Innovations in the Study of World Politics

Series Editor
Zeev Maoz, Tel-Aviv University
Advisory Board
Michael Bamett, University ofWisconsin, Madison
Deborah Larson, ueLA
Brett Ashley Leeds, Rice University
Jack Levy, Rutgers University
This series provides a forum for the publication of original theoretical, em
pirical, and conceptual studies that seek to chart new frontiers in the field of
intemational relations. The key emphasis is on innovation and change. Books
in the series will offer insights on and approaches to a broad range of issues
facing the modem world, in an effort to revolutionize how contemporary
world politics are studied, taught, and practiced.
Forgetting Ourselves: Secession and the (Im)possibility ofTerritorial Identity
By Linda S. Bishai
Multiple Paths to Knowledge in International Relations: Methodology in the
Study of Conflict Management and Conflict Resolution
Edited by Zeev Maoz, Alex Mintz, T. Clifton Margan, Glenn Palmer, and
Richard J. Stoll
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Multiple Paths
to Knowledge in
International Relations
Methodology in the
Study of Conflict Management
and Conflict Resolution \
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Edited by Zeev Maoz, Alex Mintz,
T. Clifton Morgan, Glenn Palmer,
and Richard J. Stoll

LEXINGTON BOOK5
Lanham Boulder New York Toronio Oxford
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LEXINGTON BOOKS
Published in the United States of America
by Lexington Books
An imprint of The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc.
4501 Forbes Boulevard, Suite 200, Lanham, Maryland 20706
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To Stuart A. Bremer,
Researcher, mentor, leader, and friend
Copyright 2004 by Lexington Books
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced,
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means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, \
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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Information Available
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Mu1tiple paths to knowledge in intemational relations : methodology in the study of
conflict management and conflict resolution / edited by Zeev Maoz ... [et al.].
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and indexo
ISBN 0-7391-0671-6 (hardcover: alk. paper)-ISBN 0-7391-0672-4 (pbk.: alk. \
e
paper)
l. Intemational relations-Research-Methodology. 2. Conflict management
Research Methodology.
JZ1234 .M85 2004
327.116/072 22 2003065895
Printed in the United States of America
QTM
The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American
National Standard for Information Sciences - Permanence of Paper for Printed Library
Material s, ANSIINISO Z39.48-1992.
Contents
List of Figures
List of Tables
Acknowledgments
1 Conflict Management and Conflict Resolution: A Conceptual
and Methodological Introduction
ZeevMaoz
Part 1: Rational Choice and Game Theoretic Approaches
Introduction
T. Clifton Margan
2 Bargaining and Conflict Management
R. Harrison Wagner
3 Prospects for Conflict Management:
A Game-Theoretic Analysis 73
D. Marc Kilgour
Part 11: Simulation, Experimentation, and
Artificial Intelligence 95
Introduction
....
Alex Mini:
.
4 Detecting United States Mediation Styles in the Middle East,
1979-1998
Philip A. Schrodt
95
99

VIII Contents
5 The Role of Mediation in Conflict Management:
Conditions for Successful Resolution
Jonathan Wilkenfeld, Sarit Kraus, Tara E. Santmire,
Christopher K. Frain
125
6 An Artificial Mediator
Charles S. Taber
153
Part III: Quantitative Approaches
Introduction
Glenn Palmer
187
187
7 Resolving Conflicts: Conditions Favoring Negotiated
Compromise in Militarized Interstate Disputes
Stuart A. Bremer
193
8 Pattems of Conflict Management and Resolution in
Enduring Rivalries
D. Scott Bennett
215
9 Mediation and Intemational Conflict Management:
A Review and Analysis
Jacob Bercovitch and Patrick M. Regan
249
Part IV: Case Study Approaches
Introduction
Zeev Maoz
273
10 The Management and Resolution of Intemational Conflict in
a "Single" Case: American and North Vietnamese Exchanges
during the Vietnam War
Stephen G. Walker
277
11 Crisis Mismanagement or Conflict of Interests?
A Case Study of the Crimean War
Joseph R. Gochal and Jack S. Levy
309
12 Conclusion: Multiple Paths to Knowledge?
Integrating Methodology and Substance in the Study of
Conflict Management and Conflict Resolution
Richard J. Stoll
343
Index 363
About the Contributors 371
List of Figures
3.l.
3.2.
3.3.
3.4.
3.5.
Conceptual Model of Conflict Management
Mid-Level Conflict Model
Preference Rankings Consistent with (PI) and (P3)
Simple Escalation Game
Simple Escalation Game with Incomplete Information
76
78
81
87
89
~
4.l.
4.2.
