SECOND DIVISION

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

- versus -

CELESTINA NAGUIAT, Respondent.

that neither the applicant nor her predecessors-in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious G.R. No. 134209 possession and occupation of the lands in question since 12 June 1945 or prior thereto; Present: that the muniments of title and tax payment receipts of applicant do not constitute PUNO, J., Chairperson, competent and sufficient evidence of a bonaSANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, fide acquisition of the lands applied for or of CORONA, his open, continuous, exclusive and AZCUNA, notorious and possession and occupation GARCIA,thereof JJ. in the concept of (an) owner; that the applicants claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish title or grant Promulgated: can no longer be availed of . . .; and that the parcels of land applied for are part of the public domain belonging to the Republic of January 24, the 2006 Philippines not subject to private appropriation. On 15 October 1990, the lower court issued an order of general default as against the whole world, with the exception of the Office of the Solicitor General, and proceeded with the hearing of this registration case.

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION GARCIA, J.:

Before the Court is this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the [1] Decision dated May 29, 1998 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 37001 which affirmed an earlier [2] decision of the Regional Trial Court at Iba, Zambales, Branch 69 inLand Registration Case No. N-25-1. The decision under review recites the factual backdrop, as follows: This is an application for registration of title to four (4) parcels of land located in Panan, Botolan, Zambales, more particularly described in the amended application filed by Celestina Naguiat on 29 December 1989 with the Regional Trial Court of Zambales, Branch 69. Applicant [herein respondent] alleges, inter alia, that she is the owner of the said parcels of land having acquired them by purchase from the LID Corporation which likewise acquired the same from Demetria Calderon, Josefina Moraga and Fausto Monje and their predecessors-in-interest who have been in possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years; and that to the best of her knowledge, said lots suffer no mortgage or encumbrance of whatever kind nor is there any person having any interest, legal or equitable, or in possession thereof. On 29 June 1990, the Republic of the Philippines [herein petitioner]. . . filed an opposition to the application on the ground

After she had presented and formally offered her evidence . . . applicant rested her case. The Solicitor General, thru the Provincial Prosecutor, interposed no objection to the admission of the exhibits. Later . . . the Provincial Prosecutor manifest (sic) that the Government had no evidence [3] to adduce.
[4]

In a decision dated September 30, 1991, the trial court rendered judgment for herein respondent Celestina Naguiat, adjudicating unto her the parcels of land in question and decreeing the registration thereof in her name, thus: WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby adjudicates the parcels of land situated in Panan, Botolan, Zambales, appearing on Plan AP03-003447 containing an area of 3,131 square meters, appearing on Plan AP-03003446 containing an area of 15,322 containing an area of 15,387 square meters to herein applicant Celestina T. Naguiat, of legal age, Filipino citizen, married to Rommel Naguiat and a resident of Angeles City, Pampanga together with all the improvements existing thereon and orders and decrees registration in her name in accordance with Act No. 496, Commonwealth Act No. 14, [should be 141] as amended, and Presidential Decree No. 1529. This adjudication, however, is subject to the various easements/reservations provided for under pertinent laws, presidential decrees and/or presidential letters of instructions which should be annotated/ projected on the title to be issued. And once this decision becomes final, let the corresponding decree of registration be immediately issued. (Words in bracket added)

