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  • Documents From The US Espionage Den Vol. 16

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    Documents From the US Espionage Den' is a legendary series of Iranian books containing classified US documents that were found in the American Embassy in Tehran when it was taken over by revolutionaries. These books are very hard to come by, and until now there has been no concerted effort to post them. In 1977 Iranian students seized an entire archive of CIA and State Department documents, which represented one of the most extensive losses of secret data in the history of any modern intelligence service. Even though many of these documents were shredded into thin strips before the Embassy, and CIA base, was surrendered, the Iranians managed to piece them back together. They were then published in 1982 in 54 volumes under the title "Documents From the U.S. Espionage Den", and are sold in the United States for $246.50. As the Tehran Embassy evidently served as a regional base for the CIA, The scope of this captures intelligence goes well beyond intelligence reports on Iran alone. They cover the Soviet Union, Turkey, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq. There are also secret analysis of arcane subjects ranging from the effectiveness of Israeli intelligence to Soviet oil production. Most of these documents are labelled "Confidential" or "Secret" and remain classified to this day.

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    Documents from the US Espionage Den Vol. 16

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    Documents From the US Espionage Den' is a legendary series of Iranian books containing classified US documents that were found in the American Embassy in Tehran when it was taken over by revolutionaries. These books are very hard to come by, and until now there has been no concerted effort to post them. In 1977 Iranian students seized an entire archive of CIA and State Department documents, which represented one of the most extensive losses of secret data in the history of any modern intelligence service. Even though many of these documents were shredded into thin strips before the Embassy, and CIA base, was surrendered, the Iranians managed to piece them back together. They were then published in 1982 in 54 volumes under the title "Documents From the U.S. Espionage Den", and are sold in the United States for $246.50. As the Tehran Embassy evidently served as a regional base for the CIA, The scope of this captures intelligence goes well beyond intelligence reports on Iran alone. They cover the Soviet Union, Turkey, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq. There are also secret analysis of arcane subjects ranging from the effectiveness of Israeli intelligence to Soviet oil production. Most of these documents are labelled "Confidential" or "Secret" and remain classified to this day.

    Copyright:

    Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
    Download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Flag for inappropriate content
    236 views171 pages

    Documents From The US Espionage Den Vol. 16

    Uploaded by

    Irdial-Discs
    Documents From the US Espionage Den' is a legendary series of Iranian books containing classified US documents that were found in the American Embassy in Tehran when it was taken over by revolutionaries. These books are very hard to come by, and until now there has been no concerted effort to post them. In 1977 Iranian students seized an entire archive of CIA and State Department documents, which represented one of the most extensive losses of secret data in the history of any modern intelligence service. Even though many of these documents were shredded into thin strips before the Embassy, and CIA base, was surrendered, the Iranians managed to piece them back together. They were then published in 1982 in 54 volumes under the title "Documents From the U.S. Espionage Den", and are sold in the United States for $246.50. As the Tehran Embassy evidently served as a regional base for the CIA, The scope of this captures intelligence goes well beyond intelligence reports on Iran alone. They cover the Soviet Union, Turkey, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq. There are also secret analysis of arcane subjects ranging from the effectiveness of Israeli intelligence to Soviet oil production. Most of these documents are labelled "Confidential" or "Secret" and remain classified to this day.

    Copyright:

    Attribution Non-Commercial (BY-NC)
    Download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
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    of 171

    IN THE NANE OF GOD,THE #ERCIFUL

    AND THE COMPASSIONATE


    I

    .
    5 0 2 5 3 AN0

    TELEGRAMS NO. TEHRAN 1 0 7 5 2 ,TEHRAN 10.3 4 2 ,!10Sr3W 2 2 1 56 ,TEHRAN 0 9 5 0 3 ,TEHRAN 9891 6 ,USICA

    TEHRAN 58831 WERE THE LAST C O P I E S OF T H E I R O R I G I N A L TEXTS AND,THUS,VERY


    ORE

    DULL I N COLORPTHEREF-

    THEIR

    PRINTING

    AND PHOTOGRAPHING

    IN

    BOOKS

    WERE NOT FAYDRABLY P O S S I B L E . F O R T H I S REASON,THJ ABOVE-MENTIONED DOCUMENTS WERE R&-TYPED. 1

    CONFIDENTIAL MEMORANDUM TO THE FILES SUBJECT: SUMMARY Nine letters, written in both Farsi and Erfglish, rec~ivedduring the past two months from as many former students, colleagues Iranian friends (high school teachers), and close friends -- living in Shiraz and Khorasan portray post-Pahlavi Iran in a somewhat different light than American Embassy and American press reporting. Shiraz and certain remote areas of Khorasan appear calm and peaceful, generally free of violent incidents. Inhabitants of these two areas have welcomed the demise of the Pahlavis and the establishment of an Islamic Republic, and yet criticize freely and fearlessly their new leaders, including Khomeini. Although high school students throughout Iran, even those in the remotest towns, were greatly politicized, schools were running normally by Now Ruz. Although a sense of betrayal and hyprocrisy of Carter's human rights policy led most to lividly condemn the USG, affection and respect remained for individual Americans. While the Correspondents recognized the great problems confronting postPahlavi Iran, few desire to flee. On the contrary, most of these nine correspondents, inspired by the undreamed of quick success of the Revolution in toppling the Shah, seek to participate actively in the transformation of their society. In short, these predominantly young, lower-to-middle class "provincials" remain optimistic six months after the Shah's departure. Alternative Views from the Provinces

    --

    The diversity In correspondents is great: in education, from eleventh graders in high school to two masters degree holders; in age, from sixteen to about fifty-five; in experience, from an isolated villager who has only traveled to Mashhad once or twice in his life to an urbane Shirazi who has traveled widely in Europe (but not the US); in social class, from tribal lower class to urban upper middle class. In only two respects can the correspondence of such a varied group be generalized. First, all now approve wholeheartedly of the overthrow of the Shah. Several students participated CONFIDENTIAL

    CONFIDENTIAL
    - 2 -

    actively in street demonstrations during the Revolution, while others (Shirazi teachers) waited on the sidelines ti1 the outcome was certain. Several are vociferous in their criticism of the dyarchy; i.e., Khomeini and the PGOI, replacing the Shah -- but none feel the present leaders begin to compare in venality, tyranny, and corruption with those of the ancien regime. Second, with the exception of one unsigned letter vehemently critical of ~hotbzadeh'smanagement of NIRT and Yazdi's stewardship of MFA, all wrote openly and fearlessly, oblivious to any supposed new reign of censorship. The tone in the letters was strikingly different from ones received from the same corespondents under the Shah: Then, never a direct criticism of HIM was,penned and only the most convoluted indirect ones. Now, Khomeini, Bazargan, Ministers and government policies are unabashedly and directly criticized. The degree of politicization of the youth is remarkable, encompassing not only the previously politically aware students of Tribal High School (THS) in Shiraz, but also those of a small isolated town near the Afghan border who prior to the Revolution concerned themselves with little more than football, family chores and ardesh One Khorasani student writes simply, " W h e n b i t youth of Iran were being killed, I was only thinking about volleyball. Funny, isn't it? During the Revolution many things changed, and so did I. I'm not the same Ali anymore." Students at Tribal H.S. write of the confrontations between Islamic and leftist student groups for control of the curriculum and administration. One week English, "the language of the imperialists", was voted out of the THS curriculum, only to be reinstated the following week. By Now Ruz, however, passing year-end exams vied with political consciousness-raising sessions for students' attentions. Even at Shiraz University (the old Pahlavi U), a considerable number of students had opted to attend classes, although they could participate in "political activities* and not attend classes one semester without losing their "registered" student status. Nearly all strongly condemned the USG's human rights policy, perceived to be applied hypocritically in Iran. One student drew the analogy between US support of the Shah and Somoza; several drew parallels to American intervention in Vietnam. CONFIDENTIAL

    CONFIDENTIAL
    - 3 -

    While bitterly attacking the USG (frequently citing Carter by name) for its last ditch support of the Shah and sale of 'murderous" weapons to HIM, most correspondents were careful to distinguish between USG policies and individual Americans. Respect and fondness for individual Americans remained as that for the USG plummeted to new depths. Although ethnic battles among the Kurds, Arabs, and Turkomans were mentioned,' no disturbances i~Shiraz or Khorasan were cited. Incidentally, several correspondents (themselves of Qashqai or Sunni Persian origin, and possibly harboring autonomy sentiments) criticized the severity of the PGOI's actions to squelch ethnic demands. Former Shirazi colleagues, admitting the slow pace followed by PGOI's implementing its socio-economic policies, generally praised the nationalization of undeveloped lots within the city and plans for construction of housing for the poor on them. They pleaded for time for the wellintentioned Bezargan government. Khorasani friends noted little material difference in their small town but a profound change in inhabitants' "minds". Several correspondents, while criticizing NIRT's ~atpntly pro-Khomeini and pro-"republic of the akhunds~f~&m"e'n)ted on the remarkable freedom of the press. One former Shirazi colleague noted he was spending much of his time reading all the books, from Shari~tito Marx, now easily available, that he could not legally obtain during the past twenty-six years. Finally, among the nine correspondents, only two expressed any. desire to leave Iran. One, a retiring teacher, would like to visit his son studying in Texas for a few months. The other, a student from a well-educated upper-middle class Shirazi family, wishes to study economics in England upon completion of high school next year. All the others, both teachers and students who, before, had frequently confided their desire to go abroad for further education, now intended , t o remain in Iran and participate in the reconstruction of their society. Far from wallowing in dire predictions of national doom and catastrophe, they remained cautiously optimistic about Iran's future as well as their own. NEA/IRN:BHanson July 31, 1979

    CONFIDENTIAL
    3

    IRAN: Communication Environment Problems, Prospects, Ideas

    PREMISE: U.S.-Iran relations are very problematical. While we have been urged by the Tehran Government t o give evidence of our intentions to normalize relations, the Qom faction, specifically Khomeini, the press, and others continue t o rail against us as the nefarious, imperialistic hand behind Iran's problems. executions, attacks on the Kurds, expulsion Iran's domestic policies of foreign correspondents, newspaper closures have exacerbated an already negative sense of the "new Iran" here in the U.S., and cause us serious difficulties in projecting any "warming" of relations. We should avoid any gestures which might be construed, either here or there, as supportive of these policies.

    --

    At the same time, our interests in Iran remain considerable, not the least of which is oil. Since an Islamic Government in some form or other (with religious leadership continuing t o play a pivotal role) i s likely for the foreseeable future, we must, in a measured way, convey our benign intentions and assure Iran that we both wish them well and intend not to involve ourselves in their domestic affairs.

    ASSETS: Large numbers of U.S. and western educated Iranians among whom we can expect a reservoir of essential good will and from whom we can expect Western oriented decision-making. U.S. expertise in fields of concern t o Iran: agriculture, education, defense. business, technology,

    U.S. position as a necessary counter t o a perceived worse danger --the U.S.S.R. An official government (as opposed t o the Qom faction) which has given indications of being pragmatic, non-extremist, and interested in normalized U.S.-Iran relations. Large numbers of Iranian students who are or wish to be in the U.S.

    LIABILITIES: Our minimal ability t o influence kanian events. Ayatollah Khomeini who, in addition t o fathering Iran's extremist policies and pronouncements, seems heatedly anti-U.S.

    Our minimal ability t o communicate with the religious leadership and


    lower clam majority of Iranians. The "secret hand" theory which is deep in the Iranian grain and blames the U.S. (among others) for ban's many problems. The widely held determination t o "root out foreign influence."
    An officially sanctioned press which has been vitrlolically anti-U.S.

    Heatedly anti-Zionist sentiment and the identification of U.S. policies a s supportive of Zionism against Islamic and Arab interests. Identification of the U.S. with the Shah's government and all of its excesses.

    OBJECTIVES: Suggest that the U.S. will not involve itself in Iran's internal affairs, that we wish them well and that our interests are coterminous in our mutual desire f o r a peaceful, stable and independent Iran. Promote a dialogue with Iran's new leadership. Rebuild a meaningful and mutually beneficial long term relationship.

    DANGERS: To the extent that we move away from our current very low profile approach, we risk further assaults (verbal certainly and perhaps other). This IS particularly true a t a time when Iran is facing massive internal problems and frustrations, all of which feed the "secret hand" theory of foreign meddling.

    Without prudence, any "warming' of o w relations may appear to be an endorsement of those of Iran's current policies which are in violation of ow human rights positions. Assuming an evolution of the present government to other forms and atyler in the future, too close an identification with a government inaeaaingly known for its excesses could leave w v&_51:able to the =me L i d of charges we faced with the fall of the Shah's government.

    RECOMMENDATION: Despite problems, and the potential for problemr, the significance of o w interests in Iran recommends that we explore opportunities to build a diath an's new 1&ership. At the same time, thew efforts should, z " l " h e w term, be both measured and low key, emphasizing our long term relationship with Iran rather than s h a t term tactical gains. USICA: WHAT ARE W DOING? WHAT MIGHT W DO? E E CURRENT OPERATIONS:

    - Support to the Binational


    and Isfahan.

    Centers (Iran America Societies) in Tehran

    - Support to English language teaching through the BNCs in Tehran and Isfahan. - USICA library in Tehran.
    - Student counseling through -

    AMIDEAST, a t the BNC and at the USICA library. VOA Persian language broadcasting. Press work. (Limited) magazine distribution to institutions. Giant assistance to the American Institute of Iranian Studies. Fulbright program (grants to Iranians continue, Americans in Iran currently in abeyance)

    WHAT MIGHT W DO? E

    - Expanded VOA Persian broadcasting (will be increased one how) - American participant visits. - Resumption of Iran America Society English teaching in Shiraz. - Film programs at the BNC. - A project to bring Iranian religious figures to the U.S. for the Hejira anniversary ce1ebra:ions. A specid seminar? Travel around the U.S. in connection with the celebrations? A Branch PA0 in Isfahan next year?

    OTHER IDEAS?
    Suggest convening a special meeting to consider idea8 for restoring a dialogue with Iranians. This should include the private sector, Iranologiats, Ramsey Clark? Religious or theological figures? USICA and M R can co-sponmr. '

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    TEE U . S . TqBDPF TO TEE ATTACSS UPON AMESICA iN SPEECAPS AND-IY T E E BAZAAR1 R E P L I E L THAT W A S BECAUSE U.S. COMPLAINED ABOUT T H E EXECUTION O P E L X A N I A N #YO YAS BE S A I D ELCRANIAY MACE YCNPY T O ' I S R A E L YflCB WkS S T E A L I K P AN A N T I - S E M I T I C T I R A D E J E W S DO-NOT CO ANT YORI, T K B T ARE MQN9T L E G E R S USURIOUS R A T E S , AND ONLY H E L P I E E I R OWN

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    CONFIDENTIAL

    TEHRAN 8831/1

    RUQMAR RUSBLK RUQMKW RUDTC RUQMAM RUEHMO RUQMMT RUFMPS RUSNAAA DE RUQmR #8831/01 219 ** ZNY CCCCC ZZH CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL R 0710042 AUG 79 CHRGE: STATE 8/7/79 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN APPRV: CHARGE: LBLAINGEN DRFTD: ADM:TESKUD:GO TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3105 INFO RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0218 CLEAR: P0L:VLTOMSETH RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0210 DISTR: POL2 CHG ADM RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 0222 ICA ECON RPQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0193 RF RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0254 RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 0248 RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0260 RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 0220 RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0309 RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA 0188 RtJEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0230 RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0118 RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0267 RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE BT C 0 N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF TEHRAN 08831 E.O. 12065: GDS 8/7/85 ( SKUD, TIMOTRY E.) OR-? TAGS: PINS, ECON, PORS, MILI, SCUL,ELAB, IR SUBJECT: ISFAHAN AND SHIRAZ 1. ( C-ENTIRE TEXT). 2. SUMMARY: EMBOFF SKUD RECENTLY SPENT ABOUT TWO WEEKS IN SHIRAZ AND ISFAHAN. HE FOUND COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY RELATIVELY GERAT BUT UNEMPLOYMENT HIGH. REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEES IN BOTH CITIES REMAIN ACTIVE. THE TRIBES OF FARS PROVINCE SEEMED TO BE TAKING A WAIT-AND-SEE ATTITUDE TOWARD THE CURRENT POLITICAL SITUATION. THE U.S. IS STILL WIDELY BLAMED FOR IRAN'S TROUBLES. TNCLUDING THE REVOLUTION ITSELF. SKUD FOUND GROWING UPPER AND MIDDLE CLASS DISSATISFACTION BUT THE LOWFR CLASS REMAINS GENERALLY LOYAL TO KHOMEINI AND THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT. THERE HAS BEEN LITTLE CHANGE IN SITUATION OF THE MILITARY. END SUMMARY. 3. EMBOFF SKUD RECENTLY PAID VISITS TWO CONSULATES IN SHIRAZ AND ISFAHAN. THE FIRST IMPRESSION OF SHIRAZ WAS THAT THE CITY HAD RETURNED TO NORMAL. THE BAZAAR WAS ACTIVE, MOST RESTAURANTS AND THEATRES HAVE REOPENEB AND THE STREETS ARE BUSY UNTIL LATE AT NIGHT. HOWEVER, MOSS FACTORIES AND CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS REMAIN INACTIVE OR WORK HALF-DAYS ( WHICH ARE CONSUMED BY TEA-DRINKING AND CONVERSATION). LARGE NUMBER OF UNEMPLOYED COULD BE SEEN ON STREET COWERS OR AT PUBLIC OFFICES BRINGING THEIR PLIGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE GOVERNOR GENERAL, THE LABOR OFFICE, OR THE KOMITEH. ANOTHER SIGN OF THE REVOLUTION IS TVE PROLIFERATION OF KIOSKS AND SIDEWALK VENDFRB , WHO FORMERLY WOULD HAVE BEEN ASKED TO MOVE ON.

    THE CITY WAS RESPLENDENT FOR THE CELEBRATION ORDERED BY KHOMEINI OF THE BIRTHDAY OF THE HIDDEN IMAM. CITY STREETS AND SHOPS WERE LAVISHLY DECORATED. A LARGE BALLOON INSCRIBED WITH THE NAME OF THE PROPHET DIOATED OVER A DOWNTOWN MOSQUE. FESTIVITIES WERE MARKED BY DEMONSTR4TORS SHOUTIN9 " DEATH TO THE COMMUNISTS AND SPEECHES BY NIRT HEAD QOTB-ZADEH (WHO DID NOT CONVI CINGLY DENY PRESIDENTIAL ASPIRATIONS). THERE WAS SCATTERED SHOOTING AT NIGHT AND A BUILDING ON AN ARMY COMPOUND WAS SET AFIRE.

    4.

    5. WHILE EMBOFF WAS IN SHIRAZ CONSULATE WAS VISITED BY TEMBERS OF LOCAL COMMITTEE-WHO WHISHED TO LIBERATE/PROTECT THE CONSULATE VEHICLES. THIS MATTER WAS HANDLED WITH A PHONE CALL TO THE DEPUTY GOVERNOR GENERAL. CONSULATE EMPLOYEE WITH NATIONAL POLICE CONNECTIONS RECONGNIZED ONE KOMITEII RUNNER, ENGINEER ABDULLAHI, AS A FORMER HA~~GER-ON SAVAK AND THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL'S OFFICE. AT HE HAS APPARENTLY DECIDED TO HITCH HIS WAGON TO ANOTHER STAR.

    6. IN SHIRAZ (AS IN ISFAHAN) THE CHRISTIAN HOSPITAL HAS BEEN APPROPRIATED BY THE COMMITTEE. THE SHIRAZ CHRISTIAN HOSPITAL WAS MORE OF A PRIVATE INSTITUTION THAN A MISSION, AND RUN BY A LOCAL CHRISTIAN. OTHFR PRIVATE HOSPITALS HAVE NOT BEEN TAKEN OVER. 7. ALTHOUGH SHIRAZ HAS ONLY ONF KOMITER, IT IS
    CONTROLLED BY SEVERAL AYATOLLAHS WHO VIE FOR POWER WITHIN THE STRIJCTURE. A LOCAL RFSTAURANT OWNFR EXPLAINED THAT ONE WAY A MULLAH COULD STRFNGTHFN HTS POWER BASE WAS BY RFCRUTTING GREATER NUMBERS OF PASDARANS INTO HIS CAMP. THF OllALITY OF THE RECRIITT IS LESS IMPORTANT THAN THE ADDITTON OF ONE MORE BODY TO TOTE A GllN. CONSEQUENTLY, ANY YOUTH WHO TTHES OF CLASSES OR lrlORKTNO IN DAD'$ SHOP OR 1,OOKTNG FOR WnRK CAN AFCOMF A PROTECTOR OF GOD AND CnllNTRY. THE WITIjI~TN(:0 CTVTI, AIITAORTTY BY THESE 1 ' ('ALLOW YOIITHS PRESFNTS A MAJOR ORSTACLE TO THE EXTENSION OF CENTRAI, OOVFRNMFNT AIITHORITY AND NORMALIZATION. ClIRRFNTLY THE LEADTNn MIILLAH IN FHIRA7 IS AYATOLLAH RAlU3ANT-FtlIRA7T WHO TS RAID TO RE PERSONALLY DEPUTED PY KIIOMEINT . THF THTRER TN PhPS PROVINCE HAVF REMAINED FAIRLY Q11TET THE LARQFST AND MOST P l ' R I L TRIBE, THE OvFFl RT # 8831
    R.

    CONFIDENTIAI,
    la

    TEHRAN

    8831/1

    CONFIDENTIAL

    TEHRAN

    8831/2

    QASHQAIS, IS LED BY NASSER KHAN AND KHOSROW KHAN, BOTH THEY ARE SAID RECENTLY RETURNED FROM FOREION EXILE. TO BE STICKING WITH THE NEW ORDER AS LONG AS IT APPEARS TO BE IN THEIR INTEREST TO DO SO, BUT HAVE NO DEEP THE LURS ARE SAID SEATED COMMITMENT TO KHOMEINI ET AL. TO BE SOMEWHAT MORE DISAPPOINTED, UNHAPPY WITH UNEMPLOYMENT,RISING PRICES AND THE HARASSMENT OF SOME OF THEIR LEADERS. ONE MEMBER OF A LEADINQ LUR FAMILY TOLD EMBOFF THAT ALL THEY NEED IS FOR THE U.S. TO GIVE THEM GUNS AND THE GO AHEAD.

    9. THE PREOCCUPATION WITH THE ROLE OF THE U.S. IN THE IRANIAN DRAMA REMAINS. NEARLY ALL IRANIANS WHO ARE DISSATISFIED WITH CURRENT CONDITIONS BELIEVE IT KHOHEINI IS BACKED BY AMERICA. THIS BELIEF IS FOUND ACROSS THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM, AND HELD BY DOCTORS, RUSINESSMEN, GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES AND SO ON.
    10. DISSATISFACTION WITH THE CURRENT REGIME IS STRONGEST BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE MIDDLE AND UPPER CLASSES. ISSUES INCLUDE UNEMPLOYMENT, RISING PRICES, FEAR OF THE COMMITTEES, AND THE BAN ON ALCOHOL AND MOST ENTERTAINMENT. AMONG THE BAZAARIS AND LOWER CLASSES, HOWEVER, KHOMEINI STILL COMMANDS UNQUESTIONING SUPPORT. THIS SUPPORT IS PERHAPS BEST CHARACTERIZED AS RELIGIOUS DEVOTION AND IS NOT CONCERNED WITH ISSUES OTHER THAN ISLAM AND FREEDOM-TIE, W N I N O S OF WHICH ARE SUBJECT TO IWTERPRETATION. 00 ONN, NATIONALIZATION OF INDUSTRY IS ISLAMIC, TO ANOTHER, OPENING A FOOD STAND IN A PUBLIC PARK IS FREEDOM. THE SUPPORT FOR THE AYATOLLAH COMES CHIEFLY PROM THE MAINLY ILLITERATE, AT BEST POORLY EDUCATED, BULK-OF, THE IRANIAN OPULACE WHO REMAIN POLITICALLY UNSOPHISTICATED AND LARGELY IGNORANT OF MANY ISSUES AFFECTING THEIR LIVES. ONE BAZAAR1 WAS ADAMANT THAT THE UNEMPLOYED FILLING THE STREETS OF SHIRAZ WERE OUT-OF-WORK SAVAK AGENTS.

    11EMBOFF LUNCHED WITH ARMORED CENTER OFFICER LT. KAMAL KHAKSAR ( PROTECT) AND HIS FAMILY AT W E I R HOME THE LIEUTENANT WAS IN IN THE MARRIED OFFICERS QUARTERS.

    UNIFORM WHEN HE CALLED FOR EMBOFF AT CONSULATE. THIS WAS IN MARKED CONVMST TO HIS BEHAVIOR TWO MONTHS AGO. AT THAT TIME WHEN EMBOFF RAN INTO HIM ON THE STREET HE WAS OBVIOUSLY NERVOUS AND ARRANGED TO MEET AT A RESTAURANT, WHERE HE APPEARED IN MUFTI. KHAKSAR REPORTED THAT ROUTINE CHIEFTAIN TANK MAINTENANCE IS NOW BEING PERFORMED. HE SAID THAT AS LONG AS HE AND OTHER OFFICERS WOULD START TO DO THE WORK THE ENLISTED MEN WOULD THEN JOIN IN, BUT A MERE ORDER TO DO THE WORK WOULD NOT SUFFICE. HE CLAIHED THAT A ROUTINE ENGINE OVERHAUL THEY HAD DONE HAD TAKEN ONLY FIVE DAYS, WHEREAS BEFORE, EVEN WITH BRITISH ADVISORS, IT HAD TAKEN TWENTY. HOWEVER, KHAKSAR SAID THAT HE A N D OTHER OFFICERS FELT THAT THE RETURN OF A LIMITED RUSSIAN ADVISORS HAD REMAINED IN BRITISH TEAM WAS NEEDED. THEY HAD SCHEDULED TO RETVRN SHIRAZ UNTIL ABOUT MID-MAY IN EARLY JUNE BUT WERE ABOUT TWO WEEKS OVERDUE WHEN SKUD WAS IN SHIRAZ. IN GENERAL. KHAKSAR WAS MOST PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE FUTURE OF THE ARMY. HE CITED LACK OF DISCIPLINE WITHIN THE RANKS AND THE LOW HORALE OF THE OFFICER CORPS.
    12.

    13.

    NO F-14's WERE SEEN IN THE AIR AT SHIRAZ OR ISFAHAN, ALTHOUGH EMBOFF DID SEE A TEENAGE BOY ON ISFAHAN'S MAIN STREET READING A BLUE PAPERBACK BOOK WITH "QRUMMAN F-14" IN WHITE LETTERS ON THE COVER. ( IT COULD HAVE BEEN ANYTHING FROM TECHNICAL TO PROMOTIONAL MATERIAL. BUT IT DOES RAISE THE QUESTION OF POSSIBLE COMPROMISE.) SOME OF THE ARMY AVIATION HELICOPTERS IN ISPAHAN WERE SEEN AIRBORNE BUT MOST WERE IDLE.

    14. POLICE OFFICERS IN SHIRAZ ARE STILL REGULARLY PAID ALTHOUGH FEW ARE ACTUALLY ON DUTY TRAFFIC POLICE ARE THE ONES MOST COMMONLY SEEN. SOME PATROLMEN ARE WORKING. BUT IN CIVILIAN CLOTHES. ONE 0FFICER.EXPLAINED THAT THERE ARE TWO REASONS TO BE A POLICEMAN: (1) TO COLLECT ONE'S PAY, AND, (2) TO PROTECT THE PEOPLE. HE POINTED OUT THAT BT IY 8831 NNNN CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 8831/2

    CONFIDENTIAL

    TEHRAN 8831/3

    IN POST-REVOLUTIONARY IRAN THE PEOPLE DO NOT WANT PROTECTION FROM THE POLICE, SO THE POLICE JUST COLLECT THEIR PAY. ALONG THE SHIRAZ-ISFAHAN-TEHRAN ROAD LITTLE SEEMED CHANGED BY THE REVOLUTION. A FEW STATUES HAD TOPPLED. BUT THE TOWN OF SHAHREZA WAS STILL CALLED SHAHREZA.
    15.

    IN ISFAHAN TOURISTS WERE WELCOME AT THE SHOPS AND ATTRACTIONS AMNQ MEIDAN-E-KHOMEINI ( FORMERLY MEIDAN-ESHAII, BUT THE ETMOSPHERE REMAINS MORE HIGHLY CHARGED FHAN THAT OF SHIRAZ. HOSTILITY TOWARD FOREIGNERS WAS EVIDENT. PASDARANS WERE MORE COMMON, AND ?'HE LOCAL COMMITTEES SHOWED MORE OF AN INTEREST IN THE CONSULATE.
    16. 17.

    ISFAHAN IS CONTROLLED BY FOUR REGIONAL COMMITTEES AND A CENTRAL COMMITTEE. THE CONSULATE IS LOCATED IN THE PRECINCT CONTROLLED BY AYATOLLAH KHADEMI BUT NEAR TO THE DOMAIN OF AYATOLLAH TAHERI, WHO ALSO WEARS THE FOREIGN PROBLEMS HAT. TO AVOID PROBLEMS DURING A TRANSFER OF FURNITURE TO TEHRAN, BOTH GROUPS WERE CONTACTED AND SATISFACTORY ARRANGEMENTS WERE MADE. UNFORTUNATELY, THE PROPERTY SECTION OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE HAD BEEN OVERLOOKED AND A TWO-HOUR JOB BEGUN IN THE EARLY MORNING LASTED UNTIL MIDNIGHT. THE COMMITTEE INSISTED ON READING ALL OF THE TRASH DISPOSED OF BY THE CONSULATE (SENSITIVE MATERIAL HAD LONG SINCE BEEN DESTROYED), AND GAVE SPECIAL ATTENTION TO OLP CALENDARS-- PERHAPS LONGING FOR THE GOOD OLD DAY.
    18. THE GOVERNOR GENERAL SEEMS TO HAVE LITTLE INFLUENCE IN ISFAHAN. A REQUEST FOR HIS AID RESULTED IN THE COMMITTEE BEING BERATED FOR BOTHERING THE GOVERNOR GENERAL WITH A PROBLEM THAT WAS CLEARLY A COMMITTEE PROBLEM.

    19. AN TSFAHAN BAZAARI, AND A DEVOTED FOLLOWER OF THE AYATOLLAH TOLD EMBOFF THAT HE THOUGHT AMERICA AND IRAN SHOULD HAVE GOOD RELATIONS AND THAT SOME AMERICAN ENGINEERS SHOULD RETURN. EMBOFF POINTED OUT THAT AMERICANS WERE UNLIKELY TO RETURN AFTER THE WAY THEY

    WERE THROWN OUT. HE REPLIED THAT WAS BECAUSE THEY WERE PAID FOUR TIMES WHAT IRANIANS WERE PAID. EMBOFF SUQGESTED THAT PERHAPS THEY HAD FOUR TIMES THE EXPERIENCE. BAZAARI SAID MAYBE, THEN SAID IRAN HAS A PROBLEM, NOBODY WORKS VERYHARD. ON THE ISSUE OP GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE U.S. EMBOFF POINTED TO THE ATTACKS UPON AMERICA IN SPEECHES AND IN THE PRESS. THE BAZAARI REPLIED THAT WAS BECAUSE U.S. COMPLAINED ABOUT THE EXECUTION OF ELGHANIAN WHO WAS CLEARLY AN ISRAELI AGENT. HE SAID ELGHANIAN MADE MONEY IN IRAN AND THEN SENT IT TO ISRAEL WHICH WAS STEALING 3ROM THE IRANIAN PEOPLE. AN ANTI-SEMITIC TIRADE FOLLOWED,JEWS DO NOT DO ANY WORK, THEY ARE MONEY LENDERS WHO CHARGE USURIOUS RATES, AND ONLY HELP THEIR OWN PEOPLE. HE CONTRASTED THIS WITH ISLAM WHERE MONEY IS GIVEN TO THE NEEDY FREE OF CHARGE, AND NO ONE HAS MORE THAN ONE HOME. LAINGEN BT #8831 NNNN
    20.

    CONFIDENTIAL

    TEHRAN 8831/3

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    NNNNW ESB028BRA677 PP RUQMHR DE RUEHIA I0253 2212120 ZNY CCCCC P 0921182 AUG 79 FM USICA WASHDC TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY BT C 0 N F I D E N T I A L USICA 50253 USICA FOR GRAVES PROM NEA EO 12065 GDS 8/8/85 SUBJECT: PROGRAM .POSSIBILITIES REFERENCE: TEHRAN 3109 CLASSIFIED BY R. T. CURRAN,DIRECTOR, NEA 1. INTERESTED IN YOUR REPORT CONVEYED TEHRAN REPTEL.

    ICA CHG

    CHROW

    2. REZA'S ESTIMATE OF VALUE OF IAS, ENGLISH TEACHING, AND USICA LIBRARY OPERATIONS ENCOURAGING.
    3 . CONCUR WITH EXPLORATION OF LOCAL SPEAKER POSSIBILITIES FOR HOWEVER, IAS (PRESUME THIS ALSO INCLUDES BOARD MEMBERS ) . WOULD CAUTION AGAINST ANYTHING WHICH WOULD IDENTIFY USG OR IAS WITH THE RELIGIOUS FZGHT OR ANY OTHER GROUPING.
    4. ALSO AGREE WITH YOUR INTENTION TO EXPLORE POSSIBILITIES FOR LOW-KEY VISIT BY AN AMERICAN PARTICIPANT. WE TEND TO BELIEVE, AS BETWEEN AN AMERICAN RELIGIOUS OR PHILISOPHY FIGURE, PHILOSOPHY LESS LIKELY TO BE MISINTERPRETED. AGAIN, WE ENDORSE VERY CAREFUL EXPLORATION (AMONG OTHERS, IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE VIEWS OF MININFO MINATCHI) ACCOMPANIED BY A CLEAR IDENTIFICATION OF HOW SUCH A VISITOR MIGHT BE USED, WITH WHOM, IN WHAT CONTEXT, AND WHERE.

    5. IF YOU ASCERTAIN TO YOUR AND MISSION'S FULL SATISFACTION THAT AN AMPART VISIT WOULD BE WELL RECEIVED, PRODUCTIVE AND DESIRABLE, WE WILL LEND FULL SUPPORT THIS END IN SEEKING OUT APPROPRIATE NAMES FOR YOUR CONSIDERATION.

    6. DO NOT WISH BY FOREGOING TO APPEAR NEGATIVE. HOWEVER. AS


    YOU FULLY AWARE AND APPRECIATE, THESE ARE SENSITIVE. DIFFICULT TIMES FOR U.S.-IRAN RELATIONS. WE BELIEVE ANY PROGRAM DECISIONS, HOWEVER LOW-KEY, MUST CAREFULLY WEIGH LONG TERM ADVANTAGE AGAINST SHORT TERM TACTICAL GAINS (OR LOSSES). RFINHARDT BT I0256

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    ACCOST : T3B &ISINESS CLIMATE IN IRAN GUIDANCE FOR U . S . BLrSINLSSMCh' SZPTEYBER: BEVISY TZE P03R PEOPLE'S FOUNDATION OF ATTITUCLS OF IRAU'S OIL FIELC WCRGBS KTCBEE: OIL -0LICY DEVELOPMENTS 1RAE;IAB AID TO TEE LDC'S POLICY bNr FFOj?: -:Tf KOVEEXER : 1-- M ~ N L G X K GIRAN'S I I N I X C I I L SJaPLVS 1-- BLECTRIC 30ZER PROSPECTS I K IPCN

    --

    /ILECZKBEP ECONOYJC ASSESSYENT - A6 :

    3. -h'z WILL UPDATE THIS SCEEI>ULI. APPSOXIMP.:TLY EVZ;,Y YQHTXS UNLESS WB DEFABTUEVT PP.IFER3 4 h A L T Z B K ~ T I ~ F ABRLICmEN:. LhINCENlY
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    CONFIDENTIAL DE RUQMHR #a916 21. 2. ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 0908202 AUG 79 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3151 BT C 0 N F I D E N T I A L TEHRAN 08916

    TEHRAN

    8916

    CLASS: CHRGE: APPRV: DRFTD: CLEAR: DISTR:

    CONFIDENTIAL PROG 8/9/79 CHG: L UNGEN . EC0N:ADSENS NONE ECON-3 CHG POL RF CHRON

    E.O. 12065: GDS 8/9/85 (LAINGEN, L. B . ) OR-M TAGS: EGEN, IR SUBJECT: ECONOMIC AYALYTICAL REPORTING SCHEDULE

    2. THE FOLLOWING IS EMBASSY TEHRAN'S PROPOSED ECONOMIC COMMERCIAL ANALYTICAL REPORTING SCHEDULE THROUGH DECEMBER 1979. AUGUST : -- THE BUSINESS CLIMATE IN IRAN-GUIDANCE FOR U,S. - BUSINESSMEN SEPTEMBER: REVIEW OF THE POOR PEOPLE'S FOUNDATION ATTITUDES OF IRAN'S OIL FIELD WORKERS OCTOBER : OIL-OLICY DEVELOPMENTS IRANIAN AID TO THE LDC'S- POLICY AND PROSPECTS NOVEMBER : MANAGING IRAN'S FINANCIAL SURPLUS BLECTRIC POWER PROSPECTS IN IRAN DECEMBER : -- AN ECONOMIC ASSESSMENT

    --

    --

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    --

    --

    3. WE WILL UPDATE THIS SCHEDULE APPROXIMATELY EVERY SIX FONTHS UNLESS THE DEPARTMENT PREFERS AN ALTERNATIVE ARRANGEMENT. LAINGENll BT 18916 NNNN
    CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 8916

    LE KTOHHC #693B/01 225 ZAY CCCCC ZZH R 15134562 AT? 79 TV AWEMEASST TFBRAN d 0 SECSUAUE hASUBC 31E2 FT i b N P I C E N U I A L SECUION 0 1 OF

    **

    CONFIDENTIAL SUAUE 8/12/73 CHARCE:LBLAIL P0L:VLUOMSEUB: 1 . R O N :BSCliELI UYBRAN 0 3 9 3 0 2.CONS .RYOREJ DISTR: POL3 CBG ICA ECON DAO CONS

    CLASS: CAR3E: APPRV: DRPUD: CLEAR:

    9 . 0 . 1 2 0 6 5 : GDS 3/12/95 (TOMSET?. TAGS: PEPR. IR . . . -. EUFCT: N E C O T I A T I ~ V S


    1.

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    - EYTIRE TEXT).

    2. INTRODUCTION: RECENT NFCOTIATTOYS IY YFICS THE SMBASSY BAS BEEN INVOLVED BERE, RANGING PROM COMPOTND SPCURITY TO VISA OPERATIOVS TO STP TO TPS SHERRY CASE. FIGRLIGHI SEVERAL SPECIAL FEAUTRES OF CONDTCUING PUSINFSS IN THE PERSIAN FNVIRONMENT. IN SOME INSTANCES UBE DIFFICTLUIES # S HAVE ENCOTNUESED ARE A PARUIAL QFFLECTION O TAB EFFECTS OF T l F IRANIAN RTVOLUTION. N BTU r E BELIEVE USY TNDERLYIN? CTLUTRAL AND PSYC90LOGICAL QLALITIES THAT ACCOUNT FOR TQE NATURI OF TPESE DIPFICULUIES ARE ANC d I L L RSMAIN RSLAUIVELY CONSUANU. UHSREPORE. YE SUGGEST THAT TEE FOLLOWING AEALTSIS BE USED TO E R I F F BOUH T S J PERSONNTL AND PRIVAUX SECUOR REPRESENUAUIVES W O ARE REQUIRED TO DO BUSINESS YITH AND IN THIS B COTNURY. END I NURODTCUION

    3. PERHAPS THE SINCL3 DOMINANU ASPECU OF UE3 PERSIAN PSPCBE I S A OVERRIDING EGOISI*. I T S ANTECEDENTS L I B N IN THE LONG IRANIAN 91STOHY OF INSUASILIUY ANr INSECTRIUY WFICH PUT A PREKICM O SELF-PRESERV4TION. N THE PRACTICAL EPFECT OF I T I S AN ALMOST TOTAL P m S I 4 N PQEOCCUPAUION W I T H SELF AND LEAVES LITTLE ROOM FOR ~ N D E R S T A N D I N GPOINTS OF VIFW OTHER TAAN ONE'S OWY. TRUS, FOR EXAMPLE, IU I S INCOMPEEHENSIBLE TO A IRAhIAN TEAT U.S. IMMIGRATION N LAY MAT P R O A I E I T ISSUING u I n A TOURIST VISA WREN FE HAS JETERMINED THAT HE WANTS TO LIVE IN CALIFORNIA. SIMILARLY, THT IBANIAN CENTRAL BANK SEES N INCONSISTENCY O IN CLAIMING FORCE HAJEURE TO 4VOID PENALTIES POB LATE PPYMEYT OF INTEREST DUE O OUTSTANDING LOANS WHILP TAE N GOVERHHENU OF VRICH IU I S A PARU I S DENYING THE VAILIDITY OP TBE V E R Y GROUYDS UPOY V A I C Y THE CLAIM IS FADE WFEN CONFRONUED B SIMILAR CLAIMS FROM POREIGN FIRMS FORCED Y 'I0 CEASE OPERATIONS DURING THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION. 4. UHE BEVERSE OF UXIS PARUICTLAR PSYCBOLOOICAL COIN. AND HAVING THE SAPE AISTORICAL ROOTS AS PERSIAN EGOISM. N I S A PERVASIVE TNSASE ABOTU UTE NAUTRE OF UHE WORLD I WGICH ONE LIVES. THE PERSIAN EXPERIENCE AAS BgEN TAAT NOUaING I S PERMANENU AND IU I S COMMONLY PERCEIVED UBAU HOSTILE FORCES ABOUND. IN SUCE A ENVIRONMENT EACR N IhDIVITTAL MTSU BE CONSUANULY ALERU FOR OPPORUTNIUIES 10 PROTECT BIMSELF 4GAINST THE MALEVOLEIT FORCES TEAT YOTLD OUHERUISE BE R I S TNDQING. RB I S OBVIOTSLT J S S T I F I E D IN USING ALMOST ANT MEhNS AVAILABLE TO EXPLOIT
    CON?IDENUIET.
    24

    UEHB

    CONPIESHUIAL

    USABAN 8980/1

    SOC9 OPPORTUNITIES. T F I q APPROACP UVDERLIFS TPE SOSO COMMON AMON3 PERSI I N S , A CALLED .BAZAAR M E ~ U A L X T Y " f i f N b S E l ' TPAT OFT'Y IGYORFS LONCFR, TrRM NTFR S S 1 EAVOR OP IMREDIAUELY OSUIINABLE ADJANTAGES hH% ANCBS PRlCTLCES TPAT ARB 9TGARCED AS 1INFTBICAL PY OTRFR NORMS. A EXAMPLE I S UEE SFEYIYCLY SHORUSIOEUED 4ND N BARESSING TACTICS FVPLOYED PY THE PGOI IN I T S Y F X T I A TIONS WITH GTE.

    EOUN~EY-

    5 . COTPLED CIUK UHESE PSYCIOL0:ICAL LIYIUSUIONS I S A GFLFBAL INCOflPPEHENSION OF CASUALITT. ISLAM, WITH I T S EMPYASIS ON UHI OMYIPOUBNC? OF GOE, APPTARS UO ACCOTNU A1 LEAST I N MAJOR PART FO3 T Q I S F9YN3PYYON. SOMBWPAT STRPRISINJLY, EV3N U90SE IBAYIANS EDTCAUEr I N U9E YPSTERN STYLE IND PPRpdPS YITF LONG FXP:RIENCF 3UTSIDP IRAN IUSELF F3EQTXNULY BAY9 DIVTICTLUY =FASPIN', UYE IhTER-RELATIONSHIP OF EVFNTS. YITNBSS A YEZCI RESISTING UHE IDEA UHAU IRANIAN BEPAVIOQ 9AS COYSJCTENCES ON LIBE FiRCEPTION OF IRAN I N TEE S.S. OR TBhT T 4 I S PFRCFPTION I S SOME30U RELAUEC ?O AMFRICAN POLICIES RSSARDIN; IRAN. T B I S SAME QUALITY ALSO EELPS EXPLAIN PEaSIAN AVERSION UO ACCEPUINO RESPONS~AILIDY FOR OYS'S OVY A C I I O N S . THE DEUS EX MACHINA I S ALW4YS RT V O X .

    6 - THE PERSILN PROCLIVITY TOR ASSUVING THAT TO SAY SOMBTFINS I S TO DO IT PURTSY? COMPLICATES HATTSRS. AGAIN. YAZDI CAN EXPRESS SURPRISF WTEN INFORMED TF4T TPE ISREGULPR SLCUPITY FORCES ASSIGNEE TO TH9 EMBASSY REflAIY E BUT Tl?EnCENTRAL COMMITTEE TOLD M TREY I h PLACE. WOULD G PY MONDAY, HS SAYS. O A4 YFA O P F I C i A L RFPORTS LtAU UBE SHERSY CASP I S "90 PERCEZT SOLVED. BUT YASN A CONSULAR OFFICFR INVFSTI5ATFS EX PISCOVERS TPPT NOTRINC EAS CSANGED. UHBRE I S NO RECOCYIUION UYAT INSTRUCTIOhS NUST E FOLLOVVD C P . TPAT COMYITRFYTS MVST 9 3 JCCOMPANIEP ! b y ACUION ANC RTSTLUS.

