Introduction

Revisionist Cold War scholarship in recent years has exposed the fallibility of Soviet decision
making vis--vis East European states in the post-World War II period. Accounts of Soviet military
occupation in Poland and Germany reveal Stalins lack of a coherent policy.
1
Khrushchevs
decisions and motives in both the Taiwan Straits Crisis (1958) and Berlin Deadline Crisis (1958-
1961) were tinged as much with despair as confidence and hampered by more domestic political
issues and intra-alliance constraints than Western observers could fathom at the time.
2

Khrushchevs policy toward Cuba was even more reckless than anyone realized, having deployed
additional nuclear weapons (162 warheads, including 102 tactical warheads) on the island that U.S.
officials never detected, and arguably having pre-delegated authority to the Soviet military
commander in Cuba (General Issa Pliyev) to use the tactical nuclear weapons in the event of a U.S.
attack on Cuba.
3


1
See books by Jan T. Gross, such as Revolution from Abroad the Soviet Conquest of Polands Western Ukraine and Western
Belorussia, 2
nd
ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002).
On Germany, see Norman Naimark, The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945-1949
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995).
2
See Chen Jian and Yang Kuisong, Chinese Politics and the Collapse of the Sino-Soviet Alliance in Odd Arne Westad, ed.
Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945-1963 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1998);
Zhai Qiang, The Dragon, the Lion, and the Eagle: Chinese-British-American Relations, 1949-1958 (Kent, OH: Kent State
University Press, 1994); Shu Guang Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese-American Confrontations, 1949-1958
(Ithaca, NY Cornell University Press, 1992) Hope M. Harrison, Ulbricht and the Concrete Rose New Archival
Evidence on the Dynamics of Soviet-East German Relations and the Berlin Crisis, 1958-1961 in Cold War International
History Project (CWIHP) Working Paper No. 5 (Washington, DC: Wilson Center, May 1993); and Vladislav M. Zubok,
Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis (1958-1962), CWIHP Working Paper No. 6 (Washington, DC: Wilson Center, May
1993). Also see James Hershbergs insightful synthesis, The Crisis Years, 1958-1963, in Odd Arne Westad, Reviewing the
Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory (London: Frank Cass, 2000), pp. 303-325.
3
See General Anatoli I. Gribkov, Operation ANADYR: US and Soviet Generals Recount the Cuban
Missile Crisis (Chicago, IL: edition q, 1994). For analysis of certain discrepancies on this new
information, see James G. Blight and David A. Welch, eds. Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis
(London: Frank Cass, 1998), pp. 356-363 Raymond L. Garthoff, U.S. Intelligence in the Cuban
Missile Crisis, paper presented at the CWIHP Wilson Center conference in September 1997
(Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis) and Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, One
Hell of a Camble Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958-1964 (New York: Norton, 1997).

Soviet decision making in the Hungarian crisis of 1956 was no less flawless. The First
Domino: International Decision Making During the Hungarian Crisis of 1956 is the first English-
language monograph drawing on new archival collections from multiple East bloc countries in
order to reinterpret decision-making in the Hungarian crisis by several groups: the Soviet
Presidium members, the Hungarian leadership, US policymakers, and to a lesser extent the
Yugoslav and Polish leaders. We will see that the Khrushchev leadership did not function as a
unitary rational actor, and often zigzagged ineptly between policy options with apparently little
or no analysis of costs and risks. In addition, despite Moscows dominating role in the East
European satellites, the satellites themselves at various times managed to manipulate or influence
the Soviet Union. The tail (satellites) wagged the dog (Soviet Union). In the spring and summer of
1956 before the Soviet crackdown, the Hungarian Communist Party leaders subtly turned Moscow
around to their way of thinking in several ways.
Many of these mistakes stemmed directly from misperceptions. In his classic work,
Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Robert Jervis explains some of the most
common misperceptions. First, a leader will tend to see the behavior of others as more centralized,
planned, and coordinated than it is. This is a manifestation of the drive to squeeze complex and
unrelated events into a coherent pattern.
4
Second, desires and fears strongly influence perception.
Even well-informed decision makers engage in wishful thinking. Given the essentially anarchic
international system, moreover, sovereign leaders keep themselves especially vigilant regarding
possible threats to their states security. They often see imaginary dangers.
5
Jervis offers a
twofold proposition directly relevant to foreign policy perceptions: an actor will perceive threats
vigilantly if he thinks he can avoid the danger by recognizing the stimulus and taking corrective

4
Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976).
5
Ibid., p. 372.
action (perceptual vigilance). On the other hand, if he thinks there is nothing he can do to avoid the
danger and pain that accompanies a stimulus, he will seek to avoid the evidence and underestimate
the chances of harm (perceptual defense).
6

Third, decision makers tend to overestimate their importance as both a source of influence
and as a target. When, for example, another state behaves in accord with the decision makers
desires, they will overestimate the degree to which their policies are responsible for the outcome.
However, when the other states behavior is undesired, the decision makers will most likely see this
behavior as derived from internal sources rather than as being a response to their own actions. In
this case the decision makers will believe that the other state is trying to harm them rather than
that the effect was an unintended consequence or side-effect.
7
Thus, as Jervis states, the
predisposition to perceive a threat varies with the persons beliefs about his ability to take effective
counteraction if he perceives the danger.
8

Fourth, Jervis concluded that decision makers strive to avoid what Leon Festinger termed
cognitive dissonance. According to Festinger's theory, inconsistency between two cognitive elements
("knowledges") is psychologically uncomfortable and will motivate one to try to achieve consonance
between the two elements. Applied to foreign policy decision making, an inconsistency between the
decision makers' present policy and the policy necessary to achieve an important national objective
will cause them to strive to eliminate such an inconsistency. Festinger asserts that there are three ways
a decision making group can close the gap between contradictory cognitive elements. It can change the
policy. It can change its cognition (i.e. deny the knowledge of the inconsistency). And, finally, it can

6
Ibid.
7
Ibid., p. 343.
8
Ibid., p. 374.
avoid situations and information which would likely increase the dissonance.
9
Jervis adds that people
seek strong justification for their behavior. They are not content to believe merely that they behaved
well and chose wisely; if this were the case, they would only have to maintain the beliefs that produced
their decisions. Instead, people want to minimize their internal conflict. This leads them to seek to
believe that the reasons for acting or deciding as they did were overwhelming. People will then
rearrange their beliefs to provide increased support for their actions. Knowledge of the advantages of
rejected courses of action and costs of the chosen one will be a source of uncomfortable dissonance
that they will try to reduce.
10
How, exactly, do these patterns of misperception manifest themselves in
the 1956 crisis? This book will explore that question.
The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 is worth reexamining for a number of reasons. It was the
first major anti-Soviet uprising in Eastern Europe and shooting war between socialist states. In
contrast to earlier uprisings following Stalins death, such as the workers revolt in East Berlin
(1953), the incumbent Hungarian leader Imre Nagy had not summoned Soviet military troops to
squelch the revolution and instead attempted to withdraw Hungary from the Warsaw Pact. Hence,
the Hungarian revolution symbolizes perhaps the first major domino in a process that resulted
ultimately in the Soviet Unions loss of hegemony over Eastern Europe in 1989.
On October 23 and 24, 1956, Soviet tanks initially rolled into Hungary to suppress a student
demonstration. Ever since Stalins death (March 1953) and especially after Khrushchevs Secret
Speech denouncing Stalins crimes (February 1956), popular dissent in Hungary had intensified.
This initial crackdown merely alienated the Hungarian population more, necessitating a second,
more extensive, military intervention on November 4. The intervention answered the question in
the minds of people in the East European satellite states about just how far Khrushchev would

9
Leon Festinger, A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance (Evanston, IL: Row, Peterson and Co., 1957),
pp. 3, 31.
10
Ibid., p. 382-3.
allow his destalinization policy to go. The uprising was ultimately repressed, resulting in more
than 2,000 deaths and the flight of over 200,000 refugees to the West. Not only did this event signify
a thrust for national independence and ethnic identity for Hungarians, but it intensified the split
within the Soviet Union over relations with the satellite states of Eastern Europe begun in 1948 with
the expulsion of Titos Yugoslavia from the Cominform. On the one side were the hard-liners who
supported the November 4th crackdown; on the other, the supporters of co-existence within a
socialist framework. Although the Kremlin hard-liners won the battle in the Hungarian
crackdown, their approach led to a dramatic shift of world support for the Hungarian cause and a
revulsion against Soviet tactics. Also evident were rifts within the international communist
movement and growing isolation of the Soviet Union as the Cold War deepened and resistance
spread to other satellites in Eastern Europe, albeit in subtler forms.
Indeed, the 1956 Hungarian Revolution and Soviet military interventions were seminal
events in Hungarian history, somewhat equivalent to the American Revolution, Civil War, or
Vietnam War for Americans. In 1989 tens of thousands of Hungarians participated in the
ceremonial reburial of Imre Nagy. In 1991 the Hungarian National Assembly passed Act VIII
designating October 23 as an official holiday. And, in September 1996, an international historians
conference was held to commemorate the 40th anniversary. Former Hungarian President rpd
Gncz--a 1956 freedom fighter himselfattended this televised conference open to the public.
11

Given the importance of the 1956 revolution to all Hungarians, a firm grasp of this event is
necessary to help U.S. policymakers and diplomats build rapport with Hungarian officials. As
Hungary becomes increasingly integrated with European and Euro-Atlantic institutions,
Washington officials will devote more attention to this country to better understand the social and
political dynamics in the region. In 1990 Hungary was admitted to the Council of Europe and in

11
Jane Perlez, Archives Confirm False Hope Fed Hungary Revolt, New York Times (September 29, 1996).
1996 to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Hungary became
an associate of the European Union in 1994, and its application for full membership is pending.
Closer U.S.-Hungarian ties are also reflected in the numerous high-level meetings since 1994
between U.S. Presidents Clinton and Bush and Hungarian Presidents rpd Gncz and Ferenc
Mdl. The ongoing concern with the Bosnian and Albanian crises also raises the level of interest in
nearby Hungary, a country also composed of more than one ethnic group.
Interest in Hungary has especially intensified in light of NATOs decision in March 1999 to
extend security guarantees to the country as a new alliance member and in light of the
peacekeeping efforts in the former Yugoslavia. Since American troops may be called upon to defend
Hungary, enlisted and commissioned members of the U.S. armed forces have an abiding interest in
the political and military history of the country. In fact, the Hungarians experience in the
traumatic Soviet invasion of 1956 partly explains Hungarys motivation for joining NATO.
Before the communist bloc archives opened, communist propaganda long portrayed the
event as a counterrevolution fomented by enemies of the people, which the Soviet armed forces
smoothly suppressed. Discussions about it were virtually taboo. Fortunately, in 1989-1990, an entire
institute devoted solely to the study of the 1956 events (1956-os Intzet) was established in Hungary
and has worked energetically to fill in the blank pages of this key Cold War crisis.
While a plethora of other books have been published on the Hungarian Revolution of 1956
and the Soviet military interventions, they are: a) out of print, b) memoirs, philosophical
reflections, or historical novels, c) edited collections of essays that lack conceptual coherence, d)
written in Hungarian and remain un-translated, or e) written before the opening of the communist
archives in the early 1990s. Only three scholarly books have been published in English on the
Hungarian crisis since the archives opened. The Hungarian Revolution of 1956: Reform, Revolt and
Repression, 1953-1963 (NY: Longman, 1996) is a collection of essays translated from Hungarian and
edited by Gyrgy Litvn and other scholars from the 1956 Institute in Budapest. Although it is a
valuable contribution that incorporates revelations from Hungarian archives, the book tends to
lack thematic cohesion, does not focus on the decision making process, and fails to draw on archival
sources from other East European countries.
The second book, The Soviet Military Intervention in Hungary, 1956 (Budapest: Central
European University Press, 1999), was edited by Hungarian military analysts Jen Gyrkei and
Mikls Horvth and translated from Hungarian by Emma Roper Evans. Originally published in
Budapest in 1996, this book consists of three essays, each about one hundred pages, by Gyrkei and
Horvth, Russian historian Alexander Kirov, and Russian military officer Yevgeny Malashenko,
respectively. The only essay in it that cites archival documents exclusively is the one written by
Kirov. Gyrkei's essay draws primarily on previously published documentary collections, while
Malashenko's section draws on his own memory. While the book contains useful insights, it focuses
primarily on the invasion process and ignores the international context. Many parts lack analysis,
amounting to little more than a disjointed list of statistics and isolated facts.
The third book is Hungary 1956-Forty Years On (London: Frank Cass, 1997), edited by
British scholar Terry Cox. While this book contains some recent archival findings (including my
own), it is also a collection of separate essays with the same lack of cohesion as the Litvn book.
This slim 157-page book also fails to consider the Soviet decision making process in depth and loses
some nuances of meaning due to the translation from Hungarian of some essays.
In addition, The 1956 Hungarian Revolution: a History in Documents (Budapest: Central
European University Press, 2003), edited by Csaba Bks, Jnos M. Rainer, and Malcolm Byrne, is
a valuable collection of documents from Hungarian, Soviet, and U.S. archives. It is not, however, an
analytical monograph and excludes other documents upon which this book is based.
The First Domino will draw on numerous documents from Russian, Hungarian, Polish,
Austrian, East German, and U.S. archives including cables, letters and notes from communist bloc
leaders and high-level diplomats. One of the most valuable set of documents that sheds light on the
Soviet decision making process is the so-called Malin Notes. Vladimir Malin was head of the
General Department of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee. He took notes of the secret
emergency sessions of the Presidium at the height of the crisis, between October 23 and November
4. Since official verbatim minutes of these sessions were never kept, the Malin Notes shed unique
insight on the Soviet decision making process. The book will also draw on the diplomatic cables
from the Soviet Embassy in Budapest written by Yuri Andropov, who was Soviet Ambassador to
Hungary (and later became the KGB chief and General Secretary), and cables by Vladimir
Kryuchkov, who was third secretary in the embassy, who also later became the KGB director.
Cables from other Soviet embassies in 1956 also shed light on the events.
Another valuable source from the Czech communist party archive is the handwritten
verbatim report of another emergency meeting of all the leaders of the Warsaw Pact countries in
Moscow that took place secretly on October 24, 1956. Jan Svoboda, a top aide for Antonin Novotn,
the Czech leader, took these notes.
Indispensable sources for this study also come from the Hungarian National Archive
(Magyar Orszgos Levltr) in Budapest. These include detailed minutes of the emergency
Hungarian Communist Party Politburo sessions in the crucial October 23 to November 4 period;
diplomatic cables from Hungarian embassies around the world; and detailed interrogations of Imre
Nagy and his colleagues between 1956 and June 1958 (when Nagy was executed), as well as his
handwritten correspondence while a captive in Snagov, Romania. Sources from the Polish Archive
of New Documents (Archiwum Akt Nowych) and the Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(Archiwum Ministerstvo Spraw Zagranicznych) in Warsaw include Gomuka's handwritten account
of his October 19th confrontation with Khrushchev, Plenum speeches, diplomatic cables of the
Polish Ambassador to Hungary, Adam Willman and other diplomats stationed in Budapest, and
secret letters from citizens in Pozna to the Central Committee.
The declassification of communist party documents has led the U.S. government to
accelerate its declassification of materials at the National Archive in Washington and the
Eisenhower Presidential Library in Abilene, Kansas, particularly on Presidents Truman and
Eisenhower's covert operations in Eastern Europe, schemes to construct a "Volunteer Freedom
Corps," and general dealings with Eastern European refugees. This book will also incorporate
information from these new sources. The First Domino places Hungarian and Soviet leaders
decision making in the broader context of these two countries relations with their most important
neighbors in East Central Europe and China, with the United States policies, and with the
activities of several migrs and espionage groups in Western Europe.
Chapter One examines Soviet involvement in Hungarian politics from 1953 to 1956, Soviet
perceptions of key Hungarian leaders, and the possible reasons why Hungary was the first of the
satellites to directly challenge Soviet rule. Chapter Two discusses the role of two key Slavic states,
Yugoslavia and Poland in the 1956 events. Chapters Three and Four focus on the October 24th and
November 4th interventions respectively and the nature of Soviet and Hungarian decision making.
Chapter Five investigates Jnos Kdrs activities after he disappeared on November 1 his real
views about the Soviet military invasion and Nagys abduction the political dynamics that
contributed to the Soviet decision to kidnap and execute Hungarian communist leader Imre Nagy
after he fled to the Yugoslav Embassy for refuge and Kdrs interactions with the Soviet leaders
to normalize the situation in Hungary. Chapter Six explores U.S. psychological warfare and
covert activities in Eastern Europe in the 1950s, including Radio Free Europe broadcasting, balloon
operations, and secret plans for an migr army or "Volunteer Freedom Corps." Perhaps some of
the misperceptions cannot be blamed on the Kremlin leaders, but rather on these "subversive
activities" in Eastern Europe, which may have blinded the Kremlin leaders as to the real cause of
the problems in Hungary (Rkosis unpopular dictatorship) and thus may have indirectly caused
the 1956 uprising. The chapter ends with a discussion of intelligence processing of the Hungarian
refugees at Camp Kilmer, New Jersey.
Earlier portions of Chapters 3 and 4 appeared as In the Line of Fire New Archival
Evidence on the Soviet Intervention in Hungary, 1956, Carl Beck Papers in Russian and East
European Studies, No. 1307 (Pittsburgh, PA : Center for Russian and East European Studies,
University of Pittsburgh, January, 1999), pp. 1-41, and a chapter by the same title in Terry Cox, ed.
Hungary, 1956: Forty Years On (London: Frank Cass, 1997), pp. 67-107. Different portions of
Chapters Two and Four also appeared as Hungary, 1956 the Yugoslav Connection, in Europe-
Asia vol. 50, no. 3 (May 1998): 493-517 To Invade or Not to Invade? A New Look at Gomuka,
Nagy, and Soviet Foreign Policy in 1956 in Canadian Slavonic Papers vol. XLIII, nos. 4 (December
2001): 437--473 and Reactions to the Events of 1956: New Findings from Budapest and Warsaw
Archives in the Journal of Contemporary History (2003). All excerpts appear with permission.
Several research grants enabled me to complete this book. These include the IREX
(International Research & Exchanges Board) Individual Advanced Research Opportunity grant for
seven months in Russia, December 2000-July 2001; the IREX Short-Term Travel Grant for archival
work in Budapest, Vienna, and Warsaw (August 1-September 15, 2000); a stipend from the Europa
Institut in Budapest (August 2000); the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars East
European Studies grant for three months in Washington, DC, September 15December 15, 2000;
the Eisenhower Presidential Library Grant for travel to Abilene, Kansas, April 1999; the Fulbright
Scholarship for archival research in Moscow, Russia (Sept 1994-July, 1995); the American Council
of Teachers of Russian for study in Moscow (June 1992-June 1993); and the Kennan Institute for
Advanced Russian Studies Short-Term Research Grant (June 1993) for work in the National
Archives and National Security Archive in Washington, DC.
For helping me track down information I wish to thank Russian scholars Vyacheslav Sereda,
Aleksandr Stykalin, Tofik Muslimovich Islamov, Valerii Leonidovich Musatov and the many
hardworking, underpaid archivists at the Russian State Archive of Contemporary Documents
(Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Noveishii Istorii or RGANI), as well as the director Natalya
Tomilina. I also thank the archivists at the Archive of Foreign Policy, including director Nadezhda
Mozzhukhina.
The scholars at the Institute for the History of the 1956 Hungarian Revolution in Budapest
helped me in various ways for which I am grateful. They include Gyrgy Litvn, Jnos M. Rainer,
Csaba Bks, and Jnos Tischler. Jen Borkcs, Adrienn Csipes, Kti Szbo-Beck, and Zoltn
Tcsik (the violist), helped me enormously, as did the archivists at the Magyar Orszgos Levltar.
For their assistance in explaining document collections and answering my questions, I thank the
archivists at the Warsaw-based Archiwum Akt Nowych and Archiwum Ministerstvo Spraw
Zagranicznych, the librarians at the Biblioteka Narodowa, as well as Anna Konieczna, Adam
Mazur, Magorzata Lompe, and Agnieszka Krolikowa. For his patient assistance at the Eisenhower
Presidential Library, I thank Jim Leyerzapf. Malcolm Byrne at the National Security Archive in
Washington DC provided several useful contacts and information as well.
Several scholars read and commented on parts or all of this book. I especially wish to thank
Raymond Garthoff, Bla Kirly, Sergei Khrushchev, Adam Bromke, Charles Gati, Gyrgy Gmri,
Peter Pastor, Vlad Zubok, Federigo Argentieri, Bennett Kovrig, Mark Kramer, Hayden Peake,
James Carafano, Stephen Chiabotti, and others I may have forgotten to mention. I bear sole
responsibility, of course, for any remaining errors of fact, analysis, and judgment.

Chapter 2: The Role of Yugoslavia and Poland
(SummerFall 1956)
Scottish historian Thomas Carlyle once exclaimed, "Alas for our chains or
chainlets of causes and effects, which we so assiduously track through certain
handsbreadths of years and square miles, when the whole is a broad, deep
Immensity, and each atom is chained and completed with all!" By this Carlyle
meant that, because of the essential unity of nature, an understanding of any
particular event necessitates an understanding of the total context.
1
As we have seen,
internal factors in Hungary played a decisive role in the crisis: above all the popular
dissatisfaction with the slow tempo of destalinization, the economic stagnation, and
Hungary's lack of full sovereignty in the Soviet bloc that emerged after World War
II. However, external factors were also important to the context of the crisis.
Before the opening of communist bloc archives in the early 1990s, scholars
habitually analyzed the Polish and Hungarian crises of 1956 from the Soviet
viewpoint, focusing almost exclusively on internal factors in one given satellite
country and its subordinate relationship with the Soviet Union, much like an
astronomer studies the sun as the focal point and the planets as celestial bodies
merely orbiting it.
2
This has been a useful approach, for example, in grasping the
significance for the Soviet Union of the events in Poland and Hungary. Among other
things, the revolts forced a Soviet reevaluation of the reliability and role of the non-

1
Quoted in J. R. Hale, ed. The Evolution of British Historiography (London:
Macmillan, 1967), p. 42.
2
Most scholars have focused on Soviet-Hungarian relations to discern causes of the
conflict. See the monographs mentioned in the first endnote in Chapter One.
Soviet Warsaw Pact countries in its alliance system. The Stalinist policy of heavy
political indoctrination and enforced Sovietization could no longer be relied upon to
keep national armies as reliable instruments of the Soviet Union.
However, one can develop an even deeper understanding of the total context
of the 1956 revolution by focusing more on the external influences of other Eastern
European states on Hungary. While the Soviet Union dominated the satellites in the
1950s, these satellites were also heavily influenced by their "fraternal socialist"
neighbors and Yugoslavia.
This chapter and Chapter Four will examine the influence that two Slavic
states in particular -Yugoslavia and Poland - exerted on Hungary. While this
chapter devotes slightly more attention to Poland, Chapter Four will put more
emphasis on Yugoslavia. In the midst of their crisis, the Hungarian people sought
guidance most often from these two proponents of separate paths to socialism.
Yugoslavia and Poland were two of the most independent revisionist communist
states that had each weathered their own battles with the Soviet Union and survived.
Expelled from the Cominform in 1948 and subsequently boycotted by all the bloc
countries, Yugoslavia nevertheless persuaded the United States to provide economic
aid. Meanwhile, Poland - sandwiched between Germany and Russia, partitioned
four times in history, and even wiped off the map at one point - developed a strong
sense of unity and grim determination to survive at any cost. This experience helped
the Poles deter a Soviet attack later in October 1956. Two charismatic leaders
effectively symbolized their respective countries national spirit Josip Broz Tito and
Wadysaw Gomuka. By contrast, the leaders of the other bloc countries were
repressive, run-of-the-mill Stalinists in 1956: Antonn Novotn of Czechoslovakia,
Walter Ulbricht of the GDR, Todor Zhivkov of Bulgaria, and Gheorgiu-Dej of
Romania. This is not to dismiss entirely the roles of these other countries and
neutral Austria - in the 1956 crisis; in fact, the author plans to write a second book
on this subject.
Nevertheless, the importance of Yugoslavia and Poland looms especially
large in the archival materials. Soviet propaganda about this notwithstanding,
documents reveal the extraordinary influence the Yugoslav press and diplomatic
corps had in disseminating the news of the events of 1956 to all the satellite states,
with a perspective radically different from that of the USSR. Specifically, this
chapter will illustrate how slow and tortuous the Yugoslav-Hungarian
rapprochement was, particularly between May 1955 and February 1956.
3
Having
initiated the rift with Yugoslavia in 1948 and enlisted the support of the peoples'
democracies in Tito-bashing, the USSR now discovered, ironically, that it could not
so easily induce them (especially Hungary) to make up with Tito after Khrushchev's
own trip to Belgrade in May 1955.
4
As described in the previous chapter, Rkosi

3
Yugoslav relations with Albania also remained tense. See AVP RF, Fond
Referentura po Vengrii, O 37, Por 9, P 187, L. 4, From the Diary of S. S.Satuchin,
"Notes of a Conversation with the Advisor of the Yugoslav Mission in Budapest
Osman Diki," June 2, 1956, June 18, 1956.
4
Nor was it easy for Khrushchev to get other Kremlin colleagues--such as Molotov--
to support the rapprochement. The full text of the July 1955 Plenum reveals the
numerous denunciations of Molotov's "incorrect position" on Yugoslavia.
Malenkov, for example, stated that "Comrade Molotov still does not acknowledge
that his errors in the tactics of struggle played a huge and decisive role in bringing
about the split with Yugoslavia." See RGANI (Moscow), F. 2, O. 1, D. 172, L. 105,
Plenum TsK KPSS--XIX Sozyv: Stenogramma desyatogo zasedaniya 9 iyulya 1955.
dragged his feet.
5
While they inspired Hungarian intellectuals, the activities of the
Yugoslav diplomats and journalists - propagating Titos model of socialism ("the
third path") - to some extent caused the Soviet leaders to misinterpret the origins of
the revolutionary movement in Hungary. Soviet and Hungarian authorities believed
only a small group of Hungarian intellectuals were disenchanted, while the workers
and masses were "healthy." If the Yugoslav press and diplomatic corps were
properly censored, they thought, they might be able to avoid an ideological
"spillover effect" on the Hungarian people via the Yugoslav media.
Moreover, events in Poland such as the wiato revelations, the Pozna
revolt, and Gomuka's selection as party leader during the Polish "October"
inspired Imre Nagy and his supporters in Budapest.
6
Gomuka's success in defying
the Kremlin emboldened the Petfi Circle and the Hungarian students and
encouraged them - rightly or wrongly - to view Nagy as a Hungarian Gomuka.
Hungarian reactions then influenced the Polish leadership and population.
Ironically, without Poland's initial defiance of the Kremlin leaders on October 19-
20, the student demonstration of October 23 in Budapest may not have taken place.
Likewise, had the Soviet leaders not decided to intervene in Hungary, they may very
well have intervened in Poland instead.

5
AVP RF, Fond 077, Opis 37, Por. 8, Papka 187, List 29, From the Diary of V. V.
Astafiev, "Note of a Conversation with the Chairman of the State Assembly of
Hungary Sndor Ronai," March 27, 1956. "Ronai reported that..at present, of all
the peoples democracies, Yugoslavia's relations with Hungary are the very worse."
6
Jzef wiato, a lieutenant-colonel in the Tenth Department of the Polish State
Security Ministry (Urzqd Bezpieczenstwa, or UB) from 1949 to 1953, defected to the
West in December 1953. He thoroughly exposed his secret police colleagues using
the media of RFE and BBC. The resulting public fallout helped lead to Gomuka's
release late in 1954 from guarded seclusion in a villa in Miedzyszyn, outside
Warsaw.

Yugoslav-Hungarian Relations in 1955-56
Yugoslavia was one of most independent communist states since the 1948
Moscow-Belgrade rift, aloof from the Warsaw Pact or Soviet bloc, courted in the
1950s both by the United States and Soviet Union, admired by the increasingly
independent Asian and African countries, and vehemently critical of Soviet great
power chauvinism.
7
As mentioned earlier, the 1948 rift the expulsion on
Yugoslavia from the Cominform and boycott by all members of the communist bloc
had caused great economic disruption to Yugoslavia. Tito wanted to ensure that
his country would be compensated for damages resulting from the boycott. After the
Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement in July, 1955, when Khrushchev visited Belgrade
and Tito reciprocated with a visit to Moscow (June 2-23, 1956), Tito and other
Yugoslav officials were determined to exact reparations from Soviet bloc countries
without jeopardizing the aid from the United States.
8
Most communist bloc
countries complied, but Hungary was reluctant.
9
According to Stuart H. Van Dyke,
European operations director of the International Cooperation Administration in
1956, the Soviet bloc as a whole made nearly $300 million of easy credit available to
Yugoslavia. Archival documents reveal, more specifically, that the Soviet Union had

7
Albania under Enver Hoxhas leadership was another independent communist
state in Eastern Europe.
8
According to Hungarian historians Urban and Vida, a top secret meeting of Soviet
and East European communist leaders was held during the last days of Titos visit,
on June 22-23, 1956, for which the minutes are still classified. Items on the agenda
include the problems in Poland and Hungary, as well as economic and military
issues. See Kroly Urban and Istvn Vida, Az MDP Politikai Bizottsga, 1956,
jnius 28-i lsnek jegyzknyve,Trsadalmi Szemle (1993), vol. 2, p. 83.
9
One exception to this might be Albania, with which Yugoslav relations were also at
an impasse.
agreed to help Yugoslavia by extending $250 million in economic credit
10
and by
developing Yugoslavia's atomic energy program.
11
Czechoslovakia agreed to pay
$50 million in reparations over a ten-year period at a 2 percent interest rate.
12

Romania permitted several thousand Serbian prisoners to return to the Banat
region.
13

Yugoslav relations with Hungary, however, remained at an impasse. Titos
decision to return home from Moscow by train via Bucharest rather than Budapest
showed that his reconciliation with the Soviet leadership did not extend to Rkosi
and his supporters. Tito's representatives sought to overcome key obstacles to full
reconciliation between the two East European countries, including Rkosi's
reluctance to rehabilitate Lszl Rajk, to grant amnesty to all Yugoslav political

10
According to Stuart H. Van Dyke, European operations director of the
International Cooperation Administration in 1956, the USSR promised Yugoslavia
a ten-year loan of $30,000,000 in gold and convertible currencies at a two percent
interest rate. The USSR also offered a ten-year line of credit of $110,000,000, also at
a two percent interest rate, for specific investment projects, mostly in the field of
mining. See John D. Morris, "Soviet Bloc Help to Tito is Huge," New York Times,
April 29, 1956, p. 1, col. 7.
11
"The financial and technical help given to Yugoslavia by the USSR, especially in
the sphere of atomic energy, is highly valued by the Yugoslavs." AVP RF, f. 077, o.
37, por. 7, p. 187, l. 146-147, From the Diary of Y. P. Sanzhak, Second Secretary of
the Soviet Embassy in Hungary, "Notes of a Conversation with the First Secretary
of the Yugoslav Mission in Budapest Milan Georgievi," February 17, 1956.
12
AVP RF, f. 077, o. 37, por. 7, p. 187, l. 146-147, From the Diary of Y. P. Sanzhak,
Second Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Hungary, "Notes of a Conversation with
the First Secretary of the Yugoslav Mission in Budapest Milan Georgievi,"
February 17, 1956. (The agreement was reached on the day of this conversation).
According to Van Dyke, Czechoslovakia also offered $75 million in credit to
Yugoslavia. See Morris, p. 1, col. 7.
13
New York Times, October 6, 1956, p. 11, col. 2.
prisoners in Hungary, to treat fairly the Yugoslav minority living in Hungary, and
to pay Hungarian reparations to Yugoslavia.
14

Although Tito wished to improve relations with Soviet bloc members, he was
equally determined not to get pulled back into the Soviet sphere of influence. The
post-Stalinist leadership, in turn, reconciled itself to Tito because he was evidently
immovable, protected by the West, and because the propaganda advantages seemed
- in 1954 - to outweigh the costs. However, Khrushchev and others grew
increasingly suspicious of Tito's overt support - mainly through the latters
diplomats and journalists stationed in Budapest - of Imre Nagy's national
communist movement. Like his press and diplomatic corps, Tito took keen interest
in clearing the roadblocks to full reconciliation mentioned above. At the same time,
however, more fundamental values and memories compelled him. To fully
understand Tito's behavior in the 1956 Hungarian conflict, it is first necessary to
explore these deeper values.
For Tito, destalinization entailed much more than simply the replacement of
Stalinist leaders with national communists in the East European countries, or
simply the resolution of issues like financial reparations. Rather, Tito sought a
fundamental recognition that Yugoslavia was just as important as the Soviet Union
in the international communist movement. He valued Yugoslavia's unique brand of
national communism, which had emerged from indigenous Yugoslav soil and the
experiences of World War II. From Tito's perspective, Yugoslavia's historical

14
For more details on these issues, see Johanna Granville, The SovietYugoslav
Dtente, Belgrade-Budapest Relations, and the Hungarian Revolution (1955-56),
Hungarian Studies Review, vol. XXIV, nos. 1-2 (1998), pp. 15-64.
achievements were hard-earned and thus needed to be cherished and preserved. It
was the twofold character of the "National Liberation Struggle," against both
fascist aggressors and traitors, that made Yugoslavia unique. In October 1946, Tito
wrote:
The people of Yugoslavia were not fighting only against the invaders
but also against their allies the local traitors-the gangs of Paveli,
Nedi, Rupnik, and Draza Mihailovi. Despite the fact that the
invaders and domestic traitors joined forces, the people prevailed in
their great struggle. Therein lie the specific features of the liberation
struggle of the nations of Yugoslavia, therein lies its greatness. No
other occupied country in Europe can boast of such a struggle and
our people have a right to be proud of it.
15


Moreover, Tito's Partisans had defeated the Nazi occupiers without the help
of the Soviet Red army, which had simply passed through to "liberate" Hungary.
True, Stalin sent security guards for Tito, but this was after the war and intended
more as a method of Soviet control than for Yugoslav protection.
16
Later, in June
1948, of course, Stalin banished Tito from the Cominform, just nine months after its
founding congress in Szklarska Porba (Poland) in September 1947. While Tito
seems to have believed in the intrinsic superiority of the "Yugoslav way"
(encompassing economic decentralization, experiments in worker self-management,

15.
Josip Broz Tito, "Features Peculiar to the Liberation Struggle and Revolutionary
Transformation of the New Yugoslavia," Kommunist [Organ of the Communist Party
of Yugoslavia] no. 1 (October, 1946), quoted in Military Thought and Work: Selected
Writings [of Josip Broz Tito] (1936-1979), ed. Boro Pejcinovi (Belgrade:
Vojnoizdavacki Zavod, 1982), 294.
16.
GARF, F 9401, Special Folder [Osobaya Papka] of Stalin, D. 97, L.351-352, July 13,
1945, To Stalin from L. Beria, "about the Guard on Tito and Security Measures in the
City of Belgrade." Also F 9401, Opis 2, D 97, L. 69-70, June 29, 1945, To Stalin and
Molotov From Beria, "About the Measures for Strengthening the Guard of Marshal
Tito. A total of "509 cadres" were sent to serve in Tito's personal group of bodyguards
or to keep order in the city.
and "active neutralism" in foreign policy), the rhetoric also served as a useful
weapon in his power struggle with Stalin and his hard-line successors.
The heart of the matter, as Ivo Bana and others have shown, was Tito's
refusal to obey Stalin. Stalin primarily faulted Tito for supporting the Greek
communists,
17
as well as for claiming the city of Trieste, thus delaying the Austrian
peace treaty and complicating Stalin's wartime alliance with the British and
Americans.
18
As a result, all the communist bloc countries broke off trade relations
with Yugoslavia. But Tito's Communist party had stayed in power, despite the
sudden economic boycott from all the Warsaw Pact countries. To the Soviet leaders'
dismay, Tito managed to receive economic and military assistance from the
Americans while still remaining communist. Both Tito and his representatives in
Budapest were fond of reminding Hungarian and Soviet officials of the fact that
they had not surrendered to the "imperialists," despite their ostracism from the
socialist camp.
19
Tito certainly had not disappeared when Stalin had "shaken his
little finger."
20
Indeed the Stalin-Tito feud was so intense that Tito allegedly

17.
Ivo Bana, With Stalin Against Tito (New York: Cornell, 1988).
18.
Nikita S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes, ed. Schecter
and Luchkov (Boston: Little, Brown, 1990), 72.
19.
AVP RF, f 077, o 37, por 9, p 187, l 112, From the Diary of S. S. Satuchin, First
Secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Hungary, "Notes of a Conversation with the First
Secretary of the Yugoslav Mission, Milan Georgievi," July 2, 1956. "Georgievi said
'Despite the unfair accusations, as well as the difficulties, arising as a result of the
rupture in relations, Yugoslavia continued to proceed along the path and did not
surrender to the pressure of the imperialist states."'
20.
Expression used by Khrushchev. See N. S. Khrushchev, "The Crimes of the Stalin
Era: Special Report to the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,
Closed Session, February 24-5, 1956," annotated by Boris Nicolaevsky in The New
Leader (New York, 1956): p. S48. Also cited in New York Times (March 15; June 4,
1956), p. 1, col. 8.
expected the Russians to intervene while the West was distracted in Korea.
21
Stalin
may also have authorized an assassination of Tito in the fall of 1952, which was
aborted only because of Stalin's own death in March 1953.
22
Having fought and won
independence from both the Nazis (militarily) and from the Russians (economically
and ideologically), Tito vowed never to relinquish Yugoslavia's new status, never to
capitulate to Moscow.
In addition, Tito actively peddled the third-path model (between orthodox
capitalism and Soviet communism), which evidently worried Soviet and Hungarian
officials for a number of reasons, both ideological and political. First, it contradicted
a major condition for earning the right to be a communist state: unswerving
allegiance to Moscow. (One of the "twenty-one conditions" for admission of a
communist party to the Comintern, one will recall, was rigid allegiance to the
Bolshevik party line in Moscow). Tito's third-path concept frightened Moscow
because it provided communists with an ideological sanction for disobedience. Both

21.
RGANI, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 2, L. 3, "Note by K. Voroshilov About a Conversation
with Rkosi," June 26, 1956. Rkosi informed Voroshilov that the Yugoslav official
Vukomanovi-Tempo told him that in the beginning of the war in Korea "guerrilla
bases were created" in Yugoslavia "in case of attack by the Soviet Ammy." N.B.
Yugoslavia's election to the U.N. Security Council in 1950-51 probably increased the
chance of UN intervention if the USSR did attempt to intervene. A desire for such
assistance may have been a motivating factor in Tito's decision to vote in favor of the
UN "police action" against North Korea in 1950.
22.
See Dmitri Volkogonov, "Nesostoyavsheesya Pokushenye: Kak Sovetskii Agent
Maks Gotovilsya k Terroristicheskomu Aktu Protiv Tito," Izvestia, June 11, 1993, p. 7,
No. 109 (23964). Ironically the appointed "hit man" (Joseph Romual'dovich
Grigulevich, alias "Max") was also involved in one of the assassination attempts on
Leon Trotsky in Mexico. Also see Khrushchev, The Glasnost Tapes, 72."[Stalin] was
ready to go to war against Yugoslavia, and I suspect that he was thinking about this,
although I never heard any conversation mentioning military action. Stalin, however,
began to send out agents and put on displays of strength as soon as the break with Tito
occurred."
the Comintern and Cominform had been disbanded - in 1943 and 1956, respectively
- but the CPSU still assumed it should play a leading role in the communist
movement. As Khrushchev explained to Tito, apparently in earnest, "We didn't seek
a leading role; historical conditions have given us this special responsibility, and
now we need to fulfill it."
23

Secondly, in a political context, Tito's advocation of a "third path" bespoke
possible intentions to form "from below" a separate alliance with some of the other
communist countries, excluding the Soviet Union - a new "Little Entente," this time
including Hungary.
24
The notion of intrabloc ties independent of Moscow repelled
Soviet leaders, and the Hungarian leaders dependent on Soviet hegemony, because it
reminded them of the Titoist threat back in the mid-1940s, when Tito strove to form
independent ties with other Balkan countries without Moscow's participation. Tito's
Balkan Pact with Greece and Turkey, established in 1954, was bad enough. Having
ties with these two countries was tantamount to joining NATO, the Soviet leaders
felt.
25
But an alliance of communist countries, or small countries with sizable

23.
RGANI, Rolik 5173, F 5, O 28, D 403, L 2, By I. Vinogradov, to Comrade M. A.
Suslov, "About the Conversations of Comrades N. S. Khrushchev with Comrade Tito
and the Other Leaders, which took place in Yugoslavia and in the Crimea in
September-October, 1956." "Comrade Khrushchev stated that we do not lay claim to
any special leadership, but we understand our responsibility before the peoples'
democracies on the strength of historical conditions, which developed in the struggle
for socialism."
24.
The Little Entente during the interwar period consisted of Yugoslavia,
Czechoslovakia, and Romania (the successor states of the Austro-Hungarian Empire).
This should not be confused with Stalin's plan--when relations with Tito were good--
for the formation of a Balkan Federation consisting of Yugoslavia, Albania. and
Bulgaria. Khrushchev, Glasnost Tapes, 105.
25.
RGANI, F 89, Per 45, Dok 83, L. 10, Resolution of the CC CPSU: "About the Letter
to the CC of the Yugoslav Communist Party, to Tito with Enclosed Text," January 10,
1957. "What also does not help is the position of the Yugoslav comrades in the issue of
communist parties that excluded the Soviet Union could not be tolerated. To the
Soviet leaders, Tito seemed intent on forming such a bloc, or at the very least,
driving a wedge between the USSR and the other bloc countries.
26
They could not
understand the concept of neutralism; any alliance excluding them would ipso facto
be an anti-Soviet alliance. As we saw in the previous chapter, Nagy's attraction to
the concept aroused the Kremlin leaders' suspicion.
Even if a separate bloc or federation were not formed, what the Soviet and
Hungarian authorities feared was the spillover effect," or ideological contagion of
the Hungarian people via the Yugoslav media.
27
As we now know, this was a
genuine concern, particularly in Romania, where students demonstrated in
Bucharest and the Transylvanian cities such as Timioara, Cluj, Trgu Mure, Baia

the two world camps. You repeatedly speak out against military blocs, including the
Warsaw Pact, and declare that Yugoslavia does not belong to any blocs and pacts.
However, one cannot ignore the fact that Yugoslavia belongs to the Balkan Pact, and
the Yugoslav military organs cooperate with the military circles of Greece and Turkey.
Via these partners in the Balkan alliance, you are simultaneously members of
NATO...We cannot ignore the inconsistencies in the official Yugoslav position
regarding blocs and pacts."
26.
See, for example, the anti-Yugoslav report prepared just after the invasion. AVP
RF, f. 077, o. 37, por. 39, p. 191, l. 90. I. K. Zamchevskii, "K Voprosu o Podderzhke
Imre Nadya i ego Politiki Yugoslavskimi Rukovoditelyami, 4-ogo dekabrya 1956 g."
According to a report by Italian comrades, one of the leading workers of the Yugoslav
Union of Communists, Mordi, who is now the director of the Institute of Party
History in Zagreb, insinuated during a conversation with them that the USSR no
longer reflects the interests of the workers of the small countries like Italy and
Yugoslavia, and he even suggested that they 'unite the organizations of the small
countries into their own International, without the USSR.'
27
However, scholars have not been able to ascertain just how much influence Tito's
"third-path" idea had on the Hungarian population as a whole. Soviet fears may have
been unwarranted, given the historic animosity between Hungary and Yugoslavia. The
atrocities perpetrated by Hungarians against Yugoslav citizens in Bscka (in Serbian:
Baka) during World War II, for example, marred relations. Hungarians may have
looked more to Poland-which had never been a military adversary--as a model. See
Paul Zinner, Revolution in Hungary (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962),
179n.
Mare, and Oradea during the 1956 revolution. Polish Ambassador Willman
emphasized the irredentist consequences of "spillover" as well. As he reminisced a
year after the revolution, "the Soviet representatives thought Nagys plea to the UN
to protect Hungary could trigger a war in the middle of Europe. Most endangered
were the neighbors of Hungary (Czechoslovakia and Romania), especially since
some reactionary elements wanted to reshape the border of Hungary by annexing
territories of Hungarys eastern and northern neighbors.
28

Khrushchev himself wrote in his memoirs that, according to KGB sources
"the residents of the border areas in Hungary had begun seeking
contacts with [residents in] the border areas of Czechoslovakia and Romania to
gain direct backing from them."
29
Thus, to some extent, the activities of the
Yugoslav diplomats and journalists in Hungary caused the Soviet leaders to
misinterpret the origins of the revolutionary movement in Hungary. They tended to
think that only a small coterie of writers and intellectuals was causing the trouble,
not the working masses of Hungary. As mentioned earlier, Suslov concluded during
his June visit that "the mood of the workers and peasants" was "healthy."
According to the Malin notes, Molotov made a comment during the October 28 CC
CPSU Presidium meeting that "the initial messages from Comrades Mikoyan and

28
AMSZ (Warsaw), Z.7, T. 553, W. 67, S. 49, Adam Willman, Informacja o
sytuacji w Wgierskiej Republice Ludowej dla Kolegium Ministerstwa Spraw
Zagranicznych na 17.II.1957 r.: Polityka Zagraniczna WRL. N.B. Many
Hungarians stress, however, that irredentist anxieties were unfounded. They insist
that no territorial claims were made on neighboring countries during the crisis.
29
See "Memuary Nikity Sergeevicha Khrushcheva," Voprosy istorii (Moscow), No. 4
(1995), p. 73. cited in Mark Kramer, "Special Feature: New Evidence on Soviet
Decision-Making and the 1956 Polish and Hungarian Crises," CWIHP Bulletin,
(winter 1996/7), vol 8/9, pp. 358-384.
Suslov were reassuring about...[the strength of the Hungarian] government."
During this meeting Molotov stated, in contrast to Suslov, that "the influence of the
[Hungarian communist] party on the masses [was] weak."
30
According to the
Yugoslav ambassador to the USSR (Miunovi), Khrushchev - like Suslov - had also
believed that some Hungarian workers remained loyal to the USSR. During his
meeting with Tito on Brioni on November 2-3, Khrushchev said:
the workers in the Miskolc region, where Hungarian miners had
remained loyal though reactionaries were in power. The Czechs had
given the miners some arms and it might be possible to try some
political action against Nagy with the help of those Hungarian miners
or jointly with them.
31


The Soviet leaders believed the Hungarian intellectuals were being
"infected" by the Yugoslavs.
32
If only Tito would clamp down on them, they
thought, the situation in Hungary would calm down. In the summer months of 1956,
Moscow received numerous reports from Andropov, Ger and others, complaining

30.
RGANI, F. 3, Op.12, D. 1005, Ll. 54-63, "Protokolnaya Zapis Zasedaniya
Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 28-ogo oktyabrya 1956 g. Avtograf Malina.
31.
Veljko Miunovi, Moscow Diary (New York: Garden City, 1980), 134. Of course,
Khrushchev apparently did understand that some workers were "supporting the
uprising," judging from Malin's notes of the October 28 CC CPSU Presidium meeting.
RGANI, F. 3, Op.12, D. 1005, Ll. 54-63, "Protokolnaya Zapis Zasedaniya Prezidiuma
TsK KPSS, 28-ogo oktyabrya 1956 g. Avtograf Malina.
32.
AVP RF, Fond 077, O 37, Papka 191, D. 39, L. 75. August 23, 1956, "About the
Activities of the Workers of the Yugoslav Mission in Budapest, Hindering the
Normalization of Hungarian-Yugoslav Relations From the Soviet Embassy in
Budapest." "It should be noted that there are people in the Yugoslav mission in
Budapest who not only harbor hatred toward the USSR, but try to undertake actions
which have an obviously hostile character regarding the USSR. Also see RGANI, F 89,
Per 45, Dok 5, Sept. 17, 1956. Gromyko wrote that "the reactionary part of the
intelligentsia and the opportunist elements in the party are conducting a policy to try
to rip Hungary away from the Warsaw Pact and replace USSR influence with Yugoslav
influence (emphasis added)."
about Yugoslav influence.
33
It is significant that during the October 28 CC CPSU
Presidium meeting Khrushchev thought he could use the Yugoslavs' influence on
Hungary to Soviet advantage. He asked his colleagues: Would it not be appropriate
if the Yugoslavs appealed to the Hungarians?
34
The other bloc countries - China,
Bulgaria, Poland, and Czechoslovakia - were also mentioned in the same sentence. As a
result of this decision, the CPSU Presidium sent a cable to Tito expressing support for
Nagy's new government and for the statement Nagy issued on October 28. The
following day, October 29, the Yugoslav government published a message to the MDP,
in Politika (the main Belgrade daily), which urged "an end to the fratricidal struggle"
and warned that "further bloodshed would only harm the interests of the Hungarian
working people and socialism, and would only promote the aims of reactionaries."
In the months leading up to the October crisis, the Soviet and Hungarian
leaders tried several times to get Tito to exert pressure on his diplomats and
journalists. When the Hungarian envoy Kurimszki visited Tito on Brioni on July 21,
1956, to deliver the official note about Rkosi's resignation, he also reminded Tito
about the Yugoslav radio broadcasts and articles that appeared in the newspapers
Borba and Politika written by journalists Gavro Altman and Julius uka.

33.
See AVP RF, F 77, O 37, Por 9, P 187, D 036, L. 55-56. From the Diary of V. N.
Kelin, "Notes of a Conversation with the Employee of the Newspaper Npszava,
Lorant, and the Editor of the Journal Csillag, Kirly," June 17, 1956. "Lately the
Hungarian intelligentsia is very strongly attracted to the Yugoslav question. The fact
that Tito went to Moscow through Romania, and not by the more natural route--
through Budapest--is seen as an open demonstration against Hungary. In Hungary
Dedijer's biography of Tito is passed from hand to hand. It was published in the
Hungarian language for Hungarians living in Yugoslavia. The book is enjoying
exceptional success..."
34.
RGANI, F. 3, Op.12, D. 1005, Ll. 54-63, "Protokolnaya Zapis Zasedaniya
Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 28-ogo oktyabrya 1956 g. Avtograf Malina.
Kurimszki compared the roles of Tibor Dry and Tibor Tardos with the activities of
Milovan ilas, a close friend of Tito whom Tito had abruptly dismissed from
government service in 1954, just as ilas was about to assume the presidency.
(ilass support of the later Hungarian revolution, expressed in an article in The
New Leader brought him a prison term in November 1956, which was further
extended in 1957 when his influential book criticizing the Communist oligarchy, The
New Class, was published in the West.).
35
Tito evidently ignored Kurimszki.
36
The
issue was raised again when Mikoyan visited Tito on the same day,
37
and when
Khrushchev, Tito, Ger, Kdr, and others convened in the Crimea (Yalta) in
September-October, 1956.
38
(Earlier, on September 3, the CPSU had warned all the
East European communist parties in a secret letter not to "take the Yugoslav
example" too seriously. The purpose of the Crimea meeting was, in part, for
Khrushchev and Tito to iron out their differences, as well as to decide whether and
when to stage Rajk's ceremonial reburial.) "The Yugoslav mission in Budapest

35.
AVP RF, F 077, O 37, P 191, D 39, L 41, To Shepilov from Andropov, "About the
Visit of Kurimszki, the Hungarian Envoy, with Tito in Yugoslavia (Brioni)," July 21,
1956. Tibor Dry and Tibor Tardos were veteran Hungarian communist writers who
later turned against the Rkosi regime in the summer and fall of 1956. See Milovan
ilas, The Storm in Eastern Europe, The New Leader (November 19, 1956), pp. 3-6.
36.
Ibid., L. 41. "Tito didn't answer this question; he was only interested in what kinds
of elements participated in the Petfi Circle discussions. 'I've been informed that the
majority of those present were workers and only comrades who didn't oppose what
was being said there.'"
37.
AVP RF, F 077, 0 37, P 191, D 39, L. 81. Ern Ger, in a talk with Andropov, said
that Mikoyan called him from Sophia, Bulgaria, and reported that the Yugoslavs had
"agreed to try not to support the hostile elements in the press and radio, although they
did not give firm assurances."
38.
RGANI, Rolik 5173, F 5, 0 28, D 403, L. 9, By I. Vinogradov, to Comrade M. A.
Suslov, "About the Conversations of Comrades N. S. Khrushchev with Comrade Tito
and the Other Leaders, Which Took Place in Yugoslavia and in the Crimea in
September-October, 1956."
openly maintains ties with people in opposition to the CC MDP ...[and] the Yugoslav
newspapers shield the opportunists banished from the communist party...for
example, Imre Nagy in Hungary," Khrushchev claimed.
39

Critics might argue that the dissident Hungarian intellectuals were actively
seeking out the Yugoslav diplomats and journalists, not the other way around. Some
of Belgrade's activities - dispatching its envoys to Hungarian factories and
provincial towns to advocate the "Yugoslav model," for example - might have been
rather aggressive, they would argue, but not "ordinary" diplomatic conversations,
because the Hungarians singled out Belgrade's representatives to initiate these
conversations. After all, Yugoslavia had just mended its relations with the Soviet
Union, these critics would argue, and wanted to avoid arousing Khrushchev's
suspicions. However, while this argument may seem logical, too many diplomatic
reports illustrating the proactive Yugoslav stance disprove it. In most cases, the
Yugoslavs initiated the conversations.
Moreover, one must not overlook Tito's own Machiavellian instincts. Since
his death in 1980 a spate of biographies has been published, reappraising Tito's
character and policies. They challenge the orthodox view of his official biographer,
Vladimir Dedijer, and describe Tito's skills of Realpolitik.
40
Undoubtedly Tito - like

39.
Ibid.
40
This study will attempt to synthesize the latest reassessments of Tito as ambitious
opportunist rather than dogmatist. See, for example, Veselin Djureti, Saveznici i
Jugoslavenska Ratna Drama [The Allies and the Yugoslav War Drama] (Belgrade:
Balkanoloski institut SANU, 1985); Stevan K. Pavlowitch, Tito, Yugoslavia's Great
Dictator: A Reassessment (London: C. Hurst, 1992); Kosta Cavoski, Tito--
Tehnologija Vlasti (Belgrade: Dosije, 1991); Michael Lees, The Rape of Serbia: The
British Role in Tito's Grab for Power, 1943--44, 1st ed. (San Diego, Calif.: Harcourt,
Brace, and Jovanovich, 1990); Nora Beloff, Tito's Flawed Legacy: Yugoslavia and the
the Yugoslav diplomats and journalists - sincerely believed in the superiority of the
"Yugoslav way" and the equality of all communist countries. Yet, as an experienced
politician, he probably realized the usefulness of the third-path rhetoric. Permitting
his subordinates freedom of expression won the approval of American
policymakers, especially of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles.
At the same time, much like Dulles's own "Liberation" policy (to be
discussed in Chapter Six), the third-path rhetoric created the illusion of being on the
offensive, of encouraging its supporters. ("Liberation," it will be recalled, was
coined by Dulles during the 1952 presidential campaign as an alternative to the
more passive-sounding "containment" strategy of Truman and the Democrats,
whom Dulles accused of being "soft on communism"). To some degree, as we shall
see, Tito's call for "alternative roads to communism" served later to mask his own
secret fears about the Hungarian uprising.
Many have also assumed that Tito wholeheartedly approved of Nagy's
policies and the independence movement. Publicly, it is true, Tito was propounding
the third-path rhetoric, "different roads to socialism," and noninterference in the
internal affairs of sovereign countries. It was known that Nagy, like Tito, was also
attracted to the Five Principles (Pancha Shila) espoused at the 1955 Bandung
Conference. In early 1956, as mentioned earlier, Imre Nagy was writing his
"dissertation" On Communism, the third chapter of which is devoted to these
principles, including: 1) mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and

West Since 1939 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985); David Martin, The Web of
Disinformation: Churchill's Yugoslav Blunder, 1st ed. (San Diego, Calif.: Harcourt,
Brace, and Jovanovich, 1990).
sovereignty; 2) mutual nonaggression; 3) mutual noninterference in each other's
internal affairs; 4) equality and mutual benefit; and 5) peaceful coexistence.
41
Nagy
argued that the principles must extend not only to the Third World, or to the
capitalist system, but also "to the relations between the countries within the
democratic and socialist camp."
42
(Interestingly, according to the Malin notes, the
Pancha Shila was mentioned during the CC CPSU Presidium meeting on October
30, 1956 by Kaganovich, who said "I don't think they [the Hungarians] should
propose that we build our relations on the principles of Pancha Shila").
43

Little did the world realize that Tito, like Khrushchev, was caught off guard
by the October-November, 1956 events in Hungary, specifically when the
Hungarians' anti-Soviet mood shifted to an anti-communist mood. In Chapter Four
we shall see that, despite his outward support of Nagy, Tito felt threatened by
Nagy's movement and attempted to cooperate with Khrushchev behind the scenes.

Wadysaw Gomuka
In addition to Yugoslavia, Hungarians also looked to Poland as a model of
national communism. Both Slavic countries had successfully defied Moscow. Like

41.
See Imre Nagy, On Communism: In Defense of the New Course (New York:
Praeger, 1957), 22-23. Chinese prime minister Zhou Enlai and Indian prime minister
Jawaharlal Nehru first endorsed these principles in a joint statement in New Delhi on
June 28, 1954. The principles were intended to "guide relations between the two
countries" as well as "relations with other countries in Asia and in other parts of the
world." For the full text of the statement, see G. V. Ambekar and V. D. Divekar, eds.,
Documents on China's Relations with South and South-East Asia (1949-1962) (New
York: Allied Publishers, 1964), pp. 7-8.
42.
Ibid.
43
RGANI, F. 3, Op.12, D. 1006, Ll. 6-14 "Protokolnaya Zapis Zasedaniya
Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 30-ogo oktyabrya 1956 g. Avtograf Malina.
Josip Broz Tito, Wadysaw Gomuka, as the leader of Poland, had managed to
remain true to his communist convictions without slavishly aping Soviet leaders. A
closer look at Gomuka's past will be useful, both to understand the Polish
"October" discussed below and to answer the question (addressed in Chapter
Four): why did the Soviet Union intervene in Hungary but not in Poland?
Historians have described Gomuka as more Machiavellian than Nagy.
44

Much of Gomuka's attraction was his closeness to the workers, an image bolstered
by his pre-war history of organizing strikes. He had no formal education; at the age
of fourteen, he became a blacksmith's apprentice and two years later, began to
organize a union. His admittance into the clandestine Communist Party of Poland in
1926 and election as national secretary of the Chemical Workers' Union in 1930
brought him into repeated clashes with the police. Over his lifetime, Gomuka was
imprisoned four different times: in 1926 for revolutionary activity; in 1932 for
organizing a textile strike at d in 1936 for revolutionary activity in Silesia and
in July 1951 for "nationalist deviationist crimes" including his opposition to the
Cominform in September 1947.
Gomuka had also fiercely opposed the German Nazis in underground
Poland in the 1940s. Codenamed "Wiesaw," he planned anti-Nazi sabotage and

44
The analysis of political personalities in an exercise in relativity, of course.
Wadysaw Gomuka was certainly less skilled in communist Realpolitik than GDR
leader Walter Ulbricht, who stayed in power the longest. Gomuka's naivety
eventually led to his downfall in December 1970. For a perceptive comparison of
these two leaders, see the memoirs of Gomuka's Polish-German interpreter Erwin
Weit, At the Red Summit: Interpreter Behind the Iron Curtain (NY: Macmillan Pub.
Co., 1973), pp. 173-175 passim.
terrorism. These anti-German, anti-fascist sentiments ran deep, facilitating his
ability to cooperate with the Soviet Union later in 1956.
Gomuka did not oppose the Germans on ideological grounds alone. He was
also keenly aware of the irredentist tensions associated with the new territory
Poland had acquired from Germany on the basis of the Potsdam Agreement in 1945.
In fact, in June 1945 he was placed in charge of the so-called Recovered Territories
on Poland's western border. Even in 1956, despite the Ulbricht regime's official
propaganda, Gomuka felt threatened by German revisionism. At one point he
angrily asked Marshal Rokossowski: "Why did we in fact pay reparations to the
Germans? It was explained that a certain section of German territory went to
Poland, but we were not in fact allies of the Germans during the war....I would
never have agreed to this!"
45

Thus, Gomuka especially appreciated the presence of the Soviet troops in
Poland to help defend Poland's western border. He was not about to submit to
popular demand for their withdrawal. He grasped the fact that, ultimately, only the
USSR could guarantee Poland's new western frontiers. In his speech to the Eighth
Plenum on October 19, Gomuka told the Polish communists: "Poland needs
friendship with the Soviet Union more than the Soviet Union needs friendship with
Poland. ...Without the Soviet Union we cannot maintain our borders with the
West."
46
These security concerns enabled him to empathize with Khrushchev's own
concerns about the security of the USSR's western borders; Poland was the Soviet

45
AAN (Warsaw), KC PZPR, paczka 12, teczka 46a, s. 29-36, "Nieautoryzowane
Wystapenie tow. Wiesawa na posiedzeniu Biura Politycznego w dniu 12
padziernika 1956 r.."
46
Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: the Glasnost Tapes, p. 115.
link to the German Democratic Republic, where a huge Soviet army was stationed.
According to his recently declassified, handwritten account of the October 19
Polish-Soviet confrontation, Gomuka wrote: "Poland is not Bulgaria or Hungary--
together with the USSR it's the most important [country in the region].....Without us
[Poland], it's not possible [for the Soviet Union] to organize a defense against
imperialism.
47

In Poland, as in the other "satellite" countries a rift existed between the so-
called Stalinist "Muscovites" (communist leaders who stayed in the USSR during
World War II) and the "home communists" (those who had languished in Stalinist
prisons at home). In Poland, however, the Muscovites (e.g. Bolesaw Bierut, Hilary
Minc, Jakub Berman, Edward Ochab, and others) never quite established dominance
in the Polish communist party in the early postwar years. Wadysaw Gomuka and
the indigenous communist underground had had too much authority.
48
Gomuka had
been one of the earliest re-organizers of the Polish communist movement in the 1940s.
Having organized the underground Communist party in Poland without Moscow's
help, indeed despite Moscow's collaboration with the Gestapo to sabotage the PPR,
Gomuka--somewhat like Tito in Yugoslavia--learned how to deal with problems

47
Gomuka Family Private Papers. See translation of Gomuka's notes in L. W.
Gluchowski, "Poland, 1956: Khrushchev, Gomuka, and the 'Polish October'",
Document 2, Cold War International History Bulletin, issue 5, Spring 1995
(Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars), p. 42.
48
See Kecskemeti, op.cit. on this point, p. 135. Despite the fact that Bierut was
thirteen years older than Gomuka and more trusted by Moscow leaders, he had
arrived late in Poland from German-occupied Minsk, in the middle of 1943, after
Gomuka had already established himself as one of the founders of the new party,
the Polish Workers' Party (Polska Partia Robotnicza, or PPR.)
confidently without Soviet assistance.
49
Already a fierce resistance leader in southeast
Poland, Gomuka courageously moved to Warsaw in July 1942 during the German
occupation, where he became a district secretary and member of the Central
Committee of the newly founded Polish Workers' Party (Polska Partia Robotnicza, or
PPR). In November 1943, Gomuka was appointed general secretary of the PPR
(derisively dubbed Platne Pacholki Rosji, or "paid lackeys of Russia.") Faced with
many obstacles, Gomuka developed into a bold politician, swiftly eliminating all
opposition to communist rule. He strongly advocated the December 1948 merger, on
Communist terms, of the PPR with the Polish Socialist Party (Polska Partia
Socjalistyczna, or PPS) to form the "Polish United Workers Party" (Polska
Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza or PZPR). He also led the struggle to crush the Polish
Peasant Party (Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe, or PSL).
50
However, he fought to prevent
the merger of the PPR with the Polish Social Democratic Party.
51
In August 1948
Gomuka became one of the first victims of the anti-Titoist witch-hunt, roughly the
Polish equivalent of Lszl Rajk in Hungary. Gomuka had opposed rapid
collectivization and the Cominform policy laid down by Soviet Politburo member
Andrei Aleksandrovich Zhdanov of strict adherence to the Moscow center at the

49
In one of his RFE broadcasts in Munich in 1954, wiato wrote "Parachuted into
Poland as a man trusted by Moscow, he [Nowotko] had two tasks. He had to
organize the PPR and fill it with Moscow men. At the same time he was to unravel
the net of the Polish underground and liquidate it...he brought specific Soviet
instructions ordering him to form close political collaboration with the Gestapo. "
Cited in Bethell, op. cit. 277.
50
He is credited with writing the Party's ideological manifesto and helping to
establish the National Home Council (Krajowa Rada Narodowa, KRN) in
cooperation with other leftist groups.
51
This merger eventually took place in December 1948, after Gomuka was ousted
as Secretary General and Bierut occupied the position.
expense of a unique Polish "road to socialism." As punishment, Gomuka was
dismissed from his post as general (first) secretary, expelled from the Central
Committee and the party in January 1949, and finally arrested in August 1951.
Open criticism of the Bierut and Ochab regimes by writers began in the fall
of 1954, earlier in Poland than in Hungary, sparked by Jzef wiato's macabre
broadcasts via Radio Free Europe (RFE) in 1954. wiato, a lieutenant-colonel in
the Tenth Department of the UB from 1949 to 1953, defected to the West in
December 1953. He thoroughly exposed his secret police colleagues using the media
of RFE and BBC.
52
The public outcry led to Gomuka's release from house arrest
late in 1954. Throughout 1955 increasingly candid articles appeared in journals
such as Nowa Kultura, Przeglqd Kulturalny, and Po Prostu.
53


52
Another key defector, Seweryn Bialer, provided Americans with a wealth of
information. Bialer (now head of Columbia University's Research Institute on
International Change) enlightened the CIA on the factional struggles with the Polish
government and helped leak Khrushchev's Secret Speech to CIA Director Allen
Dulles. In a discussion with Hungarian leaders soon after the stormy Petfi Circle
debate and Pozna riot about the uncontrolled press, Khrushchev added that "the
situation is the worst and most intense in the Polish party."As an example,
Khrushchev said he heard that "in the wojewoda of Cracow seventeen copies of
[his] speech were not returned to the party organization and were currently being
sold for 200 zoty." Ochab told him these speeches were not originals they had been
"written by subversive elements." Bulganin added that foreign press offices "now
have three different versions of the speech." Khrushchev then mentioned "the
defection of a Pole named Bialer." "The Polish comrades responded that Bialer
could not have gotten this document, but "he had acquired a speech of comrade
Bierut which had quoted the speech." See MOL M-KS-276-52/34 (MDP),
30.VI.1956, old. 9-10. Khrushchev's Secret Speech was published in full in the New
York Times in June, just days before the outbreak of the Pozna revolt (June 28,
1956).
53
These include Adam Wayk's famous Poem for Adults, an article in Po Prostu
entitled "Behind the Yellow Curtains" about special stores for communist elites,
and numerous others by Leszek Koakowski (philosopher and playwright), Jan Kott
(Shakespearean critic), Jerzy Putrament (novelist), and others.
Just two weeks after Khrushchev delivered his Secret Speech on February
25, Ochab replaced Bolesaw Bierut, who had died ostensibly of a heart attack
during the Twentieth Party Congress in Moscow, on March 12, 1956.
54
While Ochab
had lived in the USSR during World War II and developed strong loyalty to
Moscow, he was nevertheless a middle-of-the-roader ("the Polish Hamlet") who
eventually relinquished power peacefully to Gomuka. He admitted that Gomuka
should not have been arrested as a "rightist deviationist," and agreed to nominate
him and his closest political allies (e.g. Marian Spychalski, Zenon Kliszko, Ignacy
Loga-Sowiski, and others) for Politburo membership at the Eighth Plenum of the
Polish United Workers Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza, or PZPR),
which was set to take place on October 17, 1956.
55
Earlier in May, 1956 Ochab also
dismissed the Stalinist Jakub Berman from the Politburo and forced the latter to
relinquish the deputy premiership.
56


Pozna Revolt (June 28, 1956)
Demands for Gomuka's readmittance to a top leadership position increased
especially after the Pozna Revolt. On Saturday, June 23, 1956, workers of the
Pozna Stalin Works [Zakady Imieniem Stalina, Poznan, or ZISPO] locomotive

54
According to Dr. Fejgin, Bierut's physician, Bierut died of a heart attack. See
AAN (Warsaw) PZPR "Speech by Jozef Cyrankiewicz, Information about the
course of Comrade [Bolesaw] Bierut's illness, Protocols of the VI Plenum CC
PZPR, March 20, 1956," paczka 70, teczka 24. Source provided by Dr. L. W.
Gluchowski. There were rumors, however, that Bierut was murdered or committed
suicide.
55
It was later moved to October 19. (Soon after his election in April 1956 as the new
party secretary, Ochab had initially reiterated charges of "nationalist deviation"
against Gomuka, but he later changed his views).
56
Kecskemeti, op cit., 139.
plant in Pozna (Poland's fourth largest city) met and decided to send a delegation
to Warsaw to persuade the central authorities to meet five key demands, including a
20 per cent wage increase. By June 28 the delegation had still not received an
answer from the authorities about the wage increase, and rumors were also
spreading that this delegation had been arrested.
57
Thus, early that Thursday
morning (later known as "Black Thursday"), the night and day shifts of ZISPO
(which employed a total of 12,000 workers) decided to stage a demonstration.
58

Assuming the original ZISPO delegation had been arrested, the crowd first attacked
the city jail, freed the prisoners, and seized weapons from the guards. (According to
Edward Gierek, then a PZPR Politburo member in charge of heavy industry and
transport, the demonstrators "armed themselves with monkey wrenches, sticks,
crowbars, and sometimes even with pistols.")
59
Then the workers attacked the radio
station engaged in jamming Western broadcasts. Still looking for allegedly arrested
delegates, the demonstrators next attacked the building of the District Office of
Security (Wojewdzki Urzqd Bezpieczenstwa). This is where the first shots were fired

57
The minor demands relating to bonuses and repayment of taxes, however, had
been met. On the rumors about the arrest see PZPR 237/V/237, Polska
Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza Komitet Centralny SekretariatNarada
powicona omwieniu wypadkw poznaskich, 7. VII.56 , s.9.
58
The workers apparently wanted to capitalize on the fact that many Western
reporters were present in Pozna to cover the Twenty-Fifth International Fair that
had opened on June 17.
59
PZPR (Warsaw) 237/V/237 Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza Komitet
Centralny SekretariatNarada powicona omwieniu wypadkw poznaskich, 7.
VII.56, s. 7, Gierek eventually succeeded Gomuka as First Secretary in 1970. He
resigned from this post in 1980 after the Gdask accords were signed (August 1980).
about eleven o'clock.
60
The demonstration escalated into large antigovernment riots
in Pozna and other Polish cities.
New documents indicate that the Polish military was perhaps less efficient in
suppressing the Pozna revolt than previously thought. According to Polish
historian Edward Jan Nalepa, who has done extensive archival research,
"Everybody waited for events to develop, which became increasingly dramatic with
each passing hour."
61
After a flurry of initial phone calls, an emergency session of
the PZPR Central Committee was convened at 10:00 a.m. on June 28.
62
The
objective was to decide how "to preserve public order" using only the Citizens'
Militia [Milicja Obywatelska, or MO] and the Polish Internal Security Corps
[Korpus Bezpiecenstwa Wewnetrzego, or KBW]" without asking for reinforcements
from outside of the city." Brigadier General Wodzimierz Mu (head of the KBW)
suggested calling in additional armored KBW units stationed near Szczytno,
because the local KBW units were inadequate. (These KBW forces in Pozna
consisted of only 329 soldiers, including 62 officers, and they were already busy

60
Edward Jan Nalepa, Pacyfikacja Zbuntowanego Miasta. Wojsko Polskie w Czerwcu
1956 r. w Poznaniu w swietle dokumentw wojskowych (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo
Bellona, 1992), p. 22. Also Konrad Syrop, Spring in October: The Story of the Polish
Revolution [of] 1956 (NY: Frederick A. Praeger, 1957), pp. 49-52 passim.
61
Nalepa, op. cit., p. 23.
62
Ibid. At 6:30 a.m. on June 28, Jzef Lipiski, commander of the Tenth Division of
the KBW was the first person to deliver the message to Brigadier General
Wodzimierz Mu (head of the KBW) about the possibility of street demonstrations
in Pozna. Mu then called Franciszek Jwiak, Deputy Prime Minister. Around
7:00 a.m. Leon Stasiak, the first secretary of the PZPR Central Committee in
Pozna, informed Ochab about the situation. General Ryszard Dobieszak,
commander of the MO, Wadysaw Wicha, the Minister of Internal Affairs, and
Witold Sienkiewicz, Chairman of the Committee for Public Security Affairs
[Komitet do Spraw Bezpieczestwa Publicznego] were also informed early that
morning.
guarding transport lines, stores, and other key points in the city).
63
However, since
these reinforcements could not arrive until the next day, June 29, the PZPR and
military officials decided finally to call in regular army units. In a somewhat
disorganized manner on June 28 and 29, these regular units of the Ministry of
National Defense, along with MO units, pursued insurgents hiding on rooftops and
higher floors of buildings. Close analysis reveals that there were no evacuation and
defense plans for even the most strategic public buildings in Pozna.
64
The local
police departments did not cooperate with the MO units (in large part because the
demonstrators had robbed the police of their weapons).
65

There has also been some controversy about the number of casualties in the
Pozna uprising. According to the original report of the Polish Press Agency [Polska
Agencja Prasowa] on June 30, 1956, thirty-eight people were killed and 270
injured.
66
Later, on July 17, 1956, Marian Rybicki (the Polish Chief Public
Prosecutor) revealed in an interview that the death toll was actually fifty-three, if
one included those who died in the hospitals.
67
Rybicki announced that nine soldiers

63
Ibid.
64
Ibid.
65
Ibid. According to Nalepa, Colonel Pietrzak, the commander of the Citizens'
Militia in Pozna received a report about the the ZISPO workers' demonstration at
6.30 a.m. He merely sent a few patrols to report on the general location of
demonstrators. Then, as late as 6:00 p.m. that day, Pietrzak decided to move all
policemen back to their departments to avoid the robberies, but it was already too
late.
66
See "The Events in Pozna," Borba [Yugoslav newspaper], 1 July 1956, cited in
Zinner, op. cit., 139. Also cited in Nalepa, Pacyfikacja zbuntowanego miasta, op.cit.,
55.
67
This figure (53 deaths) has been quoted most often in secondary sources. See
See Syrop, op. cit., 42; Bethell, op. cit., 208; and Mark Kramer, "Hungary and
Poland, 1956: Khrushchev's CPSU CC Presidium Meeting on East European
and employees of the State Security Ministry (Urzd Bezpieczestwa, or UB) were
killed. He estimated the number of injured people to have been around 300,
including 21 Polish Army soldiers, 13 UB employees and 5 militia members. More
recent scholarship reveals that at least 73 people died, possibly more.
68


Rkosi Government's Reaction to the Pozna Revolt
The Pozna revolt of June 28-29 shocked the MDP leadership. Just one day
earlier, a tumultuous press debate took place in Budapest, which was sponsored by
the Petfi Circle. Participants at these Petfi Circle meetings had steadily multiplied
in the months following the Congress. In his telegram to Moscow, Mikoyan referred
to this Petfi Circle debate of June 27 as "an ideological Pozna without gunshots."
He continued "We should remember that in Pozna there were no direct
counterrevolutionary attacks. Thus, the absence of counterrevolutionary slogans in
the Petfi Circle should not reassure the Hungarian communists."
69

At that time, of course, Mtys Rkosi was still in power, although he had
only three weeks left. Judging from Andrs Hegeds' memoirs, Suslov's visit to
Budapest earlier that month had convinced Rkosi of Moscow's unwavering

Crises, 24 October 1956," Cold War International History Bulletin, issue 5, Spring
1995 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars), 50.
68
See Jarosaw Maciejewski and Zofia Trojanowicz, eds. Poznanski Czerwiec
(Pozna, Poznaskie, 1990). These editors composed a list of 100 people. In another
study published the same year, the number of deaths is stated to be 73. See
Aleksander Ziemkowski, Poznanski Czerwiec 1956 (n.p. 1981), 2nd ed. Cited also in
Nalepa, op. cit., 55.
69
RGANI, f. 89, op. 2, d. 2, l. 61. "Informatsiya Mikoyana iz Budapeshta, 18 iulya
1956." It should be noted, however that the Petfi Circles role in the October 23
demonstration was minimal.
support.
70
Rkosi thus convened a meeting of the MDP Political (Central)
Committee on June 28 to "rehearse" for the more major meeting of this body two
days later, on June 30. The purpose of this practice session was threefold: 1) to
condemn and curtail the activities of the DISZ Petfi Kr; 2) to point out which
politicians had attended Nagy's birthday celebration and to reduce Nagy's growing
influence; and 3) to criticize those who believed Hungarian policy toward
Yugoslavia had been wrong in previous years.
71
At the MDP Central Committee
meeting two days later (June 30), Rkosi called for a resolution against the Petfi
Circle, which was later published in Szabad Np on July 1, 1956. Citing the "anti-
Soviet nature" of the speakers' remarks at the Petfi Circle debate and Pozna
crisis in Poland, Rkosi sought to punish the Petfi Circle and sharply curtail
freedom of the press. "This was the most seriously organized attack against our
peoples democratic order, and against the workers class we have seen in some
time!" Rkosi exclaimed.
72
He was shocked that even "members of the Central
Leadership, a Deputy Minister, the President of the Pest Countys Council and
similar functionaries were present," because this strengthened even more "the
growing right-wing attacks." People were so eager to get good seats that they
"presented false invitations and took their places hours before the beginning of the
ceremony." Rkosi was also disgusted that


70
Andrs Hegeds, A Trtnelem s a Hatalom Igzetben; letrajzi Elemzsek
(Budapest, Kossuth, 1988), old. 261.
71
Kroly Urban and Istvn Vida, Az MDP Politikai Bizottsga, 1956, jnius 28-i
lsnek jegyzknyve, Trsadalmi Szemle (1993), vol. 2, p. 85.
72
MOL (Budapest) M-KS-276-52/34 . e., (MDP), old. 14, Budapest, 30.VI.1956
Foreign journalists were also present, taking pictures. Some of the speakers
attacked the party leadership, and the party itself in carefully prepared, written
speeches. Some utilized clever demagoguery invoking the XXth Congress; they
spoke of freedom and the youth of 48, enticing the audience to commit hostile
acts.
73


Rkosi used the event to attack the Nagy group. "We have to tighten our partys
ranks. This is even more important because, on the occasion of Imre Nagys
[sixtieth] birthday this month, a group of comrades got togetheramong them two
members of the Central Leadershipcomrades Czottner and Boros."
74
Rkosi
realized how much Nagy had in common with Gomuka. Both men were devoted to
the communist ideology and received their ideological training in Moscow.
75
Both
had once held top positions in their respective communist parties.
76
Both were
ostracized from the communist party due to their stubborn adherence to nationalist

73
Ibid., old. 14. The reference is to March 15, 1848, a key date in Hungarians'
revolutionary struggles for independence. Two especially vocal speakers in the
Petfi Circle, Tibor Dry and Tibor Tardos, were expelled from the MDP, but
readmitted in September 1956.
74
On June 6 about one hundred people gathered in Imre Nagy's apartment on Ors
street to celebrate Nagy's 60th birthday. Sndor Czottner (1903-1980) served as
Hungarian Minister of Mining and Energy from 1950 to October 31, 1956. From
1957 until 1963 he was the Minister of Heavy Industry. Gergely Boros was a more
minor member of the MDP Central Leadership in October 1956. Other visitors
included MDP Central Leadership member Lajos Fehr, playwright Gyula Illys,
composer Zoltn Kodly, historian Domokos Kosry, and writer Pter Veres.
75
According to the Osteuropa Handbuch Polen (Cologne 1959), Gomuka studied at
the International Lenin School in Moscow, 1934-35. As biographer Nicholas Bethell
points out, for some reason this piece of information is omitted in an earlier
biographical pamphet entitled Wadysaw Comuka--Wiesaw, Dzieje, Walki i Mysli
(od, 1947). Gomuka was born on February 6, 1905 in the Biaobrzegi district of
Krosno, at that time this part of Poland was ruled by Austria-Hungary. He was
greatly influenced by his father Jan, a Socialist and laborer in the oil fields who had
emigrated with his wife--before Wadysaw's birth--to the United States, but had
emigrated back to Poland, disillusioned. See Nicholas Bethell, Comuka, op.cit., pp.
2, 13.
76
In December 1945, at the First Congress of the PPR in Warsaw, Gomuka was
elected a member of the Politburo and secretary general of the Central Committee.
convictions and disapproval of fast-paced collectivization, as well as their refusal to
recant. The popularity of both "reformist" communist leaders wronged by
Stalinists had risen sharply in the era of destalinization.
Sensitive to the growing criticism against himself for not implementing the
lessons of the Twentieth Party Congress fast enough, Rkosi added: "This does not
mean the repression of edifying judgment and debate which solidifies our free,
socialist order."
77
Genuinely alarmed, Rkosi and other hard-liners believed the
"Pozna provocation has spurred a growth in enemy activity inside the peoples
democracies; including our own backyard....[T]he enemy is using all instruments at
his disposal to discredit the outcome of the XXth Congress. It is trying to sow
confusion between the party and the worker masses."
Pozna's famous international fair permitted Rkosi to raise the specter of
foreign espionage. He said "A few days before the fair, the Americans had sent
many groups of parachuting, armed saboteurs."
78
Jnos Tausz, Minister of Internal
Trade, supported Rkosi on the need to issue a resolution to suppress the Petfi
Circle. "We have tolerated too many right-wing manifestations in the last few
months under the guise of developing open criticism."
79
He added:
After reading the papers this morning about the events in Pozna [this has]
become my opinion. We shouldnt play with fire, and without further delay the
party must issue a resolution clearly stating its point of view, because I maintain
that this will aid the development of rightful criticism...We are still too close to
the Horthy regimes reign of horror we can't afford such luxuries. After the

77
MOL (Budapest ) M-KS-276-52/34 .e., (MDP), old. 14, Budapest, 30.VI. 1956.
78
Ibid., old. 14.
79
Ibid., old. 24-25 [this author's emphasis added].
events in Czechoslovakia and Poland, we must step up resolutely so that the
working class sees crystal clearly the party line and the partys point of view.
80


In the opinion of Tausz, Andrs Hegeds, and other officials, the source of
the problem was not with the "fight against bureaucracy," but rather with the
press. They had been discussing one particular article in Szabad Np on June 24 that
had praised the Petfi Circle debates. Hegeds agreed that "by now a big part of the
media is not controlled by the party anymore." He said:
Comrade Khrushchev emphasized very starkly the incidents occurring
in...Poland with serious implications for the whole international workers
movement. How serious would the situation be if events like those taking place
in Poland occurred in the Soviet Union or other peoples democracies? This
would cause inestimable damage to human progress, to the cause of socialism.
This issue must not only be viewed from a Hungarian angle, but also from an
international angle.
81



Gomuka and the Polish "October"


Meanwhile, back in Poland soon after the Pozna uprising, the Ochab
regime dismissed several senior Stalinist officials and exposed economic failures.
Workers' councils mushroomed around the country, independent of the party and
trade unions, thus signaling the need for political reforms to accompany the
administrative changes. Over a million Polish citizens convened on August 26 at the
Jasna Gra monastery at Czstochowa, a shrine that had survived a Swedish

80
Ibid. The phrase "events in Czechoslovakia" in all likelihood refers to the lesser
known abortive student revolts in Prague and Bratislava, April--May, 1956. See
John P. C. Matthews, "Majales: the Abortive Student Revolt in Czechoslovakia in
1956," CWIHP Working Paper No. 24, Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars, September 1998, pp. 5-37.
81
MOL (Budapest) M-KS27652/34 o e, (MDP) old. 33, 30 jnius 1956.
invasion three hundred years earlier, in 1655. This pilgrimage signified the Polish
peoples' expectations for a reassessment of Polish-Soviet relations.
Opposition party members during the Seventh Plenum of the PZPR Central
Committee called for Gomuka's rehabilitation and readmission into the PZPR,
which occurred in August 1956. Ochab admitted that Gomuka should not have
been arrested as a "rightist deviationist," and agreed to nominate him and his
closest political allies (e.g. Marian Spychalski, Zenon Kliszko, Ignacy Loga-
Sowiski, and others) for Politburo membership at the Eighth Plenum of the Polish
United Workers Party (Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza, or PZPR), which
was set to take place on October 17, 1956.
82

Like the Pozna revolt, the so-called Polish "October" four months later
had an enormous effect on Hungary, especially on students and the intelligentsia.
In Warsaw, just as the PZPR Central Committee was about to convene (and
Gomuka about to be elected First Secretary), the Soviet leadership on October 19
ordered its troops to advance toward Warsaw. Stationed in northern and western
Poland, their purpose was likely to intimidate the Polish leadership. Polish troops
loyal to Gomuka responded by taking up defensive positions around the capital.
Earlier in September the Polish leadership had insisted that all Soviet advisors leave
Poland. The Khrushchev leadership feared the prospect of a Gomuka regime and
the inevitable internal liberalization accompanying it. Thus on the same day,
October 19, Khrushchev led an uninvited and generally unexpected Soviet

82
It was later moved to October 19. (Soon after his election in April 1956 as the new
party secretary, Ochab had initially reiterated charges of "nationalist deviation"
against Gomuka, but he later changed his views).
delegation on a visit to Warsaw.
83
The discussions, both on the airport tarmac and
at Belvedere Palace were temperamental. According to the recently declassified
account of this verbal exchange (Gomuka's briefing to the PZPR Politburo two
hours after the Soviet and Polish delegations met), Khrushchev shook his finger
crudely under Gomuka's nose and shouted (in Russian) so all could hear "That
number won't pass here. We are ready for active intervention!"Gomuka responded
calmly, not even raising his voice:
[You can] talk in an aggressive tone, but if you talk with a revolver on
the table you don't have a fair discussion. I can't continue under these
conditions. I am ill. We can listen to the complaints of the Soviet
comrades, but if decisions are to be made under the threat of physical
force, I am not up to it.
84


Reflecting back on this episode, Gomuka told a party aktiv on November 4: "The
language of the party is often not the language of diplomacy. They said what they

83
Besides Khrushchev, the delegation included Vyacheslav Molotov, Anastas
Mikoyan, Nikolai Bulganin, Lazar Kaganovich, Marshal Ivan Konev (commander-
in-chief of the Warsaw Pact), General Alexei Antonov (Chief of the Soviet General
Staff), and ten other Soviet military officers. The Polish delegation meeting them at
the airport consisted of First Secretary Edward Ochab, Prime Minister Jzef
Cyrankiewicz, Aleksander Zawadzki, Roman Zambrowski, and Wadysaw
Gomuka.
84
AAN (Warsaw), KC PZPR, paczka 12, teczka 46a, str. 66-68. For an English
translation of this document see L. W. Gluchowski, "Poland, 1956: Khrushchev,
Gomuka, and the 'Polish October'", Document 2, Cold War International History
Bulletin, issue 5, Spring 1995 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International
Center for Scholars), p. 40. Gomuka was under house arrest for two years and then
spent time in a rest home in the summer of 1956. Some U.S. diplomats believed his
return to the political scene would not be significant because of his weakened
condition. See "Memorandum of Conversation by James W. Pratt, U.S. Mission to
the UN, regarding Liberalization Trends in Poland, Yugoslav-Soviet Relations,
Western Radio Broadcasts," October 16, 1956, National Security Archive,
Washington, D.C., Flashpoints Project, Box 2, Record # 79996, Folder 10/15-
21/56, p. 1.
thought, and we said what we thought. The discussion even became quite heated at
times."
85

Archival documents confirm what was deduced earlier, namely that the
Moscow leaders were indeed deterred from intervening in Poland by the Polish
threat of counterforce. Gomuka also assured them of his loyalty to the USSR and
Warsaw Pact.
86
According to the handwritten notes by Czech party leader Antonin
Novotn 's aide (Jan Svoboda) of the secret meeting of communist bloc leaders on
October 24 in Moscow, the Soviet leaders noted that "Gomuka several times
emphasized that they [the Poles] would not permit their independence to be taken
away and would not allow anyone to intervene in Poland's internal affairs."
87
At the
same meeting Khrushchev then said "finding a reason to start a military conflict
against Poland would be easy, but finding a way to end it would be hard."

