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The Journal of Slavic Military Studies

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Stalin's 5 May 1941 addresses: The experience of interpretation

V. A. Nevezhin
a a
Candidate of historical sciences and a senior worker at the Russian Academy of Sciences', Institute of Russian History, Version of record first published: 18 Dec 2007.
To cite this article: V. A. Nevezhin (1998): Stalin's 5 May 1941 addresses: The experience of interpretation , The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 11:1, 116-146 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13518049808430331
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STALIN AND WORLD WAR II
Stalin's 5 May 1941 Addresses: The Experience of Interpretation1

V. A. NEVEZHIN
What we are now shouting about defense - this is a veil, a veil.
Stalin, 1 October 1938
The content of Stalin's speeches at the traditional ceremonies on the occasion of the 5 May 1941 graduation from Red Army military academies have remained a mystery for researchers for half a century. Because of the existing situation, there was free range for the appearance of the most varied, sometimes extremely contradictory and conflicting interpretations of the Bolshevik leader's above-mentioned speeches. Interest in them was further sparked by the fact that Stalin addressed a wide audience under conditions of an inevitably approaching Soviet-German armed conflict, which commenced seven weeks later. The need to dismantle the historiographical 'obstructions' which were established, and to try to explain at least three circumstances has arisen. The first of these circumstances: under what conditions were Stalin's speeches given; the second - what was Stalin's aim in addressing representatives of the USSR's military elite; and third - what were the consequences of this event. The author of this article is undertaking these tasks in an attempt to present his version of what took place at the Kremlin ceremonies on the occasion of the military academy graduation.
The Fact of the 'Leader's' Self-Exposure: Versions and Sources
The first official account of Stalin's 5 May 1941 speeches appeared mPravda and other central Soviet newspapers. This information was, however, so brief that it was impossible to judge its content objectively. The following was written: the 'leader' addressed graduates from the military academies for 40 minutes.2
The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol.11, No.l (March 1998) pp.116-146 PUBLISHED BY FRANK CASS, LONDON
STALIN'S 5 MAY 1941 ADDRESSES
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'Hot on the heels' of the event, representatives of the intelligence service and foreign diplomats attempted independently to obtain additional information concerning the content of this speech.3 E. Schule, a correspondent for the German Information Agency in the Soviet capital, passed information concerning this to F. Schulenburg, the German Ambassador in Moscow. The former had received this exclusive information from an anonymous 'informant'. Based on the data he received, on 4 June 1941 Schulenburg sent a report to Berlin which mentioned the following: 'In his speech, Stalin is said to have stressed the superiority of German military potential over Soviet, and clearly wanted to prepare his audience for the necessity of compromise with Germany.'4 Thus arose the first version of the content of Stalin's address to the military academy graduates. In accordance with this version, Stalin spoke exclusively in a 'defensive' mode, emphasizing the USSR's lack of preparedness for a war against Germany. After the war began, the Germans took Red Army commanders and political workers prisoner, some of whom in conversations and interrogations recalled Stalin's 5 May 1941 speeches. It is characteristic that Stalin's eldest son, Senior Lieutenant Iakov Dzhugashvili, commander of 14th Howitzer Regiment (from 7th Mechanized Corps' 14th Tank Division), who was one of the earliest prisoners - taken on 16 July 1941 and interrogated on 18 July by representatives of German Army Group 'Center' command - barely touched upon this subject. The following was written in the interrogation protocol, which the Soviets subsequently captured: 'la. I. Dzhugashvili stated: "They told me that there was supposedly a speech by Stalin in which it was said that if Germany did not attack first, then we [i.e., the Soviet Union] would do it. I never heard any such thing! Never heard it! Never heard it! This I can say. I don't know.'"5 Here Stalin's eldest son rejected the very possibility of war beginning against Germany on the USSR's initiative.6 It is probable that the Germans did not react at all to la. I. Dzhugashvili's important report about Stalin's 'offensive' speech. This conclusion can be drawn, proceeding from materials from not only the first of his interrogations (18 July 1941), but also the second interrogation, which the Germans conducted the following day.7 Soon, however, there appeared in prison several commanders and political workers who had been present at the 5 May 1941 ceremonies in the Kremlin. They indicated the following in conversations and interrogations: 'Stalin in his speeches at that time called for an end to defense slogans and peaceful policies, inasmuch as the time had come, as it were, to extend the front of socialism by armed force, and the Red Army, which was to prepared for an offensive war, was called upon to resolve this task.'8
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THE JOURNAL OF SLAVIC MILITARY STUDIES
H. Hilger, who before 22 June 1941 was an advisor at the German embassy in Moscow and knew Russian, took part in several of these conversations. Information provided by eyewitnesses among former Red Army commanders and political workers found its way to Ribbentrop's department and was immediately used for propaganda purposes. In the imperious German Minister of Foreign Affairs' interpretation, the depositions of these Soviet prisoners was simply unprecedented. Thus, on 19 October 1943, Ribbentrop convinced B. Filov, member of the Bulgarian Regent's Council, that Stalin in his address to the Red Army military academy graduates announced the USSR's preparation to attack Germany, planned for August 1941.9 A directive from the Third Reich's Minister of Foreign Affairs to the diplomatic envoy in Ireland (16 February 1945) spoke in particular about the open call by the Bolshevik leader for an anti-German war, proclaimed in May 1941. The document stated that 'Russian officers of prominent military rank', who had been present at the Kremlin banquet, confirmed this fact.10 And so, in accordance with the second version, the nature of Stalin's speeches at Kremlin ceremonies on the occasion of the graduation of Red Army military academy students was actively geared toward the offensive, and even contained a call to take the initiative in an armed encounter against the Germans. The third version of what Stalin said on 5 May 1941 is summarized in a book by the English journalist Alexander Werth, who was in Moscow as a military correspondent after Germany's attack against the USSR. This version was, as it were, a synthesized variant of the two above-mentioned versions, and amounted to the following. Stalin supposedly warned the military academy graduates that Germany would be able to attack the USSR 'in the near future'. The Red Army, however, was still not strong enough to organize the repulsion of the Wehrmacht (technical outfitting was far from complete; the major portion of soldiers were weak in combat training; fortified regions at new boundary lines, formed as a result of the annexation of new land to the USSR, were not completely outfitted). Under these conditions, he called for all means - principally diplomatic - to delay the German attack against the Soviet Union, although hopes for a successful outcome of such a tactic were few. If the war could be delayed until 1942, then it was entirely possible that the USSR could take the initiative for its start.11 For decades these three versions were the point of departure for various debates concerning the content of Stalin's addresses to the military academy graduates, given literally on the eve of German aggression against the Soviet Union. Hilger's memoirs put in doubt the veracity of the information reported
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by this 'informant' through Deutsche Nazionale Bureau correspondent Schule and used as the basis for the German ambassador's report to Berlin on 4 June 1941. Hilger pointed out that this information 'sharply contradicted' reports received subsequently by Red Army commanders who had been taken prisoner. Not finding a 'credible explanation' for the differences in versions of the same speech, the former German diplomat proposed the following in his memoirs. The Soviets deliberately organized an 'information leak', as a result of which disinformation fell into Schulenburg's hands, on whose basis an incorrect conclusion was drawn concerning Stalin's fear of Germany. At the same time, Hilger had no doubt of the authenticity of information reported to him personally by imprisoned Red Army commanders, because they had no opportunity whatsoever to coordinate beforehand the depositions they gave to the Germans.12 The German historian I. Hoffman managed to find in German archives the protocols from the interrogations and conversations (including those in which Hilger participated) of several Soviet prisoners of war who were present at the 5 May 1941 Kremlin ceremonies.13 These sources apparently were themselves convinced by the confirmation of the interpretation set forth by Hilger and Ribbentrop: Stalin's statements at these ceremonies should be viewed as part of a program within the context of the preparation of the USSR for an offensive war against Germany. In the so-called 'historians' debate', which took place in West Germany during the second half of the 1980s, during which, among other things, the very complex problems of the genesis of World War II were touched upon, sharp criticisms were directed at Hoffman.14 In particular, it was stressed that Soviet prisoners of war (regrettably, some German researchers grouped them together with 'deserters') expressed their readiness 'to give information which those into whose hands they had fallen (that is, the Germans) wanted'.15 Skepticism was also voiced concerning the objectivity of the version of Stalin's address given in Werth's book. A legitimate question arose: why should data, given after Germany's attack against the USSR to a pro-Soviet journalist from Great Britain, be considered reliable? Pietrov-Enker suggested the following: it should not be excluded that, in giving Worth information on Stalin's address, the Soviets intended to conceal their political mistakes of the prewar period by professing a supposed capability in 1942 of liquidating Hitler's dominance in Europe.16 Thus, attempts to interpret Stalin's 5 May 1941 speeches before the publication of notes for these speeches essentially resulted in a dead-end situation. Circulating versions were subjected to critical analysis; all that was discovered, however, was a correspondence of each of them to the prevailing 'political mood' of the time.17
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The one thing which brought together even irreconcilable scientific opponents was their fixing of two events which took place during the Kremlin military academy graduation ceremonies: ameetingatwhich Stalin gave a 45-minute speech, and a reception (banquet), where he commented on the necessity of shifting from a peaceful policy to preparation for an offensive war. Such elaboration in no way, however, removed the necessity of putting notes from the text of Stalin's 5 May speeches into scientific circulation. They were published first by A. G. Latyshev in the USSR,18 and then in Germany by L. A. Bezymenskii.19 For subjective reasons (the absence of a clear indication of the source, the fact that the journal in which it appeared was devoted to film), Latyshev's publication does not have the same prestige as Bezymenskii's. This also conditioned the special confidence of mainly foreign authors in what Bezymenskii published and his interpretation.20 As will be shown below, however, the latter, at times, juggled with the facts, influencing conclusions made by Western researchers, who trusted him too much in their analysis of the content of the speeches for the graduation of the military academy students. While the three above-mentioned versions of these speeches were circulating in the West, until the beginning of the 1990s complete unanimity on this question dominated among Soviet historians, who were deprived of the opportunity of familiarization with the notes of these speeches. From official works it followed that on 5 May 1941 Stalin 'quite specifically proclaimed' the inevitability of war against Germany,21 calling the German Army 'the most probable enemy'.22 It is not by chance that Latyshev, as the first Soviet publisher of the notes from Stalin's 5 May speech, was very careful in his assessments and commentaries. He expressed confidence, however (completely justified, as it turned out), that, as a source, this speech would 'become the object of study for history specialists in the near future'. At the same time, Latyshev completely rejected the version which was developed, in his words, in Western literature, concerning Stalin's call to the military academy graduates 'to attack Hitler's Germany'. Latyshev notes that evidence concerning Stalin's comments on this matter 'are also of interest, but require a special