4.3.
4.4.
4.5.
4.6.
4.7.
4.8.
An Element of a Left-Right-Left Hidden Markov Model
A Left-Right-Left (LRL) Hidden Markov Model
Goldstein Scores: USA to Israel (USA>ISR)
Goldstein Scores: USA to Palestinians (USA>PAL)
Styles in USA>ISR and USA>PAL Data
Frequency of Modal Style, USA>ISR-PAL
Styles in Israel-Palestinian Dyad
Styles in Random Data
103
103
107
107
1I0
111
111
112
7.l. A Simple Model of the Conflict Process 195
8.1. No Conflict Management: Constant Average Hostility
over Time 221
8.2A.
8.2B.
Conflict Managernent, Decreasing Average Hostility
overTime
Conflict Managernent, Decreasing Variance in Hostility
over Time
221
222
32
Zeev Maoz
Miller, Benjamin. 1997. Great powers and regional peacemaking: Pattems in the Mid
die East and beyond. Journal of Strategic Studies 20 (1): 103--42.
Organski, A. F. K., and Jacek Kugler. 1980. The war ledger. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Osgood, Charles E. 1962. An alternative to war or surrender. Urbana, Ill.: University
of Illinois Press.
Pillar, Paul. 1983. Negotiating peace: War termination as a bargaining process.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Ray, James Lee. 1998. The answer, or an answer? Evaluating the democratic peace
proposition. Mershon International Studies Review 42 (Supp. 2): 369-71.
Schelling, Thomas C. 1963. The strategy of conjlict. New Haven, Conn.: Yale Uni
versity Press.
Snyder, Jack. 1991. Myths of empire: Domestic politics and international ambition.
Ithaca, N.Y.: Comell University Press.
Snyder, Glenn H., and Paul Diesing. 1977. Conjlict among nations. Princeton: Prince
ton University Press.
Tammen, Ronald L., Douglas Lemke, Carole AIsharabati, Brian Efrid, Jacek Kugler,
Allan C. Stam III, Mark Andrew Abdollahian, and A. F. K. Organski. 2000. Power
transitions: Strategiesfor the 21st century. New York: Chatham House.
Vertzberger, Yaacov 1. 1990. The world in their minds: Information processing, cog
nition, and perception in foreign policy decisionmaking. Stanford: Stanford Uni
versity Press.
Walt, Stephen. 1996. Revolution and war. Ithaca, N.Y.: Comell University Press.
Wemer, Suzzane. 1999. The precarious nature of peace: Resolving the issues, enforc
ing the settlement, and renegotiating the terrns. American Journal of Political Sci
ence 43 (3): 912-34.
World Politics. 1989. Special Issue on Rational Deterrence Theory 41 (2): January.
--.1989. Ripefor Resolution. New York: Oxford University Press.
Zartman, 1. William. 1997. Introduction: Toward the resolution of intemational con
flicts. In Peacemaking in international conflict: Methods and techniques, ed. 1.
William Zartman and J. Lewis Rasmussen, 3-22.. Washington, D.C.: United States
Institute of Peace Press,.

. F. ::. ::'
Part 1
Rational Choice and
Carne Theoretic Approaches
INTRODUCTION
T. Clifton Morgan
The selections in this section apply game theory to an evaluation of conflict
management and conflict resolution. "Game theory" is a formal, deductive
approach to problems of strategic interaction. Strategic interaction occurs
when two or more actors are each faced with a set of alternative courses of
action, and the choice that each makes over these alternatives affects the wel
fare of all. The goal of the game theorist is to capture the essential features of
the situation through a set of assurnptions, several of which are common
across games, and then to apply the rules offormallogic to these assumptions
to reach conclusions regarding how the actors should behave and what out
comes should be obtained. AH game models must identify, at least implicitly,
the players, the rules of the game (i.e., what choices the actors can make,
when, and with what information), the outcomes associated with every com
bination of possible moves, the players' payoffs for these outcomes, and a so
lution concept (a set ofaxioms specifying the considerations that guide be
havior and the characteristics of the predicted result of the play of the game).