    6. FINALLY, USERF ARY UBE PERSIAN CONCSP'JS O* IN?LTENCE hHD OPIIGATION. PVERYONE PAYS !J?FISAYCF T 3 TPP FORn?9 ANC UBE SAUUEB I S TSTALLY RONOREP IN USE EbEACS. F E B S I A N S A R CONSUNED W I T R DEVfLOPING P A ~ T IFAZI--TAT ~ INFLTINCE UBAU Y I L L SELF 3SU U?INSS CONE--iBIfE PAYORS APE ONLY GRLDGINGLY BFSTOIEO AND TPEN J C S T TO T F F
    brj ReQF0

    CONFIDENUIAL

    CONFIDENTIAL

    TEERAN 89@/2 POL3 CEO 1CA BCON DAO CONS AWXN NAAG R l

    C 0 N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 TEHRAN 0@9P0 DISTR: LXUENU UHAU A UANGIBLE Q T I D PRO QTO I S IMMEDIAUELT PRTCEPTIBLE. FORGET ABOUT ASSISTANCE PROFERRED LAST YEAR OR EVEN LbSU WEEK; WHAT CAN BZ OFFERED TODAY?
    7.

    THERE ARE SEVERAL LESSONS FOR TBOSE YBO WOULD NEGOTIAUE r I U 9 PERSIANS IN ALL UHIS:

    --FIRST, ONE SBOVLD NEWER ASSUME THAT F I S S I D E OF UBE I S S T E WILL BE RECOGNIZED, LEU ALONE UHAU I U WILL B i CONCEDED TO HAVE MERITS. PERSIAN PREOCCUPATION MITE SLLF PRECLUDES T H I S . A NEGOTIATOR MUST FORCE RECOGNITION OF B I S POSIUION TPON H I S PERSIAN OPPOSIUE NTMBER.

    - PERCEIVE THE ADVANTAGES OF EXPECT AN IRANIAN READILY --SECOND, ONE SHOULD NOT 10 A LONG-TERM RELATIONSHIP
    PSED ON TRUST. HE WILL ASSUME THAT P I S OPPOSITE NTMSER I S ESSENUIAtLY AN ADVERSARY. IN DEALING WIUR B I K BE WILL ATTEMPT TO MAXIMIZE TBE BENEFITS TO RIMSELF TEAT ARE IMMEDIATELY OSTAINABLE. HE WILL B E PREPARED UO GO UO GREAU LENBUSS UO ACHIEVE URIS G 3 h L . INCLTDING PUNNING TEE RISK OF SO ALIENATING WUOFVFP RE I S DEALING YIUB UAAU FTUTRE BTSINSSS WOTLD BE TNUSINKABLE, AU LLAST TO THE LATTER.

    --UHIRG. INU3RLOCKfNB EELAUIONSHIPS OF ALL ASPECUS 02 ilk I S S L E MUST BE PAINSTATINGLY, FORECEFULLT AND REFEA?TSTLY DEVFLOPED. LINKAGES WILL BE NEITHER READILY LOPIPREHEEDED NOR ACCEPTED BY PERSIAN NEGOTIATORS. --FOUSTP, ONE SHOULD I N S I S T ON PERF3RMANCE AS TRF S I N E OTA NON A EACB S U A X OF NECUOUIA'JIONS. SUAUBMSNUS U Lb INTENTIOh COUNT FOR ALMOST NOTHING.

    -S I -

    --FIFU3. CTLUIVAUI3N OF 'GOODYILL FOR SOODWILL'S SbKE A rASTE OF PFPORT. THE OVERRIDING OBJECTIVE 4T ALL UIKES SSOTLE BZ IYPRESSIY: TPON UHE PPRSIAN ACROSS TFE IAbLE TSE-MUTUALITY OF THE PROPOSED UNDERTAPINGS, HE YUST F F MADE TO KYOk T9AT A OUID PRO QUO 1" IYVOLVFD o h zoua srrss. --FIYALLY, O ! SAOCLD F r FREDARE: FOR T F F TEREAT Y U O C ? bREASfJLY I \ VX<OUIAUICNS A ANY sIYEY YOMENU 4ND N W E F COwZD f Y TB.?F'PSSIPLITY. GIYZN T 8 9 F'YRSIEN hSGOUIAUOP'S CTLUTRAL AYD PSYCH3LO:ICAL LIYIUAUIOYS. 4 3 1 5 GCING TO RESIST TEF VERY CONCEPT OF A RATIONAL (YRSM Y E YFSTSBN POINT OF V I S Y ) NEGOTIATTYO PROCTSS. LBIEU31N
    2 1

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    -~

    1501142 AUG 79

    - ENTIRE TEXT. )

    2. PFFTEL I S A REASONABLY ACCURhTS ACCOUVT EY 4 JO:?UbL-. ----- I Y T YITH CONSICFAABLEEXPERIENCE I N I R ov C L P . S ~ E S ~ RETYEBN SECULARIST POLITICAL GROUPS AND YEZai~LLh'I!IS {:I--ERALLY, ADSERENTS OF THF PARTY OF 3 0 D ) LOYAL T 3 AIAPGLLAE YHOHbINI ON AUGUST 1 2 ANC 13. ALLOYbY'S RPPPB'! IS COLOREL SO#EYAAT BY H I S SYMPATBT FOR T H I S?GULh?ISTS C!ir HIS OWN BRUSH WIT3 ISLAMIC FANATICISM. BUT T%F ;ROJIN3 POLITICAL ANC SCCIAL DIVISIONS HE CESCRIBZS P9134 UivLZRL I E TBESE CLASPES ARE VY91 REAL.

    3. HAVING SAII: THAT, AOWZVER, W ARF VOT I i J e r I u E T : 'I0 F CONCLUDE THAT wRAT BAS HAPPENED T E I S L 3 E K S I G k h L S fY2 IMMINENT APPROACd OF ARMA3P3DON IN IRaN. W IBI"Y I i E VORF J I I E L Y TEAT TfiE CURRENT CONFROYTATION E:.TkBEN mu" SECULAR LEFT AND TEE ISLAPIC BARnLINERS WILL SUBSIDT (INLEEC, THE LEVEL CF TENSION W9S NOTICGABLY LOWER YFSTEKDAY, AUGUST 1 4 , "NP T 0 l ) A l . AU*IUST 15, TtiF CITY I S YI9IUlLLY CLOSEC UP BECAUSF OF T9E SOMMEY'ORATION 'F THF I D E ~ T KOF IHAq A L I ) . SUCH h PATTERN tiAS BEEX TYFlCAL OF OTHER POLITICAL CRISFS SINCE THE FEBRUARP REYOLUTIO~, AN^ YE wGuLr NOT EXPECT TAIS ONE TO az A N Y CIFFFEZYT.
    A LF3aCY OP BITTFRNFSS k:IiL R 4 4 4 I U TO FISTCR JYST A T4E SURFACE 3F TH9 VODT POLI"1:. T B I S , i9 S - E V S I S T9E 9Eb.L SISNIFICANCE Of TAF FOLITIGAI PROCFiS THE ISLAMIC FORCES REr?AlN PBICOMINENT. N OTY-P O

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    August 15, 1979

    Mr. Henry Precht Iran ~ e s k Room 5246 M e r , J L-S& U S KJeDaitment of State ..


    Dear Renry: I am sending herewith my notes from the AWA Iran Update program on July 25-26 in New York City, together with a copy of the attendance list, per our telephone conversation last night.

    w*

    John A. Westberg Enclosures

    AMERICAN MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION'S IWLN UPDATE

    Notes July 25-26, 1979 New York City

    1.

    The first and by far the most significant

    speaker was professor James Bill of the University of Texas. He is perhaps the best known writer on Iranian affairs in the English language. His discipline is political seience

    wlth an emphasis on social and political change. Re began by describin?


    5 6

    Iranian rev~lutisn+s the m s t renarkable

    in history, noting that the breadth and depth of the opposition to the Shah's regime was extraordinary. points that he made. 1.1. The main forces behind the revolution Bill Here follows other

    were grinding poverty (which I question) and corruption.

    noted there were also other factors, namely oppression, the letting up of 3ressure 52 the Shah without eoing anything constructive to deal 1~1th the disgruntlement with his goveznment, the fact that popular religious leaders decided to fight the monarchy, and the decision arbitrarily by the government In early 1978 to cool off the economy. 1.2. The present political system in Iran is

    dominated by the Mujtahids, who are older, revered religious

    leaders.

    There are perhaps 200 of these religious leaders They are not to be confused with the Mullahs,

    in Iran today.

    who are farther down the hierarchial ladder of Shiite Islam. Bill feels these Mujtahids are the most important people in Iran today and that we must therefore get to know who they are, how they think, and what their vision is for the Iran of the future. There are many indications that the younger Mujtahids and also other older Mujtahids do not agree with Khomeini. Bill also feels that we must count on the Mujtahids,

    such as Ta1eghar.i. to bridge the nap between the Passes of


    the people and the intelligen~ia. However, we cannot expect the Mujtahids to provide governmental leadership, or political leadership, since their traditional role in society has been the protection of the people's rights vis-a-vis the go\-ernment. They do not think positively enough to be political or governmental leaders. 1.3. Bill was very critical of the inter-

    nat~onalne&ia, referring to their f o b as "fourth-raze" several times during his talk. He particularly objected to

    the way Khoneini has been presented, arguing he is not nearly as bad as the press has made him out. Query, however, the

    pronouncements this week that music is evil. 1.4. There is a preoccupation within the

    revolutionary gover-nent today with a perceived danger of interference by the United States. Paranoid. Bill says this

    stems from a number of things, including the fact that right-wing assassination squads have been knocking off eight to ten revolutionary people every night since the revolution took place. If this is true, it certainly would help to

    explain this matter. 1.5. There are four main forces threatening The first is the right-wing bands

    stability in Iran today.

    of assasins, which Bill feels will continue their activities for another year and a half at least until they are brought -~r.Aer ccntrol.
    Zacxc?:y,

    z h c e hre =he etnnic separatist

    novements, which Bill feels is the most dangerous force. Thirdly, there is the alienation of the secular, modern-educated intelligencia, who, Eill says, is absolutely essential to the long-tern future of Iran. Finally, there are the left-

    wing, marxist groups, the most prominent of which is known as the Fedayeen Khalq. 1.6. There are three groups which hold the The military, the

    key to the retam of skability to Iran:

    professional middle Class and the progressive religious leaders, the Mujtahids mentiones above. In this latter group Bill He said he did not

    feels Taleghani is the most important.

    think Shariat nadari is a significant force i2 this. 1.7. Bill noted that every U.S. President since Nixcn and Kissinger went,

    Jack Kennedy has supported the Shah.

    in Bill's opinion, way beyond the bonds Of acceptability in the deal they made with the Shah. Other reasons why

    Iranian attitude towards the United States today is negative are the supportive statements by Carter right up to the end, including the famous telephone call from Carter to the Shah on bloody Friday-(September 8 1978) which was made from Camp David and, of course, received wide publicity both within Iran and without. Bill feels there will continue to be dif-

    ficulties between Iran and the United States at the political level for the next year or so, but that ttey will pass. He says Iranians like Americans and the idea of-America very much and there is a large reservoir of good will despite the universal animosity of Iranians towards our government. (There is a thought here that if Ted Kennedy should become our next President, relations with Iran would greatly improve overnight. Query whether I could interest Ted in making a

    trip to Iran at the eppropriate time?) 1.8. Eill is milaly criticai of our government's present posture toward Iran, which is that of a very, very low profile. Bill feels our government should be doing

    something positive, perhaps offering aid of some kind. (I disagree with this at the present time because of the paranoia referred to above by Bill himself on the part of the

    Iranian government leaders today regarding interference by the


    U.S.)

    Bill stated other embassies in Teheran are He specifically mentioned Korea and

    building up rapidly. Japan. 1.9.

    There was only a passing reference to Bill noted that the social patterns

    corruption in Iran today.

    remain the same and that only a political revolution is in process so far. Ie seemed to feel that the customary laying i (I should query him on

    on of gifts is an acceptable thing.


    ? . : w

    he squares this with his identi5ying corruption as one


    1

    of the forces which caused the revolution.) 1.10. to the labor problem. There was also only brief reference Bill said it was rather encouraging He also said, however

    that the oil workers had stayed on.

    that the students were running the universities, the workers were running the factories, and the privates were running the army. Ee felt all of this would burn itself out fairly quickly. 1.11. Brief reference was made to the need Bill stated the Koreans were no longer

    for expatriates in Iran.

    welcome in Iran or the Gulf area for a variety of reasons, including a reported propensity to the colmnission of robbery, burglaries, etc.

    2.

    There were over 50 well-known American companies Among these were a number of

    represented at the conference.

    investor companies who have had expatriates back in Teheran recently. favorable. The reports of these representatives were very

    The companies include du Pont, Carrier, Foremost-

    McKesson-Robbins, General Electric Technical Services (Repairshop) and Harza.


    3.

    Bud Menaker is General Counsel for Martin He worked in Iran for a couple of years

    Marietta Aerospace.

    for the PM3 represe-t:ns t l Irar~iangoverrment in teleie communications procurement. In his talk he attempted to be

    more critical of the present situation in Iran and less optimistic about the future. He noted the danger of the

    clergy fouling the government up for many more months to come, and the oft-reported oppression of the new regime, specifically mentioning the banning of movies and music and the cutti-g into press freedom.
    C.

    Dan Burt,

    an

    American lawyer with offices in

    Saudi Arabia, flatly disagreed with the view that the situation in Iran was going to improve. He based his position

    on opinion in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf area to the effect that Khomeini will not remain in power much longer but will be replaced by a left-wing government. Burt said the Saudis

    are terribly concerned about what is going on in Iran, by which he presumably meant the instability caused by the revolution.

    John A. Westberg

    AMA

    ATTENDANCE LIST July 25-26, 1979

    George T. Lee, Jr. Akin, Gump, Hauer & Feld 2800 Republic National Bank Bldg. Dallas, Texas 75201 Robert G. Bihum VP & General Manager ARES, Inc. Box 459 Port Clinton, Ohio 43452 Lee Adams, V.P. Ralph S. Newman, Jr., Executive VP American Rice, Inc. Box 2587 Houston, Texas 77001 Thomas Carney Ashland Oil, Inc. Box 391 Ashland, Kentucky
    &

    CEO

    41101

    William Beard, Managing Director Carrier International P.O. Box 4806 Syracuse, New York 13221 Raymond Ewing, Mgr.-Treasury Combustion Engineering, Inc. 1000 Prospect Hill Rd. Windsor, Connecticut 06095 W.O. Faith, VP Continental Mechanical of Middle East Ltd P.O. Box 633 Addison, Texas 75001 ~d Kazem, Dir., Finance & Administration CBS Records Intl 51 West 52nd Street New York, New York 10019
    J. Parker Lapp, Intl. Banking Assoc. Continental Bank-Chicago Africa/Middle East 231 S. LaSalle Street Chicago, Illinois 60693

    J.E. Ryan, Sales Manager Celanese Corporation 1211 Avenue of'the Americas New York, New York 10036

    Carl Borden, Director Paul Newhart, Manager E.I. du Pont 1007 Market Street Wilmington, Delaware 19898 C.A. Keen, VP & Treasurer Fedders Corp. Woodbridge Avenue 'Edison, New Jersey 08817 Alfred Marden Mgr., Intl. Bus. Dev. Prog. General Electric Co. Bldg. 2-707 1 River Road Schenectady, New York 12345 Paul Lehning Mgr., Middle East Gas Turbine Service General Electric Technical Services Co. Bldg. 513 W 1 River Road Schenectady, New York 12345 Gulf Oil Corp. Room 1915, Gulf Bldg. Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15230 Richard Macken, Sr. Analyst, Mid-East Affairs Michael J. Figel General Electric Co. 570 Lexington Avenue New York, New York 10022 Linda C. Baroody, Esq. International Hotels Corp. Pan Am Building New York, New York 10017 IBM Europe 8 Cite Retiro 75008 Paris, France T.F. Cadigan, Manager Aloysius F. Ring, Jr., Group Contr. Norman St. Landau, International Counsel Johnson & Johnson Intl. 501 George Street New Brunswick, New Jersey 08930

    Charles E. Duffy, VP.-Intl. Mellon Bank Mellon Square Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15230 Niel K. Friedman, Administration Dept. Mitsui & Co. (USA) Inc. 200 Park Avenue New York, New York 10017 Phillips Petroleum Company 508 Frank Phillips Building Bartlesville, Oklahoma 74004 B.L. Bates, Strategic Planner W.W. Dunn, V.P. Latin America-Asia K.E. Rogers, Esq.

    Donald D. Montgomery, V.P. & 1ntl.Const. Procon International Algonquin L Mt. Prospect Roads Des Plaines, Illinois 60016 John Wilson, Director, Middle East & Africa Ben Cole, Director-Financial Analysis Rockwell International 600 Grant Street Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15219 Walter Cardwell, Esq. Derek S.L. Bostock, Esq. John Milem, V.P.-Finance Sedco, Inc. 1901 N Akard Dallas, Texas 75201 John J. Doherty, Controller Sylvania Tech. Sys. Box 9003 Sunnyvale, California 94086 Philip A. Gaita, Dir. Contracts Cliff Wright, Project Mgr. Singer Co., Link Division Kirkwood Industrial Park Bingharnton, New York 13902 Ray J. Hope, Sr. V.P. Tidewater, Inc. 1440 Canal Street, Suite 2100 New Orleans, Louisiana 70112 Robert Angus, Prog. Mgr., Iran Programs Westinghouse Electric Corp. 1111 schilling Road, MS 7600 Hunt Valley, Maryland 21030

    NNNNVV ESA95 6BRA456 00 RUaMHR be RUEHC H912 230Et232 ZNY S S S S S ZZH 0 1 7 e 2 3 Q AUG 7 9 ~ECSTATE WASHDC TO AMEMBASSY TEHRAN IMMEDIATE 4 129

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    S E C R E T STATE 2 1 5 9 7 2 E.0. TAGS* SUBJECT 8


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    (UEMENT,

    CARL)

    CHRON

    APER, PEPR, I R

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    POLITICAL REPORTING: EWIIRE TEXT)

    NEEDED RESOURCES

    2. A S PART OF HIGH-LEVEL PROGRAM REVIEW OF PERSONNEL AND RESOURCE NEEDED TO STRENGTHEN POLITICAL REPORTING FROM S n E C T E D CRITICAL WUNTRIES, WE HAVE BEEN ASKED T 0 MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING IRAN. FOLLOWING I S A FIRST DRAFf WRITTEN ACCORDING TO THE PRESCRIBED FORMAT AND WITH DEMANDED BREVITY. WE ARE AWAITING SRF COMMENT HERE ON THE 'GAPS I N COVERAGE- PART, BUT SINCE OUR SUBMISSIONS I DIE COB AUGUS 21 THERE MAY NOT BE TIME TO VET THAT WITH YOU. WE WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR SUBSTANTIVE COMMENTS, PARTICLLARLY ON THE 'RECOMMENDED ACTIONS' PART, AND WELCOME ANY ADDITIONAL SUGGESTIONS YOU MAY CARE T 0 MAKE.
    3.

    MAJOR PROBLEMS/DEVELOPMENTSr REVOLUTIONARY SITUATION WITH CONTINUED INSTABILITY AND COMPETING POWER CENTERS. GOVERIWENIAL PROCESS IN TRANSITIONAL SIAOE. POLITICAL PROCESS MARKED WITH SERIOUS COMPETITION AND CONFRONTATION BETWEEN RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR AND LEFT AND RIGHT, WITHIN ETHNIC MINORITY GROUPS. SECURITY SITUATION UNSTABLE. RELIGIOUS MINORITIES ANXIOUS. MASSIVE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, ESPECIALLY UNEMROYMENT AND R I S I N G INFLATION, WITH SERIOUS POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS. NEW LABOR MILITANCY. MILITARY AND POLICE STILL LARGELY DISORGANIZED AND DISCREDITED. OIL PRODUCTION STEADY AT 4M B/D SINCE A B I L I T Y TO DEFEND APRIL BUT VLLNERABLE TO DISRUPTIONS. FEARS OF COUNTERBORDERS AND GULF AREA QUESIIONABLE. CONCERN ABOUT REVOLUTIONARY AND/OR OUTSIDE PLOTTING. MARXIST/COMMUNISI ACTIVIT Y AND CAPABILITY FOR .z n DESTABILIZING ACTION.

    --

    QUOTE.

    IRAN.

    G A P S I N COVERAGEr LACK O F INFORMATION AND UNDERSTANDING OF: WHO THE KEY MOVERS ARE AND HOW THE CURRENTLY FRAGMENTED POWER SYSTEM OPERATES; R E L A T I O N S H I P S BETWEEN R E L I G I O U S LEADERS, T H E I R FOLLOWERS AND SECULAR L E A D E R S AND GROUPS; COMPOSITION AND STRENGTHS O F VARIED GROUPS MAKING U P L E F T I S T FORCES$ L E A D E R S H I P AND ORGANIZATION O F GUERILLA GROUPS, T R I B E S , AND ETHNIC M I N O R I T I E S ( K l R D S , ARABS, ETC.); STRENGTH AND COMPOSITION O F REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS AN0 PARA-MILITARY GROUPS; L E A D E R S H I P AND ORGANIZATION O F 'KOMITEHS" I N GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS, M I L I T A R Y , AND 1M)USTRY; L E A D E R S H I P AND STRENGTH O F NEW MIL ITANT WORKER GROUPS. E S P E C I A L L Y I N O I L SECTOR: MILITARY COMMAND S T R VRE, OPERATIONAL PREPAREDUESS, ~ AND WILL T O FIGHTS P O L I T I C A L I M P L I C A T I O N S O F CONTINUED MASSIVE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS SUCH AS LOW PRODUCTIVITY. SHORTAGES OF MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL, T E C H N I C I A N S , SPARE PARTS, RAW MATERIALS, F I N A N C I N G , AND MARKETS; BAZAAR POL IT ICS. RECOMMENDED A C T I O N S F I L L VACANT ECONOMIC AND OFFICER POSITIONSIMMEDIATELY. REVIEW NEED FOR R E E S T A B L I S H I N G P O L / f l I L P O S I T I O N . ENSURE POL S E C T I O N HAS A PERMANENTLY-ASSIGNED SECRETARY. CONSIDER E S T A B L I S H INQ ROTATIONAL J U N I O R OFFICER POSITION I N POL SECTION. REOPEN T H E THREE CONSULATES A S SOON AS C O N D I T I O N S PERMIT. A S S I G N O F F I C E R S T O THEM W I T H P O L I T I C A L R E P O R T I N G E X P E R I F I L L SENIOR FOREIGN S E R V I C E NATIONAL P O L I T I C A L ENCE. ADVISOR P O S I T I O N QUICKLY. CONSIDER ADDING ONE FSN P O S I T I O N I N POL S E C T I O N T O A S S I S T W I T H MEDIA COVERAGE. MAKE AVAILABLE FUNDS FOR I N D I V I D U A L LANGUAGE I N Y P ' J C T ION AT POST T O HELP P O L I T I C A L AND ECONOMIC O F F I C E k f MAINTAIN ASSURE FUNDS FOR AND IMPROVE T H E I R LANGUAGE C A P A B I L I T Y . TRAVEL IN-COUNTRY AND START TRAVEL A S QUICKLY AS CONDIT I O N S PERMIT. I N C R E A S E P U B L I C A T I O N S PROCUREMENT PROGRAM. T O MAXIMVM EXTENT P O S S I B L E , E S T A B L I S H AND MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH ALL MAJOR P O L I T I C A L GROUPS, INCLUDING O P P O S I T I O N , AND KNOWLEDGEABLE INDEPENDENT P O L I T I C A L OBSERVERS. 91
    115972

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    BRUCE)

    OR-M

    SUBJECT:

    1.

    (C

    IRAN:

    P O L I C Y OVERVIEW

    ENTIRE TEXT).

    2.

    SUMMARY O F I N T R O D U C T I O N :

    T H E R E FOLLOWS A N O V E R V I E W

    O F T H E CURRENT S I T U A T I O N I N I R A N W I T H I N W H I C H WE P U R S U E OUR I N T E R E S T S , CONDUCT O F U.S. FUTURE. SUMMARY. F O L L O W E D B Y SOME G E N E R A L COMMENTS ON T H E P O L I C Y OVER T H E N E A R - T E R M (12-18 MONTHS) END

    (COMPLETE B A L A N C E OF T H I S PARA LATER).

    2.

    C L A R I T Y I S N O HALLMARK OF TODAY'S

    IRAN.

    OUR V I S I B I L I T Y THE

    (AND T H A T OF MOST OTHER OBSERVERS) I R A N I A N REVOLUTION,

    I S STILL LIMITED.

    U N P R E P A R E D FOR I T S Q U I C K SUCCESS, AND E V E N MORE P O O R L Y I M P L E M E N T E D .

    REMAINS I L L - A R T I C U L A T E D

    F L O U N D E R I N G WOULD B E T O 0 STRONG A WORD* B U T I R A N I S


    M l

    F A R FROM F I N D I N G I T S B E A R I N G S P O L I T I C A L L Y ,

    A N D I T WOULD

    E Q U A L L Y A T S E A E C O N O M I C A L L Y WERE I T N O T FOR O I L R E V E N U E S U N D I M I N I S H E D FROM P R E - R E V O L U T I O N FIGURES.

    4.

    ONE T H I N G I S CLEAR.

    I S L A M REMAINS PREDOMINANT.

    K H O M E I N I AND H I S ENTROURAGE A T QUM C A L L A L L T H E SHOTS. THERE I S MUCH T A L K O F U N I T Y I N T H E S P I R I T O F I S L A M , AS E S S E N T I L A L T O THWART T H E C O U N T E R - R E V O L U T I O N A R I E S DESCRIBED AND

    CONFIDENTIAL

    ,.

    AND

    ARE S I A D TO B E B E H I N D THE REVOLUTION'S

    D I F F I C U L T I E S I N K U R D I S T A N AND K H U Z I S T A N AND I N D E E D RESPONSIBLE FOR T H E R E G I M E S P R O B L E M S I N WHATEVER F I E L D . D O R I N A N T M O T I V A T I N G FORCE, THOUGH N O

    KHOREINI RENIANS THE SINGLEI UNCHALLENGED

    P O L I T I C A L L Y FROM ANY QUARTER,

    LONGER A S S A C R O S A N C T A S S I X MONTHS AGO; PROBABLY* I S AYATOLLAH SHARIAT-MADARI

    A CASE I N P O I N T , DISTANCING HIMSELF

    I N MESHED D U R I N G T H E E L E C T I O N S T O T H E C O N S T I T U T I O N A L R E V I E W C O U N C I L J U S T COMPLETED.

    5.

    THE NATURE O F THOSE ELECTIONS,

    RESULTING PREDICTABLY CLERICS,

    I N A C O U N C I L W I T H A S O L I D M A J O R I T Y OF PRO-KHOMEINI

    S Y M P O L I Z E D T H E E S S E N T I A L R I G I D I T Y O F T H E I S L A M I C FORCES A T QUM. FOR T H E R E G I M E S O P P O N E N T S * T H E RESULT, I T I S INDEED A JOYLESS

    REVOLUTION.

    AS WE H A V E R E P O R T E D S E P A R A T E L Y ,

    HAS B E E N A GROWING F R U S T R A T I O N ON T H E P A R T O F T H E MORE SECULAR* INTELLECTUAL, M O D E R N I S T FORCES I N T H E A L L I A N C E W I T H GROWING I N S T A B I L I T Y I N T H E P O L A R I Z A T I O N I N T H E L O N G 7121. B U T T H E V I O L E N C E ON T H E

    T H A T T O P P L E D T H E SHAH, SHORT TERM AND>%%$

    r\

    I R A N I S N O T T H U S P O L A R l Z E D YET,

    S T R E E T S O F T E H R A N T H I S P A S T WEEK B E T W E E N T H E S E C U L A R AND T H E I S L A M I C P O L I T I C A L GROUPS I S S U G G E S T I V E O F D I F F I C U L T Y TO COME I F T H E R E I S NOT A L A R G E R C A P A C I T Y FOR C O M P R O M I S E ON THE P A R T O F T H E NOW-DOMINANT I S L A M I C FORCES. HOWEVER,

    6.
    TO

    THOSE FORCES R E M A I N S U F F I C I E N T L Y I N COMMAND,

    ENSURE T H E C A R R Y I N G THROUGH O F A C O N S T I T U T I O N A L P R O C E S S

    T H A T I S S C H E D U L E D TO P U T A N E L E C T E D GOVERNMENT I N P L A C E

    CONFIDENTIAL

    BY L A T E FALL.

    N E I T H E R A D I S T A N T B A K T I A R I N P A R I S NOR THE

    S T I L L DENORALIZED M I I L I T A R Y I S ANY OBSTACLE TO THAT. THE NEXT GOVERNMENT I S L I K E L Y TO B E DRAWN E S S E N T I A L L Y FROM THE PRESENT W COUNCILI TO G I V E T OF CHARACTERS I N THE P G O l AND T H E REVOLUTIONA

    WITH A S U F F I C I E N T N A J O R I T Y I N AN ELECTED PARLIAMENT

    57W E

    REASONABLE LONGEVITY FOR THE F I R S T 12-18 MONTHS

    AT LEAST.

    BUT THERE I S L I T T L E REASON TO T H I N K THAT SUCH A

    NAJORITY W I L L HAVE MUCH S U B S T A N T I V E COHESION BEYOND WHAT I S L A M CAN PROVIDE. NOR I S THERE MUCH L I K E L I H O O D THAT I T

    OR I T S LEADERS W I L L B E S U F F I C I E N T L Y F L E X I B L E TO STEM WHAT COULD B E A GROWING A L I E N A T I O N AMONG THE M I D D L E CLASS, THE

    TECHNOCRATS* AND THE SECULAR FORCES GENERALLY WHO ARE NEEDED TO RUN AN ALREADY S U B S T A N T I A L L Y MODERNIZED IRAN.

    7.

    KHOMEINI H I M S E L F REMAINS A MAJOR-DETERMINANT OF THE WERE HE TO STEP BACK, AFTER THE AND G I V E

    P O L I T I C A L FUTURE.

    I N S T A L L A T I O N OF A CONSTITUTIONAL

    GOVERNMENT,

    BREATHING SPACE TO MORE MODERATE CLERICAL LEADERS SUCH AS TALEGHANI AND SHARIAT-MADARI, P O L I T I C A L BLOC COULD SHOW PRESENT A L I E N T A T I O N OF THE THERE I S NO EVIDENCE OF THAT,
    PRODUCING

    I T I S POSSIBLE THAT AN I S L A M I C

    WITNESS THE E D I C T S FROM PUN


    CONTROLS ON THE P R E S S

    HARS.HLY

    RESTRICTIVE

    AND

    ENCOURAGING I S L A M I C EXTREMISTS TO TAKE TO THE STREETS TO DENOUNCE SO-CALLED U.S.-INSPIRED, LEFT-LEANING

    INTELLECTUALS OUT TO SABOTAGE THE REVOLUTION.

    8.

    S I M I L A R R I G I D I T Y I S STARKLEY APPARENT I N QUM'S BRUTE FORCE,

    REACTION

    TO ISSUES OF P R O V I N C I A L AUTONOMY.

    INCLUDING

    LIBERALU S E

    OF SUMMARY EXECUTIONS,

    APPEARS TO B E THE R E G I M E ' S

    ONLY UAY OF RESPONDING. THE MOMENT I N K H U Z I S T A N . APPLIED I H KURDISTAN

    THAT P O L I C Y MAY HAVE UORKED FOR I T I S NOW B E I N G RUTHLESSLY

    AN AREA UHERE FORCE OF THE K I N D NOW

    B E I N 6 A P P L I E D WOULD APPEAR ALMOST C E R T A I N TO A L I E N A T E P O L I T I C A L FORCES AVOWEDLY OPEN TO COMPROMISE ON THE B A S I S OF AUTONOMY.

    9.

    ECONOMICALLY,

    THERE I S UIDESPREAD D I S I L L U S I O N M E N T

    THAT THE R E V O L U T I O N HAS NOT PRODUCED RESULTS I T HAS MADE THIHGS WORSE FOR MANY,

    I N D E F D THAT

    I N C L U D I N G THE VERY

    LARGE NUMBER OF UNEMPLOYED.

    BUT T H I S HAS HARDLY DAMPENED

    THE ENTHUSIASM FOR K H O M E I N I AMONG THOSE SEEMINGLY HARDEST H I T b HE CAN S T I L L F I L L THE STREETS W I T H SUPPORTERS FROH SOUTH TEHRAN. SO LONG AS O I L REVENUES CONTINUE AT T H E I R

    PRESENTLY H I G H L E V E L S THE REVDLUTION I S NOT CHALLENGED ECONOMICALLY. B U T THERE COULD BE GROUINS P O L I T I C A L FALLOUT WITH

    I F P A R A L Y S I S CONTINUES I N THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY, I T S HEAVY EMPLOYMENT POTENTIAL, AND I F THE S T I L L

    GENERALLY

    STALEMATED I N D U S T R I A L SECTOR DOES NOT PICK-U$j

    AN AREA WHERE SKILLS

    THE F L I G H T OF N A N A G E R I A L PERSONNEL AND ~NT&'PERNIAL

    HAS BEEN AND CONTINUES SERIOUS AND WHERE A T T I T U D E S TOWARDTHE RETURN OF FOREIGN P R I V A T E ENTERPRISE I S S T I L L U N C E R T A I N AT BEST.

    10.

    A REGIME W I T H T H I S RANGE OF PROBLEMS AT HOME MIGHT B E BUT THE

    ADVISED TO PLAY DOWN I T S INVOLVEMENT ABROAD.

    I R A N I A N R E V O L U T I O N I N V O L V E S THREE MAJOR TENETS I N I T S


    I J

    FOREIGN OUTLOOK AND THESE REMAIN POWERFULLY DETERHING ON

    r-

    CONFIDENTIBL

    A WHOLE RANGE OF ISSUES;

    THESE TENETS I N C L U D E THE

    A P P L I C A B I L I T Y OF THE I R A N I A N REVOLUTION W I T H I N THE U N I V E R S A L I T Y OF ISLAM; THE REJECTION OF FOREIGN INFLUENCE, AHD THE

    BE I T GODLESS COMMUNISM OR WESTERN C A P I T A L I S M ;

    PARTICULAR MENACE OF INTERNATIONAL Z I O N I S M TO THE INTERESTS OF ISLAM. THE RESULT I S AN A C T I V I S T FOREIGN POLICY, ESPECIALLY V I S - A - V I S ABRASIVE

    TO MANY OF OUR INTERESTS, BUT

    ISRAEL,

    BECAUSE OF AN I N N A T E S U S P I C I O N OF THE SOVIETS RE61ME

    POSSIBLY EVEN GREATER THAN THAT OF THE SHAH'S

    CAPABLE

    OF A REASONABLE F I D E L I T Y TO CENUINE NON-ALIGNRENfr

    11.

    I N T H I S SETTING,

    WE SEE OUR I N T E R E S T S I N I R A N AS FIRST, THE PRESERVATION OF I R A N ' S SECOND, THE HEALTH OF I T S

    ESSENTIALLY THREEFOLD,

    I N T E G R I T Y AND INDEPENDENCE; O I L INDUSTRY, I N THE WEST;

    WITH A CAPACITY FOR CONTINUED NORMAL MARKETING THIRD, AN I R A N I A N FOREIGN P O L I C Y THAT L I M I T S

    THE DEGREE TO WHICH I T I D E N T I F I E S I R A N U I T H THE MORE RADICAL OF THE NON-ALIGNED ELEMENTS. I N LARGE PART, THESE ARE

    INTERESTS THAT W SHARE WITH MUCH OF THE P O L I T I C A L SPECTRUM E OF I R A N EXCEPT THE FAR LEFT.

    12.

    OUR CURRENT POLICY STANCE TOWARD I R A N I S ONE OF


    'STRICT

    LOU PROFILE,

    NON-INVOLVEMENT,

    OPEN TO OPPORTU~~ITIES

    TO ENHANCE OUR R E L A T I O N S H I P WHERE P O S S I B L E BUT LEAVING I T LARGELY UP TO THE PGOI AS TO THE PACE BY WHICH W MOVE E TO B U I L D A NEW RELATIONSHIP. W E B E L I E V E T H I S POLICY BUT UE ALSO B E L I E V E A

    HAS BEEN THE RIGHT ONE TO DATE,

    SOMEWHAT MORE FORWARD POLICY COMMANDS I T S E L F AS I R A N

    CONFIDENTIAL

    6
    PHASE. WE N E E D NOT, KHOMEINI

    MOVES I N T O I T S P O S T - R E V O L U T I O N A R Y AND S H O U L D NOT,

    EMBRACE T H E CURRENT REGIME;

    I S NO F R I E N D OF T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S . I S L A M I C CAMP A R E MORE O P E N T O US,

    B U T OTHERS I W T H E OVER T I M E .

    13.

    OUR W A T I O N S W I T H T H E P G O I A N D T H E F I R S T C O N S T I T U T I O N A L

    R E G I M E W I L L R E F L E C T OUR R E S P E C T I V E S OTHER.

    .;; TOWARD t;;

    EACH

    AN U N D E R L Y I N G P R O B L E M FOR US I N I R A N H A S B E E N T H E

    F A C T T H A T MUCH O F T H E NEW L E A D E R S H I P D O E S N O T Y E T P R E C E I V E T H A T WE H A V E A C C E P T E D T H E C H A N G E I N I R A N O R X X M E X Y I K I X X I ( T H O U G H SOME OF T H I S I S T A C T I C A L

    A R E F L E C T I O N OF T H E N E E D E V E N MORE

    TO K E E P R E V O L U T I O N A R Y C R E D E N T I A L S I N T A C T . )

    F U N D A M E N T A L T H A N T H A T H A S B E E N T H E D E T E R M I N A T I O N OF T H E NEW L E A D E R S H I P T O D E M O N S T R A T E I T S T O T A L I N D E P E N D E N C E FROM F O R E I G N ( R E A D U.S.) UNDERSTANDING SUSPECT. INFLUENCE. WE W I L L N E E D T O B E


    BEING

    OF THPS.

    A N Y E M B A R A C E F R O M US RISKS NONETHELESS, ROOM FOR U S T O

    B U T THERE I S ,

    D E M O N S T R A T E A G R E A T E R D E G R E E O F A C C E P T A N C E AND U N D E R S T A N D I N G , P A R T I C U L A R L Y AS T H E R E V O L U T I O N MOVES FROM T H E I M M E D I A T E KHOMEINI-DOMINATED RE.FLECTIVE C L E R I C I S M T O S O M E T H I N G H O P E F U L L Y MORE

    OF S O C I O L O G I C A L AND P O L I T I C A L R E A L I T I E S OF I R A N .

    It.

    11
    14.
    I N T H E I M M E D I A T E FUTURE,

    c-bC

    N O T H I N G M A T T E R S MORE I N T H A T

    R E S P E C T T H A N T H E T I M I N G AND P E R S O N OF A NEW AMBASSADOR. T I M E AND CIRCUMSTANCES H A V E COMBINED TO G I V E T H I S I S S U E AN U N U S U A L I M P O R T A N C E , ONE FOR W H I C H T H E P G O I D E C L I N E S ANY

    R E S P O N S I B I L I T Y B a T I N W H I C H T H E Y S E E US T O D A T E W I T H H O L D I N G OUR V O T E OF C O N F I D E N C E I N T H E P R E S E N T L E A D E R S H I P AND-

    CONFIDENTIAL

    I N THE REVOLUTION I T S E L F .

    15.

    O F ONLY S L I G H T L Y L E S S I M P O R T A N C E I S T H E AREA OF P U B L I C T H E P G O I H A S WELCOMED OUR P R I V A T E E X P R E S S I O N S

    DIPLOMACY.

    O F GOOD W I L L A N D O F W I L L I N G N E S S T O C O O P E R A T E I N A M U T U A L P R O C E S S O F B U I L D I N G A NEW R E L A T I O N S H I P . B U T THEY SEE I N THE

    V I R T U A L A B S E N C E ON OUR P A R T OF ANY P U B L I C S T A T E M E N T S T O T H E SAME E F F E C T A R E F L E C T I O N OF L E S S T H A N F U L L ENDORSEMENT. T H A T MAY N O T B E A L L B A D L O N G E V I T Y FOR T H E R E V O L U T I O N I S

    S T I L L F A R FROM C E R T A I N B U T SOME P O S I T I V E E X P R E S S L O N O N OUR P A R T O f U N D E R S T A N D I N G FOR T H E D I F F I C U L T T R A N S I T I O N T H A T I R A N I S G O I N G THROUGH COULD STRENGTHEN T H E HAND OF THE M O D E R A T E S WHO WANT GOOD T I E S W I T H US. AND W H I L E T H E I

    I S P R I M A R I L Y O N T H E P G O I T O A C T I N WAYS T H A T E N H A N C E I T S I M A G E I N T H E CONGRESS A N D AMONG T H E A M E R I C A N PUBLIC, AN O C C A S I O N A L P O S I T I V E AND P U B L I C S T A T E M E N T B Y

    A D M I N I S T R A T I O N S P O K E S M E N A B O U T OUR I N T E R E S T A N D H O P E S I N T H E NEW I R A N C A N H E L P R E D U C E SOME O F T H E C H I P ON T H E SHOULDER, DAMN YOU F O R OUR GAS L I N E S , A T T I T U D E S TOWARD

    I R A N I N T H E U.S.

    P U B L I C T H A T DO N O T H E L P U S I N P U R S U I N G INTERESTS I N IRAN. WE ARE NOW I N P O S I T I O N I N TH-E T O A C T I N WAYS T H A T w

    W --RANGE
    16.

    I N M I L I T A R Y SUPPLY,

    A F T E R M A T H O F T H E DOD S U P P L E M E N T A L ,

    R E F U T E P G O I S U S P I C I O N S T H A T WE H A V E H E L D B A C K ON S D E L I V E R I E S FOR P O L I T I C A L R E A S O N S . USE,

    S p a

    MORE I M P O R T A N T L Y WE C A N WHAT W I L L B E A

    MORE A C T I V E L Y T H A N WE H A V E TO DATE,

    N E C E S S A R I L Y REDUCED B U T S T I L L S U B S T A N T I A L M I L I T A R Y SUPPLY

    CONFIDENTIAL

    D E P E N D E N C E O N U S F O R OUR OWN I N T E R E S T S ,

    INCLUDING

    REBUILDING A L I A I S O N WITH A M I L I T A R Y ESTABLISHMENT THAT REMAINS STRONGLY WESTERN AND E S S E N T I A L L Y MODERATE I N I T S P O L I T I C A L OUTLOOK.

    THOSE N O N - L E F T I S T

    S E C U L A R FORCES I N T H E P O L I T I C A L F I E L D WHO

    A R E OUR N A T U R A L A L L I E S A R E A L S O T H O S E WHO R E C O G N I Z E I R A N ' S C O N T I N U I N G N E E D S FOR W E S T E R N C O N T A C T S I N B U S I N E S S A N D TECHNOLOGY. WE S H O U L D C O N T I N U E T O C O U N S E L A N E R I C R N B U S I N E S S

    W I T H UNRESOLVED I N V E S T M E N T I S S U E S I N I R A N TO S T I C K W I T H I T

    WITH PATIENCE,

    PERSISTENCE,

    S Y P M P A T H E T I C U N D E R S T A N D I N G FOR A

    &&

    AND A GOOD D E A L OF NATIONALISTIC

    ATMOSPHERE T H A T D I C T A T E S A M I N I M U M OF F O R E I G N M A N A G E R I A L AND T E C H N I C A L L E V E L P R E S E N C E .

    18.

    I N FOREIGN POLICY,

    WE S H A R E W I T H T H E P G O I A INTEREST I N IRAN'S I N T E G R I T Y AND

    FUNDAMENTAL S T R A T E G I C INDEPENDENCE. CLAIM, REGIME.

    I T I S A POLICY

    A S S E T T H E S O V I E T S CANNOT C O N C E I V A B L E SUCCESSOR UNDERLYING T H I S FACT

    W I T H T H I S OR V I R T U A L L Y ANY T H I S I S NOT AFGHANISTAN.

    I S B O T H T H E F U N D A M E N T A L A V E R S I O N T B C O M M U N I S M AMONG T H E I S L A M I C FORCES AND T H E H I S T O R I C DISTRVP U N I O N AMONG M O S T I R A N I A N S . OF T H E S O V I E T

    T H E S E ARE P O W E R F U L R E A S O N S

    WHY WE CAN A F F O R P T O L E T T H E NEW I R A N I A N L E A D E R S H I P B A S I C A L L Y S E T T H E I R OWN P A C E I N B U I L D I N G A R E L A T I O N S H I P

    W I T H U S * W H I L E E X P L O I T I N G O P P O R T U N I T I E S TO G A I N P O L I C Y

    CONFIDENTIAL

    GROUND U H E N S Y M P A T H E T I C FOR.