With its motion for reconsideration having been denied by the trial court, petitioner Republic went on appeal to the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 37001. As stated at the outset hereof, the CA, in the herein assailed decision of May 29, 1998, affirmed that of the trial court, to wit: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED. Hence, the Republics present recourse on its basic submission that the CAs decision is not in accordance with law, jurisprudence and the evidence, since respondent has not established with the required evidence her title in fee simple or imperfect title in respect of the subject lots which would warrant their registration under (P.D. 1529 or Public Land Act (C.A.) 141. In particular, petitioner Republic faults the appellate court on its finding respecting the length of respondents occupation of the property subject of her application for registration and for not considering the fact that she has not established that the lands in question have been declassified from forest or timber zone to alienable and disposable property. Public forest lands or forest reserves, unless declassified and released by positive act of the Government so that they may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public [5] domain, are not capable of private appropriation. As to these assets, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not [6] apply. Given this postulate, the principal issue to be addressed turns on the question of whether or not the areas in question have ceased to have the status of forest or other inalienable lands of the public domain. Forests, in the context of both the Public Land [7] [8] Act and the Constitution classifying lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands and national parks, do not necessarily refer to a large tract of wooded land or an expanse covered by dense growth of trees [9] and underbrush. As we stated in Heirs of Amunategui A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. Forest lands do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. xxx. The classification is merely descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. xxx Under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, which embodies the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State the source of any asserted right to [11] ownership of land. All lands not appearing to be clearly of [12] private dominion presumptively belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State remain part of the inalienable
[10]

public domain. Under Section 6 of the Public Land Act, the prerogative of classifying or reclassifying lands of the public domain, i.e., from forest or mineral to agricultural and vice versa, belongs to the Executive Branch of the government and [14] not the court. Needless to stress, the onus to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the presumption that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable or [15] disposable rests with the applicant. In the present case, the CA assumed that the lands in question are already alienable and disposable. Wrote the appellate court: The theory of [petitioner] that the properties in question are lands of the public domain cannot be sustained as it is directly against the above doctrine. Said doctrine is a reaffirmation of the principle established in the earlier cases . . . that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period, ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property . (Word in bracket and underscoring added.) The principal reason for the appellate courts disposition, finding a registerable title for respondent, is her and her predecessor-in-interests open, continuous and exclusive occupation of the subject property for more than 30 years. Prescinding from its above assumption and finding, the appellate court went on to conclude, citing Director of Lands [16] vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) and Herico vs. [17] DAR, among other cases, that, upon the completion of the requisite period of possession, the lands in question cease to be public land and become private property. Director of Lands, Herico and the other cases cited by the CA are not, however, winning cards for the respondent, for the simple reason that, in said cases, the disposable and alienable nature of the land sought to be registered was established, or, at least, not put in issue. And there lies the difference. Here, respondent never presented the required certification from the proper government agency or official proclamation reclassifying the land applied for as alienable and disposable. Matters of land classification or reclassification [18] cannot be assumed. It calls for proof. Aside from tax receipts, respondent submitted in evidence the survey map and technical descriptions of the lands, which, needless to state, provided no information respecting the classification of the property. As the Court has held, however, these documents are not sufficient to overcome the presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public [19] domain. It cannot be overemphasized that unwarranted appropriation of public lands has been a notorious practice [20] resorted to in land registration cases. For this reason, the Court has made it a point to stress, when appropriate, that declassification of forest and mineral lands, as the case may be, and their conversion into alienable and disposable lands [21] need an express and positive act from the government. The foregoing considered, the issue of whether or not respondent and her predecessor-in-interest have been in open,

[13]

exclusive and continuous possession of the parcels of land in question is now of little moment. For, unclassified land, as here, cannot be acquired by adverse occupation or possession; occupation thereof in the concept of owner, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership and be [22] registered as title. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the assailed decision dated May 29, 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 37001 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, respondents application for original registration of title in Land Registration Case No. N-25-1 of the Regional Trial Court at Iba, Zambales, Branch 69, is DENIED. No costs. SO ORDERED.

