1952년 CIA 한국전 일일보고서 안치용

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Clandestine Communist organization in South Korea revealed by reoent recent message%: messapo Recently available North Xorean messages, some of ecent y avai a

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KQRgA. Clandestine COmmunist or anization in South Korea revealed b KOREA. orth orean messages, some of whiah were were from f!rm the the 526th 526th Army Army unit unit to to the the "Eastern" "Eastern" and which and "INestern" 'Western" give an an insight insight into into the the organization organization of Communist aotivities aotivities units, give in ROK. .These These December messages in the the ROK. massages inquire inquire as to the establishment, status of of oommunioations oomunioations and and operations operations of of the "3rd and directions" status the "3rd and 4th 4th directions" (sub-units.). (sub-Units). (SUEDE AS Deo; 62760, 25 25 Dec; Deo; 64527, 64527, (SUEDE AS CM IB IN 64761, 29 Dec; 28 Deo; 64758, 29 Dec; 64062, 26 Deo 51) Deo; 64062,
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Comment: Another Another source indicates indicatet t that North Korean Korean 526th Commentr h a t tthe h e North unit,,organized into Army -,organized i n t o two two regimental-strength regimental-strength units designated the the "Eastern and Western" liason is charged with with sabotage, sabotage, subsubl i a s o n sections, sections, i s oharged evidenoe version, ROK. Available evidence version, and and guerrilla g u e r r i l l a activities a c t i v i t i e s in i n the the ROK. suggests that the Vestern" section suggests t hat t h e "Western" section is is concerned concerned with with propaganda propaganda and organizational activities, the section is a c t i v i t i e s , while t h e "Eastern" "Eastern" s ection i s charged with w i t h guerrilla guerrilla operations. operations. North Korean 17th to move t to the Kaesong Kaesong are&: area: 17th Mechanized Division t o mom o the
TWo North Eel-eau messages from from tthe 82nd Reaiment Regiment i in Kaesong area Two Korean messams h e 82nd n the Kaesonz area
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indicate movement of the 17th Mechanized Division-into Division into i n d i o a t e the t h e expected expeoted Govement of t h e 17th-Meohaniced that area. area. A 27 27 December message states s t a t e s that t h a t "the commander comander of of the .17th (Brigade) came came tto Kaesong and and he he is is iinvestigating the situation. ,17th (Brigade) o Kaeaong nvestigating t he s ituation. they mill the period of of t the prisoner I suppose that that t hey w i l l be here during t h e period h e prisoner exchange A December noted in to A later l a t e r message of 30 30 December i n regard t o . ." the t h e 17th 17th Division Division that t h a t ". . . it seems t that hat t the h e division w will i l l be moved (SUEDE AS AS CM CM I IN N 64752, 64752, 29 Dec and moved from from Pyongyang Pyongyang to t o Kaesong." Kaeeong." 65441, 66441, 31 3 1 Dec Dee 51) 51)
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Commentt The t e x t s of of these messages h a t tthe h e movement Comment: texts messages suggest suggest t that movement of o f this t h North m h Korean unit u n i t is in i n some way connected connected with the expeoted expected this transfer of prisoners of war to t o take place in in t h i s area. area.
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SECURITY INFORMATION
3 January isarC2--CIA No. $94.82 Copy Nock if
DAILY DIGEST
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
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USSR. New Soviet sea map caps 10-year labor; A recent Soviet broadcast was devoted to what was described as the first detailed "Sea Atlas" in the world. This Atlas was produced after ten years' labor on the initiative of Shakalsky, the outstanding Soviet cartographer and oceanographer, and the first volume of the series was published in 1950.
Reference was Made in the broadcast to a recently discovered map of the Russian empire of the seventeenth.century.in which Alaska, the Aledtians, and other lands are marked as discovered by Russian navigators. Thanks to this map, it is%now possible "to establish accurately the real names of the geographical points which were later renamed by the American colonizers." (R FBIS, 28 Dec 51)
Comment: This is a good example of post-war Russian chauvinism which has been frequently manifested in numerous claims of scientific discoveries. In this case, British Admiralty maps wers.also found in need of correction; "Distortions" introduced by Japanese geographers particularly regarding Korea were obliterated, and considttable help was Said to have been derived from the "new maps published by the Government of the Korean People's Democratic.Republic."
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ALBANIA. Soviet planes reported in Albania; An Albanian exile news report published in Rome states that Russian technicians have as:lembled 40 planes at airfields near the-capital Tirana. The planes reportedly were shipped dismantled from the USSR. :(R FBIS Ticker, 27 Dec 51) Comment; The French Minister in.Tirana informedthe US Embassy inBelgrade in March 1951 that two YAK-9 aircraft had been seen flying over Tirana. Subsequently, in August 1951, reported that there 25X1C were 21 or 22 Soviet YAK-9 and Stormovik aircraft ln Tirara. Periodic reports have been received that the USSR was shipping crated planes to Albania.
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YUGOSLAVIA. Yugoslavia's 1952 budget announced; Federal budget totaling 282 billion dinars ($940

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The creators of the Atlas were said to have put considerable effort into restoring the priority of Russian geographers and navigators in geographical discoveries. In addition, clarification was sought for the niMee of archirmlagoslislands; peninsulas, bays, and straits first discovered and named by Russian explorers.
In announcing the 1952 million dollars),
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&iris Kidrid-, chairman of the State Economic Council, stated that the Yugoslav Government hoped that the West would cover the anticipated Yugoslav deficit of 189 million dollars. Kidric explained that "we have a moral right to expect this assistance from the West because we are exposed to more difficulties than any other country in Europe today." He added that the Yugoslav requirements were modest compared with the amount of American aid given to other European countries since 1948.
Kidric -contended that Yugoslavia.was making only the "absolute minimum" capital construction in 1952, involving some 128 billion dinars (430 million dollars) or 13.6 per cent of the national income. Beginning in 1953, Kidric said, the main emphasis of the capital in vestment program will be directed toegriculture, and he added that with completion of the capital investment program, Yugoslavia would be in a position to wipe out all deficits.and to balance its international payments. (U NY Times, 29 Dec 51) Comment; Yugoslav statistics are quite unreliable. Nonetheless, last year's budget figure totaled 172.6 billion dinars. The large increase in the dinar value of the 1952 budgetarises from this year's higher price levels. However, a comparative analysis cannot be made until the bases for computations and additional statistics are avail-
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Yugoslavia's rate of capital investment during the past few years has approached a figure of one-third of the national income. Last year's budget was a composite of federal, republic and local expenditures, and the term "defense industries" was not included in the military breakdown. This semantic maneuver makes it virtually impossible to differentiate between capital investment and strict military expenditures; however, the implication is that no significant change will be undertaken in either of these crucial fields.
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Use of UN Peace Commission in Yugoslav-Hungarian border dispute The Yugoslav-Hungarian border dispute over a small island located in the Mura River providesa suitable occasion for the
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Expenditures for defqnse and defense industries will not qxceed the 1951 allotment accolding to Kidric. They will tota1.210 billion dinars (700 million dollars at the new rate of exchange), Which is reportedly 23.7 per cent of Yugoslavia's national income. 30 per cent of the nation's overall budget,. and 74 per tent of the federal budget. The total national expenditures which include the federal, republic, and local budgets, approximate 570 billion dinars (1.8 billion dollars).
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YUgoslavs to request an-investigation by the newly created LN Balkan subcommission, in the opinion of Ambassador Allen. The Ambassador believes that a Yugoslav request for the services of the subcommission would-be particularly appropriate at this time in view of the strong UN support recently given to Yugoslavia's resolution citing Cominform pressures. (S Belgrade 841, 29 Dec 51j CoMment:- Heretofore, Yugoslavia has opposed the presence of anY UN "watchdog unit." Although Hungarian occupation of the island'on 20 December has created a potentially explosive border situation, the Yugoslav Government has giVen no indication of unilateral retaliatory action. On 27 December, however, Yugoslavia officially protested the occupation of the ieland and demanded the immediate withdrawal of Hungarian soldiers.

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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
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Congress Party expected to win Indian national elections: The US Embassy in New Delhi feels that preliminary results in the Indian national elections foreshadow a Congress Party majority in Parliament and in virtually all of the states. (S New Delhi 2258, Joint Weeka 52, 28 Dec 51)
INDIA.
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DuRMAJOHINA. Chinese Communists reportedly concentrating near Burma border: The Chinese Communists have concentrated "several thousand" troops in Paoshan, near the Sino-Burma boundary, according to reports received by a from the hill tribes which inhabit the area. The Ithe hill people arefearful of Chinese aggression against Burma during the present dry season.
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Comment: Chinese Communist ability to intervene in Burma on short notice has been recognized for some time. Such intervention could be ex-plained on a number of grounds, particularly the continued presence of In organized Chinese Nationalist forces on the Burins side of the border. this connection, the Peiping radio has recently accused the US 7th Fleet of ferrying 70,000 Nationalist troops from Taiwan to reinforce those on the Sino-Burma border.
3.
Chinese Nationalists reportedly preparing new attack on Yunnan: The US Embassy in Rangoon reports that the British Consul in Maymyo in northern Burma has been informed by the Sawbwa of Kengtung State that the Chinese Nationalist forces in the Sino-Burma border area are intending to return to Yunnan in February. (S Rangoon 614, 1 Jan 52)
Comment: The Chinese Nationalist forces in Burma are incapable of conducting military action against the Communists in Yunnan, and are not likely to cross the border except as defectors or as small bandit gangs which will use Burma as sanctuary.
4.
INDONESIA. Foreign Minister gees small prospect of satisfactory progress in current negotiations with Netherlands: Foreign Minister Subardjo told American Ambassador Cochran that he sees small prospeet of progress in The Hague discussions before 15 January--the date on which the Indonesian Government plans to review its policy on the negotiations. Subardjo said he is strongly opposed to unilateral abrogation of the NetherlandsIndonesian Union but that popular Indonesian resentment of the Dutch attitude is making his government's position increasingly difficult. (S Djakarta 920, 28 Dec 51)
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Comment: The National Party, the second largest in Indonesia, has vigorously and persiatently criticized the cabinet's policy on the current negotiations with the /Dutch. Along with Communist elements, it has demanded the recall of the Indonesian delegation to The Hague and the unilateral abrogation of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union and of other Netherlands-Indonesian agreements signed in 1949.
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Comments The Indonesian Government has negotiated no diplomatic exchange with the Soviet Union, nor is it known to have responded to any Soviet overtures for trade negotiations. Trade agreements with certain of the Satellites, originated during the period of Dutch sovereignty, have been renewed, but the opening of negotiations now with the USSR would be out of keeping with the present trend of Indonesian foreign policy.
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INDOCHINA. I
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build-up near border:1

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Government has no plans to neeotiate trade agreement with USSR: Foreign Minister Subardjo commented to US Ambassador Cochran regarding a press story on Indonesian-Soviet trade negotiations in London that his government has taken no decision toward entering trade' negotiations with Soviet Russia and has no plans for such. He said the Indonesian Parliament definitely would not ratify any agreement even if the government should negotiate it. (C Djakarta 921, 28 Dec 51)
!denies reports of recent Chinese Communist

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asserted that recent stories of an ominous new build-up of Chinese Communist forces near the Indochina border were "Chinese Nationalist merchandise" and had no basis in fact. Ed mitted that Chinese Communist forces in this area are in sufficient strength to hit Indochina hard and fast if Peiping so decides.
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mdefinite information"' that Chinese Communist forces in Yunnan and Kwangsi now number about three hundred thousand. 'This report also states that clothing, military supplies, and small quantities of food are continuing to flow into Indochina, that the railway from Nanning to Pinghsiang will apparently not be extended, and that there are no regular Chinese Communist troop units in Indochina. (S Hanoi 435, 31 Dec; S OARMA Saigon MC 386-51, 31 Dec 51)
Comment: It is certain that the number of troops in the provinces bordering on Indochina has been increasing, but it is unlikely that the number of confirmed troops is as high as three hundred thousand.
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CHINA/INDONESIA.
Chinese reportedly met Indonesian rubber:a Chinese bankder several months ago attempted to contract for rubber in Indonesia. Several Indonesian firms reportedly refused to deal with him, but agreement was finally reached with one company. This company is known to have bid for rubber in Djakarta last November at prices substantially above current market quotations.
' The rubber acquired through this coMpany was allegedly shipped to Singapore for reshipment to China. (S Bangkok 1348, 29 Dec 51)
8.
CHINA. Chinese Communists reportedly have temporarily elven UD plans for invasion of Chinmen and Formosat A Prisoner taken in a Chinese Nationalist
guerrillaraid on the mainland reportedly has stated that the Chinese Communists have temporarily given up plans to invade Chinmen Island and FormOsa because too many troops are occupied both in Korea and in antiguerrilla warfare on the China mainland. (& ALUSNA Taipei, Joint Weeka 52, 29 Dec 51)
Comment: Other sources have recently reported that Chinmen Island would be invaded in early 1952.
Anti-Communist guerrillas in East China are not considered significant enough to cause Peiping to divert sizable numbers pf troops to thatarea for their suppression.
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Paining allegarilv diaencael secret settlement with Britain and Francs: I a Chinese Communist representative was in Hong Kong in December to negotiate secretly a temporary settlement in the Ear East with Britain and France. Peiping's representative reportedly promised Colonial Secretary Lyttelton that, in exchange for admission to .the UN and UN trusteeship over Formosa, Peiping would "yield": in the Korean talks and would "guarantee the safety" of Hong Kong, Singapore and Indochina. the Chinese official, after reaching "Preliminary agreement" with Lyttelton, conferred with Mao Tse-tung and then departed for France by air for further discussions with British and French officials.

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The Government of Indonesia prohibits the export of rubber to China, but evasions of the embargo are frequently reported. Legal shipments of rubber from producing areas to China have not been made since a Polish vessel lifted over 5,000 tons from Ceylon last October, and Chinese Communist agents are known to be-making energetic efforts to acquire additional aupplies.
Comment:
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For the first time in many years China may have enough The Communists have made strenuous efforts to increase cotton produotion, which was about 1.7 million bales in 1949 and 2.4 million in 1952. In an bffort to meet domestic requirements of about three million bales annually, the Communists have imComments
domairinaton for its textile industry in 1952:
ported large quantities of raw cotton since their takeover in 1949 - -nearly 100 million US dollars worth in 1950 alone.
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lino-Soviet decisions an P.OWIsi reported. states that Chinese leaders and their Soviet advisers reached the following 'decisions in late November regarding TIN POWs,
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(1) to leave the POW problem (henoefoith?) to the "Pyongyang Wer Prisoners Administratibn" for solutton. but
(2) to give "thought training" to MVPs already sent outside the jurisdiction of the above agency.
(5) to send all American FOW's to a Manohurian center to be handled by a speoial agency;
(4) to send some 500 UN POW's to the USSR after baeio "short-tere
training., and
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(5) to send0100 UN Mos to Peiping to work in "cinenm propaganda."
'Comments Returned FOW's lave reported that all POWs as part of their daily routine are indoctrinated by Communist political officers. It is pre Burned on thecbasis of past Communist praotioe that some hundreds of POW's have been or will be sent to the USSR and China for long-term training.._
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Communist military strategy if peace 'talks break down is reported. Iallegedly learned from a North,Korean officer in the "Plans and Operations Staff, SKEW Rip." the Communist military stra tegy recommended by this staff on 17 December in the event of a break-down of truce talks. Three courses of action were outlined, presumably in the order of their probability,
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(1)to mount the prinoipal offensive on the central front, with Wbnju as a primary objective, followed by an attack to the west to isolate the Seoul area. TheeNorth Korean Army weuld be the eluick force supported by two tank divisions. "Itaximwn artillery support-and air cover" would be needed. .Chinese forces would be held in reserve.or would make diversionary attaoks.
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(2) to mount the main effort in the western seotor,-with an armored force of "300 tanks" spearheading a joint Chinese. North Korean infantry force. A ten-division reserve in the forward area would be maintained, with an additional reserve foroe in the Anju-Wonsan area to guard against a UN amphibious operation. (3) to oonduot limited offensives all along the line, if intelligence indicates the probability of a UN-amphibious operation. Chinese forces Would remain in the combat zone, but North Korean forces would be withdrawn. A UN landing on the North Koreaniwist coast would be strongly opposed before it got ashore by enemy air operations, but a landing on the east mast would 25X1A be unopposed by enemy air in its initial phase.
Comment: Whale this report seems logical on-the surface, it must be noted that at best these are only staff recommendations. These plans ieem to center around a fear of another UN amphibious operation--a-fear which is generally confirmed by other sources. It is, however, illogical:that a UN amphibious operation on the east ooast would be unopposed by air during its most critical phase before a beath-head is secured.

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Three.Chinese Communist antiaircraft units accepted in.Korea: The Far East Command, an the basis of intelligence reports, the increased volume of AAA fire received, and photo interpretation of AAA-installations, has now accepted theIst,,2nd,-ind'3rd Chinese Communidt Antiairoraft Artillery RegimenS in-Korea. Esch of these, units is estimuted to have a strength of 3,375 and 64 guns (predominantly 37 mm) and to be truckdrawn. Photo interpretation indicated the presence in early Deceiber.of. avei 18001 antiaircraft weapons of all calibers in Korea. (S FEAF Tokyo AK 825430 Dee 51)
Comment: Enemy antiairoraft units identified in Korea now constitute -ihree-WERE-Korean regimentsthe 19th, 20th, and 23rd- -and these newlyaccepted Chinese regiments. Additionally, the presence of some Soviet personnel serving antiaircraft artillery has been accepted, and most snowy ground combat units possess organic antiaireraft units.
16.
North Korean Premier's New Year's speech indicates no change in Korean propaganda line: North Korean.Premier Kim Ilsong in u 1 January speech echoed the now-familiar propaganda line that has been adopted towards the Korean war.. He noted that the aggressive "interventionist plans" had gone bankrupt, and that the UN faces an acute crisis in Korea in view of the "quarrels and splits within the aggressive camp" and the.lowered morale of
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the UN soldiers. Chinese intervention was praised as a "just war" to forestall the inVasion of China and a brotherly gesture to preserve the freedom of North Korea. Kim concluded with the familiar threat that "if the enemy does not withdraw from Korea but continues the aggressive war, the destruotion of American imperialism will surely be hastened." (R FBIS Ticker, Pyongyang, 1 Jan 52)
17.
Comment: This discourse points out the three major problems that beset North Korea's economic recovery: destruction of industrial facilities; extreme shortage of manpower; and fiscal dislocation.
18.
JAPAN. Japanese worried by large reserve of pounds sterling: Japanese financial and trade circles are apprehensive over the problem of increasing sterling balances, according to the Pan-Asia press service. The present large sterling holdings are the result of two factors. First, many Southeast Asian countries recently have begun to buy Japanese goods through Bbng Kong with,cheap poUnds, saving scarce American dollari. Secondly, Japanese buying from sterling areas has dropped off because of a decrease in British export capacity as well as a deterioration in the quality of goods from sterling area countries. (U FBIS Ticker, 31 Dec '51)
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Comment:
ars:tour:reduction of the buying quotation of the pound sterling while

maintaining the present selling rate. This action, it is expected, will to some extent discourage Japanese exports to the sterling area, as the exporter will receive less yen from sterling sales to the Board. In addition, maintenance of the selling rate may tend to encourage imports from the sterling areas.

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Various economic measures urged by Pyongyang In a lengthy yearend report, Pyongyang outlined various economic measures that must be initiated to ensure victory in the war. Adnitting "the unprecedentedly great economic loss' caused by UN bottbing and the expansion and prolongs". tion of the war, the article listed six proposals to secure increased mobilization and utilization of materials and resources: maintenance of a monthly balance sheet registering "all valuables, such as raw materials, fixtures; and-all the mOnetary assets"; effective utilization of all scrap material; strict conservation of raw materials, merchandise, and foods; increased distribution of idle labor and "rational systamization of labor"; a decrease in the state budget and individual financial organizations' expenditures; and stricter "economic calculation and accounting" by each financial and economic organization. (U FBIS, 21 Dec 51)
The Japanese Foreign EXchange Control Board recently
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Former Home Ministry official appointed Osaka police chief: Naraichi Tanaka, a depnrgee,Jias been appointed police chief of Osaka over the protests of both the Federation of MuniCipal Chiefs of Police and the National "Rural Police Headquarters. Tanaka was formerly attached to the police bureau of the Home Ministry, and CINCFE comments that his appointment may presage the return to police power of depurged former Home Ministry officials. (S Tokyo Weeka 52, 29 Dec 51)
Comment: Many Japanese bureaucrats look back nostalgically upon the rWITIMERT efficiency of the centralized form of the Japanese Police under the Home Mlnistry prior to the Occupation's reform of the police sYstem. 'Many of the depurgees mill no doubt find their way back into the police in a government effort to strengthen internal security and improve police efficiency.
Yomiuri on 30 December reported a "movement in the air" aimed at
revivriEI defunct Home Ministry.

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SECTION 3
(WESTERN)
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GERMANY. Comunists xploit former German Chancellor in unity campaign: Uertain West German political leaders are concerned over Soviet and East German exploitation of Joseph Wirth, a former Centrist Chancellor of the Weimar Republic, in the current unity campaign. Wirth, now in the Soviet Sector of Berlin as a guest of the Communiets, has reportedly already seen important Soviet and East German officials.
.29 Dec 51)
Comment: Wirth has not been politically influential in postwar Germany, and the effect of any letter he may send to parliamentary delegates maybe undercut somewhat by reeent press reports of his presence in Berlin as the guest of the Communists. Nevertheless this, as well as Patter Niemoeller's present trip to Moscow, represents increased Soviet-East German pressure on vulnerable West German political elements.
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EAST GERMANY. Ulbricht alleged to be in Moscow's disfavor: East German Foreign Minister Georg Dertinger was asked on 19 December whether there is any truth in a rumor that Walter Ulbricht is in disfavor with the Russians. Dertinger said that it Was a fact; he added.that Ulbrichtls objections to the sending of an East German delegation to Paris had been overruled by Ambassador Semenov. Comment: A West German press.source recentlY rePorted a "violent dispute" on 5 December between Otto Grotewohl, East German Premier, and Ulbricht, Deputy Premier and Secretary-General of the East German Socialist Unity (Communist) Party. Ulbricht, reputed to be the number one Communist in the East German Government, allegedly opposed the sending of a delegation to the UN. Uibricht's recent visit to Moscow, reportedly for policy consultations, 'suggests that he is still high in Moscow's favor; moreover, the credibility of Dertinger's statement is reduced by his reputation for making contradictory and unreliable declarations.
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FRANCE. French GovernMent threatened brstaiethate in buAget debate:- Premier Prven, faced with what he considers "the matt serious.cabinet.situationl

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The former Chancellor, who is embittered against the present West German Government for neglecting him politically, reportedly plans to send a letter . to all members of the West German Parliament denouncing Adenauer as a separatist,and traitor and attacking the Schuman Plan and the West German position on unification. Official concern is felt over the possible effect of such a letter, since Wirth's name is thought still to carry weight among older, generation Germans, and.in neutralist circles. (C Berlin 864,
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since the elections, is "actively casting about" for a compromise formaa in the current budget discussions. Although the Assembly has succeeded in passing a provisional military expenditures bill, the tug of war over revenues, on which the government is expected to put the confidence question, continues. The Radicals, who insist on reform of the railroad and social security systems as the condition for voting tax increases, and the Socialists, who reject all such legislation, are in a deadlock. The Gaullists and the Communists oppose both the reforms and tax increases. A compromise which would allow SociPli9t abstention without-causing the government to collapse is being sought. (C
Paris 3849 and 3906, 28 and 31 Dec 51)
Comment: Despite the strong support given three weeks ago to the Pleven government in the Schuman Plan ratification, coalition strength is indicated not by agreement on foreign policy, but by the degree of cohesion on economic ,and ideological issues, where the cleavages are most pronounced.
14.
Austro-Czech trade agreement depends on exports of alloy steels: Following the breaking-off of negotiations in Prague, the chief Austrian trade delegate has returned to Vienna with the report that the Czechs remain adamant in their demands for 105 tons of high-speed 10 percent tungsten steel and chrome-nickel anti-corrosion steel. The draft agreement, involving the exchange of about 60 million dollars worth of goods, is otherwise completed with a Czech offer of 20 percent less coal than in the previous agreement and Austrian exports of less than half the previous quantities of steel. In return for various types of coal and coke, sugar, and ceramic clays, the Austrians will export steel, pig iron, non-embargo type ball bearings, cranes, electrical ovens, moulds, aluminum, and free dollars. On the grounds that the problem of payment for alternative coal supplies and the need for an export market requires a conclusion of the agreement, the Austrian Foreign Office has requested the US Embassy for an early decision permitting the shipment of special alloy steels demanded by the Czechs. (S Vienna 2160,
AUSTRIA.
29 Dec 51)
West refuses to amend air corridor route: The Western elements of the Allied Council refused to accept a Soviet proposal to change the long-established air corridor connecting Graz, in the British Zone, with Vienna, Despite Soviet allegations to the contrary, the Western elements contended that the new corridor would be more dangerous than the old one. US and British representatives replied to Soviet protests that the West wOuld have to accept responsibility for the consequences of failure to change the route by reminding the Soviet representative that air safety was the responsibility of all four occupying powers. (R Vienna 2158,
29 Dec 51)
Comment: US officials in Vienna have believed that Soviet motives in pressing for a change in the corridor reflected a concern for protecting
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their large air installations at Wiener Neustadt from air observation. Western unanimity in rejecting the Soviet proposal appears to have disposed of US anxiety that bilateral Anglo-Soviet negotiationg on this issue would compromise the principle of quadripartite authority in this field.
NETHERLANDS. Dutch-Indonesian talks at a standstill: A Dutch Foreign Office official has stated that the Dutch-Indonesian talks are at a standstill because of failure to settle inCidents involving Indonesian seizure of arms from two Dutch vessels. The Dutch are also irritated at the Indonesian refusal to grant exit permits to Dutch nationals wrking in Netherlands New Guinea to return there after spending leave in Indonesia. The official concludes that the "only bright spot" is that Indonesia has not sought to-justify its actions.on the basis of its claim to New Guinea. (S The Hague 6)0, 28 Dec 51) Comment: Despite the Dutch official's statement, Indonesia's actions in thFig-IFIFtances were turoubtedly prompted by the New Guinea dispute.
6.
25X6

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14
25X1A
25X6
3 Jan 52
Approved For line 2002105/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146

TOP SECRET
700020001-3
25X6
8.
Comment: This is a further indication that the Swiss Communist Party will Kaiiiire to diminish in popularity, suffer further electoral losses, and undergo additional intraparty strife.
9.
UNITED KINGDOM-SWEDEN. New trade agreement increases Swedish imports'of coal from Britain: A new trade agreement between Sweden and the United Kingdom provides that the UK will deliver 1,2 million tons of Coal and 200,000 tons of coke to Sweden during 1952. The 1951 Agreement called for no coke and only 500,000 tons of coal. Sweden will export 3.6 million tons of iron ore to Britain, the same amount as in 1951. (R Stockholm Joint Weeks 52, 28 Dec 51)
Comment: Britain's pressing need for iron ore enabled the Sweden to obtain promises for increased quantities of coal and coke, despite the fact that the UK is itself importing 750,000 tons of American coal in the first three months of this year. Sweden's solid fuel supply for 1952 is now assured.

TOP SECRET
?-5
SWITZERLAND. Dissension in Swiss Communist Party is at all-time high: Dissension within the Swiss Communist Party has developed to such an extent as to cause the party's central committee to circulate publicly a directive calling attention to the discord. The directive charges former Communist Buenzod and others with fomenting discord in the party and warns that contact with expelled party members would be considered a gross breach of party discipline. (R, Bern Joint Weeks 52, 28 Dec 51)
3 Jan 52
---..fied when filled in form is detached from controlled document.
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TOP SECRET
(0)
Approved For
se 2002/05120 :
CIA-RDP79T01146.700020001-3
TOP SECRET
3 January 9
Copy Ng.
111
2..
CIA No. 49482-A
45
S/S CABLE SUPPLEMENT

TO THE DAILY DIGEST

Not for dissemination outside 0/CI and 0/NE.
TOP SECRET
Approved For Rase 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0700020001-3
TOP SECRET
SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
1.
YUGOSLAVIA. Tito considers danger of Soviet aggression lessening: In a recent conversation with an American UN delegate, Tito stated that,he thought the danger of outright Soviet aggression was lessening in propor tion to the rearmament and strengthening of the nonCominform world. He believes that Stalin and other high Soviet authorities remain prisoners of their preconceived notions concerning capitalism and still expect to bring about the defeat of the West through the latter's economic collapse.
Comment: Yugoslav leaders had previously indicated that they considered the danger of Soviet attack greatest in the year 1952 since the USSR might decide to strike before the West reached its peak of preparedness in 19540 Titols statement is consistent, however, with his previous assertions that Western strength is a primary deterrent to Soviet aggression.
FUrther evidence that the regime is well aware that its people will fight best for nationalistic reasons is the increasing stress that has been placed on nationalism in Yugoslav holiday celebrations and the relegation of Communist ideology to a secondary role.
2.
EGYPT, Egyptian King awaiting opportunity to appoint new government: Accord ing to the new Chief of the Royal Cabinet, King Farouk is taking precautions to avoid the-appearance that any action he might take in causing a change of
government in Egypt would be Britishinspired.
The British Ambassador has warned his Foreign Office that A solution of the present problem is impossible without a minimum concession on the .Sudan. He believes that this concession might be British recognition of King Farouk's new title within a framework providing for Sudanese selfdetermination. (8, S/S Cairo 967, 29 Dec 51).
Comment: King,Farouk has shown increasing eagerness to bring about the fall of the present Wafd government. There is considerable doubt, however, whether even Western acceptance of Farouk's title of "King of Egypt and the Sudan" would sufficiently pacify aroused Egyptian public opinion to enable the dismissal of the majority party government without serious internal dis turbances.

SECTION 2 (EASTERN) TOP SECRET
1
Tito declared categorically that armies and peoples fought best to pre vent their country from being overrun by an aggression and that all 'other considerations were secondary. (5, S/S Belgrade 834, 28 Dec 51).
3 Jan 52
Approved For
See
2002101.05/2: SECcIRETA-RDP79T01146A0700020001-3
SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
3.
The Germans would like to have the sums which they pay the Swiss under this agreement apply against the overall GermanSwiss debt settlement picture. The Swiss are resisting this on the grounds that under the previous SwissAllied agreement, they would receive 250 million Swiss francs, which is more than is allotted to them under the new proposals. (C, S/S London SIGTO 895, 12 Dec 51).
Comment: This report indicates that the problem of the liquidation of German assets in Switzerland is as yet not ready for solution. Any Swiss German agreement must be acceptable to the Western Allies. France and the UK appear, however, ready to accept any plan agreeable to the Swiss and Germans,

TOP SECRET
2
SWITZERLAND. Swiss and Germans negotiate on Warld War II German assets liquidation: The Swiss and Germans have made progress in reaching agreement on the liquidation of German assets in Switzerland, required by a postwar agreement among Switzerland, France, Britain, and the United States. Accord ing to the new proposals the Swiss will receive between 100 and 135 million Swiss francs, from which they will pay Swiss war victims. The same amount will be divided among the Allies. Individual German holdings under 10,000 francs will be exempted. Because the liquidation of German assets will yield about 400 million francs, or roughly 100 million francs more than necessary to reimburse all the parties concerned, approximately twentyfive percent of the assets will not be liquidated.
3 Jan 52
Approved ForRelease 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP791-01146A00070002000113
HR70-14

o r 'Russians. Russians. or
. . .
10. 10 i KO=. o r "obsemer8"r KOREA. Chinese Communist Communist unit unit requires rations rations f for "observers": *A m o e m b e meseage r message from one unidentified Chinese Communist unit to to Wigoember from one unidentified Chinese Communist unit. another reporti reports that t h a t "four "four observers observers are are here. here. Are they another they going back f o r the New Year? If Ifnot,.better.rush not, better rush some some rations rations and and New New Year's Year's for food else else there t h e r e wonit won't be be anything anything for f o r them them to t o eat.. eat.* food ." (SUEDE AS (SUEDE 69, 1 1 Jan Jan 52) 52) CM IN IN 69,
."
Comment: is no indication o f the a t i o n a l i t y of Comment: Although Although there is no indication of the n nationality of these-em," theanxiety ' h x i e t ydisplayed displayed by by the the requesting requesting unit u n i t over these-NE;;;Vers," the over its 'might indioate i t h e r high-level fficers its rations rations.might indioate e either high-level Chinese Chinese Comunist Communist o officers
U. 1 1 .
C o m ~ s t sUffer s u f f e r non-oombat a i r losses: losses8 A Communists non,00mbat air A 24 24 Deoember message from t h e North North Korean Korean A i r Division Division at a t Sinuiju Sinuifu t o the A i r Sohool School at at from the Air to Air Yenohi reported reported that that an an airoraft a i r o r a f t(poseibly bossibly a Yenohi a jet) j e t ) was was "foroed "foroed to t o make' make an emergenoy emergenoy landing landing in i n a-corn. a-oorn field." field." The message conoluded concluded that two North Korean Korean mechanice mechanics were responsible responsible in i n that t h a t "they "they did d i d not perform perform North their duties duties properly. properly. . ." (SUEDE (SUEDE AS AS CM CM IN 63612, Sinuiju-Yenohi, Sinuiju-Yenchi, 24 De0 Deo 51) 51)
. ."
Comment: L i t t l e is known of the extent f non-oombat Comments Little extent o of non,combat losses suffered by CaiiimITWE air uunits training Manchuria. An An arbitrary-rule-ofCommunist sir n i t s i in n tr a i n i n g i in n Manchuria. a r b i t r a r y rule-ofthumb ebtimate has has placed plaoed such auoh Communist Communist losses i n the i c i n i t y of 10 thumb eetimate in the v vicinity of 10 peroent, or or 150 150 airoraft airorart of all types. percent,
--T-0ESEGNIITSUEDE-
6 6
4 Jan Jan 52 52
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ConspiracY'within unit revealed: m Two December Conepiracy within North Korean u n i t revealedt o o 28 Deoember Krean meaeages--both massagesboth from North Korean fromthe t h e 8th 8th RR RR Regiment Regiment in i n northeastern northeastern
Mires:to Security Division,--recount agitation %rea t o the'llailrid Che Railroad Security Division-recount a g i t a t i o n within the the I n one one massage, message, the the originator originator states s t a t e s he'sent he sent forMerunitts raok8. 'In former unit's ranks. "the r report Concerning the the surrender surrender conspiraoy conipiracy on 27 December." December." e p o r t ooncerning "the meSsage indicates that to o f f i c i a l 'went %nt t o Chuul Another message t h a t a fairly f a i r l y high official in irea of the 8th Regiment oh Oh mission mission and and investigation of of the i n the area 8th Regiment (SUEDE (SUEDE AS AS CM I1 IN 64723, 64723, 29 Deo 51) 51) uprising." uprising."
Comm&.tk The-Stb-RegiMent,.in ?ha 8th-Begiment, i n addition t o i ts s e c u r i t y mission, 'coMMonti to its security mission, has a t trainfng funOtion. high peroentage percentage of of ex-ROK ex-20K and and disaffected dliaffected t i o n r The higp r a mm o Parlonilel undergcliag t r a i n i n g may tend perionnel'undergeing-training tend t to o make make t this his u unit n i t susoeptible Such disquiet di6quiet has been been noted noted before. before. to unrest. Such t o unrest.

-79P-SSORET-SUEDE
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RgwesrieP/2 SECRET975A49500200001-3
25X1
6 January 1952
Copy No. ij
25X1
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
DOCUMENT NO. NO CHANGE IN CLAS3. f DECLASSIFIED CLASS. CHANCED TO: T.; NEXT REVrEW dATE
AUTHidiFIFisi
pnr_n
us
U7
25X1 25X1
DOS review(s) completed.
25X1
TOP SECRET
25X1
flipAom d F Dr Release 2003109126 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000 00200001-3
SUMMARY
GENERAL
1.
Britain wants general conference on Korea after armistice (page 3).

FAR EAST
(page 4).
4. 5.
US Consul supports Papal Nundio's pessimistic viewpoint on Indochina

(page 4).
American aid program in Burma reported in jeopardy (page 5).

EASTERN EUROPE
6.
Weak propaganda since fliers' release indicates Hungarian indecision

(page 6).
WESTERN EUROPE
7.
Comment on Communist efforts to delay West German rearmament

(page 6).
LATIN AMERICA
8.
Possible change of government in Panama (page 7).
25X1A
2. 3.
Stalin's message appeals to discontented Japanese elements (page 3). Comment on Communist policy concerning South Korean prisoners
25X1A
25X0Aroved =or Release 2003/09/26 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000 500200001-3
GENERAL
1.
Britain wants general conference on Korea after armistice:

Britain believes strongly that the powers directly concerned in the Korean hostilities should hold a conference to work out a political settlement if an armistice is arranged, according to the chief Australian delegate to the UN General Assembly. These powers would include the United States, Britain, Communist China, the Soviet Union, France, India, Australia, and perhaps Thailand and Turkey.
25X1A
Comment: This is the first information on recent British thinking regarding tfir file7eTure for achieving a Korean political settlement, which the United Kingdom has long maintained must precede any general stabilization of the Far Eastern situation.
2.
25X1
Stalin's message appeals to discontented Japanese elements:

Stalin's message to the Japanese people caught both government and public by complete surprise, according to the US Political Adviser in Tokyo. Japanese non-Communist editorial comment ranged from utter skepticism to the influential Yomiuri's interpretation that Japan should not fear this new peace offensive and should conclude a bilateral peace with the Soviet union. The Political Adviser believes that those business and bidustrial groups interested in trade with the Soviet Union and Communist China will be heartened, as will left-wing elements opposed to the peace and security treaties, rearmament and the stationing of US forces in Japan. He concludes that while most Japanese will be inclined to examine carefully any Soviet offers of friendship, the message has been well-timed to coincide with the growing uneasiness over the future US position in Japan.

FAR EAST
-325X1A
Ap6413/1 Fo r Release 2003/09(26 : CIA-RDP79T00975A00 )500200001-3
Japan to conclude a bilateral peace treaty with any state which adhered to the UN declaration of 1 January 1942 and which is at war with Japan, on the same or
Comment: The San Francisco treaty encourages
substantially the same terms.
Yorniuri has the third largest newspaper circulation in Japan and is generally said to have an independent viewpoint
3.
Comment on Communist policy concerning South Korean prisoners:
The Communist cease-fire delegate, General Lee Sang Cho, elaborated this theme by noting: "There is not a single man to be found on our side who has been forced into the war. True, in our ranks there are those personnel from your side who . . . revolted and came over to our side . . . . We have never classified them as prisoners of war and we will never turn over these patriots of Korea to you . . . . "
Intelligence, from recaptured South Koreans indicates that South Korean military personnel integrated into the North Korean Army are termed "liberated privates" and
25X1
Two authoritative Communist spokesmen recently explained the great discrepancy between the 11,000 South Korean soldiers listed by the Communists as prisoners of war and the 90,000 that the UN lists as Missing in action. Wilfred Burchett, correspondent for a French Communist newspaper, stated that the Communists released "almost all South Koreans when captured, allowing them to return to their homes or follow their own inclinations. "
25X1
were forcibly inducted. grimy preparation of detailed "liberated privates" lists, holtivever, suggests a possible future Communist concession on this
point.
4.
US Consul supports Papal Nuncio's pessimistic viewpoint on Indochina:

The US Consul in Hanoi concurs in the views recently expressed by the Papal Nuncio to the Philippines regarding the inadequacy of the French effort to win the sympathy of the Vietnamese.
25X1A
-425X1A
Appal:Ad Aor Release 2003/09/26 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000500200001-3
In commenting on the Nuncio's report of the lack of mutual trust between French and US officials and the stubborn French belief that the US desires a controlling interest in Indochina, the Consul states that the Nuncio's opinions are a "fair assessment. "
Comment: The Nuncio is reported to have studied the situation quite carefully during a visit to Indochina in December and,upon his return to the Philippines, expressed himself as "gravely perturbed" by the weaknesses of the Vietnam Government, by French distrust of Ameilcan motives, and by the failure of the French to promise full independence to Vietnam.
5.
American aid program in Burma reported in jeopardy:
25X1
The US Embassy in Rangoon reports that Burmese officials are balking at the requirements in the Battle and Mutual Security Acts which must be satisfied before Burma receives further US assistance. The Burmese apparently regard these requirements as contrary to their concept of a "neutral" foreign policy and as an impairment of their sovereignty. They also fear antagonizing Communist China and the Soviet
Union.
The Embassy considers the situation "critical" and believes the United States may have to suspend aid if the Burmese do not themselves terminate the existing bilateral ECA agreement.
Comment: The Socialist-dominated Burmese Government has always been sensitive to Communist criticism and there have been recent indications of a growing aversion to ECA -- a prime target of Communist propaganda. On the other hand, the rapidly developing aid program in Burma has been well received and appreciated by the Burmese people and was expected to further Burmese cooperation with the West

-525X1A
Approved ror Release 2003109126 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000100200001-3
25X1A
EASTERN EUROPE
6.
Weak propaganda since fliers' release indicates Hungarian indecision:

According to the US Legation in Budapest, weak propaganda coverage on the released American fliers reflects a continued lack of Hungarian or Soviet policy directives and marks a propaganda
25X1A
lost point. The unusual reticence of the press since the fliers' release on
Comment: The vacillations of Foreign Ministry officials during negotiations for the fliers' release and the sharp disparity between the charges of espionage and the actual trial for border violation tend to confirm that an over-all policy for the case has not been developed.
7.
Comment on Communist efforts to delay West German rearmament:
The East German Government has announced a draft all-German election law which requires the approval of East and West Germans in consultation. The Communists thus may hope to entice the West Germans into protracted discussions and draw attention away from negotiations with the West and delay integration.
The Communists are intensifying their efforts to delay West German rearmament and integration into Western Europe and are enjoying some success in using West Germans to promote these objectives. Pastor Niemoeller is now in Moscow to "strengthgn the cause of peace through church channels" and to discuss the release of German war prisoners. If he were to secure the release of prisoners of war now classified as "war criminals" or contract employees, his views in favor of rapprochement would become more popular in West Germany, where they now have little support.

WESTERN EUROPE
28 December suggests that editors are waiting for new government action or an official view of the situation following the retaliatory action of the United States.
-625X1A
APPW4AF or Release 2003/09/26 : CIA-R0P79100975A000 500200001-3
There is no indication, however, that Moscow is contemplating an eleventh-hour genuine offer for the democratic unification of Germany.
LATIN AMERICA
8.
possible change of government in Panama:

Harmociio Arias of Panama has alerted his newspaper for a possible early change of government. Neither President Arosemena nor the police chief appears to have definite knowledge that a coup is scheduled, but the police have been alerted?
25X1A
Comment: The bitter political campaign between the forces of former police chief remon and the nationalist, Communist-aided forces of Harmodio Arias in connection with the presidential elections next May has intensified chronic Panamanian instability. A well-organized uprising to preclude the possibility of R emon's election would have urban support and, despite Remon's ties with the police, could be successful.
x-President
25X1
-725X1A
4
1
HR70-1
44P-SEGRET-

. .
~
11. 1 1 .
KOREA, Communist policy South prisoners; ho Two ~ R U L Coxmumist polioy concerning canoerning D u t h Korean prisonersrralgiritative spokesmen reaently. reoently:expiained tneqgreat arii.t;horitativr Idommunist ~omrmauristspokesmen expralnea w1e '@e& disorepanoy betivom the KOrean soldiers 11,000 SOUth 2153uth Korean soldier6 listed l i s t e d by the Communists as between t h e 11,000 prisoners the missing in prieoners of war and and the.90,000 t h e g0,OOO that Chat t h e UN lists as miaeing in action. aotion. Wilfred for a a French Frenoh Communist Communist newspaper,stated newspaper,stated MWred Surchett, Burohett, correspondent oorrespondent for that released South Koreans Koreans when captured, that the the Communists ~ommuniats released"'almost "almost'all a l l South captured, allowing return or awd'inclinations.* l a l l d n g them to to r e t u r n to t o ttheir h e i r homes o r follow ttheir h e i r own inolintations."
The Cho, elaborated The Communist Conammist cease-fire oease-fire delegete, delegete, General General Zoe frse SangSang Cho, this theme theme by noting? wthereis %ere is not not aa single single man rmn to t o be'found be found on on our this by noting:
in our sxda who hasbeen beenforcedjnto:the foroed into;the war. war. True., Wue, i n o y ranks ranks thi,re there are are 04 who has I revolted iwd an4 caie O'er thoSe your Sicle':eho. thobe personnel personnelfrom from your aide who. o*, o+errto t o opr OIW .Wb them IU as prisoners prisonereneeir Ade:: h.de.! l bhave.never'elaiiified have never olasliified them of war kaa'we kid wb t o you, 6 (U ?BIS BRIS (C mill never over these these p patriots of Korea Korea to you. will a v e r turn over a t r i o t s of Peiping Peiping, 3 3 Jen Jan 52) 52)
m
.
1".
Comment: Comuentt These These statements statements are 4re direotly d i r e o t l y contradictory oontradiotory to t o thoar thoe, of of many Am military personnel manyXlK7ETitary personnel who who managed mnaged to t o escape escape or or were were recaptured recapked from T h e m returnees stated s t a t e d that most of the Sbuth South Korean from the t h e enemy. enemy. These prisoners Army, retrained prisoners were forcibly f o r o i b l y inducted induoted into i n t o the t h e North Korean Army,
APPROVED FOR IAPPROVED FOR RELEASE RELEASE
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'ParSECRET-
and reindootrinated, reindootrinated, and and used as a s infantry isfantry replacements replaoemsnts for f o r combat oombat units. units.
12. 12.
Oolnnrunirt l i g h t bomber bombor attacks attaoks UN-front lines l i n e s for f i r s t timer Communist light first times On 2 January January an.unidentified an unidentified airoraft.dropped.one:bomb.on,positIons.of a i r o r a f t dropped one.bomb on.positlons of a a 2 BOK the Korean Korean e east coast. I. &later 6#)K division d i d o i o n on the a s t ooaet. htsr report report indicates indicates that that the attacking was a that bombs, attaoking aircraft a i r o r a f t wag a Communist Communist TT-2 TU-2 light light bomber and snd t h a t four bombs, not n o t of American b r i o a n manufacture, manufacture, mere were dropped. dropped. .>_ 3 and L 1 1 3 and 4 Jan Jan 52). 52)
- 1
,I
')

16
,.7 Jan 52
Comments. This is i s the the first f i r e t recorded reeorded instanoe of of an enemy bomber bomber Comrrerrtr This airorm o k i n g UN installations i n s t a l l a t i o n s in aircraft attacking in the t h e forward areas. areas. Previously, A.eviouely, suoh euoh attacks attaoka have been been made by conventional oonventional type type f fighter i g h t e r and and ground The e location looation d in i n at a t least one instanoe by jet jet a iroraft. n attaok airoraft a attack aircraft and aircraft. of aircraft may of this thie bombing suggests euggeeta that the enemy a ircraft m y have approaohed from the Timbers available f for combat are t h e sea. Boao It I tis isbelieved believedthatt h a t all TU-2 bombers o r oombat subordinate subordinate to t o the the CCAF CC&F rather r a t h e r than than to to the the NKAF. NKAF.
e
-mFm%WSECTION 3
(WESTERN)

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7 Jan 52
I
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HR70-14
IQE_SECIIKT--SUEDE--
' 6. 60
8.
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KOREA. Kaesong guard guard unit 8ees long long negotiationst 82nd KOREA. Kaesong unit sees negotiations: The The North North Korean Korean 82nd -nt in the the Kaesong Haesong area, area, in in a a 5 5 January January message, message, reports reports the t h e apparent apparent Regiment in impasas f Communist the exchange exchkge of of Impasse oier oier the'oonstruotion the'construetion o of Communist airfields airfields and and the prisoners. Although Although the the message states that that "I "I suppose suppose the aonference prisoners. message states the conference
TOP 1012AFXRET-SUBEe5
7. 7.
9 52 9 Jan Jan 52
TOP SECRET SUEDE

CAPPROVED RELEASE1 PPROVED FOR RELEASE
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will take a long time," time," it notes t that the "General "General S Staff has been been planning will h a t the t a f f has treatment and and they they obtained obtained the the buildings buildings for for prisoners prisoners in in tthe'prieoner h e prisoner treatment Kaesong already. already. . ." (SUEDE AS 1311, 6 6 Jan 52) AS CY CM IN IN1311, Kaesong
. )
."
COmments The The.82nd Regiment i is local security unit and presumably presumably Comment: 82nd Regiment s a l ooal s ecurity u n i t and
doiissociess high-level Communist'decisions the does e MI-1-170e access t o to high-level Communist deoisions rrelating e l a t i n g tto o the
Cease4ire talk's. unit n a position t o observe oease-fire t a l k s . This u n i t would, would, however, however, be be i in to eatiVitiei in Kiesong related related tto preparations for for an an eventual eventual prisonerprisonera ctivities i n Haesong o preparations of-war exohange. exchange. of-war
/
10. 1 0 .
'
Communists continue oontinue island i s l e n d campaign in west e n t r a l Korea: 9emmunists w%st c central Koreas In In addition to the-reported capture of of Sunwi ganmi and And Wi Mrijalands.jiat south of of t o t h e reported 2 January oapture islands soutih t l i e Ongjin peninsula by the t h e North Korean 23rd Brigade, the'Ongjin Brigade, recent recent messages mestages of 4 and January ddetail e t a i l plans islands .4 and .7 .7.January plans for for operations operations against against Yuk Yuk and Wollae W011ae islands t o the t h e west t6 west.of of the t h e Ongjin Ongjin peninsula and against Ohwa i island sland t to o t the h e south. sOuth.'' The The'latter l a t t e r operation operation:is is tto o be be oonduoted conducted by by the the 26th 26th b battalion attalion o of f the the'23rd 23rd to begin at January. (SUEDE Brigade and it i B 'to a t 0300 0300 hours on 8 January, (SUEDE AS AS CM CM IN 1032 and 1669, 1669, 5 Jan-and Jan and 7 Jan 52) 1032
. Commentt 'Conrmunist 40th 40th Army A m y and and the t h e North Oomments Elements Elements of of the the Chinese Ohinese0ommunist Kore+n.'23rd. Brigade have been engagedin i neliminating eliminating UN UN guerrilla guerrilla and KOreeirWrErigade have been engaged espionage bases in i n the t h e western western ooastal ooastal waters waters since since November. November.
U. 1 1 .
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.- -forszemr-1 (SOVIET) SECTION 1 (SOVIET) . _. .
on Koreas Korea: 1. rerresentative again niges.Seourity a,yain Gnes Securitrp Council talks t a l k s on 1 . USSR. Soviet representative with.the delegation:Soviet UN delegate deIegate"Malik In conversation with the US delegation Soviet u# Malik asserted that the Ievel" level" of of Korean Korean discussions discussions in t h a t it It was was necessary necessary to t o 'Italie "raise the i n view of the attitude attitUde-Of.the VS negatiatore: of o f . t h e US negotiators; -The-Soviet -The'Soviet delegate alleged that that the attended by by *responsible "responsible t h e USSRIs USSR's propoial proposal for for a a SecuritY Security Couiicil_meeting Council meetlng attended political thenegotiations negotiations iin Korea and and not not leaders" was intended intended to t o hell:, help the n Korea p o l i t i c a l leaders".was Malik argued argued that to that consUltation consultation with numerous numerous UN UIJ deldelt o terminate them. them. Malik egations' had revel:kind WR &WASH' deal interest" i in the Soviet Soviet proposal. deal ofofintareat" n the
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.-

APPROVED FOR FOR RELEASE RELEASE 1:)ATE: DATE: 09-Dec-2009 09-Dec-2009 1"PPROVED
discarding the year-old year.old The Soviet package propodatprovided_for. proposal pzovidad.for discarding ;Western blueprints UN's capability capability.to meet new agaglWestern blueprints for for increaSibgrAhe. l n c r e a s m the UN's t o meet gressions. was aPParently apljarenly dangling_before dangling before the UN the'prospect the prospect The USSR Was gressions. The of big Wer power ttalks on:the prolongedirorean negotiations i in of imftediate immediate big a l k s on the prolonged Korean negotiations n the ' hope of drawing drawing support support away away from from the the Western Western collective comleotive sedurity seaurity project. project. hope of
Comments The The Soviet Soviet call:fOr-a c a l l for a Security Council meeting is is apparently apparently Comments another attempt to. force UN UN d diseUSAIon:Of_a Korean p political settlement i a b a d c m o f - a KoD'eaa o l i t i c a l settlement t o force while negotiations are while the the military m i l i t a r y armisticearmistice negotiations a r e being being held. held. .
-~
9 9 Jan J= 52 52
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orth&rYCC some 120,000 North during November and December December some Korean troops were were in i n training training in i n Manchuria. Manchuria. In In mid-December mid-December an an additional additional 50,000 50,000 troOps troops "were "were in in training training in i n this this area." area." Reportedly the Chinese Communists Reportedly the Communists and Russians intend 000 North and the the Russians intend to t o build build a a force force of of 400 4O0,OOO North Koreans Koreans by.the by the end of of January January 1952.
~
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Comment& During the period October 1950 through February 1951, some 100,000 North Korean troops were trained in Manchuria and, entarad Earth Korea organized into three corns. the VI. VII. and VIII. the oorps headquarters of both the reportedly deactivated VI and V1i1 Corps have In view d e n of of the the exexreturned to returned t o Manchuria Manahmiti to t o organiSe orgadze and and train t r a i n new new units. u n i t s . In treme manpower Korea manpower shortage shortage in in North Korea1 1 the the training training of of this this number number of of North North Korean Xorean troops troops in in Manchuria Manchuria is i a unlikely. unlikely.
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Copy No.
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DOCUMENT NO. NO CHANGE IN CLASS. D DECLASSIFIED CLASS. CHANG.20 10 NEXT REVIEW 0AI E:
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1.
Soviet representative again urges Security Council talks on Korea

(page 3).
FAR EAST
4.
US Ambassador in Cairo opposes British inaction in Egyptian situation (page 4). 5. British interested in Iraqi solution to Egyptian situation (page 5).
EASTERN EUROPE
6. Yugosiav Foreign Minister cautions US on consequences of insufficient.
aid (page 6).
25X1A

NEAR EAST - AFRICA
2
25X1 2. 3. Burmese
insurgent leaders reportedly to meet in February. (page 4).
25X1A
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GENERAL
1.
Soviet representative again urges Security Council talks on Korea:

In conversation with the US delegation, Soviet UN delegate Malik asserted that it was necessary
25X1A
to "raise the level" of Korean discussions in
Comment: The Soviet call for a Security Council meeting is apparently another attempt to force UN discussion of a Korean political settlement while the military armistice negotiations are being held.
The Soviet package proposal provided for discarding the year-old Western blueprints for an increase in the UN's capability to meet new aggressions. The USSR was apparently dangling before the UN the prospect of immediate big-power talks on the prolonged Korean negotiations in the hope of drawing support away from the Western collective security project.
I
view of the attitude of the US negotiators. The Soviet delegate alleged that the USSR's proposal for a Security Council meeting attended by "responsible political leaders" was intended to help the negotiations in Korea and not to terminate them. Malik argued that consultation with numerous UN delegations had revealed "a great deal of interest" in the Soviet proposal.
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suggesting a continued interest in an armistice.
Ithe Communists in Korea are still preparing for prisoner exchange,

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2.
FAR EAST
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3.
Burmese insurgent leaders reportedly to meet in February:
Comment: Reports of conferences to increase cooperation among insurgent-Tr-az-Fs have been recurrent for several months. There have been indications of growing unity among the insurgents in their efforts to overthrow the Burmese Government, but there is no firm evidence that they have been able completely to submerge the serious differences, personal and ideological, which heretofore have kept them separated.
Control of Burma's rice, the country's chief source of wealth, has always been a Communist objective. To date, however, the Communists have been only moderately successful in this effort.
4.
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US Ambassador in Cairo opposes British inaction in Egyptian situation: The US Ambassador in Cairo believes that, while domestic political considerations make it difficult for Britain to make new offers in the Sudan controversy, some positive action must nevereless be taken. If the British remain adamant on the Sudan, he argues,

NEAR EAST - AFRICA
Leaders of Burma's two Communist parties, together with the Peoples Volunteer Organization and the insurgent Karens, are reliably reported 25X1A to have scheduled a meeting in February for the purpose of signing an agreement for united military action against the Burmese Government. The primary objective of the Communist campaign in the immediate future is to deny the current rice crop to the government
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Egypt will make no concessions on the Middle East Command proposals.

The British suggestion that Anglo-Egyptian negotiations depend on the end of terrorism in the Canal zone is not realistic. According to the Ambassador, the Egyptians believe that they can eventually force the British to withd;aw by continuing their commando tactics, and are therefore in no hurry to negotiate. He points out that the British base at Fayid is not operative at the present time, and he warns that it eventually may even become untenable.
The Ambassador reiterates his previous warnings that events in Egypt cannot stand still but will continue to deteriorate, with the prospect that they will ultimately lead to "reoccupation, revolution, and general chaos. "
5.
British interested in Iraqi solution to Egyptian situation:
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British Foreign Office officials are agreeably surprised at the latest Iraqi proposals for a solution of the Anglo-Egyptian crisis and are considering recommending that Foreign Secreary Eden encourage the Iraqi Prime Minister in his efforts. They hope that the suggestions can be brought more into line with the Middle East Command proposals.
The Foreign Office does not like the Iraqi idea of an alliance restricted to five years nor the flat statement that Egypt could take over the air defense of the Suez Canal zone at some future date. It believes that Egypt will reject the suggestion that the Sudanese be left to decide on their future relations with Egypt free from either British or Egyptian pressure.
Comment: The parts of the Iraqi proposal appealing to the Foreign Office are evidently those stipulating that terrorism in the Suez Canal zone be ended and an allied military storage depot be established there. A depot would satisfy some of the requirements of

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the Middle East Command proposals, which the British have consistently seen as the most suitable arrangement for the defense of the Canal.
Should agreement be reached on essentials, the British would. apparently be willing to evacuate some of their troops according to their own time schedule. The British are, however, unwilling to concede that Egypt alone is capable of undertaking any aspect of the defense of the Canal zone.
6.
Yugoslav Foreign Minister cautions US on consequences of ineufficient aid:
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Yugoslav Foreign Minister Kardelj has informed Ambassador Allen that the initial Allied grant of only 25 million dollars for the first half of 1952 has caused his government difficulties in its economic and defense programs and raised doubts over the attitude of the three powers towards the tripartite aid program.
Kardelj expressed the hope that the three powers would reconsider their decision and accord Yugoslavia adequate funds now to meet its current minimum necessities and thus avoid weakening its internal economic and political structure.
Comment: Yugoslavia has requested 86 million dollars in tripartite assistance to cover its trade deficit for the first six months of 1952. This figure exceeds last year's request for the corresponding
American economic officials in Belgrade estimate that unless a grant of approximately 65 million dollars is made early this year, Yugoslavia will be forced to curtail its import program sharply, thereby handicapping its defense and economic efforts. Britain, in line with its generally critical attitude toward Yugoslav economic policy, opposes any commitment in excess of 45 million dollars.
period by some 36 million dollars. Yugoslav officials justify this increase on the grounds of larger defense commitments and higher import prices.

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The purpose Purpose of-transferring N1G-15 combat-tested o f transferring a MIG-15 combat-tested unit u n i t from the the theater May be t to air Korean t h e a t e r to t o East China 16ay o strengthen the inadequate air defenses defenses of the Shanghai area. area,
9. 9.
KOREk. Subordination force increasingly increasingly KOREA. Subordination of o f Nbrth North Korean Korean Kaesong Kaesong _guard guard force -art 1.72Mir: A 6 6 January January massage message from from the North Korean 82nd 82nd Regiment, the the 15Z7priiirseourity Nice, tto parent 8th Bth Division Division on the e eatt o iiti t s parent a s t coast Eaesong seourity force, complained Wie compelled'to inbluding complained that t h a t ". .we are oompelled t o submit submit all a l l reports,' repbrts, including tht the turrent'inforMetion, ourrent information, to t o the General General Department Department (General (General Headquarters?) Headquarters? ) and'we and we expedt expedf to t o rioeive reoeive the politioal p o l i t i c a l orders from them. them. The division I don't don't know know what what to to i e ' s t i l l requesting requesting us us to ierstill t o tend Bend the the daily d a i l yreport'. report. 'I do." (SUEDE AS CM IN do." I N 1726, 8 8 Jan Jan 52) 52)
C o k m t : It It is i s becoming becoming increasingly increasingly evident evident that t h a t the t h e Nbrth North Korean' Korean CbMment: 82nd Regiment is becoming, i s loting losing its i t s identity i d e n t i t y as a tactical t a c t i c a l unit and is i s becoming, 82nd 'Regiment ibosSibly bY default, default, the of the tha North North Korean Korean regime in the visible v i s i b l e symbol symbol.of in possibly by thie It may be may be sector Of-the of the front. front. It t h i s predominantlY predominantly Chinese Chinese Communist sector recalled reoalled that t h a t when when the the 82nd 82nd Regiment Regiment was apparently apparently ordered brdered away away from from Kaesong the Chinese Chinese.Communist Communist.Command in t h the area, North North Korean Korean Chief Chief Kaesong by: by the Command in e area, of'Stiff vith General Peng Te-huai Te-huai to o f Staff Nam Bahn 11 PerionallY personally intervened with t o ensure its i t s stay s t a y in i n KIesong. KBesong.
APPROVED APPROVED FOR FOR RELEASE RELEASE _DATE: DATE: 18-Mar-2010 18-Mar-2010
- Comment: The The Sixth Sixth Regiment, Regiment, equipped equipped with about 25 25 MIG-15's, -Comment' MIG-151s, moved to transfer.of t o Takushan T m i in n early e a r l y NoVember. November. .This'is 'This i s the first f i r s t known t r a n s f e r of a' a Several other other Chinese air a i r units jet fighter:unit units moved j et f i g h t e r unit from from Manchuria. Manchuria. Several Prom Manbhuria ManChUria te December and and early early January, January, but but these these &om t o Zeit East 'China China i in n Deoember moves involved only aircraft. only conventional conventional aircraft. _
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'9IG-15 unit to China: Several f&G-15 u n i t transfers from from Korean Korean border t o East China: meisages 6f messages of 8 0 January J anuary dealt dealt mith w i t h the move of the sixth s i x t h Chinese Communist Communist A i r Regiment' Air Regiment frOM from Tiknshan T&ushan near near the Korean Korean border to t o Shanghai. Shanghai. One One M66E:age from Nanking Nanking asked asked whether whether the the Sixth Sixth Regiment Regiment had had l left Takushan, e f t Takushan, message from and-another mossage-mentiOned the departure soveral flights of a unit and- another mssage-mentioned departure in in s weral f li from Takushan (SUEDE.AS AS CM CM IN IN 1964, 1964, 9 9*Jan Jan 52 62 from Takushan to t o Shanghai. Shanghai. (SUEDE
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10 January 1952
CIA No. 49499
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DAILY DIGEST
DIA, DOS Declassification/Release Instructions on File

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SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
1.
BULGARIA. Turkish offer to hcceot SvilenRrad refugees rebortedly refused: According to a repert from Aakara, Bulgaria has refUsed to adcept a Tur kish offer to admit into Turkey a nuMber of refugees who have been de tained at the border city of Svilengrad since the closing of the Turkieh 3 Jan 52) Bulgarian frontier on 8 November. (R FBIS
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During the past month it has become increasingly apparent that, al though the TurkishBulgarian border was closed on the initiative of An kara, Bulgaria is in fact responsible for, and apparently satisfied with, the continued arrestment of border and refugee movements between the two countries.
2.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA. Air defense preparations: The US Military Attache in Fragile reports intenaive training.in.antiaireraft gun.drilla at a pro bable air defense repair depot and training center in Bohnibe on the outskirts of Prague. Be further reports that the total number of 88mm AA guts at this depot has been reduced from 103 as of midDecember to (S US Mil Att Prague 4 Jan 52) approximately 75.
area.
Comments An increase in air defense preparations has beep evident throughout the Satellites during the past year and a half. Augmentation of the AA defenses of Warsaw by the emplacement of over 60 guns since September 1951 was preceded by accumulation of weapons at a gun park near the city. A sindlar program may well be in progress in the Prague
-

DeVeld -eht of radar defenses in Thmgrys
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Comment; On 1 DeceMber, the Turkish Ministry ef Foreign Affairs announced that it had informed the Bulgarian Government the border Could (1) Bulgaria be reopened, subject to the fulfiltent of two requirements: had recently must agree to aCcept the return of a group of "gypsies" who entered Turkey by meana of forged visas, and (2) Bulgaria must agree to comply with its guarantee that no more "gypsies" be sent into Turkey in the future. These demands, according to the Turks, met with a favorable reply in which Bulgaria "complied with the requirements" set forth in the Turkiah note.
3.
HUNGARY.
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a r ar s a on has zaa Hungary. The eta agy been built on the northwestern edge o : tion is connected by radio with air defense headqurters in Budapest. The installation at Nagykanizsa was completed in August 1951 and one of the Soviet officers inspecting reportedly deplored the delay of several
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months in the settino up of a Hungarian radar system due to a shortage the visual air ob of equipment, part of Hungary. if sou en e een e servation service as
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Comments Evidence to date has not credited Hungary with a radar integrated air warning system. The early warning system in the Satellite areas has expanded considerably during the past several years and the utilization of improved equipment is a logical development.
4,
Comment: The trend toward decreasing the scope of responsibility of individual economic ministries in Eastern Europe, in imitation of the Soviet pattern, has been under way since 1949. The first such splitting of ministries in Hungary occurred in Dec 1950. Limiting the sector of the economy, for which each minister is responsible is intended to bring more efficient administration and increased security through greater compartmentalization of lmowledge and authority.
5.
US Ambassador in Warsaw foresees new restrictions on American missions: American Ambassador Flack in Warsaw comments that the rapid
POLAND.
trial in Poland of five alleged US spies suggests a possible buildup to justify increasing restrictions on American missions in Eastern
Europe.
buildup, at Soviet instigation, is being deliberately carried to a point likely to provoke US withdrawal of one or more missions in Eastern Europe. The Ambassador states that his analysis is consistent with recent Sa
tellite notes and propaganda portraying US missions as espionage agencies which do not perform legitimate diplomatic functions. (S Warsaw 466, 7 Jan 52)
Comment: The charges against the Polish defendants did not specify that they had contacts with the US Embassy in Warsaw, but alleged that they were recruited in Germany by US intelligence officers. The recent notes, while attacking former members of US missions in Eastern Europe, did not mention any current members. So far there have been no indi cations that the USSR or the Satellites no longer desire to maintain diplomatic missions in the West.
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*
New economic Ministries created: A recent decree of the Council of Ministers cieated new economic ministries by splitting or replacing certain existing ones. The new ministries are: State Forestry and Farms, Food Industry, Medium Machine Industry, Building Material In dustry, Postal Affairs, Local Industry, Produce Collection and Communi cations. (R FELS, 7 Jan 52)
The Ambassador points out it is possible that an antiAmerican
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6.
YUGOSLAVIA. US and Insoslavia sign an Economic Cooneratiachareements The gevernmente of the US and.lugoslavie.have.formalized an economic assistance pact, under the terms of the Mutual Security Act of 1951' designed to promote the economic stability and defense of lbgoslavia.
Although the amount of economic aid depends upon administrative action, this type of agreement imposes certain broad conditions upon the recipient state. Among these are the general requirements that the recipient must make a full contribution to the defense of the free world as well as to its own defensive strength. (U Belgrade NY Times 8 Jan 52)
Commenti Yugoslavia's adherence to this agreemeni represents another'significant departure from previously held Yugoslav Communist theory concerning Western sponsored economic eid programs.
The Yugoslav press reportedly has given the signing of the agree ment wide and favorable coverage.

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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1.
SAUDI ARABIA. King makes new demand on Arabian Arerican Oil Company: King ,Ibn Saud hes recently demanded that the Trans-Arabian Pipeline COmpany, which delivers the oil of the Arabian American Oil Company to the kediterranean, beput on a profit-making basis. The King believes that he will thus be able to demand 50 peroent of any profits made by the ARAMCO subsidiary whioh now operates on a cost basis.
Comment: If Trans-Arabian Pipeline is put on a profit-making basis, the irgirirrlotted to the King will aotually oome from the parent company', ARAMCO. It is unlikely therefore that fulfillment of the King's wishes will give him more money than he is now getting on the basis of a 50-50 agreement with ARAMCO itself.
2<..% IN/EA.
Chinese Communists from Tibet claim Indian territory: Chinese Communists from western Tibet have claimed a mountain shrine at Badrinath,. some 20 miles inside Indian territory northeast of Delhi, according to Indian press reports. They have also allegedly laid claim to territory 56 miles south of Badrinath. Mew Delhi 2359, 7 Jan 52)
Comments Chinese Communist patrols have penetrated into Indian and Pakistani territory on several occasions in the past two years, and on at least ace occasion occupied a border post from which they had to be ousted forcibly by Indian troops. With Chinese Communist consolidation of Tibet proceeding apace, Chinese probing should increase in the Himalayan frontier areas where international boundaries are undefined or in dispute.
3.
PAKISTAN. Vernacular newspapers receive free engravings from Soviet Embassy: /ndividual Urdu newspapers in Pakistan receive from the Soviet Embassy, Karachi, approximately one iinc engraving a week, accompanied by outlines and long propaganda stories. Acoording to the editor of a Karachi Urdu daily, the Soviet Embassy began this practice because photographs it distributed to the press were not being printed. The engravings, which are probably made locally, are used regularly in the pro-Communist Imroz1 and in some of the smaller Urdu weeklies. They are used irregn-Mtrin Anjam and Jang, the two largest vernacular newspapers, which seldom use the acoompanyffiritories. (C Karachi Desp 582, 7 Nov 51)
,

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The Executive Board oi ARAMCO expeots to discuss this and other issues with the King when it meets with him in mid-January. Ibn Saud's recent expressions of bitterness over the oompany da not' resa e a ha atmosphere for solving their outstanding differences. 25X1A
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Comments Presumably any financial and technical difficulties preventing non-publication of photographs by Pakistani newspapers would be overcome by the reoeipt of engravings; assuring the Russians a wider dissemination of their propaganda material.
4.
INDONESIA. Officials and adherents of Republic of South MolUccas surrenders A semi-officOal news-agency reports an announcement by the Indonesian Army of the surrender on-6 January of the President, several members of the cabinet, and 2,000 adherents of the insurgent "Republic of the South Moluccas" on Ceram Island, (0 Djakarta 977, 8 Jan 52)
Comments This surrender presumably concludes the government's costly 16-moarrtmpaign against the insurgent "republic."
5.
INDOCHINA. Interim re lacements for De Lattre named: The US Military a n, General de Lattre's Attache in Hanoi has been informed that enera deputy, has been appointed Commander-in-Chief,:"pending de Lattrels return." At the same time Governor-General Gautier, De Lattte's chief civil aide, was named Aoting High Commissioner. De Littre will probably need several months to recover from a recent operation. (TS Hanoi 4560 9 Jan 52)
Comment' General de lattre has recently undergone a second operation which was apparently more serious than earlier reports suggested. Recent reports indicate.that the general will not be willing to reassume his ootmand because of disillusionment with the stalemate in Indochina as well -ashfor reasons of health.
6.
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North Korean General Nam Il reported to hold no important posts reportedly hae.learned fromhigh level government contacts in Pyongyang that "the position of Chief of Staff, North KoreanArty, formerly held by Nam Il, is now vacant" and that Pang .Hak-se is the Miniiter of Sooial Security, with Nam Il acting as a "deputy minister who controls Ministry of Sooial Security-activities in the_armed forces." There'are numerous indications that North Korean General Nam Comments Il/still holds both his positionsas NKPA Chief of Staff and Minister of Social Security. Pang Hak-6se is generally identified as Nam IL's chief deputy in the security ministry.
KOREA.
North Korean official cites need for increased agricultural production in 1952s Minister of Agriculture Pak recently stated at length that although the farmers of North Korea have successfully carried out

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their work this year, production must be increased "even more next year." The means by which.agricultural production is to be_increased are the securing of superior seeds, farming implements, Oompost, and the acquiring of advanced agricultural knowledge. In addition, Pak stressed the need for the manufacture of "many handy farming tools suitable for...immnen" and suggests a "symposium.in eaoh hamlet" in which "dietinguished farmers! will disseminate advanced agricultural knowledge to those less accomplished. (U FBIS, 8 Jan 52)
Comment: A serious food_deficiency exists in North Korea.. The major causes of this problem are: the shortage of manpower, leavinghnly the very young, the aged, and women for agricultural work; destruction of the chemical fertilizer plants; declining morale; and the weakening of controls at lower lerels.
8.
JAPAN. left-wing Socialist leader shggests Stalin give more practical demonstration of friendship: Left-wing Socialist leader Musaburo Suzuki in a newspaper interview termed Stalin's New Year message "formalistic" and expressed a hope that the USSR would give a more praotical demonstration of friendship by returning the Kuriles and Sakhalin and by repatriating Japanese prisoners'of war "if there are any." Suzuki Oleo demanded a Soviet nonaggression.pledge, which would eliminate the necessity for stationing US troops in Japan. IR Tokyo 1415, 8 Jan 52)
Comments Suzuki's statement reflects the strong Japanese feelings that the Kuriles should be returned to them since they were not obtained by aggression.
Suzukl's call for a Soviet :monaggression pledge represents a portioh of the leftist Socialists' platform adopted in late December. The prograM calls for the abrogation of the Sino -Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance simultaneously with the scrapping of the US,Japanese Security Pact and the maintenance of neutrality as the best means of decuritY.

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SECTION 3
(=TERN)
1.
GERMANY. Adenauer wants clarification of German defense contribution: American negotiators, meeting with Federal Republic representatives on the German financial contribution to Western defense, feel that Chancellor Adenauer is "dragging his feet" in these discussions. He is now insisting that German experts be sent before the NATO Temporary Council Committee tb redetermine the size of the German defense contribution. He argues that the Bonn Parliament will not approve these negotiations unless it appears that the same body which fixed other NATO nations' contributions also fix the German contribution in the same manner. (5 Bonn 1021, 8 Jan 52)
fixed the size of the German contribution. Adenaueris demand for new Committee hearings reflects his feeling that a German defense contribution fixed by the Allies alone resembles occupation costs. Allied representatives have reasonable hope that agreement will be reached on the annexed conventions to the Contractual Agreement with the possible exception of this issue -- before the next NATO conference.
East German physicians receive special training for treatment of war casualties: East German physicians were reportedly given special training last summer in the treatment of casualties resulting from atomic and che ical warfare. Certain physicians were selected for further training in the USSR.
(S CINCUSAFE, Wiesbaden Weeka 1, 4 Jan 52)
Comment: This is the first report of such a training program for civilian pf-sysicians. Since the training program allegedly has been in progress since last summer and no confirming reports have been received, it is doubtful that a civilian program is as yet being conducted on a large scale. Other sources have reported that medical training of the paramilitary police has included lectures on defense against chemical attack
and the treatment of gas casualties.
3.
Commenting on the Communists' inability
have wide political repercussions. -Indications that the People's Party, blamed by the Socialists for the court's ruling, may relax party discipline to permit its members to approve a bill of attainder depriving Starhemberg once more of his property, suggest a conciliatory attitude on the part of party leaders.
TOP SECRET
Starhemberg, former Heimwehr leader, of estates taken from him by the Nazis after 1938, the US Embassy in Vienna expresses concern that the episode may
Possibility of political crisis over restitution issue foreseen: thus far to seize the initiative in further arousing public resentment over the restitution to Prince Ernst
AUSTRIA.
Comment:
No German representatives were present when the Committee
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The US Embassy believes that if the Socialists fail to receive parliar mentary saftsfaction, they might take the issue to the electorate. (C Vienna 2237, 7 Jan 52)
Comment: The Socialists, concerned both by Communist efforts to exploit this sreand by indications of rank-and-file dissatisfaction with Socialist leadership, might possibly try to imprave.their position at the expense of the People's Party. Such action, howeVer would be at variance with pre Christmas statements of leaders of both major parties reaffirming the
'
necessity of a coalition and with Socialist' efforts to preserve the government until the 1953 elections.
Comment: Part ot the Italo -Greek reparations.agreement required that Italy-7477 Greece with manufactured products, but with the Greeks providing nert of the raw materials required. The Italians are at present hard pressed for raw materials. This issue might strain the relations which have been steadily improVing between the two countries.
5.
SPAIN. US Ambassador urges early negotiations with Spain: The American Ambassador in Madrid urges that the US take full advantage of an nnuanally pro-US atmosphere in Spain by sending teams to negotiate military and economdc aid agreements,
The Ambassador feels that a highly cordial attitude on the part of the Spanish Goverrunent has been created by recent press statements of two American officials regarding the results of the survey of the Spanish economk recently completed by a special US mission, In his opinion, these stateMents show that American interest in improving the Spanish economy and popular living standards is quite separate from political considerations. (S Madrid 712, 7 Jan 52)
Comment: the Spanish Government, through the controlled press; is apparently trying to create the impression that negotiation of an economic agreement will begin at any moment, regardless of military considerations, and that every sector of the Spanish economy will receive donsiderable immediate. aid. This tactic reflects the overwhelming political importance which the regime attaches to American aid.

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ITALY. Italian reparations to Greece bog down: Italian officials report that during the past year the Greek-Italian reparations agreement..has not been operating smoothly because of Greek administrative inefficiency and unwillingness or inability to deliver counterpart raw materials to Italy. They indicate that the prospects for future deliveries of equipment from Italy to Greece are not,good unless raw material shipments from Greece are kept up to date. Rome MSA A-1, 8 Jan 52)
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6.
CHILE. Large quantity of Chilean copper'in Lebanon offered to US: An American citizen in Beirut has offered to purchase a large quantity of Chilean copper and smaller quantities of copper of unknown origin for the US Government. The copper offered includes 13,000 tons of electrolytid copper -- 11,000 tons, f.o.b.- Chile, at 1285 dollars per tot and 2,000 tons, f.o.b. Antwerp, at 1,465 dollars per ton -- and some 1,325 tons composed of blister, electrolytic scrap, wire, and cables at from 1,150 to 1,370 dollars.
... _
..
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The US Legation in Beirut believes that the US, if it is willing to meet prices now offered in this area by Iron Curtain buyers, can effectively stop shipments to the Orbit and obtain all available supplies, (C Beirut 671, 8 Jan 52)
Comment: Presumably a major portion of the copper involved it part of the US-mined Chilean copper allocated to Chile for its free disposal under the May 1951 US-Chilean copper agreement. The Chilean Government has set a minimum price of 1,200 dollars per metric ton, f.o.b. Chile, for its "free disposal" copper, and there is nothing in the redent agreement to prevent the shiPment of all or part of the "free disposal" copper to the US. Chile agreed to make eighty percent of-the large US mine production available to the US at approximately 606 dollars per metric ton.
7.
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. Agreement with Haiti signed: The Dominidan Republic and 'Raiti have signed a five-year agreement regarding the admission of Haitian workers to the Dominican Republic and their employment there. The agreement 25X1A sets up the regulations for the employment of these workers in Dominican agriculture and industry and defines the living conditions and mutUal obligations between the workers and their employers. (R PTIS
6 Jan 52)
Comment: The Dominican and Haitian Governments have long been disthissing the proposal for a bilateral treaty on emigration. Previous talks had failed because the Dominican Republic could receive no adequate assurance that Haitian workers would voluntarily return to their country. Apparently a suitable arrangement has now been worked out on a limited seasonal basis.
The agreement represents the carrying oui of a joint declaration issued by Presidents Trujillo and Magloire at their frontier meeting last February (see OCI Daily Digest, 6 Feb.51).

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SECURITY INFORmA_TION
10 January 1952
CIA No. 49499-A
Copy No.
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TO THE DAILY DIGEST

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Comment: Both the Netherlands and Indonesia are reportedly satisfied with the exchange of notes concerning the Indonesisn seizures of arms enroute to Netherlands New Guinea. Discussion can now begin on the Indonesian demands for abrogation of. the Union statute, revision of the reSt of the Dutch-Indonesian agreements., and transfer of New Guineats sovereignty to Indonesia.

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NETHERLANDS. butch and Indonesians ready to begin discussions: The Indonesian Foreign Minister is appreciative of US intervention in the Dutch-Indonesian dispute and states that according to a press report from The Hague, the Netherlands Government is ready to proceed with the Dutch-Indonesian talks. He says that his country will do everything possible to pursue discussions to a satisfactory conclusion. (S S/8 Djakarta 978, 9 Jan 52)
10 Jan 52
HR70-14
-Ter-3BeRET-61JEDEP-
6 . 6.
FOR RELEA$E RELEASE APPROVED FOR DATE. 18-Mar-2010 18-Mar-2010 DATE:

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Another MIG-15 EO-15 division division possibly possibly moves moves from f r o m Manchuria: Manchuriat A Another A message message on on 1 January January referred o the the move of the the Yourteenth This I ieferred t to move o1 Fourteenth Air Air Division. bivision. This division is is equipped equipped wieh and has'been t Tikushan Takushan near near the, the diViiion with MIG15's MIG-15's and has'been based based a at Korean border. border. (SUEDE Roundup 7, 7 , 21152, 21152, 9 9 Jan 52) Korean (SUEDE Air Air Force Force Roundup Jan 52)
Comment: No move o f t h i s unit Comment: No subsequent subsequent messages messages about about the the.move of this unit have have been been o t h e r MIG-15 M I G 1 5 unit unit at.Takushan, a t Takushan, the t h e Sixth Sixth Regiment, is currently currently reoeived. b raceived. Another Regiment, is t r a n s f e r r i n g to t o the t h e Shanghai Shanghai area. area. transferring
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CIA No. 49500 Copy No.
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DAILY DIGEST
State Dept. review completed

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SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
1.
USSR. Russians threaten to tighten interzonal trade controls in Austria: Soviet officials in Austria recently implied to an Austrian official that controls over interzonal trade would be tightened unless the government committed itself to deliver specific quantities of aluminum, lead and copper to Soviet enterprises in Austria in 1952. The Soviet officials hinted that non-compliance would lead to curtailment of allocations of petroleum products from the Soviet zone and to restrictions on the movement of such items as scrap metal, machines, electrical equipment and other items. (S Vienna 2250, 8 Jan 52)
2.
Secretary-General of the Finnish Foreign Office analyzes Soviet foreign policy: in a conversation with the American Ambassador at Helsinki last sovsmner, the Secretary-General of the Finnish Foreign Office referred to the fall barrage of Soviet notes, particularly.those addressed to Turkey and Norway. Since the Russians could scarcely have expected the Norwegians and Turks to quail before them, the Secretary-General suspected other motives behind these exchanges. He suggested that the Soviet Union, under cover of this diplomatic activity, might be quietly preparing to retreat somewhere without too much loss of face. His best guess was that the Russians Were prepared to settle in Korea on terms that were not much to their liking. (S Helsinki Desp. 440, 27 Nov 51)

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Comment: Soviet authorities have frequently complained of inadequat-e allocations of raw materials to their enterprises and have made threats in an effort to enforce their demands. In 1947, they informed the Austrian Government that a specified list of foods and industrial products would be permitted to nmve between zones only if an official permit were obtained from Soviet authorities, and this pressure technique could be used again to force concessions from the Austrians. Until now, however, trade between the Soviet and Western zones has taken place with little obstruction.
3.
ALBANIA. Albanian Government attempts to secure gold and foreign currency: During the summer of 1951, the Albanian Government forbade the use of gold in all commercial transactionsj AnYone wishing to obtain currency for gold coins must surrender them to a bank. An unspecified number of persons were arrested in an effort to force them, under threat of torture, to surrender gold holdings and foreign currency.
I
25X1C
Trusted individuals have allegedly been sent abroad on more than one occasion to obtain foreign currency illegally through the sale of jewels.
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It was rumored that the reason for the drive to uncover convertible currency holdings was that the Albanian Government had to make a three million dollar Payment to the Czechoslovakian Goverment by September 1951. (5/
25X1A1
Comment: There was a marked intensification of effort by Albania during 1951 to collect dollars and gold. Albanian-Americans were solicited to contribute dollars to their former compatridts. Special stores dealing in luxury goods purchasable with eoupons obtained from the exchange of gold or hard currency were opened. It is reported that the stores were stocked with luxury items imported from Czechoslovakia.
4.
25X1
Comment:
It is possible that preparations for,MIG-15 production in

I
Czech=rTia were completed by the end of 1951.
25X1
25X1C I
p ans ca
who were engaged in the preparations for MIG-15 production, ed for the completion of 10 prototypes by March 1952.
5.
YUGOSLAVIA. Three higb government officials may visit America: Foreign Minister Kardelj has informed Ambassador Allen that three high Yugoslav officials -- the Federal Minister of Industry and Construction, Vukmanovic Tempo, the Vice Premier of Serbia, Invan Vaselinov, and the Vice-Premier of Bosnia-Hercegovina, Aydo Humo -- desire to visit American industries. (C Belgrade 874, 9 Jan 52)
Comment: An unprecedented visit,such as thia would mark a significant development in closer US-Yugoslav relations, especially in view of the obvious propaganda target it would provide Tito's Cominform critics.
Irrespective of the overriding political connotations, which would inevitably accompany a visit of Communist, dignitaries to America, the event, should be viewed in the contexts of overall Yugoslav economic difficulties and efforts to increase production, and the recently concluded economic cooperation pact between Yugoslavia and the US.
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Vukmanovic Tempo, a former Partisan general and confidant of Tito, is one of the rising stars in the Yugoslav regime. During the reorganization of the economic hierarchy last fall, he emerged as the chief of the powerful Federal Council for Industry, which is potentially the primary center of control over internal!ecbnomic development.

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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1.
Comments /t is not yet clear why the Calcutta press, which applauded passage of the US foodgrain loan bill in June 1951, should now criticize additional aid from the United States,
2.
PAKISTAN. No foodyain surplus forecast for 19521 The US Embassy in WIZEr-estimates-that there will be no surplus foodgrain'exports from Pakistan in 1952 because of poor rainfall and decreased acreages of crops sown in the fall of1951. (It Karachi 672, Weeka 1, 4 Jan 52) Comments Any new shortage of foodgraine in South and Southeast Asia 7017E-1952 will aggravate an already unfavorable food_situation caused by adverse climatic and political factors. Ceylon, to ehioh Pakistan has agreed to export 150.000 tons of rice, will probably suffer most from Pakistani crop failures. The most important aspect of the Shortage, however, is that Pakistan, which has usually been assumed to be a food surplus area, may no longer confidently be oounted on-as such,
3.
,"
INDOCHINA,
American Minister in Sai on disturbed by French peaoe hints: aigon, repor ing bhat PretherAuu had banned poblioation of French Foreign Minister Schuman's referenoe on 6 January to a possible armistice in Indochina, observed that local centers of neutralism and appeasement had reseted quickly through press articles 'mitasizing the desirability of peaoe in the Far East.
Heath feels that statements such as Samman's will gravely hinder the psychological mobilization effart in Vietnam, He also fears that India, -which immediately cabled the text of Schuman's statement to its Consul General in Saigon, may seize the opportunity_to propose mediation of the Indochina war or to subhit the prablemto the mt. (S Saigon 1344, 8 Jan 52)
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INDIA, Press reaotion to lido-American teohnioal aid agreements Except Tialloutta, the non-Communist Indian press has generally'reacted favorably to signature of the /lido-American technical aid agreement whereby some fifty million dollars worth of technical assistance.is to be made available to India, Papers strest the fact that this aid has no political strings, and they look forward hopefully to a.new_era of friendship and cooperation between India and the United Statei,' In Calcutta, however, the press has expressed suspicion and distrust of the agreement, raising thi old specters of foreign economic infiltration and pressure upon India to abandon its policy of neutrality between East andWest. (U New Delhi 2358, 7 Jan; U New Delhi 2381, 8 Jan: R daleutta 515, 8 Jan: R FHIS,9 Jan 51)
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Comments Occasional French hints at a negotiated peace in Indochina, put The past year or more, have usually emanated from the Ministry for Associated States rather than from the Foreign Office.
ortniw
In a speech on 9 January Premier Huu appealed to China to cease its ail to the Viet Minh in order that an international conference cOUld be held to settle the cold war throughout the Fir East. It appears that the Premier believed the Schuman statement more.portentous_than earlier ones and was attempting to identify himself early with any forthcoming peace movement.
4.
zrah
CHINA.
25X1 C
Preparations for invasion'of Formosa after cease-fire in Korea The Chinese Communists plan_to transfer MIG-152s and light STA7371 to.airfields in the East China coastal area.if there is a'truce in Korea. acoordinz to Mid-December information from' 1 Preparations to attack Formosa already taken by the 6ommunists inctuaes (1) an increase in the_number of ground personnel and Soviet technicians at these airfields; (2) the return from Korea of several Third Field Army divisions to the Nanking area; and (3) the transfer in mid-Tecember Of two Army Group coMmanders from Pyongyang to Nanking. 25X1A
I 1
25X1
COmments There ie no reliable evidence that the Communists intend to inii-E-Fasmose. in the next few months., whether or not an accord on a cease-fire in Korea is reached.
Airfields in Chekiang and Fukien Provinces, opposite Formosa, which mere built or improved two years ago are believed inactive but are presumably maintained in operable condition,
5. 25X1C
Soviet Far Eastern Commander in Chief reported in Koreas A Ilearned through oirouitous sources in western Korean that on 26 September "four-high ranking Soilet officers and three.Soviet civilians* landed at Yonpo airfield near Hanhtmg in northeastern Korea, One of:the Soviet offioers was rePorted-to be Malinovski, 8oviet.:Commander in Chief -or Far Eastern military foreel. This group stopped at Heinhung before going on to Pyongyang, where thay.were to meet with Chinese and North Korean repreeentati-Ses at the cease-fire conference. In connectionwith this visit, itwas rumored that the Soviets desired a cease-fire for a short time only to allow a build-ur of Communist strength in Korea. 25X1A
KOREA.
I
Comments It is not believed that suoh a hazardous route into Korea woulneitred by high-ranking Soviet officers. A sodded portion of Yonpo airfield has been operational for some time, but it seems doubtful if anything other than light plaaes could land there. Meet indica-
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Korea, tions continue to point to a Communist desire for a cease-fire in quantity. armistice is still an unlmown although the duration of such an
to expand arm2rs Defense Minister KOREA. ROK Minister of Defense desires. reported that a noonsiderable exLee, in a 9 January press ooncerence, be initiated by calling Will pension" of the South Korean armed forces nineteen and twenty-eight. The up second reservists between the ages of college at Taegn is also part of this exestablishment of the military 52) Ticker, 9 Jan pansion program. (11
6.
ens
pistol story exaggerated: Japanese JAPAN. Poli ce claim Nagoya Times fovember Nagoya Times story that apF6Tne sources claim that- a late confiscatn-rtrEfty was exaggerated. proximately 680 pistols had been quoted total rePolice explained that the 52) (See Daily Digest, 9 Jan since the cessation of hospresearall pistols confiscated in Japan 51) Nov 29 Summary, tilities. (S Far East Command Daily Intelligence

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that no furtherexpansion Comments American observers believe considered until the force in being, end its officer ROK foroes should be corps, reaches a more adVanced state of training.
of
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1.
Action on Czech overflight requests to be delayed: A Belgian POWEEF Office spokesman has suggested that, before answering the month-old Czech requests for approval of the proposed Prague-Paris air route by way of Copenhagen, The Hague and Brussels, the interested governments coordinate their replies through an international conference to discuss the matter in detail or by an exchange of notes. Both the United States and Britain have strongly suggested that the requests for landing rights be denied, because approval would circumvent existing controls on Czech overflights in Western Europe.
GENERAL.
France, which has not yet received a Czqph request, has stated its intention not to grant the landing rights, and the Netherlands has hinted at similar action. Belgiumls position, however, is unclear beyond its willing ,ness to continue stalling. Denmark feels that it has no legal grounds on which to refuse the Czech request. sp far, Czechoslovakia has applied pressure only on Denmark; thus it appears that the Czechs wish.to obtain Danish approval first to use .as a bargaining point in discussions with the other countries. (FactUal data from: C Brussels 908, 7 Jan 52; S The Hague 665, 3 Jan 52; S Brussels 881, 28 Dec 51; C Copenhagen 483, 5 Jan 52)
2.
Government denies plans for cUrrency reform: The EaSt German Government has officially denied rumors that large nuMbers of East Marks are being printed in preparation for a currency reform. A Soviet Zone bank official ha& admitted that orders have been.placed for the printing of new East Mark bills, but that they are merely for the gradual replacement of deteriorated old bills. The wide circulation and acceptance of the rumors of a currency exchange have already induced sufficient unloading of East Mark holdings to depress the value of the East Zone currency to where one Deutschmark, which formerly bought only 3.92:East Marks, will now-buy 4.45 East Marks. (1/ FBIS Berlin and Frankfurt, 6 to lo Jan 52; P Berlin 892, 8 Jan 52)
EAST GERTIAITC.
Comment: Official denial of reform plans was probably designed to prevent the inflationary pressure and consequent depreciation of the East. Mark which would result from the unloading of East Mark holdings. A currency reform might be intended to appreciate the East Mark to the value of the Mest Mark, thus enabling the Communists to claim that they had overcome the economic barrier to integration. Such an artificial measure would not facilitate integration of the zonal economies.and would have only propaganda value; it might also further impair the stability of the Soviet Zone currency.

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i
icture as grim: AUSTRIA. Ambassadordesignate to US sees Austrian economic e US, repo o esigna e ssa or Dr. Max J asserted that he sees little prospect of reducing Austria s annual ioreign traieeficit. Attributing this deficit to the cost of.coal tnports, Loewenthal reputedly urged that Austria increase the export price of its electric power and offer premiums for exports to Germany to improve its balance with that country. He stated, however, that Foreign Minister Gruber had vetoed the latter proposal for "political reasons," and has instructed him that his main task in Washington will be to obtain no less than 145
1
million dollars in economic aid in 1952. Regarding trade with the Soviet Orbit, Loewenthal said there is little prospect of increasing imports from the East beyond present levels. Charging too lenient an attitude on the part of Austrian officials influenced by exporters, he urged ouick retaliation when Satellite exports fall below
agreed quotas.
25X1A
Comment: Funds now allocated to Austria as economic aid are 25 million dollars below the figure held essential by the Austrian Foreign Office.
While Austria has in some cases attempted to schedule Satellite deliveries to insure the fulfillment of trade agreement quotas, the government recently requested special permission to deliver alloy steels to Czechoslovakia, justifying the exception, in part, as necessary to preserve a foreign market.
4.
Consultations for new Belgian Cabinet under way:: Prime Minister Pholien's oneparty Social Christian (Catholic) Cabinet has resigned in order to permit the formation of a government more able to cope with the "present difficulties" facing Belgium. For the past month the government has been attacked not only by the oppOsition parties, but also by influential members within the Catholic Party who have been calling for ministers with strong
BELGIUM.
financial and economic policies.
Leading candidates for prime minister are Eyskens and Duvieusart. Both the Foreign Minister and Defense Minister are expected to keep their present (1 Brussels posts. Political observers do not feresee a general election. tiies, 10 Jan 52; French News 915, 8 Jan 52; R Hilversum, 9 Jan 52; NY Agency, 10 Jan 52) Comment: Possible chamges in the Belgian Cabinet have been rumored since labor's success in obtaining wage concessions from the government in there are few late October. Except for Van Zeeland, now Foreign Minister, Party milling to risk their leaders of stature within the Social Christian ruputations to patch up the performance of the Pholien government. Because neither the Socialists nor the Liberals are likely to join with the Catholics
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in a coalition, and because new elections mill cause the Catholics to lose their present parliamentary majority, every attempt will be made to form another homogeneous government.
S.
Comment: Continued DS and British support of the EDC mill help ensure Dutch participation in the army plan. Modification in ths formerly adamant Dutch stand on certain aspects of the EEC would probably lead Belgium and Luxembourg to soften their opposition,
6.
ITALY. 'Conservative press comments on Churchill's DS'trip unfavorable to IJFITEin: The Truman-Churchillmeetings in Washington,-in addition to eliciting factual reporting in the non-Communist preds, have evoked in some conservative papers editorials unfavorable to Britain. Commentiby La Stampa, Momento Seri, Giornale di Scilia, and others add up to the theSis that Churchill is hostile to European federation and the European defense plan, that he is trying to retrieve for his country the equality with the US in world leadership that it enjoyed in Roosevelt's time, and that what he may achieve inWashington will be an exclusively British success. ,Gazzetta del Popolo observes that the meetings are particularIy'significant, coming at a time when Britain is much weaker and the US much stronger than las the case ten years ago. (U Rome 3062, 8 Jan 52; R FBIS, 7 and 9 jan 52)
'

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NETHERLANDS. Dutch support of the European Defense Commuhity,seems issnredi Dutch Foreign Minister Stikker has told a US Embassy official that he feels "reasonably sure" of early agreement on the European Defense Community and intimated that his country would modify its previous position on the unresolved issues:to facilitate over-all agreement. Although concerned that the Community concept as envisaged by France does not tie into NATO, Stikker seemed reassured when told that the DS considers the EMC a necessary adjunct to NATO and that the US would oppose any change ArCwhat it considered:a' desirable relationship between the two organizations. (S The Hague 686, 9 Jan 52)
Comment: These comments reflect the anti-British sentiments of large numbeg-TrYtaliani, including high government officials, who ascribe the loss of their former colonies and the Trieste impasse to Btitish unfriendliness. These sentiments persist despite current efforts of Eden and De Oasperi to establish more cordial diplomatic relations between the two
countries.
7.
SWITZERLAND.
Swiss tO approve military materiel orders for US:
The Swiss
Uneenetary of State is approving export licenses for the two million

dollars' wrorth of rockets and other munitions now being manufactured in Switzerland for the US, and will approve export permits for additional
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orders of twelve million dollars now being negotiated. In exchange; he requests that licenses be granted for 374,000 dollars worth of items on order from the US and urgently needed by the Swiss Arey. The US Minister in Bern strongly urges approval of thie requett because of the importance to the West of- Swiss cooperation in military matters and in export Controls. (S Bern 856, 8 Jan 52)
The practically unconditional approval of large DSmilitary order'sWinstime indicates a considerable departure frdm Swiss neutrality,
as a result of their extreme anxiety to obtain US military materiel to fulfill their rearmament program. The Swiss are also Concerned lest military imports from the US be made conditional on a satiefactory solution of the problem of liquidating German assets in Switzerland.
Comment:
8.
Swiss will furbish personnel to seperViee-Korea areleticer: The Swiss Minister in Washington has informed the Department of State that the Swiss Government would reply favorably to a DS request to provide officers for an inspection group in Korea following a possible armistice.thcre. The US had inquired as to the availabilit7 of the Swiss for such a purpose. (S State Dept Maehington,
J
Their willingness to participate in the supervision of an once again that the Swiss desire to make themselves useful to both EaSt and West And thereby preserve the utilitarian basis for their political neutrality.
armistre7Tmonstrates
9.
New DS aid arrangements formalized: An exchange of notes and verbal statements between Britain-and the US on 8 January emphasized that in accepting economic aid under the Mutual Security Act, the United Kingdom would not be assuming apy commitments going beyond those already .1.agreed to under ECM The notes will not be published until after Churchill's return to England and the exact amount of the aid is settled. The verbal statements will not be Made public in any form. (S ISA London 28, 8 Jan 52)
.
num KINGDOM,
25X1A
Comment:
Comment:.
There has been considerable British concern, 'fostered partly
by steene of American Congressmen, over the sentence in the new act
specifying that aid iS given. to further encourage the economic unification and political federation of Europe." .Any British government would have been forced by public opinion to seek some' assurance that Britain's taking a more active role in European integration measures was not a condition of the aid grant.
Although the exact amount Of the grant has not yet been determined, it is expected to be between 300 and loo million dollars.
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10.
SPAIN. Basque Nationaliats say Franco hes scored great victory: Radio Euzkadi, voice of the Basque Nationalist government-in-exile, Calls the recent press statements of US officials regarding economic aid to the Franco regime a great victory for the Generalissimo. It regards Franco's continued intransigence, expressed in his New Year's Eve message, concerning the policies of his regime as fully justified because the US, in granting him aid, has altered its policy to accommodate him. The radio commentary deplores the "misguided self-interest" of the US and warns that strengthening Franco amounts, in the long run, to strengthening Communism.
Comment: Recent statements ascribed to US officials have produced a flood-Ur-anted comments in the Spanish press, which give the impression that pending US-Spanish economic and military negotiations will result in the economic rehabilitation of the country.
11.
MOROCCO. Spanish Zone reforms may be nearing completion: The Sultan's representative in the Spanish Protectorate of Morocco reportedly will_go to Madrid on 13 January to discuss administrative reforms with Frando. MeanWhile, the leader of the Spanish Moroccan nationalists has entered into discussions with the Spanish Military Attache in Tangier. (S Tangier 230, 9 Jan 52)
Comment: AdMinistrative changesintended to avoid Arab League criticism of SpEETIK-Fille in Morocco have been rumored since mid-summer. Although there may be some reorganization of governmental services, there is little likelihood that the regime vill undergo any substantial liberalization.
12.
GOLD COAST. Developing political crisis may endanger self-government: noting the strong dissension within the dominant Convention People's Party over its leaders' relatively moderate policy, the American consul at Accra estimates that the British Governor may be forced in effect to suspend the constitution's self-government provisions through the use of his reserve powers. The Governor left for London on 7 January for a tenLdaY consultation with the Colonial Office.
In any event, serious trouble is indicated for the Convention People's Party and the British administration at the next session of the Legislative Assembly meeting on 29 January. Head of the party and Leader of GoVernment Business Kwame Nkrumah has been losing support since early December, because TOP SECRET
11
The Basque Nationalists nevertheless urge a realistic appraisal of the Spanish situation by the opposition and the recognition of the.fact that the non-Communist opposition's weakness and fractionalism has probably contributed more to Franco's continuance in power than has the recent shift in American policy. (R FBIS,9 Jan 52)
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of his restrained approach to the issues of self-government, his collab6ration with the British, and disagreements over party finances. (C Accra 93, 9 Jan 52)
Comment: The Convention People's Party came to power on a radical program about a year ago in the first election held under the new constitution, which grants the Gold Coast a considerably greater degree of self government than the natives had previously obtained in any African colony. This is the first indication that the dissension within the party oVer unfulfilled campaign promises is great enough to threaten the government's stability. Suspension of the constitution would arouse violent opposition in the Gold Coast itself, and might well shake nativo confidence in the British program of gradual self-government for other African territories.
13.
25X1C
BOLIVIA. New attempt to oust military junta possible: General Torres, 25X1C MEE-Tang General.of the Bolivian Army, will, I soon attempt to remove the military junta because of its "do-nothing" policy and its refusal to hold elections. Torres and General Seleme, Minister of Government, are on friendly terms. (C La Paz 261, 9 Jan 52)
1
.
Cemment: Torres favors the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement and is known to have opposed the military junta's assuming power last gay. His appointment was in the nature.of bribery to keep him froth cooperating. the opposition. He would appear to be more moderate than the aVerage Nationalist, however, since he refused to permit his military unit til-engage in the Movement's 1949 revolution.
General Seleme has also been maneuvering to oust the junta and may believe that his best chances are with Torres. A growing rift in the army and widespread dissatisfaction with the economic situation have contributed to the junta's instability.
,
14.
CHILE. Diplomatic-military conversations with US agreed to by government: Ararde-memoire accepting the US proposal to initiate diplomatic-,military negotiations for a bilateral military assistance agreement has been authorized by Chilean President Gonzalez Videla and initialled by the Foreign Minister. Fears of internal political repercussions in this electoral year'had caused the matter to be stalemated in the Presidtncia, although strong approval had been expressed first by the combined general staff and then by the cautious Minister of Defenses.
TheForeign Minister and the Undersecretary are very concerned about publicity which must be given when US military representatives arrive. The Foreign Minister strongly stressed fears of political capital that would be tadeby internal and foreign opponents of the administration when

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the negotiations become known. The US EMbassy comments that the President is an astute politician and, after deliberate consideration, he may haVe grounds to think he can extort from the US a quid pro quo on the copper or some other problem.
The Embassy also states that the Straits of Magellan shipping control office proposal of the US lies dormant in the Presidencia, and has not been brought to the attention of the Minister of Defense despite the lively interest of the Chilean Navy. The President fears that presidantial aspirant Ibanez del Campo might make political capital "thereof abetted by the Argentines.", (S Santiago 345, 8 Jan 52)
15.
The two mehtioned provisions have been applied to technical Section 511(b) denies technical assistance unless .the recipient country "has agreed to join in promoting international un standing and good will, and in maintaining mrld peace, and to take suc action as shall be mutually agreed upon to eliminate causes of international tension."
coopentiaagreements.

Comment:
GUATEMALA. Government is willing to accept conditions of US technidal assistance: The Guatemalan Foreign Minister has stated that his government sees to Sections 511(b) and 515 of the Mttual SecuritY Act and desires to continue existing programs of technical cooperation with the US. The US Ambassador considers this to constitute agreement to the'provisions, pending their incorporation into revised,project agreements. CR Guatemala City 208, 8 Jan 52)
This action by Guatemala will permit the programs of technical co Operation with the US to continue.
16.
MEXICO. Tungsten concentrates being shipped to Orbit countries: Of a monthly production of 30Ltons of tungsten concentrate from Sonora, Mexico, only five tons are entering the US while a substantial portioh of the remainder is believed being shipped to the Soviet Orbit. In contrast to the 62 dollars per 20 pounds offered by US buyers, others are offering fp& 72 to 80 dollars. (C Mexico City 883, 7 Jan 52) Comment: Mexican production of tungsten concentrate, although very smallTErrncreased from an average of three metric tons per month in 1950 to the present rate. A number of small mining properties have been developed recently and others may be brought into production. As is the
case with .copper, the tungsten concentrates are probably being shipped to Orbit countries through cover firms in weatern Europe.
TOP SECRET
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kj
TOP SECRET
11 January 1952
CIA.Islo. 4954)g-A Copy No.

TO THE DAILY DIGEST

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SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
1.
YUGOSLAVIA. Yugoslav Foreign Minister suggests "peacefV1" solution of Mira River dispute: Yugoslav Foreign Minister Kardelj has informed American Ambassador Allen that in the event Hungary rejects the Yugoslav request for a joint commission to examine the Mnra River island dispute, Yugoslavia would give full international publicity to its position).but had not decided "to bring the matter before any international forum." He added that "while the controversy involved a serious territorial principle, the island itself was of no great consequence."
-

SECTION 2 (EASTERN) TOP SECRET
1
In explaining the origin of the island, Foreign Minister Kardelj stated that the Hungarians had created the island in the thirties by constructing a breakwater into the river on the Hungarian side which deflected the main current. Consequently, Kardelj hinted that the Yugoslays would cause the island to disappear next spring by building a breakwater farther up the river on the Yugoslav side. (S S/S Belgrade 869) 8 Jan 52)
.
During therpast two weeks, both governments have exchanged Hungary has claimed jurisdiction on the basis of the Treaty of Trianon, and Yugoslavia has objected to the Hungarian military occupation of Yugoslav territory" and has called for an immediate evacuation.
Camment:
a seriErprotest notes.
2.
Court adviser suggests West present new proposals directly to 7IRF King Farouk's chief court adviser believes that any new Western proposals on the Suez and Sudan issues should not be presented to the present Mild government. Accordingly, the King's advieer suggests that any new offers be submitted to the King) who may then determine what action to take. The adviser believes that the present government is not sincerely interested in negotiations and must be dismissed before any solution can be achieved. He also considers it necessary that literate public opinion support such action, and thinks that the opportune moment for a change in government has not yet arrived. (S S/S Cairo 1004, 7 Jan 52)
Comments Reports from Cairo generally agree that the King is biding his time, convinced that for the time being inflamed public opinion is too strong to counter. A change of cabinets at this time might result in a more serious internal situation Without any possibility that a negotiated settlement with Britain could be reached.
EGYPT.
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SECTION 3 (WETERN)
3.
AUSTRIA. Population puzzled by absence of US retaliation against Hungary: The US Embassy in Vienna reports that there are a number of indications that Austrians are in general puzzled by US failure to retaliate more energetically against Hungary for the detention and trial of American airmen. Austrians allegedly imply that it is difficult for exposed countries to stand firmly against the Soviet Orbit vthen the US itself is not able to do so. (S Vienna 2235, 8 Jan 52)
Sh

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.41
-143P-SECRET-SVEDE-
HR70-14
9. 9 .
o the USSR. USSR, RusSian bomber Russian bomber pilots pilots return return from from Chinas China: The return t to of Russian 2ussian pilots mho ferried TU.2 is p i l o t s who TU-2 light l i g ht bombers to China i s indicated indioated in-two messages of i n ' two mebsages of 11 11 JanUary. January. Accompanied Accompyied Possibly possibly by by Chinese Chinese Communist Communist personnel, the Soviet pilots traveled n three PerSonnel, Soviet.pilots traveled iin three I-2 11-2 traneports transports which whichreretraced traoe&the the route route followed followed by by the t h e TU-21s. TU-2ls. (SUEDE (SUEDE Air Force Roundup Roundup 9, 9, 2120Z, 22 Jan 21202, Jan 52) 62)
CoMmenti Colirment; Russian TU-2 TU-2 flights to t o China China have been a prominent feature 'ofthe the growing growing bomber bomber strength strength in in China, China, now naw iin excess of of one one hundred hundred and and of n excess fifty. pilots t to the transports would would o t h e USSR in transports f i f t y . The return of the Soviet pilots suggest the TU-2's to Chinese Comunist Communist suggeet that the Russians are turning over t h e TU-2's Air Air Foroe Force units. unite.
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11. 1 1 .
North Korean Amy Army sees Bees disoharge of disabled troops 48 as source aource of of discontents A 6th Infantry disoontentr A6 6 January Jaauarymessage messagefrom fromfile t h e North North Korean. Korean 8th Infantry Divisfon n v i s i o n tO t o its i t s nolanally nolninally subordinate subordinate 82nd 82nd Regiment Regiment in i n the the Kiesong Kaesong area* area etatea ProCedure has haa been been s set up for for %en "men wounded wounded i in s t a t e s that t h a t 'discharge discharge procedure e t up p entien (bier age) and and unqualified unqualified men men (under (Under 17 17 years years of of age)." age)." aotion (over 32.yeai.s 32 years oOf f age) Thi-addieiiee iswared, performed The 'addkssee ia vrarkd, hOmver, however, that that this this diseharge disoharge "Must.be "must be performed sedretly net tto-fament discontent among your soldiers." s e o r e t l y so eo is' as n6t o foment di6GOEtent soldiers." (SUEDE (SUEDE AS IN 1752, 8 &n Jan 52) 52)Korea CM I N 1762,
'
'Comments Coment: This message indirectly'supports i n d i r e c t l y supports the the malty many reports received reaeived of loirg= in in the.NOrth Korean f equal equal importance importanoe is ie the t h e fact' faot Of of 1 0 the North Korean Army. Armye O Currently that the Army is Korean Amy i q discharging discharging any any men at'all. a t ' a l l r Currently t hat t h e North Korean
.

--110P-SEGBE-T-SUBEIE-
aceepted i intenigenceconfirms NorthKorean Korean inability i n a b i l i t y fully'to fully t o rerethe North aoospted n t e l l i g e n c e confirms the s poealble h view possible that that the the 82nd Regiment, Regiment, i in viaw Plsoesbattle plaoe battle casualties. b a s u a l t h s . It iis Of i its Kaesong, i is made a model model North Korean of t s special s p e o i a l position at a t Kaesong, s being made unit for for prestige p r e s t i g e purposes. purposes.
6 '6
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"
S -Sao 52 HR70-14
FAR EAST FAR-EAST

1 1.
considerable food foodstockpile stockpile in in eastern eastern North Korea: 2. Communists accumulate,considerable
US Army US 52 12 Jan Ian 52 SUEDE SUEDE
Korean station station to to another another reported reported the the receipt of Korean 39,490 tons tonsof ofrice, rice, millet, and 39,490 and beans beans at at one one of of the principal east Id. 9/ east coast coastsupply supply depots. depots. These 70/ tAJ 3 7 supplies, transported transported by by truck, truck, were wereaccumulated accumulatedduring during one one week's weeks time. ,time.
Comment: This is sufficient Comment: This quantity quantity of of food is sufficient to supply r o o r e a supply all all the the Communist Communistt troops in Koreafor for almost almost two twomonths, months, or or troops in sector alone alone for six sixmonths. months. in the the eastern sector
A very very short truck haul A haul is i sindicated indicated by by the the quantity of material moved quantity of moved during this period, possibly possiblyindicating indicating movement movement or central centralKorean Korean railhead railhead to to the the supply supply depot. depot. from an eastern eastern or
APPROVED FOR RELEASE APPROVED DATE: IDATE. 20-Mar-2010 20-Mar-201 0
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3-3
A7 7 January message A message from from one one unknown unknown North
I TOP TO cSECRlZT SUEI3E
AP
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HR70-14
16. 16.
OctOler_meliAge, GEXer meek ge,
KOREA. KOREA.
Communists Communiets colleCt c o l l e c t intelligence i n t e l l i g e n c e on on UN UN air a i r installations: installationst
17. 1 7 .
"q tp% x t ~ A "I i r have Porae t~ o sketch Aviation reports: "1 have the ~ ecurity-Department, u r fr c i ~ ~ Division," e e NO ~ r rean ~ the ~ of ~ Yong.(dungi0o) eirport (a UN airfield near Seoul), the table of organizaYcng (dungp'o) a i r p o r t a i r f i e l d near Seoul), the t a b l e o f organigah a t a letter l e t t e r of tions Other important (matter)." that t i o n s and other (matter)." The message adds t Army Korea, Korea, CM I IN N instruction i n s t r u c t i o n is i s being being sent s e n t to t o South South Korea. Korea, (SUEDE US Army 2668, 2668, 11 1 1 Jan Jan 52) 52)
The sender of this tentatively of t h i a message has been t e n t a t i v e l y identified identified an air a i r intelligenoe intelligenae while l o g i c a l that t h a t an While logical 'het should'exist,.this first message received received i Indicating n e t should'exist, t h i s iis s tthe he f i r s t message n d i c a t i n g such activities. aativities.
as a collection officer. a .1.7eFOITI reports c o lleotion o fficer.
from :um un.on su or tne'Diortn-KOrtan-Air-FOrbil-tb-wCElef,
Comment: Comentt
Communists accumulate accumulate considerable food stockpile in i n eastern e a s t e r n North Communists January meisagb message from from 6ne one unknown unlcnom North North Korean Korean station s t a t i o n to t o another another Korea: AA 77 January Korea: reported e o e i p t of r i c e , m i l l e t , and and beans beans at-one a t one of of reported the r reCeipt of 39,490 39,490 tons tons of ofrice,.millet, the'Oinoipal These 'supplies , transported by by t h e p r i n c i p a least east coast c o a s t supply'depots. supply depots. Theseceupplies, (SUEDE US U S Army Army Korea, Korea, truck, truok, were were accumulated accumulated during during one one week's week's time. time. (SUEDE CM IN I N 2901, 2901, 12 12 Jan 52) 52)
I
Comment: This quantity Comment: to q u a n t i t y of o f food is i e sufficient suffioient t o supply all a11 the the CommuEariFoops in Korea the eastern C onnnm~oop s in Koreafor foralmost almost tem two months, months, or o r troops trcops in in t he e astern sector s e o t o r alone alone for f o r six s i x months. months.
A. very sshort haul is is indicated indicated by by tthe quantity of m material A, very h o r t t truck r u c k haul he q u a n t i t y of aterial moved moved during during this t h i s period, period, possibly possibly indicating i n d i c a t i n g movement movementfrom from an aneastern:or eastemor central c e n t r a l Korean Korean railhead railhead to t o the the supply supply depot. depot.
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HR70-14
SECRET SUEDE'.
FAR EAST FAR
c rB
2. ,Communists replation for prisoners of 2. Communists issue new new regulation for handling handltng prtsoners of war:
..
US A Air US i r Force
W - l r u - 333X 3331'
13 Jan Jan 52 13 62 SUEDE SUEDE
An An order order on on treatment treatment of of prisoners prisoners of of war war from the Korean 7 Korean Commander Commander in in Chief, dated 7
December, of war war December, provtded provided that that no no prisoners prisoners of were to records on on were to be be released, released, that proper records prisoners should be kept, kept, and and that that currently currently held heldprisoners, prisoners, "not prisoners should be "not as yet The order order further further outoutregistered, " should should be reported to headquarters. The the administrative procedures for handling of prisoners. prisoners. lined the handling of Comment: The The issuance eighteen issuance of of this this order eighteen months that Communist Communist unit months after the outbreak of war strongly suggests that commanders have enjoyed a wide wide latitude latitude in in their their handling of UN UNprisoners. prisoners. handling of enjoyed a It is also apparent from the order that the Communists have no record i s also apparent from the order that the Communists have record of of some of of the the prisoners captured to date. captured t q
FOR RELEASE ATE: 23-Mar-2010 DATE: 23-Mar-2010 IPDPPROVED
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7013SECRET----SUEDE
1=1-
HR7
5.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 19-Feb-2010 ATE: 19-Feb-2010 IDPPROVED

KOREA.
Chinese Communists renew "air violation" allegations: rthe revival of Communist allegations of UN flights over manchuria du ng the past veeks, after a period of eilenoe on this issue, suggests a Chinese intention to warn the Chinese people not to expeot piegress at the oease-fire conferenoe. 12 Jan 52)
most serious serious charge charge to t o date date vas was leveled,on leveled on 13 13 January, Januaty, Commen*i The most Comment: when m both broadcasts saored ecored the the m Communist u n i a t negotiators and-propaganda and propaganda broadoasts "deliberate provocation" provocation" of of a a series series of of over-flights over-flights as as far far vest w e a t SA as Mhkden W d e n on on that that day. day. While the preoise precise signifiaanoe significance of of them these oharges oharges iis not yet. yetknovn, mile s not known,
-6B33m-MOO-
16 1 6 Jan 52
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ri
ft
..411
SECRET
similar protests protests over over an alleged UN UN bombing of of Kaeeong EMesong were were followed followed by a a break break in i n oemse-fire oease-fire talks talke in in late late August. by August.

--sEeREIp EC
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9.
KOREA. Communists iesue new regulation f o r handling KOEEA. Communists issue new regulation for handling prisoners prisoners of of war: wart An An on treatment treatment of of prisoners prisoners of of war h e Korean i n Chief, Chief, -017;7- on war from from t the Korean Gonrmander Commander in no Prisoners prisoners of'war t o be released, d a b d . 7 Deaember, Provided provided that t h a t no dited.7.DeceMber, of-war were were to be released, on prisoners prisoners should should be kept, and that t h a t currently o u r r e n t l y held held t h a t preper proper records records on that kept, and prisoners, "not "not as a8 yet yet registered,"-should registered," should be reported t o headquarters.' prisoners, be reported to headquarters. The u r t h e r outlined h e administrative o r handling of The order f further outlined t the administrative prooedures prooedures f for handling of (SUEDE US CM IN IN 3334, 3334, 13 1 3 Jan Jan 52) 52) prisoners. prisoners. (SUEDE US Air Air Foroe Foroe CM
Comment: Comment: The The issuance issuance of of this t h i s order eighteen months a f t e r the outorder eighteen months after the outbreak of war stronglysuggests suggests that t h a t Communist Communist unit unit commanders'have commanders'have brea07-1747-strongly I t is is also also enjoyed a a vide wide latitude l a t i t u d e in in their t h e i r handling handling of o f UN UN prisoners. prisonera. It enjOyed f r o m the t h e order o r d e r that t h a t .the t h e Communists Communists have have no reaord of o f some some of o f the the apparent from apparent no record t o date. date. prisoners captured captured to prisoners
16 Jan Jan 52 52 16
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t HR70-14

tRe
6 6
I
U. 1 1 .
NIG-15 TWO "transfer "transfer MlG15 diviiion division at a t Korean Korean border border moves moves to t o ilukdens Mukden: Two flights1w totaling 30 MI(E.16' NIG-151s, of Chinese Communist Third Third A Air Division flighb" to t a l i n g SO 8, O f t the h e chin ese Communist i r Division i r Force moired fromAntung (SUEDE UB US A Air Force CM CU IN moved &om Antungto t oNiikden Mukden on on 15 15 January. January. (SUEDE 3703, 15 Jan 52) 52)
Comments NIG-15's haa has had Cannnent: The Third Division, Division, equipped with about about 50 rnG-15'~ more than any any oother Chinese Oomunist Communist unit. more Omt-ira'bexperienoe o4mbatexperienoe than t h e r Chinese unit.
Thie This decrease deorease ln i n NIG-15 A E G U strength strength at a t the the border border may may be be temporary, termporary, eines at Nnkden, oould could be sime the t h e 7IO-15-equipped MIQ-16-equipped Fourth Division, Division, now a t Mukden, scheduled a totation r o t a t i o n 000urred ooourred in i n mid-Ootober mid-October soheduled to t o replaoe replaoe the'Third. t h e ' Third. Such a when when the t h e Fourth Fourth Division, Mviaion, then then at a t Antung, was wa8 replaced replaced by by the Third. Third.
12. 1 2 .
COmmunist C6mmmist aircraft a i r o r a f t strength in Chirur-M+nchuria-Korea China-Mhnohuria-Korea inoreased increased A. tillAir Ford()estimate estimate s states to t o 1700, 1 7 8 Air Boroe t a t e s t h a t there t h e r e is i s sufficient suffioient evidence evidenoe to Inetify the !fy the uPward upward revision revieion of o f Communiet Cammunist military airoraft a i r o r a f t strength at 1450 1450 in'the China4inohuiia-Korea area I t had been been carried c a r r i e d at in the China-Mbohuria-Korea area to t o 1700. 1700. It ranee figue includes inaludes 900 900 jet j e t fighters fighters and and 240 240 TU-2 TU02 8inoe NOVember. November. The new figure litht 100 jet l i g h t bOmbera ljbmbers and-iepresents end-represents an inerease inarease of of 100 J e t fighters, f i g h t e r s , 80 light light bombers, airoraft. Communiet air a i r strength strength inilanchuria i n Manchuria bombers, and and SO 50 tiensport tr-port a i r o r a f t . Communist is bombers. (SUEDE (SUEDE is estimated at a t 1000, 1000, inoluding'600 inoluding 600 jets j e t s and end 160 160 light l i g h t bombera. US Air Force Foroe Indioations Indioations Review, Review, 16 1 6 Jan Jan 52) 52)
Combat Comentr This This increase inorease 000urred ooourred entirely e n t i r e l y in i n China China proper. proper. Combat Comment: airormength i n Manohuria slightly s ince airoraft'strength in Nhnohuria hat3 has actually declined slightly since NOvembei, of the the movement of of several several units from South South Nhnohuria Menchuria November, teeause beoause of to t o the the Nanking-Shanghai Nanking-Shanghai area. area.
17 Jan Jan 52 52 17
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. J
11.
(4
The'inorease bambere and transports in The inorease of of light l i g h t bombers i n China China is is due due to t o the the transfer, sinoe-the estimate, of TU-2's TU-210 and and transports transports from frcm tthe USSR sinoe'the last estimate, h e USSR transfer, to proper. t o China proper. upward revieion revision of j jet lighter et f i g h t e r etrength strength is I s a000unted aooounted The upward
bYthe'identifioation fighter divifor by the' i d e n t i f i o a t i o n in i n Deoembef Deoember of of two additional additional jet jet f ighter d idsions at Hankow and Peiping. Peiping. riona a t Hankow
13. wb
KOREA. Borth i r Foroe "maJor development NOrth Korean A Air Foroe soen seen a8 as strengthenedc strengthened: A "major IiiisTrength potential" of t the Air Foroe i is indicated by m r e n g t h potential" h e North North -Korean Korean A i r Foroe e iiidioated by Three air-diviair-divirecent enemy air a i r messages messages by by the t h e US U8 Air Air Forbe, Forbe, Three reoent analysis analysis of enemy eioni -- one of whioh mhioh i is have been been mentioned, mentiOned, and and three three 'sions s jet-equipped jet-equipped -- Pave air itations s t a t i o n s -- two two in in Korea Korea and and one one iin n Manohuria Manohuria.: are again active aotive i in n transmission. (SUEDE (SUEDE A i r Foroe 1 , 21352, 16 Jan Jan 52) 52) Air Force Roundup 1 11, 2135Z, 15 message transmiss5oo.
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15. 1 s .
16.
h e lUtter a t t e r half half of of 1951 1951 from from a a single single Comments The expansion during during tthe Comentr oonveiroraft f i g h t e r and o a h r e e divioonVenilonAl a aircraft fighter and ground ground attaok attaok division division tto a tthree divisiOn-foroe, sion-foroe, including inoluding jets, j e t s , represents represent8 a a significant signifioant augmentation augmentation of of North North Korean Scorean foroei. foroea. , Deoember North Korean Kbrean Navy Navy oomrmander commander may may have have been been rephoed: replaoeds A 30 December message from trom Naval Headquarters Headquarters iin Pyongyang tto Naval n F'pngyang o tthe h e Naval North Korean meesage t h e new new year. year. A o a d w i n Chongjin Chongjin felioitated f e l i o i t a t e d aoadefty aoademy personnel AoideMY'in personnel on the The message Won Mn, M u , Naval Naval Commander." Commander." (SUEDE message Was was ligned Signed by by "Kim "limit= (SUEDE W A C ASAPAC IN 3769, 16 Tokyo CM I N 5769, 16 Jan 52) 62)
Comments Comments Vioe Admiral Hen Han I1 Il Mu Mn has long been accepted accepted as as oommander commander o f North No-ean Korean naval foroes and signed messages n suoh capaoity during of messages i in such a a'oaPabity during KimIron Won Mn Mu VAS was ohief ohief of of staff s t a f f of o f the the North North Korean Korean Navy. Navy. 1961. Kim 1951.
Table of'organization of' organization of of North North Korean Korean mechanized meohanized artillery a r t i l l e r y brigade brigade Table of a a 28 28 D December North KO Korean message ffrom reporfed: re orteds 'A A rretranslation e t r a n s l a t i o n of eosrmber North rean meseam r o m an -tied oorps e VII) o t the h e 24th tatis that tinidentij'ied corps(probably (probably t h the VII) t to 24th Brigade Brigade s states.that a providing f i v e meohanieed rtillery b a t t a l i o n s and i tab1e"of table-Of organikation Oreaniiation.providing five mechanized a artillery battalions and two infantry i n f a n t r y battalions b a t t a l i o n s has ha6 been drawn up for for t h e 24th Meohanized two the Mechanized Brigade. Brigade. (SUEDE ASAPAC IN 3769, 3769, 16 1 6 Jan 62) 62) (SUEDE ASAYAC Tokyo CY CM IN
Comments Comment t Mechanized Meohanized artillery a r t i l l e r y battalions (probably equipped with he battalions (probably mith tthe Sovie-propelled 7 6 m m gun) have been dehtified i n the Soviet self-propelled 76mm been previously i identified in the 24th Brigade. This mesiage message indioates.that indioates t h a t the the entire'brigade, e n t i r e . brigade, ourrently ourrently on BrSga'de. This cin ooastal seourity seourity duty duty in i n the the Wonsan-HaMhung Wonsan-Hamhung area, area, mill w i l l be be meohanized. meohanized. ooastal
17 Jan Jan 52 62 11
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unit mentioned mentioned i in message: .A KOREA.. Mongolien Mon olian unit n North Korean message: .A[ 1 11. 1 1 . KOREA.' oreaniaessage of 16 15 January mentioned mentioned "the "the Mongolian Porth Korean o mesa age of o
Plaoe names referred referred to t o 'Were were iin n west west c central e n t r a l &rea, Korea, Pp ees unit." k pl 's i t . " Plaoe.names 52) AS CM CM IN 3839, 3839, 16 Jaa jaa 52) southwest of of Chinnampo. Chinnampo. (SUEDE AB
'CoMients A delegation delegation from'the from'the M Mongolian People's Republio Republic,was Colmnentt A o n g o l i e People's was iin n Pylingyang on 99 Jernuary'bbserving Janmary'bbserving the the trying trying wartime wartime life life of of the the Korean Korean Pyongyang on people." peopleon It I t is is entirely entirely possible possible that t h a t the the "unit" "unit" referred,to referred.to in i n the the above above message is this same same delegation. delegation.
Frequent uno3nfirmed unomfirmed reports reports have speoulated on the presence of Mongolian m military'Personnel Mon&oliea i l i t a r y personnel in i n the the Korean Korean conflict oonfliot serving serving as cavalryoavalryMongolia's contribution t to ths o the men, tank drivers and mep, and aircraft a i r c r a f t pilots. pilots. Mongolia's COmmUnist cause to of some small Commnrnist oause in in Korea t o date has consisted of small shipmsnts shipments .of of clothing clothing.
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20 January 1952
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Copy No.
49

DOCUMENT NO.
NO CHANGE IN CLAM
DECL ASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: NEU riEVIEW DATE: _
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CENIRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
DOS. review(s) completed.
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1.
2.
USSR seeks concessions through UN discussion of Korean war (page 3). Soviet note to Austria clarified (page 3).
FAR EAST
(page 4).
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5.
6.
Iranian Communists expected to win parliamentary representation

(page 5).
7.
British Foreign Office working on new compromise proposals for

Egypt (page 6).
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NEAR EAST - AFRICA
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3, 4.
US Minister disturbed over French morale in Indochina (page 4). Chinese Communist leader believes Viet Minh can defeat the French
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GENERAL
1.
USSR seeks concessions through UN discussion of Korean war:
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Peiping adds its belief that both the USSR and China want an armistice on "reasonable" terms and that the Central People's Government was probably consulted on the Soviet maneuvers in the UN.
Comment: Available evidence indicates that, despite rumors of disunity, there will be continuing coordination of SinoSoviet strategy with respect to the Korean war.
2.
Soviet note to Austria clarified:
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The recent Soviet note to Austria mentioning "Austrian citizens liberated by the Soviet Union" has been clarified by the Austrian Minister in Moscow. It apparently refers to 400 Austrians liberated in Poland toward the end of the war and repatriated to Austria, for which the Austrian Government was to assume expenses. The Soviet note thus refers entirely to one of the previously agreed upon articles, rather than, as originally interpreted, to an article still to be negotiated.

-325X1
logistical position in Korea. The Embassy suggests that the USSR is attempting to put UN negotiators under added pressure from those members anxious for an early peace.
The American Embassy in Moscow believes that Soviet proposals for UN discussion of the Korean problem represent tactical stalling to gain further UN concessions or a better
In a similar comment, the British mission in
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FAR EAST
3.
US Minister disturbed over French morale in Indochina:
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Comment: De Lattre provided French officials and troops in Indocthina with a tremendous psychological boost during the first half of 1951, but his absences during the past six months had no noticeable eifect on French morale.
French forces in Tonkin, on the other hand, have been under constant attack by the Viet Minh since the first week of December, and all reports indicate continued and intensified pressure by the enemy, whose material strength is being rapidly increased by aid from Communist China.
4.
Chinese Communist leader believes Viet Minh can defeat the French:

-425X1
American Minister Heath states that Marshal de Lattre's death has had a "staggering" impact on all sectors of French opinion in ,Indochina. He adds that the appointments of General Salan as Commander in Chief and of Gautier as High Commissioner are viewed with misgiving and, in some quarters, with open opposition to this division of authority. He foresees the_ possibility that an attitude of defeatism will develop if a "third-rater" is named as a permanent successorto De Lattre or if the military situation in Tonkin becomes more critical.
25X1
the Secretary of the Communist Party Committee in Kwangsi as stating that the Viet Minh is sufficiently strong to defeat the French-Vietnamese forces despite increas ng US aid. Chinese units will not be needed in Indochina unless the French are reinforced by troops from other Western nations.
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evidence of greatly Comment increased Chinese material aid and the prolonged campaign against the French defense perimeter give credence to this report. Numerous in the past two weeks have deprecated December reports that overt Chinese Communist intervention in Indochina was imminent.
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5.
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6.
Iranian Communists expected to win parliamentary representation:
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Non-Communist Iranian labor leaders estimate that at least five Communist-controlled deputies will be elected to the next parliament The Communists are backing a slate of twelve candidates who are making special appeals to the workers. The labor leaders consider that the good discipline of the Communists will result in a total vote for Communist-supported candidates of 150,000 to 200,000. Labor circles report further that if genuinely free elections were permitted in the oil province of Khuzistan Communists or fellow travelers would defeat the National Front candidates.

NEAR EAST - AFRICA
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tr2Rproved I:or Release 2003/09102 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000500320061-o
Comment: The outlawed Tudeh Party is making a determined effort to win representation in the Majlis through the use of front organizations and candidates posing as Nationalists. Previous reports have estimated that Tudeh sympathizers might win up to twelve seats.
While the Communists apparently are gaining strength among the workers in all parts of Iran, there is no other indication that they are currently as strong in Khuzistan as the labor leaders quoted above have asserted.
7. British Foreign Office working on new compromise proposals for Egypt:

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Foreign Office officials, however, show "no great enthusiasm" for redrafting the Middle East Command proposals at the present time as requested after the Eden-Acheson talks. They would prefer first to obtain Egypt's conditional agreement to join the Command and then develop the proposals as necessary to meet the specific problems of AngloEgyptian defense.
officials, as well as pro-Western Egyptian political leaders, have insisted
Comment: Eden has apparently abandoned his previous opposition to any compromise on the Sudan. British and _American
that only recognition of Farouk as King of the Sudan would persuade Egypt to consider the defense proposals. There is still no evidence that once such a concession had been made Egypt would give up its contention that it can defend the Suez tanal under any circumstances except global war.

-625X1
At Foreign Secretary Eden's request the British Foreign Office has drafted a new prosal for the Sudan which probably contains a formula for recognizing Farouk as its king.
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SECTION SECTION 1 1 (SOVrET) (SOVIET)

. .
1. 1.
USSR.
wart proposals f for w ~ t The ' TheAmerican AmericanEMbassy Embassy in i n Moicow Moscow states-that-Soviet states that'soviet proposal8 or
UN UN discussion discuseion of df the the Korean Korean problenCtepresent problem represent tactical tactical further conceaaione or o r a better b e t t e r logietiCal logietibal position further UN concessions Embassy USSR is I s attekiting attempting to t o put put UN Embassy suggests suggests that t h a t the the USSR added pressure from those members anxious for f o r an early
m.
Soviet Union Union seeks discussion of Soviet seeks condessions concessions thtough through UN discussion of Korean Korean stalling s t a l l i n g to t o gain gain i n Korea. The in Korea. The negotiators negotiators undei under peace. peace.
that,.desPite tumors of of disunity, disunity, there Comments h a t , despite nnnors Comnent; There is evidence t will be contineng continuingcoordination coordination of of Sino-Soviet SinoSoviet strategy strategy with with respect respect to to the war. t h e Korean Korean w ar. ___
~~
In British-MlisiOn i in adds i its belief In a similar comment, the the British'miaaion n Peiping add6 t s belief that USSR and and China.want China w a n t an an areietibe.on annilatibe on "keasonable" "reasonable" terms terms and t h a t both the USSR that t h a t the the Central Central People's People's GOVernment Goverrnnent was prbbably probably coneulted consulted on on the the SoViet Sovlet maneuvers in I I the I UN. I N . maneuvers the
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21 Jan 52
lirSS
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SECRIPT
15. 15
Peiping taCties la in Korean oonfiiot: cOnfliot: P e i P h g allegedly allegedly resents resents Soviet taction
the
lOader8 are a r e depressed demersed by t he possibility DOSeibiut Y that-the Isadore by the will a t the Korean Korean oonfliot ooaPliot w i l l be continued, all oontinued. [ a l l parties parties attached at.taohed to t o the t h e Peiping Peipiag r e g h favor favor ending ending the the conflict, oonfliot, but but that the the WSS diriros t o involve inlrolw regime pssR desires to the hostilities Menchuria. Illustrating,Nipingts t h e US in In h o r t i l i t i e s in in Kanohuria. I l l u s t r a t i n g Peipingts "bitter "bitter resentment" Communist media are 8ovlet tactics, t a o t i o r , Chinese C o m i s t propaganda media r o ~ e n m b p t "of Soviet publinh'lng only only one-tenth one-tenth of of t h e material material provided by the the USSR. pUblisbing the USSR.
I'Chinese Communist Chinere eonmamirt
r--
-1
___

-tnc?mL
8 '
in Cormrosntr j l S o d e Soviet t advisers i n China Coimenti are that Peiping Wish08 wishes are "WrisTaWd" "dirmayed" by by current current trends trends in i n China and Koren, XWep, that t o end end the Korean Koreab conflict, oonfliot, and and that that "intense "intenre friction friokion and;disunity" and ,dSaunity" exist exlrt to have been been ourrent current S n g Chinese Comma\nist leaderi. leaderr. Rumors of of this thir tirpe have aMong Chinese Ceimunist for months. month. Mhile While tba t h e Korean Korean conflict oonfliot has hrr raised.potentially rained potentially divisive._ d i d r i m _. for issue6 among Chinese Chinese leaders leaders an al between issuer between Peiping Peiping and md Moscow, Moroow, there there is i r as SI y e t no no relinble r e l i a b l e evidence evldenae of of su nu01 di EWiky. yet o. disunity.
.
21 Jan Jan 52 52 21
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KOREA. Air Force plan plan tto use Korean Korean a airfields: KOREIL. North Korean A i r Force o use irfields: A A North North 75773.n Air,orce intention = a n AirJ?orce intention to t o initiate i n i t i a t e flight f l i g h t training training from from airfields a i r f i e l d s in in Korea is'revealed i s revealed in i n in an 11 1 1January January message f r o m an an air a i r unit u n i t at a t Sariwon Sariwon to to Korea from Pyongyang wongyang and and Sinuiju. Sinuiju. The message states s t a t e s that "practice "practice fields f i e l d s Number (training ?)." The The message message continues continues 1 , 2, 2, and and 3.are 3 ' a r e suitable suitable for for . 1. . (training'?)." t h a t if if "(training planes ?)" ?)'I are ferried f e r r i e d in, in, they would be stored in in that Operating operating oondition condition and and later l a t e r dismantled. dismantled. Fear is expressed that t h a t UN UN air air action will train will dastroy.the destroy'tho t rain f o r suggestions suggestions as as d the sender asks for to 48, Sariwon-Pyongyang, 21 t o "countermeasures." "countermeasures,'~ (SUEDE 48, Sariwon-Pyongyang, 2 1 Jan 52) 62)
Comments Comentt In In view v i e w of of the considerable consiaerable t r a i n i n g facilities f a c i l i t i e s previously training availi r Force i n Manahuria, h i s move o begin available to the North Korean A Air in Manchuria, t this move t to begin t r a i n i n g on on UN-interdioted UN-interdicted Korean Korean airfields a i r f i e l d s is i s incomprehensible under training
Jan 62 52 22 Jan
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TMID
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I t is poseible possible t hat t h e North Koreans expect expeot an ari oonditions. It ourrent conditions. that the oeeaation of hostilities, h o s t i l i t i e s , or t h a t the Chinese require Manchurian early cessation that a i r f i e l d s now available available to t o the Koreans. Koreans. It is also p airfields ossible t h a t the possible that message refers refere not to t o "training planes" but but t to o operakional operational oombat combat aircraft. a ircraft.
22 Jan Jan 52 52
HR70SECRET
8. 3.

new conscripts, ooasoripta, with with new
KOREA. reportedly rotating rotating troops troops in in Korea: I n antiantiKOREA. Chlneee Chinese Communists Communists reportedly Korea: In 4757iion of "successful completion of the truce talks," -ion7 l l ~ ~ o o e s s f completion ul of truce t a l k s," the m he Chinese C Communista are are rotating rotating their seasoned troops munists their seasoned troops from from Korea Korea end end replaoing reulacina them them
'reported plan as ae "improbable." "improbable." reported plan
fl
Far Command G-2 (3-2 regards regards this this Far Eaet East Command 18 Jan Jan 52) 52) 18
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SECRET
laat large-scale large-scale movement n The last . Connaenta Comment: The movement of, of Chinese Chinese Coamnmlst Communist troops troops i in Korea occurred.last occurred ' last spring, spring, when when certain c e r t a i n armies apparehtly left l e f t Korea or Korea armies apparently Korea f for rehabilitation. With one on? exception, exception, all a l l these these armies armies have have returned returned to t o Korea. rehabilitation. With Korea. m i l e it it is i s probable probable that t h a t some some battle-trained battle-trained individuals individuals are While are being being returned returne4 as cadres, cadres, available available intelligence intelligence indioates indicates t h a t no as that no large-scale large-scale rotation rotation has has been or o r is is being being effeoted. effeated. been
9. 9.
ROpl o f f i c i a l aoutely alarmed n f l a t i o n in ROE official.aoutely alarmed over over inareasing increasing i inflation in South South Korea: Korea: Aatlng Prime Prime'Minister Io, in inaaletter l e t t e rto toUS USAmbassador AmbaasadorMilooi0 Mueaio, stated stated that Acting Minister go, that the indiaative price priae of of r i c e in the highly highly indicative rice in Seoul Seoul is is "rising "rising alarraingly' alarmingly" and and that that he fears f e a r s that t h a t "hyper-inflation "hyper-inflation has has started s t a r t e d to t o set sef in." in.11 Be Ho continued oontinued that that ROX he B3K aurrenay advances advanaes to t o UN UN forces, forces, approaching approaching 354 354 billion b i l l i o n won, won, must must be be settled.' settled . currency immediately and and new agreements between nitiated t o immediately new agreements between the the BOK ROK and and the the UN UN muat must be be i initiated to atop the the oreation areation of of new new money money "which 'which is 1s deteriorating deteriorating Korean Korean economy." economy." The The stop ROK official o f f i a i a l further f u r t h e r stated s t a t e d that that if if something something was done about currency ROK was not not done expansion, an an arbitrary a r b i t r a r y ceiling oeiling would would be be enforced enforced by by the t h e ROK. BOK. expansion, 19 Jan 52) 19 J- 52)
Commsntr The current current worsening s due n Comment: The worsening of of the the financial financial situation situation i is dua i in p a r t to to a a seasonal'up-swing seasonal'up-swing in i n currency i c e oollection. part currency circulation circulation folltjw-ing follOwing r rice collection. nability t o reaoh The principal principal factors, faatora, however, are UN The however, are UN Command Command and and ROK ROK I inability to,reaoh agreement control of as tto o the agreement on control of the the ROK's ROK's foreign foreign exahange, exchange, aa as well well'as the 'very very r e a l and.00ntinuing and'continuing inflationary inflationary effect e f f e c t of h e DN or l oaal real of t the DN Command's Command's demand demand f for looal curreno y currency.
SECRET-6 .
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1 1 . 11.
12 12.
North Korean Korean Air Air Foroe Foroe still s t i l l concerned ooncerned with seourityr The K O m . North KOREA. with seourity: The high high ' p f i o r i t y assigned a s s i m e d to t o the t h e political p o l i t i o a l security aeourity of of North North Korean Korean Air Mr Force Force P71371ty personnel is i s revealed revealad in in a 17 17 January message i r Aoademy personnel message from'the from.the A Air Academy at The message stated Yenohi to to a a sub-unit sub-unit at a t Tungwha, Tungwha, both both in i n Manchuria. Manahuria. The Yehohi message stated t h a t "the "the purification p u r i f i o a t i o n of of your your Officers, b f f i c e r s , NCO's rivates w i l l be thit NCO's and and p privates will be st,arted." (SUEDE AS IN 4354, 4364, 18 1 8 Jan Jan 52) 52) started." (SUEDE AS CM CM IN
Comments A high degree degree of o f conoern conoern f or p olitical s e o u r i t y has Comment: A high for political seourity has been been
apparent in the North Korean AirForce Fbroe for f o r same some time. time. While this newest newest appalqaErthe North Korean Air While this npurifioation" may only routine, f tthe he "purification" may be be only routine, it it may may foreoast forecast a future future move mnve o of
NKAF t r a i n i n g program program into into North North Korea-and n t o deserting age. NKAF training Korea--and thus thus i into deserting r range.
North Korean . antiaircraft unit defends Uiju airfield: A 20 January North Korean message reported to the "first compaAr that enemy aircraft. appeared in the Uiju area (on the Manohurian border) on 19 and 20 January and requested that this information be forwarded tO the "artillery oommand." (SUEDE AS CM IN 5245, 21 Jan 52)
,
Comment: This message suggests by inference that a North Korean antiaircraft unit of =eller than company size is located at Uijil and reports to.s. central antiaircraft artillery command. Uiju airfield has been . used.ad'an operational jet base and is known to be under North Korean control.
23 Jan 52
1)1)
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Vte
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7.
8. 8.

22...4en. 52)
MaO Tse-tung Ea0 Tse-tuna alleeedlv a l l e m d l v returns ret urns frem f rolqManohuria, Manchuria, departs depar-ts for f o r Mosomr Moscow: Mao Tse-tung returned to /Ma0 t o Peiping s i n g aboyt n Manohuria with Chinese, o v i e t and about 2 2 January January from from conferences conferences i in Manchuria.with Chinese, S Soviet and The conferees allegedly decided t h a t the t h e Communists Comuniste Korean leaders. leaders. The conferees allegedly decided that would Nsompromise "oompromise somewhat" somewhat" in i n the the Korean r u c e talks t a l k s and ncite weuld Korean t trUce and meanwhile meanwhile i incite diseension dissension in i n the t h e UM. UN. Mao left IXao l e f t Peiping Peiping f o r Moscow by by air a i r on on 2 January, January, followed followed by by 10 10 ChineP, Chimp-. Communist Comunist leaders, leaders, for for the Korean w war, to tthe Viet Minh, and and a a Soviet Soviet f o r talks with Stalin S t a l i n on the a r , aid to he V i e t Mi&, loan. ( 22 Jan, 52 loan I22 52 [
"
"_
Comments Comments Information on the the movements movements of of Communist Communist leaders, Imders, and and on on the p m n g s . o f t h e i rconferences, confbrences, is iscontinually continyally supplied supplied by by such such grairangs,of their aourooe but b u t has has never never been been confirmed confirmed and and is i e generally generally regarded regarded as 68 doubtful. doubtful. sources
9. 9.
K O & . Communi8t t Panmunjom delaying until u n t i l March: Bdarohr KOREA,. Communist correspondent correspondent a at Panmunjoi sees UN delaying ATirffinnington, A m , i n n i n g t o n , Communist correspondent correspondent at Panmunjom,advanced Panmunjom, advanced the theory UN negoMat6ra.were negotiatbrO.Were under under orders orders to""stall talks on 19 January tthat h a t lJM s t a l l t Ve e talk@ him, iis conditionewill u n t i l Maroh." reason, according tto o him, s tthat h a t copditions W i l l then then be until March.7 The reason, more favoral.xe PavoraLAe m i l i t a r i l y fqr militarily for t the h e mJ UN o or r ffor o r President President Truman's Truman's peraonal pereonal h i e re-election re-election chances. chances. intervention designed designed to t o raise r a i s e his Peiping, 19 Peiping, 19 Jan 52) 52)
tb
often presaged %rends 'sends in i n the the Winnington's comments connnents have often Conuuent: Comment: Ainnington's is propaganda, propaganda, n i l e it it is probable probable that L S s latecit l a t e o t is truoe-atjons. truceEITEFTTations. While that this is the beginning of of the the build-up build-up tto justify it is possible mssible t hat t h i s charge charge i s the o j ustify Communists. hostilities by the t h e Communists renewed h o s t i l i t i e s by
5 5
23 23 Jan Jan 52 52
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HR70-14 HR70-14
9. 9.
Soviet long-range fighters f i g h t e r s noted a t Dairen: Sixbeen IA-9 IB-9 long-range long-range Soviet long-range noted at Dairen% Sixteen oonventional f i g ht e r s were w r e to t o leave leave Dairen D d r e n on on 20 20 January January for f o r Voroshilov. Vorushilov. conventional fighters The US i r Force i e l d agency agenoy comments ooments The lead lead pilot p i l o t had had a a Russian Bussian name. name. The The US A Air Force f field LA-9 airoraft a i r o r a f t have have not not been been previously previously noted noted at a t either e i t h e r Dairen Dairen or or t h a t LA-9 that Voroahilov. (SUEDE S A i r Foroe 4908, 20 20 Jan Jan 52) 52) Vbroshilov. (SUEDE U US Air Force CY CM IN IN 4908, Comment: Some a o t i v i t y by l i g h t bombers and jet jet f i g h t e r s was observed Comment: Some aotivity by light bombers and fighters wns observed A total t o t a l of of 320 320 Soviet S o v i e t military m i l i t a r y airairi n tIGMITIWIla t h z n area n the yearn A in area i in the past past year. is estimated astimated to t o be be in i n that t h a t area. area. c r a f t is craft
1 0 . KOREA. 10. KOREA.
Communist guard unit at a t Kaesong Kaesong believes believes cease-fire oease-fire talks t a l k s deterdeterCommunist pard unit m n : Truoe talks are proceeding " s o & m unfavorably,11 a v o r a b l y , " according a m o r d i n g to to rearinal Truce talks are proceeding "somewhat from a a unit unit charged charged with t h e security s e c u r i t y of of n - k Jiiaary:North a r y . North Korean Korean message message from with the Kaesong. The that t he u n i t was "preparing for for The message s t a t e d further f u r t h e r that Kaesong. message stated the unit was "preparing oombat" and and that t h a t elements elements of of the the 17th 1 7 t h Division--assooiated Division--assooiated in i n previous previous combat" messages with arrangments r prisoner ofof war exchange--had messages-with arrangements a% at Kaesong Kaesongf o for prisoner war exchangehad not not arrived in i n the the area. area. (SUEDE (SUEDE CINCFE CINCFE Tokyo, Tokyo, S18.426, S1B 426, 23 23 Jan Jan 52) 52) arrived
Oommentx Previous messages f r o m this this u n i t have indicated t h a t the the Gommentt Previous messages from unit have indicated-that opinions expressed eXpreS8ad by it do do not not reflect r e f l e o t high high Communist Communist polioy, poliay, but but rather rather opinions by it

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o "preparing npreparing are a r e observations by by the the regiment's regiment Is personnel. personnel. The reference tto out unit is ourrently currently oarrying carrying out for combat" has has been buen noted noted previously. previously. This unit f o r oombat" in the Kiesong area both a military i nt h e Kaesong a seourity mission and m i l i t a r y and political politioal training. t raining
11. 11 *
Another "important" "important" North North ,Korean i r Foroe Foroe meeting held:, A A Korean A Air meeting held:, North Air-broroe unitaat lakiwon WASinfonned informed by No&h Korean A i r Force unit t SaPiwon was by A AW-B7dquarters nadquarters at Pyongyang Pyongyang on 22 January that "the will "the important meeting w i l l be starting. starting (SUEDE AS N 5750, AS CM CM IIN 5750, Sariwon-Pyongyang, Sarimon-Pyongyang, the 24th so you must oome." oome." 62) 23 Jan 52)
January Comment: This message may may have have some some conneotion oonneotion with with the t h a 111 UiJanuary message concerning oonoerning the t h e introduction introduction of of "training "training planes" planes" onto onto "praotice "praotice f a possibly p a r a l l e l nature i a a Chinese airfields" Of parallel is a i r f i e l d s " in i n North North Korea. Korea. O Communist Communist message message of o f 21 21 January January which whioh disoussed disoussed the the departure departure of of five five YAK-18 YAK-18 trainers, t r a i n e r s , probably.subordinate probably subordinate to t o the the North North Korean Korean Air Air Force, Form, from from Yenohi Yenchi'etrfield a i r f i e l d in i n northwestern northwestern Manchuria hnahuria fOr fdr an an unidentified unidentified airfield. sirfield. The The aircraft airoraft were-to were'to proceed proceed by by way way of o f Changchun Changchun and and Mukden Mukden en en route route to to their t h e i r destination. destination.
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10. KOREA. North ,Korean antiairoraft a n t i a i r o r a f t regiment regiment locates locate8 on on east e a s t coast: coast; The a 10, KOREA. North,Korean rrival arrival .5?tre "company artillery 3 T i e hcompany a r t i l lery pieces pieces . a t the i r o n bridge a t Kawon," Xowon, a a . at the iron bridge at

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f Woman he e a s t ooast, o r i t i c a l transportation t r a n s p o r t a t i o n center center north critical north o of Wonsan on on t the east ooast, was VAS reported o t h e commanding f f i o e r of h e 23rd reported t to the commanding o offioer of tthe 23rd North North Korean Korean Independent Independent Amtiaircraft A n t i a i r c r a f t Regiment. Regiment. The message l s o revealed f another message a also revealed the the movement movement o of another nit f rom t h e Pyongyang subordinate subordinate MA AAA u unit from the Pyongyang area area (probably (probably eastward) and and the the l o c a t i o n of of still still another another AAA of oompany s i z e twenty location AAA unit unit of company size twenty miles miles from from Kowon. Kowon. (SUEDE CM IN IN 5537, 5537, 22 22 Jan Jan 52) 52) (SUEDE AS AS Korea Korea CM
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Comment: h i f t of a n t i a i r c r a f t strength from Comment: This may may represent represent a s shift antiaircraft w e l l - m e d Pyongyang Pyongyang to t o vital v i t a l east e a s t coast coast transportation t r a n s p o r t a t i o n centers. centers. well-717E;;Ted A n t i a i r o r a f t artillery a r t i l l e r y protection protection on on the the east east coast coast had had previously previously been been Antiaircraft furnished by AA units organic organic to t o coastal c o a s t a l defense and and t actical d t s in in furnished Ak units tactical units the t h e area. area.

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KO=. a i r c r a f t may may have landed landed in i n North North Korea: Korea: Aocording KOREA. Soviet transport aircraft field analysis reoent S o v i e t transmissions on t h e ground t o p r e l i m i n a r y 17677eliminary field analysis of recent Soviet.transmissions the -. -Control interoept net in in North North Korea, Korea, a a trimaport trimaport airoraft, airoraft, eubordinate subordinate tto oontrol i n t e r c e p t net o a r r i e r unit, t SSinanjlOn l n a n j u in northwestern an G uadentified carrier unit, landed landed aat northwestern mi i d e n t i f i e d - Soviet Soviet troop o Air Foroe adds adds t thatasimilarsiroraft wes obserobseri r Force h a t a s i m i l a r d r o r a f t was Korea on on 21-January. 2 1 January. The US A ved on 21 2 1 January at a t hntung Antung and may may be related related t to o the the a aircraft ircraft a at t Sinanju. Sinanju. (SUEDE Air Force CM (SUEDB US A i r Foroe CM IN I N 5984, 5984, 23 23 Jan Jan 52) 52)
tto o Sinanlu Comment: Similar t ranm irc af. t movements Commtnt: .~-.. transport c o ~r t- a aircraft .r _ movements ~. .~ ~ ~ .. ~ Sinanju _._. ." ~. are believed - are - believed ~ 1951. The Sinanju to Sinemju area area is i s known known to to t o have h a taken m n place plaoe on on 2 2 and and 8 8 July, July, 1951. befa.oenter the Soviet a air deenae system Korea. There is be a . c e n t e r of of-the i r dsf&e system in i n North North-Korea. is a Utiable sod f field Sinanjuwhich whichconceivably conceivablycould couldsupport supporta &transport u66ble rod i e l d aat t Sinanju transport iircraft. airarm.
~
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Comunishe plaid plari recapture of major UN-held UN-held island: island: A A recently reonntly transtransCommunists recapture of l a t e d North Korean messam hat a h e 5th lated message reveals reveals t that a battbattalion -- Drobablv probably tthe.5th.-of the t h e 23rd 23rd Brigade Brigade is i s to t g have have preparations preparations for f o r the the "Cho-do "Chi-do attack atiaok . . Of The same b a t t a l i o n was ordered ordered to to battalion OOMPleted oompleted by'2400 bY2400 hours hours 28 28 January." January." attaok supported by by four four 120 attaCk Ho-do, Bb-do, supported 120 mm mm howitzers. howitzers. Other North Korean mdssages'indioate that t h a t the 6th 6th and 9th b a t t a l i o n s of h e 23rd Brigade.are Brigade a r e messages-indicate battalions of t the preparations f for small-scale amphibioud amphibidui actions actions against equally active in prepara$ions o r small-soale Jan 62) t i l l i n UN UN hands. hands. (SUEDE.AS islands e etillin (SUEDE AS CM IIN N 6259, 6259, 24 Jan

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i s one one of of two two p r i n c i p a l UM-held ff't he Cho-do is principal UN-held islands o off the Comment: Cho-do t s location, location, southwest of chi&po, e s ooastFriga,central Its Chinnampo, d makes o o a s t x t - o e n t r a l Korea. Korea. I it more suitable as Faangyong-do, as a guerriala g u e r r i l l a and espionage base than Pasngyong-do, the t h e other o t h e r important important island. island.
18. 1 8 .
New Orbitlanguage heard n Korean 'Ne* Orbit-language heard iin Korean intercept: intercept: A United Nations intercept'operator in Korea monitored monitored a a ten-minute tenminute enemy enemy transmission transmission in in intercept'operator i n Korea The i n t e r c e p t operator Previoutly unheard language intercept a previously language on on 22 22 January. January. stated that the language was was possibly possibly one one o of the many many used used by by Soviet Soviet f the s tated t hat t h e new language minority groups groups in i n the t h e Caucueus Cauousus mountain moUntain region of of t the h e USSR. USSR. Voice Voioe (SUEDE (SUEDE USA-251, AFSA-251, oharaCteristios of the oharabteriatios t h e tranamission transmission were not not oriental. oriental. 0815Z, 23 Jan 5 52) 08152, 2)
h e appearanoe Comment: No immediate significance can be be attached .bo to t the appearance af USSR is is knawn-to known t o have haveaa sizable sizable oontin,contino f ttarairlanguage,in h i s new 'language i n Korea. Korea. The USSR gent 61 b f military m i l i t a r y personnel personnel serving serving in i n various capacities oapaoitiee within North Korea, and it is the of t this minoi s possible that that t h e use of h i s comparatively obsoure minoKorea, rity security part of some of of t these r i t y group tongue was an attempt at at s e c u r i t y on tthe he p a r t of hese forces. foroes.

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'North Korean Korean brigade alerted a l e r t e d against UN UlJ attempt t o recapture KOREA. KOREA. :North to
WIMes messages to and m d s Ar series ' A s e r iof e s 24 of January 24 January messages to andfrom from the t h e North North Korean Korean 23rd Brigade in reflect a f fear in west central c e n t r a l Korea ref'lect e a r tthat h a t the UN is planning t o retake retake some aome minor minor islands islands lost l o s t to 'to the t h e Communists. C O ~ ~ i E tFollowing S ~ to a UN bombing bombing of o f the the brigade CP CP and and increased increased UN UN naval naval. reconnaissance, reconnaissmce, the t h e 23rd 23rd

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that is expected t that the Will.intend to'land Brigade reported t h a t "it "it i s expeoted hat t h e enemy w i l l intend t o land Other po&ents on en t the'islands h e i s l a n d s which (have been already?) liberated. liberated: ." Other ISortents in t h e capture capture by by the t h e 5th 5th Battalion Battalion of of ". spies a r e seen are Seen in the . enemy spies . . o develop dispatched froth Choklo,along alongwith withr a radio sets." An An attempt atteMpt t to devel6p UN from Cho-do, d i o sets." intentions these.agents in a turnaround capacity is revealed i n t e n t i o n s by utilizing u t i l i z i n g these agents i n a.turnaroUnd'capacity to battalion to by an order-from order from the t h e 23rd Brigade t o the capturing b attalion t o "make use of with captured agent wai was io.ocimmunicate t o aomunicate with use of the t h e spy spy.technicially." teohnioally," The captured.agent . ." (SUEDE AS his principals p r i n c i p a l s and and inquire i n u i r e "about "about what what we we should should do... do. .'I (SUEDE CM IN Jan 52) I N 6439, 6439, 25 25-Jan 521
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9. MEA. KOREAokuShinglagagammajaLigatfampgrigLialszocs pew Chinese Comn&x&t armies reborted I n Koregs The commander commander of 9. t h e Chinese Chinese Communist Communist 2nd 2nd A ~my Group, 1st 1st Field Army, appointed to to the Army Group, Army, was appointed cornand Command the weetern western sector of battle in January. eeetor o f the Korean b a t t l e front i n early January. Two of o f the the 2nd A m y GroupDs 4thand and8th--moved 8th--moved into i n t o this t h i s sector seotor Two Army Group's wmiee--the armiesthe 4th 24 . during during this t h i s period. period. ( 1 2 4 Jan Jan 52) 52)
Comments There is sI s no no confirmation eonfirmation of of this this move, moves However, However, such such a a r o t a t i o n of 1st 1st Field Field Army Amy units m f t s and and command command would would be feasible. The The western rotation'of be feasible. Kaesong seotor is is new now held held by by the the 19th 19th Army Group--63rd, Group--63rd, 64th and and 65th 65th Kaesong sector the 1st FieldArmy Armyand andactive active in i n Korea Korea since since early early Rrmies--subordinate t o Armiessubordinate.to the 1st Field spring of epring o f 1951. 1951,
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Korean lst 1st Air The North North Korean BOFtEk. North WrtE Korean j e t s fly fly.combat oombat missions: missions: The KOREA. Korean pts Air -io%, equipped with with ma-15 MIG -1 5jet j e t fighters, fighters. is i s flying f l y i n g combat combat missions trinlon, equipped missions over Korea, aocording aocording t o preliminary preliminary f i e l d analysis over Korea, to field analysis of of a a reoent recent North North One of of the the Nbrth North Korean Korean division's division's regiments regiments is is Korean air air message. massage. One Korean stationed at a t Antung, and the the other is possibly t Anshan n t h e Mukden stationed Antung, and other is possibly a at Anshan i in the Mukden area. (SUEDE (SUEDE CINCFE SIB 431, 431, 28 28 Jan Jan 52) 52) area. CINCFE SIB
Comientr The e n t r y of h i s North et a ir d ivision i n t o oombat Comment: The entry of t this Nbrth Korean Korean j jet air division into combat follows recently observed observed expansion expansion of o f North North Korean Korean air air activity. activity. follow aa recently U t i l i z a t i o n of of airfields a i r f i e l d s deeper deeper in i n Menohuria o r combat jet aircraft aircraft Utilization Manchuria f for combat jet has been suggested on on at a t least l e a s t two recent encounters he a l t i t u d e and has been suggested two recent encounters by by t the altitude and d i r e o t i o n of of flight f l i g h t of o f the enemy jets j e t s leaving aros~ tthe h e Yalu direction the enemy leaving Korea Korea a across Yalu River. River.
While no no definite d e f i n i t e connection connection can can be be established, established, it it is i s worth noting While worth noting t h a t the t h e North North Korean Korean Air A i r Force Force radio radio circuit c i r c u i t between Pyongyang and and that between Pyongyang Sinuiju was was exceptionally exceptionally active active during during t h e period period 25-27 25-27 January. January. Sinuiju the
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North Korean Korean fear f e a r of of Chinese Chinese Communist Communist i n t e r f e r e m e indioatedt . North interferemoe indicated: A A North n i t s , instructinp. he Noith Korean Korean message message between between two two unidentified unidentified u units, instructing t the reoipient on on the the handling handling of of a a captured captured p i l o t , oautioned hat t ge p ilot recipient pilot, cautioned t that the pilot "should snktched from from you you by by Chinese Chinese comrades." comrades." (SUEDE "should not not be be snatched (SUEDE 5Olst 501st Comm Comm Recon Group Group Korea, Korea, CM CM IN IN 7625, 7625, 29 29 Jan Jan 52) 52) Bacon
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Comment: Mile comtunications intelligence supplies isolated instances of'Sfri;:ragin friction, there is no evidence available to indicate that 'Chinese interference with Korean units has become a major problem.
31 52 31 Jan Jan 52
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700220001-1
SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
1.
US Chiefs of Mission to meet in Paris: A meeting of US Chiefs of Mission in Eastern Europe and State Department representatives is planned in Paris for the first week in March. Participants will discuss: (1) Soviet short and long term intentions particularly with reference to developments in the satellites; (2) maintenance and conduct of US relations with the
GENERAL.
Radio Free Europe.
Satellites; (3) problems of protecting US official personnel and citizens in the Orbit; (14) possibilities of retaliation and pressure on the Soviet Orbit; (5) us informational and cultural programs, especially Voice of America and
(S S/S Outgoing to Moscow 507, 25 Jan 52)
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
2.
Libyan unity threatened by King's attitude: The Libyan King's iiriirence for his native province of Cyrenaica and his apparent disinterest
LIBYA-
in the more important and heavily populated Tripolitania province endanger the prospects for a united Libya, according to the American Charge in Tripoli. The King seems unwilling or incapable of thinking of the country as a whole. Of the two cabinet ministers who have a true all-Libya outlook, one is definitely slated to go, while the other's tenure appears temporary.
The Charge warns that American interests in the area will be jeopardized by the King's attitude since Tripolitania contains the important US air base, Wheelus Field. He believes that the American, British and French representatives should press the King to accept his responsibilities toward all parts
of his kingdom. (S S/S Sfripoli 371, 211 Jan 52)
Comment: When Cyrenaica, Tripolitania and the Fezzan were united to create Libya in mid-December, separatist elements were considered a threat to
its future. The elections in February will be a major test for the state which, without energetic federal leadership, faces an uncertain future.
3.
INDIA/NEPAL/CHINA.
India opposed to Chinese-Tibetan official representation in Nepalese capital: In the 6-9 January discussions between the Indian and Nepalese premiers, India advised Nepal not to try to maintain Nepalese representation in Lhasa, since this would enable China to insist upon reciprocal representation in Katmandu. The Indian Government believes that a Chinese-Tibetan mission in Katmandu would be a center for "undesirable activities " (5 5/5 New Delhi 25142, 19 Jan 52)
Comment: Peiping reportedly asked permission to establish an embassy in Katmandu last summer but was refused, apparently because of Indian opposition. Having since occupied all Tibet, the Chinese Communists are expected to raise
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the representation issue with Nepal again, perhaps through the Tibetan delegation new visiting Katmandu. Their approach may take the form of bargaining over Nepal-Tibet traderelations as well as over retention of the Nepalese representative in Lhasa. It may be noted that in late December India had advised Nepal to try to maintain Nepalese representation in Lhasa, and two weeks later had reversed that advice on the basis that permitting reciprocal representation would be disadvantageous. India and China are each maneuvering for position in strategic Nepal. Indications are that Communist China will continue to apply political, economic, and military pressure on Nepal, in a drive to undermine Indian influence there.
4.
PHILIPPINES. Special-consideration of Philippine reparation claims seen as essential in obtaining ratification of Japanese peace treaty: Insistence by the Japanese reparations mission, now in Manila, upon application of the principles of the Indonesian agreement to Philippine discussions (on ,the theory that the most favored nation treatment should obtain) would prevent any agreement being reached and result in Philippine non-ratification of the peace treaty, according to the Philippine Foreign Secretary. The US Embassy in Manila believes that Japan should be urged to recognize the Philippines, claim to special consideration.
On the other hand, the Japanese position that any commitment on reparations will be made contingent upon Philippine ratification of the treaty is regarded by the Embassy as a good tactic -which will facilitate ratification if a reasonably satisfactory agreement can be reached. (S S/S Manila-2681, 30 Jan 52)

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SECTION 1 (SOVET)
1.
HUNGARY, 'Relative-of leading Communist defect:is Albert Iiebermann for 'Mer Budgerien Commertial.Attache.in.Tel.Aviv..early in December reflsed to return to Budapest when ordered to by his government. He has asked the Israeli Government for asylum. Liebermann is the brothetinlaw of Zoltan Vas, director of the National Planning Office and a member of the Hungarian Workers' Party (Communist) politburo.
25X1A
2.
YUGOSLAVIA. Yegoelavs attack Russian objectives in the Near East: In an analysis 6rSoViet Near East.policyp.the official lUgoSlav newspaper Politika states that the Soviet Union is against the basic interests of the Arab nations and that its policy "boils dot to an attempt to exploit liberation movements for the USSR's objectives." The article maintains that the minimum objective of the Soviet strategy is to weaken the po sition of Britain and to isolate the Arab world from the West by pre venting an agreement, and that the maximum Soviet objective is to usurp Britain's traditional role by exploiting the chaotic situation, (Plain Belgrade 939, 28 Jan 52)
Comment! Thia analysis is consistent with previous YUgoslav criticism of imperialism on the part of both major power blocs in the area.

SECRET
CoMmentt. Vas has maintained his high position since the Communists gained contrel of Hungary in 1947 despite his propensity for luxurious living and the fact that hiS brother is a busidessman in London. He is very close to Matyas Rakosi, and like Rakosi spent many years before the war in prison for his Communist. activities.
31 Jan 52
ApprovedForFAII6e2001/(MV06:0A411)P79T01146A
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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1.
Inspector General of Greek Army removed: The Inspector General of the Greek Army, General Kitrilakis, has been relieved "temporarily," on orders of the Minister of Defense. All remaining pro-Papagos officers reportedly are to be removed by May. (S Athens 3416, 29 Jan; S USARMA Athens,MTD40, 29 Jan 52)
Comments The removal of Kitrilakis, a firm supporter of opposition leader Marshal Papagos, is the result of the struggle for control of the armed forces which has already caused the ouster of several high-ranking pro-Papagos officers who are also pro-American.
GREECE:
This action assumes serious proportions because it directly violates an understanding between Mae American army mission in Greece and Greek defense officials which provides for consultation on major changes in assignment of Greek army personnel. It is also indicative of increasing political manipulation within the army.
2.
Marshal Papagos sets forth conditions for collaboration with Opposition leader Marshal Papagos has offered to support a government headed by the Deputy Prime Minister and Liberal leader Tenizelos, if the latter will accept conditions set forth by Papagos at a recent meeting held by the two leaders to discuss the possibility of Liberal-Rally collaboration. The conditions demanded by Papagosl Greek Rally include the passing of a law calling for new elections to be held under the majority system in May 1952, the appointment of a Minister of National Defense acceptable to both parties, and the retirement of two or three generals to whom the Bally objects. Rally leaders reportedly feel that such a transition government would test Venizelosl good faith. Papagos has stated that he would subsequently seriously consider a Liberal-Rally coalition without resort to elections if Venizelos' conduct of the transition government were satisfactory. (S Athens 3387, 26 Jan 52)
Liberals:
Comment: This ii the most concrete proposal yet offered by Papagos. While Papagos may have made this offer in good faith, the terms he has has set suggest that he is more interested in obtaining these concessions than in collaboration.. Moreover, there appears at present little chance.that Venizelos would be able to live up to the conditions and conduct the government in a manner satisfactory to Papagos.

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Kashmiri officials decry the theory of a plebiscite: Beginning on 15 January, Kashmiri officials have made an unusual number of pullic addresses questioning the sincerity of the UN's dealings with Kashmir and censuring the idea of a plebiscite which would pit Hindus against Moslems in determining the future allegiance of the state. The Deputy Prime Minister of Kashmir asserted that "we have demonstrated that people cannot be divided on the basis of religion in our state." (R FBIS, 29 Jan; U New Delhi 2563, 19 Jan; U New Delhi 2519, 16 Jan 52)
INDIA.
4.
Kashmiri Revenue Minister to visit Peiping in March: According to the Indian press, Mirza Aftal Beg, Revenue Minister of Indian-held Kashmir, is the leader of a four-man delegation planning to visit Peiping it March to study Communist Chinese land reforms and agricultural development. (U New Delhi 2263, 28 Jan 52)
Comment; Beg has been described as a left-wing Socialist, tolerant of Communism. The government of Indian-held Kashmir, which contains, a number of Communists and their sympathizers, has been engaged for some The time in efforts to prevent Indian domination of its activities. National Conference party, which controls the Kashmiri Government, has recently expressed a desire to participate in foreign affairs and defense matters, heretofore handled. exclusively by India. The development of close relations between the Kashmir and Tibet or Communist China would increase the present Communist threat to the security of India's northern frontiers.
5.
Head lama of Ladakh raises ossibilit of union with Tib ti On 28 January the Indian press reported that Kushok Bakula, head lama of Ladakh province in eastern Kashmir, had written a letter to Indian Prime Minister Nehru outlining his opinions on Kashmir's future. According to the report, the lama stated that Ladakh of its own free will had chosen to remain with Kashmir as long as Kashmir formed a part of India, but that it would automatically merge with India if a plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir resulted in favor of Pakistan. If, for any reason, it became impossible for India to annex Ladakh, the TaAalehis would seek political union with Tibet. (1 Hew Delhi 2687, 29 Jan 52)

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Comment; Kashmiri officials have recently expressed their views in New Delhi, Bombay, and Madras, as well as in Kashmir. Their extensive travels suggest that they are waging a campaign to increase Indian popular interest in the Kashmir issue. Their new argument that Kashmiris are all brothers, despite their differing religions, seems designed to raise Indian opposition against a plebiscite which would split the state on religious grounds.
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Comment: In Maroh 1951 a senior Indian Army officer of outstanding abilitillrarmed the US Army Attache that the head lama of Iadakh was oriented more toward Tibet than toward India otlashmir and.would nom Tkbetan administration of his province. Since the head lama of Ladakh exercisesaonsiderable influenoe over the local population, his desires in the matter would probably be followed by the latter. Newly published Chinese Communist geographies reportedly show Ladakh as part of China:
6.
This proposal is essentially the same as the informal suggestion made recently by Commander in Chief Ne Win which envisioned the evacuation of the Nationalists through Thailand.to Formosa, (S Rangoon 730, 29 Jan.52)
7.
CHINA/OEYU)N. Ceylonese ship rubber to Chinas The Polish vessel Tobruk cleared Colombo on 29 January mdth 450 tons of rubber for Communist China. Local Ceylonese circles expect that up to 1,000 tons of rubber for China will also be shipped on the Russian vessel Nicolaev, now in Colombo harbor. Still another rubber shipment to China appears in prospect for the near future; the agent of the Polish OCean Lines in Colombo has information that the Polish vessel Narwik will call on 16 February with spaoe'for 500 tons of cargo. (C Colombo 443, 29 Jan 52)
Comments The only other shipment of Ceylonese rubber to China was made last October. Efforts since that tine to obtain Ceylonese rubber hive been frustrated by the unavailability ef shipping space. Reoent reports, however, have indicated increased confidence on the part of both Chinese and Ceylonese that Satellite shipping to carry rubber to China would be available early in 1952,
8,
CHINA.
Chinese Communist re &rations for attacks on Nationalist-held e at ur ng repo s repor e first two weeks of 1952 the following chinese Communist activities indicated impending attacks on Nationalist-held islands off the Chekiang coasts (1) heavy radio traffio among Chinese Communist army units stationed in the area; (2) establishment of six new Chinese Communist radio stations on Tinghai Island, off the north coast; (3) movement southward from Shanghai of 4 naval vessels; and (4) activity among naval vessels and landing craft off Shihp,u, on the north Chekiang coast.
islands

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BURMA, Formal offer for solution to Nationalist problem made: The Burmese 77517agn Minister delivered an aide memoire to the US Embassy in Rangoon offibially requesting that the US urge Taipei to order'its troops in Burma. to evacuate that country, The US Government was also asked to persuade Thailand to facilitate the movement of tha Nationalist force through its territory.
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Comments The Chinese COmmunist3maptured Tung T'ou Island between 11 and 14 January. This action and other indioatori_have been interpreted to presage an offensive against other Nationalist-held islands off tke China coast as the weather oonditions beoome more favorable.
9.
KOREA. Replaceumnt of ROK delegate to ceaSe-fire talks announced! French news agency in Tokyo reported on 29 January that Major General Yu Chae Hyong, Deputy Chief of Staff of the ROK Army, has replaced Ceneral Lee as the South Korean delegate at the cease-fire negtiations at Panmunjom.. His selection narks the third change in representatives by the ROK since last October. (R ERIS,. 29 Jan 52)
Commenti Yu, a product of the Japanese military system, has been with the Korean Gendarmerie and Army since 1914. In 1949 Yu was a colonel"and Oonducted an effective anti-guerrilla campaign on Cheju-Island, and in 1950 he served successively as commanding general of-the 6th, 2nd, and 7th divisions. Reported as a Major General in May 1951, Yu was appointed Vice-Chief of Staff of the South Korean Army.
IC.
JAPAN: Japanese emphasize need for popular support of Security Treaty. arrangmentss Ambassador Rusk reports that at the first.meeting of US and-Japanese negotiators concerned with working out the adMinistrative details of the Security Treaty. the Japanese once again made an appeal that the national sentiment of their people be oonsidered. Pointing to Socialist Party opposition to the treaty; the Japanese emphasized the necessity of gaining popular understanding and-support for the pact, which will provide for the stationing of American troops in Japan following the end of the occupation. (S Tokyo 1576, 29 Jan 52).
There is considerable !sondem among Japanese Government Comments leaders that opposition to the BS-Japan Security Treaty, now being expressed by the. Socialist and Communist Parties, Will increase unless the post-occupation arrangements reflect substantial, visible Ohanges from the current situation. The need to retain facilitiesfor prosecution of the Korean war, and the lack of substitute facilities, will prevent complete fulfillment of Japanese-desires.

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EAST attulku. Government to offer asylum to lest German youths evading military service: The East German Government has reportedly drafted a law which will offer political asylum to West German youths evading conscription. It plans to submit the draft to the East German People's Chamber during the defense debate in the West German Bundestag. (R FSIS,_Eonstanz Suedkurier, Berlin, 25 Jan 52)
Comment: Such an offer, which would attract fewWest German draft'evaders and have little effect in reducing Bundestag support for West German defense measures, is Aesigned for its propaganda effect of contrasting the "Warlike" measures of the West with the "peaceful" struggle of the East. It is unlikely that many non-Communists would be attracted by this offer, and Communist youths might very well be ordered to remain in West Germany for underground activities,
2.
FRANCE. Barter transactions reportedly increasing in French-US trades: The US Embassy in Paris reports that "barter" transactions betweeh French and US firms are increasing in frequency and volume as a result of the dollar shortage and high price levels in France. The general barter pattern involves the sale of French goods for US dollars at a losa, while these dollars can be used to import US goods, later sold for enough to recoup the loss and make a profit.
Although only a relatively small percentage of the total trade is involved, the French economic press is concerned over "government 'emcoutage ment" of this practice, and the national businessmen's association is trying to discourage it because of a fear that the tendency to calculate these transactions at an unofficial rate of 420 francs to the dollar will exert pressure for official devaluation from the'current rate of 350 francs per dollar. (C Paris 4463, 25 Jan 52)
Comment: Rumors of a devaluation arose early last autumn when the franc began to slip in value. The black-market rate for the dollar has hovered near 440 francs in recent weeks, despite the government's severe credit restrictions, which have aroused much popular oppositiOn. The deep cuts in exports, due to German competition and rising French prices, have caused considerable suffering in certain French industries, such as glove making.
3.
'
AUSTRIA. Police arrest intermediaries in scrap.armament shipments to the East: The Austrian police have arrested a number of petsons implicated in Mg-illegal shipment of cannon and machine-gun barrels to Orbit countries.

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Austrian officials charge that 160 tons of cannon barrels and 10,000 machine-gun barrels, reputedly from hidden Mbrld War II stocks, were delivered as "commercial steel" to the Hungarian ReStitution Commission. An additional 700 tons of such material were confiscated in Graz. Newspaper accounts assert that Soviet Enterprises in Austria was involved in the smuggling. The US Embassy in Vienna reports that it had known about the German army stocks,which had been regarded as alloy scrap unusable by the Austrian steel industry. Recent information suggests, however, that persons involved in transactions in armament steel in Graz may have had access to steel .armament scrap outside of Austria. Last August, according to this source, a steel expert in Graz appraised for an "export-import agent" 1,200 tons of finest Soehler armament steel, including 1,400 gun barrels, two thirds of them precision ground. An intermediary in the prospective deal and part owner of the materials inspected informed the steel expert at that time that his company had previously sold to the export-import agent some 600 tons of armament steel, then in storage in Trieste. (Factual data from: C Vienna 2457, 26 Jan 52; S Salzburg Joint Weeka 4, 26 Jan 52; 5/Control SO 77692, London, 10 Jan 52)
b.
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NETHERLANDS. Dutch protest delay in receipt of US military'equipment: The Netherlands has officially protested to US authorities the uncertainty of deliveries of US military equipment for the two Dutch divisions scheduled to take part in the SHAPE maneuvers next September. Officials state that serious political consequences can be expected if the problem is not solved SOOn.
The US Embassy at The Hague advises that, in view of the publicity given to Dutch participation in the maneuvers, the US will be publicly blamed for any failure to deliver the promised aid on schedule. Furthermore, delay, of the shipments would probably force the Dutch Government to reduce its conscription levies. This would deal a serious psyohological blow to the country's defense effort. (S The Hague 768, 29 Jan 52)
'
5.
Comment: Since last spring Dutch officials have indicated that a lack of eqUIFEI:might delay fulfillment of their military commitments.
In November, the Dutch hinted that "possibility of war in 1952" was the basis for their insistence on fielding fully equipped divisions for the SHAFg maneuvers. A later report shows that Dutch military leaders are firmly convinced of this possibility.
ITALY. Government proposes substantial social welfare program: Simultane3E757with its increased rearmament program, the Italian Government has

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announced a broad program of civilian investments designed to reduce unemployment and increase over-all produetion. The government,preposes, among other things, to construct additional law-cost.housing, initiate reforestation and work-camp programs to give employment for several hundred thousand youths, and to expand its agricultural development programs This proposal, which would require about 500 million dollars and some months for implementation, represents a policy concession to important political elements who have been dissatisfied with the restrictive financial policies associated with Budget Minister Pella. The idea has been generally received favorably, except by the Communists and industrialists; the latter object to the necessary additional taxes. (S Rome Joint Wbeka 3, 25 Jan 52; P Rome 3323, 24 Jan 52; R FEIS, 25 Jan 52)
Comment: The announcement of this program is calculated to ease tension within the Christian Democratic Party and dissatisfaction with the government throughout Italy. US officials were informed by Pella some weeks ago; howeVer, that such a program would be announced with an eye to the-forthcoming elections, and that after the elections emphasis would be placed on defense, rather than on civilian expenditures. In arky event, US observers do not believe that this program could be implemented- fast enough to improve the government's position greatly prior to the national elections should they be held this year.
6.
ITALY-TRIESTE; Linked-list system urged for Trieste communal elections: The US Political Adviser in Trieste supports the recommendation of the Allied Military Government of Zone A that the Italian electoral law calling fot linked lists of parties be 'adopted in that zone, where local elections may be held this year. The adviser.admits that the reasons he advanced last year against adoption of the electoral law are-still valid, but states that the intention of the US and UK to meet Italy's wishes in these matters appears the deciding factor in favor of its adoption. (S Trieste 712, 25 Jan 52)
Comment: Last July the electoral law principally on arouse adverse reaction from coalition Of Independentists 24 Jul 51).
Despite pressure from the Italian Government for'linked lists, moderate pro-Italian parties in Trieste, except for the.Christian Democrats, are still unwilling tb participate:in such an arrangement. In Italy, too, the democratic minority parties are opposed to this system for the local elections scheduled for spring in southern Italy.

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US representative had opposed adoptien of the the grounds that the use of linked lists wonld the Yngoslavs and might cause a linked-list and Cominformists (see OCI Daily Digest,
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CUBA. Communist daily to become weekly magazine: The Communists have announced that La 1ltima Hora will become a weekly tabloid magazine instead of a daily neWspaper.. The 108 Embassy in Havana comments that the change is probably due to the serious difficulty the Communists are having in obtaining newsprint, to the fact that La Ultima Hors is no longer as necessary to the Communists now that the daily Hay is once again in circulation, and to the Communist Party's poor financial situation which does not permit ths continued publication of two dailies. (C Havana 1095, 8 Jan 52)
8.
MEXICO. Decrees will discourage private uranium prospecting and exploitation: Under recently published decrees, private firms in Mexico are not guaranteed exploitation concessions over deposits of fissionable materials which they may discover, even if such deposits are found on property currently being exploited for other minerals. Proposed revisions of the basic mining law involve similar provisions. (U NY Times, 30 Jan 52) Comment: No Uranium is being mined at the present time in Mexico, though the US is interested in stimulating prospecting. The present decrees and the proposed legislation will serve to discourage both US- and Mexican owned mining companies from engaging in such activity.
9.
PANAMA. Czechoslovakia and Poland seek to establish missions in Panama:' Poland and Czechoslovakia reportedly desire to establish diplomatic missions
in Panama. When questioned abOut the matter, the Panamanian Foreign Minister said Czechoslovakia had not made an official approach, but that the Polish representative in Mexico had formally requested an exchange of ministers, and had eVen submitted the name of the proposed chief of mission.
The US Ambassador believes that he may have persuaded,the Panamanian Government to refuse the Polish request. (C Panama City 656, 29 Jan 52)
ComMent: It uas reported last September that the Czechoslovak Minister in Washington had made approaches to Panama for establishing official Czechoslovak representation there. There are still, however, no diplomatic missions from the Orbit in that country.

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Comment: Recent reports have made continual references to the financial strain on the Communist Party caused by the expenses of its publications,(see O)I Daily Digest, 4 Jan 52). Last November, it was reported.that the party planned to organize bond-selling campaigns and other fund-raising methods to secure enough money to continue the publication of its newspapers. It was considered essential, however, that the party maintain the appearance .ct the "independent" status ofUltimaHora (sothat it would not suffer suppression along with Boy) by limiting the publicity of the fund-raising campaigns to ligy alone'. This present repert attests to the carrying out of this policy.
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The Polish and Czech desire to establish diplomatic missions in Panama is probably motivated by a desire of the Soviet Orbit to establish representatives in key areas.

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This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office of Curreni Intelligence.
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1.
Comment: The Japanese Government's sensitivity on this subject is reflectiiirr-the hedging statements of officials before the Diet that it was "not desirable" for Japanese to attend.
2.
FRANCE. Budget deficit threatens NATO program: France is budgeting less than half the funds needed to meet 1952 NATO requirements for French forces in Europe. Ambassador Bruce states that this will necessitate a revision in the plans for NATO support installations in France.
The Ambassador fears that a drastic curtailment of the French military program might lead France to demand a definite agreement prOhibiting a larger defense contribution by Germany than by France. (TS Paris 4555, 29 Jan 52)
Comment: The gap between the budget figure and NATO's recommendations is equiv.erit to France's burden in Indochina, which the French have consistently stressed they cannot carry if NATO commitments are to be met. The recent NATO analysis of French defense capabilities is forcing France to admit that its earlier commitments were unrealistie.

SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
Government concerned over Moscow Conference invitations: The Japanese Government is concerned over possible public reaction and Soviet displeasure if it refuses passports for travel to the Moscow economic conference in April, according to US Political Adviser Sebald in Tokyo. Although the government is anxious to discourage Japanese attendance, some business leaders strongly urge participation on the grounds that refusal to send delegates would deny Japan valuable economic information, automatically write off trade with the USSR and Communist China, and unnecessarily antagonize the USSR. ln view of increasing public interest in the conference, Sebald comments that government refusal to grant passports may magnify the matter unduly and result in unfavorable repercussions. (C S/S Tokyo 1588, 30 Jan 52)
JAPAN.
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Comment on }tutor Niemoeller'S visit to Mose*: Pastor Niemoeller's primary objective in making a trip to Moscow seems to have.been his crusade for peace and the removal of East-lest tensions. Mile in Mescoar, he confined himself to religious matters and the question of German prisoners of wir. Although Niemoeller regards the sudden timing of his invitation as a "riddle," after talking with him the source became convinced that the visit was a careftlly planned Communist propaganda performance.
In dealing with the Cuestion of prisoners of war, Niemoeller talked with Deputy Foreign Minister Zorin and placed the whole matter within the framework of peace propaganda. Mhile Zorin insisted that only war criminals were held, he indicated that Niemoeller's stand weuld be considered by the Counoil of Foreign Ministers. As for the dhuroh situation, Niemoeller reported the existence of a genuine religious life and stated that the churches are not molested in their ecclesiastical functions. He believed that there had been visible progress in the condition of churches in the USSR and that the Kremlin not only tolerated but reluctantly supported them. Niemoeller attributed this progress to the separation of the churches from politics, bUt at the same time suggested that in the long run they cannot remain silent about the actual facts of Communism. The Orthodox Church leaders were sceptical about the Ecumenical Movement, which has its headquarters in Geneva, regarding it as a Western or American institution. Niemoeller, however, left Moscow with the impression that Sufficient interest had been shown to warrant further attempts at maintaining direct contact between theEcumene at Geneva and the Russian Church.
USSR.
Mile in Moscow, Niemoeller did not notice any tense or war-like situation. He felt that the masses were indifferent, and in his talks with church leaders the question of war was mentioned only in connection with the fear of American "aggression."
In his zeal to ease East-lest tension, Niemoeller may have placed undue significance on superficial facts, and he was undoubtedly influenced in his views by the warm reception accorded him by both religious and state officials.
His.report on religion in the USSlt will not influence most lest Germans, but the neutralist minority, inside and/outside the Evangelical Church, may be impressed.

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Soviet Union charges American generals are commanding Chinese Nationalists in Burma: The Soviet UN delegate charged on 29 January that two American generals are-commanding a "shock force" of Chinese Nationalist troops poised in Burma for a strike against Communist China. He also claimed that seven American colonels and twenty-seven majors were attached to Chinese Nationalist forces in Burma. (R FBIS 29 Jan 52)
USSR/BURMA.
Comment: Precisely the same accusation was made a fear days ago by thii7re-trommunist Burma Workers sad Peasants Party in Rangoon.
of breaking up present negotiations between the US and Burma for assistance under the Mutual Security Act.
3.
USSR/FRANCE.
Soviet Union retarns last five French prisoners of war: The French Ambassador in Moscow was informed by the Soviet Foreign Office on 29 January that on 30 January the USSR would deliver to
in the Soviet Union. Chataigneau expressed appreciation, but said that the Soviet count and his count of French PW's in the Soviet Union differed. (C Moscow 1257, 29 Jan 52)
French authorities in Berlin the last five French prisoners of war
Comment: This Soviet gesture toward releasing French prisoners is probably timed to coincide with the current meeting of the UN's Commission on Prisoners of War. It is not Imown whether the French prisoners in the Soviet Union were volunteers who fought with the German army, French personnel captured by the Germans and impressed into the German forces, or prisoners "liberated" from German camps by the Soviet army.
4.
25X1A
Alleged US intelligence agents sentenced: On 29 January, the Sofia Regional Court passed sentence on several Bulgarians found guilty of acting as agents for the American and Greek intelligence services. Among those sentenced to death was one of three former Bulgarian Royal Army and Air Force officers who were allegedly parachuted from a Greek-based American military plane in August, the two others having been killed in the drop or shortly thereafter. Five other Bulgarians were involved in the oase as "collaborators." (R FBIS 30 Jan 52)
BULGARIA.
involving charges of foreign espionage. Since November, violations

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Comment:
2
both Chinese and Burmese Communists. Recent intensification of antiAmerican propaganda regarding the issue is apparently for the purpose
The Chinese Nationalist issue has been kept alive since 1950 by
This is the most recent in a series of Bulgarian trials
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of Bulgarian airspace have figured in Bulgarian notes to both Greece and Yugoslavia. -Bulgarian proPaganda has shown an increased preoCcupation with border security singe the promulgation of the DS Mutual Security Act in the fall of 1951.
5.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA. Two high military officers allegedl caught in purge: It is ramored in Prague that General Jaroslav Prochaika, Chief of Staff of the Czech Army,-has been arrested. The-US Arpy Attadhe comments that there is no outward evidence that a purge of leading military figures is underway, but, that there is ho-doubt that the !political and military pot is boiling." (S DSARMA Prague 737, 29 Jan 52)
Prochaska, who is the brother of Vladimir Prochaska, Czech Ambassador to the United States, rose froP captain to army general in seven years. He is known for-his violent antia.American attitude. He apparently only retUrned-to CzeChosloVikia at the end of the mar, having been in the USSR for about twenty years,
6.
Government bids for support 'of Sudeten Germans remaining in Czechoslovakia: As a result of the manpower'shortage, the Czech Government is trying to win the supPort of some 160,000 Sudeten Germane in Czechoslovakia. Through frequent speeches and newipaper articles the Czechs ere being asked to adopt a "fraternal attitude" towards those Skuleten Germanswho are sisting:in building socialisth." The Central Council a Trade Unions has begun publication of a new Geiman-language weekly, Reconstruction and Peace, for the German workers. In spite of these official efforts, however, popular resentment against them remains.
The government stopped repatriating Sudeten Germans in April 1951, and there is evidence that it is trying to encourage some skilled Sudeten workers who have left the oountry to return to Czechoslovakia. Such a return was reportedly discuSsed with the Pieok mission when it visited Prague in'October, but apparently no agreement was reached. (S DSARMA _Prague 739, 30 Jan 52) The Ciech Government has proceeded cautiously towards a rapprOMTEGIThwith the Sudetens still in Czechoslovakia. lhile the manpower crisis increased because of the demands of the enlarged five
Comment:

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Comment: Major General Htuska, Deputy Minister of Defense was also reportedly arrested recently. Both Hruska and Prochaska-are known to be friends of Slansky and both rose rapidly in the Soviet sponsored Czech army,
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year plan, the government until 1951 continued to expel Sudetens, many 'of whom were skilled workers. Ptesumably manpower needs will override further emigration.
7.
HUNGARY. Long-term trade agreement sibaed with Soviet Union: On 23 January, a long-term agreement onyeciprocal goods delivertes between the Soviet Heim and Hungary 'Was aigned in Mbscow. The agreement provides that the USSR deliver equipment for complete plants and give technical aid to Hungary during the period 1952-55. The treaty calls for a signifieant increase in goods exchanged between the USSR and Hungary. The Hungarian trade delegation left Moscow on 29 January. (R Eamon, 1259, 29 Jan 52)
Comment: Hungary and the USSR concluded a long term framework and credit agreement on 1 January 1949. Heretofore this has been implemented ty an annual protocol. The nature of the proposed exchanges (including complete factories) has now made necessary an agreement extending over i lenger period. The Hungarian Five Year Plan is scheduled for completion at the end of 1954.
8.
Rundown hospital oars seen near Komarom: Approximately 20 hospital cars have teen seen en a siding near Aas, a village just south of Kamarom. The cars, 'reportedly old-and in need of repair, have been at Acs since 20 January. One report states that the cars have Russian markings. (S MA Budapest 2801, 24'Jan 52)
Comment: A hospital train of German origin and in need of repair was reported near Gyor (approxiately 20,miles west of Acs) in July and again in November 1951. There have also been reports that passenger and freight cars are being converted into hospital oars in Hungary.
9.
TRIESTE. Yugoslays to hold elections in Zone B: According to an Italian radio broadcast, a "competent source close to the Yugoslav military administration of Zone B" olaima that local elections conearning administrative reform are to be held sometime this year.
Subsequent to this broadcast, the Italian %brassy inforMed the Department of State that the Yugoslays intend to hold elections in Zane B "in the near future." (R FBIS 25 Jan 52; S to Belgrade 795, 30.Jan 52)
Comment: Other reports alluding to the precise timing and nature of these impending elections are lacking. Hawever, an early election

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in the Yugoslav Zone mould undoubtedly increase local animosities which mould contribute tO the worsening of Ita1O-Yugoslav relations and further prejudice any chance for the conclusion of a Trieste settlement. The last election in Zone B, held in April 1950, was designed to select two regional councils which enact zonal laWs and wus dominated by the Yugoslav supported SloveneItalian People's Front. The Soeialist Party and the Virtually-nen-existent Christian Social Party represented anly token opposition; consequently a large number of Italians failed to vote.

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1.
GREECE. Prime Minister refuses to halt purge of pro-Papagos officers: Prime idinister Plastiras does not intend to discourage the purge of pro-Pupagos officers now going on in the Greek armed forces. When the issue was raised by the American Ambassador, Flastiras stated that he would not interfere with the Minister of National Defense and the King in their efforts to restore "unity in the.armed forces." In fact, he gave the Ambassador,the impression that heieympathizes with the objectives of the purge and resents DS interference. (S Athens 31I27, 30 Jan 52)
2.
INDIA. Communist Party to agitate for release of risoners: Ajoy Ghosh, Secretary General of the Indian Communist Farty, has announced that his party would launoh mass agitation in states where the government refused to release Communist imisoners elected to seats in state legislative assemblies during the Current 'elections. (U New Delhi 2664, 28 Jan 52) Comment: Ghosh's announcement suggests that the COmmunist Party, encouraged by its election successes in southern India, is preparing to drop its "peaceful" front after the elections are completed. Agitation by the party could reaoh serious proportions in such states as Travancore-Cochin, where the Communists and their allies have won a third of the seats in the state assembly.
3.
INDONESIA. Prominent Socialist gains poor impression of Satellites: Sudjatmoko, a prominent disciple of SocialistTarty chairman Sjahrir, revealed to an American official in Home that he had just completed a six months' tour of Europe whiCh had included visits to Poland, 0zechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. When 4uestioned regarding his impressions of Poland and Czechoslovakia, he replied emphatically, "that's not for us.:" He added that he was glad that he had visited those countries because his political ideas had been clarified.
.
Sudjatmoko expects to return immediately to Indonesia and stated that he hopes to influence the Socialist Party congress which will be held in February. (C lonle. 3367, 29 Jan 52)

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Plastiras' unwillingness to_use his influence to stop Comment: the reintroduction of pothics into the army indicates that the purge will continue, unless the Amerioan Government takes strong action. The krge, rapidly becoming the major political issue in Greece, will' undoUbtedly further weaken the government by stimulating opposition efforts to obtain control.
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Comment: Statements by party leader Sjahrir and reoent Socialist alignments with left wing groups in Parliament have indicated Socialist willingness to assume leadership of a leftist bloc.
Sudjatmoko's statements appear to indicate his opposition to a policy of cooperationwith the Communitts. His influence within the Socialist Party, however, is not clear, since he has been out of the country for several years and is not even a party member. Nevertheless, his en-the-spot observations of conditions in Satellite countries may carry considerable weight with persons who have seen Communism at work only in Indonesia.
-
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)4.
The US Embassy in BURMA. Chinese Communist threat to Burma assessed: Bangkok reports that on the basis of intelligenoe available in Bangkok it has concluded that A Chinese Communist move into the Shan States of northeastern Burma is "entirely possible." The Embassy believes that such a MOW would have control of Burma, not Thailand, au its ultimate goal. Meanwhile, the Chinese NatiOhalists in Burma are giving every indication of preparing for a new incursion into Yunnan, although there is little reason to believe that their capabilities have measurably improved'since their ignominous defeatst the_hands of the Communists last summer. The Embassy states that these troops might be more effective Under different leadership, as it strongly suspects General Li Mi of being more interested in lining his pockets than in waging war. (S Bangkok 1623, 28 Jan 52).
Comment: The Chinese Communist threat to Burma is currently emphasized by the sustained propaganda campaign being conducted by the Communists, including the Russians in the UN, concerning the Nationalists in Burma.
'
5.
INDOCHINA. French disturbed over uncertain loyalty of Tonkin population: A high Frenoh offioial has admitted to the US Consul in Hanoi that the recent heavy infiltration of the Tonkin delta by the Viet Minh presents a grave problem. The uncertain loyalty of the delta population is being undermined by the "untoward behavior" of Frenoh troops toward the looal peoples, which contrasts with the studiously proper behavior of Viet Minh forces.
The US Consul oommente.that Minister of Associated States LetourneaU, who is visiting in Tonkin, appears to be acutely aware that the French are losing the "battle for men's minds" in the delta area. -(S Hanoi 513, 29 Jan 52)

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Comment: The Tonkin delta area is the major source of food and manpower for the Viet Minh army. As long as the Viet Minh retains its influence.there, French efforts to gain complete victory in Indochina will fail.
6.
CHINA. Peiping outs year-end bonuses to government workers: Workers in Chinese Communist Government agencies were not to receive the customary bonuses at the end of 1951, according to A Peiping directive issued last December. Workers in public enterprises were authorized to receive year-end bonuses in a000rdance with regulations promulgated by the Communists at the end of 1949. Workers in private enterprises were entitled to the same bonuses as last year, (U NCNA, Peiping, 8 Dec 51)
Comments Whereas the Communists insist that private firms pay the oustomary year-end bonuses, they allow public enterpriset to pay bonuses at reduced rates, The 1949 regulations referred to in the foregoing directive stipulated that public enterprises would pay as bonuses no more than half a month's pay plus half of the amount customarily paid in excess thereof. Private firms have recently been able to use the bait of better pay to attract skilled workers from public enterprises.
25X1X
7.
Chinese Communists reportedly train replacements for Third Field Army: The East China Military Area has obtained replacements for units of the Chinese Communist Forces in Korea by drawing regiments and bat-
talions individually from the Third Field Amy stationed in East.China, The resulting depletion in the
tenoeszmysuns being remedied by the induction

of peasants who have "volunteeied" since October 1951. It is expected that these replacements will be trained and assi ned to permanent units of the Third Field Army before March 1952.
Comment:

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This method of obtaining replacements for Chinese Communists
unitirEMFea has been previously reported and accepted.
8.
KOREA. South Korea may appeal to President Truman on inflatiOn problems Ambassador Muccio states that in view of the acute inflation in South Korea the Republic now contemplates an appeal to President Truman and to the nations fighting in Korea to make provisions for reimbursing the South Korean currency advances to the US forces.
Ambassador Muotio observes that economic deterioration is too severe for a piecemeal solution and recommends that the unified command urgently consider sending a group to'Pnsan immediatelywith full authority to draw up an overall economic and financial program for South Korea. (S Pusan 748, 30 Jan 52)
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Comment: The two principal issues preventing the stabilization of the economy are the failure of the unified coMmand and the Republic of Korea to reach an agreement on economic aid and the failureto reimburse South Korea for the local currency advanoes to UN forces. One effect of the resulting inflation has been a 33 percent rise in Seoul rice prices eince early December.
9.
Yoshida sayw Emperor will not abdicate: Prime Minister Yoshida 1711ate Japanese Diet on 31 January that Emperor Hirohito is not going to abdicate when the peace treaty goes into effect. (U FBIS Ticker, AP Tokyo, 31 Jan 52)
.
JAPAN.

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Comment: There has been some speculation that tina EMperor might abdicate following the effective date of the peace treaty, out of deference to the traditional Japanese concept of responsibility. This MOW is reportedly.favored by some rightist elements who feel that. Hirohito's renunciation of divinity would not apply to his son Akhito, who recently reached hie eighteenth birthday.
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(WESTERN)
1.
GENERAL. Small countries' coal demands uncover fundamental dispute on East-West trade, Current discussions in the Coal Committee pf the OEEC have disclosed wide differences of opinion on Western Europe's current coal crisis. The dispute was touched off by a vigorous appeal of Austria, Denmark, and the Netherlands for a larger share in Ruhr coal. Both Austria and Denmark contended that the Committee's Secretariat had been too optimistic in calculating their anticipated receipts of Polizh coal. The Austrians also said that despite the high price they had to pay for US coal, their country had suffered a higher percentage reduction in Ruhr allocations than any other importer.
The British delegate regards the US position as "unreasonable" and attributes to US-restrictions on East-West trade the increased pressure on British and German coal supplies. Pursuit of this policy will "wreck" the Coal Committee, the British believe, and lead to the distribution of coal by bilateral agreements. A British proposal that the problem of increasing Polish deliveries to the West be considered in Geneva by the UN's coal committee was rejected after the US objected that a debate on East-West trade in Geneva would benefit the Poles, that the problem is one of "terms of trade" and not of availability, and that coal importers should bargain bilaterally with Poland. (Factual data from: S Paris REPTO 498, 28 Jan 52)
2.
There is considerable doubt that the Constitutional Court will bag the party. Many top Federal Republic officials oppose such a ban, because they feel that it would not prevent the party's subversive activities; but only make them harder to detect.
GERMANY, West German Communists step up underground organization: The Communist Party of West Germany has recently organized three separate groups to distribute party orders and illegal literature in the event that the party is banned by the Federal Constitutional Court. The members of one group do not know those of another, and only a few party functionaries know all about the over-all plan. The nel setup was supposed to be operational by 15 January. Party records of some local organizations have already been destroyed. (S Heidelberg Weeka 4, 28 Jan 52)
Comment: For some time the party has been quietly preparing for a complete underground existence. More reliable leaders from East Germany have been replacing West German leaders on local levels.

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The demands of the small countries were strongly supported by the US delegate. US officials believe that the Coal Committee is shirking its responsibilities and that existing procedures, involving only'a limited volume of coal subject to Committee allocation, are inadequate.
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3.
UNITED KINGDOM. Britain seeks NATO assistance in denying arms_to Egypt during crisisc The British NATO Council Deputy has requested that NATO nations prevent the sale or transit of arms-to Egypt during the present AngloEgyptian dispute. He stated that Egyptian efforts to obtain military supplies in both NATO and non-NATO countries had been somewhat successful; and that although the transactions had been largely clandestine, export licenses had been granted or governments directly approached in some cases. Because of the unsatisfactory results of their protests to individual governments) the British are asking the NATO deputies to obtain definite responses from their governments within a month. (S London, DEPTO 899, 29 Jan 52)

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Comment: Egypt has been on an arms hunt for some months, chiefly for spare parts for US or UK equipment. Italy, France and Portugal gave evasive answers when approached, and it is not clear to whose export licenses the British refer. Clandestine transactions through private concerns are fairly well controlled by countries which require export permits for any arms shipments, but this does not necessarily cover cases of transshipment, and smuggling is always possible.
'
With respect to non-NATO countries, Egypt has negotiated arms agreements with Czechoslovakia, Switzerland and Spain,
4.
British UN delegate favors UN investigation of Chinese Nationalist troops in Burma: Selwyn Lloyd, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, has told a member of the US delegation at the General Assembly in Paris that he expects "very severe" attacks on the Conservative government is: the House of Commons over the question of the Chinese Nationalist forces in Burma. He plans to suggest to Foreign Secretary Eden an AngloAmerican proposal in the UN to send a Peace Observation uummission to Burma. He indicated that the move could be justified as an answer to recent Soviet charges of US support of the Chinese troops, and implied that he believed Burma would reject the proposal._ He_considered that its effect on British public opinion would be "very helpful." (S Paris DELGA 1246, 30 Jan 52)
Comment: In the present state of British public opinion the Conservative government remains vulnerable to Labor pressure on all Far Eastern issues. Recent press reports from Burma on alleged US support of the Nationalist forces have received moderate circulation in Britain.
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ARGENTINA. Meat contract with the UK may not be fulfilled: Argentina may fail by 40,000 tons to meet its meat contract with the UK. By December only 105,000 tons had been shipped; the contract, which expires on 23 April, was for 200,000 tons. (C Buenos Aires, Joint Weeka 56, 24 Jan 52)
Comment: Argentina formerly supplied about one third of the Uts K meat requirements and was an important source of meat for Allied troops during the World War II. The current shortage is a result of drought and increased domestic consumption. To augment the exportable surplus of meat -- and critically needed foreign exchange earningS -the government has ordered hotels and restaurants to serve no meat on one day a week.
6.
Labor confederation plans hemisphere labor conference: According to reports from the US Embassies in Montevideo and Bogota, the Argentine General Confederation of Labor is inviting labor groups to attend a hemisphere labor conference in Asuncion, Paraguay, 7-19 February. (C to Asuncion 117, 26 Jan 52)
Coent: mm In December a leading official of Mexico's second largest labor federation stated that he expected "the Third Latin American Lab6r Organization" to hold its constituent congress in February. The US Embassy in Buenos Aires has commented that although Peronism does not have large support in the Latin American labor movement,.it does have sufficient strength to form a third federation, though skeletal in
nate. ur
The choice of Asuncion as the site of the conference may reflect Argentina's attempt to de-emphasize its sponsorship of the meeting (see OCI Daily Digest, 5 Oct 51).
7.
Visit of US labor delegation may be inadvisable: The US Embassy in Santiago states.that, according to news services, a three-man US labor delegation is being sent to Chile to combat Communism in Labor unions. The Embassy comments that Communist influence in Chilean labor is admittedly strong and adds that the delicate political situation due to current military aid negotiations makes it advisable for the Department of State to use its influence to convince the OBIT ;regional wing of the non-Communist ICFTU) that the moment is not opportune for a visit by US or ORIT leaders. (S Santiago 400, 30 Jan.52)
CHILE.

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8.
Berberich in Antwerp from Veracruz on 16 January may be destined "for the iron curtain." The vessel concerned also carried antimony, zinc, and mercury for various firms in Western Europe. (C Mexico City 966, 30 Jan 52)
Comment: Some Mexican copper is very probably reaching the Orbit by transshipment through 17estern Europe, though there is no reliable evidence of direct shipments. The UE State Depsrtmenti has -rec-ently been
Copper shipment believed destined for Orbit: The US Embassy in Mexico City suspects that 23 tons of copper scrap shipped to Leo
MEXICO.
from Mexican ports to Canton.

SECRET
uncle ficially informed that "there is not the slightest possibility" that Mexico will permit items listed in the Battle Act to be exported to the Orbit. An unconfirmed report of 29 January, however, states that shipments of raw materials, particularly copper, are being made
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Flights Heavz aotivity Heavy a o t i v i t y at a t airfield a i r f i e l d near near Korean Koresn border border reported: reported: Flights totaling pOtsibly MI0-15's from Tatungkou, Tatungkou, totalTng poksibly 78 7 p"Chinese" C h inese"' and and -"Allied" "Allied" M I E 1 5 ' s from i r Force Antung, Were were'revealed message. (SUEDE near Antung, revealed in in a a 30 30 January January message. (SUEDE A Air Force Roundup 23, 2050Z, 20502, 31 31 Jan Jan 52) 52)
Comment: Although Although communications Commentr communioations intelligence intelI3.gence on on the aotivity a o t i v i t y of of tictiWW707 units in Manchuria t a c t i m units in Manchuriawas wasconsiderably considerably reduced reduced in in late l a t e December by COMmunist Communist security s e c u r i t y measures, measures, messages messages reporting reporting heavy heavy activity a c t i v i t y at at Tatungkou continue to t o be received. received.
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13. 13, 14. 149 5
KOREA. Arrival A r r i v a l of ,of new new Chinese Chinese Communist ConrmunieC army army group group in i n Korea Korea suggested: suggeetedr KOREA. The in a a -1/8 January Chinese m i rwthirty-fourth t y - f o u r t h Regiment" Regiment" is i smentioned mentioned in 28 January Chinese Comp. ComMunisi Korean western western munist message measage ts as being in i n a defensive position on tthe h e Korean front. Comm Reoon Recon Grqun_gbrea, 30 Jan 52) (SUEDE 501st Corn &-rea, CM IN 7955, 7955, 30 52) front. (SUEDE
Comment: There have been no indications Commenta indioations of o f major changes in i n the weste7r77:Mr ofof the Korean battle w e s t e x o r the Korean ba$tle front--the front--the area a r e a from f r o m which which the the UN UI? Recent Comiand Command eipeote expeots any any future f u t u r e Communist C o d s t offensive offensive will w i l l be be launched. launched. Recent Chirieie Natienalist iintelligence'reports haie stated, stated, h6wever, hbwever, that Chinese Nationalist n t e l l i g e n c e ' r e p o r t s have that the the Chineee CIiineae COmmunist Communist 2nd 2nd Army Army Group, Group, consisting oonaiating of of the %helit, lit, 4th 4 t h and and 8th 8th Ariies,'-had'moved western Korea Korea i in early January. The The 34th 34th Infantry' Infantry Armie8,'had moved iinto n t o western n e a r l y January. Regiment would would normally normally be be subordinate subordinate to t o the the 4th 4th Army Army of of this this army army group. group.
' While Mile the t h e introduction introduction of of this t h i e fresh fresh army army group group into i n t o western western Korea, Korea, if.00nfirmed, i f ' c o n f i m e d , might indioate indioate a a rotation rotation of of troops troops long long engaged engaged in i n this this Seotor, sector, it it might on on the the other other hand hand represtnt represept a a significant significant increase increase in in the t h e enemy's enemy's offensive offensive potential p o t e n t i a l in i n this t h i s strategic s t r a t e g i c area. area.
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Comment: Comment: Northeastern Korea suffered heavily from e epidemics p i d d o s of of typhus typhus id zarizz during An intensive anti-epidemic anti-epidemia &d s = duringthe thewinter winter of of 1950-51. 1950-51. An oimpaign wts-oarried out Korean authorities the olimpaign was'oarried out by North Koreafl a u t h o r i t i e s during t h e summer summer and fall f typhoid and and report8 have have citeld a i t e d tthe h e outbreak Recent reports outbreak o of f a l l oT of 1951. 1961. Reoent oholera villages the east coast. coast. aholera in in v i l l a g e s in i n the t h e Wonsan area on the
Outbreak Outbreak of smallpox saallpox i in n North North Korean Korean Army Army: t A A 20 20 January January message message from from i Nodh North K lorean unit at city of a oreen naval u nit a t the northeastern Korean c ity o f Chongjin states that the'outbreak of d smallpox ailments...(we) have oompleted completed s tates t h a t "due'to "due' t o t h e outbreak of l p o x ailments. ..(we) have T&m the inoculation, today, today, at a t the Chongjin s station t a t i o n area." area." -(S&E (SUEDE ASA ASA Tokyo t h e inoculation, CM CM IN IN 7354, 7354, 28 28 Jan Jas 52) 52)
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SECURITY MFORMATION
4 February 1952
US OFFICIALS ONLY

46
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily It does for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. CIA current reports in not represent a complete coverage of allComments represent the or in the Office of Current Intelligence. immediate views of the Office of Curren" Intelligence.

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SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
1.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA. United States my be implicated in Slansky trial: The American Ambassador in Prague is certain that the Slansky trial will be used for an attack on the United States and yarns that it may also be used as an excuse to restrict further or perhaps even to close the EMbassy. The Ambassador thinks the trial will have the dual object of eliminating Slansky and his colleagues and of paving the way for an anti-American move which might include presentation of dramatic "proof" of an American attempt to implement the Mhtual Security Act. (TS, S/S Prague 584, 1 Feb 52)
Comment: Slansky is accused of conspiring with a Western power and of implication in American "subversive and conspiratorial activities in the Peoples' Democracies." Recently the retiring Afghan banister in Praha told American officials that the Polish Ambassador claimed to have seen proof implicating Slansky with the US.
2.
Eztrptian Prime Minister favors "cmick action" on dispute with BritailY Fcptian Prime Minister Ali Maher has told the American Ambassador in Cairo that he is very much interested in "quick action" on the Anglo-Egyptian controversy and is hopeful that a settlement can be reached "very soon." He era, phasized, however, that no agreement is possible unless Farouk is recognized as King of the. Sudan. He further stated that the British "base" must be moved out of Egypt and that a solution of the dispute with Britain must precede any ati'intion to domestic social reforms.
EGYPT.
25X1X
has discounted the British contention that recognition of the Sudan title would result in riots and civil disorders in the Sudan. He added that if the opportunity now existing for negotiating a settlement is not seized, it will not came again. (SI S/S Cairo 1199 and 1211, 30 Jan; S, Cairo 1226, 31 Jan 52)
While both Britain and Egypt have made conciliatory gestures, neither has yet given any indication that it is prepared to make genuine concessions.
CHINAJINDIA,
25X1j.
Indian CharRe reports Korean talks stalled bv US "insincerity"; has learned of a report from the Indian Charge in Peiping that the "basic cause" of the stalemate in the Korean truce talks is Peiping's conviction that the US is "insincere...and has no real desire for
.
Comment: The American Ambassadors in Cairo and London also agree that negotiations should be opened quickly.

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peace." Peiping whether "any go wo come" of having the Indian Ambassador instructed to inform Peiping of the Government of Indies view that the US genuinely desires peace and an early armistice. (S, S/S London 3341, 1 Feb 52)
Comment; The Indian Charge last week publicly praised the Peiping regime at an Indian reception in Peiping, and in this instance apparently has accepted uncritically the Communist line. There is no reason to believe that the'Indian Ambassador's representations would have any effect on Peiping's policies,
4.
Comment: American officials have pointed out to the Japanese that.some specific commitments must be made during the Manila talks in order to instrre ratification of the peace treaty by the Philippine Congress,
5.
GERMANY. Saar issue threatens Adenauer Government: The French appointment of an ambassador to the Saar has seriously undermined Chancellor Adenauer's political position. Top German Foreign Office spokesmen state that pressure on Adenauer from all parliamentary factions compelled him to schedule for 7 February the Bundestag debate on rearmament which he had previously postponed.
Unless Adenauer can obtain some prior French action to calm the "embittered" parliamentary atmosphere, the government will be defeated on the European Defense Community. This would force either abandonment of German integration into Western defense or resignation of the government.
German diplomats feel that a crisis might be averted if France were to announce "free" elections in the Saar and were also to declare that the status quo in the Saar had not been altered by recent French action. The US High Commissioner comments, "I am for the first time really worried." (TS, Munich unnumbered, 30 Jan 52)
DOP SECREM

SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
2
Japan's reparations policy discussed: The Japanese Gevernment, in its current reparations talks in Manila, will not accept the Philippine proposal that a definite sum to be paid be agreed upon, according to the US Political Adviser in Tokyo. Japan contends that its reparations obligation is based solely on its ability to pay, without relation to the amount of war damage suffered by the claimant, and that talks must be held with all the claimants before a total obligation can be accepted. The Japanese seemed receptive, how ever, to the US suggestion that Japan agree to an interim arrangement which would provide for a list of specific services to be undertaken by the Japanese after the peace treaty is ratified, with a salvage survey to commence immediately. (3, 3/8 Tokyo 1613, 1 Feb 52)
JAPAN.
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Comment: The statements of the German spokesmen probably represent a move of Adenauer to force the Allies to intervene in the French-German controversy. Under the ;resent circumstances it is doubtful that Adenauer will go through with the debate as scheduled since he risks sure defeat if he does so, whereas he would meet only continued pressure if he delayed the discussioh.
6.
The Foreign Office favors preliminary negotiations with Egypt on the varied problems of Anglo-Egyptian relations, to be followed by British -French -AmericanTurkish-Egyptian discussion of the MEC proposal. Britain is aware that a flexible agenda for the preliminary talks will be necessary and that it will probably not be possible to exclude the question of the Sudan, The Foreign Office realizes that concessions on the Sudan would greatly aid the defense negotiations, but believes "it is no good solving a trouble spot in one area by creating a trouble spot in another area," Officials still deny that recognition of Farouk's title as King of the Sudan is necessary to obtain a defense agreement. They are suggesting that the Governor General of the Sudan consult with Sudanese leaders in order to discover some concessions that Britain could make. (S, S/S London 3294, 3320, and 3324, 30 and 31 Jan 52)

TOP SECRET
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UNITED KINGDOM. Foreign Office developing new proposals for early AngloEgyptian negotiations: The US Embassy in London reports that the British Foreign Office appears eager to start negotiations with Egypt as soon as the new government is ready. The Embassy believes the Foreign Office will be "reasonable and realistic" about its demand that terroristic activity in the Canal zone must first be suppressed, since it seeks primarily an assurance of the new government's willingness to cooperate to that end.
4 Feb 52
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,/ UNCLASSIFIED wheADRI4VE4FFSEdilfriena ZDA1149/0r41:44354131%1411-4CAPAIRO424#944ed or declassified wheo filled in form is detached from controlled document.

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4 February 1952,
US OFFICIALS ONLY
OCI No. 3865

Copy No.
2 26
DAILY DIGEST

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SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
1.
USSR/INDONESIA. pr9minent Indonesian Socialist believes.Chinese Communists will not intervene in Indochina: Sudjatmoko told an American official in Rome that during his visit to Poland in the course of his recent six months' tour of Europe, he had been an official guest of the Polish Foreign Office. As a result of conversations with officials of that office, he believes that the Chinese Communists will not intervene in Indochina with, either fortes or "volunteers." He bases this belief on several remarks made to hith that the North Korean attack on the Republic of Korea was a "mistake." He said, however, that the Chinese Communists might give assistance and equipment to the Viet Minh forces'.
While in Yugoslavia, he was informed by Yugoslays that they believe any frictions between Communist China and Russia would tend to remain concealed for a long period within a framework of "general cordiality," but that in the long run the Chinese would attempt to follow a policy designed to promote their own interests. (C Rome 3367, 29 Jan 52)
2.
USSR. Austria will send delegation to Moscow: The Austrian Government has accepted the Soviet invitation to send a delegation to Moscow to discuss Austrian payment for the repatriation of its prisoners of war from the USSR and for Austrian civilians liberated from German concentration camps. The delegation will be headed by the Austrian Minister to Moacow and will include the chief of the POW section of the Minister of Interior. (S Vienna 2510, 31 Jan 52)
Comment: Austrian payment for Soviet expenses incurred during repatriation has already been settled under one of the agreed articles of the Austrian Treaty, but a bill had never been presented. Austria had offered to send a delegation to Moscow for the same purpose in the fall of 1949.
Results of 1951 state plan announced: The Central Statistical Administration of the USSR, Council of Ministers, has announced that the value of gross industrial production in the USSR was 16 percent higher in 1951than in 1950. Industrial production, measured in rubles, exceeded the 1951 plan by 3t percent, although three branches admittedly fell short of their goals - timber, cotton growing, and railways.