    U N D E R S T A N D I N G ON OUR P A R T I S C A L L E D

    THAT W I L L INCLUDE TOLERATING T H E I R NON-ALIGNMENT

    AND I N D E E D C O M P L I M E N T I N G T H E M FOR I T U H E N I T I N V O L V E S , AS WE B E L I E V E I T U I C L I A R E F U S A L T O GO A L O N G W I T H T H E WE S H O U L D B E

    CUBANS ON T H E I R V E R S I O N O F N O N - A L I G N M E N T . ALERT TO SUCH O P P O R T U N I T I E S T H I S FALL,

    ESPECIALLY I F

    ANY OF T H E P G O I L E A D E R S H I P A T T E N D T H E UNGA.

    19.

    F I N A L L Y THERE REMAINS,

    HOWEVER,

    T H E F A C T OF A

    S U B S T A N T I A L C O M M U N I C A T I O N S GAP BETWEEN U S AND T H E ' I S L A M I C FORCES I N I R A N . KHOMLINI, THAT GAP I S GREATEST I N A L E A D E R L I K E

    WHERE I T I N V O L V E S B O T H R I G I D R E L I G I O U S ORTHODOXY I T

    AND AN E N G R A I N E D D I S T A S T E AND S U S P I C I O N OF T H E U.S.

    I S L E S S AMONG MORE M O D E R A T E F I G U R E S S U C H A S A Y A T O L L A H S T A L E G H A N I AND S H A R I A T - M A D A R I . TO U N D E R S T A N D I N G W I T H V I R T U A L L Y LEADERSHIP, BUT I T I S A SERIOUS A L L OF T H E CLERICAL OBSTACLE

    A GROUP D E S T I N E D TO P L A Y A M A J O R R O L E I N I R A N I T I S I M P O R T A N T T H A T WE S E E K THIS GAP, INCLUDING

    OVER T H E N E X T FEW Y E A R S .

    I M A G i N A T I V E WAYS TO B E G I N T O BRIDGE .EXCHANGE

    V I S I T S BY ACKNOWLEDGED EXPERTS

    I N T H E F I E L D S OF

    R E L I G I O N AND P H I L O S O P H Y INVOLVING

    AND LONGER T F R M E X C H A N G E PROGRAMS

    STUDENTS

    I N THESE FIELDS.&

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    CONFIDENTIAL DE RUQMHR # 9503 239 " ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 271147 2; AUG 79 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3468 BT

    TEHRAN 9503

    CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL CHRGE: STATE 8/27/79 APPRV: CHARGE:VLTOMSETH DEFTD: CHARGE:VLTOMSETH:EM CLEAR: C0NS:RMOREFIELD DISTR: CHARGE CONS RF POL2

    O N F I D E N T I A LTEHRAN

    09503

    E.O. 12065: GDS 8/27/85 (TOMSETH, V.L.) OR-M TAGS: CVIS, PEPR, SHUM, IR SUBJECT: NIV APPLICATIONS IN "POST-CRISIS" IRAN REF: STATE 35557

    2. SUMMARY. EMBASSY BELIEVES THAT IRAN CAN NO LONGER BE CHARACTERIZED AS BEING IN "CRISIS, AND, ACCORDINGLY. RECOMMENDS THAT REFTEL BE RESCINDED. END SUMMARY.

    3. THE IMMEDIATE TRAUMA OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION HAS PASSED. WHILE THE SITUATION REMAINS FAR DIFFERENT IN CERTAIN RESPECTS THAN UNDER THE PAHLAVI REGIME, IN THE SIX MONTHS SINCE FEBRUARY IRAN HAS SETTLED INTO A ROUTINE, THE MAIN FEATURES OF WHICH WILL PROBABLY PERTAIN FOR THE INDEFINITE FUTURE. THESE INCLUDE POLITICAL DOMINANCE BY THE ISLAMIC CLERGY, A HIGH LEVEL OF RELIGIOUS-C'JMNATIONALIST RHETORIC NOT SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERENT THAN THAT FOUND IN MANY THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES, AND AN ECONOMY SHAPED MORE BY POLITICAL PEHCEPTIONS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE THAN RATIONAL CRITEHIA FOR SOUND MANAGEMENT. THERE ARE MANY IN IRAN WHO FIND THESE CONDITIONS PERSONALLY UPSETTING ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS MINORITIES ARE SUSPICIOUS OF THE EMPHASIS ON PERSIAN SHIA ISLAM. MODERNIST AND SECULAR ELEMENTS RESENT THEIR OWN DIMINISHED ROLE IN 90TH THE ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL SPHERES. AND MANY OTHERS LAMENT THE GENERAL INEFFICIENCY AND ARBITRARINESS OF THE CURRENT SYSTEM.

    4.

    5. MUCH OF THE CRITICISM IS VALID. HOWEVER, THE CONDITIONS WHICH IT IS BASED CANNOT BE TERMED A "CRISIS". RATHER, THEY ARE WHAT HAS COME TO PASS FOR NORMALITY I N THIS COUNTRY. ACCORDINGLY, WE FIND IT NO LONGER APPROPRIATE TO SPEAK OF A " POST-CRISIS" IRAN IN DEALING WITH NON-IMMIGRANT VISA APPLICANTS. THAT MANY IRANIANS WOULD PREFER TO HAVE THPIR COUNTRY BE SOMETHING OTHER THAN WHAT IT ACTUALLY IS. DOES NOT, IN OUR VIEW, CONSTITUTE GROUNDS FOR CONTINUED BENDING OF OUR IMMIGRATION LAW. IN SHORT, THE SITUATION HERE IS ESSENTIALLY SIMILAR TO A NUMBER OF OTHER DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WHERE LOCAL CONDITIONS PROVIDE STRONG INCENTIVES FOR MANY IRANIANS TO EMIGRATE. WE SHOULD DEAL WITH THIS SITUATION EXACTLY AS WE DO IN THOSE COUNTRIES WHERE " PUSH" FACTORS ARE ALSO STRONG.
    6. TREATMENT OF VARIOUS IRANIAN MINORITIES IN POSTREVOLUTIONARY IRAN DESERVES SPECIAL COMMENT. DESPITE NUMEROUS REPORTS OF HARASSMENTS DIRECTED AT INDIVIDUAL MEMBER 0 , THR EMBASSY HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO DOCUMENT INSTANCE OF OFFICIAL PERSECUTION DIRECTED EITHER AT INDIVIDUALS OR AT CATEGORIES OF PEOPLE. SENIOR GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND MEMBERS OF THE MUSLIM LEADERSHIP HAVE REPEATEDLY ASSURED ALL MINORITY GROUP MEMBERS THAT THEIR RIGHTS WILL BE RESPECTED IN THE IRANIAN ISLAMIC REPUBLIC. BUT THERE PREJUDICE AND BIGOTRY MOST CERTAINLY DO SXIST. IS NO QUALITATIVE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN IRAN UNDER THE SHAH AND IRAN UNDER KHOMEINI IN THIS REGARD. ALMOST INVARIABLY WHEN INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF MINORITY GROUPS ARE QUESTIONED CLOSELY ABOUT THEIR MOTIVATIONS FOR WANTING TO LEAVE IRAN, INCHOATE CONCERNS ABOUT THE FUTURE RATHER THAN SPECIFIC ACTS OF PERSECUTION IN THE PAST ARE GIVEN

    7. IN RIGHT OF THE ABOVE, WE RECOMMEND THAT REFTEL BE RESCINDED IMMEDIATELY, AND THAT ALL IRANIAN NIV APPLICANTS HENCEFORWARD BE REQUIRED TO DEMONSTRATE BINDING TIED AS STIPULATED IN THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT. TOMSETH BT #9503 NNNN

    CONFIDENTIAL EUQMRA RUSBLK RUQMKW RUDTC RUQMAM RUEHMO RUQMMT BUFNPS RUSNAM DE RUQMHR #9653/B1 242 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 3 0 1 1 5 1 2 AUG 7 9 F AMEMBASSI TEHRAN M TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3 5 5 0 INFO RUQMBI/AMEMBASST ABU DHABI 0249 RUQMGU/AMEMBASSI ANTARA 0 2 3 9 RUEEACAJSINT BAGHDAD 0 2 5 4 RUQMOD/AMEYBASSI DCEA 0 2 2 0 RUSBQD/AMEflBASSY ISLAMABAD 0 2 8 7 RUOMRA/AMEMBASSY J I r D A 0 2 8 2 RU~'BLK/AMEUBASS~ KABUL 0 2 9 1 RUOMKW/AMEMBASSI KUWAIT 0 2 5 2

    TEHRAN 9 6 5 3 / 1

    **

    CLASS : CHRGE: APPRV : DRFTD: CLEAR: DISTR:

    CONFIDENTIAL STATE 8/31/79 CHARGE:VLTOMSETB POL: JL1HBERT:GO TL:EASWIFT POL2 CEG DAO MAAG ICA RF CHRN

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    TEHRAN 0 9 6 5 3

    E.O. 1 2 0 6 5 : GDS e/3a/e5 (LINBERT, JOHN) OR-P TAGS: PINT, P I N S , POOV, IR SUBJECT: MOVES TOWARD GOVERNMENT UNIFICATION
    1.

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    2. SUMMARY: EVENTS OF THE PAST WEEKS INDICATE TEAT IRAN'S DUAL SISTEM OF OFlrICIAL AND UNORICIAL GOVERNMENT I S EVOLVING TOWARD A MORE UNIFIED STSTEM DOMINATZD BY THE UNOPPICIAL, OR REVOLUTIONARY, SECTOR. THE OFFICIAL, PROVISIONAL GOVERNMPNT OF IRAN (PGOI) HEADED BY P B I n r MINISTER BAZARGAN I S BEING INCREASINGLY OVERSHADOWED BY THE CLERICAL ESTABLISHNENT WHICH I S S M D I N G ITS AUTHORITY INTO N N AREAS AND WHICH I S INC &SINGLY GIVING DIRECT UNDER PGOI ORDERS TO GOVERNMENT MINISTRI&OMINALLY CONTROL. THIS SITUATION MAY BE RECOGNITION OF KHOMEINI'S PRP-EMINENCE AND OP ?ACT THAT ONLY HE AND HIS ALLIES CAN COMMAND RESPECT AND OBEDIENCE OF BOTH SIDES OF THE DUAL AUTHORITY SYSTEM. COUNCIL OF EXPERTS DELIBERATION MAY SANCTIPT CLERICAL PBEDOMINANCE AND OFFICIALLY PUT PC01 LEADERS NOT CLOSELY IDENTITILD WITH ISLAMIC MOVEMENT OUT O r PUBLIC LIFE. END SUMMARY. 3. SOME ADDRESSEES WILL HAVE SEEN P B I S TEXT OF AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI'S AUGUST 2 8 STATEMENT ON THE ARMEC WRCES. KURDESTAN, PRESS FREEDOM, AND OTHER MATTERS ( F B I S 2 8 2 0 1 4 2 LONDON). DURING THE PAST WEEKS THE IMAM AND HIS ALLIES I THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT HAVE BEEN TAKING INCREASN 11617 DIiUCT CONTROL OVER AREAS NOWINALLY UNDER THE CONTROL OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT. I T APPEARS THAT THE SYSTEM OF DUAL AUTHOBITY DIVIDED BITWEEN QOM AND TEHR HAS NOT WORKED WELL EVEN AS A TEMPORARY ARBANGEQOM I S N W MAKING DECISIONS ON ALMOST ALL MATTERS O OF I ORTANCE, INCLUDING PUBLIC SECURITI, THE PRESS. corm MENTQ CE, A N D THE MILITART.

    CONPI DENTIAL
    55

    TEHRAN 9653/1

    CONIIDENTIAL

    TEBRAN 9653/1

    4 . LEOHEIN1 HAS OPENLY ASSERTED E I S AUTHORITY OVER THF PAST FPY WEEES. FOR PIAMPLE, THE "INTEGRATION" OF TBE EXVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL AND THE CABINETPUT FIVE MINISTZRS ON TEE REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL AND A NUMBER OF RELIGIOUS IIGURES INTO UNDER-SECRETARY POSITIONS IN THE MINISTRIES. APPARENTLY THE PRESENCE OF MINISTERS ON THE COUNCIL HAS NOT AIIECTPD THE WORKINGS 0 1 THAT BODY, BUT THE NEW uNIIZ%SECFSTARIES ARE WIELDING CONSIDERABLE INFLUENCE OVER MINISTBY OPERATIONS. AYATOLLAE KEAMENE'I TEE NEW UNDEBSPCRPTARY OF TEE MINISTBY 0 1 DEFENSE. I S BELIEVED TO N BE CLOSELY INVOLVED I DELIBERATIONS ABOUT THE FUTURE OF TEE 1-14 AIRCRAFT. ( C I . TEHRAN 9467).
    6. KEOMEINI'S ASSUMING TEE POST OP SUPREME COMMANDER THE ARHED PORCES. H I S ORDERS TO MdYE AGAINST THE KURC IRSIIWENTS AND HIS CALLS FOR MILITARY DISCIPLINE HAV -PIRECTLT A ~ S E R T E D QOM'S POWER OVER THE IRANIAN YILITA ,APMED FORCES COMANDERS ARE MORE LIKELY TO COMMAND ~ O B B D I S N C ~ ~ THEIR ORDERS ARE BACKED BY IHOMEINI'S WHBN "3311~193 THAN BY THE DUBIOUS AUTHORITY OP THE PSOI-IAUWOPITY WEICH CAN BP EASILY RfVSRSSD. TEE N W E ~COWANDER01 TEE AIR FORCE MAJ GEN BA3HSR1,BACYED BY CHOMEINI 'S AUTHORITY BAS B ~ X NWORKING TO RE-INSTILL '$DISCIPLINP AND ORDER IN E I S COMMAND. BY CONTRAST, Prl BAZABGAN'S AUGUST 27 MESSAGE TO THX ARMY EXPHESSING pBBATITUDE FOR ITS VALOR I SAQQEZ, RECEIVED LITTLE N :LTTENTION.
    \I

    8. TES CLOSURE 0 1 A NUMBER 01 PUBLICATIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN -SING THE POLICIES 0 1 THE ISLAMIC MOVEMENT WAS UNDBETAKEN AT TEE INITIATIVE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COURT AUTEOBITIB (CF. TEHRAN 9 4 4 6 ) . THE POOI, SPECIIICALLY THE MINISTRY O I NATIONAL GUIDANCE. HAD LITTLE ROLE IN TEE EVENTS EXCEPT CATCH UP WITH MEASURE> LLBUDT TAKPN BY THE REVOLUTIONARY PROSECUTOR.

    7 . TEE CAMPAIGN AGAINST UNAUTHORIZED POSSESSION OF BT 19653

    NNNN CONFIDERTIAL TEHRAN 9653/1

    CONPIDENTIAL RUQMRA RUSBLK RUQMKW RUDTC RUQMAM RUEHMO RUQMMT RUTNPS RUSNAAA D E RUQMHR #9653/02 242 ZNY ccccc ZZH B 3 0 1 1 5 1 Z AUG 79

    TEHRAN 9653/2

    **

    T O P m H C / S E C S T A T E WASHDC 3551 IN^ a u a n n l / A n s n a A s s r ABU DHABI RUQMW /AMENBASST ANKARA 8248-R U E H A D h J S I N T BAGHDAD 0255 RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 8221 R u ~ Q D / A M E M B A S S Y ISLAMABAD 0 2 9 8 RUOMEA/AMEMBASSY J I D D A 0283 RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0 2 9 2 *RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY XUWAIT 0 2 5 3 ? RUDTC/AMEHBASSY LONCON 0359 " RUQMAH/APlEPlBASSY MANAMA 0219 RUEBW/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0273 , R U Q ~ ~ T / A M ~ B AMUSCAT 0147 ~~Y RUPNPS/AMEMBASSY P A R I S 0 3 0 8 RVSNAAA/USCINCEUR V A I H I N G E N G E

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    TEHRAN 09653

    :WEAPONS I S NOW CLEARLY I N T H E HANDS O F T H E REVOLUTIONARY TEHRAN REVOLUTIONART PROSECTOR AYATOLLAH LUTHORITIES. ;AHMAD AZARI-QOMI TOLD BAMDAD NEWSPAPER O N AUGUST 27 .THAT ANYONE FOUND POSSESSING ILLEGAL ARMS WOULD BE :CONSIDERED CORRUPT O N EARTH A N D SHOT. A C C O R L I N G TO AZARI-QOMI, NO GRACE P E R I O D WOULD BE ALLOWED AND TXZ ORDER VOULC COME I N T O E F F E C T IMMEDIATELY. FOLLOWING H I S STATEMENT, T H E REVOLUTIONARY PROSECUTORS I N MASEEIID , I S F A E A N . N A J I V A B A D , PERDOWS, BANDAR ABBAS. AND OTHER P R O V I N C I A L TOWNS I S S U E D S I M I L A R ORDERS WITH T E E C O N C I T I O N THAT THOSE CARRYING WEAPONS, E X C E P T FOR T H E P O L I C E , T E E M I L I T A R Y , T H E GENDARMERIE, AND T E E REVOLUTIONARY GUARES ( P A S D A R A N I . WOULD HAVS ONE WEEX'S T I M E T O TURN TEEM I N . ORDERS ~ ~ i ISSUED TO- TEE PASDARAN TO S E A ~ C HVEHICLFS BEEN i LND HOUSES FOR UNAUTHORIZED WEAPONS.

    8 . T H E R E V O L U T I O N I R Y COURT'S CAMPAIGN A G A I N S T WEAPONS ROLLOWS THE S E I Z U R E O F T H E TEHRAN HEADQUARTERS O F T I E MOJAHIDIN-E-KHALQ BY T E E PASDABAN. COMMENTINS ON THAT S E J Z W E . A Z A R I - Q O M I QUOTEC THE IMAN AS S A Y I N G THAT " N O ONE HAD THE R I G H T T O M I S A P P R O P R I h T E GOYERNMEhT P R O P Z P P I . T H E M O J A H I D I N THEMSELVES I S S U E D d STATEMENT THAT TIIEY WOULD A C C E P T T E E ORDERS O F THR IMAM ANC T H E GOVERNMENT. D E S P I T E RUMORS O F DISCOVERY ON AN ARMS CACHE AT M O J h H I D I N HEADQUARTERS. AZARI-QOMI NOTED THAT ONLY S E V E N 6-3 R I P L X S WERE FOUND AT T H E B U I L D I N S . 9 THE MEMBERSHIP O F THE ASSEMBLY OF E X P E B T S M E E T I N J TO DRAW U P A NEW C O N S T I T U T I O N FOR IXAK HAS A E I S T I N C T L Y R E L I G I O U S C A S T . T H E S O C I A I . I D E A L S O F MOST 07 T E E MEMBERS ARE S I M I L A R T O , I F NOT I L E N T I C A L WITH T?OS O r NI. WHATEVER P B I L O S O P R I C A L D I F F E R E N C E S :HE YZfl3EnS V E , MOST ARE L I K E L Y TO AGREE THAT THE MUSLIM C L F F G " HAVE A PRECOMINANT ROLE I N THE NEW S T A T E . FYI: BATES O F T H E ASSEMBLY HAVE NOVFC O F F T B T F R O d T
    CONFICENTIAL
    57

    CONFIDENTIAL

    TEHRAN 9 6 5 3 / 2

    PACE AND HAVE TAKEN ON TEE ASPECTS OF A SIDESHOW TO TEE EVENTS BEING SHAPED BY KHOMEINI ANC THE REVOLUTIONARY COURTS. THE MOST RECENT REPORT ABOUT THE ASSEMBLY WAS A DEBATE ABOUT VHETHER JEWS SHOULD BE REFERRRED TO AS TAHUDI OR KALIMI END F Y I .

    18. SOME OBSERVERS HAVE SUGCESTEC THAT ALL OF THESE EVENTS ARE A N OPEN SEIZUBE.OF POVER BY THE UNOFFICIAL. REVOLUTIONARY AUTHORITICS AT THE EXPENSE OF TEE P 0 0 1 . ACCORDING TO THIS THEORY, TEE MOVEMENT OF THE ARMY AND THE PASDARAN INTO KURDESTAN WAS MOTIVATED NOT BY EVENTS IN KURDESTAN BUT BY KHoMEINI'S DESIRE TO TIGHTEN HIS CONTROL OVER THE CENTRAL ADMINISTRATION.

    HOWEVER, THERE I S NO NECESSITY TO SEE A PLOT IN THESE EVENTS. WHAT MAY BE EAPPENING I S THAT THOSE ~ v E OALREADY HOLD REAL POWER ARE BEING FORCED TO USE I T S T 0 IMPOSE ORDER LND STbBILITY ON THE NATION. LEAVIN3 A N ,IMPOTENT PGOI TO TRY AN6 DEAL WITH ARMED BANDS, ECONOMIC :CONFUSION. UNRULY TRIBESMEN, AND OTHERS SEEN AS COVNTERRREVOLUTIONARIES BAS NOT WORKED. VHETHER THE REVOLUTIONARY

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    C 0 N P I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 13 TEHRAN 09653 HOWEVER. STABILITY I S A ABSOLUTE NECESSITY FOR N CONTROLLING IRAN AND I T TAKES PRECEDENCE OVER ANY PHILOSOPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF ECONOMICS, RELIGION, OR FOREIGN POLICY. SUCH A PROCEDURE HAS DEEP ROOTS IN IRANIAN HISTORY, WHICH CONTAINS NUMPROUS EXAMPLES OF RULERS TAKING EXTREME STEPS TO ENSURE TEE SECURITY AND STABILITY OF THIS HETEROGENEOUS NATION.
    12. I T I S LIKELY THAT KHOMEINI'S OPENLY EXERCISING DIRECT RULE OVER IRANIAN DOMESTIC POLITICS COMBINED WITH THE LIKELT OUTCOME OF THE DELIBERATIONS OF THE COUNCIL OP EXPERTS WILL RESULT IN A CENTRALIZED STATE I N WHICH $TEE INFLUENCE OF KHOMEINI AND HIS ALLIES (BOTH CLERICbL 2AND SECULAR) WILL PREDOMINATE. I N SUCH A STATE, THE 3 ROLE OF OPPONENTS OF CLERICAL DOMINATION. OF WHATEVER !POLITICAL AND SOCIAL S T R I P E , I S LIKELY TO BE EVEN MORE ,LIMITEC THAN I T I S TODAY WKEN AT LEAST SOME SECULARISTS :ARE ALLOWED TO SERVE AS FIGUREHEADS IN THE PGOI. WHILE :SUCH A PROSPECT MAY NOT FLEASE MANY WHO ORISINALLY :SUPPORTED THE REVOLUTION. THE INSTITUTION OF SUCH A 'GOVERNMENT MAT BE ONLY THE FORMAL RECOGNITION OF AN LLREADY EXISTING SITUATION. TOPTSETH

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    CONFIDENTIAL

    TEHRAN 0965313

    September 2. 1979 Regional Security Officer American Embassy. Tehran Iran Monthly Status Report f o r August 1979 Chief. A/SY/FO Department of State

    memorandum

    I.

    Threat Assessment

    A. The potential f o r violence in Iran remains hioh. There are increasina sipns of disenchantnent with tlie results of the revolution a t many levels of society. Hinh unemployment is a problem and ideological. sociological, and ethnological differences abound. Although i t c w l d be argued t h a t many of these problem are not new t o Iran, the lack of any effective central authority t o deal with them i s a cause f o r concern.

    The PGOI, headed by P r i m Minister Bazaroan, has y e t t o sol i d i f y i t s administrative control over the country and is continually upstacred by the shadow government headed by the Ayatollah Ruhollah ~homeini,often making i t d i f f i c u l t . i f not impossible. to deal with the problems t h a t have .manifested themselves a s a result of the revolution. Cabinet members of the PGOI have repeatedly offered t h e i r resjgnations in protest of interference by the revolutionary council and c m i t t e e s . and the resulting ina b i l i t y t o do t h e i r job. Traditional security and law enforcement organizations ( i .e.. National Police and Gendarmerie) do not e x i s t as viable units. The military, which traditionally has not had an internal security role. i s inactive. These forces a r e extremely reluctant t o take part in any activity which miaht involve the use of force against other Iranjans. Trials and executions (over 400 t o date) a r e continuing against police, gendarmerie and military personnel who were involved in security functions prior t o the revolution, a factor which weakens morale i n these organizations and makes their personnel reluctant t o g e t involved i n law enforcement and i n t e r nal security functions. A good example of these fears i s a conversation that recently took place between an Emboff and a hlghranking Iranian police o f f i c i a l (subsequently related t o RSO). The pollce o f f i c i a l stated t h a t he had standinn orders t o quell any major disturbance i n Tehran, usina force i f necessary. The

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    police o f f i c i a l comnented t h a t i f he were foolish enough t o carry out these orders, his men would not obey. and, secondly. he was not about t o give these orders because of the possibili t y of future reprisals. Until such time as there i s a strong central povernment. possessing clear cut authority and the public support. i t i s unltkely t h a t these forces will take an active role in the internal security of the country. k'ith the National Police, Gendarrerie. and the military inactive, the security vacuum has been f i l l e d by an irregular revolutionary guard organized i n t o Revolutionary Komi tehs (comnittees]. Anyone encounterino them i s subject t o a r r e s t and detention f o r l i t t l e i f any. reason. The numher of roadblocks appears t o have decreased in recent days, but they can reappear a t any time. Although not as a matter of course, summacy justice, both capital and corporal. has been exercised by those groups. The revolutionary guards are a law unto themselves and operate from the Mao Tse-tuna dictum that "poker stems from the barrel of a gun." mother group, the Pasdaran, appear t o be f i l l i n q the void left by the military's inaction. The Pasdaran are also known as revolutionary guards but are separate'from those serving in the Khomitehs. Significant i s the f a c t t h a t they too are enpaoed in internal security functions; a role that the military traditiona l l y has not played. Their leader i s an Iranian named RAFSANJANI, a HojjatolesSan (one step down from an Ayatollah). A t Dresent there are approximately 10-12.000 Pasdaran who have been screened and selected f r m young, untrained Iranian Revolutionary volunteers. They are only a m d with l i g h t weapons and have been receiving t h e f r training i n ground force installations in Tehran-primarily Lavizan (the larger ground force base in Tehran). The guard i s brbken i n t o three main Froups: a major c i t i e s group; c i t i e s up t o 5000 people group. and a VIP protection grouo. The Pasdaran are a separate para-military unit which has thus f a r been active in internal security functions as well as sustaining the revolution. They have been particularly active in Turkoman Sahra area and Khoramshar. I t i s believed t h a t RAFSANJANI reports directly t o the revolutionary council with an unknown degree of coordination with the Defense and Interior Ministries. To what degree the Komitehs and the Pasdaran will be willing t o cooperate i s unknown. They are independent of each other, but do represent the only viable security forces in Iran a t t h i s time.

    CONFIDENTIAL
    61

    Page 3 Demonstrations A though improving somewhat, U.S.-Iranian diplomatic re1 lations remain i n a s t a t e of flux. Anti-Americanism has subsided over the p a s t few weeks (from i t s previous high i n l a t e May), but i s s t i l l j u s t beneath the surface. Hardly a day goes by without a newspaper a r t i c l e or public denouncement by a religious figure o r member of the PGOI, linking the USG/ICA t o a current problem in Iran. The U.S. continues t o be a very convenient scapegoat f o r the everyday problems confronting the Iranian leadership. There i s l i t t l e doubt t h a t any decisions or actions taken by the UG that are perceived t o be disadvanS tageous or offensive t o the Iranians would r e s u l t in demonstrations, possibly of a violent nature. In t h i s reaard, anti-Shah feelings remain extremely stronq. Any decision t o allow him or h i s family t o v i s i t the U.S. wobld almost certainly r e s u l t i n an imnediate and violent reaction. The a b i l i t y and/or desire of the PC01 t o contain such actions i s questionable. Terrori sm Terrorism. i n the form of assassinations, harassment. and kidnappings, i s a l s o a very real threat. Due t o the l a c k o f central authority. there i s l i t t l e t h a t can be done t o contain any group or groups wishing t o further t h e i r own interests through the use of violence. Two of the more prominent indegenous pre-revolution t e r r o r i s t groups, the Mujeheddin and the Fedayeen, have achieved a degree of legitimacy and are now act i v e politically. Neither group has claimed responsibility f o r any t e r r o r i s t acts since the overthrow of the Shah. Forghan (a grwp opposed t o the r o l e of the clergy i n the government), on the other hand, has been q u i t e active since the revolution. I t has claimed responsibility f o i the assassination of several religious figures. W have no. infomation indicating e t h a t any of these groups have tarpeted U.S. personnel I n Iran. but we must appear t o be a t t r a c t i v e targets. A of these w groups might be tempted t o carry out an operation e i t h e r i n reaction to'developments perceived t o be antl-Iranian or i n order t o induce a c r i s i s in already shaky PGOI/USG relations. Palestanian r e j e c t i o n i s t groups, which have pledged t o seek revenge f o r the USG's part i n the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty, must also be considered. This threat may be tempered somewhat by the f a c t t h a t the P O is seekina t o develop the PGOI as an L a l l y and may not wish t o endanger the relationship by placfng the PGOI in the awkward position of havina t o deal with a t e r r o r i s t action against the U G i n Iran. S

    CONFIDENTIAL
    52

    Page 4 B. Specific Acts Directed Against the U.S. Enbass2

    On August 17 a t approximately 2255 hours the M a s s y Compound was the object o f a grenade attack. Two separate exp~oSlons, one .at the n m Consulate Building and one a t the b u i l d i n g housing the s a t e l l i t e dune d i r e c t l y behind the Chancery, w n registCred. e There were no injuries, hweyer, property damage. including labor costs, t o t a l l e d appro xi mat el^ RMH) dollars. According t o the Farsi language paper "Kayhan (August 18) three groups have claimed c r e d i t f o r the explosions. These are:

    The Iranian Muslim Revolutionary Resistance Movement The 17th o f Sharlvar (September 8) Group The Tel Zatar Group

    here has been no c o n f i m a t i o n t h a t a w o f these groups was responsible. See Theran 9175 and 9153 f o r detailed Information o f t h i s incident.
    I n the early morning h w r s o f August 12 a group o f about 3550 armed irregulars (Pasdaran) arrived a t the Embassy f o r the.

    purpose o f removing Mashallah Kashanl and h i s forces froln the compound. While t h i s act was not directed a t the U S Ettbassy. .. the method used (e.9. v i r t u a l armed takeover of the compound) d i d have the potential f o r violence I nvolvlng American personnel. Fortunately, cooler heads prevailed and the s i t u a t i o n sorted its e l f out a f t e r approximately f i v e t o s i x hours nesotiatlons w i t h the irregular force. See Tehran 8973 f o r &dditi&al details.
    11.

    Operations A.
    N)

    .
    -

    V i s i t o r Consulation/Briefin~s

    Co. "0'. J e f f Ronald v l s l ted post from A U ~ U S ~t o August 16 7 i n order t o conduct an inspection o f the MSG Detachmnt.

    S/A Foucht o f the Naval Intelligence Service v i s i t e d post f r o n August 14 t o August 17 i n order t o Investigate allegations against the f o m r NCOIC 6ySgt Main. Seabee Mike Houseman arrived on August 26 i n order t o p e r f o m technical security work on new Consulate building. B. Support A c t i v i t i e s

    RSfJ centlnucd t o work closely with 6SO. FBO project supervisor and Consul General i n order to incorporate securlty req v l - m t s . i n t o construction o f nen Consulate building.

    CORF IOtWT!hL

    Page 5 .C. Siqnificant A c t i v i t i e s

    The period of August 1 through August 12 required that almost a11 o f the Security Officers time and resources be devoted to dealing w i t h Hrshallrh Kashani and h l s
    foKeJ.

    On August 12 Kashani was ousted frm the Embassy compound b y a force of a m i d irregulars.

    On August 15 S/A Dan XcCarthy arrived f o r a three-week TDY. On August 17 the Embassy compound was the object o f a combiaed RPG and hand grenade attack. Approximately 8000 dollars I n property darnap was incurred. There w e n no personal injuries.

    On August 18 A S Harland departed post on visitation. RO


    Annex J. Internal Destruction Plan, was rewritten and w i l l soon be forwarded t o the Departmeht. Detailed security briefings were conducted f o r a l l new TOY and PCS arrivals. Considerable tin was devoted t o w o r k i y w i t h the National Police i n an e f f o r t t o obtsln a reaular uniformed security force f o r Edassy protection. ~ h u far, only the bodyi guard d e t a i l canposed o f plainclothes National Police have r e p o r t d f o r duty on 8 continuing basis. Manning Of perimeter security parts has been sporadic.

    111.

    Plans f o c Cmino Month

    TW secretary. Lillan. Johnson.. w i l l a r r i v e frm Kinshasa i n order t o assist RSO's w i t h re-establishment o f records and wnagemerit systclnr destroyed as a r e s u l t o f February 14, 1979 attack.
    TSO Chuck Soper w i l l a r r i v e i n order t o continue work on physical Security inprovements;

    - Continue t o negotiate f o r a regular security force f o r the Embassy. - It Itheexpected ft hSeptember. Consulate building w i l l open s a t the new month o during - RSS w i l l v i s i t post sometime during the month o f September
    -

    ARSO Harland w i l l return from v i s i t a t i o n on September 3 . S/A FkCartb w i l l depart f ~U.S. r

    on Septenber 3.

    LIMITED OTTICIAL USE DE RUQMHR #9739 247 ZNT CCCCC ZZH - . - . . - -. 0 0407072 SEP 79 M AMEMBASSY TEHRAN TO RllEEIA/USICA WASEDC IMMEDIATE - - - - - . . . - - -- . .TE WASECC 3600 LIMITED OF?ICIAL USE TEHRAN 09733

    **

    CLASS: L I l I W D O?PICIAL 'J CEBOL: ICA 9/4/79 i5m : i c i t r i o i J ~ R A V B S DRFTD: 1CA:PAOtJGRAVIS :L' CLIIP: ROME m s n r IOA-2 CURCE POL ECON CRU

    E.O. 12065: N/A 2SUBJ: A MAJOR PUBLIC APTAIRS CONCERN


    ?,

    3 WITH

    A VIEV TO IDENTIfYING "CO~MUNICATIONTENSIONS ' I "AVE, IN TALKING WITH IRANIANS, SOUGHT VATS TO ASK' pDISCREETLT: WHAT ABOUT AMERICA AND AMERICANS MOST BUGS *IRANIANS? THE ANSWERS VART CONSIDERABLY, BUT ONE THREAD RUNS THROVGE MOST OP TAE ANSWERS TO M QUESTION: Y
    "

    ei
    z

    1.

    TO0 MANY AMERICANS HAVE BEEN T B V I S I B L E TOO LONG IN TOO MANY ASPECTS OF L I F E IN IRAN.

    g2.' I RECALL WHEN I VISITOD TEHRAN IN 1973, BEING P STRUCK BY T E PSRCEPTION THAT s o n S ~ WHAT I WAS

    :SEEING IN TEBRAN WAS REMINISCENT 0 1 WHAT I HAD SEEN I N *SAIGON IN 1967: AMERICAN TECENICIANS AND OPERATIOPS WERE HAVING A VISIBLE IMPACT ON THE LOCAL SCLNE.

    or

    3. I SUBMIT THAT, WHEREVER THE AMXRICAN PRESENCE I S SO PERVASIVE THAT I T IMPACTS WIDELY ON TEE INDIGENOUS POPULATION, THERE I S LIKELY TO BE A SERIOUS "COP~WUNICATION TENSION" BUILDING. A PROBLEM FOR ICA IN THE FIELD N AND PERHAPS ?OR OUR RESEARCH O??ICERS I WASA1N:TON. BUT nosr OF ALL A PUBLIC AFFAIRS CONSICERATION WHICH THE AGENCY MIGHT USETULLT CALL TO TEE ATTBNTION Of POLICY MAZERS -AT NSC, DOD AND STATE.
    4.

    ONE MIGHT, BT Why OF ILLUSTRATING THE DANGSR. CITE PRE-CASTRO CUBA, GREECG UNDER TH6 JUNTA OR THE RUSSIAN EXPERIENCE IN EGYPT AND A?GANISTAN. AN EVEN MORE ILLUMINATING EXAYPLE C3ULD. HOWEVER, BE CONJURED UP ?OR AMERICANS BY EVOKING A ENTIEtLY EYPOTHETICAL CASE: N 50,000 JAPANESE TECHNICIANS LIVING AND WORKING AROUND JACKSON MISSISSIPPI OR A SIf4ILAR NUMBER OF GERM4NS AND DEALING IN DULUTH. MINNESOTA. HOV WOULD AMERICANS COME TO VIEW THESE VISITORS AND TELIB COUNTRIES?

    VHEELINE

    5. GENERAL AMIB RAAIMI 'S STATEMENTS ABOUT BRINGING BACK FOREIGN ADVISORS AND HIS COMMENTS ON THE EPPECTS OF SUCH ADVISORS ON THE IRANIAN MILITARl IN THE PAST REVEAL THE KIND OF FRUSTRATIONS AND RESENTMENTS AMERICANS IN L GE NUMBERS EWOENDELED HERE.

    OUR EAGERNESS TO PROMOTE OUR SHORT-TERM POLIST, SECU TT, OR BUSINESS INTERESTS, W HAVE SOMETIMES E PROCUCED LONG-TERM HOSTILITY AND ALIENATION. AMERICAN
    55

    LT

    TEHRAN 9739

    LIMITED O??ICIAL USE


    PLURALISM AND w m o m ; r r c E N T ~ P R I S E UYRIAC AMERIC 01 INTXLEST GRO8?I DOES, 0 1 COURSE, RAKE I T DIFFICULT TO CONTEOL TEE W ( m l 01 AUEIICAMS OPERATINO IN ANY E W I I I O N ~ANY~PEII IN r E r UOILD nrn~ ~~ AMP~ICANS SEE O F F O ~ T B N I T ~ .NOIIRIELESS, IT snns CLEAR TEAT r a E EONO-VLII OUHIkl AMERICAN INTIRPST REQUIRIS ?BAT S T r r m f o u s r m l ~ s nor TO IIDUCE, FOP E u n P L E , WE BE T I S I B ~ I WERICAN PRESENCE (AND xurrcr or T a r c u L r u n r ) E SUCH COUNTRIES AS SAUDI ARABIA, !lTXICO, AND XGTPT. M ORAIBS 1T
    19739

    TEERAN 9759

    rat

    TEHRAN 9739

    EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OFAMERICA

    CONFIDENTIAL September 4, 1979 NOTE FOR POL FROM: ECON

    - Mr.
    A. D. Sans

    The implications as I read them of your recent cable on the political structure here correctly seem to be right on the mark. I think you should have gone further to say what the implications are of the demise of -the "dual government" construct for US interests. Vic suggested that I give you my thoughts in case they might be useful for a follow-up cable at some point. Here goes: It seems to me that if there ever was a dual governfsent, it ended early on as Khomeini quickly became source of power. ) I view Khomeini's recent crackdown on ( the Kurds, attacks on the left public contempt for the critical ihtelligentsia. and aiparently temporagy restrictions on the press in recent,weeks,,rather than as a panicky reaction to events beyond his control, as a systematic use of power by a man who has said publicly that he is not going to repeat Kerensky's mistake of not using the weapons of the revolution against sometime allies of conveniece who would seize the movement for their own ends. I think there is a question of timirrg here, too. Khomeini sees his Mullah-dominated constitutional assembly completing the constitution he wants for the Isalmic Republic he wants. A few weeks from now the revolution will in effect be declared a success and the new permanent goverment will be launched. It seems to me Khomeini couldn't givetit a better Ehristening present (pun intended) than an opposition that has been disarmed and fragmented and a populace that has had the requirement for order made transparently clear. Besides, at this point, Khomeini can order half a million people into the streets on a few hours notice: his revolutionary guards will throw themselves joyously on any qroup, defenseless or not. In six months or a year, the inevitable disenchantments must set in, his ability to deal with critics CONFIDENTIAL GDS 9/4/85

    CONFIDENTIAL

    will be less crisp, and I expect he would rather see his new government concede a measure of reform--and freedom-from strength and when it is ready to do so than appease critics it can no longer so easily kick into line. What of the implications for US interests? Well, if Khomeini is able to cotltain the disenchantments, you have improved prospects for internal stability and for unimpaired territorial integrity. Also, it is clear to me that, in addition to order, Khomeini wants to get people b$ck to work to ensure a decent--and even rising by local measures--standard of living. (A moral and even austere Islamic Republic should not be supposed to mean either an idle or backward one, I have been told.) Thus, our interest in continued access to Iran's oil sh uld be safeguarded by the new government's ability to ma$tain order in the oil fields and its need for earnings. Our interest in Iran's spending its oil earnings in the US should be advanced (if we don't blow it by not responding to expressions of interest) by their need--increasingly beginning to be realized--to translate oil dollars into jobs throuoh either consumer imports or, much more likely, labor intensive projects that will lead to relatively labor intensive industries. (I think this bodes well for increasing oil production, too, eventually.) Finally, a confident Khomeini with a good grip on things at home and much skepticism of things Western is going to give us real problems on many multilateral issues. We need him at least as much as he needs us in the near term and so we don't have much to threaten him with. Particularly on Middle East policy, he is going to be a contrary force we will have to reckon with.

    cc:

    CHG:VTomseth

    CONFIDENTI-

    /-

    I -

    SEC&(E"/SEE;SITIVE

    THROUGH :

    - Mr.

    Newsom

    FROM :
    SUBJECT: P o l i c y Towards I r h n ,

    Assessment: The Khomeini/Bazarqan revolutio-:??;. l c 3 3 c r s t i : f e e l s i n c r e a s i n g l y b e l e a g u c r e d by t:!e f;.:r2s ar.e o t 2 c r e t h n i c s , t h e L e f t , C e n t e r s c c u l u r i s r r ; , f o r e i g n pz;i.^:rs ( I s r a e l , USSR, I r a q , U.S. " i n p e r i . a l i s t - 5 " ) and " p r o Shah f o r c e s (ex-Savak and n i i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s ) . Khomeini's uncor.i;roir,isino r e a c t i o n i s 13 l z s n o 3 t v i o l e n t l y : t h e Bazargan moderates s h a r e some of t h a t h a r s h approach b u t a l s o s e e k compronrises, b e t t e r r e l a t i o n s a b r o a d , and a r e working t o r e - s t a r t t h e economy. Although t h e r e i s i n c r e a s i n g diser6chantne:;t ---with Khomfini even w i t h i n t h e c l e r g y ( A y a t o l l a h s S h a r i a t m a d a r i and T e l e g h ~ r i ) ,he c o n t i n u e s t o co~.?anc? a s t r o n y n a j o r i t y of t h e lower c l a s s e s , and few p o l i t i c i a n s a r e w i l l i n g t o c o n f r o n t him d i r e c t l y .

    ,,',

    ,
    >

    [.

    t'

    '-

    \:.+ -. .:I\ 4'


    .

    The d u a l l e a d e r s h i p p l a c e s i t s hopes i n t h e cons t i t u t i o n a l p r o c e s s l e a d i n y t o a new government t o g i v e I r a n a u n i f i e d , s t r o n g , c e n t r a l a u t h o r i t y . Each s i d e ( i . e . , I s l a m i c and l i b e r a l n a t i o n a l i s t ) hopes t o dominate. The c o n s t i t u t i o n i s now b e i n g reviewed by e x p @ r t s (mainly c l e r i c s ) . A referendum w i l l r a t i f y t h e d r a f t and e l e ~ c i o n sf o r a p a r l i a m e n t and p r e s i d e n t s h o u l d come t h i s y e a r . Bazargan i s a f a i r b e t f o r p r e s i d e n t . C l e r i c a l i n f l u e n , c e s w i l l be s t r o n g f o r a t l e a s t t h e n e x t s e v e r a l y e a r s and c l e r + c s w i l l c e r t a i n l y be numerous i n t h e new parlia,;-.es:,. but we doubt t h e hardd e c i s i v e and l a s t i n g l i n e mullahs w i l l

    v i c t o r y o v e r t h e s e c u l a r e l e m e n t s . The c l e r i c s c a n n o t t h e m s e l v e s r u n a complex c o u n t r y and w i l l be f o r c e d t o s e e k h e l p from W e s t e r n i z e d o f f i c i a l s and t o compromise I s l a m i c p r i n c i p l e s t o meet p o p u l a r needs. The main modernizing t h r u s t o f I r a n ' s d e v e l o r r e n t w i l l i n e v i t a b l y o v e r t i m e weaken Khomeini and t h e c l e r i c s . I f KhoneFni d i e s , c l e r i c a l i n f l u e n c e w i l l be weakened somewhat b u t not eliminated. There w i l l be l e s s u n i t y i n t h e i r r a n k s and a l l i a n c e s w i l l be formed w i t h t h e s e c u l z r i s t s . As t h e I s l a m i c i s t s l o s e t h e i r h o l d , t h e q u e s t i o n w i l l be whether t h e L e f t o r t h e C e n t e r i n h e r i t s power. ' I n t h e s h o r t r u n we b e l i e v e the.governmsnt, can d r i a g e i t s 'problems 'with t h e ~ u r d s ,a l t h o u g h c o n t i n u i n g s p o r s ' d i c ~ v i o l d ~ i ? h%'ll ' b e a l e g a c y of t h e h a r s h c a i t o d s e employed by t h c r e v o l u t i o n a r y g u a r d s . Iran's ability t o c a p t h e Kurdish r e v o l t t n d a v o i d prcblems w i t h t h r * e t h n i c Arabs depends i n l a r g e p a r t on t h i a t t i t u d e o f I r a q . S u p e r f i c i a l l y good r e l a t i o n s e x i s t a t t h e m m e n t , f o r I r a q i s v u l n e r a b l e w i t h i t s S h i a m a j o r i t y . For t h e same r e a s o n , however, I r a q w'ill n o t want t o s e e a stroncj, s e c u r e S h i a government i n I r a n and may be m o t i v a t e d t o I n f a c t , I r a q nay now be q u i e t l y h e l p s t i r up t r o u b l e s . h e l p i n g t h e Kurds. The S o v i e t s may s h a r e t h i s a t t i t u d e b u t w i l l proceed c a u t i o u s l y , f e a r f u l o f c h a o s on t h e i r b o r d e r s and t h e i m p l i c a t i s n s f o r s p r e a d i n g i n s t a b i l i t y i n the reyion.
    U.S.

