Professional Documents
Culture Documents
JEFFREY FRANKEL
HARPEL PROFESSOR OF CAPITAL FORMATION AND GROWTH
HARVARD UNIVERSITY
EM RECOVERY FROM THE GLOBAL RECESSION CONTINUES STRONGER THAN USUAL, BUT NOT SO FOR ADVANCED ECONOMIES.
SINCE LAST YEAR, THE IMF HAS REVISED 2012 GROWTH ESTIMATES DOWN SLIGHTLY, ESP. FOR EUROZONE.
1) New crisis => more defaults on periphery, higher spreads even in northern Europe & possible break-up of -zone. 2) New partisan US budget stand-off.
Greece cannot get back to a sustainable debt path by austerity, as has been clear for awhile. When it eliminates its primary budget deficit, no more incentive to keep servicing debt. => default. By then Euro banks may no longer have life-threatening exposure having passed debt to ECB, EFSF+ provisioned.
Or Portugal or Italy. Regardless, contagion to others. This time it will probably hit France as well. Could contagion reach other high-debt countries?
UK? Japan? US?
It is a long-term problem:
i) Future deficits in entitlement spending
social security & Medicare.
THE DEBT-CEILING GAME OF CHICKEN In the summer of 2011, fiscal conservatives recklessly threatened government default, if their demands were not met.
The resulting political dysfunction led S&P to downgrade US bonds from AAA to AA.
Risk perceptions were far too low in 2003-07. Shot up in 2008-09; Down in 2010-11. Up again?
Risk on
Laura Jaramillo & Catalina Michelle Tejada, IMF Working Paper, 2011
Joseph prophesied 7 years of plenty, with abundant harvests from a full Nile -- followed by 7 lean years of drought & famine. The Pharaoh empowered his technocratic official (Joseph) to save grain in the 7 years of plenty,
building up sufficient stockpiles to save the Egyptian people from starvation during the bad years.
-- a valuable lesson for todays government officials in industrialized & developing countries alike.
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For emerging markets, the first phase of 7 years of plentiful capital flows occurred in 1975-1981,
recycling petrodollars as loans to developing countries.
The international debt crisis that began in Mexico in 1982 was the catalyst for the 7 lean years,
The second cycle of 7 fat years was the period of record capital flows to emerging markets in 1990-96.
The 1997 sudden stop in East Asia was then followed by 7 years of capital drought.
The third cycle of inflows, often identified with carry trade and BRICs came in 2004-2011
and persisted even through the Global Financial Crisis.
If history repeats itself, it is now time for a 3rd sudden stop of capital flows to emerging markets!
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ARE EMERGING MARKETS DUE FOR A CORRECTION, TRIGGERED BY A NEW WAVE OF RISK OFF BEHAVIOR?
Most worrisome: Turkey.
Turkey can probably not sustain the rapid economic growth and very high trade deficits of recent years. Vulnerable to world oil price.
China could land hard as its real-estate bubble deflates and the countrys banks are forced to work off bad loans.
High GDP growth rates in Latin America over the same period could reverse,
particularly if global commodity prices fall
Esp. if the cause is that the Chinese economy begins to falter.
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BUT: A REMARKABLE ROLE-REVERSAL SUGGESTS EMERGING MARKETS ARE NO LONGER SO VULNERABLE: Debt/GDP of rich countries (> 80%) is now more than twice that of emerging markets;
and rising rapidly.
=>
Some EMs Economies are now more creditworthy than some Advanced Economies
as reflected in credit ratings or sovereign spreads.
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AAA Germany, UK AA+ US, France AA- Japan A+ ABBB+ Ireland, Italy, Spain BBB BBB- Iceland BB Portugal B CC Greece
EM SOVEREIGNS USED TO HAVE TO PAY HIGHER INTEREST RATES THAN US HIGH-YIELD CORPORATES (BB), BUT NOW PAY LESS.