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The announcement further btressed that the USSR had successfully increased production of such basic materials as steel, coal, oil, and rubber, as well as vital machinery and finished goods, and that output of consumer goods and sales of foodstuffs to the population had increased by a "significant" margin. Wholesale price reductions effective 1 January 1952 for petroleum and paper products may be followed by price cuts for consumer
goods.
Comment: While the,overall 1951 plan was successful if measured in terms of value of production, targets of production of specific quantities of basic industrial commodities were not uniformly realized. Items of secondary importance were.in some cases overproduced, while those of high priority did not meet planned goals. For example, the strategic Ministry of Heavy Engineering failed to meet planned quotas for steam engines and turbines.
Comparisons of this official report with quarterly reports for 1951 and Beriyals November speech indicate a pronounced shift to artament production. Tractor production for 1951 is significantly omitted, a factor perhaps not unrelated to Beriyes estimate that 1951 tractor production (measured in 30 h.p. units) would be considerably lower than output in 1950.
4.
RUMANIA. Rumania increases pressure on Zionists: The American Legation in Bucharest reports that the recent arrest of three Rumanian,employees of the Israeli Legation there may lead to a trial involving the Israeli Legation and ale numerous Zionist leaders in Rumania, mpst of whom have been under arrest fox, some time.
It is also reported that the Rumanian Government has increased curbs on Jewish emigration, allowing only about 800 to leave each month in comparison with the 5,000 to-8,000 of several months ago. (C Bucharest 289, 25 Jan 52)
Comment: The Rumanian Government, in a 'sudden and unexplained move, 'appointed a new Minister to Israel in December 1951, after the former envoy had been recalled in protest some two years ago. The arrest of the Legation employees and a possible trial of Rumanian Zionists will certainly mean further deterioration of relations between the two countries.

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Capital investment chfring 1951 was placed at 112 percent as compared with 1950; The number of non-agricultural workers and employees in the USSR in 1951 was estimated at 40.8 million, 1.6 million higher than at the end of 1950. The gross national income had increased 12 percent over the preceding year. (R-FBISI 29 Jan 52)
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Rumanian authorities The S .S . Transylvania is now making only three trips a month to Haifa instead of the former weekly voyages, and Rumania
The sorest point continues to be the curbing of Jewish emigration by
seems to be adopting a more stringent policy regarding documentation of emigrants, particularly for young men.

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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1.
INDIA/CHINA. Indian Ambassador to Peiping instructed to uree an early truce in Korea: According to a reliable US source, Prime Minister Nehru has instructed the Indian Ambassador to Peiping to urge the Chinese Communists to agree to a reasonable truce in Korea and not to intervenein Indochina. Nehru is said to feel that the Ambassador's representations will have some effect in Peiping. (C Hong Kong 2323, 1 Feb 52) Comment: Ambassador Panikkar has just returned to China after attending the United Nations meetings in Paris. With Chinese Communists already. probing for political and military weaknesses in India's Himalayan frontier, Prime Minister Nehru has good cause to wish the Chinese to adopt a peaceftl attitude. There is no indication, however, that the Chinese will be influenced in any way either by Nehru or by his Ambassador.
2.
INDONESIA. Government faces severe press criticism_over acceptarce of MSA aid: Press speculation and criticism over the Indonesian Government's agreement with the Mutual Security Agency is steadily increasing. Although press reports are confused and conflicting, they generally agree that American aid to Indonesia will continue and that the continuance of such aid probably implies Indonesia'a acceptance of certain terms. Opinion is overwhelmingly against any commitment to the "American bloc."
The government has made no statement of its position. When Ambassador Cochran asked Foreign Minister Subardjo whether the cabinet was "bitting tight" on MSA in the face of press questioning, he replied affirmatively, indicating that he-would make an effort to have MSA considered simply as a continuation of EGA. (C Djakarta 1096, 31 Jan; C Djakarta 1105, 1 Feb; C Djakarta 1106, 2 Feb 52)
Comment: The Indonesian Government agreed on 4 January to continue to accept US aid under the provisions of MSA pending consideration of the matter by parliament. The government's position apparently has not been publicized.
BURMA.

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Burmese waver on Plan to evacuate the Chinese Nationalists:
The
Permanent Secretary of the Burmese Foreign Office has told American and
'
British diplomats that the movement of Chinese Nationalist treops through Rapgoon to Formosa would be a breach of neutrality, and that the proper course would be to intern them.
The US Charge comments that Burma apparently will not help to evacuate the Nationalists, but vill leave the responsibility for aay such task to the United States and Thailand. (S Rangoon 753, 31 Jan 52)
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Comments Burma recEntly asked the United States to persuade the Chinese Nationalist Government to order Li Mi's troops either to leave Burma or to surrender. Burma's cooperation in such a plan was strongly implied. Fear of Communist China's reaction may have caused a change of attitude.
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THAILAND. Planned COUD postponed: a coup in Thailand before 2 February now reports that the chief plotter has decided to postpone action, in order to take advantage of the struggle for power between Generals Sarit and Phao which he feels is imminent. The
that by followindthiscoursetn. 80
percent chance of succeeding.

Comments Most Thai politicians who are out of the government constantly engage in p]anning the overthrow of the regime. There is no evidence from any other source that there is any group outside of the ruling clique which currently has the force or following capable of seizing and retaining control of the Thai Government.
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Communist Party is described

group,
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The Thai Communist reportedlY ineffectual: as a disorganized and ineffectual

ileredbrtliarteSovietLeation
that t eimi wasor
to make its own way fincially. an
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Comment: Most intelligence'sources indicate that CoMmunism has made little headway among the Thai, in contrast to its progress among the Chinese in Thailand, who have a separate Communist organization.
6.
INDOCHINA. Bao Dai suegests he succeed De Lattres In an interview with American Minister Heath, Bao Dal said that a "dangerous stalemate of incompatibility" had been reached with the French and that France must cease its "annoying interventions" in internal political matters. He also asserted that it was time the French declared their true aims in Vietnam: he hoped that they did not contemplate a return to colonialism.
Bao Dal further stated that General de Lattre had wanted him to succeed to the positions of Commander in Chief and High Commissioner. Bao Dai declared himself ready to assume the responsibilities of these positions. Heath believes that such a step might break the political impasse. (S Saigon 1505, 30 Jan 52)
Comments The French have repeatedly rejected far less drastic proposals for increased Vietnamese authority than the one proposed by Bao Dal. De Lattre's combined military and political responsibilities ea-tended to
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the states of Cambodia and Laos, which are governed by their own sovereigns and owe no allegiance to Bao Rai.
CHINA. , = 8_ ==fst== P ._._i! _;._.!!= 1 The Peiping press quotes Indian Charge Kaul, at the Indian National Day reception in Peiping pn 26 January, as praising the "mighty achievements" of Communist China and as lauding Mao Tse-tung as "one of the greatest leaders of Asia and the world and a great friend of India." In contrast, Chinese Communist, Commander in Chief Chu Tehls response conveyed merely the conventional "warm greetings" to the Government lof India. (C Hong Kong 2304, 31 Jan 52) Comment: Peipingts cool response on this occasion is in contrast to last year's reception, when MeD Tse-tung was present and spoke more warmly of Sino-Indian friendship. The Peiping regime has since then appeared indifferent to, or even contemptuous of, Indian gestures of friendship. The Chinese Communist press never praises Nehru as the Indian Charge praised Mao.
8.
Communist China mav get oil from India: The US Consul General in Calcutta reports that the Indian-Government issued an export license on 14 January for the shipment of over a thousand tons of American surplus.lubrieating oil to Macao. The Consul General discovered that this oil, although contaminated by water, would be usable after cleaning or special treatment. (C Calcutta 342, 1 Feb 52)
Comment: This oil is probably destined for Communist China, is Macao has often been a way point for strategic goods shipped from non-Communist countries to the mainland. This would be one Of the largest single shipments of oil to reach Commnnist China from Western sources since the United Nations embargo of July 1950.
Highway workers "mobilized" in East and South China: Authorities in the:East China District and Kwangtung Province last fall planned to mobilize laborers for highway repair projects, according to the Communist press.k In Kwangtung province alone, 1,734 miles of road are to be repaired this winter. (U Nan Fang Jih Pao, Canton, 6 Dec; Chieh Fang Jih Pao, Shanghai, 22 Nov 51)
Comment: A year ago the Communist press reported that 150,000 civilians had been conscripted to repair highways in Kwangtung. The Commu nista stress public works projects during the winter because it is the slack agricultural season. In addition to farmers, unemployed workers in Canton have reportedly been registered for highway construction work.

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Rate of attrition law in Nationalist Army for 1951: The rate of attrition was 14 perdent in 30 Chinese Nationalist divisiona under stady in 1951, accOrding tO a-Chinese GoVrinineat'itUdY.-4 large part ofloss Vats due to deaths, desertion, arid:discharges-for age and disability. lesSer part was attributed to transfer and desertions to other Nationalist units.-- not affecting overall 'Rationalist strength.
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Tha Nival Attache Cc:Se:Its that the attrition rate was probably LOW,for the-naSt-year beaause of better living conditions and better food for the troops', plus heightried.Morale due to American aid. (S ALUSNA
Taipei Weeka 4, 04002'., 26 Jan 52)
I
11.
KOREANorth Korea appoints new ambassador to the USSR: A lass dispatch 17-7 January noted the arrival in Moscow of "Lim 110,7 the -new Ambassador from the DemocretiTPeopleis_Republic.of,Korea._(U FHIG_Ticker, 31 Jan 52)
Comment, "LimHe' is probabli-Timlait,'a Nerth Korean Politieal majoi.general,He replaces Chn'Yong Ha, who has been the Na-th Korean Ambassador in Mesoow since 1949.
Yith Hie:is i meMber of the "Yenan faction" of the North Korean Gevernment; he has spent mast of his life-in Chaa. ind has Served with the Chinese CaMmunist Army, While Yim'i appaiiitment-ta Moe:oath:may rid Kim Il Sung of yetanother pro.;Chinese-NOrth Korean leader, there is no reliable evidence of divergence between the Soviet-trained and Ghinese-trained Korean leaders.
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12.
US Government preteats-Rhee proclamation: The Department of State' has instructed Ambagsador-Muccio in Pusan!to make an "oral representation" talyngman Rhee proteiting the lattei'l preolathatioi of Kerean sovereignty over the high Seas Adjaeent'to the-Karean peninsula. A formal note:will alsp..tm,submitted by Yucciothe:iontents of whioh-are-1-iased-On US protests Made'td-other flntries which he.Ve issued Similar proclamatiens contrary to international law. (C to Pusan A-156, 1 Feb 52)
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13.
--.261MMent:--Rhee's-Proclathation-was undoubtedly inspired by the fact that the MaaArthur line,' which ciroumscribes Japanese fishing, will be' abblished When the Japanese-Peace Treaty geei-inte effect.' The Koreansfeel-that with no line of demarcatcon the Japanese will seriously enoroach on Korean fishing grounds.
JAFAN. PoPularitY of YOshida:Cabinet shown by public opinion survey: 17r:clic opinion poll recently conductedby the Yomiuri bhimbun ihowed
that 41 percent supPerted and 17.3 peroent opposed the TO= Cabinet. TheAnfluential Tokyo newspaper oommented that.although the cabiney was

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still popular, its popularity has declined since the Liberal Party lost the gubernatorial election in Kochi prefecture last Pecember -- a constituency which has been a stronghold of the Liberals. (U FBIS Ticker 2 Feb 52)
Comment, A new, general election is reportedly scheduled for early November. While the Yoshida government appears to have lost some support since the signing of the Peaoe Treaty, the return of the conservative pilrgees to political life will undOubtedly more than offset this loss. At the present time none of the oppositioe parties appears strong enough to threaten seriously the Liberal Party's dominant position.
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SECTION 3
(WESTERN)
1.
GENERAL. French desire for NATO commitments in Tunieia and Morocco viewed as untimely: US NATO Deputy Spofford expects that since Greece and Turkey are about to become NATO members, France mill make representations to have Tunisia and Morocco also covered by NATO. A similar proposal during the 1948 NATO negotiations was rejected on military and political grounds, and Spofford points out that the strategic situation is unchanged and that the political atmosphere is now even more unfavorable than in 1948-1949.'
Comment: The three Algerian departments were covered by the original NATO agreement as a ccncession to France, and rightist groups in parliament may use.the extension of the pact to non-Atlantic areas as an excuse to press for the inclusion of the rest of French North Africa. The Moroccans and Tunisians would object strenuouslyto being included in an agreement without their consent.
2.
EAST GERMANY. New Soviet station drowns out American broadcasts in Berlin: A powerful new Soviet radio station, constructed in secrecy under, the code name "Zwilling," began test transmissions at reduced power from Berlin -Koepenick on 23 January. The new transmitter, reportedly designed for an output of 300 kilowatts, is already making it impossible for some listeners in the Berlin area to receive Radio in the American Sector (RYAS) and other stations. (5 Frankfort 4770, 26 Jan 52; S/Control SO 781840 The Hague, F-3, 10 Jan 52)
Comment: The operation of this new transmitter will interfere considerably with RIAS coverage of Berlin. Communist capabilities for broadcasting to Western Germany and Western Europe will be greatly increased during 1952 by the construction of new stations and the increase in power of existing stations,
3.
France will accept a German military contribution to Western defense only if it can be sure.that the US will not permit Germany to regain its position as a "great military arsenal," according to the French High Commissioner in Bonn. The Commissioner points out that France continues to be disquieted because it believes that the US is pressing for German arms manufacture, and he feels that there can be no sense of security in France or EuroPe unless the US guarantees that Germany will not exceed its armament production quota.
FRANCE. ' French demand limit on German armament Production:

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Spofford suspects the French Government May maneuver to have international action through NATO settle a matter which might otherwise be a point of contention in the National Assembly. (5 London DEFTO 905, 30 Jan 52)
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Chancellor Adenauer has recently hinted to the US High Comnissioner that the Germans may accept some restrictions under NATO, but the Connissioner warns that this may be just aaother attempt by Adenauer to obtain NATO membership for Germany. (S HICOG Bonn 1323, 1 Feb 52)
Comment: The question of security controls over German armanent production is still the basic obstacle to agreement on the EDC and on German participation in Western defense. The French refuse to write into the EDC treaty controls which will be unenforceable without US support. A compronise on this issue may involve French acquiescence to German participation in NATO.
4.
French Connunists propagandize for East-West trade: The US Embassy in Paris believes that a Communist motion.in the National Assembly for the establishment of normal East-West commercial relations "necessary for the prosperity of France" is obviously designed to whip up enthusiasm for the Moscow Trade Conference in April, as well as to build up sentiment favorable to the current French-Soviet trade negotiations. This "cleverly iceyed" campaign is having some effect, as indicated by the passage of East-West trade resolutions in several non-Communist municipal councils. (C Paris 4601, 30 Jan 52)
Comment: This phase of the Communist propaganda campaign is well timed to exploit the growing opposition in Western Europe to US demands for tighter East-West trade controls. The Italian Communists have also opened a press campaign supporting the Economic Conference, seeking to show that US pressure against trade with the Satellites hurts the economies of Western European countries.
French manufacturers are particularly vulnerable to the temptations of trade with the Soviet Orbit at this time when certain Frpnch exports are deteriorating drastically, and the spect:re of currency devaluation looms large.
5.
The ITALY. Communists plan to exploit rightist opposition to NATO: Italian Communist Party, in preparation for local elections in the spring, intends to concentrate on opposition to NATO and defense of "national independence." The Commuhists will exploit the differences not only among Premier de Gasperi's Christian Democrats but also within the neo -fascist Italian Social Movement, where a considerable group is strongly opposed to NATO. To this end, Communist agents are working within the Italian Social Movement under the supervision of a member of the Italian Comnunist Politburo.
Competent observers consider that the Italian Communist Party may become the strongest political party because of the differences among the non7Communists. (S Rome 3384, 30 Jan 52) SECRET 10
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Comment: Italy's support of NATO is largely confined to political leaders. The people as a whole are apathetic.
The anti-NATO sentiment within the Italian Social Movement is particularly important since the weakened Christian Democrats are reportedly turning to the extreme right for political support. Vatican leaders and others are increasingly apprehensive over the diminishing popular support for Christian Democratic policies, including the alliance with the West.
6.
The US Embassy holds that the Danish official position is not yet ascertained, but that Denmark's need for coal is immediate, and that the US must therefore be prepared either to make a firm and prompt offer of aid or to agree to a CCCOM exception on the tanker deal. (S Copenhagen 556, 31 Jan 52)
Comment: In December Denmark indicated its desire to obtain COCOM approval for the sale of a tanker to Poland because the Poles had suspended all coal shipments to Denmark.(see OCI Daily Digest, 3, 18, and 21 Dec 51). It would seem that only a resumption of large-scale coal exports'brGermany and Britain would fully meet Danish Government desires.
7.
TUNISIA. French note is unacceptable to Tunisians: The Tunisian nationalists consider France's note delivered to the Bey last Wednesday completely unsatisfactory. Although the source stated that the general strike on 1 February would be conducted peaceably, he predicted that further Tunisian troubles are inevitable unless "world conscience" prevails upon France to change its policy. (C Tunis 98, 31 Jan 52)
Golament: Although the French no longer demand that the Bey dismiss his cabinet, their insistence that the Tunisian petition be withdrawn, even though the UN has not accepted it, has further antagonized Arab Fifteen Arab, Asian, and and Asian nations as well as the Tunisians. African, nations have now notified the UN General Assembly and Security Council that "grave consequences are likely to follow a continuation of the present state of affairs" in Tunisia. Meanwhile, Algerian and Moroccan nationalist and Communist organizations indicated their cohesion with the Tunisians by a 24-hour sympathy strike, which in Morocco as well as. in Tunisia broke out in isolated incidents of violence.

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DENUARK. Government desires to maintain traditional trade connection with Poland: Danish officials have indicated their belief that the Danish Government will not refuse Poland's demand for a tanker in return for resumption of coal shipments, even if assured that the US will provide and finance Denmark's coal deficit. In their statements on the inadvisability of disturbing Denmark's traditional trade pattern two main considerations were apparent: the varied practical difficulties of transatlantic coal shipments, and the uncertainty as to the continuity and consistency of future US aid.
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BOLIVIA. New plans to oust government: The Nationalist Revolutionary Movement plans to oust the Bolivian junta between 5 and 10 February, according to a reliable source. The plan calls for seizure of tin mines and of hostages, and for coordinated uprisings. President Peron of Argentina is repertedly cooperating and providing ten planes.
The Minister of Government, who knows of the plans, claims "everything is under control." (C La Paz 279, 31 Jan 521
Comment: Pressure for a change in the governing junta has been increasing. The Commanding General of the Army and various military commanders are sympathetic to the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement, and various leaders of the movement have been maneuvering to gain power peaceably.
It is unlikely that Peron would offer planes for a coup, although he might provide undercover support.
Government may formally protest delay in tin negotiations: The Subsecretary of the Bolivian Foreign Office has expressed extreme disappointment over the continuing delay in the resumption of US-Bolivian tin negotiations, especially since the US has concluded an arrangement to obtain Malayan tin. The Foreign Office has sent the Bolivian Ambassadcr an 18-page memorandum which he will deliver to the State Department when the Foreign Office deems it advisable. The memorandum presents a full history of Bolivia's position, cites various inter-American commitments, and states that the raising of the price for Ealayan tin to 1.215 dollars a pound is clear acknowledgment that the US was guilty of "economic aggression" when the Reconstruction Finance Corporation fixed a lower price for Bolivian tin. (C La Paz 278, 31 Jan 52)
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Comment: The RFC set a temporary price of 1.12 dollars a pound for Bolivian tin. The speed with which the US and the UK negotiated for Malayan tin contrasts sharply with the US-Bolivian negotiations, which have been drawn out over the past year.
10.
The State Department has advised the Bolivian Ambassador that because of the delay in confirming the new director of the RFC, the Defense Materials Procurement Administrator has been chosen to represent the US in new tin negotiations, which can begin as soon as the Ambassador receives instructions from his government.
CHILE. 'President requests postponement of visit by US labor delegation: tialan President Gonzalez Videla has requested that the reportedly planned visit to Chile of a threerman US 1abOr delegation to combat

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Communism in Labor unions be indefinitely postponed if possible. The US Endbassy reports that the opposition press campaign against the visit is snoWballing and the visit is being ascribed to "orders" from the US military negotiating team with a view toward controlling labor and disrupting the presidential campaign of the Socialist-Communist candidate. (S Santiago 4042 31 Jan 52)
Comment: Earlier the US AMbasoador had commented that a visit by labor leaders from the US or from aRIT, the hemisphere section of the non-Communist ICFTU,would be inopportune at tis time (see OCI Daily Digest, 30 Jan and 1 Feb 52).

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Air 14. 1 4 . KOREA, KOBEA. New New North Korean Korean A i r Force Foroe organizatiOn o r g m i z q t i o n indioateds indiaatedr A North North Korean Korean II7Torce in an from Sinui Sinuiju to m o r o eofficer officer WAS was instructed instruo-n M8 8 January January message -from ju t o
13. 13 e
: ,
NR
Pyongyang to Wing w withthe t o "join the fighter f i g h t e r Wing i t h ' t h e fighter f i g h t e r group group which which is is in in the t h e 10th 1 0 t h Division." Division." (SUEDE (SUEDE AS AS CM CM IN I N 7633, 7633, Sinuiju42yongyang, Binuiju-Pyongyang, 29 29 Jan Jan 52) 52)
Air ' Ceiftetts Cbrmhentr Identified I d e n t i f i e d North North Korean Korean A i r Foroe Foroe Divisions are are the t h e lst, lat, 2td, 2ad, 3117-na /A-DiVisions; U-Divisionsj no no "10th "10th Division" Division" is i s known. known. A.possibility A.possibility ekists exists that t h a t the 10th 1Wh Division mentioned is the t h e 10th 10th Infantry Infantry Division, Division. general located This general the Chongohon Chongohon river r i v e r area area in i n northwestern Korea. Korea. Thia looated in i n the Area area has has been been the t h e site s i t e of of considerable oonsiderable Communist Communist Air Air Force Force aotivity a o t i v l t y in in airfield warning, end and ground-oontrolled ground-oontrolled i interoept a i r f i e l d ocinstruction, oonstruction, eearly a r l y warning, nterospt radar work. mrk.
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15. 1 6 .
."-Morth'Kerein."bomber North X0re-m "bomber regiment" regiment" addressed addressed aat t Pyongyang: Pyongyang: A 21 21 January moorage M fres: frim Nor e Supreme meisite North tore= Air Headquarters in Sinui3u to the'Supreme COMMAnd A Air.Depar n addresee8 the t h e "Commander', "Eomander, 3rd 3 ; d Bomber. Bomber n Pyoqgyang Pyongyang addressee i r .De C6&d Regment." 26 Sinuiju,Pyongyang, Reg/mqnt .* (SUEDE (8 Binuiju-wongyang, 21 21 Jan Jan 52) 52)
"
CommentiDespite previous mention ofof a a "bomber Commen%t 'Despite previous mention "bomberunit" unit' in i n the t h e North North KoreinIF-Prorci, there lC6rernlCi?l;-Foroa, t h e r e is i s no no evidence evidenoe of o f the the existence exirrtenoe of of such suoh a a unit unit
with bombemtype bomber.type aircraft. It is e entirely equipped with airoraft. It n t i r e l y possible that the the Unit referred utilizes obsoleicent Pp-2 PP-2 biplanes biplanes t to &it r e f e r r e d to t o ie i s the t h e one whioh u t i l i z e s obsolescent o make sporadic sporadio harassing raids raid8 on on UN UN installations.
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18. I s .
17. 1 7 .
Comment, Regiments of of the North Korean Korean Railroad Railroad Oommentt The 7th 7 t h and 8th 8 t h Regiment6 Seourity plagued with with a a high high desertion rate. rate. been plagued B e o u rDivision ~ s i o have n
CoMmunists Communists "re-educate" "re-eduo,ate' South South Korean Korean citizens, oitieene: Approximately Approximately3,00 a00 . teachers and and-edubational administrators Communist-liberated areas teaohdrb edubational a dmini~trato~r from s Uomunist-liberated gathered,on 3i 31 January in in Kaesong for a reindoatrination r a i n i n g oourse, githered,on reindootrination ttraining courses ideOrding COmmunist news news message message of 2 February. aooordihg to to a a plain4etext plain-text Communiet February. The progr&, to t o teaohltemooratio teaoh 'bemooratio education eduoation and procedures prOgraM, procedures o of f advanoed advanced teaching," teaching," vas was instituted i n s t i t u t e d in i n inticiPation a n t i o i p a t i o n of of the t h e renewal renewal of o f the t h e educational eduaationklsystem systemon' on (SUEDE 501st 5 0 L t Corn o o n Group Group Korea, Korea, CM CM IN IN 9163, 9163, February in 28 February i n this t h i s area. arear (SUEDE Comm b Reoon 3 Feb 52)
-
'Comment: Comments South Korea Korea w e s t of of t h e Imjin r i v e r is t o be west the river tO te held by by the the Comitiariininder the agreement. The C ommmmder t h e current cease-fire cease-fire line agreement. The setting s e t t i n g up of a Communist-type eduoational system in t this may provide provide sbme some.indica. a Communist-type h i s area may indication of t h e perminenoe permanenoe with whioh h e enemy seem8 o regard t s possession tion of the which t the seems t to retard i its Of of this this territory, territory.
Desertions oontinue oontinue to.worry t o s o r r North North Korean Korean training t r a i n i n unit: uaitr Desertions Desertions aiOng new new trafneea rainees in Korean 7th Railroad Railroad Beg Regiment are be inthe t h e blOrth North &rean men a r e tto o be irrhong Preirenteciby "many an an informer" informer" and making the prevented by eenlisting n l i s t i n g "many t h e "guard work closer," rooording aceording to to b a 29 29 January' JanuaryNorth oloser," b r t h Korean k r e a n message. message. (SUEDE 501st Comm Reoon Feb 5 52) Reoon Group Group Korea, Korea, CM IN IN 8540, 8540, 1 1 Fob 2)
7 7
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HR70-14 HR70-1 4
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~ APPROVED PPROVED FOR

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-Chinese jet division mentioned in i n Korean Korean messages: messages: Korean Korean A i r Force Force Air that t h e Chinese Communist 14th Division messages of 51 January indicate that the i s still a t i l l at a t Takushin Takushan (near (near Antung) Antung) and and that t h a t the t h e two t w o air'forces a i r forces are a r e coopercooperis ating olosely. (SUEDE a t i n g more closely. i r Force 25, 2238Z, 22382, 4 4 Feb Feb 52) 52) (SUEDE A Air Force Roundup Roundup 25,
. ' Comment8 Comment: The 14th 14th Division is apparently apparently not o China not moving moving t to China proper, proper, 88 t e z l y indioated as terilitalWly indicated by by a a message message of of 1 1 January. January.
G r e a t e r e c t i v i t y by Greaterectivity by Korean Korean air air units units based based in in Manchuria Manchuria WFLS was noted noted recently, and and this t h i s increase inorease probably requires more recently, probably'requires more Sino-Korean Sino-Korean coordination. coordination.
I
6 Feb Feb 52 52 6
22-Mar-201 0
1 \
.b
b P
11. KOREA. "New "New Chinese Chinese-Communist unit' proves proves t to second 1 1 . KOREA. Communist Fit" o be an old o l d one: onet A second versiOn of a 27-January-Chinese message r refers version 27 Jahuary Chinese Communist message e f e r s tto o tthe h e "5th CoMpanY of Of our 345th Regiment" Regiment" i in a Communist Communiat'defensive n rrelation e l a t i o n tto o a defensive Company position. (SUEDE 501st Corn Comm Recon Group Korea Korea CM CM IIN 9357, 4 4 Feb Feb 52) 52) N 9357, position.
l i s t e d the t h e Chinese Chinese e a r l i e r version version of of t h i s message listed this Comment: The earlier CoMMUE117-11Eit as the the 5t4th Regiment" subordinate subordinate t to unit as 4 t h Regiment" o tthe h e 4th Army, neither neither Communist preiiously identified S w c i a l Supplement, Supplement, (See Deilv Daily Dinest Digest Special preiriotmly i d e n t i f i e d in i n Korea. Korea. (See The'Chinese Coinmunist o the Communist 345th regiment regiment is is subordinate tto the 4 Feb 52.) 52) The'Chineee 115th'DditsiOn, 39thlraly, in Korea and and currently currently iin contact with with UN UN n Korea n contact llSth'Diwision, 39th'-Afiy, long i foroes in Korea. foroes i n western' western' Korea.
12. 12
13
armored division may may be be on on the the movet move: The The N North Korean North Korean annored o r t h Korean comMander of the-11131st Division" was was requested requested by by a subordinate unit u n i t to to commander t h e "13lst Division" provide nine nine vehicles vehicles to t o move move artillery. a r t i l l e r y . FECOM believes t h a t "131" "131" i s the that is cOde designation 'of t the North Korean Korean 105th 105th Armored Armored Division, Division, currently ood6 designation 'of h e North currently located some 30 30 miles north of o f Pyongyang. Pyongyang.
Another North the Armored Division h e 105th Annored North Korean mesaage, mewage, possibly from t states 1,320 replacements replacements, including "automatio "automatio a artillery , including rtillery s t a t e s a need for 1,320 < c a r ? ) men'' a r t i l l e r y ? ) . Two -(aar?) men" (self-propelled (self-propelled artillery?). Two hundred hundred of of these these new new troops troops o come'from tthe."10thDivision" h e "10th Division" and and 1,120 1,120 from from the t h e mechanized "17th are t to-come'from Division" easfof' (SUBDE C I N C F E Tokyo IN 8861, 8861, 2 2 Feb; Feb; Pyongyang. (SUEDE Mvi$ion" east" of Pyongyang. CINCFE Tokyo CM CMIN r p 0 4 6 , 30 30 Jan 52) 52)
'Cornenti i t h 120 'Comment: The The Morth North Korean Korean 105th 105th Armored Armored Division, Division, w with 120 T-34 T-34 tanks, is tanks mbelieved i e v e d to t o be be completely completely rehabilitated r e h a b i l i t a t e d and and combat combat ready. ready. For For t h e paet past few few month6 it has Peen on on seoUrity seourity duty along along t h e main the months it hae,been the main supply route and the ooast north north Of of Pyongyang. Pyongyang. The providing'of replacements replacements f o r the the armored armored division division by by the t h e 10th 10th and and 17th 17th Diviaionspalso Mviaion8,also in i n this this for general area, area, would would seem-to seem t o indicate indicate that t h a t the t h e three t h r e e divisions divisions are are subordisubordigeneral nate t to o the t h e same seme corps,possibly corps,possibly the the IV. IV.
The'movement The'movement of o f artillery artillery and and the the filling f i l l i n g out of of divisional etrength strength May may forecast foreoasf a a more more aotive aotive role role for f o r the t h e 105th 106th Armored Division in i n the the near future. future.
..
North Korean h r e a n Air A i r Force Force training t r a i n i n g command command calls c a l l s seCurity seourity conference: conference: North A conference oonf'erence at a t tIe the North North -Korean Korean a i r school i n Yenohi, Yenohi. Manchuria, Manchuria. has has ' A air school in been an unidentified unidentified date date'in February. "Emergency been 'called c a l l e d ffor o r an i n February. "&ergency problems," problems," auoh as as "the "the accident aocident of o f #.2 #2 a i r c r a f t , " are o be and the the sUch aircraft," are t to be presented, presented, and "other "other seouri eecuri o fioer" f i o e r " is i s menfiioned as scheduled soheduled to t o attend'the a t t e n d ' t h e conferconfermentioned'as ence. 4 Feb Feb 52) 52) ence. (SUEDE ( S W D E m 2240, 4 0 , Yenohi-Tunghwa, Yenohi-!hughwa, 4
6 Feb Feb 52 52 6
.7
MIL
P.
The problem problem of o f seourity seourity is is a a continuing continuing one one in in the the North North 'Comments Cornenti The Kore k mF6ree. r a e . While M l e no no specific specifio reasonsfOr reasonefor such such extreme extrame precautions precautions Korean Air L i e apparent, it it is possible that that, the Communists Communists seriously seriously fear fear the the are-apparent, defection of defeotion o f one of of their pilots to t o the UN. UN.
NF

8
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CIA No. 49524 Copy No, 4
TO THE DAILY DIGEST
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State Dept. & ONI reviews completed
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office of Curren' Intelligence:
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1.
AUSTRALIA. Australian troop commitment to Middle East Command anticipated: The Australian Cabinet is reconsidering its policy of opposition to the advance commitment of forces to the Middle East Command.
I
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Comment Australia's limited defense establishment would permit the commitment of little more than a token force to the Middle East. There is no indication that the government is prepared to propose a national conscription bill, passage of which would be prerequisite to the commitment of a sizeable force.
2.
CHINA.
Asian di lomats in Pei in view Manchurian indust
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the
Chinese Communist authorities, concerned over the slow progress of reconstruction in Manchuria, appealed some months ago to the USSR for emergency help. The Soviet reply stated that little of the needed equipment was available in the USSR or Czechoslovakia. The American Embassy in London points out, however, that when Panikkar, the Indian Ambassador to Peiping, was in London during December, he stated that Manchurian industry had undergone complete rebonstruction.
Comment: Each of these apparentiy contradictory views has merit. Although the Communists have restored and are operating an impressive nuMber of war-damaged Manchurian factories, they have been unable to replace important equipment -- such as rolling mills and hydroelectric turbogenerators looted by the Soviets -- which is in short supply throughout the Orbit.
:
3.
Chinese Nationalists agree to receive Japanese emissary: The Chief of the Chinese Mission in Tokyo has advised the Japanese Government that his government agrees to the appointment of Isao Kawada as plenipotentiary to Formosa for the purpose of negotiating a peace treaty between Japan and Nationalist China.
JAPAN.
I 1
Kameda is a prewar Minister of Finance and served as President of thrnFEisa Development Company during the mar.
Comment:
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GERMANY.
Bonn seeks Anglo-American intervention in Saar dispute: West TEMirofficials now suggest that the US and Britain jointly ask Bonn and Paris to discuss bilaterally a solution to the Saar question which would be submitted to the Saar population for approval. The formula for agreement should be based on transforming the Saar into an international territory, which, the German officials hope, would include a "small parcel of Frendh.
territory.11
French diplomats state that their government will not accept any cessio. of French territory as a condition of settlement.'
Comment: Chancellor Adenauer is trying vigorously to obtain some kind of conciliatory gesture from the West prior to the 7 February German parliamentary debates to which he has now irrevocably committed himself. Coalition leaders have indicated that if no conciliatory move is obtained the Parliament will probably pass a resolution sanctioning continued talks on the EDC, but with an admonition that Germany must obtain "satisfaction" in any resolution of the Saar and NATO membership problems.
5.
While Bidault considers that an extension of the military service period to 24 months may eventually be possible, he warns that this would have farreaching implications for the entire population since France, unlike other European countries, allows no deferments.
Comment: American officials in France recently concluded that no French goverTgat7Would be likely to press for a military budget greater than 3.4 billion dollars, exclusive of US aid. The government has advised the National Assembly, however, that a final budget figure would not be proposed
FRANCE. Defense Minister hints at resignation if budget is inadequate: French Defense Minister Bidault declares that he might resign should the 1952 military budget be limited to the present prospective maximum of about 3.7 billion dollars; he estimates that an increase of approximately one third is necessary in order to meet NATO requirements. He believes, however, that France's military budget will in aey case exceed the 3.4 billion dollars which NATO has considered the largest feasible under present political conditions.

TOP SECRET
2
The Germans suggest that the Anglo-American statement be made prior to the EDC debates in the West German Parliament; that it call upon both France and West Germany to refrain from further polemics on the Saar question; and that it stipulate that the status quo be preserved in the Saar pending the outcome of the bilateral discussions.
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until the NATO Council meeting at
Lisbon this month has considered levels of defense efforts and financial contributions.
6.
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NORWAY-SWEDEN. Norwa urges closer Western cooperation with Sweden: The Norwegian representat ve at a meeting of the NATO Council Deputies expressed his country's belief that Sweden cannot be won from its present formal neutrality, and urged that Sweden be considered a "sort of medberw of the North Atlantic Community. In support of closer cooperation, he emphasized Swedish military capabilities and asserted that Swedish leaders are in sympathy with NATO objectives.
Comment: Norway has consistently argued that it is in the West's interest to give Sweden the assistance necessary to ensure a militarily strong power on Norway's eastern frontier. Both Britain and Norway have always contended that Sweden cannot be pressed into abandoning its neutrality policy.

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25
6 February 1952
1
OCI No. 3867

Copy No.
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This summary of significant reports has peen prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA

or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.

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SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
1.
USSR Relations between USSR and Chinese Communist Embassy dfficials in Rangoon: At the reception given by the Soviet Embassy in Rangoon on 7 November 1951 in celebration of the October Revolution, Soviet officials were reportedly "friendly and courteous" towards the ChineSe Communist Embassy officials, "but no rapport appeared to exist between them." There was a certain "iciness" in the Chinese attitude towards the Soviet officials and one observer claimed that the Chinese appeared to be "scared stiff of the Soviets."1
Comment: Perhaps because of inexperience, Chinese Communist diplomatic officials are widely reported as being ill at ease on social occasions. This may account for the coolnessl between Chinese Communist and Soviet diplomatic personnel. This behavior, however, is not apparent in relations between the two governments.
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25X
2.
Four Okrugs announced for Moldavian SSR: A decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Moldavian SSR announced on 31 January the formation of the Beltse, Kagul, Kishinev, and Tiraspol Okrugs within the boundaries of the republic. The town of Kishinev will remain under the immediate jurisdiction of the organs of the republicd
25X
Comment: The creation of these four Okrugs in the Moldavian SSR follows a similar development recently announced in the Armenian SSR, and is thought to be part of a gradual long-term administrative change. ,A parallel change was indicated in November 1951 with the announcement of the formation of the Kutaisi Oblast in the Georgian SSR.
3.
BULGARIA. Cabinet changes and ciVil law reform adopted: According to the Russian News Agency, the Bulgarian Parliament approved several ministerial changes on 4 February. Dr. Kiril Dramaliev was removed from the post of Minister of Education and given "another activity," being succeeded by Demir Yanev. Boris Taskov, Chairman of the State Supply and State Reserves Administration, was replaced by Nikola Trajanov. Sava Ganovski was fired as Chairman of the Committee for Science, Art and Culture and replaced by Ruben Levi.
25X1
According to TASS, the Bulgarian Parliament has also approved a law modelling the entire Bulgarian code of civil law procedure:after that of the Soviet Union.'
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Comment: Dramaliev and Taskov are members of the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party. Sava Ganovski, though not a member of the Central Committee, has long played a prominent role in Bulgarian Party affairs.
Ruben Levi is a member of the Central Committee, and has recently been in charge of Bulgarian propaganda activities. Demir Yanev has been a candidate member of the Central Committee eince 1948, but has heretofore held positions of only minor importance.
No further information concerning a Bulgarian law reform is yet available.
4.
CtECHOSLOVAKIA. Czech Minister notes priorities for implementing State labor reserves plan: Minister of Information.Kopecky, writing in.Pravda on 20 January, says that the Czechoslovak coal, ferrous metallurgy, and construction industries will be the first fields in which the government will operate its new state labor reserves plan, patterned on the example of the Soviet Union. I
1
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Comment: In these three fields, 1951 plans wessunderfulfilled and 1952 targets have been expanded.
The appearance of the reserves system is one facet of a campaign to sovietize Czech labor which nasgrown in intensity since last September, when yearly failures in the five year plan began to appear likely. In recent months steps have been taken to reorganize trade unions and increase socialist competition, and government leaders have warned of a sterner view of labor discipline. The National Assembly recently approved the labor reserves plan which authorizes state training centers giving young "recruits" two or three year courses and factory training centers with SiX or twelve month
courses.
5.
25X1
way.
I
Union for Cooperation with the Army begins large scale operation: Rude Pravo announced on 20 January that the Union for Cooperation with the Army has organized branches throughout Czechoslovakia. According to the US Embassy in Prague, activities include lessons in defense preparedness for school children, consisting of arms familiarization, map reading and first aid,. and cooperation with the Union of Czech-Soviet Friendship in preparation for Red Army week this month.
The Embassy comments that there is no evidence other than one article in Youth Front that military training of youth groups is actually under
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Comment: The Union forCooperation with the Army was established in November 1951 on the model of DOSAAF (All Union Society for Cooperation with Army, Air Force and Navy) in the Soviet Union. It is designed to train the ciYilian population-for wartime defense measures and encourage civilian support of the Army. The Red Crown; Sokol, People's Militia, and amateur flyer groups are affiliated with the
Union.
6.
RUMANIA. Government unable to hold line on recent price cuts: The American Legation in Bucharest reports that prices for variousiconsumer goods have alreadY begun to riee again 'after the 27 January currency revaluation.and price reduction. Rationed butter, egg and milk prices had increased by 1 February, while edible oil, meat, and.tomato paste were generally unavailable or in very short supply.]
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Comment: Despite the propaganda accompanying the reform, the Rumanian Government is unable to hold to the announced 5 to 20 percent price reductions. A 2 February editorial ih Scanteia, the official Workers' Party newspaper, acknowledged that, although there was a good harvest, the low level of collections of agricultural products had made it impossible for the State "to concentrate in its hands suffiCient quantities of agricultural products to assure a full supply on the basis of ration cards and to be able to exercise necessary influence on prices in the uncontrolled market."
7.
TRIESTE. Proposed Trieste elections would serve Yugoslav interests: Ambassador Allen in Belgrade states that the Allied Military Government's proposal to hold elections in Zone A under an Italian electoral law concurrently with local elections in Italy this spring may be prejudicial to long-term Italian interests, since it will provide the Yugoslays with a strong pretext for the further absorption of Zone B into Yugoslavia. Allen believes that the Yugoslays may be expected to take full advantage of 'any opportunity to push for a territorial settlement based on giving Zone A to Italy and Zone B to Yugoslavia.
1
25
Comment: Since a inajority of the Slovenes in Zone A are proCominformist, YugOslavia would prefer a partition on the basis of the present zonal demarcation to one which would trade predominantly Italian Zone B for predominantly Slovene portions of Zone A.
8.
Probable effects of an Italian link-list system on Trieste politics: In speculating on the probable impact of an adoption of the Italian linkedliat electoral system in Zone A by the Allied Military Government for the
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impending elections, the US Political Adviser in Trieste advances the following observations:
1. The views of the populace regarding a Trieste solution would probably not be materially affected by the adoption of an Italian electoral
system.
2. If elections were held under the present AMG law, it seems likely that the moderate pro-Italian partiea would lose their working majority in the Trieste communal council and would thus be forced to seek the ODoperation,of the neo-fascist Italian Social Movement. 3. Despite the threat of an independentist-Communist coalition should the linked-list electoral system be adopted, a coalition of moderate pro-Italian parties would win a majority in the communal ceuncil. 4. Although the COminformist strength in the outlying cOmmunes would be increased under a linked-list system, this development would be more than compensated for by making it unnecessary for the moderate pro-Italian parties to seek MSI support in order to maintain a pro-Italian working majority in Trieste itself.
25
Comment: According.to Italian linked-list electoral law, two-thirds orthe seats on the communal council in communes with a population of over 10,000 are allotted to the slate or group of parties which receives aplurality of the vote. Adoption of the Italian law would probably remove any lingering objections on the part of the /talian Government and local proItalian parties to holding elections this spring.
9.
YUGOSLAVIA. Yugoslavia has no commercial relations with Soviet I;loc: American Embassy officials report that Yugoslavia maintains no commercial relations with the USSRor its Satellites;'the only Yugoslav goods reaching the Soviet bloc do so through either diversion or transshipment in a third country. In order to forestall these diversions, the Yugoslays insert a clause in each contract prohibiting resale and, in the case of Switzerland, require a special certificate from an ecodomic board that.the commodity is intended solely for internal consumption.
25
Comment: Reports of the diversion of Yugoslav goods to the Soviet bloc continue to be received. There is no evidence to indicate, however, that high Yugoslav officials are aware that shipments of Yugoslav strategic materials have been made to the Satellites, although they would hardly admit the possibility of such diversions to American officials.
Lack of a comprehensive and rigid system of enforcement of trade controls has been advanced by some observers as the probable cause for the infrequent diversions of strategic goods which do occur.
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2.
INDONESIA. Government is increasingly disturbed by press criticism of MSA: The government appears to beincreasingly disturbed by press criticism of Indonesian acceptance of US aid within the terms of the Mutual Security Act. Press speculation infers it involves modification of Indonesia's independent foreign policy. No political party or faction is prepared to defend openly any modification.
(the government hopes to avoid involvement in the current press controversy over MSA. They have informally requested USIS to refrain from giving any publicity to MSA matters. L_
25
25
Comment: The Indonesian government has made no effort to publicize its acceptance of MSA aid. Apparently it even attempted to:conceal the terms of acceptance.
The current press controversy was initiated on 30 January by an article in Indonesia Rale:, a paper which has strongly criticized government policy for a long time. The article asked what,if anyicommitments Indonesia had made to ensure continued US aid under MSA and why "Burma and others" had.rejected aid. Indonesia's "independent" foreign policy seeks to avoid commitments to either the American or Soviet "bliScs."
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3.
BURMA. Karen radio broadcast advocates cooperation with Communists: An "independent newspaper" in Rangoon has quoted A "private" broadcast from the insurgent Karen radio as calling upon the Karens to emulate the strategy and methods of Communist China. Voicing disappointment over British-American support of the Thakin Nu government, the broadcast stated that the Karens must align themselves rith the Communist-controlled Peoples Democratic Front in a common effort to overthrow the "imperialist regime."
.
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4.
CHINA.
total of 64 non-Communist registered ships, aggregating 320,000 gross tons, traded with Communist China in October 1951, the lowest monthly total since the outbreak of hostilities in Korea. The peak figure was recorded for the month of December 1950, when 142 non-Communist registered ships, aggregating 742,000 gross tons, traded with Communist China. Four-fifths of the Western shipping in the China trade was of British, Greek, or Panamanian registry. Actual ownership of the vessels, however, was mainly held by Greek cartel or Chinese Communist interests.
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Comment: The number and tonnage of Western shipping in the,China trade fell steadily throughout most of 1951. The bulk of this shipping is primarily engaged in coastal traffic between Hong Kong and the mainland.
Comment: Local Karen-Communist cooperation has been previously noted. Recentlythere have been I Inegotiations being conducted for the formation of a general alliance. As yet, however, thereis noconclusive evidence that the top Karen leaders are prepared to join forces irrevocably with the Communists.
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6.
UNCURK must be revitalized to carry out its mission: The United Nations Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea is, according to Ambassador Muccio, "a mere shadow of its former calibre" with only One delegate, the Australian, seriously interested in carrying out the commission's objectives. Since the coming months in the South Korean political scene are crucial -- regardless of the outcome of the armistice negotiations -- Muccio states that the revitalization of UNCURX is extremely important in order to eurther that part of the terms of reference which call for "the continuing development of representative government based on the freely expressed will of the people." UNCURK prestige and influence with the ROK's has deteriorated. Unless two or three constituent powers rush high-calibre delegates to Korea, the UN as a politital body will continue to lose out in ROK. This would make it harder than ever to convince the nations of the world that Korea is not just an "American show".
KOREA.
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SECTION 3
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GERMANY. .Approval of Schuman Plan by Henn Senate augurs well-for BIC developmehts: Unexpectedly, the West German Senate, following an address by Chancellor Adenauer, indirectly ratified the Schuman'Plan by not referring it to a combined committee df both parliamentary houses. In a short, calm session, the Senate also adopted a resolution which stipulated among other things that German interests in the Saar be Protected and that it enter the Schuman Plan an an equal footing with France.
domment: Adenauer declared early last meek that the dispute over the French appointment of an aMbassador to the Saar would likely preclude UpPer House ratification of the Schuman Plan as Scheduled. The-eaSe with whieh Adenauer secured the bill's passage indicates that he-overstated how fai-the Senate would go in expressing dissatisfaction with the French moye in-the Saar. The government prediction of parliamentary intransigence in the forthcoming discussions on the EDIC also appeard to be exaggerated, probably to secure favorable Allied action in the Saar.
25X
There is, however, considerable real resentment in the Bohn government over France's action, stemming from the suspicion that it indicates a-French unmillingness to accept Germany as an equal in EnroPean projectb. The Manner in Which Adenauer led the Senate to a favorable vote on the Schuman Plan demonstrates that he is trying to keep German resentment within'bounds, in accordance with his basic policy of Franco-German rapprochement.
2.
3.
FRANCE-USSR. French optimistic on securing trade agreement mith USSR: France, which resumed trade negotiations with the USSR on 21 JanUary, has indicated a willingness to construct up to six cargo ships for the USSR'for delivery in two years in exchange for immediate Soviet wheat deliveries. The Russians are considering the proposal, but have not indicated that the wheat is immediately available. The French trade delegation chief believes that, with the exception of the wheat-ship exchange, there is a strong possibility of obtaining a trade agreement in view of press agitation for a treaty and the publicity the Russians are giving to the MoscowEdoncimie' Conference. The US Embassy advises that, without the wheat-ship exchange, the proposed trade agreement is decidedly to the advantage of the French.
Comment: The Russians originally requested up to 15 cargo ships, eaeh of 5,000 tons-displacement and capable of 13 knots. France plans to trade the Soviet wheat for CerMan coal.
AUSTRIA. 'Soviet retail establishments seen as major propaganda wea.On: Austrian observers are much disturbed over the economic and pelitical

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consequences of the continued expansion of'retail outlets of SoViet Administered Enterprises in Austria (USIA). Repeatedly denounced for undercutting Austrian retailers, for evasion of Austrian'taxes, for flooding markets with cheap imports from Satellite countries, and for.' probable financial support of the Communists and the Soviet occupation forces, the USIA retail complex may be'exploited in the future as a major argument for association with the East. USIA may no* be making a Major effort to expand its operations to the Western zones. USIA outlets have been established under so-called "camouflage contractual relationshiPs," and stores reselling USIA goods are supplied by salesmen operating between Vienna and the lest. The Austrian Government and the non-Communist press have recently stepped up their efforts to increase public awareness of the dangers of "buying USIA." Plans are now under consideration to establish a cabinetlevel committee to coordinate this campaign, to cut off supplieS to Wholesalers responsible for the tax evasions of their USIA customers. \
25X
4.
Gruber'prepared for greater risks on Austrian settlement: In a policy statement on 2 February the Austrian Foreign Minister made a clear bid for stronger Western support in securing a Soviet evacuation of Auetria. Not necessarily optimistic as to the prospects, Gruber believes that the West is not fully aware of the importance of a Western-oriented Austria to a free Europe and exaggerates the strength of the Soviet position in Austria.
' '
Gruber gave up any hope of a settlement of the Austrian questien by the Foreign Ministers and ruled out the possibility of further concessions to the USSR or of "vague political undertakings" with a power of 'opposing philosophY. He renewed his plea for a transfer of the Austrian question to the UN. As to Soviet intentions in Austria, Gruber stressed the advantages to the Soviet Union of a maintenance of the status quo and scoffed at the likelihood of a Soviet partition of Austria. The USSR's economic positionin Austria is dependent, Gruber asserted, on access to raw materials in the Western zones. Further, the disadvantages to the Soviet Union of a mote toward partition would preclude such action except as a prelude t-so war. He vaguely intimated that even a small Austrian army would be effective against an "invader." Calling the presence of Western troops on the Austro German border a guarantee that Austria could pursue a "balanced policy," he made clear that such balance did not involve "all around flattery;" but a courageous'defense of Austrian.unity. /
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NETHERLANDS. Dutch suggest international consideration of New Guinea problem: Although the Netherlands has indicated that the Indonesian claim ariaTreignty over Netherlands New Guinea cannot be recognized; the Netherlands is willing tn:continue discussing New Guinea and Other related political prebleMs provided the treW Guinea issue iS submitted to an international group for settlement. The Dutch are anxious to hold "full and free talks" on complaints from both sides, and particularly want 'clarification of Indonesia's allegations of Du:tell anns smuggling.
I
25X
6.
SWEDEN. Foreign Minister hints,Sweden might leave UN if USSR does: Foreign ESIFEer Unden in a recent radio debate stated that if a permanent council member left the UN, the whole organization would be "automatically"disselved. He refused to indicate what Sweden's reaCtion would be in such a situation, but reiterated Sweden's opposition to sanctions that might lead to a world war or involve Sweden in a war with a great power. He emphasized that Sweden is bound by a Seeurity Council decision only when all the great powers are in agreement.'
Comment: Unden's statement, more extensive than the circumstancee made necessary, indicates that the Swedish-Government still clings tenaciously to its "alliance-free" foreign policy, despite informal adherence,to-COCOM principles and despite formal support for the Acheson Plan to provide "an international police service." His remarks may have.been deliberately calculated to offset recent indications Of proJaestern inclinations and to emphasize Sweden's continued "neutrality."
Comment: The Indonesian delegation asked for Dutdh agreement t.a short-Eal-Frimarily concerned with obtaining Dutch admission of Indonesia'ssovereignty over New Guinea. The chief of Indonesia's delegatien has admitted that the Netherlands could not specifically agree to the Indonesian demands, but perebnally belieVes that a satisfactorT Dutch.answer would be recognition that sovereignty over New Guinea is an "unsolved issue."
25X
7.
COSTA RICA, Foreign Minister offers resignation; plans to reorganize goVernpress report that Foreign ment party: A Costa Rican official has confirmed Minister Echandi has offered his "irrevocable resignation" from the cabinet to reorganize the government party. The US Embassy states that the President "allegedly" accepted the resignation. I
1
25X
Comment: Although the Costa Rican elections will not take place until August 1953, Jose Figueres, former president and "professional revolutionary," has been conducting a heated anti-government campaign since mid-1951. President Ulate, who cannot succeed himself, has steadfastly refused to become involved in "politics," and members of the government party fear that
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without strong leadership the party will disintegrate into bickering factions. Echandi's move is apparently designed to halt the disintegration, and possibly to promote his own candidacy.
25X1
8.
CUBA. Proposed reorganization of Army Air Force appreved: The reorganiSation of the Cuban Army Air Force, as proposed by the US Air Force Mission tO'Cuba, has been approved by'the Army General Staff and the Minister Of-Defense: The new organization, based on current US Air Force organization principles, Will for the first time provide for delegation of command functions within the Cuban Army Air Force. The Minister of State has suggested an additional budget study since he believes the Army Air Force should receive additional funds to implement the new organization, which is to be established by presidential decree When the budget study has been coMpleted./
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25X
Comment: ithas been repotted that under the influence of the US Air Force Mission and a competent Chief of Air Force.(COl. Cantillo), a here tofore nearly inactive organization is being successfully revitalized. The planned reorganization with the acquisition of new funds should enable the Cuban Army Air Forde to expand its capabilities for assisting in -western hemisphere defense.
9.
East Germany reportedly requests that a repreeentative be accredited EZflikat According to the Panamanian Foreign Minister, the Panamanian Minister in Paris has received an official communication from authorities of the SoViet Zone in Berlin requesting that a representative be accredited to Panama. US Ambassador Wiley cmmuents that Panata is apparently becoming a focal point of Satellite interest."
PANAMA.
I
25
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Comment: There is no indication as to whether the reported East German request refers to a representative who would be resident in Panama, or to One who would be resident in another country and merely adcredited to Panama. East Germany has no diplomatic representatives in Latin America at present.
The Polish request that Panama accredit Bolesaw Gelen as Polish Minister [was erroneously interpreted as to Panahal indicating a Polish desire to establish a diplomatic miesion in Panama. Gelen has already presented his credentials in Mexico, where he is replacing
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minister Drohojowski, who was resident in Mexico and merely accredited to various other Central and South American countries. There is no evidence, other than the reported East German request, that Satellite interest in Panama has recently increased.
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etter o f U. provides letter of KOREA.USSR USSR providessome someconsumer cbnsumergoods goods tO t b North North Korea: Korea: A l 1 1 . KOREA. 1717an.in to m t in the t h e amount aniount of of 250,000 250,000 rubles rubles (62,500 (62,500 dollars) d o l l a r s ) was t o be opened OA 12 of for "yarn, ootton cotton cloth, cloth, on 12 January in i n favor o f a Soviet export export ttrust rust f o r "yarn, mediOinei" shipped to to a a banking banking message, message according to and medicines" t o North North Korea, Korea, according 1 2 Jan Jan 52) 52) Pyongyang t to (SUEDE FT-4170, FT-4170, Pyongyang-Mosoow, Pyongyang-Ubsoow, 12 from Pyongyang o Mosoow. A~JSOOW.
ComMent: Prinoipal S Soviet to North Korea i in 1951 wpre Commentt o v i e t eiports exports t o Nortb n 1961were All izidioations indications point o a severe severe induatrial and i n d u e m m d military m i l i t a r y materiel. materiel. All point t to shortage of o f all a l l oonsumer oonsumer goods goods in i n North North Korea. Korea.
12. 12
'North Korean A i r headquarters evinces interest i n t e r e s t in i n downed downed UN UN plane: planet 'North Air headquarters evinces The pilot p i l o t of of 'one "one F-86 enemy enemy plane" plane" downed on 26 January near Chinnampo was to t o be seized seized and and the t h e aircraft a i r c r a f t taken t o Pyongyang, Pyongyang, acoording atloording to to a to message from from the the North Korean A i r headquarters in in S inuiju t o Pyongyang. Pyongyang. Air'headquarters Sinuiju to ( S U E D E l / 2 4 2 , Sinui ju-Pyongyang, 26 Jan Jan 52) 52 ) (SUEDEr----242, Sinuiju,Pyongyang, Comentr No N o F-86 jet j e t fighter f i g h t e r was lost l o s t over Communist territory territory Comment; d u r i h m e r i o d24 24through through 31 31 January. January. Two F-80 and t duritTER777tiod h r e e F-84 three however, were were lost l o s t on on 26 26 January. January. jets, however,
'
the Communists go go t to considerable trouble trouble tto It is 3.8 known that that t h e Communiata o coneiderable o salvage downed downed UN UN airoraft. a i r o r a f t . Furthermore* Furthermore, t there h e r e is is a p probability robability t that h a t some l lost ost F-80 j e t fighters, f i g h t e r a , and possibly one one F-86, F-80 jet F-86, have been made made operational by the eneny. t h e enemy.
7 Feb 52 52 7
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PIP PPROVED PROVED FOR RELEASE RELEASE 1
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7 February 1952
US OFFICIALS ONLY
CIA No. 49525 Copy No. 4

TO THE DAILY DIGEST
TOP SECRET szcuRrn INFORMATION

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SECTION 3 (ESTEEM)
Comment: Last November Denmark tentatively agreed to extend military service to 18 months (see OCI Daily Digest, 26 Nov 51) commencing with the conscript class to be called up in May.. This would not be the first case of Danish procrastination.

TOP SECRET
DENMARK. Government stalls on extension of conscription: Denmark's Minister OT-575inse has informed the US Embassy that the extension of military service to 18 months depends upon the delivery of prefabricated housing to Denmark under the US military aid program. The Embassy points out that agreement must be reached this month, since the May 1952 conscripts must be notified by 1 March if the training period is to be increased. Although American officials do not want to give the Defense Minister any excuse for postponing an extension of service, they are urging that TCC firmly insist that the Danes themselves supply the housing. (TS Copenhagen TOWS 42, 5 Feb 52)
7 Feb 52
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UNCLASSlikD when ialThWa-IK31V,401%149p; fied when tilled in form is detached from controlled document.
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SECURITY IRFCRMATION
7 February 195?
US OFFICIALS ONLY
OCI No. 3868

Copy No.
226
DAILY DIGEST

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SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
1.
USSR. Soviet Union amain offerinm goods to Southeast Asia; At. the current Rangoon Meeting of the UN Economic Commission for Aeia and the Far East, the SoViet delegate strongly attacked the Western rearmament pregram as the cause for the slow economic development of the ECAYE area. In Contrast, the Soviet delegation emphasized the ability of the Soviet bloc to supply capital goods.
The US delegation comments that Soviet tactics at the conference are antagonizing the participants and are receiving only moderate press coverage in Rangoon and no favorable editorials. (C Rangoon 762, 4 Feb 52)
Comment:. Soviet trade proposals during tbe October ECAFE conference in Singapore were received skeptically by Southeast Asian countries. Even though the USSR reportedly made a specific trade offer to Indonesia at that time, there is no indication that Indonesia has conSidered the proposal with any real interest.
The Soviet delegation has dharged that the poverty of Southeast Asia is caused in large part by domination and exploitation of the area by the capitalist powers, but members from India, Indonesia, Philippines, Pakistan and Thailand pointed out that their countries welcomed foreign capital and considered it ah important factor in the development of their economies.
2 ALBANIA,
Government preparing to decree second state loan: The Albanian press annotnced.on January 25 that the workers of the Stalin textile,como. bine had requested the Presidium of the People's Assembly to decree the floating of a second state loan. Several Albanian work centers have enpressed approval of the request. (R FBIS Tirana, 28 Jan 52)
Comment: The first state loan was decreed in July 1949 to run for 20 years from January 1950 to January 1970 and to be repaid by the state by means of lotteries and repurchases beginning in 1955. Subscriptions to the second state loan, as to the first, will be obligatory,
3.
BULGARIA: Note of protest deiVeyed to Britain: On 4 February tbs Bulgarian Minister of Foreign Affairs presented a note of energetic" protest to the British Legation in Sofia concerning British government sanction of and participation in a conference recently held in London by the Eastern section of the European Movement. The conferencesat which Billgaria charged sorts of fascist elements and famentors of a new war openly discussed.the question of subversive activities aimed against

"all
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the People's Democracies", was opened by the British Minister-of Housing, and a congratulatory telegram was sent by Foreign Minister Eden. The Bulgarian note stated that "this hostile British attitude is in flagrant contradiction to normal diplomatic relations And the principles and proves that the British Government openly in of the UN.4Charter, spires and supports hostile designs andections aimed against the People's Republic of Bulgaria." (i1 FBIS Sofia, 4 Feb 52)
Comment: This protest is very similar to a Hungarian note delivered to the Britiah-Legation in Budapest on 31 January. Informal protests have also appeared in the press and radio of other Satellites and in lugoslatia.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA. CzeCh Consul in Jerusalem disannears: Frantisek Necas CzeCh ConSul in JertsaleM,.disappeared on.4.February, according to Agence France PreSse. It is believed that he decided not to return to Czecho slovakia after he had been recalled to Prague, And that he will seek (R FBIS Ticker. Paris AFP, 2 Feb 52) asylum from the Israeli Government,
ConmenA: Recess, who is not a Communist, very likely has defected, Since the formation of the though-notlfrom any ideological motivation. Israeli Government and the establishment of the.Czech legation in Tel Aviv, he has had little to do. He is an alcoholic known in Jerusalem for his riotous life.
5.
HUNGARY; Detailed data on couriers required; US couriers intending to enter Hungary must now submit detailed biographic data including schools attended, military service, former positions and specialized training, when requesting visas. (R Vienna 2553, 4 Feb 52)
United States and other Western countries disguised as couriers. The above measure may be motivated by a suspicion that the United States .fo/lows the WI= procedure,
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JUGOSLAVIA.
differences: I
Ithe removal of Politburo member Franc Leskovsek from his governmental post last October was the result of a basic divergence of opinion within higher party circles. One school of thought, represented by Finance Minister Popovic and Tempo Vukmanovic, MinisterPresident of the Council for Industry, reportedly favored closer cooperation with the West and a de flationary economic policy. The second group, led by Leskavsek, preferred

SECRET
goad: Hungary has been known to send intelligence agents to the
aftwaspoliseaLesskovsekatt 1
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a neutral stand and an inflationary economic policy.

25 X1A
The report that Leskovsek has resigned from the Politburo remains unconfirmed, according to the sources. previously reported purge of the economic expert leskovsek. At the time of his removal from his governmental post, American Embassy officials expressed the opinion that leskovsekts refusal to accept party decisions regarding economic policy probably caused his demotion from the federal government, but that he might be retained in the Politburo in order to present the appearance of absolute party unity.
2omment:
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This is the first reasonably reliable followup on thel

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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
EGYPT American officials report on Sudan Question: Two American diplomatic observers, who recently returned to Cairo from Khartoum, state that unification of the Sudan under the "symbolic crown" of Egypt would be unpopular in certain areas of the Sudan and would probably cause disturbances in the main Sudanese towns. The intensity of any reaction would depend largely on the attitude taken by the British-controlled government in Khartoum. They point out that the police and defense forces,in the Sudan are well organized and seem capable, if given the proper orders, of controlling such outbreaks.
The Americ:n Ambassador in Cairo'states that, on the basis of the mi,ervers' report and the moderate attitude of the Egyptian Prime Minister, it is "important to push ahead" to a solution of the Sudan question. (S Cairo 1266, 5 Feb 52)
INDIA.
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The two observers believe that a symbolic unIrin under the Egyptian crown wo.ild be more palatable to the Sudanese if a definite date were set for an internationally supervised plebiscite.
Query regarding unusually lane number of radio tubes for Indian

Ihas
asked a large American manufacturer of electronic devices to quote prices on 2,000,000 battery-type radio tubes for Use in Indian Army walkietalkie sets. The manufao f the tubes states that this number would 25X1A supply 400,000 sets.
Comment: 400,000 men.
The total strength of the Indian Army is slightly over
25X1X
25X1X
3.
INDONESIA. Cabinet crisis possible within next several weeks: Ambassador Cochran's has informed him that a government crisis may develop within the next few weeks that the breach between the Masjumi and National parties has recentdy enlarged and that the two main factions within the Masjumi remain unreconciled. (C Djakarta 1119, 5 Feb 52)
I
25X1X
Comment: the greatest threat to the government's continued ex5ltence lies cdthin the cabinet itself. The National Party 'ntermittently threatens to withdraw its minist,ers and join the opposition, which would precipitate the cab'.netts fall.
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The present cabinet has been considered weak, unstable, and likely to be short-lived since it undertook government responsibility in April 1951. It has survived to date for two reasons: although the National Patty frequently appears eager to withdraw, it is apparently sufficiently responsible to realize that a subsequent cabinet would be either leftist-oriented or more unstable than the present one; and the cAinet has the day-to-day support of President Sukarno, still the most important factor in Indonesian politics. There are currently no indications that either of these factors has changed sufficiently to result in the fall of the cabinet.
4.
Comment: While the Soviet Union has seized upon the presence of Nationalist troops in Burma to attack the US in the UN, it is not known to have offered to assist Burma in settling the issue in any way. Nevertheless, there are indications of growing apprehension in Thailand, in both local and foreign circles,regarding the ultimate outcome of this problem.
5.
6.
CHINA.
INDOCHINA. French review recent Viet Minh operations: French intelligence officers in Saigon, in a review of Viet Minh operations since 1 December, report that the enemy is maintaining good morale despite heavy casualties and a high disease rate. They emphasize the improvement in Viet Minh staff work and estimate that a new system of rotation of front line units will enable the insurgents to maintain their current pressure on the French defense perimeter in Tonkin until the end of February. At that time, they believe, the enemyis front line ammunition will be exhausted.
Meanwhile, there is continuing heavy infiltration of the northern and southern zones of the delta by enemy units not engaged in the frontal operations. (S USARMA Saigon 56, 4 Feb 52)
The Calcutta press reports the Chinese held as spv in Calcutta: arrest in December 1951 of a Chinese suspected of espionage on behalf of of a "foreign power". The alleged spy is said to have entered India in October from Tibet. (U New Delhi Deep 1416, 22 Dec 51)
SECRET
5
BURMA/THAILAND. Thai to tichten controls over Burma border: The American Ambassador emphasized the seriousness of the problem of Chinese Nationalists in Burma to the Thai Premier by pointing out the Soviet offer to assist Burma in ejecting these troops. The Premier agreed to issue strict orders prohibiting clandestine transportation of supplies over the border into Burma, as well as an official statement dissociating Thailand from the Nationalist forces. (S Bangkok 1663, 5 Feb 52)
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Comment: This is the first such report from India. It is of someinterest in view of India's persistently conciliatory policy toward Peiping.
7.
Russians inspect Chinese airborne-troops: A Soviet team went from Khabarovak to Kaifeng and Hankow to inspect Chinese airborne troops in early December, according to the Nationalist Ministry of National Defense. This team was reportedly headed by Lt. Gen. Shapelov, Chief of Staff of the Soviet Far East Air Force. The US Far East Air Force comments that one or two transports reportedly were used throughout December for paratroop training at Kaifeng and Hankow; and that there is no apparent increase in emphasis on such training. (S FEAF Tokyo, AX 1911, 31 Jan 52) Comment:. Fewer reports of Chinese paratroop training have been received in the past six months than in 1950 and early 1951. Although an estimated-25,000 men have received jump training in China, there is an almost total lack of information about the organization of paratroop units. According to unconfirmed report, the Third Paratroop Division was recently transferred to western Chekiang and Fukien Provinces.
8.
Prospective railroad routes described in Peiping newspaper; A Peiping newspaper article on 28 September 1951 stated that China will build two long railroad lines: one will begin at Paichengtzu in Manchuria, run through Inner Mongolia and end at Lanzhou; another will begin at Yumen in Kansu Province, run through Lanchou and lead south to Kueiyang. These, plus the three lines under construction in Kwangsi, Szechwan and Kansu, total 5,173 kilometers. The article commented that these lipids are beine built to connect Manchuria, Northwest and Southwest China.
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Comment: This is the first reference to Communist plans to build a. new railroad from Manchuria through Inner Mongolia to Lanchow. It has been reported that only one section of this route, from Pacitou'.in Suiyuan Province to Lanchou, has been actually surveyed.
9.
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KOREA.
told of US a ressive intent: A hat Communist commanders in Korea in early January received intelligence emanating from the Truman-Churchill talks on UN intentions in Korea. The commanders were told that if truce talks break down, the UN will'launch an offensive to reach the 40th liarallel, coupled with.amphibious landings at Chinnampo on the west coast and Wonsan in the east.
Allegedly, the principal purpose of this expansion of adtivities is to dirert Chinese Communist pressure from Southeast Asia. To effect
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this offensive the "strength of one marine division has been increased," and the 45th, part of the 40th, and the llth Airborne Divisions are to be sent to Korea.
25X1X
Comment: However, Communist intelligence of US activities frequently shows up in their propaganda. For instance, a 2 February North Korean broadcast which accused the US of intending to expand the Korean war, cited the crrival of the 40th and 45th Divisions in Korea, the landing of airborne troops at Taegu, and the arrival of a US Marine Division at Pusan as proof of aggressive intent.
10.
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Joint Communist supply system reportedly directed by Korean: The "Joint North Korean-Chinese Communist SupplY Headquarters" is located in Pyongyang,' I Allegedly, the "director" of this organi. zation is Chang Si-u, a former.Minister of Industry and Commerce of the North Korean government and a long-time Communist. The vice director s Han Pyong-ok. lest rpnOrtpd pm the "director of General Affairs."
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Comment: Some credence is given this report because a recent radio broadcast mentioned Chang Si Wu(U) as the "Minister for Supplies in the Rear." This ministry is probably charged with logistical support of the North Korean armed forces. There is no confirmation, however, of Chang's paramount position in the joint Communist supply organization.
11.
Japanese to re-examine vessels issue in Korea-Japan talks: As a result of Rhee's proclamation of Korean sovereignty over adjacent seas, the Japanese delegates to the Korea-Japan talks concerning the-mutual return of vessels have changed their attitude. The committee had reportedly reached an unofficial agreement, bUt the Japanese now hold that Rhee's proclamation may affect an item on the conference agenda and thus re-exemination of the whole issue is necessary. (C Pusan 763, 5 Feb 52)
12.
JAPAN.
Comment: Japanese reluctance to continue negotiations in good faith in the. face of Rhee's unilateral pronouncement is understandable.
Soviet trade offensive in Japan seen failinP: The Soviet trade offensive in Japan is failing, according to Pan-Asia News Agency, as shrewd Japanese businessmen now realize that the Russians do not intend to enter into business Zontracts but are merely dangling trade offers for propaganda purposes. Hoping to alienate Japanese businessmen from US connections, the Soviet procedure is to erwpach various Japanese
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firms with orders; honever, after expensive tests and modifications have been made and much haggling has ensued, the Russians decide not to buy. In addition, Soviet mission representatives call on the Japanese Foreign Office "daily4' to promote friendship and expound on the opportunities of trade with Russia and Communist China. (R FEIS, 5 Feb 52)
Comment: While Pan-Asia' s reporting is not notably reliable, no report has been received of the conclusion of a single Soviet-Japanese trade contract. Other reports from Japan indicate that the standard Soviet practice is to drop negoti a bions before a contract can be concluded.

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FRANCE. Industrialists resent criticisms of record on war orderer An official of the French manufacturers? association told the Mutual Security Mission in Paris that industrialists are perturbed by what appears to them a "concerted campaign" in the US press accusing the French of reluctance to aceept rearmament orders. -He stated that French industrialists are "extremely anxious" to receive such orders and cannot be blamed either for delaYs in filling US-militery orders or for the financial limitations on French military prodUction. The Mission believes that the industrialists' resentment of these recent US press complaints is justified. (R Paris TOMS A-57, 24 Jan 52)
Comment: Much of thie US criticism is due to impatience with the pattern of French industry. The subdivision of industries such as metal .working and electronics into hundreds of firms prevents efficient handling of a large volume of war Orders. "While top--level French industrialists have been trying to overcome the difficulties inherent ih this system; they still face hurdles in raw material shortages, delayed deliveries, the effects of franc depreciation on prices, and the uneven support of higher productivity goals.
Parliamentary limitations on government in European army treaty negotiations not anticipated: A prominent Foreign Office official has expressed confidence that when the EDC comes up for discussion in Parliament on 11 February the government can avert the posing of cbnditions involving (S Paris 4697, 3 Feb 52) the Saar or Germany's admission to NATO.
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Comment: The French conceived the EDC as the principal means of prevent-lidGerman military preponderence in western Europe, and there is little indication of dissatisfaction with the government's handling of recent relations with Germany. In recent weeks, hoWever, there has been evidence of serious parliamentary opposition to the EDC treaty in the form in which it has evolved.
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French ready to proceed with agricultural pool: France is ready to invite eighteen countries to a meeting on agricultural integration about mid-March. The French have an open mind regarding the number of Commodities to be included in the prospective pool, but prefer to limit them at the outset. Although the Federation of Farm Unions officially approved the pool with certain reservations, French farm opinion is divided. Some farm groups realize that outside competition will be a serious shock to certain "archaic sectors" of French agriculture. Government officials state the

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plan must take effect slowly, but believe that competition will eventually reduce production costs and'raise the efficiency level of European (C Paris 4662, 1 Feb 52; S Paris, Joint Weeka 5, 1 Feb 52) agriculture.
Comment: The Pflimlin Plan, which seeks to create a single market for basic European foodstuffs, mas tabled in the National Assembly a year ago pending ratification of the Schuman Plan. The Dutch, foreseeing that the "green pool" will encounter even greater difficulties than the Schuman Plan, propose the immediate creation of a European CoMmittee for.Agriculture ani Foodstuffs, responsible wholly to the parliaments. The Dutch suggest that integration should not be'limited to certain products, but should involve agriculture as a whole.
4.
Summary 340, 9 Jan 52)
Comment: Since Communist and Soviet-sponsored newspapers have a "guaranteed" clientele, no particular significance can be attached to their relatively favorable position. The difficulties of the coalition press, however, and the contrastingly advantageous status of selected independent newspapers may be indicative of the general lack of enthusiasm with which the AUstrian public views its government after six years of uninterrupted power.
5.
Seasonal unemployment reaches critical level: The number of Austrian job-seekers increased nearly 30 percent during January and now totals about one tenth of the total labor force. Although the unemployment figure remains about 10 percent below last year's record, the situation is believed serious in some provinces and relief financing is regarded as (1 Vienna 2554, 4 Feb 52) inadequate.
Comment: The current aggravated seasonal unemployment in Austria is attributed in part to excessive employment in the construction industries following emergency measures taken by the Austrian Covermnent last year. More recent efforts to provide jobs have been complicated'by the tirevailing inflationary pressures, and a supplementary release of 400 million schillings in counterpart funds for this purpose was trimmed one fourth to minimize

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Confidential AUSTRIA. Coalition papers show sharp declines in ci-rculation: statistics of Austria's leading news agency disclose that the circulation of coalition and US-sponsored papers has fallen off seriously during the past three years. Last October press runs for People's Party and Socialist newspapers were 33 percent and 30 percent smaller than in October 1948, and the circulation of the US-controlled Wiener Rurier is down 37 percent. In ' contrast, the press run of Communist newspapers has declined only' 7 percent, and the circulation of two independent newspaper& for which comparative statistics.are available has increased 7 percent. (S USFA Intelligence
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the anticipated inflationary impact. While the seasonal problem will .probably be alleViated somewhat as Summer approaches, the announced intentions of the Austrian Government to rechannel investments at 'a lower level toward the more immediately productive sectors of the economy may at a later date aggravate the frictional unemployment problem.
6.
'Comment: This favorable reaction to the EDC represents a great change in Dutch opinion since last fall and augurs well for the parliamentary debate which may take place prior to the Lisbon NATO meeting.
7.
Dutch reluctant to forego oil-well equipment shipment to POland: Although a Dutch official has stated that the Economic Minister would be asked to delay shipment of oil-well exploration equipment to Poland, he eaid the stoppage of shipments would have seribus political and economic censequences in Dutoh -Polish relations. The Netherlands-Polish trade agree-, ment providee for Dutch export licenses for coal-mining and oil-well equip ' -
Vent, and the license for the latter was approved before the COCOM reStrictionS were drawn up. The official-adds that revocation of the libenee Would be embarrassing to his governMent and lead Poland to deny the Netherlands coal shipments. (S The Hague 793, 1 Feb 52)
Comment: A Dutch Foreign Office official, informally replying to a US request that the Netherlands seek a Western market for its oil equip -' ment, has stated that the problem was not to obtain an alternative buyer,' but-to prevent Polish penalties should the contract not be fulfilled. The spokesman was pessimistic over the chances of getting the Economic Minister to approve a delay.
8.
ITALY. Government acts to delay cabinet crisis: The Italian Government 51-7Verted a cabinet crisis threatened by parliamentary, opposition to two of its bills. The first, dealing with reorganization of the Treasury, Finance and Budget Ministries, has been withdrawn, but at the same time Budget Minieter Pella has regained the post of Treasury Minister ad interim. To secure support for the second bill, dealing with state employees' pay, the majority Christian Democrats invoked party discipline and obtained.a

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NETHERLANDS. Dutch satisfied with SHAPE's assurances on EDC:. The Dutch parliamentary delegation which visited SHAPE has stated its complete satisfaction -with SIDUE's assurances on the military feasibility of the EDC and SHAPEis'concePtion of EDC -NATO relationships, which are the same as the Dutch envisage. As a result of the visit, the delegation, which included two of the most influential members of Parliament, felt that close personal bases for future Dutch cooperation with SHAPE had been established. (C The Hague 783, 31 Jan 52)
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vote of confidence, 285.-233. Several Hpro -labor" Christian Democrate, however, including the head of the Christian Democrat-dominated Confederation of Labor Unions', voted against the government. .(S Rome Joint leeka 5, 1 Feb 52; U Rome 3425, 3 Feb 52)

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Comment: The government's action to delay a crisis leaves unsolved the prEITEE upon which opposition to its bills was based. Restorktion of Pella's previous functions virtually invests him with the powers-called for in the reorganization motion. The extent of these powers had been objected to by not only the moderate left, but aldo the right and left wings of the Christian Democratic Party, This restoration of power supporte the opinion that-Pell:a:is being groomed as a possible successor to aging Premier de GesPeri: The labor deputies' refusal to conform to party discipline was intended to refute CoMiunist claims that the Confederation of Labor Unions is a government stooge.
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Serious shortage in wheat crop forecast: -fire- Argentine Government's estimate pf the current wheat crop is now only 2.2 million metric tons, thus indicating a serious shortage in relatiOn to domestic requirements. the US Embassy is reporting a-moderately higher figure in its unclassified dispatch. (C Buenos Aires 562, 5 Feb 52)
ARGENTINA. Comment: Since Argentina's domestic wheat requirements for 1952 are estimated at 3.2 million metric tons, the new estimate indicates a million ton deficit, This would, mean not only a serious cut in the country's foreign exehange' earnings, but; il wheat is imperted; a drain on its already meager foreign exchange reserVes. Either importation or rationing of wheat'Would be politically unattractive, since either would be admission of poor government policy in the light of Argentina's prewar position as the world's third largeat eXporter of wheat: The government has denied the need to import Ireported that Argentina wheat. In December, however, 25X1 would soon sign a Secret contract to purchase Rumanian wheat (see 03I Daily Digest, 18 Dec 51).
Argentinals reduced production of agricultural products has already had important repercussions on other cOuntries, 'such ea Brazil, Britain,and France, which formerly purchased in Argentina but now must-look to the US and Canada, thus further aggravating their dollar shortage.
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BRAZIL. Riot occurs over high cost of living: A student demonstration against increased motion picture admissions swiftly grew into a city-wide riot in the capital of Minas Gerais State on 3 February. At least one person was killed and more than 60 were injured; there was also considerable property damage. Police were forced to fire on the mobs, and army troops
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later reinforced the police contingedts. The Communists reportedly incited the populace to further rioting agailist recently increased prices. (R Rio de Janeiro 996, 5 Feb 52)
ComMent: Although the CoMMunists did not start the demonstration, they apparently were ready to add to the confusion and turn it into a riot. RecentlY the ComMunists have been more active in this-section 6f Brazil, ahd have front:groups actively campaignihg against the Ilith cost of living. Felice elsewhere in Brazil reportedly are alerted to prevent-such:. demenstrations or riots, and quite likely there will be "preventive arrests" of some Cemmunists.
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Comment: The arrival of Prisco Porto signals the resumption of diplorTiatirTelations between these two republics after a period of proximately tmm months during which the Inter-American Peace Committee Was working toward a mutnally acceptable settlement of their dispute over the mOtor Veseel Quetzal. 'The "Christmas Day Agreement" refers to the-successful terMination on Christmas night of this affair which for a time gravelY menaced the peaceful relations between the two'countries and threatened to bring tension once again to the Caribbean area.

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DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. Cuban Charge arrives: The ne*'Cuban Charge d'affaires, Antonio Frisco Porto, has arrived in:Ciudad Trujillo. The Dominicans are gratified at this evidence of Cuba's adherence to the "Christmas DaY"Agreemerit" and will probably name their Charge to Cuba in the near future, -(C Ciudad Trujillo 435 and 440, 18 and 25 Jan 52)
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KOREA. 'North Korean jet j e t fighter fighter u n i t may n t o Manohurian KOREA.'North unit may be be moving moving i into Manohurian interior: A A transfer transfer order orderfrom from the "Chinese A iForce r Force Headquarters" interior: the "Chinese Air 11.3Ra-quarters" receiveil"at North No2cw1 Korean Korean Air Air Headquarters Headquarters authorizing authorizing a a move from from was receivea-at either Anshan Anshan or o r Antung Antun$ to t o the t h e Manchurian Manchurian interior i n t e r i o r town town of of Tungfeng. Tungfeng. either 29 January January message, from Sinuiju t o a North Korean f m inisterial The 29 metsage, from to Ebrean o of ministerial h a t "P'aeng TokHi"--possibly Hi"--possibly Chinese Chinese rank in Pyongyang, Pyongyang, mentioned mentioned tthat "Meng Tok Commkist Volunteer cOmmander commander Peng Peng Teh-huai--had Teh-huai--had been informed of o f this CommUnist move. (SUEDE move (SUEDE 249, Sinuiju-Pyongyang, Sinui ju-Pyongyang, 29 29 Jan Jan 52) 52 ) 249,
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Comment: Although AlthoUgh this message gives Commentt gives no no indication i n d i c a t i o n of of who who was was to move t to'Tungfeng, fact required coordination coordination t o move o k g f e n g , tthe he f a c t tthat h a t tthe h e ttransfer r a n s f e r required .With a North North Korean Korean cabinet cabinet minister minister and with With Peng Teh-huai Teh-huai suggests a with a a h a t a North Korean jet jet movement of sme moVeMent Of some significance. significance. It is possible possible t that Tighter unit etationed either at Anshan o or Antung may may be bminvolved. f i g h t e r unit stationed e ither a t Anshan r Antung involved. The reoent airfield.at a i r f i e l d a t Tungfeng Tungfeng was reported in i n use by jet j e t aircraft a i r c r a f t in i n 1951; 1951; recent Sightings by ON UN'pilbts sighfings p i l o t s of enemy enemy MIG-15 MIG15 jets j e t s leaving leaving North North Korea Korea in i n the the direaticion Tunghua -Tungfeng Tnngfenglends lendS credence credence t to possible l looation d i r e c t i o n ofof Tunghua o tthe h e possible o o a t i o n of of enemy units enemy u n i t s in i n this t h i s area. area.
I A A further f u r t h e r decline decline of of known known Communist Communist offensive offensive and and defensive defensive air. air capabilities if'such.a move occurred. c a p a b i l i t i e s over over North North Korea Korea would would resulti result, i f such a move occurred.
13.
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units North Korean u n i t s withdraw from from captured islands: islands: North North Korean: Korean' mmphibions units who captured am~hibious cawtured an unidentified island i s l a n d were ordered ordered by.a' bu'a Brigade commander commander on on 4 4 February February to t o wipe wipe out out or o r Capture capture all a l l the t h e "enemy" "eneky" . troops on the island troepS'en'the i s l a n d and and then then to t o set s e t "anti-personnel "anti-personnel mines mines and and evacuate. evacuate. at a t oriole...." onoe..
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Additional evidence withdrawals a are operating evidence that t h a t such such withdrawals r e standard operating procedure is seen i in 1 February message from from an an unidentified unidentified b battalion prooedure n a 1Pebruarymessage attalion to 23id Brigade Brigade reporting reporting tthat "our troops troops at'YUkto.have t o the' t h e 23rd h a t "our a t Yukto have thoroughly thoroughly withdrawn." (SUEDE withdrawn." (SUEDE 501st 501st Comm Corn ?Boon Recon ;Group ,Group Korea, Korea, CM: CM IN I N 9974 9974 and and 10051, 10051, 6 Feb 52) 52) Comment: intelligence in western o coastal Korea Comments American naval shore i ntelligeqce i n western o a s t a l Korea reported r e p o the ~ enemy'e.evacuation enemy',a n evacuation of o f Swami, Sunwi, Changnin, Changnin, and and Yongwi Yongwi islands islands after a f t e r their t h e i r capture.' capture. Lack of transportation t r a n s p o r t a t i o n and and fear f e a r of of ROK ROK marine marine Lack of dunteimttacks oounterattaoks and and of o f rocket rocket attacks attacks frOm f r o m UN UN vessels v e s s e l s were were listed l i s t e d as as the the principal p r i n c i p a l reasons reasons for f o r these these withdrawals. withdrawals.
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Inirideaoe of malaria in in a a Chinese Communist unit unit in i n Korea decreases: deoreasbst KOREA. Ineidenoe KOREA-. ZeVeTial Chinese Communist Communfst messages messages iindicate a 1 Chinese n d i c a t e tthat h a t tthe h e percentage of o f malaria in an an unidentified Chinese Chinese unit in in Korea Korea has'greatly has' g r e a t l y deoreased victims in 1949 ninety n i n e t y percent i n 1949 oVer According t to message, in o one message, over the t h e past three t h r e e years. year&. Aocording t h e disease; disease; in i n 1950, had the 1950, fifty f i f t y percent; peroent; and and in i n 1951, ten t e n percent. peroent.
A second second message message states s t a t e s that t h a t "in " i n the t h e years years 1949, 1949, 1950 1950and and 1951 1951((there ((there was issued))quinine issued))quinine and and ((i ((4 a a native native drug drug ?)) 7 ) ) as as malaria malaria preventatives." preventatives." 501st Coma Comm. Reoon. Reoon. Group Korea, Korea, CM CM IIN 9620, 2 Feb Feb and 29 Jan 5 52) (SUEDE 501st N 9620, 2)
Commentr n t e r r o g a t i o n reports i ndicate t hat Comment: Reoent Recent POW i interrogation indioate that in to in Korea hava have' adequate adequate supplies supplies of b f atabrine atabrine t o treat t r e a t malaria general medical supply supply situation, situation, however, however, is is reported reported to t o be
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t h e Communists the Communists oases. oases. The critical. critical.
A series s e r i e s of of North Korean Korean combat combat division d i v i s i o n may t o rear r e a r area: area: A North may withdraw to three meesages on the'interdivisional net of the Division, t h r e e messages the'interdivisLona1 n et o f t h e North Korean 13th 13th Division, II-Corps, IT Corps, currently c u r r e n t l y in i n oombat combat with UN forces in i n east-central e a s t - c e n t r a l Korea, Korea, suggests suggests One that may be preparing to Wonsan:area. One t h a t this.division t h ' i s ' d i v i s i o n may t o withdraw to t o the t h e Won8en:area. 6'February message noted that t h a t the t h e "Corps "Corps chief chief signal s i g n a l officer" o f f i c e r " required required a a 6.February iapoi-t whether tthe 13th.Division Divisioncommunications communications ohief ohief could could oarry oarry his his r e p o r t oOn n whether h e 13th. u s t south south of of Wonsan. Wonsan. Another 6 February message ndicated radio. radio' t to o Anbyon, Anbyon, j just message i indicated that town north of t h a t a "medical treatment chief" ohief" had been dispatched.to dispatched t o a tow$ of The final f i n a l message Wonsan Wonsan to t o "investigate "investigate the t h e veterinary.situation." v e t e r i n a r y situation." detailed Division's artillery. d e t a i l e d the t h e availability a v a i l a b i l i t y of of horses to t o move the 13th 13th Division's artillery. (SUEDE ( S u E I 3 E m 212396, 3 9 6 , 2397, 2397, and and 2398, 2398, 6 6 Feb 52)
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this Message does not not conclusively i indicate Comment: Although t h i s message ndicate a , orthe Corps, it strongly strongly movement of t h e 13th 13th Division, Division, much much less l e s s the t h e II I1 Corps, sugtests that h e II I1 Corps, long the Corps, long suggests t h a t sOme some such such move-may move-may be be contemplated. contemplated. If t engaged i in-combat, it will probably be replaced in line is withdrawn, i t wl11 i n the kine n combat, is.withdrawn, by eithei Wonsan area 6y e i t h e r the the rested restad V V Corps'ftom Corps' f'rom the the Wonsan area or or a a reserve reserve division division from the t h e eastern coastal c o a s t a l area. area. of the'full of t h e f u l l strength strengbh I Corps, Corps, fram
18. 1 8 .
Premier praises armed forces force8 on A m y Day: Day: On t h e occasion oocasion North Korean Premier Army the Army, of of the t h e Fourth Anniversary on 8 8 February of of the t h e North Nbrth Korean People's People's Army, Premier P r a e r Kim Il I1 Sung delivered his h i s annual tmnual exhortation to t o all a l l segments of of Kbrean'eociety Korean'society and and to t o armed armed forces, foroes, urging them than to t o "prepare to t o achieve decisiVe victory the e" and a d congratulating oongratulatin them them on on decisive v i c t o r y in in t h e approaching approaching their t h e i r achievements achievements thus thus far. far. (SUEDE ( S U E D E ~ 399, 3 9 9 ,Korea 6 6 Feb Feb 52) 527
Comment: Commentr The publicity p u b l i c i t y broadcast version of of Kim's K i m ' s speeoh speeoh condensed pertiM7-757ertions to battle." perti-rtions but neglected t o mention "the "the approaching battle." EXCept bellicose omission, the t h e broadcast broadcaat version is i s no less b ellicose Btoept for f o r this t h i s omission, address, allowing than the over tthe military network. The address, the message message 'sent sent over he m i l i t a r y network. hi:the passage of of t time and events, events, is is nearly nearly iidentical with Kim's Kim's speech f d r th e passage i m e and d e n t i c a l with on on the t h e Third Anniversary of of the People's People's Army last l a s t year. year.
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CHINA/KOREA. MIG's use u s e unexplained unexplained tactics: tactics: On O n 5 5 February US F-86'i F-86'8 observed 217MIt-15'ss in inthe t h e air, a i r , in i n formations formations of o f 12 1 2 to t o 40 40 aircraft. a i r c r a f t . The The locations o f these these formations formations indioated i n d i o a t s d an an 'origin ' o r i g i n in in Manchuria Manchuria l o a a t i o n s and.headings and headings of o t h e r than t h a n the other the Antung Antung area. area. On On t the h e same same date d a t e US j jet et f fighters ighters a also l s o sighted sighted 50 V:: 60 MIG's MIG's a at Antung arid 30 a at nearby Tatungkou. Tatungkou. (S FEAF FRU Tokyo t b 60 t Antung arid 30 t nearby Tokyo AX 2121, 2121, 7 Feb 52)
Comment: Comment8 Intercepts show show that t h a t nearly n e a r l y 100 100 "allied" " a l l i e d " and and Chinese Chinese MIG's MIG's continue to to and t the FEAF s sighting of continue t o fly t o oombat from Tatungkou and h e FEAF ighting o f 50 tto o 60 UG's a t Antung suggests t hat j et s t r e n g t h tthere h e r e is a lso b e i n g mainMIG's at Antung suggests that jet strngth also being main t tained a i n e d at at t the h e level l e v e l reached in i n late l a t e 1951, 1951, when when 100 MIG's MIG's were were b believed elieved a t each eaoh of of the t h e two two fields. f i e l d s . There is no direct d i r e c t evidence of o f th'e based at the use of bases than the for operations over Korea. Korea. o f jet jet b a s e s other other t h a n in in t h e Antung area area f or o p e r a t i o n s over
15. KOREA. KOFtEA. 156
North Korean VI1 VII Corps will mill continue continue t to o defend i in n Woman Wonsan areat area: h e People's the of the fourth anniversary of tthe founding of of t the-R.7;77s t h e occasion bccasion o f t he f ourth a n n i v e r s a r y df' h e founding
On
North Korean commander felicitated the commander of the t h e 7th 7 t h Division f elicitated t he of his parent the VII, and and a assured him t that "wp a are o f h is p a r e n t corps, corps, t h e VII, s s u r e d him h a t "we r e firmly (SUEDE 501 501 Corn Comm Recon the t h e line l i n e of of defense." defense." (SUEDE Reoon Group Group Korea, Korea, 52) 9 Feb 52)
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North Korean I 1 Corps ssigned t o defend the the The 'North Korean V VII Corps has has been been a assigned to Wonaan-Hamhung area attacks sinoe e early spring of W o n & @ -; a r e a against a g a i n s t UN UN :amphibious mphibioua a t t a c k s since arly s p r i n g of 1951. I t has been f requently s peculated t h a t tthis his c o r p s would It frequently specullted that corps would relieve relieve one of of the t h e front f r o n t line l i n e combat corps; corps; however, h i s message indicates indicates a One however; t this continued d defensive efensive r role ole f for or a at t least on0 one d division i v i s i o n of of the the V VII I 1 Corps. Corps. Comment: S o v i e t adviser a d v i s e r felicitates f e l i c i t a t e s North North Korean Koreari armored armored diVision: d i v i s i o n : Asserting Asserting Soviet t hat t h e "105th "105th (Armored) (Armored) Division's ighting t r a d i t i o n must that the Division's f fighting tradition must be be nurtured," nurtured," o v i e t "technical " t e c h n i c a l adviser a d v i s e r of t h e tank-headquartersa a S Soviet the tank headquarters" on 7 February February concon, gratulated t he d i v i s i o n ' s personnel h e occasion o f t he f o u r t h annivergratulated the division's personnel on t the of the fourth anniversary s a r y of of the the Korean Korean People's People's Army. Army. ( S W E 330 Corn C o Korea, Korea, AIX A n 989, 989, (SUEDE Comm Recon Co 9 Feb 52) 52) ,
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message is is unusual unusual iin T h i s message n tthatmarely h a t r a r e l y do do the t h e Soviet Soviet Commentt This Comment: advia7:7477the Communist they a d v i k m % h e Communist fCrces f o r c e s directly d i r e c t l y address address the t h e units u n i t s to t o which t hey I n this t h i s case, case, apparently a p p a r e n t l y the the senior senior Soviet S o v i e t adviser a d v i s e r on on are assigned. assigned, In armor has' haa addressed a message message.of congratulations commanding o offioer 'of c o n g r a t u l a t i o n s tto o tthe h e commanding ffioer of of the t h e 105th 105th Armored Armored Division. Division.
17.

18.
North Korean Korean regiment regiment forced forced to t o recruit r e c r u i t locally: l o c a l 1 a The North Korean 82nd Regiment, on Kaesong Kaesong guard guard duty, duty, i is at a "disadvantage'with 82ndd'Regirnent, s&vantage" a with its its division d i v i s i o n personnel office o f f i c e presumably owing owing to t o the t h e distance d i s t a n o o separating separating the'two permission t to accept recruits from t h e two units u n i t s -- and has requested permission o a ccept r e c r u i t s from (SUEDE (SUEDE 330 330 Camm Comm Recon Recon Co CO Kaeliong according t toan Kaesotlg ccity, i t y , according o an 8 8 February February message. message. Korea, ALT 991, 991, 8 8 Feb 52) 52) Korea, . . plight with of the t h e 82nd 82nd Regiment, Regiment, w i t h its i t s parent p a r e n t unit unit l i g h t of Comentr The p Comment: Problems relating to relating t o communications, communicatione, across t h e peninsula, peninsula, is i s obvious. obvious. Problems across the logistics, personnel, and c chain have been been p previously noted iin l o g i s t i c s , personnel, h a i n of command have r e v i o u s l y noted n t h i e regiment's regiment's messages. messages, this
--
An officer o f f i c e r at at North Koreans Koreans continue continue to t o produce produce dry d r y cell c e l l batteries: b a t t e r i e s : An the t h e North g o r t h Korean Korean Communications Communications Supply Supply 'Headquarters Headquarters advised an a n unknown unknown station s t a t i o n on 9 February that t h a t over 700,000 dry d r y cell c e l l batteries b a t t e r i e s were to t o be be factory to a c t o r y was t o produce almost the t h e entire entire produaed produced in i n February 1952. 1952. One f output. ,(SUEDE output. (SUEDE 330 330 Comm Recon Recon Co Korea, Korea, ALT ALT 016, 016, 9 9 Feb Feb 52) 52)
of all Comment: a l l types types of o f cotmunioations oommunioations equipment, equipment, partipartiComMent: Shortages of cularly batteries for p portable has been been evidenced evidenced for for a a odar-eries o r t a b l e ttransmitters, r a n s m i t t e r s , has It is probable t that long time t i s probable h a t the faotory faotory t i m e in i n Communitt Communist messages. messages. I scheduled to of t this material is looated looated i in Manchuria and and t o preduce produce the t h e bulk of his m a t e r i a l is n Manchuria t h a t the others, that o t h e r s , with w i t h infinitely i n f i n i t e l y smaller smaller quotas, quotas, are a r e in i n Korea. Korea.
.
9 9
12 1 2 Feb 52
-TOP. SECRET SUEDE
....
HR70-14
15. Communists again demonstrate considerable KOREA. Communists again demonstrate considerablelogistical l o g i s t i c a lability: ability8 W. EOM. Provisions "to until of April" a are 1C5ro';iireions "to last Last u n t i l the middle of r e reported reported by an Unidentified Chinese Communist artillery unidentified a r t i l l e r y regimental oommsnder o o d e r on a i n and February. -This food stockpile stockpile included included 234 000 pounds-of pounds-of grain and 3 February. -This food 16,665 pounds of 16,666 o f other foodstuffs. foodstuffs. (SUEDE ( S U E D E a 5543, 4 3 , 3 Feb 52) 52cj'
Comment: Although the to the line t h e proximity proximity of of this regiment t o t h e front f r o n t lime is unknown, the accumulation of over a two-month two-month food supply by by a i s unknown, aocumulation of regimental-size considerable degree of of Communist regimental-size unit demonstrates a oonsiderable logistical l o g i s t i o a l success. suocess. This level in l e v e l of of supply supply is i s somewhat somewha% unusual i n any oombat unit other than one role. one engaged engaged in in a a statio s t a t i o rear r e a r area defensive role.
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TOP SECRET
SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
1.
Possible jet medium bombers in the Soviet Zone of Germany: The US Military Liaison Mission in Germany reports the sighting of two four-engine jet aircraft taking off from Werneuchen airfield on 24 January. Observation was made at a distance of two kilometers and the aircraft were not seen following disappearance into the overcast. The aircraft resembled Type 10 medium bombers, with certain differences in the size and placement of the engines and several other structural characteristics. (TS USAFE WEEKA # 6, 8 Feb 52)
Comment: The aircraft observed,at Werneuchen, if correctly described as a four-engine jet aircraft, was probably a redesigned Type 10 or a newly designed jet-bomber. Although a small number of these prototypes were probably built, reports indicate the aircraft was unsuccessful.
USSR.
No evidence is available on jet medium: bomber production in the USSR. However, although the USSR's..known medium bomber building effort is confined to TU-4 construction, building of Type 10's or other jet medium bombers may be in process at facilities known to exist.
The Werneuchen airfield is one of five recently-completed long-runway airfields in East Germany, and is one of the fields around which high board fences are now being built.
2.
YUGOSLAVIA. Greece and Turkey favor military collaboration with Yugoslavia: Greek and Turkish officials have agreed upon the desirability of asking the Yugoslays to enter into secret military staff discussions regarding military coordination in the event of a Soviet attack, according to United States Ambassador McGhee. The Turkish Foreign Minister expressed the belief that an agreement to hold such discussions might develop within the next two or three months, and asked Ambassador McGhee whether the United States would be able to facilitate these talks. (S SiS Ankara 741, 10 Feb 52)
Comment: Although Greece, Turkey, and YUgoslavia have acknowledged the advantages inherent in regional defense arrangements, no formal proposals suggesting staff talks have been extended by either Greece or lUrkey to Yugoslavia.
There is no evidence that Yugoslavia intends to abandon its policy of nonadherence to regional defense schemes in the absence of clear signs of Soviet aggression.

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3.
SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
25X1X
Sukarno hopes to preserve present cabinet: 1President Sukarno will try to obtain a new "gentlemen's agreement" between Prime Minister Sukiman and National Party chairman Sidik as a means of strengthening the cabinet. 25X1X stated that in addition to the strain imposed by the tension betueen the Masjumi and National parties, the Socialist Party is waging an all-out campaign against the'Sukiman government. The Socialists are trying to split the liberal faction of the &hsjumi away from the remainder of the party. (C S/S Djakarta 1155, 9 Feb 52)
INDONESIA.
Act.
In addition to increasing intra -cabinet tension, the agreement to accept US aid has brought the government under severe criticism for departing from Indonesia's "independent" foreign policy. One non-leftist parliamentary faction has demanded the Foreign Minister's resignation.

TOP SECRET
2
Comment: The chronic instability of the present coalition cabinet derives chiennircm the lack of cooperation between its two strongest components-the National and Masjumi parties. Nithin the past two weeks this situation has been increasingly strained by press speculation that the Prime Minister and Foreign Minister (both Masjumi members) have agreed, without the knowledge of the cabinet, to accept American aid within the terms of the Mutual Security
13 Feb 52
TOP SECRET
Ir tihICLASSIO6Ifka-V1451'FaCkiifORISRatia4VI5iggciPliArfflalgil-IAMPAPPMPerlield
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SECRET
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SECRET
SECTION 1.(S0VIET)
1.
USSR/INDUESIA.
Arrival of TASS correspondent embarrasses Indonesian Government: TASS correspondent Vassili Usachev's arrival in Indonesia without prior knowledge of the Indonesian Government has embarrassed the government, according to Foreign Minister Subardjo. He said the government is considering whether Usachev's authority to remain can be terminated technically.
Usachev is the first TASS correspondent in Indonesia since Georgi Afrin was expelled from Djakarta by the Netherlands East Indies Govern ment in 1948 for prejudiced and provocative reporting. Although there have been rumors that.Afrin night return as a diplomatic representative, it is doubtful that he would be acceptable to the Indonesian Government because of his suspected involvement in intelligence activities. (C Djakarta 1164, 11 Feb 52)
2.
ALBANIA. Albanian exile explains Yugoslav influence in Albanian'resis tence activity: heti Spahiu, one of the chief organizers of Tito's
underground inside Albania, is reported to have stated that it is im possible to conduct largescale resistance activities in Albania today. Spahiu described the resistance forces presently active in Albania as consisting of small armed bands of 10 to 20 men each who roam the country side and occasionally assassinate an unpopular Communist official. The men under Spahiu's supervision have been instructed to avoid unneccessary terrorism, since police reprisals against resistance have been extremely
severe.
I
25X1A
Comment: Yugoslav activities and forays into Albania have been con ducted-over the past year mainly for the purposes of organizing a re sistance core among the population and encouraging Albanians to take refuge in Yugoslavia. At the same time, Yugoslav intelligence personnel are attempting to win the support of rightist Albanian exile elements
in Italy.

SECRET
1
The Foreign Minister denied a press report that his government ex pects to appoint an ambassador to Moscow and stated that Indonesia de sires no exchange of diplomatic representatives with the Soviets. Flow ever, it is possible that Usachev has been sent to try to pave the way for diplomatic representation.
13 Feb 52
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RUMANIA.- NuMber of collective farms increases slowly: The American Le gation in Bucharest reports.that as.of-li.January.1952 there were 1,089 collective farms in Rumania, an increase of only six since last September. Only 80 collective farms were set up in 1951, compared with over 900 in
1950.
The advantages of collective farming are continually propagandized in the press; and it is claimed that tens.of thousands of peasants are ask ing to join the collective farms, particularly after they see the distri bution of earnings among members of existing collectives. The Legation concludes that these claims are untrue and that, on the contrary, the Rumanian peasantry is showing strong resistance toward being forced onto collective farms. (C Bucharest 249, 11 Jan 52)
Comment: Rumania and the other Satellites have been emphasizing the need fa..persuade the peasants voluntarily to join and remain in agricul tural cooperatives, but there has been no largescale collectivization drive during the current winter season.

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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1.
GREECE. Panagos reiterates to King conditional offer of collaboration: At a secret meeting on 6 February, Marshal Papagos repeated to the King an offer to collaborate with the Liberals in new elections or consider a Rally-Liberal coalition without elections if Venizelos showed good faith in'heading a on-se/party transitional government supported by the Rally. Papagos had previously made this offer to Liberal Party leader Venizelos. The King reportedly was pleased by the convetsation but did not commit himself on the proposal. (S Athens 3649, 8 Feb 52) Comment: The conditions previously set forth by Papagos as a price for collaboration with the Liberals make it unlikely that agreement will be reached between the two parties without considerable urging from the United States. Both the King and Venizelos are opposed to elections under the majority system which Papagos insists on, and neither is apt to give in to Papagos' demand for removal of certain high-ranking military officers.
EGYPT. Wstence of Egyptian Cabinet &rands nn anlutinn tn Analn-Egyptipn dispute:

j
25X1X
J believes that,the government of Prime Minister Ali Maher will not last long unless progress is made toward solution of the Anglo-Egyptian dispute. He insists that discussions regarding the proposed Middle East Command will be in vain if Great Britain fails to recognize Farouk as King of the Sudan.
According to the American Ambassador in Cairo, recognizes social refort as the only adequate weapon against the spread of Communism in Egypt, he believes that reform in Egypt will not be possible until a solution of the Anglo-Egyptien problem is found.
25X1X
3. MIA
Comment: In London's suggestions to its Ambassador in Cairo regarding points to be discussed between Britain and Egypt there is no indication that Britain is prepared to recognize the title recently assumed by King Farouk.
elections: Socialist leader Jai Prakash Narain_stated in an 8 December 1951 campaign speech in Madras that he was certain Prime Minister Nehru had little support in his Congress Party organization. Narain said that Congressmen "bowed before him (Nehru) a few months ago and agreed to throw out Mr. Tendon (then president of the party) because they realized that there was hone else to campaign for them. After the elections, they will showNr. Nehru his plaCe in the Congress organization." (U Madras Desp .790, 11 Dec 51)

25X1X
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Comment: Prior to the beginning of the national election campaigns in India, a rightist majority within the Congress Party comMand'seemed t6. be'steadily gaining ground at the expense Of the Prime Minister. In'early September 1951, Nehru was able to-force a showdown with the rightists, who yielded to his will presumably because they recognized the necessity of retaining him as the outstanding party Symbol and vote-getter. Sinee September, the Congress rightists, who represent many of the largest business and financial interests in the country, have maintained almost complete silence. Now that the elections are over and the Congress Party is in control of the national government for the next five years, the rightists may be expected to reassert themselves.
25X1X
4
Cabinet members will consult further with their respective parties and reconsider the matter later in the week. There has been no mention of Foreign Minister Subardjo's resignation. (C Djakarta 1175, 12 Feb 52)
Comment: Foreign Minister Subardjo has been accused of departing from Indonesia's "independent" foreign policy by agreeing to accept US aid within the terms of the Mutual Security Act. t.His having done this with only the Prime Minister's consent and without the knowledge of the cabinet caused further serious dissension.
As the cabinet ministers realize, a probable subsequent government would not only follow the same general policies as tne Sukiman cabinet but would be even less stable.
5.
THAILAND. King le Thailand threatens abdication: The King of Thailand reportedly is threatening abdication in protest against the usurpation of his powers by the military clique which controls the government. The Chief of the Thai Air Force, according to another source, stated that Thailand would become a republic if the King did 1 accept the 1932 Constitution as amended.
25X1A
Comments Other reports indicate that the King is using the threat of abdication as a weapon in his controversy with government leaders over his constitutional powers and probably has no real intent of stepping down. Although veneration of the monarchy is widespread in Thailand, no effectively
SECRET
INDONESIA. Tendency oward moderation noted in current enbi net crisiip: Ambassador Cochran's I 'informed him that in a lengthy cabinet discussion on 12 February about MSA negotiations the ministers realized that if they precipitated the government s fall on this issue, the succeeding cabinet would follow the same policy as the Sukiman government. Consequently they tended toward moderation because no one wanted to precipitate a government collapse.
13 Feb 52
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organized farce has yet come forward to support the King in his struggle with the military,leaders.
6.
INDOCHINA. Vietjamese Government reoortedlv bankrupt: Vietnamese Premier Huu, at a cabinet meeting in Saigon on 7 February, announced the bankruptcy of his government and its consequent inability to meet civil and military expenses for March 1952, I
125X1X
25X1A
25X1A
Comment: Despite the urging of French and American officials, the Vietnamese Government has never prepared a budget, and accurate assessment of its fiscal status is therefore impossible.
Since its creation the Vietnamese Government has been obliged to resort to deficit financing which has been covered regularly by advances from the French Treasury. However, Bao Dai said on 28 January that the French had not promised to meet expected deficits in 1952 arising from military expenditures and had been threatening to cease other financial aid.
7.
Chief of US Military Mission reviews Tonkia military situation: The Chief of the US Military Mission in Indochina, General Brink, who has just returned from Hanoi, estimates that the "strictly military" situation in Tonkin is not as alarming as has been pictured by some observers. He states, however, that the political situation and the loyalty of the population are uncertain and that this could well neutralize the military effort. General Brink believes that the Tonkin delta can be defended, albeit with some difficulty. On the other hand, he sees a growing threat to the main communication line between Hanoi and Haiphong. In addition, French troop strength is inadequate to meet any new Viet Minh attacks on the defense perimeter and simultaneously to prevent infiltration of the delta. (S USMA Saigon MG 3179, 8 Feb 52)
25X1X
8.

SECRET
First large vessels in two years visit Shanghai: ithe Soviet tanker Sovetskaya Heft (8,228 GT) and Batumi (6,236 GT3 were docked at Shanghai on 22 January; both had left by 25 January. The Polish freighter Kosciuzko arrived loaded on 25 January. (S ASTALUSNA Hong Kong, 0605Z, 5 Feb 52)
Commenta The first ocean-going vessel to call at Shanghai since 1949 was the Polish tanker Karpaty which, according to Lloyd's Shipping Index, was at Shanghai from 15 to 21 December 51. Port authorities must have done considerable dredging in recent months to enable these vessels to negotiate the channel, which was reportedly badly silted a year ago.
CHINA.
25Y1x
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9.
KOREA.
ROK Minister declares Preparations completed for the return of
11-sgonefla: Minister of Home :Affairs "Montana" Chang, in

his first press conference, stated that his ministry has completed every necessary preparation for the return ,of the ROK Government to Seoul. Stating that the government may return at "any time," the Minister emphasized, however, that the decision will be made by PresidentSyngman Rhee. (U FBIS, 11 Feb 52)
Comment: On 28 January President Rhee, in his in Seoul since its second recapture, stated that he capital to Seoul within One month. However, severe and housing in Seoul make the return of the capital difficult and unwise task.
first public appearance hoped to return the shortages of food, fuel to that city a
10.
Four-vear defense build-up for Japan cited: Jiji news agency announced on 11 February that the Japanese Government has completed a four-year plan for building up the country's defense force to 260,000 by 1955. The proposal is reportedly based on the assumption that the gradual withdrawal of US land forces from Japan will be completed within five years. Japan, however, will request that the US Air Force and Navy remain there for at least ten years because the Japanese are planning only a fleet of small ships centering around destroyers. Under the present plan, the National Police Reserve will be changed to peace preservation corps and increased from 75,000 to 110,000 in 1952. The corps is to be strengthened annually by 50,000 for the three subsequent years Until it reaches the 260,000 goal in 1955. (U FBIS, 11 Feb 52)
Comment: The preamble of the US-Japan security treaty stateS that the US expects Japan to assume increasing responsibility for the defense of its homeland..
JAPAN.
11.
Preparations completed for official siRning of Japan-India peace The governmentsof Japan and India have completed drafts of the peace treaty to be concluded between both nations. A conference for the official signing will be held in the near future -- possibly late next week. The separate treaty, which will take effect simultaneously with the coming into force of the San Francisco pact, will be officially initialled by the Japanese Foreign Affairs Minister and the Chief of the Indian Liaison Mission in Japan. ( R FBIS, 11 Feb 52)
treaty:

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SECTION 3
(WESTERN)
1.
Comment:. The tactics of agitating for resistance and merely urging unifinTririnstead of taking concrete action toward this end can have little succees in forestalling West German defense preparations. In their increasingly desperate attempts to delay defense measures, the Communists may have to make a much greater concession in the unity campaign, perhaps by admitting an elections investigating committee to the Soviet Zone.
2.
FRANCE. French insist lapse of trade liberalization program is tempor, The Miniser of Finance has informed US officials that France has decide. upon a total suspension of trade liberalization measures in preference to a partial reimposition of import quotas in order to place the "heaviest possible emphasie" on the temporary character of the action being taken. Furthermore, French officials believe that they are thereby making it more difficult for protectionist interests later to resist a gradual relaxation of the restrictions now being imposed. France's "particularly heavy" deficit in the EPU for the week ending 1 February probably speeded the government's decision. (S Paris TOMS 125, 5 Feb 52)
:
Comment: The net French deficit, which first appeared last October, had reached 203.7 million dollars by 5 January. The UK also declared that its restoration of quotas, last November, was a temporary measure; but neither Britain nor France is likely to be in a position to reverse its action in the near future. Although the entire Western European trade liberalization program is not immediately threatened, retaliation against specific French exports by some nations is to be expected.
3.
AUSTRIA.
Firare: Recent violations of agreements with the US on the use of counterpart funds, suggesting that Austrian officials are unduly influenced by SECRET
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EAST GERMANY. Propaganda encourages West German resistance to rearmament: Under the direction of the German-Soviet Friendship League, almost 7,500 East German correspondence groups are preparing propaganda letters to West Germans which accent German unitrand introduce a new theme of "genuine German patriotism." Current press and radio propaganda is inciting "allGerman patriots" to resist conscription and prevent industrial preparations for war by labor resistance. Strike propaganda is being directed toward the West Germans through press and radio, with the ultimate objective of promoting a feeling of rebellion against remilitarization by the Western powers; at the same time, West Germans of all parties are being exhorted to unite against the Adenauer government and join the East Germans in the interests of peace P Berlin 981, 31 Jan 52) 25X1A
Political interests complicate administration of foreign as-
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partisan considerations, have brought warninge of NSA retaliatory action. Last month-the MSA mission in Vienna informed the then Minister of Agriculture Kraus that breadgrain delivery premiums, financed with counterpart funds, should be terminated as scheduled on 31 January. The Minister agreed to this, but subsequently introduced in the economic directorate a proposal to extend the program. He obtained Socialist approval by implying that the DS desired the extension. Placed in a dilemma by Kraus' action, the Austrian GovernMent has now urged the US to approve a further limited use of counter part'funds,since further grain deliveries might thus be induced, and discontinuation of the premiums would embarrass the government -- particularly that part of it dependent upon farm support. Similarly, the Austrian Government has continued indirectly to finance subsidies with counterpart funds contrary to agreements that such expenditures must appear in the regular budget. By charging buyers less than the value of MSA imports and making up the difference with "phantom counterpart deposits," the government has tontinued its subsidy programs while concealing the size of the public debt. MSA officials, believing that it is time to crack down on this practice, have demanded a refinancing of the memorandum account with treasury bills, and have threatened to withhold any further counterpart releases until the government complies with its commitments. (Factual data from: C Vienna NIETO 82, 2 Feb 52; G Vienna TOMUS 102, 2 Feb 52; S Vienna NIETO 89, 7 Feb 52)
4.
BELGIUM. Government retaliates for Czech ouster of Belgian Attache: Belgium has declared the Czech Military Attache in Brussels persona non grata in retaliation for Czechoslovakia's expulsion of the Belgian Military Attache in Prague. The Czech official's espionage activities had been known to both Belgium and the Netherlands for two years; his expulsion had been postponed in the hope that he would defect and provide useful information. The US Embassy in Brussels states that although the delay in the Belgian reprisal may haire impaired the effectiveness of this step in the eyes of Czechoslovakia, the development of the case has been well received by the public. (C Prague 591, 4 Feb 52; S Brussels 1131, 7 Feb 52)
5.
Communists protest government's "austerity" cuts in campaign to reduce production: Several Communist-dominated local trade union branches are urging their members to abandon overtime work as a protest against the Conservative Governmentls reduction of health service benefits. The executive of the Scottish coal miners union and one coal mining.district in South Wales are supporting the move. (R London Joint Weeka 6, 8 Feb 52)
Comment: The Belgian Military Attache was expelled from Czechoslovakia in ear y January following charges of espionage activities.,(see (YCI Daily Digest, 17 Jan 52).
thaTED KINGDOM.

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Commeht: In view of the trade union movement's increasing alertness to CoERTIEFE tactics, this new Communist effort has little chance of succeeding except in isolated instances. Even slight success, however, might have appreciable effects on coal production, since last year's increase was achieved in large part by overtime work.
6.
7.
LATIN AMERICA. Moscow Economic Conference fails to engender enthusiasm: Despite current reports from the Communist press and radio that Latin American "businessmen, industrialists, merchants, and workers" are exhibiting a "lively interest" in the approaching Moscow-Economic Conference, there is no evidence that such enthusiasm has been engendered. Prominent non-Communist business and professional men who have been invited have shown little or no interest and have ignored or refused the invitation. Although in Gctober 1951 three Latin Americans were named on the Initiating Committee for the conference, Latin American Communist groups have apparently been poorly informed concerning the conference; they have shown uneven enthusiasm and a general lack of interest. Undoubtedly, a number of prominent Latin American Communists and fellow travelers will attend, but they will probably be publicists affiliated with pro-Communist newspapers or favored members of the various national pro-peace committees, which have acted as organizing ageits for the conference. Although Latin American labor will probably send some delegates, there has to date been little evidence of interest within the CTAL or non-Communist labor groups.
'
8.
Available information suggests that the conference will probably acoompliSh little or nothing taffard furthering Latin American economic relations mith the Soviet Orbit. (Factual data from: R FBIS TABS-Montevideo, 2 Feb 52; C Copenhagen D-390, 30 Oct 51; U El Nacional, Caracas, 13 Sep 51, etc.)
NORWAY. Government desires early German participation in Western defense: NEF7/75Fwill vote for full West German membership in NATO if there is no other way to securelGermany's participation in Western defense. The government prefers, however, that Germany first become a member of the EDG, particularly since the Norwegian Foreign Office maintains that public opinion in formerly occupied countries is not yet prepared for Germany's full membership in NATO. NorWay wants every effort to be made to conclude an EDC agreement, including pressure on France. (S Oslo 703, 8 Feb 52)
25X1
BOLIVIA. Large delegation attends Argentine-sponsored labor conferences Twelve Bolivian labor leaders, including several ardent supporters of the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement and one known Communist, mere scheduled to attend the River Plate labor conference in Asuncion 9-17 February (see XI Daily Digest, 8 Feb 52). Their expenses are being paid by the
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Argentine General Confederation of Labor, which is sponsoring the meeting.
25X1A
Comment:, Argentine influence among Bolivian labor leaders has incre-ilrETPreciably during the past year. The extent to which Argentina is subsidizing delegates from countries other than Bolivia has not been
indicated.
9.
Comment: President Arbenz has spent at least 20,000 dollars for advertising in the Journal of Commerce since last July. It is doubtful that this expenditure can go far to counteract the present unfavorable political and economic climate for foreign investors in Guatemala.
10.
Government seizes United Fruit Company holdings: The Labor Court of the Department of Escuintla has served an order of attachment on the United Fruit Company's Pacific coast properties. The attachment is effective immediately, but the company has until 14 February to appeal the order. The seizure came after the company had failed to comply with the decisions of Guatemalan courts ordering it to pay 645,000 dollars in back wages to the 3,746 workers it suspended last September and to resume immediately its operations on the Pacific coast. (R Guatemala City 255, 11 Feb 52)
Comment: The suspension of the workers last September came after a devastating storm on the Pacific coast banana plantations. Before rehabilitating the plantations the company wants assurances from the government that company costs uill not rise substantially. The company reportedly intends to liquidate its holdings in Guatemala if these assurances are not forthcoming.
A company decision to leave Guatemala would be a severe blow to the country's economy. Strong nationalist feeling seems to blind present Guatemalan leaders to the repercussions such an event would have.
11.
HAITI.
arfongshoremen is demanding substantial wage increases and improved

SECRET
10 13 Feb 52

Labor unrest resurges:
GUATEMALA. Cabinet Ministers invite US investmenta: The Minister of Economy and Labor and the recent AMbassador to Washington, now Minister of ComMunications, stress that US investments in Guatemala are "more than welcome" and inVite inquiries on the subject from potential investors. They say favorable concessions, including various tax exemptions, can be arranged. They point particularly to undeveloped mineral resources such as iron, zinc, lead, and chromite; hydroelectric power investment possibilities; lumber resources; and reported petroleum deposits. (U Journal of Commerce, 7 Feb 52)
The Union of Workers of the Shipping Agents
Approved For Rase 2002105/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A4/00310001-1

SECRET
working conditions from the Haitian Wharf Co., an affiliate of the HaytianAMeriaan Sugar Co. and the Association of Shipping Agents. The latter two have refused the demands which ultimately mill probably have to be referred to the Department of Labor -with a request for arbitration. So far the government had indicated no desire to back the demands. (D Port-au-Prince 346, 27 Dec 51)
Comment: The principal cause for the present wage agitation is the failuTni-general wage levels to parallel the rapidly rising cost of living. This is the first indication of labor unrest since December 1950 when labor disturbances, reportedly encouraged and supported by the Workers Peasant Movement and the Communist Party, resulted in the dissolution of those two organizations. Since then labor has remained poorly organized, has had little influence, and has been controlled largely by the government. The present dispute mill probably end with the granting of a small mage increase and perhaps some.additional minor benefits.

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HR70-14
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CommeA C m e A
geneigT7-ETES to g e n e r nt o
Pei i ain claims Sino-Soviet allianoe prevente revents ex ansion of pelping f L ga i n olaima expansion of Korean confliots Korean confliots An A n anonymous hnonymoue oommen oonunentator ator over over the Peiping e p ng raaio ra 0 asserted'. asserted hat "the "the $ino-BOviet SinomSoviet alliance allianoe has has forged forqed the the Ameriean Amerioan imoerialists im e r i a l i s t s to to that think'tylue'before the war war of of aggression. aggression...." = . ' think % d o e bef ore 'enlarging enlarging the
Peiping frequently refers tto o t he S ino-SAt a l l i a i o e in in the Sino-Soviet alliance like Sino-Boviet inparkioular, partioular, as as aa bulwark bulwark'against the Sino-Soviet t rtreaty eaty i n against US "aggression" "aggression" in in Asia. Asia. Kowever, n l a t e January However, PeipiagDs Peiping's propaganda propaganda ithiate.January for for the t h e first f i r s t time time explicitly e x p l i c i t l y credited oredited the.Sino-Soviet t,he Sine-Suviet .treaty treaty with with.preVentpreventThis latest .iw, ,an ekparisfonof of'the t h eKorean Korean oonflSotto t othe'China the'China mainlande Thie latest ingan e*pansion Oonfliot mainland.; braadoast'is another implied implied warning that t h a t the the USSR USSR is ' i s committed oonanitted to t o China's' China's' broadcast is another defense under Sino-Soviet treaty. treaty. .defense under the the terns terms of of the Sino-Soviet
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9. 9.
Mi743711 m1-4F,70:17 messagq
Kbrean
KOREA. KOREA.
North Korean VIII VI11 Corps possibly still s t i l l in i n existence: existenoe: North ". . . aoknowledged acknowledged that states: s t a t e s ; 'I. that (the ( t h e units u n i t s undet.the under the command command ofour?) d o u r ? ) '8th 8 t h Corp's Corps have been (arranged?). (arranged?). . (SUEDE DCM-2661, 8 (SUEDE DCM-2661, 8 Feb 52) 52)
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.." . e"
the fragnentarynature nature of of this t h i s message message precludes precludes a a Comment: fragmentary Uomentr 1i1e the thi s ithe ioundc7Onion,this is s t hfirst e f i r srecent t recentindication i n d i c n t i o n of of the t h e continued continued a oundxsion, existence of of the t h e North North Korean KoreanVIII V I 1 1corps. Corps. This This'command command lost lost its Its units u n i t sby by, by transfers to Combat corps o or,tothe VIICorps during early deactivation or o r by combat corpe r 4 o the V I 1 Corps auring spring, 1951. Unconfirmed s p r i n g , 1951, Unoonfinned collateral o o l l a t e r a l reports r e p o r t s have have stated s t a t e d that t h a t the t h e vili V l l i Corps WAS training m s enroute to t o or o r in i n Manchuria Manohuria organizing and end t r a i n i n g new North Korean units. units.
10. 1 0 .
wile

11. 1 1 .
Unu8ual activity a c t i v i t y in i n Wonsan Wonsan area a r e a seens seen: Unusually detailed Unusual d e t a i l e d reporting reporting of UN UN naval naval activity a o t i v i t v in i n the t h e vicinity v i a i n i t v of UN-held islands islands in of i n the t h e Wonsan Wonsan a-10 nidentified r ailroad a r e a was area was given in a 10 February meaeage message from an u unidentified railroad s eourity b a t t a l i o n to t o its security battalion i t s parent parent regiment, regiment, the t h e 7th. 7th. Another unidentified u n i d e n t i f i e d battalion b a t t a l i o n farther f a r t h e r north in in t h e Hamhung area area the reported on 10 10 February t he r e c e i p t of o f 100 "ships" "ships" with another 50 s till reported'on the receipt with another still expected. expeoted. (SUEDE Det 1 151 15th Korea, CS (SUEDE Det 61 1 5 t h RSM Korea, GS 072, 11 11 Feb; Feb; 501st 501st Comm Corn Reaon Korea, SK-6-258, 12 1 2 Feb 52) 62) Reoon Group Korea,
Comment: I t may h a t tthis his d etailed r e p x t i n g and tthe he It may be aperxlated speoulated t that detailed reporting m e n t iof m the h e reoeipt r e c e i p t of of "ships" "ships" possibly possibly indicates indicates a a future f u t u r e Communist Communiat Mantion attempt to t o oapture oapture UN-held UN-held islands i s l a n d s in i n Wonsan Wonaan bay. bay. During six During the t h e past p a s t six months only only one one successful successful enemy enemy landing landing has has been been made on on these these islands, islands, months although several s e v e r a l small altheugh smallattackahave attacks have been been made. made.
Korean arikaircraft a n t i a i r c r a f t protects proteote unknown i n s t a l l a t i o n e north of North Kbrean installations of HaMhung: Hamhungr- TAO Two North Korean Roreah plain p l a i n language messages n d i c a t e the deploymessages i indicate deployment -of of antiaircraft a n t i a i r c r a f t guns, mns, possibly subordinate t to o t the h e North Korean 21st A M Regiment, Regiment, to t o protect p r o t e c t certain o e r t a i n unidentified u n i d e n t i f i e d installations i n s t a l l a t i o n s north of of AAA HaMhung. (SUEDE 501st Oomm 1 Feb; Comm Reoon Recon Group Korea, Korea, SK-0-313, SK-G-313, 1 11 Feb; 330th 330th Hamhung* (SUEDE
corn 11 Feb Fab 52) Comm Recon Recon Co Co Korea, Korea, AD-110, AM-110, 11
Commentt Comment: The The deployment deployment of of antiaircraft a n t i a i r c r a f t guns gun8 north n o r t h of of Hamhung, Hamhung, along menemata ernate supply r o u t efrom fromManchuria, Manchurh, may may indicate i n d i c a t e proteotion proteotion of of 'along an supply route l i n e s of o f communications communioations or o r supply supply dumpa. dumps.. lines
,
I M l e no 21st 2lst antiaircraft a n t i a i r o r a f t artillery a r t i l l e r y regiment is i s identified I d e n t i f i e d in in While a t t l e , the t h e 19th, 19th, 20th, Z O t h , and 23rd Independent AAA North Korean order of b battle, Regiments Regiments have have been been aocepted. accepted.
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14 Feb 62
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HR70-14 HR70-14
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Air activity a c t i v i t y notod t Antung n first n t e r c e p t since Air notod a at Antunl iin first iintercept since Decemberr Decembers A A Chinese Communist Communist air air message message from f r o m Antung Antung to to MUkden Mukden on on 13 13 February February Chinese r e p o r t e d that t h a t 18 16 "allied" " a l l i e d " NIG-16's KLdIa-16'~ left lef't Antune; for combat oombfit in in Korea. Korea, reported Antung for (SUEDE 6920 6920 Security Security Group Group Johnson Johnson Ald AB Japan, 3 Feb 2) (SUEDE Japan, SG SG 319, 319, 1 13 Feb 5 52)
16 Feb 62
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Comments. The disappearance disappearance on 25 Dec Deo 1 1961 of radio whioh which 961 o f tthe h e radio Cornenti reported tactical a air activity repor-tioal ir a c t i v i t y in i n southern Manchuria sharply sharply reduced reduoed US US of t h e two fields fields knowledge of aotivity. FEAF observation of the knowledge of Buell suoh a o t i v i t y . Recent FE4F f MIG's oontinue to to that large numbers o of MIG's continue hat l a r c e nwnbera near Antung has hb8 confirmed t operate although tthis message i is first communications h i s messap a tthe he f i r a t communicRtions o p e r a t e from from thorn, t h 3 m , although intelligence reference this Sntell.igence t h i s year yenr to t o MIG M I G flights f l i g h t s from from Antung. Antung.
10.
KOREA.. &-South Ex-South Korean prisoners with Communist army segregatedr segregateds KORFA. p r i s o n e r s serving w i t h Communist 177711deTErfred E i d e m e d North liorth Korean Korean security a e c u r i t s officer o f f i c e r on on 11-tebruary 1 1 Februarv ordered ordared complete h i s t o r i e s on "the "the l iberated"e n l l s t e d men histories liberated enlisted men who who have have been been assembled assembled from every division." division." The ex-prisoners o be n "particuex-prisoners wore were tto be assembled assembled i in "particul a r secrecy" seorecy" and a a report repo,rt submitted submitted by by 15 15 February. February. (SUEDE lar (SUEDE 330th Corn Comm Recon Co Koroa, Korea, ALT-132, ALT-132, 13 Feb 52) Reaon
11. 110

+
...
6 6
" l i b e r a t e d " soldiers s o l d i e r s is applied applied by by the the Communists Communist8 Comments Comment; The term term "liberated" t o captured oa-South n t o Communist; to South Korean troops treops who who have have been impressed impressed i into Communist forces. Foraes. The Communists a i l e d tto o l i s t tthis h i s category o f p r i s o n e r s iin n tthe he Communists f failed list of prisoners list t u r n e d over during during negotiations n o e o t i a t i o n s at a t Panmunjom. Panmunjom. The list turned Tho seoret s e o r e t assembling of t these of h e s e prisoners p r i s o n e r s suggests suggests that t h a t the t h e Communists nay i l l i n ( ; to t o negonegomaY be w willing t i a t e further f u r t h e r on on the the question q u e s t i o n of of their t h e i r repatriation. repatriation. tiate plans to t o utilize u t i l i z e close c l o s e support su o r t aircraft a i r c r a f t suggesteds suggested1 P ossible Communist plans Possible enemy planes or close a i r support n d i c a t e d by planes f for.olose air support o CI eround tround troops troops mre mere iindicated by a a 13 February February Chinese Chinese Communist Communist voice voice transmission. transmission. The t 13 e x t revealed revealed that that text t h e unidentified u n i d e n t i f i e d sender hRd s t u d i e d "the "the plan o f r epulsing l i t t l e wolves" the had studied of repulsing little wolves" and had oonoluded conoludod that t h a t since s i n c e the the "ground "ground of o f the t h e front f r o n t area area I is is really r e a l l y unsuited unsuited 'for f o r combat t h e maximum 400 plane plan is wrong . . the (and) r e requirnd o have more that than 700 700 planes planes for f o r that t h a t purpoSe." p~rpoae.~' (and) 80 we a are requirad t to (SlJEDE 112, 14 1 4 Feb 52) 52) (SUEDE AFSA-251, AFSA-251, CS 112,
. .
..
Comments Comment; There is a f urther p o s s i b i l i t y tthat h n t tthis h i s message s from further possibility message i is from a C h i m mCommunist m u n i s t tactical t a c t i c a l unit u n i t using using the t h e term term "planes" "planes" as as a a oover oover name, name a Chinese for f o r troops. troops. It I t is i s improbable that t h a t a message o f t h i s importance would of this would be be
s e n t by V O i O Q transmission n view of sent:bY voice transmission i in of Chinese Chinese Communist ComMunist awareness awareness of of UN UN interception. interoeption.
12 12
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US US mission mission concerned concerned over over South South Korean Koreananti-cease anti-cease fire fire campaign: campaign:
I
first time time that that Comment: This is the first Muccio Muccio has has expressed expressed any suspicion that Rhee might refuse to to accept the outcome outcome of Preside$ Rhee's public public of the the truce truce talks. Presideuit statements that he he could could not not accept an armistice armisticeand andthat that South South statements that should ignore ignore the the negotiations negotiations and and fight on "to lrto the Korean troops should against the PanYalu" presage presage a more extreme line in this crusade against Panmunjom talks. munjom talks.
0
4. Ex-South serving with wtth Communist Communist army segregated: Ex-South Korean Korean soldiers soldiers serving
US US Army Army Korea 13 Feb Feb 52 52 SUEDE SUEDE
division." division." The The ex-prisoners ex-pr tsoners were were to to be assembled in "particular secrecy" and a report reportsubmitted submitted by by 15 15 February. and a
The term term "liberated" "liberated" soldiers Comment: The . is applied by is by the Communists Communists to to captured capturedSouth South Korean Korean troops troopswho who TheCommunists Communists have been impressed into the Communist forces. The have been Communist forces, list turned this category category of of prisoners in the list turned over during failed to list this negotiations at at Panmunjom. Panmunjom. The The secret secret assembling of of these these prisoners negotiations suggests that the theCommunists Communists,may may be be willing willing to negotiate newtiate further on on the question question of of their their repatriation. repatriation.
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Ambassador Muccio Ambassador Muceioreports reports that official South SouthKorean Koreanhysteria hysteria against against a a cease fire is is "sparked "sparked by by President President Rhee" Rhee" and and will will reach a creseendo crescendo as as the the possibilities wssibilities of of ' a successful armistice armistice grow. 'grow. If I f the Rhee government boycotts the talks and and the the ensuing ensuing political Muccio obarmistice armistice talks political discussions, discussions, Muccio serves, "our "our faces faceswill w i l lbe be very very red." red." However, However, he hedoes doesnot notthink think that South Korean i l l continue Korean forces forces w will continue the the fight fightafter after an an armistice, armistice.
An unidentified An unidentified North North Korean Korean security security officer on 11 11 February ordered ordered complete complete histories on "the liberated liberated enlisted enlisted men men histories on who have been been assembled assembled from every who have
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HR70-14
t9 SECRET SUEDte
FAR FAR EAST
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i 9 Fell S2_
Soviet air air defense unit probably Soviet probably participating in Korean war:
US A Air US i r Force 15 Feb 52 15 52 SUEDE
controls C C Traffic analysis strongly indicates that about about mid-November mid-November 1951 1951 an anair air defense commander spbordinate to the Soviet 5th Fleet moved moved from subordinate & Port Arthur Arthur Naval Naval Base Base to to Antung, Antung, which which Si the Port A--9 9 Jet combat munist jet combat operations in northwestern Korea. Korea,
is the the first firstindication indication of of the Comment: This is Comment: of an ,anair airdefense defense organization organization of of the the Soviet Soviet Armed direct participation participation of direct Forces in Korean Korean air operations. operations. Forces in
defense officer in in question question The The 5th 5th Fleet air defense is communicate with apparently continues to communicate with his Soviet superiors. It is probable that hls his presence in the Antung area represents represents either an probable that Antung area an attempt attempt to him and and his his personnel personnel combat combatexperience, experience,or or a a measure to estabto give him lish lish closer closer Soviet Soviet control control over over that that portion p r t i o n of of the the combat combat operations operations which which are are considered consideredaaSoviet Soviet responsibility. responslbillity.
NR NR
A t the of a 5th 5th Fleet fighter At the same same time, time, aircraft of division appear to have moved combat area and moved from from Port Port Arthur into the combat GCI net centered centeredat atAntung. Antung. Begincommunicate on on the the GCI to have begun to communicate ning shortly therewere werefrequent frequentChinese Chinese Communist Communist references ning shortly thereafter, there "Soviet" MIG-15's in the combat area. to flights of "Soviet"
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TU-a Air Division leaving.Manchurias Bombers of Chinese 8th 8 t h Bir leavlnp, Manchuria8 Eleven TU-2 light bombers of of the the Chinese 8 8th Air Division were were scheduled scheduled tto make a a l i a h t bombere th'A i r Divieion o make ' t k n s f e r move" b k d e n to t o Pangfou, Pangfou, 100 100 miles milee nnrthwest northwest of of Nanking, Nanking, "transfer move" from Mukden on 14 14 February. February. The 8th 8th Division, Divieion, equipped equipped with w i t h at a t least l e a s t 34 34 TU-2te, TU-2'e, has haa on baen based based at st the the Mukden Mukden West West airfield. a i r f i e l d . (SUEDE A i r Foroe been Air Foroe Roundups 33 and 34, 34, 2219Z 22192 and ahd 2113Z, 21132, 14 14 and and 15 1 5 Feb Feb 52) 62)
Comments a o m e n t t During November, November, 8th 8 t h Division Division bombers made one one costly costly attempt bomb UN-held i island off northwestern Korea, Korea, b but general a t % m to m o m b a Urn-held sland o f f northweetern u t iin n g eneral TU-218 TU-2's have seldom'appeared aeldom appeared in i n combat. combat. Aside from from this thie diVision, d i v i s i o n , there there is i a only only one one operational o p e r a t i o n a l light l i g h t bomber bomber regiment regiment in i n Manchuria. Manohuria.
7. KOREA. Soviet S o v i e t air a i r defense defense unit u n i t probably probably partioipating p a r t i c i p a t i n g in in Korean Korean wart war8 7 . ' XOR?%k. i o ,analysis s t r o n g l y indicates.that i n d i c a t e s that about mid-Nevember mid-November 1951 1951 an an air air Traffic Amelysis strongly defense commander oommander subordinate to t o the Soviet Soviet 5th 5th Fleet F l e e t moved moved from from the t h e Port Port
Naval Base Base to t o Antung, o o n t r o l s Communist e t oombat operaArthur Naval Antung, whioh which controls Communist j jet operat tions i o n e in i n northwestern Korea. Korea.
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A t the t h e same same time, time, aircraft a i r a r a f t of of a a 5th 5th F l e e t fighter f i g h t e r division d i v i s i o n appear appear At Fleet t o have from Port n t o tthe h e combat r e a and o have to have moved moved from Port Arthur Arthur i into combat a area and tto have begun begun to to oommutioate on the oommwoate t h e OCI G C I net n e t centered centered at a t Antung. Antung. Beginning h o r t l y ttherehereBeginning s shortly a f t e r , tthere h e r e were lights of after, were frequent frequent Chinese Chinese Comuniet Communist referenoes referencest o to f flightsof 'Soviet" i n the t h e combat oombat area. area. (SUEDE Air "Soviet" MIG-15's MIG-151e in 34, Air Force Roundup Roundup 34, 2113Z. 2113Z, 1 15 6 Feb 6 52) 2)
Comment: Comentr This i s the irat i ndication o f %he is the f first indication of the direot direct partiolpation participation of an-fenss r g m i z a t i o n of e Soviet n the .of an-Tar-We'fense oorganization of t h the Soviet Armed Armed Foroes Foroei iin the Korean Korean a i r operations. air operations.
8. 8,
90
s,*

to Korea. I
Ney Communist arty army may may be be in i n Koreas Koreaa The New Chinese Chinese Communist The presence prese'noe in i n Korea of a 8 new new Chinas's Ch$neao Communiet ih an an 8 8 February February message measage of TomMunist army arty wa8 VAS indioated indioated in wfsioh mentioned mentioned the t h e 10th 1 0 t h Army, Amy, previously previouely in i n southwest southweat China, China, and and its its Whioh subordinate 28th, 28th, 30th, 30th, and and 184th 184th Divisions. Divieiona. The measage t o bear bear message tends to out interoepts of last summer whioh indicated the army miwhil hA Arrnuitm
kuusuE Ana-Z51, cc/OAP-146,
1% rOU 04;
This new i identifioation, conjunction with with o other recemt Conunentt Thie d e n t i f i o a t i o n , in oonjunction t h e r recgnt Comment: intelligence that the 1 16th Army i is in Korea-Manohuria ttheater, suggests i n t e l w that 6 t h Amy s i n tthe h e Korea-Manohuria h e a t e r , suggeeta a signifioant s i g n i f i o a n t reinforcement reinforoement of of the the Communist Communist forces force8 in i n North North Korea. Korea.
An unidentified KOREA. North Korean Korean air a i r regiment used used Anshan Anrhan airfield: a i r f i e l d r An unidentified KOREA. rii-r-t Korean Force"regimantal "regimentalcommander" commander" reporbed reported from from S Sinuiju the Korean A Air i r Force i n u i j u tto o the "Minister of Pyongyang t that the Force Headquartera of 'Defense" Defensen iin n Pyongyang hat t h e "Air " A i r Foroe Headquartera CoMmander"'had unit to the airfield n i t commander aommander t o use t h e Anshan a i r f i e l d on Commander" had ordered "our u Sinuiju-Pyongyang, 30 0 , Sinuiju-Pyongyang, 30 Jan Jan 52) 52 ) January." (SUEDE (SUEDE 1 2 6260, 30 January.'
message probably probably iis one on on tho the previous previous day Thie message s rrelated e l a t e d tto o one Comment: .This Oommentt in which an unidentified North Korean "Minister" "Minister" wae WAS informed tthat i n 'wh-unidentifLed h a t tthe he Chinese Air Force Headqdarters HeadqUarters had ordered ordered tthe transfer of a Korean u unit Chinebe A i r Foroe he t r a n a f s r of nit Inasmuch as a s the Nbrth North Korean let 1st (MIG-15 (MIG-15 from Anshan to from Anahan t o Tungfeng. Tungfengr Inasmuoh Air Division equipped) h ir D i v i s i o n was still still operating operating in i n mid-February from from Antung, Antung, is.entirely possible that these'messages are related flights it ie entirely p ossible t hat t h e s e messages a re r e l a t e d tto o ttraining raining f lights Korean air a i r aotivity a o t i v i t y has has not not involving both Anshan Anshan and and Tungfeng. Tungfeng. North Korean
,
previously p r e v i o u s l y been been noted'in noted i n the t h e Anshan-MUkden Anshan-Mukden area. area.
The 6 t h Fleet F l e e t air a i r defense defense officer o f f i o e r in i n question q u e s t i o n apparently a p p a r e n t l y continues continues The 6th t o communicate oomunioate with w i t h his h i s Soviet S o v i e t auperiore. superiora. It to I t is probably t hat h i s presence presence that his a the t h e Antung a r e a represents represent8 either e i t h e r an attempt o give i m and in Antung area attempt t to give h him and his his personnel oombat eiperience, experienoa, or or a.measure a m e ~ s u r et o e stablish c l o s e r Soviet ontrol personnel oombat to establish closer Soviet o control over that t h a t portion p o r t i o n of of the t h e oombet oombat operatione a r e conaidered oviet over operations which which are considered a S Soviet responsibility. responeibility.
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10. 1 0 .
the h e couree course Communist mesaage Communist message indioates'possession i n d i o a t e s possession of o f UN UN F-86: F-861 During t of & a 6 b January Januarv Chinese Comuniat e t transmiasion. t a t i o n reported of Communist GCf GOT n net transmission, one one s station reported tation r e p l i e d , "those riendly other s station replied, "those are are ffriendly "0 "8 ...F-86 F-86"pPlanes." planes." The other Security Group, Johnson AB, AB, Japan, (SUEDE 6920 Seourity Group, Johnson Japan, SG SG 294, 294, airoraft." airoraft." 12 Feb 52) 62)
...
Comment: Conunentx
I
missed groups groups i in message oould could a alter meaning The missed n tthia h i s mesaage l t e r tthe h e meanini
is, however, however, evidence that There is, t h a t COmmunist Communist forces forces have have et at oonsire17517. o o n s i . Isast'one in operational flights over North North least'one UN F-86 F-86 fighter f i g h t e r engaging i n o perational P l i g h t s over Korea. Korea.
11. 1 1 .
that t h e first first i n d i c a t i o n since 961 t h a t radio rqdio indication since July July 1 1951 Comment: Commsntr This is the The contact c o n t a between m e e n North North Korea Korea and and this t h i s branch branch unit u n i t has hasbeen beeneffected. effected. ' The 4th (branch unit unit), located i in ) , looated n t thaChiri-san h e Chirl-san area'and areti and oomprising oomprising 4 t h "direction" "direotion" (branoh the majority in Korea, has has a it times been been roporked reported t h e vast m a j o r i t y of o f partisans partleans i n South KoreR, t times as remaining ftve ae exercising exeroising control o o n t r o l over over the t h e ,remaining five units. units.
Guerrilla (3uerrllla u unit n i t iin n Sputh Spth Korea Korea establishes e s t a b l i s h e s radio radio contact c o n t a c t with with North h No r t h Korean mesaage' 21 January J anuary indioated h a t oomuniofition message of 21 indioated t that communication Koreai Korea, A.North between Kaesong and and "the'Fartisan n t h e ' P a r t i s a n Supreme Supreme Headquarters ireotion ETEWJen Kaelong Headquarters through d direction wai also number nuMber 4" has haa been effected. e f f e c t e d , It was a l s o disclosed disolosed that t h a t oontact oontact will will be be (SUEDE p.681, Jan 6 52) oontinued continued "without any any intermission." intermission." (SUEDE06 8 1 , 221 1 Jan, 2) '
18 52 18 Feb 52
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HR70-14
I
8. 8.
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Soviet-piloted night night fighter f i g h t e r activity a a t i v i t y increases increases in in the t h e Korean Korgsn areas area; KOREA. K O R U . Sovietpiloted W t r atrainirig'is Z a r i g ' is being oviet p i l o t s engaged in in the the Eight being emphasized emphasized among among S Soviet pilOts Korean air a i r war, w&, according aooording to'an t o 'an analysis analysis of o f January January voice voice-transmissions Korean transmissions n t h i s oonneotion, f t h e Eloviet In this connection, dome some o Of the Soviet made by a USAF USAX' unit unit in i n Japan. Japan. I night fighters hme been been moved moved f i g h t e r e preiiously prediously based baaed in i n the t h e Anshan,Mukden Anshm-Wden area a r e a have t o Antung airfield. to Antung airfield.

'
Comments Sinoe Conrmentr Sinae early e a r l y October Ootober 1951, 1961, between between 20 20 and and 25 25 SovietSovietpilotpsrformanoe conventional conventional fighters, f i g h t e r s , based at a t Anshan, have have piloted high performance been flying f l y i n g oombat oombat missions missions over over North North Korea Korea with with only only slight s l i g h t suocess. suoceas.
I
9. 9.
New North Korean Korean brigade identifiedi i d e n t i f i e d t A 13 13 February message from from an unid unidentified e n t i f i e d North Korean Korean unit unit instructs instructs a a Subordinate iubordinate to t o "get "rret the the Vehicle front froh t h e 22nd Brigade." Brigade." (SUEDE 501st C)roup"Korea, vehiole the 501st Comm Reoon Group Korea, 16 RSM/6470, 1 7 Feb Feb 52) 52) 15 R8M/6470, 17
Comentr This i 'CoMment: S the f i r s t mention, mention, either o i t h e r in in communications communications is thafirst or odllaterel intelligence, 0 0 i n t o l l i g e n a e , of of a a North North Korean Korean 22nd 22nd Brigade. Brigade. While W h i l e it it is is possible that that, the t h e identification i d e n t i f i c a t i o n is l a an a n operator's operator's error e r r o r for f o r "23rd' "23rd possible Brigade," already e l l iidentified, d e n t i f i e d , it e a s i b l e for f o r tthe h e North North Brigade'," already w well it would would be be f feasible Eorean army a m y to t o form form additional additional brigade brigade size s i z e unite u n i t s to t o fulfill fulfill the t h e heavy heavy Korean a e o u r i t y mission of'defenee o f defense. of of the t h e coastal c o a s t a l areas. areas, security
10. 1 0 .
North Korean Korean A i r Force Force operates operates radar radar station s t a t i o n at a t Pyongyang Pyongyang airfields airfield; Air The hotor'of motor'o f the the wradar "radar set" abt" atldirit, The a t M i r i m , an r m airfield a i r f i e l d en on the t h e outskirts outskirks of of Pyongyang, ie i s to t o be.sent'for be sent'f'or repairs, r e p a i r s , according according to to a a 14 14 February February North North Printyang, Korean Air-Force A i r Foroe message. message. This Kerean This message And md two others others of of the t h e saMe seine date date a l s o indioate i n d i c a t e the the arrival a r r i v a l ef o f new new radio radio equipment'at equipment at this this looation. looation. also (SUEDE 6018t Comm Comm Reeon Reoon 'Group Group Korea; 6 RSM/6374, (SUEDE 501et Korea; 15 15 RSq6373, RS4/6373, 1 16 RSM/6374, and and R9M/6379, 14 14 Feb Feb 52) 62) 16 RSM/6379, 15 Comentr This This is i s the t h e second second referenoe reference in in communications communioations intelliintelliComments s t a l l a t i o n . It g e n o e North n t h Korean gence to Korean operation operation OS of aaradar radari n initallation. Ithad had preprev i o u s l y been been thought thought that t h a t moat radar installations installations i n North viously most radar in North Korea Korea were Chinese Chinese or or Soviet-operated. Soviet-operated. were
5
The reporting r e p o r t i n g agency agency oonoludes oonoludes that t h a t this t h i s aotivity a c t i v i t y will w i l l inorease inorease Tha in Korea. Korea. (SUEDE 6920 S Security Soviet night interceptor-capabilities i n t e r c e p t o r o a p a b i l i t i e s in ecurity Group, Johnson Johnson AB, AB, Japan, Japan, SG SO 317, 317, 13 13 Feb Feb 52) 52)
1 9 Feb 52 19
(APPROVED RELEASE APPROVED FOR RELEASE

[DATE: 20-Mar-2010 DATE: 20-Mar-2010
b.b b2, <C sc
".
of North Korean A Air Force c communications and The establishment esttbliahment o f a North i r Foroe o m k l i c a t i o n s and radar station s t a t i o n at a t Mirim M i r i m adds adds to t o the t h e growing growlng capability a a p a b i l i t y of o f that t h a t force. force.
11. 1 1 .
"The North Korean Ko,rean coastal c o a s t a l unit u n i t reports r e p o r t s UN UN baoteriologioal b a c t e r i o l o g i c a l warfare: warfare8 "Tho spies re p u t t i n g poison poison into i n t o the the drinking drinking water" water" and and are.distributing are dietributihg . spiea a are puthmg "pai:+er" oausesdeath deatht o to anyone anyone "using "using t ihose paperi f for the l'paper" t hthat a t oauses h o s e papers or t h e nose," nose," battalien Seourity February. i a b a t t a l i o n of'the of' t h e 7th 7 t h Railroad Railroad S e o u r i t y Regiment reported on 16 February. This battalion, area, b a t t a l i o n , stationed s t a t i o n e d somewhere somewhere in i n the Wonsan-Hamhung a r e a , also noted that northeast Hamhung. t h a t "Chineee ''Chine8e units* u n i t a n eapthred captured a a downed domed US pilot a o r t h e a s t of o f Hamhung;. 501st Corn Comm Recon Reoon Group Group Korea, Korea, 16 15,1180466, (SUEDE 501at R8d8456, ls 16 Feb 52) 52)
such as this, this, acauaing accusing the UN of of Comheatt Communist messages such ComMent: emplo'$~ p m e s e and Chinese N a t i o h a l i s t troops n employing Japanese Natiohalist troOps and of of engaging engaging i in haoteriOlogioal b a o t e r i o l o g i o a l and and chemiOal chemical warfare, have frequently frequenlily forecast f o r e c a s t a new propaganda outburst of charges o of f T UN J N a atrocities trocities i in n Korea. Korea.
u n i t s in i n northeastern northeastern Korea are tire probably The Chinese Communist units of the t h e 3rd Division M v i s i o n mentioned i n earlier e a r l i e r messages elements of in mossages as being being in t h a t area on a railway s e d u r i t y and and construction c o n s t r u c t i o n mission. mission. in that railmrYsedurity
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19 February 1952
US OFFICIALS ONLY OCI No. 3876
Copy No.
251
DAILY DIGEST
DIA, DOS, JCS Declassification/Release Instructions on File

This summary of significant reports has been prepared primal11y for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.

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SECTION 1 (SOVIEri)
1.
25X1C
BULGARIA. ding to
Lar e number of
et
lanes re orteal
based near Sofia:
Ancor-
25X1C
e located at 150 "Russian jet planes" o unspeci e Two trainSofia, in mid-January 1952. Bozhuriste Airfield, northwest of active ing schools were reportedly in operation at the airfield, one for The airfield was said student pilots and the other for reserve officers. (S to be guarded by,an antitank regiment.
52)
25X1C 25X1C
25X1A
Air Force jet aircraft strength

SECRET
1
planes" refers to RussianComment: Presumably the term "Russian jet Although the spethe Bulgarian Air Force. type jet aircraft assigned to cific details of this report are not confirmed, augmentation of Bulgarian has also been indicated by other reports. reported that 48 MIGIn January, December 1951, and that 34 jet aircraft 15's had arrived at Varna in early had been unleaded at the same port on 10 December. On 20 December, rePorted that a "newly formed" antitank artillery regiment s a lone full of "Russian" Bozhuriste Airfield. He stated that the airfield wss
25X1C 25X1C 25X1C
25X1C 25X1C
=MIII=11.1.11
officers and planes.
2.
against cosmopolitanism CZECHOSLOVAKIA. Conference will spark campaign organized by in Czech science and philosophy: An ideological conference universities will be held the Czech Military Academy of Technology and.the the struggle The conference will discuss in Brno from 27 to 29 February. science and against cosmopolitanism and bourgeois objectivism in Czech philosophy, upholding Soviet science as a model. Minister of Information:Kopecky will deliver the main address on Patriotism." "Cosmopolitanism, Proletarian Internationalism, and Socialist (R FBIS1111111117 Feb 52)
The conference will no doubt launch a nation-wide propaComment: organizations against all influences ganda campaign conducted through mass "foreign" to the Soviet idea of internationalism. in Czech life which are cosmopolitanism has stressed its international Current propaganda against Zionism and social democracy as aspects and has attacked the Vatican, sovereignty for the benefit of the United forces undermining national
States.
25X1A
stated Kopecky, who is apparently to be the leader in this campaign, political work in Pravda last month that mass in an article in the Soviet
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SECRET remnants of MasarYk and Benes and reactionary Czechoslovakia was hampered by He added that "foreign enemies chauvinism, the attitude of the church. tendencies of cosmopOlitanismi Zionism, elements" relied upon and nationalism.
'
ideology and .
Domestit employees in a re
3'.
HUNGARY. sidential section of Budapest have week. three hours a fense indoctrination
aivild_SIsfL----Stra3.-15.---P-asteedu: been.instructed to report for air
de
(S Budapest 2817,
15 Feb 52)
civilian defense other recent reports that There have been Comment: extended. training in Hungary is being Rumors that mass deporta rumored: Mass de ortations from too many HUNGARY RUMANIA. be resumed on 1 March rnmp tions from Budapest are to according to s sources to be entirely unfounded, there are rumors that remaining.elemen In Bucharest, apparently in Hungary. be deported. These reports are useless to the economy will connection with new housing rentals rumored for April. inspired by police investigation in of state employees reliability check Feb 52) and a political 16 Feb 52; C Bucharest 325015 (S Budapest 2819, middle MayJuly 1951 . several thousand During the period provinces. Budapest to the Comment: deported from evacuations. No and upper class residents were isolated Cases of individual have been Since then there scale have occurred. from Bucharest on a mass previous deportations
The pro_YugoSladt Trieste leaders: Tito receives that Nhrshal YUGOSLAVIA TRIESTE. Politika reported on 15 February newspaper in Trieste, in official Belgrade of proTito party leaders received a delegation Tito reportedly Tito had in Brioni. Babic, at his winter villa party, in its cluding Branco Front, the proTito the Liberation Trieste. promised to support for the Slovene population in equality of rights struggle for that the visit of these proTito officials believe Slovene American EMbassy attempt sponsored by the Yugoslav Trieste problem. on the Slovenes may be part of an Tito's flexibility leaders and designed to limit 52) (R Belgrade 1013, 15 Feb may be related to proTito groups to Brioni The visit of condominium for the Comment: Yugoslavia may advance the idea of a reports that Free Territory of Trieste. invited Mario Stocca and that Tito had formulate An earlier report stated to Brioni in order to Slovene leaders
4.

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5.
other nonCommunist
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independentist front in a working agreement which would strengthen the weuld weaken Italy's position in its nego Zone A, a development which tiation with Yugoslavia.' Yugoslav request for 80 million YUGOSLAVIA. Tripartite governments reject States have informed the Yugoslav dollars: Britain, France, and the United approximately 80 million dollars to finance Government that its request for refused and that it should look to the In capital goods imports has been and Development for the financing of ternational Bank for Reconstruction these imports. .(C Belgrade 1010, 15 Feb 52)
6.
Britain, France and the United States have extended a total of 75 million dollars in tripartite aid to date. This leaves a potential 50 million for the remainder of fiscal 1952. The scheduling for the remainder of the program is being drawn up this week in Washington. Yugoslav officers told that American officers come as "spectators," Zagreb Military not as "inspectors": The Political Commissar of the Yugoslav officers last month that District told a conference of high United States military aid group, the despite the acceptance of a small that only real "condition" attached to American military assistance was The any attack from the east must be resisted by all possible means. stated that his officer friends informant, a seem unperturbed about the aid program.
the The American Consul states that theparty lineappears to be that American military men are coming as "spectators" rather than "inspectors." (s Zagreb 152, 8 Jan 52) leaders will attempt Comment: This report suggests. that Yugoslav minimum, just as they did to limit the to hold American observation to a size and functions of the aid group.
7.

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complete their ambitious Comment: The Yugoslays are attempting to For this reason, the IND program investment schemes as soon as possible. has been both inadequate and protracted.
25X1X
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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1.
The Iranian Senate Senate insists that oil negotiations continue: World Bank's negois thoroughly aroused over the reported break in the to make certain that oil problem and intends tiations with Mossadeq on the informed the the talks do not cease. The president of the Senate has however, that it that the Senate considers, American Ambassador in Tehran which runs counter would be unwise to insist on acceptance of an agreement be enforced for any length to public opinion and consequently could not of time. (S Tehran 3141, 17 Feb 52)
IRAN.
2.
elections: Communists prove most powerful opposition group in Tehran Tudeh Party is indicate that the illegal Election returns from Tehran Although the strongest organized opposition in that electoral district. from Tehran, a the National Front won all twelve parliamentary seats votes as Tudeh-sponsored candidate gained fourteenth place with 29,000 candidate's 112,000 votes. compared with the top Nationalist
covertly been The American Embassy notes that the National front has the Shah to the of the security forces from trying to divert the loyalty with the It fears that continuation of this policy, together Government. would expected deterioration of the economic and political conditions, left as the only create a political vacuum in which the Tudeh would be (S Tehran 3116, 16 Feb 52) effective organized group. National Front control is expected to prevent the election Accordingly, the Communists are not .of most Tudeh-sponsored candidates. legal means. in a position to obtain control of the government by however, indicate that he will conMossadeq's actione since taking office, This and the Army. limit the powers of the Shah tinue to do all he can to stringent measures policy, combined with Mossadeq's unwillingness to take and there is strengthen the Communists, against them, will undoubtedly attempt to seize power. a real danger that they may eventually
Comment:

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Unexpected Senate intervention in the talks between Interprevented's, breakdown. national Bank officials and Moseadeq apparently with appropriate opportunity that a fair offer There may now emist the consideration by moderface-saving devices may actually be given genuine the intolerance and hyperate Iranians. Moseadeq is still captive to intervention by the nationalism he helped arouse. The importance of to that of the Majlie, influence is subordinate Senate, whose power and should not be overemphasized.
Comment:
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3.
ation, is another
4.
with bombing.: Clandestine nationalist radio charges French INDOCHINA. transmitter Front," secret radio The "Voice of the National Resistance accused Triad& Minh The, of nationalist guerrilla forces under Colonel the "zone of bombing and strafing the French in a 12 February broadcast Communism." struggling against where the National Resistance Front is used by the French The radio emphasizes that the planes and weapons contends that this attack were "begged from a foreign country," and French assertion that they are fighting proves the deceitfulness of the Oommunism in Vietnam. (R FBIS, 15 Feb 52)
25X10
their inFrench officials in Indochina have intimated ainst Colonel The os forces. tention to take action misunderstood by er c n position in Indoc na, a ready states tha that US miliif it were learned many Vietnamese, would sink to anew low Vietnamese who have tary aid was being used against anti-Communist An attack in force would, morespurned overtures from the Viet Minh. over, seriously strain French capabilities.
Comment:

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5
reported tightening grip on rice trade: The Burmese Government that the Burmese GovernAmerican Embassy in Rangoon has been informed trade completely by subsiment is preparing to control the Burmese rice which originally were dizing a "cooperative" to handle rice exports The Embassy comments that this action is planned for private trade. for bid rice which would apparently designed to secure a higher price government to government basis. set the standard for prices sold on a (S Rangoon 807, 15 Feb 52) far the most important source of Comment: The sale of rice,is byHowever, a substantial amount has revenue Tor the Burmese Government. This contemplated usually been left for private dealers to handle. negotiations for the action, following closely upon the conclusion of and the Bnrma OorporCompany partial nationalization of the Burmah Oilsocialization in Burma. significant step toward
BURMA:
25X1C 25X1C
5.
CHINA.
25X1D
Hong Kong reported: ncrease of Chinese troop strength near the Faoan district, about fifty miles troops arrived there; northwest of Hong Kong, 40,000 Chinese Communist estimates that there are now 80,000 bommu, on 11 February. nist forces in thia area alone (S
25X1C 25X1C
2 5X1 A
buildChinese Communist troop strength in the Hong Kong Command at 75,500, including up area has been estimated by Far East and mechanized units. 8,000 troops in artillery
ComMent:
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been unprecedentedly propaganda on Hong Kong has not yet suggested imminent Chinese Communist weeks, but has the past three threatening during attaok.
predicted:. Sources in both commands Nationalist Army and Army Headquarters Changes in Ministry of National Defense Formosa are defense commanders on the Chinese Nationalist will'be assignments of the area divisional commanders state that.the Following this, army and of their staffs with.them. to be shifted. take members shifted and not permitted to Chiang Kai-shek Yuan recently proposed to the Executive of National Defense In addition, the Chief of Staff, Ministry and Combined of duty of Air Foroe that the tours chief of the Army, Navy, commanders in and the to twe years. Seryice Force be limited changes and comments that these personnel Army Attache Previous military with all The American out, would be a sharp break the tradition had abandoned plans, if carried the Nationalists mould mean that 52) practice and 02527E, 14 Feb (S USARMA,Taipei. of war lord armies.
6.

Se
7.
25X1C
repor a 25X1C and, after a anchuria from separate Korea and Japan the USSR is attempting. to concluded, "may" propose that China, This plan Korean truce is to immigration. Separate state, open . as a recognize Manchuria Communists," and Mao Tse-tung's objecrepublics," "Manchurian Asiatic is to be proposed.by endorsement of the " mailer 25X1C tions are to be overcome b
te state in Manchuria al
ly planned*
IIIIIIIIII.
25X1C
25X1C
e.g., Outer Mongolia.
(S
report. The Soviet does not support thia Other evidence speculated that, in the CoMmentt has been strong, and it government might regional position in Manchuria is the Manchurian alliance remains event of a Sino-Soviet split, So long as the Sine-Soviet Manchuria will become a adhere to the Soviet bloc. be little prospect that appears to firm, there separate state.
25X1C
25X1C
8.
ta ks.re orted: Chinese approaoh to Korean
25X1C 25X1C
the Peiping regime
truce talks but conclusion of the Korean successful (1) desires a Korea to bear "full responsibilite wants the USSR and North for the results;
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"in the long run" (2) is not convinced that Soviet military strength to get out of Korea; oan match the US and ia therefore anxious
diplomatically (3) nevertheless will not conclude a truce until Nations"; and recognized by the "United
"planting loyal Mao (4) hopes to "extend power" in Manchuria by "concentrating troops" in the area. followers" there and by
25X1A
point, this report is not supported by Comment: Except for the fir:it any knawn developments.
Two questions of concern to ROE Government: KOREA. Poet-armistice period UN General Assembly session recently asked by the Korean observers at the to conolude a security --regarding the willingness of the United States with the ROE, and what the UN will do if the paet or defense.arrangement accordKoreetifter aniarmistice--highlight, the North Koreans invade South the UN concern of the ROK lest ing to Ambsssador Muccio, the ever-present Despite prompt . unprotected. withdraw from Korea too early and leave it record of UN assistance since of the war and the action at the outbreak would happen after an then, the ROK continues to be skeptical of what should be given to the serious consideration armistioe, and Muccio believes 52) entire question. (S Pusan 813, 16 Feb expeoted by Mays According to an JAPAN. Outlawing of Communist Party met secretly on unconfirmed report, Japanese Communist Party leaders the outlawing of the countermeasures agaInst 10-12 February to discuss party, which the JCP expects by May 1952.
90
100
'
control law probCINCFE-oomments that the proposed organizations might provide a Communist activities and ably will severely restrict the JCP has been For same tiros past legal basis for outlawing the party. covert organizations, expandpreparing for the event by strengthening its non-Communist labor and ing popular front activities, and infiltrating 52) political groups, (S.Tokyv Weeka 7, 16 Feb

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SECTION 3
1.
(WESTERN)
Chancellor Adenauer is reportedly about Heinrich von Brentaho, present leader of the Christian Democrats in the Bundestag, confirms that he has been offered the Foreign Affairs Ministry post now held by the Chancellor, and Eberhard Wildermuth, present Housing Minister, will reportedly be named chief defense adviser, or future Minister of Defense. Brentano, who has tot yet formally accepted the offer, states that he must accept the post and risk a possible clash with the Chancellor by continuing his attempts to bring about a bipartisan approach to foreign affairs with the opposition Social Democrats, which he feels is imperative.
GERMANY.
Cabinet shifts predicted:
rErne two new key cabinet members.
local US officials comment that Brentano is unlikely to challenge Adenauervs authoritarian methods to any great extent. (C Bonn 1595, 161AA)52)
comment: Adenauervs party has reacted unfavorably to the Chancellor's "inept" handling of the_opposition during the rearmament debates in the Bundestag on 7 and 8 February, At the same time, 25X1C reported growing criticism of Adenauervs present chief defense adviser, Theodor Blank, hinting that.he no longer was considered a likely candidate for the future Defense Ministry post. Wildermuth has shown an interest in the defense post for some time, although he has not been mentioned prominently as a candidate for the position since late 1950. Now one of the more obscure cabinet members, he would be much more subject to Adenauervs close control.
2.
The poll results also suggest that though West Germans, particularly youths and veterans, are preponderantly opposed to a conscription law, the majority are likely to go along with any such legislation. (C Frankfurt 4949, 8 Feb 52)
3.
BELGIUM. Government discourages participation in Moscow Economic Conference: A Belgian Government official says that his government, following.the US
Poll cites adverse West German reaction to NATO: Favorable reaction toward NATO has as yet failed to develop in West Germani, according to a poll conducted for HICOG by a reliable German survey organization. UnL familiarity with NATO as well as lack of opinion was midespread. Although readtions to General Eisenhower as a leader were distinctly favorable, a sizeable minority showed a lack of confidence in him and believed that he would not treat any German troops as equals. The great majority considered the USSR the principal threat t6 peace; approximately one-third of those interviewed, however, had serious apprehensions that US behaviour could precipitate war,

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SECEZT industrialists position, has tried to discourage the attendance of Belgian The official adds April. at the Soviet-sponsored economic conference in received concerning the from businessmen have been that numerous inquiries of extreme The promoters of the conference in Belgium are conference'. (C Brussels 1182, 15 Feb 52) left -wing sympathies. tried to discourage attendance Comment: The Netherlands, too, has at the Moscow Ecpnomic Conference,
4,
ltAtY.
Weeka 7, 15 Feb 52)
Christian Democratic Party secretary Comment: The recent advocacy by of party members general Goneila of a labor organization composed solely 'of Labor Unions, which was resented by the leadership of the Confederation tried to keep the includes Republicans and democratic Socialists and has Digest, 23 Jan 52). influence (see OCI Daily organization free from political union is increasing Church participation in the sponsoring of a party trade government in Christian Democrat-dominated anti-clerical opposition to the the face of local elections in south Italy this spring, Italian 'Italy alarmed by British and French restrictions on imports: British nmport restricseriously worried over recent economic officials are restrictions tions which will affect Italian agricultural products and French US Embassy officials in Rome fear on the import of semi-finished materials. Rome Joint Weeka 71 (S that Italy may take retaliatory action. 15 Feb 52)
trade union tabor Minister urges Christian Democratic domination of and the Catholic Christian Democratic Party argities: High officials of the party-sponsored Church attended the ceremonies at the recent opening of a The Minister of Labory.in a key speech, trade union leadership school in Rome. only to the most narrow defined the scope of union activity as "being devoted should be undertaken by interpretation" and asserted broad-scale operations the and expressed support for politieal parties. He praised the Church of Italian Workers activities of the Church-supported Christian Association comments that this The US EMbassy in Rome within the unionvs framework, Christian Democrats to create speech further illustrates the efforts of the No executives of the Christian Democrat to their wishes. a union subeervient (S ROMA Joint dominated Confederation of Labor Unions attended the ceremony.
25X1A
Britain, France, West Germany, Comment: Recent import restrictions by trend toward such which fears a world-wide and the 1/3 have alarmed Italy, outlets will make the Soviet restrictions. Curtailment of Western trade agriculturalists and market that much more attractive to southern Italian conferences on possibly increase their desire to participate in Moscow Italo-Thviet trade will raise international trade. Furthermore, increased SECRET
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Communists in the forthof the Italian and vote-getting power the prestige coming southern Italian elections. difficulties it would be hard for Because of its balanee of payments against Britain.and France, Italy to undertake effective countermeasures
25X6
6.
SiTLESN.
The recent arrest New Communist spy case stirs public opinion: espionage reportedly for Soviet of a former Communist nevmpaperman, extreme installations in the concerning the Boden fortress and other than the similar case of a north, has caused an even greater sensation 51). CCI Daily Digest, I and 7 Nov naval petty officer last autumn (see proninent party members may be belieVes that several The Swedish press going on for the past ten years. implicated in this spying which has been indicated by the fact that the police, ... The serioueness of the case is the accusedfs name and record at this contrary to usual practice, released (R Stockholm 984, 16 Feb 52) early stage before formal arraignment. is a key defense position in the far Comment: The Boden fortress the spy operated north-MEE-the Finnish frontier. The allegation'that in a review of the security detection may result for ten years without security measures Parliament to pass certain immediate system and stimulate likely to lessen trade The case is also already proposed by the government. against individual workers.in sensitive union opposition to discrimination opinions." defense plants because of "politieal
The DS endorse nationaliat aspirationa: has been increased TUNISIA. Tunisian moderates Tunisian solidarity Consul General in Tunis reports that SECRET
8.
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SECRET expressing their that even non-nationalists are likely to accept violence and Tunisian is by the recent No reputable to Neoallegiande to Habib Bourghiba. French insistence in opposition to reorganized at that were France a post in a cabinet The Consul General states negotiations would be resumed Destour will and policy. under which be reached. Stop haggling about conditions an amicable settlement might and present concrete proposals, (S Tunis 1113 14 Feb 52) other sources. solidarity is confirmed from apparently has Increased Tunisian Comment: with other pressing problems There is no preoccupation FrencEaVeThment study solution to the Tunisian crisis. of a contemplate meeting the prevented a full that French policy-makers indication, however, demands in any respect, Tunisian Government's squadron in Korea: to ground its air -Government plans ground its air UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA. told the US that it will after which it will 9. Africa has The Union of Southbeginning 31 March for three months, explained that failure squadron in Korea African officials does The South necessitates this step, which review its position. squadron Prima Minister aircraft for the South African to obtain jet repatriation of tho personnel, that such a move might start a not involve assured him reminded by the US Ambassador to UN forces in Korea, Malan, when high loss other contributors but that the in a hurry," chain reaction wnong "want to act Malan stated that South Africa does not difficulties compel this move. definite recruiting government had rate and subsequent be reconsidered if his (S to Capetown 74$ 13 Feb 52; decision could that the within six months, assurance of receiving jets 52) S Capetown 19, 14 Feb hinted at a possible grounding South Africa U5 informed Last September Comment: jets, Subsequently the Mustangs, to secure US-armed F-51 should it continue to fail squadron, which is using similar US units, that the South Africa jets at the same time as would be equipped with
-
10.
conference: Committee formed at labor in Paraguay American Syndical Latin labor conference ARGENTINA, Argentine-sponsored Syndical Committee with headof the The second part have formation of a Latin American after participants approved the In about 4 months and the date-of a Aires. try to announce quarters in Buenos support, the committee will labor federation. confirmed their create a new Latin American the majority special labor congress to pushing the new federation, but delegation is unions. An official The Argentine authorization from their home confidentially that of delegates must obtain Confederation of Ibrkers stated (C Asuncion 236, 15 Feb 52) of the Paraguayan to join the federation, Paraguay does not intend difficulty in persuading considerably more have persuading will federation than it had in Comment: Argentina unions to join a new Plate labor.conference, the participating observers to an expense-free River them to send SECRET 19 Feb 52
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reflects security negotiations security mutual mutual attitude on to -begin The Uruguayan Government's Uruguay's reluctance URUGUAY. before instability, instability: political negotiations reflects political bilateral US of to replace with the is scheduled negotiations indicated the undesirability to the colegiado, has According council, or Dec 51). President nine-man Digest, 20 prepared military has 1 March when the (see CCI Daily negotiations Uruguayan executive and hence the Affairs, the the present of Foreign to get started, and is eager Undersecretary after 1 March. for the negotiations in completed speedily council can participate could be new unstalling so that the affected by the general governnent is (1) preparations also The but its attitude is Serious problems are: sanction; the negotiations, political situation.does not have wide popular (3) tho the certainty of system that agree on a cabinet; Colorados council to for the new governmental nine-man governing Datllista balance inability of the section of now (2) the Daily and (4) the unfavorable (see O)I that an important colegiado; possibility support of the wool to move in volume may withdraw its from the failure of resulting of trade and possibly Digest, 2 Jan.52). of the colegiado, three will have from the installation Party, which negotiations. Herrerista Confusion resulting the nationalist of mutual security D-718, 719, la Jan, attitude of progress 33-6951 696, the impede the D-671, 672, seats, may council Montevideo, 52) C 310, 8 Feb (Factual data from: 52; S Montevideo and 1 Feb 25 Jan,
19 Feb 52
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19 FebruarY 1952 CIA No. 49543

Copy No.
US OFFICIALS ONLY
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prepared primarily This summary of significant reports has been It does Intelligence. for the internal use of the Office of Current current reports in CIA not represent a complete coverage of allComments represent the or in the Office of Current Intelligence. immediate views of the Office of Curreni Intelligence.

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TRIESTE. State Department favors postponement of Trieste elections: The United States Department of State concurs with Ambassador Dunnis recommenda tion that no final decision regarding Trieste elections should be made at this time. The Department believes that the elections, if held, should coin cide as closely as possible with Italian communal elections.
The final determination concerning the timing of the election announce ment must be based primarily upon an estimate pf the likelihood of an Italo Yugoslav settlement which would necessarily include Premier de Gasperi's views and what is known about the Yugoslav attitude.
If no settlement appears likely, the Department thinks that it might be desirable to consider seriously postponing the elections until after the Italians had assumed major administrative responsibilities in Zone A. (S, S/8 to' Trieste 822, 13 Feb 52)
Comment: In contrast to the above views, the British Foreign Office be lieves that an indefinite postponement is "merely putting off an evil day"; and that by holding the Trieste elections concurrently with Italian communal elections, the former will bd swallowed up and forgotten.
2.
progressive reduction in occupation payments and will find particularly objec tionable the retention of provisions requiring cash disbursements to the occupy ing powers.
While the present agreement has preserved quadripartite unity, it is un likely that the dispute over occupation costs has been permanently resolved. An escalator clause will permit the reopening of the ceiling figure in the event Austrian prices continue to rise, and the British and French can renew their pleas for increased allotments on the ground that exhausted resources will force a reduction in occupation armies. (Factual data from: TS, Vienna 2383, 21 Jan; S, Vienna 2660, 14 Feb 52) TOP SECRET
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AUSTRIA. High Commissioners conclude agreement on occupation costs levy: After several months of negotiations, the four High Commissioners in Vienna have agreed to require occupation costs payments from the Austrian Government in the amount of 151 million schillings per element for 1952. Thisicompromise agreement, how ever, will please few of the participants -- excepting perhaps the Russians, who have other ways of obtaining schillings. Both the French and British, who had hoped for 185 million schillings, believe the present allotment is inadequate and consider that US pressure and Soviet maneuvers in the Allied Council com pelled them to accept the lower figure. Austria had previously appealed for a

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4. 4.
12th Division is NIG-equipped and movin moving north: 12th D ivision i s MIG-equipped n o r t h : A message of of test e s t flight f l i g h t of o f the the 17 1 7 JanuarY January from Peiping to t o Nanking asked askqd about about t e e t transports 12th Division D i v i s i o n NIG-151s." MIG15tsi" Only Only a few few t r a n s p o r t s and and trainers t r a i n e r s have have been been 12th d i v i s i o n in i n previous intercepts, i n t e r o e p t s , according according to t o the the associated a s s o c i a t e d with this division (SUEDE A i r Force Roundup Roundup .35, 36, 22382, 8 Feb 2) Air 2238Z, 1 18 Feb 5 52) r e p o r t i n g agency. agonoy. reporting
5 7
Comment: Subsequent messages scheduled t the Commentt h e transfer t r a n s f e r on on 19 19 February February of tWo t transports o f two r a n s p o r t s and and eleven e l e v e n NIG-15's MIct-15's of o f the t h e 12th 1 2 t h Division D i v i a i b n from from Shanghai Shwghmi 1 2 t h Division t ransport r ecently transport recently t o Tangshan Tnngshm in to i n North North qhina. China. Another 12th made to near Korean b border, possibly made, a a "test " t e s t the t h e route" r o u t e " flight flight t o Takushan n e a r tthe h e Korean order, p ossibly t he u l t i m a t e destination destint4tion of of this t h i s unit. at. the ultimate
5. 5 .
Comment: Commentt During December Deoember and January, January, UN UN aircraft a i r c r a f t encountered encountered about 200 enamy enomy jet J e t fighters fighters a m day. day.
S i n c e only Since o n l y 100 100 Soviet S o v i e t and and Chinese planes plRnes a are re e estimated s t i m a t e d tto o be be based based a t Tatungkou, h i s record reoord number of of sorties s o r t i e s suggeSts s u g g e s t s that t h a t this t h i s field f i e l d is is at Tatungkou, t this a s t a g i n g point p o i n t for f o r jet jet aircraft a i r c r a f t in i n Korean combat, combat. This staging Thia possibility p o s s i b i l i t y is is n l a o suggested by UN observation o b s e r v a t i o n during during the the past p a s t month, also month.
6. 6 .
KOREA. KOREA.
i n Korean air a i r war war improves: i m roveer A A high high S o v i e t interceptor i n t e r c e p t o r technique teohnique in Soviet has been developed b ySoviet SovieCpersonnel degree o-fioiency orFaiciency has been developed by personne operating operating on t h e SoViet S o v i e t GOl GCI net'in net i n northwnstern northwestern Korea, Korea, a000rding acoording to to a on the a field f i e l d analysis analysis of o f intercepted i n t e r o e p t e d voice voioe traffic. traffic.
CHINJIVKOREA. Recordnumber numberof ofj o jet sorties from YaluRiver River baseCAn estimated CHINA KOREA. Reoord t so r t i e 8 from Yalu ba s e : An e stimated A 9 MIG-15 MIG-15 ssorties o r t i o s on on 116 6 February February was was rrevealed e v e a l e d iin n messages messages from tote of 43.9 the This figure f i g u r e represents represents t h e Korean ICoraan border town town of Tatungkou, Tatungkou, Maaohuria. Mmohuria. 'This highest the h i g h e s t recorded reaorded number of o f combat combat flights f l i g h t s from from that t h a t field. f i e l d . (SUEDE (SUEDE Air A i r Force,Roundup Foroe Roundup 35, 2238Z, 22382, 18 10 Feb Fob 52) 52)
__pr_
,
c o n t r o l l e r s , tracking The ground controllers, t r a c k i n g large l a r g e UN UN air a i r formations, f orma-tions now now wait wait o f two two or o r four f o u r UN UN aircraft aircraft to t o break b r e a k off o f f from from the t h e major major group group f o r elements of for b e f o r e ordering o r d e r i n g the t h e Soviet-piloted'MIG-151s S o v i e t - p i l o t e d M I G I S 1 s to t o attaok at-taok the t h e smaller before smaller elements. element 8. (SUEDE A Air i r Foroe Roundup 35, 35, 2238Z, 22382, 18 18 Feb 52) 52) Commentt This improvement improvemont in i n tactics, t a o t i c s , in Comment: i n addition a d d i t i o n to t o demonstrating demonstrating t h o good good quality q u a l i t y of of Soviet S o v i e t radar r a d a r equipment, equipmont, indicates i n d i c a t e s that t h a t the t h o lessons lesson8 the of v a l u a b l e to t o Soviet S o v i e t radar r a d a r operators o p e r a t o r s as AS well w e l l as a8 to to of oombat have proved valuable Russian pilots. pilots.
7. 7 r
North Korean Korean GCI GCI system system has has oporational o p o r a t i o n a l characteristics c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of o f Soviet Soviet nets: n e t s t The North Korean adjunct a d j u n c t of the t h e tri-lingual t r i - l l n g u a f OCT G C I net n e t operates o p o r a t e s in in n o r t h w e e t e r n Korea Korea but b u t may have have a a station s t a t i o n south s o u t h of o f the t h e 38th 3 8 t h parallel, parallel, northwestern t h e US A i r Force reports. reports. I 1 the Air
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L-
While aircraft active
the on t h e Korean net, n e t , to t o date; d a t e , have been largely largely occupied occupied with w i t h training, training, patrolling and obeervation, observation, on on two tm occasions with aircraft p a t r o l l i n g and occasions contaat contaot w i t h UN a irorafl (SUEDE USAFSS USAFSS Brooks Brooks AFB, AFB, ODD ODD 2-20473, 2-20473, 17 17Feb, F e e 52) 62) may have been been made. made. (SUEDE may have
Comments that the appearances appearances o of a North North Comment; It has been speculated spoculnted t h a t the f a K o r e m e t and und aR mia-15 MIG-15 equipped equipped fighter f i g h t e r division d i v i s i o n indicated i n d i a a t e d p1m.s Korean Of m net plans to at the of.any t o leave l e a v e an in operational o p o r a t i o n a l air nir force f o r c o in i n North Korea a t t h e ttime i m e of any armistioe." most evidence t to date, both i in ground c oontrol and iin a r m i s t i o e . Most o d a t e , both n ground o n t r o l and n ffighter ighter operations, o p e r a t i o n s , oontinues to t o suggest suggest a a Soviet-organized Soviet-organized and and oommanded commanded air air defenso system. defense system.
Comment; s u g g e s t s that that the t h e IV I V Corps Corps occupies oocupies a a similar similnr Connent: This message suggests posit-the w o s t coast coas-t to t o that t h a t of o f the t h e VII VI1 Corps Corps on on the t h e east e a s t ooast. coast. positr67-677the west The relationship r e l a t i o n s h i p Of o f these t h e s e two two corps c o r p s to to the t h e two two defense defense commands commands known known to to exist e x i s t on on both b o t h coasts c o a s t s is i s unknown. unknown.
9. 90
may have emer emergency irfield i n Suiho reservoir r e s e r v o i r area: areat A Communists mar-have eno a airfield in Sovie -p ated aircraft Sovie%-piloted a i r c r a f t was was instructe i n s t r u c t e. d by h e Soviot e t in i n northnorth. y tthe oviet GCI I n net w e s t e r n Korea Korea to t o cross c r o s s the the river.and river and land land in i n the the region r e g i o n of o f "Sapog." "Sapga" The western A i r Force Force believes b e l i e v e s that t h a t Sapog Sapog may may be be a a cover-word oover-ward for for the t h e SuihO Suiho US Air r e s e r v o i r on reservoir on the t h e Yalu Yalu river. r i v e r . (SUEDE A i r Foroe 22382, 18 18 Feb 52) 52) Air Force Roundup Roundup 35, 35, 2238Z,
Comments This This is i s the t h e first f i r s t indication i n d i c f i t i o n of o f an an airfield a i r f i e l din i n.this this Comment: m o u n t z t e r r f i i n . While n o tknown knownon onwhich whioh side s i d e of o f the t h b river river While mounta7313terrain. itit isi s not t h i s airfield a i r f i e l d is i s located, l o c a t e d , the t e r r n i n on i d e seems lightly this terrain on the the Korean Korean s side seams s Slightly suitable. more suitable.

4 4
10. 10 a
Evidence of war re orteds A of Communist C o m u n i s t use of o f IFF in Korean air air w ar r e o rted: A 31 January message h e Soviet-operated CI n et i n nor 31 message on t the Soviet-operated G GOI net in nor hwestern hwestern Korea Korea mentioned that that a a. "transponder" "transponder" and snd s pare p a r t s should e n t tto o an spare parts should be be s sent an unlooated destination. d e s t i n n t i o n . This t unlocated ype o f equipment n IFF (Identitype of equipment is is used used iin UP (Identif i o a t i o n Friend Friend Or o r Foe, Foe, en an eleotronic e l e c t r o n f c device). device). (SUEDE (SUEDE Air A i r Foroe Foroe fioatin 36 2238Z, 22382, 18 18 Feb Feb 52) 52) Roundup 35
8 a 8.
North Korean IV Corps may have hnve coastal c o a s t a l defense defonse assignment: Rs8ignmen-b; The North Korean IV I V Corps Co r p s commander commander on on 16 16 February Februmy sent s e n t congratulations c o n g r a t u l a t i o n s tor to an unidentified an u n i d e n t i f i e d unit unit for for the t h e sinking s i n k i n g of of "six "six warships warships of o f various v a r i o u s types." typos." (SUEDE 330th Corn Comm Recon Co Korea, Korea, A AIT m 256, 18 1 8 Feb 52) 52)
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Comment: This i is first suggestion IFF iis employed by by Comment: s tthe he f irst s u g g e s t i o n tthat h a t IFF s ompbyod Soviets enamiTIFYFITIA in enemy-ft i n the t h e Korean air a i r War. War.' The S o v i e t s are known to t o have SaH-3, since s i n c e 1948. 1948. possessed an o n IFF IFF set s e t of o f native n n t i v e design, design, SoH-3,
11. 1 1
regiment in reporting that it i n western woetern Korea Korea near near 'Pyongyang, Pyongyang, r e p o r t i n g th& it had had two two tons tons oil" stated if movement of of v vegetables from of "fuel "fuel o i l " (gasoline), (gasoline), s t a t e d tthat hat i f tthe h e movement e g e t a b l e s from mirth Pyongyang and wood wood from west west o of n o r t h Of o f Pyongyang, Pyongyang, coal c o a l from f r o m south s o u t h of o f Pyongyang f (SUEDE 601 501 Comm would be Pyongyang were to'be t o ' b e made, made, the t h e POI POLWuld be exhaUsted. exhausted" (SUEDE Recon Feb 52) Reoon Group Croup Korea, Korea, SK-G-535, SK-G536, 19 1 9 Feb; Feb; 15 15 RS4/6490, RSma/SCQO, 19 Feb 52)
Internal suply t transportation strains POLsumly: An I n t e r n a l supply r a n s p o r t a t i o n stPOL s u r A n unidentified unidentified
text this i s looated l o o a t e d in i n Pyongyang Pyongyang e x t suggests s u g g e s t s that that t h i s unit is Comment; Comment: The t and i is s engaged ongaged in i n moving moving supplies s u p p l i e s into i n t o Pyongyang Pyongyang for for an a n unidentified unidentified superior a u p e r i o r unit u n i t or o r organization. organization.
No serious s e r i o u s shortage s h o r t a g e of w l in t h e Communist ndicated of f fuel the Communist armies armies has has been been iindicated since s i n c e the t h o early e a r l y days days of o f the tho war. war.
12. 12.
Wirth Korean b battalion lists its food supply as as o of 17 February: The North attalion l ists i ts f o o d su f 1 7 Februar I The r i t y Regimen 3 r d Battalion'in Battalion i n a ti message to t o the t h e 7th 7 t h Railway eported 3rd Rarlway Security Regiment r reported the hand'as of 17 February." Over 90,000 t h e quantity q u a n t i t y of foodstuffs f o o d s t u f f s "on "on hand' as o f 1 7 February." 90,000 kilograms 46,219 k kilograms of Gleaned oleaned r rioe k i l o g r m s were listed, l i s t e d , including i n c l u d i n g 46,219 i l o g r m s of i o e and 15,342 (SUEDE 15,342 kilograms lcilograms of o f vegetables. vegetables. (SUEDE 501st 6Olat Comm Corn Reoon Reoon Co Co Korea, SK-G-539, SK-G-539, 18 18 Feb 52) 52)
+!
Cornenti This unit is i s believed believed t o b e based between Comment: to be between Wonsan Wonsan and Hamhung Hamhung on ttiGeTZTCoast. on h x c o a a t . The amount amount of of supplies s u p p l i e s indicated i n d i c a t e d would would be be sufficient suffiaient support the the battalion b a t t a l i o n for f o r about about three t h r e e months. months. It to t o rupport s possible, p o s s i b l e , however, however, It i is t hat t h e unit is that the i s only o n l y serving aervlng a a line l i n e of of communications oommunioations function f u n c t i o n and and that that t h e s e supplies s u p p l i e s are a r e not n o t intended intended for f o r that t h a t unit's u n i t ' s consumption. oonsumption. these
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Soviet interceptor interceptor technique in Korean Korean air air war improves: Soviet technique in improves:
USA Air Force 3 3 a, US i r Force

18 Feb 52 18 52 SUEDE SUEDE
if-014-44-7 >se, .
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A of proficiency has hasbeen been developed developed A high high degree degree of by Soviet GCI GCI by Soviet Soviet personnel personnel operating on the Soviet tn northwestern net in northwestern Korea, Korea, according to afleld afield of intercepted voice traffic. analysis of
improvement in intactics, tactics, in In Comment: This improvement addition to to demonstrating demonstrating tthe7FiacWality of Soviet Sovietradar radar equipment, equipment, indiindiaddition h e n q u a l i t y of cates that valuable to to Soviet Soviet radar radar oper operthat the the lessons lessonsof ofcombat combat have have proved proved valuable ators ators as a swell well as a s to to Russian Russian pilots. pilots.
The tracking large UN air The ground ground controllers, controllers, tracking large UN air or four four UN aircraft to break formations, now now wait for elements of two two or UN aircraft break off off from the the major major group groupbefore before ordering orderingthe theSoviet-piloted Sovlet-piloted MIG-15's MIG-15'sto to attack the smaller smaller elements. elements.
NR 1NR
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organization warns against INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM. New Zealand labor The New Zealand Federation of Labor Australian Communiat Youth Carnival; Carnival for Peace and warned trade nnions againet supporting the Youth 15 to 23 March on the Friendship scheduled to be held in Sydney from and "a campaign for the grounds that "it is a child of the Cominform" 12 Feb 5?) (REBIS sort of peace the Communists want." Government has decided to ban the entry Comment: The Australian according to a Moscow of all "undesirable delegates" to the Carnival, Communist inbe applied to prominent broadcast. This definition could but probably would also vitees such as Howard Fast and Paul Robeson, accepted invitations to the be used against the 40 Chinese said to have discouragements, plus the opposition of the affair. Despite these the Carnival Organizing ComAustralian Confederation of Trade Unions, entertain "cultural and sportcontinuing plans to mittee apparently is of the Pacific." ing groups from all nations, especially the countries reported to be opposiA main point to be stressed at the Carnival was present in Communist prevailing subject at tion to military training, a youth activity. first day; According to ALBANIA. Second state loan oversubscribed issued for the sum of 300 Radio Tirana the second Albanian state loan leks on the first day. million inks waS oversubscribed by 20 million foreigners livoptional and Albanians, Subscriptions to the loan were Proceeds could subscribe. ing in Albania, and Albanians living abroad and health services of the issue will be used to extend educational and the oil refinery at Cerk and to build the Mat River power station 18 Feb 52) CR FBIS in southern Albania.
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address on 15 FebruarTpleading government loan.
3.
leader calls for a united YUGOSLAVIA. Exiled Yugoslav Cominformist In an article appearing in front of all anti -Titoists in Yugoslavia: Yugoslav exile leader, the 8 February issue of the Cominform Jburnal, a Pere'Popivoda, calls the Yugoslav Air Forcer, former deputy commander of of the peoples of Yugofor the formation of a "united liberation front woad be included not only all working slavia." Within this framework
will conduct lotteries to help Comment: The Albanian Government loans. Vice Premier Tuk Jakova pay off its indebtedness on the state suspicion since the Febwho has been rumored to be under a aloud of Legation, delivered a radio ruary 1951 bomb explosion at the Soviet with the workers to support the latest
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and, to a strata in town and countryside Popivoda supports his people but "even the middle bourgeoisie.," of the national history of the international degree, a section stating.that "the of this kind is essential united front appeal by teaches that a unified front (U Bucharest, Cominform labor movement struggle for liberation." in a revolutionary Journal, 8 Feb 52) which aspect of the Popivoda article, apnea' to is its Comment: The significant February issue of Pravda, for the organization in the 10 also appeared in Yugoslavia of a Comin virtually all anti-Titoist elements This is the first instance Yugoslavia to overmovement. of a revolutionary of a united front in confidence in the form appea/ for the,formation appeal implies a lack of organization and its appeal among throw Tito. This unusual Cominform strength and ability of the the populace in Yugoslavia.
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tian settlement: a politica a nformed the American'Ambassador in London that a. , ng v ser o reduction of the number of British troops,in the Canal zone to the figure specified in the 1936 treaty would give Egypt a boost in morale. This would enhance the possibility of gaining full cooperation from all the Arab States in the defense of the Middle East.
EGYPT.
Farouk's advi er offers su
estions fer A
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warned that the oontinued impasse had enabled the Soviet Union to increase its propaganda activity in Cairo and that this had had a marked effect upon the simple Egyptian public. He added his belief that Egyptian Prime Minister Ali Maher might not be able to continue in office if he did not soon show some suocess in solving this problem. (S London 3581, 18 Feb 52)
upsets IRAN, International Bank representative's, departure frem Iran that the Iranian Senate's British: The British Foreign Office'fears interest in an oil settlement Might abate while International Bank.Vice President Garner is in London and that upop his return negotiations might have to be resumed from the beginning.

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He added that if Great Britain made the gesture. of formally scheduling the departure of its remaining forces in the Suez Canal zone, the Egyptian Government woUld probably permit some British troops to remain Until Egyptian replacements could be trained and equipped. Re also stressed the importance of recognizing the symbolic tie between the crown of Egypt and the Sudan.
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The American Embassy in London pointed out to the Foreign Office that the Bank's representative, in order to convince the Iranians that he WRE3 not aoting for Britain, smst make a determined effort to negoti(S London 3583, 18 Feb 52) ate with it.
The intervention of the Iranian Senate in an effort to Comment: keep lielalitions going has aroused some hope that the International Bank might be able to find an interim solution for the oil problem. Any plan acceptable to Iran, however, Would still have to be negotiated with Britain, and that country so far has given little indication that it is willing suffioiently to modify its demands.
3.
tactics in faoe PHILIPPINES. Communists Put new stress on infiltration 1952, it In Communist Party documents of January of, admitted setback: the clean was recognized that the movement had received a setback due to
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INDOCHINA. French claim progress in delta clearing operationss The French Tonkin Command states that a 16 February attaok on the Viet Minh 320 Division, which has beer renfiltrating the delta, has achieved "success in the initial phases." The French hope that the entire operation, except for mopping up, will be completed by the end of the week or sooner. A Viet Minh attaok in regimental strength on Hos Binh on 17 February apparently was designed to take advantage of the employment of Freneh reserves against the 320 Division. (0 Hanoi 575, 18 Feb 52)
Comments One of the prinnipal weaknesses of the French military position in Tonkin, as Marshal De Lattre noted, is the lack of Vietnamese forces capable of occupying anu holding areas cleared by the French. Clearing operations undertaken by the French last October at a very heavy cost in personnel were declared "successful" at that time, but were subsequently nullified by Viet Minh reinfiltration during December and January. The Viet Minh attack of 17 February appears to display a degree of coordination which does not bode well for the success of current French clearing operations.
election in November end the goVernment's campaign against the Hulce, Both developments were attributed to the presence of "American imperialists" in the Philippines. Asserting that the progress of Communism in the Philippines was contingent upon the success of liberation movements everywhere, the documents emphasized the need for so-called "legal activity" in the key industries, the armed forces, labor, and organizations of students, intellectuals and professional workers. Comments The documents are interpreted to mean that the party intends.to establish a secure underground. The reduced emphasis on military struggle and the stress on more careful preparation of the party for seizui-e of power indicates thRt the party is either assessing its faults wisely or getting good advice. There is obviously a wide gap, however, between preparing the order and its consummation. Lack of ca able cadres is implicit throughout the documents,
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w o o served the Bombay International Exposition held in January, that the USSR and Communist China had the largest exhibits in terms of floor space. China, along with several other Communist countries, displayed a complete line of maohine tools, including compressed air equipment items which were exact oopies of American models and as good as the originals. "A superb replica" of an American portable jackhammer was also shown. Prices of these items were not available. The observer concl ded that these exhibits clearly demonstrated China's ability to copy.
stated
Communist China exhibited well-made co ies of American tools at
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demonequipment in Korea has also Chinese-made goods, and in the Comments Captured ability to copy American-manufactured necessary. strated China's eqUipment, to improvise when (lase of electronic
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The "17 Mixed reported motives is based at Taichou North Kiangsu Airbeae Command Airbase Command" four YAK79 fighters, Group" under the "North Kiangsu TAK-10 fighters, with five Aircraft of. this unit Airfield. It is equipped planes, and one TU-2 bomber. using airfields at two reoonnaissance from 11 to 17 January, Kiangsu made several practice flights All of these are and Nantung. Taiohou, Huaiyin
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A reKorea on 10 Februarys sighted over February in Record number of MIC's sighted by UN aircraft on;10 -15's were few enemy cord number of 366 MIG From 11 to 15 rebruary relatively while maintethe Korean combat area. The Far East Air Force noted that the enemy has aircraft were observed. have caused the slump, problems may number of days. over a nance or fuel supply sustained a high operational effort in the past 5819, 1155Z, 19 Feb 52) (S CINCFE Telecon SECRET 20 Feb 52 5
transferred to the President's activities Political D.7=--intelligence Nationaliet work has been removed from-the Section of office, Most intelligence National Defense to. the Materials Chiamg Chingpartment of the Ministry of Department, reoffice, according to Political the President's son and chief of the resulted President's elder This move kuo, the intelligence activities. Political Department, mains in charge of these into the American advisers from the intrusion of Kai-shek is that President Chiang known official states as the A Nationalist coordinating and policy group of the two intelligence directing an This committee is composed including Committee." units on Formosa, "Taiwan Information all intelligenoe officers from hundred ranking the PoliticalDepartment. by Chiamg Materials Section was established demands for Although the Comments allegedly in response to American since then August 1951, Kai7shek in this is the first report Political Department, abolition of the concerning the Section. appointed American adviser was suggestion, an At Chiang Ching -kuo's Department in December 1951. to the Political
Huaiyin identified at Taiohou, while have been The only strips. Commant: No airfields had only small dirt lending last report Hsuchou. Province is at and NEES-Figat North Kiangsu known large airfield in
(S
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January the number of jet aircraft Comment: During December and averaged about 200 per flying day, encountered by UN fighters over Korea maintaining. However, MC -15's a rate which the enemy is apparently they did in December. seldom penetrate as fa; into Korea now as
in Korea: UN espionage and KOREA. Russians link MBA to UN operations to the 100 million dollar bacteriological warfare in Korea were linked encouraging SOviet defections; Mutual Security Agency appropriation for despite Korea. It W8.13 stated that in in a 15 February Soalet broadcast in and to conduct espionage intensive UN efforts to organize resistance against the "American imperialist" North Korea, the people have arisen 52) agents. (U PSIS ticker, 15 Feb appropriation has provided propaganda fuel Comments While the MSA this is the first reference linking in thnTirTrat Orbit fo sore time, in the Far East. VSA appropriations to UN operations
9.

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2.
The measures against Communist strikers: Government takes strong to FRANCE. Government is determined U5-57gassy in Paris believes that the French political strikes and sabotage in enforce "rigorous sanctions" against Defense has already dismissed several strategic industries. The Ministry of government-owned plants for participating in the hundred workers from strike of 12 February. Communist protest Communist-sponsored political state-owned Renault works, demonstrations are expected, especially in the The non to assure freedom of work. where police are taking precautions strikers, who sanctions against Communist unions warn that such arbitrary help the Comwitnesses, would were not given a chance to speak or present 52) (C Paris 5068, 18 Feb munists recoup their lost prestige.
strengthening its hand government has been Comment: For some time the political program.by following for dealing forcefully with the Communists' "legitimate" economic demands. a more conciliatory policy on labor's
of budget debate: French French treasury depleted by postponement be barely able to meet February Ministry of. Finance officials expect to have to request an increase expenditures and fear that the government may the Bank of France to cover March in the ceiling on direct advances from 1952 fiscal that Parliament fails to vote the (C obligations. For each month expenditures. percent short of will fall about ten program,,revenues Paris TOMOS 160, 14 Feb 52)
3.

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police crisis in attempt to upset city to use GERMANY. Politicians use Berlin elements in West Berlin are trying governmenti Certain political the coalition city department to upset Democrats away the present dispute in the police Democrats and Free government, by splitting the Christian conflict The dispute, arising from a personal from the Social Democrats. to decrease popular confidence action between top police officials and threatening died down had it not been for the in the force, would probably have former Deputy Mayor Friedensburg of some leading politicians, particularly in a coalition govermnent from and others who might hope to come to power (C Berlin unnumbered, eliminated. which the Social Democrats have been 11 Feb 52) has given a Christian Democratic dissident Comment: The police scandal to harass its antagonists in element, led by Friedensburg, an opportunity present circumstances Friedensburg is and out of the party; but under theDemocratic support to overthrow the city not likely to get enough Christian government.
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trade officials feel relations remain terms of trade, Austrian DesPite deteriorating considerations, present trade to sever trade that, apart from strategic that the only alternative is Greatly They assert Czechoslovakia as well. with advantageous. Poland, but because most of the relations not only with exports in 1951 are defended of other manuThe inclusion expanded iron and steel volume of deliveries. consisted of pig iron justified as reducing the Soviet Enterincrease agreement is exports from factures under the trade unrequited possible Polea as prices reaching the try to exact the highest of Such Materials The Austrians aasert that under-invoicing Austria. prises in believes officials Embassy The US Embassy price for for their exports, and controls is negligible. be the necessary evade exchange deliveries mai exporte.to Austrian Vienna 1802, 16 Jan 52; 1787, 15 Jan 52; S to in general that current (0 to Vienna Satellite coal. 2674, 15 Feb 52) S Vienna The Vatican Ambassador: prospect of German AMbassador to the Vatican ueicom6s appointment of a West German Bonn last spring. 5. VATICAN. to irefores the prospective the Papal Nuncio appointed apparently been tacitly exchange for relations has Hely See in Concordat of 1934 of diplomatic valid The rerestablishment parties on the basis that the that the Concordat is agreed upon by both The Vatican's position is boundaries are continues in force, by Germany until new avoids the then covered The Holy See thus for the entire area agreement. of which involve the established by international and boundaries, the most important of Germany into East the division problemd of national border, and Saar, the Poliah-German West. difficulties in Germany. causing adbassador is of an influential'Catholic The appointment been sent; but the has traditionally
more for it.
A. Protestant

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1952 take up again the Assembly is expected to for tax revision and in the Comment: The National but Padre's program Any increase budgeb in the coming week, considerable opposition, serious under present reform faces would be of France postwar trend administrative the Bank of the deiling on advances by probably lead to a.reversal conditions and economic borrowing by the government. away from inflationary terms: DS defended despite unfavorable estimates that Trade agreement of Commerce with Department to Austria during 4. AUSTRIA:-POtAND. in Vienna agree less favorable Embassy officials increased supplies bedome progressively trade with Poland has Not only have the Poles extracted return for smaller Austria in part by the the past two years. goods, and wood from done this in steel, metal but they have of iron, coal and sugar, Austrians received During 1951, the 1.4 million dollars Polish shipments of coal prices. but paid simple manipulation of Poland than in 1950, coal from one-third less
'
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Ambassador. Catholic populatioh of lest Germany has demanded a Catholic their own representative, are groups in Bavaria, which prior to 1934 sent its own representative, or be allowed to send asking that either Bavaria representative. German a Bavarian Catholic be sent as West Germany's Italy is a Catholic, Protestants point out that since the Ambassador to Adenauer, already under See. a Protestant should be sent to the Holy the issue,from becoming Protestant fire on a number of issues, wants to keep (Factual data from: send a Protestant. a_political controversy and may C to Berlin 513, 20 Dec 51; 5 Feb 52) eb 52; R. FBI'S C to Munich 232, 21 Nov 51; R FBIS 25X1A 25X1A
question: The US Embassy in UNITED KINGDOM. British considering Sudan Secretary Eden is still reluctant to recognize London believes that Foreign before the Sudanese are in a position to decide Farouk as King of the Sudan suggested that the question be for themselves. The Foreign Office has and that meanwhile postponed until a Sudanese parliament is established to discuss the matter. The Foreign some high-ranking Egyptian go to the Sudan British AMbassador in Cairo and Office, noting that discussions between the that the latter is still the Prime Minister have not yet begun, believe (S London 3586, 18 Feb 62) settlement. drafting proposals for a
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that some concessions must be Comment: Eden is now believed to agree indication that he is willing made on the Sudan issue, but there is still no to meet all of Egypt's demands.
7.
British rumored to be negotiating transfer of Iraq bases: of the Iraq Air Force Britain is negotiating to turn over to tfiTe control to widely 'circulated the tWo RAF bases at Habbaniya and Shaiba, according Iraq would remain under rumors in Baghdad. The RAF units stationed in the US Army Attache in Baghdad In view of the rumors British command. of the Commander considers significant the visit to Iraq in early February for 20 February in Chief cif the RAF in the Middle East and that scheduled (S USARMA land Forces. by the Commander in Chief of the British Middle East Baghdad BD 020, 18 Feb 52) confirm such a British plan, which Comment: There is no evidence to defense problems. RAF is similar to earlier UK proposals on Anglo-Egyptian Anglo-Iraqi Treaty, which units are stationed in Iraq under the terms of the is on record as The Iraqi Prime Minister remains in force until 1955. British had three favoring revision of the treaty. As of 1 October 1951 the two bases. fighter squadrons and one bomber squadron at the
admission to ECE: The Swedish SWEDEN. Government favors delay on German the US delegate that Sweden prefers that 271-7.te to the ECE has informed
8.

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the "German issue" not' be raised at the forthcoming plenary session. Sweden would feel obliged to support the admission of East Germany as mell as West (C Geneva 599, 15 Feb 52) Germany to a consultative status.
_ Comment: Sweden has not recognized the East German Republic, but evidently considers that ignoring it completely in a matter not involving actual recognition might make Sweden appear too pro-Western in its orientatim,
9.
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Comment: Other sources indicate that the Sultan is adopting a less conci iatory policy in dealing with the French Resident General.
. .
10.
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC. Marine Corps to be formed: The Chief of the Dominican Navy General Staff, Commodore Cesar De Windt, has advised the UN Naval Attache that a small Marine Corps will be formed in 1952, The Marines will serve as Although militarily there is dPecial security guards and as fleet marines. no real .reason for a Marine Corps at this time, its formation does constitute (R HQ USARFANT NA WIS 3-52, 18 Jan 52) an important prestige factor.
activities in Guatemala: GUATEMALA. Czechs show interest in commercial Documents obtained by the US Air Attache in Guatemala show the close intereet of the Czech Legation in Mexico in firms handling Czech products in Guatemala. Pro-Communists in the Guatemalan Government are reportedly fadilitating the importation of Czech goods. Last November the Czech Minister to Mexico, accompanied by his Commercial Attache, visited Guatemala; there they allegedly conferred with several Eastern European nationals who are acting as commercial agents for the Czechs. At least one shipment of arms of Czech origin arrived in Guatemala last October. While the proceeds from the sale of Czech goods are allegedly used for Communist activities in Guatemala, it is believed that the primary motivation of the Czechs is (Factual data from: C Guatemala to help alleviate their dollar shortage. 22 Oct 510 19 Dec 51, and 2 Jan 52; City IR-118-510 IR-145-51, and IR-3-52, U Guatemala City Desp. 530, 19 Nov 51)
11.
MOROCCO. Sultan ado ts policy of non-cooperation: The Sultan of Morocco that he would not approve any allegedly told under way for a new French-Moroccan political reforms until negotiations were adamant, While denying that the Sultan has been so treaty. in Rabat told the US Consul that France was not contemplating a if France revision of the Protectorate Treaty. Tunisian treaty, it would have toTollow suit in were obliged to revise the from Tunisian developments. Morocco because the Sultan was taking his cue the possibility of the Sultan's agreement to Morocco's entrY into the French Union, even in return for.major concessions, was_mishful (C Tangier Weeks 57, 1 Feb 52) thinking.
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reports, Aceorlding to press purchasing reported: of the USSR are and of bananas Tabasco, representatives Veracruz, MEkICO. USSR'purcheses state that in'Veracruz in the states of authorities tons of bananas" "thoueands of (NY), 14 Feb 52) to propaganda move (U La Prensa could be a Campeche. associated if made, trade. An purchasing Such purchases, increasing East-West the vssR Comment: of efforts ,of "a Russian shipment via reported the desirability for called at a recently emphasize ixtle fiber might be the vessel has such a non-strategic development No Soviet arrival of in.Mexico to buy28 or 30 January." the recent agent mid-1950 and vessel due in Tampico port since not been reported. Western Hemisphere
12.
vessel at
13.

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made: Despite agreement the military on bilateral Odria had approved President accordance in Surprise counterproposal Minister that 'PERU. representatives February by the Foreign Peruvian on 14 and of Staff an assurance negotiated by US important new pbints Act, the Army Chief Military plan containing Security significance counterproposal to ascertain the with the Mutual agreement the army-navy-air ia trying presented an the signing of The US Ambassador of difference. Pending clarification, Feb 52) of the new proposal. (S Lima 491, 14 chosen countries postponed. must be Latin American Mutual Security Act eight with the with the Negotiations in accordance and possibly Cuba. Comment: military agreements except in Ecuador for bilateral smoothly progressed have not
Tampico has
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US OFFICIALS ONLY
46
primarily reports has been prepared It does of significant This summary of Current Intelligence. of the Office reports in CIA for the internal use of all current represent coverage the not represent a complete Comments Intelligence. Current or in the Office ofof of Curreni Intelligence. immediate views the Office

TO THE DAILY DIGEST
outside 0/CI Not for dissemination
and 0/NE.
TOP SECRET
SECURPIT INFORMATION
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coalition governsupport from withdrai Minister Plastirasl hesitates to alarmed at Prime in overleader Venizelos is take the initiative meager GREECE. Minority 1. Minister by the Deputy Prime but is unwilling to ment: also discouraged coalition. He is government the Venizelos is conduct of of the regime. a Rally-Liberal doubts that many throwing the present made in proposing although he 3758, 15 Feb Papagos has offers which with the Rally, (S S/S Athens into such a coalition. continuing to negotiate follow him Liberals would is maintained government 52) who fears coalition Venizelos, -Liberal leader both by The present EPEK minority favored of Liberal Comment: system, cooperation political the majority primarily by the Liberals as a topto accept would be held Under the yet willing that new elections and thus eliminate include Venizelos is and Papagos, that that since they also Plastiras however, coalition, possibility unlikely, remains the Rally-Liberal party. It is for a under the system. There conditions new elections into small factions Papagost elections on the majority will order falls it politics eventual government divide Greek would again when the present potential. system. This improve the Communist proportional and would presumably interest in royal King arouses Arabian illness of Saudi King Ibn Saud, who occasionaliflapses regarding Long illness of speculation SAUDI ARABIA. 2. continuing considerable The state, has arousedArabia. successor: semi-comatose in Saudi into a developments already designated political future the King has Saud should Jidda, Hare in reconsiders, to King Ambassador opposition Unless the to rumored According after successor. deSpite as his test would come difficulty undue greatest Crown Prince Saud without SaudIs control a political succeed to the throne however, that Prince difficult to under the uultrabelieves, would be for it him. Hare the seams" power, 438, 17 Feb 52) been ',cracking at his accession to which has already Ibn Saud. (S S/S Jidda course situation rule of the aging over the probable forceful speculation sudden. Internal considerable should be his popular There has been death to consolidate and Comment: Arabia if Ibn Saud's attempted Government Prince in Saudi Arabian the Crown would of events the Saudi Saud increase as since the younger friction between tensions might Nest, other hand, and the On the might diminish, support. between his country American Oil Company relations the Arabian attempt to strengthenconsiderable friendliness. probably he has exhibited toward which

TOP SECRET
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fled when filled in formrff tie ac ed rom colt girVadiJment.
istpArt
os,ggarii,erArsiftsizenttprottemiestotsoutdo or declassi-

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1. 1.

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10, 10.
11. 1 1 .
12.
S o v i e t MIG's MIG's fly fly from from Tetungkou Tatungkou to t o Mukden: Mukdan: Eight Soviet Eight "allied" "a3.liod'' MIG-15's M1G-15'~ f l e w from Tatungkou on on the t h e Korean Korenn border border to t o Mukden Mukden on on 16 1 6 February, February, and and flew Waill;TUngkou a similar similnr flight flight was was noted noted in inthe t h e late lateafternoon Rfternoonof o fthe t h e.19th. J9th. a The The r e p o r t i n g agency agency comments comments that t h a t these t h e s e flights f l i g h t s are are not designated as as reporting not designated and Soviet Soviot MIG-15's M1E.15'~ are are known known to to be be based based at a t Tatungkou. Tatungkou. (SUEDE moves, and (SUZDE 6920th Security Seourity Group, Group,,Johnson Johnson AB AB Japan, Japan, SG SG 429, 429, 19 19 Feb Feb 52) 52) 6920th
21 Feb 52 52 21
c_
1W SECRET SUED2r
A reoently r e o e n t l y observed observed shift s h i f t in i n the t h e flight flight pattern pattern of o f MIG's BIIIG's Commonti A Comment: over Korea Rorea'sug ;est8 t h a t some some enemy enemy planes plaries are.now are now flying flyingto t o.combat combat over sug ;este that from fields f i e l d s in i n the the interior i n t e r i o r of o f Manohuria and and are are staging s t a g i n g through Tatungkou from o r Antung. Antung. Flights of or of Soviet MIG's MIG's from Tatungkou to t o Mukden, Mukden, never p r e v i o u s l y noted, noted, may may be be part p a r t of o f this this new new flight flight pattern. pattorn. previously

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(page 5).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
2. 3.
Chou En-lai states Chinese attitudes on Korean truce talks (page 3). Korean president resorts to force to intimidate political, opposition
Parts of Yunnan Province declared a military zone (page 6).
Egyptian Prime Minister may recommend temporary suspension of Parliament (page 7). Greek situation not expected to improve (page 7).
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2.
Chou En-lai states Chinese attitudes on Korean truce talks:
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Chinese Communist Premier Chou En-lai, in a talk on 12 February with Indian Ambassador Panikkar in Peiping, stated that a Korean armistice could be achieved if Peiping were satisfied that the United States had no "aggressive intentions." Chou
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specified that early agreement on the withdrawal of foreign troops would be viewed as demonstrating United States intentions. He saggestedthat all nations involved in the Korean conflict should be included in a postarmistice conference on other Far Eastern questions.
returned to Peiping two weIR-gc7reportedly was instructed to urge the Chinese Communists to agree to a reasonable truce in Korea. Panikkar's report of his interview with Chou adds nothing to Peiping's
Comment:
The Indian Ambassador, who
3.
Korean President resorts to force to intimidate political opposition:

A crisis of serious implications has developed in the struggle for power between President Rhee and the Korean National Assembly, Ambassador Muccio reports. On 18 February the President's campaign of "crude intimidation" reached a climaxwhen his cohorts attempted to storm the Assembly.
Provoked by the Assembly's rejection of an important bill, Rhee has been trying to secure the recall of opposition assemblymen through the use of scurrilous posters and the collection of signatures by armed Youth Corps squads. The National Assembly, "angered and shocked," has placed the blame for the campaign and the 18 February riot squarely on Rhee.
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Comment: President Rhee must reach an agreement, either through rFolOrcompromise, with the National Assembly prior to its election of a Korean President in June.

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public statements that the Korean negotiations depend upon UnitedStates "sincerity," that withdrawal of foreign troops from korea is .essential to a settlement, and that other Far Eastern questions must be discussed in post-armistice talks.
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Parts of Yunnan Province declared a military zone:
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The Swiss Minister in Peiping is quoted as stating that western and southern Yunnan Province, bordering on Burma and Indochina, was declared a "military zone" in early January. Foreign nationals, including Swiss and French missionaries, were evacuated.
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rather than Indochina.
5.
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Comment: I large numt ers of Chinese Communist troops in southern Yunnan have been moving for several weeks toward Burma
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NEAR EAST - AFRICA

6.
Egyptian Prime Minister may recommend temporary suspension of Parlfament:
Prime Minister Ali Maher has stated that if

25X1A
the Wafd Party continues to oppose the government-proposed "assistance" of five million Egyptian pounds (approximately fourteen
million dollars) to victims of the January riots, he will ask King Farotik to suspend Parliament for one month.
The American Ambassador in Cairo believes that the Wafd Party is attempting to avoid any implication of responsibility for the January riots and to prevent the discharge of Wafd members now in the government.
The distinction between suspension and dissolution of Parliament indicates that Ali Maher is being cautious in approaching a show-down with the Wafd. The Constitution provides that both houses may be adjourned by the King for one month and may not be continued in adjournment without agreement of both chambers. The Chamber of Deputies may be dissolved, but elections must then be held within two months.
Comment:
7.
Greek situation not expected to improve:
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The American Embassy in Athens believes thid the present Greek Government is unlikely to provide the firm leadership required to overcome economic and political difficulties. Moreover, the King and Deputy Prime Minister Venizelos will not move to overthrow the government except under strong American pressure. Strong American support of any party or faction would only arouse animosity against the United States and make it difficult for Greece to obtain the desired stability.

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has done little to facilitateThronomic rehabilitation of Greece, and its policy of releasing political prisoners has troubled the American Embassy.
In view of Venizelos' fear that new eiections under the majority system would eliminate his Liberals as a political force, there is a possibility that the government will decree new elections under the proportional system. This would continue the present political tradition of a multitude of factions working at cross-purposes.
Comment:
The present coalition government
25X 1
8.