    Policy:

    I n t h e s e c o n f u s e d and u n c e r t a i n c i r c u m s t a n c e s o u r p o s t u r e h a s been t o l i e low, r e s p o n d i n g t o o p p o r t u n i t i e s t o s t r e n g t h e n o u r c r e d e n t i a l s w i t h t h e GPO1 b u t n o t p u s h i n g o u r s e l v e s f o r w a r d . W began a more a c t i v e r o l e e l a s t s p r i n g , b u t wzre s e t back by I r a n i a n r e a c t i o n t o t h e S e n a t e R e s o l u t i o n i n May. Our o b j e c t i v e s i n I r a n - - a c c e s s to o i l , d e n i a l o f S o v i e t i n f l u e n c e , promotion o f a f r i e i . d l y , n o n - a l i o n e d , ~?d,er.qt$.+ ! ~ y $ r ; ! y ? ~ ~ , $ z : haye. ..tp,:.bc :p"u,yeued,. d - x i n j .... b. .~ Q . ~ . Mriths'when the I r a r i i h n s w i l l n o t h+ve s o r t e d a c t x i t h p r e c i s i o n t h e i r p o l i c y o r i e a t a t i o n and when t h e c l e r i c a l t e n d e n c i e s towards a u t h o r i t a r i a n i s l r %illbe o n l y weakly r e s i s t e d - - i n t h e n e a r tern--by s e c u l a r i s t s . W w i l l want e t o p o s i t i o n o u r s e l v e s s o t h a t we can m a i n t a i n a w ~ r k l n q

    r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h whatever group h o l d s d e c i s i v e power w h i l e m a i n t a i n i n g t i e s .to o t h e r s i g n i f i c a n t p o l i t i c a l elements, including t h e opposition. W w i l l want t h e e I r a n i a n s t o u n d e r s t a n d o u r f i r m n e s s on o u r p r i n c i p l e s - e.?., human r i g h t s - - a n d t o b u i l d r e s p e c t f o r t h o s e p r i n c i p l e s . We.will a l s o want e q u a l and f a i r t r e a t m e n t O f o r e r i v a f e U.S. i n t e r b s t s : i n . I r a n . : u t : . a t t i t w 2 . t o ~ a r d s f r a n .should b e .cha,racter.ized by p y rnpa'khe ti.c.. undeys tand.inq v f ' t h e crif'pibul t i e s ,"p a t i e h c e .in r = s o l v i n g them, b u t a l s o r e g u l a r , f i r i n and c l e a r r e m i n d e r s o f o u r i n t e r e s t i n an I r a n L h a t i s f r i e n d l y t o - . t h e West-and - s t a b l e , r e s ~ f r c t f u l o f i n d i v i d u a l r i g h t s and progres.sive.in meeting t h e needs o f i t s c i t i z e n s .

    'we geed t o ' keep a c l e a r perspective on t h e . ~ u r 3 i i t and e t h n i q Arab. p r o b 1 . n ~ . These : a r e o l d p r o b l e m s , .an3 th&; w i 1 l " p e i i ' i s t f o r a l 6 i i ~ l m e t o come. To e n c x r a g e t t h e i r a m b i t i o n s f o r autonomy cotild have d e s t a b i l i z i n g i m p l i c a t i o n s f o r tlje e n t i r e r g q l o n
    X t h e s h o r t . t e r m ( i . e . , u n t i l a new grJernr?:-t i s n formed) we want t o c l e a r away a s many of t h e problems o f t h e p a s t a s poss'ible and.avoid new i.ssues o f co7tent i o n . During t h e s e months we a r e l a y i n g t h e b a c i s f o r d e a l i n g w i t h t h e new government t h a t we hope w i l l have more e f f e c t i v e powers. During t h i s p e r i o d and beyond we w i l l want t o a l l a y t h e s u s p i c i o n s o f t h e r e l i g r ' o u s l e a d e r s and, where p o s s i b l e , c u l t i v a t e t h e i r . f r i e , i d s h i p . Our h a n d l i n g o f A r a b - I s r a e l i s s u e s w i l l have a d i r e c t impact on I r a n i a n a t t i t u d e s . The I r a n i a n s a r e becoming i n c r e a s i n g l y s u s p i c i o u s of r a d i c a l P a l e s t i n i a n i n f l u e n c e e s p e c i a l l y i n t h e o i l f i e l d s , b u t ' t h e r e i s s t i l l among t h e c l e r i c s and men l i k e Yazdi a s t r o n g a t t a c h m e n t t o t h e PLO and t h e .."Palestiriian c.aus,+. " Over t h e l o n g e r term we w i l l want t o work f o r a n I r a n i n which t h e moderate, s e c u l a r n a t i 0 ~ 1 3 l i s t sa r e predominant i n managing t h e c o u n t r y . But b e f o r e we c a n e x e r c i s e i n f l u e n c e i n I r a n , we must develDp a p o s i t i o n o f t r u s t and r e s p e c t .

    bel.i,eye.w9. sh~uldibegtn 'nov to raavir out range of b i l a t e r a l problems. and o f f e r thcrtal:cr.4ing


    auggastions: (We w l l l be developznq a t a S e p t e n b c r 7 i n t e r a g e y c y m e e t i n g d e t a i l e d a p p r o a c h e s on t h e l s s u e s marked by an asterisk.)

    SECRET -

    3Ef I.::
    -4-

    -- Bazargan aand.e ~suosns cs yi mtpeasthhoestei c weowtihl el i doI s o a promptly, naming p r t r


    revolution.

    .. .e...%herq.is.;nc+ inc?ic:jt,ion- the..PGQZ:qIanw 'i3ObII . t o :e . " y a n . A m p ~ s q ? Q .in. :iaalainat.on a?~..pur..:M .$Fei.r;.. ~ .. .ai)pb'iri&&ts 'df i n .&iisahif h&e n e v e r %.e&l i n k e d . W e 5 p e c t t h e I r a n i a n s .::aj. w a i t u n t i l a new! government e i s e l e c t e d b c f c r s . sondir.? us an envoy.
    ~at r --e c o . ~ n o n dtbn: ~ t t e c o n s u l t a t i o n s w r t h key C o n g r e s s n e n , nonln t e a ? L->$ssa3ol' t o ts i n p l a c e i n O c t o b e r . P o s s l b l y i n - o r m t h e I r a n i a n s Q: o u r p i a n s i n advance t h r o u g h a p r + v a t e r n t e r m c d l a r y .
    '2.

    Should we .qend.,c mcssage o r emlosary

    ameiril?
    He have had p o d l r e c t c o n t a c t w i t h t h e man who r e m a l n s . t h e $ t r ~ n g e s t ' ~ o i l t l c leacTermin Iran'. al His h o s t i l i t y towards u s i s u n l i k e l y t o a b a t e s i g n i f i c a n t l y , a l t h o u g h t h e r e have been fewer venomous s t a t e m e n t s -- a g a i n s t u s r e c e n t l y . C l e a r l y , a f l r s t meeting c o u l d be a bruising a f f a i r .
    A meeting w i t a c c e p t a n c e of t h e r e \ h i s suspicions of us. him mare r e a d i l y on . t h e f i r s t caJl.

    --

    --

    m i n i will signal our definite on a n d ' c o u l d e a s e somewhat .auld a l s o e n a b l e u s t o approach i s s u e s once we have made

    .;

    .-- Oh ' t h e o t n e r , . w&ld r i s k . appeari'ng' tO c a v e i n t o a man who !: . -t-: .is and who i s stror.?',;, d e p r e c a t e d h e r e and by i.;..ztcrcized I r z n i a n s . T:?:J;, we would want t o be c a r e f u l r o t t o a p p e a r t o esibra-e Khomeini and t h e c l e r i c s a t t h e ei:?e?s? of .c.i: 12z1s1ar f'kiends. W s h o u l d a v o i d d i r e c t ? i n k a g e w i t h s-y e s p e c i f i c Iran,ran g r o u p s .
    ~ % a ' s ~ r b o l i s io f a c , a l l , o n !:Lc&ern~ v : l o t r, : ln a t t a c h t o v i s i t s t o t h e o t h e r r e l 1 7 l o u s leaeer;, 3 2 ~ t h e y w i l l n o t s e e u s u n t i l we have s e e n him. W b a d l y e nehd c o n t a c t s w i t h T a l e g h a n i , S h a r i a t m a d a r i , and o t h e r ' moderate c l e r i c s . W want t o r e a s s u i e them o f o u r e a c c e p t a n c e of t h e r e v o l u t i o n a s t h e i r i n f l u e n c e may r i s e i n t h e months ahead.

    --

    Recomendatlon: Have Bruce La.ngen p a s s t h e v c r d r t h a t - h e l a l i k e ti - c e t l o r r l n l a f t e r t.ls r e t u r z -3 ., Tehran when he c o u l d Jcl1 :cr ? mes:..ge from : i a s h l n : t ~ - . Laingen c o u l d t h e n p r o s e & with meerlngs w l t h o t h e r c , *"' L r e l l g l o u s l e a d e r s . A l t e r r a t r v e l y , make a c a l l o n ci' Khomelnl p p r l o r l t y f o r a rew k m l d ~ ~ a d o r .

    .---

    '",;

    ;3.
    '

    Row d o , we ' s t r i m q t h a r i b n i i l i t d r y r k ' l a t i o n k h i p ? e

    --..The..J.rgnL:ng . a ' r e . s ! ; s ~ i c i ~ ~ s ouq h?::Slinc c f of. t% ~F'Ms. t a s t f u n d , naed s p a r e s al;d $ e c h ? i c a l . s"ppn! -, t from u s , bu't f e a r f o r p . o l i t i c a 1 , r e a s o n s t o ask f o r t h e . .. .latter; .

    "

    '

    '

    . .... -:e w a n t . t o be r a s . p o h s i v e . o ~ . m i l i t a r yi s s u e s i n . ,w o'i-der td' s t r e n g i h e h ~ o i a r 5 1 ; . : ' s a u t . i . ~ r , i t yznZ t o rr.s .:re ,we have f r i e n d s i n t h e m i l i t a r y who might be key t o t h e f u t u r e , p o l i t i $ a l o r i e n t a t i o ~of the c o u n t r y .
    . . .
    a. Increase dur e x c h a n g e s o? info'rmatlri o n t h e t r u s t fund t o b u i l d I r a n i a n c o n f i d e n c e .
    b. Examine t h e r e l e a s e o f s e n s i t i v e r t e m s on a c a s e b - c a s e b a s i s an4 ' e p r e p a r e d t o . r e l e a s e i o w T e v e l 3

    .'

    66

    I/

    cl&a~tems

    wher

    s e r v e s o u r purposes. e t Irdnian requests for spares ? t h e $5 m i l l i o n l e v e l p r e ,ed a n d . f r i e n d l y t h l r d coun2 - h e l i c o p t e r s ) . t o he:? -::nians ~ a ? $0 d l v e ; ? & f y t

    c. Be p r e p a r e d and s u p p o r t somewhat v i o u s l y s e t . Permit tries ( e . g . , I t a l y c p e t m i l j t a r y npe?s ' s&F;drt:


    '4.

    'Ic:

    private companies?

    Bow d o we head o f f d i s p u t e r botwo?n

    ' i

    :.

    -*?

    I r a n h a s begun i n a 1 i c i t e l . w s y t o pay Sills e-d ... r ~ y . . . p p e r ~ c ~ ~ ! & a..,,.~pAy,on~.qqgqt:~s.5.O l l - i o n .arb..:i.s c.c:8 .mi f i n r s h l n g , t h e I s f a h a n r e f i n e r y : A!.!,: g o t S;G : -:..:.I . : . ? r e s t a r t J e e p o p e r a t i o n s . Many d i - g u t e s persi;: a :: . :r2 attachment of I r a n i a n a s s e t s i s a c o n t i n u i n ? t h r s e t . GTE and American B e l l a r e n e g o t i a t i n g d i s p u t e s w;th o x active assistance..

    --

    SECRET

    a . Encourage t h e p r i v a t e Iran-American Chamber o f Commerce t o a s s i s t u s i n working t o r e s o l v e d i s p u t e s . P e r h a p s a b u s i n e s s m i s s i o n t o Tehran c o u l d b e o r g a n i z e d .


    b ~~~~~~e o u r . l n f o r m a t i 0 ~ f f o r t s -to make'kure" e U..S husixle6.s k a o n s o f OW readineg&..to ysaks* the^ w r t h t h e I r a n x a n s a n a o u r s u c c e s s sto;les t o date.
    b. r + t can we do t e . r e a c t i \ i a t b t h e intelligence s i t e s ?

    'hcknmn

    The Iranians have n o t for6!closed t h e p o s s i b i l r t y o f r e 0 p e n i n g : t h e s i ' t r e s ' i n the Y n d e f i n i t e ~ ' f i t u r e :but' it , w r l l be a hard p o l i t i c a l d e c i s i o n . I r a n i a n management and c o n t r o l and p o s s i b l y S o v i e t a c q u i e s c e n c e c o u l d * t e preconditi0.n~

    --

    a r e working w l t h c o n t r a c t o r s t o r e s t a r t t h e IBF,K intelligence m o n i t o r i n g . p r o j q c t on a regqcqd s c a l e w i t h ' t h * i&a. t h i ' t ' t h & ~ a k k s m a hf u n b t i b i might' d l t i m d t e l y b e lncluded i n t h a t operation. Recommendation: C o n t i n u e t o f o l l o w t h e IBEX . a p p r o a c h and make d i s c r e e t . soundings. w i t h t h e PGOI ( e . g . , S e c r e t a r y - Y a z d i a t UNGA) b u t make no r e q u e s t s ~ n t i a n e w l y - e l e c t e d government is i n p l a c e l

    -- We

    There ~ s - & oi'~ d i c h t f o n ' t 6 a f : t h 6 PGOI b i l l .di$c r i m i n a t e a g a i n s t u s when 1980 c o n t r a c t s a r e s i g n e d i n December--but d e c i s i o n s c o u l d b e a f f e c t e d by n e g a t i v e p o l l t i c a l developments. W e a r e now g e t t i n g a l m s t a s much c r u d e a s l a s t y e a r (750,000 now v s . 900,000 l a s t y e a r ) a l t h o u g h t o t a l I r a n i a n e x p o r t s a r e down o n e - t h i r d w i t h e y I r a n l a n s u r r n g t h e f a l l on e n e r g y . could v i s i t a t an e a r l y s t a g e . SECRET

    --

    p w a e n w 2 t . ??-,~r r w ~ b f ~ * & ~ ~ ~ ilnurz t f


    Dick Cooper

    SECRET -7-

    7.

    lbould wi rosou vim o p e t a t i o n s 'urd parm~tt h e


    w-pt.-rchool dependents a s recommenced W lave t o l d t h e I r a n i a n s adequate s e c u r i t y f o r e

    the compo\md.is a p r e r e q u i s i t e f o r v i s a s .
    thd =is

    --

    8m

    n d a t i n;:.. A. iwm +.irQpua$e;p~.~sec.tio~at, . a s k r e d ; we should move ahead on n%rrral' oon~ularppcrAtions and r e t u r n of dependents on a
    ~ ~ r i i d ~ i 4

    'f

    n*.d

    --.*I&. kn+ l i t f l e about I r a n i a n .grou@ .and few ( i n u p s ~ e e m ' t ohave any r e a l coheslon o r s t r e n g t h . we to knov m r e

    A CIA b r i e f i n g o f f i c e r gave a well-receivea i n t e l l i g e n c e b r i e f i n g t o Baiargan, Y a z d ~ ,and Entez?!r on 4ugurt 21. :.The I r a n i a n s were .=t interefited i a .try;. q a i r s t i n i a n s ;.A? gh&, .ind ' S o b i e t dange$s ' t o t n e P001. They asked f g r a r e p e a t b r i e f i n g i n two montbs

    --

    Recgmwndationr ~ o n t i n u e develop an i n t e l l i g e n c e to ucchdnge'with t h e fradkans: When .fecnkble, .reek tt i n c l u d e . l r a n i m n i l i t a r y o f f i c e r s i n an examinatio~.of

    t!Wbi2m*t&bh%.
    9

    lhould

    WO

    @henweour 8pproach.aa i y U n r ~ g h t s

    u t h o u g t l executions- a n d h a t a h tteatm&nk-'iif 'lturds. w n t i n u e a t a d e p l o r a b l e l e v e l , s i n c e t h e J u l y amnesty sol. p o l i t i a a l o f f e n d e r s have been r e l e a s e d from p r i s o n and t h s r e a r e some s l i g h t s i g n s t h e J u s t i c e Ministry i s rm&sserting i t s a u t h o r i t y .

    --

    20-

    C r i t i c a l n e w p a p e r s have been closed and.several r$.iaed.. aS1 ppf t h e s e i s s u e s r e p e a t e d l y wlth t h e FGOI.

    -- jw3n3JlM+a%w&+ob+; Mshua,.

    R a c o ~ m n d a t i o n : Continue t o work on human r i g h t s p r o b l e m a s they a r i s e and involve prominent o u t s i d e r s ' and t h i r d c o u n t r i e s t o u s e t h e i r i n f l u e n c e a s w e l l .

    o/<

    .o l.

    Sow Can we improve Iranian public percepttoas

    'ftBL:. %'h.Is

    and U S attitudeb towards Iran? ..

    force in our relationship.

    -- Anti-Americanism continues a strong, inhibiting

    ---. 'l'he lrahiane .arebitterly resentful of the 'gerae~v.e@..~s~i~~~i~ti~~~:e$.::e~.:f~e~&:'~s8.p:s&ai ng;. a: :. '


    "Zionist-imp,erlalrst.consp~racy.

    -concrete actions on bQth sldes--sxqns that they are improving on hunan rights and, that w e accept the , pevoluticn. :'Recommendation':. . a. ICA develop a plan of more to cnhancb . U .S.-1Fani.m t.ies, ?+I,. , lo American visitors w l can meet with secular leaders, use of VOA to send ,i~creasad .English 1angu.aae. &eachjng tribution. ' '

    ~ . ~ " + : c ~ s a + i r : . ;~ sF ~ g ~ ~ g ~ e ~ , + .??:3 ;. ~ ( . : d ~ . ~ ~ a ; . y ~ ~ i

    assertive actlons distinguished reliqjous and political mrssaqos, an& magazine dis-....

    . ..

    b. Occasional public statements by senior U.S. aficials on the i~portance Iran and p t good U.8.of , Iranian relations..

    y& &J\$
    &-b

    same lines. d. Quiet work with the Iranians to relax the ban 6 on foreign newsmen.
    e.' At an early date holii'a meeting of private and academic U.S. and Iranian experts on Iran to discuss ways to bridge the communications gap.

    I<.
    (C.

    Drafted:. :lEA/IRN:HPrecht:bdf ext. 20313:9/5/79 .Clearance: NEA/IRN': ~ ~ ~ a i n (draft) ~eA' NEA: PDConstable r p S/P:PKreisburg ;! I

    hP ooiiibi I

    NT CCCCC ZZH Sip 79 N1 AUtMBASSY TIBPAN 'TO S N S T A T t WASHDC 3658

    t RUQlRR l O e 5 l 249

    **

    CLASS 1 C M I P B W U L C l l W t STATX 9/8/99 wnv: C I I M I : l L f O l l O I t I mmr CHAMZ:nmama: CLEm: NOYt

    h.0. l Z l 6 5 r GDS 9/6/85 (TOUSRH, V.L. 1' TAG9 r PINS, I R SUBJtCTr EUIGRt PLOTTtRS
    1.

    (C-ENTIRE TtXT.)

    2. TEE RtSURTACINB 01 SHAPUR BAKHTIAR I N PARIS AND PERSISTENT Runons ABOUT VABIOUS IRANIAN EUIQRIW B ~ I N Q dCTIVtLY INVOLVID IN PLOTS TO OVERTHROW T H t ISLAMIC R ~ O I M AYATOLLAH montIs1 POSES A T ~ P T A T I O N2 0 SEE OT IN t H 1 S t POLITICAL P I I L E S THP SOLUTION TO A SITUATION IN RAN T H t U.S. FINDS DISTASTtFUL. U T t R ALL, AMERICANS N AN IDtNTITY WITH BAKHTIAP W I N H t SPEAKS (TLUPNTLY I WtSTtEN LANGUAGt) 01 INDIVIDUAL WLtDOU AND t I B t R T Y H n a s m t ~ r DISGUSTID AND I N C O ~ P R L H ~ ~ D I N G a VHEN YATOLLAH IHALQIALI (IMftEDIATlLT A R L P DISPATCHINO ANOTBfa AQOLE OT KURDS TO T B I R TATS) PROUDLY DSSCPIBtS HIMSliLT S TE8 IPANIAN ADOLT EICEHANY. MOUOVEE. TEE ARGUWLUT !BAT IRAN CANNOT FUNCTION AS A ~ ~ O D P N UTIOU nmom ! E TtCHNICAL SKILLS ~ O N O P O t I Z ~BY T E t IRANIAN tDVCATtD H D ELITE STRIKES THESE SAME AMtRICANS AS tHlRtNTLY LOGICAL. LINCI MANY ntnarns or THIS nrrr H A r t n m INTO ~ X I L E UTHIB THAN PUT UP W IA GOVERNMENT INCREASI~~OLY n r r A n n ~ rn BY NARBOV-~IIDED ISLAMIC FANATICS IT IS A SIMPLI STLOGISTIC STEP TO ?HZ CONCLUSION TEA# THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC I S BOUND TO PAIL THROUGH A SHORTAOL 01 THE TECHNICAL SKILLS NtCESSART TO OPERATL THE NATIONAL BURLAUCRACT AND ECONOMY.

    Ie

    3.

    IT YOOLD. I N OUR VIEV, BE A GUVE p a n o n TO susscaIsr TO THE PPOPOSITION PUT FORWARD BY VMIOUS EMIGRZS THEMStLVICS ?EAT THEY HOLE THE KtY TO SETTING THINGS RIGHT IN IRAN. OUTSIDE THPIB O N RILATIVELY MINISCULt CLASS. THEY W HAVE VIRTUALLY N SUPPORT HERE. TURTHER, THEY HAVE N O O OBRCIVE HEANS OF OVERTHROWING THE CURRENT OREER READILY T THEIR DISPOSAL. THE ZMLRCENCE 0 1 NOSTALGIA WITHIN THE

    RMED FORCES FOR THE "GOOD OLD DAYS," VITH A CONCOMITANT ESTORATION OF THE MILITART'S COERCIVE CAPABILITT, COULD ALTER THE SITUATION, BUT AS OF THIS MOUENT NEITHER OP THESE PRECONDITIONS EXISTS. TINALLT, THERE I S N REASON TO O B E L I t V t THAT THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC WILL NOT BE ABLE TO 0 CO-OPT SUPFICIENT NUMBERS OF PEOPLE WITH THE VERNMENT OFFICES ON AT LEAST A SCALE WHICA TBE ISLAMIC SHAH'S DREAM, NOT KHOMEINI'S.

    EFPIMENTLY, BUT

    CATCHING-UP WITH WEST GERMANY WAS THE


    77

    4.

    FOR TlfE MOMENT, KHOHIIUI'S I S M I C ?OlCLS RtRkIN FInnLT I U ?LACE urm NO I n r s o T I t r O P P O ~ I T I O N xu SIUET. DISA~~CTION-111sV I ~ WBUT r01 T n r o R r s r r n L B BLIN ~ R O ~ 1 U T U l l T I E RANKS O? TBB DISO&~NTLID DO NO2 SLLn LISSLT TO BE CAPABLE 01 TUUSIATINB TELIR I)ISlAZlSPAliOTION INTO T I E K I N D 0 1 ACTION THAT UODLb CBALIdIIOX TW RUM8 IN ANT SERIOUS MAINER. THAT IS I I X C I A L L ' I TlUL 01 MIORBS W O EAIE LITTLE SUPPORT VBEBt I T l U L C I COWS H I XRU S ITSELF. TEE ISLI~YICmrmxwvs c o H r m a zauxztrr W. COME TO GRIPS YITK TKB i s b b s n er rwkn n u u ~ r t n rur YET LEAD TO ITS ULTIRATI PAILUIL, ar IF IT serr w r ARE REASONABIT COW?ZDLN? TEAT Y l A t W J S RUMCllS f ? WILL 3 : 1 POME BROVN RATEER TIIANNURTURIID W PARIS OR NtV TOEX. 1

    :o+nsETn

    DEPARTMENT O F STATE

    The Honorable L. Bruce Laingen Charge d'hffaires, a.i. American Embassy Tehran Dear Bruce:

    personally. The main nourishment I took from George was (1) a deep sense of inadeqacy in governing among the leadership, a desire for U.S. help, but an inability to ask for or even accept it; and (2) concern over the strength of clerical influence, optimism (like us) on that count for the long term but fear that the Majlis elections might produce only mullahs -- meaning that the long ternt might be that mufh.longer away. The interesting idea is that of these worries and is a = , v o ~ can contribute to bxadarua -k n is thinkina what in the inner circle will be welcome.

    m.

    Finally, here is a paper I did and for which DN added the sentence at the top of the second page. Sincerely,

    We-understand Secretary Brown may ask what you plan to say to Yazdi when you sec him in Ncw York. confirmed that Yazdi will attend the UNGA). following points: (It is not yet We suggest the

    --

    Since the Revolution wc have sought to fashion a

    new relationship cith Iran's lenders, responding positivcly to requests where possible. taken have been helpful Wc hope thc actions wc have c.~., offer of spare parts, sale

    --

    of heating oil and keroscnc, supportlvc public statcmcnts and assistance in settling commercial disputes.

    --

    . .

    We are prcpared to go further if Iran wishcs:

    --

    We wish to givc Yazdi thc iinmc of a ncw Ambassador;

    -- We reaffirm our rcndincss to Itnvc our Charge


    or the new Ambassador mrct with Ayatollah Khomeini.

    -- We are prepared to consider any ncw programs of


    cooperation

    --

    e.g., in intelligence exchnngc,

    agricultural developmcnt, narcotics control, employment generation, oil field management that Iran might suggest.

    --

    --

    We remain interested in the intelligence site? for SECRBT/NODIS *.

    SALT verification and the bencfits that would have for world

    peate.

    At n suitable time wc will br lircparcd to dis-s

    cuss this issuu with the Iranian? and t o allow Iranians

    to man the sites.

    --

    Wu hope thnt Iran will scc t11c.i~ moves as sincere

    gestures of good will.

    Wc hope that Iran's lenders, in-

    cluding Ayatollah Khomeini, would join 11s in attempting to combat the mistrust bctwecn our two cour~trics. A gooJ
    step in that direction would be to remove the restrictions

    on thc foreign and domestic press atid gct back to the

    deals behind the revolution.

    Clearance: ~ ~ ~ l p ~ ~ d h s t a b l c P b~~kiirso~

    SECRET/NODIS

    81

    LIMITED O f f I C I A L USE DE R U Q W R #8988 258 2NY CCCCC ZZH 0 1611132 S L P 79 Ftl AMEMBASSY TEHRAN TO U S I C A VASBDC IMMEDIATE

    TEHRAN 18888 CLASS: CHRGE: APPII: DRlTD: CLEAR: DISTR: LIIITLD OIlICIkL U S I C A 9/16/79 US1CA:PAO:JGRAl US1CA:PAO:JGRAVES NONE ICA-2 CRARGE PO' l C 0 N CRU

    **

    USICA ?OR CURRAN FROM P A 0 S P E C D I S


    t.0. 12865: N/A SUBJ: CPAO WORK GOALS

    REF:

    U S I C A 52725 GOALS ?OR MY OER "CONTRACT-:

    I PBOPOSE THE ?OLLOWING

    1. (NO. 1 I N R L P T E L ) A S S E S S AND ADJUST POST ORGANIZATION, RESOURCES, AND S T A m nnrr TEEM APPROPRIATE TO POST~ REVOLUTIONART IRAN. S T A F F HAS ALRSADT BEEN GR8ATLY RIDOCED, AND I PLAN TO DEVELOP A NEW S T A F P T I Q PATTERN AND N t V J O B D E S C R I P T I O N S BY JANUABT. A S NEW OPPORTUNITY DEVELOPS TO PROMOTE 0.S. I N T I R ~ S T S . W I L L A L J U S T RESOURCE ALLOCATIOU AND S T U ? ASSIGNMENTS. (NO. 2 11 R E ? T E L ) D I V R O P I N S T I M T I O I A L A N A L I S I S UHICII IICLUDB ISLAMIC R~VOLUTIONARY STRUCTOR~S - LXBBRAL AND EADICAL-LXlT R l l O L U T I O N A ~ Y S -T - -U -C --~ ~ S . - -~ - -T , AID rai NN ooinnnm~-Ir INDU ~ N P R O P O S ~ U 1W CONSTITUTION IS I N ?ACT ADOPTED AND SPIWS A NEW W V P N M Z N T . R E B U I L D PHYSICAL DBS O P L I A T I O U WHICH WAS D s s r r o n D DURING R n o L o T r o r (ALL n c o ~ nrr c o n r r s c r T r n ) . ~s B U I L D UP A P R A C T I C A L DRS U S I N G T I T L E S R A T R I B THAN ~NDIIIWTAL NARIS, AND a r o r N usrno THIS LIST 02 PARTIC~PANTS- M R P U B L I C A T I O N D I S T R I B U T I O N AND S I I I L C T I O N 0 A u t I r n c E s 1011 PROGRAMS. I N CONJUWCTIOI WITH IAS, 1 BEGIN ESTABLISHING " ~ L C I P I I N T " C A T ~ G O I Y WHICR n A r CONTAIN S P E C I f I C NAMES RATHER THAN J U S T T I T L E S . I WOULD ALSO HOPI! TEAT WE C W L D Bt?ORE T H I YEAR IS 001 I D l N T I R A NUMBER O? PROGRAM 1 N S T I T U T I O N S . B U T T H I S W I L L 0 1 COUllSE DEPEWD 01 T E E P O L I T I C A L C L I M A T E (NO IRAMIAN ORGANIZATION WOULD DARE WORK POBLICALT u r T a US AT PRISENT)
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    3. ( 1 0 9 I N RE?TEL) n O n o T E usr, BY L I a n A a r ' s NATURAL AUDIENCE AND O T l l t l l I N C I I I D U A L S IMPORTANT T O T E E M I S S I O N , 01 OUR LIBRARY'S RE?ERENCE S E R V I C E AND C O L L E C T I O N S I W I L L ALSO ENCOURAGE THE LIBRARY T O COOP1CRATS WITH T E E I A S I N D E I E L O P I N G VATS T O B U I L t U P T E E P Q C h T I O N TEAT THE CULTURAL CENTER I S O F GlCWUINE S E R V I C I T O T E E C O M W N I T T * I E . . I M P R O I O RELLVANT B I I m E N C E M A T E l l A L S ~ C O O N S ~ LSTUDENTS, AND STRENGTBLNa o L D I N a s I N RLLIGION AND PHILOSOPHY. LIWITSD OIYICIAL
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    5. I N C O O P P A T I O M Y I T B THE CONSUL Q S N l n A L , r 0 R t WITH 2111 PWS TO B r m s t rm D A W U ~ R W ~ o LT T I t r VISA rL A PROBLlMi COONSXI THE MlSStOW WITH RlGARD TO THB PUBLIC AYYAIIS IHPLICATIOYS O P PROIOS2D CONSULAl P O L I C I E S AND PROClDURt8.

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    1. PSYCHOLOGICAL SITUATIOW KEOMEINI AND MULLAHS, STILL ENTHUSIASTICALL1 SUPPORTBD BY THX MASSES REMAIN ONLY EIPECTIIIG POWER IN iRAN. THEY, HOWEVER, ~ A V E NOT DlVISED MEANS OF GOVERNING EFFICIENTLY. NOR HAVE THEY YFf MANAGED TO REAtIZE ANYTHING LIKE THP ANACERO% NISTIC PAN-ISLAMIC WORLD THEY DBEAM OF RESUSCITATING a mon A N IDEALIZED PAST. KHWEINI CAN CERTAINLY VETO NOVSS BY OTHER FACTIONS I N IRAN. BUT BE PROBABLY V A N N O T MAKE HIS PAN-ISLAMIC DREAM A REALITY. NOR CAN BE QUELL RIGGIONAL, ETENIC, OR POLITICALLY INSPIRED UPRISINGS WITHODT THE HELP OF E , ARMY OR LEFTIST PARA-MILITARY RLVOLUTIONART GROUPS. HE CANNOT REVIVE ?HE MODERN SECTOR OF TEE ECONOMY AND THUS REDUCE UNEMPLOYMENT WITHOUT TEE EELP OP WESTBRN-TRAINED TECHNICIANS AND MANAGERS. HE CANNOT EVEN GET THE :SCHOOLS BACK IN OPERATION OR 0NSNAE.PL TRAFFIC IN TEHRAN OR SKIRAZ. O THE OTHER HAND I T SELMS CLEAQ N TEAT KHOMEINI HAS N REAL INTENTION b F GIVING THE PGOI O THE UNSTINTING SUPPORT I T WOULD NEED TO BEGIN COPING WITH THE C O U N F ~ ~ Y ' S PROBLEMS. ~ E R B S , TEERBPORE, I LITTLE PROSPECT THAT THE PRESENT DRIFT WILL T.URN INTO ANYTHING MORE DYNAMIC OMTIL TEE COUNCIL OF EXPERTS FINISHES I T S WORT AND A N E W CONSTITUTION SPAWNS A LEGALLY CONSTITUTED GOVERNMENT A PROCESS WHICH I S GOING TO TAKE AT BEST MONTHS AND MAY BRING FORTH A N IMPRACTICALl ULTRA-ISLAMIC STRUCTURE N W TEAT THE O UNTINELY DEATR OF AYATOLLIB TALEGEANI HAS STILLET: THE VOICE OF THE MOST SENSIRLE RELI3IOUS LEADER I N TEE COUNCIL

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    2 . IMPLICATIONS FOR USICA I F I FACT IRAN I S FATED N TO DRIFT FOR MONTHS YET UNDER A PROVISIONAL dOVERNMENT WHICH I S HAMSTRUNG BY VARIOUS UNCOOltDINATED REVOLUTIONARY KOUITLHS AND SUPPOBTBD ONLY FITFULLY BY YHOMEINI AND OTHER POWERPUL CLERGY, USICA SROULD I M JUDGMENT: N Y
    A. AVOID ANY ACTION WHICH COULD BRING THE UNFAVORABLE ATTENTION OF ANY FACTION TO FOCUS ON US.

    B PUT OUR O W REVOLUTION-WRECKED HOUSE IN ORDER . U WITH A VIEW TO HAVING READY TEE ORGANIZATION, STAFF, AND EQUIPMENT NECESSARY TO TALE EFFECTIVE ACVANTAGE OF UNITIES TO PROMOTE' U.S. IVTERESTS WHYN TREY PRESENT s EvL J f l ; ; :
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    C. USE THE UtCZLLENT CONTACTS WHICH 1 0 ROSIN HAS DEVFLOPED TO BELP THE MISSION COPE vITH PRMsING AND POTENTIALLY EXPLOSIVE SITVATIONS SUCH AS OUR VISAISSUING OPERATION.

    D. IMPROVE OUR NOW-CONTROI~SIAL MUC APPRECIATED LIBRARY AND ENGLISH TLACHING SEBI~CES $0 THE COWIINITT.
    SEEK OPPORTUNITIIS TO DEHOWSTBITL AMERICAN N STIIPATHETIC INTEREST I ISLAM AND THE VEGL-BfING IRANIAN PEOPLE.
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    I. UNOBTRUSIVSLY ENCOURAGX AND SUPPORT SUCB INSTITUTIONS AS THE IAS, FIILBRIGHT COHMISSION, AHIDBAST, AND AMERICAN INSTITUTE O r IRANIAN STODIES.
    3. COMMUNICATION PROCISS I N ADDITION TO O W ONGOING ENGLISH-TIkCHING &ND LIBEABY ACTIVITIES, THE EXCELLENT VORX 09 10 R O S ~ HAS RESULTED I A N N C?IECTIVE, ONGOINQ COMMUNICATION PROCESS VIA TEE PRESS. ONLIKELY AS IT MAY ssm I N R ~ V ~ L U T I O N A R T IRAN, ROSEN'S W R OUTGOING IIANNBR, FLUENCY IN PABSI, AND INSIGHTS AM INTO THE PERSIAN MENTALITY EAV1 ACTUALLY GIVEN THE POST EAST, CONTINUING OPPOBTUNXTY TO BOTH PLACE SPECIFIC RELEASES AND ENTER INTO PROGRESSIVELT WORE REWARDING DIALOG WITB nEHBERS OP THB WORKING PRESS. NOT ONLY DO THEY N W CALL ON US REGULARLY ACCEPT OUR O I N V I T A T I O N S , AND LISTEN STMPATHETICALLTWHEN WE TALK O? OUR CONCERNS, THEY OPTEN OF LATE TA3E PAINS TO CONTACT US WHEN TBET ARE WORKING O STORIES OP IMHFIDIAT N CONCERN TO US. VE COULD, rOR EXAMPLE, RAVE HAD W SEVERELY DAMAGING REPORTS O O W NEWLT REOPENED COhSULAR SERVICE. BUT PRESS REPORTS DID NOT DWELL ON THE EUGE CROWDS AH'OCCASIONAL DISORDER, TEE VIEWS OF DISGRUNTLED VISA SEEKERS, AND THP CONmSXOW AND OCCASIONAL INJUSTICES WHICH TBE SHAKE-DOWN PROCESS I S GRADUALLY ELIMINATING BUT WHICH NONETEELESS COULD HAVE E BEEN USED TO MAXE US WOK VERY BAD INDEED. W GOT, INSTEAD, I hLL TBE MAJOR DAILIES STMPATHETIC, COMPREN EENSIVE, SERVICE-ORIENTED REPORTING DESIGNED TO FELP IRANIANS UNDERSTAND AND EFFICIENTLY USB OUR CONSULAR BT
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    TEHRAN 1 0 1 8 7

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    OUR MOST TIHE-CONSUHING, ?RUSTBATING ACTIVIR 1 0 1 THE PIOHEN? I S VISA PUSHINQ. I T SEEMS TEAT AU OUR CONTACTS, WTB SELF-STYLED AND amuxNB, EAVE RELATIVBS AND ?BIPNDS W O ARE DESPERATnY EAGIR H T ENTEll THE U.S. O TEE PElSrAN HPYTALITT I S SUCH TEAT ANTONE nro SEES TEE P o s s x a r L x r y or omxwrre SPrcrAL PRIVILEGE ?OR nxnstm Q EIS rmrn AND ~ I E N D S BAS N O QUALM ABOUT ATTXWTING TO USE ANT RELATIONSHIP R USICA OFFICERS BE I T EVER SO TXNUOUS O ?AR?ETCEED. ARE T H ~ I I O R S OBLIPED TO SPEND SOtlETHING LIKE T O W EOURS EIWY vorrxno DAY BITFCR D R A C E ~ L L T~ P N D I N G0 r r REOUESTS ?OR XELP O WRESTLING VITE OUR VISA-ISSUING R COLLEAGUIS I N AN A T ~ TO BENDER S ~ V I C XTO GENUINELY T USLmL EVEN ESSENTIAL CONTACTS I TEE MINISTRIIS N or I O R ~ I G N AITAIRS OX Q~IDANCE.A C A D ~ I C S . nmaxrs or TEE IAS, OR mrnmns or WORKINO PRESS. THE COST O DOING IIUSINESS IN IRAN TODAY! 01AVES r BT

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    C O W F I D E N T I A L

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    E.O. 12065: 9/14/99 RDS-1 (TOON, MALC0LM)OR-M TAGS: PEPR, IR, UR SUBJECT, (U) SOVIET POLICY TOWARD IRAN REF': (A) TEHRAN 9646 (B) MOSCOW 21766 (C) STATE 237685 (D) TEHRAN 8828 1.C- ENTIRE TEXT. 2 . SUMMARY. RECENT SPECULATION ABOUT A SHIFT JN SOVIET POLICY TOWARD IRAN APPEARS TO BE PREMATURE. THE SOVIETS ARE RAPIgLY BACKPEDALLING IN AN EFFORT TO DISASSOCIATE OFFICIAL POLICY FROM CRITICAL PRESS COMMENTARY ON IRAN, ESPECIALLY THE BOVIN ARTICLE IN NEDELYA. THE MFA IRAN DESK OFFICE FLATLY DENIED THAT THERE HAVE BEEN ANY CHANGFS IN SOVIET POLICY TOWARD IRAN. THE KOSYGIN MESSAGES TO BAZARGAN AND KHOMEINI WERE PROBABLY ALSO INTENDED TO DAMPEN SPECULATION THAT THE SOVIET UNION HAS ABANDONED ITS POLICY OF VAINTA-INING FRlENDLY OFFICIAL RELATIONS WITH POST-REVOLUTIONARY IRAN. RECENT EVENTS IN IRAN HAVE NO DOUBT JNCREASED SOVIET CONCERN AND IRRITATION WITH THE SITUATION THERE, BUT WE SEE THIS AS A SHIFT IN THE ALWAYS AMBIVALENT SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD KHOMEINI'S ISLAMIC REVOLUTION, XATHFR THAN A SHIFT IN 'BASIC POLICY. THE SOVIET UNION CONTINUES TO VIEW THE PRESENT IRANIAN POLITICAL ARRANGEMENT AS TRANSITIONAL AND WILL WALK TO SEE WHAT FOLLOWS IT BEFORE UNDERTAKING A SERIOUS REASSESSMENT OF SOVIET POLICY TOWARD IRAN. FND SUMMARY.
    % 7

    3. AS NOTED IN REF A, RECENT SOVIET PRESS COMMENTARIEs ON IRAN HAVE PROVIDED AMPLE GROUNDS FOR WONDERING IF A REASSESSMENT OF SOVIET P\'LICY TOWARD IRAN MIGHT BE UNDERWAY. THIS IS ESPECIALLY TRUE OF BOVIN'S NEDELYA ARTICLE (REF B), WHICH BLASTED THE ISLAMIC REVOULTION AND PASNTED KHOMEINI( THROUGH QUOTATIONS FROM HIS OWN STATEMENTS) AS A DANGEROUS RELIGIOUS FANATIC. GOROVOY's CONVERSATION WITH DEPTOFF (REF C) ALSO TENDS TO SUPPORT THE IDEA OF A NEW SOVIET POLICY TOWARD IRAN.

    4. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE PAST FEW DAYS, HOWEVER BELIE A SHIFT IN OFFICIAL POLICY TOWARD IRAN. PRAVDA ON SEPTEMBER 11 PUBLISHED SEPARATE TELEGRAMS SENT BY KOSYGIN, WHILE OVERFLYING IRANIAN TERRITORY EN ROUTE TO ETHIOPIA, TO BAZARGAN AND KHOMEINI. BOTH TELEGRAMS EMPHASIZE THE SOVIET UNION'S COMMITMENT TO DEVELOP GOOD-NELGHBORLY RELATIONS WITH IRAN, AND--IN THE TEXEGRAM TO KHOMEINI-ON BASIS OF NON-INTERFERENCE IN EACH OTHER'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS.