85
AAN (Warsaw), Arch. KC PZPR, 237/V-241. Stenogram Krajowej Narady
Aktywu Partyjnego odbutego w dn. 4 listopada 1956 r. Wystpenia W. Gomuki, 4
November 1956, s. 166. [Nieraz w jzyku partyjnym, z tak powiem, jzyk
partyjnyum nie bywa czsto jzykiem dyplomacji. Oni mwili co myleli i mymy
mwili comy myleli. Dyskusja bya nieraz moe i ostra.]
86
Ibid. Gomuka later told the party aktiv on November 4: "[N]either I nor any
Politburo member wants to damage the friendship with a great powerful socialist
country. No communist, Pole, and patriot could have such an intention based on the
normal state interests of Poland."
87
This report was written in Czech by Jan Svoboda, a top aide to Czech Communist
leader Antonin Novotn, of a key meeting on October 24 of top CPSU Presidium
members and East European Communist leaders (except Gomuka and Ger).
Statni Ustredni Archiv [Central State Archive in Prague,or SUA], Fond 07/16,
Svazek 3, "Zprava o jednani na UV KSSS 24. rijna 1956 k situaci v Polsku a
Mad'arsku" ("Account of a Meeting at the CPSU CC, October 24, 1956, on the
Situation in Poland and Hungary"). See Tibor Hajdu, "Az 1956.oktber 24-i
moszkvai rtekezlet," vknyv I (Budapest: 1956-os Intzet, 1992), pp. 149-156. Also
published in Npszabadsg, June 20, 1992. For an English translation, see Mark
Kramer, "Hungary and Poland, 1956: Khrushchev's CPSU CC Presidium Meeting
on East European Crises, October 24, 1956," Cold War International History
Bulletin, issue 5, Spring 1995 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International
Center for Scholars), pp. 1, 50-56.
Moreover, Khrushchev held a meeting on October 19 with his generals at the Soviet
embassy in Warsaw while waiting for the Eighth Plenum to elect Gomuka as First
Secretary. He admitted candidly later: "As we began to analyze the problem in
more detail and calculate which Polish regiments we could count on to obey
Rokossowski, the situation began to look somewhat bleak. Of course, our own
armed strength far exceeded that of Poland, but we didn't want to resort to the use
of our own troops."
88

Despite the movements of both Soviet and Polish troops toward Warsaw
during the Eight Plenum, there is no evidence to suggest that any major group in the
PZPR actually tried to mobilize military forces to "storm" the plenum. Two
important documents discovered recently in the Central Military Archive in
Warsaw (reports by Major Witold Osinski), shed considerable light on the decision-
making process within the Polish military, particularly the KBW.
89


Hungarian Reactions to Polish October

88
Nikita S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: the Last Testament, ed. and trans.
Strobe Talbott (NY: Bantam Books, 1974), p. 203.
89
Major Witold Osinski was a deputy chief in the Second Section of the Chief
Directorate of Information (Gwny Zarzd Informacji, GZI). See CAW (Warsaw),
sygn. 1812/92/8 and Bylego Archiwum Wojskowej Sluzby Wewnetrznej, sygn.
2859/20/K. For an English translation, see L.W. Gluchowski and Agnieszka
Poleszczuk, trans. "The Osinski Reports," in The Hidden History of Hungary, 1956:
A Compendium of Declassified Documents (Washington, DC: National Security
Archive, 1996). This collection was prepared for the conference "Hungary and the
World, 1956: The New Archival Evidence," in Budapest, September 26-29, 1996.
Hungarians in Budapest watched the Polish drama closely. Hardly anyone
was indifferent, although opinions varied among Petfi Circle intellectuals and
students, journalists, and MDP leaders.
Hungarian students and intellectuals eagerly read Gomuka's triumphant
speech of October 20, which was published verbatim in Szabad Np (the official
organ of the MDP) on October 23, the very day of the student demonstration in
Budapest, as described below. Gomukas rise in Poland provided the Hungarian
intellectuals with an opportunity to express their grievances against the Stalinist
Communists and Soviet domination. For months leading up to the revolution,
Hungarian students were regularly invited to the special "Polish Reading Room"
[Czytelnia Polska] in Budapest for special "Polish-Hungarian Friendship Weeks,"
poetry readings, films, field trips, lectures, and language lessons.
90
By October, with
Rkosi gone, the Petfi Circle met almost daily. On October 11 the members
conferred about improving Hungarian engineering. The next day they debated
"timely questions of our public education." On October 16, another debate took
place about Garden-Hungary [Kert-Magyarorszg].
91
All these lectures
emphasized, subtly or overtly, the need to forge policies based on indigenous needs
and to avoid imitation of Soviet policies.
Journalists continued to write freely well into the autumn while Ger was
First Secretary, despite the complaints expressed by Hegeds, Tausz, and other
Hungarian officials soon after the Pozna revolt, and despite the resolutions calling

90
AMSZ (Warsaw) Z.7, T.551 W.66, s. 33--41, "Sprawozdanie z dziaalnoi
Czytelni Polskiej za pierwszy kwarta 1956 roku."
91
MOL (Budapest) 1676/2000/XX-5-h, 1 doboz, 1 ktet, Esemnynaptr, 1956, old.
125-6.
for stricter overview. At an October 20 session of the Political Committee, for
example, Hungarian party officials decreed that "the Hungarian press and radio are
allowed to deal with the Polish events only according to the articles by the Soviet
News Agency, TASS [Telegrafnoe Agentstvo Sovietskovo Soiuza] and to official
Polish materials in a comparable official tone." Lajos cs, one of the Political
Committee members, was assigned responsibility for overseeing the editorial
boards.
92
Increasingly, Hungarian citizens thus turned to the CIA-funded Radio
Free Europe to hear more objective news reportage.
As for the MDP leadership under Ger and Prime Minister Hegeds, one
finds, surprisingly, that officials seldom mentioned the Polish example during their
decision-making sessions in late October. They were preoccupied with the crisis,
which began early in the afternoon of October 23. On that day in Budapest about
ten thousand Hungarian students gathered at the statue of the Hungarian poet
Sndor Petfi for a pro-Polish demonstration.
93
The demand for returning Nagy,
Rkosis opponent, was intended to parallel Gomukas return to power. After
articulating their sixteen points and listening to the famous actor Imre Sinkovits
recite patriotic poetry, the demonstrators marched as a symbolic gesture to the
statue of the Polish General Jzef Bem--a hero of the Hungarian struggle for

92
MOL (Budapest) MK S 276, csoport 53, .e. 310, old. 1 "Jegyzknyv, A
Politikai Bizottsg 1956 oktber 2o-n tartott lsrl. "TASS is the Soviet News
Agency."
93
Sndor Petfi is arguably the most famous Hungarian poet. He became the aide-
de-camp of General Jzsef Bem, then head of the Transylvanian army, who had
great affection for the somewhat unsoldierly but enthusiastic poet. Petfi played a
leading role in the literary life of the period preceding the outbreak of the
Hungarian Revolution of 1848. He disappeared during the Battle of Segesvr, on
July 31, 1849.
independence in 1848-1849 and an idol of Petfi --chanting the slogans:
"Independence based on freedom and equality!
94
Poland shows us the way, lets
follow the Hungarian way! Were the nation of Father Bem and Kossuth, lets walk
hand in hand! Long live the Polish-Hungarian friendship!" When they arrived at
Bem Square around 4:00 p.m., where they met the other demonstration organized
by the Buda-based Polytechnic University, they placed flowers on the statue, hung
up Polish flags, the Kossuth coat-of-arms and Hungarian flags with the coat-of-arms
symbol representing the communist regime cut out of the middle.
95

Despite the MDP's attempts to restrict the press, Szabad Np published a
major editorial on October 23 praising the demonstration, thus making it too hard
for Ger (who was out of the country) to cancel it. In contrast to the disgruntled
workers in Pozna, the Hungarian students' demands were more political and
harder for a conservative regime to meet. In their sixteen points, the students
tested the limits of the authorities on October 23 by boldly calling for the dismissal
of Rkosi's successor Ern Ger, the reinstatement of the reformer Imre Nagy, the
total withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary, and true independence and
equality with regard to the Soviet Union, among other demands.
96


94
Jzef Bem was born in 1794, in Tarnw, Galicia, which is now part of Poland.
Although a Polish army officer who trained at the Warsaw Military School, Bem
offered his services to the Hungarian leader Lajos Kossuth in 1848 and defeated his
opponents in Transylvania and the Banat region.
95
MOL (Budapest) 1676/2000/XX-5-h, 1 doboz, 1 kotet, Esemnynaptr, 1956, old.
137.
96
The actual number of recorded points varies, according to the youth groups,
instititions, and cities in which they originated. One of the first meetings of the
communist youth organization DISZ (Dolgoz Ifjsg Szvetsge) took place in the
town of Szeged, where students articulated twelve points (paralleling the twelve
Unlike the Polish leaders during the Pozna crisis, the top Hungarian party
leaders (First Secretary Ern Ger, Prime Minister Andrs Hegeds, Jnos Kdr,
Antal Apr, and Istvn Kovcs) had been in Yugoslavia from October 14 to October
23. Ger himself was for the most part absent from Hungary even longer, from
early September until October 23. Andropov had advised Moscow on August 29
that a Hungarian-Soviet meeting would be expedient.
97
On September 2, Ger
himself had told Andropov that he would like a meeting to "strengthen party unity"
with CPSU Presidium members in Moscow in the first half of October, since his own
vacation would end in early October, and since Kdr and Hidas would be in
Moscow on their way back from Beijing.
98
Hence, from late September to early
October, Ger met Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders vacationing in the Crimea.
There, on September 30, Ger met with Tito and Rankovi, with Khrushchev
mediating. Tito then invited the high-level Hungarian party-government delegation
to visit Yugoslavia from October 14 to October 23. Ger accepted the invitation,
despite his anxiety about the political situation in Hungary, which he expressed to
Andropov on September 27.
99
Again, when he returned to Budapest briefly from
Moscow, he told Andropov on October 12 that the situation in Hungary had
intensified more than he had imagined it would while he was in Moscow, and that
the measures discussed in Moscow with the CPSU leaders "would not be sufficient

points drawn up by Hungarian youth in the March 1848 Revolution. Other students
at the Technical University in Budapest expanded the list to sixteen.
97
AVP RF, F 077, O 37, P 190, D 33, Ll. 65--79, "Zapiska Yu. V. Andropova v
Prezidium TsK KPSS, 29 avgusta 1956 g."
98
RGANI, F 5, O 28, D 394, L. 256, "Zapis' Besedy Yu. V. Andropova s E. Ger
Peregovorakh s I. Nadem, 2 sentyabrya 1956 g."
99
RGANI, F. 5, O. 28, D. 394, L. 256, "Zapis' besedy s Ern Ger, 27 sentyabrya
1956 g.," September 27, 1956.
now."
100
At the secret meeting in Moscow on October 24 of all the communist
leaders, Khrushchev himself wondered aloud why Ger, Hegeds and others would
dare to "spend time by the sea" when there were "signs that the situation in
Hungary is extremely serious."
101

Yugoslav Ambassador Miunovi thought that Khrushchev had arranged to
have Ger and Tito meet each other in the Crimea, seemingly by accident.
According to Miunovi's reasoning, Khrushchev thought he could subdue Nagy
and his followers, and perhaps other East European leaders, by making it appear as
if Tito approved of Ger as Rkosi's successor. As Miunovi wrote: "It looks as
though we are responsible with the Russians for choosing Ger in Rkosi 's place
and are now confirming the new situation, though we are in fact learning about it
only after the Russians have carried out their decisions."
102
Miunovi thought the
Russians sought to create the impression that they, the Russians, chose Ger for
Tito's sake, so that if Ger proved inadequate, they could blame Tito.


100
RGANI, F. 89, O. 2, D. 2, L. 73, "Informatsiya Andropova iz Budapeshta, 12
oktobrya 1956 g."
101
See the report written in Czech by Jan Svoboda, a top aide to Czech Communist
leader Antonin Novotn, of a key meeting on October 24 of top CPSU Presidium
members and East European Communist leaders (except Gomuka and Ger).
Statni Ustredni Archiv [Central State Archive in Prague, or SUA], Fond 07/16,
Svazek 3, "Zprava o jednani na UV KSSS 24. rijna 1956 k situaci v Polsku a
Mad'arsku" ("Account of a Meeting at the CPSU CC, October 24, 1956, on the
Situation in Poland and Hungary"). See Tibor Hajdu, "Az 1956. oktber 24-i
moszkvai rtekezlet," vknyv I. (Budapest: 1956-os Intzet, 1992), pp. 149-156. For
an English translation, see Mark Kramer, "Hungary and Poland, 1956:
Khrushchev's CPSU CC Presidium Meeting on East European Crises, October 24,
1956," op. cit., pp. 1, 50-56. Imre Nagy, too, was absent from Budapest on the eve of
the student demonstration. He was attending a wine festival in western Hungary
and returned to Budapest only on October 23.
102
Miunovi, op. cit., p. 102.
In any case, in contrast to Ochab's conciliatory approach to the
demonstrators, Ern Ger delivered a scathing radio speech at 800 p.m. (10 p.m.
Moscow time), on October 23 stressing friendship with the Soviet Union and
denouncing the Hungarian demonstrators as counterrevolutionaries, further
enraging his audience. (One can claim without much exaggeration that Moscow was
indirectly to blame for Ger's vituperative speech, having admonished him earlier
in July to avoid all concessions and restore discipline.) The Hungarian decision-
makers had almost assumed that they would have to call in Soviet troops. Gathered
in Gers room between 900 and 930 p.m. that evening, the MDP leaders went
through the motions of debating the pros and cons of calling in Soviet troops, but in
reality they were merely aiding Ger in his phone conversation with Khrushchev,
during which he requested Soviet military assistance.
103
In all likelihood, the
Hungarian communist officials were rather haunted by the political rightist
reaction and their collective memory of the white terror that had overthrown
Bla Kuns communist regime in 1919. The Horthy regime had banned the
communist party and led the country headlong into an alliance with Hitler. Thus the
inter-war period probably served as a reference point for the communist leaders in
1956 in interpreting the political violence around them. This fear may explain why a
large section of the Hungarian party accepted Soviet intervention, and why a rift

103
The Hungarians' debates on this issue are best reconstructed from the
reminiscences of Andrs Hegeds, Jnos Matolcsi, and Jen Fock, all located in
PIL [Politikatrtneti Intzet Levltra]: H-168; 867.f.m-284; and 867.f.f-215
respectively. For a useful essay on Hungarian decision making on October 23, see
Zoltn Ripp, "Hiba a rendszerben--oktber 23,"tvenhat oktbere s a hatalom: a
Magyar Dolgozk Prtja vezet testleteinek dukumentumai 195 oktber 24-oktber
28 (Budapest: Napvilg Kiad, 1997).
developed among Nagys followers after the outbreak of the revolution. Nagy and
others wanted to return to some version of a popular front coalition and others
strongly rejected such a retreat.
In any case, angered by Gers speech, demonstrators stormed the central
radio studio of the Hungarian broadcasting network. Fighting broke out at other
locations in the city and continued throughout the night. The crowd tore down a huge
statue of Stalin on Dzsa Gyrgy street in the center of Budapest. In cities throughout
Hungary (Gyr, Miskolc, Debrecen, Esztergom, Zalaegerszeg, and others) thousands
of demonstrators called on the government to resign. Despite his attempts to establish
control, Ger could not stop the growing unrest.
Thus, as a result of Gers failure to quell the unrest, the first Soviet
intervention in Hungary on October 23-24 was actually an invasion by invitation.
Although Nagy was later blamed for inviting the troops, and Hegeds (the former
Prime Minister) actually signed the official written invitation ex post facto, it was
Ger who verbally requested them. The circumstances behind the request are
rather puzzling. It is now known that Ger summoned the military attach of the
Soviet embassy for military assistance. Soviet ambassador Yuri Andropov then
attempted to call into action the Special Corps [Osobii Korpus] in Hungary, headed
by Pyotr Lashchenko, who replied that he needed a direct command from Moscow.
104
The Soviet Presidium could not take action, however, until it received a formal
request from the Hungarian leadership. Strangely enough, when Khrushchev called
Ger (after Ger's call to the Soviet military attach) to invite him to the emergency

104
See Kramer, "Hungary and Poland, 1956," op. cit. Also Fyodor Lukianov,
"Khrushchev Ostorozhen; Andropov Nastaival," Izvestiia no. 169 (July 24, 1992): 6.
meeting on October 24 in Moscow, the latter declined, saying the Hungarian
situation was too serious, but he did not say a word about his earlier call for military
assistance. Only after Andropov called Moscow to inform Khrushchev, did the
Soviet leader then call Ger again to tell him the request would be fulfilled, but only
if it were in writing. Ger refused, saying he did not have time to summon a
meeting.
105

Hence, as one can see, there was no time for the MDP leaders to think about
Poland in late October, at the height of the crisis. A thorough perusal of the minutes
of the MDP Political Committee in late October reveals little mention of the
country.
106
Once so fearful of the Pozna riot, Hungarian leaders earlier anxieties
about Poland were overshadowed by the eruption of the revolution in their own
country. As the Polish Ambassador to Hungary, Adam Willman, reported to Karol
Korolczyk, deputy director of the First Department of the Polish Foreign Ministry
in Warsaw:

The chairman of the Foreign Department of the Central Committee of the
Hungarian Workers Party, while discussing with Mnnich and me the problem
of past fears of some Hungarian high-ranked party members concerning the
developing situation in Poland, said, that fears for the socialist development of
Poland have long ago disappeared and melted as snow when a thaw begins.
107


105
The formal request did not actually arrive in Moscow until five days later.
Andropov sent it in a ciphered telegram on October 28, 1956. See AVPRF, F. 059a,
Op. 4, P. 6, D. 5, L. 12. "Shifrtelegramma" October 28, 1956.
106
Nagy's new government was renamed the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party
[Magyar Szocialista Munksprt, or MSZMP] on November 1, 1956.
107
AMSZ (Warsaw) Z. depesz T.783 W.57, s.89, szyfrogram nr. 4746 , 17 kwiecien
1958, from Ambassador Willman, Budapest, to Korolczyk, Warsaw. Incidentally,
this situation in fact bears out crisis decision making theory well. Political scientist
Charles Hermann defined a crisis as having three key features. First, it entails a
threat to high-priority goals; secondly, it involves surprise (shock) to the decision
makers; and third, there is very little time for the leaders to decide how to respond.

The Hungarian party officials were instead consumed with survival issues
like ensuring the food supply, getting people off the streets, disarming the
insurgents, treating the wounded, and burying the dead. At the October 23, 2:00
p.m. session of the Hungarian council of ministers, Hegeds told his colleagues he
did not know much about the Polish events because he had had no time to read
about them. He had just returned from Yugoslavia.
108
The Hungarian Embassy in
Warsaw also had difficulty assessing events. Pter Bal, the Hungarian Ambassador
to Poland, reported:
The embassy work during the last period was influenced by the events back at
home [in Hungary]. Its work consisted of informing dozens of delegations.
....Everybody was concerned for the development of socialism. This does not
mean that everybody evaluated the events correctly. Events occurred so
quickly, and the situation was so difficult, that it was impossible to evaluate it.
109


By early November, the government led by Nagy and Kdr did look to
Poland for guidance. For example, at the November 2 session of the MSZMP
Political Committee, Nagy's cabinet suggested that Warsaw capital of the assertive
yet loyal satellite, Poland - would be the right place for negotiations between the
Hungarian and Soviet delegations regarding Soviet troop withdrawal. As we shall
see in Chapter Four, the negotiations took place instead at the Soviet military

Charles F. Hermann et al., New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy (London :
HarperCollins Academic, 1987. Also Charles F. Hermann, "Sorting Out Crisis
Outcomes," International Studies Quarterly, vol. 40, no. 2, (1996): 311.
108
MOL (Budapest), XIX a 83 a 160 doboz, Jegyzknyv, Kszlt a
Minisztertancs 1956. vi oktber h 23-n d.u. 2 rakor kezdd lsrl.
109
MOL (Budapest) XIX-J-1-j (1945-1964). Klgyminiszterium TK
Lengyelorszg, Magyar Npkztrsasg Nagykvetsge, Vars, "A kvetsg
legkzelebbi feladatai," 1 doboz. 1/b 008066, 1956. 15 december 1956, old. 1
headquarters in Budapest. When one recalls that KGB Chief Ivan Serov arrested
the entire Hungarian delegation on November 3 at midnight on Csepel Island
(Budapest), thus incarcerating Nagy's top military officials on the eve of the second
invasion, one wonders how much the course of history might have been altered had
Warsaw been chosen instead as the site for negotiations.
110
As we now know, Nagy
also sought the Polish leadership's help on November 3, regarding Jzsef Cardinal
Mindszenty (the Hungarian cardinal and Archbishop of Esztergom since 1945), who
had been released from prison on October 31, 1956. Ambassador Willman sent a
telegram at 4:00 p.m. on November 3 to Warsaw conveying Nagy's request that the
Polish government persuade Cardinal Wyszyski, head of the Polish church, to
exert influence on Cardinal Mindszenty in favor of reducing the tension in Hungary.
The Soviet intervention the next day made this request pointless.
111
Poland played a
mediating role yet again after the second Soviet intervention, when Jnos Kdar
requested on November 11 that Ambassador Willman help mediate between his new
government and the Nagy group staying at the Yugoslav embassy.
112


110
MOL (Budapest) 3541/2000, XX 5 h, 13. doboz, 8. ktet, Vizsglati dosszi:
Nagy Imre s trsai gyben, 1957. III. 10. 1957. VIII. 17. Jegyzknyv a
Kormny Kabinet 1956 november 2-an dlutn tartott negyedik lsrl [emphasis
added]. It is not yet known why exactly the negotiation site was changed to the
Soviet headquarters, but presumably the Soviet leadership--having decided to
intervene by then--insisted on the change for logistical reasons.
111
AMSZ (Warsaw), Szyfrogram nr. 17984/2 z Budapesztu, 3 listopada 1956, s. 101.
(The Polish Primate, Stefan Cardinal Wyszyski was arrested in 1953 and released
on October 28, 1956. He supported Gomuka's policies. Jzsef Cardinal Mindszenty,
on the other hand, supported Nagy and the revolution but in a much more
restrained fashion. He was sentenced to life in 1948 and released on October 31,
1956. On November 4, he took refuge in the U.S. Embassy in Budapest.
112
AMSZ (Warsaw) Z. depesz., w. 48, t. 613, kart 30, 11 listopada 1956. "Depesza od
Wierna do polskiej ambasady w Budapeszcie." Wierna told Willman to assist in
reaching an agreement and in concentrating the socialist forces in the government."

Comparison of Pozna (June 28) Crisis with the October 23 Crisis
Perhaps the Nagy government--with its fresh memories of the October 23
crisis--was more inclined to look to Poland as a model because of the way the Polish
leaders handled the Pozna crisis. While both were spontaneous revolts wholly or
partly motivated by economic grievances, the two crises differ in at least five specific
ways with regard to the leaders' respective crisis management styles.
First, the Pozna crisis was a workers' revolt primarily caused by acute
economic distress. Polish archives are full of top-secret, unpublished, letters sent to
the CC PZPR, which illustrate this distress.
113
Unlike Hungarian authorities during
the October 23 uprising, the Polish authorities were able eventually to contain the
crisis, due in part to its limited, economic nature.
Secondly, Ochab and his colleagues were physically present in Poland on
June 28 at the time of the crisis, and thus could take quick action, albeit after initial
delay. Furthermore, the PZPR Politburo decided to send to Pozna a governmental
delegation consisting of the Prime Minister Jzef Cyrankiewicz and Central
Committee secretaries Jerzy Morawski (in charge of propaganda); Edward Gierek

113
AAN (Warsaw) Polska Zjedoczona Partia Robotnicza Komitet Centralny,
Biuro Listw i Inspekcji, Biuletyn #32/143, Warszawa, 7.VII.1956, s. 24. One
worker, Jzef Juszczyk, complained in a letter to the CC PZPR: "About 40 people
left the shop today without bread, butter, and meat. Why is it so? Why do people
complain? They are right. They bring potatoes, but after an hour they are gone. No
one feels responsible for the supplies. Maybe it is not important, but after a while it
becomes important for a person and then unhappiness arises.[Dzis, wasnie okoo 4
osb odeszo ze sklepu z gorzkimi sowami, brak chleba, masa, misa. Dlaczego tak
jest, dlaczego ludzie przeklinajq? Przeciez majq racje...Brak poczucia
odpowiedzialnosi za ten odcinek pracy. 1o sa, sprawy tak mao wazne ale jak doniose
dla czowieka i midzy innymi rodzq niezadowolenie].
(in charge of heavy industry and transport) and Wiktor Kosiewicz (Chairman of
the Central Council of Trade Unions). Cyrankiewicz was in charge of the political
situation.
114
In Hungary, not only had Ger, Hegeds, and other key leaders been
abroad in Yugoslavia, but Imre Nagy also had been attending a wine-tasting festival
near Lake Balaton. As mentioned earlier, Nagy had not even been admitted back
into the MDP until October 13, a week before the first student revolt. He had no real
authority to speak for the Hungarian leadership until October 24 when appointed
Prime Minister. Nagy's awareness of his lack of status explains in part why he came
across as hesitant in his speech to the student demonstrators on October 23.
Thirdly, First Secretary Ochab did not berate the Pozna workers over the
radio during the crisis. Instead, at the later plenary session of the Central
Committee on July 19, Ochab contritely acknowledged that the "callousness and
bureaucracy of the authorities, both central and local" played an important role in
the events.
115
Surprisingly, documents reveal that not all PZPR members--even the
more liberal ones--agreed that what happened was a spontaneous expression of
workers' grievances. Edward Gierek, who was considered to be a progressive PZPR
Politburo member (and who eventually succeeded Gomuka as First Secretary),

114
Nalepa, Pacyfikacja Zbuntowanego Miasta, op. cit., 27.
115
Resolution Adopted by the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers
Party at its Seventh Plenary Session, 18-28 July 1956, in Paul Zinner, ed. National
Communism and Popular Revolt in Eastern Europe (NY: Columbia University Press,
1956., 146-147.
thought the demonstration had been planned well in advance.
116
At a Central
Committee meeting on July 7, Gierek said:
[W]hat goal did the organizers of the provocation have? ...[T]he goal
was to organize a strike in the whole city of Pozna .... to organize
armed robberies on the special buildings belonging to the
government such as jails, courts, district attorney offices, etc.
...There can be no doubt that the objective of these actions was to
show foreign countries and the rest of the Poland that there is a
force against the government in the country [and] to pry the masses
away from the government. [I]n the morning hours of [28] June,
well-organized bands armed with monkey wrenches, sticks, and
crowbars, and sometimes even with pistols, using terror and
provocation, forced the workers to stop work and to get out in the
streets.
117


Fourthly, the Polish leaders managed the Pozna crisis on their own, without
calling in Soviet troops. None of the Polish leaders apparently even mentioned the
possible need to do so.
118
In the aftermath of the two Soviet interventions in
Hungary and the inability of the Hungarian armed forces to suppress the uprising
there, the Polish military's containment of the Pozna riots has been portrayed as
having been prompt and efficient.
119
PZPR member Jerzy Morawski, for example,

116
PZPR (Warsaw) 237/V/237 Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza Komitet
Centralny SekretariatNarada powicona omwieniu wypadkw poznaskich, 7.
VII.56, s. 6-7.
117
Ibid.
118
Thorough perusal of declassified Polish documents pertaining to the Pozna
crisis shows no mention of possible Soviet "assistance." Classified documents may
still reveal that the idea was raised, although it is highly improbable.
119
See, for example, Zinner, op. cit., 126; Gibney, op.cit., 6; Zbigniew K. Brzezinski,
The Soviet Bloc: Unity and Conflict (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1967), 248; Harry Schwartz, Eastern Europe in the Soviet Shadow (NY: John Day
Co., 1973; Nicholas Bethell, Comuka: His Poland, His Communism (NY: Holt,
Rhinehart, and Winston, 1969), 208; Daniel F. Calhoun, Hungary and Suez, 1956
(Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1991), 115; Syrop, op. cit., 52. Syrop
acknowledges that "it took a considerable military force to bring the situation under
claimed in a television interview that the Polish authorities "reacted fiercely" to the
Pozna events in order to reassure the Russians that their "military assistance"
would not be needed.
120
Some analysts say the Polish authorities even overreacted,
i.e. that the riots could have been contained without any military force whatsoever.
121
(A discrepancy exists in the sources on the question of who actually suggested the
use of the Polish Army to suppress the uprising. According to Ochab, Marshal
Rokossowski volunteered to use the army units.
122
General Mu, on the other hand,
claims that Rokossowski remained silent during the meeting when the use of the
army was discussed.
123
)
Finally, unlike Hungarian troops, the Polish army and security forces did

control." But then he continues "Sporadic fighting...was localized and apparently no
one was hurt [emphasis added]." See below for statistics on casualties.
120
Cited in Tony Kemp-Welch, "Khrushchev's 'Secret Speech' and Polish Politics:
The Spring of 1956," Europe-Asia. 48: 2 (March, 1996), 206, n 148.
121
According to Syrop, "one high-ranking Communist said later in private that up
to the moment of the first shots a couple of fire engines using their hoses could have
put an end to the demonstration." Syrop, op. cit. 51. Edward Nalepa, on the other
hand, avers that "Even when tens of thousands of people were already
demonstrating on the streets of Pozna beginning in the early morning of 28 June,
the situation might have been neutralized by a visit of high-ranking party
representatives, who could have made a political declaration of some kind to the
people. But nobody wanted to face the crowd in Pozna." Nalepa, op. cit., 22.
122
Marshal Konstanty Rokossowski was born in Poland in 1896, but moved to the
Soviet Union at the age of seventeen and joined the Soviet Communist Party in 1919.
He suffered in the Stalinist purges of the late 1930s, and commanded the
Byelorussian front toward the end of World War II. Poles despised him as the one
who led the Red Army forces to "liberate" Poland, after conveniently waiting on the
other side of the Wisa River for the Polish resistance forces to expend their energies
in the futile Warsaw Uprising of 1944. He served as Polish national defense minister
from December 1949 to November 1956, despite the fact that he was a Soviet citizen.
He was removed from the PZPR Politburo on October 20, 1956 and recalled to the
Soviet Union in mid-November 1956.
123
Nalepa, p. 24. Also Teresa Toranska, Them: Stalin's Polish Puppets, trans. from
Polish by Agnieszka Kolakowska (London: Collins Sons and Co., 1987) interview
with Ochab, p. 60.
follow orders, more or less. According to Nalepa, a few officers tried to resist firing
on the crowds, but most members of the armed forces, especially the KBW, were
willing to carry out the orders. (It should be remembered that the Polish military
establishment was still dominated by many Soviet commanders and pro-Soviet
Polish officers.)

Conclusion
In contrast to the situation in Poland, the problems in Hungary had been
festering over a longer period, due to Rkosi's tenacious hold on power. Rkosi's
refusal to take responsibility for Rajk's execution and to admit to other mistakes,
not only irked the Hungarian people and elicited "passive aggressive" behavior
among MDP officials aimed at unseating the Hungarian dictator, but it also delayed
the Hungarian-Yugoslav rapprochement. Other issues prevented a full Yugoslav-
Hungarian rapprochement, including the rehabilitation of Lszl Rajk, the refusal
to grant amnesty to all Yugoslav political prisoners in Hungary, unfair treatment of
the Yugoslav minority living in Hungary, and delayed payments of reparations to
Yugoslavia.
As explained earlier, the Soviet image of Hungary was flawed in the sense
that the Soviet leaders failed to grasp the spontaneity of the Hungarian movement
and the depth of popular hatred of Rkosi. The Yugoslavs' activities further
reinforced that distorted image. The Hungarian people would be quiescent the
Russians thought - were it not for the embittered Yugoslav journalists and
diplomats stirring up memories of the anti-Titoist Rajk trial and peddling their
indigenous brand of communism. In contrast to the slowly crescendoing
"contagion" of the Yugoslavs during the three years after Stalin's death, the quick,
percussive events in Poland panicked Rkosi and Ger. Rkosi dug his own grave
soon after the Pozna revolt by attempting to punish the Petfi Circle and sharply
curtail freedom of the press. Hungarian newspapers grew even bolder throughout
the summer and early fall, printing details about Gomuka's defiance of
Khrushchev on October 19-20 and encouraging participation in the October 23
demonstration. While the Ger regime was too busy with the October 23 crisis to
think about Poland, the Nagy government looked to Poland for guidance. The Polish
leadership's response to the Pozna revolt bespoke a wise restraint absent in Ger's
response on October 23. As we shall see, in the ensuing days, between October 23
and November 4, the Nagy government was unable to exercise such constraint; it
was compelled to follow the peoples' demands, carefully shunning the word
"counterrevolution" for fear of inviting Soviet troops. We will resume the narrative
of Tito's and Gomuka's roles in the Hungarian crisis in Chapter Four.

Chapter 3: The First Invasion (October 23-24, 1956)
Western observers have long held an image of the Soviet Union as a crafty
monolith that expertly, in the realpolitik tradition, intervened while the West was
distracted by the Suez crisis. In fact, the documents reveal that the Soviet Union had
difficulty working with its Hungarian allies.
124
If Washington's problems with Paris
and London during the simultaneous Suez crisis stemmed from the Allies' bellicosity
and obsolete colonial ambitions, Moscow's problems with Budapest stemmed from the
pro-Soviet Hungarian leaders' failure to fight resolutely in the period between the two
interventions. After a brief overview of the events from October 24 to October 31, this
chapter will focus on the Soviet process of decision making, the execution of the first
Soviet military intervention, the Hungarian style of crisis management, Soviet
perceptions of Nagy during his fast-paced reforms, and the plight of the Hungarian
communists loyal to the Soviet Union.

124.
These are: 1) the former top-secret working archive of the Communist Party's
Central Committee, called the Russian State Archive of Contemporary Documents
(RGANI); 2) the Archive of the Russian Foreign Ministry (AVP RF); and 3) the
Russian State Archive of Social and Political History (RGASPI). Vladimir Malin,
the head of the CPSU CC General Department during the entire Khrushchev
period, took extensive notes of all presidium meetings, although verbatim
transcripts were not kept in the 1950s. Russian archival authorities released the
Malin notes pertaining to the Hungarian uprising in mid-1995 to a Russian
historian, Vyacheslav Sereda, and to Hungarian scholars at the 1956 Institute in
Budapest, who had exclusive access to the material until the spring of 1996, when
the full set was published in Hungarian translation. See Vyacheslav Sereda and
Jnos M. Rainer, eds., Dnts a Kremlben, 1956: A szovjet prtelnksg viti
Magyarorszgrol (Budapest: 1956-os Intzet, 1996). The Russian version was
published as "Kak reshalis voprosy Vengrii: Rabochie zapisi zasedanii Prezidiuma
TsK KPSS, iyul'-noyabr' 1956 g.," Istoricheskii arkhiv (Moscow), no. 2 (1996): 73--
104, no. 3 (1996): 87--121, respectively. Malin's handwritten notes are now available
to all researchers in RGANI, f. 3, op. 12, d. 100506 and published in E. D.
Orekhova, V. T. Sereda and A. S. Stykalin, Sovetskii Soyuz i Vengerskii Krizis 1956
Goda: Dokumenty (Moscow: Rosspen, 1998).

Overview
As we now know from Malin's notes, the CPSU Presidium met in Moscow on
October 23 from shortly after 10 p.m. until 11 p.m. (Moscow time).
125
This meeting
had been scheduled to address other issues, but the agenda was hastily altered to
include the crisis in Hungary. As a result of this meeting, Marshal Georgii Zhukov
issued orders for the mobilization of five Soviet divisions.
126
At 7 a.m. on October 24 a
Hungarian radio broadcast announced that the MDP Central Committee had
recommended at an all-night sitting that Imre Nagy become prime minister, replacing
Andrs Hegeds. Ern Ger would continue as First Secretary of the party. Other
Hungarian "Stalinists" would remain in top government posts.
127
The next morning
(October 25), a massacre known to Hungarians today as "Bloody Thursday" took
place at the Parliament building, where the Chairman of the Council of Ministers (now
Imre Nagy) presided. Nagy himself was not inside; on October 23, after a brief address

125
RGANI, f. 3, o. 12, d. 1006, l. 4-4ob, "Protokol'naya Zapis' Zasedaniya
Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 23 oktyabrya 1956 g." written by V. N. Malin.
126.
APRF, f. 3, o. 64, d. 484, l. 85-87, "Dokladnaya Zapiska Ministerstva Oborony
SSSR v TsK KPSS o Deistviakh Sovetskikh Voisk 'Po Okazaniyu Pomoshchi
Pravitel'stvu VNR v Sviazi s Voznikshimi v Strane Besporyadkami,' " 24-ogo
oktyabrya 1956 g."
127
According to the notes of the October 24th meeting of East European leaders
taken by Czechoslovak communist leader Antonn Novotn's aide Jan Svoboda,
"Comrade Khrushchev recommended to Comrade Ger that he tell everyone that
the plenum of the [MDP] CC had not taken place before the demonstration was
suppressed." In other words, Khrushchev wanted the Hungarian leaders to lie
about the timing of the Plenum. (The MDP Central Committee met at 10:22 P.M. on
October 23, whereas the Soviet troops began to arrive at 2 A.M., and some divisions
from Romania arrived only at 12:00 noon on October 24. ) It is not clear why
Khrushchev wanted this; in any case, Ger did not claim this until several days
later. See comment on this point in Kramer, "Hungary and Poland, 1956," CWIHP
Bulletin, pp. 1, 50-56.
to the demonstrators at the Parliament building, he had gone to the MDP
headquarters on Akadmia Street at 10:00 p.m. where he stayed all night. On October
25 about 25,000 unarmed Hungarians had gathered in front of the Parliament building
in Lajos Kossuth Square, shouting "Down with Ger!" However, they were
demonstrating peacefully: holding placards and flags and fraternizing with Soviet
troops. Suddenly around 11:00 a.m. shots rang out from the roofs of the buildings,
where the VH personnel were keeping guard. Some of the Soviet tanks fired at the
VH men on rooftops. The volley of shots lasted between ten and twenty minutes, the
crowd immediately dispersed, and between 120 and 234 citizens were killed.
128
In the
archive of the Soviet Ministry of Defense is a report filed by the Hungarian chief of the
General Staff Major-General L. Tth. He wrote: "Soviet troops received the order to
liquidate the demonstration at the Parliament. It was carried out."
129
The documents
remain unclear regarding who exactly gave the order to shoot. From 9:00 a.m. on that
day, the Hungarian Politburo had been in session, attended by deputy premiers
Anastas Mikoyan and Mikhail Suslov. A report by "comrade Ilona Vig of the fifth
region" about the firefight reached the Hungarian leaders that morning.
130
After this
incident, the Hungarians' perception of the Soviets turned completely hostile. Rumors-

128
Bill Lomax, Hungary 1956 (London: Allison and Busby, 1976), p. 128. In his
book, Fltmadott a tenger-1956: a Magyar Oktber trtnete (Munich, 1981), the late
Pter Gosztonyi writes that 120 were killed.
129
Jen Gyrkei and Mikls Horvth, Adalkok a szvjet katonai megszlls
trtnethez; Szovjet katonai intervenci, 1956 (Budapest: Argumentum Kiad,
1996), p. 48. Other evidence suggests that VH forces suddenly started shooting at
the unarmed crowd, and later the Soviet tanks deployed around the building opened
fire, although the exact sequence of events cannot be determined conclusively.
130
Lajos Gyurk, 1956 (Budapest, 1996), p. 154, cited in E. D. Orekhova, V. T.
Sereda and A. S. Stykalin, Sovetskii Soyuz i Vengerskii Krizis 1956 Goda: Dokumenty
(Moscow: Rosspen, 1998), p. 387.
-some initiated by the BBC and other foreign news services--spread about the scale of
the bloodshed.
131
As Malin's notes of the October 28 CC CPSU Presidium meeting
reveal, the Soviet leaders--especially Suslov--were keenly aware that their own troops
were blamed for the incident.
132

The Soviet Presidium members Mikoyan and Suslov, who had arrived on
October 24, scolded Ger for unnecessarily antagonizing the Hungarian population
during his October 23 speech, and ordered him to resign from his position as First
Secretary immediately.
133
Thus, about two hours after the October 25 massacre,
Ger's ouster was announced. Jnos Kdr (a younger "home Communist" with a
reputation as a centrist) replaced him as First Secretary. Perhaps, had the message
been broadcast earlier, the massacre could have been avoided. On October 27, Imre
Nagy reorganized the government, appointing non-communists--representatives of
parties from the pre-Communist era--to key posts.
134
The next day, October 28, at
1:20 p.m., Nagy ordered an immediate ceasefire, and "instructed the Hungarian

131
For older, but detailed, accounts of the October 25 massacre, see Bill Lomax,
Hungary 1956 (London: Allison and Busby, 1976), pp. 121-2; and Sndor Kopcsi,
In the Name of the Working Class trans. Daniel and Judy Stoffman (Toronto: Lester
& Orpen Dennys, 1986), 139-40.
132
RGANI, f. 3, O. 12, D. 1005, L. 61, "Protokol'naya Zapis' Zasedaniya Prezidiuma
TsK KPSS, 28-ogo oktyabrya 1956 g." Suslov said: "The popular view of our troops
now is bad (and has gotten worse). The reason is the dispersal of the demonstration
on Oct. 24, 1956." (He was referring to the massacre in front of the Parliament
building on the 25th--not 24th--of October.)
133
Because stormy weather forced Mikoyan's and Suslov's plane to be diverted to an
airport about 56 miles north of Budapest, Mikoyan, Suslov, Malinin, and Serov
arrived late in Budapest, riding in Soviet armored personnel carriers. See AVP RF,
f. 059a, O. 4, P. 6, D. 5, Ll. 1-7. "Telegramma A. I. Mikoyana i M. A. Suslova iz
Budapeshta v TsK KPSS 24-ogo oktyabrya."
134
These included: Bla Kovcs, the former General Secretary of the Smallholders
Party; Zoltn Tildy, the former leader of the Smallholders Party; and Ferenc Erdei,
the former leader of the National Peasant Party.
Armed Forces to fire only if attacked."
135
Two days later, on October 30, at 10:00 a.m.,
groups of insurgents began a siege of the Budapest party committee building on
Republic Square, a building which had remained unscathed after October 23-4, but
which had been left unprotected after October 29, when the Soviet armored
detachment guarding the building was redeployed elsewhere. Imre Mez, a secretary
of the Budapest party committee and Dezs Nemes, rector of the Party Academy, were
trapped in the building and could not summon help. Mez and a few associates were
executed and several VH agents lynched in what was one of the most grizzly events in
the revolution. Later that day, at 2:30 p.m. Budapest time, Nagy formally announced
the establishment of a multi-party system, with full participation by the Smallholders
Party, the National Peasant Party,
136
the Social Democratic Party, as well as the
Communist Party.
137

Meanwhile the Suez crisis began to unfold. The Egyptian president, Gamal
Abdel Nasser, angered by the withdrawal by the United States and Great Britain of

135
Later that day the CC CPSU Presidium met in Moscow. According to Malin's
notes, Khrushchev said: "We are ready to withdraw troops from Budapest. We
must make this conditional on a ceasefire by the centers of resistance. RGANI, f. 3,
o. 12, d. 1005, l. 56ob, "Protokol'naya Zapis' Zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 28-
ogo oktyabrya 1956 g."
136
This party was renamed the Petfi Party on November 1, 1956.
137
Other non-Communist parties soon sprang up as well, including the Hungarian
Independence Party, the People's Democratic Party, the Catholic People's Party,
and the Catholic National Association. On October 30, at 2:30 p.m. Budapest time,
Nagy announced the formal restoration of a multi-party state and the establishment
of an "inner cabinet" of the national government. The new cabinet consisted of
Nagy, Zoltn Tildy, Bla Kovcs, Ferenc Erdei, Jnos Kdr, Gza Losonczy, and
Anna Kthly (from the Social Democratic Party). That same day, a "revolutionary
national defense council" of the Hungarian armed forces was set up, which
supported the demands of the revolutionary councils of the working youth and
intellectuals, and called for the immediate withdrawal of Soviet
troops from Budapest and their withdrawal from the entire territory
of Hungary.
an offer to finance the Aswan High Dam project, nationalized the Suez Canal on
July 26, 1956. Great Britain, France, and the United States applied diplomatic
pressure on Nasser, but the latter refused to change his mind. On Wednesday,
October 24, at 4:27 a.m. while the first Soviet intervention, code-named "Operation
Wave" (Volna) was already underway, Secretary of State Dulles discussed with
President Eisenhower a piece of intelligence received by the State Department that
same morning. A member of the British Cabinet had resigned, saying Britain's "use of
force" against Egypt would be a "great blunder."
138
Thus Washington's attention
began to shift toward Great Britain, France, Israel, and Egypt (the Suez Canal). The
British and French were American allies who could be scolded, whereas the Russians
were too dangerous to fight, Eisenhower and Dulles apparently thought. (British
Prime Minister Anthony Eden, trying to explain his mistaken belief that Washington
would back Britain during the Suez crisis, claimed later that the United States
reneged on a tacit agreement to support him in Egypt after Britain assisted the
United States in removing the legitimate leader of Guatemala, Jacobo Arbenz, in
1954.)
139


138.
Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 64.
139
Anthony Eden, Full Circle: The Memoirs of Anthony Eden (Boston, MA, 1960), p.
634. Cited also in Sharon I. Meers, The British Connection How the United States
Covered its Tracks in the 1954 Coup in Guatemala, Diplomatic History, v. 16, no. 3,
(Summer 1992): p. 409. But Eisenhower said, "It's hard for me to see any good final
result emerging from a scheme that seems certain to antagonize the entire Moslem
world. See "Memorandum for Phyllis Bernau, White House, regarding Presidents
Message to Anthony Eden," October 30, 1956, Flashpoints Project, box 2, record
# 64570, folder 10/30/56, p. 1, National Security Archive, Washington, D.C. This
document is originally from the Ann Whitman File, Office of White House,
Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, Kansas.
Moreover, Eisenhower had not ruled out the possibility that the Kremlin
would use nuclear weapons to prevent their loss of the Eastern European states.
"With the deterioration of the Soviet Union's hold over its satellites, might not it be
tempted to resort to extreme measures, even to start a world war?" he wrote in his
memoirs. As an inducement to the Soviet leaders to accept Hungarian neutrality,
Secretary Dulles gave a speech in Dallas on the evening of October 27, promising
economic aid, but emphasizing: "We do not look upon these [East European]
nations as potential military allies." On October 29, Dulles cabled Ambassador
Bohlen in Moscow ordering him to repeat these words personally to Khrushchev,
Zhukov, and others.
140
On the same day, Israeli forces attacked the Egyptian army
on the Sinai Peninsula, and the Suez crisis began. The French and British joined the
Israeli incursions on October 31 by imposing a naval blockade and by bombing
Egyptian airfields, ports and communication centers in preparation for troop
landings. On November 5 Britain and France dropped paratroops at Port Said and
Port Fuad.
141
Egypt's Arab neighbors did not come to its aid. Khrushchev, however,
threatened missile attacks on Western Europe and invited the United States to join
the USSR in a military operation in the Middle East against Britain and France.
142

Meanwhile, on October 30, the Soviet government published the
"Declaration on the Principles of Development and Further Strengthening of
Friendship and Cooperation Between the USSR and Other Socialist Countries."

140.
Ibid.
141
Wm. Roger Louis and Roger Owen, eds. Suez 1956: The Crisis and its
Consequences (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), p. xvi.
142
Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (NY: Simon and Schuster, 1994), p. 566
However, by the October 31 Presidium session, most of the Presidium members had
decided against withdrawing troops from Hungary as a whole.

Soviet Decision Making
Let us now look more closely at the Soviet decisions and then analyze how
they were reached. The chain of events on October 23 and 24 have long been a topic
of debate. However, since the declassification of several key documents, the picture
has become much clearer.
143
It is now known that an important meeting of all the
East European leaders was convened in Moscow on October 24 at Khrushchev's
initiative.
144
This meeting was suggested by Khrushchev during a hitherto unknown
CC CPSU Presidium meeting which was held on October 20 for the purpose of
briefing the Presidium members about Khrushchev's trip to Poland the day

143
These include: RGANI, f. 3, o. 64, d. 484, ll. 85-87. "Informatsiya Ministerstva
oborony SSSR v TsK KPSS," Oct. 24, 1956 (Strictly Secret: Special Dossier) from
Marshal Georgii Zhukov, Soviet minister of defense, and Marshal Vasilii
Sokolovskii, chief of the Soviet General Staff. Also Czechoslovak leader Antonn
Novotn's report to the other members of the Czech Communist Party (KSC)
Politburo on October 25, 1956 (in which he describes a key meeting of East
European leaders that took place on October 24 at Khrushchev's initiative).
"Zprava o jednani na UV KSSS 24. rijna 1956 k situaci v Polsku a Mad'arsku'
("Account of a Meeting at the CPSU CC, October 24, 1956, on the Situation in
Poland and Hungary"). The manuscript is stored at the Central State Archive in
Prague (Statni ustredni archiv, or SUA) in fond 07/16, svazek 3. For an English
translation see Mark Kramer, "Hungary and Poland, 1956: Khrushchev's CPSU
CC Presidium Meeting on East European Crises, 24 October 1956," in Cold War
International History Bulletin (Spring 1995), 1, 50-56. For more first-hand
information about the events of October 23 and 24, see E.I. Malashenko, "Osobyi
korpus v ogne Budapeshta" (Part 1), Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal 10 (October
1993), pp. 22-30.
144
Novotn's report, although not dated, was most likely written late on the evening
of October 24 or early on the morning of October 25. Jan Svoboda, Novotn's top
aide and speechwriter, took the notes.
before.
145
It is clear from Malin's notes that Khrushchev had intended to focus on
the events in Poland during this October 24 meeting, but by that day stormy
demonstrations had erupted in Hungary, so much of the discussion concerned
Hungary. According to Czech First Secretary Antonn Novotn's account of the
meeting, there was very little disagreement; Khrushchev merely informed the East
German, Czechoslovak, and Bulgarian communist party leaders about recent
developments in both Poland and Hungary.
146

On October 27 and 28 the Soviet leaders continued to support Nagy during
the latter's actions, including the admission of non-communists into the MDP.
During the October 28 CPSU Presidium meeting, for example, Suslov had said "Our
line is not to protest the inclusion of several democrats in the government."
147
Two
days later Khrushchev pointed out that there were "two paths" the USSR could take,

145
RGANI, f. 3, o. 12, d. 1005, ll. 49-50, "Protokol'naya Zapis' Zasedaniya
Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 30-ogo oktyabrya 1956 g." "We should invite to Moscow
representatives from the Communist parties of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania,
the GDR, and Bulgaria."
146
Although the Hungarians and Romanians were also invited, the communist
leaders actually present were, from East Germany: Walter Ulbricht (head of the
East German Communist Party, or SED), Otto Grotewohl (prime minister), and
Willi Stoph (defense minister); from Bulgaria: Todor Zhivkov (Communist party
leader), Anton Yugov (prime minister), and Georgi Damyanov (Bulgaria), and of
course Antonn Novotn (Czechoslovakia). Ger could not attend because of the
turmoil in Hungary on October 24. The CPSU Presidium members (full and
candidate) and CPSU Secretariat members who participated include: Kaganovich,
Molotov, Bulganin, Kirichenko, Malenkov, Saburov, Brezhnev, Shvernik, Furtseva,
Shepilov, Pospelov, and Khrushchev. Joining the meeting later were: Zhukov
(Defense minister), Pantaleimon Ponomarenko (Soviet ambassador to Poland),
Pavel Yudin (a leading CPSU ideologist), and Liu Xiaoqui (a senior Chinese
official). Mikoyan and Suslov were absent; they flew to Budapest earlier on October
24 to observe the situation there. For more detail, see See Kramer, "Hungary and
Poland, 1956," CWIHP Bulletin, pp. 1, 50-56.
147
RGANI, f. 3, o 12, d. 1005, l. 61 ob, "Protokol'naya Zapis' Zasedaniya
Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 28-ogo oktyabrya 1956 g."
one "the peaceful path, the path of troop withdrawals and negotiations," and the
second one "the military path, the path of occupation."
148
Although he and his
colleagues knew that the situation in Hungary was getting worse and the people were
becoming more and more "anti-Soviet," all of them--except Kliment Voroshilov,
perhaps--agreed on October 28 that they should adopt the peaceful path and support
the Nagy government.
149
They were concerned that the situation in Hungary was
deteriorating by the hour and that the Hungarian leaders might not be able to control
their population. Khrushchev posed the question: "Will we have a government that is
with us, or will there be a government that is not with us and will request the
withdrawal of [Soviet] troops?...There is no firm leadership there, neither in the party
nor in the government. The uprising has spread into the provinces. The [Hungarian]
troops might go over to the side of the insurgents."
150
Most of the Soviet leaders had

148.
RGANI, f. 3, o. 12, d. 1006, l. 6, "Protokol'naya Zapis' Zasedaniya Prezidiuma
TsK KPSS, 30-ogo oktyabrya 1956 g."
149.
RGANI, f. 3, o 12, d. 1005, ll. 54-61ob, "Protokol'naya Zapis' Zasedaniya
Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 30-ogo oktyabrya 1956 g."
150
RGANI, f. 3, o. 12, d. 1005, l. 58, "Protokol'naya Zapis' Zasedaniya Prezidiuma
TsK KPSS, 28-ogo oktyabrya 1956 g." During this session the consensus appeared
to be that the Soviet Union should support the Nagy government. Since the latter
had announced its intention to negotiate a withdrawal of Soviet troops from
Budapest and later from Hungary as a whole, the Soviet Union should at least
appear to support Nagy's decision. The Soviet leaders feared that a lack of Soviet
support for the Nagy government would discredit the latter, and then--due to the
lack of firm control in Hungary--the Soviet Union would have to intervene and
occupy the country. Molotov and Voroshilov were the most reluctant about agreeing
to a troop withdrawal, whereas Khrushchev stated: "We are ready to withdraw
troops from Budapest [but] we must make this conditional on a ceasefire by the
centers of resistance." The others generally supported Khrushchev (Zhukov,
Bulganin, Malenkov, Saburov et al.). Zhukov conceded that the USSR had to be
ready, if necessary, to withdraw all Soviet troops from Hungary, viewing this as "a
lesson for us in the military-political sphere."
agreed on the need to withdraw troops at least from the city of Budapest; negotiations
about the complete withdrawal of troops from Hungary could begin later.
Although the Soviet government exhibited overt support on October 30 for
Nagy and "national communism" by publishing the declaration about strengthening
cooperation (mentioned above), two Presidium members, Mikoyan and Suslov,
expressed their doubts in a telegram on this day about the reliability of the
Hungarian armed forces:
[T]he peaceful liquidation of this hotbed [of insurgents] is almost out of the question
[pochti iskliuchena]. We are going to achieve the liquidation of it by the Hungarian
armed forces. There is only one fear: the Hungarian army has taken on a wait-and-
see attitude [zanimala vyzhidatel'nyiu pozitsiiu]. Our military advisers say that
relations of the Hungarian officers and generals with Soviet officers in the past few
days has deteriorated further. There isn't the same kind of trust as there used to be.
It might happen that Hungarian units sent to put down the insurgents will unite
with them, and then it will be necessary for Soviet armed forces once again to
undertake military operations...."
151


They continued: "We do not have yet a final opinion of the situation--how
sharply it has deteriorated. After the session today at 11 o'clock Moscow time, the
situation in the Central Committee will become clear and we will inform you. We
think the swift arrival of Comrade Konev is essential."
152
(Marshal I. S. Konev was
the Soviet commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact's armed forces, who would lead
the invasion of Hungary days after this message was sent.)
As mentioned above, the Malin notes also prove beyond a doubt that the
Khrushchev leadership made the final decision to intervene on October 31. During
the Presidium meeting on that day, Khrushchev reportedly said:

151
RGANI, f. 89, per 45, dok. 12, l. 3, "Informatsiya Mikoyana i Suslova ot 30-ogo
oktyabrya 1956 g."
152
Ibid.
We should reexamine our assessment and should not withdraw our troops from
Hungary and Budapest. We should take the initiative in restoring order in Hungary.
If we depart from Hungary, it will give a great boost to the Americans, English, and
French: the imperialists. They will perceive it as weakness on our part and will go
onto the offensive. We would then be exposing the weakness of our positions. Our
party will not accept it if we do this. To Egypt they will then add Hungary. We have
no other choice. If this point of view is supported and endorsed, let's consider what
we should do."
153


A bit later he said: "Comrade Zhukov is instructed to work out a [military]
plan and report on it.
154
Reports reached Nagy on October 31 that new Soviet troops
were entering Hungary from Miskolc, a city about 80 miles northeast of Budapest.
Nagy and other members of his government noted during a Hungarian cabinet
meeting that "Soviet troops have left Budapest," but other "troops are continuously
crossing the eastern border, military moves have been registered around Budapest,
and Czechoslovak regiments are stationed at the Czechoslovak border."
155
Nagy
summoned Ambassador Andropov several times in the morning and afternoon of
November 1, seeking a clear explanation for the influx of Soviet troops. Later Nagy
invited Andropov to the inner cabinet meeting of the Hungarian Council of

153
RGANI, f 3, o 12, d 1006, l 18-18ob, "Protokol'naya Zapis' Zasedaniya
Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 31-ogo oktyabrya 1956 g." The pages in this document are
arranged in reverse order, i.e. 18--15.
154
Ibid. Point 6 of Protocol 49 reads: "Poruchit' Zhukov razrabotat'
sootvetstvuyushchiy plan meropriyatiy svyazannykh s sobytiyami v Vengrii, i dolozhit'
TsK KPSS."
155.
MOL XX 5 h, 13. doboz, 8. ktet, Vizsglati dosszi: Nagy Imre s trsai
gyben, 1957. III. 10. 1957. VIII. 17. "Jegyzknyv a Kormny Kabinet 1956
november 1-n dlutn tartott negyedik lsrl." The document reads "The
National government asked the Soviet Ambassador in Budapest Yuri Andropov
whether or not there would be another Soviet intervention, but Andropov gave an
evasive answer. Thus the military leader Kovcs told Andropov about the Soviet
troops movements. [T]here is no doubt that Soviet troops did cross the border and
are heading for Budapest. The cabinet made the following decisions: a) it proclaims
neutrality immediately; b) the Hungarian government is withdrawing immediately
from the Warsaw Pact.... [It] turns to the UN and asks the four Great Powers for
help."
Ministers at 7:00 p.m. on November 1. Andropov gave a number of bogus excuses,
saying at first that the Soviet personnel were "railroad workers," and then--when
that was proven false--that the troops were only evacuating "wounded soldiers."
156


Analysis of the Soviet Decision Process
Recent findings refine and contradict older hypotheses formed by western
scholars writing before the collapse of the Soviet Union and the opening of the
archives. Scholars had seriously considered the possibility that the Soviet leaders
were merely deceiving Imre Nagy and his followers; that their support for Nagy's
liberal moves was a complete sham. They had intended all along to intervene a
second time and were just waiting for an opportune moment.
157
The Malin Notes
debunk this view as oversimplified. During the October 28 CPSU Presidium
meeting, for example, Suslov said "Our line is not to protest the inclusion of several

156
RGANI, f. 3, o. 12, d. 1006, l. 25 ob. "Protokol'naya Zapis' Zasedaniya
Prezidiuma TsK KPSS 2-ogo noyabrya 1956 g." Jnos Kdr and Ferenc Mnnich,
who were flown to Moscow secretly on November 1, participated in this Presidium
session. Kdr - who apparently spoke the most often - gave a detailed account of
the evening Council of Ministers session and Andropov's evasive responses. See also
the cable by Mikoyan and Suslov, in which they convey Nagy's apprehension. "Last
night by the instructions of Imre Nagy, Andropov was summoned. Nagy asked him:
is it true that new Soviet military units are continuing to enter Hungary from the
USSR? If yes, then what is their goal? We did not negotiate this." RGANI, F. 89,
Per. 45, Dok 12, L. 2. "Informatsiya Mikoyana i Suslova ot 30-ogo oktyabrya 1956
g." For Andropov's account of the meeting, see AVP RF, F. 059a, O. 4, P. 6, D. 5, Ll.
17-19, "Telegramma Posla SSSR v Vengrii Yu. V. Andropova iz Budapeshta 1-ogo
noyabrya 1956 g."
157
Condoleeza Rice and Michael Fry, for example, pose the question: "Was the
Soviet leadership planning to invade Hungary as early as October 23, or were they
playing a waiting game, undecided, hoping that events would take a moderate
turn?" See Condoleeza Rice and Michael Fry, "The Hungarian Crisis of 1956: the
Soviet Decision," Studies in Comparative Communism, vol. 16, nos. 1 and 2
(Spring/Summer 1983), p. 88.
democrats in the government."
158
He was referring to non-communists like Bla
Kovcs (former General Secretary of the Independent Smallholders Party from
1945 to 1947) and Zoltn Tildy, another leader of the Independent Smallholders
Party [Fggetlen Kisgazda Prt] from 1945 to 1946 and former President of the
Hungarian Republic from 1946 to 1948. Only by October 30, when doubts crept in
about the reliability of the Hungarian army and Nagy's ability to control the
population, was there an element of deception. In the telegram on that day (cited
earlier) Mikoyan and Suslov disclosed their assumption that they could deceive
Nagy as to their own wait-and-see attitude: "We intend to declare [predpologaem
zayavit'] today to Imre Nagy that the troops are leaving according to our agreement,
that for now we do not intend to bring in any more troops on account of the fact that
the Nagy government is dealing with the situation in Hungary. We intend to give
instructions to the Minister of Defense to cease sending troops into Hungary,
continuing to concentrate them on Soviet territory. As long as the Hungarian troops
occupy a non-hostile position, these troops will be sufficient. If the situation further
deteriorates, then, of course, it will be necessary to reexamine the issue in its
entirety. "
159

Many scholars writing without access to archives have pondered Soviet
motivations behind the October 30 declaration. Some have construed it as a

158
RGANI, f. 3, o. 12, d. 1005, l. 62, "Protokol'naya Zapis' Zasedaniya Prezidiuma
TsK KPSS, 28 oktyabrya 1956 g."
159
RGANI, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 12, l.2. "Telefonogramma A. I. Mikoyana i Suslova iz
Budapeshta v TsK KPSS, 30-ogo oktyabrya 1956 g."
deliberate attempt to mislead the Hungarians.
160
Broadcast on the radio on October
30 and published on the front page of Pravda the following day, the document
propounded the basic concept of "national communism." Entitled "Declaration
about the principles of development and further strengthening of friendship and
cooperation between the USSR and other socialist countries," it expressed the Soviet
government's deep regret that the "events in Hungary led to bloodshed." It stated
that the Soviet government in the interests of "mutual security" was ready to
examine with other socialist countries in the Warsaw Pact "the question of Soviet
troops located on their territories," which should be there "only with their consent."
In addition, the Soviet government, according to the document, was "ready to
discuss measures for strengthening economic ties between the socialist countries" in
such a way as to prevent any "violation of the principle of national sovereignty,
mutual profit, and equality in the economic relations" of the countries.
161
The Malin
Notes show, again, that this view is oversimplified. Rather than mask their intention

160
Condoleeza Rice and Michael Fry seriously consider a scenario in which the
declaration was "a trap and provocation, calculated to drive Nagy toward extreme
moves and a single policy option." See Rice and Fry, "The Hungarian Crisis of
1956," p. 88-89. Charles Gati implies that the declaration was a deceptive ploy,
coming as it did just one day before the decision was made to intervene a second
time. Charles Gati, Hungary and the Soviet Bloc (Durham, NC: Duke University
Press, 1986), pp. 148-149. Ernest Nagy, however, reasons that the declaration was
genuine. See Ernest Nagy, Crisis Decision Setting and Response: The Hungarian
Revolution (Washington, DC: National Defense University Research Directorate,
1978), p. 11. The author bears no relation to the Hungarian leader. Daniel Calhoun
also believes the declaration was sincere. See Daniel Calhoun, Hungary and Suez,
1956: An Exploration of Who Makes History (Lanham, Maryland: University Press
of America, 1991), p. 355.
161.
RGANI, f. 3, o. 64, d. 484, ll. 25--30: "Vypiska iz Protokola No. 49 Zasedaniya
Prezidiuma TsK KPSS ot 30 oktyabrya 1956 g.: O polozhenii v Vengrii." The title in
Russian is "Deklaratsiya o printsipakh razvitiya i dal'neishem ukreplenii druzhby i
sotrudnichestva mezhdu SSSR i drugimi sotsialisticheskimi stranami."
to intervene, publishing the declaration was actually an attempt to resolve the crisis
in a non-violent way. The Soviet leaders decided at the October 28 Soviet Presidium
meeting to issue this "appeal to the population," in order to "save face," extract
themselves from an "onerous position," and end the bloodshed. Another non-violent
option entailed discussions with the "fraternal communist parties" (i.e. the Chinese,
Bulgarians, Poles, Czechs, and Yugoslavs) asking them to appeal to the
Hungarians.
162

Most of them - except Molotov, perhaps - were sincere about the October 30
declaration as if Soviet-Hungarian relations could really be based on the principles
of noninterference and mutual respect. Ekaterina Furtseva said: "We must search
for other modes of relations with the people's democracies." At this same meeting,
on October 30, Saburov said: "It's impossible to lead against the will of the people."
And Shepilov said: "We'll have to keep up a struggle with national Communism for
a long time."
163
The others agreed with these long-range, realistic viewpoints.
Moreover, the fact that the Kremlin decided on October 28 to continue supporting
Nagy and decided only on October 31 (the day after issuing the declaration) to
intervene also attests to the sincerity of the declaration. By October 31 Khrushchev
and his colleagues realized that the October 30 declaration was not enough to satisfy

162
RGANI, f. 3, o. 12, d. 1005, l. 55, "Protokol'naya Zapis' Zasedaniya Prezidiuma
TsK KPSS, 28 oktyabrya 1956 g."
163
RGANI, f. 3, o. 12, d. 1006, l. 9ob, "Protokol'naya Zapis' Zasedaniya Prezidiuma
TsK KPSS, 30-ogo oktyabrya 1956 g." Furtseva's comment appears on p. 10 of this
document, while Saburov's comment appears on the back of page 10 (list 10 ob).
the Hungarian people; it had come too late.
164
Thus the Soviet leaders had not
decided from the outset to intervene a second time; on the contrary, homo soveticus
waffled just like his Western counterpart.
Scholars also pondered whether or not the initial withdrawal of troops from
Budapest beginning on October 29 was simply a stalling tactic while gauging the
likely outcome of the Middle East developments.
165
We now know that Nagy
announced on his own initiative, in a speech on October 25, the withdrawal of
troops from Budapest and follow-up negotiations for further withdrawals from
Hungary itself. This is yet another example of the fallibility and powerlessness of
Stalin's successors; the "tail" (satellites) could wag the "dog" (Soviet Union).
According to newly declassified diplomatic cables, Soviet Presidium members
Mikoyan and Suslov later scolded Nagy for not informing them in advance, saying
they considered this "a most crude mistake, because the withdrawal of Soviet troops
will inevitably lead to an intervention by American troops."
166
Since Nagy had made
the announcement, however, the Soviet leaders went cautiously ahead with it. The
Malin Notes of October 28 indicate that Khrushchev told the CC CPSU Presidium,

164
RGANI, f. 89, o. 45, d. 12, l. 2. "TsK KPSS, High-Frequency Transmission,"
October 30, 1956. See CWIHP Bulletin (Spring 1995), p. 32 for my English
translation of this document.
165
Rice and Fry, for example, consider this seriously in one of their "scenarios": "It
would follow that the partial Soviet evacuation from Budapest on 29-30
October...must be viewed as [a] fraudulent act, as mere stalling acts to enable the
preparations for actual invasion to be completed. ...[T]he troop movements within
Hungary... must be regarded as a tactical regrouping and reorganizing maneuver,
in preparation for the final invasion." See Rice and Fry, "The Hungarian Crisis of
1956," p. 92.
166
RGANI, f. 3, o. 64., d. 483, l. 128. "Telegramma A.I. Mikoyana i. M. A. Suslova iz
Budapeshta v TsK KPSS 26-ogo oktyabrya."
"We are ready to withdraw troops from Budapest. We must make this conditional
on a ceasefire by the centers of resistance.
167


Role of the Suez Crisis in Soviet Calculations
The influence of the Suez Crisis on the Soviet decision to intervene in
Hungary has also puzzled Western observers. Some have posited that the Russians
would not have intervened had the Israelis, British, and French not attacked Egypt in
late October. Had the Suez crisis occurred one month later, they hazard, "Hungary
would be another Poland today."
168
Others have argued that the Israeli mobilization
and the Anglo-French ultimatum to Nasser had minimal effect on Soviet decision
making, particularly on the partial withdrawal of Soviet troops from Budapest.
169
The
general consensus among scholars, however, has been that the Suez Crisis served as a
convenient distraction for the Soviet leaders. It affected the timing of the Soviet
invasion, but sooner or later the Khrushchev regime would have launched an invasion,

167
RGANI, f. 3, o. 12, d. 1005, l. 56ob, "Protokol'naya Zapis' Zasedaniya
Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 28-ogo oktyabrya 1956 g."
168
George Mikes, The Hungarian Revolution (London: Deutsch, 1957), p. 141. See
also Ernest Nagy, Crisis Decision Setting and Response: The Hungarian Revolution
(Washington, DC: National Defense University Research Directorate, 1978), p. 22.
169
While he lacks sufficient evidence, J. M. Mackintosh is dubious about the
influence of the Suez crisis on Soviet decision making, since TASS announced the
troop withdrawal well after the Russians received news of Israeli mobilization. The
Kremlin would have known as early as October 25 via the Soviet legation in Israel
that the Israelis had mobilized their army. TASS announced the alleged Soviet
intention to leave Hungary at 11 a.m. on October 31, after the Anglo-French
ultimatum had been publicized at 4 a.m. that same morning. See J. M. Mackintosh,
Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy (London: Oxford University Press,
1963), p. 177.
even without the Suez crisis.
170
According to Miunovi, Khrushchev himself stated
this openly.
171

It is now known that the CPSU and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been
receiving reports from their diplomats abroad about the possibility of a war over the
Suez Canal. As early as September 21, for example, Andropov wrote the following to
N. S. Patolichev, the deputy minister of foreign affairs on September 21:
Our Hungarian comrades have conveyed to us the following information. In
connection with the issue of the Suez Canal in the missions of the Western states in
Budapest, there is talk mainly about the possibility of a war arising because of the
Canal, and preparations for one may be underway. For example, the French envoy in
Budapest Voncoeur thinks it urgent to consider the possibility of a war over the Suez
Canal, but he notes that it is difficult to predict events.
172


While the issue is still not entirely clear, the Malin Notes reveal that
Khrushchev and others on October 28 thought about the Suez matter as a "real
mess" [kasha] in which the British and French had become embroiled, and that the
Soviet Union "should not get caught in the same company."
173
Since Israel did not

170
See, for example, Rice and Fry, "The Hungarian Crisis of 1956," p. 97. Also Gti,
Hungary and the Soviet Bloc, p. 153; Jiri Valenta, "Soviet Decision Making and the
Hungarian Revolution," in Bla Kirly, Barbara Lotze, and Nndor Dreisziger, eds.
The First War Between Socialist States: the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and its
Impact (NY: Columbia University Press, 1984), p. 271; and John Campbell, "The
Soviet Union, the United States, and the Twin Crises of Hungary and Suez," in W.
Roger Louis and Roger Owen, eds. Suez 1956: the Crisis and its Consequences
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), p. 251. Campbell writes: "The surprising feature
of the double crisis was that the two sets of events proceeded as independently of
each other as they did....The Soviets were not disturbed by moral judgements. The
diversion of Western attention may have affected the timing of Soviet moves
slightly, but nothing more. In the last analysis it came down to a choice by the Soviet
Union on how to protect its own interests."
171
Veljko Miunovi, Moscow Diary (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1980), p. 134.
172.
RGANI, rolik 5169, f. 5, o. 28, d. 394: "From Andropov to the Deputy Minister
of Foreign Affairs, N. S. Patolichev," Sept. 21, 1956."
173
RGANI, f. 3, o. 12, d. 1005, l. 59 ob, "Protokol'naya Zapis' Zasedaniya
attack until October 29, Khrushchev is most likely referring to the protracted
political (not military) "mess." Thus the Kremlin leaders did indeed think a lot
about the plight of the British and French in the Middle East; it stimulated them to
search for ways to end the problem in Hungary quickly, i. e. with military force.
Later in his memoirs Khrushchev claimed that the "imperialists tried to take
advantage of the troubles we were having in Poland and Hungary so they could send
their troops into Egypt to reestablish colonial rule."
174


The Issue of Hungarian Neutrality
Another issue that has preoccupied scholars is that of Nagy's declaration of
neutrality and withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet decision to invade
Hungary. Did Nagys declaration provoke the second Soviet attack, or had the
Kremlin leaders already decided to intervene beforehand? Before the opening of the
archives, many observers insisted on the former, that the Soviet Union intervened in
Hungary--and not in Poland-- precisely because Hungary went too far, especially by
declaring neutrality and withdrawing from the Warsaw Pact. Others argued that it
was only after Nagy received repeated excuses from Andropov regarding the influx
of Soviet troops at the meeting of the Hungarian Council of Ministers in the early
evening of November 1 that Nagy decided to go ahead and proclaim neutrality.
Since we now know that the Soviet Presidium decided to invade on October
31, and that Nagy declared neutrality on November 1, it is clear that Nagy, at least,

Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 28-ogo oktyabrya 1956 g." Ne popast' by v odnu kompaniyu.
174
Nikita S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), p.
403.
decided to withdraw Hungary from the Warsaw Pact only after the Soviet leaders
decided to launch a second invasion.
175
On October 31 and November 1, Nagy
protested against the invasion at the Soviet Embassy, while Hungarian diplomats
did the same in Moscow. Nagy also cabled the Secretary General of the UN and the
permanent members of the UN Security Council for help. Only when he received no
reply did Nagy declare neutrality. The actions of the Khrushchev leadership also
show that the Soviet decision to intervene preceded Nagys declaration of neutrality.
Khrushchev lead a delegation to Brest (October 31) to Bucharest (November
1), and to Brioni, Yugoslavia (November 2). At each place Khrushchev informed the
local communist leaders that the invasion was in progress. Thus, where Nagys
decision making is concerned, the Soviet invasion was clearly the cause, his
declaration of neutrality the effect. Naturally, for Soviet communist officials, Nagys
announcement of Hungarys withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact became a
convenient justification for the intervention ex post facto; it did not, in fact, prompt
the Soviet decision.
176


175
An
emergency meeting of the CPSU presidium
was convened
on October 31 to reevaluate the decision
of the
previous day
not to use force
.
Marshal Zhukov was instructed
"
to work out a plan and report on it.
" RGANI, f.
3, o. 12, d. 1006, l. 17ob, "Protokol'naya Zapis' Zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS,"
31 oktiabria 1956 g.," See also RGANI
, f. 3,
o
. 64,
d
. 484,
l
. 41: "Postanovleniie Prezidiuma TsK KPSS: O
polozhenii v Vengrii. Vypiska iz protokola # 49, P49/VI ot 31 oktyabrya 1956 g."

176
Raymond Garthoff, for example, points out that the Soviet Presidium reached its
final decision to invade on October 31, "without the new information on
developments in Hungary on October 31, indeed without even awaiting the return of
Mikoyan and Suslov (and opposed by Mikoyan to no avail, when he learned of the
change)." Khrushchevs decisive reversal, indeed, seems to have been occasioned
more than anything else by a conversation with Polish leader Wadysaw Gomuka.
See Istoricheskii Arkhiv, no. 3 (May-June 1996, p. 87. Cited in Raymond Garthoff,
Hungary, 1956 The Washington Reaction, unpublished paper delivered at
Hungary and the World, 1956 the New Archival Evidence, September 26-29,
1996, p. 21.
However, when one considers decision making at the grassroots level in
Hungary, this issue becomes a murkier, unanswerable chicken-and-egg question.
Documents indicate that Hungarian and Soviet communist officials had been
hearing hints from other Hungarians i.e. students, local officials, and radio
broadcasts - about the desire for neutrality (especially as influenced by Yugoslavia's
example) ever since the Twentieth Party Congress in Moscow. Jzsef Rvai
complained about this in a speech at the MDP Plenum on July 18, 1956:
[I]n Hungary there is talk, and since the Twentieth Congress it is becoming all the
more common, about nation-specific characteristics of our socialist development; if
one takes a closer look and scratches beneath the surface, then invariably two ideas
come to the surface; one, independence from the Soviet Union...The other opinion
which masquerades as a nation-specific characteristic is dont bother the private
farmer, dont pursue collectivization...If we take a closer look, then basically it
means that we should follow some sort of policy of neutrality la Yugoslavia and
give up on cooperatives in the villages. Needless to say, comrades, this is all poppy
cock. There must be no talk about neutrality, loosening of ties to the Soviet camp, or
renunciation of the socialist reformation of agriculture.
177


Even U.S. State Department officials, who were closely monitoring local
"freedom radios" in Hungary, knew as early as October 27 that "renunciation of
the Warsaw Pact" was a key item on the demonstrators' list of demands.
178
In fact,

177
MOL 276 f 60/647, "Rvai Jzsef Beszde Az MDP Kzponti Vezetsgnek
lsn," Budapest, 1956 jlius 18," old. 95-6.
178
Department of State Memorandum from W. Park Armstrong, Jr. to
Undersecretary Containing Summary of Points About Hungarian Situation
Covered in Secretarys Meeting, October 27, 1956, p. 2. National Security Archive,
Washington D.C., Flashpoints Project, Box 2, Folder 10/27-8/56. This
memorandum lists the insurgents' demands as 1) a new provisional government,
including leaders of the insurgent youth; 2) immediate cancellation of martial law;
3) immediate renunciation of the Warsaw Pact and the peaceable departure of SU
troops from Hungary; 4) punishment of those responsible for the bloodshed and a
general amnesty; 5) construction of Hungarian socialism on a democratic basis; 6)
disarming of the security police and assumption of responsibility for order by the
according to Jan Nowak, director of the Polish desk in Munich, the RFE Guidance
of October 28 recommended that RFE support these demands from the local radios,
including the demand for the withdrawal of Hungary from the Warsaw Pact.
179

Calls for Hungarian neutrality and withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact had already
been broadcast by Radio Budapest at various times on October 31.
180
Moreover,
Bl
a

Kovcs
(
a member of Nagy's cabinet from October 27, 1956, and a state minister, November 3--4, 1956
) gave a speech
on October 31 for
the Independent Smallholders Party
in Pcs that specifically advocated
neutrality well before Nagy did. He said:
When the Hungarian freedom fighters battled against the Russian tanks, they
fought for the country's independence. This does not mean that we regard the
Russian people as our enemies, but one cannot follow a unilateral policy...It is
necessary to establish relations, based on equal rights, with all nations, and one
cannot tie the country's fate to one or another military bloc. The Hungarian people
want a neutral Hungary.
181



Army. The statements pledge continued demonstrations until victory is won."
[emphasis added].
179
Jan Nowak, Poles and Hungarians in 1956, p. 7.
180
See, for example, the "Proclamation of the representatives of the Revolutionary
Forces and the Revolutionary Council of the People's Army" broadcast by Radio
Budapest on October 31. "We demand from the government the immediate
termination of the Warsaw Pact by informing members of that Pact." Also see the
statement by the workers of National Air Defense Command, broadcast by Radio
Budapest on the same day. "We demand that Hungary become a neutral state, like
Austria." Both are cited in Edmund O. Stillman, The Ideology of Revolution: the
People's Demands in Hungary, October--November 1956 (NY: Free Europe Press,
1957), p. 22.
181 (
Emphasis added).
Kovcs
'
speech

was reported
on the second page of
Kis Ujs

g
, the party's
newspaper, in its first new issue on
Nov
ember
1, 1956.
Kovcs was
secretary general of the
Independent Smallholders Party until 1947
. On February 25, 1947 he was arrested on a charge of
conspiracy against the Soviet occupation forces and incarcerated in a Soviet prison
until the fall of 1955.
He returned to Budapest from Pcs in November 1. After the
revolution he served for one year (1958-1959) in Kdr's new regime and died in
1959. This translated excerpt is published in Edmund O. Stillman, The Ideology of
Revolution: the People's Demands in Hungary, October--November 1956 (NY: Free
Europe Press, 1957), p. 31-2. See also footnote #3 in E. D. Orekhova, V. T. Sereda
and A. S. Stykalin, Sovetskii Soyuz i Vengerskii Krizis 1956 Goda, p. 493.
It should be noted that
Kovcs
prefaced these remarks by assuring his audience that:

"No one should dream of going back to the world of aristocrats, bankers, and
capitalists. That world is definitely gone! A true member of the Smallholder's Party
and a Minister of the State cannot think along the lines of 1939 or 1945. The last ten
years were bitter, but they also provided a useful lesson."