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12. 12.
KOREA. KOREA. North North Korea Korea continues oontinues munitions munitions production: production: A A badly badly garbled garbled t Sinuiju irORE Korean mebsagd o of f 1 16 6 FFebruary ebruary mentioned mentioned an uaraenal" "arsenal" a at Korean meet:laze and mother anotherat at an an Unidentified W d e n t i f i e d location. location. Two Two thousand thousand armor-piercing armor-piercing and sh6Ils were on on hand hand at a t the the Sinuiju Binuiju arsenal arsenal on on this t h i s date. date. (SUEDE (SUEDE shells 330th Comm Corn Reoon Reoon Co Co Korea, gore&, AIX-274, Am-274, 19 1 9 Feb Feb 52) 52)
manufacturComment: Comment; In In June June 1950 1950 North North Korea Korea had seven seven installations inatal,lations menufso-kuring i n g hilia-ERnades,-mortar h-nades, mortar shells, shells sub-machine sub-machine guns, guns, mnall-arms amall-ame mamunition, anrunition, mortars, gunpoWter, gunpowder, and and parts part6 for f o r small small arms, arms, all all in in limited limited quantities. quantifiae. Despite Deepito the the nearly nearly total t o t a l deetrUction defttruotion of of four four of of these these installations i n s t a l l a t i o n s and and severe damage much of:their damage to t o the the others, othera, the t h e Communists Communists were were able able to t o morie move much o f their equipment into i n t o underground underground facilities f a c i l i t i e s prior prior to t o the the retreat r e t r e a t of of Ootober Ootober 1950. 1960. CommUnications CommuniQationa intelligence i n t e l l i g e n c e and and other other sources source8 haVe havo confl,rmed confirmud the continued oontinued small-eoah manufaoture of of munitions munitiona during during 1951. 1951.

7
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SECURITY INFORmATIoN
25 February 1952
US OFFICIALS ONLY
OCI No. 3879

Copy No. 2 5 1
DAILY DIGEST


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sEcuR ITY INFORMATION
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SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
1.
Soviet Union re lies to East_permannoere,rarisv-,eacerea: USSR. Government on 20 February, the Soviet In a note-to the East German cenclusion of a peace treaty with Union stated that it regards the decisions and the participation
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2.
'
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According to 'Radio Athens, Ithnendink currency reform rumored: BULGARIA. thirty Russians are studying the it has beenlaported from Sofia that io pegging, the lev to the Soviet currency in Bulgaria with a view 18 Feb 52) (R FBIS ruble.
Legation in Bucharest reOn 10 February, the American Bulgarian notes were Comment: ported that, according to an informant, new No other reports concerning an currently being printed in Bucharest. reform have yet beenieceived, though impending Bulgarian currency expected as a result of the Rumanian rumors of this type might be recently been prevalent in Czechoslovakia, revaluation. Such rumors have Hungary, and East Germany.
,
3. CigligaA,
Government hat ordtred maximum culturalLmEsEum: The Czechoslovaz techniques for the spring sowing this use of impreved agricultural raise over 1951 figures in agriyear in order to meet a 15 percent raise in delivery quotas. The 'cultural production and a 17 percent yields for land already under cultiemphasis is on increated average Agriculture will be responsible for organizing vation. The Ministry of agriculture. competition in the socialized sector of cultivation in villages withThe government also urged dollective public meetings to discuss advantages out cooperatives and will arrange Embassy in Prague villaget. The American of collective work in such in the tem o of collecindicates an increase 13 Feb 52) states that this program 15 Feb 52; R IBIS 11111111 (S Weeka No. 7 Prague, tivization.

Government ordez_n_nasures
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Germany in accordance with the Potsdam ReplYing to the negotiations as necessary. of Germany in the peace the four occupation powera, the East German note of 13 February to everything possible indicated that the USSR would do restoration nf Soviet note further peace.treaty and:the to expedite the conclusion ofa expects the other powers to take correGerman unity. The Soviet Union 20 Feb 52) (R FBIS Spending steps. specific proposals., this formal Comment: Althetgh not 'Offering does not preclude an approach to Soviet reply to the East Gerthan note question. the four powers on the German treaty
io meet_sflim_egIl=
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is still government to undershow that the measures compulsion The present and Indirect infer an increase Comment: of persuasion peasant; but to the basis of applying a combination independent unjustified on the position of seems to be mine the collectivization of in teMpe in agricultural the evidence. increase seeks an iMmediate take positive measures that it will now been any significant Since the government the last it is not likely There has not during production, collectivized force to achieve to increase collectivization. of land actually direct the amount etployed increase in has not'yet government year and the this end. The Tito increase in YugoslaVia: Slovenia schools of attacks in the ordered the Anti-religious instruction and has YUGOSLAVIA. religious regions, wAver4. Catholic xegime has forbidden and from their respective predominantly press both faculties provincial and Croatia, the their of all theological Moreover, haVe increased along separation republics. in Slovenia the various articles sities in newspaper Party organizations and A series ofreligion in Yudoslayia. local Communisi against the clergy, the demise of attacks suggest a high lines has predicted Marxist developments that these part of a concerted believe issue as officials revolutionary American the party,s revive the religious building reactivate decision te that the level (C Belgrade party purity and Communists restore Yugoslav regime. effort tt of the order to reassun objective functions,in the principal remains of socialism is not activity 1.0,0, 20 Feb -52) probably increase in anti-Catholic notable that the spirit but is-also The party Comment: Yugoslavia belief in regenerate attempt to to Yugoslav the widespread only:an represents a concession to discredit calculated Stepinac release-of:Archbishop and the West. Catholics
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Parliament members Two Israeli party splits: decided to and have opposition leftist MAPAM, ISRAEL. Leftist party, the oppOsed to the decided have broken with their The two membei-s are (C Tel Aviv 861, form an independent group, by the left wing of MAPAM. slant taken pro-;Communist 21 Feb 52) R FBIS, 21 Feb 52g followed the Communist leftist MAFAM has often Ben Gurion's Comment: The strongly opposition to Prime Minister in the 120-man 15 members the strongest line and is It is losing two of its remaining 13 are opposed coalition government. moreover, some of the The stability of the this action; alignment, Parliament by Communist which may foreshadow to the party's often-displayed by this formal break, is enhanoed present government more splintering. Bechir Saadami has been opposition leader: deported to deports and is being LIBYA. Government Libyan Government Saadawi's National custody by the of 19 February, taken into Libyan elections During the country. The government Egypt. Prime Minister, staged riots throughout the Congress Party according to the Libyan fanaticism into the against him, finally acted inject dangerous religious were Moslems and because he attempted to that his candidates alone Tripoli, the forces in elections by spreading rumors Christians, The securityanticipation of trouble. were that the rest have been reinforced in /426, 22 Feb 52) Saadawi stronghold, 1425, 21 Feb; S Tripoli (0 Tripoli Egyptian money, financed in part by He reportedly Communists. that of the Comment: Saadawi, parallels Western-sponsored a line which and the present has often adopted indicate that governopponent of the West returns is an outspoken for the incomplete Although victory in the elections Government of Libya. captured,by have won a sweeping Tripoli were ment candidates all five seats inputs:him in, direot contact Representatives, House of supporters Saadawi's deportation band of organized his hardcore their sepSaadawi supporters. friepds, while propaganda and with his Egyptian continue their anti-Western may be expected to against the immature Libyan Government. aratist maneuvers
1.
'2.
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'A causing detonstrations in East Pakistan: Language issue 3, PAKISTAN. East Pakistan, on 21 February. general strike was reported in Daooa, national langprotest against the use of Urdu as the meeting of It was called in Police used tear gas to prevent a mass uage in Pakistan* killed and fifteen seriously and university students, four of whom were American Consulate in Dacca, shops (R Karachi injured. According to the trouble is expected. partlyshut down and more services were 884, 21 Feb 52) Minister, although an East Bengali The Pakistani Prime Comment: that Urdu, the language of himse177-7eCently told the East Pakistanis language of the country. This West Pakistan, is to be the official regarding the use of Urdu versus Bengali of touched off a controversy It is heightened by the feelings whioh has been brewing since 1947. government in Karachi ignores their the East Bengalis that the national of any Communist connection culture and interests. There is no evidence Indian Communists of Calcutta who with the strike in Dacoa, but the will presumably not fail to direct the Communist Party of East Pakistan aggravate'the situation. take advantage of the opportunity to
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4.
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forces reported: Burmese Communist BURMA. Deployment of Communist and beyond, into the Mandalay area oes are still moving northward He also stated that he had oImnulflst zurces had requested permission been led to unuerstanc tha to meet territor in Karenni in order from the Karens to cross their General Li Mils Chinese Nationalists. 20 Feb 52)

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l.
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movement of Burmese Communist forces that Burmese Comment: A general northward This is the first report, however, was long ago confirmed* Chinese Nationalists. Communists are preparing to engage the The Mayor of urated: Burma-Soviet Cultural Association inau a urma ov et Cultural Rangoon pres e over a mee ng a wh c Ambassador was one of the chief The Soviet Association was established. professor was elected speakers and a Rangoon University mathematics Its objectives are to promote student president of the Association. visits of cultural groups and that the wide press and teacher exchanges and to facilitate in Rangoon comments exhibits. The American Embassy and that with sufficient funds coverage of this event was favorable, effective Communiat front. (C the Association may develop into an Rangoon 827, 22 Feb 52) cultural and educational exchanges Comment: Heretofore, Burmese West, particularly the United have been almost exclusively with the
5.
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6.
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7.
risoners: anized emory North Korean and Chinese unit whose task KOREA. Communist cells or established a special -of North Korean Army headquarters has and Chinese prisoners North Korean is to organize Communist cells among included in this unit: two are made into war in UN camps. Three companies are soldiers who have been integrated up of well -indoctrinataxl Communist and eventual contheir surrender the front-line troops to make possible third company is composed of girls camps, the finement in prisoner-of-war and Secure work at UN hospitals, or as' who cross front-linos as refugees prostitutes near prisoner-of-war camps.
.
'
to counter UN intelligence operations repatriaThe purpose of this project is hun er strikes, riots and demanding by organizing demonstratio s 25X1A tion of all prisoners. (S confirmed the Operating interrogations have Prisoner-of-war Comment: unit. techniques and mission of this staged in the Koje Island compound on The press has reported a riot repatriation. 22 February over the issue of

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Recently the Burmese Government has States and British Commonwealth. of these activities. There are indicafeel been tightening its regulations neutral foreign policy, it will conformity with its tions that, in oompelled to equallize oultural exchanges. 25X1X 25X1X 25X1X in West China describes travel on new railroad traveled over 1057miles GBINA. Jfl last november looated in to Chengtu, rewas from Ghuttglallg built railroad o rthe partially rail bed as badly laid and travel as West China, He described the The track gauge is one meter. "excruciatingly shaky." 25X1A 17 Dec 51) report from a source who has traveled This is the first Comment: observations conflict with These uncomplimentary of adopting railroad. on this new which stated that as a result Peiping broadcast thernmost firmly an Ootober railway is Soviet methods, "the Chengtu -Chungking oonstruction." Construction of andsched built in the history of Chinese railway 329-mile railroad was begun in mid-1950 this well-publicized uled to be completed this year.
:
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1.
canal lock on Berlin route to West: GERMANY. East Germans plan to close repairs of the East German officials have announced the closing for the Mittelland Canal Grosswusterwitz lock of the Plauer Canal, part of February to 6 March, system linking West Berlin and West Germany, from 22 At first this will US officials in Berlin. according to a report from already hampered by apparently not affect the Mittelland Canal traffic; closing is prolonged beyond ice conditions. Later, however, if the re-routing canal traffic between Berlin and 6 March, it may necessitate the barge trip the West by a longer and inferior route, thus lengthening 52) (C Berlin 1048, 19 Feb by approximately two days.
.
lock in the Mittelland system Comment: The closing of the Rothensee against West comprised one of the major Communist harassing measures six weeks, these "repairs" Originally announced for Berlin during 1951. were dragged out for almost eleven months.
of defense Allies to press Federal Republic for acceptance Eden suggests that US High contribution: British Foreign Secretary immediate favorable Commissioner McCloy press Chancellor Adenauer for financial contribution action on the over-all figure for the West German of the TCC's recommendation for global defense. He says that accaptance contribution would aid the survival of the of a 2.6-billion-dollar Foreign Minister to present French Government and might move the French German security congrant further concessions in such matters as West (S Lisbon SECTO 31, 21 Feb 52) trols. anticipates a,crisis this week Commentl The French Government will not be ameliorated by any aver budgetary problems, which probably Adenauer will have great difficulty obtaining immediate German action. approximate 500-millionparliamentary approval of the TCC figure since an conceptions oi the Federal dollar gap exists between German and Allied Finance Minister Republic's defense bill. Furthermore, the West German If he persists, the report. is trying to arouse public feeling against approval of the TCC Adenauer may find it impossible to ask parliamentary Minister may be persuaded into recommendations. Although the Finance will insist that West accepting the over-all figure in principle, he figure -- particularly Germany be granted large deductions against this for Federal support of West Berlin.
stronger Soviet pressure: AUSTRIA. Austrian officials anticipate Vice-Chancellor Schaerf have informed the US Embassy Chancellor Figl and have received new directives in Vienna that the Soviet Headquarters may
2.
3.

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economic and political position in Austria. to "bolster" the Soviet Union's to be devoted to economic penetration, Special attention, they believe, is exploitation of the unemployment problem. with probable Commissioner) has warned Figl and General Sviridov, the Soviet High Austria Soviet retail establishments in Schaerf that any action against that attack on the' Soviet Union) and intimated support of would be considered an before the Federal Chancellory in n workers" might demonstrate policy with the associates this new these enterprises. The US Embassy of the Soviet Headquarters. recent shake-up in high-ranking personnel 2753, 22 Feb 52) (S Vienna 2752) 22 Feb 52; R Vienna treaty deputies failed Since the scheduled meeting of the Comment: been increasingly bold in denouncing The Soviet to materialize, the Austrians have Soviet economic exploitation. Soviet policy on the treaty and attacks on the Austrian and US Governments authorities reacted with violent and remilitarizing Austria. and their alleged plans for partitioning The French Socialist Socialists crack down on party dissidents: FRANCE. against the Socialist deputies who Party is taking disciplinary action the government on the EDO resolution broke party ranks to vote against probably be expelled from the party only a matter of of 19 February. One deputy will because voting discipline is not which and others suspended, the party's bargaining power, doctrine but also a major element in (R Paris elections. diminished by the last parliamentary was greatly 5133, 21 Feb 52) government support which saved Premier Faure's Comment: The Socialist the Socialists margin in the party caucus, and irreducible conditions was decided by a narrow recommendations are to have made it clear that their Community treaty. Socialist attempts concessions into other for ratification of the Defense solidarity may force the government maintain party that would further weaken the EDC. possible successor to De Lattre: French official s eculates on of various possible successors in General Raoul Salan is the best qualified Commissioner and military commander Indochina. to General de Lattre as High official now in high French acumen Southeast Asia, in the opinion of a has exhibited greater military believes that Salan prestige This official that he has far less political than De Lattre, but considers (S Hanoi 576) 20 Feb 52) than the late commander, in acting as French military commander in Comment: Salm is now extensive experience old, has had He is only 53 years Indochina. reputation of being a successful negotiator. Southeast Asia, and has the
4.
5.

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successor High-ranking Paris sources had indicated earlier that no States has completed would be named until the Minister for the Associated the Minister might receive his investigation tour, and indicated that the appointment himself.
6.
Office This is the first admission by the French Foreign Comment: solution to the present impasse. that no real effort is being made to find a to give the imHautecloque's current instructions appear to be designed Tunisian intransigence is pression that France is being magnanimous while the principal factor barring an agreement.
reappears: Contrary to previNETHERLANDS. Intra-Catholic Party controversy between the left-wing and ous expectations, intra-Catholic Party differences flared up over ecoright-wing groups have not disappeared but have instead threat of a split early in January, the nomic issues. Last June, and again seemed to have been reof the two groups into separate political parties the Socialist remains unreconciled to solved. The right wing, however, wing, representing the real trend of the party's policies, while the left complaints over labor's inaderank and file of the party, has voiced its (S The Hague Desp. 1332, 30 Jan 52) quate share of the national income.
7.
the Catholic Party would lead to its Comment: A formal split within Such a division elimination as the largest single party in Parliament. after the June elections. however, at least until does not seem likely, resentment over what it Labor in general has increasingly expressed economic burden for considers a disproportionately large share of the defense. evident: The Stiffened parliamentary attitude on New Guinea government's article in the Netherlands Lower Chamber has approved the New Guinea within the constitutional revision bill to term the Netherlands amendment to refer to Netherlands Kingdom and has rejected the Socialist It also approved a Catholic New Guinea as a non-self-governing territory.
8.

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unacceptable program to Tunisia: FRANCE-TUNISIA. France proffers admittedly Foreign Office told The Ghief of the Protectorates Division in the French Hautecloque is returning the US Ambassador that Resident General Jean de and to promise "vague to Tunis with instructions to see the Bey privately If Bey's Prime Minister, reforms" in exchange for the dismissal of the Office expects, he will Hautecloque fails in this mission, as the Foreign specific reforms to upon have to wait until the French Government decides well restored, there is now no offer the Bey. Since order has been fairly 52) (S Paris 5145, 22 Feb sense of urgency.
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Party amendment providing that Parliament must give prior approval to any change in New Guinea's legal status. This enforces the present government's commitment to consult Parliament before agreeing to a different status for New Guinea and will restrict the negotiating authority of the post-election The US Embassy at The Hague interprets these developments as a Cabinet. stiffened Catholic and conservative parties' attitude on the New Guinea (C The Hague 866, 20 Feb 52) problem.
Comment: The Netherlands Government has recently reaffirmed its policy to retain interim control over New Guinea. However, the Dutch have proposed international consideration of the issue -- undoubtedly because they are sure of their 'claim to the area. With the June elections for the Lower House not far off, the conservative parties' attitudes also represent a votegetting attempt on Indonesian policy, one of the most important foreign policy issues. The Socialists have always favored a more conciliatory approach.
9.
Italians in Egypt threatened by Egyptian court action: Italy has rejected a note from Egypt to the effect that any Italians found in Egypt The Foreign Office maintains without proper visas will be brought into court. that international practice allows only expulsion of such individuals. It points out that Britain is recruiting laborers for the Canal zone elsewhere than in Italy, notably in Malta which has a large Italian population. It considers it "possible" that some Italians may have been hired. (S Rome 3663, 20 Feb 52)
ITALY.
Comment: Italians in Egypt without Egyptian visas would presumably be those brought in for work in the Canal zone. The late January riots in Cairo have undoubtedly caused Italy to view with an even greater coolness than previously the British proposals for recruiting Italian workers for the Suez
.
area.
10.
those institutions, because Spain's present dollar and gold reserves are so small; and (2) the Spanish multiple rate exchange system, which could be simplified only very slowly. The US Embassy in Madrid feels that Spain's membership is desirable and believes that if US economic aid to Spain is large enough to enable Spain to build up sufficient dollar balances from its own export earnings for the Bank's and the Fund's quota requirements in addition to the necessary working balance of the Spanish Foreign Exchange Institute, the Franco Government will show greater enthusiasm for membership. (S Madrid 890, 19 Feb >2)
SPAIN. Possibilities of Spain's membership in International Bank and Monetary Fund considered: The principal obstacles to Spain's membership in the International Bank and the International Monetary Fund, -according to the (1) the quota requirements of unofficial views of Spanish officials, are:

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11.
12.
Although encoura e schism amon nationalists: Protectorate ofMOROCCO. S anish officials nationalist and conversations between Spanish Moroccan nationalists atmosphere and the ficials have been conducted in a cordial Spanish native affairs without difficulty, have resumed political activity formation of splinter nationalist officials are reportedly encouraging the nationalist party, Islah. the principal parties to offset the influence of 52) (5 Tangier Joint Weeka 59, 14 Feb officials, the bureaucracy responsible for Comment: Native affairs strongly opposed the rapprochement administration at the local level, have and the Spanish Zone nationalists. between the Spanish High Commissioner nationalist leaders have always worked.against The natural jealousies among organization and provide an excellent oppora strong, cohesive nationalist counteract Islah's influence. tunity for the Spanish officials to
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policy toward Formosa predicted by UK UNITED KINGDOM. Friendlier British Tansui, Formosa, told the US Army Attache British Consul there: The British Consul at "definite evidences of a friendlier" on 11 February that he believed evident "in the regime would become policy toward the Chinese Nationalist of the American military colleague near future." The Consul, a wartime copment on his estimate of the present officer, made this remark in requesting Nationalist forces, a situation in condition and military potential of the covering interested. His statement which he said his government is "keenly" agreement with Attache, fair and in these points was, according to the US (S Taipei Joint Weeka 7, 16 Feb 52) recent US analyses. speculation in Britain that Churchill Notwithstanding wide Comment: Far Eastern issues, including Formosa, yielded to US pressure on a variety of plans a "friendlier" attitude no other evidence suggesting that Britain Such a shift in policy under toward the Nationalists has been received. received with grave misgivings on the present conditions would probably be Conservative Party, and be rejected part of a significant portion of the Eden up to now has appeared quite out of hand by Labor. Foreign Secretary bipartisan policy in the Far East. anxious to retain Labor support for a
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TOP SECRET
25 February 1952
US OFFICIALS ONLY
CIA No. 49546
Copy No.46
TO THE DAILY DIGEST
reports has been This summary of significant Current Intelligence. It does for the internal use of the Office of of all current reports in CIA not represent a complete coverage Comments represent the Intelligence. Office of Current or in the immediate views of the Office of Curreni Intelligence.

Not for dissemination outside 0/CI
and 0/NE.
prepared primarily
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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
1.
2.
The American portend more aggressive policies: sensational eharacter Communist riots JAPAN. the nationwide, a reports that occurred on 21 February indicates FaTtical Adviser inlokyo riots" which that the inci He believes of the "anticolonization Japanese Communist Party. Communist Party. by the Japanese test of strength from the aggressive policies dents portend more 52) (C S/S Tokyo 1754, 23 Feb has been anticipated Communist activities in violent for a more militant Comment: An increase 1951 party thesis which called since the adoption of the
policy.
Communist activities. recently has been exaggerating hearings relative to The Japanese press wellpublicized been conducting government attempt Also, the government has suggests a deliberate This emphasis action or to lessen the Communist menace. drastic legislative support for more either to gain increased defense appropriations. criticism against

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of Staff with the West: Syrian Chief military ties that a visit Ambassador in Damascus SYRIA. Syria seeks closer to the American US zone in autumn to the Shishakli has suggested Turkey, similar to one last with Turkey. officers to 'by Syrian moving toward a "parallel policy" and Germany, would help Syria inprovide access to American equipment, methods this matter cooperation in At the same time this would Ambassador believes that US contribution to Middle East The American personnel. edging Syria toward a real would be instrumental in seOurity. to Turkey, states that chief of the US military mission General Arnold, army personnel in Turkey. facilities for training Syrian training would strengthen there are adequate Ankara considers that such between the Syrians Ambassador in advantageous contact The American TurkishSyrian ties as well as provide expected French opposition He also believes that Syrian instructors. attempting to stabilize the and American States from 20 Feb 52) S/S Ankara 793, should not deter the United (S Damascus 476, 18 Feb; military establishment. from various countries in has been seeking arms weight to previous While Shishakli Comment: position, these reports add strengthen his awn sympathetic to the West. Staff is order to Army Chief of indications that the powerful
25 Feb 52
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4. 4.
i m p r e s s i o n 6 of of the t h e North N o r t h Korean guard Comment: The impressions force in in the t h e neutral n e u t r a l zone do not represent r e p r e s e n t high-level h i g h - l e v e l Comforce Comm u n i s t thinking. t h i n k i n g . They do, do, however, however, represent represent a a relatively relatively munist o p i n i o n from from enemy enemy sources. sources. informed opinion
5. 5. re ort on island North Koreans Koreans-reporb: on their t h e i r eaSt east uoast. c w t i s l a n d landing: landing: A s u c c e s s fu ul la ndin g Qn n d on on 20 Fe ebrmary, - ruary, resu resultin g ng ang o i s sl a an an ng on Yangdo success
'
in enemy," was r reported by an unidenunident h e "annihilation'of " a n n i h i l a t i o n ' o f the t h e enemy," e p o r t e d by I n the t i f i e d North Korean naval n a v a l unit. u n i t . The sender s e n d e r admitted, a d m i t t e d , however; however, tified t h a t on another a n o t h e r nearby island i s l a n d the t h e enemy enemy (ROK (ROK marines) m a r i n e s ) were were that .u using heavy f fire " still f ighting s i n g heavy i r e power." power.q' A later l a t e r mesSage message "still fighting s stated t a t e d that t h a t "our '?our eight e i g h t wooden wooden boats boats struck struck a a mine mine and and were were 63 were unexpectedly u n e x p e c t e d l y attacked a t t a c k e d by by two two enemy enemy destrOyers. destrbyers. 6 3 men Were (SUEDE-501st Comm Recon Co CO Korea, Korea, 15RSM/6837 and lost." (SUEDE 5 O b d Corn 15RSMl6831, 24 Feb F e b 52) 52) 15RSM/6831, 24
.
Comment: The attack a t t a c k against a g a i n s t Yangdo, Yangdo, n north o r t h of of S Songjin ongjin in northeastern is the t h e second attempt a t t e m p t on on the t h e part p a r t of of i n n o r t h e a s t e r n Korea, Korea, is the t o eliminate e l i m i n a t e UN guerrilla g u e r r i l l a and and espionage esp$onage the North North Koreans to

a
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.
u n i t continues c o n t i n u e s to to r eport p rogress KOREA. North Korean guard unit report progress t a l k s ; Items I t' e m s three, t h r e e , four f o u r and five r3v e in in the t h e truce truce n u c e talks: IT-riuce n e g o t i a t i o n 6 have have been been progressing p r o g r e s s i n g with w i t h "great "great effect" effect" as a8 of of negotiations 20-February ccording t o a s taff-o f f icer-of 20 February, a according to staff officer of t the North Korean Korean h e North t h e truce t r u c e talks t a l k s area. area. Another message of of r e g i m e n t guarding g u a r d i n g the regiment 22 F ebruary, p r o b a b l y from t h e same s ourcel r eported t hat February, probably the source, reported that v ? h a v i n gseen s e e n their t h e i r (the ( t h e UN's) UN's) great great e n t h u s i a s m today, t o d a y , it i t looks looks "having enthusiasm as if i f there w i l l be an an agreement in i n the t h e truce t r u c e results." rp8ults.s' will (SUEDE 501st 501st Corn Comm Recon Recon Co,Korea, Co,Korea, SK-G-725, SK-G-725, 23 23 Feb; Feb; 330th 330th Comm Comm Co Korea, Korea, ALT-408, ALT-408, 23 23 Feb F e b 52) 52) Recon Co
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bases on on the t h e east east coast. coast. Unlike U n l i k e their t h e i r highly h i g h l y successful auccerasful campaign on on the ,the viSst west coast, coast, both both Communist Communist effort8 efforts have have m met et w i t h failure. Failure. According to press presls accounts, the t h e enemy laudlandwith force of of battalion b a t t a l l o n size s i z e was was repulsed r e p u l s e d with with heavy heavy losses losses ing fOrce t h e battalion-commander battalion commander was was taken taken prisoner. prisoner. and the
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27 February 1952
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06 No. 3881
Copy No.251
USAF review(s) compled., DIA, DOS and JCS review(s) completed.
reports has been prepared pi intarily This summary of significant Intelligence. It does for the internal use of the Office of Current of all current reports in CIA not represent a complete coverage Comments represent the or in the Office of Current Intelligence. immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.

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Nes"
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Rejectnote on UN question: admission its Italian Governreplies to that the USSR is impeding USSR Italian that the USSR. of 1. assertion states note its renunciation TErItaly's Soviet law by be able to the UN, a new international Union and will not action. of its ment is violating to the Soviet consequences obligations for the treaty Italy's for blocking the peace to evade responsibility powers the Western Italy of violating .The note blames accuses Atlantic bloc./ and.again to the North UN membership, adherence treaty by its reply to a formal represents note nothing new to Soviet The Soviet and adds Comment: note of 8 February the Italian Italy. policy towards peace: threaten Balkan Leactions Turkish Turkish to the delivered to the note, adNote asserts protest was BULGARIA. 2. note of According Atlaniic Pact will February. A Bulgarian North on 22 aginto a base for against gation in Sofia to the "aggressive" of Turkey and Bulgaria mission of Turkey the transformation Republic of construction of straPeople's accelerate the the presence American-sponsored gression against maneuvers, the use of Balkans. military in the peace holding of and naval units, and are cited the services" missions tegic bases, and military intelligence of Bulgaria of Western "a base for foreign the two security the between Turkey as threatening relations of directly as measures to the deterioration contributin of sponsorcountries. of accusing Turkey protest application "in An earlier Turkish Bulgaria to the within Comment: activities Act" was presented eliaMaie ing Security Mutual the American16 January, Nations SecreLegation on the United and requested of the United States Bulgaria activities On 19 February to the governments and Greek when American transmit against tariat to Since 6 December, Nations protest to the United Greece a similar peace in the Balkans. addressed Mutual Security Act, against was directed the American protest to Yugoslavia, worded memorandum have all a strongly in protest against three notes of These protests Secretariat delivered Britain. has also Bulgaria and one to Great one to Greece,

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been similar in that each has borne, directly or indirectly, upon the alleged Western conspiracy against peace in the Balkans,
3.
Red Army Day reception uneventful: The Red, Army Day HUNGARY. reception EiTd at the SovIITTEWEdgsy in Budapest was attended by the Soviet Ambassador, the Soviet Military Attache,Vractically all Hungarian senior military officers, the Hungarian President and Foreign Minister and Chinese and North Korean reOresentatives. The Russians were most friendly and hospitable; the Orientals, on the other hand, kept their distance,
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Comment: Rumania now,joins the USSR and other Satellites in ofladiiiry observing a Railwaymen's Day.
In contrast to the propaganda surrounding this celebration, the American Legation in Bucharest forwarded a copy last December of an appeal allegedly sent-by Rumanian railway workers to First Vite Premier Gheorghiu-Dej who led the Grivita railway strike in 1933. After depicting the "miserable life" of Rumanian workers, the appeal called on Gheorghiu-Dej to help to
improve:the Thithanian standaild of living

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RUMANIA. -Country celebrates Railwaymen's Day: Rumania offically observed its first-Rillwaymen's Day on 16 February, the nineteenth anniversary of a bloody rail strike at Grivita. Accompanying propaganda )1orified the position of Rumanian railroad workers compared to those in capitalist countries and called for more efficient operation and maintenance of Rumanian railroads.
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French cabinet official n aigon ea. to him by 117ITIEE-Tresencer in n oEETEC-MT5ESter statement made e iratEirilifgirgille Letourneau that even if repor s States still Minister for Associated Indochina the United States for if France restored in peace were "French presence" there support the ought to anarchy would result. were eliminated
assert;_pgiflice_al
INDOCRAA.
2.
intervention: Chinese Communist accor. ng commander fears a s BURMA. Burmese ac e in angoon repor Ne Win, five fresh TET-Amer can rmy Chief, General .to the Burmese Commander in have been massed along the Chinadivisions may move Chinese CommunistWe that these troops Win believes Bunsaat an Burma frontier. northeastern Nationalists in against the Chinese ush them into Thailand "earl date" and SECRET
3
refers to the "French presence" Indochina within The term Comment: to retain in authoFIch France hopes Union. The French have sought of the French sovereignty the framework limitations on Vietnamese and Vietnam the existing to justify agreements uniting France of the grant France basis on the These agreements of within the French Union. the re-establishment powers pending large emergency security. support French policy at American policy has beep to in the knowledge that a immediate future least during.the withdrawal would mean an immediate victory statement is, French military Letourneau's Minh. Communist-led Viet French have for the extension of what the significant United States. however, a policy of the mainconceived to be the proper the French hope to indications that indefinite There are numerous position in Indochina for an tain their privileged not previously hinted that they would period, but they have to underwrite this'position. like the United States the Legation Saigon stated that cable, US In an earlier is highly distasteful as now constituted establishes the supremacy French Union formula clearly since it that to the Vietnamese, the Union, and recommended aspects of Republic within of the French given the organizational that no American approval be the French gave some assurance Union unless the French was in prospect. a more liberal formula
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Comment:
T. s is the suggesting g y-p ace. Iurmese source rom a Nationalist rs s a emen against the intervention that Chinese Communist is imminent. troops in Burma
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of Panamanian-flag The continued participation Comment: Panamanian decree issued trade violates a vessel-rill-The China ships in this trade, Most of the Pananmnian-flag last August. running only. between Communist-owned coasters strategic cargo from however, are ports and do not carry at present Chinese Communist owners of these coasters are The Communist Chinese Communist abroad. Panamanian to transferring many of them from
registry.
KOREA.
4.
combat pilot Communists in Korean theater step up ssg e over to a o TM-Wing: The record with increased aggressiveness N-OFTE-InTiea last week, coupled the Far East Air Force that the to of enemy pilots, indicates of the stalemated armistice talks enemY is taking advantage large a number of pilots as as deeper in to provide training for combat aircraft on fields By basing compleic, the possible. into the Antung training flights Manchuria and shuttling them of pilots in enemY can commit larger numbers over the combat area.
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November 1951 in China trade drops: regisWestern shipping CHINA. n WETEE-WETE:Uommunist success ve mon A total was the s x decline. China trade showed a tered shipping in the registered merchant ships, aggregating of 51 non-Communist traded with Communist China during this of 254,000 gross tons, figures since the outbreak month -- the lowest monthly hostilities in Korea. bulk of non-Communist As in previous months, the trade carried British, Greek, China were.owned registered shipping in the A fourth of the vessels owned by registry. or Panamanian Over half were by Chinese Communist interests. operating mainly from England. international Greek cartels
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also-notes the possibility that The Far last Air Finite may be-planning to alter a twomonth Iull, air o erations into the-Communists; for-ex andin exploit their capabilit ZN-held territory. President Rhee's ssemblY, ona Irate National Assemblymen urge n a e m nor y grouP w impeachment proimpeac men Ambassador Muccio, is urging not give a satisRhee if he does the recall of ceedings against President his campaign to secure explanation of factory the legislature. his political opponents in Assembly consider the move members of the suppressing any proMore moderate succeeded in resort" and have if Rhee a "last Muccio fears, however, that much far. ceedings thus tempers of the Assemblymen impeachment pushes the "already frayed" panicked into-starting further, they might be set off more drastic which would in turnsu.sorters. proceedings, hee and his s b
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3.
weaken trade inadequacies with COCOM members administrative Austrian Orbit, cooperation AUSTRIA. materials to the failure Despite Austria's and the controls: the flow of strategic procedures in restricting of Austrian control appreciate the unreliability to Governthe inadequacy governments solely by the Austrian Western European through issued of Western items to leak certificates of end-use some important ment are permitting lead and controls. recently reported in Vienna has in Vienna middleman The US Embassy firms to a notorious of Austrian use. given zinc sales by British accepted as a guarantee the British were had letterhead was dealer, buyers, whose this same legitimate sales to citing of a cenIn other The absence which the firm, by and the apGovernment. certificates from the Austrian end-use certificates deliveries obtained for verifying agency for issuing to obtain metals tralized formal procedures absence of certificates officials consuch parent US Embassy the dealer to use permitted purchasers. that, while acto Orbit sufficiently serious they have for diversion procedures, diversions firms these of Austrian sider deficiencies action against the British knowledgingthe "blacklisting" recommended such sales, \ who made
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Party suspended: of Swiss Communist Communist Party President of-the Swiss SWITZERLAND. Central Committee from all party attitude" %Me National its President, Leon Nicole, abandon his perilous him "to suspended Travail. du has It has warned of La Voix action functions, the publication did not comply, final to 2 June. discontinue if he and to 30 May hints that Congross given Party Nicole was the National would be taken at party has ouster from the in the party. complete popularity to stop the Comment: Nicole's because of his "attitude" or prevented in established probably been either to change his has just which he unlikely He is of the newspaper publication with leftist Swiss Socialists. conjunction
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7.
Peron plans to tighten controls: According to unARGENTINA. governors, official reports of Peron's recent speech to provincial The nafederal authority in the provinces will be extended. and Weleducation, public works, tional government will control will fare (through the Eva Peron Foundation); and national codes criminal law. replace provincial authority to enact civil and Government employees must be strictly Peronista. All citizens concerned only must join unions or associations, since Peron is with organizations, not individuals.
strict If unions and professional associations are under out, as Peron opposition will be frozen Peronista control, the
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reports that professional licenses intends. There are even have been denied to non-Peronistas. line with Peron's The reported plans are in imentation and control increased re continuing efforts tow rd
Comment:
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The Secretary Naval air arm authorized: io, has authorDOMINICAN REPUBLIC. ruj ec or enera of 7ZE-STITYIT-WITMIU-Navy, naval air arm. Implementation establishment of a Navy Sub-Secretary for ized the delegated to the this program has been has indicated that he wants and Air, Comodoro de Windt, who the new service branch has the Air to go very slowly. A cadre for ten officer pilots from by transferring been formed Force to the Navy, reflect the belief that the Comment: Current reports been largely inspired by the establishment of the air arm has naval air arm. Nevertheless, recent revitalization of the Cuban is expected to increase maarm when fully set up, the new aircombat efficiency and make it Navy's of the Western terially the Dominican assigned role in the defense more able to fill its Hemisphere.
anti-US proAttache distributing Argentine Labor s er NICARAGUA. NiZairal5fiii-P7FgaIRTF-S6E6za an reign the Argentine fl and a: US Embassy that among local SIVIITi-Sacasa have informed the anti-US propaganda Labor Attache is distributing investigating and that when they were labor unions, They said put a stop to it proof they would they had satisfactory if necessary, asking the Attache's recall, who seems quite friendly, The Argentine Charge d'Affaires, confidentially that although the has told Ambassador Whelan his gyerrment has given Attache is a member of his staff, him no control over labor activities. Attaches throughout Latin America Argentine Labor justiComment: local labor toward Argentina and to orient labor federation. are attempting for a third-position incialism, and to gain support Nicaraguan labor leaders were In the past five months, seven various labor conferences, and Asuncion vited to Buenos Aires to attend entine-s onsored conference in the recent Ar some attended
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CIA No. 49548
Copy No. 46
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reports has been This summarY of significant Current Intelligence. It does Office of use of the for the internal of all current reports in CIA complete coverage not represent a Comments represent the Intelligence. Office of Current or in the Intelligence. immediate views of the Office of Current

and 0/NE. Not for dissemination outside 0/CI
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prepared primarily
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Chou En-lai says Korean talks prove that Peiping will not intervene in Indochina: Chinese Communist Premier Ithat Chou En-lai\-truce in the Peiping regime wouid not be agreeing to a toward IndoKorea if Peiping had "aggressive intentions" Chou also remarked that it was easier for Communist ehina. two China than for the United States to conduct a war on
CHINA.
fronts.
1.
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Chines suggest American intervention JAPAN. reported to the Tirerry negotia 1 ions: Foreign Minister Yeh that the Japanese representative
American gharge at.Taipei 23 Febat the japan-China "peace" treaty negotiations on draM dissatisfaction with the Chinese ruary expeessed and continued to avoid any mention of the word "peace."
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He believes that the Japanese now have no intention of signing a bilateral peace treaty resembling the San Francisco text) and that the time has come for the United States to intetvene in behalf of the Nationalists,\
I
determined not to extend Comment: The Japanese appear Francisco treaty to the Nationalist the benefits of the San terminology which would imply Government, and to avoid any negotiating for the people of that the Nationalists were international consideWith both "face" and mainland China. cannot accept the Japanese rations involVed, the Chinese viewpoint.

TOP SECRET
not agreed to a truce Comment: The Peiping regime has Chou intervened in Indochina. in Kbrea:and has already in merely.that, pending developments appears:to have egad large7scale will net undertake a the Korean talks, Peiping It has been widely Korean type of operation elsewhere, speculated that, in the event of nen-conclusion or violation Of a Kotean armistice and consequent UN retaliits forces ation against China, Peiping would dispatch of Southeast Asia. into Indoehina and other areas
in Japanese
27 Feb 52
N." .
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IR Minittitranti bed kotgaffe
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FAR FAB EAST
Communists step up up combat pilot training: Communists in Korean Korean theater theater step
7 26 Feb 52 62
1 The record total total of of 1,387 1,387 MIG-15's MIG-15's sighted sighted
North Korea last last week, week, coupled coupled with with over North increased aggressiveness aggressiveness of of enemy enemy pilots, indicated indicate e
Ithat the
advantage of talks to to provide provide enemy is taking advantage of the the stalemated stalemated armistice armistice talks training for as as large large a a number number of of pilots as a s possible. possible. By Bybasing basingcombat combat
aircraft Antung air craft on fields fields deeper in Manchuria Manchur iaand andshuttling shuttlingthem them into into the Antung of pilots in training complex, the enemy can commit larger numbers complex, enemy can commit larger of pilots in flights over the combat combat area.
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1 bhe the possibiltty possibility that the Communists, Communists, after after a atwo-month two-month lull, may may be be planning planning to to exploit their cspability capability for for expanding expanding air UN-held territory, air operations into UN-held territory.
Comment: The Comment: move from fron) Shanghai Shanghai The current move to the Korean border area areaof of MIG-16's MIG-lS's of of the the 12th 12th Chinese Communist Cammunist Division, evidence of of Division, not previously previously committed committedto to com5at, combat, is is further evidence Communist Communist emphasis on combat training.
.

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9. 9.
10.
11. KOREA. 11.
Comment: When this this division division w a a based at a t Antung its its was Comment: a i r c r a f t flew f le w many many combat combat missions missions over over Korea. Korea. Although aircraft s ~ @ t i wby t ~ 3rd 3rd D i v i s i o n aircraft s i n c e mid-January activitvby Division since mid-January has not been-aekected, this t h i s message suggests s u g g e s t s that t h a t they t h e y are are still s t i l l in in been-detected, t h e Mukden Mukden area. area. the l~#llled A i r Force" ForcevY p l a q e s at a t Manchurian Manchurian combat combat field: field: "Allied Air planes A Chinese Communis Communiet IP8688Ege TatUAgkOU near the message from rom a ung.ou near e Korean orean border r e p o r t e a the t h e arrival a r r i v a l on 16 16 February of border to Mukden reported several flights,of f l i g h t s , o f "Allied qqAPlied l a n e s and MIG-lSPs Air E'orceyo Force" p planes MIG-15's of o f the t h e Chinese Communist Communis L 6th 6 t h Division. D i v i s i o n . (SUEDE m 5 9594, 4, Tatungkou-Mukben, 10 Feb Feb 52) 52) Tatungkou-Mukden, 16
Comment: t h i s Chinese message l P a l l i e d q probably q means Comment: In this "allied" probably pqSovietlv r a t h e r than t h a n "Korean" vsKoreantv ( t h e most likely l i k e l y alternative alternative "Soviet" rather (the since only Soviet S o v i e t and Chinese aircraft a i r c r a f t are believed believed meaning), meaning), since a t Tatungkou, Tatunghou, one of the Lhe principal p r i n c i p a l combat fields f i e l d s in in based at ir F o r c e , Q v not reviously phrase 'vAllied "Allied A Air Force," not p previously Manchuria. The phrase in these t h e s e messages, strengthens s t r e n g t h e n s the t h e probability p r o b a b i l i t y that that observed in Bone of 00 the MIG-15's MIG-15's encountered encount,ered by b y UN aircraft a i r c r a f t over Korea some elements of of the t h e Soviet Soviet Air Air Force. Force. are elements
Korean officers o f f i c e r e begin begln two t,ao,monthsq raining North Korean months' t training course: -111EHT-1ine-company E i ght 1 1 nf+CO~np~%iijr t?Omanders the commanders, probably probably from the R TIBYTH-Korean o r ' f h o r s a n 82nd 82nd Regiment Regiment ad. at Kaesong, Kaesong, were o ordered r d e r e d on on to t heir p a r e n t divislion o r a training training 23 February to come to their parent division f for
27 Feb Feb 52 27 52
of Mukden-based Mukden-based 3rd Air AQP Division D l v i s i o n revealed: revealed: A Activity of Hukdeln to t o Liaoyang Liaoyana referred to to a T lig 23 February message from Mukden flight -h t YAK-11 trainers t r a i n e r s of of the t h e Chinese Chinese Communist Cormnuhist 3rd 3 r d Air A i r Division. Division. of YAK-11 t o the t h e reporting r e p o r t i n g agency, agency, this this is is the t h e first f i r a t reference According to t o this t h i s division d i v i s i o n since since 15 15 January, January, when it it moved to to Mukden to from Antung. Antung. While this this division d i v i s i o n is equipped w i t h at a t least l e a s t 30 30 from with MIG-15vs,a a few few YAK-11's YAK-11's are are usually u s u a l l y attached attached to t o Chinese Chinese jet jet MIG-15's, u n i t s . (SUEDE (SUEDE 6920 Security S@c?.urityGroup, Johnson Johnson AB AB TOkyo, Tokyo, SG SG 494 494 units. Feb 52) 52) 25 Feb
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ThiP SECRET SUED&-course. o f f i c e r s were instructed i n s t r u c t e d to to bring b r i n g "two "two months(?) course. The officers provision^^^ and land a a field field manual manual. on on the t h e attack attack of of fortified fortified of provisions" positions. positions.
t h a t eight e i g h t company company commimdernwould corn ndamwould F i e l d analysis a n a l y s i s notes n o t e s that Field from a a line l i n e regiment regiment for for two two months mont a if i f any any , n o t be released from not operations were planned planned during d u r i n g that t h a t period. p e r i o d . The suggestiori suggestion( that t h a t the t h e course c o u r s e will w i l l include Include offensive offensive tactics, t a c t i c s , however, howevers is is f u r t h e r indication i n d i c a t i o n of of Communist Commuois'k offensive-mindedness. offensive-mlndedness a further (SUEDE (SUEDE CINCFE, CINCFE, SIB SIB 449, 4 4 9 , 26 26 Feb Feb 52) 52)
Comment: This T h i s is is further evidence that t h a t the t h e enemy enemy is is not not Comment: contemplating in the the immediate immediats future. f u t u r e . However, However, c o n t e m p l a t l n g an a n offensive o f f e n s i v e in numerous indications, l.ndiq.ati.ons, both in in communications communications intelligence i n t e l l i g e n c e and and other reports, enemy's c continued preparar e p o r t s , have pointed p Q i n t e d up the enemys8 ontinued p reparation for any eventuality--including e v e n t u a l i t y - - i n c l u d i n g an offensive. offenslve.
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KOREA. Noarth..Koreans bwtb..Kor,aans: order p r e c a u t i o n a against. against aiIegad. oZXaged order'precautions EtWaricilogioal warfare: orth K o r e a n battalion b a t t a l i o n commander comander North Korean w rinaia,a& warfare: A N February to special precautions to was ordered o r d e r e d on-27 on 27 'February t o take take s pecial p recautions t o avoid c o n t a m i n a t i o n of his contamination h i s Unit's u n i t ' s food and and water because because "the " t h e enemy dropped bacteria" in i n central c e n t r a l Korea. Korea. Covering wells and disinfecting d i s i n f e c t i n g United Nations l e a f l e t s were a dditional Nations leaflets additional recommendations.
These latter l a t t e r measures were probably inspired i n s p i r e d by by a 16 February message which stated s t a t e d that t h a t "spies " s p i e b are are putting putting poison into i n t o the t h e drinking d r i n k i n g water" and and distributing d i s t r i b u t i n g paper paper which causei c a u s e s death d e a t h toltnyone to'hnyone using u s i n g these t h e s e papers p a p e r s for the t h e nose." nose." which (SUEDE AFSA-251, Group Korea, AFSA-251, 15472, 1547Z, 28 Feb; Feb; 501st Corn Comm Recon Group-Korea, 15RSM/6456, 16 1BRSY/0456, 10 ?eb Yeb 52) 52) Comment: T h e r e is no evidence that t h a t a serious s e r i o u s health health There problem exists e x i s t s in i n North North Korea. Korea. Following Following recent r e c e n t charges charges made by both b o t h the t h e North Korean and the t h e Chinese Communist sing b acterioForeign M i n i s t e r s that t h a t the t h e United Nations Foreign Ministers Nations were u using bacteriol ogical w a r f a r e in i n the t h e Korean war, the t h e entire e n t i r e Soviet S o v i e t Orbit Orbit logical warfare has h a s been giving g i v i n g great g r e a t emphasis emphasis to t o this t h i s subject. s u b j e c t . The American Embassy in i n Moscow observes o b s e r v e s that t h a t Soviet Soviet p r e s s and a d i o coverage EMbassy press and r radio links l i n k s the t h e BW issue i s s u e with w i t h the t h e Panmunjom Panmunjom truce t r u c e talks. talks.
North Korean major major commands commands ,have have llargeyolitical a r g e p o l i t i c a l unit: unit: A 27 February message to Korean tine HeadHeadt o the t h e North K o r e a n "Front "Front Line n o t e d that t h a t "the,table " t h e t a b l e of of organization o r g a n i z a t i o n of p olitical quarters" noted political p l a t o o n was changed....it changed. i t should s h o u l d consist c o n s i s t of of 42 p e r s o n s in in platoon persons c o r p s headqVarters, h e a d q u a r t e r s , while w h i l e 51 51 persons peraons in i n division d i v i s i o n as as before." b e f o r e .lf corps (SUEDE 501st 5 0 1 s t Comm Comm Recon Recon GrOup Grbuy Korea, SK-G-919, SK-G-919, 28 28 Feb Peb 52) 52) (SUEDE
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Comment: This T h i s disproportionately d i s p r o p o r t i o n a t e l y high h i g h number number of of politinTOFionnel p o l i t i c a l p e r s o n n eassigned l a s s i g n e dat a t stafflevel s t a f f l e v e lis isfurther f u r t h e r evieviplaced indoctrination in the dence of the t h e great g r e a t emphasis p l a c e d on i ndoctrination i n t he North Korean Korean army. army. North
Supply Supply of of foodstuffs f o o d s t u f f s for f o r three three North North Korean Korean battalions battalions listed: l i s t e d * A North o t t h Korean Korean mesdage mess'age of o 22-Pebruary e b r u a r y -- possibly possTl3y between two rear-area east coast -- listed rear-area units u n i t s on the tfhe2%zt l i s t e d the the foodstuffs f o o d s t u f f s on on hand hand for f o r three t h r e e battalions b a t t a l i o n s and and the t h e number number of of days the t h e provisions p r o v i s i o n s are are to t o last. l a e t . Each battalion b a t t a l i o n had had approxiapproximately 11 hand and a ten-day ten-day s supply 1 1 days supply s u p p l y of of rice rice on hand upply on requisition. requisition. In g e n e r a l , the t h e battalions b a t t a l i o n s had a one to to In general, three t h r e e week supply of miscellaneous m i s c e l l a n e o u s grains g r a i n s and v vegetables e g e t a b l e s on hand with requisition. w i t h no additional a d d i t i o n a l supplies s u e sr e a u i s i t i o n . (SUEDE (SUEDE _ _~ ~ l i on 501st 22 Feb 5 O l s t Comm C o r n Recon Co Korea, 15RSM/6760, 15RSM/6760, -22 Feb 52) 52) .
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Comment: In a static s t a t i c defensive role on the e ast east Comment: Units in might be expected to maintain a somewhat higher level coast might'be level of ratione rations on on hand. hand. This relatively low low level level may may reflect reflect continued,transportation continued,transportation difficulties. difficulties.
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1. North Koreans Koreans order precautions against 1 . North against alleged bacteriological warfare:
US Army Army Korea A 6 teNsA-?5/ North Korean battalion commanderwasordered was ordered US A'2S/ A A North Korean battalion commander on 27 February take specialprecautions precautions to /3112 on 27 February toto take special 16, 28 Feb 52 52 /sV72. SUEDE contamination of of h his water i s unit's food food and andwater avoid contamination SUEDE /-41Thecause {Asbecause "the "the enemy enemy dropped dropped bacteria'' bacteria" in central 1545/41401. - 4/L
Korea. overing wells and distnfecttng disinfecting United United Nattons Nationsleaflets leaflets were additional addittonal recommendations. recommendations.
These latter measures inspired measures were were probably probably inspired by a 16 16 February message message which whtch stated stated that "spies "sptesare areputting puttingpoison poison into into the drinking water" and and distributing distributing paper paper which which causes causes death death to to "anyone "anyone using these papers for the using the nose." nose."
1s no evidence evidence that that aserious a serious Comment: There Is Following recent charges health problem exists in North Korea. Following recent made by exists in North Korea. Chinese Communist Foreign both the the North North Korean Korean and andthe the Chinese Foreign Ministers that both the United Nations were using bacteriological warfare United Nations were using bacteriological warfare in the Korean war, the entire entire Soviet Soviet Orbit has been giving giving great great emphasis to this subject. subject. The American press and in Moscow Moscow observes that Soviet press and radio American Embassy Embassy in coverage links links the the BW BW issue with with the Panmunjom truce talks. talks,
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1. 1 . Soviet Korean armistice: Soviet diplomat diplomat predicts predicts early early Korean armistice:
In discussing prospects f for In discussing or a a Korean Korean armistice, Soviet Deputy Soviet DeputyForeign Foreign Minister Minister Zorin recently remarked to to the Swedish Swedish Ambassador Ambassador that an is notunlikely unlikelyand and"will "will armistice agreementis armistice agreement not occur soon. Ambassadorremarked remarkedthat that in in previous previous convere we sh Ambassador of armistice armistice agreement "because sations Zorin Zorin had depreciated chances chances of the Americans didn't want want it."
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Comment: Although Although Soviet have Soviet spokesmen have prevtously' expressed optimism regarding the previously the outcome outcomeof ofthe thecease-fire cease-fire talks talks, Zor in's remark remark is isthe theonly only recent recentexpression expressionof of such such a a Soviet Soviet Zorin's attitude. This sanguine sanguine approach attitude. approach might might be be deemed deemed particularly particularly appropriate in conversationa conversations with withrepresentatives representativesof ofneutral neutralnations. nations. On the other hand, emphah a d , Communist Communist statements statementsand andpropaganda propaganda continue continue to emphaalleged use use of ofbacteribacterisize obstacles to an agreement, agreement, such such as the UN's UN's alleged ological warfare, warfare.
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Radio messages from from Moscow, Moscow, addressed addressed to to a a soviet S o v i e t group group' Radio messages
be serving s e r v i n g as as advisers a d v i s e r s at a t the t h e Panmunjom Panmunjom peace p e a c e talks, talks, b e l i e v e d t o be believedto are o r i g i n a t e d by the t h e Ministry M i n i s t r y of of Foreign F o r e i g n Affairs. Affairs. originated
This conclusion c o n c l u s i o n is is based based on on an an Armed A r m e d Forces F o r c e s Security Security This a n a l y s i s which which notes n o t e s aa similarity s i m i l a r i t y of of message message .charactercharacterAgency analysis i s t i c s in i n traffic t r a f f i c between the t h e Ministry M i n i s t r y of Foreign Affairs Affairs istics and various v a r i o u s Soviet S o v i e t consuls, c o n s u l s , and and that t h a t addressed a d d r e s s e d to t o the t h e Soviet Soviet group in in Korea. Korea. (SUEDE (SUEDE AFSA RU-TIB RU-TIB 1804, 1804, 26 26 Feb Feb 52) 52)
Comment: P r e v i o u s analysis h a s shown a correlation correlation Comment; Previous has b e t w e e n m r developments t tthe he t ruce t a l k s and the t h e volume volume betweZiniiiTUr developments a at truce talks of p a s s e d on this t h i s circuit c i r c u i t between Moscow Moscow and and Korea. Korea. of messages passed
8 . 8.
S o v i e t advisers a d v i s e r s still s , t i l l present p r e s e n t with w i t h North Korean Air Air Soviet F o r c e : North Korean Korean Air A i r Headquarters H e a d q u a r t e r s at a t Sinuiju S i n u i j u was w a s queried queried Force: -February by an an air a i r unit u n i t near n e a r Pyongyang as t o whether BilS-February by to whether " the j o u r n a l i s r ; comrade Chayev" Chayev" had arrived. a r r i v e d . (SUEDE 501st "the journalist Comm Recon Grp Korea, 15 15 RSM/7022, RSM/7022, 28 28 Feb Feb 52) 52) Comment: A sizable s i z a b l e group of S o v i e t air a i r advisory a d v i s o r y perperof Soviet s onnemu s u a l l y identified i d e n t i f i e d as "journalists," has been active Bonne usually active w i t h the t h e North Korean Air A i r Force F o r c e since since its its inception. i n c e p t i o n . No with r ecent r e f e r e n c e s to t o these these Russians R u s s i a n s has h a s been noted in in recent references intelligence. communications intelligence.
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A d d i t i o n a l evidence e v i d e n c e of Soviet S o v i e t role r o l e in i n truce t r u c e talks: talks: Additional
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North Kor,ean a n t i a i r c r a f t artillery a r t i l l e r y dump probably Korean antiaircraft probably at piju; An Imaaircraft Rorth n i n t i a i r c r a f t artillery ar e r y battalion b a t t a l i o n of o the e Nor % i n k r d Independent Independent AAA Aii'iegiment q u e r iedf its pare:: Ibrean 23rd Regiment queried parent u n i t s , "Did " D i d you you start start for for U i j u to t o get g e t the t h e ammunition? ammunition? Until U n t i l. units, Uiju w e get g e t it, i t , we can't c a n ' t prepare p r e p a r e for f o r combat." combat.11 (SUEDE 501st we (SUEDE 501st Corn 15 RSM/7100, RSM/7100, 29.Feb 29 F e b 52) 52) Comm Recon Grp Korea, 15
it:
Comment: Elements of t h e 23rd AAA Regiment robably of the Regiment are p probably located nor-th north and Pyongyang. U i j u , one two operaoperaand east east of of Pyongyang. Uiju, one of of two t ional N o r t h Korean airfields, a i r f i e l d s , is known t o have a d e f e n sive tional North to a defensive AAA unit u n i t and may additionally a d d i t i o n a l l y be an an antiaircraft a n t i a i r c r a f t artillery artillery supply s u p p l y depot. depot.
10.
Comment: While t h i s message does d o e s not clearly c l e a r l y indicate indicate Comment: N h i l e this that North.Korean t hat m o r e a n training t r a i n i n g aircraft a i r c r a f t are to t o abide by this this restriction, r e a t r i c t i o n , communications communications intelligence i n t e l l i g e n c e has h a s revealed r e v e a l e d that that N o r t h Korean MIG-15 aircraft North a i r c r a f t are are flying f l y i n g missions m i s s i o n s in i n Korea. Korea. The restrictton r e s t r i c t $ o n on activity a c t i v i t y South s o u t h of Pyongyang may be be inspired inspired by the t h e great g r e a t security s e c u r i t y consciousness c o n s c i o u s n e s s of of the the NKAF, NKAJ?, and and by its its fear f e a r that that a a pilot g i l a t will w i l l defect d e f e c t or or be be captured. captured.
Message suggests s u g g e s t s restriction r e s t r i c t i o n on range r a n g e of North Korean Intercepted instructions on 1 11 February p i l o t trainees: trainees: I ntercepted i n s t r u c t i o n s on 1F e b r u a r y from pilot the t h e North Korean Air A i r School School at a t Yenchi to t o the t h e "person Itperson in i n charge charge 04 f i r i n g " at a t Air A i r Headquarters H e a d q u a r t e r s in i n Sinuiju S i n u i j u declared: d e c l a r e d : "Oral "Oral of firing" orders Of of the t h e commander officer" o f f i c e r " are are that t h a t no "action " a c t i o n (should (should Comm be) t a taken as far far as as t the Pyongyang area." be) k e n as h e Pyongyang area." (SUEDE 330th Corn Recon Co, Becon Co, Korea, Korea, ALT-7499, ALT-499, 28 28 Feb Feb 52) 52)
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Department review(s) completed.
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily It does for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. reports in CIA current not represent a complete coverage of allComments represent the or in the Office of Current Intelligence. immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.

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In view of the location of Bucharest on major Comment: the American east-west lines of communication in Enmania, SovietmissiOn there has similar capabilities for detecting The missions in CzechosloSatellite Military preparations. since the vakia and Poland possess even greater capabilities is still personnel in these countries movement of Western relatively unrestrictedc
Jorces The current disposition of Soviet and Satellite ncapability of initiating on the Yugoslav border indicates require reinforcements an attack without.warning but vould for euetained operationgo,
2.
Hungarian pension rolls drastically cut: Between 20,000 the rolls in Hun'and 704000:pensioner5 have(been ct from affected are .mostly gary effective I March., The pensioners higher courts, railroads, post office, forther employees of the and Commerce. and the Minietries of Foreign Affairs, Justice 1947 decree which authorized .The.actioW.was taken under'a of pensions in the interest the government to.reconeider .out, however, balancing tke budget. Legation officials point 200 million that according to the 1952 budget there will be a decree is They believe that the forint surplus this year; another blow at the remnants of the "class pnemy."
qs Legation in HungarY still able to detect major HUNGARY. Budapest military pOeparations:H]:The United States Ctharge in personnel, believes tliat, despite restrictions on diplomatic prepathe Athericain Legation ig Still capable .of detecting against the West Hungaian militarY action rations for major The and should .be able to give four to five days' warning. rail lines although new,bridges and Charge points out that, communications, enable east-west traffic to bypass Budapest, in the Budapest are se centered ,supply and administration permitted to area, where Western representatives are still travel, that any unusual activity could be observed. made by An attack on Yugoslavia; however, could be eastern Hungary forces in southern and Soviet and Hungarian any warning. without the Legation's being able tO furnish Charge's estimate. The Military and Air Attaches concur in the
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Comment: Two other moves against the remaining elements of the upper and middle classes in Hungary have been reported property belonging to recently. The confiscation of private former capitalists and government officials was decreed on In addition, there is evidence that deportations 17 February. of residents from Budapest will be resumed early in March.
3,
ScanRUMANIA. Party criticizes local governmental bodies: PiFT77 teia, the official newspaper of the Rumanian Workers' Hig-scored the economic activity of people's councils. Many regional authorities have failed to utilize their own re. sources to provide food, consumer goods, and construction materials for local use, preferring to rely on the central government to furnish supplies from other regions. People's councils, "following the Soviet example," must set up new undertakings, increase their output, and constantly cut production costs in order to improve the standard of living and culture of the working people.
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Collection of agricultural products and productirST-Fonsumer goods in Rumania have been insufficient even to meet the demand on the rationed market. The central government, by insisting that local authorities assume more of the burden of supplying the population, conveniently makes them the scapegoat for prevailing shortages and the poor standard of living.
Comment:
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Agricultural associations hailed: A recent lead editorial in Romania Libera, the official newspaper of the Rumanian peol=g-Forniarg, states that the first permanent agricultural associations of the Soviet TOZ type were formed in Rumania in the fall of 1951. Model statutes for them were published recently. People's councils are urged to popularize the statutes, abide by the principle of "free consent," prevent' the entry of "kulaks" into such associations, and allow the peasants "internal democracy" in electing their own leaders.
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Comment: Voluntary agricultural associations existed in Rumania prior to last fall but very often dissolved after In September 1951, the Central Committee .of each harvest. the Rumanian Workers' Party decided that this form of association "did not allow members to draw all the benefits of mechanized agriculture" and recommended establishment of
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as propose under administered by Italy and Yugoslavia Wiggte be jointly for a three alternately by each countrY appointed a governor appointed of Public Security would be The Director mutual year term. third country_sal the basis of from among citizens of a __agreement.
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associations which Soviet TOZ-type permanent agricultural get better results and would the peasants to would "enable methods of managing their agriaccustom them to collective preliminary step toward escultural exploitations as a tablishment of collective farms." virtually stopped in Although actual collectivization appears to be tightening up agriRumania in 1951, the government co-operative stages. .The permanent the copreliminary on the will now resemble more closely cultural associations peasants in which the operatives in the other Satellites, land and tools which they retain nominal ownershiP of the bring into the co-operatives.
solution for Trieste Tito ro.oses condominium as e reeHerrttory of
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Italian only to exacerbate The announcement will serve for any imminent the prospects governments to .public opinion and further dim between the two renewal of preliminary talks Tito probably settlement. produce a formula for a bilateral appeal that the proposal will enhance the groups, reasons,.however, among indePendent in Trieste Trieste of the pro-Tito partY position in the forthcoming local and strengthen its elections.
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with German oil contracts reports concludes Tehran Embassy in Iran reportedly IRAN, The American two contracts for has concluded iliaItalian firms: Government Middle East that the Iranian A contract with the Italian amount of oil; the sale of oil. unspecified exchange of involves an for the provides Petroleum Company company, the another, with a German of Iranian oil for pipe for worth 300,000 dollars water system. shah
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Embassy in Tehran report from the involving An earlier Comment: negotiations, Italian-Iranian the concluded and presumably stated that had not been Bank attempts of oil, 500,000 tons the International outcome of were awaiting the settlement. to reach an interim in now have representatives and German firms trade relations, Several West Iranian-German negotiating to revive could be Iran attempting that any one of these operators independent quite possible it is Various Company. with the Iranian Oil negotiating intermittently any Americans, have been known none has concluded including far as is oil, but so for Iranian agreement. Security decree: Government's Internal assigning direct Iranian Comment on Ministers 2. of the Iranian Council of A decree of the for internal security to the Minister to extend the government responsibility to be an attempt by forces which constitutionally Interior appears Iranian armed direct control. over the its control and are under his from both the Shah owe allegiance to certain to arouse opposition The decree is almost Army. the Shah and the over attempt to win control supporters National Front Front A previous in a purge of National On the basis Force resulted the Shah. the Air backed by of Staff, the army without by the Army Chief attempt by the Shah to use sult in a of the decree, any of the Interior might the Minister approval of government and the army. between the showdown
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confers with Iraqi Prime East Commander the British Middle British Middle IRAQ. Robertson, commander of to Iraqi Prime General MD-aster: attompted to explain maintaining the Mier-Mid Foxces, has importance of properly Minister's "wild Minister Nuri the dispel the Prime base and to the Canal zone. The talks Suez Canal evacuation of Nuri the opporideas" on British role general in nature and gave were in Baghdad expounding his own ideas on Iraq's possible tunity of Command. in the Middle East that in Baghdad believes airbases in Iraq was The British Embassy Counselor British-operated on on that the subject of the two He described Britain' upon. not touched "letting sleep ng dogs lie." s e as
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on first informationavailable This is the high level conComment: while this February visit. Anglo-Iraqi Robertson's 20-22 London's desire to promote been tied specifically ference reflects to have relations, the meeting appears announced willingness to mediate gestures, Minister's to the Iraqi Prime Despite friendly British dispute. plan has not Nuri's mediation the Anglo-Egyptian Robertson visit, Office. including the attention by the London Foreign been given serious Iraq, treaty relations with influenced Britain, which has special Iraqis who, ultra-nationalist is also disturbed over again raising the question of revising actions, are by Egypt's Treaty. the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi
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Burmese Commander outlines plan for evacuation of Chinese Nationalists: Burmese Commander in chief Ne Win on 29 February amplified to the American Military Attache an earlier suggestion for $olution of the problem of the Chinese Nationalists in Burma. Ne Win's plan calls for the surrender of the Nationalists and their repatriation to Formosa by airlift as far as Rangoon, and from there by sea. Ne Win admits that his government has not approved the project, but he wants to know, for planning purposes, whether the United States will assist in any airlift of the Nationalists and if the Taipei government would help'defray expenses. The attache doubts that the Burmese Government will accept the proposal.
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Burmese leaders have considered such a project Comment: in the past but have been unwilling to approve because of their fear of Chinese Communist reaction. Although Ne Win believes he can influence the government to accept, any decision in the matter would be dependent on the attitude of Socialist Party leaders, who are reportedly planning to invite Communist China to eliminate Li Mi's forces.
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general withdrawal not indicative of s not n Hoa Binh oa rom rawa INDOCHINA. wi renc symptom e recent emergency: Legation in Saigon as a The FETWEirEFId by the American of the situation in Indochina. his deterioration of a general chief, General Brink, reiterates in the military assistance that the military picture defended, estimate of early February that this area can be alarming and Tonkin delta is not albeit with some difficulty. withdrawal is its effect of the Vietnamese The chief Comment: impact on the "fence-sitting" previous psychological aggravated by adverse around Hoa Binh. population, an impact considerably of great victories French claims extravagant
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eruary HigICRSIUNIsrei2n..Thpressra on reports of the concerned by nigi Tvec-Mgh-r"xingosscaso that they were Rhee current conflict between Tlird Syngmanmethods adverse being uSed in the
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high-handed They noted that these support National Assembly. attitude towards him and the to affect the UN's Rhee replied that reports are bound post-armistice program. will of the people; a of the ROK in represented the not the Assembly, derelict in his duty if he failed to he, therefore, he would be President is elected directly whereby the set up a system
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Although he disclaimed any personal interest by the people. indicated that he in the dispute with the Assembly, Rhee to be President. considered only himself qualified
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West Gerspeed mobilization plans: GERMANY. West Germans preliminary is drafting many s embryonic defense ministry 400,000 men who will make conscription of the The plans for the contribution to the European Defense Force. a conup GermanY's Blank, is preparing planning office, headed by TheOdor of the United States to present scription law similar to that ratification of the EDC treaty to Parliament immediately after Actual enactment of the legby all participating countries. 60 days, but would not delay islation would require another The German of officers and cadres. the voluntary recruitment full strength two years after contingents are expected to be at the system is inaugurated. "moderate pessimism" that German officials estimate with by autumn. Signature of the the EDC treaty will be in force the middle or end of EDC treaty is considered possible by contracts will be signed March, and it is hoped that the German the question of Government leaders do not expect in April. mobilization. constitutionality of rearmament to delay
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controls jeopardize French tactics on German security reopened the quesIrench representatives in Bonn have accord: arms-producing capacity, tion ot restricting West Germany's to be established under that the controls since they believe the European Defense CommunitY Are inadequate. raising this quesThe US High Commissioner states thatmade Both so far. tion again could jeopardize the progress consideration of oppose he and the British representative limit current discussions to and desire to capacity controls, the specific weapons to be barred. meetings Although the recent Foreign Ministers' Comment: restriction German arms produced a general solution to the West certain weapons cateproblem$ agreement was not reached on by the Allied High Commisgories which are now being discussed biological, and chemical weapons, sioners. Except for atomic, capacity. no restrictions were placed on arms-producing
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3.
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French-Viet Minh negotiations denied: FRANCE. Rumors of that France is l'rench Foreign Office officials flatly deny with the Viet Minh. There have been considering negotiations that Minister of Associated States many reports in Paris papers a survey mission in IndoLetourneau, who has just completed china, had implied such a policy change. reports that Letourneau's The American Minister in Saigon no tendency to concomments, both public and private. showed sider such negotiations. \ stated that France Letourneau is reported to have Viet Minh, but would not would not reiuse to negotiate with the take the first steps. deputies in the While a minority of the non-Communist that France must face French National Assembly are convinced the Assembly the question of a withdrawal from Indochina, of the government's 29 February in favor voted overwhelmingly on motion to carry on the war.
Comment:
SECRET
right-wing extremists West German Communists and e an n prepara on or a poss p ans: further undergroun leaders of both the Constitutional Court, by the West German and the neo-Nazi Socialist Reich West German Communist Party underground. The KPD chairman Party are making plans to go executive departments to obtain cover has ordered all central In Bavaria, titles to Since apartments in Duesseldorf suburbs. to party members. party propertY are being transferred from their reported missing key Communists in the US Zone are functionaries are known to and a few top accustomed haunts, that West German KPD leaders be in East Germany, it is presumed on future underground operations are now getting instructions from East German authorities. operations are sketchy to date. SRP plans for such cover to be planning to set up Party leaders pse however, believed front groups. to have the Although the government will try Comment: that the attempts officials feel two parties outlawed, German The government to the KPD. may fail -- especially in regard to obparties in order recently raided the offices of these reportedly found that the two tain evidence for its case, and made preparations for underparties had apparently already of destroying incriminating ground operations to the extent records.
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in Paris believes that the The AMerican Military Attache in Indochina military situation recent deterioration of the Government reconsider its policy. to will soon force the French
5.
considered nearer: their counterparts in the are contemplating collaboration with conviction that only direct General Labor Confederation in the in wages: They believe' action can bring a satisfactory rise all labor is possible at the that effective joist action by today" Consequently "a major political question plant level. will return Frachon labor boss Benoitundertake is whether Communist a nonpolitical increased freedom to from Moscow with level strike Movecampaign for a "semi-uncontrolled factory would coincide With Such a campaign ment" like that of 1936. stressing neutralism and East-West trade SoViet propaganda advantages. that most members Local non-Communist leaders, asserting and even a large percentage of the General Labor Confederation "certainly not" industrial workers were of Comiunist-voting between the views pro-Soviet; pointed up a "real difference" confederation. nf meal and national officials of that
strike movement Solidarity ofirench labor in local labor leaders in France Local non-Communist
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endanger Western treaty plans: AUSTRIA. Premature diseloeures "disgusted." by the premature The British Foreign. Office is treaty which the revelation in Paris of details of the new to Moscow have agreed to submit Western Foreign Ministers official observed that some time in March. A Foreign Office Foreign Office sOokes,attributed to a French the Paris report, deliberately trying to man, suggests that the "French are
SECRET
with existing The dissatisfaction of French labor Comment: have been avoided and serious strikes wage levels has been growing with their only becaUse the workers remain deeply disillusioned been received of a national union leadership.. No reports have movement at the specific directive for a nonpolitical strike solidarity of all local union plant level. The chances of a The General leaders in such a program are increasing, however. is antagonizing its Labor Confederation's national headquarters fanatics" to "young inexperienced membership by appointing gradually purged, replace veteran local leaders who are being by employers"associations or fined by management in a drive control in the factories. to weaken union
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SECRET sabotage the abbreviated treaty." also much concerned by the The US Embassy in Vienna is Press despatch alleging publication of a London Associated favors the skeleton treaty. that neitherBritain nor France the treaty plan as a propaThe British are said to regard American popularity in ganda gesture designed to increase given thc Russians The Embassy fears the report has
Austria. w draft.'
1
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critical: French financial situation as BELGIUM. Belgium views van Houtte has stated that Belgian governVTICKII-Prime Minister because the French finanment and business circles are alarmed Noting France's "pivotal" cial position is "visibly crumbling." that that country's "incapacity position in NATO, he stressed its defense effort. to manage its economY" was damaging position in the European As a result of the French debit further French trade restrictions. Payments Union. Belgium expects
intrenched speculative interests Comment: Pressure from are precipitating an early and a deepening distrust of the franc of this trend are the economic collapse. The underlying causes the burdensome defense highly unfavorable trade balance and commitments in Europe and Indochina. postponing a showdown on While some political compromise replacement of the Faure governrevenues will probably permit coalition, this solution ment by another middle-of-the-road 1952 military program. would prevent realization of the on EPU imports will The tightening French restrictions chain reaction of measures by provide a major stimulus to the liberalization program. European countries against the trade rise in European proThis trend may soon preclude the steady goals. duction essential to meet rearmament

SECRET
been skeptical The French and British have long initial Austrian press reabout the American plan, and the forthcoming new draft has action to the announcement of a Indiscretions -- variously attributed not been enthusiastic. undoubtedly revealed Western into London and Paris -- have brought on Soviet-Communist tentions to the Russians and Austria. charges of Western desires to partition
Comment:
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8.
ITALY. Businessmen call for open stand on Moscow Economic Certain Italian business interests want the Conference: Con-
government to take an open stand on the Moscow Economic ference. So far the government has officially ignored the conference and discouraged attendance. Foreign Office officials now favorallowing certain anti-Communists to attend so that t ev can refute Soviet propaganda regarding the conference.
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In January Communist chief Togliatti opened the Italian Communist drive in support of the conference with charges that the-government's policy of curbing trade with Eastern Europe was preventing solution of the problems of southern Italy.
9.
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Press pleased that Lisbon saW no extension of DenSWEDEN: The Swedish press and radio mark's and Norway's NATO ties: have noted with satisfaction that Denmark and Norway were not pressed at the Lisbon NATO meeting to permit "foreign" 'troops to use air and other facilities in Scandinavia during peacetime. The fact that Denmark and Norway are not to join the gurenean Defense Force is also greeted with satisfaction.
Most 'Swedes see Danish and Norwegian NATO membership as adversely affecting the prospects for continued Swedish neutrality, and particularly fear the establishment of "foreign" bases in their neighbor countries. Some Swedes still entertain hopes for limited Scandinavian military c0operation, and consequently desire to see DenmarlOs and Norway's NATO ties kept to a miminum.
Comment:
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The Italian Confederation of Industry was inComment: vited to the Moscow conference several months ago. This is the first information received regarding the attitude of business interests' toward the conference.
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n Latin American support requests recenfly Bolivia again Ambassador in Argentina against 11. The Bolivian complaints tin dispute: conference to review Bolivia's subthe early held a press RFC. He announced States on by the the tin price offered the Organization of American GovernArgentine mission of the case to a anda aggression and requested damagin charges of economic additional Peron 25X1 This gives throughout Latin America, ment support. which will hp pxn1nitpd I similar I Ambassador in Quito held1 aIn La Paz The Bolivian 25X1 Comment: charges will file conferencel Bolivia press efforts told the, press that United States only if the government against the of economic aggression fail. to renew tin negotiations improves: negotiations Reyna, is now Outlook for trade agreement Economy, Manuel sincere in their VENEZUELA. 12. Director of Political have been active and negotiation Venezuela's US officials impeding the convinced that 25X1 the difficulties overcome efforts to comthat some of a new trade agreement that Reyna is now aware he is willing Warren feels Ambassador and that, in addition, groups if protectionist Reyna is now promises will be necessary of Venezuelan concessions. to resist the pressures 125xl certain desired L the US can grant him talks. anxious to begin preliminary
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conposition is in sharp Venezuelan officials The present Foreign Office Commcnt: unless the US few weeks ago when that of a agreement a new Recent trast to tariff. to consider reductions in the oil military supplies virtually refused deliveries of could promise substantial long-awaited attitude. to hasten US efforts to the changed contributed have probably

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3 Mar 52
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TOP SECRET
3 March 1952
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CIA No. 49566
Copy No. 46
TO THE DAILY DIGEST

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outside 0/CI and 0/NE. Not for dissemination
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reports has been It does This summary of significant Current Intelligence. Office of for the internal use of.the coverage of all current reports in CIA not represent a complete Comments represent the Current Intelligence. Office of or in the of Curreni Intelligence. immediate views of the Office
prepared primarily
TOP SECRET
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"'s
TOP SECRET SECTION 2 (EASTERN) Japan-China peacq treaty toward progrqss Sthte has advised the VS Political JAPAN. Greater on the Department Of growing reluctancepeace iinia: Thol there:is a that on the Japanese ATIViger inaTokyoUS Senators to actpeace treaty talks Appear partiof several that the PoJapanese-Chtnese treaty while the It was suggested state. attention of Prime Minister to be in a-pritical this to"the Aade at Adviser bring progress could be litical that, good Yoshida in ithe hope dispel Any suspicion that the Japanese break off the ,Thipei in order to gooctfaithalid intend to ratifies the San in States are not acting the United as vaon as 1 negotiation / ct. Francisco p the obstacle to progress in that The principhl insistence Comment: talks is Chinese the treaty as Jacifinese-Chinese be'defined in current gives the isPescadotes Formosa andthe the RepubliciOf China,7 whiCh in the San Francisco "teiritories of contemplated that lands .a stetus beyond Yoshida letter to Dulles. treaty and:in the
2.
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land nrobahlly
future of military dubious about the British Ambassador in Cairo and UNITED KINGDOM. The British are agreed UUFFTTFII-Egge: authorities in the Canal zone and the.friendIritish military Egyptian authorities necessary for cooperation of that the people,'both considered h bases, do not now ship of the Egyptian operation of the Briti the successful never will again exist.
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SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
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authorities British military even Until recently loe maintained Comment: bases could Suez Canal have held that the Egyptian opposition. in the face of considerable East are defense of the Middle for the British base into British plans of the of British transformation on the the maintenance still based Command base and Allied force. a Middle East of the troops in Egypt as part
TOP SECRET 3 Mar 52

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For Release 2005/01/26 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000800120001-1

TOP SECRET
O FFI
CE
FORM 2e u Wit PRIVIOVI [DITIONS.

B.73
----------
HR70-14 HR70-14
7.. 7
Message6 suggest s u g g e s t transfer t r a n s f e r of s e v e r a l MIG-equipped Messages several MIG-equipped divisions: of I 1 and 2 March M arch disclose d i sc lose "test Ittest flights" flightstt d i v i s i o n s : Messages of by seven s e v e n MIG-15'8 g1G-1SPs of the t h e Communist 14th 1 4 t h and one t ransport transport t h e 17th 1 7 t h Division. D i v i s i o n . Similar flights f l i g h t s have preceded unit unit of the i n the t h e past. p a s t . According to t o the the r e p o r t i n g agency, agency, these these moves in reporting meaaages s u g g e s t that t h a t the t h e 17th 17th D i v i s i o n , now based at a t Tangshan messages suggest Division, i n North China, China, may move to t o Tatungkou Tatungkou near n e a r Antung, Antung, and and that that in t h e 14th 1 4 t h which is is at a t Takushan, Takushan, another a n o t h e r Antung Antung area area field, field, the may move move to t o Peiping. PeiRing. (SUEDE e c u r i t y Group (SUEDE 6920 S Security Group Johnson AB J a p a n , SG 593 and atld SG SG 616, 616, 1 1 and and 2 2 Mar 52) 52) Japan,
4 Mar 52
1'1) 5
TOP SECRET SUEDE

11:)13 SECRET SUEDr*

'Comment: Another Another Communist division d i v i s i o n of of MIG-15's--the MIG-1Sgs--the 'Comment: 12th-is i n the t h e process p r o c e s s of of transferring t r a n s f e r r i n g from o 12th,iis in from Shanghai Shanghai t to t h a t all a l l these t h e s e moves ocCur, o c c u r , Communist Communist Takushan. Assuming that s t r e n g t h near n e a r the t h e Korean Korean border b o r d e r will w i l l be increased i n c r e a s e d from MIG strength the p r e s e n t two-divisions two d i v i s i o n s of the present of! about about 50 MIGPs MIG's each t to o three divisions. divisionS.
8. 8 .
l l A l l i e d v lMLGss ly t o Korean b o r d e r from Mukden: Six ""Allied" MIG's f fly to border Mukden: Six a11 i e d " MIG-15's -15's flew f l e w from from Mukden Mukden to t o Tatungkou Tatungkou near n e a r the the February, flight Korean border b o r d e r on 21 21 F e b r u a r y , according a c c o r d i n g to t o a Chinese f light message. (SUEDE (SUEDE ASAPAC SPOT SPOT 30961, 29 29 Feb Feb 52) 52) Comment: Inamid-February , 24 "allied" l l a l l i e d ' l (presuMably (presumably Comment: In.mid-February, S o v i mMIC-15's - 1 5 ' s flew f l e w frOm from Tatungkou Tatungkou to t o Mukden. Mukden. The six six menmenSoviet) t i o n e d above may be part p a r t of of that t h a t group on a r eturn f l i g h t , or tioned return flight, t h e y may may have have been been replacements'. r e p l a c e m e n t s . Flights F l i g h t s of of Soviet S o v i e t MIG's MIG's they f i e l d s on on, t h e Korean d e e p e r in in between fields .the Korean border border and and ones ones.deeper n o t noted noted in i n intercepts i n t e r c e p t s before b e f o r e February. February. Manchuria were not
9.
KOREA. a c t e r i o l o g i c a l warfare w a r f a r e in i n Korea Korea now now major major Communist Communist KOREA. B Bacteriological North theme: A N o r t h Korean K o r e a n east e a s t coast c o a s t defense d e f e n s e unit u n i t was was propaganda theme: a l e r t e d on I 1 March to t o hold hold p r o t e s t meetings among the the t roops alerted protest troops to intensify alleged bacterioloi n t e n s i f y "hostile " h o s t i l e feelings" f e e l i n g s " against against a l l e g e d bacteriolo: gical g i c a l warfare warfare by by the t h e UN UN forces. f o r c e s . The addressee a d d r e s s e e was admonished to "make sure t o "make s u r e they they (the ( t h e troops) t r o o p s ) are are awake awake at a t the t h e lecture." lecture."
w i t h which the t h e enemy is treating t r e a t i n g the the s e r i o u s n e s s with The seriousness c h a r g e s cd of BW is evident e v i d e n t fiom from a series of 28 and 29 February charges of,28 as North Korean messages which contained c o n t a i n e d such instructions i n s t r u c t i o n s aS " t h e contaminated area a r e a must be be covered covered with w i t h snow snow and and spray... spray,.. "the n o t go near n e a r the t h e actual a c t u a l place" p l a c e " and which o r d e r e d that that do not ordered "injections with.number nine vaccine will be " injections w i t h number n i n e (unidentified) (unidentified) v accine w i l l be made." made." Another message s t a t e d that t h a t "the " t h e surgical s u r g i c a l institute. institute meSsage stated members l eft h e r e to t o investigate i n v e s t i g a t e the t h e bacteria b a c t e r i a bombs dropped -members left here t h e 29th." 29th." on the (SUEDE U S A 251, e t 151, 15RSM 15RSM AFSA 251, 10002, 1000Z, 2 Mar; Mar; D Det Korea, CS CS 259, 259, I 1 Mar M a r 52) 52)
Comment: The entire entire S Soviet oviet O Orbit rbit c continues ontinues t to o g give ive unusiiii-Fainence t o the t h e bacteriological b a c t e r i o l o g i c a l warfare warfare charges, charges, u n u s u a l prominence to and Communist China has has r eportedly d i s p a t c h e d 'Panti-epidemic reportedly dispatched. "antiepidemic teams'' to t o combat the the UN's U N P s alleged a l l e g e d BW BW campaign campaign in i n Korea. Korea, A teams" Communist correspondent c o r r e s p o n d e n t at a t the t h e truce truce t talks alks r reported eported t that hat t the he c h a r g e s lend l e n d "a m o s t sinister s i n i s t e r aspect aspect t o t h e new'American charges most to the new'American d e l a y i n g techniques t e c h n i q u e s in i n the the c onference t e n t , ( I and redicted delaying conference tent," and p predicted t that hat t the he f full ull e effects f f e c t s of BW will become evident e v i d e n t as as the the weather gets gets warmer. warmer,
6
4 Mar 52
'
'MP SECRET SUElDr
There is is still s t i l l no no evidence e v i d e n c e of o f an in North There an epidemic epidemic in North Korea sufficient to to justify justify the t h e current current all-out all-out propaganda propaganda Korea sufficient of the t h e Communist Communist world. world. effort of
4 Mar 52 52
TOP SECRET-SUEDE
HR70-14 H R70-14
Tte9PSECRET---SUED& 4 WWEEHFSUEDd
eva- 52FAR FAR EAST
NR
2.
Bacteriological warfare warfare in in Korea Korea now now major major Communist Communist propaganda propaganda theme:
Armed Forces Armed Forces

. .
Security Secur ity Agency Agency 1, 2 2 Mar Mar 52 52 SUEDE Qtrft- 11160 SUEDE @/hi1'7b'bQ ~-
seriousnesswith with which which the enemy enemy i s The seriousness is treating BW treating the the charges c h a r g eof XB W is evident in a series seriesof of 28 28 and and 29 February February North Korean messages which containedsuch suchinstructions instructions as as "the conKorean 'messages which contained taminated area *. do donot notgo go near near area must must be be covered coveredwith with snow snow and spray spray ... the actual actual place" place" and and which which ordered ordered that that "injections "injections with w i t h number number nine nine (unidentified) vaccinewill willbe be made. made. " Another message stated that (unidentified) vaccine Another message that "the "the surgical institute institute members members left left here here to to investigate investigate the the bacteria bacteria bombs bombs dropped on the 29th. 29th. "
APPROVED FOR FOR RELEASE RELEASE DATE: DATE: 24-Mar-2010 24-Mar-2010
A was A North North Korean Korean east east coast defense unit was alerted on on 1 1March March to hold protest meetings meetings alerted among the among the troops to to intensify "hostile "hostile feelings" warfare by by the the against alleged bacteriological warfare -1 UN was admonished admonished to to UNforces, forces. The addressee addressee was (the troops) a r e awake awake at the "make sure they (the "make are '' lecture, " lecture.
I'
'?
3-3 -
TOPSECRETSUEDE S U E D E
It1)-SECRK SUEDE' SUEDM
isstill stillno noevidence evidence of of an an epidemic epidemic in in There is North current all-out all-out propaganda propaganda effort effort of of North Korea Korea sufficient sufficient to to justify justify the the current the Communist world.
NR

-4-
Comment: The entire entire Soviet Soviet Orbit continues to Comment: The give and ComComgive unusual unusual prominence prominenceto tohe thebacteriological bacteriologicalwarfare warfare charges, charges, and munist China combat China has has reportedly reportedly dispatched dispatched "anti-epidemic "anti-epidemic teams" teams" to combat A Communist Communist correspondent campaignin inKorea. Korea. A correspondent at the UN's alleged BW BW campaign the truce talks reported that the the charges charges lend lend ''a "a most most sinister sinister aspect to the new American the new American delaying delaying techniques techniques in in the the conference conference tent, tent, "and "and predicted that the full effects will' becomeevident evidentaas theweather weathergets gets warmer. warmer. effects of of BW B W will'become s the
TOP SECRET 4 WS l E H FSUEDE SUEDE
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5 March
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OCI No. 3886

Copy No.
251
DAILY DIGEST
DIA AND DOS review(s) completed.
This summary of significant reports has been prepared pr hilarity for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.

FET. Ott
i7E.00;111S
sT,11:::NES
CENTER
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SECTION 1 (SOVIET)
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Vitamin C in Switzerland: representapurchase offer to that commercial Soviet reports recently ofUSSR: Legation in Bern 1. Switzerland tons) of TE-6-HS Legation in (50 metric kilograms tives of the Soviet 50,000 1 ferep to purchase largest VitaMin C. the world's only 553 States, The United C, produced amount re! Comment: of Vitamin and consumer It is believed that the reserve or producer emergency metric tons in 1950. submarine been used for an would have for troops and doses of quested feeding in field rations supply to supplement supplemental for requested would If used million the amount for 2.7 crews. per person, year's supply, about 50 mg, doses, or one one billion trdops. of Trade The World Federation warfare in COMMUNISM. INTERNATIONAL US with use of bacteriological General confidential2. in New Secretary UN Dnions charges of the delegation States UN The office in Vienna, Korea: to the United in China, from WFTU headquarters ly; transmitted affiliate protest from its formal virus York a received bubonic of cholera and b6hind the lines based on information quantities front and criminal against large spread both at the Citing this as a the WFTU reallegedly troops. American agreements, to dein itorea by of all signed responsibility violation of its people" apt in Nations "decent mlinded the United and called upon all Korean war, efforts to stop the fnnd human rights, most atrociou to try out the to make all possible Which is "but a pretext destruction.q! broadcasts weapons of including last propaganda, claim made a similar by a committee Comment: CoMmunist Pyongyang, and report prepared Democratic from Peking However, a 60-page International in Korea, and Women's "year. "atrocities" nent by the Communist Council document, to investigate!US Security of a UN fFederation by.Malik as warfare in its list issued allegedly ;later bacteriological conventions but ;did not include to TASS, a banned by international According !weapons forces in Korea. will investigate !in use by US international jurists in Korea. of !commission the "interventionists" crimes of
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The indifferent to education: lack of inworkers scored the Albanian Party newspaper the night schools which Alhanian Communist and attending workers. terest in organizing illiteracy among Albanian diplomas wipe out receiving wei/e set up to of workers stated that incompleted Ciiing the poor percentage courses, it and propagandn frOm their night school of poor organization the result organizations. coUrses were trade unions and youth on!the part of the and mines, cooperatives workers to attend The directors of large not allowing to faCtories were accused of This laxity is contrary of Ministers school courses. the night decision of the Council the the 9 January 1952 enterprises to support all Albanian which directed schools. I opening of the night campaign, which anti-illiteracy Albanian The first Comment: 1949, may have raised 1 November The second was decreed for of the population. Aboli1951. literacy to 50 percent began on 1 November included in campaign anti-illiteracy one of the projects of December illiteracy is tion of During the last half courses and the five year plan. lack of attended the anti-illiteracy 60,000 people It is noted that the attend later. Albania, 40,000 will evident in southern Kukes, and interest in education was districts of Shkoder active in stampthile in the northern been more police have where the security attendance has been better. ing out resistance, SECRET
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US diplomatic Security Police intensLy watch over have watched the US The Polish Secury Police o ices: Attache's building since Embassy main building and the Air been increased interference 22 february. There has also presumably from the Sewith phone calls to Americans -- police pressure on Polish curity Police -- and intensified citizens. serVants and the neighbors of American this increased surThe Air Attache believes that circulating in Warsaw that v011ance was caused by rumors Soviet tc the meeting of US diplomatic representatives Embass-., in Wariaaw. Orbit will consiaer closing the American
POI;AND,
1
6.
calls for-a purge of petty bourYUGOSLAVIA. Party leader In an address before the Central geOis elements in CPY: PartY, Milovan Djilas, Committee of the Serbian Communist called upon the Secretary of the Yugoslav Politburo, proletariat, to increase party; as the instrument of the situation the political tbe class struggle. He stated that of all partY meetings, on the agenda mist be the c:i item discussion the issues involved 'and and that through a political of measures the party can be tbrough appropriate "In effect," pnirged of its petty bourgeois elements. of these alien elements stated Djilas, "the party gets rid tbrough political strAe.'
first report, since last fall, Comment: This is the on United States ofiany unusual Security Police pressure representatives in Warsaw. orlany other Western diplomatic Security Police pressure During the past few years Polish Polish civilian emagainst the American Embassy and its and haS not been mainployees has fluctuated considerably tained at any constant level,
25X1 25X1
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kat the Communist Party of ugo school teachers unreliable public cided to purge politically andtrade as one of the first ahd key personnel in industry implement the recent shift of the party measures designed to
line to the left.
rnmmant.
de-
the revo_utionary role of the The recent emphasis on on the part of the regime to party is probably an attempt and to convince the people and restore party discipline government's foreign and domestic party re gulars that the abandonment of soclalism. olicie s do not represent an
SECRET
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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
25X6
25X1
3.
An estimated BURMA. Naw Seng reportedly recruiting in China: .5,000 Kachins and "Sino-Shans" who attended a recent Chinese Communist-sponsored festival at Paoshan, near the SinoBurmese border, were urged by Naw Seng, the Kachin rebel leader from Burma, to join his forces. Volunteers were ipromised military training before an invasion of Burma cheduled "in the near future."
Comment: Naw Seng's long refuge in China is an irritant in SiE-57niiiiiiese relations, particularly because of the patent
nsincerity of Peiping's Embassy in Rangoon when approached on the matter oy Burmese authorities.
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Naw Seng's impending return to Burma has often been rpported over the past year.
4
INDIA.. Ambassador Panikkar's daughte:: marries a leading 76EMUnist: Dievaki Panikkar, daughterol India's Ambassador to
Oina, haS married M. N. Govindan Nair, a south Indian Communist leader who was recently cl zted to the TravancoreCochin State Assembly. I
1
1
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5.
Larger defense budget for 1952-53 may not mean larger military establishment: The Indian National Budget for 19b2-53 provides for an increase in defense expenditures of 170 million rupees (about 34 million dollars) above the amount spent in 1951-52. The total new defense budget is 1,980 million rupees (396 million dollars) compared to the Previous year'3 1,810 million rupees (362 million dollars). Inflationary price rises during 1951-52 may Comment: be responsible for more than half of the increase over last year's budget. Anticipated military commitments in Nepal and defense projects in eastern India may account for the
rest.
25X1

SECRET
5
Indian Ambassador Panikkar is one of the few Comment: iMportant .diplomatic links between China and the nonCOmmunist world. He has long been suspected of Communist His ti:Lnsfer to Calro is reportedly scheduled for Leanings. the near future.
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SECTION 3
(WESTERN)
1.
cooperation EAST GERMANY. East Germans conceal intentions on In an East German Office of with UN Election Commission: Information tommunique on the United Nations commission for the investigation of electoral conditions in Germany, it was announced that the Council of Ministers saw no reason to alter the position outlined by; the East German delegates at the ad hoc committee hearings in Paris last December. While the East German delegation at Paris stressed that all-German elections were a purely German issue and not a UN matter, this communique avoided any commitment on eventual permission to the commission to enter East Germany, as well as any indication of whether East Germany would participate in the 17 March preliminary disti:ssions.
1
1
25X1
These tactids permit the Communists to keep the WZgITFETPowers and the West Germans guessing, and to gear their unity policy at the last minute to the latest developments in Germany's integration with the West.
Comment:
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4.
Political motives seen in Foreign Minister's recent AUSTRIA. The reaction trom provincial political leaders to address: Gruber's controversial foreign policy address on 2 February has pushed the Foreign Minister's prestige within the People's Party to a new low and rendered his retention in the Austrian Cabinet increasingly problematical. Ciber is probably well aware of this, and his recent conduct suggests that he may be 25X1 trying to establish himself as an independent political figure.
A continued development along these lines would be a matter of some concern. Baiting the Soviet Union in Austria for political purposes could upset the delicate international balance in this country. Moreover, any firm coalescence of
SECRET
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right-wing elements around a strong leader would raise serious obstacles to the existence of the present coalition government.
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5.
ITALY.' Foreign Office experts pessimistic on Trieste problem: Italian leoreign Oftice specialists see no hope for a settlement of the Trieste issue following Premier de Gasperi's recent press statement rejecting Tito's proposal for an Italo-Yugoslav condominium, and the play given by the Italian press to the whole issue. The incident has inflamed Italian nationalist sentiment.
Comment: This is the first comment from Foreign Office specialists regarding prospects for a solution of the Trieste issue. Their view confirms previous indications that a settlement of ,the problem is highly improbable for the foreseeable
future I
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7.
MALTA.
No settlement in sight for naval dockyard strike:
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=Ilion has been found to the serious strike of civilian
No
workers employed at the British Admiralty dockyards in Malta, and the strikers have refused the Admiralty offer to negotiate following a return to work. A hunger strike was called for 2 March by Dominic Mintoff, leader of the opposition Malta Labor Party. /
Comment: The 18,000 employees of the Brit_Lsh dockyards, the major Maltese industry, struck on 22 February over failure to receive a cost-of-living increase. The strike has the
SECRET
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SECRET support of all the political parties, but Mintoff has capitalized on it to renew his demands that Malta should receive financial assistance for permitting an American Naval Air Squadron to be stationed there. The 3,000 British and colonial troops garrisoned on the island have been reinforced by an infantry battalion from Cyrenaica, and no violence has occurred as yet.
8.
Tunisian official fears Arab-Asian bloc will overTUNISIA. extend demands: The Tunisian Minister of Justice, himself a nationalist, fears that the more extremist Arab representatives in the United Nations may include a request for Tunisian independence when the problem of the protectorate is brought before the Security Council, The Tunisian nationalists themselves desire only a Security Council recommendation that France proceed with reforms leading to internal autonomy by direct negotiation 25X1 with the Tunisian Government.
1
The essentially moderate nature of the Tunisian Comment: position remains unchanged. An auxiliary demand is for the release of imprisoned nationalist leaders prior to the resumption of negotiations, The Tunisian Ministers also are afraid that thulr position might be jeopardized by ina-,curacies in the brief which Pakistan has agreed to sponsor and waich is being prepared largely without Tunisian supervision.
9.
GUATEMALAJ Arbenz urges United Fruit Company and union to In a speech opening the new Guatemalan reach m settlement: Congress on 1:March, the President referred to the current United Fruit Company crisis and urged the company and union to reach an agreement. Otherwise, he warned, the court decisions would have to be enforced: He said, however, that the government does not wish to expropriate the company or discriminate against North American capital, and added that Guatemala welcomes foreign investmea-..s provided the investors are prepared to comply with Fox the time being, however, the government the country's laws. does not intend to discuss new contracts with the company, "but abides by existing rights and obligations of agreements 25X1 now in force."
The companys Pacific coast properties are Comment: scheduled for forced sale on 5 March to satisfy the back wage demands of suspended workers Recently the union made compromise proposais to tne company
I
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The company undoubtelly rather than submit to the forced sale will accept i compromise of its valuable properties.
I
1C.
Action leaders to join VENEZUELA. Communists invite Democratic An apparently authentic issue of the r:lanpopular front: from destine Communist Tribuna Popular has reprinted a letter the outlawed party's Political Commission to the National Committee ev& the also illegal Democratic Action Party asking joint action against the "military dictatorship." The Communist Party has previously sought the cooperation of the Democratic Action, rank and file, but has ecnsistently denounced the leadership as imperialist and traitorous. The US Embassy at Caracas sees no reason to believe that the Democratic Action 25X1 leaders will respond to the invitation.\
I
Although the Democratic Action Party has also been callin0 for a popular front against the governing junta, there has been no suggestion that its appeal was directed at the Communists.
Cotment:
I
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TO THE DAILY DIGEST
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SECTION 2 (EASTERN)
25X6
3.
EGYPT. American Ambassador in Cairo assesses Egyptian grEiTtion: The new cabinet of Prime Minister Hilali can give -Egypt a good government only if Great Britain offers major concessions on the Suez base and Sudan issues, according to the American Ambassador in Cairo. .The opposition of the strong Wafd Party to the new government will make it

TOP SECRET
1
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TOP SECRET Western terms than it more difficult for Hilali to accept Ali Maher and Nahas was for the previous cabinets under Pasha.
25X6
4.
Prime Minister assures greater cooperation with GREECE. exhibited a "SurUnited States: Prime Mlster Plastiras conversation mood" during his recent prisingly conciliatory his After promising that with the American Ambassador. economic field, government would redouble its efforts in the full responhe assured the Ambassador that he would assume and that no sibility Jor changes in the Greek armed forces, qnnsilltptinn with further thangeS would be made Without full the Chiei of the American Mj1itzrv mission
I
Premier is a stronger Comment: While the Ilew Egyptian his ability to meet Wafd personality than his predecessor, the long term depends, in large opposltion successfully over with the of any future negotiations part, upon the outcome British.
22SX1
5.
SECTION 3 (WESTERN)
send large arms exports to SWITZERLAND. Swiss reluctant to A Swiss Foreign Office spokesman informed the United States': not.certain whether the American Minister in Bern that he is exports of arms" approve "such large the Swiss Government can 240,000 rockets, valued at as are required by a contract for TOP SECRET
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TOP SECRET
140 million Swiss francs, for the US Air Force. The Foreign Minister himself opposed the export of this order but was willing to refer a request to the Federal Council, Switzerland's executive body. The US Air Force placed the contract in January with Buehrle Oerlikon, munitions manufacturers, with delivery on the order to begin on 8 January. American observers hope the Swiss nre not now seeking a quid pro quo for the military orders they have placed in the United StatesA
Comment: The Swiss position at the beginning of the year implied approval of all export permits for American military materiel ordered in Zwitzerland. The reversal may reflect concern that SWiss claims against Germany arising out of World War II may'not receive sufficient consideration at the German debt conference now under way in LonThe Swiss have threatened to leave the OEEC and EPU, don. and have refused to come to an agreement over the liquidation of German assets in Switzerland.
.
25X1.
6.
GUATEMALA. American Ambassador advises .delLying termination aid to Guav.ellain! Since the United Fruft Company's dispute with theGeatemalan GoVernment is at a crucial point, Ambassador Schoenfeld recommends that the 'United States delay for a few days any decision to terminate technical assistance programs in Guatemala. He feels that aisraT.action by the United States at this moment would harm rather than help the company's chances of arriving at an agreement .with the government.
The Ambassador suggests that if the dispute becomes more serious these measures could then be justified On the grounds that conditions are not condueive to cooperative He feels, however, ihat such measures are not programs likely to improve matters and will at best be a concession to American public opinion6
25X1
The present crisis between Guatemala ComMent: United Fruit Company arose 'from a court order that the company'S Properties on the Pacific coast be sold at public auction bn 5 March to satisfy the back wage demand of some 3i700 workers. These laborers were suspended by the company after wind storms did cohthiderable damage to the plantations last September.
TOP SECRET
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The company has refused to rehabilitate the plantations without guarantees against increased labor costs during the The company can be expected to reach next three years. some agreement with the wrkers in order not to lose such valuable properties.
7.
be replaced by a charze d'affaires, as has been done in Moscow and Warsaw.

I
Diplomatic relations with Czechoslovakia under reMEXICO. v ew: The US Embassy in Prague has been informed that the Effacan Minister to Czechoslovakia has been recalled for discussions concerning the question of maintenance of relations with CzeJlolovakia. The Mexican Foreign Office is re-examining its representation in Prague in view of the prospective transfer of Czech Minister Kaisr from Mexico City and the "harassment" to whiCh the Mexican Legation has been subjected. The Mexican Minister has suggested that he
25X1
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UNtLASSIFIED when
fied when filled in form is detached from controlled document.
On46A000800140001-9 APRoznaldSEOtERelbasetntel:PUITP:tiftlbflitAutomatically
SECRET DOCUMENT CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP

REG I STRY
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SOURCE DOC. ND.
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DOC. DATE
COPY NO.
OFF ICE

SIGNATURE
DATE
T I ME
received by the Central Intelligence Agency and attached tO each Top Secret document such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or This fornt will be placed On top Of until document and will remain attached to the Control personnel and those individual.' whose official or classified Top Secret within the CIA Secret TOp Top Secret matter is limited to Secret material will sign this /corn& transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret document will sign and Each individual who sees the Top duties relate to the matter. Top Secret the left-hand columns provided. and indicate period of custody in right-hand columns. indicate the date of handling in the SEEN BY RELEASED DATE RECE I VED OFFICE/DIV. REFERRED TO I GNATURE T IME DATE
ATTENTION:
When NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: Top Secret Control for record.
be Completed in the this jorm is detached from TOP Secret material it shall
DESTROYED
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appropriate apnoea belOw
and transmitted to Central

TO
SPATCHED
(OUTSIDE CIA)
DOWNGRADED
BY (Signature) WITNESSED BY
TO
BY
(SignetUre)
(Signature)
DATE
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ApproVi For Releare Y605/01/26 : CIA4P79T011464 0009nOlcinonl

140)
VD4m 26 uot Polrious tOOTIORs.
TOP SECRET
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P3SECRET9T009WA000600090001-5
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Copy No. 4
DOS REVIEW COMPLETED
BULLETIN CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

I
socumENT No
NO CI LANCE IN CLASS.

NAM
DECLA7SIFF0 CLASS, CHANCED TO: TS

NEXT IIEVIEW CIATC:
:3
711,- A
DATEate REVEWER: 1
25X1
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Approved For Releas
ECRET
00600090001-5
25X1
Approved Fo Release 2003/09/02 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000600 09000Q5X1A
SUMMARY
FAR EAST
1. 2.
USSR probably controls Korean air war from Mukden (page 3).
Burmese rebel leader reportedly recruiting in China (page 3).

NEAR EAST - AFRICA
4.
6.
7.
25X1A

(page 4).
3.
American Ambassador in Cairo assesses Egyptian situation
Thnisian official fears Arab bloc will over-extend demands

(page 4).
WESTERN EUROPE
Italian Foreign Office experts pessimistic on Trieste problem

(page 5).
Gaullist regime reported immihent in France (page 5).

LATIN AMERICA
American Ambassador advises delaying termination of aid to Guatemala (page 6).
25X1A
Approved F or Release 2003/09/02 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0006 00090001-5
Approved F
25X1A
600090001 5
FAR EAST
1.
USSR probably controls Korean air war from Mukden: The US Air Force believes that the USSR probably exercises over-all command control over enemy air combat operations in Korea from a combined Soviet-Chinese-Korean air eadquart s located in Mukden.
25X1A
: 25X1
25X1
Comment: This combined headquarters at Mukden presumably comiaiiare jet fighter units of the Chinese, Korean and Soviet Air Forces based at combat airfields in the Antung area.
2.
Burmese rebel leader reportedly recruiting in China:
25X1A
An estimated 5,000 Kachins and "Sino-Shans" who attended a recent Chinese Communistsponsored festival at Paoshan, near the SinoBurmese border, were urged by Naw Seng, ac in rebel leader from Burma, to join his forces. Volunteers were promised military training before an invasion of Burma scheduled "in the near future."
is an irritant in Sino -Burmese relations, particularly because of the patent insincerity of Peiping's Embassy in Rangoon when approached on the matter by Burmese authorities.
Naw Seng's impending return to Burma has often been reported over the past year.
- 3 -
Comment:
Naw Seng's long refuge in China
25X1A
Approved
00090001-5
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NEAR EAST - AFRICA
3, American Ambassador in Cairo assesses Egyptian L:ituation:

The new cabinet of Prime Minister Hilali can give Egypt a good government only if Great Britain offers major concessions on the Suez base and Sudan issues, according to the American Ambassador in Cairo. The opposition of the strong Wafd Party to the new government will make it more difficult for Hi lali to accept Western terms than it was for the previous cabinets under Ali Maher and Nahas Pasha.
Meanwhile the American Ambassador in London reports that the British Government will for the present wait to see how the situation develops. Britain does not wish to act quickly lest the Egyptian Cabinet be accused of being a "British creature." The British also feel that Egypt must first cope with the Wafdbefore it can tackle Anglo-Egyptian negotiations.
25X1A
is a stronger personality than his predecessor, his ability to meet Wafd opposition successfully over the long term depends, in large part,
upon the outcome of any future negotiations with the British.
4. Tunisian official fears Arab bloc will over-extend demands:
25X1A
pendence when the Security Council. a Security Council leading to internal Government.

Comment:
While the new Egyptian Premier
The Tunisian Minister of Justice, himself a nationalist, fears that the more extremist Arab representatives in the United Nations may include a request for Tunisian indeproblem of the protectorate is brought before the The Tunisian nationalists themselves desire only recommendation that France proceed with reforms autonomy by direct negotiation with the Tunisian
-425X1A
App?oved Fo Release 2003/09/02 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0006f 0090001-5
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(Approved
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Comment: The essentially moderate nature of the Tunisian position remains unchanged. An auxiliary demand is for the release of imprisoned nationalist leaders prior to the resumption of negotiations.
The Tunisian Ministers also are afraid that their position might be jeopardized by inaccuracies in the brief which Pakistan has agreed to sponsor and which is being prepared largely without Tunisian supervision.
5.
Italian Foreign Office experts pessimistic on Trieste problem:

Italian Foreign Office specialists see no hope for a settlement of the Trieste issue following Premier de Gasperi's rejection of Marshal Tito's proposal for an Halo-Yugoslav condominim& The incident has inflamed Italian nationalist sentiment.
Comment: This is the first comment from Foreign Office specialists regarding prospects for a solution of the Trieste issue. Their view confirms previous indications that a settlement of the problem is highly improbable for the foreseeable future.
25X1A
6.
Gaullist regime reported imminent in France:

WESTERN EUROPE
I
25X1
I
25X1A
I one of De Gaulle's chief advisers 'believes that within sixty days the General "will be in powerr at least to the extent that his Rally of the French People will participate in a new government. It will, however, expect to dominate such a government.
25X1
-5-
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25X1
Soustelle, head of the Gaul lists' parliamentary group, was summoned last week-end for a conference with President Auriol, who said he wanted to see De Gaulle but feared Communist reaction.
demand the premiership as the price of permitting formation of a new government; they would, however, insist on acceptance of their program for constitutional reforms and a major French reorientation within the Atlantic alliance. There is no evidence that sufficient deputies of other parties are swinging to acceptance of the Gaul lists in a coalition on these terms.
Summoning Soustelle, as the parliamentary leader of a major party, would be normal at the beginning of a Cabinet crisis.
Comment:
kacques
The Gaul lists would probably not
7.
American Ambassador advises delaying termination of aid to Guatemala:

Because the United Fruit Company's dispute with the Guatemalan Government is at a crucial point, Ambassador Schoenfeld recommends that the United States delay for a few days any decision to terminate technical assistance programs in Guatemala. He feels that abrupt action by the United States at this moment would harm rather than help the company's chances of arriving at an agreement with the government
25X1A
opinion.
The Ambassador suggests that if the dispute becomes more serious, measures then be adopted which could be justified on the grounds that conditions are not conducive to cooperative programs. He feels, however, that such measures are not likely to improve matters and will at best be a concession to American public

LA TIN AMERICA
-6-
25X1A
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0090001-5
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25X1A
The present crisis between Guatemala and the United Fruit Company arose from a court order that the company's properties on the Pacific coast be sold at public auction on 5 March to satisfy the back wage demand of some 31700 workers. These laborers were suspended by the company after wind storms did major damage to the plantations last September.
Comment:

25X1A
The company has refused to rehabilitate the plantations without guarantees against increased labor costs during the next three years. The company can be expected to reach some agreement with the workers in order not to lose such valuable properties.
Approved F or Release 2003/09102 : CIA-RDP79100975A000 500090001-5
HR70-14
AR SECRET SUEDirt
SECTION SECTION 2 2 (EASTERN) (EASTERN)
1. 1
KOREA. Chinese Chinese unit u n i t receives r e c e i v e 8 air-ground air-ground liaison l i a i s o n personnel: personnel: KOREA. m Chinese n e s e Communist Communist message of 25 A 23 February, F e b r u a r y ? probably probably between its parent p a r e n t division, d i v i s i o n , listed listed a n unidentified u n i d e n t i f i e d regiment regiment and and its an t h e number number of of "third " t h i r d section s e c t i o n personnel p e r s o n n e l received received in i n the the the ( t h i r d section s e c t i o n is is probably ith F e b r u a r y allotment" a l l o t m e n t " (third February probably concerned w with communications). Included in i n this t h i s list were "nine airaircommunications). l i a i s o n men." men." (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Recon Group Group Korea, Korea, ground liaison (SUEDE K - L 1 9 0 , 29 29 Feb Feb 52) 52) K-1190,
r e c e i p t of o f nine n i n e air-ground air-ground liaison l i a i s o n men in in Comment: The receipt s i n g le e month at at a a Chinese Chinese Communist Communist regimental r e g i m e n t a l level l e v e l is is a sing a n indication i n d i c a t i o n that t h a t the the enemy enemy has h a s not n o t abandoned abandoned his h i s hope hope of of an employing aircraft aircraft over over the t h e front f r o n t lines. lines. employing cannot be be considered considered a a firm f i r m indication i n d i c a t i o n of of T h i s message cannot This i n t e n t to t o commit commit airpower airpower at a t the t h e front, f r o n t , however, however, because because intent p r e v i o u s messages, c a p t u r e d documents and POW'S numerous previous messages, captured POW's have mentioned mentioned the t h e existence e x i s t e n c e of an a n air-ground air-ground liaison l i a i s o n set-up set-up have i n the t h e Communist armies. armies. in
2. 2.
3.

area, area.
c o n t r o l s Korean air a i r war USSR probably controls war from Mukden: Mukden: The US A i r Force believes b e l i e v e s that t h a t the t h e USSR probably xercises o ver-all Air probibrY e exercises over-all p e r a t i o n s in i n Korea command control c o n t r o l over o v e r enemy air a i r combat o command operations from a a combined, combined, Soviet-Chinese-Korean ir h eadquarters from Soviet-Chinese-Korean a air headquarters located in i n Mukden. In I n addition, examination by the t h e Air Air located F o r c e of of traffic t r a f f i c on the t h e Communist Communist ground-control-intercept ground-control-intercept Force r a d i o net n e t in i n Korea and Manchuria now s trongly i ndicates radio strongly indicates p a r t i c i p a t i o n of o f Russian, Russian, Chinese Chinese and and Korean Korean personnel, personnel, participation i n c l u d i n g pilots, p i l o t s , in i n air a i r combat combat activities. a c t i v i t i e s . (SUEDE (SUEDE A ir F orce including Air Force Roundup 44, 2139Z, 21392, 3 3 Mar M a r 52) 52)
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Comment: This, h e a d q u a r t e r s at a t Mukdeu Mukdea presumably This combined headquarters the jet j e t fighter f i g h t e r units u n i t s of of the t h e Chinese, commands the Chinese, Korean and S o v i e t Air Air F o r c e s based at a t combat irfields i n t h e Antung Soviet Forces combat a airfields in the Antung
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unit orts UN bacteria drop: An Chinese u n i t in i n Korea re reports 3. KOREA. 3, m t i ? i e ed Chi ne68 unit on 26 February e ruary reported r e p o r t e d that that ommun s un nese Communist UnTaati "yesterday "yesterday it i t was discovered that that in i n oar oxr bivouac bivouac area area there there Was a real was r e a l flood of of bacteria bacteria and and germ8 germs scattered scattered from from a a

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plane p l a n e by by the t h e enemy. enemy. P Please l e a s e supply supply u us s immediately immediately w with i t h an an i s s u e of that w e may combat t h e menace, top t he s pread issue of DDT that we combat the menace, s stop the spread of t h i s plague, p l a g u e , and and eliminate e l i m i n a t e all a l l bacteria." bacteria." (SUEDE 501st 501st of this (SUEDE Comm Recon *Group K-1221, 3 3 Mar Mar 52) 52) Group Korea, K-1221,
Comment: Reports R e p o r t s such s u c h as as this t h i s from from enemy enemy field f i e l d units units Comment: provide p r o v i d e the the rommunists Communists with w i t h the t h e "proof" t'proof'' which they t h e y apparently apparently require r e q u i r e to t o support support a a propaganda propaganda campaign. campaign. This T h i s is is the t h e second second i nstance d u r i n g the the c u r r e n t BW scare that t h a t a Communist f ield instance dUring current field u n i t has h a s actually a c t u a l l y reported r e p o r t e d the t h e discovery d i s c o v e r y of of UN bacteriological bacteriological unit a gents. agents.
4. 4 .
Comment: The North N o r t h Korean 82nd Regiment has h a s been in in Comment: the t h e Kaesong area a r e a almost almost since s i n c e the t h e start s t a r t of of the the truce t r u c e talks. talks. Its o n l y combat d u r i n g this this p e r i o d has been limited limited t o minor Its only during period to minor p atrols. patrols.
5 . 5.
North Koreans will w i l l hold h o l d critique c r i t i q u e on abortive a b o r t i v e Yang-do Yang-do operation: A major North Korean station Korean coastal c o a s t a l security security s tation o peration: h informed formed a s subordinate ubordinate s station t a t i o n on 29 F February ebruary t that hat " "the the training t r a i n i n g documents pertaining p e r t a i n i n g to t o the t h e operation o p e r a t i o n at a t Yang-do Yang-do you come come up up t to must be brought brought by by you you 'when when you o Pyongyang for for the the instruction.meeting." 501st C Comm Recon Group Group Korea,. Korea, i n s t r u c t i o n , m e e t i n g . " (SUEDE 501st o r n Recon 15RSM/7194,.1 15RSM/7194, 1 Mar Mar 52) 52)
a t t e m p t to t o capture capture Comment: The disastrous d i s a s t r o u s North Korean attempt Comment: Yang off the t h e coastcoast n near e a r Chongjin Chongjin in in n northeastern o r t h e a s t e r n Korea Korea Yang island I s l a n d off was conducted by by elements e l e m e n t s of of the t h e newly identified i d e n t i f i e d 63rd Was conducted Independent Infantry I n f a n t r y Regiment. Regiment, FECOM FECOM reports r e p o r t s suggest s u g g e s t that that t h e assaUlt assault u n i t which attempted a t t e m p t e d to t o take t a k e the the unit t h e island i s l a n d against against Marines suffered ROK marines s u f f e r e d nearly n e a r l y 100 100 percent p e r c e n t Casualties. casualties.
Kaesong guard force f o r c e criticized: c r i t i c i z e d : -The The assistant assistant r egimental regimental t h e North Korean 82nd 82nd Regiment, Regiment, charged c h a r g e d with w i t h the the commander of the * s e c u r i t y of as n o t i f i e d on e b r u a r y by nidenti*security of Kaesong, Kaesong, w was notified on 29 29 F February by an u unidentified of your unit u n i t from the highest highest f i e d senior s e n i o r that t h a t "the " t h e spirit s p i r i t of r a n k to rank t o the t h e lowest lowest has h a sdecayed'. decayed. It It h a s been forgotten f o r g o t t e n that that has o u r comrades our comrades at st the t h e front f r o n t lines l i n e s are fighting f i g h t i n g to t o the t h e death." death." T h i s message was w a s apparently a p p a r e n t l y inspired i n s p i r e d by a financial f i n a n c i a l misapmisapThis p r o p r i a t i o n which resulted propriation r e s u l t e d in i n the t h e 82ndls 8 2 n d ' s supply s u p p l y officer officer b e i n g sent s e n t to being t o the t h e provost p r o v o s t marshal. m a r s h a l . (SUEDE 5 0 1 s t Comm 501st COMM Recon Group Korea, Korea, 15RSM/7253, 15RSM/7253, 1 1 Mar Mar 52) 52)
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A i r defense d e f e n s e communications communications between between Sariwon Sariwon and and .Pyongyang Pyongyang Air being b e i n g organized: o r g a n i z e d : A 29 2m e s a g e orth K or e a n February message from N North Korean Air A i r Headquarters H e a d q u a r t e r s in i n Sinuiju S i n u i j u instructed i n s t r u c t e d an a n air a i r unit u n i t near near Pyongyang t o make make a a topographic t o p o g r a p h i c survey s u r v e y to. to e establish-"the stablish "the Pyongyang to direct and the radar station d i r e c t line l i n e to t o cOnnect c o n n e c t pyongyang Pyongyang and the radar s t a t i of_ri n ;n Sar-.?on .'I (SUEDE 501st Comm Corn Recon Group Korea, 15RSM/7224, 15RSM/7224, Sar.:.von." (SUEDE 1 Mar 52) 1 52)
Comment: This Thls intelligence, i n t e l l i g e n c e , in i n addition a d d i t i o n to t o indicating indicating Comment: that and Sariwon Sariwon will w i l l be be laid, laid, t h a t land 'land lines l i n e s linking l i n k i n g Pyongyang Pyongyang and s u g g e s t s that t h a tthe the suggests radar radar station statio at n Sa.:1,Lwc. a t Sa--.,ii-. is subordinate s u b o r d i n a t e to to the N o r t h Korean Korean Air A i r Force. Force. the North
7 . 7.
N o r t h Korean Air A i r Force F o r c e expands expands its i t s operations: operations: D uring North During a two-week two-week period p e r i o d in i n mia-February, mid-February. 142 142 aircraft a i r c r a f t communicating communicating i n Korean,. Korean, Russian c t i v e on the t h e KoreanKoreanin Russian and and Chinese Chinese were were a active b+.rated ,..,eratedGCI GCInnet e t iin n North North Korea. Operations O p e r a t i o n s to t o date d a t e on the the net nel; have been mainly m a i n l y limited l i m i t e d to t o training t r a i n i n g and observation. observation. However, a i r c r a f t controlled c o n t r o l l e a by the t h e Korean ground system system However, aircraft o n e possible p o s s i b l e contact c o n t a c t with with a a UN plane, p l a n e , and Korean . have made one ground operators o p e r a t o r s have tracked t r a c k e d UN aircraft a i r c r a f t on three t h r e e occasions. occasions.
I n a d d i t i o n , there t h e r e is e vidence t h a t some North In addition, evidence that North Korean a i r c r a f t are p erforming r e c o n n a b x c e missions m i s s i o n s and and protecting. protecting aircraft performing reconnak=mce t h e i r airfields. airfields, their
US Air A i r force F o r c e concludes c o n c l u d e s that t h a t "allied" " a l l i e d f ' aircraft a i r c r a f t are The US p probably r o b a b l y active a c t i v e in i n the t h e training t r a i n i n g phasa p h a w of of the the N North o r t h Korean GCI net, n e t , and that t h a t some North Korean air a i r units u n i t s are now participating p a r t i c i p a t i n g in i n combat.(SUEDE USAFSS Brooks AFB, ODD-220694, 1 20694, 1 Mar Mar 52) 52)
8. 8 .
CHINA. y ad CHINA. Poss.i.; Poss.La..ly more MI G-15Ps t o o '..4 more MIG-15's tomove move from from Shanghai Shanghai t to VFilla-border: P -border: Possibly. 38 MIG MIG715's of tthe Chinese o s s i b l y 58 -15's of he C h i n e s e Com, Comm u n i s t 12th 1 2 t h Division Dfv i s i o n were scheduled s c h e d u l e d to t o leave Shanghai on munist 4 March on a a northbound L i a , h t . The:US The US Air A i r Force F o r c e points points o u t that t h a t this t h i s brings b r i n g s the t h e Division's D i v i s i o n ' s strength s t r e n g t h to out t o at a t least least 49 MIG-15's, MIG-l5's, including i n c l u d i n g 11 1 1which which left l e f t Shanghai Shanghaifor f o rTakushan,' Takushan, near n e a r the t h e Korean Korean border, b o m d r , in i n February. F e b r u a r y . (SUEDE A ir F orce Air Force Roundup 45, 45, 2133Z, 21332, 4 4 Mar Mar 52) 52)
Comment: The strength Comment: s t r e n g t h of of Chinese C h i n e s e MIG d divisions i v i s i o n s is This usually uaual'ly about a b o u t 50 50 planes. planes. T h i s is is the t h e first f i r s t evidence e v i d e n c e that that t h e 12th 12th D i v i s i o n has has a the Division a full f u l l complement. complement. The transfer t r a n s f e r of
6 M Mar a r 52 52
the 12th 1 2 t h Division will w i l l raise raise the t h e number number of Chinese jet divisions at at the t h e Korean Korean border border to t o thrfe, t h r e e , although although one one of of divisions them--the 14th--is 1 4 t h - - i s believed b e l i e v e d scheduled s c h e d u l e d to to transfer transfer to t o China them--the soon. Proper soon. Proper
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Fourth Fourth Field Field Army Army admits admits heavy heavy casualties casualties as as of of last last September : The The Chinese Chinese FourtE Fourth Field Field Army Army had 150,000 150,000men men September:
h o s p i m z e d in inCentral Central and and South South China, China, according according to to a a EUgFraIrzed its Medical Medical Department. Department. document produced last last September September by its document This This document document was obtained obtained by a Hong Hong Kong newspaper; newspaper; subsesubsequently of Central Central quently the the Communist Communist Public Public Health Health Department Department of South China China admitted admitted that that it it had carelessly carelessly allowed allowed copies copies and South to be used used as as wrapping wrapping paper. paper. to
The document document also reveale reveale an alarming alarming need for f o r medicine medi-cine for improved improved treatment treatment of of the the wounded. wounded. ,and called for and called - The total tota? number of casualties casualties suffered suffered by by the the Comment: Comment: Fourth Fi eld Army s unknown; : u . e r ,the the Chinese Chinese ComComField Army alone alone i is unknown;k @ hb.er, Y :. :;:es :es have suffered nearly in munist munist Ir. have suffered nearly900,000 900,000 casualties casualties in t h e Korean war. Only 20,000 2 0 , 0 0 0 have been taken prisoner prisoner by the the the Korean war. Chinese imports'of Heavy Chinese imports of antibiotics antibiotics and other other pharphartaceutlCuls < : z i n g the past year maceutiCals J...:ring the past yeardemonstrate demonstrate their their urgent urgent need of medicines. medicines.
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No sickness sickness from from BW BW reported reported in in North North Korean Korean coastal coastal No unit : A North North Korean Korean unit unit on on coastal coastal security securitv in in eastern eastern unit Rorsa reported reported to to Naval Naval Defense Defense Headquarters Headquarters near near Wonsan Wonsan on on Korea March that that although although on on the the 28th 28th insects insects were were again again dropped dropped 2 March Paekyang, Sinpung, Sinpung, and Innam,"no Innam,"no one one has been been infected infected at Paekyang, yet." (SUEDE 501st 501st Comm Recon Recon Grp Grp Korea, Korea, 15 15 RSM/7413, RSW7413, 3 3 Mar Mar 52) 52) yet."
:
Comment: This provides some indication indication that no actual actual Comment: provides some epidemic is current current in in this this area, area, in in which which the the UN UN has has been been epidemic is accused carrying on on bacteriological bacteriological warfare. warfare. It I t is is also also accused of carrying noteworthy that that Communist Communist propaganda propaganda to to date date has has concentrated concentrated on the the actual actual dropping dropping of of infecting infecting agents agents rather rather than than on on the to the the employment employment of of BW. BW. the incidence incidence of of disease disease due due to
North Korean east east coast coast unit unit claims claims BW BW caused caused hardships: hardships: A North North Korean Korean coastal coastal security security unit unit in in eastern-Korea eastern Korea reported reporfed on 3 March that that UN UN bacteriological bacteriological warfare warfare agents agents in in the the surrounding area haa had prevented prevented the the movement movement of of transportation transportation surrounding area since 21 February. February. Later in in the day the unit reported to since 21 reported to Pyongyang that "Pupyong "Pupyong (just (just southwest southwest of of Hamhung) Hamhung) is Pyongyang that is the contaminated area. According to the the correct correct news, news, no no one one contaminated area. can pass through through it. it. If you do not act quickly, 12th and quickly, the 12th 13th guard stations into starvation condistations will have fallen fallen into starvation conditions." 15RSM/7459, tions." (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, Korea, 15RSM/7459, 5 Mar 52; 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, 15RSW7502, 5 5 Mar 52) 52) 52; 501st Korea, 15RSM/7502,
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Comment: that the the raise the possibility possibility that Comment: These messages raise blaming the the east east coast coast transportation transportation difficulties, difficulties, enemy is blaming caused caused by UN air and naval strikes, strikes, on the more provocative provocative BW theme. theme. ,
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North Korean Korean unit unit has has unidentified unidentified "secret" "secret" weapon: weanon: A North I ._ Marc.. North Korean Korean message, message, possibly possibly from from the the 23rd Z3rd Brigade, Brigade, March Worth informed a subordinate subordinate unit that the inspection inspection which will be informed performed very soon soon will mainly concern concern the "special "special weapons which are are being being handled handledsecretly secretly at go: c unit." (SUEDE which at 701. unit." (SUEDE 501st 501st Comm Recon Recon Grp Grp Korea, Korea, 15RSM/7524, 15RSM/7524, 5 5 Mar Mar 52) 52) Comm
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Comment: indications as to to what these these Comment: There have been no indications might be. be. The The Soviet S o v i e t Union has previously sought sought new'weapons might new.weapons compromise of new new materiel, materiel, and most weapons weapons and and to avoid compromise equipment encountered to to date date -- with the the notable notable exception exception of of equipment encountered the MIG-15 MIG-15 -- have have been been World World War War II I1 models. models.
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President KOREA, Rhee declares declares he he will w i l l not n o t run r u n for for re-election: re-election: President KOREA, REW-WrofF-T5-iii he will not be ~ ~ w r o t e t American o a n ~ correspolaint ~ ~ c o r x that te h as t h ne ~ w in l l tn ot b e a c a n d i d a t e for f o r re-election r e - e l e c t i o n next n e x t >;%-,,e, according a c c o r d i n g to t o Ambassador Ambassador candidate Muccio. Rhee's R h e e ' s advisers a d v i s e r s had urged the the President P r e s i d e n t to t o hedge his his s t a t e m e n t , but b u t he he answered answered that that his his life life expectancy e x p e c t a n c y was w a s short short statement, t h a t the t h e Korean people p e o p l e "may "may as w ell f a c e up t o t h e problem and that well face to the i s successor) successor 1 now." now. 'I (of h his
Comment, Rhee has issued i s s u e d similar s i m i l a r statements s t a t e m e n t s at a t times t i m e s when when Comment a p ol-alcrisis in o r d e r to to d iscomfit h i s oppopoliticii crisis was brewing in order discomfit his opponot s i t i o n and to t o rally r a l l y popular p o p u l a r support. s u p p o r t . Probably Rhee will not sition c o n s i d e r himself h i m s e l f d'finitely d s f i n i t e l y hound by s uch a s tatement i f he consider such statement if he for his his re-election. re-election. c a n point p o i n t to t o popular p o p u l a r demand demand for can
2. 2.
North Koreans plan p l a n for f o r procedures p r o c e d u r e s in i n case case of of cease-fire: cease-fire: The ~-;;incipalZ"Gr33TK~GEriTXflcal TTZF y m e r s met met :rincipai-Rorth Korean parificaI and and m irrnary leaders a t Gemra1 Headquartemon 12 12 F e b r u a r y to to d i 6 c u s s developments at Geueral Headquarterion February discuss following f ollowina a a cease-fire,[ c ease-f i r e , I - - ___

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of R Rhee's Ambassador Muccio comments that t h a t forecasts f o r e c a s t s of h e e ' s future future p o l i t i c a l moves are are highly h i g h l y speculative; s p e c u l a t i v e ; the t h e weight w e i g h t of of evidence, evidence, political however, still s t i l l points p o i n t s to t o the t h e conclusion conclusion t h a t he ill o nly s tep that he w will only step down from the t h e presidency p r e s i d e n c y if i f forced f o r c e d to t o by i r c u m s t a n c e s beyond by c circumstances beyond his control. control. I 7
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The group decided that when a ceaSe-fire took place North Korean troops would be withdrawn north of the 39th for rest and reorganization. In preparation for the wituurawal of the Chinese Communists, North Korean army strength would be raised to 20 divisions and all fit males under years old would be inducted "prior to 30 April 1952."
Such a m meeting, actually occurred, Comment: Such e e t i n g , if i f it it a ctually o c c u r r e d , would Comment: indica-that lea d i n g North Korean of f i c i a l s are nticipating indict-Tie' that leading North Korean officials are aanticipating a conclusion c o n c l u s i o n of the t h e truce t r u c e talks. talks. P revious r e p o r t s have Previous reports have advanced t he t hesis t hat t h e North the thesis that the North Korean Korean army army would would withdraw withdraw from from concont act p r e p a r a t o r y tto o a e o r g a ; ' z a t i o n following f o l l o w i n ga. a cease-fire. cease-fire. tact preparatory a rreorgazation The level l e v e l of recruitment r e c r u i t m e n t in i n manpower-short manpower-short North North Korea Korea seems seems t o have a s s e d t the h e sstage t a g e where nly p h y s i c a l l y ffit i t males to. have long long ppassed where o only physically males under 35 35 years y e a r s old o l d are are to t o be be drafted. drafted.
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A A Chinese Chinese Communist Communistartillery artillery unit unit was informed informed w i l l be on on 29 29 February February that "all personnel will be rereinoculated w i t h bubonic inoculated at once" with bubonic plague plague vaccine. vaccine. Healthy r e to take only Healthy individuals, individuals, however, however, a are a half-strength shot shot or may may "temporarily ''temporarily not not be beinoculated." inoculated."
Army Security Agency Army Agency 29 Feb, Feb, 4 29 4 Mar Mar 52 52 SUEDE
Comment: The Communists evidently a re are large-scale immunization program carrying outaalarge-scale carrying out n-M'--munization programin inKorea, Korea, probably because the the threat threat of of epidemics epidemicswill will be beheightened heightened in in the the coming coming months. months. These messages provide provide further evidence that continued and unthere is isno no serious seriousepidemic epidemic within within these units. units. The continued theme in Communist Communist broadcasts, broadcasts, BW theme precedented coverage given given the BW are moreover, supports supportsthe theview view that that propaganda propaganda motives motives a r e behind behind the charges UN use use of of BW BW in Korea. charges of of UN
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Another Another message message from a Chinese Communist artillery regimentreported reported on27 27February February that "wehave havenow now fully fullyobtained artillery regiment on that "we obtained malaria, and andbubonic bubonic the vaccine vaccinerequired requiredfor for smallpox in the the spring time, time, malaria, plague." The plague." The sender sender notes that the smallpox smallpox and andmalaria malaria shots shots have have alalready been given, "How shall shall we we administer administerthe thebubonic bubonicplague given, but queries, "How plague shots?' shots ' P
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Communist truce truce talks talks strategy strategy reported: reported:
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Korean Vice Premier Ho Ka'i Ka'i is alleged aiieged that the the Soviet Soviet Union be a member of the the to have requested that inspection team team for for the the following following reasons: to emphasize neutral inspection Union's moral responsibility the Soviet Union's responsibility towards preserving the peace in Korea; Korea; to to test test the the American reaction and to to provoke negotiators; and to to regain the the iniinirash statements by the the UN negotiators; tiative at the conference by diverting UN attention to this issue isste while the Communists concentrate on "other basic issues."
1 North
Comment: The points listed by Ho Ka'i, Comment: Ka'i, although unconfirmea, seem fairly logical. logical. The 10 10 February speech echoes firmea7gga fairly the current Communist propaganda propaganda line. line,
oreans were p ! I = easan notes that the the North K Koreans pleasantly surprised by the UN's agreement agreement on the the post-truce post-truce political conference, believing conference, believing they they had had won won a a major major point. point.
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KOREA. scare Continues c o n t i n u e s to t o occupy occupy Communists Communists in i n Korea: Korea: KOREA. BW scare message from from t the north IC Korean MMarch a r c h message h e North o r e a n 23rd 23rd i t s subordinate s u b o r d i n a t e battalions b a t t a l i o n s suggested suggested B r i g a d e to t o one of its Brigade p r e v e n t i v e measures to t o be used against against b a c f e r i a allegedly allegedly preventive bacteria dropped by dkopped by UN U W aircraft. a i r c r a f t . The The report r e p o r t stated s t a t e d .that t h a t "three "three persons. persons. f e v e r i s h and and their t h e i r nervous nervous became suddenly feverish s y s t e m have have benumbed." benumbed." A f t e r treatment, t r e a t m e n t , "two "two persons p e r s o n s alive alive' system After and one dead." dead." The e p o r t concluded he a stounding The r report concluded with with t the astounding s t a t e m e n t that t h a t "the " t h e government will w i l l soon take take p i c t u r e s of statement pictures s p e c i f i c appearance appearance of the t h e germs collectively c o l l e c t i v e l y and,correct and c o r r e c t specific p h o t o g r a p h i c data photographic d a t a will w i l l be be provided." provided."
Y-Taiik detailed 6 6 A l o n g detailed
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m a n i f e s t a t i o n of the theme is a 1 1 March query Another manifestation.of from Pyongyang to t o a North Korean a ir u n i t at n t he air unit at Sariwon, Sariwon, i in the supposedly contaminated area, area, "Have o t had victims "Have you n not had an anjLyictims e s u l t of e r t a i n bacteria SUFDEf~XM , as a r result of c certain bacteria yeapons?" weapons?" ((SUEDEL 324, I 1 Mar; 501st 5 0 1 s t Comm Recon Recon Grp Korea, Korea, SK-H-184, SK-H-184, 6 6 Mar Mar ) )
Comment: Enemy messages have not n o t yet y e t mentioned epidemic epidemic Comment: c o n d i t i o n s in i n North North Korea. Korea. There is no d o u b t , however, however, that that conditions doubt, t h e enemy h a s succeeded i n c o n v i n c i n g his roops t h a t BW the has in convincing his t troops that BW a g e n t s are being b e i n g used used against a g a i n s t him. him. agents
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AFFECTING THE NATIONAL THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES SECS. 793 AND 794, THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, IN ANY MANNER TO AN TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH BY LAW. UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED
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official hopes publicity on payFinance Ministry According FRANCE. to a Finance Ministry ReiTtrc_crisiswillhelp: attach great importance to official,nencuausocrities of a proposed Belgian loan the EPU's prospective approval to reduce France's EPU of 100 million dollars intended proportions. deficit for February to more manageable government an opportunity This expedient would give the new for internal toward a program "to find its stride" and work financial stabilization. with Belgium go through, Even if the arrangements still ask the Bank-of France however, the government musit its February settlement with for enough gold to complete act of Parliament, Since this would require an the EPU. deplorable that the "present the effect the French official assured in public, with situation" would be aired fully firm correctional rogram of building up pressure for a by the government. deficit in the EPU nearly doubled Comment: The French the end of FebruarY, causing from Tiii-UinuarY to the imports from EPU government to reimpose licenses on all with Parliain conjunction countries. This development, revenues to meet inment's refusal to vote sufficient created a serious financreased defense commitments, has cial crisis. correctional proPolitical differences preclude the crisis. end to this gram necessary for an early
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crisis: US Minister fears Icelandic political that party conto Iceland reports Ihe American Minister coalition flicts within the Conservative-Progressive have of payments situation government over the balance situation must become so bitter that "a serious political Progressives, parbe anticipated." A withdrawal of the visit to Iceticularly on the eve of Admiral McCormick's US efforts gravely prejudice current land next week, would defense to conclude detailed arrangements for additional facilities. request The Minister strongly urges granting Iceland's economic aid. for immediate American
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The Progressive Party, which has for some Comment: withdraw from the time UFFH-ggeking an issue on which to the imposition of additional cabinet, violently opposes of payments crisis. meet the balance import restrictions to removed The death of President Bjornsson on 25 January partisan from the scene the one figure who stood above parties politics, and simultaneously set all political to choose his jockeying for position in the July election successor.
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NATIONAL THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE OF THE STATES WITHIN THE MEANING DEFENSE OF THE UNITED ESPIONAGE LAws, TITLE 18, USC, SECS. 193 AND 794, THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
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Mosccy comments that this absence was unusual, inasmuch as 4........ +ha war hp has missed only. the 1946 meeting.
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Stalin absent from the USSR. STritet:--loriemier Stalin 61d not attend the 6 March Joint Session of the Supreme Soviet: The American Embassy in
Joint Session of the Supreme
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Except for irregular dinners, theater perComment: formances, and receptions for foreign representatives, Stalin's postwar public appearances have been limited to the Joint Session of the Supreme four annual state affairs: Soviet, the Lenin Anniversary celebration, the Air Day In recent years Stalin's Parade and the May Day celebration. In 1945 he number. decreased in public appearances have anniversary of the the celebration on stopped attending the Bolshevik Revolution, and his irregular appearances over the last year have been comparatively few.
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Onvrin+ rnmhat nilnts transferred to instructor status:
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This is the first report received concerning Comment: Soviet utilization of air combat veterans as flight instructors, although it is reasonable to assume that a Soviet training program, employing combat-experienced pilots, has been established. The addition of new pilot-replacements may be indicated by a decrease in enemy aggressiveness, noted since the middle of February. Variations in the
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83 Soviet pilots, in Mukden on 4 Febvete-ans of Korean air combat, arr ved to Khabarovsk where The pilots are to be transferred ruary. they will become MIG-15 instructors.
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character of enemy air activity, ability and aggressiveness air perhave already suggested a rotation plan for enemy sonnel. Vasile Luca dismissed as Finance Minister: The Presidium of the Rumanian GE1Wad National Assembly relieved of Vasile Luca, high ranking Communist and Vice Premier, He was rehis post as Minister of Finance on 8 March. Supply placed by Dumitru Petrescu, Chairman of the State in that capacity by Emil Commission, who was succeeded Stanciu. The American Legation in Bucharest has no further information as yet but suggests that Luca's dismissal, alPremier, though he presumably still holds the title of Vice Rumanian regime. may presage a top-level shake-up in the
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The Legation reported that the dismissal of Comment: probably the three deputy finance ministers on 6 March was dissatisfaction with a face-saving device to combat general Luca's dismissal may have the January currency reform. and is more serious ramifications for top Rumanian leaders rumor" that Vyshinsky possibly connected with a "fleeting If Luca should be purged, it was in Bucharest last week. will be the first time a high-ranking Rumanian Communist leader has been ousted since before the Cominform-Tito break in 1948.
4.
Trieste Mayor asks for Italian intervention in beTRIESTE. In an half of the Italian population in Yugoslav Zone B: interview with Italian Premier Alcide de Gasperi, Mayor Bartoli of Trieste urged the Italian Government to intervene in Washington and London in behalf of the rights of the Italian population in Zone B on the basis of the Hague ConHe cited the introduction of a discriminatory vention.
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Luca spent many years in Moscow and, along with Ana with Pauker, Bodnaras, and Chisinevski, returned to Rumania have been Since that time these four the Red Army in 1944. Party and the most powerful leaders in the Rumanian Workers' Government. Luca's successor, General Dumitru Petrescu, is also a Moscow-trained member of the Central Committee of the Rumanian Workers' Party.
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French and British Ambassadors oppose According to the American I.:1,c;Jiavia on Trieste: -11:2ssurin Belgrade are Charge, tE,E7 fl.ench anc, British Ambassadors in of economie pressure on very much opposed to t'cic employment of the Trieste bring'about a solution Yugoslavia in Order to of pressure would issue. .They believe that the application buttressing Yugoslav Western policy of undermine the Current inAnnandnrin hv qunolvinR aid with no political conditions.
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Breakdown of Yugoslav military budget for YUGOSLAVIA, The following break 'own by major categories 1952 reported: dinars 1 of the Yugoslav defense budget of 210 billion supplied by Yugoslav for 1952 has been (700 million dollars) officials: (in millions of,dinars) 83,237 Heavy equipment and ammunition 79,006 Expendable supplies 26,525 Military Structures and factories 18,500 Pay and allowances 2,732 Others 210,000 Total
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between the two exchange rate, the suspension of trade terror by the Yugoslav zones, and the employment of police of acts designed military government in Zone B, as examples zone by strengthento weaken Italian claims to the Yugoslav emigration. Moreing Yugoslav control and forcing Italian arrests of Italians over, Bartoli contended that the arbitrary o are calculated to create an atmosphere tion for the coming elections in Zone B. Pro-Italian leaders in Zone A contended last Comment: blocked the movement month that the Yugoslav authorities had In addition, the Yugoof all goods between the two zones. legal tender the dinar as the only slays have established governing trade in Zone B and imposed stricter regulations and monetary transactions between the two zones. B is unThe over-all policy of Yugoslavia in Zone to the terristrengthen its claims doubtedly calculated to forcing Italians to tory by applying additional controls and The efemigrate or accept increased Yugoslav domination. and the fect cf this action upon Italo-Yugoslav relations Trieste problem cannot help but be harmful.
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not Yugoslav expenditures for defense will Comment: assistance, however, exceed the 1951 total. Western military Yugoslav military will contribute substantially to 'the potential.
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major operaForeign Minister Kardelj to undergo that during a The American Charge in Belgrade reports he learned tion: Ilialeon attended by many top Yugoslav leaders, temporarily assume that Deputy Foreign Minister Vlahovic may the latter may unForeign Minister Karaelj's duties since month which will redergo a serious spinal operation this As a consequence, period of recuperation. quire a two-month replace Alex Bebler Assistant Foreign Minister Barisic will United Nations. as the Yugoslav representative in the Kidric indicated that In addition, economic czar Boris congress might be held a general Yugoslav Communist PartY A party within the year if external conditions permitted. congress has not been convened since 1948. Interior Since the luncheon was also attended by able to get an American Charge was Minister Rankovic, the to be intimacy and "interesting glimpse of what appeared 7 Yugoslav leaders." solidarity among top 8 Mar 52) Kardelj During the illness of Foreign Minister Comment: title of Foreign last. ETFIIIRT Marshal Tito assumed the government was probably more At that time the Minister. aggression from. concerned over the possibility of external increased Western aid. the East and the problem of securing is frequently Kardelj's death would remove a f!..gure who in the Yugomentioned as ranking next to Tito in importance slav hierarchy.
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The nonanticipated during coming month: Strikes o yo) has directed JAPAN. a or n ons o ounc during the enera UUMBUnis series of brief strikes will be timed its affiliates to sta e a The strikes coming month o the Diet of new labor e prese to coincide w "oppressive" by labor. legislation considered
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The ROK Office of announced: changes jneCcbange5 on 6 March. KOREA. Two ROK Cabinet wo PUUTIc INT6FEETTon announce April, replaced Cho Attorney-General since 'So Sanghwan, Justice, while Ham Insop relieved Chinman as Minister of Forestry. Ham, of Agriculture and was formerly Yim Munhwan as Minister Agricultural University, nffirial of the a graduate of Tokyo and an dean of an agricultural college Forestry. Ministry of Agriculture and
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The ROK Vice negotiations Embassy that mer can JAPAN/KOREA. e n orme negoMinister of Fore gn ATTa. rs in the Japan-Korea has been made including considerable progress is near on many issues, the return of tiations and that agreement status of Koreans in Japan and is the nationality registrY. Korea, however, vessels of Korean compensation Japanese Japan's insistence upoi "greatly disturbed" by relinquished in Korea. for vested properties 7 Mar 52) probably are advancing property to Comment: The Japanese only to set up a bargaining position DesPite the claimi-EigrEst Korea against TJapan. wide divergence offset Korean propertY claims there is still a optimism expressed above, countries economic matters, with on the two in views between prepared to retreat. neither country psychologically
I
has indicated its intention, which Comment: The government support, of enacting legislation law, with gITOWremployer effect of the labor standards the scope and general strikes, would reduce Ministries, ban combine the Labor and Welfare Since Sohyo supports the public meetings. that of and restrict which is identical with treatY, security leftist Socialist platform -ofcpposition to the peace take an the Communists -Communists undoubtedly will rearmament, the pact and active role in the strike demonstrations.
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new inserO of Rhee's policy of er mani es a On the ur to him. a s ust ce cabinet with men personally loyal to appoint a filling his have deemed it necessary in an attempt other hand, Rhee must Agricultural Ministry comPetent man to head the deteriorating food-Price.situation. to control the presently third force: Japanese-sponsored o n e g o a e a Nationalists fear CHINA. a ure a c a s e eve ratification of the Riffinalso peace before the treaty Sino-JaPanese the Japanese Government free would leave multilateral treatY equip a Chinese anti-Communist and antito sponsor, arm and Influential war-time Sino-Japanese collathe su ort Kuomintang force. would be used to attract borators, now in Japan of overseas Chinese. of reportedly expressed fear Kai-shek Chiang Sino-Japanese Comment: prolonged or unsuccessful and the this TEIFirevent of Chiang's statement, peace treaty negotiations. officials, may have been occasioned fears of other Nationalist Vice-President Li Tsung-ien, by repOrts that Nationalist intensifying his activities In through his associates, is force in Japan. behalf of organizing a third might attract vocal such a force were established it If overseas Chinese to the detriment supPort from and financial of the Kuomintang.
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importance to the The decline in Hong Kong's strategic goods source of supply for of the past year. ChineirtThiTnunists as a trade developments in was one of the notable 260 million Hong Kong dollars point of about to the Chinese From a high from the British Colony January 1951, exports million Hong Kong dollars in Communists dropped to some 60 in China's commercial dependence decline December. This sharP associated with a marked increase in Kong has been on Hong attacks on the Colony. Peiping's propaganda SECRET
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The trade with Hong Kong: has ong market Peiping is noncommittal on ong e ommun s s rom nese vessels o to lay up withdrawa in the Colony Ship caused many shipping companies goods to the mainland. from Peiping formerly employed in carrying tried to ascertain operators in Hong Kong have the day when trading left intact for brought no response. if this tonnage should be in uiries have would resume but their
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Communists capture major town: Two thousand Burmese_ in niinUnists captured Myingyan, one of the largest towns looting the treasury, They retired after central Burma. burning the post office, re easing convicts and capturing the District Commissioner. Myingyan is located in the area where the Comment: BurmegrOVgrnment is reported to have made major gains against the Communist insurgents.
BURMA.
campaign's Communists concerned over anti-corruption South China District effects on production: The Central and and commercial authorities on 2 March ordered that factories close as a means of concerns were not to be allowed to evading the campaign against graft. personnel of a Peiping reported in a broadcast that the and safety practices refinery in northwest China neglected the nnntn wns nnt "labor disc nline" and sa a reqfllt fulfilled. February the anti-corruption Comment: During January and throughout China. campara-Wig the predominant propaganda theme its adverse effects TheSe broadcasts are the first which report of Manchuria In the rural areas on industrial production. suspended in the interest and East China the campaign has been of spring planting.
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Communists This is the second recent incident in which the of time. have seized a large town for a short period
The New cabinet composition reported in local preSs: has reports that the local press American Embassy in Rangoon of "most" of the published an unofficial, but accurate, list 22 ministers who will take office in the Burmese Cabinet While some papers are apprehensive during the next few. days. key portfolios, over the fact that Socialists will hold the choices made, they have voiced general approval of the Party) (head of the Socialist especially that of U Ba Swe
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as Defense Minister.
The Embassy comments that the new cabinet will be stronger than its predecessor.
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will be stronger in the government The new Comment: members of the dominant The include more PartY. sense-I:ant will in Burma -- the Socialist will be further organization political the regime, however, elements in distinctly always held moderate who have isolated by ruthless men anti-Western views.
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Political tension continues:
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indicated that Premier merican Embassy in Bangkok, soon. es gn to the militarist PhibUn intends states that although goal of comaway" from the ultimate and "only one step between Phao group is Phibun's office would create plete power, competition for Army Commander Sarit, in rival, Assistant vi his chief ossibl resultin internal conflict a serious
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as agreements to accept Phibun rival compromise In the past, outbreak of violence between Premier have prevented the political groups.
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dismiss Mossadeq and seize: Shah reportedly prepared to

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Mossadeq is "terrified" by According to another report, the terroristic Feda an-i-Islam threats of assassination from and ma
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Although the removed, unconfirmed. wishes him These reports are policies and drastic Comment: to Mossadeq's intends to initiate that he Shah 1171W5sed there is no indication about. this action to bring with several made which is credited has in the past Fedayan-i-Islam, The officials. attempted assassinations, Government there is no Iranian killings and terrorists, threats against wholesale Mossadeq may fear these would force his resignahave alone Although that their threats in resignation interest of evidence expressions His past tion. maneuvers. been political

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FRANCE. French Army effects possible purge of Communist officers: 7M-7TEent transfer of about 10-0- junior French army officers to a "practically inactive" post has been interpreted by the press as a purge of Communists and sympathizers from the army. Althongh a later press release, purportedly originating with the War Secretariat denied any significance in these transfers,
Since the end of the war, when the Communists Comment: held riEUEE;r of important military assignments, the government has been fairly successful in removing them from the armed services. Of the several hundred known Communist officers, almost all are of junior rank; of the very few senior officers, none occupies a commana position.

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Soviet Russians renew demands for raw materials: AUSTRIA. protests against the officials have brushed off Austrian and have repeated obstruction of interzonal trade permits, of nonferrous metals to Austrian allocations requests for large Soviet demands still far Soviet Enterprises in Austria (USIA). of copper, and amount to 45 exceed Austria's total production country's production respectively of the percent and 15 percent of lead and aluminum. an equivalent Conditioned upon Soviet agreement to return economy and to repay Austrian tonnage of processed metals to the metals, prepared Austria is forelgn exchange expended on such tons of aluminum, 1,800 to make a maximum offer of 1,200 tons the 1951 than of lead, and 2,000 tons of copper. While larger third of the than one allocations, these quantities are lesS supports the Austrian Soviet demands. The American Embassy obtain the abolition proposal, but will press Austria to try to of transit permits. /
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favoring Italians in Trieste plan demonstration ITALY-TRIESTE. in Trieste are Pro-Italian elements Territory's return to Italy: mark the fourth planning a demonstration tor 20 March to calling for a return tripartite declaration (anniversary of the of the entire territory to Italy. SECRET
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comments that this action The American Political Adviser the United States and Britain to is obviously designed to commit through local Allied support .of the tripartite declaration demonstration. Meanwhile, approval of the Military Government's Belgrade, in Three AmbaSsadors concrete at a recent meeting of the Big proposal reasonable or even Italy's failure to advance a artl' to considered issue was for a solution of the Trieste Italo-Yugoslav negotiations. for the imnasse in Italy does not There have been indications that posSibility although the now, desire a settlement of the issue purely record, has been for the of an Italian counterproposal is undoubtedly giving unofiicial Premier de Gasperi suggested. as a means of strengthening support to the proposed demonstration government in face of popular support for his Western-oriented the forthcoming Italian elections.
Comment:
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The reduced to holding operations: Communist efforts of Henri ve ea MOROCCO. my any was ecapi a e 15P6ZEin ommunis \who added that Bonnet last pecembelL will continue to out-sidle because the the partY's influence find a suitable replacement. maintaining French Communist Party cannot to forming,. cadres and PartY activities are now reduced a state of vigilance Communist activity is The decline in Moroccan Comment: the loss Of Bonnet, confiFE5Z-5T other sources. In addition to of its active with the arrest and however, the party is faced of its property, natiVe indifference, members, confiscation nationalist animosity,
F
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anti-communist press items_desIgned_to ARGENTINA. Occasional Degaitilled tne bolster third position: The-US State on a recent anti-Communist Embassy in Buenos Aires to comment La Critica, which is understood article in the daily newspaper including Rodolfo Puiggros. antito be infiltrated by Communists, the publication of occasional maintain Peron's The Embassy believes that as necessary to Communist material is recognized the self-declared incompatible with ros. third position and is not dissident Communists such as Pui ortunism of the o
campaign of The continuing "anti-imperialist" paralleled the press has often the government-controlled consistently capitalism more CoMmunist line and has attacked than Communism. good rapport with Peron, Puiggros, who reportedly enjoys in 1946, because he disagreed formed a dissident Communist group Reportedly, he is tactics. with Argentine Commumist Party estimates that in well-regarded by Moscow, since the latter gains through infiltration greater Argentina Communism can make government (see opposition to the of Peronista ranks than in
Comment:
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Front": / selves as "Red departments guerrillas in the Guerrillas designate 'the government COLOMBIA. 10, despite offers Replies to such refuse to surrender 1 such and Huila names of Tolima food, and employment. some are signed by of the Red offers of pardons, death, and and "The Guerrillas proclaim war to the 25X1A of Tolima" 1 as "The Red Front color and the term Front." 1 Party's of the Red is the Liberal from the affiliation Comment: Although derived well be that party. "Red Front" may certain elements of in May 1951 to be cooperwith guerrillas Communists were reported there is no indication role in any in Tolima, individual 25X1 guerrillas playing a significant the ating with are Communists violence in Colombial as yet that of the outbreaks of 25X1 Batista has seized Fulgencio General bloodless coup. coup: in an almost Comment on All CUBA. 11. the situation. control of are on his ZUEfrol-51-TEW-ZUBIE-Government to be in complete in the Havana area of He appears officials also in the hands military provinces are police and outlying side. The five of all his forces. the temporary suspension the announced for 45 days and has cancelled government has Batista appointed an interim guarantees Saladrigas as ccnstitutional elections. He has Carlos Minister, general Prime 1 June Council of Ministers. of himself as with all consisting president, and a 15-man to comply the new order and provisional maintain domestic that enough to Batista has stated Promising to only long obligations, which time international will remain in power and justice" at government progress based on interim "establish a regime 1948, will be held. elections senator since and a dictator of Cuba, in the coming June Batista, former for the presidency Party which placed Action than 10 perhas been a candidate He headed the United listings with less time, his 1951 party elections. Since that October the considervoters. third in registered had diminished cent of the total the presidency position which attaining deteriorating his chances for have been ably, and it may strike this sudden blow. impelled him to Trust control of Panama seek l'industrie banking interests le Commerce et National pour PANAMA. French 12. The Banque
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Trust Company. The is trying to acquire control of the Panama dominating motives are US Embassy in Panama estimates that the bank's contacts with the a desire to facilitate the French located Western dollar area and to establish a safe, centrally circumvention capital Hemisphere depository in wh'ch fliaht and will plan a substantial role. and 7 Mar 52) A branch of the Banque National pour le Commerce Comment: important of the numerouS -et l'Industrie has been one of the more completely free money market has banks in Tangier, where a financial circles More recently, existed since the last war. of controls apprehensive of the imposition in Tangier have been possibility, of have also feared the by that government and eventual Russian control of North Africa.
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KOREA. KOREA, Food Food situation s i t u a t i o n of of North North Korean Korean battalion b a t t a l i o n stated: stated: A North March m h Korean Rorean battalion b a t t a l i o n commander's commander's message on 8 Y arch kilograms of of cleaned cleaned rice rice and and 30 30 kilograms kilograms s t a t e s that that 34 34 kilograms states been had been of wheat, "one "one day's day's ration r a t i o n of of 180 180 persons," persona," had
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r e q u e s t e d and and refused r e f u s e d by by a a supply s u p p l y unit, u n i t , and and "it I t i t is is Xsquested d difficult i f f i c u l t to t o serve s e r v e food food from from 10 10 March." March." (SUEDE 501st 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, SK-H-301, SK-H-301, 10 1 0 Mar 52) 52) Comment: I t has enerally b elieved t h a t the the It has been been g generally believed that Comment: enemy u units n i t s were supplied supplied w with i t h about about one kilogram of of food day per per man. man. T h i s message, message, however, however, indicates i n d i c a t e s that that This per day only one-third o n e - t h i r d of a a kilogram.of kilogram of grain--the grain--the b bulk u l k of the the Communist diet--was diet--was to t o be be supplied. supplied.
4.
Comment: The Communist supply s u p p l y situation s i t u a t i o n has has been been good during d u r i n g the t h e past p a s t months. months. This T h i s is is probably g e n e r a l l y good generally a n isolated i s o l a t e d incident. incident. an
5. 5.
j Messages ' 13 flights f lig h t s from Messages of of MSG MIGI5 from Tatungkou, Tatungkou, on on the t h e Yalu Yalu River, R i v e r , have have not n o t been been intercepted intercepted s i n c e 20 20 Februarv,I February. since
The US A i r Force comments t hat t h e Russian o perated Air that the operated ground-controlled-intercept n e t s in i n Korea Korea on on which which Chinese Chinese ground-controlled-intercept nets u n i t s have operated o p e r a t e d reveal units reveal no no significant s i g n i f i c a n t decrease decrease in i n jet jet s o r t i e s into i n t o Korea Korea in i n recent r e c e n t weeks. weeks. (SUEDE Air A i r Force Force sorties 49 2049Z, 20492, 10 10 Mar Mar 52) 52) Roundup 49
Comment:
CHINA. CHINA.
remained the t he only on y combat com a field from which fliGbc f1 ere consistently c o n s i s t e n t l y intercepted. intercepted. repor s were
Chinese Communist unit u n i t reports r e p o r t s shoe shoe shortage: shortage: A A Chinese Chinese Communist message on 4 Y March a r c h to t o an u unidentified n i d e n t i f i ed d division iv i s i o n from one of his subordinate commander from s u b o r d i n a t e regiments r e g i m e n t s indicates indicates t h a t 90 percent that p e r c e n t of the t h e men in i n one one of of the t h e regimental r e g i m e n t a l units units do not have,shoes. have shoes. The o riginator r e q u e s t s that t h a t "the "tbe originator requests commander iesue....many issue many shoes t o a l l e v i a t e the unprecedented to alleviate c r i t i c a l need." need." message, possibly possibly critical Another Chinese Communist message, t h e same from the same organization, o r g a n i z a t i o n , however, however, s says a y s that t h a t except e x c e p t for f o r tie tb 20th others" have have r received 2 0 t h artillery a r t i l l e r y regiment, r e g i m e n t , all."the a l l " t h e others" eceived t h e i r allotment a l l o t m e n t of of cotton c o t t o n shoes. s h o e s . (SUEDE (SUEDE 5 0 1 s t Comm Corn Recon their 501st Grp Korea, K-1350 and and K-1368, K-1368, 9 9 Mar Mar 52) 52)
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a p p a r e n t correlation c o r r e l a t i o n between battle activity a c t i v i t y and the the An apparent messages, presumably presumably of a military m i l i t a r y nature, n a t u r e , from froh volume of messages, t h e administrative r d m i n i s t r a t i v d office o f f i c e in in Moscow to to this t h i s station s t a t i o n in in Korea Korea the ie u g g e s t e d by the t h e fluctuation f l u c t u a t i o n of traffic t r a f f i c in i n this this d irection is a suggested direction during t h e last l a s t seven seven months; months; traffic t r a f f i c volume was high h i g h in in d u r i n g the t h e period p e r i o d from from August August to t o October October 1951 1951 when fighting f i g h t i n g was was the comparatively c o m p a r a t i v e l y heavy. heavy. The last i m e the s tation w as h eard last ttime station was heard waa a f t e r which date fighting f i g h t i n g has h a s been at at a a was on 28 October, after virtual v i r t u a l standstill. standstill.
AFSA suggests suggestre that t h a t the t h e resumption r e s u m p t i o n of combat activity activity l a r g e scale might be accompanied accompanied by reappearance r e a p p e a r a n c e of of on a large military m i l i t a r y messages measagee to t o Korea Korea but b u t cautions c a u t i o n s that t h a t such s u c h an a n analysis analysis ie n o t definitive d e f i n i t i v e since the t h e radio r a d i o traffic t r a f f i c is b e l i e v e d to t o be is not believed an (SUEDE RU-TIS 1667, an overflow o v e r f l o w from from landline l a n d l i n e traffic. traffic, (SUEDE RU-TIS 1667, 6 Mar Mar 52) 52)
Comment: The period period of high h i g h volume of this t h i s traffic t r a f f i c to to MoscoiERT3 inin February M o s c o m F e b r u a r ycoincides c o i n c i d e s roughly r o u g h l y with w i t h that t h a t ot .of "Operation Clam-up", Clam-up", a tactical feint f e i n t by DN forces to t o develop develop "Operation UN forces indications i n d i c a t i o n s of of enemy enemy intentions. intentions.

I
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t o an a n office o f f i c e in in Moscow Moscow previously p r e v i o u s l y identified i d e n t i f i e d as the t h e "Mili"Milito t a r y Administration A d m i n i s t r a t i o n of of Areas outside o u t s i d e the t h e USSR" reappeared r e a p p e a r e d on on tary 21 January J a n u a r y 1952 1952 after a period p e r i o d of of inactivity i n a c t i v i t y since s i n c e 29 39 October 1951. 1951. The u n u s u a l l y high h i g h volume raffic t o Moscow unusually volume of this t traffic to on 12, 1 2 , 20, 2 0 , and 24 24 February F e b r u a r y may indicate i n d i c a t e military m i l i t a r y activity activity of some of ieome sort. sort. The station s t a t i o n was heard h e a r d a4 e c e n t l y as 26 Feban r recently ruary. r uary,
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USSR. Reappearance o v i e t MMiniliReappearance of of messages messages to to Moscow Moscow from from S Soviet is-1.Y Mission in in Korea: Korea: Messages from a d i o sstation t a t i o n which tary Miaeion from a a rradio whia ' i s beli eved to to s erve t h e Soviet Soviet m ilitary a d v i 6 e r a in Korea is believed serve the military advisers
13 Mar M a r 52 52 13
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KOREA. Ex-South Ex-South Korean soldiers in i n Communist army again again KOREA. l 3 Z G d separately: s e p a r a t e l y : Th listed The e North Korean 82nd 82nd regImeat, regimedt, hat " sumlemental a u a r d i n n Kaesong, e p o r t e d on 8 guarding Ka6song, r reported 8 March March t that "supplemental i n v e s t i g a t i o n " revealed r e v e a l e d "15 "15 liberated l i b e r a t e d soldiers" soldiers;'' in i n the the investigation" o r g a n i z a t i o n . (SUEDE o m m Recon Grp Korea, Korea, 15RSM/ 15RSM/ organization. (SUEDE 501st 501st C Comm 7883, 10 Mar 52) 52) 7883, 10
Comment: " Liberated s o l d i e r s " is the t h e term term the f h e ComCom"Liberated soldiers" t h e 30,000 30,000 to t o 50,000 50,000 ex-South m u n i s t s generally g e n e r a l l y apply to t o the munists ex-South Korean soldiers s o l d i e r s impressed impressed into i n t o their t h e i r armies. armies. The enemy's enemy's r i s o n e r s suggests suggests t hat t he s p e c i a l handling h a n d l i n g of these p special prisoners that the Communists, may be preparing p r e p a r i n g to to n egotiate t his p ressing Communiste negotiate this pressing issue at a t the t h e truce t r u c e talks. t a l k s . They have continued to t o deny, deny, however, t h e existence e x i s t e n c e of o f any any more p r i s o n e r e of war han however, the prisoners war t than those listed l i s t e d in i n December. December. S i c k n e s s due to t o BW reported r e p o r t e d by by enemy enemy unit: u n i t : A North Sickness Korean anti-aircraft a n t i - a i r c r a f t unit u n i t in in the t h e liamhung Hamhunrr area area of of ilorthdorthe a s t e r n Korea Korea reported r e p o r t e d on on 10 10 March that that-"a man who who ate ate eastern "a man
4
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ice u using with the s i n g the t h e hand w i t h which he had touched t h e leaflets leaflets (SUEDE of the of t h e enemy forces, fell f e l l prey to t o the sickness." s i c k n e e s . " (SUEDE 501st 5 0 1 s t Comm C o r n Recon Grp Korea, 15RSM/8108, 15BSM/8108, 11 11 Mar M a r 52) 52) rationComment: This would appear to t o be a farfetched rationComment; alization of disease i in North a l i z a t i o n for a possible outbreak of n a North Korean Korean unit.. u n i t ..
4. 4.

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KOREA. Reorganization of North Korean Army again again reported: reported: KOREA. of the t he North K orean I, IV, IV J and VII Corps orps was T h e e o r g a n i z a e l o d of TEU-Feorganization Korean with the reo reorganization of the 11-and II and completed on 20 February, with anization of ITI to ta be completed m m l e t e d in in the the near near future. future
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"Mixed "Mixed North North Korean and Chinese Communist units" will will replace 'the two latter latter corps corps on on the the front. front. replace the two Communists, disdisthe Chinese Communists, turbid oreans who turbed by by the numbers of North K Koreans who were were "idle," "idle," had had authorization recruited recruited many many Koreans Koreans for for Chinese without authorization units. units. It appears obvious from this and many other Comment: It Comment: previous reports that the North Korean Army Army has been undergoing some form of reorganization and rehabilitation during six months. There is no evidence, evidence, however, however, of the the the past six reported integration Chinese Communist Communist integration of North Koreans into Chinese units. units
2. a .
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Muccio reports possible method of repaying repaying UN UN won won drawings: drawings: The ROK Foreign MinTster before the National Nitional Assembly Minister recommended before on 8 agreement on won won advances to 8 March U r c h that the 28 July 1950 agreement UN forces be amended in such a manner manner that repayment repayment of the loans would would be be made made in foreign foreign exchange exchange of of materials, materials, providing providing ROK's material mobilization program into into the UNC takes the ROK's consideration. American American Ambassador Ambassador Muccio Muccio states states that, from consideration. point of of view, view, an an accelerated accelerated aid aid program program providing providing the ROK point greatly increased imports o of and concerted f saleable goods, and efforts to a satisfactory satisfactory to promote their their resale, resale, would would be be a settlement of (S Pusan Pusan 899, 899, 12 of UN UN won won drawings. drawings. (S 12 Mar 52) 52)
3. 3.
Comment: The ROK and the UN have been at at odds on a repayComment: ment method which would counteract the inflationary effect of monthly won won advances advances to to UN UN forces. forces. At present, present, aid aid goods goods deliverleeare deliveriesare still far from sufficient sufficient to cover :he monthly advances. advancee
Inflation in in South South Korea Korea threatens threatens government: government: Ambassador Inflation Muccio believes beli eves that that the the 34 percent increase in rice prices in Korea from from1 1'to to 8 March brings runaway inflation closer South Korea South and may lead l e a d to to the the fall f a l l of of the the government. government. Rice has risen risen' 114 114 percent in in the the past two two months, and other food prices have also increased. increased.
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The Ambassador observes observes that that inflationary inflationary pressure, pressure] charcharThe by a a rise r i s e of of a a thousand thousand per per cent cent in in note note issue issue since since acterized by of the the Korean Korean war, war, is is principally principally due due to to South South the beginning of Korea's inability inability to to finance finance war war costs. costs. Hoarding, Hoarding, political Korea's poor publicity about the uncertainty, poor publicity about the recent rice harvest and ' transportation are are contributing contributing factors factors to to the the inorinorlack of transportation price advances. advances. (C (C Pusan 887, 887, 11 11 Mar Mar 52) 52) dinate price Comment: rise in in South South Korean food food prices prices Comment: The sharp rise 1 Y m has h as resulted resulted in in the the resignation resignation of of the the Minister Minister of of during 1g52 Agriculture, and and the the press press has has warned warned that that rice rice riots riots are are Agridulture, probable if if prices prices continue continue to to skyrocket. skyrocket. probable
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2. 2 .
Further blamed on on BW: BW: A A6 6 March Marchthinese F u r t h e r sickness s i c k n e s s blamed Chinese t h a t one of the t h e soldiers s o l d i e r s of of the the Communist message states that a UN propaganda leaflet l e a f l e t and and "was "was 3 4 5 t h regiment regiment picked p i c k e d up a 345th immediately s o l d i e r was administered administered immediately poisoned." poisoned." The soldier is now recovered." recovered.1' "fever m e d i c i n e , the t h e fever f e v e r abated a b a t e d and and he is "fever medicine, All other o t h e r units u n i t s are are warned not not to t o handle h a n d l e leaflets. l e a f l e t s . (SUEDE (SUEDE 5 0 1 s t Comm Recon Recon Grp G r p Korea, Korea, K-1421, K-1421, 11 1 1Mar Mar 52) 52) 501st.Comm
Comment: This T h i s is is the t h e second instance i n s t a n c e noted of of the the 'Communists l'inking sickneSs s i c k n e s s to t o UN leaflets. l e a f l e t s . These allegaCommunists linking allegat i o n & itay Aay d iscourage th e enemy o l d i e r s from e a d i n g UN tionE discourk'ge the enemy ssoldiers from rreading propaganda.
3 . 3. CHINA/KOREA. e s t a b l i s h e s that t h a t Chinese Chinese and and Korean Korean CHINA/KOREA. Evidence establishes
pilots actually a c t u a l l y engage engag6 in C n combat: combat: In I n late l a t e February and and
early ground-controlled intercept e a r l y March March 'the 'the g round-controlled i n t e r c e p t net n e t directing directing j e t s in i n combat combat over over Korea Korea was heard h e a r d -giving g i v i n g specific specific enemy jets combat r d e r s in i n the t h e Chinese and Korean languages. languages. Direccombat o orders Direct i o n s intercepted i n t e r c e p t e d included: i n c l u d e d : "Attack," ''Attack," "Guard "Guard yourselves," y o u r s e l v e s ,*I tions and "The "The enemy is is just j u s t behind behind you." you.11
The US Air Force F o r c e comments comments that t h a t the t h e first first evidence evidence of o r g a n i z e d Chinese units u n i t s in i n aerial a e r i a l combat occurred occurred organized 27 Sktptember 1951. (SWEDE i r Force Roundup Roundup 50 50 and and 51, 51, Sbptember 1951. (SUEDE k kir-Force 20552 and 2128Z, 21282, 11 1 1 and and 12 12 Mar M a r 52) 52) 2055Z
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Comment: usually Comment: Russian ls is the t h e language language u s u a l l y employed messages establlsh e s t a b l i s h that.Chinese t h a t Chinese and on this this. n e t . These These. meesages on net. Korean, pilots p i l o t s are are engaging engaging in in actual a c t u a l combat combat with w i t hInv UN Korean planes p l a n e s -- not not just just flying.patrols flying p a t r o l s over over Korean Korean territory. territory. The 1st 1st Korean Korean Division Division and and the t h e 6th 6 t h Chinese Chinese Division, Division, with w i t h about about. 50 50 MIG's WIGS each, each, were were believed b e l i e v e d based based in i n the the Antung area i n February. a r e a in
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Soviet strategy in Korea Failing in its attemp to get tiations-Lfore UN, tiations before the UN , the Soviet'Union Soviet ' Union truce negotiators to propose USSR as as truce negotiators to propose the the USSR Dection nationsl nations1 inspection
KOREA.
the Korean instructed one of the one of the
truce negoCommunist neutral ~~neutral
This 1s proposal surprised surprised Korean leaders, leaders, who felt felt that that the the take a more active active part in the negotiations. Soviets would now take
I
Comment: 1 the Soviet role in the the Comment: I truce negotiations from their very beginning is generally a major major one. one. Furthermore, Furthermore, the current believed to to have have been been a heavy propaganda campaign on the BW theme tends to contradict the theory that the t h e Soviet Union is trying to localize the the Korean conflict conflict in in the the world's world's eyes. eyes,
Soviet strategy, apparently is to convince the world population that the Korean conflict is a local problem. Having accomplished this, in addition to reorganizing the North Korean Armed Forces, and having assured themselves that the UN is not contemplating another offensive, the Soviet Union will demand withdrawal of foreign troops -including the Chinese Communists -- from Korea.
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Communist press echoes charges that t h a t United United States is is The Communists Communiste are gfving g i v i n g great g r e a t press The p u b l l c i t y to t o stories s t o r i e s from from Korea Korea alleging a l l e g i n g that t h a t the t h e US US is is spreading spreading publicity b bacilli a c i l l i behind the t h e North Korean lines. l i n e s . The US Embassy in i n Rome is is beginning to t o receive r e c e i v e inspired i n s p i r e d "protests" from from local l o c a l labor labor organizations o r g a n i z a t i o n s and and believes believes that t h a t despite d e s p i t e official o f f i c i a l denials. d e n i a l s . the the Communists intend i n t e n d to t o push their t h e i r campaign. campaign.
ITALY. ITALY.
Comment: The Communists are are doubtless d o u b t l e s s striving s t r i v i n g to t o fan fan anti-American workers in in order o r d e r to to disrupt disrupt anti-American feeling f e e l i n g among among Italian I t a l i a n workers defense production. production.
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SUMMARY
FAR EAST
1.
Sino-Soviet negotiations on Korea and Formosa reported (page 3).

NEAR EAST - AFRICA
2. Koenig may St nmed De Lattre in Indochina (page 3).
(page 4).
4, 5.
British Cabinet defines concessions to be offered Egypt (page 4). Pakistan offers to delay presentation of Tunisian issue (page 5).
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Egyptian Government threatened by increasing domestic problems
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FAR EAST
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Sino-Soviet negotiations on Korea and Formosa reported:

Sino-Soviet "negotiations" on poli-
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ctes tor tlrea and Formosa, which began on 15 February, were still in progress on 1 March.
The USSR is said to desire that the Korean talks be delayed indefinitely, so that India and other Asian states can press for UN or Big Three discussion of the Korean question and all Asian problems,
The Chinese, who consider the conquest of Formosa their primary objective, reportedly fear that an attempt to invade Formosawould provoke tire United States to extend the war into China. The USSR prefers that the Formosa operation be postponed pending a B tg Three
meeting.
Comment: The USSR has made several attempts to transfer the'Korean talks to the UI4 Security Council, where decisions would be subject to Soviet veto, The USSR made several feelers during 1951 regarding a Big Power meeting, but there have been no new overtures in recent months.
Peiping's propaganda has frequently demanded control of Formosa as a condition for a Korean settlement and has often called for an international conference to settle outstanding Asian problems, Many sources have reported that Peiping still hopes to acquire Formosa as part of a general Asian settlement
2.
Koenig may succeed De Lattre in Indochina:

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again to be held ointly by a military man, probably General Pierre Koenig, Gaullist deputy in the National Assembly.

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the posts of High Commissioner and Commander in Chief of French Forces in Indochina are
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Koenig's appointment to this post would be acceptable to French civilian and military authorities in Indochina.
tional Defense Committee, KWvas formerly Chief of French Forces
Comment: Chairman of the Assembly's Na-
in Germany, where he succeeded De Lattre on the Allied Control CounciL
NEAR EAST - AFRICA

S.
Egyptian Government threatened by increasing domestic problems:
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Party has ordered a revival of student agitation and a renewal of the so-called "Liberation Battalion" operations against British military orces e uez Canal zone. !former Premier Nahas Pasha, leader of the Wafd, and Ali Maher, Prime Minister ililali's immediate predecessor, have agreed to join forces against King Farouk.
I
the Wafd
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King Farouk, I has been compromising Hilali's efforts to eliminate governmental corruption by trying to obtain cabinet appointments for two "corrupt and unscrupulous" palace favorites.
Comment: The American Ambassador in Cairo has pointed out that Hilali has little support other than that of the palace, and that even this is of questionable value. During the past few weeks the Wafd Party has apparently been reorganizing for a showdown with the Premier.
4.
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British Cabinet defines concessions to be offered Egypt:
The British Cabinet has authorized Ambassador Stevenson to offer the Egyptian Government the progressive withdrawal of all British combat troops from the Canal zone in return for Egyptian participation in a Middle East defense organization.
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A proposed joint communique would commit both governments in principle, leaving the implementation of the agreement to subsequent negotiations which would include other interested powers. Stevenson is given discretion to promise that, if conditions within Egypt permit, some British forces will be evacuated as soon as formal Anglo-Egyptian negotiations get under way.
With regard to the Sudan, Britain will propose that the Governor General form a "Sudan Council of Ministers and Parliament, " whose interim decision on the issue of King Farouk's "symbolic sovereignty" over the Sudan will be accepted by the United Kingdom.
Foreign Secretary Eden has told the US Ambassador in London that he feels the Cabinet has made what for the moment are its maximum concessions to Egypt.
Comment: The British and American Ambassadors in Cairo have both insisted that nothing short of Britain's recognition of King Farouk's new title will induce Egypt to begin negotiations for a general Anglo-Egyptian settlement
For reasons of general prestige the British Cabinet has been very reluctant to take any action which could be interpreted as a repudiation of previous pledges to make no constitutional changes affecting the Sudanese without consulting them.
5.
Pakistan offers to delay presentation of Tunisian issue:
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According to a Pakistani Foreign Office spokesman his government informed France that it would delay presentation of the Tunisian issue to the Security Council provided France were willing to release the imprisoned nationalists and stop repressive measures.
or
Me added that Indonesia is actually the prime mover in presenting the Tunisian problem, although Pakistan has assumed the chairmanship.

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Comment: The French Foreign Office is attempting to dissuade Pakistan from presenting the issue, but continues to insist that, before nationalist leaders can be released, the Tunisian Government must withdraw its petition for Security Council arbitration of the French-Tunisian disagreement.
'Pakistan is not an enthusiastic sponsor in this instance, but agreed to act in order to improve its position as a leader of the Moslem world. Iraq, not Indonesia, is the most active supporter of the Tunisian cause.
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Russian message suggests s u g g e s t s typhus typhus epidemic epidemic in i n Korea: Eorea: A Russian. admi administrative-message an ) a military n net in nbrthRussian n i s t r a t f w - m s s s a g e rm I nriXitarp et i n 'n nrthwestern.Korea r e p o r t e d that t h a t ". ''. v i l l a g e s an a n epidemic of w e s t e r n Korea reported villages typhus,Jias broken o out. t yphue 8 broken u t . Please urgently u r g e n t l y send. send. a ss~stance.'v assistance." Mai 52) ( S V E D E p 811331, 1 3 3 1 , 6 Mar 52) (SUEDEL
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Campaign againSt.BW a g a i n s t BW continues c o n t i n u e s unabated unabated in i n North North Korea: Korea: portin A considerable considerable p o r t i 6 n of of chinese Chinese and and Korean Korean communications communications still s t i l l are are concerned concerned with w i t h reports r e p o r t s of of BW, BW, with w i t h preventive preventive m e a s u r e s , and and with w i t h incidence i n c i d e n c e of measures, of disease. disease,
c o a s t a l security s e c u r i t y stations s t a t i o n s in in n o r t h e a s t e r n Korea Two coastal northeastern reported classified r e p o r t e d on o n 11 1 1March March that t h a t "the " t h e bacteria b a c t e r i a .bomb bomb c lassified as mosquito, mosquito, f fly l y and and f Ilea l e a were were d dispersed" i s p e r s e d " and and,"ansnomy "an ewmy plane dropped dropped ants, a n t s , fleas, f l e a s , mosquitoes, mosquitoes, flies f l i e s and and crickets," crickets,"
A Chinese Communist Communist unit u n i t commander commander .in.western i n w e s t e r n Korea Korea d e m o n s t r a t e s his conviction c o n v i c t i o n that t h a t Mils BW'isbeing against demonstrates being employed against him unit h i m in i n his h i 6 order o r d e r to to a a subordinate subordinate u n l t who,captured some UN soldiers. s o l d i e r s . The sUbordinate s p b o r d i n a t e unit u n i t is is instructed i n s t r u c t e d to t o ask a s k the the p r i s o n e r s what."type what "type of Of immunization immunization shots s h o t s were administered administered prisoners recently. recently. i n preparation p r e p a r a t i o n for f o r defense d e f e n s e against a g a i n s t what what in disease," and."what and "what type t y p e of of cOmmOn common literature l i t e r a t u r e (was) (was) made available a v a i l a b l e regarding regarding: disease d i s g a s e immunization immunization and and prevention." prevention."
.
1 2 March North Korean naval n a v a l messages to to u n i t 6 in in Two 12 units S o n g j i n and and Chongjin, Chongjin, cities cllties in i n coastal c o a s t a l northeastern n o r t h e a s t e r n Korea, Korea, Songjin ordered with officials o r d e r e d the the units u n i t s to t o cooperate w i t h city city Q f f i c i a l s .A."have Lo ''have a counterplan c o u n t e r p l a n which includes i n c l u d e s injections, i n j e c t i o n s , Vaccinations v a c c i n a t i o n s and and rat r a t poison" poison" and."to and " t o prevent p r e v e n t an an epidemic epidemic the t h e rats. r a t s . . must be hunted." hunted 1r

...
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The P e i p i n g radio r a d i o denied d e n i e d on on 13 13 March March that t h a t epidemic epidemic Peiping conditions c o n d i t i o n s prevailed p r e v a i l e d in i n North.Kprea. Nor Ch Korea. Poor sanitary sari., 'cary conconditions, among t the t h e generally g e n e r a l l y low l o w level l e v e l of immunization immuniqation amoqg he d i t i o n s , the civilian p o p u l a t i o n , and the t h e lack of an e f f e c t i v e lousicide lousicide civilian population, effective makes such s u c h an an outbreak outbreak a a constant c o n s t a n t possibility. possibility.
Comment: The very v e r y fragmen't.ary fragmedtary c condition o n d i t i o n of of tthe h e message message and thepoilition t h e t i o n of the t h e missing m i s s i n g words words could could make make it i t misleadmisleading. If it it describe8 describes actual i n g . If a c t u a l epidemic conditions, c o n d i t i o n s , it it is is the t h e first f i r s t to t o reveal r e v e a l an a n outbreak o u t b r e a k on on such such a a scale s c a l e in i n any any North North Korean area this t h i s winter. w i n t e r . Louse-borne y p h u s occurred o c c u r r e d in in Louse-borne t typhus and c civilians epidemic proportions p r o p o r t i o n s among among 'Communist Communist ttroops r o o p s and ivilians in i n eastern e a s t e r n KOrea Korea during d u r i n g the the winter w i n t e r of of 1950-51. 1950-51.
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T w o 13 13 March March North North Korean Korean meesages, meLaages, one one from fromn'orthn'orthTwo eastern Det Korea, r e p o r t d e a t h s due due to t o cholera. c h o l e r a . (SUEDE (SUEDE - D e t 151 151 e a s t e r n Korea,,reportdeaths 15th 1 6 t h RSM, Korea, CM C M IN Ik 20412, 20412, 12 1 2 Mar 52, 52, 20791, 20791, 13 13 Mar 52, 52, 21099, 14 Mar 52; 52; 501st Comm Corn Recon Grp Korea, K-1395, K-1395, 11 1 1 Mar 52) 52) 21099, 14
c a h p a i g n againgt a g a i n g t rats r a t s in i n Sbngjin S o n g j i n and and Comment: The cakpaign C h o n g is m a a sound k e v e n t i v e measure measure insofar i n s o f a r as as these these Chongjin sound p Oeventive a n i m a l s are are the t h e primary p r i m a r y vectors v e c t o r s of o$ bubonic b u b o n i c plague. p l a g u e . The The animals r e p o r t e d incidence i n c i d e n c e of of cholera cholera is is gurprising h u r p r i s i n g since s i n c e this t h i s is is reported normally normalJy cqnsidered cqnsidered a a summer summer disease. diseise,
8. 8.
Comment: D e s p i t e the t h e serious serioug food f o o d shortage s h o r t a g e among among Despite Comment: i t appearg a p p e a r d that t h a t this t h i s unit u n i t has has acacN o r t h Kprean civilians, c i v i l i a n s , it North-T5FEEE cumulated a a considerable c o n s i d e r a b l e quantity q u a n t i t y of of food f o o d for for what, what, judged judged cumulated by by the t h e stockpile's s t o c k p i l e ' s size, s i z e , is is apparently apparently a a major North North Korean Korean command. Mention Mention of of t the h e myon won organization,.a o r g a n i z a t i o n , . a low.level low l e v e l Korean Ibrean p o l i t i c a l subdivision, s u b d i v i s i o n , suggests s u g g e s t s that t h a t the t h e North N o r t h Korean Korean armed armed political p e r m i t t e d to t o deal d e a l directly d i r e o t l y with w i t h local l o c a l civilian civilian forces are permitted components t o channel c h a n n e l requests requests components for f o r food f 9 o d without w i t h o u t having h a v i n g to through t h r o u g h higher h i g h e r civilian c i v i l i a n authority.' authority.
9. 9 .
Additional A d d i t i o n a l facts.reported f a c t s , r e p o r t e d onANorth on,,iNorth Korean Korean operated operated GC1 GCI net; neZt: LISAF USAF aanalysib n a l y s i b of of-communiCations c o m m u n i a t i o n s ttraffic raffic o on n fhe the
horth % o r e a noperated operated OCI GCI net n e t in i n nOrthWestern n o r t h w e s t e r n Korea Korea reveals reveals NorthMOrean a i r f i e l d s are are associated.with a s s o c i a t e d w i t h the t h e system s y s t e m and and three three t h a t two airfields that other o t h e r fields f i e l d s May may be be similarly s i m i l a r l y linked. l i n k e d . One field f i e l d is is p robably probably in near Sunchon, a city Miles south e a r Sunchon, c i t y 40 miles s o u t h of Sinuiju. Sinuiju, i n Korea n
The analysis a n a l y s i s discloses di'scPoswsthat t h a tone m eof of .the. the Korean Korean GC1 G C I stations s t a t i o n s is is mobile m o b i l e and and Very v e r y likely l i k e l y in in the t h e pyongyang Pyongyang area. area. system comprised of otat The s y s t e m is is now comprised a t least least six s i x GC1 GCI stations. stations.

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A 10 10 March message message -- perhapS perhaps a a reply r e p l y to t o the t h e above above a rear regiment r e g i m e n t commander to t o one o n e of his his i n t e r c e p t -- from a intercept s u b o r d i n a t e battaliong b a t t a l i o n e orders o r d e r s that t h a t the t h e food food situation s i t u a t i o n be be subordinate reported basis,and that r e p o r t e d on on a a monthly' monthly'b asis,and t h a t empty bags be tot t h e myon organization. o r g a n i z a t i o n , (SUEDE 5 9 , 9 9 Mar; Mar ; n 2 9 6 0 , to.the 772960, (SUEDE j 2 9 2959, 10 10 Mar 52) 52)
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North N o r t h Korean Korean unit u n i t is is stockpiling s t o c k p i a i n g large large quantities q u a n t i t i e s of of of food f o o d stuffd s t u f f d submitted s u b m i t t e d on 9 9 March An inventory i n v e n t o r y of N o r t h Korean Korean supply s u p p l y battalion b a t t a l i o n commander to to h is r egimental "Uri North his regimental l i s t s approximately a p p r o x i m a t e l y 8,000 @,OOO metric metric tons t o n s of of rice rice h e a d q u a r t e r s lists headquarters and and 3,800 3,800 metric tons t o n s of of wheat, wheat, in in addition a d d i t i o n to tc) large large quantities quantities of potatoes, p o t a t o e s , meat and and vegetables v e g e t a b l e s on on hand. hand.
food: food:
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The Korean Korean early warning warning system, system, however, however, seems to operate independently from the the GCI independently from GCI net. net. An 11 11 March North North Korean Korean air air "transmitter lokkattor," possibly possibly "transmitter lokkattor," may indicate indicate a a D/F D/F installation. installation. RU-AIR-Weekly Digest RU-AIR-Weekly Dlgest 46, 4 6 , 8 Mar AF message mentioned a located at Sariwon, Sariwon, which (SUEDE USAFSS, ADV SUMhf SUMM (SUEDE USAFSS, Roundup RQundup 52, 52, 13 13 Mar M a r 52) 52)
Comment: The Korean-operated Korean-operated portion portion of of the the Communist Communist Comment: air defense darinig-system system in in northwestern northwestern Korea continues continues to expand expand its i t s facilities facilities and and to t o improve improve its its operations. operations. Korean Korean radar installations installations are are now identified identified at.Sariwon at Sariwon and Pyongyang. Pyongyang
There are operational airfields known operational airfields in northare no known western Uiju along.the western Korea, Korea, south south of of .Sinuiju Sinuiju and Uiju along the Korean Korean side of the the Yalu Yalu river, river, except except for for a a sod sod airfield airfield at at side
.Pyongyang. PY9ngYang *
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Soviet plan'for plan'for UN or Big Three discussion of Korea and Formosa reported: states that Sino-Soviet S ino-Joviet "negotiations" were under way as as of of 1 1 regarding policies policies toward toward Korea Korea and and Formosa. Formosa. The USSR March regarding is s said a i d to desire that that the the Korean talks be "delayed "delayed indefinitely," indefinitely," so that that India India and and other other Asian Asian states states can can press press for for UN UN or or Big Big so Three discussion discussion of of the the Korean Korean question question and "all "all Asian problems." problems."
The Chinese, who consider the conquest of Formosa their objective, reportedly reportedly fear fear that that an attempt attempt to to invade invade number one objective, Formosa would provoke the United States to extend the war into into China. China. The USSR prefers that the Formosa operation be postnoned Den pending a Big Big T Thrr RostPomd ding a hr e meeting. meeting.
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Comment: The Tho USSR has made several attompts Comment: attempts to transfer the Korean K5FFWE-falksito t'alks4tothe the UN Security Security Council where decisions would be be subject subject to to Soviet Soviet veto. veto. The USSR made several several feelers feelers during 1951 1951 regarding a Big Three meeting, but there thero have been no such such overtures overtures in in recent recent months. months. Peiplng's propaganda.has propaganda.has frequently demanded control control of of Peiping's Formosa as a condition fer f p r a Korean settlement and has often often called for an international confercnce conference to settle outstanding
17 Mar 52 52 17
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Asian problems. problems. Many sources have reported that Peiping Formosa by by political political means. means. hopes to to acquire acquire Formosa
5.
Tuberculosis, typhoid and typhus occurring in North Approximately 60 percent of all North Korean govern'TIMoffice workers and party organizers are infected with tuberculosis.II tuberculosis, typhus and!typhoid serum are top priority import 'items and Jlat the government has printed posters stating that the US has dropped typhoid germs in populated North Korean areas.
Korea:
Comment: The reported incidence of disease among Communist bureaucrats seems extraordinarily high. The need for typhus and typhoid serum and the blaming'of the US for typhoid in populated areas may be cited as evidence that these diseases, endemic to Korea, still occur. Poor sanitary conditions and lack of mass civilian immunization, probably have contributed to this situation.
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Communists may mav expand exDand propaganda Drosaaanda to t o include i n c l u d e chemical March warfare in i n Korea: Korea: A k 13 1.3-M arch message message from from a a North North Korean Ko r e a n unit u n i t in in a a rear rear area area reports: reports: "On "On 7 March the t h e enemy used (they) were w white colored chemical weapons ( t h e y ) were hite c o l o r e d powder, pbwder, It said that which are are soluble s o l u b l e in i n water. I t is s aid t h a t when one drinks will killed d r i n k s the t h e water he w i l l be k i l l e d instantaneously. instantaneously. This T h i s has h a s been been discovered d i s c o v e r e d by by the t h e medical medical section s e c t i o n of of the the Volunteer troops troops stationed s t a t i o n e d here." here." (SUEDE 501st 501st Comm Recon Grp Grp Korea, Korea, SK-H-586, SK-H-586, 15 15 Mar Mar 52) 52)
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Comment: P r e v i o u e Communist harges Previous communist propaganda c charges against UN have been preceded by similar a g a i n s t the t h e D" s i m i l a r "reports." l'reports.'' The alleged alleged discovery d i s c o v e r y of of a a toxic t o x i c chemical chemical by by a.Chinese a Chinese u n i t may indicate i n d i c a t e that.China t h a t China is Communist unit is taking t a k i n g the the initiative i n i t i a t i v e in i n expanding the t h e campaign to t o include i n c l u d e chemical chemical warfare. warfare.
N o r t h Korean message urges u r g e s economy economy in i n food food consumpconsumpNorth tion: t i o n : A North N o r t h Korean Ko r e a n message on 15 1s March M arch from from an an unidentiunidentif u n icites t C i t an e s an orde r from t hsupreme e supreme commander elling TMunit order from the commander . t telling government clerkis c l e r k & to to economize economize in in food food consumption. consumption. AccordAccording t o the t h e provision, p r o v i s i o n , all a l l men."under men "under the t h e armed echelons" ing to will w i l l be provided with w i t h 509 509 grams grams of of meat meat and and 800 800 grams grams of of p e r month month commencing commencing 15 15 March March 1952. 1952. (SUEDE rice per (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Recon Grp Grp Korea, Korea, Nr N r 1960, 1960, 16 16 Mar Mar 52) 52) Comm
Comment: P r e v i o u s intercepts i n t e r c e p t s and r e p o r t s have indicated indicated 'Comment: Previous reports t h a t- n r that ECTITUr the t h e North Korean units u n i t s are are well supplied s u p p l i e d with with food. food. The above above message gives g i v e s the t h e impression impression that t h a t the the bulk b u l k of of the t h e North1Corean North Korean diet d i e t is is composed of.coarse of c o a r s e grains g r a i n s -not n o t rice r i c e -- the t h e favorite f a v o r i t e Korean Korean food. food.
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e l e c t r i c a l equipment equipment to t o border border North Koreans Koreans remove remove electrical North A 13 13 March M arch North Kbrean Ko r e a n message addressed addressed to t o the the ^SUFFly " s u p p l y Department Department Chief Chief of of the t h e Communications Communications .Command Command Bureau" Bureau" reported r e p o r t e d that t h a t "the " t h e communications communications equipment equipment that that started s t a r t e d from.Anju from Aaju on on 30 30 January January and and two t w o freight f r e i g h t cars cars . were unloaded unloaded at a t Sinuiju S i n u i j u on on 13 13 March." March.?' The reporting r e p o r t i n g unit unit were t h a t this t h i s movement movement may be be associated a s s o c i a t e d with with a a North comments that Korean battery b a t t e r y factory f a c t o r y in i n this t h i s area.. area. (SUEDE (SUEDE 501st 5 0 1 s t Comm Corn Korean Recon Gip Grp Korea, Korea, 15RSM/8372, 15RSM/8372, 14 14 Mar Mar 52) 52)
area: area:
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Comment; Comment: Removal of of these these facilities f a c i l i t i e s from from interior interior Korea to t o the t h e relative r e l a t i v e safety s a f e t y of of the t h e border border regions regions North Korea would seem seem to t o demonstrate demonstrate that t h a t the t h e North North Koreans Koreans expect expect t h e conflict c o n f l i c t to t o continue. continue. the
The one-month one-month delay d e l a y in i n moving the t h e shipment a a distance di6tance of o n l y 60 60 miles m i l e s again a g a i n shows show6 the t h e effectiveness e f f e c t i v e n e s s of of the t h e USAF's USAF's of only r a i l cutting c u t t i n g tactics. tactics. b rail
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North Korean Korean unit u n i t plans p l a n s 19 19 March March operation: o p e r a t i o n : A 13 I3 March messagb messag's Irom .Division, from a a regIment regiment of aP the t h e North NorthKorean Ko r e a n27th 27t5 .Division, i n combat in i n the t h e east-central e a s t - c e n t r a l sector, s e c t o r , instructs i n s t r u c t s a subordisubordiin n a t e unit u n i t -- probably artillery a r t i l l e r y -- to t o "prepare "prepare completely completely nate f i r i n g at a t the t h e present p r e s e n t location l o c a t i o n by 2000 2000 hours h o u r s oh on for firing 19 March without without fail." f a i l . " A 15 15 March message, message, probably p r o b a b l y from from 19 t h i s same regiment; r e g i m e n t , indicated i n d i c a t e d that t h a t because "vehicles " v e h i c l e s and and this a r t i l l e r y 1 ' would be ba concentrated, c o n c e n t r a t e d , they they should should be be "scattered "scattered artillery" p r e p a r e d for f o r action." action." and prepared
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15 MarCh March message from from the t h e North Korean "Front "Front Line tine A 15 Commandff Iinstrncts nstructs a ubordinate u n i t -- p o s s i b l y antiantiCommarid" as subordinate unit possibly a i r c r a f t artillery a r t i l l e r y -- that t h a t it it "should "should attack a t t a c k the t h e enemy aircraft a i r c r a f t in in the t h e night. n i g h t . The beginning of of the t h e attack a t t a c k is is aircraft 1 (?) March and gnd r e p o r t the t h e completion of the the p reparation 1 (?) report preparation and t h e beginning of qf the t h e attack a t t a c k on the t h e 1(?) l ( 7 ) and 1(?)." 1(?)." the (SUEDE 501st 501et Comm.Hecon Corn qecon Grp Grp Korea, Korea, SK-0-568, SK-H-568, 14 1 4 Mar; Mar; (SUEDE 15RSM/8514, 16Mar;. Nar; SK-1I-719, SK-H-719, 17 17 Mar M a r 52) 52) 15RSM/8514, 16
I Co ent fragmentary nature n a t u r e of of these t h e s e messages The fragmentary Comment: p r e c l u es analysis a n a l y s i s of of the t h e scale, s c a l e , location, l o c a t i o n , or o r purpose purpose of of preclnOes T h e r e are no current c u r r e n t indications i n d i c a t i o n s of a a t h i s oPeration. o p e r a t i o n . There this g e n e r a l Communist olfensive o f f e n s i v e in i n Korea, Korea, but b u t limited l i m i t e d objective objective general o p e r a t i o n s remain a constant constant p ossibility. operations possibility.
7 . 7.
Chinese bomber bomber division.to d i v i s i o n to move from Mukden t o North MUkden to Mahch*ia: N N1ne-T1J-2 i nb TU-2 bombers bombers of of tthe h e Chi Chinese nese Communist Communist 8th 8th Manchupia: b i v i s i b n were were tO t o leave l e a v e Mukden Mukden on on 17 17 March March for f o r Tsitsihar Tsitsihar bivisVon i n North North Manchuria Manchuria.on on a a ."test "test f l i g h t . " The r eporting in flight." reporting agency comments that t h a t all a l l previous p r e v i o u s flights f l i g h t s of of this t h i s nature nature have been followed by the the transfer t r a n s f e r of of the t h e entire e n t i r e unit" unit concerned. A t p r e s e n t 11 11 TU-2's t h e 8th 8th D i v i s i o n are At present TU-2's of of the Division i n the t h e Nanking area a r e a .and and 37 t Wukden, c c o r d i n g to in 37 are are a at Mukden, a according t h e reporting r e p o r t i n g agency. agency. (SUEDE 6920 S the Security e c u r i t y Group Johnson AB,, AP 4 5 , '16 Mar .AB,, AP0045,-16 Mar 52)
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18 Mar 52
bombers, t the largest in l i g h t bombers, he l argest i n the China Comment: TU-2 light area, have not n o t been been in i n the t h e Korean Korean war war since s i n c e November November 1951. 1951. The T h e transfer t r a n s f e r of this t h i s division d i v i s i o n would leave leave only part p a r t of one light l i g h t bomber regiment in i n south s o u t h Manchuria. ManChuria.
8 8..
Comment: Both the t h e Chinese C h i n e s e Communist 4th 4 t h and 6th 6th Comment: Air With MIG-15's A i r Divisions are equipped w ith M I G - 1 5 ' s and have had e x t e n s i v e combat combat experience e x p e r i e n c e over over Korea. extensive Korea. S Since ince t the he o only nly MIG-15 division MIG-15 d i v i s i o n in i n South South China China is is not not yet y e t fully f u l l y trained, trained, t h e transfer t r a n s f e b of the units of either e i t h e r of of these these u n i t s to t o the t h e Canton'area Canton area would appreciably a p p r e c i a b l y increase i n c r e a s e Communist air a i r strength s t r e n g t h there. there.
Jet d division Jet i v i s i o n may transfer trztnsfer from from Manchuria to t o South South Fout Air Division Fouf. transports t r a n s p o r t s of the t he Chinese C h i n e s e 4th 4th A ir D ivision were scheduled schedulgd to to leave l e a v e Liaoyang, Liaoyang, Manchuria, Manchuria, for f o r Canton on 15 15 March. March. The flight f l i g h t was an "airfield " a i r f i e l d transfer." transfer." 4 A later l a t e r message, however, however, r referred e f e r r e d to to t the h e same aircraft a i r c r a f t as ps t r a n s p o r t s of the traAsports t h e 6th 6 t h Air A i r Division. D i v i s i o n . The r e p o r t i n g agency reporting c a u t i o n s that cautions t h a t neither n e i t h e r designation d e s i g n a t i o n is confirmed, confirmed, b but u t that that the unit t h e transfer t r a n s f e r of a Chinese Communist air u n i t is indicated indicated by t h e s e inesiages messages because i m i l a r ttransport ransport f l i g h t s in by these because ssimilar flights the t h e past have preceded preceded entire e n t i r e unit u n i t transfers. t r a n s f e r s . (SUEDE (SUEDE SG 839, 839, Johnson AB AB Japan,16 Japan, 16 Mar Mar 52)' 52) '
China: China:
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Communists may may expand expand propaganda propagandato toinclude includechemtcal chemicalwarfare warfare in in Korea: 1. 1 . Communtsts
US US Army Army Korea

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enemy used chemical chemtcal weapons weapons . . . (they) the enemy were white white colored powder, powder, which whtch are are soluble in water. It is is said s i that thatwhen when one one drinks drinks the the water. water . , . he he will will be be killed ktlled This has been by the the medical medical section of tnstantaneously. been discovered by of the instantaneously. Thts Volunteer troops stationed here:' here." Volunteer
15 Mar 52 16 52
"On77March March .sx.ti-gs4 unit inin aa rear area reports: sh.~,-SgC unit rear area reports:"On
A A 13 13 March March message message from from a North Korean
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Comment: Previous Communist Communtst propaganda charges against have been been preceded preceded by bystmtlar similar "reports:' "reports," The against the the UN UN have T h ealleged alleged discovery dtscovery of of a a toxic toxic chemical chemicql by by a a Chinese Chinese Conununist Communtst unit unlt may m a y indicate indtcate that China Chtna is 1s taking taktng the initiative initiative in tn expanding expandtng the campaign to include chemical warfare.
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5. 5. N o r t h Korea's K o r e. E g i a n t chemical complex comDlex may mav retain r e t a i n some some North __ .' s giant Korean message, r reporting c a p a c i t y : A 12 I T March M a r c h North, North K o r e a n message, e p o r t i n g the the capacity: aischarae o t e s tthatMv h a t he "has "has been discharge of of an afficer. officer, n nOies been disposed disrrosed at a t the t h e Hungnam fiungnam factory, f a c t o r y , ' his h i s farmer former work shop." shap." A 15 15 March North Korean. mesSage rreports probIem.of loading Karean message e p o r t s tthat h a t tthe h e problem of l oading the Hamhung Hamhung area area with with "oxygen "oxygen and and nitrogen" nitrogen" v e h i c l e s in i n the vehicles c a n be can Koreansupply supply uunit the HamhungHamhungbe solved._ s o l v e d . Al...North A North Korean n i t iin n the Wonsan area reports that t h a t "the " t h e directives d i r e c t i v e s of of the t h a center c e n t e r for for a t the t h e factory." f a c t o r y . " (SUEDE (SUEDE 501st 501st c a r b i d e have nat n o t arrived a r r i v e d at carbide Corn GrpXDrea, SK-H-513, SK-H-513, 14 14 Mar; SK-H-696, 9K-H-696, 16 16 Mar; Mar; Comm Recon Grp:torea, SK-H-724, 17 SK-S424, 17 Mar Mar 52) 52)

6 . 6.
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Comment: The The:Hungnam Comment: Hungnam chemical complex, complex, the largest largest in the Ftu.I$aat t o the t h e Korean conflict; confliot; s uffered rix 2Oot prior to suffered d e s t r u c t i o n varying v a r y i n g from_90 from 90 to t o 95 96 percent p e r c e n t in i n its its five five major major destruction of the i n s t a l l a t i o n s . Calcium carbide was one of installations. t h e principal principal products i n t e r - p l a n t use u s e and and for export; e x p o r t ; and and both both p r o d u c t s for inter-plant oxygen and and nitrogen n i t r o g e n were produced in i n aonsiderable-euanticonsiderable. quantit ties. i e s . It I t is is possible p o s s i b l e that t h a t some some segments segment8 of o f ,thw.considerablia the.eonsiderabiLe industrial Capacity of the p plant i ndustrial c a p a c i t y of l a n t have been rehabilitated rehabilitated in i n some slight s l i g h t degree.
North Korean IV XV Corps organization o r g a n i z a t i o n suggested: suggested: The t h e North Korean Ko r e a n 2148 ~3 'B % r i g a d e in in a a 12 12 March March commander of the Brigade message instructed i n s t r u c t e d his h i s 5th 5 t h battalion battalion-commander t o "draw "draw commander to up the t h e name-list.of n a m e - l i s t , o f the t h e persons p e r s o n s received r e c e i v e d from from the t b e 10th, IOth, 1 7 t h , 105th 105th D i v i s i o n s and other other u n i t s , from January 25th 17th, Divisions units, t o today." t o d a y . " (SUEDE 5 0 1 s t Comm Recon Grp Korea, SK-H-546, SIC-H-546, to 501st 14 1 4 Mar M a r 52) 52) Comment: Probably the t h e 23rd Brigade in i n converting c o n v e r t i n g to to Comment: a mechanized artillery a r t i l l e r y unit u n i t received r e c e i v e d personnel p e r s o n n e l with w i t h armored armored training t r a i n i n g from the t h e 17th 1 7 t h mechanized and and 105th 105th armered armored Divisions. Divisions. T This h i s message suggests s u g g e s t s that t h a t the t h e four f o u r units u n i t s are are subordinate s u b o r d i n a t e to to t h e same major command, possibly p o s s i b l y the t h e IV I V Corps. Corps. This corps-corpsthe b e l i e v e d composed of the believed t h e 4th, 4 t h , 5th, 5 t h , and and 10th 1 0 t h Infantry Infantry D i v i s i o n s , the Divisions, t h e 105th 1 0 5 t h Armored Division, D i v i s i o n , and and the t h e 23rd 23rd and and 26th B r i g a d e s - - i s located l o c a t e d in 26th Brigades--is in the t h e rear rear area area of western w e s t e r n Korea. Korea. No recent r e c e n t references r e f e r e n c e s have have been been seen s e e n to t o either e i t h e r the t h e 4th 4 t h or or t he 5 th D i v i s i o n s , but but the t h e 17th 1 7 t h Mechanized D i v i s i o n is the 5th Divisions, Division known to t o be still s t i l l in i n the t h e area. area.
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u n i t deals deals ditectly d i r p c t l y with w i t h North North Korean Korean Chinese Communist unit local government: gaverment: I n a 9 M arch C h i n e s e Communist a In March_Chinese communist message a lower l o w e r echelon e c h e l o n unit u n f t was instructed i n s t r u c t e d to t o "please ' ' p l e a s e contact c o n t a c t the the g o v e r n m e n t a l officials o f f i c i a l s of the t h e k'un k ' u n (county) ( c o u n t y ) of af that t h a t locality locality governmental and inform i n f a r m them them we w e need need 3,000 3,000 bottles." b o t t l e s . " (SUEDE (SUEDE 501st 5 0 1 s t Comm Corn Recon Grp Korea, K-1444, K-1444, 14 1 4 Mar 52) 52) Comment: This T h i s is i s the t h e first f i r s t instance i n s t a n c e noted n o t e d of of a a direct direct ' C h i n e s e Communist requisition r e q u i s i t i o n upon upon a a lower lower echelon e c h e l o n of of the the ChineieCUREunist North N o r t h Korean Korean Government. Government, While it is p robable t h a t the the b ulk probable that bulk of Communist s u p p l i e s are p rovided t h r o u g h normal of Chinese Communist supplies provided through normal l ogistical c h a n n e l s originating o r i g i n a t i n g in i n China proper, instances instances logistical channels s u c h as this such this w will-undoubtedly ill-undoubtedly c contribute ontribute t to o f friction r i c t i o n between the t h e Chinese C h i n e s e units u n i t s and and Korean Korean villagers. villagers.
8. 8 .
9. 9.
N ew N o r t h Korean brigade New North brigade possibly possibly formed: formed: R A 13 March March message from from the t h e NortE North Korean-Sth Ko r e a n -8th D DiVfsion i v i s i o n to t o its subordinate subordinate 8 2 n d . r e g i m e n t at 82nd.regiment a t Kaesong Kaesong mentiOned mentioned two two soldiers, s o l d i e r s , both bath of of from the the "22nd "22nd Brigade B r i g a d e under the t h e direct command whom were from of the t h e Supreme Headquarters." Eesdquarters." (SUEDE Grp (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, SK-H-554, SK-H-554, 14 1 4 Mar Mar 52) 52)
Comment: The North Korean Army at at p r e s e n t is a ccepted present accepted h a v i n g four f o u r brigade-type b r i g a d e - t y p e units--the u n i t s - - t h e 23td, 2 3 M , 24th, Z4th, 25th, 25th, as having and 26th 2 6 t h Mechanized Artillery A r t i l l e r y Brigades--evenly Brigades--evenly divided divided between the t h e east and and the t h e west coast. c o a s t . While confirmation confirmation is s still t i l l lacking, l a c k i n g , it is possible p o s s i b l e that t h a t another amther brigade--the brigade--the 2 2 n d ~ - m i g h thave have been been formed formed in i n the t h e Pyongyang Pyongyang area area as as a a 22nd-might s p e c i a l reserve r e s e r v e force. force. special
C h i n e s e Communist Cammunist unit u n i t reports r e p o r t s frozen f r o z e n feet f e e t caused c a u s e d by by Chinese shortage Communist-message of footwear.: footwear: 'A A 4'March,Chinese. 4 M a r c h Chinepe Communist message s h o r t a g e of Tram from the h headquarters e a d q u a r t e r s of of an an iitalery, a r t i l l e r y dlvision d i v i s t a n to t o its its rear rear area supply s u p p l y unit u n i t states states that_90 t h a t . 90 petcent p e r c e n t of. of tthe h e rregiment's egiment's s h o e s are u n u s a b l e and and "recently " r e c e n t l y more than t h a n 20 20 men men have have shoes unusable g o t t e n frozen f r o z e n feet." f e e t . " The sender s e n d e r reguests r e q u e s t s that that a a second second pair pair gotten of shoes be issued i s s u e d because the t h e men "do "do not n o t have have additional additional shoes to t o wear." wear." (SUEDE S O l s t Comm Recon Co Co Korea, Korea, K-1489, K-1489, 501st 17 17 Mar Mar 52) 52) Comment: T h i s is is the t h e second report r e p o r t within w i t h i n the t h e past past Comment: This m a a shoe shortage s h o r t a g e in i n Chinese Chinese Communist Communist units. units. two w weeks of As the t h e Communist supply supply s i t u a t i o n has e n e r a l l y good situation has been been g generally good d u r i n g the t h e past p a s t months, these these are are probably p r o b a b l y isolated i s o l a t e d incidents. incidents. during
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Epidemics among Communist Communist troops...reported troopn.mqumtred iin n n orthwestern E idemics among northwestern Korea: Orean VI11 o r p s , after reorganizing r e o r g a n i z i n g in i n the the rthe North Korean VIII C Corps, S i n u i j u - U i j u area, area, moved moved during d u r i n g early e a r l y March March to. t o , an Sinuiju-Uiju an area east of Pyongyang. Pyongyang. The general g e n e r a l morale of the the understrength u s d e r s t r e n g t h corps corps percent of t the troops " "are bedridden with is low and about a b o u t 30 p e r c e n t of h e troape are b edridden w ith typhoid fever f e v e r or typhus," t y p h u s , " A high h i g h mortality m o r t a l i t y rate r a t e exists e x i s t s among among these diseased d i s e a s e d patients. patients.
s u b s t a n c e is i s lent l e n t to t o this t h i s report r e p o r t by a a Some substance Comment: fragmentary net northfragmentary 6 d March March message message on on the t h e Russian R u s s i a n .GCI GCI n e t in n orthw e s t e r n Korea r e p o r t i n g an u t b r e a k of y p h u s iin n t h i s general general western..Korea. reporting anooutbreak of ttyphus this area.
While Korea cannot Whxle -the.existence t h e e x r s t e n c e of of epidemics e p i d e m i c s in in North' N o r t h Korea cannot beAletermined; be determined, a a lack l a c k of,saaitary of s a n r k a r y conditions condatAonts andLpreventiVe and p r e v e n t i v e m e a s u r e s and a shortahe of medical.personnel m e d i c a l p e r s o n n e l have probably measuresand.a.shorta6,e.of have-probably made conditions an epidemic. epidemic. c o n d i t i o n s ripe r i p e for f o r an
t h e North N o r t h Korean VIII VI11 Corps Corps The p r e s e n t whereabouts whereabouta of the present are unknown, unknown, although a l t h o u g h recent r e c e n t reports r e p o r t s have have indicated i n d i c a t e d that t h a t it it i n the t h e process p r o c e s s of of reorganization r e o r g a n i z a t i o n in i n northwestern n o r t h w e s t e r n Korea. Korea. was in
4. 4 .
H i g h - l e v e l inspection i n s p e c t i o n to t o be arried o ut i n N o r t h Korean High-level be c carried out in North Korean A Army r m y soon: soon: I In n a 14 Y March arch message, message, a an n u unidentified n i d e n t i f i ed N North orth Ibrean the k o r e a n regiment r e g i m e n t informed informed a a subordinate s u b o r d i n a t e unit u n i t that that t h e "division" "divieiont* on April "in order would carry out out a a preliminary p r e l i m i n a r y inspection inspection o n 1 I A pril " in o rder to satisfactorily t o s a t i s f a c t o r i l y meet the t h e Supreme Supreme Headquarters H e a d q u a r t e r s inspection." inspeation.** I n t h i s same r e g a r d , a 16 March message, r o b a b l y from from In this regard, message, p probably the North VII Corps Corps i in N o r t h Korean. Korean VI1 n tthe h e Wonsan-Hamhung area, area, reported r e p o r t e d that t h a t "National " N a t i o n a l inspection i n s p e c t i o n will w i l l be be opened opened from f r o m the the Prepare.for 1 7 t h day. day. P r e p a r e f o r it i t sufficiently." s u f f i c i e n t l y . ' * (SUEDE (SUEDE 330th 3 3 0 t h .Comm Comm 17th Recon.Co Recon Co Korea Korea ALT-845, ALT-845, 15 15 Mar; Mar; 501st 5 0 1 a t Comm Comm Recon Recon Grp Grp Korea, Korea, SK-H-747, SK-I-747, 17 17 Mar M U 52) 52) I
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Comment: This T h i s impending impending high level l e v e l inspection i n s p e c t i o n may may Comment: i n d i c a t e the t h e culmination culmination of of the t h e extensive e x t e n s i v e training t r a i n i n g and and indicate which has h a s been been going going on on in i n the t h e North North r e o r g a n i z a t i o n program program which reorganization A r m y in i n past p a s t months, months. Korean Army
5. 5.
Communists continue continue organizing organizing to t o meet threat thre.at nf of BW: A Communists Chinese Communist Communist message arch r e p o r t e d . %hat ,'la message on on 13 15 H dirchreported:that-"a c e r t a i n unit_has u n i t ha6 discovered discovered a a large l a r g e concentration c o n c e n t r a t i o n of of plague plague certain germs. Many Many people people have have been been afflicted afflicted w i t h this t h i s undiagnosed germs. with disease and and already already several s e v e r a l persons persons have have succumbed succumbed with w i t h the the disease i l l n e s s . " Another Chinese Chinese Communist Communiat unit u n i t on on 14 14 March_listed March l i E t e d illness." f o u r preventive p r e v e n t i v e measures arrying o u t tthemanti-smallh e ' Hanti-smallfour meaSures for for c carrying out t h e "anti-plague "anti-plague program." program." and the pox campaign" and
6. 6..
a 17 17 March March North North Korean Korean message aessage detailed detailed Meanwhile, a p r e v e n t i v e steps s t e p s to t o be be taken taken by by subordinate subordinate units u n i t s "to "to preventive diseases which may intrude intrude i nto h e r e by he p r e v e n t various v a r i o u s Aiseases prevent into here by t the weapons used used by by ihe t h e enemy." enemy." These These measures. lncluded new weapons measures4ncluded e s t a b l i s h m e n t of of infectious i n f e c t i o u s disease d i s e a s e hospitalt, h o s p i t a l s , cooperation cooperation establishment w i t h local l o c a l governments governments in i n the t h e anti-epidemic anti-epidemic campaign, ampaign, with s t r i c t e r hygienic hygienic . d i s c i p l i n e , isolation i s o l a t i o n of of infected i n f e c t e d units, units, stricter Aiscipline, high priority p r i o r i t y reporting r e p o r t i n g of the t h e outbreak of disease, diseaee, and and s t r i c t observation o b s e r v a t i o n of of "enemy "enemy aircraft aircraft bacterJa1 strict . of of.bacterial bombs.". SOlst C o m m Recon Recon Grp Grp Korea, Korea, K-1499, K-1499, 17 1 7 Mar; Mar; bombs." . (SUEDE (SURDR.501st.Comm K-1500, 17 1 7 Mar; M a r ; SK-B-768, SK-H-768, 18 1 8Mar M U 52) 52) K-1500,
...
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North Korean food economy measures not n o t as as harsh h a r s h as as previouielyzepOrtedl accurate transiatign r e v i o u s l y r e p o r t e d : -A A more 'accwate trans-latfan nf of a a b March North Korean message message (fiei,Special (eee.Specia1 intelligence lntslligence 15 March North-Korean Supplement, 18 18 March,..Item March, I t e m 4) in food food Supplement, 4) concerning economy in conh a s been been received. r e c e i v e d . The message-urges consumption has messageAirges cons e r v a t i o n of provisions p r o v i s i o n s in i n the t h e military m i l i t a r y establishment e s t a b l i s h m e n t and and servation d e c r e e s that t h a t "50 "50 grams grams of meat and and 800 800 grams grams of of rice" rice" will will decrees "deductedqqfrom i r o n each each man's monthly.ration. monthly r a t i o n . The previous The'previous be Pdeducted" t r a n s l a t i o n indicated i n d i c a t e d that t h a t each each man's man's monthly ration r a t i o n would would translation lllimited'' tto o qt509 of rice." rice." be "limited". "509 grams grams of of meat meat and 800 grams of (SUEDE Korea, ALT-897, 17 Mar 52) 52) (SUEDE 330th Corn Comm Recon Co Korea,
Comment: While this t h i s new translation t r a n s l a t i o n still s t i l l indicates indicates a shortage o f food in of i n North Korea, Korea, the t h e deduction of of roughly d a y ' s ration r a t i o n per per month month is is not not nearly n e a r l y as as severe s e v e r e as as the the one day's measures suggested suggested by by the t h e previous previous interception. interception.
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Chinese MIG-15's MIG-15'6 moye moye to t o Korean Korean border: border: Twenty-seven Twenty-seven Chinese MIG-l'S's, probably probably of o f the. t h e Chinede 1 7 t h Air A i r Division, Division, MIG-1Srs, Chinede Communiet Communist 17th were scheduled scheduled to to fly f l y frm frbm Tangshan Tangahan in i n North China to to were Tatungkou near near Antung Antung on on 17 17 March. March. Thirteen T h i r t e e n MIGIs M I G ' s of of this this Tatungkou on 9 9 March. March. (SUEDE (SUEDE d i v i s i o n left l e f t Tangshan Tangshan for f o r Manchuria Manchuria on division Air A i r Force Force Roundup Roundup 55, 5 5 , 2100Z, 21002, 18 18 Mar Mar 52) 52) Since the t h e 17th 1 7 t h Division D i v i s i o n is is equipped equipped with w i t h about about Comment: Since SO MIG-15's, YI&lb'S, its transfer t r a n s f e r will will raise raise the t h e total t o t a l enemy enemy jet jet 50 its strength s t r e n g t h at a t Antung Antung and and Tatungkou Tatungkou to t o nearly n e a r l y 250,.a 250, a record r e c o r d number. number. may, however, however, replace r e p l a c e a combat-depleted nit i n t he 1 7 t h may, The 17th combat-depleted u unit in the r o t a t i o n of of this t h i s nature n a t u r e has has occurred ocuyrred before. before. area; rotation A i r c r a f t of of the t h e 17th 1 7 t h Division D i v i s i o n were were noted noted in i n an an advanced advanced Aircraft stage of training t r a i n i n g in i n February. February. On On 26.February 26 February lhey t h e y practiced practiced stage'of r e l e a s i n g auxiliary a u x i l i a r y fuel f u e l tanks, t a n k s , the t h e first f i r s t intercepted i n t e r c e p t e d reference reference releasing t o auxiliary a u x i l i a r y tanks t a n k s on.MIG-15's. on M I G - 1 5 ' s . to
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Propaganda value v a l u e of BW scare scare stressed stressed in i n North Korean Korean u n i t : An 18 18 March Yarch NorIch N o r x h Korean o t e 8 that t h a t in in unit: Korean message message n notes Fagrence t h e "public " p u b l i c opinion o p i n i o n project: p r o j e c t : progress p r o g r e s s is is slow slow r e f e r e n c e to t o the a t battalion b a t t a l i o n units. units. I n accordance w ith t he o utlined r egulaat In with the outlined regulat i o n , you must r e p o r t public p u b l i c opinion o p i n i o n concerning c o n c e r n i n g the t h e appearappeartion, must report ance of bacteria weapons in in a a wide sphere." sphere." (SUEDE Det D e t 151 151 (SUEDE 1 5 t h RSM Korea, CS CS 351, 351, 19 19 Mar Mar 52) 52) 15th
T h i s intercept i n t e r c e p t shows shows that t h a t the t h e current c u r r e n t BW BW Comment: This p r o p a m a m p s i g n is is intended i n t e n d e d to t o increase i n c r e a s e both both civilian civilian propaiiai-Uampaign and m military i l i t a r y feeling f e e l i n g in i n North North Korea Korea against a g a i n s t the t h e UN. UN.
9. 9.
North Korean IV IV Corps Corps units u n i t s identified i d e n t i f i e d in i n western w e s t e r n Korea: Korea: series of of! T7 17 Marcfi Y a r c h North Korean messages, ossibly i ncludA series North-Korean messages, p possibly includi ng d u p l i c a t e interceptions, i n t e r c e p t i o n s , indicates i n d i c a t e s that t h a t an antiaircraft antiaircraft ing duplicate u n i t of of: the t h e "llth " 1 1 t h Regiment" Regiment" shot s h o t down down a a UN UN F-84 F-84 in in western western unit Korea, sbuth s o u t h of of Chinnampo. Chinnampo. An An altercation a l t e r c a t i o n developed developed between between Korea, the "llth "11th Regiment" u n i t of of the t h e North Korean 23rd 23rd Regiment" and a unit B r i g a d e , known known to t o be be in in this t h i s area, area, as as to t o the t h e credit c r e d i t for for Brigade, downing the t h e UN UN plane. plane. downing
19 March North Korean message, message, probably p r o b a b l y from from the the 23rd 23rd A 19 B r i g a d e An , i n westernKorea, w e s t e m K o r e a , reports r e p o r t s the t h e alleged a l l e g e d dropping d r o p p i n g of of Brigade bacteria in in the the area area occupied by the t h e "18th.Regiment, P'18th Regiment, 4th 4th Division." Division.'' (SUEDE 330th Comm Roeon Co Korea ALT-936 and Recon.Co ALT-937, 18 ALT-837, 18 Mar; 501st 501st Comm Corn Recon Grp Korea, Korea, 15 15 RSM/8724 and 15 15 RSM/8725, RSM/8725, 18 18 Mar; Det D e t 151 1 5 1 15th 1 5 t h RSM Korea, CS-355, CS-355, 19 Mar 52) 52)
Comment: The llth 1 1 t h North Korean infantry i n f a n t r y regiment is organ'ic to the t h e 5th 5 t h Division, D i v i s i o n , IV IV Corps. No recent r e c e n t information informatian. organic h a s been received r e c e i v e d On on either e i t h e r the t h e 4th 4 t h or o r 5th 5 t h North N o r t h Korean Korean has D i v i s i o n s , both b o t h good goad combat combat units, u n i t s , which were last l a s t located located Divisions, in t h e Pyongyang-Chinnampo-Sariwon w e s t e r n Korea: Korea; the Pyongyang-Chinnampo-Sariwon area of western
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Sino-Soviet-Korean preparations for Slno-Sovlet-Korean preparations for future hostilities reported: I I Russian, Russian , Chineset Chinese, reporTa77 leaders decided early in in 1952 1952 and Korean leaders
Comment: Sino-Soviet-Forean Comment; Many sources have reported Sino-Soviet-Korean preparations for for an an expansion expansion of of hostilities. hostilities. 1

C,RET
(1) "to " t o continue fighting" in Korea until the t h e end of April 1952, 1952, in order to cover preparations military movement movement elsewhere; elsewhere; for a military
(2) that that the the Soviet Air Air Force will "go into operation" at once if the US Air Force bombs Manchuria; and and
(3) that Asia that "preparations for war" war" in Southeast Asia must be complete conmlete by by August August 1952. 1952.
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North Korean attitude toward Peace talks xenorted:L
jpeace talks are to t o be delayed indefinitely, indefinitely, at Ct least Least peace talks until "overtures are made from Moscow." During this period the North Koreans will "make final preparations to recover the area north of the 38th parallel."
Comment:
the
Although there are no Current* indications that
'6511EUENts intend to launch an offensive to regain that
portion of North Korea now in UN hands, undertaking such an operation is within their present capabilities. The final line of demarcation between the Communist and the UR sectors is to be the line of contact on the day the ceasefire is effected.
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however. =la ss last year's however, e last year'sepidemic epidemicconditions, conditions,

1[
The incidence of of typhus, typhoid typhoid and and smallpoz., smallpa-,
of disease in epidemic Comment: The outbreak of disease in proportions among Communist Communisttroops troops and and civilians civilians in in North North Korea Korea is is a constant possibility, possibility, There is i sno no convincing convincing evidence evidence from from any any source, however, of of the recurrence of epidemics epidemics similar similar to tothose those experienced experienced by by however, recurrence of enemy last year. the enemy
interrogation interrogation of of 80 80prisoners prisoners some of of whom whom were in and civilian refugees, some Communist as 10March, 10 March, CommunistNorth NorthKorea Koreaas as recently recently as of no no plague plague o or revealed that they they knew knew of r cholera in North North Korea. Captured Captured Communist Communist soldiers reported that unitpolitical unit political and non-commlsfiioned that the non-commissioned medical medical officers officers were were the the source source of of claims that Untted United Nations Nations were were ustng using biological biological warfare, warfare.
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N e w major Chinese C h i n e s e Communist Communist unit u n i t may be be in i n Korea: Korea: A New 1 6 March message, probably p r o b a b l y carried carried on on the. the; Chinese Communist 16 7th 7 t h Artillery A r t i l l e r y Division's D i v i s i o n ' s net, n e t , mentions a a "63rd "63rd Division." Division." The field f i e l d reporting r e p o r t i n g unit u n i t adds a d d s that t h a t this t h i s unit u n i t is i s organic o r g a n i c to to the t h e 21st 2 1 s t Chinese Chihese Communist Army, Army, last l a s t reported r e p o r t e d in i n the t h e coastal coastal areas of of Chekiang Chekiang Province, P r o v i n c e , East East China. China.
A 7 March Chinese Communist message p a s s e d in i n Korea passed t h e "61st " 6 1 s t Division," D i v i s i o n , " also also a a subordinate s u b o r d i n a t e of of the t h e 21st 21st mentioned the Army. (SUEDE SIB 465, 465, 22 22 Mar; AFSA CC/CAP-172, CC/CAP-172, 20 20 Mar M a r 52) 52) Army. (SUEDE CINCFE SIB
Korea have have Many recent r e c e n t Chinese C h i n e s e Communist Communist messages messages in i n Korea mentioned units u n i t s not n o t accepted a c c e p t e d in i n this t h i s theater, t h e a t e r , but b u t thought t h o u g h t to to be elsewhere It entirely possible e l s e w h e r e in i n China. China. I t is e ntirely p o s s i b l e that t h a t such s u c h is is the t h e case with w i t h the t h e 21st 2 1 s t Army. Army,
8.
North Koreans Korepns use u s e diving d i v i n g equipment equipment for f o r salvaging salvaging operation: A North-Korean arch from from or o r e a n naval n a v a l message_of message o Is March 3 i e c : Section i f l n .Chief" %itffV1 rreports e p o r t s tthat h a t llwe-t:lt: : reconstruct ae "Ships "we tried o to reconetruct it" i t t 1but b u t diving d i v i n g equipment is i s needed needed for f o r "a ''a safe s a f e salvaging s a l v a g i n g job." job." a diving d i v i n g party p a r t y be be mobilized, mobilized,' r e q u e s t i n g that that a o r i g i n a t o r , requesting The originator, declares t h a t "we "we mi m i ht h t be be able abJe to t o use u s e it i t after a f t e r refloatation refloatation d e c l a r e s that or o r salvage." salvage." (SUSDEpp12968, 2968, 18 18 Mar Mar 52) 52) (SUEDE
Comment: I t is u n c l e a r what t y p e of materiel being It unclear what type materiel is being salvaged t h e North N o r t h Korean Korean naval n a v a l unit. unit. In t he p a s t the the s a l v a g e d by the In the past enemy has h a s gone gone to t o considerable c o n s i d e r a b l e lengths l e n g t h s to t o recover r e c o v e r UN UN equipment. equipment.
9. 9.
Number of of air a i r combat combat units u n i t s in i n Manchuria Manchuria revealed: r e v e a l e d : An An u n e v a l u a t e d material fkom from the t h e Russian, R u s s i a n , Chinese Chinese a n a l y s i s of unevaluated analysis l a n g u a g e traffic t r a f f i c on the t h e Ground Control C o n t r o l Intercept Intercept and Korean language ( (GCI) GCI) v voice o i c e network, network, which directs d i r e c t s enemy aircraft a i r c r a f t in i n combat combiLt o v e r Korea over Korea indicates i n d i c a t e s that, t h a t , as as of of 10 10 March 1952, 1952, the t h e following following u n i t s were regularly units r e g u l a r l y committed committed to t o combat combat from-Manchurian from-Manchurian M1G-l.5'~ b a s e s : three t h r e e Soviet S o v i e t regiments r e g i m e n t s equipped equipped with w i t h about about 50 50 MIG-15's bases: each, each, a a Soviet LA-11 LA-11 night n i g h t fighter f i g h t e r regiment, r e g i m e n t , two two Chinese Chinese f i g h t e r regiments r e g i m e n t s with w i t h about a b o u t 25 25 MIG's MIG's each, e a c h , and a a North fighter
5 5
Comment: The 21st 2 1 s t Chinese Chinese Communist Communist Army, A r m y , although, a l t h o u g h it it has bZiE7EFEtioned been mentioned in i n connection c o n n e c t i o n with w i t h Korea, Korea, has h a s never n e v e r been been accepted a c c e p t e d in i n the t h e theater. t h e a t e r . While not n o t conclusive, c o n c l u s i v e , these latest latest identifications i d e n t i f i c a t i o n s may may indicate i n d i c a t e its i t s.presence p r e s e n c e in i n Korea. Korea.
24 Mar 52 52
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regiment of of unknown unkpown size. size. An additional a d d i t i o n a l two to t o four four Korean regiment u n i t s and and five f i v e Korean Korean units u n i t s observed observed on on these t h e s e nets nets Chinese units t o be engaged engaged only only in i n training t r a i n i n g activities. a c t l v i t i e a . (SUEDE (SUEDE appeared to AFSA Chinese Chinese and and Korean Korean Voice Voice GCI GCI Nets N e t s in i n the t h e Korean Korean Area, Area, AFSA 14 Mar Mar 52) 52) 14
t e n t a t i v e identifiidentifiComment; Other intercepts i n t e r c e p t s provide p r o v i d e tentative Comment: c a t i o n of of these t hese units. u n i t s , The three t h r e e Soviet MIG-15 MIG-15 regiments regiments may may cation t h e Fifth F i f t h Fleet units u n i t s which left l e f t Port P o r t Arthur be the Arthur for Antung i n the t h e fall f a l l of of 1951. 1951. The only o n l y known known Chinese Chinese units u n i t s at at Antung Antung in o r Tatungkou Tatungkou in in February February were were two two regiments regiments of of the t h e 6th 6 t h Air Air or D i v i s i o n . A regiment of the t h e North Korean Korean Air A i r Force Force 1st 1st Division Division Division. h a s been active a c t i v e at a t Antung. Antung. has
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Communist units u n i t s in i n Korea Korea report report various v a r i o u s diseases: d i s e a s e s : During During the period in t hrough 20 20 March, M arch, Communist Communist .units units i n North t he p e r i o d 12 1 2 through a variety v a r i e t y of diseases, d i s e a s e s , ranging r a n g i n g from from smallpox smallpox reported a Korea reported t o night n i g h t blindness. blindness. to
12 March the Although on 12 t h e supply s u p p l y orsanization o r g a n i z a t i o n of the the Chinese Communist 7th 7 t h Artillery A r t i l l e r y Division D i v i s i o n reported that t h a t only only f o u r men had smallpox out o u t of a total four of 519, t o t a l of 519, a garbled garbled 1 5 March message from this t h i s same u n i t reported r e p o r t e d that d eaths 15 unit deaths o c c u r r e d from the t h e outbreak o u t b r e a k and that t h a t the the u n i t was powerless occurred unit t o combat the t h e disease. disease. to
6. 6.
7 7. .
S i m i l a r l y , a 20 March North Korean Similarly, Korean message mentioned mentioned a c i v i l i a n death d e a t h from "pest" t r p e s t ' l in i n Hamhung Hamhung and the t h e occurrence o c c u r r e n c e of civilian r t p e x t r l and and cholera cholera in i n another a n o t h e r northeastern n o r t h e a s t e r n Korean Korean area. area. A "pest" Korean battalion b a t t a l i o n in i n the t h e Hamhung Bamhung area area on.19 on 19 March reported reported North Korean o n l y six six soldiers s o l d i e r s as as patients, p a t i e n t s , four f o u r of of them them for for surgery. surgery. only An u unidentified n i d e n t i f i e d Chinese Communist r regiment e g i m e n t on an 17 1 7 March r e p o r t e d that reported persons were a afflicted with nightblindness, t h a t 122 p e r s o n s were fflicted w ith n ight blindness, due p r i m a r i l y to to a a vitamin v i t a m i n deficiency, d e f i c i e n c y , and requested.that requested t h a t primarily "some llsome night n i g h t blindness b l i n d n e s s medicine" medicine" be be issued. issued. (SUEDE 5Qlst Comm (SUEDE.50.1st.Comm Recon Grp Korea, Korea, SK-H-866, SK-H-866, 20 20Mar; Mar;SK-H-945,. SK-H-945,22 22.Mar; Mar; K-1570, K-1570, Recon Grp 21 2 1 Mar; K-1602, K-1602, 22 22 Mar; Mar; K-1578, K-1578, 21 21 Mar Mar 52) 52)
O r g a n i z a t i o n and location l o c a t i o n of of North Korean J e t division division Organization jet c revealed: r e v e a l e d : AFSA APSA analysis flight reports a n a l y s i s of of Chinese-COrmitinist Ch i n e s e Com-unist f37 i g h t reports has revealed r e v e a l e d the t h e organization o r g a n i z a t i o n and and locations i o c a t i o n s of of: the t h e North North Korean 1st 1st (jet-equipped) ( j e t - e q u i p p e d ) Air A i r Division. Division. One regiment of of 26 26 MIG-15's, MIG-lS's, commanded commanded by by Kans. Kang Taeyon a t Antung airfield, a i r f i e l d , is flying f l y i n g combat training training and located l o c a t e d at f l i g h t s in i n North Korea. The other flights o t h e r regiment regiment of of 24 24 MIG-15's, MIG-lSfs, command4d by Yang Tuhi and located Anshan, was was.last commanddd located at a t Anshan, last mar 52) observed o b s e r v e d in i n training. t r a i n i n g . (SUEDE (SUEDE KC/CAP-15, KC/CAP-15, .22 22 Mar 52) E n t i r e North Korean cores cor a l e r t e d to t o caeture c a p t u r e defector defector Entire alerted from Pol.iti o c a l M in n istry: s t r y : On ca on rare arch t h e PvChi e ef o of Secur e c u r ity ty Q e c t i o n , " prohably p r o b a b l y of of the t h e North North Korean Korean IV, IV Corps, Sectiond' Corps, informed the the d i v i s i o n and brigade" b r i g a d e " of the the " S e c u r i t y S e c t i o n chief, c h i e f , each division "Security'Section d e s e r t i o n "to "to the t h e 38th 38th parallel" p a r a l l e l " of of IA LI Un Un Uri Un (?), (?), who had desertion
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s e r v e d with w i t h the t h e "Political " P o l i t i c a l Minirtrmi_". Mini All e f f o r t s were were to to served efforts made to t o capture c a p t u r e him. him. (SUEDE (SVEDEktry'. 2972, 22 Mar 52) 52) 2972, 22 be made Comment: The apparent apparent alerting a l e r t i n g of an entire e n t i r e North Kotean Korean Comment: c o r p s , fhe t h e first first time t i m e such such a a procedure procedure has has been been noted, noted, corps, i l l u s t r a t e s the t h e importance attached to p r e v e n t i n g the t h e defecillustrates preventing defection t i o n of this t h i s individual, i n d i v i d u a l , probably probably a a member of the t h e Ministry Ministry of Social Social Security. S e c u r i t y . The North Korean Air A i r Force F o r c e has has demondemonstrated a a similar similar high high level l e v e l of of security s e c u r i t y discipline d i s c i p l i n e in i n its its strated e f f o r t s to t o prevent p r e v e n t the t h e desertion d e s e r t i o n of personnel p e r s o n n e l in i n sensitive sensitive efforts positions. positions.
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4. 4 .
North Korean Army unit u n i t disproves d i s p r o v e s police police r report e p o r t of of BW incident: messages from a North North K Korean battalion in i n c i d e n t : Two messages orean b attalion i n the Hamhung area r reported 25 March tthat civilian police e p o r t e d on 2 5 March hat a c ivilian p olice t h e Hamhung officer o f f i c e r had discovered d i s c o v e r e d an a n American American bacteria b a c t e r i a bomb. bomb. The p o l i c e m a n ' s findings f i n d i n g s apparently a p p a r e n t l y were based policeman's based on t the he c coincidence oincidence of a UN bombing attack of "flies" in of a t t a c k and the t h e appearance appearance of i n the the area.
Comment: T h i s is i s the t h e first f i r s t observed observed instance i n s t a n c e in in Comment; This which a Communist unit u n i t has h a s investigated i n v e s t i g a t e d and e ntered a entered n e g a t i v e report r e p o r t on an a n alleged a l l e g e d American American use u s e of of BW BW agents. agents. negative
5. 5.
A d d i t i o n a l subordinate s u b o r d i n a t e of of new Chinese Communist army Additional group g r o u p reported r e p o r t e d in i n Korea: Korea: A recent r e c e n t message, p r o b a b l y passed passed message, probably t h e Chinese Chi n e s e Communist b y the t a t e s that that Communist 7th 7 t h Artillery A r t i l l e r y 'Division, Division, s by states "the " t h e 18th 1 8 t h Army requests r e q u e s t s that t h a t you compute.the compute t h e total t o t a l number of all a l l personnel p e r s o n n e l under under your your command...." command....ll comnients that t h a t the t h e 18th 1 8 t h Army, subordinate s u b o r d i n a t e to t o the the FECOM comments 5 t h Chinese C h i n e s e Communist Army A r m y Group, Group, has h a s been located in i n Korea 5th by several s e v e r a l collateral c o l l a t e r a l reports. r e p o r t s . The r e f e r e n c e to t o "18th " 1 8 t h Army," reference c o u l d be be a a garble g a r b l e for f o r "68th "68th Army" ArrnylI known known to t o be be FECOM FECOM warns, w a r n s , could in the i n t h e general g e n e r a l area a r e a of of the t h e 7th 7 t h Artillery A r t i l l e r y Division. D i v i s i o n . (SUEDE CINCFE CINCFE SIB SIB 468, 468, 26 26 Mar Mar 52) 52) Comment: Communications intelligence i n t e l l i g e n c e in i n 1952 1952 has has Comment; s u g g e s t e d the t h e presence p r e s e n c e in suggested i n Korea of of four f o u r new Chinese Communist armies--the 10th, 1 6 t h , 18th, 1 8 t h , and and 21st. 2 1 s t . While it i t is is possible possible armies-the l o t h , 16th, that t h a t all a l l or o r elements e l e m e n t s of of these these armies armies may may have have entered e n t e r e d Korea, Korea, i n s u f f i c i e n t evidence e v i d e n c e to t o accept accept t heir p r e s e n c e in in t h e r e is insufficient there their presence the t h e combat zone. zone.
North Korean Korean V V Corps Corps loses loses two two majof major units: units: A 29 January J a n u a r y North Korean Ko r e a n message message mentions mentions that t h a t "since " s i n c e the the V Corps is transferring of the 46th Division t r a n s f e r r i n g the t h e control c o n t r o l of the 4 6th D ivision
3 3
6. 6.
A North Korean military m i l i t a r y sanitation sanitation o fficer, s e n t to to officer, sent a f f i r m this t h i s incident, incident, r e p o r t e d that that t he p oliceman's r eport affirm reported the policeman's report caused was false f a l s e and an@ that t h a t the t h e flies,"were f l i e s "were not not c a u s e d from the the bacterial the place." b a c t e r i a l weapon but b u t from the t h e fertilizers f e r t i l i z e r s on t he p lace." Korea, SK-H-1045, SK-H-1045, 25. 25. Mar; et (SUEDE 501st 5 0 1 s t Comm Corn Recon Recon Grp Grp Korea, Mar; D Det 151 15th 151 1 5 t h RSM R S M Ebrea, Korea, 26 26 Mar Mar 52) 52)
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and the t h e 25th 25th D Division i v i s i o n (probably ( p r o b a b l y 25th 2 5 t h Brigade), B r i g a d e ) , and and since since all of the the b e i n g turned t u r n e d over, o v e r , it i t is is not not p ossible being possible 3003i-29Jan-52) to .I1 (SU~D~[mL130t33, 29 Jan 52) to ." (SUEDE
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HR70-14
Comment: The loss l o s s of of these t h e s e two major units u n i t s leaves l e a v e s the the V Corps Corps with w i t h the t h e 6th, 6 t h , 12th, 1 2 t h , and and 32nd 32nd Divisions. Divisions. I t is is It possible p o s s i b l e that this this January J a n u a r y transfer t r a n s f e r was a p preparation r e p a r a t i o n for f o r the the V Corps' return Korea, p possibly rer e t u r n to t o combat in i n eastern e a s t e r n Korea, o s s i b l y to t o relieve l i e v e the t h e II I 1 Corps. Corps.
7. 7.
North Korean regiment r e g i m e n t at a t Kaesong h has a s large l a r g e security security e l e m e n t : A poorly p o o r l y translated t r a n s l a t e d 26 20 M March arch message message from the the N North orth element: Korean 82nd Itorean 82nd rregiment, e g i m e n t , tthe h e Kaesong Kaesong g guard uard f force, orce, t to o its i t s parent parent 8th Division reports current strength of s security men i in 8 th D ivision r e p o r t s the the c urrdnt s t r e n g t h of e c u r i t y men n t h e re the r e ime ime t t as a8 324, 3 2 4 , organized o r g a n i z e d into i n t o between between 50 50 and and 70 70 nets. nets. 29/7H, 21 (SUEDE (SUEDEvpf29/7&, 21 Mar-52) Mar 52) HR70-14
it is is not n o t known what what the t h e normal normal Comment: Although it complement North regiment c o m p l of m security s e c u r i t y personnel p e r s o n n e l is in in a N o r t h Korean r egiment of 3,000 3,000 soldiers, s o l d i e r s , this t h i s figure f i g u r e seems seems high. h i g h . The llshowpiece" "showpiece" role of of the t h e 82nd Regiment Regiment as the t h e Kaesong guard g u a r d force f o r c e may a c c o u n t for f o r the t h e extra account e x t r a security s e c u r i t y precautions. precautions.
Artillery B r i g a d e has been generally generally The 25th Mechanized Artillery Brigade Identified been coast81 defense d e f e n s e role. r o l e . The V Corps has b een i d e n t i f i e d in in a a coastal engaged in i n training t r a i n i n g and c oastal s ecurity d uty i n t h e Wonsancoastal security duty in the WonsanHamhung Bamhung area, since s i n c e it it was relieved r e l i e v e d from combat combat by I I Corps i n the in t h e fall f a l l of of 1951. 1951.
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N o r t h Korean rear u n i t s ordered to t o produce h alf t heir North units half their orean message on 23 M Nor vegetable requir e m e n ts: s : A North Korean arch vegeta e requ remen Tarch orders o r d e r s each rear service s e r v i c e battalion b a t t a l i o n commander to t o obtain obtain a p p r o x i m a t e l y 30 acres of f a r m i n g land l a n d in-order i n order t o p rovide approximately farming to provide 50 p e r c e n t of the the u nit's v egetable r e q u i r e m e n t s for s even percent unit's vegetable requirements seven months. The remaining r e m a i n i n g 50 50 percent p e r c e n t will w i l l be be provided p r o v i d e d by by the the l o g i s t i c s command, but each e a c h battalion b a t t a l i o n is is warned that t h a t "the "the logistics command, but superi s uperi i l l be unable u n a b l e to t o supply s u p p l y more more than t h a n their t h e i r half. half. " w will ( S U E D E B 3007, 23 Mar 52) 52) (SUEDE 3007, 23 Comment: pparently f ollowing Comment: The North Koreans are a apparently following the p r a c t i c e of of the the practice t h e Chinese Chinese Communist Communist units u n i t s in i n static static positions which were r e c e n t l y ordered t o s tart v egetable recently to start vegetable gardens 19 Mar Mar 52). 52). g a r d e n s (See ( S e e Special S p e c i a l Intelligence I n t e l l i g e n c e Supplement Supplement 19 The considerable c o n s i d e r a b l e amount of of acreage acreage t o be o b t a i n e d by the to obtained by the m i l i t a r y may well military w e l l work a a further f u r t h e r hardship h a r d s h i p on the t h e straitened straitened N o r t h Korean Korean farmers, f a r m e r s , already already suffering s u f f e r i n g from exorbitant exorbitant North t a x e s in i n kind. kind. taxes C h i n e s e Communist m i l i t a r y clothing c l o t h m g arrives a r r i v e s in in N orth Chinese military North Korea: Messages from n e s e Communist r t1 ille r y div isxo n ommun s a rom a Chi nese ar ery vis on a and n 8 the e 6 68th 8th C Chinese h i n e s e Communist Communist Army on on 2 21 1 and and 23 22 March March c o n f i r m the t h e arrival a r r i v a l of of these u n i t s ' clothing c l o t h i n g in i n Antung, North confirm units' Antung, North Korea. Both messages indicate i n d i c a t e the the u niforms w i l l be s e n t to to uniforms will sent t h e forward area. area. (SUEDE 5 0 1 s t Corn K-1689, the 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, K-1689, 21 2 1 Mar; K-1680, K-1680, 22 22 Mar Mar 52) 52) e f e r to t o stocks stocks presumably r refer Comment: These messages presumably of summer un u n i forms. f o r m s . The issuance i s s u a n c e of of this this clothing c l o t h i n g suggests suggests of a C Chinese h i n e s e Communist Communist expectation expectation t that hat t their heir t troops roops w will i l l be be i n Korea for f o r at a t least least a a few few more more months. months. in
8. 8 .