lower court erred in decreeing the registration of the property in the name of the appellee. Appellee presented no valid and sufficient title deed showing his ownership of the land in question. He, however, tried to prove that he inherited the same from his ancestors, who had been in possession of the land for many years dating back to the Spanish regime; that he as well as his predecessors in interest had party cultivated the land and partly used it as a pasture; that various improvements had been made on the land ever since the Spanish regime; and that upon the death of their father, Pablo Padilla, he and his sister Alejandra took possession of the land. On the other hand, the appellants introduced evidence tending to show that the land in question was never occupied by Pablo Padilla during the Spanish regime; that when the several homesteaders settled upon the land during the 1912 to 1918, the same was unoccupied, unclaimed, and without any sign of previous cultivation or occupation; that the homesteaders were not molested in their possession of portions of the land in question until 1927, after they had cleared their holdings and put the same in cultivation. In Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa vs. Municipality of Taal (38 Phil., 367, 376), this court said: " . . . In order, however, that the petitioner for registration of his land under the Torrens system shall be permitted to have the same registered and to have the benefit resulting from the certificate of title finally issued, the burden is upon him to show that he is the real and absolute owner, in fee simple, of the lands which he is attempting to have registered. The petitioner is not entitled to have his lands registered under the torrens system simply because no one appears to oppose his title and to oppose the registration of his lands. In order that land may be registered under the torrens system, the petitioner must show, even though there is no opposition, that he is the absolute owner, in fee simple, of the same. . . ."
1aw phil.net

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC G.R. No. L-37435 November 28, 1934

NUMERIANO PADILLA, applicant-appellee, vs. PABLO REYES and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, oppositors-appellants. Attorney-General Jaranilla and Jose Nava for appellants. Sison and Siguion for appellee.

ABAD SANTOS, J.: Appellee applied for the registration in his name of a parcel of land containing a little over 161 hectares located in Bongabong, Nueva Ecija. The application was opposed by the Director of Lands and by nine homesteaders, on the ground that the property sought to be registered was public land. One Pablo Reyes, who claimed to be the exclusive owner of the land, also filed an opposition. After due hearing, the court below dismissed all the oppositions and decreed the registration of the land in the name of the appellee. From this judgment all the parties who opposed the application appealed, although Pablo Reyes' appeal was dismissed for failure to file his brief on time. In support of this appeal the following errors have been assigned: (1) That the lower court erred in holding that the appellee has established his title to the property sought to be registered, and (2) that the

On the other hand, it is well-settled that no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government. A grant is conclusively presumed by law when the claimant, by himself or through his predecessors in interest, has occupied the land openly, continuously, exclusively, and under a claim of title since July 26, 1894, or prior thereto. (Ongsiaco vs. Magsilang, 50 Phil., 380.) In the case before us, appellee has failed to prove any express grant from the government; neither has he succeeded in proving possession from which a constructive grant can be predicated.

It results that the judgment appealed from must be reversed, and it is hereby decreed and adjudged that the property sought to be registered in this case is public land. Without any special pronouncement as to costs in this instance. So ordered. Street, Butte, Goddard and Diaz, JJ., concur.

question merely prescribes, in general terms, the manner or procedure to be followed by an applicant in the obtainment of the certificate of title applied for, or in the denial or issuance thereof, as the case may be, by the court or by the Government agencies therein mentioned. After the trial, the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur rendered judgment therein denying the application of the applicant partnership on the ground that it is an alien, and holding, at the same time, that the parcels of land it sought to register in its name are a portion of the public domain. The said applicant took exception to and appealed from such judgment, claiming that the trial court committed the following alleged errors, to wit: I. The trial court erred in holding that the applicant, Li Seng Giap & Co. being a partnership made up of individuals who are neither citizens of the Philippine Islands nor of the United States, is not entitled, for this reason, to register the land described in its application under the provisions of the Land Registration Act. II. The lower court also erred in declaring the land described in the application a part of the public domain. III. The lower court also erred in denying the applicants motion for reconsideration as well as its motion for new trial. It is unnecessary to discuss the nature of the three parcels of land in question. The record shows that they are agricultural lands which at present contain coconut trees, abaca and cacao with which they have been planted for over forty years. The coconut trees there on range from one to forty years in age. The said three parcels had likewise been cultivated and had actually been occupied for many years during the Spanish regime by several natives of the Province of Camarines Sur, named Inocencio Salon, Lazaro Ceron, Margarita Labordes, Doroteo Quitales and Cornelio Vargas. The occupation or possession thereof by the above-named persons was under claim of ownership but neither the exact date when such possession began nor the circumstances under which they acquired the property in question has been determined. However, it seems

Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC DECISION March 15, 1934 G.R. No. L-40177 LI SENG GIAP & CO., applicant-appellant, vs. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, oppositor-appellee. Manly and Reyes for appellant. Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee. Diaz, J.: On August 16, 1932, Li Seng Giap & Co., a partnership composed of individuals who are not citizens of the Philippine Islands nor of the United States, but aliens, instituted these proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, for the registration in its name in the registry of deeds, of the three parcels of land described in the plans Exhibits A and B, and technical descriptions attached to its application, in accordance with the provisions of Act No. 496 and of Chapter VIII or Title II of Act No. 2874. The Director of Lands filed an opposition to the said application alleging as his grounds that the three parcels of land in question were public lands belonging to the Government of the United States under the administration and control of the Government of the Philippine Islands, and that, being an alien, the applicant partnership cannot invoke the benefits of the provisions of section 45 of the said Act No. 2874. The aforecited section is contained in Chapter VIII of Title II of the said Act invoked by the applicant. The Director of Lands has made no reference to Act No. 496 in his opposition for the reason that the Act in

certain that such occupation began some fifty-five years ago and continued without interruption from that time until said persons decide to sell them to Sebastian Palanca who is also an alien like the herein applicant. Neither is there anything of record to show when the sale was made but it also seems certain that it took place during the Spanish regime. Sebastian Palanca continued in possession of the aforesaid three parcels of land from the time he acquired them in the manner hereinbefore stated until July 22, 1930, when he sold them to the herein applicant-appellant. However, before selling them and while he was in possession thereof under claim of ownership, as alleged, he failed to obtain a gratuitous title or even a mere possessory information therefor, which would serve to protect his claim of ownership, by taking advantage of the benefits afforded by the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, which was promulgated in the Philippines and published in the Gaceta de Manila, No. 106, of April 17th of the same year. The pertinent parts of said decree, which are also articles 1, 19 and 21 of the Maura Law, and which had been in force in the Philippines during the last years of the Spanish regime and continued to be so until the enactment of the Public Land Act and the amendments thereto, read as follows: ARTICLE 1. All uncultivated lands, soil, earth, and mountains not included in the following exceptions shall be considered alienable public lands: First, those which have become subjected to private ownership and have a legitimate owner. Second, those which belong to the forest zones which the State deems wise to reserve for reasons of public utility. xxxxxxxxx ART. 19. Possessors of alienable public lands under cultivation who have not obtained nor applied for composition on the date this decree shall be published in the Gaceta de Manila, may obtain a gratuitous title of property, by means of a possessory information in conformity with the law of civil procedure and the mortgage law whenever they establish any of the following conditions:

First. Having, or having had, them under cultivation without interruption during the preceding six years. Second. Having had possession of them for twelve consecutive years, and having had them under cultivation until the date of the information, and for three years before that date. Third. Having had them in possession ostensibly and without interruption, for thirty or more years, although the land is not under cultivation. xxxxxxxxx ART. 21. A term of one year, without grace, is granted order to perfect the informations referred to in articles 19 and 20. Article 80 of the regulations for the carrying out of the Royal Decree above-mentioned provided as follows: ART. 80. By virtue of the provision of article 21 of the Royal Decree of February 13, 1894, the inextensible period for carrying out the informations referred to in the two preceding articles, shall be counted as on the 17th day of April, 1895. Upon the expiration of this period the right of cultivator and possessors to the obtainment of free title shall lapse, and the full property right in the land shall revert to the State or, in a proper case, to the public domain. Therefore, there can be no doubt but that under the last aforecited article the three parcels of land in question reverted to the State as property of the public domain upon the expiration of the period specified therein, by reason of negligence on the part of the possessors thereof. The applicant-appellant contends that under the provisions of section 54, paragraph 6, of Act No. 926, it has necessarily acquired the right to have the corresponding certificate of title issued to it upon registration of the said parcels of land in its name in the registry of deeds, inasmuch as it had actually been in the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession thereof, under claim of ownership, not only by itself but also through Sebastian Palanca from