While it is not clear whether the Kremlin leaders heard Kovcs' speech the day it
was delivered (October 31), we do know from the Malin Notes that the Soviet
leaders had heard about Kovcs' speech in Pcs.
182
In addition, on October 31,
Zoltn Tildy told Mikoyan in Budapest that Hungary would leave the Warsaw
Pact.
183
As mentioned earlier, Nagy himself had written about Hungarian neutrality
in earlier years, especially when he was demoted from his post as prime minister on
April 14, 1955.
184
One should mention that there is no explicit mention of neutrality
and Warsaw Pact withdrawal in the Malin Notes before the October 31 session
when the final decision was reached. However, since Radio Budapest had broadcast
more than one call for neutrality and Warsaw Pact withdrawal on October 31, it is
likely that one of the Soviet diplomats heard it and reported it to Moscow.
Thus, while Nagys own announcement of Hungarys withdrawal from the
Warsaw Pact did not cause the Soviet invasion, it is quite possible that the Soviet
leaders heard calls for Hungarys withdrawal from other Hungarians at the

182
RGANI, f. 3, o. 12, d. 1006, l. 25, "Protokol'naya Zapis' Zasedaniya Prezidiuma
TsK KPSS, 2-ogo noyabrya 1956 g."
183
Interview by Major General Pl Malter, Hungarian Minister of Defense, given
on the evening of November 2, 1956, published in The Revolt in Hungary: A
Documentary Chronology of Events, Oct 23, 1956Nov 4, 1956 (NY: Free Europe
Committee, n.d. [1957], p. 73, cited in Garthoff, "The Tragedy of Hungary," P-984,
The RAND Corporation, November 28, 1956, also published in Problems of
Communism, vol VI, no 1 (January-February 1957).
184
See his book, On Communism: In Defense of the New Course (NY: Praeger, 1957).
grassroots level, predicted that Nagy might cave in to these demands from below,
and thus decided to preempt such a withdrawal by launching a second military
intervention.
Incidentally, if one can judge from Nagy's testimony while in captivity in
Romania, he had gone along with the decision to withdraw Hungary from the
Warsaw Pact because it was the consensus of the cabinet.
185

The Malin Notes and other documents allow us to make other observations
about the nature of Soviet decision making. The Soviet Union certainly was not a
"unitary rational actor." Western scholars have long doubted that the Soviet
Presidium was always "unanimous" in its decisions. They suspected that there were
hawks and doves in the Kremlin, but they could not prove it, much less identify who
was a hawk and who was a dove. The Malin Notes show beyond a doubt that there
were hawks and doves. Surprisingly, some individuals commonly thought of as
hawks actually behaved as doves at least part of the time. Although a Khrushchev
supporter, Marshal Zhukov's military role would incline one to think that he favored
an intervention. On October 28, however, he said: "We must display political

185
MOL XX.-5-h, 8 ktet, 13 doboz (1956-1958), "Jegyzknyv, Nagy Imre
kihallgatsrl, Budapest, 1957 szeptember 2," old. 106. Nagy told his interrogators,
"In that cabinet session on November 1, 1956, in the morning and afternoon, where
the declaration of neutrality and the cancelling of the Warsaw Pact were on the
agenda, Jnos Kdr, first deputy president of the party, minister of state, as I
mentioned earlier, was also there, besides the other cabinet members. The cabinet
made the decision with his participation. As far as I can remember, we invited
Andropov on Kdr's suggestion. Andropov was informed of the cabinet's
decision....I dont think its right to hold me responsible because I didnt discuss
these questions with the party....[T]he first deputy of the party [i.e. Kdr] took part
at the session."
flexibility," because "the situation has unfolded quite differently compared to when we
decided to send in troops."
186

Mikoyan was clearly opposed to the use of military force in Hungary. The
decision on October 23 to send troops to Hungary, thus, was not unanimous.
According to Malin's notes of the October 23rd Presidium session, Mikoyan had
said:

Without Nagy the movement cannot be controlled. [Mikoyan] expresses doubt about
the introduction of troops. What are we losing? The Hungarians themselves will
restore order. We should try political measures, and only then send troops.
187


Mikoyan vigorously opposed the second, more major intervention as well,
having been physically absent with Suslov in Budapest when the CC CPSU
Presidium decided without him on October 31 to intervene again. According to
Khrushchev's newest memoirs, Mikoyan flew back to Moscow on the evening of
November 1, just as Khrushchev, Molotov, and Malenkov were preparing to fly to
Brest. He protested the decision and demanded another meeting. Khrushchev
refused. Mikoyan threatened suicide. Khrushchev replied, "I believe you are a
rational man. I know that in the end, if you think about it, you will see the necessity
for our decision."
188

Rational decision making generally entails a clear definition of the objectives
and of the optimal criteria of any potential decision. Moreover, the rational actor
specifies what he wants to achieve, preserve, or avoid as problems. He then

186
RGANI, F. 3, O. 12, D. 1005, L. 60 ob, "Protokol'naya Zapis' Zasedaniya
Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 28-ogo oktyabrya 1956 g."
187.
Malin, "Protokol'naya Zapis,' 23 oktyabrya 1956 g."
188
Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: the Glasnost Tapes, pp. 122-3.
considers several alternatives, evaluating each of them to see how they meet the
optimal criteria. He chooses the best option (the one that maximizes benefits and
minimizes costs and risks) and finally "troubleshoots" his chosen option. As
Herbert Simon pointed out, most human beings do not reach decisions this
painstakingly. Instead, a typical decision maker usually considers some alternatives
sequentially and chooses the one which meets minimum criteria. He does not
laboriously construct a matrix of all possible alternatives and calculate the
probabilities of expected consequences. He merely decides by a process of
elimination, or what Simon termed "satisficing behavior."
189

The Malin Notes suggest that the Soviet leaders did consider at least a few
alternatives. At the October 28 meeting, Khrushchev also acknowledged the
existence of non-violent options, like retaining the Nagy government, but sending
into exile some of its members, or like issuing an appeal to the peasants and
workers.
190
As mentioned earlier, Khrushchev recommended that Nagy--if he
agreed to it--serve as deputy prime minister in the post-invasion Kdr
government.
191
However, the Presidium leaders seem to have to zigzagged abruptly
and rather irrationally from one position to another, completely different position.
For example, as mentioned above, Marshal Zhukov during the October 30
Presidium meeting expressed the need to withdraw Soviet troops not only from

189
Herbert Simon, The New Science of Management Decision (New York: Harper,
1960). Cited in James E. Dougherty and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories of
International Relations, 3d ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1990), p. 476.
190
RGANI, F. 3, O. 12, D. 1005, L. 58 ob, "Protokol'naya Zapis' Zasedaniya
Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 28-ogo oktyabrya 1956 g."
191
RGANI, F 3, O 12, D 1006, L. 18ob, "Protokol'naya Zapis' Zasedaniya
Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 31 oktyabrya 1956 g."
Budapest, but from Hungary as a whole, "if necessary." And he said: "This is a
lesson for us in the military-political sphere."
192
Most of them--except Molotov,
perhaps--seemed sincere about the declaration that was published on October 30, as
if Soviet-Hungarian relations really could be based on the principles of
noninterference and mutual respect.
Yet, at the Presidium meeting the very next day, October 31,
Khrushchev, as mentioned earlier, declared: "We should not withdraw
our troops from Hungary and Budapest. We should take the initiative in
restoring order in Hungary."
193
Saburov reportedly said in disgust,
"After yesterday's session, this discussion is all pointless. It will
vindicate NATO."
194
But the Presidium went ahead and ordered
Zhukov to draw up a military plan.
One also notices from the Malin Notes that Khrushchev states his opinion first--
after the scheduled briefings--in most of the meetings that he attends, and then the
other Presidium members tend to support him, even when they supported the exact
opposite opinion the day before. This is true for the meetings on October 21, 23, 28, 30,
and 31, and it suggests that the phenomenon described by psychologist Irving Janis as
"groupthink" may have been operative.
195
Ostensibly, the other Central Committee

192
RGANI, F. 3, O. 12, D. 1006, L. 9 ob, "Protokol'naya Zapis' Zasedaniya
Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 30 oktyabrya 1956 g."
193
RGANI, F. 3, O. 12, D. 1006, L. 18, "Protokol'naya Zapis' Zasedaniya
Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 31 oktyabrya 1956 g."
194
Ibid., L. 17.
195
Irving Janis, Groupthink (Boston : Houghton Mifflin, 1983). Groupthink is
defined here as "a deterioration of mental efficiency, reality testing, and moral
members hesitated to voice an opinion that was radically different from that of
Khrushchev, whom they perceived more or less as "the number one" in the Kremlin.

The Military Interventions: "Operation Wave" (Volna)
Although the Soviet Special Corps [Osobii Korpus] stationed in Hungary under
the command of Gen.-Lt. Pyotr N. Lashchenko, was aware of the rising temper of the
population, the October 23 demonstration "surpassed all expectations." There were
no Soviet troops actually in Budapest, but parts of the corps were located in
Szkesfehrvar, Gyr, Szombathely, Kecskemt, Szolnok, Szeged, Debrecen, and
Ppa. In several of these cities, minor threats and attacks on Soviet troops by
Hungarians had already occurred.
196
In addition, the Soviet Embassy in Budapest
often briefed the Special Corps about the current situation.
197
The Soviet consulate in

judgment that results from in-group pressures." (p. 9). Janis explains that
"Members tend to evolve informal objectives to preserve friendly intragroup
relations and this becomes part of the hidden agenda at their meetings." (p. 8).
196.
AVP RF, F 077, O 37, D 18, P 188, L 19: "From Gen.-Lt. Pyotr Lashchenko,
Commander of Soviet Troops in Hungary to Soviet Ambassador Andropov," May 18,
1956. See also Evgenii I. Malashenko, "Osobyi korpus v ogne Budapeshta,"Voenno-
Istoricheskii Zhurnal, v. 10 (1993): 24. Malashenko's account is published in four
consecutive issues of the journal: October, 1993, no. 10: 22-30; November, 1993, no.
11: pp. 44-51; December, 1993, no. 12: 33-37; and January 1994, no. 1: 30-36.
197.
AVP RF, F 077, O 37, D 18, P 188, L 19: "Lashchenko to Andropov." Military
officials also advised the Moscow leaders. Marshal Ivan Konev was commander-in-
chief of the Warsaw Pact and assumed direct command of Soviet military operations
in Hungary in November 1956. Gen. Mikhail Sergeyevich Malinin was one of Konev's
top aides during the invasion and the first deputy chief of the Soviet General Staff. As
the Malin notes imply, Soviet leaders in Moscow frequently consulted Malinin in the
weeks before the invasion. RGANI, F. 3, O. 12, D. 1006, Ll. 7, 10, "Protokol'naya
Zapis' Zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 30 oktyabrya 1956 g." The reports
Malinin sent regularly from Budapest to the General Staff are still closed to
researchers.
Gyr was another potential source of information before it was closed in July 1956.
198

Thus, the Special Corps was reasonably well informed about the growing crisis and yet
was surprised by the events of October 23--4.
Soviet troops crossed the Hungarian border at 2:15 A.M. on October 24 at
Csap, Beregovo, and Vylok. The Soviet military plan was codenamed "Operation
Wave" [Volna], and the signal for launching the plan was "Kompas." The plan
presupposed that the troops would only need between three and six hours to
establish control over the most important Hungarian cities, including Budapest.
Part of the "Volna" plan was the proposal to recall Soviet troops from the
countryside, where they were assisting Hungarian farmers with the harvest.
The Volna plan placed Soviet forces on heightened alert in mid-October and
brought them to full combat alert on October 20-21 by the command of the Soviet
General Staff. At 11:00 p.m. on October 23, the Soviet troops received mobilization
orders and reacted promptly, in spite of a thick fog. Five divisions (31,500 Soviet
troops) were deployed under the general command of General Sergei Malinin (a first
deputy chief of the Soviet General Staff) and operative command of General Povalii:
the "Special Corps" [Osobii Korpus] (consisting of two mechanized divisions); two
divisions from the Transcarpathian Military District in Ukraine (the 128th artillery
division and 39th mechanized division under the command of General Pavel Ivanovich
Batov); and a mechanized division (from a separate mechanized army based in
Romania near the border with Hungary).
199
An operational group of eighty generals

198.
AVP RF, Putevoditel,' vol. 1, "Vengriya."
199
APRF, F. 3, O 64, D. 484, Ll. 85-87. "Dokladnaya Zapiska Ministerstva Oborony
SSSR v TsK KPSS o Deistviakh Sovetskikh Voisk 'Po Okazaniyu Pomoshchi
and senior officers from the Soviet General Staff gathered in Moscow and flew to
Hungary to provide constant guidance. Another operational group from the Special
Corps arrived in Budapest from Szkesfehrvar at around 2:00 a.m. and set up a
command center in the Hungarian Ministry of Defense building.
200

Apart from the fact that the first intervention did not solve the original
political problem in the country, it did not put down the resistance as swiftly as it
might have; isolated groups held out against the Soviet army for weeks. Until the
summer of 1956, the Soviet leaders had had no concrete military plans for Hungary,
should unrest occur there, despite the fact that soon after the riots in East Berlin in
1953, the CPSU leadership ordered commanders of all Soviet forces in Eastern
Europe to construct plans for counterinsurgency anti-riot and operations. However,
after Andropov's alarming telegram to the CC CPSU on July 9 and the discussion of

Pravitel'stvu VNR v Svyazi s Voznikshimi v Strane Besporyadkami,' 24 oktyabrya
1956 g." This detailed memorandum from Marshal Georgii Zhukov (Soviet minister
of defense) and Marshal Vasilii Sokolovskii (chief of the Soviet General Staff)
provides the exact number of troops deployed and describes the assignments of the
Soviet ground and air forces. In total, the Soviet General Staff sent 1,130 tanks and
self-propelled artillery, 380 armored personnel carriers, 3,930 motor vehicles, 185
anti-aircraft guns, and 615 guns and mortars to put down the resistance. In
addition, two Soviet fighter divisions (159 planes) provided air support for the
ground forces. Two other Soviet bomber divisions (122 aircraft) were placed on full
alert at Hungarian and Ukrainian airfields. See also RGANI, F 89, Per 45, Dok 7, L
1: "Zapiski Perevertkina, Zamestitel' Ministra Vnutrennykh Del, SSSR, 24
oktyabrya 1956 g."
200
TsAMO, F. 32, O. 701291, D. 15, L. 133. Cited in Aleksandr Kyrov, "Sovetskaya
Armiya i Vengerskaya Revolyutsiya: Voennye Arkhivy o Sovetsko-Vengerskoi
Voine 1956 g.," unpublished paper for international historians' conference
"Hungary and the World, 1956: the New Archival Evidence, 26-29 September 1996,
Budapest." A similar version is published in the English-language version of the
book by Jen Gyrkei and Mikls Horvth, Soviet Military Intervention in Hungary
(Budapest: Central European University Press, 1999). See note #6 supra for citation
of 1996 Hungarian edition. Documents on 1956 from Soviet military archives
remain for the most part off-limits to foreign scholars and most Russian scholars.
it in the emergency Presidium session of July 12, the CPSU leaders began to think
ahead.
201
Miunovi informs us in his memoirs that on July 15, Khrushchev hinted
about his willingness to use force in Hungary:
I was about to take my leave...[b]ut Khrushchev kept me back and said: If the
situation in Hungary gets still worse, we here have decided to use all means at our
disposal to bring the crisis to an end. Khrushchev said he was telling me this in
confidence, that such a decision had not yet arisen and that maybe it wouldn't arise,
but that he wanted to inform Tito in good time about the internal decisions which had
been taken here.
202


Five days later, on July 20, 1956, Moscow instructed Evgenii Ivanovich Malashenko,
who headed one of the operational groups of the Special Corps headquarters at the
time to draw up a military plan for the "restoration of order" in Hungary. In his
account, Malashenko describes several obstacles the Special Corps faced. First, the
senior Soviet representative in the Hungarian Ministry of Defense, Gen.-Lt. M. F.
Tikhonov--the one most responsible for providing the Special Corps with data about
Hungarian troops--was quite ignorant. He "couldn't answer a single one" of
Malashenko's questions and "asked that [he] come back in two or three days."
203

Second, until July 1956 the Soviet army did not have a plan for conducting operations
in Hungary. Operation Wave was drawn up hastily ("in several days"), based on the
plan drafted by the Hungarian General Staff for joint actions of the Hungarian army,
security organs, and police. Third, the Hungarian troops turned out to be unreliable,
so the Soviet plan had to be changed, to exclude joint operations with Hungarian

201
See APRF, F. 3, O. 64, D. 483, Ll. 151-162. "Telegramma Yu. V. Andropova v
MID SSSR o Besede s E. Ger, 9-ogo iyulya 1956 g;" and RGANI, F. 3, O. 12, D.
1005, Ll. 2-2ob, "Protokol'naya Zapis' Zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 12-ogo
iyulya 1956 g." respectively.
202
Miunovi, Moscow Diary, p. 8.
203
Malashenko, "Special Corp in the Budapest Fire," no. 10 (1993): 24.
forces.
204
On October 23, when shooting began at the Radio Building, Hungarian
troops initially rushed to the scene to reinforce the Hungarian secret police (VH) who
were guarding it, but after hesitating a moment, they sided with the crowd.
205

According to the U. N. report written a year later, the Hungarian army as a whole
collapsed from the day of the uprising, and "certain units fought on the side of the
insurgents. There was no single instance recorded of Hungarian troops fighting on
the Soviet side against their compatriots.
206

Although individual accounts differ on the degree of insubordination of
Hungarian military personnel, all observers and scholars agree that the Soviet leaders
eventually viewed them as unreliable. According to Malashenko, only "one of the
Hungarian tanks accompanying the Soviet tanks to the Radio Building deserted."
Mikoyan and Suslov, however, acknowledged that by October 24 at least one whole
Hungarian "battalion mutinied," defeating Hungarian state security personnel, who
"put up a violent resistance to the insurgents" and might have won the battle

204
Malashenko, "Special Corp in the Budapest Fire," no. 1 (Jan. 1994): 35.
Malashenko asserts: "Many Hungarian soldiers took part in the struggle with the
armed insurgent groups and helped our troops. The Hungarian army as a whole did
not go over to the other side and did not fight against the Soviet troops." This
contradicts other versions. Mikoyan and Suslov wrote in an October 24 telegram:
"The comrades express the opinion that the Hungarian army conducted itself
poorly." AVP RF, F 059a, O 4, P 6, D 5, Ll. 1-7. "Telegramma A. I. Mikoyana i M.
A. Suslova iz Budapeshta v TsK KPSS, 24 oktyabrya 1956." Another source claims
that the Hungarian army basically collapsed and was useless to the Russians. See
United Nations Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary, General
Assembly, 11th Session, no. 18 (New York: 1957), ch. 5, p. 28.
205.
UN Report, ch. 2, p. 6.
206.
UN Report. Mikoyan and Suslov noted in their October 24 telegram, however, that
Hungarian patrols were on the streets together with the Soviet troops. This
information has not been verified. See AVP RF, F. 059a, O 4, P 6, D 5, Ll 1-7.
"Telegramma A. I. Mikoyana i M. A. Suslova iz Budapeshta v TsK KPSS, 24
oktyabrya 1956."
otherwise.
207
This military insubordination is all the more remarkable because many
scholars long argued that by the late 1940s Hungarian communists were the
undisputed masters of the national armed forces. They considered the Hungarian
army the tool of the communist party that acquired control over most aspects of
public life.
208

Soviet forces also were not always reliable, according to some reports. There
were cases of Russian soldiers fraternizing with Hungarians and, according to CIA
Director Allen Dulles, some reports of the alleged desertion of a Russian tank crew.
209

Despite their untrustworthiness, Soviet military and political leaders initially
believed, at the height of the crisis, that the Hungarian army and security forces could
manage on their own. Earlier General-Lieutenant Tikhonov said that the Russians did
not need to help the Hungarians, who-having strong security organs, police, and army-
could "restore order" themselves.
210
As mentioned earlier, Mikoyan during the
October 23 Presidium session advocated political rather than military measures."
211

Both he and Suslov as late as October 24 thought it safe to rely more on Hungarian
forces. They wrote to Moscow confidently:

207.
AVP RF, F 059a, O 4, P 6, D 5, Ll. 1-7. "Telegramma A. I. Mikoyana i M. A.
Suslova iz Budapeshta v TsK KPSS, 24 oktyabrya 1956."
208
See, for example, Zoltn Barany, Soviet Control of the Hungarian Military
Under Stalin, Journal of Strategic Studies, vol. 14, no. 2 (June 1991), pp. 148-164.

209.
Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 1956--1961 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday,
1965), 67. According to another source, Soviet officers in several centers contacted the
new Hungarian revolutionary councils, denying all intention of interfering in
Hungarian affairs. See J. M. Mackintosh, Strategy and Tactics of Soviet Foreign Policy
(London: Oxford University Press, 1963), 171. Declassified documents in TsAMO
include the Soviet defense ministry's complete list of Hungarian army units that took
the side of the insurgents. See TsAMO, F 32, O 701291, D 17, Ll. 33--48.
210.
Malashenko, "Special Corps," 24.
211.
Malin, "Protokol'naya Zapis,' 23 oktyabrya 1956 g."
Due to the fact that a turning point in the events has occurred, it has been decided to
use Hungarian units more boldly for patrolling, for detaining suspicious elements and
people violating the state of emergency, and for guarding important installations
(railroad stations, roads, and so on.) The Hungarian comrades, especially Imre Nagy,
approved the use of more Hungarian military units, militia, and state security units in
order to lighten the burden of the Soviet troops and to emphasize the role of the
Hungarians themselves in ending the riots.
212


They seemed to think the Hungarian comrades were too pessimistic. "We had
the impression that Ger especially, but the other comrades as well, were exaggerating
the strength of the opponent and underestimating their own strength," Suslov and
Mikoyan wrote. "We heard the preliminary reports of the Soviet military command
and the command of the Hungarian armed forces, which-after closer scrutiny-turned
out to be rather exaggerated in a pessimistic way.
213

The Hungarian army and security organs could not restore order, however,
and it was the Soviet leaders who were too optimistic. Isolated skirmishes continued
until about October 30, after the October 28 ceasefire. If the numbers of Marshal
Zhukov are correct, there were five Soviet divisions mobilized for the attack
(Operation Wave) in Hungary: 31,550 military personnel, 1,130 tanks, 615 weapons
and mortars, 85 antiaircraft weapons, 380 armored personnel carriers, 3,930 motor
vehicles.
214
In Budapest itself, according to one report, there were about 6,000 men,
290 tanks, 120 armored personnel carriers, and 156 guns. Even then there were not
enough troops to both "search and destroy the enemy" and reinforce the guard at key

212.
AVP RF, F 059a, O 4, P 6, D 5, Ll. 1-7. "Telegramma A. I. Mikoyana i M. A.
Suslova iz Budapeshta v TsK KPSS, 24 oktyabrya 1956."
213.
Ibid."
214.
RGANI, F 89, Per 45, Dok 6, L 1: Report of Zhukov on Oct. 24.
military objectives in a city of more than a million people.
215
On October 27, Jnos
Kdr asked whether more Russian troop reinforcements could be sent to Hungary.
216

Other weaknesses in Operation Wave included instructions given to both Soviet
and Hungarian troops
217
in Budapest and other Hungarian cities
218
not to open fire
first on the insurgents; and the failure of the Soviet army to "isolate the battlefield" by
blocking all roads leading into Budapest.
219


215.
Malashenko, "Special Corps," 30.
216.
RGANI, F 89, Per 45, Dok 9, L 3: Information from Mikoyan, Oct. 27, 1956.
217.
Malashenko, "Special Corps," vol. 10 (1993), 28. Of course, on October 24, in Pest,
the Russians did more shooting than either the pro-Soviet Hungarian patrols or the
Hungarian insurgents. "[T]o solitary shots we replied with salvos." AVP RF, F 059a,
O 4, P 6, D 5, Ll. 1-7. "Telegramma A. I. Mikoyana i M. A. Suslova iz Budapeshta v
TsK KPSS, 24 oktyabrya 1956."On October 30, Mikoyan and Suslov wrote: "The new
minister of Internal Affairs [Ferenc Mnnich] sent 100 fighters, who met more than
200 people, but did not open fire, because the Central Committee advised not to spill
blood. That was late at night. Imre Nagy was sleeping in his apartment, and they
apparently did not want complications with Nagy, fearing that opening fire without his
knowledge would be an occasion for the weakening of the leadership." RGANI, F. 89,
Per. 45, Dok. 12, L. 1 "Telegramma Mikoyana i Suslova, 30 oktyabrya 1956 g." On
October 24 as well, Mikoyan and Suslov wrote: "One of the most serious mistakes of
the Hungarian comrades was the fact that, before 12 midnight last night, they did not
permit anyone to shoot at the participants in the riots." AVP RF, F 059a, O 4, P 6, D 5,
Ll. 1-7. "Telegramma A. I. Mikoyana i M. A. Suslova iz Budapeshta v TsK KPSS, 24
oktyabrya 1956."
218.
In the Szabolcs region on October 26-7, for example, local Hungarian authorities
were instructed not to shoot. As Colonel Starovoitov, a commander of the Border
Guards of the Ministry of Internal Affairs reported: "Entering the region, they [the
"counterrevolutionaries"] began to summon the youth to join the uprising, to destroy
the stars, monuments, and obelisks commemorating the soldiers of the Soviet Army,
and to free all the criminals from the prisons. All of this was done without the slightest
resistance on the part of the local authorities. It occurred because the government had
issued an order to open fire on the insurgents only if they opened fire first. Owing to
this, the insurgents, without even using weapons, went to the jails, disarmed the guards
and freed the prisoners." RGANI, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 17, l. 4: "Notes of Kirichenko
with enclosed reference report of the chief of the second staff of the Ministry of
Internal Affairs border troops of the South-West Region in Connection with the
Crossing over onto the Territory of the USSR," Nov. 1, 1956.
219.
In his October 29 telegram to Mikoyan and Suslov, Serov informed them: "There
are some smaller groups that came to Budapest from other cities. The Soviet military

Hungarian Crisis Decision Making, October 24--November 4, 1956
The Soviet leaders soon realized that Operation Wave on October 24 only
exacerbated the situation. It alienated the Hungarian population, and especially
after the October 25 massacre - brought on a number of lynchings of the VH
agents, upon whom the massacre was blamed.
220
After Imre Nagy was voted in as
Prime Minister on October 23-24, he issued a plethora of reformist decrees in an
attempt to keep up with the accelerating events and ever more radicalized popular
demands. In fact, from October 24 on, Nagy did not lead the uprising. The
Communist party was in shambles. The number of active party members upon
whom the party could rely was rapidly decreasing. Eventually the Soviet leaders
realized Nagy had lost control of the party leadership. It would be useful to review
briefly Nagy's fast-paced reformist measures in the period between the initial Soviet
intervention and the final crackdown of November 4. Nagys actions stand in sharp
contrast to those of the Polish leader Gomuka.
Unencumbered by Gomuka's fear of German revanchism, Nagy announced
in an October 25 speech that negotiations about the withdrawal of Soviet troops
from Hungary would take place. As mentioned above, the new documents reveal

command is taking action to liquidate them." RGANI, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 11, l. 1:
"Information from Serov to Mikoyan and Suslov about the situation in Hungary on
October 29 1956." See also UN Committee Report, ch. 2, p. 6.
220
At the time of the first intervention (October 24), Ern Ger told Mikoyan and
Suslov over the telephone: "[T]he arrival of Soviet troops in the city has a negative
effect on the disposition of the inhabitants, including the workers." AVP RF, F
059a, O 4, P 6, D 5, L 1: "Shifrtelegramma iz Budapeshta," Cable from A. I.
Mikoyan and M. A. Suslov to the
CPSU Presidium, October 24, 1956.
that Mikoyan and Suslov chided Nagy for not consulting with them in advance
about this.
Nagy also promised in the October 25 speech to create new state security
organs and to disband the VH, which had been closely associated with the
repression of the 1949-1953 period. The primary motive of the VH in combining
efforts with the Soviet troops was to seek protection from the lynching mobs, rather
than to assist in counterinsurgency operations. According to KGB chief Ivan Serov's
reports, some of the Hungarian agents actually disguised themselves in Soviet
uniforms.
221
Mikoyan and Suslov also expressed concern about what would happen
to former VH agents after Nagy's decision to disband the organization.
222


Then, in a single day, October 28, the Nagy government broadcast another
declaration at 5:25 p.m., calling for a cease-fire; amnesties for those involved in the
uprising; a raise in salaries and pensions, the immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops
from Budapest and follow-up negotiations for a full troop withdrawal from
Hungary. He also rejected previous characterizations of the uprising as a
"counterrevolution," saying "this movement aims at guaranteeing our national
freedom, independence, and sovereignty, of advancing our society, and our
economic and political system on the way of democracy."
223


221
RGANI, F 89, Per. 45, Dok. 10, L. 2. "Telegramma I. A. Serova iz Budapeshta v
TsK KPSS 28-ogo oktiabria,"
222
RGANI, F 059a, O 4, P 6, D 5, Ll. 13-14. "Telegramma A. I. Mikoyana i M. A.
Suslova, 29-ogo oktyabrya 1956 g."
223
"Radio Address by Imre Nagy Announcing the Formation of a New
Government," Oct. 28, 1956 in Zinner, op. cit., 428-432.
Two days later, on October 30 at 2:30 p.m. Budapest time, Nagy formalized
the establishment of a multi-party state, with full participation by the Smallholders
Party, the National Peasant Party
224
and the Social Democratic Party, as well as the
Communists.

He also formed an "inner cabinet" of the national government
consisting of Zoltn Tildy, Bla Kovcs, Ferenc Erdei, Jnos Kdr, Gza Losonczy,
Anna Kthly (from the Social Democratic Party), and himself. On the same day, a
"revolutionary national defense council" of the Hungarian armed forces was set up,
which supported the demands of revolutionary workers' councils.

Chaos in the Nagy Government and Soviet Perceptions of Nagy
Soviet views of Nagy became even more ambiguous in the period between the
two interventions. To be sure, Imre Nagy, like Wadysaw Gomuka, was extremely
popular, at least before the confusion surrounding his alleged role in calling in
Soviet troops on October 23. As we have seen, students were actively calling for him
to replace Ger. As with Gomuka, the Khrushchev leadership was at first willing to
rely on Nagy to control the party; in fact, this was the original motive in permitting
the Hungarian "comrades" to elect him as prime minister during the all-night
Parliament session on October 23-24. At first the Soviet leaders seemed to assume
Nagy would be loyal and malleable; by the end they perceived him as hostile and
opportunistic. On October 23 in Moscow, Mikoyan had tried to persuade his
colleagues that "without Nagy they cant get control of the movement, and its also

224
This party was renamed the Petfi Party on November 1, 1956.
cheaper for us." Khrushchev consented, saying "We should recruit Nagy for
political action."
225

Documents from the 1957 interrogations show, perhaps not too surprisingly,
that Nagy originally opposed both the student demonstration of October 23 (fearing
Gers reaction) and later the declaration of Hungary's neutrality.
226
He even
opposed the general workers' strikes taking place in Hungary after the Soviet
intervention of November 4.
227
To be sure, Nagy made these statements under
duress, while in captivity, and one must balance these documents with eyewitness
reports and scholarly analyses. Nevertheless, Nagy's statements in the last two years
of his life remained remarkably consistent and courageous.
As late as October 28 at the emergency Presidium meeting in Moscow, the
Kremlin leaders still believed they could count on Nagy. According to Malin's notes,
Bulganin said "In Budapest there are forces that want to get rid of Nagys and
Kdrs government. We should adopt a position of support for the current
government. Otherwise well have to undertake an occupation. This will drag us
into a dubious venture [v avantyuru]."
228


225
RGANI, F. 3, O. 12, D. 1006, Ll. 4-4ob, "Protokol'naya Zapis' Zasedaniya
Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 23 oktyabrya 1956 g."
226
MOL, XX-5-h, 8 ktet, 13 doboz (1956-1958), old. 99, Jegyzknyv, Nagy Imre
kihallgatsrl, Budapest, 1957 szeptember 2. Nagy told his interrogators: "As I
confessed during my questioning of April 15, 1957, I did not agree with the planned
strike of students. I did not find it right.
227
MOL, XX-5-h, 1 ktet, 1 doboz (1956-1957), Budapest, 1957 februr, old. 193(b).
This is a letter handwritten by Imre Nagy from Romania. Page numbers appear
only on every other page; thus I have used alphabetical letters to distinguish the
pages.
228
RGANI, F 3, O 12, D 1005, L. 57 ob, "Protokol'naya Zapis' Zasedaniya
Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 28-ogo oktyabrya 1956 g."
Yet Nagy had a different kind of popularity than Gomuka. His friendliness
encouraged his political colleagues, other institutions, and press organs to take
initiatives without his knowledge or permission.
229
This led to a multiplication of
overlapping curfews, cease-fires, decrees for reform, and a dizzying acceleration of
events between October 23 and November 4 that eventually convinced Khrushchev
and his colleagues that Nagy could not control his party leadership and government.
This perception was reinforced by anti-Nagy broadcasts from local radios and RFE
as we shall see in a later chapter. Only access to Hungarian archival documents
enables us now to envision clearly the utter confusion in Nagy's Parliament in the
period between the October 24 and November 4 Soviet interventions.
230
An
examination of three factors in particular is useful in illustrating this confusion: 1)
the establishment of curfews, 2) the appearance of new political parties, and 3) the
announcement of a cease-fire.
One curfew was announced on the radio on October 24 at 4:30 a.m. "Citizens
are permitted on the streets only between 10:00 a.m. and 2:00 p.m."
231
Later, on

229
As mentioned above, Nagy tended to focus on making correct verbal arguments
and expecting others to change their behavior. His colleagues were, perhaps more
like Gomuka in emphasizing political positions instead.
230
Many otherwise excellent secondary works in English, even the handful
published in the 1990s, fall short of depicting the actual disarray of the Nagy
government during the brief democratic interlude, from October 24 to November 4.
These include Gyrgy Litvn, ed. trans. Jnos M. Bak and Lyman H. Legters, The
Hungarian Revolution of 1956: Reform, Revolt, and Repression, 1953-1963 (London:
Longman, 1996); Terry Cox, ed. Hungary 1956--Forty Years On (London: Frank
Cass, 1997); and Jen Gyrkei and Mikls Horvth, Soviet Military Intervention in
Hungary (Budapest: Central European University Press, 1999). Gyrkei and
Horvth do provide a useful account of the military complications. See pp. 32-35.
231
MOL, 1676/2000/XX-5-h, 1 doboz, 1 ktet, Esemnynaptr, 1956, old. 141.
Defense Minister Lszl Piros repeated this over the radio at 9:18 a.m. "Gyorsiri
that same day, at 4:24 p.m., the radio announcer said: "Citizens are prohibited to go
out between 6:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m. the following morning."
232
The following day,
October 25, at 5:38 a.m. the radio broadcast a message on behalf of the City Council
and the Political Committee of Budapest urging all citizens to go back to work.
That same day, at 10:47 a.m. the radio warned Budapest citizens not to go out
between 6:00 a.m. and 6:00 p.m. "unless absolutely necessary."
233

During the October 25 session of the MDP Central Leadership, one of the
party leaders Ferenc Nezval asked incredulously: "Did the Political Committee
know what the situation was like this morning when it informed people they could
go to work? Fighting began after that!"
234
Indeed, at 10:30 a.m. VH personnel
began shooting from the rooftops at about 25, 000 unarmed Hungarians who had
gathered in front of the Parliament building, shouting "Down with Ger! The radio
is lying, were no bandits!" As mentioned earlier, 234 citizens were killed during
this incident.
235

The next day, October 26, at 4:15 a.m. citizens were told they could go out
only between 10:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. A year later, on September 2, 1957, during
one of his interrogation sessions, Nagy explained: "The ordering and lifting of the
curfew was discussed at the October 26 session of the Central leadership. I
mentioned that it was not me who ordered the curfew but somebody else in my

feljegyzs az MDP Kzponti Vezetsgnek lsrl, 1956.oktber 25, [I] a,"
tvenhat oktbere s a hatalom, op cit. old. 42.
232
Ibid. (tvenhat oktbere s a hatalom).
233
Ibid.
234
Gyorsiri feljegyzs az MDP Kzponti Vezetsgnek lsrl,1956.oktber 25,
[I] a, tvenhat oktbere s a hatalom a Magyar Dolgozk Prtja vezet testleteinek
dukumentumai 1956 oktber 24-oktber 28 (Budapest: Napvilg Kiad,1997)
235
MOL, 1676/2000/XX-5-h, 1 doboz, 1 ktet, Esemnynaptr, 1956, old. 143.
name. Sndor Ngrdi answered that the Council of Ministers ordered the
prohibition."
236
"It is pointless to bring up my responsibility as if I am a criminal,"
Nagy complained. "In my opinion, if I am responsible, it is within the collective
responsibility of the Political Committee and I accept that."
237

A second factor which helped convince the Soviet leaders that Nagy had lost
control concerns the proliferation of non-communist parties. Whereas Gomuka
preserved the power of the PZPR, Nagy reorganized the government on October 27,
appointing non-communists--representatives of parties from the pre-Communist
era--to key posts.
238
He formally established a multi-party system on October 30, as
mentioned above. Although they changed their minds later, the Soviet leaders
initially supported Nagy's move, according to Malin's notes. During the October 28
CPSU Presidium meeting, Suslov had said, "Our line is not to protest the inclusion
of several democrats in the government."
239

One of these non-communists was Zoltn Tildy, who served in Nagy's
government from October 27 to November 4, 1956. He described the atmosphere in
the Parliament on his first day of work as follows:
There was utter chaos, helplessness, and confusion. The Parliament was flooded
with delegates and delegations. People from the street were milling in the

236
MOL, XX.-5-h 8 ktet, 13 doboz (1956-1958), old. 100, Jegyzknyv, Nagy Imre
kihallgatsrl, Budapest, 1957 szeptember 2.
237
MOL, XX.-5-h 8 ktet, 13 doboz (1956-1958), old. 102, Jegyzknyv, Nagy Imre
kihallgatsrl, Budapest, 1957 szeptember 2.
238
These included: Bla Kovcs, the former General Secretary of the Smallholders
Party; Zoltn Tildy, the former leader of the Smallholders Party; and Ferenc Erdei,
the former leader of the National Peasant Party.
239
RGANI, F 3, O 12, D 1005, L 62, "Protokol'naya Zapis' Zasedaniya Prezidiuma
TsK KPSS, 28-ogo oktyabrya 1956 g." written by V. N. Malin.
hallways, one could hardly walk past them, and one could not get any
information as to what the actual situation was in the country.
240


Between October 31 and November 3, the Hungarian Council of Ministers'
office was inundated with letters by new political parties, asking for official
recognition and start-up funds for newspapers and office buildings. These included
the Social Democratic Party [Szocildemokrata Prt]; Hungarian Independent Party
[Magyar Fggetlen Prt] and its newspaper Fggetlen 1v; the Hungarian
Revolutionary Youth Party [Magyar Forradalmi Ifjsgi Prt]; the Democratic
Peoples' Party [Demokrata Npprt]; the Christian Democratic Party [Keresztny
Demokrata Prt] with its newspaper of the same title; and the Hungarian
Revolutionary Committee (headed by Jzsef Duds, one of the leaders of the
freedom fighters).
241
Church and youth organizations also asked for
acknowledgement, such as the Hungarian Orthodox Administration [Magyar
Ortodox Adminisztratura], the Boy Scout Movement [Cserkszmozgalom], and
Christian Youth Association [Keresztny Ifjsgi Egyeslet].
During a Cabinet session of the MDP, a decision was made--which the
Gomuka leadership would probably never have contemplated--to withdraw funds
from the MDP's account in the National Bank and distribute it among these parties.

240
MOL, XIX5h, Nagy Imre s Trsai, 25 doboz, 3 ktet, Birsgi Iratok, 6. II.
1958, old. 13. A Magyar Npkztrsasg Legfelsbb Birsgnak Npbirsgi
Tancsa. Note: This was a statement Tildy made to his interrogators in 1958. He
was arrested in May 1957, sentenced to six years in prison in June 1958, and
amnestied in 1960. [A legteljesebb zrzavar, tanacstalansag, kapkodas. A Parlamentet
elznltk a kldttek s a kldttsgek. Emberek, magnemberek a folyoskon, alig
lehetett jrni s senkitl sem lehetett konkrt informcit kapni arra, hogy mi a
tnyleges helyzet az orszgban.]
241
MOL, 3541/2000, XX-5-h, 13.doboz, 8 ktet, Vizglati iratok, old. 72.
According to Zoltn Tildy's testimony, "Some [members] of the Social Democratic
Party came to me, saying that an official of the national bank told them that money
can be taken out of the party-based bank account. I said 300 thousand forints, but
later someone else suggested another 300 thousand, so we took 600 thousand."Tildy
said Jzsef Bognr (Minister of Foreign Trade) authorized the withdrawal.
242

Nagy's issuance of a cease-fire is a third factor illustrating both the lack of
coordination of his government and its failure to deter the second Soviet
intervention of November 4. On October 28, at 1:20 p.m., Nagy ordered an
immediate cease-fire, and "instructed the Hungarian Armed Forces to fire only if
attacked."
243
Western observers have long been reduced to speculation about the
discussions at private meetings of the inner councils of the Hungarian Communist
Party. We now know that this cease-fire was the subject of a heated debate within
the emergency sessions on October 27 and 28 of the MDP Political Committee.
Jnos Kdr emphasized that the cease-fire should not involve branding the
participants as counter-revolutionaries. However, he warned, "If anyone after the
declaration should still rise against our Peoples Republic, then measures [should]
be taken against them to the point of their surrender or execution. We have to stand

242
MOL, XIX-5-h, Nagy, Imre s Trsai, 25 doboz, ktet 3, Birsgi Iratok. A
Magyar Npkztrsasg Legfelsbb Birsgnak Npbirsgi Tancsa, 6 februr
1958, old. 2. The decision was dated November 2, 1956.
243
"Az MDP KV Politikai Bizottsga lesenek jegyzknyve, 28.X.1956." tvenhat
oktbere s a hatalom a Dolgozk Prtja vezet testleteinek dukumentumai 195
oktber 24- oktber 28 (Budapest: Napvilag Kiad,1997), old. 114, Annotation #18.
Also MOL xx-5-h, 1 doboz, 1 ktet, Esemnynaptr, 1956," oktber 6. old. 129. Or
Szabad Np, October 29, 1956.
strictly against atrocities that are condemned even by the general public: shooting
prisoners, murders, hangings."
244
Andrs Hegeds countered:
I support a cease-fire, but not against bandits and looters....There was no cease-
fire in Budakeszi when they tallied up the communists and wanted to hack them
to pieces. I think it was the right thing to do when we sent the Petfi Officers
School there to detain these people (120 or 160 of them). ...Let's encircle
Budapest with 1000 of our people to start enforcing it, but wherever the rebels
are killing, robbing, and murdering comrades, I cannot vote for a cease-fire
there and I believe neither can you.
245


Kdr retorted, "A cease-fire cannot be declared in such a manner that it
applies to one city but not to another...[I]t has to be comprehensive, along with
measures taken against looters, murderers and bandits. In other words we need a
general cease-fire, plus the use of force against those still attacking us with weapons.
"
246

Antal Apr further cautioned, "A cease-fire has to be declared without time
limits attached. We must be sure that when the Soviet troops are withdrawn, the
Hungarian security forces stand by; otherwise there will be a vacuum in their
place."
247
He added, "Theres no other solution than what comrade Kdr
suggested. The masses will understand this too. If we did anything else the Party
would fall apart, vast masses would rise against us, and wed get isolated."

244
PIL [Politikatrtneti Intzet Levltra] 290,f. 1/15. . e. old. 57-68. See also
"Jegyzknyv a Politikai Bizottsg ltal 1956. ktober 28-n tartott lsrl,"
tvenhat oktbere s a hatalom a Magyar Dolgozk Prtja vezet testleteinek
dukumentumai 1956 oktber 24- oktber 28 (Budapest: Napvilag Kiad,1997), old.
98. It should be noted that, until the moment Kdr decided to serve as the Soviet
Union's quisling, he strongly supported Nagy's efforts.
245
Ibid., old. 102.
246
Ibid., old. 105.
247
The Nagy government disbanded the VH (VO) on October 28.
Ibid., old. 105.
Nagy stepped in: "A cease-fire has to be declared as quickly as possible.
There was absolute uncertainty even this morning when they wanted to start a
military operation at 6 a.m." He fumed at Hegeds: "Comrade Hegeds has a lot to
do with the fact that theres serious fluctuation within the leadership. Yesterday
morning he agreed with us and now he again contemplates new military
operations."
248

Nagy was upset. Despite their discussions about issuing a cease-fire, members
of his own Political Committee along with military officials were secretly plotting an
attack on the Corvin Alley insurgents for 6:00 a.m. on October 28, which they
thought could be a turning point in the conflict. Nagy later called Kroly Janza to
forbid the operation. Nevertheless, Nagy was not able to stop it. The attack was
launched, but failed.
249
As Nagy protested to the Hungarian court later in
September 1957: "The investigation shifts the responsibility onto me in connection
with the ... liquidation of the armed group in the Corvin Alley. In my opinion its
groundless." To prove himself, Nagy pointed out that a day after the Political
Committee decided at its October 27 session to issue a cease-fire:
I was informed by Jnos Kdr that Hegeds and Ger were talking about some
kind of action and he asked me to check on it. Hegeds was staying in Gers
room. I talked to him in front of Ger. I asked him about this action. He
answered that Apr and the others are planning some kind of action. I directed
Hegedss attention to the decision of the Political Committee that we were not

248
Ibid. old. 105.
249
Mikls Horvth, Malter Pl (Budapest: Osiris Szzadvg, 1956-os Intzet,
1995), p. 97-105. Also annotation #22 on pp. 114-115 in tvenhat oktbere s a
hatalom a Magyar Dolgozk Prtja vezet testleteinek dukumentumai 195 oktber
24- oktber 28 (Budapest: Napvilg Kiad, 1997), old. 98. Colonel Andrs Mrton,
commander of the Zrinyi Military Academy, tried to tell Imre Nagy about the
planned action, but apparently could only reach Andrs Hegeds whom he asked to
tell Nagy, which Hedegs did.
allowed to start an offensive action. I asked him to call Apr. I told Apr about
the decision of the Political Committee the day before and I [reminded] him as
well that the Party and government leaders dont know anything about this
planned action, so he would be responsible for whatever happened. I asked him
to tell that to General Malinin.
250


To his credit, Nagy was aware of the chaos within his leadership. He told the
Hungarian Political Committee on October 28: "In this tragic situation we find
ourselves in, the party leaderships total failure is the reason why these issues arise
in such a random fashion."
251
He stressed the need to focus on the most pressing
issues and not get distracted.
Comrade Mikoyan turned to me and said we had to stand more firmly. I refuse
to stand more firmly where party interests demand us to move on. I didnt stand
firmly even on what the Central Committee and the Political Committee
represented.... There are two options: if we look upon this movement, backed up
by such substantial forces, as a counter-revolution then we have no choice but to
subdue it with tanks and artillery. This is tragedy. ....If were not careful we will
be subjected to an intervention. We should lean on, and lead, the huge national
forces that are on the move.
252


Thus, while Gomuka was careful to walk a fine line between appeasing the Polish
officials and population and reassuring the Soviet Presidium members, Nagy
apparently believed that appeasing the population was the best way to avoid a
Soviet intervention. Describing the national movement as "counterrevolutionary"
would be tantamount to calling in Soviet tanks, he reasoned. Presidium member
Molotov, who had disapproved of Nagy from the beginning, firmly concluded on

250
MOL, XX.-5-h 8 ktet, 13 doboz (1956-1958), old. 101, Jegyzknyv, Nagy Imre
kihallgatsrl, Budapest, 1957 szeptember 2. Nagy insisted that the attack did not
actually take place at 6 oclock.
251
PIL (Budapest) 290, f. 1/15. . e. old. 57-68. See also "Jegyzknyv a Politikai
Bizottsg ltal 1956. ktober 28-n tartott lsrl," tvenhat oktbere s a hatalom:
a Magyar Dolgozk Prtja vezet testleteinek dukumentumai 1956 oktber 24-
oktber 28 (Budapest: Napvilg Kiad,1997), old. 105.
252
Ibid. [Azt jelenti, ha nem vigyzunk, intervencinak vagyunk kitve. Nagy,
hatalmas npi erkre, amelyek mozgsban vannak, tmaszkodni kell s lre kell llni].
October 28: "Nagy is actually speaking against us." Voroshilov concurred: "Nagy is
a liquidator." Even Ekaterina Furtseva, a CPSU CC Secretary who had supported
Nagy earlier, agreed that "Comrade Mikoyan is apparently wrong about
Nagy. They released 1,000 [prisoners] who had been arrested."
253

After much debate, the Nagy government announced the cease-fire.
However, on the same day of the cease-fire (October 28), the Soviet Union was
planning an attack on the Corvin Alley where one of the worst "hotbeds of
resistance" [ochagi vojny] was located. As Nagy told his interrogators a year later:
"The Political Committee held a session on October 27. It decided that a cease-fire
should be declared, so we shouldnt start an offensive action or military operations.
Where we are attacked by armies, we will destroy it with armies. During this time
the Soviet leaders were working out a plan for the liquidation of the group in the
Corvin passage. The essence was which can be proved with a lot of confessions and
materials to destroy the block of apartments with artillery fire; then the
Hungarian infantry led by Colonel Mrton would destroy or capture the armed
rebels."
254
Soviet KGB Chief Ivan Serov confirmed this in his October 29 cable back
to Moscow: "There were negotiations during the night with the resisting groups in
the region around the Corvin Cinema, Zsigmond, and Szna and Moszkva Squares
to surrender their weapons. Toward evening agreement was reached. There are

253
All passages quoted in this paragraph can be found in RGANI, F 3, O 12, D 1005,
L 59, "Protokol'naya Zapis' Zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 28-ogo oktyabrya
1956 g."
254
MOL, XX 5-h 8 ktet, 13 doboz / 1956-1958, old. 101, Jegyzknyv, Nagy Imre
kihallgatsrl Budapest, 1957 szeptember 2. [This author's emphasis added] .
some smaller groups that came to Budapest from other cities. The Soviet military
command is taking action to liquidate them. "
255

The Nagy government and Soviet military units were thus working at cross-
purposes. It is easy to see how the Soviet leaders may have concluded that the
Hungarian leaders and armed forces would not stand in their way in the event of a
full-scale invasion and that they could end the operation quickly in this small,
landlocked country.
Imre Nagy saw the cease-fire, among other things, as a necessary measure to
accelerate the withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Budapest. Indeed, although
perhaps unbeknownst to him, the CC CPSU Presidium met in Moscow later that
day (October 28). According to Malin's notes, Khrushchev had said: "We are ready
to withdraw troops from Budapest. We must make this conditional on a cease-fire
by the centers of resistance."
256

Yet, while they welcomed the cease-fire, Mikoyan and Suslov seemed to
interpret it to mean the voluntary surrender of all weapons. The following day they
reported from Budapest back to Moscow: "The insurgents declare that they will
give them [weapons] up after the Soviet troops leave Hungary. Thus the peaceful
liquidation of this hotbed is excluded (i.e. impossible). "
257
They went on to say:


255
RGANI, f. 89, per 45, dok 11, l. 1, Informatsiia I. Serova, 29 oktiabria 1956. [This
author's emphasis added].
256
RGANI, F 3, O 12, D 1005, L 59, "Protokol'naya Zapis' Zasedaniya Prezidiuma
TsK KPSS, 28-ogo oktyabrya 1956 g." written by V. N. Malin. [This author's
emphasis added].
257
RGANI, F 89, Per 45, Dok. 12, L 1, "Informatsiya Mikoyana i Suslova iz
Budapeshta ot 30 oktyabrya 1956 g. See Cold War International History Bulletin
(Spring 1995): 32 for my English translation of this document.
We will achieve the liquidation of these armed Hungarian forces. There is just one
fear: the Hungarian army has occupied a 'wait and see' position. Our military
advisors say that the relationship of the Hungarian officers and generals to Soviet
officers in the past few days has been worse. There is no trust as there was earlier. It
could happen, that the Hungarian units sent against the insurgents could join these
other Hungarians, and then it will be necessary to once more undertake military
operations (with Soviet military forces).
258



By October 31, as mentioned above, Moscow leaders made the final decision
to invade massively a second time in Hungary. As Mikoyan and Suslov reported to
Moscow:
The political situation in the country is not getting better; it is getting worse. This is
expressed in the following: in the leading party organs there is a feeling of
helplessness. In the party organizations there is a process of collapse [raspada].
Hooligan elements are seizing regional party committees and killing communists.
259


"Antisovietchina": Hungarian Communists as Endangered Species
One can deduce from the above description of events that the initial Soviet
intervention on the night of October 23--24 had not solved the main problem: the
popular agitation against the Hungarian Communist regime. Instead, it exacerbated
the tensions, which coalesced into a frenzied desire for revenge."
260
The Hungarian
leaders most responsible for the unjustified repressions in the late 1940s and early
1950s were whisked away to the Soviet Union, where they stayed for the duration of

258
Ibid.
259
RGANI, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 12, l. 1, "Informatsiya Mikoyana i Suslova ot 30
oktiabria 1956 g."
260
Stetson Kennedy, an emigr American writer in Budapest and "friend of the Soviet
Union" told a Soviet diplomat that he had observed "such wild excitement of the
crowd only during racial confrontations in the United States." He wrote: "The crowd,
in which there were many women, completely lost reason. It was in a state of mass
psychosis. The main direction of this rage was anti-Soviet and anti-Russian." AVP RF,
f. 077, o. 37, por. 10, p. 188, l. 248, From the Diary of B. V. Gorbachev, second
secretary of the Soviet Union Embassy in Hungary, "Notes of a Conversation with
American Emigr Writer Stetson Kennedy," Dec. 8, 1956.
the October-November events or, in the case of the former first secretary, Mtys
Rkosi, for life.
261

But the loyal Hungarian Communists less culpable for past atrocities were
apparently trapped. An examination of the apparent plight of these loyalists is useful
for a number of reasons. First, it shows us the kind of biased information the Foreign
Ministry in Moscow was receiving from Hungary in the days leading up to the crisis.
Second, the many references to the problems of these Hungarian Communists reflects
the Khrushchev leaderships strong psychological need to justify the military
crackdowns.
262
The reader will recall that one of the patterns of misperception Jervis
describes is the decision makers need to avoid cognitive dissonance and to seek strong
justification for their actions. According to the Malin notes, Molotov actually said,
"We must look after the Hungarian Communists," during the October 28 presidium
meeting.
263
Third, the Kremlin leaders concern about the loyalists, especially the
tortured VH agents, shows us how sensitive the leaders were to appearances.
Photographs of the latters corpses appeared on front pages of newspapers worldwide
and provided the West with powerful propaganda: the USSR cannot protect fellow

261
These include, for example, Mtys Rkosi, Ern Ger, Jzsef Rvai, Andrs
Hegeds, and Istvn Kovcs. Rkosi left Hungary for the USSR after the July Plenum,
1956, when he was demoted as first secretary. He lived in Moscow, was then exiled to
Krasnodar, Tokmak (Kirghizia), Arzamas, and finally to Gorky, where he died in
1971. For a recent account of Rkosi's years in exile, based on new archival
documents, see V. L. Musatov, "Istoriya odnoi ssylki: 'Zhitie' Matiasa Rakoshi v SSSR
(1956--1971 gg)," Kentavr (Moscow), no. 6 (November-December 1993): 72--81.
262
(Maintaining the post-World War II status quo in Eastern Europe-not permitting
Hungary to leave the Warsaw Pact-was their primary motive.)
263
Malin, "Protokol'naya Zapis', 28 oktyabrya 1956 g." Since Hegeds, Ger, Bata
and a few other hard-line MDP officials were flown to Moscow on October 28, it is
possible that Molotov was referring to them, rather than to lower-ranking officials.
Communists from lynch mobs.
264
While the persecution of loyalists was probably not a
primary motive for the November 4 invasion (since the issue was not explicitly raised
in the crucial Presidium sessions of October 30 and 31), the sanguinary images
certainly embarrassed the Kremlin leaders, making their protection of these loyalists
in all likelihood a compelling secondary motive for the invasion. Finally, the plight of
the Hungarian loyalists has largely been neglected in Western historiography of the
revolution.
265
Most Western scholars have viewed the 1956 events from the perspective
of the Hungarian freedom fighters, basing their accounts on eyewitness reports by
foreign journalists or citizens in Hungary at the time, and on interviews with refugees

264
Such references should be treated with due caution by scholars, and they should be
corroborated with more reliable published sources. Party officials regularly paid lip
service to the fate of party loyalists. Indeed, the Soviet diplomats stationed in Budapest
may have been inclined to exaggerate the danger to the Hungarian Communists as a
way to prove to Moscow that they, the Soviet representatives, were being sufficiently
"vigilant" in this country rebelling against the Soviet Union. Only a very small Soviet
elite were ever trusted to go abroad; once obtaining this privilege, they felt the need to
prove they had not "gone native." Likewise, pro-Soviet Hungarian officials may have
been inclined to give alarmist reports to the Soviet diplomats at the Embassy in
Budapest, because it was they who felt most threatened by the popular unrest. Their
jobs depended on Soviet power propping up the regime. Most important, since the
party was the key link between the two regimes, and since Soviet officials were
socialized as nomenklatura members to regard the well-being of party members above
others, this emphasis on the Hungarian loyalists came naturally to them.
265
Two books were written in the 1950s that bear mention. Herbert Aptheker, an
American Communist of Central European and Jewish heritage, wrote The Truth
About Hungary (New York: Mainstream Publishers, 1957), in which he suggested
that white terror against communists had been the main reason for the Soviet
intervention. Peter Fryer, a communist correspondent for the British newspaper
Daily Worker and an eyewitness of the Hungarian revolution, argued just the
opposite in his book, Hungarian Tragedy (London: D. Dobson, 1957) and Hungary
and the Communist Party: An Appeal Against Expulsion (London, n.p., 1957). He
republished these works along with documents pertaining to his subsequent
expulsion from the British Communist Party in 1997. See Hungarian Tragedy and
Other Writings on the 1956 Hungarian Revolution(London, Index, 1997).
who left in the two months following the Soviet crackdown.
266
Reports written by
Soviet diplomats who had conversed with Hungarian Communists loyal to the USSR
remained classified since early 1992, after the demise of the Soviet Union.
This section will thus examine the treatment of loyalists during the uprising (i.e.
Communists who remained loyal to the Hungarian and Soviet parties). In the days
following the initial intervention, the Hungarian Communists apparently became
scapegoats for the masses. While Soviet sources referred to these functionaries as
honest communists, the Soviet officials left them essentially defenseless. In some
cases, they could not even find weapons with which to defend themselves and to fight
the "counterrevolutionaries." (Although the Soviet army was able to suppress the
revolt without arming these loyalists, doing so might at least have improved the
USSR's image among Third World nations as a champion of foreign communists.) Of
course, from Moscow's viewpoint, the decision not to arm civilians was completely
logical, since it would have been hard to tell precisely who was loyal to Moscow (and
later to the new Kdr regime) and who was not. If the pro-Soviet Hungarian leaders
had issued a weapon to anyone who professed loyalty, they would probably have ended
up arming many of the defectors.

266
See, for example Endre Marton, The Forbidden Sky (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971),
and Zinner, Revolution in Hungary. In raising this issue of the plight of Hungarian
loyalists, I do not fall victim to Soviet propaganda. Not surprisingly, official Soviet
writers in the late 1950s and 1960s exaggerated the theme of violence against pro-
Soviet Hungarians during the Hungarian "counterrevolution." Certainly more
Hungarians were killed by the Soviet army than were pro-Soviet Hungarians by
popular mobs. According to Zhukov's report, there were 669 Soviet deaths for the
entire period of the military operations in Hungary. See RGANI, f. 89, o. 2, l. 9--11,
Information by Zhukov, "Data About the Losses of the Soviet Troops on the Territory
of Hungary in the period of the 1956 Events." In contrast, an estimated 2,502 killed by
Soviet forces. See Gosztonyi, "Az 1956-os forradalom szamokban," Npszabadsg
(Budapest), Nov. 3, 1990, p. 3.
To understand the political and socioeconomic impact of the revolution on
Hungarian Communists, it is useful to look at particular individuals from a variety of
vocations and geographic regions. The following section will focus on artists,
musicians, and employees of cultural institutions in Budapest; party functionaries and
security agents in cities such as Csepel, Miskolc, and Gyr chairmen of cooperative
farms in the countryside; members of the Central Committee of the MDP itself; and
scientists and scholars from the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. Soviet diplomats
conversed most often with pro-Soviet Hungarians who voluntarily visited the Soviet
Embassy in Budapest.
267

Sndor k, a Hungarian artist and old Communist in Budapest, was eager to
help put down the October 23 uprising, which he described as "an orgy of nationalist
intoxication." On October 24 government officials announced that a
"counterrevolutionary uprising" was taking place and summoned all members of the
Partisans' Union. More than one hundred bellicose members gathered. Boris
Gorbachev, second secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Budapest, reported k's
remarks:

267
Reflecting on the "mistakes" of the Rkosi and Ger governments, Sall (Hungarian
Charg d'Affaires) pointed out that the Hungarian leaders were unaware of the real
disposition of the Hungarian population. These leaders had lived in the USSR for 20-
30 years. They and Soviet Embassy officials speak mostly with "Soviet emigrs to
Hungary who speak Russian," and pro-Soviet Hungarians like Altomar, Minister of
the Food Industry, and others. "The workers of the embassy [i.e. Soviet diplomats]
created the impression among Hungarians that it is impossible, useless, and even
dangerous to speak openly with them, because bringing them bad news is regarded as
sedition [kramola]." (RGANI, O 28, Rolik 5195, Delo 479, L. 1-2, From the Diary of K.
A. Krutikov, "Notes of a Conversation with Sall, the Charge D'Affaires of Hungary in
the People's Republic of China," December 17, 1956.)
They phoned the Central Committee, which promised to give them weapons. The
members of the Partisans Union waited all day; however, the weapons were never
distributed. On the next day, the same story was repeated. The Central Committee of
the Hungarian Workers Party and the government did not want to distribute weapons
even to old Communists. After October 25 the union no longer convened; many old
communist-undergrounders were disappointed by such actions of the Central
Committee and of the government. In several days the white terror against
Communists began.
268


Comrade k reported that his name appeared on the list of those who were to
be "destroyed" (unichtozhenyi). k "was threatened with violence on the night of
November 3--4 [on the eve of the second Soviet intervention]. He guarded the door all
night, armed with a pistol."
Mikoyan and Suslov reported the Hungarian leadership's irresolution on
October 24 in their first telegram to Moscow after their arrival in Budapest. The
Hungarian comrades, they said, had decided to provide weapons to pro-Soviet factory
workers, but "they didn't carry out [the decision] because they couldn't deliver
weapons at the factories, fearing that the opponent would intercept them." Mikoyan

268
AVP RF, F 077, O 37, Por. 10, P 188, L 259: from the Diary of B. V. Gorbachev,
second secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Hungary, "Notes of a Conversation with
Comrade Sndor k," Dec. 13, 1956. The term undergrounders refers to those
communists who were forced to operate illegally during the Horthy regime, when the
communist party was banned.
and Suslov told the Kremlin that they would make sure weapons were delivered
"today, with the help of our armored personnel carriers."
269

In Budapest, institutions promoting ties with the Soviet Union were attacked -
especially ones that were housed in buildings that had once belonged to non-
Communist political parties before the Communist seizure of power. The Hungarian-
Soviet Society (HSO) is one vivid example. Istvn Hidvgi, former director of the
foreign department of this society, told Gorbachev that, in the last days of October,
armed insurgents from the Independent Smallholders' Party plundered the HSOs
headquarters on Semmelweis Street, which happened to be the old offices of the
Smallholders Party before it was suppressed in 1949. They burned Russian and Soviet
books, photo displays, and other material. The HSO regional offices in Budapest were
also looted. The Independent Smallholders' Party, Hidvgi said, took over the rooms of
the headquarters and district offices. These party leaders, all armed, confiscated lists
of the home addresses of HSO activists. In Gorbachev's words: "The party leaders
divided up the list of HSO members' apartments among their people, went to each
apartment, and evicted the tenants and their families. Soviet troops, arriving on
November 4, stopped this violence. Many workers of the HSO were ferociously
beaten."
270

The Institute of Cultural Ties (ICT) of Hungary was also "ransacked by the
insurgents." One institute employee, Istvn Monori, told Gorbachev that "during the

269
AVP RF, F 059a, O 4, P 6, D 5, Ll. 1-7. "Telegramma A. I. Mikoyana i M. A.
Suslova iz Budapeshta v TsK KPSS, 24 oktyabrya 1956."
270
In another conversation with Gorbachev on December 12, 1956, Hidvgi specifies
"the morning of October 30" as the exact time of this event. See "Notes of a Chat with
Khidvegi," AVP RF, F O77, O 37, P 188, D 036, L 257, From the Diary of Boris
Gorbachev, second secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Hungary, Dec. 12, 1956.
days of the White Terror," the leaders of the National Peasant Party occupied the ICT
building, which had once belonged to them.
271
Among the party leaders were
insurgents armed with submachine guns and grenades. They burned the institute's
newspapers, journals, and books, but did not get the documents, which were locked in
steel safes. The "bandits" tried unsuccessfully to open the safes by shooting at the locks
with their submachine guns.
272

In other Hungarian cities as well, after the October 23 intervention, many
people suspected of being Communists were hunted down and persecuted. As KGB
Chief Ivan Serov reported to Moscow:
The situation in several cities can be characterized in the following way: the population
has been mobilized against the Communists. In several regions the armed people
search in the apartments of Communists and shoot them. In the factory town of Csepel
(near Budapest) there were 18 Communists killed. The bandits check the buses
traveling between cities; prominent Communists are pulled out and shot.
273


According to Colonel Starovoitov of the Ministry of Internal Affairs Border
Guards in the Szabolcs region in eastern Hungary, insurgents "liquidated" the entire
staff of the regional administration of the Hungarian Ministry of Internal Affairs
(Belgyminisztrium or BM) in the city of Miskolc.
274
The rebels summoned the
commander of the regional administration to negotiate with them; they seized him,

271
Incidentally, the Communist Party and Social Democratic Party were forcibly
merged in the spring of 1948, thus completing the power seizure in Hungary.
272
AVP RF, F 077, O 37, Por 10, P 188, Ll. 234--35, From the Diary of B. V.
Gorbachev, "Notes of a Conversation with Istvn Monori, 28 noyabrya 1956."
273
RGANI, F 89, Per. 45, Dok. 11, l. 2: "Information of Serov to Mikoyan and Suslov
about the situation in Hungary on October 29, 1956."
274
There is some confusion as to whether "the employees of the BM" represent a
different body from the VH. Probably the BM and VH are one and the same
security organ, simply being referred to differently in the Soviet, Hungarian, and
American accounts.
tied his neck to a car with rope, and dragged him through the streets of the city. BM
officers were also killed in the city of Gyr."
275

As this example shows, the October 23 intervention was a catalyst for the
creation of revolutionary councils and for uprisings throughout Hungary. Jnos
Ambrus, later a secretary of the new Hungarian Socialist Workers Party (HSWP)
under Jnos Kdr, told the Soviet diplomats S. S. Satuchin and M. I. Petunin, in
Budapest: "[V]arious kinds of 'revolutionary' committees and councils that sprang up
after October 23 summoned the population of the region to continue the struggle 'for
the achievement of national independence,' demanding the withdrawal of Soviet Army
units and the return of Imre Nagy to government leadership."
276

Colonel Starovoitov described how the uprisings spread progressively
throughout Hungary:
On October 23, 1956, the uprising began in the city of Debrecen; on October 25 in the
city of Miskolc; and on October 26 or 27 (they don't remember exactly), the insurgents
from the indicated cities began to enter the Szabolcs region to organize an uprising
there...On October 27 the insurgents came to the city of Nyiregyhza, released
prisoners from the jails, and began the uprising in the city....On October 28 a large
meeting of at least 7, 000 people was arranged in the square, and elections to the
'workers' council' began.
277


Meanwhile, in the western part of Hungary, according to Andrs Takcs, a
member of the Gyr Regional Executive Committee of the MSZMP, the commotion

275
RGANI, F 89, Per 45, Dok 17, L. 6: "Notes of Kirichenko with enclosed reference
report by Starovoitov, the Commander of the Second Section of the Headquarters of
the Administration of Border Guards of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the
Southwest Military Region," Nov. 1, 1956.
276
AVP RF, F 077, O 37, Por. 10, P 188, L 266, From the Diary of Satuchin, first
secretary and M. I. Petunin, second secretary, "Notes of a conversation with the
Secretary of the Temporary Executive Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers
Party of the Fourth Region of Budapest, Jnos Ambrus," Dec. 17, 1956.
277
RGANI, f. 89, per. 45, dok 17, l. 4: "Notes of Kirichenko," Nov. 1, 1956.
began a bit later. Takcs told Petunin about the events he had witnessed, beginning on
October 23. He said that until October 25, Gyr was peaceful. "In the second half of
the day, on October 25, a group of about five hundred to six hundred people, mainly
youth, surrounded the regional committee of the party and gave a list of demands to
the secretaries of the regional committee. [T]he first demand was the withdrawal of
Soviet troops from Hungary. Then this crowd went to the prison with the purpose of
freeing the prisoners, but the guard opened fire and did not permit the prison to be
demolished."
278

On October 26, Takcs continued, a "mighty demonstration" took place. All
the party leaders from the Gyr city committee fled to Czechoslovakia. Takcs
remained, but had to live in friends' apartments until the Soviet troops arrived. Had
he returned to his own apartment, he would have been beaten to death, he said.
The violence also spread to cooperative farms. More than half of all
cooperatives collapsed: 1,926 out of 3,926. According to Hungarian Deputy Minister of
Agriculture Magyari, there were several cases before November 4 in which former
landowners and kulaks "took back their estates." While the majority of productive
cooperatives continued to work normally, he said, "the counterrevolutionary elements
in the countryside tried to liquidate the productive cooperatives and steal cooperative
property. They chased and sometimes killed the chairmen of the cooperatives, the
Communists, and social workers in the village. For example, in the Michurin
cooperative farm in the region of Gyngys, they burned the farm animals and fodder,

278
AVP RF, F 077, O 37, Por. 10, P 188, L 242, From the Diary of M. I. Petunin,
"Notes of a Conversation with a Member of the Gyr Regional Executive Committee
of the MDP, Comrade Andrs Takcs," Nov. 29, 1956.
stole much cooperative property, and beat the chairman of this cooperative fiercely."
279

Given the violence against Hungarian Communists and the Soviet troops'
failure to protect them, many formerly loyal Hungarians from every walk of life, not
surprisingly, became deeply despondent and turned against the USSR. Jnos Ambrus,
stated that "in the first few days after October 23 the party organizations everywhere
collapsed. The leaders of the party organizations as well as the economic leaders of a
majority of the enterprises demonstrated together with the dissatisfied elements,
supported their demagogical demands, and became in essence preachers of
antidemocratic slogans. In this way, they compromised themselves and definitively
destroyed their own authority."
280

Some former MDP loyalists supported the demonstrators even before the
violence and the Soviet troops' failure to protect MDP members. When Sndor k
arrived at the Academy of Fine Arts on October 23, where a student meeting was in
session, planning the demonstration of solidarity with Poland, he saw two MDP
Central Committee members among the students: Lajos Nemes and gnes Kenyeres.
k was "startled" by the fact that Kenyeres, the deputy director of the Central
Committee Department of Science and Culture, was "completely under the influence

279
AVP RF, F 077, O 37, Por. 10, P 188, L 270, From the Diary of V. K. Gulevskii,
first secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Hungary, "Notes of a Conversation with the
Deputy Minister of Agriculture of the Hungary Magyari," Dec. 18, 1956. The name of
this region is spelled incorrectly in Russian as Dendes.
280
AVP RF, F 077, O 37, Por. 10, P 188, L 266, From the Diary of Satuchin, first
secretary and M. I. Petunin, second secretary, "Notes of a conversation with the
Secretary of the Temporary Executive Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers
Party of the Fourth Region of Budapest, Jnos Ambrus," Dec. 17, 1956.
of the student slogans and excited to the extreme." She allowed herself to make
"counterrevolutionary" attacks against the government.
281

Scientists and scholars, of course, also soured on "friendship with the Soviet
Union," especially after the second military intervention. Tivadar Sikls, director of
the Foreign Department of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, told L. S. Yagodovsky
of the Consular Department in the Soviet Embassy in Budapest that his department
"is besieged by many scholars who say they need to go abroad, either to meet with
some colleague or to attend some conference." They all just want to travel to the West,
he told Yagodovsky. "But the department refuses to grant foreign passports, pleading
a lack of funds (sredstv), or the need to wait for the government's instructions, or
various other excuses." Sikls said many of the Hungarian scholars who received their
education in the USSR remained loyal to Moscow and to the new Kdr government,
although there were some exceptions. Yagodovsky wrote: "Sikls mentioned his old
friend, a candidate of science [Ph.D.], who attended graduate school at Moscow State
University, and who was appointed the director of the first Hungarian atomic reactor.
When Sikls returned from Berlin, where he was during the Hungarian events, the
first thing he did was contact this old friend, since he had always known him to be a
real Communist. However, as it turned out, this comrade's disposition had changed
drastically, and now he spoke, in Sikls' words, 'worse than [Radio] Free Europe.'"
282


281
AVP RF, F 077, O 37, Por. 10, P 188, L 258, From the Diary of B. V. Gorbachev,
second secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Hungary, "Notes of a Conversation with
Comrade Sndor k," Dec. 13, 1956.
282
AVP RF, F 077, Por 10, P 188, Ll. 261--62, From the Diary of L. S. Yagodovsky,
secretary of the Consular Department of the Soviet Embassy in Hungary, "Notes of a
Conversation with the Director of the Foreign Department of the Hungarian Academy
of Sciences, Comrade Tivadar Sikls," Dec. 14, 1956.
The defections extended to the realm of fine arts. Pl Fehr, manager of the
music section of the Hungarian-Soviet Society, also visited the Soviet Embassy on his
own initiative. He too lost his job - not because he was sacked, but because the entire
society had collapsed. It formerly had branches not only in Budapest, but also in the
regions of Baranya, Somogy, and Zala, with a membership of at least thirty thousand
in each regional branch since 1952.
283
The musicians may have wanted to leave both
because of the violence and discrimination against Communists and the Soviet failure
to protect them.
"Among the musicians, especially the great ones, there is a potent longing
[tiaga] to leave Hungary for the West," he said. "The director Somogy, the violinist
Zatureczky and many others have already left; the director Ferencsik also is getting
ready to leave. There was already a shortage of artists and musicians in Hungary,"
Fehr said. "Now it will be felt all the more."
284

The director of the Budapest Theater of Operetta, Margit Gspr, was
unceremoniously sacked. "A meeting of theater employees took place in the first days
after the fascist uprising," she lamented to Gorbachev. "They unanimously dismissed
her, rejected the Stanislavsky system, threw out of the repertoire all Russian and
Soviet works, and added to it a number of Western and old Hungarian operettas."
During the most recent events the artists were "gripped by an anti-Soviet poison," she

283
AVP RF, F 077, O 036, L 1, From the Diary of V. M. Baskakov and V.N.
Kazimirov, "Notes of a Conversation with the Secretaries of the Regional
Organizations of the Hungarian-Soviet Society, Comrades Felvegi (Baranya), Endredi
(Somogi), and Lszl (Zala)."
284
AVP RF, F 077, O 37, Por 10, P 188, L 237, From the Diary of B. V. Gorbachev,
second secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Budapest, "Notes of a Conversation with
Pl Fehr, Former Director of the Music Section of the Hungarian-Soviet Society."
said. Unable to "live in such an atmosphere," Gspr stated her intention to emigrate
with her husband to the Soviet Union or the German Democratic Republic.
285

Given a little more foresight, Soviet diplomats such as Yuri Andropov,
Vladimir Kryuchkov, and others in Budapest could have advised Moscow of the
need temporarily to arm loyal Hungarian citizens in case of an emergency, perhaps
to form some kind of Hungarian Communist militia. The situation for these citizens
was indeed unpleasant, although they also had a strong incentive to exaggerate their
woes in order to catch Soviet diplomats' attention. Nevertheless, Soviet authorities
could have offered greater protection. Judging from their reports to Moscow, they
had long known about the latent anti-Soviet sentiment, rising in a slow crescendo
among the Hungarian population at least since Khrushchev's "Secret Speech" in
February 1956.
286


Conclusion
For the Khrushchev leadership, the persecution of the pro-Soviet Hungarians
served as a powerful propaganda tool to justify the violation of Hungarys newly
acquired independence. Just as the activities of the Yugoslav diplomats and
journalists propagating Titos model of socialism caused the Soviet leaders to

285
AVP RF, F 077, O 37, Por 10, P 188, L. 236, From the Diary of B. V. Gorbachev,
second secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Budapest, "Notes of a Conversation with
Margit Gspr, Former Director of the Budapest Theater of Operetta."
286
After the Twentieth Congress Speech, there was talk about how "the cult of
personality is not over in Hungary." Pressure rose for Rkosi to admit his past
mistakes and to rehabilitate unfairly repressed individuals. See AVP RF, F 077, O 37,
Por 7, P 187, L 170. Anti-Soviet sentiment was also evident in Petfi Circle
discussions. See, for example, RGANI, Rolik 5169, F 5, O 28, D 394, Ll. 112-9, From
the Diary of Andropov, "Notes of a Conversation With Andrs Hegeds," June 26,
1956.
misinterpret the origins of the revolutionary movement in Hungary, so also did the
Kremlin leaders receive biased reports from these hyper-vigilant Hungarian
loyalists.
In contrast to the Soviet motivation in Poland in October (which was to
prevent something from happening, or at least to get reassurance that something
bad was not going to happen), Soviet motivation in Hungary was apparently to undo
the damage that had already occurred. However, the violent October 23 student
demonstration had caught off guard the Soviet "Special Corps" stationed in Hungary
under General Lashchenko, despite earlier signs of popular agitation. The Soviet
military plan, codenamed "Volna" (Operation Wave) was flawed in several ways and
only exacerbated the situation in Hungary. Malin's notes suggest that the Soviet
decision makers did not function as a "unitary rational actor:" they zig-zagged from
one extreme to another; hawks and doves grappled over the issue; and a good deal
of "groupthink" was apparently operative.
The Hungarian leadership was even worse. The Hungarian leaders failed to
fight resolutely. Critics might argue that the pro-Soviet Hungarians in general
would have reacted more decisively had they been provided with weapons, received
permission to shoot in self-defense, and had they not been confused by contradictory
curfews and ceasefires. However, a more fundamental problem of morale lay
beneath the confusion. Hungarian communists were loath to fight fellow citizens and
a mass movement articulating ideas that many of them shared but could not express
openly. Allowing the mass movement to accelerate may have signified their tacit,
albeit perhaps subconscious, approval. The Kremlin leaders' support for Nagy -
ambiguous to begin with - evaporated as they observed the chaotic activities of his
government in the last days of October. His inability, for example, to enforce a
cease-fire convinced them in part that Nagy's government would probably not be
able to resist a second, full-scale invasion effectively and that such an operation
could be launched and ended quickly in this small, landlocked country. In the next
chapter we will analyze the Soviet army's performance in the second intervention on
November 4, 1956, which improved significantly since the previous one on October
24.

Chapter 4: The Second Invasion (November 4, 1956)
"Though fraud in all other actions be odious, yet in matters of war it is
laudable and glorious," wrote Machiavelli in The Prince, "and he who overcomes
his enemies by stratagem is as much to be praised as he who overcomes them by
force." The Khrushchev leadership overcame the Nagy regime as much by
stratagem as by force. The second Soviet invasion, planned on October 30-31 and
executed on November 4, came after three days of skillful deception. In this chapter
we will analyze the Soviet army's performance in Operation Whirlwind" (Vikhr),
which improved significantly over its execution of Operation Wave on October
24.
This chapter will also resume the earlier discussion of two Slavic states,
Yugoslavia and Poland, and their reactions to the Hungarian crisis.
287
It will first

287
Few studies have looked closely at Polish-Hungarian relations during 1956,
drawing on recently declassified archival documents. In the older literature, most
scholars emphasize to varying degrees the Polish influence on the Hungarian
Revolution but overlook the Hungarian influence on Polish events. In addition,
many writers seem to imply that Poland responded to the Hungarian events as one
united mass. Jnos Tischler, of the Institute for the Study of the 1956 Revolution in
Budapest, is the most well-known scholar in this area of research. See, for example,
Jnos Tischler, "Lengyel szemmel 1956-rl," Mltunk, vol 2-3 (1992), pp 277-278.
For a useful, though limited, documentary collection see Tischler, redaktor,
Dokumenty do Dziejw PRL Rewolucja wgierska 195 w polskich dokumentach
(Warszawa: Instytut Studiw Politycznych PAN, 1995). This chapter will cite
additional documents not included in that collection. For a broader overview of new
archival findings about Soviet decision-making during the Polish and Hungarian
events, see Mark Kramer, "The Soviet Union and the 1956 Crises in Hungary and
Poland: Reassessments and New Findings," Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 3,
no. 2 (1998), pp. 163--214. Older works (written before 1990) tend to mention the
Polish influence (namely the Pozna Revolt) but overlook Hungarian influence on
Poland. For example, see Ferenc Fehr and gnes Heller, Hungary 1956, Revisited
(London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), p. 9; Tibor Mray, Thirteen Days that
Shook the Kremlin, trans. Howard L. Katzander (NY: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959),
examine the ambiguous role of the Yugoslav leader Tito, who ended up supporting
the Soviet use of military force against Hungary. It will also explain the hitherto
murky circumstances surrounding Tito's decision to grant Imre Nagy political
refuge in his Budapest embassy on the day of the invasion (November 4, 1956).
Tito's reluctance to surrender Nagy - and the later Soviet abduction of him - chilled
Soviet-Yugoslav relations once again.
Wadysaw Gomuka's position resembled Tito's to some extent publicly he
needed to support Nagy's policies because they were close to his own, but privately
he dreaded anything that might spark an uncontrollable revolutionary movement
within Polish borders, especially in the absence of Soviet troops. In contrast to
Hungarian reactions to the Polish events discussed in Chapter Two, Polish reactions
to the Hungarian Revolution were more complex and in some ways circumspect,
due in part to the greater scale of violence in Hungary and to Gomuka's
temperament as a realist.

p. 52; Jiri Valenta, "Soviet Decision Making and the Hungarian Revolution," in
Bla Kirly, Barbara Lotze, and Nandor F. Dreisziger, eds. The First War Between
Socialist States: the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and its Impact (NY: Columbia
University Press, 1984), p. 266; Michael G. Fry and Condoleeza Rice, "The
Hungarian Crisis of 1956: the Soviet Decision," Studies in Comparative Communism,
vol. XVI, nos. 1 & 2 (Spring/Summer 1983), p. 87; Bennett Kovrig, Communism in
Hungary (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1979), p. 293; Jorg K. Hoensch, A
History of Modern Hungary, 1867--1986 (London: Longman, 1988), p. 215; and
Gyrgy Litvn, ed. trans. Jnos M. Bak and Lyman H. Legters, The Hungarian
Revolution of 1956: Reform, Revolt, and Repression, 1953-1963 (London: Longman,
1996), p. 51. Gyrgy Gmri and Adam Bromke wrote perceptive articles on the
Polish reactions to the Hungarian revolt without access to archival sources. See
Gyrgy Gmri, Polish Echoes of the Hungarian Revolution, The Review
[Brussels] (October 1959): 52-63. Bromke refers to "Poland's response," however,
as if the entire population responded in the same manner. See Adam Bromke,
"Poland" in Bla K. Kirly and Paul Jonas, ed. The Hungarian Revolution of 1956
in Retrospect (Boulder, Colo.: East European Quarterly, 1978), pp. 87-93.

Overview, October 31--November 22, 1956
Having made up their minds to "restore order" in Hungary by force, the Soviet
Presidium members informed the visiting Chinese delegation on October 31 about the
decision. As mentioned earlier, three prominent Soviet leaders (Khrushchev, Molotov,
and Malenkov) then traveled on November 1 to Brest, Poland to inform the first
secretary of the PZPR Wadysaw Gomuka of their decision to invade Hungary.
Khrushchev and Malenkov continued on to Bucharest, where they met with
Romanian, Bulgarian, and Czechoslovak leaders. On November 2, Khrushchev and
Malenkov flew to Yugoslavia, where they met with Tito at his villa on Brioni, an
Adriatic island, from early evening to dawn the next day. En route the two Soviet
leaders worried about Tito's reaction to their news of the imminent invasion. Gomuka
in Poland had raised some objections to the Soviet decision, so they thought Tito
would, too. Their fears were unwarranted; as will be discussed later in this chapter,
Tito deemed military intervention necessary to preserve communist, one-party rule in
Hungary.
During the night of November 3, sixteen Soviet divisions, including two air
force divisions and some armored divisions, crossed the border into Hungary. Details
of the Soviet plan to invade Hungary, codenamed Operation "Whirlwind" (Vikhr) are
revealed by the declassified documents. The plan was launched on November 1 by the
commander-in-chief of the Warsaw Pact, Marshal Ivan Konev, when he began the re-
deployment of the Soviet troops. In comparison to Operation Wave (Volna) (on
October 23-4, when only five Soviet divisions were stationed in Hungary, Operation
Whirlwind employed seventeen divisions (60,000 Soviet soldiers and officers).
288

This second intervention came after three days of deception. The Russians
negotiated with the Hungarians (the so-called "mixed commission" headed by Pl
Malter) about the withdrawal of Soviet troops, but at the same time flew Kdr and
Mnnich secretly to the Soviet Union on November 1 to establish a new pro-Soviet
government.
289
(Kdr's actions between November 2 and 4 will be examined in
Chapter Five). Meanwhile, as mentioned above, Khrushchev and his colleagues met
with East European leaders to inform them of their decision.
Fresh troops began to cross the Hungarian border as early as November 1.
After several phone calls to Andropov that day for an explanation, Nagy finally
summoned him to a 7 P.M. session of the Hungarian Council of Ministers and
demanded a public clarification.
Nagy in a rather nervous tone informed all those present that earlier that morning he
asked the Soviet Ambassador about the report that Soviet troops had crossed the
Hungarian border and were penetrating into the heartland of the country. He, Nagy,
'demanded,' an explanation of this. He said that, since the Soviet government has not
yet stopped the movement of Soviet troops and has not explained its actions
satisfactorily, he proposes to confirm the decision made that morning to renounce the
Warsaw Pact and declare the neutrality of Hungary.
290


Andropov earlier that day told Nagy that the Soviet government was ready to
negotiate a partial troop withdrawal; he suggested that two delegations be appointed,

288.
According to Zhukov, there were 58,821 Soviet soldiers in Hungary. See RGANI,
F 89, O 2, D. 3, Ll. 1-3, Informatsiya Zhukova Dannye Ministerstva Oborony
SSSR o Poteryakh Sovetskikh Voisk na Territorii Vengrii, 11-ogo noyabrya 1956 g.
289.
For more background on Malter's role, see Mikls Horvth, Malter Pl
(Budapest: Osiris/Szzadvg/1956-os Intzet, 1995), esp. pp. 214-248.
290.
AVP RF, f. 059a, op. 4, p. 6, d. 5, l. 17--19 Telegramma sovetskovo posla
Andropova iz Budapeshta, 1-ovo noyabrya 1956 g.
one to discuss political issues, and the other to discuss technical questions connected
with the withdrawal. Although Nagy went ahead and announced Hungarian neutrality
on the radio at 7:45 that evening, he agreed to the negotiations, the so-called "mixed
commission."
291
By the afternoon of November 3, an agreement seemed to be near.
As long as negotiations for the withdrawal of Soviet troops continued, Imre
Nagy would not take concrete defensive measures against the Soviet tanks in Hungary,
which by November 3 numbered in the thousands. He feared that any aggressive move
by Hungarian forces would destroy the possibility of a Soviet withdrawal. Meanwhile,
the Hungarian delegation (composed of Pl Malter, Ferenc Erdei, Mikls Szcs, and
Istvn Kovcs) had reconvened at 10:00 P.M. on November 3 at the Soviet
headquarters in Tkl on Csepel Island. According to the United Nations (UN) report,
Serov interrupted the negotiations at midnight. The members of the Soviet delegation
(Generals Malinin, Cherbanin, and Stepanov) were allegedly as surprised as the
Hungarians.
292
Military commanders like Malashenko, on the other hand, claim to
have been ignorant about the negotiations.
293

The U.S. Ambassador in Moscow, Charles Bohlen soon figured out that the
negotiations were just a stalling device. "Soviet press today contains no reference to
any mixed commission," he wrote in a telegram to Secretary of State Dulles on
November 4 at 12 noon. "Mixed Commission is little more than [a] device to gain time

291.
U.N. Report, ch. 2, p. 9.
292.
Ibid., ch. 7, p. 45. Since this report is largely based on interviews with refugees-
who could not have been eyewitnesses of these negotiations-the view that the Soviet
delegation itself was surprised is probably only a rumor.
293.
Malashenko, op. cit., v. 12 (1993): 35.
for preparations [for] armed action in Hungary."
294
Marshal Konev had summoned
Lashchenko, commander of the Special Corps, to Szolnok on November 2 and given
him an assignment: to crush the counterrevolution at 5:00 A.M. on November 4.
295

At 5:00 a.m. on November 4, Kdr's associate Ferenc Mnnich announced
the establishment of Kdr's new "Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants'
Government," temporarily located in Szolnok, a city sixty-five miles southeast of
Budapest. This was the final clue to Imre Nagy that he had been betrayed. An hour
later Nagy and some of his closest supporters, including Jzsef Szilgyi, Mikls Gimes,
Gza Losonczy, Ferenc Donth, Zoltn Sznt, ZoltnVas, Sndor Kopcsi, Zoltn
Tildy, Szilrd Ujhelyi, Gbor Tnczos, and Sndor Haraszti with their families, sought
refuge in the Yugoslav Embassy, but they were abducted by Soviet troops on
November 22 and transferred to Romania.
296
The Soviet leaders installed Jnos Kdr
as the new prime minister. (Imre Nagy and several others were eventually hanged on
June 16, 1958 in Budapest).