approach'."
Simultaneously with putting the text of Stalin's 5 May speech into scientific circulation, mention was made for the first time in Soviet historiography of the 'leader's' comments made at the ceremonial reception (banquet) that evening. D. A. Volkogonov published part of them. Having become familiar with the contents of these comments, the historian acknowledged that Stalin had focused the military academy graduates' principal attention on the necessity of offensive actions.24
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Following Volkogonov, Bezymenskii thought it necessary to mention Stalin's rhetoric. To support this thesis, he cited the same words from Stalin's 5 May toast at the reception banquet as his predecessor. The sense of this toast could be summarized as follows: the Red Army is a modern army and, consequently, must operate as an offensive army. Adding to this (citing Hilger) corresponding evidence from captured Red Army commanders who were at the Kremlin ceremonies concerning Stalin's call for offensive military operations to resolve the basic foreign policy task - expanding the front of socialism - Bezymenskii, nevertheless, refrains from penetrating assessments.25 In 1992, books on the Second World War under the pseudonym of V. Suvorov began to appear in Russia in large printings. The author was V. B. Rezun, a former officer from the Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, and the books comprised
a trilogy: Icebreaker, Day 'M', and The Last Republic.26 They focused quite
a bit of attention on a treatment of Stalin's 5 May speeches, especially those addressed to the military academy graduates. Suvorov was not, however, acquainted with materials on this subject which had already been published at that time by Latyshev, Bezymenskii, and Volkogonov. All of Suvorov's structuring was, therefore, based not on the above-mentioned historians, but rather mainly on his own ideas concerning the USSR's preparation to attack Germany in Summer 1941. Stalin was preparing not for a German invasion, but for 'surprises' of the opposite nature, that is, an offensive war.27 Differing from Western historiography, which, practically speaking, ignored Rezun's (Suvorov's) publication on the Second World War (the exception being works by the Israeli researcher G. Gorodetskii28), a stormy polemic flared up among Russian researchers concerning the former GRU officer's trilogy.29 During this polemic, Volkogonov himself stressed his own evidence, attempting to prove that 'history had supposedly already refuted' Suvorov's version of the USSR's preparation for an offensive war. Referring to the 5 May Kremlin speeches, the historian somewhat incorrectly commented on Stalin's words concerning completing the Red Army's reconstruction and technical rearmament, which made it possible 'to shift from the defense to the offense', and concerning the Red Army's strength, which simply obliged the army 'to operate offensively'. Volkogonov was sure that the Soviet leader not only constantly thought about the threat from the West, but also weighed his own offensive plans. Despite all his discretion, Stalin at times 'let the cat out of the bag'. Volkogonov thought that the 'leader's' addresses to the military academy graduates was a clear example of such an 'information leak' about Stalin's true plans.30 In 1993, Hoffman published an article in Russian. Like Suvorov, he was not inclined to view the events on the eve of the Soviet-German War in the
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context of a 'pacification' of Hitler on the part of the Soviet leadership. Hoffman called Stalin's 5 May speeches 'a fact of self-exposure'. In his publication the historian made frequent use of evidence he had found from imprisoned Red Army commanders and political workers.31 In a polemic against Hoffman, the majority of Russian authors, as well as their Western colleagues, focused attention on the contradictory nature and ambiguity of sources such as notes from German interrogations of, and conversations with, captured Red Army commanders. For example, A. N. and L. A. Mertsalov posed the following question: 'what could these officers and even generals know about Stalin's true intentions, and how reliable are their words, noted down in fascist concentration camps?'32 In reality, it should be recalled that evidence of Soviet prisoners of war (even if they were eyewitnesses and themselves heard what Stalin said at the Red Army military academy graduation ceremonies) was ultimately written down by representatives of the German command and, naturally, was interpreted within the existing political situation. In any case, materials from the above-mentioned interrogations and conversations should be examined only after comparing them with other existing documents and materials, and carefully analyzing the sources. The Mertsalovs in their polemic also disputed Hoffman's statements that the Bolshevik leader had offensive plans on the eve of 22 June 1941. In their book published in 1992, they stated: "The Red Army's offensive plans ("beat the enemy on his own territory") were constantly spoken of, loudly and clearly, in the USSR in the 1930s and beginning of the 1940s.
Stalin stressed this once again in his speech to the military academy graduates on 5 May 1941 Pl
In 1995, notes not only from this speech, but also from Stalin's address at the Kremlin reception (banquet) were published in Russia and Germany by K. Semenov.34 In addition, the actual stenogram of a February 1966 discussion at the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, concerning A. M. Nekrich's book, 22 June 1941, became the property of researchers. One of the discussion participants, Colonel V. A. Vasilenko, speaking about assessing Stalin's address at the military academy graduation, stressed that the 'leader' did not focus attention at all on the growing danger of a fascist attack, but rather pointed to the Red Army's lack of preparedness for offensive operations, indicating that it was necessary to restructure the army as soon as possible to resolve specifically offensive missions successfully.35 Valuable evidence of these 5 May ceremonies in the Kremlin is contained in eyewitness memoirs of these events by General of the Army P. N. Liashchenko, who was present at them as a graduate from the Frunze Military Academy.36 Gorodetskii used the unique source of G. Dimitrov's
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unpublished diary in his interpretation of Stalin's address.37 Of indisputable interest is the evidence of Iu. P. Sharapov, who was a student at the Moscow Institute of History, Language [sic], and Literature (IFLI), and who heard about the content of Stalin's address to the military academy graduates from G. F. Aleksandrov, chief of the Communist Party's Directorate of Propaganda and Agitation, at that time a teacher at IFLI.38 Thus, by the mid-1990s there existed a rather representative body of sources concerning the content of Stalin's speech at the 5 May 1941 military academy graduation and his address at the reception (banquet) on this occasion. In addition to the already mentioned evidence, we cite the as yet unpublished entry in playwright V. V. Vishnevskii's diary, dated 13 May 1941, which supplements this other evidence. Now there exists the possibility, based on these sources and historiographical achievements, to analyze thoroughly the content of the 'mysterious' (as V. Suvorov called it) speech and no less secret comments Stalin made literally six weeks before the Soviet-German War began. Before embarking on this work, however, it is extremely necessary to spend some time on the nature of events which took place at that time. Without doing this it would be difficult to understand the actual intentions of the Bolshevik leadership on the eve of the great armed conflict against the Third Reich, or to explain the significance of Stalin's instructions as given in the Bolshevik leader's 5 May 1941 address.
Reconstructing the Chain of Events
Gorodetskii correctly emphasizes that what Stalin said on 5 May 1941 must be viewed, above all, in the context of those events which were taking place in both the political and military arenas.39 A. G. Latyshev was one of the first to attempt to do this. In his opinion, Stalin's speech to the military academy graduates was given at a time when Hitler had clearly begun to violate the Soviet-German agreement, and simply no longer considered Stalin to be his 'partner'. Latyshev notes that it is from this that there arises some ambiguity in the actions of the Bolshevik leader, supposedly manifesting itself in the 5 May speech, namely the combination of decisiveness to repel the Germans with acknowledgement of the danger of German aggression.40 . Reflecting on the situation at the beginning of May 1941, L. A. Bezymenskii, a contemporary of these events, characterized as follows the mood which dominated the social consciousness at that time: 'The time ... was exceptional: even for the rank-and-file Soviet citizen it became clear that stormy events were approaching.' The historian and publicist interpreted in his own way the reason for Stalin's intentional address to the
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representatives of 'the flower of the Red Army': after all, it was namely they on whom the 'leader's' reckoning and hopes lay.41 In the preface to his publication of the text of Stalin's 5 May speech, A. A. Pechenkin comments as follows on the circumstances which incited Stalin to address specifically the representatives of the military elite. The situation on the western borders of the USSR, which was becoming increasingly more heated, was worrying them, as a dangerous concentration of German forces was taking place here. They did not believe that the Soviet-German non-aggression pact would last long, and 'wanted to know that the country's leader was thinking about this'.42 In reality, Hitler's foreign policy had been activated in April 1941. He first turned his attention to the situation existing in the Balkans. On 25 March 1941, Yugoslavia joined the Germany-Italy-Japan axis, an event which displeased Moscow. Stalin put into action a plan for overthrowing the pro-German Yugoslav government; this plan had already been developed in 1938 through the mediation of the NKVD. It could not be ruled out that the Bolshevik leadership was counting on bogging down the Italian and German operation in Greece by means of a new anti-German government, which was to come to power after a revolution. The Red Army's deputy chief of military intelligence was sent to Belgrade to assist in the overthrow of Tsvetkovich's pro-German government. By this time, the NKVD had won over M. Gavrilovich, the Yugoslav ambassador to the USSR.43 On 26 and 27 March 1941, as a result of a state revolution to which the Soviets contributed, the Simonovich government came to power. On 5 April 1941, his representatives signed in Moscow the Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression between the USSR and Yugoslavia.44 Hitler was extremely dissatisfied with Stalin's activities. In a conversation with Minister of Foreign Affairs Ribbentrop he proclaimed that the Soviet-Yugoslav pact was 'a clearly expressed affront to Germany', and a clear violation of the 28 September 1939 Treaty of Friendship and Borders. Later, at the end of April, the Fuehrer called Schulenburg and informed him of his misgivings with respect to the rapprochement between the USSR and Yugoslavia. In Hitler's opinion, this was a warning. He considered the revolution in Belgrade and the 5 April treaty proof of the unreliability of the Soviet Union as a partner for Germany.45 Literally a few hours after this treaty was signed, German forces invaded Yugoslavia and Greece. The Balkan events resonated strongly in various strata of society, especially among the intellectual elite.46 As with many other contemporary events, V. V. Vishnevskii attentively followed the Balkan developments. He lamented, however, about the inadequacy of official information concerning them. Writing in his diary,