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Chinese Communistdivtsion divisionin inKorea Koreareceives receivesgas ps masks: Chinese Communist masks:
Chinese Chtnese Communist Communist Military 22 Mar Mar 52 52 SUEDE SUEDE
A Chinese Communist Communist 7th Artillery ArtilleryDivision Mvision A on 22 March gives instructions instructions on on message on tssue of gas masks. The message refers the issue refers to t o the receipt receipt of of 500 500 "American-type" llAmerican-type"gas gas masks and 500tubes 500tubes of anti-gas ointment. ointment.
a I e.14.r /44,,4,
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Comment:
in Communist communications in in Korea Korea to to chemical chemical warfare warfare defense equipis possible possible that that the the arrival arrivalof of this thisequipment equipment is i slinked linked with with the ment. It is recent expansion warrecent expansionof of Communist Communist charges of American use of biological warfare in in Korea Korea to to include include use of o f chemical warfare. fare
are not not believed to be Gas masks are be standard equipment in in either either the Chinese Communist Communistor or North NorthKorean Korean army. The equipment this issue issuein inrelation relationto tothe the7,000 7,000 to to 8,000 8,000 men in the 7th small size size of of this Artillery Division may indicate an initial delivery. Artillery Division
the first This is is the first observed reference

3.
North Korean Korean A Air North i r Force Increases increases activity activity at at Sariwon: Sariwon:
US Air US A i r Force 25 26 Mar 52 52
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United on United Nations Nationsaerial aerial reconnaissance on in the the 24 March March disclosed that two two airfields airfields in 35 miles milessouth southof of Pyongyang, Pyongyang, Sariwon area, area, 35 had been runways were been repaired repaired and that that their runways operational.
An 11 January ir Comment: An Comment: January North North Korean A Air Sariwon reported ields" Force message from Sariwon reported that that three three "practice "practice airf airfields" it also also indicated indicated that were suitable for training; it that aircraft were to be ferriedintoand and disassembled in in the the Sariwon Sariwon area. ferriedinto
i r Force Although Althoughaa 6 6 March MarchNorth NorthKorean KoreanA Mr Sariwon indicated indicated that unsatisfactory conditions necesmessage from Sariwon necessitated permission "to planes;' a a 10 10 March March ' ' t o transfer. . . the training planes," message from Pyongyang Pyongyang reported reported that that We "we dismantled dismantled the the (main (mainparts?) parts?) themto tonumber number two." two." and transferred transferred them
..
'
'
to The enemy's enemy's unwillingness, unwillingness, thus thus far, far, to provide adequate jet jet fighter coverage this far south south would would seem to rule ispossiout Sariwon's utility utiltty as a s an an operational operational Communist Communist airfield. It is possible, however, however, that that the the Communists Communists are seeking seeking to establish operational air installations installations within air within North North Korea either in anticipation of of a a ceasefire or fire or in tn preparation preparationfor foraarenewed renewedoffensive. offensive.
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4. 4 .
A Chinese C h i n e s e Communist 7th Division meSsage on 22 7 t h Artillery Arti
masks. The March gives g i v e s instructions i n s t r u c t i o n s on on the t h e issue i s s u e of of gas g a s masks. The message refers r e f e r s to t o the t h e receipt r e c e i p t of of 500 500 "American-type" "American-type" gas gas masks and 500 500 tubes t u b e s of anti-gas a n t i - g a s ointment. o i n t m e n t . (SUEDE (SUEDE 501.Comm 501 Comm Recon Grp Grp Korea, Korea, K-1716, K-1716, 22 22 Mar Mar 52) 52) Comment: This is i s the t h e first f i r s t observed o b s e r v e d reference r e f e r e n c e in in This Comment: t o chemical w a r f a r e dedeCommunist communications in i n Korea to Commurail-TOmmunications warfare f e n s e equipment. equipment. I t is p o s s i b l e that t h a t the t h e arrival a r r i v a l of of this this fense It possible is linked l i n k e d with w i t h the t h e recent r e c e n t expansion e x p a n s i o n of of Communist equipment equipment is u s e of of biological biological w a r f a r e in i n Korea to to c h a r g e s of charges of American use warfare i include nclude u use s e of of chemical c h e m i c a l warfare. warfare.
Gas G a s masks are not n o t believed b e l i e v e d to t o be standard s t a n d a r d equipment in in e i t h e r the t h e Chinese C h i n e s e Communist Communist or o r North N o r t h Korean Korean army. army. The T h e small small either size s i z e of of this t h i s issue i s s u e in i n relation r e l a t i o n to t o the t h e 7,000 7 , 0 0 0 to t o 8,000 8,000 men in in the t h e 7th 7 t h Artillery A r t i l l e r y Division D i v i s i o n may may indicate i n d i c a t e an a n initial i n i t i a l delivery. delivery.
C h i n e s e Communist Communist division d i v i s i o n in i n Korea Korea receives r e c e i v e s gas gas masks: masks: Chinese
31 Mar 52
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5. 5
Urgency shown in i n North Korean transportation t r a n s p o r t a t i o n messages: Maral North gorth Korean A 26 March Ko r e a n message from from an a n unidentified u n i d e n t i f i ed supply s u-m v - lo f f i c e r requests r e q u e s t s a battalion b a t t a l i o n commander Eommander in i n northeastern n o r t h e a s t e r n Korea Korea officer to t o "quickly " q u i c k l y transport...commodities. transport commodities. The time t i m e limit limit expires expires
in days." i n 30 days."
...
On the same day, d a y , another a n o t h e r message message in i n northwestern n o r t h w e s t e r n Korea Korea t h e same o orders r d e r s vehicles v e h i c l e s dispatched d i s p a t c h e d "quickly...without l v q u i c k l y . . . w i t h o u t fail" f a i l ' ' to t o major s u p p l y points. p o i n t s . The vehicles v e h i c l e s are supply are instructed i n s t r u c t e d to t o take take "repaik "repair tools, engineer t ools, e n g i n e e r equipment, e q u i p m e n t , spare s p a r e tires, t i r e s , and and iron i r o n plates..." plates...It
it is is possible p o s s i b l e that t h a t the t h e enemy is is *Comment: k o m e n t : Although it p r e p a r i n g for f o r ground operations o p e r a t i o n s on a greater g r e a t e r scale t han preparing than h e r e t o f o r e , the t h e balance b a l a n c e of heretofore, of evidence e v i d e n c e continues c o n t i n u e s to t o indicate indicate d e f e n s i v e or limited l i m i t e d attack a t t a c k operations o p e r a t i o n s in i n the t h e near n e a r future. future. defensive
s t a t i n g that t h a t these t h e s e may may be be ordinary o r d i n a r y priority priority FECOM, while stating s shipments, h i p m e n t s , notes n o t e s the t h e possibility p o s s i b i l i t y that t h a t "deadlines " d e a d l i n e s have been been established e s t a b l i s h e d in i n preparation p r e p a r a t i o n for f o r future f u t u r e operations." operations." (SUEDE (SUEDE Corn Recon Grp, G r p , Korea Korea SK-H-1079 SIC-H-1079 and and SK-H-1087, SK-H-1087, 27 27 Mar; Mar; 5 0 1 s t Comm 501st CINCFE CINCFE SIB SIB 470, 470, 28 28 Mar Mar 52) 52)
6. 6.
North N o r t h Korean ICorean 10th 10th "Mechanized" ,'Wechanized'' Division D i v i s i o n still s t i l l in i n ChongChongchon tiver Noiqh Korean March fiiver area: area: A N or' t h K o r e a n message on 26 116 arch notes notes that Battalion of the the 1st Mechanized Infantry % h a t the t he "Ist. "1st B a t t a l i o n of I n f a n t r y RegiRegi-, ment" and merit" and the t h e "2nd "2nd Battalibn B a t t a l i o n of of the t h e 2nd 2nd Mechanized Mechanized Infantry Infantry Regiment" Regiment" are are still s t i l l in i n the t h e Kaechon Kaechon area area near n e a r the t h e Chongchon Chongchon River Korea. (SUEDE 3 3 0 t h Comm Recon Co Co R i v e r in i n northwestern n o r t h w e s t e r n Korea. 330th Korea, ALT-112, Korea, ALT-112, 25 25 Mar; 501st 501st Comm Corn Recon Recon Grp Grp Korea, Korea, 15RSM/9375, 27 27 Mar Mar 52) 52)
Comment: Comment: The 1st 1st and and 2nd 2nd Mechanized Infantry I n f a n t r y Regiments Regiments are believed b e l i e v e d subordinate s u b o r d i n a t e to t o the t h e newly newly mechanized mechanized 10th 1 0 t h North North Korean Division, D i v i s i o n , located l o c a t e d in i n northwestern n o r t h w e s t e r n Korea. Korea.
c o n t i n u e d presence p r e s e n c e of of the t h e three t h r e e major major North North Korean Korean The continued units--the 1 7 t h , and and 105th 1 0 5 t h Divisions-,in D i v i s i o n s - - i n the the armored u n i t s - - t h e 10th, 1 0 t h ) 17th, same general g e n e r a l area of northwestern n o r t h w e s t e r n Korea Korea recalls frequently frequently unconfirmed reports that t h a t the t h e deactivated d e a c t i v a t e d North North Korean Korean VIII VI11 unconfirmed reports Corps was undergoing u n d e r g o i n g reorganization r e o r g a n i z a t i o n in i n this t h i s general g e n e r a l area. area. In I n late l a t e December., December,, a aN North o r t h Korean Korean p prisoner risoner r reported e p o r t e d hearing hearing that t h a t an a n "VIII V I I I Mechanized Corps" Corps" was being b e i n g formed. formed
31 Mar 52 52 31
7. 7.
Code Code numbers numbers assigned assigned to to subordinate subordinate divisions divisions by North MarcE message, the Korean Korean II-Corps: I1 Corps: In an 11 11 Y arch message, the commander commander of o r Corps, currently in combat in eastern the North Korean II I1 Corps, Korea, Korea, instructed instructed his h i s subordinate subordinate division division commanders commanders to rubber numbered stamps stamps to identify carve india india rubber identify their documents. Code numbers Corps - 498; 2nd I1 Corps 2nd ments. numbers assigned assigned were: were: II D i v h i o l A - 271; 271; 13th 13th Division Division - 741; 741; 27th 27th Division Division - 878. 878. (SUEDE 501st Comm Comm Recon Recon Grp Grp Korea, Korea, SK-H-1074, SK-H-1074, 21 2'1 Mar Mar 52) 52)
Comment: these code code designations designations are are different different Comment: All of these from-those Prom'those previously previously assigned assigned co i~ these-units. fhese'units.
8. 8.
communications have previously Comment: North Korean communications mentioned tliis impending impending high-level high-level inspection. inspection. The The nature nature mentioned this of of the the preparations, preparations, as as revealed revealed in in this this message, message, indicates indicates an over-all over-ail inspection miliinspection of all all phases of the enemy's m ilitary tary establishment. establishment.

...
5 5
North Korean Korean units units ordered ordered to to prepare pr,epare for for "national "national inspection": March message, an unidentiinspection": According to a 24 M arch message, Tied P i e d North North Korean Korean regimental regimental chief chief of of staff staff has has ordered ordered "each "each battalion battalion commander" commander" to to make make exhaustive exhaustive preparations preparations for the : h e "national "national inspection...which inspection which will be made from next The list April April 1st." 1st." The list includes: includes: destruction destruction of non-regulanon-regulation documents, documents, all activity to be conducted conducted in a regulation regulation activity'to manndr, manner, proper proper knowledge knowledge and and use use of of the the chain chain of of:command, command, clean clean uniforms, uniforms, and and rigid rigid adherencelo adherenceto high-level high-level training training schedules. (SUEDE 501st schedules. 501st Comm Comm Recon Recon Grp Grp Korea, Korea, SK-H-1043, SK-H-1043, 26 Mar 52) 52)
31 31 Mar 52 52
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OCI No. 5149 Copy No. 25, j
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence, Comments represent the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
ARMY and USAF review(s) completed.
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST
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EASTERN EUROPE
1.
The US Legation in Budapest noted that the fact that one village was selected in each of six counties indicated that the measure was intended to frighten other delinquents.
Livestock collections lagging in Hungary: Six villages have lost their free marketing privileges for delinquency in crop collection. In announcing this step, Szabad Nep, the Budapest Communist daily, pointed out that in spite of several warnings the villages had not complied with their obligations for months.
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Comment: The Hungarian Communist concern for production and delivery of crops is seen even in their attitude toward socialization of agriculture. Local officials were warned recently not to let their efforts at increasing the cooperatives interfere with the spring planting.
2.
Bitterness is carefully directed at "fascists and irredentists" in an apparent effort not to worsen inter-governmental relations further, according to the Charge.
American Embass evaluates Yugoslav reaction to Italian Trieste po cy: n commen ng on ugos av coun er emons ra ons an reaction to events in Trieste, the American Charge in Belgrade reports that the "general tone of events in Yugoslavia indicates a firm, well-controlled attitude on the part of the regime designed to impress the West:with Yugoslavia's determination not to yield to solutions arrived at without Yugoslav participation,"
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On 31 March
Tito bluntly warned the West that
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it may "lose the sympathy of our peoples" by supporting Italian territorial claims An the Free Territory of fleste. He asserted that the United: States and Britain are not attempting to correct the mistakes of the:tripartite pledge to Yugoslavia, Italy; but, on the cOntrary, are extolling them. he contended, will never accept a'dictated settlement of the Trieste Aispute in favor of Italy. The Charge warned in a cable last week that the reactiOn of Yugoslav officials to any semblance of Western support for Italian territorial claims would be strong, especially in the ranks of the Slovene members of the Communist Party.
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FAR EAST
3.
Comment: The San Francisco treaty binds Japan to recognize the validity of Japanese property dispositions made by the US Military Government in Korea. The Japanese Government, however, feels that Korean claims for property in Japan of Japanese corporations whose head offices likewise unacceptable, and undoubtedly is were in Korea are working for a mutual cancellation of claims by both nations.
4.
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North Ebrean Air Force increases activity at Sariwon: United Nations aerial reconnaissance on 24 March disclosed that two airfields in the Sariwon area, 35 miles south of Pyongyang, had been repaired and that their runw ys were operational.
Comment: Sariwon was reported in October 1951 as a storage area for concealed North Ebrean aircraft. These two airfields, both sod,are believed to be the bases for North Korean-piloted P0-2 biplanes which have madesporadic harassing attacks against UN rear installations.
The enemy's unwillingness, thus far, to provide adequate jet fighter coverage this far south would seem to rule out Sariwon's utility as an operational Communist airfield for anything heavier than P0-2's. It is possible, however, that the Communists are seeking to establish air installations within North Korea either in operational conjunction with cease-fire preparations or in preparation for a renewed offensive.
5.
Japanese detainees remit funds from Communist China: Three million yen from Japanese nationals in Communist China were
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Koreans incensed over Japanese property claims: Ambassador Muccio reports that, according to the Korean press, ROK Foreign Ministry officials are incensed over Japan's claim to property in Korea, which they consider is a repudiation the Japanese peace treaty. Muccio believes the Japanese of may be underestimating Korean sensitivities on the property issue in the current Japan-Korea talks. Asserting that the Koreans are unlikely to accept any compromise in their present mood, Muccio recommends that Japan be cautioned against impression that it is reoudiati g the terms of giving the the peace treaty.
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delivered to the Japan-China Friendship Society in Tokyo on 27 March, according to the newspaper Asahi. The funds, except for ten percent earmarked for the Zengailia theatrical troupe, were addressed to 345 families.
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This is the first time, according to this account, that the Chinese Communist Government has lie mitted Japanese to remit funds home.
I
Comment: This transfer of funds, which is unconfirmed, appears to be a Chinese Communist propaganda maneuver. Both the Japan-China Friendship Socie tVand Zenshinza are Communist fronts.
6.
British firms in China now plan to close immediately: The British Government is preparing to allow immediate arrangements to be ask Peiping authorities to made for closing most of the remaining British firms in China. This approach has been requested by the principal British business interests operating in China, and will probably be made early in April because of their fear that the Communist authorities have learned of their intention to withdraw eventually and may be planning retaliation.
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Comment: Most British interests believe that the Chinese Communisti'are operating in China now determined to eradicate all foreign economic influence, and that it is therefore futile to attempt to continue their mainland operations under existing handicaps' However, these rirms remain powerrul advocates or a non-provocative" British policy toward China, since they are in most cases based at Hong Kong, and anticipate continued profitable conditions elsewhere in the Far East this year.
china:
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French industrialists may force withdrawal French Industrial and export interests from Indomay initiate a press campaign against the continued drain of wealth and manpower in Indochina if they fail to obtain substantial tariff preferences in the trade discussions scheduled to start 18 April with the Associated States. The Economic Counselor of the French High Commission, who has just returned to Saigon from Paris, is convinced that French troops would be withdrawn from Indochina within three months after the launching of such a press campaign by big business.
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Minister Heath comments that extensive preferences for French interests would defer the development of stable political institutions in the Associated States and also further reduce the number of adhere ts to the Bao Dai government.
Comment: French business interests have supported the militaiinriort in Indochina on the assumption that France would retain economic dominance when peace is established.
9.
Burmese Government's anti-Communist campaign continues: The Burmese War Office reports that its operations against the Communist insurgents in north-central Burma are lontinuing "with much success."
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Even with business hostile, a complete withdrawal is unlikely for reasons of prestige. Nevertheless, a fettering of French economic activity in Indochina would probably result in determined efforts by France to arrive at a negotiated peace with the Viet Minh.
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Anti-Communist campaign in Malaya seen endangered by American rubber policy: The American Consul General in 8ingapore reports that Malayan officials and rubber producers are arguing strongly that the present American rubber policy, if continued, will dangerously impair the Malayan and will play into the hands of the local Communists. economy They emphasize that this policy, which involves decreased natural
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Comment: Even if the success of these operations is exaggerated, the campaign indicates an increased determination to combat the Communists. This determination is also reflected in recent statements by the Premier and the Defense and Home Ministers rejecting Communist peace feelers and again demanding that the Communists lay down their arms.
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rubber purchases in Malaya and support of synthetic production, will not only reduce the vitally important dollar contribution which Malaya makes to Britain but will also reduce the living standard of thousands of Malays who are highly vulnerable to Communist influence.
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Comment: Although the arguments reported by the Consul Generir-iYnlausible, they are influenced by self-interest. The extent to which the rubber industry and the anti-Communist campaign may be endangered by American rubber policies cannot
now be assessed. SOUTH ASIA
11.
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Maharajah of Bhutan is dead: The 50-year old Maharajah of Bhutan died on 24 March after a brief illness, according to a Reuters dispatch from Gangtok in nearby Sikkim.
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Comment: The late Maharajahl t Isuccessfully prevented the expansion of both Chinese Communist and Indian influence in Bhutan. He established border posts and a system of travel permits to check Chinese infiltration from Tibet, and also resisted Indian requests to send troops and a mapping mission into Bhutan because of his fear of eventual Indian domination. The length of time Bhutan remains outside Chinese or Indian control willrrobably depend in large part upon the strength of character of the Maharajah's successor.
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The Crown Prince of Bhutan, about 25 years old, has until recently displayed no great interest in governmental affairs. Since 1950, helms governed a portion of the country and has won much popularity because of his liberalism. He is married to a daughter of Bhutan's capible Foreign Minister, who has been responsible for much of his country's foreign policy. The Crown Prince is Iqualified to succeed his father. However, his ability to oppose foreign pressure is still questionable.
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The southern border of Bhutan is less than 50 miles from all major road, rail, and river communications routes connecting the province of Assam directly with the rest of India.
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12.
Reported Afghan-Pakistani border raid still unconfirmed: No Afghan or American source in Afghanistan has heard ot the attack alleged by the Pakistani Foreign Secretary to have been made on 24 March by 3,000 Afghans on a Pakistani border post near Chaman, close to the southern Afghan frontier. The Pakistani Charge in Kabul has been informed of the incident by his government but has received no instructions to protest
it.
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Comment; Neither the Afghan nor the Pakistani press has The Pakistani Foreign taken notice of the alleged raid. Secretary appears to have reported it to the American Embassy as part of a political maneuver to influence American thinking on the Kashmir issue in favor of Pakistan.
13.
Iranian Prime Minister reportedly will remain in otfice: Prime Minister Mossadeq apparently has decided not to resign when the new Majlis meets, according to Minister of Court Mossadeq, in conversation with Ala, spoke as though he Ala. intended to remain in office indefinitely, and indicated that he will abandon efforts to revive Iran's oil industry and concentrate on balancing the national budget without the oil
income.
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The Shah has left Tehran for a ten-day rest. According to Ala, the Shah had been counting on Mossadeq's voluntary resignation.
1
Mossadeq's conversation with Ala appears to Comment: foreshadow a serious attempt by the Prime Minister to collect taxes from recalcitrant merchants and landlords. The government, however, may choose to expand the note issue and to use the gold cover to finance its operations. Either move would arouse strong opposition.

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some sort of conflict between nomadic and settled Afghan tribesmen occurred on or about 23 March, during the course of the nomads' annual migration to the hills of central Afghanistan. The American Embassy in Kabul comments, however, that such incidents are regular occurrences and that they seldom have political signi1
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
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Meanwhile, Iran's financial situation is steadily growing for the month worse, and the funds available to the government and wage ending 21 March barely covered government salaries commitments.
14.
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While there is considerable sentiment among Comment: Libyans generally favoring Arab League membershiP, Libya resents the interference of the League, particularly of Egypt, in its domestic affairs. Since the new Libyan Government recently invited the construction of American military installations in Cyrenaica and expressed interest in joining the proposed Middle East Command, King Idris may consider it more profitable now to strengthen Libya's ties with the West rather than those with the Arab countries.

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Libya not considering Arab League membership: Libya has time, according no intention of joining the Arab League at this The Minister noted that to the American Minister in Tripoli. opening of Parliament contained the King's speech at the friendly references to other Arab states, but no mention of the When the American Minister commented on this Arab League. omission, the King smilingly said that it was enough to know .one's friends without loining an organization for that purpose.
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WESTERN EUROPE
15.
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Although Possible Soviet moves in Berlin examined: American officials in Berlin believe thar Ireports of a Russian plan for another Berlin blockade were planted by the USSR as part of a "scare campaign," they anticipate increased harassing in Berlin at the time of West Germany's signing or ratification of the contractual agreements.
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Soviet harassing measures in Berlin have Comment: slackened in recent months, although the USSR is still causing some inconvenience by delaying the approval of export permits and by the occasional closing of some canal locks on the routes to Berlin.
These officials doubt that the Russians will step up interference in Berlin at the present time, however, par-. ticularly while they are trying to attract West sympathy for their unity and peace proposals.
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When denied admission to East Germany, the commiss on returned to Geneva. It plans to wait several weeks before reporting to the UN Secretariat -- at least until the Soviet Union has had an opportunity to reply to the 25 March Allied note concerning a German peace treaty and Should the commission file a negative all-German elections. report immediately, it might appear as though the UN were closing the door to Soviet acceptance of the Allied position.
Comment:
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Invitations have been sent to major United Nations and non-Communist international welfare agencies. The official Soviet organ in Austria boasts that delegates from 45 countries will attend the meeting./
Local preparation for this conference closely Comment: parallels that which preceded the World Peace Conference
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Major Communist propaganda effort anticipated in Vienna American officials in Austria conference on child welfare: report direct Soviet participation in the intense propaganda build-up for the Vienna International Conference for the Protection of Children scheduled for 12 to 16 April. As a part of the preparatory campaign, the Soviet Deputy High Commissioner delivered a protest to the American Embassy in Vienna on 25 March regarding the alleged "abduction" of children of Soviet nationality from the US Zone of Austria. Local Communist propaganda links the conference with such current issues as biological warfare and Western rearmament.
United Nations investigating commission bolsters Berlin American observers report that the reactions of West morale: Berliners to the recent Berlin visit of the UN commission were characterized by restrained satisfaction and some disThe appearance of the commissioners, whose task appointment. is to investigate the feasibility of free all-German elections, provided a "psychological shot in the arm" for most residents by focusing world attention on the problems of Berlin. Many residents, however, felt let down because the commission did not exert some kind of dramatic pressure on the East German Government to be admitted to its territories. Such pressure would have clearly put that government on the propaganda defensive.
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last fall. That meeting was also prefaced with an official Soviet denunciation of Austrian remilitarization followed by an elaborate propaganda effort on the part of the Austrian Peace Committee. International meetings called by the WFTU in Vienna are also notable for recent efforts to obtain respectable international participation.
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Austrian efforts through publicity to discourage unilateral Soviet intervention in Austrian affairs may give an exaggerated impression as to the number of such episodes. Despite the increased vigor with which the Russians have in recent months pursued their economic and political objectives in Austria, a major shift in Soviet .-ccupation policy has not yet been indicated.
Comment:
20.
Although government officials responsible for defense and foreign policy state that NATO commitments must be met, those responsible for financial policy insist that expenditures must not lead to inflation.
1
Belgian budgetary deficit interfersag with military production: Although Belgian officials generally believe that their country can balance its ordinary budget, the deficit in its extraordinary, defense budget, which has already caused the government to suspend new commitments, has seriously interfered with the forward production planning of such important military suppliers as Fabrique Nationale and Poudreries Reunies. The Belgian Finance Minister has stated that it is impossible to finance 26 million dollars of the extraordinary budget of 596 million dollars without unblocking Belgium's EPU credits or raising loans above those now contemplated.

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Austrian officials complain of Soviet unilateral interThe Austrian Minister of Interior complained at a recent cabinet meeting of the "continued unilateral interference" of Soviet occupying forces in internal Austrian affairs. He cited in particular the obstruction of roads in the vicinity of the Czech border, property requisitions, the harassment of local officials with personal questionnaires, and the interrogation of Austrian citizens at border crossing points.
vention:
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Comment: It is widely accepted within the Belgian Government that no substantial reduction in budgetary expenditures can be obtained without cutting into military allotments, and
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the Finance Minister has asserted that he will not agree to inflationary measures to meet rearmament needs. The government also has refused to raise taxes.
This attitude toward defense is also probably an attempt to obtain sympathetic consideration of Belgium's in the EPU, currently being negotiated, as well as a position favorable reception for its proposal for pre-financing defense production.
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London Embassy comments on Communist BW propaganda campaign: Explaiangthat the impact o/ the Communist BW propaganda campaign in Britain has been "negligible to slight," the American Embassy in London comments that heavy counterpropaganda from Washington would be unnecessary, but not harmful in effect, as far as the United Kingdom is concerned. Pointing out that Foreign Office sources indicate the Communist had a more substantial effect in the Far East campaign has and other areas, the Embassy recommends that the countercampaign be continued, with primary responsibility remaining with Washington.
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25X1
24.
US Embassy suggests military grant aid to Dominican Republic: Since the Dominican Republic has been considered as an alternate for the receipt of military grant aid, the US Embassy in Havana is interested in knowing whether the availability of funds originally allocated for Mexico and possibly other countries will make it possible to grant aid to the Dominican government during the offer current fiscal year.
25X1
ties which might be largely counteracted if any contem lated military grant aiti offered without delay.
that Dominican efforts to have the arms production facilities of the country used in the collective defense effort have just been turned down. It feels that this will undoubtedly result in an unfortunate reaction on -the part of the Dominican authori-
The Embassy has been unofficially informed
25X1
SECRET
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TOP SECRET
25X1
1 April 1952
25X1
CIA No, 49597 Copy No. 4 6
25X1
This summary of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete cav2rage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
25X1
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TO THE CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST
TOP SF.CRET
4.
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TOP SECRET TEC NATIONAL THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING MEANING OF THE DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE 793 AND 794v THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS. MANNER TO AN OF WHICH IN ANY TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
NEAR EAST-AFRICA
1.
'
us support: Former Former Iranian Prime Minister seeks approached the American Iranian Prime Minister Ahmad Qavam has should he be named Prime Embassy in Paris seeking US support he.does not want the premiership Minister. Qavam said that the-full confidence unlese he is drafted by the pills and has of the Shah and Parliament. I for Prime Comment: Qavam is the strongest candidatee his advanced Ministe7-754..iside the National Front andv despite He is, howin Iran. agew he is pne of the few able leaders to approve eVer,.distrusted by the Shah; who would be unlikely him except AR last resort.
'
25X1
2.
question: Britain and Egypt unable to agree on Sudan their talks in EgYptand Britain have made a little progress Eastv but the Egyptian defense of the Middle on the proposed agreement is possiForeign Minister has reiterated that no real title as King of recognition of Farouk's ble withoui BritiSh the Sudan. "practically an The Foreign Minister issued what was Sudan by 1 April ultimatum" that Britain give its answer on the determine what action in order that Prime Minister Hilali might elections. :Me American he shOuld take in regard to the 18 May official not to intends to advise Ekvot's AmbasSador, however, insist on the 1 April time limit.
25X1
TOP SECRET
1 Apr 52
UNCLASSIFIED when
TOP SECRET
fied when filled
in apprabarftbriieetRffoffergeiument: kelkilipPgaTrelltt46ADORQOParglikir"
blankTOP SEW?' whr1/29(tathStcf
ed or declassi-
DOCUMENT
SOURCE
CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT DESCR I PT ION
0
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OCI 4885 1 April 1952
DAILY KOREAN BULLETIN

I.
Military Operations
AMY
Scattered patrol clashes and several enemy probes up to platoon size reported across the Eighth were Army:front. Occasional including 26 shells with enemy mortar and artillery fire, propaganda leaflets, was encountered.
Naval air units flew 269 tion targets. Shore bombardment sorties, principally against east coast transportacontinued on both coasts.
The Far East Air Force flew 313 sorties, ers against the including 26 missions by medium bombChinnampo and west and northeast of Sinanju. Ramhung marshalling yards and traffic choke points In three engagements with 7-86's destroyed six MIG's and damaged two. a total of 40 MO's, 88 One 7-86 sustained minor damage.
II,
Military Intelligence
US natal aircraft pilots observed on 27 March that in northeastern an airfield at ChOngjin Korea was being resurfaced with dence of much vehicular traffic a black material. There was eviin the vicinity a hangar framework of the airfield and supplies for were seen in the Chongjin railyard. farther from the front lines (Chongjin airfield,much than Antung, offers little air operations advantage for Communist against UN ground installations. situated for operations against It is, however, strategically UN naval forces operating off This airfield has been northeastern Korea, almost continuously ever been noted there. operational, but little activity Unconfirmed intelligence has North Korean airforce reports have indicated that a unit with some unidentified tioned here.) operational aircraft is sta-

Air Air
NO OBJECTION TO THE DECLASSIFICATION THIS DOCUMENT. OF

271 IBM.i_______48o0a-97>
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III.
General Situation
Cease-fire
South Korean Foreign Minister Pyun, commenting on the cease-fire talks, stated that if the Russians were allowed as a neutral inspection team, "it would be tantamount to.moral defeat. .and succumbing to the USSR." On the question of prisoners of war, Pyun held that no prisoners should be forcibly repatriated. He added that the Chinese Nationalist Government had requested the ROK to, retain custody of those Chinese prisoners who do not wish to return to Red China until such time as they can be transferred to Formosa,
.
Propaganda
Radio pyongyang on 31 March gave an interim report on the alleged US biological warfare effort in Korea. The broadcast charged that from 20 January through 25 March, the US had dropped germ-laden insects on more than 400 occasions The broadcast concluded with a summary of the detailed preventive measures taken in pyongyang,

2
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SECRET Security Information OCI 4886 2 April 1952

I.
Military Operations
Naval air and surface units continued interdiction of enemy supply lines on both coasts.
Aircraft of the Far East Air Force destroyed 10 MIG-15,s, probably destroyed three, and damaged 10 in four engagements betWeen Sinuiju and Sinanju. One F-86 was lost and a second received minor damage. A total of 382 MIG-15's and three Type 15's were sighted, of which 87 were engaged. The Far East Air Force flew a total of 1200 sorties, including 14 medium bomber sorties against railroad targets west of Sinanju,
II,
No significant reports have been received during the past 24 hours.

III.
Generalatuation
A representative of the Far East Commandfs psychological warfare office has informed the US Ambassador in Formosa that the majority of Chinese prisoners of war in Korea would, if permitted,'choose to be repatriated to Formosa. The FECOM officer also stated that further surrender of Chinese Communist troops is being inhibited by the absence of any assurance that they will be sent to a safe place and not returned to Communist China.

Air
Psychological Warfare
The enemy launched a twobattalion attack against US First Marine Division positions in the US I Corps zone 25 miles north of Seoul, forcing a withdrawal. A counterattack restored the Marine positions The Communists also launched a battalion size attack against the ROK Sixth Division in the TB IX Corps zone and light probes occurred elsewhere across the front.
THE C.I.A. HASNO OBJECTION TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OF THIS DOCUMENT.

No. 5 JUL.1978
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I.
Military Operations
Lim
Enemy company and squad size probes and light patrol contacts across the Eighth Army front. Friendly forces maintained positions were encountered The US First Marine Division in the US I Corps zone received 3,100 and patrolled. and artillery fire in its sector. rounds of mortar
Naval air and surface interdiction of enemy communications both coasts. lines continued on
FEAF aircraft destroyed five MIG -151s and one Type-15 and damaged and one Type-15. One F-86 was lost and three were four MIGIs damaged in the encounters northwest Korea. FEAF flew over a total.of 1,263 sorties, of which 868 were combat.
II.
FEAF reports that recent photo interpretations the number of enemy antiaircraft show a significant decrease in weapons along the principal supply Korea. During the routes in North period from 5 to 25 March, 27 been removed. At present there guns and 185 automatic weapons have are no indications of the redisposition weapons at any other of these points in North Korea. Communist.antiaircraft (Since the nrincipal function of weapons in Korea cations, a redisposition has been the protection of lines of communiat this time seems Strange. was estimated to have almost As of mid-February the enemy 400 antiaircraft artillery guns and 1,500 automatic weapons disposed in North Korea.)
III,
General Situation
No significant

Navy Air
Ground SECRET Security Information
THE C.
reports have been received during the past 24 hours.
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SECRET recurity Information
OCI 4888 4 April 1952

I.
Military Operations
Arm
Light patrol contacts and one enemy squadsize probe wero reported across the US Eighth Army front.
Naval air and surface units continued interdiction of enemy communica tions on both coasts.
In three engagements over northwest Korea, FEAF planes destroyed two MIC-15's, probably destroyed a Type 15, and damaged four NIG's and one Type 15; two F-66Is received major damage. FEAF flew a total of 1,n78 sorties, including seven medium bomber missions against Sinanju rail targets,
There have been no significant developments

III.
'
General Situation
lhere have been no significant developments

Air
during the past 24 hours,
during the past 24 honrs.
THE C.I.A.HAS NO OBJECTION TO THE DECLASSIFICATION,Or THIS DOCUMENT.
No.0
5 JUL hilbi
613
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OCI 4889 5 April 1952
DAILY
I.
KOREAN BULLETIN
Military Operations
AEMY
an enemy squad engaged sector of the US X Corps zone under In the US 25th Division friendly elements to withdraw fight, causing a UN patrol in a seven-hour cover of smoke and mortar fire.
PIEY
units continued Naval air and surface both coasts. Air
Included among the them combat missions. sorties, 237 of FEAF flew 627 and 14 medium bomber sorties. latter were 80 close support
II.
against Communists guerof its operations in a summary reports that Far East Command, 1951 to 14 March 1952, from 1 December Of those captured, rillas in South Korea 10,256 were captured. killed and 5,172 are awaiting processing. 11,276 individuals were relapsed, while Fifty key processed and sentenced, or have died. 4,393 have been have been the The others are awaiting trial, operations, which have reduced of captured during operating in groups leaders were killed or 3,300 guerrillas and bandits to Abouthalf number of dissidents capability for serious operations. 20 to 50 persons with little of these guerrillas are unarmed.
III.
General Situation
Economic
financial in a recent speech that the ROK Finance Minister Paek stated improving." He cited magy.figures taken by the situation in South Korea is "gradually vaguely of various measures statement and spoke .7 to support his "tendency." government to check the inflationary

'Guerrillas
interdiction of enemy communications on
THEC.I.A.HASNOOBJECTION
1
.
TO THSDECLASSIFICATION 09 THISDOCUMENT. 0
No.
5 At t971 02 3
"
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(Paekts speech was probably given merely to bolster the morale of the South Koreans as the inflationary spiral has shown no signs of leveling off. In fact, the US Ambassador in Pusan reported in late March that the retail price of rice had risen so precipitously that it ucould touch off a total collapse...of the won.u)

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OCI 4890 7 April 1952

I.
Military Operations
Alm
The First Commonwealth Division in the US I Corps zone received 3,156 rounds Two of artillery and mortar fire and repelled two companysize enemy attacks. along the platoonsize probes and normal patrol contact were reported elsewhere Eighth Army front.
Naval air and surface units continued interdiction of enemy communications on both coasts.
Air
Of 43 M1G-15's encountered, FEAF aircraft destroyed four, probably destroyed one and damaged six. No friendly casualties were reported. FEAF flew a total of 1,024 sorties, of which 661 were combat.
II.
FEAF reports that the coming of the spring thaws to North Korea will be an In one area ob added burden to the already battered enemy lines of communications. served, bomb craters were filled with water and parts of the railroad bed were under water. Coupled with this, the spring floods may further damage the flimsy bridges over rivers in the northwest. Communist a*areness of this threat is seen in sightings of car loads of crushed rocks for fill and the building of piers to protect bridges.
III,
General Situation
Political
Ambassador Muccio reports that President Rhee by stating he had been shocked to learn of President would not seek or accept the nomination. Rhee added of democracy is its changing of leaders in the midst

Navy
Logistics
opened a 31 March conversation Truman's announcement that he that one of the real wealaiesses of a crisis. (9
THEC.I.A. HASNOOBJECTION TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OF THISDOCUMENT.

No,_
0 5 Jot_ 1978
0).3
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Muccio interprets Rhoe's "shock" as resulting, probably, from the realization that President Truman's announcement might be cited by Rhee's opponents as a worthy example for him to follow.
Propaganda
Radio Peiping on 6 March transmitted some of the "findings" of the Commission of the International Association of Democratic Jurists which recently investigatod American biological warfare in Korea, The Jurists stated that "different types of insects were reported found in 169 areas of North Korea." Findings were also made with respect to the use of "gases or chemical weapons by American planes."

%MET
Security Information
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OCI 4891 8 April 1952

I.
Military Operations
Aza
Action was limited to platoon-size enemy probes at various points along the front; those were repulsed. Navy
Naval air and surface craft continued the interdiction of enemy supply lines on Loth coasts.
Air
Poor weather limited air activity as UN land-based aircraft flew 294 sorties including only 89 combat. Four medium bomber missions were flown, three of them against close support targets. No enemy aircraft were sighted.
Recent combat intelligence reports received in FECOM indicate that the Chinese Communist 40th Army, deployed in western Hwanghae Province with a coastal security mission, is moving into an assembly area in the Sariwon region. Although there is insufficient information to accept such a movement, FECOM speculates that the 40th Army may be preparing for a more active role. (Unconfirmed reports that the 40th Army was being replaced in Hvanghae Province have been current for some time. Both the 50th Army, accepted in Korea, and elements of the 16th Army, not fully accepted in Korea, have been mentioned as the relieving force.)
Air
During the last two weeks of March, the US Fifth Air Force, operating over Korea, observed.the following new developments in the air war: the Communist MIG-15 formations have been encountered'at lower altitudes -- between 20:000 and 40,000 feet; the Type 15 jet has appeared again in numbers with some modification of its armament and a greater degree of aggressiveness. the enemy appears to be experimenting with the armament on the MIG-15; and iinauy, MIG-15's aro attacking UN fighter
1
THE C.I.A. HAS NO 07. TEC TION

Ground
TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OF THIS DOCUMENT.
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bombers more aggressively.
FEAF observes, in regard to the latter, that UN fighter bomber operations have not been placed in any immediate danger by the increased aggressiveness of the MIG's.
General Situation
Political

2
South Korean Prime Minister Chang, after reporting briefly to the National Assembly on the outcome of the ROK mission to the UN General Assembly in Paris, has been "lying very low" since,his return on 1 April, according to the US Embassy in Pusan. Chang, who claims he is not strong enough to carry out his duties because of his recent illness, has a statanent from a US Army doctor prescribing further rest and he may go aboard the US hospital ship Consolation. The only conversation thus far between President Rhee and the Prime Minister was inconclusive; thus rumors of Rhee's intentions and candidates for the Job are still the favorite topics of conversation in Pusan.
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&SLEET Sec'irity Information
OCI 492
9 April 1952

I.
Military Operations
AL11W
The-o wore tmo small probes in the US X Corps zone; action along the rest of the front was limited to patrolling.
No_ j_v
Because of bad weather conditions UN carrier aircraft flew no missions. face craft on both coasts continued interdiction of enemy supply lines.

Air
Political Economic SZERET
Sec..lrity Information
1
mo.
Sur-
UN land-based aircraft flew 757 sorties. including 387 combat. :Eleven medium bomber missions were flown against targets which included Sunchon north railroad bridge.
Six II:CC-151s were observed and encountered with no claims reported.
II,
No significant reports have been received during the past 24 hours. General Situation
South Korean Minister of National Defense Shin hrs announced that the emergency martial law proclaimed on 1 December 1951 and precautionary martial law proclaimed on 4 April 1951 will be lifted in most of South Korea on 7 April 1952. Shin cited successful anti-guerrilla operations, the advent of the farming season, and impending local elections as the main reasons for the decree. The local elections to be held on 25 April are for city, town and township assemblies in all localities except a few unrohabilitated areas where martial law still exists.
US Naval intellience learned from sources aevore that farmers in the Haeju area of western i;orea are being treated well by eneny forces in the interest of food
THEC.I.A. HASNO OBJECTION TO THE DEC7ACSIFICATION OF THIS DOCUMZNI.
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GICRET Security Information
production. In eastern Korea, however; interrogation of an enemy prisoner reveals that rice; not groun in Korea, and sheep; raised and slaughtered in China, are being shipped into Korea via the east coast rail line. The principal outshipments consist of enemy fuel drums,
Medical US Naval intelligence reports typhoid cases in one family out of every five in a small North Korean east coast village. The death rate is estimated at 30 percent of those ill.

2
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'
001 4893 10 April 1952

x.
Nilitary Operations
Amz
Action across the front was limited to patrol contacts; there was pne fourhour clash two miles east of Funji in the US I Corps zone involving elements of the US 1st Marine Division,
NaVal air aid surface craft continued interdiction of enemy supply installations.
FEAF aircraft flew 856 sorties, including 13 medium bomber attacks on targets including the Synchon south railroad bridge and the Chinnempo marshalling yards. Military Intelligence
Pilots of US Marine Corps aircraft observed a Communist dnch-equipped truck traveling southward from Wonsan shortly after midnight on 6 April. Tae truck was towing two balloons, each from 10 to 15 feet in diameter, secured by 60-foot cables. Small objects, the size of basketballs, were dangling from thc inThons. (Aile this observation is too incomplete to allow accurate evaluation, the description suggests an antiaircraft weapon for mse against low flying UN aircraft. It is possible that the smaller objects suspended fron the balloac Ire explosive charges.)
'
III.
General Sitdaation
An unevaluated US Navy report, gleaned from a recent prisoner of war interre gation, states that smallpox end typhoid "are common" in the area south of Tanchon
Nafrth Korea.
Peiping Radio, meanwhile, stated on 3 April 1952 that "there is. no epidemic in Korea" and the real purpose.of the World Health OrganizatIonis offer of acsistance in North Korea is "to check on the results of germ warfare for the United States."
THE C. T. A. HAS NO crancnort TO THE Dr:CrIASSIFI CATION OF THIS DOCUMENT

Air
Navy
Antiaircraft
Medical
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JJSECRET Security Information
ocI 4894 11 April 1952

I.
Military Operations
LiEna
Two small enemy probes and light patrol activity characterized action along the front.
No reports were received from Task Force 77 on the east coast, but west coast carrier planes and surface craft on both coasts continued to interdict enemy supply lines.

'
In the US I and ILCorps zones, there were three instances of attempted line-crossing from north to south:by Korean civilians.
Air
UN land-based aircraft flew 699 sorties including 340 condbat. bomber missions were flown, three against close support targets.
Five medium
One unidentified aircraft was engaged.
II.
III...General Situation
TO THEDECLASSIFICATION
THIS DOCUMENT.
0 5 JIJL 1978 No.
OF
015
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OCI 4895 12 April 1952
DAILY KOAEAN BULLETIN

I.
Military Operations
Army
Light enemy probes in squad and platoon strength were encountered across the Eighth A/py front. The Communists continued harassing fire with mortar and artillery.
Navy Naval air and surface units continued interdiction of enemy supply lines on both coasts.
The Far East Air Force flew 781 sorties, of which 463 were combat. No airborne enemy planes were reported sighted or engaged. The bomber command flew 16 sorties in a shoran bombardment of a supply complex in north central Korea.
II.
25X1C 25X1C

Air
Ground
25X1C
orean troops are now being issued their since such issue is usually made in mid-May, this accelerated sc e u e, coupled with the mapply and troop buildup, may foreshadow an offensive before 1 May.
(While this early issue of summer uniforms may well be related to recently detected signs of preparations for more intensive Communist military operations, it may also be routine. Recent reports have indicated relatively mild temperatures along the battle line.)
inese summer uniforms.
ommunis
an
or
Antiaircraft Defense
The Far East Air Force reports that the enemy is continuing a significant redisposition of his antiaircraft defense weapons. supply route from the Chongchon River south to Pyongyang (44 guns and 101 automatic weapons) lost nearly 50 percent of its protection :::::::::::::102
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1
i (
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v
SECRET Security Informatien
Similarly, Saamcham airfield in northMarch and the first week of April. western Korea, once heavily defended, no longer has any significant antiaircraft defenses.
Much of this strength has been redeployed northward to protect the main rail lines leading from the Manchurian border into the Sinanju area. The Air Force comments that the most heavily defended areas now are those which recently were the targets of intensive UN fighter bomber attacks. (New antiaircraft artillery positions now being constructed in the Wonsan-Hamhung area in eastern Korea may be destined to receive some of this redeployed strength).
III.
General Situation
Radio Pusan on 11 April announced the dismissal of Acting Premier Ho Chong from the ROK cabinet. (Ho has been without official position since Premier It is probable That Ho's sympathies for the opChang Myon returned from Paris. position political party were behind his dismissal from the government.)

Political
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SErRET Security Information
OCI 4896 14 April 1952

I.
Military Operations
LEMZ
Two enemy attacks in company strength were repulsed in the LE I Corps and ROK II Corps zones. Minor patrol clashes and scattered enemy artillery fire were reported elsewhere along the Eighth Army front.
Air and surface Units struck at enemy communications on both coasts.

Air
FEAF planes flew a total of 1,164 sorties and in counter-air missions destroyed six MIG-15ts, probably destroyed one, and damaged four. No report has yet been received on US casualties, The bomber command flew eight shoran missions against a rail bridge in north central Korea.
US naval forces off Wonsan in eastern Korea reported that on 10 April the enemy burned brush in the area, apparently to cover daytime train movements. Also on 10 April, 27 Korean line crossers were apprehended by UN troops in the west and west central sectors. One group claimed to be civilians who had been .forced to move by Chinese Communist troops. Only one of the line crossers armed.
(Efforts to maintain daytime train movementsindicate on increased urgency in the enemrs logistical effort. Prior to previous Communist offensives in Korea, it was observed that the enemy always made a considerable intelligence effort, utilizing a large number of low level Korean agents to reconnoiter UN installations.)
A recently captured Chinese soldier reports that on 13 Ehrch he observed a Communist radio equipped air-ground liaison team in central Korea near the battle front. He states that the position was in daily contact with other unknown stations:
SECALET

Ground
ara
Air
THE: 0 1- A 'IA s fir 0 On T
ECTION
Iiop
Tars DonLifi143IFICATION
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The US IX Corps commenta that previously reported enemy airground liaison teams have been equipped only with panels and flares. The Far East Air Force comments that while this installation may be intended for Conmunist air-ground support operations, it is doubtful whether the Communists have sufficient suitable aircraft to begin operations of this type.
III.
General Situation
Propaganda

2
British Communist correspondent Minnington reports from Pyongyang on 12 April that "the vapor trails of NIG-15,s" over that city have brought "peace" -- at least during daylight hours. After describing a recent encounter between MIGIs and UN jots over Pyongyang, he states that the "line of the air battle moves steadily south."
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wt
rionlno of the impionagelaws, Mb
friliashirld &mail inromalimile
793
TH, the transmiuMn or rovokin of which M any manner to en unauthorized person b

prohibited by law.
rd
18. WC, hes.
CCI 4897 15 April 1952
D.AILY KOREAN BULLETIN

I.
Nilitary Operations
Army
Tank elements from the US 40th Division engaged an enemy battalion in ;leUS IX Corps zone. In the RON II Corps and US X Corps zones, the enemy launched one battalion-size and one coMpany-size attack against the RON Third and Seventh Divisions.
Air and surface units attacked enemy supply lines on both coasts.
Air
The Far East Air Force flew 782 sorties, including 16 medium bomber sorties against targets at Sinanju, Chinnampo and Sariwon. No enemy-aircraft were engaged. Military Intelligence
UN fighter pilots to whom full credence is given observed on Tatung Nue airfield and 50 on Antung in the early morning of 450 jet aircraft 13 April. Later in the day only 81 aircraft were on Tatung Kuo and 101 were on Antu.ng. The Far East Air Force believes resulted from (a) bad weather at other at Tatung Kuo for large scale staging, techniques of operating from a crowded this unusually heavy concentration may have Manchurian fields, (b) testing of facilities or (c) training of pilots in procedures and field,
A recently captured Chinese Communist soldier reports that he belonged to.an element of the 38th Chinese Communist Army. At the time of his derertion on 31 March this army was still deployed along the main supply route in northwestern Korea between Sinanju and Pyongyang. (The 38th Army has frequently been reported moving southward for avariety of 'reasons. This firm location would see to negate these previous reports.)
III,
No significant reports have been received during the past 24 hours,

General Situation

Eam
Air
Ground
T17
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onnenolf TO rC.I.A.HASwi E; D2C'ASSIFICATION THIS D0C OF
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OCI 4898 16 April 1952

I.
Military Operations
Army
Scattered patrol engagements were reported across the US Eighth Army front. In the US I and IX Corps zones, the enemy made probing attacks in strength up to two platoons.
Air and surface units struck at enemy supplies and communications on both
coasts.
The Far East Air Force flew 256 sorties, of which 56 were combat. No enemy aircraft were sighted. Nine medium bomber sorties were flown against the Chongju rail bridge.
II.
The Far East Command reports that a recently captured Chinese Communist artilleryman states that on 5 March he observed 30 armored vehicles, resembling self-propelled artillery, in the area west of Pyongyang in central Korea. Ris battery commander told him the following day that this armor was from an armored regiment attached to the 12th Chinese Communist Army in east central Korea. FECOM observes that the number of tank sightings in central and eastern Korea have increased recently, possibly indicating an eastward or southward shift of enemy armor. While it can not be confirmed, it is possible that the Chinese Communist 3rd Armored Division, located in the eastern Wonsan area, has displaced elements southward into this area
III.
25X1C
General Situation
Political

Air
25X1C
Foreign Minister Pyon Yeng-tae is soon to be replaced by Yang
1
cf
THEC.I.A.HASNOODIECTION
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Yuchan, present Ambassador to the United States. pyon's fall from favor is re portedly due to his failure.to support President Rhea. (It is entirely possible that Pyon is slated for replacement in view of the recent extensive cabinet changes instituted by Rhee. Pyon, however, has demonstrated himself to be a willing tool for the aging President.)
Propaganda

2
In a 14 April radio broadcast from Pyongyang Premier Kim Ilsong was eulogized on the occasion of his 40th birthday, which occurred on 12 April. The broadcast stated that various statues are being erected in his honor at the site of his "victories over tho Japanese." (Tho real Kim Ilsong was a near legendary guerrilla chieftain who operated in Manchuria and northeastern Korea against the Japanese. The present Kim Ilsong is reliably reported to have served with the Soviet Army in World War II. Following the liberation of Korea from the Japanese: a deliberate fiction was invented by the Communists alleging that the present Premier Kim is the same man as the famous guerrilla leader.)
-t"..."*"cza,
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tti 4899 17 April 1952

I.
Military Operations
Ground
The enemy made scattered probing attacks across the Eighth Army front. United Nations forces maintained positions and patrolled.
Air and surface'units attacked enemy Supplies and communications on both

coasts.
FEAF flew 838 sorties, of which. 460 were combat. No engagements with enemy planes were reported. The bomber cammind conducted shoran bombing of the Sinanju area,
II.
A Chinose Communist prisoner captured on 23 March'from the 32nd Antitank Artillery Division reports that his political officer told him on 1 Mhrch that the UN planned to launch a four-division offensive against the Chinese Communist 12th Army in east central Korea. This reported UN offensive was to be met with a Communist counterattack supported by armor, artillery and reserve infantry .elements. No actions were to be taken, however, if the UN offensive did not .materialize. The US IX Corps observes that this counterattack plan.is of "particular .:interest" and may represent a "variation" of reportod plans for a 6th Phase Offensive, Olhile no ready explanation can yet be attached to the heightened military activity along the battle front in the enemy's immediate rear, this prisoner's ,statement provides a plausible explanation. The possibility remains, however, that the "counterattack" referred to could expand into a-major attack, if in fact it ever occurs.) / 3 C.I.A.HAS NO OBJECTION SECRET TO THE DECTASSIFICATION OF Security Information
THIS DOCUMENT.

Air
Ground
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General Situation
Political
25X1C
25X1C
Meanwhile a British news service reports that on 16 April this constitutional amendment, intended to divest Rhee Of political power, was introduced in the nytional Assembly. Observers in South Korea say that the amendment has the necessary twothirds support of the Assembly needed for approval.

2
prior to 9 April I Rux National ssem ymen broke w e Liberal Parynthe National Assembly (nominally a pro-Rhee group, but currently estranged from the executive). This new voting faction is attempting to ally themselves with the Democratic Nationalists, Rules's opposition. Reportedly they propose to submit a constitutional amendment calling for a "responsible cabinet" tyce of government similar to that of France. Rhee vetoed an identical amendment only recently and that Rhee woul "d ssolve the assembly and call for a national election if the amendment is made a political issue." (Political organizations in the South Korean legislature are characterized more as voting coalitions than political parties. While this rift in the Liberal Party, which nominally supports the government, has not been confirmed, it is entirely possible. This move will strengthen the voting power of the Democratic Nationalists.)
Attworial
contains tacwmedon die&
mthonal defemm of the
iitinelffigs Epatare2001W09'Ch4-121)P91701172.12020200100001-9
SEdRET
meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, WC, Secs.
793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of

which in any manner to en unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
Security Information OCI 4900 18 April 1952

I.
Military Operations
Array
Action across the front was highlighted by the repulsing of n company-strength enemy probe in the US I Corps zone, tank activity in the US It Corps zone, and company-size attacks in the ROK II Corps zone, one of which was thrown back by ROK 6th Division counterattacks.
Air and surface units continued to intercept enemy supply lines along both
coasts
UN aircraft flew 258 effective sorties, including 80 combat. The 16 medium bomber missions included'an attack on the Sinhung-dong railroad bridge. A preliminary report indicates that one MIG was destroyed and two damaged in engagements between Sinanju and Sinuiju.
25X1C
00 North Korean pilots arrived at Sariwon airfield in wes ern Korea, south early in February. Allegedly the pilots were graduates of a Manchurian training center. It was rumored that by "middle April" some 30 unidentified aircraft would be at the field. At the time of the report -- 2 March -- only six aircraft were on the field. These were flown only at night by North Korean pilots. (It has long been suspected that the sod airfields in the Soriwon complex was one of the centers for enemy night harassing missions conducted by obsolescent P0-2 biplanes. In view of recent efforts to maintain two fields at Sariwon in operational condition, it is probable that some North Korean Air Force activity is located here.)
III.
General Situation
Propaganda
A 17 April Chinese Communist radio broadcast reports that on 13 April a

Navy Air
Air
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THIS DOCUMENT.
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US F-86 Sabre jet was shot down by ground fire over a Sino-Korean border town on the Yalu River. The Communists allege that the downed aircraft, together with three others, intruded over Manchurian airspace. According to US news reports, the US Air Force admits the loss of an F-86 on that date. Air Force spokesmen say that the US jet was attacked over northwestern Korea by four MIG-15's.

SECRIT Security Information
2
Approved For Release 2001108/09 : CIA-RDP91701172R000200100001-9
information allotting This-material contains

national
law, ,
the
delenso of the unAvliiKtsdvathin tiStrWase

sre
'I*
et,
2001/08/QA:
-RDP91T0117240302Q01throi-a
ormation
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793 and 794,
the transtalsthon
or revelation of
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oari.
which in anY manner

prohibited by law.
to an unauthorized person
19 A
f9)532-

Military Operations
Army
Air and surface units continued their strikes against enemy supply and communication points on both coasts.
Air
The Far East Air Force flew 1,243 sorties of which 796 were combat. Tuelve medium bomber sorties were flown, seven directed against a rail by-pass bridge in the Sinanju area A total of 118 airborne MIG's were observed; of 33.engaged, one was destroyed and three were damaged. One F-86 received minor damage.
An enemy front-line oropaganda broadcast, made in the east central sector, announced that a "general Attack" would be launched before long.

Ground
A four-hour enemy attack of company strength was repulsed by the ROK Capitol Division in east central Korea. In the sector of the US 1st Marine Division, 1,281 rounds of artillery and mortar fire were renorted. Elsewhere along the Eighth Army- front, action was limited to probes and patrol clashes.
25X6
General Situation
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TO Vi2DFCCA3SIFICATIONOF THISDOCUMTNT.
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OAS
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ODI 4902 21 April 1952
DAILY KOREANH BULLETIN

I.
Military Operations
AEME
Small groups of the enemy made scattered probing attacke across the US Eighth Army front. UN forces maintained positions and patrolled.
Air and surface units attacked enemy supplies and communications on both
coasts.
Within a two and one half hour period 63 F-86ts had eight engaientp with 105 MIG-15ts and two Tyne-15ts over northwest,Korea. Nino MIGts were'destroyed and eight MIGIs and one Type-15 were damaged; no friendly losses were reported.' FEAF planes flew a total of 915 sorties.
II.
On 20 April UN aerial observers noted three separate enemy groups, aggregating nearly a regiment, moving southwards into the Kaesong area. (Move ment of large groups of troops into the battle area has previouslr signalled enemy preparations for more active military operations.)
The Far East Command reports the capture Of additional chinese prisoners from the 26th Army in central Korea who state that their arpy will be relieved in the near future. One prisoner stated that this relief had been scheduled three times previously, but plans had been upset by the UN. FECOM comments that this relief is as yet unsubstantiated, although the 26th has been in the line since June 1951. (Previous reports have indicated that the 60th Chinese Communist Army, farther to the west in reserve, would be the relieving force for the 26th. Again this can not be substantiated.)

Navj
Air
Ground
I
1
No.
THE C.I.A. HAS NO OBJECTION'
TO THE DECIAZZIFICATION OF THISDOCUMENT.

0
5 JP! 1978
02" 3
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.sta
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General Situation
Economic

According to two 20 April Korean-language broadcasts from radio Pyongyang, Premier Stalin offered "50,000 tons of flour stocked in Siberia" to Premier Kim Ilsong because "I have become cognizant of the fact that provisions are needed by the Korean people." Kim Ilsong accepted Stalin,s offer, stating that this is "another manifestation of the disinterested brotherly aid given by the, great Soviet people to the Korean people." (The public announcement of this considerable gift of food to the North Koreans by the USSR may be seen as another indication of the critical food shortage believed to exist among North Korean civilians. This offer will probably be given =damn propaganda coverage within North Korea.)
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OCI 4903 22 April 1952

I.
Military Operations
Amy
There were light patrol contacts and scattered enemy probes across the US Eighth Army front. UN forces maintained positions and patrolled.
Ne.a
coasts.
Revised figures for air engagements reported in the Daily Korean Bulletin of 21 April are seven MIG-15's destroyed, four damaged and one Type-15 damaged. One 1-86 was lost. In an early morning reconnaissance flight of F-860s, one 1CG-15 was destroyed. An 1-86 received major damage when hit by debris from .the destroyed NIG. Total Far East Air Force sorties were 1,126, including seven bomber command sorties against the Sinanju rail bridge and the Kyomipo steel mill.

Air
25X1C
In the afternoon of 21 April, a ROK ground observation post in the east central sector observed 200 mounted enemy troops together with 100 troops on foot. .(This observation made in the sector of the Chinese Communist Twelfth Army, not known to have organic cavalry troops, raises again the question of whether the enemy will use cavalry in the Korean conflict. The last cavalry encounter occurred in late October 1950 when a US .unit was surprised by mounted Chinese Communist troops in northwestern Korea. Two unidentifled Chinese Communist cavalry units were long belieted to be in Korea, but lack of contact or capture of prisoners caused FECOM to drop these'units from the Communist order of battle.)
THE C.I.A, HAS NO OBJECTION TO THE ITZCLASSIFICATION OF THIS DOC
The Far East Command, on the basis of prisoner-of-war and accepts the deactivation of.the North Korean 17th Mechanized Division., FIC lieves that the personnel and armor of this division have been pro-rated to units of the North Korean IV Corps in the western area near Pyongyang. (If deactivation has taken place as FECOM believes, the armored elements of the Korean army will be reduced to two divisions - thc 105th Tank aid the newly organized 10th Mechanited.)
M beother
this
North
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III,
General Situation
Political
On 19 April the South Korean National Assembiy passed a resolution to amend a government organization law whereby, if a vacancy occurs in the Prime Ministership, a successor shall be appointed within ten days. The American Ebbassy in Pusan reports that if this amendment becomes law, it will prevent President Rhee from naming an acting Prime Minister whose appointment, unlike that of a permanent Prime Minister, is not subject to Assembly con, currence. It is also stated by the Embassy that there is as yet no reliable indication of Rheets intentions in regard to action on the above resolution or of a successor to ex-Prime Minister Chang.
Radio pyongyang in a 21 April broadcast detailed how the 50,000 tons of flour presented to North Korea by the USSR were to be used. The gift will go without charge to farmers who suffered from the war or floods, to mitigate the agricultural taxes presently in arrears, and to continue the state loans to impoverished farmers, (The emphasis on relief of the North Korean agricultural population partially confirms the serious food shortages thought to exist among the North Korean civilian population.)
Propaganda
In a 21 April broadcast the Pareign Minister of North Korea refused the offer of assistance made by the UNIs World Health Organization. Pak said "we have succeeded in preventing the spreading of epidemicslu and added that the World Health Organization, after all, was a US puppet.

Economic

2
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OCI 4904 23 April 1952

I.
Military Operations
Aamiy
Patrol action and scattered enemy probes up to two platoons in size were repo ted across the US Eighth. Army front
coasts.
Far East Air Force planes flew 1,228 sorties, Of which 883 were comThat. Four Type-15ts attacked four F-86/s but no damage was reported for either side. The UN bomber command flew 10 sorties against the Sinanju rail bypass.
II.
The US Navy reports the results of a ROK naval intelligence interrogation of a North Korean prisoner. The latter stated that political advisers of his division said the North Korean Army was preparing for an all-out offensive against the UN forces in Mhy 1952. (Enemy prisoners have recently been reported as-saying that an offensive was impending -- previously a reliable indicator of Communist intentions when received in sufficient volume. Although there is evidence of considerable enemy movement and unusual activity in North Korea, the Far East Conwand does not believe a Communist offensive is imminent,)
UN aerial observers report the sighting On 21 May of a 5,000 foot airstrip with 10 revetments in an area just north of Sariwon (The Communists have been able to construct numerous sod airfieldsin North Korea only to have the UN detect and destroy them. To date, the Only airfields south of the Yalu River complex that

kratz
Air
Ground Air

1
.1700OPTTIOS TO THE D?.C7AISIFICATION :THISDOCUMENT. OF
THEC.T.A.HAS
20
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405S111
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SEMI&
Secur ity Information
the enemy has made an effort to keep operational have been the sod fields at Sariwon. Obsolescent biplanes are believed to have flout from these fields in harassing missions against the UN rear areas.)
III,
General Situation No significant reports have been received during the past 24 hours.

2
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WI 4905
24 April 1952

I.
Military Operations
Army
Scattered patrol contacts and light enemy probes were reported across the US Eighth Army front.
coasts.
FEAF aircraft flew 1,072 sorties, of which 730 were combat. damaged in an early morning encounter over northwest Korea.
II.

Air
Ground Political
Navy
One MIG was
The Far East Command reports that the capture of a Chinese soldier from the 15th Army in the sector of responsibility of the 26th Army in central Korea strengthens the indications that the 26th has been relieved: FECOM, however, is unable to say what unit comprises the relieving force. (Relief of the 26th Army has been indicated since early April. Although the 60th Army received primary mention as the relieving force, the 15th Army, as indicated by the prisoner, may actually have accomplished the relief.)
III.
General Situation
25X6
President Rhee has announced the nomination of Assembly Vice Speaker Chang Taek-sang for the vacant nost of Prime Mtaistsr arperinp to Ambassador Muccio.
e assador believes Chang is one ef the acceptable to both Rhee and the Assembly.
25X6
vei;;;;;;;;;;;TIOW
T ibrazr.
No.
ON 01
045-
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(Relations between Rhee and the Assembly are now so strained that the latter could conceivably indicate its lack of confidence in the Preaident by rejecting the nomination.)
Economic
During the period of 14 March to 11 April prices in South Korea remained fairly constant, and for the first time since May 1950 there was a decrease in the amount of now curreney. The commodities index in Pusan during the period decreased 3 percent while tba retail ric.3 erice in Pusan and Seoul increased 3 percent and decreased 7 percent reapectively. According to Radio Pyongyangv the North Korean Government on 20 April released a cabinet decision which establishes rewards to be paid "for discoverers of mineral veins." The Government edict specified the types of ors which will bring recompense, including lead, wolfram, copper, gold, silver "and others." In addition to the reward money, the promulgation eontinues, the discoverer will be given "the privilege of purchasing daily necessities, clothing, and the like at the State-set prices." (Enemy documents indicate that a considerable amount of North Korean mine products was shipped to the Soviet Union before the war. Previous reports have indicated that only a small minority of North Korean bivilians are fortunate enough to have access to scarce conaumer goods at government-controlled primes, the vast majority having to spend from five to six times as much for their daily needs in the opal: market.)

2
Noen't
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OCI 4906 25 April 1952

I.
Military Operations
Small probing attacks and patrol engagements characterized the activity all across the W Eighth Army front, as elements of the US 40th Division in the US IX Corps zone repulsed two probes after a 25-minute struggle.
Air and surface craft continued to intercept enemy supply lines,
FEAF aircraft flew 999 sorties, 620 of them combat. There were 73 closesupport missions divided among all five UN Corps zones. A total of 11 medium bomber sorties was flown, six against the Chongju railroad bridge complex and the Chinnampo marshalling yards. Twenty MIG's were observed, 14 encountered, with two probably destroyed and one damaged.
UN aerial observers on 23 April sighted what appeared to be over 250 Comnunist-built tank traps in the general area of Kumsong in east central Korea. (UV forces in this sector have made a number of highly successful armored probes in the past, and these barriers may be directed against future UN local action.)
UN fighter aircraft, directing naval gunfire at Wonsan, on 21 April detected and destroyed an enemy IL-10 conventional ground-attack aircraft on Wonsan airfield.
Far East Air Force notes that, although there were several single-engine planes on Wonsan field on 12 March, there were none on 8 April. (It is possible that the Communists are using some 2,800 feet of undamaged runway at the airfield to mount limited harassing sorties acminst UN installations or for limited night operations.) SECRET Security Information
THE C.I.A.HAS NO OBJECTION TO THB DECLASSIFICATION OP THIS DOCUMENT.
N

Navy
Air
Ground
Air
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III.
General Situation
Economic
A statement issued on 21 April by the North Korean Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry claimed that spring sowing for this year, despite "many difficulties caused by . . the American imperialists and by the flood and drought of last year" is progressing faster than last year. The Ministry eetimated that total areas planted showed 150.9 percent increase over last year, thus "vividly" showing "the heightened production desire of the farmers." (Despite the above "facts" cited by pyongyang, the continued lack of farm equipment, personnel, draft animals end fertilizer presage a continued poor yield.)
According to US observers Assembly Vice Speaker Chang Taeksan has organized a "middle ground" Assembly group, including 30 Assemblymen who signed a petition for the recent cabinet responsibility amendment and 13 who did not sign. The group supports the amendment but professes to believe the measure needs "further study." The organization of this group probably has Rhee's covert backing in an effort to confuse the amendment issue. Rheels recent nomination of Chang to the Prime Ministership mey have been a reward for Chang's action in the Assembly which possibly weakened the unity of antiRhee elements.

Political

2
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SECRET'
Security Information OCI 4907 26 April 1952

I.
Military Operations
Teel( Force 77 on the east coast replenished and conducted no air operations. West coast carriers and surface units on both coasts attacked enemy supply routes.

Lan
41x
Truce Talks
Enemy ground activity was limited to small probes in the west and east-central sectors.
FEAF aircraft flew 663 sorties, of which 378 were combat. aged in an engagement just north of the Chongchon River.
One MIG was dam-
II.
No.significant reports have been received during the past 24 hours.
General Situation
Radio Peiping on 25 April warned the United States that it will be "heavily punished by the people of Korea, China, and the rest of the world" unless Korean and Chinese POW's "demands" to return home are met. The broadcast recalls the Koje riots and previous propaganda broadcasts as evidence of US brutality against Communist prisoners.
THE C.I A. HAS NO TO Till DIC7A7SII.

THIS DOCUW.11111.
I.11TT:C:74 C
115fr
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Political
Insterday municipal, town and township elections were held in South Korea and an estimated seven million voters were expected to elect representatives for 17,559 seats. Prior to the elections, President Rhee cautioned the ROK voters about electing "candidates who are spending much money" in their campaigns, as they "will undoubtedly try to recoup their outlay at the expense of the public." The ROK President also warned that "professional politicans," if elected, would expand their powers but that women candidates should not be discriminated against.
A North Korean propaganda broadcast of 24 April charged the US with using poison gas shells against Communist troops 33 times between 27 February and 9 April. Radio Pyongyang warned the people of North Korea on 25 April that as a result of alleged US germ warfare in the past, an "outbreak of vicious epidemics" is pos sible in the near future.

Propaganda
2
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OCI 4908 28 April 1952

I.
Military Operations
Arm
Patrol contacts and scattered enemy probes were reported across the Fdghth Army front.
Air and surface units attacked enemy supply points and communications on both coasts.
FEAF planes flew 1,028 sorties, of which.657.were combat. Of the 20 airborne MIG-15'5 observed, ten were encountered but no damage was inflicted on either side. Ten medium bomber sorties wers directed against the Huichon rail bridge.
No significant reports have been received during the past 24 hours

III.
General Situation
ROK Foreign Minister Pyon on 25 April issued a statement claiming that japan has "unilaterally" broken off the current Korean-Japanese neotiations. The South Korean official charged that the Japanese negotiators' claims to private property in Korea -- a major issue in deadlocking the continuing ta/ke was the factor causing discontinuance. Pyon added, however, that "we have not given up hope for introspection and reconsideration on the part of Japan." (japan has Noeposed, possibly as a bargaining maneuver, that the talks be broken off. There is no confirmation, however, that the talks actually have been suspended.)
In a proraganda broadcast on 26 April, Radio Peiping c

Air
Political Trace Talks
Lisa
rged the US with
SIMET
THE C.I.A. HAS NO OBJECTION TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OF THIS DOCUMZNT.
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"destroying the basis of negotiations in the executive sessions" by "holding back large numbers of Korean and Chinese prisoners." Peiping quoted a Communist negotiator to the effect that "we are still willing to continue to negotiate a settlement in the hope:of achieving an armistice." The "'ole reasonable basis for solution to the PW problem" was said to lie in the earlier demand that between 116,000132,000 Communist prisoners be returned.

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I.
Military Operations
Army
Patrol clashes and scattered light enemy probes were reported across the US Eighth Army front,
coasts.
Limited by weather, Far East Air Force planes flew only 205 sorties, of which 84 were combat. No sightings of enemy aircraft were reported,
II.
A North Korean, captured off northeastern Korea and interrogated by the US Navy, stated that the ammunition supply at one coastal artillery installation was 40 rounds per gun. He added that the unit was under orders to conserve ammunition for "anti-invasion use" and had refused daily requests to fire on UN naval vessels in the area (While fragmentary, this statement indicates the continued fear of another successful UN amphibious operation.)
III.
General Situation
The American special economic mission to South Korea met on 24 April with the ROK Finance and Foreign Ministers to present the US position on the settlement of "won" advances to US forces. Clarence E. Meyer, chief of the US mission, stated that current arrangements for won advances and aid supplies "will provide ample financial means to cope with the inflation." (The South Koreans have placed most of the blame for inflation on the UN's failure to make current payments for the won as it is used.) SECRET Security Information
THE C.I.A. HAS NO OBJECTION TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OF THIS DOCUMENT.
0

Air
Navy
lian
Economic
5 JUL
1978
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OCI 4910 30 April 1952

I.
Military Operations
Army
Scattered light enemy probes were encountered across the US Eighth Army UN forces maintained positions and patrolled.
front,
'
Air and surface units attacked enemy supplies sad communications on both
coasts.
Aircraft of the Far East Air Force, hampered by overcast along the northwest coast, flew 451 sorties, of which 202 were combat. No sightings of enemy aircraft were reported.
III,
General Situation

Navy Air
No.
THE C.I.A. HAS NO OBJECTION TO THE DEOLASSIFICATION OF
THIS DOCUMENT.
5 JI11- 197g
O41-3
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OCI 4911 1 May 1952

I.
Military Operations
hoz
The US Eighth Army reported scattered patrol contacts and three enemy probes of platoon size.

Nan
Air
Manpower
Surface units bombarded coastal communication and supply points. of naval air units were not received.
Reports
A total of 112 enemy jets was observed in northwest Korea, of which 51 Six 1'IG-15's were encountered in eight engagements by F-86,s, F-80,s, and F9F,s. ere destroyed and three MIG's and two Type-15,s were damaged. One F-80 vas lost and an F-86 and F9F received major damage. FEAF aircraft flew a total of 922 sorties, of which 545 were combat,
II.
Recent prisoner of war interrogations indicate that many ex-ROK soldiers, upon completion of Communist training and indoctrination, are again being assigned to frontline Communist units. Far East Command believes that this may be attributed to the critical shortage of trained manpower in the North Korean ArmY.
III.
General Situation
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OCI 4912 2 May 1952

I.
Military Operations
Ame
Scattered light enemy probes were reported across the US Eighth Army front.
coasts.
Planes of the Far East Air Force flew 1,292 sorties, of which 820 were
combat. In counter air action, 12 MIG-15ts were engaged and one was damaged. Friendly aircraft suffered no casualties.
In the afternoon of 30 April, four US F-86 jet pilnts, flying at 30,000 feet along the Yalu River, observed an estimated 500 enemy aircraft on airfields in the Yalu River complex. The Coimunist aircraft reportedly occupied all major revetment and taxiway space, with 100 at Takushan, 150 at Tatungkuo, and 250 at Antung. Visibility during the ten-minute sighting was reportedly good and the US lead pilot used binoculars.
The Far East Air Force, while noting that such a concentration is possible, believes that the sighting might have been too high by as much as 100 planes. FEAF carries 350 Communist MIG-15ts as based on airfields in the Yalu River complex.
III,
General Situation
Foreign Relations
The coming into force of the Japanese peace treaty has evoked "apprehensive commentn in South Korean newspapers the past week; most editorials have stated that
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Japan is not yet democratic and is still fundamentally imperialistic. The press has also "warned" Japan not to try to recover its former position in Asia. It hopes that instead Japan will play an assigned role in rearming for defense against communism. Political President Rheels campaign to discredit his opposition in the ROK National Assembly received an unexpected boost on 24 April when So Ninhe, a leading member of the opposition, shot and killed a ROK Army captain in a fracas. American observers note that varying accounts of the incident are receiving wide circulation and that Rhee may seize on the case as an illustration of his thesis that Assembly men are a "little group of willful men who consider themselves above the law."

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OCI 4913 3 May 1952

I.
Military Operations
REY
There were scattered patrol clashes all along the front and four minor probes in the US X and ROK I and II Corps zones, but the enemy forces withdrew
in each case
Air and snrface craft bombarded enemy supply and communications faciliThree F-9Fts were lost, with two of the pilots recovered and the third presumed killed in action.
ties.
FEAF aircraft flew 869 sortie4, of which 472 were combat, There were 13 medium bomber missions, nine against the Kogugyong-dong railroad bridge. Eight MIG-15ts were observed and all were engaged, with claims of one probably destroyed.
NO significant reports have been received during the past 24 hours.
General Situation
According to a 30 April radio broadcast the Mongolian People arrived in North Korea on brought 24 carloads of "May Day gifts" to the second delegation from Mongolia to visit North arrived in late December 1951 and toured North
The US Army Attache in Korea reports that famine conditions exist in certain northern areas of the ROK province of North Kyongsang. This situation,

Navy
Mr
Political
fromPyongyang, a delegation from 28 April. The Mongols reportedly North Kwean people. (This is the Korea in_1952. A previous group Korea during January 1952.)
Econondc
7,41
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caused by last fall's crop failure in the effected area, has not as yet been remedied by increasing the UN Civil Assistance Comnrind and other welfare efforts.
The total number of registered refugees in South Korea numbered as of 15 April 10,464,491, according to the ROK Social Affairs 'Ministry, or about half the population of South Korea. Of this number, over 618 thousand are refugees from North Korea. Those who are suffering from "living difficulties" total 4,367,472.

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'CCI 4914
5 May 1952

I.
Military Operations
Army
Scattered light enemy probes and patrol clashes were reported across the US Eighth Army front.
Air and surface units attacked enemy supplies and Communications on both
coasts.
In six encounters, FEAF aircraft destroyed four M1G-15,s, one YAK-3, and one IL-2, and probably destroyed another NIG-15. Friendly aircraft suffered no damage. Total FEAF sorties were 715, of which 458 were combat.
The ROK Government on 30 April vetoed a National Assembly Bill providing for legal guarantees against political intimidation on the grounds that the "sweeping" provisions of the bill would foster subversive activities and would make the maintenance of law and order difficult. At the same time, a provision in another law calling for the President to fill any vacancy in the Prime Minister's post within ten days was rejected by the executive.
US observers in Korea comment that these Actions by Rhee can only further increase friction between the executive and the legislature. Regardless of whether the Assembly overrides these vetoes, the legislature has made its point that Rhee is not protecting the political freedoms guaranteed in the constitution and does not intend to abandon hie practice of appointing "acting" Prime Ministers thus avoiding Assembly approval.
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OCI 4915 6 Mhy 1952

I.
Military Operations
Arm
Ground action was characterized by light enemy probes and minor patrol clashes.
Navy
Air and surface craft bombarded enemy supply and communications facilities.
Air
Six MIG-151s were encountered by three F-861s and one MIG was damaged. Aircraft of the Far East Air Force flew 1,160 sorties, 751 of them combat. The 13 medium bomber missions included an attack by eight aircraft or the Nuichon railroad bridge. Military Intelligence
The Far East Command is decreasing the estimated daily non-battle casualty rate of the enemy as of 6 May to one casualty per 3,000 troops, because of the armistice negotiations and the resultant relatively static situation. As the enemy has had an opportunity to supply troops with more suitable clothing, heated bunkers, and larger amounts of food and entertainment to discourage desertions, the former ratio of one casualty to 1,000 troops is now "unrealistic." Intelligence sources, prisoner-of-war reports and captured enemy documents justify this latest computation, according to FECOM, and indicate that the enemy forces are entirely capable of replacing the number of non-battle casualties suffered each month,
On 5 May in the late afternoon American F-86 pilots sighted 315 swept-wing aircraft on the three Communist airfields in the Yalu River complex, (The Far East Air Force has estimated that up to 350 MIG-15/s are based on these fields.)
III.
General Situation
Political
Radio Pusan announced today that the ROK National Assembly has approved the appointment of Chang Tak-sang as Prime Minister by a 95 to 81 vote. (Chang, one of the few men acceptable to both the Assembly and Rhee is, according to US Ambassador Mucciq an 'xitelligent, ambitious opportunist. THEC.T.A.HASNOO7TECTION

Army Air
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SECRET Security Information OCI 6000 7 May 1952

I.
Military Operations
1ZME
Scattered enemy platoon-size probes and patrol contacts were reported across the US Eighth Army front.
Air and surface units attacked enemy coastal routes.
combat,
Aircraft of the Far East Air Force flew 1,238 sorties, of which 848 were Tiro HIG-15,s were encountered with no damage to either side. Military Intelligence
From 1 Jay 1951 to the present, the Communists have lost 319 aircraft in combat, according to a Far East Command estimate. Another 49 were probably destroyed and 444 were dsmaged. Communist non-cambat losses are estimated at 69 aircraft wrecked and 47 seriously damaged. The great bulk of these losses have occurred among jet fighters.
III.
General Situation
The destruction of irrigation facilities and the devastation of forest3 are two major problems confronting the North Koreans, according to a Radio Byongyang broadcast of 3 May. In view of the depleted forests, the broadcast stated, committees for floods and wind damage must be organized and "tree-planting must be launched throughout the country." As for irrigation, the Communist regime urges the farmers to secure and repair water pumps and other irrigation equipment and "replace all motors operated by oil with those operated by charcoal." (Reported)y. the only well-irrigated paddies in North Korea are in the Chaeryongbasin southwest of Byongyang, the other cultivated areas being dependent solely on the sumer rainy season. The curtailment of oil pointe up the civilian shortage of this commodity; the bulk of POL supplies goes to the armed forces.) SECRET Security Information
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Air
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'SECRET Security Information.
'
OCI 6001 8 May 1952

I.
Military Operations
ArmY
Patrol clashes and enemy probes up to company strength were reported across the US Eighth Army front.
The US Destroyer OWENS received six hits from enemy shore batteries at Songjin. The ship reported six personnel casualties and considerable damage.
FEAF aircraft flew 983 sorties, of which 646 were combat. Four Australian Meteors engaged two 11I0-151s south of Pyongyang and claimed one MIG destroyed. An Australian Meteor received minor damage. Two Navy Banshees engaged eight MIG's at an unreported location with no damage to either side.
In the special meeting of the UN economic mission with ROK ministers on 3 May, South Korean Finance Minister Peek stalemated the negotiations by stating that South Korea "must control" foreign exchange accruing from the recentlyconcluded US-ROK tungsten agreement. (The tungsten contract was formally signed some weeks ago. It expressly stipulated that the resulting'foreign exchange was subject to US control. The draft of the current economic negotiations, however, provides that -- subsequent to the effective date of the draft -- any future foreign exchange accruing from ROK exports will be contrerolled::::1

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OCI 6002
9 May 1952

I.
Military Operations
itaz
There were several small enemy probes, particularly in the US I Corps zone in the west, where the enemy again evidenced sensitivity to UN observation.
Air and surface craft attacked enemy communications on both coasts; one Corsair was lost.
UN land-based aircraft flew 1,240 sorties including 871 combat. Nineteen medium bombers attacked targets which included Kwaksan railroad bridge and Sariwon airfield. Of 28 MIG-15!s observed 19 were engaged, with claims of two destroyed and one damaged against one Australian Meteor damaged.
General Situation
The US Army Attache in Korea reports that as of 7 May the retail price of rice was 100,000 won for 20 litres. No immediate end of the price rise seems to be in sight, according to the report.
Cease-fire
US military observers in Korea report that officers of the ROK Army generally feel that the war should be actively continued.

man
Economic
No.
eof
THE C.I.A. HAS NO OBJECTION TO TH7 DECLASSIFICATION OF THISDOCUMENT. 0 5
Jut 1C2.8
Te
ApprovedForRejszse2001/08/09:CIA4RDP91T01172229200100001-9 SECRET Security Information OCI 6003 10 Mey 1952

I.
Military Operations
Lrmr
The enemy made scattered probing attacks up to company strength along the Eighth Army front. A friendly tank patrol met with battalion strength resis tance and artillery and antitank fire in the western sector.
coasts.
Air and surface units raided enemy 'supplies and communications on both
FEAF aircraft flew 797 sorties, of which 480 were combat. Of 28 swig' aircraft observed, eight were encountered. One MIG15 was damaged.
The Far East Command, in its latest estimate of Communist armored strength in Korea, reports that while the table of equipment 'of enemy units in Korea calls for a total of 443 tanks and 160 selfpropelled artillery pieces, the enemy now has only 384 tanks and 134 selfpropelled guns.
The bulk of this armor is to be found in A Worth Korean tank division, a mechanized division, four mechanized artillery brigades, and in organic North Korean corps artillery. The Chinese Communists have 160 tanks and 16 self propelled guns in their two armored divisions.

Armor SECRET Security Information
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TO TIT''71.7:11FICATION OF THISDOCUMENT.
No.
941 *7n OITEOTION

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General Situation Pol4tical
The National Assembly on 8 May elected Kim Donsong, an antiathee member of the Assembly Liberal Party, as Vice Chairman to fill the vacancy left by the new Prime Minister. The election of Kim demonstrates the continuing strength of the antiRhee forces in the Assembly.
The ROK, according to the US Embassy, still insists that further JapaneseSouth Korean negotiations are futile as long as the Japanese persist in their property claims in Korea. The South Korean Government is reportedly lann an intensive propaganda campaign for june denouncing Japanese claims.
25X6

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DAILY KOREAN DULLETIN

I.
Military Operations Ground
Enemy night probes against ROK forces on the western and central fronts and scattered patrol activity marked the ground action on 11 May. Navy UN naval air and surface units bombarded communications and supplies on the east and west coasts.
UN aircraft flew 1168 sorties of which 700 were combat. encountered, four NIG-15's mere reported damaged.

Air
Political
0 5
.
Of the enemy planes
II.

III,
General Situation
South Korean press and official reaction to the recint UN Command "package', proposal was one of grateful and fervent support for the United Nations stand on 'prisoners of war, although the attitude on the airfield issue is viewed as a major throat to ROK security. Almost complete silence on the part of ROK officialdom followed Rhea's 14 April statement opposing any armistice which failed to insure the unification of Korea, Ambassador Muccio comments that this is in notable contrast to earlier vigorous denunciations by officials, newspapers and contrived mass meetings which reached a peak of intensity last December,
THE C.I.A. HASNOOBJECTION' TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OF THIS DOCUMENT.

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COI 6005
13 1147 1952

I.
Military Operations
UN naval air and surface units continued to harass enemy lines of comflunications and supply and troop installations on both the east and west coasts.
UN land-based aircraft flew 1,031 sorties including 664 combat. Medium bombers attaeked an important railway bridge in northwestern Korea. Twenty-two NIC-15's were observed or encountered during the period with no damage suffered by either side,
U.
ROK naval interrogation of recently captured North Korean prisoners reveals that 5 boat builders north of Songjin in northeastern Korea have been busy since mid-March building wooden boats to be used in another attempt to capture the UNheld island of Yang-do. CA determined effort by the North Koreans on 20 February to capture Yang-do ended in disaster for the ene uni northeramost UN-held island

Air
Minor probes by small enemy groups across the front again characterized the day's ground action. Heavy enemy mortar fire was received by UN forces in the west, while in the east the Communists continued to make front-line propaganda broadcasts.
25X6
Air
UN F-86 pilots, on patrol along the Yalu River on 12 May, observed 3E0 swept wing aircraft on Tatungkou and Antung airfields between 1000 and 1100 hours.
31
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III,
General Situation
Political
Radio Pyongyang broadcast on 8 May that a new guerrilla organization, known as the "Country-saving Fighting League," has been formed in South Korea to include "patriots in all walks of life against the American and Japanese imperialists and national traitors," The same broadcast, attempting to play upon traditional Korean hatred for Japan, describes the entry of 10,000 Japanese police reserves into the Korean war as a part of a scheme to prepare a South Korean-Japanese military alliance,
Radio Pyongyang on 7 May again accused the UN of using poison gas-shells on 22 and 25 April.
In the combat area, enemy front-line propaganda loudspeaker broadcasts on 11 May stated that "the Chinese Communist and the North Korean.Army will launch a 6th Phase Offensive if the peace talks fail." On the east coast, ROK units on 11 May received leaflet-bearing mortar fire. The leaflets atated that "200 Japanese officers were dispatched to Korea by order of the National Defense of the UN," a theme also noted in a previous Radio pyongyang broadcast,

Propaganda

2
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OCI. 6005
14 May 1952

I.
Military Operations
AEDZ
The enemy demonstrated his sensitivity in western Korea by attempting to eliminate certain UN ground observation posts. On the central front a UN tankinfantry patrol was heavily engaged for an hour by an enemy unit employing recoiless rifle and mortar fire.
UN naval air and surface units attacked enemy lines of communications and industrial installations on the North Korean east and west coasts. Air
UN land-based aircraft flew 1,244 sorties, of which 801 were combat, Medium bombers attacked an enemy bridge in northeastern Korea, while UN jet fighters observed or encountered 116 MIG-151s in northwestern Korea. Five of the enemy jets were destroyed with only one UN F-86 damaged.
25X1C
The North Korean "divisions frequently reported training in Manchuria arrived in North
inese ommunis s officers ques e a e new arrive visions be assigned to the front to support Chinese Communist troops, but the North Koreans intend to use the new units as the nuclei for "three additional North Korean corps." (The current training of North Korean troops in Manchuria has been consistently reported from different sources, but no firm confirmation has ever been received. Although there is n;.: evidence to support the arrival of these new units in Korea, it is entirely possible that replacements and perhaps specialized Korean units , armw or artillery, have been training in Manchuria and that they began entering Korea in April.)

AEME
25X1C
Air
On 11 May a US naval patrol plane was attacked by MICIs in the Korean Bay about 90 miles from Dairen and the same distance from lihe Shantung coast.
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No serious damage was reported. (This interception is a further indication of the effectiveness of the Communists' early warning and air defense system in areas near Dairen and the Shantung coast.)
III.
General Situation
25X1C 25X1C
Economic
25X1C
The US Economic Mission conveyed a four-point proposal to ROK officials on.12 May in an attempt to reach agreement on various economic issues. The proposal stipulates leaving the won-dollar conversion rate at 6,000 to 1, paying up all back drawings for the US soldiers' pocket money, paying $3 million per month as partial settlement of UN won drawings, and arriving at "specifio figures" for won drawings for the period commencing 1 January 1952.
Finance Minister Pea, after reckoning the total sum to be available to South Korea, commented that it was "not much money."

2
April l92 the North Korean Government was "obliged" to ip undamaged p].ant equipment from industrial installations in Hamhung, Songjin and Kyomi o in payment for Soviet equipment. During the period February to April, shipments from the USSR to North Korea, presumably of war ma er 6 , were not regular, (During the cease-fire negotiations the North Korean Army has been able to effect a considerable rehabilitation of its combat units, including the addition of both heavy and light equipment. While the methods of payment for this materiel have never been disclosed, it is conceivable that the export of undamaged Korean industrial equipment would be one means of reimbursing the USSR for equipment used in the conduct of war.)
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OCI 6007 15 May 1952

I.
Military Operations
Ground
UN naval air and surface craft maintained the blockade on both coasts of North Korea and attacked Communist supply line targets.
UN land based aircraft flew 599 combat sorties out of the total of 1,100 flown during the period; medium bombers attacked a railroad bridge and industrial installations in coastal eastern Korea. UN F-86 encountered or sighted 30 MIG-1513. Three of the enemy planes were downed compared to a friendly loss of one F-86.
UN air observers on 13 April observed same 200 square miles of gray emoke covering the Hoeyang area in eastern Korea about 30 miles south of Wonsan. (The enemy, in the past, has sought to conceal major daylight troop movement by the use of such smoke. However, the possibility of forest fires cannot be ruled out.)
General Situation
Economic
Chinese troops, according to a recent North Korean broadcast, are extending aid to Korean farmers by "helping them plow and sow as well as in irrigation projects." ln addition Pyongyang stated that millet and rice have been given to THE C. T.A. HAS NO OBJECTION'. TO THI: D ECLASSIFICATION OF THIS DOCUMENT .
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LT=
SIX
Ground
The enemy in western Korea again vigorously resisted attempts by the UNts lst ROK Division to maintain an observation post at Kigong. ln the central sector, a number of company-size Communist attacks made limited gains.
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.SECRET
the peasants by the Chinese. (The paucity of experienced farm labor -- the major factor accounting for poor crop yields -- has necessitated the use of Chinese as well as North Korean static military units for agricultural pursuits. Recent gifts of flour and grain from the USSR and China point lip the severe North Korean civilian food shortage.)
PronaSnda
Radio Peiping charged on 14 May that "American Military aircraft" violated the Kaesong neutral zone early that day between 0240 and 0335. The broadcast claimed that "many" flares were dropped and the zone machinegunned.

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OGI 6008 16 May 1952

I.
Military Operations
AEMZ
Unsuccessful enemy probing efforts of platoon and company strength highlighted action across the front. The enemy repulsed friendly patrols in the central sector.
Naval air and surface units continued blockading the east and west coasts and bombarded shore installations.
Air
UN aircraft flew 1,226 sorties of which 815 were combat. Of the 29 14IG-15's encountered, three were destroyed. One UN F-86 was lost.
II.
The Far East Command, after detailed analysis of enemy documents awl prisoner of war statements, accepts the presence of an organic artillery regiment with each Chinese Communist arzy and an organic artillery battalion with each division in Korea, In both the IX and rx Army Groups, however, an artillery regiment of two artillery battalions and an antiaircraft automatic weapons battalion is organic to each division. FECOM concludes that the ultimate goal of the Chinese Communists is to have an artillery regiment organic to each infantry division. (There is no indication that this revision of srgenic Chinese Communist artillery strength will result in a further upward estimate in the number of artillery pieces available to the enemy in Korea.) Air UN F-86 pilots observed 280 swept-wing aircraft on Antung, Tatung-kou and Takushan airfields in the early morning of 15 May. Later, in the afternoon, 250 aircraft were observed on Tatung-kou airfield alone.
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ito

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General Situation
POlitical "Bureaucratic tendencies among officials, corruption and embezzlement," residues of Japanese suzerainty, are still to be seen in North Korea, according to a 13 May broadcast from Pyongyang. An indoctrination campaign is, therefore, to be "launched vigorously," using every available means for political education and cultural training of the working masses. Those who eMbezzle, fail to abide by discipline, waste State property and are tardy in reporting for duty will be dealt with "mercilessly." (The North Korean Government earlier this week announced the formulation of a State Inspection Committee, presumably to tighten up the regime's control. The new committee will inspect and control activities in government installations as well as private enterprises.)

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SECRET
OCI 6009
17 May 1952

I.
Military Operations
Ground
Scattered minor enemy probes and patrol contacts occurred along the front during the past 24 hours. The US 187th Airborne Infantry Regiment was relieved from its Japan assignment and began movement to the UN 2nd Logistical Command, which is also charged with the security of the prisoner of war compounds.
UN naval air and surface craft harassed enemy lines of communications and supply installations.
Land-based aircraft under Far East Air Force control flew 1,067 sorties, 644 of which were combat. Medium bombers attacked an important railway bridge in northwestern Korea. Although no MIG-15's'were encountered, UN F-86's patrolling in the Yalu River area observed the constant movement of aircraft from and to Communist airfields in Manchuria. At orm time 205 swept-wing aircraft were on the three fields near Antung.
I/.

Air
Ground
25X1C
25X1C
nk
The North Korean Army on 27 April had 450 "tanks," most of them in the 10 th 1 th Mechanized Divisions in western and west-central Korea, These eement on supply
25X1C
25X1C
"mass shipments of machinery and e USSR to pay for these tanks. (FECOM scrap om ortb Korea nave been ma has estimated that the enemy, including the Chinese, have only 384 tanks in North How Korea, although their armored tables of organization provide for 443 tanks. the North Koreans and the Chinese receive and pay for equipment from the USSR is unknown.)
(1-1
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1979
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III.
General Situation
Cease-fire
An American Red Cross representative now in Korea reports that ROK personnel detailed for handling the anticipated exchange of prisoners of war are of "high" calibre. The US Embassy comments that the above report may be indicative of future ROK tactics towards the armistice, that is, of cooperation on an operucing level while the government remains aloof.
Political
A Radio Peiping broadcast of 16 May emphasized the theme that "the latest scheme of the American aggressors for wrecking the Korean armistice negotiations" is their refusal to listen to reason at the conference table "while creating threatening provocations outside the conference tent."

Propaganda
2
Sin Hungu former South Korean diplomatic representative in Tokyo, on 13 May announced his candidacy for president of tbe ROK in the June elections. (Sin, better known as Hugh Cynn, is a controversial figure and a former long-time intimate of Rhee; he broke with the President in 1950. Reportedly a collaborator with the Japanese, he became wealthy after World War II as a contractor. Whether or not his candidacy has Rhee's approval is not known. However, he has had and may still have close connections with and support from leading native Protestant churchmen, from the Yun Chiyong clique which surrounds Rhee, and from the Hung Sa Dan, a secret bortherhood organized 30 years ago and reputedly very powerful.)
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I.
Military Operations
kona
An attack by the enemy in company strength against an ROK outpost in western Korea was the heaviest action of the period. In the east, ROK units were probed by North Korean platoon-size groups.
UN naval air and sea elements attacked enemy supply lines, troop installations and defensive positions on the Korean east and west coasts.
UN aircraft under Far East Air Force control flew 860 effective sorties, 435 of which were combat. No medium bomber miseions were flown and only 7 MIG -151s were sighted or encountered One F-86 was lost.
No significant reports have been received during the past AS hours.
III.
General Situation
On lA May the ROK Government submitted to the National Assembly a "new" proposal to amend the constitution in a manner similar to the government-sponsored bill of last January. The proposal calls for popular election of the president and vice-president, a bi-cameral legislature and confirmat: Cabinet appointees by the Lower House. Ambassador Mum::
The US Embassy in Pusan reports that the only South Korean newspaper comment .on the General Dodd incident appeared in seoul Shinmnn which stated that the UN invited the "insult" by over-indulgent treatment. The newspaper added that %he "gentlemanly attitude" of the UN will only encourage further Comunist aggression.

Li=
AIL
Political
NO.
.,.,,,"""T
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I" JO
1.
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plan may be intended to counter the Assembly's suggestion of 7 Nay calling for a Cabinet responsible to the National Assembly. The conflicting bills Will Un(Proposals doubtedly be the principal political issue during the next month. for the popular election of the president and vice-president as well as a bicameral legislature are strongly opposed by the Asseubly.) Economic
The ROK, according to the US Embassy in Pusan, plans to import 24,000 metric tons of rice from Thailand and 13,000 metric tons from Taiwan in the near future. This rice, none of which has arrived yet, is part of the 60,000 metric tons proposed import for which South Korea received US concurrence in the allocation of ROK foreign exchange.

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SECRET Security Information OGI 6011 20 May 1952

I.
Military Operations
UN patrols at several points made contact with scattered enemy patrols of platoon size probing across the entire front. All friendly divisions maintained their positions.
UN naval air and surface craft continued to maintain a blockade of both coasts, and attacked Communist supply lines.
LI
UN air activity was light. Of 621 sorties flown, 326 were combat. UN bombers attacked a road and railroad bridge south of Sunchon in northwest Korea.
II.
Mi/itary Intelligence
lnterrokation of North Korean prisoners taken in the Wonsan area reveals that the anon* is planning to attack Yodo (Island) in Wonsan harbor. Reportedly 80 sampans, each able to carry 80 men, are in the HodePando area north of Yodo and currently engaged in fishing. These vessels will mass at an undetermined location for loading immediately prior to the planned attack on Yodo. (The enemy managed to make a sucessful surprise raid on one of the UNheld islands in Wonsan bay late in 1951. The latest Communist east coast amphibious venture was the 20 February attack on Yangdo off Songjin which ended in defeat. Current indications point to a future enemy atteppt to capture both Yodo and Yrmgdo.)
General Situation
Propaganda
Press reports of 20 May state that one Communist prisoner of war was killed and 85 wounded in a new clash between POWs and the United Nattons troops guarding
OF T17C.T.A.WISNOWECTIO1

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The latest riot occurred in-a Pusan camp and broke out oVer resistance to medical attention being given the prisoners. One American guard was slightly hurt (Previous press accounts have given the impression that fanatic Communist prisoners were confined to Koje Island and that anti-Communist prisoners had been removed to the Pusan area.)
theM

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OCI 6012 21 May 1952

I.
Military Operations
-Ground Minor probes and clashes of squad and platoon strength characterized action across the front. All UN divisions maintained their positions.
UN naval aircraft and surface vessels maintained the blockade of both North Korean coasts. Air action on the east coast was limited by the weather. Air
38 MIG-15's observed, 30 were encountered. two F-86's were lost.
UN aircraft flaw 975 sorties including 601 combat missions. Of a total of Eight MICs were reported destroyed while
No significant reports have been received during the last 24 hours. General Situation
The US Embassy reports that between 1,000 and 1,500 persons attended a care fully prepared mass meeting in Pusan on 19 May sponsored by vrtrious "anomalous patriotic organizations" presumably associated. with Rhee's Liberal Party, Follow ing speeches denouncing Assembly member So Minho (who, allegedly in selfdefense killed a South Korean army officer) and "Assembly men who oppose the people's wiil," .the crowd marched to the capitol grounds Heavily armed police, however, prevented where the Assembly was in session. any violence.

Nan
Political
1")
IY:fLASSIFICATIOR OF THIS DOCUMENT.
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OCI 6013 22 May 1952

I.
Military Operations
Two probing attacks by the enemy on the central and eastern fronts were repulsed by UN forces.
Naval surface units on the east coast bombarded targets in a railroad and harbor area at Chaho. Results were unobserved. Naval air units attacked enemy supply lines near the west coast.
UN aircraft flew 1,054 effective sorties, 631 of which were combat. Bombers attacked Sinhung.aong, but no significant fighter action was reported.
.
No significant reports have been received during the last 24 hours.
III.
General Situation
A recent North Korean cabinet decision, according to Radio Pyongyang, calls for the loan of food to 6,000 farmers in the Kaesong area who are "suffering from disaster." Approximately 218,700 pounds of grain and 820 gallons of seed grains have been given to the "afflicted farmers in the liberated area," it is reported. (Intelligence reports indicate that the Kaesong area has suffered acutely from food shortages, due primarily to a shortage of experienced farm laborers.)
In a 17 May broadcast, radio Pyongyang noted "partial defects" in the anti epidemic campaign being waged in North Korea against the "germ atrocities of the eneMY." The coming of summer, the broadcast notes, will intensify/pen faults as

ga
Economic
Propaganda
CIS THE C.I.A. HAS NO 09JECTION TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OF THIS DOCUMENT.

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issuance of certificates of disinfection at random and failure to boil water end to sweep out dwellings. The listeners are exhorted that "hatred of the enemy scheme (BW campaign) should be aroused." (A third summer under conditions of modern war will make hardhit North Korea particularly vulnerable to summer diseases such as typhoid and cholera.)
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OCI 6014 23 May 1952

I.
Military Operations
hoz
Company and platoon size probes against ROK units in the west highlighted enemy action. On the rest of the front only scattered probes and patrol clashes occurred.
US naval surface units maintained the blockade of both North Korean coasts. Air units continued to interdict enemy supply installations. Air
UN aircraft flew 1,120 sorties including 758 combat, but no significant fighter action was reported. Ten bombers attacked railroad installations north of Sunchon.
II.
The Far East Command reported on 22 May that as of 17 May the North Korean and Chinese Commmnist armies in Korea had suffered 1,608,988 casualties. These include 480,170 killed, 995,186 wounded and nonbattle casualties, and 133,632 prisoners of war.
General Situation
Political

hEEZ
25X1C
ti
legislative riots similar to the 19 May riot against Assem lyman o Minho were scheduled for 23 May by the ROK government. It is believed that Ho Chong and 0 Wiyong, prominent antiRhee assemblymen, will be singled out for "assassination." (No riots are reported to have occurred on 23 May. It is possible however, that President Rhee gave at least tacit consent to the 19 riot and Will be iigormed of future antiAssembly disturbances before they occur. 13,-3C.T.A.HASCOOBJ cTioN TO T32 D3CLASSIFICATION SECRET OF THIS DOCUMENT. Security Information
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Propaganda
Radio Peiping maintained its standard attack against the UN's prisonerof war stand in two 22 Nay broadcasts, but also devoted considerable time to personal attacks on Admiral Joy. One broadcast predicted that "Harrison, the twostar general who stepped into Joy's shoes today, may yet write one of the darkest chapters of the armistice negotiations."

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OCI 6015 24 May 1952

I.
Military Operations
ADM
An enemy platoon-sized probe four miles southeast of Yuusil, which was repulsed by elements of the 8th ROK Division, high lighted action across the front. Elsewhere scattered patrol skirmishes were reported.
UN naval air sortiee totaled 246. Surface units continued to blockade and bombard both the east and west coasts.
During the period, UN aircraft flew 1012 sorties, of which 650 were combat. No enemy fighters were encountered.
II.
The Far East Command reported on 23 May that the 60th Chinese Communist Army appears to have made a southeasterly deployment to positions in the rear of the 15th Chinese Communist Army. The 60th was formerly located northeast of Singye, in western Korea. (The proximity of the 60th to the battle line of the 15th suggests that another relief may soon take place. It is to be noted, however, that until the relief occurs, a strong offensive potential will exist in the central sector near Fyonggang.)
25X6
III.
General Situation

Air
Ground
Navy
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Security Intonation
Economic
The index of all retail ccumodity prices in Pusan rose only two percent during the week ending 10 May, according to US observers in Korea. The retail price of rice, however, rose ten percent during the period making a total rise (Increased supplies of consumer goods for of 186 percent since 1 January. resale and frequent ROK governmental measures have been largely ineffectual in controlling the rice price, which in turn influences all other retail prices. The scarcity of rice supplies is the main factor causing the price increase; this is compounded by hoarding, black market activities, and inadequate facilities for distribution.)

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I.
Military Operations
An
An estimated two companies of enemy troops, supported by a 35-minute artillery barrage, attacked UN positions in the vicinity of Mhbang on the western front. US units maintained their positions. Elsewhere only minor patrol actions were reported.
US naval surface vessels maintained the blockade of both North Korean coasts. Surface units bombarded targets in the Wonsan area. Naval aircraft continued to interdict enemy supply installations.
UN aircraft flew 1108 sorties including 673 combat missions. During the period 37 MIG-10, were engaged by US 5th Air Force fighters. Four MIG-15b were destroyed while one was damaged. No friendly airplanes were destroyed.
II,
On 24 May the ROK Defense Minister announced that emergency martial law will be re-instituted in various areas of North and South Cholla and South Ayongsang provinces. Martial law had been previously lifted to create and maintain a free atmosphere during the recent local elections. The South Korean official stated, however, that "the Communist remnants, taking advantage of the withdrawal of martial law, are active in some areas." (Since the termination of Operation Ratkiller on 14 March, there have been indications that the Communists are attempting to rebuild their guerrilla forces in South Korea.)

Ian
Air
Guerrilla ActivitY SECRET Security Information
No.
LE1
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JUL 1978
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General Situation
Politica],
Radio Pusan announced on 24 Nay that It Bumsuk has been appointed Minister of Home Affairs succeeding "Montana" Chang Sukrun, who was "released from his duties at his own request." (Rhee had reportedly become provoked over Chang's actions in unduly antagonizing members of the National Assembly. /11 a metber of the "palace g.uard" and vice-chairman of the President's Liberal Party, is currently Rhea's favorite protege.)

Ambassador Muccio reports that National Assembly members questioned the Prime Minister and two other cabinet members on 23 May in conneotion with the recent anti-Assembly demonstrations, the latest of which was in progress at the time. The Ambassador comments that the opposition members are definitely apprehensive both as to their personal safety and the fate of constitutional government in the ROK. The ugly aspects of the current demonstrations against the Assetbly metbers are the principal reasons for their reported decision to hold the presidential elections within tWo weeks.
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I.
Military Operations
Ara
Except for probing attempts by enemy platoons against the lst ROK Division on the western front, ground action was characterized by patrol clashes. On the eastern front heavy enemy artillery firing continued.
Naval air units destroyed freight cars, gasoline dumps and a railroad bridge at Wonsan. Surface vessels maintained the blockade of both coasts.
Air
During the past 24 hours UN aircraft flew 980 sorties which included 87 reconnaissance and 619 combat missions. Ten UN bombers again attacked the railroad bridge at Sinhong-dong. Two MIG-15,s were engaged. One MIG15 was destroyed without friendly damage).
The Far East Command reports the 25X1X southward movement of large numbers of Chinese Communist troops along the coastal route of northeast Korea. These troops, armed with the latest weapons, move at night. Naval pilots report the southward movement of "hundreds.of oxcarts" in the vicinity of Hungnam. FECOM comments that no Chinese Communist units are currently accepted in northeast Korea nor have there been any reports of their presence there in great numbers. (These reports, if true, would suggest that additional Chinese troops are being moved into Korea from Manchuria by the circuitous northeastern route in order to.avoid 5th Air Force harassment.)

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SWRET
Security 11formation
General Situation
Propaganda
Soviet, Chinese, Hungarian, Mongolian and North Korean delegates to a "Coordinating Conference for Victory over the Anglo-American Imperialist Invasion of Korea" convened on 4 Nay at the North Korean Foreign Office building, according to information provided by a secretly anti-Comaunist North Korean. While no immediate program was adopted, the conference decided to establish committees to investigate purported UN war crimes and atrocities. The conference allegedly was called under Soviet inetructions in order to propaganda material for suven.1 Communist-sponsored peace conventionsprepare this summer.
The US EMbassy reports that since early on 25 May, President Rhee has taken a series of high-handed actions towards the political opposition. Four Assemblymen have been arrested and 15 or 16 other opposition members are in hiding. The imposition of martial law by the ROK Military Police has been used as an excuse for this action. Some 44 Assemblymen were held incommunicado by the Military Police on 26 May. The recently appointed Prime Minister, Chang, finding his telephone wires cut and himself under virtual arrest, has resigned. Tho UN Commission for Unification and Rehabilitation in Korea called on Rhee on 26 May and expressed a sense of shock at this series of events. The President was unimpressed. The US EMbassy is under the impression that the President is operating on the assumption that the UN and the United States will not intervene and will sit by and watch the demise of democratic government in Korea.

Political
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WI 6018
28 May 1952

Military Operations
UN forces captured a hill position on the extreme western end of the front after a three-hour engagement with the enemy. Action along the remainder of the front was characterized by enemy platoon-size probings and artillery shelling.
Navy
Naval surface units attacked enemy supply installations, including billeting areas near the mouth cf the Yalu
UN aircraft flew 723 sorties including 77 reconnaissance and 401 combat missions. Only two airborne MIG-15fs were observed during the period. One 11IG-15 was destroyed. No significant bombing operations were reported.
II.
The Far East Command on 27 May estimated that the eaemy c,.s a total of 1,115 aircraft 2assed in Manchuria and that this overwhelming saperiority gives him a major offensive capability. The home bares of UN F-86,s, as well as the headquarters of both our ground and air forces in Korea, are well Tritbin the combat radius of the 350 jet and 95 piston fighters based at Antung, Tatungkou, Takushan and Sinuiju. Only a few miles farther inland on the Anshan-Mukden airfields, 30 light bombers, 240 jet and 85 piston fighters are in position to provide support as well as additional shock power for a striking force.
Although there are no indications of an impending air offensive, that the Communists have sufficient aircraft, personnel, air facilities FECOM notes and logistic support to launch an offensive without warning in which UN planes, crowded on Kimpo and Suwon airficks, wad quite possibly sustain more than 50 percent destruction from the initial attack. Such losses would necessitate forfeiture of offensive aerial superiority in favor of defense tactics.

Air
Air
SECRET Security Informrtion
TH7 C. T.A. HAS NO ontrEcnoti TO TH7 inCIASSIFICATION OF THIS DOCUMENT.
No9 5 JUL 1978
Approved Force lease 2001108/09 : CIA-RDP91T0117C20200100001-9 General Situatior

Political
During the course of a call paid to President Rhee by General Van Fleet and US Charge Lightner, the South Korean chief executive indicated that ROK Army Chief of Staff Lee is being removed for implication in the "plot" against Rhee.
In reply to Lightner's comments that the world would view present develop ments in Pusan as drastic police measures designed to prevent the legislature from proceeding, Rhee stated that "gangsters" had obtained control of the Assembly. The President claimed, however, that within two months a duly elected National Assembly could be operative since the principal traitors in the Assembly would be put out of the way and their places taken by true representatives of the people.
The EMbassy comments that while Rhee no doubt has a large popular following, most of the potential leadership of South Korea such as the intellectuals, businessmen, an increasing number of government officials and army officers would welcome a change. Few are willing to take a positive stand under present cir cumstances. Rhee is determined to get rid of his enemies at all costs. The EMbassy believes that further informal representations will be ineffective and stronger action seems required.

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CCI 6019 29 Nay 1952

I.
Military Operations
Amiz
UN patrols and raiding parties on the western front encountered stubborn resistance and heavy mortar fire before forcing the enemy into a local withdrawal. Enemy patrols were active on the eastern front.

EaS
Air
Political
Naval surface units maintained the blockade of both coasts. tion of supply routes by naval aircraft was also continued.
The interdic
Of a total Of 830 sorties flown by UN forces during the period there were 72 reconnaissance and 456 combat missions. Preliminary reports indicate that three 1IG-151a were destroyed.
II.
III.
General Situation
The UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea on the Noting evening of 28 May delivered a statement of its views to President Rhee. that the National Assembly had voted, in accordance with Constitutional provision, for the lifting of martial law, UNCURK recommended an end to the emergency state in Pusan and the release of all arrested Assemblymen. (The Assembly voted 96 to 3 on 28 May for the rescinding of martial law. Rhee, however, has so far ignored the vote.) The local news blackout on the South Korean political situation ended on 28 May as most Pusan newspapers not directly affiliated with the government carried accounts of the arrest of Assemblymen. Most accounts were reasonably con, plete but cautiously worded as the press and radio continued to be subject to government censorship.
SECRET Security Information 1
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TO THE DECLAS.7IFICATION OF THIS DOCUMENT.
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OCI 6020 31 May 1952

I.
Military Operations
Probing action by enemy patrols of up to company size constituted the ground activity across the front for the last 48 hours. Friendly divisions maintained their positions.
UN air and naval craft maintained blocksde actton on both coasts.

Air
On 29 May UN aircraft flew 768 missions, including 424 combat flights. No MIG's were encountered. On 30 May, UN aircraft flew 388 effective sorties including 112 combat and 227 transport flights. and two were destroyed while one F-51 was lost. Six MI1.-15's were encountered Military Intelligence
President Rhee informed the American Charge on 30 May that martial law in the Pusan area would be lifted "shortly."
During the same conVersation, when the American official. pointed out that all the arrested assemblymen were members of Rhee's opposition, the President angrily accused the United States and UNCURK of interfering in ROK internal affairs.
Radio Pusan announced on 31 May that two more members of the National Assembly have been arrested. The number of Assemblymen noir arrested or imprisoned totals eleven.

.1112.17
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ROK Vice-president and opposition leader) Kim Songs% vas admitted as a patient aboard a US Navy hospital ship on 29 May after he issued a resounding denunciation of the Rhee regime. The US Charge comments that the American Embassy and Navy are therefore open to char es by Rhee of harboring an enem of state.

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Security Infortation OCI 6021 2 June 1952

Operations
THE C.I.A. HAS Mr, r'"7"1"T.AM TO THE DEC '..A THIS DOCUMENT.
53-
At=
front.
No12LjuLisia___, 0 7/.$
Enemy platoon size patrols continued their probing action across the entire All friendly units in contact maintained their positions.
coasts.
UN sir and surface naval units maintained the blockade of both Korean
UN aircraft flew 751 effective sorties during the last 24 hours, of which 397 were combat missions. No MIG-15's were reported as encountered or destroyed.
several Chinese Communist soldiers of the 65th ArMl 5 a wii.t and the 64th Army are soon to be replaced in Korea by mewer-trained Chinese armies." (These two armies have been in aotion since the .Chinese entered Korea.)
General Situation
The American Charge reports that some ROK officials, particularly among the military, are now not so sure that Rhee will win the current dispute. The three Chiefs of Staff are urging the Defense Minister to restore civil authority in Pusan "to get the Army out of it." Opposition leaders claim that some of .ThEheAssemblymen who supported Rhee two weeks ago have now crossed over to his opponents.
According to a Reuters dispatch from Pusan the BOK Government yesterday accused its alliei of "interfering with internal affairs" and threatened to oust all UU agencies An official ROK spokesman declared that two American organize tions and a UN agency "had interested themselves beyond their jurisdiction." The seven provincial assemblies have passed resolutions declaring that the National Assembly has lost the confidence of the nation, and that new general elections should be held as soon as possible. The assemblies also approved the establishment of martial law in Pusan and opposed interference by foreign powers in ROK internal affairs.

25X1C
Politica;
&IX
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Security Information OCI 6022 3 June 1952

I.
Military Operations
Anz
Ground action across the entire front was characterized by scattered probes by enemy and friendly troops. All UN units maintained their positions. Navy UN naval surface units attacked railroad and other supply facilities while maintaining the blockade of both Korean coasts. No naval air action was reported. Air
During the past 24 hours UN and US aircraft flew 10011 sorties of which 647 were combat missions. For the second straight day no enemy fighters were reported as encountered orchstroyed.
II.
UN pilots on 25 May observed eight unidentified aircraft, probably jet type, which appeared to be larger than the MIG fighter. Far East Air Force comments that on the basis of this and previous reports of the existence in the Far East of a Soviet fighter larger than the NIG-150 the Russians may be preparing to combat test either an improved version of the NIG or a new jet fighter.
III.
General Situation
Political
Rhee has directed Prime Minister Chang to issue an ultimatum to opposition Assemblymen that they must agree to his direct election amendment to the constitution by 3 Juno or he will dissolve the Assembly. The Prime Minister informed American officials that the opposition is standing firm against this dictation. He also stated that he would refuse to sign the document dissolving the Assembly, and expects to be fired. THE C. I. A . HAS WO OBT CTIO/f
TO EIS. TrECAS SIFICATION

Air
Mr
THISaDOCUMENT.
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American Charge Lightner, after a conversation with members of the UN Commission for the Uhification and Rehabilitation of Korea, reports that pur suit of a tentative UNCURK plan to invite President Rhee and key members of the opposition to a joint conference under its auspices would now be useless He said that the President would not be deterred from his present course hy normal dip/omatic approaches while the Assembly would accept no compromise which included Rhee in the government,

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OCI 6023 4 June 1952

I.
Military Operations
Friendly patrols on the central front were in 20 instances engaged by enemy forces of platoon strength. Enemy probing on the western front increased during the period, but no enemy action was reported from the eastern front.
Naval air and surface units maintained the blockade of both Korean coasts, attacking enemy lines of communication and supply.
UN air activity was light. During the period 338 sorties were flown including 146 Combat missions. No fighter action was reported.
Far East Command reports that the presence of elements of the 40th Chinese Communist Forces Army in the 64th COE Army area is revealed by documents taken from the body of a Chinese soldier which identified him as belonging to the 119th Division of the 40th Army. It is noted by FECOM, however, that despite "strong indications" that elements of the 119th Division are in the sector previously occupied by the 190th Division, there is at present insufficient evidence to warrant a change from currently accepted dispositions of the two armies.
III.
General Situation
Political
A press service states that Britain has joined the United States in protests to President Rhee over political developments in Pusan. In a very vaguely worded 2 June press release, Rhee notes rumors, which he credits to "anti-government factions," that "US aid will be cut out unless the wave of political fire dies down." He comments that all Koreans are determined
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not to yield their right to independence even under the ihreat of starvation. Rhea concludes that "all friendly nations" will give assistance "for the sake of righteousness rather than for the sake of certain individuals or groups,"
RrcilywEmda

Radio Pyongyang on the four days beginning 25 May broadcast the court trial of four North Korean "traitors" who committed many alleged barbarities in collusion with American imperialists during the UN occupation of North Korea. (In "proving" the blackness of Americans, the propaganda broadcast details of how 35,000 North Koreans were aKterminated in one county during the Occupation. In contrast to these American activities, Radio Pyongyang on 28 May described the efforts of a Rumanian medical team among Korean school children.)
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OCI 6024 5'June 1952

I.
Military Operations
AIME
Ground operations across the front were limited to clashes between UN and enemy patrols and minor probing actions. An unspecified number of enemy tanks were observed near Punji on the western front.
UN naval and air units continued to bombard enemy supply lines and rear installations on both coasts.
Air
Of 844 effective sorties flown by UN aircraft during the past 24 hours, 545 were combat missions. UN fighter patrols observed airborne MIG-15's in the Yalu River area. Only two of these were engaged. No 1110-15 nor friendly losses were reported.
Far East Comnand reports two new Communist airstrips under construction in the east central front area. No aircraft have been noted on either strip. There appear to be objects such as low bushes scattered over tin runways with a possible attempt at camouflage. FECOM comments that the two new strips could be used by Communist light aircraft in night intruder or heckler missions against front line poseions.
THE C.I.A. HAS
A UN F-51 pilot on 31 May, while observing two NI0-15's or Type-15's which were probably on a reconnaissance mission, stated that one of the enemy planes fired what appeared to be two rockets. Fifth Air Force comments that this is the first observation of the possible use of rockets by MIG-type aircraft in Korea, and it is possible that the Communists such planes for use in a ground attack role. are experimenting with rockets on Far East Air Force states that the Soviets have the capability of mounting such rockets on Min's and that they are fully conscious of the advantages of this type of weapon in.both an air-toair and air-to-ground role.

Mr
SECRET Security information
Ban
NLECTIOS
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III.
General Situation Cease-fire
Two North Korean prieoners of war captured during the middle of May reported that their officers are telling the troops that the armistice talks have failed because the UN persists in fighting. The US Eighth Army comments that up to now some hope of an eventual armistice had usually been expressed by Communist briefing officers, and these are the first statements of flat failure.
The Speaker of the Assembly stated on 4 June that 11 members of the Assembly are under arrest, 20 knowh to be in hiding, the 52 pro-Rhee members are under orders to boycott sessions, 83 members of the opposition are in attendance while the whereabouts of the remaining 15 is unknown. A quorum of 92 is necessary to do business and two thirds of the total number is necessary to elect the President.
(Reuters reports that the Assembly met time a quorum has been present since 2 June. on 5 June with 93 present, the first changed, since in a 4 June public statement he It may be that Rhea's tactics have threatened the Assembly with dissolution in a few days if they failed to "settle the issues.")
Radio Pyongyang announced on 3 June that the North Korean regime has decided to participate in the Olympic games in Helsinki on 8 July.

Propaganda
American Charge Lightner reports that although President Rhee backed down on his 3 June threat to dissolve the Assembly, he is achieving the same result through the maintenance of martial law the retention of the imprisoned Assemblymen, and threats of more arrests and violence to those Assaublymen who might come out of hiding to attend Assembly meetings.
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OCI 6025 6 June 1952

I.
Military Operations
Ara
There was little ground action across the Korean front. The most note worthy activity occurred on the eastern front, where the enemy repulsed a UN raiding party with heavy artillery fire.
Naval action was again marked by surface and air attacks in support of the coastal blockade of Korea, as well as hy the harassing of enemy lines of communication and supply. Air
UN aircraft flew 957 effective sorties. Combat missions comprised 582 of the total flights. For the third straight dgy the Far East Air Force failed to report any significant fighter action.
II.
III,
A recentlycaptured Chinese prisoner of war stated that a movement against rank..consciousness exists in the Chinese Communist forces. When an officer mis treats a soldier, according to the POW, the officer is punished in the same manner as violators of the "San Fan" campaign. ("San Fan" was aimed principally at corruption, waste and bureaucracy in Chinese military and civilian organiza tions. It is conceivable, therefore, that maltreatment of enlisted men by of ficers might be interpreted as military bureauctatism. EVidence is lacking, however, of widespread hostility between officers and men in the Chinese Com munist Forces.)
General Situation
Political
Charge Lightner in Pusan reports that a South Korean Government pUblicity release of 4 June was his first indication that the mass demonstrations scheduled for 7 June in Pusan had been postponed. On 3 June Rhee threatened his cabinet
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Ground
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with the demonstration and march on Pusan and told Lightner they would take
place.
The Charge comments that while the immediate reason for the delay may be the hope that the Assembly is sufficiently intimidated to submit, Rhee may also be aware of the incongruity of disorders in a city under martial law and the possibility that the UN might be forced to take action to safeguard the port. Charge Lightner reports that intimidation of the press, and not censorship, is being used as the chief Rheeyeapon to control papers and to produce copy favorable to the administration. As examples of the technique, the Charge cites the 25 May token raid by hoodlums on one paper and the arrest of the chief editor of the principal opposition daily for "passing false rumors." The editor was released shortly after a USIS officer inquired about the incident. A positive propaganda approach by the administration is seen in the variety of posters appearing throughout Pusan, attributed to the White Skeleton Society, urging dissolution of the Assembly and opposing the reliance of "traitors" on foreign intervention.
Economic development in the Republic of Korea has been at a virtual standstill during the current political turmoil, South Korean officials have made no effort to implement the recently concluded Unified Command-ROK economic agreement, and Finance Minister Peek has even intimated that financial settlements might not be made at all.
Meanwhile, the ROK has taken no positive steps to implement the tungsten agreement signed two months ago. The US Embassy comments that one of the reasons for this inaction by ROK officials is undoubtedly to embarrass the United States "for interfering in Korean internal affairs."

Economic
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4111111,
OCI 6026 7 Jane 1952

I.
Military Operations
UN surface units continued to maintain the blockade of both Korean coasts. 'Naval air sorties totaled 269.
UN aircraft under FEAF control flew 1,169 sorties, including 580 combat Missions. Seven 14I0-15'5 were destroyed and tvo damaged. No UN planet were lost.
II.
III.
Five North Kbrean "youths" in a small boat who Surrendered to a ps Navy vessel filie miles at sea claimed to be members of an underground movement fleeing from the Communists. They asserted they bad avoided conscription during the past year by hiding in the hills. ,(Previous reports:indicate that there are sone small dissident groups iu North Korea. However, rigid governmental security measures and a lack of coordination on the part of the disaffected groups seriously curtail the possible scope of their activities.)
General Situation Propaganda
Radio Pyongyang on 1 June issued a lengthy propaganda statement on the current South Korean political turmoil. Quoting liberally from various US and foreign press services, the Ccasaulist organ played up the arrest of
TH: C.I.A. HAVI NO 07 TECTION

Air
Brief probes and patrol contacts characterized the action across the front. In the western sector a company-sized UN raiding party occupied an objective and then repulsed an enemy counterattack.
Ground
TO THE DECLASSIFICATION Or THIS DOCUMENT.
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Assemblymen, the imposition of martial law, and pUblic demonstrations. The broadcast concluded that "Syngomm nee, archtraitor who must face stern judgment by the 30 million Korean people... As now throwing his phameful fate into a grave wbich he himself has dug." (This is the first known propaganda reference to the present political situation in South Korea. 2be ,Communist media are expected, however, to become increasingl y vocal on this subject.)
Political
Ambassador MUccio came away from his first visit with President Rhee since returning to Kbrea with the impression that Rhee vill continue Adamant. A leader of the opposition group in the Assembly is reported by a Nationalist Chinese news agency to have stated that no matter vbat happens, tilt present Assembly Xill not re-elect Rhee.
It now appears that the mess demonstrations originally scheduled for 7' Jim will take place within the next few days., -although the number of persons involved will be smaller than anticipated. American off icials in outlying areas report that groups are being asseMbled for the journey to Pusan. Although these groups have reportedly been ordered to aVoid violence, various forms of pressure on the Assemblymen can be expected.

EMMET
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OCI 6027
9 June 1952

I.
Military Operations
Ground
Enemy activity during the last 24 hours vas confined to scattered patrol clashes across the front, All UN divisions maintained their positions.
DN naval air and surface forces maintained the blockade of both Korean coasts and attacked enemy lines of communication.
Of 877 effective sorties flown hy UN aircraft during the period, 544 were coMbat missions. No enemy fighter action was reported.
The Far East Command accepts, as of 7 June, the relief of two frontline divisions of the 64th Chinese Communist Army by two divisions of the Chinese Communist 40th Army, The 64th Army will now be carried, location unconfirmed, behind the battle line in the vicinity of Karachon.
III.
General Situation
According to a Reuters dispatch, Preeident Rhea on 8 June issued a cam, promise proposal for settlement of the political crisis. Rhee proposed that the President be eleoted by the Assembly this year, and hy popular vote in the future. He further demanded immediate approval of his plan for a bicameral
legislature

Item
Air
AIM
Political
THE c. . A. !LAS NO OBJECTION TO TL1T DECLASSIFICATION OF THIS DOCUMENT.
No.
5 JUL. 1978
CIL,
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Propaganda
Peiping, pyongyang and Moscow radios are making increasing references to the current political strife in South Korea. The Communist organs Claim that the imposition of martial law is a result of increased guerrilla activi ties throughout South Korea,

SECRET
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SECRET Security Information OCI 6028 10 June 1952

I,
Military Operations
Aimz
A. Chinese Communist battalion launched a one hour attack against ROK positions in central Korea, while other Chinese elements, supported by nearly 19000 rounds of mortar and artillery fire, probed ITS positions in west central Korea. Brief probes and patrol clashes characterized action on the rest of the front.
UN naval air and surface craft attacked enemy lines of communications and coastal troop installations on the east and west coasts. The UN blockade was maintained.
Land based aircraft under Far East Air Force control flew 19076 sorties of which 658 were combat. Medium bombers raided an enew railroad bridge in northeastern Korea. No air-to-air combat was reported.
II,
The relief of the 12th Chinese Communist Army, previously on the,line in the central sector, by the 60th CCF Army has been accepted hy Far East Command. The relieved 12th Lill now be carried in immediate supporting distance of the front. The 12th, 15th and 60th Armies comprising the 3rd Army Group are now concentrated within a specified sector of the front. Far East Command has also accepted the forward displacement of the CCF 38th Army from the Sunchon area to the vicinity of Iehon.

LIM
gz
2ra
o
THE C. T.A. HAS NO OBJECTION' TO TiFf DECLASSIFICATION OF THISipOcUMENT.
No.
JUL 197g
013
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SECRET
/II.
General Situation
Political
The first in a series of Pusan mass meetings National Assembly and adoption of the Rhee-sponsoreddemanding dissolution of the constitutional amendments was held on 9 June. The meeting was a dismal failure, with only 400-500 persons attendingp most of wham dropped out during the march to the President's residence.
25X1C
reaction to the =URN of 7 'Tune offering the Commission ts assistance vas negative. Rhee was not interested in compromise, stating that the Assembly was "coming around" and wtuld finally agree to his amendments.
President Rhee Is
letter
Yi Para-solcp presen e er o Inte ee s execu ive in the current iMbrogliop will soon replace Stin Tae-yvng as Minister of Defense. (The moving of Yi Pow-sok into this post may be an attempt by Rhee to forestall developing anti4thee sentiment in high army circles.)
25X1C
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_Security Information OCI 6029 11 June 1952

Military Operations
In the east near Yulse, the ROK Capital Division received a company size probing attack causing the withdrawal of a ROB outpost position. Minor probes and patrols occurred along the rest of the front.
112.
UN naval surface units shelled Communist coastal installations and transportation routes along both coasts, while naval aircraft attacked similar objectives.
Air
Only 237 combat sorties were flown in the 589 effective sorties flown by UN land based aircraft. Fifteen medium bombers were scheduled for various night missions in North Korea. Ten of these attacked a railroad bridge oVer the Chongthon River undet bright moonlight conditions. Three were aggressively attacked by enemy fighters with a resultant loss of two B-29's and damage to the other UN aircraft.
II.
During the week ending 8 June, Communist M1G-15 pilots initiated only two of-the reported 16 encounters with UN Sabre jets, a marked contrait to the enemy's aggressiveness during the previous six weeks. Far East Atr Force comments that the high number of kills scored by friendly pilots on 6 June (7 MIG's destroyed) and lack of aggressiveness may indicate that a new Communist unit has entered combat.
Ta THISOOCU:r^7.:

Air
SECRET
0 5 j
For the second straight dgy the enemy aggressive3y probed UN positions in west central and east central Korea. An estimated Chinese company, supported by over 4,000 rounds of mortar and artillery fire, and by fire from armored vehicles, made minor penetrations in positions of the US 45th Division near Mabang in the west. After a two hour fight the enemy withdrew.
( " " TECnog

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III,
General Situation
25X6
Political
25X6
Ambassador MUccio reports that the National Assembly failed to achieve a quorum on 10 June, with only 89 members present. a quorum in the fut ure is doubtful. Two or mem ers are summoned illelice station every morning for questioning, while several other members have received visits from plain-clothes detectives in the last two days in an apparent intimidation attempt. Five members were unable to return to Pusan on 10 June because of "car trouble."
25X6
The US Military Attache has been informed that Col. "Snake" Kim, Chief of the South Korean Army CIC, generally considered a loyal supporter of the President, submitted information to the ROK Acting Chief of Staff on 9 June that no evidence has been uncovered to link the 12 arrested Assemblymen with a Communist plot. Kim reported that Rhee is aware of this but that a release would be difficult, since the President would have to admit the original arrests were a mistake. (This type of report seems out of character for Kim in view of his loyalties and may represent a maneuver on the part of Rhee or his underlings.)


2
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I.
Military Operations ArmY
UN surface vessels bombarded enemy installations on both the east and west coasts ofNorth Korea. Although naval air units on the east coast were not airborne, aircraft from the light carrier "Bataan" attacked west coast installations south of Pyongyang.
UN aircraft under Far East Air Force flew 977 effective sorties, of which 520 were combat. Medium bombers attacked transportation targets on the east coast. Twenty-seven Communist MIG-15is were airborne on the afternoon of 11 June. Nine were encountered with three destroyed.
One of the US B-29's lost yesterday in a night raid over northwestern Korea was apparently destroyed by hits from air-to-air rockets fired by a MIO-15. Far East Air Force observes that while there have been other reports of eneMy use of air-to-air rockets in Korea, this is the first instance where they were used by MIG-151s FEAF adds, in respect to this 10 June night encounter, that this is the first confirmed loss of a UN aircraft to enemy night fighter activity and that the attack was a "well planned, integrated effort, with seeming groundto-air and air-to-air coordination."
THE C.I.A. HAS NO ODJECTIO# TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OF THIS DOCUMENT,
Just before noon on 11 June, UN F-86 pilots observed 130 swept-wing aircraft on Antung, Tatungkuo, and Takushan airfields. Two swept-wing planes were also observed on Sinuiju airfield (not ordinarily used by enemy jets).

Navy
Action was again heavy on 11 June in the Mabang area of the west central front held by the US 45th Division. A Chinese battalion, preceded by a heavY concentration of artillery and mortar and accompanied in their attack by barrage fire, engaged US outpost positions. The enemy withdrew after a one hour fight and an artillery duel. At midnight another attack, later repelled, was launched on a 45th Division outpost. A US battalion raiding party met determined resistance southeast of Mabang early in the morning of 12 June.
Air
Air
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III.
General Situation
Propaganda
The current South Korean political crisis was exploited by Radio Moscow in a 10 June broadcast in German as showing the nature of the "antipopular character of the US terror regime in South Korea" and illustrating "the type democracy in whose name the US and British of interventionist are laying waste" Korea. (While no major theme is developed in the broadcast, this is the first noted exploitation of the ROK imbroglio by the USSR.)
According to a late press dispatch some 10,000 people gathered in Amen on 12 June to demonstrate in favor of President Rhee. the National Assembly The demonstrators claimed was both "corrupt and traitorous." ported. No violence was reSo MTh-hos, opposition National reconvened court martial trial of Assemblyman accused of the murder of Korean Army
Ambassador Muccio reports that the
a South captain, gives an EMbassy observer convicted as a symbol of Rhee's the impression that So will be on such reasons as the detention political opposition. This assumption is based of So incommunicado, the replacement of two civilian and one military the judge after the beginning of the court declaration trial and the that the jurisdictional powers of the martial law commander and the court martial are unlimited.
The Manager of the Pusan South Korean Public Information radio station was ordered by Dr. Clarence 'tree, Director, on 11 June to discontinue of America relays over the all Voice Korean Broadcasting System effective actual reason for the ban is 12 June. (The undoubtedly connected Ryee to US officials with a statement made by that the South Korean Government test to the State Department. is preparing a formal proThe note allegedly featuring press editorials will object to VOA commentary criticizing President Rhee as a "dictator.")

2
Political
AppmeciForfteste200103/09:=-FN)P91T01172RW00100001-9
MI 6031
13 June .952

I.
Military Operations
AEMZ
Evidencing defensive and offensive capabilities, enemy battalions offered stubborn resistance to UN raiding parties and launched attacks supported by a heavy volume of artillery and mortar. Most of the action took place near Mabang on the western front and Tuchon in the central sector.
UN surface units continued to blockade and bombard both Korean coasts, Naval air sorties, totalling 244, were concentrated in the Songjin-Wonsan area. Air
During the 24-hour period, UN aircraft flew 925 sorties including 539 combat. No enemy fighters were engaged. Early morning visual reconnaissance revealed 10 aircraft on Antung, 60 on Tatungkou and 60 on Takushan.
Based on the statements of recently-captured prisoners of war, Far East Command has accepted the relief of the 42nd Chinese Communist Army by the 38th, The 42nd, which was previously on the line, is now carried in the immediate rear.
Guerrilla
Far East Command reports that Communist is at its lowest ebb since the beginning of guerrilla strength in South Korea the Korean war. It is noted, however, that despite the indicated reduction in overall strength, captured agents and line crossers reveal that the enemy has not relaxed his efforts to rebuild the guerrilla organization which was badly shattered last winter during Operation Ratkiller. (Infrequent guerrilla attacks tend to confirm the fact that the Communist partisans, on orders from Pyongyang, are devoting their efforts to augmenting and reorganizing their five branches in

apu
GrOund

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III.
General Situation
Political
The Chief of Staff of the ROK 9th Division has reported that a serious morale situation is developing, particularly among junior officers, as a result of recent Korean political events. (While similar reports have been received on the morale of staff and headquarters officers, this is the first such report from a combat unit.)
Radio Peiping reported on 11 June that two UN military aircraft violated the cease-fire security zone in the vicinity of Panmunjom on 7 June.

Cease-fire Talks SECRET Security Information
Radio Pusan announced on 9 June that during the period 16 June to 15 July amnesty would be granted to all stragglers, AWOL's and deserters who desire to serve again. The surrender places are the martial law headquarters in Pusan, (Surrenders under previous military police stations, and other locations. amnesty programs have been at police stations. The inclusion of the martial law headquarters on this occasion suggests an attempt to augment the troop strength available to the provost marshal in Pusan, whose requests for additional troops have been denied.)
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OCI 6032 111. June 52

I.
Military Operations
Army
US troops from the 45th Division took two hills in the Mabang area of the Strong enemy night-time west central sector following a vigorous Chinese defense. probes against the two positions mere repulsed. On the central front, Chineee troopkin company strength probed ROE positions near Kumsong. Minor patrol clashes occurred along the rest'Qt the line.
UN naval aircraft and surface vessels continued the blockade of both North Korean coasts.
During the past 24 hours UN aircraft flew 999 effective sorties including 574 combat and 190 transport missions. Bo enemy aircraft sightings were reported. Visual reconnaissance revealed only 15 enemy aircraft at Antung and 30 at Tatungkou while Takushan was closed in by weather.
No significant reports were received during the past 24 hours.
III.
General Situation
of the meeting, were incited by speakers to call for the dissolution of the National Assembly and to resist "foreign" interference. One speaker "threatened to oppose the President himself if he fails to dissolve the Assembly." The crowd, consisting of representatives of local governments, women workers from
and other citizens, was orderly and passive in and vitriolic speeches.
SECRET
when some 8,000
The largest anti-Assembly meeting to date occurred on 12 June in Pusan persons, most of whom had been brought by truck to the location
the government controlled Chosun Spinning Company, students, Youth Corps members,
the face of inflammatory

Navy
Air
Political
s1oans
ti-2 C.I.A. HAS NO Ojet ION TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OF

THIS DOCUMENT.
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Ambassador Muccio reports that National Assemblyman Yi Chong-hyong, fOrMerlY a etroag suppeorter of President Rhee, interviewed Rhee on 10 jUne. Xi tOld-the-Praidant-thit-the "will of the PeoPle" Wei being miaufaCtUred by the POliee. and-Other officiale. 'thee said that this Wee "eompletely wrong" and thathe still intended to secure direct presidential election and the establiehment Of a bicameral legialature. Rhee then attempted to obtain Yi's support in the Assembly to "get these things &one smoothly." Yi stated that this could not be done until the imprisoned assemblymen were released and martial law raised. Nuncio reports further that Korean police, uniformed and in civilian garb, are carefully surveilling the US Embassy in Pusan. Both entrances are under conetant observation by "little men with notebooks." The dearth of Korean visitors during the past few days leadsthe ambassador to conclude that the police have had "little talks" with would-be visitors.

SECRET Security Infonastion
ApprovedFore4Wease2001AMBERWADP91T0117eia00200100001-9
00I 6033 16 June 1952

I.
Melitary Operations
AEMZ
The Mabang area of the west central sector was again active as two outposts of the DS 45th Division were attacked by Chinese forces in undetermined strength. The enemy in company strength forced the withdrawal of a ROK 6th Division outpost in the east central Kumsong area. Stubborn North Korean and Chinese resistance was encountered by UN raiding parties in both the west central and eastern sectors. Of 2,800 rounds of artillery and mortar fire received by the let US Marine Division, 20300 fell in the sector of the attached Korean Marine Regiment.
Due to communication difficulties, no information on naval activities was received.
UN landebased aircraft under Far East Air Force control flew 901 missions, of which 563 were combat. No other information was received.
The Far East Command reports that vehicle sightings increased 10 percent during the period 7-13 June over the previovs week and were considerably above comparable averages for full-moon periods. Seventy percent of sightings were south of the 39th Parallel, a very high figure equalled only once before. The main supply routes into the west central sector were the most heavily travelled.
UN aerial observers report that the entire 6,200 feet af runway at Pyongyang east airfield was operational on 13 June after removal of some 74 Some e,400 feot of sod runway at Pyongyang main airfield dummy bomb craters. was also observed o be operational. A concentrated attack of 150 UN fighterbomber sorties on le June resulted in claims of 115 bomb hits on Pyongyang

Re.v
Air Air
WC
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east and 8 hits on Pyoncrang main airfields. (It is perhaps significant that on 13 June two conventional UN naval aircraft were attacked by )IA's in the Chinnampo area. The fact that UN radar did not pick up these hostile aircraft prior to the attack suggests either that the planes had come from Antung at very low altitudes or that the MIG's were based much closer to Chinnampo in North Korea. No sweptwing aircraft, however, have been observed on ay North Korean airfield other than Uiju on the Yalu river.)
General Situation
25X6
Politica
MUccio states that in the last week Rhee has not made a single gesture that suggests a modification of his stand. While all groups in the Assembly admit that a compromise solution palatable to the free world is essential, Mucci() has no hope for success so long as Rhee remains aloof.
Mhocio reports that at a pro-Rhee mass meeting on the evening of 12 Junes anonymous individuals distributed two printed handbills roundly condemning the President. That same night anti-Rhee posters signed by an unknown "Womento National Protection Corps" appeared in Pusan. As far as the EMbassy is awares this is the first time that anti-Rhee handbills or posters have been circulated
in Pusan
Radio pyongyang on 15 June stated that the North Karean regima has protested to the UN over the Koje Island "atrocities."

Propaganda
SECRET Scour:14y Information
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Security
mom
Intonation
CCI 6034 17 June 1952

I.
Military Operations
.UN naval vessels continued the blockade of both Korean coasts. of 305 naval air sorties were flown.

Navy
Alt
Supported by a heavy concentration of tanks and self-propelled guns, Chinese battalions during thanights of 15 and 16 June launched strong attacks against US 45th Division positions in the Mhbang area. The enemy was forced to withdraw on both occasions by a heavy concentration of UN artillery fire. Determined enemy resistance was offered to raiding partiea from the ROK 9th Division in the Chorwon sector and to the ps 7th Division in the Tuchon area in the east.
artillery,
A total
DN flew 690 effeottve sorties, of which 440 were coMbat missions. There were 98 daytime close support sorties attacking troops bunkers, gun positions and buildings. 7-86 pilots report observing 50 sweptkng aircraft on Antung, 75 on Tatungkou and 50 on Takushan airfields. A B-29 was attacked by three enemy aircraft, apparently jets, without damage.
aircraft
No significant reports have been
received
during the past 24 hours.
III.
General Situation
IWAL2A4
25X6
' Iteas the opinion of US &baggy personnel in Pusan on 16 June that the National Assembly is stalling for tims. There are some indioations that oppositionAsesublymen are losing heart and unconfirmed reports are circulating that some have gone over to Rh et "
SECRET Seourity Information

Approved For Release 2001/08/0
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During the National Assembly meeting on 14 June', demonstrators outside denounced the 'Assemblymen through loudspeakers, erenerally.orderly parades and demonstrations, led by Rheels youth corps members, continued all day. In midafternoon 2000 marched to the Assembly compound under the direction of "hoodlumtype leaders" and listened to hysterical harangues. (Radio Pusan announced on 11 June that President Rhee had received a petition, bearing over a Million signatures, which demanded the dissolution of the Assembly. Reports have been received which claim that groups purporting to represent local councils plan to seize the Assemblymen representing their local hoMe districts.)

SECRET
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SECRET Security Infarvation
OCI 6035 18 June 1952
DAILY KOREAN BULLETIN I.

Military Operations
AMX
No major enemy action occurred during the period? although UN raiding parties and patrols met stiff resistance. In the western sector near Panmunjom, patrolling DS Marines engaged in several fire-fights with stubborn Chinese defenders. A battalion-strength patrol from the 1st Commonwealth Division met heavy resistance in the Rigong area Resistance was also encountered by patrols fram the BOK 9th Division in the west central and the US 40th Division in the central sector.
UN naval air and surface craft on the east coast of North Korea attacked enemy supply routes and troop installations. Little activity occurred on the west coast.
UN land-based aircraft flew only 629 sorties, of which 316 were combat. Medium bombers flew 14 sorties against transportation targets on the east eoast, an industrial installation south of Pyongyang, and took part in a close suabrt mission. During the night of 16 June, a B-29 over the Chongchon River encountered a probable enemy jet which made a firing pass. No damage was sustained.
The Far East Air Force reports that the 30 daylight sorties flown hy enemy MIC-15's during the week of 9 to 16 June was the lowest number for nearly a year. Contrasted with this, 37 night sorties by all type enemy aircraft represents a new high in the Communists' night interception effort. FEAF further notes that the pattern of enemy daylight activity clearlY indicates that pilots were not sent out for training but for combat. The aggressiveness of MIG-15's encountered points to the presence of "well-trained and proficient combat pilots." FEAF still estimates9 however, that the enemy willl not stipend his air defense operations southward or initiate air offensive operations at this time.

tau
Air
Air
THE C. I. A. HAS NO OBJECTIOI TO THE DECLASSIFICATION

THIS DOCUMENT.
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III.
General Situation
Political
Martial Law Commander Won in Pusan has advised Ambassador Mnecio the "conspiracy case" trials will begin within a few days. The trials will not be public although the Embassy, 8th Army and UNCURK have been invited to have two representatives each present. Muccio comments that "there is danger Rhee may be trying to use us for his purposes by having us'present."
25X6


2
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SECRET
OCI 6036 19 June 1952

I.
Military Operations
AZMI
ROK 6th Division elements in the Kumsong area of the east central sector were attacked by two enemy companies, supported by self-propelled artillery and conventional artillery fire. Sporalic action is continuing. Farther to the east in the ROK 7th Division area a UN raiding party was turned back from its objective near Malguji by stabbor4y resisting Chinese elements. Scattered probes and patrols occurred along the rest of
Air and surface units of the UN naval force attacked enemr transportation targets and troop installations on both coasts.
Land-based aircraft under control of the Far East Air Force flew 306 effective sorties, 82 of which were combat. Thirteen medium bomber missions were flown with the major target being the east coast city of Chongjin.
II.
Ihe.Eighth Army reports that dud enemy artillery shells picked up in the US lot Marine Division sector in the west have been identified ammunition. The type of fMze as Soviet 152mm found on the Shells, the RCM: 34 K, iS the Far East Command.. SSkSOSS in
The Far Fast Air Force reports that enemy night fighters on a B-29 on the night assessment of the damage inilisrtedi by of 10-11 June reveals that 23mm cannons and not rockets were used in the attack. Air bursts observed by bomber crews that night destroying fuses. were believed to have been from 37mm projectiles with se/fTHE C. L A. HAS NO OBJECTION TO THE DECLASSIFICATION THIS DOCUMENT. OF

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Rear Areas The 9,037 enemy vehicles sighted by UN aerial observers during the week of 6 to 12 June was the second highest observed during a f1111 moon period in 1952. The traffic pattern has shifted and the bulk of movethent, 67 percent of Which was belOw the 39th Parallel, was concentrated in the central area with sons decrease on the eastern and western main supply routes.
III.
General Situation
Political
Ambassador Nbccio reports that the National Assembly convened on 18 June with 152 members present, the largest attendance since the beginning of the political crisis. Deciding to elect three temporary chaitmento replace the speaker and vice speakers whose terms expired on the 18th, the Assembly voted overwhelmingly in favor of the previous officers. Even Rhea's Sam-U-Jang group voted for the incuMbents. Nuncio comments that the Sam,Wang is as terrified of Rheels threat to dissolve the AsSembly as the opposition since they are not sure of regaining their Seats. The press reports that the "semi-secrei" of the 14 South Koreans in the "conspiracy" case have begun. One of Rheets supporters is credited with stating that the trial is closed both for security reasons and to protect the families and friends of some of the accused. The court is made up of seven military men and twn civilians.
Economic
'
trials
UN naval interrogation of enemy prisoners captured off eastern North Korea revealed that a zinc smelting plant in the interior, northwest-of Songjin was in continued operation and had never been bombed. The plant, which was run in conjunction with a zinc mine some 7 miles away, was under the supervision of 2 or 3 Soviet technical advisers. (While there is no record of a major zinc smelter in this area, North Korea produced updards of 10,000 tons of refined zinc annually in the period immediately preceding the war. It is en, tirely possible that a zinc smelter is still in operation in North Korea under Soviet supervision.)
SECRET
Sectritq Information
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OCI 6037 20 June 1952

I.
Military Operations
AEEZ
After launching five successive attacks against 6th ROK Division positions one and one half miles southeast of Kumsong, enemy troops of company and undetermined size succeeded in taking part of a hill, Across the front the enemy fired 4700 rounds of mortar and artillery, of which 2400 rounds fell during the night.
coasts.
UN naval surface units shelled Communist supply installations on both Naval aircraft attacked suppiy targets in support of these operations
More than 845 sorties were flown by UN land-baped aircraft. Of these sorties, 503 were combat missions. Far East Air Force reported the first instance of a night attack by an enemy jet in the northeast area of North Korea,

III,
General Situation
25X1X
The Ambassador reports that in an 18 June conversation with Rhee the latter admitted he was at the end of his rope, tired and did not think he could carry on much longer. On the same day the President said that Yi Pom-sok, the Home Minister, and Ahn Ho-sang, head of Rheets youth corps, were becoming quite a problem and he did not know what to do about it. (Yi is a senior meMber of the clique which now controls the police and is working for control of the army. Ahn recently made a violently anti-American speech in what was ostensibly an extemporaneous address.)
Ambassador Mhccio reports thatj11111,10111111111111111111111111111 112 Assemblymen have no so u on suppor ng a 'Four

SECRET

fl
Air
Political
25X1X
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Point Compromise" amendment to the Constitution. The legislation Will probably be introduced on 20 June. The source thought the amendment would pass but warned that if the Assembly refused, a hunger strike would be staged before the presidential residence and Rhee would be forced to dissolve the Assembly, The Ambaesador comments that Rhee men and opposition are both avoiding commitment on the conduct of the next preeidential election. (While the compromise amendment calls for popular election of the president, there is some question as to whether the next election should be by popular election or by the Assembly, as the Constitution now requires.)

The National Assembly on 19 June, with 109 members present, voted by 78 to zero an urgent motion to have a special committee investigate the government charges of an internal communist plot. (Presumably the pro-Rhee faction abstained from voting.)
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OCI 6038 21 June 1952

I.
,
Military Operations
Air and surface units of the UN naval force attacked enemy transportation targets and troop installations on both coasts.
Land-based aircraft under control of the Far East Air Force flew 1034 effective-sorties, of Which 621 were combat. Ten medium bomber missions were flown in attacks on targets in enemy rear areas.
General Situation
An English news agency reports from Pusan that the Democratic Nationalist Party, Rhee's principal opposition group, walked out of the National Assembly in a body on 21 June when discussions began on the'compromise agreement to end the current ROK political crisis. The account continues that while the DNP favors the compromise solution, they will block its passage until Rhee raises martial law and releases the 12 Assemblymen currently under arrest. The same press service quotes Home Minister Yi Pom-sok as saying that 4 persons had been arrested in the hoodlum attack on a private meeting of Rhee's opposition yesterday. He added, however, that those arrested claimed they broke into the
1

Navy
Air
Political
An enemy battalion launched successive probes against US 45th Division positions in the Mabang area west of Chorwon following heavy concentrations of artillery and mortar fire but were forced to withdraw. Elsewhere along the front the enemy launched short-lived probes. UN,raiding parties and patrols were effectively resisted.
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meeting because they were refused admission and that they bedtime "gamy" When what vas reportedly a cultural meeting turned into criticism of President Rhea. (The 20 Jline meeting of the recently formed Committee on Opposing Dictatorships and Defending the Constitution was attended by many of the most respected citizens of the ROK and was avowedly an anti.Rhee private political meeting.)

2
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I.
Military OperatiOns
ALM
Fighting continued in the west central Chorwon area as raiding parties from the US 45th and ROK 9th Divisions met heavy resistance from Chinese defenders. A regiment of the ROK 9th Division briefly occupied its objective, but disengaged under very heavy enemy pressure. In the east central Kumsong area, Chinese troops probed newIy-won outpost positions of the ROK 6th Division without success.
While UN naval air units off eastern North Korea conducted nO operations owing to resupplying, aircraft from the British carrier "Ocean" attacked enemy supply and troop installations south of Chinnampo. Naval surface vessels born,barded enemy lines of supply on both the east and west coasts.
UN land-based aircraft flew 658 sorties, of which 291 were combat. Medium bombers flew five close support, leaflet, and surveillance missions. UN aerial observers reported 155 swept-wing aircraft on Yalu River fields on the morning of 22 June.
II,
25X1C
on 13 N4Y the North Korean VIII Corps left Sinanju with the 42nd Division leading the movement. Units of the corps with an armored task force of 30 tankr attached, had reached and were bivouack:d in the Yangdok area on 1 June, (The deactivation of the North Korean VIII Corps as a combat force was accepted over a year ago. Although there have been some unconfirmed reports of its reconstitution in northwestern Korea, the present existence of the VIII Corpe or of its subordinate 42nd Division never previously reported as a major North Korean unit, cannot be confirmed.), el

12:=
Mr
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III.
General Situation
25X6
Political
A British news agency reports from Pusan that Syngman Rhee won a minor victory in the National AsseMbly by a vote of 63-2 which extended his term of office to 15 August. A bill submitted by pro-Rhee supporters is under consideration which provides for an indefinite extension ofitheels term until a new president is "elected according to the Constitution." A South Korean Government spokesman has announced that the State Department reply to the South Korean explanation of Why it banned "Voice of America" broadcasts was "unsatisfactory." Ambassador MUccio reports only partial confirmation of press reports of the arrest of 20 students on 17 Juno. The Arabassador believes "some students" were arrested between the 17th and the 20th for condemning Rhee.actions in the current crisis. There has apparently been pressure for about two weeks on the joint council, of university student councils to pass resolutions demanding dissolution of the Assembly, direct presidential election and a bicameral legislature. Recent pro-Assembly statements, however, provoked the arrest cf the students.
.

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Security
Information
OCI 6040 24 June 1952

I.
Military Operations
.4121Z
Two probes by Chinese platoon-size units against ROK 6th Division outposts in the east central Kumsong area provided the only significant action of the period. There were minor probes and patrol clashes along the rest of the front.
Naval aircraft from three carriers of Task Force 77 on the (swat coast attacked hydro-electric installatione at the Supong power complex on the Yalu River and at 'ainchen :and Pujon systems north of Hungnam. UN naval surface vessels attacked enemy shore installations.
UN land-based aircraft flew 1,001 sorties, of which 650 were combat. Medium bombers attacked transportation targets on the east coast. Other UN fighter - bomber aircraft, under 5th Air Force control, participated with naval aircraft in the attack on the North Korean hydro-electric plants.
II.
The US Military Attache in South Korea reports that President Rhee has asked the Minister of National Defense to "establish a national guard type crganization with a strength of two million." Similar organizations have a record of three previous failures in South Korea, and the ROK Army is opposed to the idea because the present armed forces require a maximum effort in materiel, sunray ani personnel. (The political advantagee of such a para-military force have been exploited by the ROK Government previously and presumably were in Rheels mind when he gave this order.)
III.
General Situation
Political
US naval observers in South Korea report that the present political situation has discouraged ROK naval officers.

Air
ROK Army
Nan
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On 23 June the ROK National Assembly attained a quorum when Rheels Sam-U-Jang group and Prime Minister Chang Taik-sangts Silla-ho group arrived together after an all-night conference. With most of Rheels cabinet in attendance, and under the active leadership of the Rhee clique, the Assembly passed resolutions postponing the expiration of the President's term to 15 August and continuing the President in office "for the time being or until new elections are feasible," The only opposition members present were the Speaker and one or two others who asserted the resolutions were unconstitutional.
During the past 10 days, Radio Pyongyang carried a number of broadcasts on the WFTU resolution calling for world solidarity with the Korean people on 25 June, the 2nd anniversary of the Korean war. These broadcasts called for the North Koreans to "repay" this solidarity by observing a dey of "struggle" on that date. (Despite numerous low level reports of an impending enemy offensive on 25 June, there are no indications that any major action is contemplated. It is entirely possible, however, that the enemy will seek to increase the tempo of military pressure along the front on the anniversary day.) Radio Pyongyang is reported to have failed to sign on at the scheduled time on 24 June. (It is not known whether this failure to come on the air was due to UN bombing of the Yalu River power complex.)

Propaganda SECRET Security Information
Ambassador Muccio observes that it is not clear what effect these resolutions will have and what the reaction from the opposition will be. The Ambassador adds that the resolutions could have the effect of continuing Rhee in office indefinitely, and, if so, "Rhee will have won his battle with the Assembly hands down -- by a vote of 63 out of a total of 163."
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Military Operations
Anz
Action along the front on the second anniversary of the beginning of the Korean war was limited to scattered patrol clashes and minor probes. UN positions along the line received almost 5,000 rounds of artillery and mortar fire,
A total of 562 sorties were flown by UN naval aircraft against targets on the east and west coasts, North Korean hydroelectric installations were again attacked in cooperation with aircraft from the Far East Air Force. Naval surface forces bombarded enemy shore installations.
Land-based aircraft under Far East Air Force control flew 1,266 sorties. Of the 870 combat sorties, 342 were fighter-bomber attacks on the North Korean hydroelectric system. Medium boMbers flew 29 missions, principally in close support of ground troupe. Five enemy MIG-15's were encountered; one UN 7-86 suffered major damage and crashed on landing.
II.
III.
25X1C
The North Korean IV Corp's "Advanced Command Post" at Sariwon was being converted on 11 June to seerve as "Joint Chinese Communist4orth Korean Headuarters on Us Western Front," (North Korean iv eorpa units bave been concen n the Pyongyang area for over a year. There are no firm indications that the enemy intends to commit his well-trained and armor-equipped IV Corps in the Chinesecontrolled western sector in the near future.)

Air
AltElY
Nan
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General Situation
Economic
Preliminary bomb-damage analysis of the 23 June attack by the Far East Air Force and naval units indicates that the Supong (Suiho) hydroelectric system SECRET Security Information
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on the Yalu River is not operating. No turbinea appeared to be in operation. Two large transformere, a generating plant and the main transformer switchyard suffered heavy damage, In the Changjin gystem north of Hungnam, the number four generating station was completely destroyed with sUbstantial damage to the trans former yard. At generating plants three and four of the Pujon gystem, to the east of the Changjin, heavy damage was inflicted on the transformer yards. The generating capacity apparently was not decreased to a major extent. (The Supong aystem was estimated to be producing from 200,000 to 250,000 kilowatts of electricity for Manchuria and North Korea. PUjon plants three and four were rated at 12,000 kilowatts, and Changjin number four at about 15,000 kilowatts.)
.
POlitical
Radio Pnsan announced on 24 June that Rhee made a personal appearance before some 1000 representatives of local assemblies staging a "hunger strike" before his temporary residence, to demand dissolution of the Assembly. The broadcast suggests that Rhee, in commenting on the Assembly's failure to dis solve itself voluntarily, "admitted for the first time" that something practical had to be done about the situation. (This appears to be additional pressure on the Assembly to pass the compromise resolution under consideration or face dis solution.)

Reuters reports an unsuccessful attempt on 25 June to assassinate Presi dent Rhee while he was makirig a speed' in a public plaza in Pusan. The wouldaoe assassin, wearing western clothing, made his way through the guests on the rostrum to a point behind Rhea, After the unsuccessful attempt, he was seized unhurt by the police,
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Military Operations
Aam
The scene of active fighting along the front shifted to the western sector during the period. Outpost positions of the US 1st Marine Division north of Panmunjom were subjected to repeated probing attacks by at least two Chinese companies. Heavy artillery and mortar fire was received by defending Marines during one encounter. Less than 20 miles to the northeast of this action, elements of a ROK 1st Division raiding party encountered determined enemy resistance in the Sangnyong area. Brief probes and patrol clashes occurred along the reat of the front.
UN naval air and surface craft maintained the blockade and attacked enemy troop, supply and transport installationa on both Korean coasts. Naval aircraft flew 248 sorties, principally combat.
UN land-based aircraft flew 528 combat sorties, of a total of 865 sorties flown by all types of aircraft. Medium bombers attacked an important railroad bridgein central North Korea. Of the 50 enemy MIG-15's observed in the air during the period, 41 were encountered by UN F-861s, with one MIG destroyed and one probably deetroyed.
During a morning aerial reconnaissance of the Yalu River airfields on 25 June, UN observers sighted a MAXiMUM of 270 swept-wing aircraft and 150 "large dark aircraft." Only one pilot observed the latter aircraft and photos taken in the afternoon did not confirm this sighting. In the early evening, other pilots observed about 250 MIGis on the three-field Yalu River complex..
UN Rear Areas
The US Military Attache in South Korea reports the formation of a wellorganized Communist guerrilla force, called "the anti-American regiment," in two southwestern Korean provinces. Encounters have indli:ILZ1G;;;;:e4s

Navy
Air
Air
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THISDOCUMENT.
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"well organized." (It is possible that this newly formed unit was responsible for the highly successftil 25 June raid on a train in this area.)
III.
General Situation Political
Unconfirmed press reports quote South Korean Government sources as re porting that police have arrested two members of the Assetbly in connection with the unsuccessful attempt on the life of President Rhee. A third Assemblyman is being sought. Reuters states that one Assemblyman "confessed" lending the would be assassin a gun and driving him to the scene in a government car. Ambassador MUccio reports that the conspiracy court martial of seven Assemblymen and seven private citizens continued on 24 June. The first defendant, a private citizen. called to the witness stand by the prosecutionotold a story of Communist affiliation in 1949 end subsequent disillusionment. The defense sug gested the court read leaflets written by the defendant since 1949 and note that they express opposition views, not a Communist conspiracy. The 'witness dramatically renounced his previous confession' allegedly obtained by the police through torture.

In an address on 25 June, the ROK Home Minister Yi Pom-sok, strong man of the clique behind Rhea, assailed the "gmnap" which had been responSible for all of South.Korea's troubles in the past and which now was "misleading the nation by plotting to alienate our government from friendly nations abroad"' and "inviting interference in our internal affairs." Yi noted that these acts "may not be directlymotivatedby the enemy." (This may be a veiled admission that no direct evidence of:a Communist "conspiracy" can be found in the ease of the arrested Assemblymen.)
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OCI 6043 27 June 1952

I.
Military Operations
MAE
In a daylong battle 4 miles east of Sangnyong on the western front, enemy groups of platoonsize drove elements of the ROK 1st Division from a hill which the division had seized earlier. The enemy counterattack was supported by more than 3500 rounds of artillery and mortar fire, as well as the fire of three armored vehicles. In the west central Mabang area, an enemy battalion engaged raiders from the US 45th Division. After a brief engagement the enemy was forced to withdraw.
Naval surface and air units continued the blockade of both Korean coasts. Naval air attacks were again concentrated on enemy supply lines and routes of Communication.
There were 932 effective sorties flown by UN landbased aircraft during the 24 hour period. Most of the 579 combat missions were armed reconnaissance flights and attacks on enemy installations in areas just behind the front lines. One flight revealed the presence of 180 aircraft on three Manchurian airfields.
Enemy vehicle sightings by UN aerial observers during:the period 13-19 June:totaled 13,8870 of whidh 75 percent were below, the 39th parallel. Far East Air Force concludes that the enemy has moved considerable amounts of supplies southward into the forward supply zones. The SibyonIchon area in the west was the destination of a major &are of the southward traffic.
III.

AIE
Enemy Rear Areas
25X6
General Situation
Politieal
SecurkSy Information
TO THE DECLASS/FICATION OF THIS DOCUMENT.
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Ambassador Nuccio reports on 27 June that the pressure caMpaign by the Rhee forces against Korean employees of DS installations in the Pusan area has continued Imabated during the past week. The Ambassador states that Ehbasay employees are now so thoroughly intimidated that they can be relied on only for routine duties within the Embassy building, and that, in the absence of a Koreanspeaking American, the EMbassyte coverage of political developments is becoming increasingly difficult.

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Central Intelligence Agency Office of Current Intelligence

6044,
28 aim 1952

I.
Military Operations
AEU
UN naval-aircraft flew 283 sorties in close support missions and against targets in North Korea. Supply installations and the electric power system were primary targets. Naval surface units maintained the blodkade and bombarded Shore targets.
Of the 845 effective sorties flown by aircraft under Far East Air Force control, 455 were combat. Medium bombers attacked transportation targets in northeastern Korea. US F -86's observed 29 MIG-l5's airborne; four were encountered and one destroyed.
I/.
Shortly before noon on 27 June, UN aerial observers reported sighting 400 swept-wing aircraft on Antung, Takushan and Tatungkuo airfields in the Yalu River complex. (The figure 400, if correct, represents the second largest concentration of enemy jet fighters observed on the Yalu River airfields during the course of the war.)

Eau
Air
-
The enemy again concentrated his efforts in the vest central sector on Chinese cepturtita strategic hill southwest of Mabang from the US 45th Division. forces in this sector launched three night attacks in battalion strength, but were repulsed after five hours of heavy fighting. In the eastern sector, a comparry-size raiding party from the ROK 5th Division seized a strategic outpost position and repulsed-a counterattack by a North Korean platoon.
Air
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III.
General Situation
Political
In a conversation with opposition members of the National Assembly on 24 June, ROK Prime Minister Chang Tsek-sang reported that the pro-Rhee assembly group, the Sam-U-Chang, pumas& to introduce a motion of "self-dissolution." Chang added that some of the Sam-U-Chang members were resisting this move, however, if it were introduced, Chang's assembly group, the Sills Hoe, would go aver completely to tbe anti-Rhee opposition.
Adopting another tack, the Rhee forces on 26 June marshalled a group of 123 individuals calling themselves the "All-Nation Peoples Self-Determination Delegates fran Local Districts." This body encamped on the steps of the National Assembly and formally adopted a resolution "dissolving" the National Assembly. (Press reports of 28 junto stated that a "500-strong mob" would not allow members to leave the National Assembly:until a dissolution resolution was passed: One Assemblymen Who attempted to leave was badly beaten. About 100 South Korean policemen took no action during the demonstration.)
In a 27 june broadcast to the Soviet Far East, Moscow repeated a story Which originated in Pyongyang about the political crisis in South Korea. After a fairly factual account of events in the south, Moscow made the startling .is the main cause of the statement that "the mounting wrath of the people. The broadcast continued that "partiacutely tense atmosphere in South Korea." san uprising" and popular indignation against the ilorrible beastialities" committed against Communist POW's were also primary contributors to the state of emergency in the ROK.

Propaganda
Cabinet The UN Command reported on 27 June that further ehanges in the BOK Pam-sok, militant leader of were expected. Reportedly present Home Minister Yi Yi's old position of the pro-Rhee clique, is to become Minister of Defense. Home Minister w111 go to An Ho-sang, present leader of the Taehan Youth Corps. (Frequent reports have been received stating that Yi Pcm-sak would take over the Ministry of Defense as a final step to gain control of all military and paramilitary groups in South Korea. An Ho-sang's militant Taehan Youth Corps has been used as the major arm of the pro-Rhee clique in their intimidation campaign. An Ho-sang, former ROK Minister of Education, is an ultra-nationalist with little regard for the US.)
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Central Intelligence Agency Office of Current Intelligence 6045, 30 June 1952

I.
Military Operations

Air
Air
SECRET Security Infarmation
No,
Chineee units continued pressure on newly won outpost positions of the US 45th Division in west central Korea on Saturday. Sunday's activity, however, was limited to a few enemy brief probes and patrol clashes, probably due to the fall of if inches of rain.
Naval surface craft bombarded enemy shore installations. operations were scheduled due to the weather.
No UN naval air
Land-based aircraft under Far East Air Force control flew 233 effective sorties, 83 af which were combat. Medium bombers flew 16 sorties against transportation targets in northwestern Korea.
During the night of 26 June, a US B-29 flying at 24,000 feet over north central Korea observed an unidentified aircraft behind and below fire three rocketflt 1,500 feet range. The rockets, traveling level in flight, evenly spaced, and leaving a white sparkling trail, passed directly under the B-291s tail and exploded 1,000 feet beyond the B-29 with a large white burst, the size of normal flak.
Far East Air Force comments that, although evidence is still too imolai, elusive to accept the use by the enemy of air-to-air rockets, an investigation is currently under way. (Two previous reports of the possible use of rockets hy enemy aircraft were tentatively evaluated as tracer ammunition from aircraft
guns.)
THE C.I.A. HASN) OBJECTION TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OF THIS DOCUMENT.
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III.
General Situation
Political
On 30 June, President Rhee sent a message to the National Assembly stating that he "could not wait apy longer" to dissolve the Assembly. His mesSage, which was read by the Prime Minister, said that he cannot depy the will of the people apy longer, and he must now find a method to accomplish the Assembly,s dissolu, tion. .(An attempt by the Rhee forces within the National Assembly on 28 June to vote dissolution of that body was not passed.)

ROK General Choe Kyung-}ht, recently deposed presiding officer of the court martial of Assemblyman So Min-Hol accused of homicide, informed American officials that he had received direct orders from the Pusan nartial law commander General Won to complete the trial in two or three days and to produce a death sentence for So Minr-Ho General Choe stated that he was not convinced that So Min-He's self-defense plea was justified, but that he favored a one to three year sentence, with possible suspension or parole on good behavior. (It seens evident that Choets removal from the trial was due to his moderate stand towards the defendant.)
...
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FAR EAST
5. 5.
Supply situation s i t u a t i o n in i n two two North N o r t h Korean Korean units u n i t s revealed: revealed: Recently R e c e n t l y available a v a i l a b l e North N o r t h Korean Ko r e a n messages messages of of mia-February, mid-February, t o the t h e rear area area logistics l o g i s t i c s command command from from unlocated unlocated a d d r e s s e d to addressed units area, reflected r e f l e c t e d the t h e supply supply u n i t s in i n the t h e Wonsan-Hamhung area, s i t u a t i o n . ' One unit u n i t stated s t a t e d that t h a t the t h e grain g r a i n supply s u p p l y received received situation.. Kowon had had been entirely e n t i r e l y used used up up and and "we "we are are worried" worried" from Kowon a t Hamhung is is b e c a u s e the the e n t i r e grain g r a i n and kerosene k e r o s e n e supply s u p p l y at because entire exhausted. e x h a u s t e d . The other o t h e r intercept i n t e r c e p t also a l s o reported r e p o r t e d on the t h e grain grain situation ice?) s i t u a t i o n at a t Kowon, Kowon, stating s t a t i n g that t h a t two two trains t r a i n s of of (wh (wh ice?) f for o r the t h e 7th 7 t h and and 37th 3 7 t h Division9had D i v i s i o n 3 had arrived. a r r i v e d . (SUEDE (SUEDEi~~ SOOl, 3001, 10 10 Feb; F e b ; r 1 3 3002, 0 0 2 , 14 14 Feb F e b 52) 52)
most of of Comment: Previous P r e v i o u s intercepts i n t e r c e p t s revealed r e v e a l e d that t h a t most Comment: t h e Communist units u n i t s have have been been well w e l l supplied. s u p p l i e d . In In t his e astern the this eastern coastal arek, a r e h , however, however, constant c o n s t a n t bombardment bombardment by by UN naval n a v a l units units and aircraft a general g e n e r a l deterioration d e t e r i o r a t i o n in i n railroad railroad a i r c r a f t caused caused a facilities f a c i l i t i e s which probably p r o b a b l y resulted r e s u l t e d in i n temporary t e m p o r a r y shortages. shortages.
6. 6.
S ynthetic n t h e t i c petroleum p e t r o l e u m plant p l a n t on Soviet-Korean Soviet-Korean border b o r d e r may be Tarc or korean message from b e stil s t i l l i n operat o p e r a t ion: o n : A 28 M a r c h North IC o r e a n message rom "Aoji" was addressed T fAojisq a d d r e s s e d to tb the t h e "Heavy "Heavy Industrial I n d u s t r i a l Ministry, Ministry, Chemical Control C o n t r o l Department." Department." 5 0 1 s t Comm C o r n Recon Grp Grp (SUEDE 501st Korea, 15RSM/9523, 15RSM/9523, 30 30 Mar Mar 52) 32)
:

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-TOP-SEeRET-SUE-DComment: The Japanese constructed a synthetic fuel Comment; ugrii-i-low plant using a low temperature temperature carbonization carbonization system system at at Aoji. Aoji. 250 barrels During 1940-45, 1940-45,this this installation installation produced daily 250 100 barrels barrels of of methanol. methanol. The The plant plant was was of liquid liquid fuels fuels and and 100 known known to to be be operating operating in in early early 1950. 1950.
7. 7.
5 7
Comment: The The exact regional regional rail rail authority in in Korea Comment: can can not be be clearly clearly established; established; however, however, there are a number of predominance in of indications indications which point to to North Korean Korean predominance in the east and Chinese Chinese Communist Communist authority authority in in the the west. west. It is is known known that that a a joint joint railroad railroad command command exists exists in in Mukden. Mukden.
8. 8.
Communists report epidemic in in North North Manchuria: Manchuria: A transCommunists report epidemic to leave leave Peiping Peiping on on 31 31 March Harch and to to plane was was scheduled scheduled to port plane proceed proceed to t o Tsitsihar Tsitsihar in in northern northern Manchuria. Manchuria. The The mission, mission, as as to stated in in an intercepted intercepted Chinese Chinese Communist Communist message, was "to investigate investigate the the epidemic." epIdemicatf (SUEDE 6920 Johnson 6920 Security Grp Johnson AB, AB, SPOT SPOT NR NR 223, 223, 30 30 Mar Mar 52) 52) Tsitsihar is i s much farther farther north north than than the the Comment: Tsitsihar Comment: areas areas of 03 Manchuria Manchuria which which the the Communists Communists declare declare were violated by American American biological biological warfare warfare attacks. attacks.
Numerous Numerous reports reports noW now state state that epidemics epidemics in in Manchuria ,interceptsof of Although .intercepts and China China pkoper proper are are widespread. widespread. Although recent messages do not yet confirm coral= the of epidemics epidemics the existence existence of on a scale unprecedented scale unusual unusual for China, China, they do reveal reveal unprecedented attention attention by by the t h e Chinese Chinese to to the the epidemic epidemic threat. threat.

4 4
Chinese Communist control of North Korean rail system epo Chief e or nu u Depot nornies a su gested: The North Korean informed a suggeste orean Sinuiju super or on 28 March that "we superior we had loaded the materials on 2 freight freight cargo cargo trains, trains, but but we we unloaded unloaded because because the the (Chinese?) (Chinese?) thewooden freight were insufficient. insufficient." Volunteer Army thought thewooden freight cars wePe The message continued continued that shipment shipment would be impossible impossible in In March, but April. (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon March, but would would be be effected effected in in April. Grp Korea, Korea, 15RSM/9530, 15RSM/9530, 30 30 Mar Mar 52) 52)
1 1 Apr 52 52
. .
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3. 3.
Enemy units u n i t s still s t i l l reporting r e p o r t i n g BW BW agents a g e n t s in i n Korea: Korea: An An its battalions battalions u n i d e n t i f i ed North N o r t h Korean Korean regiment regiment notified n o t i f i e d its unidentified o n 30 30 March March that t h a t "the " t h e enemy enemy is is actively a c t i v e l y dropping d r o p p i n g bacterial bacterial on ll u n i t s were to r e p o r t promptly weapons in i n general g e n e r a l now." now.'( A All units were to report promptly UN biological b i o l o g i c a l warfare w a r f a r e attacks. attacks.
A Chinese Communist Communist, artillery a r t i l l e r y division'reported d i v i s i o n ' r e p o r t e d the the f o r m a t i o n of of a a five f i v e man "health 'lhefslth program" program,' committee "in " i n an formation t o check c h e c k the t h e spread spread of of bacteria." bacteria." attempt to
4. 4.
C h i n e s e Communist Communist unit u n i t helps h e l p s North N o r t h Korean Korean civilians: civilians: Chinese g h t of of a a 27 27 March M arch message from from the t h e Chinese Communist The gist 7th A rtillery D i v i s i o n , deployed in i n central c e n t r a l Korea, reveals 7th Artillery Division, Korea, reveals two members of that t h a t unit u n i t on 23 March "participated " p a r t i c i p a t e d in in t h a t two that a n attempt attempt to t o alleviate a l l e v i a t e the t h e sufferings s u f f e r i n g s of of the t h e North Korean an North Korean p e o p l e , who anaat areat a a loss loss to t o supply s u p p l y themselves themselves w i t h food." foodot' people, with (SUEDE 501st 5 0 1 s t Comm Comm Recon Recon Grp Grp Korea, Korea, K-1797, K-1797, 30 30 Mar Mar 52) 52) (SUEDE Comment: On On previous p r e v i o u s occasions, o c c a s i o n s , Chinese Chinese Communist Communist Comment: t r o o p s have have assisted a s s i s t e d North North Korean Korean farmers f a r m e r s in i n their t h e i r harvesting. harvesting. troops messages have indicated indicated However, recent r e c e n t Chinese Chinese Communist Communist messages r e q u i s i t i o n e d directly d i r e c t l y from the the t h a t certain c e r t a i n supplies s u p p l i e s are requisitioned that Korean civilian c i v i l i a n population. population. North Korean
The distress d i s t r e s s of civilians c i v i l i a n s in in Communist-held Communist-held areas areas of N o r t h Korea Korea is is believed b e l i e v e d to t o be be serious. s e r i o u s . All A l l indications i n d i c a t i o n s point point North i n 1951 1951 and and 1952 1952 and and to t o the the c ontinued t o lower lower grain g r a i n yields y i e l d s in to continued o v e r the t h e civilian c i v i l i a n economy. economy. p r i o r i t y of military,!:aupply priority militarysupply over
5. 5 .
C o n v e n t i o n a l North N o r t h Korean Korean aircraft a i r c r a f t division d i v i s i o n mentioned: mentioned: Conventional from a a North Korean Ko r e a n air a i r unit u n i t near n e a r Pyongyang Pyongyang A 29 March message from t o air a i r headquarters h e a d q u a r t e r s at a t Sinuiju S i n u i j u mentioned "seed "seed to t o %he to the LA D i v i s i o n . g 1 (SUEDE 1 5 1 15 15 RSM RSM Japan Japan CS CS 397, 397,30 30,Mar .Mar 52) 92) Division." (SUEDE Det 151

3 3
P r e v e n t i v e measures measures are are still s t i l l being b e i n g pushed a c t i v e l y in in Preventive pushed actively N o r t h Korea Korea as a8 indicated i n d i c a t e d by by continuing c o n t i n u i n g reports reports of of unit u n i t inocuinocuNorth l a t i o n s . One One Chinese Chinese Communist Communist unit u n i t on on 24 24 March March reported, reported, lations. however, t h a t inoculations i n o c u l a t i o n s have have not n o t been been made and that that a a however, that made and l'grave s i t u a t i o n v 1has developed because "the " t h e friendly f r i e n d l y troops "grave situation" ( p r o b a b l y North ort o f d isease?).,, (probably North Koreans) Koreans) have have developed (some s sort of disease?)." (SUEDE 5 0 1 s t Comm Recon Recon Grp Grp Korea, Korea, SK-H-1226, SK-H-1226, 30 30 Mar; Mar; K-1813, K-1813, (SUEDE 501st K-1729, 29 29 Mar Mar 52) 52) 26 Mar; K-1729,
2 A p r 52 52 2 Apr
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Comment: The term t e r m "LA "LA Division," Division," named after a f t e r the t..e Comment: Soviet-made c o n v e n t i o n a l fighter f i g h t e r aircraft, a i r c r a f t , has long long Soviet-made LA-9 conventional i d e n t i f i e d with w i t h the t h e North Korean Korean Air A i r Force, Force, although although been identified the Recently, t h e term has h a s not n o t recently r e c e n t l y been been observed. observed. R e c e n t l y , however, however, have referred r e f e r r o d to t o numbered numbered divisions: divisions: North Korean messages messages have the MIG-15-equipped 1 s t ; and the t h e 2nd, 2nd) 3rd, 3 r d , and 10th, l o t h , which M1G-15-equipped 1st; n o t been been definitely d e f i n i t e l y identified. i d e n t i f i e d . Probably the t h e "LA "'LA have not Division" D i v i s i o n " also also boars bears a a numbered numbered designation. designation.
6 6..
52)
bombers: A North Communist "command lvcommand post" p o s t " hit by UN bombers: Korean message passed Between between two two unlocated units u n i t s on on 27 27 March s t a t e s that t h a t the the "Pyongyang "Pyangyang (?) (?) command post was directly directly states hit h i t with w i t h four four one-ten ona-ten bombs....on bombs,...on 25 25 March, March ting t i n g in in t the h e injury i n j u r y of a number of of persons." p e r s o n s m t g (SUED ( S U E D m 018, 28 Mar M a r 3018,
/NM
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North Korean battalion b a t t a l i o n commander commander given g i v e n two weeks to to unidentified A a1 April A p r i l message from an an u nidentified a t r e n g . t h e n his h i s Unit: u n i t : A'l strengthen North Korean Ko r e a n "grigade "Brigade Commander," Commander , I t possibly p o s s i b l y located l o c a t e d in i n coastal coastal w e s t e r n Korea, Korea, to t o one one of western of his h i s battalion b a t t a l i o n commanders commanders ordered ordered , that t h a t "in " i n accordance accordance with w i t h the t h e Supreme.Commander's Supreme Commander's order, o r d e r , you are not n o t to t o rest until u n t i l you have trained t r a i n e d your units u n i t s and tightened tightened d e f e n s e . " The message continued c o n t i n u e d that t h a t "this " t h i s duty" duty" is is to b your defense." begin b e g i n on 3 3 April A p r i l and and that t h a t two two weeks will w i l l be allowed for f o r its its Korea,15RSM/9836, accomplishment. (SUEDE 501st Comm Corn Recon Recon Grp Grp Korea,15RSM/9836,
2 2 Apr..52) Apr 5 2 )
4. 4.
Chinese Communists in i n Korea prohibited p r o h i b i t e d from sending sending Korean money to t o China: China: A 28 28 March gmessage e sent s e n t by by the the Chinese Communist-7th t h a t "con"conTShinese Communist 7 t h Artillery A r t i l l e r y Division stated that c e r n i n g the cerning t h e regulation r e g u l a t i o n which prevents p r e v e n t s our o u r sending s e n d i n g Korean money home to t o China, China, main rear r e a r headquarters h e a d q u a r t e r s has already already proclaimed some decision d e c i s i o n on on the t h e case concerning c o n c e r n i n g the t h e MidMidArmy District D i s t r i c t and and their t h e i r sending s e n d i n g Korean Korean currency c u r r e n c y home...." home. I? South Army South Comm Recon Recon Grp G r p Korea, Korea, K-1856, K-1856, 2 2 Apr Apr 52) 52) (SUEDE 501st Comm

2 2
can Comment: While no immediate immediate implications implications c a n be drawn f from rom t this h i s message, message, behind b e h i n d the t h e sense s e n s e of of urgency urgency there may may be a n intensified i n t e n s i f i e d anti-guerrilla a n t i - g u e r r i l l a drive d r i v e in i n western w e s t e r n North N o r t h Korea, Korea, an c o u p l e d with coupled w i t h operations o p e r a t i o n s against a g a i n s t UN-held UN-held islands. islands.
...
Comment: The meaning of h i s message is n ot e ntirely of t this not entirely Comment: c l e a r . It I t may i n d i c a t e , however, however, that t h a t an an attempt a t t e m p t is is being being may indicate, clear. made to t o discourage d i s c o u r a g e Chinese C h i n e s e personnel p e r s o n n e l in i n Korea from from accumulataccumulati n g North ing North Korean won, won, which can can only o n l y be be used Used there. t h e r e , All All Chinese Communist supply s u p p l y messages have referred r e f e r r e d to t o values values in i n terms of of Chinese currency. currency.
4 Apr 52 52
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8. 8.
A d d i t i o n a l bombers leave l e a v e Mukden Mukden area area for for Peiping: P e i p i n g : Four Additional more Tl3-2 TU-2 light l i g h t bombers bombers of of the t h e Chinese Communist 10th 1 0 t h Air Air Division D i v i s i o n flew flew from from Mukden on on 31 31 March to t o Peiping's P e i p i n g ' s Nanyuan a i r f i e l d . Two weeks earlier, e a r l i e r , four f o u r TU-2's this d ivision airfield. TU-2's of of this division t h e same route r o u t e on an a n "airfield " a i r f i e l d transfer." transfer." had flown the The r e p o r t i n g agency commented that t h a t possibly p o s s i b l y only o n l y six Tu-2'~ reporting TU-2's of this t h i s division d i v i s i o n are are now now in i n Manchuria. Manchuria.
from Harbin reported TU-29s TU-2's on training t r a i n i n g flights flighks Messages from on 31 31 March and and 1 1 April, A p r i l , and and unidentified u n i d e n t i f i e d aircraft, a i r c r a f t , believed believed t to o be TU-2's,conducted Tu-2'~ conducted ~ "aerial "aerial strafing" s t r a f i n g " there there on on 31 31 March. March. (SUEDE ir F o r c e Roundup 64: 64,' 6920 6920 Security S e c u r i t y Grp Grp Johnson Johnson AB, AB, (SUEDE A Air Force AP 268, 1 1 Apr Apr 52) 52)
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Comment: recent d e p a r t u r e of the t h e bomber-equipped Comment: The recent departure bomber-equipped 8th Division 8 th D i v i s i o n from from Mukden Mukden to t o Tsitsihar T s i t s i h a r in i n North North Manchuria, Manchuria, and the t h e continuing c o n t i n u i n g transfer t r a n s f e r of 10th D i v i s i o n TU-2's to of 10th Division TU-2's to p r o p e r , leaves leavesfewknown l i g h t bombers bombers within w i t h i n immediate immediate China proper, fewknown light r a n g e of of the t h e Korean front. f r o n t . The Chinese Communist Communist Air A i r Force Force range evertheless e s t i m a t e d to t o have is n nevertheless estimated have 240 TU-2's, TU-2's, of which which about r r i v e d from the t h e USSR USSR in i n late l a t e 1951. 1951. about 70 70 a arrived
9. 9.
The final destination d e s t i n a t i o n of this this division, division, Comment: a p p e a r s now now to t o be be Peiping, P e i p i n g , was was not not known known when when it it which appears t r a n s f e r r e d . This T h i s is is the t h e only o n l y known known MIG-15 MIG-15 division d i v i s i o n in i n the the transferred. P e i p i n g - T i e n t s i n area. area. Peiping-Tientsin
1 4 t h was was replaCed r e p l a c e d at a t Takushan Takushan by by the t h e 12th 1 2 t h Division; Division; The 14th i t f lew t h e r e from i t h about it flew there from Shanghai Shanghai w with about 50 50 MIG@sinmid-March. MIG'sinmid-March. of Chinese air air combat combat units u n i t s has occurred o c c u r r e d frequently frequently Rotation of 1951, when they t h e y first f i r s t appeared appeared in.combat i n combat over since October 1951, Korea. Korea

-4
MIG-15 Division MIG-15 D i v i s i o n may be be based based at a t Peiping: P e i p i n g : A message s chedulin g 24 schedu -1S"s s on a roun round-robin -ro in f l i g ht t at a t Peiping's Peiping's ng ig Nanyuan airfield a i r f i e l d on on 31 31 March suggests s u g g e s t s that t h a t the t h e Chinese Communist 14th 1 4 t h Air A i r Division D i v i s i o n is is now now based based there. t h e r e . On 11 1 1 March 38 M I G b 1 5 ' s of his d i v i s i o n lleft e f t Takushan, iver MIG;-15's of tthis division Takushan, a Yalu R River b a s e , for Peiping. P e i p i n g . (SUEDE ir F o r c e Roundup 65, 65, 2 2 Apr A p r 52) 52) base, (SUEDE A Air Force
4 Apr 52 52
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P/2SEGEREIE975A0611600360001-5
25X1
5 April 1952
25X1
25X1

DECLASVFlirD
DOCUMENT NO NO CHANGE IN CLASO,
CLASS. CI rAr:1
irrI
LA1.
taSti
25X1 25X1
DA112.1f
25X1
Approved For Releise 2003110/22 : CIA-RDP791-009
TOP SECRET
A000600360001-5
25X1
25X1A
Approved Fc r Release 2003/10122 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0006C 0360001-5
SUMMARY
1.
25X1
2.
3.
Preparations for Communist offensive in Korea reported (page 4). Desperate plight of Americans in China reported (page 5).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
25X1
6. 7.

FAR EAST
oyria tavors closer relations with Spain (page 6)

EASTERN EUROPE
25X1
8.
25X1
LATIN AMERICA
9.
Chilean free-disposal copper sales reduced (page 7).
25X1
-225X1A
Approved For Release 2003110122 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0 00600360001-5
25X1

25X1A
25X1
3,
4.
Preparations for Communist offensive in Korea reported:
25X1

FAR EAST
25X1A
-4-
Approve d For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0 )0600360001-5
25X1A
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Two Chinese Communist armies began moving southeast on 28 March from staging areas in east central Korea near the 39th Parallel Four additional Chinese armies have also been aiertea ior tne ollensive. Four North Korean corps, now
in the east coast area, are scheduled to participate.
terrain.
5.
Desperate plight of Americans in China reported:
25X1A
desperate.
The Consul General calls attention to an authentic report from Tsingtao of the arrest of an American missionary on 7 March under circumstances indicating that the seizure might be connected with the germ warfare propaganda campaign.
Recent British and French diplomatic reports have expressed grave concern for their nationals in China.
Comment: All Western businessmen in China are subjected to extortionate financial demands as a condition for permission to leave the country. Over 200 Americans are still in Communist China, nearly 40 of them under arrest.

