14 October 2005 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Graduate Degree Programs SUBJECT: MMAS Prospectus 1. Essential Information. a.

Submitted by: Major Elizabeth A. Medina, CA, Section: 6D b. Proposed Topic: Operationalizing the Interagency (IA) Coordination Mechanisms between the State Departments Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) and the Department of Defense (DoD) for Planning and Execution. c. Proposed Research Committee: (1) Chair: Mr. Bob Walz, DJMO, and 684-3979. (2) Second Reader/Consulting Faculty: Dr. Judy Jones, DJMO, and 684-3976. (3) Third Reader: LTC Marcus Fielding (AUS), DJMO, and 684-3906. (4) Fourth Reader: Mr. Mike Czaja, CA/SOF, and 684-3735. d. SGA: Mr. Edwin Kennedy, 6D, CTAC, and 684-3144. e. Focused Program: ASI 6Z f. Problem Statement: In the past decade of post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization in Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq, the US military has conducted operations which include transition to and from Department of State (State) responsibility. Uniquely, for operations in Iraq, the Secretary of Defense created an organization called Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) to be responsible for the occupation of Iraq, replaced after a year by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) which then transferred sovereignty to the Iraqi people. As the military has been called upon to plan, transition and work more frequently with other government agencies, President Bush recognized the need for a deployable civilian diplomatic corps that could institutionalize the US reconstruction and stabilization efforts under State: S/CRS. Despite the responsibility to be given to S/CRS, in post1

conflict environments, and failing or failed states, that have the potential to be hostile environments, the military will continue to provide significant support since we historically have the bulk of the resources required and/or available. g. Proposed Research Question: To reach the level of interoperability required in the Contemporary Operational Environment (COE), can the government operationalize the coordination for planning and execution of reconstruction and stabilization operations between S/CRS and DoD? The term operationalize in this paper will mean to establish doctrine, organization, training, leadership, material, personnal, facilities, planning and execution that will translate strategic goals into tactical action. h h. Qualifications: (1) Education: In 1989, I completed a year of school at the national university of France, the Sorbonne, studying French Civilization. In 1991 I completed a Bachelors of Science in French and Political Science. By 1999, I completed my course work, the first three chapters, and the majority of my research on a thesis regarding Hepatitus C for a Masters in Public Health. I must re-do my research to bring it current before finishing my thesis and earning my MPH. In the meantime, Im pursing this Masters in Military Arts and Sciences in strategy while at Command and General Staff Officers Course (CGSOC). In related schools, Ive attended the Army Force Management Course, completed course work for the Joint Campaign Planners Course, completed Federal Emergency Management Courses on emergency management, and taken courses at Touro University on Emergency and Disaster Management to include terrorism and bio-terrorism. (2) Interagency experience: After college, in 1992, while still a reserve officer, I worked as a civilian for the World Banks Dutch Executive Director, for the Georgetown Cardiology Department and finally from 1994 to 1996 for a United States Agency for International Development (USAID) contract company in international health, focusing on program management and evaluation. I also served as an emergency and disaster management volunteer
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for the American Red Cross. During this time, I hosted tours for multiple Civil Affairs (CA) units that provided an introduction to States crisis action center, USAID, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) representative for Washington DC, and the NonGovernmental Organization (NGO) umbrella organization called InterAction to promote understanding and interoperability. (3) Military experience: In 1984, I enlisted into the Army as a medic. I came home to attend college and was commissioned into the Military Intelligence (MI) branch in 1987. I served as a reserve component officer until 1996. Then, I became an Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) officer. I have served with the 25th Light, 10th Mountain, 82nd Airborne, 3d Mechanized Infantry Divisions. I have served overseas in humanitarian assistance operations in Haiti, in support of the SOUTHCOM Commander in partner-nation capability building with Colombia and Ecuador, and in stabilization and support operations in Iraq, specifically working with the Country Teams, and the partner nation interagency community. I have worked at the tactical, operational and strategic level in civil military operations planning for three of the four geographical combatant commands (COCOMs) and understand that critical translation of strategic objectives must occur at the operational level for tactical units to achieve the required effects. I have been assigned as both an instructor and course manager for MI and CA schools, as well as have been assigned to teach Reserve Officers Training Corps (ROTC). I understand the doctrinal base of operations for