HISTORIC ROLE REVERSAL IN THE CYCLICALITY OF FISCAL POLICY IN INDUSTRIALIZED VS. DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
In the textbooks, benevolent governments are supposed use discretionary fiscal (& monetary) policy to dampen cyclical fluctuations.
expanding at times of excess supply, and contracting at times of excess demand.
But in practice,
In practice, policy has often been procyclical, i.e., destabilizing, in developing countries:
Governments would raise spending in booms; and then be forced to cut back in downturns.
Kaminsky, Reinhart & Vegh (2004), Talvi & Vgh (2005), Alesina, Campante & Tabellini (2008), Mendoza & Oviedo (2006), Ilzetski & Vegh (2008) and Medas & Zakharova (2009).
Pro-cyclical spending
procyclical countercyclicall
Countercyclical spending
AN IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENT -IN THE LAST DECADE, SOME DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WERE ABLE TO BREAK THE HISTORIC PATTERN:
And so had fiscal space to respond to the 2008-09 recession. I.e., some emerging market countries finally achieved countercyclical fiscal policies.
2000-2009
procyclical countercyclical Frankel, Vegh & Vuletin (2011)
In the last decade, about 1/3 developing countries switched to countercyclical fiscal policy:
Less prone to current account deficits. Capital inflows less concentrated in $ bank debt
And local-currency debt. More FDI.
Exception: the one region that apparently didnt learn the lessons of the 1990s was Eastern Europe.
Commodity price volatility likely to continue. Whether a commodity price rise is good or bad
depends on
(i) whether you are a buyer or seller (ii) the cause of the increase.
COMMODITY PRICES HAVE BEEN ESPECIALLY VOLATILE OVER THE LAST DECADE
Commodity prices: all commodities
Indices 180 160 140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0 60 61 63 64 66 67 69 71 72 74 75 77 79 80 82 83 85 86 88 90 91 93 94 96 98 99 01 02 04 05 07 09 10 in prices of 2010
A.Saiki, Dutch Nat.Bk.
Nominal prices
2010=100
Oil
But when virtually all commodity prices move together, it must be macroeconomic:
70s, 80s, 2002-08 , 2008-09, 2009-11. led growth 2002-08 & 2010-11.
as reflected in real interest rates.
Leading explanation: global business cycle, e.g., China Secondary explanation: monetary policy,
GROWTH IN CHINAS IMPORTS OF MINING PRODUCTS IS A BIG REASON FOR THE UPWARD
TREND IN THEIR PRICES.
This has been idiosyncratic, not a continuation of the general commodity boom. E.g., natural gas prices are strongly down,
at least in the U.S.
COLOMBIA, LIKE MOST LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES, IS VULNERABLE TO FURTHER SWINGS IN PRICES OF COMMODITIES ESP. OIL & COFFEE
continued
4. Allow some currency appreciation in response to a rise in world prices of export commodities,
but not free floating. Accumulate some forex reserves.
5. If the monetary regime is to be Inflation Targeting, consider using as the target, in place of the CPI, a price measure that puts weight PPT on the export commodity (Product Price Targeting).
6. Emulate Chile: to avoid over-spending in boom times, allow deviations from a target surplus only in response to permanent commodity price rises.
concluded
ELABORATION ON TWO PROPOSALS TO REDUCE THE PROCYCLICALITY OF MACROECONOMIC POLICY FOR COMMODITY EXPORTERS
I) To make monetary/exchange rate policy less procyclical: PPT Product Price Targeting
REGIME FOR COUNTRIES WHERE TERMS OF TRADE SHOCKS DOMINATE THE CYCLE Floating accommodates terms of trade shocks, thus giving countercyclical monetary policy; but can entail excessive exchange rate movement and does not provide a nominal anchor.
Inflation targeting, in terms of the CPI, provides a nominal anchor; but can dictate a procyclical monetary policy.
PPT
Automatically countercyclical.
It calls for appreciation when import prices rise, and not when export prices rise.
[1] Frankel (2011).
Professor Jeffrey Frankel
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