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he complained 'We essentially know little. The press is silent about our feelings, our plans, and our proposals.'47 According to Marshal I. Kh. Bagramian's memoirs, the Soviet press 'for completely understandable reasons' (he had in mind the attempt not to aggravate the situation with Germany) reacted to the German invasion of Yugoslavia in a restrained manner; the people, however reacted with indignation.48 In a letter addressed to A. A. Zhdanov dated 2 May 1941, an anonymous author using the pseudonym 'Citizen' asked, not without justification: what concrete steps has the Soviet leadership taken to prevent the German defeat of Yugoslavia, and was there even a verbal protest made after this country was subjected to an attack by our 'friend' Hitler?49 Nevertheless, the Bolshevik leadership, despite the 5 April treaty with Yugoslavia, had no intention of getting directly involved in the Balkan events. Moscow understood that, under conditions of the war which had begun in this region, Hitler would be forced to weaken his southern flank. Later, on 21 June 1941, Molotov, the People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs, claimed in a conversation with German Ambassador Schulenburg that 'the Soviet-Yugoslav pact, which was exaggerated abroad as contradicting relations between the Soviet Union and Germany, is restricted within a narrow framework, and cannot affect our [i.e., Soviet-German] relations.'50 Moreover, this agreement envisioned that 'if one of the sides is subjected to attack by a third government, the other side is obliged to observe a policy of friendly relations with the first side'.51 The Soviet leadership, obviously not wishing to aggravate relations with Germany at this time, nevertheless undertook in Spring 1941 several veiled anti-German actions. In March the Stalin Prize was awarded to the creator of the 1938 film Alexander Nevskii. This film, which bore a clear antiGerman character, had no longer been shown openly after the well-known 23 August and 28 September 1939 agreements between the USSR and Germany were signed. In April 1941, however, when tensions arose in relations with Germany in connection with Balkan events, the film once again appeared. That it was awarded the Stalin Prize was interpreted in the USSR as an anti-German action.52 A telephone call from Stalin to the writer Ilya Ehrenburg on 24 April 1941 had a certain resonance among the intellectual elite. After the call, the journal Znamia continued publication of the author's anti-fascist novel
The Fall of Paris.53
At the beginning of April 1941, propaganda materials began to promote the idea, based on historical analogies, that Russian forces had the great experience of victories over the Germans. In the 8 April issue of the journal Politucheba krasnoarmeitsa [Political Education of the Red Army Soldier],
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a journal which was designed for leaders of political classes (and had a publication size of 115,000 copies54), an article appeared which began as follows: 'The dynamic offensive spirit of Russian soldiers was exhibited most clearly in the nobler attempt to engage the enemy face to face and destroy his personnel with a shattering blow.' This thesis is illustrated by a description of the Battle on the Ice in 1242, and the Battle of Griinwald [Tannenberg] in 1410, in which the German invaders 'were beaten, as the chronicles note, on their own territory'. Finally, the author cites data on the offensive operation on the Southwestern Front, conducted by Russian forces during the First World War, the so-called 'Brusilov Penetration' (1916), as a result of which the German and Austro-Hungarian Armies were defeated.55 During talks with the Yugoslav ambassador in Moscow on 5 April 1941, Stalin received information of German preparations for attacking the USSR. He supposedly thanked the diplomat and said, 'We are ready; if they [the Germans] want to, let them come.'56 After Germany's attack against Yugoslavia and Greece, however, there followed on Stalin's part 'friendly' outpourings addressed to German Ambassador Count Werner von der Schulenburg, Third Reich Military Attache Colonel Hans Krebs, and Japanese Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka during the latter's transit at the Belorussian Station in Moscow on 13 April 1941. The Soviet leader's behavior was presented by diplomats from Schulenburg's close circle as evidence of Stalin's bias toward Germany, associated with the Wehrmacht's successful combat operations in the Balkans. They reported this to Berlin.57 Assertions appeared later in memoirs and research that Stalin's abovementioned 'demonstration', taken together with several others (breaking off diplomatic relations with countries occupied by the Third Reich), was done to 'pacify' the Fuehrer. This point of view, however, contradicts the historical realities of Spring 1941. Evidence coming from different sources concerning the concentration of German forces on the Soviet borders incited Stalin to undertake practical steps aimed at intensifying military preparations, mainly as a demonstration of force with respect to Germany. In April-May 1941, the People's Commissariat of Defense and the Red Army General Staff began to mobilize the reserves under the guise of the Great Training Assembly (BUS). By 22 June, more than 800,000 men had been called up from the reserve, thereby strengthening half of all rifle divisions designated for combat operations in the West.58 The Soviet military-political leadership attached special importance to the BUS as a measure allowing an increase in the numerical size of the armed forces on the eve of major foreign policy actions, without, in fact, announcing a mobilization. Thus, addressing the Moscow Regional and
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Municipal Joint Conference of the Communist Party on 18 March 1940, Marshal S.M. Budennyi, Commander of Moscow Military District forces, stressed that any time alarming situations arose (for example, the 1939 'liberation campaign', the war against Finland), the BUS made it possible to 'check our efficiency'.59 From 25 March through 5 April 1941 there was a partial Red Army draft (not to be confused with large training assemblies!), about which there is no information in research literature. Citizens who were born in 1921 (after 1 September) and who had not taken part in the 1940 draft were covertly conscripted in all military districts, except for the Baltic Special Military District and the Far Eastern Front. Personal summons were sent to draftees without any public notice in print or announcements at meetings (local party and Soviet leaders were, however, informed of the forthcoming action). Draft centers were outfitted on the inside; there were no posters or slogans hung on the outside. Of the overall number of those subject to the draft, 354 men (0.09 per cent) did not have valid reasons for not appearing.60 It is not difficult to calculate that, in all, around 400,000 men were drafted over ten days. Of them, according to documents, 90 per cent (draftees from the Central Asia Military District were not taken into account) were fit for combat. In sum, thanks to the so-called partial draft, during which extreme precautionary measures were observed, the ranks of the Red Army were increased by at least 300,000 men. Following this, by order of the Red Army General Staff, rifle, mechanized, and tank divisions, as well as air assault brigades, began to redeploy from the Far East and Transbaikal Military Districts to the West.61 This was possible, thanks to the conclusion of the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact on 13 April 1941.62 A demonstration action of concentrating Red Army mobile mechanized and cavalry units on the Romanian border, which was contiguous with the Axis powers, was also undertaken. The Germans noted a large-scale movement of troop trains with Red Army soldiers and military equipment. Later, in May 1941, German intelligence reported a threatening regrouping of Soviet forces in Southern Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina.63 The Wehrmacht command did not at all exclude the possibility that these forces would conduct 'offensive operations against the Balkans and Romania's oil regions'.64 In April 1941, Hitler confidentially reported to Ribbentrop that he had an intelligence report, according to which the Soviet Union had already undertaken 'large-scale military preparations on the entire front from the Baltic Sea to the Black Sea'. The Fuehrer announced to Schulenburg that the Bolshevik leader intended to intimidate Germany. At the same time, Hitler, aware of the limited transport capabilities to implement industrial
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contracts, did not particularly believe in the effectiveness of Soviet military deliveries with respect to these agreements.65 Hitler, who was well informed about the Nazi leadership's true reaction to the USSR's foreign policy actions in Spring 1941, rightly stated that 'Stalin's appeasement policy has made no impression on Hitler.'66 Moreover, persistent rumors made their way around Moscow, that troops participating in the May Day parade would be sent to Minsk, Leningrad, and the Polish border. Talk about the impending war also began to focus on the German border territory. Among the Poles of the generalgovernorship \general-gubernatorstvo] who observed German troop movements and concentrations, the assumption of Germany's forthcoming attack against the USSR was most constant. In turn, Wehrmacht servicemen concentrating in East Prussia and on the territory of the generalgovernorship spoke about an attack of Soviet forces, expected on 10-15 April. War between the Third Reich and the Soviet Union would supposedly begin in Spring 1941, as a result of which the latter would 'seize the entire territory of Germany and establish Soviet rule there', or Soviet-German friendship would deteriorate and a Red Army attack was to be expected, 'with the aim of capturing territory as far as Cologne'.67 Although the NKVD reported rumors about the probability of a Soviet attack against Germany, citing facts of appropriate 'political cultivation' conducted in one of the German Army's artillery regiments, it is doubtful that the German command inspired such rumors and 'expectations'. On the contrary, on the basis of the Directive on Disinforming the Enemy, adopted by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of Germany and the operational leadership's staff on 15 February 1941, everything was done to conceal the preparation underway for war against the USSR. During the second stage of the Directive's activity (starting in April 1941), the main staffs of the armed forces services were obliged to keep up the impression among personnel of preparation being conducted for a landing in Britain. The above-mentioned document strictly prescribes: 'It is necessary to mislead as long as possible even those forces designated for action in the East as to the actual plans ... in addition to maintaining the secrecy of measures being carried out, everything possible must be done in light of the given instructions.'68 On 2 May 1941, Schulenburg reported to Berlin that he and his German embassy colleagues in Moscow were constantly contending with 'rumors about an inevitable German-Russian military conflict', inasmuch as the latter created 'obstacles to the continuing peaceful development of SovietGerman relations'.69 In this situation, which did not, despite Schulenburg's opinion, presage an improvement in these relations, but rather threatened a military