these branches. I have been responsible for the training, operations and peace- and war-time deployments of a reserve CA battalion and command which has helped me understand the full range of interoperability issues required for stabilization and reconstruction not only between the military and the interagency organizations but the partner- and coalition-nations as well. (4) During my 21 years of civilian and military service, I have noted a continued gap in interoperability of the US interagency community with regard to organizing, planning, training and executing the transition of operations with specific respect to non-lethal effects. I understand
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the role and the current practical application of the Joint Interagency Coordination Groups (JIACGs) at both SOUTHCOM and CENTCOM. I understand and have experienced a successful Interagency Transition Planning Team (ITPT) between DoD and State, under Ambassador Jeffries and LTG(R) Kicklighter for OPLAN Sovereign Iraq. In Iraq, I worked with RAND Corporation European and National Strategy Analyists. I have since worked with the US Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (USACAPOC) and US Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) to begin the brainstorming of what Special Operations Force (SOF) and CA plug-ins must exist at the operational and strategic levels to give us better success in post-conflict planning. I continue to work with friends assigned to SOUTHCOM, CENTCOM, S/CRS, as Defense Attaches, as employees of USAID, as employees of other government agencies and in the intelligence arena. 2. Thesis. a. Chapter One: Introduction. My topic is the operationalizing of the interagency coordination mechanisms between S/CRS and the DoD. Since the Goldwater-Nichols Act which forced a joint environment in the late 1980s, weve been directed to further integrate all US national elements of power through interagency planning and coordination. During the late 1990s and early 2000s we received Presidential Defense Directive (PDD) 56 and the Interagency Handbook for Complex Contingencies that mandated interagency coordination. However, there was no follow-through on the planning and execution so we continued to see the existence of critical gaps through the spectrum of operations and up and down the levels of implementation. In this chapter, I will look at what requirements, doctrine and mandates exist, what is being improved, what is being built from scratch and what has yet to be built. I will evaluate how well these organizations and processes have worked to date as well as how well they may work in the new and contemporary operational environment.

(1) Assumptions. I will assume that State will retain the mission of US reconstruction and stabilization efforts despite any party change in the White House and that the establishment of the S/CRS will become law during the next session of Congress by December 2005 as well as the provision of the first crisis response funds for that organization. I will also assume that the majority of resources, primarily personnel and funding, will continue to come from DoD. I will further assume that the US National Security Strategy (NSS) will continue to state the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) requirements to protect our citizens through preventative means which leads to the importance of planning for failing and failed states. (2) Delimitations. Facets of the issue that will not be covered are: changes to the national oversight structure as defined in the NSPD-1; likelihood of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) being involved or engaged; how the interagency body will complete the specific type of planning and execution; or what types of missions the interagency body should be coordinating whether reconstruction and stabilization alone or a more broad repertoire of missions. b. Chapter Two: Literature Review. Relevant literature is from the past five years, as the Bush administration has been in the White House only since then and with the event of September 11th, 2001, the policies and strategies have changed significantly from previous versions. Because of these recent policy changes, both military and civilian official publications have been published recently that define and relate to this subject. As well, similarly recent studies and reviews of these policies and publications are also abundantly available. (1) National Strategy Documents. The National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)1, U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS), National Military Strategy (NMS), National Strategy for Homeland Security (NSHS), National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (NSCT), all place heavy emphasis on interagency coordination, integration, interoperability and familiarity to achieve strategic objectives in the COE.