whom it had purchased them, for more than ten years prior to July 26, 1904, the date on which the aforesaid Act went into effect, in accordance with the proclamation of the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands of the same date. The section invoked by the applicant-appellant reads as follows: SEC. 54. The following-described persons or their legal successors in right, occupying public lands in the Philippine Islands, or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles to such lands have not been perfected, may apply to the Court of Land Registration of the Philippine Islands for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor to wit: 1. All persons who prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States had fulfilled all the conditions required by the Spanish laws and royal decrees of the Kingdom of Spain for the purchase of public lands, including the payment of the purchase price, but who failed to secure formal conveyance of title; 2. All persons who prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States, having applied for the purchase of public lands and having secured a survey, auction, and an award, or a right to an award, of such lands, did not receive title therefor through no default upon their part; 3. All persons who prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States, having applied for the purchase of public lands and having secured a survey and award of same, did not, through negligence upon their part, comply with the conditions of full or any payment therefor, but who after such survey and award shall have occupied the land adversely, except as prevented by war or force majeure until the taking effect of this Act; 4. All persons who were entitled to apply and did apply for adjustment or composition of title to lands against the Government under the Spanish laws and royal decrees in force prior to the royal decree of February thirteenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, but who

failed to receive title therefor through no default upon their part; 5. All persons who were entitled to a gratuitous title to public lands by possessory proceedings under the provisions of articles nineteen and twenty of the royal decree of the King of Spain issued February thirteenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, and who, having complied with all the conditions therein required, failed to receive the title therefor through no default upon their part; and 6. All persons who by themselves or their predecessors in interest have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural public lands, as defined by said Act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two, under a bona fide claim of ownership except as against the Government, for a period of ten years next preceding the taking effect of this Act, except when prevented by war or force majeure, shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a government grant and to have received the same, and shall be entitled to a certificate of title to such land under the provisions of this chapter. All applicants for lands under paragraphs one, two, three, four and five of this section must establish by proper official records or documents that such proceedings as are therein required were taken and the necessary conditions complied with: Provided, however, That such requirements shall not apply to the fact of adverse possession. It may be noted that the case of the applicant does not come under paragraph 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 of the aforecited section, which, by the way, conclusively shows that prior to the enactment of Act No. 926, the said Maura Law was the last law which regulated the acquisition of alienable public lands and the issuance of the corresponding title to those who could establish their claim that they were entitled thereto. Being aware of this fact, the applicant has never invoked said paragraphs. He merely confines himself to invoking the provisions of paragraph 6 thereof, in support of which he cites the rulings of this court in the cases of Tan Yungquip vs. Director of Lands (42 Phil. 128) and of Central Capiz vs. Ramirez (40 Phil. 883).

In the former case, it was held that inasmuch as the applicant Tan Yungquip, who was a Chinaman, had proven: That he had acquired the parcels of land which he sought to register in his name, some by purchase and others by inheritance; that he and his predecessors in interest had been in the open, peaceful, continuous and notorious possession of the same for at least thirty years, and that such parcels of land were agricultural lands, therefore, he was entitled to have them registered in his name under the provisions of the aforecited section 54 of Act No. 926, for the reason that he filed his application to that effect more than one year prior to the enactment and enforcement of Act No. 2874. It was likewise held therein that the matter should be decided in favor of said Tan Yungquip on the ground that no valid law could be found, at least on that occasion, which prohibited the registration in his name in the registry of deeds, of the parcels of land of which he claimed to be the owner. In the latter case above cited, that is, the case of Central Capiz vs. Ramirez, it was likewise held that lands held in private ownership constitute no part of the public domain and cannot, therefore, come within the purview of said Act No. 2874 on the ground that said subject (lands held in private ownership) is not embraced in any manner in the title of the Act, and that the intent of the Legislature in enacting the same was to limit the application thereof exclusively to lands of the public domain. Although nothing has been said in the decision rendered in the aforecited case of Tan Yungquip vs. Director of Lands to the effect that the application of the therein applicant should be granted on the ground that the provisions of section 54 of Act No. 926, which were therein under consideration and interpretation, do not distinguish between citizens of the Philippine Islands or of the United States and aliens, however, the appellant contends that the aforecited section has such scope and that the question raised in this case should be decided under the latter interpretation. We do not believe that the rulings it the aforecited two cases and that in the case of Agari vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (42 Phil. 143), are decisive and applicable to the case under consideration, on the