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clash, Stalin gave his address to the military academy graduates on 5 May 1941. Stalin, understanding the necessity of an adequate reaction to the existing situation, attempted to show in public that it was 'under his control'. From 22 April to 2 May 1941 he appeared three times at various ceremonies: on the occasion of the conclusion of a ten-day festival of Tadjik art, at the May Day parade, and at a reception in honor of participants in this parade. The appearance of a large number of generals and admirals at the 2 May Kremlin reception, as well as the presence of V. G. Dekanozov, the Soviet ambassador to Germany, next to Stalin on the mausoleum dais during the May Day parade (which foreign observers immediately assessed as 'a special sign of the leader's trust'), did not go unnoticed by foreign diplomats and provided food for thought.70 V. Suvorov suggested that when Stalin spoke before the military academy graduates his appointment to the post of Chairman of the Soviet of People's Commissars was not only already decided, but 'perhaps had already taken place'.71 This suggestion, stated in the book Icebreaker, was supported after the publication of the Politburo's secret resolution 'On Increasing Work of Central and Local Organs', dated 4 May 1941. It stressed that coordination was necessary to raise the authority of these organs 'in the current strained international situation'. In accordance with this basic task, the Politburo unanimously confirmed Stalin as the Chairman of the Soviet of People's Commissars. At the Politburo's 'insistence', he remained First Secretary of the Party Central Committee and, inasmuch as he could no longer 'devote adequate time to the work of the Central Committee Secretariat', A. A. Zhdanov became his Secretariat deputy. The latter was freed from his duties of supervising the Central Committee's Propaganda and Agitation Directorate. It should be added that, in addition to Secretariat matters, Zhdanov, in practice, was Stalin's deputy in the Central Committee Orgburo as well. The 4 May resolution also named A. S. Shcherbakov Secretary of the Party Central Committee and head of the Propaganda and Agitation Directorate, while he retained his post of First Secretary of the Moscow Municipal Committee \gorkom] and Regional Committee [obkom]. In turn, V. M. Molotov, who before this was Chairman of the Soviet of People's Commissars, was transferred to the post of Stalin's deputy to the Soviet of People's Commissars, while continuing as 'leader of foreign policy' - the people's commissar of foreign affairs.72 Thus, this Politburo resolution, in fact, legalized Stalin's holding higher party and government posts. Formally, only the foreign policy sphere remained Molotov's. Zhdanov officially was appointed Stalin's party
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73
deputy. Shcherbakov's position in the sphere of ideological activities was strengthened. A traditional point of view has arisen in Western and domestic historiography: the Bolshevik leader's address before the military academy graduates supposedly came first, and then, the next day, came Stalin's appointment as chief of the Soviet government. This has a simple basis: the decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet concerning this appointment is dated 6 May 1941. Gorodetskii does not even exclude the possibility that this appointment could have been connected with German Ambassador Schulenburg's initiative. Acting independently, on 5 May 1941 he came into contact with Ambassador Dekanozov 'with the intention of warning the Russians' about the danger from Hitler (this contact was immediately reported to Stalin).74 Thanks, however, to the publication of the Politburo's secret 4 May 1941 resolution, it became clear that Stalin himself had decided to take the initiative and set forth on actions on the threshold of a ripening armed clash against Germany. It appears that Schulenburg's 'warning' could hardly have influenced the Bolshevik leader's decision in any way. Another of Suvorov's assumptions associated with Stalin's 5 May 1941 speech also merits attention. The author of Icebreaker wrote that Stalin's speech to the military academy graduates 'could be considered part of the program'.15 Such an assumption contains a large portion of truth. In reality, where, if not before an audience representing the command cadre of the Red Army, could the undisputed leader of the Bolshevik party, whose appointment as chief of the Soviet government was predetermined by a secret Politburo resolution, present an assessment of the existing situation and formulate their immediate missions? Hitler acted in just this way when, on 18 December 1940 (the day Directive 21 - Plan 'Barbarossa' - was signed), having decided to prepare for war against the USSR, he addressed 5000 military school graduates and German officers.76 Beginning at the end of April 1941, materials began to be published concerning the upcoming Red Army military academy graduation ceremony. Pravda included on its pages conversations with chiefs of the best known academies: Frunze Academy (General-Lieutenant M. Khozin), Dzerzhinskii Artillery Academy (General of Artillery A. Sivkov), and Stalin Mechanization and Motorization Military Academy (General-Major of Tank Troops G. Kovalev). Short reports then appeared on the upcoming graduation of military academy students in Leningrad and Kiev. Finally, an interview with Chief of the Directorate of Red Army Military Institutions, General-Lieutenant I. K. Smirnov, was published.77 Moreover, on 5 May 1941, at a meeting of the Central Committee Secretariat, the question of the regular publication of the newspaper
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Izvestiia on holidays was examined. L. Rovinskii, who had just been appointed editor of Izvestiia (he took up his post on 8 May 1941), thought it necessary to come directly to the Central Committee Secretariat with a request for permission to publish the newspaper the entire week (right up to 11 May) without interruption. His letter (marked 'urgent') addressed to Central Committee Secretaries A. A. Andreev, A. A. Zhdanov, and G. M. Malenkov said that on 30 April 1941, with respect to a Central Committee Orgburo resolution, Izvestiia had been permitted to publish its next issue (after 1 May) not on 5 May, but on 4 May. In accordance with procedure established by the Central Committee Directorate of Propaganda and Agitation, Izvestiia should not be published one day of the 5-11 May calendar week. It was for just this reason that Rovinskii requested that the Central Committee permit the publication of Izvestiia without interruption until the following Sunday (the issue from 11 to 12 May). The arguments cited by him to justify this request merit attention. Rovinskii cited the abundance of major events for the 5-11 May calendar week, among which he named Publication Day and the military academy graduation (emphasis is Nevezhin's). The question of publication of Izvestiia was decided by questioning the Central Committee secretaries: the request was granted. Andreev, Zhdanov, and Malenkov affixed their signatures to a copy of Rovinskii's letter.78 In accordance with the procedure for meetings of the Orgburo and Secretariat, confirmed by the Central Committee on 30 April 1941, the latter met on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays, starting at 1300.79 Since 5 May was a Monday, the question of publishing Izvestiia was examined in the Secretariat in the afternoon. Consequently, Stalin's closest circle was well informed about the importance of the upcoming event for that evening - the ceremonies on the occasion of the Red Army military academy graduations. In addition, Zhdanov's approval of Rovinskii's letter, in his own hand, attests that the Central Committee Secretary was already in Moscow. Zhdanov most likely arrived in the capital on 3 May or 4 May at the latest - when the Politburo was discussing the question of his new appointment. Judging by official records, he was the only person whom Stalin received in his Kremlin office on 5 May. The audience lasted 25 minutes, and concluded at 1800.80 And it was at 1800 on 5 May 1941 that the conference hall of the Great Kremlin Palace was already filled with graduates, professors, and teachers of 16 Red Army academies and nine military departments from institutes of higher learning, as well as representatives from the Red Army and Red Navy higher command. Around 2000 men had assembled in the Kremlin. Stalin's 'arrival' took place in this atmosphere, replete with great
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pomposity. The 'leader' was accompanied by his 'coworkers': Politburo members (except for Khrushchev, who was conducting a Plenum of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee in Kiev), Politburo candidate members, prominent military leaders (including people's commissars of defense and the Navy), and General of the Army G. K. Zhukov - Chief of the Red Army General Staff. The first ceremonial act in the Kremlin on 5 May was marked by a grand meeting dedicated to the graduation of commanders who completed military academies. Marshal S. K. Timoshenko - People's Commissar of Defense - opened the meeting. The floor was then given to GeneralLieutenant I. K. Smirnov - Chief of the Directorate of Red Army Military Institutions - who gave a brief report on the results of his department's work. Afterwards, M. I. Kalinin offered parting words to the military graduates, calling on them to quickly assimilate into practice the experience they acquired during their studies. Finally, Stalin appeared on the podium, presenting his speech to those in attendance in the conference hall of the Great Kremlin Palace. Pravda and other newspapers stressed that Stalin's speech, which lasted around 40 minutes, 'was listened to with exceptional attention'.81 By 1900 on 5 May, guests had filled the Georgievskii, Vladimirskii, Malyi, and Novyi Halls of the Great Kremlin Palace. As on 2 May 1941, Party Central Committee members, people's commissars, Supreme Soviet deputies, representatives of the Red Army and Red Navy higher command, and diplomats gathered here. Naturally, the academy graduates and their instructors were invited. The second act of the grandiose 5 May event - the ceremonial reception (banquet) -was marked by Stalin's appearance, accompanied by Politburo members and candidate members. According to an already existing tradition, Timoshenko gave a few words of welcome to those present. Then graduates representing the Frunze Academy, Stalin Red Army Mechanization and Motorization Academy, Dzerzhinskii Artillery Academy, Red Army Air Force command and navigation personnel, and Voroshilov Chemical Defense Academy spoke. Later, judging by a newspaper account, Stalin proposed a toast in honor of the entire leadership and command staff of the military academies. He expressed confidence that the graduates would enter their military units with a thorough knowledge of new equipment. Having characterized the importance of the individual combat arms in the Red Army, Stalin essentially repeated the toast (enhancing it somewhat) which Molotov had given on 2 May 1941 at the reception in honor of the parade participants. Pravda reported that the 'leader' proposed a toast 'in honor of representatives of all types of weapons' - artillerymen, tankers, pilots,
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cavalrymen, infantrymen, engineers, technicians, combat engineers, communications specialists, cyclists, parachutists, and mortar men. Timoshenko took the floor once again. He addressed the chiefs of the military academies with a call to raise work to the level of the increased demands confronting Red Army personnel. The People's Commissar of Defense once again reminded the military academy graduates of the crucial tasks before commanders and their practical activities in units and subunits, the main one of which was, in his words, to fulfill the requirements of the Bolshevik party and Soviet government worthily and honorably. In accordance with established procedure, the reception, which lasted several hours, was accompanied by a major concert. The concert program included performances by well-known artists, a ballet soloist from the Bolshoi Theater, and numerous artists from the USSR State Ensemble and the Red Army Song and Dance Ensemble. This was the atmosphere in which such a grandiose and important event - Stalin's address to the military graduates on 5 May 1941 - took place.
Thus Spoke Stalin
Those who were present in the Great Hall of the Kremlin Palace awaited the 'leader's' address. Judging by the recollections of an eyewitness, General of the Army and Hero of the Soviet Union N. G. Liashchenko - a graduate of the Frunze Military Academy - Stalin appeared as soon as Kalinin finished his parting words. During his speech, the speaker's face was 'severe, rigid'.82 Relying on data from an anonymous 'informant' literally 'hot on the trail', E. Schule, correspondent for the German information agency DNB, observed that the Bolshevik leader spoke in his favorite manner, calmly, 'without any emotion'.83 Liashchenko, on the contrary, had the impression that Stalin played a 'game of self-aggrandizement' with the military academy graduates.84 Opinions are contradictory as to whether Stalin had a written text for his address. Bezymenskii stated that Stalin 'spoke without a written text'.85 D. A. Volkogonov, on the contrary, was sure that during the 5 May 1941 speech the speaker 'held sheets of paper in front of him'.86 A. A. Pechenkin stressed, 'Without glancing at his notes, [Stalin] freely used numbers, and identified cannon calibers, initial missile velocities, tank armor thickness, and flight speed of fighters and bombers.'87 In fact, Stalin's speech consisted of two parts. The first was devoted to the state of the Red Army; the second provided an assessment of the international situation. Sources do not corroborate the version encountered in historiography, in accordance with which Stalin 'dwelt mostly on