(2) Military Publications. Joint publications, the Unified Joint Task List (UJTL) Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) pamphlets, Army doctrine, coalition doctrine, and CA doctrine are built on the premise that interagency coordination and planning is key to national success. JFCOM has published a substantial amount of material in the past five years regarding the SJFHQ and the prototype interagency coordination group called the JIACG. Recently, all of the COCOMs have established JIACGS, but each with different foci. This paper will discuss the general benefits and limitations of the current JIACG as covering only one or two of the sectors of coordination, law enforcement/lethal and intelligence but not the diplomatic/humanitarian/nonlethal sector. The National Defense University (NDU) has been chartered to be the training center for interagency coordination and continues to host interagency conferences as well as offer training in interagency management of complex crisis operations, with a handbook that describes the Pol-Mil planning that takes place under the new NSPD-1 structure of the Policy Coordination Committee (PCC). NDU supports the JIACG concept with an additional recommendation that there be a national interagency contingency coordination center. (3) National Studies and Effectiveness Reviews. Many of the related national studies completed by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in the past six months, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) phase I and II reports on Beyond Goldwater-Nichols (BG-N), US Army War College (USAWC) and Command and General Staff Officers Course (CGSOC) student theses find that critical gaps remain: an identified lead agency, infrastructure and processes for interagency coordination, and relationships that will produce the kind of operational planning and execution that is required to address post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization. Michael Donley of Hicks & Associates Inc has written two papers entitled Rethinking the Interagency System which are best suited as a baseline for my research. In these two papers Donley identifies specific shortcomings and alternatives to the current system, or lack of a system. His noted key problems are: the lack of horizontal and vertical integration efforts
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[and interoperability]; the legitimacy of decision-makers below the President; the weakness of operational level planning, coordination and execution; and the lack of institutional development and support for interagency coordination. (4) Pending Documents. There are currently two bills before the legislature, one in the Senate Foreign Relations committee for review, and one in the House Committee on International Relations for review to establish a legal basis for the S/CRS. S/CRS has developed its own structure with direction from the Policy Coordination Committee (PCC), through its own divisions and management staffs to the Humanitarian Stabilization and Reconstruction Teams (HSRTs) at the COCOM. It has also drafted a task list that mirrors the military UJTL. S/CRS is currently soliciting candidates for their cadre positions as well as exercising with some of the COCOMs on standard contingency plan (CONPLAN) and functional plan (FUNCPLAN) exercises. However, it is in the future that these tasks and positions will become offical against which they can assign work and hire quality candidates. Lastly, the 2005 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) will also address the shortcomings of the current interagency coordination mechanisms. I will keep gathering newly published documents to add to the collection of primary resources. c. Chapter Three: Research Design. To be able to present my thesis in a comparison and contrast method, I will need to follow a number of steps to identify what exists and what should exist for operationalizing interagency coordination. (1) Step one of my reseach will be to identify the non-disputed requirements, roles and responsibilities for interagency coordination mechanisms at the tactical, operational and strategic levels stated in relevant NSC publications, the military pubs, State pubs, S/CRS documents, Congressional Record and budget authorizations married up with the multiple studies that make additional recommendations and provide insight.

(2) The next step will be to identify all of the current efforts by S/CRS, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), JFCOM, the COCOMs, Special Operations Command (SOCOM), and Department of the Army (DA) to build or improve the required doctrine, organization, training, leader development, materiel, personnel and facilities (DOTLMPF) elements. This paper will specifically include what planning and execution processes are being built or improved as well. (3) The third step will be to determine what is not being developed but needed as far as DOTLMPF and planning and execution processes, to which I will refer as +PE from here forward. (4) The fourth step will be to diagram the existing or planned linkages with a specific identification of responsibilities and deliverables at each level and for each entity, noting any gaps or ambiguities. For instance, within SOCOM there is an effort to establish formal Modified Tables of Organization and Equipment (MTOEs) for offical Civil Military Operations Centers (CMOC) at the tactical, operational and strategic levels, which includes a National level CMOC that includes planning support to S/CRS. (5) The fifth step will be to look at recent operations, emergencies, and crises to determine what external examples may exist for solutions to any remaining gaps, potentially looking to other nations such as Colombia, Great Britian and Australia. (6) And lastly, I will apply the possible solutions to the situation and make recommendations necessary according to the DOTLMPF+PE analysis to be able to operationalize national reconstruction and stabilization strategy. (7) Expected Findings. What I expect to find with a DOTLMPF + PE analysis I will address by element. (a) Doctrine & Organization. There is a broad effort to update the doctrine both in