ground that although it is true that Agari, who was the applicant in the last case, was an alien, it was likewise true that the persons, from whom he had acquired the land which he sought to register in his name in the registry of deeds during the time Act No. 926 was still in force, were natives of the Philippine Islands, who, in turn, had acquired it through their father, who was likewise a native of the Islands, by composition with the State in accordance with the laws then in force; nor that, under the provisions of the aforecited section 54 of Act No. 926, the applicant-appellant Li Seng Giap & Co. could have succeeded in securing the certificate of title which it now seeks; in the first place, because the three aforecited decisions refer to cases which are different from the one now under consideration; in the second place, because said decisions were based on the supposition that the parcels of land in question therein were of private ownership and at that time no law was known to be in existence, which prohibited the registration of said parcels of land in the registry of deeds, in the name of the aforesaid applicants Tan Yungquip, Central Capiz and Agari, and in the third place because while Act No. 926 was still in force (it is no longer in force, having been expressly repealed by section 128 of Act No. 2874, on December 28, 1919), it should have been interpreted in the light of the provisions of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, commonly known as the Organic Law of the Philippine Islands, inasmuch as the former had been approved under the authority of sections 13, 14, 15 and 62 of the latter Act. The very title of Act No. 926 above referred to shows that one of the purposes for which it was approved was to carry out the provisions of sections, 13, 14, 15 and 62 of the aforecited Act of Congress, which title reads in part: An Act . . . providing for the determination by the Philippines Court of Land Registration of all proceedings for completion of imperfect titles and for the cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in said Islands, as authorized by sections thirteen, fourteen, fifteen, and sixty-two of the Act of Congress of July first, nineteen hundred and two, entitled An Act temporarily to provide for the administration of the affairs of civil government in the Philippine Islands, and for other purposes.

Sections 14 and 15 of the aforesaid Act of Congress, which bear relation to the question under consideration, provide as follows: SEC. 14. That the government of the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized and empowered to enact rules and regulations and to prescribe terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect their title to public lands in said Islands, who, prior to the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States, had fulfilled all or some of the conditions required by the Spanish laws and royal decrees of the Kingdom of Spain for the acquisition of legal title thereto, yet failed to secure conveyance of title; and the Philippine Commission is authorized to issue patents, without compensation, to any native of said Islands, conveying the title to any tract of land not more than sixteen hectares in extent, which were public lands and had been actually occupied by such native or his ancestors prior to and on the thirteenth of August, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight. s. SEC. 15. That the Government of the Philippine Islands in hereby authorized and empowered, on such terms as it may prescribe, by general legislation, to provide for the granting or sale and conveyance to actual occupants and settlers and other citizens of said Islands such parts and portions of the public domain, other than timber and mineral lands, of the United States in said Islands as it may deem wise, not exceeding sixteen hectares to any one person and for the sale and conveyance of not more than one thousand and twenty-four hectares to any corporation or association of persons: Provided, that the grant or sale of such lands, whether the purchase price be paid at once or in partial payments, shall be conditioned upon actual and continued occupancy, improvement, and cultivation of the premises sold for a period of not less than five years, during which time the purchaser or grantee cannot alienate or encumber said land or the title thereto; but such restriction shall not apply to transfers of rights and title of inheritance under the laws for the distribution of the estates of decedents. It may be noted that both of the above-cited sections provide that gratuitous title to property may be issued only to natives of the Philippine Islands who are in