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the international situation and the Soviet Union's foreign policy', and then, as it were, moved to 'military issues'.88 The 'leader' focused the main thrust of the first part of his speech on the fact that the rearmament of the Red Army had been completed, as a result of which it had, in his opinion, become a modern army. Judging by numerous available sources, Stalin stressed this circumstance several times on 5 May 1941.89 He further emphasized that the current restructuring of the Red Army had been drawn from its military campaign against Finland and 'from the current war in the West', that is, World War II, which had begun on 1 September 1939.90 Stalin further stated that one-third of the existing Red Army divisions were mechanized. In turn, according to him, of those mechanized divisions, one-third were tank divisions and the remaining two-thirds were motorized divisions. 'We don't talk about this, but you ought to know it', Stalin assured the military graduates in the hall. He mentioned 'first-line' tanks, which had armor that was three to four times thicker than 'second-line' vehicles. Stalin tried to convince those present: it was namely these 'thick-walled' tanks which would 'tear through the front'. The 'second- and third-line tanks', accompanying infantry, would quickly make their way into the formed penetration. At that time, not only the 'thick-walled' KV-ls and KV-2s were part of the Red Army's equipment, but also the T-34s, subsequently acknowledged as the best in the world. As for his favorite child - aviation, Stalin reported that more modern aircraft had replaced those planes with a speed of 400-500 kilometers per hour: 'We have in sufficient quantity and are producing in mass quantities airplanes with a speed of 600-650 kilometers per hour.' He had in mind, above all, the Yak-1, Yak-3, and MiG-3 fighters, 11-2 ground attack aircraft, and Pe-2 bombers. Stalin concluded that the relatively obsolete vehicles would have to make way for these 'first-line' vehicles. In concluding his description of the outfitting of the Red Army, Stalin particularly said: 'One can have good leadership personnel, but if one does not have modern military equipment, one can lose the war ... To control all this new technology - a new army [emphasis is Nevezhin's], one must have command personnel who are completely familiar with modern military art.' Stalin attempted to convince those present that changes had occurred in the technical outfitting of the forces, but, in his opinion, the military academies were 'lagging behind the modern army'. Further on, an entire paragraph of Stalin's speech was devoted to explaining the essence of this lag: artillerymen and pilots were being trained on obsolete models of equipment, and the training programs themselves were not appropriate for modern demands. 'Our school should and can restructure its command
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personnel training on new technology, and use the experience of modern war', Stalin summarized. Having characterized the condition of the Red Army, Stalin shifted to the second part of his address, which concerned foreign policy issues. He dwelt in detail on an assessment of the reasons for the Western allies' defeats and Germany's victories during the 1940-41 military operations. Stalin explained, 'The German Army, defeated in 1918, learned its lessons well. The Germans critically re-examined the reasons for their defeat and found ways to organize their army better, train it, and rearm it. Military thought in the German Army had moved forward. The Army had armed itself with the newest equipment. It had studied new procedures for waging war.' Further on he stated, 'It is namely because the defeated army learned its lessons well that Germany has assimilated the experience of the past. In 1870 the Germans defeated the French. Why? Because they fought on a single front. The Germans were defeated in 1916-1917. Why? Because they fought on two fronts.' Stalin focused considerable attention on answering the question: why then, did France inadequately take into account the experience of the First World War? According to his arguments, everything boiled down to complete trivialities: French heads were dizzy with self-satisfaction because of their victories. The French closed their eyes and lost their allies. The Germans took their allies away. France rested on her successes. Military thought in her army did not move forward. It remained at the 1918 level. There was no concern or moral support for the army. A new morale appeared, which rotted the army. The attitude toward the army was one of contempt. Commanders began to be viewed as failures, as the lowest ranks [of society] who had no plants, factories, or shops, who were forced to go into the army. Girls would not even marry military men. Only under conditions of such a contemptuous attitude toward the army could it have happened that the military apparatus fell into the hands of Gamelin [M. G. Gamelin was the Commander-in-Chief of French Ground Forces from 1939 to 1940] and Ironside [E. Ironside was the Chief of Staff of the British Army in 1939-40]. This was also the attitude toward the military in England. The army should have enjoyed the exceptional concern and love of the people and government - this gives the greatest moral force to the army. The army must be cherished. When there appears in a country such morale [a contemptuous attitude toward the army], then the army cannot be strong and combat-capable. This is what happened with France.91
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V. V. Vishnevskii's diary asserts that in the cited portion of Stalin's address at the ceremonial meeting of the military academy graduates, in addition to what was quoted there were also other statements: 'Within the military forces [of Britain and France] are Hitler's agents. All this had an effect.'92 There is no mention in the published version of Stalin's speech of subversive activity by German agents in the armed forces of Western countries. Stalin then shifted to the question of how he understood the problem of political preparation for war: 'To prepare for war politically means to have a sufficient number of reliable allies and neutral countries. Germany had coped with this problem before beginning the war; England and France had not.' The 'leader' also answered other fundamental questions that he himself had formulated. 'Is the German Army really invincible?' 'How could it have happened that Germany was victorious?' Stalin explained, characterizing the situation existing in Europe in Spring 1941: There are no and have not been any invincible armies in the world. There are poor armies, good armies, and better armies. Germany began the war and proceeded into the first period under the slogan of liberation from the yoke of the Versailles Peace. This was a popular slogan which had the support and sympathy of all who had been treated badly by Versailles. The situation has now changed. The German Army is marching under a different slogan. It has replaced slogans of liberation from Versailles with aggressive ones. Stalin warned, however, that the Wehrmacht 'will not succeed under slogans of an aggressive, belligerent war'. Moreover, Stalin said that these slogans were dangerous. There followed a kind of excursion into the history of the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries: 'Napoleon, as long as he waged war under the slogan of liberation from serfdom, encountered support and sympathy, had allies, and was successful. When Napoleon shifted to aggressive wars he found many enemies and was defeated.' Summing up what was said about Germany, Stalin said to the military academy graduates, 'Inasmuch as the German Army is waging a war under the slogan of subjugating other countries and subordinating other nations to Germany, such a shift of slogans will not result in victory.' In the weekly review dated 14 May 1941 from the political intelligence department of the British Foreign Office, the following information was given vis-a-vis this part of Stalin's speech: Stalin seemed to stress that, although Germany had begun the war with the aim of liberation 'from the Versailles chains', this war had developed into an attempt by the Germans
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'to lay hands on the entire European continent', in connection with which the USSR had to be ready for any eventuality.93 Stalin continued his address, putting himself and those present at the ceremonial gathering in the Great Kremlin Hall at ease:
From the military point of view, there is nothing special in the German Army, neither in tanks, nor in artillery, nor in aviation. A significant portion of the German Army is losing the ardor it had at the beginning of the war. In addition, boasting, self-satisfaction, and conceit have cropped up. Military thought is not moving forward; military technology is not only lagging behind ours, but America is beginning to overtake Germany with respect to aviation. Concluding his speech to the military academy graduates, Stalin thought it necessary once again to summarize his ideas with respect to the reasons for Germany's triumphant military operations in Europe. He was determined to make it understood that the strength and power of the German Army should not be exaggerated, that the German Army was victorious primarily because of the military weakness and lack of preparedness for war on the part of its adversaries, mainly France. In conclusion, Stalin congratulated the military academy graduates and wished them success. Judging from other sources, there were other statements from the 'leader' in his 5 May speech which were not recorded in Semenov's notes. According to Liashchenko, in his speech Stalin described the international situation, dwelled on the 1939 treaty (it is, unfortunately, unclear from the text of the Liashchenko interview specifically which USSRGermany agreement he had in mind - the 23 August non-aggression pact or the 28 September friendship and borders agreement). In addition, the 'leader' disapprovingly spoke of Germany's aggressive actions, in connection with which deliveries of strategic raw materials and grain to Germany were apparently to be halted. Stalin then spoke about the inevitability of an armed conflict with Hitler, and that 'if V. M. Molotov and the apparatus of the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs is able to delay the beginning of the war for two or three months, then this will be our good fortune'.94 V. A. Anfilov wrote that Stalin, in characterizing the USSR'S foreign policy situation, recalled with satisfaction the neutrality pact with Japan, which had been signed on 13 April 1941.95 G. L. Rozanov stated that, giving his 5 May 1941 address at the reception for the military academy graduates, the Bolshevik leader 'specifically stressed the importance of the SovietJapanese pact for maintaining peace'.96 Having noted in this connection the 23 August 1939 pact with Germany,
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Stalin (in the words of Anfilov) focused the attention of those present on the aggressive course of the German Army and on the possibility, on its part, of new aggressive campaigns, calling for an increase the country's defensive capabilities.97 According to British intelligence data, Stalin supposedly announced in his 5 May speech that the USSR 'could not allow anyone to lay hands on Turkey'.98 As for characteristics of Germany's initial stage of military operations in Europe, V. V. Vishnevskii offered a somewhat different conclusion concerning this matter than that which was noted by Semenov: 'With slogans against Versailles, Hitler achieved a number of successes, but there is a great struggle ahead.' Inasmuch as Stalin had specified in his speech that France and England had suffered defeat at the hands of Germany, the great struggle expected for the future had to be waged against other powers. If one judges by Vishnevskii's diary entries, this conclusion was formulated as follows: The USSR is deploying its forces. Numbers. There are no resources in Europe - they are in the US and USSR. These world powers
will determine the outcome of the struggle.'99