-525X1A
Comment. There are no firm indications that Communist forces in Korea intend to launch another major offensive in the near future. It is possible, however, that a limited objective offensive may be undertaken in eastern Korea, the apparent focal point of the reported preparations, where UN forces hold a considerable amount of North Korean
He was afraid, not so much of jail, as of "the other thing."
The American Consul General in Hong Kong reports that the manager of the Standard Vacuum Oil Company in Shanghai telephoned the company's Hong Kong office and declared that the plight of American businessmen was
Approve For Release 2003/10122 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0 30600360001-5
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NEAR EAST - AFRICA

6,
25X1
7.
Syria favors closer relations with Spain:
25X1A

Spain, I
The Syrian Government favors close political, economic, and military collaboration with
I
This
o be equally independent of the Soviet Union and the West.
attitude stems in large part from Syria's desire
25X1 25X1
The Syrian Foreign Minister reportedly said that his government will take advantage of Spanish Foreign Minister Martin Artajo's coming visit to complete plans for closer relations.
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that some of the Arab states may be willing to consider a Spanish-Aran pact. There have been many rumors that the matter would be discussed by the Spanish Foreign Minister during his tour of the Arab capitals which began on 4 April.
25X1
Comment:
25X1
8.
9.
Chilean free-disposal copper sales reduced:

official in Chile has reported that there are practically no new orders for copper from Chile's 20 percent free-disposal quota, and that current shipments are on old orders. The United States Embassy in Santiago accepts this version and believes that President Gonzalez Videla's optimistic statements on this subject are intended for internal consumption in Chile.
25X1A
- 7 -

LA TIN AMERICA
25X1A
25X1
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Comment:
25X1
ot free-disposal copper to be sold at the Chilean o icial price of $1200 per metric ton may considerably weaken Chile's position in the current Washington conversations in which that country is seeking an increase of about six cents per pound in the price of copper sold to the United States.
The continued failure

-825X1k
year of the US-Chilean agreement of May 1951 may approximate 100,000 metric tons.
Chile's free-disposal copper quota for the first
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FAR EAST
HR70-14 HR70-14
7. 7.
N o r t h Korean armored division d i v i s i o n continues c o n t i n u e s training t r a i n i n g north north North of of Pyongyang: Pyongyang: A communication communication on on 11 April A p r i l from f rom "Number "Number 109," loan i d e n t i f i e d as the t h e 2nd Tank Regiment of the t h e 105th 105th N o r t h Korean identified North s t a t e d "concerning " c o n c e r n i n g the unit u n i t move....I agreed Tank D i v i s i o n , stated Division, move....I agreed it. W e shall s h a l l be be quartered q u a r t e r e d in i n the t h e barracks b a r r a c k s by by the t h e end end of of t o it. to We A p r i l . Taphyon-dong ( 2 0 miles n o r t h of of Pyongyang) April. Taphyon-dong (20 miles north Pyongyang) is suitable. suitable."
1 April A p v i l message message from frnm the t h e same same unit u n i t stated s t a t e d that that Another 1 Another i t was p l a n n e d to t o start s t a r t training t r a i n i n g from 3 A p r i l , the the fPwhil-e "while it was planned April, t h e 1st 1st Company, Company, 1st 1st Battalion" B a t t a l i o n " were were delayed. d e l a y e d . The The t a n k a of the tanks s u g g e s t e d that t h a t at a t least l e a s t the t h e 2nd 2nd Regiment Regiment of the t h e 105th 105th message suggested N o r t h Korean Korean Armored Armored Division D i v i s i o n will w i l l be be training t r a i n i n g in i n the t h e TaphyonTaphyonNorth dong area a r e a during d u r i n g April. April. (SUEDE 5 0 1 s t Comm Comm Recon Recon Grp Grp Korea, Korea, (SUEDE 501st 15RSM/9890; 3 3 0 t h Comm Comm Recon Recon Co C o Korea, Korea, ALT-385, ALT-385, 2 2 Apr A p r 52) 52) 15RSM/9890; 330th
Comment: The continued c o n t i n u e d presence p r e s e n c e of of this this d ivision division t h e rear areas during during A p r i l is another a n o t h e r indication i n d i c a t i o n that that the rear areas April Communistsdo not n o t intend i n t e n d to t o launch launch an a n all-out a l l - o u t offensive offensive Communistsdo t h e immediate future. futuro. the

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Russian night-fighter Russian night-fighter Rilot pilot leads leads MIG-15 unit in in Manchuria: messages designated "Yehfeimaofu," ehfeimaofu ,w Manchuria: Recent Recent Chinese Ch inese mmsssages a e a t e d Chinese transliteration Efimov, as e nansl i t e r a t i o n for for the the Russian Russian name Efimov. Tatungkou pilot of of a a trainer trainer MIG-15 from from Anshan possibly to Tatungkou on 30 March, and 30 March, and as as lead lead pilot pilot of nine nine MIG's MIG's on a round-robin round-robin flight from Anshan Anshan on on 2 2 April. April. This is the the first first mention mention of of flight from This is in intercepts intercepts since since December December 1951 1951 when the Manchurian Manchurian Efimov in when the tactical tactical network network disappeared disappeared from from the the air. air. At that that time time Efimov was an LA-11 conventional conventional night-fighter nightfighter was in in command command of ofanLA-11 unit unit at at Anshan. Anshan. The M1G-15'~ The Air Air Force Force comments comments that that the the association association of MIG-15's with with Efimov suggests suggests that that his his LA-11 LA-11 unit unit may have have converted converted from to jets. jets. (SUEDE USAFSS AFB from conventional conventional fighters fighters to USAFBS Brooks Brooks AFB ODD-2-21153, 1 Apr; Apc; Air Air Force Force Roundup Roundup 66, 66, 3 3 Apr Apr 52) 52) ODD-2-21153, 1
Comment: Comment: The The enemy's enemy's night night interception interception attempts attempts have have generally generally been been ineffective. ineffective. Conversion Conversion of of this this night night fighter fighter unit.to jets will will strengthen strengthen Communist Communist defense defense of of Northwest Northwest unit to jets Korea, but no no MIG-15's MIG-15's at at present present are are used as as night interceptors. interceptors. Korea, but
TOP SECRET SUEDE
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7 April 1952
US OFFICIALS ONLY
OCI no. 5153

Copy No.
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NIN 10 WINES a BECONS
CENT&
wmoimaY
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NthARCHIVAL RECORD
PLEASE ICTIIMI TO
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS, 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW,
GENERAL
1.
Three committees have been formed: International trade, with Lange as chairman and vice chairmen from Great Britain, the Soviet Union, Communist China and Italy; economic cooperation, with Boyd-Orr as chairman and vice chairmen from the Soviet Union and Pakistan; under-developed areas, with the chairman from India and vice chairmen from France and
Italy.
British and French delegates are reported to have had private meetings with Chinese Communist delegates. (C Moscow 1587, 3 Apr 52)
Comment: The organization of the conference into committees is a concession to non-Communist criticism of conference plans for mass meetings.
The committee on international trade, possibly the crux of the whole conference, will be directed by an Orbit chairman and vice chairman. Western Europe is the best represented of the non-Orbit areas on the committees, while the Middle East, Latin America and Southeast Asia have apparently been given no committee positions despite the interest shown in these areas for the conference. This lends support to the various estimates that Western Europe is the primary target of the Soviet Union's economic counteroffensive. The private meetings between French and British and Chinese Communist delegates may be for the purpose of exploring trade possibilities between these countries recently suggested by conference organizers in Moscow.
SECRET
Committee positions are allotted at the World Economic Conference: THe US Minbassy in Moscow reports that the sessions of the World Economic Conference will be equally divided between plenary meetings and committee meetings.
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SECRET SOVIET UNION
2.
Soviet retail price cuts offset by heavier taxes in The US Embassy in Moscow reports official estimates TUT the people of the Soviet Union will save 28 billion rubles in 1952 because of the reduction in retail prices (C Moscow 1577, 2 Apr 52) effected on 1 April.
1952:
3,
Finnish Premier regains unanimous support of his party: Finnish Premier Kekkonen has withdrawn his resignation following a unanimous vote of confidence accorded him on 2 April at a meeting of his political party, the Agrarians. The Agrarian Party also fully approved Kekkonen's economic stabilization policy. The US Legation in Helsinki comments that these developments appear to represent a sweeping repudiation of Kekkonen's critics within his own party at least for the time being. (R Helsinki 401, 3 Apr 52)
Comment: Well informed observers believed when Kekkonen offered his resignation that it was merely a tactic to bring his party back into line. During recent months the Premier has suffered most criticism from his own party group in the Finnish Diet.

EASTERN EUROPE
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Comment: The alleged 28 billion savings is more than cancelled out by increases of 15.1 billion rubles in turnover taxes, 4 billion rubles in direct taxes, and 9.1 billion rubles in compulsory loans , which will amount to at least 28.2 billion rubles.
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FAR EAST There under Chinese direction: Communists not exercises any r y Japanese nese ommun st enceta te according is no ev Japanese Communist Party, direct control over the that the Japanese and Chinese Commuof It is known primarily for the exchange to CINCFE. seeks and maintain liaison, nist Parties indications that the JCP CINCFE and there are propaganda, its policies and prOgrams. approbation of heavily been more values CCP that the JCP has always it mainnotes, however, Communist Party, and that the Soviet in Tokyo. influenced by Soviet representatives liaison with tains direct (S Tokyo 1208, 28 Feb 52) criticism of the Japanese reversal of JCP Comment: The Cominform's 1950, which forced a to the Moscow proComma-FigIn January continuing adherence Sovietcontrol over the JCP. policy, as well as a amply demonstrates paganda line, 1950, nowever, in enjoining indicates Peiping's success in September of the party to unite, the two opposing factions to Chinese influence. that the JCP is responsive
in Korea, reported: orea Preparations for Communist offensive ommun or a Pre ara ions
4.
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began moving southeast on the Two Chinese Communist armies in east zentral Korea near staging areas additional Four 28 March from according to this report. offensive. Four 39th Parallel, been alerted for the have also are scheduled Chinese armies now in the east coast area corps North Korean to participate. firm indications that Communist major offensive in Comment: There are no obintend to launch another forceg-117roirea possible, however, that a limited It is the the near future. undertaken in eastern Korea, where UN jective offensive may be reported preParations, terrain. point of the apparent focal amount of North Korean forces hold a considerable
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missioulallovet-ea: cu. au-, obCommunist MIG-15 fliesphoto ITRI-SiNaii-analutn AprITT-W-WITTCYETt' in two mid-wing fuel 2 jet fighter with Communist MIG-15 22,000 feet to 17,000 served a altitude of The MIedived from an
tanks.
On
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SECRET another feet over Suwon airbase, then proceeded to Kimpo, jet turned Over Kimpo, the enemy important UN airfield altitude. toward Seoul, where it again dived to a lower
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This UNCURK actiOn is the first result of a concenenTfort to improve the calibre of the UN organization all which, since the outbreak of war, had gradually lost UNCURK to observe the ROK failure to invite effectiveness. UNCURK early 1952 by-election indicated the low ebb of influence.
Comment:
8.
The Peiping may agree to investigation of its BW charges: impression from Indian Ambassador to Peiping has received the is a "considerable a Chinese Vice Foreign Minister that there possibility" that the Chinese will agree to an impartial intercharges. national investigation of their biological warfare with Peiping's Pannikar expected to discuss this subject Foreign Minister, Chou En-lai, on 5 or 7 April. that any The Indian Foreign Office advised Pannikar body should have full freedom to international investigative concerned, investigation in the localities undertake independent (S New Delhi evidence submitted to it. as well as to review 3617, 4 Apr 52)

SECRET
7.
The UNCURK decides to observe South Korean elections: Rehabilitation United Nations Commission for Unification and a formal in Korea (UNCURK) decided in late March to conduct 25 April and elections scheduled for observation of the local South Korean officials 10 May, according to Ambassador Muccio. intention informally of the Commission's are being notified but no invitation from the ROK is baing requested. the ROK to Muccio comments that it is in the interest of The scrutiny, have its elections held under international Plimsoll, high UN official, and Ambassador credits Cordier, a for this the Australian delegate, with responsibility both (C decision and for putting new life in the Commission. Pusan 966, 4 Apr 52)
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The Desperate plight of Americans in China reported: I reports that American Torisrifteneral in Hong Kong lin Shanghai telephoned the G/ that the plight of company's Hong Kong office and declared He was afraid, not so American businessmen was desperate. much of jail, as of. "the other thing." authentic report The Consul General calls attention to an missionary on 7 arrest of an American from Tsingtao of the indicating that the seizure might March under circumstances (C propaganda campaign. be connected with the germ warfare Hong Kong 2791, 3 Apr 52) in China are subjected Comment: All Western businessmen condition for permisfinancial demands as a to exrciFft6Eate are still in sion to leave the country. Over 200 Americans arrest. Communist China, nearly 40 of them under
I
raids" in China: reports on "American germ air newly arrived at Hong Kong from raids alleged American germ air has supplied detalig on the single searchthere on 5 and 8 March. During the alerts, a while antiairlight played in one direction for two hours, all directions. No planes craft batteries fired wildly in were heard or seen on either date. face masks and On 9 March, hundreds of children wearing thousands of equipped with fly swatters and bottles, and For days afterwards, soldiers were led out to collect insects. the police led people on insect hunts. lis convinced that there While\ Chinese believe the were no raids, he states that many (C Hong Kong 2802, 2 Apr 52) Communist BW charges.
I 1
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for Indochina Letourneau considered best man available the French GovernSaigon believes that post:--Mlnister Heath in appointing Minister for ment' made the best possible choice in Commissioner in IndoAssociated Sttes, Jean Letourneau, High has the personal Heath explains that Letourneau china. familar with the qualifications necessary for the post, is of American situation, and has a "friendly understanding" 52) (C Saigon 1935, 4 Apr policy.
position as a Since Letourneau retains his Comment: assignment may be member of the Pinay government, his new
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interpreted as an indication of French determination to push for a solution of the Indochina problem. The important decisions on Indochina policy, however, which will still be made in Paris, aretpt to suffer by his absence from the capital. LetourneaU's appointment is not being received with much enthusiasm in Vietnam. He has a rather low opinion of the ability of the Vietnamese to maintain their independence, is identified in the minds of many Vietnamese with and he French equivocation on the subject of negotiations with the Viet Minh.
12
French plan to reduce training program for Vietnamese recruits: A French defense official informed the American Legation in Saigon that the call-up of the fourth increment of Vietnamese draftees under the two-month training program Lack of money and the need will be postponed indefinitely. to use the camp training cadres in the activation of regular Vietnam Army units were given as the reasons. The Legation considers the French decision evidence that the mobilization program has proved less useful than anticipated and that it was designed principally forrsychological (C Saigon 1931, 4 Apr 52) purposes.
This report indicates that the time and effort Comment: expended since the training program started last Octoberdmight have been more advantageously employed if existing irregular units had been transferred into regular army formations. These irregulars number over 200,000.
13
Netherlands condemns Indonesian imprisonment of its Prompted by strong pressure in Parliament, a Dutch 17276-TOtTl5ffice official has asserted that the nationals of no other country in the "free world" have received as bad treatment as the Dutch have in Indonesia. As of last November, 108 Dutchmen were under arrest and awaiting trial, about half of whom had been detained longer than six months. Indonesian Foreign Office promises of information have not been forthcoming.
natioHYMT
Attributing the situation to an "exaggerated Indonesian conception of its newly won sovereignty," the Dutch official stated that his government prefers not to take reprisals which are allowable under international law. Privately, the
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Foreign Office admits that it probably will not submit the problem to the Union Court of Arbitration, hoping that the new Indonesian Government will be more effective in controlling its local authorities, who ordered most of the arrests. (R The Hague 1043, 2 Apr 52) Parliamentary attacks, especially by the rightComment: wing groups, against the passivity of the Dutch Government's policy toward Indbnesia have been increasingly severe. A specific target is expected to be the government's failure to take action against Indonesia for its seizure of Dutch vessels enroute to New Guinea.
14.
25X1C
Ceylonese Government dissolves parliament and calls immediate electionsfloid Soulbury, Governor General of Ceylon, proclaimed dissolution of parliament effective 8 April 1952 and set new elections for 28 April to 31 May 1952. The new parliament will meet 10 June 1952, The Governor General 25X1C believes that the United National Party now in power will retain its position by holding immediate elections. says that the Akuressa by-elections, in sonthern Ceylon, (S Colombo 558, 3 Apr; R FBIS, 4 Apr 52) will be cancelled. Before the recent death of popular Prime Minister Comment: D. S. Senanayake, the United National Party planned to delay the elections as long as possible so that party forces could By calling parliamentary elections consolidate their position. at once, the party can take advantage of the personal popularity andmemory of the late Prime Minister whose aura now falls about his son, Dudley Senanayake, the new Prime Minister. Also, dissolution of parliament and timely elections may discourage defections from the United National Party and prevent leftist-Communist parties from gaining strength, particularly in Akuressa -- the heart of Communist Party The Akuressa parliamentary seat beenme influence in Ceylon. vacant upon the death on 30 December 1951 of W. P. A. Wickramasinghe, brother of the secretary-general of the Ceylon Communist Party, and a supporter of that party.
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SOUTH ASIA
With the appointment of the Sultan of Jogjakarta as Indonesian Defense Minister, two serious difficulties -- the lack of internal security and the absence of administrative efficiency on a local level -- may be substantially ameliorated.
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NEAR EAST - AFRICA

15.
The Iranian financial collapse not necessarily imminent: Iranian Government, by resorting al special devices such as indirect loans from the National Bank, floating an internal loan, and transfer of uncommitted foreign exchange, has raised sufficient funds to cover its salary and wage commitments for the last two months of the Iranian year which ended on 20 March and will probably be able to meet its other year-end obligations without unusual difficulty.
In order to meet current financial obligations, has improvised successfully for months. It would be difficult to estimate the length of time it could continue to function by reducing the government payroll and facilities. However, the increasing financial and economic deterioration has forced the government to consider the unpopular step of debasing the currency. The new Majlis, with its strong National Front representation, might be amenable to taking such a step as the only means of maintaining Iran's freedom,
the
IniTrii Government
Comment:
16.
Minis-fol.-MTinterior: 25X1C givenl power.
The Minister, Maraghi Bey, apparently expects the resignation of Hilali, the postponement of elections, his own accession to power on the basis of a strong program for social reform, and, should the Anglo-Egyptian dispute still not be settled, an ultimatum from Farouk giving the British 60 to 90 days to satisfy national aspirations. Should these not be 'concludes that "a national struggle 25X1C satisfied, I would begin upder Maraghi's direction."
1
Egyptian King may be planning new government under present The Egyptian Minister of Interior has ra strong implication" that he and King Farouk are planning the Minister's accession to

SECRET
8
The Ministry of Finance is considering expansion of the note issue and use of the gold note cover reserve. The American Embassy believes that Prime Minister Mossadeq might be able to persuade the Majlis to dilute the currency on the basis of "patriotic expediency." Even without such Majlis action, the Embassy believes it possible that the government could carry on financially through May 1952. (C Tehran 3636, 24 Mar 52)
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that the possible This is the first indication be followed by Comment: government might resignation of the Hilali Maraghi is considered chaos. something other than general able and ambitious. "absolutely untrue" by There have been rumors, termed Farouk is not fully Cabinet, that rumors is the Chief of the Royal Lending some credence to these Hilali. to take supporting resisted royal pressure a report that Hilali has King's friends who are notoriously into his cabinet two of the corrupt.
17.
elections likely to be postponed: Egyptian parliamentary that the Egyptian'parliawill King,FaTiouk has stated categorically to take place on 18 Ma now scheduled mentary elections, rot be held! previous indications that Comment: There have been date. Farouk would postpone the 18 May election
in Sudan: British Governor General Egypt denounces action ofhas the British Governor denounced The Egyptian Foreign Minister constitution to submitting a new General in the Sudan for considered The Foreign Minister, who breaking off the Legislative Assembly. seriously contemplated the act "provocative," British Ambassador. talks with the censorseverely limited by its Egyptian newspapers, though imperBritain of extending ship, have unanimously accused from Egypt. separate the Sudan ialisn and of a new move to 1728, 4 Apr 52) 3 Apr; C Cairo (S Cairo 1718, does not lead If the Governor General's action Anglo-Egyptian Comment: current preliminary to a complete breakdown in harden the Hilali government talks, it will at least certainly Sudan and Suez issues. against making concessions on the
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18
19.
in talks with Egypt: British see less promising outlook conversation between the Egyptian The results of the 1 April Ambassador make the prospect Foreign Minister and the British to the British Foreign Office. for agreement look less bright to a formula that would not The Foreign Office is agreeable Egypt to participate in a specifically and publicly commit objects to the Egyptian regional defense arrangement, but
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SECRET the removal of all British phrasing, which would necessitate military units from Egypt. if Britain and Egypt Office hopes that The British Foreign statement as a basis for negotiations, can agree on a joint will agree to call offthe elections the the Egyptian Prime Minister constitution in order to conduct stands and perhaPs suspend the As the situation negotiations in a calm atmosphere. feel that Hilali could not win now, Foreign Office officials agreement would become useless. the elections, and a negotiated 2 and 4 Apr 52) (S London 4384 and 4450, of the British Foreign Office in Comment: The willingness promise of Egyptian participation not tinnWitcm a public East is a concession from the position the defense of the Middle 13 March, according to which taken by the British Cabinet on only in exchange for British combat troops would be withdrawn to regard the estabBritain still seems strategic necessity. such a commitment. air defenses in Egypt as a lishment of joint face severe criticism Turkish Republican Party leaders epu ican arty, ur is e ongress o e from mem ers p: 26 March to 30 March and founded by Kemal Ataturk, met from and administration. strongly criticized the party's program emerging as the strongest and Former Prime Minister Gunaltay, the Republican leaders, directly most popular figure among organizational failures and attacked the Secretary-General's President-General Inonu's leadership. less openly criticized that the Republican leaderThe American Embassy believes for the 1954 hold the party together at that ship will attempt to Failure to make a better showing general elections. unlikely that would make it time than in the 1950 elections present form. (C Ankara 995, the party could continue in its 1 Apr 52) PartY's continued popularity ranks over Comment: The Democratic in the Republican Party's effort has en-FM-fed dissension latter in its adopted by the the proper policy to be The Republican Party's traditional to return to power. Erim and Kasim Gulek, have been leaders, such as Inonu, Nihat more liberal group increasingly criticized by the younger, Despite the recent resignations led by GunaltaY and Cavid Oral. who protested the "chief of several Republican deputies there is no evidence that mentality" of Inonu and his group, groups is yet great enough to the dissension between the two party. bring about dissolution of the SECRET
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21.
Anti-Communist French labor campaign suffers setback: A "severe blow" may be dealt efforts toward collaboratiob among the principal non-Communist French labor organizations by a sharp split in the leadership of the rightist Independent Labor A failure to mend this split would benefit Confederation. considerably the Communist-led General Labor Confederation. The moderate majority of the Independent Labor Confederntion's executive committee recently defied an attempt by the minority and the organization's principal financial backer to (S Paris 6055, place ex-Vichyites in certain top positions. 3 Apr 52)
Comment: The Independent Labor Confederation seeks an inter-confederal grouping of non-Communist labor representatives. The present leaders of Force Ouvriere, one of the two principal non-Communist labor organizations in France, would be excluded because of their unaggressiveness and deep distrust of the Catholic Labor Confederation.
22.
Gaullists no longer considered a French opposition party: The Gaullists can no longer be considered part of the parliamentary opposition to the Pinay government, in the opinion of The Embassy sees in the strong the American Embassy in Paris. Gaullist support for Pinny's budgetary program evidence that the RPF is badly divided and that its leaders are afra.id to (C Paris 6089, call for opposition tactics at this time. 0 Apr 52)
In the past De Gaulle's strategy has permitted Comment: his followers to support the government on specific measures consonant with his own program. While De Gaulle is probably wary of running counter to public opinion, in view of the current interest in giving Pinay a chance, it is unlikely that he has modified to any degree his basic opposition to cooperation with "the parties."
23.
French leadership in agricultural pool planning weakened: The Pinay governmenT-Eis greatly weakened France's leadership in the planning for a European agricultural pool by supporting the position of the French National Management Association, which opposes the "green pool" because it would destroy the
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association's exploitation of cartels based on restricted The future French position will depend upon farm markets. leaders' ability to consolidate forces and overcome this political opposition.
A high French Government official predicts that the plenary "green pool" session, now due to open about 23 April, of will end without decision, but will appoint a committee and make recommendations, as was experts to study problems (C Paris done in the preliminary stages of the Schuman Plan. 6081, 3 Apr 52)
24
Netherlands regards continuance of European Payments Union essential: The Dutch Government considers the European Payments Union essential for the preservation and expansion of intra-European multilateral trade, which it holds is a necessary basis for rearmament and for maintaining a standard of living high enough to resist further Communist inroads. The possibility is of a return to bilateralism and quantitative restrictions considered real in view of the present low level of western European gold reserves. The functioning of the EPU indicates that its reserves within the existing quota system are inadequate, and the Netherlands regards these reserves, which provide for swings in creditor-debtor positions, as the key to the importance of the Payments Union, The Dutch feel that each EPU member should contribute a fair share toward the proposed additional reserves (C The Hague TOMUS 184, 1 Apr 52) of 178 million dollars.
25.
American Embassy believes Irish budget proposals may precipitate general election: The American Embassy in Dublin believes thate is a strong possibility of an early general election in Ireland because of widespread hostile reaction been to price increases provided for in the budget which has To fill a 42-million-dollar gap presented to Parliament. between estimated revenues and expenditures, the government
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alleged that Comment: Non-Communist labor leaders have himself, opposes all current Pinay, a conservative businessman His such as the agricultural pool. long-range economic plans government, moreover, has the support of deputies repreSenting conservative rural elements, apt to reflect the narrow qpinions of many French farmers rather than farm organizations which fully appreciate the advantages of agricultural integration.
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has proposed higher taxes, lower subsidies on bread and flour, and the elimination of subsidies on tea, sugar, and butter. (R Dublin 153, 3 Apr 52)
Comment: So long as the De Valera government has to depenfliZE-the support of five independents to maintain its parliamentary majority, there is the prospect of a general election; but there is no indication of any clear-cut policy differences between the two major parties.
Ireland.
26
Norway insists on maintaining trade with Orbit: Officials of the Norwegian Foreign Office and Ministry of Commerce insist upon importing 275,000 metric tons of coal from Poland rather than increasing coal shipments from the United States. While Norway could finance increased imports of American coal in 1952, the government argues that it cannot afford to use dollars indefinitely to meet its coal deficit, particularly in view of the uncertainty of US economic aid and its limited extent. Norwegian officials believe that if they fail to reach an agreement with Poland now it will be difficult to reopen negotiations later. (S Oslo 865, 2 Apr 52)
Comment: Like Denmark, Norway hesitates for both political and economic reasons to sever trade relations with eastern Europe. Norwegian officials are currently willing to pay for the Polish coal with 750 tons of aluminum.
27.
Swedish Defense Minister proposes extended training period: Swedish Defense MInister gilsson has proposed that the period of conscription be extended from 10 to 13 months. Noncommissioned officers, officers, and those assigned to special duty, would receive further instruction. (U FBIS, Stockholm, 2 Apr 52)
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13
The presentation of the "harshest budget in the history of the state" follows conferences in London between Irish and British Treasury officials on the necessity for improving the sterling area's financial position. The Irish Government, evidently impressed by the seriousness of the country's balance of payments deficit last year, which was equivalent to 185 million dollars, has announced its intentions of also reducing non-sterling imports. The Opposition, on the other hand, has maintained consistently that there is no economic crisis, but has made no clear statement of its own financial policy for
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Comment: As part of its postwar demobilization program, Sweden in 1g48 reduced the period of compulsory military service Subsequently the increasingly precarious from 12 to 9 months. international scene stimulated a demand for more extensive training and a token increase of one month was made in 1951. The American Army Attache, however, considers an extension to 18 months as the minimum need of the Swedish Army.
LATIN AMERICA
28.
Ballivian's action indicates that the junta is approaching Further unproductive sessions between the end of its patience. the negotiators can "break the camel's back," and result in a wave of anti-US sentiment not only in Bolivia, but throughout (R La Paz Joint Weeka 13, 28 Mar 52) Latin America. Negotiations for a long-term US-Bolivian tin Comment: contract have extended over a year, and the junta apparently believes that Bolivia's strained political and economic situation would not support another prolonged delay. Thus far there is no evidence that Bolivia has prepared to renew its campaign to mobilize Latin American support for charging the United States with "economic aggression" under article 16 of the Organization of American States. The Bolivian Foreign Minister stated in March that his country would consider taking the case before international organizations only if the subsequent decision on the tin price should be unfavorable.
29.
Leftist opposition parties in Mexico sign campaign pact: The Popular Party, the Federation of People's Parties, and the Party of the Revolution have signed a pact to draft a "minimum political platform for the present electoral campaign." Once this has been approved by these three Mexican parties, they will discuss the formulation of a list of congressional candidates to be given joint support in the coming elections. PHIS Radio, Mexico, 31 Mar 52) (R
SECRET
Bolivian President appeals to President Truman on tin President Ballivian has sent a personal letter to issue: President Truman asking his aid in obtaining a "remunerative" price for Bolivian tin. The letter, friendly in tone, stressed Bolivia's urgent need for a prompt solution of differences impeding US-Bolivian negotiations.
7 Apr 14 Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000900050001-8
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Approve Wr Release 2002/05120 : CIA-RDP79T01446A000900050001-8
SECRET the possibility of The reputed "pact" suggests the pro-Communist supporters of a worY51(Wrangement between opportunistic General Lombardo Toledano and those of the of People's Parties includes Henriquez Guzman, whose Federation Should the working agreement both leftists and conservatives. able to elect a few materialize, extreme leftists may be coalition is unlikely to the congressional deputies. However, of the administration party political dominance threaten the Institutions) which will undoubtedly (the Party of Revolutionary and whose presidential win most of the congressional seats is virtually certain to be candidate, Adolfo Ruiz Cortines, elected.
Comment:

SECRET
15
7 Apr 52
Approved ur Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01,46A000900050001-8
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US OFFICIALS ONLY
7 April 1952
CIA No. 49606 Copy No. 4E
reports has been This summarY of significant Intelligence. It does for the internal use of the Office of Current of all current reports in CIA not represent a complete coverage Comments represent the or in the Office of Current Intelligence. immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.

TO THE CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST (including S/S Cables)
Not for dissemination outside 0/CI and
0/NE.
prepared primarily
TOP SECRET
Approved,Ur Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T014.46A000900050001-8
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THE NATIONAL pus MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING MEANING OF THE
DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE 794, THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS. 793 AND TO AN TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
FAR EAST
status of Japanese official reiterates views on future Treaties In the opinion of the Soviet Mission in Tokyo: Japanese Foreign Office, any attempt by Bureau Chief of the occupying power, the Soviet Union to remain in Japan as an would be contrary after the peace treaty becomes effective, Headquarters to the 1945 Moscow Agreement which named SCAP The official also as the sole organ of occupation control. of SCAP would that the dissolution told a Diet committee for remaining in leave the 3oviet Mission no legal basis unable to force its views Japan. Admitting that Japan was of armistice beon the USSR, he contended that the state (R S/S Tokyo 2107, tween Japan and the USSR will continue. 4 Apr 52) Peace Treaty Comment: The provision in the Japanese of the members of the requiFTERFiltification by a majority USSR or designed to prevent the Far Eastern Commission was the position of any other FEC member nation from inheriting
SCAP.
2.
United States urges Japan to modify its position in The Department of the Sino-Japanese peace negotiations: American Political Adviser in Tokyo State has requested the Government that its proposals at to inform the Japanese with the Sino-Japanese peace negotiations are inconsistent letter the commitments expressed in Yoshida's 24 December The Department points out that the Japanese to Dulles. conformity with the are committed to negotiate a treaty "in
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if no The Japanese Government on 16 March indicated that date of allied decision were forthcoming by the effective Mission the peace treaty regarding the status of the Soviet personnel would treat the Soviet in Japan, the government status. as ordinary foreign nationals without diplomatic
1.
7 Apr 52
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principles set out in the multilateral treaty of peace," and, in the view of the United States, the Japanese Government should not attempt to exclude mention of these principles, including that of Japan's obligation to pay reparations. (S S/S to 1nkyo 2646, 3 Apr 52) Negotiations at Taipei are stalemated due to Comment: JapanTrEETUMpt to conclude a treaty which would not extend "victor" status to the Chinese. China, for reasons of presthis tige and its international legal status, cannot accept limitation.
3.
It is noted that the Japanese have proposed Comment: a similar technique in their negotiations with the Republic of Korea. The Japanese undoubtedly feel that their bargaining position vis-a-vis their former colonies will be considerably strengthened after Japan regains its sovereignty. The Chinese however, hoping for United States assistance, are likely to hold out for whatever concessions can be gained during the current negotiations.
4.
Japanese urging Koreans to conclude limited treaty: The Japanese are pressing the Koreans to conclude agreements on only three of the five issues currently under negotiation: amity and basic "relations," the nationality of Korean residents in Japan and the transfer of vessels, according to Acting US Political Adviser Bond in Tokyo. Fisheries and claims would be deferred pending further "fact finding."
Wording of the documents covering the first three issues is substantially agreed upon and thus the Koreans are maneuvered into a corner as a result of the imminence of Japanese sovereigntY,which may force them to accept Japanese Bond believes Japanese appreciation of this situproposals. ation accounts for continued Japanese optimism on the out(C Tokyo 2118, 4 Apr 52) come of negotiations. TOP SECRET
7 Apr 52 2 Approved For Release 2002/05120 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000900050001-8
Japanese to propose simplified treaty with Chinese In an attempt to resolve the impasse in the Nationalists: Sino-Japanese treaty negotiations, Japan will propose that maincertain controversial matters pertaining to the Chinese This under negotiation. land be dropped from the treaty now will permit an immediate resumption of full diplomatic relations between Japan and Formosa, leaving controversial substantive matters to be left for subsequent separate negotia(S S/S Tokyo 2123, 4 Apr 52) ion.
TOP SECRET sensitive to any slight The South Koreans, remain particularly touch), relations, While in thriTigternational of Japanese superiority. manifestation any that the South as regards a remote possibility outmaneuvered by the not probable, it is enraged at being the negotiations. Government, Korean indefinitely from Japanese, might withdraw
Comment:
WESTERN EUROPE
50
financing the construction In an endeavor to maintain force. use of the American air partnership and to maximize dollar desire a "rephasing" the concept of USAF-RAF 1953, the British receipts in 1952 and the program. participation in of their financial Britain was to share to be Under the present agreements 1951 slice, and the US was equally in the cost of the cost of the 1952 slice. These, responsible for the entire 1953 program, may reach the together with the proposed dollars, but no payments have yet to pay equivalent of 280 million have now offered in effect The Britilh 49 been made. to a total contribution of of all costs up S London 4372, 20 percent (TS London 4234, 25 Mar:, million dollars. 1 Apr 52) represents a distinct policy Comment; This offer British suggestions that the United change from two previous capital cost as well as responsiThe States assume the whole of the airfields. bility for the subsequent maintenance to contribute the UK might agree method American Embassy believes of the total cost, provided a as much as 25 percentmaximize British dollar receiPts in can be worked out to 1952 and 1953.
.
.

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3
agreement for used_y_xisaLl_orces Eil-aigglited a new an more comprehensive in England for the of airfields
overnment is r e inaL2E9492.111),LnaltarpWr-n---lentonairfields in Eng an

:
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5 . 5.
Chinese again a g a i n report r e p o r t civilian c i v i l i a n suffering s u f f e r i n g in i n North p o r t h Korea: Korea: Artillery The supply s u p p l y component of o f the t h e Chinese C h i n e s e Communist 7th 7th A r t il l e r y D i v i s i o n in i n central c e n t r a l Korea reported r e p o r t e d in i n a 28 March message that that Division q P . . . . t h e r e is a large l a r g e segment i v i l i a n population "....there segment of of the c civilian population which is w i t h o u t food." food." The message urged that t h a t Chinese Communist u nits without units some contributions c o n t r i b u t i o n s "to " t o alleviate a l l e v i a t e some of of these t h e s e disdiss h o u l d make some should tressing t r e s s i n g cases." cases." The sender s e n d e r suggested s u g g e s t e d that t h a t Chinese Chinese rice r i c e might might f o r Korean straw for roof thatching. t h a t c h i n g . (SUEDE (SUEDE 501st 501st be exchanged for Recon Grp Grp Korea, Korea, M-1908, M-1908, 28 28 Mar Mar 52) 52) Comm Recon
.
A l l . indications, i n d i c a t i o n s , however, however, point p o i n t to t o a continued c o n t i n u e d adequate adequate All l level e v e l of of s supply upply f for or b both o t h Chinese Chinese Communist Communist and and N North o r t h Korean Korean m military i l i t a r y units. units.
6
North Korean aircraft a i r c r a f t fly f l y from from Yenchi Yenchi to t o Sinuiju: S i n u i j u : A 3 April April s e n t from from Yenchi,-Manchuria, Yenchi. Manchuria. to t o BUkden Mukden reported r e u o r t e d ". message sent will w i l l take off on on 5 5 April April'.'. from'Yenchi v i a Changchun C h b g c h u n and and from Yenchi via Shenyang (Mukden) (Mukden) to t o Sinuiju. Sinuiju. M ission: t r a n s p o r t and deliver deliver Mission: transport ield r eporting u nit o b s e r v e s that t h a t Yenchi is $ 6 the the .." The The f field reporting unit observes h e a d q u a r t e r s for f o r the t h e North Korean A ir F orcePs t r a i n i n g command headquarters Air Force's training and that except bombt h a t all a l l types t y p e s of conventional c o n v e n t i o n a l aircraft, aircraft, e x c e p t light l i g h t bombers, are stationed s t a t i o n e d there. there. A p r e v i o u s movement from Yenchi ococprevious YAK-18 trainers t r a i n e r s flew flew to t o Fengcheng, Fengcheng, north n o r t h of of Antung. Antung. c u r r e d when YAK-18 curred S e c u r i t y Grp, Orp, Johnson Johnson AB Japan, J a p a n , No. 284, 284, 4 4 Apr Apr 52) 52) (SUEDE 6920 Security
.
Comment: C i v i l i a n food shortages, s h o r t a g e s , already a l r e a d y critical, critical, are are Civilian Comment: p r o b a m n g accentuated a c c e n t u a t e d by by the t h e traditional t r a d i t i o n a l "spring " s p r i n g hunger" hungert1 probably-being --the f o l l o w i n g consumption consumption of he f all r ice h a r v e s t and --the period following of t the fall rice harvest t he m a t u r i n g of the t h e summer grains g.rains in i n June. June. the maturing
a .
a .
..
. .
-lP
Comment: T h i s message is too fragmentary t o e valuate This to evaluate o t i n g , however, hat r e c e n t messages p r o p e r l y . I t is proper.177--it is worth worth n noting, however, t that recent being s t o r e d at at c ertain i n d i c a t e d that t h a t trainer t r a i n e r aircraft a i r c r a f t are being have indicated stored certain a i r f i e l d s in in N o r t h Korea. Korea. airfields North
7. 7.
.
a .
. .
Korea restricts restricts t troop tobacco S e c u r i t y ,Ministry M i n i s t r y in i n North Korea roop t obacco Securit in 31 M arc ration: r a t i o n : On a r c h a message, sa ween two message,passed u n i den e n t i f ied passe, between wo un WaFTE-Korean units,stated -%-Korean u n i t s , s t a t e d that t h a t "according " a c c o r d i n g to t o the t h e Military M i l i t a r y Orders . and he o rder o f the t h e Racial R a c i a l (Social?) ( S o c i a l ? ) Security S e c u r i t y Ministry, Ministry, and t the order of i n v e s t i g a t e the t h e members who do not n o t smoke, and from from 1 1 March March investigate e x c e p t them them from from cigarette c i g a r e t t e supply." supply.11 (SUEDE (SUEDE 5 01st C o r n Recon Grp except 501st Comm Korea, SK-I-7, SK-1-7, 2 2 Apr Apr 52) 52)
.
.
8 Apr 52
TOP SECtiET SUEDE ~ PPROVED RELEASE I 'APPROVED FOR RELEASE

IDATE: DATE: 18-Mar-2010 18-Mar-2010
515,p
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'P-
Comment: This T h i s message is is unique because it i t suggests s u g g e s t s the the d e g r e e of authority a u t h o r i t y exercised exercised by by the the state s t a t e security s e c u r i t y organ o r g a n of of degree North Korea. S i n c e tobacco is essentially e s s e n t i a l l y a morale booster, booster, Since North Korea. i t s supply s u p p l y would properly p r o p e r l y be be a a /Unction f u n c t i o n of of the t h e Security S e c u r i t y MinisMinisits
try. try.
8. 8.
f o r North Korean Korean combat combat corps c o r p s moves moves from from Supply depot for western w e s t e r n sector: sector: A recently r e c e n t l y availabIe.11 available 1 1 January J anuary communication communication 'from from the t h e North Korean IV I V Corps s supply upply c chief hief t to o t the h e 23rd 23rd Brigade Brigade r reported e p o r t e d ' that t h a t "since " s i n c e the t h e I Corps is moving moving all of of t the he m materials aterials from its i t s present p r e s e n t location location (in w e s t e r n Korea) Korea) , you (in western are to t o organize organize *I1 (SUEDE ASAPAC Japan Spot Spot No, No. 3309A, 3309A, ." (SUEDE 4 Apr 52) 4 52)
.
..
. .
9, 9.
N o r t h Korean Korean militar military p ersonnel o r d e r e d to to h e l p eiviliaL civilinrNorth personnel ordered help farmers: pr farmorst A Nort North Korean 7orean message o of 4 Ap r i l from rom-t the.'East e as CoaeJt ca~jc K2Fn.5 H eadquarters a t Songhyon-ni rders e very m a n of of an ununUlfeiiiT Headquarters at Songhyon-ni o orders every man i d e n t i f i e d naval n a v a l unit at a t Songjin S o n g j l n to t o "assist " a s s i s t the t h e farmers f a r m e r s for for identified seven s e v e n days." d a y s O P ' (501s.t: 52) (501st Comm Comm Recon Recon Grp Korea, Korea, 15RSM/10072, 15RSM/10072, 6 Apr 52) Comment: O t h e r recent r e c e n t Communist messages from Korea Korea have have Other indicated that t h a t the t h e enemy is is taking t a k i n g advantage advantage of the t h e static s t a t i c milimilitary situation t ary s i t u a t i o n to to improve improve the t h e food food situation s i t u a t i o n in i n North North Korea. Korea.
10 10.*
Q m m w i c s r t i o n s suggest s u g g e s t presence p r e s e n c e of of another'Chinese a n o t h e r ' c h i n e s e Communist Cgmmunist Communications i n Korea: The Army ko'up GroUp ln far East reports that March The'Far E a s t Command r eports t h a t a 21 M arc6 Chinese Communist message mentioned mentioned the t h e 505th, 5 0 5 t h , 508th, 5 0 8 t h , and 524th ChiniWgniiiiiErgriiessage Regiments. T The h e first f i r s t two are organic o r g a n i c to t o the t h e 57th 5 7 t h Chinese Chinese CommunCommunIst A r m y , while w h i l e the the latter l a t t e r is is subordinate s u b o r d i n a t e to t o the t h e 59th 5 9 t h Army. Army. The ist Army, net over n et o v e r which these these units u n i t s were were mentioned mentioned was was in i n the t h e Pyongyang Pyongyang Singye Singye area area of of western w e s t e r n Korea. Korea. A 24 February Chinese Chinese Communist message spoke of the t h e 174th 174th D Division i v i s i o n of t the he 5 58th 8th C Chinese h i n e s e Communist Communist

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Comment: T Comment: h e North Korean I I Corps, currently c u r r e n t l y in i n combat The in eigT5755Korea, made a i n ea-'Roreas a trans-peninsular t r a n s - p e n i n s u l a r move from from the t h e westwestern e r n sector s e c t o r in i n November 1951. 1951. T h i s message suggests s u g g e s t s that t h a t the the This c o r p s supply s u p p l y installation i . n e t a l l a t i o n followed followed a a month month or o r so so later. later. corps
Army. Army e
FECOM adds adds that t h a t the t h e 57th 5 7 t h Army A r m y is is carried c a r r i e d just j u s t north n o r t h of of the river, in east c central China, and and t h e Yalu r i v e r , the t h e 58th 5 8 t h in i n Nanyang i n east e n t r a l China, t the h e 59th 5 9 t h in i n the t h e Taiyuan area area of of north n o r t h China. China.
No conclusions c o n c l u s i o n s can c a n be be drawn drawn from.these'isolated from t h e s e i s o l a t e d messages messages and the t h e presence p r e s e n c e of of this t h i s new new force force in i n Korea Korea cannot cannot be be accepted. accepted. (SUEDE (SUEDE CINCFE CINCFE SIB SIR 475, 475, 5 5 Apr Apr 52) 52)
8 Apr 52
~-
Comment: The rise r i s e in i n Chinese Chinese Communist Communist unit u n i t identificatins identificatbs made YE1F0 communications may be be caused caused communicationsintelligence i n t e l l i g e n c eduring d u r i n g 1952 1952 may by the traffic making comparative comparative rreferences tounits by t h e San-Fan t r a f f i c making e f e r e n c e s to,units not in i n Korea. Korea.
1 2. 12
personnel orea o are Tel panr n g the r etu r n from ofp ersonnel Communists Commun s s are ri c ct i ing re urn rom Korea
i n o c u l a t i o n record and a "no-plague" no-plaguett c e r t i f i c a t e . 4n n w i t h o u t an inoculation without certificate. i n t e r c e p t from the t h e Chinese military m i l i t a r y net n e t in i n Korea Korea says says that t h a t only on y intercept some 500 of the t h o more than t h a n 800 800 persons p e r s o n s entering e n t e r i n g the t h e border border city c i t y of of Antung on 25 March March had Rad their t h e i r records r e c o r d s with w i t h them. them. (SUEDE (SUEDE 501st 501st on 25 Comm C o r n Recon Grp Korea, KoreaL,K-1949, K-1949, 1 1 Apr Apr 52) 52)

6 6
Chinese guard a gainat a i n q t plague threat t h r e a t from Korea: The Chinese Korea: .The Chinese
Comment: The numerous reports r e p o r t 6 of of plague plague insManchuria.are i n Manchuria are unconfirmed, Chinese Communist Communist messages messages hawe have u n c o n m ; although a l t h o u g h several s e v e r a l Chinese emphasized epidemic epidemic control. c o n t r o l . Communist precautions p r e c a u t i o n s are underunders t a n d a b l e in i n view view of standable of the the fact f a c t that t h a t plague plague is is endemic endemic to t o the t h e area. area. They also a l s o serve s e r v e to t o emphasize emphasize the t h e biological b i o l o g i c a l warfare w a r f a r e charges. chargers.
1
8 Apr 52 52
TOP-S-EtRET-
HR70-14 HR70-14
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3. Chinese again report civilian civilian suffering suffering in in North North Korea: Korea:
The supply component component o of the Chinese CommuThe f the Division in nist 7th Artillery Division in central central Korea Korea rereported in a a 28 28March Marchmessage message that ".... there ported in that SUEDE is a large largesegment segment of of the the civilian civilian population population SUEDE which is i s without without food." food" The message urged that Chinese Chtnese Communist units should make make some contributions "to allevithat Chinese The ate some The sender suggested that some of of these distressing diatreasing cases." cases:' rice might rice might be be exchanged exchanged for Korean straw for for roof roof thatching. thatching.
Chinese Communist Communist Military 28 Mar 52 52 d r - ' f 0 8
".. .
Comment: Ctvtltan Civilian food foodshortages, shortages, already critical, probably hunger" critical, are are probablybeing beingaccentuated accentuated by by the the traditional traditional "spring ??spring hunger '' --the period between consumption of the fall rice harvest and the maturing period between consumption of the fall rice and the maturing of the summer grains grains in in June. June.
All to a acontinued continued Ail indications, however, however, point point to of supply supply for both both Chinese Chinese Communist Communist and North Korean adequate level of military units.
. 4. 4 Chinese guard against plague plague threat from from Korea: horea:
Chinese Chinese Communist Communist Military , 1 1 Apr 52 52 I( - I 74 1
Chinese Communists r e restricting the The Chinese Communistsaare restricting the fromKorea Korea of of personnel personnel without without an return from return inoculation record and and a "no-plague" "no-plague" certificate. inoculation SUEDE Chinese military military net net in in An intercept from the Chinese SUEDE Korea says says that that only only some some 500 500 of of the more than than 800 persons entering of entering the the border bordercity city ofAntung Antung on on 25 25 March had their their records recordswith withthem. them.
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SUF,DE -TOPSECRET SUEDE

APPROVED PPROVED FOR FORRELEASE RELEASE DATE: ATE: 24-Mar-2010 24-Mar-2010
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of plague plague Comment: reports of Comment: The numerous reports tn Manchuria are unconftrmed, although although several several Chinese ChtneseCommunist Communist are unconfirmed, Communistprecautions messageshave have emphasized emphasized epidemic epidemic control. control. Communist precautions messages are understandable understandable in in view view of are of the the fact fact that plague plague is is endemic endemic to to the the area. area. emphastze the the biological biological warfare charges. They also serve to emphasize

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2. 2.
North Korean antiaircraft concentrata n t i a i r c r a f t artillery a r t i l l e r y may be concentrati n g on o n eas/ e a s t coast: coast: A /Corth N o r t h KKorean o r e a n message rom a n east coast message ffrom an ing unit mentions on 3 April A p r i l "the !!the 20th 2 0 t h Regiment." Regiment."
On 4 April April a a message, message, Probably p r o b a b l y addtressed addkessed t o t h e commander to the

set up his of the t h e "21st " 2 1 s t Regiment," Regiment," orders o r d e r s him to to s et u p h i s command post in Hamhung area, area, b but continue maintaining effective i n tile the Hamhung u t tto o c ontinue m aintaining e ffective control area. c o n t r o l over o v e r his h i s units u n i t s in i n the t h e Pyongyang Pyongyang area.
AntiairComment: While only o n l y the t h e 19th, 1 9 t h , 20th 2 0 t h and 23rd A ntiaircraft are accepted a c c e p t e d in i n the t h e North N o r t h Korean c r a f t Artillery A r t i l l e r y Regiments are Army, other o t h e r evidence e v i d e n c e indicates i n d i c a t e s that that a a 21st 2 1 s t and a 22nd may Army, also e x i s t . The general g e n e r a l text t e x t of these t h e s e messages suggests suggests a l s o exist. t h a t the t h e 20th 2 0 t h and 21st 2 1 s t AAA Regiments j o i n i n g the t h e 23rd that Regiments are joining in area. i n the t h e Hamhung Hamhung area.
I n this this c o n n e c t i o n , a net n e t decrease decrease of of nearly n e a r l y ten t e n percent percent In connection, i n enemy antiaircraft a n t i a i r c r a f t weapons occurred o c c u r r e d along.major a l o n g . m a j o r enemy in r o u t e s during d u r i n g the t h e last l a s t two t w o weeks of March, communication routes March, and r e c e n t photo p h o t o reconnaissance r e c o n n a i s s a n c e in i n the t h e Wonsan area of eastern' recent eastern' Korea shows showsnew n t i a i r c r a f t artillery a r t i l l e r y installations. installations. Korea new a antiaircraft
North Korean Korean communication. communication on A Worth on 5 5 April A p r i l notes n o t e s that t h a t the the "(Mechanized?) Battalion B a t t a l i o n is "(Mechanized?) is moving from Sinsong S i n s o n g (possibly ( p o s s i b l y in in western Korea) to t o Cho'np'yong" Chotnptyongll (near ( n e a r Hamhung). Hamhung). (SUEDE (SUEDE 501st 501st w e s t e r n Korea) Comm Recon Grp Corn G r p Korea, Korea, 15RSM/9982; 15R$M/9982; 15RSM/10053, 15RSM/10053, 5 Apr; A p r ; 330th Comm Recon Co Korea, ALT-475, ALT-475, 6 6 Apr Apr 52) 52)
9 Apr 52
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5 . 5.
Front F r o n t line l i n e Chinese Communist division d i v i s i o n prepares p r e p a r e s for f o r action action in recent message, passed-from Korea: A r e c e n t message, p a s s e d from the t h e 21st 2lst i n eastern e a s t e r n Korea: Chinese its parent p a r e n t 7th 7th C h i n e s e Communist COmmunist Artillery A r t i l l e r y Regiment Regiment to t o its Artillery A r t i l l e r y Division, D i v i s i o n , indicated i n d i c a t e d that t h a t the t h e 21st 2 1 s t had had been attached attached to t o the t h e artillery a r t i l l e r y group of the t h e 203rd 303rd Chinese Communist Infantry Infantry D i v i s i o n in i n eastern e a s t e r n Korea. Korea. The message indicated I n d i c a t e d that t h a t the the Division regiment with mortar and r e g i m e n t was moving forward f o r w a r d together together w i t h the t h e mortar artillery a r t i l l e r y elements e l e m e n t s of of the t h e 203rd's 2 0 3 r d ' s artillery a r t i l l e r y group. g r o u p . The forward forward d i s p l a c e m e n t of of the t h e command command post p o s t of of the t h e 203rd D i v i s i o n was displacement Division a l s o suggested. suggested. also
Army, of of which the the Comment: The 68th 6 8 t h Chinese Communist Army, is a a component, component, o occupies eastern-most 203rd Divr-sion D i v i s i o n is c c u p i e s tthe he e astern-most p o r t i o n of portion of the t h e Chinese-held Chinese-held front. f r o n t . Recent r e p o r t s have indiindiRecent reports c a t e d that it i t was about a b o u t to t o be relieved r e l i e v e d by a sister army--the army--the cated 67th--which has deployed deployed into i n t o this t h i s sector. sector. 67th--which has
t h i s activity a c t i v i t y cannot c a n n o t be be interpreted i n t e r p r e t e d definitively, definitively, While this of recent r e c e n t reports r e p o r t s have have indicated i n d i c a t e d an a n impending impending a flurry of "offensive." i n f o r m a t i o n suggests s u g g e s t s that t h a t such such " o f f e n s i v e . 1 1 The bulk b u l k of information action place in i n the t h e eastern e a s t e r n sector. sector. a c t i o n would take t a k e place T h e r e continues c o n t i n u e s to t o be a lack l a c k of of firm f i r m indication i n d i c a t i o n of of There Communist intentions i n t e n t i o n s to t o launch l a u n c h a "general " g e n e r a l offensive" o f f e n s i v e " along along I t is e entirely n t i r e l y possible, p o s s i b l e , however, however, that that t h e entire e n t i r e front. f r o n t . It the a limited l i m i t e d objective o b j e c t i v e offensive o f C e n s i v e of some some size s i z e might be launched launched in In eastern e a s t e r n Korea Korea by by Chinese Chinese and and North North Korean Korean forces. forces.
,
,
6. 0 .
Chinese Communist 40th_Army 40th.Army may may be be preparing p r e p a r i n g for f o r combat: combat: A recent r e c e n t message, message, probably p r o b a b l y passed p a s s e d on the t h e 2nd 2nd Chinese Chi n e s e ComComm u n i s t Artillery A r t i l l e r y Division's.net, D i v i s i o n ' s , n e t , reported r e p o r t e d that t h a t "today " t o d a y personpersonmunist nel t h e artillery a r t i l l e r y unit u n i t of of the t h e 40th 4 0 t h Army A r m y arrived a r r i v e d (and (and n e l of the i n s p e c t e d ? ) my battalion. b a t t a l i o n . They were introduCed i n t r o d u c e d to to u s by the the inspected?) us 115th 1 1 5 t h Division." Division
The Far F a r East E a s t Command commented that t h a t an inspection i n s p e c t i o n of a an n a artillery rtillery u unit, n i t , currently c u r r e n t l y in in s support u p p o r t of the the 3 39th 9 t h Chinese

' 4
The F a r East E a s t Command stated s t a t e d that t h a t "the " t h e placing p l a c i n g of Far of a c o m p l e t e CCF artillery a r t i l l e r y regiment r e g i m e n t of of an an independent independent artillery artillery complete division of an an infantry i n f a n t r y division d i v i s i o n suggests s u g g e s t s that that d i v i s i o n under u n d e r control c o n t r o l of t h e latter lat.ter di*ision d i v i s i o n may be assigned assigned a a task task where the t h e utilizautilizathe c o n t r o l of of a large l a r g e amount of a r t i l l e r y is is t i o n and complete control tion of artillery required." r e q u i r e d . " (SUEDE (SUEDE CINCFE, CINCFE, SIB SIB 477, 477, 8 8 Apr Apr 52) 52)
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Communist Army, Army, by by another a n o t h e r major unit--the u n i t - - t h e 40th 4 0 t h Army--may Army--may indicate i n d i c a t e an impending impending relief r e l i e f of of the t h e 39th. 3 9 t h . More ominously, ominously, t he s uggested p r e s e n c e of of the t h e 40th 4 0 t h Army in i n the t h e immediate rear the suggested presence of of the t h e 39th, 3 9 t h , poses poses a a considerable c o n s i d e r a b l e offensive o f f e n s i v e threat t h r e a t in i n this this sector., s e c t o r . , (SUEDE (SUEDE CINCFE, CINCFE, SIB SIB 478, 478, 9 9 Apr Apr 52) 52)
Comment: of reports r e p o r t s have recently r e c e n t l y been r eceived Comment: A number of received general i n d i c a t i n g the the p o s s i b i l i t y Of bf a:renewed a.*renewed Communist general indicating possibility offensive. pointed t o the t h e eastern eastern o f f e n s i v e . The bulk b u l k of of them have p o i n t e d to sector as as the t h e focus f o c u s for f o r such s u c h an an operation. operation. T This h i s is i s the t h e first first i n d i c a t i o n received r e c e i v e d of a significant indication s i g n i f i c a n t strengthening s t r e n g t h e n i n g of enemy forces deployed d e p l o y e d in i n the t h e west. west.
I r-- -
I t is is p r o b a b l e that t h a t this t h i s message refers r e f e r s to to Comment: It probable i l l be l i t e r a t u r e and propaganda literiTUFF-irid propaganda on on atomic atomic weapons weapons which which w will t o educate e d u c a t e Chinese C h i n e s e Communist Communist troops t r o o p s in i n Korea. Korea. u s e d to used
I t is n o t e w o r t h y that that a C h i n e s e Communist It noteworthy Chinese Communist propaganda b r o a d c a s t on o n 30 30 March charged c h a r g e d that t h a t since s i n c e the the U n i t e d States States broadcast United a l l e g e d l y tested t e s t e d BW and.CW and C W agents a g e n t s in i n Korea, Korea, the t h e use u s e of h a s allegedly has atomic weapons would would be be a a logical l o g i c a l step. step.
8. 8.
C h i n e s e Communists believed b e l i e v e d training t r a i n i n g 2,500 2 , 5 0 0 pilots pilots a a Chinese year:,An Air Force F o r c e analysis a n a l y s i s of of intelligence i n t e l l i g e n c e relating r e l a t i n g to t o the %Tie trainlng r a n An tag of o f Chinese C h i n e s e pilots indicates i n d i c a t e s that t h a t there t h e r e were were 2,800 2,800 g r a d u a t e d pilots p i l o t s in i n the t h e Chinese C h i n e s e Communist Communist Air A i r Force F o r c e as as of of graduated 1 a n u a r y 1952, 1932, and the t h e training t r a i n i n g effort e f f o r t in i n China should should 1 J January produce 2 , 5 0 0 pilots p i l o t s annually. annually. p r o d u c e 2,500 The number of of aircraft a i r c r a f t employed in i n primary, primary, basic b a s i c and 9 3 , 63 63 and 44, 44, respectively. respectively. advanced stages s t a g e s of of training t r a i n i n g are 93, r e l a t i v e l y small s m a l l number number of of advanced advanced trainers t r a i n e r s suggests suggests The relatively t h i s training t r a i n i n g is is done,in d o n e . i n the t h e Soviet S o v i e t Union, Union, or or t h a t some of this that t h a t part p a r t of of the t h e conventional c o n v e n t i o n a l fighter f i g h t e r regiments r e g i m e n t s of the t h e CCAF CCAF that are actually a c t u a l l y advanced advanced training t r a i n i n g units. units. (SUEDE US Air'Force A i r ' Force (SUEDE SRTS SRTS Cont 2-30803, 2-30803, 4 4 Apr Apr 52) 52)

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7 . 7. - _
I n f o r m a t i o n program D r o f z r a m on, on atom o n d u c t e d bv Information atom bomb bomb Drobablv probably conducted by " c Chinese Communists in Chinese-Communists i n Korea: Korea': On 4 April A p r i l a message I I I directs d i r e c t s that t h a t "should " s h o u l d Army Army distribute d i s t r i b u t e any material m a t e r i a l that t h a t has h a s the t h e powers of of the t h e atom bomb, bomb. immediately notify us piCk them u up May be i mmediately n t o pick p - so s o that t h a t they t h e y may btify u s to returned r e t u r n e d to t o the t h e education e d u c a t i o n unit." unit." (SUEDE (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon
52 10 Apr 52
IS
of Communist Communist a air schools Comment: Expansion of ir s c h o o l s and training has been pronounced pronounced i in past six n tthe he'p a s t six t r a i n h g activity activity h a s been months. However, However, recent months. r e c e n t performance in i n the t h e Korean air a i r war of MIG15 MIG-15 pilots of p i l o t s believed b e l i e v e d to t o be be Chinese Chinese shows shows that t h a t they t h e y are are proficient less p r o f i c i e n t than t h a n Russian R u s s i a n pilots. pilots.
9. 9 .
Message refers r e f e r s to t o unknown Sino-Soviet S i n o - S o v i e t ,enterprige e n t e r p r i s e in in A message from Moscow to referred Manchuria: A t o Mukden r e f e r r e d to to a shipment of goods sent s e n t to t o the t h e "Daldok "Daldok works" works" on a contract contract concluded with c oncluded w i t h the t h e "Sino-Soviet "Sino-Soviet Shipbuilding S h i p b u i l d i n g Joint J o i n t Stock Stock (SUEDE APSA-261 APSA-261 Weekly Intelligence Company." (SUEDE I n t e l l i g e n c e Notes 14-52, 14-52, Company." 2 Apr 52) 52)
10. 10.
C h i n e s e Communists change weather w e a t h e r cipher: c i p h e r : On 1 1 April A p r i l the the Chinese Chinese cipher used by by tthe Peiping the c i p h e r used he P eiping C h i n e s e Communists Communists changed changed -the collective c o l l e c t i v e weather w e a t h e r broadcasts. broadcasts. A p r e l i m i n a r y study s t u d y of of the the preliminary alteration a larger larger supply s u p p l y of of cipher c i p h e r books books has has a l t e r a t i o n indicates i n d i c a t e s that that a been distributed. d i s t r i b u t e d . This T h i s increase i n c r e a s e was was necessitated, n e c e s s i t a t e d , in i n part, part, by the t o be by t h e establishment e s t a b l i s h m e n t of of new new stations. s t a t i o n s . Changes Chahges were to expected, e x p e c t e d , since s i n c e they t h e y previously p r e v i o u s l y occurred o c c u r r e d in i n April A p r i l and and September September 1951. 1951. (SUEDE AFSA-271 WIB 15-52, 15-52, 1 1 Apr Apr 52) 52)
Comment: Comment: Changes in i n major Chinese Chinese meteorological m e t e o r o l o g i c a l ciphers ciphers were reported r e p o r t e d in i n November November 1950 1950 prior p r i o r to t o Chinese Chinese entry e n t r y into into the t h e Korean war, and and in i n April A p r i l 1951 1951 prior p r i o r to t o the t h e Communist Communist spring s p r i n g offensive. offensive.

6 6
Comment: Nothing is known of Comment: of this "Sino-Soviet "Sino-Soviet ShipShipbuilding Joint Joi'nt Stock S t o c k Company." Company." The only o n l y large large shipyard s h i p y a r d in in Manchuria is is Daldok Daldok in i n Dairen, D a i r e n , which which was was a a Sino-Soviet Sino-Soviet trust trust until u n t i l early e a r l y 1951 1961 when when it i t was was returned r e t u r n e d to t o full f u l l Chinese Chinese ownerownership. C h i n e s e Changchun Changchun Railway R a i l w a y is is the t h e only o n l y other o t h e r SinoSinos h i p . The Chinese Soviet S o v i e t economic economic organization o r g a n i z a t i o n presently p r e s e n t l y identified i d e n t i f i e d in i n Manchuria.
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5. Re-election of Rhee as as ROK ROR President President reported reported "assured": "assured": Syngman Rhee cannot cannot be defeated in in the the coming coming election election for for president conducted t he ROK BOK National Nat ional Assembly! Assemblv I Dresident conducted bv by the
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Comment: Comment: President Rhee's Rhee's election election to to another another term term of of office is considered highly possible by American officials in Korea. Korea. The principal reason for these these opinions, opinions, however, however, is the inability of the National Assembly to to agree agree on on an an alternate candidate. candidate,
The dominant factor factor in in the the coming election will be the temper at the time time: of the the National National Assembly; Assembly; currently currently it it is is strongly strongly anti-Rhee. anti-Rhee. The possibility possihility remains that that if if Rhee Rhee continues continues his campaign of intimidation intimidation and subversion, an enraged National National Assembly Assembly will will bring bring his his defeat. defeat.

'44
His victory is assured because Rhee is appointing Assemblymen's relatives to government posts and the Ministry of Internal Affairs is giving each Assemblyman a monthly subsidy of 500,000 won. Reportedly the ROK Army will be used to ensure Rhee's victory if it becomes necessary. necessary.
6. 6.
Communist Offensive offensive in in east east central central Korea Korea again again
prep
dictear-dictem
Chinese "a Chinese Communist-North Korean offensiveri is is to to be launched launchbd on the the Korean offensive" of w weeks." east central front in "a "a matter 02 eeks."
In connection with with this this data, data,[ the 20th Chinese Communist Army had moved into the Hamhung*he V North displacing the Kowon area area between between 20 20 and and 24 24 March, March, displacing Korean Corps Corps which which had had proceeded proceeded southwest southwest of of Wonsan. Wonsaa. Heavy troop troop movements have recently been observed south and west of Wonsan. Wonsan. I
= I
Comment: from this this same same general general Comment: A very recent report from area similarly similarly predicted predicted an an offensive offensive iu in the the near near future, future, different Chinese Chinese Communist Communist units units were were named. named. although different
There are no indications indications that the Communists intend to launch a general general offensive offensive along along the the entire entire front front in in the the near near
10 Apr 52 52 10
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future. troop movements movements duringrecent duringrecent future. Various reports reports 'and 'and troop weeks, however, raise the weeks, the definite possibility possibility that Communist contemplating a limited objecforces in eastern Korea are Contemplating tive offensive of considerable considerable weight. weight.
NR

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4 . 4.
A d d i t i o n a l details d e t a i l s on North Korean Air Air F o r c e Combat combat airairAdditional Force MS Air force pilot craft c r a f t reported; r e p o r t e d : The l % e .US A ir F o r c e reports r e p o r t s that t h a t a Korean p ilot "'Yang "Yang Tu Hut' Hu" was scheduled s c h e d u l e d on 8 April A p r i l to t o lead l e a d a flight f l i g h t of of t w e l v e MIG-15's Y I G - 1 5 ' s an0 ant$ one"UMIG-15"from 0ne'WMIG-l5*~fromAnshan, Anshan, near n e a r Mukden. Mukden. twelve as being b e i n g active a c t i v e with w i t h the t h e eleeleT h i s pilot p i l o t has h a s been been identified i d e n t i f i e d as This of the the North North Korean Korean lst 1st Air A i r Division D i v i s i o n (MIG-15 (MIG-15 equipped), equipped), ment of last reported l ast r e p o r t e d at a t Anshan. Anshan.
A 7 nuaryNo r t h K o r e a n AAir ir F o r c e message ndicated t hat 7J a January NorthKorean Force message iindicated that f o u r t e e n LA-9 LA-9 (conventional ( c o n v e n t i o n a l fighter) f i g h t e r ) flight f l i g h t leaders were fourteen b eing d i s p a t c h e d to t o the t h e 2nd D i v i s i o n . On 12 1 2 January J a n u a r y a message being dispatched Division. of these t h e s e pilots p i l o t s at a t Sinuijn. Sinuiju. acknowledged the t h e arrival a r r i v a l of
5. 5.
Q a q i t a r y and anti-epidemic a n t i - e p i d e m i c campaign c o n t i n u e s in in N orth 4an4tary continues North The continuing c o n t i n u i n g outbreak o u t b r e a k of smallpox s m a l l p o x cases was menThe Korea: menm d i in n a p r i l message he C h i n e s e Communist 7th 7th TIT517d a1 1A April message from from t the Chinese Artillery a r m y was to t o receive r e c e i v e enough enough "vaccine" "vaccine" A r t i l l e r y Division. D i v i s i o n . Each army f o r smallpox) s m a l l p o x ) to t o inoculate i n o c u l a t e 50,000 and and every every (presumably for
( i . e . artillery?) a r k i l l e r y ? ) would be given g i v e n enough " special1' d i v i s i o n (i.e. "special" division f o r 10,000 1 0 , 0 0 0 VaCCinatiOns The message message concluded c o n c l u d e d that t h a t it i t was for vaccinations The t h e army's a r m y ' s responsibility r e s p o n s i b i l i t y to t o inoculate i n o c u l a t e civilians c i v i l i a n s -- starting starting the 15 years y e a r s of of age. age. w i t h those t h o s e under u n d e r 15 with

. .
. .
This T h i s is is considered considered a a sign s i g n of of the t h e presence p r e s e n c e of at a t leatt leakt t h e North N o r t h Korean 2nd 2nd Air Air D i v i s i o n (LA (LA equipped) equipped) e l e m e n t s of the elements Division at a t Sinuiju. S i n u i j u . (SUEDE 6920 Security S e c u r i t y Group, Group, Johnson AB, AB, Cite Cite AP354, 8 8 Apr; USAF USAF Roundup Roundup 68, 68, 8 8 Apr Apr 52) 52)
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A p r i l Chinese C h i n e s e Communist message from an a n element e l e m e n t of of A 2 April t h i s same a r t i l l e r y division d i v i s i o n reported r e p o r t e d that that s a n i t a r y measures this artillery sanitary were to t o be taken, t a k e n , such s u c h as as building b u i l d i n g new new latrines l a t r i n e s and wells. wells. and mice were listed l i s t e d as as the t h e principal p r i n c i p a l target target of exterexterRats and mination. Korea, K-2030, K-2030, 2 2 Apr; Apr; m i n a t i o n . (SUEDE 5 0 1 s t Comm Recon Grp Korea, 501st K-2072, 1 1 Apr Apr 52) 52) K-2072,
6 . 6.
N o r t h Korean nit i n west North Korean u unit in west u used s e d iin n rroad o a d rrepair e p a i r work: woq: A r a n k i n g officer o f f i c e r of of the t h e North N o r t h Korean Ko r e a n 5th S t h Infantry I n f a n t r y Division D i v i s i o n in in ranking A p r i l that t h a t "2,000 112,000 t h e Pyongyang-Chinnampo region r e g i o n reported r e p o r t e d on 7 April the men of of this t h i s division d i v i s i o n must must form t o r e p a i r the t h e road." m a d . " The The to repair i n question q u e s t i o n leads l e a d s from from Pyongyang to t o "Munsongni" "Munsongni" and and is 18 r o a d in road t to o be r repaired e p a i r e d between 12 12 and and 18 18 April. April.
of this t h i s message:
T h r e e "Munsongnis" ltMunsongnisll are presented p r e s e n t e d in i n various v a r i o u s translations translations Three one is is south s o u t h of of Chinnampo, Chinnampo, _another . a n o t h e r is near near
1 11 1 Apr 52 52
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.Sibyon-ni Sibyon-ni i in n a a predominantly Chinese sector, s e c t o r , and and the t h e third third is on the t h e lateral l a t e r a l main trans-peninsular t r a n s - p e n i n s u l a r supply s u p p l y route. route. 501st Korea, 15RSM/10320, Apr; CINCFE CINCFE (SUEDE 5 0 1 s t Comm Recon Grp Korea, 15RSM/10320, 8 Apr; Tokyo, Tokyo, SIB SIB 478, 478, 9 9 Apr Apr 52) 52)
This Comment: T h i s is is the t h e second recent r e c e n t observed o b s e r v e d incident incident of North N o mKorean e a n tactical t a c t i c a l forces f o r c e s being b e i n g employed employed in in a a communicommuniof cations r o l e . Probably this this u nit w i l l be used c a t i o n s maintenance role. unit will along t h e main main lateral l a t e r a l route. route. a l o n g the
7. 7.
The regimental r e g i m e n t a l commander commander of of the t h e 29th 2 9 t h Chinese Chinese Communist Communist A r t i l l e r y Regiment, subordinate s u b o r d i n a t e to t o the t h e 2nd 2nd Artillery A r t i l l e r y Division Division Artillery i n s t r u c t e d his h i s battalion b a t t a l i o n commanders on 6 6 in w e s t e r n Korea, instructed in western A p r i l that t h a t "Division " D i v i s i o n has h a s instructed i n s t r u c t e d us u s to t o order order (the April (the g a t h e r i n g of) information i n f o r m a t i o n as as to t o the t h e exact e x a c t positions p o s i t i o n s of of enemy enemy gathering supply a r t i l l e r y positions p o s i t i o n s and and tank t a n k assembly a s s e m b l y areas. areas. s u p p l y centers, c e n t e r s , artillery Other O t h e r details d e t a i l s concerning c o n c e r n i n g the t h e positions p o s i t i o n s should s h o u l d also a l s o be be subsubmitted. m i t t e d . Your investigation i n v e s t i g a t i o n must be be completed completed by by 15th 1 5 t h April April w i l l report r e p o r t the t h e results r e s u l t s on on the t h e 16th 1 6 t h April." April." (SUEDE and you will (SUEDE 501st 5 0 1 s t Comm Recon Grp Grn Korea, Korea, K-2053, K-2053, 8 8 Apr; Apr; 15RSM/10275, 15RSM/10275, 8 Apr 52) 52)

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A d d i t i o n a l Communist military m i l i t a r y activity a c t i v i t y in i n Korea during during Additional A l l regimental r e g i m e n t a l commanders of of an an unidentiunidentiA p r i l indicated-: i n d i c a t e d : All April fied N o r t h Korean Ko r e a n division d i v i s i o n were ordered o r d e r e d on on 7 7 April A p r i l by by the the fied North d i v i s i o n commander commander to t o be be sure s u r e that t h a t vehicles v e h i c l e s wererepaired and division wererepaired and t h e end p r i l . " The message stated stated r e a d y for f o r operation o p e r a t i o n "by "by the. ready end of of A April." t h a t no gasoline g a s o l i n e would be provided p r o v i d e d in i n April, A p r i l , and that t h a t ox-drawn ox-drawn that carts t o be be mobilized m o b i l i z e d by by 15 15 April. April. c a r t s were to
...
.
Recent troop Comment: Recent t r o o p movements and reports r e p o r t s of impending attacks have heightened h e i g h t e n e d the t h e possibility p o s s i b i l i t y that t h a t the t h e enemy intends intends to piother m i l i t a r y operation, o p e r a t i o n , although although t o launch launch a n o t h e r large l a r g e scale military they t h e y are too t o o nebulous to t o reach r e a c h firm conclusions c o n c l u s i o n s on enemy inint e n t i o n s . To date, most signs tentions. signs point p o i n t to to a a limited l i m i t e d objective objective i n eastern eastern Korea. Korea. A rtillery r e c o n n a i s s a n c e and target target attack in Artillery reconnaissance selection in the t h e west, however, are are an an indication i n d i c a t i o n that t h a t the the s e l e c t i o n in o f f e n s i v e -- if if it it materializer materializep -- will w i l l be on a a broader b r o a d e r front. front. offensive
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8 . 8.
a r t i l l e r v division d i v i s i o n in i n eastern e a s t e r n Korea Korea Chinese Communist artillery . _ distributet distribute's gas as masks: masks: A 2 April p r i l message from the t h e 7th Chinese neys e tommunist b i v i t Division i z / i nin east e n t r a l Korea reported = d Conlmunist AArtillery east c central t h a t "relative " r e l a t i v e to t o the t h e gas masks; masks, the t h e llth, l l t h , 20th, 2 0 t h , and and 21st 21st that Regiments will w i l l each e a c h receive r e c e i v e 120 120 apiece." apiece.'' The balance b a l a n c e was was t o go to t o another a n o t h e r artillery a r t i l l e r y battalion, b a t t a l i o n , and and the t h e "other "other units units to will w i l l have.to have t o await a w a i t the t h e next n e x t allotment." a l l o t m e n t . " (SUEDE (SUEDE 501st 5 0 1 s t Comm Corn Recon Grp Korea, K-2039, K-2039, 8 8 Apr Apr 52) 52)
4
1 1 Apr 52 11
.
RIP SECRET SUEDe
Comment: The 7th A Artillery Division received 500 masks masks Comment: rtillery D ivleion r e c e i v e d 500 22ffinE7 This later on 2 This l a t e rmessage messageindicates i n d i c a t e s that t h a t the t h e above above was was the only It is is probable probable t that these t he o n l y shipment received r e c e i v e d so 80 far. It hat t hese that their masks are to be used for troop indoctrination i n d o c t r i n a t i o n and t hat t heir receipt r e c e i p t does d o e s not not presage p r e s a g e enemy enemy use use of of gas gas in i n Korea. Korea.
NR

5 5
52 11 Apr 52
TOP SECRET SUEDE
Approved F&PPRelease 2002105120 : CIA-RDP79T0111114000900o90001-4
SECRET
11 April 1952
US OFFICIALS ONLY
OCI No. 5157

Copy No. n y
RECORDS CENTER RETURN TO ARCHIVES ft

SECRET
IMMEIHATaY
AFTER USE
JOB 4:1/1101._
BOX
1".
Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A01:990,TM&
Cfi crr
Approved Fos,Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T0114e/000900090001-4
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS. 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW,
GENERAL
The note does not point to any forthcoming concessions, but instead reveals all the weaknesses of Russia's German policy. As a result, it is not likely to deflect the West German Government from its present course of Western integration. The USSR has attempted to devise a new approach to appeal to West Germany and to convince the Western powers that further negotiation would produce real concessions. It has been unable to make effective proposals, however, for fear of further weakening its hold on Germany. The new proposal indicates that the USSR cannot agree to free elections, which would result in the loss of East Germany, fearing an ultimate westward orientation of a unified Germany. Accordingly, the note only proposes that the four powers discuss the question. In answering the Western demand for UN investigation of electoral conditions, the note suggests that such a check could be carried out by a commission of the four occupying powers, presumably operating under a Soviet veto threat, but does not propose the setting up of such a commission. The Soviet note essentially represents a legalistic attempt to delay developments in the West without committing the USSR. Accordingly, it specifies neither a date nor an
SECRET
1
1.
The Soviet renewal of the German peace treaty proposal: In its 9 April note, the Soviet Union for the first time directly proposed four-power discussions of free all-German elections and investigation of electoral conditions. The East German Government made such a proposal last September with Soviet iupport, and it was rejected by Chancellor Adenauer.
11 Apr 52
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SECRET
agenda for such a meeting.

clarify its earlier proThe failure of the USSR to the impression that this posal for a German army confirms Soviet influence offer was made primarily to increase By reaffirming the Oder-Neisse among German nationalists. that it does not intend line, however, the USSR indicates opinion by offering to to make a drastic play for German away from Poland. take the former German territories to West European and In a final attempt to appeal concludes with the warning German opinion, the Soviet note made between a united Germany, that the choice is now being Germany carrying with it a connoting peace, and a divided (S Factual data continuing threat of war in Europe. 1644, 10 Apr 52) based on S Moscow 1645; C Moscow
2.
meeting at Budapest Possibility of high level Orbit low rank of non-military discounted: The relatively Day ceremonies in Budapest personalities at the Liberation rumors that a "Cominform" on 4 April does not support although a gap in reported meeting may have been held, allowed time for such a activities on 5 April would have hand, the inclusion of high rankconference. Cm the other all the Satellites except ing military personalities from rumOr that high level military Albania lends credence to the taken place. and economic talks may have the Russian According to one unsubstantiated rumor, Satellites in their preparahigh command is pushing the (S Budapest 769 and tions for a "big push in August." L-2860, 8 Apr 52) sources consistently have Comment: American Legation Cominform meeting. Similar of a discounted the probability in 1950 circulated rumors, which were never confirmed, attended by Voroshilov and Day fete was when the Liberation of Orbit delegations, ina much more impressive assembly chief Busboy. cluding the so-called Cominform a high level military Although there may have been Satellite military perof ranking meeting, the presence various Orbit counceremonies in the sonnel at Liberation tries is not unusual.

EASTERN EUROPE
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FAR EAST
"dishonorable armistice": South Korea reserves right to veto Times on 10 April quoAmbassador Muccio repOrts that the Korea saying that his government ted a high-ranking ROK official as "dishonorable" circumstances. would veto any armistice signed under attaches the greatest signifiAccording to the official, the ROK of Chinese cance to an armistice provision for the withdrawal Communist troops. South Korean critiThis statement is in line with previous to Ambassador Muccio. He cisms of the negotiations, according restrained in recent weeks. notes that the ROK has been relatively (R Pusan 984, 10 Apr 52) Korean criticism of the armisComment: The tempoof South periodically along with tice negotiations appears to accelerate successfully concluded. rumors that the negotiations will be
4.
25X6
5.
Saudi Arabia: Syrian Army Chief of Staff Shishakli visits is visiting Staff, Lt. Col. Shishakli, Syrian Army Chief of SECRET
3

NEAR EAST - AFRICA
11 Apr 52
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JKing Ibn Saud in Riyadh with the reported intention of strengShishakli has expressed thening Syrian-Saudi Arabian relations. his confidence of having successful talks with the Saudi Arabian monarch during his first trip to Saudi Arabia since his coup (S Damascus 574, 8 Apr; d'etat in Damascus last November. p FBIS Ticker, Beirut, 9 Apr 52)

SECRET
4
Comment: Shishakli's stop-over in Riyadh follows his recent visit to Jordan and Lebanon. The Army Chief of Staff to gain further Arab probably has two specific objectives: support for the Syrian military regime, which is strongly opposed by the Iraqi Government; and to obtain a new loan from King Ibn Saud to finance the purchase of arms and ammunition which Syria is currently trying to acquire abroad. Ibn Saud has long been a strong supporter of Syrian independence and has opposed any plan which might unite Syria with the Hashemite Kingdoms of Iraq and Jordan.
11 Apr 52
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WESTERN EUROPE
6.
25X6
7.
Political support for French Premier Pinay is consolidated: The American filbassy in Paris reports that Premier Pinay's favorable showing in the critical confidence vote on tax amnesty consolidated his political support and gave him a "clear mandate" to try out his economic program. Pinay's support now runs roughly from a half-way point in the centrist Popular Republican (MRP) ranks ,to a half-way point within the RPF on the right. Although this is not a majority in the Lssembly, it does afford fair stability, because the deputies of the divided parties who disagree with the Premier will abstain from voting rather than risk splitting their parties. Furthermore, though many of the other supporting deputies are highly skeptical of Pinay's program, they are fearful of public reactionS if they should topple his government immediately. This new coalition coheres, however, only on internal issues,and until a comparable accord has been reached on foreign policy, the formation of a stable right-cehter majority cannot be claimed. (C Paris 6196, 9 Apr 52)
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Comment: Pinay's success in obtaining parliamentary support for his "stability without sacrifice" program assures him office tenure until late May when the Assembly reconvenes. Although the prevailing climate of confidence in the government has caused the franc to appreciate from 490 to 407 to the dollar, close observers doubt that Pinay's program can avert a collapse later in the year.
8.
Communist influence reaff irmed in Air France.where new strike threatens: Air France flight personnel regret the "premature" termination of the ir fruitless December strike and contemplate another walkout af ter Easter, according to the American Embassy in Paris.
Comment: The December strike received little support from Yrench labor, which considers Air France personnel well paid in comparison with other French workers. In view of Premier Pinay's success in holding the price line, the proposed strike may also be "premature."
Although the number of Air France personnel on whom the Communist leadership can depend has been large, it is decreasing. The number which supported the CGT in the elections is far larger, however, and can be interpreted, as is the case in most French industries, as a protest against the ineffectiveness of non-Communist labor unions.
9.
Austrian Minister of Interior warned about Communist influence in police: The editor of a large independent newspaper in Salzburg has published an open letter to the Austrian Minister of Interior warning of the necessity for minimizing Communist infiltration into Austrian security forces. letter charges that recent investigations of officers The denounced by a Communist police official were used by a Communist police inspector to gain access to top secret files of the Austrian political police. Data so obtained, including loyalty files of Salzburg police and reports of alleged CIC and police cooperation in raiding local offices of the Communist Party, were later published in Communist newspapers, including the official organ of the Soviet occupation force. (R FBIS, Salzburger Nachtrichten, 8 Apr 52)

SECRET
The Embassy also reports that, in grievance-committee elections held in late March, the Communist-dominated General Labor Confederation maintained its position as the most influential union among ground crew personnel. (C Paris 6217, p Apr 52)
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Comment: Since 1945, the,Socialist Minister of Interior has Mide-i-Zonsiderable effort to purge from the police forces the numerous Communists installed there by his Communist Despite the predecessor in the provisional government. dismissals and transfers of unreliables to non-Soviet sectors, his efforts have not been completely satisfactory.
10.
Belgian trade union federations plan joint action to obtain wage increases: Meeting jointly for the first time in a 11117E67of years to "examine the situation," the Secretariats of the Socialist and Social Christian trade union federations (the FGTB and the CSC) insist that premiums to workers must come An FGTB leader states that from excess business profits. the adamant stand of employers against further wage increases will probably make strikes necessary. Any strike called by the FOTB unions would include metal workers and possibly cement and tramway workers. the CSC has not yet committed itself to calling out the it controls, the US Embassy in Brussels believes that a (11 Brussels 1487, 7 Apr would bring CSC participation.
miners, Although unions strike
52)
Because the CSC supports the one-party Social Comment: Christiii-i3vernment, it has not heretofore joined the FGTB If the government fails to back strong labor demands, demands. it is likely to lose the support of the CSC representatives in Parliament essential to its slim parliamentary majority.
11..
2 5X1 C
25X1A
This party official reportedly declared that the Christian Democrats are "heading toward ruin" and that the Communists "must be shown to be the strongest party in Italy."
Communist official foresees violence in Italy: a member of the Communist Party Central Committee recently warned party officers in Milan not to be surprised if Italy "suddenly resembles Egypt and Tunisia" as a result of economic unrest, which, he predicted, would He urged result from Italy's adherence to NATO policies. the fomenting of general disturbances in every sector of the economy prior to the local spring elections, as well as an increase in clandestine activities in the labor field.
I
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11 Apr 52
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Comment: While there have been no widespread distuiTTRZT6, the Communists riots or up labor agitation during the for political reasons have stepped past few weeks and have obtained considerable support from workers with real economic grievances. If present governmental pressure on industries to discharge key Communist employees is effective, the Communists may be forced to rely more on clandestine means. According to American observers in Italy, the Christian Democrats have lost considerable dissatisfaction with De Gasperi's strength because of widespread policies. The Communists, well as the neo-Fascists, as are expected to make substantial gains in the local spring elections.
12.
Norway reaches "favorable" trade accord with Poland: American The ssy at s o reports at t e ra e agreement between Norway and Poland concluded on 8 April is "somewhat better" from the strategic goods viewpoint than the proposal originally submitted to COCOM. The Polish delegation made "strenuous" efforts to purchase ships vessels,but Norway refused and limited and to charter additional its maritime services to sailings from Poland to other Baltic ports and to Norway. The Norwegians emphasize that they obtained a 60-percent increase in the coal commitment -- 275,000 to 450,000 metric tons -- by increasing their offers of rayon pulp to 2,000 and their promises of ferromanganese tons, and ferrochrome to 250 and 200 tons. Norway will also export 150,000 tons of iron ore, 15,A00 tons of pyrites, and 750 tons of aluminum. pOslo 887, 9 Apr 52) (S
Comment: Until a lew days ago Norway havinTUITTiculty appeared to be in obtaining
coal.
The agreement also contains provisions for the delivery of other goods such as herring from Norway and textiles sugar from Poland. and
a promise of 275,000 tons of The unexpected relaxation by Poland without increase in offers of strategic any undue goods is another strong indication that Polish coal is becoming available in greater quantity.

SECRET
8
11 Apr 52
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LATIN AMERICA
13
Argentine newspaper repeats Communists' biological warfare propaganda; The 9 April edition of Democracia stated that telegrams received from Europe "confirm that American troops have used bombs containing cholera germs in Korea, and that the epidemic seems to have spread to Chinese provinces." The paper also alleged that the Stars and Stripes reported on 9 February that the US 65th 7WiTieET-had used 500 bacteriological bombs to test their effectiveness in artillery bombardment. (R Buenos Aires 689, 9 Apr 52)
,14.
Three Chileans reportedly departed for the Moscow Economic Conference; Clotario Blest, President of the Government Employees Union, and Jorge Salazar, Director of the Semigovernment Employees Union, departed on 30 March for the Moscow Economic Conference. The United States Embassy in Santiago believes that these two and George Inascimento, who reportedly departed earlier for Paris en route to Moscow, will be the only individuals from Chile attending the conference. Blest is popular in labor circles and heads numerous Communist-front organizations, although he is not a party member and is a Catholic. Salazar is a Radical Party member Inascimento, a Chilean publisher, is with Marxist views. considered pro-Communist. Guillermo del Pedregal, a successful businessman and Communist sympathizer, who apparently would have headed the Chilean delegat1on, cancelled the trip because of business reasons, and also because he is managing Ibanez del Campo's (Factual data from: C presidential campaign in Chile. Santiago unnumbered, 20 Mar and 2 Apr 52;
Democracia is reportedly owned by Senora de Comment; These accusations are representative of Argentina's Peron. vitriolic anti-TS campaign.
25X1A
15.
25X1A
Panama refuses diplomatic status to Soviet couriers; The Panamanian Foreign Minister has told the US Ambassador that "the two Soviet couriers will not be accorded diplomatic status for transiting Panama bui may apply for ordinary consular visas." The Ambassador comments that the Foreign Minister
SECRET
9
11 Apr 52
Approved Rap Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000900090001-4
SECRET
presumably intends to examine the Soviet pouches if the couriers (C Panama 877, 9 Apr 52) come through. stopped in Comment: Soviet couriers have customarily The USSR is now to Venezuela. Havana on their way from Mexico attempting to establish a new courier route because of the recent break in Soviet-Cuban relations.
16.
Ex-Foreign Minister Dominguez Campora, presiding officer of the Uruguayan delegation in the conversations, says, however, that he must discuss the military plan with the six majority members of the National Government Council. He intimated that the plan might have to be discussed with the three minority Herrerista Party members later. The US Embassy states that, while this may be unavoidable, "it presents security problems (S Montevideo 393, 9 Apr 52) for the US Government."
Comment: While Dominguez has stated his understanding that the plan may not be submitted to Congress under any conditions, he has stated that Senate members of the minority party propose to fight the "political agreement." The Herrerista members of the National Government Council approved the opening of conversations,
Ecuador, Peru, Cuba, Brazil and Chile have now signed bilateral military assistance agreements with the United No agreement could be reached with Mexico. States.

SECRET
10
Prospects for bilateral military agreement with Uruguay believed good: The US Embassy in Montevideo believes that prospeCts for a.bilateral US-Uruguayan military assistance agreement are good; it points out that Chile's signing of such an agreement has had a helpful effect.
11 Apr 52
Approved For FIdase 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146Aap90C115110/0.11-
TOP SECRET
US OFrICIALS ONLY
11 April 1952
CIA No, 49610 Copy No. 40
This summary of signifthant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of not represent a complete coverage Current Intelligence. It does of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.

TO THE CURRENT INTELLIGENCE DIGEST (including S/S Cables)
and 0/NE.
TOP SECRET
Approved gap Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RIDP79TONMA000900090001-4
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS. 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH,IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORriED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
SOUTH ASIA
1.

TOP SECRET
Importance of Stalin-Radhakrishnan interview said to be Secretary General Bajpai of the Indian Ministry exaggerated: of External Affairs has told Ambassador Bowles that he believes the importance of the 6 April interview between Premier Stalin and Indian Ambassador Radhakrishnan in Moscow has been exaggerated out of all proportion. The Secretary General stated that the conference had no implication beyond the obvious desire of Stalin to convince India that the Soviet Union was (S always ready to come to an understanding with the West. S/S New Delhi 3694, 9 Apr 52)
Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0009a011:14851i2
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UNCLASSIFIED when blAtibT9reaEFUTREJigoaocrimality5j2e SwydacmcgtoOrtustygobdanyeithccior declassified when filled in form i? detached Tram controlledifocument.

SOURCE
REG I STRYy}7/ 6
CIA CONTROL NO.
DOC. NO.
DOC. DATE
COPY NO.
0 C ..t"i L
c rP
.Atiisy7
LOGGED BY
NUMBER OF PAGES
ATTENTION: This form will be placed on top of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency or classified Top Secret within the C A and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Toy Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those individuals whose official duties relate to the matter. Top Secre Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this /OM and indicate period of custody in the left-hand columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and indicate the date of handling in the right-hand columns.
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8.73
Approved For Release 2002105/20 : CIA-RDP7910 146A000900090001-4

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OFF ICE
DATE
n u Ullt PAC VIOUll
(40)
HR70-14
Teir-SECRET-SUEDE 'gad
[3 Arr
,,'
NR

FAR EAST EAST FAR
2.
. -
OFSA -
Early Communist Communist offensive in ! n Korea possible: possible: Early
Armed Forces Forces

,
Security SecurttyAgency Agency 12 Apr 52 52 SUEDE SUEDE
Koreq may may Developments along the the front in Koreq Communist preparations for indtcate Chinese Communist indicate preparations for this an offensive offensive to to take take place place some some time time after after this week.. week. .
--(?1,
cc/cap
-3-
RELEASE FOR RELEASE APPROVED FOR ATE: 23-Mar-2010 DATE: 23-Mar-201 0 IDPPROVED
FOPSECRETSUEDE SUEDE -TcP
., - .-.
-
SUEDESJ -TO1)-MCMT--SUEDE's
Recent Chinese Communist voice messages messages inCommunist voice indicate that at up to to the the line, line, that some at least leasttwo two armies armiesmay may be be moving moving up some Chinese artillery elements forward, and that comcomChinese artillery elements have have been displaced forward, mand organization of forward artillery units has been changed to permit mand organization of forward artillery units has been changed permtt that 15 15 April more effective tactical control. control. Other messages indicate indicate that has been established as as the the deadline deadline for reconnaissance reconnaissance reports reportson onUN UN positions posttions as a swell well as asfor forcompletion completionof of supply supply movements. movements.
These developments couldalso also mean mean either either a developments could routine roptine rotation of of certain certain front front line line units units or or anticipation anticipation of of a a UN UN spring offensive.
Comment: Comment: Evidence Evidence is still still too too tenuous tenuous to to establish establish firm firmconclusions conclusionson onenemy enemyintentions. intentions. Earlier reports reports'of of an an impending impending attack attack indicated that a limited offensive offensive might might be planned for the eastern eastern sector; sector;recent recentenemy enemyreconnaissance reconnaissance and and target target selection selection in in the west, west, however, that the the offensive, offensive, if if it it materializes, materializes, will the however, suggest that will be on a broader front.
NR
i
I
I
-4 4-
L TOP-SEeRETS U E SUEDE D E
1
!
HR70-14
OP SECRET SUEDE'
FAR EAST
- . -
" : .R
I
I
9. 9 .
E a r l y Communist Communist offensive o f f e n s i v e in i n Korea Korea possible: p o s s i b l e : Developments Early a l o n g the (iont along f r o n t in i n Korea may indicate i n d i c a t e Chinese Communist prepret i m e after a f t e r this this parsCtions for f o r an an offensive o f f e n s i v e to t o take t a k e place p l a c e some some time parations week.
Recent Chinese Communist voice v o i c e messages indicate i n d i c a t e that t h a t at at least two armies may be moving up to t o the t h e line, l i n e , that t h a t some ChiChinese that n e s e artillery a r t i l l e r y elements e l e m e n t s have been displaced d i s p l a c e d forward, f o r w a r d , and and that command organization o r g a n i z a t i o n of of forward f o r w a r d artillery a r t i l l e r y units u n i t s has h a s been changed to t o permit p e r m i t more effective e f f e c t i v e tactical t a c t i c a l control. c o n t r o l . Other Other 15 April A p r i l has h a s been established e s t a b l i s h e d as as the the messages indicate i n d i c a t e that t h a t 15 d e a d l i n e for f o r reconnaissance r e c o n n a i s s a n c e reports r e p o r t s on UN positions p o s i t i o n s as as well well deadline as f o r completion c o m p l e t i o n of of supply s u p p l y movements. movements. for
These developments developments could c o u l d also a l s o mean either e i t h e r a routine r o u t i n e roroc e r t a i n front f r o n t line l i n e units u n i t s or o r anticipation a n t i c i p a t i o n of of a UN t a t i o n of certain tation spring s p r i n g offensive. o f f e n s i v e . (SUEDE (SUEDE AFSA AFSA CC/CAP-196, CC/CAP-196, 12 12 Apr Apr 52) 52)
'
1 I
II
Evidence is still s t i l l too t o o tenuous to to e establish stablish Comment: f i r m -ions on enemy enemy intentions. intentions. E arlier r e p o r t s of firm E5ECTigions on Earlier reports of an i m p e n d i n g ' a t t a c k indicated i n d i c a t e d that t h a t a limited impending'attack l i m i t e d offensive o f f e n s i v e might be planned for the t h e eastern e a s t e r n sector; s e c t o r ; recent r e c e n t enemy reconnaissance reconnaissance p l a n n e d for and target t a r g e t selection s e l e c t i o n in i n the t h e west, w e s t , however, however, suggest s u g g e s t that t h a t the the offensive, if it i t materializes, materializes, will will be be on on a a broader b r o a d e r front. front. o f f e n s i v e , if
I
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1 18-Mar-2010 18-Mar-2010
14 14 Apr 52 52 el)) C/D
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10. 10.
Chinese C h i n e s e Communist rocket r o c k e t launcher l a u b c h e r regiments r e g i m e n t s attached a t t a c h e d to to artillery April unidentified a r t i l l e r y divisions: divisions: A T A p r i l message from an an u nidentified Tfhinese Ghinese Communist artillery a r t i l l e r y unit u n i t in i n western w e s t e r n Korea. Korea o Outlines utlines of tthe h e rrocket ocket a r t i l l e r y regiments." regiments." t h e "command relationship r e l a t i o n s h i p of' the artillery I It t s says a y s that t h a t each rocket r o c k e t launcher l a u n c h e r regiment will w i l l be under the the a n "automatic " a u t o m a t i c artillery a r t i l l e r y division" d i v i s i o n " (presumably (presumably the the command of an t h e i r motorized m o t o r i z e d artillery a r t i l l e r y divisions). divisions). Chinese d e s i g n a t i o n of their Chinese.designation Thus the t h e 201st a O l s t Rocket Launcher Launcher Regiment Regiment will w i l l be be attached attached to to the t h e 8th.Artillery 8 t h A r t i l l e r y Division, D i v i s i o n , the t h e 202nd 202nd to t o the t h e 2nd 2nd Artillery Artillery D i v i a i o n , and and the t h e 203rd 203rd to t o the the 7th 7 t h Artillery A r t i l l e r y Division. Division. T his Division, This t h e message announceS, announces, will w i l l eliminate e l i m i n a t e the the a r r a n g e m e n t , the arrangement, " c o n f u s i o n inherent i n h e r e n t in.too i n too many chefs c h e f s in in the t h e kitchen." kitchen." "confusion (SUEDE 501st 5 0 1 s t Comm C o r n Recon Grp G r p Korea, K-2083, K-2083, 9 Apr 52) 52)
d o e s not n o t indicate i n d i c a t e whether whether the the Comment: The message does Launcher Division--the D i v i e i a n - - t h e parent p a r e n t unit unit for for the the 201st, 201st, 21st Rocket Launcher i t s subsub202nd and 203rd Regiments--has Regiments--has been de-activated d e - a c t i v a t e d and and its o the listed listed o r d i n a t e rocket r o c k e t launcher l a u n c h e r l'egiments r e g i m e n t s made rganic t ordinate made o organic to a rtillery d i v i s i o n s or whether h i s is o n l y an attachment. artillery divisions whether t this only an attachment.
I t h a s previously p r e v i o u s l y been observed o b s e r v e d that t h a t the t h e rocket r o c k e t launcher launcher It has were deployed deployed across across the t h e entire e n t i r e front. front. r e g i m e n t s were regiments
11. 11.
C Chinese h i n e s e Communist artillery a r t i l l e r y , division d i v i s i o n in in eastern e a s t e r n Korea: Korea: A A Chinese 2-April units of n e s e Communist Communist message message o/. of 2 Ap r i l rreveals e v e a l s tthat hat u n i t s of t h e 7th 7 t h Chinese C h i n e s e Communist Communist Artillery A r t i l l e r y Division, D i v i s i o n , in in eastern eastern the Korea, will w i l l be be issued i s s u e d about about 93,000 93,000 catties c a t t i e s (approximately ( a p p r o x i m a t e l y 46 t tons) o n s ) of of food from the t h e supply s u p p l y depot. d e p o t . (SUEDE (SUEDE CINCFE Tokyo, CINCFE Tokyo, SIB SIB 479, 10 1 0 Apr Apr 52) 52) Comment: Although this t h i s amount of food f o o d will w i l l provide provide Comment: ratiolig-TUF-only four d days for division, r a t i o n s f o r o n l y tthree h r e e tto o four ays f o r tthe he d i v i s i o n , the the movement of of this t h i s quantity q u a n t i t y of of supplies s u p p l i e s shows shows that t h a t the t h e enemy's enemy's front are satisfactory. satisfactory. f r o n t line l i n e logistics l o g i s t i c s are
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units Chinese Communist rear r e a r area u n i t s continue c o n t i n u e forward . The Chinese C h i n e s e Communist Communist 21st 2 1st Arfillery_Regiment, A r t i l l e r y Regiment, dis Iacement: The ached. for operation's .66 203rd ChineSe Communist Communist I Infantry .cl;;",' or'-o &rations' to t hthe e 203rd Chinese nfantry a ;~:rn;nt: bivigion D i v i s i o n in i n eastern e a s t e r n Korea,.requested Korea, r e q u e s t e d its its parent p a r e n t 7th 7 t h Artillery Artillery D i v i s i o n to t o supply s u p p l y additional a d d i t i o n g l communications communications equipment, equipment, includincludDivision ing wire, "orders received r e c e i v e d from the t h e infantry i n f a n t r y relarelawire, because of of "orders tive t i v e to t o the t h e deployment of of positions, p o s i t i o n s , there t h e r e will w i l l be be a a rereforward .'' The message continued c o n t i n u e d that that deployment forward ." "depending on circumstances c i r c u m s t a n c e s each battalion b a t t a l i o n and company will will a l s o create from one to to two observation observation p o s t 6 that t h a t they t h e y may also posts exercise exercise effective e f f e c t i v e control c o n t r o l over over their t h e i r fields f i e l d s of of fire. f i r e . Thus we w e may correct correct and and adjust a d j u s t to t o affect a f f e c t slaughter s l a u g h t e r of of enemy enemy troops." troops.11
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On 6 April, A p r i l , however, however, headquarters h e a d q u a r t e r s of of the t h e 7th 7 t h Artillery Artillery D i v i s i o n ordered o r d e r e d this t h i s supply s u p p l y unit u n i t to t o the t h e effect e f f e c t that t h a t "At "At Division present, bmt can . move move forward p r e s e n t , you can c a n not not b u t you c an , p l e a s e search search your your area area for f o r any any scrap s c r a p lumber lumber before you move, please and bring b r i n g it i t with w i t h you." you:'
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On 4 April, A p r i l , the t h e supply s u p p l y unit u n i t of of the t h e 7th 7 t h Artillery A r t i l l e r y Division Division received supp displace orders to t o move. move. One s u p p l lyinstallationwas y i n s t a l l a t i o n w a s to to d isplace r e c e i v e d orders r e a r w a r d to t o the t h e Yangdok area, a r e a , a major Communist supply rearward s u p p l y center. center. of the t h e unit's u n i t ' s other o t h e r major major supply s u p p l y installation installation l o c a t i o n of The new location was not n o t given. given.
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A n 8 A p r i l measage i n d i c a t e d that t h a t the t h e 7th 7 t h Artillery Artillery An.8 April message indicated Division's h o s p i t a l was also moving forward. (SUEDE (SUEDE 501st 50lst Division'S. hospital was also moving forward. Corn Grp Korea, Korea, K-2161, K-2161, 12 12 Apr; Apr; K-2154, K-2154, 11 1 1Apr; Apr; CINCFE, CINCFE, Comm Recon Grp Tokyo SIB SIB 481, 481, 12 1 2 Apr Apr 52) 52) Comment: These messages indicate i n d i c a t e clearly c l e a r l y that t h a t a reredeployment $8 being b e i n g undertaken u n d e r t a k e n by by major elements e l e m e n t s of the t h e 7th 7th deploWenT-I's Chinese Communist Communist Artillery A r t i l l e r y Division. Division. I t is n o t immediately Chinese It not l i e s behind behind this t h i s action. a c t i o n . In In t h e case case of evident,however,what lies the t h e 21st A r t i l l e r y Regiment, t h e move may only o n l y reflect r e f l e c t its the Artillery Regiment, the a t t a c h m e n t to t o the t h e 203rd 203rd Infantry I n f a n t r y Division. D i v i s i o n . The request r e q u e s t for for attachment wire and and the t h e establishment e s t a b l i s h m e n t of of additional a d d i t i o n a l observation a b s e r v a t i o n posts posts would seem seem to t o point p o i n t to to a a continued c o n t i n u e d static s t a t i c role role for f o r this t h i s unit. unit.
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North Korean Air Force F o r c e unit u n i t near n e a r Pyongyang has equipment a r r i v a l deadline: d e a d l i n e : An arrival North lbrean Force A n 11 1 1 April AP r i l K a x o r e a n Air Air F o r c e message an air a i r unit u n i t ' near n e a r Pyongyang Pyongyang to t o headquarters h e a d q u a r t e r s at a t Sinuiju Sinuiju from an u ' (probably (probably communications equipequipr g p o r t e d that t h a t "the I f t h e 'pe 'pe pe u' reported ment) must be , b y the t h e 20th." 20th.11 (SUEDE (SUEDE 001st 501st Comm Corn Recon Recon Grp Grp 'merit) must be by 15RSM/10669, 13 13 Apr Apr 52) 52) Korea, 15RSM/10669,
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Comment: While the t h e unrecovered portion p o r t i o n of this t h i s message message p r e c l m c u r a t e analysis, a n a l y s i s , the t h e enemy h as e stablished a preclagg-tracurate has established number of deadlines number d e a d l i n e s for f o r movement, movement, supply s u p p l y functions, f u n c t i o n s , and and other other m i l i t a r y . a c t i v i t i e s during d u r i n g the t h e period p e r i o d 15 15 to t o 20 20 April. April. military.activities
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Acute shortage s h o r t a g e of work animals animals s u g g e s t e d in i n North suggested North Korean Korean messa messa e: e: An u n i d e n t i f i ed North Ko r e a n battalion b a t t a l i o n commander commander unidentified Norfh Rorean a ned iin n an 1A p r i l message t h a t "even "even a a small s m a l l cattle, cattle, coniptained an 1 11 April message that which can can barely b a r e l y till till ( the s oil),c o s t e 660,000 0 , 0 0 0 tto o 7 0 , 0 0 0 won (the soil) ,costs 70,000 of the t h e cattle, c a t t l e , which appear appear in in in t h e market price. p r i c e . Most of in the t the h e market, market, have wounds in t their h e i r necks. necks. W We e can see v very e r y ffew ew c a t t l e , which are a r e fat f a t and without w i t h o u t wounds, a l l the the cattle, wounds, out of all cattle c a t t l e assembled assembled in i n the t h e market." market." (SUEDE 501et 501st Comm Recon G r p Korea, SK-1-318, 12 12 Apr Apr 52) 52) Grp Korea, SK-I-318, c o n t r o l l e d pre-war pre-war p r i c e of a good work ox Comment: The controlled Comment: price i n North Korea Kore8 was about about 12,000 12,000 won. During the t h e brief b r i e f period period in of UN o c c u p a t i o n in i n November 1950, the t h e price on t he f r e e market occupation the free rose to t o 20,000 2 0 , 0 0 0 won. During the t h e summer and fail f a l l of 1951, c attle cattle p prices r i c e s apparently a p p a r e n t l y reached r e a c h e d the t h e level level r reported e p o r t e d above, above, a although lthough t h e controlled c o n t r o l l e d price p r i c e is is still s t i l l believed b e l i e v e d to t o be be about about 15,000 15,000won. won. the
ox is is almost almost as as vital v i t a l to t o the t h e Korean agricultural agricultural The ox as rice. r i c e . The acute a c u t e shortage s h o r t a g e of n i m a l s indicated indicated economy as of work a animals in t h i s message, ith t h e extreme h o r t a g e of in this message, coupled w with the extreme s shortage of farm labor, adds another a n o t h e r burden to t o the t h e suffering s u f f e r i n g civilian c i v i l i a n population. population. labor,
6. 6 .
New night n i g h t fighter f i g h t e r unit, u n i t , probably jet-equipped, j e t - e q u i p p e d , active a c t i v e over over The Russian-voice Russian-voice ground-controlled g r o u n d - c o n t r o l l e d intercept i n t e r c e p t net net Korea: The reveals that t h a t an a n additional a d d i t i o n a l night n i g h t fighter fighter u nit, p robably j etunit, probably jetequipped, e q u i p p e d , appeared appeared over o v e r Korea Korea on on 29 29 January. J a n u a r y . The Air A i r Force Force b e l i e v e s that t h a t this t h i s new unit u n i t is associated associated w i t h the the c onventional be/ieves with conventional LA-11 night n i g h t fighter unit u n i t at a t Anshan, Anshan, under under the t h e command command of of LA-11 S i n c e these LA-11's LA-11's are still s t i l l active, the t h e jet j e t airairEfimov. Since craft unit rather t than replace the c r a f t in i n the t h e new u n i t may augment augment rather han r eplace t he LA-11's. i r Force Roundup Roundup 71, 71, 11 1 1 Apr Apr 52) 52) (SUEDE A Air
LA-11 fighters f i g h t e r s under Ef imov have been flying flying Comment: LA-11 Efimov n i g h t p a t r o l s and intercept intercept m i s l i o n s over ince t h e fall night-FiTFEas misgions over Koreq Korea s since the of 1951, 1951., when they t h e y were the t h e only identified i d e n t i f i e d enemy n night ight f fighter ighter unit. u n i t . Efimov has h a s also also Ied led flights f l i g h t s of of MIG-15's MIG-15's at a t Anshan. Anshan. p l a n e s observed observed j e t fighters f i g h t e r s on s everal e venings. During March UN planes jet several evenings.
R u s s i a n , "Kuteszufu," l*Kuteszufu,vl p e r h a p s an assistant a s s i s t a n t or reAnother Russian, perhaps replacement for for Efimov, Efimov, was noted for for the t h e first f i r s t time t i m e on 10 1 0 April April plicement l e a d e r of of eight e i g h t "allied" " a l l i e d 1 ' MIG-15's MIG-15's at a t Anshan. Anshan. as leader
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7 7., Chinese jet C hinese j e t division d i v i s i o n still s t i l l at a t Mukden: A message of 4 April Air Division's A p r i l from from 'laden Mukden to t o Peiping P e i p i n g reporfed r e p o r t e d the the' 3rd, 3rB A i r Division's 686, Mukdentower wave length l e n g t h and and its its call c a l l sign. sign. ( SUEDEm6 8 6 , Mukden(SUEDE Peiping, P eiping, 4 4 Apr Apr 52) 52)
Comment: T h i s message suggests s u g g e s t s that t h a t the t h e MIG-equipped MIG-equipped COmment: This 3rd Air Division Jet f fighters 3 rd A ir D i v i s i o n is is still s t i l l at a t Mukden. Mukden. Jet i g h t e r s of this this mid-January when when t they division have been unobserved since mid-January hey withdrew frOm from Antung. Antung. Chinese jet fighter f i g h t e r divisions d i v i s i o n s now now in in the 6th, Manchuria Manchuria include: include: t he 6 t h , 12th 1 2 t h and 17th, 1 7 t h , in the t h e Antung area; a r e a ; the t h e 3rd, 3 r d , and and probably p r o b a b l y the t h e 4th, 4th, in i n the t h e Mukden Mukden area. area.

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Compunists in i n Korea may.anticipate may a n t i c i p a t e a a UN offensive: o f f e n s i v e : A 12 12 Communists April message passed p a s s e d to t o "all.battalions" " a l l b a t t a l i o n s " of of an a n unidentified unidentified A p r i l message N o r t h Korean Korean unit u n i t stated s t a t e d that t h a t "according " a c c o r d i n g to t o the t h e officer o f f i c e r at at North the t h e corps, the t h e enemy has h a s pushed pushed forward forward into i n t o our o u r area. -.ea. They are feeling f e e l i n g out o u t our o u r positions p o s i t i o n s so so c can a n bomb theM." them." (SUEDE (SUEDE Grp Korea, Korea, 15RSM 15RSMl-p 081, 13 13 lips 52) 501st Comm Recon Grp jJ308l, 52)
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Chinese Communist unit reports plagueinfected rat in central Korea: The "Anti-plague Committee" of a Chinese Communist rocket launcher regiment in east central Korea reports to its parent unit on 3 April the discovery of a "dead rat at the battalion mediCal officer's location." Cherdical analysis made by the "Army Group's Quarantine Unit" revealed that "the rat was infected with and died with bubonic plague." The message c o n c l u d e s , however, with w i t h the t h e statement s t a t e m e n t that t h a t "at "at present p r e s e n t we w e still still concludes, have not n o t discove discove y l a g u e among the the y cases of of bubonic bubonic p plague troops troops." 62, (suEDEr-edpT 62, 3 3 Apr Apr 52) 52) (SUEDE
The devastation in Communist-controlled areas of Korea has greatly heightened the possibility of a serious epidemic. Currently, however, typhus and typhoid have been the only diseases reportedly occurring with a high incidence.
8. 8 .
North Korean unit u n i t may posgess p o s s e s s large l a r g e stockpile s t o c k p i l e of of gasoline; gasoline: r t i l l e r y sstatistical tatistical o f f i c e r v 1of of " t he ' a In 16 April A p r i l message message l'the artillery oificer" I n a 10 t h e North Korean 5th 5th D i v i s i o n in i n the t h e Pyongyang Area &rea reported reported the Division to his superior t o h is s u p e r i o r that t h a t "gasoline " g a s o l i n e on QQ hand on o n the t h e 13th 1 3 t h of of March: March: 2,217,800 kilograms." 2,217,800 kilograms.1q The balance b a l a n c e of his report r e p o r t on on fuels fuels mentioned that t h a t the t h e authorized a u t h o r i z e d quantity q u a n t i t y used used for f o r various v a r i o u s purpurposes 487 kilograms. k i l o g r a m s . (SUEDE (SUEDE 5 501st 0 1 s t Comm Recon p o s e s aggregated a g g r e g a t e d 10 10 487 3080, 11 G r p Korea, 15RSM 15RSM{~'-13080, 1 1 Apr Apr 52) 52) Grp o r r e c t , this t h i s North Korean is c correct, gallons g a l l o n s of gasoline. g a s o l i n e . There has was was BO so p plentiful l e n t i f u l in i n North Korea; f a i r l y strict s t r i c t gasoline regulations. regulations. fairly
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Comment; he f igure If t the figure Comment: unit would 700,000 u nit m a have v e over o v e r 700,000 'been no Iindication n d i c a t i o n tthat hat f fuel uel been no i n fact f a c t current c u r r e n t reports r e p o r t s show in
Comment: Although t h i s message may have been originated originated Although this area unit u n i t and and may have have reference r e f e r e n c e to t o UN UN agents, agents, a a by a rear area u n i t in i n eastern e a s t e r n Korea Korea on on 17 17 March March ordered ordered Chinese Communist unit i its ts u units n i t s to t o be in i n readiness r e a d i n e s s because "the "the enemy are are preparing preparing 11 to launch launch a a revenge revenge attack a t t a c k against a g a i n s t us. us. ."
Comment: Comment:
Rats a r e the t h e primary primary hosts h o s t s of of bubonic bubonic plague. plague. Rats are
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Vehicular strength and practices in Korea of Chinese Communist Artillery Division reported:. The supply element of the Chinese Communist 7th Artillery Division in eastern Korea reported r e p o r t e d to t o its its headquarters h e a d q u a r t e r s on 2 April A p r i l that t h a t the the d divisiOn i v i s i o n had t o t a l of 438 operational o p e r a t i o n a l vehicles vehicles w i t h 225 additional a d d i t i o n a l ones ones a total with similar to the 2i-ton u n d e r repair. r e p a i r , The bulk b u l k of them were s imilar t o t h e US 24-ton under The expenditure h e message continued c o n t i n u e d that t h a t gasoline gasoline e x p e n d i t u r e is truck. T truck. limited l i m i t e d to t o 91 9 1 gallons g a l l o n s per p a r Vehicle v e h i c l e per p e r month. month. the Artillery A later l a t e r message of 6 April A p r i l from t h e same 7th 7th A rtillery supply t h a t "the " t h e regulations r e g u l a t i o n s relative r e l a t i v e to t o the the s u p p l y element e l e m e n t reported r e p o r t e d that use are not n o t strict s t r i c t enough." enough.1f The message u s e of of petroleum p e t r o l e u m products p r o d u c t s are n o t e s that t h a t "utter " u t t e r confusion" c o n f u s i o n b qprevails p r e v a i l s and and that t h a t they t h e y have been notes " e x p e r i e n c i n g unseeming losses" lossestv i n fuel f u e l consumption, consumption, In I n concon"experiencing in clusion books be printed p r i n t e d with with c l u s i o n the t h e sender s a n d e r suggests s u g g e s t s that t h a t ration r a t i o n books s t a m p s for f o r 5, stamps 5 , 10, and 25 2 5 gallons g a l l o n s and that t h a t the t h e new s system y s t e m be g given i v e n "a trial t r i a l run r u n beginnin beginnin 2 21 1 A April. p r i l O g P (SUEDE (SUEDE 501st Comm Comm Recon Grp G r p Korea, Korea, K-2169 K-2169 and andT-PS3, 53, 9 Apr 52) 52) monthly r ration 91 per vehicle Comment: The monthly a t i o n of 9 1 gallons p er v ehicle Comment: l i m i t each e a c h vehicle v e h i c l e to t o under u n d e r 500 500 miles m i l e s of of travel. t r a v e l . Neverwould limit t heless, t h i s message indicates i n d i c a t e s that that s ufficient g a s o l i n e is theless, this sufficient gasoline a r r i v i n g in i n the t h e forward f o r w a r d areas areas to t o allow a l l o w considerable c o n s i d e r a b l e truck tryck arriving movement movement.
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army u units n i t s urged urged to exceed q quotas uotas i in n s san-fan an-fan Chinese division headquarters artillery d ivision h eadquarters n e s e Communist Communi,st artillery qu%zlia d i r e c t i v e from from the t h e Northeast N o r t h g a a t'(lanchuria) (Manchuria) in Korea quotes a directive Bureau of the t h e Chinese Chinese Communist Party P a r t y which establishes establishes a t t q u o t a t l of e m b e z z l e r s to t o be i s c o v e r e d in in e ach "quota" of major and minor embezzlers be d discovered each division during against c corruption, o r r u p t i o n , waste and d ivision d u r i n g the campaign against a l l units u n i t s to t o "seek "seek to to b u r e a u c r a c y . The headquarters h e a d q u a r t e r s urges u r g e s all bureaucracy.

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exceed" the eighteen exceed'? t h e quota q u o t a of o f three "large " l a r g e tigers" tigersv' and e i g h t e e n "small tigers" t i g e r s " allotted a l l o t t e d to to the t h e division d i v i s i o n in i n the t h e "first " f i r s t phase" phase" of of the the S U E D E r t Q900, O O , Unknown-Unknown, 1 0 Feb 52) 52) (SUEDE Unknown-Unknown, Korea, 10 campaign. (
Comment: The above directive, d i r e c t i v e , ordering o r d e r i n g an an arbitrary arbitrary Comment: numbeirUT-Uffenders of o f f e n d e r s to t o be be found found regardless regardless of of the t h e evidence, evidence, number is clearly a L misuse of of the t h e highly h i g h l y regarded r e g a r d e d quota q u o t a system s y s t e m and and may in in time be viewed as an an expression e x p r e s s i o n of the t h e "bureaucratism" ltbureaucratism" which the t h e campaign campaign in i n part p a s t aims aims to t o combat. combat. Although any given given unit estabu n i t may contain c o n t a i n its its allotted a l l o t t e d number number of "tigers," t ' t i g o r s , ' t the t h e eatablishment exhortation to exceed t that quota l i s h m e n t of a quota q u o t a and the the e xhortation t o exceed hat q uota illustrate, by which which Communist Communist f functionaries can i l l u s t r a t e . t the h e pprocess r o c e s s by unctionaries c an prove p r o v e their t h e i r industry i n d u s t r y and and rectitude r e c t i t u d e only o n l y by denouncing their their associates, associates, fabricating f a b r i c a t i n g evidence e v i d e n c e where necessary. necessary
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Four Pril th e sighting 4 ' 5 0 jets jets at P-10-pilots reported on on 13 13 A April the sigRing of 450 at F-86 pilots reported Tatungkou and both airfields airfields on the KoreaTatungkou and 50 50 at at Antung, Antungboth Manchuria border. The pilots were thoroughly interrogated FEAF gives full and FBAF full credence credence to to their their account. account. Photographs taken five hours later showed only 81 aircraft at Tatungkou and 101 101 at Antung. Antung.
UN pilots see 500 UW 500 jets jets on two Yalu River airfields:
Comment: On 9 March March UN pilot reports of enemy aircraft Comment: on the-WIW-River the Palu River airfield airfield were were invalidated Invalidated by by photographs photographs the time. time. However, conditions for f o r observation may taken at the have been been more more favorable favorable on on 13 13 April. April. If accepted, the the report of of tho tho pilots pilots means means that that most most of of the the estimated estimated jet jet aircraft in Manchuria were parked aarked on these two two fields. Their Their normal complement is is about about 100 100 planes planes each. each.

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North Korean Greater communications activity a c t i v i t y among North The Far E East reports lhat!for the heFar a s t Command r eports t ha$,'for t he commands: T first since,late North Korean Korean f i r s t time tfme s i n c e l a t e January January the t h e three t h r e e North c o r p s which are corps are now now at a t the t h e front f k o n t are are in i n daily d a i l y radio r a d i o concontact with t act w i t h each e a c h other o t h e r and and with w i t h front f r o n t line l i n e headquarters. headquarters. Concurrent w with development, North Korean Supreme supreme Headi t h this t h i s development, Concurrent quarters with both q u a r t e r s has been b e e n in i n active-communication a c t i v e communicati-on w ith b o t h the the f r o n t line l i n e headquarters h e a d q u a r t e r s and the t h e remaining front remaining North North Korean combat corps, c o r p s , at a t present p r e s e n t in i n reserve r e s e r v e in i n the t h e Wonsan Wonsan area. area. Hg ASAPAC Tokyo, Tokyo, Japan (SUEDE Bg J a p a n 8621 8621 AAU, Spot Spot 3335A, 3335A, 16 Apr 52) 52)
7. 7.
military 15 April US A Armed m i l i t a r y activity a c t i v i t y in i nKorea:: Korea-: -On On 1 5 A P r i l ffie t h e US rmed >arized r e c e n t developments in in Forces Security Agency summarized recent t h e Chinese Communist Communist forces f o r c e s in i n North Korea and and- concluded concluded the that are possible: possible: t h a t three t h r e e interpretations i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s are
The military m i l i t a r y activity a c t i v i t y that t h a t AFSA summarizes summarizes includes includes command alignments a l i g n m e n t s in i n Chinese Chinese CommuniSt Communist infantry i n f a n t r y and and new command artillery u n i t s , forward displacements d i s p l a c e m e n t s of of u n i t s , signifisignifiartillery units, units, cant meetings Communistpersonnel, p e r s o n n e l , emphasis emphasis on on supply supply cant m e e t i n g s of Communist matters, mattem, and and certain c e r t a i n communications communications changes. changes. (SUEDE (SUEDE AFSA AFSA CC/CAP-196, CC/CAP-196, 15 15 April A p r i l 52) 52)
North Korean jet j e t unit u n i t may move to t o interior i n t e r i o r of ManManchUria: A US Air. Porce coinmunicatiohs communidatiohs in-telligence r Force i n t e f i i g e n c e unit unit in Japan recent to w i n reports that that a r e c e n t reference reference t o an a n airfield airfield
8. 8.

:e:trti
4
I ntercepted o p e r a t i o n a l messages in i n Korea Comment: Intercepted operational have already a l r e a d y indicated i n d i c a t e d an acceleration acceleration of of Chinese ComCommunist military m i l i t a r y activity. activity. T h i s , however, is the t h e first first This, however, is o observed b s e r v e d sign s i g n of greatly g r e a t l y increased i h c r e a s e d activity a c t i v i t y on the t h e part p*rt of the t h e North Korean Army. Army. r e c e n t heightened h e i g h t e n e d Chinese Communist AFSA summarizes recent
1) a r routine rotation front units may be be in 1) outine r o t a t i o n of f r o n t line line u n i t s may in process, process ,
2 ) the t h e enemy may anticipate a n t i c i p a t e a UN spring s p r i n g offensive offensive 2) o n s e q u e n t l y bolstering bolstering h is d efenses, o r and is c consequently his defenses, or
3) the t h e enemy may r e p a r i n g to t o launch an o ffensive may be p preparing offensive 15 April. April. sometime after a f t e r 15 sometime
17 Apr 52
TOP SECRET SUEDE

5,re
Ttil) SECRET SUEDie

'
' i n s p e c t i o n at @t Tungfeng, northeast n o r t h e a s t of indicate 'inspection Tungfeng, of Mukden, Mukden, may indicate f u t u r e occupancy ocqupancy of of this t h i s field. field. future
The field f i e l d station s t a t i o n speculates s p e c u l a t e s that t h a t the t h e most most "likely" "likely1' The u n i t involved involved would would be be a a North Korean one, one, and cites cites a unit s t a t e d "Will Vi11 Yang Yang Tu Tu Hi's Hi's unit unit 25 January message which stated come to t o Tungfeng Tungfeng immediately." immediately." Another related r e l a t e d message 20 January January said said t h a t the t h e "documents...which lldocuments...which order order of 20 that t h e transfer t r a n s f e r from from An(?) An(?)@robably the (probably Anshan) Anshan) to to Tungfeng Tungfeng have come." come." (SUEDE 6920th Securlty S e c u r i t y Group Johnson AB Japan AP A P 434, 434, CHICOMSUM 636, 14 14 Apr Apr 52) 52) CHICOMSUM 636, Comment: On 8 8 April April a a "Yang "Yang Tu Tu Hu," Hu," probably probably the the Comment: same p i l o t as mentioned mentioned above, above, led l e d a flight f l i g h t of pilot of twelve twelve MIG-15's from Anshan Anshan airfield. airfield. MIG-15's from
The reasons for this t h i s move to t o Tungfeng, h e t h e r it it Tungfeng, and w whether o r will w i l l occur, o c c u r , have have not not been been revealed. revealed. has occurred or
9. 9.
,
may have have larger l a r g e r role r o l e in i n UN UN plane plane interception: interception: Chinese may A n analysis a n a l y s ' i s of of Russian Russian voice v o i c e ground-controlled ground-controlled Intercept .intercept An (GCI) traffic reveals ( GCI) t raffic r e v e a l s that t h a t two Antung-based Antung-based jet j e t regiments, regiments, a c t i v e in i n combat combat over over Korea, Korea, have not not been obnormally active obs e r v e d since since 1 1 April. April. served
The Air Force believes b e l i e v e s that t h a t these these a ir u n i t s are air units Chinese. A s of 1 1 March they t h e y were directed d i r e c t e d by both the the Chinese. As Russian and and Chinese Chinese components components of of the t h e GCI GCI net. n e t . Now, Now, t o the t h e Air A i r Force, flying u n i t s may be according to Force, these flying units be operopera t i n g solely s o l e l y under the t h e direction d i r e c t i d n of of the t h e Chinese Chinese GCI GCI net, net, ating or they they may have have left l e f t the t h e Yalu Yalu River River area. area. (SUEDE (SUEDE Air Air Force Roundup 72, 72, 15 1 5 Apr Apr 52) 52)
Russian-voice GCI G C I net, n e t , which controlled controlled Comment: The Russian-voice four -and regiments until u n t i l early e a r l y March, March, Soviet and two Chinese regiments t h e fighters f l g h C e r s which engaged engaged UN UN planes. p l a n e s . The d i r e c t e d most of the directed Chinese GCI net, net, f i r s t identified identified i n mid-November first in mid-November 1951, 1951, was was occupied m a i n l y in directing d i r e c t i n g aircraft a i r c r a f t in in t raining, p atrol mainly training, patrol a l e r t exercises. exercises. and alert
If e x c l u s i v e Chineee o n t r o l of h e s e ;two a i r units u n i t s is is If exclusive Chinese c control of tthese wo air conf irllred ~t would ndicate i n c r e a s i n g Chinese, confirmed, it would i indicate increasing Chinese, and and corcorrespondingly less S Soviet, responsibility for t the interception respondingly oviet, r e s p o n s i b i l i t y for he i nterception of UN planes. planes.

5 5
Apr 52 17 Apr
HR70-14 HR70-14
-TOP-SEGRET- SUED
CIS
NR
3. 3 .
Greater communications Greater communications activity activityamong among North North Korean Korean commands: commands:
US ArmyJapan Army Japan _ $CJ( aRdThe An kiThe FarEast East Command Commandreports reports that that for the US Far the 16 Apr 52 sm.., 33591 first time since late January the three North first time since late January the three North l6 Apr 52 Sf*b33358 Korean corps which which are now at are Korean are now at the the front are SUEDE SUEDE co(.3)... h t IA)._ ~ . .30 633, contact with w i t h each other and and On in daily radio contact with this this development, development, North ltne headquarters. Concurrent with with front line Korean Supreme Headquarters has has been been in in active active communication communication with with both the front front line headquarters and boththe and the remaining remainidg North Korean Korean combat combat corps, at in the Wonsan atpresent presentin inreserve reserve in the Wonsan area. area.
J

FAR FAR EAST
Comment: Intercepted operational messages in Korea have already an acceleration acceleration of of Chinese Chinese Communist Communist already indicated indicated an This, however, however, is is the the first firstobserved observed sign sign of of greatly military military activity. activity. This, increased increased activity activityon on the the part partof of the theNorth North Korean Korean Army. Army.
NR
PPROVED FOR FOR RELEASE RELEASE ATE: 23-Mar-2010 DATE: 23-Mar-2010 'DPPROVED
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US OFFICIALS ONLY
266
S ate Dept. review completed

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THE NATIONAL THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING MEANING OF THE STATES WITHIN THE DEFENSE OF THE UNITED AND 794, THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS. 793 MANNER TO AN OF WHICH IN ANY TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
GENERAL
Germany: The Paris Embassy analyzes latest Soviet note on of any real SovParis regards the lack American Embassy in as the most important iet adVane- in its position on Germany considers feature of the 9 April note. The USSR presumably East-West dialogue without its best Let is to keep alive the influence making any serious proposal while it attempts to Western decisions. hope will work in its The possibilities the USSR may (1) weakening of the suggests, include: favor, the Embassy government opposed Adenauer regime and its replacement by a (2) a sharpening econto European defense integration; (3) breakdown France and England; omic-political crisis in and (4) of unity in the Western powers' foreign policy; in Mutual problems and reduction United States election year Security funds. practical failure of From the Soviet point of view, a Soviet control of East Western integration without a loss of objective and one Germany may still appear an attainable of Germany with preferable to a unification and neutralization (S Paris 6330, 15 Apr 52) all the ensuing uncertainties. It is very unlikely that the Adenauer regime Comment: Defense will be replaced before ratification of the European Community program. celebration: Peiping invites labor organiiations to May Day in India accepted All but one of the major labor federations of Labor to attend the invitation of the All-China Federation undertake a fourthe May Day celebration in. Peiping and to The United States Embassy in New Delhi week tour of China. Conconsiders this a serious set-back to the International the underscoring federation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), non-Communist trade unions to arouse the failure of the ICFTU
2.
25i6
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3.
German and Soviet notes on the icartrhe publishes US Czech press s e on zec papers pu A peacersay: the of 25 March on the German This is US note MT-Texts of Unior's reply of 9 April. tha American question and the Soviet years, accordinr4 to the has carried the first time in several the Czech press (R.Prague 736, Prague, that Embassy in communication. full text of any United States 15 Apr 52)

EASTERN EUROPE
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maneuvers in Asia and reflecting to the danger of Stalinist Chinese Communist popularity in build-up of the successful the past year. India during Socialist Hindu MaXdoor Sabha sophisticated Even the anti-Stalinist, accepted,although its thoughts about the labor federation (HMS) some second seems to have been based on leadership now said to have decision,which was curiosity over wisdom of the of the Peiping regime, World FedIndian recognition the desire to observe conditions in China, and strategic plans in the making. 52) eration of Trade Unions 52; C Bombay 4940, 10 Apr 6035, 13 Apr (S New Delhi curtailed in the West, has aceelThe WFTU, East, re-organized Comment: in Asia And the Middle Committee for eratedM-Trogram department, set up a permanent expansion in plans for its colonial attention to Africa, and devoted much colonial and underdeveloped areas. All-China Fedsent from the Liu Direct invitations were countries, but Vice Chairman Labor to many Saillant in eration of General Louis delegates to invite Ning-i wrote to WFTU Secretary particular desire December expressing a East and asking him to transmit from Africa and the Middle and individuals in those to organizations the invitation implies that Peiping has no That procedure countries. movements in those areas. with Communist direct contact
17 Apr 52
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FAR EAST
4.
25X1C
Communists in eastern Korea reportedly emphasizing defense: Both North Koreans and Chinese Communists in the FigIFFE and east central Korean battle zones are preparing for defensive action 4
25X1C
The building of a second and a third defensive line, and the distribution of ammunition and rations in the front lines are cited as supporting this information.
25X1A
25X1A
25X1C
Political issues to be raised by Communist negotiators at Panmunjom: The North Korean delegation at the truce talks will propose the establishment of a "special subcommittee to discuss political issues," The proposal will be submitted prior to the resolution of the neutral observers
.issue.
Comment: An unusual amount of recent enemy military activity has been reflected in an increasing volume of reports on Communist intentions.
25X1C
25X1C
25X1
the North Koreans were ordered bytheir Soviet advisers to delay settlement on all major issues until 20 May.
1
25X1A
Comment: General Hsieh Feng, a Chinese Communist, is the strai5F-Fepresentative on the subcommittee dealing with neutral observers. Recent talks, however, have been conducted at the staff level with North Korean participation.
Agreement has been reached by the negotiators to reserve discussion of political issues until a cease-fire is effected. Although no reason is given for the enemy's reported intent to delay the talks until 20 May, the heightened tempo of enemy military activities may be related to this strategy.
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NEAR EAST - AFRICA

A Tudeh plans May Day demonstrations throughout Iran: front organireport from Tehran states that the Tudeh and its throughzations are planning large-scale May Day demonstrations 25X1C Ibelieves that security out Iran. forces are capable of controlling plvincial demonstrations in the capital would severeIbut that a determined Tudeh effort The report concludes that in there. ly tax government forces martial law spite of army advice Mossadee will not extend 25X1A to include I May.
6.
1
, I .
7.
1 I I
25X1C
King Farouk considering change of government in Egypt: of King 1arouk is determined to prevent the return to power to and will therefore be forced the influential Wafd Party is prereplace Prime Minister Hilali Pasha with someone who The without Parliament. nitel pared to govern Egyptin reports e y can dates to succeed Milan are tn former that the two and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abd-al Hamid Badawi Pasha, Ahmad Murtada the current Minister of Interior, War, an al-Maraghi Bey. weeks Comment: There has been some evidence in recent if Egypt is wish to continue in office that Ailali may not unable to reach an agreement soon with Britain.
1
Comment: Martial law, which was imposed in Tehran immediately following the Tudeh riots of 28 March, is schealarmed duled to end in late April. Mossadeq, who is allegedly Last year, despite army by the recent riots, may extend it. The advice, Mossadeq permitted Tudeh May Day demonstrations. successfully considered capable of security forces, however, are controlling any isolated Tudeh activities along these lines.
25X1C
25X1A
25X1A
8.
Anti-American sentiment increasing in Morocco: An increase in Morocco is in anti-American sentiment and propaganda Agitators of the principal reported by a nationalist source. exploiting the widespread nationalist party, Istiqlal, are involvement. fear of an eventual war and a common desire to avoid The older and more moderate Istiqlal leaders, who had held out hope of favorable American action in the UN General Assembly, now find their authority weakened
25X1A
25X1A
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responsible for the increasing Comment: Factors more Assembly's refusal anti-American sentiment than the General of French policy in Morocco last December to place the question large numbers of (7) the presence of on its agenda are: causing local irritaemployees American airbase construction French-controlled anti-American tone of tions; (2) the strong by the Residency General; newspapers, especially those backed consistently disparaging and (3) Resident General Guillaume's stationed in attitude toward American diplomatic personnel Morocco.
9.

1
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of Communist French Moroccan police to be purged Security in French Morocco sympathizers: The new Director of and Communist all militant syndicalists plans to dismiss As a test case, the sympathizers from the Moroccan police. police, which is secretary of the local union of Casablanca Labor ConfederaCommunist-directed General affiliated with the expelled from Morocco. tion. was suspended f _ nm the force and
1
25X1A
25X1A
for improveComment: The police union had been agitating economic benefits. situation and for other ments in the housing without an increase in In protest against longer working hours enforced all traffic regupay, the Casablanca police strictly lations on 28 February, thus snarling traffic.
17 Apr 52
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SECRET
WESTERN EUROPE
10.
Moscow Economic Conference propaganda scores gains in West Germany: Resentment of the "fact" that West Germany was not adequately represented at the Moscow Economic Conference and is not allowed normal Eastern trade has increased following the announcement that trade negotiations between England and Communist China were arranged at Moscow. Meanwhile the Commur nist press and certain non-Communist journals are making an extraordinary effort to exploit alleged discrimination against West Germany. (S Frankfurt Sitrep 13, 15 Apr 52)
Comment: Many anti-Communist newspapers in West Germany have -5177iWid the line that the "ruble stinks only in Bonn," and have implied incorrectly, that other Western countries were permitted official representations at the Moscow conference. These papers have often ignored the fact that at least four West German businessmen did attend the conference.
East German propaganda has been that the West Germans should "get on the bandwagon before the British run off with the spoils." It has also tied in the theme that the West is to blame for the current failure of interzonal trade negotiadons.
11
Strife increases within independent union of non-Communist French labor: The US Embassy in Paris reports that the feud within the right-wing Independent Labor Confederation (CGSI) is now a "full-fledged battle" which renders compromise "practically impossible." The prospective adverse effect of this split on the progress of the non-Communist trade unions' effort to join forces against the Communist-sponsored General Labor Confederation (COT) in strategic industrial zenters has seriously alarmed a "leading labor source." The Embassy believes that this factional breakdown is most unfortunate, since it might set a precedent for similar upheavals in other non-Communist trade unions now when there are indications that the CGT itself is vulnerable because of internal difficulties. (S Paris 6327, 15 Apr 52)
Comment: The heterogeneous composition of the CGSI is responsible for this schism, which is basically a struggle for union leadership between the majority faction of industrialist and RPF backers and the minority faction of ex-

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financial CGSI depends heavily for whom the Vichyites, upon support. and the strength of a united CGSI potential Force Ouvriere, Despite the ICFTU to the given by the expected to marea1715757--financial aid being unions can be the non-Communist CGT only after they have proven their gress against the definite gains for the working classes. effectiveness by
12.

LATIN AMERICA
Conference disMoscow Economic results claims for Communist Trying to claim concrete Soviet Austrian press: Communist and counted in Conference, to alleged trade from the Moscow Economic given wide publicity both Orbit and nonmedia in Austria have delegation by Austrian to the by the chief of offers made Quoting a Moscow broadcast they allege Orbit countries. Professor Dobretsberger, Soviet Union delegation, the Austrian exchange agreement with the coal deto double important that an Poland offered Hungarian "has been concluded," that settlement was reached" on liveries, and that "a Austria. trade obligations toward the practical significance to These efforts to attach been derided in the non-Communist however, have dismissal from his Moscow meeting, Dobretsberger's demand committee's press. These papers claims a hoax, point to his recall call his negotiations, and university new+. competence in trade Hunlack of official long been pressing the agreeGovernment has existing trade that the Austrian ob)igations under Vienna, 9, 11 and garians to settle their 3251, 10 Apr 52; R FBIS, (U Vienna ments. 12 Apr 52)
25X1X
A revolt
June
13.
25X1X iS Se 25X1X
1
Iwith
I
New Argentine revolt reportedl
being lanned:
25X1X
this revolt ously apqnniated 25X1X not prey s persons Plans call for the assassinais better planned an plots against the government. officialsnnd army intervengovernment forces ox the General tion of Peron and other resistance by the shock any tion to handle Confederation of Labor.
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25X1X
Reportedly, the government knows ofl and is "extremely worried" about his activities.
.
Iplotting
2
5X1A
25X1A
25X1C
In March Comment: several small groups were plotting independently to assassinate Peron and his wife, but apparently there is no well-organized plot. Although the army does oppose the powerful influence of the General Confederation of Labor, there are no other indications that influential army leadera favor Peron's assassination or that they have managed to evade Peron's rigorous security measures by engaging in such plots.
1 1
25X1C
'
14.
Disorders may occur in Bolivia: Upon his return to Bolivia, Paz Estenssoro, leader of the Nationalist Revolutionary Movement, violently denounced the small upper class as principally responsible for Bolivia's ills, and threatened maximum punishment for military personnel " responsible for last week's He promised to diversify, the country's economy to deaths." end its dependence on the price of tin, and to name a commission to study nationalization of the mines.
Order has apparently broken down in the Catavi mining area, where the army has been disarmed and labor is hostile In response to the company's request for to mine officials. aid in restoring order, the government dispatched the labor leadere who were responsible for the 1949 massacres at Catavi. ( C La Paz, 396 and 397, 15 Apr 52) Government statements and actions thus far do Comment: not iiii;i7-designed to deter vengeful acts by the Movement against the former government and its supporters. The mine manager at Catavi has considered the evacuation of staff personnel, which includes 45 Americans.
15
Venezuelan police announce discovery of new revolutionary plots: The Venezuelan National Security. Police have announced TET-irrest of fifteen persons and the seizure of a bomb cache in connection with an alleged Democratic Action plot to assassinate Junta strong-man Perez Jimenez. According to "confessions" of the prisoners, the attempt on Perez was to be part of a
SECRET
8
The government's apprehension concerning a possible revoit,however, was indicated in February when it made hundreds of unpublicized arrests.
17 Apr 52
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SECRET scheduled for Holy Week

April 19.
larger plan of terrorism and July 5.

SECRET
9
the police discovered the The US Embassy believes that yet convinced that an actUal bombs as stated, but it is not (11 Caracas 483, 15 Apr 52; planned. attemPt against Perez was U NY Times, 16 Apr 52), uncover arms caches Comment: The Security'Police attempts to link the new perialCiIIY. Current government panic in a Caracas church discovery to ihe disastrous:fire assassination plan may, as the last week and.to an alleged part.of the continuing campaign Embassy suggests, be merely, Action Party. against the outlawed Democratic -Action disturbances However, bona fide Demneratic and 5 July or on such as 19 April whether on patriotic days the election be expected as 'other occasions -- can probably campaign unfolds.
17 Apr 52
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TOP SECRET
17 April 1952
US OFFICIALS ONLY
reports has been prepared primarily This summary of significant Intelligence. It does for the internal use of the Office of Current of all current reports in CIA not represent a complete coverage Comments represent the or in the Office of Current Intelligence. immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.

TOP SECRET
and 0/NE.
Approved {a,r Release 2002/05120 : CIA-RDP79T0111146A000900130001-9
TOP SECRET THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS. 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMISSION OF REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PiRSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
GENERAL
Foreign Secretary Eden urges that the Western reply be coordinated in London or Paris rather than in Washington to avoia European criticism that the United States is dominating Western policy. (S S/S, London 4616 and 4628, 15 Apr 52)
Comment: The chief of German affairs in the British Foreign Office had stated earlier that the USSR could make real trouble in its efforts to prevent German integration with the West by offering genuinely free election of an allGerman Government. Britain evidently now believes that the USSR is preparing a prolonged diplomatic campaign aimed at blocking the ratification, if not the signature, of the EDC treaty and the Allied-German contract.
West German ratification would be endangered only if the Soviet Union offered proposals for unification which guaranteed Gerwany's independence.

TOP SECRET
1
1.
Britain anticipates prolonged Soviet campaign against West German integration: The British Foreign Office belreves that the Soviet note of 9 April may have been designed to elicit a Western refusal to hold'discussions on a German peace treaty, and that such a refusal would prejudice West German ratification of the European Defense Community treaty and the contractual agreements. Britain favors Chancellor Adenuaer's suggestion that the Western reply point out the necessity for advance agreement on essentials without actually rejecting the possibility of four-power talks.
17 Apr 52
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TOP SECRET
FAB EAST
Japan denies intention of buying Iranian oil: The Japanese Foreign Office told the United States Political Adviser in Tokyo that the reported attempts of a Japanese trade delegation (see OCI CID 31 Mar) to purchase Iranian oil are without government support. It also indicated that the Japanese Government would deny the allocation of foreign exchange for Iranian oil in view of the oil's questionable title. (C S/S Tokyo 2202, 15 Apr 52) SOUTH ASIA
3.
American rubber agreement with Ceylon to block shipments to China is unlikely: The American Embassy in Ceylon says that it is unlikely that the United States can conclude an agreement to buy Ceylonese rubber to block China rubber purchases until after elections take place and a new government is formed on 10 June.
.
The Prime Minister, who would desire an accord under other circumstances, believes that such an agreement might compromise the voting support for his United National Party. The Permanent Secretary of External Affairs, moreover, says it is legally impossible for the government to sign an agreement before the elections since parliament is already dissolved. (C S/S Colombo 574, 10 Apr 52)
Comment: Indications are that no rubber agreement will be reached before the elections or, in the event of a United National Party victory, even after the elections. The party is closely associated with major rubber interests that would be unwilling to see the government sign an American agreement, before or after the elections,which might alienate the electorate.
4.
New Anglo-Egyptian statement drafted: The text of an exchange of letters on defense problems has now been agreed to by the Egyptian Prime Minister and the British Ambassador in Cairo. Egyptian agreement, however, is conditional on the
TOP SECRET
2

NEAR EAST-AFRICA
17 Apr 52
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TOP SECRET
conclusion of a satisfactory statement on the Sudan.
The British Foreign Office feels that if the British Cabinet approves this text, the conversations in London with the former Egyptian Ambassador,Amr, who is scheduled to arrive on 16 April, can be confined to the Sudan. The Foreign Office still refuses to suspend the new Sudanese constitution, but hopes that Egypt may be induced to associate itself with the constitutional development. (S S/S London 4618, 15 Apr 52)
Comment: The formulation of a statement on the Sudan satisfactory to both parties is remote as long as the British Foreign Office refuses to recognize Farouk's title to the Sudan or to suspend the new constitution.

TOP SECRET
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17 Apr 52
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11.73
TOP SECRET
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Unidentified U n i d e n t i f i e d Chinese Chinese artillery a r t , i l l e r y unit u n i t in i n Korea awaits orders: o r d e r s : On 6 April Ap r i l an a n unidentified u n i d e n t i f i ed Chinese Chi n e s e Communist artillery artillery m n Korea was ordered o r d e r e d to t o report r e p o r t daily d a i l y on the t h e enemy situsituunit in a t i o n and b attle r e s u l t s , "to dispatch d i s p a t c h a crew t o s e l e c t new ation battle results, to select positions t o prevent prevent p o s i t i o n s and and then t h e n proceed with w i t h the t h e camouflage to d e t e c t i o n .I1 The message-concluded message .concluded with w i t h "after " a f t e r discussions discussions detection."
are completed completed a at place rentive t our p lace r e l l t i v e to t o your your situation, s i t u a t i o n , we we shall s h a l l advise a d v i s e you you by by wire w i r e of of our o u r decision." d e c i s i o n . 1 1 (SUEDE 501st 501st Comm Korea, K-2244, K-2244, 16 16 Apr 52) 52) Comm Recon Grp Grp Korea,
6. 6.
B W drop: drop: An unidenunidenNorth Korean Korean' unit u n i t reports r e p o r t s suspected s u s p e c t e d BW tified Ko r e a n unit u n i t in i n the t h e WonsanWonsan area r reported e p o r t e d on 14 14 t i f i e d North North Korean A p r i l that t h a t "enemy planes" p l a n e s 1 *dropped flour f l o u r mixed w i t h arsenic. arsenic. April with concluded that t h a t "we "we are are not n o t sure s u r e whether it i t is is The statement conCluded the t h e bacterial b a c t e r i a l weapon or or not." not." (SUEDE 5 0 1 s t Comm Recon Grp 501st Korea, SK,201422, SK-201622, 15 15 Apr Apr 52). 52)
Comment: This T h i s is is the t h e first f i r s t enemy report r e p o r t of of a suspected suspected d r o p h e past p a s t three t h r e e or or Aore i o r e weeks. weeks. It BW driTrIE-The I t is possible p o s s i b l e that that t h i s report r e p o r t might revive r e v i v e the t h e lagging l a g g i n g BW campaign in i n Korea, but this Korea, but i it t ~ seems e e m smore likely l i k e l y that t h a t this t h i s is j just ust a r residual esidual e effect f f e c t of of t the h e now-subsiding now-subsiding campaign.
7.
Size and equipment of Chinese Communist artillery regiartillery r egiment, easteniKorea presented: p r e s e n t e d : Th The e 21st 2 1 s t Chinese Ch i n e s e Communist ment iin n eastemKorea Artillery Regiment, attached A r t i l l e r y Regiment, a t t a c h e d for operations o p e r a t i o n s to t o the t h e 203rd ChAnese Communist. Division, on April n 15 15 A p r i l that that Chanese Communist IInfantry nfantry D i v i s i o n , rreported epqrted o "at present "at p r e s e n t our o u r regiment r e g i m e n t has.2,305 has.2 , 3 0 5 men." men . I 1
Comment: This T h i s is is another a n o t h e r of the t h e many recent r e c e n t intercepted intercepted ChinelITTUERunist expectancy Chinese Communist messages which have indicated i n d i c a t e d an an e xpectancy of imminent change. nature Its n a t u r e remains unidentified. unidentified. of change. Its
'
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The armament message armament of of the t h e 21st 2 1 s t is is indicated'in i n d i c a t e d i n a 13 13 April A p r i l mbssage parent.7th Division the divisional supply from its p a r e n t 7 t h Artillery Artillery D i v i s i o n to to t he d ivisional s upply installation t h a t from from 1 1 to t o 10 10 April A p r i l the t h e "21st t121st i n s t a l l a t i o n which stated s t a t e d that Artillery A r t i l l e r y Regiment (fired) ( f i r e d ) 204 204 rounds rounds of of Soviet S o v i e t 122 122 (mm) (mm) h howitzer o w i t z e r ammunition." ammunition." (SUEDE 501st 5 0 1 s t Comm Recon Grp Grp Korea, Korea, K-2253, K-2253, K-2254, K-2254, 16 16 Apr Apr 52) 52)
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21st Chinese Chinese Communist Communist Artillery A r t i l l e r y Regiment Regiment The 21st Comment: Comment: The was 203rd Infantry Division was attiched a t t a c h e d for f o r operations o p e r a t i o n s to t o ttle t p e 203rd Infantry D i v i s i o n in in early I t may be noted noted that t h a t the t h e 21st, 2 1 s t , together together with with e a r l y April. A p r i l . It the t h e other o t h e r elements e l e m e n t s of of the t h e 7th 7th Artillery A r t i l l e r y Division, Division, received r e c e i v e d 120 120 gas masks in i n late l a t e March. March. g a s masks
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8. 8.
Organization coastal O r g a n i z a t i o n of of North NorthKorean Koreaneastern eastern c o a q t asecurity l s e c u r i t. x A North o r torean o r e a n message message on on 15 April p r i l mentions mentions TI the 3rd, 17th (probably the 37th Division !7tih&obably t h e 7th), 7 t h ) ,37:h D i v i s i o n and and the t h e 24th 2 4 t h Brigade B r i g a d e loaded loaded the t h e rice rice on on the t h e vehic1e0 v e h i c l e s on o n the t h e 13th." 13th.w The message continues c o n t i n u e s that t h a t rice r i c e for f o r the t h e 3rd 3rd Division D i v i s i o n was ununThe message loaded l o a d e d at at a a major supply s u p p l y depot d e p o t southwest southwest of of Wonsan. Wonsan. (SUEDE (SUEDE 501st 5 0 1 s t Comm Comm Recon Recon Grp Grp Korea, Korea, 15RSM/10817, 15RSM/10817, 16 16 Apr Apr 52) 52)
cor 8 given': ivencorps

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Comment: Comment: This This message massage confirms confirms the t h e general g e n e r a l location l o c a t i o n and and organization of the t h e North N o r t h Korean KoreanVII VI1Corps Corpsin i nthe t h e.Wonsan Wonaan area. area. o r g a n i z a t i o n of The rice at supply The unloading u n l o a d i n g of of the t h e 3rd 3rd Diitision's Diui9ioas r ice a t a s u p p l y depot depot responsible r e s p o n s i b l e for f o r supplying s u p p l y i n g North North Korean Korean combat combat corps c o r p s at a t the the f r o n t may indicate i n d i c a t e that t h a t this t h i s division d i v i s i o n is is south s o u t h of of the t h e Wonsan Wonsan front area, possibly possibly in in a a reserve reserve capacity. capacity.
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2. Far East EastCommand Command sees seesno noimminent imminentCommunist Communist offensive: offensive:

FAR FAR EAST
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"thereare areno noindications tndications of of observes that "there an imminent attack." attack:' conThe comment continues, however, uto point out that the Communists have made good use of the relative quiet provided by the cease-fire to reinforce, both in men and materiel, and to re-deploy and retrain their units.
The enemy, e n e m y , l is able able to to The is launch a major major offensive offensive with with little littlewarning. warning. The duration of such such an an attack on the the Communists' to keep keep their their advancing advancing attack would would depend on Communists' ability to units units supplied. supplied. -3-
TOP_SECRET-SUEDE-APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: (DATE: 20-Mar-2010 20-Mar-2010
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I n t e n s i v e enemy m i l i t a r y activity a c t i v i t y in i n Korea Korea still s t i l l indiindiIntensive military cated: A A 9 t) April A P r i l Chinese C h i n e s e Communist C o m u n i s t meseage,message, p o s s i b l y /rom from an cated; possibly ZETaUntified u n i d s n t i f i e d infantry i n f a n t r y division d i v i s i o n headquarters, h e a d q u a r t e r s , indicates I n d i c a t e s intenintensive t r a i n i n g of mobile radio .sive training r a d i o operators. o p e r a t o r s . The message states states t hat p e r s o n n e l "must "must learn learn t h e passwords used n a t t a c k and that personnel the used i in attack t h e code words.@' 13 A p r i l from an u nidentithe words." Another message of 13 April unidentif i e d Chinese Communist u nit q ueries,"what r e p o r t is t h e r e on fied unit queries,"what report there t h e mud s i t u a t i o n as it i t affects a f f e c t s the the f ront l ine p o s i t i o n s and the situation front line positions roads?" r oa d s 12 April A p r i l message message from from another a n o t h e r unidentified u n i d e n t i f i e d Chinese Chinese A 12 Communist u n i t relates that t h a t "at " a t 1100 h ours t he b ivouacking unit hours the bivouacking p a r t y arrived a r r i v e d safely s a f e l y without w i t h o u t incident." i n c i d e n t .'l The message mentions party a u n i t number which is p o s s i b l y that t h a t of h e 42nd unit possibly of a regiment regiment of of t the C h i n e s e Communist Communist Army A r m y in i n combat combat in i n the t h e west west central c e n t r a l sector. sector. Chinese (SUEDE 50tst Cam Korea, K-2264, K-2264, 17 17 Apr; Apr; K-2274 K-2274 and and (SUEDE 50)st Comm Recon Grp Korea, 2275, 17 17 Apr Apr 52) 52)
a l l of these t h e s e messages messages Comment: While all Comment: interpretation, i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , the t h e bulk b u l k of current c u r r e n t enemy enemy preparations p r e p a r a t i o n s for f o r some some undidclosed u n d i s c l o s e d type t y p e of of
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c a n be be given g i v e n routine routine can traffic t r a f f i c indicates Indicates operation. operation.

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d i v i s i o n in i n North North Korea Korea reports r e p o r t s supply s u p p l y status: status: Combat division I n a message to t o the t h e "3rd Corps A r t i l l erY Chi e f of Staff," S t af f , an In Artillery Chief unidentified u n i d e n t i f i e d North Korean division d i v i s i o n reports on 17 17 April A p r i l that that it it h has a s 69 horees h o r s e s on on hand. hand. The message also stateS s t a t e s that t h a t "fixed "fixed r a t i o n s for ten ritions t e n days, d a y s , horse horse feed f e e d for f o r five f i v e days and and dry d r y grass grass until u n t i l the t h e end end of of May May have have been been secured." secured." (SUEDE (SUEDE 3 330th 3 0 t h Cam Comm Recon Co, Co, Korea Korea A-10090, A-10090, 17 17: Apr Apr 52) 52)
Comment: only refer refer to to the the unidentified unidentified Conunent: This This message message411o/ may only u n i t ' s a n i m fodder, a l fodder, b uit t it s i g n i f i c a n t to t o note n o t e that t h a t only only unit'iMail but isis significant t e n day level l e v e l of rations r a t i o n s is is being being m a i n t a i n e d at a t division. a ten maintained It It h has as p previously r e v i o u s l y been speculated s p e c u l a t e d that t h a t the t h e enemy had built b u i l t up o n s i d e r a b l e stockpile s t o c k p i l e of food and ammunition in i n the t h e forward a c considerable area.
5 5
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Nre)
SECRET
21 Aprii 1952
US OFFICIALS ONLY
266
CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
DIGEST
reports has been prepared primarily of significant It does This summary Office of Current Intelligence. use of the for the internal of all current reports in CIA complete coverage not represent a Comments represent the Intelligence. Office of Current or in the of Current Intelligence. immediate views of the Office
DIA and DOS Reviews Completed

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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, ZSC, SECS. 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
..GENERAL
Comment: Despite US pressure on the Bonn Government, as well as on other Western governments, to discourage participation of their nationals in the WEC, a sizable group of Germans appeared at the conference and allegedly concluded various trade deals with the Orbit countries,particularly China. Nevertheless, the East German press promotes the theme of the Federal Republic being "left out" of the profitable EastWest trade and attempts to fan British-German commercial rivalry.. This theme has reappeared in many West German newspapers and the German delegate's move in the Coordinating Committee for export controls may be further evidence of a certain German apprehension in regard to its position at the World Economic Conference and vis-a-vis East-West trade in general. This attitude is further borne out by the recent demand for restoration of East'West trade by the powerful Foreign Policy Committee of the West German Bundestag. Indonesian delegation to Moscow allegedly offers rubber to the USSR: The Economic Secretary of. the Singapore bovernment states that he has fairly reliable information that Indonesian representatives to the Moscow Economic Conference emphasized to the Russians that the difficulties of the Indonesian rubber
SECRET
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German delegate to COCOM suzgests discussion of the results of the WEC: An exchange of information and views on the World EFUFETE-Conference is scheduled for discussion in the Coordinating Committee for export controls on 30 April at the request of the German delegate. The discussion will include the identity of the participants, the deals actually concluded, the authority under which the deals were concluded, whether they are inside or outside the terms of current trade agreements, and information on the Soviet bloc economic situation. (S Paris 6406, 18 Apr 52)
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depressing tactics." producers result from American "price offered "unlimited quantities" Russian help and They appealed for (C Singapore 1127, of Indonesian rubber to the Soviet Union. 18 Apr 52) month the Indonesian Government Comment: Within the past conversations with at least three central has conducted of raw materials, including European countries for the exchange Indonesia, however, is not known rubber, for capital goods. sell rubber. heretofore to have approached the USSR to
The Extension of Austro-Rumanian trade agreement likely: asked in Vienna, has Rumanian Government, through its Legation until September of for an extension the Austrian Government expired this month. their trade agreement which was to have the commodity exThe Rumanians, who proposed to re-examine in the meantime to inchange lists in September, have promised and to make strenuous efcrease shipments of wheat and fodder Austria. The Rumanian forts to reduce Rumania's deficit to level of deliveries hereLegation expressed regret for the low troubles pretofore and attributed thesel deficits to economic The Austrian Government is receding the currenCy reform. nortedlv willing to renew the agreement,
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warned the The Austrian Foreign Office had reportedly would be cancelled Rumanian Government that the trade agreement lists and deliveries were unless improvements in the commodity November dealso extended last Since the agreement was made. until September spite Austrian dissatisfaction, a new extension of a bargaining represent full exploitation would probably not estimated as position which the Austrians have previously favorable.
EASTERN EUROPE
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units in Possible identification of additional paratroop forwarded a report flulnria: llhrtS Army Attache in Rome has parachute regiments Iwho identifies four subordinate in the Bulgarian Army. This source identified Attache Rome 10 locations. (S Army units of these regiments,at R-74-52, 27 Feb 52)
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Comment: Current Order of Battle accepts only five parachute battalions in the Bulgarian Army. The formation of additional battalions and the establishment of regimental organizations has not been previously reported and remains to be confirmed.
Embassy observers comment that although the government may desire to continue its deflationary policy, some adjustment will have to be made between purchasing power and inflated (R Zagreb Desp prices if factories are to .remain in operation. 201, 11 Mar 52) Comment: Despite the fact that over-all purchasing power has increased slightly during the past few months, the average worker still has little left after he purchases food. The new insistence on profitability and self-sufficiency of enterprises and a minimum wage system preclude the possibility of significant price decline in the non-agricultural sector. The arguments of party leaders who favor the substitution of of an inflationary policy for the present restrictive monetary policy, which was instituted last fall in an attempt to stabilize the economy, will be considerably strengthened by the current disparity between wages and prices. High costs, which perpetuate high prices, remain the outstanding problem limiting the profitable sale of Yugoslav goods at home as well as abroad.
6.
slavia:
that have from from
Yugoslays release figures on Satellite refugees in YugoA Yugoslav news agency in Belgrade reported on 12 March 9,505 citizens from Bulgaria, Rumania, Albania, and Hungary come to Yugoslavia since 1948. Of this total 3,124 came Alh.lnia; 2,437 from Bulgaria; 2,323 from Rumania; and 1,621 Hungary. (U Belgrade Desp, 867, 15 Mar 52)

SECRET
Lack of purchasing power in Yugoslavia results in surplus of goods: According to the United States Embassy in Belgrade, although it is evident that retail stores contain a larger volume of consumer goods than they did a year ago, the average Yugoslav does not have the level of income necessary to purchase As a result, the goods produced by consumer goods industries. some Yugoslav officials have publicly supported the introduction of installment buying in an;effort to bridge the gap between wages and prices.
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Some of these refugees have subsequently been Comment: deported to Trieste, but the vast majority of Albanians and Bulgarians who have remained have been organized into exile committees by the Yugoslays. The objective of these organizations is to recruit refugees for espionage and subversive activity and to create well-controlled units capable of attracting and holding the allegiance of other refugees or poIdeological divergencies, nationalism, and tential defectors. group hostilities among these groups severely handicap Yugoslav efforts in this field.

1SECRET
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The above figure on the number of Albanian refugees arriving in Yugoslavia is considerably lower than the generally accepted figure of 4,000 to 6,000 Albanian refugees reported by reliable contacts.
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FAR EAST
Communist offensive: Far East Command sees no imminent review of the enemy's intentions The Far East Command, in a that "there are no indiand capabilities in Korea, observes The comment continues, howcations of an imminent attack." Communists have made good use of ever, to point out that the by the cease-fire to reinforce, the relative quiet provided to re-deploy and retrain their both in men and materiel, and units. launch a major is able to The enemy, FECOM estimates, The duration of such an offensive with little warning. Communists' ability to keep their attack would depend on the (S CINCFE Telecon 5762, 17 Apr 52) advancing units supplied.
8.
on Rhee election South Korean Prime Minister comments discussing Rhee's reelection Chang, in plans: Prime Minister 18 April, stated that Rhee campaign with Ambassador Muccio on election petitions for a direct presidential is accumulating opposing it. amendment and for the recall of Assemblymen immediately Rhee, he will to reelect If the Assembly fails invalid and say it is against "the will declare the election The Prime Minister added of the people," according to Chang. Rhee, and that the only that the Assembly will never reelect is for the UN to immediately way to thwart the President's move decision. recognize the validity of the Assembly's not as certain as Chang that The Ambassador, however, is present firm anti-Rhee posithe Assembly will abide by its tactic of Rhee's is one Muccio adds that this suggested tion. (S Pusan 1014, President. of several courses open to the 18 Apr 52) Prime Minister Chang, who has Comment: The remarks of request, may reflect tendered his resignation at Rhee's ihas personal presidential ambitions AssemolyMen have the suggested that Rhee may be planning to election session, thus who are loyal to him boycott the requirements. blocking the election through quorum
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reportedly intends to visit Top Chinese official in Tibet I General intends India in In, tativ g-wu, senior Chinese represe arirg C Nehru plans for Prime Minister to visit India to discuss with
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a "most-favored-nation trade treaty" with Tibet and to request "increased" expnrtgi of grain, cloth and construction materials from.India.
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Comment: There has been no high-level contact between India and Tibet since the Chinese occupation of Tibet in autumn 1951. Chang's visit could prepare the way for a discussion of all aspects of Indo-Tibetan relations.
Comment: One of the chief justifications for the November coup WOTri, alleged neceseity of cracking down on Communist Since that time there have been a number of reports activity'. revealing hesitancy on the part of the Thai Government to follow through with a campaign against Communists.
11.
Comment: General Temple's relations with Ne Win have alwaygrEgirstrained, but this situation has generally been attriboted to the former's personality rather than to his
rank.
The change in the British mission's leadership comes at a time when the Burmese Government has indicated a desire for additional military assistance.
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Chief of British military mission in Burma replaced: Major General Temple ! Chief of the British Services Mission in Rangoon, has been relieved by Air Commodore Ward. The American Embassy comments that a lower ranking officer may work more harmoniously with Burmese Commander in Chief Ne Win, and that the appointment of an air officer is fortunate because the air component of the mission has been the most successful (C Rangoon 1011, 18 Apr 52) in working with the Burmese.
O.
The Chinese Anti-CommUnist drive in Thailand questioned: Communist newspaper in gingkok issued a special enclosure to its 12 April publication which advertised that "107 Russian Communist books" were available in three loCal bookstores. The American Embassy states that this development "points up" the insincerity of Police Director General Phao's announced (C Bangkok 2235, drive against Communist propaganda. 17 Apr 52)
Chang's immediate minsion, however, may be to ease a India, which probably serious food shortage reported in Tibet. cannot supply much food, may agree to cooperate in expediting shipments of Chinese commodities sent via Calcutta.
_Aor 52
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Indonesia concerned oyer smuggling from Thailand to Sumatra: An officer of the Indonesian Embassy in Bangkok exFFEWIFFif concern to the American Embassy over information that arms and opium are being sMuggled from Thailand and Nhlaya to Sumatra, where they go io the "leftist Chinese-backed" labor organization, SOBSI. The officer stated that the traffic Increased (hiring the last twouonths of 1951. (C Bangkok 2235, 17 Apr 52)
Comment: The smuggling of arms and opium from Thailand to thi-FUUT-Of Southeast Aeia has been confirmed.
13.
Congress Party loses Control in north Indian state: On 19 April, one day after the resignation of the Congress Party Government, the United Front opposition coalition in the State Assembly of the Patiala and East Punjab $tates Union in northern India announced its intention of forming a government. If successful,it would becOme the first.non-Congress grqup to win control of any Indian state. (U FBIS, 19 Apr 52)
;
CoMment: The coalition,which is controlled by the Sikhs,' is agaiiiirly supported by the elected delegates of all other pOlitical parties, including the Communists, as well as by ilidependents and several dissident Congress Party membere.
The Sikhs are for the most part not attracted to Communism, butthey have agitated for a separate, Punjabi-spea*ing Sikh state in north India. The ex-rulers of the princely States, from which the'Patiala and East Punjab States Union is formed, have also occasionally engaged in intrigue against the Indian Congress Party. It is likely that political conditions in the Union will become moie unsettled than they have been in the past.
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$ince the opposition outnumbers the Congress Party hy at least six votes, it will be difficult for the governor of:the state to refuse it the right to form a government.

SOUTH ASIA
SOBSI, Indonesia's largest labor federation, is Communistdominated and in constant Contact with Chinese Communists and with the Chinese Embassy in Djakarta. Its activity as a receiving agent of arms and opium hasmot previously been reported.
Approved fiscRelease 2002/05/20 : ClA-RDP79T01146A000900150001-7
SECRET Communists will seize control. There is no indication that outnumber the Communists Sikh delegates in the State Assembly of the opposition, most of by 19 to 3. The total strength which is non-Communist, is at least 32. present situation is The most immediate danger in the opposition in other that it will encourage the anti-Congress India where Communists are states, particularly in south of newly-formed Congress Party strong, to attempt the overthrow governments.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA

Irlisn ;evil:0%11:1 .Ett.gain:t titileh ruses A ran an Government of ca ion y u ron Nationa interference in, Iran's internal '"documentary proof" of British differenoes to public
14.
Front affairs has broughtthe National reportedlYvsupported by Mullah One newspaper, attention. almong'important Kashani, has not only deplored the ufriction insisted that the Foreign members of the National Front" but has publishing the letters. in Ministry did a "pretty foolish thing" also implicated the prime Opposition charges that the evidence insist that "nothing in the Minister have forced Mossadeq to names may be mentioned." docutentiis directed against those whose Apr; U Tehran 3930, a Iartb3899, 12 Apr; C Tehran3900,12 not provide so far published do Comment: The documents interference. charges of British stroni-VITPOrt for Iranian National Front coaliWhile differences among leaders of the first time a dispute has tion have always existed, this is the however, been Aired in the press. There is no indication, threatened. tfiit Moseadeq'S'Oblitrbl of the coalition is
demonstration Iranian Communists ordered to hold MaY Day Committee of Provincial in spite of martial law: The Tehran the scheduled May Day demonhas ordered that the TUdeh Party strAtiOn is to be held "with or without martial law."
dissension in
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In a 28 March encounter with the police, _Comment: suffered a setback; therefore, Commuliist:rid demonstrators strong enough at this time it is doubtful that the Tudeh is However, martial law in Tehran to risk a clash with the army. While it could be renewed, is Scheduled to end before 1 May. in spite of Mossadeq reportedly isoppoied to its extension
itrmy advice.
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King reportedly considers dissolving Greek Parliament: The King may dissolve parliament next week and declare nee
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Papagos thinks that the King will not take an unfriendly position toward him, as in the last election.
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In early March the King reportedly considered Comment: dissoliiiritrliament in view of the illness of Prime Minister Plastiras. The outgoing government has the right to designate the system to be used in the following election. It is doubtful, therefore, that parliament would be dissolved before the current controversy over the electoral system is
settled.
While it seems certain that the majority system, which would favor the Greek Rally, will be employed, the Palace and the Liberals are said to be attempting a gerrymander in order to reduce Papagos' strength in southern Greece.
7.
Syria willing to accept 500,000 more Arab refugees: Syria is willing to resettle 500,000 Arab refugees in addition to those already there, according to the Chief of State, Colonel Colonel Shishakli had previously intimated that he would Selo. welcome this opportunity for economic development. Colonel Selo urged an agreement integrating Syrian plans for a $200,000,000 development program with the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) projects. He also made it clear that in view of the political risks involved in accepting the refugees and in spite of the economic advantages, Syria would welcome any'additional funds for general economic development whlch (C Beirut 1111, 18 Apr 52) UNRRA could secure.
Comment: Acceptance of Arab refugees along with sizable econoirariggistance would enable the Shishakli-Selo regime to build a larger, more powerful Syria.
Successful resettlement of so many refugees would be a major step toward the solution of one of the Near East's most pressing problems. Other Arab states are likely to be uncooperative on the resett1ement project and insist that the refugees be returned to their Palestinian homes.

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Although arms No evidence of arils smuggling into Tunisia: froarTtipolitania.is quite possible, smuggling 'into Tunisia neither the American Legation in Tripoli nor the Consulate
General in Tunis has been able to obtain any evidence of such scale could not go traffic. . Organized smuggling On a large regulations now in force in undeteCted under the seCurity running is a negligible factor Tunisia, and occasional gun stocks in Tunisia of weapons in view of he reiaining'sizable (C Tripoli 566, 17 Apr; c 'MIAs abandoned by Axis forces. 159, 18 Apr 52)
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Tangier buSiness interests grow apprehensive: The American Legation inTangier states that since the recent riots, business:and financial circles are worried about physical security-in the Zone. The effect of the Spanish proposal tot alter.the Zone's government upon the question of the perman_t mice of the administration is also causing concern. It is feared that the uncertainty will Oiscourage flight capital to the Zone, though bankers have not noted any change in capital holdings in Tangier. .A few business ventures have already been (C Tangier,Weeka cancelled and some withdrawals of gold made. 67, 10%Apr 52)
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Tangiers economy is based on its uncontrolled currearaiket, and internal disturbances, such as the 30 March riot, put ii at a competitive disadvantage with more
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stable money. marketS.

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Despite sensational rumors that Afrika Korps Comment': veteriargqF being recruited for an army to "liberate North Africa" ind that Tunisian and Libyan Missions aie seeking arms and funds; there is no evidence that substantial support is reaehing Tunisian nationalists or that a serious military effort to'dislodge the French from North Africa can be made in the near future.
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WESTERN EUROPE
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A reported Soviet note: German Protestant leaders discuss of 10 March, attended by 12 March discussion of the-Siiitel-note Union (CDU) leaders and East German Christian Democratic President of the Synod of the all-German Dr. Gustav Heinemann, of the West Berlin Evangelical Protestant Church, and Pastor Koch rally all possible forces for Church, concluded in agreement to a peace treaty. emphasized that although During the discussion, Heinemann it is a problem is painful to many Germans, the Oder-Neisse line His attemPt to discuss subordinate to the maintenance of peace. by the East Germans, and the Weimar election law was rejected in East Germany met with his request for an amnesty of prisoners 25X1A evasion. CDU has been used extensively to Comment: The East German East German position recruit-F.:Wort among West Germans for the have been made to use such Strong efforts on unification. to gather "neutralists" as Heinemann and Pastor Niemoeller that Koch and this meeting suggests support. The tenor of ideas on the East German Heinemann will continue to support unification. of Heinemann's position on The report indicates a reversal had previously declared was unthe Oder-Neisse line, which he acceptable.
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commission under close East Germans may admit investigating has printed an A reliable West German newspaper supervision: Commission order for unconfirmed report that a Soviet Control being election records is the expurgation of East German under the direction of executed in Thuringia and Brandenburg (R FBIS Frankfurter the East German Interior Ministry. RundSchau, 15 Apr 52) that the East If true, this report suggests Comment: sort of into admit some Germans may be preparing ultimately commission sugpossibly the four-power vestigating commission, gested in the Soviet note of 9 April. "four-power Prominent East German Communist interprets of the -East Havemann, president control": Professor Robert traii-"Committee for the Fighters of Peace," has reportedly SECRET
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stated that international control of all-German elections "cannot be in the sense of investigating the possibility of democratic elections and controlling the German population while it is voting," but that international control could only be "exerted by the four occupying powers among themselves; that is, reciprocal supervision of and by each other to ensure that no power exerts undue influence on the outcome of the elections." (S Berlin 1220, 12 Apr 52) This interpretation suggests that "inspection" or Comment: "superialifoi" as proposed by Moscow will have entirely different meanings for the Communists and the West.
The US High Commissioner, observes tbat although he had explained he US priority system on end-item aid to Blank, the West German delegation in Paris may adopt the Minister's view. (S Bonn 2439 and 2441, 18 Apr 52)
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The most French-German controversy over Saar worsens: recent developments in the Saar are forcing both France and the Federal Republic into antagonistic positions from which it will be increasingly difficult to retreat, according to American representatives in Bonn. The French, indignant over German Governmentrsponsored propaganda in the Saar, have now angered the Germans by banning a German magazine which criticized the French Ambassador to the Saar.
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Comment:. Under the American system for end-item aid, it is cuETOTaiii; for recipient nations to plan their military production on schedules and costs before asking US aid to cover If the German delegation in Paris does not defense gaps. proceed realistically in determining defense costs, thft European Defense Community negotiations could ha.delayed at a time when the Allies are pressing for their speedrtermination.
23.
Federal Republic defense costs may complicate Paris treaty negotiations: West German Defense Minister Blank recently declared in Bonn that his government assumed that the United States would supply five billion dollars worth of heavy equipxent not included in previous estimates of German defense eipenditures, and that delivery would coincide exactly with German troop He said that if the Federal Republic must supply and drafts. finance some of this equipment the amounts, types, and delivery schedules of equipment contributed by the US must be known before the West German government can accurately estimate the costs of the German EDC contingent.
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SECRET American officials fear that when the Bundestag debates the Saar issue on 23 April, dissident elements in the coalition Saar solution might, under the goading of the opposition, demand a before the ratification or even signing of the contractual agreement and the European Defense Community treaty. remarks that One of Adenauer's close advisers, Blankenhorn, for a definitive negotiate with the French it is useless now to and could Saar solution, since Schuman is "discredited in Paris" (C Bonn 2413, 17 Apr 52) make no binding commitments.
The law, furthermore, does not control sales of higherIn consequence, large quantities of quality "utility" scrap. "utility," the paper charges, are delivered scrap classified as buyers who operate through the Hungarian every month to Orbit Restitution Commission or under the Administration of Soviet (R FBIS, Vienna Arbeiter Zeitung, Enterprises in Austria. 15 Apr 52)
6.
Belgian Government and people unresponsive to Moscow Economic Conference blandishments: Although Belgium is still generally interested in increasing exports of non-strategic goods to eastern Europe, the Belgian Government will not permit shipments of strategic materials to Communist China or Soviet Orbit countries under any package purchase arrangements or by so-called conventions with these countries. No one in Belgian business or official circles has received information on the Chinese and Soviet trade package offers to Belgium reported in the press. Belgian financiers are reportedly not interested in financing these deals, and business circles are opposed to exports to Comof strategic materials. Labor groups have not responded trade with the Orbit will solve munist propaganda that increased 52) (C Brussels 1546, 16 Apr Belgium's unemployment problem.
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Clandestine trade in scrap iron attributed to weakness in Zeitung, which is Austrian law: The Socialist paper, Arbeiter such matters, attributes the current frequently well informed on lively illegal East-West trade in scrap iron to loopholes in the Austrian Raw Material Control Act. Under this law, Austrian prices to the scrap dealers are compelled to sell scrap at fixed These prices, however, are so Austrian Scrap Iron Association. that the prices Orbit buyers offer far below the world level and encouraged. "black market" sales are
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Comment: Belgium's trade with eastern Europe has tradi.tionaTTF-EBT been of substantial proportions. The contrel of shipments of strategic goods routed through Belgian ports, however, has been a weak point in the East-West trade problem, and the Belgian Government is now planning to institute its own transit trade control system over selected strategic items, such as nonferrous metals.
27.
(8 Oslo 904, 17 Apr .52)
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Norwegian views on Yugoslav and 8panish_participation in OEEC: The liforwegian Government will accept informer Yugoslay Wilicipation in the Organization for European Economic Cooperation on the grounds thai the economic advantages outweigh the political disadvantages. Spanish participation, however, (S Paris Repto would be quite a different "kettle of fish." 1729, 18 Apr 52)
Comment: Scandinavian opinion generally inclins to a reluarirnllnboration with Yugoslavia in the present emergency but still tends to rent(' cooperation with Franco as quite impossible.
29
,Political disturbances in Eouador: The political sitund-Ring-Si a pending revolution ation in Ecuador A aro persistent, April wnen university minor incident occurred in Quito on 18 tudents shot at and burned An effigy of presidential candidate Velasoo Ibarra. This resr 1+ad in unfounded rumors that the revolution had started.

LATIN AMERICA
Czechoslovakia will receive 25,000 tons of pyrites Comment: and Poland 15,000 from Norway during the current trade year.
Norway dislikes expansion of export controls: The American Embassy at Oslo reportS that Norway is reluctant to see pyrites placed on COCOM's List II (quantitative restriction).. The Foreign Office points out that pyrites are an important item in Norway's trade with Czechoslovakia, Poland and East Germany.
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The February announcement of Velasco Ibarra's candaicritd his return on 1 March from exile in Argentina have
,
Comment:
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would upset earlier predictions that the presidential contest The political situation is now combe a "fairly normal one." and political leaders are repletely confused and military aligning themselves. Velasco is scheduled to arrive in Quito on 22 April on his campaign tour, which has already resulted in violence. Communist leaders are reported to be organizing shock troops in Quito in preparation for Velasco's arrival, and Communist and Socialist students are actively engaged in propaganda campaigns against him. Should the expected disturbances in Quito reach serious proportions, it is possible that the ambitious Minister of Defense,might stage a preventive coup "to protect" Ecuador from further bloodshed and from possible rule of the twice deposed ex-president Velasco.
30.
Head of Mexican pro-COmmunist-party committed for trial General Octavio Vejar-Vasquez, provisional president-of the leftist Popular Party, has been formally committed for trial by a military court. He iS charged with disobeying orders (U NY Times, 18 Apr 52 assigning him to a mission:in Tampico.
Comment: General Vejar became provisional president of the anti-administration, pro-Communist Popular Party when its leader, Vicente Lombardo Toledano,.accepted the party's nominations presidential candidate. It is probable that General Vejar was .ordered away from Mexico City to minimize his political activity, .and that he chose to create the present issue to make political Army regulations.forbid unauthorized participation in capital. political activity by military personnel.
General Vejar's arrest is not likely to affect the outcome of the presidential campaign, in which Adolfo Ruiz Cortines, the administration candidate, is virtually certain-of election.
Revolution reportedly, planned for Venezuela. 'Gustavo Machado, a high Communist leader, and Valmore Rodriguez, spokesman for the Democratic Action Party, Were on the Colombian-Venezuelan frontier 25X1C with a large shipment of atms which they planned to delivei to the area around Maracaibo -on 18 April. the government was setting up an extensive water blockade and land patrols. The Chief of the National Security Forces in the capital, howeyer, indirrad thnt he had no knowledge of amy planned disturbances
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Police precautions may be merely a routine followthat the outlawed up on7WriEwernment's 9 April announcement disturbances for 19 April Democratic Action Party had planned affected by the The Maracaibo oil area was not and. 5 July. October. Democratic Action's uprisings last
Comment:
The present report implies full-scale Communist-Democratic Action collaboration,which would be a new factor in current Venezuelan politics. It is not certain whether the meeting and collaboration of these two leaders -- if true -- would imply mere harassing or strike tactics in the Maracaibo oil area or would herald country-wide disturbances.

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TOP SECRET THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS. 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
WESTERN EUROPE
The American Embassy in London, recalling Churchill's and Eden's often expressed willingness to negotiate with the Soviet Union under favorable circumstances, expects that the British Labor Party's continuing fear of a rearmed Germany will lead it also to demand further probing of Soviet intentions. (S S/S London 4673, 17 Apr 52; S London 4683, 17 Apr 52)
The.West German Government, especially Chancellorniliguer, opposes four-power discussions on unity at this time. France, however, would probably not reject such talks if Britain insisted.
Comment:
2.
Belgium may be less adamant on uniform military service period for Defense Community members: The American Embassy fn Brussels considers that Belgium is not yet ready to accept a proposal by General Eisenhower for discussing the establishment of a uniform military conscription period within the European Defense Community after the signing of the treaty. The Embassy states, however, that should the other questions facing the Defense Community be settled, Belgium probably will not hold out for a solution to the military, service period before the treaty is signed. TOP SECRET
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Britain believes four-power talks on German unity may be necessary: Foreign Secretary Eden plans to tell the British Cabinet that four-power talks on all-German elections may be a necessary prelude to French and German ratification of the European Defense Community treaty and the Allied-Germze contractual agreement. Eden, who sees no need for a prompt reply to the Soviet note of 9 April, believes that the West should continue to press for signature of both treaties, meanwhile taking into account British and Continental opinion toward subsequent ratification.
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TOP SECRET Eisenhower made some Embassy officials add that General (S the treaty. progress in urging a speeding up of work on S/S Paris 6385, 18 Apr 52) continental country with Comment: Belgium is the only period, and this has become a twermiTtWUr month conscription a serious issue in domestic politics.
Belgium regards There are no indications, however, that of military service as the establishment of a uniform period Community conference. a major problem facing the Defense

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a i r unit u n i t ordered o r d e r e d to to suspend May Day North Korean air celebration: gorth K Korean Air Force Headc e l e b r a t s o n : A message from North orean A ir F o r c e Headquarters q u a r t e r s at a t Sinuiju S i n u i j u sent s e n t on 13 13 April A p r i l to t o the t h e commander of an an air a i r service s e r v i c e unit, u n i t , probably probably at a t Sariwon, Sariwon, near n e a r Pyongyang, Pyongyang, stated: "The May May Day Day ccelebration ha ben s t a t e d : "The e l e b r a t i o n ha n suspended. suspended. Do not 352, 13 n o t make any preparations." p r e p a r a t i o n s . 'I .(SUEDE ( StJEDEqiha"352, 13 Apr 52) 52)
Comment: s u s p e n s i o n of traditional t r a d i t i o n a l May Day activiactiviComment: The suspension ties t i e s apparently a p p a r e n t l y does not n o t apply apply to t o all a l l enemy forces, f o r c e s , since since 18 A April p r i l message8 messages from enemy ground u units n i t s have referred referred to making preparations p r e p a r a t i o n s for f o r the t h e day. day.
The North N o r t h Korean Air A i r Force Force has has used used the t h e sod sod airfield airfield at a t Sariwon Sariwon 'to t o operate o p e r a t e obsolescent o b s o l e s c e n t biplanes b i p l a n e s in i n harassing harassing raids r a i d s against a g a i n s t the t h e UN; there there is is also also an an early early warning warning radar radar installation i n s t a l l a t i o n nearby. nearby.
4.
u n i t in in P o s s i b i l i t y of major new Chinese Communist unit Possibility Korea reported: reRortetl: The The "305th ''50ath regiment" re&zlmentlt was mentioned - in i --_ n a a garbled,hi6 Chinese Communist g a r b l e d , L i g h priority p r i o r i t y 16 16 April April-Chinese Communist message which referred r e f e r r e d to t o "lines " l i n e s contact." contact
The field f i e l d collecting c o l l e c t i n g unit u n i t noted noted that t h a t the t h e 505th 505th Infantry Infantry is subordinate s u b o r d i n a t e to t o the t h e 169th 169th Division, D i v i s i o n , 57th 5 7 t h Army, Army, last last Regiment is located at a t Antung. Antung. It I t is is not not p o s s i b l e to t o judge from this this possible message whether whether the t h e 505th 505th is is actually a c t u a l l y in i n Korea. Korea, (SUEDE (SUEDE 501st Comm Comm Recon Recon Grp G r p Korea, Korea, K-2351, K-2351, 20 20 Apr Apr 52) 52)
Comment: The 505th, Comment: 505th, 508th, and 524th Regiments were mentibned lb a mentia 21 2 1 March March Chinese Chinese Communist Communist intercept. i n t e r c e p t . These These units u n i t s are are organic o r g a n i c to t o the t h e 57th 5 7 t h and and 59th 5 9 t h Armies. Armies.
5. 5.
While no new new Chinese Chinese Communist Communist major mador units u n i t s have have r e c e n t l y been been confirmed confirmed in i n Korea, Korea, all a l l or or elements e l e m e n t s of of the the recently 10th, l o t h , 16th, 1 6 t h , 21st, 2 1 s t , 66th, 6 6 t h , and and now now more recently r e c e n t l y the t h e 57th 57th have have been been tentatively t e n t a t i v e l y identified i d e n t i f i e d by by communications communications intelintelligence. l i g e n c e . Collateral intelligence i n t e l l i g e n c e gives g i v e s some support s u p p o r t for for the t h e presence p r e s e n c e of the t h e 16th, 1 6 t h , the t h e 66th 6 6 t h and and the t h e 57th. 57th.
Immediate Immediatq need for f o r North Korean armored personnel personnel seen: s e e n : An unidentified u n i d e n t i f i e d North Korean Korean unit u n i t was was ordered ordered on on ItMay tank immediatelyl." m a yto t o"send "sendthe t h ereserve reserve tankcrews crews immediatelytll (SURE ASA Pacific ( S U V E Hqs Hqs ASA P a c i f i cTokyo Tokyo Japan Japan 8621 8621 AAU-Spot AAU-Spot 3358A 33588 19 19 Apr A p r 52) 52)
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' Comment: North Korean messages messages of late l a t e March March and and e a r l y April: A p r U ssuggested.that u g g e s t e d t h a t both the t h e 105th 1 0 5 t h Tank' Tank and he early and t the 10th would mill-training 1 0 t h Mechanized Mechanized Divisions Divisions wouldbe be i n l t r a i n i n g north n o r t h of of Pyongyang during d u r i n g April, A p r i l . This T h i s requirement requirement for f o r additional additional the personnel reflect urgency in t armored p e r s o o n e l may r e f l e c t urgency h e training. training.
6 , 6.
Emergency call c a l l procedure procedure established establiehad f for or N North o r t h Korean c o a 4 t defense defense h e a d q u a r t e r s informed informed a East coast headquarters c o a s t a l security s e c u r i t y unit u n i t at a t Songjin S o n g j i n on 19 19 April A p r i l that t h a t "the coastal " t h e enemy s situation i t u a t i o n is is severe. severe. e . .in i n one one week week w we e w will i l l do do a an n emergency emergency ea11 t r a i n i n g and and will w i l l be bq prepared p r e p a r e d for f o r complete complete combat.YI combat." eall training
coastal unit: unit:
tenor e p o r of of these hese orders o r d e r s suggests s u g g e s t s that t h a t the the Comment: The t Comment: enemy-fieastern a n t i c i p a t i n g a UN amphibiamphibienemy in nOrtheastern Korea may be anticipating ous operatiOn. operat ion.
I
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over-all deployment of of Communist North The o v e r - a l l deployment Communist forces f o r c e s in i n North Korea, s i n c e ' t h e Inchon Inchon landing, l a n d i n g , has ha6 reflected r e f l e c t e d the t h e fear f e a r of of Korea,ssince'the a n o t h e r similar successful s u c c e s s f u l UN UN operation. operation. another
Enem Enemy counterattack C o u n t e r a t t a c k in i n eastern e a s t e r n Korea f foiled o i l e d by by UN intel n or i n t e l ' l i ggene encd: "In o r der e r ' to o con c o n f use use t t he e enemy, enemy," t he 2Tst st Chinege ComW61$t Artillery A r t i l l e r y Regiment Regiment reported r e p o r t e d on on 15 1 5 April, April, Chinese ComMUniet "we had hail originally o r i g i n a l l y intended i n t e n d e d to t o counterattack c o u n t e r a t t a c k against a g a i n s t Square "we Top mountain mountain (in (in eastern e a s t e r n Korea). Korea). .but .but because because our our c counterountera t t a c k plan p l a n leaked l e a k e d out, o u t , it i t was was decided decided not n o t to t o move move infantry. infantry. attack However, our o u r artillery a r t i l l e r y barrage b a r r a g e advanced advanced according a c c o r d i n g to t o the the However, o r i g i n a l131101." pXan.T1 (SUEDE 0 1 s t Comm Recon Grp Korea, K-2262, K-2262, original (SUEDE 5 501st 19 19 Apr 52) 52)
"

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The following f o l l o w i n g day, d a y , another q n o t h e r North nit, p robably North Korean u unit, probably also a100 on coastal c o a s t a l security s e c u r i t y duty, d u t y , stated:"things s t a t e d : " t h i n g s are not n o t going going good. . t h e , e emergency mergency c a l l must r a c t i c e d once a week. .the call Must be be p practiced week. T r a i n i n g shoUld s h o u l d be tightened." tightened." Co Training (SUEDE 330th Comm Recon Recon.Co ALT-836, 20.Apr; ALT-836, 20 Apr; 501st 5 0 1 s t Comm Corn Recon Recon Grp G r p Korea, Korea, 15RSM/11140, 15RSY/11140, 21 Apr 62) 62) 21
.
I In n e early arly A April, p r i l , the t h e 21st 2 1 s t Chinese C h i n e s e Communist Comment: Artillery A r t i l l e r y Rdgiment RBig'iment was attached a t t a c h e d to t o the t h e 203rd Infantry Infantry D i v i s i o n , 68th 6 8 t h Army, Army, an unusual u o u s u a l procedure, p r o c e d u r e , presumably Division, d e s i g n e d tO designed t o support support a a specific s p e c i f i c operation o p e r a t i o n assigned a s s i g n e d to t o the the infantry i n f a n t r y unit. unit.
I t iB is possible R o s s i b l e that t h a t the' the' " counterattack1' r e f e r r e d to to It "counterattack" referred was was the the 'operation o p e r a t i o n intended. intended.
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8. 8.
* Communist supply, s u p p l y oofficers f f i c e r s iinspecting.vehicles n s p e c t i n g , v e h i c l e s in in .Communist of the Bureau of Rear " I n s p e c t o r s o,f t h e General. General Bureau l bar Korea: ."Inspectors North Korea: .under b e r v i c e started s t a r t e d to t o inspect i n s p e c t all a l l cars cars in i n all a l l units. units. Bervice t h e Korean.PeOple's Korean P e b p l e ' s Army," Army,'! reports r e p o r t s an unidentified u n i d e n t i f i e d North the Korean unit u n i t on on 18 18 April. A p r i l . (SUEDE (SUEDE 501st 5 0 1 s t Comm Comm Recon Recon Grp Grp Korea, Korea, Korean $K-1-599, 19 19 Apr Apr 52) 52) AK-I-599,
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Comment; It I t is not clear whether or o r not n o t this t h i s vehicle vehicle Comment: i n s p e c t i o n is -rel&ted t o aa general g e n e r a l inspection i n s p e c t i o n which was inspection Teated to in many many North North Korean Korean units u n i t s in i n early e a r l y April. April. underway in
9 . 9.
10. 10.
NOrth Korean naval combat: "As " A s soon as as North n a v a l unit.expects u n i t e x p e c t s combat: t h e combat . .chief w i l l giv e th e orders orders con-con.c. e ve he e. eg ns, t h e the com a be.g'ins, cerning c e r n i n g communications," communications," reported r o p o r t e d an a n unidentified u n i d e n t i f i e d North massage dea/t with Koreaa Korean naval n a v a l unit u n i t on on 17 1 7 April. A p r i l . The message deaIt w i t h certain certain f u n c t i o n s which.were which were to t o be carried c a r r i e d out o u t by communications functions April. (SUEDE 501st 501st C Comm o r n Recon Recon Grp Grp Korea, Korea, 15RSY/10593, 15RM/10593, 22 April, 18 Apr 52) 52)
.
Comment: T h i s information i n f o r m a t i o n may reflect r e f l e c t CommUnist tommunist This .COmment; e x p e c % a t i o n " o f a n o t h e r UN UN amphibious amphibious operation. o p e r a t i o n . On On the the expectition'of'another o t h e r hand, hand, recent r e c e n t intercepts i n t e r c e p t s have expressed e x p r e s s e d increased increased other urgency i n d i c a t e d preparations p r e p a r a t i o n s for f o r some type t y p e of of urgency and have indicated m i l i t a r y operation. operation. military
11. 11.
KOreans Koreans may be be connected connected with w i t h Chinese Chinese paratroop p a r a t r o o p school: school: A message about about an.ait an ai'r transport tTansport flight f lig h t t o Manchuria, apparently to Vanchuria, apparently p a r a t r o o p school s c h o o l in in Central C e n t r d China, China, referred'to r e f e r r e d t o one or from a paratroop Air Force comments t that more "Karean" vTdr*eantl p a s s e n g e r s . The A i r Force h a t Korean passengers. e elements l e m e n t s may have been trained t r a i n e d as paratroopers p a r a t r o o p e r s in i n Central Central China, r e t u r n i n g to t o Manchuria, Manchuria. (SUEDE A (SUEDE Air ir F Force orce China, and are now returning Roundup 77, 77, 4 4 Apr Apr 52) 52)

.
4
Chinese deserters d e s e r t e r s assault a s s a u l t North Korean Korean convoy convoy commander: commander: A - r e c e b t l y 'available a v a i l a b l e North Korean Ko r e a n message passed p a s s e d between two two A-recently Goast security s e c u r i t y units u n i t s states s t a t e s that that a a convoy commander was was east coast a s s a u f t g d by an u n d i s c l o s e d number number of llChinese r u f f i a n s and assaulted undisclosed of "Chinese ruffians d e s e r t e r s from from the t h e Chinese Chinese Volunteer Army." Army." The message deserters i n d i c a t g s that t h a t the indicates t h e attack a t t a c k took t o o k place p l a c e in in a s small m a l l town located located on an alternate a l t e r n a t e supply s u p p l y route r o u t e leading l e a d i n g from h o r t h e a s t e r n Korea hortheastern t o the the. Sino-Korean Sino-Korean border. border, (SUEDE ASAPAC Tokyo Japan (SUEDE HQS ASAPAC to 8621 AAAU, Spot Spot 3348A, 33484, 23 23 Mar M a r 52) 52) 8621 AAAU,
23 Apr 52 52
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.. Comment: The intercept i n t e r c e p t may may also also mean mean that t h a t Korean Korean officials-had o f f i c m d been been visiting v i s i t i n g this t h i s paratroop paratroop school. s c h o o l . However, However, previous messages messages have have suggested suggested that that a-paratroop a'paratroop unit u n i t is is t r a n s f e r r i n g to to Manchuria. Manchuria. Although the the Chinese Chinese Communists Communists transferring have long long conducted conducted paratroop paratroop training t r a i n i n g in i n Central Central China, China, and and have poslaibly Manchuria, this t h i s is the the first f i r s t indication i n d i c a t i o n of possibly Manchuria, of Korean i n t e r e g t in in this t h i s activity. activity. interest
NR

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9 9. .
Reappearance of Moscow,-Pyengyang traffic may be R i significant: s i n i f l c a n t : Moscow-originated Moscow-originated tiaffic t i a f f i c addressed addressed to to +-----T "Korrespondent o r r e s p o n e n t 20," 20," identified i d e n t i f i . e d as as connected connected with w i t h military military a c t i v i t i e s in in the t h e Soviet S o v i e t Military M i l i t a r y Mission in i n Korea, Korea, was was activities i n t e r c e p t e d on 16 16 and and 17 17 April A p r i l for f o r the t h e first first time time since since intercepted 28 O c t o b e r 1951. 1951. October
r e a p p e a r a n c e of of this t h i s addressee addressee in i n traffic t r a f f i c is is a a The reappearance possible possible! indicator i n d i c a t o r of of the t h e resumption r e s u m p t i o n of of military m i l i t a r y activity. activity. (SUEDE AFSA RU-TIB 1949, 1949, 23 23 Apr Apr 52) 52) Comment; s i g n i f i o a n c e of 28 3 1 8 October 1951 1951 lies lies Comment: The significance in i n its proximity p r o x i m i t y to t o the t h e end end of.active o f , a c t i v e military m i l i t a r y operations o p e r a t i o n s in in Korea._ Korea. Prior P r i o r to t o this, t h i s , there t h e r e was an a n apparent a p p a r e n t correlation correlation t h e volume of of "Korr "Korr 20" 20" traffic t r a f f i c and and the t h e intensity intensity between the of m i l i t a r y operations. operations. of military The reappearance r e a p p e a r a n c e of of "Korr "Korr 20" 20" is is not n o t in i n itself i t s e l f conconc l u s i v e evidence e v i d e n c e of anticipated'AillitarSr a n t i c i p a t e d ' Y z l i t a r y Aetivm7Ly, activriji, clusive since are presumed presumed to t o represent r e p r e s e n L ouly ou*y s i n c e intercepted i n t e r c e p t e d messages messages are t h e overflow o v e r f l o w of of traffic t r a f f i c from from land l a n d lines. lines. the
10. 10.
Chinese Communist unit u n i t wants map of of Korean front: f r o n t : !'It "It e c e s s a r y 'that that I I go go to t o Army Army to t o procure p r o c u r e and and return r e t u r n with with is n necessary maps which clearly our c l e a r l y define d e f i n e both b o t h the t h e enemy's enemy's and o u r zone of a u t h o r i t y " across across the t h e entire e n t i r e peninsula, p e n i n s u l a , reported reported an a n unidentiunidentiauthority f i e d Chinese Communist unit u n i t on o n 16 fied 16 April. A p r i l . (SUEDE (SUEDE 5 501st 0 1 s t Comm Comm Recon Grp Korea, K-2318, IC-2318, 19 19 Apr Apr 52) 52) 'Comment; T h i s information i n f o r m a t i o n suggests s u g g e s t s that t h a t the t h e enemy'unit, enemy u n i t , 'Comment: This probably of d division i v i s i o n size size o or r less, less, w wishesa i s h e s a bbroader r o a d e r viewof viewof t the he probab'ly front, f r o n t , including i n c l u d i n g the t h e line l i n e of of contact. c o n t a c t . No immediate immediate signifisignific a n c e can c a n be cance be attached a t t a c h e d to t o this this message. message.
11 11.
a l l the t h e way wav own all the Armies and t h e enemy 'armies and our o u r own t h e zone between the
to western t o the the w e s t e r n sea cliffs, c l i f f s ; there t h e r e is is some some kind k i n d of of changing changink activity o n , but b u t as a s yet y e t the t h e Army has h a s not n o t advised a d v i s e d us us a c t i v i t y going g o i n g on, Of of the t h e nature n a t u r e of the t h e activity," activkty,l' a a Chinese Chinese Communist Communist unit unit r e p o r t e d on reported on 18 18 April. A p r i l . The message continued c o n t i n u e d reassuringly, reassuringly, however, that t h a t when "Volunteer "Volunteer Headquarters" Headquartersfqascertains a s c e r t a i n s the the a c t i v i t y "they " t h e y will w i l l in in turn t u r n tell t e l l us." U ~ . ~(SUEDE ~(SUED E Recon activity 501st Comm Recon Korea, K-2368, 21 Grp K o r e a , K-2368, 2 1 Apr 12) 52)
'
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Communists in i n t e n t i o n s : "In "In Communi.sts i n Korea uneasy about UN intentions:
24 Apr 52 52
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RR SECRET SUEDbThis T h i s message intimates i n t i m a t e s that t h a t the t h e enemy Comment: f e a r s a possible p o s s i b l e UN operation. o p e r a t i o n . Similar S i m i l a r apprehensions a p p r e h e n s i o n s have fears been r e c e n t l y expressed e x p r e s s e d in o t h e r enemy messages and n recently other and i in prisoner p r i s o n e r of of war war statements. statements.
12 12.
P Political olitical m meeting e e t i n g to t o by be h held e l d by by North North Korean Korean mechanized mechanized division: The Vepartment C Chief" of t the North d i v i s i o n : Th e "Political " P o l i t i c a l Department hi ' efVP of he N orth 10th D ivision, r e c e n t l y mechanized, nstructed a Korean Korean 10th Division, recently mechanized, i instructed s u b o r d i n a t e political p o l i t i c a l officer o f f i c e r on 20 A pril t h a t an u nidentified subordinate April that unidentified o begin b e g i n on 22 22 April. A p r i l . (SUEDE (SUEDE 330th 3 3 0 t h Comm Corn t y p e of meeting meeting type Recon Grp Grp Korea, Korea, 3201, 21 2 1 Apr Apr 52) 52)
r 3

1 6 6
Comment: T h e r e has been an an increase i n c r e a s e during d u r i n g the t h e past past There weeks in the number of conferences c o n f e r e n c e s scheduled s c h e d u l e d by by v a r i o u s North various Korean and Chinese C h i n e s e Communist Communist units. u n i t s . High level l e v e l meetings m e e t i n g s have have g e n e r a l l y preceded p r e c e d e d previous p r e v i o u s enemy enemy offensives. offensives. generally
24 Apr 52
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1.
British views differ on Korean POW repatriation (page 3).
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5.

(page 4).
3.
Indonesia may propose breaking embargo on rubber sales to China

NEAR EAST - AFRICA
Turkish abstention in Tunisian case causes domestic criticism

(page 5).
FAR EAST
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7.
East German Politburo charts action to culminate in May (page 6).

LA TIN AMERICA
8.
Bolivian unrest affects South American stability (page 7).
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1)
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GENERAL
1.
British views differ on Korean POW repatriation:
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Comment: Although previous indications of British views on the Panmunjom talks have not revealed any special concern over the American position, British officials apparently now appreciate that the prisoner exchange issue is the key problem.

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According to the London Embassy, however, Prime Minister Churchill is personally interested in the problem and in informal ministerial discussion has maintained that under no circumstances should the prisoners held by UN forces be sent back against their will "to face Communist reprisals."
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The American Embassy in London reports that the Foreign Office has submitted a brief to Foreign Secretary Eden recommending that Britain insist that the United States yield on e pr soner repatriation issue if necessary to keep the Korean truce talks going. The Embassy in Washington is understood to have sought an American commitment to consult the United Kingdom before negotiations are allowed to break down on this issue.
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FAR EAST
3.
Indonesia may propose breaking embargo on rubber sales to China:
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The American Embassy in Djakarta has learned Ithat immediately prior to the departure of the Indonesian delegation to the Ottawa Rubber Conference, to be held in May, the Foreign Office was considering breaking the embargo on rubber sales to China. In addition, Prime Minister Wilopo has been publicly quoted as stating that the Indonesian Government is in contact with India, Ceylon and Singapore for presentation at Ottawa of a united stand on rubber exports to Iron Curtain countries. This stand, however, is as yet undetermined.
Comment: Indonesia has complained that the UN-sponsored ban on rubEeTrcports to China, to which Indonesia reluctantly adhered, depressed rubber prices. During the past two months, a further drop in prices and a seriously shrunken market for low grade rubber have created a general demand in Indonesia for an expansion of exports.
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5.
Turkish abstention in Tunisian case causes domestic criticism:

Turkish abstention in the UN Security Council vote on the Tunisian - French dispute has been widely criticized in the Turkish press. A Turkish Foreign Office spokesman told the American Ambassador on 22 April that his country had taken this action because it wished to maintain solidarity with the Western powers, and that it would have voted for consideration of the Tunisian case if the United States had done so.
Comment: This is the first time that Turkish adherence to United States policy has aroused widespread criticism in the press. Although the Turks have been uniformly critical of Egypt and Iran in the disputes of those countries with Britain, there is apparently considerable belief in Turkey that the Tunisian complaint is justified.
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7.
East German Politburo charts action to culminate in May:

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Moscow about 13 April and convened a nieeting of the Socialist Unity Party (SED) politburo to discuss action to be taken should West Germany sign the contractual agreement prior to the holding of a four-power conference.

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East German Premier Grotewohl and his deputy, Walter Ulbricht, returned from
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The USSR will reportedly apply continuous pressure for a four-power conference while the SED takes immediate Through local action steps to mobilize the West German support. German Socialist Party over groups the SED will try to swing the West May to the side of resistance before 1 May. The Communists plan where large along the inter-zonal border, Day demonstrations for unity numberS of People's Police will be stationed.
The conference revealed that SED leaders believe the contractual agreement will be signed by mid-May, whereas the USSR believes it is still possible to "hinder" the signing.
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8.
Bolivian unrest affects South American stability:
The Chilean Foreign Minister believes that the 25X1A Bolivian revolt was the "joint work of the Nazis, Peronists, and Communists," and was part of an over-all plan for South America. He states that Presi en az s enssoro is clearly not in control, since he cannot persuade the "Communist" miners to surrender their arms. The general belief of diplomats in Santiago is that there must be an intensive investigation of the Communist and Peronista threat to South America before Bolivia is recognized, and that the United States decision on recognition will determine the immediate political future of South America. Comment: Brazil also is not yet satisfied that the Paz Estenssoro regime is t-iliThe and a high Foreign Office official mentioned the possibility of an additional coup. Chile and Peru fear that any new disorders in Bolivia might eventually spread to their countries. Spain and Guatemala are the only countries which have recognized the new Bolivian Government.

LATIN AMERICA
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SECRET
25 April 1952
US OFFICIALS ONLY
OCI No. 5167

Copy No.
266
*Army and State Dept. reviews completed*
This digest of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence Agency. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports received. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.

SECRET
RETURN TO ARCHIVES Et RECORDS CENTER
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IMMEDIATELY AFTER USE

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SECRET
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, 11SC, SECS. 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
GENERAL
2.
Soviet Union reportedly protests use of material in Informal Soviet representations have been Afghan press: made to the Afghan Embassy in Moscow and to the government in Kabul against the extent of Afghan press use of publications material supplied by American and British sources. The British Embassy in Kabul has also been reliably informed of Soviet protests against the increasing use of American economic aid,which was claimed to be endangering Afghanistan's (C Kabul 428, 17 Apr 52) neutral position. Such a protest by the USSR against American inforEiTTUEactivities may result in their curtailment. However, due to Afghanistan's fear ofprovoking the USSR it is unlikely that effective steps would be taken against the In fact, the pro-Communist articles in the Afghan press. Afghan press seems to be printing somewhat more pro-Communist material, but the government appears to take no notice of the trend.
Comment:

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Comment on TASS denial of Stalin four-power talk offer: Since recent Indian press speculation on the reported Stalin proposal for a four-power meeting would presumably contribute to the Soviet "peace" campaign, Moscow's official There have been other signs that the denial is suprising. Kremlin does not want to give the impression that it is soliciting such a general meeting with the West. Stalin's reply to the American editors on 1 April gave only a guarded answer concerning a big power meeting and the subsequent Stalin-Radhakrishnan conversation received no play in Soviet remain free to choose media. The USSR apparently wishes to matter for any four-power meetthe time, terms and subject 1722, 23 Apr 52) (Factual data based on R Moscow ing.
25 Apr 52
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3.
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biased to Soviet-Egyptian barter agreement reportedly on-w ea e recen co er a n c auses n -' to place favor USSR and Egypt appear barter agreement between the disadvantage. the Egyptian Government at a on weight and quality of wheat 1 the USSR ruling parties, and any disputes are to specifies is to be binding on both decision. The contract be subject only to Moscow's imports be paid in free that at least some of the wheat [the total exchange will leave sterling. 1 free sterling. the USSR with a considerable sum of
1 1
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4.
officers and Increased number of Soviet soldiers num r o ussian ncrease n ague: betrucks o erve observed in Prague soldiers, officers and trucks were tween 1 and 17 April,
that a There have been persistent rumors in been stationed believed to have possiSovierinifary mission, It is also in FebruarY. Karlovy Vary, moved to Prague preparation military forces are in Prague in ble that Russian 6 May. Day parade on for the Czechoslovak Liberation
Comment:

EASTERN EUROPE
position Moscow has been in an advantageous Egyptian cotton due to the to baFTUF-Tath Egypt for cotton and growing Egyptian surplus, the drop in world prices, When the barter agreement was financial difficulties. for cotton were reannounced in mid-February, no prices established a favorable vealed, and the USSR apparently balance at that time. is accurate, is a good The negotiation, if this report of exporting wheat, and gainexample of the Soviet practice This such as sterling. ing in exchange needed hard currency practice has applied the is probably the first time Moscow and settlement of disputes of binding clauses on quality outside the Soviet Orbit.
Comment:
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danger of Soviet attack: Yugoslav UN delegate sees less United Nations, Ales Bebler, of a The Yugoslav delegate to the officials that the possibility result largely as a has informed American attack has lessened, Russian or Satellite SECRET
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indebehind Yugoslav many nations that statements solidarity of various of the Bebler felt against aggression Moreover, Moscow pendence. yarning Americans by responsible beneficial effect. had a have also formally, approach Yugoslavia will get them to agree Bebler, According to Satellites in an effort to and to adhere commissions neighboring all mixed border concerning the upon the fOrmation of recommendations Assembly's Bebler states that to the General of normal relations. replies to these overtures, re-establishment support expects negative his government provide evidence to necessary. at least but that these would protest should this be found any future Yugoslav 52) (S New York 734, 23 Apr rejected Government has already the The Hungarian suggesting Comment: delivered on 18 February commission to settle the a YugaTiV-Fote of a mixed border establishment delineate the boundaries. Mura Island dispute and a have represented as General propaganda organs in the UN Yugoslav victory the success expressed condiplomatic which significant in the resolution Assembly of the Yugoslav of a serious state of tension of Soviet-Satellite existence cern over the the normalization called for Balkans and Yugoslavia. relations with
25 Apr 52
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FAR EAST Communist Army in central Korea Relief of,Chinese the Command reported on 22 April The Far East of a indicated: in central Korea, ZWIIII7E7-1n the 26th Army sector the 15th Army. The prisoner Chinese Communist soldier from into the line ten days said that his unit had come of the 76th Division, previously and had relieved elements 26th Army. and statement of this FECOM comments that the capture relief of the 26th prisoner strongly indicate that the place. Pending receipt Chinese Communist Army has taken the identity of the of further confirmation, however, established. (S CINCFE relieving force cannot be firmly Telecon 5771, 23 Apr 52) taken from the 26th Army Comment: Recent prisoners contemplated in April. have indicated that a relief was that the 60th Chinese Previous reports have suggested relieving force. Communist Army might be the
rubber for China: The Polish vessel to load Ceylonese Colombo 25 April to Polish vessel Kilinski is expected at Credits have been opened in Ceylon load rubber for China. tons, but the American to cover the purchase of 6,000 considerably less is Consul in Colombo believes that (C Colombo 593, 23 Apr 52) available for shipment.
(7,612 gross tons) carried a Comment: The Kilinski to China from Ceylon in deck cargo of 300 tons of rubber to load a full cargo of March, and is apparently planning to China from Ceylon rubber this trip. Rubber shipments thus far in 1952, have totaled less than 3,000 tons space. primarily due to a shortage of shipping
6.
7.
8.
rubber sales Indonesia may propose breaking embargo on has learned Embassy in Djakarta to China: The American prior to the Trari-Feliable source that immediately to the Ottawa Rubber departure of the Indonesian delegation the Foreign Office was conConference, to be held in May, rubber sales to China. sidering breaking the embargo on
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exports.
on 3 April, The new Indonesian Cabinet, installed interpretation of appears to be committed to a stricter policy than was its Indonesia's "independent" foreign predecessor.
9.
The American General visit Premier Nu to Embassy n angoon repor commissioned by has been comment* U Chan Htoon there. The Embassy Indochina and study conditions first Burmese official perthat his that Chan Htoon will be the on Indochina and sonally to obtain information Burmese towards the policy report may "influence future States." (C Rangoon 1028, French Union and Associated 23 Apr 52) authorities have recently Comment: Although Burmese of the of the Communist orientation regime as indicitenareness not accepted the Bao Dai Vietminh, they.have independent. chief authors of the Burmese Chan Moon was one of the highly respected. constitution and his opinions are
rBuT22;_ollisialtantrIpmjal: urmese Attorney a s
10.
role in providing military a Iraq resentful of British ca on t er y resen 5 any mp raq equipmen SECRET 25 Apr 52
:

NEAR EAST - AFRICA
5
MOP() has been publicly Prime Minister Government is in conIn addition, Indonesian at quoted as stating that the and Singapore for presentation Curtain to Iron tact with India, Ceylon on rubber exports Ottawa of a united stand however, is as yet undetermined. This stand, countries. 52) (C Djakarta 1547, 22 Apr complained that the UNComment: Indonesia has to China, to which sponstifinin on rubber exports depressed rubber prices. adhered, Indonesia reluctantly further drop in prices and two months, a rubber have During the.past market for low grade for an expansion of a seriously shrunken created a general demand in Indonesia
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Treaty of 1930, under the Anglo-Iraqi military Britain possesses, for providing it with with the small responsibility exclusive it is dissatisified it has quality of British arms equipment. Moreover, Iraq has the inferior quantity and with this attitude, . In line (S Bagdad recently received. sought American equipment. on several occasions 901, 21 Apr 52) suspicion of widespread There are reports of East as well as Comment: in the Near power french intentions only Western is the British and United States conviction that the materiel. which can supply-military for make it more difficult 1930. resentment may TreatY of Iraq's the Ang10-1raqi Britain to renegotiate
25 Apr 52
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WESTERN EUROPE
11
East German defector describes unity campaign as tactical: The current Soviet unity campaign for Germany is only a tactlal maneuver, according to Gerold, Rummler, personal relations officer for East German Foreign Minister Dertinger. Rummler, who fled to West Berlin about two weeks ago, asserted that East German politicians were worried by the prospect of all-German elections until informed by Russian Ambassador Pushkin that the Soviet Union did not cohtemplate "sacrificing" the East German regime in free elections.
Comment: Rummler later:Stated publicly that Dertinger does have liTIEFTor all-German elections, but that his plans call for separate simultaneous elections in East and West Germany, with the West German parties being excluded from East German election lists.
This information may diaillusion the one-third of the West German populace which either'suppOrts the Soviet unity offer or has not as yet been convinced of its insincerity.
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East German Politburo charts action to culminate in may: East German Premier returned from Moscow Grotewohl and his deputy, Walter Ulbricht, the Socialist Unity about 13 April and convened a meeting of to be taken should West Party (SED) politburo to discuss action Germany sign the contractual agreement prior to the holding of a four-power conference.
1
The USSR will reportedly apply continuous pressure for a four-power conference while the SED takes immediate steps to mobilize the West German support. Through local action groups the SED will try to swing the West German Socialist Party over The Communists plan May to the side of resistance before I May. the interzonal border, where Day demonstrations for uniti along be stationed. large numbers of People's Police will The conference revealed that SED leaders believe the contractual agreement will be signed by mid-May, whereas the USSR believes it is still possible to "hinder" the signing.
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American observers in Berlin comment that the East German tactics since the 9 April SoViet note support Rummler's state(C Berlin 1236, 19 Alir 52) ments.
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Grotewohl may have been in Moscow early this Comment: Ion 3 April that he had month:j gone on two weeks' sick leave to recover from a nervous breakdown.
13
East-West trade financed by Austrian Creditanstalt declines: During the last quarter of 1051, letters of credit issued byfrig nationalized Creditanstalt of Vienna for trade between Orbit countries and various Western countries, including Austria, declined to negligible proportions. Throughout 1950 and the early months of 1951, such financing allegedly constituted an important part of the bank's business. The last remaining account of a Soviet-controlled enterprise in Austria was reportedly relinquished recently by the preditanstalt to the Soviet Military Bank in Vienna.
I
25X A
Comment: The Soviet occupation authorities are believed to be transferring all USIA accounts to the Soviet Military Bank, possibly in an effort to conserve schillings, to control more closely the operations of Soviet-held enterprises in Austria, and to tighten security controls over their economic activities. The decline in Creditanstalt-financing of covert East-West trade, therefore, does not of itself imply decreased efforts in seeking to make such transactions. Nevertheless, the over-all volume of rail shipments transiting Austria from the West to the Orbit declined considerably during 1951.
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American stability: The Bolivian unrest affects South vian revolt was ster se eves t at t e o and and Communists," Chilean ore gn Min Nazis, Peronists, work of the He states that the "joint plan for South America. of an over-all was part not in control, since he arms. President Paz Estenssoro is clearly miners to surrender their cannot persuade the "Communist" is that there of diplomats in Santiago and Peronista The general belief the Communist investigation of must be an intensive recognized, and that Bolivia is threat to South America before recognition will determine the (S Santiago 546, the United States decision on of South America. political future immediate 23 Apr 52) the Paz not yet satisfied that Brazil also is official Comment: and a high Foreign Office regime is stable Estenssoro

LATIN AMERICA
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Chile and possibility of an additional coup. eventually mentioned the disorders in Bolivia might that any new PerU fear spread to their countries. have the only countries which Guatemala are Spain and recognized the new Bolivian Government.
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Ecuadoran militar
cou
redicted for this week.
25X1
a
ore n cua or be establ s e the dictatorship will military candidate Velasco Ibarra visits presidential controversial capital on 26 April. resigPlaza has announced the Meanwhile, President Galo/ Defense nation of his entire cabinet. resignations to get rid of rumored forced the the President Granados, who was planning to lead the Minister Diaz hdlnnedacounterd o revolt.
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scheduled to reach Quito originally Velasco was time. Comment: disturbances were expected at that 22-7WII-and serious on left-wing elements have been According to other reports, open street fighting followers into or trying to provoke Velasco's a coup. repressive action to provide an excuse for will give the President an of his cabinet The resignation government during this tense preopportunity to strengthen the necessarily prevent further not election period, but will possible coup and countercoup. including a disturbances
18
to break labor union desires ry general Another leading Guatemalan ymun o onza ez, secre Tiquisate, has Fruit Company workers in Communistfrom the lifiheunionolun.1"" should break away Workers.(CGTG) declared that his union Confederatior of Guatemalan 1 Reuters, 21 Apr 52) controlled General (R FBIS STAT "and be independent." of Guatemala's by the leader closely after a Comment: This declaration, workers, follows workers' union (SAMF) largest un on of agricultural powerful railway in within the strong faction CGTG and condemned Communists from the have already andemanded withdrawal confederations the union. Two agricultural with the CGTG. nounced their complete break SECRET
fronSoinnttro:
25 Apr 52
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US OFFICIALS ONLY
CIA No. 49625

Copy
NO.
46
This digest of significant reports has been prepared primarily

for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office ,of Current Intelligence.