    5. MFA COUNSELOR AND CHIEF OF THE IRAN SECTION STANISLAV KONSTANTINOVICH KOVRIGIN TOLD EMBOFF SEPTEMBER 12 THAT THERE HAD BEEN,ABSOLUTELY NO CHANGE IN SOVIET POLICY TOWARD IRAN. HE SAID THE BASIC STATEMENTS OF SOVIET POLICY CONTINUE TO BE BREZHNEV'S SPEECHES OF NOVEMBER 19, 1978. AND MARCH 2. 1979, AND ELABORATED THAT SOVIET RELATIONS WITH IRAN ARE BASED ON GOOD-REIDGHBORLINES,MUTUAL RESPECT FOR SOVEREIGNTY AND NON-INTERFERENCE IN EACH 3THER'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS. KOVRIGIN ALSO TERMED "AUTHORITATIVE" THE TASS DENIAL (PRINTED IN SEPTEMBER 5 PRAVDA) OF CHARGES OF SOVIET INTERVENTION IN KURDISTAN BY IRANIAN POLITICAL FIGURES AND NEWSPAPERS.
    6. ASKED ABOUT RECENT CRITICISM OF IRAN IN THE SOVIET PRESS, KOVRIGIN DENIED ?AT THERE HAD BEEN ANY CRITICISM, SAYING THE SOVIET PRESS WAS MERELY REPORTING THE NEWS THERE AS WESTERN MEDIA DO. AS FOR THE BOVIN ARTICLE, KOVRIGIN INSISTED THAT BOVIN WAS EXPRESSING ONLY HIS OWN PERSONAL VIEWS AND THAT NEDELYA, UNLIKE PRAVDA, IS NOT AN AUTHORITATIVE PUBLICATION.
    7. BOVIN HIMSELF TOLD AN AMERICAN JOURNALIST (PROTEcT) IN AN OFF-THE-RECORD INTERVIEW SEPTEMBER 12 THAT HIS WRITINGS REFLECT HIS OWN OPINIONS AN^ NOT NECESSARILY 'THE VIEWS OF THE GOVERNMENT. HE DENIED THAT HIS NEDELYA ARTICLE ON IRAN MEANT A REILSSESMENT OF SOVIET POLICY, BT 12156 88

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    N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 MOSCOW 22256

    SAYING HE DOESN'T EVEN KNOW WHAT SOVIET POLICY IS. BOVIN DESCRIBED NEDELYA AS A "POPULAR" SUNDAY SUPPLEMENT (TO IZVESTIYA) WHICH IS NOT AT ALL AUTHORITATIVE.
    8. IZVESTIYA SEPTEMBER 13 CAFRIED A LONG ARTICLE BY ITS TEHRAN CORRESPONDENT WHICH IIPLICITLY CONTRADICTED l ENTITLED "IRAN: MANY OF THE POINTS I l THE BOVIN ARTICLE. PROCESSES OF RENEWAL," THE IZVESTIYA ARTICLE

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    OFFERED EXCUSES FOR IRAN'S CURRENT ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, SAYING THEY WERE NATURAL FOR THE INITIAL ?ERIOD OF ANY REVOLUTION AND ALSO THE RESULT OF ABANDONMENT BY FORMER WESTERN ECONOMIC PARTNERS;

    -- SAID THE ANTI-IMPERIALIST DIRECTION OF THE IRANIAN SUPPOI?T WORLDWIDE;

    CALLED THE SEVERING OF IRANIAN MILITARY AND INTELLIGENCE TIES WITH THE US A POSITIVE FACTOR FOR GENERAL DETENTE AND PEACE;

    --

    -- SAID THE SOVIET UNION TOOK A POSITION IN SUPPORT OF THE IRANIAN NEVOLUTION AND IS READY TO COOPERATE ACTIVELY WITH THE NEW IRAN; AND, IN CONCLUSION
    SAID THE SOVIET PEOPLE VIEW WITH UNDERSTANDING THE DIFFICULTIES CONFRONTING IRAN AND SINCERELY WISH THE FRIENDLY IRANIAN PEOPLE A SOLUTION TO THEIR PROBELEMS

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    9. COMMENT: THE SOVIETS ARE OBVIOUSLY BACKTRACING QUICKLY FROM THE IMPRESSION CREATED BY THE BOVIN ARTICLE THAT THE SOVIET UNION WAS REASSESSING ITS IRAN POLICY. WE DO NOT TAKE AT FACE VALUE, HOWEVER, STATEMENTS THAT BOVIN WAS EXPRESSING ONLY HIS "PERSONAL OPINIONS." IT IS TRUE THE NEDELYA IS LESS AUTHORITATII~THAN PRAVDA AND THAT BOVIN IS A MAVERICK, BUT HE IS ALSO REGARDED AS WELLCONNECTED WITH SOVIET LEADERS. HIS ARTICLE PROBABLY ACCURATELY REFLECTS SOVIET IRRITATION OVER SOME RECENT EVENTS IN IRAN: THE USE OF FORCE AGAINST THE KURDS, THE SUPPRESSION OF LEFTLSTS, INCLUDDING THE TUDEH, IRANIAN

    SUPPORT FOR THE ISLAMIC REBELLION IN AFGHANISTAN, DEFAULT ON GAS DELIVERY CONTRACTS, A ? ABOVE ALL, ACCUSATIONS N AGAINST THE SOVIET UNION BY IRANIAN POLITICAL FIGURES AND PRESS.
    10. WE ARE NOT READY TO CONCLUDE THAT THIS AMOUNTS TO A CHANGE IN SOVIET POLICY, HOWEVER. AS NOTED IN REF D, THE SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD IRAN'S ISLAMIC REVOLUTION HAS ALWAYS BEEN AMBIVALENT. WE SEE THE RECENT MIXED SIGNALS BEING EMITTED BY THE SOVIETS AS CONFIRMATION THAT THIS AMBIVALANCE STILL EXISTS, ALTHOUGH THE NEGATIVE ASPECTS OF THE SOVIET ATTITUDE MAY WEIGH SLIGHTLY MORE HEAVILY NOW THAN EARLIER. THE BOVIN ARTICLE AND OTHER RECENT CRITICISM OF IRAN PROBABLY SHOULD BE SEEN AS A WARNING THAT BT U 2156

    PP RUQMHR DE RUEHMO #2156/03 2601635 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 171600Z SEP 79 FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1540 INFO RUFHLG/AMCONSUL LENINGRAD 7068 RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 1038 RUFHOL/AMEMBASSY BONN 8223 RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0867 R~FNPS/AMEMBASSYPARIS 7868 RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1079 RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0604 RUSBAE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 1559 RUFHNAAISMISSION USNATO 7310 RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY M A N 1803 RUEHEG/AMEM~~ASSY CAIRO 2220 RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 1145 RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 0384 RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 1463 RUQMHR/AMEMBASSY TEHRAN PRIORITY 0235 RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 2869 BT C 0 N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 MOSCOW 22156 THE SOVIETS HIT BACK, IF IRANIAN POLITICAL LEADERS CAN AND NEWSPAPERS CONTINUE TO ATTACK THE SOVIET UNIOU. SUCH CRITICISM MAY ALSO HAVE BEEN A TRIAL BALLOON TO TEST REACTIONS TO A POT!ENTIAL SHIFT IN SOVIET POLICY; IF SO, THE SOVIETS WERE ~PPARENTLYSURPRISED BY THE STRONG REACTION IT GENERATED IN WESTERN AND IRANIAN MEDIA AND ARE NOW TRYING TO DOWNPLAY ITS SIGNIFICANCE. li. THE SOVIET UNION CONTINUES TO VIEW THE PRESENT POLITICAL STRUCTURE IN IRAN AS TRANSITIONAL AND WILL MOST LIKELY WAIT TO SEE WHAT FOPLOWS IT BEFORE UNDERTAKING A SERIOUS REASSESMENT -OF SOVIET POLICY. NFA DESK OFFICER KOVRIGIN TOLD EMBOFF THAT IRAN'S FUTURE DEPENDS ON THE NEW CONSTITUTION AND ON WHO WILL OCCUPY THE NEW ORGANS OF POLITICAL POWER. HE ADDED HIS "PERSONAL OPINION: THAT ALL OF IRAN'S CURRENT PROBLEMS ARE ATTRIBUTABLE

    TO THE PROVISIONAL NATURE OF THE PGOT. HE BELIEVED THAT THE CLERGY WOULD STTLL CONSTITUTE THE MOST POWERFUL GROUP IN THE COUNTRY AFTER THE NEW CONSIITUTION TOOK EFFEZT, BUT EXPRESSED MILD OPTIMISM ABOUT THE PENDING POLTICAL STRUCTURE. ASKED IF HE SAW ANY OTHER RELIGIOUS FIGURES WITH THE POTENTIAL POLITICAL INFLUENCE OF A KHOMEINI OR A TALEGHANI, KOVRIGIN SAID THERE WERE NONE IN VIEW. HE CONCLUDED THIS DISCUSSION BY STRESSING THAT TRAN'S POLITICAL FUTURE IS FOR THE IRANIANS THEMSELVES TO DECIDE AND THAT THE SOVIET UNION STRICTLY ADHERES TO ITS POLICY OF NON-INTERFERENCE IN IRAN'S INTERNAL AFFAIRS. IN SUM, WE RELIEVE THE SOVIET UNION IS STICKING TO ITS POLICY OF PURSUING GOOD STATE-TO-STATE RELATIONS WITH IRAN FOR THE PRESENT. THE SOVIETS WOULD NO DOUBT PREFER A STRONGER SECULAR GOVERNMENT IN TEHRAN; BUT THEY RECOGNIZE THAT KHOMEINT IS THE MOST POWERFUL IRANIAN POLITICAL FIGIJREBY FAR, AND THEY PROBABLY SEE LI~TLE POSSIBILITY OF THEIR ALTERING THAT REALITY. THEY ALSO KNOW THAT-KHOMEINI IS 79 YEARS OLD AND CANNOT LAST FOR EVER. AT LEAST AS LONG AS KHOMEINI DOMINATES IRANIAN POLITICAL LIFE, WE BELIEVE THAT MOSCOW WILL CONTINUE TO MAKE KNONN ITS DISPLEASURE WITH IRANIAN POLICIES AND STATEMENTS irARMFUL TO SOVIET INTERESTS AND WILL WATCH FOR CPPORTUNITIES TO ENHANCE ITS INFLUENCE IN IRAN. HOWEVER,WE FEEL THAT MOSCOW WILL STOP SHORT OF TAKING DIRECT ACTIONS TO INFLUENNCE EVENTS THERE. TOON BT
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    2.0. 1 2 8 6 5 . : G D S ( L I M B E S T , JO11N) OR-P TAX: 1 2 , P I k T PGOV SUEJFCT: C O U N C I L O F E X P E R T S 4 P P R O V E S GOVERNMENT OF I H i O L O G I A N S

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    T3.E C C J N C I L 0 1 E X P E R T S F O R E X A M I N I N G T H E NEW I R b N I 4 N C O N S T I T U T I O N A P P R O V E D A R T I C L 3 V O F T H E NEW C O N S T I T U T I C N O h S E P T P Y B 3 P 2 1 BY A V O T E D F 5 E - 8 W I T f l F O U R A B S T E N T I O N S . T d I S AZTICLE, ESTABLISBES TEE VILIYIT-E-PAQIH. 09 GOVERNWENT O F T H E O L O G I A N S . T A X A R T I C L E S T I P U L A T E S THAT I N T E E b B S E Y C F , O F T H E IMAM 0 1 T 9 E AGX ( T O WHOM A L L S Z C U L A 3 POVER R I G H T L Y E P L O N G S ) , T H E MAN4SEMENT O T P U B L I C A F F A I R S AND T B E L B A D E R S B I P O F T B E COMMUNITY I N T R E ISLAMIC REPUBLIC O F IFAN I S VESTED I N A JUST, VIRTJOUS VNO:.fLBDGEABLE, C O U R A G F O U S , AND SAGACIOTJS S P E C I A L I S T I N ' ISIAMIC JURISPRUDENCE (FAQIH). 3. T B I S LEADE?. MUST BE A C C E P T E D AND R E C O G N I Z E D BY 4 MAJORITY O F TBE PUBLIC. I F S U C R A P E Q S O N CANNOT B E EOUhD, C O U N C I L O F S I C H L Y Q r J L L I P I E D R E L I S I O U S LAW S C ~ O L A E S W I L L PSSUME T E I S FONCTION. T R E LA1# $ I L L S P E C I F Y TEE ZIORMATIOd P N C CrlSAA'IIZATION O F T H I S COTINCIL.
    4. V I L l Y h T - E - T A O I B I S I N F A C T T H E T I T L E O F ONE O F hYATOLLAP X R O M E I Y I ' S h O R R S O F P O L I T I C A L P H I L O S O P H P . NO C E S T A I N O F T S E E X A C T MRANING O F T F E TERM OR O F YG-TERM P O L I T I C A L I M P L I C A T I O N S . POWEVER I T S O N DOES REPRESENT A S I G N I F I C A N T A L T E X A T I ~ NOF I G I N A L DRAFT C O N S T I T U T I O N , WHICH E N V I S A G E D A S E C U L A R PRESIDSNCY A N D A R E V I T A L I Z E D C O V N C I L OP RXLIGIOVS V X P T R T S TO A N S U P S T Y A F A L L L A d S Y T R F I N C O N F O U Y A N C F d I T P

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    ISLAM. THIS ARRANGEMENT WAS CONTAINED IN THE ORIGINAL 1906 CONSTITUTION BUT HAD NEVXR BCEN IMPLEHENTCD.
    5 . IN THL ShORT TERM, THE ADOPTION OF THIS ARTICLE APPEARS TO CLEAR THE WAY FOR AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI TO T A U CHARGE OPENLT OF ALL SECULAR AND RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY. AS LONG AS (QOMEINI IS ALIVE, THERE WILL BE FEW RIVAL CLNDIDATES PO3 TYF OPFICE'S OF FAQIH.
    6 TYL APPROVED ARTICLE MACES NO MENTION OF THE OFFICE . OF PRESIDENCY. h09 HAVE ANY OF THE ARTICLES APPROVED SO FAR DEFINED TEE PRESIDENCY OR DEFINED TBZ RELATIONSEIP SETbEEh TRE P2ESIDEdCY AND TEE TEEOCRATIC LEADER. IT APPEARS, BO'EIZVER, THAT TEE INTENTION OF THIS ARTICLE IS TO FORYALIZE A MERSIYG OF STATE AND RELIGION AND TO FN3UR9 THLT THE kEY CBITF OF STATE, WHATEVER HIS PORMAL TITLE. WILL BE DRAWN F30M AMONG THE LEADEBS OP TEE SEIA CLERGY. COUNCIL PRESIDENT MONTAZERI SAID ARTICLS WAS FORMAL ACCNOWLEDGEMENT THAT IN ISLAM RELIGION AND POLITICS ARE INSEPASABLE. PEQSIAN-LANGUAGE PAPER BAMDAD SF SEPTEMBEZ 15 REFERRED TO T31S OPINION WRITING FOP. SOME, NOT WELL-VERSED IN ISLAMIC SU~ISPRUDEWEE, TRP QCESTIOX IS VHETBFR TH3 GOVEQYYTNT OF TEE THEOLOGIAN IS THF SAME AS TEE PFESIDENCY. IF IT IS NOT THEN WILL ~ O THE EXISTENCE OF TWO AUTBORITIES CREATE T AN& CONTRADICTIONS?"

    EONFLICT

    SINCE THE FNTIRE CONCEPT OF VILAYAT-E-FAOIB IS CLOSELY ASSOCIATED VITB LSOM3'INI. PUBLIC COMMENT HAS BLEN CAUTIOUS. COUNCIL REPRESENTATIVE ABU At-BASAN BANI SADX IS QOUTED Z Y BAYDAC AS AS<IN% R6ETORICALLY VFIFTHXR IT kILL EE POSSIPLE TO FIhlD A SCHOLAR OF QFLIGIOES LAW kEO MEETS ALL OF THE CONDITIOYS DEFINED IN THF ARTICLE. A V O T R ~ RREPRESENTATIVE,POOLDCAM-HA~AGHF'I. EXPLAINED BIS VOTE AGdINST THE ABTICLP ?Y SAYING TEAT TFIS TFIEOCFACY'S FUNCTIONING 'S DEPENDENT O N THE D ~ E S E N C T A OF AYATOLLAH 3FOMEINI EV? WO3LD PROBABLY NOT WORK IN 41s ATISZNCX.
    7.

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    AGAINST T R I S A R T I C L E . T H I S REPORT HAS R E C E I V B D V I D E ACCEPTANCF, I TEHRAN. N I F THERE I S TO B E ANY S I G N I P I C A N T O P P O S I T I O N 10 T H E A R T I C L B , TEEN TALIGBANI'S O P I N I O N COULD BECOYE T H E FOCUS O F TAAT O P P O S I T I O N . EOWEVSR, APPROVAL 00 T T I S A R T I C L B I S AN I N D I C A T I O N T E A T THE PROPONENTS O F C L E R I C A L GOVERNMENT ARE NOk I N THE ASCENCAhT I N THE COUNCIL 09 EXPERTS. AT T H S SAMS T I M E , VILAYAT-E-PAQIH, L I L E THE I S 1 , A P I C R E P U B L I C , I S S T I L L AN UNYOYN QUANTITY FOR MOST I R A N I A N S . I F A RETEREIDUM WERE B 3 L D ON THE S U E J E C T TODAY. T R I S P O L I T I C A L CONCEPT WOULD UNDOURPEDLY R E C E I V E OVERWHELMIYG APPPOVAL AND TBE D Z T A I L S O F T H I S ARRANGFMENT WOULD 3E L E F T FOR T H E LEARNED THEOLOGIANS T O V 0 9 7 OUT. LAINCEN RI #@I81 NNNN VZCZC
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    1.

    PCOV. IR CLBRICAL ILFLUENCE

    (C

    - LNPIRS TEXT)

    2 . ?OR PURPOSSS OF ANALYSIS SERE. JP WOULD APPRECIATE lrOBTAIB PNBASST VIEWS AND INPORHATION ON PERCEIVED 329WING INTLUfNCS 0 1 CLERGY.

    A . I? POSIrION OP CLERGY IS BECOHIN3 STRONGER, WFAT SPECIFIC POLICY EFFECTS \tAY 1P EXPECT? THAT IS. WBAT D ~ F Y S R ~ N CIN SPcor POLICIES (WEETBBR ENUNCIATED 02 DE ~ ?ACTO) DO Y EXPECT IN FOBSION AFPAIRS, ECONO'IIC/ COMMSRCIAL %ISIOkS. OR MILITARY PROGRAHS?

    B WHICH RECENT PC01 DECISIONS DOPS TEE PMBASSY ATTRIBUTS . TO PRESENTLY ENLARGED I~PLUEF(CE Tag CLERGY? IS THEBE OF EVIDENCE THAT NEW CLERICAL INFLOENCF IS BEING PXPRESSED T9ROPGH NIW PORnS OR INSTITTPIONS aAFHER ThAN PERCCrGE BIVOLOTIONARY COI'NCIL AND YOIITEFS AS GAS BZEh TSF CASE SINCI YCBRDARY? FOR EXhHPlE, ??F EYBASSY APPPARS TO BELIEVE ?PAT TEE BESITATION ON PESALE 3F F-14's CAN B1- ATTRIQOTRD TO CLERICAL INILUENCL. IS TSERE FIRM PVIDENCE ?OR T41S VIEW? IS IT LOT POSSIBLE TPAT THEitZ IS SPRONC DIPPJ?RSNCE OF 3PIEION BEl'#EEN IAF. YFA FACTIOYS IT0 CLERGY JOINING TEE SIDE POR BZl'ENTI3N OD P3SSIBLP nRCINC ANT IVPLKHENTING ACTION BE DELAYLD? ARS NOT TOPlITEES-WABRE CLERICAL INFLUENCE 64s EESN EXPRXSSED IN THE PAST--NOW YEAYER IN TRF MILITAaY TdAN LAST SPRING? DOES EMBASSY EAVE EVIDENCE TFAT CLERSY IS BEFIND RECEVT DECISIONS TO RESTART PAJOS POREIGN CONTRACTS AND YA<E LARGE PAYMENTS TO US FIR'lS?

    --

    C .

    THE ZMBASSY'S FINF CABLES ON EDUCA'IIOY PRCELEXS ST TFAF CLERICEL ILTLUENCI VIZFT BE SF09T 01 IVE IN TEAT SECP3rl. YOUR OZSCRIPSI3N SrrG>ISl'S TzLT

    TFE CIXRICS MAY BX COMBATTED BOTE ON TBE P 3 0 1 LEVEL ANG AT T E 3 LEVEL 3 F IMPLEVENTATION WEERE MANY IRANIANS WILL s I n P L y 40 AS THEY PLEASE. HOW STRONGIS THE TBNDEYCY TO GIVE L I P SEBVICE TO CLXRICAL DIRECTIONS, BUT PRAGYLTICALLY TO CONTINUE TO FOLLOl PAST PRACTICES. E.G.. TBF PBACTICE OF PLAYING YFSIC ON BADIO/TV AFTE3 THE KKOMEINI "BAN*? D. #E ARE T50ROUG9LY. CONFUSFD BY.TEE PRESS DESCBIPTIOH RPVISI3NS. TEE NEW ARTICLB F I V E , FOR OF C ~ N S T I T U ~ I O N A L EXAPPLE. DOES NOT MATCE WITH ARTICLE P I V r IN THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION. I S THE DOCUMENT BEING COMPLETLLP REWRITTEN? I T I S ESPECIALLY UNCLSAR BOW THE RELI3IOUS LEADER AHll COLJNCIL DKSCRIBED I N TEE NEW ARTICLE FIVE RELATE TO THE DRAFT DOCUqENT'S CO1NCIL OF GUARDIANS, THE PRESIDENT AYD THE MAJLIS. MCRKY POLITICLL ENVIRONMENT I N TODAY'S IRAN AND COMHEND EMBASSY FOR EXCELLENCE OF I T S POLITICAL REPOSTING BNDER ADVERSE CIRCUMSTANCES. I T IS IMPORTANT TPAT WE TRY T O DEPICT TaXNDS UITH AS #UCE S P E C I F I C CETAIL AS POSSIBLE. W APE ALSO DEEPLY INTERESTED I N THE INSIGHTS AND E JUDGMENTS OF ASTUTE IRANIAN OPSERVERS WHO ARE CLOSE F 3 TEE ACTION; YEEP RINGING THE DOORBELLS. VANCE BT #64B7

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    C - 0 N F I D F N T I A L SECTION 01 O? 03 TEHRAN 18281 GDS 4/19/85 (LIMBERT, J 0 8 N ) OR-P PGOV, IR KBOMEINI MODERATES HIS ATTACKS O INTELLECTUALS N

    f E.O. 12065, 8 TAGS: PINT,


    : SUBJECT:
    REPS: 1. (C

    (A) TEHRAN QSe8, ( B ) TEARAN 10191

    - ENTIRE TEXT).

    2. SUWAEY: AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI'S SPEECHES POLLOVING THE DEATH OX TALECHANI CONTAINED A CHANCE I N EMPHASIS. HE SOPTENfD HIS ATTACKS ON THE IRANIAN INTELLECTUALS WHOM HE PREVIOUSLY ANATHEMATIZPD I S CHARBZADEH (INFATUATED WITB THE VEST). INSTEAD HIS SPEECHES CONTAINED CALLS ?OR UNITY-UNITI WITHIN THE CLERGY, UWITT VITEIR THE UNIVERSITIES. AND UNITY BETWEEN CLERST AND INTELLECTUALS. ALTHOUGH VE CANNOT BE CFRTAIN O? KHOMEINI'S MOTIVES. HE HAS BBPN TRYING TO ENSURE THAT A LARGE PART OF FORMER TALBGHANI SUPPORTERS INCLUDING THE MODERATE CLERCT AND THE SECULAR I N ~ E L L E C T U A L S ,ARE NOT IRREPARABLY ALIENATED FROM THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION. IT REMAINS TO BE SEEN I? THE SHIFT IN KHOMEINI'S POBLIC STATEHENTS HAS ANY PRACTICAL EFFECTS O THE REVOLUTIONART AUTHORITIES OR N O THE WORK OF THE COUNCIL OF EXPERTS. N

    3 I N REFTEL A EMBASSY DISCUSSED SOME O? THE IMPLICATIONS . OP TALECHANI'S DEATH FOR THE IRANIAN POLITICAL LEADERSHIP. ONE PROBLEn CREATED BT HIS DEATH I S TEkT ONE OF TALEGHAKI'S MAJOR CONSTITUENCIES, THE UNIYEBSITT-BASED ECTUALSc HAS 3EEN L P T WITHOUT AN OBVIOUS LEADER OTECTOR. TALECHANI'S DEPARTURE HLS LEFT THIS WITBOUT A LEADER OF SUFFICIENT STATURE VHO CAN
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    WORY TO PRESERVE UNITY BETWRlN MORE EXTREFIE CLERICAL SUPPORTERS OF THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION AND THE MODERATE ANC SECULAR ELEMENTS VEO HAVE ?ZLT THEMSELVES UNDER INCREASING PRESSURE FROM THF ADVOCATES OF A PURELY ISLAMIC STATE. ALTEOUGH I T I S STILL TOO SOON TO # A l l A DEFINITS JUDGEMENT I T APPEARS TBAT ATATOLLAE KHOtileINI I S WKING A EPIORT #'o ATTRACT THE MORE MODERATE N CONSTITUENCT OF TALEGEANI AND TO ENSURE THEIR CONTINUINQ LOTALTY TO THE REVOLUTION.
    4. AS EMBASSY NOTED RE?TEL A, THE LOYALTY O? TALEGEANI'S FOLLOVING VAS INTENSELY PERSONAL AND BASED ON AN INSTINCTIVE TRUST AND RESPECT. I T VAS ALSO BASED ON A UNIQCE SST OF HUMAN ?ACTORS VHICH ARE NOT DUPLICATED I ANT OTHER LRADER NOV ON THE IRANIAN POLITICAL SCENE. N AYATOLLAH EOSSEIN ALI MONTAZERI, APPOINTED rnrn Jon'ra OF TEHRdK I N PLACE OF TELEGHANI. HAS NOT ATTRACTED TEE SANE LOYALTY. MONTAZEBI'S PERFORMANCE AT H I S FIRST FRIDAT PRAYSRS ON SEPTEMBER 15 AT BEHESHT-E-ZAHRA WAS UNIMPRZSSIVF. HE I S UYDISTINGUISHED IN APPEARANCE, AND A INNFFECTIVR SPEAKER. ALTEOUGE MANY N BTTENCED FRIDAT PRAYERS OUT 0 1 RESPECT FOR THE MEHORY OF TALECHANI. MONTAZERI MAT FIND I T DIFFICULT TO ATTRACT TALFGHANI'S MASSIVE CONGREGATION AT TEBRAN UNIVERSITY WHEN FRIDAY PRAYERS BESUMl THERE O SEPTEHBER 21. N
    5.

    SIGNS HAVE ALREADT APPEARED QN THE GATES 0 1 TEERAN UNIVERSITY PROCLAIMING I T TO BE TALEGBANI UNIVERSITY , A N D MONTAZERI nrr NOT BE ABLE TO MATCH THE PMIPORMANCE OF E I S PREDECESSOR. IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY OBVIOUS REPLACWEIT FOB TALECHANI AS LEADER OF THE EDUCATED, IT APPEARS TEAT KROMEINI HIMSELL IS MAKING CONCILIATORY MOVES TOWARD THIS GROUP.
    6. THE EDUCATED HAD PREVIOUSLY BElN A TARGET IOR SBOMEINI'S SCORN AND RIDICULE. JUST A FEY DAYS BEFORE TALEGBANI'S DEATH, RHOMEINI TOLD A GATHERING AT m I Z I E H SCHOOL IN O M TBAT THOSE EASTERNERS VHO HAD MADE THE O VEST THEIQ ~A'ABA WERE TEE FOLLOVERS OF TAGHUT (THE DEVIL) SPOKEN Q F I THE QORAN. KBOMEINI SAID THAT BLIND N IMITATION OP THJ VEST HAS BROUGET THE FREEDOM FOR OUR T_O_UNGPEOPLE TO WATCH PBRNOGRAPET ON TELEVISION, TO

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    MORE OPIUM, AND TO WASTE T H E I R L I V E S I N BROTHELS LND BARS. A m R B F L I T T L I N G T H E IMPORTANCE O F T H E COUNTRY'S ECONOMIC I NWASTRUCT*URE, i ( H O ~ E I N 1 WITH GREAT EMOTION :TOLD H I S L I S T E N E R S , ISLAM I S S E R I O U S . ISLAM I S NOT IBIVOLOUS. ISLAM DOES NOT MEAN YOUNG BOYS AND G I R L S TAKING O f x T H E I R CLOTHES AND G E T T I N G I N T O T H S WATER TOGSTEER. KHOMEINI S A I D THAT ISLAM ALLOWS ONLY TWO S P O R T S , SHOOTING AND HORS7, R A C I N G , BOTH O P WFICIl iIAC OVERTONES O F M I L I T A R Y T R A I N I N G . THE LATTER, HE S A I D , I S S O IMPORTANT T E A T ISLAM E V l N ALLOWS E E T T I N G ON T H E RESULTS.

    7 KHOMEINI ALSO CONDEMNED T H E U S E O F WESTERN NAMES . FOB SHOPS, ROADS, AND P A R K S - A N ~ ASTED FOR THE BOYCOTT 0 1 PRODUCTS AND SHOPS WHICH BEAR WESTERN NAMES S I M P L Y FOR T H E S A K E O F P U B L I C I T Y AND S A L E S . ONLY I N T H I S WAT BE SAID, WOULD IRAN BE ABLE T O OVBRCOMG ITS F A S C I N A T I O ~ FOR T B P WEST AND TO BECOMP SOWETHING OTHER THAN A P A S S I V E ABSORBER O F EVERYTHING T H E WEST C I S H E S OUT. 8 K H O H E I N I , I N T H I S ANDIOTHER S P E E C H E S , FAD E S P E C I A L L Y . HARSH WORDS FOR IRANIAN INTELLECTUALS. I N AN E A R L I E R S P E E C H H E HAD S A I D , WE DO NOT WANT INTELLECTUALS" AND THEN RETRACTED S L I G H T L Y B T SAYING THAT SOME PEW MIGRT B E WORTHWHILE. I N H I S S E P T 8 S P E E C H I N QOM HE ACCUSED T H E INTELLECTUALS O F B E I N G I N F E C T E D WITH THE SAME I U l A T U A T I O N WITH T H E V E S T (GHARBZADEGI) WHICH HAS CORRUPTED THE E N T I R E I R A N I A N S O C I E T Y EXCEPT FOR THE MOSQUES AND THE CLERGY. (FYI: I R O N I C A L L Y THE VERY T E 9 K A D t G I WAS COINED ET T T E LATE J A L A L AL ARMAC, O+JE INTFLLECTUALS WHO XHOMEINI HARSHLY ATTACLS.1 THF DUTY F THE I N T E L L E C T U A L S , S A I D XHOMEINI, WAS NOT TO

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    ADVOCATE THE FALSE FRLIMlM OF THE VEST, BUT TO EXPOSE ITS EVILS AND ITS E S S ~ N T I A L VORTHLESSNESS.

    MODRRATE HIS ANTI-TI N W ?OR UNITY ESPECIALLY UNITY BETWEEN THE CLERGY O AND THE INTEL~ECTUALS
    10. SPEATING IN QOM O SEPTEMBER 13* IEOMEINI URGSD THE N INTELLECTUALS TO BECOME PART O? THE SEA OF RELIGIOUS POWZR SO TEAT TEE COMBINED STRENGTH O? THESE GROUPS coaiD BETTGR SERVE THE C O U N ~ Y . "YOU ARE ALL 01THE SAME NATION, LIVE I ONE COUNTRY AND ONE HWg. SO JOIN N FORCES AND PROTECT TOW HOUSE. ALTHOUGH STILL

    CRITICIZING THE INT~LLICTUALS'INFATUATIOY urra THE WEST, i HE SPARED THW THE HARSH* BLANXET CONDmNATION$ RE HAD
    $ MADE ONLY FIVE DAYS BEZORE.

    IHOMEINI ALSO APPEALED TO T I E RELIGIOUS LEADERS NOT TO dBUSE TRE POWER IN THEIR RANDS AND VARIED TEEM AGAINST OPPOSING TBB rJNIVERSITY-EDUCATED YOUNG PEOPLE, W O CONSTITUTE THE FUTURE LEADERSHIP 0 1 THE NATION. H - THE OVER-RIDING CONCERN BOTH FOR THE UNIVIRSITY AND FOR f THE CLmGY 8 2 SAID SHOULD TIE UNITY. $E ENTREATED BOT9 THE CLERGY 'AND THE UNIIERSITIES NOT t o SPLIT n INTO ?UEDING ?ACTIONS AND TO PROTECT THEIR O N INTERNAL W ' UNITY O? PURPOSE. 12. TEE IMAM TOOK A SIMILAR CONCILIATORY LINE I W A
    11.

    ISLAMIC REVOLUTION. SUCB A STEP WOUL~'SFRI0USLY YE4<EN TRE GOVERNflENT. ADVOCATING PATIENCE, YHOMBINI SAID TBAT SUCH DRASTIC MEASURSS WERE ILL-ADVISEC AND TBAT SUCH REFORM SHOULD FOLLOW APP!?OlAL 09 THE N W CONSTITUTION E AND ?ORMATION O? THE NEV LEGrSLATITB ASS?M9LY. 13. COMMENTI &LT?IOURE *POMEIN1 HAS NOT ILF,TRIAT?LD FROM N ANT OF HIS mNDAMENTAL IDFAS O THE HARt!RlL ElFECT OF FOREIGN INFLOENCSS O IRANIiN SOCIfTY. 4R APPBASS TO BE N CONCERNED TEAT BE NOT ALIRNATR THE LATE 4YbTOLLAH ET
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    VZCZC ZE? RR PUERC RUBIJCS RUEXJCS RUQMEI RUQMGU RUEHAD ROQMOD W S B f D RUQMRA RUSBL".UQYYV RUDTC RUQMAM BUEHMO RUQMMT RUFNPS RWSNAAA DE RUQNsR #&?281/03 2631321 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 2 0 1 2 5 5 2 SEP 79 F ANSMBASSY TEERAN M TO ?EEHC/SECSTATE VASEDC 3878 INFO RUEKJCS/SECDV WASR DC BUEYJCS/JCS WASH DC e u i u ~ ~ / t i N T BAGHDAD 2 2 9 1 sr RUQMO~/AMT"BASSY COHA 0 2 6 6 SFSBQD/dM~MbASSY ISLAMABAD 0 3 2 1 RUQF~RA/AMEMEASSP JIDDA 8322) FDSEL?/AM'FP!BASST r(A3UL 033B RtQMC iJ/AMVBkSSY $UWAIT 029E RUDTC/AhE?BASSY LONDON 0 4 0 6 ECQMAM/AMSYBASSY MANAUA 0 2 6 5 QUEHNO/bNEMBASST YOSCOW 0 2 9 2 RUQnM?/ANZHEASSY VUSCAT 2 1 9 3 RCFNPS/ANEMSASSY PAR18 0 3 5 9 ?USNAAA/USCINCEUR V A I S I N G ~ N GE BT c o N 7 I D E Y T I A t S E C ~ O Y OP 03 e3

    EBRAN 1 0 2 e 1

    TALEGQANI'S SUPPORTERS AMONG MODERATES I N THE CLSRCT AND TFE VNIVFRSITIES. TBF ABSFNCE OP TALEGHANI HAS APPARENTLY FOPCEC TFB IMAM TO TONY DOWN SOWE OF B I S MORR EXTBEeE ATTACKS A>AINST TYf SFCULAS AND WESTERN-ORIPNTED SECTION? CF THE SOC19TY. WHO* HE HAD ILEGULARLY ANATHEMATIZED I H I S EARLIPR SPESCBES. N
    14. IN VOCIFTING H I S PUBLIC STATTYENTS, T 8 3 IMAM MAT FAVP BEEN INFLUENCED BY TEE INMINSNT OPENING OF TRE SCBOOLS AND UNIVERSITIES, WHEQZ THERE ARE RUMORS OF SLBIOES DIVISIONS YETIFEN THE RZLICIOUS AND T9E SECOLhR STUCZNT SFOOPS. XHOMPINI W Y REALITY TSAT HT I S TRE A ORLY POSSISLF RBPLACRVEYT FOR TALEGuANI AS A MEDIATOR BETWEEN DISPUTI%C FACTIONS. TBFRT I S N OY3 FLSE WITH O FNOUG? STAT'JRP AND P R F S T I W . ALTiiOU24 I T I S STILL TOO EARLY TO PE CESTATN, I T APPFAeS THAT (HOMPIMI I S ATTEMPTI N 2 TO FXTTND TPE !iAYD OF F R I Z L D S S I P TO A YIDER StCTOR OP IRANItN SOCIFTY VITHOUT CEANGINZ R I S UNDERLYING NESSAGB TYAT IRAN'S SALVATION L I E S NEITDER IN PAST NOR 'J:EST, BUT If4 TE3 ST9AIG9T PATH (SIBAT AL-YUSTAQIY) OF ISLAM.

    15. I T I S S T I L L UNCLYAR YhAT THOMEINS'S YORE MOD3RATZ L I N P IN Y I S RECENT SPEECXZS YILL YEAN IN PQACTJCAL TIRYS O WFETSER RE 1 5 OPPElING THE MODESATES ANYTEING R MORE THAN WORDS. ON3 ARPA TO WATCH WILL Bt THE COUYCIL OF E T P W T S , WBICH HAS BESN CONVERTING T E 9 ORIGIYAL DXAPT CONSTITUTION INTO THE FUNDAMENTAL LAV OF A THEOC3ArIC STATE ( 4 B F 5 ) . I T R W A I Y S TO13E SEEN WSFTBSR TSF DPIVF TOR TEEOCQbCT IN TEE COUNCIL, uED BY ATAT0514<S T I Ah'!' YONYAZ R I . I S AT ALL BL'lNTED - T T I Z S H I F T - , E 0 P ~ O Y E I V I ' S PUFLIC STATEMENTS. I T I T I S NOT, : HOMlI4I'S EFFiRTS AT R7CONCILIATIOY WILL BE
    VZCZC
    267

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    CIFFICULT, WPECIALLT AS MODERATES MAT SEE TSWSELVES BEING SYSTFMATICALLY EXCLODED FROH ANY SEARS I N TBE IXANIAN POLITICAL PROCESS.
    1 5 . W CCTE THAT A ~.AOYEINI SPEECH AUGUST 19 TO E A I R TOBCX OFFICERS I N oon MADE ATTER TBIS CABLX WAS WRITTEZ bG4IN COYTAIN? A ATTAC6 O WESTERNIZED N N INTELLFCTUALS. I T I S DIPFICWLT TO SAT YEETHBR THESF COMMENTS WILL MARK TEE BESINNIN4 OP A N W SPATE 0 9 A Y N WFSTE9W SPEECSES, OR VEETEER TREY ARE A EXCIPTION TO N TEE TSEND YE PAVE BEEN OBSERVING SINCE TALEGBANI 'S DEATH. LA I NGXN ET NNNN

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    *

    C O N F I D E N T I A L S E ~ ~ I O N FB 03 TEYRAN O ~ E.O. 12065: GDS 9/28/05 ( L I I B E R T , J O H N ) OR-P TAGS: P I N T . PGOV. I R V ~ R XOF'COUNCIL OF EXPERTS PROCEEDS SLOWLY SUBJECT:

    I.

    (C

    - ENTIRE TEXT).

    2. SUMMARY: THE COUNCIL O F EXPERTS FOR THE EXAMINATION O F TEE IRANIAN CONSTITUTION, WHICH WAS SUPPOSED TO COMPLFTE I T S WORT B T SEPTEMBER 23. HAS S O FAR APPROVED ONLY X I P T E E N A R T I C L E S O F T E E NEW CORSTITUTION. THE O B I G I N A L D3AFT SUBMITTED FOR CONSIDERATION CONTAINED 151 A R T I C L E S , S O THE COUNCIL W I L L HAVE E I T H E R TO S P E E D PP I T S P d C E OR EXTEND I T S MANDATE. ACCORDING TO P R E S S REPORTS ON SEPTEMBER 19, THE COUNCIL'S L I F E HAS BEEN EXTENDED P O 9 LNOTEER 15 DAYS. HOWEVER T B I S NEW P E R I O D WAY WELL_ NOT B E S U F ? I C I E N f TO COMPLETE THE COUNCIL'S WORI. s N C SUMMARY.

    3. THE WORd O F THE COUNCIL 0 1 EXPERTS HAS BEEN PROCEEDING SMOOTHLY, I F SLOWLY. RADIO AND T E L E V I S I O N BROADCASTS O F TEE SESSIONS HAVE s a o w N THR DBBATES TO BE LIVELY, ORDERLY, AND VERBOSE. M E R E I S NO P R O V I S I O N FOR L I M I T I N G THE LENGTH OF S P E E C S E S OR O F R E S T R I C T I N G THE S U B J E C T . MATTER. AS A RESULT, ALMOST THE E N T I R E F I R S T MEETINGS WERE TAKEN U P BY GlNERAL S P E E C B B S BY VARIOUS DELBGATES-SPEECHES WIV L I T T L E RELEVANCE TO THE S P E C I F I C MATTERS I N THE CONSTITUTION.
    4.

    T F F g I G H LIGHTS O F THE MAIN A R T I C L E S PASSED S O PAR

    A) ARTICLE 5, T E E GOVERNMENT O F THE THEOLOOIAN INCITE: VZCZC 277

    VZCZC

    277

    (VILATAT-E-FAQIH). THIS ARTICLE WAS DISCUSSED IN DETAIL SIPTEL. ALTHOUGH THE EXACT MEANING OF THIS ARTICLE I S STILL UNCLEAR, MAJOR IMPLICATION I S TO ENSURE SHIA RELIGIOUS ESTABLISHMENT CONTROL OVER THE OFPICE OF CHIEF OF STATE. PASSAGE OF THIS ARTICLE HAS STIRRED OPEN CRITICISM. RELIGIOUS SCHOLAR EZZATOMB SAEABI HAS SEFERZLY CRITICIZED ARTICLE 5 , SAYING THE NEW PROVISION WILL LEAD TO A AUTHORITY RUNNING PARALLEL WITH THAT OP N THE GOVERNMENT OR I OPPOSITION TO THE GOVERNMENT. I T N I S DANGEROUS POB ISLAM, HE SAID,.BECAUSE I F A GOVERNMENT MADE MISTAKES I T COULD BE REMOVED. BUT I F A RELIGIOUS LEADER MADE A MISTAXE, P E O P L ~V O U ~ D LOSE FAITH-IN THE CLERGY ITSELF AND THUS IN ISLAM. ASSEMBLY OF EXPERTS DELEGATE ANC REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL MtMBER ABOLHASSAN BANISADR HAS ALSO CRITtCIZED ARTICLE 5 SAYING THAT I F CLERGYMEN VFRE TO BE.ENTRUSTED WISH P ~ C I A L S POWERS, THEN TEE EXISTENCE OF INDEPENDENT PARTIES WAS UEANINGLESS. N HOWEVEE, I REPLY TO THESE CRITICS, AY~TOLLAH KHOMEINI % TOLD GROUP OF AIR PORCE OFlICERS TEAT OUR QOVSRNMENT 2 I S ISLAMIC, AND THAT (THEY) UUST SUPPORT ARTICLE 5 SO THAT THE COUNTRY I S NOT HARMD. THE NATION HAS CAST ITS VOTE FOR TEE ISLAMIC R E p B L I C i ALL 0 T YOU MUST COUPLY, OR YOU WILL BE OBLITERATEn. E" 2 (B) ARTICLE12,ESTABLISHINGTWELVERJA'fABISBI'ISM - AS THE STATE RELIGION O r IRAN ?OR LTBBNITT. THIS ARTICLE WAS OPPOSED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SUNNI ARFAS, NOTABLY MOWLAVI ABDULAZIZ DELEGATE FOR BALUCHPSTAN, 0 W O SAID THAT THE OPFICIAL RELIGION H SHOULD BE ISLAM NOT ONE SECT. THE ARTICLE ALSO NOTES TEAT THE VARIOUS SUNNI LA# SCHOOLS ARE RWPECTED AND HAY BE PREELY APPLIED I AREAS WHERE SUNNIS PRBDOUINATB. N ( C ) ARTICLE 13 DEFINES TEE RECOGNIZED NON-UUSLIM MINORITIES: C B R I S T I A ~ S , JEWS AND ZOROASTIANS. THESE MINORITIES ARE GUARANTEED m r m n OF RELIGIOUS PRACTICE ANC EDUCATION, AND dRE ALLOWED TO APPLY THEIR O N LAWS W OF DIVORCE, MARRIAGE AND INHERITANCE. TAIS ARTICLE CREATED A BRIEP S T I R OF INTEREST I A SMALL ANCIENT SECT N CALLEC THE SABEANS, WE0 CLAIM TO BE FOLLOWERS OF JOHN TEE BAPTIST. AYATOLLAH MAHARRENI-SBIlAZI ENDED THAT CONTROVERSY WHEN HE SAID THAT THE SABPANS WERE INCLUDED UNDER TEE PROTECTION AFFORDED TO JEWS AND CHRISTIANS. THE BAHA'I SECT. HOWEVER. I S NOT CONSIDERED A TRUE BT

    --

    NNNN

    VZCZC

    277

    VZCZC 278 OG aUEHC RUEKJCS RUEKJCS RUQMBI RUQMGU RUEHAD RUQMOD RUSBQD RUQMRA RUSBLK RUQMKW RUDTC RUQMAM RUEHMO RUQMMT RUPNPS RUSNAAA DE RUQMHR #0288/02 2631428 ZNY CCCGC ZZH 0 2014022 SPP 79 Pn AMEMBASSY TEHRAN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE VASHDC IMMEDIATE 388e INFO RUEKJCS/SECDL? VASE D C RUEKJCS/JCS VASE DC RUQHBI/AMEt4BASSY ABO DEABI 0297 a u Q n o u / A n s n s A s s r ANKARA 0282 RUEHADhSINT BAGHDAD 8293 RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0268 RUSBQBhMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0335 r t u Q n a r / A n r n s A s s r JIDDA ass1 RUSBLK/AMEMBASSYKABUL 0340 R U Q M K ~ / A ~ ~ ~M W AA T~ ~ ~ U B I 0300 BUDTC/AMEMBASS Y LONDON 0408 8 BUQMAM/AMBMBASSY MANAMA 0267 f ~uimonnsnarss~ noscov 0294 BUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0185 E RUINPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0361 RUSNAAA/USCINCEUR VAIHINOEN GE BT C 0 N P I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 01 83 TEERAN 10288

    '
    f

    ELIGION BY THE n o s L m s AND, THEELMBE, IS NOT PBOTECTED BY THIS ARTICLE.