The cited formulation is not, however, supported by other sources. It is, therefore, difficult to judge just what was meant: would the Soviet Union enter into a decisive one-on-one fight against Hitler; would the United States come to the aid of Britain to continue the war, or would the greatest transatlantic power, together with Britain, become an ally of the USSR. Vishnevskii himself imagined the development of events according to the third of these variants. On 15 March 1941 he had already written in his diary, 'We are proceeding so as to completely break Hitler, in a coalition with the Western democracies.' On 13 May, having summarized the basic content of Stalin's speech to the military academy graduates, Vishnevskii once again stated this idea: 'America is entering into the affair, ready for '42. And we [i.e., the USSR] also will say the word.'100 Werth reproduced this part of Stalin's speech as follows: 'England has still not been defeated, and the role of American potential will probably continue to grow.'101 Liashchenko remembered well: a supper (reception) was held in the Kremlin after the ceremonial portion of the gathering with the military academy graduates. This is how he described this supper: 'They seated us around tables in groups of 20. I noticed that there was a man in civilian clothes at each table. There was cognac and vodka on the tables. As secretary of the course's party organization, I was the senior person at my table. During supper I noticed that the men in civilian clothes did not drink, only ate a little, and basically listened.'102 It is obvious that Liashchenko, occupied with food and drink duties as 'senior man' at the table, did not hear what was said at the reception, as did
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the 'men in civilian clothes'. Thanks to Semenov's notes, it is possible to fill in this gap. In the official account (published in Pravda), the sense of Stalin's new discourses, which substantively added to what had been said in the 40-minute speech, was very briefly recounted. According to Semenov's notes, Stalin spoke three more times at the reception. First there was a toast to the leaders of the military academies, which had much in common with what he had said in his principal speech. Stalin thought it necessary once again to note that the academies were using obsolete equipment and programs in their teaching, resulting in a lag 'in the matter of teaching contemporary materiel'. It was necessary to eliminate this, mainly by transferring new equipment to the military academies. The second time Stalin spoke was a welcoming speech in honor of representatives of the various combat arms. First he proposed a toast 'to the health of the artillerymen'. Stalin called artillery the most important combat arm, the 'god of modern war', inasmuch as infantry, tanks, and aircraft were equipped with it. At this time the artillery generals approached the government table, but security did not allow General-Lieutenant A. K. Sivkov, Chief of the Artillery Academy, to come up to Stalin. Sivkov had had the impudence to dispute the 'leader's' above-mentioned critical comments.103 Stalin raised the next toast 'to the health of the tankers'. In his words, tanks 'are mobile, armor-protected artillery' whose caliber could be as much as 130mm. Inasmuch as Stalin followed the state of the Air Forces with particular attention, his proposal to drink 'to the health of the aviators' was natural. He noted that 'long-range aviation' was designed 'to raid rear areas ... and for partisan activities'. Long-range aviation was not, however, of decisive importance: the Bolshevik leader preferred 'close battle aviation, which was undervalued and was being kept down'. According to Stalin, it was a matter of airplanes which directly interacted 'with artillery, with tanks, and with infantry'. He said that 'fighter, ground-attack, and dive bomber aviation' would have a decisive role. This speech was clearly a development of Stalin's idea about 'first-line' and 'second-line' aircraft, which he had stated earlier in his speech to the military academy graduates. Nor was the cavalry ignored at the 5 May 1941 Kremlin reception. Stalin proposed a toast 'to the health of the horsemen'. According to him, 'in modern war' the cavalry was to 'develop success after a penetration of the front', pursuing the enemy and wedging into the penetration. In particular, Stalin stressed that it was the cavalry which, 'pursuing withdrawing artillery units, must prevent them from choosing new fire positions and setting up on them'.
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He concluded his welcome in honor of the combat arms representatives by mentioning the signalmen and 'glorious infantrymen'. According to Stalin, the modern infantry were 'men clothed in armor, bicyclists, tankers'. He thought it necessary to also speak about 'the importance of self-loading rifles', declaring that one soldier armed with such a rifle was equal to three soldiers armed with conventional rifles. Further on, Semenov's record noted the key moment of the whole grandiose affair - Stalin's rebuttal to the speech by the 'general-major of tank troops', who was not mentioned by name. It was namely this rebuttal which was the quintessence of Stalin's Kremlin statements, and it was specifically this which was the core of the on-going polemic, whose result was that different groups of participants in the discussion came to completely contradictory conclusions concerning what was said at the conclusion of the ceremonial reception for the Red Army military academy graduates. Stalin declared that it was necessary to reject a peaceful policy and a 'defensive line'. In Stalin's words, inasmuch as the Red Army was already reequipped with modern fighting means, reconstructed, and outfitted with equipment for modern battle, the USSR had the strength ('we have become powerful'), and, therefore, 'it is necessary to shift from the defense to the offense'. He refined this further, stating that it was necessary to shift 'to a military policy of offensive operations'. In particular, for this it was necessary to restructure all education, propaganda, and agitation 'in an offensive spirit'.104 Stalin's call for shifting to a military policy of offensive operations and restructuring all Soviet propaganda in an offensive spirit was engraved into the memories of the events' eyewitnesses and participants.105 In this respect, testimony from imprisoned Red Army commanders and political workers is more representative. The gist of Stalin's rebuttal was noted as being basically similar in the interrogations of three imprisoned Red Army commanders (October 1942). According to these testimonies, Stalin said, 'The era of the USSR's peaceful policy has ended. The necessity of expanding to the West by force of arms has ripened.' The prisoners reproduced the 'leader's' toast from the ceremonial reception (banquet) on 5 May 1941: 'Long live the dynamic offensive policy of the Soviet State!' m The following is found in Hilger's memoirs on this topic. Stalin declared that it was necessary to have done with defensive slogans, 'inasmuch as they have become obsolete, and we cannot gain an inch of land with them'. Hilger reproduced Stalin's words with quotes from eyewitnesses: 'The Red Army must get used to the idea that the peaceful policy has ended, and the era of widening the front of socialism by force has begun. He who does not recognize this is a Philistine and a fool.'107 Stalin's unmistakeable conclusions regarding the necessity of shifting
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to 'a military policy of offensive operations', noted in several independent sources, continue nevertheless to be called into question. Citing Stalin's idea about the necessity of shifting to a 'military policy of offensive operations', in Dimitrov's interpretation, based on his notes dated 5 May 1941, Gorodetskii asked his reader to focus attention on the specifics of the Russian word 'offensive'. The professor attempted to prove that it means 'a counterstroke, that is, countering an attack, which would mean a war begun at one's own initiative'.108 Gorodetskii was not at all original. The German researcher I. Fleischauer similarly interpreted the term 'offensive' as Stalin used it in his reply.109 Such linguistic findings by respected Western historians would have a solid foundation, were it not for a single 'but'. In Ozhegov's Dictionary of the Russian Language, the work on which began on the eve of the Great Patriotic War (there have been around 20 editions, and copies have exceeded two million), the following definitions can be found: 'Offensive [nastuplenie] ... Dynamic forward movement of forces with the aim of attacking an enemy and defeating him.' 'Counteroffensive [kontrnastuplenie]... a meeting, retaliatory offensive
against the enemy, prepared during defensive operations.'110
Thus, if we follow the canons of the Russian language, the sense of Stalin's statement did not at all come down to the fact that the USSR and the Red Army had to hold back until the enemy attacked, and then shift to a counteroffensive. On the contrary, the moment had come when it was necessary to shift to dynamic offensive operations. In the final analysis, however, the matter does not lie in linguistic findings. If we are to judge by Stalin's 5 May 1941 statements, the possibility of shifting to an offensive policy already existed. First, according to Stalin's own statements, which were seized by the propagandists, any war which the Bolsheviks waged and would wage was, by definition, just, for its ultimate aim was to shatter 'capitalistic encirclement'. Second, the situation was 'appropriate', inasmuch as Hitler after the defeat of France and capture of several European states was fighting 'under the flag of subjugating other nations'. The German Army's slogans were 'aggressive' and Stalin predicted that the Germans would not be successful if they used these slogans. Third, and finally, 'conditions were favorable' for shifting to dynamic offensive operations (all of Stalin's rhetoric on 5 May associated with the Red Army's preparedness attests to this).111 In my opinion, what Stalin said on 5 May 1941 should not be viewed as empty declarations. For the leadership of the Red Army General Staff and for the Bolshevik Party's propaganda structures, Stalin's instructions to the
142
military academy graduates in the Kremlin was a 'mobilization' task in the spirit of a 'slogan of offensive war', instructions which were soon realized in practice.
NOTES 1. 'Stalinskie vystupleniia 5 maiia 1941: opyt interpretatsii'. Translated by Dr Harold S. Orenstein, Corps and Division Doctrine Directorate, Fort Leavenworth, KS. 2. Pravda, 6 May 1941; Izvestiia, 6 May 1941; Krasnaia Zvezda, 6 May 1941, etc. 3. Sekrety Gitlera na stole u Stallna. Razvedka i kontrrazvedka o podgotovke germanskoi agressii protiv SSSR [Hitler's secrets on Stalin's table. Intelligence and counterintelligence concerning the preparation of German aggression against the USSR] (Moscow: 1995) Documents No.52 and 63. 4. L. A. Bezymenskii, Osobaiapapka 'Barbarossa' [Special file 'Barbarossa'] (Moscow 1972) p.304; idem, 'Shto zhe skazal Stalin 5 maia 1941 goda?' [What, then, did Stalin say on 5 May 1941?], Novoe vremia 19 (1991) p.37; idem, Otkroveniia ipriznaniia. Natsistskaia verkhushkaovoine 'tret'egoreikha'protiv SSSR. Sekretnyerechi. Dnevniki. Vospominaniia [Revelations and admissions. The Nazi bosses on the Third Reich's war against the USSR. Secret Talks. Diaries. Memoirs] (Moscow 1996) p.81. 5. Cited in Iosif Stalin v ob'iatiiakh sem'i. Sbomik dokumentov [Joseph Stalin in the arms of his family. Collection of documents] (Moscow 1993) p.84. 6. Ibid, pp.83-4. 7. A.N. Kolesnik, Mijy ipravda o sem'e Stalina [Myths and truth about Stalin's family] (Khar'kov 1991) pp.72-5; V. Schtriek-Schtriekfeld, Protiv Gitlera I Stalina. General Vlasov I Russkoe Osvoboditel'noe dvizhenie [Against Hitler and Stalin. General Vlasov and the Russian Liberation Movement] (Moscow 1993) pp.28-30. 8. I. Hoffman, Das deutsche Reich und Zweite Weltkrieg [The German Reich and the Second World War] Vol.4 (Frankfurt am Main: 1991) pp.106-7. See also Bezymenskii (note 4) p.36, and Revelations pp.34, 81; and J. Hoffman, 'Podgotovka Sovetskogo Soiuza k nastupatel'noi voine' [Preparation of the Soviet Union for an offensive war] Otechestvennaia istoriia 4 (1993) p.23. 9. Bezymenskii (note 4) p.36. 10. 'Mirovoe ravnovesie I "vakuum sily". Prognoz Ribbentropa o sud'bakh poslevoennogo mira s prilozheniem dokumentov po istorii separatnykh dogovorov Germanii I soiuznikov' [World equilibrium and the 'vacuum of power'. Ribbentrop's prognosis on the fate of the postwar world, with attached documents on the history of separate treaties between Germany and the allies], in Neizvestnaia Rossiia, XX vek [Unknown Russia, 20th Century], Book 2 (Moscow 1992) p.310. 11. A. Werth, Rossiia v voine 1941-1945 [Russia in the war, 1941-1945] 1st ed. (Moscow 1965) pp.138-9. 12. Revelations (note 8) p.81. 13. Hoffman (note 8) p.23. 14. U. Hoerster-Philipps, '"Spor istorikov" v FRG' [The 'historians' debate' in West Germany], Novaia i noveishaia istoriia [hereafter cited as NNF\ 3 (1988) pp.48-55; N.S. Cherkasov, 'FRG: "Spor istorikov" prodolzhaetsia?' [West Germany: is the 'historians' debate continuing?], NNI 1 (1990) pp.171-84. 15. FrankfurterAllgemeine Zeitung, 11 Oct. 1986. B. Pietrov-Enker, 'Germaniia v iiune 1941 g. - zherrva sovetskoi agressii? O raznoglasiiakh po povodu tezisa o preventivnoi voine' [Germany in June 1941 -victim of Soviet aggression? On disagreements concerning the thesis of preventive war] in Vtoraia mirovaia voina. Diskussii. Osnovnye tendentsii. Rezultaty issledovanii [The Second World War. Discussions. Principal trends. Results of research], translated from German (Moscow 1996) p.469. 16. Ibid.