The major advantage of game theory is that it forces us to be very explicit
when stating our assumptions and very rigorous when following the logic
from these assumptions to our conclusions. This logical rigor demands that
game models, like all formal models, be simplifications of the phenomena
they represent. Many scholars find this troubling and criticize game theory on
the grounds that it oversimplifies what intuition suggests are complex phe
nomena. Often, however, following the formallogic shows that our intuitions
are incorrect. Sorne factors we believe should be important determinants of
outcomes prove to be irrelevant, assumptions we believe accurately reflect
':1'1
,
F"
that the players can choose. The models focus on a range of outcomes and are
intended to determine the conditions under which each strategy will lead to
various outcomes and when each will be selected. Next, the game theorist be
gins developing the model by thinking about how to structure the model in a
way that best captures the important features of the process that is to be stud
ied. This involves identifying the players, the moves available to thern, and
the information they have when making a move. Rarely is the game that one
sees in a published work the game with which the researcher started. Devel
III
!iil
T. Clifton Margan 34
the "real" world turn out to be contradictory, and conclusions we believe are
supported by our assumptions prove to be logically invalid. Thus, one com
mon use of game theory is to discipline our thinking and to determine
whether there is a logical basis for our intuitive understanding.
Game models can also provide a theoretical basis for empirically testable
hypotheses. When the models are developed generally (i.e., when they are in
tended to capture a c1ass of problem rather than to represent one particular
case) they lead to very specific hypotheses relating one set of variables to an
other. Independent variables are captured through variations in the structure
of the game-particularly in the preferences of the players. Dependent vari
ables are typically reflected through the outcomes and through the choices
that the players make. Exploring how varying the independent variables in the
model leads to variations in our expectations regarding the actions the play
ers take and in the outcome of the game produces hypotheses that can be
tested empirically. Thus, we have a means for determining whether the model
is a theoretically useful, even if not descriptively accurate, representation of
the phenomena of interest. An interesting exercise is to compare the conclu
sions of the models presented in this section with the results of the empirical
analyses presented in other sections of this book.
The selections in this section were written by R. Harrison Wagner and
Marc Kilgour. The authors were charged with developing game models that
could capture the differences between conflict management and conflict res
olution as strategies for dealing with international conflict. Most would ac
cept that resolving a conflict is better than managing it, but intuition suggests
that managing a conflict that is not ripe for resolution may at least reduce the
costs ofthe conflict until it can be settled. Typically, the starting point for any
game theoretic model is a conjecture, or "guess," about what one thinks the
model will show. In this case, the idea was to develop a model that would
identify the conditions under which it is better to adopt a strategy aimed at
managing a conflict than to adopt a strategy aimed at resolving the conflict.
The first step, of course, is to conceptualize these strategies and to deter
mine how to build a model around these conceptualizations. In both in
stances, conflict management and conflict resolution are treated as strategies
~
lntroduction: Rational Choice and Game Theoretic Approaches 35
oping the game model is a dynamic process in which one explores a number
of alternatives. Often one finds that moves initially believed to be crucial to
understanding affect the conclusions not at all , enabling us to simplify the
model by removing these moves.' On the other hand, the researcher fre
quentIy finds that adding, or changing, an assumption can dramatically in
crease the insight produced by the model at relatively little cost in terms of
complexity.
Next, the researcher must select a solution concept to be used in solving
the game. Solution concepts basically comprise the assumptions one makes
about what characterizes the outcome that should occur as a result of play
ing the game. (This "should occur" is sometimes interpreted as a normative
prescription and sometimes as an empirical prediction.) Perhaps the most ba
sic solution concept is the Nash Equilibrium. Basically, this says that a strat
egy combination (one strategy for each player in the game) will be in equi
Iibrium when each player 's strategy is a best reply to all other players'
strategies in that strategy combination. That is, no player would be made bet
ter off if she unilaterally changed her strategy. This concept can frequentIy
lead to multiple equilibria, many of which can seem strange , intuitively.
Thus, most researchers typically adopt sorne other solution concept which
places additional (or even different) requirements on the outcome to be des
ignated as the solution.
The last step in the process is the application of the solution concept to the
game. This can involve a straightforward solving of a specific garne, but it
generally is a more involved process. More insight can be gained by using the
model to show how variations in key factors influences behavior and out
comes and by showing how changing assumptions leads to different conclu
sions. Many students place far too much emphasis on this stage of the
process. Of course, one wants to solve the game correctIy and one wants to
draw as much insight as possible from the model. Solving the game is often
the most straightforward part of the research, however. The solution might be
tedious and technically complex, but the stages at which the model is being
developed are much more important in determining the insight that will be
produced. It is also important to keep in mind that applying game theory in
one's research is a dynamic process. One rarely writes down a single model,
solves it, and is done. Usually, the solution to one model provides guidance
as to what changes are necessary. It is usually advisable to begin with the sim
plest possible model and to let one's specific dissatisfaction with the results
suggest what complicating factors to add.
While the chapters in this volume present the final iteration in this process,
readers should be able to see how Wagner and Kilgour addressed these issues
and can hopefully gain at least sorne feel for the thinking that led to the final
,
36
.,.....