Office of Cuirent Intelligence
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TO THE CURRENT WTELLIGENCE DIGEST
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FAR EAST
1.
Comment: As far as is known, the Soviet Union has not approached the Japanese Government relative to the future status of its mission. The Japanese have indicated that the Soviet personnel attached to the ACJ will lose their diplomatic privileges after 28 April, but will not be forcibly ejected.
It is considered likely that the Soviet Union, rather than accept a restricted position, will propose that its mission The Japanese have indicated, be considered as a trade agency. however, that no privileges will be extended to the USSR without reciprocal treatment.
4
2.
It is noteworthy that the Chinese Nationalist member did not support the Soviet position, as previously threatened in the event the China-Japan treaty had not been concluded by the time the San Francisco treaty became effective.

TOP SECRET
1
Future of Allied Council for Japan questioned by USSR: The Soviet member of the Allied Council for Japan, at the meeting on 23 April, asked what effect the coming into force of the "so-called peace treaty" would have on the future of the ACJ. After criticizing the conduct of the occupation and denouncing the United States view that the ACJ automatically terminates on 28 April, the Soviet member stated that, since the USSR has insisted upon the withdrawal of foreign forces from Japan and the conclusion of a genuine peace settlement, it "can bear no responsibility whatsoever for the situation (C S/S Tokyo 2274, 23 Apr 52) which has arisen."
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Turkish abstention in Tunisian case causes domestic critiTurkish abstention in the UN Security Council vote on Mg-Tunisian - French dispute has been widely criticized in the Turkish press. A Turkish FOreign Office spokesman told the American Ambassador on 22 April that his country had taken this action because it wished to maintain solidarity with the Western powers, and that it would have voted for consideration of'the Tunisian case if the United States had done so. (S S/S Ankara 1160, 22 Apr 52)
cism:
This is the first time that Turkish adherence Comment: to United States policy has aroused widespread criticism in the Although the Turks have been uniformly critical of Egypt press. and Iran in the disputes of those countries with Britain, there is apparently considerable belief in Turkey that the Tunisian complaint is justified.

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6 . 6.
Further F u r t h e r forward movement b bv Chinese Communist artiller artillerv observe emen o o b s e r v e d i n eastern Korea: The supp s u p p ly e element of t h e 7 t h orea: A r t i l l e r y Division, D i v i s i o n , in C h i n e s e Communist Artillery Chinese I n east central c e n t r a l and e a s t e r n Korea, recently eastern r e c e n t l y requested r e q u e s t e d headquarters'to h e a d q u a r t e r s . t o let l e t them " t h e distance d i s t a n c e between between the t h e new positions p o s i t i o n s to t o which the the know "the 2 0 t h Regiment 20th R e g i m e n t has advanced advanced and and Yongdok." Yongdok."
7.
Relief of Chinese Communist artiller division in western Korea sugges e inese ommun st messages o an pr 1 indicated that elements of the 2nd Chinese Communist Artillery D i v i s i o n , previously p r e v i o u s l y in i n support s u p p o r t of of the t h e 39th 3 9 t h and and 42nd 42nd Armies A r m i e s in ih Division, west central c e n t r a l Korea, Korea, were were to t o be be relieved r e l i e v e d by by an an unidentified u n i d e n t i f i e d unit unit and 24 24 April. A p r i l . The messages discussed d i s c u s s e d routes r o u t e s of of between 20 and a p p r o a c h , the t h e location l o c a t i o n of headquarters, h e a d q u a r t e r s , and gave instructions instructions approach, about about the t h e ammunition load l o a d to t o accompany accompany pieces p i e c e s moving into into p osition. position. On 16 1 6 April, A p r i l , the t h e 29th 3 9 t h Artillery A r t i l l e r y Regiment, subordinate subordinate rtillery D i v i s i o n , advised a d v i s e d its i t s 2nd B a t t a l i o n that that t o t h e 2nd A to the Artillery Division, Battalion " f o r the t h e next n e x t few few days d a y s we w e should s h o u l d maintain m a i n t a i n normal normal activity. activity. "for so a6 as to avoid a v o i d arousing a r o u s i n g enemy enemy suspicion s u s p i c i o n about about us. us. .facili.facilit a t e completion c o m p l e t i o n of of our o u r taking t a k i n g over." overOfp tate
.

e
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...
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F a r East The Far E a s t Command Command notes n o t e s that t h a t this t h i s indicates indicates a a "sizeable "sizeable of the t h e 20th 2 0 t h Artillery A r t i l l e r y Regiment, Regiment, subordisubordid i s p l a c e m e n t J t of forward displacement" nate t o the the 7th 7 t h Division. D i v i s i o n . Since S i n c e the t h e 21st 2 1 s t Artillery A r t i l l e r y Regiment Regiment n a t e to of this t h i s division d i v i s i o n has h a s been been the t h e only o n l y unit u n i t actively a c t i v e l y supporting supporting i n the t h e sector, s e c t o r , this t h i s movement definitely definitely f r o n t line l i n e enemy units u n i t s in front increases."the f i r e support s u p p o r t for f o r any a n y future. future. . i n c r e a s e s 'Ithe potential p o t e n t i a l fire operation." o peration." (SUEDE (SUEDE CINCFE SIB SLB 491, 491, 24 24 Apr Apr 52) 52)
.
.
.
.
''On O n 20 A April, p r i l , although a l t h o u g h the 2nd Battalion B a t t a l i o n reported reported completion f i r i n g mission, m i s s i o n , messages clearly c l e a r l y indicated indicated c o m p l e t i o n of a firing that it and a battalion b a t t a l i o n of the t h e 30th 3 0 t h Regiment, Regiment, also a l s o of t h a t both b o t h it t h e 2nd 2nd Artillery A r t i l l e r y Division, D i v i s i o n , were were moving moving to to a a new new location, location, the st ill unidentified. unidentified still
..
A p o s s i b l e indication i n d i c a t i o n of which unit u n i t replaced replaced t h e 2nd the possible A r t i l l e r y Division.is D i v i s i o n is in i n a 20 2 1 0 April A p r i l message Chinese Communist Communist Artillery B a t t a l i o n , 29th 2 9 t h Artillery A r t i l l e r y Regiment, stated from the t h e 2nd Battalion, Regiment, which stated " t h e 27th 2 7 t h Regiment is is lacking l a c k i n g 10 1 0 units u n i t s of of and two t w o copies copies "the of .IQ The 27th A r t i l l e r yRegiment, Regiment, subordinate s u b o r d i n a t e to t o the the " The 27th Artillery 1st Chinese C h i n e s e Communist Artillery A r t i l l e r y Division, D i v i s i o n , has h a s not n o t been
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.identified identified previous1 prevtouslylain in this'sector this sector of of the front. f r o n t . (SUEDE (SUEDE .Apr; [11-]997, 14 Apr Aprr-598, 98, 12 12 Apr, Apr,andj-----1012, and I p O l 2 , 16 16 Apr; 997, 14 501st K-2386, K-2387, K-2387, 22 22 Apr Apr 5 52) 5 0 1 s t Comm Recon Grp Grp Korea, Korea, K,-2378, K-2378, K-2386, 2)
Comment: it is is apparent apparent that that major major elements elements of of Comment; While it the 2nd 2na Artillery Artillery Division have moved moved from their previously previously occupied positions, the the messages do not clearly indicate whether the units units were relieved or if if they remained in the immediate area of the the front. front.
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GENERAL GENERAL
1. 1 .
North Koreans Koreans order order increased for military units: increased hate hate propaganda propaganda for units:
The senior North Korean Korean Political Political officer in a northeast area was was instructed on on 24 April to "spread propaganda increase 4 Aprtl propaganda and andincrease es 3? /A/the C 3 ,/,5-1, - J s b co:-.14- 3 1 l e hostility by by having talks talksabout about the the US US The message continued that imperialists illing the prtsoners." imperialtsts prisoners." The the political officer officer should should "tell "tellthem themabout abouttheir their(the (theUN's UN's )) violent vtolent servicemen." action toward the servicemen:"
US Army 24 Apr 52 52 SUEDE
ATE: 23-Mar-2010 IDPPROVED

~ U J -
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sistently maintained that that the the UN UNgrossly grosslymtstreated mistreated its its prisoners prisoners of war, the handed Commuof the current currentreaction reacttonto tothe thenew newlist Hst handedto tothe theCommunist nist negotiators negotiatorsat atPanmunjom, Panmunjom, containing containingthe thenames namesof ofonly only70,000 70,000 enemy who would w i l l probably probably enemy prtsoners prisoners who wouldnot notresist resist repatriation, repatriation, will reach new new heights of invective. invective.
The new new attempt attempt to intensify animosity may have a connection with coming coming mtlitary military operations of which there connection with which there have been some indications but no no confirmation. confirmatton
Comment:
Although Although the the enemy enemy has has con-
-3-
TOP-SECRE-T SUEDE
--11sT-SECRET-- SUEDE SUEDti

NR
3. Soviet air unit unit at at new new base in central central Manchuria: Manchuria:
US Air Force US A i r Force

.
23 Apr 52 52 SUEDE , SUEDE (Dilb <OM-\+ ?nips). 3as~) LIIO
a x e e transports, transports, probably probablyof of the the Soviet Soviet 9th 9th 114- 0 Air Arnty, made shuttle flights from Mukden Anshan shuttle flights from Mukdenand and Anshanto toTungfeng Tungfeng between 16 16 and 23 23 April. April,
only Soviet MIG-15's to be be based based outside of M1G-15'~ previously known known to of the Dairen Dairen and Antung Antungarea area of of Manchuria Manchuriawere were in in a a small unit at Anshan, Anshan, which which may include the aircraft involved aircraft involvedin tnthe themove moveto tbTungfeng. Tungfeng, This group has been associated associated with with night night interception interception oKer oyer Korea. Korea
_ -4 _
T h e a Soviet air unit, unit, equipped equipped with MIC-15's -15's is is now nowbased basedat at Tungfeng. Tungfeng. The

FAR EAST
e' /See
A Chinese Communist Communist message of 22 22 April A revealed a Soviet Soviet air detachment detachment at a t Tungfeng, Tungfeng, the same same 120 miles northeast northeastof of Mukden. Mukden. On Onthe day, six sixSoviet SovietMIG-15's MIG-15's landed landed at atTungfeng. Tungfeng.
developments suggest that that Comment: These developments
-10-P-SE6RET- SUEDE SUEDE
HR70-14 HR70-14
FAR EAST EAST
4 . 4.
Relief of 2nd 2nd Chinese Chinese Communist Communist Artillery Artillery Division Division by by Relief the 1st 11Ering 1st Division Division further further indicated: indicated: m s i n g the the period 20 to to the 24 toil, aa new Communist 2 4 April, new Minese Chinese Comniunistartillery artiIlery unit unit occupied occupled positions which had had been occupied by positions in in west west central centralKcirea Korea which elements of the elements the 2nd 2nd Artillery Artillery Division. Division. One One message message indiindioated elements o of oated 'that that elements f the the 1st 1st Artillery Artillery Division Division4aight night be the relieving relieving force. force.
Confirmation Confirmation of of the the pregence presence of o f 1st 1st Artillery Artillery Division Division elements Division unit O6d Division unit elements is is Been seen in in another another message message from fromaa 2fid in in process process of relief relief which which stated stated that that "concerning l'concerning the the matter matter regiment (subordinate (subordinate to to the the 1st Division) Division) wanting wanting of the the '27th 27th regiment 11 ." to to borrow, borrow, temporarily temporarily our our one one map. map.
.
On 22 22 April, April, an an unidentified unidentified Chinese Chinese artillery artillery unit unit rereported a a successful successful fire fire mission mission in in west west central central Korea Korea and and defensive noted that that "our "our artillery artillery , assumed fully the defensive
.

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28 Apr 52 52
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d duties u t i e s of the t h e 29tnRegiment".(sabordinate 29th' Regimentt1 ( s u b o r d i n a t e to t o the t h e 2nd 2nd Division). Division). (SUEDE 501st 5 0 1 ~ Comm t Corn Recon Grp Grp Korea,K-2414, Korea,K-2414, 23 23 Apr Apr 52) 52)
5. 5.
C Cr r yatic p t i c message suggests s u g g e s t s enem enemy a air ir a activity ctivity w within i t h i n North Korea: e' or A cryp c r y p t i c, c , gar garble d North Korean o r e a n groun ground force orce message of 22 April A p r i l noted noted that t h a t ". It. today. t he p i l o t of the t h e 2nd 2nd today. the pilot b a t t a l i o n at a t the t h e combat area area was sent s e n t by emergency airplane a i r p l a n e at at battalion 1100 hours. hours. ." a ft (SUEDE (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, 15RSM/11235, 15RSM/11235, 23 A Apr p r 52) 52)
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6, 6,
liorth o r t h Korean Korean u unit nit o orders r d e r s vegetables v e g e t a b l e s at a t extremely extremely low low ilrice: price: 'An unidentified iorth K Korean untt states that, "aftek'donferring d e n t i f i e d North oreap u nlt s tates t h a t , I'af tet.conferring with w i t h the t h e clty c i t y peoPle's p e o p l e ' s commissar," commissar," it i t will w i l l buy buy some some 27 27 metric metric t o n s of vegetables v e g e t a b l e s at at a a price p r i c e of "one !'one won per p e r one kilogram." kilogram.1t tons (SUEDE 5 0 1 s t Comm C o m m Recon Grp Grp Korea,15RSM/11268, Korea, 15RSM/l1268, 23 23 Apr Apr 52) 52) (SUEDE 501st
'
Various v egetables o f f e r e d to to t h e North Korean Comment: vegetables offered the p u b l i c at a t government-controlled government-controlled prices p r i c e s average average 37 37 won won per p e r kilokilopublic gram. Probably the t h e military m i l i t a r y would pay less than t h a n the t h e civilian civilian p e r kilogram seems seems excessively e q c e s s i v e l y low. low. segment; however, however, one won per
7 . 7.
SOviet S o v i e t air a i r unit u n i t at a t new new base base in i n central c e n t r a l Manchuria:. Manchuriia: A Chinese Communlst message of 22 '22 April Ap r i l revealed revealed a a SoViet S o v i e t air air Chinesb Communist detachment. a at Tungfeng, 120 120 miles miles n northeast detachment t Tungfeng, o r t h e a s t of Mukden. On the t h e Same Same day, six s i x Soviet S o v i e t MIG-15's landed landed at a t Tungfeng.
\
t h e Soviet S o v i e t 9th 9 t h Air A i r Army, Army, Three transports, t r a n s p o r t s , probably of the made shuttle s h u t t l e flights f l i g h t s from from Mukden Nukden and and Anahan CLaaElhan to to Tungfeng Tungfeng bebetween 16 16 and 23 23 April. April. Air Forbe Roundup 79, (SUEDE A i r Forbe 79, 23 Apr; Apr; AB Japan, J a p a n , 23 23 Apr Apr 52) 52) 6920 Security S e c u r i t y Grp Grp Johnson Johnson AB
S o v i e t air air s u g g e s t that t h a t a Soviet Comment: These developments suggest u n i t , equipped w i t MIG-15's, h MIG-l5's,is unit,-WWWed wtth is now nowbased based at at Tungfeng. Tungfeng. The The only M I G - 1 5 ' s previously p r e v i o u s l y known to t o be based outside o u t s i d e of of o n l y Soviet S o v i e t MIG-15's the Dairen area of of Manchuria Manchuria were were in t he D a i r e n and a n d 'Antung ' h t u n g area i q a small unit unit a t Anahan, i n c l u d e the aircraft a i r c r a f t involved in i n the t h e move at Anshan, which may include Tight t to o Tungfeng. This This group has h a s been associated a s s o c i a t e d with withtp a g h t inint e r c e p t i o n over o v e r Korea. terception

' 4 4
Comment: C ommept: P o s s i b l y coincidentally, c o i n c i d e n t a l l y , UN f ighter p ilots d isPossibly fighter pilots disa Communist Communist conventional c o n v e n t i o n a l ground ground attack attack c o v e r e d and and destroyed a covered aircraft Wonsan airfield a i r f i e l d on on 22 22 April. A p r i l . While there t h e r e is is no a i r c r a f t on Wonsan direct d i r e c t link l i n k between between this t h i s message and and the t h e destroyed d e s t r o y e d enemy enemy p l a n e , it plane, i t may be s p e c u l a t e d that that a N o r t h Korean operational operational speculated North a ir u nit e x i s t s in i n the t h e Wonsan-Hamhung Wonsan-Hamhung area of t h e east coast. coast. air unit exists of the
28 .APr Abr 52 52
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28 April 1952
US OFFICIALS ONLY
OCI No. 5168

Copy No.
266
*Army and State Dept. reviews com leted*

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SECURITY' INFORMA.TION
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS. 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
*
GENERAL
1.
USSR and Hungary fail to participate in Milan international trade fair: The USSR has declined to participiig-in the annual international trade fair now in progress in Milan, where 45 nations are represented. Czechoslovakia and Poland are the only Satellites participating. Although Hungary applied for display space, it failed to present an exhibit. ilan 154, 24 Apr 52; R Milan Deep 277, 25 Mar 52; R FBIS J 7 Apr 52)
STAT
Comment: The Soviet refusal to take part in the fair is in sharp contrast to propaganda at the recent Moscow Economic Conference in favor of increased East-West trade. The USSR may fear a repetition of last year's fiasco, when only its vodka exhibit found favor with the Italians.
Hungary's non-attendance may result from its desire to conserve hard currency which would have to be expended at the exhibit for rentals. Czechoslovakia's presence may possibly be explained by Italian interest in quality goods; Poland's by its anxiety to sell coal in exchange for strategic goods from the West.
2.
Preparatory meeting to be held in Peiping for peace conThe All-India Peace Council in Bombay announcedThat a preparatory meeting would be held in Peiping on 28 May to plan an Asian and Pacific rAgion peace conference to be held in Peiping sometime this year. (U New Delhi 3891, 23 Apr 52)
ference:
SOVIET UNION
3.
Austrian officials expect new Soviet move: As a result of a curious conversation with Soviet Political Representative Kudryavtsev, Austrian Foreign Minister Gruber has the impressSECRET
,
28 Apr 52
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SECRET
ion that the Soviet officials in Austria are planning some kind of move and are awaiting fiaal instructions from Moscow.
At the same time, Austrian Minister of Interior Helmer reports that there is considerable commotion and excitement the conin the Soviet garrisons whiqh may be connected with Russian and Soviet officials on a troversy between Austrian line service. request for additional telephone The US Embassy suggests caution in an interpretation of.the foregoing information, as Gruber and Helmer are both inclined (S Vienna to read military significance into Soviet moves. 3374, 24 Apr 52)
9.
travel to Comment: Although this excuse for prohibiting occasionally encountered by foreignunrestricted zones has been is possible that Soviet officials may now ers in the past, it it affords them legalistic choose to utilize it extensively as sanction to reduce progressively the travel of foreigners in officially open areas. The mere statement of the absence of an Intourist representative at the desired destination point is a much simpler control system than the clumsy and devious methods usually employed.
5.,
Albania receives technical aid from Bulgaria: The AlbanianBulgarian trade agreementribarias signed in Sofia on 1 April, emphasized technical collaboration between the two countries by expediting the engagement of 50 Bulgarian textile and construction engineers to work in Albania. According to the French Embassy in Athens, which provided this information, they are to receive half their basic pay in Bulgarian currency deductible from the joint clearing account. Rumors that assizable Bulgarian mili(S Athens tary mission is on the way.to Tirana are unconfirmed.
4606, 24. Apr 52)
The Albanian News Bulletin in Rome published a Comment: report ln February that Bulgiaini-YET-Efners were going soon
SECRET
2

EASTERN EUROPE
Intourist restricts ticket sales to foreigners: An Ameritrip to can Embassy official in Moscow attempting to arrange a tickets were available and that Stavropol was informed that no tickets only to points in the henceforth Intourist will sell (C Moscow 1737, 24 Apr 52) USSR where it has representatives.
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to Albania to replace the Russian mission. Czechoslovak, Humgarian, Rumanian and Bulgarian technicians have been employed in small numbers in Albania for at least two years. However, there is as yet no firm indication that the Russian mission has been measurably reduced.
6.
STAT
The creation of a metallurgical industry is a Comment: part of the Five-Year Plan, which, according to Bulgarian announcements, will be fulfilled by the end of 1952. Bulgarian supplies of raw materials, except for metallurgical coking coal, are probably sufficient to support a small steel industry. Although the Bulgarian Ministries of Heavy Industry and Construction failed to fulfill their plans for capital construction during 1951, heavy publicity given to the "labor heroism and unheard of speed" manifested by workers engaged in the construction of the Dimitrovgrad power and chemical complex served effectively to overshadow serious failures registered in other sectors of the economy. The unusual emphasis given to this new project suggests that it might serve a similar propaganda funcFor this purpose, it is possible that the tion during 1952. metallurgical plant, like the Dimitrovgrad project, might be hurried to completion well ahead of schedule.
7.
Rumanians release convicted Italian priest: The American Legation in Bucharest has been informed by the Italian Minister there that the Rumanian Government on 14 April released Father Clemente Gatti without ransom. He is now in Vienna undergoing medical treatment before proceeding to Rome.
The Legation suggests that the priest's release is a good will gesture on the eve of the arrival in Rome of a new Rumanian ,Minister, but it may also be due to Gatti's poor health.' (C
SECRET
'
Bulgaria to construct first metallurgical plant for ferrous metals: According to a decree issued jointly by the Ministerial Council and the Central Committee of the Bulgarian Communist Party, Bulgaria's first state-owned metallurgical plant for ferrous metals will be constructed during 1952-53. The plant, which is scheduled to be completed by the summer of The construction of 1953, will be located in the Sofia area. the plant is considered to be "a task of first importance both to the party and to the nation," and will require for its fulfillment a "full mobilization of effort on the part of the (R FBIS r orkly, engineers, and technicians of Bulgaria." 24 Apr 52)
28 Apr 52
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Bucharest 401, 17 Apr 52)

Comment: Father Gatti was sentenced to 15 years' imprisonment for "espionage" following a public trial in Bucharest in September 1951. At the same time, Eraldo Pintori, an employee of the Italian Legation in Bucharest, was sentenced to life imprisonment. The Italian Government is still negotiating for Pintori's release and has allowed shipment of a strategic grinder to Rumania to further the negotiations.

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4
28 Apr 52
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FAR EAST
9.
Vehicle sightings in North Korea approach record high: The Far East Command reports that enemy vehicle sightings in North Korea during the week 19 - 25 April totaled 24,142, double that of the preceding period and the second highest weekly total on record. Southbound traffic comprised 59 percent of the sightings, a relatively low figure, although an increase over the previous week. Sixty-one percent of the sightings were south of the 39th parallel, which is above recent averages. Communist traffic reached a new weekly high on the road between Pyongyang and Sariwon in western Korea, and heavy traffic was noted on the route from Wonsan to Chorwon in the east and central sector. (S CINCFE Telecon 5776, 26 Apr 52)
Comment: The enemy has maintained a consistently high level-UrgUliply movement throughout the cease-fire talks, ,resulting in a greatly improved position in supplies and personnel.
25X6

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5
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10 25X1C American POWs reported in Chekiang:
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Chekiang
Province.
175-nerican POWs are-FM-at a camn
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Comment: Hundreds of the several thousand American troopi-aTTUred in Korea have reportedly been moved to camps in Manchuria and China proper for further interrogation and indoctrination, possibly with a view to propaganda exploita-
tion of disaffected persons.
There is no reliable information on the location of the camps or the current activities of the prisoners.
11.
Chang Ching-wu's reported visit appears doubtful: The US Embassy in New Delhi cannot confirm reports that General Chang Ching-wu, senior Chinese representative in Tibet, is en route to India to discuss economic and political questions involving China, India and Tibet. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs says that it has received no application for a visa for General Chang, and that the matter of his visit has not been broached by Chinese officials in any way. (S New Delhi 3933, 25 Apr 52).
Comment: As General Chang would be unlikely to appear in New Delhi without making previous arrangements with Indian officials, the Ministry's statement casts doubt upon a 17 April report of Chang's expected arrival, which later appeared in the Indian press. A discussion of Tibetan problems between top-level Indian and Chinese representatives, however, may be arranged at any time.
Iranian Under Secretary of Finance pessimistic over Iran's financial futur117--nbassador Henderson in Tehran reports that the Under Secretary of Finance appears to have no idea how his government can solve its financial problems. Discussing the situation with the Ambassador on 23 April, the Under Secretary stated that the government's current plans for reducing expenditures and gaining new revenues were "utterly inadequate." He said that the Majlis would never approve the government's plan for expanding the note
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12.

NEAR EAST - AFRICA
28 Apr 52
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issue and asked the Ambassador "what are your plans for helping us?" (C Tehran 4074, 24 Apr 52)
Comment: Although Mossadeq has not directly asked for American financial assistance since his February request was refused, his ministers have often spoken to the American Embassy about Iran's desperate financial situation.
Iranian officials have tried particularl 3' to stimulate aid by arousing United States concern over possible Soviet control of Iran. The Under Secretary's question is another illustration of the widespread Iranian feeling that the United States will eventually give them financial aid.
25X1
13.
Egypt may take Suez dispute to UN: prime Minister Hilali Pasha may take tne Anglo-Egyptian dispute to the United Nations if he decides that "negotiations with the British are fruitless."
I
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Comment: In 1947, Egypt tried without success to obtain a Security Council decision against Britain. Any new attempt by the Egyptian Government to obtain a UN solution of the dispute would probably be made in the General Assembly.
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WESTERN EUROPE
14
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15.
inquiry" just On the asis of an "extensive French National Assembly is Embassy in Paris reports that the attitude toward the European taking a somewhat more favorable of the Soviet Union's Defense Community, in particular because advocacy of a new German Army. hoped-for assurances from A crucial remaining issue is the the coma break-up of the United States and Britain against Opponents of of any member. munity because of the withdrawal the popular concampaign issue in the community find their best American and of the expected fusion over the nature and extent British commitments. to can now be expected While Socialist leader Guy Mollet party's enthusiasm,at his defend the treaty, although without remains whether enough congress opening 22 May, the question US and British assurances are deputies will consider that the Apr 52) (C Paris 6565, 25 sufficient.
seen improving: Prrects for French ratification of EDC concluded, the American

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8
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The French Government obtained a scant vote of Comment: confidence in February on the European Defense Community plan, The vote with reservations designed to placate the Socialists. Was obtained on the strength of a promise by Foreign Minister Schuman that he would seek not only declarations by the American commitand British Governments but also "legal and political ments" from the parliaments of those countries.
16.
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LATIN AMERICA
17.
Chilean copper workerg at two large mines on strike: The workers at Anaconda's importan Chuquicamata and Potrerillos copper mines in Chile went out:on strike after approving the action of the Confederation of Copper Workers (CTC) in wage negotiations. The president of the CTC admitted that he did not plead He too strongly for arbitration by President Gonzalez Videla. strengthen his bargaining position feels that the strike will Negotiations are and consolidate his control of, the workers. (C Santiago 559, 26 Apr 52) at a standstill. The results of last June's copper strike provide estimating the effect of the current strike. Each a mediTurnr week's stoppage caused a prodUction loss of about 3,319 metric tons of bar copper at Chuquicamata, and 651 metric tons at Potrerillos.
'Comment:
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18.
WFTU undertakes organization of food industry workers in Latin America: A regional conference of Latin AmericaWFWETirs is planned in 1952 by the International Union of Workers in the Food, Tobacco, and Beverage Industries and Rotel, Cafe, and Restaurant Workers, In preparation for the conference, the International Union will study working conditions in the various food industries of Cuba, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Mexico, and Guatemala. At a meeting of the Executive Bureau of the International Union, scheduled for Warsaw in July, an Administrative Committee member will be designated to visit Latin America to draw up a budget for the conference, to set a place and a date for it, and to make other preparations.
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Comment: The WFTU, of which the International Union is an agency, sponsored Latin American regional conferences of farm workers and of transportation workers in 1951. The currently planned conference of workers is part of the WFTU's long-term plan to extend its influence through the formation of regional branches of its component trade unions.
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28 Apr 52
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48
for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.

TOP SECRET
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FAR EAST
25X6
Rhee defies ROK National Assembly by appointing,acting Prime Minister: According to the US Embassy in Pusan, President Rhee announced on 25 April that he had appointed Yi Yonyong as acting Prime Minister. This "surprise announcement" followed Rhee's 24 April statement that in deference to the National Assembly's desire to fill the Prime Ministership promptly, he had nominated Chang Taek-sang to be permanent Prime Minister.
25X1
Ambassador Muccio says that Yi has filled several posts Jand has been twice rejected in I elegislature. He notes that for the Prime the reasons for Yi's appointment have given rise to new speculation about Rhee's motives. (S S/S Pusan 1038, 25 Apr 52)
Prime Minister, whose appointment, unlike a permanent one, is This latest action by not subject to Assembly concurrence.
TOP SECRET
1
a speETWITholution to deter Rhee from appointing an acting
Comment:

nse
The South Korean legislature on 19 April passed
28 A pr 52
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Rhee will irritate the already strained relations between him and the Assembly.
SOUTH ASIA
3.
AmbasiinflowIes reports that Indies need for external assistance during the coming fiscal year will be between 260 and 285 million dollars, and that all but about 25 million must come from the United States.
India will need extensive external assistance in 1952-53:
52)
Comment: The above figures emphasize again the magnitude of the task facing the Indian Government in achieving economic 'stability. They also suggest that last year's 190 million dollar loan to India for the purchase of wheat was merely the first of a series of similar requests to be expected in the
future.

NEAR EAST-AFRICA
He states that the present Indian Government is unlikely to survive if it fails to meet the goals of its current fiveyear plan, adding that no one in New Delhi believes these goals can be met without foreign aid. (C S/S New Delhi 3921, 24 Apr
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WESTERN EUROPE
5.
Drees believes French and German ratification of-EDC treaty in doubt: Dutch Prime Minister Drees is not hopeful that France and Germany will ratify the European Defense Community treaty. He states, however, that once the treaty is signed, the Dutch Parliament will ratify it. Drees does not feel that the outstanding issues in the Defense Community conference will cause any difficulties. He believes, however, that a deadline around 20 May for the signing of the treaty is the earliest that can be met,. (S S/S The Hague 1126, 22 Apr 52)
Comment: The problems still facing the conierence include French pressure for firm American assurante against German secession from the organization, Britain's relationship to the community, the organization of the European Defense Forces, and the size and cost of the German military contribution.
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HR70-14 HR70-14
FAR EAST
4. 4 .
Additional A d d i t i o n a l armor armor arrives a r r i v e s in i n North Korea: Korea: North N o r t h Korean Horean messacres of 24 and-25 and 1 5 April A p s i 1 refer to t he a r r i v a l of dditional messages refer to the arrival of a additional tanks and self-propelled guns in i n the t h e Pyongyang area. area. tanks-and s e l f - p r o p e l l e d guns
The messages suggest s u g g e s t that at a t least least 43 tanks t a n k s and 22 22 self-propelled s e l f - p r o p e l l e d artillery a r t i l l e r y pieces p i e c e s have been been brought into i n t o Korea Korea unidentified on freight f r e i g h t cars from from China. China. The u n i d e n t i f i e d North Korean u n i t which unit w h i c h originated o r i g i n a t e d these t h e s e messages messages is is to t o receive r e c e i v e some some of of this t h i s armor. armor. (SUEDE (SUEDE 501st 501st Comm C o r n Recon Grp Korea, SK-I-828, SK-1-828, SK-1-853, SK-1-859, 25 25 Apr; Apr; 151 151Det, D e t , 15th 1 5 t hRSM RSMJapan, Japan,YSG CS 464, 464, SK-I-853, SK-I-859, MSG CS
27 Apr 52) 52)
6. 6.
North Korean aircraft a i r c r a f t reported r e p o r t e d night n i g h t flying f l y i n g extensively: extensively: ir v oice t raffic r evears P r e l i m i n a r y analysis a n a l y s i s of Nor'th Preliminary North Korean a air voice traftiC reveils that t h a t North Korean aircraft a i r c r a f t are are making many night n i g h t flights, flights, r e p o r t s a US Air reports A i r Force unit u n i t in i n Japan Japan on on 27 27 April. A p r i l . (SUEDE (SUEDE 6920 Security S e c u r i t y Grp Grp Johnson AB AB Japan,Spot 26, 27 Apr 52) 52) Japan,Spot 26,
Comment: The N o r t h Koreans have long engaged in i n night night North Comment: h arassin g operations o p e r a t i o n s with w i t h obsolescent o b s o l e s c e n t P0-2 PO-2 biplanes b i p l a n e s and and harass ng w i t h higher h i g h e r performance performance conventional c o n v e n t i o n a l airdraft. aircraft. p o s s i b l y with possibly d a t e the t h e mission of of night n i g h t interception i n t e r c e p t i o n has h a s been been To date a Soviet S o v i e t air a i r unit u n i t at a t Anshan, Manchuria. Manchuria. performed largely l a r g e l y by a T h i s group, group, referred r e f e r r e d . to t o as This as "Efimov's," "Ef imov ' 8 , 'v has h a s flown flown conventional conventional h i g h performance fighters, f i g h t e r s , but b u t may currently c u r r e n t l y be be convertconvertLA-11 high t o MIG-15's. MIG-15's. i n g to ing
29 Apr 52
Comment: Both the t h e North Korean 105th 105th Tank Division D i v i s i o n and and 10th Mechanized D Division 1 0 t h Nechanized i v i s i o n are located located in in the t h e Pyongyang area, and could c o u l d reasonably r e a s o n a b l y be be the t h e recipient r e c i p i e n t of of these these tanks. tanks.
eiD @ m
'<pp
APPROVED FOR RELEASE RELEASE DATE: DATE: 18-Mar-2010 18-Mar-2010
,,,,'
NR
8. 8 .
Comment: While While the the significance significance of this this inspection inspection Comment: be immediately immediately assessed, assessed, team's arrivalin inNorth North Korea Koreacan can not not be team'gTOFTVal high high level level inspection inspection activities a c t i v i t i e s suggest suggest preparations preparations for future, military operations. operations. future military A principal failing in in previous previous principal failing enemy offensives keep offensives in in Korea Korea has has been been the the inability.to inability to keep advancing ground advancing ground units units supplied. supplied.
Chinese logistical inspection inspection team arrives in Chinese Communist logistical Korea: Hua-tung (believed Korea: "The "The Hua-tung (believed io to be be a a major major logistical logistical headquarters in China) China) staff staff inspection inspection team will arrive headquarters in a r r i v e in in Korea Ninth Army Group Korea on on the t h e 25th. 25th. Ninth Group staff staff officers. officers. . .will .will them with with trucks" trucks" at at a a Chinese Chinese border border town, town, reports reports the the meet them 7th Communist Artillery Division 7th Chinese Chinese Communist Division Headquarters Headquarters on 22 April. April. The message adds adds that 400 gallons of gasoline will will be issued issued for for their their use. use. (SUEDE (SUEDE 501st Comm %rp Korea, Korea, tbmm Recon Grp K4419, 24 K-2419, 24 Apr Apr 52) 52)
i NR
-TOP SECAT SUEDE
29 Apr 52
29 Apr 52
I ' .
--'10P-SECRET SUE&E
2?/(1--rrSc. 1g
HR70-14
GENERAL
1. 1 . Britain Britain backs backs UN UN stand on Korean Korean prisoner prisoner exchange exchange issue:
1
British Foreign Foreign Secretary Secretary Eden Eden has has instructed the Foreign Officeto toprepare prepare a paper paper for circirthe Foreign Office Commonwealth members culation to the other Commonwealth r recommending @commendingsupport of the United United Nations' Nations' rerefusal to repatriate repatriate prisoners prisonersof of war war against against their their,will.
,
The Commonwealth countries The other Commonwealth countries contributing UN forces exto UN forces in Korea have not not committed committed themselves themselves on on the the prisoner prisoner exchange change issue. issue.
APPROVED PPROVED FOR RELEASE ATE: 24-Mar-2010 DATE: 24-Mar-2010
Comment: The The Foreign Foreign Office O f fice had previously Comment: recommending compromise compromise with with the the Communists Communists submitted to Eden a brief recommending this issue negotiations. on this issue if if necessary necessaryto toprevent preventthe the collapse collapse of of the the truce trucenegotiations. Prime Minister Minister Churchill Churchill had had informally tnformally expressed the view vtew that prisoners Prime prisoners held by the UN must not notbe be handed handedover overto toface facereprisals. reprisals. UN must
ET SUEDE SUEDE
"t0P-SE-CRET-SUE&E-
SOVIET UNION UNION SOVIET

4.
1NR NR
armor arrives arrives in 5. Additional Additional armor in North North Korea: Korea:
North Korean Military
I
24, 25 Apr 52 24,25 52

SUEDE
Ira -24 The The messages messages suggest suggest that that at least 43 43 tanks and 22 self-propelle artillery pieces pieceshave have been been brought brought into Into Korea Korea on on freight cars frelght carsfrom fromChina. China. The unidentified North North Korean Korean unit unit whichorigiwhichorigiThe unidentified nated nated these these messages messages is is to receive some some of of this armor.
105th Tank Comment: Both the North Korean 105th Comment: Mechanized Division Divisionaare Pyongyang area, area, Division and 10th Mechanlzed r e located in the Pyongyang and could could reasonably reasonably be be the the reclpient recipient of o f these tanks. tanks.
-5 5 --

FAR EAST EAST
North Korean Korean messages messages of of 24 24 and and 25 25 April April refer refer of additional additional tanks to the arrival arrival of tanks and and self-proself-propelled guns in the the Pyongyang.area. Pyongyang.area.
45/cc,
Approved OW/Release 2002105120 : CIA-RDP79101446A000900210001-0
SECRET
29 April 1952
US OFFICIALS ONLY
OCI No, 5169 Copy No.266
*Army, DIA and State Dept reviews completed*
This digest of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence Agency. It does
not represent a complete coverage of all current reports re-
ceived. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
RETURN TO ARCHIVES
RECORDS CENTER
IMMEDIATELY AFfER USE
pproved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A000900,4+10 JOBlial-4-42-BOXS

SECRET
Approved holeRelease 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79TOSA000900210001-0 SECRET
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS, 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
GENERAL
1.
Rummler quoted Dertinger as saying, directly after the conversation, that if the USSR does not really want an understanding, "then my entire political perspective was wrong" and the USSR "should do this with another Foreign Minister (C Berlin 1273, 26 Apr 52) and not with me in this seat."
Rummler had previously labelled the current Comment: Soviet unity campaign for Germany as only a tactical maneuver. Dertinger's position has always been tenuous, and Rummler predicted his early ouster regardless of how the political situation develops.
2
STAT
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World Federation of Trade Unions reported withdrawn enHeadquarters of the tirely into Soviet Sector of Vienna: (WFTU) has moved secretly World Federation of Trade Unions into the Soviet Sector of from Vienna's International Zone Interreport Ost, 23 Apr 52) (R PHIS the city.
Disillusioned East German official reports USSR not The Soviet Ambassador to East Germany does seeking agreement: not see any way to agreement in the 26 March Western note on Germany, according to Gerold Rummler, recently-defected public relations officer for East German Foreign Minister In a 27 March conversation with Dertinger, Dertinger. Ambassador Pushkin emphasized that Western insistence on Germany's freedom to join alliances meant Germany's incorporation in the "aggressive" North Atlantic Pact and disagreed with Dertinger's contention that efforts could continue toward an all-German understanding.
25X1
the Wm planned to move its offices from the Coburg Palace

in the First (International) District to the Soviet requisitioned Porrhaus in the Soviet Sector. The Coburg
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1
Comment:
'reported in November that
29 Apr 52
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Palace was said to be used primarily for representational purposes, while the Secretariat and most important offices had been housed in the Rainer Palace, Soviet Sector, from the outset of the organization's establishment in Vienna. The WFTU withdrawal into the Soviet Sector may be counted a minor success for the Austrian authorities, who have repeatedly protested the organization's presence as illegal. However, it assures increased Soviet protection for WFTU activities, since the Vienna police admit that they are powerless to control entrance to the Soviet Sector.
EASTERN EUROPE
3.
1
Although there is no itemization of the specific Comment: goods said to be in short supply, such major Bulgarian export products as canned foods, dried fruits and vegetables, hides, and tobacco might presumably be involved. It has recently been revealed that, at the end of 1950, 6.2 billion leva were allocated for the creation of a Bulgarian "material reserve." Although little is known concerning the activities of the Department of State Supply and Reserves, it is perhaps significant that the former chairman of the department was removed and replaced in February. Despite increased production in Bulgaria, as in other Satellites, serious shortages of goods are not uncommon, as It is possible, therea result of high export requirements. fore, that an unusual paucity of goods on the Bulgarian market at the present time could be a reflection of increased export commitments on the part of Bulgaria, possibly involving a preparatory step in the developing Communist campaign to reopen Satellite trade with the West.
4.
Probable initiation of antiaircraft defense build-up observed in Budapest: The US Military Attache in Hungary has
SECRET 29 Apr 2 Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP791111146A000900210001-0 52
Stockpiling operations reported in Bulgaria: According to the French Legation at Sofia, a noticeable paucity of "non-perishable goods" has "confirmed" reports of considerable In answer to a query by stockpiling operations in Bulgaria. Vice Minister of Foreign the French Minister, the Bulgarian being built up are inAffairs explained that the reserves be made after the harvest." tended "for.commercial treaties to (S Athens 4607, 24 Apr 52)
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reported personal observation of two 85mm antiaircraft batteries in the vicinity of Budapest. These installations are the first semi-permanent air defense positions observed in this area, although preparation of another installation in the hilly center of town on the Buda side of the Danube (S USMA Budapest L 2872, 23 Apr and L 2875, is rumored. 26 Apr 52)
Comment: These reports suggest that the air defenses of BuBITZ7T-Will be built up in a manner similar to that which took place last summer around Warsaw and which was reIn additionS to cently initiated in the vicinity of Prague. being national capitals, these cities are important points on east-west lines of communication as well as important industrial centers.
Two Hungarian antiaircraft divisions have been previously identified in the Budapest area.
5.
Hungarian Cabinet demands more production from farm cooperatives: The Hungarian Council of Ministers issued a decree on 23 April calling for more work, better discipline and improved methods from agricultural producers' cooperatives in order to increase crop yields and especially livestock proPenalties are provided for absenteeism, absent duction. members are ordered to return to their own cooperatives unless working in state enterprises, and detailed incentive rewards are offered for over-fulfillment of goals. The use of methods characteristic of kolkhozes is recommended to all agricultural producer cooperatives. FBIS Budapest, 25 Apr 52)
(R
Comment: The decree, which embodies party recommendations-larEplements the 1952 crop surrender decree, is part of the drive to tighten discipline in the whole Hungarian It follows three months of criticism for low proeconomy. duction, highlighted by the recent announcement that food production had achieved only 99.6 percent of its target during In preparation for spring planting, the first quarter of 1952. there has been constant hammering on leadership failures by party, local councils, the agricultural trade union MEDOSZ and the youth organization DISZ.

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Reports from Hungary have indicated a heightened interest in air defense in recent months.
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allegedly Eighteen percent of Hungary's arable land now emphasized Recent policy has is farmed by cooperatives. by force, but collectivization by attraction rather than The recommendation that all pressure has not been relaxed. since party cooperatives use kolkhoz methods is interesting, cooperatives as a leader Rakosi proposed supporting simpler method of gradual transition to real kolkhozes.
directed by Russians: Rumanian currency reform reportedly Unix, according The American Legation in Bucharest reports Eugene Varga was in to usually reliable diplomatic sources, Rumanian currency reBucharest in January and directed the fixed the amount have arbitrarily form. Russians are said to in circulation. of new currency which might be placed Aurel Vijoliu, Varga allegedly refused to speak to being the first State Bank, this President of the Rumanian subsequent disfall from grace and indication of Vijoliu's /that the State missal.j ind details of the Bank President was ignorant of the nature publicly announced. currency reform until the decree was (C Bucharest Desp 305, 8 Mar 52) censured Varga, a leading Soviet economist, was Comment: of World War II on in 1947 for his views regarding the effect in eclipse, capitalist economies. Since then he has been been a Soviet although there is good evidence that he has There have also been economic adviser in his native Hungary. department of heads an economics unconfirmed reports that he the Moscow Economic the Cominform and took part in organizing Conference.
6.
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over a Despite violent Yugoslav protests Comment: Trieste, it is administration of greater Italian role in the intend to endai inge quite evident that Yugoslavia does not Nonetheless, Western military and economic support. n Ihave noted a considerable worsening Conservative Party Yugoslav-British relations since the victory last October in Britain. the Yugoslav Assistant Foreign Minister Mates told hoped improved relaNational Assembly on 29 March that he closer cooperation for tions with Greece will "contribute to defense of general national interests."
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Chinese Communist logistical capability increased in V Chinese CommuKoreaT-1

n.-INF-military truck transport facilities in Korea have greatly improved during the past year. The addition of four truck battalions and the establishment of truckrepair shops, as far
SECRET
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daily has increased 320 percent the forward as the front lines, capacity in tons per kilometer
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improvement in Chinese truck transThis apparent Comment: average of vehicle by the growing daily portation is supported reported highest 1952 level at their sightings, which were Chinese in Korea are that the A correslast week. Current estimates 1951. had in late facilities, if have 5,000 more trucks than they and repair capability ponding development in maintenance their logistical confirmed, would greatly enhance in Korea.
11.
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/2.
Chiang Kai-shek and Nationalist Army to be reorganized: have ordered that a reorganithe Ministry of National Defense be started in May and completed zation of all Nationalist armies by the end of 1952. will be 20 Instead of 38 divisions in 12 armies, there being reorganized into two divisions in 10 armies, each army division consisting full-strength divisions and one skeleton
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4.
15
conference is potentially France-Indochina economic of French, Vietnamese, Cambodian, explosive: The conference is now meeting in Paris to and Laotian representatives which which France is to determine the level of trade-preferences by the American Legation in enjoy in Indochina is described Reversing their previous Saigon as "potentially explosive." groups are working for position, important French business
SECRET
8
Indochina described as Attrition of French forces in of last week's Tonkin delta forces serious: Despite the success during which Franco-Vietnamese the US Army Enkrag operations, destroyed one Viet Minh regiment, suffered by "very probably" casualty rate Attache in Saigon believes that the consideration." He states the French is a matter for "serious inflicted by the French was five that the ratio of casualties it must increase to eight or ten to one during that week, but the Viet period to insure victory over a long one for to 52) (S Saigon Weeks. 17, 27 Apr Minh.
13.
airfields near Indochina Existence of operational Chinese of information from two riench border doubted: On the basis American Air Attache in Saigon air intelligence officers, the operational airfields in the believes that there are no triangle of South China, several Pinghsiang-Lungchou-Ningming (S USAIRA Saigon, AFC-43-52, miles from the Indochina border. 25 Apr 52) report of 5 March that Comment: This contradicts a parallel paved runways, each Frena-iinatrols had sighted two 6,000 feet long, at Lungchou.
Artillery units will be assigned only of an officer cadre. to each army and each division. will be met by using available Equipment requirements (S ALUSNA ones are received. weapons until the necessary 52) Taipei, Joint Weeka 17, 26 Apr of the Nationalist Army is The reorganization Comment: with the American Military Assistance anothFF-FFrarm consistent and Adirisory Group's suggestions. commander of the General Sun Li-jen, recently reappointed the army until the reorganization of ground forces, has opposed of American equipment. substantial amounts arrival of
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and each of the three bilateral treaties between France Associated States. would presumably mean theend These views, if accepted, Associated States which the unity of the of the economic hard to maintain. Vietnam, while French Government has worked compromise on trade preferences, showing some willingness towill insist on concessions which block development is fearful that the French industrialization, difficulties. will hinder Vietnamese serious budget of trade with Japan, and cause 52) (S Saigon Weeka 17, 28 Apr
.
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strengthened in at General General Sarit's position reported m assy n ang o repor s mer can e in Chief of Thailan appointment as Deputy Commander Other Ta-ITT-THinarat's strengthened his power. probably control over the Thai Army has appear to have solidified his appointments also Army. lower echelons of the First are not that while these changes importance The Embassy comments Sarit's growing sensational, they are symptomatic of to succeed General Phin as is preparing (C and indicate that he when the latter retires. Commander in Chief of the Army Bangkok 2290, 25 Apr 52) the First Army, has long Sarit,who commands Comment: / been Fraiiiized as al Commander in Chief of the Army, Since he is already Assistant appointment appears to be the posithe significance of his new of a rival holding that the possibility elimination of the powerful father-in-law of in Although General Phin, General his seventies, tion. Phao, is and ambitious Police Director he is about to retire voluntarily there are no indications that in the immediate future.
and labor unrest in Sumatra e eraSOBSI promotes new wave of a or n ones a s arges 67. ommun s - e. of labor unrest Java: new wave a TTUE, appears to be promoting During the past week, reports and Sumatra. areas in Sumatra, throughout Java on rubber estate have been receivedof unrest industry, numerous strikes suppressed turbulence in the oil the partial settlement of a among government workers, and 52) (C Djakarta 1560, 25 Apr dock strike in Java. officials and Since the release of many of its Comment: government security sweep last sympallaiW75 , arrested in the resuming activity. September, SOBSI is gradually SECRET
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American position less secure: Mossadeq is Minister's Iranian Prime Prime Minister 18.1 reports that within Iran. and opposition leading supAmbassador Henderson difficulties among his now facing serious instead of dissension have appeared and the new Majlis, and Kashani, critical than porters, notably Maki Mossadeq, appears to be more of being amenable to iEvidences had been anticipated. himself that he must accommodate decision to Mossadeq now recognizes Prime Minister's and the American resumption of to the Shah's wishes, necessary for the pressure from the Shah. assurances give the of strong military aid was the result 52) (S Tehran 4137, 26 Apr that the economic indications growing unseat his Comment: There are policies may do more to influences or political consequences of Mossadeq's hold on than any of the diplomatic The Prime Minister's government although he subjected. weakened, to which he has been 27 April. has not been appreciably the government opening of the Majlis on failed to appear at the in inducing there is Shah's presumed victory Act assurances, In spite of the Mutual Security the Prime give the Mossadeq to Shah is ready to remove no evidence that the Minister. post in France: Minister seeks Ambassador's the French Iranian Foreign Affairs Kazemi has asked According Foreign France. Iranian Minister of him as Ambassador towill agree "with Government to approve Ambassador Ambassador in Tehran, Paris to the French Kazemi told the American cabinet from the reluctance." release him considerable Mossadeq will 52) that Prime Minister (S Tehran 4131, 26 Apr Majlis meets. after the criticized government has been I The Mossadeq Comment; Kazemi,1 the critical increigrari and I may hope to escape 25X6 1
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denied reports to the previously adds credence from France. This report Ebtehaj was being recalled that Ambassador
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Greek Army officers reported considering military coup: A groUTT6T-iimy officers red by a 1 lare reportedly "beginning to talk" of an armed coup to be beaded by opposition leader Papagos. The move, aimedat ending the protracted government crisis, is supported by Generals1
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Since all the officers reportedly supporting this move were potential victims of the government-instigated purge, the report could be part of a maneuver foreshadowing a more determined government effort to oust them.
Comment: There has been considerable dissatisfaction in Greece over the purge of pro-Papagos army officers during past months, and plans for a coup may have been discussed. The would be unlikely to support such an attempt, however, now that he and his supporters are increasingly optimistic over the possibility of unseating the government.
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Austrian Communists seek new opportunities for mass action: For several months the Austrian Communist Party (KP0e) has been trying to improve its organizational effectiveness in exploiting joint-action possibilities with non-Communist Austrians. Party publications have denounced "sectarianism," called for a concerted effort to win peasant support, and emphasized the need for broad programs of worker-unity and supra-party appeal. Schools for works councilors elected on unity lists have been organized, and renewed emphasis has been placed on agitation and propaganda. Other evidence, however, points to Communist fears that "mass organization affairs" may cost the party its "political
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for the ideological perspective." Concern has been expressed intermediate administrative orientation of party workers; new upon basic cells; new financial units have been superimposed for been given responsibility "comptrollers" have allegedly observing unit effectiveness in general.
Non-Communist Austrians ascribe this current 100e activity There is no to energetic "running to stay in the same place." higher than in party's potential substantially reason to rate the Austrian the past, despite recent successes in the labor elections. undoubtedly economic problems and coalition tensions, however, are (Factual data improving opportunities for Communist agitation. 352, 2 Apr 52; R FBIS Vienna, S USFA Intelligence Summary from: 8 and 14 Apr 52)
25.
Soviet interference threatens Austrian control over police American officials in Vienna assert that last month's forces: MMEatist demonstrations against the Greek Legation make it under "fiction" to maintain that there is a united police force Communist police ofAustrian control in the Austrian capital. headficials in Soviet sectors countermand orders from police quelling quarters; Soviet consent is still required before police political disturbances in Soviet sectors can be re-enforced; other Soviet authorities facilitate Communist demonstrations when Soviet objectives are not jeopardized. American observers believe that the fiction of Austrian control over Soviet zone police interferes with the purge of Communist police officials in non-Soviet sectors. The Austrians contend, however, that such a purge would result in Soviet dismispolice, and US officials sal of non-Communists from Russian-sector to acknowledge that the present situation is probably preferable of a Soviet zone an open break and the possible establishment police. The Ministry of Interior hopes that instructions to the Police President to ignore the Russians when diplomatic missions are endangered may meet this specific problem. The US Embassy warns that drastic action may be necessary to prevent serious incidents (S USFA Intelligence Summary 353, 9 Apr 52) in the future.
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ation (CSC) may welcome the end of the present government, since its leaders may be embarrassed by their responsibility for the government without corresponding influence. Government attempts to mediate the differences between labor and employer groups have so far failed, and the cabinet is undoubtedly aware of the long-term effects of the present (C Brussels 1591, 25 Apr 52) labor alliance on the PSC.
Comment: The CSC and the Socialist trade union federation have joined together for the first time in a number of years to press their demands. Unless a settlement is reached, strikes will occur in the mining, metal, cement and oil refinery industries.
27.
25X1
Panama National Police may have divided loyalties: A cabal of younger officers in the Panama National Police are approaching ex-president Arnulfo Arias and presidential candidate Roberto Chiari in an effort to make a deal against the administration's candidate, Jose Remon, according to information attributed to I These officers believe that a Remon victory in the 11 May election would profit them nothing, but that if Remon were to lose, the upper echelon of police loyal to him would be swept out and they could then gain control of the police themselves. (C Panama City 917, 26 Apr 52)
Comment: This is the first indication of a possible division within the National Police, Panama's only organized armed force. The circulation of such reports, whether founded on fact or not, would be another factor for instability in the tense pre-election atmosphere.
becaulTeT-ba-milaTottliel--WIT-Piraguayan
discovered the "clandestine removal of a quantity of arms from a regimental arsenal" as well as "plotting among dissidents who hoped to capitalize on the unfavorable economic situation." Within the past 10 days, 150 persons, including "out group" Guiones and Febreristas and a number of retired army officers 7among them former provisional President Rolon -- were taken into custody. Some were promptly released, but many civilians were immediately deported tO Argentina and Brazil.
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SECRET The United States Embassy in Asuncion states that "the intention of the government was to break the back of the opposisignificant tion." The Embassy also comments, "This is the most reflection action of its kind within the last 15 months, and a of certain unrest among the public and a decided nervousness on (C Asuncion 297, 25 Apr 52) the part of the government."

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US OFFICIALS ONLY
CIA No. 4967

Copy No.
410
(includthg S/S Cables)
ThiS digest of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the
immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.

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Indian aide memoire on Tunisia accompanied by bitter Secretary General Bajpai of the Indian Ministry comment: of External Affairs on 25 April read to American Ambassador Bowles the contents of an aide memoire on the Tunisian question, which was apparently identical to that reportedly distributed on the same day by the Indian UN delegation in New York. Bajpai commented bitterly that the United States grossly underestimated the depth of Asian feeling on colonialism. TOP SECRET
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to take the pro-Westernism He deplored the American tendency granted. He implied that of Asian leaders such as Nehru for wanted the aide memoire to several Indian cabinet members had line. (S S/S New Delhi follow a more strongly anti-Western 25 Apr 52) 3755, 13 Apr; S S/S New Delhi 3928, Ambassador Bowles on 11 April Comment: Bajpai had told given him by the that trigtigrally approved of the reasons abstention on the Tunisian Ambassador for the United States' Nehru, who apparentPrime Minister question. Since that date some to have communicated ly inspired the aide memoire, seems of his personal feelings to Bajpai.
3.
AMeriCAD less secure: Iranian Prime Minister's position is Minister Mossadeq Prime AmbasSador Henderson reports that Iran. and opposition within now facing serious difficulties among his leading supEvidences of dissensiontave appeared and the new Majlis, inporters, notably Maki and Kashani, to be more cristead of being amenable to Mossadeq, appears tical than had been anticipated. accommodate himself Mossadeq now recognizes that he must Minister's decision to to the Shah's wishes, and the Prime the resumption of American give the assurances necessary for the Shah. pressure from military aid was the result of strong (S S/S Tehran 4138, 26 Apr 52) economic There are growing indications that the Comment: his do more to unseat consequences of Mossadeq's policies may political influences government than any of the diplomatic or Minister's hold on to which he has been subjected. The Prime weakened, although he the government has not been appreciably Majlis on 27 April. the opening of the failed to appear at victory in inducing In spite of the Shah's presumed assurances, there is Mossadeq to give the Mutual Security Act ready to remove the Prime Minister. no evidence that the Shah is

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6 . 6.
Additional A, A d d i t i o n a l use u s e of radar r a d a r by North Koreans indicated: indicated: A recently Air Message of of 12 r e c e n n y available a v a i l a b l e North Korean Korean A i r Force lnessage 12 March indicated possibly Sariwon, w was use a i r unit, unit, p o s s i b l y at a t Sariwon, a s to to u se i n d i c a t e d that t h a t an air "detectors" what "type of d detecting " t y p e of etecting " d e t e c t o r s " and wanted to t o know what to used." machin'e. machine. .is t o be used."
~
Sarawon has h a s been idedtified i d e r i t i f i e d as the the s i t e of arlySariwon site of an e earlyr a d a r installation, i n s t a l l a t i o n , possibly p o s s i b l y served served by Soviet S o v i e t personnel, personnel] warning radar and this t h i s message suggests s u g g e s t s that t h a t the t h e North North Korean Korean air a i r unit unit there receive additiOnal a d d i t i o n a l equipment equipment of of their t h e i r own. own. t h e r e might receive
7. 7.
"Orientation" t o be be conducted conducted at at North North Korean'Supreme Korean Supreme "Orientation" to of t the Headquarters: An unlocated element of h e North Korean R a i l r o a d Security S e c u r i t y Division D i v i s i o n was was informed informed on Railroad on 25 25 April. ApriT that that " "the the p persons e r s o n s attending a t t e n d i n g the t h e Supreme Headquarters Headquarters o orientation rientation will w i l l arrive a r r i v e by by 26 26 April." April." (SUEDE.330th Recon Co Co Korea, Korea, (SUEDE 330th Comm Recon ALT-940, 26 26 Apr Apr 52) 52) ALT-940, A n increase i n c r e a s e in i n the number of of staff s t a f f meetings meetings Comment: An o n f e r e n c e s ] particularly p a r t i c u l a r l y in i n tactical t a c t i c a l units, u n i t s , has h a s generally generally and c cBTOTRITes, in the t h e past. past. I t is probable, probable, preceded snemy enemy offensives o f f e n s i v e s in preceded It or p olitical o r logistical logistical however, t that h a t tthis h i s meeting however., meeting is is ffor political or for operational o p e r a t i o n a l planning. planning. i n s t r u c t i o n , rather r a t h e r than than for instruction,
"
8. 8 .
North Korean Air A i r Force may be uping using a airfield irfield w within ithin Korea: In I n the t h e late l a t e afternoon a f t e r n o o n of 25 25 A pril, reports r e p o r t s a US April, m r c e field f i e l d unit, u n i t , North Korea air a i r force v oice t raffic Air-Force voice traffic i n d i c a t e d that t h a t an operational o p e r a t i o p a l airfield a i r f i e l d was w a s undergoing undergoing repairs. repairs. indicated c o n t r o l station s t a t i o n informed an aircraft a i r c r a f t to to A Korean ground control "come in'one i n 'one hour later. l a t e r . We l e are' are' ccleaning l e a n i n g tthe h e playgrodnd" playgronnd" (covername for (cover-hame f o r airfield). airfield)

'1
t h e Communistshave Communistshave made c considerable onsiderable Comment: CoMment: Although the use of radar r a d a r in i n North N o r t h Korea for antiaircraft a n t i a i r c r a f t artillery artillery d i r e c t i o n , ground-controlled ground-controlled intercept, i n t e r c e p t , and and early e a r l y warning, warning, direction, it believed personnel were o operating i t was generally generally b e l i e v e d that.Soviet t h a t S o v i e t personnel perating t h e bulk of of this t h i s equipment. equipment. the
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S imilarly, t h e 21st 2 l s t North ntiairSimilarly, the North Korean Independent Independent A Antiaircraft April c r a f t Artillery A r t i l l e r y Regiment reported r e p o r t e d on 26 A p r i l that t h a t an i n d i v i d u a l "who "who was was being being trained t r a i n e d to t o be be a a radar r a d a r operator" operator" individual must return r e t u r n to t o his h i s unit. u n i t . (SUEDE ASAPAC Japan, 8621 AAU Japan, 8621 Spot 3370A, 33704, 25 Apr; 501st 501st Comm C o m m Recon Grp G r p Koreaj5RSM/11503, Korea,,15RSM/11503, 27 Apr A p r 52) 52)
30 Apr 52
1.
The field f i e l d unit u n i t comments comments that t h a t this t h i s is is the t h e first f i r s t such O c C u T m n c e ssince i n c e 23 Korean occurrence 23 November November 1951, 1951, when when a North Korean ground station is dirtied." dirtied." s t a t i o n reported r e p o r t e d that t h a t "the "the playground is UN aircraft a i r c r a f t had had strafed s t r a f e d Uiju Uiju airfield a i r f i e l d that t h a t day. day. (SUEDE (SUEDE S e c u r i t y Grp Grp Johnson AB AB Japan,AP Japan,AP 604, 604, 28 28 Apr 52) 52) 6920 Security
Comment: Comment: Both Sinuiju S i n u i j u and and Uiju were operational o p e r a t i o n a l on on A p r i l . Recently North Korean air a i r activity a c t i v i t y has been 25 April. noted at a t Sariwon, Sarlwon, Wonsan Wonsan and and Yonpo, Yonpo, near near Hamhung.
9.
I t is generally g e n e r a l l y thought that t h a t the t h e 17th 1 7 t h North Comment: Comment: It Korean Mechanized Division D i v i s i o n was was deactivated, d e a c t i v a t e d , and and that t h a t its its Koreari-Gainized personnel p e r s o n n e l and and equipment equipmeqt were transferred t r a n s f e r r e d to t o the t h e 105th 105th Armored, 1 0 t h Mechanized and and the t h e newly newly formed formed mobile mobile Armored, 10th a r t i l l e r y brigades. b r i g a d e s . While t h i s message messagealone alone d o e snc5t lnbt artillery While this does, r e f u t e the t h e previous p r e v i o u s indications i n d i c a t i o n s that t h a t the t h e 17th 1 7 t h was was deactideactirefute v a t e d , it it raises r a i s e s the t h e possibility p o s s i b i l i t y that t h a t this t h i s unit u n i t still s t i l l exists. exists. vated,
10. 10.
Chinese Communist artillery artillery u unit n i t is in i n "bivouac" "bivouac1' following relief: Headquarters of the t h e 2nd Chinese Chinese Communist Communist f o l l o w i n g relief: Artillery central Korea r requested A r t i l le r y Division D i v i s i o n in i n west. west c e n t r a l Korea e q u e s t e d its its r e c e n t l y relieved r e l i e v e d 29th 29th Artillery A r t i l l e r y Regiment to t o "report " r e p o r t by by recently l letter e t t e r a summary 0 of % the t h e transfer t r a n s f e r of of your your b battalion's attalion's positions, also the t h e present p r e s e n t arrangement arrangement of of your your bivouac bivouac p o s i t i o n s , also area." (SUEDE (SUEDE 501st Comm C o m m Recon Recon Grp Grp Korea, Korea, K-2472, K-2472, 26.Apr 26 Apr 52) 52) Comment: Elements of the t h e 29th A r t i l l e r y Regiment were Artillery relieved aud24 April. April. T r e l i e v e d from combat between 20 and24 This h i s message, i n d i c a t i n g that t h a t the 29th has not returned r e t u r n e d to to although indicating combat in another sector s e c t o r of the t h e front, f r o n t , reveals r e v e a l s that t h a t it it is is s t i l l located l o c a t e d in in some proximity to t o the the front f r o n t lines. lines. still f l i g h t of Soviet S o v i e t jets j e t s at a t Tungfeng in in central central Large flight Ch i n e s e message message of of 26 26 April Ap r i l reported r e p o r t e d 35 35 Soviet So v i e t Manchuria: A Chinese Manchuria: 1 5 ' s on MIG-15's on a a training t r a i n i n g flight f l i g h t at a t Tungfeng, 120 120 miles m i l e s northnorthHiikden. Transports T r a n s p o r t s subordinate s u b o r d i n a t e to t o the t h e Soviet S o v i e t Union east of Mukden. continue c o n t i n u e to t o make make shuttle s h u t t l e flights f l i g h t s from froqr Mukden Mukden into i n t o the the Tungf eng area. area Tungfeng
11. 11.
Mechanized North Mechanized N m t b Korean unit u n i t believed b e l i e v e d deactivated. deactivated. An unidentified u n i d e n t i f ied North North Korean Korean armored armored unit Tn' the mentioned: An - _ unit -~in'the Pyongyang area h e "17th pril. TiVE,E7Wili areamentioned mentioned t the "17th Division" Division" on on 24 A April. The text of the t h e message message did d i d not not indicate iladicate the t h e status s t a t u s of of the the t e x t of (SUEDE 330th 330th Comm Corn Recon Recon Co Co Korea, ALT-935, ALT-935, D i v i s i o n . .(SUEDE Division. 26 Apr A p r 52) 52)
The Air Air Force Force comments comments that t h a t the t h e appearance appearanceof, of 35 35 The Soviet jets is is another another indication i n d i c a t i o n that that a a Soviet S o v i e t fighter fighter u n i t has just just moved moved there. t h e r e . (SUEDE unit Force Roundup (SUEDE Air Force Roundup 82, 82, 28 Apr Apr 52) 52)
Comment: message of of 22 22 April April revealed revealed Comment: A Chinese message that a a Soviet S o v i e t air a i r unit u n i t was W a f 3 at at Tungfeng. Tungfeng. The number number of of that MfG-15's MIG-15's observed flying f l y i n g there on 26 A April p r i l is t the h e normal of a a Soviet S o v i e t air a i r regiment. regiment. complement of
30 Apr Aps 52 52 30
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While the newly a arrived t h e quantity q u a n t i t y of of 'this ' t h i s newly r r i v e d material can can not a c c u r a t e l y established, established, a a 24 24 April A p r i l North N o r t h Korean n o t be accurately message shows that t h a t the t h e 105th 1 0 5 t h Armored Division,located D i v i s i o n , l o c a t e d north north of Pyongyang, of Pyongyang, received r e c e i v e d 43 43 tanks t a n k s and and 22 22 self-propelled s e l f - p r o p e l l e d guns. guns. is to t o be shipped shipped An unknown additional a d d i t i o n a l amount amount of of armor armor is f u r t h e r south s o u t h to further t o Pyongyang. (SUEDE Japan, 8621 8621 AAU, MU, (SUEDE ASAPAC Japan, Spot 3382A, 3382A, 29 29 Apr Apr 52) 52)
Earlier Comment: E Comment. a r l i e r estimates r-- 1 M gave t h e the two two North Korean Korea/ armored armored units--the u n i t s - - t h e 105th 1O!ith 'rank and tthe 10th Mechanized Division--a Division--a f full Tank and he 1 0 t h Mechanized u l l complement of
-1
armor, including including a a total t o t a l of of 192 192 tanks. t a n k s . These messages, messages, however, seem to t o indicate i n d i c a t e that t h a t the t h e filling f i l l i n g out o u t process p r o c e s s is is however, continuing. c ontinuing.
Since unit S i n c e there t h e r e is no known enemy armored u n i t located l o c a t e d in in i t is is possible p o s s i b l e that t h a t the t h e additional additional p r o p e r , it Pyongyang proper, armor which was sent s e n t there t h e r e may provide p r o v i d e for for a a further further expansion of North North Korean Korean armored armored strength. strength. e x p a n s i o n of
, 1 , , "
North Korean tank t a n k division d i v i s i o n receives r e c e i v e s new new armor: armor: A concons l d e r a b l e number of armored vehicles v e h i c l e s were brought brought into i n t o Korea siderable from China between between 22 22 and and 25 25 April. A p r i l . Some were driven d r i v e n and and others were shipped shipped in i n by by rail. rail.
7. 7.
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Recent enemy messages messages in i n Korea Korea suggest s u g g e s t no no major o?erations operations p l a n n e d in i n May: May: North Korean Ko r e a n Air A i r Headquarters H e a d q u a r t e r s at a t Sinuiju Sinuiju planned advised an unidentified u n i d e n t i f i e d air a i r unit u n i t in i n North Korea Korea on 30 30 April ADr'il t that hat " "the t h e frequencies f r e q u e n c i e s and and call c a l l signs s i g n s for f o r the t h e air a i r nets n e t s for for May will w i l l remain remain the t h e same same as as they t h e y were were in in April." April."
continuance of A April p r i l communication Comment: o n t i n u a n c e of Comment: The c p r o c e d u r e s during d u r i n g May and and continued c o n t i n u e d training t r a i n i n g in in a a major major North North procedures command may be be interpreted i n t e r p r e t e d as a8 an an indication i n d i c a t i o n that t h a t no no Korean command enemy operation o p e r a t i o n is is contemplated contemplated in i n the t h e lmmedikte:future. Xmmedihte'future. major enemy
6. 6.
Chinese Communist "flak V l a k trap" t r a p " described: described: An unidentified unidentified Chinese Communist unit u n l t in i n North Korea gives gives a a detailed d e t a i l e d account account in a 26 April message of the o p e r a t i o n of a decoy to t o lure UN operation aircraft a i r c r a f t into i n t o range r a n g e of antiaircraft a n t i a i r c r a f t weapons. weapons.
s y s t e m , as as described, cOnsists c o n s i s t s of of remote controlled controlled The system, l i g h t s which which are ground lights are revealed r e v e a l e d upon upon orders o r d e r s from from the t h e unit unit command post. p o s t . The UN aircraft, will a i r c r a f t , it i t is anticipated, anticipated, w i l l make command a bomb run r u n on o n the t h e light. l i g h t . A second light l i g h t is then t h e n displayed displayed and it i t is presumed that t h a t the t h e UN aircraft a i r c r a f t will make a a low-level low-level s e c o n d run r u n on this t h i s new light--at l i g h t - - a t which time t i m e the t h e antiaircraft antiaircraft second will open open fire. f i r e . The one time weapons will t i m e when the t h e system was tested, t h e UN aircraft a i r c r a f t made one pass p a s s and and flew f l e w away. away. (SUEDE (SUEDE t e s t e d , the Comm 501st C o r n Recon Grp Grp Korea, KQrca, K-2547, K-2547, 30 30 Apr Apr 52) 52)
7. 7,
Soviet S o v i e t advisers a d v i s e r s still s t i l l with w i t h North North Korea Korea unit: u n i t : In In a a A p r i l message message 24 April vvTulovvl inf o r m ea "Koryucheyev-is on r y u c eyev s to o "Tulov" informed "Nazarenko" that arrive a r r i v e at a t the t h e Division D i v i s i o n by 25 25 ApriI." April." (SUEDE ASAPAC ASAPAC Tokyo, Tokyo, J a p a n 8621 8621 AAU Japan AAU Spot Spot 3391A, 3391A, 29 29 Apr Apr 52) 52)
Comment: Comment; The code system system of the t h e message was new in in Apri17-157Eiiious messages iin have r referred A p r i l . P r e v i o u s messages n tthis h i s ssystem y s t e m have e f e r r e d to to t h e movement of armor the armor from from Manchuria Manchuria into i n t o Korea. Korea. -This This

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An unidentified u n i d e n t i f i e d North Korean unit, unit, p o s s i b l y subordinate subordinate possibly to t o the t h e V Corps Corps in in the t h e Wonsan-Ramhung Wonsan-Hamhung area, area, reported r e p o r t e d on on A p r i l that t h a t "the " t h e training t r a i n i n g course c o u r s e at a t the t h e Corps Corps will w i l l be be held held 29 April from the t h e 1st 1st of of May to t o the t h e 30th 3 0 t h of of May." May." (SUEDE D e t 151 151 (SUEDE Det 15th RSW RSM Japan, J a p a n , CS 477, 477, 30 30 Apr; Apr; 501st 501st Comm Corn Recon Recon Grp Grp Korea, Korea, 15RSM/11672, 30 15RSM/11672, 30 Apr 52) 52)
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movement raises the the possibility that these t h e s e Soviet advisers may have been assigned to North Korean Korean armored units u n i t s in in northwestern northwestern Korea. Korea.

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2. R. ecentenemy enemymessages messages in in Korea Korea suggest suggest no no m major Recent j o r operations operattons planned planned 2.
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US Army Japan North Korean Korean A Air US Army North i r Headquarters at at Sinuiju Sinuiju 30 Apr 52 advised an unidentified air unit in North Korea 62 unidenttfied air 30 April April that "the frequencies and and call call signs signs 'I 77 on 90 -/sAte.sm e .+77 -,SAu6n, for the air nets for May will remain the same , K+for the air nets for M a y the same T emor 14.4.4 Vitdcwg, /9401 m/db,,,,h they were were ih i April." ApriL'," koa_ haas they
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An unidentified North Korean unit, possibly subthe V V Corps Corps in in the the Wonsan-Hamhung Wonsan-Hamhung area, reported on on ordinate to tiv area, reported "the training course at a t the the Corps Corps will will be be held held from the the 29 April April that "the 1st of May M a y to the the 30th 30th of of May." May." 1st
continuance of of April commuComment: The continuance nication procedures during continuedtraining training in in a a major North during May M a y and continued command may an indication tndication that no major Korean command may be be interpreted interpreted as as an is contemplated contemplated in the immediate future. future. enemy operation is
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Realignment Realignment of Soviet S o v i e t -Far F a r East East Air A i r Forces F o r c e e indicated: indicated: S o v i e t ' Far Easa East Air Force communications since A n a l y s i s of Soviet Analysis 20 March suggest that t h a t a fighter division d i v i s i o n of the the 9 th A ir 9th Air A Army, r m y , located located in i n the t h e Mari.time Mar$tirne P Province r o v i n c e and and Port Port 4 ArthurrthurDairen has been been tranSferred t r a n s f e r r e d to t o the t h e KhabarovSk Khabarovsk region. D a i r e n area, has Recent messages messages.revealed aircratt from all threS regiments Recent r e v e a l e d aircradt three r egiments of this this division division to t o be be under 10th 10th Air Air Army rather than than . 9 t h Air Army A r m y control. control. 9th
Transfer of this d division, increases T r a n s f e r of i v i B i o n , if confirmed, confirmed, i ncreases fighter t h e Khabarovsk Khabarovsk area to t o four divisions divisions f i g h t e r strength s t r e n g t h in i n the with w i t h 12 1 2 regiments r e g i m e n t s and and gives gives the t h e 10th 1 0 t h Air Air Army Army a a total t o t a l of of Air 23 f fighter i g h t e r regiments. r e g i m e n t s . (SUEDE A i r Force Roundup F6, 2 May 52) 52)

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Comment: The s suggested u g g e s t e d realignment realignment of Soviet S o v i e t Far East East air line with ofaa bbuildup during a i r (676771W-17W forces is Inin line with i nindications d i c a t i o n s of uildup d uring 10th Air Army, whose whose zone zone of of the past 15 months of of the. the 1 0th A i r Rrrny, operations stretches Khabarovsk area to o perations s t r e t c h e s from the t h e Khabarovsk t o the t h e Chukotsk peninsula and includes peninsula i n c l u d e s Sakhalin S a k h a l i n and and the the Kurile K u r i l e Islands. Islands. Whereas fighter s strength 9th Air Army h has t r e n g t h in the the 9 th A i r Army a s remained Whereas relatively February 1951, 1951, t the 10th Air since February he 1 0th A i r Army has has r e l a t i v e l y stable s t a b l e since. received other significant reinforcements apr eceived o ther s i g n i f i c a n t unit unit r e i n f o r c e m e n t s and has apparently conversion at p a r e n t l y been engaged in jet jet c o n v e r s i o n training a t a faster faster rate than t h a n the t h e 9th 9th Air A i r Army. Army.
fighter 9th The transfer of three f i g h t e r regiments out of the 9 th Air related to buildup A i r Army may also be related t o indications Indications that t h a t the b uildup of the t h e Chinese Communist and and Korth North Korean Korean air a i r forces forces has has reached proportions mithdrawal of Soviet p r o p o r t i o n s making possible withdrawal 6ovlet units u n i t s involved i n v o l v e d in in air a i r defense d e f e n s e of the t h e Yalu River border. border.
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Comment: Comment: It I t is is improbable improbable that t h a t the t h e 15th 15th D Division i v i s i o n would personnel for ttraining if imminent imminent m military m d tthese hese p e r s o n n e l for r a i n i n g if ilitary have 75737S-Fd operations o p e r a t i o n s were were contemplated. c o n t e m p l a t e d . The cryptic c r y p t i c reference r e f e r e n c e to t o an an "air. .project" cannot "air. .project1? c a n n o t be be evaluated. evaluated.
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M a DL greetings g r e e t i n g s occupy occupy North North Korean Korean units: u n i t s : May Day has has May.Dzy in i n the t h * apas d i n s p inspired ired many North n i t s to t o exchange g r eetRorth Korean u unifs greet-ings i n g s and felicitations. felicitations.
N o t a b l e among among the t h e numeroUs numerous messages was one which stated stated Notable that should t h a t "the " t h e enemy will w i l l never n e v e r give up u p the t h e land, l a n d , so, you s hould get busy and and get g e t better b e t t e r results r e s u l t s in i n combat." combat." Another from from the the North N o r t h Korean Korean air a i r training t r a i f i i n g center c e n t e r at a t Yenchi, Yenchi, Manchuria, Manchuria, sent sent to Headquarters "you who are in Air H e a d q u a r t e r s at a t Sinuiju S i n u i j u congratulated: c o n g r a t u l a t e d : 'Iyou in t o Air combat on May Ma Day." Dag." (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, Kori!a,rI 3241,and 3 2 4 1 , a n d d 3 365, 65, 1 1 May May 52) 52)
9. 9.
Small S m a l l North Korean community community on on verge v e r g e of of starvation: starvation: Fourteen am es, cons ng e, o r t h Rorean o r e a n familFes, c o n s ist stin g o of 63 peop people F o u r t e e n Nor are on the t h e verge v e r g e of starvation' s t a r v a t i o n ; "to " t o the the p point o i n t of e existing xisting on bark," according a c c o r d i n g to to a a 28 28 April A p r i l Chinese C h i n e s e Communist o n roots r o o t s and and bark," message, message. It I t stated, s t a t e d , however, however, that t h a t 37 37 individuals i n d i v i d u a l s can-work c a n work and and g i v e n "materials "materials to t o grow grow spring rspring spinach s p i n a c h for for w i t h their their s h o u l d be given should with present (SUEDE 501st p r e s e n t supplies s u p p l i e s they t h e y cannot c a n n o t live l i v e ten t e n days." days.?l (SUEDE 501st Comm Corn Recon Recon Grp Grp Korea, Korea, K-2551, K-2551, 28 28 Apr Apr 52) 52) Previous P r e v i o u s intercepts i n t e r c e p t s and and intelligence i n t e l l i g e n c e reports reports Comment: existing have revealed isolated i s o l a t e d cases of starvation starvation e x i s t i n g among amopg the the North North Korean Korean civilian c i v i l i a n population. p o p u l a t i o n . The importation i m p o r t a t i o n of'flour of ' f l o u r and

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Personnel start P e r s o n n e l from North Korean front f r o n t line l i n e division division s tart training: Th The North Korean train'inrr: e chief of of staff s t a f f of an unidentified u n i d e n t i f i ed N orth K orean regiment reglment reports r e p o r t s the t h e arrival a r r i v a l of of 47 men for f o r training t r a i n i n g from the the North N o r t h Korean 15th 1 5 t h Division, D i v i s i o n , currently c u r r e n t l y in i n immediate immediate reserve reaerve in i n the t h e North Korean III I11 Corps Corps sector sector of of the t h e eastern e a s t e r n front. front. lie will .from H e sstates t a t e s ffurther u r t h e r tthat h g t "1 May w i l l be a a day day of of rest. rest. . from will be done done and and w will be accomplished 3 May the t h e air. a i r . . .prOject .prqject w i l l be i l l be by 10 May, May, and from l Ma1y will start." by y l lectures ectures w ill s t a r t . " (SUEDE (SUEDE 330th C o r n Recon Co Co Korea, Korea, 3242, 1 May May 52) 52) Comm b3242 , 1
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for farm labor are Worth Korean North ehortage. food shortage.
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to attend fiveChinese Communist artillerymen a r t i l l e r y m e n in i n Korea t o a ttend f ivetTattack"tactics: tactics: A Chinese Ehi n e s e Communisl Communist roCiet rocket day course c o u r s e on on "attack" launcher r regiment in easi-aia7a1 'launcher egiment i n east c e n t r a l Korea Korea on on 29 29 April A p r i l informed informed i ts d ivision h e a d q u a r t e r s : "The information i n f o r m a t i o n came by elephone its division headquarters: by t telephone that p present -that r e s e n t battle b a t t l e tactics t a c t i c s and and assignments a s s i g n m e n t s are are not n o t adequate. adequate. I t is r e q u e s t e d that t h a t division d i v i s i o n promulgate a r igid f ive-day It requested rigid five-day educational s u b j e c t of 'Army 'Army F Functions u n c t i o n s in i n the the e d u c a t i o n a l program on the subject (SUEDE 501st 501st Comm Comm Recon Recon Grp Is t this A ttack.' h i s satisfactory?" s a t i s f a c t o r y ? " (SUEDE Attack.' Korea, K-2608, K-2608, 3 3 May 52) 52) Comment: The scheduling of s such course not Comment: s c h e d u l i n g of uch a c o u r s e is is n ot enemy intentions i n t e n t i o n s to t o initiate initiate immediately indicative i n d i c a t i v e of enemy offensive I t seems more likely l i k e l y that t h a t Chinese o f f e n s i v e operations. o p e r a t h o n s . It Communist artillery a r t i l l e r y units, probably inadequately trained inadequately t rained in division maneuvers, are t trying to h i g h e r maneuvers, rying t o improve improve in d i v i s i o n or higher Weir i l i t a r y efficiency. efficiency. 'Weir m military
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F Future u t u r e combat role r o $ e for f o r North North Korean Kgrean armor armor suggested: suggested: Four North horth Korean Koaean officers, o f f i c e r s , including i n c l u d i n g two t w o "tank "tank battallon battalion technical were ordered o r d e r e d On On 25 25 April A p r i l to to t e c h n i c a l department chiefs," c h i e f s , " were report unit, possibly r e p o r t to t o an a n unidentified u n i d e n t i f i e d North Korean u nit, p o s s i b l y the the 1 0 5 t h Tank Tank Division. D i v i s i o n , The o officers f f i c e r s were instructed i n s t r u c t e d to " rere105th e x t e n s i v e (combat)." (combat) extensive (SUEDE (SUEDE ASAPAC ASAPAC Tokyo, Tokyo, r c 1 3 2 4 B3246 par %7--'-'13247, 3247, 2 2 May May 52) 52) and
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N e w Chinese Chinese Communist Communist artillery a r t i l l e r y regiment regiment may may be be in in Korea: Korea: New An unidentified u n i d e n t i f i e d Chinese Chi n e s e Communist Communist unit u n i t on on 22 2 Z 'April ' Ap r i l reported t h a t ". 'l. .all t h e ammunition t h e lst 1st b a t t a l i o n of the the that .all the ammunition for the battalion I3th 1 3 t h regiment r e g i m e n t has h a s arrived." a r r i v e d . " The message mentioned guns guns r i v e r and and asked whether the the u n i t should shouTd s upply c r o s s i n g a river crossing unit supply materials and and labor l a b o r for f o r repairing r e p a i r i n g seven s e v e n bridges b r i d g e s on the t h e route route from Wonsan Wonsan south s o u t h toward toward the t h e battle b a t t l e line. l i n e . (SUEDE (SUEDE ASAPAC Tokyo, Tokyo, 8621 8621 AAU AAU Spot Spot 3400A, 3400A, 2 2 May May 52) 52)
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Comment: The 13th 1 3 t h Chinese Communist Communist Artillery A r t i l l e r y Regiment Regiment Comment: believed is b e l i e v e d to t o be subordinate s u b o r d i n a t e to t o the t h e 3rd 3 r d Artillery A r t i l l e r y Division. Division. It I t was last l a s t located l o c a t e d at a t Amoy Amoy on on the t h e east east China China coast. coast. There i n d i c a t i o n s that t h a t any elements e l e m e n t s of t the h e 3rd have been no indications Artillery A r t i l l e r y Division D i v i s i o n were were enroute e n r o u t e to t o Korea. Korea. Another possibility p o s s i b i l i t y is is that t h a t the t h e 13th 1 3 t h Artillery A r t i l l e r y Regiment Rekiment r g a n i c to t o a Chinese Communist Communist Army Army presently p r e s e n t l y in i n Korea. Korea. is o organic Armies A r m i e s in i n the t h e 9th 9 t h Army A r m y Group are are known to t o have organic organic numbered artillery a r t i l l e r y regiments. regiments.
Comment: These messages are probably probably related related to t o the the movement into self-propelled i n t o Korea in i n late l a t e April A p r i l of tanks t a n k s and s elf-propelled guns from from Manchuria. The reference r e f e r e n c e to t o preparation p r e p a r a t i o n for for combat combat is indicative i n d i c a t i v e of the t h e continued c o n t i n u e d aggressive a g g r e g s i v e position p o s i t i o n of of the the North N o r t h Koreans, Koreans, but b u t cannot cannot be be interpreted i n t e r p r e t e d as as pointing p o i n t i n g towards towards b f f e n s i v e intentions. intentions. imminent bffensive
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Communists continue defenses c o n t i n u e to t o strengthen s t r e n g t h e n antiaircraft antiaircraft d efenses in e a s t e r n Korea: /lie in eastern North.Kbrean 21st Antiaircraft Artillery l'he N orth,Korean Z lst A ntiaircraft A rti .l r e r y Regiment is is to t o establish e s t a b l i s h an an ammunition ammunition depot d e p o t in i n the t h e WonsanWonsanHamhung to.a.i"top area by by 10 10May, May, accOrding according t o a " t o p secret". secret" North North Hamhung area Korean message of 5 5 May. May. message of The order "secure The, o r d e r says that t h a t the t h e depot d e p o t should be " s e c u r e from strafing s t r a f i n g by enemy planes," p l a n e s , " adding:that'the a d d i n g t h a t t h e "rear area department d e p a r t m e n t started s t a r t e d transporting t r a n s p o r t i n g ammunition ammunition on on the t h e 4th 4 t h of of May. . . 11 May.
North Regiment, also b building The N o r t h Korean 23rd AAA Regiment, u i l d i n g an ammunition depot relinquish d e p o t in i n the t h e area, area, apparently apparent1.y is to to r elinquish this function to 21st because.thatdnit o tthe he 2 1st b e c a u s e t h a t u n i t is is ordered o r d e r e d to to this f unction t (SUEDE 5 501st:Comm "take " t a k e in in their t h e i r tasks." tasks." (SUEDE 0 1 e t Comm Recon Grp, Grp Korea, Korea, 6 May May 52) r 1 3 _13255, 2 5 5 , 6 52)
Comment: A buildup b u i l d u p in i n enemy enemy antiaircraft a n t i a i r c r a f t defenses. d e f e n s e s in in ' Comment* eastelii-Viga e a s t e r n Korea has h a s been been Underway Underway for f o r the t h e past past month. month. Recent prOtecting messages have have stressed s t r e s s e d the t h e importance i m p o r t a n c e of p r o t e c t i n g the t h e lines lines of communication in i n this t h i s area and of ensuring e n s u r i n g the flow of supplies s u p p l i e s to t o the t h e front. front.
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of BW BW again Korea: An An. r e p o r t s use u s e of Communist unit u n i t reports a g a i n in i n Korea: o r e a n naval naval u n i t r e p o r t e d in a 5 u unidentified n i d e n t i f i ed North North K Korean unit-reported 5 May May message message that t h a t "on "on the t h e second second of of May, May, at a t night n i g h t (they?) (they?) dropped bacteria weapons at a t Chongpyong (near ( n e a r Hamhung in in p r e v e n t i o n disease d i s e a s e committee committee n o r t h e a s t e r n Korea). Korea). The prevention northeastern k i l l e d it." i t .Iv (SUEDE (SUEDE 501st 5 0 1 s t Comm Comm Recop Recon Grp Grp Korea,r---13254, Iforea,p254, killed 6 6 May May 52). 52),
Comment: The last l a s t intercepted i h t e r c e p t e d enemy r report e p o r t of of an alleged United RW occurred April. Since U n i t e d States S t a t e s drop d r o p of BW o c c u r r e d on 14 A p r i l . Since that t i m e , the t h e Communist all-out a l l - o u t propaganda campaign has has t h a t time, lost l o s t much of its its intensity. i n t e n s i t y . The bulk b u l k of of recent r e c e n t Communisti Communisti commentary on the t h e subject s u b j e c t has h a s dealt dealt w i t h the t h e findings f i n d i n g s of with of v a r i o u s committees and and the t h e accumulation accumulation of "evidence." Itevidence various
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a s s e s s i n g transportation t r a n s p o r t a t i o n capabilities capabilities Chinese Communists assessing in The Artillery Division e i - Chinese n e s e Communist 7th 7th A rtillery D ivision i n Korea: Th~ received an "urgent from Army rear" on 3 3 May demanding a n l l u r g e n t wire from a " d e t a i l e d report" r e p o r t v 1on on the t h e vehicle v e h i c l e situation s i t u a t i o n in in Korea. Korea. The "detailed wire asked for f o r the t h e information i n f o r m a t i o n to t o be broken down by manumanuvire asked f a c t u r e and and mileage m i l e a g e of of the t h e vehicles. vehicles. (SUEDE 501st facture (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon K-2656, 5 5 May May 52) 52) Grp Korea, K-2656,
Comment: This T h i s message may mean mean only o n l y that t h a t the t h e Chinese Chinese Comment: a regular r e g u l a r reporting r e p o r t i n g system as a Communists have instituted instituted a maintenance requirement. requirement.
o t h e r reports r e p o r t s of of increased i n c r e a s e d Communist Communist I n view of other In a c t i v i t y , however, however, this activity, t h i s urgent u r g e n t wire wire may may indicate i n d i c a t e a desire to assess truck t r u c k transportation t r a n s p o r t a t i o n capabilities capabilities f or a f uture for future operation. operation.
12. 12.
Manchuria-based aircraft a i r c r a f t adopt adopt new system of indicating indicating Manchuria-based fuel new and and more more p precise of indicating level: .AAnew r e c i s e ssystem y s t e m of indicating a a f u e l level: p l a n e ' s fuel f u e l level l e v e l has h a s been used on the t h e Russian-language F-: plane's Russian-language g-: g r o u n d - c o n t r o J l e d intercept i n t e r c e p t net n e t on the t h e Korea-Manchuria Korea-Manchuria border border ground-controlled since 20 20 March. The new system u s e s the t h e numbers t hree, f our uses three, four landing o r d e r e d if i f an a irplane's and five, five, w i t h an a n immediate landing with ordered airplane's fuel three. P r e v i o u s l y only only general g e n e r a lterm's, terms, f u e l level l e v e l drops d r o p s below below three. Previously s such u c h as "watch ''watch your fuel," f u e l , I 1 were were used. used. (SUEDE AFSA JCAFE-30, AFSAJCAFE-30, 2 May May 52) 52) 2
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Comment: The attention a t t e n t i o n the enemy ground c o n t r o l l e r is controller paying to t o the t h e fuel supply of com4at combat aircraft suggests that the t h e Communists have been losing losing planes'which p$@nes'whichhave run out of fuel. fuel. S i m p l i f i e d instruments and inexperienced p ilots Simplified pilots may be beresponsible map r e s p o n s i b l e for for this t h i s problem. problem.
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Communist units u n i t s renew charges c h a r g e s of BW attacks in North

ong in ci ers Korea: T h e y dropped spid e r s an and an a n ts s over o v e r Songjin c i t y. y. Korea: sey roppe sp
763/17," today," a North Korean coastal security s e c u r i t y station s t a t i o n in northThe e a s t e r n Korea Korea reported r e p o r t e d on on 6 6 May. Yay. The message continues continues eastern that t h a t the alleged a l l e g e d drop area a r e a has been isolated isolated and is is being investigated i n v e s t i g a t e d by b y "the " t h e plague plague prevention p r e v e n t i o n work work committee." comitteeOf4 (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon (SUEDE Recon Grp Grp Korea, Korea, 15RSM/12019, 15RSM/l2019, 6 6 May May 52) 52)
..
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Coment: In I n February and March, P I a ttacks March, reports of B BW attacks Comment: sent North s e n t FriF59.-Communist by many Communist units u n i t s in in N o r t h Korea Korea were used in in charges against a g a i n s t the t h e United United States. S t a t e s . During the the propaganda charges p a s t few weeks, Communist Communist propaganda has has made little l i t t l e reference reference past t o specific BW incidents, i n c i d e n t s , although although some some enemy enemy units u n i t s reported reported to such attacks a t t a c k s as as late l a t e as as mid-April. mid-April. such
9 May 52 52
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FAR EAST EAST
I. 1 . Communist units renew charges charges of of BW BW attacks in in North North Korea: Korea:
"They dropped ants over over Songjin Songjin "They dropped spiders spiders and ants city.. . . today," today," a North Korean coastal city. Korean coastal security station in in northeastern northeastern Korea Korearere/SA.50/110 /f l SR5fl / I L 01 f ported on on 6 6 May. May. The message continues continues that the alleged drop area area has has been been isolated isolated and and is isbeing being investigated investigated by "the '*theplague prevention work committee." committee."
US US Army Army Korea Korea

5, 6 May 52 5,6 SUEDE, SUEDE
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Farther area, in the the Wonsan-Hamhung Wonsan-Hamhung area, Farther south south in Iton the second of another North Korean unit on 5 May May reported reported that "on May, at night, night, they theydropped droppedbacteria bacteria weapons a Chongpyong." t Chongpyong." May, at weapons at
In February February and and March, March, reports reports Comment: In of attacks sent sent by by m marifro-iiinunist of BW BW attacks m i i u n i s t units in North Korea were During the propaganda charges charges against against the the United United States. used in propaganda Communist propaganda past few weeks, weeks, Communist propaganda has has made made little little reference reference tO to specificBW incidents, although some enemy suchattacks, incidents, although enemy units units reported such attacks as as late as as mid-April. mid-April.
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9 May 1952 OCI No. 51'17 Copy No.
US OFFICIALS ONLY
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OSD, DOS, NAVY Declassification/Release Instructions on File

been prepared primarily This digest of significant reports has Intelligence Agency. It does for the internal use of the Central of all current reports recoverage not represent a complete represent the immediate views of the Office ceived. Comments of Current Intelligence.

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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC., SECS. 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
GENERAL
1.
The High Commissioner's office believes that the press emphasis on boundaries, on an East German army, and on not allowing the "great achievements" under Communist regime to be lost, as well as the Pravda phrase that "the German Democratic Republic is entering the camp of peace and democracy," are designed to pose a threat to the Germans that their chance for a united Germany is slipping away, and also as a preview of a program for making a complete Satellite of the East Zone ida the event Western military integration is unchecked. (C Berlin 1318, 7 May 52)
Comment: The press campaign, as well as the recent assertions that an East German army would be created and Grotewohl's allegation that another situation similar to that of Korea was being created, fits into the recent pattern of Soviet pressure to prevent signing of the contractual agreements. It may be a further indication of the seriousness with which the USSR regards the signing of the agreements.
2.
Austriamaluminum allegedly diverted to Orbit via Trieste and Belgium: A Viennese firm, Kress and Company, allegedly purchases 150 to 200 tons of aluminum per month from the
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Russians increase pressure to prevent West iGerman integration: The Eastern Affairs Invision of the High Commissioner's office in Berlin notes that several conspicuous articles in the Soviet Zone press are devoted to accusing the Western powers of turning interzonal boundaries into "international" boundaries, and draws the conclusion that the Russians are considering tightening the zonal borders themselves.
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aluminum works at Braunau, Austria, for ultimate export to the Orbit. The metal is reportedly shipped via Trieste and Switzerland to Antwerp, and then, on the basis of fraudulent end-use certificates b unknown routes to Czechoslovakia.
Comment: It is uncertain that Austrian-produced aluminum in thra-4UsiBlities here reported is regularly diverted to Orbit
The Netherlands Foreign Office feels that it must reply to the Czech note by the end of May and does not see what further delaying tactics can be used. (C The Hague 1177, 7 May 52) Comment: Czechoslovakia has been pressing the Netherlands and B5T1TUE-for several months to grant it landing rights in order to establish its air route to Western Europe, which was cut off on 10 September by a three-power action that denied Czechoslovakia the right to overfly Western Germany. Belgium and the Netherlands have indicated that they will eventually accede to the Czech request. France, which is the proposed terminal of the Czech air route,recently said that it will continue to postpone a final answer to the Czechs, but that it does not wish to be the only Western European country to refuse.
4.
Communists plan International Social Security Conference: An intercepted letter from the World Federation of Trade Unions headquarters in Vienna, reveals attempts to interest
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Czechoslovakia presses the Netherlands and Belgium to grant flight rights: Czechoslovakia in the past two weeks has withdrawn blanket permission for the Friday flights of KLM out of Prague, thus forcing the Netherlands Minister to request permission for each flight in advance. The same procedure is understood to have been applied to Sabena, the Belgian airlines. Czechoslovakia last week reiterated its demands for the right to fly commercial service between Prague and Amsterdam, including eventually fifth freedom rights for transport between Berlin and Amsterdam.
countries, although such diversions have long been suspected. The Trieste company of Massimiliano Iannitti, as well as his Austrian contact, the managing director of the Krasa Company, Gerhard Seelig, was investigated last fall, without conclusive results, for alleged transshipments of aluminum through Belgium and Switzerland to Satellite purchasers.
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authorities in the field of social insurance in the forthcoming Communist-sponsored International Conference on Social Security and Social Insurance. The US Embassy in Vienna believes that, besides being a propaganda sounding board for attacks against the West, the conference may also be used to establish a new, Soviet-oriented international organization in competition with the International Social Security Association sponsored by the International Labor Office. (q Vienna 1579, 31 Mar 52) Comment: The Social Security Conference, planned at the BerliR-WPTU-General Council meeting in November, is expected The WFTU has sent to take place in June in Berlin or Vienna. out questionnaires asking for information on the harmful effects of the restricted commercial relations between capitalistic and non-capitalistic countries, the strain of inflation upon social security benefits, inadequacies of social security systems in capitalistic countries, and unemployment figures. This information is expected to be presented to the conference in a Handbook of Social Security which will contrast the systems in the West and underdeveloped "colonial" areas unfavorably with what has allegedly been accomplished in the Communist bloc countries.
5.
A Gromyko-Kora conference on Japanese POW's reported: correspondent in Moscow reported that Mrs. Kora, the Japanese Diet member who attended the Moscow Economic Conference, confided to him that she had had a four-hour conference with Gromyko regarding the question of Japanese prisoners of war. Gromyko took the usual Soviet position that there were none in the Soviet Union, and that Mrs. Kora's visit to hospitals and graves would establish that fact. Mrs. Kora's secretary, a former Japanese POW from the Soviet Union, is allegedly a Communist sympathizer.
The United States Embassy feels that Soviet propaganda will exploit Mrs. Kora's inspection of the graves to undermine the United States position regarding the Soviet refusal to return Japanese prisoners of war. (C FOR AMERICAN EYES ONLY Moscow 1780, 7 May 52)
Comment: The reported Gromyko-Kora conference may have occurFa-TR-lieu of the interview which Mrs. Kora reportedly had requested with Stalin.

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Inasmuch as no other delegates at the Moscow Economic Conference are known to have:interviewed ranking Soviet officials, the granting of this conference, if true, would represent a further Soviet overture toward Japan. EASTERN EUROPE
6.
Comment: The Czech action is an abrupt change of pace. It is not known why the Czechs withdrew their demands at a time when they may have known there was a possibility that they would receive some of the scrap. The new source of heavy scrap is a matter of conjecture, since there is a scrap shortage throughout the Orbit and world shortages coupled with western export controls work against large shipments into the Orbit.
7.
Polish citizens to register for new identity cards: Public announcements have appeared all over Poland requiring all citizens over 18 years of age and those over 16 who are selfsupporting to register between 2 and 12 May with the Ministry Persons in active military service are exof Public Security. cepted. According to the US Military Attache in Warsaw, this is a universal registration:for the new personal identity cards. A reliable source has informed the attache that the form to be filled out requires mstatement as to military service prior to 1939, the period 1939 to 1945, the period after 1945, and whether or not the applicant has served in any foreign army. (S Warsaw MA-53-52, 6 May 52) Comment: Last October the Polish Government decreed the issuaidera-these personal identity cards which will provide. the sole documentation for the individual, will replace the existing domicile registration cards, and will be valid for five years. During early 1951 a comprehensive registration of all Polish citizens was made.
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Czechoslovakia drops long-standing demands for scrap metal from West Germany: During the recently completed 1952 trade negotiations, the Czech delegation announced that Czechoslovakia is no longer interested in receiving light metal scrap from West Germany. The Czechs, claiming that they are now able to import heavy iron and steel scrap from another unnamed country, did not repeat demands made since July that Germany deliver 25,000 tons of scrap allegedly promised under previous trade agreements. (S Bonn 2691, 6 May 52)
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8.
Heavy Stalin tamks reported iv Rumania: The American MilitWFTAITicEe franciirest repoPih-176107au mid-April he observed JS heavy tanks in P4testl in south-central Rumania. On 20 April the Turkish Military Attache observed 20 JS-3 tanks at the tank.barracks in Bucharest where the Tudor Vladimiresen Armored Division is stationed. Since the dates of observatien were so close, the American Military Attache believes there are two different tank lots. (S Bucharest 404, 18 Apr 52, and 420, 1 May 52)
Comment: The"Jiseph Stalin -3" is the largest and most moderirhaif tank, and its presence in Rumania suggests that Rumania's armed forces are being further strengthened on the Soviet pattern. There are no previous reliable reports of the presence of these heavy tanks in Rumania. Of the other Satellites, Poland and Czechoslovakia are known to have JS-3 tanks; Hungary and Bulgaria have earlier model JS-1 and JS-2 tanks.
9
Rumania's
inforia-the-Therican-UWEifISW-TE-Mairest that 200 to 300

Rumanian army officers identified with the old regime were arrested in mid-April. Remaining officers in the same category are reportedly apprehensivenwhich, the Legation suggests, may result.in a drop in army efficiency.(S Bucharest 433, 6 May 52) The Legation reported unconfirmed rumors of They appeared to be connected with evacuations of other "undesirables" from Rumanian cities.
Comment
such iFfThlThs in mid-April.
The total number of Rumanian commissioned officers is conThe proportion of these servatively estimated at about 11,300. identified with the pre-Communist regime is not known; but any decrease in efficiency would, from the government's point of view, probably be compensated by an.increase in political reliability.

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army officers arrested: A reliable source has
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FAR EAST Impasse reached in ROK-US economic talks: During the 6 May meeting between ROK authorities and fffg-US Economic Mission, discussion was confined to the question of a realistic won-dollar conversion rate. The Mission stated that, in determining the tentative sum likely to be received by the ROK for UN military expenditures since 1 January 1952, a conversion rate of 12,000 won to one US dollar was used. The three South Korean cabinet ministers present argued against changing the present rate of 6,000 to one, and were quite adamant in their stand. The meeting adjourned without any immediate possibility of agreement.
10.
Finance Minister Paek on 7 May stated that he would resign if there were a change in the present 6,000 to one rate. (C Pusan 1079, 7 May; Pusan 1083, 8 May 52) In order to combat the acute inflation in South Comment: Korea, the 13S Economic Mission has maintained that first a The open realistic conversion rate must be established. market rate is currently 12,000 to 13,000 won per US dollar. ROK officials fear that any official change in the exchange rate, however, will cause retail prices to rise, as has happened in the past. North Korean Government seeks solution to Panmunjom talks: The Soviet "representative" in Pyongyang on 25 April called a meeting of the top North Korean and Chinese Communist leaders to eonvene on 5 May oug oreans Although the Nort that the conierence would deal with new instructions from the USSR on the cease-fire talks, some officials believed that no significant action would take place at Panmunjom prior to 20
May.
11.
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The North Koreans planned to press the USSR at this meeting for a "decision" on the truce talks, or, failing this, to urge that an international conference be called to "settle the Korean War." The North Koreans also planned a proposal to launch another attack prior to elections in the ROK,although it was known that neither the Soviets nor the Chinese favored Ii was believed thac such a proposal would such a course. bring about a clarification of the Sino-Soviet position.
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Another proposal contemplated was for a "political conIf this propoference" to be held at Kaesong in August 1952, the North Korean propaganda sal were raised and agreed upon, campaign calling for a "democratic organ planned to institute a Korea." conference for the unification of
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While no confirmation of this planned meeting Comment: or of these North Korean intentions can be obtained, this report could very well represent North Korean governmental thinking.
It must be pointed out, however, that the North Koreans probably are not in a position to urge such policies on the USSR, being in the least influential position in the Communist triumvirate.In any case they could be expected to abide by any decision made by the two senior partners--China and the
USSR.
12
The text Purge of public security apparatus underway: Minister of of an adaress in-DIJFEEer 1951 by Lo Jui-ching, Public Security, indicates that a purge of the Chinese Communist public security apparatus has been underway for months.
Lo told a meeting of party cadres in Peiping that "corruption andlureaucracy" were widespread in the security apparatus, especially in the cities, where the apparatus had absorbed many former Nationalist secret police. Lo concluded that "degenerated" and corrupt elements must be purged from security bureaus throughout China. The Chinese Communist press in January 1052 revealed that the Director and Deputy Director of the Administrative Office of the Ministry of Public Security, together with four-fifths of the office staff, were found to be corrupt.
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Comment: The campaign against corruption, waste and bureaucracy, launched in late 1951 and now drawing to s close, It was learned affected all organs of the Peiping regime. ,chief of the Public in February 1952 that the administrative Security Ministry had been arrested and shot.
The text of Lo's address, however, indicates more serious corruption in the public security apparatus than other Communist sources had revealed. As the Chinese Communist leadership depends directly upon its public security force
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for the maintenance and consolidation of its control,the current purge of this apparatus is probably correspondingly severe.
13.
Soviet journal praises Liu Po-cheng and Chen Yi: The Moscow English-language Journiiiirenines, carries in its
February 1952 number an article 137-ThU-rainsellor of the Soviet Embassy in Peiping which warmly praises the military ability and ideological orthodoxy of Generals Liu Po-cheng and Chen Yi. (U New Times, Moscow, Feb 52)
Comment: Liu and Chen, commanders respectively of the 2nd and 3rd Field Armies, are the two Chinese Communist generals most frequently reported to have fallen from favor in the past two years. This article suggests that both were in good standing with Moscow and Peiping in early 1952.
14.
Western shipping in China trade increases:
1952,-47-71OU=Communiiiriered merchant ships, aggregating

204,000 gross tons, traded with Communist China. By comparison,the figures for the preceding month were 43 merchant ships totaling 188,000 tons. (C ONI Report 24-C-52, 1 Apr 52)
Comment: Vessels carrying British and Panamanian registry make up the bulk of Western-flag merchant shipping in the China trade. The Panamanian-flag ships are exclusively coasters operating in violation of a Panamanian decree against calling at Chinese Communist ports.
15
25X1C
Communists reportedly plan to attack Nationalist offshore islands in ay: Figarte a e ommun s s in en o inva e 1111111.11111ands of Tachen, Matsu, and Chinmen at the end of May. The plan, submitted by Chen Yi, Commander of the Third Field Army, was approved in April by Mao Tse-tung. It seeks to insure the security of the southeast China coast and to learn the reaction of the American Seventh Fleet. This undertaking reportedly was suggested after the Soviet Union
-
In January
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25X1C Comment: Another report has referred to a March meeting at which Chen yi is said to have discussed plans to capture the off-shore islands by early June. The Chinese Communists are estimated to have about 240,000
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troops in the adjacent coastal area, as opposed to approximately 75,000 Nationalist trOops on the islands.
16:
There are strong indications that the Cambodian Government is abetting Thanh's activities as a means.of pressuring the French for political concessions. The chief of the French information service recently characterized Thanh as "not.yet" a Communist but saw his path leading "inevitably" in that He added that while the Communists were undertaking direction. little military action in Cambodia, they were busily effecting a political penetration.
17.
Burmese CommuCommunist peace feelers'continue in Burma: nist propaganda has renewed its call upon the Burmese Government to enter into "frank discussions" looking towards the establish(C Rangoon 1078, 8 May 52) ment of peace and security.
.
Comment: Communist peace feelers in Burma have been re:ported with increasing frequency since the Vienna peace conference last November. These approaches have thus far been It is not yet clear brushed aside by Burmese officials. Whether they result from Communist weakness or are merely tactical maneuvers.
.
18
Proposed merger of Communist and leftist labor federations in InUTTT--The secretary of the Communist7dominated All-India Trade Union Congress (AITUC) on 26 February 1952 sent the
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SOUTH ASIA
With no improvement evident in the Vietnamese Comment: situation, krench authorities are having progressively serious problems in Cambodia.
Cambodian Army allegedly passing arms to rebel forces: According to the chief of the French Surete in Indochina, troops of the Cambodian Army on two occasions delivered "cases," which he presumed to be ammunition, to the non-Communist rebel leader Son Ngoc Thanh. French military sources also report an instance of the "disappearance," and possible delivery to Thanh, of ammunition consigned to a Cambodian platoon. Meanwhile, a "clouded" military situation has prevented American officials from making a scheduled visit to Siemreap, a town (C Saigon 2179, 7 May 52) in central Cambodia.
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Communist World Federation of Made Unions (WFTU), Vienna, copies of correspondence relative to a proposed merger of.the AITUC and the leftist United Trade Union Congress (UTUC) of 1650, 8 Apr 52) (C Vienna Desp India.
Comment: The AITUC, which reportedly has about 706,000 membeFgrig7the only Indian labor organization directly The UTUC is a leftist group of unions, affiliated with WFTU. with about 300,000 members, Which left the AITUC in 1949 because of the latter's policy of violence.
There have been recurrent rumors of a merger of AITUC a formidable and UTUC. Together they might becomr opponent to the non-Communist Indian National Traae Union Congress (INTUC) with a membership of 1,434,258. NEAR EAST - AFRICA
19.
Since he became Acting Prime Minister in early Comment: March, following Prime Minister Plastiras' second heart attack, minority leader Venizelos has increased his efforts to gain control of the government. .It is unlikely that he would agree, however, to new elections under the majority system advocated by both Plastiras and opposition leader Papagos unless he were convinced that he has no alternative.
SECRET 10
Greek Acting Prime Minister says situation intolerable: Acting Prime MinEster Venizelos told the American Ambassador that both the King and he thought that the existence of "two Prime Ministers" had created an intolerable situation which could not continue. He had,hoped that Prime Minister Plastiras would go abroad for his health, but Plastiras' apparent optimism over his recovery might well prevent this "happy solution." Venizelos added that if Plastiras remains in Greece, the gov(S Athens 4722, 3 May 52) ernment would have to resign.
When the Communist Party of India adopted a new line emphasizing united front action early in 1950, the AITUC was quick to put it into practice on the labor front. The AITUC appealed to the UTUC to join:it in united action,particularly against the labor bills then.pending in Parliament, and met with some success. The two groups also cooperated in January dockworkers' strike. AITUC and UTUC dele1951 in a Calcuttl gates are now in China where'they participated in May pay activities.
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20
British oil companies pressing hard for Libyan oil The Libyan Prime Minister told the American concessions: Minister that British oil companies, Shell and Anglo-Iranian, are pressing him hard for oil concessions. The Prime Minister said he intends to proceed slowly in this matter because he wishes to make the best possible arrangements for Libya and avoid a dispute over oil such as has developed (C Tripoli 632, 6 May 52) in Iran.
So far there is no indication of any oil Comment: deposits in Libya which would make commercial operations profitable, according to the oil company representatives. It is rumored in Tripoli, however, that the British may have located oil deposits in eastern Libya. In any event, they are anxious tosecure the passage of Libyan legislation which would enable them to engage in oil exploration.
The Libyan Prime Minister previously expressed surprise at the apparent lac'zi of interest on the part of American comif concessions are to be granted, panies; he indicate6 that, he preferred to deal with them.

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WESTERN EUROPE
2
Split occurs in new West German state's coalition governDifficulties are increasing for the coalition governWin in the newly formed West German state of Baden-Wuerttemberg. Eight of the Free Democratic Party's delegates in the local legislature are considering bolting in protest against their party's merger with the Social Democrats rather than with Adenauer's Christian Democrats in forming the state's government. (S Frankfurt Sitrep 16, 7 May 52)
ment:
This is the first indication of defection within the state's coalition government. A continuation of this trend might lead to the formation of a state government friendly to Adenauer and to the sending of a more favorable delegation to the Federal Senate.
22.
Austrian oil production estimated at 20 percent above
1951:ThgFretunraninesii claims thal crude oil proMaion in Lower Austrian oil fields under Soviet control will exceed 1951 production by 50 percent, Mutual Security Agency estimates based on daily output in March place crude oil production at 2.88 million tons in 1952, or about 20
percent above last year's total. In 1951, when production exceeded refining capacity, the Soviet oil administration exported or consumed 44 percent of Austria's refined petroleum products as well as some 800,000 tons of crude oil. (U Vienna 3528, 7 May 52; R Vienna TOMUS A-77 and A-80, 18 and 17 Mar 52)
Comment: While expanding production may lend substance to Austrian fears of an early exhaustion of resources, Austrian domestic requirements are now fully met by Soviet allocations. Furthermore, the conversion of important plants to fuel oil has permitted savings in fuel imports and reduced Austria's dependence on Polish coal. It is, of course, by no means clear that increased dependence upon Soviet generosity will be preferable to dependence upon Polish exports.

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Comment: The composition of this state government could threaten Adenauer's majority in the Federal Senate and cause a partial or total defeat of the Chancellor's programs.
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r,
23.
Britain discussing arrangements for cooperation with EDC air forcesr-in order to,be win on the ground floor" of air force planning after the European Defense Community treaty is signed, the British Air Ministry hopes to have a senior observer present when practical EDC planning actually begins. The British observer at the Paris conference has stated that his government is eager to have its forces on the Continent cooperate as closely as possible with EDC force0. British Defense Minister Alexander will visit Paris next week to discuss proposed arrangements for this cooperation which have been approved at the EDC confer(S Paris 6873, 7 May 52) ence.
Comment: This proposal gives specific form to Britain's heretofore somewhat vague assertions of desire for cooperation with the EDC without accepting the obligations of full membership. Emphasis on air planning.reflecis Britain's efforts to push its first line of defense as far east as possible in view of its air defense system's growing vulnerability to jet warfare.
.
.
24
Bolivian miners take over municipal government at Corocoro: The manager of the American Smelting and
Nfining Company copper mine at Corocoro reported on 7 May that union members bad taken over the municipal government, and that "Indian rebels" threatened to seize the mine. He asked the US Embassy at La Paz to obtain protection, and said that it was impossible to evacuate management personnel.and families.
Labor-management relations at Corocoro Comment: have been strained for a long time. On 22 April the Corocoro miners called a general strike, which was ended the next day by government order.
Through Foreign Office channels, the Embassy was assured that steps were being taken to assure the (C La Paz 448, 7 May 52) safety of foreign personnel.

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'Chilean reaction to termination of copper agreement
may make new talks-di-Meat: The US Embassy inliantiago states that politiaiii-Trehile continue praising
President Gonzalez VidellOs ending of the copper Agreement, and that the reaction since 2 May is creating "a difficult atmosphere for any talks with the US."
In the Chilean Congress two. Radical and. Liberal'

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The Minister of Finance reportedly may try to make an improved exchange rate for the US companies a bargaining lever for a higher copper price from the Ex-dictator apd.presidential aspirant United States. Ibanez del Campo's policy council has called upon Congress to push a strategic materials conference among "American nations." (C Santiago 583, 7 May 52)
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senators have renewed the charge that US copper companies comPeted with Chile in the European market, and have criticized the United States "/or informing the government that certain sales were going behind the iron curtain." There is some tendency to.tie the ratification of the Mutual Security agreement to a satisfactory.copper deal with the US.
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TOP SECRET
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US OFFICIALS ONLY
This digest of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.

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Not for diSsemination outside 0/CI and 0/NE.
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS0 TITLE 18, USC, SECS. 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIDITED BY LAW.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
Ambassador Henderson reports that the Iranians interpret the release as evidence that the United States is "indifferent if not rather smug" about their difficulties. He believes that the release has undermined Iranian goodwill towards the United States, and points out that the Iranian press has interpreted the release as evidence of American(S S/S Tehran 4303, 7 May 52) British collusion against Iran.
Commentz The British release inaccurately attributed to a State Department spokesman a remark made by a correspondent during a 29 April press conference. The British, however, apparently consider that the military aid agreement has strengthened Mossadeq and have already expressed strong resentment over its conclusion.
Turks displeased with handling of Tunisian issue: Turkish UN delegate Sarper fold the American delegate that Turkey's decision to abstain on the Tunisian item was partly caused by its reluctance to antagonize France so soon after being accepted in NATO. He added that he was so concerned over his country's difficult position vis-a-vis NATO and the Arab-Asian group that he had almost persuaded Ankara to vote against inclusion of the item on the agenda. Turkey's standing with the Arabs, Sarper hinted, was being increasingly (S S/S New York 7860 6 May 52) impaired.

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British press release adversely affects Iranian-United States relations: The British Embassy in Tehran released to the Iranian press on 5 May purported extracts from a Department of State press conference in Washington on military aid to Iran. The transcript, as released by the British without prior notification to the American Embassy, quoted the Washington spokesman as saying that the non-payment of Iran's troops was a problem which does not concern the United States.
9 May 52
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TOP SECRET influenced by its desire Comment: Turkey's abstention was with the Western powers, particularly to maintain solidarity would have preferred Turkey, apparently, the United States. dealt with outside the Security Council to have the question through direct negotiations. that Turkey Many leading Turks share Sarper's conviction openly align the West if it did not would be more useful to itself with Western policies in the area.
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2. rockets reported in Korea: 2. More Moreeffective effectiveCommunist Communist training training with with AA AA rockets
A garbled and fragmentary fragmentaryChinese ChineseCommuCommuUS Army Army US A nist message message of of 4 4 May May states states that that an an unidentiunidenti11 May 52 fied Communist Commwist untt unit commenced commencedantiaircraft antiaircraft SUEDE SUEDE ftring on on 3 3 May May with equipment tentatively firing 1-f- 274-G The unit unit reported reported that tdenttfied by Launchers." The identified by translation translation as "rocket launchers." it at various altitudes it expended expended rounds of of ammunition at altitudes from from 10,800 10,800 to The message stated further that two of the launchers stated further that two launchers 24,600 feet. The 24,600 "performed splendidly" and "we either hit hit "performed splendidly" andthat thatit it was wasestimated estimatedthat that "we and damaged or or hit and dropped" of the the targets. targets. dropped" each of
report, as as received, received, indiindiComment: This report, cates that the Communist fUrciiiie training Communist forces are trainingwith withAA A A rockets rockets possessing possesetng vertical range range and and accuracy characteristics characteristicsin In excess exceseof of those those of of any thelast last three three months, months, there known During the known Soviet Sovietor or Chinese rocket. During of sightings sightings of Communist Communtst AA AA rockets steadily have have been been a series series of rockets at steadily increasing vertical ranges, but but this this is isthe the first firstindication indication of of a groundgroundlaunched rocket rocket attaining attaining24,600 24,600 feet. feet.
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y b o c k e rockets t s directed directedagainst agatnst UN aircraft to date date have have been been ineffective ineffective and inaccurate. This message UN aircraft to suggests equipment which whichwill willincrease increase his the enemy enemy may may have have new equipment suggests that that the AA capabtltty. AA capability.
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Russians R u s s i a n s make make large large shipments shipmepts t to o Chinese and Korean Korean Communists: R u s s i a n medsages reveal r e v e a l jetters l e t t e r s of credit credit Communtsts: Recent Russian c o v e r i n g Chinese C h i n e s e purchases p u r c h a s e s of of four four Million m i l l i o n rubles jrubles (one (one milmilcovering l ion d o l l a r s at a t the t h e official o f f i c i a l rate r i t e of spare lion dollars of exchange) exchange) worth of spare parts p a r t s for motor vehicles v e h i c l e s and and tractors, t h c t o r s , almost almost 200,000 2 0 0 , 0 0 0 rubles rubles for medical m e d i c a l supplies, s u p p l i e s , and and over o v e r 350,000 350,000 rubles r u b l e s for for explosives. explosives. The delivery d e l i v e r y date date for f o r these these items i t e m s is is believed b e l i e v e d to t o be be no no later later than t h a n 21 2 1 June. June.
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A i r Force F o r c e comments that that a a build-up burld-up pattern pattern The US Air s t r i k i n g l y similar s i m i l a r to t o that t h a t which.preceded which precedeti the t h e outbreak o u t b r e a k of strikingly h o s t i l i t i e s in i n 1950 1990 is is provided p r o v i d e d by this transaction t r a n s a c t i o n coupled coupled hostilities w i t h recently r e c e n t l y reported r e p o r t e d letters letters of of credit.amounting credit amounting to t o 13 13 with m i l l i o n rubles r u b l e s covering c o v e r i n g Soviet S o v i e t shipments s h i p m e n t s of of petroleum p e t r o l e u m propromillion d u c t s to t o the t h e North N o r t h Koreans, Koreans, and and deliveries d e l i v e r i e s in i n late l a t e May or ducts early e a r l y June J u n e of approximately a p p r o x i m a t e l y 2,000 2 , 0 0 0 motor vehicles. v e h i c l e s . (SUEDE Air A i r Force F o r c e Roundup Roundup pl, 91, 9 9 May May 52) 52)
Comment: A steady s t e a d y build-up bullti-up of supplies s u p p l i e s during d u r i n g the the Comment: period p e r i o h of the the truce t r u c e negotiations n e g o t i a t i o n s has h a s provided p r o v i d e d the t h e Communists t o launch launch a a major Offensive o f f e n s i v e against against w i t h sufficient s u f f i c i e n t materiel to with the of deliveries deliveries from the f o r c e s . A continuing, c o n t i n u i n g f flow l o w of the t h e UN forces. S o v i e t Union Union is is foreshadowed foreshadowed by by a a Sino-Soviet Sino-Soviet trade trade protocol protocol Soviet which was was signed s i g n e d in i n mid-April mid-April and and which which provided,, p r o v i d e d , according according t o TAISS, Ita considerable c o n s i d e r a b l e expansion e x p a n s i o n of goods exchange in in to TABS, for "a the as against a g a i n s t the t h e 1951 1951 level." level." t h e coming year y e a r as Koreans intercept i n t e r c e p t UN UN communications: communications: The commander North Koreans of the t h e North Korean Korean 23rd 23rd brigade, B r i g a d e , assigned a s s i g n e d to t o coastal defense defense in i n western w e s t e r n Korea, learned l e a r n e d "by I'by intercepting i n t e r c e p t i n g the t h e enemy enemy wireless wireless telegram," of of UN UN operational o p e r a t i o n a l plans p l a n s in i n this t h i s area. area. The officer, officer, r e p o r t i n g to reporting t o his h i s corps corps commander commander on on 9 9 May, May, stated s t a t e d that t h a t ROK ROK g u e r r i l l a s were evacuating e v a c u a t i n g islands i s l a n d s north n o r t h of the t h e 38th 3 8 t h parallel parallel guerrillas and were concentrating c o n c e n t r a t i n g on Paengnyon island, i s l a n d , just j u s t south s o u t h of the the
parallel. 'parallel.
3 3
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He attributes attributes this this withdrawal withdrawal to to a a UN UN expectation expectation of of "final suCcess success at the truce conference" which provides for such a withdrawal. The North Korean warns, however, that the Communistthe ROK guerrillas are preparing to attack the held Ongjin peninsula peninsula area, area. (SIIEDE (SDEDE CSSO6-extract, CS506-extract, UnknoFnUnknownUnknown, 10 10 May Way 52) 52) Unknown,
8 . 8.
The Air Force Force observes observes that that the the establishment establishment of of these these The stations represents represents an an expansion expansion of of operational operational air air dedenew stations fense capabilities, while while the the increased increased volume volume of of communicacommunicafense suggests an an increased increased state state of of readiness readiness on on the the part part tions suggests of the Communist air air defense defense system. system. (SUEDE (SUEDE Air Force Roundup 90, 90, 8 8 May May 52) 52)
9. 9 .
No communications equipment eauioment increase increase scheduled scheduled for for North Korean Korean Army Army in in May: May: A North N orth Korean Korean communications communications staff officet informed informed a a communications communications supply suDulv officer officer at at Pyongyang on on 6 6 May May that that "there "there are are no no plans plans for for the the comcomPyongyang munications equipment for for the the 'Inmingun' 'Inmingun' (Peoples (Peoples Army) Army) for May." May." that although although some some equipequipThe message continued that ment had arrived arrived presumably in in Manchuria, as "trading material,11 the two two freight freight cars cars assigned assigned to to the the communicacommunicamaterial," the tions office were incapable incapable of transporting transporting any equipment to rail rail damage damage in in northwestern northwestern Korea. Korea. (SUEDE 501st owing to (SUEDE 501st Corn 15RSW/12030, 7 7 May 52) 52) Comm Recon Grp Korea, 15RSM/12030,
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Comment: This This communications organization has previously Comment: c oncems e l f with the the manufacture of batteries concerned itself batteries and and with with the importation importation of wire and and telephone telephone equipment. equipment.
The reference to to the the lack lack of of i s to to be be communications equipment is suggests that either a sufficient is on On hand or that bad scheduling scheduling r rivals. ivale plans plans indicates indicates that that no no imported in in May. May. It also also imported quantity of such material caused a break in in arar-
the discovery of of these these new new GCI GCI installations, installations, Following the inter-net communications communications among among the the stitions stations of of the volume of inter-net the Russian-language GCI net net has has increased increased sharply. sharply.
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Four new Soviet GCI stations stations appear appear in in northwest northwest Korea: The US Air Ai r Force Force reports reports that that an an additional additional Russian-language Russian-language ground-controlled-intercept station, possibly located located at at an an airfield south of the the Yalu River, appeared appeared on on 15 15 April. Three additional additional Russian-language Russian-language GCI GCI radar radar stations, stations, also also located in the the Same same general generhl area area and and directly subordinate subordinate at Antung, appeared appeared between between 16 16 and and to the chief controller at 19 April.
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SECURITY DIFORMATION
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OCI No. 5178

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AFFECTING THE NATIONAL THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES SECS. 793 AND 794, THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF BY LAW. UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED
GENERAL
official explained, when A French Foreign Office that lt had not been questioned by the American Ambassador, to make a formal minisconsidered desirable or appropriate National Assembly was not in terial statement because the (C Paris 6912, 8 May 52) session. United French have expected greater Comment: The Indochina "internationalizing" possible and a StateiriZTO-rt in the Korean armistice be signed. there should of the conflict

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on reluctant to su port UN position French Government e prom nence as g ven renc press statement war pr soners: approval of General Ridgway's to the government's The press has seemed on the Korean armistice negotiations. clear that the French defensive in its efforts to make Government had been consulted in advance.
12 May 52
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FAR EAST Japanese labor showing increased leftist tendencies: The "spring offensive" of organized labor in Japan has been associated with a marked increase in left-wing domination of labor leadership, according to the American Embassy in Tokyo. The deposition of moderate Takeo Muto as chairman of the Coal Miners Federation, and his subsequent resignation as chairman of the GeneratCouncil of Japanese Trade Unions (SOHYO) has passed direction of Japan's most comprehensive labor federation to extreme leftist Minoru Takano.
Comment: Takano, a former Communist, has been instrumental in labor's support of left-wing socialist policy, much of which parallels the Communist anti-US "peace" program. There is some evidence that Muto's deposition was engineered by Communist elements, who undoubtedly regard Takano's ascendency as facilitating their ttempts to regain influence in SOHYO claims a membership of about the labor movement. 3,000,000, more than hall of Japan's organized labor.
Japanese observers believe Emperor will not abdicate: The Emperor's Constitution Day statement indicates that he has no present intention of abdicating despite intermittent rumorS to that effect, according to Japanese observers. The US Embassy in Tokyo also notes that the ceremonies connected with the presentation of credentials by foreign diplomats, which emphasized the Emperor's role as "symbol of the state," reflect an effort to restore the prestige of the imperial institution. (S Tokyo Weeka 95, 9 May 52)
Comment: Opposition to the Emperor has stemmed primarily from the Communists, leftist students and the intelligentsia who advocate abolition of the imperial institution, as well as from minority right-wing elements who think the emperor system would be strengthened by Hirohito's abdication in favor of the Crown Prince. The vast majority of the Japanese people continue to support the present emperor, however, and current trends indicate he will be restored at least partially to his traditional role.

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The Embassy comments that this development increases the possibility of further general strikes patterned after the (S Tokyo 95 Weeka, 9 May 52) April walk-outs.
12 May 52
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Biological warfare propaganda to continue:
In the Chinese CommunisT-Peofin Daily of 6 gay that the
A report
World Peace Council is organizing rariEternational committee to investigate biological warfare suggests that this propaganda campaign will continue. (S Hong Kong 3024, 9 May 52)
Comment: Although the campaign has declined in intensity, there are several indications that it will continue.
5.
Chinese Communists dismiss high officials: The Central People's Government of China announced on 6 May the removal of 14 officials including a deputy director of the Ministry of Public Security, the Director of Public Security in East China, the two ranking officers of the Department of North China Affairs, eight governors or deputy governors of provinces, and the mayors of Tientsin and Anshan. (R FBIS 9 May 52)
Comment: Although certain of the removed officials may be reigNIWEEd to important posts, the pattern of removals suggests that Peiping is dissatisfied with the work of its governin g apparatusin several regions and provinces, particularly in the North China area. These dismissals appear to be,connected with a purge of the party, government and secret police which has been in process for several months.
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Hong Kong Communist news agency given two weeks to The official Chinese Communist news agency in Hong Kong informed the British authorities, one day before the deadline for its registration under a publications ordinance, that it was willing to register as a "state agency" but not under the ordinance governing "ordinary" publications.
register.:
The British replied that the agency was recognized as a state agency but that,,as no special ordinance existed for such agencies, it was expected to register under the existing ordinance and would be given two more weeks to do so. (S Hong Kong 3024, 9 May 52)
Comment:
an imPFEMY test-case in Sino-British relations.
This apparently insignificant issue is in fact
The Hong Kong Government, partly in an effort to force the Peiping regime to recognize British authority in the Colony, informed the Communist news agency in early April that it must register within a month or cease operations..
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The current strain between the Peiping and Hong Kong authorities is reflected in a 10 May statement by Peiping's Ministry of Foreign Affairs protesting "persecution" of Chinese and the recent suspension of the pro-Communist Ta Rung Pao.
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Carson Chang's "third force" activities in Hong Kong reported: Carson Chang, leader of the Democratic Socialist Party, is drafting a political platform.for a "new Chinese government" for which he hopes to get American recognition and support. The platform will call for a "democratic" government demanding the overthrow of both the Communist and Nationalist regimes.
Chang conferred with ex-Nationalist leaders in Bong Ron in A ril and with contacts
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Comment: Carson Changi, who arrived in the United States a week-rac-Is expected to try to impress American officials with his and his friends' capabilities for leading a "third force" in China.
There is no cohesive group of ex-Nationalist figures of sufficient stature to qualify as a "third force."
8.
Rumors of French intention to ne otiate settlement of Indochina war con nue: he French are arrang ng for Nehru to negotiate with Ho Chi Minh while the British Commissioner General in Southeast Asia, Sir Malcolm MacDonald, negotiates with Peiping--presumably for the settlement of the Indochina
war.
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Meanwhile reports that the representative of a Communist 1!!!!!! 1111,1111ated in late April that at the request of French authorities he will, while en route to China, stop in Saigon to discuss with Ho Chi Minh the ossibilities for ending the war
Comment: A recent report from Thailand claimed that . Nehreerillair, Mme. pandit, was carrying proposals for the settlement of the Indochina war to Peiping. These reports
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from various quarters are wholly lacking in confirmation. .It is noteworthy, however, that they continue to circulate among anti-Communist Vietnamese upon whom they have a debilitating effect.
The Vietnamese premier, in charging that French Minister Letourneau was seeking his dismissal, has told the American Minister in Saigon that he would produce documentary proof of Letourneau's intention tosettle with the Viet Minh. The American Legation has previously seen forged documents purporting to prove this intent on the part of the French.
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Comment: The 308th and the 312th Divisions have been inactiVrilice the French withdrawal from Hoa Binh in February and reportedly are located just northwest of the delta. It has been presumed that they would carry the brunt of any offensive the Viet Minh might launch before the rains in June.
A Chinese advisers seen south of the Tonkin delta: Vietnamese schoo).teacher who recently returned after living five years in the Viet Minh zone has told the American Consul in Hanoi that he'occasionally saw Chinese Communist lieutenants and captains in the Thanh Hoa area, south of the Tonkin delta. He added that these officers were commonly understood to fulfill strictly advisory functions, and that he never heard (R Hanoi that Chinese combat troops were in the country. Desp No 34, 25 Mar 52)
10.
Comment: It has been firmly believed for some time that Chinese advisers, now estimated to number 10,000, have been with the Viet Minh forces, although none has ever been seen by a completely reliable source. The authentic nature of the source's statements on other experiences under the Viet Minh regime lends unusual credibility to this eye-witness report.
11.
Singapore government suggests London pressure US to resume rubber buying: The Singapore government on 5 May asked London to consider putting pressure cn the United States to
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Lately inactive Viet Minh division reportedly not ready for combat: gyring to heavy losses, the Viet Minh 308th Division is not yet ready for combat It is currently filling up ranks and training 25X1A recruits.
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resume natural rubber purchases for stockpiling. The request cites fears of officials and traders that a continued falling market would bring widespread labor unrest, already showing itself, and handicap the anti-guerrilla campaign in the Federation. The American Consul General comments that although the long-term outlook for rubber is good, a continued slump now would "almost certainly produce adverse political consequences." He believes that if the current price fall is not reversed fairly soon, a special American effort would be justified to try to keep the Malayan price above the "danger point," esti(C Singapore 1224, 6 May 52) mated at between 31 and 33 cents.
The view that American policy is responsible for what is presently regarded in the trade as a short-term recession is widely held in Britain. A London Times editorial on 8 May stated that previous compulsory us5-Ur-synthetic rubber in America "irretrievably" weaned American manufacturers away from natural rubber.
12.
Indonesian Defense Minister plans to lift emergency military regulations: The Sultan of Djogjakarta, the Indonesian Defense Minister, plans to lift military controls invoked under the State of War and Siege law, a former Dutch emergency ordinance. He also plans to employ five police companies in a a ainst the Darul Islam early in June.
Comment: An Information Ministry broadcast of 3 May stated that in areas where security has been restored, the state of war and siege will gradually be lifted. Although no specific plans have been announced, current conditions would warrant the removal of restrictions only in Sumatra and possibly in the Lesser Sundas.
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The Darul Islam, a militant Moslem organization, presents the government with a chronic security problem in West and Central Java.
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Indonesian Government cautiously reaffirms independent foreign policy: The foreign policy section of the government's
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Comment: Top grades on the Malayan market as of 10 May were NWITIWg at about 28.5 cents a pound, and demand reportedly continues weak.
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9 May statement to Parliament piously reaffirmed Indonesia's independent policy, but gave no firm indication of the cabinet's intentions on any specific issue. The statement made no mention of relations with the Soviet bloc and was indefinite on MSA, the Japanese peace treaty, and relations with the Netherlands. American Ambassador Cochran comments that although the statement may not offend anyone, it is difficult to imagine whom it will satisfy. He regards it as reassuring in indicating that the government will not "launch out on a dangerous new path," but as failing to give assurance as to the ability (R of the government to cope with its critics or problems. Djakarta 1631, 9 May 52)
SOUTH ASIA
14.
Ceylon opens credit for Soviet rubber deal: The Foreign Department of the RIFE of Ceylon states that a credit of 200,000 pounds sterling has been opened in favor of R. Wanigatunga and Co., for shipment in June of Ceylonese rubber to the USSR via Rotterdam. Wanigatunga recently returned from the Moscow Economic Conference through Hong Kong. The American Embassy in Colombo believes this credit is the first installment of an anticipated one million pound sterling Russian (C Colombo 617, 8 May 52) credit.
Comment: This deal is in a more advanced stage than any which appearsto have resulted from the Moscow Economic ConferIt is the first Soviet purchase of Ceylonese rubber ence. since 1946 when 3.000 tons were bought. The transaction further emphasizes the official Ceylon policy of selling to all comers.
Iranian Parliament rejects credentialsof opposition and government leaders: 1n-a stormy session on 8 May, the Majlis refused to seat 22 of the 70 deputies who have been elected. Those whose credentials were rejected include several of the most important leaders of the conservative opposition. The conservatives, however, succeeded in obtaining rejection of ten of the twelve Tehran deputies, all of whom are members of the National Front, and they are making a determined effort to
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have the Tehran elections annulled altogether. R Tehran 4337, 9 May 52)
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of theMan deputies represents a considerable set-back
Comment:
Conservative.suCcess in obtaining rejection
for the Prime Minister, who reportedly hoped to purge the opposition from the .Majlis. Confirmation of the rejections, which arenaw being reviewed by a Parliamentary board, would Rejection further postpone full convocation of the Majlis. Communist-sponsored of the Tehran deputies would permit some deputies to be seated unless the Tehran elections are annulled.
16.
Maraghi Bey says that he is ready to take over if AngloEgyptian talks break down, and states that he plans to ask the United States to become an equal ally in the defense of the Suez Canal and to help Egypt rebuild its army. This is to be done through the United Nations and with limited British participation. Maraghi also plans to open direct negotiations with the leader of the anti-Egyptian Umma Party in the Sudan; he believes that the British cannot prevent his doing so.
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Maraghi's plan, which would undoubtedly be Comment: strodirraFFosed by Britain, is in line with the frequently expressed Egyptian opinion that the United States should actively help settle the Anglo-Egyptian dispute. His plan to negotiate with the Sudanese will meet with firm opposition from British officials in the Sudan.
Maraghi, who also holds the key portfolios of War and Marine, has recently placed his own appointees in almost allthe top positions of the Interior Ministry, which is responsible for maintaining order throughout Egypt.

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Egyptian Interior Minister criticizes Hilali: The Egyptian Minister of Interior, Maraghi Bey , who wishes to become Prime Minister Hilali's successor, is critical of Hilali's legalistic mentality, his lack of foreeful leadership and his failure to win popular support.
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Indications seen that !East Germans are tightening security: American representatives in Berlin believe that the 8 May East German press announcement of the conviction of fifteen persons as foreign saboteurs is more likely to be a preparation for increased internal and external security measures rather than a true reflection of sabotage in East Germany. They feel this belief is supported by other East German press releases on Western "military provocations" on the interzonal border and on the "dangerous" smuggling of East German goods into West Berlin.
Comment: Suggestive that new security measures are being prepared in East Germany is the unexplained detention of American and British military patrol vehicles on tile Berlin-Helmstedt autobahn starting on the evening of 8 May,
The suggested East German security measures may be related to recent threats by Grotewohl and Pieck to "organize the armed defense of the homeland" if Bonn goes ahead with its program of Western integration. (S Berlin 1324, 9 May 52)
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French Government sues Communist papers protesting Ridgway's arrival: The French Government intends to deal firmly
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with Communist attacks against General Ridgway's arrival in France by bringing suit against the Communist newspapers which have published an appeal for protest action. Although this step is not likely to deter the Communists from continuing with preparations for protest, it may have an inhibiting effect on many who might otherwise be tempted to go (R Paris 6954, 9 Ma) 52) along with them. This is the second reported instance in which Comment: the French have invoked the Anti-Communist Press Bill of March 1952, which deprives directors of Communist press organs of parliamentary immunity. It is anticipated that an increasing number of such suits will be brought against the Communist press, thereby aggravating its present financial embarrassment.
in Auaria:
Comment: The volume of Communist propaganda from indigenous, . Soviet, and international Communist-front sources to which the Austrians have recently been exposed has reached unprecedented proportions. There is little indication, however, that the Austrian people, who are sophisticated in such matters, have been much impressed by this virulent barrage, even as it refers to East-West trade in which they are vitally concerned. Probably more harmful to US interests has been the recent and more effective Communist propaganda "exposing" the "cost" to Austria of the Marshall Plan.
21.

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High Commissioner Donnelly urges propaganda counterattack After failing to secure the agreement of Soviet authorities in Vienna "to call a truce" in their intensified anti-American propaganda campaign, US High Commissioner Donnelly proposes that the United States retaliate with a "glovesoff" counterattack. Donnelly suggests that all information media at American disposal, such Austrian newspapers as will cooperate, and various "front" organizations be utilized to expose Soviet activities both in Austria and elsewhere. When informed of American intentions, Austrian Minister of Interior Helmer was reportedly surprised that such countermeasures have (S Vienna 3550, 9 May 52) not previously been taken.
Magnani-Cucchi group introduces new factor Besides the Christian Democrat, the neo-fascist munist electoral blocs in Rome, there is now to list headed by Magnani and Cucchi, who quit the munist Party over a year ago in protest against
in Rome elections: and the Combe a fourth Italian ComSoviet domi-
12 May 52
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SECRET nation and formed the Italian Worker's Movement (ILI). This gr9up hopes to attract support from dissident elements of the Pemocratic Socialist, Liberal and Republican Parties. The MLI's membership has remained static for some months and has atrnnted no imnortant personages from pro-Communist 25X1A parties.
Comment: The Magnani-Cucchi group may well draw support from dissident elements in the Democratic Socialist and Republican Parties, both of whom, although officially linked in an electoral bloc with the Christian Democrats in Rome, are internally divided on this issue. A high-ranking Social Democrat, Andreoni, has already left his party and joined Magnani and Cucchi in leading the MLI list. The Liberals (conservative), however, who are expected to show increased strength in these South Italian elections, are extremely unlikely to quit the Christian Democratic bloc in favor of the MLI.
Although the new Magnani-Cucchi list will damage mainly the Christian Democratic bloc, it may also draw support from a few dissident Communists.
.22.
Netherlands will not present obstacles to signing of Defense ComMunity treaty: Fore gn Minister Stikker of the Netherlands Believes that the cabinet, which meets 16 May to discuss the European Defense Community treaty, probably will agree to sign the treaty even though the problem of the German financial contribution is not solved. The cabinet, however, is likely to take the position that.a satisfactory settlement must be reached before the treaty can be ratified, by the Parliament. Because the Netherlands is reluctant to commit itself for a fifty-year membership in the Defense Community, Stikker is considering proposing as a prerequisite of signature that it have the right to withdraw from the Community should the British (S The Hague 1188, 9 May 52) defense guarantee be discontinued. British Government seen strengthened by Cabinet reshuffle: The American Embassy in London considers that Prime Minister Churchill's first cabinet reorganization should strengthen the government. Harry Crookshank, in his new sinecure post of Lord Privy Seal, will be able to devote full time to leadership of the House of Commons where the government's heavy program is running behind schedule. Iain MacLeod, who replaces Crookshank
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as Minister of Health, is an expert on the health service, an able debater, and a close colleague of Chancellor of the Exchequer Butler. Although the new Minister of Transport, Lennox-Boyd, is inexperienced in the transport field, his appointment is expected to aid the program for denationalizing the trucking Henry Hopkinson, who succeeds the able Lennox-Boyd industry. in the increasingly important post of Minister of State for Colonial Affairs, is a close friend of Foreign Secretary Eden, but has had little experience in foreign affairs.
The Colonial not like the work

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Comment: Churchill has made a significant gesture of recognition to the back bench Conservatives in his new appointMacLeod and Hopkinson are members of the young, more ments. progressive Conservative group which has considered itself inadequately represented in the government.
Embassy comments that Lennox-Boyd will be missed at the Office, stating that, Colonial Secretary Lyttleton does his job and has let Lennox-Boyd carry a large part of (C London 5078, 8 May 52) of the office.
12 May 52
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12 May 1952 US OFFICIALS ONLY

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THE NATIONAL THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING MEANING OF THE STATES WITHIN THE DEFENSE OF THE UNITED AND 794, THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS. 793 MANNER TO AN TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
EASTERN EUROPE
2.
Postponement of EDC Foreign Ministers' meeting is indicated: Community conferThe Italian delegation at the European Defense to schedule the ence would not agree with the other delegates Prime Minfinal Foreign Ministers' meeting for 19 May, because
TOP SECRET
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WESTERN EUROPE
Political feasibility of joint Yugoslav-Greek-Turkish in Belgrade comments staff talks afTirmed: The American-Charge Communist Politburo that continued cohesion in the Yugoslav effectively cope indicates the ability of the Tito regime to to join in military with any party opposition should it decide and Turkey. staff talks with Greece indicated Yugoslav Nonetheless, a high Yugoslav official has with non-Commuunwillingness to enter into military commitments Charge. to the American nist neighbors at this time, according is attributed to the unOne of the reasons for this hesitation NATO command defined status of Greece and Turkey within the exploit its NATO structure, and Yugoslav fears that Italy may 8 (TS S/S Belgrade 1400, membershiP for political purposes. May 52) public Comment: The Yugoslav regime has been preparing Turkey and has and opini671-76F-closer relations with both Greece talks with these counindicated its interest in military staff coasiderations, tries. However, because of internal political for staff talks had Yugoslavia made it clear that the initiative This condition was partially to come from Athens and Ankara. requested the Yugoslav 'met when the Greek Chief of Staff recently of Greece's desire to inform Belgrade Military Attache in Athens for immediate staff talks.
12 May 52
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Comment:
if the EDC are not problem this year.
Germany and Switzerland reach agreement on wartime trading debtrnermany and Switzerland have come to a tentative agreeEUWE over Swiss claims for the one-billion-franc wartime trading debt owed by Germany. The Swiss will now accept 500 million Of this amount, 121.5 million francs will be paid in francs. four yearly installments, 278.5 million in 30 equal annual installments, and the remaining 100 million will be made available by the Swiss as a loan to the German railways. The United -States, Britain, and France feel that this is the most satis(C, S/S Bern 1390, 6 May 52) factory arrangement possible.
Comment: The bilateral solution of this debt represents a significant concession by the Allies to Switzerland, which has been most unreasonable, even threatening to leave the OEEC and the EPU if its claims were not considered. This agreement will not go into effect until the German debt conference is concluded in London and agreement reached on the Washington accord.

TOP SECRET 2
The fact that most of the delegates wanted the meetiniOSThe 19th is the first clear indication that, barring some unforeseen development, the contractual agreement and the EDC treaty--which must be handled together--will not be signed by 20 May. When the Foreign Ministers meet, they will need several additional days to reach final agreement on unresolved provisions of the EDC treaty before the signing can occur.
12
May 52
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2. 2.
American BW BW drop d r o p reported r e p o r t e d by by Chinese Chinese unit: u n i t : A Chinese Communist rocket launcher unit reported Communist l a u n c h e r artillery a r t i l le r y u nit r e p o r t e d on 6 May that plane dropping propaganda (was observed) observed) d ropping.p ropaganda t h a t "an "an enemy p l a n e (was g e r m i c i d a l bombs." bombs." The message continued c o n t i n u e d that that l e a f l e t s and germicidal leaflets "the e r e spread e p r e a d over o v e r an area 150 m e t e r s wide and "the germs w were meters combat in west 600 meters long" long" and that t h a t the"42nd the"42nd Army (in ( i n combat in w est c e n t r a l Korea) was w a s dispatching d i s p a t c h i n g personnel p e r s o n n e l to t o take some specispecicentral mens." (SUEDE (SUEDE 501st 501st C o r n Recon Grp Korea, K-2757, K-2757, 11 1 1 May May 52) 52) mens." Comm
3 3.
Lumbering job job occupies o c c u p i e s Chinese.Communist Chinese Communist artillery a r t i l l e r y unit: unit: Lumbering Communist u unit, possibly On 5 May Kay an a n unidentified u n i d e n t i f i e d .Chinese Chi 11888 Communist nit, p o s s i b l y an an anti-tank o r d e r e d to t o "pull out o u t one a n t i - t a n k artillery a r t i l l e r y battalion, b a t t a l i o n , was Ordered platoon men, from the c o n S i s t i n g of 20 men, t h e fourth f o u r t h company p l a t o o n each, conSisting and the t h e anti-aircraft a n t i - a i r c r a f t company company to t o proceed p r o c e e d to. to. .where they .where they will w i l l assist assist in i n the t h e chopping choppipg and and gathering g a t h e r i n g of of lUmber.". lumber." The w i l l be utilized u t i l i z e d in the the message added added that,"this t h a t " t h i s wood will repairing of installations." installations." (SUEDE 501st.Comm 501st C o r n Recon Grp r e p a i r i n g of (SUEDE Recon'Grp Korea, K-2759, K-2759, 11 1 1 May May 52) 52)
Comment: T h i s is further further e v i d e n c e that t h a t the t h e Communists Comment: This evidence repairing are r e p a i r i n g and building b u i l d i n g semi-permanent semi-permanent facilities. f a c i l i t i e s . While not a conclusive c o n c l u s i v e indication i n d i c a t i o n of of enemy enemy intentions,sit i n t e n t i o n s , i t would. would appear doubtful personnel diverted a ppear d o u b t f u l that t h a t combat p e r s o n n e l would be d i v e r t e d by the unit repair defensive the u n i t commander to t o lumbering lumbering operations o p e r a t i o n s to to r epair d efensive installations were aware aware of of a a pending pending major major offensive. offensive. i n s t a l l a t i o n s if.he i f he were
$4. 4.
.Chinese Chinese a attillery ktillery d division i v i s i o n inactive i n a c t i v e since s i n c e late l a t e Aprill April: The Chinese 2nd A Artfllery r t i l le r y D Division; ivision, r relieved e l i e v e d from from Chinese Communist Communist 2ria i n mid-April, mid-April, instructed,"all i n s t r u c t e d . " a l l regiments" r e g i m e n t s " on 27 April April combat in that 28 April, A p r i l , Division D i v i s i o n station s t a t i o n will w i l l cease t h a t "beginning " b e g i n n i n g 28 contact c o n t a c t with w i t h all a l l stations." stations."
According to E a s t Command, the t h e 2nd 2nd Artillery Artillery t o the t h e Far F a r East.Command, Division as of 9 May. May. FECOM FECOM believes believes D i v i s i o n net n e t had had not n o t reappeared r e a p p e a r e d as that period t h a t this t h i s net n e t being b e i n g closed c l o s e d for f o r an indefinite indefinite p e r i o d indicates indicates

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Comment: a r i o u s North Korean units units r e p o r t e d the the Comment: V Various reported a l l e g e d u s e of bbiological allegga-iiirrof i o l o g i c a l warfare warfare by by tthe he U United nited S States t a t e s earlier earlier i n May. It I t is i s entirely e n t i r e l y possible p o s s i b l e that t h a t these these messages messages may may be be in used to c o n t i n u e the t h e momentum of the t h e Communist BW propaganda used to continue campaign.
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that "no a active operations envisaged for the unit in t h a t "no ctive o p e r a t i o n s were e nvisaged f or t he u nit i n the SIB 499, 9 9 MaY; May; t h e immediate future." future." (SUEDE CINCFE CINCFE.SIB CCM-1109, 52) CCM-1109, 27 27 Apr Apr 52)
Comment: When combat l e m e n t s of t h e 2nd rtillery combat e elements the 2nd A Artillery r e l i e v e d in i n west central c e n t r a l Korea by elements elements D ivisio n were relieved Divis on 1st Artillery Artillery D i v i s i o n between 20 and 24 April, A p r i l , it it o f the t h e 1st of Division was w a s speculated s p e c u l a t e d that t h a t the t h e 2nd 2nd Artillery A r t i l l e r y might remain r e m a i n in i n combat. combat. I t now ppears t hat t he d ivision h a s been It now a appears that the division has been withdrawn withdrawn from the t h e front. front.
5. 5.
'6.
7. 7.

:t
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Record number of Chinese C h i n e s e jet j e t divisions d i v i s i o n s believed believed based a l y s i s of messages passed p a s s e d on on the the b a s e d on o n Korean border: b o r d e r : An Analysis C h i n e s e Communist ground-controlled g r o u n d - c o n t r o l l e d intercept i n t e r c e p t net n e t during during Chinese April indicates i n d i c a t e s that t h a t four f o u r Chinese Communist MIG-15 MIG-15 d ivisions divisions are based b a s e d on on Manchurian Manchurian fields f i e l d s near n e a r the t h e Yalu Yalu River. R i v e r . They t h e 4th 4 t h Division D i v i s i o n probably p r o b a b l y at a t Antung, Antung, the t h e 6th 6 t h and 17th 17th are the at a t Tatungkou, and and the t h e 12th 1 2 t h at a t Takushan. Takushan. (SUEDE USA-38 AP Ap 741, 741, 9 May 52) 52) Comment: Four Chinese jet Jet d i v i s i o n s are the t h e largest largest divisions n o t e d in i n this t h i s area, area, and and they t h e y represent r e p r e s e n t a doubling d o u b l i n g of number noted strength s t r e n g t h since s i n c e February. February.
I n a d d i t i o n to t o these t h e s e four f o u r divisions, d i v i s i o n s , with w i t h an a n average a v e r a g e of of In addition b e l i e v e d to t o be g n e Korean and three three planes each, gne 50 p lanes e a c h , there are believed Soviet WIG-15 units, u n i t s , of of unknown unknown strength, s t r e n g t h , in i n the I h e Antung area. area. S o v i e t MIG-15
.Soviet jet unit Soviet J et u n i t indicated i n d i c a t e d at a t Mukden: Several S e v e r a l messages messages in e a r l y May reported r e p o r t e d flights f l i g h t s of of as as many many as a s 34 34 "allied" ltallied" in early MIG-15's MIG-15's on on-round-robin round-robin flights f l i g h t s at a t Mukden. Wukden, R u s s i a n flight flight Russian l e a d e r s were mentioned. (SUEDE leaders (SUEDE USA-38 AP 741, 741, 9 May; Air May; Air Force F o r c e Roundup Roundup 92, 92, 12 1 2 May May 52) 52)
p r o v i d e the t h e first f i r s t indication i n d i c a t i o n of Comment: These messages provide Comment: a Soviet S o v l e t MIC-15 M I 6-15 unit u n i t at a t Mukden. Mukden. Soviet S o v i e t MIG's M I G ' s are also based based at a t Antung, Anshan Anshan and and Tungfeng. Tungfeng. The ones o n e s at a t Antung Antung and and Anshan have flown combat missions Korea, but b u t the the m i s s i o n s over o v e r Korea, function of the t h e units u n i t s at a t Tungfeng and and Mukden is I s not n o t yet yet f u n c t i o n of determined. determined.
Chinese policy" C h i n e s e admit a d m i t Pmishandling ?'mishandling of of p o l i c y t 1 in i n san-fan san-f a n campaign:. A 15 April from Chinese "volunteer" "volunteer p r i l message from.Chinese headquarters =er: in Korea torea deals d e a l s with w i t h "cases "cases of of suicide s u i c i d e and ani
13 May 52 52
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self-mutilation resulting resulting from from mishandling of of policy policy and and during the the san-fan san-fan campaign campaign among among extortion of evidence" during "volunteer" forces. lvvolunteerll forces
The report has been sent to to "all *la11 party committees" committees'* with with the explicit aim of preventing the recurrence recurrence of such such incidents. (SUEDE incidents. (SUEDE Chinese Chinese Communist Communist Military Military Identifications Bulletin No. 69, 69, CC/CAP-217, CC/CAP-217, 7 7 May May 52) 52) Comment: An intercepted Intercepted message of of early early February February the establishment of of a a "quota" rcquotall of major major and and minor minor revealed the of offenders to be discovered in each llvolunteerll "volunteer" unit unit during during the campaign against corruption, corruption, waste waste and and bureaucracy. bureaucracy. Moreover, Moreover, all units were urged to exceed exceed the established established quotas. 15 April report confirms confirms that that this this misuse misuse of of the the The 15 of quota system, in in particular encouraging encouraging fabrication fabrication of resulted as as expected expected in in new new expressions expressions of of evidence, has resulted corruption, waste, and and bureaucracy. bureaucracy.
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Korean border: border: Record number of Chinese jet divisions believed based on Korean Analysis of of messages passed on the Chinese US A i r For Chinese US Air Force ice Communistground-controlled ground-controlled intercept intercept net Communist 9 May 52 52 during April indicates that four fourChinese Chinese CommuCommuSUEDE v A Pnist MIG-15 divisions are based on qsfi- 37 PP -7 7V/ fl MIG-15 divisions on Manchurian fields are the 4th Division Dtvision probably probably at atAntung, Antung, fields near near the the Yalu Yalu River. They They are the 4th 6th and 17th at Tatungkou, Tatungkou, and the 12th 12th at at Takushan. Takushan. the 6th
Comment: Comment: Four Chinese jet divisions are the the largest largest number number noted noted in this area, and andthey they represent representaadoubling doubling of strength since February.
In addition addition to to these these four four divisions, with In with an an average of 50 planes each, there there are arebelieved believed to to be be one one Korean Korean and three units, of of unknown unknown strength, strength, in the Antung Antung area. area. Soviet MIG-15 units,
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Communist u n i t in i n Korea has e pidemic o u t b r e a k : An Communist unit epidemic outbreak: unidentified Ko r e a n unit, u n i t , probably p r o b a b l y an an antiaircraft antiahcraft u n i d e n t i f ied North Korean artillery a r t i l l e r y battalion b a t t a l i o n in i n eastern e a s t e r n Korea, reported on o n 8 May that "on the day, patients suddenly t h a t "on t h e 6th 6 t h and 7th 7th d a y , 17 17 p atients s u d d e n l y came down with wi%h a a high h i g h fever." f e v e r . " (SUEDE (SUEDE USM-664, USM-664, Korea, Korea, SK-J-225, SK-J-225, 8 May May 52) 52)
This communicaComment: T h i s is the t h e first f i r s t indication i n d i c a t i o n in i n communications y e a r of of disease d i s e a s e in i n epidemic e p i d e m i c proporproport i o n s intelligence i n t e l l r g e n c e this t h i s year tions t i o n s among among Communist Communist units u n i t s in i n North N o r t h Korea.' Korea.
12. 12.
C h i n e s e move antiaircraft a n t i a i r c r a f t artillery a r t i l l e r y nearer n e a r e r Korean front: front: Chinese An unidentified u n l d e n t i f i e d Chinese Chi n s s e Communist-antiaircraft Communist a n t i a i r c r a f t unit, u n i t , probably probab3y i n the t h e Singye S i n g y e area of of west central c e n t r a l Korea, located in Korea, in referring r e f e r r i n g to t o "the * * t h e38th 3 8 t h Army's Army's Independent Independent 2nd Battalion" Battalionv1 reported 6 May: May: "at "at the t h e present p r e s e n t time time that t h a t battalion's battalion's r e p o r t e d on on 6 commander accompanied accompanied by by one o n e company company has h a s arrived." a.rrived.lI A little day, reported l i t t l e later l a t e r on the t h e same d a y , this t h i s unit unit r e p o r t e d that t h a t "as the t h e 38th 3 8 t h Army's small s m a l l antiaircraft a n t i a i r c r a f t artillery a r t i l l e r y units, u n i t s , and and the proceededforward t o assume t h e llth 1 1 t h Battalion B a t t a l i o n have have already already p r o c e e d e d f o r w a r d to t h e defenSive d e f e n s i v e duties d u t i e s of of the t h e 1st 1st and and 3rd 3 r d companies. companies. 11 the ." T h i s message'cOntinued message c o n t i n u e d that t h a t the t h e 1st 1st and and 3rd 3rd companies companies which This were were relieved r e l i e v e d by by the t h e 38th 3 8 t h Army Army AAA M A Battalion B a t t a l i o n 'I. . w i l l be .will deployed. .with . w i t h their t h e i r principal p r i n c i p a l duty. d u t y . . .the'direction . t h e d i r e c t i o n of of deployed. fire ." (SUEDE f i r e upon enemy enemy aircraft. aircraft. " (SUEDE USM-664, USM-664, Korea, Korea, K-2731 and and K-2732, K-2732, 10 10 May May 52) 52)
.
Other O t h e r intelligence i n t e l l i g e n c e sources, s o u r c e s , however, however, have have indicated indicated relatively high a r elatively h i g h incidence i n c i d e n c e of communicable diseases d i s e a s e s in in North N o r t h Korea.
.
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13. 13.
Comment: Comment: The 38th 3 8 t h Chinese C h i n e s e Communist Army is is believed believed located l o c a t e d in i n the t6e Sunchon Sunchon area, area, northeast n o r t h e a s t of of Pyongyang. Pyongyang. The The deployment of of its i t s organic o r g a n i c antiaircraft a n t i a i r c r a f t battalion b a t t a l i o n to t o an an area in i n the t h e immediate immediate rear of of the t h e front f r o n t lines l i n e s gives g i v e s further further evidence e v i d e n c e of of the t h e increasing i n c r e a s i n g importance i m p o r t a n c e attached a t t a c h e d to t o antiair-, antiairc r a f t defenses d e f e n s e s in i n the t h e combat craft combat zone. zone. It'does I t d o e s not' n o t appear that appear that the t h e bulk b u l k of of the t h e 38th 3 8 t h Army Army will w i l l follow f o l l o w this t h i s AAA AAA battalion. battalion.
N o r t h Korean unit u n i t well w e l l supplied s u p p l i e d with w i t h food food despite despite North reduction Every man man iin the 2 21st Antiaircraft r e d u c t i o n in i n meat meat ration: r a t i o n : ' Every n the 1st A ntiaircraft A r t i l l e r y Regiment will w i l l be be provided p r o v i d e d with w i t h 150 150 grams grams of of salt salt Artillery
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a month "to " t o use u s e for f o r toothpaste" t o o t h p a s t e f 1 but b u t 50 grams of of meat will will be deducted d e d u c t e d from the t h e month's month's ration, r a t i o n , according a c c o r d i n g to t o a 10 10 May North message eoncluded c o n c l u d e d that t h a t "there "there N o r t h Korean message. The message need.to food beginnin is no need t o save s a v e the t h e main and auxiliary auxiliary f ood b eginnin on the (SUEDE USM-664, 15RSM t h e first f i r s t of of May." Yay." (SUEDE USM-664, Korea,Korea ,-I .!jRSB.r73 280, 3280, 11 May 52) 11 52)
Comment: D e s p i t e .the the c u r t a i l m e n t of meat, meat, .which which is Despite curtailment of of m minor i n importance r t a n c e in i n the t h e soldier's s o l d i e r ' s diet, d i e t , the t h e above message demonstrates d e m o n s t r a t e s further f u r t h e r the t h e continued c o n t i n u e d logistical logistical success s u c c e s s of the t h e Communists, Communists,
14. 14.
T h i s message suggests s u g g e s t s that that p o s s i b l y a small small Comment: This possibly virtually amount of commercial fertilizer, f e r t i l i z e r , known to t o be v irtually u n o b t a i n a b l e by the unobtainable t h e average a v e r a g e North N o r t h Korean farmer, f a r m e r , is is being being imported. Other possibilities fertilizer ther p o s s i b i l i t i e s are that t h a t this this f ertilizer imported. O s t o c k p i l e d in i n some some isolated i s o l a t e d area area or or that that a a small s m a l l amount amount was stockpiled is being b e i n g produced in i n the t h e Hungnam-Hamhung area, area, the the former f o r m e r center c e n t e r of of North Korea's Korea's extensive e x t e n s i v e tertilizer f e r t i l i z e r industry. industry.
15 15.
More gas gas masks needed by by Communist artillery a r t i l l e r y unit u n i t in in Korea: The 7th Korea: 7 t h Chinese Ch' i n e s e Communist Arfillery A r t i l l e r y Division D i v i s i o n headheadquar'ters informed upply e l e m e n t on 7 May that t h a t personnel personnel TIVifTers informed its its s supply element were going g o i n g to to Antung Antung "to " t o request r e q u e s t gas gas masks," masks." .The The message message continued c o n t i n u e d that t h a t two two vehicles v e h i c l e s were being b e i n g prepared p r e p a r e d by the the transportation t o transport t r a n s p o r t the t h e masks. masks. t r a n s p o r t a t i o n company, company, possibly p o s s i b l y to (SUEDE (SUEDE 501st.Comm 5 0 1 s t Corn Recon Recon Grp Grp Korea, Korea, K-2762, K-2762, 11 1 1May May 52) 52)
16. 16.
Comment: On 22 22 March,the M a r c h , t h e 7th 7 t h Artillery A r t i l l e r y Division Division .Comment: received S u gas rgas masks, masks, the r e c e i v e d 50 t h e first f i r s t receipt r e c e i p t of of anti-gas a n t i - g a s equipequipment noted Korea. These masks, masks, probably p r o b a b l y intended i n t e n d e d for n o t e d in i n Korea. training t r a i n i n g purposes, p u r p o s e s , were distributed d i s t r i b u t e d to t o the t h e artillery artillery regiments r e g i m e n t s subordinate s u b o r d i n a t e to t o the t h e 7th 7 t h Artillery A r t i l l e r y on on 2 2 April. April.
North Korean Air scheduled A i r Force F o r c e "lecture" l*lecturevl s c h e d u l e d for 12 May at Between two I n a 6 May 1 2 Ma? a t Sinuiju: Sin u i j u : In May message message passed, p a s s e d between two unidentified a i r units, units, u n i d e n t i f i e d and and unlocated u n l o c a t e d North N o r t h Korean Korean air
7 7 14 14 May 52 52
S m a l l amount of fertilizer f e r t i l i z e r pay impokted into into N orth Small may be imported North North unidentified A N o r t h Korean message passed between two two u nidentified un'i-t;son 9 May statel3 t h a"they t "they haveleaded" loaded" 130 130 bags b a g s of of angon 9 May stateS that have fertilizer f e r t i l i z e r at at a a smal smal n in i n the t h e Hungnam Hungnam area. area. (SUEDE (SUEDE 11 USM-664,"ACorea,15RSM USM-664 ,"', Korea, l S R S Y ~ L o 3281, ~ 1 1 May 52) 52)
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individual was instructed:"since there a n i n d i v i d u a l was instructed: "since t h e r e is a lecture lecture an 1 2 May, from 12 May, you are are to t o arrive a r r i v e at a t Sinuiju S i n u i j u by 11 1 1 May." May." The message message was USM-35, Korea, Korea, ALT-024, was garbled. g a r b l e d . (SUEDE USM-35, ALT-024, 10 52) 1 0 May 52)
Comment: immediate significance s i g n i f i c a n c e can c a n be Comment: While no immediate attached a t t a c h eto d t this h i s meeting, m e e t i n g , the t h e enemy in i n Korea has h a s always preceded p r e c e d e d a major operation o p e r a t i o n with with a a series of of high h i g h echelon echelon o f f i c i a l conferences. conferences. official
17.
Another Chinese jet j e t division d i v i s i o n may move to t o Antung airfield: Ch i n e s e message scheduled s c h e d u l e d 22 M1G-151s MXG-13's of the the a i r f i e l d : A Chinese 31737511711iion from Mukden t to Antung o on'13 3 r d D i v i s i o n from Mukden o Antung n 13 May.May..' This T h i s 'flight ?light
Comment: The 3rd 3 r d Division D i v i s i o n flew f l e w combat missions at at Comment: Antung,'from mid-October 1951 1951 to t o mid-January mid-January 1952, 1952, when it it Antuni7HUE-Eid-October r e t u r n e d to returned t o Mukden. Mukden. Although it i t may be moving into i n t o the the Antung area area to t o replace replace one one of of the t h e units u n i t s now now based based there, there, there no indications i n d i c a t i o n s yet y e t that t h a t any any are are moving out. out. t h e r e are no MLG-15 divisions, d i v i s i o n s , averaging a v e r a g i n g 50 50 planes p l a n e s each, each, Four Chinese C h i n e s e MIG-15 and one,Korean oviet u n i t s are e l i e v e d to be Korean and and three three S Soviet units are b believed a l r e a d y based in i n the t h e Antung Antung area. area. already
may be a u unit nit t transfer,accordingto r a n s f e r , a c c o r d i n g , , t o the t h e reporting r e p o r t i n g agency, agency, which comments that t h a t after a f t e r this t h i s move there t h e r e will w i l l be at a t least least j e t s on on Yalu Yalu River R i v e r bases. b a s e s . (SUEDE 347 jets USA-38 AP (SUEDE USA-38 AP 782, 782, 12 May 52) I2 52)
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The USAF USAF reports r e p o r t s that that aircraft a i r c r a f t to t o date d a t e have have been been This message suggests s u g g e s t s that that This w i l l increase i n c r e a s e his h i s AA AA which will
5 5
More effective e f f e c t i v e Communist training trainipg w i t h AA rockets with reported repor%ed in i n Korea: .Korea: A garbled g a r b l e d and and fraginentary f r a g ' m e n t a r y Chinese CornuChinese Communist May states an unidentified&.ommunist unident1fiedCommunist n i s t message of 4 M ay s t a t e s tthat h a t an u n i t commenced commeGced antiaircraft a n t i a i r c r a f t firing f i r i n g on 3 May w i t h Giuipment unit with equipment t e n t a t i v e l y identified tentatively i d e n t i f i e d by translation t r a n s l a t i o n as "rockbt l t r o q k e t launchers." l a u n c h e r s .*l of%ammunition at The unit u n i t reported r e p o r t e d that t h a t it it expended rounds of',ammunition at various v a r i o u s altitudes a l t i t u d e s from from 10,800 1 0 , 6 0 0 to t o 24,600 24,600 feet. f e e t . The message s t a t e d further f u r t h e r that t h a t two two of of the t h e launchers l a u n c h e r s "performed "performed splendidly". splendidly" stated t h a t it i t was e stimated t h a t "we "we e ither h i t and r and that estimated that either hit and damaged damaged o or hit h i t and dropped" dropped" each e a c h of of the t h e targets. t a r g e t s . (SUEDE 501st 501st Comm Recon Grp G r p Korea, K-2752, K-2752, 11 11 May May 52) 52)
Comment: e p o r t , as r eceived, i ndicates t hat t he Comment: This r report, received, indicates that the C ommum r c e s are are training training w i t h AA r ockets p ossessing Communist forces with rockets possessing v e r t i c a l range and accuracy a c c u r a c y chatacteristics c h a P a c t e r i s t i c s in i n excess of those vertical of those of any known known Soviet S o v i e t or o r Chinese Chinese rocket. r o c k e t . During the t h e last l a s t three three months, there s i g h t i n g s of Communist months, t h e r e have been a series of sightings AB rockets r o c k e t s at a t steadily s t e a d i l y increasing i n c r e a s i n g vertical v e r t i c a l ranges, ranges, b u t this this AA but is t the h e first f i r s t indication i n d i c a t i o n of of a ground-launched ground-launched rocket rocket a attaining ttaining 24,600 feet. feet.
rockets r o c k e t s directed d i r e c t e d against a g a i n s t UN UN ineffective i n e f f e c t i v e and and inaccurate. inaccurate. t h e enemy may have new equipment the capability. capability.
15 May 52
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12. Higher e c h e l o n expresses e x p r e s s e s interest i n t e r e s t in in Hi her North Korean echelon intercep i n t e r c e p te. e d UN message: The day SW ng olld ain g t h e 9 M ay report report ay Po Orthe of t h eRorth North Korean Ko r e a n 23rd 23rd Brigade Brigade Commander Commander that t h a t he had i n t e r c e p t e d a UN message r evealing o perational p l a n s in intercepted revealing operational plans w e s t e r n Korea, Korea, an an unidentified u n i d e n t i f i e d North Korean unit, u n i t , probably probably western IV Corps h eadquarters, q ueried " let m e know he r egiheadquarters, queried "let me know where where t the regiment commander caught c a u g h t the t h e enemy wireless communication telegram." telegram." (SUEDE 15th 1 5 t h RSM D Det e t 1, 1 , 15RSM/12241, 11 1 1 May May 52) 52)
,
t h i s intercepted i n t e r c e p t e d UN Comment: The interest i n t e r e s t evoked by this Comment: message messairaWa-the and t h e method method of of handling h a n d l i n g it it suggests s u g g e s t s that t h a t these these N o r t h Korean military m i l i t a r y units, at a t least, least, do not n o t have access to to North i n t e l l i g e n c e derived d e r i v e d from from UN communications. communications. intelligence
13. 13
14. 14
N o r t h Korean Korean regiment r e g i m e n t receives r e c e i v e s artillery a r t i l l e r y ammunition: ammunition: North The commander of an unidentified u n i d e n t i f i ed North NorthIorean Korean regiment, regiment, p o s s i b l y the t h e 21st 2 1 s t Antiaircraft A n t i a i r c r a f t ArtillerY, A r t i l l e r y , received received a a message message possibly on 10 May s t a t i n g that t h a t "1,400 "1,400 76 mm" s h e l l s and 96,050 96,050 armor stating mm" shells p i e r c i n g shells s h e l l s had arrived a r r i v e d at a t the piercing t h e "field " f i e l d ammunition ammunition depot." depot." a d d i t i o n a l truckloads t r u c k l o a d s of ammunition ammunition were to t o be delivered delivered Ten additional t o the t h e regiment regiment "this " t h i s evening," e v e n i n g , " according a c c o r d i n g to t o the t h e originator. originator. to (SUEDE USH USM 664, (SUEDE 664, SK-J-320, SK-5-320, 11 1 1 May 52) 52)
t h e 21st N o r t h Korean AAA Regiment Comment: On 5 May, Comment: May, the North w a s ordered o r d e r e d in ina a ."top " t o p secret" o e s t a b l i s h an an was secret" message message t to establish ammunition depot in the t h e Wonsan-Hamhung Wonsan-Hamhung area. area. T h i s apparently apparently d e p o t in This is the t h e first f i r s t arrival a r r i v a l of ammunition at a t the t h e newly established established antiaircraft a n t i a i r c r a f t artillery a r t i l l e r y depot. depot.
Unknown,Chinese Unknown Chinese unit u n i t moving moving to t o the t h e Korean Korean front: f r o n t : An unidentitie4 q cChinese h in e s e COMmunist Conlmunist wait u n i t in in western w e s t e r n Korea, possibly possibly u n i d e n t i f ie antiaircriftsartillery unit, n i t , was advised a d v i s e d on 5 May that that an a ntiaircraft artillery u llyour s u b m i t t e d plan p l a n failed.to f a i l e d ' t o advise a d v i s e us u s at; ah t o what t i m e you "your submitted to what time intended t o move. .you w will ill p please lease s submit ubmit a r report e p o r t prior prior i n t e n d e d to to t o any move you make that that w we e may send s e n d representatives r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s forward t o control c o n t r o l the t h e move move and and the t h e traffic t r a f f i c on on the t h e road. road. ft to ." (SUEDE 501st 501at Comm Corn Recon Recon Grp Grp Korea, Korea, K-2737, K-2737, 11 1 1May May 52) 52) (SUEDE
..
Comment: refers to t o the t h e recently recently Comment: This T h i s message possibly refers n o t e d w d deployment deployment of of small small Chinese Chinese antiaircraft antiaircraft noted-Y5FREd artillery w e s t e r n Korea. Korea. The The statement s t a t e m e n t that t h a t traffic traffic a r t i l l e r y units u n i t s in i n western control a n indication indication c o n t r o l would be instituted, i n s t i t u t e d , however, however, may be an that t h a t a larger l a r g e r unit u n i t is i s on on the t h e move. move.
15 52 15 May 52
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Chinese in Korea short s h o r t of skilled s k i l l e d ordnance o r d n a n c e repairmen: repairmen: "The 27 Large Depothhas no sstilled weapons and motor molor '?The go.l. bo.: 27 La r g e Depo"t a s no k i l led weapons per80nnel't a712 May intercept i n t e r c e p t from a Chinese regiment regiment personnel" ar12 revealed. s a i d , "We have r received e c e i v e d 60 motor r e v e a l e d . The message said, c y l i n d e r repair r e p a i r orders o r d e r 8 and are hoping to t o recruit r e c r u i t qualified qualified cylinder own regiment. ;regiment. e I t will e q u i r e two p e r s o n n e l from from vur 'our own personnel It will r require t i m e to t o complete c o m p l e t e (backlogged (backlogged orders?)." orders?)." (SUEDE months time 501st (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Recon Grp Grp Korea, Korea, K-2788, K-2788, 12 12 May May 52) 52) Comm
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Comment: s t i m a t e d to t o have Comment: The Chinese Communists are e estimated i n Korea Korea since s i n c e December. December. recei-0 a d d i t i o n a l vehicles v e h i c l e s in received 5000 additional T h i s message may be be the t h e first f i r s t sign sign that t h a t this t h i s sudden increase increase This t r a n s p o r t is seriously s e r i o u s l y taxing t a x i n g their t h e i r maintenance i n motor transport in c a p a b i l i t i e s . The 27th 2 7 t h "Large "Large Depot," f o u r logistical logistical capabilities. Depot," one of of four r e g i m e n t s in regiments in the t h e 4th 4 t h Supply Supply Area, Area,would would o ordinarily r d i n a r i l y be responsresponsible i b l e for for major motor repair r e p a i r orders. orders. It would seem seem that t h a t the the f o r c e d to t o recruit r e c r u i t its own p ersonnel r e p o r t i n g regiment r e g i m e n t has h a s been forced reporting personnel for f o r this t h i s work.
15 May 52
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Chinese r rice imports by N N9r0 Chineste ice i m p o r t s by w $ h Koreans Koreans suggested: s u g g e s t e d : The The p o l i t i c a l comMander comrdander of of an an4111.4entilied D&iQ e n t i f l e d . North political North Korean Korean supply supply unit, p possib1y ;pit, o s s i b J y on the t h e east coast, Coast, has,according h a s , a c c o r d i n g to to a a 30 30 April April meettage "issued a ad directive receive ffifty freight cars of of meshage !'issued i r e c t i v e tto o receive ifty f r e i g h t cars A later l a t e r message on on 9 9 May, May, Hamyong-Namdo ProVince." rice at q t Hamyong-&amdo Province." also passed between two t w o unidentified u n i d e n t i f i e d North Korean units, units, that stated t h a t "management *9nanagsment of the t h e Manchurian rice should s h o u l d not n o t be (SUEDE 501bt Grp taken pare (of) taken-re (of) by this t h i e place." p l a c e . * # (BUEDE OOlbt ComM Conuii Reo-On ReEon G rp .Korea, SK-J7335, 12 May; 15th Detl .Korea, SK-37335, p2 Yay; l S t h RSM D e t l Korea 15RSM/12392,14 15RSM/12392,14 May52) May 52)
Comment: C o d e n t : Although fragmentary f r a p e n t a r y and inconclusive, inconclusive, these these messaiTg-Iiiad confirmation to prisoner massages l e n d c onfirmation t o p r i s o n e r and agent a g e n t reports reports that being t h a t rice r i c e for for military m i . l i t g f y .conSumption'As .conbumption' is b e i n g ilported imported v i a the east e a s t coast rail r a i l line. line.

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7. 7 .
North Korean west w e s t coast coast tactical t a c t i c a l unit u n i t short s h o r t of.officers: of o f f i c e r s : A major North Korean ICo r e a n tactical t a c t i c a l unit, u n i t , probably p r o b a b l y subordinate s u b o r d i n a t e io to the westerd Korea, comp&ained comPlained in April t h e IV Corps in w e s t e r n Korea, i n a 30 A pril message that t h a t "the " t h e paper paper wdrk work on on the t h e recommendations for a p p l i c a n t s to t o the Kangkon M i l i t a r y Academy c a n n o t be applicants Military cannot be done before 30 30 April,. A p r i l , because han h a l f of h e heavy because more more tthan half of t the heavy machine gun platoon p l a t o o n leaders. leaders. .are eing t rained. .at t h e 5th 5th .are b being trained. .at the Division." Division." A f t e r further further q uestioning a p ossible n evision After questioning possible revision i n the .in t h e quota q u o t a of p personnel e r s o n n e l to t o be s sent ent t to o t the h e North North Korean Korean "West Point," P o i n t , " the t h e sender s e n d e r continued c o n t i n u e d that t h a t "we "we should s h o u l d have 3 intelligence i n t e l l i g e n c e officers,.but o f f i c e r s , b u t Since s i n c e 2 are p resently b eing presently being t r a i n e d we trained w e have have only o n l y 11officer.. o f f i c e r . Although w e have vacancies vacancies we f o r 2 infantry'company i n f a n t r y company commanders, commanders, we have n o t been allotted allotted for not a single s i n g l e replacement." replacement." (SUEDE USM-86, SPOT SPOT 3434A, 10 10 May May 52) 52)
.
.
.
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Comment: crltical o f f i c e r shortage is Comment: Although no critidal officer d e m o n s t r a t e d in i n this t h i s message, message, the t h e lack lack of o fficer r eplacedemonstrated officer replacem e n t s and and the t h e training t r a i n i n g status s t a t u s of of many many of of the t h e unit'sjunior unit'sjunior ments o f f i c e r personnel p e r s o n n e l indicate i n d i c a t e that t h a t the t h e unit u n i t is not c urrently officer currently p r e p a r e d for prepared for combat combat operations.. operations, East coast North Korean tactical tactical u n i t has mid-May unit mid-May inspection: North inspection: A N o r t h Korean.tactical Ko r e a n t a c t i c a l unit, u n i t , possibly possibly a a s u b o r d i n a t e of of the t h e V Corps Corps in i n the t h e Wonaan-Hamhung Wonaan-Hamhuna area of subordinate eastern e a s t e r n Korea, stated s t a t e d in i n -a a 12 1 2 May message that t h a t "lf ;if you d e l i v e r the t h e division's d i v i s i o n ' s orders deliver orders since s i n c e there is is an a n inspection inspection m e e t i n g on o n 14 1 4 May, May, you you are meeting a r e to t o arrive a r r i v e at a t diVision. division. , b y the the ,by e v e n i n g of 13 May." May." (SUEDE ALT-225, 12 1 2 May May 52) 52) evening' of 13 (SUEDE USM-35, Korea ALT-225,
.
8. 8.
Comment: This T h i s inspection i n s p e c t i o n may be a c o n t i n u a t i o n of the the continuation series of i n s p e c t i o n s started s t a r t e d by the t h e North Korean G eneral seria-BT-IiiiPections General Headquarters in early e a r l y April. April. T This h i s is is the t h e first f i r s t noted noted H e a d q u a r t e r s in i n c i d e n t of a tactical t a c t i c a l unit u n i t being b e i n g inspected. inspected. incident
Evacuation E v a c u a t i o n policy p o l i c y for f o r Chinese Chinese wounded wounded in in Korea: Korea: Only men "who sustain than s u s t a i n heavy wounds to t o the t h e pofnt p o i n t where more than two months convalescence required, who r recover c o n v a l e s c e n c e is r e q u i r e d , or who e c o v e r from their t h e i r wounds but b u t with w i t h lasting l a s t i n g defects d e f e c t s rendering r e n d e r i n g them them unfit unfit for f o r service" s e r v i c e q 1can c a n be be transferred t r a n s f e r r e d to t o division d i v i s i o n medical m e d i c a l units, units, according t o an an 11 1 1 May May Chinese Chinese Communist Communist message. message. Ttle Tpe a c c o r d i n g to battalion communication noted n o t e d that t h a t six s i x men in i n the the b a t t a l i o n were qualified q u a l i f i e d to t o receive r e c e i v e the t h e wounded soldiers'compensation soldiers'compensation benefit. 501st Korea, K-2768, K-2768, 11 (SUEDE 5 0 1 s t Comm Recon Grp Korea, 1 1 May 52) 52) benefit.
9. 9.
Comment: Comment: T This h i s strict s t r i c t evacuation evacuation r rule u l e was announced announded in in answei775-i-request for instructions i n s t r u c t i o n s by by a a subordinate s u b o r d i n a t e unit. unit. a n s w e m r e q u e s t for
16 May 52 52 16
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I f i t r epresents a g eneral p olicy, i t may eveal i nadequate If it represents general policy, it may r reveal inadequate medical facilities f a c i l i t i e s for f o r wounded wounded soldiers s o l d i e r s in i n rear rear areas. areas. The f a c t that t h a t the t h e Communists Communists are are awarding wounded soldiers s o l d i e r s at a t the the fact f r o n t "compensation benefits" b e n e f i t s v qin i n the t h e form of of extra extra r ations front rations be further f u r t h e r evidence e v i d e n c e of of an an insufficient i n s u f f i c i e n t hospitalization hospitalization may be c apability. capability.
10 10.
Comment: Elements of Division, aomment; of the t h e 1st 1st Korean D i v i s i o n , the t h e only only , known Korean jet j e t unit, u n i t , are are also also believed b e l i e v e d based based at a t Antung. Antung. knownK5FFWW M M1G-15's I G - 1 5 ' s and LA-11's, LA-ll's, usually u s u a l l y under Efimov's Efimov's command, have been flying f l y i n g night n i g h t missions m i s s i o n s over o v e r Korea since s i n c e late l a t e January, January, b u t have not n o t been a a serious s e r i o u s threat t h r e a t to t o UN air a i r night n i g h t operations. operations. but
t Anshan in and Soviet S . o v i e tjets j e t s uunusually n u s u a l l y active Korean and active a at Anshan in Manchuria: Jet Jet tetivity a c t i v i t y at a t Anshan, Anshan. 2T 25 miles m i l e s south s o u t h of of Mukden, Mukden. Manchuria: on 14 14 and and 15 15 May included: included: a a round-robin roundLrobin flight f l i g h t of 23 23 MIG-15's, MIG-lS;s, believed subordinate s u b o r d i n a t e to t o the t h e 1st 1st North Korean Division; Division; a a s c h e d u l e d night n i g h t flight f l i g h t from from Anshan to t o Antung of eleven e l e v e n more scheduled M M1G's I G ' s under Efimov's command; and and a a daytime flight f l i g h t over Kdrea Kdrea of 14 1 4 M1G-15's M I G - 1 5 v s with with a a Russian R u s s i a n flight f l i g h t leader. l e a d e r . Efimov also a l s o led led a f flight l i g h t of LA-11 LA-11 conventional c o n v e n t i o n a l fighters f i g h t e r s the the n night i g h t of of 13 13 May, possibly p o s s i b l y on on an an interception i n t e r c e p t i o n mission m i s s i o n over o v e r Korea. Korea. (SUEDE Air Air (SUEDE F o r c e Roundup Force Roundup 94, 94, 14 1 4 May May 52) 52)
NR
NR
16 1 6 May 52 52
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SUEDE 13-SEGliET SUEDE
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16 May 1952
US OFFICIALS ONLY
OCI No. 5182

Copy No.
267
OSD, DOS Declassification/Release Instructions on File

not represent a complete coverage of all current reports received. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.

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GENERAL
1.
Britain has been pressing the French Embassy in an effort to minimize French objections to the American proposal. (S London 5177, 14 May 52) Britain objects to the American proposal for basinTiFiga forces on population percentages because it apparently favors the Western powers, including the Commonwealth countries, over the Soviet bloc. France, evidently not counting some of the countries of South Asia on the Western side, believes that the American proposal favors
the Soviet bloc.
Comment:
2.
Britain does not believe that the USSR will accept any disarmament proposal, and is interested primarily in gaining the propaganda initiative.
Communistsintensifypeace campaign among religious groups: Protestant and Catholic Church leaders from Austria, Denmark, Finland, Syria, the Netherlands, and Bulgaria attended a conference of Christian, Moslem, and Buddhist religious leaders of the USSR held from 9 to 12 May at Zagorsk, near Moscow. The conference approved a letter to Stalin, an appeal to the World Peace Council, and an appeal to "churches, religious organizations, clergy, and believers
SECRET
1
Britain urges prompt coordination on American disarmament proposal: The Foreign Office, fearing that Britain may be unable to support the United States in the UN Disarmament Commission, requests urgent consideration of British objections to the American proposal so that the West can present a solid front at next month's meetings of the commission. The Foreign Office emphasizes that the cabinet will have to decide the British position soon, and that Anglo-American agreement is necessary to gain maximum propaganda value from the commission's. work.
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in religion of all the world," which repeated all the subjects currently being exploited by Soviet-Communist propaganda, particularly the peace lines. (R Moscow 1813,
13 MaY .52)
Attendance at the Zagorsk conference is believed to have fallen below Communist hopes; but continued efforts were forecast by one of the speakers, who stated that the time had come for a world congress of religious leaders of all countries to discuss the question of the defense of world peace.
SOVIET UNION
3.
Soviet Union purchases raw cotton from Pakistan: Some firm deals have been made between the USSR and Pakistan, according to Amjad Ali, a Pakistan delegate to the Moscow Economic Conference and a member of the Pakistan delegation to the UN. He said the Soviet Union had placed a small order for raw Pakistani cotton, and that delivery had already (C New York 817, 14 May 52) been made.
Comment: While such an order may be only a token purchase on thrTiFT-51 the USSR, it serves to strengthen Moscow's propaganda on its desire for enlarged trade. It also points up an increasing Soviet effort to expand commercial relations in the South Asia area.
4.
Bulgaria continues ef forts to encourage motherhood: According to an article published in the newspaper. RTibrichesko

EASTERN EUROPE SECRET
2
Comment: Activities suggesting that the Communists may be-TaTiriplating the establishment of an international church front for peace have included invitations to important church leaders to visit Moscow; a joint meeting in Paris last December of the Commission of Churches for International Affairs with World Peace Council members including JoliotCurie "at which misunderstandings were cleared up and another meeting considered;" a Conference for Christians for Peace in London which, however, got somewhat out of the control of its pro-Communist organizers, and peace conferences for clergymen in the Satellites.
16 May 52
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Delo, the Presidium of the Bulgarian National Assembly real-171y awarded the Order of' Motherhood Glory 1st Class to a number of Bulgarian mothers who had given birth to, reared, and educated eight or more children.
Comment: Government efforts to increase the Bulgarian birth rates have been reflected both in the institution of such decorations as the "Order of Motherhood Glory" and in the enactment of laws extending special benefits to prolific mothers. An additional incentive Was given by the 1951 Decree on Encouraging Childbirth, according to which "all unmarried, widowed, married, and divorced Bulgarian and foreign citizens without children who reside in Bulgaria and who are between the ages of 21 and 45 for women and 21 and 50 for men are required to pay a tax amounting to 5 percent of their income."
5.
25X1A
The there are now more Soviet soldiers in Budapest t an last taiL. The Military Attache discounts the rumored presence of 15,000 additional troops, but has observed a noticeable increase in the number of Soviet supply and signal personnel'in Budapest.
Increase in Soviet signal personnel reported in Buda est:
25X1C
He believes that the predominance of signal troops and equipment may indicate possible establishment of a Soviet (S Budapest...11112 May 52) signal center in Budapest. An increase in signal troops may possibly be Comment: accounted for by known Soviet efforts to augment signal communications facilities between the USSR and the European Satellites. Another possible explanation is suggested by Soviet interest in the construction of an underground air defense center reportedly near completion on Gellert Hill in Budapest.
25X1C
SECRET
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SECRET
FAR EAST
6.
Japanese react favorably to US stand on POW exchange: Japanese press reaction to the Korea truce terms has been roughly divided between editorials strongly supporting the United States stand on POW exchange and those expressing hope that the negotiations would be continued, according to Ambassador Murphy. There have been no reports unfavorable to the American position and no Communist treatment of the subject is evident. Murphy comments that, having been sheltered by the occupation so long, the Japanese do not react as keenly on this matter as its importance to Japan would normally warrant. (C Tokyo 132, 15 May 52)
Comment: The failure of the Japan Communist Party to make aii-TIBUF of the United States stand on exchange of POW's
may be due to thewspicion that such a campaign would either be ineffective or would leave the party open to criticism of the Soviet failure to account for World War II Japanese POW's.
7.
North Korean anti-ROK propaganda to foreshadow new offensive: The North Korean Labor (Communist) PiFfir-ffeTdquarters is initiating a propaganda campaign against President Rhee and the ROK Government to prepare the North Korean people psychologically for a new offensive, a secretly anti-Communist member of the Labor Party learned from a high-ranking party official. The USSR has been told of the wish for an attack, but has indicated that approval will not be given at this time.
A different source in North Korea, in early April reported similarly 4orttl Koreans, contrary to the wishes of both the USSR and the Chinese,wanted an offensive.
Comment:
25X1A
25X1C1
25X1C
WPM
It may be significant that on 30 April and again on 8 May radio Pyongyang broadcast vitriolic attacks against the South Korean Government and President Rhee. These latest broadcasts represent the first indications of a possible shift in North Korean propaganda from an anti-US military theme to an anti-ROK political theme. Present condition of North Korean hydroelectric system revealed: Based on current photo reconnaissance of the North Rorean hydroelectric complec, Far East Command tentatively
SECRET
8.
16 May 52
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SECRET
concludes that the power potential is not being fully utilized. The latest photographs reveal that there has been no recent augmentation of the Korean facilities, that no additional transmission lines are apparent and that the operating capacity is less than that of 1945. (S CINCFE Telecon 5823, 15 May 52)
Comment: The total operating capacity of the North Korean hydroelectric system in August 1945 was approximately 729,000 kilowatts. In view of the destruction of industrial installations and the lack of transmission facilities to private consumers, North Korea probably still has a surplus of available electric
power.
9.
25X1C
25X1A
Comment: According to a Far East Command report in March, MIG-type jets, appearing slightly larger and possibly faster than standard MIG-15's, have been observed by UN pilots in Korea. Reports of a similar plane have emanated from the Soviet zone of Germany.
10.
Report of new rail lines in Southwest China incorrect: Item 13 in the 2 May issue of the Current Intelligence Digest reported a Chinese Communist announcement of two new rail lines in the Kunming area. FRIS now states that no mention was made of rail lines in the original report, and that the reference was possibly to bus lines. (C FBIS China Abstracts 6, 13 May 52) India agrees to facilitate Chinese grain shipments to Tibet: The American Embassy in New Delhi has been reliably ria5Fmed that the Indian Government has indicated willingness to allow the shipment of 1,500 tons of Chinese grain to Tibet by way of India.
India has, however, rejected a Peiping proposal to ship 10,000 tons of food and other supplies to Tibet via India and to sell grain to India. New Delhi took the view request for transit facilities should not be tied that the to the grain offer, and that in any case Tibet's transport facilities were inadequate for handling such large quantities. SECRET
5
11.
New jet superior to the MIG-15 reported in China: A reported that on 10 M'arch three of tne newest Soviet e s arrived in Peiping from Manchuria, and left two days later for Hsuchou, in central China. These planes reportedly have more newer and eed than the MIG-15.
16 May 52
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Indian The Embassy assumes that Peiping will accept the in relieve a serious food shortage offer quickly in order to (C New Delhi 4209, 14 May 52) Tibet.
25X1C
expected to seek Comment: The Peiping regime has been in Tibet. Indian cooperation in alleviating the food shortage
India's partial compliance with the Peiping request was presumably designed to conciliate Communist China without contributing substantially to Chinese strength in Tibet.
25X1C j12.
repor s rough 26X1CI sources: rem er Pinay is conhat Frenc ending the fighting in Indochina at vinced of the necess y an early date. Two French emissaries are soon to meet in also Europe with representatives of the Viet Minh and probably with representatives of the Chinese Communists to discuss ossibilities of an armistice. FOR CRITICAL SECURITY REASONS this repor 2 X1A 15 to be further transmitted within the United States, or beyond the borders of the United States, without the express penission of the releasing office.)
French eace overture to Viet Minh expected by
25X6
25X1C
25X1A
Rumors of this sort have been reported from Comment: varioug-Taiaries during the past few months. A report in the 11 May issue of a French weekly claimed that a high French .official had met a brother-in-law of Mao Tse-tung in Geneva to discuss Indochina.' Various French officials have categorically denied any intention of making armistice overtures to the Viet Minh. Minister Resident Letourneau recently repeated these denials, but also stated that the door to some sort of arrangement with the Viet,Minh has not been.closed.
113
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
Iranian lubricant plant reportedly damaged: The Abadan lubricant plant blew up while being tested, according to the opposition press in Iran. The American Embassy, which transmitted this report, says that an Iranian National Oil Company spokesman recently stated that he had received "very disappointing" news from Abadan. Although he refused to amplify his statement, he said that the Iranians had again approached
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the American company which built the plant to supply technicians to operate it. (C Tehran 4414, 14 May 52) Iran has been able to produce crude oil and some siETIFFefined products for internal consumption since oil nationalization. The lubricating plant, which was completed shortly before the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company withdrew from Iran, has never been operated, however, and Iran has been forced to import lubricants. Failure to put this installation into production will necessitate continued dependence on outside supplies and a consequent drain on Iran's scanty foreign
Comment:
'exchange.
14.
move.
The British believe that Spanish participation in the administration could be increased without arousing Soviet interest in assuming its seat on the Committee of Control. (S London 5190, 14 May 52)
Comment: Under the 1945 bilateral French-British agreement egnETIghing the present provisional administration in Tangier, the Soviet Union as well as the United States was awarded a seat on the Committee of Control, which is the ultimate authority in Tangier. The USSR has thus far refused to sit on the same council with a representative of the Franco regime, but the Western powers fear that it might exercise its prerogative and thus establish a foothold in this strategic
area.
15.
Prominent South African Indian leader restricted under anti-Communist law: The MiRister of Justice has ordered Dr. Y. N. Dadoo to resign as president of the South African Indian National Congress within thirty days, and has prohibited him from moving from the Transvaal Province, where he lives, for the next two years. Dadoo has also been ordered to resign from a number of other organizations, several of which were set up for the express purpose of campaigning against the Nationalist government's segregation laws. (U Reuters Johannesburg, 14 May 52)
SECRET
7
Britain fears consequences of attemptto exclude USSR from Tangier: After serious consideration, the Dritish reign Office has abandoned the idea of excluding the USSR from the Committee of Control in the International Zone of Tangier because of the impossibility of maintaining the secrecy necessary to prevent the USSR from making a counter
16 May 52
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Comment: A former member of the now defunct Executive Commitrig-Ur-the Communist Party in South Africa, Dadoo has groups in been a leading promoter of unity among all non-white threat to the greatest potential the Union, which offers and Many other prominent Indian white rule in South Africa. native African leaders, like Dadoo, have been officially "named" Communist, but, except in a few cases, the government has not yet moved to restrict their activities.
:16.
despite urgent Comment: This decision has been reached for the South African Government American representations to 20 percent increased exports in 1952. In recent years, about of American manganese supplies, including stockpile requiremuch ments, has come from the Union. This has amounted to as Africa's 50 to 60 percent of South as 400,000 tons a year, or total manganese exports.

SECRET
8
American manganese stockpile to suffer from projected has South African export cut: The South African Government all that manganese exports to informed the American Ambassador annually. to 500,000 long tons destinations will be limited A few weeks ago Minister of Economic Affairs Louw estimated South Africa's exportable surplus for 1952 at 700,000 tons. He now says the drastic cut is necessarY as a conservation measure, since it is estimated that a higher export rate would (S Capetown 89, 13 May 52) exhaust known deposits in 50 years.
16 May 52
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WESTERN EUROPE
17
Austrian Foreign Minister reportedly plans viSit.to-YugOslaViir-rilitrian Toreign Minister Gruber reportedly plans an official visit with Marshal Tito at Bled about 20 May. DiscusSions would include Austro-Yugoslav-trade relations,'Austrian prisoners of war held in Yugoslavia, the opening of more border-crossing points, and a cultural exchange treaty. III
Comment: A meeting between Gruber and Tito, to discuss an AustrOZW.05glav "military understanding" among other things, was reportedly considered by the Vienna and Belgrade governments last September. This meeting, which was strongly opposed by the US Legation in Vienna, failed to materialize.
25X1A
25X1A
The Communist press in Austria is likely to interpret a Gruber-Tito meeting as further "proof" that both countries are linked to Western defense planning.
118.
Only minor Communist demonstrations expected in Berlin: Although the US High ComMiggioner's Office in Berlin has expected Soviet-created "difficulties" over signing of the Allied-German contractual agreement, it reports that intelligence and police agencies have uncovered nothing more tang4ble in the way of specific Communist plans than the fact that the East and West Berlin Socialist Unity Parties intend to demonstrate on 20 May. American officials in Berlin still anticipate an increasing number of incidents before, and possibly after, the signing of the contractual agreement, but feel that the situation can be regarded with "calmness." (C Berlin 1343, 14 May 52)
19.
East Germans reportedly organizing defense ministry: American army headquarters in Germany considers that the provisional appointment of Willi Stoph, former chief of the East German paramilitary police procurement agency, to head the Ministry of the Interior may be merely a "convenient cover" for Stoph and several of his associates while they organize a defense The new ministry might be formally announced upon the ministry. ratification of the Allied-West German contractual agreement. (S Heidelberg Weeka 19, 12 May 52)
Comment: According to several recent reports of unknown reliability, various high-level specialists have been transferred
SECRET
9
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SECRET
from other East German government 'Agencies to the Ministry of' the Interior for the purpose of organizing a defense ministry. Heinrich Rau, who became a Soviet citizen in 1935 and led a Communist brigade in the Spanish Civil War, is mentioned as the government's choice to head the new ministry.
20.
West German labor rejects anti-rearmament campaign: The West German Federation of Trade Unions has not only rejected a Social Democratic offer to participate in a joint effort against the Allied-German contractual agreement and the EDC treaty, but is now conducting a vigorous leaflet campaign on purely union problems, focusing its members attention away from foreign policy issues.
2 5X 1 A
I
Comment: The Federation has same six million members; its present stand could be a potent factor in reducing opposition to the signing of the treaties.
Belgian controls may stop diversion of some strategic items to Orbit: Emphasizing that the Belgian plan to control transit trade will not stop the shipment of strategic items to the Soviet bloc, a Belgian trade official has stated that the plan will prevent the diversion of goods originally exported to Belgium. The new regulations will require Belgian shippers to present, in addition to a Belgian transit license, a certificate authorizing transshipments from the country of origin or COCOM country through which the goods may have passed. This system will place the responsibility for any diversion on the originating country.
Comment: Although the diversion to the Orbit through Belgiii-PaTis of items on the Belgian control list may decline, a shift to Dutch ports is,expected, since the Netherlands states that it will not institute physical controls over transshipments.
Belgium has not completed its list of items to be covered by the regulations and is waiting for Dutch comments before submitting the plan to COCOM. (S Brussels 1695, 14 May 52)

SECRET
10
The Federation's chairman claims that Adenauer's coalition is prepared to support the Federation on the projected Trade Union law if he can prevent or anized labor from activel o posing the treaties.
16 May 52
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SECRET
LATIN AMERICA
22.
Brazil considering recognition of Bolivia: The Brazilian Charge d'Affaires-In-Washington informed the State Department on 14 May that his government had received satisfactory assurances of Bolivia's compliance with its international obligations and believed that Paz Estenssoro was firmly in control. Under the circumstances Brazil felt that extended delay in recognizing the present government would be prejudicial to Brazilian interests.
23.
Bolivian decree provides for commission to study nationalization of mines: President Paz Estenssoro has issued a decree which provides for the creation of a commission to study "nationalization by expropriation" of mines controlled or owned The comby the Patino, Hochschild, 'and Aramayo enterprises. mission, to be composed mainly of government representatives, is charged with rendering a report on the juridical, economic, and technical aspects of "legal expropriation" of these mines (R La Paz 461, 14 May 52) within 120 days.
Comment: The tenor of the decree appears stronger than Paz' WWVIais indications that nationalization would proceed cautiously.and for the time being primarily affect exports.
The Patino management has stated that the mining companies will cooperate fully with the government and keep up production, since they believe that failure of the present government would bring chaos and loss of their investments.
Ratification of the MSA a reement may be dela ed in Chilean Congress: The US Embassy in Santiago has stated that the AMA agreement, which was sent to the Chilean Congress on 17 April, may be "shunted aside" because of the copper problem.
SECRET 11
After the Cuban 10 March coup, Brazil recognized Comment: the new Cuban Government on 22 March without prior notification to other governments, despite prior assurances that it would act simultaneously with certain other Latin American countries and the United States on 27 March.
The Charge stated that Brazil was also consulting Chile, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela in order to facilitate simultaneous (S to Rio de Janeiro 1020, 14 May 52) action.
16 May 52
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SECRET
Meanwhile, the Radical Party is trying to win the Communist vote for its candidate, and this consideration may tend to hold up ratification of the agreement. Also, a high government official has said that the agreement may not be ratified until after the 4 September presidential election. (C Santiago, D-1304, 7 May 52)
Comment:
In general there was little reaction in Chile
to tirg-Wil signing of the MSA agreement, but the 2 May

denunciation of the US-Chilean copper accord provoked new leftist criticism of the MSA agreement. There is now some tendency to tie ratification of this agreement to a satisfactory copper deal with the US. There have been several indications that Socialist-Communist forces have agreed to support the Radical-government bloc's presidential candidate for a stiff price. Such collaboration might impede not only ratification of the MSA agreement but also the negotiation of. a new copper agreement With the United States. 24 Early returns from Panama's presidential election favor Preliminary vote tabulations from 53 of 699 precincts lirninama give presidential candidate Jose Remon about 16,000 votes against 6,000 for Roberto Chiari, Although Chiari continues publicly to claim victory, one of his close friends states that in private he is conceding victory to Remon.
Remon:
Chiari's followers claim that ballot boxes in various areas were stuffed by the pro-Remon element and that 8 ballot boxes in Panama City were stolen and destroyed. The US Embassy reports that the box numbers as well ap the numbers of the police cars which participated in the theft are public knowledge. (C Panama 952, 14 May 52)
Comment: There has apparently been no violent public react143Efcrthe alleged and apparently open fraud practiced by Remon's adherents.

SECRET
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TOP SECRET
US OFFICIALS ONLY
16 May 1952
CIA No. 49650
Copy No. 46
This digest of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports It in or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments representCIA the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFCEMATION
Approved Fo*elease 2001/11120 : CIA-RDP79T011*001000040001-7

TOP SECRET
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF TEE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS. 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
NEAR EAST-AFRICA
1
Moreover, the Tunisians would fare worse under recent proposals for actual French participation in government than under the system of externs] French existing before mid-January. (S, S/S US rti Del New 810, 13 May 52)

LATIN AMERICA TOP SECRET
1
French reforms unacceptable to TUnisians: A Tunisian nationalist, sent to the United States by his party in order to line up support in the United Nations, states that the French-proposed reforms are completely unacceptable to the TUnisians because they envisage French participation in and control over executive and legislative branches of the government.
the the control York
Comment:" Although the former Chenik cabinet did not expect the French to accept their demands for an exclusively Tunisian executive, legislature, and civil service, it hoped for a progressive program including a considerable degree of local autonomy.
2.
Argentina fabricating charges of United States plot: A former OBS and Military Intelligence agent of Czech-Argentine nationality has stated that he was arrested and interrogated along lines which convinced him that the Argentine police are "all out to uncover a plot by the United States." He added that large numbers of people are being questioned, and that this will later receive wide publicity. When the US Etbassy asked the Foreign Minister why two Argentine employees of the US International Education service had been arrested, he replied vaguely that he "hoped to show
16 May 52 Approved For Release 2001/11/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A001000040001-7
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the Embassy something soon." May 52)
(S,S/S Buenos Aires 778, 13
Comment: Government-controlled newspapers and Peron's recent-ErNigaies have emphasized the theme that foreigners, directed by the United States, are plotting against Peron. The police are apparently now trying to collect "evidence" to prove American interference in Argentine affairs and possibly to justify a demand that all US1E activities be terminated.

TOP SECRET
2
16 May 52
TOP SECRET
I
UNCLASSIFIED whe
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fied when filled N form i
filkr-64ymiettf%errili'frO9 tUshibistefferiiiiMiterAbdONJOUY2f1 detac e rom con ro e ocumen.

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HR70-14 HR70-14
FAR EAST FAR

2. 2.
a p p a r e n t l y needed needed by by North North Communications equipment apparently p r e 3 i n u s l y noted n o t e d in i n the the A North N o r t h Rorean Ko r e a n officer, o f f i c e r , preViously Koreans: A E o m u n i c a t i o n s Bureau Bureau of of Supreme Supreme Headquarters, H e a d q u a r t e r s , instructed instructed ComMunications a communications officer, o f f i c e r , possibly p o s s i b l y in in Manchuria, Manchuria, on on 8 8 May May t h a t "if it i t is is impossible i m p o s s i b l e to to transport t r a n s p o r t by by rail r a i l for for a a long long that t h e damaged damaged railroad railroad south s o u t h of of Sonchon, Sonchon, d u r a t i o n because because of the duration you are are to. to. .take t h e roundabout n o r t h e a s t route route to to make make you .take the roundabout northeast t r a n s p o r t i n g possible. p o s s i b l e . . ." ." (SUEDE ASAPAC, 34488, transporting ASAPAC, Tokyo Tokyo Spot 3448A, 52) 15 May 52)
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Comment: May, the t h e North Korean addressed a d d r e s s e d in i n this this Comment: On 6 May, message informed informed Pyongyang Pyongyang that t h a t he h e was was incapable i n c a p a b l e of of trans-'. trans-,, message p o r t i n g any communications equipment equipment into i n t o Korea Korea from from porting Manchuria owing owing to t o track track damage damage in i n northwestern n o r t h w e s t e r n Korea Korea " s o u t h of Sonchon." Sonchon." "south
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19 May 52 19 May 52
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The northeastern n o r t h e a s t e r n route r o u t e is.very is v e r y circuitous. circuitous. I t i nvolves It involves trip Manchuria, entry a t r i p across Manchuria, e n t r y into i n t o Korea near n e a r the t h e Soviet Soviet border, b o r d e r : , and then t h e n the t h e perilous p e r i l o u s trip t r i p south s o u t h on the t h e exposed exposed east coast line. line.
3. 3.
un ea e inese ommunis o e i n e s e Communis e a dguar q u a r ters erg o g ; e : i n , t Artillery Regiment, in in support s u p p o f t t of t f the 39th A Army r m y in west2rn western Korea, informed post on.4 May t that."we Korea, informed its i t s forward command p o s t on 4 May hat."we have received received a a report r e p o r t from from the t h e 39th 3 9 t h Army Army giving g i v i n g positicins positions of ." of enemy artillery a r t i l l e r y as as follows. follows. . I1 The message pinpoints pinpoints the t h e location l o c a t i o n of the t h e "147th Artillery A r t i l l e r y Company Company long-range long-range guns," the "99th Artillery Battalion," the "113th A Artillery he " 99th A rtillery B attalion," t h e "113th rtillery g uns," t Company," and Battalion headquarters." Company," and the t h e -"999th "999th B attalion h e a d q u a r t e r s . I ' (SUEDE ASAPAC, Tokyo Tokyo Spot S p o t 3452A, 3452A, 15 15 May May 52) 52)
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positions reported UN lront f r o n t line l i n e artiller artillery p ositions r eported b by C hinese Chinese
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Comment: Commant:
It would be be normal normal f for 39th I t would o r the the 3 9 t h Army to to
was sent. sent.

4. 4.
North N o r t h Korean,coastal K o r e a n , c o a s t a l unit u n i t ordered o r d e r e d to t o conserve c o n s e r v e ammunition: anynunition: An unidentifiedAororth Korean unit, probably charged:W1th orean u nit, p robably c h a r g e d With u n l d e n t i f i ed North K coastal northeastern Korea, o ordered c o a s t a l security s e c u r i t y of of a portion p o r t i o n of n o r t h e a s t e r n Korea, rdered that all artillery ammunition e even in the ll a r t i l l e r y ammunition ven i n t he t h a t ."you "you s should h o u l d ssave ave a extreme combat." combat.l? The message also a l s o mentioned a a change change in in the t h e location l o c a t i o n Of of the t h e "107mm 11107mmgun".positions. gunT1p o s i t i o n s . (SUEDE (SUEDE 15th 15th RSM Det D e t 1, 1, Korea Korea 15RSM/12395, 15RSM/12395, 14 1 4 May May 52) 52)
Comment: A recently r e c e n t l y captured c a p t u r e d North North Korean Korean prisoner prisoner revealed Communist a artillery positions t h a t Communist rtillery p o s i t i o n s on on the t h e east east r e v e a l e d -that coast had been ordered to missions t o refuse r e f u s e fire fire m i s s i o n s in i n order to to retain r e t a i n ammunition ammunition for f o r an an expected e x p e c t e d UN UN amphibious amphibious operation. operation.
5. 5.
Evacuation E v a c u a t l o n ,of o f North North Korean Korean postal p o s t a l unit u n i t from from western western city sent city ordered: ordered: A North N o r t h Korean Korean message message on on 12 12Slay Y ay s e n t in in a a system messages and s y s t e m sometimes used u s e d by GHQ for administrative a d m i n i s t r a t i v e messages Signed a "Liaison ' # L i a i s o n officer," o f f i c e r , " ordered o r d e r e d that t h a t "the " t h e field f i e l d post post s i g n e d by by a exchange office w i l l be be evacuated e v a c u a t e d and and all a l l affairs affairs o f f i c e in i n Sartwon SarPwon will of the t h e office o f f i c e must must be be handed handed to to the t h e central c e n t r a l field f i e l d post post Korea 15RSM/12414, department." d e p a r t m e n t . " (SUEDE (SUEDE 15th 1 5 t h RSM RSM Det'A., DetI.1, Korea 15RSM/12414, 14 1 4 May May 52) 52)

2 2
assist its i t s assigned a s s i g n e d artillery a r t i l l e r y in i n firing f i r i n g counter-battery counter-battery missions. m i s s i o n s . The 27th 2 7 t h Artillery A r t i l l e r y Regiment had been been in i n support support of the t h e 39th 3 9 t h Army for for only o n l y about about two two weeks week6 when when this t h i s message message of
19 May 52 52 19
Although Sariwon is Comment: Although i s in i n an a n area arga where Chinese Comment: Communist units c i t y is is on on the t h e main main supply supply u n i t s predominate, p r e d o m i q a t e , the t h e city route t o Kaesong and and to t o North North Korean Korean units u n i t s in i n western w e s t e r n Korea. Korea. r o u t e to At A t least l e a s t two two major major Korean Korean tactical t a c t i c a l units u n i t s and and a a North North Korean Korean Air A i r Force F o r c e unit u n i t are are also a l s o located l o c a t e d in i n the t h e Sariwon Sariwon area. area.
6. 6.

7 . 7.
Ordnance Ordnance type t y p e and and ammunition aqmunition supply. s u p p l y of Chinese antiairantiairc r a f t unit u n i t revealed: r e v e a l e d : gh An u unidentifiedthinese n i d e n t i f i e d Chi n e s e Communist Communist antianticraft a i r c r a f t artillery a r t i l l e r y unit, u n i t , probably p r o b a b l y of regimental r e g i m e n t a l size s i z e and and aircraft located in i n the t h e Singye area of of western w e s t e r n Korea, reported r e p o r t e d on on 11 i t s ammunition expenditure e x p e n d i t u r e and and supply s u p p l y on on hand. hand. The 11 May May its message revealed r e v e a l e d that t h a t 72 rounds of 8 5 m m a ntiaircraft a rtillery message 85mm antiaircraft artillery ammunition t h a t 2,453 2 , 4 5 3 rounds r a u n d s remained on on m u n i t i o n had been fired f i r e d and and that hand, t h a t 82 8 2 rounds r o u n d s of 37mm 3 7 m m were fired f i r e d with w i t h 9,291 9 , 2 9 1 remaining, remaining, hand, that 11 rounds r o u n d s probably p r o b a b l y of 12.7mm 12.7mm machine gun gun ammunition ammunition and t h a t 11 that (SUEDE 501st 501st Corn Comm Recon Grp were fired f i r e d with w i t h 61,169 61,169 remaining. r e m a i n i n g . (SUEDE Grp Korea, K-2833, K-2833, 15 15 May May 52) 52)
This h i s antiaircraft a n t i a i r c r a f t unit u n i t has been very v e r y active active Comment: T recently. r e c e n t l y . Probably P r o b a b l y the t h e ammunition expenditure e x p e n d i t u r e listed l i s t e d was only o n l y for for a a 24-hour 24-hour period. period. Three more Russian R y s s i a n fighter f i g h t e r units u n i t s located l o c a t e d on KoreaKoreaManchuria border: b o r d e r : Th ree additional a d d i t i o n a l Russian R u s s i a n fighter f i g h t e r units, units, Three probably regiments, t h e ground-controlled ground-controlled Rrobablu r e g i m e n t s , became active a c t i v e on the intercept i n t e r c e p t (GCI) (&?,I) net n e t in i n the t h e Yalu River R i v e r area on 21 2 1 April. A p r i l . The Air Force A ir F o r c e states s t a t e s that t h a t this t h i s increases i n c r e a s e s to t o nine n i n e the t h e Russian Russian f i g h t e r units u n i t s on this fighter t h i s net, n e t , and represents r e p r e s e n t s a continuing continuing build-up. b u i l d - u p , (SUEDE (SUEDE Air A i r Force F o r c e Roundup Roundup 95, 95, 15 15 May May 52) 52)
Comment: The Chinese moved one or two jet j e t divisions divisions With these new Soviet to t o Antung Anxung in i n the the past p a s t month. month. Wit4 S o v i e t units units the of jets j e t s in i n the t h e Yalu River R i v e r area area is is estimated e s t i m a t e d at at t h e number of Since April pilots on 5 00. S i n c e 13 A p r i l UN p i l o t s have o n several s e v e r a l occasions occasions 500. o b s e r v e d 450-500 450-500 jets j e t s on on fields f i e l d s in i n this t h i s area. area. observed
In units, I n addition a d d i t i o n to t o the t h e increase i n c r e a s e in i n air air u n i t s , the t h e installainstallation of another t i o n of a n o t h e r Russian-language GCI station s t a t i o n and three new radar r a d a r stations s t a t i o n s near n e a r Antung were noted n o t e d in i n the t h e last last month, providing month, p r o v i d i n g additional a d d i t i o n a l facilities f a c i l i t i e s for f o r controlling controlling f i g h t e r operations o p e r a t i o n s over over Korea. Korea. fighter
19 May 52 1 9 May
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North Korean combat enginee,r engineey c course extend North o u r e e to to e x t e n d to t o 30 June: The North North Korean Korean 8 8th Division eastern korea informed The th D i v i s i o n in in e a s t e r n Korea informed one of its its s subordinate regiments, probably t the of ubordinate r e g i m e n t s , probably h e 82nd on Kaesong guard duty, duty, on on 88 A April,of two ffuture "short courses" courses" for guard p r i l , , o f two u t u r e "short engineer officers. One,to by the engineer e ngineer o fficers. O n e , t o be.conducted by the e ngineer troops of an unidentified u n i d e n t i f i e d corps c o r p s (probably (probably the the I I Corps), Corps), t r o o p s of wis begin w a s to to b e g i n 15 1 5 April A p r i l and and terminate t e r m i n a t e on 15 15 June. June. Another course for engineer staff officers was be held at or e ngineer s taff o fficers w a s to be a t "Front"Frontc ourse f Headquarters" from line Headquarters" from 1 1 June June to t o 30 30 June. June. (SUEDE 501st 501st Comm Recon Grp Grp Korea, Korea, SK-J-561, SK-5-561, 17 17 May May 52) 52)
t h i s intercept i n t e r c e p t is dated, dated, it i t would Comment: Although this appear t to clear that at time appear o be a c l e a r indication indication t hat a t the the t i m e no increase increase current military operations North in c urrent m ilitary o p e r a t i o n s was contemplated by N orth Korean senior s e n i o r tactical t a c t i c a l commanders. commanders.
6. 6 .
Easing E a s i n g of of North Korean Korean military m i l i t a r y manpower situation situation indicated: North Korean regiment, probably regiment, p robably i n d i c a ' t e d : An unidentified u n i d e n t i f i e d Nor'th coastal on c o a s t a l security s e c u r i t y duty d u t y in i n eastern e a s t e r n Korea, Korea, instructed instructed a subordinate s u b o r d i n a t e unit u n i t on 13 13 May M q r y to t o "report " r e p o r t the t h e men who who are above above the 32 and have no technical t e c h n i c a l ability a b i l i t y and and the t h e wounded t h e age of 32 men who who are are unable unable to t o serve Berve and and send send them them to t o the t h e regiment regiment at at once." (SUEDE 501st Comrn Comm Recon Grp once." Grp Korea, Korea, 15RSM/12470, 15RSM/12470, 17 52) 17 May 52) Comment: On 30 30 January the t h e 7th 7 t h Railway R a i l w a y Security S e c u r i t y Regiment Comment: in HaRETEE-Fassed i n H m m a s s e d similar e i m i l a r instructions i n s t r u c t i o n s to t o a subordinate subordinate battalion, t h a t these t h e s e manpower manpower categories c a t e g o r i e s would would b a t t a l i o n , indicating i n d i c a t i n g that be b e discharged. d i s c h a r g e d . Other O t h e r unidentified u n i d e n t i f i e d units u n i t s have issued i s s u e d similar similar orders. orders.
I'
These messages, messages, while w h i l e indicating i n d i c a t i n g that t h a t some some order order is is being b e i n g injected i n j e c t e d into i n t o the t h e recruiting r e c r u i t i n g policies p o l i c i e s of the t h e North Korean Korean Army, Army, have have a a connection c o n n e c t i o n in i n that t h a t perhaps p e r h a p s the t h e manpower manpower need of of the t h e civilian c i v i l i a n population p o p u l a t i o n is i s so so great great that t h a t it i t forces forces the North the N o r t h Korean Korean Government to t o discharge marginal m a r g i n a l military military manpower. It speculated deactivation I t might be s p e c u l a t e d that t h a t the the d e a c t i v a t i o n of two two North N o r t h Korean Korean corps c o r p s within w i t h i n the t h e pastnine p a s t n i n e months months and and the the reduction r e d u c t i o n of of major tactical t a c t i c a l units u n i t s to to a a number number for f o r which which replacements more easily e a s i l y be be provided provided fits f i t s into i n t o the the r e p l a c e m e n t s can c a n more government's government's over-all o v e r - a l l manpower manpower policy. policy.
Despite m i l i t a r y activity a c t i v i t y throughout D e s p i t e the t h e flurry f l u r r y of military i n April, A p r i l , which led led to t o speculation s p e c u l a t i o n of an impending impending North Korea in offensive, o f f e n s i v e , there there are are no no clear current c u r r e n t indications i n d i c a t i o n s of of immediate immedia$e eommunist intentions Bommunist i n t e n t i o n s other o t h e r than t h a n defensive. defensive.
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Major North N o r t h Korean V Corps C o r p s unit u n i t remains r e m a i n s near Hamhung In a m message, i n east: east: e s s a g e , probably p r o b a b l y addressed a d d r e s s e d to t o the t h e chief c h i e f of of in t he m i l i t a r y security security b u r e a u in i n Pyongyang, o r t h Korean the military bureau Pyongyang, a N North o f f i c e r reports r e p o r t s on 14 1 4 May t he d e s e r t i o n of o u r men r o m the the officer the desertion of f four men f from 6 t h Division. Division. H e locates l o c a t e s the t h e place p l a c e of of d e s e r t i o n as "Kumsu"KumsuHe desertion 6th r i," a s m a l l town near n e a r Yonghung, ail c enter s o u t h of ri," small Yonghung, a r rail center south SK-J-539, Hamhung. {SUEDE (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, SK-J-539, 1 7 May 52) 52) 17
domment: The 6th Comment: 6 t h North N o r t h Korean D Division i v i s i o n is is a subordinate subordinate of the Corps, general of the V C o r p s , which has h a s been located in i n the the g e n e r a l Hamhung area since its i t s withdrawal w i t h d r a w a l from from combat combat in i n late l a t e 1951. 1 9 5 1 . A. A number number of r recent e c e n t reports r e p o r t s have alleged a l l e g e d that t h a t the the V C Corps o r p s was to t o return return t o combat, c o m b a t , relieving r e l i e v i n g one o n e of to of the the N North o r t h Korean corps c o r p s on o n the the battle b a t t l e line. line.
8. 8 .
9. 9 .