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17. G. Gorodetskii, Mif 'Ledokola': Nakanune voiny [The 'Icebreaker' myth: on the eve of the war] (Moscow 1995) p.292. 18. I.V. Stalin, 'Rech' v Bol'shom Kremlevskom Dvortse 5 maia 1941 goda' [The speech in the Great Kremlin Palace on 5 May 1941; Preface and conclusion by A. Latyshev] Iskusstvo kino 5 (1990) pp.10-16. 19. L. Bezymenski, 'Die Rede Stalin am 5 Mai 194. Dokumentiert und interpretiert [Stalin's speech on 5 May 1941. Documented and interpreted] Osteuropa 3 (1992) pp.262-82. 20. See Gorodetskii (note 17), and Pietrov-Enker (note 15) pp.469-70. See also I. Fleischhauer, Diplomatische Widerstand gegen 'Unternehmen Barbarossa': die Friedensbemuhungen der Deutschen Botschaft Moskau 1939-1941 [Diplomatic opposition against the 'Barbarossa Undertaking': peace endeavors from the German Embassy in Moscow, 1939-1941] (Frankfurt am Main 1991) pp.322-6. 21. P.A. Zhilin, Kak fashistskaia Germaniia gotovila napadenie na Sovetskii Soiuz (Raschety i prochety) [How fascist Germany prepared for an attack against the Soviet Union (Calculations and miscalculations)] (Moscow 1966) pp.223-4. 22. Istoriia vtoroi mirovoi voiny 1939-1945 [History of the Second World War, 1939-1945] Vol.3 (Moscow 1974) p.439. 23. Latyshev (note 18) p.16. The emphasis is Nevezhin's. 24. D.A. Volkogonov, '22 iiunia 1941 goda' [22 June 1941], Znamia 6 (1991) p.4. See also idem, 'Etu versiiu uzhe oprovergla istoriia' [History has already refuted this version], Izvestiia, 16 Jan. 1993. 25. Bezymenskii (note 4). 26. V. Suvorov, Ledokol: Kto nachal Vtoruiu mirovuiu voinu [Icebreaker: Who began the Second World War]; Den'- 'M': Kogda nachalas' Vtoraia mirovaia voina [Day 'M' - When the Second World War began]; Posledniaia Respublika: Pochemu Sovetskii Soiuz proigral Vtoruiu mirovuiu voinu [The last republic: Why the Soviet Union lost the Second World War] (Moscow 1995). 27. Suvorov, Icebreaker (note 26) pp.169, 170, 178. 28. See note 17. 29. Preliminary results of this polemic are given in the following works: G.A. Bordiugov (ed.) V.A. Nevezhin, compiler, Gotovil li Stalin nastupatel'nuiu voinu protiv Gitlera? Nezaplannirovannaia diskussiia. Sbomik materialov [Was Stalin preparing an offensive war against Hitler? Unplanned discussion. Collection of materials] (Moscow 1995); Iu. N. Afanas'ev (ed.) Voina 1939-1945: Dva podkhoda [The war, 1939-1945: two approaches] Part 1 (Moscow 1995); V.A. Nevezhin, 'Preddverie Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny v sovremennykh diskussiiakh' [The threshold of the Great Patriotic War in contemporary discussions] in G.A. Bordiugov (ed.) Istoricheskie issledovaniia v Rossii. Tendentsii poslednikh let [Historical research in Russia. Recent trends] (Moscow 1996) pp.278-307; M.I. Mel'tiuhov, 'Sovremennaia istoriografiia i polemika vokrug knigi V. Suvorova "Ledokol"' [Modern historiography and polemics concerning V. Suvorov's book, Icebreaker] in Iu. N. Afanas'ev (ed.) Sovetskaia istoriografiia [Soviet historiography] Part 1 (Moscow 1995); V.A. Nevezhin, 'Sobiralsia li Stalin nastupat' v 1941 g.? (Zametki no poliakh 'Ledokola' V. Suvorova) [Did Stalin intend to attack in 1941? (Marginal notes to Suvorov's Icebreaker)], Kentavr 1 (1995) pp.76-85. 30. Volkogonov (note 24). 31. Hoffman (note 8). 32. Cited in 'Was Stalin preparing ... (note 29) p.44. The emphasis is Nevezhin's. 33. A.N. and L.A. Mertsalov, Dovol'no o voine? [Has there been enough about the war?] (Voronezh 1992) p.75. The emphasis is Nevezhin's. 34. 'Sovremennaia armiia - armiia nastupatel'naia'. Vystupleniia I.V. Stalina na prieme v Kremle pered vypusknikami voennykh akademii. Mai 1941 g. ['The modern army is an offensive army'. I.V. Stalin's address to military academy graduates at the Kremlin reception. May 1941], in A.A. Pechenkin, pub., Istoricheskii arkhiv [Historical archives, hereafter cited as IA] 2 (1995) pp.23-31. 35. A.M. Nekrich, 1941, 22 iiun' [22 June 1941] 2d ed., additions and reworking (Moscow 1995) Addendum III, p.304.
144
36. P.N. Liashchenko, 'S ognem i krov'iu po polam' [With fire and blood in the fields] Voenno-istoricheskii Zhurnal [Military-historical journal, hereafter cited as VIZh] 2 (1995) pp.22-8. 37. Gorodetskii (note 17). 38. Iu. P. Sharapov, Litsei v Sokol'nikakh. Ocherki istorii IFLI- Moskovskogo instituta istorii, filosofii, i literatury imeni N.G. Chernyshevskogo (1931-1941 gg.) [The lycee in Sokolniki. Essays on the history of IFLI - The Moscow Institute of History, Philosophy, and Literature named for N.G. Chernyshevskii (1931-1941) (Moscow 1995) p.122. 39. Gorodetskii (note 17) pp.291-2. 40. Stalin, 5 May 1941 Kremlin Speech, pp.15-16. 41. Bezymenskii (note 4) p.37. The emphasis is Nevezhin's. 42. "The modern army is an offensive army' (note 34) p.37. 43. P. Sudoplatov, Razvedka i Kreml'. Zapiski nezhelatel'nogo svidetelia [Intelligence and the Kremlin. Notes of a reluctant witness] (Moscow 1996) pp.136-7. 44. Vneshniaia politika SSSR. Sbornik dokumentov [USSR foreign policy. Collection of Documents] Vol.4 (1935-June 1941) (Moscow 1946) Document No.503. 45. Revelations (note 4) pp.32, 79. 46. Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi arkhiv literatury i iskusstva [Russian state archive of literature and art, hereafter cited as RGALI], f. 1038, op. 1, d. 2079, 1.18. See also V.A. Nevezhin, 'The Pact With Germany and the Idea of an "Offensive War" (1939-1941)' Journal of Slavic Military Studies 8/4 (Dec. 1995) pp.829-30. 47. RGALI, f. 1038, op. 1, d. 2079, 1.22. 48. I. Kh. Bagramian, Tak nachinalas' voina [The war began in this way] (Moscow 1971) p.55. 49. RTsKhlDNI, f. 77, op. 1, d. 895, 1.43. See also Nevezhin (note 4) p.830. 50. Moskva voennaia. 1941-1945. Memuary i arkhivnye dokumenty [Military Moscow. 1941-1945. Memoirs and archive documents] (Moscow 1995) Document No.1. 51. Cited in USSR Foreign Policy (note 45) Document No.503. 52. Bagramian (note 48) p.55. 53. For more details, see Nevezhin (note 46) pp.831-2. 54. RTsKhlDNI, f. 17, op. 117, d. 58, 1.150. 55. O. Levitskii, 'Istoricheskie primery geroizma russkoi pekhoty' [Historical examples of the heroism of Russian infantry], Politucheba krasnoarmeitsa 7 (1941) pp.10-16. All emphasis is Nevezhin's. 56. 'Iz istorii Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny. Nakanune voiny (dokumenty 1940-1941 gg). O podgotovke Germanii k napadeniiu na SSSR' [From the history of the Great Patriotic War. On the eve of the war (documents from 1940-1941). On German preparations to attack the USSR], Izvestiia TsK KPSS 4 (1990) p.209. Organy gosudarstvennoi bezopasnosti SSSR v Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny. Sbomik dokumentov [Organs of USSR state security during the Great Patriotic War. Collection of documents], Vol.1, 'On the eve,' Book 2 (1 January-21 June 1941) (Moscow 1995) Document No.176. See also Werth (note 11) p.136. 57. Iu. Fel'shtinskii, compiler, Oglasheniu podlezhit: SSSR-Germaniia, 1939-1941. Dokumenty i materialy [To be made public: USSR-Germany, 1939-1941. Documents and materials] (Moscow 1991) Document No.163. 58. 1941 god - uroki i vyvody [1941 - lessons and conclusions] (Moscow 1992) p.82. 59. RTsKhlDNI, f. 17, op. 22, d. 1776, 1.40. 60. Ibid. f. 71, op. 25, d. 4007, 1.1-3. 61. 1941 - Lessons and Conclusions (note 58) p.83. See also Velikaia Otechestvennaia voina 1941-1945gg. Voenno-istoricheskie ocherki. Kn. 1. Surovye ispytaniia [The Great Patriotic War, 1941-1945. Military history essays. Book 1. Severe trials] (Moscow 1995) p.90. 62. USSR Foreign Policy. Collection of Documents (note 45) Vol.4, Document 506. 63. 'Frontoviki otvetili tak!' [Soldiers at the front responded this way!], prepared by V.P. Krikunov, VIZh, 1989, pp.30-2. See also O.V. Vishlev, 'Pochemu medlil I.V. Stalin v 1941 g.?' [Why did I.V. Stalin delay in 1941?], NNI 1 (1992) p.96. 64. Mirovaia voina 1939-1945 [The World War, 1939-1945] (Moscow 1957) p.151.
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65. Revelations (note 4) pp.32, 34, 79, and notes. See also J. von Ribbentrop, Mezhdu Londonom i Moskvoi: Vospominaniia iposlednie zapisi: Iz ego naslediia, izdannogo Aneliz von Ribbentrop [Between London and Moscow: Recollections and last notes: From his legacy, published by Annalise von Ribbentrop] (Moscow 1996) pp.180-1,183. 66. Revelations (note 4) p.78. The emphasis is Nevezhin's. 67. Pogranichnye voiska SSSR. 1939-iiun' 1941. Dokumenty i materialy [USSR border troops. 1939-June 1941. Documents and materials] (Moscow 1970) Documents 353, 360, 363, and 367; Organy bezopasnosti SSSR v Velikoi Otechestvennoi voine [USSR security organs during the Great Patriotic War], Vol.1, Book 2, Document 196. 68. 1941 - Lessons and Conclusions (note 58) Addendum 11. Emphasis is Nevezhin's. 69. To Be Made Public, Document 168. 70. Ibid. Document 170. 71. Suvorov (note 26) p.170. 72. A.A. Pechenkin (pub.), 'Naznachit' tov. Stalina I.V.' Postanovlenie Politbiuro TsK VKP(b). Mai 1941g. [Comrade Stalin appointed. Resolution of the Politburo of the Communist Party Central Committee. May 1941.], IA, 5 (1994) pp.221-2; O.V. Khlevniuk, A.V. Kvashonkin, L.P. Kosheleva, L.A. Rogovaia (compilers), Stalinskoe Politbiuro v 30-e gody. Sb. dok-tov [Stalin's Politburo in the 1930s. Collection of documents] (Moscow 1995) Document 17. 73. O.V. Khlevniuk, Politbiuro. Mekhanizmy politicheskoi vlasti v 30-e gody [The Politburo. Mechanisms of political power in the 1930s] (Moscow 1996) p.256. 74. Gorodetskii (note 17) pp.191-7. 75. Suvorov (note 26) p.169. Emphasis is Nevezhin's. 76. Hitler's Secrets on Stalin's Table (note 3) p.11. 77. Pravda, 26 April, 1 May, and 5 May 1941. 78. RTsKhlNDNI, f. 17, op. 116, d. 82, 1.109; op. 117, d. 268, 11. 80, 81. 79. Ibid. f. 17, op. 116, d. 82,1.98. 80. 'Posetiteli kremlevskogo kabineta Stalina' [Visitors to Stalin's Kremlin office], IA, 2 (1996) p.46. 81. Pravda, 6 May 1941. 82. Liashchenko (note 36) p.23. 83. Bezymenskii (note 4) p.37. 84. Liashchenko (note 36) p.24. 85. As note 83. 86. Volkogonov, 22 June 1941 p.6. 87. 'The modern army is an offensive army' (note 34) p.24. 88. V.A. Anfilov, Nezabyvaemyi sorokpervyi god [The unforgettable 1941] (Moscow 1982) pp.91-2. 89. Ibid. p.91. See also Pravda, 6 May 1941; G.K. Zhukov, Vospominaniia i razmyshleniia [Recollections and reflections], 12th ed., Vol.1 (Moscow 1995) p.374. 90. This and any subsequent rendering of Stalin's 5 May 1941 speech is taken from 'The modern army is an offensive army' (note 34). 91. All comments in brackets are provided by Nevezhin. 92. RGALI, f. 1038, op. 1, d. 2079,1.31. Emphasis is Nevezhin's. 93. Hitler's Secrets on Stalin's Table (note 3) Document No.52. 94. Liashchenko (note 36) p.23. 95. Anfilov (note 88) p.91. 96. G.L. Rozanov, Stalin-Gitler: Documental'nyi ocherk sovetsko-germanskikh diplomaticheskikh otnoshenii 1939-1941 [Stalin-Hitler: Documental sketch of Soviet-German diplomatic relations, 1939-1941] (Moscow 1991) p.197. 97. As note 95. 98. As note 93. 99. RGALI, f. 1038, op. 1, d. 2079, 1. 31. 100. Moskva [Moscow], 5 (1995), pp.107, 109. 101. Werth (note 11) p.138. 102. Liashchenko (note 36) p.23.
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103. 'The modern army is an offensive army' (note 34) p.31, note 9. 104. Nevezhin (note 46) pp.832-3. 105. Zhukov (note 89) p.375; Gorodetskii (note 17) p.293; RGALI, f. 1038, op. 1, d. 2079, 1. 31. 106. Cited in Hoffman (note 8) p.23. 107. Cited in Revelations (note 4) p.81. 108. Gorodetskii (note 17) pp.293-4. 109. Fleischauer (note 20) p.326. 110. S.I. Ozhegov, Slovar' russkogo iazyka [Dictionary of the Russian language] 16th ed. (Moscow 1984) pp.251, 337. Emphasis is Nevezhin's. 111. Was Stalin Preparing an Offensive War against Hitler? (note 29) pp.66-168. See also Nevezhin, pp.833-9; V.A. Nevezhin, 'Stalinskii vybor 1941 goda: oborona ili lozung nastupatel'noi voiny?' [Stalin's choice in 1941: defense or the slogan of an offensive war?] OI, 3 (1996) pp.55-73.