T. Cliftan Margan
decisions. In addition to viewing each chapter as a specific example of the ap
plication of game theory, two things in particular are worth noting about these
chapters taken together-the differences in their specification of the problem
and the similarity in their conelusions. The most obvious difference between
the papers rests with the representation of the game. Most often, games are
represented in either the strategic (matrix) form or the extensive (game tree)
formo Kilgour utilizes both. Wagner, on the other hand, does not represent his
model graphicalIy at alI. The important point to recognize is that the repre
sentation is not the defining feature of a game. Clearly specified assurnptions,
however represented, and rigorous deductive logic are the keys to game the
oretic analysis. The key differences are in how each conceptualizes the prob
lem (Wagner views it as a bargaining game, Kilgour as an escalation game)
and in what factors each treats as the principal determinants of behavior and
outcomes.
Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of these papers is the extent to which
their conelusions converge. In one sense, this is reassuring. AIthough there
are differences in the models, they have a great deal in common. In particu
lar, they have the foundation that is common to alI game theory and the fact
that the conelusions are so similar is a testament to the power of that core set
of assumptions. Most interestingly, the main conelusion is not what our intu
ition would suggest. An increasing amount of literature assumes that the dis
tinction between conflict management and conflict resolution is an important
one. It is widely accepted that conflict management is in sorne sense easier
than conflict resolution and that many disputes that cannot be resolved can be
managed. This, in fact, was the premise on which this entire project was
based. Both of these papers produce resuIts suggesting that these ideas are not
warranted. The resuIts suggest that, in general, the distinction between con
flict management and conflict resolution is either not useful, in that the re
quirements for successful management are the same as the requirements for
successful resolution, or that efforts to manage conflicts may actualIy make
them more difficult, and costly, to resolve.
This is precisely what game theory does best. If the assumptions upon
which these models are based accurately reflect our intuition regarding the
strategic interaction underIying conflict, then we must accept that the conelu
sions that we thought folIow from these assumptions do not do so. The for
mal exposition of the argument has uncovered a flaw in our logic. On the
other hand, if the models' assumptions do not conform with our intuition, the
precise statement of these assumptions makes it a straightforward task to
identify the discrepancies and to construct new models. If these models pro
duce resuIts that do conform to our prior conjectures, we can telI exactIy
which assumptions are necessary to produce these conelusions. It is important
to rernember, however, that the goal is not to keep searching until one finds
lntroduction: Rational Choice and Game Theoretic Approaches 37
the assumptions that produce the conelusion that one wants. Rather, we
should be guided by empirical evidence. If our theories produce conelusions
we did not expect and ifthese conelusions are supported by the evidence, then
we have truly expanded our understanding.
RESEARCH INTERESTS or THE CONTRIBUTORS
TO THE GAME THEORY SECTION
Harrison Wagner's research interests inelude intemational conflict, intema
tional political economy, the relations between domestic and intemational
politics, and formal theories of foreign policy and intemational politics. In his
most recent research he has used the theory of games to investigate various
problems in the theory of intemational politics, ineluding intemational coop
eration, the balance of power, deterrence, crisis bargaining, the causes of war,
and the use of economic sanctions. His most recent publications inelude:
"The Causes of Peace," in Stopping the Killing: How Civil Wars End, Roy
Licklider, ed. New York: New York University Press, 1993; "What Was Bipo J
larity?" International Organization, vol. 47, no. l (Winter, 1993), 77-106;
"Peace, War, and the Balance of Power," American Political Science Review,
vol. 88, no. 3 (September 1994),593-607; and "Bargaining and War:' Amer
ican Journal 01 Political Science, vol. 44 (July, 2000),469-84.
Marc Kilgour thinks that his research interests are at the intersection of
mathematics and social science. He often applies game theory and decision
theory to problems in fields such as arms control, intemational relations, en
vironmental management, negotiation, and fair division. His publications in
intemational relations inelude Perfect Deterrence (with Frank Zagare, Cam
bridge University Press, 2000) and Game Theory and National Security (with
Steven Brams, Blackwell, 1988).
NOTE
1. Frequently, criticisms of game theory as oversimplifying complex phenomena
miss the mark on exactly this point. Surely intemational conflicts unfold over a se
quence of moves in which each side has many opportunities to change its behavior,
and an accurate description of these events requires a discussion of each of these
moves. Often, however, a very simple game model in which each side is allowed only
one move can provide an explanation for each side's behavior each time it has to
make a decision in a long sequen ce of interactions. This is not to say that the values
of the variables that affect decisions do not change as history unfolds, rather, it is to
say that if the model is useful it will tell us exactly how changes in these variables
lead to changes in decisions.