294.
Telegram from Bohlen to Dulles, "Regarding Bohlen's Belief that the Soviet-
Hungarian Commission to Negotiate the Withdrawal of Soviet Troops is a Sham,"
Nov. 4, 1956, 12:00 noon (Moscow time), No. 1048, National Security Archive,
Washington D.C. On this point see also U.N. Special Committee Report., op. cit., p.
47; and Michel Tatu, "Soviet Intervention in Eastern Europe," in Stephen Kaplan,
ed., Diplomacy of Power: Soviet Armed Forces as a Political Instrument (Washington:
Brookings Institution, 1981), p. 216.
295.
Jen Gyrkei, "Kto byl togda komandirom: Ob Osobom Korpuse i odnoi osobo
strannoi stat'e," Most (Budapest: 1992), No. 1--2, 42. (The journal Most is a
collection of essays written by Hungarian scholars, but translated into Russian for
the Russian reading public).
296
Pl Malter was earlier arrested at Tkl. Arrested separately later were Mikls
Gimes (communist journalist and Nagy supporter), Sndor Kopcsi (Budapest
police chief), Zoltn Tildy (former head of the Independent Smallholders Party and
briefly a member of Nagys government), and Ferenc Jnosi (Nagys son-in-law).
Mikls Vsrhelyi did not seek refuge in the Yugoslav embassy, since he lived in
Buda and was at home. He went to a Yugoslav diplomat's private flat and joined the
others only on November 22, 1956.
Fighting continued in various regions throughout Hungary from the 5th to 11th
of November, with the Budapest industrial district of Csepel as one of the last centers
to fall. However Soviet forces eventually suppressed the resistance and installed a pro-
Soviet government under Kdr and Mnnich. Khrushchev and his colleagues in
Moscow were able to maintain direct contact with the new Hungarian government via
Leonid Brezhnev and Anastas Mikoyan, who had been sent to Budapest on November
3 for that purpose.
297

The total number of Hungarian casualties is estimated to have been 21,728:
2,502 dead and 19,226 wounded.
298
Close to two hundred thousand refugees fled across
the Austrian border. During the "normalization" process, more than a thousand
Hungarian citizens were deported to prisons in Uzhgorod and Stryj in Ukraine.

Plan Whirlwind [Vikhr], November 4
Compared to Operation Wave," the second Soviet intervention, begun at 615
A.M. on November 4 and codenamed "Vikhr" (Whirlwind), was smoothly executed, in
a purely military sense, because the Soviet troops had learned from their mistakes. In
contrast to the five Soviet divisions (31,500 men) stationed in Hungary on October 23--
24, Operation Whirlwind employed about seventeen divisions (60,000 Soviet soldiers
and officers). Soviet forces immediately closed borders and roads so insurgent groups

297
RGANI, F. 3 O. 12. D. 1006, L. 30. Protokolnaya Zapis Zasedaniya
Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 2-ogo noyabrya 1956. Avtograf V. N. Malina.
298.
For casualty figures, see Pter Gosztonyi, "Az 1956-os forradalom szmokban,"
Npszabadsg (Budapest), Nov. 3, 1990, p. 3; for refugees, Vengriya 1956 goda:
Ocherki Istorii Krizisa (Moscow: Nauka, 1993), 163; and for deportations, TsAMO,
f. 32, o. 701291, d. 15, ll. 13, 93, and d. 16, ll. 31, 53, 331.
could not enter from other cities, as they had in late October.
299
The insurgents thus
now had no way of receiving reinforcements, whereas almost eight extra Soviet
regiments arrived to put down the "hotbeds of resistance" in Budapest alone.
300

Earlier restrictions, such as shooting only in self-defense, did not hamper
them, and they no longer planned joint actions with the Hungarian armed forces. By
October 30, Mikoyan and Suslov had had second thoughts about the reliability of
the Hungarian army. As mentioned in the previous chapter, they reported to the
Kremlin on that day that there was no trust as there was earlier and that it might
be possible that Hungarian units sent against the insurgents could join these other
Hungarians.
301

Soviet troops, therefore, concentrated initially on disarming the Hungarian
military. By early morning on November 5, they had disarmed the administrative and
corps units of two infantry corps, the units of five infantry divisions, two mechanized
divisions, five antiaircraft artillery divisions, two tank regiments, three antitank fighter
guards, as well as the entire Hungarian aviation force. (Meanwhile, other Hungarian
tank divisions were fighting alongside the Hungarian resisters near the Corvin

299.
"For the purpose of preventing the penetration of Hungary by the hostile agency
and the escape of the resistance leaders from Hungary," Marshal Zhukov wrote,
"our troops have occupied the Hungarian airports and solidly closed off all the
roads on the Austro-Hungarian border."RGANI, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 23, l. 1,
"Information from Zhukov to Mikoyan and Suslov on November 4, 1956, on the
Situation in Hungary as of 12 noon November 4, 1956." See also Malashenko,
"Special Corps," vol. 1 (1994), 30.
300.
Malashenko, v. 1 (1994), p. 37.
301.
RGANI, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 12, L.2.
Cinema.)
302
By November 9, Moscow felt confident enough to permit Kdr to carve
out of the remnants of the Hungarian army two divisions of loyal Hungarian
Communist fighters in order to "hungarianize" the conflict.
303

Despite the factors working in their favor, Soviet forces faced new obstacles.
The Hungarian armed forces fought back this time. At first, as during Operation
Wave, Nagy forbade the Hungarian army to resist Soviet troops. He gave explicit
orders not to open fire on Russian tanks, because he expected a positive result from the
ongoing negotiations with the Soviets. Only near midnight on November 3, when he
first lost contact with the Hungarian delegation at Tkl and then at 4 A.M. on
November 4 received news that Kdr had established a pro-Soviet government at
Szolnok, did Nagy decide not to forbid the Hungarian forces from fighting. He never
officially authorized them to fight, however. In his last address to the Hungarian
people, on the radio at 5:20 A.M. on November 4, he announced, "Today at daybreak
Soviet troops attacked our capital with the obvious intention of overthrowing the legal
Hungarian democratic government. Our troops are in combat " In truth, Hungarian
troops had not yet begun to fight, and Nagy never explicitly ordered them to do so.
304

In the face of armed resistance, despite the quantitative superiority of Soviet
troops, Operation "Whirlwind" took considerably longer than Marshal Konev
predicted. As Khrushchev wrote in his memoirs:

302. RGANI
, f 89, per 45, dok 26, l. 1, "Informatsiya Ministerstva Oborony SSSR
(Zhukova) v TsK KPSS o Polozhenii v Vengrii po Sostoyaniyu na 9.00 5 noyabrya
1956 g.
303.
RGANI, F 89, Per 45, Dok 34, "Draft of a Telegram to Andropov from the CC
CPSU, Nov. 9, 1956.
304.
U.N. Report, 7 [emphasis added]. See also Calhoun, Hungary and Suez, 428.
Konev at that time commanded the troops of the Warsaw Pact and I asked him: how
much time would he need, if we were to instruct him to restore order in Hungary and
crush the revolution. He thought and then said, "Three days...No more is needed."
305


In actuality, the fighting did not end until around November 12, or eight days.
Not immune to a Clausewitzian "fog of war," the Soviet side also had unforeseen
difficulties and incurred many casualties, though not as many as the Hungarians.
306

First, they had to request reinforcements. According to Malashenko, "the division unit
headed by General Abaturov bore especially heavy losses. It had to execute the most
complicated tasks, and in the center of the city-where the armed groups were the most
concentrated. In the first few days they [Soviet troops] did not always very skillfully
organize military operations. Units of the 7th and 31st Guards airborne divisions had
85 killed, 265 wounded, and 12 who disappeared."
307

By November 6, 377 Soviet soldiers had been killed. Marshal Zhukov reported
on November 9:
According to preliminary data, the losses of the Soviet troops in the period of military
operations from October 24 to November 6, 1956, consisted of 377 people killed, and
881 people wounded. Of these, 37 officers were killed, and 74 officers were wounded.
Soviet troops disarmed about 35,000 Hungarians. A large quantity of weapons,
military equipment, and ammunition was seized in the course of battle and taken
under guard as a result of the disarmament process. An inventory of this equipment
continues.
308



305.
Nikita S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970),
417--8.
306.
Already by October 27, as reported by Hungarian Politburo member Antal
Apr, there were about three thousand wounded Hungarians in the hospital, 250 of
whom died. RGANI, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 9, l. 3: "Information of Mikoyan from
October 27, 1956."
307.
Malashenko, "Special Corps," vol. 1 (1994), 36.
308
RGANI, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 36, L. 1: "Information from Zhukov on the Situation
in Hungary as of November 9, 1956, 9 a.m."
According to Marshal Zhukov's firsthand report, 669 Soviet soldiers and
officers were killed in the fighting, 1,450 were wounded and 51 were declared
missing.
309
There were a total of 58,821 Soviet soldiers in Hungary. Of those, 7, 349
were officers with 85 killed, 138 wounded, and 2 missing. Of the 51,472 sergeants and
soldiers, 584 were killed, 1,402 wounded, and 49 missing.
310
A more recent Russian
source records the number of Soviet deaths as 720 and the number of Soviet wounded
as 1,540.
311
More than 600 families of the Soviet "Special Corps" were evacuated from
western Ukraine.
312


Lack of Communication between Soviet Troops and pro-Soviet Hungarians
Another complication was the lack of communication between Soviet troops on
the one hand and Soviet diplomats and pro-Soviet Hungarians on the other. On
November 4, Andropov, for example, sent a telegram to the Central Committee of the
CPSU: "With Kdr, Apr, and Mnnich, we have no communication. In general, the

309.
Ibid.
310
RGANI, F 89, O 2, D. 3, Ll. 1-3, Informatsiya Zhukova Dannye Ministerstva
Oborony SSSR o Poteryakh Sovetskikh Voisk na Territorii Vengrii, 11-ogo
noyabrya 1956 g.
311.
"Sobytiya v Vengrii 1956 g.," in Col.-General G. A. Krivosheev, ed., Grif
sekretnosti snyat: Poteri vooruzhenykh sil SSSR v voinakh, boevykh deistviyakh i
voennykh konfliktakh: Statist-icheskoe issledovanie (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1993), p.
397.
312
TsAMO, F. 32, O. 701291, D. 16, L. 48. The 177th airforce division evacuated the
Russian families from November 1-3, 1956. Cited on p. 31 in Aleksandr Kyrov,
Sovetskaya Armiya i Vengerskaya Revolyutsiya (unpublished paper presented at
Hungary and the World, 1956 conference in Budapest, September 1996.)
absence of communication among our friends was felt very strongly today. . . . [T]here
was [also] no regular communication with the headquarters of our troops in Tkl."
313

Information remained at a premium for Andropov, because Russian language
documents and news about Hungary had been destroyed. In December, the embassy,
paradoxically, had to appeal to the home country for information about the very
country to which it was supposed to be providing information. In a telegram to I. K.
Zamchevskii, director of the Fifth European Division of the Soviet Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Andropov wrote: "I request that you send to the Soviet embassy in the very
next diplomatic post all TASS material concerning the events in Hungary from
October 23 to the present. This material is essential for the practical work of the
Embassy, since the majority of the dossiers and other documents were destroyed."
314

Zamchevskii then immediately wrote to Patolichev, the deputy minister of
foreign affairs: "In connection with the events which occurred in Hungary, we stopped
the publication of all informational materials in Russian. . . . [A] critical need has now
arisen in the Embassy for the publication of a daily bulletin in Russian with a digest of
the Hungarian press for the Soviet institutions in Hungary, as well as for the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs in the Soviet Union and other organizations in Moscow.
315


313.
AVP RF, f. 059a, op. 4, por. 5, p. 6, ll. 20: "Telegram from Andropov to the CC
CPSU," Nov. 4, 1956. Kdr and Mnnich, in fact, did not arrive back to Budapest
from Szolnok until 6:10 a.m. on Nov. 7. (See RGANI, f. 89, o. 2, d. 3, l. 27:
"Information from Zhukov to the CC CPSU."
314.
AVP RF, F. "Referentura po Vengrii" [information on Hungary] d. 034 (Notes
of Conversations of Foreign Ministry Division Personnel)," Telegram from Iu. V.
Andropov to I. K. Zamchevskii, Dec. 4, 1956. The document does not say how these
documents were destroyed, i.e., whether the Soviet Embassy was attacked or
whether the Russians shredded documents themselves as a precaution.
315.
Ibid.
One other phase of Vikhr did not go as planned. The KGB officers K. E.
Grebennik, P. I. Zyrianov, and A. M. Korotkov were supposed to arrest the "Nagy
group," but the Hungarians escaped to the Yugoslav Embassy at 6 A.M. on November
4.
316

Tito offered to receive them in Yugoslavia. Andrei Gromyko and Jnos Kdr
did not think this a good idea. Gromyko wrote to Kdr: "We are fully in accord with
your reply to our ambassador that Nagy and the others hiding in the Yugoslav
embassy should in no way be transferred to Yugoslavia, since they were the organizers
of the counterrevolutionary demonstration, and you cannot allow two Hungarian
governments to exist-one in Hungary, the other in Yugoslavia."
317
Eventually, of
course, the Soviet leadership solved that problem, too. On November 17, Soviet
presidium members Mikoyan, Suslov, and Aristov secretly suggested to the CPSU
Central Committee, unbeknownst to Tito, that they "provide for the arrest of Nagy
and his group as soon as they are released from the Yugoslav Embassy, demand that
Nagy sign a declaration in which he admits his mistakes, and send him and his group
to Romania."
318

Apparently, the Romanians (and probably Russians) did not think Tito would
mind too much. "We didn't think the Yugoslavs would make a fuss [podnimut shum]
about the transfer of Imre Nagy and his group to Romania," wrote V. Nikolaev
"However, as you know, they appealed with notes of protest to the Soviet and

316.
Malashenko, vol. 12 (1993): 34.
317.
RGANI, f 89, o 2, d 3, l. 39, "Letter of Andrei Gromyko to Jnos Kdr,"
November 9, 1956.
318.
RGANI, f. 89, op. 2, d. 5, l. 3-4: "information from Malenkov, Suslov, and
Aristov from Budapest," Nov. 17, 1956.
Hungarian governments. It is possible that this issue can be presented at the United
Nations and so on. We think we ought to be ready for any kind of speeches and
conversations in connection to Imre Nagy."
319


Tito's Secret Fears
The Romanians had good reason to believe that Tito would not protest
against the abduction of Nagy. Like Khrushchev and the Special Corps, Tito was
caught off guard by the October-November, 1956 events in Hungary, specifically
when the Hungarians' anti-Soviet mood shifted to an anti-communist mood. It has
been assumed that Tito wholeheartedly approved of Nagy's policies and the
independence movement. Publicly Tito was propounding the third-path rhetoric,
"different roads to socialism," and noninterference in the internal affairs of
sovereign countries. As mentioned earlier, Nagy, like Tito, was also attracted to the
Five Principles (Pancha Shila) propounded at the 1955 Bandung Conference. Nagy
argued that the principles must extend not only to the Third World, or to the
capitalist system, but also to the relations between the countries within the
democratic and socialist camp. Interestingly, according to the Malin notes, these
principles were mentioned during the CC CPSU Presidium meeting on October 30,
1956 by Kaganovich, who said "I don't think they should propose that we build our
relations on the principles of Pancha Shila.")
320


319.
Ibid., d. 3, ll. 13--15: "Information by V. Nikolaev, Nov. 26, 1956."
320.
RGANI, F. 3, O. 12, D. 1006, L. 9, Protokolnaya Zapis Zasedaniya Prezidiuma
TsK KPSS, 30-ovo oktyabrya 1956 g. Avtograf Malina.
However, despite his outward support of Nagy, Tito inwardly felt threatened
by Nagy's movement. With the opening of the communist party archives, we can see
that Tito's perspective changed as the situation became violent in Hungary.
321
He
realized the potential of nationalist (non-communist) "spillover" into Yugoslavia,
which itself was an artificial state composed of several ethnic and religious groups:
Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, Macedonians, Bosnian Muslims, Montenegrins, as well as
Hungarians and Albanians. He himself had always been careful to conceal the fact
that he was born into a peasant family from north Croatia and actually fought on
the Austrian-Hungarian side against Serbia in 1914
322

A brief review of Yugoslav-Hungarian diplomatic history will illustrate
why Tito feared that the ethnic Hungarian minority in northern Yugoslavia,
consisting of at least 500,000 people, would help spread the ideas of the Hungarian
Revolution inside his own country. It is worth remembering that the state of

321.
AVP RF, F 77, O 37, P 191, D 39, L 99. From the First Secretary of the European
Department of the Soviet Foreign Minister, V. Bakunov and Second Secretary of the
European Division, A. Khanov, "Information about the Position of the Yugoslavs
toward the Events in Hungary," December 12, 1956. "[T]he display of revanchist
aspirations by counterrevolutionary elements, uttering the slogan 'Great Hungary,'
noticeably influenced the Yugoslavs' position. If before this the Yugoslav press
praised the actions of the Nagy government, so after the counterrevolutionary
nationalist demonstrations, the press and various Yugoslav representatives spoke
with alarm about the growth of the anarchic, counterrevoutionary forces in
Hungary. This anxiety was noticeable in Tito's letter to the CC of the HWP on
October 30." (This quote merely reflects Tito's subjective fears, based on effective
Soviet disinformation. It does not reflect the conditions in Hungary, since no one
among the Hungarian revolutionaries expressed "revanchist aspirations" or uttered
the slogan "Great Hungary." The issue probably weighed on Tito's mind, given the
fact that, after the Trianon Treaty (1920), Yugoslavia received significant parts of
Hungarian territory, viz. Bcska, the Baranya, and the western Bnt, amounting to
20,956 square kilometers.
322.
See Stevan K. Pavlowitch, Tito, Yugoslavia's Great Dictator (London: C. Hurst &
Co, 1992), 43.
Yugoslavia was created by incorporating large parts of southern Hungary after
World War One, between 1918 and 1920. By the Treaty of Trianon (June 4, 1920),
Yugoslavia gained Croatia and the Vojvodina (formerly called Bcska and Bnt in
Hungarian). The Serbs had already taken over the administration of the Bcska, the
Baranya, and the western Bnt on November 24, 1918, presenting the Hungarians
with a fait accompli.) In fact, Hungary lost more than two-thirds of its pre-war
territory. The territory ceded to Rumania alone--Transylvania (in Hungarian
Erdly) and half of the Bnt - was larger than the area left to Hungary.
Czechoslovakia gained Slovakia and Ruthenia. Italy gained Fiume; and Poland
gained a small area in northern Slovakia. Whereas in 1914 approximately 21 million
people lived in Hungary, by 1920 after Trianon, Hungary had under 8 million
inhabitants. Not surprisingly, many Hungarians--including those living in Croatia
and Vojvodina--clamored in the interwar years to have the Trianon Treaty
revised.
323

Later, during World War Two, Hungary became increasingly dependent on
Hitler's Germany. The Hungarian prime minister Lszl Brdossy (who took over
in 1941 when his predecessor, Pl Teleki, committed suicide) ordered the Hungarian
army to follow in the steps of the German Wehrmacht on April 11, 1941 by invading
Yugoslavia and occupying the Bcska and parts of the Vojvodina. Thanks to
German support, Hungary recovered an area of 80,000 square kilometers with 5

323
Jorg K. Hoensch, A History of Modern Hungary, 1867--1986 (London:
Longman, 1988), 84 and 102.
million inhabitants, including over 2 million Magyars who had been living under
foreign rule since the signing of the Trianon peace treaty.
324

During World War Two, the Germans also invaded Yugoslavia and occupied
it. During the German and Hungarian occupation, a strong Serbian partisan
movement under Communist leadership developed, particularly in the Vojvodina.
The Hungarian military leadership in Vojvodina (or Bcska) organized anti-
partisan raids and summary courts-martial against the participants in, and
sympathizers with, the partisan movement. The largest anti-partisan campaign took
place in Novi Sad (the main city of the Vojvodina) between January 21 and 23, 1942.
The Hungarian military leaders massacred about 879 Serbian and Jewish people
altogether.
At the end of 1944, the Serbs reoccupied Bcska (Vojvodina), and it has
remained part of Yugoslavia ever since. Serbian propagandists have exaggerated
the massacre in Novi Sad to some extent. In the two and a half years after the
incident, a far more bloody and extensive Serbian vendetta was carried out against
the Hungarians in the Vojvodina. This was a taboo subject in Hungary over the last
four decades because of Tito's cult of personality. Marshal Tito, the commander-in-
chief of the partisan army at the time, condoned and apparently issued verbal
orders to his partisans to avenge all "injustices" suffered by partisans and Serbs
during the four years of the war. Thousands of Hungarians in Vojvodina were killed

324
Ibid., 150.
by Serbian partisans in the fall of 1944.
325
By 1948, bitter emotions abounded on
both the Hungarian and Yugoslav sides. The Soviet-Yugoslav rift had given the
Hungarian Stalinists like Rkosi and Ger the opportunity to vilify all "Titoists"
and the Yugoslav minority in Hungary generally. Tentative, secret correspondence
between Tito and Khrushchev began in the summer of 1954 before the signing of the
Balkan Pact in July 1954.
326

For Tito it was much easier to encourage faraway Poland than nearby
Hungary. Between October 31 and November 1, 1956, the leading Yugoslav
newspaper Borba stopped supporting the Nagy government, as "in any case, not a
counter-revolution," and now denounced its connection to "right-wing elements."
Indeed, as his own fears of spillover intensified, Tito probably began to empathize
somewhat with the Russians vis--vis the spillover of Yugoslav ideas into the bloc
countries.
Some scholars have suspected Tito's own alarm, but the documents provide
greater detail about these fears.
327
In his letter of November 8 to Khrushchev (and

325
See Tibor Cseres, Titoist Atrocities in Vojvodina, 1944-1945 (Serbian Vendetta in
Bcska (Buffalo : Hunyadi Publishers, 1993). For a Hungarian version, see Tibor
Cseres, Vrbossz Bcskban (Budapest : Magveto, 1991).
326
This secret correspondence was declassified in the wake of the collapse of the
Milosevi regime and consequent re-opening of the National Archives of Yugoslavia
[Arhiv Jugoslavije]. See, for example, AJ, Arhiv CK SKJ, 507/IX, 119/I-48, I-49, I-
50, I-51, and I-52, cited in CWIHP Bulletin, issue 12/13 (Fall/Winter 2001), pp. 315-
324.
327
Vli, for example, notes Titos concerns. See Rift and Revolt in Hungary, 350-1.
Leonid Gibianskii, a senior researcher at the Institute of Slavonic Studies of the
Russian Academy of Sciences in Moscow, has written extensively on Soviet-
Yugoslav relations during the 1956 crisis. He has worked extensively in the former
archive of the CC of the Union of Communists of Yugoslavia, which is now a fond in
the collection of the Archive of Yugoslavia (Arhiv Jugoslavije, or AJ), as well as in
the archive of the former united secretariat on Yugoslav foreign affairs (Arhiva
later on November 11 in his speech at Pula), Tito stated clearly that he had agreed
with Khrushchev on the need to intervene.
328
In fact, Khrushchev himself
apparently was surprised at how readily Tito agreed with him on the need to
intervene.
329
Moreover, Tito was quoted often by the Soviet Presidium as having
asked rhetorically: "What kind of a revolutionary, what kind of communist, could
Nagy be, if with his knowledge they hanged and shot leading workers, communists

Saveznog sekretarijata za inostrane poslove, Politicka arhiva, or ASSIP-PA). See, for
example, Soviet-Yugoslav Relations and the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, in
CWIHP Bulletin, issue 10 (March 1998), pp. 139-148 Le trattative segrete
sovietico-jugoslave e la repressione della rivoluzione ungherese del 1956, Storia
Contemporanea (Roma), 1994, no. 1, pp. 57-82; Magyarorszg, 1956: Hruscsov s
Tito titkos levelezese (Budapest: Kztrsasg, 1992), 25 szm., pp. 74, 76-7, 80-1 and
26 szm., pp. 74, 76-7, 80-1, and 27 szm., pp. 29-32. See also Zoltn Ripp, Hungarys
Part in the Soviet-Yugoslav Conflict, 1956-1958 Contemporary European History
vol. 7, no. 2 (1998), pp. 197-225.
328.
RGANI, F 89, Per 45, Dok 38, L.1-2, From the Central Committee of the
Yugoslav Communist Party, Brioni, to the First Secretary of the CC CPSU
Khrushchev, November 8, 1956. "It is true that during our conversation on Brioni
we agreed with your assessment that the weakness of the Nagy government and its
actions led to the danger of the destruction of the essential socialist achievements in
Hungary. We agreed that the Hungarian communists should not remain in such a
government and that they should...decisively resist the reaction. There is no need to
remind you that we expressed our doubts about the consequences of open assistance
from the Soviet army from the very beginning, as well as during all conversations.
But...such help became unavoidable." Also see Tito's speech delivered in Pula,
November 11, 1956 in Borba, November 16, 1956, or cited in Zinner, ed. National
Communism, 516-541.
329
Khrushchev wrote in his memoirs: "I expected even more strenuous objections
from Tito than the ones we had encountered during our discussions with the Polish
comrades. But we were pleasantly surprised. Tito said we were absolutely right and
that we should send our soldiers into action as quickly as possible." Strobe Talbott,
ed. Khrushchev Remembers (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), 421. It appears that
Miunovi may not have realized the benefits of Soviet military action in Hungary,
however. When Khrushchev told him on July 15, 1956 that the USSR was prepared
to "use all means at [its] disposal to bring the crisis to an end," Miunovi construed
this as a veiled threat. In his memoirs he wrote: "Now they [the Russians] threaten us
with the use of the Soviet Army in Hungary and invite Yugoslavia to understand them
properly and remain silent." See Veljko Miunovi, Moscow Diary (Garden City, NY:
Doubleday, 1980), p. 88. Miunovi's journal draws on notes he took right after the
negotiations at Brioni.
and public figures?"
330
Two months after the Soviet crackdown, Tito confided in
Firiubin, the Soviet ambassador to Yugoslavia, that "the reaction raised its head
[podnial golovu], especially in Croatia, where the reactionary elements openly
incited the employees of the Yugoslav security organs to violence." After Firiubin
told him that his speech in Pula, and the speech of Yugoslav Vice President Eduard
Kardelj later on December 7, 1956 denouncing Kdrs repression of the Hungarian
workers councils, made a bad impression in Moscow, Tito assured him, "I do not
want to complicate Soviet-Yugoslav relations in any way."
331
The Soviet Presidium
also claimed that Tito himself had plans to intervene militarily in Hungary.
332
Tito,
in his talk with the Soviet military delegation on Brioni on November 18, 1956,
allegedly declared, "If the Soviet troops were not used to put down the insurrection,
then Yugoslav troops, which were by that time braced [podtianutyi] on the

330
AVP RF, F 77, O 37, Papka 191, Por 39, List 100. From the First Secretary of the
European Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, V. Bakunov and Second
Secretary of the European Division, A. Khanov, "Reference about the Position of
the Yugoslavs toward the Events in Hungary," December 12, 1956. Also
RGANI, F 89, Per 45, Dok 83, List 3, Resolution of the CC CPSU: "About the Letter
to the CC of the Yugoslav Communist Party, to Tito with Enclosed Text," January
10, 1957.
331
RGANI, F. 89, O 2, D 4, L 43, Information of Firiubin, Soviet Ambassador to
Yugoslavia, "Notes from a Conversation with the President of the Yugoslavia (Josip
Broz Tito)," January 11, 1957.
332.
RGANI, F 89, Per 45, Dok 83, List 5, Resolution of the CC CPSU: "About the
Letter to the CC CPY (Tito) with Enclosed Text," January 10, 1957. Ivan Gosnjak,
the Yugoslav State Secretary for Defense Matters, allegedly said something similar
at the reception in the Soviet embassy in Belgrade on November 23 in honor of the
Soviet military delegation. AVP RF, f. 077, o. 37, p. 191, d. 39, ll. 82-93. I. K.
Zamchevskii, "K Voprosu o Podderzhke Imre Nadya i ego Politiki Yugoslavskimi
Rukovoditelyami, 4-ogo dekabrya 1956 g. Some speculate that Tito, and other
prominent Yugoslav officials around him, may have contemplated this preemptive
intervention, both to keep the Soviet army out, and to prop up the communist
government in Hungary. See Richard Lowenthal, "Tito's Affair with Khrushchev,"
The New Leader, v. 41 (October 6, 1958), 14. Also Vli, Rift and Revolt in Hungary,
351.
Yugoslav-Hungarian border, would have been sent in for that purpose."
333

(Khrushchev himself may have thought about a possible Yugoslav intervention
when he said during the October 31 CC CPSU Presidium meeting "We should
negotiate with Tito...There will be no large-scale war.")
334
In a conversation with
Andropov, Kdr said, "The Yugoslavs apparently are trying to save Nagy not
because they need him, but because they fear he can cause some undesirable things
for them."
335

Moreover, while some scholars have asserted that Tito wholeheartedly
favored Nagy as a replacement to Rkosi, there is surprisingly little evidence in the
Soviet archives to prove this.
336
On the contrary, Tito seemed willing--although
unenthusiastically--to tolerate the Stalinist Ern Ger, but to prefer Jnos Kdr
337

or Zoltn Sznt to head the new post-Rkosi government.
338
When Tito was

333.
Ibid.
334.
RGANI, F. 3, O. 12, D. 1006, L. 17, Protokolnaya Zapis Zasedaniya
Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 31-ovo oktyabrya 1956 g. Avtograf Malina.
335.
RGANI, F. 89, Per. 45, Dok. 34, L. 3. "Draft of the Telegram to the Soviet
Ambassador in Budapest, Yuri Andropov, from the CC CPSU, November 9, 1956.
336.
Charles Gati, Hungary and the Soviet Bloc, 137. "Thus, with Tito as a key player
now, and Nagy as Tito's obvious choice the Russians were increasingly interested in
Nagy and the authority he could command." (emphasis added) See also Vli, Rift
and Revolt in Hungary, 249-50.
337.
RGANI, F 89, Per 45, Dok 38, L 2, Protocol 54, Resolution of the CC CPSU
Presidium, "About the Answer of the Yugoslavs on the Issue of Imre Nagy and His
Group," November 10, 1956. "[Y]ou completely shared our positive view of Kdr,
as a prominent and authoritative leading statesman of the communist movement of
Hungary, who is capable in the present difficult conditions to lead a new
revolutionary government...You were very satisfied that the CC CPSU still in the
summer after the departure of Rkosi tried to have Kdr appointed First Secretary
of the CC Hungary (HWP)." (This may suggest that Khrushchev's choice of Kdr
was overruled by Molotov and other hard-liners in favor of the Stalinist Ger)
338.
AVP RF, F 077, O 37, P 191, D 39, L 81, August 23, 1956, "About the Activities
of the Workers of the Yugoslav Mission in Budapest, Hindering the Normalization
of Hungarian-Yugoslav Relations From the Soviet Embassy in Budapest," by V.
informed by Kurimszki that Rkosi had resigned," he never mentioned Nagy's
name.
339
Of course, this may be because Nagy was not readmitted to the Hungarian
communist party until October 14, 1956. However, it appears that Tito did not
regard Nagy as highly as did the Yugoslav diplomats and journalists in the summer
of 1956.
He certainly did not want Rkosi to remain in power. He had reached an
agreement with Khrushchev in Moscow in May and June, 1955, that Rkosi would
be dismissed.
340
The Khrushchev leadership apparently resisted this at first.
341


Kazimirov. "[O]n July 23, 1956, Ger in a talk with Andropov said that Mikoyan
called him from Sofia, Bulgaria... Ger stated that if he correctly understood
comrade Mikoyan, the Yugoslav embassy considered the candidacy of Ger as
unacceptable for the post of First Secretary of the CC HWP, where they would have
liked to see Jnos Kdr or Zoltn Sznt." (emphasis added). Zoltn Sznt (1893-
1977) was a revisionist communist, a member of the moderate wing of the opposition
before October 1956. He sought political asylum in the Yugoslav embassy on
November 4 together with Nagy and his other supporters, but was taken to Romania
on November 18 as a "guest" of the Romanian Communist Party (along with Zoltn
Vas, chairman of the Government Commission on Consumer Supplies). Later, in
the Spring of 1957, proceedings were initiated against him and the others, and the
Hungarian security police arrested him. He was allowed in 1958 to return to
Hungary.
339.
Ibid., L 41, From Andropov, Soviet Ambassador in Budapest to D. T. Shepilov,
Minister of Foreign Affairs, August 14, 1956. "Then Tito unexpectedly started to
ask [Kurimszki] about the state of health of comrades Ger, Kdr, and Revai...
Comrade Tito did not mention Imre Nagy even once in the course of the whole
conversation. and did not even drop a hint about him." Words are underlined as they
appeared in the original document.
340.
A letter from Khrushchev to Rkosi on July 13, 1956 and letter from Tito to
Ger on September 11, 1956 clearly reveal the content of the June talks in Moscow.
See Jzsef Kiss, Zoltn Ripp, and Istvn Vida, eds., Top Secret: Magyar-Jugoszlav
Kapcsolatok, 1956 Dokumentok (Budapest: MTA Jelenkor Kutat Bizottsg, 1995),
pp. 77-84 and 116-17 respectively. Prominent officials and scholars have shown
definitively that Tito insisted that Rkosi be dismissed before Yugoslav relations
with the communist bloc countries could improve. See, for example, Sndor
Kopcsi, In the Name of the Working Class (New York: Grove Press, 1986), 89: "The
Yugoslav leader wanted the head of the Hungarian dictator who had mounted the
false trials of Rajk and Kdr in which everybody had been 'agent and spy for
Titos statements about his willingness to tolerate Rkosi during the meeting with
the envoy Kurimszki in July 1956 manifest Titos political finesse. He told
Kurimszki:
Whomever the Hungarian people choose and recognize as their leader is their
business...l also said in Moscow that I do not support Rkosi, but if the Hungarian
people want him, then let him be. It is their business. We thought and still do
think...that the settling of the issues between the two parties should not cause shocks
to the Hungarian Workers' Party.
342
The contemporary Western press speculated
that reparations payments from Hungary--which were finally negotiated in May
1956--may have persuaded Tito to end his overt opposition to Rkosi's
incumbency.
343


Tito's clique.'" Or Endre Marton, The Forbidden Sky (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971),
207. When Khrushchev begged Tito to forget how Stalin had treated him in 1948,
Tito demanded Rkosi's ouster." And Ferenc Vli, Rift and Revolt in Hungary, 223.
"He [Tito] undertook to persuade the Kremlin to have Rkosi and his associates
removed from the Hungarian leadership; but the Soviet Presidium steadfastly
refused.
341.
See RGANI, F 89, Per 45, Dok 84, L. 7. To the CC CPSU from the CC CPY, Feb.
7, 1957. "In the course of our conversations with comrades Khrushchev, Bulganin,
and others in May and June of 1955, we expressed our negative position regarding
the policies of Rkosi. You passed by these remarks, defended Rkosi, and used the
whole authority of the Soviet Union in defense of this person and his policies, which he
personified, right to the very last moment, that is, until the majority of the Central
Committee of the Hungarian Workers' Party eliminated him." Also see Tito's
speech in Pula, November 11, 1956, cited in Zinner, ed. National Communism, p.
523-4. "When we were in Moscow...we said that Rkosi's regime and Rkosi himself
had no qualifications whatever to lead the Hungarian state....[T]heir actions could
only bring about grave consequences...[W]e were not insistent enough with the Soviet
leaders to have such a team as Rkosi and Cer eliminated" (emphasis added).
342.
These statements are quoted in Andropovs telegram to Shepilov. See AVP RF, F
077, O 37, P 191, D 39, L 40, From Andropov, Soviet Ambassador in Budapest to D.
T. Shepilov. Minister of Foreign Affairs. August 14. 1956.
343.
John MacCormac, "Hungary Meeting Yugoslav Claims," New York Times, May
4, 1956, p. 6 col 3. "In return for getting his way, it is believed that Marshal Tito will
Given his wariness of Imre Nagy, why did Tito offer the latter political
asylum in his Budapest embassy? Scholars have been puzzled about Tito's motives.
This event is worth examining in detail, both because Tito's act of granting Nagy
asylum epitomizes his political philosophy, and because his reticence in handing
Nagy over to the USSR contributed to a new cold phase in Yugoslav relations with
both the USSR and Hungary.
Until the November 4 invasion, most of the Soviet and Hungarian remarks
were directed against the activities of the Yugoslav diplomats in Hungary, and
against the pro-Nagy reporting of the Hungarian situation by the Yugoslav
journalists. Even at the Crimea meeting in September 1956 when Khrushchev
discussed this problem with Tito, he approached it in a delicate way that would
enable Tito to save face. Tito probably does not have any sinister designs,
Khrushchev stated; it is the "reactionary forces" in Hungary that are using the
"Yugoslav way" as a way to "camouflage their own nationalistic designs."
344

It is plausible that Khrushchev and Kdr, until the November 4 invasion,
had been willing to give Tito the benefit of the doubt and assume that the Yugoslav
journalists and diplomats were simply acting on their own, and not on Tito's orders.
But after November 4, when Nagy and about forty others received political refuge in
the Yugoslav embassy in Budapest, the Soviet and Hungarian officials attacked Tito

cease his active opposition to Mr. Rkosi, who is chief of the Hungarian Workers
(Communist) Party."
344.
RGANI, F. 5, O. 28 D. 403 L. 9, From I. Vinogradov to Comrade M. A. Suslov,
"About the Conversations of Comrades N. S. Khrushchev with Comrade Tito and
the Other Leaders in the Crimea, September-October, 1956."
ad hominem. How dare Tito shelter this leader of the counterrevolution? The Soviet
leaders were enraged.
The course of events is well-known. On November 4 at 5:20 a.m., Nagy made
his last appeal on Radio Budapest and then went to the Yugoslav embassy with
Zoltn Sznt and eleven other party leaders and intellectuals with their families.
345

In the Yugoslav embassy, Nagy remained safe from the invading Soviet army until
his final departure from the embassy compound on November 22, 1956.
What is less known, however, is how exactly Nagy's group ended up in the
Yugoslav embassy and what motivated Tito. From the available correspondence
between Khrushchev and Tito, the following scenario emerges. On November 1
Zoltn Sznt spoke with the Yugoslav ambassador to Hungary, Dalibor Soldati,
about the possible need for political asylum. He was afraid of possible violence
against Hungarian government members by the anticommunist insurgents. Soldati
gave a preliminary affirmative answer, and Sznt was supposed to tell him exactly
when he and others would be coming to the embassy. Soldati also informed Tito
and Kardelj of this request.

The "Agreement" at Brioni
The next day Tito, Rankovi, Kardelj, and Miunovi met with Khrushchev
and Malenkov at Brioni and discussed the Hungarian situation from seven o'clock

345.
These included Julia Rajk (widow of the executed Communist leader), Zoltn
Vas, Gyrgy Lukcs (the philosopher), Gza Losonczy, Ferenc Donth, Gbor
Tnczos, (president of the Petfi Circle), journalists Sndor Haraszti, Mikls
Vsrhelyi, Gyrgy Fazekas, and others. Altogether there were ten men, fifteen
women, and seventeen children in the group. Elie Abel, "Nagy Is Abducted by
Soviet Police; Sent to Romania," New York Times, November 24, 1956, p. 1, col. 7.
in the evening of November 2 to five o'clock in the morning of November 3.
346

Khrushchev and Malenkov informed the Yugoslav leaders of their plans for
invasion, but not the actual date. They discussed the future leader of Hungary.
Khrushchev favored Mnnich, whom as mentioned in the first chapter he
likened to a battered old wolf.
347
Not gullible like Bierut or Nagy, Mnnich was
also a Muscovite fluent in Russian. Since Mnnich had lived outside Hungary
serving as a diplomat from 1949 to 1956, he was more or less untarnished by
Rkosi's misdeeds. Tito, on the other hand, viewed Mnnich with suspicion,
precisely because of the latters close Russian ties. Thus, Khrushchev and Tito
settled on Kdr, a home Communist who had suffered in Rkosis prisons.
In return for Khrushchevs support for Kdr, Tito (supposedly the national
communist independent of Soviet influence) agreed to try to persuade Nagy after the
Soviet invasion, to issue a declaration announcing his own resignation, his inability
to stop the violence in the country, and his support for the new Kdr
government.
348

Perhaps if everything had gone according to the plan worked out between
Khrushchev and Tito at Brioni on November 2, the Soviet leadership would never
have felt compelled to deport Nagy to Rumania, put him on trial, and eventually
execute him (in June 1958). This secret deal between Khrushchev and Tito was

346.
Aleksander Rankovi (1909-1983) was the second most important public figure
in Yugoslavia. He was minister of internal affairs and party secretary responsible
for cadres.
347
See Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, p. 424.
348.
Tito wrote: "....[W]hen they [the Nagy group] showed up here in our
embassy,...[we] persistently tried to prove to them the usefulness of such a
resignation for the regulation of the situation in Hungary." RGANI, F 89, Per 45,
Dok 84, L. 8. Letter of Tito to Khrushchev, February 7, 1957.
not known until the Yugoslav and Soviet Communist Party archives opened after
the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, and the correspondence between Tito and
Khrushchev in early 1957 was declassified.
349
The account of the meeting that
Miunovi wrote by memory after the meeting does not reveal the full content of the
discussion.
350

On November 4, after Nagy and twelve other Hungarian leaders took refuge
in the Yugoslav Embassy, the Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade, N. P. Firiubin, sent a
telegram to Moscow at 4:30 p.m, reporting that Kardelj reported that they
contacted Imre Nagy as it had been agreed with Khrushchev ... It is still not clear
whether or not Imre Nagy made the declaration [about Hungary's withdrawal from
the Warsaw Pact] in the name of the government in Budapest. If he made this
declaration, then they, the Yugoslavs, will try to have him announce publicly that he
made this declaration under the pressure of the reaction. They also intend to

349
See Russian documents on the negotiations: RGANI, F. 89, Op. 45, D. 83, Ll. 1-12
and D. 84, Ll. 1-18. "Pis'mo Tsentral'nogo Komiteta Kommunisticheskoi Partii
Sovetskogo Soyuza ot 10 yanvarya 1957 goda Tsentral'nomu Komitetu Soyuza
Kommunistov Yugoslavii and Pis'mo Tsentral'nogo Komiteta Soyuza
Kommunistov Yugoslavii ot 7 fevralya 1957 goda Tsentral'nomu Komitetu
Kommunisticheskoi Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza." Although Gibianskii found a brief
reference to the Brioni negotiations in one document located in the former CC of the
Yugoslav Communist Party (Union of Communists of Yugoslavia), he could not find
a full account or transcript. See AJ, f. 507, CK SKJ, IX, 119/1-91 (st. sign. 1-1/63), p.
4, cited in CWIHP Bulletin, issue 10 (March 1998), p. 148. However, the
correspondence between Khrushchev and Tito in the Yugoslav archives prove that
such a deal was made. See AJ, F. 507, CK SKJ, IX, 119/I-77, l. 1; 119/I-78, l. 2-3;
119/I-92 (st. sign. 1-I/64), l. 3, cited in Gibianskii, Soviet-Yugoslav Relations and
the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, CWIHP Bulletin, issue 10 (March 1998), p. 148,
n. 21.
350
See Veljko Miunovi, Mockovske godine 1956-1958 (Zagreb, 1977). For an
English version, see Veljko Miunovi, Moscow Diary (Garden City, NY: Doubleday,
1980.
negotiate with Nagy, to get him to make an announcement that he supports the
government headed by Kdr in Szolnok.
351
].
Tito had apparently thought he could coax Nagy quickly to comply. What
both he and Khrushchev failed to consider was the possibility that Nagy would
stubbornly refuse officially to resign. Had they recalled Nagys refusal to recant in
1955, prompting Rkosi to expel him from the party, they might have spared
themselves the embarrassment.
During the course of the talks at Brioni, according to Miunovi, Tito
informed Khrushchev about Sznt's request for asylum in the Yugoslav embassy:
They [Khrushchev and Malenkov] again asked what possibilities we had of trying to
do something about Nagy. Apart from Losonczy we mentioned Zoltn Sznt, who
has already asked for asylum in our embassy because of the danger of reprisals. It
seems to us that such people are not to be distrusted, because they are decent folk
with good intentions.
352


The question arises: if Khrushchev objected so much to Nagy's refuge in the
Yugoslav embassy, why did he not protest this possible scenario when it was first
broached during the meeting at Brioni? Several answers can be deduced. First, the
most pressing concern for Khrushchev and Malenkov at the time was getting Tito's
support for the intervention and his promise to try to persuade Nagy to publicly
resign and state his support for the new Kdr government. It was clear to the
Yugoslavs that Khrushchev had already decided to intervene, and that he merely
wanted Tito's ex post facto approval--not his advice or permission. Khrushchev

351.
Telegram from Firiubin in Belgrade, 4 November 1956, #1059-1060, RGANI, f.
89, per. 45, dok. 25. [Emphasis added]. Kdr did not actually return to Budapest
until November 7 at 6:10 a.m. See RGANI, f. 89, op. 2, d. 3, l. 27. Information from
Zhukov to the CC CPSU.
352.
Miunovi, Moscow Diary, 137.
needed Tito's help in making the Soviet invasion look more legitimate to the
international community, which would then facilitate the "normalization" in
Hungary. Second, Tito apparently mentioned only Sznt, and not Nagy, so it is
possible, although unlikely, that Khrushchev did not realize that Nagy himself might
also seek asylum in the Yugoslav embassy.
In addition, since Tito had been surprisingly supportive of the Soviet
invasion plan, Khrushchev evidently assumed that, even if Nagy sought asylum in
the Yugoslav embassy, Tito would quickly turn Nagy over to the Soviet authorities.
This is indicated in the telegram of November 4, in which Khrushchev instructed
Soviet Ambassador Firiubin to tell Eduard Kardelj, Deputy Head of the Yugoslav
Government, that
as far as the further sojourn of Nagy and his group in the embassy, excesses could
occur with them, not only by the reaction but also by the revolutionary elements.
Thus, bearing in mind that the Hungarian Revolutionary Worker-Peasant
government [headed by Kdr] does not have security organs at present, it would be
expedient to deliver Nagy and his group to our troops for transport to the
Revolutionary Worker-Peasant government in Szolnok.
353


Despite Tito's assent to "work on Nagy," what complicated matters further was
Khrushchev's silence about when the invasion would begin. Miunovi writes
The Russians still said nothing about when their troops would intervene. We can't
ask them, and they don't want to say. For that reason the time factor remains
unclear: We don't know what opportunity we may have to influence Nagy and try to
reduce the number of casualties and the amount of unnecessary bloodshed. But we
agreed that we would try and influence Nagy.
354



353.
RGANI, F 89, Per 45, Dok 25, L.2 Telegram from the CC CPSU (Khrushchev) to
Soviet Ambassador to Yugoslavia (Firiubin), November 4, 1956.
354.
Miunovi, Moscow Diary, 138.
Before Sznt could reply to Soldati about when he would seek asylum, the
actual invasion had begun, on November 4. Soldati called Nagy at 100 a.m. on
November 4 in the Hungarian Parliament building and invited him to the Yugoslav
embassy. Thus, on the basis of the first tentative conversation on November 1, the
Nagy group fled to the embassy.
355

Since Tito had mentioned Sznt's request during the Brioni meeting, he
apparently concluded that Khrushchev condoned the possible offer of asylum to the
Hungarian leaders. This is indicated in the November 4 telegram in which Firiubin
wrote:
Kardelj reported that on the night of November 4 they called Imre Nagy, as it had
been agreed with comrade Khrushchev...It is still not clear, said Kardelj, whether or
not Imre Nagy made his last declaration in the name of the government in Budapest.
If he did make this declaration, then they, the Yugoslavs will try to get him to state
that he made it under pressure from the reactionaries. They also intend to persuade
Imre Nagy to make a declaration of support for the government headed by Kdr in
Szolnok. In Kardelj's words such a declaration will facilitate discussion of the
Hungarian question in the Security Council and [facilitate diplomatic] recognition
of Kdr's government as the legitimate government.
356


Later, in explaining to Khrushchev why he had granted asylum to Nagy, Tito
cited the sheer "speed of events" and "absence of detailed information."
357
"This
problem...in the final analysis...is a result of our conversation on Brioni, although

355.
RGANI, F 89, Per 45, Dok 38, L. 13. Letter of Tito to Khrushchev, November 8,
1956.
356.
RGANI, F 89, Per 45, Dok 25, L. 2 op. cit.
357.
RGANI, F 89, Per 45, Dok 38, L 13. "From the Central Committee of the
Yugoslav Communist Party to the First Secretary of the CC CPSU Khrushchev,"
Brioni, November 8 1956. "If you take all this into consideration, then it becomes
clear that only the speed of events was not anticipated and created problems that
now are essential to solve. We think the question of whether or not our embassy
acted correctly in Budapest no longer has any significance. What is important now
is that we work together to solve this problem in the spirit of friendly relations,
which we already established between our countries and parties."
because of the events in Hungary, things developed differently than we expected,"
he wrote. The conversation between Sznt and Soldati had already taken place
before the Brioni meeting, and Tito did inform Khrushchev of it. Khrushchev could
be blamed for the initial presence of Nagy's group in the Yugoslav embassy, since he
did not tell Tito at Brioni that the offer of political asylum to Nagy was
unacceptable. He also did not give Tito a reasonable amount of time in which to
persuade Nagy to make the declaration supporting Kdr. Soviet troops went into
action less than twenty-four hours after Khrushchev and Malenkov left Tito at
Brioni.
In any case, the quarrel between the Soviet and Yugoslav leaders developed
later when Khrushchev realized that Tito would not easily relinquish Nagy and his
group. It was simply incomprehensible to Khrushchev that Tito could continue to
harbor Nagy, the "leader of the counterrevolution," when Tito had been so
understanding during the Brioni meeting. What Khrushchev did not consider was
the possibility of internal dissent with Titos own government. Tito may have
delayed the transfer of the Nagy group and pretended he knew nothing of
the abduction, because of dissidents in his own country, both internal (Kardelj
and Soldati) and external (ilas). As noted above, Kardelj had gone much
further in his December 7 speech criticizing Kdrs repression of the workers
councils than had Tito in his Pula speech. Soldati had taken the initiative by giving
Sznt a preliminary affirmative answer regarding asylum, well before the Brioni
negotiations.
358
Meanwhile, ilass support of the Hungarian revolution, expressed
in an article in The New Leader brought him a prison term on November 19, 1956,
which was further extended in 1957, when his influential book criticizing the
Communist oligarchy, The New Class, was published in the West. In all likelihood,
Tito also delayed the transfer of the Nagy group until he received a formal
guarantee that Nagys group would return home safely - a tangible document he
could then use to denounce the Hungarian and Soviet treachery that would
inevitably transpire. Although he may not have known Nagys precise fate, Tito
knew his communist colleagues far too well to trust their written word.
The Soviets leaders, in all likelihood, then decided to intimidate and punish
the Yugoslavs for sheltering Nagy in another, nonverbal, way. By explicitly
mentioning in the November 4 telegram that "excesses" could occur, the Soviets
seem to have been preparing a cover for a little-known event that took place on
November 5 at 3:30 p.m.
359
On this day a Soviet tank fired on the Yugoslav

358
Soldati apparently sympathized deeply with Imre Nagy and his supporters.
Supporting evidence for this view was relayed to me in October 2002 by Italian
scholar Federigo Argentieri, who met Soldatis son, Dalibor, Junior, who served as
a diplomat in Rome in 1992 and currently teaches at Belgrade University as a
professor of Spanish, a language he learned when his father went to Mexico after
the Hungary revolution. Argentieri also met Frane Barbieri, a Croat-born, Italian-
speaking journalist who emigrated to Italy in the early 1970's and had been a friend
of Soldati (senior) since childhood. Barbieri told Argentieri about Kardelj's dissent
and the existence of a diary Soldatic kept, but which has never been found.
359.
RGANI, F 89, Per 45, Dok 29, List 3, From the Diary of D. T. Shepilov, Soviet
Minister of Foreign Affairs, "About the Conversation with the Yugoslav
Ambassador to the USSR Miunovi," November 7, 1956. There is a discrepancy in
the time of the incident. Miunovi and Shepilov said it occurred on November 6 at
12:45 p.m. The Soviet investigatory commission, however, established the time of
the occurrence as November 5, "around" 3:00 p.m. See AVP RF, F 077, O 37, Por
18, P 188, L 38, From General-Lieutenant Beliusov, Chief of the Eighth
embassy. The cultural attach Milenko Milovanov was killed in the gunfire, the
building frame damaged, and all the windows shattered. The Yugoslav foreign
minister, Koca Popovi, accused the Soviet authorities of having deliberately opened
fire on the embassy, knowing that it was indeed the Yugoslav embassy and that
Imre Nagy and his supporters were inside.
360
To reinforce Popovi's complaint, the
Yugoslav ambassador to the USSR, Veljko Miunovi, visited the Soviet minister of
foreign affairs, Dmitri Shepilov, the next day.
361
Soldati also complained about the
incident to Andropov. Soldati requested that Soviet tanks near the Yugoslav
embassy be moved. Andropov relayed this message to Valerian Zorin, the Soviet
deputy foreign minister, warning that "the demand for the withdrawal of the Soviet
military unit from the building of the mission is of a suspicious nature."
362

As we know from Malin's notes, these messages were discussed at the
Presidium meeting by Khrushchev, Zhukov and Shepilov. A cable was prepared for
the Yugoslav government and transmitted via Firyubin to Popovi.
363
On November

Administration of the General Staff, to N. S. Patolichev, Deputy Minister of Foreign
Affairs of the USSR, "Akt."
360.
See Shifrtelegramma, November 5, 1956 in RGANI, F. 3, Op. 64, D. 485, Ll. 143-
144.
361.
RGANI, F. 89, Op. 45, D. 29, Ll. 1-3. From D. T. Shepilov to the CPSU
Presidium, "About the Conversation with the Yugoslav Ambassador to the USSR
Miunovi," November 7, 1956. Shepilov told Miunovi that the Soviet military
command would comply with the Yugoslav request to "pull back the military unit
next to the [Yugoslav] embassy compound."
362.
RGANI, F. 3, O. 64, D. 485, L. 130. "Telefonogramma," November 5, 1956.
363.
RGANI, F. 3, O. 12, D. 1006, L. 41, Protokolnaya Zapis Zasedaniya
Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 6-ovo noyabrya 1956 g. Avtograf Malina.The telegram,
signed by foreign minister Dmitrii Shepilov, was sent to the Yugoslav foreign
minister, Koa Popovi, via the Yugoslav ambassador in Moscow, Veljko
Miunovi. It stated that the Soviet military commander in Hungary had been
ordered to make a careful study of how the incident happened.
9, 1956 a commission composed of Major-General K.E. Grebennik,
364
Colonel K.V.
Boskoboinik, and Major A. B. Lukin conducted an investigation of the
circumstances.
365
The Yugoslav government later presented a claim of $84,446 to
Hungary for the death of Milovanov.
366

Although the Soviet officials claimed that it was an accident, the attack on
the Yugoslav mission could very well have been deliberate (although this cannot be
verified until other documents from the Soviet military archives are declassified).
The Soviet leaders resented Tito for giving the Nagy group political refuge, and this
would have been an easy way to take revenge. They had both the motive and the
opportunity, and the incident could be readily explained. After all, Tito himself had

364.
Major-General Grebennik was Serov's deputy in the KGB and Soviet
commandant of Budapest after November 4, 1956.
365.
AVP RF F 77, O 37, D 18, P 188, L 35, From Major General Grebennik,
Lieutenant-Colonel Kuziminov, and Gspr (Deputy of the Hungarian Government
Assembly), November 6, 1956, "About the Accident to the Employee of the Yugoslav
Mission in Budapest on November 5, 1956." This report was later sent directly to
Colonel General N. Pavlovskii on November 9, 1956 and other superior officers in
the Soviet General Staff. See AVP RF, F 077, O 37, Por 18, P 188, Ll 38-39, To
Comrade N S Patolichev and Beliusov, November 9, 1956, From the Commission
composed of Grebennik, Boskoboinik and Lukin. "The Soviet soldiers said that the
Soviet tanks were being shot at from the direction of apartment buildings situated
near the Yugoslav mission. In reply to this shot, a Soviet tank opened fire on the
indicated house. Apparently because the tanks were moving, a volley of shots fell on
the embassy building, and as a result, one of the employees who was standing at the
window was killed." The Soviet authorities pledged to transport the body to
Yugoslavia.
366.
AVP RF, F 144, O 18, Por 4, P 41, L 25, "Telephone telegram no. 185 from V.
Astafiev, Temporary Charge d'Affaires of the USSR in Hungary (Budapest) to I. K.
Zamchevskii, Director of the Fifth European Division, Soviet Foreign Ministry,"
April 14, 1957.
earlier asked the Soviet government to "take measures to protect the Yugoslav
embassy from possible attacks on it."
367

From the Yugoslav point of view, once Nagy's presence in the embassy was a
fait accompli amply covered in the world's major newspapers, the situation
changed Tito was caught in a dilemma. As Miunovi aptly articulated it
They [the Soviets] have decided to sling mud at Yugoslavia as the organizer of the
counterrevolution if we don't hand Imre Nagy and the others over to them. But if we
do hand them over, they will then point to us as a country which does not keep its
word and which nobody should depend on.
368


Tito concluded that he might as well take advantage of this opportunity to
persuade Nagy to resign--something he had promised Khrushchev he would do. As
he wrote in his letter to Khrushchev, the act of granting asylum to Nagy "did not
contradict the Brioni agreement."
369
The Yugoslavs, Tito assured Khrushchev,
wanted the same thing Khrushchev and Kdr wanted: a strong communist party
government in Hungary. They had sincerely tried to persuade Nagy to declare his

367.
RGANI, F 89, Per 45, Dok 25, L 4, "Telegram from the CC CPSU to N. Firiubin,
Soviet Ambassador in Belgrade," November 4, 1956.
368.
Miunovi, Moscow Diary, 146.
369.
Miunovi stated that..."During the conversations on Brioni it was agreed that
Imre Nagy and others could facilitate the situation of the new revolutionary worker-
peasant government [headed by Kdr] if they in some way or another declare their
intention to cooperate with the government or at least, not demonstrate against it.
The present location of Imre Nagy and others in the Yugoslav embassy does not
contradict that agreement that was made with comrades Khrushchev and Malenkov
with Tito and the other Yugoslav leaders during the Brioni meeting. RGANI, F. 89,
Per 45, Dok. 29, L. 2, From the Diary of D. T. Shepilov, "About the Conversation
with the Yugoslav Ambassador to the USSR, Miunovi," November 7, 1956.
support for Kdr.
370
The fact that Nagy turned out to be so stubborn, Tito noted,
should not be blamed on the Yugoslav Communist Party.
371

Furthermore, as he tried to explain to Khrushchev, not all of the members of
Nagy's group were "anti-Soviet"; some were "honest communists" who would be
great assets to Kdr's new government. What was wrong with offering them
asylum?
372
Zoltn Sznt, for example, was one of the original leaders of the
underground Hungarian communist party; he helped recruit Hungarians into the
communist party while at a POW camp near Suzdal in the USSR in 1943.
373
He had
also once been the Hungarian ambassador to Yugoslavia (until Titos expulsion
from the Cominform in 1948), and was highly regarded by the Yugoslavs.

370.
RGANI, F 89, Per 45, Dok 38, L 13. "From the Central Committee of the
Yugoslav Communist Party to the First Secretary of the CC CPSU Khrushchev,"
Brioni, November 8 1956. "Despite the absence of detailed information, we
nevertheless thought that such a declaration from Nagy would have been essentially
useful to Kdr's government...and could help to correct the situation in Hungary,
which is what we suggested to you."
371.
RGANI, F 89, Per 45, Dok 84, L. 8, To the CC CPSU from the CC CPY,
February 7, 1957. "As far as the remark about the resignation of Nagy is concerned,
we'd like to remind you that we informed Nagy and his comrades of our opinion
when they ended up in our embassy and persistently tried to prove to them how
useful such a resignation would be in regulating the situation in Hungary. The fact
that Nagy did not take our advice is not the business of the Yugoslav Union of
Communists; it is his personally. We even went too far in this, wishing to ease the
situation of the Kdr government and USSR by taking advantage of Nagy's
presence in the Yugoslav embassy."
372.
RGANI, F 89, Per 45, Dok 25, L. 4. Telegram from Soviet Ambassador to
Yugoslavia, N. Firiubin, Belgrade, to CC CPSU, November 4, 1956. "Tito asked also
for the Soviet government to tell the Kdr government not to carry out repression
against those communists who did not immediately take the correct line during the
latest events in Hungary." Jnos Kdr also urged lenient treatment for many of the
members in the Nagy group. Since Tito supported Kdr, he was receptive to this
idea. RGANI, F 89, Per 45, Dok 34, L. 2, Telegram from the CC CPSU to Andropov,
Soviet Ambassador to Hungary, November 9, 1956.
373.
See RGASPI, f. 495, o. 142, d. 827, l. 10. "Sznt Zoltn levele Rkosi
Mtyshoz, Szuzdl, 1943. december 24.
Moreover, the Yugoslav leaders evidently believed that, once Nagy and his group
left the embassy and "confronted the actual situation," they would eventually
"abandon their quixotic attitude" and "realize that they have to contribute to...the
building of socialism."
374

When Tito refused to turn in the Nagy group, Khrushchev then began to
accuse him personally of protecting Nagy, the man Tito himself described at the
Brioni meeting as having "cleared the path for counterrevolution." From the Soviet
viewpoint, offering Nagy political asylum was a supreme example of Yugoslav
"interference in the internal affairs of Hungary."
375
The longer Tito kept Nagy, the
more convincing became all those reports by the Soviet diplomats and Hungarian
officials in Budapest in 1955 and in the early months of 1956. The accusations
became more shrill. Tito, the Soviet leaders said, had "warned Nagy of the
upcoming invasion."
376
This Titoist perfidy no doubt strengthened the clout of
Molotov's Stalinist wing in the Soviet government. As pointed out in Chapter Two,
Molotov had opposed the 1955 reconciliation with Tito, and was later ousted in 1957
for his "erroneous stand on the Yugoslav question."
377
(He apparently believed that
even Kdr was too much of a "Titoist;" during the November 4 CC CPSU

374.
MOL, XIX-J-1-j.66 D 4/J. 1956, "Magyar Jegyzknyv Kdr Jnos s D. Vidic
Kztti Trgyalsrol," Trsadalmi Szemle, no. 12 (1989): 83.
375.
RGANI, F 89, Per 45, Dok 78, L. 12, "Protocol 164 of the CC CPSU Presidium
Session," July 16, 1958.
376.
RGANI, F 89, Per 45, Dok 83, L 4, Resolution of the CC CPSU: "About the
Letter to the CC of the Yugoslav Communist Party, to Tito," January 10, 1957.
[Paraphrased] Thus, because of your contacts with Nagy, he was warned about the
upcoming action of the Soviet troops in Hungary.
377
RGANI, F. 2, O. 1, D. 172, L. 105, Plenum TsK KPSS--XIX Sozyv: Stenogramma
desyatogo zasedaniya 9 iyulya 1955.
Presidium meeting Molotov urged his colleagues to exert more pressure on Kdr
"so that Hungary does not go the route of Yugoslavia.")
378

It is true that the Yugoslavs did "warn" Nagy about the invasion Soldati
called Nagy at 1:00 a.m. on November 4 and told him.
379
But by then probably
everyone could see that an invasion was imminent. Also, Soldati could not have
known exactly when the Soviet invasion would begin, so if he warned Sznt, it was
only in a very general way.
Given Tito's wariness of Nagy, his agreement with Khrushchev on the need
to intervene, and his desire for harmonious relations with the USSR, one must ask:
why did Tito not quickly hand the Nagy group over to Khrushchev?
380
Why did he
object to sending the Nagy group to Romania, the Soviets' chosen destination?
The answer lies, again, with Tito's values and apprehension. He valued
Yugoslavia's reputation as a responsible, sovereign state, and was convinced that
Yugoslavia should honor the principles of international law as befits such a state. It

378.
RGANI, F. 3, O. 12, D. 1006, L. 35ob, Protokolnaya Zapis Zasedaniya
Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 6-ovo noyabrya 1956 g. Avtograf Malina. (In the
November 6 Presidium meeting Khrushchev accused Molotov of thinking about
"bringing back Hegeds and Rkosi." RGANI, f. 3, o. 12, d. 1006, l. 41,
Protokolnaya Zapis Zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 6-ovo noyabrya 1956 g.
379.
Endre Marton, the Hungarian journalist employed by the Associated Press,
wrote: "Bla Kovcs was the first to tell me that Nagy and many Communists who
remained loyal to him went to the Yugoslav embassy after Ambassador Soldati
called Nagy at dawn to say that Khrushchev had informed Tito about his decision to
use force to quell the revolt....Nagy was invited to seek refuge in the Yugoslav
embassy at one o'clock in the morning, November 4th, by Dalibor Soldati." (Bla
Kovcs was secretary-general of the Smallholders Party until his arrest in February
1947, and was later appointed minister of agriculture by Imre Nagy on October 27,
1956). See Endre Marton, The Forbidden Sky, 197.
380.
In his Pula speech (November 11, 1956), Tito said: "We are against interference
and the use of foreign armed forces...[but] if it meant saving socialism in Hungary,
then...Soviet intervention was necessary." Earlier in the speech he stated: "The first
intervention, coming at the invitation of Ger, was absolutely wrong."
is noteworthy that Tito kept the Brioni meeting with Khrushchev secret from the
Yugoslav public for several days after the meeting, to avoid tarnishing Yugoslavia's
reputation.
381
Once Nagy's presence in his embassy was an accomplished fact, Tito
took the concept of political asylum seriously. In his February 1957 letter to the CC
CPSU (Khrushchev), Tito maintained that he could not "violate his word and
simply give up these people," citing the Yugoslav constitution on the issue of
political asylum.
382

Apart from this reason, one must also remember Tito's considerable skills in
realpolitik. Just as the "third-path" rhetoric served a dual purpose (winning the
approval of both the Yugoslav people and U.S. policymakers), so sheltering Nagy in
the Yugoslav embassy served both to incarcerate Nagy (thereby defusing the
uprising), and also to win the approval of the international community for
"protecting" Nagy from the Soviet aggressors. As Miunovi wrote "[I]t could not
be disputed that the fact that the Nagy government had in effect disappeared from
the moment it entered the Yugoslav embassy had proved useful and had helped both
Kdr and the Russians."
383

Tito could then take advantage of Nagy's presence in the embassy to coax
him to cooperate with the Kdr government. If he could discredit Nagy, perhaps he
could reduce the chances of anticommunist "spillover" into Yugoslavia. Tito was so
sure he could get Nagy to support the Kdr regime that he believed the Yugoslav

381.
Aleksandr Stykalin and Elena Orekhova, "The 1956 Hungarian Events and the
Position of the Soviet Leadership" Unpublished paper presented at Cold War
History Project Conference in Moscow, January 1993, 23.
382.
RGANI, F 89, Per 45, Dok 38, L. 14. Letter from CC CPY (Tito) to CC CPSU
(Khrushchev), November 8, 1956.
383.
Miunovi, Moscow Diary, 150.
embassy might be attacked "when the reaction finds out that Nagy, who is in the
embassy, supports the Kdr government."
384

Tito understood the political advantage of seeming (to the West) as if he were
protecting Nagy. Although Tito himself may not have fully supported Nagy's
movement when it turned anticommunist, some observers in the West thought that
he did. To simply hand Nagy's group over to Kdr and the Russians would destroy
Yugoslavia's reputation as an independent sovereign country with respect for
human rights. Meanwhile, those domestic opponents who knew how Yugoslav
prisoners at Goli Otok were treated did not dare to contradict Tito and his
followers.
During the rift of 1948-55, Tito had discovered the advantages of being
neutral, even before the Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser did. Dulles had been
eager to extend economic aid to Yugoslavia, confident that the Yugoslav example
would encourage Hungary and the other Soviet satellites to fight for independence.
In a speech to the Four-H Club in Chicago in 1954, Dulles said:
In 1948 Yugoslavia broke free from the grip of international communism and
reasserted its own nationalism. Now, the Soviet Union treats Yugoslavia with
deference while it continues to treat with contempt the puppet governments of
Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria. That may embolden the satellites to demand a
measure of independence.
385



384.
RGANI, F 89, Per 45, Dok 25, L.106. Telegram from N. Firiubin (Soviet
ambassador to Yugoslavia) to CC CPSU (Khrushchev), November 4, 1956. Tito
asked the Soviet government to take measures to protect the Yugoslav embassy
from these possible attacks.
385.
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, "The Captive Peoples," Four-H Club
Speech, Chicago, Illinois, November 29, 1954.
When Dulles visited Tito in May 1955, Tito ostensibly told him what he
wanted to hear, speaking about "independence," rather than about "national
communism." He told Dulles that the "transformation in the satellite countries"
would take place faster than Dulles can even imagine, and that he, Tito, was trying
to accelerate this process, so the satellites would become independent, which Tito
wanted very much.
386
In the tightly bipolar world of the 1950s, both superpowers
vied for client states among the neutral countries. Tito could pretend to do the
bidding of each superpower, but neither would know his real intentions.
If Tito had simply handed Nagy over to Kdr's government, this might have
been encouraged Khrushchev to see Yugoslavia as just another obedient Soviet
satellite. Tito feared the prospect of Yugoslavia once again getting pulled back into
the Soviet camp. He had swallowed his pride enough at the Crimea meeting, when
he assured Khrushchev that he had "no fundamental disagreements," and that in
Yugoslavia "only a different method of building socialism [was] being applied."
Khrushchev had replied, "The methods and forms can differ, but there must be a
single principled line." Tito had agreed: socialism can never be divided into various
sorts; it is a "single revolutionary doctrine, which we, communists, should adhere
to."
387

Thus, respecting Nagy's political asylum was a useful way of reminding
Khrushchev that he, Tito--despite the official normalization of Soviet-Yugoslav

386.
AVP RF, f. 077, o. 37, p. 191, d. 39, l. 89. I. K. Zamchevskii, "K Voprosu o
Podderzhke Imre Nadya i ego Politiki Yugoslavskimi Rukovoditelyami, 4-ogo
dekabrya 1956 g.
387.
RGANI, F 5, O 28, D 403, L 9, From I. Vinogradov to Comrade M. A. Suslov,
"About the Conversations of Comrades N. S. Khrushchev with Comrade Tito and
the Other Leaders in the Crimea, September-October 1956."
relations--would still act independently, even if that displeased the Kremlin. His
concern for Nagy's physical safety probably stemmed more from his determination
to safeguard Yugoslavia's international reputation than from any desire to
encourage Nagy and his plans for a multiparty system in Hungary.
388


The Abduction
As if to retaliate for Tito's stubbornness in holding on to Nagy, the Soviet
leaders made a deliberate decision on November 17 to kidnap the Nagy group as
soon as it left the Yugoslav embassy (on November 22).
389
A bus was driven up to
the Yugoslav embassy, supposedly to transport Nagy and the other officials with
their families to their apartments. While the Hungarian were climbing into the bus,
a Soviet military official also entered the bus, despite the Yugoslavs' vehement
protests. (The bus driver was also a Russian.) Noting that the bus driver did not
speak Hungarian, Soldati then apparently told Imre Nagy that he and the others

388.
Although Tito did not state this bluntly, he did imply repeatedly in the secret
correspondence with Khrushchev that the reason he could not simply relinquish the
Nagy group to Kdr's government was because he needed to safeguard
Yugoslavia's international reputation. He wrote: "We understand your conclusions
in your letter and consider them logical, but...absent in your letter is a deep
understanding of our situation and especially of our readiness to solve this question
in the spirit of mutual friendly relations and not to the detriment of the
international reputation of Yugoslavia as a sovereign country." RGANI, F. 89, Per.
45, Dok. 38, L. 10. "From the CC CPY (Tito) to the CC CPSU (Khrushchev), Brioni,
8 November 1956."
389.
RGANI, F 89, O. 2, D. 5, L. 3-4, "Information of Malenkov, Suslov, and Aristov,"
November 17, 1956."Our recommendations are: a) provide for the arrest of Nagy as
soon as he is released from the Yugoslav embassy; b) demand that Nagy sign a
declaration in which he admits his mistakes; c) send him and his group to Romania;
and d) prepare a text for the Hungarian government about Nagy."
could stay at the Yugoslav embassy if he wanted to.
390
To make sure that the
Hungarians were taken to their homes, the diplomat Milan Georgievi and military
attach Milan Drosa were ordered to accompany the group. The bus proceeded just
around the corner from the Embassy, and then the Soviet lieutenant colonel forced
Georgievi and Drosa to get off. The bus took the Nagy group first to the Soviet
KGB compound in Mtysfld and the next day transported by plane to Romania,
contrary to the assurances that Kdr's government had given to the Yugoslavs.
391

What angered Tito so much about the kidnapping was the blatant deception.
Nothing quite stings the ego as outright betrayal after lengthy negotiations in good
faith.
392
In an official letter to the CC CPSU on November 24, Tito wrote:

390
See Jnos M. Rainer, Nagy ImrePolitikai letrajz, II, 1953-1958 (Budapest:
1956-os Intzet, 1999), pp. 350-351. Rainer reports that this was the unanimous
account of the surviving witnesses. Nagy declined the offer and climbed into the bus.
391.
RGANI, F 89, Per. 45, Dok 56, Ll. 9-10. "Protocol #62 from the CC CPSU
Presidium session of December 6, 1956, to Malenkov, Shepilov, and Gromyko,
"About the Answering Note to the Yugoslav Govemment's Note of Nov. 24, 1956 on
the issue of Imre Nagy and his Group." See also the note of protest that Yugoslav
foreign minister Koa Popovi sent to the Soviet and Hungarian embassies on
November 24, 1956, in RGANI, F. 89, 0. 2, D. 5, Ll. 19-26, and RGANI, F. 3, 0. 64, D.
488, Ll. 95-96. Information from Malenkov, Suslov, and Aristov, November 23,
1956. This elaborate plot was devised by Ivan Serov and other senior KGB officials.
Interestingly, Serov thought about using the same trick to arrest Cardinal
Mindszenty--who had sought refuge in the American embassy. RGANI, F 89, Per
45, Dok 53, L. 2, "Notes of Serov on November 27, 1956." (There were several
communications, incidentally, between Sznt and the Hungarian leaders, as well as
several telegrams between the Yugoslav Embassy and Belgrade, in the final days
before the Nagy group left the Yugoslav Embassy).
392.
For details on the abduction, see the newly declassified correspondence between
Tito and Khrushchev in early 1957, now stored in the former CPSU Central
Committee archive "Pis'mo Tsentral'nogo Komiteta Kommunisticheskoi Partii
Sovetskogo Soyuza ot 10 yanvarya 1957 goda Tsentralnomu Komitetu Soyuza
Kommunistov Yugoslavii/Pis'mo Tsentral'nogo Komiteta Soyuza Kommunistov
Yugoslavii ot 7 fevralya 1957 goda Tsentral'nomu Komitetu Kommunisticheskoi
Partii Sovetskogo Soyuza," February 1957, in RGANI, F. 89, Op. 45, D. 83, Ll. 1-12
and D. 84, Ll. 1-18.
The Yugoslav government regards the abovementioned action a crude violation of
the agreement negotiated with the Hungarian government. The [actions taken by
the Kdr government] . . .are completely inconsistent with the agreement. The
Yugoslav government cannot accept the version that Nagy and the others
voluntarily went to Romania, since it was known...--while they were still here in the
Yugoslav embassy--that they wanted to stay in their own country. The Yugoslav
government expresses an energetic protest to the Hungarian government, and
demands that the agreement be followed immediately. [Failure to do so] will damage
Soviet-Yugoslav relations. [T]he...violation of the agreement is in complete
contradiction of widely recognized international legal norms.
393


Tito's indignation probably equaled or surpassed the outrage Nagy felt when
he realized the negotiations on November 3 for Soviet troop withdrawal were all a
hoax. The negotiations concerning the Nagy group were conducted between
Dobrivoje Vidi, Tito's representative, and Jnos Kdr of the Hungarian
Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Government until November 22.
394
The document
that emerged from these talks "guarantee[d] the security of the indicated persons,"
and pledged "not to hold the Yugoslavs responsible" for the past events.
395
.
Both of these pledges were broken: Nagy and several others were abducted,
and Yugoslavia was blamed for fostering the "counterrevolution" in Hungary. This

393.
RGANI, F 89, Per 45, Dok 56, Ll. 10-11. "Protocol #62 from the CC CPSU
Presidium session of December 6, 1956, to Malenkov, Shepilov, and Gromyko,
About the Reply to the Yugoslav Note of November 24, 1956 on the issue of Imre
Nagy and his Group, including enclosed copy of the November 24 letter.
394
Documents on the Kdr-Vidi talks can be found in Jzsef Kiss, Zoltn Ripp,
and Istvn Vida, eds., Top Secret: Magyar-Jugoszlav Kapcsolatok, 1956 Dokumentok
(Budapest: MTA Jelenkor -kutat Bizottsg, 1997), pp. 247-267, 269-274. An
English translation of these negotiations was published. See Lszl Varga, Kdrs
Safe Conduct to Imre Nagy, New Hungarian Quarterly vol. 31, no. 119 (Fall 1990),
pp. 101-106, and six documents pertaining to the Hungarian-Yugoslav negotiations
in November 1956 in New Hungarian Quarterly vol. 31, no. 120 (Winter 1990), pp.
119-130.
395.
RGANI, F 89, Per 45, Dok 49, L 2, "Information of Malenkov, Suslov, and
Aristov," November 22, 1956. In the end two promises were broken. The document
"guarantee[d] the security of the indicated persons," and pledged "not to hold the
Yugoslavs responsible" for the past events.
deception, Tito felt, had made Yugoslavia a laughingstock in the international
community. Characteristically enough, the Romanian (and probably Soviet) officials
were surprised that Tito was so angry about the abduction; they thought he might
raise the issue at the United Nations.
396
Khrushchev later expressed his regret about
Soviet involvement in the kidnapping during the November 27 CC Presidium
meeting. "It was a mistake for our officer to get onto the bus," he said, according to
notes taken by Malin's deputy Vladimir Chernukha. He thought the matter should

396.
RGANI, F 3, O 64, D 488, L. 178, "Information by V. Nikolaev from Bucharest,"
November 26, 1956. Emil Bodnra (head of the Romanian armed forces from 1947
to 1957 and senior aide to Gheorghiu-Dej) told Nikolaev: "We didn't think the
Yugoslavs would raise a fuss [podnimut shum] about the transfer of Imre Nagy and
his group to Romania. However, as You know, they appealed with notes of protest
to the Soviet and Hungarian governments. It is possible that this issue can be
presented at the United Nations and so on. We think we ought to be ready for
various speeches and conversations in connection with Imre Nagy." The CC CPSU
Presidium later discussed this telegram, which went on to state that Gheorghe
Gheorghiu-Dej (the Romanian leader) planned to have high-level talks with
Yugoslavia to soften tensions between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union and
Hungary about the fate of Imre Nagy. RGANI, F. 3, O. 64, D. 488, L. 177 "Excerpt
from Protocol No. 60 of the CC CPSU Presidium Session," 27 November 1956. The
protocol stated that "on the basis of the exchange of opinions at the session of the
CPSU CC Presidium, Comrade Bulganin is instructed to hold negotiations with
Comrade Gheorghiu-Dej." Later that same day, Bulganin called Gheorghiu-Dej,
which he later recounted in writing for the other CPSU Presidium members: "I told
Comrade Gheorghiu-Dej that, in our opinion, a meeting at the highest level with the
Yugoslav leadership about Imre Nagy and his group will not produce a good
solution, since the Yugoslavs have a set position on this matter, and such a meeting
might complicate the situation. The Yugoslavs might demand a meeting with Imre
Nagy and the others, which would hardly be worthwhile. . . ." RGANI, F. 89, Op. 2,
D. 5, Ll. 16-17, "Information of Bulganin to the CC CPSU Presidium about the
telephone conversation with Gheorghiu-Dej," November 27, 1956.
have been left up to the Hungarians.
397
For the Yugoslavs it felt like a "return to
1948."
398


Not surprisingly, Hungarian-Yugoslav relations cooled after the so-called
Nagy affair. Hungarian diplomats snubbed their Yugoslav colleagues by rejecting
the latters' invitations to social events, and by declining to invite the Yugoslavs to
their own social events.
399
Thus, Yugoslav-Hungarian relations had come full circle.
This clear case of betrayal began a brief new cold war between Hungary and
Yugoslavia. In preparation for the Nagy trial, the judicial proceedings of which
were initiated in February 1957,
400
the Hungarian and Soviet foreign ministries
went to great lengths to gather data on Yugoslavia's "role in the Hungarian
counterrevolution." At the 40th anniversary of the October Revolution in Moscow
in November 1957, the Yugoslav delegation refused to sign a declaration affirming
the Soviet Union's leading role in the communist movement and left Moscow. In late
April 1958 the Soviet leaders then refused to send a delegation to the Yugoslavs'
Seventh Party Congress held in Ljubljana, where a document was signed that

397.
RGANI, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, L. 52. Protokolnaya Zapis Zasedaniya
Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 27-ogo noyabrya 1956. Avtograf V. N. Chernukha.
398.
"We asked the Yugoslavs to refrain from any additional declarations about the
Nagy affair. The Yugoslav ambassador said any talks are useful, but the situation is
deteriorating, as if we are returning to 1948." (emphasis added) RGANI, F 89, O 2,
D 3, L. 13-15, "Information by V. Nikolaev," November 26, 1956.
399
AVP RF, F 077, O 39, Por 7, Papka 197, List 39, From the Diaries of V. V.
Astafiev and V. M. Baskakov, "Notes of a Conversation with the Deputy Minister of
Foreign Affairs of Hungary, Jnos Pter," September 5, 1958. Also: AVP RF, F 077,
O 39, Por 3, Papka 197, List 7, From the Diary of P. S. Dedushkin, Manager of the
5th European Division of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, "Notes of a Conversation
with Jnos Boldoczki, Hungarian Ambassador to the USSR," January 23, 1958.
400
Litvn, op cit., 187.
rejected the USSR's claim to any leading role in the communist movement. In the
next chapter we will look at the circumstances behind Khrushchev's decision to
execute Nagy and its links to the 1957 plot to oust the CPSU leader. For now it is
interesting to note how the Yugoslav press played a key role in shaping Polish
reactions to the Hungarian events.