5 5
N o r t h Korean tank t a n k regiment to t o be b e extremely e x t r e m e l y securitysecurityNorth c o n s c i o u s : The "political" l t p o l i t i c a l l l officer, o f f i c e r , probably p r o b a b l y attached a t t a c h e d to t o the the conscious: N o r t h Korean 10th 1 0 t h Mechanized Division, D i v i s i o n , on o n 17 17 May instructed instructed North " the p olitical r e g i m e n t a l commander "the political regimental commander of of t the he t tank ank r regiment" e g i m e n t " to to place a a "junior " j u n i o r propaganda p r o p a g a n d a man" man" in i n each e a c h tank t a n k platoon p l a t o o n and a n d to to place d i s p o s e "one Itone informant" i n f o r m a n t " in dispose in each e a c h tank t a n k section. s e c t i o n . (SUEDE (SUEDE ROK Int Int Group, 5 0 1 s t Comm Group, 501st Comm Recon.Grp Recon Grp Korea, Korea, SK-J-578, SK-J-578, 17 17 May May 52) 52)
Comment: Previously P r e v i o u s l y observed o b s e r v e d security s e c u r i t y penetration p e n e t r a t i o n down t o this t h i s level l e v e l has h a s been b e e n confined c o n f i n e d to t o "elite" l t e l i t e l l units, u n i t s , such s u c h as as the the to North Kaesong Guard Force, F o r c e , the t h e 82nd 821113 Regiment and the the N o r t h Korean Air A i r Force. Force.
1 0 t h A i r School 10th,Air S c h o o l activity a c t i v i t y noted n o t e d at a t Yenchi Yenchi in in Manchuria: Manchuria: Four F o u r YAK-if VAK -11 trainers t r a i n e r s of of the t h e 10th 1 0 t h Air A i r School S c h o o l were to t o fly f l y On on Fengcheng, both Manchuria, 16 May from Yenchi to to F engcheng, b o t h in in M a n c h u r i a , according according to t o a Chinese C h i n e s e Communist Air A i r Force F o r c e message. m e s s a g e . (SUEDE 6920 6920 Security S e c u r i t y Group Group Johnson J o h n s o n AB AB Japan, J a p a n , AP AP 831, 831, 16 16 May May 52) 52)
P r i s o n e r s of war have reported r e p o r t e d that t h a t the t h e major major Comment: Prisoners NorthKURTITair training N o r t h Korean a i r t r a i n i n ginstallation i n s t a l l a t i o n in i n Manchuria Manchuria was the the ! l o t h Manchurian i r Academy," under d i r e c t command of of North North elOth Manchurian A Air Academy," under direct Korean Air.Force A i r F o r c e Headquarters, H e a d q u a r t e r s , located l o c a t e d at a t Yenchi. Yenchi.
20 May 52 52
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1. 1. Gas
mask issue seen as issue to to Chinese Chinese Communisti Communistgseen a spropaganda propaganda maneuver: maneuver:
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Sixteen recently captured captured Chinese Chinese Communist Communist were either issued soldiers reveal that that they they were gas masks in the the use use of of anti-gas anti-gas masks or instructed instructed in field expedients expedients during April 1952, 1952, according L E E Three possible posstble reasons reasonsadvanced advancedby by FECOM FECOM to Far East CommaNd. for such such enemy enemy preparations are arethat thatthe theCommunists Communists anticipate anticipate UN UN use of to wage wage chemical chemicalwarfare, warfare, or that the gas masks of gas, that that they they intend intend to are a r e to to provide provide "proof" t'proof" for forenemy enemy propaganda propaganda charges of of the United United States C W in Korea. using CW
.
I20 May 52 52

Comment:
3 - 3
FECOM concludesthat that available available evidence evidence fails fails FECOM concludes to indicate enemy enemy intentions intentions of o f employing employing chemical warfare in tn the the immediimmedifuture, ate future.
The The issue of of gas masks masks, [
1 probapr oba-
bly is American use use of of chemical bly is intended intended to support Communist Communist charges of of American chemical warfare agents agents in In Korea. Korea.
While specific Communist propaganda allegations allegations While of US use of of biological biological warfare warfare ended ended in in early early April, a of US use a continuation continuation of of the the American "atrocities" by recent recent charges that the American "atrocities" theme theme has has been been provided provided by United United States States has used CW CW agents in combat. Pyongyang on on 24 24 April April detailed detailed 33 inciRadio Pyongyang dents of of alleged use of chemical warfare occurring occurring between between 27 February and 9 April, and andagain again on on 7 7 May May charged charged that that the the United United States States used used CW CW on 22 and 25 April.
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North Korean Kgrean M.i,nistry Ministry of Iadustry I q d u s t r y to t o receive r e c e i v e communicacommunicaliorth Korean Korean Supreme Supreme H Headquarters t i o n s equipment: equipment: the The worth e a d q u a r t e r s in in tions Pyongyang May, quoting q u o t i n g from from "the " t h e Trade Trade Department Department Pyongyang on on 14 1 4 May, statistics," listed statisticsIf1 l i s t e d 238 238 telephones, t e l e p h o n e s , 61 61 wireless radios r a d i o s and and 2Jtransmitters 2 ) t r a n s m i t t e r s which would would be be available a v a i l a b l e to t o the t h e Ministry M i n i s t r y of of Industry. I n d u s t r y . The addressee, a d d k e s s e e , an an unidentified u n i d e n t i f i e d supply s u p p l y unit, u n i t , is is informed that."you t h a t "you will w i l l be be able a b l e to t o receive receive them. them. , , a t Antung, .at if you bring b r i n g the t h e requisition r e q u i s i t i o n from from the t h e Industry I n d u s t r y Ministry.." Ministry.''
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On 16 16 May, u n i d e n t i f i e d unit u n i t informed informed Pyongyang Pyongyang that that May, an unidentified "the " t h e equipment that t h a t arrived a r r i v e d at a t Antung Antung is. is. . i n the. the S inuiju .in Sinuiju warehouse." warehouse.11 The originator o r i g i n a t o r then t h e n inquired i n q u i r e d about about fuel f u e l "for 'Ifor t he p u r p o s e of the purpose of transporting t r a n s p o r t i n g the t h e equipment.V equipment.'? (SUEDE7/-5.01st (SUEDGi5Dlst Grp, 15RSM/12530, 15RSM/12530, 17 1 7 May; May; 330tk.Comm 330th Corn Recon Recon CO, Co, Comm Recon Grp, BLT 101, 101, Korea, 16 1 6 May May 52) 52)
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Comment: I n view he N o r t h Koreans' urgent d esire In view of of t the North Koreans':argent desire t o transport t r a n s p o r t communications equipment equipment into i n t o Korea, the t h e regime regime to h a s probably p r o b a b l y decided d e c i d e d to t o employ employ trucks t r u c k s instead i n s t e a d of of using u s i n g the the has is one one of of the the c i r c u i t o u s northeastern n o r t h e a s t e r n railway r a i l w a y routes. r o u t e s . This T h i s is circuitous rare instances i n s t a n c e s of of a a non-military n o n - m i l i t a r y agency agency receiving r e c e i v i n g equipment qquipment in i n such s u c h short s h o r t supply. supply.
Famil Family threatened t h r e a t e n e d if if North Korean Korean airman airman deserts: deserts: A of recent r e c e n t North detailed series o ort Korean orean A i r Force orce messages have ave detailed the of a a North North Korean Korean airman airman to t o desert."to d e s e r t . " t o China." China." i n t e n t i o n s of t h e intentions In reference Headquarters In r e f e r e n c e to t o this t h i s situation,North s i t u a t i o n , N o r t h Korean Air Air H eadquarters a at t S Singiju i n p i j u informed an air a i r unit u n i t near n e a r Pyongyang on 15 15 May that t h a t "you '(you are a r e to t o tell t e l l him him that t h a t if i f he h e deserts, deserts, his h i s family. family w i l l share will s h a r e the t h e trouble. t r o u b l e . . .'I ." (SUEDE 1 5 t h RSM D e t 151, 1 5 1 , Korea, 15th Det 15RSM/12642, 18 18 May May 52). 52).
Comment: Comment: Although many recent prisoners p r i s o n e r s of war have revealed r e v e a l e d that t h a t their t h e i r political p o l i t i c a l officers o f f i c e r s threatened t h r e a t e n e d retaliation retaliation i f they t h e y deserted, this t h i s message is is the t h e first first on their t h e i r families f a m i l i e s if .on e v i d e n c e of such such a a policy p o l i c y noted noted in in communications communications intelligence. intelligence. evidence
Artillery A r t i l l e r y regiment mentioned as a t 3 organic o r g a n i c to t o Chinese Chinese division Communist messrlge message i in Korea on d i v i s i o n in in Korea: Korea: A Chifiese Chisese Communist n Eore'a on May directly '17 d i r e c t l y referred r e f e r r e d to t o the t h e "Artillery " A r t i l l e r y Regiment" of of t h e 117th 1 1 7 t h Division. D i v i s i o n . (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon"Grp Recon'Grp Korea, Korea, the K 2906, 2906, 17 17 May May 52) 52)
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sisw
TC>.' SECRET SUEDE

Far Comment: a r East E a s t Command concluded recently recently Comment: The F that, t h a t , as a a general g e n e r a l rule, r u l e , an a n artillery a r t i l l e r y regiment was organic organic Artillery however, have long t o each army. army. A r t i l l e r y regiments, r e g i m e n t s , however, l o n g been to recognized r e c o g n i z e d as as integral i n t e g r a l parts p a r t s of divisions d i v i s i o n s in i n the t h e 9th 9 t h and 2 0 t h Chinese Army Groups. But this t h i s is is the t h e first f i r s t reference reference 20th to divisional within Army t o a d i v i s i o n a l artillery a r t i l l e r y regiment w i t h i n the t h e 13th 1 3 t h Army Group.
8. 8.
the patrol Comment: Cbmment: The fact f a c t that that t h e US p a t r o l bomber was almost within w i t h i n the t h e limits l i m i t s of of t,he Port Arthur Base tshe P ort A r t h u r Naval B a s e area, area, as as d e f i n e d in i n the t h e 1945 1945 Sino-Soviet Sino-Soviet Treity, T r e a t y , also also suggests s u g g e s t s that t h a t the the defined attacking MIG's came a t t a c k i n g YIG's came from from the t h e Soviet S o v i e t base b a s e at at Port P o r t Arthur. Arthur.

4 4
US patrol p a t r o l plane p l a n e attacked a t t a c k e d probably probably by by Soviet S o v i e t MIG's: MIG's: A US naval n a v a l patrol e a t r o l bomber was attacked a t t a c k e d by two t w o MIG-15's YIG-15's on 11 Soviet1 1 May while flying over o v e r Korea Bay, midway between S ovietcontrolled c o n t r o l l e d Port P o r t Arthur A r t h u r and and Takushan, Takushan, a a Chinese Chinese jet J e t base. base. About the net reported About t h e same time t i m e a Chinese air a i r defense d e f e n s e search search n et r eported two t w o aircraft a i r c r a f t traveling t r a v e l i n g at a t 300 300 knots k n o t 6 on a soUtherly s o u t h e r l y course course (S COMNAVFE 09202, 0920Z, 12 Arthur. 1 2 May( SUEDE SUEDE Air A i r Force Force from Port P o r t Arthur. 97, 19 19 May May 52) 52) Roundup 97, Roundup
21 May 52 52
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21 May 1952
US OFFICIALS ONLY
OCI No. 5185

Copy No.
267
DIA, IDOS, OSD Declassification/Release Instructions on File Office of Current Intelligence

SECRET
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'THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE 'OF THE UNITED STATES WITHILTHE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS. 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW,
EASTERN EUROPE
The new blast furnace, begun last July, was Comment: designed to be the largest in the country. The Diosgyor plant, reportedly employing twenty thousand workers, allegedly sends 47 percent of its steel to the USSR. Hungarian steel production in 1951 amounted to 800,000 metric tons, while pig iron production was estimated at 450,000 tons.
'
2.
Polish Government gains new collectivization weapons: A Polish Government resolution published on 13 May places all agricultural-producer cooperative machinery centers under state control. The American Embassy in Warsaw comments that by taking over control of the entire farm machinery pool, the Polish Government gains a potent weapon for pushing its agricultural Individual peasants needing farm collectivization program. machinery will have to meet whatever conditions the Government prescribes in order td obtain use of the necessary machinery. (R Warsaw 655, 16 May 52)

SECRET
1
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1.
The muchLarge new Hungarian blast furnace inaugurated: publicized new blast furnace at Diosgyor in northeastern The principal speaker Hungary was inaugurated on 11 May. who stated that the new was Hungarian Politburo member Gero, furnace would increase Hungarian pig iron production by more than one third, with a consequent increase in steel production and resultant abundance of consumer goods as well as a strong(R IBIS, 13 May 52) er country.
21 May 52
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Comment: An additional factor motivating the government's adoption of this resolution is the fact that tractor production goals have not been attained by Polish industry. This failure appears to have slowed the progress of the collectivization program.
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SECRET
2
21 May 52
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FAR EAST
3.
Gas mask issue to Chinese Communists seen as propaganda maneuver: Sixteen recently captured Chinese Communist soldiers reveal that they *ere either issued gas masks or instructed in the use of anti-gas field expedients during April 1952, according to Far East Command. Three possible reasons advanced by FECOM for such enemy preparations are that the Communists anticipate UN use of gas, that they intend to wage chemical warfare, or that the gas masks are to provide "proof" for enemy propaganda charges of the United States using CW in Korea:.
interFBWOns, probably is intended to support Communist
charges of American use of chemical warfare agents in Korea. While specific Communist propaganda allegations of US use of biological warfare ended in early April, a continuation of the American "atrocities" theme has been provided by recent charges that the United States has used CW agents in
combat.
Radio Pyongyang on 24 April detailed 33 incidents of alleged use of chemical warfare occurring between 27 February and 9 April, and again on 7 May charged that the United States used CW on 22 and 25 April.
Further shipments of Ceylonese rubber to China: The Polish vessel Kilinski departed from Colombo, Ceylon, on 19 May with 4,700 long tons of rubber for China.
Another Polish ship, the Jednosc, is expected to arrive next week to pick up more rubber for China. (C Colombo 828, 19 May 52)
Comment: Inability to find shipping space has prevented the CEITiati-from getting larger shipments of Ceylonese rubber. To overcome this difficulty, the Communists are now diverting Orbit vessels to Ceylon. The Jednosc will be the sixth Orbit vessel--five Polish and one Russian-- to pick up Ceylonese rubber for China thus far in 1952. No Western-flag vessels have engaged in this trade.
SECRET

Comment:
3
FECOM concludes that available evidence fails to indicate enemy intentions of employing chemical warfare in the immediate future. (S CINCFE Telecon DA TT 5831, 20 May 52) The issue of gas masks, confirmed in prisoner
21
May 52
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5.
Trade slump in Hong Kong continues: The trade depression which-his prevailed in Hong Kong since December 1951, continues, although the American Consul General reportS some indications of improvement. April statistics show a further reduction in Hong Kong's over-all trade, but commerce with China increased 25 percent. There is no sign, however, of a wholesale resump(It Hong Kong 3072, 16 May 52) tion of Communist purchasing.
Comment: A sharp decline in Chinese Communist purchases from RUNI-Kiing since late 1951 has resulted in swollen inventories and widespread pessimism among businessmenin the Colony. The slump, however, has not yet caused panic in commercial circles. The local stock market remains firm, new construction continues, and there is litile evidence of an exodus of capital.
Other "third force" figures continue to make plans-TreWirthrow the Nationalists rather than to join them.
Comment:
These ex-Nationalist leaders do not in fact constitute a "third force." They have no capability at present for overthrowing the Nationalists; nor is it likely that they would be given any significant power if they were to join them.
7.
Rumors of uprising in Thailand unfounded: The American Army Attache in, Bangkok reports that a number of reliable sources had indicated to him that rumors of an imminent up(S MA rising led by junior military officers were unfounded. Bangkok, 190800Z and 200200Z May 52)
8.
It was on the basis of these rumors that Thai Comment: GoverinWET-75Iiicials excused their inability to attend a reception in honor of US Armed Forces Day. This excuse now appears to be a fabrication.
Indonesia seeks diplomatic relations with Japan: Information Minister Mononutu announced on 17 May that Indonesia will open diplomatic relations with Japan. He specifically
SECRET
4
"Third force" plan to approach Chinese Nationalists reported: A "third force" leader in Hong Kong was reportedly attempting last month to form a committee to approach the Chinese Nationalists for terms on which they might return to (S/Control - US Formosa and participate in the government. 25X1A Officials Only
6.
21 May 52
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declined to state whether Indonesia would ratify the Japanese (C Djakarta 1680, 19 May 52) Peace Treaty.
'
Comment: The former cabinet was severely criticized for signing the Japanese Peace Treaty. Critics considered the government's action a concession to the Western bloc.
The Prime Minister has implied that the peace treaty must be re-examined, and Parliament has indicated a reluctance to ratify the treaty until Indonesia has negotiated what it considers adequate reparations from Japan. NEAR EAST - AFRICA
9.
The President added that Turkey would be prepared to fulfill its NATO obligations, but he emphasized that it would be useless for his country to act alone against the Soviet Union. (S Ankara 1267, 17 May 52)
Comment: Turkey, despite its membership in NATO, still fears that the West will sacrifice the Eastern Mediterranean in the interests of Western Europe. President Bayar's remarks appear to be part of the continuing Turkish effort to convince the West that the Eastern Mediterranean is vital to European defense.
10
South African Government restricts left-wing labor leader: Acting under the Suppression of Communism Act, the South African Government has ordered E. S. Sachs, white leader of the trade union movement's left wing, to resign as general secreSachs is barred tary of the powerful Garment Workers Union. from union membership, may attend only religious and recreational meetings, and may not leave Transvaal Province for two (U Reuters Johannesburg, 19 May 52) years.
Comment: Sachs has been the most prominent trade union advocate of white and non-white opposition to the Nationalists'
SECRET
5
TUrkey sees Soviet attack on Iran or Iraq as NATO problem: Turkish President Bayar and the Chief of the Turkish General Staff tobithe American Ambassador recently that the Soviet Union would have to defeat or neutralize Turkey before conquering Iran and Iraq. Consequently a Russian attack on Iran or Iraq would force NATO, of which Turkey is now a member, to decide whether or not to declare war.
21 May 52
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SECRET
segregation program. His affiliation with the Communist Party is less certain than that of the top South African Indian agitator similarly restricted last week.

SECRET
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WESTERN EUROPE
11.
12.
West German Social:Democrat's attack EDC treaty on constitutional grounds: The Social Democratic Party, which contends that any West German contribution to Western de--. fense will require an amendment to the constitution, and hence approval by two-thirds of the parliament, has formally petitioned the Federal Constitutional Court to rule on the legality of German participation in the European Defeat:le Community. The court has,agreed to consider the case on
. .
10 June,
The Social Democrats are now also trying to force a parliamentary debate on the Allied-German contractual agreement on 23 May, three days before the scheduled sig.nature, by invoking a provision of the constitution for a special parliamentary session on the demand of one-third of.the members. (S Bonn 2883, 17 May 52)
Comment: Several months ago Allied officials were serioZiTY-iiirried that the Federal Constitutional Court might support the Social Democrats' position and thus force a general election or prevent GerMan participation in the. EDC. Several prominent German jurists, however) have since then eApressed the opinion that a simple majority in the parliament is sufficient to ratify the treaty.
13.
French Cabinet balks at European Defense Community signature: There is considerable sentiment within the 'French Cabinet for postpotang signature of the European
SECRET
7
East German Government may strengthen control over labor: Two projected East:German labor decrees are designed to .intro-: duce a stricter disciplinary code for industrial workers and to circumvent existing labor courts of arbitration-by form ing factorrcommissions dependent on political directives. ."Honor courts" would be used to publicize good examples of work and reward achievements, and also to "punish:negligent and undisciplined workers and employees by appropriate measures." Workers would be made responsible for defective production, with fines to run as high is one month's salary. The work-norm system contemplated.under the decrees would require of the worker faster and more intense performance in order to avoid reduction of his Wages. .(C Bonn, 2828; 16 May 52)
21 May 52
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SECRET Defense Community treaty and the contractual agreement with He Germany, according to Under Secretary Maurice Schumann. states that a full cabinet session will decide on 21 May whether Foreign Minister Robert Schuman will be authorized
to sign.
Under Secretary Schumann expects that the Foreign Minister will be given the authority, but he indicated that Ptemier Pinay and other ministers are inclined to look upon the European Defense Community as a complicating factor in the government's domestic program. (S Paris 7169, 20 May 52)
Comment: Even if Schuman receives cabinet authorization on 21 May, the tripartite and quadripartite meetings scheduled to precede signing will have to proceed without a hitch if both instruments are to be accepted by 26 May.
This is a critical moment for Pinay, since the French Assembly has just reconvened and he is staking the life of his cabinet on parliamentary approval of a large bond issue.
14.
Italy unlikely to meet current military production An analysis of data for the third quarter of the current fiscal year indicates that Italy is not likely to reach its military production goals. There has been a sharp decline in the rate of defense orders for hard goods and a 25 percent decline in the rate of deliveries. Nevertheless, the monthly rate of defense production is still substantially. above that for the previous fiscal year. (S Rome Joint Weeka 20, 16 May 52)
goals:
Comment: Political considerations have prompted the Italiii7Z5Virnment to retard its defense program until after the 1953 national elections. It wants to avoid the appearanee that defense expenditures are too large in comparison with civil expenditures.
15.
Italy pessimistic as to benefits of trade agreement with Germany: The Italians' recently concluded trade agreement with Germany does not encourage their hope that a rise in exports to Germany would offset the decline in exports caused by British and French trade restrictions. Import quotas agreed upon by Germany on horticultural products were disappointing to Italy. Furthermore, Italy's trade deficit with Germany in the first quarter of 1952 was considerably
SECRET
8
21 May 52
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larger than in the same period of past years. Weeka 20, 16 May 52)
Comment:
(S Rome Joint
Italy's trade experts are disturbed about its The trend toward greater restrictions in international trade poses difficult problems contributing to the country's trade imbalance with the EPU and its growing dollar deficit. Italy has been increasingly unable to obtain the imports it requires from the EPU area, and hence forced to purchase such items from the dollar area.
long-lirriade outlook.
16
The Communist official said excessive confidence by his party must be avoided, because there is no possibility of "a real Christian Democrat catastrophe," and it is uncertain "whether the new political situation which is taking shape in the country will be ripe by 25 May." 25X1A
!25X1A
In the 25 May local elections, the Christian Comment: DemociTfiriFe expected to suffer a large decrease in popular vOte and to lose control of the municipal councils in many of the important'cities of Southern Italy. Their chances of winning in Rome have recently been improved by an intensified campaign on the part of Catholic Action committees, according to the American Embassy.
The "Citizens' List" is composed of Communists, proCommunist Socialists, and a group of non-Communist neutralists led by former Premier Nitti. Communist gains are expected to result less from the alliance with Nitti than from the party's reputation as protagonist of the workers.
'
17.
Norway opposes adoption of COCOM restrictions on pyrites: Norway continues to oppose the inclusion of pyrites on COCOM's SECRET
9
High-level Communist discusses Rome elections of 25 May: A member of the Communist Central Committee recently stated that the Communist electoral front in Rome known as the "Citizens' List" may well turn out to be an arrangement which The Commuis a basic contribution to future party policy. nist official emphasized the Vatican's differences with the Christian Democrats, but acknowledged that Premier de Gasperi . has momentarily prevented a shift of his party to the extreme right, which would have been "most favorable" to the CommuThe neo-fascist Italian Social Movement, he nist campaign. said, has gained "considerably" throughout the city.
21 May 52
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International List II, which places quantitative restrictions A Noron the export of certain goods to the Soviet Orbit. wegian Foreign Office official told the American Ambassador that Norway did not intend to increase its exports of pyrites and would keep them to the minimum level necessary to obtain vital imports. He insisted, however, that the American proposal did not consider sufficiently such factors as the im(S Oslo 1002, 19 May portance of maintaining export markets.
52)
18.
Sweden places embargo on re-export.of strategic commodities to Eastern Europe: The Swedish Government has informally assured the United States that strategic goods imported into Sweden against a Swedish import permit will not The US Embassy believes be re-exported to the Soviet bloc. that no further guarantee will be necessary, except when there is reason to suspect a diversion to Eastern Europe (S Stockholm 7118, 17 May 52) before entry to Sweden.
Comment: Sweden's informal observance of International Lists-7-70-II quotas has limited the exPort of domestic manufactured goods to Eastern Europe. This new assurance that commodities will not be re-exported by Swedish firms is a further assistance to the American program for controlling East-West trade.
19.
If Colombian Communists appraise guerrilla prospects: Colombian guerrillas sbould unite, they reportedly could count on Communist support. According to Communist leaders, however, the Llanos guerrillas are the only ones now capable of positive action, and activity in other parts of the country is sporadic, uncoordinated, and incapable of delivering an effective blow.

LATIN AMERICA
Due to lack of arms, insufficient numerical strength SECRET

10
Comment: Pyrites constitute an important item in Norwegian exports to Poland and Czechoslovakia. Norway's attitude towards controls has become less cooperative as COCOM discussions have involved List II items, such as aluminum, ferrochrome, and abrasives, in which Norway has a direct interest because of its trade agreements with the Soviet Orbit.
21 May 52
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and fear of being outlawed, Communist Party heads dare not aid guerrilla warfare at present. They prefer to await a better opportunity to join in acts of violence a ainst the government. 25X1A
Comment: Only in the Viota district of Cundinamarci has CrmiuTrut cooperation with guerrillas been reported, and this iS attributed to the local Communist leader rather than.to party policy.

SECRET
Communists have come to regard their position in Colombia as very precarious. Police vigilance under the state of siege has made regular meetings almost impossible and the party is faced with financial difficulties and increased Catholic opposition. Its political showing has also been poor. For these reasons Communists have sought Liberal support to form a "Democratic Front."
11
21 May 52
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21 May 1952
This digest of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports It in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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WESTERN EUROPE
1.
Chancellor Adenauer is determined to reduce to the minimum the number of outstanding questions for quadripartite consideration. Aside from financial questions relating to the West German military contribution, those issues currently to be considered are the date when the contracts are to become effective, whether or not the Federal Republic will be permitted to manufacture guided missiles,and the title for the treaty as a whole. (S S/S Bonn 2936, 20 May 52)
Comment: This new deadline may not be met unless there is an early harmonization of opposing views on the financial question. Allied and German negotiators have not yet reached even the basic agreement which seems necessary before the Foreign Ministers can discuss the problem.
Another factor contributing to the uncertainty of the signing date is the possibility of a debate in the Bonn Parliament on 23 May, which may cause Chancellor Adenauer to spend vitally needed time defending the contracts.

TOP SECRET
Signin of Allied-German contractual a reement may be dee an ferre ermano casnonn now sugges a TEF-C7ntractual agreement be signed on 26 May instead of 24 May. This will allow an extra day for the tripartite and quadripartite deliberations which are to precede the signing ceremony.
:
21 May 52
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7. 7.
7-!k r o u n d s of "instant-ammunition'l
M A depot: d e o t : The Supply Chi e f of t h e North Korean 2 1st A ntiairAAA Chief the 21st Antiaircra t Artillery r i l l e r y Regiment eported t he r e c e i o t of craft Regiment r reported the receipt of 42.840 42,840
on 11-12 11-12 May. May-. rounds of "instant ammunition" on Corn Recon Grp Korea, SK-J-515, 14 14 May May 52) 52) Comm Korea, SK-J-515,
(SUEDE 501st 501st (SUEDE
S u b s t a n t i a l supply s u p p l y of of ammunition ammunition received r e c e i v e d ,by ,by North Substantial North Korean Korean
Comment: The The depot d e p o t receiving r e c e i v i n g this t h i s ammunitionammunition%.ts $q in the the Comment: Wonsan-Hamhung area area and, a n d , according a c c o r d i n g to t o communications intel-l. WonsaW7Hainrig communications intel;i The was only o n l y scheduled s c h e d u l e d to t o be be opened opened on on 10 10 May. May. The l i g e n c e , was ligence, r a p i d arrival a r r i v a l of this this r e l a t i v e l y large s u p p l y of ntiairaraft rapid relatively supply of a antiaircraft ammunition on on 11-12 11-12 May May indicates i n d i c a t e s the the importance i m p o r t a n c e to t o the the ammunition enemy of the t h e rapid r a p i d buildup b u i l d u p of h is a ntiaircraft d e f e n s e in in enemy his antiaircraft defense t h i s region. region. this Element of of recently r e c e n t l y withdrawn withdrawn .Chinese Chinese Communist rtil1,ery Element Communist a artillery t o combat: combat: A A message, p r o b a b l y from from the the diViSiOA returns r e t u r n s to division message, probably 3 rd B a t t a l i o n of the t h e 30th 3 0 t h Regiment, 2nd 2nd Chinese Chinese Communist Communist 3rd Battalion Artillery D i v i s i o n , to t o its its p arent u n i t , s t a t e d on hat Artillery Division, parent unit,stated on 15 May May t that ' ' 1 arrived a r r i v e d at a t the t h e 117th 1 1 7 t h Division's D i v i s i o n ' s command command post p o s t today. today. . "I and i s c u s s e d the t h e results results w i t h the t h e division d i v i s i o n commander. commander. If and d discussed with If
.
8. 8.
3 3
22 May 52 22 May 52
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FOR RELEASE RELEASE APPROVED FOR DATE: 18-Mar-2010 18-Mar-2010 DATE:
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.we w will simd one battalion. the situation t he s i t u a t i o n warrants. warrants. .we i l l shad battalion. .(to positions near (of) two 105mm 105mm artillery a r t i l l e r y companies. companies. . (to p ositions n ear .Commander Hui Bui.and the t h e town of Sangyong). .Commander and Commander. have already a l r e a d y gone to t o clarify c l a r i f y and a n d investigate i n v e s t i g a t e the t h e position. position. (SUEDE 5 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, (SUEDE 0 1 s t Corn Korea, K-2920, K-2920, 18 18 May 52) 52)
.
\,
.
.
.
.
.. ..
. . . .
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11
This along with Compient: Conuient : T h i s artillery a r t i l l e r y battalion, battalion, a long w i t h other other elements e l e m e n t s of of the t h e 2nd 2nd Chinese Chinese Communist Communist Artillery A r t i l l e r y Division), Division), April was withdrawn from combat combat in i n late late A p r i l and.replaced and r e p l a c e d by the the 27th of the t h e lst 1st Artillery A r t i l l e r y Division. Division. 2 7 t h Regiment of This signal.traffic T h i s is the t h e first noted s i g n a l t r a f f i c passed assed by any element e l e m e n t of the t h e 2nd 2nd Artillery A r t i l l e r y Division D i v i s i o n since s i n c e 27 7 April. April.
9. 9
10. 10.
S h i p repair regair engineer e n g i n e e r needed needed by by North North Korean Korean naVal n a v a l unit: unit: Ship An unidentified u n i d e n t i f i e d naval n a v a l unit u n i t in i n gongjin, S o n g j i n , a latge large port on the the n o r t h e a s t Korean coast, c o a s t , advised a d v i a e d another another u n i d e n t i f i e d unit unit northeast unidentified i n a 14 May message of its its need for for a a ship s h i p rePair r e p a i r engineer. engineer. in (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, 15RSM/12535, 15RSY/12535, 14 1 4 May May 52) 52) (SUEDE Comment: A North Korean unit u n i t failed f a i l e d in i n its i t s 20 F ebruary Comment: February e f f o r t to t o take t a k e Yang-do, the n o r t h e r n m o s t UN-held s l a n d off effort Yang-do, the northernmost UN-held i island t h e Korean east coast, c o a s t , Recent South Korean naval n a v a l interrogainterrogathe tions have r e v e a l e d that t h a t the t h e enemy h a s been onstruc.ting revealed has been c constructing n e a r Songjin S o n g j i n for f o r another a n o t h e r attempt a t t e m p t to t o capture capture wooden boats near t h e nearby island. i s l a n d . The ship s h i p repair r e p a i r engineer's e n g i n e e r ' s duties duties the would presumably be concerned concerned with w i t h this t h i s construction c o n s t r u c t i o n program. program.
Increased I n c r e a s e d Soviet S o v i e t night n i g h t . interception.noted i n t e r c e p t i o n , n o t e d over o v e r Korea: Korea: Russian Gcr n net Recent communications on the the R u s s i a n voice GCI' e t indicate indicate that t h a t the the t three h r e e new Soviet S o v i e t fighter fighter u units n i t s first first n noted o t e d in in Manchuria on 21 April A p r i l began night n i g h t combat o p e r a t i o n s against against operations UN aircraft a i r c r a f t over o v e r Korea Korea in i n mid-May. mid-May. E a c h of of these t h e s e units u n i t s has has Each a b o u t 25 fighters, f i g h t e r s , probably p r o b a b l y jets, j e t s , and they t h e y may be o perating about operating Anshan, 50 50 miles miles south s o u t h of of Mukden. Mukden. Only one jet j e t fighter fighter from Anshan, regiment operations r e g i m e n t previously p r e v i o u s l y was engaged in i n regular r e g u l a r night night o perations over o v e r Korea. Korea. (SUEDE A i r Force:Roundup Force-Roundup 98, 98, 20 20 May May 52) 52) Air
Comment: The F Comment: ar.East A ir F o r c e also also r e p o r t s an a n increase increase Far,East Air Force reports since-ZiFITRay since e a r l y Nay in i n enemy enemy night n i g h t interception i n t e r c e p t i o n of of UN UN bombers+ bombers, i n d i c a t e that t h a t the t h e enemy h as a s s i g n e d about about Although messages indicate has assigned 100 jets j e t s and and 25 25 conventional c o n v e n t i o n a l fighters f i g h t e r s to t o this t h i s operation, operation, 100 t h e i r lack l a c k of airborne a i r b o r n e radar r a d a r has h a s hitherto hitherto p revented e ffective their prevented effective interception. interception.
4 4
22 May 52 52
`ll'OP SECRET SU1II)4E

11. 1.1.
Chinese regiment d describes field supply C h i n e s e artillery a r t i l l e r y regiment escribes f ield s upply s y s t e m in i n Korea: system Korea: Th The e 2 27th 7 t h Chinese Communist Communist A Artillery rtillery Regiment in western Korea on 17 May May instructed Regiment i n combat in in w e s t e r n Koree instructed its subordinate units that,"when each u unit needs (certain i te s ubordinate u nits t h a t , " w h e n each nit n eeds ( certain types') i t should s h o u l d first f i r s t report r e p o r t to t o Regimental Regimental typed) of ammunition it Post will) to Forward Command P o s t (which (which w i l l ) authorize a u t h o r i z e you t o go to to Rear Command Command Post P o s t and and pick p i c k it i t up. up. . i f you oil, .if you need oil, provisions, notify Post p r o v i s i o n s , etc., e t c . , you should sho.uld n o t i f y Rear Command P ost directly d i r e c t l y (which (which will) notify n o t i f y you to t o come and pick p i c k it i t up." up." (SUEDE 3 O l s t Comm C o r n Recon Recon.Grp Grp Korea, Korea, K-2906, K-2906, lY*YIay 52) 52) (SUEDE 501st IT...May
.
t a c t i c a l doctrine d o c t r i n e in i n field f i e l d supply, supply, Comment' 'Chinese . C h i n e s e tactical Comment: a t the t h e regimental r e g i m e n t a l level, l e v e l , apparentlY apparently r e q u i r e s the the u nit even at requires unit n e e d i n g supplies s u p p l i e s to t o travel t r a v e l to t o tthe h e rear rear for f o r them. them. T his needing This is c ontrary t o t h e American r a c t i c e under he s upplier 'is contrary to the American p practice under which which tthe supplier moves supplies s u p p l i e s forward forward as as far f a r as as the t h e battalion. battalion.

12. 12.
5 5 To learn about OCR and PDF Compression visit our website
M i s s i n g Chinese Communist air air division d i v i s i o n identified: identified: A t Missing At least MIG-15's the Chinese Communist 1 15th Air Division l e a s t 27 m G - 1 S ' s of t h e Chi n e s e Communist 5th A ir D ivision f r o m Tdcushan, n e a r the t h e Yalu 1 9 May began transferring t r a n s f e r r i n g from on 19 Takushan, near River, R i v e r , to t o Kungchuling, Kungchuling, about about 250 250 miles m i l e s north. n o r t h . On the t h e following following YIG's of the t h e 6th 6th D i v i s i o n began moving from from Mukden Mukden to to day 38 MIG's Division ,Takushan, t o replica replsce the t h e 15th. 1 5 t h . (SUEDE 6920 S Security e c u r i t y Group Takushan, to DOG 508, 5 0 8 , 519, 519, 19 1 9 May; May; AP AP 889, 889, 20 20 May May 52) 52)
references Comment: These are the t h e first f i r s t intercepted intercepted r eferences h i c h appears a p p e a r s to t o have at to the Air Division, which have been at t h e 15th 15th d ir D ivision, w Takushan for f o r at a t least least several s e v e r a l weeks. weeks. Every. Every C h i n e s e Communist Chinese Communist a i r division d i v i s i o n from from the t h e 2nd 2nd to t o the t h e 20th 2 0 t h has has now now been been identified. identified. air T h e r e is-probably i s ' p r o b a b l y no no Chinese Chinese Communist 1st There 1st Division D i v i s i o n because because onflict w ith t h e North Korean its number number would c conflict with the Korean 1st which which is i n Manchuria. Manchuria. Of the t h e 19 19 Chinese divisions, d i v i s i o n s , 13 13 are are based in i t h jet j e t fighters; f i g h t e r s ; since s i n c e September 1951 1 9 5 1 nine n i n e of these these equipped w with d e p l o y e d to t o Yalu R i v e r bases b a s e s at a t one time or another. another. have been deployed River
52 22 May 52
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SECRET
SECURITY =FORMATION
22 May 1952
US OFFICIALS ONLY
OCI No. 5186
Copy No.287
DIA, DOS, OSD Declassification/Release Instructions on File
DIA, DOS, OSD AND USAF REVIEW COMPLETED

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SOVIET UNION
1.
25X1C
1Finnish Premier Kekkonen will attempt to keep Finland out of the Council for the present.
i
1
25x1C Council'
USSR informally suggests Finland join the Nordic L Soviet Ambassador Rodionov in Stockholm in late April expressed the view to the Finnish Minister there that Finland should join the Nordic Council. The Soviet Ambassador also made a similar statement to Swedish Prime Minister Erlander prior to the latter's recent trip to the United States.
25X1A
Comment:
If the report of Rodionov
statement
is cor-
rect:WV:Wild appear to be another Russian effort to

weaken Scandinavian support of NATO.
Several months ago Denmark proposed the formation of a Nordic Council, to be composed of representatives from Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Iceland. The Council would serve as an advisory committee dealing with problems common to its members and recommend legislation to each of the Parliaments. Denmark and Sweden are willing to participate and it appears that Iceland and Norway will join, despite some domestic opposition.
2.
EASTERN EUROPE
Czech jets make identification passes at Belgian airOn 19 May three MIG-15's made identification passes ra-Within about 700 feet of a Belgian airliner flying inside its corridor over Czechoslovakia. No attempt was made to interfere with the plane's line of flight. The United States Embassy in Prague warns that a corridor or
liner:
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border violation may result in more drastic action by Czech jet interceptors. (S Prague Unnumbered, 20 May 52)
Comment: This incident could be a Czech warning of potential unpleasantness if Belgium and the Netherlands fail to grant a Czech request for reciprocal flight rights. Czechoslovakia has been pressing both the Netherlands and Belgium for several months to grant it landing rights in order to re-establish its air routes to Western Europe which were cut off on 10 September.
3.
25X1A1
Czechoslovakia pushes export measures to offset American sanctions: Czechoslovakia has launched a two-way attack to WaTE-UOTTirs by exports and thus overcome American economic sanctions, It has undertaken an "export offensive" to all countries which can pay in dollars, especially in Latin America, and it is probing for means to re-export Czech goods to the United States through third countries in Western Europe and Latin America. las of March, no reexport deals had been put through from Mexico.
25X1C
25X1C 25X1A
Comment: There have been a few indications that the Czechg-17U-Trying to re-enter the United States market through Mexico and by direct shipments of goods valued at less than one hundred dollars, for which consular invoices are not necessary.
Large quantities of Czech ethyl alcohol and Czech and 'Polishnaphthalene are reportedly being offered for sale to the Unitea States from West Germany. The sale of the ethyl alcohol alone reportedly would realize some three million
dollars.
4.
Hungary seeks North African trade: Hungarian participation in the Algiers fair is interpreted by the American Legation in Budapest as part of a drive to expand trade with underdeveloped areas. Hungary exhibited heavy machinery, electrical equipment, textiles and leather goods. (R USARMA Budapest L-2888, 16 May 52; R FBIS Budapest, 15 May 52)
Comment: Budapest's interest in developing trade with the 1,7170T-ind North Africa has been pointed up by Hungarian participation in local trade fairs in the area. "Hectic" preparations for the Beirut spring exhibit were reported
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Among the Hungarian recently by a Budapest trade journal. industrial products to be shown at Beirut were machine tools, electrical machines and appliances, radios, railway/ trains and equipment, river and sea-going vessels, X-ray 4ppliances, Hungary's trade with Algeria has apdrugs and chemicals. parently been negligible in the past.
5.
In an earlier conversation with Ambassador Allen, Marshal Tito stated that Bulgaria was Yugoslavia's most dangerous (S USARMA Belgrade 370, 20 May 52) Satellite neighbor. In the past; Yugoslav estimates have indiComment: cated considerable scorn for the military capabilities of the neighboring Satellites, except Bulgaria.

SECRET
3
The Yugoslav Yugoslav estimate of Satellite strength: intelligence chief recently informed the US Army Attache in Belgrade that his government does not visualize any outbreak of hostilities with the neighboring Satellites in the predictable future. The general staff estimates that Rumania and Albania remain negligible in combat potential, whereas the Hungarian armed forces are continuing to expand, and now possess qualities which must be reckoned with.
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FAR EAST
6.
Japan seeking United States assistance in demarche to the USSR: The Japanese Government has made informal inquiries
'
alTeFEIng.the willingness of the United States to act as intermediary in delivering a note to the Soviet Government. The note would notify the USSR that Japan considers the Soviet Mission in Japan "null and void." (C Tokyo 190, 22 May 52)
Comment: The Swedish Foreign Office refused a similar requeif-ITUN the Japanese Government to act as intermediary.
7.
Comment: According to CINCFE, smuggling of strategic goodsT-STUFF-as machinery, optical instruments and medical equipment, from Japan to China has now become "big business." There are indications that large foreign freighters are playing an increasing role in the smuggling trade.
8.
Extremist elements becoming active in Japan: Japanese political alignments during the first weeks of sovereignty reflect a strong swing both to the left and right from center, according to Ambassador Murphy. He reports that strong appeals to Japanese patriotism are being made by both extremes in an effort to capture national sentiment at its peak of reaction to the occupation, with the Communists attempting to seize the advantage by regaining labor leadership and fostering neutralist and anti-rearmament sentiment. On the extreme right, the return of the wartime leaders to public life is providing a rallying point for many who ad silently resisted democratization.
Murphy believes that this development is a reflection of confused thinking and general restlessneE resulting from a misconception of the US-Japan Security Treaty, as well as fromdisillusionment and isolation from realities which were caused by the war and occupation. (S Tokyo 187, 20 May 52)
SECRET
4
Smuggling of critical materials from Japan indicated: The American Embassy in Tokyo has received reports that Japanese smuggling activities, formerly limited primarily to consumer goods, are now being expanded to include goods on the export control lists. The shipments presumably are made in collusion with customs officials, and it is reported that fairly large manufacturers and exporters are becoming increasingly interested in the illegal profits derived from these activities. (C Tokyo Desp 1453, 24 Apr 52)
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9.
No indication Chinese Communists intend to expand air operations in Korea: The Far East Air-Force (FEAF) reports on 20 May that there are no indications that the enemy intends to expand air operations over Korea beyond the present defense of the Northwest. Only 189 aircraft were sighted in the past week, but the pilots are becoming more aggressive. The Communists, FEAF conjectures, may have decided the cost of extensive combat training was too high, and moved the majority of jet training back to Manchuria. (S FEAF AX 5193, 20 May 52)
Comment: With at least 350 MIG-15's based on the Korean border, the Communists are capable of flying many more combat sorties than are now observed. Communist air strength in Manchuria has steadily increased in 1952, and is estimated at 1,100 planes, including 600jet fighters.
10
Chinese Communists reportedly want to sell iron ore to E. Ott and Company informed the American Consul General TE-Tong Kong on 16 May that Chinese Communist authorities on Hainan Island requested the company to arrange the export of Hainan iron ore to Japan. The form of payment was not revealed. (C Hong Kong 3074, 16 May 52)
Japan:
Comment: The Chinese Communists have exported iron ore only to the Soviet bloc, and they regard it as a strategic export in the same category as tin, antimony and tungsten. In 1950 they were negotiating to sell Hainan iron to Japan, but no shipments were made.
11.
French bomb bridge near China border: A bridge at the Tonkinese town of Dong Dang, several miles from the China border, was bombed by the French during the past week. (S Saigon Weeka 20, 18 May 52)
Comment: The proximity of Dong Dang to the China border lends significance to this raid. During Marshal de Lattre's command the French scrupulously avoided acts which could provoke China. The bombing of Dong Dang, which probably was part of the effort to interdict Viet Minh supply lines, may indicate a revision of this policy; the French may believe that there is now less danger of an incident with the Peiping government.

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Karens and Burmese Communists nearing an alliance: In early April staff-level representatives of the Karens and the Burmese Communists reached an agreement on joint operations and the administration of captured areas, 25X1C 25X1Q No agreement was reached regarding the boundaries of a future Karen state. While feeling that a complete alliance with the Communists is inevitable, the top Karen leadership is reportedly stalling for time in the hope of receiving military assistance from other sources. 25X1A 25X1A1
1 I
12.
Burmese hope to send delegation to Peiping peace conferThe pro-Communist Burma Trade Union Congress is reported to have chosen a four-man delegation to attei tne forthcoming "peace" conference in Peiping. Although the delegates have already obtained their passports from the government there ail still "pertain diffirnl ies to overcome" before they leave. the delay is caused by the hesitancy of the Chinese Communist Embassy to finance the entire trip. (C Rangoon 1115, 20 May 52)
ence:
'
Comment: This is the latest in a series of reports indicRITEFFrogress toward an alliance between the two . major insurgent forces in Burma.
25X1X
25X1X
Comment: This report illustrates the contradictory Burmegi-Parcies regarding Communist activities.
The Chinese Communist Embassy has been reported by other sources to be financing the activities of various pro-Communist groups in Burma. University exchange established between Indonesia, USSR, and China: A semi-official Indonesian news agency reported from Amsterdam that members of Indonesia's delegation to the Moscow Economic Conference succeeded in establishing exchange arrangements between the Gadjah Mada and Islam Universities in Djokjakarta and universities in Moscow and Peiping. For the present the exchange will be limited to scientific material, although the Moscow University is willing to accept Indonesian students. (R FBIS Djakarta, 20 May 52)
Comment: As far as is known, no student exchange program has existed heretofore between universities in Indonesia and
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Communist-controlled countries. However, small groups of Chinese students leave Indonesia monthly to pursue higher education in Communist China, and Indonesians are known to be studying in the eastern European Satellite countries. In June 1951, a Chinese-language daily in Djakarta took special note of the "first" Indonesian going to Communist China to study. There has been no previous report of Indonesian students going to Moscow to study. SOUTH ASIA
15.
The government's recent disenfranchisement of most Indians living in Ceylon will not be a decisive issue in the elections. The UNP apparently has lost little strength and popular support since the previous Prime Minister's death in March. A reported coalition of the Trotskyite Lanka Same Samaj Party and the independent Sri Lanka Freedom Party, which might threaten the position of the UNP, has showed few signs of
power.
It is therefore unlikely that the opposition, including the Communist front, will display sufficient strength to overthrow the present government. (Factual data from C Colombo Desp 863, 2 May; R Colombo Desp 840, 29 Apr; R Colombo Desp 828, 17 Apr 52)
16.
Indian Government revokes sale of 70 war surplus aircraft: The sale in December 1951 of 70 surplus Curtis C-46 aircraft to Banwari Lal & Company, Bombay, has been revoked by the Indian Government for non-payment of purchase price. Banwari Lal is reported to be legally contesting the revocation of sale. (S New Delhi 4266, 17 May 52)
Comment: These United States' surplus aircraft are in the hands of the Indian Government. If they were sold to a private Indian firm, they might eventually reach the Communist Orbit. Revocation of the above sale eliminates this possibility for the time being.

SECRET
7
The forthcoming parliamentary elections in Ceylon: Indications are that the pro-Western United National Party (UNP) coalition government led by Prime Minister Dudley Senanayake will win a narrow victory in parliamentary elections to be held between 24 and 30 May.
22 May 52
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NEAR EAST - AFRICA

17
Iranian oil official says Italian tanker expected: A National Iranian Oil Company spokesman has confirmed information received by the American Embassy that a tanker is due momentarily at Abadan to load one thousand tons of crude oil The spokesman described the shipment as an for Italy. experiment which, if successful, would result in further (C Tehran 4494, 21 May 52) shipments.
Comment: This is the first confirmed report since the British withdrawal from Abadan that a tanker is actually prepared to load there. An Italian oil company representative in Iran on 20 May informed an American Embassy official that an Italian ship was due in Abadan on 21 or 22 May. The British Admiralty reports that the vessel is the Italianowned tanker Rosemary, under charter to a Swiss company.
The shipment is apparently the first to be made under a two million ton per year contract reportedly concluded between Iran and a small Italian petroleum company in February. The Italian Government has made definite assurances that no Iranianal will be given import licenses. These assurances will not necessarily prevent shipment of the oil to another country.
18.
Changes in top-level command in Spanish Morocco likely: The High Commissioner of Spanish Morocco, Lt. Gen. Garcia Valino, will probably be replaced by a civilian, possibly Spanish Foreign Minister Martin Artajo, according to a Spanish official high in the Moroccan administration. This official also expects that Moslem General Mizzian will be given command of the armed forces in Morocco. The Spanish officialtold the American Legation in Tangier that these changes would serve as further indications of the liberalization of Spain's Moroccanpolicy and are expected to (C be favorably received in Morocco sue tne Atab world. Tangier 383, 19 May 52)
It has been rumored for some weeks that Garcia Comment: Valino, regarded as a most able military oTficer, would be replaced. The appointment of a civilian as his successor would mark a new departure in Spanish policy. Martin Artajo's removal from his present post has been reported as imminent ever since the cabinet changes of last July. He recently
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completed a goodwill tour of the Arab states. The appointment of Mizzian, a Moroccan, to command the army of Morocco would be enthusiastically received by Moroccans; however, recent events suggest that if he were given the command it would be nominal only.
19.
With regard to Morocco, however, he stated the Foreign Office was preparing to make "substantial concessions" to the Sultan. This, he felt, might "do the trick." (S New York 835, 20 May 52)
Comment: French diplomatic officials are more and more frequently blaming the United States for their difficulties No solution of the Tunisian impasse in Tunisia and Morocco. is yet in sight, and the 17 March demands of the Sultan of Morocco remain unanswered.

SECRET
9
French UN representative is discouraged over North African situation: Throughout a conversation on the North African situation with the American delegation to the United Nations on 19 May, the chief of the French delegation appeared to be generally discouraged. Regarding Tunisia, he said (1) that there were two conflicting extreme views in France: imprisoned nationalists so they that France should release the could enter into negotiations -- but this would be "yielding to blackmail" -- and (2) that France should continue its policy of firmness. He blamed the United States for the current difficulties, saying that if the United States had taken a firm stand in the beginning, the nationalists would not have been encouraged in their intransigent position. He also implied that the French Government would have to make concessions to the Tunisians.
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WESTERN EUROPE Soviet tough line in Germany seen meeting early test: The next few weeks may be the test, according to American officials in Bonn, of the actual effect in West Germany of The High Commissioner's offiee the Kremlin's new tough line. points out that the "crust of West German courage is understandably thin" under the present circumstances, but that it may be hardened if the Allies are able to show a determination to counter Soviet moves. HICOG believes that the Soviet Union will not impose likely a full-scale blockade of West Berlin, but is more to apply a "creeping blockade" of selective harassing, possibly restricted to outward movements from Berlin, combined with an'Eastern offer to absorb West Berlin's production. .As West German integration becomes a fact, the Kremlin may also insist more and more that the Western powers deal with the East German Government, acting as a front for the USSR. (.S Bonn 2803, 13 May 52)
21.
20
Britain blocking agreement on German defense contribution: German Finance Minister Schaeffer is evidently prepared to accept the American proposal that Germany's defense contribution be divided between the Allies and Germany on the basis of increasing the German share after a period of continuing high payments to the Allies for support of their forces in Germany.
British representatives, however, have been instructed to insist upon a flat monthly rate for support costs on the grounds that scaling down German payments to the Allies this year would prejudice the British bargaining position (S Bonn 2951, 20 May for the period after 30 June 1953.
52)
Although Schaeffer's conciliatory attitude hope of reaching an agreement in principle presearEWne on the defense contribution, the inability of the British negotiators to modify their position may make it necessary to leave the entire question for the Foreign Ministers to
Comment:
settle.
22.
Adenauer may regain control of the West German Senate: FreeHDemocratic Party leaders now predict that the West
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German state of Baden-Wuerttemberg will have a pro-Adenauer government within eight weeks, and have directed the Free Democrat deputies to withdraw their support from the present state governMent. They have taken this action because the Federal Senators from that state will not support the federal coalition's program. If a special state convention on 7 June does not concur in this directive, a national party convention on 5 July may expel some of the objecting members. American officials in Bonn comment that the party's national leaders will probably be successful in securing a new state government favorable to Adenauer. (S Frankfurt Sitrep 18, 20 May 52; C Bonn 2950, 20 May 52)
Comment: Certain financial provisions of the contractual TiViiiant and its implementing legislation may not be ratified unless there isapro-Adenauer government in BadenWuerttemberg, giving the Bonn government a majority in the Federal Senate.
23.
French police reportedly sanction strong-arm group's inti-Communist demonstration: The American Embassy in Paris has been "reliably informed" that the group of RPF militants and various veteran elements which broke up a Communist-sponsored anti-American play on 17 May had the "tacit approval" of the police, who had been given advance notice of the demonstration. This same group intends to take similar action against any "particularly insulting" Communist demonstrations., (S Paris 7157, 19 May 52)
! !
arm 6.7SWave been treated impartially by the police The reported tacit
agreement reflects the groWing boldness of the government in its repression of Communist activity.
24.
Threatened resignation of Austrian Trade Minister reflects foreign trade dispute; ,The request of Minister of Trade Boeck-Greissau that he be relieved of his cabinet post has been turned down by the Executive Committee of the Austrian People's Party. The Minister's announcement of his intention to resign in opposition to a further extension of the foreign trade law is considered by US officials in Vienna to have been a "tactical move" in the protracted coalition dispute over economic policies. (R Vienna TOMUS 381, 16 May 52; R FBIS, Vienna, 21 May 52)
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Comment:
11
Heretofore, Communist and Gaullist strong-
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Comment: Under the present law, extensive authority over /17-11in trade is vested in a commission where, because of the necessity for unanimous decisions, "veto" power is exercised by the participating representatives of labor, industry, and government. The commission is clearly cumbersome, restricts the authority of the Minister of Trade, and has long been held an obstacle to an export program which would reduee Austrian dependence on foreign aid.
Since tentative agreement to extend the trade law may be linked with mutual concessions by the coalition parties on various economic issues, the Minister's "resignation" suggests a "face-saving" gesture as well as a tactical move.
Italian Government faces danger in 25 May elections: The Whited States Embassy in Rome believes that the extensive gains which the extremist parties are "certain" to make in the 25 May South Italian elections will "jolt" Premier de Gasperi's government and result in insistence by the left, and probably also by the right, on immediate national elections.
The center's continuing ability to hold a national working majority against both the Communists and the extreme right will meet its test in Rome, where the Christian Democrats are linked in an electoral bloc with other moderate parties only. The Embassy believes the center alliance will pull through in Rome, but with a plurality of only 50,000 or fewer votes as compared with 320,000 in the 1948 national elections.
Should De Gasperi lose the city, "even the staunchest supporter of the center would have to admit doubt of its continuing viability." The ensuing crisis could bring about national elections this fall, or a radical reorganization of the government, possibly with the resignation of De Gasperi, or an admission of government weakness by postponement of national elections from 1953 to 1954. (S Rome 5067, 20 May 52)
26.
Detained Spanish opposition leaders freed: The majority of the Socialist leaders arrested in a nation-wide police drive during March are now at liberty The arrests were in part a precautionary measure against a possible recurrence of the strikes ox last epring. sue government presumably decided that the activities of these opposition members were
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not a serious security threat and therefore did not warrant risking the unfavorable foreign reaction which prosecutions would produce. The round-up of leaders of the clandestine Socialist organization was apparently made possible by the theft last fall by a Spanish police agent of files from the Socialist Party headquarters in Toulouse, France. (Factual information from: S Madrid Desp 997 and 1059. 27 Mar and 17 Apr 52;
1
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LATIN AMERICA
!
Latin American labor committee calls for recognition of Bolivia: The Committee for Latin American Syndical Unity has requested the presidents of all American nations to recognize the new Bolivian Government, according to a telegram sent to the Bolivian labor federation by Jose Espejo, president of the committee and top Argentine labor leader. The committee has also directed its regional subcommittees to call for a plebiscite ip the respective countries in favor of recognition. (R Buenos Aires 791, 20 May 52) This action is indicative of the committee's primaiirlagrest in political rather than labor matters. The committee, which was formed at an Argentine-subsidized conference in Asuncion last February, has subcommittees in Costa Rica, Haiti, Chile, and Uruguay, and national committees in a few other countries. Bolivia has been recognized by only four countries -Guatemala, Spain, Argentina, and Paraguay.
Comment:
28.
Argentina will not renew contrabt for United States The chief of the US Army Mission in Argentina was informally notified on 19 May that Argentina will not request extension of the mission's contract. No explanation was given, but the decision was made on a level higher than the Ministry of the Army. (C USARMA Buenos Aires 24, 19 May 52)
Army 'Mission:
Comment: The decision is in line with Peron's late 1951 -Fiderthat Argentine Army officers would avoid unnecessary contracts with US Army personnel in Argentina.
SECRET 13
27.
22 May 52
Approved FoiRlease 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79101146A001000080001-3

SECRET
Peron's advisers have tried to convince him that the United States is directing a plot against him, and the army the strongest position to attempt is in such a plot. Peron's apprehension of a possible army revolt has been indicated by continuing arrests of army officers, his placing the army on a 24-hour alert, and his asking congress to extend through 1952 the law authorizing him to "readjust" the armed forces register. Last October the Argentine Air renew its contract with the US Air Force decided not to Force Mission.
29.
The Brazilian Foreign Minister on 14 May that early recognition informed the of the new regime in Bolivia would be in the and that he had stated this view best interests of Brazil to President Vargas. He added that preservation of continental tranquility could be more easily assured with a recognized regime than with one "kept dangling."
US
Ambilgrdar
The US State Department informed Peru on 20 May that the United States "together with Brazil" had reached the conclusion that continued non-recognition is equivalent to withholding help from moderate elements and that it had asked President Truman for authorization to recognize Bolivian Government sometime next the week.
Constitutional guarantees reported Interior Minister Ramon Hermida re-established in has announced that TR-constitutional guarantees which were suspended after the 10 March coup in Cuba have established, since the Council been automatically reof Ministers has not extended the original suspension order which expired on 20 May.
Cuba:

Comment:
SECRET
Brazilian Foreign apparently changes position on Bolivian recognition Office question: A delay of even several months in recognizing the new Bolivian Government would have no important long-range effects on Brazil's oil operations in Bolivia, and Brazil is content to observe the situation for the time being, to a statement made to the US Ambassador on 20 May according by the Foreign Office's political division. head of the Brazilian (S Rio de Janeiro 1440, 20 May 52)
14
22 May 52
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SECRET
This brings to an end the initial period of national emergency and attests to the fact that the current political situation is such as to warrant the beginning of a return to "constitutional normalcy" within the terms of the newly promulgated Constitutional Statutes supplanting the 1940 constitution. The announcement will probably further lessen (Factual data popular resistance to the Batista regime. from; U La Prensa (NY), 21 May 52; R FBIS Havana, 20 May 52)

SECRET
15
22 May 52
Approved OM/Release
e/C4C.
2002105/20
:
CIA-RDP79TOl1egA001000080001-
TOP SECRET
US OFFICIALS ONLY
22 May 1952
CIA No. 49654
Copy No. 46

TOP SECRET
Approved For Release
2002/05120
: CIA-RDP79T01146A001000080001-3
Approved Fitieheiease 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01MIA001000080001-3
TOP SECRET
FAR EAST
1.
Prior to 28 April, when the Japanese Peace TreatTWEITEe effective, Japan proposed to Indonesia and tie Philippines the establishment of diplomatic relations pending their ratification of the treaty. The Indonesian Embassy in Tokyo, accredited to SCAP, lost its status when the treaty became effective.
Comment:
Although the former Indonesian government signed the Japanese treaty, Parliament has indicated reluctance to ratify it and the new Prime Minister has implied that the treaty will be re-examined. NEAR EAST - AFRICA
2.
Iran offers to include oil in exports to USSR: Iran has now agreed to include oil on its list of exports offered to the USSR under the pending trade agreement. The Iranians, however, have made the offer conditional on the payment of the world market prices, on limitations on quantity, and on Russians' taking delivery at Abadan. They also insist on Soviet deliveries of sugar and machinery in exchange. The Russians reportedly are displeased with these conditionS.
The US Embassy in Tehran comments that the USSR could be expected tomake every effort to move the petroleum if it thought this would result in discontinuance of American (S S/S Tehran 4468, 19 May 52) aid to Iran. TOP SECRET
22 May 52
Indonesia expects to open Consulate General in Japan: government The Indonesian press announced on 20 May that the (R Djakarta General in Tokyo. intends to open a Consulate 1689, 20 May 52)
Approved Pee Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T011001000080001-3 TOP SECRET
3.
Greek official denies army retirements are due to of Defense Mavros political pressure: Greek Under Secretary Ambassador that he will do all he has assured the American of the armed forces. can 'to prevent a further political purge Military Council informed that the High The Ambassador had been connected with the had ordered the retirement of all officers When he questioned Mavros clandestine army organization IDEA. the Council intended about the matter, the latter insisted that in the abortive to retire only the five officers involved resignation in May coup which followed Field Marshal Papagoe' (S S/S Athens 4937, 17 Mar 52) 1951.

TOP SECRET
2
to be those sentenced Comment: The five officers appear Their sentenceS had in FeEFUiFT-for their part in the coup. The army been delayed pending review by a board of inquiry. of attempted to disguise its purge command in the past has merely trying to pro-Papagos officers by claiming that it was reduce the influence of IDEA. of Although Mavroe may be successful, government fear efforts to PapagoS' influence is still strong,and further continue the purge may be expected.
22 May 52
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UI PRIV 101.11 COI TIONS.
FORM 843
A e
TOP SECRET
(401
HR70-14 HR70-14
FAR EAST
12.
13. 13.
UN eastern e a s t e r n rear area area is is target target of of North Korean reconreconnaissance n a i s s a n c e unit: u n i t : Am An unidentified-North u n i d e n t i f i e d North Korean Korean tactical t a c t i c a l unit, unit, i n combat combat on on the t h e east east coast, coast. was was instructed i n s t r u c t e din initrA its probably in ."rear area .itrear area r reconnaissance e c o n n a i s s a n c e mission" to t o rendezvous.at,an r e n d e z v o u s at, an "assembly .in the g general of Chang-sin-ni,tl Chang-sin-ni," 12 ltaseembly area. area. . i n the e n e r a l area of 12 miles m i l e s south s o u t h of South S o u t h Korean positions p o s i t i o n s in in the t h e eastern e a s t e r n sector. u n i t , probably not n o t more than t h a n four f o u r or five f i v e men, men, is is to to The unit, situation "decide on the t h e enemies'rear e n e m i e s ' r e a r area.supply area s u p p l y transport transport s ituation .situation." and the t h e military. military. . situation." Other O t h e r intelligence i n t e l l i g e n c e targets are the t h e "supply " s u p p l y replenishment r e p l e n i s h m e n t situation, s i t u a t i o n , communication communication situasituation t i o n and the t h e enemies'disposition. enemies'disposition. .I1 p r i s o n e r is is to t o be A prisoner taken .(and). .after ending t a k e n "silently " s i l e n t l y by b y ambush. ambush. .(and). .after e n d i n g the the questioning evidence q u e s t i o n i n g accurately, a c c u r a t e l y , you are to t o bring b r i n g the the e v i d e n c e ' with with you and (kill?). (kill?). 1t you and ."
.
.
..
.
.
.
A 19 19 May message, message, in i n the-same the.same system s y s t e m and probably to to . the will t h e same unit, u n i t , notes n o t e s that $hat "there "there w i l l be a reconnaissance reconnaissance .from 21 Following search. .from 2 1 May until 24 24 May." May." F o l l o w i n g completion completion of the t h e mission m i s s i o n and and "having "having complete command of the t h e enemy situation, s i t u a t i o n , you are are to to submit submit a a written w r i t t e n report by 29 29 May." May." (SUEDE 330th C Comm o r n Recon Co Korea, Korea, ALT-344 ALT-344 and and ALT-348, ALT-348, (SUEDE 20 May 52) 52)
.
Wistly V d s t l y increased i n c r e a s e d gasoline g a s o l i n e supply s u p p l y probably p r o b a b l y available a v a i l a b l e to to Chinese C h i n e s e Communist Communist division: d i v i s i o n : The The Chinese Chin e s e Communist /th 7th Artillery A r t i l l e r y Divition D i v i g i o n in i n eastern e a s t e r n Korea Korea mentioned mentioned the t h e possession possession of 4,000, 4,000, and possibly p o s s i b l y 4,400, 4 400, drums of of gasoline g a s o l i n e in i n a garbled garbxed (SUEDE 0 1 s t Corn Cjrp Korea, Korea, K-2936, K-2936, 15 May message. (SUEDE 4 601st Comm Recon Orp 15 15 15 May 52) 52)
6 6
23 May 52
C-i b
.57
APPROVED FOR FOR RELEASEDATE: RELEASEDATE: ,18-Mar-2010 18-Mar-2010
ri-OP SECRET SUEDE

Comment: p r i l message from this t h i s same unit u n i t indicated indicated Comment: A 9 A April t hat t h edivision i s i o n was then t h e n limited l i m i t e d to to a a monthly gasoline gasoline that the ration r a t i o n of 91 gallons g a l l o n s for f o r each e a c h of of its its 438 operational o p e r a t i o n a l vehicles. vehicles. The 15 May message suggests s u g g e s t s available a v a i l a b l e gasoline g a s o l i n e supplies s u p p l i e s have have been q quadrupled been u a d r u p l e d or o r quintupled, q u i n t u p l e d , indicating i n d i c a t i n g that t h a t each e a c h vehicle vehicle may now be fueled f u e l e d for f o r g000-2500 3000-2500 miles m i l e s during d u r i n g the t h e coming coming month. month.
I
14 14.
North Korean armored armored command command continues c o n t i n u e s active: active: A A North North Korean officer o f f i c e r signing s i g n i n g himself himself as."chief as " c h i e f of of officer's officer's d e p a r t m e n t , Tank Tank Headquarters,"informed Head&arterq" informed the t h e."Chief "Chief of of Staff, Staff, department, 105,"of 105,"of his h i s arrival a r r i v a l on on 14 14 May May "to " t o organize o r g a n i z e the t h e1(-9th I c 9 t h unit." unit." The personnel that the "self-propelled p e r s o n n e l officer o f f i c e r then t h e n requested requested t hat t he " self-propelled a rtillery b a t t a l i o n commander be dispatched d i s p a t c h e d to t o the t h e tank t a n k regiment." regiment." artillery battalion

.
.
Two days d a y s later later a a message sent s e n t in i n this t h i s same same system s y s t e m and and signed s i g n e d by the t h e "division " d i v i s i o n commander" commander" informed i n f orrned the."responsible the "responsible officer River, that o f f i c e r at a t Anju," Anju," on the t h e Chongchon R iver, t h a t orders from Supreme H e a d q u a r t e r s had arrived a r r i v e d to Headquarters t o "discontinue " d i s c o n t i n u e the t h e work0. works. the tank t he t a n k personnel p e r s o n n e l should s h o u l d arrive a r r i v e here. here. .by he 1 9 t h day." day." .by tthe 19th (SUEDE ROK ROK Int M, t h r u 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, Korea, CSUEDE I n t Grp M , thru SK-J-642, SK-J-642, 20 20 May; May; SK-J-548, SK-5-548, 19 19 May May 52) 52)
r"
..
.
Although the t h e first f i r s t message message obviously o b v i o u s l y refers refers to to Comment: Although the Ind to Tank Regiment t h e 105th l b s t h Tank T ank Division D i v i s i o n ?ind t o its i t s 2nd 2nd'Tank Regiment (code (code number - 109), 1091, the t h e later later message may have have been been sent smt by by the the 10th 1 0 t h Mechanized Division D i v i s i o n commander. commander. Elements Elements of this t h i s unit unit are known to t o be located located in i n the t h e Chongchon Chongchon River R i v e r area. area.
15. 15.
Chinese units C h i n e s e Communist u n i t s in i n Korea continue c o n t i n u e to t o report report on o n extermination e x t e r m i n a t i o n of of rodents r o d e n t s and and insects: i n s e c t s : Two Chinese fiinese Communist messages messages on on 15 15 May M aY reveal r e v e a l that t h a t measures measures are are continucontinuing in i n g to t o be taken taken-i n the t h e Communists' Communists' samitary s a m i t a r y and and antiantiepidemic epidemic campaign. campaign. One intercept i n t e r c e p t stated stated that t h a t the t h e entire entire battalion b a t t a l i o n killed k i l l e d 133 133 rats r a t s and and 7,378 7 , 3 7 8 flies f l i e s in i n two two days. d a y s . The other o t h e r message revealed r e v e a l e d that t h a t "there "there are are many many mosquitos mosquitos in in the. .regiment's positions" and 500 500 b bottles the. .regiment's p o s i t i o n s " and o t t l e s of mosquito oil o i l are are urgently u r g e n t l y requested. r e q u e s t e d . (SUEDE 501st 5 0 1 s t Comm Recon Grp Grp Korea, 1-2945 K-2945 and and K-2946, K-2946, 20 20 May May 52) 52)
.
16. 16.
Chinese Communist C k n u n i s t antiaircraft a n t i a i r c r a f t regiment r e g i m e n t to t o an unidentified unident division d i v i s i o n reports r e p o r t s that t h a t "machine "machine gun gun companies companies in i n combat combat must must move move their t h e i r positions p o s i t i o n s on on a a daily d a i l y basis b a s i s and and occupy occupy and and use use
North-Korean seek compensation comRensation from North- Korean .civilians . c i v i l i a n s seek from Chinese Chinese troo s: An n imperfect i m p e r f e c t intercept i n t e r c e p t on on 9-May 9 May from from an a n unidentilied uniden ied
ifE
7 7
May 52 52 23 May
TOP SECRET SUEDE
( f a c i l i t i e s and land?) l a n d ? ) of of the t h e local local populace. p o p u l a c e . The people people (facilities g r e a t l y opposed to t o th th They insist i n s i s t on some type t y p e of are greatly 1174, Unknown-Unknown, Korea 1174, Unknown-Unknown, (compensation?)." (SUEDE 9 May 52) 52) t h i s regiment is is Comment: The experience e x p e r i e n c e reported r e p o r t e d by this a n o t h e r example of the the friction f r i c t i o n existing e x i s t i n g between between Chinese Chinese another Communist troops t r o o p s and and North North Korean civilians. civilians. The North Korean M i n i s t r y of Internal I n t e r n a l Security, S e c u r i t y , however, however, is i s sufficiently sufficiently Ministry strong s t r o n g to prevent p r e v e n t any any friction f r i c t i o n from from becoming a a serious serious problem. problem.
" : .R

8
23 May 52 52
TOP SECRET SUEDE
HR70-14 HR70-14
FAR EAST EAST
11 11.
unit,north,l,of Pyongyang ordered to frdwk: Chinese art4.l1e An unidentifi.4 Chine4s CommUnist diVisioni commander On 19 Marinstructed a a ubordinate that "Highdr Headquarters has ordered instructed that reg t h a t your r e g1 ment staying at Anju (north Of Pyongyang) will immediately immed4ately rdturn r q t u r n til the front. f r o n t . Ydu Yqu will w i l l immediately immediately make snake message o ordered preparations p r e p a d a t i o q s tq partiotpate p a r t i q i p a t e in i n battle." b a t t l b .I' The, The message rdered the t h e recipielpt r a c i p i e p t to to inform infori t the h e "601st "601et Regiment" that t h a t they t h e y are aretb. tb "proceed and " "for "proce'sd as.of a6 ,of the t h e 20th 20th of of this t h $ s month month to t o *Kaesong" Kaesong" and for further on of my f u r t h e r detailS detail@ on the t h e move move contact c o n t a c tthe t h e43rd 43rditegimen-e Regiment of divisi,on." (SUEDE 0 1 s t Cow (SUEDE 5 501st Comm Recon Recon Grp Grp Korea, Korea, K-2988, K-2988, 23 division." May 5A) 57) I
t4

12. 12.
t
Preliminary P r e l i m i n a r y analysis analysis of this t h i s information i n f o r m a t i o n sugsugComment: gests an g e s t s -that Tthat n unidentified u n i d e n t i f i e d regiment of the t h e 8th 8 t h Chinese Chinese Communist Conununist Artillery A r t i l l e r y Division, D i v i s i o n , currently c u r r e n t l y supporting s u p p o r t i n g elements elements of of the t h e 19th 19th Army Grouplin G r o u p ' i n western w e s t e r n Korea, is is soon soon to t o eater enter combat. combat.
6OXst Regiment would normally normally be be subordinate s u b o r d i n a t e to t o the the The 60Ist 67th 6 7 t h Chinese Army, A r m y , believed located located in i n eastern e a s t e r n KOrea Korea and and in in no position p o s i t i o n to t o Move move to t o Kaesong, the t h e extreme extreme western w e s t e r n front. front.
u n i t s on Ongjin PeninBula or U N North Korean units Peninsula alerted alerted f for UN AP unidentified. North Korean Korean u unit on 22 M May a t t a c k : An u n i d e n t i f i e d North n i t on ay reports repo'rts attack: TEiT-Tron 19th were prep,aring preparing t to land Ongjin... o n tthe he 1 9 t h tAhey h e y were o l a n d on Ongjin-. therefore t h e r e f o r e all a l l troops t r o p p s should s h o u l d prepare p r e p a r e for combat at a t any any tiMe time Regiment; 22nd apd never n e v e r let l e t one one of of them them land. l a n d . The 81st Regiment, 22nd Regiment, the Regiment, t h e units u n i t s in i n the t h e area and the t h e patrol p a t r o l company should should report r e p o r t their t h e i r attempts a t t e m p t s from from time time to t o time...." time...." (SUEDX (SUEDE USA 54A 54A Korea, CS.535, CS 535, 21 2 1 May May 52) 52)
..
In addition to demonstrating the sensitivity COmment: Comment: I n a ddition t o d emonstrating t he s e n s i t i v i t y of of the operations, t o any any suspected s u s p e c t e d UN UN *amphibious amphibious o p e r a t i o n s , this this t h e enemy enlemy to message locates massage locates two two previouBly p r e v i o u s l y unlocated u n l o c a t e d North Korean Korean units units i n w e s t e r n Korea. in western The 22nd 2Znd Regiment is is probably probably antiaircraft a n t i a i r c r a f t artillery. artillery. The 81st 81st Regiment, however, however, would normally normally be b e subordinate s u b o r d i n a t e to to t the h e 8th 8 t h Division, Division, now now in i n eastern eastern Korea. Korea. Recent agent a g e n t rereports p o r t s have have indicated i n d i c a t e d the t h e presence p r e s e n c e of of an an "81st "81st Mixed Mixed Brigade" Brigade" w i t h both b o t h Korean and Chinese troops on he O ngjin P eninsula with on t the Ongjin Peninsula It possible that the like the iin n w western e s t e r n Korea. I t is p ossible t hat t h e 81st, l ike t h e 82nd at Kaesong, d did with a t Kaesong, i d not n o t move to t o the t h e east east w i t h its i t s parent p a r e n t division, division, but was West with b ut w a s expanded and remained in i n the t h e west w i t h a coastal c o a s t a l sesec curity u r i t y mission. mission.
TOP SECIIET SUEDE

26 May 52
e/
st $ 1
S"PP
ri-OP SECRET SUED,

13. 13,
Extension E x t e n s i o n i. q$ North Korea Korea4 land l a n d lines l i n e s continues: c o n t i n u e s : A North Korean un y assigne. u n it, t . posSib posblibly a s s i g n e d to t o coasta c o a s t a l secur s e c u r ity t y duties d u t i e s in in the area, ' s t a t e d in i n - a 19 19 May message that t h a t it i t had t h e Wonsan area,'stated completed installing l i n e is is over over 2 2 miles mileg t w o laad lapd lines. l i n e s . One line i n s t a l l i n g two long l o n g and and the t h e other o t h e r over o v e r 21. 21. (SUEDE'501st Korea, (SUEDE'50lst Comm.R6con Comm.RQconGrp Grp Korea, 15RSM/12929t 15BSM/12929, 19 19 May Yay 52) 52)
c o n t i n u i n g effort e f f o r t to to provide p r o v l d e land l a n d lines lines Comment: The continuing for f o r caTIMURFations communications despite d e s p i t e material shortages, such s u c h as copper copper wire, h a s been typical t y p i c a l of North N o r t h Korean security s e c u r i t y conscioushess. consciousdess. w i r e , has
14. 14.
Five a i r divisions d i v i s i o n s reported: reported.: . F i v e additional a d d i t i o n a l Chinese Communi4t Communi& air a n a l y s i s of traffic t r a f f i c intercepted i n t e r c e p ' t e d on od the t h e Chinese Chin e s e COmaunist Cominunlst An analysis Air A i r Force F o r c e administrative a @ m i n i s t r a t i v e network indicates i n d i c a t e s that t h a t five f i v e preprev i o u s l y unknown unknown Chinese C h i n e s e Communist air viously a i r divisions d i v i s i o n s are located located i n Chita C h i n a prOper. p r o p e r . Four of of them them were were first f i r s t noted n o t e d in i n Novemtier Novepl&er in CC/CAP-231, 22 i n February. F e b r u a r y . (SUEDE CC/CAP-231, 2 3 2 May May 52) 52) 1951, and the t h e fifth f i f t h in
-
strength The operational o p e r a t i o n a l status,: s t a t u s , ; ttype y p e and s t r e n g t h of of aircraft, aircraft, and ntimerical of these these d divisions unknown. nyrneriaal ddesignations e s i g n a t i o n s of i v i s i o n s are unkngwn.
This information i n f o r m a t i o n increases i n c r e a s e s to t o 25 the t h e number Comment: with a i r divisions. d i v i s i o n s . Only ten, ten, w i t h an an of Communist air of known Chinese Communist estimated Manchuria, where p l a n e s , are in i d Manchuria, e s t i m a t e d strength s t r e n g t h of of 500 planes, to Soviet jets and c conventional fighters 350 t o 400 S o v i e t and Korean j e t s and onventional f ighters are also alwo based. baeed.
The number of' l a n e s in in t h e Chin6de ir of combat p planea the Chinege Communist A Air Force F o r c e Increased i n c r e a s e d froa from an a n estimated erjtimated 1,000 1 , 0 0 0 in in June 1951 1951 to t o the the present est'imate of of 1,800 1 , 8 0 0 planes. planes. p r e s e n t estimate
Sharp reported iil ;,Chinese fflights lights r e p o r t e d on GCI GC.1 net: net: S h a r p increase i n c r e a s e itc,Chinese A n a l y s i s of' of' ttraffic'on rafficbn t h e thIneseJiroice Chin e s e d v o i c e GCI e t on the Analysis the GCI n net On the Manchuria-Korea border planes Manchuria-Korea b o r d e r reVeals reveals that t h a t Chinese Communist p lane$ made a minimum of a,minimum of 662 662 flights f l i g h t s'in i n March March and and 1,292 1 , 2 9 2 in i n .April. April. of aircraft a i r c r a f t operating o p e r a t i n g on on this t h i s net n e t also a l p o increased. increased The nuMber nuplber of (SUEDE A Air Force RoundUp 100, i n the t h e same period. period. (BUEDE ir F o r c e Roundtap 100, 22 22 May May 52) 52) in air Co e n t : An over-all o v e r - a l l increalie i n c r e a s e iin.Communist n Communist a i r strength strength . ent: r e a n border border d uring A p r i l was a p p a r e n t from UN near e: o orean during April apparent n ear t t e pilot many as 500 p planes p i l o t observations o b s e r v a t i o n s of.as of as many l a n e s on the t h e fields fields There were were ffour known Chinecjre ChineseComa across c r o s s the t H e Yalu, Yalu,R River. i v e r . There o u r known Communist m u n i s t divisions-d i v i s i o n s - - the t h e 4th, 4 t h , 12th, 1 2 t h , 15th 1 5 t h and 17th 1 7 t h -- at a t the the Perhaps 3rd 6th, three f fields i d l d s near n e a r Antung in i n April. April. P e r h a p s thek the;S r d and, and 6 th, the remaining t he r e m a i n i n g Chinese COmmunist'jet Communist'jet divisions d i v i s i o n s in i n Manchuria, Manchuyia, also o operated the GCI net, though t they were b believed alao p e r a t a d on t he G CI n e t , even though h e y were elieved t o b e in i n Mukden. to be
15. 15.
--
1
7
26 May 52
NR
17 17.
C h i n e s e move additional a d d i t i o n a l air a i r elements e l e m e n t s to t o Korean Korean border: border: Chinese moVement of elements Chinese Communist 18th Air The movement e l e m e n t s of The the C h i nese Communist A iP D i v i s i o n to t o the t h e Yalu Yalu River R i v e r area area is is revealed r e v e a l e d in in several s e v e r a l ininDivision tercepta. tercepts. H e r e t o f o r e carried at Canton, Canton, in i n South China, C h i n a , this t h i s division division Heretofore May message in connection with was mentioned in a 21 2 1 Yay in c onnection w i t h the t h e dedep a r t u r e of of aircraft a i r c r a f t from from Mukden Yukden in i n Manchuria. Manchuria. A message the the parture next n e x t day scheduled s c h e d u l e d the t h e flight f l i g h t of nine n i n e MIG-15's of of this t h i s division division from Air Force on the t h e Korean Korean border. border. (SUEDE A ir F orce from Mukden Mukden to t o Takushan, Takushan, on 1 0 1 , 23 23 May May 52) 52) Roundup No. 101,
of an Comment: Movements of elements e l e m e n t s of a n air a i r unit u n i t have frefreIf transfer t r a n s f e r of of quently unit transfers. t r a n s f e r a . If q u e n t ' L ' foreshadowed y s h a d o w e d entire e n t i r e unit Division materializes d this u nit e nters t h e whole 16th 1 8 t h Division. the materializes m and.this unit enters combat, p e r c e n t of the t h e known Chinese Communist j jet et combat, some 75 percent units u n i t s will w i l l have beeh beeb combat combat trained. trained.
INR
52 26 May 52
4-
1-01) SECRET SUED,

FAR EAST EAST
5. 5 .
HR70-14 HR70-14
North lforeans c o n t i n u e sRecialist sp.ecia4is.t. training: t r , a i n i n g : A battalion battalion Koreans continue commander, gorean 2fat of the t h e Nortfi North Korean 2 l s t AAA AAA Regiment, Regiment. commander. Presumably tiresumablv of Artillery Academy reported on on' 17 17 May May tne tile arrival a r r i v a l of of "forty-Inine "fortyh.ne A r t i l l e r y dcadlemy graduates g r a d u a t e s of big b i g calibre, c a l i b r e , small s m a l l calibre calibre and and machine machine gun" gun!! near near He requested s l i g h t l y west west of of Hungnam. H e r e q u e s t e d instrucindtrucChongpyong, slightly tions Grp t o their t h e i r disposition. d i s p o s i t i o n . (SUEDE (SUEDE 501st 6 0 1 s t Comm Recon G rp t i o n s as to Korea,SK-J-749, Korea, SK-5-749, 20 20 May May 52) 52)
Cogmeqt: The continued c o n t i n u e d training t r a i n i n g activity a c t i v i t y indicated i n d i c a t e d by by Comment t h i s message has been characteristic c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of North Korean Korean armed armed this force f o r c e interest i n t e r e s t in i n developing d e v e l o p i n g its i t s artillery a r t i l l e r y and and antiaircraft antkaircraft services. services.
6. 6.
I
Chinese d i v i s i o n in i n Korea Korea .gives gives @ m u n i t . i p np r i o r . i , t y ave.r .Chinese division ammunition priority over An intercept i n t e r c e p t ol of a a message from from a a Chinese Chineee COmmunist Communist Unit, unit, fRibably the -ably t h e 7th 7th Artillery A r t i l l e r y Division, D i v i s i o n , said: s a i d : "Please " P l e a s e immediately immediately stoP s t o p all a l l food shipments. ehipments. N No o matter how you o obtain b t a i n it i t you must o n c e n t r a t e all must c concentrate a l l efforts e f f o r t s on the the o obtaining b t a i n i n g of of f five i v e thousand ammunition and and five f i v e hundred hundred barrels barrels of of gasoline g a s o l i n e by by rounds of ammunition t h e month. The supply supply d e p o t has already a l r e a d y shipped shipped t h e end of the the depot t three h r e e thousand of the t h e ten t e n thousand rounds allotted." a l l o t t e d . I v (SUEDE (SUEDE 5 0 1 s t Recon Comm Grp Korea,K-3027, 20 May May 52) 52) 501st Korea,K-3027, 20 f ood: food:
'
Comment: I n t h e abaence absence of other o t h e r offensive o f f e n s i v e indications, indications, Comment: In the this -message s e t t i n ga adeadline d e a d l i n e for for ammunition ammunition re-supply re-supply UFFETmessage setting may merely indicate i n d i c a t e that t h a t this t h i s artillery a r t i l l e r y division is s eeking t o may seeking to maintain m a i n t a i n its its basic load. load.
___
NR
3 3
52 27 May 52
St S'-"PP
FOR RELEASEDATE: RELEASEDATE: APPROVED FOR 18-Mar-2010 ,18-Mar-2010
HR70-14 HR70-14
.v
7-SECIUM-zmcmx-
FAR EAST
6. 6.
Japan unable to to grant equal equal rights rights to to UN UN forces: forces: Foreign Minister Okazaki told IIdinister told Ambassador Ambassador Murphy that public and Diet it difficult, difficult, if not impossible, impossible, to grant opposition will make it forces in in Japan the the same same rights as American forces operating operating UN forces parliamentary defeat under the the security security treaty. treaty. He said that parliamentary proposed UN agreement was certain i if f the the government for the proposed publicly relinquished its its jurisdiction jurisdiction in cases involving violation violation of Japanese law, although in practice practice Japan would not exercise that that right. right. Additionally, exercise Additionally, Diet sentiment sentiment was such obtaining money money to support that the government had no chance of obtaining the UN forces. forces.
Comment: The Commonwealth governments 4re are highly critical Comment: of Japan Japan's s unwillingness to accept any financial obligation for the support of non-US troops based in or sojourning in Japan, as well as its desire to retain criminal jurisdiction forces. The government has been severely attacked by over UN forces. its political opposition on these points under the US-Japan security treaty; it fears that extending similar privileges to to treaty; it forces will will have have serious serious domestic domestic repercussions. repercussions. non-US forces
7.
Chinese take initiative from North Koreans at Panmunjom: ne8e Communist8 have the Chi Chinese Communists have taken the initiative from the North Korean delegation in conducting the Panmunjom talks, and that Nam Il is now merely their spokesman. Chinese Communist delegates are in constant communication with Soviet political advisers.
The Koreans are said to have abandoned their demand for the withdrawal of Chinese "volunteers" along with that of all non-Korean UN troops.
The Chinese reportedly believe that a Soviet "political feint" directed at Britain, France, India, and Japan will impel some favorable "change in American plans." -___ Peiping's views are presumed presumed to determine determine the Comment: Pelping's North-OFWEff over-all military military North Korean line in the talks, because the over-all position in in Korea depends depends upon Peipink's Peiping's willingness to continue its its commitment. commitment. continue

-mem-
APPROVED FOR RELEASE RELEASE DATE: 1:)ATE: 09-Dec-2009 09-Dec-2009 I4PPROVED
Murphy is convinced that the Japanese Japaneee Government Government is eager UN, but is restricted to cooperate with the UN, restricted by by the aolid solid opposition. (C 24 May 52) 52) (C Tokyo Tokyo 245, 245, 24
27 May 52 52
C lb /b c
W'
V'
Communist China China has has indicated indicated an an intention intention to to hold hold its its "volunteers" in Korea at least until all UN forces are withdrawn. withdrawn.
9. 9.
Rhee uses dictatorial dictatorial measures measures against against opposition: opposition: US US Pusan'reports that, since since early on 25 23 May, Hay , President Embassy Pusan reports that, taken a a series series of high-handed actions against the Rhee has taken the opposition. Four opposition members of the Assembly political opposition. have been arrested arrested while while 15 15 or 16 16 others are in in hiding. The The imposition of martial law by the ROK Military Police has been employed as as an an excuse excuse for for this this action. action. Some 44 Assemblymen employed 26 May. May. held incommunicado incommunicado by by the the Military Police on 26 were held Recently appointed Prime Minister Chang, finding his telephone telephone arrest, has resigned. wires cut and himself under virtual arrest,
The UN Commission for Unification and Rehabilitation in in Korea called on Rhee on 26 May and expressed shock at this events. The President was unimpressed. unimpressed. The US series of events. Embassy comments that the President appears to be operating on on the basis that the UN and the United States will not intervene and will sit by and watch the demise of democratic government (S Pusan Pusan 1160, 26 May; May; S Pusan 1164, 1164, 26 May; S S Korea, (S in Korea. Pusan 1163, 1163, 27 27 May 52) 52)
10. 10.
First Communist admission of Chinese air operations over Pao in in Aong Hong Kong Kong claimed : The e Communist newspaper newspaper Ta Ta fuing Kun Pa0 Korea Korea: UW-2T May that CCAF's hero - iui-fiid shot down down two two US US MaFthat hero Chang-Ch Chang-d Td shot aircraft over North Korea Korea on on 10 10 February. February. The reporting agency comments that that this news story is the first Chinese Communist claim that their "volunteers" "volunteers" are flying MIG-15's MIG-15's in in combat combat in North Korea, a fact fact accepted accepted by by most most observers observers for for months. months. Hong Kong Kong 3117, Joint Weeka 21, (S Hong 21, 23 May 52) 52)
SECRET
5 5
May 52 27 May 52
'
not known how how many many of of the estimated estimated 350 Comment: It is not to 500 Manchurian-Korean border border area are piloted 5 0 jets D m iin n the Manchurian-Korean by either either Chinese, Chinese, Russians, Russians, or or North North Koreans. Koreans, This is the the first Communist publicity indicating the nationality publicity indicating nationality of the the pilots of of any any enemy enemy jets. jets.
11.
American official doubts Peiping will compromise compromise on POW issue; Th The ronsui Ge deneral in Honn Hong KonC? Kong notes notes inCreasissue: e linerican American Consul neral in increas-propaganda coverage of of the the POW POW issue issue in i6 the thewChinese TNipropaganda coverage Chinese Commuwhst Peiping describes describe6 as as nist press and an adamant stand on what the U"s POW'S. UN's "forcible retention" of POW's. The American official, official, recalling Indian Ambassador Panikkar's prediction in in early 1952 1952 that that the POW issue i s s u e would be the the kar's to solve, solve, remarks that it is "difficult "difficult most difficult of all to to conceivd'of down on on this this point. point. ( 6 Hong conceivd'of Peiping backing down (S 3117, 23 23 May May 52) 52) Kong 3117, Comment: The Communist negotiators do not appear convinced Comment: that the UN Command will will not compromise compromise on on the the POW P O W issue. issue. There is thus insufficient insufficient evidence to indicate whether whether the Communists allow the the talks talks to to founder founder on will allow on this this issue. issue, jNR
6 6
52 27 May 52
TOP SECRET
27 May 1952
25X1
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Copy No.
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ARMY and DOS review(s). cornpleted. USAF review(s) completed.
DOCUMENT NO. NO CHANGE IN CLASS. 111(
0 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO:git2Sa_ 22X1

NEXT REVIEW DATE
AUTH:setIfigFilia /1 PIEVIEWER: DATE! /

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TOP SECRET
Approved For Release 2005/11/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000700130001-8 To learn how to use OCR and PDF Compression visit our website
25X1
Approved For
Gc1bW
97 A0007 0130001-8
Mlv ARY
FAR EAST
1.
2.
Chinese take initiative from North Koreans at Panmunjom (page 3). Communists may be using airborne intercept radar in Korea
(page 3).
3.
25X1
6.
Iranian National Bank refuses loan to government (page 5).

WESTERN EUROPE
7. 8. 9. 10.
Party official reports dissension among Trieste pro-CominformiEts

(page 6),
Germans prefer contractual agreement to present Soviet unity proposal (page 7). East Germans draft law for establishment of national army (page 8). France titing initiative on concessions to Saar (page 8).
25X1

NEAR EAST - AFRICA
Peiping believes Chinese Communist prisoners soon to be sent to

Formosa (Da MP 41
25X1
Fo Ildcoac 200C/11/05 : CM RD1'70T00075A0007 0130001-8

IApproved
FAR EAST
1
25X1
Chinese take initiative from North Koreans at Paninunjom:

Chinese Communists have taken the initiative from the North Korean delegation in conducting the Panmunjom talks, and that Diam IL is now merely their spokesman. Chinese Communist delegates are in constant communication with Soviet political advisers. The Koreans are said to have abandoned their demand for the withdrawal of Chinese "volunteers" along with that of all non-Korean UN troops.
Ithe
25X1
The Chinese reportedly believe that a Soviet "political feint" directed at Britain, France, India, and Japan will impel some favorable "change in American plans."
Comment: Peiping's views are presumed to determine the North Korean line in the talks, because the over-all military position in Korea depends upon Peiping's willingness to continue its commitment.
Communist China has indicated an intention to hold its "volunteers" in Korea at least until all UN forces are withdrawn.
2.
25X1
Communists may be using airborne intercept radar in Korea:

area,
reason to believe the enemy may now be using airborne intercept radar in the Korean
I
The Far East Air Force reports that it has
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-325X1

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Approved For ri c c
.., .
90007 1130001-8
The Far East Air tofore the Communists have been severely Force comments that herein night operations due to their non-employment of this type ofhandicapped radar. If the enemy chooses to employ planes equipped with such radar, he will have a capability not considered available to date in the Korean theatre.
3.
25X1
Peiping believes Chinese Communist prisoners soon to be
sent to Formosa:
25X1
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Comment: Peiping is probably aware that many Chinese prisoners, particularly those once served in the Nationalist armies, have asked to be sent to who Formosa and that the Taipei government is urging such a transfer. The claim I may be introduced at any time into Peiping's propaganda about Korea and alleged American plans for "aggression" in Asia, possibly in an attempt to block any plans for a transfer.
25X6
Lninese officials claim to have information that Chinese prisoners held in South Korea are "about to be sent to Formosa."
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-425X1

L111.
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6.
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Iranian National Bank refuses loan to government:
Prime Minister Mossadeq informed Ambassador Henderson on 22 May that Nasser, Acting Governor of the Iranian National Bank, had refusedto advance funds to help the government meet its monthLy payroll. The r nie Minister was furious at Nasser and insisted that he be replaced even thoughhis removal might shake public confidence in the bank and thus increase Iran's financial difficulties.
Approved For Release 2006/11/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000700130001-8 To learn how to use OCR and PDF Compression visit our website

NEAR EAST - AFRICA
-525X1
25X1
Approved Foi Release 2008/ I 1/05 CIA-RDP79T0097M000 700130001-8

.
Mossadeq, who claimed that Britain and the United States had brought pressure on Nasser to refuse the loan in order to cause the government's downfall, insisted that the bank could afford to lend the money. The American Ambassador reported that the British Embassy had confirmed his opinion that it had not put pressure on Nasser. He commented that Mossadeq would undoubtedly create additional opposition if he were to remove Nasser, since the latter is widely respected.
Comment: Nasser's refusal to grant the loan, which would total about ten million dollars, is undoubtedly due to his concern for the bank's stability. It may also reflect the growing lack of confidence throughout Iran in the Prime Minister,
7.
25X1
Party official reports dissension among Trieste pro-Cominformists:

A dissatisfied official of the pro-Cominform Communist Party in Trieste has indicated that it may be necessary for elements of the party to break away from the leadership of Vittorio Vida li. The official states that Vida li has been controlling the party through a special unta established about 1 April 1952. This group Is "sacrificing old comrades for new members who automatically obey directives without question."
Vidali's party has been losing In addition, considerable dissension recently was generated among party officials when reports reached them that Vidali had advocated the return of the Free Territory to Italy in pre-election speeches in southern Italy. Large elements of the party desire for various reasons to maintain the present line calling for an independent Trieste.
members steadily for morr a year.

WESTERN EUROPE
Comment:
-67
25X1
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Approved Fo Rcicosc 200C/11/06 : CIA fIDP70T00076A000 00130001-8
8.
Germans prefer contractual agreement to present Soviet unity proposal:

Reporting the views of both East and West Germans on the Soviet unity proposals, American observers in Bonn state that the proposals have apparently elicited no more support in East Germany than they have in the West.
25X1
Comment: There has never been any evidence of substantial East Germai suxw of the Soviet proposals; there have, on the other hand, been reports of uneasiness among Socialist Unity Party functionaries for fear that their party might be sacrificed for unity.
The one reported declaration by the East German radio in March that the USSR was willing to reopen the OderNeisse question was refuted by subsequent Soviet statements that the border was final.
the last chance to prevent Allied signature of the contractual agreement and the EDC treaty, the Soviet Union not only did not meet the Western condition that there be agreement on free all-German elections prior to a four-power conference; it also did not advance from its position as stated in the Soviet note of 10 April.
treaty serves as another clear indication that the USSR is not yet prepared to make any significant concessions in Germany. Although it was


-725X1
East Zone residents interviewed in West Berlin believe that the proposals are nothing more than propaganda and should be rejected. Even if the USSR were to drop its insistence on the Oder-Neisse border, opposition would still outweigh approval among East Zone respondents. Among West Germans, however, Soviet concession of the territory east of the Oder-Neisse line would make the proposal acceptable to better than half of those interviewed, including not only those of neutralist inclinations, but also those who have previously supported the West.
The latest Soviet note on a German peace
Approved F or Release 2006/11/05 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0007(0130001-8

25X1
9.
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East Germans draft law for establishment of national army:

Ithe East German Government has drafted a law for the establishment of a national army. UnitedStates Army observers in Heidelberg believe this action was taken in anticipation of the signing of the contractual agreement.
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The paramilitary police, a force of 52,000 which includes 14,000 to 16,000 officers, can easily be expanded at least to keep pace with the growth of a West German defense force. The formal establishment of an East German national army would not preclude continuation of the unity campaign.
10.
France taking initiative on concessions to Saar:
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The French Ambassador and the Saar Government have decided on the immediate formation of a mixed commission to revise the 1950 conventions governing French-Saar relations. The commission will file a report early in July for the French Assembly's consideration.
The French Ambassador at Saarbruecken is said to favor "substantial concessionsr provided strengthening the Saar as an autonomous state does not prejudice French economic interests.


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Comment: The recently reported allocation of heavy weapons to the parity police, an acceleration in recruiting, and vigorous propaganda on the need for an armed force to counteract West German contingents all suggest that the 24 Alert Police units may soon be formally unveiled as a national army. This probability is supported by a governmental reorganization which may culminate in the establishment of a defense or armaments ministry.
25X1
Approved F
200C/11/05 CIA RDr73T00075A000 00130001-8

.
iRufec,...=
Saar demands will be in the direction of greater autonomy, particularly in the fields of taxation, banking, social welfare, and labor relations.
agreement and the EDC treaty. The latest move seems to be a new French approach designed to win local goodwill and promote autonomy for the Saar as the alternative to reintegration with Germany.
keeping the Saar issue in ibTiruntil the signing of the contractual
Comment:
France and Germany have been
25X1


-9-
Approved Farkelease 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79TO1S1\001000120001-8
a/(a.
SECRET
SECURITY INCRMATION
28 May 1952
US OFFICIALS ONLY
OCI No. 5190
Copy No. 267
*Army, USAF and State Dept reviews completed*

SECRET
RIM TO NIMES a
REMUS CENTER
SECURITY IfircemanoN 1:1114151/711 UBSOEX Approved For Release 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79T01146A001000120001-8
) 77606,
Approved ?bloke lease 2002/05120 : CIA-RDP79T0114941001000120001-8
SECRET
GENERAL
1.
Embassy officials point out, however, that the'Soviet Union doubtless considers that much could be done to render the Western situation in Berlin unsatisfantory by a succession of creeping restrictions, none of which might be expected to appear in itself important enough for strong Western countermeasures.
The Embassy concludes that the USSR is probably preparing to exploit these possibilities "with great energy and impudence." (S Moscow 1871, 24 May 52)
EASTERN EUROPE
Czech Government forced to cut electric supply to Prague consumers: The Ministry of Fuel and Power issued a statement on 22 May that the Prague electric power grid was compelled repeatedly to interrupt power supplies because certain enterprises were using more electricity than the plan called for or were changing the working hours laid down by agreement with the power suppliers. Small consumerc, were also criticized for taxing the power supply during peak hours. Consumers were warned that power would continue to be cut off without notice. (R FBIS Prague, 23 May 52)
Comment: This is the first indication that the chronic wintei"--;=-Tage of electric power will continue at least through the spring. The fact that gas.main pressure was also

SECRET
1
Embassy Moscow expects Soviet harassment in Berlin to stop short of provocation: The US Embassy in Moscow estimates that Soviet harassing tactics may be expected to stop at a point where the USSR believes that going further could provoke actual hostilities involving Soviet and Western forces.
28 May 52
Approved FOkelease 2002/05120 : CIA-RDP79T01141001000120001-8

-
SECRET
reduced in January points up the possibility that the power shortage is due to a lack of coal used in the major power stations supplying Prague.
Interruption of the power supply at the transformer have an adverse effect on output of such strategic items will jet aircraft engines,.heavy machinery and transportation as ment, and electronic equipment, the production of which equipis concentrated in and around Prague.
3.
Comment: A time limit for the harvestIng of first crops was set by the cabinet decree of 18 May that required the earliest possible sowing of second crops for fodder. This repOrtedly is the first measure of the Hungarian Communist regime specifically aimed at increasing second crops.
Hungary experienced two weeks of unseasonably cold weather with snow flurries and night frosts.
I
4.
Further curtailment of private trade in Rumania: The American Legation in Bucharest reports that an article in the Rumanian press has revealed that private traders in grain, flour, cattle, meat, horses, hides, cotton, fodder and oil seeds, and petroleum have recently been "eliminated." (R Bucharest 461, 24 May 52)
Comment: The liquidation of all capitalist elements in industry and private commerce is one of the major aims of the current Rumanian Five Year Plan. Since 1947, 95 percent of the industry, 85 percent of the transport, and more than 12.6 percent of the cultivated land of Rumania have been the "socialist sector." Elimination of the private drawn into retail traders mentioned above will result in a further expansion of the "socialist sector" in the field of trade, only 24 percent of which remained in private hands by the end of 1951.
Hungary attempts to repair frost damage to The Hungarian press on 21May admitted for the first crops: time that frost had damaged spring crops and simultaneously published new decree on resowing and replanting. The US Legation at a Budapest noted that serious damage had been done to all crops except small grain. (R Budapest 872, 26 May 52)
SECRET
2
28 May 52
Approved FbrRelease 2002/05/20 : CIA-RDP79TO1NeMo1000l20001-8

SECRET
5.
Yugoslav regime continues to emphasize administrative decentralization: The Tito regime's anti-bureaucratic drive continues with the major emphasis on decentralization of personnel and the need for political education of the party, workers, _teachers, and youth. Difficulties in applying the principles of decentralization are illustrated by the reCent withdrawal of the right to state employment in those instances where technicians and political agitators refuse transfers to the interior. (S Belgrade Weeka 21, 23 May 52)
Comment: This application of "administrative methods" reflects the significance attached by Yugoslav planners to the problem of persuading university students to fill "unpleasant posts" in the provinces, and inducing party members, particularly those demonstrating managerial incompetence, to vacate administrative sinecures for political work amidst the local organs of government.

SECRET
Approved Fos Release 2002105/20 : CIA-RDP79T01S001000120001-8
SECRET
FAR EAST
6.
7.
Rhee plans to remove South Korean Chief of Staff: During the course of a 27 May call paid to President Rhee by General Van Fleet and American Charge Lightner, the South Korean chief executive indicated that ROK Army Chief of Staff Lee is being remove4 for implication in the "plot" against Rhee. In reply to Lightner's comments that the world would view present developments in Pusan as drastic police measures designed to prevent the legislature from proceeding, Rhee stated that "gangsters" had obtained control of the Assembly. The President claimed, however,'that within two, months a duly elected National Assembly could be operative since the principal traitors in the Assembly would be put out of the way and their places taken by true representatives of the people. The Embassy comments that while Rhee no doubt has a large popular following, most of the potential leadership of South Korea, such as the intellectuals, businessmen, an increasing number of government officials and army officers would welcome a change. Few are willing to take a positive stand under present circumstances. Rhee is determined to get
SECRET
Although there are no indications of an impending air offensive, FECOM notes that the Communists have sufficient aircraft, personnel, air facilities and logisiic support to launch an offensive without warning in which UN planes, crowded on Kimpo and Suwon airfields, would quite possibly sustain more Such than 50 percent destruction from the initial attack. losses would necessitate forfeiture of offensive aerial superiority in favor of defense tactics. (S CINCFE Telecon 5848, 27 May 52)
Far East Command asserts Communists possess overwhelming air superiority: The Far East Command on 27 May estimated that the enemy has a total of 1,115 aircraft massed in Manchuria and that this overwhelming superiority gives him a major offensive capability. The home bases of UN F-86's, as well as the 'headquarters of both our ground and air forces in Korea, are well within the combat radius of the 350 jet and 35 piston fighters based at Antung, Tatungkou, Takushan and Sinuiju. Only a few miles farther inland on the Anshan-Mukden airfields, 30 light bombers, 240 jet and 85 piston fighters are in position to provide support as well as additional shock power for a striking force.
28 May 52
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rid of fiis enemies at all costs. The Embassy believes that further informal representations will be ineffective and (S Pusan 1170, 27 May 52) stronger action seems required.
'
8.
Communist China importing large quantity of Pakistan Since 1 September 1951 Communist China has purchased cotton: All except 320,000 400-pound bales of Pakistan cotton. (C Army Karachi 6, 16 May 52) 83,000 bales have been shipped.
Comment: This quantity of cotton probably cost China over 70 million dollars. Heavy Chinese buying of Pakistan cotton has not been expected, as the 1951 domestic cotton crop was believed ample for China's needs. The Communists may be building up their raw cotton stockpile which was abnormally low last summer.
9.
Germ warfare propaganda reported making some progress in Accusations that the United States is resorting to germ warfare in Korea continued to be a major Communist propaganda theme in Burma, according to the US Embassy in Rangoon. The Embassy comments that while there is still a general lack of credence regarding these attacks, the "big lie technique" may be expected to convince many and that some progress in (C Rangoon 1120, 22 May 52) Burma was already discernible.
Burma:
Indicative of the Burmese reaction to fantastic Comment: stories was the recent congregation of thousands of Rangoon citizens around one of the city's lakes in response to a rapidly spread rumor that an underwater devil had captured and devoured a British seaman. Part of the crowd waited all day for an investigation by "experts."
10
Opposition attacks Burmese Government on rice policy: The political opposition to the Burmese Government, which is mostly pro-Communist, is attacking the large profits obtained from rice bought from the farmer for less than 50 dollars a ton and sold for at least 168 dollars a ton. The US Embassy comments that the opposition has a genuine issue with which to approach 75 percent of Burma's population and that the only surprise is (C Rangoon 1125, 23 May 52) that it was not exploited sooner.
Comment: The controlled price paid to farmers has not changed since Burma became independent in January 1948, while the price for exports has steadily increased.

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Despite the increase in price and the volume of exported rice, there is no public accounting of most of the proceeds by the Burmese Government or its handling agency, the State Agriculture Marketing Board.
11.
25X1A
Burmese Socialists worried by Communist peace feelers: The Burmese Premier I Istated in 25X1C mid-April that the Executive Committee of the government party had held three meetings to consider the problem of Communism. The Premier Isaid that the Commu25X1C nist-inspired "peace" campaign was being well-received by most of the people and by segments of the army. On the other hand, the Burmese Socialists who dominate the government are opposed to making peace with the Communistsbecause they feel their position is insecure and they anticipate further trouble from the Communists if they were permitted tocperate above ground.
25X1A
12.
25X6
13.
SOUTH ASIA
Pakistan faces growing jute and cotton problem: Estimated carry-overs of jute and cotton past the end of the current crop year on 15 July will be the largest since Pakistan became independent in 1947. Foreign demand for these commodities is now almost non-existent, except from India.
SECRET
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The Pakistan Government is concerned over the situation, as shown by the recall from leave of the Governor of the No State Bank, and it is actively studying the problem. solution has yet been reached. (C Karachi Jt. Weeka 21, 23 May 52)
Comment: Pakistani commodity markets have suffered a decline s nce January. Government income is being substantially lowered by reductions in export duties which were necessitated In the case of jute, the government by the slump in business. Indian production of may face a long-term loss of income. raw jute has been increasing rapidly, and Indian mills are less dependent than heretofore upon Pakistani raw fibre. Pakistani mills do not yet produce considerable amounts of either jute or cotton goods. The continued hesitation of foreign buyers to purchase Pakistani raw materials at current prices will have a decidedly adverse effect on that country's budgetary outlook.
14.
General Motors assembly plant in India may be forced to close by 1953: The Indian Government is reportedly planning import control measures which may result in the closing of the General Motors assembly plant in Bombay by 1953. The government apparently intends to favor so-called Indian manufacturers who, at present, seem to be completely incapable of fulfilling India's automobile and truck requirements. The American Consul General in Bombay suggestsit might be pointed out to the Indian Government that the forced closure of the American-owned General Motors plant would have a most unfortunate influence on the flow of American capital to India. (C Bombay 360, 26 May 52)
Comment: Fear of eventual nationalization and of the above-fYiroi government favoritism toward Indian firms has delayed the entry of foreign capital into India. Without such foreign capital, industrial expansion in India will necessarily be slow, and India will continue to depend heavily on United States economic aid.
25X1X
15.

NEAR EAST - AFRICA
SECRET
7
25X1X
Iranian Prime Minister allegedly has reserve plan to settle oil dispute:
25X1X the Prime Minister is prepared to reach an agreement with tli e
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SECRET
25X1C Anglo-Iranian Oil Company on the basis of the International Bank proposrls if British technicians are excluded from the insisted 25x1c industry that the Prime Minister is serious in pressing Iran's claim to Bahrein Island and that he has a new plan to present to AIOC should it fail to agree to this proposal.
25X1A
25X1A
Comment: The problem of British technicians has proved one of the chief stumbling blocks in settling the oil issue. Iran genuinely fears that the employment of the British by the International Bank would mean a renewal of British influence in internal affairs, and it has refused to accept the International Bank's stipulation that it should be free to hire personnel from any source necessary to ensure efficient operation of the industry.
25IX1
Any agreement based on Iran s claim to Bahrein, which is extremely slim, would be unlikely to succeed.
16.
25X1C
announceeorist
Royalist group formed in Iran:
A Meshed newspaper has youth group, the Fedayani-Shah. The paper stated, however, that the group's constitution had not yet been formulated and that its details would be announced later. The American Consulate comments that the (R Meshed 44, announcement appears to be a trial balloon. 20 May 52)
Comment: The success or failure of this group will undoubtedly depend upon the support accorded it by the Shah. Although the Shah undoubtedly believes that Mossadeq's policies are leading Iran toward disaster, there is no indication that he is yet prepared to take a determined stand againstthe National Front, even to the extent of openly supporting a group such as the Fedayan-i-Shah.
17.
South Africa's internal security may be threatened: South Africa's internal security is now threatened as a result of the government's drive against hostile individuals and groups under anti-Communist legislation, in the opinion of the US Military Attache in Pretoria. Rioting mixed-breed and white garment workers protesting the arrest of leftist union secretary E. S. Sachs on 24 May
SECRET
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were quelled by "vicious" police measures which sent 66 persons to the hospital. Sachs was re-arrested on 26 May when he again defied the government and addressed the garment workers who were stagiuga one-day protest strike. There was (C USARMA Pretoria 47, 25 May; R no violence this time. Pretoria 209, 26 May 52)
Comment: A strong combination of whites and non-whites against the government would seriously threaten internal security, but there is no evidence that this is developing despite the vigorous reaction to recent government steps.

SECRET
The garment workers have broad support in left-wing unions and in non-white nationalist organizations, and general These groups, sympathy from moderate opposition forces. however, are not known to have offered to join in any concerted action against the government.
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WESTERN EUROPE
18.
East Germans retaliate against signing of contractual agreeThe reactions of the East German Government to ibe signing rirThe Allied-West German contractual agreement are of the kind and magnitude anticipated, and must at the moment be regarded as only potentially explosive. The months-long propaganda buildup against the approval of the contractual agreement portended some vigorous reaction by the East German Government; it has, however, made it clear that the new border decrees are not irrevocable.
ment;
'25X1A
While semi-belligerent moves on the part of the East Germans are, therefore, likely to continue and perhaps increase, they are also likely to avoid extreme measures which would mobilize West Moreover, the East German German sympathy for Western policies. Government, with the assistance of possible Soviet diplomatic moves, may be expected to continue efforts to consolidate West German opinion against ratification of the contractual agreement through demands for spontaneous demonstrations signature campaigns, or "popular decision."

SECRET
This suggests that the primary objective of the East German and Soviet Governments is still to block or delay the contractual agreement, the European Defense Community, and any form of European unity.
25X1A
19.
25X6
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20.
25X6
21.
French Socialists and Re ublicans favor internationalizatiC7E-31-WF-TE-TE3oc na: Reports from the French Popular Ilptitlican and Socialigt-Tirty Congresses, now in session, indicate increasing popular dissatisfaction with the hopelessness of the French position in Indochina.
A motion of the centrist Popular Republicans, requesting the government to take the initiative in proposing that the Panmunjom conference be extended to consider all Pacific problems, would satisfy the long-standing French desire to share the Indochina burden. The new Minister Resident to Indochina, who is a member of this party, also stressed that the burden is an international one, but reaffirmed his insistence that France cannot abandon its mission.
SECRET
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A Socialist spokesman has suggested settlement through both international and direct negotiations, adding that talks with China and India cannot be considered impossible until they have been attempted. This is reminiscent of the Socialists' earlier insistence that negotiations should be attempted with the Viet
Minh.
Although the many recent rumors that the French were secretly seeking an armistice with the Communists have not been substantiated, the French public's growing awareness of the risks involved in the Indochina policy can be expected to lead to increased pressure on the government for an end to the present stalemate. (Factual data from: U Paris 7334, 26 May 52)
22.
25X6
23.
Neo-Fascist gains likely to be repeated in Italian parliamentary elections: The greatly increased strength of the neoFascists, which was obtained at the expense of the Christian Democrats, and the undiminished strength of the Communists in the southern Italian municipal elections held on 25 May suggest that the trend toward political extremism may continue in the national parliamentary elections, which will take place not later than 1953. On the argument that the national government no longer represents the viewpoint of the majority of voters, the neoFascists and the Communists may try to get the parliamentary elections advanced to this autumn. In anticipation of these SECRET
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'elections, Premier de Gasperi will almost surely try to broaden his government by bringing into it members of the Liberal and Social Democratic Parties, and may give representation to his own Christian Democratic Party's right wing. He is also likely to try to revise the national election law to provide for either bloc voting or for single-member districts, a step which would re-enforce the center's margin.
The decisive majority obtained by the pro-Italian parties in the city of Trieste will strengthen the Italian Government's determination to insist upon the return of the entire Free Territory to Italy. (Factual data from: S Rome 5067, 20 May 52; R FBIS Rome, 26 May 52; PA Rome, 27 May 52; U NY Times, 27 May 52)
LATIN AMERICA
24.
Cuba and Peru to re-establish diplomatic relations: A protocol establishing diplomatic relations between Peru and Cuba will be signed within a few days at Rio de Janeiro, according to a news item published in that city.. Brazil will serve as intermediary between the two countries. (R FBIS Paris, AFP, 23 May 52)
Comment: The Cuban Government currently has friendly relations with all countries of Latin America except Peru. This country broke relations with Cuba on 29 August 1949 as the result of a controversy over the disappearance of two Peruvians who had sought asylum at the Cuban Embassy in Lima.
The accession to power of the Batista government, a sympathetic regime from the Peruvian viewpoint, is contributing considerably toward the restoration of relations. Pre-election coup possible in Ecuador: A majority of Guayaquil area citizens who would -have voted for Salazar Gomez in the 1 June presidential elections now favor a pre-election coup and a military dictatorship, 25x1c1 Salazar Gomez has withdrawn from the race and the New Democratic National Alliance candidate appears to have little popular support. Defense Minister Diaz Granados is also increasingly in favor of a military junta or a coup in favor of Salazar Gomez,
25.
25X1C
.
25X1C
25X1C
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25X1C
the pro-Salazar group probably does not have sufficient support to launch a successful revolt at this time, but that if the election results show that the Conservatives are winning, an attempt is likely.
25X1A
25X1C
The Defense Minister and certain senior army been considering a coup for some time, but,1 25X1C have refrained because they feel It hat they lack support. Current government protests against clerical interference in favor of the Conservative candidate, however, may furnish an excuse for pro-Salazar military elements.
offictiThe
Comment:
25X1A
26.
Comment: Of the Latin American countries, Honduras has consistently been one of the most friendly to the United States. The current criticism seems to.reflect an underlying feeling that United States policy in Latin America is unduly influenced by economic considerations.

SECRET
Hondurans criticize United States for not recognizing Bolivia: The United States has been criticized by both administration and opposition newspapers in Honduras for not recognizing the new Bolivian Government. The prevailing view is that recognition is tied to tin "to the eternal discredit of the United States." (C Tegucigalpa Weeka 21, 23 May 52)
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TOP SECRET
28 May 1952
US OFFICIALS ONLY
CIA No. 49675

Copy No. 46

TOP SECRET
SECURITY INFORMATION I
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS.793 AND 794, THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW,
NEAR EAST AFRICA
25X1C
1.
Egyptian King seriously considering replacing present Prime Minister: King Farouk and his advisers are seriously considering replacing Prime Minister Hilali Pasha, 25X1C Chief of the Palace Cabinet, Afifi Pasha, is reportedly Farouk's first choice as a successor, and Minister of the Interior Maraghi Pasha is the second.
25X1C
if t e King rejects a reform program proposed by Maraghi, the latter may initiate a revolution.
There is no strong evidence that Maraghi alone could cause a change in the government without the King's support. 25X1A
,25X1A
2.
Comment: There has been an increasing number of reports in thi-Tigi-leeks that Prime Minister Hilali might resign or be replaced. Former Prime Minister Sirry Pasha has been mentioned, along with Maraghi and Afifi, as a possible candidate for the premiership if Hilali should leave the government.
France conditions further air base grants on full US support in North Africa: According to a high Foreign Office official, France will not consider granting the United States base rights in Algeria and Tunisia if assurances are not received of complete American confidence in its North African policy. France expects unconditional American support for the
TOP SECRET
1
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reforms which it is ready to institute in Tunisia and Morocco. (S Paris 7313, 26 May 52)
Comment: Faced with international criticism of its action in North Africa, France has also resorted to other pressure tactics, such as suggesting the possibility of withdrawal from the United Nations if that organization decides to discuss the Tunisian question.

TOP SECRET
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25X1

HR70-14
Ali
28-52 mcues2__
0,1177
/NR
1.
2. Chinese forces in Korea to increase increase offensive offensive capabilities: capabilities:
Chinese Communist Communist Military Military

18 May 52 52 SUEDE SUEDE
complished by 15 15 July. year's year' sfloods." floods."
APPROVED APPROVED FOR FORRELEASE RELEASE DATE: DATE: 22-Mar-2010 22-Mar-2010

FAR FAR EAST
K-36Y M-3651(
message of of18 18 May May on a a An intercepted intercepted message network in in Chinese Communist military military network reveals that that "all "allvolunteer volunteer units" units" Korea reveals store supplies suppliesto to last last have been ordered to store through 15 15 September. September. This must be acis attributed attributed to to "experience "experienceof of last The order is
-3-
_TOP_SECRET-SUEDE-
AI
Comment: Other recent messages received Comment: Other from Korea show that several Chinese units in area have alKorea show that s e v e m s e tn the forward area havealA general ready accumulated accumulated heavy heavy stocks stocks of of petroleum petroleum and and ammunition. ammunition. supply build-up build-up in in the theforward forward area, area, if if achieved, achieved, would would increase the capasupply bility for an biltty an offensive offensive of of major proportions. proporttons.
3.
asserts Communists air Far East East Command Command asserts Communists possess overwhelming overwhelming air superiority: super tor ity:
r
I
A Although thereaare r e no no tndtcattons indicationsof ofan an imtmpending atr air offensive, pending offenstve, he Communists have sufficient the aircraft, personnel, air lir facilities and logisticsupport supportto tolaunch launch an an ofaircraft, personnel, facilities and logistic UN planes, planes, crowded crowded on Ktmpoand andSuwon fensive without without warning warningin tnwhich whichUN fensive on Kimpo Suwon airfields,would airf ields,would qutte quite posstbly possibly sustain sustain more than than 50 50 percent percent destruction destruction would necessitate forfeiture forfeitureof of offenoff enfrom the initial attack. Such Losses losses would stve sive aerial aerial superiority Superiorityin in favor favor of of defense defense tactics.
4. 4 8

-4 4 --
that the enemy has a total of 1,115 aircraft massed in Manchuria and that this overwhelmbring superiority gives gives him htm a a major major offensive offensive Ing superiority icapability. iiibility. The of UN UN F-86's, aswell well as as the the headquarters headquarters The homebases homekiies of F-86's, as arewell well within within the combat of of both both our our ground ground and andair air forces forces in Korea, Korea, are radius of the the 350 350 jet jetand and 35 35 piston piston fighters fightersbased based at atAntung, Antung, Tatungkou, Tatungkou, radiusof Only a few miles farther tnland on the AnshanTakushan and Sinuiju. inland on the AnshanTakuahan and Sinuiju. Only a few miles Mukden airfields, 30 light bombers, 240 240 jet6and jepand 85 Mukden airfields, 30 85 piston pistonfighters fighters are in position position to provide provide support support as well well as additional addttional shock shock power powerfor for a striking force.
27 May 52
~~
HR70-14 HR70-14
FAR EAST
jNR
8. 6.
Chinese forces Korea to abilities: forces in in,Korea to increase increase offensive offensive ca capabilities: An intercepte ay on a intercepted message message o of 1 18 May .a .hinese Chinese Communist ommun st military military network network in in Korea Korea reveals reve&lsthat that "all "all volunteer volunteer units" units" have been ordered t o store store supplies supplies to to last last through through 15 15 September. ordered to This This must must be be accomplished accomplished by by 15 16 july. July. The order is is attributed attributed to ."experience "experience of last last year?s yearasfloods.". floodsOvP 5Olst Comm Comm (SUEDE 501st Recon Recon Grp Grp 'Korea, 'Korea, K-3054, 18 18 May May 52) 52)
28 May
52
1)
TOP SECRET SUEDE

APPROVED APPROVED FOR FORRELEASEDATE: RELEASEDATE: ,18-Mar-2010 18-Mar-2010
e/
51 Sto
O t h e r recent recent messages nessages received r e c s i w e d from Korea show Comment: Other that t h a t several Chinese C h i n e s e units in the t h e forward f o r w a r d area have already already accumulated of petroleum p e t r o l e u m and and ammunition. ammunition. A a c c u m u l a t e d heavy heavy stocks s t o c k s of general g e n e r a l supply s u p p l y build-up b u i l d - u p in i n the t h e forward f o r w a r d area, area, if i f achieved, achieved, would increase increase the t h e capability c a p a b i l i t y for f o r an a n offensive o f f e n s i v e of 0% major major proportions. proportions.
7. 7.
Chinese a g a i n reports r e p o r t s large large C h i n e s e artillery a r t i l l e r y division d i v i s i o n in i n Korea again Artillery Division The Chinese C h i n e s e Communfst Communist 7th B a s o l i n e stores: 7th A stores: The r t i1 l er y D i v is$0 n gasoline r e p o r t e d on 18 18 gay Irba y that t h a t it i t had finished f i n i s h e d storing s t o r i n g l1,200barrels ,200barrels reported of of gasoline g a s o l i n e at at a a dump dump near n e a r the t h e western w e s t e r n front f r o n t and was seeking seeking (SUEDE 501st Comm a s a f e place to t o store s t o r e 400 400 barrels barrels of of oil. o i l . (SUEDE safe Grp Korea, Korea, K-3035, K-3035, 18 18 May May 52) 52) Recon Grp This This Comment: of of petro petroleum eum supply supply l a s t week a message last 4,000-4,500 barrels 4,000-4,500 barrels message is is new evidence e v i d e n c e of the t h e high h i g h level level which which the t h e 7th 7 t h Artillery A r t i l l e r y has h a s achieved. a c h i e v e d , In In t h i s same division division r e p o r t e d that t h a t it i t had this reported of of gasoline g a s o l i n e on on hand. hand.
8. 8.
Elements E l e m e n t s of of new new Chinese Chinese army army reported r e p o r t e d in I n Korea: Korea: On 18 May an a n unidentified u n i d e n t i f i e d Chinese Chi n e s e Communist regiment r e g i m e n t in i n Korea 18 notified n o t i f i e d its subordinate s u b o r d i n a t e units u n i t s that t h a t two companies of guerrillas guerrillas belonging t o the t h e 50th 5 0 t h Division D i v i s i o n are "now going g o i n g into i n t o activity." activity." b e l o n g i n g to 501st (SUEDE S O l s t Comm Comm Recon Grp Korea, K-3000, K-3000, 18 18 May May 52) 52) (SUEDE
Comment: The 50th Division.is normally s subordinate io Comment: 50th D i v i s i o n is normially ubordinate t o the the 1 7 t h Army, which is is currently c u r r e n t l y accepted $ccepted in in southern s o u t h e r n Kweichow, Kweichow, 17th Xi-ETWhich China. T h i s is This element of this is the t h e first f i r s t time that t h a t any e l e m e n t of t h i s army China. h a s been observed o b s e r v e d in i n Korea. Korea. has

4 4
28 May 52
HR70-14
I
41,
FAR EAST EAST FAR

2. 2.
Chinese Communiet Communist artillery a r t i l l e r y regiment regiment Apparently a p p a r e n t l y moving moving Chinese towara Korean. Korean front: f r o n t : A Chinese Chi n e s e Communist on 24 24 M a3 toward Communist message Massage on Mai 'from regiment of the t h e 8th 8 t h Artillery Artillery D i v i s i o n mentioned mentioned that that from a regiment Division 11becau8ewe w e have have recently r e c e n t l y changed changed positions p o s i t i o n s things t h i n g s are are not not "because r u n n i n g as ae smoothly smoothly as usual." usual." I t also also s t a t e d that t h a t the t h e 40th 40th running It stated (complete or or Chinese Communist Communist Army Army "has "has ordered ordered that t h a t we w e (complete Chinese forward something?) something?) by b y the t h e end endof of ,June." June." (SUEDE (SUEDE 501st 501st Comm Comm forward Recon Grp Korea, Korea, K-3201, K-3201, 24 24 May May 52) 52) Recon Grp
Two previous p r e v i o u s messages messages recently r e c e n t l y indicated indicated Comment: Two Comment:, t h a t the -Artillery D i v i s i o n is is changing changing its its position p o s i t i o n and and that 8th Artillery Division moving forward in i n the t h e central c e n t r a l sector. sector. The The reference r e f e r e n c e to t o the the moving forward 40th Army, A r m y , elements elements of which have have been observed observed in i n the t h e same same 40th g e n e r a l area, area, may may indicate i n d i c a t e that t h a t the t h e 8th 8 t h Artillery A r t i l l e r y Division Division general w i l l be supporting s u p p o r t i n g the t h e 40th 4 0 t h Army. Army. will
'
3 . 3.
.Enemy trucks t r u c k s damaged damaged in i n Korea Korea being b e i n g shipped shipped to t o China: China: .Enemy A unit of the t h e Chinese Chinese Communist Communist 7th 7 t h Artillery A r t i l l e r y Division Division informed the t h e division d i v i s i o n headquarters h e a d q u a r t e r s on on 25 May May that t h a t "three "three informed GAZ trucks t r u c k s with w i t h cabs. cabs. .have been .and t hey .have been damaged. .and they s h o u l d be returned r e t u r n e d to t o China China for for repairs." repairs." (SUEDE 501st should (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Recon Grp Grp Korea, Korea, K-3223, K-3223, 27 27 May May 52). 52) Comm
.
4. 4 .

.
.
.
Coqment: As As it i t is is known knswn that t h a t the t h e Chinese Chinese haVe have several several Comment: l a r g e n n a n c e depots d e p o t s in i n Korea, Korea, the t h e above above message message would large-SOSTWnance would seem to t o indicate i n d i c a t e that t h a t either e i t h e r the t h e depots d e p a t s do do not n o t have have the the seem f a c i l i t i e s for f o r making making major major repairs repairs or o r that t h a t they t h e y are are facilities overloaded. overloaded. Communist messages i n d i c a t e diseases diseases continue c o n t i n u e in i n Korea: Korea: .Communist messages indicate Korean intercept i n t e r c e p t on on 21 21 May M ay IrOm from a a battalion,possibly battalion, possibly A North Korean s u b o r d i n a t e to t o the t h e 21st 2 l s t AA Regiment,stated R e g i m e n t , s t a t e d that t h a t "cholera subordinate trouble o ccurred i n tthe h e Pyongyang and preventive preventive trouble occurred in Pyongyang area" area and measures should s h o u l d be be prepared prepared in in the t h e Sadong Sadong area. area. One One day day Measures later a n o t h e r Korean n i t , thought thought t o be of the t h e same later another Korean u unit, to same subsubordinatdon', ddeclared e c l a r e d tthat h a t "cholera (plague) are are ordinatIon', "cholera and and pest pest (plague) p r e v a l e n t .I1 prevalent."
A Chinese Chinese Communist Communist message, message, also a l s o on on 21 2 1 May, May, revealed revealed A t h a t an an u n i d e n t i f i e d division's d i v i s i o n ' e hospital h o s p i t a l and and one one of its its that unidentified emergency e n t e r s were crowded, w i h nine nine emergency rest rest c centers were "extremely1' "extremely"'crowded,rmit t u b e r c u l a r patients p a t i e n t s at a t the t h e latter. l a t t e r . (SUEDE 15RSM 158511fp}3317, tubercular 3317, 3318, 25 25 May; 501st Comrn Recon Grp Grp May; ROK ROK Int I n t Grp Grp M, M, 24 May; 3318, May; 50Ist Comm Recon Korea, K-3023, K-3023, 24 May 52 Korea,
29 May 52
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Comment: The above messages, messages, c coupled with previous oupled w ith p revious existence of cholera and p plague iinforia-037-confirm n f o r m a t i o n , c o n f i r m the the e x i s t e n c e of lague North Communigt ttroops. among N o r t h Korean civilians c i v i l i a n s and and ,Chinese C h i n e s e Communist roops. have been most most The diseases heretofore h e r e t o f o r e appeared a p p e a r e d to t o have ,prevalent p r e v a l e n t in in the t h e area area south s o u t h of of Wonsan. Wonsan.
8. 6 .
C,hinesq c a n v e n t i o n a l fighter f i g h t e r regiment r e g i m e n t sti11 s t i l l Actlir* a,ctiv.e chineSe conventional pear RArbip: flight Message on n ear,P a r b i n : A Chinese Chi n e s e communfst Communist fli g h t message o n 271day 27, Bay b schectuled chedulea'lr2 12 or or 221 1 LA-9 LA-9 c cOnventional onventional f fighters i g h t e r s on a 200200mile round-robin r o u n d - r o b i n flight f l i g h t at a t Lalin, L a l i n , near n e a r Harbin. H a r b i n . The eportThe r reporti n g agency ing agency comments comments tthat h a t these these are are pprobably r o b a b l y i in n th the e 25tQ 250 Regiment of the Division Regiment t h e 9th 9th D i v i s i o n . No flight f l i g h t of'more of 'more than t h a n one a i r c r a f t of his r egiment h a s been bserved s ince e arly aircraft of t this regiment has been o observed since early e c u r i t y Croup J a p a n AP Ap 977, 977, December. (SUEDE 6920 6920 S Security Group Johnson AB Japan
.00 e n t : The strength s t r e n g t h of the t h e 25th;Regiment 25th;Regiment is carried 'Co ent: - s. at division's other regiment, the 27th, a t 21 2 1 * . The d ivisionvso ther r egiment, t he 2 7 t h , is at a t Tunhua and also has 21 21 LA-9's. LA-9's. T his d i v i s i o n , the t h e only This division, known Chinese C h i n e s e conventtnal c o n v e n t i d r i a lfighter f i g h t e r'unit ' u n i t in i n Manchuria, Manchuria, ills hqs known never been a assigneCtoa base. n e v e r been ~ ~ s I g n e 4 : t o 'combat ~ combat a base.
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2. Strong UN action urged urged against against President President Rhee: UN action Rhee:
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American Charge Lightner in Pusan Pusan believes believes if democratic democraticgovernment government in in SouthKorea SouthKorea that if i s to to be preserved, immediate immediate action is action is is rereo curb President Rhee's dictatorial aictatorial quired t to methods. m e t h o d s .
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Ltghtner protest by by the the UN UN Lightner recommends a protest Commission for the Unification of Korea. Cornmisston Untftcatton and Rehabilitation of Korea. If If this this does not the Charge Charge suggests a 24-hour 24-hour ultimatum not brtng bring tmmediate immediate results, results, the that UN UNforces forces will will take take protecttve protective actton action unless imprisoned specifying that National Assemblymen are safety and right to meet National Assemblymen are released and thetr their safety guaranteed. guar anteed Ltghtper comments comments that thatifs if the violation of Lightner democrattc processes i s permitte$in Korea, where -the United Nations Nations democratic processes is permittectin Korea, where-the United i s in in a a strong strongposition, posttion, Korean Korean democratic elements elements will w i l l be completely is disillusioned and the new new governments governmentsof ofthe theFar Far East East will will gain gain the the imimpression that that the the United Untted States ts unwi11ing: to is unwilling tosupport supportthe theprinctples principles it it professes. prOfe88e~.
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Approved Forktiealpep1/5EeptET097511000700160001-6
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Copy No. 3
'CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN
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L PEES K
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS $ C

NEXT REVIEW DATE:
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MITI+ HR 70
DATE
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Approved For Release 2004/01/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A00C 700160001-6
25X1A
SUMMARY
FAR EAST
1.
Communists may initiate new American atrocity propaganda theme

(page 3).
2. 25X1
President Rhee determined to break Assembly opposition (page 4). Portuguese foresee danger to Macao from any new export controls (Page 4)
6.
7.
8. 9. 10. 11.
British propose settlement for Saar issue (page 8). MRP dissatisfaction with Pinay increasing (page 9). American Minister in Switzerland against further blocking of Swiss bank assets (page 9).
25X1A

SOUTH ASIA
India fails to reduce troop strength in Kashmir (page 6).

WESTERN EUROPE
Military announcements expected on East German People's Police

Day (page 7).
(page 7).
Economic countermeasures seen most effective against East Germany
Approved :or Release 2004101116 : CIA-RDP79100975A000 700160001-6
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FAR EAST
1.
Communists may initiate new American atrocity propaganda theme:

I
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trial of four Korean traitors began on

25 May in
w
Pyongyang,
the
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Radio Pyongyang's coverage of the trial began on 25 May and emphasized that the four defendants were led by Americans.
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The 29 May issue of Pr avda carried an article, based on an account in the sensationalist Indian journal Blitz, of the alleged transportation of 20,000 Japanese prisoners to Central Pacific islands in February just prior to announcement of new tests of atomic weapons in the area. This article asserts that Korean and Viet Minh prisoners were used as human targets in similar tests in Nevada last year.
Comment:
-3-
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e massacre, un mer can direction, of over 35,000 Koreans between October and December 1950, when the UN controlled most of North Korea.
The defenccants were charged
25X1
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2. President Rhee determined to break Assembly opposition:

American Charge Lightner in Pusan concludes that the conference between the UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea and President Rhee, has not changed the latter's e erm a on ma a n martial law in Pusan until he has broken the resistance of the political opposition in the Assembly. The President apparently estimates this may take two weeks. He is using General Van Fleet's name to justify ignoring UNCURK and the Assembly's demands for an end to martial law. Rhee has plans to give the illegally imprisoned Assemblymen a summary trial under martial law.
25X1A
3.
Portuguese foresee danger to Macao from any new export controls:

Portuguese officials, now meeting with other Western delegates in Paris to discuss export controls, have stated.that stopping strategic exports from Macao to Communist China would lead to a complete halt of all trade, with "very serious consequences" for the colony.
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Present export controls at Macao are the maximum which can be contemplated, according to the Portuguese delegation. Macao authorities, in fact, are recommending to Lisbon a relaxation of the present regulations rather than the imposition of additional measures.
25X1

25X1A
25X1

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25X1
SOUTH ASIA
6.
India fails to reduce troop strength in Kashmir:
25xi'x'A
62,000 Indian troops in Kashmir, previously repor e o e process;' has not yet commenced. In fact, recent troop transfers may have effected a net increase of three battalions.
Though Pakistan has only 19,000 soldiers in Kashmir, an Indian External Affairs officer asserts that recentbellicose statements made by Pakistani officials caused India to reverse its earlier decision to withdraw a division of its forces from the state.
Comment: In preparation for the current talks in New York with UN nresentative Graham, India has emphasized the concession represented by its voluntary withdrawal of an army division from Kashmir and the conciliatory attitude illustrated thereby.
The American Embassy in New Delhi has learned cth at the withdrawal of 18,000 of the
25X1
Since Pakistani officials have issued bellicose statements during every Kashmir crisis in the last four years, it is doubtful that the Indian excuse is genuine.,
-625X1A
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WESTERN EUROPE
7.
Military announcements expected on East German People's Police Day:
25X1A
expect that over the week end of 30 May-2 Tune the German Democratic Republic will announce an overt recruiting campaign for the para-military Alert Police, pre-military training for the Free German Youth organization, and possibly a national army.
25X1
8.
Economic countermeasures seen most effective against East Germany:
The High Commissioner's office in Berlin believes that General Chuikov'e protest 25X1A against the blocking of East German accounts in American banks testifies too the effectiveness of such measures. While discounting the efficacy of any local economic countermeasures by the West, HICOG officials believe that economic retaliation on a global scale would be most effective, and, particularly in its financial aspects, could be most easily enforced.
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These reports suggest not only a desire on the part of the East Germans to avoid future losses through the freezing of accounts, but also supports the contention that East Germany would be hurt by a major interruption of its trade with the West.
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East Germany has designated 1 June as the "Day of the People's Police." The Fourth Parliament of the Communist youth organization is meeting in Leipzig at this time.
Comment:
25X1A
9.
British propose settlement for Saar issue:

As a means of settling the Saar dispute, British Foreign Secretary Eden proposes that:
(1) the Saar be placed under the trusteeship of urope with full political, cultural, and economic freedom, except that France would continue to have a 50-year lease, with option of renewal, on coal fields and railways, and would receive credit for iron and steel output under the Schuman Plan;
ounc
o
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(3) France and Germany agree to these arrangements without prejudice.to the final determination of German frontiers in an eventual peace treaty; and
(4) the Council of Europe supervise the election of a new Landtag, which would then pass on these proposals.
Eden further suggests that, if all parties concerned agree to these steps, the Saarlanders themselves could within five years decide their future.
The British position regarding the Saar has been that the United States and Britain should discreetly press for settlement before greater French-German animosity developed over this issue.
Comment:
European authorities;
(2) the Saar become the seat of the projected
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10. MRP dissatisfaction with Pinay increasing:

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The American Embassy in Paris reports that the recent Congress of the Popular Republican
Party (MRP) was marked by "scathing denunciations" of the "reactionary policies" of the nay governmen yen the newly elected party president expressed regret at MR P participation in the government.
11.
American Minister in Switzerland against further blocking of Swiss bank
assets:
25X1A
The American Minister in Switzerland opposes any further blocking of Banque Populaire funds in the United States in retaliation for the bank's handling of Chinese Communist accounts. He recuthmenua taat any ther action be postponed until it is conclusively proved that the bank has other Chinese Communist accounts. The Minister believes that the blocking of any more of the bank's assets would adversely affect Swiss consideration of further participation in the European Payments Union, the extension of Swiss controls over East-West trade, and the German 'assets problems now under discussion.
The blocking of additional funds now could make this incident the central issue in the dune session of the Swiss Parliament, which plans to study the problem.

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Comment: This new display of unrest in the Popular Republican Party, reflecting increased dissatisfaction with the party's exposure to attack from the left, gives added weight to its demands that Schuman remain in the cabinet as a condition of continued Popular Republican support of the coalition.
Despite this opposition, however, the conservative majority of the party voted by a large majority to allow Pinay to continue his price-lowering experiment
HR70-14
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Atomic defense mentioned mentioned in tn Chinese Communist Communtst message:

Chinese Communist Military An unidentified in An unidentified Chinese Communist unit in Korea, possibly possibly an element of o f the 8th ArtilKorea, Dtvision, stated stated in in a a19 19May M a y message: lery Division, the defense defense against against "The preparations for the "The atom bomb bomb will be pressed." pressed." the atom
19 May 52 52 SUEDE SUEDE
is the the first first noted noted reference reference Comment: This is traintng t n the ' w forward a r d area, ChineseCommunist Communist to atomic defense training in' area. AAChinese message on 4 April April referred referred to to the the distribution distribution of literature literatureon on atomic atomic Communtst propaganda stated on on propaganda broadcast broadcast stated weapons. weapons, A Chinese Communist 30 March that the the American American use useof of atomic atomicweapons weapons would would be the next next logical step warfare step in in Korea Korea after after testing testing biological biological and chemical warfare
weapons. weapons,
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Chinese Communists Communists seek seek evtdence evidence of of American American use use of of chemical chemical warfare: warfare: Chtnese
Chinese Communist Military 25 May 52 SUEDE The 27th Chinese The 27th Chinese Communtst, Communist,Artillery Artillery Regiment, tn relaying relaylng a message message that that may may have have ment, in come on 25 25 May May come from from Joint Ioint Headquarters, on ordered "that "that all all types types of of American American bombs .to find and poison f tnd poison gas gas bombs bombs be be collected. ,to J Y-3?3 -3Jjl which varieties varieties are are manufactured." out whtch are the the most most (used?) (used?) and and how how they are manufactured" Units were enjoined to to be be on on watch watch or for projectiles projectiles dropped f from r o m planes planes both "poisonous or fired fired by by artillery, artillery, both "poisonous and andnon-poisonous non-poisonous kinds kinds alike." alike."

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message suggests that the Comment: This message Communists Communists are seeking seeking more evidence evidence to support charges charges such such as asthose those on 24 24 May Maythat that the the Americans Americans are broadcast by by Radio Radio Pyongyang Pyongyang on a r e employemploying chemical warfare in in Korea. Korea,
HR70-14
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FAR EAST
5.
Communists may initiate propaCommunists initiate new American atrocity gropaMinister in in Nort Korth Korea orea keported reported ganda theme: The Hungarian Minister in a& 26 May traitors of four four Korean n ; e r ! K traitors f ?? %% - m message e s s a m that that the the trial trial of began 25 May May in in Pyongyang, Pyongyang, and and would would last last for for five five days. days. began on on 25 The The defendants defendants were were charged charged with with the the massacre, massacre, under under American American direction, December direction, of of over over 35,000 3 5 , 0 0 0 Koreans Koreans between between October October and December 1950, 1950, when the the UN UN controlled controlled most most of of North North Korea, Korea. The The Minister Minister added added that that "Comrade Comrade Meray is is attending" attending and would fOrward forward his first first detailed report on the 27th (SUEDE D-15149, 26 May 82.)' of of May. May. D-15149,Pyongyang-Peiping, Pyongyang-Peiping, 26 May a2) Comment: Radio Pyongyang's Pyongyangs coverage coverage of the trial trial began on 25MiTiad emphasized that the 251dayd emphasized that thefour fourdefendants defendantswere were led led
by Americans. Americans.
The attendance Hungarian newspaper attendance of of Meray, Meray, a prominent Hungarian newspaper correspondent, correspondent, at at the the trials trials suggests suggests that that Orbit-wide Orbit-wide coverage coverage will will be be given given this this trial trial as as a P companion companion propaganda propaganda theme theme to to other other current current American American atrocity atrocity lines. lines.

3 3
2 Jum 52
S/54,72
The 29-May 29.Hay issue i s s u e of r a v d s carried a n article,-.based a r t i c l e , based of P Pravda carried an on Indian Blitz; o n an a n account a c c o u n t in i n the t h e sensational. sens-1 I n d i a n jjournal ournal B l i t z , of of the t h e alleged a l l e g e d transportation t r a n s p o r t a t i o n of 20,000 2 0 , 0 0 0 Japanese J a p a n e s e prTgUEFrs'to p r E r s - t o Central Pacific February j u s t prior p r i o r to t o announceannounceC entral P a c i f i c islands i s l a n d s in in F e b r u a r y just ment of of new new tests This tests of of atomic a t o m i c weapons weapons ih i n the t h e area. area. T his / article and V Viet Minh p prisoners a r t i c l e asserts asserts that t h a t Korean. Korean and i e t Minh r i s o n e r s were used as human targets used t a r g e t s in i n similar s i m i l a r tests in i n Nevada last l a s t year. year.
6.
Comment: There has h a s been recent r e c e n t evidence e v i d e n c e that t h a t the t h e Chinese Chinese Communist forces f o r c e s have been decentralizing d e c e n t r a l i z i n g their t h e i r motor repair repair installations. i n s t a l l a t i o n s . This T h i s message would seem seem to t o indicate i n d i c a t e that that a a s i m i l a r pattern p a t t e r n of decentralization d e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n exists e x i s t s in i n the t h e North Korean similar Army.
These three t h r e e towns are located l o c a t e d on the t h e main supply s u p p l y route route in the t h e vicinity v i c i n i t y of Hungnam.
7.
Atomic A t o m i c defense d e f e n s e mentioned by by Chinese Communist unit u n i t in in An unidentified u n i d e n t i f i e Chinese i n e s e Communist unit u n l t in i n Korea, Korea, possipossie l e m e n t of of the t h e 8th :tpA r t i l l e r y Division, D i v i s i o n , stated s t a t e d in in a a bly an element Artillery 19 19 May message: message: "The preparations p r e p a r a t i o n s for f o r the t h e defense d e f e n s e against against t h e atom the atom bomb bomb will w i l l be!pressed." be:.pressed." (SUEDE (SUEDE 501st 501st Conam Comm Recon Grp Korea, Korea, 1C-3289, X-3289, 19 1 9 May Way 52) 52)
Korea; Korea-
8,
Comment; This Comment: T h i s is is the t h e first f i r s t noted n o t e d reference r e f e r e n c e to t o atomic atomic defense ping d e f e n s e tra train i n g in i n the t h e forward f o r w a r d area. area. A Chinese Communist Communist message on on 4 4 April A p r i l referred r e f e r r e d to t o the t h e distribution d i s t r i b u t i o n of literature literature -&'Chinese Communist propaganda propaganda broadcast broadcast on o n atomic atomic weapons. weapons. WChinese Communist o n 30 30 March that t h a t the t h e American American use use of atomic atomic weapons weapons stated on would,be'.the next step in e x t llogical ogical s tep i n Korea after a f t e r testing testing would be the n biological b i o l o g i c a l and and chemical c h e m i c a l warfare w a r f a r e weapons. weapons.
C h i n e s e Communists Communists seek seek evidence e v i d e n c e of of 'American 'American use u s e of Chinese chemical c h e m i c a l warfare w a r f a r e in i n Korea: Korea: The 27th Chinese Chin e s e Communist Communist Artillery A r t i l l e r y Regiment, in i n relaying relaying a a message that t h a t may have come come "'that all &I1 types types on-25 25-May o r d e r e d1"that from May ordered from Joint J o i n t Headquarters, . H e a d q u a r t e r s , on of American .to American bombs bombs and and poison p o i s o n gas gas bombs bombs be be collected. collected. .to
.

4 4
E x i a t e n c d of ExiNtence. of ssubordinate u b o r d i n a t e North North Korean Korean r repair epair d depots epots A-Fgoent North Korean rilegitagte ihdicitted-that, North Korean mes&ag& TnCichtedthat e established: s t a b l i s h e d : =cent v e h n G e d ofof major e i n n ssent e n t tto o a VehiclZsALrisHnOed majorrepairs repairs are are bbeing a motor motor m a i n t e n a n c e repair r e p a i r depot d e p o t at a t Pongdae-ri. Pongdae-ri. The message also also maintenance r e v e a l e d the t h e existence e x i s t e n c e of two repair r e p a i r installations, i n s t a l l a t i o n s , possibly possibly revealed s u b o r d i n a t e to t o this t h i s depot, d e p o t , in i n the t h e vicinity v i c i n i t y of Chongpyon or or subordinate in the h e Pompo Pompo area. area. (SUEDE 15RSM 15RSM Det D e t 151, 151, 15RSM/13099, 15RSM/13099, : ' i n t (SUEDE 25 May May 52) 52)
2 Jun, Junl 2
52 52
ir
N-110E) SECRET SUEeE

find f i n d out o u t which which varieties v a r i e t i e s are are the t h e most most (used?) ( u s e d ? ) and and how how they they be o on are manufactured." m a n u f a c t u r e d . " Units U n i t s were were enjoined, e n j o i n e d , tto o be n watch for for are p r o j e c t i l e s dropped d r o p p e d from from planes p l a n e s or or fired f i r e d by by artillery, artillery, projectiles b o t h "poisonous l l p o I s o n o u s and and non-poisonous non-poisonous kinds k i n d s alike." a l i k e . I t (SUEDE (SUEDE both 5 0 1 s t Comm C o w Recon Recon Grp Grp Korea, Korea, K-3231, K-3231, 27 27 May May 52). 52). 501st
T h i s message message suggests s u g g e s t s that t h a t the t h e Communists are are Comment: This seeking s e e k i n g more evidence e v i d e n c e to t o support s u p p o r t charges c h a r g e s such s u c h as as those t h o s e broadbroad'cast c a s t by by Radio R a d i o Pyongyang Pyongyang on on 24 24 May May that t h a t the t h e Americans Americans are are e m p l o y i n g chemical c h e m i c a l warfare w a r f a r e in i n Korea. Korea. employing
9. 9.
Comment: The two regiments r e g i m e n t s of of the t h e 1st 1st D i v i s i o n are Division t he o n l y known Korean jet j e t units: u n i t s : the t h e one o n e based b a s e d at a t Antung the only a l s o ..the the o n l y known ir u nit r e g u l a r l y assigned assigned was also only known Korean Korean a air unit regularly t o combatduty. to combat-duty.
10. 10.
P r e s e n c e ' of of "big-brother, " b i g - b r o t h e r , small-brother small-brother units" u n i t s " nOted noted Presence Korea: An unidentified u n i d e n t i f i e d .Chinese Chinese by h h e s e Comniunist unit u n i t in i n Rorea by C Chinese-CoMmunist Communist unit, Communist u n i t , tentatively t e n t a t i v e l y identified i d e n t i f i e d as of regimental regimental size aa 15. s i z e and and rocated Xocated north n o r t h of of Kaesong, Kaesong, commented commentedin in 15 May. May message: T h e r e are 4ere big-brother, are some b i g - b r o t h e r , ssmallbrother m a l l - b r o t h e r units units a t o u r living l i v i n g area." area." (SUEDE (SUEDE 501st 5 0 1 s t Comm C o w Recon Grp Grp Korea, Korea, at our K-2978, 23 May May 52) 52) K-2978, 23 Comment: S Since ince R Russians u s s i a n s are f frequently requently r referred eferred t to o Communist C China as."elder brothers," the context of tthe iin n Communist hina a s."elder b rothers," t he c o n t e x t of he message suggests s u g g e s t s the t h e presence p r e s e n c e of of Soviet S o v i e t and and North N o r t h Korean troops i n tthe h e bivouac ,of the t h e sending s e n d i n g unit. u n i t . Presumably in bivouac area arewmf o v i e t advisers. advisers. tthe h e "big " b i g brOthers". b r o t h e r s 1 ' are are S Soviet
11. 1 1*
MIG-15's Chinese' f l y to t o Pyongyang: Pyongyang: Six M I G - 1 5 ' s of of Chinese MIG-15's MIG-15's fly t he 9 3h'R e g i m e n t of the t he 3 r d Ai r D i v i s i o n were o f l y from the 9th Regiment 3rd Air Division were t to fly Antung to t o Pyongyang and and back back on o n 28 28 May. May. The m mission i s s i o n was (SUEDE as ."navigational " n a v i g a t i o n a l methods." g i v e n in i n the t h e message message as given methods." (SUEDE 6920 S Security 6920 e c u r i t y Group Johnson AB Japan J a p a n SC SC 534, 5 3 4 , 28 28 May May 52) 52)
5 5
N o r t h Korean jets j e t s may have been withdrawn from Yalu North R i v e r base: base: On On 21 May M ay two t w o regimental-sized-round r e g i m e n t a l - s i z e d r o u n d robin robin' River f l i g h t s were scheduled s c h e d u l e d at a t Anshan in i n south s o u t h Manchuria for for flights MIG-lS's believed b e l i e v e d to t o be b e subordinate s u b o r d i n a t e to t o the t h e North N o r t h Korean Korean MIG-15's 1st Air A i r Division. D l v i e i o n . One of of the t h e regiments r e g i m e n t s was was led l e d by by a a pilot pilot 1st who was observed o b s e r v e d in in December December and and January J a n u a r y leading l e a d i n g flights flights o v e r North N o r t h Kbrea. Korea. The The Air A i r Force F o r c e concludes c o n c l u d e s that t h a t the t h e combat-: combat: over committed c o m m i t t e d regiment r e g i m e n t of this t h i s division d i v i s i o n may have h a v e been withdrawn Special f r o m Antung to t o Anshan. Anshan. (SUEDE (SUEDE S p e c i a l Air A i r Intelligence Intelligence from Summary 52-22, 52-22, 29 29 May May 52) 52) Summary
2 Jun. 2 Jun.
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Comment-: US pilots have have seldom encountered encountered enemy enemy jets jets Comment: as f a r south s o u t h as Pyongyang in i n recent r e c e n t months. The 3rd 3rd Air Air far Divis1on;which has has had had considerable c o n s i d e r a b l e combat combat experience, experience, Division,-which r e t u r n e d to t o Antung Antung two two weeks weeks ago ago from from Mukden, Mukden, where where it i t was was returned l o c a t e d after a f t e r mid-January. mid-January. I t is one of f i v e Chinese located It of five d i v i s i o n s based near near the t h e Korean Korean border. border. divisions

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Another Soviet S o v i e t 5th 5 t h Fleet F l e e t fighter f i g h t e r regiment regiment identified identified regiment at p r e v i o u s l y unidentified u n i d e n t i 2 ie d fighter fighter r egiment a t Port P o r t Arthur: Arthur: A previously which has h a s been active a c t i v e in i n the t h e Port P o r t Arthur area area for for some some time time believed Fleet is now b e l i e v e d io t o be subordinate s u b o r d i n a t e to t o the t h e Soviet S o v i e t 5th 5th F leet Naval Air A i r Force. The reporting r e p o r t i n g agency believes b e l i e v e s that t h a t total total fighter f i g h t e r strength s t r e n g t h in in Port P o r t Arthur includes i n c l u d e s seven naval n a v a l regiments, regiments, three Which are hich> a r e jet-equipped, j e t - e q u i p p e d , and two two other o t h e r units, u n i t s , possibly possibly t h r e e of w Special under the A i r Army. Army. (SUEDE S p e c i a l Intelligence I n t e l l i g e n c e Brief, Brief, t h e 9th 9 t h Air 52-21, 52-21, 28 28 May Way 52) 52) Fleet regiments Comment: Three 5th 5th F l e e t fighter fighter r e g i m e n t s were shifted shifted Comment: from from Port P o r t Arthur A r t h u r to t o Antung, Antung, presumably for for combat cymbat duty d u t y over over Korea, in i n October October and and November. November. Recent voice v o i c e traffic t r a f f i c suggests suggests that 1 1May. May. t h a t these t h e s e units u n i t s returned r e t u r n e d to t o Port P o r t Arthur Arthur before b e f o r e 11
3 Jun 52 52
C/V5/5 CI b / 5 I 5
SECRET-SUEDERELEASE APPROVED FOR RELEASE ATE: 22-Mar-2010 0 DATE: 22-Mar-201 rDPPROVED
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Relief, not n o t reinforcement, r e i n f o r c e m e n t , of of front f r o n tline l i n eUnite., k n i t s maymay e explain xplain .Chinese army movement: movement: Mao Tse-tung a s issued i s s u e d instructions instructions Chinese army. Tse-tung h has that the e 64-Ch t h and and 65 6bth,Armies th,Armies iin n Korea Korea are to t o be replaced r e p l a c e d by by newly-trained.Chinese r i e d Chinese armies armies After A f t e r the the r rotaticiln otati l e t ea, a g e n e r a l offenoffeni is comp compietea, general sive s i v e will w i l l begin. begin. 31 31 May May 52) 52t
-1
~~
4. 4.
Chinese Cbmmunist unit u n i t in i n Korea Korqa continues c o n t i n u e s lumbering activities: Artillery a c t i v i t i e s : An element element of of the t h e 8th 6 t h Chinese Ch i n e s e Commuriist Communist A rtillery D i v i s i o n stated s t a t e d in in a Division a 31 31 May May message that t h a t "We-discovered "we*di8covered more more t than h a n 100 100 logs l o g s to t o add to t o our o u r timber timber supply." supply." The unit u n i t had had cut cut The t h e logs and was preparing the p r e p a r i n g to t o move them "down the t h e mountain (for (for loading?).'t l o a d i n g ? ) o f t (SUEDE 501st CSUEDS 5 0 l s t Comm Recon Grp Korea, K-3418, K-3418, 1 1 Jun J u n 52) 52)
Comment: P Previous revealed r e v i o u s intercepts i n t e r c e p t s have r e v e a l e d that t h a t units u n i t s of the CCF 40th 40t h Army, the t h e 63rd 63rd Army and and the t h e 8th 8 t h Artillery A r t i l l e r y Division Division have engaged in in extensive e x t e n s i v e tree-cutting t r e e - c u t t i n g in i n the t h e vicinity v i c i n i t y of of Singye on on the t h e west west central c e n t r a l front. f r o n t . The continuing c o n t i n u i n g logging logging a c t i v i t y , which is is presumably furnishing f u r n i s h i n g the t h e Chinese Communist activity, forces with w i t h construction c o n s t r u c t i o n material for for defensive d e f e n s i v e bunkers, bunkers, artillery'positions or supply s u p p l y depots, d e p o t s , suggests s u g g e s t sa,lcontinued a.icontinued a r t i l l e r y . p o s i t i o n s or defensive d e f e n s i v e effort. effort.
.5. 5.
Russian MIG15's Flights M 3 G - 1 5 s fly f l over o v e r Korea Korea from frpm Mukden: Mukden: F lights 20 and and SO 30MIG-159s Y I G-15's each eac were'. were s c h e d u l e d from from Mukden ldu&den over of 20 Scheduted over' northwest n o r t h w e s t Korea Korea on 31 31 May and and 1 1 June, according a c c o r d i n g to t o Chinese Communist flight leag pilots p i l o t s had Russian Russian f l i g h t messages. messages. The lead names. (SUEDE (SUEDE 6920 6920 Security S e c u r i t y Group Group Johnson Johnson AB ABJapan, J a p a n ,.CAT-7760, .CAT-7760, DOG-647,31 DOG-647,31 May; May; CAT-7831, CAT-7831, DOG-663, DOG-663, 1 1 Jun Jun 52) 52)
Korea by the t h e Soviet S o v i e t MIG-15 unit unit at a t Mukden, 125 125 miles from from
t h e Korean Korean border. b o r d e r . Eneiy Enemy fighter-interceptors f i g h t e r - i n t e r c e p t o r s have have not not the previously p r e v i o u s l y been been noted n o t e d flying flying combat combat missions m i s s i o n s from from a a base barse as as far River f a r from from the t h e -Yalu Yalu R i v e r as as Mukden. Mukden.

--%---Comment:. Comment:
Comment: This is the t h e first indication i n d i c a t i o n that t h a t the t h e icentlyrdcentlyT h i s is o b s e r v e d movement of of several several Chinese Chinese armies armies toward toward the the front front obserVE37076kent for the purpose pot reinforcing, is f or t he p u r p o s e of of relieving; r e l i e v i n g , and n ot r e i n f o r c i n g , the the units u n i t s there. there. Insofar I n s o f a r as as this this report r e p o r t 'refers (refers t o t h e relief r e l i e f of of to the the t h e 64th 6 4 t h Army, it it is is supported s u p p o r t e d by intercepted i n t e r c e p t e d messages. messages. t o these tbese messages the t h e 40th 4 0 t h Army, A r m y , which has h a s long long According to had a a defensive d e f e n s i v e role r o l e on on the t h e Korean Xorean west coast, c o a s t , moved laAt last week to t o the t h e west central c e n t r a l front f r o n t and and was last l a s t observed observed contacting contacting t h e 64th 6 4 t h Army Krmy there. there. the
These are the t h e first f i r s t observed o b s e r v e d flights f l i g h t s over over
2 2
3 Jun J u n 52 52
WA' SECRET SUEDr

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6. 6 .
Chinese Communist rocket r o c k e t launcher l a u n c h e r regiment r e g i m e n t moving to to east e a s t central c e n t r a l front: f r o n t : A message from an a n unidentified.Chinese u n i d e n t i f i e d Chi nese d e s c r i b e d in i n great great 'Communist a r t i l l e r y regiment r e g i m e n t on 30 May described Communist artillery detail Division its planned p l a n n e d route r o u t e to t o the t h e 7th 7 t h Artillery Artillery D ivision d e t a i l its Headquarters east central c e n t r a l front. f r o n t . This This message, on on H e a d q u a r t e r s on o n the t h e east communications net that originating a communications n e t which indicates indicates t h a t the the o riginiting unit u n i t may be the t h e 202nd 202nd regiment r e g l m e n t of the t h e 21st 2 P s t Rocket Launcher Division, t o the t h e east central c e n t r a l front f r o n t would D i v i s i o n , said s a i d that t h a t the t h e move to be accomplished 501st Comm Recon Grp in four four days. d a y s . (SUEDE (SUEDE 5 0 1 s t Corn a c c o m p l i s h e d in Korea, K-3252, K-3252, 30 30 May May 52) 52)
Comment: The various v a r i o u s regiments r e g i m e n t s of of the t h e 21st 2 1 s t Rocket Comment: conventional were p placed under command of of conventional laced u n d e r tthe h e command Launcher Division, D i v i s i o n were artillery At a r t i l l e r y divisions d i v i s i o n s in i n mid-April. mid-April. A t that t h a t time t i m e the t h e 202nd s u b o r d i n a t e to to the t h e 2nd Artillery Artillery Rocket Launcher Regiment was subordinate Division D i v i s i o n then t h e n on'the o n ' t h s west west central c e n t r a l front f r o n t in i n support s u p p o r t of of the t h e 39th 39th and 64th and the t h e 203rd 203rd Artillery A r t i l l e r y Regiment waa w a s under under 6 4 t h Armies, and the of the Artillery Division east central i v i s i o n on the the e ast c entral t h e command of t h e 7th 7th A rtillery D front t h e 12th 1 2 t h Army. Army. This This message message is is a a strong s t r o n g indicaindicaf r o n t behind b e h i n d the tion will t i o n that t h a t the t h e 202nd Artillery A r t i l l e r y Regiment Regiment w i l l relieve r e l i e v e the t h e 203rd Regiment on on the t h e east east central c e n t r a l front. front.
4 4 4 Jun J u n 52 52 4
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Communist message messa e indicates additio forward Chinese Communist indicates a d d i t i o qal al f orward artil ery ment moving ast Central artille r y reg regiment moving to to East e n t r a l Front: Front3cco rdXig ccor ng to May a Y Chinese Chin e s e Communist Communist message message passed-between passed between two two t o a 26 M unidentified u n i d e n t i f i e d units, u n i t s , the t h e 209th 2 0 9 t h Artillery A r t i l l e r y Regiment Regiment "'will start start to t o move on o n the t h e 31st 31st day. day. On the t h e second of J u n e , the t h e entire entire of June, unit (SUEDE bOlst Comm Corn Recon Recon Grp Grp Korea, Korea, u n i t shall s h a l l have left." left." (SUEDE 501st K-3327, 29 IC-3327, 29 May May 52) 52)
Comment: Recent evealed t hat t he 2 09th Recent messages have have r revealed that the 209th Artillerk A r t l l h r y Regiment is is in i n very v e r y close association a s s o c i a t i o n with, w i t h , and and t h e 202nd Regiment the 2 1 s t Rocket p r o b a b l y subordinate.A0, s u b o r d i n a t e - " t o , the probably Regiment of of the 21st Rocket Launcher Division. D i v i s i o n . As the latter l a t t e r regiment, regiment, w hile c ompleting while completing four-day move to Artillery Division a four-day t o the t h e area of the t h e 7th 7th A rtillery D ivision on the t h e east central physical c e n t r a l front, f r o n t , was apparently a p p a r e n t l y in in p h y s i c a l contact contact with t h e 209th 209th Regiment Regiment throughout t h r o u g h o u t the t h e move, move, it i t is is very very w i t h the probable that t h a t both b o t h regiments are to b0 in t h e same be located in the
area.
8. 8 .
Front-line F r o n t - l i n e Chinese Chinese Communist Communist artiller artillery r egi ment w ill re iment will send ra n ng -sc 'Do !ay message from rom s e n d personne p e r s o n n e l to to tr ay message the 27th Artillery Regiment headquarters t bent h eadquarters t h e headquarters h e a d q u a r t e r s of the to t o its i t 6 forward f o r w a r d command Command post states s t a t e s that t h a t a training t r a i n i n g school s c h o o l of " s h o r t duration" d u r a t i o n ' g will w i l l be opened in i n the t h e middle of of June J u n e in in a "short small s m a l l town town near n e a r Pyongyang. Pyongyang. A detachment igh detachment of 25 men "of "of h high e d u c a t i o n a l standards," s t a n d a r d s , " including including 5 5 platoon p l a t o o n grade g r a d e officers, officers, educational will w i l l apparently a p p a r e n t l y be be sent scant to t o the the school. s c h o o l . (SUEDE (SUEDE 501st 50lst Comm Corn Recon R e c o n Grp-Korea, GrprKorea, K-3090, K-3090, 31 31 May May 52) 52)
Comment: Comment: The 27th 2 7 t h Artillery A r t i l l e r y Regiment is is on the line line west of of Chorwon ChOrWQn supporting s u p p o r t i n g the t h e 39th 3 9 t h Army. A r m y . The continued continued training possibly t r a i n i n g activity a c t i v i t y for front f r o n t line line units units p o s s i b l y indicates indicates that I s not n o t imminent. imminent. t h a t an a n offensive o f f e n s i v e is
9. 9 .
Chinese plant C h i n e s e Communist C Q m U n i S t forces forces in i n Korea continue.to continue to p lant A Chinese vegetable Chinese Communist Communist unit unit in i n Korea, Korea, v e g e t a b l e gardens: gardens: possibly Division, p o s s i b l y an a n element e l e m e n t of of the t h e 8th 8 t h Artillery Artillery D i v i s i o n , stated stated on 30 30 May that t h a t "the g ' t h e first f i r s t battalion b a t t a l i o n has lost l o s t the t h e receipt for for their The originator of t h e i r vegetable v e g e t a b l e seeds." seedsoTQ originator t h e i r purchase p u r c h a s e of'their then tf it it would be possible to use the t h e amount appearing appearing t h e n asks a s k s if ( t h r u 501st 501st on a (SUEDE ROK Int Iat Group Gpoup M (thru a former f o r m e r receipt. receipt. (SUEDE Comm Recon Recon Grp) Grg) K-3404, K-3404, 31 31 May May 52) 52)
Comment: Comment: Previous P r e v i o u s intercepts i n t e r c e p t s have revealed r e v e a l e d that t h a t in in militarily static Worth Korean static or or defensive d e f e n s i v e situations s i t u a t i o n s both b o t h North

5 5
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and Chinese units have started vegetable gardens. This This message apparently apparently indicates indicates a a continuation continuation of of the the Communists' Communists program for program for partial p a r t i a l self-sufficiency. self-sufficiency.

6 6
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19 --Tte-SEeRET-SUED-eFAR EAST 7AR

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HR70-14 HR70-14
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Entire E n t i r e artillery a r t i l l e r y division d i v i s i o n in i n Korea Korea being b e i n g transferred: transferred: In a message message on 24 M May a y the t h e 21st Artillery A r t i l l e r y Division D i v i s i o n cautioned cautioned u b o r d i n a t e regiment to t o record record experiences,"since e x p e r i e n c e s , f l s i n c ethe the a s subordinate present p r e s e n t transfer t r a n s f e r is is the the first first transfer t r a n s f e r for f o r the t h e entire entire (SUFDE-1286, 286,'Unknown-Unknown, Unknown-Unknown ,24 24May. May 52) 52) division." d ivision (SUEDE
'
."
of more recent r e c e n t messages on the t h e same Comment: A series of n net et r resulted e s u l t e d ip i n the t h e conclusion c o n c l u s i o n that t h a t one and p pOssibly o s s i b l y two two regiments to the r e g i m e n t s of of this t h i s division d i v i s i o n were were proceeding. proceeding t o t h e east central central If t the entire division he e ntire d i v i s i o n moves to the t h e same same area; area, as as f r o n t . If front. be indicated i n d i c a t e d here, h e r e , the t h e artillery a r t i l l e r y strength s t r e n g t h on this t h i s front front may be will w i l l have have been been doubled. doubled.
5. 5 .

3 3
units Chinese Communist front-line f r o n t - l i n e artillery artillery u n i t s continue continue Chin e s e Communist message passed t r a i n h g ' a c t i v i t i e s : A Chinese training'activitieS: between two unidentified u n i d e n t i f i e d units u n i t s on 31 31 May r e v e a l e d that two two Mak revealed battalions b a t t a l i o n s of of the t h e 31st Artillery A r t i l l e r y RetiMent Rekiment are "taking " t a k i n g over o v e r the the defense Regiment, which is being d e f e n s e Positions @ p s i t i o n s of the t h e 42nd 42pd Regiment, b e i n g withwithIn t o division d i v i s i o n for f o r artillery a r t i l l e r y combat (training?)." ( t r a i n i n g ? ) .*' I n drawn to addition, the 48th 43rd Regiments a d d i t i o n , the t h e message stated that that t he 4 8 t h and 43rd w will i l l also a l s o be trained t r a i n e d by the t h e "division." * * d i v i s i o n . " (SUEDE 501st Comm Corn Grp Korea, Korea, K-3475, K-3475, 22 June June 52)' 52) Recon Grp
Comment: The above message, ith p revious message, coupled w with previous intercepts Units will t h a t front f r o n t line line u nits w i l l initiate initiate i n t e r c e p t s stating s t ' a t i n g that t r a i n i n g activities a c t i v i t i e s in i n June, June, further further s t r e n g t h e n s the the p robability training strengthens probability that t h a t a Communist offensive o f f e n s i v e is is not n o t imminent. imminent.
5 June 52 52
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5 June 1952
OCI No, 5195

Copy No.
267
State Dept., OM, Treasury, USAF reviews completed

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SOVIET UNION
1.
Georgian party Secretary Vostoka announced the removal the Georgian Communist Party, He has been replaced by V. I.
removed: On 25 May, Zarya of Kvirkveliya, Secretary of after five months in the post. Melkadze.
I
25X1 Comment: The purge of party and government officials in GeFFiri-itill continues. Kvirkveliya, who was appointed to deal with the corruption problem,was probably judged unsatisfactory.
In the last six months, virtually the entire Georgian party leadership in important positions has been replaced. Only the Second Secretary of the Georgian Central Committee and one Secretary of the Tbilisi city party remain in their
posts.
2.
Czech military maneuvers may be on a larger scale than in recent years: The American Embassy in Prague reports that the Cisarsky Les maneuver area in western Bohemia appears to have been enlarged and that summer field training under way in the area may be on a bigger scale than in previous years. Last week rumors cropped up in Czechoslovakia regarding an imminent mobilization call and the movement of Soviet units into the country. The American Ambassador attributes these rumors to "widespread dissatisfaction and resentment against the Communist regime plus wishful thinking and ... self pity."
25X1
EASTERN EUROPE
25X1
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Comment: Annual Czech spring and summer field training has bggirlaraer way since I March and is expected to continue at least until 1 July. Last year's maneuvers, which reanhed division level, were reported to be unsatisfactory to Soviet military observers. This year's field training is reported to hive started earlier than usual in order to permit it to reach a higher level and to give more time for training.
Rumors of impending mobilization or hostilities normally increase during maneuver periods. The tension caused by Communist propaganda on the signing of the West German Contractual Agreement would contribute to further spreading of rumors.
3
25X1
Hungarian soldiers reveal low morale: Two Hungarian soldiers of peasant origin F Istated they were bitter against tne Communist regime because it had deprived them of "their all." They further revealed that they were not issued arms until removed from the zone in which their relatives reside. Vegetableicrops were virtually ruined and grain crops seriously undeveloped in eastern unwary and in north central Hungar according to the soldiers.
Comment: The denial of arms to Hungarian conscripts until they leave the zone where their relatives reside sheds light on the regime's estimate of the reliability of the Hungarian farm population. This report provides further confirmation of the previously reported serious crop damage in Hungary.
25X1
25X1
4.
Hungarian press continues silent on Austro-Hungarian border incident: The US Legation in Budapest reports that the Hungarian press continues to be silent regarding the Austrian protest of a border violation allegedly committed on 15 May by Hungarian workmen, accompanied by State Security police. The Hungarians reportedly cut down trees on the Austrian side of the border, in order to prevent Hungarian escapees taking shelter from machine gun fire. The Austrian note presented on 28 May asserted that the Hungarian official in charge had promised restitution.
25X1
Comment: Incidents on the Austro-Hungarian border have been 771717-common. The present occurrence, however, may prove more serious. An unconfirmed report cl 26 May stated that Hungarian educators had been told during the previous
SECRET
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weekend to de-emphasize German developments and watch the party press carefully for a "new line on Austria." This campaign has not yet materialized.
5.
Diplomatic retaliations between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria sharpen: Yugoslavia has warned Bulgaria that "if the position
67-11fliplomatic personnel in Sofia deteriorated Yugoslavia would initiate corresponding measures toward the Bulgarian diplomatic staff in Belgrade."
Comment: This warning of reprisal constitutes an answer to the latest Bulgarian note of 22 May in which Sofia protested against "the unwarranted restrictions applied against officials and employees of the Bulgarian Embassy in Belgrade" and warned that a continuation of such action would provoke corresponding measures against Yugoslav diplomatic personnel.
25X1
Should there be further reprisals, one or both of the countries concerned might possibly recall its remainiug diplomatic personnel.
25X1
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7.
Rhee able to prevent South Korean Assembly action: American Charge Lightner reports that although President Rhee backed down on his 3 June threat to dissolve the Assembly, he is achieving the same result through the maintenance of martial law, the retention of the imprisoned Assemblymen, and threats of more arrests and violence to those Assemblymen who might come out of hiding to attend Assembly meetings. The Speaker of the Assembly stated on 4 June that 11 members of the Assembly are under arrest, 20 are known to be in hiding, the 52 pro-Rhee members are under orders to boycott sessions, 83 members of the opposition are in attendance, and the whereabouts of the remaining 15 is unknown. A quorum of 92 is necessary to do business, and two thirds of the total number is ne essary to elect the President.
25X1
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Comment: A press report indicates that 93 Assemblymen were FFRUFY on 5 June, a quorum being present for the first time since 2 June. A public statement by Rhee on 4 June indicated that he is deferring dissolution of the Assembly in the hopes that the legislators can "settle the issues."
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9.
Communists may be experimenting with rocket-equipped MIG's: A UN F-5I pilot on 31 May, while observing two MIG-15's
57-Wpe-15's which were probably on a reconnaissance mission, stated that one of the enemy planes fired what appeared to be
two rockets.
Fifth Air Force comments that this is the first observation of the possible use of rockets by MIG-type aircraft in Korea, and it is possible that the Communists are experimenting with rockets on such planes for use in a ground attack role. Far East Air Force states that the Russians have the capability of mounting such rockets on MIG's and that they are fully conscious of the advantages of this type of weapon in both an air-to-air and air-to-ground role.
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Greek Parliament adjourns until October: The first regular session of the present Greek Parliament was terminated on 2 June by royal decree in accordance with the constitution. Parliament will assemble for the next regular session on 15 October unless it is convoked sooner by the King. *During the interim period, legislation will be enacted by legislative decrees issued by the King with the concurring opinion of the interim Parliamentary Legislative Committee provided for by the constitution.
Comment: Adjournment of Parliament presumably will make opposition efforts to unseat the government even more difficult and, accordingly, increase the present government's chances of staying in power.
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Russian jet buzzes British plane in Austrian air corridor: A British military training plane flying in the Austrian air corridor near Wiener Neustadt on 27 May was circIed several times by a "wing-wagging" MIG-15 which decreased 10 speed to an estimated 150 knots. No shots were fired. This is the second instance of Soviet nuisance-flying in this area of the corridor. On 16 March 1952.111G-15's fired guns near another British plane.
Comment: The earlier incident closely followed the West's rejection of a Soviet proposal to shift the authorized air corridor away from Wiener Neustadt, where Soviet air installations are subject to air observation. At that time the Soviet High Commissioner warned that the Western powers would have to suffer the consequences of this rejection.
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Comment: Soviet propaganda has paid little attention to possible US activity on Bornholm since July 1951, when concern was expressed over increased United States "interest" in the island following Danish adherence to NATO.
18.
Almost complete election returns show Velasco Ibarra ahead in Ecuador: With 312,000 of a possible 350,000 votes counted, former dictator Jose Maria Velasco Ibarra has a plurality of 36,000 over Conservative candidate Alarcon Falconi and seems almost certain to have won the Ecuadoran presidential election. The two "liberal" candidates were never in the running. Velasco was President of Ecuador twice before -- in 1934-35 and 1944-47 -- and was twice deposed by the army. Although he was once supported by liberal and leftist groups, including the Communists, he is now engaged in a bitter feud with them and draws much of his organized support from neo-fascist Guevara Moreno's Concentration of Popular Forces and from the militant right-wing National Ecuadoran Revolutionary Action. Velasco has in the past regarded the United States as the natural leader of the Western Hemisphere, but has been critical of what he considers its lack of idealism and moral leadership. During his recent years of exile in Argentina, he is believed to have acquired certain ties with the Peron regime.
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Soviet propaganda accuses US of occupying Bornholm: A recent East German broadcast stated that American forces had occupied the Danish island of Bornholm and seized fishing vessels which were cutting cable lines between East Germany and Sweden. The US naval office in Berlin suggests that this propaganda attack may be related to reported Soviet troop activities in Rostack and the island of Ruegen in East Germany.
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The possibility of an army coup is now probably somewhat weeks, and more unlikely than it has been for the past few inaugurated fair chance of being Velasco is believed to have a in September.i
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TOP SECRET THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, DSC, SECS, 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW,
FAR EAST
1.
Rhee threatens mass demonstrations in Pusan: American Charge Lightner reports that at the Cabinet meeting on 3 June, President Rhee stated "thousands, perhaps millions" of people are streaming towards Pusan to demand dissolution of the National Assembly. Adding that there would be terrible disorders in "two or three days" and Assemblymen's lives would not be worth much, the President directed Home Minister Li Bum-suk not to prevent the flow of these people into Pusan.
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Comment: Strong police action was required on 19 and 23 MariEgE-Rhee supporters staged demonstrations before the National Assembly and threatened Assemblymen.
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Comment: The Turkish Foreign Minister has previously criticized the French and British reluctance to promote unity among the Arab States.
Recent Turkish governments have desired a stable Arab world, which would simplify Turkish defense problems, but they have consistently been sceptical of the possibilities of Arab unity.
The Foreign Minister's statement is presumably intended to encourage the United States to participate more actively in the Near East.
Turkish Forei n Minister favors Arab unit : French and Britis esire o ma n a n spec a n uence n the Near East has caused them to oppose unification among the Arab States, the Turkish Foreign Minister told Ambassador McGhee on 29 May. Citing this as one of his complaints against French and British policy, the Foreign Minister said that he believed Arab unity was desirable. He added that his government repudiated the policy of previous Turkish governments which kept the Arab world divided by playing one against the other.
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Iranian financial situation is critical: Acting Governor Nasser of the Iranian National Bank has told an American Embassy official that the government has sufficient funds to pay its employees for May but rat he did not know what the government could do for June.
Comment: Nasser's earlier refusal to lend the government funds to help it meet its financial obligations has so infuriated the Prime Minister that he is reportedly determined The fact that Mossadeq is considering such to remove Nasser. a move, which would have serious political consequences for him, highlights the serious financial situation of the government.
60
Greek Opposition leader discusses political situation: In a 29 May conversation with the American Ambassador, Greek Opposition leader Papagos criticized the King's excessive use of Navy transportation as evidence of the Monarch's lack of understanding of Greece's deplorable financial and political situation. Papagos also stated that Social-Democrat leader Papandreou, now definitely but secretly associated with the Greek Rally, planned to write an open letter to the King calling attention to the country's ills and urging new If this failed, the Rally would try to wean deelections. puties away from the government coalition, although Papagos insisted that he would not accept an deputies who had been bribed to accord him their support.
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Comment: Marshal Papagos has previously criticized the King Faintialy for his interference in military affairs. His remarks, which would appear to reflect his growing frustration at the Rally's inability to unseat the EPEKLiberal coalition, may accordingly foreshadow a more determined opposition attack upon the government for its lack of constructive action in economic matters.
It is unlikely that a letter such as that described by Papagos would have a decisive effect upon the King. The maneuver would appear typical of the Rally's failure to take full advantage of its political opportunities. TOP SECRET
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C h i n e s e Communists Communists desire desire details d e t a i l s on on UN UN tank t a n k tactics: tactics: An Chinese unidentIfied u n i d e n t i f ie d Chinese C h i n e s e Communist Communist unit, u n i t , presUmably pi%sun&bly an an element e l e m e n t of of 7 t h Artillery Artillery D i v i s i o n , on 30 30 May-passed 8 request r e q u e s t from frsm the 7th Division, May passed on a bivision h i v i s i o n headquarters h e a d q u a r t e r s for for a 8 report r e p o r t on on UN UN tank t a n k tactics'. t a c t i c s . The The r e p o r t , which is i s to t o be based on a month's month's experience, e x p e r i e n c e , is to to report, i n c l u d e details d e t a i l s on on the t h e total t o t a l number number of of tanks t a n k s available, available, include u t i l i z a t i o n on the utilization t h e defense, d e f e n s e , infantry i n f a n t r y support s u p p o r t tacticS, t a c t i c s , and the the p percentage e r c e n t a g e of of hits h i t s registered. registered. It is also a l s o to coyer c o v e r UN u s e of anti7tank a n t i 7 t a n k equipment equipment and and mines. mines. (SUEDE use (SUEDE 501st Corn Comm Recon Grp Grp KOrea, Kbrea, E-3461, K-3461, 2 2 June J u n e 52) 52)
Comment: The reason r e a s o n underlying u n d e r l y i n g the t h e request r e q u e s t for inforComment: mation m a t i o n is is not n o t apparent. a p p a r e n t . It may be speculated s p e c u l a t e d that t h a t the the Communists tanks.in Communists plan p l a n the the eventual e v e n t u a l use use of # t a n k s in this this area mea and wish to t o acquire acquire a a working knowledge knowledge of of UN tank t a n k tactics. tactics.
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"Anti-plague" team noted n o t e d in front f r o n t line line C h i n e s e Communist "Anti-plague" Chinese 2 7 t h Chinese Chin e s e Communist Communist Artillery A r t i l l e r y Regiment headquarters headquarters Th0 27th The itsforward f o r w a r d command command post gost on on 22 June J u n e to to check c h e c k on on how how much much iWga its t h e needed needed medical m e d i c a l supplies s u p p l i e s had had been been received r e c e i v e d and and to to report report of the o n "how the lohe anti-plague a n t i - p l a g u e soldiers s o l d i e r s sent s e n t to to the t h e front f r o n t are are performBerformon i n g their t h e i r duties." d u t i e s . " Headquarters H e a d q u a r t e r s then t h e n stated s t a t e d that, t h a t , as a6 it i t had had to to ing r e l a y information i n f o r m a t i o n to t o the t h e army army anti-plague a n t i - p l a g u e office, o f f i c e , the the forward forward relay u n i t should s h o u l d report r e p o r t the t h e plague p l a g u e situation s i t u a t i o n "once "once daily d a i l y or o r once once unit G r p Korea, Korea, e v e r y two two or o r three t h r e e days." days." (SUEDE every (SUEDE 501st 501st Comm Comm Recon Recon Grp 4 June J u n e 52) 52) K-3538, 4 unit: unit: Comment: Recent Recent intercepts i n t e r c e p t s have have revealed r e v e a l e d the t h e existence existence of l a g u e and and cholera c h o l e r a among among Communist Communist troops t r o o p s and and civilians c i v i l i a n s in in of p plague t h e rear r e a r areas areas of of western w e s t e r n Korea. Korea. The r e s e n c e of anti-plague the The p presence of anti-plague teams in i n this t h i s regiment, r e g i m e n t , now now on on the t h e west west centrtil c e n t r a l front, f r o n t , is is teams p r o b a b l y a precautionary p r e c a u t i o n a r y measure measure to t o prevent p r e v e n t the the spreading s p r e a d i n g of probab1y t h e s e diseases. d i s e a s e s . The above above message also p o i n t s up up the t h e increasing increasing these message also points importance b e i n g attached a t t a c h e d to t o the t h e health h e a l t h problem by the enemy. enemy. importance being problem by
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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1. 2.
Soviet Union plans appointment of new ambassadors (page 3). Soviet feeler regarding terms for Korean armistice (page 4).
FAR EAST
Appointment of new Vietnamese premier stuns Tonkinese (page 4).

EASTERN EUROPE
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7. 8.

4.
Ambassador Kennan comments on Rumanian situation (page 5).

WESTERN EUROPE
5,
Italy prepares to resume direct discussions with Yugoslavia over Trieste (page 5).
LA TIN AMERICA
6,
Argentine exile brerlirts iunn rtavnit arrnincf Dnant. Innn. n

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GENERAL
1.
Soviet Union plans appointment of new ambassadors:
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Ambassador Kennan reports from Moscow that he was told by the British Ambassador thatthe Soviet Union has indicated its desire to appoint Andrei Gromyko as Ambassador to Great Britain.
The proposed appointment of these two top foreign service officials to London and Washington may be an indication that the USSR does not anticipate an imminent conflict with the West. The Kremlin may also expect a period of deepening international crisis during which its representatives in London and Washington must be equipped to speak with authority and be capable of accurate analysis of Western intentions.
Gromyko is a specialist in Western affairs, having been Counselor in the Soviet Embassy in Washington from1939 to 1943 and later Ambassador to the United States. He participated actively in the Dumbarton Oaks, Yalta, and Potsdam conferences and was chief Soviet delegate to the UN Security Council from 1946 to 1948. Since that time he has been First Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR. Zarubin's primary experience in Western affairs contrasts with that of Panyushkin, the present Ambassador to the United States, who is a Far Eastern specialist. Zarubin who has been in London since 1946, headed the Soviet diplomatic mission to Ottawa at the time of the Canadian spy case and was chief of the A merican division of the Soviet Foreign Office. He has frequently been a delegate to Council of Foreign Ministers' meetings and to the UN.

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Comment: Previously the USSR had requested the United States tc-7...aTel'f) Georgi Zarubin as Ambassador. to Washington.
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2.
Soviet feeler regarding terms for Korean armistice:
In a conversation with an Israeli delegate at the United Nations, Assistant Secretary General Zinchenko, a Russian national, took the 25X1A initiative in suggesting a new formula for the Zinchenko asked for an opinion on Korean armistice negotiations. the possibility of initialing an armistice agreement on the basis of issues already settled, with the understanding that the agreement would become effective upon settlement of the POW issue.
The Israeli delegate commented that Zinchenko was probably "not freewheeling" and suggestedlhat the Russians were sounding out sentiment on bringing up pending issues such as Korea during the USSR's presidency of the Security Council in June.
Comment: The USSR's first initiative on a Korean settlement occurred in the Malik conversation with the Israeli delegate in March, 1951. Such approaches appear intended both to convey information and gain an impression as to how firmly UN members support the US stand in Korea.
3.
Appointment of new Vietnamese premier stuns Tonkinese:
An official of the Tonkin government told the American Consul in Hanoi that news of the 25X1A appointment of Nguyen Van Tam to the premiership has been received with "stunned incredulity," and predicted that Tam will last only a few months, since he is entirely without Vietnamese backing. The same official interprets Tam's appointment as a final desperate bid for power by the French, who, he said, induced Bao Dai to name Tam by assuring Bao Dai a large personal income.

FAR EAST
Zinchenko opened the discussion with a reference to a conversation of a year ago between Malik and the Israeli delegate in which the latter expressed the view that settlement of the German question would be difficult as long as the Korean war continued.
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Security and later as Actbiitaisnor of Tonkin for a period of five
Comment:
Tam was active as Minister of
months prior to March 1952. His repressive police methods and his liquidation of the popular nationalistic Dai Viet Party, the principal rival of the pro-French ruling faction which Tam represents, earned him the enmity of the Tonkinese. The incumbent governor of Tonkin is reported to have tendered his resignation on learning of the Tam appointment, but was ordered by Bao Dai to remain on duty.
EASTERN EUROPE
Ambassador Kerman comments on Rumanian situation:

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The Ambassador does not feel that integration is imminent, but he suggests the possibility that the present purges and reform of the judicial system may be partly intended to
lead the way.
Comment: Although the timing of the Rumanian purges appears to connect them with the East-West struggle in Europe rather than with purely internal causes, a power struggle within the party hierarchy is the major factor.
5.
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Italy prepares to resume direct discussions with Yugoslavia over Trieste:

Italy will propose that direct discussions with Yugoslavia on Trieste be held in London, according to the Secretary of the Italian Foreign
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WESTERN EUROPE
The American Ambassador in Moscow suggests that the recent changes in Rumania may be part of a new phase in Soviet foreign policy. He speculates that as a result of the present German cr sis, the USSR may exploit puppet Satellite forces more boldly to heighten international tension and that, as part of this move, the Russians are taking further steps toward including Rumania in the USSR.
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Ministry. Appropriate instructions are being sent to the Italian Ambassadors in Washington, London, and Paris. The Italian official pointed out that Italy has not yet replied to the most recent Yugoslav proposal.
The Italians favor London as the conference site because they now believe that Britain will assume a sympathetic attitude toward Italy.
Comment:
6.

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Foreign Secretary Eden agreed with Secretary Acheson on 27 May that Britain and the United States should consider "imposing" a Trieste settlement on Italy and Yugoslavia.
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LA TIN AMERICA
7. Argentine exile predicts June revolt against Peron:
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A June revolt against the Argentine Government, starting with Peron's assassination, has been predicted by an exiled high-ranking naval officer. He states that the future government will be a three-man military junta.
Numerous reports have been received of an impending revolutionary attempt, but none has indicated how the unidentified plotters would be able to circumvent Peron's rigorous security measures. The armed services have been purged of officers of doubtful loyalty, and there is no evidence of cooperation among civilian opposition groups.
Comment:
Peron has frequently urged die powerful labor confederation, reportedly armed, to be ready to rise apinst those who might attempt a revolution.
B.
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The exiled officer is confident that even a weak revolt could oust Peron in view of the present economic crisis and the government's inadequate control over the interiors He considers the military capabilities of the General Confederation of Labor "highly overrated," and states that the army has some hidden arms.
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1. order MIG's to concentrate on on UN UNground-attack round-attack planes: 1 . Communists order MIG's to planes:
\
2. lacement of necessaryto topreserve reserve democratic 2. Re Replacement of Rhee Rhee considered conaidered necessary democratic processes:
American Charge Lightner believes that any any solution of of the political dispute in in South South Korea Korea which leaves leaves President President Rhee i n power power would would which Rhee in represent represent aacapitulation capitulationby by the the Assembly from which never recover. recover. He points out which it would would never He points outthat thatRhee Rheewould would continue continue away at the opposition by by continuing continuingarrests, arrests, with with his hisown own to whittle away Hence, any compromise which supporters into the the vacancies. vacancies, Hence, which supportersstepping stepping into allows Rhee to keep keep h his office wouldp would, i in Lightner's opinion, i s office n Lightner's opinion, be as as fatal to democratic processes processes as asRhee's Rhee's plan planto a0dissolve dissolve the the Assembly Assembly new elections. election& and call for new
Several times during the latter part partof of May, May, MIG-15 pilots were were instructed instructed over the MIG-15 pilots Russian ground-controlled intercept net in in Manchuria and Korea to concentrate concentrate on on UN UN 114., % , /Ho Io ground-attack consider the F-86 only as ground-atta planes and lto o consider F-80 Sabres Sabrasody a s secondary secondary In addition, addition, outstations targets. targets. In outstations on the Russian net have been repeatedly for information Mormationon onUN UN ground-attack groundattack planes. asked for US US A Air i r Force 6 Iune June 52 62 SUEDE SUEDE
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Air The A i r Force believes believes that that this this development may reflect reflect the of lines by groundof UN UN attacks on on supply Lines the effectiveness effectiveness attack planes. planep.
who has The Prime Prime Minister, The Minister, who has recently recently appeared sympathetic appeated sympatheticto tothe theAssembly Assembly opposition, opposition, advised advised Lightner Ltghtner 4 June that without American or or UN UNassurances assurances of of support for on 4 without American constitutional government the Assembly opposition might as government Assembly as well well capitulate capitulate now nowaas s later. later.
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Communists orqe's NIGgs.itykOcincentrate PIC% Communists or4er CQncentrate on on-UN UN groundgrOund-
Mato mior15 pilots were inStruated over the Russian ground7
controlled interCeit and Korea tot o 'concen-. controlled i a t e r c e h t net n e t in inManChuria Handhutia and Korea concern= trate'on UN UN groundi-attack groundAattack planear o consider h e F-86 Irate:OA planes and and t to consider t the F-86 Sabrelt only only-as secOndary target): targetio In a addition, Sab.xes as sechqdarg d d i t i o n , Outstationsoutstations om on th, the Russian Russian net:have set have been been retiStiedly rebaatedly asked asked for for information on UN VNLground.6attac* planes, qn grouhd-at tac$ planes
1
The A i r Force beJAeves tthat-tis.development h a t this dgvelagment may Air-Forde;believeS may rereflectthe lines by f l e c t ' t h e effectiVaness e f f e c t l v b n e p of of UN UN attacks attacks on supply l i n e s by groun4.4ttack jUne -519 grouadl;.attrck planes. planes, ASUEDE-USAF"Moundup-NO,'110', (SUEDE- USAF Rounaup T o , l l O #8 8 June 'a
6. 6.
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Cqmment: Recent messages have indicated that that regiments regiments Comment: of thrinaRocket DIvision, kwhich t h g m o k e Launcher t Uuhcher DZvlsion, bhdch had had been been attached attacbed to t o various Ckinese Chinese artIllery a r t l l e r y divisions, divitidoqs, were were moving. moving. The size mentioned in alee of the the installati installati ns men.tioned An this t h i s message suggests suggests that t h a t the the originating originating element e ~ m e n ilas t a h a ecOmpleted mov0 and and is is cchmpleted its I t a move no* constructing and supply-ktorage. now c o n s t r u c t i n g sites s i t e a for for ammunitiOn anmunititbaa and supp1y'"storage. . .
7, 7.
North Korean Korean u n i t haa difficulty d i f f i c u l t y mobilizing required unit.haw mObiliting-required u q l d w a t i f i ed North K orean miH%ary n i t on e sonneJt An An.unidentified-Narth Korean military u unit EPTSOnne1: 3 June informed nformed its its Subordinate subordinate element elemeht that t h a t "I **Itold t o l d you YOU l 4 you msbilise 86 to di4.you mobilize only only80 t o mobilize mobilize 280 280 Parsons.. per80ns. Why d . person^?^^ peraohar! The addressee addresseewas was ordered ordered to t o report r e p o r t the t h e reason' reason fOr for the.disbrepandy t h e disorepancy and and to.mobilize.another t o mobiPlee another 100 100 persons. persqas, (SUEDE (SUgDE ROK Int I n t Group Group M M OK-K-58, SK=K=-68, 5,June 5 Jumb 52) 52)
!i-kirr

f
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Chi,nese Communist Comyunlst rocket rocket laun4lier lsrpnQ@er u n i t digging digging in: In: A Chinese unit message vassecttStween units 21st Ch Chinese Commesgagespassed between two u n i t s on the 3let '"inese Comlnunlst Rocket Launche* M u che) Diviaton PJUne rrtated t h a t the munist Division net on 1JUne stated that engineers had aom$letgd comOletSd '*two "two of the the work work projectsqt projects" which which ungsnesrs are a r e "six " a l x meters deepp.two deep, ,two meters meters high," high," The digging digging apparentapparently' continued n night l y continued i g h t and day, day, (SUEDE 5 Olst C a m Recon Recon Grp Grp 501st COmm Korea, K-3525, K-3535, 4 4 June Juae 52) 52)
I .
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8.
Comment: Although it cannot be determined detemiasd whether whether to be be used used in in a a military l t l i l i t a r y or or the Conscripted Carariited persons persons are are to civilian points the shortc i v i l i a n capacity, c a p a c i t y , the t h e message p o i n t e up t h e labor ehortage that that is I s known known to t o exist e x i s t in in North North Korea, Korea,
a.
Chinese reveals aontinued continued forward Chinese CommUnistl,msOsate Comvalgt fpptwbage.reveals, displacement atti14ry t: An Chinese A n uniidentitied ua'ideritlfi etd, alnese displaaement of a*tlll+ rjr un unit:
9 JUne June 52 52
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COmmunist artillery unit0 probably subordinate to the 21st Rocket-Ltundher DiVision, reported that "we have already arrived at Chaktaedong." The message then stated that the unit would continue moving forward. ($11E10E 501st Comm Recon
Grp, K-35810 5 June .52)
Comments Intercepts-in late May indicated that elements of the Zierilocket LaUncher Division were probably moving toward the front line. This message tends to confirm that indication as the above'unit has arrived e.t.a ObSition in the immediate tear, behind the-63rd and-64th ArMies.
90
unit at %'his Soiiet Soviet jet j e t anit at Mukden Mukdsn was first f i r s t noted Comment: Conmenat: this ._____ in mesaages messages in in early kerlg May. May, Thebe These arb are its first observed flights Pilots i l o t s of this unit may may be' be fakiliarizing iamfliariaing flights over over Ko*ea. Kax+sao P themselves with border preoarktdry preparitOry to a themselves w i t h the tkm Manchuria-Korea Yanehuria-Kgrsa bord@r e a base nearer u Korea regular combat issignment sksaignlaent from 9 r e a than tdaa Muhden, 125 Mukdem, 125 miles ~lllleslaway. away,
Soviet MIG 15's continue,to fl from Mukde over Korea: A Chinese moose e sc,e.ule. ov e p rom 'u en over northwest rea on 4 June. The flight leader had a Russian name, Similar flights were noted on 41 May and 1 (SUEDE USAF Roundup No 109, 5 June 52) Juneo
0 0
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1. 1.
C h i n e s e Communist tactical t a c t i c a l unit u n i t disturbed d i s t u r b e d at UN's Chinese.Communist UN'S Panmunjom walkout: Panmunljom walkout: A n' unidentified u n i d e n t i f i e d Chi liese Communist tactttactiAn ChineseCommunist c a l Unit, u n i t , probably an a n element e l e m e n t of the t h e 21st 2 1 s t Rocket Launcher cal D i v i s i o n , ssent ent a une t h a t "Today a t the the Division,' a message message on on 7 7 J June that "Today at waa bad. bad. They They Pahmunjom n e g o t i a t i o n s , the t h e enemys enemyQsattitude a t t i t u d e was Panmunjom negotiations, a t t a c k i n g us. us. , .Make .Make p reparav e r y much have the t h e intention i n t e n t i o n of attacking very preparaa t the t h e front f r o n t and also continuo0ply continuously r e p o r t th th tuation t i o n s at tions report tuation at t he f r o n $ . " (80.nE (8SOlst Comm Corn Recon Recon Grp Grp Koreac ICorea,n-1388, at the front." 301st 9 June 352) June52) 2 1 s t Rocket.Launcher Rocket Launcher Regiment is ]he not n o t known Comment: The 21st I t is is p o s s i b l e that that t o have units u n i t s , located l o c a t e d near n e a r Panmunjom. Panmunjom. It to possible t h e Communist!AcOmmand Communist, ommand in in Korea Korea interpreted h t e r p m t e d.the the 7 7 June June three.three& the recess declaration dec a r a t i o n of the t h e UN negotiators n e g o t i a t o r s as an a n ultimatum day recess a n d , acting a c t i n g accordingly, a c c o r d i n g l y , alerted a l e r t e d their t h e i r front f r o n t line l i n e troops t r o o p s for for and, o s s i b l e offensive. offensive. a p possible
The seriousness seriousness with w i t h which the t h e Communists view t h e UN view the I s further f u r t h e r evidenced evidenced by by the the 9 9 June June open open letter letter to to walkout is walkout General l a r k from Kim II-sung Ill!-s.ullag and Peng Tsh-huai Eaccushg the the General C Clark Teh-huai accusing Ull of of "unilatexal.breaking "unilatelcrrit b r e a k i n g off o f f of the t h e conference," The The UN your side.still side s t i l l has 4as Communist l e a d w f f ' m e s s a g surges u r g e s that."if t h a t "if your Communist leadeWmessage s i n c e r i t y for f o r the t h e armistice armistice negotiations n e g o t i a t i o n s you you should s h o u l d order order sincerity your delegates d e l e g a t e s to t o return r e t u r n to t o Panmunjom. PamunJom. tt your
-
2. 2.
R e c e n t l y relieved.Chinese r e l i e v e d Chinese artiAlery a s t i , l l s r y d division d i v i s k o n may be Recently u n i d e n t i f i e d Ch i n e s e Comtuntst Commlnrfst An unidentified thinese ar i 1 e r y division, d i v i s i o n , probably, p r o b a b l y tthe h e and, une s t a t e d in in artillery 2nd, on on 6 6 J June stated e i s a g e that,"the t h a t . ' v t h e '29th r e g i m e n t * ? switch-board a s already already a X message 29th regiment's switch-board h has division. Can communicate c o m u n i c a t e from from tonight tonight b e e n connected c o n n e c t e d with w i t h division. been w i t h the t h e 38th.Army. 9 8 t h Army. vv with ." a t t a c h e d to t o Igth 3 8 t hArmy::' Army,:' attached
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Another message of 6 June from a an element of of t this Another n element h i s same artilleri.division "the soldiers at the 28th a r t i l l e r y d i v i s i o n noted that that " the s o l d i e r s are a t t he 2 8th Regiment's post which is in around IMng-NamKdng-NamR e g i m e n t ' s command post In the t h e area around Jwa,ri," n near supply route Jwa-ri," e a r Yangdok on the t h e transpeninsular transpeninsular s upply r oute. K-3633 and.K-3635.,8 and I(-3635.,8 June June 52) 52) (sOwn 501st.Comm (SqPDE 5 0 1 s t C o r nRecon ReconGrp GrpKorea, Korea, K-3633
Comment: Chineee Communist Comnaunist Artillery A r t i l l e r y Division; Division; Comment: The 2nd Chinese relieved r e l i e v e d from:combat from combat in in western w e s t e r n Korea in late late April, has not It is p possible been located since since then. t h e n . It o s 6 l b l e that elements of this this division d i v i s i o n may now now be attached a t t a c h e d to t o the the 38th 3 8 t h Army. Army.
have placed 8 t h Chinese placed the 3 38th Communist Army Comm!mist A r m y in in west west- central ILmea orea in immediate combat reserve from an area near r e s e r v e following following a a move move southward.' southwards' from near Pyongyang.
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SUMMARY
FAR EAST
1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
Japan informally requests American "political" loan (page 3). Little sentiment for Rhee in Korean provinces (page 3). Economic depression in China reported (page 4). Chiang Kai-shek plans increased control over military forces
French report incr eased Kuomintang activities in Southeast Asia (page 5).
SOUTH ASIA
6.
7. 8.
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WESTERN EUROPE
Comment on Ceylonese rubber shipments to Orbit (page 6).
West Germans want increase in armored strength of border police (page 7). Comment on reaction to insulation of East Germany (page 8).
(page 5).
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FAR EAST
1.
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Japan informally requests American "political" loan: The Japanese Government has approached Ambassador Murphy informally to request his support of a 100 to 200 million dollar line of credit by the United States.
Finance Minister Ikeda, while reiterating Japan's need for fresh capital, told the ambassador that it is politically necessary for the Yoshida government to have this support from the United States prior to the general elections expected in October. He stated that the amount of the loan was not as important as the mark of confidence which it would constitute in the present regime in Japan. Yoshida's government expects the election campaign on aspects of to be attacked vigorously during particularly the Administrative its relations with the 'United States, It undoubtedly believes that Agreement and the China trade policy. cooperation is economic a practical demonstration of US-Japanese essential to counter, this criticism. Direct American aid to Japan ceased in June 1951.
Comment:
2.
Little sentiment for 'thee in Korean provinces:
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A merican officials, reporting on political developments from South Korean provincial centers, generally confirm that Rhee has little genuine popular support in his campaign against e ssem y. They add that petitions and demonstrations are attributable primarily to oppressive tactics by the official and quasi-official organs subordinate to the President.
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Comment: Rhee has publicly proclaimed that his over-all campaign against the National Assembly reflects the "will of the people." Only recently the "Communist plot" theme was introduced to justify his dictatorial actions of late May and early June.
3.
Economic depression in China reported:
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A source from Tientsin reports thateconomic deterioration there is "indescribable." Half the personnel in government trade organs, he asserts, have been purged, and the remainder are fearful of assuming responsibility.
Another report from a former resident of a town in East China states that business there has been at a standstill for weeks and that the number of beggars is greater now than in Nationalist times.
Comment: Economic initiative among private businessmen and officials of government economic organizations has been paralyzed by Peiping's campaign against the bourgeoisie. Peiping's current propaganda, acknowledging the "temporary difficulties now encountered in production and business," declares, however, that this campaign is "basically concluded" and states that the regime will grant loans and orders to business enterprises. It is too soon to assess the effectiveness of these new efforts to restore commercial confidence.

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Eye-witness accounts from several recent arrivals in Hong Kong give a picture of economic depression on mainland China which contradicts Communist claims that the economy has recovered from the effects of the anti-bourgeois campaign.
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4.
Chiang Kai-shek plans increased control over military forces:

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!Chiang Kai- shek plans a reorganization of the military
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forces to increase his control and that of his elder son, Chiang Ching-kuo. During the past sik wee s over 00 officers have been processed for retirement, effective in July, and hundreds of promotions are being prepared. Opponents of Chiang like General Sun Li-len will be deprived of their trusted subordinates.
I
to Chiang Kai-shek exists anThing ationalist leaders, his elder son is disliked by Kuomintang members.
The reorganization of the Nationalist Army, suggested by the US Military Advisory Group, will necessitate some officer transfers. The Generalissimo apparently plans to use this opportunity to retire those officers who oppose him and his son.
5.
French report increasedKuomintang activities in Southeast Asia:

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its propagandists an tempting to regain control of Chinese schools, , unions, and businesses.

Comment:
Chiang has also proposed to reorganize the ground forces into separate area commands, responsible directly to him rather than to the chief of the ground forces.
Although no effective opposition
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These activities seem to be centered in' lin addition to the interBangkok and Saigon. aobut reactions both in nal dangers they may cause, they will bring
J
Indochina and Communist China.

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For some titne the Nationalists have tried to obtain permission to use Indochina as a basefor intelligence and guerrilla activities against the China mainland, but the French have consistently rejected this proposal.
6. Comment on Ceylonese rubber shipments to Orbit:

CeY ion will apparently continue to sell rubber to the Orbit, despite the Prime Minister's announcement of 1 lune
that the government's export policy is being reconsidered.
The Prime Minister personally favors halting rubber shipments to China, and the government, as a result of the recent parliamentary elections, is strong enough for the first time to embargo such shipments without fear of being overthrown. Current

SOUTH
SIA
Reports of Chinese Conimunist terrorism and experience with the extortion campaign have turned many of the ten million Chinese in Southeast Asia against the Peiping regime. The Nationalists have attempted to capitalize on Communist policy and to win back the overseas Chinese, because they are important as a source of financial support and of increased Nationalist prestige with foreign governments.
Comment:
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Ceylonese queries regarding an American rubber contract like that offered them in.1051, whereby the United States guaranteed to purchase a fiked amount, suggest, however, that only a quid pro 'quo of this sort would produce a reversal of the present policy of selling to all customers. Otherwise, the Ceylonese Government would hesitate to raise the controversial embargo issue.
Unlike last year, however, the United States no longer has either the administrative machinery or the funds immediately available to purchase rubber, and this mar become a major factor delaying a Ceylonese embargo.
Meanwhile, the USSR and itsSatellites are in a position to capitalize on any anti-American feeling which may arise in. Ceylon as a result of disagreement on rubber policy. Soviet propaganda is already suggesting that the USSR is in.a better position to supply. South Asia with.consumer goods than is the West. The USSR has entered the Ceylonese rubber market for the first time since 1046, and more Communist shipping is becoming available to transport rubber to China.
7.
West Germans want increase in armored strength of border police:

The West German Minister of Interior, Robert Lehr, has asked United States authorities to permit him to equip the border police with a second group of 70 armored vehicles in view of growing poliAmerican-ma e tical tension and "danger to the east zdaal-berder-areaP
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HICOG officials note that if a strong paramilitary force is permitted to develop, the Bonn government may not be able to reduce it after the German EDC contingents are raised. They admit, however, that Lehr's request is justifiable because of the signs that the Russians and German Communists are determined to foment further trouble.

WESTERN EUROPE
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They further point out that the Federal Republic still has no substantial force other than the border police to quell large-scale civil disturbances and to cope with possible East German "police" actions along the interzonal border.
Lehr has also recently renewed of the cabinet and parliament for doubling his efforts to secure approval the size of the 10,000-man border police.
Comment:
Unconfirmed reports state that open resistance to the intensive military recruiting campaign is being encountered. Students at the Russian-sponsored Michurin Institute reportedly refused to volunteer, and an overwhelming majority of the administrative employees of the consumers' cooperative voiced open opposition when called upon to approve a national army.
Popular opposition to the anti-unification measures of "sealing" the border and forming a :national army may make it difficult for the Communist regime to implement its plans to isolate East Germany. The increasing flow of refugees, the postponement of "People's Po lice Day," the failure formally to proclaim a national army, and the decline in propaganda on border security suggest such difficulties.