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The Journal of Slavic Military Studies

Stalin's 5 May 1941 addresses: The experience of interpretation

STALIN AND WORLD WAR II

Stalin's 5 May 1941 Addresses: The Experience of Interpretation1

STALIN'S 5 MAY 1941 ADDRESSES

THE JOURNAL OF SLAVIC MILITARY STUDIES

STALIN'S 5 MAY 1941 ADDRESSES

THE JOURNAL OF SLAVIC MILITARY STUDIES

STALIN'S 5 MAY 1941 ADDRESSES

THE JOURNAL OF SLAVIC MILITARY STUDIES

STALIN'S 5 MAY 1941 ADDRESSES

THE JOURNAL OF SLAVIC MILITARY STUDIES

STALIN'S 5 MAY 1941 ADDRESSES

THE JOURNAL OF SLAVIC MILITARY STUDIES

STALIN'S 5 MAY 1941 ADDRESSES

THE JOURNAL OF SLAVIC MILITARY STUDIES

STALIN'S 5 MAY 1941 ADDRESSES

THE JOURNAL OF SLAVIC MILITARY STUDIES

STALIN'S 5 MAY 1941 ADDRESSES

THE JOURNAL OF SLAVIC MILITARY STUDIES

STALIN'S 5 MAY 1941 ADDRESSES

THE JOURNAL OF SLAVIC MILITARY STUDIES

STALIN'S 5 MAY 1941 ADDRESSES

THE JOURNAL OF SLAVIC MILITARY STUDIES

STALIN'S 5 MAY 1941 ADDRESSES

THE JOURNAL OF SLAVIC MILITARY STUDIES

STALIN'S 5 MAY 1941 ADDRESSES

THE JOURNAL OF SLAVIC MILITARY STUDIES

STALIN'S 5 MAY 1941 ADDRESSES

THE JOURNAL OF SLAVIC MILITARY STUDIES

STALIN'S 5 MAY 1941 ADDRESSES

THE JOURNAL OF SLAVIC MILITARY STUDIES

STALIN'S 5 MAY 1941 ADDRESSES

THE JOURNAL OF SLAVIC MILITARY STUDIES

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