    - BE (D) ARTICLE 17, ESTABLISHES I ILBQISLATORE, THE STATE, V E ARHS 01 COMPRISBD OF THE PWPLE, THE TEE TO
    EXECUTIVE, TEE JUDICIARY AND TEE THlaCRATIC LmDSBSBIP. THE THEOCRATIC LEADSBSHIP I S O I V E l TRP P m R TO S t f TEAT TEE PRINCIPLES AND ARTICLES O? T H I CONSTITUTION ARt IMPLEMENTED, IN ADDITION TO BEING TEE LIAISON B n W P t N THE OTHER FOUR ARMS 01 TEE STATE.

    - IRA!,( E ) oa

    ARTICLE 21. MAKES PfRSIAN TBll OlFXCIAL LANGUAGI BUT-ALLOVS .FOB~THIC USE OF O T H ~ "LOCAL AND . TRIBAL LANGUAGPS ALONGSIDE 0 1 PERSIAN I PUBLICATIONS, N TEE HBEIA, AND THE TEACHING O? LIl'ERATUBE IN LOCAL SCHOOLS.
    4. THE ASSEMBLT HAS BEGUN TO PACE THE FORMIDABLE TASK OF ANSWERING QUESTIONS OF THE LEGISLATURE, THE JUDICIARY, AND TEE CABINET. UNLESS THP PACE O? WORK I S SPEEDED UP, TBP;RE SEEMS LITTLE PROSPBCT POR TEB COUNCIL TO FINISH ITS WORK BEK)RE THE END OF 1979. ON 19 SEPT HOWEVER. KHOMEINI AGAIN URGED TBf ASSEMBLY TO P A S S A G ~ . O FTEE CONSTITUTION G I V I N G INDICATION THAT HE HAY BE BECOMING IMPATIENT WITH TBE ASSEMBLY'S SNAIL LIKE PACE. SHOULD KHOMEINI STEP IN EE COULD UNDOUBTEDLY SPEED UP THE PSOCESS. 5.

    EXPIDITI

    THE COUNCIL HAS CHANGED I T S ROLE FROM THAT ORIGINALLY GED. IT WAS FIRST THOUGHT THAT THE COUNCIL WOULD QUICS REVIEW OF THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION AND E I T WITH MINOR CHANGES. INSTEAD. TEE ~ O U N C I L
    278

    VZCZC

    VZCZC

    27t'

    HAS TURNED INTO A GENUINE CONSTITUBNT ASSEMBLY, REWRITING, ADDING AND OMITTING ARTICLES AT WILL. 6. NOT ALL ARE PLEASED WITH WHAT I S EMERGING FROM THE COUNCIL. THERE APPEARS TO BE A STABLE BLOC OF ABOUT FIFTY TO FIFTY-FIVE DELEGATFS WHO SUPPORT VOVES TO INCREASE THB ROLE OF THE CLERGY I N THE NEW GOVERNMENT. ALTHOUGH THERE I S N FORMAL FACTION OR PARTY STRUCTURE. O AYATOLLAHS MONTAZERI AND BEHESHTI EAVE GENERALLY BEEN SPOIESMEN FOR T H I S GROUP. T2ERE I S A SMALL MINORITY INCLUDING SOME or TEE NON-MUSLIM DELIGATES AND M O Q A D ~ A M NARAGHL'I, DELEGATE FROM TABRIZ FROr THE MUSLIM PEOPLES REPUBLICAY PASTY (MRPP) WHO EAVE BEEN UNSUCGESFULLY R I S I S T I N G TEE MOVES TO YEaGE CLERICAL AND SECULAR AUTHORITY.
    7. ALTiOUGH TEE DRAFT CONSTITUTION SPECIRICALLY MENTIONED RIGHTS FOR THF NON-PERSIAN ETENIC GROUPS I IRAN, TAB N COUNCIL HAS SO FAR MADE N MENTION OF TZESE GROUPS I N O 5 THE ARTICLES APPROVED. TBE OAIGINAC ARTICLF 5, WHICH : GUARANTEED WUAL F I 3 A T S FOR PERSIANS, YURDS, TURKS, ARABS ETC., EAS SO FAR BFEN IGNORED BY TEE ASSEWBLY. A N D C B I T I C D R . R E Z A BASAHENI TOLD A N HRPP MEETING TEAT IY H I S OPINIOV I F THE CONSTITUTION I S R A T I F I E T VITHOUT GIVING AUTONOMY TO THP MIYOPITIES, I T WOULD NOT E E IN LINT WITH TFE IBANIAN REVOLUTION. COMMENT: THE IRANIBN EXPERIENCT WITH CONSTITDTIONS ANC PARLIAMENT, E EAS NOT BEEN A PAPPY ONE. THS 1906 CONSTITUTION WAS ONE OP THE YOST VENERABLE AND h 3 S T IGNORED COCUMFNTS IN THE MIDDL6 EAST. AN IBINIAN POT! CF THX PSE-EEZA SHAH ERA ONCE NEOTI IN FXASPERATIOK, ONF CAN ONLY DEFECATE ON SLCH A PAELIAMSNT.

    ~RITER

    e.

    MITE THIS BACGG03ND I T I S PERHAPS UNDERSTANDABLE TFAT TSE PPCCEEDIdZS OF +FE COUNCIL OF EXPERTS "AV3 NOT EXCITED CSEAT I N T J S E S T , DESPITE THE FACT Ti'IT I T S I!ZCISIOYS & I L L BE CRUCIAL I N DETERWINING THT SHAPE OF SONE CONSIDIR TRT SNTIBX PROCEDURE A NEW GOVERNMZNT. A CRAPADE gHICE WILL COYPLSTE I T S WORr AND THEN BE IGNORED BY SOME lJ DICTATOP. OTHTR MIDDLE-CLASS vW THRY IRANIANS ARE WOR2IED EY TET DOCVYENT EMERGING. SEE T B r KEk CONSTITUTION AS CONFIRMING THEIR WORST FEARS ThAT IPAN I S FACING A PTFIOD OF RXACTIONARY CLSRICAL BI
    #8288

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    00 ?.UEEC

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    RUQVAM/AME~BA~~Y-MANAMA~~~~~

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    --

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    N ? 1 F

    D E N T I A L SECTION

    RULE ? H A T W I L L UNDO MANY 0 1 T E E HARD-WON S O C I A L G A I N S T H E I R CLASS EAS ACBIRVED I N T R E L A S T F I F T Y YBARS. LAINGEN ' BT #0288 NNNN

    Un11.d Sures olAmema Weshmomn. D C 2&%7

    September 26,1979

    MEMORANDUM FOR: FROM: SUBJECT:

    State/NEA- Mr. H u o h i 8. h u n d e ~ IcA/NEA

    - R T. Curryq'.c

    Public Diplomacy Communication &tween United States and Iran October 1979 February 1980

    Based on discussion# in lap office on September 7, ICA agrees that some cautious exploration of additional opportunities for communication between the United States and Iran in the public diplomacy area Is in order in the next four a five months.

    k a &ding practice, we will try to encourage institutiond linkages, a ccncept of commuuication endwred on September 7. These linkage. will stress the two-way flow of relations. At t h b time i t must he recognized that their development depends on a e a t i n g an atmosphere of t n u t and respect. In initial stages, friendly and u n d u r t a d h g onwonone penonally developed ties u e essential. Tbrougb c a d p e r d rapport can be built carefully determined inntitutional linlugn which, in t w , can nurture further mutual relationships. Likely fie& for initiating or reestablishing contact include Iranolqy, the humanitiu, physical sciences, English teaching, .adphysical dumtion.
    Still continuing, albeit in a low-key, modest farhim with currently Iranirpr to the United States programs, Is the limited, one-way The United States dould work of the Fulbright Commission. maintain its f h c i d capport of these operations 8s a wellestablished and core institutional link between private and public

    CONFIDENTIAL

    Subject to General Declaeaification Schedule of Executive Ordu 12065. Automatically Downgraded a t Two Y e u h t e r v a b 8nd D e c b i f i e d m September 7.6, 1985.

    educators ;d kutitutil in both c w t r k r M m i l u b , fudictnult p h d activities of the Amwican hutitute for 2r.ni.n Studin .baJd be fatered. Within thi. general approach md responding to the recomm.Pd.timu of tbe Charge' and our Public-Affairs Officer, we will e u m h e tbe followiug venues for some restrained i n i t i a t i m wbkh may be considered if k8nian authorities make it c k u t h t w Marest in enhanced relationships ia reciprocated:
    1 .

    Propose visits to Iran by cuefully selected u h o l u and public figurer. Whenever possible, the &its +ill be privately uranged. hdividluk A d d h e aedibility and relev~nce premnt-day Iran. to Enccurage inritations to Iraahn ktUDic s c h h aad, poaalbly, Iranian religiarr figure* t o the EejCa annivemary celebrations in the United StatEvents during the vlsft should also hcluda limikr representatives Lom other Islamic wcietkr t o rtrar the multi-aational nature of the Q~S~WUIC~S. Sponsorship should be privately uranged with the Hejira Anniversary Committee pla* a mdor role. Discuu with private entities, such u the Johnua Foundation m unireraity-based semimars includiug the Eut-Weat Center, be groups o kmiau f rcholars to the United States t o ccasklm noncontrover8lu topics. Preferably the mmtbgs .bOUld be mu1tiaation.l P-bh field. w litmatme. eeative writing a, more p.~matic.IIy, library development 8nd lib?y science.
    Work with a f e w cuefully selected foc~ipa shd4nt

    2 .

    3.

    4.

    advisers m d admissions officers a t ~mircnities sophisticated in handling S h m i c and k.nLr, StudOnts a) t o assen during this period of change In Lam evolving needa and attitudes of kan1.n dudenu so u b) to look towud p h s f w a posstbk student conference or other type dialogue in the United Stater a t some future p r o p i t w ~date. .

    5.

    l%phr dLb h & 8 U c d ~ t l bIS&tW d take part in a arppat otha d d u t i o n ~ excbnge o p r a t i a u tn h m k thM-unmtries, ouch u thorn of tbi- University of Nebraska at O m d a in Pakintan, pooil$Uthe f w inviting I ? stlrhacr and academia to take p u t in aub m m b w jmojects wbkh f a t e intellectual uadsnt.ndin(( .nd on-gobg contact.
    Cauider augmentation o current X C W S Eq@bbf

    6.

    t e a c w ud cultural InrtitutkuU poridcd t h t rdminttrutin claim8 for ,put draagss m d ~ t r a t i o o r8 m gl*.n cop,ix8nes by &MfM mthorlties.
    7.

    Be r b t t to o p p a t d t i a to invite k.lrknr to take put in multi-regiond exchange p w a m s , particularly thae in m w m &

    NOTE

    The V O A p d i r m ~ pLvv to inomuc bodcast time to Inn in P c n i e by one bau a day about th t n of tJm new yeu. It will .bd a w thirtyminut* mornjag ibor featuring new8 and new8-dat.d material lad 8o ulditiwd thirty minut- to tbe front md o the f current --hour evening .bar. Tb extended $bow will provide prsater opportdty f a M p t h cowet-e rd nrlhlrd materid C p i d u r t i m nmrr ereat. in b a outside the politlcd a sphere, a series on Iranian klamk studk. and Centera i the United States, .ed interviews ria Am4c.n scholar# and k d o & t s ud appropriate public IIgurw representing a wide spectrum of political and foreign policy viewpoints.
    DISTRIBUTION:

    D The Acting Mractor ECA - Ms. Alice Ilchman

    , MGT Mr. James k b t t e r PGM Mr. Huold Scbneidmur VOA Mr. Peter Straw State/NEA Mr. Peter Conrtable State/NEA Mr. H u u y Recht

    IC '?IS OEPAETFiiE StATPEBNT AL'OOSZ 23. TAlDf REPORTEDLT. PPPSS TklAT hSS:L?S P1SCUSSIl;G RELATICNS 3ETVEIK 7 1 CJ:'WPFIES #Ire r A # C E . rAZD1 SAID RE WILL ALSO '0 h k AMEEICAN PLlY TO LANE COYEAT TOOOPS 1 1 T.1: C P L F T O PEGPfDP S?AEILlT? IN TRL FtSlOU. SUCK A CS, US SAID, WILL NOT IN-ART VAT W L P hhY OF Thr RECICM'S' COlILICTS COK!:P~T: TEilRAN PRFSS EAS BEPY POLLOfIN3 WITlI IWTLEWT !CLS ETlTEarKTS PT QSC OPYICIALS PE3ARff10 fOIMfiTIOV r ~ F . 6 ~ 6 . T6?Bt BAS BEEL A BRLAT DYAI ETRE TliAT C S i INTENDS T 3 0! IAS I U C I E I ED EAT ~ 1 1 I I lT~ i C V IN TEE GULF 1851, TFLT W YA' O E TO fSUD I FOPCtS TO LFZKINISTAW; AH3 TBbT US N G C04SIDX91':: SbMi AC:ION LOAIYST OIL tIELDS

    CONFIDENTIAL DE RUQMHR 10500 273". ZNY CCCCC ZZH 0 3012552 SEP 79 ZFF-1 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN TO SECSTATE WASHDC =DATE 3992 BT C O N F ' I D E N T 1 ALTEHRAN10500 NEA/IRN FOR HENRY PRECHT

    TEHRAN

    10500

    CLASS: CHRGE: APPRV: DRFTD: CLEAR: OISTR:

    CONFIDENTIAL STAT 9/30/79 CHAROE:LBLAINOEN P0L:EASWSIFT:OO NONE POL 2 CHG CHRON RF

    FOLLOWING SENT ACTION SECSTATE SEPT 24 BEING REPEATED FOR YOUR ACTION. ACTION OFFICE CLAIMS NON-RECEIPT. QUOTE CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 10342 E.O. 12065: GDS 9/24/79 (SWIFT, ELIZABETH A.) 0R.P TAGS: IR, PORG,MASS SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S MEETING WITH YAZDI: GULF DISTRICT; US PRESENCE IN PERSIAN GULF REF: TEHRAN 10i83

    1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT).
    2. DURING CONVERSATIONS WITH YAZDI OCTOBER 3, WE SUGGEST SECRETARY VANCE RAISE QUESTION OF OUR ACCESS TO COMMISSARY, GULF DISTRICT AND OTHER MILITARY PROPERTIES SUCH AS MOTOR POOL AND ARMY COMMUNICATION COMMMAND (ACOM) FACILITY. 3. FOLLOWING DEATH OF AYATOLLA TALEGHANI, THE TALEGHANI COMMITTEE FORMERLY CONTROLLED COMMISSARY IS TURNING OVER CONTROL OF COMMISSARY AND OTHER PROPERTIES (BOTH US AND IRANIAN) EITHER TO OFFICE OF THE PRIME MINTSTER OR TO ARMY. WE ARE NOT CERTAIN WHO ACTUALLY CONTROLS ACCESS TO THE GULF DISTRICT. WE HOPE THAT COMMISSARY AND THE GULF DISTRICT MAY END UP IN HANDS OF PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE. IF SO, YAZDI WOULD BE IN A POSITION TO CONTROL DISPOSITION OF COMMISSARY AND GULF DISTRICT. WHILE YAZDI HAS NOT BEEN RESPONSIVE TO OUR APPROACHES IN THE PAST, WE THINK IT NOW MIGHT BE WORTH ANOTHER TRY.

    4. IN HIS DEPARTURE STATEMENT AUGUST 23, YAZDI REPORTEDLY TOLD PRESS THAT " BESIDES DISCUSSING RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES WITH VANCE, YAZDI SAID HE WILL ALSO DISCUSS AN AMERICAN PLAN TO LAND COMBAT TROOPS IN THE PERSIAN GULF TO PROVIDE STABILITY IN THE REGION, SUCH A MOVE BY THE US, HE SAID, WILL NOT IN ANY WAY HELP DEFUSE ANY OF THE REGION'S CONFLICTS.11

    5. COMMENT: TEHRAN PRESS HAS BEEN FOLLOWING WITH INTEREST VARIOUS STATEMENTS BY USG OFFICIALS REGARDING FORMATION OF RAPID REACTION FORCES. THERE HAS BEEN A GREAT DEAL OF SPECULATION HERE THAT USG INTENDS TO 04 HAS ICREASED ITS COMBAT MARINE FORCES IN THE GULF AREA; THAT WE MAY INTEND TO SEND IN FORCES TO AFGHANISTAN; AND THAT US MIGHT BE CONSIDERING SOME ACTION AGAINST OIL FIELDS IN MIDDLE EAST. LATEST VERSION OF THIS IS KAYHAN STORY AUGUST 24 QUOTING KHOMEINI'S REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UAE MODARESSI THAT FIVE TO SIX THOUSAND US TROOPS ' ARE STATIONED IN JUFAIR BASE IN BAHRAIN. IT WOULD BE VERY USEFUL IF SECRETARY COULD DISCUSS WITH YAZDI DISPOSITION OF OUR FORCES IN THE INDIAN OCEAN AND PERSIAN GULF SO HE WILL HAVE FULL UNDERSTANDING OF OUR INTENTION IN THE AREA,CHARGE TOOK OPPORTUNITY DURING CALL ON MINISTRY OF NATIONAL GUIDANCE MINISTER MINACHI TODAY TO DESCRIBE PRESS REPORT OF U.S. TROOPS IN BAHRAIN AS TOTALLY WITHOUT FOUNDATION AND UNHELPFUL TO ATMOSPHERE AFFECT ING US RAN RELATIONSHIP. LAINGEN UNQUOTE. LAINGEN BT
    #0500

    NNNN CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN


    10500

    D PaDily, e e f i m t dny e l n tam w It'. F r i L y aft.noon, ) h e 1 1 0 8 l d Sunday, and eP the 11. (ping t e p1.j t.1.i. with the I t a l i u A ~ b u r s d u n 8 few * i a . day woeknd. W e t a w 0 . u 6G or 70 %bas-iem here, a p o i mumbar ccmpilred t o Wta. Sbviot e o l 1 . y ~ . i e n veky memior Soviet d i p l u t , refleoting rtke importance they attach k tbi@plm. I have not cmllad on hi. yet, i n i M e he wan g..o a &ood doal of the bot I u k d to make a courtesy c d l on him the ether aad was told... c a l l again im on* w a d ~ a b sounds lib a diplomatic i l l n e s s to me81 time, the Ambassador i a ill.. J The place where the action i s these day9 i n N Elb8s.l is the C n m l u sbet*a... thd ~9f.1-o the Revolution the consular section was l e o a t d im a oop8mta v i e r issuing place. bysy, siace the student f l w t o the bui-diag i n another part of toke. EP$n then i t w ~ s U during the m v e l u t i e ~ UA ha8 always been heavy. % tt h a t buildin# was dm& S and eo w c l o ed down eur c o n a a l d a o t i v i t i d . o f f i c i a l l y except f o r slgv o .r e requiracmtsi V told the govoruent here that u n t i l w had s u f f i c i e n t personnel back hero of our m e e , u.rtil w had t i n e to rebuild en efPieo f a o i l i t y , and...-bet e important... u @ i l tho gaveras?nt could .ssu,a eur secl(Sity ip the coap.un&, we# wore not going t o mopenf. That s i k u t i c n cantirued u n t i l a week a gm, who8 w f i n a l l y fiWshed work on 8 d w u d e vrry modern r u d g f i o i e n t visa issuing facility... l i k e a b a d , with r..r e f o f f i e i n bmhind b u l l e t glass. 1180 w f i u l l y o o n ~ m a d e tho g wt h e n t h a t thy bad to "8 20-25 police t 8 control the o r d s , u d t h a t they f-4 did. Se w roopno a week y, t o rid about 3000 poplo tho atxwot8 aatold* a d c 1 u o r i . g f o r visa.- especially students, B u y of them marrhr m i o w t o got tLem t . i n ti.. f o r f a l l c d s s classes u d i m a w mbro 8f them s i m p 4 8ppIJh# Sor 8 s - t o t r y t e gain entry into oome soh001 w h i c h they claimad t o ua ;m grr@ a to them. of these students, however, hare such l w grade8 p.d moh limitad m tht o b w su8pect th8ir.re.l Furpore i s aimply t o g e t t o the U and 8 w a u w a d - b e i r i g u b e S So our refumal r a t e i a high... UP t o f o r t y poment. W n w ha.). 8 . m o f f i o q e 1ncludi.q two wives, irtFrm one of whss you've .rdrr sat, Pevne, who sit k h h d t k e i r b u l l s t proof P a m a d ~ntorviewapplieadte a l l day long. A Marine help. contr.1 t h i y r irside, ale* bebind thick bullet proof glass, u d a11 s o r t s of e l e c t r i o b r u n e n o p m t . tno eng.m l a d exit.. A oomputer bank, linked t o f i l e 8 1n P u i e , is zrn%x a d l a b l o ; to c ~ e c ~ % ~ l i 68temino whetlor ha's been turred d o n -e ~ ~ t # t ~ r before. f EutAeutoide i s a mesa. The #s police are g e t t i n g b e t t e r a t o r c d c m t r b l , grrduUXyl , but h moot days It w simply h w t o close d m beasuse no order or l n o o w bo e a oaintahed. Tke plaoe has become &*st a t o u r i s t a t t r a c t i n in thie city, s i d d v nclrrs h=ve s e t up shep, u d w suspect t h a t tho A a e Y police m invelrod i n a l l - a r t s fa of petty bribery i n a s s u r i q pepplo of ~ l d h u 8 n 8 . prof0u.d p&oo8 h s ~ the limos. So far, fortunately, t h e n ' s beem no reriou8 riolencc, u d m &kidbaa o b-en threaten+d i n ply way. But w worry 8 b i t about t h a t , o.p.cially the r i a U e r e a c t i m of a m a 80rt from tho8e who a n tuxmod d m . Honce the bullet m e f r h m m iuU.l a d thm pbiice ~ u t s i a ~ . W y the mumberm?.. h p o d qW.tir. Partl). tho e o n t i m u t i n 8f a p -. t .. - :-.>*la have been the preferred e l a c e f o r highbr education of P*rsim student8 9r.r 8 i ~ o v d l d W - r 11. part& too of courlb 138 aimply tho dosire t o get out of ~ r o l u t l n l d y Iran, not the most plenaant place theso day8 f o r tho s e a u l u , wostsnisod Iruiu... s e r e t h d h r l t of tho Crowds eutside a r e ~ o t u d o n t s ,thoso I r u i u s ~ e +n 1migra.t vim. glfan the .mall n u b - r of those n w available u d who w a m t t o go the t US e m "viait' but who really intbud t o stay. I dem't mean to imply that a11 thi8 i e b d a . I t is f a I r u V 8 thW,beouuf it u . 9 r t s t o 8 torriblo brain h i m . But f o r U 8 it i 8 u d d ~ d1t 0im .rp b i l a t e r a l relationship with thi8 cbuntry... a kuu l i n k t h a t dh .d*8 m u Lp.rtut atremuth a t the grass root8 t o UsdarstanUng. Am& yet tho p i e h that a l l this promi s a b i t o f a puadox... w a n not the most poplar people im Iru theso &ye) w e obrioum and toe supportive of a d i l l i k d r y i m e undw the shU. So m our Mode hem r cautioum about being seen 6 . 0 cl8eb t o us... u d y e t t k r n is thir pie* of hua&ed8 p.d sometime8 thm8ud8 of I r a n i u 8 out8ide ~ u r ETba88y emh w, . h obrioum s l 'dospusto t o get t o the Unit.d Stat081 Tho worther i 8 loroly here n w l w had a d u a t i y of n o u n tko u p i f l e n t e wultain r l ~ y c behimd t ~ a i t y l a a t week. u d t h m i r a t x c h of id1 im u rir d m i n the city. Tko oky i 8 blue, tho oelebrated Por+iu b l w of t h i s e u a weather, mad w try to p t out int* tho m&Ms8 on hikoo ud pimica e doing that trmorrw, ef which 1'11 w r i t * in r y noxt lsttrr.l....

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    VAIHINGEN GE

    0 N 1 I C E N T I A L S E C T I O N 01 O F

    TEHRAN 10697

    E.O. 12865: G C S 18/4/55 ( S W I F T , E L I Z A B E T H A. ) OR-P ITAGS: SHUM, I R , P I N S , P I N T S U B J E C T : WEEKLY P O L I T I C A L ROUNDUP


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    :2.

    SUMMARY: A GROWING NUMBER O P DEMONSTRATIONS AND P R O T E S T S BY T H E UNEMPLOYED HAS SWEPT IRAN I N THE L A S T :TWO WEEXS, AND THE S E R I O U S NATURE O F THE P R O T E S T S MAT . B E THB H A J O B REASON FOR A REPORTED BAN ON UNAUTHORIZED PROTESTS AND GATBERINGS. ACTS O F TERRORISM AND SABOTAGE ALSO CONTINUE WITH KHUZESTAN AND T E E KURDISH ABEAS B E I N G THE M A ~ N AREAS O F UNRPST. THE C I T Y O F MASHAC BAS V I T N B j S E D TWO RECENT A S S A S S I N A T I O N S . BOTH V I C T I Y S B E I N G CLERGYMEN. I N S I S T A N AND BALUCHISTAN. A S E C U R I T Y PROBLEM BETWEEN T R I B g S P E O P L f AND GOVERNMENT PORCTS SEEMS TO HAVE BEEN DEFUSED B T T R I B A L LEADERS AND T H F LOCAL GOVERNOR GENERAL. ACROSS THX COUNTRK THERE I S A GROWINC. EFFORT BT C I T I E S TO BRING UNRULY COMMITTEES UNDER CONTROL. END SVY'IARY. 3. THE I R A N I A N P O L I T I C A L SCENCE HAS BEEN DOMINATED DURING T B E P A S T WEEK BY MAJOR C A B I N E T R E S H U F F L I N G , T E E CONTINUATION OF THE ASSEMBLY O P EXPERTS WORC ON A NEW C O N S T I T U T I O N , AND THE APPARENTLY QO?l I N S P I R E D C R I T I C I S M O F NATIONAL I R A N I A N O I L CO. HEAD RASSAN N A Z I 3 WHICH RESULTED I N H I S TEPASTURE FROM THE NIOC AND DISAPPEARANCE, RUMORS S A T PERBAPS T 3 P A R I S . ACCORDING TO DEP P P I M H I N TABATABAI, THE GOVERNMENT U S BANNED A1.L UNAUTHORI ZEC R A L L I E S , CEMONSTRATIONS , GATHERINGS AND MARCBES Y I T B A WABNING THAT THOSE WBO P E R S T I N T B E S E PROTESTS W I L L 9 E DEALT WITH AARSFLY. IBE 1 5 PROBABLY A RESULT O F T H E 1ROWTN3 C D N P L A I I I I AND MONSTRATIONS FROM THE RANKS OF T F E UNEMPLOYEr
    4.

    C O N l I D E N T I A L B E I N G SEEN ACROSS IEAN. ONE O F T H E MOST T E L L I N G INDICATIONS OF THE s n r a r n OF rat Paoamn WAS THE sIzr O F A CROWD Y E I C H JAMMED THE AREA NEAR TEERAN'S IRAN A I R O F F I C E S ON SEPTEMBER 23. PARS NEVS S E R V I C E CLAIMED THAT "THOUSANDS" O F P E O P L E CAUSEC A MAJOR T R A n I C SNARL, N E C E S S I T A T I N G TEE U S E O F P O L I C E CARS AND B E L I C O P T E R S TO D I S P E R S E TEE CROWD. T H E THRONG BAD GATHERED AROUND T H E IRAN A I R B U I L D I N G T O A P P L Y FOR T E E TWENTY A I R STEWARD J O B S ADVERTISED AS VACANT BY T H E NATIONAL A I R L I N E S . IN THE CASPIAN COAST TOWN O F BABOL. T E R E t HUNDRtD R E C W T L T GRADUATED TEACHERS ENGAGED I N A S I T - I N AT TAZ CITY'S EDUCATION DEPARTMENT TO DEUAND JOBS AND A S I M I L A R I N C I D E N T O c c u R R E D I N T H E NEARBY C I ~ Y or S A R I . AT NOUSHAHR AND LANGRUD, 1200 B I G H SCHOOL GBADUATES DEMONSTRATED TO ATTRACT ATTENTION T O T H E I R LACK 01 J O B S , AS D I D 200 XI-STUDENTS AT BABAK (NEAR KERMAN). ONE HUNDRED F I t T T H I G E SCHOOL GRAGUA?ES AT S I T A R K A L G A T B E R I D I N FRONT O F T H E EDUCATION O F F I C E . D I S M I S S E D T E E B U I L D I N G S ON S T A F F AYD BEGAN A S I T - I N FOR TW SAME R t A S O N S . SZPT ~ H U N D R E D S ~ O IUNEMPLOTED YOUTHS OATHERED IN PRONT O F THE P R I M E M I N I S T W TO DRAY ATTENTION T O T H E P L I G H T O F J O B L E S S RECENT GRADUATES, A GROUP THEY E S T I M A T E AS 218,008 STRONG. ANOTHER CROWD O F 350 DEMONSTRATEf AT T H E M I N I S T R Y O F LABOR ON SEPTEMBER 26. T H E DEYONSTBATIONS A T THE P R I M E M I N I S T R Y CONTINUED DURING THE V E M , GROWING TO A CROWD ESTIMATED AS 1200, AND RESULTING I N T H t REVOLUTIONARY GUARDS D I S P E R S I N G T H E CROWD U I T E SHOTS I N T H E A I R AND THE M L P I S T O F S I X DEMONSTRATORS ON OCTOBER 1. DEMONSTRATIONS AT T H E P R I M E M I N I S T R Y BECAME TENSE. REPORTEDLT SOUE O F THE DEMONSTRATORS VERB SHOUTING "DOWN WITH K H O W I N I W I T H VACANCIES MINIMAL I N P R I V A T E INDUSTRY, WITH THE I R A N I A N U N I V E R S I T Y SYSTEM ABLE TO ABSORB ONLY A SMALL PERCENTAGE O F A P P L I C A N T S FOR HIGHZR EDUCATION. AND V I T H M I L I T A R Y S E R V I C E PROCEDURES S T I L L B E I N G S O U W H A T CONFUSED. THERZ SEEUS T O B E NO Q U I C S SOLUTION FOR T H E UNEMPLOYMENT PROBLtM.

    TEHRAN 10697/1

    HS

    5. THE SLOW BUT STEADY ATTXUPT BY C I T I E S ACROSS IRAN E I T H E R T O D I S S O L V E T H E COMPLICATED COMMITTEE STRUCTURES OR TO MERGE THEM I N T O P O L I C E OR REVOLUTIONART GUARD

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    TEHRAN

    WIIllO T E E MONTHS S I N C E THE PLYOLUTIONl THE COMMITTEE

    O I O A N I Z I T I O N S BAS W T WITH VARYING DEGREES 01 S U C C E S S .

    S?ST# BAS COUP I N 101 A GRPAT DEAL O F C R I T I C I S R , WITH C O M I T T S E BANDS B E I N G POPULAPLY ACCUSED O F CRIMES RANGING non r a m TO zoarwa TO ILLEGAL ARRESTS. ON SEPT 11. KHOMEINI O R D E R b REVOLUTIONARI ORGANIZATIONS NOT TO ACT ON T H E I R OWN I N GOVERNMELT A T I A I B S . SOME EXAMPLES HAVE APPEARED RECENTLY, E S P E C I A L L Y I N T A B R I Z 01 COMMITTEE M U B I B S BEING ARRESTED AND T R I E D PO11 ANTI-REVOLUTIONARY ACTS. I N TEHRAN, ATATOLLAX MOHAMMSD REZA MAHDAVI-KANI, NAFIONAL DIRECTOR O r IRAN'S U V O L U T I O N A R T COMMITTEES, HAS ANNOIIIICED THAT ALL O F TEHRAN'S REVOLUTIONABY SUBC O M M I T T E D ARE DISSOLVED. AT P R E S E N T , TEHRAN HAS A REVOLUTIONARI connIrrrr FOR r A c a or ITS 14 D I ~ T R I C T S , AND ONE E T I M A T E O F T E E SUB-CORMITTEES HAS BEFN GIVEN AS 1,280. ACCORDING TO MAKDAVI-KANI, THE YEMBERSHIP O P T B E 14 D I S T R I C T COMMITTEES W I i L B E S T R I C T L Y CONTROLLEE. AND ANYONE WITH A QUESTIONABLE RECORD WILL B E P J R G E D . 6. ACTS O F SABOTAGE AND TERRORISM CONTINUED THROUZHOUT T H E COUNTRY LATE SEPTEMBER AND EARL^ CCTOBER. SEVERAL . S H O P S WERE DAMAGED WHEN AN EXPLOSION SHOOX THE BAZAAR !A? KHOBPAMSHMR, ALTEOUGH NO I N J U R I E S HAVE BEEN REPORTED. . " A 70 METER COMMUNICATIONS TOYER ON THE iHORRAUjHA!IR-A9YIZ ;ROAD WAS BLOWN U P ON SEPTEUBER 31, AND COMMUNICATIONS - U I N I S T E R HASSAN ESLAMI CLAIMED THE LXPLOSION YAS CAUSED :BY A T I n r BOPB. THE TOWER PELL ACROSS A N ADJACENT RELAY L S T A T I O N , DAMAGING THAT B U I L I I N G . AND CAilSING A CUT O F F ; I N COMMUNICATIONS EETWEEN THE MAIN C I T I E S O F THE O I L f PROVINCE AND THE R E S T 0 1 IRAN. ON SEPTEMBER 38 ANOTKER :EXPLOSION OCCURRED NEAR THE KEORRAMSHAHR GOVERNOR'S OIFICE. NO CASUALTIES WERE REPORTED. AT LEAST E I G H T . P E O P L E WFgE K I L L E D AND 1 7 I N J U R E D ON OCTOBER 3 #HEN A !BOMB EXPLODED ON THE TEERAN-KHORRAMSHAXR T P A I N . T E E R T I S PSTILL NO I N C I C A T I O N VBO S E T OF? THE BOMB. " I N TXERAN A F I R E BROKE OUT A T T E E AFGHAN EWBASSP ON SEPTEMBER 23. AN EMBASSY SPOXESMAN CLAIMED THE BLAZE WAS CAUSED BY ABSONISTS. DAMAGE WAS APPARENTLY L I M I T E R T C THE GUARDS CABIN AT THE E H B A S S I . ANOTHER DXPLOSION, PERHAPS FROM A GRENADE, TOOX PLACE O U T S I D E T E E SAUDI ARABIAN W B A S S I ON SEPTEHBER 24 DURING THE O F F I C I A L CELEBRATION BEING HELD TO YART SAUDI ARABIAN NATIONAL DAY. TWO ASSASSINATIONS HAVE TAKEN PLACE I N MASHAD, BOTH INVOLVING LOCAL CLERGYMEN. HAJ MOSHALLAH HOMAI WAS GUNNED DOVN LATE I N THE EVENING ON SEPTEMBER 22. A NEWSPAPER REPORT CLAIMED THAT THE CLERGYMAN HAD SEEN A SUPPORTER O F THE SHAH. A SECOND CLERSYMtN WAS ASSASSINATED I N MASHAD ON OCTOBER 1. SETTED ADMAD AHMADI WAS SHOT TO DEATH ON THE COORSTEP OT H I S OYN HOUSE,AND RUMORS CIRCULATING I N MASHAD CLAIM THE DEATR WAS PART O F A PLOT TO L I Q U I D A T E 21 PROMINENT PERSCNALIT I D I N THE C I T Y .
    7.

    T E E ETHNIC KURCISH AREAS HAVE ALSO BAD A F A I R SHARE O F UNREST DURING THE P A S T FEW DAYS. ON OCTOBER 3 EIGH" BUILDINGS I N NAQADEH. INCLUDING T H E TOWNS WATER S U P P L Y , T E E GENDARMERIE HEADQUARTERS AND P R I V A T F HOMES AMAGED I N A GRENADE ATTACK. SPORADIC VIOLENCE T OTHER KURDISH TOWNS TOO, AND CLASHPS AND I N C I I L V T S C O N P I D E N T I A L
    129

    TI

    HAVE BEEN PEPOBTXD I N SAEDASHT, BANLH. S A Q W Z , IIAEAMD, AND ~ U U I T E E f a r z r I r n e ) . rr ~ A N A N D A J TXE uousr or A REVOLUTIONARY GUARDSIIAN VAS WRECKED BY AN ZIPLOSION ON OCTOBER 1. ON OCTOBER 2 A GROUP OF 24 n E V o L m I o N A n r GUABDSUEN WERE AHBUSHED I N SAPDASH? RESULTIN6 I N I I V E 0 I TEE GUARDS BLING KILLED, EIGHT VOUNDD AND THE BEST BEING CAPTURED.
    8. THE BALUCHISTAN BIIOION BAS ALSO SEEN RECENT ONBEST. ON SEPT 28 WNCBEDS O t ZAHIDAN IISSIDINTS SUF'POPTBD BY PSOPLP FROM KHASH AND IRAN S U E R DWONSTBATED A3AINST THE NEV IRANIAN CONSTITUTION AIITICLES W I C B STATE THAT THE OFOICIAL RELIGION 0 1 IRAN I S TEE JA'AIAEI SECT 0 1 S H I I T E ISLAM. BALUCHISTAN I S A PRBDOIIINANTLT SUNNI AREA. U N C O N P I P ~nunons OF BESTLESSNESS HAVE BEEN D FREQUENT FROM THE REGION, BUT THEBE HAS BLlN LITTLE
    8T

    '

    NNNN C O N I I D E N T I A L

    C O N F I D E N T I A L COVERAGE I N THE IRANIAN P R E S S . THE GOVERNOR GENERAL O P S I S T A N AND BALUCHISTAN, DR. H A R I R 1 , P A I D A RECENT V I S I T T O QOM TO REPORT ON C O N D I T I O N S I N H I S P R O V I N C E . CLAIMING THAT THE REGION I S UNDER CONTROL. SOtlE TROUBLE HAD OCCURRBD IN THE LASHAR AREA YAERE TRIBESMEN ATTACKED TWO GENDARMERIE P O S T S AND DISARMED THE S E C U R I T Y YORCES THERE. LEGOTIATIONSR I B A L LEADERS VITA T RESULTED I N A PARDON ?OR THOSE ACCUSED O F ATTACFING T H E GENDAEHERIE P O S T S , AND H A R I R I CLAIMS THAT THE T R I B E S P E O P L E V I L L SURRENDER T H E I R WEAPONS. LAINGEN
    R I

    TEHRAN 10697N

    NNNN C O N F I D E N T I A L TEERAN 10697/1

    DE RUQMHR 10752/01 280** ZNY CCCCC ZZH 0 0713472 OCT 79 FM AMEMBASSY TEHRAN TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4122 INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASH DC RUEKJCS/JCS WASH DC RUQMBI/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0315 RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0303 RUEHADDSINT BAGHDAD 0308 RUQMOD/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0286 RUSBQD/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 0353 RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 0354 RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0355 RUQMKW/AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 0318 RUDTC/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0428 RUQMAM/AMEMBASSY MANAMA C283 RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0315 RUQMMT/AMEMBASSY MUSCAT 0196 RUFNPS/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0386 RUSNAAA/USClNCEUR VAIHINGEN GE BT C 0 N F I D E N T A L SECTION 01 OF

    CLASS:CONFIDENTIAL CHRGE: STAT 10/7/79 APPRV: CHARGE:LBLAINGEN DRFTD: POL: JL1NBERT:GO CLEAR: POL: EASWIFT DISTR: POL2 CHG ICA E C O N ~ ( ICHRON RF

    TEHRAN 10752

    E.O. 12065: GDS 10/7/85 (SWIFT, ELIZABETH A.) OR-P TAGS: PINT, PINR, IR SUBJECT: REVOLUTIONARY MASHHAD REF: TEHRAN 10151
    1. (C - ENTIRE TEXT)

    2. SUMMARY: POLITICAL OFFICER SPENT OCTOBER 2-3 IN MASHHAD, CAPITAL OF NORTHEASTERN PROVINCE OF KHORASAN. CITY WAS IN FESTIVE MOOD AND FILLED WITH VISITORS ON OCCASION OF BIRTHDAY OF EIGHTH IMAM. MASHHAD CONTINUE T?P TRADITION OF GOING ITS OWN WAY OUTSIDE OF THE MAINrTlEAM OF IRANIAN POLITICAL LIFE. AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI HAS ESTABLISHED HIS AUTHORITY THOUGH A DELEGATE WHO WERSHADOWS BOTH THE CIVIL GOVERNOR GENERAL AND THE TWO NFLUENTIAL LOCAL RELIGIOUS LEADERS WHO RAN THE CITY FOR IrE MONTH BETWEEN THE EFFECTIVE COLLAPSE OF CENTRAL OVERNMENT AUTHORITY IN JANUARY 1979 AND THE REVbLUTION P FEBRUARY. EMBASSY WILL REPORT SEPARATELY ON CONDITIONS T MASHHAD UNIVERSITY AND ON VISIT TO LEADING MASHHAD ELI'GIOUS FIGTJRE. END SUMMARY.
    123

    3. EMBASSY POLITICAL OFFICER SPENT OCTOBER 2-3 IN WASHHAD THE CAPITAL OF KHORASAN PROVINCE AND THE SITE OF THE SHRINE OF IMAM REZA. EIGHTH IMAM OF THE SHI'A MUSLIMS. OFFICER HAD NOT VISITED MASHHAD IN EIGHT YEARS AND DURING HIS VISIT HE CALLED ON UNIVERSITY FACULTY AND ON AYATOLLAH HAJ HASAN TABATABA'I-QOMI, ONE OF SENIOR . RELIGIOUS LEADERS OF THE PROVINCE. FOLLOWING ARE IMPRESSIONS GAINED FROM THE VISIT. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND

    4. MASHHAD HAS TRADITIONALLY FOLLOWED A PATH INDEPENDENT OF THE MAINSTREAM OF IRANIAN POLITICAL LIFE. THE REASONS FOR THIS INDEPENDENCE ARE OBSCURE, ALTHOUGH THEY MAY BE RELATED TOTHE CITY'S GEOGRAPHIC ISOLATION TEHRAN IS 600 MILES WEST AND THE ROADS BEYOND MASHHAD GO NOWHERE, THEY SAY). HISTORICALLY THE CITY HAS ALWAYS BEEN MORE CLOSELY LINKED TO CENTRAL ASIA AND AFGHANISTAN THAN TO THE CENTRAL PERSIAN HEARTLAND. FOR WHATEVER REASONS, THE CITY'S ROLE IN THE MAJOR POLITICAL UPHEVALS OF THE PAST DECADES--THE CONSTITUTIONAL MOVEMENT, THE SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS AFTER WORLD WAR 11, THE MOSSADEGH PERIOD, AND THE RECENT ISLAMIC REVOLUTION--HAS BEEN PERIPHERAL. THIS CHARACTER OF THE CITY EXISTS DESPITE THE FACT THAT MASHHAD IS A CERNTER OF PILGRIMAGE, FOR ALL SHIA MUSLIMS. IS ONE OF THE FIVE LARGEST CITIES IN IRAN, AND IS THE CENTER OF ONE OF THE COUNTRY'S MOST IMPORTANT AGRICULTURAL AREAS.

    5. MASHHAD HAD REMAINED RELATIVELY FREE OF THE DISTURBANCES WHICH COVERED SO MUCH OF IRAN THROUGHOUT LATE 1978. THE INHABITANTS' HOPE FOR PEACE WERE SHATTERED IN EARLY JANUARY,lo79,HOWEVER ,WHEN FOUR DAYS OF FIGHTING LEFT ABOUT 2,000 PERSONS DEAD. ACCORDING TO LOCAL SOURCES, AT THAT T l l THE ARMY WENT ON A RAMPAGE, ATTACKING A IiF t'OcPITAL AND SHOOTING INDISCRIMATELY AT ANYONE IN THE ST17ETS. FOLLOWING THAT FIGHTING, VANY OF THE SOLDIERS FLFD THEIR BARRACKS, AND THE MILITARY AUTHORITY MELllED AWAY. THE FARMANDAR (TOWN GOVERNOR) JOINED THE REVOLUTIONARIES AND THE OSTANDER AND OTHER CENTRAL GOVERNMENT REPRESENTATIVES LFFT THE CITY. FRON EARLY JANUARY UNTIL THF FEBRUARY REVOLUTION, EFFECTIVF AUTHORITY WAS IN THE HANDS OF AYATOLLAH HAJ HASAN TABATAAA'I-OOMI AND AYATOLLAH SAYYID ABWLLAH SHIRAZI, WHO RAN THF AFFAIR? OF THE CITY PROM THEIR HOMFS AND SCHOOLS. IT WAS AYATOLLAH SHIRAZI, FOR EXAMPLE, WHO FORBADE THE PFOPLE FROM ATTACKING FOREIGNERS. THE FOREICH COMMUNITY LEFT MASHHAD AROUND JANUARY 7 AND TRAVFGED OVERLAND TO HEART.