Role of the Yugoslav Press
The Soviet diplomats and Hungarian officials noted in their reports that
many of the Yugoslav diplomats had "built their careers on" the 1948 rift and now
had difficulty readjusting to the new rapprochement begun after Khrushchevs
trip to Belgrade in May 1955.
401
For example, Marko igmund, second secretary of
the Yugoslav mission in Budapest, had once worked in the archive of the Yugoslav
Communist Party Central Committee and thus "knew the history of the Soviet-
Yugoslav rift well."
402
Soviet and Hungarian officials noted his tendency to harp on
the 1948 events in conversations.
403


401
AVP RF, f 077, op 37, por 7, p 187, l 94, From the Diary of Y. V. Ponomarev,
"Notes of a Conversation with the Director of the Protocol Section of the Hungarian
Foreign Ministry, Jzsef Marjai," January 2, 1956. "Marjai said it is still difficult to
restore normal relations with Yugoslavia. The diplomats of the Budapest mission
are a big obstacle. The majority of them, in Marjai's words, had built their careers
on the rupture of relations with the democratic camp, on slander and lies, and now it is
difficult for them to start on a new basis." (emphasis added). Ponomarev agreed: "I
said [to Marjai] that in reality the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry is littered with people
who are hostilely disposed [zasoren] toward the normalization of relations between
the USSR and Yugoslavia, as well as between Yugoslavia and the other democratic
countries. But we must work with these people."
402
AVP RF (Moscow), f. 077 (Referentura po Vengrii), op 37, por 7, p 187, d 036, l
148, From the Diary of V. N. Kazimirov, "Notes of a Conversation with the Second
Secretary of the Yugoslav Mission, Marko igmund and the Attach Novak
Radenovi," March 5, 1956. At a film presentation at the Czech embassy, igmund
Moreover, the Yugoslav diplomats and journalists' hatred of Rkosi
intensified after he admitted on March 28, 1956 that Lszl Rajk had been innocent,
because it further discredited Lazar Brankov, their own compatriot. Brankov was
consul at the Yugoslav legation in Budapest in 1948 and charg d'affaires in the
absence of Yugoslav Ambassador Mrazovi. In 1948 Rkosi had ignored the
diplomatic immunity of Brankov, arrested him, and persuaded him to testify against
Rajk and Tito during the September 1949 trial.
404
(Ironically, Brankov was one of
the emigr "Cominformists;" he supported the Cominform Resolution in 1948.)
405


"tried to again begin a conversation about the events of 1948-1949, saying that he
knows well the history of the rift of Soviet-Yugoslav relations, since he worked in
the archive of the CC CPY and is acquainted with the correspondence of that
period. Then he tried to lay the blame for the rift completely on the USSR."
403
AVP RF (Moscow), f. 077 (Referentura po Vengrii), op. 37, por 7, p 187, l. 95,
From the Diary of Iu. V. Ponomarev, "Notes of a Conversation with the Director of
the Protocol Section of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, Jzsef Marjai," January 2,
1956. "Marjai said 'with a person like igmund, it is hardly likely that anything can
be done.'" In a footnote to his report, Ponomarev wrote: "The second secretary of
the Yugoslav mission [igmund] is indeed different from the other Yugoslav
diplomats in his reactionary views. In a number of conversations with our comrades
he asks provocative questions about the normalization of relations and responds in a
wholly unfriendly way about Hungary."
404
Brankov was one of the most damaging witnesses at the rigged trial of Lszl
Rajk in September 1949. He testified that he had attended meetings during which
Tito and Rankovi instructed Rajk about "overthrowing the socialist order in
Hungary." It is unclear whether or not Brankov was coerced to testify. He left
Hungary in 1956. See Ivo Bana, With Stalin against Tito, 225, and Vli, Rift and
Revolt in Hungary, 62.
405
Tito expressed his puzzlement in a speech made on October 1, 1949 at the end of
maneuvers by the Yugoslav People' Army in Serbia. "[I]t is interesting that
Brankov, who is also one of the accused, immediately, from the very beginning,
came out in support of the letters which were sent to our Central Committee. But it
is well-known who Brankov is, a common thief and defrauder; this has been written
about him earlier. And how is it possible that this rascal who considered himself to
be the leader of all likeminded persons on whom they rely in the attack on our
country, how is it possible that he was put on trial in such a role?" Josip Broz Tito,
"Power Shall Not Be a Decisive Factor in Relations Between Socialist Countries," in
Boro Pejcinovi, ed. Josip Broz Tito: Military Thought and Works: Selected Writings
The Yugoslav press and diplomatic corps played a key role in educating the
Polish reading public and diplomatic corps about events in Hungary. As political
liberalization accelerated in Poland, the Poles naturally showed greater interest in
Yugoslav politics. Egon Forgcs of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry noted on
October 12 that Polish and Yugoslav delegations have exchanged visits "more
often" and that "Polish democratization has resulted in their [the Polish people]
being more interested inYugoslav politics."
406
Polish Ambassador Willman spoke
frequently, for example, with Dalibor Soldati, the Yugoslav ambassador in
Budapest. At a reception in the Yugoslav embassy on May 24, 1956, Soldati told
Willman: "Polish discussions are widely reflected in the Yugoslav publications,
including the newspapers Borba and Polityka and communiqus of the Yugoslav
Press Agency.
407
News like this soon trickled down to the Hungarians via institutions
like the Hungarian-Yugoslav cultural society in Budapest. Banned in 1949, the
Hungarians sought to resurrect it in 1956.
408
Soviet Ambassador Yuri Andropov

(1936-1979) (Belgrade: Vojnoizdavacki Zavod, 1982), 302. It would be natural for
the Yugoslav diplomats to conclude from this episode that it was much safer to be
an overt "Titoist" in Hungary, since 1) the Hungarian "stalinist" leadership was
adept at using opponents of Tito for its own purposes; 2) no Yugoslav diplomat was
safe from Hungarian Stalinists, despite ostensible diplomatic immunity; and 3) it
was safer to be a Titoist because of Tito's own repression against "Cominformists."
406
MOL XIX-J-1-j (1945-1964). Klgyminisztrium TK Lengyelorszg. 5 doboz.
5/b, 12. X.1956. old. 1. "Lengyel jugoszlv viszony jabb fejlemnyei."
407
AMSZ (Warsaw), Z. depesz W.48, T.612, s.1, Szyfrogram nr. 9583, 25.V.1956,
from Adam Willman in Budapest to [Karol] Korolczyk in Warsaw.
408
AVP RF, f. 077, op. 37, p. 191, d. 39, ll. 43-46. From Yuri Andropov to the
Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, N. S. Patolichev. "About the
Rehabilitation of the Hungarian-Yugoslav Society," trans. from Hungarian by V.
Kazimirov. (One of the society members was Gza Losonczy, a close Nagy supporter
who died in prison even before Nagy was executed).
immediately notified Moscow with alarm. "Pay attention to the fact that, despite the
liquidation of the society in 1949, it has continued to function, as the enclosed
document shows," he wrote. Initiatives like these from the Hungarian intelligentsia
seemed to justify Tito in defending himself against Khrushchev's and Kdr's
accusations of "interference." As Tito wrote in one of the post--invasion letters to
the CPSU, in essence: it is not Yugoslavia's fault if Hungarians look to Yugoslavia as
a model to emulate.
409

In the spring and summer of 1956, Yugoslav journalists in Hungary
attended the Petfi Kr discussions, reported on them in detail, and encouraged
Imre Nagy's supporters. Delighted to hear the complaints about Rkosi from
students and writers, the Yugoslavs attributed them to the fact that Rkosi had not
fully "corrected his mistakes" after the CPSU Twentieth Party Congress.
410
Nagy's
supporters then personally delivered flyers to the Polish Embassy and asked Polish
personnel to distribute them. One of them read:

409
RGANI, F 89, Per 45, Dok 38, L 15, From the CC CPY, Brioni, to the First
Secretary of the CC CPSU, Khrushchev, November 8, 1956. "We reject the hint
about our close ties with the Petfi Circle. Yugoslavia exists as it is, with its
revolutionary past and experience...If separate people in Hungary speak about
Yugoslavia, that does not give anyone the right to throw blame on Yugoslavia as
being responsible for the internal events [of Hungary]."
410
AVP RF, f 077, o 37, por 9, p 187, l 112, Iz Dnevnika S. S. Satuchina, Pervyi
Sekretar' Sovetskogo Posol'stva v Vengrii, "Zapis' Besedy s Pervym Sekretariem
Iugoslavskoi Missii, Milan Georgievi," 2 iulia 1956 g." " Georgievi said that,
unlike in Yugoslavia, 'there are many people in Hungary who are not satisfied with
the present situation [in Hungary].' He mentioned the resolution of the CC HWP of
June 30, 1956, as well as information received from a Yugoslav journalist who
attended the June 27 Petfi Circle discussion. 'In Yugoslavia,' Georgievi said,
'party members and famous social figures do not openly denounce the policies of the
party and government as they are doing here. In my opinion a large part of the
Hungarian population is displeased with the fact that the HWP leaders are
unwilling to correct their serious mistakes.'"
We, Hungarian communists ....never agreed with the anti-social policy of Rkosi
Ger, but we also never agreed with the merciless terror of the Kdr clique,
directed mainly against the democratic forces. In these difficult days we find it
necessary to raise our voice and to speak for the unity of Hungarian democracy
born in the revolution of October 23. We declare our support for the principle of
national communism as represented by comrade Imre Nagy. We oppose the lawless
actions directed against the Hungarian journalists and writers and we demand that
the present regime keep its promise not to persecute them. The arrested communists
and Hungarian patriots should be released. We demand that the regime establish
friendly contacts with the People's Republic of Poland and the People's Republic of
Yugoslavia.
411



Polish Reactions to Hungarian Events
Let us look more closely, then, at Polish reactions to the Hungarian events. In
contrast to Hungarian reactions to the events in Poland, Polish reactions were more
complex and in some ways circumspect, due in part to the greater scale of violence
in Hungary and to Gomuka's temperament as a realist. He and his colleagues in
the PZPR followed events closely in Hungary, as indicated by the high-level PZPR
Central Committee meetings, official communiqus, and the more than sixty secret
telegrams to Warsaw written by Ambassador Adam Willman in Budapest.
As with the Hungarian reactions, one needs to differentiate between the
different segments of the Polish population: the Polish masses, journalists,
diplomatic corps in Budapest, and Gomuka himself.
On the one hand, the Polish population expressed great sympathy toward
Hungary for its human and material losses, especially given the special historical

411.
AMSZ, Z7, T. 542, W. 65, s. 84. "Ulotka nadesana do polskiej ambasady w
Budapeszcie." The flyer is undated, but must have been written after November 4,
1956 but before Nagy's execution in June, 1958. One copy, translated from
Hungarian to Polish, was sent to Department of Foreign Affairs in the PZPR
Central Committee.
relationship between the two countries. Poland and Hungary had shared
monarchs,
412
and aided each other during World War Two, albeit fighting on
opposite sides in the war.
413
Indeed for many Poles the Hungarian uprising
reminded them of the Warsaw Uprising of 1944. In both cases outnumbered
"freedom fighters" fought stronger foes without external assistance and lost. While
many Polish veterans yearned to intervene, a sense of fatalism prevailed. As Polish
poet Adam Wayk somberly noted, "We used to be the conscience of history, but
now our silence has become raison d'tat."
414

Polish journalists also opposed the Soviet intervention, and they were livid
when a Polish delegation voted on November 4 in the UN on the side of the USSR
against the West on the Hungarian question. The first news about the "Hungarian
tragedy" was provided by more or less uncensored Polish newspapers, such as
Trybuna Ludu (the central organ of the PZPR Central Committee) and other

412.
Through strategic marriages with Hungarians, the Polish monarchy was able to
extend its power and territory. In the 14th century, for example, the main line of the
Piast dynasty ended in 1370 with Casimir III, and the crown passed to Casimir's
nephew, Louis I of Hungary and to Louis' daughter Jadwiga, who married the Duke
of Lithuania, the ruler of the house of Jagellon. Poland and Lithuania then began
187 years of joint rule and expansion. See Joyce Moss and George Wilson, eds.
Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet republics : the Culture, Geographical Setting, and
Historical Background of 34 Eastern European Peoples (Detroit, Gale Research,
1993), p. 203.
413.
The Hungarians went to extraordinary lengths to help Polish Jews escape the
Holocaust. Janusz Moszczeski, First Secretary of the Polish Embassy in Budapest,
wrote a report discussing the activities Dr. Jzsef Antal, the former director of the
social department in the Hungarian Interior Ministry during the war. According to
his account, during the war he facilitated the departure to the West of several
thousand Polish Jews. They escaped to Hungary from the territories of former
Galicia occupied by Hungarian armies. He provided them with "Arian" papers in
Hungary and protected them from German and "native fascists." AMSZ Z. 7, T.
553, W. 67, s 161. Budapeszt, 27.III.1957.
414
Adam Wayk, Nowa Kultura (November 25, 1956). Cited in Bromke, op. cit. p. 91.
provincial newspapers on October 24 and 25. On October 28 the PZPR Central
Committee published an appeal to "[our] Hungarian brothers" to stop the shedding
of blood.
415
Radio Poland called for blood donations, and so many citizens
volunteered that they had to sign up for appointments. They also collected money,
food, and medicines to send to Hungary. In fact, Poland was one of the very first
countries to begin sending generous humanitarian aid to Hungary. In the month of
February 1957, according to one Foreign Ministry report, Poland donated the most
goods to Hungary, including 45 wagonloads of foodstuffs, ten of clothing and shoes,
and 27 of thread and textiles.
416

The Polish embassy in Budapest maintained close contact with the
Hungarian people. Karol Korolczyk, deputy director of the Polish Foreign
Ministry's First Department issued careful instructions to the diplomats to base
their reports as often as possible on "conversations with the people," not simply on
"press reports."
417


At the height of the Hungarian Revolution, the Polish Embassy was
bombarded with pleas for help, not only from Polish citizens wishing to evacuate,
but also from Hungarian citizens. In at least one case, a group of Hungarian

415.
"Apel KC PZPR do narodu wgierskiego, 28 padziernika 1956 r.," Sztandar
Modych, 28 padziernika 1956 r., s. 1. Published also on page 132 in the following
collection of Polish documents pertaining to the Hungarian Revolution: Jnos
Tischler, redaktor, Dokumenty do Dziejw PRL: Rewolucja wgierska 195 w
polskich dokumentach (Warszawa: Instytut Studiw Politycznych PAN, 1995).
416.
AMSZ, Z. 7, T. 542, W. 65, s. 146.
417.
AMSZ, Z 7, T 551, W 66, s. 236. "Sprawozdanie prasowe za okres stycze-luty-
marzec 1956 r. Pismo K. Korolczyka."
refugees in Vienna appealed for "asylum" in Poland.
418
The Embassy's shortage of
cars increased the tension. In a letter to Rapacki (the Polish Foreign Minister) later,
one Polish citizen, Wodzimierz Galiski, described Ambassador Willman as "pale-
faced" and "too busy to talk." "The embassy personnel were nervous and would not
let me make phone calls," Galiski complained, and added indignantly, "The
atmosphere was such that the people of Budapest were more friendly toward the
Poles than was the Polish Embassy."
419
He explained: "I had been living in the hotel
"Nemzeti" where the fighting was most intense (the city center near the radio and
the newspaper Szabad Np). The hotel was partially damaged. I was lucky that the
bullets and burst of shots from automatic weapons hit my room, because it forced
me and my wife to move out. But we had no car." Galiski's letter triggered a paper
trail of justifications from embassy personnel. Stanisaw Jaworski, wrote directly to
Maria Wierna on November 27, 1956: "The objections are completely ungrounded.
I am a chauffeur in the embassy. During the most intense street fighting, risking my
life, tired and hungry, day and night, among the bullets, tanks and automatic
weapons, sometimes all by myself and sometimes accompanied by other embassy
members, I drove to the addresses where the Polish citizens resided, to take them to
the embassy or to the airport which is located some 40 kilometers from
Budapest."
420


418.
AMSZ, Z 7, T 542, W 65, s.10. "Notatka, Warszawa, dnia 30 listopada 1956 r.,
Modrzejewski z Wydziaem Zagranicznym Zrzeszenia Studentow Polskich.
419.
AMSZ, Z7, T. 542, W. 65, s. 88. "List od in. Wodzimierza Galiskiego do
Ministra Spraw Zagranicznych Rapackiego."
420.
AMSZ, Z.7, T. 542, W. 65, s. 102. "List od Stanisawa Jaworskiego do tow.
Wierna z dnia 27 listopada 1956 r." Wierna then sent a telegram to Ambassador
Willman: "We understand the difficult situation in the embassy and we do not want
Jaworski was not the only embassy member whose life was at risk, it seems.
Archival documents reveal that the Polish Embassy itself was attacked. "Bullets hit
the window frames and balcony frames" of the embassy building on November 6,
1956, just two days after the final Soviet intervention.
421
This incident resembles the
attack on the Yugoslav Embassy one day earlier, on November 5 at 3:30 p.m, with
the exception that in the latter case, as mentioned earlier, the Yugoslav cultural
attach Milenko Milovanov was killed.
422
Without further evidence one cannot
prove that these were deliberate attacks by Soviet or AVH forces, but it is
interesting that the embassies of the two East European countries most supportive
of the Hungarian revolution were attacked.
The diplomatic corps continued candid reportage of the Hungarian situation
following the crackdown during the so-called "normalization" process and offered
to mediate between the Hungarians and Yugoslavs in the quarrel over the Nagy

to judge this case too early...but we want you personally to intervene, to stop this
wave of protests, which may go too far." AMSZ, Z. depesz nr. 356, T. 613, W. 48, s.
9, 2.XI. 1956. Willman then wrote a soothing note to both Wierna and Korolczyk,
assuring them that "efficient care of Poles present in Hungary was from the very
beginning an objective of the embassy, approached with full responsibility. "
AMSZ, Z. 7, T. 542, W. 65, s.pages 96-98. "Pismo ambasadora Willmanna do tow.
Wierna, Korolczyka i Szybka."
421.
AMSZ, Z 7, T 542, W 65, s. 5. "Sytuacja wewntrzna Wgier wypadki i ich
echa dziaalno ambasady w tych dniach. Budapeszt, 6 listopada 1956."
422.
RGANI, f 89, per 45, dok 77, l. 7, "Telefonogramma ot Astafieva v Budapeshte k
P. S. Dedushkinu MIDa SSSR, 24 iiunia 1958 g." See also RGANI, f 89, per 45, dok
29, l. 3, "Iz Dnevnika D. T. Shepilova, Ministr Inostrannykh Del, Zapis' Besedy s
Iugoslavskim Poslom Michunovichem, 7 noiabria 1956 g." There is a discrepancy in
the time of the incident. Miunovi and Shepilov said it occurred on November 6 at
12:45 p.m. The Soviet investigatory commission, however, established the time of
the occurrence as November 5, "around" 3:00 p.m. See AVP RF, f 077, op 37, por
18, p 188, l 38, From General-Lieutenant Beliusov, Chief of the Eighth
Administration of the General Staff, to N. S. Patolichev, Deputy Minister of Foreign
Affairs of the USSR, "Act."
group. In a secret note on May 3, 1957, Willman reported to Korolczyk in Warsaw
about the "brutal methods of the [Hungarian] security services" and the arrests and
deportations taking place.
423
Moreover, in their November 12 telegram to the
Kremlin from Budapest, Presidium members Suslov and Aristov reported on their
conversation with Kdr. The latter told them that the Polish Ambassador visited
him and offered to act as a mediator between the Hungarian and Yugoslav
governments in the regulation of the Nagy question. Kdr declined the offer,
explaining that the Hungarian government could handle the matter itself, since
Nagy and his supporters were, after all, Hungarian citizens and members of the
Hungarian Socialist Party.
424

To a great extent Gomuka went along with this outpouring of public
sympathy toward Hungary. He had to, for his political position was perhaps less
secure than commonly thought. The situation in Poland was still volatile in late
October and November 1956, stimulated in part by the Hungarian Revolution. As
PZPR member Piatowski said at a November 4 party aktiv meeting: "There are no
doubts, comrades, that the political situation got a little more complicated after the

423.
AMSZ, Z 7, T 553, W 67, s.60 [recto]. "Referat od Korolczyka do Ministerstwa
Spraw Zagranicznych, 9 maja 1957. Tajne. "[B]rutal methods of the security
services [stosowanie brutalnych metod przez organy bezpieczenstwa] are especially
widespread in the countryside. Recently, in the town Hajdszoboszl, which was
very peaceful in October and November of the previous year, 81 people were
arrested and sent to isolation camps [obz odosobnienia]. These people were accused
of spreading of counterrevolutionary rumors [szerzenie nastrojw
kontrrewolucyjnych]. One of the arrested, an old man, was beaten up badly and died
in the hospital. A similar case occurred in Kunszentmikls, where a young woman
died in the local hospital. She was also badly beaten up. In the town called Pocsaj in
a district of Hajdu-Bihar a peasant was killed by the security service personnel."
424
RGANI F 89, Per 45, Dok 43, Ll. 4-5, Telegramma M.A. Suslova I A. B.
Aristova v TsK KPSS o besede s Ya. Kadarom, 12 noyabrya 1956 g.
Eighth Plenum of the Central Committee of our party and that this situation was
complicated by the events in the international arena in Hungary."
425

Strikes and demonstrations continued to erupt in Polish cities well after the
Eighth Plenum in October. Rallies took place in Gdask, Szczecin, and other cities
on October 22, and the next day in Pozna, Lublin, dz, Bydgoszcz, Kielce, and
Wrocaw. As late as November 18 in Bydgoszcz, a spontaneous street demonstration
broke out, during which people called for the "overthrow of the Stalinist regime in
Poland" (i.e. Gomuka's) and protested the coercion of Poland by the USSR.
426
Had
Gomuka displayed weak leadership or approved too strongly of the Hungarian
uprising, the Soviet leaders could easily have decided to send tanks rolling back into
Poland.
The measured pace and scale of Gomuka's political and economic reforms
after the Polish October further indicate his desire not to alarm Soviet leaders.
While he and his colleagues worked to eliminate the most oppressive Stalinist
features, such as arbitrary arrests, collectivization of agriculture, Herculean work
norms, and persecution of the Roman Catholic Church, they also maintained the
command economy and the monopoly of the Polish communist party. More
importantly, Gomuka insisted on retaining Soviet troops and membership in the

425
AAN (Warsaw), KC PZPR, 237/V-241. Stenogram Krajowej Narady Aktywu
Partyjnego odbutego w dn. 4 listopada 1956 r. Wystpenia W. Gomulki, s. 66.
426
Wodzimierz Jastrzbski, Bydgoski Padziernik 1956 r. jako przejaw oporu
spoecznego przeciwko totalitarnej wadzy in Wodzimierz Jastrzbski, ed. Rok
195 w Bydgoskiem. Materiay z konferencji naukowej na temat 'Bydgoski pazdziernik
1956r. (Bydgoszcz Instytut Historii Wyzszej Szkoy Pedagogicznej w Bydgoszczy,
1996.), p. 57.
Warsaw Pact. While Polish citizens grew disillusioned, they still believed in the late
1950s that Gomuka's policies resulted from Moscow's coercion.
Moreover, the Gomuka regime's reaction to the Hungarian revolution
differed from that of the other communist bloc countries in that Gomuka did not
blame the unrest on "foreign counterrevolutionary elements." He knew such
propaganda would not convince the Polish people. A major segment of Polish
society identified itself with the ideas of the Hungarian Revolution and felt that the
events in Hungary resembled Polish events in the summer and fall of 1956. The
Pozna revolt was too fresh in their memories. Thus Gomuka directed Polish
propagandists to speak mainly of the "Rkosi-Ger clique's errors."
Gomuka shared Imre Nagy's conviction about the need for each Warsaw
Pact country to follow separate roads to socialism that incorporate indigenous
elements. In fact, his position resembled Tito's of Yugoslavia to some extent:
publicly he needed to support Nagy's policies because they were close to his own, but
privately he dreaded an uncontrollable revolutionary movement within Polish
borders, especially in the absence of Soviet troops. He told a group of editors on
October 29, "We are not going to get involved in any political situation [similar to]
what is happening in Hungary. Hungary is in a different geographical place, and
they [the Hungarians] live under different conditions. Our countrys interests
dictate to us different necessities and a different way of working things out....Its
easy to decide that [to withdraw Soviet troops], but it will be much more difficult to
be responsible after that."
427

Furthermore, as a realist, Gomuka knew he could not be too supportive of
the Hungarian insurgents and simultaneously reassure Moscow of his loyalty. As
mentioned earlier, the Khrushchev leadership continued to observe his actions
closely. Poland was the Soviet "land bridge" to East Germany (German Democratic
Republic, or GDR). Gomuka knew that the Polish communist party could only
maintain its monopoly--and its western Oder-Neisse border with the help of Soviet
power. (In fact, to ensure a permanent Soviet military presence, he signed a Polish-
Soviet bilateral treaty in Moscow in mid-November 1956.) This put him in a ticklish
spot, since one of the Hungarians' "sixteen points" was the total withdrawal of
Soviet troops from Hungary. If Gomuka supported the Hungarian cause too
demonstratively, Polish citizens would probably pressure him to have Soviet troops
withdrawn from Poland.
A glance at several of the Gomuka regime's public declarations thus reveals
a shrewd balancing act to appease both his Polish constituency and Kremlin bosses.
He denounced Ger for calling in Soviet troops on October 23 "instead of entering
immediately and consistently on the road of solutions in conformity with the
interests of socialism."
428
Then, at his triumphant appearance on October 24 in
front of the Palace of Culture [Paac Kultury i Aauki] in Warsaw, Gomuka tried to

427.
AAN (Warsaw) PZPR 237/V/840, s. 14.Wystpienie tow. W. Gomuki na
naradzie redaktorw w dniu 29.X.1956 r."
428.
Trybuna Ludu, November 2, 1956.
dampen the enthusiasm of the Polish teenagers who had shown up waving
Hungarian flags:
Today we turn to the working people of Warsaw and of the entire country with an
appeal: enough meetings and demonstrations! The time has come to embark on
daily work--full of faith and consciousness that the Party united with the working
class and with the nation will lead Poland on the new road to socialism.
429


On the evening of October 29 Gomuka visited Warsaw Technical University
where students asked him if they could designate a day of general mourning in
honor of Hungary; Gomuka quickly rejected the notion.
430

Moreover, in order to prevent the Hungarian Revolution from shifting
farther to the right on October 28, the Gomuka leadership sent a delegation to
Budapest, composed of Marian Naszkowski (Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs)
and Artur Starewicz (substitute Member of the Central Committee).
431
On October
29 an appeal of the PZPR Central Committee was published in all the Polish
newspapers, simultaneously with the Szabad Np paper. Signed by both First
Secretary Gomuka and Prime Minister Cyrankiewicz, it expressed "sorrow at the
bloodshed and the damages in Budapest" and "called upon the Hungarians to stop
the 'fratricidal fight' as quickly as possible. "We are both on the same side...the side

429.
Trybuna Ludu, October 25, 1956. For an English translation, see Paul Zinner, ed.
National Communism and Popular Revolt in Eastern Europe (NY: Columbia
University Press, 1956), pp. 270-276.
430.
Marcin Kula, Paryz, Londyn i Waszyngton patrzq na Pazdziernik 195 r. w Polsce
(Warszawa: Instytut Studiw Politycznych Polskiej Akademii Nauk, 1992), p. 140.
431.
AMSZ, Z. depesz., W. 48, T. 612, K. 215, s. 76, Szyfrogram nr. 17654 z
Budapestu, 28 padziernika 1956, Adam Willman.
of freedom and socialism." But the message continued: "We have not the slightest
intention of interfering in the internal affairs of your country."
432

When Khrushchev, Molotov, and Malenkov flew to Brest on November 1 to
consult with Gomuka, the latter opposed military intervention in Hungary.
433
But
on November 2, still another appeal by the PZPR Central Committee was published
in Szabad Np, this time condemning not only Soviet interventionism, but also the
Hungarian "counterrevolution," in which reactionary bands were "lynching good
communists."
434
Strongly influenced by the Chinese communists, Poland voted on
November 4 in the UN General Assembly on the side of the Warsaw Pact countries
against the United States and other Western countries condemning the Soviet
intervention in Hungary.
435
On the same day, in his speech for party aktiv workers

432.
"Apel KC PZPR do narodu wgierskiego, 28 padziernika 1956 r.," Sztandar
Modych, 28 padziernika 1956 r., s. 1. Published also on page 132 in the following
collection of Polish documents pertaining to the Hungarian Revolution: Jnos
Tischler, redaktor, Dokumenty do Dziejw PRL Rewolucja wgierska 195 w
polskich dokumentach (Warszawa: Instytut Studiw Politycznych PAN, 1995). Also
published in Szabad Np, October 29, 1956.
433.
Gomuka later told Chinese Prime Minister Chou En-lai on January 11-12, 1957
that the Russians did not reveal their intentions, but merely asked about the Polish
opinion on the Hungarian situation.
434.
Szabad Np, November 2, 1956.
435.
AAN, KC PZPR, paczka 107, tom 5. Materiay dotyczce stosunkw polsko-
chiskich i problemw wewtrznych Chin z lat 1956-1957, kart 388. "Stanowisko
rzdu Chiskiej Republiki Ludowej w sprawie sytuacji na Wgrzech, sprecyzowane
przez ambasadora ChRL w Warszawie w rozmowie z wiceministrem spraw
zagranicznych Marianem Naszkowskim 4 listopada 1956 r." The Polish Political
Committee met on the evening of November 4 to decide how to vote on the
Hungarian issue in the UN General Assembly. Earlier that day Wang Ping-nan, the
Chinese Ambassador in Warsaw, had told Marian Naszkowski, the Polish Deputy
Minister of Foreign Affairs, that Poland should vote on the side of the USSR and
the new Kdr government because Imre Nagy's government had been
counterrevolutionary. N.B. It should be remembered that the People's Republic of
China (PRC) was not officially recognized in the UN until October 1971; only the
Nationalist Chinese government on Taiwan (Formosa) was. Therefore the PRC had
in Warsaw, Gomuka noticeably refrained from condemning the Soviet intervention
that was taking place literally as he spoke. Delegations from the GDR (November
20) and Romania (November 22-23) visited Budapest, but a Polish delegation was
noticeably absent.
436
On November 29 Gomuka opined publicly that "the Western
aggression in Suez" was much worse than the Soviet intervention in Hungary,
because in the latter case, the Soviet Union was not trying to transform Hungary
into a colony.
437

Polish-Hungarian relations cooled somewhat in 1957. Hungarian
Ambassador to Poland, Pter Bal, complained to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry
that Polish journalists deliberately shunned the Hungarian embassy in Warsaw and
refused to publish articles on the Hungarian events in Polish newspapers. A new
Hungarian institute was established in Warsaw, but no journalists came. "Knowing
the negative opinion of most Polish journalists, we even included a couple of delicate
issues [knyes krds] in our speech," he wrote.
438
Finally Nagy's execution in June,
1958 tarnished Polish-Hungarian relations still further. Gomuka vehemently
protested against the execution, which came as a total shock to him.
439
A month
after the execution, Polish Ambassador spoke with Kapicic, the Yugoslav

a vested interest in persuading other communist states to vote the way it would
have.
436.
MOL, XIX-A-83-a, 160 doboz , Jegyzknyv a Magyar Forradalmi Munks
Paraszt Kormny 1956. vi november ho 19. napjn tartott lsrl."
437
MOL, 288, f. 32/1958/14 e, old. 13.
438.
MOL, XIX-J-l-j (1946-1964) KM TK Lengyelorszg, 9. doboz, 5/f 001893, 5
prilis 1957, "Mrcius 15-i nnepsg, Vars.
439.
OHA (Budapest, Interview no. 572, Emanuel Planer, former head of the Polish
Radio's Public Relations Department, conducted by Jnos Tischler, 1993. See also
Gomuka's speech in Gdask, June 28, 1958 in Npszabadsg published on that
same day.
Ambassador to Hungary, about Polish reactions to the execution, as reflected in
Gomuka's speech in Gdask on June 28, 1958. "The Polish leadership does not
consider [the Nagy sentence] to be an internal Hungarian affair," Willman reported
to Warsaw.
440

In many ways the Hungarian crisis was a godsend for Gomuka. It diverted
Soviet attention from Poland somewhat, hence facilitating his removal of Marshal
Rokossowski from the Polish Ministry of Defense, as well as the Soviet advisors.
441
It
enabled Gomuka to claim credit for his "thoughtfulness and bravery that
preserved Poland from meeting Hungary's fate."
442
And it allowed him to justify a
firm grip on the PZPR and population, lest a fate similar to Hungary befall Poland.
As Gomuka told party members in somewhat rambling Polish on December 20,
1956:
As we know, our situation was not that bad. In Hungary, the situation was much
worse. In Poland even though the leadership was isolated from the masses and from

440.
AMSZ, Z.depesz T.783 W.57, s.168 [misnumbered as page 167], Szyfrogram nr.
9166, 18.VII.1958, from Adam Willman.in Budapest to [Maria] Wierna in Warsaw,
Director of the First Department in the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
441.
Marshal Konstanty Rokossowski was born in Poland in 1896, but moved to the
Soviet Union at the age of seventeen and joined the Soviet Communist Party in 1919.
He suffered in the Stalinist purges of the late 1930s, and commanded the
Byelorussian front toward the end of World War Two. Poles despised him as the
one who led the Red Army forces to "liberate" Poland, after conveniently waiting
on the other side of the Wisa [Vistula] River for the Polish resistance forces to
expend their energies in the futile Warsaw Uprising of 1944. He served as Polish
national defense minister from December 1949 to November 1956, despite the fact
that he was a Soviet citizen. He was removed from the PZPR Politburo on October
20, 1956 and recalled to the Soviet Union in mid-November 1956.
442
AAN, KC PZPR, paczka 15, tom 59, numery 1-17, kart 63, "Informacja Biura
Politzcynego KC PZPR dla organizacji partyjnych PZPR o sytuacji na Wgrzech i
stanowisku partii w kwestii stosunkw polsko-radzieckich, 1 listopada 1956 roku."
the working class, the party as a whole was still in such a condition that one stronger
impulse could not possibly destroy its activity and make it crash.
443


Polish Deterrence of a Soviet Intervention
One question that has long intrigued scholars is: Why did the Soviet Union
intervene in Hungary but not in Poland? Perhaps it was Gomukas shrewd,
balanced reaction to the Hungarian events rather than, or in addition to, his defiant
behavior during the Eighth PZPR Plenum that deterred a Soviet invasion of Poland.
Khrushchev and his colleagues did not suddenly fly to Warsaw on October
19, on the eve of the Eighth PZPR Plenum, solely to prevent Wadysaw Gomuka's
election as First Secretary of the PZPR, as some basic accounts of the crisis
sometimes imply. As Khrushchev pointed out in his memoirs, Gomuka held "a
position that was most advantageous for us. Here was a man who had come to
power on the crest of an anti-Soviet wave, yet who could now speak forcefully about
the need to preserve Poland's friendly relations with the Soviet Union and the Soviet
Communist Party."
444
He continued: "Our embassy informed us that a genuine
revolt was on the verge of breaking out in Warsaw. For the most part, these
demonstrations were being organized in support of the new leadership headed by
Gomuka, which we too were prepared to support." In an interview, Ochab
confirmed this view when he said: "Basically our Soviet friends wanted to make

443.
AAN, 237/IV/842, Przemwienia Tow. Wadysawa Gomuki, 1920.XII.1956.
Wystpienie I Sekretarza KC PZPR tow. Gomuki na konferencji partyjnej
Warszawskiego Komitetu Wojewodzkiego PZPR w dniu 20 grudnia 1956 r.], s. 245.
444.
Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: the Last Testament, p. 205.
Gomuka First Secretary. At one point Khrushchev said to Gomuka: we bring you
greetings."
445

Khrushchev worried that the policies Gomuka and his supporters promoted
were anti-Soviet in nature. In his memoirs cited above, Khrushchev added that,
although he was "prepared to support" Gomuka, he was concerned about the
"demonstrations" which "had a dangerously anti-Soviet character."
446
In the
handwritten account of the October 19 Polish-Soviet confrontation cited earlier,
Gomuka shows that he understood why Khrushchev was concerned about the
imminent new appointments in the Polish party leadership:
I [Gomuka] am returning to work under an anti-Soviet slogan...[For the Soviets]
the question is not about people, but [about] what kind of politics is lurking [behind
the proposed] personnel changes. The atmosphere in Poland is anti-Soviet, as are
the organizational decisions.
447


Scholars have also claimed that Gomuka's tough, self-confident stance
helped convince Khrushchev that Gomuka had things under control in his own
country. However, one gets the impression from the interview with Ochab cited
above that Gomuka's tough stance may in some sense have worked against him. As
Ochab said:
Presumably they thought Gomuka would put the country in order and was the one
to stake their bets on...But Gomuka...displayed considerable toughness of character
during those difficult talks.
448



445.
Toranska, op cit. interview with Ochab, pp 77-78.
446.
Ibid.
447.
Gomuka Family Private Papers, op cit. See fn #61 supra.
448.
Interview of Edward Ochab, op. cit., p. 78.
The secondary literature explains or implies that Gomuka's behavior during
Khrushchev's sudden visit is what convinced Khrushchev that military intervention
was not necessary. However, according to Malin's notes of the secret CC CPSU
Presidium session on October 20, the Soviet leaders had not completely ruled out a
military intervention in Poland. On the day they returned to Moscow, they had said:
"Theres only one way output an end to what is in Poland. If Rokossowski is kept,
we wont have to press things for a while." Apparently they mentioned the need to
order "maneuvers;" "prepare a document;" and "form a committee."
449
This
suggests that Gomuka's bold behavior during the Soviet leaders' visit to Warsaw
had not completely convinced them that an intervention was not necessary. Indeed,
documents reveal that the Khrushchev leadership was still extremely worried about
the Polish situation as late as October 24, as illustrated by the convening of a secret
emergency meeting of all communist party leaders in Moscow on that day to discuss
the Polish situation.
450

One should thus bear in mind the significance of Gomuka's statements and
leadership after the Eighth Plenum. This aspect has been relatively neglected in the
secondary literature, which tends to view the "showdown" on October 19-20

449.
RGANI, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1005, Ll. 49-50, Protokolnaya Zapis Zasedaniya
Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 20-ogo oktyabrya 1956. Avtograf V. N. Malina. These are
only brief notes, often consisting of sentence fragments, so it is not clear what is
meant here. Presumably the Soviet leaders planned to have military maneuvers and
install a committee of pro-Soviet officials to eventually take over the Polish
government after a Soviet intervention.
450.
Because a crisis developed unexpectedly in Hungary at the same time, the
communist leaders discussed both Poland and Hungary, but the meeting was
originally called to discuss Polish events. Gomuka and Ger could not attend, but
communist leaders from Czechoslovakia (e.g. Antonn Novotn, et al), East
Germany (e.g. Walter Ulbricht, Otto Grotewohl, and Willi Stoph), and Bulgaria
(Todor Zhivkov, Anton Yugov, and Georgi Damyanov) were present.
between the Soviet and Polish delegations during the Eighth Plenum as the turning
point of the Polish crisis.
While the difference in personalities--Gomuka and Nagy--is important in
explaining the Soviet decision to invade in Hungary instead of Poland, one must
remember at least two other factors that influenced the decision: 1) the escalating
crisis in Hungary and 2) Soviet apprehension about how to end a military conflict
with Poland. During the secret October 24 meeting, Khrushchev reportedly said
"Finding a reason for an armed conflict [with Poland] now would be very easy, but
finding a way to put an end to such a conflict later on would be very hard."
451
Given
the will of the Polish people to fight, it is possible that any Polish leader with a
modicum of popularity, not necessarily Gomuka, would have been suitable to the
occasion.

Conclusion
In sum, the Soviet intervention on November 4, 1956, was not the smooth,
well-planned operation that Eisenhower and Dulles believed it to be. Although
Soviet troops performed better in the "line of fire" on November 4 than on October
24, the November events were only the prelude to a long, arduous process of
normalization in Hungary, as we shall see in the next chapter. Whether or not, as
Dulles once said, the Soviet military intervention was "not quite as bad" as the
British and French intervention in Egypt, the Soviet leadership had to work hard to

451.
Kramer, "Hungary and Poland, 1956,"op. cit.
heal Hungarian-Soviet relations. The mere presence of Soviet troops evoked
memories among Hungarian leaders and citizens alike of past mistreatment.
In Chapter Two we discussed how the Soviet leaders tended to think that
only a small core of intellectuals - not the masses of workers and peasants - was
causing the trouble. If only Tito would clamp down on them, they thought, the
conflict in Hungary would be resolved. In this chapter we see that Tito himself was
also wary of the nationalist ferment of the Hungarian Revolution, and in early
November worked with Khrushchev behind the scenes to prevent it from spreading
to Yugoslavia. Tito's dilemma lay in the fact that, while reconciliation with Hungary
(and the USSR) would benefit Yugoslavia financially, such a rapprochement might
also lead to renewed domination of Yugoslavia by the Soviet bloc. He valued
Yugoslavia's status as a neutral, nonaligned country that had stood up to Joseph
Stalin. Tito's willingness to shelter Nagy after the Soviet crackdown ruptured the
old wounds in Yugoslav relations with both the USSR and Hungary. Once Nagy was
sheltered in his Budapest embassy Tito felt honor-bound to adhere to international
law regarding political asylum. Although beyond the scope of this book, it should be
noted that leaders in the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and the PRC also feared
the possible unraveling of the Warsaw Pact and "spillover" of anti-communist ideas
across their own borders.
452


452
See SAPMO (Berlin) DY/30/IV2/5, 574, Abt. Leitende Organe der Partei und
Massenorganisationen Sektor Parteiinformation, Information ber die Ereignisse
in gyptien und Ungarn und die eingeleiteten Manahmen von den Bezirks und
Kreisleitungen, den 2.11.56 and other East German documents. For Romanian
spillover effects, see Corneliu Mihai Lungu and Mihai Retegan, 1956 :
Explozia : Perceptii Romne, Iugoslave i Sovietice asupra Evenimentelor Din Polonia
i Ungaria (Bucuresti: Editura Univers Enciclopedic, 1996). Also Tfalvi Zoltn,
Ironically, Khrushchev was just as chagrined as Tito about the new rift
between Hungary and Yugoslavia. Had it not been for the Sino-Soviet dispute of the
early 1960s, the events of 1956 might have led to another complete break between
Yugoslavia and the bloc countries closest to the USSR.
Like the Yugoslav reaction, the Polish response to the Hungarian events was
complex - more so than the Hungarian response to the Polish events. While the
Polish journalists, diplomats, and masses empathized with Hungarians, Wadysaw
Gomuka himself performed a shrewd balancing act. His personal character helps to
explain why the Soviet leadership decided to invade in Hungary instead of Poland,
but Soviet concerns about how to end an invasion of Poland, as well as the turmoil
in Hungary, must also be considered as key factors in the decision. Without the
unrest in Hungary and Nagy's behavior as a basis of comparison, the Khrushchev
leadership might have judged Gomuka's actions differently and might have
intervened in Poland.
In comparing the Polish and Hungarian crises, it can be argued that the
latter crisis was much deeper. To reiterate, Hungarian communist officials were
perhaps more willing to tolerate Soviet military assistance, because they were

Az 1956 os magyar forradalom visszhangja Romniban, Erdlyben, Szzadok
(1998), no. 5, pp. 9891088. A wealth of U.S. diplomatic reports regarding
Romanian reactions can be found at the National Security Archive. For example,
see Telegram from U.S. Minister to Rumania, Thayer, regarding student strike in
Cluj in reaction to recent events in Hungary, October 23, 1956, National Security
Archive, Washington, D.C., Flashpoints Project, Box 2, Folder 10/23/56, Record
#62392, p. 1. Although all Chinese archives that might reveal new information on
the PRCs role in the Hungarian Revolution are still closed, some new documentary
collections have been published. See Chen Jian, "Beijing and the Hungarian Crisis
of 1956," unpublished paper presented at Hungary and the World, 1956
conference in Budapest, September 1996. This report is based on documents
selected and edited by Chinese authorities, as well as on memoirs.
haunted by the political rightist reaction and their collective memory of the
white terror that had overthrown Bla Kuns communist regime in 1919 and
made the communist party illegal in Hungary. There was no real Hungarian
Pozna. Thus, Kremlin leaders, Hungarian party officials, Hungarian reform
communist intellectuals, and even the student organizers of the October 23
demonstration were caught off guard by the revolution; it seemed to come from
nowhere. Kremlin leaders could understand Polish workers demands for bread,
but had a harder time understanding Hungarian demands for freedom. Both
Gomuka and Nagy attempted to bridge the fundamental contradictions of de-
Stalinization, namely that to achieve political consolidation, their party leaderships
had to strike a compromise between the aspirations of their populations and the
demands of the Kremlin. Reasons why Gomuka succeeded, at least in the short-run,
and Nagy failed can be found both in their personality differences and the
differences in the natures of the Polish and Hungarian crises.

Chapter 5: Jnos Kdr and the Normalization Process


This chapter will focus on the personality and behavior of Jnos Kdr.
Specifically it will investigate his involvement in the Rajk Affair, his prison
experiences, his activities between November 1 and 4, 1956; and his roles in the
abduction of the Nagy group and the post-invasion normalization process. Just as
the Soviet leaders were not omniscient in the summer months of 1956 and allowed
Rkosi to stay in power too long in Hungary, so also they did not succeed in quickly
subduing the Hungarian population after the intervention. The "normalization"
process proceeded more slowly than the West knew, due in part to the persistence of
small-scale fighting and the passive resistance of the Hungarian population;
disagreements between the Kdr and Khrushchev regimes about the pace and scale
of mass arrests and deportations; and the lack of coordination between the Soviet
Committee of State Security (KGB) and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) in
carrying out the arrests. The more advisors the Kremlin sent to remedy the situation,
the more irritated the Hungarians became. Even when the situation became outwardly
calm, Hungary was not completely subdued.
Somewhat akin to the American experience in Vietnam after the murder of
Ngo Dinh Diem in August 1961, the Kremlin had decided to intervene militarily in
Hungary the second time because they believed there was no effective Hungarian
government to control the situation. At the October 31 Presidium session during
which the decision to invade was reached, Khrushchev himself had said [T]here is
not now any governmentWe should create a Provisional Revolutionary
Government (headed by Kdr).
453
Of course, the Kremlin leaders may have
convinced themselves that Nagys government was weak in order to justify their
invasion. Hungarian officials in Nagys regime, such as head of the National Guard
Bla Kirly, insist that Nagy was effectively in control of domestic affairs
after the revolution became victorious on October 28. According to Kirly,
without foreign attack on us, general elections would have been held within a few
months and democracy established.
454

In any case, the Soviet leaders were able to avoid the kind of tar baby
syndrome that perplexed Pentagon leaders in Vietnam, having been fortunate to
find in Jnos Kdr a flexible and realistic politician to pacify Hungary. Despite
their initial doubts about Kdrs effectiveness, the Soviet leaders were largely able
to leave him in charge and issue orders from Moscow. Indeed, the difficulties of
normalization perhaps stemmed more from the obstinacy of the Hungarian
insurgents and general population than from Jnos Kdrs personal shortcomings.

Kdr's Personal Background
Given his working class background, prison experiences, and status as a
"home Communist," Jnos Kdr (born Jnos Chermanek) might have served as a

453
RGANI, f. 3, o. 12, d. 1005, l. 18, "Protokol'naya Zapis' Zasedaniya Prezidiuma
TsK KPSS, 31 oktyabrya 1956 g.," avtograf Malina.
454
Interview with Bla Kirly, June 4, 2002. He said, Since October 31st
the National Guard was effectively keeping law and order. From that
day on even incidences involving small firearms decreased. During the night of
November 2-3 in Budapest not a single shot was fired. On November 2, Andropov
lied, claiming that the Soviet Embassy was under siege. We were there within thirty
minutes and would have reestablished order had it been necessary. Andropov later
claimed he had been misunderstood.
better Hungarian Gomuka than Nagy. Like Gomuka seven years his senior, Kdr
perhaps better grasped the realities of power better than Nagy, who--as observed in
Chapter Four--emphasized logical Marxist-Leninist arguments over political points.
Born on May 12, 1912 in Rijeka, a city in northwest Yugoslavia (Croatia), Kdr
began to work at a very young age as a mechanic working with fine instruments. He
was the illegitimate son of a Slavic peasant girl and a penurious conscript soldier.
Because he lived in Budapest while attending school and then lived in the
countryside during the summer months, he confessed once that he had lived a
double life. As he told Lajos Mesterhzi, chief editor of the Budapest Magazine,
The drawback of the double life which I led in my childhood was that I suffered a
lot for it in Budapest I was called a country boy while in the village I was a city
boy, so that in fact my contemporaries looked upon me as fundamentally alien both
here and there.
455

In 1931 at the age of 19 he joined the Communist Party of Hungary, but also
worked in youth organizations of the Social Democratic Party. From 1940 to 1941
Kdr helped reconstruct the underground communist party that had been crushed
by Admiral Horthy's forces. Beginning in May 1942 Kdr was a member of the
Central Committee [Kzponti Bizottsg or KB] of the Hungarian Communist Party.
After the Soviet "liberation" of Hungary, he became a Politburo member, and in
1946 he became Deputy General Secretary of the Party. Rkosi had instructed
Kdr to persuade Rajk, who was Kdr's friend, to confess to an array of false,

455
Conversation with Lajos Mesterhzi, editor in chief of the Budapest Magazine,
February 1967, in Jnos Kdr: Selected Speeches and Interviews, p. 290. Cited also
in Gati, Hungary and the Soviet Bloc, p. 170.
Titoist crimes. Unbeknownst to Kdr, Rkosi had arranged to have the
conversation in Rajk's cell tape recorded, for future use against Kdr.
456
In
helping Rkosi depose Rajk, Kdr thus made himself vulnerable. Although Kdr
assumed the Rajks post the same year, Rkosi - in quintessential Stalinist fashion -
soon swung the hatchet onto his erstwhile hatchet man.
In May, 1951, Rkosi then had Kdr arrested on trumped-up charges. He
endured seven months of torture in prison. Having received direct orders from
Rkosi to beat Kdr until he talks, Minister of Defense Mihly Farkas and his
son Vladimir (a thirty-year-old colonel of the VO), thrashed his back, feet, and even
testicles, causing permanent sterility thereafter.
457
They smeared his body with
mercury to prevent his pores from breathing. Vladimir Farkas reportedly urinated in
Kdrs mouth for good measure.
458
Eventually, like most prisoners, Kdr
confessed so they would permit him to sleep. Any prisoners who refused to confess
were beaten until they died. In December, 1951, Kdrs former trial was held in
secret. He was then sentenced to prison in solitary confinement.
Many have marveled at Kdr's rugged courage to become a quisling for the
Soviet leadership after this experience. Kdr was one of the few Hungarian officials
who actually chose to re-enter Hungarian politics in the mid-1950s after their release
from prison. According to Hungarian journalist Gyrgy Plczi-Horvth, writing in
March 1957 for the Berlin paper Der Monat:

456
Vli, p. 227. This tape recording was published in toto. See Tibor Hajdu Farkas
s Kdr Rajknal, Trsadalmi Szemle 4 (1992),pp. 70-89.
457
Tams Aczel and Tibor Mray, The Revolt of the Mind (London: Thames and
Hudson, 1960), p. 252. Also see Calhoun, Hungary and Suez, 1956), p. 61.
458
Aczel and Mray, p. 251.

Out of prison Kdr changed into the ultimate type of split personality, a kind of
"controlled schizophrenia," a conscious mixture of delusion and cynicism, of obsession
and opportunism. Many leading Communists suffered from this. They want and need
power. But this naked private ambition is deeply unsatisfying unless they self-
hypnotize themselves, at times, into that fine fervor of feeling, of fanatical faith which
started them on their way.

Kdr was rehabilitated in 1954 and later elected as first secretary of the
Pest county party committee. On July 18, 1956, in the midst of the growing unrest,
Kdr was chosen again as a member of the Politburo and CC secretary of the
MDP. Four months later, he became first secretary of the temporary CC of Nagy's
new party, the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party [Magyar Szocialista Munksprt,
or MSZMP], which was formed on November 1, 1956.
459

After the November 4 invasion, Kdr about-faced, taking over as First
Secretary of the CC of the Hungarian Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Government
and held the post until 1988. In 1988-1989 he held the honorary post of party
chairman. Finally, on May 8 he abandoned all posts and died on July 6, 1989 at 77
years of age. This happened to be the same day Imre Nagy was officially
rehabilitated.

Kdr's Activities Between November 14, 1956
Seven years later Kdr emerged as the First Secretary. His activities
between November 1--4 have long mystified scholars. It was known that Kdr
made secret contact with Soviet officials on the evening of November 1 and left

459
Valerii L. Musatov, "Yanosh Kadar i Vremya Reform v Vengrii," Novaya
Noveishaya Istoriya no. 3 (1990), 139-140.
Hungary; he was spotted with Ferenc Mnnich in front of the Soviet Embassy on
that day.
460
From the newly declassified Malin notes, it is now known that both Kdr
and Mnnich participated in the CC CPSU Presidium meetings in Moscow on
November 2 and 3).
461
At 5 a.m. on November 4 Kdrs supporters broadcasted the
formation of the Hungarian Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Government on the
radio. Kdr himself returned to Budapest from Szolnok at 6:10 a.m. on November
7.
462
The new regime held its first session only on November 11.
463

Much conjecture has also centered around Kdr's motives in abandoning
the Nagy government.
464
Some scholars surmised that Kdr had decided at the
outset, on November 1, to serve as a Soviet quisling. They also believed that Kdr
went to the town of Uzhgorod, the capital of the Carpatho-Ukraine, to negotiate
with the Soviet leaders on the formation of a new government.
465

Thanks to the notes kept by Vladimir Malin, it is now known that Kdr was
not completely a quisling at first, and that he flew directly to Moscow, not
Uzhgorod, to confer with the Kremlin leaders. With Andropov acting as a mediator,
Kdr and Mnnich spent the night of November 1 at the Soviet military

460
Vli, p. 371.
461
RGANI, f. 3, o. 12, d. 1005, ll. 67-69, "Protokol'naya Zapis' Zasedaniya
Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 2 noyabrya 1956 g.," avtograf Malina; and RGANI, f. 3, o.
12, d. 1006, Ll. 31-33 ob, "Protokol'naya Zapis' Zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS,
3 noyabrya 1956 g.," compiled by V. N. Malin.
462
RGANI, f. 3, o. 64, d. 486, l. 27, Informatsiya Ministerstva Oborony SSSR v
TsK KPSS o Polozhenii v Vengrii po Sostoyaniyu na 9.00 7 noyabrya, 7-ogo
noyabrya 1956 g.
463
See footnote #3 in Orekhova, Sereda and Stykalin, Sovetskii Soyuz i Vengerskii
Krizis, p. 611.
464
See Vli, 371, fn 30; also Tibor Mray, Thirteen Days that Shook the Kremlin,
trans. Howard L. Katzander (NY: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959), pp 206-9.
465
Vli, p. 371.
headquarters at Tkl, and early in the morning of November 2 flew to Moscow
without informing Nagy and other government officials. They both participated in
the emergency CC CPSU Presidium sessions on November 2 and 3.
466
On
November 2 they were joined by Istvn Bata (Hungarian defense minister until
October 24), who was flown to Moscow on the evening of October 28 (along with
Ger, Piros, Hegeds). On November 3, they were joined by Imre Horvth
(Hungarian foreign minister until November 2), who took detailed notes of that
day's session.
467

One would think that if Kdr had intended to betray the Nagy government
from the start, then he would be apt to exaggerate the danger of the Hungarian
situation, criticize the Nagy government, flatter the Russians, and boast about his
own abilities to handle the situation. Although Kdr does say some things to this
effect, his responses are surprisingly more honest. In the Presidium session of
November 2, where he appears to have done most of the talking, Kdr tended to
downplay the dangers. "The opposition members [oppozitsionery] are supporters of
Nagy;" "the people leading the armed groups are party members, like Duds the
engineer;" and "they did not want this coalition government; they just want to oust
the Rkosi clique," Kdr told his Kremlin colleagues.
468
Moreover "the goal of the
mass demonstrations on the periphery" was not to "destroy the people's

466
See RGANI, f. 3, o. 12, d. 1006, ll 23--29, "Protokol'naya Zapis' Zasedaniya
Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 2-ogo noyabrya 1956 g." and RGANI, f. 3, o. 12, d. 1006, ll.
31--33ob, "Protokol'naya Zapis' Zasedaniya Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 3-ogo
noyabrya 1956 g."
467
RGANI, f. 3, o. 12, d. 1006, ll 31--33ob, "Protokol'naya Zapis' Zasedaniya
Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 3-ogo noyabrya 1956 g."
468
RGANI, f. 3, o. 12, d. 1006, l. 23, "Protokol'naya Zapis' Zasedaniya Prezidiuma
TsK KPSS, 2-ogo noyabrya 1956 g."
democracy," he said. The Hungarian demonstrators did not see themselves as
counterrevolutionaries. "I personally attended one meeting, and no one there
wanted a counterrevolution," Kdr said.
469
"Tildy and other comrades are afraid
of [former Hungarian prime minister] Ferenc Nagy," he said.
Instead of maligning the Nagy government, Kdr tried to explain to the
Soviet leaders how his Hungarian colleagues perceived Soviet behavior. "The Soviet
government is doing one thing, but the Soviet troops are doing another." "There
were movements of Soviet troops, which alarmed the government and masses."
Kdr told the Presidium members that, while the October 30 declaration reassured
the Hungarians, the masses were still tense and "reacting harshly." The Nagy
government did not know what to do, he explained: to shoot or not to shoot? They
summoned Andropov, who prevaricated, first telling them the troops were really
"railroad workers," later "wounded soldiers" being evacuated. "The government
has been thrown into a nervous state," Kdr said.
It is also telling that Kdr believed the Hungarian declaration of neutrality
resulted from Soviet behavior: "The whole government was inclined to think that if
the troops move toward Budapest, the city must be defended. In this atmosphere
the idea of neutrality arose. The initiator of it was Zoltn Tildy. Everyone supported
it," he told them. (Kdrs opportunism revealed itself when he took this
opportunity to let his Soviet colleagues know that he himself said no steps should be
taken without first speaking with Andropov).
470


469
Ibid.
470
RGANI, f. 3, o. 12, d. 1006, l. 26, "Protokol'naya Zapis' Zasedaniya Prezidiuma
TsK KPSS, 2-ogo noyabrya 1956 g."
As for the Soviet use of military force, Kdr voiced strong reservations.
"The armed forces could be deployed to support Hungary. But then there will be
skirmishes [stychki]. The use of military force will be destructive; blood will be
spilled. Then what will happen? The morale of the Communists will be reduced to
zero...The socialist countries will bear losses." Besides, Kdr added, will military
force really guarantee that a similar situation will not arise in the future in one of
the other bloc countries?
471

Despite these stated reservations against the use of military force, Kdr had
been thinking--if only half-seriously--about a Soviet intervention as early as July 14,
just four days before being admitted into the MDP Politburo. On that day he joked
to Mikoyan, Many say that the Soviet comrades often interfere in Hungarian
affairs and always unsuccessfully. Why not interfere in our situation now; maybe
this time it will be successful?
472
Later, on October 27, Kdr requested that the
Soviet leaders increase their troop levels for use in the Hungarian provinces.
473

When Antal Apr (deputy chairperson of the Hungarian Council of Ministers) told
Mikoyan during this same meeting on October 27 that the situation was becoming
stabilized on the periphery, Kdr --as well as Hegeds--looked skeptical.
474

However, in the Presidium session of November 2, Kdr did express his
conviction that Nagy's coalition government had lost authority, and this apparently

471
RGANI, f. 3, o. 12, d. 1006, l. 27ob, "Protokol'naya Zapis' Zasedaniya
Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 2-ogo noyabrya 1956 g."
472
RGANI, f. 3, o. 64, d. 483, l. 215. Zapis Besedy A. I. Mikoyana s Yanoshem
Kadarom, 14 iyulya 1956 g.
473.
RGANI, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 9, l. 3, "Informatsiya Mikoyana, 27 oktyabrya 1956
g."
474
Ibid.
had motivated him to shift his allegiance to the Soviet side. He told his Soviet
colleagues, "People will not consider the government to have any authority because
of the fact that it is a coalition government [Avtoritet pravitel'stva ne budet
uchityvat'sya iz-za koalitsionnovo pravitel'stva].
475
All [political] forces aim to
resurrect their parties. Each wants to get a grip on power. This further undermines
the government's authority."
476
Thirty-three years later, just three months before
his death of a lung ailment, Kdr confirmed this view during his conversations
with a journalist. "Nobody was listening to us anymore," he said.
477
Furthermore,
the demand for complete Soviet troop withdrawal was universal. At the November 3
emergency Presidium meeting in Moscow, Kdr had told the Kremlin officials: "I
agree with you;" "a socialist country must not capitulate to counterrevolution."
478

The next day, November 3, these reservations seemed to have intensified, and
Kdr appeared more open to the idea of a second Soviet military intervention.
"The counterrevolutionaries are killing [communists]," and Nagy just "shields" the
killers, he complained.
479
Kdr repeated this idea in his premortem interview. "I
already said earlier, and I still think, that Imre Nagy himself and his supporters did
not want a counterrevolution. However, one can't deny that Imre Nagy fell under
the influence of those participating in the events. That's the only way to explain why
he could not stand up to them, when there was a great need to. ....By October 30,

475
RGANI, f. 3, o. 12, d. 1006, l. 24, "Protokol'naya Zapis' Zasedaniya Prezidiuma
TsK KPSS, 2-ogo noyabrya 1956 g."
476
Ibid.
477
Jnos Kdr, Vgakarat (Budapest: Hirlapkiad, 1989). Cited in Musatov,
"Yanosh Kadar," p. 144.
478
RGANI, f. 3, o. 12, d. 1006, l 32ob, "Protokol'naya Zapis' Zasedaniya Prezidiuma
TsK KPSS, 3-ogo noyabrya 1956 g."
479
Ibid., l. 32.
lynching had already gone on. Innocent people were sacrificed....It was difficult to
reconcile such things with our goals."
480

However, he warned the Muscovites at the November 3 session that any new
post-invasion Hungarian government "must not be like a marionette
[marionetochnym]; it must have the support of the workers." Thus, they should
clarify Hungary's relationship with the USSR.
481


Role of Jnos Kdr in Nagy's Abduction, November 22, 1956
Kdr then was not initially as hawkish and subservient to the Kremlin
during the October-November 1956 events as earlier portrayed. He did not at first
advocate a massive Soviet military intervention, as the Malin notes reveal. However,
Kdr was deceitful in the one area where Western accounts have been more
forgiving of him: the abduction of the Nagy group.
This was especially disappointing to Tito. Kdr had given his word
concerning the safety of Nagy group after it left the Yugoslav Embassy in Budapest;
now he had turned out to be almost as deceitful as Rkosi. As early as the summer of
1956, Tito had favored Kdr as a possible replacement for Rkosi (Despite Kdr's
earlier role in the Rajk case).
482
As mentioned earlier, at the November 2-3 Brioni

480
Jnos Kdr, Vgakarat (Budapest: Hirlapkiad, 1989). Cited in Musatov,
"Yanosh Kadar," p. 144
481
RGANI, f. 3, o. 12, d. 1006, l. 33, "Protokol'naya Zapis' Zasedaniya Prezidiuma
TsK KPSS, 3-ogo noyabrya 1956 g."
482
AVP RF, f. 077, o. 37, papka 191, d. 39, l. 81, August 23, 1956. "About the
Activities of the Workers of the Yugoslav Mission in Budapest, Hindering the
Normalization of Hungarian-Yugoslav Relations From the Soviet Embassy in
Budapest." On July 23, 1956, Ger in a talk with Andropov said that Mikoyan
called him from Sofia, Bulgaria and reported that the Yugoslavs agreed not to
meeting, the Yugoslavs persuaded Khrushchev and Malenkov to choose Kdr
rather than Mnnich to head the new Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Government.
Kdr had languished in prison while Stalin and Rkosi were in power, whereas
Mnnich had been Hungarian ambassador to the USSR.
483
(This was clearly a wise
choice, since Mnnichalong with Kdr---participated in the plans to abduct the
Nagy group.)
484

Most writers have expressed the view that Kdr had not known about the
kidnapping plan and had disapproved of the Soviet treatment of Imre Nagy.
485
But
recently declassified documents indicate that Kdr commended the secret KGB
plan to arrest Nagy and the others the minute they stepped outside the Yugoslav
embassy.
486
Nagys continued presence in Hungary would inspire the Hungarian
"reactionaries," Kdr worried. He spoke often to Andropov of the need "to
demand a document from Nagy announcing his retirement [otstavka] as Hungarian
Prime Minister.
487
Rumors about an imminent American intervention vexed him as

support the hostile elements in the press and radio... Ger emphasized that if he
correctly understood comrade Mikoyan, the Yugoslav embassy considered the
candidacy of Ger as unacceptable for the post of First Secretary of the CC MDP,
where they would have liked to see Jnos Kdr or Zoltn Sznt." (emphasis added)
483
Miunovi, Moscow Diary, 135.
484
RGANI, f. 89, o. 2, d. 3, l. 11. "Yesterday, late last night, the negotiations of
comrades Kdr and Vidi were concluded....On the evening of November 22 Nagy
and his group must leave the Yugoslav embassy. Essential measures [neobkhodimye
mery] in connection with this have been prepared jointly by comrades Serov and
Mnnich." (emphasis added)
485
Marton, Forbidden Sky, 211.
486
RGANI, f. 89, o. 2, d. 5, ll. 3-4, "Information of Malenkov, Suslov, and Aristov,"
November 17, 1956. Kdr has agreed with these recommendations." (emphasis
added)
487
RGANI, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 34, L. 6, Proekt telegrammy posly USSR v
Budapeshte, 9 noyabrya 1956 g. "
well.
488
Sporadic gunfire could be heard in the outskirts of Budapest until
December and widespread passive resistance continued into 1957. To gain the
peoples' cooperation, Kdr had to resort to lies, namely, that he would share power
with Nagy as soon as Nagy returned from the Yugoslav embassy. Clearly, Kdr
wanted Nagy taken out of Hungary--not to Yugoslavia (technically a neutral
country), but to Romania (a loyal Soviet satellite).

Role of Romania
Until recently scholars could only wonder why Romania was chosen as the
place to which to deport the Nagy group. In 1956 Romania was considered one of
the most reliable Soviet allies. Khrushchev trusted the Romanian party leadership,
and the military and security services of the two countries cooperated closely. After
Stalins death in 1953 and Khrushchevs visit to Belgrade in 1955, Romanian-
Yugoslav relations were normalized quite quickly (in comparison to Hungarian-
Yugoslav relations, tainted as they were by Titos hatred of Rkosi). Ties were
resurrected during Titos visit to Bucharest from July 24 to 27, 1956. The Romanian
leaders promised to resettle near the Romanian-Yugoslav border the Serbian
minority that had been deported from there in the early 1950s as a result of the
Cominforms anti-Yugoslav resolutions. On October 20, the First Secretary of the
Romanian Workers Party, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, visited Belgrade.

488
RGANI, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 38, L 4, Postanovlenie Prezidiuma TsK KPSS: Ob
Otvete Yugoslavov na Vopros Nadya i ego Gruppe. "Kdr in a slightly worried
tone also said that information had reached him that the United States had begun
military mobilization. He requested that someone tell him whether there was any
truth to these rumors."
While Prime Minister, Imre Nagy had instituted a number of measures to
improve Hungarian-Romanian relations. For some reason he trusted Gheorghiu-
Dej. Unfortunately, with a sizeable Hungarian minority in Transylvania (numbering
today two million people or about 7. 2% of Romanias total population), Gheorghiu-
Dej, like Tito, had reason to worry about the Hungarian revolutions spillover
effects and thus to cooperate with the Khrushchev leadership. Recent scholarship
indicates that the Central Committee of the Romanian Workers Party met at noon
on October 24 and decided to increase censorship of students and intellectuals,
especially in Transylvania (Erdly). Bolyai University, the citadel of the Hungarian
intelligentsia in Transylvania, was closed in the fall of 1956. Hundreds were arrested
well into the 1950s under paragraph 327 of the Romanian criminal legal code for
public agitation.
489

Late in the evening on November 2, after his second conversation with
Andropov, Nagy summoned the Romanian ambassador Ion Popescu and informed
him that new Soviet troops were crossing the border into Hungary. Nagy asked to
consult with Gheorghiu-Dej. The Romanians quickly informed Aleksei Epishev, the
Soviet ambassador in Romania. Epishev then sent a telegram to Moscow, letting
CPSU Presidium leaders know that Gheorghiu-Dej had dispatched the Romanian
deputy foreign minister, Aurel Mlnan, by plane to Budapest to talk with
Nagy.
490
Mlnan (also former ambassador to Hungary from 1949 to 1952) and

489
Tfalvi Zoltn, Az 1956 os magyar forradalom visszhangja Romniban,
Erdlyben, Szzadok (1998), no. 5, p. 990. Also Mria Gl, Erdly, 1956 Mitosz
vagy trtnelem? Beszlgets dr. Vrhegyi Istvnnal, Szabadsg (Kolozsvr), vol 5,
no. 25 (June 24, 1994), p. 4.
490
RGANI, f. 3, o. 12, d. 1005, ll. 67-69. Chernovaya zapis telefonogramm A. A.
Walter Roman (Romanian security chief who knew Nagy from his Comintern
involvement in Moscow) arrived in Budapest the next day, November 3. Late that
evening, on the eve of the invasion, Nagy held lengthy discussions with these
Romanian officials. He requested that the Romanians serve as mediators between
the Budapest and Moscow governments, to help negotiate a withdrawal of Soviet
troops.
491
Since Khrushchev and Malenkov had already traveled to Bucharest in the
afternoon of November 2 and informed Gheorghiu-Dej, as well as the Czech and
Bulgarian leaders, about the impending invasion, the purpose of Mlnans visit
was probably simply to detain Nagy and keep him from obstructing the planned
invasion.
On November 22, the day the Nagy group was abducted, a Romanian
delegation composed of Gheorghiu-Dej, Walter Roman, Emil Bodnra, and Stoica
Chivu arrived in Budapest for a two-day visit.
492
On the last day of their visit, after
meetings with Suslov and Kdr, Gheorghiu-Dej gave a speech to the CC MSZMP
revealing his hope that Nagy could be persuaded to relinquish his prime
ministership and support Kdr:
Today we will travel home to see how Imre Nagy is accommodated. If he has
everything he needs [then] I can say that he [can be] calm, and in a good mood. On
the request of the worker-peasant revolutionary government, we gave asylum for
Imre Nagy and the others. They all arrived in Romania in good health. We created

Episheva iz Bukharesta, 3-ogo noyabrya 1956 g.
491
Corneliu Mihai Lungu and Mihai Retegan, 1956 Explozia: Perceptii Romne,
Iugoslave si Sovietice Asupra Evenimentelor Din Polonia si Ungaria (Bucuresti:
Editura Univers Enciclopedic, 1996), pp. 181-182. This volume contains the
declassified cables from the Romanian Foreign Ministry archive in Bucharest.
492
Emil Bodnras (1904-1976) was a member of the Romanian Politburo, deputy
chairman of the Council of Ministers, and Minister of Defense. Stoica Chivu was a
member of the Romanian Politburo and chairman of the Romanian Council of
Ministers.
suitable conditions for them so that they can be informed how order is restored in
Hungary and what the situation is like there. Certain people are of the opinion that
without Imre Nagy order and discipline cannot be restored in Hungary. The reality
is different. And we hope that if he has any honesty still left in him he will
acknowledge this. We hope that he will change his opinion.
493


Unfortunately, hypocrisy and betrayal are often more the rule than the exception in
politics. While Gheorghiu-Dej publicly assured his audience that Nagys visit in his
country was temporary and that he could soon return to Hungary, he cynically told
V. F. Nikolaev (a Soviet diplomat in Romania) on December 14:
In our opinion, Imre Nagy--an irreconcilable enemy of the Hungarian people and of
socialismcannot remain in Hungary, because hostile elements would gather
around him.We dont think we will leave Imre Nagy in Romania for the rest of his
life. As soon as the Hungarian peoples democratic government stabilizes, we will
transfer him to the Hungarian comrades, and we are convinced that he will be
hanged for the crimes he committed.
494


Nagys Exile in Romania
From November 23, 1956 until April 14, 1957, Nagy lived with his wife,
completely secluded from the other members in the group, in a heavily guarded
house in a large forest near Lake Snagov in Snagov, Romania just 28 miles from
Bucharest. Ironically, the Snagov Monastery, located in the middle of the lake, is the
alleged burial place of Vlad the Impaler (Jlad Jepes), fictionalized by British
novelist Bram Stoker as Dracula---a tyrant known for skewering his enemies and
feasting near their bodies, dipping his bread in jars of their blood and eating it.
495


493
MOL, M-KS-288-4/2..e. Jegyzknyv. Kszlt a Magyar Szocialista
Munksprt ltal 1956. november 24-n tartott Kzponti Bizottsgi lsrl.
494
Cited in Istvn Vida, Mirt Romania? Rubicon (1998), p. 26. Emphasis added.
495
For information on Nagys experience in Romania, the trial, and execution, see
A Fogoly, 1956-1958, pp. 170-437 in Jnos M. Rainer, Nagy Imre: Politikai
eletrajz, msodik ktet, 1953-1958 (Budapest: 1956-os Intzet, 1999).
Lukcs, Sznt and Vas were transferred to a separate villa in the same
region on January 24, and assigned "ideology instructors" under whose tutelage
they studied Marxism-Leninism for two or three hours a day. On the fourth day,
Lukcs was told to write an evaluation of the events in Hungary and forced to re-
write it ten times. On his return flight to Budapest in 1957, deputy minister of
internal affairs Andrs Tmpe tried to persuade Lukcs to make a public statement
supporting Kdr. When he refused, he was forbidden to make any statements.
496

Jzsef Rvai, the chief ideologue from Rkosis regime, called Lukcs and, when the
latter told him he planned to work on aesthetics, Rvai replied
You are working on aesthetics now, but you were into politics in October and
November. Now you are not willing to return to politics. Well, let me tell you that
even a dog cleans up his own filth before it moves on.
497


For the first two months of Nagys captivity a modicum of basic necessities
were provided. A doctor came regularly to treat both Imre Nagy (heart problems
and dizziness) and his wife (gall bladder and cardiac arrhythmia).
498
An
ophthalmologist examined them and prescribed glasses. They were promised a visit
by their grandchildren on February 1. Although forbidden to leave the premises,
Nagy could take daily walks along the lake. He received an assortment of
newspapers: Npszabadsg, Npakarat, Esti Hrlap, Pravda, lHumanit, and the

496
A compromise solution was apparently found between a public statement and no
statement, when Lukcs wrote a letter to Kdr stating something to the effect that
the November 4th assistance has restored the possibilities of socialism in
Hungary. See Lukcs Gyrgy snagovi levele Kdrhoz, Trsadalmi Szemle 4
(1990), 63-89. Information provided by Federigo Argentieri.
497
AMSZ (Warsaw) z. 7, t. 542, w. 65, s. 149-150. Informacja w sprawie Gyrgy
Lukcsa.
498
MOL, XX-5-h, 1 ktet, 1 doboz (1956-1957), Nagy Imre levele Roman Walterhz
Bucharest, 1957. februr 9, 2. old. Ceruza.
Romanian paper Elre. Once a week Romanian authorities would show a movie at
the house.
In late January these privileges ended. Nagy wrote to Walter Roman on
February 9:
Since late January our life has deteriorated. I have not received any newspapers
since January 27 except the Romanian Elre, which I receive lateI wrote three
letters home on December 23. None of them have been answered. Since January
no doctor has come to see us. I do not wish to complain, it is not my custom.I
am putting all this into words not for my own sake but for that of my wife, who
never took part in any political activities. She was not even a party member. She
had nothing to do with the things that have brought me and the other comrades
here. A doctor prescribed a strict diet for her, but now they leave out every
substance that could be regarded dietary and she has to eat what I eat.
499


Thus, Gheorghiu-Dejs promise to provide suitable conditions for the
Hungarian comrades so that that they can be informed how order is restored in
Hungary proved empty. Nagy also tried to help other innocent members in his
group:

The situation is the same in the case of 33 other people, 23 of whom are family
members (including 13 children, 8 of whom are of school age). The party cant be
indifferent towards their fate. It has been nearly three months since the group of 40
people arrived in Romania. Seven people have been separated and taken away by
now: Dr. Gyrgy Lukcs, Zoltn Sznt, Zoltn Vas and their wives, as well as
comrade Szilrd jhelyi.
500


It is no coincidence that living conditions sharply deteriorated in late
January. Soviet, Hungarian, and Romanian officials had begun to lose patience with
Nagy. Despite Romanian officials numerous attempts at persuasion, Nagy had

499
Ibid., 3. old.
500
MOL, XX-5-h, 1 ktet, 1 doboz (1956-1957), Nagy Imre levele a Magyar
Szocialista Munksprt Ideiglenes Kzponti Bizottsgnak, Bucharest, 1957.
februr. 23. old. Ceruza.
refused to recant. In contrast to the Polish leader Gomuka, who would have focused
on political positions, Nagy fixated on cogent arguments. He seemed to believe that,
if he could logically prove the correctness of his position, according to Marxist-
Leninist principles, then others would change their behavior. In his letters to the CC
MSZMP written during captivity in Snagov, he advocated "a thorough and
profound Marxist scientific and political analysis of the October-November
events."
501
Nagy apparently believed he could assist the Kdr government, if he
could receive newspapers and be kept informed:
I feel that, if I were aware of the situation in Hungary, I might be able to improve
the economic and political situation, which is still extremely tense.
502


Later, in one of the same letters from Romania, he claimed, "I consider myself still a
member of the MSZMP. I have never quit the party, and as far as I know, I was not
expelled from it."
503
Seemingly oblivious even to the possibility that he might soon
be hanged, Nagy assumed an almost pedantic "I-told-you-so" attitude toward his
future executioners:
[I]n July 1956...I talked to comrade Mikoyan in Budapest...I pointed out that Ern
Ger's appointment as first secretary would not solve the problem because neither
the party members nor the people accept him. I stated that the party and country
were heading towards a serious catastrophe that could only be prevented by
returning to the so-called "June Policy" [jniusi politika], with which the party and
the people would happily identify....I told comrade Mikoyan that Rkosi's
humiliating anti-national policies had caused more damage to Soviet-Hungarian
relations...than had Dulles and American propaganda. Comrade Mikoyan listened
to it all. If today, after the October events, he recalls this discussion, he will
definitely admit that many problems could have been prevented if he had taken my
words into account.
504


501
Ibid., 15. old.
502
Ibid., 14. old.
503
Ibid., 20. old.
504
Ibid., 30. old.

By January 27, 1957, Bodnra and others were ready to admit defeat. A note of
resignation could be detected in Bodnra words about the Nagy group as conveyed
by Epishev in a top secret telegram to Khrushchev and the other CC CPSU leaders
on that day:
For the whole period that they [the Nagy group] have been with us, they have had
ties only with the representatives of the Romanian Communist Party, who, in their
conversations with the group, have already exhausted a circle of questions.
505


While Bodnra assured the Soviet officials that Nagys group could remain in
Romania for as long as necessary, it would be expedient, he wrote, for the
Hungarian comrades to select 3 to 5 of their own trusted people to come to
Romania. They could maintain constant contact with the members of Nagys group
and to a certain extent prepare the soil for the conduct of the trial. In this way,
Nagy would be exposed as a betrayer of the interests of the people, and in
this way he would be brought to trial at the appropriate moment.
506

Gyula Kllai, a member of the CC MSZMP, in fact had arrived in
Bucharest on January 25, 1957 to question Nagy. He continued to
deceive Nagy into believing that the Kdr regime actually cared about
Nagys opinion. Put your ideas in writing, he urged Nagy.
507



505
RGANI, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 69, l. 2, Telegramma Yepisheva iz Bukharesta
Prezidiumu TsK KPSS, 27-ogo yanvarya 1957 g.
506
Ibid.
507
MOL, XX-5-h, 1 ktet, 1 doboz (1956-1957), Nagy Imre levele Roman Walterhz
Bucharest, 1957. februr 9, 5. old. Ceruza.
Timing of the Decision to Execute Nagy
Much debate has centered on the reasons for executing Nagy and the actual
timing of the decision. Did Khrushchev decide from the outset to kill Nagy after the
military intervention? If not, what factors compelled him to resort to this extreme
measure? Why was Nagy not executed until June 1958? One will recall that during
the CPSU Presidium session of October 31 the Kremlin anticipated Nagys
continued membership in a post-invasion regime, possibly as a deputy prime
minister.
508
Documents reveal also that Khrushchev expected Nagy to resign on
November 4 as prime minister, and that the security forces would be able to arrest
him (now that Nagy was again in the party and thus subject to control).
509
The
Soviet leaders had not expected Tito to shelter Nagy in his embassy, but rather to
coax the latter to resign. They also had not expected the Yugoslavs to complain
strongly about the abduction of the Nagy group. After all, Tito declared in his
speech at Pula on November 11 that Nagy had been at fault.
510

Instead, Nagy again slipped out of the Soviet leaders grasp. This enraged
Khrushchev. He told Gomuka and other Polish leaders on May 24, 1957 At 15
minutes past 4 oclock in the morning Zhukov went into action. We expected Imre

508
RGANI, f. 3, o. 12, d. 1005, l. 18 ob., "Protokol'naya Zapis' Zasedaniya
Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 31 oktyabrya 1956 g.," avtograf Malina.
509
AAN (Warsaw), KC PZPR, paczka 112, tom 26. Materiay do stosunkw
partyjnych polsko-radzieckich z lat 1954-1954, kart 685. (Discussion between PZPR
and KPSS, May 24-25, 1957.)
510
RGANI, F 89, Per 45, Dok 38, L.1-2, From the Central Committee of the
Yugoslav Communist Party, Brioni, to the First Secretary of the CC CPSU
Khrushchev, November 8, 1956. "It is true that during our conversation on Brioni
we agreed with your assessment, that the weakness of the Nagy government and its
actions led to the danger of the destruction of the essential socialist achievements in
Hungary.
Nagy to resign. But the scoundrel called for resistance, and he himself fled to the
Yugoslav Embassy.
511
Khrushchevs anger against Nagy intensified as Nagy
continued to refuse to resign as prime minister or sign any written statements
supporting Kdr, and as his own position as First Secretary was challenged by the
hardliners in the Kremlin in June 1957. As early as December 4, 1956 Zamchevskii
ordered his subordinates in the fifth European Division of the Soviet Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, to compile a comprehensive "reference report" [spravka] on Nagy
and the role of Yugoslavia in the 1956 events, in preparation for a possible trial. It
contained descriptions of events in Nagys biography that were considered
compromising or dubious.
512
This, along with Gheorghiu-Dejs comment to
Nikolaev on December 14, suggest that a trial and probably an execution were
inevitable; it was only a question of when, not whether, to schedule it. Certainly by
August 26 the Hungarian Politburo intended to apply the highest measure of
punishment [i.e. execution] to Nagy, Gza Losonczy, Ferenc Donth, Mikls Gimes,
Pl Malter, Jzsef Szilgyi, and Bla Kirly.
513

Publicly, Nagy was not immediately branded a traitor after the Soviet
intervention, however. In the early days of Kdrs regime, when a wall of hatred

511
AAN, KC PZPR, paczka 112, tom 26. Materiay do stosunkw partyjnych
polsko-radzieckich z lat 1954-1954, kart 685. (Discussion between PZPR and KPSS,
May 24-25, 1957.)
512
AVP RF, f. 077, o. 37, p. 191, d. 39, l. 82. I. K. Zamchevskii, "K Voprosu o
Podderzhke Imre Nadya i ego Politiki Yugoslavskimi Rukovoditelyami, 4-ogo
dekabrya 1956 g.
513
RGANI, f 89, per 45, dok 74, l. 1, Informatsiya Yu. V. Andropova, R. A.
Rudenko, P. I. Ivashutina v TsK KPSS, 26-ogo avgusta 1957 g. Incidentally,
Szilgyi was executed on April 24, 1958, almost two months before Nagy and his
supporters. His execution occurred right in the middle of the Yugoslav congress,
although the news was released only on June 17, 1958.
existed between it and the people, Kdr only said that Nagy had been weak. The
MSZMP Provisional Central Committee first met from December 2 to 5, 1956 and
issued a resolution on the causes of the counterrevolution. During the debates on
December 2, Kdr told his colleagues:

A very important cause of the events of October 23
rd
was the steady growth over the
previous years of one part of the party opposition, under the leadership of comrades
Nagy and Losonczy. They went overboard in their efforts to correct the mistakes of
the Rkosi-Ger clique. ...I am convinced that the opposition group led by the
comrades of Imre Nagy, especially the party members in the Writers and
Journalists Associations, and party members at universities, went so far in their
criticism as to become the ideological organizers of the armed revolt against state
institutions and the Hungarian Peoples Republic as a whole.
514


Kdr made a number of (overtly) genuine overtures to Nagy. On November 25 he
gave a speech in Budapest stating plainly We have no intentions to call Nagy and
his group to account for the events....This is not in the interests of the country; it is
not in the interests of consolidation. The issue is simple, he explained to his
audience. Without asking, Nagy left the country, since the Yugoslav embassy is
Yugoslav territory even when it is located here (in Budapest). Let them stay there
for several months, .....After that, they can return and support us.
515

In early January 1957, Kdr regime first called Nagy a traitor.
516

Accusations grew sharper as the first wave of trials against Hungarian insurgents
and writers proceeded. The first death sentence was pronounced on December 16

514
MOL 288. f. 4/3.. e. 2. old. Jegyzknyv. Kszlt a Magyar Szocialista
Munksprt Kzponti Vezetsge ltal 1956. december 2-n tartott lsrl.
515
RGANI, f 8, per 45, dok 52. ll. 7, 9. Vystuplenie Kadara, 25-ogo noyabrya 1956
g.
516
Mray, Thirteen Days, p. 257.
against a participant for concealing weapons.
517
On January 19, two key leaders
of the freedom fighters, Jzsef Duds and Jnos (Uncle) Szab were executed.
A month later, on February 22, 1957, Zamchevskii reported to his superiors
a conversation he had with the Hungarian Ambassador to the USSR, Jnos
Boldoczki, upon the latters return from a ten-day sojourn in Hungary. Boldoczki
told him that everyone in the country is starting to talk more about Imre Nagy, as
about a person who should be brought to trial.
518

Four days later, on February 26, Kdr reported to the CC of the MSZMP
that proceedings against Nagy had begun.
519
Despite his acute lack of resources,
Nagy in Bucharest astutely grasped the change in the MSZMPs policy. [After] the
February decision of the MSZMP Central Leadership, accusations have been hurled
at me and the so-called Nagy-Losonczy group The party leaders method
resembles that of the Rkosi--Ger clique They didnt draw their conclusions
from objective facts and historical truth. Instead they prove and explain their
statements according to their own political aims.
520