DoD and in State to fit the evolution of S/CRS. I do not know of any other agencies which have
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begun the updating or integrating of doctrine or organization, but will find out, specifically looking at how the Country Teams, Military Attaches and MILGRPs are linked and related through this process. There is not yet a corresponding publication by either JFCOM, NDU that accomodates these updates but I expect that during the period of my research I will see movement on that front. (b) Training. I see State and DoD making efforts to be more inclusive of S/CRSs HSRTs in COCOM exercises, but dont know of any inclusion at the lower operational or tactical levels yet, such as in the Combat Training Centers (CTCs). I will try to identify what agencies are involved in the JIACGs at each COCOM, how they are participating, down to what level and in which sectors they are working, planning and executing. I will look to see what interagency training continues to be provided and for whom by both JFCOM, NDU. (c) Leadership. I will look specifically at the leaders of each of the entities, S/CRS, the COCOMs, JFCOM, NDU, the ASOC and CAPOC Commanders to see what roles, responsibilities and decision-making legitimacy they have. I will consider their leadership visions as well as their leadership development philosophies for their subordinates to make sure that we address the operational level capabilities. (d) Material. Ill look at whether the organizations are working resources and funding that are interoperable and able to relate to eachother no matter what the circumstances: peacetime through wartime. I will need to look at what the Humanitarian Information Unit (HIU) unclassified collaboration software is evolving into, as well as what the classified software sharing capabilities are in the intelligence and law enforcement agencies. This information linkage will need to be the back bone for both horizontal and vertical integration and interoperability. We must all be able to plan off of the same operational picture. (e) Personnel. Analysis will be looking at the recruiting, retention and deployability of each of the interagency coordinating sections for each agency. This paper will look at whether
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the right people can be placed in interagency planning elements throughout the spectrum that can create and deploy the horizontal and vertical relationships that will establish the initial institutional linkages. (f) Facilities. Proximity and access will be considered, looking back to the informational back bone to identify whether the geographical or positional locations suit the relationships and familiarity that must be developed between the layers and staffs and agencies. (g) Planning and execution. I will look at the actual planning products, whether a type of Pol-Mil plan, a Mission Performance Plan, a Bureau Performance Plan, a CONPLAN or FUNCLAN, identifed as a responsibility of each element, each level and determine whether the information required can be fed through the system so that the strategic guidance is clear and understood, translated into operational guidance that can be measured by effects, and used to write plans and orders at the tactical level no matter what the level of hostilities. The execution of such planning will need to be conducted on a spectrum from State led operations through the Country Team and MILGRP, to DoD led operations through the COCOM, JTF and Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs). (8) Expected recommendations. I expect that at the end of my research, I will continue to see a gap in clear responsibility for specific elements of analysis. I expect that S/CRS will remain responsible for US reconstruction and stabiliation efforts. I expect that the responsibility will be identified clearly in the pending legislation. However, I do not expect that any one agency or leader will be assigned the tasks of interagency training. I will recommend that NDU be responsible for the academic training, and that JFCOM be responsible for the inclusion of the organizations in all exercises, to include CTCs. I dont expect that any agency or leader will be assigned the tasks of interagency planning products and coordinated exeuction. I will recommend the COCOMs be responsible to provide plans to the Country Team and the related Bureau for crisis plan approval. I dont expect that any agency or leader will be assigned the responsibility of
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communications interoperability. I will recommend that OSD be responsible for working with the HIU to develop and field only systems that can be used between all agencies. 3. Initial Reference List: Birmingham, Guillermo, Barndt, Luann, and Salo, Thomas, Achieving Unit of Effort: A Call for Legislation to Improve the Interagency Process and Continue Enhancing Interservice Interoperability So All May Labor as One. Joint Forces Staff College, Joint and Combined Warfighting School-Intermediate, 18 September 2003 Bogdanos, Matthew F. Joint Interagency Cooperation: The First Step. Joing Force Quarterly, Spring 2005, Issue 37, p10-18. March 2005. Briem, Christopher. Joint is Dead: What is Next? Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute, Vol 130, Issue 1, p56-59. January 2004. Buss, John C. , USAWC Center for Strategic Leadership Issue Paper: the State Department Office of Reconstruction and Stabilization and Its Interaction with the Department of Defense, July 2005, Carlisle Barracks, PA. Center for Strategic and International Studies. Beyond Goldwater Nichols Phase II Report, June 2005, Washington DC. Clays, Michelle M., The Interagency Process and Americas Second Front in the Global War on Terrorism. April 2003, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Peace Operations; October 1996, Washington DC. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Publication 3-57, Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations, 2002, Washington DC. Clinton, William. Presidential Decision Directive 56: Managing Complex Contingency Operations; 1999, Washington DC. Donley, Michael. Occasional Paper #05-01: Rethinking the Interagency System. Hicks & Associates Incorporated. March 2005. McLean, VA. Donley, Michael. Occasional Paper #05-01: Rethinking the Interagency System, Part 2. Hicks & Associates Incorporated. May 2005. McLean, VA. Drechsler, Donald R. Reconstructing the Interagency Process after Iraq. Journal of Strategic Studies, Volume 28, Issue 1, p3-30. March 2005. Krasner, Stephen D & Pascuale, Carlos. Addressing State Failure. Foreign Affairs, Vol 84, Issue 4, p153-163. July/August 2005. NAIC. The Failed States Index. Foreign Policy, Issue 149, p56-65. July/August 2005.
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National Defense University. The Interagency Management of Complex Crisis Operations Handbook. January 2003. Washington DC. National Intelligence Council. The National Intelligence Councils 2020 Project Piscal, Richard. USAWC Strategy Research Project: A No Policy Policy for Nation-Building . March 2005. Carlisle Barracks, PA. Lugar, Biden, Hagel. S.R. 600. Establishment of the S/CRS. Congressional Record. January 2005. Washington DC Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization. SCRS Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks. April 2005. Washington DC. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Unified Joint Task List. August 2005. Washington DC. United States Joint Forces Command. The Joint Warfighting Center Joint Doctrine Series, Pamphlet 4: Doctrinal Implications of Operational Net Assessment (ONA). February 2004. Norfolk, VA.

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