    6. DOLLOWING THE VICTORY OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION IN WFPQUARY 1979, THF TWO AYATOLLAPS OF MASHHAD LOST
    M1'CP m-

    OF T ' I POLITICAL POWER TO SHEIKH TARASI, AYATOLLAH tFR

    u--<: 'N ': :n

    CONFIDENTIAL

    TEHRAN

    10752/2

    KHOMEINI'S REPRESENTATIVE IN MASHHAD. TABAST WAS AN OBSCURE CLERGYMAN BEFORE THE REVOLUTION, BUT ASSISTED BY KHOMEINI'S AUTHORITY AND BY A SMALL GROUP OF RNOIJJTIONARY GUARDS, HE HAS BEEN ABLE TO ASSERT HIS CONTROL OF THE CITY TO THE POINT THAT HE NOW ORDERS ARRESTS,TRIALS, AND EXECUTIONS WITHOUT REFERENCE TO ANY OTHER AUTHORITY. THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL AND OTHER RE PRESENTATIVES OF THE OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT HAVE ALSO BEEN OVERSHADOWED BY TABASI

    7. A MEMBER OF A PROMINENT, LIBERAL MASHHAD FAMILY EXPLAINED THE POLITICAL ECLIPSE OF THE T l AYATOLLAHS kO AS FOLLOWS:
    (A) DURING KHOMEINI'S 15-YEAR EXILE FROM IRAN, THE MASHHAD RELIGIOUS LEADERS HAD BEEN FORCED TO M K E ACCOMMODATIONS WITH THE CIVIL AUTHORITIES. AZIZI, THE LAST GOVERNOR GENERAL OF KHORASAN UNDER THE MONARCHY, HAD ESTABLISHED EXCELLENT RELATIONS WITH THE MASHHAD RELIGIOUS LEADERS TO THE EXTENT THAT THE NEW REGIME HAS NOT MOLESTED HIM (AZIZI). HOWEVER, THE AYATOLLAHS HAD ALSO DEAL WITH EX-GOVERNOR GENERAL VALIAN, WHO IS ONE OF THE NEW REGIMJX'S NUMBER ONE TARGETS. KHOMEINI'S THREATS TO REVEAL THESE ASSOCIATIONS HAS PREVENTED THE MASHHAD AYAYTOLLAHS FROM EFFECTIVELY OPPOSING HIS POLITICAL AUTHORITY. (B) DURING THE FIRST WEEKS AFTER THE REVOLUTION, AYATOLLAH TABATABAI-QOMI DID VOICE SOME OPPOSITION TO THE PROCEDURES OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COURTS. SPECIFICALLY, THE AYATOLLAH NOTED THAT UNDER ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE THE ASSERTIONS OF A PLAINTIFF HAD TO BE SUPPORTED BY THE TESTIMONY OF IMPARTIAL WITNESSES. HOWEVER, THE REVLUTIONARY COURTS WERE USING THE KAINTIFFS AS WITNESSES AGAINST THE ACCUSED. ACCORDING TO EMBASSY SOURCE, KHOMEINI SIMPLY IGNORED THESE OBJECTIONS AND "BLACKMAILED" THE AYATOLLAH'S INTO SILENCE BY THREATENING TO MAKE AN ISSUE OF THEIR ASSOCIATIONS WITH MEMBERS OF THE PAST REGIME.

    8. THE MASHHAD AYATOLLAHS HAVE REPORTEDLY ALSO BEEN UNHAPPY AT THE CULT OF PERSONALITY WHICH HAS BEEN BUILT

    UP AROUND KHOMEINI. THE RECENT AHNIVERSARY OF HIS TRAVELS FROM IRAQ TO PARIS(0CT 5) WAS DESCRIBED ON THE STATE RADIO AND TELEVISION AS THE SECOND GREATEST HEJRAT (MIGRATION) IN ISLAMIC HISTORY, SECOND ONLY TO THE TRAVEL SUCH OF THE PROPHET MOHAMMAD FROM MECCA TO MEDIFIA. LANGUAGE VERGES ON HERESY FOR STRICT MUSLIMS. KHOMEINI HAS ALSO ASSUMED THE AUTHORITY TO GRANT CLERICAL TITLES ON HIS OWN INITIATIVE. TRADITIONALLY SUCH HONORIFICS AS AYATOLLAH AND HOJJAT AL-ISLAM WERE NOT BESTOWED BY ANY INDIVIDUAL BUT 'WERE GRANTED BY CONSENSUS OF THE SCHOLARLY COMMUNITY WHEN A PERSON HAD REACHED A CERTAIN DEGREE OF LEARNING AND PIETY. KHOMEINI'S UNILATERALLY BESTOWING THESE TITLES ON VARIOUS CLERGYMEN IS SEEN AS A THREAT TO THE COLLEGIAL SYSTEM WHICH HAS TRADITIONALLY PREVAILED AMONG THE SHIA LEADERSHIP.

    9. EMBASSY SOURCE SAID HE HAD VISITED AYATOLLAH QOMI AS PART OF A DELEGATION . IN PRIVATE, THE AYATOLLAH TOLD ONE OF THE DELEGATION MEMBERS THAT KHOMEINI WAS ABLE TO " SIT UNDER AN APPLE TREE IN PARIS AND ISSUE EDICTS W!ILE THOSE LEADERS ON THE SCENE HAD TO TRY AND ALLEVIATE THE BLOODSHED AND SUFFERING OF THEIR FOLLOWERS. DURING THE WORST OF THE FIGHTING IN MASHHAD, BODIES OF THE VICTIMS WERE STORED IN AYATOLLAH QOMI'S HOUSE UNTIL THEY COULD BE WASHED AND BURIED SECRETLY. QOMI SAID HE HAD TO C0E:SOLE THE SURVIVORS AND TO DEAL WITH THE AUTHORITIES TO TRY AND STOP FURTHER KILLING. "WHERE WAS KHOMEINI DURING ALL THIS"? HE REPORTEDLY ASKED. BT
    10752

    NNNN CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN 10752/2

    10. EMBASSY WILL REPORT SEPARATELY ON CALL ON CONDITIONS OF MASHHAD UNIVERSITY AND ON VISIT TO AYATOLLAH TABATABA'IQOMI . LAINGEN. BT 60752

    NNNN CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN


    10752/3

    ,126

    0 0 RUQMHR DE RUEHCR X I 0 0 1 2850238 ZNY S S S S S ZZH 0 1202102 0'3 79 Rrl SECSIATE WASHDC TO RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE 5685 INFO RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY TEhRAN IMMED IATE 4949 RUDKFMQ/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 5864 RUWRA/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 1630 BAGHDAD 2 2 7 0

    cti:

    2746

    CHARGE'

    CHRON

    2.

    EGYPT IAN EMBASSY OFFICERS ZANT AND HAREDY CALLED ON NEA/IRN OCTOBER I 0 FOR A B R I E F I N G ON IRAN. I N GENERAL EGYPTIANS APPEARED TO SHARE GENERAL L I N E S OF OUR ASSESSMENT SUMMARIZED BELOW.
    3.

    Lh

    THE ECONOMY: INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION S T I L L DOWN 5 0 PER 4.0 MILLION B/D WITH CENT. OIL PRODUCTION HOLDING 3.5 REVENUES PROBABLY EXCEEDING 1978. GREATEST D E F I C I E N C Y I S L O S S O F EXPERIENCED MANAGERS. UNEMPLOYMENT ESTIMATED 20 40 PERCENT; INFLAT1011 2 0 PERCENT. GOOD AGRICULTURAL YEAR. SPOTTY SHORTAGES SOME MERCHANDISE. GENERALLY SLOW MOVEMENT TOWARDS RECOVERY. ENCOURAGING THAT INCREASING NUMBEE OF US FIRMS BEING PAID AND SOME AGREEING T O RESUME WORK (FLUOR ON ISFAHAN REFINERY, AMC TO ASSEMBLE J E E P S ) .

    4. KLRDS AND ARABS:' RECENT OUTBREAK OF BOMBINGS A N D ARMED ATTACKS CONSIDERED SERIOUS. DIFFICULT T O EVALUATE

    I M R I C A T I O N S FOR REGIME, HOWEVER, AS THERE HAVE BEEN MOMENTS O F SERIOUS D I F F I C U L T Y FOR PGOI IN THE PAST. ARMED FORCES: SLOW MOVEMENT TO REGROUP. NEW COMMANDER OF I A F APPEARS STRONG AND DETERMINED. .OUR CONTACTS WITH N IRANIAN MILITARY GENERALLY BUSINESSLIKE AND P O S I T I V E I T ONE.
    5.

    6. LEFT AND MIDDLE CLASS: LYING LOW. SMALL I N NUMBER, N MASS APPEAL, FRAGMENTED, LACK OF STRONG, CHARISMATIC O LEADERS. POTENTIAL AUGMENTATION O F STRENGTH SHOULD PRESENI REGIME STUMBLE BADLY. TUDEH PARTY SMALL AND DISCREDITED BY SOVIET LINKAGE.

    ,,,

    7. Q E R Z C A L ASCENDANCY: KHOMEINI--DESPITE MIDDLE CLASS, L E I T - W I N G AND E T H N I C D E F E C T I O N S - - C O M M A N D S S T R O N G M A J O R I T Y S U P P O R T O F T H E MASSES. . HE AND OTHER H A R D - L I N E MULLAHS A P P E A R D E T E R M I N E D T O A S S E R T T H E I R D O M I N A N C E OVER NEW C O N S I I T U I I O N AND E L E C T I O N S FOR M A J L I S AND P R E S I D E N T . N E V E R T H E L E S S , T H E R E SOME R E S I S T A N C E W I T H I N T H E P G O I (BAZARGAN, Y A Z D I ) AND AMONG C L E R I C S ( S H A R I A T M A D A R I ) .
    8 . FOREIGN RELATIONS: R E G I M E D E E P L Y S U S P I C I O U S O F SHAHS U P P O R T E R S THOUGHT T O B E BACKED I N K U R D I S H AND A R A B A R E A S B Y I S R A E L AND IRAQ. VAGUE F E A R O F A S A U D I - I R A Q A L L I A N C E BACKED B Y U S A G A I N S T IRAN. SOMEWHAT L E S S F E A R O F S O V I E T TIREAT. S O V I E T HAND I N I R A N NOT NOW A P P A R E N T . EMBARRASSED D E S I R E B Y P G O I T O R E A S S U R E G U L F S T A T E S A F T E R C L A I M S AND T H R E A T S A S S E R T E D B Y V A R I O U S A Y A T O L L A H S A G A I N S T B A H R A I N AND KWAIT. A B I D I N G FEAR O F U S M I L I T A R Y P R E S E N C E I N T H E G U L F AND O F U S A S N A N I P L L A T O R O F OMAN1 I N I T I A T I V E FOR S T R A I T O F HORNOZ. R E S T R A I N T ON A F G H A N I S T A N D E S P I T E C O N C E R N F O R I N C R E A S E D S O V I E T ROLE. C O O L I N G P R I V A T E A T T I T U D E S TOWARD R A D I C A L P A L E S T I N I A N S OUT O F C O N C E R N FOR T H E I R I N F L U E N C E I N T E H R A N AND P O S S I B L E M E D D L I N G W I T H 0 I L . F I E L D A R A B WORKERS. EQUAL H O S T I L I T Y TOWARDS I S R A E L AND E G Y P T . C O N T I N U I N G S T R O N G S U P P O R T FOR PLO. 9. U.S.-IRAN RELATIONS: D E S I R E ON OUR P A R T T O F A S H I O N A E W R E L A T I O N S H I P , C O O P E R A T I N G WHERE W A S I B L E , M O V I N G AT A P A C E COMFORTABLE FOR I R A N I A N S I N L I G H T O F S T I L L S T R O N G S U S P I C I O N S AND A N T I - A M E R I C A N F E E L I N G S . LIMITED RESUMPTION I N SHIPMENT O F PREVIOUSLY-PURCHASED MILLTARY S P A R E P A R T S AND S A L E O F NEW S P A R E S . ONE-S)(OT S A L E O F K E R O S E N E AND H E A T I N G FUEL. E X T E N S I V E E F F O R T S T O S E T T L E COMMERCIAL AND M I L I T A R Y CONTRACT D I S P U T E S . I N T E R E S T I N N A M I N G AN AMBASSADOR AMONG E X E C U T I V E B R A N C H O F F I C I A L S BUT D I F F I C U L T Y O F M A K I N G F R I E N D L Y G E S T U R E WHEN A T N O S P H E R E I N I R A N S O F R E Q U E N T L Y UNFRIENDLY.

    -- f LHUOEPNECF LE L W I T HMODERATEU SPI NR A GRMUAPTTIUSRTES W AI TI N T CA ILNE RORC S AUGMEVT : M IN OUT C A G H I AN0


    REVOLUTIONARY IDEOLOGUES. --(LOOMY: P G O I CONTROL S L I P S F U R T H E R . KURDS, A R A B S AND b T H E R S S U S T A I N REVOLT I N PROVINCES. ECONOMY U N R A V E L S . --MIDDLE GROUND: T H E R E A F A I R CHANCE, HOWEVER, T H A T P R E S E N T P O L I T I C A L C O N D I T I O N S WOULD P E R S I S T W I T H O U T C L E A R R E S O L U T I O N FOR SOME T I M E T O COME. I F CLERICS ESTABLISHED F I R M CONTROL, AND T H I S NOT YET A S S U R E D , I T SEEMED MATTER O F T I N E B E F O R E C O M P L E X I T I E S O F GOVERNMENT WOULD OVERWHELM THEM. REPLACEMENT P O L I T I C A L F O R C E I M P O S S I B L E T O V I S U A L I Z E AT T H I S T I M E . VANCE

    10.

    SCENARIOS:

    BT
    17101
    128

    Policy Initiatives

    - Talks with PermReps

    We do not need to dwell on the importance of Irqn to the West.

    stability of Iran %*,-if anything, more important to us now than at the time of the Shah. Our job of

    protecting Western interests in Iran is, of course, infinitely more difficult. We are dealing wtih a government that is

    Suffice it to say that the independence and

    inexperienced, deeply suspicious o k our motives, and attempting simultaneously to accomplish the conflicting objectives of restoring normal conditions and transforming the society according to vaguely-defined Islamic revolutionary ideals. The U.S. has special problems which make our task more complex than our allies. The unwinding of our military relationship is a serious point of contention with the Islamic Government. We are also confronted with a wide range of similar, but more manageable problems with commercial contracts. Some of these problems have resulted in action in U.S. court8 to attach Iranian assets in this country. The Iranians do not understand the extent to which we are bound by the separation of powers; the laws, requlations and precedents which often control our action; and the political limitations thrtt press treatment of their hynan rights record has created for the USG. Finally, despite our repeated denials, the Iranians are deeply suspicious that we areplotting against them in concert with the Israelis, the Shah, the Saudis, even

    the Iraqis and the coannunists. If, as we conclude, no group or individual outside Iran, has any real capability at the moment of significantly influencing events in Iran (i.e. bringing down the Government), our best approach would seem to attempt to

    -- moderate the policies of the present regime and


    help to promote greater pragmatism, reconciliation and economic recovery.

    -- help to preserve' and

    strengthen elements in

    Iran, especially in the military, moderate religious and secular groups, which could play a useful role in the future as the political drama unfolds.

    -- build confidence of the regame in an effort to


    reduce the prospect of harsh measures of reaction which,

    in turn, make stability more elusive.


    In recent months, the U.S. has taken several limited steps to begin to fashion a new relationship:

    -- release of spare parts in the pipeline and


    resumption of Iranian purchase of spares. The Iranians have been slow to take delivery.

    --

    sale of kerosene and heating oil.

    -- concerted efforts by the State Department to help


    resolve commercial disputes.

    SECRET-SENSITIVE
    -3-

    -- patient efforts to close out the PMS program


    in a manner which would protect Iranian as well as US interests. We would like to appoint an Ambassador, but the Iranian campaign in the press (and privately in meetings

    LL with Yazdi) Inot given us a fit opportunity.

    There

    is still considerable reluctance on the part of political leaders, especially the clerics, to talk to us. There are five ideaswhich you might discuss with the other three 1.

    S&Aers:

    .':<,<l.

    An approach to Khomeini.

    To our knowledge no

    senior Western ambassador or emissary has seen Khomeini since the February Revolution. We think it might be use-

    ful for Western representatives to call on him, not to embrace the,clerics, but to reassure him that the West accepts the Islamic revolution, has no intention of interfering in Iran's internal affairs, and is concerned with
    '

    the continuing instability that derives from weakness of the Bazargan Government. The object w ~ u l dbe to sugqest

    very gently to the Ayatollah that Bazargan needs additional backing if the communists are not to have an opportunity for serious meddling in Iran. We have no suggestion as to which country might make the first move, but perhaps the French, given their past assistance to Khomeini, would be in the best position, SECRET-SENSITIVE

    SECRET/SENSITIVE
    -4-

    2.

    Approach to the Iraqis.

    The Iranians are

    convinced that Iraq is actively assisting Kurdish and Arab rebels in Iran. There may well be some truth to these assertions. ?t seems very probable that if Iraq made a serious effort to police its borders, the Iranian ,rebels, especially the Kurds, would find it hard to continue their insurrection. As a first step we think the French and Germans might separately engage the Iraqis in discussions of Iranian developments. The ultimate purpose of the exchange, which might require prolonged confidence building, would beto persuade the Iraqis to reduce the pressure on the Bazargan government.
    3.

    I,

    ;I

    Assistance to Iranian Military.

    The Iranians

    have told us it is their policy to diversify support for US-origin military equipment. We have replied that we

    would have no objection in principle provided the arrangements with Europeans were made within the framework of our laws, regulations and policies. only what we ourselves would provide.) (We will license We have also

    pointed out the practical problems that may arise. While there are real impediments to the diversification of support, we hope the allies will agree,thatall of us should_do what we can to strengthen the iranian military which could be a key group in the future.
    We would like

    --

    to stay in close touch with the allies in advance of these developments in order to assure that the Iranian military SECRET/SENSITIVE

    ccgceives the necessary support.

    4 .

    contadts with Dissident Exiles.

    we do not believe

    m t i a r and otheg Iranian dissidents abroad at this-tim hold any promise for future political influence.

    W. intend

    t o avoid any association with these groups which could imply political endorsement.

    5.

    Regular consultations. We believe it would be important

    to stay in continuing contact with the allies on Iranian developaents. We suggest that we encourage our Ambasscldors and Charge in Tehran to consult'on their activities frquently, although it may be awkward for all four to assemble at once. We suggest at least quarterly meetings of the PenaReps.

    Drafted: NEA/IRN:HPrecht:sch '10/13/79 x. 20313 MLGreene (draft) Clearances: IAR/RNA P Mr. Newsom (draft)

    Ootmcer 15, 1979 friend., 1"m a t heme toa-t, which is uu4Ul l a t e l y because m a hasry rchedule m f f d i p l e u t i c parties:.. ~ @ vge t tke tmlavisrimm em, l i s t e n i y ( i n p e r s i u ) t m a v i s i t i n # a PLO d m l e p t i o n beim& lauded a t the Cmamtitutimmal Review Cmuacil sesmicm tmday, with b t h n PI0 8 ud t h e Mullaka deamuaein& the U fmr i t s suppmrt f m r . i m p c r i r l i s u , S It g e t s weprlag a f t e r a while... you l e a & t m dmldier en, Z i o a i m u d Iaramli agr08mima. s l a g t k a t at learnt-men m the rhetmrio is j u s t t:.at f s a i d fmr tke recmrd aad maid z z a f y r e r m l u t i a n u y @ s e a l , whioh is stmut indecd I the cmuneila s f the 8 t a t e radim1( u d televimiod "e *m I.prmteat t m &mvelueat types t h a t t h i s kind m a t t ~ a k f c m a s t a ~ t l y n U purpmaes i n I r u eannmt r e a l l y s r r v e the gmvernments'e m a i n t e r e s t s i n m S w d e n l m p i y a e m d r e l a t i a s h i p v i t k us tke u w e r i s u s u a l l y smacting t m the e f f e q t k a t we st r s c m p i z e t h a t tke mvmlution is n e t y e t cmmplete aad t h a t - t h r gmvaauent itmalf c c u a s t o u t r e 1 erne m the t h i w t h a t u e said m the r$ib aad tclvision. ~ h i 18 ~ f n nmnsemae but what i s mne t m do... yester3ay the r a d i ) c a r r i e d aamthar a tack m m O n e a a CIA y m t up t m a l l smrts ef d a a t a ~ d l yt h i a m m a s d-mo3strated by m a l l r p d y p r e t e s t cfrt ever the executimns...... well, I w i l l grumble a b i t when I see the Pmreim ~Unster tmmerrmv and we s h a l l see what he has t m say. m name fmruard a s ~ a b a n a a d ~ r ~ ~ ~ s y Even i f muh government were t m d e c i l e t m tkt the enthusiasm m the p a r t m the l a c a l gcvernment v r i s would be a b i t su86ucl. n f I n f a c t hm.ever,I caa n w t e l l ymu t h a t the liklihmmd m m s t a y i n s o bere m C T i e e r m f y m a e x i s t s , a dacisibn we tomP q u i t e indepeqdemt mf.attitude*-here. Far m i t i m a &nmd thine, f u i l y wise, aad la p l y event I have LS1 a f a i r l y e x t e n ~ v e . t m u x here.... when I w i l l be r e l i e v e d i n s t i l l u a o l e u , but we shmuld bmw shortly. Yepwhile there is much t o dm, u d much t m wmrry abcut, i f one is inclined t m wmrry. I ' m met, mince mur capacity k r e a l l y influence t h e evmlutimm m eventa here is l i a i t e d i n aay event. But I a u f m mptimist abmut the lmnger t e n . Minister, r e t u r i a g Utmm seeimg Iec:r*ry maay c s w i r , but .lam w n t m t m a &ee i n New Ymrk, w e f u l l m c % , i z f f : T f us m n ray, publicly, t h a t I r a a neededathe U j u s t aa the U aeeded I r a a . Fine. I f t k t ' s the S S policy apprmach h e r e we c u l i v e with t h r t , because I t h i J t h a t kind m awareness w i l l f prmduce r e s u l t s , hmwever slmwly. I have %tuck elmem t m the compmund l a t e l y , because of the pressure m.f work... and t h a t n e t auch a b a d f d e becausa usually there i s plenty of diversiom hem. Temnis is alidays available, u d I play a t - l b a s t every e t h e r day. This Friday we have a t m u r a u e n t here a g a i n t the I t a l i a a c e u u a i t y , sad we w i l l aak them t o s t a y an f a r dinnek aad the f i l a mm weeks a:@ we had a r a m m the "Kmmeini CU* tmurame~t i n l f " I l t e n a i m n a l Velvet". qmftball, van a a u s u a l by the Marimes... they're y o u # anU tough emmugh t e always b e i t the y pp.ts off t'ne r e s t m us. One might we went, with m b u l l e t prmmf limsusime u d L f pmlice i n a fmllmw-car, t o a b i g PirUthday part a t the homo of an Ambricu g i r l married t m . u Iruiu. Fine time, u a t i l midaibbt when the revmlutiamaries frmm t h e meigkborhmd %rnitehn discovered hy c a r and the p l l i c e eutside the g a t e s e f the heuse and deolded t ey S the blacked m u r way and i n s i s t e d w fmllmw them t m m e h a ' t l i k e what was gmkag m l . Kamitsh hdqs. we s a i d tuDu nm, they had 1s r i g h t , ctc. After smme minutes they l e t ur leave but them fmllmwmd us. dernuding mvar the W l k i e - t a l k i e s (they have them t m m , atmlen frcm mur campmund i n ~ e b r ~ i r y h a t w ffmllew then t e t h e i r hdqs. But m d r i v e r , tei!lnd t) e y the wheel m the'hmmred tamkl'that iyChrysler has becmme, i s n e t t m be t r i f l e d with a t f m u y heur amd e s p e c i a l l y net a t midnight. S we zmsmed mff end were eventually l e f t air" Yesterday a Cernan busimessman wm l i v e s tatbbmex i n the b i t y was aasasainated a s he l e f t h fmr wmrk, killmd by two yauthm with mileama en a mm~mrc~ole. This has sent mhmck waves b u s i ~ e s sce.ouaity,aad it w i l l b x m : be even mere l i f f i c u l t t m g e t tnrsugh the f a r e . b u s i n e s r t t m c m here. ~e (hink i t i s an e x c e p t i . n t e the r u i e rec-mtiy... e t the s u r i t y situat,?on has c e r t a i n l y bren imp@@v:ng, a t l e a ~ in Tehrm. Tlaewhere i n The f i g h t i n g i n Kurdestan i s g e t t i ~ g worse and tbere i s t r r u & l e i m the couqtry, 1 . . Baluchistin tmm. ~ l of which i s l bad, but tol-rbble fmr t h i s regime, s 1 m y a s m things remain uader cmntrml i n the m i l prmvi.ce ef Khuzistan. Wen t h e r e , t h r r e has been trouble l a t e l y , and t h a t could r e a l l y sprkk t r ~ u b l , . long chat... it went well u d I wa8 Yeatarday I c a l l e d an a leading Hullah fmr a w8raly received b u t I c u e away with a new appreciatimn m hew much m a c m m u a i c a t i r f f &ap e x i x t s betweea the West aad the c l e r i c a l leadership m t h i s place. Suepicims m m f f i 8 deep indeed, a prmduct m m u r auppmrt fmr the Shah, I s r a e l , amd a perceptiea *f mr f h c i c t y d a s a m a t e r i a l i s t mse r ) e r r a l l y hmatile tn Islan. Hmwever much I t r i e d t m emphasize t h a t we tam a r e a p.mple with s t r s a g s p i r i t i u a l values and premcoupatimnm I fmund

    ', e.. ,r .

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    t m c s h a phrase, I s l a a i s here t m atay....


    134

    UNCLASSIFIED
    DEPARTMENT OF STATE

    suewcr: The Current Situation in Iran (Speech given at 33rd Annual Conference of the Middle East Institute)
    PARTICIPANTS: James Bill

    University of Texas

    PLACE:

    Mayflower Hotel, Washington, D. C.

    DATE: October 5, 1979

    DISTRIBUTION:

    INR/DDR NEA/

    NEA/I RN s/p

    Embassy Tehran

    Approximately half of Bill's speech was devoted to explaining the background of the Revolution. (Bill's analysis Can be found in the Wlnter 1978-79 issue of Foreign Affairs). He then turned to the current situation with the comment that he expected continued chaos in Iran for the following reasons: --a leadership famine; --no viable political institutions; and --the tremendous disruptive nature of'the revolution itself. Bill maintains that there would be even more chaos than there is presently if Khomeini and the clerics suddenly departed the scene. They are presently the only ones who have the capacity to hold the social mosaic together. However, in the long run the ayatollahs do not have the ability to erect a new political structure. Historically, the Shi'a clergy have always been outside the government and have , acted as a negative force. They are mentally and emotionally unprepared for the challenge of rebuilding Iran.

    :: .:

    DS.I?W

    UNCLASSIFIED -135

    . -

    ruling cllque: --the ethnic tribes;

    --"countarrevolutionary" groups. of remants of the old military and security apparatus. Bill believes they at least 600 revolutionary guards, komiteh or religious leaders. ) ;
    --the far left, particularly the Fedayeen-a1 Khalq; --the secular, modern intelligensia. ("Ultimately Iran cannot be ruled without their support.")

    The Future. Bill believes that the conservative fundamentalist clergymen will not be able to retain power over long run. Eventually a triple alliance composed of the military, the progressive religious clergy and the secula technoc~atsmight emerge to allivate the continued chaos (which will persist as long as the fundamentalist are in power.) Amplifying on this senario, Bill suggested: --Iran must have a central instrument of coercion and the military is the only institution which can fulfill that role. Although it has been decapitated, it will rebuild itself. --There are progressive religious leaders who are waiting in the wings. He put the following individuals in that catewry: Zanjani, ShariatMedari, Shirazi, Beheshti and Lphuti. The US Position. In order to improve US/Iranian Bill suggested we: --Admit past policy "errors"; --Send a "new breed" of representative

    /
    (We

    technicaland administrative aid. should assure this aid reac and not just the government --Avoid contacts with the exiles.

    UNCLASSIFIED
    136

    CONFIDENTIAL

    IRAN (for 2nd Quadripartite Meeting, October 15, 1979) The Current Situation Nine months after the overthrow of the Pahlavi dynasty, the Iranian revolution has still not run its full course. Power continues to be fragmented, the economy is stagnated, andmilitaryand security forqes remain shattered. The loose coalition of forces which overthrew the Shah has collapsed as its leaders have split over the kind of society that they envision for the future. Nevertheless, Ayatollah Khomeini is the pre-eminent figure in Iran and will most likely remain that for the coming months. Internal Political Situation: currently at work in Iran. . Three major forces are

    (f--<3

    First, Khomeini is consolidating his power and control of Iranian society. This effort is being over =aspects waged simultaneously on several fronts. A Council of Experts is preparing a final draft constitution, which will provide the legal basis for the Islamic Republic. In this process, the constitution is being made more strictly Islamjc. The .constitutional referendum and national elections which will follow are likely to be dominated by clerical forces. Religious forces could easily win the election and dominate the new government. Religious leaders are increasing their control in other key areas: --The ousting of bil chief Hassan Nazih removes the man who was most outspoken in opposition to the Clergy. --The threatened purges in the oil company, the military and the government bureaucracies are designed to eliminate the less fervent supporters of the new order. --Even the very halting steps aimed at curbing or eliminating the independent local komitehs are part of a process which strengthens clerical control.

    CONFIDENTIAL
    137

    CONFIDENTIAL

    Second, parallel to this increased clerical domination, factions wlthin the ruling clique are jockeying for power and position. Khomeini remains the final arbitrator of any dispute among these factions. His associates include other ayatollahs who agree with him to various degrees and secularists such as Prime Minister Bazargan and Foreign Minister Yazdi. These latter men continue to fight a quiet internal battle against the clerics for Khomeini's good will. None of these associates is accepted as a possible successor to Khomeini. That fact, plus Khoneini's age (he is 79),adds much uncertainty to the regime's future course.
    opposition

    Finally, the new regime is being challenged by several groups including: --the ethnic minorit~es (most notably the Kurds and the Arabs); --remnants of the old regime, including military and SAVAK personnel; --leftist forces who are underground, well-armed but not an immediate threat; and --the exiles in Europe and the US who are composed of former army officers, technocrats, the intelligentsia, and liberal politicians.

    None of these groups has been able to put together an organization which can effectively challenge the Khomeini machine. The clerics have run rough-shod over the ethnic minorities and have outmaneuvered the left. Although many of the exiles,would like to topple the regime, they appear to be uncoordinated and disorganized, notwithstanding the efforts in Paris of former Prime Minister Shahpour Bakhtiar. We believe Bakhtiar has very little prospect of political success in Iran. #foreign Polic : The form and the content of the new regime's foreign p%licy are still taking shape. Present foreign policy reflects the confused domestic situation, but several trends are becoming clear:
    2 .

    --Xenophobic nationalihm: This includes general attr n-en and specific anti-US policies.

    --Islamic messianism: Khomeini wants to export the revolution to Islamic or Shi'a groups abroad.

    CONFIDENTIAL
    130

    CONFIDENTIAL
    6

    - 3 -

    So far, however, he has not supplied much material aid to such groups. Rather, he has been eXpbrting an idea and the revolutionary techniques and the organizational theory necessary for the idea's implementation. Iran8s,anti-Israeland pro-PLO stances, as well as some pro-Shi'a activities in the Persian Gulf are the key expressions to date of this drive. The Iranians have, however, been quite restrained in Afghanistan. --Participation in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM): Iran has been searching for a new international framework to substit te for the Shah's close ties to the West. The N d presents some possibilities, but in general Iran will remain a lone wolf. --Recognition of Iran's geopolitical realities: Inevitable tensions exist between this element and the Islamic one.- Those tensions have been particularly evident in the Persian Gulf: the "realists" of the Foreign Ministry want normal relations, but the clerics want to export the revolution. One result has been insecurity in the region as the Gulf regimes attempt to assess what Iran will do. Those states are convening a security conference (without Iran) in November. Another result has been a more assertive attitude among the minority Shi'a communities in the Gulf. The Econom : Iran is faced with strong inflationary of 2-3 million (20 percent of the work pressures, unem:lqyment force), and a decline in real GNP of 20 percent. Yet, the Iranian economy is functioning and even shows some tentative (if DerhaPs orilv,tem~orarv)sisns of improvement. Banks are functioning, seGera1-majo; joint ventures are operating. oil continues to ~rovide$60-570 million per dav in revenues, and wheat, and rice harvests-appea; satisfactory. the importantThe longer-term outlook, however, remains less encouraging. There is nothi g on the economic horizon to replace oil as a vehicle for gro th when crude production begins to decline gradually early in the 1980s. Furthermore, the Bazargan government has inherited an economy afflicted with a twin curse: a legacy of unrealistic prestige programs initiated during the oil boom, and the near anarchy Wreaked by the revolution itself.

    l!

    CONFIDENTIAL
    139

    CONFIDENTIAL
    - 4 I

    There could be a silver lining: the revolution affords planners a rare chance to wipe the slate clean, strip away past excesses, and rationalize the economy. The present political climate is not, however, conducive to this development. Moreover, uncertainty about the future is causing an exodus of those whose skills and talents are crucial to any economic recovery in Iran. The initial hope that accompanied Khomeini's arrival is being replaced by disillusionment as expectations remain unfulfilled. The removal of National Iranian'Oil chief Aasrsn Nazih not only casts doubt on the ability of the petroleum organization to function effectively but also will be seen by the modern technocrats and professionals as an attack on then. The Soviet View of Iran Moscow welcomed the creation of the new Iranian regime in February and set out to encourage the new regime's antiWestern policies, to help prevent the repression of pro-Swiet groups, and to protect the USSR's economic interests. Since , then, the Soviets have been pleased with Iran's continuing anti-Western orientation but perturbed over their inability to improve economic and political relations with the Ithomeink regime. The Soviet Ambassador has had two unpleasant encounters with Khomeini, and Khomeini has indirectly accused the USSR of involvement in the Kurdish conflict. Moscow's options in dealing with Iran are limited. A. long as there is no group that can effectively challenge Khomeini's rule, the USSR will continue to try for good relations with Iran's present leaders, even though it wants a more secular, pro-Soviet government eventually to emerge. To this end, Moscow has encouraged Iran's "progressive element*" (the ethnic minorities, the left a ; the recular d moderates) to unite and "build for tomorrow. Direct Soviet support for the "progressives', however, will probably remain cautious and circumspect. The Soviets are well aware that their relations with Tehran will be damaged if their efforts are detected. They must also know that support for subversive actions increases regional suspicion of Soviet intentipns and risks producing a counteraction by other regional states.

    I I

    CONFIDENTIAL
    140

    The Soviets are perhaps most immediately concerned with bilateral economic probl-ems. The Chairman of the USSR State Committee for Economic Relations conferred with Iranian officials twice last summer in an apparently unsuccessful effort to persuade Iran to comply with various contractual colPmitmants to the USSR including natural gas deliveries. The reduced gas deliveries and Tehran's decision not to construct the export segment of a second natural gas pipeline to the ~ S S R are particularly aggravating to the Soviets. Moscow's frustration over the lack of progress in SovietIranian bilateral relations has been evident in recent Soviet press commentary. The Soviets have used selective quotations from remarks by Iranian officials as a basis for increasingly open criticism of the Iranian leadership, particularly Bazargan's provisional government. The Soviet press has generally stopped short of direct critikism of Khomeini, but kt has conveyed it$ displeasure with some of his policies and statements. The Soviet media have openly defended the Iranian Tudeh Party and the ethnic minorities. However, the media have also emphasized the necessity for those groups to operate within a framework of national unity. This cautious line suggests Moscow does not want to antagonize Khomeini further Dr unnecessarily increase the Tudeh Party's already exposed position.

    CONFIDENTIAL
    la1

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    1. REF MSG hE3UFSTEI AFMIcS-YAA9 V I F d S . ZCOSCIYATFI k I T F iMBPSSY AEi? P F F F h S S ATTAChE O F F I C S iDAO'. C V POSSIBLE . CCNSCLIrATIOY O TAO AND SFCU?IT" ASSISPAY3Z t ' A V A 2 F W J ~ 2 E 2. ALTHCUGH I T I S RECCGhIZFC TnhRF Y9Y > F SOY] TO CONSOLIPATION OF SYALL OR3AhIZATIOiS k d E Q i SOME IPPLICATIVE MAk'PCLTR SPACES MIGHT 3 ) SAVEr. ?B:CMMFFr TPE hFb OrC I h IRAK. FORYED Oh 1 OC" 7 P , hOT 33 C O h S I ? ? r S r a CANLILPTF K C'lKSOLIDA?ION AT T-:IS TIME. fY6 l O L I C J I ; ' 1 C H DEASONS AQP OFFEREC OR COYSICER4TIOh: '

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    A. AS A hESbLT CF T F F 4EB 7 9 3FBOLJTICh I & ' IAEY, T' U SECURITY ASSISTAYCT DR3SEPN IY IRAN. THi L4.23'31 l'S1 TRCGRAM OF I T S "INT IN L F I S 3 U C F PRICR TC THE RTVCLLTICY, HAS BEEN UVDFR;OING DRASTIC CHAY;ES. BECPrSF C"TP?SL CHANGES IN RFSPfil'CTO"Ih'3 A V T THX S I G k I F I , ^ 4 \ I T PCTEh"1 IYPACTS CPOh TPE ENTIRF US: FYS PRO:RAY, I T I S EIFt'ICCZT, I F HCT IMPCSSIPLFp 5C TOR7AST YAFPF E NEd IRANIAN PiiOGRAY YAY IEAC. FPESEkTLY YANY OF THE INDIVIDUfL r ' E S I L 3 4 L PROGRAMS S T I L EEING CLOSED OUT. SUCH AS PEACE ZEBRA. A3E LAlGEH TEAU F T I F E PFCGFAY' CF CTHES COUNTFIES. ATCITICNALLY, THFRZ H YE BEEN INDICATIONS FROY THE F;OI TriAT TdEF b I L L WAN? SUPPLY SUPPORT PTCGRAVE REIVITIATZC IY THP FUTU3E. AS A RESULT OF TIiFIR FOiiCE STRUCTUPE ANl' PRSVIOUS USG FUBNISHED EC.ITIF't'ENT ALRFADY PURCilhSFD, I T J3ULD BE FEASONABLF AT TfiIS TIME TO ESTIY4TE A PROSRAY TO SDPFOET THESE US PROVIDEC SYSTEPS WOULD BE EXTENSIVE. F. CUE TO TZH UYCFRTAINTFS SURROUNLING TAF RFSTRUSTUPIhG ACTIOhS O THE PPESZNT IRhYIAN FMS FR03EAr ANT THF S I Z P OF N THE PRCJECTEC PROGRAM. AS STATFr IN ?A AZOV?, A CC'uSCIITAT ED OROANIZATION, REPUCED IN S I Z E . WOULD PR034ZLY a7 UMAaLE TO HANCLE TPE N W SECURITY ASSIST4NCE FUNCTIONS WdI:P PAY E b E LEVIED. THEREFOR!?. TATIYG ACTIOh TO COlSOLICATF ?PIOR TO A NEJLY DEFINIT-IZED PROGRAP WOULD P F PRHNAIURE.

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    T n E LOCJL N A T I C F E I P C S I T I O h S PCSSIBLY O h 3 D 9 I V F 9 COt'LL R P PLIhINATED AND THY ODC FSN CLERT P O S I T O N ELIYILAIE:. ONE CTHER P O S S I B I E PCSITION V S I S H Y I S F T 9F F L I Y I N B T F r I S Y E ODC GS-7 ATYIN CO-ORDINAmOR. WIT8 THY W-C C O O i C I V A T 0 9 I h THE CAO, T 3 I S VICYT BE UNNECESSAFY DYPLICAIION. KOIEVTR, 5TCAUSE OF RPASONS S P E C I F I F r E A Q L I E 9 IN 2 4 % N r 3, AGAIN W E C4NNOT PREDICT TBE k O R ( L 0 I D IN SECURITY ASSISTAECF. Ah? I T ~cvLrTUEREFORE S T I I L A ~ P E A RIMPSUEEVT rc RECUCE ~ I. H O U T T. - . ANY FACTUAL W09iIOAD DATA RE3UIREMENTS.
    1. TEE YOST APPARENT PROBLEM YE ANTICIPATF. I S THE REICTIOh OF TXX F C O I . ALTHOUCP WF ARE YOVIY3 SLOWLY I N ? R E S A RFSTRIlCTU9ING EFFOBT. d E APPEAR TO RE UA(Ik: P R 3 C a l S S . W E HAVE ACCCYPLIS?Er T H I S BECAUSE OF TAE APPAEFYT TRUST CUR LOGISTIJS PERSChNEL FAVE FSTABLISHED #IT!! T F E I R CO3YTERPARTS. T E I S TRUST MIGHT BF S E R I 9 U S L T J E O P A R D I I E E I F TSE FCOI PERCEIVED CUR OPC PEOPLE 4S BTING PART CF TfiB DAC. OUR C I S S I O N / P U R P O S S I S D I S S I M I L A R IY TfiAT L4E ODC I S T b S i E P TO A S S I S T THE HCST COUNTRY I S d TYPE SUPPORT. WHEHFAS l'AC N EERSCNNEL OBVIOUSLY ART RECOGLIZEO AS COLLECTORS O F OVERT INTELLIGENCE I.NFORCATI3Y. AS AN EZAPPLE. PRESENTLY OUa ODC PECPLE CAN MAKE V I S I T S WITH THEIR CCUNTERPARTS AS A PAR1 O F NOitCtAL OPERATI3NS. WITHCUT ANY PROTCCGL REgUIREMYhT ON THE OTHER AAkC, DAO I S PRESEhTLY RXSTRICTED TC % O I h 5 THROUGH J O I N T S T b P F PROTOCOL BEFORE MEETIN3 Y I 1 R CEMBERS OF THE P G O I . 3. IN CONCLUSION, REC3CMENr THAT TIlE NEW O r C 3RGANIZAPION I h IRAN NOT BE CONSOLIDATED WITA D I O . T E E SAVINSS I h PFRSCNNEL ANC FUNrING YCUIC BE MINIMAL. AN1 THE PCTENTIAI i C 9 ,LOST GROUND IN SECURITY ASSISTAECE/OPC Y I S S I O N ACCOYFIISHMENT WOULC BE UNNECESSARILY INZRl'ASPC.
    4.

    CAARGE CONCURS.

    BT

    RULYCSA T COYCARGSU S I X REEPERA T USS JOSEPU STRAUSS R 1700122 3CT 7 9 F DIA WASHINSTON DC//JSI-?// M TO DIACURINTEL AIG 7 0 1 1 A ~ G 7933 RUVAAAA/AFLC ~ P A F B OE RUFLEY.k/NAF SIGONELLA I T / / I N RUEBDSA/DFSC CAMERON STATION VA//FOSC//BG
    RT -

    C O t i F I D F N T I A L 5934 DIADIN 283-3A (AS OF: 1453 EDT 16 OCP 79) DIA DEFENSE INTELLISENCE NOTICE ( D I N ) (U) SUBJ:
    I

    SFAMON

    IRAN: WOVE TOWARD THEOSRACY. (U) I 1. ( C ) THE ASSEflBLY OF EXPERTS DO!lIN&PED BY MUSLI5 R E L l C I O b S LEADERS WHOSE MANDATE I S TO REVIEW TET DRAFT CONSTITUTION BAS BEEN GRANTED AN EXTEYSIO* O F TIflR BECAUSE I T I S MAZING S U B S T A N T I V ~ CFANGES TO THE CONSTITUTION. MOST OF TEESE CHANGES BAVE BPEN

    PAGE 2 HUEZJCS 4381 C 0 N 5 I D E N T I A L DZSIGNED TO CONCENTRATE ALL POWER IN IRAN I THE HANDS OF S B I I T E N LEADERS. THE LATEST CONSTITLJTIONAL CLAUSE ESTABLISEES TEE POSITION OF A SUPREKE R 2 L I G I 3 C S LEADFR, WHICH WILL B t ASSOiIED BY TEE ONE I F ONE CANNOT BE CHOSEN, TEE MOST RESPECTED BY H I S COLLEASUES. THE SUPREME LEADER OFFICB WILL BE HELD BY A COUNCIL OF HOLY YEN. WOULD BE COMMANDEI I C F I E F OF TEE ARMED FORCES, WOULD HAVE POWER N N TO DECLARE JAR I CO#SULTATION # I T 0 F MILITARY COUNCIL (YHICE HE APPOINTS), AND WOULD BE AGTAORIZED TO REHOVT THE ELECTED PRESIO DENT. FOLLOWING THE PASSAGS OF T E I S CLAUSE, THE ASSEMBLY I S N W DEBATING THE SELECTION PROCESS FOR THF PRESIDENT, YilOSE AUTEORITY, I VIEW OF TFE NEW CLAUSE, 6OULD BE PUESTIONABLE. T H I S BODY I S N REPORTEDLY CONSIDERING TBRET OPTIONS. q E COULD BE APPOINTED BY THE PARAMOUNT RELIGIOUS PERSON, ELFCPED WITE TKE LAFFER'S APPROVAL, OR CHOSEN FROM A L I S T OF CANDIDATES CRAWN UP BY TEE LEADER. 2. ( C ) I T I S CLEAR IRAN I S EVOLVING TOdARD A THEOCRATIC STATE IN YEICB THERE WILL BE LITTLE ROOM FOR DISSENTING VIEWS. ALTHOUGH TAE CONSTITUTION MUST BE PASSED BY A POPULAR REFERENDUM, I T I S EXPECTED TO BE APPROVPD BY A L A W F MARGIN. IN S P I T E OF 'INCREASINGLY VOCAL OPPOSITION BY TEE L E F T I S T S AND YODERATE SECULARISTS, TEE N DEEPLY DPVOJP LOkXR CLASSES APPARENTLY R#MAIN STFADFAST I THEIR

    SUPPORT FOR KHONEINI AND WILL VERY LIKELY CONSIDER SUPPORT OF THE CONSTITUTION THEIR RELIGIOUS DUTY. I T WILL NO LONGE9 BE NECESSARY mL AYATOLLAH KHOMEINI TO RUN FOR TEE PRESIDENCY, OR FOR ANYONE ELSE FOB THAT MATTER. THE LATPST C L b U S t WILL LEOITIMIZE THE U N O r l I C f A L POSITION.HELD BY KEOMEINI AND WILL REDUCE TEE PRESIDENT TO A WERE FIGURXHEAD. P R E P j S D BY% LCDR D. ADAPIS, USN, J S I - 5 (DECL 16 OCT 85) BT

    wMAN

    RIGHTS PRACTICES
    IRAN -

    S e t ti n s The f i r s t s i x weeke o f 1979 marked t h e f i n a l phase ?of t h e Iranian r e v o l u t i o n . The Shah l e f t t h e country on

    January 16, Ayatollah e o m e i n i returned on February 1, t h e Government of Prime Minister Bakhtiar collapsed on February 11, and a new p r o v i s i o n a l GQvernment under Prime ~ i n i s t e 'Ba2argan:was r installed. For most I r a n i a n s ,

    Ayatollah Khomeini remained t h e p r i n c i p a l p o l i t i c a l f i g u r e

    as s p i r i t u a l guide and l e a d e r of t h e r e v o l u t i o n .