Despite his initiation of proceedings against Nagy, Kdr kept foreign
dignitaries and journalists guessing. Would there be a trial for Nagy? If so, would it
be open or closed? On February 27 a spokesman for the Hungarian Foreign
Ministry said The Government has no intention of bringing Imre Nagy to

517
Litvn, ed., The Hungarian Revolution of 1956, p. 187.
518
RGANI, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 66, l. 1, Iz Dnevnika I. K. Zamchevskogo, Zapis
Besedy s Vengerskim Poslom Yanoshem Boldotskim 16-ogo fevralya 1957, 22
fevralya 1957.
519
Litvn, ed., The Hungarian Revolution of 1956, 187.
520
MOL, XX-5-h, 1 ktet, 1 doboz (1956-1957), Nagy Imre levele a Magyar
Szocialista Munksprt Ideiglenes Kzponti Bizottsgnak, Bucharest, 1957.
mrcius 18. 9 old. Ceruza.
trial.
521
On March 7, 1957, Rvai violently criticized the party leadership for
treating Nagy the traitor with such patience.
522
Again, amazingly, Nagy spotted
this in Rvais article in Npszabadsg on March 8, 1957 entitled Ideological
Acquittal. Rvai is trying to restore deeply rooted dogmatic and anti~Marxist
views, Nagy fumed. He was the main ideologist of the Rkosi-Ger clique.
523

Before a group of foreign journalists on April 4, Kdr again stated that, in view of
the delicacy of the situation, there would be no trial of Nagy.
524

Yet, that same month (April 14, 1957), Nagy was formally arrested and
brought back to Budapest in preparation for a trial. After the Polish-Soviet summit
on May 24-25, 1957, Polish officials realized Khrushchev and the Hungarians
intended to hold Nagy accountable for the counterrevolution, but they were not
sure when the trial would take place or whether it would be open or closed.
Gomukas apprehension probably helped to convince Khrushchev and Kdr to
delay the trial. He told Khrushchev, Imre Nagy was certainly not an imperialist
traitor. Besides, a single man would not have been able to provoke all that. That
doesnt matter, Khrushchev replied. Whether he was an agent in the legal sense or
not, and whether he got money for it, that is irrelevant, because he pursued
subversive activities. He was the banner. Kopcsi, the head of the police, did what
Imre Nagy ordered him to do, and Kopcsi had Communists hanged.... The
Americans backed Imre Nagy. They said terror must be curbed. Skeptical,

521
Mray, That Day in Budapest, p. 258.
522
Ibid.
523
MOL, XX-5-h, 1 ktet, 1 doboz (1956-1957), Nagy Imre levele a Magyar
Szocialista Munksprt Ideiglenes Kzponti Bizottsgnak, Bucharest, 1957.
mrcius 18. 10 old. Ceruza.
524
Mray, That Day in Budapest, p. 258.
Gomuka said There will be great outrage. Khrushchev shrugged this off. Yes,
there will...Our enemies will shout in protest, [but] our friends will understand that
he played a traitors role.
525

By June 6, Polish ambassador to Hungary Willman was still unsure about
the trial. He reported back to Warsaw The information we have gathered so far...
is not enough to say for sure whether or not the trial will be held. He added,
however, that Henrik Vas, director of the Kossuth publishing house, told
Moszczeski (Polish editor of 1rybuna Wolnosi) that a book about 500 pages long
had been published for the MSZMPs internal use, discussing all aspects of Nagy's
activities. (This referred to the White Book published by the Kdr regime; the
fourth volume, published in November 1957, contained a whole chapter on the
counter-revolutionary activity of Imre Nagy).
526
In a different telegram on the
same day, Willman also informed Korolczyk, deputy director of the first
department of the Polish Foreign Ministry (Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych), that
the membership of Kdrs MSZMP consisted of about 340,000 members, which
was almost 38% of the membership of Rkosis MDP.
527
A week later Vas told
Moszczeski that an open trial [of Nagy] is to be expected.
528



525
AAN, KC PZPR, paczka 112, tom 26. Materiay do stosunkw partyjnych
polsko-radzieckich z lat 1954-1954, kart 685. (Discussion between PZPR and KPSS,
May 24-25, 1957.)
526
AMSZ (Warsaw), z. 7, t. 542, w. 65, s. 152, Pismo ambasadora Willmanna do
dyr. generalnej Wierna z dnia 6 czerwca 1957 r.
527
AAN 237/XXII841, s. 25. Telegram from Willman to Korolczyk, deputy
director of the First Department of the Polish Foreign Ministry, June 6, 1957.
528
AMSZ, Z. 7, T. 542, W. 65, s. 34, Notatka ze spotkania J. Moszczeskiego z
Henrykiem Vasem odbytego 17 czerwca 1957 r.
Anti-Party Group
In the meantime, back in Moscow, Malenkov had joined forces with Molotov
and other Stalinists to try to oust Khrushchev--thus revealing that, in fact, the post-
Stalin succession struggle had not yet been fully resolved. Together, Malenkov,
Molotov and Kaganovich orchestrated a Presidium vote to dismiss Khrushchev on
June 18. They had planned to demote him to the post of Minister of Agriculture. On
that day Khrushchev was scheduled to meet with Hungarian journalists, but the
coup plotters demanded that the Presidium convene (on the pretext of deciding who
would deliver speeches at the upcoming 250
th
anniversary of the foundation of
Leningrad.)
529

Only three members, Suslov, Mikoyan, and Ekaterina Furtseva, supported
Khrushchev. Khrushchev cagily demanded a vote by the entire Central Committee
and coaxed Marshal Zhukov to rush Khrushchevs supporters to Moscow from the
far-flung regions of the USSR via Army transport planes. Zhukhov also assisted
Khrushchev by threatening to release documents proving the complicity of Molotov,
Kaganovich, and Malenkov in the Stalinist purge years. (Molotov in retirement
claimed it was Khrushchev who most feared exposure of his actions in the Stalinist
years; he himself had no regrets).
530
The Plenum convened from the 22
nd
to 29
th
of

529
P. G. Pikhoya, Sovetskii Soyuz: Istorii Vlasti, 1945-1991 (Moskva Izdatelstvo
RAGS, 1998), s. 173.
530
I have defended Stalin and defend him today, including the terror. I believe
that, without terror, we wouldn't have gotten through the prewar period, and after
the war we wouldn't have had a more or less stable situation in the country. See Sto
Sorok Besed s Molotvym: Iz Dnevnika Feliksa Chuyeva (Moskva: Terra, 1991), p.
338.
June, 1957.
531
The Central Committee overturned the Presidium vote. Molotov was
appointed Soviet ambassador to Mongolia; Malenkov as director of a power station
in Central Asia; and Kaganovich as director of a cement factory in Sverdlovsk.
(Four months later, Zhukov was then expelled from the Presidium and CPSU at the
October 1957 Plenum and isolated until his death in 1975. Newly released KGB and
military documents reveal that Zhukovs telephone was bugged in 1963 when the
latter cursed the Soviet leaders for what they had done to him. The KGB almost
arrested him).
532

Although Khrushchev survived this coup attempt, his rivals accusations
impressed upon him the need for a stricter, more consistent foreign policy. Just a
few days before the plenum, Molotov had rebuked Khrushchev for conducting a
policy of dangerous zigzags" [provodit liniyu opasnykh zigzagov] in foreign affairs.
533

Later, at the evening session of the plenum, June 25, Andrei Gromyko (then first
deputy minister of foreign affairs) used the Hungarian example in support of
Khrushchev:
In the absence of unity, it is easier for enemies to throw us [podbrosit] another
Hungary and a second edition of 17 June 1953--the events in the GDR. They can say
to us: fine, the Russian people have shown that more than once in complicated

531
In 1995 the Moscow-based Russian State Archive of Contemporary History
(Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Noveishii Istorii or RGANI) declassified opis
(inventory) number 1 of fond (reserve or fund) number 2, containing the transcripts
of fifty-one CC CPSU Plenums from May 5, 1941 to March 26, 1966. The
transcripts for the June 1957 Plenum are contained in dela (files) 222-259.
532
See RGANI, f. 3, o. 16, d. 948, l. 8, Zapiska KGB no. 1447-c ot 27-ogo maya 1963
g. See also the two-part article by V. P. Naumov, Delo Marshala G. K. Zhukova.
1957 g, Novaya i Noveishaya Istoriya, no. 5 (2000), ss. 87-108 and no. 1 (2001), ss.
79-99.
533
RGANI, f. 2, o. 1, d. 259, l. 2. "Plenum TsK KPSS, iyun' 1957 goda:
Stenograficheskii otchet, Zasedaniye Pervoe, 22-ogo iyunya.
circumstances they close ranks; the leadership also closes ranks, and victory is
thereby assured.
534


Khrushchev, having himself already resolved to punish Nagy in some way,
most likely interpreted this close call as a green light to execute Nagy. In this way he
could a) exhibit his toughness as a leader, thus further reinforcing his newly won
status; b) signal to the remaining hardliners in the Kremlin his intention to pursue a
more cautious policy in Eastern Europe from then on; c) show deference to the
Chinese Communist Party d) lessen Kdrs anxieties and e) avenge the Yugoslavs
for sheltering Nagy.
In the spring of 1956 Mao Zedongs policy of letting a hundred flowers
bloom had engendered a spurt of dissident weeds that needed hasty extraction.
Like Khrushchev, Mao and his colleagues in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
were heavily censured for inviting this criticism and behaving too leniently.
Consequently, the Chinese again became unflinchingly strict against rightist
deviationism. (In a conversation with Soviet charg d'affaires in Beijing Abrasimov
on July 3, 1957, Mao characterized the rightists as a snake which has slithered out
of the earth, scented danger, and wants to slither back in, but has been strongly
seized by the tail.)
535
Mao and his followers attacked the Yugoslav Communist
Party in their newspapers and meetings even more vigorously than did the Soviet
leaders. Maos influence on the Khrushchev leadership steadily increased after the

534
RGANI, f. 2, o. 1, d. 259, ll. 45-65. "Plenum TsK KPSS, iyun' 1957 goda:
Stenograficheskii otchet, Zasedaniye Pyatoe, Vechernee, 25-ogo iyunya. See also
Poslednyaya Antipartiinaya Gruppa, Istoricheskii Arkhiv 5(1993), s. 25.
535
AVP RF, f. 0100, o. 50, p. 424, d. 8, Iz Dnevnika P. A. Abrasimova, Zapiski
Besedy s pervym sekretarem KNR, 3-ogo iyulya 1957, 9-ogo iyulya 1957 g.
Soviet military intervention in Hungary---and especially after the Chinese leaders
strongly supported Khrushchev in the struggle against the Malenkov-Molotov anti-
party group.
536

Moving ahead expeditiously on the trial and execution would also soothe
Jnos Kdr, who never felt entirely secure in his new role with Nagys existence a
constant threat to his authority. Like Khrushchev, he longed for closure on the Nagy
case. In fact a closed trial would have taken place as early as September 1957 had
the Soviet Union not told the Hungarians to delay it. Colonel Jzsef Ferencsik, chief
investigator of the eighth department in the Hungarian Ministry of the Interior
officially concluded the investigation of Nagy on August 17, 1957 but then resumed
the investigation on September 13, claiming that other crimes were discovered.
537

In August Bla Biszku, Kdrs Minister of Internal Affairs, had informed
Andropov (now head of the CC CPSU department for ties with the communist and
workers parties of all the socialist countries) of his governments plans for Nagys
trial. Referring to a Soviet-Yugoslav meeting in Romania on August 1 and 2,
Andropov explained to the CPSU Presidium in a telegram on August 29:
It is well-known that the Yugoslav comrades during the recent meeting in Romania
protested against the organization of the Nagy case, declaring that it will inevitably
lead to a deterioration of relations between Hungary and Yugoslavia. It would thus
be very important to conduct this case in such a way that the planned improvements
in Yugoslav relations with the other socialist countries be harmed as little as
possible. In this respect it is very important to choose the time of Nagys case
correctly.
538



536
Mray, That Day in Budapest, pp. 261-2.
537
MOL XX-5- h, 13. doboz, 8. ktet, 96 old., 1957 augusztus 17-n, Vizsglati
iratok, and 123/a, szeptember 13-n.
538
RGANI, f. 89, per. 45, dok.75, l. 2, Zapiski Andropova v TsK KPSS, 29-ogo
avgusta 1957 g.
It would be best to postpone the trial until January or February 1958, Andropov
continued, because the Hungarian question is still on the agenda of the United
Nations. Sentencing Nagy would bring the issue back to the front pages of the
worlds newspapers. Although Khrushchev had told Gomuka back in late May
1957 that he did not care about the publicity, he was more sensitive to this now.
Having ousted Molotov (another leader on Titos blacklist for his role in the 1948
witch hunt), Khrushchev was feeling more optimistic in August 1957 about the
chances for a rapprochement with Tito. Andropov noted this improvement in his
August 26 telegram:
In the beginning of August, 1957 a favorable trend has been observed on the part of
the state and party organs and the press in Yugoslavia toward the development of
friendship and cooperation with the USSR and other socialist countries. As
Rankovi said recently in a conversation with an employee of our embassy in
Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav government intends seriously to deepen ties of friendship
and cooperation with the CPSU.
539


Furthermore, Andropov argued, it would be wise to postpone the trial because of
the imminent meeting in Moscow of all communist parties (November 7). During
this conference, Kdr consulted with all the communist leaders, except the
Yugoslavs, about Nagy's upcoming execution. Gomuka alone among the communist
leaders opposed the execution, as he had earlier in May. The Italian leader Togliatti
endorsed the execution, but requested that Kdr wait until after the Italian
elections, which were scheduled for May 25, 1958. Kdr agreed to honor the
request.
540


539
RGANI, f 89, per 45, dok 74, l. 2, Informatsiya Yu. V. Andropova, R. A.
Rudenko, P. I. Ivashutina v TsK KPSS, 26-ogo avgusta 1957 g.
540
See Jegyzknyv a KB 1957. november 29-n tartott ulsrol, in Karola Vgyi
Nmethn, Lszl Soos, Gyrgy Varga, Gbor Ujvari, eds. A Magyar Szocialista
Andropov also pointed out that, given the recent improvement in relations,
the upcoming Seventh Conference of the Union of Communists of Yugoslavia in
November takes on a special meaning. The decisions of this conference will
undoubtedly affect the further development of relations of Yugoslavia with the
USSR and other socialist countries, especially along party lines.
541
To avoid
alienating Tito, we should not sentence Nagy before this meeting, he explained.
However the participation of the Yugoslav comrades in the meeting...can influence
them to revise their mistaken positions on the Hungarian question in its entirety.
One can suppose that after the meeting, the Yugoslavs will relate to the fact of
Nagys case in a less sensitive way. Andropov craftily hinted that the Yugoslavs
might be blackmailed into silence about Nagys execution Before the trial we intend
to warn the Yugoslavs that if they accuse the Hungarian government of violating
the agreement not to hold Nagy responsible for criminal activities, we will publish a
political memorandum disclosing all the compromising material on Yugoslavia that
the Ministry of Internal Affairs has.
542
Finally, Andropov added that the political
situation in Hungary was still too unstable; the Kdr regime should wait two or
three months.
543

Kdr dutifully followed the Soviet officials advice, although he proceeded
to sentence on November 13, 1957 the famous dissident writers Tibor Dry (nine

Munksprt kzponti Bizottsgnak 1957-1958.evi jegyzknyvei (Budapest, MOL
1997), pp. 119-147. I thank Federigo Argentieri for this information.
541
RGANI, f. 89, per. 45, dok.75, l. 2, Zapiski Andropova v TsK KPSS, 29-ogo
avgusta 1957 g.
542
RGANI, f 89, per 45, dok 74, l. 2, Informatsiya Yu. V. Andropova, R. A.
Rudenko, P. I. Ivashutina v TsK KPSS, 26-ogo avgusta 1957 g.
543
RGANI, f. 89, per. 45, dok.75, l. 2, Zapiski Andropova v TsK KPSS, 29-ogo
avgusta 1957 g.
years), Gyula Hy (six years), Zoltn Zelk (three years), and Tibor Tardos (eighteen
months). Later on December 10 Antal Plinks-Pallavicini, commander of the tank
unit which freed Cardinal Mindszenty, was executed, followed by Lszl Ivn-
Kovcs, one of the insurgents from the Corvin Alley, where some of the heaviest
fighting took place. On January 28, 1958, when the Kdr regime received the go-
ahead signal to begin the trial of Nagy, the public prosecutor formally presented
charges against Nagy and his accomplices. Based on these accusations, the first
session of the trial was held on February 6, 1958.
544

However, the process stalled again the very next day, presumably because
the Kremlin leaders hoped again for a rapprochement in Hungarian and Soviet
relations with Yugoslavia. On March 27 and 28, 1958, Kdr met Tito at
Karadjordjevo, just across the Hungarian border.
545
They discussed economic and
ideological cooperation between the two countries, the issue of an atom-free zone in
Southeast Europe, and the case of Imre Nagy. Apparently Kdr assured Tito that
Nagy would not be tried. Certainly Yugoslavia would not be held accountable for
the events of October-November 1956, Kdr promised. The meeting appears to
have gone well, since Khrushchev omitted any castigation of Nagy from the official

544
Litvn, ed., The Hungarian Revolution of 1956, p. 187.
545
For the excerpts of the Yugoslav minutes of this meeting in Karadjordjevo, see
Jzsef Kiss, Zoltn Ripp, and Istvn Vida, eds., Top Secret: Magyar-Jugoszlav
Kapcsolatok, 1956 Dokumentok (Budapest: MTA Jelenkor Kutat Bizottsg, 1997),
pp. 295-96. These excerpts were as published in a White Book on the Nagy affair
in October 1958. The Hungarian minutes have apparently not been located. See also
Bennett Kovrig, Communism in Hungary from Kun to Kdr (Stanford: Hoover
Institution Press, 1979), p. 336. Mray hypothesizes that Tito tied to persuade Kdr
to pursue a policy more independent of the USSR, akin to that of Gomuka. This
angered Khrushchev when he heard about it from Kdr during his April 1958 trip
to Budapest. Mray, Thirteen Days that Shook the Kremlin, p. 260.
text of his speech in Budapest where he visited in April 1958 to commemorate the
liberation of Hungary.
546

The very brief but positive trend in Soviet-Yugoslav and Hungarian-
Yugoslav relations noticeable beginning in August 1957 ended abruptly, however,
during the Seventh Congress of the Yugoslav League of Communists, April 22-26,
1958. In preparation for this congress, Titos regime published its draft program on
March 13. This program, referred to as Yugoslavias Way, ruffled Soviet feathers
with its objurgation of unequal relations among socialist countries and the
Manichean division of the world. This publication, in addition to the Yugoslavs
refusal to sign the declaration presented during the Moscow Conference of
Communist Leaders on November 7, 1957, greatly influenced the timing of Nagys
execution. Imre Nagy became the human sacrifice, ushering in a renewed cold war
between Yugoslavia and the communist bloc. As argued earlier, however,
Khrushchev and others had already decided to kill Nagy (or at least punish him
harshly) once they realized he would not resign or support Kdr, and had also
planned to cast blame on Yugoslavia for fomenting counterrevolution if necessary.
After a secret trial, Nagy was executed by hanging on June 16, 1958, at age
62. A stubborn idealist to the end, his final words were I do not appeal to the court
for clemency. The news was broadcast by radio on June 16, 1958 at 12 midnight
local Budapest time and published in the press on June 17, 1958. On June 24, Soviet
diplomat Astafiev reported to Dedushkin at the Soviet Foreign Ministry:

546
See Khrushchevs speech on April 9, 1958 in Npszabadsg (April 10, 1958). It
did not refer to the Nagy affair.
The sentence of Nagy and his accomplices attracted a lot of attention in Budapest.
After several hours in the morning, it was impossible to buy in the kiosks a
newspaper containing the report about the judicial process. In the capital small
groups of people gathered squares and parks and collectively read the report.
Workers and peasants asked the representatives of the party organizations: why
was the sentence carried out earlier than it was published in the papers? Why was it
a closed trial? Why weren't the party organizations informed before the publication
of the report? Where was the trial held and where was the sentence carried out--in
Hungary or in Romania?

Astafiev downplayed this public reaction:

In the opinion of the Hungarian comrades, the population of the country will devote
attention to the sentence of Imre Nagy and his accomplices for four or five days, and
then the issue will lose its meaning.
547


The Yugoslavs outrage would last longer than four or five days. The day after the
execution, the new Yugoslav ambassador to Hungary, Jovo Kapii, angrily
described the Nagy trial as just "another link in the chain of the new anti-Yugoslav
campaign, being conducted by the USSR and other bloc countries."
548
Tito and his
colleagues were keenly aware of the similarities between the Nagy trial and the Rajk
trial nine years earlier.
549



547
RGANI, f 89 per 45 dok 77, l. 12, Telefonogramma ot Astafieva v Budapeshte
Dedushkinu, MID SSSR, 24-ogo iyunya 1958 g.
548
AVP RF, f. 077, o. 38, por 14, papka 193, From the Diary of V. K. Gulevskii,
Attach, and V. Astafiev, Temporary Charg D'Affaires, "Notes of a Conversation
with Jnos Pter, Hungarian First Deputy Foreign Minister and Istvn Sebes,
Hungarian Deputy Foreign Minister, June 17, 1958. Pter told Gulevskii about a
recent talk he had with Jovo Kapii, the Yugoslav ambassador to Hungary.
Kapii had just learned about Nagy's sentence and execution. Pter told Kapii
that other material--about the role of Yugoslavia in the Hungarian events--would be
included in the report of the Nagy execution. Pter warned that if the Yugoslav
government begins to attack Hungary, then "Hungary will be forced to publish
other materials in its possession."
549
RGANI, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 77, l. 8, Telefonogramma po VCh no. 197 Astafieva
iz Budapeshta v MID SSSR (P. S. Dedushkin) s prilozheniem: tekst yugoslavskii
noty, vruchennoi MID VNR 23 iyunya s.g. yugoslavskim poslom Kapichichem,
perevod s vengerskogo, 24 iyunya 1958 g.
"Normalization": Peace Reigns?
The passive resistance of the Hungarian population was bound to continue as
long as Imre Nagy remained in Hungary, or even alive in Romanian captivity. Once
Nagy was dead, Soviet and Hungarian authorities thought, the Hungarian people
would lose their banner and counterrevolutionary dreams. Attempts by
communist authorities to pretend all was back to normal were transparent.
If you were a Soviet citizen, picking up your morning issue of Pravda on
November 6, 1956, this is the TASS report from Budapest you would have read, under
the headline "About the Situation in Hungary:"
The Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Government of Hungary enjoys the broad
support of the national masses. According to the reports from the provinces, order and
peace is established (vodvoriaiutsia). The workers councils of Szombathely,
Nagykanizsa, Szolnok, and other cities declare their support for the Revolutionary
Worker-Peasant Government. In many cities industrial enterprises have started to
operate; public transport has been put into action. In a number of regions railroad
operations have been restored.

Two days later, on November 8, you would have spotted the following article, similarly
titled:
The situation in the country with every hour takes on a more normal character.
Peace reigns in the capital as in the majority of regions in the provinces.
Government institutions are taking measures for the provision of uninterrupted
supplies for the population.

Articles on Hungary in Pravda, Izvestia, and other newspapers in the first few
days of November, 1956, were invariably located on the last page, dwarfed by
voluminous diatribes against the "imperialist aggression in Egypt" (Ruki Proch ot
Egipta! [Hands off Egypt]), and gala commemorations of the Great October
Revolution of November 7.
550

In truth, the situation was anything but halcyon in Hungary in late 1956.
Normalization proceeded much more slowly than the West believed, due in part to the
persistence of small-scale fighting; the passive resistance of the Hungarian population
(including demonstrations, strikes, and sabotage); fuel shortages; Hungarian
resentment of Soviet advisors; the security vacuum that resulted from the dissolution
of the secret police (VH); disagreements between the Kdr and Khrushchev
regimes about the pace and scale of the mass arrests and deportations; lack of
coordination between the KGB and the MVD in carrying out the arrests; and lack of
prison space.
551

In sharp contrast to the official newspapers, KGB Chief Serovs top secret
reports to Moscow did not conceal these problems. He pointed out that the
revolutionary committees were stockpiling weapons for a second attack; the majority
of enterprises were not working; the local organs of power were barely operating; the
workers' councils created under Nagy were "under the influence of provocateurs;" the
printing offices were refusing to print pro-Soviet newspapers; and students were

550.
British and French paratroopers landed at Port Said early in the morning of Nov.
5, 1956.
551
While this chapter will draw heavily on Soviet archival documents, a number of
recent secondary works on the Soviet normalization process in Hungary are also
useful to consult. See, for example, Tibor Huszr and Jnos Szab, Restaurci vagy
kiigazts: a kdri represszi intzmnyeslse 1956-1962 (Budapest: Zrnyi Kiad,
1999) and Tibor Zinner, A kdri megtorls rendszere (Budapest: Hamvas Intzet,
2001).
spreading leaflets and "agitating among the workers."
552
Losses in retail and
wholesale trade from plunder allegedly amounted to 1 billion forints. Out of that sum
goods costing 550 million forints were stolen, and equipment costing 450 forints was
destroyed, according to the Hungarian minister of trade.
553

Kdr himself had told Andropov on November 9: "[N]ormal life in Hungary
is returning slowly. So far there are no ties with the periphery or with enterprises. A
significant part of the workers would like to start working again, but they fear revenge
from the bandits."
554

Mikoyan and Suslov shared Kdr's opinion. On November 13, they wrote to
the Kremlin from Budapest: "The process of normalization is going a lot more slowly
in Budapest, where at the present moment there is still no normal life. . . .[M]any
factories still are not working. . . . [A]mong [the workers] is now a very strong
chauvinist and anti-Soviet mood."
555

Their anxiety was contagious. "Like you, we are worried about the slowness of
the restoration [nalazhivanie] of normal life in Hungary, and especially in Budapest,"
wrote the CPSU Central Committee members to Kdr.
556


552.
RGANI, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 41, lL. 1--2: "Notes of Serov on November 11, 1956," to
the CPSU (Khrushchev).
553.
AVP RF, f. 077, o. 37, por 10, p. 188, l. 273, from the diary of A.P. Kovalev, advisor
of the Soviet Embassy in Hungary, "Notes of a Conversation with Hungarian Minister
of Trade Taus," Dec. 18, 1956.
554.
RGANI, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 34, l. 5: "Telegram from the Soviet Ambassador
Andropov in Hungary to Malenkov, Zhukov, Aristov, Pospelov, and Gromyko," Nov.
9, 1956.
555..
RGANI, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 43, l. 11.
556.
RGANI, f. 89, per. 45, dok 39, l. 2: "Excerpts from Protocol 54 of the CC CPSU
Presidium Session."
The military skirmishes did not abate until about November 12, and even then
"small bands" of insurgents roamed at large, needing to be "liquidated (arrested or
executed). Three CPSU Presidium members reported: "After November 12, our
troops were no longer conducting any military operations. There were only separate
brigades in the provinces, and our troops are pursuing small bands of insurgents with
the goal of liquidating them. In Budapest itself there were no armed demonstrations,
even by single individuals."
557

When the military phase was over, a new set of problems arose for the Soviet
army and the KGB, further thwarting their "normalization" efforts: the passive
resistance of the Hungarian population. The workers used new, political methods
against the Kdr government. "Having lost the opportunity to lead a struggle against
the government by military means," Mikoyan, Suslov, and Aristov complained on
November 22, "the reactionary forces are using new methods in their
counterrevolutionary goals, above all strikes and sabotage. Last week the reaction
tried to draw into a general strike the majority of blue and white collar workers in the
main branches of industry and the railroads."
558

On the day after this telegram of November 22, an "hour of silence" was
announced, to commemorate the Hungarian uprising. In Serov's words:
[L]eaflets appeared, in which it was written 'All, who are against the Kdr
government, must not come out on the street from 2 to 3 P.M. on November 23; the
empty streets will show Kdr and our well-wishing friends-the Russians-that they are
not wanted here.' As a result, almost the entire population of Budapest deserted the
streets, which were empty from 2 to 3 P.M. Inhabitants, who were in the streets at 2:00

557.
RGANI, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 49, l. 3: "Information of Malenkov, Suslov, and
Aristov," to the CC CPSU Presidium, Nov. 22, 1956.
558.
Ibid.
P.M. suddenly went into buildings and the courtyards of the buildings and stood there
until 3 P.M.
559


Moreover, as of November 22, there was an acute shortage of fuel and electrical
energy in Hungary. Malenkov, Suslov, and Aristov reported to Moscow:
The coal mines in the country that produced up to 80 thousand tons of coal in a 24-
hour period in normal times, now are producing only 2-3 thousand tons. The majority
of mines work at only 10 to 15 percent of their capacity. There are almost no supplies
of coal in industries and on the railroads. Despite the daily requirement in electrical
energy of 900 megawatts, only 300 megawatts are produced.
560


Even when the economy began to improve and the majority of workers
returned to the factories, pro-Soviet Hungarians were surreptitiously squeezed out of
jobs, or at least harassed, as late as July 1957. The novelist and playwright Bla Ills
for example, had a talk with Soviet diplomat L. F. Ilichev, in which he warned that
"there is still a very strong anti-Soviet mood in Hungary among all types of people:
intelligentsia, peasants, workers, and even in the Kdr government." Ills recounted
his experience of arriving at a Hungarian radio station, ready to expound on Soviet
literature and being asked to extemporize on French literature instead.
561

Thus, due to this instability, it is not surprising that the Central Committee of
the MSZMP delayed judicial proceedings against Nagy and his group until April 1957,
and that the court trial did not take place until June 1958.
562
Clearly, Moscow had a
serious problem: how could order be reestablished in Hungary? In the months

559.
RGANI, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 51, l. 3, "Notes of Serov," from Nov. 24, 1956.
560.
RGANI, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 49, l. 5: "Information of Malenkov, Suslov, and
Aristov," to the CC CPSU Presidium, Nov. 22, 1956.
561.
RGANI, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 73: from the diary of L. F. Ilichev, "Notes of a
Conversation with Hungarian Writer Bla Ills," July 30, 1957.
562.
RGANI, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 69, l. 2: "Protocol 80 of the CC CPSU Presidium
Session on March 4, 1957, with Enclosed Telegram from A. Epishev from Bucharest,
Romania, to Khrushchev and the CC CPSU," Jan. 27, 1957.
following the intervention, the Soviet leaders took several measures. They shipped coal
and other essential goods and resources to Hungary.
563
They invited delegations of
Hungarian students, workers, and party officials to the USSR. They arranged
scholarly exchanges between the Soviet and Hungarian Academies of Sciences. They
built monuments in the USSR honoring foreign Communists, including Hungarians,
who participated in the 1917 October Revolution. Finally, they influenced the Kdr
government to dismiss all those officials who had "displayed instability, hesitation, or
an openly counterrevolutionary, anti-Soviet disposition."
564

There were at least four major phases of the Soviet normalization effort: the
dispatch of advisors, mass arrests and deportations, restructuring the Hungarian
security organs, and "legitimizing" the presence of Soviet troops in Hungary.

In the two months following the second intervention on November 4, the
Soviet Presidium sent more than seventy advisors and three Central Committee
members to Hungary. As the problems of normalization grew more complex, more
advisors, from different fields of expertise, were dispatched.
In the first week following the crackdown, on November 10, Moscow decided
to send Suslov and Aristov and a small group of economic workers to Budapest. By

563.
RGANI, f. 5, op. 28, rolik 5195: "Notes of a Conversation with the Deputy
Secretary of the United Nations Phillippe de Seine, and the Representative of the
International Red Cross, Meyer." See also RGANI, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 58, l. 1--6, N.
Ivanov, Head of the Department on Economics in Europe, "Reference About Free Aid
Given to Hungary by Other Countries."
564.
RGANI, f. 5, op. 28, rolik 5195, d. 479: "Notes of a Conversation of Ambassador
Andropov with the Hungarian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Kroly Szarka,"
Jan. 29, 1957. This "shuffling of cadres" [peretasovka kadrov] applied, for instance, to

the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where diplomats to the USSR, China,
France, Belgium, Austria, the United States, etc. were all replaced.
November 12 Suslov and Aristov had arrived; Malenkov also arrived on November
15.
565
To help Serov process more quickly the cases of the prisoners held in the
Uzhgorod and Stryj prisons, the KGB sent "two groups of qualified investigators" to
Ukraine in mid-November.
566
On December 8, the Presidium instructed its members
M. Z. Saburov, A. B. Aristov, and P. B. Nikitin to study the issue of sending to
Hungary a "group of workers to help the Hungarian comrades in economic work."
567

A week later, on December 14, the Presidium decided to send three groups of
specialists to Hungary. The first group consisted of experts "in the fields of coal,
economic, and financial affairs." The second group were "40--50 people. . . to be sent
to Hungary for 2--3 months as deputy military commanders for economic and political
issues" in accordance with "the request of the commander of the Southern group of
troops."
568
In the third group were eighteen people from the KGB and five from the
MVD who were to assist the Hungarian security organs in the "struggle against the
counterrevolution."
569


565.
RGANI, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 39, l. 1: "Excerpts of Protocol 54 of the Central
Committee Presidium Session on November 10, 1956." The economic workers were
told "to help restore order" in the railroad system, newspapers and radio, provision of
goods, and overall management of the economy in the city of Budapest. They were
"located unofficially" in Hungary, and instructed to act strictly in accordance with
Kdr's instructions only.
566.
RGANI, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 48, l. 2: "Notes of Ivan Serov," Nov. 19, 1956.
567.
RGANI, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 57, l. 1: "Excerpts from Protocol 63 of the CPSU
Presidium session of December 8, 1956."
568.
RGANI, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 59, l. 1: "Protocol 64 of the Central Committee
Presidium of December 14 1956, About Sending Soviet Specialists and Party Workers
to Hungary."
569.
RGANI, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 60, l. 1: "Protocol 64, of the Presidium session of the
CPSU Central Committee of December 14, 1956, The Issue of the Committee of State
Security."
From the perspective of the new Kdr government and the Soviet leadership,
these advisors were helpful in eventually putting down the revolt. Indeed, the
Hungarian "comrades" needed all the help they could get. In the first months after the
November 4 intervention, Kdr relied completely on Soviet assistance. Nagy had
disbanded the Hungarian security agency (VH), and what few security agents there
were had been lynched, forced to hide, or compelled to flee Hungary altogether. Kdr
literally had no security police to protect his new regime. Even when most of the street
fighting ended, the regime still had to deal with the abovementioned passive resistance,
such as the call for everyone in Budapest to remain indoors for one hour on November
23. On December 4, women from all parts of Budapest-about twenty thousand-
marched silently to the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier on Heroes Square. And on
December 11 and 12, a general strike was launched in which work in all factories
stopped, except for electricity, gas, water, and milk.
The Soviet advisors did not always improve the situation in Hungary, however.
Their presence in some cases tended to arouse indignation among Hungarians who
considered themselves more knowledgeable about conditions specific to their
country.
570
Nevertheless, helpful or not, the dispatch of these advisors and other

570.
RGANI, f. 89, per. 45, dok 76, ll. 2--3: Protocol 116 of the CC CPSU Presidium
session on October 11, 1957, to Suslov, Beliaev, Pospelov, Furtseva, and the Secretary
of the CPSU Khrushchev. Enclosure: From the diary of V. S. Baikov, Advisor of the
Soviet Embassy in Hungary, "Notes of a Conversation with the Director of the
Department of Party and Mass Organizations of the CC HSWP, member of the
Hungarian CC HSWP, Jozsef Sndor," Sept. 16, 1957: "Recently a Soviet delegation
of economic planners came to Hungary, continued Sndor, to give us a consultation for
preparation of the three-year economic plan to develop the country. . . . It is possible
to ask our Hungarian economists: why, indeed, do we need Soviet specialists to look
for Hungarian resources? We have enough economic specialists who are scholars and
measures taken by the Soviet authorities illustrate the difficulty and protracted nature
of the normalization process in Hungary, as manifested in every major sphere of
activity. The large number of Soviet advisors sent to Hungary also reveals the extent to
which the Kdr regime depended on Moscow for its survival.
Not until 1960 were most of the Soviet advisors recalled from Hungary.
Khrushchev began a discussion about reducing the number of advisors during his
official visit to Hungary from April 2 to 9, 1958. Consequently, during its sessions on
September 23 and October 7, 1958, the Hungarian Politburo authorized Jnos
Kdr and Antal Apr to write a letter to the CC CPSU requesting that the Soviet
advisory system be gradually abolished.
571

As soon as the last "hotbeds of resistance" were "liquidated," one of the first
major tasks of the Soviet army and the KGB was to confiscate weapons, in order to
reduce the chances of another armed uprising. But it was difficult to know who even
had weapons. One Soviet counterintelligence officer, Captain Zlygostev, for example,
who participated personally in the detentions of insurgents, told M. N. Kholodkov, the
deputy minister of internal affairs of the USSR that "in a number of villages he found
himself in situations whereby anarchy reigned in these populated points, and it was
impossible to find out from anybody who among these local residents participated in
the counterrevolutionary demonstrations."
572
Serov complained to Khrushchev:

professors from academic institutions and research institutes, who study the economy
of our country."
571
Dokumentok A Magyar Belgyminisztrium szovjet tancsadi, Mltunk
(1999), vol. 3, pp. 224-225.
572.
RGANI, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 46, l. 4: "Notes by Dudorov, Ministry of Internal
Affairs, USSR," Nov. 16, 1956.
The data that we have testifies to the presence of even more weapons among the
population. However, the voluntary surrender of these weapons is proceeding slowly.
Weapons are given up only after the agency establishes the presence of weapons and a
search is conducted.
573


According to one source, Soviet authorities searched apartments for pictures
and films taken of the revolution, in order to identify the participants in the street
fighting.
574
The KGB and the MVD initially resorted to mass arrests. KGB
documents recently declassified from the CPSU Central Committee archive reveal
the numbers of people detained, arrested, and deported during the month of
November. It is now known that the people arrested were sent to prisons in Ukraine
(Uzhgorod, Stryj, Dragobych, Chernovtsi, and Stanislav).
575
According to documents
from the Soviet Ministry of Defense (TsAMO) archives, a total of more than 10,000
Hungarian citizens were incarcerated, and more than one thousand were deported
to the prisons in Uzhgorod and Stryj.
576
As of November 7, between four and five
thousand people had been detained. By November 10, 500 people were detained while
trying to escape to Austria, 3,733 people were arrested, and more than 700 of them
were sent to the prison at Chop.
577
(Chop is a city in the USSR on the Ukrainian-
Hungarian border that was closed to all foreigners, including the Hungarian
ambassador to the USSR, Jnos Boldoczki.) During the second intervention, from

573.
RGANI, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 42, l. 1: "Notes of Serov to the CPSU (Khrushchev),
November 13, 1956."
574.
Lszl Zalai, "Glazami prostovo vracha" [From the eyes of an ordinary doctor],
Most (1992), no. 1--2, 43.
575.
RGANI, f. 89, per. 45, dok 46, l. 2: "Notes by Dudorov, Ministry of Internal Affairs,
USSR," Nov. 16, 1956.
576
TsAMO, f. 32, op. 701291, d. 15, ll. 13 and 93. Also d. 16, ll. 31, 53, 331.
577.
RGANI, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 41, l. 1: "Notes of Serov," Nov. 11, 1956; AVP RF, f.
"Information on Hungary," op. 37, por. 4, p. 187: from the diary of I. K. Zamchevskii,
"Notes of a Conversation with Hungarian Ambassador to the USSR, Jnos
Boldoczki," Dec. 18, 1956.
November 4 to November 11, a total of 4,056 people were arrested.
578
According to
another source, in three years (1957--1960) 13,000 people were interned for varying
lengths of time in newly constructed concentration camps in the Hungarian cities of
Tkl and Kistarcsa. Between December 1956 and summer 1961, between 350 and 600
people were executed, 75 percent of whom were men in their twenties.
579
While Soviet
officials were involved in arresting, detaining, and deporting Hungarians, they
probably transferred the prisoners to the Hungarian authorities for actual trials and
sentencing.
As the number of people arrested increased, the likelihood that they had been
involved in the "fascist orgy" (razgul) decreased. In his report for November 15,
Kholodkov wrote: "Among the people who arrived are a significant number of
members of the Hungarian Workers Party, soldiers in the Hungarian army, and
students. Also [there are] sixty-eight people who are underage, born between 1939 and
1942, of which nine are little girls." By November 15, there were 846 people in the
Uzhgorod prison, "including twenty-three women."
580

Two Hungarian officers wrote indignantly to the Soviet MVD in mid-
November, 1956:

578.
RGANI, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 42, l. 1: "Notes of Serov," Nov. 13, 1956.
579
The number of executions was estimated to be 600 in the Hungarian journal Most
(published in Russian). See "Skol'kikh liudei zatronuli repressii?" Most, no. 1--2,
(1992): 54. Mria Ormos also estimates the figure to be 600. See Mria Ormos, "A
konszolidci problmai 1956 s 1958 kztt," Trsadalmi Szemle, vol. 44, Nos. 8-9
(1989), pp. 48-65. However, this number may be a bit high; it was estimated to be
around 350 by the Institute for the History of the 1956 Revolution in Budapest. See
Litvn, ed., The Hungarian Revolution of 1956, pp. 143-4. Kyrov estimates that
between 350 and 500 were executed. A. Kyrov, "Sovetskaya Armiya i Vengerskaya
Revolyutsiya, p. 47.
580.
RGANI, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 46, l. 2: "Notes by Dudorov, Ministry of Internal
Affairs, USSR," Nov. 16, 1956.
Comrade Chief! Excuse me for the trouble, but we were forced to resort to this method
of communication with you. . . . [W]e have been identified as guilty people, without any
official investigation, and have been treated like fascists for four days now. The most
terrible thing is that we-officers and Communists-are being held with this scum
[chern'] and forced to listen to dirty stories about the counterrevolution.

"We are convinced," they wrote, that "it doesn't even make any difference to
'our Soviet comrades' who, on what street, and when [people] are caught. It does not
even matter [to them] whether or not a person participated in the
counterrevolutionary uprising."
581

As during the earlier phase of the military intervention, the Hungarian
government, now led by Jnos Kdr, at first failed to cooperate with Soviet security
organs. Kdr tried to persuade Serov to let up on the arrests, which were having a
negative, boomerang effect.
582
The workers were becoming even more stubborn. He
reported to Serov what the representative of the Szolnok region had told him.
According to Serov, Kdr said:
[W]hen they arrested forty people in the region, representatives of the workers came
and said that they would not begin to work until the arrested people were freed. In
other regions there were rumors that six thousand people were arrested in Szolnok....
You must consider that the mood among the masses in Hungary plays a large role. The
Soviet comrades and our [pro-Soviet] Hungarian security agents can arouse
indignation among the masses.
583



581.
RGANI, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 46, l. 7.
582.
In late November, however, Kdr became tougher in his position on the arrests.
In a speech at a workers' council, he allegedly said: "Among the demands that are
constantly repeated is the demand to stop the arrests. The arrests will not stop! The
arrests will continue in the future! And if it is necessary, then they will become even
stricter. . . . Let the murderers stop their banditism, stop frightening the miners and
workers, and then we will stop the arrests." Ibid. dok. 52, l. 4, "Information of
Malenkov, Suslov, Aristov, Nov. 26, 1956.
583.
RGANI, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 39, l. 3: "Excerpts from Protocol 54 of the CC CPSU
Presidium Session of November 10, 1956."
In a later conversation with Suslov and Aristov, Kdr said that: "the Soviet
military authorities are arresting people in the provinces who are not really enemies of
the people, but only people who showed political instability (neustoichivost') It is
necessary to search for the real organizers of the insurgency, and, above all, in
Budapest." Kdr added, "Unfortunately, such individuals as General [Bla] Kirly,
[commander of the Hungarian armed forces], Jzsef Duds, the former chairman of
the so-called national revolutionary committee, and others are still in hiding."
584
This
softness shown by Kdr initially confirmed the Soviet leadership's earlier fears about
Kdr. In April 1956 they deemed him as possibly too dangerous a rightist to readmit
into the Hungarian Politburo.
585
Later they feared he would not be a reliable post-
intervention quisling. Indeed, they had nearly called off "Operation Whirlwind" at the
last minute, because of doubts about his reliability.
586
But after Imre Nagy was
deported to Romania, Kdr became much more resolute.
587


584.
RGANI, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 43, l. 6: "Telegram of Suslov and Aristov of November
12, 1956."
585
APRF, f. 3, Op. 64, D. 483, Ll. 135-6. "Telegramma Iu. V. Andropova iz
Budapeshta v MID SSSR 29 aprelya 1956 g." KGB Chief Serov also reported to
Moscow statements by Hungarian writers like Tams Aczl to the effect that the
choice of Kdr and Kllai as members of the CC will "strengthen the activities of
the rightist group. RGANI, f. 89, O. 2, D. 2, L. 1, "Informatsiya I. A. Serova iz
Budapeshta, 26 iyulya 1956 g."
586.
See AVP RF, f. 2, op. 1, d. 259: "Stenographic Account of the June 1957 CC CPSU
Plenum." Also published as "Posledniaia 'antipartiinaia' gruppa" [The last anti-party
group], Istoricheskii Arkhiv 3--6 (1993), 1--2 (1994). See also RGANI, f. 89, per. 45,
dok. 1, l. 4: "Telegram from Andropov in Budapest to the CPSU (Moscow)," April 29,
1956. "Rkosi noted that he [Kdr] over the course of many years has shown himself
to be an unstable person . . . . It is advisable to have a talk with the Hungarian
comrades, candidly expressing our fears in connection with the decision to include
Rvai and especially Kdr into the Politburo [emphasis added]."
587.
On the day of Nagy's abduction from the Yugoslav Embassy, Malenkov, Suslov,
and Aristov also wrote: "Kdr has begun to understand better the need to conduct a
Ferenc Mnnich, Hungarian minister of the armed forces, also pointed in
alarm to the link between the mass arrests and the strikes. Serov wrote: "Yesterday
Mnnich again raised the question: shouldn't we stop the arrests in the regions, since
the workers in response are striking [bastuiut]? They are especially dissatisfied that the
arrested people are being sent to Siberia; the BBC broadcast this."
588

One incident especially upset both Kdr and Mnnich: the arrest of Tams
Nagy, the university professor and famous economist. An active participant in the
antigovernment demonstrations and a source of inspiration for the students in the
uprising, Tams Nagy reportedly went to the Yugoslav Embassy for contact with
Imre Nagy. Both Kdr and Mnnich argued that despite these activities, it was a
mistake to arrest the professor. Everyone knows Tams Nagy, and if he is kept in
prison, the students would probably organize a demonstration. It would be better to
free him.
589

Because of the excessive arrests, the Soviet MVD and the KGB created new
problems for themselves. The prisoners did not have proper identification with them,
further delaying their cases. The Soviet organs were overworked and understaffed.
Kholodkov told minister of internal affairs Dudorov it was urgent that "responsible
and competent workers (maybe even Hungarians)" be sent immediately to help

harder line in the struggle with the reaction." RGANI, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 49, l. 9:
"Information of Malenkov, Suslov, and Aristov," Nov. 22, 1956.
588.
Ibid., dok 42, l. 3: "Notes of Serov on November 13, 1956, to the CPSU
(Khrushchev)." Apparently this was simply a rumor; the prisoners were not sent to
Siberia, but to various camps in the Soviet Ukraine.
589
RGANI, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 42, L. 2. "Zapiski Serova, 13 noyabrya 1956."
"process the cases more quickly," since there were only eight KGB officers assigned to
this task.
590

A bureaucratic dispute developed between the KGB (under Serov) and the
MVD (under Dudorov and Kholodkov), begun when Kholodkov wrote a
memorandum to his superior, Dudorov, who then forwarded it to the Central
Committee of the CPSU. Kholodkov wondered if perhaps "there may be unjustified
arrests," given the fact that people such as Rudolf Fldvri (a former member of the
Central Committee of the Hungarian Workers Party, and first secretary of the Borsod
regional committee), Gyrgy Vig (a lieutenant in the Hungarian army and a translator
for one of the units), Andrs Sebk (the principal doctor of a Hungarian polyclinic),
and scores of adolescents under the age of seventeen were being arrested.
591
In
response, Serov wrote to Khrushchev, justifying himself In my own opinion, we
should not make any concessions to the insurgents. Experience shows that the least
concession you make, the more demands and threats they make. The arrests are being
made only when there is concrete data about the accused's hostile activities, confirmed
by evidence. Serov went on to argue that Rudolf Fldvri did indeed deserve to be
arrested because he "proclaimed the so-called Revolutionary Committee and
conducted malicious propaganda against the USSR . . . . He himself spoke on the radio,
justifying the counterrevolutionary actions of the insurgents." (In the end it was

590.
RGANI, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 42, ll. 4--5.
591.
RGANI, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 46, l. 4: "Notes of Dudorov," Soviet Ministry of
Internal Affairs, Nov. 16, 1956. The arrested people asked Kholodkov, "How did we-
Hungarian citizens-end up on Soviet territory?" Assuring him that they had not acted
against the Hungarian Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Party (under Kdr), nor
against the Soviet troops, they demanded that their cases be processed more quickly,
that their relatives in Hungary be informed of their fate, and that they be permitted to
read Hungarian newspapers (ibid., l. 3).
decided that Fldvri is "the type of person who will serve any authorities," and he
was released.)
592

In a further attempt at self-justification, Serov gave a reason that could easily
support the opposite of what he intended: These people are guilty; they just refuse to
confess.
The experience of the investigatory work shows that at present the active enemies and
organizers under arrest persist for a long time and do not admit their guilt. Even those
arrested persons who were caught at the scene of the crime with weapons in their
hands deny their guilt. This is how we can explain the declarations of innocence by the
arrested persons, as described in Kholodkov's note. We organized a second careful
check . . . of the arrested people who are in the Uzhgorod and Stryj prisons. For this
purpose the investigatory administration of the KGB sent two groups of qualified
investigators to the spot.
593


Then he attempted to shift the blame to the Soviet army and the Ministry of
Internal Affairs. He explained that it was the Soviet military units that had sent
prisoners to Chop, and to the camps of the ministry "without permission from us [the
representatives of the security organs] and without any evidence on these individuals
[about their guilt]." He continued: "The head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in
Uzhgorod accepted sixty-eight students from a trade school in Budapest. According to
Konev's orders this group of teenagers was sent back to Budapest and freed."
594

The Soviet authorities in Hungary and Ukraine were faced with another, more
tangible problem; they were running out of prison space. On November 14, Serov
discussed "the absence of enough prisons . . . where interrogations can be conducted,"

592.
RGANI, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 42, l. 2: "Notes of Serov of November 13, 1956, to the
CPSU, Comrade Khrushchev"; dok 48, l. 1: "Notes of Ivan Serov to the CC CPSU
(Khrushchev)."
593.
RGANI, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 48, l. 1: "Notes of Ivan Serov to the CC CPSU
(Khrushchev), Nov. 19, 1956."
594.
Ibid.
saying "we have in mind transporting the prisoners to a building close to the Soviet-
Hungarian border."
595

With the prison shortage in mind, Mikoyan, Suslov, and Aristov on November
26 came up with a more draconian plan for breaking the insurgents' spirit, so they
would surrender their weapons and stop inciting otherwise peaceful citizens to rebel,
overtly or covertly, against the Soviet Union. They told Jnos Kdr it was necessary
"to select from those arrested...five to seven people, and in the interests of deterring
the counterrevolution . . . try them and shoot them [emphasis added]. Comrade Kdr
agreed with our suggestion, and said that it is necessary to do this," they informed
Moscow. Perhaps in connection with this plan, eight people in an unarmed crowd were
massacred in the city of Eger, northeast of Budapest.
596

In the period between the two Soviet interventions, the Hungarian government
made key decisions that resulted in a security vacuum and contributed to the slow pace
of "normalization."
The insurgents seized their first weapons from the VH in late October,
probably stimulated by their conviction that VH agents opened fire first on unarmed
demonstrators on the fateful night of October 23.
597
On October 28, Serov had
reported to Moscow:

595.
RGANI, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 44, l.1--2: "Information of Serov and Andropov," Nov.
14, 1956.
596.
RGANI, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 52, l. 6: "Information of Malenkov, Suslov, and
Aristov," Nov. 26, 1956, to the CC CPSU. For the event in Eger see RFE/RL News
Briefs, Feb. 7-11, 1994, pp. 17--18.
597.
AVP RF, f. 077, o. 37, por. 10, p. 188, l. 255: from the diary of N. Sudarnikov,
advisor of the Soviet Embassy in Peking, "Notes of a Conversation with the Trade
Representative of Hungary to the PRC Lszl Ujhzi," Dec. 4, 1956.
In many regions, local organs and party workers dispersed and then began various
"revolutionary" national and other committees, which are beginning their activities by
disarming the security organs. For example, the revolutionary committee of Miskolc
organized a meeting in front of the building of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and
then forced the workers to surrender their weapons and tortured those who protested.
On the same day, a battalion of internal troops was dispersed . . . by this revolutionary
committee.
598


Apparently because of the "witch hunt" against VH employees that began
after the first Soviet intervention, the Nagy government decided to disband the agency
on October 29, as mentioned earlier.
599
The new minister of internal affairs, Ferenc
Mnnich, held a meeting on the evening of October 28 in which he assured employees
that (in Serov's words) "a special court will be organized, which will be authorized to
condemn to hanging those persons responsible for lynching Communists and attacking
government and public institutions." He said the "workers honestly carried out their
duty in the struggle with hostile elements." Nevertheless, he "announced that the state
security forces would be disbanded, and that a single police force would be created
instead." As Serov reported, Mnnich appealed to everyone to remain on the job
(ostavatsia na svoikh mestakh). Nevertheless, several of them left work and never
returned," and the "morale of the [remaining] employees deteriorated."
600

When the "counterrevolution" was crushed after November 4, many former
VH employees joined in the mass arrests of "fascist bandits" with a vengeance. Now
it was their turn to disarm those who had first disarmed them. Kdr warned Serov
about the danger of this. Serov reported to Moscow:

598.
RGANI, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 10, l. 1: "Information of Serov," Oct. 28, 1956.
599.
Gati, Hungary and the Soviet Bloc, 145.
600.
RGANI, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 11, l. 3: "Telegram of A. I. Mikoyan from Budapest to
the CC CPSU with a Report from I. A. Serov," Oct. 29, 1956.
Kdr said that reactionaries are being arrested by former employees of the security
forces, those whom the government laid off [raspustilo]. It is not advantageous to us for
the employees of the security forces to participate in the arrests . . . . Further, Kdr
said that in the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Budapest, where a number of security
agents were concentrated, an unhealthy situation was created, since among these
employees are individuals who worked in the forces under Rkosi and played a
negative role. Thus he thinks that these employees should be immediately removed and
given some other work to do. Moreover, he thinks it expedient to disband the guards
since there are dishonest people [there].
601


Unlike Serov, Kdr did not believe the mere fact that some individuals were
"caught with weapons in their hands" was a sufficient reason to arrest them. As he
pointed out, "it is written in the declaration of the government that those who give up
their weapons [and] stop their resistance will not be punished. The Hungarian
government should not take revenge on these citizens and display cruelty to them."
602

The Soviet leaders sought to use the lack of a Hungarian security force as a
means of persuading the Yugoslav government to relinquish the Nagy group to Soviet
military forces for protection. On November 4, the CPSU Central Committee had
sent a telegram to Nikolai Firiubin, the Soviet ambassador in Belgrade, instructing
him to warn Eduard Kardelj, the vice premier of Yugoslavia, that, as far as the
presence of Imre Nagy and his group in the Yugoslav Embassy was concerned, there
could be excesses with them, not just on the part of the reaction, but also on the part
of the revolutionary elements. In this regard, bearing in mind that the Hungarian
Revolutionary Worker-Peasant Government does not have at present [any] security

601.
RGANI, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 39, ll. 4--5: "Excerpts from Protocol 54 of the CC
Presidium of the CPSU, with enclosed letter from Ivan Serov to the CC CPSU
(Khrushchev)," Nov. 10, 1956.
602.
RGANI, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 39, l. 2.
organs, it would be expedient to give Nagy and his group to our troops for transfer to
the Revolutionary Worker-Peasant government in Szolnok."
603

By the time Kdr and the Soviet authorities were ready to start "restoring
order" in Hungary, practically no Hungarian security forces remained intact. VH
agents had either resigned; fled to Czechoslovakia, Romania, or the USSR; or been
tortured and hanged.
604
In his letter to the CPSU Central Committee, Istvn Kovcs
(former first secretary of the Budapest city committee) wrote: "After November 4,
many thousands of employees in the security forces were dismissed from their jobs and
left out on the streets. They can't find new work, and they are being hunted down."
605

Many disguised themselves at first by wearing police uniforms. The "
Rkosists" (leaders of the defunct MDP) exiled in the USSR complained about the
"victimization" [travlia] of these security agents.
606
"It is true that before 1953 a very
serious violation of laws was committed by separate security organs," wrote Ger,
Hegeds, and Kovcs in a letter to the CPSU central committee. "However, those who
did commit such violations have long been banished from the security organs. . . .

603.
RGANI, f. 89, per. 45, Excerpts from Protocol 51 of the CC CPSU Presidium, Nov.
4, 1956 [emphasis added]. In fact, on November 5 around 3 P.M. Soviet tanks fired on
the Yugoslav Embassy, resulting in the death of Milovanov, the cultural attach. AVP
RF, f. 077, op. 37, p. 188, d. 18, l. 38. (In another document the date and time of this
event is given as November 6 at 12:45 p.m. [RGANI, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 29, l. 1: from
the diary of Shepilov,"Copy of the Notes of the Conversation with Veljko Miunovi,
the Yugoslav Ambassador to the USSR"].)
604.
RGANI, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 11, l. 4: "Telegram of A.I. Mikoyan from Budapest to
the CC CPSU with a Report from I.A. Serov," Oct. 29, 1956. See also AVP RF, f.
"Information on Hungary," op. 37, por. 10, p. 188, l. 242: from the diary of M. I.
Petunin, "Notes of a Conversation with Member of the Gyr Regional Executive
Committee of the HSWP, Andrs Takcs," Nov. 29, 1956.
605.
RGANI, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 64, l. 6: Letter of Istvn Kovcs to the CC CPSU
(Khrushchev), Jan. 10, 1957, "Request for a Reception to Discuss Hungarian
Matters."
606.
RGANI, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 10, l. 2: "Information of Serov," Oct. 28, 1956.
[T]he greater part of the . . . security organs consists of workers devoted to the people's
democracy . . . . but they are being fed to the antisocial elements [ikh otdaiut na
s''edenie antinarodnym elementam].
607

The Soviet leadership took action in at least three areas for the purpose of
filling the security vacuum and restoring order in Hungary. First, on Serov's
recommendation, Kdr and Mnnich "requested" that the Soviet Presidium "give its
consent" to sending advisors to work with Hungarian state security, police, and border
guards. By December 3, there were nine advisors for the "security of the center"; eight
"in the periphery organs of state security (in the committees)"; two for the border
guards; three for the "police militia"; and one for "special technology."
608

Second, the Soviet authorities decided to restructure the Hungarian security
forces completely, including "the secret service, counterintelligence, and other services,
both in the center and in the peripheral areas [na mestakh]." This reform was
undertaken apparently because of the mutual animosity between the Hungarian
insurgents (and population) and the security agents. "[W]e prepared the following
documents for a paper for Kdr. . . . [O]nly a small number of employees will be
publicly acknowledged as security agents, and the rest will work incognito. This is
done in order to hide the real number of forces, since there is such deep hatred of the
employees of the security forces." Serov also "included a suggestion for organization of
the police forces" and "prepared a structure for the border guards" in Hungary.
609


607.
RGANI, f. 89, per. 45, dok 47, l. 5 "Letter to the CC CPSU from E. Ger, A.
Hegeds, and I. Kovcs," Nov. 18, 1956.
608..
RGANI, f. 89, per. 45, dok 60, l. 7: Protocol 64 of the CC Presidium Session of
December 14, 1956, "The Issue of the Committee of State Security."
609.
RGANI, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 53, l. 3: "Notes of Ivan Serov," Nov. 27, 1956.
Third, the Soviets discharged Hungarian security officials who conducted
themselves "suspiciously" during the October-November "events." For example, they
replaced Pcze, head of the Main Administration of the Police, because he "supported
the insurgents in a number of cases" and at the present time is "idling." As Serov
wrote, "incriminating data on Pcze was reported to us by Mnnich. . . . Kdr gave
his consent to replace Pcze."
610

Another primary reason why "friendship and cooperation" between the Soviet
Union and Hungary (as worded in the October 30 declaration) could not easily be
"strengthened," let alone "normalized," was the very fact of the presence of Soviet
troops on Hungarian soil, as discussed in Chapter One. It irritated every sector of the
Hungarian population: factory workers, students, the intelligentsia, and so on. At the
time of the first intervention (October 24), Ern Ger told Mikoyan and Suslov over
the telephone: "[T]he arrival of Soviet troops in the city has a negative effect on the
disposition of the inhabitants, including the workers."
611

"Withdrawal of Soviet troops" was at the top of the list of workers' demands
when they went on strike. Pull out your troops, and then we will give up all our
weapons and go back to work. The Soviet authorities said: give up all your weapons,
go back to work, and then we'll withdraw our troops. "Full order" (polnyi poriadok)
must be restored first. As one Hungarian cynic quipped, "The Soviet troops will leave
Budapest quickly, when rocks bloom on the roads" [as quoted in the Russian: kak

610.
Ibid. See also RGANI, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 17, l. 3: "Notes of Kirichenko with
Enclosed Report by Colonel Starovoitov": "[T]he commander of the militia of the
Hungarian People's Republic Pcze opposed decisive measures against the individuals
occupied in hostile activities against the democratic structure of Hungary."
611.
. AVP RF, f. 059a, op. 4, p. 6, d. 5, l. 1: "Ciphered Telegram from A. I. Mikoyan and
M. A. Suslov from Budapest to the Central Committee of the CPSU," Oct. 24, 1956.
tol'ko rastsvetut na mostovykh kamni].
612
It was their recognition of this stalemate, that
first prompted Mikoyan and Suslov on October 30 to conclude that probably the only
solution was to apply military force. "The insurgents declare that they will give [their
weapons] up after the Soviet troops leave Hungary. Thus the peaceful liquidation of
this hotbed is almost out of the question."
613

On November 30, after the second Soviet intervention, Hungarian officials
drew up a document containing "recommendations" for the "realization" of the Soviet
declaration of October 30.
614
Among the seventeen "sore points" in Soviet-Hungarian
relations discussed were: the frequency of "accidents" caused by Soviet troops, and the
lack of any agreement about compensation (including pensions) to Hungarian citizens
(e.g., spouses of the deceased) for loss of income; and the need for a separate
agreement defining the purpose, "distribution," "quantity," and length of stay of

612.
AVP RF, f. 077, op. 37, por. 10, p. 188, l. 275: from the diary of V. A. Kriuchkov,
third secretary of the Soviet Embassy in Hungary, "Notes of a Conversation with the
Secretary of the Union of Journalists, Ferenc Vadas, and the Secretary of the
Organization of the HSWP of this Union, Roza Peti [sic]," Dec. 18, 1956.
613.
RGANI, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 12, l. 2: "Information of Mikoyan and Suslov," Oct. 30,
1956. Although Mikoyan signed this telegram with Suslov, he was against military
intervention-according to the Malin notes and Khrushchev's memoirs. See Nikita S.
Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Glasnost Tapes, 122--23. Also Malin,
"Protokolnaya Zapis, " Oct. 26, 1956 (d. 1005, ll. 53 [versa], 62 [versa]. During this
meeting, Bulganin reportedly said that Mikoyan [is] "maintaining an improper and ill-
defined position, and is not helping the Hungarian leaders put an end to their zigzags."
Molotov agreed with Bulganin, saying, "We must set certain limits and instruct
Comrade Mikoyan how to act." Zhukov said, "Mikoyan is acting improperly; he's
pushing us toward capitulation." Kaganovich and Malenkov also agreed. Khrushchev
said, "Mikoyan is acting as he said he would . . . . [He] supported a position of non-
intervention..."
614
The complete text of the declaration can be found in the October 31, 1956 issue of
Pravda (Moscow), p. 1, entitled Deklaratsiya o printsipakh razvitiya i dalneishem
ukreplenii druzhby i sotrudnichestva mezhdu SSSR i drugimi sotsialisticheskimi
stranami.
Soviet troops in Hungary, "as is stipulated, for example, in the Soviet-Polish
declaration."
615

A series of talks between Soviet and Hungarian delegations on military issues
did in fact begin in the winter of 1957 and continue into the spring.
616
The agreement
finally reached on April 26 defined the "legal status of Soviet troops in Hungary," as
well as the quantity, composition, and exact location of the troops. The document
merely emphasized that the Soviet troops were stationed in Hungary "temporarily," in
accordance with the Warsaw Pact (viz., the Soviet-Hungarian friendship treaty of
February 18, 1948); they would remain there as long as the "aggressive North Atlantic
bloc (NATO) existed," which had "numerous troops and bases near the borders of the
socialist countries."
617


615.
AVP RF, f. 077, o. 37, por. 17, p. 188, l. 31, 39: "The Suggestions of the Hungarians
on the Realization of the Declaration of October 30, 1956," Nov. 30, 1956.
616.
On January 29 and 30, 1957, the Soviet delegation, headed by Marshal Konev, met
with the Hungarian delegation, led by Ferenc Mnnich, minister of the armed forces
of Hungary. Apparently, the conditions of the Hungarian army was discussed more
than the presence of the Soviet army in Hungary. "At the January meeting the
military staff and number of troops of the Hungarian army" were discussed, as well as
the "weapons system," "antiaircraft defense measures," and "military advisors" in
the country (ibid., op. 38, por. 14, p. 193, l. 3: From the Ministry of Defense General
Staff, Deputy Minister of Defense of the USSR, V. D. Sokolovskii, to the Deputy
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, N. S. Patolichev, Feb. 26, 1957). As for the
presence of Soviet troops, Sokolovskii wrote to Patolichev, "We think the issue about
the legal status of the Soviet troops, temporarily located on Hungarian territory can be
examined later after a significant improvement of the situation"(ibid.). Another round
of talks took place in Moscow on March 20-28, 1957, about the status of Soviet troops,
"temporarily" stationed on the territory of Hungary (ibid., l. 8: From Marshal G.
Zhukov and A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs to the CC CPSU, April 26,
1957). An agreement was drafted by April 26, and completed in Budapest (ibid., ll. 11--
20, "Resolution of the CC CPSU about the conduct of talks with the Hungarian
Government about the Conclusion of an Agreement about the Legal Status of the
Soviet Troops in Hungary").
617.
Ibid., l. 11--20: "Resolution of the CC CPSU about the conduct of talks with the
Hungarian Government about the Conclusion of an Agreement about the Legal Status

Conclusion

In sum, Kdrs working-class background and experience of torture as
Rkosis prisoner most likely instilled in him a degree of flexibility and realism that
trained him for his later role as quisling. Although not a quisling at the outset when he
visited Moscow on November 2 and 3, Kdr accepted the daunting challenge of
heading the post-invasion government out of perhaps a strange mixture of
opportunism and fanatical faith.
Perhaps the prison experiences of both Jnos Kdr and Wadysaw Gomuka
whetted these individuals appetites for power and honed their skills in the overt
coddling of Kremlin leaders. Arguably unlike Imre Nagy, they were battered
wolves, able to mollify Moscow while keeping their own people satisfied or at least
nonviolent. (Khrushchev openly lamented his promotion of Ger instead of Kdr
during the November 3 Presidium session.)
618

In late November and December of 1956, Kdr pleaded with the Russians to
adopt a more lenient approach to the insurgents, but later became firmer when
Nagy was deported from Hungary and could no longer challenge his authority. We
now know that Kdr approved of the secret KGB plan to arrest Nagy and his
followers as soon as they left the Yugoslav embassy. Despite the prolonged
restlessness of the population long after the crushed revolution and the bloody
repression of 1957-1958, Kdrs regime after normalization and Nagys execution in

of the Soviet Troops in Hungary." See also "From the Declaration of the Governments
of the USSR and Hungary, March 28, 1957," Sovietsko-Vengerskie Otnosheniia: 1948--
1970 (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1974), 112.
618
MOL, XIX J-1-K Horvth Imre klgyminiszter iratai, 1956 november 3-n , 55,
doboz., l. 7-8.
June 1958 represented a sharp move away from the conditions under Rkosi. Kdr
managed in the 1960s and 1970s to develop his own brand of lenient national
communism (goulash communism) and to earn a measure of grudging respect and
trust from the Hungarian people. With the exception of occasional brutalities in
November and December 1956, and Losonczys murder following an attempt at
force-feeding in December 1957, no evidence exists of a systematic use of torture by
the Kdr regime. Some scholars have mused about the effect of Kdrs own
experiences of torture on his later curtailment of the practice as General Secretary.
While this may have been a factor in reducing the oppressiveness of his regime, one
should remember that the Twentieth CPSU Congress had also established a general
policy discouraging the use of torture.
Arguably, the most influential factor in Kdrs moderate style of management
was the sullen recalcitrance of the general population after the failed revolution.
Kdr had to made a virtue out of a necessity: to make minimal demands on the
people and to separate politics from ideology as much as possible in order to stay in
power and prevent another revolution.
Ironically, then, the 1956 revolution due to the passive resistance it sparked in
the Hungarian people - prepared the way for Kdrs relatively tolerant domestic
policies. Unlike Tito, Kdr never trumpeted his moderate New Economic
Mechanism (NEM) - introduced in 1968 - as a socioeconomic model for the other
satellites, lest he irritate Moscow. The nationalist flame was never extinguished, as
proved by Hungary's independence today.

Chapter 6: Role of the United States
Most books on the Soviet intervention in Hungary do not contain a separate
chapter on the role of the United States. However, by more closely investigating US
propaganda and psychological warfare operations before 1956, one can see a tighter
link between U.S. actions and Soviet responses. Newly declassified documents on
U.S. psychological warfare in the late 1940s and early 1950s confirm that each
superpower's actions often reflected those of its adversary in the bipolar Cold War
era.
619
To what extent, we must ask, did US intelligence activities in East Central
Europe related to Eisenhower's liberation or "rollback" policies strengthen Soviet
resolve to maintain hegemony over the so-called satellites, resorting to military force
if necessary?
U.S. foreign policy objectives in the 1950s emerged from the Solarium
study named after the sunroom in the White House - conducted throughout the
summer of 1953. Task Force A, led by George Kennan, argued for a continuation
of the containment policy, relying on economic aid Task Force B, led by Admiral

619
These include documents in the Free Europe Committee, CD Jackson, and
Volunteer Freedom Corps papers declassified in the late 1990s at the Eisenhower
Presidential Library (Kansas); documents regarding the Operations Coordinating
Board and Psychological Warfare in the State Department's decimal files (hitherto
closed Record Group 59) in the National Archive (Washington D.C.); U.S.
diplomatic cables stored at the National Security Archive (Washington D.C.); and
the Willis D. Crittenberger Papers housed at the U.S. Army Military History
Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA. There are relatively few secondary sources on U.S.
policies on Hungary in 1956. Some especially useful ones include Bennett Kovrig,
The Myth of Liberation: East Central Europe in U.S. Diplomacy and Politics since
1941 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973); and James Marchio,
"Rhetoric and Reality: The Eisenhower Administration and Unrest in Eastern
Europe, 1953-1959," Ph.D. diss. at American University (Ann Arbor, MI: UMI,
1990).
Radford espoused containment, albeit with a heavier reliance on the nuclear
deterrent and Task Force C, led by C.D. Jackson proposed the conduct of
psychological warfare. This so-called rollback approach was designed to increase
efforts to disturb and weaken the Soviet bloc, overtly and covertly attacking the
communist apparatus, and missing no opportunities to confuse and unbalance the
enemy. President Eisenhower decided to mix elements from all three task forces, i.e.
to continue the containment policy, but increase reliance on covert action and the
nuclear deterrent.
This chapter adopts a functional approach, focusing on the U.S. operational
response to the Hungarian crisis. It will examine just a few of the panoply of
psychological warfare measures advocated by CD Jackson and others in the Task
Force C that gave substance to the U.S. liberation and rollback policies.
620
In
singling out just a few activities for the purpose of disclosing new evidence, the
author does not attribute more significance to these trees than to the forest
(U.S. policy toward Eastern Europe). We will begin by reviewing the reactions of the
US policymaking community to Stalin's death and to the new "collective
leadership" in the Kremlin. We will then examine the propaganda and news-
disseminating activities of Radio Free Europe (RFE) and see how they may have
undermined the Nagy regime as early as 1953. Ironically, in seeking more aggressive
ways to "overload the switchboard" of the Soviet and East European countries, and

620
Other measures include NATO operations, funding of the Polish underground
movement "Wolno i Niezawiso"(Freedom and Independence, or WIN), and the
CIAs unsuccessful infiltration attempts in Albania (November 1948), Ukraine
(September 1949), Moldova (August 1951), and the Hungarian-Romanian district of
Faragas (October 1951).
to win the hearts and minds of the newly independent Third World nations,
RFE's propaganda may have harmed the very "national communists" it should
have nurtured. Despite vigorous denials by RFE officials even to this day, RFE did
indeed broadcast at least sixteen scripts during the revolution that seriously
distorted US policy and misled the "freedom fighters." Had American officials been
proofreading the scripts before they were read over the air, they probably would not
have approved of these sixteen scripts.
621

This chapter will also disclose the hitherto secret plans for an emigr army or
"Volunteer Freedom Corps," some proposed benefits of which resemble those
promised by advocates of NATO enlargement. The fact that the VFC was never
implemented illustrates the Eisenhower Administrations growing caution about the
potentially destabilizing policies of liberation and rollback, especially in the
aftermath of the popular unrest in East Germany, Poland, and Hungary. After some
analysis of the level of Soviet knowledge of migr activities, we will investigate the
intelligence processing of the Hungarian refugees at Camp Kilmer, New Jersey.
While Kdr grappled with the task of normalizing the population within Hungary,
U.S. officials struggled to manage the exodus of their fellow Hungarians overseas, a
task which proved to be troublesome but rewarding.


621
In his recent book, for example, Arch Puddington (deputy director of the New
York bureau of the radios between 1985 and 1993) claims that, despite accusations
that RFE broadcasts incited the Hungarians to rebel, later investigations by
independent parties (the United Nations, a congressional subcommittee, the West
German government, and the Council of Europe) largely absolved RFE of blame.
See Arch Puddington, Broadcasting Freedom: The Cold War Triumph of Radio Free
Europe and Radio Liberty (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2000).
Differences of Opinion on Post-Stalinist Foreign Policy
Stalin's death on March 5, 1953 perhaps confused U.S. foreign policy officials
as much as it did Soviet citizens themselves. While Stalin was alive, the United States
had a concrete enemy against which to plan its policies. After his death, US
policymakers lacked plans and methods for gauging the motives of the new Kremlin
leaders. The situation resembled the quandaries of both Ronald Reagan in assessing
Gorbachev's perestroika and Bill Clinton in forging a new U.S. foreign policy after
the collapse of the USSR. How was it possible to know whether Stalin's successors
sincerely wanted a rapprochement with the capitalist West, or whether their
behavior was simply more devious and deceptive? The bipartisan support for
containment, intact while Stalin was alive, began to crumble.
On the day Stalin died, CD Jackson--Eisenhower's speechwriter and
assistant for "psychological warfare strategy" in 1952-3-- wrote, It is hardly an
exaggeration to say that no agency of this Government had in its files anything
resembling a plan, or even a sense-making guidance, to cover the circumstances
arising out of the fatal illness or death of Stalin."
622
Differences of opinion
intensified about how to interpret Soviet intentions in the midst of a string of
ostensibly conciliatory foreign policy moves--the rapprochement with Tito in
Belgrade, agreement to Austrian neutrality and withdrawal of troops there, the
Geneva summit, Khrushchev's denunciation of Stalin, and scores of rehabilitations.