possession of the necessary qualifications specified therein. It may therefore be inferred from the foregoing that Act No. 926 could not have a different scope from that given it by the aforecited Act of Congress and, therefore, the phrase all persons employed in paragraph 6 of section 54 of the former Act should be understood to mean only citizens of the Philippine Islands or citizens of the United States or of any insular possession thereof. The parcels of land involved in this case, which as hereinbefore stated, have reverted to the State after April 17, 1895, by virtue of the Maura Law, not of private ownership. Neither were they so on or after the aforesaid date. The applicant herein did not show any title thereto either by possessory proceedings or otherwise, which may be considered as having been issued by the Government. The only basis on which it now claims the right to have them registered in its name is its alleged possession thereof together with that of Sebastian Palanca and of the former possessors, as if to say, that it is entitled to the registration thereof in its name, inasmuch as the parcels of land in question already belong to it, having acquired them by prescription through the continuous, open, exclusive and notorious possession thereof, under claim of ownership, at least since the Spanish regime in the Philippine Islands. However, the truth is that the law expressly provides that no public land may be acquired by prescription, and that such mode of acquisition does not hold as against the Government. This provision is contained precisely in the very law invoked by the applicant, that is section 54, paragraph 6, of Act No. 926. In the case of Ongsiaco vs. Magsilang (50 Phil. 380, 386), this court said: . . . in a controversy between private individuals, where the Government has not intervened, and where it appears that the land has ceased to be of public domain and has come to be of private ownership, a petitioner may obtain registration of land upon a title acquired by adverse possession as against individual opponents. The same rule does not maintain with respect to land claimed by the Government and as to which the Government is opposing. In the case of

Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Abad (56 Phil. 75, 80), this court, deciding a question similar to the one raised herein by the appellant, said as follows: Subsection (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874 is not obnoxious to the constitutional provision relied upon by the appellant, as depriving the appellant of property without due process of law. That provision has reference to property to which the citizen has acquired a vested right. It does not extend to privileges and inchoate rights which have never been asserted or perfected. The contention of the appellant . . . is therefore without merit. There is no justifiable reason for disturbing the holdings of this court in the aforecited two cases. On the contrary, it is considered timely to reiterate them herein inasmuch as they decide the same question. The provisions of section 54 of Act No. 926 as well as those of section 45, paragraph (b), of Act No. 2874 should necessarily be so construed as not to permit aliens to obtain title to lands in their favor. It should not be understood, however, that the constitutional guaranty that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws, is violated thereby, because, as this court has said in the case of In re Patterson (1 Phil. 93, 95, 96), Unquestionably every State has a fundamental right to its existence and development, as also to the integrity of its territory and the exclusive and peaceable possession of its dominions which it may guard and defend by all possible means against any attack . . . . Superior to the law which protects personal liberty, and the agreements which exist between nations for their own interest and for the benefit of their respective subjects is the supreme and fundamental right of each State to self-preservation and the integrity of its dominion and its sovereignty. It is upon grounds of public policy that the rights of individuals, particularly of aliens, cannot prevail against the aforesaid right of the Government of the Philippine Islands. and more particularly when, as in the present case, far from violating any constitutional law, it deals precisely with the enforcement of the provisions of the first organic law of the country and those of the Jones Law (section 9), to the effect that lands of the public domain should not be disposed of or

alienated to persons who are not inhabitants or citizens of the Philippine Islands. Wherefore, finding that the judgment appealed from is in accordance with the law, it is hereby affirmed in toto, with the costs against the appellants. So ordered. Malcolm, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull, and Butte, JJ., concur. Imperial, J., concur in the result. Separate Opinions STREET and GODDARD, JJ., dissenting: It is settled by the decision of Central Capiz vs. Ramirez (40 Phil. 883), that Act No. 2874 is applicable only to land of the public domain; and the undersigned are of the opinion that the land which has been held in private character from a date anterior to July 26, 1894, as occurred in the case of the land which is the subject of this application, should not be considered public domain. The land covered by this application should therefore have been registered in the name of the applicants, exactly as was done in Tan Yungquip vs. Director of Lands (42 Phil. 128). Any other interpretation makes Act No. 2874, as applied to this land, subject to the objection that it deprives the applicants of the equal protection of the law.