    An

    Islamic Republic was proclaimed following a n a t i o n a l refqrendum on March Sfi d Ie l e c t ewasCouncil I of Experts prrppred a new c o n s t i t u t i o n which t o be I n twe t a l l

    submitted t a referendum p r i o r t o t h e e l e c t i o n of a new a government. Violence againstunarmed crowds by t h e s e c u r i t y f o r c e s of the previous regime t h a t had begun i n e a r l y 1978, and wbich took thousands of l i v e s , continued i n t o 1979. I n addition, beginning i n l a t e 1978, mobs, widely

    btlievell t o have been h i r e d by t h e previous regime, attackefl supporters o f t h e revolution i n s e v e r a l loca-

    tions.

    Thus, Wan the r e v o l u t i o n succeeded, f e e l i n g s of

    -2-

    bitterness and revenge against the leaders and supporters of the Shah's regime were intense. The traditional-security In consequence

    forces and judicial system were discredited.

    power was diffused among a variety of groups which were rarely responsive to the directions of the central government. It was a period of great revolutionary fervor, Revolutionary courts

    political uncertainty and confusion.

    were established on the national and local levels: most administered justice according to their own standards. Rough justice was.'aleio meted out by a variety of revolutionary committees and armed groups

    --

    some of which had

    no legal standing whatsoever; their weapons gave them authority. Throughout this period the formal government

    under Prime M-ijster Bazargan was committed to according full due process, criticized practices of the revolutionary courts, but was-ble 1. to interfere with those practices.

    Respect for the Integrity of the Person,


    Including Freedom From:

    a.

    Torture.

    We are aware of no reports of torture by any government agency or by the national system of revolutionary courts. There were two or three reports of harsh t r e a t - c n t S y revolutionary groups in the provinces. In general, those

    persons accused of crimes by the revolutionary courts seem

    to have been fairly treated in the circumstances of a chaotic prison system. Authoritative Government and clerical leaders have stated on various occasions their condemnation of torture which is specifically prohibited in the new draft constitution. b . Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. More t a < e u i n h@xctos
    .p,oh~b'.

    '-5~-

    by firing squads, often carried


    *

    out in the midst of night, took the lives of political and


    s,Jdb c ~ , ~ u.h e d

    h.b.3~ e-b.b**da

    military figures a i e t f ie0 with the previous Governmentfi 'dhi counter-revolutionaries accused of plotting to overthrow the new Government and persons accused of violating Islamic ethical norms (prostitutes,homosexuals, drug sellers). The Government argued that the public rage against such persons was so intense that if some had not been speedily / tried and executed by the revolutionary courts, crowds would have taken justice into their own hands causing a far higher death toll. There is no way to prove or disprove this assertion. The number of executions of persons from the previous regime declined/subs=>
    1

    , July 11 by Ayatollah Khomeini for all pprsons except n those directly involved with murder or orders to kill.

    'kolloxing anRamnesty declared !

    ?FIRVCL

    or Oph,*
    I'

    ddni
    ca0k

    into the fall months.

    The working of revolutionary

    courts caused widespread fear and resulted i 5 the 1 flight from Iran of thousands of citizens who believed they could be victims of an unfair system. c. .Arbitrary Arrest or Imprisonment.

    Arrest and imprisonment by revolutionary groups--with or without Government sanction--remained an e v e r present threat 'through 1979; the incidence of such arrests declined in the second half Of the year. longed imprisonment without charge was frequent. ProMany

    prisoners arrested in spring on suspicion of polrtical crimes were released beginning in July. the Government stated there were In October political We

    prisoners held in jails throughout the country. believe.. d.

    ...
    Denial of Fair Public Trial.

    Although supporters of the new Government have stated that the revolutionary trials were conducted fairly and-with due process, we cannot agree. Most of the trials

    were carried out in secret in a very short time and without right of appeal. Most accused persons we know of were

    not afforded the right of defense counsel or time to prepare evidence in their behalf. The summary nature of the

    -5-

    trials by revolutionary courts was strongly criticized s.ne byaeaders of the Iranian Government, as well as Iranian and international human rights groups. The guilt or innocence of persons condemned by these courts will never be known. e. Invasion of the Home.

    The search by revolutionary groups for figures from


    the previous regime led to frequent invasions of the privacy of homes. Our impression is that these incidents

    were significaritly reduced in the second half of the.year. as Government police forces began to reassert over revolutionary groups.
    2.

    Governmental Policies Relating to the Fulfillment of Such Vital Needs as Food, Shelter, health d r e and Education.

    The new government clearly considers among its highest priorities the improvement in the standard of life of the average Iranian citizen, especially the pscrrr classes. The Government 1s cowlt:~CI to the

    revitalization of agriculture, the extension of educational opportunities and the prcvislon ef improved
    housiiio and health care.

    Bur beraose of the revolutionar:

    turmoi1,'only limited steps could be taken during the

    year to implement these policies.

    One beginning was


    / l

    the work of the Reconstruction Crusade which sent yo ?g


    % .

    Xranians into the countryside and poorer neighborhoods to build schools and other public buildings and perform previously-neglected public services. Slowness in

    u" t ;
    $'

    economic recovery made the reduction in unemployment levels a key government concern. Some progress was made

    in stimulating economic activity during the summer and fall.


    3.
    '

    ~espectfor Civil and Political Liberties, Including : a. Freedom of Speech, Press, Religion, and Assembly.

    It is clear that freedom of speech, the press and


    assembly were significantly strengthened with the advent
    /

    of the new government.

    That situation continued generally

    until August when the Government felt threatened by the Kurdish challenge to central a from left and center groups. and,rnagazines were closed and
    I

    ticism wspapers

    1 8

    foreign

    correspondents were expelled.

    A new xequirenent for


    h press

    licenses for demonstrations was established.

    law promulgated in August established penalties f ~ r criticism of political and religious leaders and was harshly criticized by Iranian journalists as excessively

    restrictive. The arrest of several prominent critics was ordered and they remain in hiding. Nevertheless, throughout 1979 and even including the post-August period of restrictions and intimidatio~ Iranians enjoyed a greater opportunity to express their political views than at any time in the past 25 years.

    The press has freely reported events, pursued officials

    /with sharp questioning and criticized Government policies l n political eaders. Although opposition leaders and ad editors justifiably feel that the freedom they had in the first half of the year has been abridged, their ability to speak out is still less restricted than under the previous government. By December 1,

    6 previously

    banned papers had been allowed to resume publication. Religious minorities experienced periods of great anxiety about their well being during the year. With the execution of the prominent Jewish leader Habib Elghanian and harsh attacks on Israel and Zionism, Iranian Jews felt seriously threatened. Similarly, when a mob attacked a Baha'i shrine and the Government members confiscate3 property of the Baha'i corr~unity, of that faith felt similarly threttened. The new draft constitution continues the provision in the previous constitution which recognizes the Jews, Chriatians

    Zoroastrians, b u t n o t t h e Baha'is a s r e l i g i o u s m i n o r i t i e s .
    The Government s t a t e d r e p e a t e d l y t h a t r e l i g i o u s m i n o r i t i e s

    would n o t be p e r s e c u t e d , t h e i r r i g h t s would be p r o t e c t e d and t h a t o n l y t h o s e p e r s o n s charged w i t h s p e c i f i c o f f e n s e s

    w i l l be a r r e s t e d and t r i e d .

    There i s no e v i d e n c e o f

    p e r s e c u t i o n by t h e Government, b u t t h e a b s e n c e of e f f e c tiv-rnment

    I\

    c o n t r o l h a s sometimes allowed v i g i l a n t e the

    groups t o t a k e a c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e m i n o r i t i e s , e.g. a t t a c k on a B a h p ' i s h r i n e i n S h i r a z . b.

    Freedom o f Movement Within t h e C o u n t r y , F o r e i g n T r a v e l and E m i g r a t i o n .

    There a r e no o f f i c i a l r e s t r i c t i o n s on movement w i t h i n the country. I n t h e f i r s t month f o l l o w i n g t h e - r e v o l u t i o n , Subsequently,

    t h e d e p a r t u r e o f a d u l t m a l e s was p r o h i b i t e d .

    t h e r i g h t of I r a n i a n s t o l e a v e t h e c o u n t r y h a s g e n e r a l l y n o t been a b r i d g e d e x c e p t f o r a group of p e r s o n s who a r e wanted i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h p o l i t i c a l and c r i m i n a l i n v e s t i g a t i o n s , and some o f t h e i r r e l a t i v e s . The number of

    p e r s o n s b a r r e d from l e a v i n g t h e c o u n t r y from March t o October i s n o t known b u t i s b e l i e v e d t o t o t a l around 10,000; t h e 1 s t was reduced I n n ~ r b e rI n October.

    ./-_ -

    c.

    Freedom t o Participate I n t h e P o l l t l c a l P r o c e s s .

    -_ ----

    P a r t i c i p a t i o n i n t h e r e f e r e n e a and e l e c t l o s s helC I n I r a n s i n c e t h e r e v o l u t i o n h a s been f r e e l y p e r m i t t e d . However,

    -9-

    a full range of alternatives in the referenda were not available and there was not time in the elections for well-developed campaigns or for the organizations of effective political parties. The voting power has been On occasion,

    a mixture of secret and open balloting.

    groups identified with pro or anti-Government groups have intimidated candidates or sought to disrupt the electoral process. These disruptions were, in part, a consequence of ineffective government police powers, in part a result of individual zeal by revolutionary authorities. The regime has offered greater autonomy to the provinces and to the ethnic minorities than they were permitted under the previous government. The government

    proposed autonomy including locally-elected councils


    (

    elections were held in October) and the use

    of local languages with Persian in the schools, media, and assemblies. These offers have been rejected by some Kurdish, Arab, an8 Baluchi leadere whose demands have not been made clear in detail. The demands of some'leaders may include indepen8ence from Iranian central government control

    --

    unacceptable to any

    authority in Tehran. Negotiations between the government and dissident ethnic groups continued sporadically most of the year.

    The Kurdish revolt and disturbances caused by other ethnic leaders was often met by a sharp, forceful response by the Iranian army and revolutionary guards. Excesses

    of violence have been committed by both the'regime's forces and rebel groups, as well as by terrorist groups opposed to the government.
    4.

    Government Attitude and Record Regarding International and Ron-governmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human ~i~hls:

    he Iranian Government has been severely criticized on human rights grounds by many international and nongovernment human rights groups. Representatives of

    these groups have been invited to Iran and some have made visits and inspections. The Government has criticized

    these groups and the international press for presenting a distorted and unfair picture of conditions in Iran. Although the Government excluded most of the foreign press, it made an effort to maintain a dialogue with human rights groups.

    Drafted: NEA/IRN:HPrecht:amp 10/18/79 - ext:20313

    I
    1

    AmEmbassy London INCOMING TELEGRAM

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    FOR G L A S P I E GDS 1 6 1 1 9 / 8 5 E.0.12065: TAGS: IF! SUBJECT: (C) UPDATE ON IRAN

    ENTIRE TEXT).

    -.

    2.

    PLEASE P A S S TO HENRY PRECUT FR3M HOPPER.

    3. ALL I I E 3 S IN YOUR T A L K I h G POINTS PAPS? WERE USED, IN ADDITION TO I N R ' S ASSESSAEhT.


    4.

    UNIVERSAL AGFEEi'lENT BUT. SOME HESITANCE TO MAKE FIRST HIGH-LEVEL CDNTACT

    5. MODEFATE E X I L E S SEEN A S HOPELESS AT X S T , DANGEROUS CONFORT WAS EXPRESSED THRT PEESENT CLERICAL AT WOPST. REGIXE I S SO CLEARLY NOT ASSOCIATED WITH WEST THAT AT LEAST W E NEED NOT a E SLANED FOR I T S HUMAN RIGHTS F A I L I N G S . PX)REOVER, I T S PECULIAR NATIONAL AND P E L I G I O U S CHARACTER MEANI S A TEMPORARY BARRIER T O CONMUHIST ADVANCES. WHILE I T S NON-M~TEPIAL CAST MAKES IRAN UNLIKELY PQOLIFERATIOt! CANDIDATE FOP MEDIUM TERN. FINALLY, I T I S AN INTROVERTED PEVOLUTION. 5. MOST FELT SOVIETS WERE LAYING BACX WAITING FOR EVENTUAL S C I A L PEVOLUTION. TOTAL AGREEMENT THAT WE SHOULP L O U FOR SIEPS TO INCREASE R E G I M E S C O N F I D E N C E ~h J E S T , A N D E N A L L Y mPORTANT SEEK CPLN, GRADUATLD S T E P S TO 3 0 L S T E P NEIGHSORING MODERATE STATES.
    F P E N C H A N D G E R M A N M I N I S T E R SHAD F R I E N D L Y MEETINGS W I T H 7. YAZDI I N NEW YORK. THE FOHKEP I h SCHLDULED BILATERAL, T H E LATTEP I N UNPLANNED CONTACT AT IECLPTION. 6 0 T H , HOWEVEP, U V E L I S T S OF BILATEPPL I S S U E S ON WHICH THEY NEED COkCRETE PESULTS BEFOPE THEY WOULD CONSIDEF HIGH-LEVEL V I S I S S .
    3.

    OTHERS SAWGPEATER PISK OF LEFT-WING F E A C P I O L W I T H I N SIX TO TWELVE MONTHS.

    Y Y P IDEAS TO LOOK FOP PFACTICAL S T E P S WERE WELCOME FEW Ii'lMiDIATE FESFGhSE5. S S I G TnGuGHT S O T d TURKEY. WHOSE EMSASSY REPOPTEDLY HAS E:TASLISHED GOOD C O N T A C T S , AND I N D I A h S . X I G h T U ~ E F U L L YPLAY-MIDCLL?IAN POL5 WERE I T NOT FOR COtlNTEPVAILIhG PZOILENS. SOME THOUGHT THEY MIGHT ALSO a E USED TO PASS CAJTIONAPY irOFCING TO 9.
    331 FrOVOLE3

    10. ASIDE FPOM I g A N ' S POLE k1TH P-0 WHICH ALSO CAUSED LATTEP SOME PROSLEMS -- T i i I " FOREIGN POLICY I S I O T PPD9LEi'l NOW-FOR WEST. XEY QLtESr!ON 1 s dkZ?aZF( CLERICAL PEGIME CObLD ADD R A ~ I O ? ~ A L a U C T b F f C i E S J E P N GOVEPNNENT ST TO I T S ICEOLOGICPL DASE.
    156

    --

    t1. EE-9 A T T E R P T I N G . I h D I V I G U 4 L L Y AND C O L L E C T l V E L Y WAINI N F A C T C O ? I ~ U S I T Y c o h 5 ~ c i E t ~OPEUL o tii~ T I A 7 I O N S It1 A U G 3 S f . S I L L T E i A L T R A i i C C N T l N U i S A N D USE 3 F GOVERNPENT G U A R A N T E E S C H E R E S h R S &EN L i S S T H A N F E A R E J .

    T A I N PLLATIONS.

    12. LOCAL CONTACTS B Y Z X B A S S I E S Y ~ U PIDEA OF C L O S Z ~ C O N S U L T A T I O t 4 , I N T E P P A N AND E L S E r Y i ? i , W E L C O X E J . ANOWLEDGE G A P E X I S T i D F E G A P D I N G P 4 i S E N T P F A C T I C E S . G L I T m A N

    nus

    LIFII'I'ED OFFICIAL USE


    EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

    Tehran, Iran October 25, 1979 MEMORANDUM TO: FROM: The Files L. Bruce Laingen - Charge dfAffaires, a.i.

    SUBJECT: Comments by the French Ambassador Raoul Delaye

    I made a courtesy call on the #rench Ambassador today. He has been here two years. I would not describe him as enthusiastic about the present situation in Tehran.
    He has seen Khomeini three times; two times were substantive. He describes him as friendly but not warm towards France. He seems convinced that Khomeini will inevitably fail and that the immediate gain will be by the left. The Iranian Revolution is unvopular in France. No clerical revolution could possibly have strength with the French public. The presence of Bakhtiar in Paris in itself does not seem to have caused the French much problems with Khomeini; at least not yet, said the Ambassador. Yazdi did not refer to Bakhtiar during his bilateral with the French Foreign Minister in New York. The French community'numbers about a thousand in Iran. That number may grow slightly following an agreement to resume construction on a conventional power plant in the Tabriz area, an agreement reached t w o or three days ago.

    LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

    VZCZC -537 RR RUEEIA DE RUQMHR # I 3 7 6 3 0 1 1 3 5 8 ZNY CCCCC ZZH R 2 8 1 3 4 2 2 OCT 79 m AMEHBASST TEHRAN TO USICA WASHDC

    BT

    C O N F I D E N T I A L

    LIMITED OFFICIAL USE TEHRAN 11376 USICA

    E.O. 1 2 0 6 5 : N/A SUBJ: USICA IRAN'S

    PROGRAN NEEDS:

    TURN ON THE SPIGOT

    N 1. I THE AFTERMATH OF THE REVOfiUTION, THE POST FOUND I T NECBSSART TO CURTAIL I T S STAFF AND ACTIVITIES AND THEREFORE REQUESTED THAT AGENCT PROGRAM SUPPORT SERVICES BE REDUCED O SUSPENDED. R
    N O E CLIMATF I IRAN HAS N W SUFFICIENTLY STABLIZED MI? RENEWED PROGRAM ACTIVITY. THE BINATIONAL IN TEHRAN, FOR EXAMPLE, HAS INITIATED A FEATURE ERIES AND TWO PERSIAN PLATS ARE CURRBNTLT BOOKED IN TEE IAS THEATRE. TEE IAS I S ALSO EXHIBITING A PERSIAN ARTIST AND THE ART WORK OF PERSIAN CHILDREN. A PIANO CONCERT I S SCHEDULTED FOR NOVEMBER AND SOME 3 , 5 0 0 STUDENTS ARE ENROLLED I ENGtISH CLASSES. THE LIBRART I S ATTRACTING N ABOUT 158 USERS AND FIELDING 28-36 REQUESTS FOR INFORMATION A DAT. THE STUDENT COUNSELING SERVICE HAS DIPFICULTY COPING WITH DEMAND. THE BINATIONAL CENTERS IN ISPHAHAN AND SHIRAZ ARE ALSO ACTIVE. THE NLBRIGHT COMMISSION IS'ONCE AGAIN ORGANIZING EXCHANGES ANO THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT HAS RECENTLY COME UP WITH CANDIDATES FOR AGENCT PROGRAMS.

    3. BOTH THE CLIMATE I IRAN AND POST OBJECTIVES LIMIT N SHARPLY, HOWEVER, THE KIND OF PROGRAMMING WHICH I S FEASIBLE. IRANIAN SENSITIVITIES PRECLUDE ALL BUT CLASSIC MUSIC AND N PILM,PLAY, OR DANCB'WHICHHAS ANT OVERT O SEXUAL ASPECT CAN BE USED. SIMILARLY, IRANIAN SENSITIVITIES CURRENTLT MAKE PUBLIC PROMOTION OF SOME U.S. OBJECTIVES COUNTERPRODUCTIVE ( I . E . HUMAN RIGHTS, MIDDLE EAST PEACE BASED O N THE CAMP AVID AGREEMENTS. AMERICAN SECURITT CONCERNS). ON THE OTHER HAND THE POST CAN MAKE EXCELLENT USE OF ANTTHING WHICH S B O V ~U.S. INTEREST I ISLAM. PERSIAN CULTURE, THE N WELFARE OF FAMILT AND CHILDREN, SPIRITUAL VALUES, THIRD WORLD DEVELOPMENT, SELF-DETERMINATION AND TERRITORIAL 3 INTEGRITY OF NATIONS.
    THE POST'S KEY OBJECTIVB NUST OF NECESSITT BE TO REDUCE IRANIANS SUSPICIAN THAT THE U.S. I S SEEKING TO 3' UNDERMINE TEE REVOLUTIONARY REGIME AND I S NOT REALLY ? PREPARED TO COOPERATE WITH IRAN TO RESOLVE ISSUES AND f PROMOTE MUTUAL INTERESTS. THE POST RPCOGNIZES, OF
    $.

    1
    8

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    537

    VZCZC

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    COURSE, THAT T H I S OBJECTIVE I S D I F F I C U L T TO ACRIEVE AND I S THEREFORE TAKING A LONG-TERM VIEW I N PLANNING I T S COMMUNICATION PROGRAM. IRANIANS RECALL PAST O.S. P O L I C I E S AND ACTIONS WHICH ARE NOT REASSURING TO THE OTHER CONTEXTS: A SERVICE ORIENTED LIBRARY WBICH FOCUSES ON IRANIAN BISTORY AND CULTURE. RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY.

    WORLD FILNS AND VTR'S 'WHICH SHOW A M E R I ~ A N INTEREST IN MORAL VALUES, SPIRITUAL EXPERIBNCE, FAMILY AND CHILDREN. PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT. HEALTH. AND SCIENCE A N D TECHNOLOGY SERVING .BASIC HUMAN NEEDS; FEATURE FILMS VHICH APPEAL TO IRANS STARVED FOR ENTERTAINMENT AND INDICATE U.S. INTEREST I N HAVING FRIENDLY RXLATIONS WITH REVOLUTIONARY IRAN.

    ISSUESI

    5. THE POST THEREFORE REQUESTS THAT AGENCY PROGRAM SUPPORT SERVICES AGAIN INCLUDE TEHRAN AS AN ADDRESSEE WEEN ANNOUNCING AVAILABLE MATERIALS AND PARTICIPANTS. OST RECOGNIZES THAT MUCH OF WHAT I S BEING OFFERED STS BY THE AGENCY I S INAPPROPRIATE TO IRAN AT PRE NT, BUT THE POST IS PREPARED TO COPE WITH A LARGE AM0 T OF PAPER I N ORDER'TQ FASTEN ON THOSE FFW OFFERINGS VEICH ARE USEFUL I IRAN TOCAY. THE POST ALSO RXQUZSTS N ,TEAT PDM AND ECA ACTIVELY ENGAGE IN ACQUIRING OR DEVELOPING PROGRAM OFFERINGS WHICE MEET THE NEEED OUTLINED IN PARAGRAPH 4 OF T H I S MESSbGE.

    :;I
    NNNN VZCZC

    6 . THE POST RSQUESTS THAT THF 4GENCY SUSPEND, IN THE CASE OF USICA IRAN. RESTRICTIONS O AGZNCY PROGRAM N SUPPORT SERVICES WHICR PRECLUDE ALERTING POSTS TO OFFERINGS WHICE ARE NOT CENTRAL TO THEIR PROJECT PROPOSALS BECdUSE USICA TEHR4N DOES NOT HAVE ANY PROJEC PROPOSALS ON RECORD. I F THE CLIMATE IN IRAN REMAINS REASONABLY STABLE, THE POST WILL, ROWEVER, PARTICIPATX FULLY IN THE AGENCY'S NEXT PLANNING CYCLE. GRAVES BT

    537

    TEHRAN C E RUQMHR #1405/01 302 ZNY C C C C C Z Z H n 2 9 1 2 2 4 2 O C T 79 FM AMEfiBASSY T E H R A N T O R U E E C / S E C S T A T E VASHDC 4529 I N F O R U E C J C S / S E C D E F WASH DC RUECJCS/JCS WASH DC PIIQMBI /AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 0351 RUQMGU/AMEMBASSY ANqARA 5345 R U E H A C / U S I N T BAGHCAC 0351 RUQMOD/AME?lBASSY DOAA a320 R U S B O D / A M E ~ B A S S Y ISLAMABAD 0396 RUQMRA/AMEMBASSY JICDA 0414 RUSBLK/AMEM B A S S Y T A B U L 0393 RUOMKW/AMEMBASSI SUWAIT 0361 F U D T C / A M Z N S A S S T LONCON a 4 7 4 RUCMAM /LMEMBASSY MANAMA 4319 RUFHMO/A~~EMBASSY MOSCOW 0356 RUQMMT/AMEMBASST MUSCAT 0228 R U F N P S / A M E M B A S S Y PARIS 0426 EUSNAAA/USCINCEUR V A I A I N G E N G E
    om
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    P-7-J

    11405 1 / 2

    **

    TRFTD: POL:JLIMEERTIEM CLTAR: P0L:VLTOHSETH D I S T B : C H A R G E P O L - 2 ECON R ~ ~ C B R O 6N W E B /

    :
    I

    ;C 0 N F I D E # T I A L S E C T I O N 4 1 O F

    TEHRAN 11405

    i TE.O.G S : 12065:T A PIN


    t SUBJECT:
    1. 2.

    C D S 15/29/85 ( T O M S E T H . V.L.) OR-P SA IR M ~ L L I ~ N A R C H FOR ~ N I T Y~ N D YS KHOMEINI TEXT.)

    (C-ENTIRE

    M I L L I O N S O F I R A N I A N S P A R T I C I P A T E D I N O C T O B E R 26 YARCH I N T E H R A L AND T H E PROVINCES T O SHOW S U P P O R T F O R T H E L E A D E R S H I P O F AYATOLLAH K H O M E I N I AND F O R U N I T Y O F IYAY (KHOMEINI) AND OMYAT (NATION). THE MARCH H A C BEEN C A L L E D BY T H E I S L A M I C P E P S B L I C A N P A R T Y ( I R P ) . L E D BY K Y A ~ O L L A HB E H E S H T I . I Y TEHRAN I CROWD E S T I M A T E D A T O V E R O N E N I L L I O N P E O P L E C O N V E R G E D B Y V A P I O U S R O U T E S ON T E A R A N G N I V E B S I T Y WHERE T H E Y L I S T E N E D T O S P E E C H E S , C H A V T E D S L O G A N S , AYC H V L D F E I C A Y P R A Y E R S . MARCH AND F E E T I N G S J E R E O R D E R L Y . I N T E E R A N , CROWD I N C L U C E D MANY WOMEN AND C K I L C R E N AND U N I F O R M E C Y I L I T A R Y raRSONNEL. T H E R E WAS A G E N E R A L B O L I D A Y MOOD, 4 N D H 4 R A S S E D Y A R S H A L L S D I C AN E X C E L L E N T J O R O F K E F P I N Z O R D E R AND G O O D SFIFITS. CROdDS F I L L E D ALL STREETS S[JRROUNDINl TERRhN ' N I V E R S I T Y A S WELL P S U N I V T R S I T Y ;BOUNDS, NBLCH # E R E T O O O I L C ~ T E C C R NANY P T R S O V S T O P R P Y . F
    3.
    I. i

    AT F O a E I 3 N M I N I S T E R ' S S U G G E S T I O N . V I S I T I N G D E P T O P B ICBT, A C C G M P A N I E C 3~ EYBASSY POLOFF A N D WORRIED-LOOKING I * F I C I i L F 3 O M MPA P R O T 3 r O L A T T E N D E D P X A Y E R S AND R I L L Y . C \,ET P A S T GA'E G U A R C S , Q U I C 3 - T I N T I N 3 MFA O F F I C I A L I ' T n O D U C E D U . S . V I S I T O R S LS 'FROY T H E S E I E G A L E Y B C S S Y ~ J T I C ~ P T F L YNO 3 N E I N V O L V E D <NEW MUCH A B O U T S E N E G A L . O N & 1 ,

    ."

    COYFIDENTIAL
    161

    TEHRAN

    11405 1 / 2

    COLFIDENTIAL

    TEHRAN

    11405 1/2

    5. CROWD WAS ADDRESSED BY AYATOLLAH BEHESHTI, SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE IRP, A N C BY MOHAMMAC ALI R A J A ' I , ACTING MINISTER OF EDUCATION. BEBESATI CALLED FOR UNITY FOR ALL SUPORTERS OF THE REVOLUTION AND. REITERATED PHQMEINI'S EARLIER CALL FCR UNITY BETSEEN THE CLERGY AND THE UNIVERS I T I E S . THESE SPEECHES WERE FOLLOWED BY TRE ADDRESS (IEOTBEH) OF AYATOLLAH MONTAZERI, IMAM JOM'EH OF TEHRAN. YONTAZERI APPEARS TO H h l E CONSIDFRABLE POPULARITY AYONG THE ORDINARY IRANIAN, dHO APPRECIATESHIS LACK OP AFFECTATION ANC H I S SIMPLICTY OF SPEECH. HIGHLIGHTS C F MONTAZERI'S ADDRESS INCLUDED:

    A. PEOPLE SHOULC APPSECIATE VALUE OF FREEDOM AND NOT COMPLAIN AT SHORTAGES 3 F SOAP POIDEB AND MEAT. HE COYPARED THESE COMPLAINTS TOaTHC PORANIC STORY OF PEE I S R A E L I T E S ' COMPLAINTS AGAINST MOSES 4FTER HE HAD LED THEY TO FREEDOM.

    2s"

    B. PERSONS IU HIGH P O S I T I O N S . INCLUCING CLERGYMEN, FOLLOW T&E EXAMPLE OF THE PROPHET, AND NOT SURROUND "HEMSELVES WITH SERVANTS AND GUARDS TO DISTANCE THEMSELVES g F 6 0 M TEE PEOPLE.

    k SHOULD

    ";AILED.

    ANTI-REVOLUTIONARY BUREAUCRATS SHOULC NOT BE BUT SHOULD BE QUIETLY RETIRED AND REPLACED,,BY YOUNGER, COMMITTED PEOPLE. MONTAZERI COMPLAINED, AT ]LEAST I N THE OLD EATS FEAR OF THE SAVAK MADE SOYE OFFICIALS :DO SOMETHING FOR THE PEOPLE EVERY N W AND THEN. O NO! THE SAVAK I S GONE. ANC THEY NEVER TEINK OF THE PUBLIC

    C.

    r. F I V E MINUTE ARABIC SPEECH ACVISED ARABS TO LF4VE THE EAST AND WEST AND FOLLOW THE STRAIGHT PATH 3 F ISLAYIC 6. AFTER PRAYERS, CHEERLEADER LED ABOUT TWENTY MINUTES THE ONLY ANTI-AVERICAN OF REVOLUTIqNARY SLOGAM. DEBT3 TO TEE CORRUPT TRIUMJIRATE: CARTER. VERSE WAS. SACAT, AN^ BEGIN." CROWD THEN DISPERSEC I N ORCERLY FASHION.
    7.

    SIMILAR MARCHES AND PRAYERS WERE HELD IN OTHER C I T I E S

    B'I

    #I405
    NNNN CONFIDENTIAL TEHRAN

    11405 1/2

    C O N F I D E N T I A L

    TLXShN 1 1 4 d ~Z i ?

    O F IRAN. I N ESPAHAN, S H E I X H YHALYHALI TOLD THE CROWD THAT GENERAL HUYSER, ACCOnPANIED BY TUO BUALY SERGEANTS, HAD FORCED THE SHAH OUT OF T 9 E COUNTqY. F t l I D d l YRA'E > WHICH HAC BEEN STOPPEC ~d TEAT C I T Y .OR S O W :rms $1 t 3 y ' RESUflED AT YHOflEINI'3 C I R E C T ORDTH UN"ZH THE L F I D E P , H I P OF AYATOLLAH 4AahBBRI. I R A N I A N RADIO AN1) '?ELEVISION ;bVE PROMINENT COVERAGE TO T H E MARCH O F S U P P O R T I N MECCA, CLAIMING THAT I T WAS J O I N L D B Y P A K I S T A N I S , I U V A I T I S . ANC CHACIANS.

    BT
    XI405

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    C 0 N F I D E N T I A L //NODIS//CHE?'lfEE
    U E HUQMHR # I 4 4 5 3Y3 ZNY CCCCC ZZd 0 3MlL4592 OCT 7 9 E M A M E M B A S S YT F H R A N TO S E C S T A T E W A S H D C I M M E D I A T E 4 5 4 1 b 'i' C 0 N P I D E N T I A L ThHRAN 1 1 4 4 5

    TEHRAN 1 1 4 4 5

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    CLASS: CHPCE: APPRV: CRFTD: CLTAR: TISTR:

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    NODIS CCEhOCEh 3.0. 1 ? 0 6 5 : RDS-2 1 0 / 3 0 / 9 3 ,TAGS: PFPH, I H , US THF SHAH IN U.S. SUBJAC?: (LAINGEN, L.B.) OR-M

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    STATE 282888 (c-ENTIRE T ~ X T . )

    AT NO TIME HAVE W GIVEN P C 0 1 ANY SUGGESTI3N THAT E 12. "USG SHOULD HONOH OH RAE ACCEDEC TO REQUEST PHYSICALLY $ T O EXAMINE THE SPAii. dHEN I SAW YbZDI AT ALGERIAN ? N A T I O N A L D A Y R E C E P T I O N OCTOBER 28, I TOLD H I M THEN THAT WE Iihl! NOT AGREED TO FORWARI: T H I S REQUEST TO SHAH'S ATTENDING PHYSICIANS. HE RESPONDED BY SAYIN: H E WOIILD H A V F T H O U G H T , G I V E N THE POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE E $,OF THIS ISSUE, THAT W COULD S E T ASIDE WHAT I DESCRIBED :TO Bd THE PEDICAL, PROFESSIONAL, AND ETHICAL STANDARDS THAT HAD PBECLIICED OUR PRESSING THE COCTORS TO AGREP TO A PRYSICBL 2XkHINATION BY IRANIAN DOCTORS.

    5
    f

    3. hfl7 HAVF NOT f i R N MEDICAL BULLETIN O SHAH S I N C E THAT N Of OCTOBER 2 5 (STATE 2 7 3 1 2 9 ) . IibS THERE BEER OVE SINCE? LAINGEN

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    TO S R S T A T E YASELC PRIORITY 4590 BT

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    CLASS: CERGE: APPRV : SRTTD: CLEAR: DISTR:

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    .* --------- '.-.

    L I M ~ T B UOPFICIAL US6 TEHXAN 11523


    FOR UNEEBSECRETART COOPXR FROM CEAR: E.O. 12865:N/A TAGS: 0TXA (COOPER) SUBJ: V I S I T
    1. I WANT TO BEYEV THE S'J3:ESTIGS dE TOUCHED O WBEk ' E N : TALfED I N LATE A 9UST P3AT YOU CONS1319 STOPPIQZ BY IRAN U 3 ON SOMT UPCOlING T R I P IN C < TZPO?3A P i E AREA. ONE S F Q OUR LIBITATION3 BZRE I S TEAT d E ?>.Vr NOT HAD 4 N f POLICT LEVEL VISITORS INLEEC YE ZAVE 'AC NONE S I N C 3 TKE "EVOLUTIOI(. TPI1 T I Y E 3 9 5 XOT AI.:AY3 BEEN :OGC, BUT ON $THE YHOLE I T I S EETTE3 NOr' A N h i 'JOT:T.?.JPT"nHF - I n L - - - - - - - ----. ~ ~ A C E ESUPPORT I N OUR EFFORTC: T O F N H A N C E OIJR CRECENTIALS D g WITH THE NHV IR1VEAV LT4DERSAIP TEAT A SENIOR VISITOR COULD BRING TO BEAh.

    ~Z~.TRE PDOI'S OJN POLI,T E I R E C T I O N I N THE ECONOWIC AREA IS STILL IR A GOOD DEAL O F D I S A X B A T , A N D MAT R E M A I N :THAT V11 IOR SOPI% TIYE THE 307EBHYIVT S T I L L BEING P R O T I S I O N U AND TEE' COYSTITUTI3NAL DRAFTIN1 PROCESS NOT YET C O W L 3 3 I . HENCE TYRRF; ARE REAL L I N I T S ON YBAT CAN BE LEaRUllIY PROY f X E I d l N I i V S I D E . BUT riE CAN B ~ N E F I T PXOR d TIUELY REAPFIRYATION 3P OUR RIADINISS T 3 YORC WITH THE P 6 0 I IN A YTITUAL PROCESS OF BUILCING A NEfi RXLATIONSBIP IN THE INP3RTbNT I'CONOY IC/COYMEifCILL/OIL A2EAS.

    3 . YE EAVE I N MIND A FA1 RLY BRIEF S'POPOV'R, DITRING dHICH YOU COULC GET SCXE POLICY PCINTS ACROSS IN C I 9 3 C T

    CGNVEBSITIONS WITH SENIOP PSOI TPPXS. P O j S I R L f SIJYPLr. W Z N T I~ A N r N r o a v h L s a n I v A a A T TBE: R T S I D E N C I I OR T IF: n I9AN ERICAN AN SOCIFTY 3N 1. 3UI S T , INVITATIONAL BASIS.
    4. I F YOU COCPIh'lJF TO TilIN' WFLi OF T:i: ICEA, nlE 'JG 817 MELCOYE KNO#ING SOHETHIN: OF POSSIRLE TIMI'J: 5 3 THAT .I COULD TARE SOME SOUNDIN2S MFH7. LAINZEN

    BT

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    E.0.12065:GDS 1 1 / 4 / 8 5 (KENNEDY, TAGS: kINV, I R OPI&POLITICAL RISK SUBJECT: OPI C REF: A. S T A T E 281949, TEXT) B.

    "-

    I N V E S T M E N T I N S U R A N C E PROGRAM

    1. 2.

    (C-ENTIRE

    SUMMARY A N D C O N C L U S I O N S . E M B A S S Y A P P R E C I A T E S T H E O P P O R T U N ~ T YT O M A K E I T S V I E W S KNOWN A T T H I S E A R L Y S T A G F . WE C O N S I D E R F R E S H I N V E S T Y I N I

    B Y A M E R I C A N C O M P A N I E S T O B E A N I M P O R T A N T F A C T O R I N R E B U I L D I N G OUR R E LATIONCHIPS WITH IRAN. T H E TWO P R O P O S A L S D I S C U S S E D I N REF A ARE J U S T TIIE

    K I N D OF ESTABLISHED,LOW-PROFILE
    I;?

    I N D U S T R I E S OF I N D I S P U T A B L E USEFULNESS WE H O P E T H A T

    i
    i

    W H I C H S H O U L D B E I N T H E V A N G U A R D O F S U C H NEW I N V E S T M E N T .
    /

    T H E S E C O M P A N I E S W I L L P R O C E E D W H E T H E R OR N O T T H E Y A R E I N S U R E D BY O P I C .

    3.

    WE H A V E W Xh & t7

    MISGIVINGS,

    HOWEVER,

    OVER T H E UTILJTY,

    B O T H FROM I H E

    P O I N T OF V I E W OF M E N T S ,9fl&qL?A

    [ H E USG AND O F T H E COMPANIES, AT T H I S T I M E W I T H THE P G O I .

    OF t S P O U S I N G THESE I N V I S T /

    MOREOVER,

    BEFORE INCREASING

    ODIC INSURANCE L I A B I L I T Y ,

    WE S H O U L D H A V E A B E T T E R F E E L T H A N WE H A V E NOW AND P A R T I C U L A R L Y TOWARDS

    FOR P G O I A T T I T U D E 5 T O W A R D S F O R E I G N I N V E S T M E N T , COMPENSATION I N CASES OF N A T I O N A L I Z A T I O N .

    4.

    OUR R E C O M M E N D A T I O N ,

    THEREFORE,

    I S N O T T O RESUME A L I M I T E D PROGRAM END SUMMARY A N D C O N C L U S I O N S .

    AT T H I S TIME,

    U N T I L THE SITUATION CLARIFIES.

    5.

    PROCEDURAL D I F F I C U L T I E S .

    R E G A R D I N G R E F A,

    P A R A 2 1 OUR B E S T I N F O R M A -

    T I O N I S T H A T T H E FORMER C E N T E R F O R T H E A T T R A C T I O N O F P R I V A T E I N V E S T P E N T

    I S DORMANT,
    DISLRE~TLY

    AND DOES N O T E V E N A N S W t R
    T O FIND

    THE

    (ELLPHONE.

    WE A R E T R Y I N G

    OUT M O R E A B O U T ITS

    P R ~ S E N TS T A T U S .

    E
    6.

    WEREI"0

    . : .c/
    F I N D S O M t O N E T O T A L K TO, WE WONDER W H A T V A L U E A N Y A P P R O V A I SO F A R A S WE KNOW, THE C E N T E R W O r L D HOLD. T H E PGOII

    1 G I V E N BY

    DENOJJNCED T H E I N V E S T M E N T G U A R A N T Y A G R E E M E N T S O F 1 9 5 7 A N D - 1 9 7 9 W H I C H C L L A R L Y RESPONDED TO T H E P O L I C Y MANDATES O F T H E tORMER REGIME. WHETHER

    HAS NOT

    THEY R E T A I N ANY S I G N I F I C A N C E W I T H I N THE P O I I C Y AND I N S T I T U T I O N A L UNCERT A I N T I E S OF TODAY'S I R A N I S A N O T H E R Q U E S T 1 N. WE A R E R E A S O N A B L Y C O N F I k L

    DENT T H A T N o C I V I L S E R V A N T w o u L D APPROVE T H E S E PRJi-r(Ts RESUMPTION OF O P I C PROGRAMS) H I S APPROVAL, ON H I S OWN.'

    <AND W I T H THEM THE

    E V E N I F A M I N I S T E R WERE T O G I V E

    T H E R E I S NO A S S U R A N C E O F HOW L O N G H E M I G H T S T A Y I N O F F I C E . A CHANGE I N M I N I S T E R S NEED NOT OF GOVERNMENTAL

    I N MORE N O R M A L A N D S T A B L E GOVERNMENTS,

    E N T A I L A N A L T E R A T I O N O F P O L I C Y OR A F F E C T T H E V A L I D I T Y

    CONFIDENCE FOR THE PGOI.

    4hl
    7.
    P O L I C Y PROBLEMS. WE WOULD H A V E G R E A T E R C O N F I D E N C E I N T ; <E APPROVAL G R A N T E D B Y A MINISTER W E R E W E CONFIDENT THAT

    mM~~~arnnr~Sdfcky,
    AT THE DEGREES

    \T

    REFLECTED SETTLED P G O I P O L I C Y REGARDING FOREIGN INVESTMENT. MOMENT, P O L I C Y I S NOT SETTLED. A NUMBER O F O F F I C I A L S ,

    OF V A R Y I N G

    OF INFLUENCE, INVESTMENT.

    W I L L T E L L YOU T H A T THEY ARE A L L FOR RENEWED F O R E I G N ' C E R T A I N M U L L A H S WOULD SAY T H E S A M E . I S DEEPLY DIVIDED. KHOMEINI'S IHE RELIGIOUS ESTABLISH-

    - ww\\., b,l-:.\%,%, INFLUENCE-'I'N--IRAN ('------ N E E DS N 0

    MENT,

    HOWEVER,

    OUN H O S T I L I T Y TO W E S T E R .

    OR W H I C H F O R E I G N I N V E S T M E N T I S A M O S T V I S I B L Y SYMBOL,

    ~\~\b:v47t'n F C A ~ ~ ~ ~ W . X H & . T J ~ ~ A ~ J ~ S - & ~

    PAGE 3

    8.

    I N T H I S AREA,

    AMBIVALENCE

    S E E M S TO P R E V A I L .

    FOR E X A P P L E ,

    ISLAMIC

    ECONOMIST BANI-SADR,

    S A I D TO B E D E S T I N E D T O P L A Y A H I G H L Y I N F L U E N F I A L GOVERNMENT, T O L D US ( R E F
    ) THAT

    R O L E I N T H E NEW C O N S T I T U T I O N A L FAVORED F O R E I G N INVESTMENT,

    HE

    P R O V I D E D T H A T I T WAS FOR T H E B E N E F I T OF I R A N BANI-SADR DID

    A N D N O T FOR T H E B E N E F I T OF M U L T I N A T I O N A L C O R P O R A T I O N S . N O T A M P L I F Y H I S S T A T RENT. WOULD, FOR EXAMPLE,

    HE DISALLOW R E M I T T N C l S
    I

    OF P R O F I T S TO F O R E I G N I N V E S T O R S . MINISTER, THE ~

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