622
Memorandum to General Robert Cutler from CD Jackson, March 4, 1953, C. D
Jackson Papers, Box 45, Folder Cutler, General Robert, Eisenhower Presidential
Library.
Perhaps the spectrum of American opinion can best be described in terms of
the views on how fear and confusion in the post-Stalinist Kremlin would affect
Soviet behavior. At one end of the spectrum were those who construed such fear as a
possible impetus for impulsive aggression against the West. Hence they counseled
caution. These include diplomats such as Charles ("Chip") Bohlen, the business
community, and at times President Dwight Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles.
Bohlen, U.S. Ambassador to the USSR in 1956, seemed somewhat willing to
believe that the post-Stalinist leaders could be trusted. He explained to CIA officials
Frank Wisner and Cord Meyer: "Many of the things we thought of as Soviet policy
flowing logically and inexorably from the Soviet system were in reality little more
than expressions of Stalins own will and whim."
623
Stalin was pathologically cruel,
but he was a Georgian. The Russians were not "sadistic" like the Nazis, Bohlen
reminded them.
624
He did not think the U.S. should go beyond containment, and
deemed the CIA perhaps too pro-active. On at least one occasion Bohlen chastised
Wisner (CIA's Deputy Director of Plans) for recruiting ordinary American tourists
visiting the USSR:
A member of a visiting group here...told a staff member that he and another group
member had been urged by your boys to try during their visit to the Soviet Union to
take photographs of articles such as bridges, any military installations, etc........I
know that in pursuit of its duties your outfit cannot afford to neglect any possibility
of information not normally available here but I really question the desirability of
this type of operation. I must assume that if this is true of a group of schoolteachers
that you are doing the same thing with many of the groups which will be visiting the

623
Transcript of Conversation between Charles E. Bohlen, American Embassy,
Manila, Phillipines, with Frank G. Wisner, Cord Meyer, Richard Helms, Robert
Amory, et. al. summarizing Bohlens four years of service as US Ambassador in
Moscow, Research Notes, 1957, p. 2, secret, NARA, RG 59, Records of
Ambassador Bohlen, 1952-1963, Lot 74D379, Box 10.
624
Ibid., 54.
Soviet Union this year. It seems to me that it is highly probable that some of these
people with no experience in this country and no intelligence training will be inept
and we will have a happy little incident on our hands, and even though I realize you
warn them never to mention any connection with your outfit, I am not sure if the
heat was on they all would follow this advice.
625


Leaders in the business community who contributed regularly to the
Crusade for Freedom - allegedly funding Radio Free Europe (RFE) - also thought
that perhaps Stalin's successors were different. CD Jackson asked William Jackson
(Eisenhower's assistant for National Security Council affairs) to give a persuasive
speech for them. They ask a wide variety of questions," C D explained. "But there
is one common denominator question which runs something like this: 'What with
the Spirit of Geneva, and apparent propaganda relaxation, and apparent
improvement of conditions of individuals behind the Iron Curtain, and greater two-
way travel access across the Iron Curtain, havent diminishing returns set in for the
work of FEC [Free Europe Committee] and RFE?' "
626

In the center of the spectrum is Secretary of State John Foster Dulles. His
position was more complex. His name is synonymous with the "liberation" policy
mainly because of his campaigning during the 1952 election. He had concluded
when he lost the senatorial election in 1949 to Herbert H. Lehman in New York, that
to win an election he would have to select a few simple ideas and hammer them

625
Letter from Charles E. Bohlen, U.S. Ambassador to Moscow, to Frank G.
Wisner, Washington, D.C., July 20, 1956, 2 pages, secret, RG 59, Records of
Ambassador Bohlen, 1952-1963, Lot 74D379, Box 10, NARA.
626
November 9, 1955, Letter to William H. Jackson, U.S. Delegation, Geneva, from
C.D. Jackson, C.D. Jackson Papers, Box 63, Folder Jackson, William (2),
Eisenhower Presidential Library, 1 p.
home to the electorate.
627
In fact, Dulles readily acknowledged that key internal
changes had occurred in the USSR. As he told C D Jackson on April 14, 1956, "Ten
years ago, in my article in Life, I said that if we could stay with this thing long
enough, there would come a time when important internal changes would occur in
the Soviet Union, and that any change from the rigid Stalin police state would
probably be a step forward. Well, that has come to pass."
628
On a certain level,
Dulles seemed to accept the idea that a World War III was less likely in the post-
Stalin era. Although he spent $1,000 to build a bomb shelter for his family in 1950
or 1951, if he had to do it over again, he would have saved his money, he confided to
Jackson.
629
Moreover, as we shall see, Dulles and the State Department did not
always approve of CD Jackson's psychological warfare schemes via RFE and the
VFC.
Nevertheless, Dulles' training as a lawyer prompted him to check his
premises and weigh the evidence. "The down-grading of Stalin does not of itself
demonstrate that the Soviet regime has basically changed its domestic or foreign
policies," he said to Eisenhower. "The essential question is this: Are the Soviet
rulers now attacking the basic causes of this domestic discontent and foreign
distrust, or is their purpose merely to allay this discontent by blaming it on the

627
Townsend Hoopes, The Devil and John Foster Dulles (Boston: Little, Brown, and
Co., 1973), p. 82.
628
April 16, 1956, Report to Henry R. Luce in New York from C.D. Jackson re:
CDJs April 14 hour and a half meeting with John Foster Dulles, personal and
confidential, p. 9, C.D. Jackson Papers, Box 69, Folder Log1956 (2),
Eisenhower Presidential Library.
629
Ibid., p. 3.
past?"
630
While the Soviet Union has taken "a few forward steps," he continued, it
continues to keep East Germany divided, stir up bitterness in Asia, and increase the
danger of hostilities in the Near East.
631

Dulles also worried about how the destalinization campaign would affect the
European allies. Powerful "big business" groups throughout Western Europe---
certainly less driven ideologically and morally against the communist bloc--were
eager to capitalize on the "thaw" in order to tap into new eastern markets and not
about to let the United States restrain them without a good reason. Dulles told
Jackson, "Frowns have given way to smiles. Guns have given way to offers of
economic aid."
632
"[W]ith all these outward improvementswith the repudiation of
Stalin, with the rehabilitation of scores of officials, scientists, soldiers, dead and
alive, with the apparent acceptance of Tito, and therefore of Titoismwith all these
things going on, it is very difficult for the United States to say to its allies that all of
this means nothing, that it is a trick, that the ostracism must be maintained."
633
In
any case, Dulles reassured Jackson that he would not want to "turn back the clock
and recreate Stalin's Russia." He would prefer to overcome these obstacles than to
solve "the problem of H-Bomb competition." Despite his concerns about Asia, the

630
Memorandum from J.F. Dulles to Eisenhower, April 2, 1956, p. 2, John Foster
Dulles Collection, White House Memoranda, Box 4, Folder: White House Office
General File #6, Eisenhower Presidential Library.
631
Ibid., p. 3.
632
Report to Henry R. Luce in New York from C.D. Jackson re CDJs April 14
hour and a half meeting with John Foster Dulles, April 16, 1956, p. 2, C.D. Jackson
Papers, Box 69, Folder Log1956 (2), Eisenhower Presidential Library.
633
Ibid. (Luce Report).
Middle East, and Western Europe, Dulles thought the most crucial "barometer" of
Soviet change, however, was Eastern Europe.
634

At the other end of the spectrum were those groups and individuals upon
whom this chapter will focus: those more skeptical of Soviet motives and willing to
exploit Soviet fear via aggressive psychological warfare and rollback schemes. These
include, to some extent, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CIA officials such as the Director
of Central Intelligence (DCI) Allen Dulles and Frank Wisner, advocates of the secret
Volunteer Freedom Corps like Henry Cabot Lodge and C.D. Jackson; and Radio
Free Europe personnel in Munich and New York.
Harold Stassen (Mutual Security Agency Director) and the Joint Chiefs of
Staff doubted the sincerity of Khrushchevs "peace overtures" and insisted on
"concrete evidence of a revolutionary change" in the Soviet regime before the
United States would enter into any arms limitation agreement with the USSR.
635
At
an NSC meeting on June 30, 1955, Eisenhower remarked that the Joint Chiefs were
"just telling us not to be 'damn babies' at Geneva." The President said he would
accept these cautions, but that we "should also state clearly in the paper that we will
not shut our eyes to evidence of change in Soviet policy."
636

Not surprisingly, CIA officials were also dubious about Soviet aims. At an
NSC meeting on March 22, 1956 Allen Dulles mused that "the plain attempt to blast

634
Memorandum on the Discussion at the 256
th
meeting, July 28, 1955, p. 8, as
reported by Bromley Smith, senior member, NSC Special Staff, Eisenhower Papers
(Ann Whitman File), NSC Series, Box 7, Folder: 256th NSC Meeting, Eisenhower
Presidential Library.
635
Memorandum on the Discussion at the 253rd NSC Meeting, June 30, 1955, p. 5-6,
Eisenhower Papers (Ann Whitman File), NSC Series, Box 7, Folder: 253rd NSC
Meeting, Eisenhower Presidential Library.
636
Ibid.
Stalin to pieces had raised a number of interesting problems." He continued
"Joseph Stalin has now become the Trojan corpse which was to be introduced
inside the defenses of the free world.
637

In contrast to diplomats and business leaders, CD Jackson and RFE
personnel perceived the Soviet leaders' fear as a moderating influence, making them
less dangerous and more willing to negotiate with the West. Therefore it made sense
to heighten that fear. In a memo to Special Assistant for National Security Affairs
Robert Cutler on the day Stalin died, Jackson wrote, "During the present moment
of confusion, the chances of the Soviets launching World War III are reduced
virtually to zero, and will remain in the low numbers so long as the confusion exists.
Our task, therefore, is to perpetuate the confusion as long as possible, and to stave
off as long as possible any new crystallization."
638
William Griffith, the RFE
Political Advisor in Munich supervising the individual East European radios, wrote
"The opportunities for influencing developments from the outside are probably

637
Memorandum on the Discussion at the 280th meeting of NSC, March 22, 1956,
Eisenhower Papers (Ann Whitman File), NSC Series, Box 7, Folder: 280th NSC
Meeting, Eisenhower Presidential Library, declass 5/26/98.
638
Memorandum to General Robert Cutler from CD Jackson, March 4, 1953, C. D
Jackson Papers, Box 45, Folder Cutler, General Robert, Eisenhower Presidential
Library. In Jackson's words, "They [The Soviet leaders] have certainly not acquired
a new morality overnight, nor a new code of genuine international ethics. All they
have acquired overnightthe night Stalin diedis fear." CD Jackson wrote to
General Critt [Letter to General Crittenberger from C D Jackson, April 10, 1953,
Eisenhower Presidential Library, C D Jackson Records, 1953-1954, Box 6,
Correspondence re Volunteer Freedom Corps, Declassified October 28, 1994.
greater than at any time within the last seven years. Regime confusion means
opportunity to confound and compound distrust, uncertainty, and fear."
639

After a luncheon with an emigr friend, Leon Volkov, CD Jackson posited:
This Era of Uncertainty offers a golden opportunity for cold war operations. The
satellites will be restless, their leadership uneasy. People will be more willing to talk.
There will be more leaks as to what is actually taking place behind the Curtain. The
opportunities to overload the switchboard will be legion, the Kremlins ability to
send back quick and positive decisions greatly reduced. There will be greater
expression of differences of opinion within the Soviet blocwith no absolute ruler to
make the final judgements.
640


(CD Jackson was a former President of Free Europe Committee, of which Radio
Free EuropeRFE--was a part). He was especially eager to hear the Soviet
explanations for the 1952 germ warfare campaign and for the North Korean attack
in June 1950. In a mock letter to Khrushchev, Jackson wrote, "[I]f you were to
square away at Stalins 1952-53 'germ warfare' campaign, which was one of the
most massively internationally organized propaganda lies that the world has ever
seen, and you were to denounce that [lie], then Americans would begin to
understand."
641

In early March, 1952, Chinese Foreign Minister Chou En-lai claimed that the
United States had sent 448 aircraft on 68 missions to spread plague, anthrax,
cholera, encephalitis and meningitis over Korean battlefields. North Koreans facing

639
Letter from William Griffith to CDJ, December 6, 1955, re: RFE Business,
Personnel, and Events in Europe, Eisenhower Presidential Library, C D Jackson
Papers, Box 54, Folder: "Free Europe Committee, 1955 (1)."
640
Memorandum of Luncheon with Leon Volkov, C. D. Jackson Records, March 5,
1953, p. 1, Box 6, Folder Volkov, Memos Re Eisenhower Presidential Library.
Declassified on July 23, 1998.
641
Memorandum to John K. Jessup from C.D. Jackson re: a suggested editorial
article, April 9, 1956, p. 1, C.D. Jackson Papers, Box 69, Folder Log1956 (2),
Eisenhower Presidential Library.
execution were infected with plague to make the case and 25 American POWs were
induced to sign "confessions." Documents reveal that, in fact, Chinese battlefield
advisers invented the story when many North Koreans were dying of cholera.
642

RFE personnel were perhaps the most cynical of all. Scriptwriters and
broadcasters were instructed to:
Make clear that the West has not been deceived for one moment by the program of
the new collective dictatorship. Quote evidence from the free world that it
recognizes: a) that the Soviet imperialist aims have not changed, b) that the de-
canonization of Stalin is a Trojan Horse which has failed of its purposeit has
created confusion among communists and has met with skepticism and disgust by
all other men, c) that the campaign for transition to socialism in the West failed
before it was publicly announcedfailed, as Haakon Lie said at the Socialist
International, with the Austrians, the British, the Danes, the Finns and the
Norwegians even before the XXth Congress opened.
643


Radio Free Europe
Emigrs have confirmed the overall positive record of RFEs reportage
during the Cold War years.
644
However, the poor performance of the Hungarian
desk during the 1956 revolution gravely blackened the radios reputation among the
general public for several years after the crisis. Moreover, very little is known about

642
For more detailed information, see Kathryn Weathersby, "Deceiving the
Deceivers: Moscow, Beijing, Pyongyang, and the Allegations of Bacteriological
Weapons Use in Korea," and Milton Leitenberg, "New Russian Evidence On The
Korean War Biological Warfare Allegations: Background And Analysis," both in
CWIHP Bulletin (Winter 1998), no. 11, pp. 176--199. Available also at
http://cwihp.si.edu/cwihplib.nsf.
643
Radio Free EuropeFree Europe Press: Special Guidance No. 26, Twentieth
Congress CPSU, B. April 6, 1956, Transition to Socialism, confidential, 15 pages,
C.D. Jackson Papers, Box 54, Free Europe Committee, 1956 (6), Eisenhower
Presidential Library. Declassified August 10, 1989.
644
Interesting chapters on the influence of RFE on the East European populations
can be found in the memoir of Adam Bromke, who served as editorin-chief of the
Polish leaflets and worked closely with the RFE Polish desk. See Polak w Swiecie
(Warszawa:Graf-Punkt, 1995).
RFE's extensive and sometimes bizarre propaganda campaigns in the years
preceding the Hungarian crisis. Approved on December 11, 1953, policy paper NSC
174 called for measures such as informational activities via the Free Europe
Committee, speeches by defectors, food shipments and other humanitarian aid,
diplomatic initiatives, and psychological warfare schemes.
645
Other policy papers in
1955 considered the detachment of one of the satellite states, such as Albania, from
the bloc but concluded that this entailed too high a risk of nuclear war.
646
This
section will outline these early "informational activities" as well as RFE's role in
1956, drawing on the new archival documents.
647

Guglielmo Marconi's invention of the wireless telegraph in 1895 sparked a
revolution in new propaganda techniques. Unlike books or newspapers, radio
broadcasts could reach masses of people simultaneously, and could be understood
even by the illiterate.
648
Radio was the perfect medium with which to penetrate the
Iron Curtain, for Western television in the 1950s could not penetrate the Soviet bloc
due to differences in frequencies, receivers, and transmission standards between

645
NSC 174, "United States Policy Toward the Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe,"
December 11, 1953, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1952-1954, vol
VIII, p. 110.
646
See FRUS 1955-1957, vol XXV, pp 4-11. Discussed also in Raymond Garthoff,
Hungary, 1956 The Washington Reaction, unpublished paper delivered at
Hungary and the World, 1956 the New Archival Evidence, 26-29 September
1996, pp. 1-26.
647
See fn. #1 supra.
648
A Russian immigrant, David Sarnoff, later developed Marconi's invention
further: a radio music box (without headphones) to enable many people to listen
simultaneously. See Nancy Lynch Street and Marilyn J. Matelski, Messages from the
Underground: Transnational Radio in Resistance and in Solidarity (Westport, Conn.:
Praeger, 1997), p. xv.
East and West European TV stations.
649

In the years after World War II, independence movements intensified in
numerous Asian and African colonies, and the Soviet Union began to capitalize on it
by encouraging "wars of national liberation." Soviet propaganda dramatized the
United States' association with the colonialist powers Great Britain and France, its
NATO allies. A growing number of US officials began to realize the need for
psychological or political warfare, to be used in conjunction with diplomatic,
economic, and military measures to achieve U.S. national objectives.
650
These men-
-many of them former OSS officials or CIA officials---included Joseph C. Grew
(distinguished diplomat); Adolf A. Berle, Jr. (lawyer and former assistant secretary
of state); Allen W. Dulles (lawyer, OSS representative in Switzerland, and later
DCI); DeWitt C. Poole (former charg d'affaires in Moscow in 1917 and State
Department propaganda expert); and General Lucius D. Clay (former commander
of US occupation forces in Europe and U.S. military governor in Germany with
control of intelligence and counter-intelligence departments.
651


649
Report and Recommendations Concerning Television in Europe, Operations
Coordinating Board, April 23, 1956, Folder International Broadcasting, II, secret,
National Archive (NARA), Record Group (RG) 59, Lot 62D430, Box 41, p. 1.
650
The terms psychological warfare and political warfare were often used
interchangeably. As CD Jackson noted to William Jackson, "Over and over again
thousands of charactersmostly military charactershave got to have explained to
them that psychological warfare is not an occult science practiced on a couch, but
just one of many clubs in the bag of the Foreign Minister or the military
commander. We sure have been ruined by that word 'psychological.'" Letter to
William Jackson, White House, May 9, 1956, from C.D. Jackson, C.D. Jackson
Papers, Box 63, Folder Jackson, William (2), Eisenhower Presidential Library.
651
"Report on Radio Free Europe," December 15, 1952, Business Research Staff of
General Motors, C D Jackson Papers, Free Europe Committee, Box 54, ,
Eisenhower Presidential Library. Declassified October 10, 1996. At a 1996
conference in Budapest, James McCargar explained that Frank Wisner and other
In 1949 these men established Radio Free Europe, one of four divisions of the
National Committee for a Free Europe (NCFE). RFE was one of the newest of the
major transnational radios--following the Vatican Radio (1931); the British
Broadcasting Company's Empire Service (1932); and the Voice of America (1942).
Radio Moscow was established before the Voice of America.
652
As the fastest
growing division, RFE in 1950 broadcast a total of 7 hours daily; by 1952, it
broadcast 57 hours daily. RFE had two main studios (New York and Munich) and
19 transmitters of its own located in Germany (Holzkirchen and Biblis) and
Portugal (Lisbon).
653

As part of "a private American organization [NCFE], RFE claimed to be
supported wholly by funds raised by the Crusade for Freedom. Eugene Holman,
Chairman of the Board of Standard Oil Company, also served as Chairman of the
Board of NCFE in 1956. C D Jackson also sat on the NCFE board even after

CIA officials figured prominently in the Free Europe committee. See McCargar,
James, "Remarks at the International Conference, 'Hungary and the World, 1956:
the New Archival Evidence,' 26-29 September 1996, Budapest" (unpublished paper
for the Radio Free Europe panel).
652
Headquartered in New York, Radio Liberty was founded in 1951; the two radios
merged as RFE/RL on October 1, 1976. The other three divisions in NCFE included
the National Councils Division; the Division of Intellectual Cooperation; and the
Research and Publications Service.
653
"Report on Radio Free Europe," December 15, 1952, Business Research Staff of
General Motors, C D Jackson Papers, Free Europe Committee, Box 54, Eisenhower
Presidential Library. Declassified October 10, 1996. The 57.5 hours reflects the total
number of hours of daily broadcasts by each of the different radios: Czech
programs: 20 hours (including 7 hrs of original programs); Hungarian: 18 hours;
Polish: 12 hours; Romanian: 3 hours; Bulgarian: 3 hours; and Albanian: 1.5 hours.
By 1958, RFE used twenty-nine transmitters. USARIS Invades Radio Free
Europe, The Islander, vol II, no 26, Fort Slocum, NY, July 2, 1958.
relinquishing the Presidency of NCFE.
654
Citizens were urged to "make a mark on
the course of events" in the "world-wide struggle between titanic forces."
Newspapers warned that "only the many individual Americans who have
contributed to RFE in the past can assure its continued success in the future."
655

In 1952 the research staff of General Motors wrote an in-depth, thirteen-page
report on the history of RFE and why it should continue to receive funding.
656

Although we have long known that RFE received its funding from the CIA
from its inception, and that financing increased dramatically after the Korean War,
it was not known exactly how much funding it received. We now know that in 1956
RFEs annual budget was $21,000,000, of which $16,000,000 was furnished by the
Central Intelligence Agency.
657
The CIA continued to finance RFE and RL until
1971, despite the so-called Katzenbach committee which exposed in 1967 the CIAs
financing of student organizations. According to George Urban, an RFE executive
from 1961 to 1965, the CIA gave RFE personnel considerable leeway in the choice of

654
Memorandum to the Directors with attached copy of statement of March 19
signed by Joseph Grew to the Secretary General of the United Nations, March 20,
1956, p. 2, C.D. Jackson Papers, Box 54, Free Europe Committee, 1956 (6),
Eisenhower Presidential Library.
655
Robert Neumann, Radio Free Europe Communists Scream Because its
Effective,Los Angeles Times, Feb. 16, 1955, p. 2.
656
Letter from Robert Lang to CD Jackson, re: General Motors Report on RFE,
February 19, 1953, Eisenhower Presidential Library, CD Jackson Papers, Free
Europe Committee, Box 54. Declassified October 17, 1996.
657
General Willis D. ("Critt") Crittenberger was appointed on October 1, 1956 to
serve as the new Chairman of NCFE. In a July 3, 1956 personal memo, Critt
wrote RFEs annual budget is $21,000,000, of which $16,000,000 is furnished by
the Central Intelligence Agency. The other five is raised by another private
organization known as Crusade for Freedom. I would therefore be associated
principally with Allen Dulles of the Central Intelligence Agency, with whom I
worked in the Volunteer Freedom Corps. U.S. Army Military History Institute,
Carlisle Barracks, PA, Willis Crittenberger Post-Retirement Activities,
Correspondence, 1956--Memorandum for the Record.
its programs. He broadcast interviews of famous ex-communists like Arthur
Koestler as a way to attack the Soviet bloc's "soft underbelly"---those communist
functionaries struggling with the moral conflict between their former idealism and
current obsequiousness.
658

RFE had at least four key goals. First, it was to prevent the integration of the
Iron Curtain countries into the Soviet empire. Defense planners believed Soviet
strategy was to attack Western Europe, and to accomplish that, the satellites would
have to be firmly consolidated within the "Soviet Empire" as reliable military allies.
Secondly, RFE sought to use the talents of political figures, writers, and journalists
from the "Iron Curtain countries" who lived, often jobless, as political refugees in
the United States. Great Britain could no longer play host to these kinds of "exile
governments."
659
Thirdly, RFE aimed to serve as the "voice of the internal
opposition," to provide news and alternative viewpoints otherwise inaccessible.
660
A
fourth goal was psychological: "to contribute to the liberation of the nations
imprisoned behind the Iron Curtain by sustaining their morale and stimulating in
them a spirit of non-cooperation."
RFE quickly developed into a key tool of Eisenhower's "Liberation" policy.
Administration officials especially appreciated RFE for its relatively low cost and
greater flexibility, in comparison to the covert operations that had failed in recent

658
George R. Urban, Radio Free Europe and the Pursuit of Democracy: My War
Within the Cold War (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1997), p. 47.
659
James McCargar, "Remarks at the Intemational Conference, "Hungary and the
World, 1956: the New Archival Evidence, 26-29 September 1996, Budapest"
(unpublished conference paper).
660
Letter from William Griffith to CDJ, [December 6, 1955, re: RFE Business,
Personnel, and Events in Europe, Eisenhower Presidential Library, C D Jackson
Papers, Box 54, Folder: "Free Europe Committee, 1955 (1)."
years: Albania (November 1948), Ukraine (September 1949), and Poland (1949-
1952).
661
In his memo to Cutler lamenting the lack of a plan after Stalin's death, CD
Jackson had also noted "In the case of Radio Free Europe, because of its greater
flexibility and freedom from official taboos, I was able to suggest a nasty idea or
two."
662
Jackson did not specify what he meant by greater flexibility and official
taboos, but generally, broadcasted words rather than secret agents - are easier
and cheaper instruments to wield in the Cold War.
RFE directors believed Stalin's successors had the same goals as Stalin, but
that they were more imaginative. RFE would have to come up with more subtle and
persuasive ways to respond to the new policies of "peaceful coexistence" and
destalinization. More than ever RFE sought to increase the Kremlin leaders' fear
and doubt about the satellites' reliability. As expressed in a 1955 newspaper
editorial:
This is not a revolt. It does not overthrow the Communist regimes and their police.
But with every act of sabotage, with every secret underground paper, with every
anti-Communist inscription secretly printed on walls in the dead of night, the hated
Communist regime feels less safe, needs to mobilize additional policemen, and the
Kremlin wonders just how far it can rely on satellite forces, resources, and
transportation in times of crisis. And this wonderment has its effect on the decisions
made by the Soviet leaders.
663


Buoyed by its unexpected success in the food program carried out in the
summer of 1953 soon after the East Berlin riots, which drew citizens not just from

661
Peter Grose, Operation Rollback Americas Secret War Behind the Iron Curtain
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 2000), pp. 158-9, 171, 176-9.
662
Memorandum to General Robert Cutler from CD Jackson, March 4, 1953, C. D
Jackson Papers, Box 45, Folder Cutler, General Robert, Eisenhower Presidential
Library.
663
Robert Neumann, Radio Free Europe Communists Scream Because its
Effective,Los Angeles Times, Feb. 16, 1955, p. 2.
Berlin but from all over the German Democratic Republic (GDR), RFE (working
together with the Free Europe Press, or FEP) embarked on a series of massive
propaganda programs---leaflets to be blanketed over the satellite countries by the
use of balloons. Between 1953 and 1955, at least four programs were launched:
"Operation Prospero" (July 13-17, 1953); "Operation Veto" (April--September,
1954); "Operation Focus" (October 1, 1954--February, 1955); and "Operation
Spotlight" (1955). To be sure, the distribution of leaflets from balloons was not new;
Germans and Russians during World War I used balloons to deposit subversive
leaflets, as well as lethal chemical agents.
664
But, for the first time, the Free Europe
Press (another unit of NCFE) coordinated leaflet drops with radio broadcasts.
"Prospero" aimed to exploit dissatisfaction of citizens in Czechoslovakia over
drastic currency reforms, which in 1953 had triggered riots in the Czechoslovak city
of Plze and East German cities. Operation Veto, also aimed at Czechoslovakia,
sought to influence upcoming parliamentary elections. For four months, beginning
in late April to coincide with the May Day holiday, balloons dropped "opposition
ballots" and stickers with the number ten (symbolizing ten demands the people
should make, including freedom of speech and reduced production quotas). RFE's

664
In World War I, German balloons dropped propaganda leaflets over enemy
territory by timed release. The Bolsheviks in the Russian Civil War (November 1917
to 1922) dropped some 9,000 kilograms (19,845 lbs) of leaflets via propaganda
bombs (agitatsionnaia aviatsionnaia bomba). One Russian construction, the "Krilov
Apparatus," consisted of a compartment fitted with a safety pin like a hand
grenade, and by a time fuse could explode at the desired height above ground to
break the box and scatter the leaflets. See David R. Jones, ed. The Military
Encyclopedia of Russia and Eurasia, vol. 8 (Gulf Breeze, Fla.: Academic
International Press, 1998), pp. 92-97. See review by J. Granville, "Bombs Educate
Vigorously," H-RUSSIA, H-Net Reviews (May 1999). http://www.h-
net.msu.edu/reviews/
former Deputy European Director Allan Michie believes Veto actually caused the
Czech regime officials to postpone the elections.
665
Beginning on October 1, 1954
and directed at Hungary, Operation Focus was similar to Veto, although twelve new
demands were suggested, which fit internal conditions in Hungary more closely.
(Prime Minister Imre Nagy's New Course had progressed further than in
Czechoslovakia; the party apparatus was split between Nagy and Rkosi
supporters; and the opposition was more diffuse and centered in the countryside
rather than in urban centers as in Czechoslovakia.) The Hungarian acronym for the
words "twelve demands of the National Opposition Movement" [Nemzeti Ellenllsi
Mozgalom] is NEM, which--appropriately--means "no" in Hungarian. It was
reported that signs for "NEM" and "12" became ubiquitous throughout
Hungary.
666

In Operations Prospero and Veto, simple rubber balloons were launched
since Czechoslovakia was so close to Germany. Hungary, however, was further
away--FEP could not launch the balloons from occupied, or later neutral, Austria--
and thus a different balloon was designed, made of plastic and filled with hydrogen,
with a cardboard container for the leaflets attached underneath the balloon. Below
the container an envelope was filled with dry ice, which when melted, tipped over
the container, scattering the leaflets over the territory below. By calculating the
speed in which the ice would melt, the weight of the leaflets, the amount of hydrogen

665
Allan Michie, Voices Through the Curtain: the Radio Free Europe Story (New
York: Dodd, Mead, and Co., 1963), pp. 144-145. Michie joined RFE in 1952.
666
John Holt, Radio Free Europe (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1958), p. 162. Discussed also in James Marchio, "Rhetoric and Reality: The
Eisenhower Administration and Unrest in Eastern Europe, 1953-1959," Ph.D. diss.,
American University, Washington, DC, 1990, pp 218-9.
in the balloon, and velocity and direction of wind, the FEP planners could hit
designated targets with reasonable accuracy.
667

Another, less known leaflet-balloon program, Operation Spotlight, caused
tension between the New York and Munich offices of RFE, and split the Polish
emigr community. The revelations of Polish security chief Jzef wiato caused
mass arrests and dismissals in the Polish United Workers' Party in Warsaw and led
indirectly to the return of Wadysaw Gomuka to power. RFE considered wiato
one of its most valuable apostates; between September 28 and December 31, 1954
the Voice of Free Poland focused on wiato in 101 broadcasts and 146 news
items.
668
Although they agreed that wiato should be used, many Polish emigrs
working for RFE disliked this man who had so much "blood on his hands." The
RFE Munich office came up with the idea of printing some of wiato's confessions
on leaflets to be delivered by balloons. The New York Poles, especially Stanley
Strzetelski, the head of the RFE Polish desk, vigorously opposed the idea.
Nevertheless, when the disgruntled Poles tried to negotiate, they were told that the
leaflets had already gone to press. wiato himself had also not been consulted and
threatened to sue the NCFE for $10,000 just as he had sued NCFE earlier (and
received $2,000) for publishing his material in News From Behind the Iron Curtain
without his permission. In the new leaflets wiato was "labeled as a man who has
drunk of every shame." At a result of this contretemps, wiato refused to work
with RFE; irate Poles wrote letters to Congressman Machrowicz and Secretary of
State Dulles; Strzetelski (considered by some "the best Polish brain in exile") and

667
Michie, Voices through the Iron Curtain, p. 158.
668
Ibid., p. 165.
Robert Lang (Director of RFE for five and a half years) resigned; and the
communist Radio Warsaw exploited news about these tensions.
669

As to be expected, the communist governments protested fervidly against the
balloon operations. While the Czech regime made thirty-four press, radio, or
government attacks on RFE in response to Prospero, it denounced RFE 155 times in
response to Veto. On May 5, 1954, the Czech government formally protested to the
U.S. government. Czech military aircraft attempted to shoot down the balloons,
while Czech police were instructed to collect the leaflets.
670
No protest was raised at
the UN level, however, until February 24, 1956, the day before Khrushchev's Secret
Speech. The Prague government accused the United States of causing an airplane to
crash in the Tatra mountain area of Slovakia on January 18, 1956, in which twenty-
two people died.
671
The Free Europe Committee issued a persuasive rebuttal. One
of the NCFE Directors, Joseph Grew, cited testimony of the US Civil Aeronautics
Administration that mere balloons with the weight of FEC loads (one to seven
pounds) could not cause a crash.
672
No balloons were launched into Slovakia on
January 17 or 18, and balloons launched to other areas on those days weighed only
three pounds. Given the direction and speed of the winds, no balloon released from
West Germany could have reached Slovakia by 14:47 local time, when the airplane
made the last radio contact. Besides, Czech sources reveal that visibility at the time

669
Letter from Robert Lang to Adolph Berle and CD Jackson in New York,
November 29, 1956, CD Jackson Papers, Box 54, folder: 1956 (4), Eisenhower
Presidential Library.
670
Michie, Voices through the Iron Curtain, p. 149-150.
671
Statement by Joseph Grew to the Secretary General of the United Nations,
March 19, p. 4, C.D. Jackson Papers, Box 54, Free Europe Committee, 1956 (6),
Eisenhower Presidential Library.
672
Ibid., p. 1 (Grew statement to UN)
of the crash was only 70 feet. Normally scheduled to fly from Bratislava to Kosice,
the plane had been forced by bad weather to make a forced landing at the Tatra
airport. Technicalities aside, another FEC official, Ed McEnerney, wrote, "The
Communist governments in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland - those countries
to which balloon leaflets are sent by Free Europe Committee - have for years
violated the principle of free communication, by jamming foreign radio news
broadcasts, by preventing the entry of Western books, newspapers and periodicals,
by censoring family letters, and by rigorously restricting other media. FEC holds
the view that these restrictions constitute violations of the Preamble of the UNESCO
constitution."
673
Moreover, he continued, since the balloon operations began in
1954, why have they suddenly become the object of abusive assertions reminiscent of
Communist germ warfare accusations against United Nations airmen during the
Korean conflict?
674
It is also suspicious, he added, that the Soviet Union is taking
the lead in the campaign, since no balloons have been sent to that country.
675

This elegant rebuttal aside, Eisenhower and Dulles themselves had been leery
about the balloons from the program's inception. In a memo on his conversation
with the president, Dulles wrote:
We discussed the matter of the Soviet protest about the meteorological [sic]
balloons. The President recalled that both he and I had been rather allergic to this

673
Ed McEnerney, Free Europe Committee, March 20, 1956, C.D. Jackson Papers,
Box 54, Free Europe Committee, 1956 (6), Eisenhower Presidential Library.
674
N.B. The Czech government did object to the RFE broadcasts from Holzkirchen
on May 21, 1951, just three weeks after the broadcasts began. "Report on Radio
Free Europe," December 15, 1952, Business Research Staff of General Motors, C D
Jackson Papers, Free Europe Committee, Box 54, Eisenhower Presidential Library.
Declassified October 10, 1996.
675
Ed McEnerney, Free Europe Committee, March 20, 1956, C.D. Jackson Papers,
Box 54, Free Europe Committee, 1956 (6), Eisenhower Presidential Library.
project and doubted whether the results would justify the inconvenience involved.
The Pres[ident] said he thought the operation should now be suspended. I agreed,
but said I thought we should handle it so it would not look as though we had been
caught with jam on our fingers.
676


They probably had misgivings as well about another RFE caper, whereby
Hungarian toilet paper printed with Rkosi's face was installed on all trains in
Vienna bound for Hungary.
677

For their part, the RFE and FEP officials were not too distressed by the
communists' diplomatic protests. Communist regimes, such as the Hungarian, had
begun to decry the "hostile and imperialistic propaganda stations well before
RFE's first broadcast on October 6, 1951.
678
Indeed, these protests were considered
to be one vital source of feedback on the effectiveness of RFE radio and balloon
operations - along with: attacks in the Communist press and radio, refugees, and
letters through ordinary mail or smuggled over the Iron Curtain frontier.

676
John Foster Dulles, "Memorandum of Conversation with the President,"
February 6, 1956, 10:15 a.m., John Foster Dulles Collection, White House
Memoranda, Box 4, Folder Meetings with the President, January-July, 1956," File
#5, Eisenhower Presidential Library. John Prados also states that, after the
Hungarian crisis, US propaganda projects like Operation Focus were discontinued,
and the migr liberation army was disbanded. A legacy of the Hungarian
revolution in 1956 was the reduced emphasis on psychological warfare. See John
Prados, 1he Presidents Secret Wars. Apparently balloons were used in 1956,
however, to drop medicines in Hungary. See "Memorandum Regarding Medicines
Dropped from Balloons," CD Jackson Papers, Box #54, 1956 Folder (4), Eisenhower
Presidential Library. Other evidence suggests that leaflet drops did continue even
after the Polish and Hungarian crises. See Allen Dulles to Andrew Goodpaster, Nov.
20, 1956, CIA Vol. I (4) [Nov 56--March 57], WHO, Office of Staff Secretary,
Records of Paul T. Carroll, et al., Subject Series, Alphabetical Subseries, Box 7,
Eisenhower Presidential Library.
677
Michael Nelson, War of the Black Heavens (NY: Syracuse University Press, 1997,
p. 40.
678
On this point see Bla Rvsz, "A Belgyminisztrium SZER-kpe 1955-ben, "
Mltunk, 1 (1999), p. 170.
According to the General Motors Report in 1952, secret "listeners clubs" were
formed, and RFE was becoming the most popular Western radio station:
RFE receives monthly 160-180 letters from Poland; 100 from Hungary; and about
15-20 from Czechoslovakia. Severe measures, especially in Czechoslovakia have
been taken by the communist governments to control the mail sent abroad....From
the letters sent from Czechoslovakia, for example, it can be inferred that people
have come to regard RFE as a real substitute for Radio Prague. It also appears that
it is much more popular than the other Western radio-stations like the Voice of
America, the BBC, Radio France, or Radio Belgrade, which all have special
programs for the Iron Curtain countries.
679


In addition to the growth of propaganda, Marconi's invention also sparked a
revolution in electromagnetic warfare, which can be defined as "the contest for the
control of all or parts of the radio spectrum or the denial of use by others through
preclusive use, jamming, and related measures.
680
In 1948, the Soviet Union began
systematically to jam Western propaganda broadcasts beamed at the Soviet bloc
using 900 transmitters at between 1,000 and 1,500 stations mostly in Soviet
territory.
681
Jamming was most effective in the European USSR; RFE and other
programs could not penetrate Moscow and other major Soviet cities. "
682
Western
programs directed to the East European satellites, however, were jammed less
effectively, but they certainly were not "jam-proof," as one US reporter claimed

679
"Report on Radio Free Europe," December 15, 1952, Business Research Staff of
General Motors, C D Jackson Papers, Free Europe Committee, Box 54, pp. 9-10,
Eisenhower Presidential Library. Declassified October 10, 1996.
680
Special Estimate: Soviet Bloc Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action in
Electromagnetic Warfare, April 24, 1953, p. 1, Record Group 263, CIA Records,
Intelligence Public File, HRP 92-4/001, Box 2, NARA. Declassified February 9, 1994.
681
Ibid., p. 2.
682
Ibid., p.1. Electromagnetic Warfare.
about RFE.
683
By using fourteen frequencies simultaneously, the Voice of America
(VOA), for example, could be heard on some channel at least half the time.
684

According to two U.S. Legation (Budapest) officers in the Vrosliget area of Pest,
and one local employee monitoring radio from the Rzsadomb area of Buda
between July 14 and September 5, 1956, the VOA was audible on one of the
frequencies most of the time, RFE could be heard fairly clearly at 11:30 or 12:00
p.m., while the French radio and BBC (both English and Hungarian versions) were
jammed more thoroughly, perhaps in spite, due to the Suez situation.
685
To
compensate for the failure to jam broadcasts completely, Soviet authorities also
registered all owners of receivers.
686
A dealer in the USSR could sell a radio set only
after the Ministry of State Security (MGB), and later KGB, stamped the set's card
with the potential buyer's name and personal information on it. Consumers in the
USSR were relatively lucky. Bulgarian peasants brought their radios for "free
repair;" when they got them back, they received only Radio Sofia.
687


RFE during the 1956 Revolution
The role of RFE during the 1956 Hungarian Revolution has generated a lot
of controversy. Soviet officials, Americans, and emigrs worldwide accused RFE of

683
Robert Neumann, Radio Free Europe Communists Scream Because its
Effective,Los Angeles Times, Feb. 16, 1955, p. 2.
684
Ibid., p. 3. Electromagnetic warfare.
685
Telegram from U.S. Legation in Budapest regarding VOA Monitoring Report,
September 6, 1956, pp 1-3, National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.,
Flashpoints Project, Box 2, Record # 78939 (originally from NARA Decimal
Files).
686
Ibid., p. 3. Electromagnetic Warfare.
687
Nelson, War of the Black Heavens, p. 30. Nelson cites a speech by William Haley
at the University of Nottingham on December 1, 1950.
inciting the Hungarians or arousing false hopes for Western military aid. This
section will review the newly available evidence about the nature of RFE broadcasts.
While some broadcasts raised hopes of military aid, others discredited Nagy,
praised Mindszenty, fomented hatred of VH men, gave misleading information
about the UN, created a false picture of the political situation (siding with Hungary
and ostracizing the Soviet Union), and otherwise distorted the news.
Less recognized is the fact that U.S. diplomats in the Budapest Legation also
failed much earlier to support the Nagy government and encouraged reliance on
regional anti-government Hungarian radios. To understand US diplomats'
undermining of Nagy, one must recall the tight connection between the Nagy
government's protests regarding Operation Focus and the neutral position on Nagy
by US diplomats and RFE in 1956.
Although a number of RFE and CIA officials such as CD Jackson, General
Willis Crittenberger, Cord Meyer, Paul Henze, and James McCargar passionately
denied that RFE incited the Hungarians or undermined Nagy, even some forty years
after the event, incontrovertible evidence now exists that some scripts were indeed
misleading.
688
Upon Eisenhower's request, Allen Dulles presented a four-page
report on November 20, 1956, which read RFE broadcasts went somewhat beyond

688
After the second Soviet intervention, Eisenhower ordered a postmortmem
analysis from the CIA. Cord Meyer, the CIA's liaison with the radios since 1954,
concluded: "RFE did not plan, direct, or attempt to provoke the Hungarian
rebellion. John Prados, 1he Presidents Secret Wars CIA and Pentagon Covert
Operations from World War II through the Persian Gulf (Chicago: I.R. Dee, 1996), p.
125). (Cord Meyer succeeded Tom Braden as head of the CIAs International
Organizations Division.)
specific guidances in identifying with Hungarian patriot aims, and in offering
certain tactical advice to the patriots."
689

The full extent of RFE broadcasters' transgressions was fully disclosed only
in the past few years.
690
At an international historians' conference in Budapest in
September 1996, William Griffith, who had served in 1956 as the Political Advisor
in Munich in charge of overseeing the Radio Free Hungary staff, produced a
thoughtful memo that he had written to another RFE official, Richard Condon, on
December 5, 1956. Griffith acknowledged that sixteen programs involved
"distortions of policy or serious failure to employ constructive techniques of policy
application."
691
It should be noted that, contrary to common assumptions of
scholars today, RFE did not actually forbid the use of "polemics." According to the
1952 General Motors comprehensive study, "In its polemics, RFE excels in
answering immediately the Communist falsehoods. Thanks to a highly flexible
organization, the Communist broadcasts may be answered when they are still on the
air."
692


689
"Radio Free Europe," Eisenhower Library NLE MR case no. 80-502, doc. no. 4.
Cited in Nelson, War of the Black Heavens, p. 74, and paraphrased in Prados, The
Presidents Secret Wars (p. 125).
690
See, for example, Gyula Borbndis history of the Hungarian broadcasting
section at RFE: Magyarok az Angol kertben: a Szabad Eurpa Rdi trtnete
(Budapest: Eurpa, 1996).
691
"Memorandum from William Griffith to Richard Condon (RFE), "Policy
Review of Voice of Free Hungary Programming, 23 October--23 November 1956,"
December 5, 1956, Document no. 16 in Csaba Bks, Malcolm Byrne, and Christian
Ostermann, eds. The Hidden History of Hungary 1956: A Compendium of
Declassified Documents (Washington, DC: National Security Archive, 1996).
Hereafter referred to as Griffith memo.
692
General Motors Report, p. 7.
Moreover, given the premium on speed and the language barrier, U.S.
managers could not possibly check each transcript before it was transmitted.
693

There was no deception about this. Griffith, Paul Henze, and the General Motors
study admit that programs were not previewed by Americans before they were
broadcast. However, "politically sensitive programs were discussed before they
were written in policy meetings each morning."
694
Summaries of the programs in
English were presented each morning to Griffith. As he wrote in his postmortem
analysis, all too often "summaries originally presented at morning policy meetings
for these programs.....failed to reflect the content of the program as it was finally
written."
Although Andor Gellrt was director of the Hungarian desk and should have
been checking the Hungarian scripts, he had been seriously ill and actually
collapsed again at the end of the first week of November. Griffith apparently did not
realize that Gellrt was not editing and approving the scripts. Unfortunately, the
one American who could speak Hungarian, William Raedemakers, was sent to the
Austrian border at the height of the crisis to send dispatches from Hungary to a U.S.
newspaper. Thus, unbeknownst to Griffith, Hungarian emigrs subordinate to
Gellrt were approving the scripts instead: Viktor Marjas (9 scripts), Jnos lvedi
(5 scripts), Lszl Bry (3 scripts), and Lszl Feketekuthy (1 script). The two

693
John Holt, Radio Free Europe, pp. 44-45. Most of the Americans who usually
went to work for RFE were professional journalists; they did not have expertise in
East European languages.
694
Paul B. Henze, "Recollections of Radio Free Europe: Its Evolution in the 1950s
and the Hungarian Revolution," p. 3, unpublished paper delivered at "Hungary and
the World, 1956: the New Archival Evidence, 26-29 September 1996, Budapest."
Hungarian broadcasters who approved the most inflammatory reports, Marjas and
lvedi , "practically never" attended the morning meetings.
695

After the revolution refugees claimed they had heard on the weekend of
November 4 RFE promises that help would come. RFE officials have usually denied
this, but Griffith clarifies the issue in his memo. On November 4, Zoltn Thury
broadcast a "Short World Press Review." Griffith considered Thury's statements
"the most serious policy violation of all." Thury quoted excerpts from a London
newspaper:
This morning the British Observer published a report of its Washington
correspondent. This situation report was written before the Soviet attack early this
morning. In spite of this the Observer correspondent writes that the Russians have
probably decided to beat down the Hungarian Revolution with arms. The article
goes on: 'If the Soviet troops really attack Hungary, if our expectations should hold
true and Hungarians hold out for three or four days, then the pressure upon the
government of the United States to send military help to the freedom fighters will be
irresistible.' This is what the Observer writes in today's number. The paper observes
that the American Congress cannot vote for war as long as the Presidential elections
have not been held [elections were to be held on Tuesday, November 6]. The article
then continues: 'If the Hungarians can continue to fight until Wednesday [the day
after the elections] we shall be closer to a world war than at any time since 1939.'
The reports from London, Paris, the United States and other Western reports show
that the world's reaction to the Hungarian events surpasses every imagination. In
the Western capitals a practical manifestation of Western sympathy is expected at
any hour.
696


As Griffith concedes: "The fact that the Observer printed these words hardly gave
Thury authorization to broadcast them to Hungary at a time when Hungarians were
likely to be clutching for any straws of hope from the West."

695
Marjas approved the most damaging scripts. Griffith states that he had language
and hearing problems.
696
Michie, Voices through the Iron Curtain, pp. 259-260.
A cursory glance at some other broadcasts would cause even the most brash
journalists ethical cardiac arythmia. Some programs gave concrete military advice.
On October 27 and October 28, for example, Jlin Borsnyi told listeners how to
disconnect railroad and telephone lines, and claimed that if they could establish a
central military command and continue fighting, this would greatly influence the
debate on Hungary in the UN Security Council. Borsnyi implied that "the most the
Soviets can bring in is about four divisions and that it might take as long as two or
three weeks for the Soviets to secure the Danube line if Hungarians fight effectively
against them." He reminded listeners that in 1943 Yugoslav partisans in Serbia
fought against numerically superior German forces and won. Gyula Litterati
advised listeners on October 30 about techniques of anti-tank warfare, giving the
impression that tanks were easy to destroy.
On October 29, a "shrill, violent" report by Imre Mikes told the freedom
fighters not to give up their arms. This report "lacked any reference to the fact that
people in the country might be able to judge this delicate question better than
emigrs on the outside and made no reference to the Freedom Stations or other
opinion from within the country," Griffith writes. "This had been specifically
advised and agreed upon at the morning meeting when a summary of the program
had been presented."
697

On the same day, October 29, Katalin Hunyadi stated that in Cleveland
"Groups of Hungarians and Americans give their names...they want to volunteer to
go to Hungary so that they can fight against the Soviets." Other transcripts, while

697
The quoted statements in this paragraph can be found in the Griffith memo, op.
cit.
they did not incite the uprising, grossly undermined the Nagy regime or certain
members of it in a "bombastic, rhetorical, and overly emotional" manner, Griffith
wrote.
At the Budapest conference in September 1996 commemorating the fortieth
anniversary of the 1956 revolution, Maria Wittner, a former insurgent imprisoned
from 1956 to 1970, read some RFE quotations aloud.
Imre Nagy agreed to the invasion of Soviet troops. Already on this very day
this step of his is put down as one of the greatest acts of treachery in Hungary's
history. And this will be remembered forever.
Imre Nagy, who covered his hands in Hungarian blood....
Where are the traitors......Who are the murderers? Imre Nagy and his
government....only Cardinal Mindszenty has spoken out fearlessly.
698


After the crisis, CD Jackson requested that a portion of the RFE transcripts
broadcast during October and November 1956 be translated into English and sent
to him from Munich. While some consisted of straightforward reporting, for
example, of the students' demands, others undermined the Nagy government.
699

One broadcaster, Jnos Olvedi, asserted on October 24:
Instead of introducing real reforms, the [Nagy] regime tried to solve every problem
by introducing only half-measures. They ignore the will of the people. Instead of
setting up a popular representation, they continued to govern by way of a sham
parliament.
700



698
Interview of Maria Wittner by author, Budapest, September 28, 1996. Cited also
in Michael Nelson, War of the Black Heavens (NY: Syracuse University Press, 1997),
p. 82. See also Jane Perlez, "Budapest Journal: A 1956 Crop of Fearless Teen-
Agers," New York Times (October 3, 1996), p. A4.
699
RFE Europe Broadcasts [October 29, 1956--November 9, 1956], CD Jackson
Papers, Box 54, Folder "Free Europe Committee, 1956 (2)," Eisenhower
Presidential Library.
700
Ibid., p.7-8, Script #2, "Special Commentary III," October 24, 1956, RFE Europe
Broadcasts [October 29, 1956--November 9, 1956], CD Jackson Papers, Box 54,
Folder "Free Europe Committee, 1956 (2)," Eisenhower Presidential Library.
A second commentator said "The [Nagy] government and its armed units are
no more masters of the situation."
701
Still a third stated:
We know that the President of the Council of Ministers in his speech on Sunday
promised to fulfil a part of these demands. Instead of promises, however, and
instead of words, action is needed.
702


A fourth broadcaster admitted his lack of knowledge of the situation in
Hungary and attributed his confusion to the Nagy regime:

We don't know exactly what is going on in Budapest and ... in the entire country.
But ...from [Nagy's] speech one can draw a conclusion how great a confusion exists
within the government itself.
703


Lszl Bry praised Mindszenty on October 31, 1956, implying that he--
rather than Nagy--should be followed.
Dear Listeners, they selected [a path] without being able to see the proper and
intelligent path and no one knew who was the director. The answer to that
question...is Cardinal Jzsef Mindszenty. The primate was a prisoner, not an officer.
He did not distribute arms, he did not give out a political program: he did not give
commands to the people. But in spirit he was there in the streets of Budapest.
704


The Hungarian speakers should not always be blamed for their unsupportive
references to Nagy in this case, because the October 24

RFE guidelines themselves
instructed them to avoid to the utmost extent any explicit or implicit support of
individual personalities in a temporary government such as the communists Imre

701
Ibid., p. 14.
702
Ibid., p. 6.
703
Ibid., p. 13-14.
704
Ibid. Excerpt #6, RFE Special Commentary, October 31, 1956, Lszl Bry, RFE
Europe Broadcasts [October 29, 1956--November 9, 1956], CD Jackson Papers, Box
54, Folder "Free Europe Committee, 1956 (2)," Eisenhower Presidential Library.
N.B. The documents in CD Jacksons collection are in awkward English
apparently translated by native Hungarian speakers in order to help the New York-
based RFE officials investigate the reports broadcasted during the crisis.
Nagy or Jnos Kdr.
705
These negative broadcasts in all likelihood contributed to
Soviet views that Nagy had lost control. On October 27, KGB Chief Serov reported
to Moscow: "It is significant that proclamations have appeared around town at
night, in which Imre Nagy is declared a traitor and Bla Kovcs is proposed as a
Prime Minister. They are summoning people to organize demonstrations in Kovcs'
favor."
706

Some reports aroused loathing of the VH personnel, which may have
contributed to the lynchings:
The people look at the VH men creeping out of their hideouts with hatred and
contempt. In some places the Russian soldiers themselves looked at the Hungarian
VH men with contempt and disgust; in the days of the revolution they disappeared
and now, shadowed by foreign arms, they come out again in order to continue with
[what] they did before.
707


Many of the transcripts referred to activities in the UN but failed to remind
listeners of the UN Security Council's limitations. On October 29, the Hungarian
people were told which five countries were permanent members of the Security
Council and which were the elected members. Nine of the Security Council
members had voted to put the Hungarian issue on the agenda for discussion, the

705
Jan Nowak [Zdzisaw Jezioraski], Poles and Hungarians in 1956, unpublished
paper delivered at conference Hungary and the World, 1956 the New Archival
Evidence, 26-29 September 1996, Budapest, p. 7.
706
RGANI, F. 89, Op. 2, D. 2, L. 132, "Informatsiya Serova iz Budapeshta, 27-ogo
oktyabrya 1956 g." [emphasis added]. Kovcs, the former Secretary General of the
Smallholder Party, had been rehabilitated in August 1956 and appointed Minister
of Agriculture by Nagy on October 27.
707
N.B. Most of the lynching took place between the two interventions, but this
excerpt suggests that earlier descriptions of VH men were similar. Script #6, RFE
Border Reports, "Report of an Austrian Journalist," Nov. 7, 1956, p. 38. RFE
Europe Broadcasts [October 29, 1956--November 9, 1956], CD Jackson Papers, Box
54, Folder "Free Europe Committee, 1956 (2)," Eisenhower Presidential Library.
Hungarian people were told.
708
"There is only one vote against this," the speaker
continued, "that of the Soviet Union, while Yugoslavia does not participate in the
voting.
709
He did not explain to his listeners the "unanimity rule," i.e. that only
one vote was necessary to block action in the Security Council decisions on
substantive matters required nine votes, including the concurring votes of all five
permanent members of the Security Council.
In any case, support for Hungary in the Security Council was certainly not
unanimous. Yet, on November 3, the eve of the second Soviet intervention, another
Hungarian script reader, Tibor Sebk, stated "Let us stress that the first important
fact about the meeting of the Security Council is the completely unanimous attitude
and sympathy of the Council with the Hungarian people."
710

Sebk then proceeded to explain in detail how Emiho Nunez Portuondo of
Cuba submitted a proposal to send a UN committee to Hungary "to assure the
conditions for political independence in Hungary." Ironically, pre-Castro Cuba
(during Fulgencio Batista's regime) was one of the most energetic defendants of
Hungarian independence in 1956. Sebk reminded his listeners that Cuba

708
In 1956 Nationalist China was still one of the five permanent members of the UN
Security Council, along with the United States, Great Britain, France, and the Soviet
Union. The six elected members were Belgium, Austria, Yugoslavia, Peru, Pakistan,
and Cuba. (The Peoples' Republic of China occupied Nationalist China's seat in
October, 1971).
709
Excerpt #7, Special UNO Program, October 29, 1956, pp. 2-3, [October 29,
1956--November 9, 1956], CD Jackson Papers, Box 54, Folder "Free Europe
Committee, 1956 (2)," Eisenhower Presidential Library.
710
Tibor Sebk, Script #5, "International Commentary Hungary and the UN,"
Nov. 3, 1956, p. 32, RFE Europe Broadcasts [October 29, 1956--November 9, 1956],
CD Jackson Papers, Box 54, Folder "Free Europe Committee, 1956 (2),"
Eisenhower Presidential Library. Emphasis added.
repeatedly reminded the world five years ago of the "shameful persecution and
imprisonment of Cardinal Mindszenty."
711

Another speaker, Andrew Kazinczy, referred to the "intervention of the UN
in Hungary" as if it were perhaps a foregone conclusion. Referring to the Soviet
delegate to the UN, Arkady A. Sobolov, he said:
It is still going to be very difficult for Mr. Sobolov to whistle a cool and hot tune at
the same time from the same mouth. It is not possible to demand the intervention of
the UN in the Middle East situation and at the same time protest against the
intervention of the UN in Hungary.
712


As mentioned earlier, Marconis invention, the radio, spread news and
propaganda to more people faster and, unlike newspapers, could be understood
even by illiterate people. But if that information is misunderstood, the negative
effects are multiplied as well. The Hungarian broadcasters were hired for their
fluency in Magyar and English, not for their knowledge of international relations,
specifically of UN procedures. Their supervisors were responsible for content and
should be held accountable.
Sebk's description of Sobolov on November 3, for example, does not
resemble objective reporting:
The Soviet delegate Sobolov lied like a cornered poultry thief before the judge.....My
dear listeners, is this the tone which the representatives of a big power should use?
Does a leading diplomat have to lie in such a shameful way? Every word is a
contradiction; he gets caught in his own arguments. Last Sunday he still spoke of a
fascist insurrection against the government. Now he babbles that the insurrection
has been suppressed, that the national government has restored order but that some

711
Ibid.
712
Andrew Kazinczy, Excerpt # 5, Special International Commentary, Nov. 2,
1956, RFE Europe Broadcasts [October 29, 1956--November 9, 1956], CD Jackson
Papers, Box 54, Folder "Free Europe Committee, 1956 (2)," Eisenhower
Presidential Library. Emphasis added.
counter revolutionaries smuggled in from abroad endanger the defenseless Soviet
tank divisions.
713


Other broadcasters almost chortled in their narration of Western diplomats'
ostracism of Soviet officials on the important Soviet holiday, November 7,
commemorating the October Revolution.
Diplomats of the free world...demonstrated with their absence at the military parade
taking place in Moscow's Red Square... Last year, headed by Khrushchev, even the
Soviet leaders began to dance around midnight, but this time not even the young
communists felt like dancing. And so the usually pompous reception reflected a
mood of depression. Obviously it was felt even by the cynical Soviet leaders whose
hands are soiled by blood, that they are at any rate dancing on the top of a volcano:
the earth is roaring under their colonial empire and they try in vain to crush the
peoples longing for freedom with their tanks...[T]he heroic determination and self-
sacrifice by the Hungarian revolutionaries fully over-shadowed the splendor of the
39
th
anniversary of the Bolshevik October Revolution.
714


Emotionalism is further evident in the excessive encouragement of the
revolutionaries, followed quickly by anger at the West. On October 24, 1956,
Balzs Balogh (codename for Lszl Bry), said confidently, The Soviet Union will
lose more on other battlefields than it is trying to gain in Hungary.
715
"Let us be
attentive," exclaimed emigr writer Sndor Mrai, "because great events will come
which will turn the Hungarian case--now as the first shock passed, into a world case.

713
Tibor Sebk, Script #5, "International Commentary Hungary and the UN,"
Nov. 3, 1956, p. 34, RFE Europe Broadcasts [October 29, 1956--November 9, 1956],
CD Jackson Papers, Box 54, Folder "Free Europe Committee, 1956 (2),"
Eisenhower Presidential Library.
714
Script #7, Special Report, Nov. 8, 1956, pp. 5-6, RFE Broadcasts [October 29,
1956November 9, 1956] CD Jackson Papers, Box 54, Folder Free Europe
Committee, 1956 (2), Eisenhower Presidential Library.
715
Balzs Balogh, Excerpt #2, Special Workers No. 1, To the Uprising Workers,
p. 4, October 24, 1956, RFE Broadcasts [October 29, 1956November 9, 1956], CD
Jackson Papers, Box 54, Folder Free Europe Committee, 1956 (2), Eisenhower
Presidential Library.
"
716
Another speaker compared the Hungarian uprising to the Kronstadt rebellion
of March 1921, "in which sailors turned against the communist dictatorship, even
though they had helped the Bolshevik revolutionaries to victory.
717
"A political
victory must follow an armed victory!" said another commentator on October 29.
718

"The Hungarian people will win in the end," exulted yet another unnamed
broadcaster.
719

Commentaries soon turned bitter. "The Soviet Union has won a few days'
time while the world contented itself with verbal protests in the UN."
720
Another
said, "The Russian military command had good reasons to single out this date for its
military attack on Budapest and the country, the very Sunday during which bombs
are still exploding, and cannons thundering, in Suez...[I]n the United States people
live in the tension of the election campaign."
721


716
Sndor Mrai, p. 17, RFE Broadcasts [October 29, 1956November 9, 1956] CD
Jackson Papers, Box 54, Folder Free Europe Committee, 1956 (2), Eisenhower
Presidential Library. Author of forty-six books, Mrai was one of Hungary's most
influential representatives of middle class literature between the two world wars. He
left Hungary in September 1948 and committed suicide in 1989, the same year that
he was awarded the prestigious Kossuth Prize, Hungary's highest award for
literature. His diaries were published in Hungarian in the year he died. In 1996 it
was published in English as Memoir of Hungary (1944-1948) (Budapest: Central
European University Press, 1996). For a review see J. Granville, "Home Sick
Home," in The Hungarian Quarterly, vol 39, no. 150 (Summer 1998), pp. 140-144.
717
Script #5, Calling Communists C-373, October 25, 1956, RFE Broadcasts
[October 29, 1956November 9, 1956] CD Jackson Papers, Box 54, Folder Free
Europe Committee, 1956 (2), Eisenhower Presidential Library.
718
Oct. 29, 1956, p.2, RFE Broadcasts [October 29, 1956November 9, 1956] CD
Jackson Papers, Box 54, Folder Free Europe Committee, 1956 (2), Eisenhower
Presidential Library.
719
RFE Europe Broadcasts [October 29, 1956--November 9, 1956], p. 14, CD
Jackson Papers, Box 54, Folder "Free Europe Committee, 1956 (2)," Eisenhower
Presidential Library.
720
Ibid., pp. 16-17.
721
Ibid.
Because of the sheer speed of events and difficulty in obtaining information,
RFE broadcasters were instructed to repeat the demands made through local
Hungarian radio stations taken over by insurgents. This was a useful method by
which to discover the true desires of the people in some cases. Unfortunately, the
RFE unwittingly became at times "the mouthpiece of the most radical and extreme
Hungarian elements." As mentioned earlier, the RFE Guidance of October 28
"included a request that RFE should support demands for the removal of all leading
communists from the government, free elections within six months, and withdrawal
of Hungary from the Warsaw Pact."
722
Nagy himself did not advocate the latter
extreme measure - withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact - until it became clear that the
Soviet leaders had launched a second military invasion of Hungary.
RFE was not the only one to blame for undermining the popularity of Nagys
government. One should realize that the diplomats in the U.S. Legation in Budapest
began to counsel neutralism vis-a-vis Imre Nagy at least as early as October 15,
1956, when Nagy was readmitted into the Hungarian Workers' Party. On that day,
the US Charg d'Affaires, N. Spencer Barnes sent a telegram to the State
Department:
Legation believes tone if not explicit wording of media comment on restoration
should be benign and that medias main role in treating Hungarian affairs in future
will be to give minimal publicity to Nagyist statements and actions. Nagy as premier
reacted openly and violently to attacks on his regime by American radio, and
Legation feels we should do all we can to forestall such occurrence once more.
723



722
Jan Nowak, Poles and Hungarians in 1956, p. 7.
723
N. Spencer Barnes, Counselor of Legation, Telegram #137 to U.S. Department of
State, Washington, D.C., October 15, 1956, 400 pm. re Restoration of Imre Nagys
Party Rights, p. 1, Flashpoints Project, Box 2, Record Number 62391, National
Security Archive, Washington, DC.
This no doubt refers to Operation Focus which was launched in conjunction with
RFE broadcasts between 1953 and 1955, while Imre Nagy was Prime Minister. The
Hungarian Ministry for Foreign Affairs had sent a note of protest to the US
government on October 15, 1954, and to the American Legation in Budapest for
dropping leaflets from balloons.
724
Barnes was perhaps manifesting the habitual
caution of a professional diplomat; yet, in a revolutionary situation, neutralism soon
translates into a lack of support, and in this case, may have had far-reaching
consequences in terms of undermining Nagys popularity.
A week later, Nagy's cool reception by the crowds on October 23 further
prejudiced the diplomats against Nagy. Barnes repeated his advice for moderation
in the media in his report to Washington:
Crowd called repeatedly for Nagy, who when finally appeared asked demonstrators
bide their time and wait for natural developments, which he said would lead to
democratization in H[ungary]. Crowd hardly listened and Nagy said you called me
here to give my opinion and Im giving it. He asked crowd to sing Szazat [Szzat]
and then go home. Crowds attitude after first moderating words very cool.
Legation strongly urges media refrain from taking any kind of stand on Imre Nagy
for time being.
725


As is well-known, the State Department was confused about who had called
in the Soviet troops on October 23. Diplomats continued to believe that Nagy did,
and this further alienated them. On October 25, as his telegram to the US Embassy

724
Note of Protest from the Hungarian Ministry for Foreign Affairs, CD Jackson
Papers, Box 54, folder: "1954," Eisenhower Presidential Library. Noted also in
Jnos Berecz, Ellenforradalom tollal s fegyverrel 1956 (Budapest: Kossuth
Knyvkiad, 1981) In Russian: Yanosh Berets, Krakh Operatsii Fokus
Kontrrevolutsia Perom I Oruzhieem (Moskva Izdatelstvo politicheskoi literatury,
1986, p. 38
725
Telegram from N. Spencer Barnes to U.S. State Department, October 23, 1956,
p. 2, National Security Archive, Washington, D.C., Flashpoints Project, Box 2,
Record #514. Szzat ("Appeal") written in 1836 during the conflict with Austria, is
one of Hungary's most patriotic anthems.
in Belgrade reveals, John Foster Dulles feared that the Nagy-Kdr government
might take "reprisals" against the Hungarian "freedom fighters."
726
On the same
day, the diplomats in the Budapest Legation were more careful to reserve
judgement and state merely that Nagy was being blamed for calling in the troops.
727

Also on October 25, Douglas Dillon, the US Ambassador to France, transmitted
French opinions on the Polish and Hungarian situations, including the shrewd
observation that "Nagys position will be considerably weaker than Gomukas
because he has been compelled [to] rely openly on [the] Soviets and therefore is
precluded from having [the] degree [of] popular support presently enjoyed by
Gomuka."
728

Nevertheless, despite the diplomats' reservation of judgement, by the next
day, October 26, the State Department officials asserted in a top secret
memorandum "Nagys appeal for Soviet troops indicates, at least superficially, that
there are not any open differences between the Soviet and Hungarian

726
Telegram from Secretary of State Dulles, State Department, to US Embassy in
Belgrade, approved by Jacob D. Beam, October 25, 1956, p. 1, Flashpoints
Project, Box 2, Folder 10/26/56, Record #82362, National Security Archive,
Washington, D.C. Dulles wrote, [D]ifficult see how unarmed people however heroic
can overcome Soviet tanks. In circumstances therefore we desire minimize bloodshed,
keep Nagy-Kdr regime from taking reprisals and (assuming it still has some good
will with populace) encourage it proceed with rapid democratization [emphasis
added]."
727
Running Overseas Teletype Conversation between American Legation and State
Department, Section Four, October 25, 1956, starting at 6:30 am, p. 2,
Flashpoints Project, Box 2, Folder 10/25/56, record number 62044, National
Security Archive, Washington, D.C. Italics added.
728
Telegram from Douglas C. Dillon, U.S. Ambassador to France, to State
Department, Washington, D.C., October 25, 1956, re: French Opinions on Poland
and Hungary, pp 1-2,Flashpoints Project, Box 2, Folder 10/25/56, National
Security Archive, Washington, D.C.
governments."
729
Had they taken Dillon's telegram seriously, perhaps they would
not have judged Nagy's selection of cabinet officials on October 27 so harshly and
perceived his moves instead as part of a careful balancing act. On that day they
wrote:
The new Hungarian cabinet, announced by Radio Budapest at 11:30 Saturday a.m.
falls far short of Premier Nagys promise of a broad national government. Of the
top 15 positions, all but one are occupied by Communists. Unlike Nagy, neither one
of these communists has been publicly identified as an opponent of Rkosi in intra-
party differences, nor as an advocate of liberalization in Hungary. Five of the
ministers are holdovers from the previous cabinet.
730


Two days later, the State Department still believed that a war had developed in
Hungary "between the Hungarian people on the one hand and the USSR and a small
group of Quislings on the other."
731
That same day, October 29, Dulles discussed
with top White House aide Bernard Shanley the expediency of meeting Edward T.
Wailes, the new U.S. Minister in the Budapest legation, before the latter flew to
Budapest to take up his post. They were not sure this would be a good idea, since: a)
it is "not important in the sense of carrying a message, because the present [Nagy]
government is not one we want to do much with;" and b) "from the domestic

729
State Department Top Secret Information Memorandum, October 26, 1956,
"Summary of Expected Soviet and Yugoslav Positions on Hungary," Flashpoints
Project, Box 2, Folder 10/29/56, National Security Archive, Washington D.C.
730
State Department Memorandum from W. Park Armstrong, Jr. to
Undersecretary of State, October 27, 1956, p. 1, "Summary of Points About
Hungarian Situation Covered in Secretarys Meeting," "Flashpoints" Project, Box
2, Folder 10/27-8/56, National Security Archive, Washington D.C.
731
Top Secret Department of State Memorandum, Afternoon Summary of Latest
Developments in Dual Crises, October 29, 1956, p. 1, Flashpoints Project," Box
2, Folder 10/29/56, Record # 65222, National Security Archive, Washington D.C.
(Emphasis added).
standpoint," it would "advertise that we have not had an ambassador there for
several days. "
732

Even on November 4, when the Soviet Union launched a second, more
massive, intervention in Hungary to overthrow Nagy's government, US diplomats--
this time including U.S. Minister Wailes--still suspected Nagy's loyalties. They
apparently believed that Nagy had fled to the Soviet (not Yugoslav) Embassy.
733
(In
fact, Nagy was still in his office in the Parliament building on the morning of the
attack. He broadcast a report on the radio at 5:20 a.m. on November 4, shortly after
Bla Kirly, commander-in-chief of the National Guard, telephoned Nagy to inform
him that Soviet tanks were advancing toward the Parliament building.)
734

Indirectly, the problem lay with Eisenhower's fundamental prejudice. Flush
with the "successful" covert operations in Iran (1953) and Guatemala (1954), he
sincerely believed that the communist ideology was intrinsically bellicose. In a letter
to his friend, the industrialist Paul Hoffman in 1958, Eisenhower explained his views
on communism and free elections. He wrote:
Communism could, I think, be defined as a doctrine of complete socialism, but
including the clear determination to employ any means, including force and
international war, to bring about destruction of other forms of government.
Consequently, we should not favor on a reciprocal basis giving to proponents a full

732
Memorandum of Telephone Conversation between Dulles and Shanley regarding
U.S. Ambassador to Hungary, Wailes, October 29, 1956, 10:56 a.m., p. 1,
Flashpoints Project, Box 2, Folder 10/29/56, Record # 64562, National Security
Archive, Washington D.C. (Emphasis added).
733
Telegram From U.S. Legation, Budapest, to U.S. State Department, November 4,
1956, p. 3, Flashpoints Project, Box 2, National Security Archive.
734
Interview with Bla Kirly, June 4, 2002. Kirly visited Nagy in the Parliament
on November 2 and telephoned him several times on the evening of November 3.
opportunity to promote Communism, because Communism cannot be divorced
from the readiness to use violence. I do not believe this is quibbling.
735


In short, a communist government by definition could not be legitimate--even if the
leader was popular and the people genuinely support him or her.
Like RFE, the US legation relied on regional Hungarian radio stations as a
source of news. Unfortunately many of these stations were also unclear about
whether or not Nagy had called in Soviet troops on October 23 and thus tended to
be critical of Nagy. Displaying again a lack of political sophistication, they searched
for anti-government radios, assuming that anti-Nagy radios had credibility, while
pro-Nagy radios were communist and therefore suspect.
736
The U.S. lacked local
sources of intelligence about Hungary; there were no Hungarian equivalents of
Jzef wiato and Seweryn Bialer of Poland. Similarly, according to Brookings
Institution scholar and former CIA analyst, Raymond Garthoff, the US lacked
reliable well-placed Western penetration agents close to the Soviet leadership that
would have provided insight on the Soviet decision making process. Hence both the
diplomatic corps and RFE were hampered. Ironically, RFE, which was originally
intended to be the "local voice of the opposition," ended up at the height of the crisis

735
Eisenhower to Paul Hoffman, January 18, 1958, Whitman file, box 21,
Eisenhower Presidential Library. Cited also in Blanche Wiesen Cook, The
Declassified Eisenhower: A Startling Reappraisal of the Eisenhower Presidency
(New York: Penguin Books, 1981), p. 208.
736
Report regarding Situation in Eastern Europe as of 4 p.m., October 26, 1956,
with attached cover letter from W. Park Armstrong, Jr. to Allen Dulles.
Flashpoints Project, Box 2, Folder 10/26/56, Record Number 78988, National
Security Archive.
lacking inside news and was forced to repeat parts of broadcasts from makeshift
local stations with less access to country-wide news.
737

Apart from the issue of RFE's inflating of the Hungarian insurgents' hopes
about Western military aid and its undermining of Nagy, the fact remains that RFE
did not actually "cause" the Hungarian Revolution itself. As Bohlen opined, the
revolt would have occurred even if there had been no radio at all.
738
The situation
had been brewing for a long time, the trouble being caused in large part by the
failure of Soviet and Hungarian communists to replace Rkosi with a suitable
reformist leader soon enough. Indeed, the insurgents would be insulted if it were
even suggested that their revolution was caused by some foreign radio!
Yet perhaps the number of casualties might have been lower without RFE's
misleading broadcasts. At the root of the problem was, of course, the ambiguity of
the liberation policy itself. It was difficult enough for US politicians to understand,
as illustrated by a witty television colloquy ("Pick the Winner") between Dulles and
Averell Harriman, presumably the Democrats' choice for Secretary of State. After
Dulles repeatedly urging Harriman to read his article in Life magazine, and the
latter replying that he had and still could not fathom the Liberation policy, the
moderator Walter Cronkite ended the dispute with the repartee: "Mr. Harriman,

737
Raymond Garthoff, Hungary, 1956 The Washington Reaction, unpublished
paper delivered at Hungary and the World, 1956 the New Archival Evidence, 26-
29 September 1996, Budapest, p. 19. Seweryn Bialer (now head of Columbia
University's Research Institute on International Change) enlightened the CIA with a
wealth of information on the factional struggles in the Polish government.
738
Transcript of Conversation between Charles E. Bohlen, American Embassy,
Manila, Phillipines, with Frank G. Wisner, Cord Meyer, Richard Helms, Robert
Amory, et. al. summarizing Bohlens four years of service as US Ambassador in
Moscow, Research Notes, 1957, p. 27, secret, NARA, RG 59, Records of
Ambassador Bohlen, 1952-1963, Lot 74D379, Box 10.
being impartial, we don't know whether Mr. Dulles can't write or you can't
read."
739

To expect East European emigrs to interpret the Liberation policy correctly
was fatuous. As Nowak recalled:
In the years 1952 to 1956 I had major difficulty in interpreting and explaining to
listeners the true meaning of the liberation policy launched by the Eisenhower-
Dulles administration. It was not clear if by liberation, the US meant a rollback of
the Soviets by war or by threat of war or if Americans intended to encourage self-
liberation by insurgency.
740


In all likelihood, it was neither the desire for the East Europeans to liberate
themselves, nor the desire for the United States militarily to liberate East Europe.
Rather, the intent was purely psychological. One will recall that CD Jackson and
other officials in Task Force C of the Solarium talks in the summer of 1953 had
advocated measures to to confuse and unbalance the Soviet bloc, overloading the
switchboard, so that the bloc would disintegrate by itself, without any US military
action. Eisenhower Administration officials had perceived the need to counter the
post-Stalinist "peace offensive." The Soviet use of the word "liberation" (as in
"wars of national liberation") was also primarily psychological. The Kremlin
leaders probably sought to prejudice the Third World countries against the West
and thus help prevent these countries from joining "Dullesian" pacts like CENTO
and SEATO, encircling the communist bloc. To plan actual military operations in
these countries, the Kremlin officials would risk exposing the Soviet Union as no less

739
Hoopes, Devil and John Foster Dulles, p. 131-2.
740
Jan Nowak, Poles and Hungarians in 1956, p. 1, unpublished paper delivered
at Hungary and the World, 1956 the New Archival Evidence, 26-29 September
1996, Budapest.
of a warmonger as the imperialist United States. Besides, to Soviet and Chinese
leaders, the imperialist camp was so full of internal contradictions the anti-
imperialist liberation movement in Africa and Latin America was intensifying; and
time was on the side of the socialist camp. Hence, military liberation of the
developing countries was unnecessary, they thought.
741

The very ambiguity of the Liberation policy was very convenient for the
Eisenhower Administration, and enabled it to claim that it was doing something
more active than "merely" containing the spread of communism. At the same time,
the policy was cheap. Rhetoric involved no huge payments or military training.
Likewise, as mentioned above, the idea--as expressed in the RFE's official
policy objectives--was to keep alive in the East Europeans the hope for freedom, so
that they would never become completely consolidated in the Warsaw Pact and
would not become reliable military allies for the Soviet Union. Thus, in this way, the
perceived Soviet strategy of attacking Western Europe would be thwarted.

Volunteer Freedom Corps, 1953--1960
The Volunteer Freedom Corps (VFC), a top-secret project under debate in
1953 even before Stalin's death, constitutes another method of psychological
warfare for the achievement of rollback and liberation. Like RFE, the VFC was a

741
A number of declassified Soviet documents reveal this line of thinking among
both Soviet and Chinese communist leaders. In one conversation with S. F. Antonov,
temporary charg daffaires in Beijing, Mao Zedong said The imperialists have
many weaknesses. They have serious internal contradictions. A rapid swell in the
anti-imperialist liberation movement is occurring in Africa and Latin America.
Overall, the international situation is favorable for the socialist camp. See RGANI,
f. 5, o. 49, d. 235, ll. 89-96. Iz Dnevnika S. F. Antonova, Zapis besedy s
predsedatelem KNR, Mao Zedong, 14-ogo oktyabrya 1959.
project designed to employ East European emigrs or "displaced persons," speed
the rate of defections from the communist bloc, keep alive the hope of the satellites'
eventual independence from the USSR, and thereby disrupt the consolidation of the
Warsaw Pact. Because it would also provide manpower for future wars, the VFC
idea typifies the American desire for a cheap "quick fix" method of minimizing U.S.
casualties.
The originator of the VFC plan was Republican Senator Henry Cabot Lodge,
although CD Jackson was an energetic advocate. In the spring before the 1948
election, Lodge of Massachusetts introduced a bill authorizing the enlistment of
2,500 foreign aliens into the U.S. Army and, after five years of military service,
permanent resident status. Unbeknownst to Lodge, Trumans National Security
Council, with George Kennan and Frank Wisner, had already been working on a
similar project.
742
Congress passed Lodge's bill on June 30, 1950. A year later
Congressman Charles Kersten successfully pushed through Congress an
amendment to the 1951 Mutual Security Act, which authorized $100 million to form
military units consisting of emigrs from the communist bloc. These units were
intended to support NATO, "or for other purposes, when it is similarly determined
by the President that such assistance will contribute to the defense of the North
Atlantic area and to the security of the United States. Soviet officials denounced the
Kersten Amendment twice in the UN General Assembly as constituting
"interference in the internal affairs" of the communist countries.
743


742
Grose, Operation Rollback, p. 202.
743
Text of Section 101 (a) (1) of Public Law 165 of the 82
nd
Congress under title I
(Mutual Security Act 1951 as amended), Willis D. Crittenberger Papers, Post
Planning for the VFC was authorized by the National Security Council in the
policy paper NSC 143/2 in a meeting on February 25, 1953. The Council members
appointed an ad hoc committee to study the proposal thoroughly and report back to
the NSC. The committee was "to be composed of representatives from the CIA,
Psychological Strategy Board (PSB), State and Defense Departments, and was to be
chaired by a retired high-ranking Army General."
744
It was to remain strictly top
secret.
Lieutenant General Willis D. Crittenberger ("Critt"), a native of Anderson,
Indiana, was selected to head the committee. He had commanded the only
mechanized cavalry regiment in the U.S. Army in 1935. As commander of the first
U.S. Army, he had been responsible for Camp Kilmer in New Jersey, where the first
aliens recruited under the Lodge Act were processed and trained.
745
As we shall see,
the Hungarian refugees of 1956 also stayed at Camp Kilmer. Crittenberger was
later appointed President of the Free Europe Committee in July, 1956, and took up
his post in October, 1956, at the very height of the Hungarian crisis.
746

Crittenberger flew to Europe on March 26, 1954 to consult with U.S. Ambassador to

Retirement, Folder Free Europe Committee, 1955-1958, U.S. Army War College,
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.
744
White House Office, National Security Council Staff, Psychological Strategy
Board (PSB), Central File Series, Box #11, Folder PSB 080, #1 (VFC), Eisenhower
Presidential Library. The Psychological Strategy Board was created in May 1951; it
was the culmination of the efforts of those within the Truman Administration
lobbying for a more vigorous counterattack against the USSR.
745
James Jay Carafano, "Mobilizing Europe's Stateless: America's Plan for a Cold
War Army," Journal of Cold War Studies, vol 1, no. 2 (Spring 1999).
746
Memorandum for the Record, July 13, 1956, Willis D. Crittenberger Papers: Post
Retirement, Correspondence, 1956, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks,
Pennsylvania.
France Douglas Dillon, U.S. High Commissioner in Germany James B. Conant, as
well as U.S. military authorities in Europe.
Crittenberger explained to them in detail the VFC's rationale. Communism
cannot be defeated by mere orthodox tactics. We must make allies of those who
"might otherwise be hurled against us....and inject this new dimension into the
present world struggle that would penetrate the Iron Curtain along 'horizontal'
lines. We will impede the Communist effort to sovietize its armies and its peoples,
and disrupt at its source the Russians' power to launch universal war."
747

Amidst the uncertainty after Stalin's death, the VFC also promised to be a
useful litmus test of the intentions of Stalin's successors. The VFC would stay top
secret, but if the Kremlin got wind of the VFC prematurely, this would provide the
West with valuable clues about the Khrushchev leaderships intentions. As CIA
officials speculated, "If the Kremlin at the time of the establishment of the VFC
were engaged in an attempt to reduce international tensions, its reaction might be
more moderate in character and might be delayed."
748
CD Jackson concurred. If
the new Kremlin leaders were not sincere, then the VFC would show them "we see
through their game."
749
Attracting defectors was a high priority for US officials, not
only for the psychological value in the contest for allegiance of the uncommitted

747
Memo on Formation of National Military Units of Escapees from Communist
Dominated Countries, folder Free Europe Committee, 1955-1958, Willis D.
Crittenberger Papers, Post Retirement, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks,
Pennsylvania.
748
Special Estimate Communist Reactions to US Establishment of a Volunteer
Freedom Corps, April 13, 1953, Record Group 263, Records of the CIA,
Intelligence Public File, HRP 92-4/001, Box 2, NARA. Declassified February 9, 1994.
749
Letter from CD Jackson to General Crittenberger, April 10, 1953, CD Jackson
Records, 1953-1954, Box 6, Correspondence re: Volunteer Freedom Corps, pp 1-2,
Eisenhower Presidential Library, Declassified October 28, 1994.
Third World countries, but also as key sources of information, given the difficulty of
obtaining intelligence about communist countries.
One reason for Americans' difficulty in obtaining quality intelligence about
communist countries stems from their problems in recruiting agents-in-place.
Reflecting on his experience in recruiting, one perceptive CIA analyst listed a
number of obstacles. Recruitment of defectors is a delicate psychological art
requiring tact, sensitivity, and highly refined interpersonal skills, he explained. In
fact, the U.S. case officer cannot recruit people to defect; the individual must go
through an internal psychological process in order to recruit himself. The process of
decision on critical personal matters is usually "long and turbulent, full of starts
and stops and reversals." It is "not an event or incident, a one-shot deal."
Americans should not use money as an inducement, since that only reinforces
deliberate Soviet stereotypes of the CIA as "buying people to do dirty deeds."
Usually deep-seated moral and ideological factors impel the defector. Moreover,
recruitment is much more effective if done by local citizens on the CIA's behalf (i.e.
citizens already recruited as U.S. agents), rather than by American case officers
directly. The individuals defenses are not up as much against a fellow citizen, and
he is less likely to report the proposition to the authorities. One especially strong
factor keeping Soviet and East Europeans citizens from defecting is the anxiety
about making a place for themselves in Western life. Finally, he wrote, "We should
not entertain the idea that we can ever induce a defection. All we can do is help the
Soviet system do that for us.
750

The VFC would address each of these points, once it became public
knowledge. By its very existence, it would attract defectors over the long term. In
actively opposing communism, it would appeal to the average defector's moral and
ideological needs. He would be drawn to it by those who had already decided to join,
many of them compatriots. And, by offering employment, the VFC would help
mitigate the fear of adjustment in Western society. In this way, the VFC constituted
yet another attempt to respond more persuasively to the Kremlin's new policies of
"peaceful coexistence" and destalinization. CD Jackson, who, it will be recalled,
thought that increasing the Soviet leaders' fear would induce their conciliation,
endorsed the VFC enthusiastically, pointing out that "it adds to that fear and
urgency, and could conceivably accelerate rather than retard peaceful
developments.
751

Apart from its psychological value, the VFC allegedly had practical military
value for the wars that lay ahead. At low cost, the VFC would minimize American

750
Andrew J. Twiddy, The Recruitment of Soviet Officials A New Concept of Soft
Sell and Painstaking Development in Making an Agent of the Adversary, Studies
in Intelligence series, vol. 8, entry 27, box 15, folder Winter 1964, pp. 1-15,
NARA. Although written much later, the principles of recruiting defectors applied
in the 1950s as well.
751
Letter to General Crittenberger from C D Jackson, April 10, 1953, C D Jackson
Records, 1953-1954, Box 6, Correspondence re Volunteer Freedom Corps, pp. 1-2,
Eisenhower Presidential Library, Declassified October 28, 1994.
casualties and supply a nucleus of dedicated, trained young men who needed no
pampering.
752
In CD Jackson's words:
[I]n these days of perpetual armed alert it is to the interest of American security
and American defense economics to have such a group of soldiers who do not have
to be surrounded by mobile breweries, ice cream factories, Coca Cola bottling
plants, dependents, and all the expensive marginal trappings which we have allowed
over the years to creep up on our military establishment.
753


In employing the "displaced persons" and defectors from the "captive nations," the
VFC, once public, would attract votes for the U.S. Congressmen "with foreign-born
and hyphenated constituencies who are today prey to all kinds of separatist and
irredentist pressures." For them the VFC would serve as a useful "political safety
valve."
754

Another advantage of the VFC concerned Germany. Officials agreed that the
VFC would have to be stationed on German soil, since the USSR had most of its
troops there (at least 22 line divisions), and would pass through western Germany
during the presumed offensive on Western Europe.
755
By employing and housing

752
Memorandum to Ambassador Murphy from Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., October
21, 1953 re: Progress Report on Volunteer Freedom Corps, p. 1, CD Jackson
Records, 1953-1954, Box 6, Eisenhower Presidential Library. Declassified January
26, 1994. "If fighting breaks out anywhere else it will be a duty to our own young
manhood to seek to develop these and other supplementary sources of manpower."
753
Letter from C.D. Jackson to Lieutenant General Willis D. Crittenberger, March
15, 1954, re: Volunteer Freedom Corps, C.D. Jackson Records, 1953-54, Box 6,
Correspondence re: VFC, p. 2.
754
Letter from C.D. Jackson to Lieutenant General Willis D. Crittenberger re:
Volunteer Freedom Corps, March 15, 1954, p. 2, C.D. Jackson Records, 1953-54,
Box 6, Eisenhower Presidential Library.
755
Eisenhower told Conant, West Germany is the only possible host country for
the project, which makes your Adenauer approach of greatest importance. Letter
from President Eisenhower to Ambassador James Conant, re: Volunteer Freedom
Corps, September 9, 1953, p. 1. C.D. Jackson Records, 1953-54, Box 6, Eisenhower
Presidential Library.
the thousands of displaced persons throughout Europe, the VFC would reduce the
strain on the German economy. European citizens regarded these displaced persons
with hostility because they competed for scarce resources and jobs. The VFC would
integrate these individuals and thus help protect against separatist civil wars. As CD
Jackson wrote to Crittenberger:
[I]n the long run, and on the assumption that their training and indoctrination and
integration would be well handled by the Army, produce an international group
which could be of inestimable value if and when liberation of the satellite belt were
to be near. When that day comes, we will be plagued with Slovak Separatism and
German Sudeten problems and Oder Neisse lines and goodness knows what
Transylvanian difficulties. At that time the existence of American trained and
integrated soldiers of various satellite nationalities could tip the balance against
eventual civil wars which might have to be suppressed by American arms, with the
resultant bloodshed and hatred.
756


Despite the VFC's alleged advantages, selling the vision to the U.S. State
Department and European allies proved too difficult. Some scholars have claimed
that the European allies and neutral states objected the most strongly. German and
Austrian political leaders would often send conflicting signals, expressing approval
of the plan to one enthusiastic U.S. Congressman, for example, while denigrating it
in the presence of a State Department official. The U.S. State Department, and to a
lesser degree the CIA, also strongly opposed the project, however.
757
Despite the
numerous delays (the Korean armistice, West German elections, Four Power

756
Letter from C.D. Jackson to Lt. Gen. Willis D. Crittenberger, March 15, 1954,
re: Volunteer Freedom Corps, C.D. Jackson Records, 1953-54, Box 6, Eisenhower
Presidential Library.
757
To grasp the full extent of U.S. bureaucratic resistance and determine whether it
outweighed the reluctance of foreign governments, one would need to consult
additional archives, such as the papers of Henry Cabot Lodge (at the Massachusetts
Historical Society and elsewhere), and State and Defense Department files,
especially the U.S. Army staff files.
Conference, Bermuda Conference, EDC ratification, and German rearmament)
caused by events involving the European Allies, the VFC advocates pointed out that
it was not necessary to have the Allies' permission, just their reaction. Henry Cabot
Lodge wrote to Ambassador Murphy, If we wait until all our allies agree to this
project it will never get done. He added, "We should, therefore, get everything
ready so that the program can be undertaken without delay when the need next
ariseswithout waiting for the unanimous consent of our allies."
758
As CD Jackson
wrote to Crittenberger before the latter set off for Europe, "I dont think there is
ever going to be a time short of actual war when all of our allies will be
enthusiastically for such a project, and the President never felt that this was a sine
qua non."
As I understand from earlier conversations, your trip is not for the purpose of
getting a yes or no out of everyone. It is simply to get the American principals
involved thoroughly to understand what VFC is. Then, when the decision to move
ahead has been made in Washington, and the signal is flashed to them to sound out
the Governments to which they are accredited, they will know in detail what it is
they are talking about and will not consider this a routine query.
759


Jackson continued, "We are only asking for our allies' reaction to the plan--a
reaction which we would expect to be lukewarm. It is only if they are strongly
opposed that we would consider this a major deterrent."
760


758
Memorandum to Ambassador Murphy from H. C. Lodge, Jr., re: Progress
Report on Volunteer Freedom Corps, October 21, 1953, p. 1, CD Jackson Records,
1953-1954, Box 6, Eisenhower Presidential Library. Declassified January 26, 1994.
759
Letter from C.D. Jackson to Lt. Gen. Willis D. Crittenberger re: Volunteer
Freedom Corps, March 15, 1954, C.D. Jackson Records, 1953-54, Box 6, pp 2-3,
Eisenhower Presidential Library.
760
Ibid.
Thus, even in the face of foreign governments opposition, the VFC might
have come to fruition, had the U.S. State Department approved of the scheme. As
early as May 1953, legislation for the VFC would have been introduced in Congress.
On May 21, 1953, Robert Cutler wrote to Crittenberger, "Clearance by State would
be your signal to get in touch with General Persons in order to pave the way for
introducing your legislation in the Congress."
761
The State Department officials
seemed to be most concerned about avoiding actions that might antagonize US
relations with Western European countries, with the United Nations, and with the
East European refugees themselves.
Meanwhile, U.S. Army officials argued that, by 1952, there was no great pool
of displaced persons to draw from, and thus the VFC was impractical. However,
after the East Berlin uprising in June 1953, new waves of German refugees fled to
the West. Despite this new army of refugees to draw upon, the Eisenhower
Administration did not actively revive the proposal. He had probably cooled to the
ambitious plan for a VFC and accepted as a sufficient compromise the more
moderate idea of recruiting cadre into labor battalions to work on U.S. installations
in the occupied zones of Germany and Austria. As civilian workers hired as guards
and technicians, these cadre did not threaten German and Austrian authorities as
did the idea of recruits for heavily armed combat forces.
State Department officials worried in particular that the formation of the
VFC would jeopardize the ratification of the EDC. When the French Parliament
vetoed the EDC treaty (August 30, 1954), then the State Department raised other

761
Letter to General Crittenberger from Robert Cutler, May 21, 1953, CD Jackson
Records, 1953-1954, Box 6, pp. 1-2, Eisenhower Presidential Library.
issues. Ultimately, the success of NATO and rearming of West Germany made the
VFC unnecessary. Although Eisenhower justified the VFC as a way to recruit
cheaper troops and minimize U.S. casualties in foreign wars, he probably construed
the VFC mainly as a vehicle for solidifying the Europeans commitment in the Cold
War. The bloody suppression of the Hungarian Revolution, in Eisenhowers second
term, impressed upon Eisenhower and other officials in his Administration the fact
that the liberation policy was a sham. Having let the Hungarians down despite their
urgent pleas for help, Eisenhower was in no mood to create a VFC, which would
merely raise unrealistic hopes for the Eastern Europeans. The President probably
realized that there were other, less divisive, ways to unite the Europeans, so he let
the idea of the VFC wane.
Serious consideration of the VFC project officially ceased three weeks before
Eisenhower left the White House. In December 1960 the National Security Council
formally annulled the 1953 NSC policy paper that authorized planning for the VFC.
Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to construe the VFC plan as a complete
failure. By 1998, almost forty years after the VFCs demise, the means to unite
Europeans emerged again, albeit for other reasons. On April 30, 1998, the U.S.
Senate ratified the Clinton Administrations decision to enlarge NATO (North
Atlantic Treaty Organization), by a vote of 80 to 19, 13 votes more than the
necessary 67.
762
Although more likely a coincidence of policy objectives, NATO

762.
Those who voted against NATO or did not vote include: Senators Daniel Patrick
Moynihan (D, NY); John Warner (R, VA); Robert C. Smith (R, NH); Paul
Wellstone (D, Minn.); Tom Harkin (D, Iowa); former senator Sam Nunn (Ga);
former Reagan chief of staff and Senate majority leader Howard Baker (R, Tenn),
and others. Warner and Moynihan proposed a three-year freeze on additional
expansion offers, or at least claims to offer, some of the very benefits that the earlier
VFC vision did. Just as the VFC would "tip the balance against eventual civil
wars," so NATO expansion will supposedly--in Madeleine Albright's words--
"expand the area where wars simply do not happen." Since joining NATO,
Hungary has ostensibly settled many of its irredentist conflicts with, for example,
Romania. Similarly, just as VFC aimed to keep alive the hope of freedom among the
Captive Nations, so the enlarged NATO seeks to spread democracy and private
enterprise, preventing Central Europe from slipping back to communism or from
being bullied by Russia. Like the VFC, NATO expansion purports to provide
employment and thus ease the strain on Central European economies making the
transition to democracy. From the American standpoint, expanding NATO--similar
to the original VFC plan--attract votes for the U.S. Congressmen "with foreign-born
and hyphenated constituencies." Finally, although, as we saw in Chapter Four,
Moscow had problems getting its pro-communist Hungarian allies to fight
resolutely, US and NATO officials are confident that new NATO members like
Hungary will provide reliable manpower for future European wars.

Soviet reactions to US Intelligence Activities, 1947-1955
One of the objections to the VFC voiced by European and US State
Department officials was that, once implemented, it might ignite further Soviet

membership in NATO beyond Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic.
Moynihan also suggested delaying NATO membership for Poland, Hungary, and
the Czech Republic until they have been admitted into the European Union. Harkin
proposed placing a spending cap of 25% on the United States for all costs of NATO
enlargement including U.S. subsidies extending beyond the "common costs" of
NATO members.
propaganda offensives, instead of act as a deterrent. Their fear was legitimate. As
mentioned earlier, Soviet officials had already denounced twice the Kersten
Amendment (authorizing emigr military units) in the UN General Assembly. Let us
now look more closely at the reactions of the Soviet and Hungarian communist
leaders to US intelligence and psychological warfare activities in Eastern Europe
and attempt to gauge whether they might have strengthened Soviet resolve to
maintain hegemony over the satellites.
Admittedly, it is difficult to separate genuine apprehension from propaganda
on the subject. However, the verbatim minutes of the emergency sessions in the
Soviet Presidium (the newly declassified "Malin Notes"), earlier diplomatic cables
and memoirs, and newspaper articles do reveal that Soviet officials were very
concerned about U.S. intelligence activities, as well as radio propaganda. One will
recall that as early as July 12, 1956, the Presidium members complained about the
subversive activity [podryvnaya deyatel'nost'] of the "imperialists" and decided to
publish an article about international solidarity to rebuke them.
763
This
apprehension blinded them in part to the problem of Rkosi's incumbency. Three
days later, on July 15, Khrushchev told Miunovi that "the Soviet Union could not at
any price allow a 'breach in the front' in Eastern Europe, and that was just what the
West was working for. "
764
As mentioned earlier, Suslov commented that Rkosi's
retirement would be a "gift to the Americans."
765
Later, at the October 28

763
RGANI, F. 3, O. 12, D. 1005, L. 2, "Protokol'naya Zapis' Zasedaniya Prezidiuma
TsK KPSS, 12-ogo iyulya 1956 g."
764
Veljko Miunovi, Moscow Diary, p. 8. Emphasis added.
765
RGANI, F. 89, O. 2, D. 2, L. 7-8, "Informatsiya Mikoyana iz Budapeshta, 14
iyulya 1956."
Presidium meeting, as well, Klement Voroshilov (chairman of the Presidium of the
Supreme Soviet) said: "We acted correctly when we sent in troops. We should be in no
hurry to pull them out. American secret services are more active there than Comrades
Suslov and Mikoyan are.
766
At another Presidium session on November 3, Khrushchev
questioned Nagys loyalty, grumbling, "Dulles needs someone just like Nagy;" "We
cannot consider him as a Communist."
767

Soviet and Hungarian officials viewed Western radio broadcasts as a key
factor in the anti-Soviet sentiment in Hungary. Ferenc Mnnich, who had traveled
with Jnos Kdr to Moscow, told Presidium members on November 2 that the
situation arose in Hungary because the leaders were "isolated from the masses,"
and that the radio broadcasts (presumably RFE and VOA) promulgated the idea
that "the regime exists and is preserved only through the support of the USSR."
768

Had it not been for VOA [and RFE], the Hungarian people would never have
heard the full text of Khrushchev's catalytic "Secret Speech," Rkosi lamented to
Voroshilov on June 26, 1956 (the day before the stormy Petfi Circle
debate and two days before the Pozna riot). "We made excerpts and mass-
produced them for reading in the party organizations, but we were too late, because

766
RGANI, F. 3, O. 12, D. 1005, L. 57., "Protokol'naya Zapis' Zasedaniya
Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 28-ogo oktyabrya 1956 g."
767
MOL, XIX J-1-K, doboz 55, Horvath Imre klgyminiszter iratai, 1956
november 3-n. [Emphasis added]. Cited in Vyacheslav Sereda and Jnos M.
Rainer, eds., Dnts a Kremlben, 1956: A szovjet prtelnksg viti Magyarorszgrl
(Budapest: 1956-os Intzet, 1996), p. 93. For an English translation, see Mark
Kramer, The 'Malin Notes' on the Crises in Hungary and Poland, 1956," CWIHB,
(winter 1996/7), vol 8/9, pp. 385-410.
768
RGANI, F. 3, Op. 12, D. 1006, L 28, "Protokol'naya Zapis' Zasedaniya
Prezidiuma TsK KPSS s Uchastiem Ya. Kadara, F. Miunnikha, I. Baty, 2 noyabrya
1956 g." Avtograf V. N. Malina.
'Voice of America' had already begun to broadcast the text of the speech in full.
769

During his visit to Budapest in mid-July, 1956, Mikoyan reported to Moscow
that, on the question of democratization, "many [Hungarian CC members],
especially under the influence of Western propaganda, are rolling down the rails of
formal bourgeois democracy."
770
Soviet Ambassador Andropov and other
diplomats in the Budapest Embassy kept abreast of Western press and radio
broadcasts, preparing digests at regular intervals.
771
Andropov thought US
diplomats in the Budapest Legation were providing material for the VOA
broadcasts from Munich.
772
On November 1, Aleksei Kirichenko--First Secretary of
the Ukrainian
Communist Party and Soviet Presidium member--reported his impression that the
radio broadcasts of "Voice of America" greatly influenced the youth.
773
Communist
leaders in other satellites also felt threatened by Western radio broadcasts;
Bulgarian Politburo member Tsola Dragoicheva wrote to GDR leader Walter

769
RGANI, F. 89, Per 45, Dok 2, L 4, Zapiska K. E.Voroshilova v Prezidium TsK
KPSS o besede s M. Rakoshi o sostoyanii vengero-iugoslavskikh otnoshenii i
slozhnosti polozheniya Rakoshi v VPT, 26 iyunya 1956 g."
770
RGANI, F. 89, O. 2, D. 2, L. 10-11, "Informatsiya Mikoyana iz Budapeshta, 14
iyulya 1956."
771
AVP, F 077, Opis 37, Portfel' 20, Papka 188, Delo No. 170-Ve, Questions of the
Press, list 3. On August 1, for example, Andropov sent a digest of Western press and
radio reports about Mikoyan's visit to Hungary and Yugoslavia in July 1956,
compiled by the attach Kazimirov.
772
AVP, F 077, O 37, Por 37, Papka 190, List 140. From the Diary of Andropov in
the Soviet Embassy in Hungary to V. V. Kuznetsov, Deputy Minister of Foreign
Affairs of the USSR, July 5, 1956.
773
RGANI, F. 89 Per. 45 Dok #17, List 3, November 1, 1956, "Notes of Kirichenko
with enclosed reference report by the Commander of the Second Section of the
Headquarters of the Administration of Border Guards of the Ministry of Internal
Affairs in the Southwest Military Region."
Ulbricht asking for "five shortwave radio receivers with which to counterract the
hostile US and western propaganda."
774

One Pravda article hinted about the Kersten Amendment as follows:
The U.S. Congress allocated more than 100 million dollars for subversive activities
against the socialist countries. This same money was used to send spies and saboteurs
to the Peoples' Democracies, launch balloons filled with provocative "literature," [and]
print an enormous quantity of deceitful pamphlets...The imperialist intelligence
agencies are planting their hostile agents into all the chinks [shcheli] they can find.
775


Another Pravda article, one of many that appeared after the "October-
November events" [i.e. the Hungarian uprising], claimed that the student
demonstration on October 23 resulted from the persistent attempts of
"underground reactionary organizations" to "stir up a counterrevolutionary
mutiny" [myatezh].
776

While not as reliable as primary documents, Soviet and Hungarian books
about RFE's role in the Hungarian revolt written in 1956 or later reveal a surprising
amount of accurate detail (mixed in with the usual propaganda). This suggests that
communist officials were monitoring RFEs activities closely and were influenced by
them, although more information would be needed to confirm this. Zakharchenko
(1956) and Jnos Berecz (1981) knew the names of the Radio Free Hungary
personnel such as Andrs Gellrt and Jnos Borsnyi ("Colonel Bell") and recalled

774
SAPMO (Berlin), DY 30/13598, To Ulbricht from Tsola Dragoicheva, member of
the Politburo of the Bulgarian Communist Party, September 26, 1952.
775
"Krushenye Antinarodnoi Avantyury v Vengrii," Pravda (October 28, 1956), p. 6.
776
"Proval Antinarodnoi Avantyury v Budapeshte," Pravda, October 25, 1956, p. 4.
the strong disavowal by RFE official Frank Abbott of the organizations role in
inciting revolutionary activity.
777

As the protests of communist authorities show, they were keenly aware of the
RFE-affiliated balloon operations, Operations Prospero, Veto, and Focus. Berecz
explained that the code name Focus originated from a Hungarian emigr newspaper
in Munich.
778
One will recall that the Nagy government officially complained about
Operation Focus to the US administration.
Due in large part to skillful infiltrators like Harold (Kim) Philby, the
Soviet and satellite governments also knew a good deal about US-sponsored
espionage projects and organizations to implement rollback in East Europe, such as
Gehlen's Organization, various US military intelligence groups, the Kampfgruppe
gegen Unmenschlichkeit (Battle Group Against Inhumanity), the NTS (Narodno-
Trudovoi Soiuz, or National Labor Union), the MHBS, plans to establish an migr
army (the VFC), and others. Like the Pravda article cited above, Z. Savelin's book
written in 1956 relates the details of Henry Cabot Lodge's Act calling for the
enlistment of 2,500 foreign aliens into the U.S. Army, as well Charles Kersten's

777
V. Zakharchenko, Iu. Popov, and A. Starodub, Budapesht, Oktiabr-noiabr 195
o tom, shto my videli svoimi glazami (Izdatelstvo TsK VLKSM Molodaia
Gvardiia, 1956), pp. 39--48. See also Jnos Berecz, Ellenforradalom tollal s
fegyverrel 1956 (Budapest: Kossuth Koenyvkiado 1981) or the Russian translation of
the book: Jnos Berecz, Krakh Operatsii Fokus" Kontrrevolutsia Perom I
Oruzhieem (Moskva Izdatelstvo politicheskoi literatury, 1986), p. 108. Berecz read
the books on RFE by John Holt and Allan Michie closely.
778
Berecz, Ellenforradalom tollal s fegyverrel 1956, p. 25.
Amendment to the Mutual Security Act, especially the fact that individual countries
were named.
779


Gehlen Organization
Beginning in 1947, Americans also employed emigr agents via General
Reinhard Gehlen's Organization.
780
Gehlen, former head of the Abwehrs Foreign
Armies East (Fremde Heere Ost) and self-styled expert on military intelligence about
the Soviet Union, predicted Germany's imminent defeat and offered to cooperate
with the Americans against the USSR. The Gehlen organization was installed at a
former Nazi compound in Pullach, near Munich, in December 1947.
781
It operated
almost autonomously but received generous funding from the U.S. Army G-2
Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC), and later the CIA, even after Gehlen's
Organization became subordinated under Chancellor Adenauer as West Germany's

779
Z. Savelin, ZagovoryOruzhiie Reaktsii (Moskva Gosudarstvennoe Izdatelstvo
Politicheskoi Literatury, 1956), p. 12.
780
In 1955, the CIA transferred the Gehlen Organization to the Federal German
government, and on April 1, 1956, the Gehlen Organization officially became the
Bundesnachrichtendienst (BND), the official intelligence service of the Federal
Republic of Germany. Some of the best books on Gehlen include Hermann Zolling
and Heinz Hoehne, Pullach Intern: General Gehlen Und Die Geschichte Des
Bundesnachrichtendienstes (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1971, and Oscar
Reile, Treff Lutetia Paris: Der Kampf der Geheimdienste im westlichen
Operationsgebiet, in England und Nordafrika 1939-194. Im Dienst Cehlens, 1949-
1961 (Mnchen: Verlag Welsermhl, 1973). These German sources should be
balanced with Western sources, such as Mary Ellen Reeses General Reinhard
Gehlen: The CIA Connection (Fairfax, Va: George Mason University Press, 1990),
and Charles Whiting, Gehlen: Germany's Master Spy (New York: Balantine Books,
1972). @One should read with caution E.H. Cookridges Gehlen: Spy of the Century
(London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1971).
781
The camp was built in 1936 for staff members of Hitler's Deputy,
Hess, and then served temporarily as the residence of Nazi Reichsleiter Martin
Bormann. Later, in April 1945 it became the headquarters of Field Marshall
Kesselring. See Zolling and Heinz Hoehne, p. 132.
official intelligence agency (the Bundesnachrichtendienst, or "Federal Information
Service") in January 1957.
782
It was claimed earlier that one of Gehlen's triumphs
was the swift acquisition of Khrushchev's Secret Speech, which he gave to Allen
Dulles, who promptly published it on June 4 in the New York Times and had it
broadcast via RFE.
783
However, other sources in the mid-1970s reveal that Tito
refused to provide a copy. Instead, James Angleton (the CIAs director of
counterintelligence for the first twenty-seven years of the agencys history) obtained
the full text of the speech from Israeli intelligence, which received it from a Jewish
Soviet communist reporting to Israel who according to Angleton - gave the text
gratis for ideological reasons.
784

Soviet, Hungarian, and East German communist leaders were also intimately
familiar with the many affiliates and espionage training schools of Gehlen's
organization. Beginning at least as early as 1953 via NATO's West German
intelligence liaison, Heinz Felfe, Moscow received regular reports about Gehlen's
activities. (Not until 1962 was it discovered that Felfe, a former SS Obersturmfher

782
E.H. Cookridge, Gehlen: Spy of the Century (London: Hodder and Stoughton,
1971). Cookridge writes that a secret arrangement was allegedly made with the CIA
to pay the Gehlen Organization a reduced sum in return for a carbon copy of every
report sent from Pullach to Bonn, p. 288. If such an arrangement did exist, it
certainly ended when the Gehlen Organization became the BND.
783
Cookridge claims that Captain Andreas Zitzelberger, a former Abwehr officer
and a Gehlen agent in Yugoslavia, obtained the full text from one of Tito's officials.
Cookridge, p. 303.
784
See The New York Times, November 30, 1976. Cited also in Ray S. Cline, The CIA
Under Reagan, Bush, and Casey (Washington, DC Acropolis Books, 1981). Wisners
operatives in the field also obtained an abridged copy of the speech from a Polish
source. The Yugoslav Party newspaper Borba did published excerpts of the speech.
See Dietrich Staritz, Geschichte der DDR: Erweiterte Neuausgabe. (Frankfurt: Neue
Historische Bibliotek, 1996), p. 145.
had betrayed Gehlen's Organization over a six-year period, despite earlier warnings
from counterespionage agent Oscar Reile).
785

Until 1951, the Soviet leaders also had first-hand knowledge about U.S.
covert operations from such agents as Philby and Captain Nikita Khorunshy, the
latter whom they deftly installed in one of Gehlen's training schools at Bad
Homburg, the very center of the operation being run against the USSR.
786

Originally establishing his cover in Canada as a businessman, agent Gordon
Lonsdale (in reality the Russian Colon Molody) also provided information to the
Russians after he moved to London. Other Soviet agents infiltrated Nazi networks
such as the Vatican "Ratline." Once they possessed such bona fide anti-Soviet
credentials they easily found jobs as broadcasters for RFE and VOA. Not a Soviet
agent himself, Carmel Offie (Frank Wisner's assistant for "emigr affairs")
unknowingly helped these agents.
787
One Robert Vogeler, for example, warned CD

785
See Oscar Reile, Treff Lutetia Paris: Der Kampf der Geheimdienste im westlichen
Operationsgebiet, in England und Nordafrika 1939-1945. Im Dienst Cehlens, 1949-
1961 (Mnchen: Verlag Welsermhl, 1973), pp. 393-394. Also Lyman Kirkpatrick,
The Real CIA (NY: Macmillan, 1968) and Mark Aarons and John Loftus, Ratlines:
How the Vatican's Nazi Networks Betrayed Western Intelligence to the Soviets
(London: Heinemann, 1991), p. 270. Aarons and Loftus write: "In 1959 the NATO
intelligence services reviewed their anti-Soviet failures and concluded that support
for the emigrs should be abandoned, as these "exile organizations were hopelessly
riddled with Communist spies."
786
See Kim Philby, My Secret War (London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1968), and
Prados, 1he Presidents Secret Wars, p. 58. Khorunshy came to Frankfort after
defecting from east Berlin in 1948. Impressed by his knowledge of Russian
conditions, emigrs in Gehlen's Organization hired him to train other agents at Bad
Homburg.
787
Aarons and John Loftus, Ratlines, p. 269. See also Grose, Operation Rollback,
passim. Wisner transformed the Vatican Ratlines into an illegal immigration
pipeline, codenamed Operation Bloodstone. The OSS during World War II coined
the term "ratline" to denote their escape and evasion networks used by US Air
Force crews shot down in occupied Europe. Literally a ratline is the rope ladder
Jackson a month before Stalin's death that Communists or ex-Socialists had
"infiltrated" RFE; they were "utterly discredited in their own country and were
doing [RFE] more harm than good. Vogeler planned to "feed this information to
Senator McCarthys Committee," CD Jackson wrote to NCFE official Thomas
Myers in New York.
788
He worried that this might destroy RFEs credibility and
lead to its demise.
A plethora of authors from the communist bloc have written detailed
accounts about Gehlen's organization.
789
Citing the Munich correspondent for the
New York World Telegram and Sun, Hungarian author Gyrgy Parragi claims that
"the closest ties with the Hungarian counterrevolutionaries were maintained by the
Gehlen Organization." Parragi's book was published in Russian.
790
GDR leader

reaching to the top of the mast, which is the last place of safety when a ship is
sinking. he had transformed the Vatican Ratlines into an illegal immigration
pipeline, codenamed Operation Bloodstone.
788
Letter to Thomas E. Myers, National Committee for a Free Europe, New York,
from C D Jackson, February 19, 1953, CD Jackson Records, Box 6, Folder V,
Eisenhower Presidential Library. Declassified July 23, 1998.
789
See V. Chernov, Liubimets Kanstler (Moscow: Gosudarstvo Izdatel'stvo
Politicheskoi Literatury, 1962); M. I. Rakhmanov and A. M. Alyeshin, FRG: Gnezdo
Imperialisticheskovo Shpionazha (Moscow: Izd-vo Sotsial'no-Ekonomicheskoi
Literatury, 1962); Mikls Szab, Ya Vernulsya na Rodinu: Vospominaniya
Razocharovavshevosya v Emigratsii Politika (Budapest: Kossuth Knyvkiad, 1957);
Gyrgy Parragi, Fasizmus frakkban s mundrban (Budapest: Kossuth Knyvkiad,
1962). Translation into Russian by M. Popova (Moskva: Voennoe Izdatel'stvo
Ministerstva Oborony SSSR, 1962); Jnos Berecz, Ellenforradalom tollal s
fegyverrel 1956 (Budapest: Kossuth Knyvkiad 1981) In Russian: Yanosh Berets,
Krakh Operatsii Fokus Kontrrevolutsia Perom i Oruzhieem (Moskva Izdatelstvo
politicheskoi literatury, 1986); Z. Savelin, ZagovoryOruzhiie Reaktsii (Moskva:
Gosudarstvennoe Izdatelstvo Politicheskoi Literatury, 1956); and Boris Sokolov,
"Shpiony Gitlera: Kto Oni? Shpion: Almanakh Pisatel'stkovo i Zhurnalistskovo
Rassledovaniya, no. 6 (Moskva: Mistikos, 1995), pp. 54--60.
790
Gyrgy Parragi, Fasizmus frakkban s mundrban (Budapest: Kossuth
Knyvkiad, 1962?) Translation into Russian by M. Popova (Moskva: Voennoe
Izdatel'stvo Ministerstva Oborony SSSR, 1962).
Walter Ulbricht apparently believed that Gehlen had "control over all military,
fascist organizations and agencies of West Germany and West Berlin including the
offices in the East conducting espionage activities in the peoples democracies."
Therefore, he intoned, "It is necessary to increase the vigilance of the party
organizations, working class and all GDR citizens to nip in the bud all attempts to
establish branches of these agencies in the GDR."
791

Moscow also knew that several US military intelligence organizations had
detachments or elements in West Germany: MIS (Military Intelligence Service);
AIS (Air Intelligence Service); ONI (Office of Naval Intelligence), and CIC (G-2s
Counter-Intelligence Corps).
792
The latter (CIC) was headquartered at Stuttgart
beginning in September 1949. Its value to the OPC (Office of Policy Coordination,
created in 1948) was incalculable, since the CIC carried out intelligence missions in
the Soviet zone and screened displaced persons and refugees---the key source of
OPC agents.
793
Thus it was the CIC that discovered Gehlen languishing in a POW
camp at Oberursel from May to July 1945. The Kronberg-based Brigadier General
Edwin L. Sibert, highest intelligence chief in the U.S. occupation zone in Germany,
alerted Washington about Gehlen's value. Sibert realized that Stalin would never

791
Quoted passages in this paragraph come from the full text of Ulbrichts speech to
the 30
th
SED Plenum on January 30, 1957, located in SAPMO (Berlin), DY 30/IV 2/1
170, S. 35.
792
Mentioned in M. I. Rakhmanov and A. M. Alyeshin, FRG: Gnezdo
Imperialisticheskovo Shpionazha (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Sotsial'no-Ekonomicheskoi
Literatury, 1962), p. 128.
793
Prados, 1he Presidents Secret Wars. According to Prados, about 500 defectors a
month arrived from behind the Iron Curtain as late as 1951. The 66
th
CIC
detachment carried out 2,211 intelligence missions in the Soviet zone in 1949 alone.
grant independence to the East European countries and that Gehlens aid would
prove invaluable.
794

Mikls Szab - a Hungarian emigr who served as an envoy for Kdr
among other migrs - wrote two detailed books (published in Hungarian and
Russian) about Gehlen and the CIC's recruitment of emigrs for intelligence work
in the satellite countries. A member of the Smallholders Party, Szab was
imprisoned in Hungary until the fall of 1953. He emigrated to Vienna in 1954 but
returned to Budapest, disgusted by the "traitorous" behavior of his fellow
countrymen and the "immoral" manner in which US and German intelligence
agencies lured these impecunious emigrs into mortally dangerous subversive work.
"Like butterflies flying toward the light," Szab wrote, "these people are tempted
with various promises: money, luxury cars, beautiful women; then they are sent
across the border to fill up the Hungarian, Czech, East German, and Polish
prisons."
795
(Szab has since admitted that he served as Kdrs agent as early as
1957.)
796


794
Hermann Zolling and Heinz Hoehne, Pullach Intern: General Gehlen und Die
Geschichte Des Bundesnachrichtendienstes (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe,
1971), p. 103. Parragi discusses the connection between Gehlen and the CIC as well.
Parragi, Fasizmus frakkban s mundrban (Budapest: Kossuth Knyvkiad, 1962),
p. 147.
795
Mikls Szab, Ya Vernulsya na Rodinu: Vospominaniya Razocharovavshevosya v
Emigratsii Politika (Budapest: Kossuth Knyvkiad, 1957), and Mikls Szab,
Emigranty po Professii, p. 330, cited in M. I. Rakhmanov and A. M. Alyeshin, FRG:
Gnezdo Imperialisticheskovo Shpionazha (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Sotsial'no-
Ekonomicheskoi Literatury, 1962).
796
See Mikls Szab, Csendes hbor (Budapest: Zrnyi Katonai, 1984).
A Soviet documentary collection published in 1951 and a GDR publication
translated from German into Russian provide ample details about many other US
or US-sponsored intelligence enterprises such as the Kampfgruppe gegen
Unmenschlichkeit, the NTS, and the Bonn-affiliated BFS (Bundesamt fr
Verfassungsschutz), and MAD (Militrischer Abschirmdienst).
797
Their sheer
abundance prompted one Soviet author to observe: "Just as a forest glade can be
covered with mushrooms, so West Germany now is swarming with numerous
espionage centers, organizations, and groups... American intelligence uses the
territory of West Germany as a trampoline for the launching [perebroska] of agents
into the GDR and into other socialist countries."
798
Funded by the Crusade for
Freedom (a cover for the CIA funding RFE as well), the Kampfgruppe
gegenUnmenschlichkeit engaged in controversial sabotage, such as blowing up a
large bridge over the Elbe in Weimar, that it was terminated in March 1959. The
NTS in Germany ran its own balloon operations and operated its own radio station,
which some may have confused with RFE at the height of the Hungarian crisis.
The 1951 volume outlines other problems in US-Hungarian relations which
may have put Moscow on guard, including the alleged espionage of American
businessman Robert A. Vogeler, US contacts with Cardinal Mindszenty, and the

797
Dokumenty o Jrazhdebnykh Deistviiakh Pravitelstva Soedinennykh Shtatov Protiv
Vengerskoi Narodnoi Respubliki (Budapesht: Vengerskoe Gosudarstvennoe
Izdatelstvo, 1951), p. 17. Also Unmenschlichkeit Als System (Berlin: Kongress-
Verlag, 1957). Trans into Russian by V. G. Cherniavskii and A.M. Lidvanskii,
Beschelovechnost kak Sistema (Moscow Voennoe Izdatelstvo Ministerstva
Oborony USSR, 1959).
798
M. I. Rakhmanov and A. M. Alyeshin, FRG: Gnezdo Imperialisticheskovo
Shpionazha (Moscow: Izd-vo Sotsial'no-Ekonomicheskoi Literatury, 1962)]
(pp. 37, 41).
seizure of Hungarian assets in the United States as retaliation for Hungary's refusal
to compensate US citizens for their property that was nationalized after the
communist takeover.
799
(One of CD Jackson's ideas in the aftermath of the
Hungarian crisis, incidentally, was to release the $600,000 or so of blocked
Hungarian funds to benefit the new refugees.)
800


Soviet Fears of U.S. Intervention
Awareness of US intelligence activities may also have heightened Soviet and
Hungarian leaders' fears of a US or US-sponsored intervention. On October 26
Mikoyan and Suslov scolded Nagy for not informing them in advance about his
announcement of the Soviet troop withdrawal from Budapest (and negotiations for
a complete withdrawal from Hungary), saying they considered this "a most crude
mistake, because the withdrawal of Soviet troops will inevitably lead to an
intervention by American troops."
801
(This is yet another instance of the "tail"--the
satellites--wagging the "dog"--the Soviet Union.) Even after the second Soviet

799
Dokumenty o Jrazhdebnykh Deistviiakh Pravitelstva Soedinennykh Shtatov Protiv
Vengerskoi Narodnoi Respubliki (Budapesht: Vengerskoe Gosudarstvennoe
Izdatelstvo, 1951), p. 17. The Vogeler affair is also mentioned in Z. Savelin,
ZagovoryOruzhiie Reaktsii (Moskva Gosudarstvennoe Izdatelstvo Politicheskoi
Literatury, 1956).
800
Message from C. D. Jackson, Time, Inc., New York, to William H. Jackson,
White House, November 17, 1956, p. 3, C D Jackson Papers, Box 63, Folder
Jackson, William H (1), Eisenhower Presidential Library. On the US seizure of
assets see U.S. Public Law 285 passed by the 84
th
Congress, described in letter from
Henry P. Leverich, Officer in Charge, Balkan Affairs, to Mrs. Arthur Tennenbaum,
February 7, 1956, NARA, RG 59, lot file # 76 D 232, box #41, folder A2.13
Hungary. For Soviet and Hungarian officials' discussion on the issue, see AVP, F
077, O 38, Por 37, Papka 190 (January 1, 1956--July 18, 1956).
801
RGANI (Moscow), f. 3, op. 64., d. 483, l. 128. "Telegramma A.I. Mikoyana i. M.
A. Suslova iz Budapeshta v TsK KPSS 26-ogo oktiabria."
intervention, Jnos Kdr worried about a U.S. military attack. As mentioned in the
previous chapter, Kdr had told Andropov on November 10 that he had overheard
rumors that the United States had begun military mobilization, and requested that
someone tell him whether there was any truth to these rumors. Kdr recalled this
fear of US troops even three months before his death, in his conversations with a
journalist.
802
While it is true that the CIA had initiated a program code-named
"Red Sox/Red Cap" for the purpose of encouraging unrest, "Wisners migr unit
was far from ready," according to author John Prados. He claims that "on two
separate occasions" during the Hungarian crisis, Eisenhower rejected proposals to
airdrop arms to the Hungarians.
803
One trooper from the U.S. Army's 11th
Airborne Division recalls that on Friday, October 21, the units went on a "category
B" alert, which was the highest level short of actual combat. He waited with other
paratroopers until the "stand down order" on October 27 at Furstenfeldbruk
airfield near Munich. "Senior officers briefed us that we were going to take an
airport southwest of Budapest and hold it while transports would bring in other
troops and supplies." He acknowledges, "We would have been outnumbered by

802
RGANI, F 89, Per 45, Dok 38, L 4, Postanovlenie Prezidiuma TsK KPSS: Ob
Otvete Yugoslavov na Vopros Nadya i ego Gruppe. " Kdr in a slightly worried
tone also said that information reached him that the United States began military
mobilization. He requested that someone tell him whether there is any truth to these
rumors." On his later statements see Jnos Kdr, Vgakarat (Budapest:
Hirlapkiad, 1989). Cited also in Valerii L. Musatov, "Yanosh Kadar i Vremya
Reform v Vengrii," Novaya Noveishaya Istoriya, no. 3 (1990), 144.
803
Prados, 1he Presidents Secret Wars, pp 119-121. Also Bennett Kovrig, "Rolling
Back Liberation: the United States and the Hungarian Revolution," in Bla Kirly,
Barbara Lotze, and Nndor F. Dreisziger, eds. The First War Between Socialist
States: the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 and its Impact (NY: Columbia University
Press, 1984), pp. 282.
about 5 divisions to our one until help arrived."
804
This operation probably
constituted part of the contingency planning of the U.S. European Command
(EUCOM), to be ready to move into Hungary if President Eisenhower decided to.
However, Washington never seriously contemplated such an intervention.
In any case, just as Washington lacked a plan of action should Stalin die, so
also it lacked a concrete plan of response should a satellite try to withdraw from the
Warsaw Pact and appeal for U.S. aid. The National Security Council had issued a
policy paper in July, 1956 (NSC 5608) that rejected both direct military intervention
and armed support of insurgents for the liberation of the satellites, but also urged
that regimes not subservient to the USSR be fostered. According to newly
declassified parts of the document, John Foster Dulles had added In general,
however, [we] do not discourage, by public utterances or otherwise, spontaneous
manifestations of discontent and opposition to the Communist regime, despite risks
to individuals, when their net results will exert pressure for release from Soviet
domination.
805
In any case, it is doubtful that limited covert assistance could have
stopped the Soviet intervention.


804
Interview with paratrooper Fred Clauser, May 22, 2001. The mission of the 11th
Airborne Division was to stop the Russians if they invaded West Germany from
Chechoslovakia. It covered the territory from Augsburg to the Bavarian Alps, plus
neutral Austria after 1955.
805
NSC, "US Policy Toward the Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe," Annex to NSC
5608, July 6, 1956, para 31, p 14, and see para 35, p 15. Declass. Feb 29, 1996. Cited
in Raymond Garthoff, Hungary, 1956 The Washington Reaction, unpublished
paper delivered at Hungary and the World, 1956 the New Archival Evidence, 26-
29 September 1996, pp. 1-26.
Soviet leaders also worried that Gehlen's agents might intervene. The Malin
Notes of the November 2 Presidium session show strong concern that the "Austrians
support a fascist organization, a Hungarian organization [based in] West Germany,
[consisting of about] 35 thousand Horthyists."
806
According to British historian E.
H. Cookridge (a former British Secret Service agent of Greek origin, Edward
Spiro), Gehlen's agents in Austria went to Budapest before the fighting began.
Ostensibly Gehlen and his agents had informed NATO intelligence many months
earlier of the imminent clash in Hungary.
807
Cookridge writes, controversially:
General Gehlen had set up a strong 'Hungarian section' in 1950, headed by Colonel
Istvn Kllnyi. Many of its members were former Hungarian intelligence officers,
such as General Zk, Colonel Ferenc Farkas and Count Bla Hadik. Clandestine
anti-communist groups inside Hungary were supplied with propaganda material
and arms by Gehlens agents in Austria. When during the first days of the revolt,
the Stalinist old guard was overthrown in Budapest.... Gehlen strained all his
resources to assist. A large team of his Hungarian agents and officers who lived in
exile in Germany and had been trained in emigr camps near Munich reached
Budapest on the eve of the fighting. Dulles contributed a well-armed shock unit
from the CIAs private army in Germany.
808


The "large team of agents and officers who lived in exile in Germany" cited by
Soviet Presidium members and Cookridge most likely refer to General Zk's

806
RGANI, F. 3, O. 12, D. 1006, L. 24ob, "Protokol'naya Zapis' Zasedaniya
Prezidiuma TsK KPSS s uchastiem Ya. Kadara, F. Miunnikha, I. Baty."
807
E.H. Cookridge, Gehlen: Spy of the Century (London: Hodder and Stoughton,
1971), p. 305. On his former career, see Boris Sokolov, "Shpiony Gitlera: Kto Oni?"
Shpion: Almanakh Pisatel'stkovo i Zhurnalistskovo Rassledovaniya, no. 6 (Moskva:
Mistikos, 1995), p. 54. Sokolov claims his real name was Edward Spiro. Because of
his background, one should read Cookridges account with extreme caution.
808
Cookridge, Gehlen: Spy of the Century, pp. 304-5. Hungarian communist author
Jnos Berecz also states that "Gehlen's Hungarian division played an active role in
Hungary during the October events." Jnos Berecz, Ellenforradalom tollal s
fegyverrel 1956 (Budapest: Kossuth Koenyvkiado 1981) In Russian: Yanosh Berets,
Krakh Operatsii Fokus Kontrrevolutsia Perom i Oruzhieem (Moskva Izdatelstvo
politicheskoi literatury, 1986, p. 83.
Hungarian veterans' organization (Magyar Harcosok Bajtrsi Szvetsge, or MHBS).
On October 29, MHBS members told the US consul in Munich that it was
"organizing three brigades for action in Hungary" and requested financial backing.
As US officials reported:

They stated that the first brigade, 300 strong, was in Austria and that General Zk
was going there yesterday to arrange for passage into Hungary. The second brigade,
also 300 strong, was being organized in Germany with headquarters in Munich, and
plans were being made to organize the third in Western Europe, principally in Italy
and France. The representatives stated that the organization needed financial
assistance and inquired as to whether the US could assist; they had already received
assistance from the German Red Cross, they stated.
809


Given the general dearth of information about this organization, however, any
discussion about them is necessarily speculative to a degree. Later scholars insist
that Dulles did not contribute any shock unit.
In sum, Soviet and Hungarian communist authorities were keenly aware of
US-sponsored intelligence activities in the East European satellites almost a decade
before the 1956 revolution, and this probably strengthened Soviet resolve to
maintain hegemony over the satellites. Even if RFE and other activities did not
prompt the Soviet leaders necessarily to use military force against its satellites, it
still put them on guard and encouraged a Manichean mindset-- if they let Hungary
leave the Warsaw Pact, it would automatically join NATO.
Critics may assert that US-sponsored intelligence activities had the opposite
effect on some Soviet leaders: that they motivated Kremlin leaders to allow more

809
Information Memorandum, October 29, 1956, Staff Summary, US Department of
State, re: Actions of Hungarian Emigre Groups, World Reactions to Revolt,
National Security Agency, Flashpoints, Box 2, Folder 10/26/56.
equality in Soviet - satellite relations. This may be true, to some extent. However,
allowing limited freedom is just another, albeit subtler, method of maintaining
hegemony over the satellites. One lifts the lid slightly off the pot to prevent the pot
from boiling over.
Still other critics may point out that US-sponsored intelligence activities
normally would have strengthened Soviet resolve to maintain hegemony over
Hungary and other satellites, but US public assurances to Moscow that the United
States did not regard the satellites as potential allies decreased Soviet apprehension
and hence lessened the impact of those intelligence activities. The Russians became
less concerned about Hungary's security allegiance once they received these
assurances from Washington, they would argue. However, these assurances came
late in 1956: on October 27 (Dulles' speech in Dallas) and October 29 (when
Ambassador Bohlen repeated the message personally to Khrushchev and Zhukov),
after events had acquired a momentum of their own. The argument for increased
hegemony concerns Soviet perceptions of US activities in the earlier period (1947--
1955).
Finally, this is not to say that Soviet officials' anxiety about US-sponsored
intelligence activities to achieve "rollback" was the only factor prompting them to
exert control over the satellites. As the Malin Notes show, the Kremlin leaders were
also motivated by the desire to maintain a positive public image among Third World
countries and foreign communist parties, and to avoid appearing weak in the eyes of
the US and Western countries.

Intelligence Processing of Hungarian Refugees at Camp Kilmer
The United States also sought to avoid appearing weak. Having failed to
liberate the captive nation Hungary in the midst of its crisis, the Eisenhower
Administration tried to recoup its failure after the crisis. Instead of military aid,
Washington offered money and humanitarian supplies to the refugees, taking
measures to maximize the public relations effect of each gesture. US officials chose
to offer aid to Hungary via the UN, rather than unilaterally, because the former
would be a more profound gesture of sympathy. As one US representative to the
UN, Walmsley, pointed out to Lodge in a telegram, "Even if the final action is
blocked by Soviet veto, the initiative would, in addition to increasing US prestige,
add to the prestige of the UN in the eyes of satellite peoples who now hold the
organization in low esteem because of its past failure to note their plight. The UN is
also a unique publicity center and consequently UN actionor attempted action
would generate great influence."
810
On October 31, the State Department
announced plans to send 2,000 tons of cheese and powdered milk to distressed
Hungarians in Austria and Hungary.
811
On November 2, 1956, the Eisenhower
Administration offered $20 million worth of food and relief supplies to the
Hungarian refugees. Other ideas for aid to Hungary included: 1) collecting private
funds from Hungarians in US cities and elsewhere for rebuilding the Cathedral in

810
Telegram from Walmsley, U.S. Mission to the UN, to Lodge regarding [Lodges]
Working Paper, October 25, 1956, 7 pm. Flashpoints Project, Box 2, Folder
10/26/56, record number 82345, National Security Archive, Washington, D.C.
811
Staff Notes, No. 37, The White House, October 31, 1956, Flashpoints Project,
Box 2, Record # 64850, Folder 10/31/56, National Security Archive.
Budapest, now the site of the Stalin statue;" and 2) offering Columbia University
scholarships to ten qualified students.
812

The most extensive US aid concerned the Hungarian refugees who came to
the United States. In the months following the October 23 student demonstration, an
estimated 188,000 Hungarians found refuge in Austria and 18,000 in Yugoslavia. As
of September 1, 1957, approximately 35,000 of these refugees had accepted asylum
in the United States.
813
Upon returning from a December visit to Austria, Vice
President Richard Nixon reported the Austrian government's difficulties in
assimilating the refugees. The Austrian authorities told him that, of the 67,000
presently in Austria as of January 1, 1957, they could only accept 30,000---if
financial aid was provided for the construction of housing and other facilities.
Clearly, Nixon said, "the United States and other free nations must take
substantially more refugees than they have agreed to take up to this time."
814

According to the Austrian Federal Ministry, in November 1956 Austrian authorities
needed to build at least two new refugee camps before winter in Traisskirchen and
Judenau, both located in Niederoesterreich (lower Austria, bordering
Czechoslovakia). These camps had been occupied by the Allied Powers; when
returned to the Austrian government, the buildings were uninhabitable. Officials
estimated that the Traisskirchen camp could shelter 8,000 refugees, and the

812
Memorandum by Robert R. Bowie, U.S. Department of State, to Mr. Leonhart,
October 31, 1956, re ideas about aid for Hungary, Flashpoints Project, Box 2,
Record # 66139, Folder 10/31/56, National Security Archive.
813
Guy E. Coriden, Report on Hungarian Refugees, NARA, Studies in
Intelligence, Entry 27, Box 15, Folder 2 (Winter 1958), p. 85.
814
Report to the President on Hungarian Refugees," p. 4, January 1, 1957, Office
of the Vice President, Washington DC, Eisenhower Collection, International Series,
Box 28, Folder: Hungarian (1), Eisenhower Presidential Library.
Judenau camp 2,000. Ten thousand refugees would cost approximately $2,700,000
per year, they calculated.
815

Several reasons dictated speed in transporting the refugees out of Austria.
First, as Nixon pointed out, the pressure on Austria could become too great. If the
Austrian border guards turned back the refugees, CD Jackson also warned
Eisenhower, "the cause of freedom will have received a terrible blow. Everything
that all of us have said about our side of the Iron Curtain will turn out to have been
a ghastly lie, and I do not know how we will ever manage to erase the bitterness."
816

Aiding the refugees was Eisenhower's chance to mitigate some of the anger
Hungarians felt toward US-funded Radio Free Europe for promising military aid.
Secondly, the Soviet Union might invade Austria in "hot pursuit" of the
refugees, alleging that the Austrians had violated their own declaration by giving
aid and comfort to the Hungarian rebels and by permitting Western organizations
to use Austria as a base for providing assistance to the rebel forces. Recall again
the Kremlin leaders' specific complaint at the November 2 Presidium session that
"Austrians support a fascist organization." These accusations continued, despite
earnest avowals to the contrary by Austrian Ambassador Bischoff, for example, on
November 3 when he visited Valerian Zorin, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs in

815
Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Karton 403, Aussenpolitik, IIpol (1956): Ungarn,
"Situationsbericht ber das Fluechtlingswesen in sterreich, November 8, 1956, von
Dr. Jurkowitch, Innenministerium, zu Dr. Axmann, Bundeskanzleramt
(Auswaertige Angelegenheiten), S. 1-2.
816
Letter from C. D. Jackson, Time, Inc., New York, to Dwight D. Eisenhower,
White House, November 23, 1956, p. 2, CD Jackson Papers, Box 50, Folder Dwight
Eisenhower--Correspondence, 1956," Eisenhower Presidential Library.
Moscow.
817
The CIA warned of possible "hot pursuit," citing facts such as frequent
communist allegations about Austrian violations of their pledge of neutrality;
Austrian concerns that Soviet forces would not stop at the Austrian-Hungarian
frontier; and reports that the Soviet Embassy in Vienna had burned large amounts
of paper on November 2, 1956. Moreover, the CIA report warned:
There has been considerable movement of Hungarian nationals across the border
from Austria, despite Austrian measures to prevent Hungarians from re-entering
Hungary. Refugees in large numbers apparently fled into Austria and these almost
certainly included military personnel. These circumstances might in Soviet eyes
provide a justification for Soviet violation of Austrian neutrality.

CIA officials pointed out, moreover, that Austrian neutrality had not actually been
guaranteed by the four Great Powers which signed the Austrian State Treaty.
Rather, the Austrian government proclaimed its own neutrality by constitutional
proviso, and the signatory powers simply took note of that declaration.
818

A third reason to hurry was that the refugees could provide valuable
intelligence about the Hungarian communist system--something short in supply,
compared to US intelligence sources on Poland and other satellites. Eighty-three
percent of the refugees were under forty years of age; about sixty-four percent were
male; and less than one percent was engaged in agricultural enterprises. These
characteristics made the group a "positive foreign intelligence asset," according to

817
RGANI, F 89, Per 45, Dok. 21, L. 1, Zapis iz Dnevnika Zorina ot 3-ogo 1956
g." Bischoff insisted that Austria had sent into Hungary only airplanes with medical
supplies, clothes, and foodstuffs.
818
Special National Intelligence Estimate 11-8-56: "Likelihood of Soviet Violation of
Austrian Neutrality," November 6, 1956, p. 1, Record Group 263, Records of the
CIA, Intelligence Public File, HRP 92-4/001, Box 3, NARA.
Guy Coriden, one of the CIA analysts who debriefed them.
819
Early on, some
refugees on their own initiative went overtly to the US or UK missions in Austria
and volunteered information, either for patriotic reasons or for better treatment.
Their preliminary reports further proved the value of the refugees as an intelligence
source. Nixon also commented on the caliber of the refugees: they are young people
"of the leadership type" who had to leave the country to avoid deportation. In
reply Eisenhower recalled that Marshal Zhukov once told him, "if you got rid of the
leaders of a country, you could do anything you wanted to."
820
It was agreed that
this opportunity to debrief the "escapees" should not be passed up; the Hungarian
government could step up efforts to close the border completely, and then it would
be too late.
821

Moreover, the Austrians would not allow intelligence processing on their
neutral territory; it would justify Soviet accusations. Even US officials involved in
balloon-leaflet operations felt it was only a matter of time before they were forced
out. As Crittenberger wrote in December 1956: "In Austria, against a background
of confusion in the handling of the refugees, some of our extra-curricular activities
evidently served to irritate and then exacerbate certain officials...After [certain
episodes] that ran counter to Austria's policy of strict neutrality, it was not desirable

819
Guy E. Coriden, Report on Hungarian Refugees, pp. 87-8, Studies in
Intelligence, Entry 27, Box 15, Folder 2 (Winter 1958), NARA.
820
Notes on Meeting in the Presidents Office, including Vice President, Loy
Henderson, Deputy Undersecretary of State, et al., December 26, 1956, p. 1, Dwight
Eisenhower Papers, Ann Whitman Diary Series, Box 8, Folder December 1956,
Eisenhower Presidential Library.
821
Report to the President on Hungarian Refugees," p. 4, January 1, 1957, Office
of the Vice President, Washington DC, Eisenhower Collection, International Series,
Box 28, Folder: Hungarian (1), Eisenhower Presidential Library.
to continue our frequent explanations to Washington, in the face of increasing
evidence that diplomatic protests might force us out at any time."
822

The danger of communist infiltration of the Austrian refugee camps was a
fourth reason for the expeditious transport of the refugees to the United States.
While Nixon was not so concerned with this issue, he said "some of the
Congressional leaders are worrying about that." Eisenhower opined that "such
danger is almost zero." Perhaps recalling Alger Hiss or the Rosenbergs, he said the
Communists did not have to go to such elaborate means to get spies into our
country. But the danger was real. In early November the refugees were spilling over
the Austrian border at a rate of 10,000 every two or three days according to
Austrian authorities; by late December about 800 were arriving a day, according to
Nixon.
823
According to the Austrian foreign ministry officials, spies from Soviet,
Hungarian, Romanian, and Czech agencies were struggling to obtain complete lists
of Hungarian refugees in the camps. Austrian counterintelligence agents caught
Czech spy Heinz Silomon with detailed information on the refugees. Helmer, the
Minister of the Interior, stated that the clamping down on all forms of espionage

822
Draft of Letter to Richard Condon (unsent). Willis Crittenberger Post-
Retirement Activities, Correspondence: October--December, 1956." U.S. Army
Military History Institute, Carlisle Barracks, PA.
823
Report to the President on Hungarian Refugees," p. 3, January 1, 1957, Office
of the Vice President, Washington DC, Eisenhower Collection, International Series,
Box 28, Folder: Hungarian (1), Eisenhower Presidential Library. Also: Staatsarchiv
(Vienna), Karton 403, Aussenpolitik, IIpol (1956): Ungarn, "Situationsbericht
ber das Fluechtlingswesen in sterreich, November 8, 1956, von Dr. Jurkowitch,
Innenministerium, zu Dr. Axmann, Bundeskanzleramt (Auswaertige
Angelegenheiten), S. 1-2.
activities was "among the responsibilities imposed by Austrian neutrality.
824

Amidst the growing confusion and crowded quarters, morale was bound to
plummet, making the camps easy to infiltrate. Some of the refugees were honest
patriots; others were opportunists eager to find more lucrative employment. Still
other "refugees" (including Mikls Szab) were indeed intelligence agents with
"missions to collect intelligence, to establish nets, or to report on the activities of
Hungarians in the first two categories."
825

Finally, swift and massive aid to the refugees earned good publicity for the
United States, especially amidst the accusations against RFE. The first increment of
seventy refugees arrived at McGuire Air Force Base on November 25, 1956;
military police escorted them to Camp Kilmer in New Jersey---the place where the
first aliens recruited under the Lodge Act were trained and the place for which
Crittenberger had held responsibility as Commanding General of the First
Army.
826
On CD Jackson's urging, Eisenhower invited a group of Hungarian
refugees to the White House for a photo opportunity.
827
On December 1, 1956, the
Eisenhower Administration raised the quota of incoming refugees to 21, 500, all of

824
Staatsarchiv (Vienna), Karton 450, sterreich 11-14, Ungarische
Agententtigkeit in sterreich," March 27, 1957, p. 1. This document refers to an
article entitled "Spionagekampf um Flchtlingslisten," which appeared in a
Munich-based newspaper, Vertriebenen-Anzeiger [Exiles' Gazette] on March 23.
825
Coriden, Report on Hungarian Refugees, p. 88.
826
Memorandum for the Record Staff Meeting, November 17, 1956, Record
Group 498, Operation Mercy at Camp Kilmer, New Jersey, Box 34, Folder, USAD
File, November 17December 31, 1956, NARA. See also James Jay Carafano,
Mobilizing Europes Stateless Americas Plan for a Cold War Army, Journal of
Cold War Studies (Spring 1999), vol. 1, no. 2, p. 73.
827
"November 26, 1956," Folder November 1956 Diaryacw (1), Ann Whitman
Diary Series, Box 8, Eisenhower Papers as President (Ann Whitman File),
Eisenhower Presidential Library.
whom were to be transported quickly to the United States. By May 9, 1957, a total of
31, 983 escapees had passed through Camp Kilmer.
828

The main problem experienced at Camp Kilmer was the same one William
Griffith encountered at RFE headquarters in Munich: a dearth of Hungarian--
English interpreters. To treat wounded, sick, or pregnant refugees, the medical
team at Camp Kilmer combed every army area for Hungarian-speaking medical
personnel and found only 3 medical officers, 3 army nurses, and 4 enlisted
technicians.
829
The intelligence community quickly realized that 1) it had fewer
Hungarian language specialists than specialists in all but the most exotic Eastern
and Near Eastern languages, and 2) the Hungarians as a people had a lower
"coefficient of second-language competence" (in 1956) than any other civilized
population except Americans.
830
At the height of the crisis, the US Legation in
Budapest sent a proposal to Washington about offering English lessons; Dulles
enthusiastically approved.
831

Despite the shortage in Hungarian-English translators, analysts and
intelligence officers managed to interview about 6,000 refugees, including scientists,
private soldiers with knowledge of troop and supply locations in one limited area,
and ministerial officials with detailed knowledge of intra-Bloc operations. Analysts

828
Consolidated Activity Report for the Period November 21, 1956April 30,
1957, May 17, 1957, p. 2, Army Medical Processing Team Records, Record Group
498, Operation Mercy at Camp Kilmer, New Jersey, NARA, Box 34.
829
Consolidated Activity Report," p. 21.
830
Coriden, Report on Hungarian Refugees, p. 91.
831
Memorandum A-57 from John Foster Dulles, U.S. State Department, to
American Legation in Budapest, Hungary, October 23, 1956, regarding English
language instruction to Hungarians, Flashpoints Project, Box 2, Folder 10/23/56,
Record #78943, National Security Archive.
produced about 1,500 intelligence reports covering a variety of fields. According to
Coriden, "When you add the thousands of reports and items to the training and
area familiarization and divide it by the cost (Army food and quarters were
provided, and no additional personnel were hired) you find that the intelligence
community made a bargain purchase. The Hungarian exploitation effort, American
domestic style, will be a source of example and anecdote for some time to come."
832


Conclusion
In sum, like the activities of the Poles and Yugoslavs described in Chapter
Two, American intelligence and psychological warfare activities in the late 1940s
and 1950s - RFE propaganda, Free Europe Press balloon operations, the Gehlen
Organizations's shenanigans, rumors about U.S.-sponsored " emigr armies" (VFC)
and the like - most likely influenced the Soviet officials' assessment of the Hungarian
situation somewhat and increased their determination to retain the satellite as a
Warsaw Pact member. At first, these activities led the Soviet leaders to believe
Rkosi should stay in power, and later, to believe that Nagy had lost control.
It is difficult, of course, to estimate the precise impact of the various U.S.
psychological warfare operations on Soviet behavior. More conclusive evidence
would be needed in order to prove that Gehlens Organization, CIA operations, or
migrs actively abetted the Hungarian insurgents, or that any U.S. activities
directly influenced the Soviet decision to intervene in Hungary. Undoubtedly, the
CIAs clandestine activities greatly irritated Moscow, but while they may have

832
Coriden, Report on Hungarian Refugees, p. 93.
encouraged Soviet leaders ambitions to maintain hegemony over East Central
Europe, they did not generate such ambitions. Rather, Khrushchevs determination
to keep Hungary in the Warsaw Pact probably arose primarily from post-World
War II strategic and ideological imperatives.
In repeating the anti-Nagy broadcasts of the regional radios during the crisis,
RFE certainly did not enhance Nagys domestic popularity and most likely
undermined it to some degree. Nevertheless, Nagy's New Course in 1953-54 had
enjoyed wide public support as a partial remedy to the strictures of Stalinism. Thus,
RFEs broadcasts probably did not lead directly to Nagys demise, or to the Soviet
officials' conclusion that they needed to replace Nagy by military force. The newly
declassified notes of the emergency sessions in the Soviet Presidium suggest that
some Soviet and Hungarian officials genuinely feared a U.S. intervention and
viewed Western radio broadcasts as a key factor in the anti-Soviet sentiment in
Hungary. However, these officials may have evoked the U.S. military threat to
justify the forceful restoration of communist rule in Hungary.
In any case, RFE neither "caused" the Hungarian Revolution, nor stood
alone in weakening the Nagy government; U.S. diplomats also advocated neutrality
toward Nagy as early as October 15, 1956, hoping to make amends for Operation
Focus. Ironically, the FEP-sponsored balloon operation coincided with the popular,
reformist Nagy regime (1953-1955), and ended just when it might have done the
most good, when the unpopular Hungarian Stalinist Rkosi took over.
After the revolution, the Eisenhower Administration quickly welcomed
thousands of Hungarian refugees. The Administration was motivated by the
logistical pressures on Austria; the fear that Soviet troops might invade Austria in
"hot pursuit" of the refugees; the desire to capitalize on this key source of
intelligence; and the wish to gain favorable publicity after the exposed bankruptcy
of the liberation policy. While Khrushchev's call for "wars of national liberation"
among Asian and African states heightened the USSR's popularity, Eisenhower's
policy to liberate the "captive" nations of Eastern Europe only brought ignominy in
the end.

Chapter Seven: Conclusion

In the beginning of this book, we explained four of the most common
misperceptions among policymakers, as laid out by Robert Jervis. First, as the
reader will recall, the decision maker in his attempt to fit complex data into a
coherent pattern - assumes that the behavior of others is more centralized, planned,
and coordinated than it actually is. Second, the decision makers fears and desires
bias his perception. He will perceive threats vigilantly if he thinks he can avoid the
danger by recognizing the stimulus and taking corrective action (perceptual
vigilance). However, if he thinks there is nothing he can do to avoid the danger or
pain that accompanies a stimulus, he will seek to avoid the evidence and
underestimate the chances of harm (perceptual defense). Third, a decision maker
tends to overestimate his importance as an influence on the other actor or as a
target of the actors behavior. When the other actors behavior is desirable, the
decision maker will gladly take credit for it, but when the behavior is undesirable,
he will not take responsibility for it. Instead, he will construe the behavior as
stemming from internal sources rather than resulting in response to his own
actions. Furthermore, he will believe that the other actor or state is deliberately
seeking to harm him, and discount the possibility that the behavior could be
accidental and unintended.
Fourth, in accordance with Festingers cognitive dissonance theory, a
decision maker seeks strong justification for his behavior. To minimize his internal
conflict, the decision maker will block out uncomfortable information about the
advantages of rejected courses of action and costs of the chosen one. Let us now
evaluate these four patterns of misperception with regard to the groups of decision
makers discussed throughout this book.

Misperception of Centralization

Soviet, U.S., and Austrian policymakers, as well as Western Cold War
scholars before 1989, appear to have fallen prey to the misperception that other
actors were more centralized and coordinated than they really were. Notes of Soviet
Presidium sessions suggest that some officials genuinely feared a U.S. counter-
intervention and saw RFE broadcasts as part of a unified U.S. policy. In fact, as the
previous chapter illustrates, U.S. policymakers differed in their views about the
intentions of the post-Stalinist leadership, the efficacy of psychological warfare
schemes like the balloon operations, the need for a Volunteer Freedom Corps, and
many other issues. The few strident RFE broadcasts during the revolution came
from only a handful of migrs straying from policy guidelines and were not part of
a coordinated U.S. strategy to incite the insurgents.
All too often U.S. decision makers assuming the Soviet bloc to be a unified
communist monolith failed to calibrate their psychological warfare schemes, thus
often harming the national communists more than the hard-line Stalinist leaders.
The fact that Imre Nagy was a communist did not mean that he always acted in
lockstep with Moscow. When one considers the difficulties Soviet organizations and
envoys had just normalizing the situation in Hungary itself after the military
crackdown, it is almost laughable that President Eisenhower and Austrian
government leaders feared the Soviet armys hot pursuit of the refugees into
Austria.
Likewise, many Cold War scholars before 1989 advocates of content
analysis aside - have shown a tendency to assume to varying degrees that the Soviet
Union behaved as a unitary rational actor and that all major decisions were
unanimous. This study has shown that both the October 23 and October 31
decisions to invade were not completely unanimous. Although absent when the
second invasion was decided upon, Mikoyan clearly opposed the use of military
force in Hungary. Other key decision makers commonly believed to be hawks, such
as Marshal Zhukov, behaved as doves at least part of the time.
Many Cold War scholars before 1989 also tended to believe that the Kremlin
followed a grand strategy and that all the satellites worked in concert with the first
socialist state. They presumed that intentions always preceded actions accidents
did not occur. Documents in 1956 reveal, on the contrary, that the Soviet Union had
difficulty working with its Hungarian allies, that the other bloc countries influenced
Soviet behavior, and that the normalization process proceeded more slowly than
foreigners realized.

Overestimating Ones Importance as Influence or Target

Evidence of the second key misperception - overestimating ones importance
to another state as an influence or target also abounds in the decision making of
Soviet, Hungarian, U.S., and Polish officials. Soviet expectations of Hungarys strict
ideological obedience to the first socialist state may have blinded the Moscow
leaders to Hungarys intrinsic anti-Slavic sentiments and contributed to their flawed
image of this client state. Hungarian leaders were able to influence Moscow leaders
subtly by their apparent obedience. Exhibiting the behavior desired by the Kremlin
can in itself constitute a tactic of deception (passive aggression), since the desired
outward behavior does not necessarily signify intentions identical to Moscows. In
this cunning way, Hungarian communist officials were able to influence the Soviet
Presidium on matters such as the Rajk question, Farkas Affair, Jewish question,
return of Kdr to the Politburo, and dismissal of Mtys Rkosi.
Likewise, the Kremlin leaders initially made favorable comments about Imre
Nagy when his behavior seemed desirable and later blamed others when they
disapproved of his actions. At the October 23 meeting, for example, Mikoyan opined
that without Nagy they cant get control of the movement, and its also cheaper for
us. He thought the Hungarians themselves will restore order on their own, and
that Moscow should try political measures, and only then send troops.
833
Even
though Mikoyan was outvoted and the Presidium did decide to send troops by the
end of the meeting, no one spoke ill of Nagy. In fact, Khrushchev suggested
recruiting Nagy for political action.
834
Three days later, however, at another
Presidium meeting, the members blamed Mikoyan for supporting Nagy. In the
ensuing days, they blamed Nagy for his apparent inability to enforce cease-fires and
curfews and did not consider the possibility that their own collective decision to send
in Soviet troops contributed to the situations deterioration. By the eve of the second
intervention, November 3, Khrushchev told fellow Presidium members at the

833
Malin, "Protokol'naya Zapis,' 23 oktyabrya 1956 g."
834
RGANI, F. 3, O. 12, D. 1006, Ll. 4-4ob, "Protokol'naya Zapis' Zasedaniya
Prezidiuma TsK KPSS, 23 oktyabrya 1956 g."
emergency session, "They criticized Nagy and regarded him as an opportunist, but
he is also a traitor."
835

The Soviet leaders also failed to take responsibility for the negative
psychological effect of their contingency military preparations in late October and
early November. Nagy had been trying to negotiate a Soviet troop withdrawal with
Soviet military officials, but when his Hungarian subordinates reported the influx of
more Soviet troops across the Hungarian border, he as sovereign leader of
Hungary had no choice but to react to this apparent threat. Thus, the Soviet
Unions own action - ordering new troops to advance across Hungarian borders
brought about the undesired behavior from Nagy (declaring Hungarian neutrality).
Instead of taking responsibility for this, however, Kremlin leaders again blamed
Nagy as a traitor who fell under the influence of the masses and could no longer
control his country.
Likewise, Khrushchev did not take responsibility for Titos behavior. Since
the latter had agreed to work on Nagy to coax him to resign as Prime Minister,
Khrushchev also assumed that Tito would turn the Nagy group over to Soviet
authorities after it fled to the Yugoslav Embassy. When Tito refused, Khrushchev
chastised Tito not only for his obstinacy over the Nagy affair, but also for
fomenting the Hungarian revolution itself. The Soviet leadership could not
understand Titos psychological need to adhere to international law regarding
political asylum. Khrushchev conveniently discounted any possibility that the

835
See MOL, XIX J-1-K Horvath Imre kulugyminiszter iratai, 1956 november 3-n
, 55, doboz., l. 7-8. Cited in Vyacheslav Sereda and Jnos M. Rainer, eds., Dnts a
Kremlben, 1956: A szovjet prtelnksg viti Magyarorszgrl (Budapest: 1956-os
Intezet, 1996), p. 93.
Kremlins own actions might have brought about Titos recalcitrance and fear of
renewed Soviet domination. The expulsion of Yugoslavia from the Cominform in
1948 and severing of trade ties with bloc countries had damaged the Yugoslav
economy. Khrushchevs trip to Pula on November 2 merely to inform Tito of the
predetermined Soviet invasion had probably reinforced Titos wariness about Soviet
domination.
When tens of thousands of refugees fled for Austria, moreover, the
Khrushchev leadership blamed the Raab government for violating Austrian
neutrality by providing asylum, when in fact, the exodus of refugees from Hungary
resulted from the bloody repression of the freedom fighters within Hungary by
Soviet troops and the VH.
As far as the Soviet Special Corps stationed in Hungary was concerned, it
sought to take credit for the absence of a Hungarian Pozna and its own help to
Hungarian farmers with the harvest ( as part of plan "Volna"), but shunned
responsibility when the revolution did erupt and discounted the unsettling effect of
their troops on the Hungarian population.
However, the Soviet leadership and military were not alone in their
susceptibility to this common tendency to overestimate ones importance as
influence or target. Rkosi had ruled Hungary with an iron hand for so long that he
overestimated his influence over the population. Thinking that the Pozna uprising
in Poland justified a new crackdown on the party opposition in his own country, he
merely sealed his own fate. When the revolution broke out, Rkosi remained blind
to his own catalytic role; even while in permanent exile in the USSR, he wrote
endless letters to the Kremlin, insisting instead that hostile Horthyist elements
had fomented the revolution one he could have suppressed had he not been forced
to flee Hungary in July 1956.
Meanwhile, Radio Free Europe officials in New York and Munich also fell
prey to this type of misperception. Having decided that their key objective was to
increase the Kremlin leaders fear and doubt about the satellites reliability, they
proudly cited the rising numbers of defectors, communist governments angry
protests, secret listeners clubs, and balloon operations as proof that their radio
broadcasts and initiatives were influencing the populations of the captive nations
and causing anxiety for the communist authorities. Indeed, as pointed out in the
previous chapter, some officials, such as RFEs Deputy European Director Allan
Michie, believed that Operation Prospero helped trigger the riots in 1953 in the
Czechoslovak city of Plze and East German cities, and Operation Veto contributed
to the postponement of elections in Czechoslovakia.
RFE officials also wanted to take credit in the early days of the Hungarian
Revolution in late October - when it looked like Moscow would tolerate a more
liberal Hungary. When the Soviet troops intervened the second time, however,
RFE was blamed for raising false hopes in the freedom fighters. True to Jerviss
prediction, most RFE officials were then loath to take responsibility for the
bloodshed, arguing that the insurgents behavior derived from internal sources
rather than from foreign radio broadcasts. While this is probably correct, their
pattern of taking credit and avoiding responsibility resembles that of the other
national groups described above.
Finally, Polish leader Gomukas behavior vis--vis the Russians and
Hungarians exhibits this misperception as well. When Khrushchev paid Gomuka a
surprise visit in Warsaw on October 19, Gomuka most likely gave himself credit for
successfully persuading the Soviet leader that he, Gomuka, was a trustworthy
communist who stopped far short of Titoism, simply maintaining the Polish
communist partys monopoly and keeping Poland within the Warsaw Pact. He may
have overestimated his personal influence on the outcome of this critical encounter
of October 19, however. As explained earlier, the simultaneous occurrence of the
Hungarian unrest an event entirely outside of Gomukas individual control - may
very well have been the determining factor convincing Khrushchev that he could
trust Gomuka (convenient to believe, given time constraints) and deterring the
Soviet armed forces from intervening in Poland.
Moreover, Gomuka did not view the Hungarian events as altogether
desirable. Inwardly he dreaded anything that might spark an uncontrollable
revolutionary movement within Polish borders. In accordance with Jerviss theory,
Gomuka did not construe the Hungarians behavior as in any way a response to his
own actions, but instead attributed them to internal sources: the mistakes of the
Rkosi-Ger clique. As discussed in Chapter Four, Gomuka a realist
maintained a shrewd balancing act between appeasing the Polish people, who deeply
empathized with the Hungarians, and reassuring his Kremlin bosses that he was
firmly in control of his country.

Influence of Desires and Fears on Perception
Wishful thinking is rife in international crises by all parties involved, given
inter alia the inevitable data constraints. The Hungarian crisis is no exception. In
1956 the Soviet leaders wanted to believe that the unrest in Hungary (buttressed
perhaps by U.S. intelligence activities in East Central Europe) could be quelled by
keeping a forceful leader Rkosi installed. Believing the problem lay at the top
would also enable the communist leaders to avoid the ideologically painful
realization that the Hungarian workers and peasants (the toiling masses) were
also disillusioned. Likewise, they wanted to believe that the Hungarian armed forces
could maintain order by themselves, obviating a Soviet military crackdown on a
fellow socialist state that would surely alienate foreign communists and be difficult
to explain.
With respect to Yugoslavia, the Kremlin officials wanted to believe that,
having successfully enlisted the support of the peoples democracies in
excommunicating Yugoslavia from the Cominform in 1948, they could easily compel
them now to heal the breach with Tito in 1955-1956. Instead, Rkosis dawdling
contributed to the popular tensions in Hungary. Khrushchev and others also
believed that, if only Tito would censor the Yugoslav press and diplomatic corps
properly, they might be able to avoid an ideological spillover effect on the
Hungarian people.
Moreover, the Khrushchev leadership was probably perceptually vigilant
regarding the Pozna revolt in Poland, but perceptually defensive about Hungary
in the summer of 1956. Since the Pozna uprising was mostly about unrealistic work
norms and food shortages, Khrushchev and his colleagues may have felt more in
control of the situation. The Hungarian quagmire, by contrast, struck them as more
intractable because it entailed political and ideological independence for Hungary.
Since there was no real Hungarian Pozna, Kremlin leaders had no prior
warnings. The revolution seemed to come out of nowhere, thus further heightening
their sense of a lack of control. Had they been more vigilant about the Hungarian
situation in the spring and summer of 1956, they might have removed Rkosi
sooner.
Desires distorted the Hungarians thinking as well. Without Polands initial
defiance of the Kremlin leaders on October 19-20, the student demonstration of
October 23 in Budapest may not have taken place. The Hungarians wanted to
believe that, if Poland could defy the USSR, so could Hungary. They glossed over
the crucial differences between the two countries and their leaders, underestimating
Gomukas own fears of ideological spillover.
As for Washington policymakers, those who supported RFE initiatives and
the VFC like C. D. Jackson and Henry Cabot Lodge, in all likelihood wanted to
believe that the Khrushchev leadership was essentially the same as Stalins, just
more devious. In this way their psychological warfare projects would still be deemed
necessary for national security and worthy of funding. Jackson and others could
also be considered perceptually vigilant. Believing that the post-Stalinist Kremlin
was confused, they thought this the opportune time to take corrective action and
overload the switchboard to increase the Kremlins confusion.
By the same token, U.S. business leaders wanted to believe that diminishing
returns had set in for the work of FEC [Free Europe Committee] and RFE, now
that Moscows propaganda had become less strident, two-way travel across the Iron
Curtain had increased, and living conditions for Soviet citizens had improved, all
in the Spirit of Geneva. Visualizing the huge profits from trade with the Warsaw
Pact countries, these corporate leaders also engaged in wishful thinking. Unlike
Jackson, Lodge, and other psychological warriors, U.S. businessmen and diplomats
like Bohlen, were more apt to think Soviet leaders fear stemmed from heightened
vigilance and a sense that they could take corrective action. Hence, the Soviet
leaders fear would be an impetus to action, perhaps aggressive action. Business
executives and diplomatic officials tended to be perceptually defensive; they advised
caution because they felt that the Soviet leaders were perceptually vigilant and
thought danger could be averted by taking corrective action.
Fears affected Titos perceptions as well, rendering him perceptually vigilant
during the Hungarian revolution. He worried that the nationalist ferment would
spill over onto Yugoslav territory, and in early November worked with Khrushchev
behind the scenes to prevent this. He found himself in a quandary since, while
reconciliation with Hungary (and the USSR) would benefit Yugoslavia financially,
such a rapprochement might also lead to renewed domination of Yugoslavia by the
Soviet bloc. He valued Yugoslavias status as a neutral, nonaligned country that had
defied Stalin. One form of corrective action Tito took to demonstrate Yugoslavias
independence was to grant asylum to Nagy and his supporters and refuse to release
them to the Soviet authorities without a written guarantee of their safety.
Facing the massive influx of Hungarian refugees across their border,
Austrian government officials remained perceptually vigilant as they took corrective
action, such as seeking financial aid from the United States. They capitalized on
many US officials eagerness to help the many Hungarians who were embittered by
their tragic gamble, having believed some of the ill-considered RFE broadcasts,
Washingtons hollow promises of "liberation," and perceived promises to send
timely military aid. Austrian officials also understood the importance of
appearances in the Manichean Cold War era, stressing the United States duty not
to permit the cause of freedom to die by compelling Austrian guards to turn away
extra Hungarian refugees. Finally, they underscored security risks: that Soviet
forces might follow the refugees into Austria in hot pursuit, citing as supporting
evidence reports that the Soviet Embassy in Vienna had burned large amounts of
paper on November 2, 1956.
The perceptions of Soviet diplomats stationed in Budapest, Warsaw, and
other communist capitals, were also biased by their own anxieties. They tended to
write alarmist, conservative reports about the unrest to the Soviet Foreign Ministry,
perhaps in order to prove their loyalty to Moscow. The fact that "anti-Soviet
movements" were growing in Poland and Hungary in all likelihood increased the
danger that they, the diplomats, would be perceived, at the least, as not having been
"strict" or "vigilant" enough, or at the most, as having gone native and
encouraged this anti-Soviet feeling. Being especially "vigilant," on the other hand,
could improve one's chances for promotion in the Soviet hierarchy. It is noteworthy,
for example, that Ambassador Yuri Andropov, who took a very strict approach to
the 1956 revolution, was promoted in 1957 to the post of director of the CPSU
Central Committee department for ties with communist parties in the bloc countries
after the November 4, 1956 invasion, and ultimately to the post of General Secretary
in 1984.
836
Jnos Kdr's pro-Soviet government also presented him with a special
award.
837
Clearly, Andropov's "vigilance" was richly rewarded.
Finally, defectors and migrs from communist bloc countries often
manifested wishful thinking. Having endured the censure and harassment of
communist citizens who regarded leaving the Motherland as the ultimate sin --
uprooted themselves, leaving relatives and loved ones behind, and -- as they
accustomed themselves to life in their new country -- often became even more anti-
communist than right-wing policymakers in Washington. They tended to favor
strong military responses by the United States in many of the Cold War crises. Some
of the migr broadcasters on the Hungarian Desk in Budapest during the crisis
wanted to believe that Washington would respond militarily. That fervent desire
may itself have subconsciously colored their broadcasts.

Cognitive Dissonance
The reader will recall that the fourth common misperception is derived from
Festingers cognitive dissonance theory. Jervis states that the typical decision maker
seeks strong justification for his chosen course of action. Seeking to avoid any

836
RGANI, f 89, per 45, dok 75, l 3, "Notes of Yuri Andropov to the CC CPSU of
August 29, 1957." This document is signed "Andropov, Head of the Department
of the CC CPSU for ties with the Communist and Workers' Parties of the
Socialist Countries."
837
AVP RF, f 077, o 38, por 3, p 192, l. 11, From the Diary of P. S. Dedushkin,
"Notes of a Conversation with the Hungarian Ambassador in Moscow
Boldoczki," December 4,, 1957. "[T]he Presidium of Hungary issued a decree on
Sept. 28 awarding Andropov the 'Order of the Banner of Hungary' as a token of
gratitude for his fruitful activity in deepening Hungarian-Soviet friendship."
internal conflict, he will repress data about the advantages of rejected courses of
action and costs of the chosen one.
In order to make the difficult decision to defect or emigrate, citizens from
communist bloc countries needed strong internal justification for their
abandonment of their native countries and close relatives. They developed a deep
hatred of communism and penchant for puritanical, absolutist solutions as a way to
minimize their internal psychological conflicts. Many New York-based migrs who
worked for RFE found themselves in a moral bind, for example, when RFE
broadcast wiatos exposs of his and others nefarious deeds. They wanted nothing
to do with communist officials like wiato who had blood on their hands, but
they needed employment. For many of them RFE which coveted their native
fluency in languages few Americans could speak - was the only source of
employment.
At the October 31 Presidium session, Khrushchev sought to justify the
decision to invade by claiming [T]here is not now any governmentWe should
create a Provisional Revolutionary Government (headed by Kdr). The reader
will also recall that Presidium members such as Molotov emphasized the need to
look after the Hungarian Communists" and Soviet diplomatic cables sent to Moscow
featured lengthy conversations with the beleaguered communists.
838
Ex post facto
explanations of the military crackdown multiplied, given the strong psychological
need to justify the deaths of so many innocent young people. Post-invasion
communist propaganda reproached alleged U.S.-hired migrs engaged in covert

838
Malin, "Protokol'naya Zapis', 28 oktyabrya 1956 g."
operations, Horthyite elements, the Yugoslav press and diplomatic corps and
others for fomenting the counter-revolution.

External and Internal Influences on Soviet Foreign Policy Decision Making

Sovietologists writing in the 1960s and 1970s often raised more questions
than they answered. What is the relative influence of external and internal factors
on Soviet foreign policymaking? How important is ideology in Soviet decision
making? The above analysis of misperceptions by the Soviet leaders, Hungarians,
Poles, Yugoslavs, Americans, and migrs can help to answer these questions.
Before the Soviet collapse, foreign policy analysts generally oscillated
between two major orientations in explaining foreign policy behavior. Theorists of
international relations favored a macro-analytic approach,
anthropomorphizing the state. As a unitary rational decision-making unit, a
states foreign policy was assumed to be a response to external conditions in the
international system (the essential anarchy or absence of a world sovereign, changes
in the number of major powers, and shifts in the power configurations among the
states).
839
They ignored the internal characteristics and dynamics of a particular
state, namely its political structure, viewpoints and backgrounds of key
policymakers, and the desires of the population. Some analysts of Soviet foreign
policy reasoned that certain internal factors could be ignored, since the Soviet Union
was presumably insulated from the constraints of an open, pluralist society whose

839
On these two orientations, see William Zimmermans illuminating essay Elite
Perspectives and the Explanation of Soviet Foreign Policy in Erik P. Hoffman and
Frederic J. Fleron, The Conduct of Soviet Foreign Policy (London: Butterworths,
1971), pp. 18-30.
decision-makers are obliged to take the opinions of domestic critics into account.
Unfortunately, the availability of data, or lack thereof, can drive a scholars
methodology and conclusions, if only subconsciously. Would such scholars have
explained Soviet foreign policy as resulting from external factors alone had they
possessed notes of Presidium sessions and foreign policy cables?
On the other hand, other analysts usually specialists in area studies or
comparative politics tended to adopt a micro-analytic approach. They argued
that the Soviet Union, for example, was so unique as a communist state that its
behavior could be judged on the basis of internal factors. As a closed society, the
USSR was assumed to be impermeable to extra-national influences
840
Such
scholars sought to explain foreign policy on the basis of internal political processes,
according more weight to factors such as the given states political structure moods
and desires of the population; and perceptions, personalities, and career
backgrounds of individual policymakers. Still lacking data on the latter (perceptions
of policymakers), these micro-analysts often relied on non-human factors such as a
states national character (as shaped by unique historical experiences, for example),
ideology, natural resource endowment, or geopolitical position. The two-camp cold
war atmosphere further perpetuated the view that Soviet foreign policy differed
fundamentally from other states foreign policies and kept the field of Soviet studies
divorced from the disciplines of comparative politics and international relations
theory, both conceptually and methodologically.

840
Ibid., p. 20.
While the macro-analytic and micro-analytic approaches each yield valuable
insights, each is overly narrow. An enlightened post-Cold War scholar must employ
both approaches to paint the full panorama of Soviet foreign policy during the Cold
War, particularly its decisions in the 1956 Hungarian crisis. Possessing only
external data, a scrupulous scholar still needs access to internal data to prove
that presumed external factors did indeed affect the key decision makers. Given the
prevalence of accidents, bureaucratic snafus, policymakers hectic work schedules,
and human fallibility writ large, one cannot infer the impact of external factors by
logic alone. Nor can it be assumed that all external factors affect the key decision
makers in the same way. As we have seen in the 1956 crisis, the Hungarian situation
did not influence Mikoyan the same way as it did his colleagues in the Kremlin,
prompting him to advocate political rather than military solutions.
Likewise one can skew the picture by concentrating excessively or exclusively
on internal factors that influenced Soviet decision makers. Changes in the
international environment can profoundly alter elite attitudes and affect the goals
and purposes for which decision makers regardless of their personal
idiosyncrasies and career backgrounds -- exercise power. Thus, too highly
differentiated cognitive maps of individual decision makers can obscure these
simpler group attitudes and common goals.
The study of perceptual patterns universal to human beings helps to bridge
the gap between the macro and micro analytic orientations in the study of
foreign policy, avoiding exclusive focus on either external or internal factors,
but instead showing how the two types constantly commingle. As we have seen in
the previous chapters, these patterns pertain to all national groups -- Russians,
Americans, Hungarians, Poles, Yugoslavs, and migrs from other Central
European countries, as exemplified in the 1956 Hungarian crisis. All human beings
are apt sometimes to assume another actor (person or state) is more organized than
it really is; to overestimate their importance as influence or target; to allow fears
and desires to bias their perceptions; and to shun cognitive dissonance whenever
possible.
Abetted constantly by these misperceptions, external and internal factors
interact inextricably on an eternal basis. For example, the essential anarchy of the
international environment (external factor) commonly causes a state to see its
neighbor as more organized, centralized, and aggressive than it really is
(misperception), which in turn often activates such internal factors or phenomena as
the growth of exclusionary ideologies and warmongering moods among
policymakers and population alike. Those internal factors in turn intensify the need
to avoid cognitive dissonance, seeking strong justification for going to war, given the
inevitable loss of innocent lives, in the name of national security and racial
superiority.
The communist ideology functioned as more than simply a tool of ex post
facto justification. It also molded the Kremlins understanding of events in the
international realm and consequent choice of allies. Recent works by Cold War
scholars such as John Lewis Gaddis, William Wohlforth, Vojtech Mastny, and
Vladislav Zubok and Constantin Pleshakov show convincingly how Soviet foreign
policy was guided by ideological preconceptions about intra-capitalist rivalries, the
innate hostility of the capitalist societies in the West and their inevitable economic
collapse, and by the conviction that time was on the side of the communist bloc.
Most importantly, ideology molded the Soviet decision makers perceptions of
threats and opportunities.
841

Thus, with respect to the Hungarian crisis, we can see that ideology - the
communist version of the domino theory never to allow a communist regime to
fall (internal factor) - gave rise to the Soviet leaders initial belief that the
Hungarian political leaders or armed forces could maintain order by themselves
(misperception: wishful thinking). However, diplomatic reportage from Budapest
warning of dangers (misperception: fear), in combination with growing
apprehension of a Hungarian withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact (misperception:
fear) were reinforced by external factors, such as expressed fears by Gomuka, Tito,
Ulbricht, and other communist leaders of ideological spillover, and Gomukas
assuagement of Soviet fears regarding Polish unrest, compelled the Kremlin leaders
to take stronger measures on the Hungarian question. Preliminary military
preparations heightened Hungarian fears of an invasion, inducing Nagy to declare
neutrality. An internal factor - hawks and (outvoted) doves in Kremlin and the
prospect of innocent lives lost intensified the need to justify the decision to invade

841
For an insightful essay on these points, see Melvin Leffler, Bringing it Together
the Parts and the Whole in Odd Arne Westad, ed. Reviewing the Cold War:
Approaches, Interpretations, and Theory (London: Frank Cass, 2000), pp. 43-63. Also
see John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1997); William C. Wohlforth, The Elusive Balance: Power
and Perceptions During the Cold War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993);
Vojtech Mastny, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1996); Vladislav Zubok and Constantin Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlins Cold
War: From Stalin to Khrushchev (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996).
(misperception: cognitive dissonance). Soviet foreign ministry officials were
instructed to prepare dossiers incriminating Titos Yugoslavia, U.S. (imperialist)
spies, and Horthyite elements for fomenting the counter-revolution. An external
factor changes in alliance composition brought on the invasion and subsequent
repression in full force.
These factors and misperceptions, and many others, occurred not necessarily
in a strictly linear fashion, but indeed often in a cyclical progression. Viewed in this
way, then, the question of which factors were more influential on Soviet foreign
policy external or internal appears pointless. The Cold War, and the Hungarian
crisis within it, resulted from complex interactions between a turbulent
international system and its constituent units; between regimes operating within
that system; between populations and their leaders; between factions, parties, and
interest groups.
842
The new archival evidence suggests that both external and
internal influences combined and reinforced each other, fuelled by common human
misperceptions. Access to communist bloc archives has thus heightened the
importance of multi-factor explanations of Soviet interventionism. However, the
difficulties of using this material to trace patterns in decision making should be
noted. Diplomatic reports from the USSR, Hungary, and Poland tended to be
strictly factual and lack in-depth comparative analyses, for example, on the
differences between the Polish and Hungarian situations. Soviet diplomats in
particular were especially cautious not to speculate, but simply to report the facts.

842
Leffler, Bringing it Together the Parts and the Whole, p. 58.
Nevertheless, the new documents on the Hungarian crisis debunk the old
view held by many scholars before the Soviet collapse that the Hungarians'
unrealistic ambitions made a Soviet intervention inevitable. No event is ever
predestined; individuals can make rational choices to change the course of history at
any given moment. The documents, particularly the Malin notes, indicate that homo
soveticus wavered just like his Western counterpart. At the crucial October 28
Presidium session, for example, the Khrushchev leadership did consider non-violent
options. They may have been encouraged to do so by Dulless speech the previous
day, assuring Moscow that the United States did not regard the East European
nations as potential military allies." On the other hand, had the United States
issued a convincing military perhaps even nuclear - threat at that critical moment
of hesitation in the Soviet Presidium, the Soviet decision makers might have been
deterred from intervening. While Dulles had intended for his speech to persuade
Moscow to accept Hungarian neutrality, it might have had the opposite effect of
giving the Soviet leaders the green light to invade Hungary.
Moreover, many prominent Cold War historians and political scientists, such
as John Lewis Gaddis, Vojtech Mastny, Vladislav Zubok, and Constantin Pleshakov
continue to lay much of the blame for the onset of the Cold War on Stalins
paranoia and need for control. Others like Melvin Leffler stress the need to prove
that Stalins security needs differed distinctly from those of other Soviet officials
after World War II, and that most U.S. policymakers and diplomats in the 1945-
1948 period perceived evil qualities in Stalin.
843
While there is limited space here to

843
Ibid., p. 49.
probe the hoary debate on the causes of the cold war, suffice it to say that by the
Khrushchev era, the conflict was most likely sustained by self-perpetuating
misperceptions and suspicions. In short, multi-archival research tends to confirm
the post-revisionists theory about the cold war it was everyones fault and no ones
fault. It resulted from the emerging bi-polar structure of the international system,
power vacuum in the center of Europe, and spiraling misconceptions.