-825X1A
The adoption of measures to insulate the Soviet Zone caused a sharp rise in the flight of refugees westward into the Federal Republic, but the flow was cut down by 8 June by reinforcements of Soviet troop patrols and People's Police. The daily average of 190 refugees as of 27 May had risen to 2,000 on 6 June. A large proportion of the refugees are men between 18 and 22 who seek to escape military service.
Comment on reaction to insulatioo of East Germany:
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Chinese artillery a r t i l l e r y division d i v i s i o n meets meets two twomonths' months' supply suppty goal: goal: The 7th The supply supply element element of of the th e b Chinese C h i nese Communist Communist Artillery ArtillerY D i v i s i o n in in east-central e a s t - c e n t r a l Korea Korea informed informed the t h e supply Division _ _ - elements of subordinate s u b o r d i n a t e artillery a r t i l l e r y regiments regiments on on 7 7 June June that."since t h a t "since our our of has exceeded d i v i s i o n has division exceeded Volunteer Volunteer Army Army Rear's. Rear's. nIIotment, .basic allotment, t h e detachment will, w i l l , therefore, t h e r e f o r e , stop 8to.p issuing. issuing. ,We w i l l inform inform the .We will c a n be resumed." resumed." (SUEDE 501st SOlst ComM CORUIIRecon you when shipments can (SUEDE Re6on K-3667, 9 9 June June 52) 52) Grp Korea, Korea, K-3667,
. .
Comment: In I n late l a t e May the t h e 7th 7 t h Chinese.Communist Chinese Communist Artillery Artillery Division and ynd other o t h e r enemy enemy units u n i t s Were ware ordered ordered tosietockpile tol%tockpiTe a I months level l e v e l of of fuel, f u e l , ammunition ammunition and and rations r a t i o n s by by 15 15 July. July. two monthd This T h i s supply effort e f f o r t may have been a preparation g r e p a r a t i o n for f o r f/dods PToods due t o t h e summer r a i n s , as suggested in in e arlier m e ~ s a g e g ,r ather to the rains, earlier messagep, rather in p reparation f or o ffensive t h a n any s i g n i f k c a n t increase in than significant preparation for Offensive operations. operations.
5. 5.
COmmunist Communist armor arnor continues c o n t i n u e s to t o arrive anrive in io western Korea Korea: A n unidentified:North u n i d e n t i f i e d North Korean Korean unit', unit, D r o b a b h an element of the the An pro6ably IIV V Corde h a t "16 selfCory* in western western Korea, Korea, reported-'on reported on 5 Jbne June t that "16 ( (selfa t Sukchon and 26 v ehicles w ill p r o p e l l e d guns?) guns?) were unloaded at propelled vehicles will g e t to;Sukchon t o Sukchon on on the t h e night n i g h t of of June June 5." 5-l' get

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June, another message,:pOssiblsent On 7 J une, a n o t h e r message, possj: s e n t by by the t h e same same unit, "the 16 16jtanksn u n i t , rrePorted e p o r t e d tthat h a t Itthe (tanks?) that t h a t were were at a t Opa-kul Opa-kul .in the morning-0:7. were. ,.nnloaded. unloaded. e . in t h e mornihg of 7 JUne. June. , e1 (SUEDE 1$th Det (SUEDE l d t h RSM D et 1 1 Korea 154SM/13982; 15RSM/13982, 6 6 June; J u n e ; ROK ROK Int Int Grp M, M, Korea Korea R Retranslation ofSKSK*40907.i8 Grp e t r a n s l a t i o n of 10907, 8 June J u n e 52) 52)
.
.
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Commtent: messageslrefer.to Commnt: Possibly both both m e s s es r e f e r t o the t h e same same shipmeht or of armor, armor, 'either e i t h e r tanks tanks or or self-propelled s e l f - p r o p e l l e d guris. guns. arrivals not a a significant s i g n i f i c a n t amount amountof ofarmor., armor, theses these a rrivals While not indicate the continued of heavy heaVy, equipment equiPment i into North i ndicate t he c o n t i n u e d flow of n t o North Korea. '
6. 6 .
Comment: Reports of jump training,An tra Manchuria have been infrequent. i n f ~ e q u e n t . Most of the t h e paratrooPer p a r a t r o o p e r training t r a i n i n g noted in in Chinese Message's has been been at Kalfebg,...ln'the CentralSouth messages has a t Kaifesg, i n t h e Ce ntral-South District.' Chinese a airborneunits.have D i s t r i c t . Although no Chinese i r b o r n e , u n i t s . h a v e been been identified soldiers i d e n t i f i e d or or are are known knownto t oexiet,'.ep*e e x i s t , ' s o m e 2-5,000 25,000 s o l d i e r s are are b believed elieved , to t o have have received r e c e i v e d some some paratrOo:per paratrooper t training. raining,
~~

~-
Paratrooper P a r a t r o o p e r training t r a i n i n g in.MinChuria. in Manchuria: ',11.-.12-transbort IL-12 t r a n s f i o r t w a sto t ofly f l yoh on9 9June J unefrom.Changchun. from Changchun to to U a r b i n , in in n u m b e0 mwas number Harbin, a n c h u r i a , "to i g t o assist'parachute assist p a r a c h u t e jumping." jumping." The field field central Manchuria, reportin u n i t comments that t h a t this,aircraft t h i s a i r c r a f t bas unit has been been used used for jump trapiing n i n g at a t several R e v e r a l locations:in:China. l o c a t i o n s in China. It was last last noted ari1iving i v i n gat. a t Changchun. Changchrxnon on24,11ay.. 24 Yay. (SUEDE ecurity (SUEDE 6920 S Security Group Johnson Jotinson AB AB Japan, J a p a n , AP-167, AP-167,9. 9 JUne'52)
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ONI, DIA, DOS and USAF
review(s) completed.
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SECRET NATIONAL THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION ArFECTING THEOF THE STATES WITHIN THE MEANING DEFENSE OF THE UNITED ESPIONAGEIJAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS, 793 AND 794, THE TO AN TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
GENERAL
East matters urged by NATO consultation on Middle Netherlands permanent repreNetheitinds representative: The be full NATO dissentative believes that there should now and a the Near East and Mediterranean cussion of problems in While East Command. in the Middle report on developments United recognizing the primary interest of Britain and the that this area States in the command problem, he pointed out Council had assumed added importance for the North Atlantic NATO and that since the admission of Greece and Turkey to uninterested. nther NATO powers were by no means
1.
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Comment: This bid for more NATO discussion of matters of complaint about common concern follows closely on the Norwegian replies to the Soviet notes on lkck of discussion of Western of the the chronic displeasure It further exemplifies Germany. to smaller NATO countries with the failure of the big powers consult them. Middle East Command plans are seheduled to be discussed first among the US, Britain, France, Turkey and the interested dominions.
2.
SOVIET UNION
Ambassador Kennan comments on TASS denial of Stalin interLE-a&Menting on the 7 June MSS view on Oder-Neisse denial of a Stalin interview implying that the Polish-German Germany," frontier was a subject for negotiation with a "neutral of a from Moscow that the device Ambassador Kerman observel denial is a time-honored Soviet practice. Such denials appear
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SECRET
to be issued by the USSR when the Kremlin wishes to evade formal responsibility but wants its views known to a specific audience. The Ambassador believes that the USSR intended to convey that the Oder-Neisse line is at present the established border and that Stalin does noi wish to discuss the issue or commit himself at this time. The Ambassador further notes that eager Satellites are put on lotice not to take the policies of the Kremlin for granted.
1
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3.
Motor vessels dispatched to Soviet Far East: A US Naval Mission in Southeast Asia reports that four Russian motor ships arrived in Singapore on 2 June and departed four days later for Korsakov on Sakhalin Island. The source states that each vessel carried a cargo of canned foods, and that, including these latest arrivals, 25 of these vne ships have passed through Singapore en route to Korsakov,
1
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Comment: About twenty ships of 1194 tons each are known to haVU7WIWN constructed in Budapest and to have"been deThese ships have diesel engines, are livered to the USSR. probably strengthened for ice operations, and are economical to operate. They are thus particularly suitable for service in the waters of the Soviet Far East.
4.
Soviet State farm amalgamation program remains static: A recent article in a Soviet publication by an official in the Ukrainian State Ministry of Farms proposed amalgamation of state farms as one of the several measures to streamline the organization and increase the profitability of such farms in the Ukrainian Republic.
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The official estimated that this would reduce total state farm administrative-management expenditures in the Ukrainian Republic by 3i million rubles a year, and release some 350 special sts and administrative workers for employment elsewhere.
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Comment: Neither TASS nor Polish press comment carried the difirrg-of Stalin's alleged statement to Polish correspondents.
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The Embassy observes that press references to Comment: the merger of state farms have been rare even during the height of the widely publicized campaign for amalgamation. The Embassy notes-that so far this year two items on this subject have appeared urging amalgamation in Leningrad Oblast and in the Ukraine. Both accounts indicate tnat little has been done as yet in either area.
EASTERN EUROPE
5
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Recently, the Communist Party of Bulgaria has Comment: laid ;MEI-emphasis upon the necessity of improving ideological work, particularly in the cultural and educational
This theme was particularly apparent durilig the fields. Fatherland Front Congress held in MaY,
In February, the chairman of the Committee for Science, Art and Culture and the Minister of Education were replaced', presumably as a result of dissatisfaction with their handling of:Bulgaria's cultural and educational indoctrination campaigns. American aircraft probably did not overfly Hungary on The American Embassy in Belgrade reports that the 28 Ma ugop av Foreign Ministry disclaimed knowledge of an alleged overflight by an American plane over HUngarian territory on The Ministry prlmised to inform the embassy in case 28 May, it received information.
Bulgarian press scores failures in youth indoctrination Rabotnichesco Delo, the Bulgarian Communist Party program: newspaper, has attacked the Dimitrov Union of People's Youth and the Sofia Ministry' of Education for their "completely unsatisfactory" efforts in selecting competent leaders for the Bulgarian children's organization, the Septemvriyche Pioneers, Several other organizations, including the Supreme Committee for Physical Culture and Sport and the Committee for Science, Art and Culture were also criticized for their lack of a sistance "in educating our children in the Communist. Spirit,7
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The US Legation in Budapest on 4 June reported Comment: receipt of a Hungarian note protesting, in unusually courteous terms, the overflight of an American C-46 two-epgined aircraft en route to Yugoslavia..
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The USAFE Tulln airbase has stated that.such aircraft are not used hy the US Air Force anywhere,in Europe, but suggested that the Israeli Airlines fly this.type of aircraft with scheduled flights in that general area.
7.
The legation notes that this measure provides for Aubstahtially increasing communal expenditures beyond those envisaged in the national budget and also furnishes a device for blunting criticism of'the national administratioe's failure to provide local improvements.'
Local "self-taxation" established in Rumania: A Rumanian decree of last January makes it possible, for people's counCils to levy special taxes for local improvements, according to. the AmeriCen.Legation in Bucharest. Under this "self-taxation" syscoM, people's councils may, with the apprOval of local toWn meetings, collect up to 90 lei (aPproximately $8.10) per.capita and use locally available materials for such improvements.
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Tito regime introduces cFrther agrarian liberalization: In an apparent effort to appease independent peasant opposition and lessen Western criticism, the Tito regime has abolished compulsory delivery of wheat., rye, corn, oats, and barley, leaving only wool subject to such regulations. American Rmbassy officials point out; however, that the private peasant is still,vulnerable to heavy taxation.'
1
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Comment: The abandonment of compulsory grain deliveries while-Eartatuing high taxation is intended to increase grain production and make cooperative farming more attractive to the individual peasant.
During the past year, the regime's agrarian. POlicy has been Characterized by efforts to hold the line,op. cO4lectivization against the pressure of peasant opposition:andgc criticism. There are strong indications that the, pal-iv-way emphasize .the advantages of'the general type of cooperative in an attempt to increase production and introdUPO*thO collective method to private peasants.
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FAR EAST
9.
President Rhee rejects UNCURK's compromise recommendation: President Rhee has reacted negatively to UNCURK's proposal of 7 June that a compromise solution be found to the political At a meeting dispute, according to the commission's chairman. with the commission on 9 June, Rhee's only interest was to get his constitutional amendments adopted. He quoted his Prime Minister as reporting that the Assembly is "coming around" to his viewpoint.
11.
Construction of new railway in West China begun: Chungking radio announced that construction woiR-Was underway on the Chengtu-Luehyang section of the Chengtu-Tienshui railway, a The 470-mile line connecting Szechwan and Kansu Provinces. Southwest China Engineering Bureau plans to begin laying rails in May 1953 an to complete a 73-mile stretch to Mienyang by November 1954.
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Ambassador Muccio comments that the statement allegedly made by the Prime Minister is not understandable in view of the fact that he had expressed doubt on 7 June that the Assembl osition would be willin to compromise or capitulate.
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Comment 1 1 thecquivalent of10,000,000 dollars was being allocatea tor work on this railroad in 1952, and its completion deadline was 1954.
The Communists are planning to open two other lines in West China this year. They are the ChungkinrChengtu, to be finished this month, and the Tienshui-Lanchhu in Kansu Province.
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Tibetan cabinet change strengthens Communist control: The recent dismissal of Tibetan Prime Minister Lukhang is thoughtto have weakened theelements opposing Chinese Communist policy in Tibet. Instead of appointing a new Prime Minister the Dalai Lama has now assumed direct control of the cabinet, which will be guided on all matters by Peiping's proconsul General Chang Ching-wu.
Comment: The able and influential Lukhang was placed in charge of the Tibetan civil administration last fall, before the Dalai Lama'sregime had ratified the Sino-Tibetan Agreement providing for Communist occhpation of Tibet. He is said to have opposed Chinese policies in Tibet and to have been dismissed as a result of Communist pressure.
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French officials interested in possible Japanese investment in Indochina: Many French officials are interested in the possibility of Japanese investment in Indochinese production of iron, coal, salt and phosphates,1 The basis for such interest is not only tne economic Value df such investment for Indochina but the fact that it would provide Japan with an incentive for supporting the Western political position in the area.
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The American Legation in Saigon, while noting the obvious desirability of this objective, observes that private French interests own concessions covering most proved mineral areas in Indochina. In the case of current salt negotiations, they have insisted on maintaining majority voting rights in any French-Viet amese-Japanese company which might eventually be organized.
Comment: French business interest5in Indochina have, up to the present, had the snpport of Frenchafficials in a policy designed to reserve for themselves so far as possible the Indochinese market and the exploitation of Indochinese resources.
SOUTH ASIA
14.
Unrest in Nepal affects India's border security: The unres1 now sweeping Nepal appears to have strong anti-Indian overtones which may vitally affect the security of India's northeastern frontier.
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Alleged "Communist bandits" raided eastern Nepal in midThe disturbances later spread to include harassment of Indian landlords in western Nepal, a strike of low-paid gollernment employees in telephone, mint, and press orpnizationsin Katmandu and an anti-foreign, anti-government student demonstration in sympathy with the strikers. Some 70 persons were injured during the demonstration.
May.
.
The situation developing in Nepal seems to be similar to the one in Kashmir, where a nationalistic political regime originally supported by India has apparently become antagonistic toward India's proprietary attitude and, with Communist support, has embarked on a course of action increasing the insecurity along the border that India is trying to eliminate.
Political aspects of the unrest include the recent election to the presidency of the ruling Nepal Congress Party of .B. P. Koirila, anti-Indian half brother of the present Indian-dominated Nepalese Prime Minister, and the dismissal of the pro-Indian Minister of Communications who protested the "undemocratic" nature of the election. An Indian mission reorganizing the Nepalese Army has also created ill will in military circles by suggesting that the number of generals be reduced from 30 to four.
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16.
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loaded fireFrench may quell future Moroccan riots without has Public Security in Morocco arms: The French Director of depriving the possibility of riltussed with Paris authorities The Moroccan police of the means of killing possible rioters. police would carry guns but no ammunition. shooting of The Director cited an instance in which the judgment of attributable to the poor demonstrators by police was d Fr nch officials.
anticiThis report suggests that the French do not Comment: and are concerned over pate ser ous armed resistance in Morocco handling of riots the adverse effect on foreign opinion of their in North Africa.
West Adenauer's popularity rises: According to a reliable successful Chancellor Adenauer's German opinion survey agency, making him more direction of West German foreign relations is In April 1951 only 32 percent of the West German popular. 1952, this populace felt that he was q "wood" chancellor: by May figure rose to 51 percent. of These survey results corroborate the findings Comment: and his recent-175M elections which indicated that Adenauer the losses Christian Democratic Party are recovering from some of If MOSCOW continues to suffered during the 1950 state elections. in Berlin, he feelings with its scare program incense West German and his party may become even more popular.
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problem: OEEC approves basis for settlement of Belgium's EPU approved the basic points The Ministerial Council of the OEEC has persistent creditor Belgium's problem as a for the settlement of nation in the European Payments Union. Belgium will grant Under the plan approved by the Council, Against the amount of a further quota to the Payments Union. credits (since 180 million dollars owed Belgium as post-quota of 80 million will make a dollar payment September 1951), the EPU dollars of these dollars to Belgium on 1 July. Another 50 million France by deliveries of credits will be paid by Great Britain and The OEEC has proposed military goods to Belgium within two years.
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that, for the remainder, Belgium be immediately granted special dollar drawing rights on the International Monetary Fund. This latter recommendation is indispensable from the point of view of the Belgians who will repay the Fund as Belgium receives EPU repayments.
Comment Belgium is demanding dollar payments from the EPU because it has a chronic dollar deficit. At the same.time it has been granting to the EPU export credits above its original 360million-dollar quota, which was exhausted in September 1951. The Belgian public is deeply interested in the outcome of these negotiations, because of the government's difficulties in financing its extraordinary budget and rearmament expenditures. Although the OEEC proposals do not meet fully Belgium's "firm position" of late May, American officials in Brussels believe that, for domestic and international reasons, Belgium will continue its membership in the Payments Union.
19
Swedish Foreign Minister reaffirms foreign policy: Foreign Minister Unden, in reviewing Sweden's foreign policy at the Social Democratic Convention in Stockholm, reaffirmed Sweden's adherence to its alliance-free line. Denying that this position was negative, he stressed the positive, peaceful contributions which neutrality could make in a divided world. Unden stated that the expansion of the Council of Europe to include military matters would probably result in "pushing Sweden out" of the organization.
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Comment: Unden's renewed stress on Sweden's non-alliance course indicates that the Social Democrats intend to emphasize their foreign policy record in the September parliamentary elec-
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NATIONAL THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THEOF THE STATES WITHIN THE MEANING DEFENSE OF THE UNITED ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS. 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION Of WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIRITED BY LAW.
GENERAL
1.
Ambassador Kennan emphasizes importance of Soviet overAssistant Secretary General Zinchenko's apture on Korea: formula for proach to an Israeli UN delegate suggesting a new in negotiations is of major importance, the Korean armistice Zinchenko's sugKennan in Moscow. the opinion of Ambassador gestion appearS aimed at a virtual cease-fire in Korea without to be final and formal agreement, the prisoner-of-war issue by to disagree," and possibly handled by aa overt "agreement tending to minimize its imsubsequent informal arrangements portance. prisonThe Ambassador believes that any solution of the that suger impasse would have to be along some such line as gested by Zinchenko.i Comment:, In addition to conveying a possible way around the pilIZETif-of-war impasse, the Soviet "feeler" to the Israeli delegate could be another effort to bring UN pressure to bear upon the United States to modify its stand in Korea, Reportedly, the Russian suggestion has already been echoed in part by other delegations.
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American Ambassador concerned over apparent abandonment of Anglo-Saudi Arabian negotiations: The American Ambassador in Jidda has expressed concern over the apparent intention of the British Foreign Office to abandon direct negotiations with Saudi Arabia on the Persian Gulf boundary dispute and to return to negotiations through the normal diplomatic channels in Jidda which "failed so dismally in 1949."
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Saudi Arabia strongly favors direct negotiationer-riants the Persian sheikhs, whose boundaries are involved, to be present in any attempted settlement of the dispute.
Comment:
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1. Kernam emphastzes of Soviet overture on emphasizes importance of overture on 1 . Ambassador Kennan Rorea:
solutton The Ambassador believes believes that any solution be dong along some some such such line line as as that of the prisoner impasse impassewould would have to be
suggested by Zinchenko. suggested Zinchexako.
conveying a possiComment: In addition to conveying possible way r i s o n r impasse, the Soviet YeelerfT way around aroundthe thep prisonTi:Wirar "feeler" to pressure to UN pressure the Israeli Israelidelegate delegate could could be another effort to bring UN its stand in Korea. Reportedly, bear upon upon the United United States to modtfy modify its Reportedly, the Russian suggestion has already been echoed in part by other t h e suggestion already been echoed other delegations. delegattons.
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Assistant Secretary Secretary General General Zinchenko's Zinchenko's approach to an Israeli IsraeliUN UN delegate suggestsuggestKoreanarmistice ing a new new formula formula for for the Korean armistice negotiations in the the negotiations is is of of major major importance, importance, in op on m assador assadorKennan Kennan in Moscow. Moscow, Zinchenko's Zinchenko's suggestion suggestion appears aimed at a virtual cease-fire cease-firein tnKorea Koreawithout without final and and forforthe prisoner-of-war prisoner-of-was issue Issueto tobe behandled handled by by an overt mal agreement, the "agreement to disagree;' andpossibly possibly by by subsequent i n f o r m a larrangedisagreer and informal arrangetending t to minimize its its importance. o minimize importance, ments tending
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4.
UN UN walkout walkoutat at Panmunjom Panmun om causes causes Communist concern: concern:
Chinese Communist Communtst Military Military 7 June 52 52
Headquarters Headquarters of o f the the Chinese Chinese Communist Communist "Volunteer" Forces Forces in in Korea Korea on on 7 7 June June "Volunteer" alerted at at least leasttwo two tactical tactical units unitsto to"guard "guard alerted against an enemy attack" and to prepare for for basis alert was The of the enemy alert was combat. \&s?\Sb attttude at atPanmunjom. Panmunjom stated to be the the UN's U " s "bad" attitude
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Comment: Apparently Apparently the Communist command construed the as an an ultimatum. ultimatum. Kim as command the URrii7ralkOut o u t Kim Il-sung's 11-sung's and Peng Teh-huat's Teh-hual's 9 open letter letter to General and 9 Tune June open General Clark Clark shows sko.wshow how form consider the the three-day three-day recess. This serious the Communists Communists consider 'Ms form of communication communicationi isreserved reserved for for important important proposals, proposals, and of s and in the urged to to "order "order your your delegates delegates to to return return to letter General General Clark Clark was urged Panmunjom" If if the the UN UNstill still desired desired an an armistice in PanmunjomT' in Korea. Korea.
5. 6.
President Rhee Preeident Rhee rejects rejectsUNCURK's UNCURKIs compromise recommendation: recommendatton:
Ambassador Muccio comments Ambassador Muccio comments that that the the statestatement allegedly allegedly made made by by the the Prtme Prime Minister is understandable in i s not not understandable i n view of of the fact that he had view had expressed expresseddoubt doubt on on 7 7 June June that thatthe the Assembly wouldbe bewilling willingto to compromlse compromise or or capitulate. capitulate. opposition would
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President Rhee has reacted negatively negatively to UNCURK's UNCURK'sproposal proposalof of77June Junethat that a a comcombe found found to to the the South SouthKorean promise solution solution be promise Korean political dispute, dispute, according to the commtssion' commission's polttical s C r man. with the the commission commission on on 9 9 June, June, thee's Rhee's only a meeting with only interest was interest was to to get gethis hisconstitutional constitutionalamendments amendments adopted. adopted. He quoted quoted his Prime Prime Minister Minister as asreporting reportingthat thatthe the Assembly Assembly is i s "coming "coming around" to his his viewpoint. viewpoint.
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North In N o r t h Koreans Koreans handling h a n d l i n g US US tanks: tanks: I n a 26 May message passed over used by by the component of t the North p assed o v e r a net n e t used t h e armored component he N orth KOrean IV IV Corps it i t was stated s t a t e d that t h a t "a committee committee to t o receive Korean the tanks has at t he t anks h a s been appointed a p p o i n t b d upon arrival arrival a t Sukchon in accordance with .on tthe of American a ccordance w i t h order o r d e r number. number. . .on h e rreceipt e c e i p t of tanks." continued certain electrical e equipt anks." The message c o n t i n u e d that that c e r t a i n electrical: quipment was missing m i s s i n g from from the t h e tanks t a n k s and that t h a t one was w a s out o u t of of order and s should h o u l d be repaired r e p a i r e d by by an a n unidentified u n i d e n t i f i e d unit. unit. F r e i g h t cars Freight were to t o be b e used used to t o transport t r a n s p o r t the t h e tanks t a n k s and the t h e message requested requested that "a special freight sent M-46." (SUEDE f r e i g h t car be s e n t for f o r the t h e M-46." t h a t @la ASAPAC Korea, Pasal-751 P a s a l - 7 5 1 Spot S p o t 3488A, 3488A, 9 9 June J u n e 52) 52)
.
4. 4.
p r e s e n c e of of Soviet S o v i e t advisers advisers w ith N o r t h Korean Continued presence with North tank division a d d r e s s e d to t o "Kalusev," "Kalusev," t ank d i v i s i o n indicated: i n d i c a t e d : In I n a message addressed a N North Division o r t h KOrein Kbrean enquired e n q u i r e d on 21 May "did " d i d the t h e 105th 105th D i v i s i o n (tank) (tank) s a l a r i e s for f o r the t h e translators t r a n s l a t o r s on on 18 18 May May from from the. the. . r e c e i v e the t h e salaries receive department. department. Sgot 3484A, 3484A, ." (SUEDE ASAPAC Korea,Pasal-744 Korea,Pasal-744 SPot 7 Julie J u n e 52) 52)
.
Comment: h i s message does d o e s not not c larify w h e t h e r these these Comment: T This clarify whether tanks, being shipped t a n k s , presumably captured c a p t u r e d US materiel, materiel, were b eing s hipped into i n t o or o r out o u t of of Korea. Korea.
."
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Comment: Comment: The presence p r e s e n c e of of Soviet S o v i e t personnel p e r s o n n e l with w i t h North North .Korean armored units, units, presumably presumably in training Korean armored in a t r a i n i n g and advisory advisory capacity, c a p a c i t y , has h a s been been previously , p r e v i o u s l y indicated. indicated.
5. 5.
u n i t in i n central c e n t r a l Manchuria m a k e s - f i r s t flight flight S o v i e t MIG-15 unit Soviet makes-first over korea: Eight E i g h t Soviet S o v i e t MIG-15's Y I G-1S's based b a s e d at a t Tungfeng, Tungfeng, in i n central central o v e r Rorea: Manchuria, were to t o fly fly a a "patrol " p a t r o l against a g a i n s t enemy enemy aircraft" aircraft" M a n c h u r i a , were during d u r i n g daylight d a y l i g h t hours h o u r s of of 9 9 June. J u n e . The Air A i r Force F o r c e states s t a t e s that that this the first evidence that tthis t h i s is Is t he f irst e v i d e n c e that h i s uunit n i t i isparticipating s : p a r t i c i p a t i n g in In the Air Force t h e Korean air a i r war. war. (SUEDE (SUEDE A ir F o r c e Roundup 112, 112, 10 TO June J u n e 52) 52)
Comment: Comment: There T h e r e are are at a t least least nine n i n e Soviet S o v i e t fighter f i g h t e r units, units, probably p r o b a b l y regiments, r e g i m e n t s , in i n Manchuria. Manchuria. They are based b a s e d at a t Tungfeng, Tungfeng, Mukden, Anshan Anshan and and the t h e Antung Antung area. area. All A l l except the t h e Tungfeng unit u n i t have have been been noted n o t e d operating o p e r a t i n g over o v e r northern n o r t h e r n Korea. Korea. The The Soviet a t Mukden Mukden and and Tungfeng are are the t h e farthest f a r t h e s t from from S o v i e t MIG-15's MIG-15's at northwest Korea. They They were were first f i r s t noted n o t e d in i n April A p r i l and and May May and and n o r t h w e s t Korea. do do not n o t appear a p p e a r to to have have been been assigned a s s i g n e d to t o regular r e g u l a r combat combat duty d u t y as as yet. yet.
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Flight F l i g h t of of MIG-15's MlG-15'~in i n south s o u t h Manchuria Manchuria believe4 believed, Korean: Korean: A Chinese Communist Communist A Air ir F Force o r c e message reported r e p o r t e d that t h a t 28 M M1G-15'e X -15'9 O
with round-robin w i t h a Korean commanding officer o f f i c e r were to make a round-robin Security flight f l i g h t at a t Anshan Anshan on on 10 10 June. June. (SUEDE 6920 S e c u r i t y Group Johnson AB Japan, J a p a n , AP AP 181, 181, 10 10 June June 52) 52)
Comment: T h i s is is believed b e l i e v e d to t o be a regiment rbgiment of the the Comments This missions 1st 1st koraiii-Division. Korean D i v i s i o n . This T h i s regiment was flying f l y i n g combat misslans from Antung in late 1951, 1951, but b u t was recently r e c e n t l y noted n o t e d flying f l y i n g at
Anshan, bnshan, of this this also is a lso
100 100 miles miles from from the t h e Korean Korean border. b o r d e r . Another regiment Korean division, the t h e only known Korean jet j e t fighter f i g h t e r unit, based at a t Anshan. Anshan.
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SOVIET UNION
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Ambassador Kennan notes. that this appears to be the first time that the subject of the violation of China's frontiers by French aircraft has been given this much play in the Soviet
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Moscow press needles French on violations of China's frontiers: All Moscow papers carried a 7 June Peiping TASS report that French aircraft are continually violating the air frontiers of China and international law. The article warned that the French Government must bear full responsibility for such hostile acts as bombing, strafing and reconnaissance, and for the murder of Chinese citizens and damage to Chinese property.
EASTERN EUROPE
Finnish Communists to demonstrate on Korean anniversary:
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Comment: On 24 May the World Federation of Trade Unions published "an appeal to working people of the world asking them to declare the second anniversary of the Korean war a day of solidarity with the heroic Korean people, a day of the defense of peace."
. .
The FinniZh Federation of Labor Unions has officially withdrawn from the WFTU: therefore any demonstration in Finland will be purely Communist with little labor support.
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3.
Alleged story of Stalin interview reported spreading in The American Ambassador in Warsaw reports that the WEEFF-of the alleged recent Stalin interview implying the Polish-East German frontier was a subject for negotiation with a "neutral Germany" has apparently spread in Poland.
Poland:
The substance of the interview was not reported in the Polish press whose reactions have consisted of a flat denial of the report of the interview in the principal party organ, an editorial in another paper ridiculing the story and pointing out certain errors, and the printing of the verbatim text of the TASS denial of the report.
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Comment: Recent Soviet notes have not hinted that the Polish-German border was subject to revision.
Spreading of the story in Poland, however, would undoubtedly cause the government uneasiness since it is contrary to numerous public reiterations by Polish and East German officials that the Oder-Neisse line is permanent. Moreover, the fact that Poland's Communist regime has continued to maintain control and administration of the "recovered territories" is one of its few actions which have gained genuine popular support.
Despite the vehement Polish and Soviet denials, the Ambassador believes the USSR's record of deceit and betrayal of Poland will doubtless cause some Poles uneasiness over the future status of the "recovered territories."
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FAR EAST Rhee supporter finds no evidence of Communist plot: The US Military Attache has been informed that Colonel "Snake" Kim, chief of the South Korean Army CIC and considered a loyal supporter of the President, told the ROE Acting Chief of Staff on 9 June that no evidence has been uncovered to link the 12 arrested Assemblymen with a Communist plot. Kim reported that Rhee is aware of this, but that a release would be difficult since the President would have to admit the oririnal arrests were a mistake.
Comment: This type of report seems out of character for araillKim in view of his loyalties, and may be a
4.
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5.
US medium bomber downed;by air-to-air rockets on Korean night mission: The 0 Far East Air Force reports that a B-29, 'which was lost on the night of 10 June over. northwestern Korea, was hit by rockets fired by an enemy MIG-15 jet. A medium bomber was also lost due to unknown causes and a second one was seriously dithaged, but returned to South Korea. Far East Air Force obserVes that while other reports have been received of enemy use of air-to-air rockets in North Korea, this is the first instance of MIG-15's using rockets in combat and the first confirmed loss of a UN aircraft to enemy night action.
In regard to the 10 June night encounter, Far East Air Force says that "this attack was a well-planned, integrated effort, with seeming ground-to-air and air-to-air 25X1 coordination" and that "the proficiency and aggressiveness of the Red attack may indicate the initiation of a concerted effort by well-trained Communist air and ground teams .to prevent UN night interdiction strikes."1
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visit: Minister-Resident Letourneau has suggested informally TU-WIT American official in Paris the establishment of two tripartite bodies, one to discuss the political aspects of
Indochina's international role, and the other the military.

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The best the French can hope for, according to the Minister-Resident, is to hold on until "the general international situation has improved sufficiently for us to negotiate a settlement." The American Ambassador infers that this remark envisaged inclusion of Indochina,in an over-all Far East settlement, but suggests that a definite exposition of French thinking, both on.this question and the poSsibility of negotiations with Ho Chi Minh, be sought in discussions with Litourneau nexi week in Washington. 25X1
Comment: As a preparatory step'toward long-desired tripartite negotiations on Indochina.Some French Officials in Saigon have recently suggested traisforming their High Commission into a roving mission responsible for over-all supervision of French interests in Southeast Asia and the Pacific
area.
7. -
Tam appointment benefits Viet Minh: The US Consul in Hanoi believes that the creation of ehtf-Tiliovernment has provided the Viet Minh with a highly exploitable propaganda tool'for therecrnitment of new personnel at a time when the Military balance in Tonkin is delicate. The Tam,appointment, widely regarded as a "major victory for the Viet Minh," hag even "nauseated" the top French civilian representative and his staff. The Consul observes that while another regime might have :rallied considerable popular support and'thus denied to the Viet Minh what the Prench could never deny by arms alone, the best that cis be hoped from the Tam regime is that it will not 25X1 too seriously harm the war effort. This, he emphasizes, is "a pcior return for French hIlood and American Money."'
CoMment: Recent French clearing operations have resulted in heiVirMlit Minh losses, and a concomitant drop in rebel morale has been reported. The recruitment of personnel and the psYcholOgiCal reconditioning of present forces are therefore of first priority. It appears probable that the atmosphere created by the Tam appointment will considerably further the realization of these Viet Minh goals.
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Israel The American concerned by Jordanian political Ambassador in Tel Israel considers Aviv reports developments: King that, although Talal's problem, the Israeli condition an internal Government developments in Amman is following Jordanian current political change in the status with interest.and of Jordan a serious would consider any matter.
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French opposition anticipated: American to American capital in the Fezzgn pates sirong French Minister Villard in Tripoli anticicapital to undertake opposition to any attempt by points out that econoMic development in the American although Libya, the French the Fezzan is legally Fezzan. Re they have in the now completely control A province of past. the province as Villard adds that the discuss the French.have been in regard to economic resources of reluctant to possible'oil and iron the Fezzan, partioUlarly although Libya would welcome deposits. He believes it would American enterprise that in the Fezzan; not'wigh,to-offend'the-French'; I SECRET
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11.
"Conference for Solution of German Problem" shifted from France to Denmark: The French Communist newspaper Humanite announced on 9 June X'elillition of the situation that "after careful in Paris the Conference for the Solution of the German Problem" will be held in Denmark 13-15 June instead of in Paris as originally planned. The agenda calls for consideration of West Germany's agreements with the West and the "means of peacefully resolving the German problem in conformity with the interests of Germany and the security of its neighbors unifi ation democratization sovereignty, peace treaty."
Comment: Although the Communistshave tried to avoid open assocj.jtion with the conference, the meeting has been chiefly promoted by Communists and fellow travelers. agitation for Renewed
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a peace treaty could delay the the German agreements. ratification of This is believed to be the main purpose of the conference.
12.
Soviet trade harassing in Berlin slackened: Reports from office in Berlin show that Soviet officials are approving most of the trade permits submitted to them by West Berlin firms. Soviet interference with Berlin parcel post shipments has also been at a minimum in recent months
the IffEECommissioner's
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Comment: West German press reports also indicate that German interzonal trade, held up by the Allies during most of 1951 primarily in retaliation against the export permit and parcel post harassing, has "being carried through smoothly recently resumed and is now in both directions" amid German negotiations for increases in that trade. Meanwhile a recent statement economic sanctions against Berlin. by Ulbricht implies future of the type of measures applied in This could entail renewal carrying out of more serious ones. 1951 as well as the One East German party leader is also reported to have warned that the East Germans would cut all roads to Berlin,except the main Helmstedt autobahn and renew the parcel post interference.
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West German Senate decision may delay ratification of Allied-German treaties: Early West German ratification of the Bonn and Paris treaties has been imperiled by the German Senate's decision on 10 June that both treaties in their entirety require Senate sanction. If Chancellor Adenauer is unable to win immediate Senate approval of the treaties, some delay will ensue since he will be forced either to appeal the Senate's decision to the Constitutional Court or get the decision arbitrated by a loint parliamentary mmittee.
I
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As matters now stand, Adenauer probably cannot get favorable upper house action unless the state government of Baden-Wuerttemburg is reconstituted in favor of the federal coalition, thus restoring his majority in the Senate.
Comment: Previously Chancellor Adenauer had intended seeking upper house approval of only certain financial provisions in the treaties, leaving approval of the treaties as a whole to the lower house.
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Bolivian tin nationalization appears more certain; At ceremBlinieirlearing in the Tia Nationalization Study C9mmisionc. President Paz Estenssoro called on Bolivians to brace themselves for the "most transcendental and vital step since independence, namely nationalization, which is the principal goal and He discounted justification,for the/revolution."

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the operational problem and expressed belief that a solution could be found for the financial and commercial problems. 25X1
Comment: This contrasts sharply with, earlier descriptions of Paz' "MOderate" attitudeT.ifid:maylindiCitethat the influence of extremist Minister of Mines Lechin still predominates.
The tin nationalization measures are to be applied only to the three'principal producers, who control approximately 80 percent of Bolivian tin production.
18.
"AntiCommunist terrorism" reported.in Guatemala: Several persons are reported to have been killed after an attempt to seize a Guatemalan border garrison and simultaneous disturbances in a nearhy small town. In other parts of the country, including the capital, attempts .to dynamite hydroplectric plants have been reported. The Minister of the Ihterior announced that the government was in full control of the situation and charged that the disturbances were part of "a large-scale terroriStic plot instigated by antiCommunists."
.
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Comment: Anti-government and anti-Communist groups -are apparently becoming more active in Guatemala since the bitterly disputed agrarian retorm bill was sent to Congress last month. While the anti-Communists' coordinating committee has eschewed violence, it has shoWn its inability to control the activities Of its boldsr members.
The garrison allegedly attacked is on the Honduran border. Early in the year prominent Guatemalan exiles -were reported preparing tin invasion from Hondpras.which would be coordinated with internal upriOings. The US Embassy in Honduras; however, found no evidence to substantiate these reports. It is possible that the current reports of anti-Communist terrorism are exaggerated by:the government in an attempt to discourage -disorders in the future.
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Venezuela reportedly attempting to provoke break with the USSR: Venezuelan authorities on 7 Jime "reitusederfiTY to SoViet diplomat Yakushev and his-wife, and detained them overnight despite Charge Krylov's attempts to intervene. The Venezuelan chief of protocol is reported to have said that if the USSR does not break relations as a result of the "evident insult," it will be clear that the Russians have some "impelling reason" for remaining. Subsequently, the Venezuelan Foreign Office issued a communique that Charge Krylov and Attache Aliabiev adopted an "aggressive,violenti disrespectful attitude" and .that the Venezuelan Charge in Moscow has been instructed to jeouest immediate withdrawal of those two men.
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Comment: Rumors that Venezuela would break relations with the USSR have cropped up periodically since mid-1949, but this is the first "incident" of any kind. The Venezuelan action bears a strong resemblance to the Cuban moves which preceded the break there last April. A decision to close the Caracas Embassy would leave only three Soviet diplomatic missions in Latin America -- in Mexico, Uruguay and Argentina.
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Iranian official predicts possible military coup: Prime Minister Mossadeq does not have the'support of the Iranian public, the Senate, Majlis or the Shah, former Iranian UN representative Abul Panahi told the American Ambassador on 6 As a result of growing alarm over the financial crisis June. Mossadeq will no longer be tolerated.
1.
Panahi stated that if the Shah did not soon re lace the Prime Minister, a military coup would take place.
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Prime Minister Mossadeq's position has There is evidence, however, that his control of the government yet seriously threatened or that the Shah is ready to action against him.
Comment:
ciablrWaihed during the last two months.
appreno firm is as take
While current press reports of an attempted army coup support Panahi's account of army intrigue against the Prime Minister, there is no evidence that the army leadership is either willing or able to carry out a successful coup without the Shah's approval.
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HR70-14
FAR EAST FAR
3, 3.
MIG-15's down downB-29 B-29on onKorean Koreannight nightmission missionwith with air-to-air rockets: MIG-16's air-to-air
Rockets fired fired by by MIG-15's MIG-15'sdowned downed a B-29 B-29 on the night of of 10 June June over northwestern Korea. Korea, I I Another B-29 B-29 was was lost lost from un1 Another known causes and and a a third third was was seriously seriously damaged, damaged, but but returned returned.to known causes to South Korea.
June 52 62 12 June

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"this attack was a well-planned, w ell-plinned, integrated effort, with with seeming seeming ground-to-air and air-to-air coordination" and that "the proficiency proficiency ground- to-air and air -toair coordination" and that "the of the the Red attack may indicate Lndicate the initiation of of a and aggressiveness of concerted effort by well-trained Communist teams." Communist air and and ground teams."
HR70-14 HR70-14
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.FAR FAR EAST
5. 5.
" '
Another Chinese C h i n e s e Communist Communist division. d i v i s i o n in i n Korea reports reports In 6.June to subordinate large ,petroleum supply: I n a 6 June message t o its s ubordinate .large petroleum supply: ivision i n Korea u n i t s , an a n unidentified u n i d e n t i f i ed Chinese Communist d units, division in Korea reported that t h a t it i t had had reCeived r e c e i v e d (1099?) ( l o g e ? ) barrels barrels of of gasoline gasoline p l a n to t o distribute d i s t r i b u t e them them to t o its its battalions b a t t a l i o n s within within and would plan days. (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, Korea, K-3716, K-3716, t h e next n e x t few few days. (SUEDE 501st the 10 June J u n e 52) 52) Comment: Comment: Although it i t was was recently r e c e n t l y reported r e p o r t e d that t h a t the the C h i n e m u n i s t s had r d e r e d "a11 olunteer u n i t s " to t o store store Chinege-Traiiunists had o ordered "all V Volunteer units" twolrinonths'supply e t r o l e u m , the t h e only only a two.atonths' supplyof offood, food, ammunition ammunition and and p petroleum, e v i d e n c e that t h a t it it was.done was done came from ?th 7th A r t i l l e r y Division evidence Artillery reports. T h i s message indicates i n d i c a t e s that t h a t the t h e required r e q u i r e d level l e v e l of of This s u p p l y , at a t least least in in petroleum, p e t r o l e u m , is is being b e i n g 'reached reached by t h e r units. units. supply, by o other
6. 6.
C h i n e s e Communist division d i v i s i o n to t o em emphasize communications Chinese hasize communications train ommun ca ions personne t r a i n ng: h : Communications p e r s o n n e l of egim ent o of the-' o 'each eac r reg ment t e 218t Rocket ocket Launcher.Division Launcher D k v i s i o n were were ordered ordered on on 11 I1 June June to to a t t e n d a divisional d i v i s i o n a l communications conference. c o n f e r e n c e . They were also also attend i n s t r u c t e d to t o bring b r i n g materials materials to t o classify classify each e a c h (regiment's) (regiment's) instructed S U E D E . 5 0 l s t Comm Recon Grp Korea, 11 June J u n e 52) 52) t rainees. ( trainees. (SUEDE*501st Korea, K-3698, K-3696, 11
Comment: This T h i s conference c o n f e r e n c e is is preliminary p r e l i m i n a r y to to a a divisiondivisionwide commun -cations cations training t r a i n i n g program and and it it comes at a t a time time t h i s unit u n i t has moved from from the t h e front f r o n t lines l i n e s to t o a reserve when this p o s i t i o n . The fact that t h a t the t h e entire e n t i r e division d i v i s i o n plans p l a n s to t o implement implement position. t h i s ttimesuggestsacontinuing i m e s u g g e s t s a c o n t i n u i n g period period of of relative relative t r a i n i n g at this training
inactivity. inactivity

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Approved F or Release 2003109102 : CIA-RDP79T00975A00000290001-2
SUMMARY
SOVIET UNION
1.
Amliassador Kennan believes Soviet policy still based on imminent collapse of capitalist world (page 3).
FAR EAST
2.
(page,4).
4.
3.
Soviet tactical units reportedly moving towards Korean front (page 4). Thailand threatens to change sides in case of Chinese aggression
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5.
Iranian Chief of Staff warns of possible Tudeh coup d' etat (page 6).
EASTERN EUROPE
6.
Increased work quotas in Hungary apparently due to Soviet pressure

(page 6).
WESTERN EUROPE
7.
Director of French police says, Communist Party seriously weakened

(page 7).
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SOVIET UNION
1.
Ambassador Kennan believes Soviet policy still based on imminent collapse of capitalist world:
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Ambassador Kennan considers that the most important and effective blow which can be dealt the USSR at this time would be a psychological attack designed to shake the rem in s confidence in the basic thesis that the capitalist world is unstable,upon which he feels Soviet policy is still based. The Ambassador says that Soviet behavior towards the West is predicated on the persistent hope that the present structure of the Western world will prove increasingly inadequate to withstand the steady attacks of the world Communist movement. The Kremlin, therefore, considers a war against the West as unnecessary as well as dangerous, but at the same time is also unwilling to have any "real, as distinct from demonstrative," negotiations with these Western governments which it considers short-lived.
In the present, shrill exaggerations of Soviet propaganda, the Ambassador reads an extreme nervousness and perhaps even an advanced degree of inner doubt about the soundness of this thesis.
The idea that the Communists are wrong in their analysis of the trend of Western society, and that in the forseeable future they will continue to be faced by those governments they now strive to undermine, stoul,i, in the Ambassador's opinion, "be thrown out against the Communist world in every conceivable variation, with unremitting reiteration and persistence, and with all possible factual support."

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2.
Soviet tactical units reportedly moving towards Korean front:
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Soviet infantry and artillery units moved south of the Chongchon river in northwestern Korea in early May, I
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Allegedly the artillery units are destined for front line service.
An expansion of facilities and an increase in personnel, particularly armored specialists, began in early May at North Korean General Headquarters,[ At the same time beginning 20 May, roundthe-clock conferences have been scheduled at combined ChineseKorean Headquarters.
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antiaircraft artillery unitsalinairlsory personnel in Korea has been

previously accepted, but the existence of other Soviet ground combat units has not been confirmed. Since commitment of Soviet ground units at the front would increase the danger that Soviet involvement could be proved, such a move seems unlikely.
3.
Thailand threatens to change sides in case of Chinese aggression:
The government-controlled paper in Bangkok on 11 lune commented at length on Thai 25X1PJ fears of a Chinese Communist invasion through Burma. While stating that Thailand would fight aggression, the article included a thinly-veiled threat of quick capitulation if the United States did not soon send more
arms.
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Comment:
The presence of Soviet air and
- 4 -
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The American Embassy in Bangkok comments that this newspaper is frequently used to express unofficially the government's views, and that the article in question lends credence to increasing reports that Thai leaders feel insecure in the absence of an American guarantee to defend their country. The embassy adds that they may some day use this reasoning to justify "changing sides in the cold war:'
There have been other recent indications that the Thai Government is questioning the wisdom of its extremely pro-Western policies and is preparing to adapt itself ultimately to possible Chinese domination of the Far East.
Comment:
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4.
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5.
Iranian Chief of Staff warns of possible Tudeh coup d'etat:

The Iranian Army Chief of Staff on 6 dune warned his staff of the possibility of a Tudeh coup d'etat. He stated that Tudeh
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hroughout the army,

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cells, which include senior officers, exist he said action against them was too dangerous.
Comment:
6.
Increased work quotas in Hungary apparently due to Soviet pressure: Higher production quotas for workers were introduced in Hungary early this month after a six weeks study had demonstrated laxness and disorganization in important plants.
Comment:
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The higher quotas apparently result from direct Soviet intervention to speed up Hungarian production for the USSR. Sharp Soviet-inspired criticism has recently struck the Hungarian bauxite,locomotive and shipbuilding industries, and apparently has led to an investigation of accounting methods to discover concealment of underproduction.
The chief of the Hungarian National Economic Planning Office went to Moscow in February and returned in March with a demand for a 25 percent rise in industrial production and a 5.2 percent reduction in costs.
6

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There is no evidence, however, of any organization capable of carrying out a successful coup. There are no senior officers prominent among the suspects, the majority of whom are enlisted personnel or junior officers, often conscripts.
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WESTERN EUROPE
7.
Director of French police says Communist Party seriously weakened: The director of the French National Police believes that the French Communist Party is now disorganized and demoralized, and that it will have difficulty recruiting.
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Despite Frachon's past success in staging effective strikes on economic issues, as in the Paris transport workers' walkout of March 1951, he has, until now, been geneially overruled by top party leaders who have insisted on political strikes.
Comment:

-725X1A
The main Communist threat for the future, he fears, lies in the possibility that Benoit Frachon, Secretary General of the Communist-led General Labor Confederation, will be given free rein to concentrate on labor's economic demands.
HR70-I HR70-1 4 4
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4, 4.

.
.
Communists till q p p r e h e n s i v eabout a b q u t UN UN amphibious amphibious Communists s still wrehensive on A 'component of the t h e North North Korean Korean IV Corps, Co r p s , on A component of coastal d e f e n s e w e s t e r nKorea, Korea, in i n aa 10 10 June J u n e message message to to coastardeanse ini n western "Chief of Staff, S t a f f , 3rd 3 r d Infantry I n f a n t r y Regiment" Regiment" stated stated that t h a t "as "as for for "Chief of t h e estimate in i n accordance a c c o r d a n c e with w i t h the. the. .verdict. .from the .verdict. .from h e a d q u a r t e r s , it i t is is said said that, t h a t , in in regard regard to t o the t h e Yellow Yellow Sea, Sea, headquarters, t h e y (the ( t h e UN) definitely d e f i n i t e l y plan p l a n to t o land l a n d today. today. .'l (SUEDE they ." (SUEDE 3 3 0 t h Comm Comm Recon Co Co Korea, Korea, ALT-554, ALT-554, 11 1 1June June 52) 52) 330th
c apabl 1 f t i8 s : capabilities:
.
Comment: On On 7 7 June J u n e an a n alert, a l e r t , inspired i n s p i r e d by the t h e UN UN walkout walkout Comment: P a , was ent o u t by hinese V olunteer H eadquarters Paitpunjom, was ssent out by C Chinese Volunteer Headquarters c e r t a i n combat combat units u n i t s to t o be prepared for for UN offensive o f f e n s i v e action. action. certain is p o s s i b l e that t h a t this t h i s Korean a l e r t is is s till w i t h i n this this is possible Korean alert still within $ c o n t e x t . Another o s s i b i l i t y is that that a a coastal coastal security security ,context. Another p possibility i s being b e i n g alerted a l e r t e d to t o intercept intercept a a UN guerrilla g u e r r i l l a landing. landing. u n i t is unit
at at to to It It
5 . 5.
V ehicles r e c e i v e d by o r t h Korean i l i t a r y : . "In "In order Vehicles received by N North Korean m militarv. to t o carry c a r r y the t h e .(vehicles?) ( v e h i c l e s ? ) ffrom rom tthe h e 123 12grd rd u Unit,-1(7?) n i t ,-l(71) trainmen trainmen and some, some of your your leaders leaders will w i l l be b e dispatched dispatched to t o the,ChOngchon", t h e Chongchon" and River, reported reported an a n unidentified u n i d e n t i f i e d west west coast coast N o r t h Korean Korean River, North t a c t i c a l unit u n i t 'on o n 10 10 June. J u n e . The sender s e n d e r told t o l d the t h e addressee a d d r e s s e e not not tactical t o worry b o u t inspections, inspections, b u t to t o be prepared for f uture to worry a about but future message terminated t e r m i n a t e d with w i t h the t h e cryptic c r y p t i c statestateI n s p e c t i o n s . The message inspections. ment that t h a t "I "1 will w i l l leave l e a v e here here on.' on. .the 1 5th b ecause I I must must ment .the 15th because c o n t i n u e the. the. ; .plan." .plan." (SUEDE 1 5 t h RSM D e t 1, 1, Korea, Korea, continue (SUEDE 15th bet 15RSM/14250, 1 1 June J u n e 52) 52) 154SM/14250, 11
Comment: Mechanization Mechanaestion of of North N o r t h Korean Korean units u n i t s in i n the the Comment: Pyongyang area, in i n western w e s t e r n Korea, has been proceeding p r o c e e d i n g steadily steadily i n 1952. 1952. I t is p o s s i b l e that t h a t these.(vehicles?) t h e s e ( v e h i c l e s ? ) are are some some of of in It possible t h e n e a r l y 2,000 2 , 0 0 0 shipped s h i p p e d from from the t h e USSR USSR to t o North N o r t h Korea KQrea in i n the the firet first theAlearly q u a r t e r of of 1952, t h e y may may be additional a d d i t i o n a l armor amar arriving. arriving. 1952, or quarter or they
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6. 6 ,
Communist salvage knocked-out tanks Korea: In s a l v a g e knocked-out t a n k a in i n North Korea: In a 10 June mesgage, message, reporting r e p o r t i n g on the t h e routine r o u t i n e activity a c t i v i t y ' of o f the the battalions unidentified North regiment on t the b a t t a l i o n s of an u nidentified N o r t h Korean regiment h e west coast, t h e sender sender s t a t e d that t h a t "we t h e exchange coast, the stated "we have completed completed the of the t h e ttransformers?) t t r a n e f o r m e r s ? ) of of the t h e accespoi,les a c c e s p o b i e s of he t anks r eceived," of t the tanks received." I t a lso r e p o r t e d that t h a t "One tank t a n k destroyed destrayed by by a a mine at at It alpo reported Chinnampo being b e i n g beyond r repair, e p a i r , they t h e y started w with i t h (accessories?)." (accessories?)." (SIUEDE I n t e l l i g e n c e Grp G, G, Korea SK-K-167, SK-K-167, 12 1 2 June J u n e 52) 52) (SUEDE ROK Intelligence
'
Comment: The text t e x t of this t h i s message suggests s u g g e s t s that t h a t the t h e enemy Comment; is s sarflini a l v a g i n gparts p a r t s frdm from totally t o t a l l y destroyed destroyed tanks t a n k s and and is is probably probably engaged in i n some some sort s o r t of of tank t a n k assembly assembly activity. activity.
7.. 7
Chinese C hiqese, report r e p o r t probing p r o b i n g attack attack against a g a i n s t US US divisions: divisions: A , message carried i n I y s t e m used l e m e n t s of h e 21st Chinese message-carried in a s system used by by eelements of t the21st Communist Rocket i v i s i o n commenced ith W u r eporting :Communist Rocket Launcher Launcher D Division commenced * With "Ku reporting to.Meng: t o Yeng: 8th 8 t h of of June J u n e Situation S i t u a t i o n Report." Report." The The 9 9 Tithe June message message t h a t ."14 "My 215th c o v e r naae o r tthe he 1 15th D ivision) t h e n noted n o t e d that then .215th ( (cover name ffor 115th Division) a probe at a t one one platoon p l a t o o n of of the t h e enemy enemy 45th 4 5 t h Division D i v i s i o n and and made a k i l l e d and wounded 35." 35." Seven UN attempts to to c a p t u r e the t h e 115thfs 115th'~ killed capture p q m i t i o n s were were ,reported. reported. (SUEDE 501st 501st Comm Comm Recon Recon .Grp, Grp, Korea Korea positions K-3737, 11 K-3737, 1 1 June June 52) 52)
L e f t flank flank elements e l e m e n t s of of the t h e 45th 45th US US DiVision, Division, Comment: Left t h m c e n t r a l sector, ubjected t o a four-hour probon th'iriiii7Central sector, were were s subjected to lour-hour prpbing attack Miring the night by between between 100 and 150 i ng a ttack d uring t he n i g h t of 8 June by of t h e enemy enemy pupported. qupported by r t i l l e r y and ire. of the by a artillery and mortar mortar f fire..
n
8. 8 .
Communlst a r t i l l e r y regiment regiment in i n Korea Korea .discusses discusaes p l a h s for for Communist artillery plahs "defensive 11de9eneivewarfare": warfare1T: An An unidentified unicientif i e d Chinese Ch inese Communist a artillery rtilzry regiment referred r e f e r r e d to t o the d duties u t i e s of its rear rear s service ervice e echelon chelon during warfare" in " d e f e n s i v e warfare" i n a 9 June message d u r i n g each period of "defensive apparently a p p a r e n t l y 114ting l i s t i n g guiding g u i d i n g rules r u l e s for for its i t s rear rear echelon. e c h e l o n . These d uti a i duties included n c l u d e d tthe he p preparation r e p a r a t i o n and ands t storage o r a g e of off o food, o d , ammunition ammunitiW and betroleum. It also directed the getroleurn. I t 01qo t h e amount m o u n t and method to t o be be used. (SUEDE (SUEDE 501st 50lst Corn Recon Grp Korea, K-3749i IC-3789, 11 1 1 June June 52) 52) used.. Commjiecon
Comment: Comment: This This regiment regiment seems to t o be instructing i n e t r u c t i n g its its subordinates suborin i n planninglfor p l a n n i n g $#or a a defensive d e f e n s i v e situation. s i t u o t 8 . o n . Since Since c c u r s st the r egimental l e v e l , no general g e n e r a l con-. cont h i s message o this occurs at the regimental level clusion is possible. p o s s i b l e . The message is some e evidence v i d e n c e that t h a t frontfrontc l u s i o n is l i n e units u n i t e have no.immediate no immediate offensive o f f e n s i v e plans. plans. line
9. 9:'
Korea: An replacements e n t e r i n g Korea: Chinese Chinese COmmunist Communist replacements:entering undetermined number of of ttrainees r a i n e e s from fromtast E a s t and and Southwest China undeterrnlned number
3 3
52 16 June 52
a r r i v e d in in S o u t h e r n Manchuria and were e n t e r i n g Korea on 10 10 June, arrived Southern entering Junet t o a qommunications i n t e r c e p t from t he 7 th A rtillery a c c o r d i n g to according communications intercept the 7th Artillery Division, t o be met i n Korea by r epresentaD i v i s i o n , The trainees t r a i n e e s were to met in representaeveral d i v i s i o n s to t o whom they t h e y were s s i g n e d , (SUEDE t i v e s of s tiVes several divisions were a issigned. (SppE 501st S O l s t COMM Corn Recon Recon Grp Grp Korea,K-3797, Korea, K-3797, 10 IOJune June52), 52) Comment: I t would be normal to t o eqpect t h e Chinese ComComment: It eXpect the.Chinese.Communist set e t up up a a replacenlent replacement aybtem. Oaten. For this t h i s reasqn reason the m u n iunits s m tto o s a r r i v a l of trainees t r a i n e e s in i n Korea a t this t h i s time must e r e g a r d e d a* as arrivil at must b be regarded routine. r outine.
10. 10.
11. 11.

s
tanks.
flights of Sovie$ Soviet MIG's MIG's i in Manchuria s suggest use Long f l i g h t s of n Manchuria uggest u s e of externaX Chinese-.COMMuniet-miessageschedule&-i e x t e r n a s fuel fueltanks': tanks: A I Chinese. Coinmpn'ia't message s c h e d u l e d a 12 Tune MIG-15's based baSed a at .Tungfeng,sin ce*tral une flight g of o 1.2'SSoviet o v i e t MIG-16's t Tungfeng, i n Fe tral &zhuri::iohnta' : o z d - r o b i n fflight l i g h t of o 420 .?The Manchuria, on a roUnd-irobin of about about 400 400 tto 420 miles miles.1The l e n g t h of this this f l i g h t suggests s u g g e s t s the the u s e of e x t e r n a l wing thAke, thnks, length flight Use external t o the the r e p o r t i n g agency..(SURDE agency. (SUEDE Air A i r Force Roundup 115, a c c o r d i n g to according reporting RoundUP 115, 13 June June 52) 52)
ComMent: Comment: On the t h e same day four f o u r Soviet S o v i e t jets j e t s at a t Tungfeng Tungfeng flew flew a n ,"e-rcraft p a tpatro17 r o l " m i mission s s i o n which la s t e d a an n hour ' 7 an 'lerli570-TFTicraft which lasted hour and and 3 37 minutes a so ssuggesting uggesting t h e use u s e of externalviing-tip e x t e r n a l wing-tip tanks. t a n k s . /1 miriutesi also the .F-86. have o often observed MIG's MIG's *th F-86 ppilots i i o t s have f t e n obeerved e k t e r n a l tanks t a n k s over over th eiternal northwest Korea. The coXbat coplbat radius r a d i u s of the.MIG-15 t h e MLG-15 is is increased increaBed n o r t h w e s t Korea. from 160 t o 316 a u t i c a l m i l e s by the t h e use u s e of of iwo two 70-40 70-80 gallon gallon to 315 n nauticalmiles.by
The The Chinese Chinese 3rd 3rd .Division D i v i s i o n may .mayhave have qose more MJ.G-'15's: MIG-151s; A Apparently pparently twp of.18 18YIG MIG,45.'ss, both-ofthe'Chinese Communist twp flights. f n g h t s of -lSse, bot h O f t h e Chi n e s e Communie t 3rd 3rd
Air D i v i s i o n , were scheduled s c h e d u l e d on 12 12 June.June. Pne One flight f l i g h t by the"Srd the'3rd Air Division, Division's t o Pyongyang and back; the t h e other o t h e r was was D i v i s i o n ' s 9th 9 t h Regiment was to a round7robin round-robin flight f l i g h t via v i a Fengeheng Fengcheng in.Manchuria. i n Manchyria.
field commentst h that only 22 mWs of MIG's of The f i e l d rrePorting e p o r t i n g uunit n i t comments a t on l y 22 this division t his d i v i s i o n were noted when it i t transferred t r a n s f e r r e d to t o Antung in in May i t ninv now his has 36 36 messages suggest s u g g e s t that t h a t it w h i l e these t h e s e messigei from Mukden, while (SUEDE 6920 Security S e c u r i t y Group Johnson AS AB Japan,Chicemsum Japan,ChicOmsum aircraft. a i r c r a f t . (SUEDE 814, 12 814, 1 2 June June 52) 52)
D i v i s i o n had had .59 50 MWrs n October Comment: The 3rd Division ..Comment: MIGis iin October 1951 1951 when It r eturned i t was w a'first r n wsigqed o Anfung fQr combat combat duty. d u t y . It returne4 it apeigned t to Antung fpr usual to M a d e n in J a n u a r y 1952 With:only w i t h o n l p 30 30 aircratt, aircra?t. The usual to Mukden Januarv1952 complement of a a ChiU0Se Chinege MIG-15 YIG-15 diVision d i v l s i o o has h a s been 00. 50.
,,,"
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units repQrtedly reportedly moving towards Korean Soviet tactical units front: Soviet infantry and artillery units moved iron t ' -y ~ 1 re 3 south of the Chon chon River theChOngOhOn Biver in in northwestern northwestern Korea Korea in in early early May, May, 7 1
k g egedly e d l y the artillery units are destined deetlaed for front line Iine service. service.
. LzF-=Fl
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area,
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Comment: Comment: The presence of &viet Soviet antiaircraft artillery units and advisory personnel personnel in i n Korea Korea has has been been previously previously units-ia-ravisory accepted, but the the existence exietence of other Soviet ground combat accepted, has not not been been confirmed. confirmed. Since commitment of Soviet Soviet units has the front would increase increase the the danger that that ground units at the eoviet involvement involvement could be proved, such such a move seems unlikely. Soviet
Enemy increases increase8 capabilities capabilities on east central Korean front: front: The C nese Communist oug o have ave een Chineee rmy, thoaght to been re rellevea ommun s 12th Army, eve in east entral rea on 9 June by the 60th Army, remains in combat, Recently captured prisoners oner re o o war n e Kumsong-Tulsa sector indicate that one division of the the 60th 00th and two two divisions divisions of the the 12th 12th are in in this this division sector, which was previously occupied by the the 12th 12th Army alone. alone. sector,
o armies in In this thfst ! espite the presence of elements of two the pattern of enemy activity along the rest of the front has been one of "a series of reliefs in place." ( 13 June 52)
Comment: the 12th 12th Army Army may may yet yet be be withdrawn, withdrawn, Comment: Although Although the hosti1itiee in in this this sector sector have been intensified intensified in in the the past hostilitles few few days. days.
4 4
An expansion expansion of of facilities facilities and an increase increase in In personnel, particularly armored specialists, began in early May at North Korean General General Headquarters, Headquarters,[ At the same time, May, round-thetime, beginning 20 I ay roundt 3 T clock con conferences erences have been scheduled at combined ChineseKorea C-3, C-3, 14 14 June June 52) 52) Korean Korean Headquarters. Headquarters 1 - 4
June 52 52 16 June
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Two-month supply Two-month s u p p l y level l e v e l scheduled s c h e d u l e d for for North N o r t h Korean Korean unit: unit: A 13 13' 3une June message message from a unit u n i t that t h a t may' may be the t h e supply su.pply component of the t h e 10th 1 0 t h North North Korean Korean Mechanized Mechanized Division, D i v i s i o n , near n e a r Pyongyang, Pyongyang, of stated of supply s t a t e d that t h a t "the " t h e guarantee g u a r a n t e e of the t h e service s e r v i c e of s u p p l y of the t h e army unit u n i t in in the t h e rainy r a i n y season. Beason. .wheat l o u r for a y s and nights, nights, .wheat f flour for 14 d days and subsidiary 40 days days and and nights. nights. .(had .(had been s u b s i d i a r y foods f o o d s for f o r 40 received). .from the t h e General G e n e r a l Service S e r v i c e of of Supply, Supply Bureau." bureau." received). Another 12 1 2 June J u n e message message from from the the same same unit u n i t indiciated i n d i c b t e d that that " p r o v i s i o n e for f o r 60 days d a y s and nights nights w i l l be p r o v i d e d by June 30." 30." "provisions will provided (SUEDE ROK ROK Int Int G Grp r g M Korea, Korea, SK-K-205 SX-IC-205 and and SK-K-211, SK-K-211, 13 13 June J u n e 52) 52)
.
.
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5 5.,
concerned with Communists remain , c oncerned w i t h WI BW in i n Korea: Korea: An unidentunidentCommunists Zemaill ified Chinese CUmmunfitirtillery regiment on 1 02 June i fied C h i n e s e mmmunist ,%art ille r y r e g i m e n t on June informed informed s u b o r d i n a t e elements e l e m e n t s that."an t h a t "an investigating investigating committee. committee. its subordinate is comipg t o Korea Korea to to investigate i n v e s t i g a t e the t h e releasing r e l e a s i n g of of germs germs and and coming to p l a n e s and and artillery. a r t i l l e r y . Request that t h a t men be i n s e c t s by enemy planes insects found who who can c a n verify v e r i f y the t h e releasing r e l e a s i n g of of germs. germs. 11 found ."

1 1
of whether this this stockpiling s t o c k p i l i n g was undertaken u n d e r t a k e n in in Regardless of a i n s and f lOOd6, i t is e vident t hat a a n t i c i p a t i o n of summer r anticipation rains floods, it evident that s u b s t a n t i a l improvement in enemy logistical l o g i s t i c a l capabilities ill substantial capabilities w will have been effected e f f e c t e d when when this t h i s program program is is completed. completed.
Comment: A similar s i m i l a r supply s u p p l y level l e v e l was was decreed decreed recently r e c e n t l y for for chine7J-CUiRunist evidence C h i n e s e Communist units u n i t s in i n the the battle b a t t l e line, l i n e , and there t h e r e is evkdence t h a t at a t least least some some units u n i t s have have already a l r e a d y achieved a c h i e v e d this t h i s level. level. that
..
.
.
13 June J u n e another a n o t l k r Chinese artillery artillery r e g i m e n t a l commander On 13 regimental stated 'in message tthat h a t "Army egiment t o n i g h t and and stated 'in a a.message "Army called called my my r regiment tonight ordered chairmen of of t the anti-plague a l l chairmen and aad assistant a s s i s t a n t chairmen he a nti-plague o r d e r e d all commission commisSion to t o attend a t t e n d the t h e meeting." meeting.'g The sender s e n d e r continued c o n t i n u e d that that the m e e t i n g will b e.anti-plague p r o j e c t and " t h e topic of the "the meeting be.anti-plague project and e s t a b l i s h m e n t of of anti-plague a n t i - p l a g u e program h e summer and autumn establishment program for t the seasons." (SUEDE 501st 501st Comm Corn Recon Recon Grp Grp Korea, Korea, K-3837. K-3837 and K-3838, K-3838, s e a s o n s . " (SUEDE 14 June June 52) 52)
Comment: The The enemy is is continuing c o n t i n u i n g to t o accumulate data to to support s u . p p o Wks mch charges a r g e s that t h a t the t h e UN used biological b i o l o g i c a l warfare weapons i n Korea. in Korea, It I t is noteworthy that t h a t Malik on 16 1 6 June J u n e requested requested a a UN Security S e c u r i t y Council C o u n c i l meeting m e e t i n g to t o discuss d i s c u s s these t h e s e same same charges. charges.
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Possible Mechanized D Division P o s s i b l e North North Korean Korean 1.0th 1 0 t h Mechanized i v i s i o n command conference "Tfie'conference of t thercommanders. c o n f e r e n c e held:. held: lT?% e c o n f e r e n c e of h e commanders of the the units u n i t s under my control c o n t r o l shall s h a l l be convened on the t h e 17th 1 7 t h and on the North Korean Korean message, message, p possibly t h e 18th," 1 8 t h , " states states a a 14 1 4 .June J u n e North ossibly sent by s ent b y the t h e commander of the t h e 10th 1 0 t h Mechanized Division. Division. In this on tthe same communication communication h i s regard, r e g a r d , messages: messages ssent e n t on h e same I n t system s y s t e m on o n 11 11 and and lp 13 June June suggest s u g g e s t that t h a t possibly p o s s i b l y subordinate subordinate e l e m e n t s of the elements t h e 10th 1 0 t h were participating p a r t i c i p a t i n g in i n joint joint reconnaissance reconnaissance training activities with elements ct the 4th ith e l e m e n t s of t h e North Korean 4 t h and t raining a ctivities w 5th Divisions, 5 t h Infantry Infantry D i v i s i o n s , stationed s t a t i o n e d in i n the the Pyongyang Pyongyang area, area. A related 12 1 2 June June message indicatea i n d i c a t e s that t h a t another a n o t h e r subordinate subordinate unWis."making preparations t oparticipate .participate in. in. , t o be carried carried u n i t : i s "making p r e p a r a t i o n sio .tobe out o u t from.June from June 15. 15. , .'l ." (SUEDE 3 3 0 t h Comm Recon G r p Korea,BLT-252, 330th Grp Korea,BLT-252, 13 June; June; Conlin 13 J u n e ; RI* ROK Int I n t Grp Grp M M Korea, Korea, SK-K-217, SK-K-217, 13 1% J u n e ;501st 501et Corn Recon Grp Grp Korea, Korea', SK-K-224, SK-K-224, 14'June; 14 June; ROK ROK Int'Grp Int Grp M M Korea, Korea, SK-K-236, SK-K-236, 14 June J u n e 52) 52)
.
.

4 '
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111
Comment: Comment: The recently r e c e n t l y mechanized North Korean 1 0th D ivision 10th Division haa been personnel, h as b e e n ,receiving r e c e i v i n g equipment equi.pment and p e r s o n n e l , and has been in in training its conversion c o n v e r s i o n from an a n infantry I n f a n t r y unit u n i t . These T h e s e A4 I? t r a i n i n g since s i n c e its messages suggest s u g g e s t that t h a t the t h e unit unit has h a s reached reached a a fairly f a i r l y advanced state s t a t e of preparedness p r e p a r e d n e s s for for combat. combat.
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IP
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17 June 1952
US OFFICIALS ONLY
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OSD, DOS Declassification/Release Instructions on File


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primarily This digest of significant reports has been prepared It does Agency. for the internal use of the Central Intelligence reports renot represent a complete coverage of all current views of the Office ceived. Comments represent the immediate of Current Intelligence.
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS. 793 AND 794, the TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
GENERAL
1.
25k1A
Also on 13 June, and apparently without prior knowledge of the Soviet move, Venezuelan security police began rounding up Communist leaders and closing down front Organizations as a preliminary to a late-afternoon announcement that the governing junta had -- independently .- severed relations with the Soviet Union. That morning Security Chief Estrada had indicated to the American Ambassador that he expected the USSR to dealare relations at an end, but that if this did not occur, Venezuela would take the initiative. He emphasized that Venezuela is in a "critical" pre-election period, but offered no hint as to how the government would use the affair in its campaign. The American Ambassador is unable to explain why the Venezuelans chose this particular time for the break. (C Caracas 817, 13 June 52; R Moscow 1998, 14 June
Comment: The Security Chief's statement that Venezuela wouldFiErrairect action to end relations if the indirect attempts failed seems to confirm earlier rumors that the provocative incidents were deliberately planned.
Venezuela has not explained motive for break with USSR: In response to Venezuelan provocations during the preceding week, the USSR on 13 June broke relations with Venezuela charging "hooliganism" and violations of international law. The Soviet note said that Venezuela had been acting under the direction of its "North American masters," a statement which the US Ambassador to Moscow feels should be challenged.
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Venezuela's earlier willingness to let the USSR initiate the break, and the failure to announce charges against the Soviet Embassy suggest that the government may be unwilling or unable to produce proof of espionage or political meddling at this time.
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EASTERN EUROPE
2.
Soviet-inspired housecleaning of Hungarian economy hits coal mines: As a result of an investigation by the Ministry of Mining and Power, ten mine managers and engineers were repiiianded and fined for non-fulfillment Of the'coal proplan, according to the Hungarian trade Union newspaper. (k Budapest 934, 14 June 52)
Comment: Soviet criticism of non-fulfillment of Soviet demanUE-ETUE the Hungarian economy now has been directed against the bauxite mines., heavy industry, some segments of light steel industry, and accounting methods. No major heads have fallen yet, but it seems likely that important scapegoats must be found.
3,
Hungary tightens croP surrender ruleis: A Hungarian ministeria decree cd 8 June. ending free market privileges for.grain on 30 June is interpreted by the US Legation in Budapest as confirmation of reports of serious crop damage from frosts, and Communist concern over Hungary'm ability to meet both domestic consumption nedds and 'ccamitments abroad.
The Legation estimates damage to the corn crop at 15 to (R BudiPest Weeka 24, 13 June 52) 30 percent. If the Legation's estimate of crop damage is Comment: porrearFiTioning probably will be reinstituted in Hungary, since deliveries to the USSR would continue at the expense of the Hungarian consumer: Ruiors were reported last week It is too early to that ration tickets were being printed. the range of the estimate is assess daMage, however, and
wide.
The decree itself is not unusual. Doubtless it was intended to curb the much-criticized laxity. in crop surrenders and to stop speculation. Six villages recently lost free market privileges for "speculating away" crops that should have been surrendered.
4.
Yugoslav official attacks publication of Belgrade article criticizing US policy: American Embassy officials in Belgrade' have learned from a reliable source that a representative of the official governmental news organ, -Politika, was "soundly berated" by an official of the Yugoslav Foreign Office for
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publishing a prominently displayed article attacking United States Information Service. The publication the article was criticized on the grounds that lt would of this be construed as an official view and could do nothing but harm, particularly at a time when the economic aid question is still pending. Embassy officials believe that this incident offers interesting commentary on Yugoslav press-State relations an during the present transition period between strict and relaxed controls over the press. (C Belgrade 1594, 14 June 52)
unfriendly acts of a minor nature allegedly committed by Americans in Yugoslavia. Its publication in the important Belgrade daily, Politika, demonstrates the ambiguity of present Yugos1av-WestilF17FiIiIions. This, results from a concerted attempt by the party to extirpate Western cultural influences without prejudicing relations' with thellest.
,
5.
Yugoslavia and Bulgaria exchange another series of According to Belgrade news organs, Bulgaria has ignored Yugoslavia's latest protest note concerning the alleged violation of. Yugoslav extraterritorial rights in Sofia by Bulgarian secret police. Moreover, the Yugoslav Charge in-Sofia has asked the dean of the diplomatio Corps to make an appropriate representation regarding the rights, of Yugoslav personnel in Sofia.
protest 'notes:
Bulgaria, in return, formally protested against the illegal activities of Yugoslav diplomatic personnel in Sofia. This protest was summarily rejected, by Bulgaria. (U Belgrade, 1684, 13 June 52)
Comment: The continued exchange of notes alleging hostiTg-WETI against each other's diplomatic personnel may portend the breaking of formal relations: It howeVer, that these tirades merely represent is more likely, an attempt to direct domestic frustrations and bitterness outward towards a potential enemy".
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objected to the circulatraTrunfriendly" books by the United States Information Service and other
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Comment;
The article in question
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FAR EAST
6.
Kora denies Soviet holding 180,000 Japanese POW's: Mrs. Tomi Kora, Japanese Diet member now in Peiping, has replied to Yomiuri Shimbun telegram and denied the authenticity of a. reOFT-EFeoited to her that the USSR is holdinu180,000 prisoners of war. She, regretted the "false telegral sent by a person with malicious intention."
Yomiuri Shimbun on 17 June claimed the cablegram had been

sent UffaMF1Kri17-Ki5FIT's name by "B. B. ssui" and was received
.from the Hong Kong telegraph office. 17 June 52)
(R FBIS Ticker, 16 and
7.
Rhee continues intimidating Assemblymen: During the National Assembly meeting on 14 June demonstrators outside denounced the Assemblymen through loudspeakers. Generally orderly parades and demonstrations led by Rhee's youth corps members continued all-day. In the mid-afternoon 2,000 demonstrators marched to the Assembly compound under the direction of "hoodlum-type leaders" and listened to hysterical harangues. (S CINCUNC C-50235, 15 June 52)
Comment: Radio Pusan announced on 11 June that President Rhee had received a petition bearing over a million signatures which demanded the dissolution of the Assembly.
8.
Reports have been received which claim that groups purporting to represent local councils plan to seize the Assemblymen representing their local home districts.
Increasing anti-US sentiment being expressed by South Koreans: In the course of an ostensible anti-cease-fire irefriii of 2,000 to 3,000 persons, the president of the ultranationalist Taehan Youth Corps; Ahn Ho-sang, made an emotional extemporaneous speech blaming most of Korea's ills on the United States. He criticized the Panmunjom negotiations, the division of the country at the 38th Parallel, non-repayment of
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Comment: The telegram originally credited to Mrs. Kora receiVereReiderable publicity in Japan, particularly,since the Japanese Government had estimated that only 77,637 of its nationals were still alive in the USSR, China and North Korea. Mrs. Kora's endorsement of the Soviet "peace" campaign is likely to suffer somewhat by this interchange.
17 June 52
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SECRET ROK "loans" to the US, and American interference in Korea's internal affairs. He concluded by saying that if the United States evacuates its troops while the situation is still unresolved, the "Korean people will fight the UN troops." (C Pusan 1378, 16 June 52)
Comment: Ahn Ho-sang, former ROK Minister of Education, is GeRiliciaucated and was a great admirer of the Hitler Youth Corps.
9.
Ship operators may use British registry as cover for illegal activities: The US State Department has pointed out to the Consul General at Hong Kong that "the British flag may be employed to cover up illegal shipping activities by nenBritish elements." Of the 36 British-flag vessels trading with Communist China in January and February, seven were known or believed to be beneficially owned by Chinese Communists and ten by Greek cartels. Most of the Greek-owned shipping was reported under charter to the Poles, Czechs or Indians. The Consul General was requested to investigate and report on the activities of Communist-owned and Greek-owned shipping under British registry, with a view to determining their possible use for transporting contraband to Communist China. (S to Hong Kong A-1105, 13 June 52)
Comment: Merchant ships of British registry make up the majority of Western-flag shipping in the China trade. Although cooperative in applying controls on the export of strategic materials to China, the British have consistently resisted American suggestions that similar controls be applied to shipping. The United States and Panama are the only major maritime countries to prohibit vessels from calling at Chinese Communist ports.
10.
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Peipin autumn: EY-INTO

alle edl
read n the pas
Probably some of the increasing anti-Americanism is emanating from Rhee himself. In a recent conversation he accused the US State Department of "corruption" in the present ROK political crisis. Later in the conversation he deplored the appearance of anti-American posters, but claimed they were an expression of the people's sentiments.
for world w r before reported mon "word has gone
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for the Peiping is to be "ready down the line from Moscow" that the summer." before the end of nutbreak of world conflict
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expectation of a world war Comment: Reports of Peiping's received. No report yet frequently by soig-arfinite date are judgment that it has been based on received has permitted a anything more than speculation. Governon early fall of new Vietnamese a 25X1C n ao ment: Huu, deliormer r Frading to French pressure o ou the hope that Tam berately chose Tam as Huu's successor in of slow evolutionary the French policy would further discredit Sao Dai hoped thus progress toward Vietnamese independence. of a genuine nationalist to pave the way for the formation government. this tactic may boomerang to the. 25X1C (5/ invite military disaster. benefit o
blin
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reports on the Tam appointment Comment: NumerOus other lend plausibility to this view.
SOUTH ASIA
12.
independence: The Kashmir makes further gestures toward 1952 passed a resoluKashmir Constituent Assembly on 12 June of the hereditary monarchy tion providing for the termination Assembly also and adopted a state flag. The Constituent form of governdecided that the state should have a democratic None of the Indian states ment with an elected head of state. has its own flag or elects its head of state.
in progress Formal constitutional discussions are now (S delegation. between the Indian Government and a Kashmir 52) New Delhi 4651, Jt Weeka 24, 14 June Constituent Assembly present Comment: The actions of the toward autonomy exist more FiVralliFe that strong movemerits of the resolution would within Kashmir. The implementation in the United Nations, compromise India's position on Kashmir stage. have reached a delicate where negotiations
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13.
Iranian oil shipment may be impounded at Aden: The tanker Rosemary, under charter to an Italian company and loaded with 1,000 tons of Iranian crude oil, is diOabled and will reportedly put in at Aden on 17 June. According to the Foreign Office official who provided this information, the British plan to impound the cargo which was scheduled for refining in Italy and transshipment to a Swiss consignee
Comment: The Rosemary, under Honduran registry, is carrying the first oil to leave Iran since nationalization. This shipment reportedly will be followed by others under a contract negotiated between Iran and an Italian company acting for a Swiss firm.

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Although the it will not grant out that delivery be prevented. (C
Italian Government has assured Britain that an import license for the oil, it has pointed at the free port of Naples or Tfieste cannot London 5709, 14 June 52)
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WESTERN EUROPE
14.

SECRET
East GerMan Security American officials Ministry'given wide new ln police powers: man security decree, Berlin comment that the announced 13 June, puts latest East Gerinto the hands of broad new powers the Ministry of State Democratic Republic Security of the German and fits in with the present intimidate both East and West campaign to, Germans as well as to compliance with restrictive ensure' measures. The decree, in apparently is thought to permit "deliberately confused the Security East Germany the Ministry to execute language," throughout restricted border measuretwhich originally applied area. In effect, it subordinates only to the and judicial organs to the Ministrk of all police the Mihistry to conduct State Security and searches, allows make arrests,%and tences without reference to existing laws. impose sen14 June 52) (C Berlin
1503,
15.
June 52) In their attempts to recoup Communist can be prestige, heretofore Moscow's expected to stress labor grievances; recurrent but strations has forced the emphasis On "direct-action" demonfully sxploit their hold Communists' hand before they could on French labor,
FrenCh Communist Party forced FrencI Government's temper Moscow line: stern reprisals to The Communist Party leader& have seemingly alarmed and forced them to tives slightly. . While the usual teMper Moscow direoterized a 12 June "direct-action" line characprotest meeting somewhat modified. "to free Duclos," it appeared tomorkers' economic Party leaders gave decidedly increased play demands and made toward conciliatory gestures fellow-travelling for,lukeiarm cooperation. elements which had recently been rebuked (C Paris 7814, 14
'HComment:
partyMat/Ts
16.
Two opposition groups join forces in long under way between Anstria: Negotiations leaders of the Union and the 'Action for of Independents (WU) Political have resulted in a merger Renewal (Young Front) appear 'to H' agreement. Although not available, the executive full details are committeeis said to be chairmanship of VdU leader Kraus, with Young under the witz as deputy chairman. 52) (S USFA Weeki 24, Front chief StrachSalzburg, 14 June Comment: The Veit has been trying for some time to convinde
.
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the People's Party that it would make a better coalition partner than the Socialist Party. Having made little apparent headway in this effort, the VdU sees some advantage in joining with the Young Front, which was expelled from the People's Party last year. ,The VdU would hope to swing People's Party memberi. Over to.the.new combination.
17.
Comment: Graf's semi-sarcastic comment reflects the infrequiliaTUT Soviet actions pleasing to Austria. The actions cited do not seem to be part of a new and general conciliatory policy.
18.
expected: Recent opinion polls in the Netherlands indicate that the 25-26 June national elections will result in little change in the present composition of the Parliament. On the basis of these polls, the Communist Party may lose two of its present eight seats in the Lower Chamber, but all other parties are expected to maintain at least their present representation. There are mo strong issues dividing the parfies, and domestic issues" such ae housing, taxes and cost of living are dominant in the lukewarm political campaigns.
The United States elections and speculation on the composition of the next Dutch Cabinet are arousing greater interest than the forthcoming elections. personalities as Foreign Minister.Although such current Cabinet Stikker are not expected to participate in the next Cabinet, no signifiCant changes in the policies of the new government are anticipated. (R The Hague 13394 13 June 52)

SECRET
Austrian official appreciative of favorable Soviet action: Austrian Deputy Minister of Interior Ferdinand Graf the Soviet occupation authorities has praised which, he said, would do more to for three recent actions, understanding than all Communist bring about Austro-Soviet propaganda. The actions he endorsed were (1) the decision to stop deporting Austrians sentenced by the Russians and to people to serve their sentences allow these in Austria; (2) the reture of tehformer AustrianPON'e from Russia; Austrian shipping on the Danube from and.(3) the treeing of Linz to Vienna. (R FBISReuters, London, 15 June 52)
Littlechangein composition ofOutchParnament
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19.
De Gasperi reportedly discussing alliance with Monarchists Shortly after the recent municipal for national elections: eleCtions, Premier de Gasperi reportedly discussed with Monarchist leader Lauro the possibility of an alliande between the Christian Pemocrats and the Monarchists for the national elections in 1953, Lauro allegedly agreed that his party would support the Christian Democrats provided De Gasperi would "actively aid the Monarchists with government support and 'funds in those areas now under Monarchist eontrol." De Gasperi's reply is not known.
Comment: This report is another indication of the strong pressures on De Gasperi to move his party still farther to the right, despite the opposition of the democratic parties whose His attempts to split the Monsupport he needs in any event. archists from the neo-Fascists before the local elections in May suggest that he may make similar attempts before the national elections.
25X1A
20.
Nenni Socialists allegedly will keep appearance of independence from Communists through 1953 Italian elections: Pfitro ;lunar leader of the Italian Socialist Party, bas agreed to conr tinue,until after the 1953 parliamentary elections the recently adopted tactic of appearing to be politically inde endent froM
25X1C
25X1C
25X1A
Nenni's recent intimations that he is willing to enter De Gasperi's government on specified conditions were reportedly made as the result of pressure from certain elements within the Socialist Party who, although they still support a SocialistCommunist coalition, believe that a display of political independence will attract a larger following to Nenni's party. .Nenni is said to have objected to-this plan at first, but eventually to have become convinced of its merits.
.
25X1A
Comment: Whether Nenni intends to make a real break with the TOEMETets cannot be determined. Nenni has stated that if the system of proportional representation is retained in the 1953 parliamentary elections, he will enter a separate list from that of the Communists. If the national elections are conducted on he basis of the "plurality" system that was used in the recent municipal elections, however, Nenni's party will probably continue its alliance with the Communists.
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21.
Ital shortl to .ublicize trade controls:.The Italian Minis er o ore gn a.e nten s o n orm general terms thia week e Parliament in of Italy's trade controls Orbit. Ihe government against the believes that "secrecy" 'from this program te should be lifted counteract the the Mqsoow Economic Conference. propaganda resulting from The American Embassy poiSti that a year ago Italy was out unwilling to make such an announcement because it feared political repercussions. 24, 13 June 52) .(S Rome Joint Weeka
Despite these controls, some embargoed items continue slip through to the Orbit. to The American Embassy in relayed a report that Rome has 5709000 dollars' rolling mill equipmentapproximately worth of and spares out of may have been shipped to an 8000000-dollar Poland. order If this report is true, would mean that Polish steel it ducts would be substantially capacity for finished steel proincreased. This order the most important Italian was one of commitments Italy had made application to the Orbit for which for exception under the Battle
Act.
22.
.Swiss military mission prepares for US visit: An exchange of no es e ween e n e a es an the way for a Swiss military w zer an his prepared purchasing mission'to visit the United States to procure equipment for the Swiss program. rearmament
The Swiss have agreed to comply with the requirements the Mutual Defense Assistance of Act in obtaining such equipment. .Bowever, the fact that Switzerland has given such assurances and the fact that it will purchase such equipment from Government will not be the US made public. (S to:Bern 1721, 13 'June 52) Comment: The Swiss probably hope suffingET-Zquipment to purchase eventually from the United States to rearmament deficiences. overcome their Swiss lack of mechanized which they can obtain only equipment, abroad; is the greatest the fulfillment of their obstacle to rearmament program. to abide by the terms Swiss agreement required by the obtaining such military United States of countries equipment is another of recently taken by the Swiss several measures in the East-West struggle. which will assist the United States
SECRET
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Comment: Italy wants to be the first The government will be in country to publicize position to defend such a better tactical a program if it makes such meat itself and indicates that such controls affect an annoUnce part of trade with the Orbit. only a small ..,
COCOCEUTFUls.
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23.
COlombian Congress called into special session:. 'Acting President Urdaneta has called,a special session of the Colom-' bian Congress to meet from 23 June included in the preliminary agenda, to 12 July. Although not will be the presidential succession. the chief topic reportedly Conservative Party'spokesmen administration does not, consider have indicated that ihe present.state of siege to conVoke itself obligated under the the regular, session of Congress scheduled for 20 July, and this may be postponed indefinitely. (R Bogota 7870.14 June 52)
Conment:,The only Congressional session since November 1949.itia-int'of the present all-Conservative Congress from 90 October to 31 December 1951, by Which Urdanetewas.elected President designate. Until now the governeent has appeared to fear a test of strength with,the powerfUl Alzatista opposition.Particularly On the question of Urdaneta's right to remain in office.after 7 August. If the forces of Alzate prove superior, the administration may retain power only by President Gomez temporary return to office, which does not seem likely in view of his serious illness.

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17 Juue 1952
US OFFICIALS ONLY
CIA No. 49790
Copy No. 4 b

TOP SECRET
This digest of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports It in or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments representCIA the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
Approved For Release 2001109106 : CIA-RDP79-101146A001000250001-4
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TOP SECEIET
THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 16, USC.. SECS, 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
WESTERN EUROPE
.
1.
June.52)
Comment: Gruber has stated tha4 the trip was sUggested by thi-SEITTsh, whom the Italians suspect ox faVoring a solutton of the Trieste problem favorable to Yugoslavia. The ainoUnced purpose oflhe Tito-Gruber talks is the improvement of relations between Austria and Yugoslavia.
2.
Argentine propaganda charges. that the US,banned Evita's beok produce anti-USreaction:, Yven."thougbtfuLpeoile" are beginning to believe current Argentine propaganda alleging that the United States has banned Senora de Peron's "The Reason for My Life," and the campaign has produced very unfavorable reactions to the United States. 'The Argentine-Sponsored news agencY, Agencia Latina, has carried reports froth La Paz, Rio de Janeiro, and Panama expressing incomprehension-Of the U8 attI4ude, and adverse resolutions are being passed by numerous academic, press, and labor organizations. (C S/S Buenos Aires 641, 13 June 52)
Comment: Argentina has continued to propagandiie these chargiragigite the United States denial, which was printed by only two Buenos Aires newspapers, both English-langueger. The charges offer a new point of departure for Argentina"s:anti-US
.TOP SECRET
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LATIN AMERICA
Austrian'YoreignBinister Gruber to visit Tito this week: Austrian Foreign Minister Gruber has informed the US,Embassy to Vienna that his plan to visit Tito.is now definite, and that he.expects to leave Vienna on 19 or 20 June. He hopes to mollify the "still unhappy" Italians by mentioning in a cOmMunique that he has informed the four occupation powers and Italy of his prospective trip. (S S/S Vienna 3902, 13
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campaign.
On 12 June feminine Peronista members of Congress introduded a bill proposing that 100,000 copies of Evita's book; in. English, be distributed free of charge to US labor, and that the United States be denounced before "all parliaments of the world" for this "unusual Offense committed surreptitiously by capitalistic imperialism."

TOP SECRET
2
17 June 52
Uhl.ClASIFlED when liftpirarliftlEGRIFtefelieSeNt2111MOWCIORWC-gbPrirbt469Wittihd2S0W0424 r declassifiesd when filled in form is detached from controlled document.
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ATTENTION: This form will be placed on top o/ and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency or classified Top Secret within ihe C A and will remain attached to the document until such time at it is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those individuals whose official duties relate to the molter. Top Secre Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached me Secret material will sign this form and indicate period of custody in the left-hand columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and indicate the date of handling in the right-hand columns.
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2. 2 .
Chinese dig d i g atom atom bomb bomb shelters shelters in i n Korea: Korea: A badly b a d l y garbled Chinese Communist u unit Korea message from an uniaentified unidentified C h i n e s e Communist n i t iin n Korea on 13 13 June J u n e reported that t h a t "construction " c o n s t r u c t i o n of of atom atom bomb bomb defenses" defenses" began on on 13 13 June. June. The a d d i t i o n a l repairs repairs began The message message mentioned mentioned additional on artillery a r t i l l e r y and and air a i r defenses defenses and and preventive p r e v e n t i v e measures m e a s u r e s being being taken t o guard against a g a i n s t damage damage from from rain. r a i n . (SUEDE t a k e n to (SUEDE 501st Comm Recon Grp G r p Korea, Korea, K-3874, K-3874, 16 16 June June 52) S2)
This message probably is a progress report on Comment: T h i s meseage the message, sent t h e May message, s e n t over o v e r a Chinese 8th 8 t h Artillery A r t i l l e r y Division Division net n e t which outlines outlines a a seven-point seven-point defense d e f e n s e program. program. I t referred It referred t to o a air i r defense, d e f e n s e , with w i t h emphasis emphasis on on esimouflage qdmouflage and and d defenses efenses a against gainst the t h e atom atom bomb. bomb,
3. 3.
A 4 April A p r i l Chinese Chinese message indicated i n d i c a t e d that t h a t literature l i t e r a t u r e about about the t h e atom bomb was to t o be be distributed, d i s t r i b u t e d , and and on 30 30 March a a Chinese Chinese propaganda broadcast s t a t e d that t h a t it i t would would be be a a "logical " l o g i c a l step" step" b r o a d c a s t stated for f o r the t h e United States, S t a t e s , following f o l l o w i n g the t h e alleged a l l e g e d BW-CW campaign, campaign, to t o use the t h e atom atom bomb. bomb,
North Korean Korean mechanized mechanized. unit u n i t visited v i s i t e d by by Supreme Supreme Headquarters: Headquarters: An from-an 'elementof oft h thelbth North 11 June June meSsage, message, proflably ,probably from an element e 10th N orth , An 11 Korean Mechanized Division,.stated D i v i s i o n , s t a t e d that t h a t "Supreme "Supreme Headquarters Headquarters .Tank (Headquarters OfficerS?) Tank ( Headquarters O f f i c e r s ? ) of the t h e Supreme Supreme Headquarters H e a d q u a r t e r s are. are. and are going going out o u t to t o the t h e battalions b a t t a l i o n s for f o r the t h e (plans?) ( p l a n s ? ) of of the the units ." The message reported u n i t s (for?) ( f o r ? ) this t h i s month on on 10 10 June. June. reported construction c o n s t r u c t i o n activity a c t i v i t y of of elements e l e m e n t s in i n the t h e division, d i v i s i o n , including including the (SUEDE t h e Ncaves " ( c a v e s for?) for?) the t h e tanks t a n k s received. received. .'I (SUEDE ROK Int Int .", Grp $ M Korea, SK-K-169, 8K-K-169, 13 13 June June 52) 52)
,
..
.
.
Comment: Comment: Although garbled and badly translated, t r a n s l a t e d , thisthis message special armored s staff or meseage suggests'the s u g g e s t s t h e existence e x i s t e n c e of of a s p e c i a l qrmored taff o r command command at a t North North Korean Korean Headquarters, H e a d q u a r t e r s , charged charged with w i t h armored armored affairs. affairs.
.
4. 4.
Armor continues c o n t i n u e s to t o arrive a r r i v e in i n North North Korea: Korea: "This " T h i s is to to report r e p o r t that t h a t 12 12 tanks t a n k s out out, of of the t h e 24 24 tanks t anks were were unloaded unloaded from from cars at t h e Chongchon Chongchon River). River). June llth, llth, a t Sunchon Sunchon (south ( s o u t h of of the .on June and the .the it t h e (unit?). (unit?). . t h e remaining 12 1 2 tanks t a n k s are are and arrived a r r i v e d 'OA expected e x p e c t e d to t o be be unloaded unloaded from from cars cars tonight," t o n i g h t , " reported reported possibly possibly the t h e supply s u p p l y unit u n i t of of the t h e 10th 1 0 t h North North Korean Korean Mechanized Mechanized Division Division on 12 June. June. (SUEDE (SUEDE ROK ROK Int I n t Grp Qrp M, SK-K-207, SK-K-207, 13 13 June June 52) sz3 on 12
.
2 2
18 June 52 52 18
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Commen : The The North North Koreans Koreans received r e c e i v e d at a t least least 43 43 tanks tanks Commen.1: and 2 self-propelled se - p r o p e l l e d guns guns in i n late l a t e April. A p r i l , On On 5 5 June June aa .shipshipand 22 ment of 16 16 self-propelled s e l f - p r o p e l l e d guns guns arrived. arrived. ment
Far E a s t Command n early h a t the the The F.ar East Command estimated estimated i in early May May t that N o r t h Koreans Koreans had had sonly o n l y 384 a n k s and e l f - p r o g e l l e d guns, guns, North 384 ttankS and 134 134 s self-propelled I n d i c a t i n g that t h a t they t h e y were t a n k s and e l f - p r o p e l l e d guns indicating were 59 tanks and 29 29 s self-propelled guns t h e number number of of allOted a l l o t e d armored armored vehicles. vehicles. s h o r t of the short

3 3
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FAR EAST
7. 7.

Chinese Communists order road reconnaissance in.XumsOng in Kumsong ., AmeSeage A message V4iSigeoi.on passed on 16 I5June:over June over the 21st 218% Rocket MITEcher Launcher Division Division net net ordered ordered 4 Ei subordinate subordinate unit unit to to ureconnoiter "reconnoiter Very very quickly quickly conditions conditions on on the:road the'road pasSing passing down down through through I1 Kumsong. KUmsong.
area: area t
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.The day, a another The ffollowing o l l o w i n g day, n o t h e r message stated s t a t e d that t h a t the the H e a d q u a r t e r s had requested r e q u e s t e d particulars p a r t i c u l a r s on the t h e road road Volunteer Headquarters a t Kumsong. Information I n f o r m a t i o n required r e q u i r e d ."this " t h i s BAternOonl' includgd Afternoon" included at t h e roads, r o a d s , and and the t h e 'limber number passabat? t he w i d t h and and condition c o n d i t i o n of of the the width passab4e i n spring s p r i n g and and summer. summer. The message further f u r t ' h e r stated: stated: 'W e are in "We p r e p a r e d to t o enter e n t e r battle b a t t l e at a t any time," time." (SUEDE 0 1 s t Comm prepared (SUEDE 5 501st.Comm Recon Grp Korea, K-3932 K-3932 and and K-3945, K-3945, 17 17 June June 52) 52) Recon.Grp-Korea,
I
Comment: T h i s urgent urgent r equest f o r information i n f o r n a t i o n on highThis request for highways in i n the t h e Kumsong sector may indicate i n d i c a t e enemy intentions i n t e n t i o n s to to e x t e s s i v e operations o p e r a t i o n s in in this t h i s area. area. conduct more extensive
I n the t h e past few weeks hostilities h o s t i l i t i e s have increased i n c r e a s e d in i n the the In Kumsong Xumsong area, a r e a , where two two Chinese Communist Communis! armies are deployed deployed f a c i n g the t h e ROK ROK II I I Corps. Corps. facing
8. 8.
! '
9 9.

Korea Korea continues': continues':
4
A Artillery r t i l l e r y fire f i r e directions d i r e c t i o n s in i n Russian Ruesian noted noted in in Korea: Korea: A' A Russian-language radiotelephone c o n v e r s a t i o n wad intercepted Russian-language radiotelephone conVereation wae intertepted i n Korea on on-14 A p r i l by by an an unverifiable u n v e r i f i a b l e source. s o u r c e . The in 14 April The trans.tranamission t o be be disguised d i s g u i s e d field f i e l d artillery a r t i l l e r y fire f i r e directions directions misoion seemed seemed to passed pagmed between a forward observer, o b s e r v e r , a unit u n i t commander, commander, and battery b a t t e r y positions. p o s i t i o n s . (SUEDE AFSA lar-TIp RU-TIS 2132, 17 June June 52) 52) (SUEDE AF8A 2132, 17
Comment: No similar transmissions t r a n s m i s s i o n s have been reported reported p r i o r to t o or o r since s i n c e this prior t h i s date. d a t e . The Thg intercepted i n t e r c e p t e d conversation conversation suggests a r t i l l e r y unit of b battalion-size a t t a l i o n - s i z e or less less s u g g e s t s a field artillery g o i n g into i n t o firing f i r i n g position, p o s i t i o n , adjusting a d j u a t i n g fire, f i r e , and firing firing a going m ission. mission.
T h e r e is I s no no confirmation c o n f i r m a t i o n of the the presence of o f $oviet Soviet There a r t i l l e r y units u n i t s in i n Koiea,.other Korea,' o t h e r than t h a n antiaircraft a n t i a i r c r a g t artillery. artillery. artillery A recent r e c e n t intelligence i n t e l l i g e n c e report, r e p o r t , hoWever, however, stated s t a t e d that t h a t Soviet Soviet a r t i l l e r y was moving toward toward the t h e front f r o n t in i n early earay May. May. artillery
Chinese Communist r o n t , llinepetroleum i n e petroleum build-up build-up in in Chinese Communist f front The Artillery f i e headquarters h e a d q u a r t e r s of the t h e 7th Ar tillery b i v i s i o n . located Division, located on on the t h e eastern e a s t e r n front f r o n t in in Korea, Korea. on 11 1 1 June June indicated i n d i c a t e d that t h a t it i t had had stored s t o r e d 1,000 1,000 harrels parrels of of gasoline. gasoline, I It t i t s 20th 2 0 t h Artillery A r t i l l e r y Regiment Reg3ment had already a l s o repokted r e p o k t e d that t h a t its also (SUEDE 501st 501st Comm t transported r a n s p o r t e d an additional 700 700 barrels. barrels. (SUEDE Recon Grp Grp Korea, Korea, K-3849, K-3849, 15 1 5 June June 52) 59) Comment: The storage s t o r a g e of of 1,000 barrels of gasoline g a s o l i n e by the Division represents t h e 7th 7 A rArtillery fillery D ivision r e p r e s e n t s approximately approximately 50,000 SO, 000 ' gallons g a l l o n s for f o r the t h e 418 418 operable o p e r a b l e vehicles v e h i c l e s of of the t h e division. division. A r e c e n t l y reported r e p o r t e d "Volunteer V o l u n t e e r Headquartersll requires recently Headquarters" directive requires each monthst'supply of of f food, t o store s t o r e two monthe,'supply o o d , ammunition and e a c h unit u n i t to petroleum.
19 June 52 52
TOP SECRET SUEDE-
'I
10. 10.
N e w Soviet t l o v i e t jet.fighter j e t f i g h t e r units. u n i t s iin n Manchuria e l i e v e d at at New Manchuria b believed Tun f e n : -Russian R u s s i a n voice v o i c e tratfic t r a f f i c passed paseed Oft on t h e GCI n e t in in Tungfeng: the GO net ManChuria anc u r a and Korea Korlea during d u r i n g May indicated i n d i c a t e d that t h a t the three new jet f i g h t e r units u n i t s which appeared on 21 A p r i l werd t fighter April were based based a at Tungfeng, Manchuria, a according Tungfeng, in in central. c e n t r a l Manchuria, c c o r d i n g to t o the t h e US US Air A i r ForCe. Force, These units u n i t s have have been been used used for f o r night n i g h t combat flights f l i g h t s and and daydayatrols o v e r Korea in In recent r e c e n t weeks. weeks. (SUEDE ir light b order p 'light border patrols over (SUEDE A Air F o r c e Roundup Roundup 117, 117, 17 17 June June 52) 52) Force
&
Comment: There are nine n i n e units u n i t s now active a c t i v e on this t h i s RusSian Russian Comment: GC' majority of thelenemy thelenemy f fighters G C I net,' n m which c h ddirects i r e c t s tthe he m a j o r i t y of ighters e n c o u n t e r e d by encountered by US-UN L J S U N aircraft a i r c r a f t over o v e r Korea. Korea. I n March there there In were six s i x units u n i t s operating o p e r a t i n g under under the t h e control c o n t r o l of of .this t h i s net n e t based based were a at t Yalu R RiVer i v e r fields f i e l d s or o r Anshan. Anshan. A11,with possible exception A l l , w i t h the t h e possibke exce@tion of one, o n e , were equipped equipped with w i t h MIG-15's. MIG-l5's,
11. 11.

5 5
Dairen-based Dairen-based jet j e t fighters f i g h t e r s fly fly to t o Mukden: Yukden: A Chinese C h i n e s e ComCommunist message scheduled Soviet muniet s c h e d u l e d four four S o v i e MIG-15 t ~ 0.15 m jet fighters f i g h t e r s for f l i g h t on 16 16 June June from from Dairen Dairen to t o Mukden Mukden and and back. back: a flight According t o t he A ir F o r c e , these these a i r c r a f t are s ubordinate t o one of to the Air Force, aircraft subordinate to of t he S oviet 5 th F leet u n i t s which o t h e Antung in the Soviet 5th Fleet units which moved moved t to the Antung 4rea area in l a t e 1951 1951 and later l a t e r returned r e t u r n e d to t o Dairen. Dairen. (SUEDE ir F orce late (SUEDE A Air Force Roundup 117, 17 17 June June b2) $2) Roundup 117,
the f irst f l i g h t s observed this Comment: These are the Comment: first flights observed this year BT-76Viet of S o v i e t MIG-15's MIG-15vs from D Dairen a i r e n to t o other other p points o i n t s in i n Manchuria. Manchuria. the fall however, t there several flights In t he f a l l of 1951, 1051, however, h e r e were s everal f lights totalling a t least least 60 aircraft a i r c r a f l t from from Dairen Dairen to t o Antung. Antung. t o t a l l i n g at
19 June 52
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reconnatssance in in Kumsong Kumsong area: 3. Chinese Chinese Communtsts Communists order order road reconnaissance
US US Army Army Korea

Tune 52 17 June 62
SUEDE SUEDE
'3c-3cig. X-3YYC
x -3739 X-3
A A message passed on 16 June over the 21st Rocket Launcher Launcher Dtvision Division net net ordered ordered a subordinate unit unit to to "reconnoiter "reconnoiter very qutckly road passing passingdown quickly condittons conditions on the road down throughKumsong. I? through Kumsong . . ."
..
4.

Artillery inin Russian noted in Artillery fire ftredirections directions Russiannatted in Korea:
The The followtng followingday, day,another another message message stated that the Volunteer Volunteer Headquarters had had requested requested particulars particulars on the road at atKumsong. Kumsong. Information "this afternoon" afternoon" included included Information required required "this the width width and I n and condition conditionof ofthe theroads, roads, and the the number number passable in spring stated: "We 'We are are prepared prepared spring and and summer. The message further stated: battle at atany any time." time." to enter battle
Morurgent request for for inforComment; Comment: This urgent mation on highways highways tn in sector may may indicate indicate enemy inmation % e h tthe-TaiThongsector tentions to conduct more extensive extensive operations operations in in this this area. conduct more are&
In the the past few few weeks weeks hostitities hostilities have have tninIn creased in the the Kumsong Kumsong area, where whoretwo two Chinese Communist Communist armies creased in armies are deployed facing facing the theROK ROK H II Corps. are deployed Corps.
A Russian-language radiotelephone Armed Forces Forces A Russian-Language radtotelephone conconwas Intercepted intercepted in in Korea Korea on on Security Agency Agency versatton was versation Security 17 June 14 April April by by an an unverifiable source. The June 52 52 transmission seemed seemed to to be be disguised disguised field SUEDE SUEDE transmission artillery RUT&3 ks-a_ GL artillery fire ftredirections directtonspassed passed between between a R forward forward observer, observer, a a unit commander, commander, and and battery positions. posittons.
No similar transmissions transmtssions have have Comment: No Comment: been reported prior thiss date. prtor to to or o since r m date. The intercepted conversation suggests a field artillery artillery unit battalion-size or less unit of of battalton-size lessgoing ptng into firing position, position, adjusting adjusting fire, and and firing firing a a mission. mt8ston.
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i sno no confirmation confirmation of a There is of the the presence of Sovtet artillery A Soviet artillery units units in inKorea, Korea,other otherthan thanantiatrcraft antiaircraftartillery. artillery. A recant artillery was recent intelligence intelligience report, however, however, stated stated that that Soviet Soviet artillery was moving toward the front in in early earlyMay. May.
5. Rheereportedly reportedlyplans plansto todiscredit discreditAmerican American Ambassador: Ambassador: 5. Rhee

I
I
President Rhee is is determined determined to to build a case charging charging American A mer ican Ambassador Muccio South Korean Muccio with with interference interference in South politics, learned froM Ponce nave been coIlecthii Police have collecting information on all Korean employees employees a at ]American American installatiops, subaubjecttng many of and have maintained mainthined a close jecting many of them them to to interrogation, interrogation, and watch on those in the American Embassy. on those Comment: A A plan plan to to discredit discredit Ambassador Mucclo Muccio can not not be confirmed. c o n f i r m e dHowever, w e v e r , Rhee has has told told a aranking rankingUN UN official in offichl that there there was was "corruption" tlcorruptionlt in the the American American Embassy. Embassp
The Embassy Embassy has has reported reported police police surveillance surveillance The during the past weeks, and and some someKorean Korean employees employees have have been subjected dclrtng to pressure. pressure.
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1.
Soviet Union holds Satellite Economic Conference in BudaThe Soviet-sponsored Council of Economic Mutual Assistance reportedly met in Budapest on 21-23 April to fix delivery deadlines for trade among the European Satellites, and to emphasize that production for export within the Orbit has priority over domestic requirements. Poland, East Germapv. and Rumania were criticized for failure to meet schedules
pest:
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Comment: Dissatisfaction with the Rumanian economic situatioiriii-The reason given for-recent purges of prominent government officials which began shortly after this meeting. Further evidence of continued Soviet concern with Satellite economic performance was manifested on 1 June when work-norms in Hungary were railed in answer to Soviet demands.
2.
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Rumored movement of Polish troops into Czech training area: 1 the US Military Attache in Accorrifll Prague, two Polish military units of unknown size with guns and tanks passed through Hradic Kralove near the Polish border on the way to the Karlovy Vary area in western Bohemia. The MA observes that recent expansion of the Cisorsky Les training area near Karlovy Vary increases the possibility that sizable exercises may be held in the late summer or fall. He believes, however, that if exercises involving Polish and Czech. forces are now under wav. they are probably of company or battalion size.
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Similar rumors in previous years have never
been arillWed.
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Hungarian Prime Minister fears wars Floirime Minister Dobi fears that a growing tension there will be a war, as the symptoms point to tasked what the in international relations. that he actually outcome of the war would be, Dobi replied believed the West would win.
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believes that the acbount The American Legation in Budapest and that Dobi, although a is probably substantially accurate atmosphere prevailing mere figurehead, may well reflect the .among Hungarian leaders.
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Party has been Dobi's chief usefulness to the Communist laborer he has attracted the fact that as a former genuine farm As a leader peasant support for the unpopular party program. mainin the government of the Smallholder Party, his presence tains the fiction of a popular front.
4.
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Rumania steps up "hate America" drive: The American Lefront-page editorial gation in Bucharest reports that a vicious of the Rumanian Workers' on 15 June in Scanteia, official organ hate-America drive. Party, appears to initiate a' stepped-up of "inferior The editorial asserts that mains extermination of Malthusianism" "imperialistic distortion peoples" based on an Korean "barbarities" are an is American policy and that the for a campaign application of this policy. The paper calls Number 1" of peace to expose American imperialism as "Enemy to American-inspired an entire nave and humanity a "atrocities." Rumanian General ConfederaComment: On the same day the incidents to the UN. tion of Labor protested the Koje Island
which Rumania has now taken up the "atrocity" approach in early May and the USSR launched after the Dodd incident and East German which appeared in Soviet the "Malthusian" angle propaganda last week.

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FAR EAST Ranking members of Soviet mission in Japan returning to Moscow: Representatives of the Soviet mission in Tokyo called at the British Embassy on 14 June and requested transit visas to Hong Kong for fivenembers of the mission, including the chief, Major General Aleksei Kislenko and a political adviser. The party desires to go to Moscow this week via Hong Kong and China. The departure of some ranking members may be a Comment: SovienpritTire in response to recent Japanese demands for the Retention of a working staff of approximission's withdrawal. mately 65 in Tokyo maintains the Soviet position that the dissolution of the Allied Council for Japan is "illegal." japanese Diet considering bill for Ryukyus liaison office: A Foreign Office-sponsored bill to establish Japanese Government liaidon offices in the Ryukyus is being consineied in -thitlit Lower House, according to Ambassador Murphy. Passage The Naka office on Okinawa may be opened as appears imminent
early. as 1 July.
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newly-Maid central legislature, have petitioned for the

return of the islands to Japan. One of the major disappointments to the Japanese in the peace treaty was its failure to proiride for the return of the Ryukyus. The establishment of the liaison offices will probably be viewed in both areas as an initial step toward the islands being returned eventually. to japen's administrative control.
7.
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Rhee reportedly plans to discredit American Ambassador: President Rhee'is determined to build a case charging American Ambassador Muccio with interference in South Korean polities., Ilearned from al Police have been collecting information on all Korean employees at American installations, subjecting many of them to interrogation, and have maintained a close watch on those in theAmerican Embassy.
1
Numerous groups in the Ryukyus, including the
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A plan to discredit Ambassador Muccio can not Comment.: be confirmed at this time. However, Rhee has told' Ithat there was "corruption" in the American 'Embassy.
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The Embassy has reported police surveillance during the past weeks, and some Korean employees have been subjected to pressure.
S.
Rhee's opposition to continue fight in hope of UN intervention: South Korean Assemblymen opposed to Presidea Rhee
IFF-Wtermined to continue the fight,"I
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'learned from/
This
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determination springs from their beliefthat the UN Commis25X1 sion (UNCURK) and the EighthArmy will protect the Assembly compound, and "will take practical control of the ROK government before the presidential election." 125X1
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9.
Chinese aircraft assembly plant rePorted in north Manchuria: r the Chinese Communists in. June ivol openea what they can the "first airplane plant" at Tsitsihar, on the Chinese Changchun Railway. From August 1951 to March 1952 this plant reportedly assembled 453 conventional aircraft -- old types suitable for training purposes only. Some of the engines and tarts, all of which were shipped from the USSR, were not new. 25X1
1
.10.
Comment: Peiping Radio first announced the existence of an "Aviation Industry Bureau" in June 1951. Laftiew of the growth'of the Chinese Communist Air FOrce over the past year, there are probably many plants in China-deeigned to assemble and repair coibat and training aircraft received from the USSR.
FrenCh behind removal of popular Cambodian Cabinet: The US Charge'in Saigon, in commenting on official French denials of iMplication in the King's 15 June overthrow of the Cambodian-Cabiiet, states that it is inconceivable that the King woUld have seized the initiative Without securing French aPProval. French armored troops with American equipment are now parading the PhnowPenh streets and are posted with machine guns at street corners.
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Comment: While this belief may exist among some of the opposition Assemblymen, there is increasing evidence that Rhee's intimidation campaign is paying off and that the "will to resist" Of many Assemblymen has been seriously weakened. Ambassador Muccio reported on 16 June that Rhee could probably effect a comprokise favorable to himself with the Assembly at any time but that it appeared likely that he would continue his campaign until the oppositionwas eliminated.
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The Charge in Phnom Penh points out that a democratic government, responsible to an elected legislature, has been replaced by a government responsible only to the monarch. The King, he says, has by-passed the constitution with the aid of French military force and has probably alienated public opinion. 25X1
Comment: The deposed government, which in recent months has ilaiigiugly insisted on a relaxation of French controls, possesses more than a tWo-thirds membership in the Cambodian Assembly. The highhanded dismissal of the cabinet may not bring an immediate explosion, but certainly foreshadows an accelerated deterioration Of the political situation in
Cambodia.
11.
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Pakistani Cabinet reportedly writes off Kashmir: Accord4 the Pakistani Cabinet in a secret meeting in May wrote off Kashmir as lost to Pakistan. 'The cabinet decided to emPhasize other issues in an attempt to divert public attention-from the Kashmir problem. 25X1
1
Comment: While, Pakistan's leaders have on occasion Shown despaTI-RUF any favorable solUtiOn of-the Kashmir dispute, there is no evidence that the Pakistani Cabinet has adopted such a drastic attitude as writing off Kashmir. UN Representative Graham is at present carrying on negotiations on the subject with Indian and Pakistani representatives to the United Nations in New York.
\I.
Greek Communists may benefit from reopening of trade with Deviet.bioc: During his recent visit to Moscow, George Terzekis, a Greek businessman, concluded a barter transaction
SECRET
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SOUTH ASIA
Reverberations may also reach Vietdam, where unpopular Tam government has just been installed, Vietnamese Nationalists may well be given further distrust ultimate French intentions in Indochina, refuse cooperation in opposing the Viet Minh.
the highly and where cause to, and to
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
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'with the Soviet Union for goods totalling more than one And ihree-quarters million British pounds against an almoet.equal amount of Greek tobacco and bay leaves. Terzakis As_also reported to have concluded transactions with Rumania, Czechothlovakia and the Soviet-controlled USIA in Vienna Which totalled approximately 10,000,000 dollars.
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Comment: While none of the contemplated Greek exports is a strategic item, trade with the Soviet Orbit, already spoeeored by the Communist radio as the panateefor Greece's economic ills, would tend to strengthen COmMunist efforts in Greece. The Greeks have shown an increasing tendency recently to blamethe United Statee for the economic hardships resulting from the government's failuire to take the unpalatable reforms necessary if Greece is to avert 4 financial and economic Crisis. The feeling ie particularIY strong in strategic Macedonia where the destitution of more than 50,000 tobacco farMers is becoming a major relief problem.
13.
France agrees.to negotiate statue Of American armed forces in Morocco: The United States Ambassador in Paris reports that the krench Foreign Office Legal Adviser has agreed to negotiate a'special agreement defining the rights and obligations of American aried forces in Morocco. The Legal Adviser agreed that these negotiations would American differencei oier the also stated that no ieference by the French in the 'hearings International Court.' with American representatives be treated.apart from French-: spedial regime in Morocco. He to this agreement would be lade on the Moroccan case before the
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Comment: This agreement to negotiate is an indication of French:willingness not to complicate French-American differennee over Morocco by the introductianof a technical:question.
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West German Bundestag leader suggests program for European On a recent trip tO the United States, Richard prrairr-unity: a prominent German industrialist and deputy chairman 61-06rg, of the Bandestag's Foreign Trade Committee, told American officials that he thought an immediate program to unify Europe, politically and economically, would stimulate the Europeans to push defense measures "without qualification." He felt that France, Italy, and Germany would agree to a unity program if the United States actively exerted its leadership in that direction, and he suggested that the US dispense aid to "Europe" rather than to its individual countries. Freudenberg believed he could be influential in securing the backing of Germany's Christian Democratic and Social Democratic parties for a unity program.
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15.
Government-labor dispute abates in West Germany: The compromise reached on 13 June by Chancellor Adenauer and the chairman of the West German Federation of Trade Unions not only temporarily ended the violent dispute over the government's draft co-determination law, but also may have averted a serious threat to the government's foreign policies. Had the dispute continued, the federation's leadersmight have been forced by their supporters to adopt an all-out stand against the federal coalition's policies, particularly its Western integration program. Adenauer agreed that there would be no immediate parliamentary action on the draft law, and that a government-labor committee should be established to revise it. The committee will begin work on 30 June in Duesseldorf. Some coalition leaders feel, however, that the basic positions of the disputants are irreconcilable. Furthermore, they predict that conservative elements in the coalition will be successful in obtaining parliamentary passage of the law On the other hand, next month against labor's objections. American observers helieve that Adenauer will be able to delay parliamentary consideration of the law, and thus avert another head-on clash between lnbor and the government.
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16.
French Communists seen switching to conciliatory tactics: At the close of a two-day national congress the French fellowtraveling Union of Progressives approved a direct appeal to leading non-Communist political and economic groups calling for a cessation of hostilities in of German rearmament, a settlement Indochina, the prevention of the Korean conflict, and the safeguarding of constitutional liberties and social achievements realized during the Liberation.
No mention was made of direct action and this conciliatory approach by a leading Communist political front dovetails with the sudden abatement of the Communist Party's hard policy. The American Embassy in Paris observes that the Communists are evidently beating a tactical retreat as a result of the confusion into which government repressive measures have thrown them.
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17.
Italy seeks means to counter Soviet trade propaganda: The favorable 'reaction of the Italian delegation to the recent Moscow Economic Conference has disturbed the Italian Government, which firmly believes in trade between_ Western Europe that a significant increase achieved either safely or easily. and the USSR cannot be The Italian Communists seem to have strengthened their popular standing somewhat by' their propaganda statements that greater trade with the Orbit would buttress the country's economy and lessen international tension.
To counter this propaganda, Italy favors publicity on East-West trade controls to demonstrate that only a small part of Italo7Orbit trade is affected. Government spokesmen have already ably publicized the fact that the Orbit countries are responsible for the failure of trade levels to rise within existingtrade agreements. The Italian Government believes, however, that the Orbit propaganda campaign may be more successful now since the trade restrictions imposed by the United States over the past year have had an unfavorable effect on Italian public opinion. These restrictions may also account in part creasing intransigence on the enforcement for Italy's inof East-West trade controls and its seeming determination to export to the Orbit strateeic_items contracted for prior to COCOS embargo.
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American Embassy sees Sweden unintimidated by Soviet acThe US Embassy at Stockholm believes-that the Soviet Tracks on Swedish planes, far from frightening Sweden back to a more rigid neutrality policy, will only aggravate its intensely anti-Soyiet feeling. The incidents have aroused-the Swedes from their complacent self-satisfaction in foreign affairs. The Embassy does not expect any fOrMal Change in Sweden's alliance7free policy, but simply a greater pro-Western emphasis inits pplication.
tion:
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Comment: Periodically the Swedes are assailed by doubts concalitErthe :soundness -of their foreign polic*; the current incidents will greatly stimulate their soul-searching.
19.
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Bolivian.President said to be strongest supporter of tin nationalization: The presider:1i of the-Banco Minero has implied that Bolivian Preblaent Paz Estenssoro is personally, responsible for the present trend toward nationalization; he doubts trat the maior pressure for expropriation comes from Lechin.
Comment: Paz 10 June speech at the swearing in of the Tin NWITURETization Study CoMmission also ind*cated his determination to carry out nationaliiation of the three principal tin mines. Up to that time Minister of Mines and Petroleum Lechin had been the official most vocal on the subject.
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20.
25X1
Pro-Argentine Ecuadoran army officers reportedly trying to undermine US Military Mission: Nine Ecuadoran army offi cers have been named1 las workine in the 25X1X interest of Argentina by disseminating propaganda and attempting to discredit the US Military Mission in Ecuador. They hay, been advocating the replacement-of the US Mission by an Argentine group which, they say, Would cost less and woUld give instructiOn "more in accordance with the realities and s iri " of the Ecuadoran Army. / 25X1
Comment:.
LATIN AMERICA
ArgenarIRents since
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1950:
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the Ecuadoran Command and Generai Staff School which was closed in February because of the anti-government and proArgentine sentiment discovered there.
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According to another, recent report,:intensive pro-Argentine propaganda in ECuador wafltarted in February or March 1952, and has been hsndled in part by: the:propaganda chief of the Concentration of PoPplar ForceS, :one ol the grouPs supporting presidentrelect Nelasco.Ibarra.
The present Ecuadoran Government has been fearful of Argentine inflUence and recently declared the Argentine Ambassador persona% non grata'onrthe ground that he was interfer= ing in the presidential election campaign.
21.
Comment: Soviet diplomatic, consular,..and domestic:personneT-TE-UTeguay total about:25 .persons, net counting wives and children. The Legation Maintains close liaison with Slav minority groups and there is evidence thit'it has more frequent overt contacts with local Communists than either of the other. USSR diplothatic establishments in' Latin America. The Uruguayan Government granted agrement in May for a new Minister from the USSR to Uruguay: :The post had' previously been VacSnt for more thamthree years: r "
Uruguay hai had no representative in Moscow sinceH1947. A Minister was appointed.by 'the 'administration in 1948, but Congress refused to approve the appointment.

SECRET
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Uruguay,, may be,donsidering diplomatic appointment-to Moscow: :Tne possibleyappointment'.of-an pruguayap_charge d Arfaires tnMosdow was rumored,in.the Uruguayan-presS recently. There has been nO official confirmation of the rumors, but contradictory informal statements !7s, Foreign Office Officials suggest that such an appointment is being considered.
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This digest of significant reports been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of has Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence. represent the immediate views of the Office of CurrentComments Intelligence.
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TOP SECRET THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS. 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. EASTERN EUROPE
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Comment: However rife speculation has been over a possible split in the Albanian Government and Communist Party ranks, no open dispute has occurred to upset the present hierarchy. A continuous purge has been going on since early 1951 which has served to tighten Soviet control in Albania, keeping both Hoxha and Shehu loyal supporters of Soviet policy.
ositions: Iwithin position of Minister of Interior Mehmet Shehu has become continually stronger because of his support by the Soviet Military Attache in Tirana. The shift in favor probably occurred after the often-mentioned bomb explosion at the Soviet Legation in Tirana in February 1951 for which Premier Hoxha was forced to denounce a number of his friends for deviationism and inefficiency. The Soviet Military Attache, who was responsible for state security and logically was the man to suffer for this breach of security, remained in his position and gave free rein to Shehu for proceeding with executions and imprisonments. Former Soviet Minister Chuvakhin, who championed Premier Hoxha, left Albania in December 1951 with no public recoRnition after five years' service in Tirana. states that, as Shehu received a position not inferior to Hoxha at the March Congress of the Albanian Workers' Party and as Hoxha is now deprived of Chuvakhin's protection, the net result might be 25X1A that Hoxha will meet an unhappy end.
assesses Albanian leaders'
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Communists continue c o n t i n u e to t o be uneasy uneasy about a b o u t UN amphibious "According to report in Korea: Korea: "A ccording t o a r e p o r t from Supreme i n t e n t i o n s in intentions Readquarters, t h e , American American Pacific P a c i f i c Fleet F l e e t departed departed YoklAuka, Yokabuka, R e a d q u a r t e r s , the Japan, a North North Korean Korean t tactical unit J a p a n , and and is is at a t iiea," d,ea," a actical u n i t on o n the the east coast stated stated on on 7 7 June. J u n e . The message added added that that "scheduled " s c h e d u l e d for dawn of 7 7 June J u n e is is a a plan p l a n to t o make a landing Ianding Therefore in the vicinity Wonsan and and Tongchon. Tongchon. T h e r e f o r e you will will i n t he v i c i n i t y of Wonsan p r e p a r a t i o n s for f o r combat. combat. (SUEDE ASAPAC Japan ." make preparations PASA1, 810, 810, 1 16 PAS& 6 June 52) 52)

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Comment: Although it i t is is possible that t h a t this this is is a a training training m e s s a mby by North N o r t h Korean Korean units u n i t s defending d e f e n d i n g the t h e east east coast, coast, messafe-WET it nevertheless i t n e v e r t h e l e s s highlights h i g h l i g h t s the t h e continuing c o n t i n u i n g Communist Communist fear fear of of amphibious action. action. UN amphibious
7. 7 ,
Another Bino-Korean Sino-Korean border b o r d e r point p o i n t seen s e e n used used by-Communist by-Communist forces:. An u unidentified North borea Korean' mechanized u unit an mechanized n i t commander f o r c e s : An n i d e n t i f l ed North was ordered on 14 1 4 June June to ascertain a s c e r t a i n whether whether someone c could o u l d go " t o Supung. . . t o receive cars?). (SUEDE Int "to .to receive (motor cars?). ." (SUEDE ROK Int Grp G r p M Korea, SK-K-245, SK-K-245, 15 1 5 June J u n e 52) 52)
.
. ."
.
Svpung is is a a border b o r d e r town town near n e a r the t h e giant g i a n t hydrohydroComment: Supung e elect7TE-Tant l e c t r i c p l a n t on on the t h e Yalu Yalu River. River. A v e h i c u l a r bridge b r i d g e crosses crosses vehicular t h e Yalu in i n this t h i s area. area. There is is no current c u r r e n t information I n f o r m a t i o n on on the the the of the t h e bridge. b r i d g e . Previously P r e v i o u s l y the the p r i n c i p a l ports p o r t s of of c o n d i t i o n of condition principal e n t r y for f o r supplies s u p p l i e s into i n t o Korea Korea were were Sinuiju, S i n u i j u , Chian, Chian, and and Tumen: Tumen; entry
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Copy No. 5 3
DOCUMENT NO.
33
Mt/CHANGE IN CLASS.
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S Dis
O DECLASSIRED CLASS. CHANCED TO: TS

NEXT RevIEw DATE:
Au-nt.tw
DATE/1
1
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REVIEWER _
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TOP SECRET
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State Departmentoryligagnpfragse 2003110/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000700330001-7

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Approved F r Release 2003110115 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0007 00330001-7
SUMMARY
GENERAL
1.
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FAR EAST
2.
Possible Chinese concession on POW's reported (page 3).
3. 4.
5. 6.
7.
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(page 4). (page 5).
WESTERN EUROPE
LA TIN AMERICA
EASTERN EUROPE
Comment on reduction of Yugoslav diplomatic staff in Sofia
USSR reportedly takes over full control of Hungarian aluminum
Response to French loan disappointing (page 5). Franco reportedly plans to assume position of regent (page 6).
Argentina bars broadcast of US denial of press censorship

(page 6).
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0330001-7
1.
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2.
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Possible Chinese concession on POW's reported:

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was told by Chou En-lai on 15 June that the Chinese were willing to consider two alternative proposals for solving the prisoner-of-war question at Panmunjom, the British Foreign Office has learned. -325X1A

FAR EAST
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Approved Fo Release c 2003/10115 : CIA-RDP79T00975A00070 330001-7
According to Ambassador Gifford, the first proposal is a reduction in the number of POW's to be repatriated, and the second acceptance by the UN of the principle that all POW's who wished could return to their homes. The POW's not electing to do so would be brought to Panmunjom "after being freed from the military influence and control of Kuomintang and Rhee agents" to be interviewed by "neutral nations" and Red Cross representatives from both sides. The North Koreans and Chinese would then abide by the prisoners' decisions.
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tinued to stress the "impermissible" nature of UN screening owing to pressure from "Kuomintang and Rhee agents." Chou's develop ment of this theme ay mean that the Communists are interested in a face-saving compromise.
Comment:
Communist propaganda has con-
ee er.
Ambassador Gifford concludes that, although unreliability must be considered, this may be a "genuine
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EASTERN EUROPE
3.
Comment on reduction of Yugoslav diplomatic staff in Sofia:
The recall of all but one official of Yugoslavia's Embassy staff in Bulgaria follows a series of official Yugoslav-Bulgarian recriminations concerning mistreatment of diplomatic missions. It is probable that the staff of the Bulgarian Embassy in Belgrade will now be reduced.
While relations between the two governments have been moving in the direction of a complete break, it would appear to be advantageous for both countries to continue maintaining diplomatic missions I
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4.
USSR reportedly takes over full control of Hungarian aluminum:
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The USSR is reported to have taken over full control of the hitherto 25X1A jointly-administered Magyar-Soviet Bauxite Aluminum Company. Simultaneously the c e o I e non- errous metals department of the Ministry of Mining and his deputy were removed.
The USSR has gradually been tightening its control over this key Hungarian industry. Assumption of complete control by the Soviet Union is logical in view of the recent
Comment:
5.
Response to French loan disappointing:
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The French Government is disappointed because the first three weeks of its new loan drive have resulted in the sale of barely half of the first bond issue. While 50 percent of the 45'1 million dollars received so far represents a return of hidden capital to circulation, less than 10 percent is ingold.
Subscriptions are lagging, particularly in rural districts, partly because of pre-harvest cash shortages, but also because of dissatisfaction with the government's current firm stand against agricultural price increases.
5

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During 1951 Hungary accounted for more than one third of the total Soviet Orbit bauxite production, and aug_aented the USSR's production of aluminum by 15 percent. The Hungarian bauxite industry in 1952 is scheduled to increase its 1951 output by fifty-three percent.
severe criticism levelled at the bauxite industry and the critical need of the Soviet Orbit for aluminum.
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Comment: The fate of the Pinay government will be determined largely by the success of this drive, the money from which is urgently needed to provide a minimum investment program and meet the administrative and military deficits. It is primarily important to the government for its psychological effect, however, because it tests popular confidence in the anti-inflation program.
6.
Franco ILeErtedl
lans tnssinti
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of regent:
Comment: Such a step would permit Franco to remain in power another 16 years.
The Pretender, Don Juan, has consistently refused to relinquish his rights to the throne in favor of his son or to recognize the validity of the 1947 Law of Succession.
If Franco carries out this plan, he will risk creating an incident serious enough to threaten the security of the regime. Such action would therdore indicate his confidence in the security of his position.
LA TIN A MERICA
7.
Argentina bars broadcast of US denial of press censorship:

The director of the Argentine governmentcontrolled radio on 18 June refused to allow the US Embassy in Buenos Aires to broadcast the State Department's official denial "The Reason for my Life" has been banned in
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General tranco plans to name the minor son of Don Juan as heir-apparent to the Spanish throne and to assume the position regen mse I. is action will allegedly he taken before 18 July, the anniversary of the outbreak of the Civil War.
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The previous day the director had cut the statement from the script of the Embassy's radio program on the grounds that permission for its use had to come from higher authorities.
the United States.
The Embassy comments that it is now evident that Argentine officials will not allow the 'denial to be broadcast or to be published in the Spanish-language press.
Charges that the United States has banned Senora de Peron's book currently highlight Argentina's anti-US campaign. Only two small English-language newspapers in Buenos Aires have published a denial of the charges.
Comment:
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OCI No. 6425

Copy No.
2 76
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DIA AND DOS RELEWpRiSsTatkPiigieranD172117W7rrCIA:RDP19T01146A001000290001-0 APPLY

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NATIONAL THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THEOF THE STATES WITHIN THE MEANING DEFENSE OF THE UNITED AND 794, THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS. 793 TO AN TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
GENERAL
1.
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Charge may react Venezuelan measures against Soviet Ambassador Kerman warns against Western diplomats in Moscow: are not treated that if the Soviet representatives in Venezuela be serious with full courtesy until they leave, there may Venezuelan repnot only against the repercussions in Moscow The Ambassador resentative but possibly against other missions. precedent for points out that it is important not to set a in relations. mistreatment of diplomats in the case of a break for perMeanwhile, Czechoslovakia has asked Venezuela Ind the Czech mission to represent Soviet interests there, Minister in informed the Venezuelan Vice Foreign Minister Caracas were permitted Prague that unless the Soviet staff in is prepared to take to leave Venezuela freely, the Soviet Uniin "whatever stens the situation required."
1
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during In response to Venezuelan provocations Comment: broke relations with the preceding week, the USSR on 13 June of international and violations Venezuela charging "hooliganism" reported that on the night of A usually reliable source law. by police, and a Embassy was surrounded the break, the Soviet to leave. beaten when he tried Soviet official was badly asked that the InterThe Soviet Embassy in Caracas has "mistreatment" by the national Red Cross Investigate the Venezuelans. Ambassador Kennan on 14 June emphasized that the Soviet "obviously actnote to Venezuela stated that Venezuela was masters." ing under the direction of its North American
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2.
Venezuela breaks relations with Czechoslovakia: Venezuela broke diplomatic relations with Czechoslovakia on 20 June after the Czech Minister presented a Soviet note which the Venezuelan Foreign Ministry considered unacceptable.
1
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Comment: The break with Czechoslovakia occurred within a week of the Venezuelan rupture with the USSR. In both cases, Venezuela apparently seized an opportune moment to make a break. There are no other Orbit diplomatic missions in Venezuela.
3.
Bulgarian Premier claims fulfillment of Five Year Plan for cooperative farms: In an article published in the Cominform journal on 13 June, Premier Vulko Chervenkov asserted that, in less than four years, the Bulgarian Five %eat Plan for agricultural output had been fulfilled. During the mare period, Bulgaria "also succeeded in reaching the level envisaged by the Five Year Plan for cooperation in agriculture and its mechanization."
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Czech diplomatic missions in Latin America have been active in gathering intelligence and in promoting trade transactions, both legal and illegal, designed to alleviate the dollar shortage in Czechoslovakia.
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Comment: The Bulgarian Five Year Plan ham envisaged the collectivization of 60 percent of all arable land in the country by the end of 1953.. Although later announcements have asserted that "half" of the land is now in the socialist sector, the most recent official reports have been limited to the statement that 47.5 percent of the arable land had been absorbed by the end of 1951. There has been no indication that a new collectivization campaign is now under way in Bulgaria, and no intensive drive is known to have been waged since the spring of 1951.
4.
United States rejects Bulgarian coastal waters decree: The American Legation in Bern has been directed to address to the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, through the mediation of the Swiss Foreign Office, a note "taking exception" SECRET
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to a Bulgarian decree of October 1951, according to which the territorial waters of Bulgaria were extended to twelve marine miles in breadth. Stating that the provision is deemed to be in conflict with the generally accepted principles of international law, the note asserts that the United States reserves "its interests and the interests of its nationals and vessels under the provisions of the law in question."1
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The Bulgarian claim to a twelve mile territorial Comment: limiCllloWs a'pattern previously set by the USSR and Rumania. The United States has previously disavowed recognition of the Soviet claim, and a note rejecting the Rumanian decree of
September
5.
1951
has recently been dispatched.
Previously only guarded references had been made to East German forces in consideration of Czechoslovakia's dislike and fear of Germany. Until now the major emphasis in the German questra-Eig been placed on rousing the Czech people against the remilitarization of West Germany and supporting the Soviet propoeals for the unification of Germany. Czech officials 'have tried to play down fear of East Germans by conferences between the heads of the two states. At the same time fear of "another Korea" perpetrated by the West has been propagandized in an effort to squeeze more production from the workers.
Comment:
su ports creation of East German arm une o w n campa gn on The Czec press opene a concer of an East German army as a popular support for the creation of the Wall Street wardefense against "the aggressive plans invasion of Korea." mongers revealed by the
Czech ress openl
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American Le ation in Budapest comments on possible imminent purge of in Budapest foresees a possible purge of Hungarian leaders in the near future as a result of the serious deficiencies in important industrial and agricultural sectors, includingthe key aluminum industry and others of special interest to the The Legation cannot confirm a report from CIRCEUR of USSR. the imminent purge of Deputy Premier Matyas Rakosi.
In its main features this line has also been followed by Poland and Hungary.
Hungarian liiagThnErAIZEMS
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In view of the direct criticism being levied against various Economic Ministries and the State Planning Board, the Legation nominates Erne Ger8, Chairman of the People's Economic Council, and Zoltan Vas, Chairman of the State Planninr Board. as the most likely purge victims.
I
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Soviet criticism of the failure of Hungarian Comment: production has been directed mainly against the coal and bauxite mines, heavy industry and certain sectors of the light industry. The economic situation has deteriorated to such an extent that high-level scapegoats for the production failures must be found.
The CINCEUR report on Rakosi must be viewed with considerable reserve, however, since it appears to be a rather considered Ifrom inaccurate duplicated s fall frog Reports of Ra os to be "probably not reliable." favor have appeared periodically for several years and have never been confirmed.
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7.
Korean minority in Japan may demonstrate on 25 June: Ambassador Murphy reports thatI indicate the likelihood of North Korean and Japanese Communist demonstrations on 25 June, the second anniversary, of the outbreak of Korean hostilities. The disorders will probably include rallies, and attacks on police sub-stations and South Korean sympathizers. The Ambassador comments that since the anniversary is meaningless to the average Japanese, the demonstrations will probably be,confined to North Koreans and hard-core Japanese Communists.
1
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Recent violence in Japan has been associated largely with the large and volatile leftist Korean element. The WFTU appeal, added to discontent over recent Japanese Government measures against the Koreans and the increasing tension between right and left-wing Korean groups, could well provide the spark for an emotional spree on 25 June.
8.
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'seer no President Ithee's I informed a high UNCURK official on 19 June that he toid Knee that there were "too
Rhee's "consp racy

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Comment: The World Federation of Trade Unions (WITU) has issuenii-glipeal to observe 25 June as a day of international solidarity with the North Korean people and for the defense of peace.
ssem
ymen:
case in
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many smart defense lawyers and that with the present prosecution there waslittle chance of winning the conspiracy case." Rhee stated that he had to win "because everything he had done "the old was based on this case " man" had been misled into believing that he had a good case, but that it was obvious that "there was nothina to it, and that the charges would not hold up."
it
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Rhee has counted heavily on a successful conComment: clusion of the "Communist conspiracy" case to justify his highhanded actions of the past month.
9.
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Soviet AAA unit reportedly moved to protect Communist headquarters: In April there were about 1,200 Soviet antiaircraft personnel deployed in the Tokchon area, about 40 miles east of Sinanju, according to informationl I In late May, however, more than hall
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of this force was.transferred to Kangdong, leaving only about 500 Soviet antiaircraft personnel in Tokchon.
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An unknown and unlocated number of Soviet antiComment: aircraft artillerymen are generally accepted in Korea performing a rear area combat function. While Kangdong has been reported as the location of the Communists' "Joint Headquarters" in Korea, there has been no information relative to any major installation at Tokchon which would require Soviet AA artillery protection. Sino-North Korean economic agreement reported: An agreement Overning economic relations-between Communist China and 25X1X North Korea was concluded on 18 February in Peiping, 1 It reportedly provided for the appointment of a Chinese representative to "assist the government of the Korean People's Republic to foster the economic development and reconstruction of the Korean People's Republic." The Chinese representative was to have the authori v to "visit and inspect all industrial facilities in Korea." 25X1
10.
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Comment: The report of this agreement is unconfirmed. The aFf5T5Tient of a Chinese representative exercising supervisory responsibilities over North Korean economic affairs would be a departure from the pattern of Soviet domination.
11.
Campaign against bourgeoisie yields large revenue to Chinese Communists: 1 Treasifiiii-rePorted "semi-official banking sources" expect Peiping to derive extra revenues of 2,500,000,000 dollars from its campaign against the bourgeoisie. The American Consul General at Hong Kong considers this figure exaggerated,but
1
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Comment: This figure is undoubtedly exaggerated, amounting as it does to about ten times the sum Peiping claims to have collected in the 1951 arms donation drive. Nevertheless, the campaign against the bourgeoisie has apparently been successful, not only in adding to Peiping's revenues but also in increasing its foreign exchange holdings. One Hong Kong publication has estimated that the campaign broughtPeiping about 200,000,000 dollars of bullion and recoverable foreign exchange.
believes that the regime will obtain more from the campaign than it did from the 1951 arms donation drive.
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12.
FgMas
Leading officials of China's Kwangsi provincial government reMoved: The Government Adminisiration Council of the Peiping removed five leading officials of the Flangsi Provincial People's Government.
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Comment: The four key posts in Kwangsi have long been held concurrently by one min, Chang Yun-i, a member of the CCP's Central Committee, has been governor of the province, secretary of the party's provincial committee, and commander cal commissioner of the Kwangsi military district. and politiChang was rumored in early 1952 to be falling from favor.
13.
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Sino-Vietnamese units reportedly preparing attack on French: A "doubtful" report Istates that six regiments or the Lien wan men ann kmixed Chinese-Vietnamese border army) havemoved toward the French defense perimeter in Tonkin and aremOv prepared to launch a coordinated offensive. Redeployment began on 27 May "under conditions of greatest secrecy," and units are from Moncay in the east to Yen Bay in the west. now in position
Ithat it has received no reliable information confirming the eristence of this army.
1
The five removed officials have been Chang's military and political deputies. The Peiping announcement affords no clue as to whether they are being given new assignments, or were removed either at Chang's instigation or as a consequence of his fall.
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Comment: The last report of this army was in January, when it allegedly participated in action against a convoy of French trucks. The report above cannot bp taken as confirmation of the army's existence since the ultimate source of both reports may have been the same.
14.
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successor, I believes thkt artnough Nu may only have been testing his strength, he might retire if anyone but Defense Minister Ba Swe were selented.
1
Burmese Premier may resign: During a 1 June cabinet meeting, Burmese Premier Nu "agreed" to remain office for one month to give his colleagues an opportunity in to chonse a
1
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Comment: This is the second recent report that Nu mayte actuaIITZWEsidering retirement, but he has threatened to resign several times since assuming office in 1948.
Nu has been regarded as the leading figure of the moderate faction in the Burmese Government, and is inclined toward cooperation with the West. The ambitious Ba Swe, on the other hand, has a record of affinity for Communism, despite his recent anti-Communist statements.
15.
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Report of plot against Burmese Premier deprecated: Brigadier kyaw Zaw, the second-ranking officer in the Burmese Army, was recently reported to be implicated in a plot to assassinate Premier U Nu. Howeverd Ihe impressed the/ s a sincere supporter of the Nu regime. gyaw Zaw is quoted as stating that Nu's prestige is high and that he is an irreolareahm lrader
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Chinese Nationalist offensive from Burma denied: Recent reports that General Li Mi's Chinese Nationalist troops are planning to launch an offensive in the near future have hesn
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Comment: There has beenno reliable evidence that the Chinese Nationalists in Burma seriously contemplated another offensive after their defeat in Yunnan last summer. Moreover, \reported that Li Mi's forces have seriously deteriorated recently as a result of large-scale desertions.
Captured documents confirm link between Communist insurgents and Burmese tlWtovernment released copies of captured documents which contain numerous references to cooperation between the Communist insurgents and the strongly leftist Burma Workers and Peasants Party (BWPP). The Home:Minister is reported to have said, "that's the information I want."
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Comment: These documents provide further evidence that the Siiiiii-nikers and Peasants Party is the aboveground arm of the Communist insurgent movement in Burma.
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Although the Burmese Government has tended in the past to tolerate the BWPP as a legal opposition party, the release of the documents and a recent raid on the party's headquarters indicate that the government is adopting a more stringent policy toward the party. Militant Moslem organization plans outbreaks in Indonesia: has received reports that the Darul Islam, a fanatic Moslem organization, plans to create 25 X1C disturbances in the cities of West Java, including Djakarta, during the Moslem New year holiday, 22-24 June. Authorities are taking precautions to nrevent Sgrlous trgulae_.4 25X1 1
18.
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Comment: The Darul Islam is a well-armed organization with possibly 10,000 members which is seeking to establish a theocratic state in Java.
While government forces will probably be able to suppress any Darul Islam outbreaks in the West Java cities, this report demonstrates the continuation of insecure conditions in Indonesia, which are seriously hampering the development of the country's economy and reducing popular confidence in the government.
19.
Indonesian Communist Party votes support of government: Communists in the Indonesian Parliament joined government parties on 19 June in voting to give the cabinet an "opportunity to work." The only opposition to the mrtion came from two leftist parties in the Communist bloc. 1
Comment: The Indonesian Communigt Party is currently encouFailli-the establisnment of'a "united national front." The reasons for the split over the parliamentary vote among memberS of the Communist bloc, however, are not clear.
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20.
Indonesian Government admits increased guerrilla activity in West Java: The Indonesian Prime Minister .disclosed at a press connThnce that guerrilla activity has recently increased, particularly in west Java. He stated that the government has been concentrating on the "consolidation of its strength" and that the guerrillas have used this opportunity to make trouble.
1
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Comment: The Indonesian Government hasmade little progress intwo andtalf years of independence in dealing with the country's primaiy problem--lawlessness. During the past six weeks, dissident groups in West Java, ranging from 30 to 600 well armed men, ambushed security patrols, raided small security garrisons, They have accumulated and terrorized the rural population. funds, food, ammunition and weapons.
21.
Iranian bank official urges action in financial situation: The Acting Governor of the Iranian National Bank, Nasser, has warned his government that the bank's note cover reserve is dangerously low and has Urged action to remedy the situation. Nasser believes that the government's only recourse is to issue new banknotes without gold backing because most of Iran's foreign exchange is already pledged. The Mailis is opposed to debasing the currency.
I
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
The present cabinet was initially quite popular with Indonesians because of the appointment of the Sultan of Djokjakarta as Minister of Defense and the belief that he would take stern and effective action against dissidence. No such action has yet been evident. The Sultan may not be at fault, however, since cabinet leadership is unusually indecisive and may be impeding his work.
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Comment: Mossadeapolitical position is weaker, but in the past he has been able to overcome parliamentary opposition through an emotional appeal to the people. If he exploits immediately his trip to The Hague, he could win sufficient support to secure expansion of the note issue.
22.
Saudi Arabia protests Israeli decision to transfer Foreign Ministry to Jerusalem: American Ambassador Hare reports that the Saudi Arabian Government has protested the proposed transfer of the Israeli Foreign Ministry from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Saudi Arabia hopes that the United States will make strong direct representations to Israel and stresses its conviction that the American stand on this question will probably be a deciding factor. Hare considers the issue a matter of principle, not a question of placating the Arabs. Since the United States' position is based primarily on political considerations, he
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finds it difficult to condone the reported Israeli move from the standpoint of policy as well as principle.
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Comment: Syria and Egypt have taken similar action to obtain diplomatic support to oppose the transfer of foreign missions in Israel to Jerusalem.
23.
Political crisis in Lebanon temporarily passed: According to American Minister Minor in Beirut, the politieal &Isis resulting from the trial of eight editors responsible for printing articles against the Khouri regime has been passed with the sentencing of the editors.
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Minor considers that the real danger to the government now is the poSsibility that the Khouri regime may assume a false sense of Abeurity and fail to initiate needed reforms withouttich further Serious crises can be expected.
Comment: There hag been considerable evidence in the Oast few wFUEN715F a growing dissatisfaction withl Ithe Khouri regime. As long as the opposition remains disunited as it is at present, however, it cannot be effective against the government.
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24.
South Africa pressing Britain for transfer of Cape naval The South African Government has been maintaining conMious pressure for the transfer of the Royal Navy base at Simonstown to South African control, and Chief of Staff Du Toit is raising the issue again at the current London meeting of Commonwealth Chiefs of Staff.
base:
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I
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According to the American Military Attache at Pretoria, who learned this fromi Ithere, South Africa has so far refused either to undertake the necessary reorganization of the South African Navy or to give adequate political guarantees on British use of the base.k 25X1 \
Comment:
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While the Nationalists would like to enhance
theiroflestige and reduce British power in the subcontinent

before next year's election, practical considerations preclude
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any possibility of transfer for some years to come. The South African Navy and Marines are currently at 75-percent of their authorized strength of about 9,000 officers and men. During the past year only two of South Africa's six small fighting ships were operative due to manpower shortages, the appointment of an Afrikaner army officer as head of the naval forces last June having lowered morale and increased recruiting problems.

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tripartite Further request made for NATO consultation on giving the North Atlantic The importance of reply to Soviet note: tripartite Council some information about the contents of the recent NAC meeting reply ttu3the latest Soviet note was stressed in a Asserting representatives. by the Danish and Norwegian permanent major increasingly concerned lest that their parliaments were affect them through steps regarding Germany be taken which might on the reply the NATO-EDC relationship, they asked for information least to lend color "sufficiently in advance of its dispatch at to the appearance of consultation before publication." exert increasing Pointing out that NATO members will probably discussing those aspects of NAC as a forum for pressure for using them, the American American foreign policy of direct concern to brief delegation to NAC recotmends in the present instance a reply to the three powers of theil confidential disclosure by the:, note at least 48 hors in advance of delivery.
25.
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This is the third approach along this line by the small/IF-WM countries, who continue to worry about big-power domination.
Comment:
26.
AcSaar decides against authorizing pro-German parties: Saar Government cording to a French-Foreign Office official, the the German has decided not to authorize Saar branches of either Democratic Union. the German Christian Social Democratic Party or
Although the new parties could not hope to obtain a substantial number of votes under the present circumstances, operation of a their presence would jeopardize the effective might become Socialist coalition which Christian Democratic and / necessary after the fall elections. The same French official indicated earlier that Comment: Social Democrats, he faVirarrThe Saar licensing of the German expected the new organias did the Saar Socialist Party, which zation to be a complete failure.
French The latest Saar decision probably reflects growing Instead of the high-level uneasiness over German tactics. solution of the issue which was expected after the SchumanGerman Adenauer talks in March, the French now face hostile Saar itself. Council of Europe and the propaganda in both the
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policy: dissidents on foreign Gaullist rapprochement Piney conciliates Paris believes that the Gaullist dissi27 and the Embassy in The American influencing French Government coalition already French and is between the progress dents has made further Minister foreign policy. Piney and Defense by Premier the government, treaty as In recent talks held are cooperating with Community Gaullists who Defense Pleven with European debates this down the In subsequent The the Premier played their cooperation. toward the treaty. will an obstacle to restraint the government the "remarkable" group showed debate on that, as a concession, parliamentary Embassy concludes scheduling 25X1 continue to postpone that treaty's ratification. reduces the possibility year later this development government the Comment: This force the fall of De Uaulle can issues. within the on foreign policy evident coolness now be the already policies can On the other hand, present defense approach in relations toward Piney government into a more critical expected to develop States. with the United Belgium's rovokes dis ute: ly to give forel n polio commission cy, crea e os ens Bel ian questions, rore gn po 28. on on policy on European The Party. nationa comm ss support for a national Socialist Belgian broad political the commission memdispute within the has touched off a government has appointed to Christian well as Social responsiSocial Christian And Liberal, as divide "anxious" to the Socialist that it is bers of schemes. suggesting European integration Parties, thus on critibility for its position been the target of a Minister has leaders, and Foreign The Belgian Socialist labor members not to Christian and urged party Social Anerican cism by leader has reportedly the government. induce Party would aid since it Socialist that the government may serve on the commission however, naming to the commisstate, with it by \ I 25X1 officials Embassy integration. Party to cooperate European committed to the Socialist Socialists sion prominent 25X1 of composed of members conto be commission is policy to study the Comment: The specialists on foreign union could be formed. "balanced" European ditions in which a

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SECRET Should Socialists and Liberals join the commission, the government's vulnerability on foreign policy would be reduced and chances for the maintenance of the 24-month conscription period improved.
29.
German interests consider establishment of armament plant in Sicily: A former German diplomat, Hans Kraus, is allegedly trylng to promote the establishment in Palermo, Sicily, of an' armaments plant to be named Industrie Mediterrania. The firm would manufacture tank tracks and treads for semi-tracked vehicles. The Italian and Egyptian armed forces are reportedly ready to place substantial orders for these items, and a number of prominent German indurrislists are annarentiv interested in financing the plant.
25X1
Comment: A new industry in southern Italy would be welcomed by the Italian Government; however, the fact that existing Italian armament plants are working far below capacity would militate against the establishment of such a new plant.
'
30.
Italian Government not expected to dissolve neo-Fascist party: Despite the overwhelming parliamentary approval of a bill empowering the government to dissolve the neo-Fascist Italian Social Movement in the "extraordinary case of necessity and emergency," Christian Democratic spokesmen intimate that no such move is likely in the immediate future. Government offiCials fear that even if the party were proscribed, a similar movement would spring up before the 1954 national elections. The new movement might benefit from the "martyrdol" and be free of the present party's less pOpular ties with the old Mussolini regime. The US Embassy in Rome comments that the new law may still inhibit the neo-Fascist press and provide a lemal basis ilny jailing some of the party's leaders.
Comment:
25X1
Ever since the Italian Social Movement showed an alarmUirliZrease in strength bY polling third place in the local elections in southern Italy last month, the centrist parties and the Communists have been increasingly vocal in their,demands for the party's suppression.
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31.
Eden rumored to leave British Foreign Office for domestic There are persistent rumors thit Foreign Secretary Eden lit: relinquish the Foreign Office for another cabinet assignment in an endeavor to alleviate some of the difficulties the government has been encountering with its domestic legislative program. Other "equally speculative" rumors are that Harold Macmillan Minister of Housing and Local Government, or Selwyn Lloyd, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, will replace Eden and that Lord Woolton, Lord President of the Council, will be "auietiv drooped 25X1 at some convenient date."
Comment: Recently, there has been much press speculation that WIEW-Minister Churchill will relinquish some of his duties to Eden whose parliamentary leadership arouses general confidence throughout the Conservative Party. Several public opinion polls have shown a steadily increasing dissatisfaction with the government's handling of domestic issues, and back-bench Conservatives are highly critical both of what they consider the government's ineptness in combating the Opposition's successful parliamentary tactics and of the"unpredictability" of Churchill's intervention on domestic issues.
Macmillan, who has prewar and wartime experience in the foreign field, has been considered an outside contender for the succession to Churchill. Lloyd is a protege of Eden's with no great party standing of his own. Lord Woolton has been under heavy attack because of several statements, one of 25x6 which was a pre-election promise to reduce food prices.
32.
25X1
Mountin arliamentar o position to Norwegian defense budget reporte orweg au er o ommerce as n orme officials in Paris that a growing element in all Norwegian political parties considers the defense budget too large. p is firmly convinced that the defense program, as submitted in reply to the special NATO committee and now under consideration by the 25X1 Norwegian Parliament, will not be approved unless about 10 million dollars in economic aid is forthcoming for fiscal year 1953.
Comment: Last winter Norway accepted the HATO recommendation that its 1953 defense budget be approximately 30 percent larger than the 1952 budget. Even so only 5 percent of Norway's 1953 gross national product was allocated to defense, a figure exceeded by the other NATO countries except Denmark and Portugal. American aid in fiscal year 1952 approximated 15 million dollars, of which 9.8 million was economic aid.
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33.
Czechoslovakia said to want to establish relations with Panama: The Panamanian Foreign Minister has informed Ambassador
'
WITerthat the Polish Legation in Mexico has officially notified him of the appointment of a new Minister who will also be accredited to Panama.
The Foreign Minister also said that the Czechs plan a new move to establish diplomatic relations with Panama. The Foreign Minister intends to take the position that 'no diplomatic representation is necessary since there are "no relations of any kind" between either of the two countries and Panama. 25X1
Comment: The Polish Minister in Mexico has long been accredited to Panama, but there are still no diplomatic missions from the Orbit in that country. Last September the Czechs were reported to have approached Panama on establishing official representation there.
Czech and Polish interest in Panama is probably motivated by a desire to have representation in key places and to further Orbit trade with dollar areas. Panama has been a regular stqpping place fOrrOrbit couriers and representatives traveling between Mexico, Havana, and Caracas.
34.
'25X1X
1
Revolt reportedly planned in Surinam: The political situ25X1X ation in Surinam has "deteriorated rapidly" in the last few weeks and a revolt against the Netherlands is planned, The four reported leaders were members of a seven-man delegation which returned this month from The Hague after susOension of negotiations for a new political relationship with the Netherlands.
1,
25X6
The Commander cif the Dutch forces in Surinam,I

Ihas
25X1
25X6
25X1
reinforced the army garrison at the capital and taken steps bp protect the major Airport. He has also ordered the army to hold maneuvers in the capital city of Paramaribo and feels that this shnw of force will 'deter disturbances. 25X1
Comment: Surinam, which supplied almost half of the total US baTaiterFeouiremente in 1951, has been: increasingly desiroug
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of greater political freedom. however.
This is the first hint of a revolt,
One of the alleged plotters is a labor leader with considerable influence among the bauxite miners. Dutch army and marine units, superior in numbers and training to the native police, should be able to control the present threat.

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TOP SECRET THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS. 793 AND 7940 THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW,
GENERAL
1
The Foreign Minister asked for suggestions on how to handle the departure of the Russians most courteously and indicated that, following their departure, he-would counter TABS accusations with a communique stressing the courtesies extended. Ambassador Warren states that the report on the incident by the International Red Cross representative is favorable to Venezuela.
I
Venezuela reportedly will give no further basis for Soviet complaints: In an interview with the Venezuelan Voreign Minister, Ambassador Warren received the impression that the Venezuelan Government is now fully aware of the possible international repercussions of its treatment of Soviet Embassy personnel.
.
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2,
Private Dutch-Polish trade agreement signed: A private contract has been signed between Poiana and the Dutch firms Phillips, Noordmetaal, Poolse Kolen Import Maatschaapj, aud Gesellschaft fur Welthandel for Dutch exports of 780,000 dollars worth of electro-technical equipment and 1,118,000 dollars worth of nonferrous metals in exchange for an equal value of Polish coal. Approval of the agreement by the Dutch Government and the Netherlands Bank remains to be-obtained.
Delivery of the Polish coal was to have begun in May, while Dutch exports are scheduled to start in mid-July. The nonferrous metals are believed to include 1000 tons of copper or lead, or a combination of both, which will have to be purchased outside the Netherlands. 25X1 TOP SECRET
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Comment: There is no indication of the types of electF6=TWEEFical equipment to be exported to Poland. Financing of the nonferrous metals probably, can be obtained elsewhere, should the Netherlands Bank refuse approval.
FAR EAST
3.
Overthrow of Thai Premier reportedly planned: Police Director General Phao is reportedly planning to depose Premier Phibun by a coup d'etat.
(also states that the influence of General Sarit, Phao s chief rival, has been weakened by loss of control over certain army units formerly supporting him. If Sarit fails to rebuild his position soon, the source believes his army supporters may attempt a coup which might result in "general fighting throughout
I
25X1
the Kingdomo",/
25X1
if
Comment: Press reports of 20 June state that a general alert has been ordered in Thailand. However, Phao is currently in Europe and probably would not leave the direction of a coup to his subordinates.
The American Embassy in Bangkok states that Sarit has strengthened his position in recent months and that there is little imminent possibility of an open conflict between the'Phao and Sarit factions. The possibility of a coup by either Phao or Sarit cannot be discounted as their rivalry is a constant threat to stability in Thailand. EASTERN EUROPE
25X1X
4.
Yugoslavia will reportedly sponsor invasion of Albania by Albanian refugees:,

1 I I
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Yugoslavia plans to create a special organization of Albanian

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refugees which in the near future will attempt to "liberate" an extended zone in Albania as a base of operations for a general revolt. The Yugoslav role in thts liberation stnuggle will be well camouflaged in order to counter charges of Yugoslav intervention and make international inspection pos/the To support this prediction, 1 sible. 25X1 establishment of special operational radto communications 25X1A courses for Albanians in Yugoslavia 25X1
5.
Slow progress being made in MIG-15 production in Polish factory: Progress in the manufacture or assembly of M(G-l5's at the former PZL Aircraft Factory in Mielec is very slow, and no aircraft have yet been produced. The plant is re-
ported to be engaged at present in the assembly of threW MIG-15's, the parts of which were received from the USSR in February. Difficulty is being experienced with the blueprints received from the USSR. Soviet engineers are expected at Mielec in the near future. 25X1A June 52)
I
25X1
It was reported last October, apparently 'that the former PZL factory in Mielec and the State Aircraft Engine Plant in Rzeszow were being retooled to manufacture jet plane parts and assemble MIG-15's. The estimate made at that time that jet planes could not be produced in quantity in Poland before early 1953 still appears valid.
Comment%
6.

LATIN AMERICA TOP SECRET
3
The possibility of a Yugoslav-supported reComment: volt in Albania at this time is remote, despite the favored treatment and special training given to a large number of Albanian refugees. Fear of providing an excuse for a Soviet-Satellite counteraction remains a dominant influence on Yugoslav policy towards the Albanian Communist regime of Enver Hoxha.
Agrarian reform law may cause revolution in Guatemala:
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UnreSt in Guatemala has been aggravated by the passage on 17 June of the agrarian reform law. There have been scattered riots in rural areas, attempts have been made to dynamite hydroelectric plants in several cities, and there have reportedly been numerous arrests. A revolution may be inspired by large landowners and other anti-Communists. President Arbenz and administration leaders bad repeatedly stated their determination to see the law enacted "even at the risk of civil war." The President has ordered all firearm licenses revoked. Military planes have started patrol flights over the entire country.
25X1
The Chief of the Armed forces has declared his firm support for the government and the agrarian reform law, but some elements of the army may turn against the governIf rioting gets out of control, however, the army ment. may feel compelled to take over the government to restore
order.

TOP SECRET
4
Comment: There is no evidence that the widespread antigovernment and anti-Communist activity is now sufficiently coordinated for a successful revolution.
23 June 52
25X1

...
TCR SECRET SUglarr

FAR EAST
.Soviet artillery Soviet a r t i l l e r y again reported reported in i n Korea: ICorea: Three Soviet Soviet artillery battalions the Chongchon River field a rtillery b a t t a l i o n s moved from t h e Chongchon, River area area to t o two locations l o c a t i o n s south s o u t h of Pyongyang Pyongyang in i n early early June, June,/
HR70-14
0 . G.
Comment; Comment;
previously s e v i o u s l y reported reported
jthe movement of Soviet artillery and infantry' units across the t h e Chongchon RiVer R i v e r in in early e a r l y May. MayA one-hour voice transmission one-hou's Russian7language. Russian-language voice transmisqion was was seemed t to disi n t e r c e p t e d on on 14 14 Aprii. A p r i l . The transmission t r a n s m i s s i o n seemed o be d isintercepted guised passed between a forfor, guieed field q i e l d artillery a r t i l l e r y fire f i r e directions d i r e c t i o n s passed battery pogitions. u n i t commander and b attery p oqitions, ward observer, obsmrver, a unit
There is, is, however, however, no no confirmation &onfirmation of the the existence p x i s t e n c e of of any organized Soviet S o v i e t combat unit u n i t engaged engaged in i n the t h e KOrean Korean war war other Soviet-pi1oted M1106,15ts. o t h e r than t h a n antiaircraft a n t i a i r c r a f t artillery artilleryand and Soviet-piqoted MIP15:'p.
, %
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25X1
OCI No. 6427

Copy NO.
276
DIA AND DOS RELEASE INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

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SOVIET UNION
1.
25X1
Comment: Alarmist reports on Soviet military activity opposite the Iranian borders with the USSR have frequently been sent by Iranian military officials in this sensitive area. Few of these reports have been accepted or subsequently verified because of the absence of confirmatory sources in the area. Frontier fortification activity appears to be routine at many points on the periphery of the Soviet Orbit; the scale reported by this source seems highly exaggerated.

EASTERN EUROPE
1 SEURET
1
2.
25X1
Reinforcement of Polish Baltic coastal area reported: Residents of PolandI Ireport considerable military activity in the Baltic coastal area during May 1952. New units, unidentified as to nationality, are reportedly being activated in, and large quantities of materiel are being transported to, coastal points from Gdynia to Stettin. Polish guards are said to have been posted at some of the railroad stations in this area to guard military transports. The movement of Soviet military rolling stock in the Stettin area has increased to the point where activity equals that of 1947 when the area was returned o Polish control. 25X1
25X1A
Soviet military activity on Iranian border reported: the Commander of the Iranian Third Division reports signs of Soviet fortifications along the border from Moghan to Julfa which indicate to him that the USSR is building a new "Maginot Line." According to the general's sources, a new railroad marshalling yard will be developed by the USSR 30 miles north of Julfa. The general also believes he has confirmation of Soviet preparations for extensive maneuvers directed at the border with Turkey and Iran.
I
1
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Comment: These reports, although unconfirmed, suggest a reiiiraTelient of defenses of the Polish Baltic coastal area, which have been only lightly garrisoned by Soviet and Polish units. During recent months there have been a number of indications of increasing Soviet sensitivity all along the Baltic, particularly in connection with the security of water and air approaches to Soviet-controlied territories. Other unconfirmed reports have suggested Soviet ground force reinforcements of the Baltic coastal area of East Germany.
3.
25X1
Yugoslav census in Zone B of the FTT designed to support Belgrade's ethnic claims: An otficial census being conducted in the Yugoslav dominated zone of Trieste is drawing bitter comments from the pro-Italian press in the city of Trieste. All residents of Zone B are obliged to report to their local officials With their identity cards. Only those living in the zone permanently.since 1040 and registered persons residing in the zone with official permission are being recognized as residents. Italian newspapers in Trieste contend that the census is designed to seal off Zone B to thousands of Italian refugees presently residing in Zone A and to include thousands of newly arrived Yugoslays. 25X1
Comment: During the past few years, the Yugoslav 'authorities-1177OBe B have pursued a policy of intimidation and exclusion ofrthe Italian minority in order to undermine Italian claims to the area. Official Italian estimates hold that some 6,500 persons have taken refuge in Zone A since 1946.
A ceneus of this type will probably be used by Belgrade to support its claims in any future negotiations conducted on the basis of ethnic principles or considerations.
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FAR EAST
4.
Japanese press reaction favorable to treaty with India: Ambassador Murphy reports that Japanese metropolitan papers and prefectural dailies both reacted favorably to the treaty with India. Papers in Osaka, a major export trade center, viewed the treaty as an "extraordinary" gesture of friendship and contrasted its generous terms with the multi-lateral San Francisco treaty. One prefectural paper foresaw an opportunity for a new "third force" built around Japan and India. The Ambassador concludes that India gained great popular support by the treaty terms and Japan obtained a model treaty to be employed in negotiations with other Asian nations, although development of either potential will prove difficult.
25X11
1
Comment: The treaty, originally proposed by India in December l9hl was signed on 9 June,and contains many articles based on the San Francisco treaty. Reportedly, however, it contains no provisions on territorial, adjustments or reparations. Both of these factorsappeal to the Japanese as well as the symbolism of friendship on the part of an important Asian nation.
5.
25X1XCommunists agree to continue stalling at Panmuniom:

SECRET
that he was informed of an 8.and 9_June_meeting between Soviet, Chinese and North Korean leaders on the cease-fire and the military situation by a North Korean Irepresentative at the meeting. Allegedly all parties agreed to "continue stalling tactics at Panmunjom." The North Koreans argued at the meeting that they could never give in on the POW issue. The argument was opposed by both the Chinese and the Russians.
The Chinese criticized North Korean emphasis on the Koje incidents saying that the BW issuewas a "more effective longterm propaganda line."
The Soviet representative stated that his country was "determined" to take the Korean problem to an "International Conference table."
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Militarily, the meeting discussed the possibility of a UN offensive, and the line was advanced that thisvould give an opportunity for a "counter-offensive to recover territory north of the 38th Parallel." High North Korean leaders desire military action, according to the source.
25X1
I
25X1
25X1X
I
Ihas Comment: Although 25X1X nn nnagrEEF proven reliable, there is no way of evaluating
6.
25X1X
Orders for Communist offensive in Korea not received by 11 June: As of 11 June neither North Korean nor Chinese Comitiagf-line units had received orders to prepare for a general offensive, 25X1X It was believed in "Combined Chinese Communist-North Korean General Headquarters" that such an operation would not take place until the rainy season. 25X1A
i
munisnis in Korea are contemplating an immediate major

offensive. Future enemy offensive plans presumably include the use of their numerically ,superior air and artillery arms, in which case the "rainy season" would impedp the movement of their heavy equipment as much as it would that of.the United Nations.
7.
25X1
Chinese Nationalists reinforcing offshore islands: The Tachen Islands, located about 30 miles off the Chinese mainland opposite Chekiang Province, will be reinforced by two Chinese Nationalist regiments with,a strength of 3,035 men on 25 June, according to the American Military Attache at Formosa. The reinforcements will include artillery and communications facilities for air support. 25X1
I

This report cannot be confirmed.
I
level.
Comment:
There have been no firm indications that Com-
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All of these arguments might have been advanced by the It seems improbable, various national groups represented. however, that the Soviet representative, presumably the senior member, would allow such bickering in a conference at this
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Comment: Reports that the Chinese Communists plan to invade the Tachen Islands have been persistent. This reinforcement will bring the total number of Nationalists and guerrillas on these islands to approximately 8,000 men.
Since the Chinese Communists can commit over 100,000 men to this area, the reinforcement will not lessen appreciably their ability to capture these islands.
8.
25X1
While this is the first report mentioning Communist paramilitary groups in Thailand, it is probable that they have existed for some time. Moreover, the ability of the Communist guerrillas in Malaya to obtain significant quantities of guns and ammunition from Thailand indicates that the arming of these units would not be a particularly difficult problem.
9.
Thai Government continues to sow seeds of dissension: The American Embassy in Bangkok reports several examples of short-sighted Thai government policies which have alienated elements of the population to the advantage of the Communists. The most significant of these are:

(l) (2)
Comment: Thailand is the only country in Southeast Asia which-ag-Floaped1 Communist violence. Many of Thailand's three million Chinese feel that they have been persecuted. As in Malaya, they constitute the overwhelming majority of the local Communist movement.
the government's heavy-handed censorship of the press which has provided the pro-Communists with a legitimate and popular propaganda target. General Sarit's public castigation of members of Parliament for opposing the government and civil servants for meddling in politics.
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Communists reported preparing for guerrilla action in Thailand: The American Embassy in Bangkok has been informed that the Communists in Thailand are planning to form armed guerrilla bands in the hinterland composed of discontented Chinese.
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the appointment1 1General /Mao to collect the 4,000 Wit naturalization fee and the denunciation of the'bad behavior of naturalized Thai toward "real Thai," acts which have incensed the large Chinese minority.
5
.
6 X
25X1
Comment: Although the ruling military clique overwhelmingly-Fair:5U. the government, such instances of misgovernment offer increasing opportunities for the Communists to exploit discontent at the expense of the government.
10.
Comment: While there have not yet been any startling devel5FMTETW, recent reports indicate that Bangkok is experiencing iti worst case of political jitters since the November 1951 coup.
11.
Armed Moslem organization orders attack in West and Central Java: !orders carried by a captured courier of the Tentera Islam Indonesia called for a general attack in West and Central Java on 22 June, the beginning of Moslem New Year celebrations. Targets of attack were listed as small towns, army and police posts, and road traffic.
1
1
Tension in Bangkok continues: The American Embassy in -Bangkok reports further indications of rising political tension. Premier Phibun is allegedly taking special precautiqns against a possible coup attempt. Police Director General Phao has cut short his European tour apparently to return to protect his pnsition against the maneuverings of his chief rival, General Sarit. 25X1
25X1X
25X1A
I
II
25X-1
25X1A
Comment: No coordinated dissident attacks are known to have TWEel-Tilace in Java on or since 22 June. However, guerrilla operations have seriously indreased in West Java during the last six weeks. These disturbances have been largely directed at the same targets as those listed in the above report, which may be based on knowledge of this rather "routine" activity.
The Tentera Islam Indonesia is the army of the Darul Islam, a fanatic Moslem organization which seeks to establish a theocratic state in Indonesia. Based in West Java, it is also active in Central Java and is gradually extending its influence into the eastern part of the island.
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12.
Pakistan requests American grant of 30,000,000 dollars: Prime Minister Nazimuddin'has requested the United States to grant Pakistan approximately 30,000,000 dollars to cover the purchase of 300,000 tohs of wheat, which, he says, Pakistan does not have the dollar exchange to buy. If neither a grant nor a loan to be repaid in kind can be extended, the Prime Minister desires a loan to be repaid from dollar credits over the next ten years. Nazimuddin also stated that there would be serious unrest if no wheat loan were forthcoming. In view of his own critical position, he requested that, by the first of July, the United States give some assu ance of its intention to help.
I
Comment: When Pakistan gained independence in 1947, it anticipated a regular annual burplus of grain. In 1948 natural disasters resulted in a 100,000 ton deficit, and 1952 will apparently be another deficit year.
Because of its growing population and its slow economic and agricultural improvement, Pakistan may develop a chronic food deficit. NEAR EAST-AFRICA
13.
25X1
Non-Communist labor organization asks for intervention in Tunisia: The International Confederation of Free Trade Unions has requested the French non-Communist Force Ouvriere to intervene again with French authorities in order to obtain "more moderate handling" of Tunisian trade unions. It has also asked the two major American labor groups to exert pressure on the United States Government to request that France issue visas to the two principal Tunisian labor leaders so that they may attend the ICFTU General rnincil now meeting in Berlin.
Comment: An ICFTU observer was sent to Tunisia immediately upon the outbreak of disorders in January. Since that time, Farhat Hached, Secretary General of the non-Communist Tunisian labor organization, UGTT, who was allowed to attend an ICFTU meeting in Brussels, made an unauthorized trip

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to the United States to talk with United Nations members and_ American labor leaders. Hached is thectly effective nationalist leader still at liberty in Tunisia, and restrictions are teing employed against him and his union in an effort to obtain maximum public order in Tunisia.
14.
South Africa may meet minimum American requirements of strategic materials: South Africa is prepared to consider favorably exporting to the United States as much as 500,000 long tons of manganese a year, on the understanding that this rate cannot be continued after 1953. The Union will also make every effort to meet American chrome requirements, according to an official note. Despite these assurances, the government is considering a proposal for the further reduction of manganese exports as a conservation measure, since an investigating committee has reported that the high-grade ore required by the United States would be exhausted in 20 years at the current rate of export.
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Comment: South Africa would have to export manganese to the United States at about four times the current average monthly rate for the rest of 1952 in order to meet the target figure. Continuing rail transportation difficulties, however, greatly limit the Union's ability to meet any commitments it may make for mineral exports to the United States.

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WESTERN EUROPE
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East Germans reported purchasing steel rails in France: West German officials have informed American authorities that representatives of the East German Government are ready to sign a contract with the Schneider-Creusot company for 80,000 tons of steel rails. Payment would be ill dollars to a Lausanne
HICOG believes that the reported transaction has serious implications for interzonal trade noliev AR wall as for AlliedWest German relations.
1
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Although steel rails are on the American embargo lists, they are not included in the COCOS international lists, France has so far agreed to prohibit shipments of steel rails only to Communist China,
16.
Berlin canal by-pass likely to open on schedule: American Army officials in Germany believe that the Paretz-Niederneuendorf Canal, East Germany's project to by-pass the system, will be capable of carrying traffic West Berlin canal by the deadline date of 28 June. Personal reconnaissance by local American officials on 19 June disclosed a number of East German barges at the new canal's entrance, and on 23 June the flood ates were re ortedl open to ftll nip ',arm,
1
Comment: The West Germans undoubtedly consider that the reported sale reflects discrimination against them in EastWest trade matters, in view of the strict quantitative limitations on interzonal trade.
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states that barbed wire and timber are.currently being delivered.along the inter.sector border in Berlin. In the past few weeks, East Germany has been tightening controls on the border between West Berlin and East Germany, but not on the Berlin intersector border. SECRET
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Comment: There are indications that a "fanfare opening" will take place on 28 June, but that work on the canal will continue beyond that, in order to make the canal fully operable.
American officials have estimated that Soviet harassing in Berlin might increase after the opening of the by-pass, with a possible severance of Berlin utilities,
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East Germans reportedly plan elevated railway by-passing West Berlin: A new double-tracked S-bahn (elevated) line Sas reportedly been proposed by the East Germans to permit between Oranienburg, north of Berlin, and East without traversing the French sector of Berlin. Berlin to operte Surveying for the line is said to have been started.
traffic
25X1A
Comment: This project may be the one recently reported involving the electrification of a small section of near the French sector to enable all S-bahn traffic rail line in East Berlin and East Germany to operate without entering West Berlin. A survey recently completed by the Allies showed that West Berlin was more vulnerable to Soviet harassment in the transportation field than in most of the other public The S-bahn, being run by the East German Reichsbahn, utilities. was found to be particularly vulnerable, although the West Berliners are arranging for supplementary transport if this should become necessary.
18.
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19.
West German action on Bonn-Paris treaties is postponed: American officials in Bonn now believe that West German approval of the Bonn-Paris treaties will not occur before the end of September. Chancellor Adenauer has abandoned plans for ratification during the present parliamentary session, but government leaders have agreed to act on the bills immediately after Parliament reconvenes on 4 September.
25X1
The six Schuman-Plan countries seem agreed that the coalsteel pool assembly should undertake political unification. British delegates to the Council of Europe, however, want the Council to discuss political unification; such a move would further weaken the Schuman Plan and at the very least delar EEC ratification for
a long period. I
European integration negotiations may delay EDC ratification: Prospects for quick ratification of the European MYTige Community treaty may be dimmed if the presentation of European political-unity proposals is bungled at the forthcoming meeting of Ministers of the Schuman-plan countries, in the opinion of the American Embassy in Paris.
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Comment: While French ratification of the EDC seems assured, there is little possibility it will take place before
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November. Political integration would mollify the Gaullists, however, and could reverse the bitter opposition of some to the EDC, thus making ratification certain.
Defense Minister Pleven has recently pledged that the Pinay government will push vigorously for political integration to embrace both the Schuman Plan and the EDC, but the French Government has no illusions that Britain would surrender its sovereignty to a supranational authority.
20.
Swiss reportedly ship arms to Rumania: A report from Vienna the latter part of May reveals the probable shipment of an unknown quantity of machine pistols to'Rumania from Haemerli, a Swiss export firm.
I
25X1
The US Air Force has discounted recent reports that the Oerlikon 8-cm guided missile was being used against UN aircraft in Korea.
21.
25X1
Swiss Communists stressing SW charges: The American Minister in Switzerland has requested the State Department to send him dodumentary evidence against the-Communist biological warfare charges. A Swiss Communist organization has been holding Meetings in Bern, accusing the United States using BW in Korea. At its latest meeting on 20 June there of r_Nagia capacity audience of 100 people. indicate the Communists are having limitia-iiieEess with their campaign in Switzerland. Comment: Reports
Comment: The US Military Attache in cently that in the last few months Swiss Bern reported remateriel have increased rapidly and are exports of war now of considerable magnitude. There is no record, however, that significant exports have been made to Iron Curtain countries.
25X1
The nonCommunist preis there has vigorously assailed the Swiss Commur nist-front Peace Partisans' SW charges, .of the fact that the Chinese Communists particularly in view rejected the first proposal in March 1952 for an investigation of the charges by the International Red Cross.
That the Communist BW campaign appears to be relatively 'lite in getting under way in Switzerland the internal dissensions which have beset may be attributed to the Communist party there.
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LATIN AMERICA
22.
Ecuador to request US naval vessels: The Chief of the Ecuadoran Navy, Commander Endara, plans to visit the United States during July to discuss the possibility of acquiring two destroyer escorts.
The US Embassy, which has not yet been the matter, understands that President Galo fically asked Endara to make the trip, The "sympathetic attention" ti the needs,of the
consulted about Plaia has speciEmbassy recommends Ecuadoran Navy.
25X1.
The Ecuadoran Navy is small and run-down and was assigned only a minor rols under the recently-signed bilateral military assistance agreement with the United States. The US Embassy at Quito believes that the navy could play a larger part in hemisphere defense if it hadadequate equipment: it previously recommended that the United States supply several patrol craft and ammunition for the navy's one frigate. The Embassy reports that the navy's morale and efficiencTis good, partly as a result of extensive use of foreign training schools, though some of its operations in recent years have been notable fiascos. Ecuador is not believed to be able to pay in advance for even one destroyer escort.
23.
Anti-Communists and large landowners reportedly plotting revolt in Guatemala: The coordinating committee of Guatemalan anti-Communist groups has reportedly been conferring with the Association of Guatemalan Agriculturalists and a revolutionary attempt "may occier at any time." They are said to have 25X1 "considerable" men and materials ready, but to have only half the'100,000 dollars they require. Efforts are being made to raise the remainder.:1
Comment: A revolution could hardly succeed at this time without the support of at least a part of the army. There is no evidence that the military will desert the Arbenz administration or that a serious split exists within the armed forces,
SECRET

12
Comment: Plaza himself discussed the matter with American officials last year, but requested that no action be taken until the'flam-up in Ecuadoran-Peruvian relations had quieted down. Ile may now wish to have his efforts on record before he turns over the presidency to Velasco Ibarra in September.
25 June 52
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In a speech on 20 June President Arbenz stated that efforts had recently been made to bribe some members of the army, but that the officers rejected the offers with "the purest patriotismr" Another report states that heads of military establishments in Guatemala City are being shifted to foil any attempt against the government. Organized labor is forming defense committees to aid the army and police in defending the government.
24.
25X1;
Comment: The Round Table Conference was held to establish the fialI-Filations for the Netherlands Antilles and Surinam within the "new" Kingdom of the Netherlands. The islands of Aruba and Curacao with their large oil refining facilities are among the mostprosperousareas in the world. The greater percentage of the population is composed of the politically inarticulate foreign oil workers, principally British West Indies and Surinam negroes. The dissatisfaction of local politicians,I
1
Failure of Round Table Conference not likely to cause stir n e er an s n es: 1n a es onsu neral 'Preston reports that public opinion in the Netherlands Antilles is apathetic toward the lack of results of the recent Round Table Conference at the Hague. The majority of the small and prosperous literate population, with the exception of a few politicians, has no desire for further autonomy. The chances of disturbances there are very remote.
I 25X6
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25.
stems from the fact that they wish to wrest from the Dutch Crown control of the judiciary and office of the attorney general (which controls police and immigration services), thereby gaining a greater say in the operations of the Royal Dutch Shell and Standard Oil Companies.
Surinam Government unaware of existing Communist activities: The new American Consul at Paramaribo is trying to ascertain the extent of Communist activities in Surinam in view of the "tremendous importance" of the bauxite industry. He has been told by the Commander of the Dutch forces there that Communist activity has been going on for some time and that it is increasing. The Consul had received negative replies from Surinam Government officials on this subject.
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According to the Dutch Commander, most of the Communist activity is directed from Georgetown, British Guiana, and "considerable amounts" of Communist literature are sent across the Corantijn River which divides the two countries. Distribution of the literature in Surinam is made from the port of Nickerie. The Consul also sees indications that Dutch and Surinam Communists in the Netherlands may be taking an increased interest in Surinam.
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Comment: Bauxite is not shipped through Nickerie. There have tZWE-Wti indications that Communist propaganda has reached the mining or shipping areas.

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If Communist activities in Surinam are actually being directed from British Guiana, they are possibly cloaked in the guise of nationalism in accordance with the instructions reportedly given to British Guiana's Cheddi Jagan when he visited Europe last year.
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This digest of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF IME ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS. 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF.WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
WESTERN EUROPE
1.
25X1
The Embassy believes that French-Saar discussions are still in a preliminary stage, and suggests that a joint AmericanBritish demarche cautioning France to hold up until after EDC tr tification may be desirable. I 25X1
I
Commentz Recent French efforts toward liberalization of the French-Saar Conventions have probably been aimed at creating goodwill toward France in the Saar prior to the Landtagelections this fall.
These efforts may provoke a sharp reaction in Germany, where there is widespread conviction that the status of the Saar should not be modified by a German-French-Saar accord.
LATIN AMERICA
2.
25X1:
Bolivia appointa mew ambassador to.United States: Bolivia has requested an agrement for the ippointment of Dr. Victor Andrsde as its new A0assador to the United States. Andrade was Boll:Han Ambassador in Tashington during 1944-1946. 25X1
CoMment: Dr. Andrade is reportedly pro-US but opposed to "any economic penetration" by the United States. Other posts he held under the wartime regime of the Nationalist ReVolutionary Movement were the Ministries Of Foreign Affairs and Labor, and in 1945 he repreeented Bolivia at the United Nations Conference in San Francisco.

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French apparently not delaying Saar Convention revision: The American Embassy in Paris reports that the French Foreign Office apparently plans to proceed with its efforts to liberalize the 1950 French-Saar Conventions without waiting until Bonn and Paris have ratified the European Defense Community,
25 June 52
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UN's air a i r strikes s t r i k e s at a t hydroelectric h y d r o e l e c t r i c plants p l a n t s reported r e p o r t e d bY, by enemv u n i t : On th e . a f t e r n o o nof ofg4T44e, 24 'J une.anan u n i d e n t i f ieb enemy-art-r-Tirnirattsrnoon .unIaentiTied _ . _ unit F o r t ih Korea u n i t rradioeda a d i o e d ' l ' aformation formation Of of eight e i g h t aircraft' aircraft NOrth bombed twice twice at a t the, the s u b s t a t i o n in iq Oro-ri,, Oro-ri, ttherefore, herefore, t he substation the DET 151 1 15th RSH, Korea korea e l e c t r i c polier power is off." 6 t h RSM, electric off." (SUEDE DET MBg # cs CS 627, 6 2 7 , 24 24 June June 52) 52) Mbg
~
of Hamhuag Hamhung is an Comment; The Oro-ri Oro-ri substation s u b s t a t i o n north of important important transformer point for f o r electricity e l e c t r i c i t y produced produced by by the the system. Changjin hydroelectric h y d r o e l e c t r i c system.
8. 8. Communists In Communists still s t i l l fear fear UN UN offensive: offensive:\ I n a message sent sent from the North o r e a n 7th 7th D ivission in Fn the its Rorth K Korean Division the Wonean Wonsan area to its artillery a r t i l l e r y regiment on on 15 16 June, June, the t h e sender 6ender cautioned c a u t i o n e d that that "according t o a mespags message from f r o m Supreme Headquarters, Headquarters, s since i n c e the "according to enemy at a t the t h e front f r o n t lines l i n e s is is planning. planning. .movements, .movements, you will. will. t h e division d i v i s i o n units u n i t s which do do not. not. .and .and s secure ecure t theik h e l k comcomthe ASAPAC, Tokyo SPOT 3571A, 24 n u n i c a t i o n s . v v (SUEDE ASAPAC, 24 June June 52) 52) munications."
.
.
.
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Comment: T h i s message is considered considered f u r t h e r indication indication This further c concern of theWIREF's the,enemyfs concern about about UN UN intentions i n t e n t i o n s in in Korea. Korea.
o f f i c e r e receive r e c e i v e available a v a i l a b l e gas gas masks: maeks: A 23 33 June June Chinese officers message, posslbfy from a b battalion of the 8th Chi Chinese Artillery messag , possibly a t ' t a l i o n 03' t h e-igth nelse A rtillery D i v i s i n , r reports e p o r t s tthat h a t "at r e s e n t my attalion h a s 45 gas gas Divisidon, "at p present my b battalion has masks, and lacks maeke, lacks 417 417 gas gas masks." masks." The message continuehl continues that Chat af the t h e masks available, a v a i l a b l e , "sections " s e c t i o n s above ,platoon l e v e l have 31. of platoon level 31 l a c k 41. 41. P e r s o n n e l of of the t h e command post have have 13. 13. .and and lack Personnel lack 39. Personnel squad llevel have one one gas gas mask mask and lack 39. P e r s o n n e l below, below squad e v e l have (SUEDE 501st 5 0 1 s t Comm Corn Recon Recop Grp Grp Korea, Korea, lack 337 gas masks.'' masks." (SUEDE l a c k 337 K-4054, 24 K-4054, 24 June June 52) 52)
9.
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26 June 52 26 June. 52
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Comment on Soviet Orbit propaganda treatMent of the Korean war anniversary: The bulk of the Soviet Orbif's propaganda output on 25 and 26 June was keyed to the second anniversary of the Korean war, and to the WFTU appeal of 24 May 52 which had designated 25 June "a day of solidarity with the heroic Korean people, a day of the defense of peace,"
In accordance with the appeal,"all progressive mankind, all workers" were exhorted to raise their voices for a peaceful settlement of the Korean question on a just and wise basis; withdrawal of all foreign troops from Korea; unconditional banning of atomic weapons; condemnation of "the crimes of American aggressors who have used bacteriological weapons in Korea and Northeast China"; and "unmasking of the inhuman and dishonorable oppression practiced by American commanders against Koreans and Chinese POWs."
Moscow emphasized the failure of "American aggressors despite the use of the most barbaric, inhuman means of warfare, to subdue the heroic Korean people," and reasserted that the war in Korea is but a "dress rehearsai" for a third world war. The peace-loving peoples of the wOrld were again urged to present a united front "against the machinations of the warmongers" and to rally more cloiely around the USSR.
East German material drew a parallel between, events in Korea and Germany, comparing Adenauer's role with that.of Rhee and marking Ridgway's presence in Germany at this time of "ominous significance and boding ill for'the future of West Germany."
The mass of material produced no positive evidence of future Soviet-Communist tactics in Korea. It followed the consistent pattern of preparation for any event. The tone was surprisingly mild despite the rehash of atrocity charges.
27 June 52 C \\)
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NFU and its puppet Party and its puppetparties, parties,on onthe the second second anniversary anniversary of
Peiping reaffirms desire for "peaceful" "peaceful" settlement in in rom the e C h i nese Communist Korea: une broadcast message from ommunist Korea : A S June roa cas message
congratulated the Korean people for "beating "beating the Korean conflict, congratUlated off the (American) (American) onslaught" and reaffirmed the the Chinese aim aim of of aettling the the Korean question "by "by peaceful peaceful means." means." The message settling pOW question prevents an armistice armistice and and stated that only the the pow commencement of of political political negotiations. aegotiations. the commencement
Another message in In the broadcast promised Korean Communist forces forces that that the the Chinese Chinese "volunteers" "volunteers" would "fight "fight to to the the
end" beside them. A third message assured the "volunteers" that the people of China crould.give them "limitless support."
Comment: These messages illustrate illustrate the Chinese Communists' Comment: to seek s e e k an armistice, armistice, permitpermitapparentintentions: to continue continue to apparent intentions: to failed tbem then to to seek seek by political means what they have failed ting them to t o achieve by force; and to t o persist in their t h e i r Korean commitment of Western Western their minimum aim, aim, the the withdrawal of at least until their Korea,is secured. secured. forces from Korea,is
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unit signs anti-US a atrocity North Korean tactical tactical u nit s i g n s anti-US trocity document: A N North' unit on t the-West ooast documeht: or tli KKorean o r e m ttaCtioal actical u n i t on h e weet coast reprted number of of persons persons who who p parti7 r e g o r t e a on on 21 2 1 June June that t h a t lithe "the number articipated Koje-do p prisOner appeal petition c i p a t e d in i n the t h e iigning s i g n i n g of.the o f . t h e Koje-do risoner a ppeal p etition and 5 50 were 16 16 officers, o f f i c e r s , 31 31 non7commissioned non-commiseioned officers and 0 enlisted men.l (SUEDE 330th Corn Comm Recon Grp Korea, Korea, ALT-696, ALT-696, 22 June 52) men." (SUEDE 52)
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3. 3,
Chinese CommuniSt r o c k e t launcher launcher division division g lans t o u se Communik rocket plans to use e t a i l e directions r e c t i o n s for' f o r dilag-flags using flags to'give t o ' give signal-flags: 'Detailed I n an an 18 18 June June s % f % % % o ir D r o c k e d tk lc h e r were in adjustments for rocket launCher fblrings arings were meSsage from the Rocket Launcher DiviDivimessage t h e Chinese Communist Gonmunist 21st a l s t Rocket sion to t o one one of of its its subordinates. s u b o r d i n a t e s . The flags f l a g s are ore apparently apparently sion o n l y to used only correction t o show the t h e observer o b s e r v e r whether the the c o r r e c t i o n is for for elevation established the o r direction, d i r e c t i o n , and and once this t h i s is established the e l e v a t i o n or .change figures change in f i g u r e s is is shouted. shouted. (SUEDE 501st SOlst Comm Recon Grp Grp .Korea, K-3997, 18 Korea, K-3997, 18 June June 52) 52)
Comment: The fire of s rocket be r rapidly o c k e t launchers l a u n c h e r s can be apidly Comment: adjusted This h i s eliminates eliminates ad j u s v by o oral r a l and and visual v i s u a l signals. signalsa T complicated mathematics and possible and makes it it p o s s i b l e to t o engage ror this flag targets rapidly. r a p i d l y . For t h i s reason r e a s o n simple f l a g communications targets would be be valuable v a l u a b l e to t o newly newly trained t r a i n e d artillery a r t i l l e r y units, units.
.
Shortly Comment: S h o r t l y after a f t e r the t h e UN informed the t h e Communists Communists in l a t e April A p r i l that t h a t only o n l y 70,000 70,000 p prisoners rieoners d desired esired t to o be be rerei n late p patriated, a t r i a t e d , an unidentified u n i d e n t i f i e d North Korean u unit n i t was i instructed nstructed message t to agitate the troops a against the UN UN in a measage o a g i t a t e among t h e troops g a i n e t the Action, action. I t is possible t h a t the t h e document referred r e f e r r e d to t o in i n the the lt that message represents 22 June message r e p r e s e n t s the t h e end end result r e s u l t of of the t h e Communist Communist Order t o agitate. agitate. o r d e r to
27 June 52
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1. 1 . Withdrawal Withdrawal of of Chinese Chinese unit unitfrom from sensitive sensitive sector on Korean front
indicated: indrcated:
an On 25 25 June June a a North North Korean Korean regiment, regiment, an element of of the the IV Corps Corps in in the the Pyongyang Pyongyang SUEDE divisionof ofthe the ChiChiarea, reported reportedthat thataadivision SUEDE nese 42nd Army had requested per mission s - J. 3-37 42nd Army had requestedpermission .5 < - h 37 to reconnoiter "the "the defensive defensive area" held held by by the regiment. regiment.
26 Tune June 52 52
US Army US Army Korea
The 42nd Commsnt: The Comment: 42ndArmy, Army, recently recently rerelieved from combat in west central Korea, is currently located by by combat in west central Korea, currently located the Far Far East EastCommand Command as a simmediately immediatelybehind behind the front. Unless Urless this unit is is replaced, replaced, its itswithdrawal withdrawal from a a reserve reserveposition position in in the the active west will reduce reduce Communist offensive west central sector will capabilities in an invasion invasion corridor.
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6. 6.
Korean tank officers scheduled for Training of North Korean tank o fficers s cheduled f or mid-July: In June message s sent over North : I n a 24 June ent o ver a N o r t h Korean mid-Jul armored & f o r c e force network, n e t w o r k , it i t was stated stated that t h a t "from "from 10 1 0 to t o 20 20 July, July, the t h e short s h o r t course for f o r the the regimental r e g i m e n t a l commander commander and and staff staff is to t o take take place at a t the t h e training training r e g i m e n t of the the officers" is regiment North Korean ROK I Int M Korea Korean 105th 105th Tank Tank Division. D i v i s i o n . (CANOE (CANOE ROK n t Grp M SK-K-487, 25 SK-K-48'7, 25 June J u n e 52) 52)
Comment: The N North principal Comment: Tho o r t h Korean Army has the p r i n c i p a l armored force involved utilization would be be e expected i n v o l v k d in the t h e war and rand its u t i l i z a t i o n would xpected in any forthcoming f o r t h c o m i n g offensive offensive effort. e f f o r t . Training T r a i n i n g of of North North Korean senior senior armored armored officers officer8 is is an an indication i n d i c a t i o n that, t h a t , as as of of that date, d a t e , no tactical tactical role r o l e was was planned p l a n n e d for f o r this t h i s force force during d u r i n g July. July
North Korean Korean antiaircraft a n t i a i r c r a f t units u n i t s to t o report damage inflicted inflicted on on hydroelectric h y d r o e l e c t r i c pla p l a nts: n t s : In a 26 Jute June message paSsed passed 1 in: a 11 system used by North N o r t h iorean Korean antiaircraft anthireraft u units nite o on n t the h e east coast, an an unidentified u n i d e n t i f i e d company commander was ordered to t o "depart tonight t o n i g h t and go to t o Pujon-gang Pixjon-gang and make m a k e a concrete c o n c r e t e investigation investigation of oP the t h e damage damage situation." s i t u a t i o n . ' s This T h i s officer o f f i c e r was also ordered to to find f i n d out o u t "whether "whether or o r not n o t it i t is is true t r u e that t h a t the t h e 7th 7 t h Division Division antiaircraft a n t i a i r c r a f t battalion b a t t a l i o n could c o u l d not not fight fight properly p r o p e r l y on on 23 23 June dune b e c a u s e they t h e y did did not n o t have have any any ammunition. ammunition. If because ."
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T OP SECRET CANOE I
SY 5,411...
On the the same same day day a a North North Korean Korean antiaircraft antiaircraft artillery artillery unit, unit, On probably the the command command center center for for all all antiaircraft antiaircraft defenses defenses on on probably the east east coast, coast, issued issued a a detailed detailed order order to to subordinate subordinate antiantithe In this, this, the "25th battalion battalion aircraft regiments and battalions. battalions. In regiments and i s to to radio radio the the 24th 24th regiment regiment and and report the the bombed commander commander is riituation of the the Hochon generator office telephone.I? situation Hochon River generator office by telephone." 27 June June 52) 52) SK-K-572 and and SK-K-586, SK-K-586, 27 M Korea, Korea, SK-K-572 (CANOE ROK Int Int Grp Grp M (CANOE Comment: Both the Pujon Pujon and Hochon Comment: 23 to t o 26 26 were aftacked during the the period period 23 were attacked during Preliminary damage damage reports reports indicate indicate that that Preliminary presently operational. operational. presently
7 . 7.
hydroelectric hydroelectric systems systems June by by UN UN aircraft. aircraft. June is neither system system is neither

.
.
Unknown,Communist unit mentioned in in Korea: On 25 25 June June the the Unknown Communist unit 203rd Rocket Rocket Launcher Launcher Regiment Regimentinformed informedits itspa,'ent pa-ent Chinese 203rd Chinese 21st that "the "the friendly friendly antiaircraft the 21st Division Division that antiaircraft artillery, artillery, the 509th Regiment has requested to observe firing." 509th Regiment has requested to observe our our regiment's regiment's firing." The following following day, day, the the division division informed informed the the regiment regiment The that "concerning "concerning the the request request by by the the 509th 509th Regiment t o watch that Regiment to watch the artillery artillery fire, fire, please refuse them them as as the the situation situation does does the please refuse Grp not necessitate necessitate such such actions.r actions.'' (CANOE not (CANOE BOlst 501st Corn Comm Recon Recon Grp Korea, K-4084, 26 26 June; June; K-4113, K-4113t 28 28 June June 52) 52) Korea, K-4084, Comment: If 509th Regiment an infantry infantry unit, unit, Comment: If the the 509th Regiment were were an other regiments it w o m component of of the the 57th 57th Army. Army. Two would be a component Two other regiments in the 500-510 500-510 series series have been reported in Korea, Korea, but no the presence presence of df the the 57th 57th Army Army exists. exists. confirm&tiQn confirmation of the
-
In view view of of this this request request to to observe observe artillery artillery fire fire and and the characterization characterization of "antiaircraft "antiaircraft artillery," artillery," it is is entirely possible possible that that other other Chinese Chinese Communist Communist antiaircraft antiaircraft entirely the Korean theater. regiment8 numbered in in this this series series are are in in the regiments numbered Korean theater. The term term "friendly," "friendly," usually usually used used with reference to to Korean The with reference Korean units, is is not not clear. clear. units,
8. 8.
unit: In In response response to a query concerning concerning the proper proper chain of command in in a a tank tank crew, crew, a a North North Korean Korean message message of of 20 20 June, June, command
L o w level level of training trainipg demonstrated tank Low demonstrated by North Korean Korean tank
sent in in a a system system used used by by armored armored units, units, elucidated elucidated that that "the' "the sent commander the gun the tank tank should commander and and the gun chief chief of the should act act according according to the the commander'splans. comandervsPlslns. .the .the person loading shells. shells. .to to person loading .to .who work the. .wireless the gunchief's gunchief'splans, and the. the. the plans, and .who work the. .wireless communication. e .should .should act according to to thedrIver's. thedrnverPS. , communication. act according (CANOE Int Grp M SK-K-346, 21 21 June June 52) 52) plan." (CANOE ROK Int M Korea, Korea, SK-K-346,
.
.
.
4 4
1 52 1 July July 52
TOP SECRET CANOE
basic North Comment: Transmission of b a s i c information I n f o r m a t i o n over a N orth Korean armored armored unit u n i t network network indicates ilidlcates the.low t h e low level, 1 s v e l .of o f .traintraining among some armored armored units._ units.
9.
Chinese C h i n e s e Army may move into i n t o western w e s t e r n Hwanghae Hwanghae Province: P r o v i n c e : The Brigade B r i g a m oCommander, m m a n d s r , probably p r o b a b l y of o f the t h e North N o r t h Korean-23rd ICorean 23rd Mechanized Mechanized A r t i l l e r y Brigade, Brigade, was was irifiiimed Informed on u n e by attalion Artillery on 25 25 J June by one one of of his hiS b battalion are-presently over the_observation commanders that t h a t Y'we "we are p r e s e n t l y tturning urning o ver t he observation post to t o the t h o Volunteer V o l u n t e e r Army. Army. We will c o m p l e t e l y finish the relief completely by. by. .25 15th RSM, RSM, Kprea,'15RSM/5258,. Korei, 16RSW/5268, 20 26 June. June .25 June." june." (CANOE 15th
52 ) 52 )
.
.
It is possible that this North brigade Comment: I t i s p ossible t hat t his N o r t h Korean b rigade is tuFRTriiUver i s t u m v e r its i t s defensive d e f e n s i v e positions p o s i t i o n s in i n Hwanghae Hwanghae Province, Province,
10. 10.

5 5
southwest s o u t h w e s t of message sent sent (42nd Army)" Army)" '(42nd North N o r t h Korean Korean
Pyongyang, to t o the t h e Chinese C h i n e s e 42nd 42nd Army. Army. A previous previous on o n 25 2 5 June J u n e mentioned that t h a t the t h e "125th " 1 2 5 t h Division Division was to r reconnoiter the "defense area" of of a was econnoiter t he " d e f e n s e area" IV IV Corp Cosp dnit. Unit.
Soviet MIG's MIGss practice.strafing p r a c t i c e s t r a f i n g in i n Manchuria: Manchuria: Two "allied" "allied" (Soviet) M1G15's traininefllfght'at ( S o v i e t ) mG -1b O s Made made a."strafing a "strafing t r a i n i n g " , T f l I g h t . a t Tungfeng, Tungfeng, i n central c e n t r a l Manchuria, Manchuria, on on 27 27 June, J u n e , according.to a c c o r d i n g t o aa.Chinese Chinese in message. S e c u r i t y Group GroEp Johnson J o h n s o n AB AB Japan, Japan, (CANOE AP-533, 6920 Security 27 June J u n e 52) 52)
This of ttrainin&is unusual MIG15's h i s ttype y p e of raining,is u n u s u a l ffor o r M1G-15'~ Comment: T in enemy is p planning i n ChilliT-rf C h m ssuggests u g g e s t s tthat h a t tthe h e enemy l a n n i n g eventual e v e n t u a l use use of ground-strafing g r o u n d - s t r a f i n g tactics t a c t i c s by jet j e t fighters f i g h t e r s in i n Korea. Korea. The The Russian-manned Bussian-manned units u , n i t s at a t Tungfeng Tungfeng have have been been used used for f o r night n i g h t combat combat f l i g h t s and and daylight d a y l i g h t border flights border patrols p a t r o l s over over Korea. Korea. .
1 July J u l y 52 52 1
TOP SECRET CANOE
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AppmedFoniumear2nhAmotmlft-Rnoq17117290mooll000l-8
Central Intelligence Agency Office of Current Intelligence 6046, 1 July 1952
DIA AND DOS HAVE NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND RELEASE.

I.
Military Operations
Lien
UN naval aircraft on the west coast flew 12 combat sorties against enemy targets as weather closed down carrier operations on the east coast. Naval surface craft maintained the blockade and attacked enemy troop, supply and industrial installations on both coasts. Air
UN land-based aircraft flew 339 sorties, of which 185 were combat. Medium bonbers attacked a railroad bridge in north central Korea.
II.

General Situation
On 28 June two North Korean Army soldiers deserted to the UN near Panmunjom. They stated upon preliminary interrogation that their former unit was the "4451st Headquarters Company, Temporary PW achange Unit." (This is the first indication that the Communists have carried their cease-fire planning to the extent of organizing a "PW exchange unit.")
The Dutch and Australian delegates to the UN Commission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Korea were warned confidentially that the UN delegates DIA and IDaS review(s)cornpleted. SECRET THE C.I.A. NASBO OBJECtiON 25X1
TO THE DECIASSIFICATION

Cease-fire
Paitical
Action flared on a new sector of the front as North Korean elements in battalion strength attacked positions of the US 25th Division in the eastern sector near the "Punchbowl." The enemy attack, supported by almost 1,300 rounds of mortar ant artillery fire, was repulsed. Minor activity occurred along the rest of the front.
CIA-RDP911-644kidtn4000 I-8
No. 0 6 JUL M78
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"who play a prominent part in UNCURK's activities" should leave Korea as soon as Possible or beware of assassination. Home Minister Yi Pom-sok's reaction, on He made the being informed, was that he considered the threat not serious. safety of UNCURK members his personal responsibility. Ambassador Muccio, in Comment on the story that Rhee plane to appoint Yi Pom-sok as Defense Minister and pro-Rhee youth corpe leader An Ho-sang as Home Minister, states that this is one of the current rumors in Pusan. While the President is trying to find a replacetent for the present Defense Minister and may be considering Yi among others, Muccio does not believe Rhee would push these appointtents. Yils appointment as Defense Minister could be disastrous, in the Ambassador's opinion, from the point of view of maintaining the nonpolitical nature of the ROK armed forces,
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Central. Intelligence Agency Office of Current Intelligence 6047, 2 July 1952

I.
Military Operations
'
Naval air sorties were flown in western Korea from the light carrier Carriers of Task Force 77 on the east coast were engaged in resupply. UN naval surface craft bombarded enemy shore installations.
"Bataan," against enepy troop and supply targets.
UN land-based aircraft flew only 376 sorties, of which 125 were combat, Medium bombers attacked a vital railroad bridge in northwestern Korea.

III,
General Situation
A Korean Amy general court martial convicted leading opposition Assemblyman So Min-ho on 1 July of murdering a Korean Arpy captain on 24 April and sentenced him to death. The sentence is subject to review by Rhee. The Assembly opposition is reported to be considerably aroused. (The recently deposed presiding officer at the trial, Brigadier General Choe, has reported that Martial Law Commander Won originally ordered him to complete the trial in two or three days and to produce a death sentence.)
25X1

Nan
Air
Political
SECRET
A raiding party from the ROK let Division in the western fought a seven-hour engagement against Chinese defenders before Sangnyong area capturing their objective. The Chinese counterattacked with three platoons in an effort to recapture the position, In the east central sector near Tuchon other Chinese defenders forced a raiding party from the US 7th Division to ;:ithdrew after a fierce 45-minute engagement.
THE C I A . HASNO OBJECTION
LCIASSIFICATION
fioSISHDE 0;11MEN
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President Rhee confided to Ambassador Muccio on 28 June that he is under pressure from representatives of local assemblies which will compel him to take action soon, since the Assemblyts delaying tactics have gone far enough. Rhee mentioned in the conversation that Prime Minister Chang Taek-sang had come to him for money. The Ambassador replied that he hoped Rhee would nevertheless disr cuss the situation calmly with 15 or 20 "rensonable" Assemb1ymen. (Rhests refer.once to the Prime Minister presumab37 was intended-as Preof of the line he has taken for the past'10 dgys that he must rid the AsseMbly of the corrupt members, about 80 in number. To date the President has remained adamant on the score of compromising with the "reasonable" members of the opposition.)

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I.
Military Operations
kat
Action along the front was limited to a few enemy-initiated probes and routine patrol contacts.
UN land-based aircraft flew 379 sorties, of which 159 were combat. Medium boMbers flew 32 sorties against two vital rail bridges in north central Korea. No enemy MIG-151s reportedly were encountered.
II,
25X1
The North Korean Army on 1 June designated the IV Corps ea the "West Coast Special Task Force" and the V Corpe as the "East Coast Special Task

Air
Naval aircraft from Task Force 77 on the east coast flew 183 sorties against enemy supply, transportation and troop installations. Heavy weather in the west limited operations of the light carrier Bataan. UN naval surface craft bombarded enemy coastal installations on both coasts,
LIAM
Force."n
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(The current deployment of these corps suggests a mission much as described in this report, although this cannot be completely confirmed. Organizationally, the report credits the IV Corps with one too mamy infantry divisions and the V Corps with a mechanized division whose existence also cannot be confirmed. If this new organization is correct, presumably the North Korean VII Corps in the Wonsan area is now available for combat duty.)
OBJECTION TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OF THIS DOCUMENT.
THE C. I. A. HAS NO
mow' corps are reported to be completely mobile and, while charged primarily with a defensive mission are capable of "supporting offensive action." The IV Corps aggregates 3 infant;y, 1 armored, and 1 mechanized division, in addition to a mechanized artillery brigade, The V Corpe comprises 3 infantry divisions, 1 mechanized division, and two artillery brigades.
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General Situation
Ambassador NUccio comments that the death sentence for opposition Assemblyman So has come as a surprise to most informed Koreans in view of the weakness of the case. There is evidence that the sentence is arousing mounting indignation not only in the opposition but also among those elements heretofore considered neutral in the struggle between the President and the Assembly,
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I.
Military Operations
Army
Chinese forces in west central Kbrea carried out an hour long probe in platoon-strength against an outpest of the US 45th Division for the most significant ground action of 4 July. Similar probes by battalion-strengh Chinese forces in the same sector of the line on the previous day were repulsed. Also on 3 July, a raiding part from the US 1st Marine Division in western Korea met stiff resistance from a well-emplaced enemy battalion north of Panmunjom.
Naval aircraft from Task Force 77 off eastern Korea flew 168 sorties on 3 July. No report has been received on 4 July's operations. In the west, naval aircraft from the US light carrier Bataan and the British carrier Ocean attacked enemy installations on 3 and 4 July. Naval Emrface craft bombarded enemy shore installations and maintained the blockade.
On 4 July, UN land-based aircraft flew 909 effective sorties, of which 540 were combat. Two medium bomber missions were flown. Communist jets were much in evidence, as 84 MIG-15's and 2 Type-15's were observed in flight. Of those observed, 47 were encountered with 10 definitely destroyed, 2 more claimed destroyed, and 8 claimed damaged. (Most of these were hit by UN F-86's during the Sakchu raid.)
II.
Photo reconnaissance of an area southeast of Sakchu, near the Mhnchurian border in northwestern Korea, revealedlhat there was heavy activity at the location of a reported North Korean Army Military Acadepy. Intelligence reports had indicated that some 2,000 North Korea officer-trainees under. 60 instructors were to graduate in July.

Navy
Air
EnemyRear Areas
SECRET
THE C. /.A. HAS NO OH ECTION

THr. DECLASSIFICATION
tiLS DOCUMENT fo
OF
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On 4 J147, UN fighter-boMbers, escorted by F-861s, launched a concentrated attack on installations. Preliminary reports indicate that the strike was successful with considerable destruction to enemy facilities. During the attack, enemy NIG-15's attempted to intercede and were engaged by UN F-861s. Nine of the Communist jets were downed, one was probably downed and seven were damaged at a cost of two lost F-861s.
General Situation
The necessary two-thirds majority of Assemblymen to effect these amendments was achieved by a police round-up of opposition menbere and by the government's release, to attend the National Assembly, of 10 legislators under arrest for "conspiracy." The "compromise" was passed by a vote of 163 to 0 with 3 abstentions.
According to press sources, the presidential election will be held 15 July. (This latest MOVO apparently represents a eonsiderable shift in Rhee's position. arlir in the week he presented the Assembly with a virtual ultimatum to agree to popular presidential election or face dissolution. American observers in Pusan had stated nearly two weeks ago that Rhee could have effected this "compromise" at any time of his choosing. The passing of the "compromise" amendments, mgy put an end to the political crisis in South Korea. The election of a preaident on 15 July, however, is a virtual guarantee that Rhee will continue as ehief executive.)
The South Korean National Assembly on 4 July voted to pass four constitutional amendments. The amendments, representing a "compromise" between Rhee and his political opposition, provided for the popular election of the president,..the establishment of a bi-cameral legislature, the right of the Assembly to overthrow the cabinet, and the seleCtion of the cabinet by the prime minister.
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Central Intelligence Agency Office of Current Intelligence 6050, 7 duly 1952

I.
Military Operations
MEE
On 5 July, Chineserforces probed UN positions in the west central Mhbang area and.in the east central Talchon area. No serious action developed. During 6 JUlor, however, Chinese forces near Panmunjom, in the west, launehed a series of probes against positions of the US 1st Marine Division. These prObes, eventually repelled, were supported by over 5,000 rounds of mortar and artill3ry fire. In the west central Chorwon area, two companies of Chinese probed posi tions of the ROK 9th Division.
On 5 and 6 July, naval aircraft operated.against targets in North Korea ftom UN carriers on the west coast. Aircraft from Task Force 77 on the east coast, aftAr 256 sorties on 5 July, did not fly on 6 July, while the force engaged in re supply. UN naval surface craft continued bombardment of enemy share installations and maintained the blockade.
On 6 July, UN landbased aircraft flew 619 sorties, of which 330 were coMbat. The previous day, 719 were flown with 421 combat sorties. UN medium bombers attacked enemy transportation targets in north central and north eastern Korea on 6 July. UN F-861s on patrol in the Yalu River area observed 4 MI0-151s on 5 JOY, but no encounter took place.
The Far East Command reports that the Chinese Communist ald Army, recently relieved from combat in west central Korea by the 38th Army, has withdrawn from the vicinity of the front lines and now has a coastal security and line of communication mission in the area from Pyongyang to Binanju.
FECOM 7.eached this conclusion from the statements of recent prisoners taken from the 38th Army who reported thie move. (The effect of this withdrawal is a .slight lessening of enemy offensive capabilities in the west central sector.)

Ean
Air
AIM
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ITO THE DECLASSIFICATION OF
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THE C.
. A. HAS NO OBJECTION
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General Situation
Political
Ambassador Muccio reports that on 5 July 131 members of the National Assembly signed a petition asking for the retrial of So Min,ho, Assemblyman convicted of murdering a South Korean Army captain and sentenced to death in a trial that had been widely considered rigged. The petition was delivered to the American Con, sulate General in FUsan. A French news agency announced on 6 July the creation of a South Korean Government air defense organization under the direction of Home Minister 71 Pom-sok. Several subsections have already been created in principal cities and provincial centers "in order to forewarn civilians of air attacks by Communist forces." (The need for such an organization tas been apparent ftr sone time. Yil however, has displayed a predilection in the past for employing such para-military forces for his own political ends.)
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Central Intelligence Agenay Office of Current Intelligence
8006, 8 Ju.1,y 1952

I.
Military Operations
UN carrier-based aircraft flew 250 sorties against anemy installations on the east and west coasts. UN naval surface craft bombarded enemy shore installations and maintained the blockade.
UN land-based aircraft flew 720 sorties of which 389 were coMbat. The Principal medium bomber targets were railroad bridges and a marshalling yard in northwestern Korea. No enemy jets were observed airborne, but an undetermined number were observed on Tatungkuo airfield.
II.
ROK interrogators have learned from recent refugees from northeastern Korea that there has been considerable movement of North Korean Army units north toward Chongjin from the Wonsan-liamhung area. (The reasons behind such a movement are difficult to explain. It is possible that better training areas exist in the northeast or that a concentration of troops is being effected in the Chongjin area for possible future action against UN-held Yangdo off the coast between Songjin and Chongjin.)
THE C.I.A. HASNO OBJECTION TO THE DEr.LASSIFICATION OF THIS DOCUMENT.

Air
Arnw
In western Korea, Chinese forces, defending from bunkers in the Punji area, withstood a company-size raiding party from the US 1st Marine Division for four hours. The US unit finally withdrew. In the east central sector near Kumsong, a reinforced company of Chinese troops, supported by fire from 14 tanks, nearly overran an outpost of the ROE 6th Division. Artillery and mortar fire was also used by the attacking enemy. In the Tulsa area to the east of Kumsong, a raiding party from the ROK Capital Division was engaged and forced to withdraw by a Chinese company, supported by mortar, artillsry, and a flame-thrower.
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III.
General Situation
Political
The speaker of the ROK National Assembly, Sin Ik-hi, called on President Rhee on 5 July to congratulate him on his "victory" over the AsseMbly. Rhee, in a conciliatory mood, admitted that he had gone too far at times, but stated that "proper legal processes" would be observed from here on out.
Ambassador Muccio reports that the Communist conspiracy court martial trial was adjourned for ten days on 7 July at the request of the defense. Emhassy officials have the impression that all parties are etalling and have noted an air The Ambassador believes the governof optimism on the part of the defendants. ment may be seeking a mechanism for dropping the case without loss of face.

SElRET
Sin,a strong Democratic Nationalist Party man, told Rhee that the ROK was headed for a "totalitarian" state if only one party (Rhee's Liberals) were allowed to exist. Sin protested against the suppression of the DNP at the local level hy Rhee's Liberals. Rhee answered him by saying that he agreed that the two-party system was necessary and that he would endeavor to provide freedom for the DNP to /Unction without restraint.
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I.
Military Operations
hoz
The most significant action of the period occurred in the east central Yulsa sector where a Chinese platoon, supported by over 1,500 rounds of mortar and artillery fire, forced a withdrawal of an outpost position of the ROK Capital Division. A few miles to the west of this, UN artillery engaged enemy tanks moving along the road toward Kumsong. Brief patrol contacts marked action along the reat of the front.
Naval aircraft from UN carriers on the east coast flee 189 sorties against enemy installations, including strikes at transformer yards and hydroelectric installations in the Hochon river system. No naval air operations were conducted on the east coast, UN naval surface craft hotbarded the enemyheld shores.
UN landbased aircraft flew 1,003 sorties, of vhieh 721 were combat. Medium bombers concentrated their effort on neutralizing an important railroad marshalling yard in northwestern Korea. Of the 360 fighterbomber missions flown, 43 were against a power plant in the Changjin river system north of Hamhung. ReAlthough turning pilots claimed more than 22 hits were scored on the target. only 1 MIG45 and 2 unidentified aircraft were seen in the air during, the period, 136 eweptwing fighters were sighted on Communist airfields in the Yalu river complex.
II,
Enemy Rear Areas
Poor weather conditions from 26 June to 3 July so reduced enemy vehicle sightings that no accurate analysis was possible. Only 8,707 vehicles were ob served. UN naval units reported 1,400 enemy vehicles moving on the east coast, The great majority of these were 'in the WOnsan area where extremely heavy truck traffic has been reported. Despite the lack of sightings, Far East Air Force believes that enemy transport activity during the period was above normal.
THE C.I.A. HaNO OBJECTION TO THE DEOLATjIF1CATION OF

&ay
Mr
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ITHIS DOCUMENT.
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Interrogation of a North Korean POW by a US naval unit revealed that the send commander of the supply dumps in an area south of Wonsan has been ordered to (Analysis of recent vehicle sight all &munition to the ftontlines by 10 July. the ings has revealed a continued high movement of supplies and ammunition toward frontline.)
General Situation
Ceasefire
In a 7 July diatribe from Peiping, an unusually moderate note vas intro duced relative to the peace talks at Panmunjom. The Chinese claimed that "recently the Americans have begun to change their attitude . . . and have shown a desire to (Previous concessions made by the enemy in seek a solution to the POWquestion." the truce talks have invariably been preceded by a barrage of propaganda present ing the concession as a victory for the Communists.) Nehru has advised American Ambassador Bowles that the Indian Government has heard nothing further from Indian Ambassador Panikkar in Peiping in regard to the ceasefire. An inquiry has been sent to Peiping asking for a progress report.

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I.
Military Operations
AEME
The most severe action of the period occurred on the east coast where a battalion-strength raiding party from the ROK 5th Division fought an inconThe clusive all-day battle with North Korean defenders of a strategic hill. ,.North Koreans used nearly 10,000 rounds of mortar and artillery fire in repute ing the raid Further to the west, in the east central Tulsa sector, Chinese pressure was maintained on elements of the ROK Capital Division which were forced to withdraw from outpost positions.
Naval aircraft from carriers operating on thseast and west coasts flew 277 sorties against enemy installations in North Kbrea. Northeast of Hungnam, naval surface vessels boMbarded enemy supply lines and defense positions.
UN land-based aircraft flew 611 effective sorties, of which 262 were combat. The principal medium bomber target, a railroad bypass in northwestern Korea, was attacked by nine 8-291s. No enemy aircraft were sighted in the airy but UN F-86 pilots, on two occasions on the morning of 9 July, sighted 200 aircraft on the Yalu River airfields of Antung and Tatungkuo..
The Far East Command reports that further interrogation of a recent North Korean prisoner taken near Kaesong reveals that he heard that two battalions of the 82nd Regiment departed Kaesong for the Wonsan area on 20 June. Between 5 and 7 July a new Chinese unit, about 3,000 strong, arrived in Kaesong. (The move of the North Korean 82nd Regiment from the Kaesong area leaves this important sector of the front without any North Korean troop representation.)
In the afternoon of 9 July, UN aerial observers sighted three small umSECRET

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identified aircraft on Pyongyang airfield.
Moto reconnaissance of this field on 7 July revealed that repair activity was in progress. At that time about 3,000 feet of sod runway were operable.
III.
General Situation
Political
According to the US EMbassy in Pusan, election of the Assembly speaker and vice-speakers is scheduled for 10 July. Former speaker Sin Ik-hi is believed to have the beat chance for the speakership while the election of two opposition men as vice-speakers is possible. The EMbassy comments, however, that it is possible that one of the vice-speaker candidates will have to make way for a pro-Rhee man. (Yun Chi-yun, amember of the militant Rhee clique, has been mentioned as a possible vice-speaker candidate.)
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A Nationalist Chinese news agency reports from Pusan that So Min-ho, National AssanUrman who was tried for murder and sentenced to death, has won a rehearing. President Rhee granted the retrial after receiving petitions from 130 members of the Assembly. (The trial and conviction of So, one of the outspoken opposition leaders, was described as rigged by foreign observers and was one of Rheels methods for applying pressure on the opposition. If the prosecw. tion's recent change of tactics in the Communist conspiraoy trial is a yardstick, the granting of a retrial suggests that So will be given a lighter, possibly even a suspended, sentence. This might serve to remove some of the criticism of Rheets recent tactics.)
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Central Intelligence Agency Office of Current Intelligence 8009, Il July 1952

I.
Military Operations
Aircraft from UN naval carriers on the east coait did not operate as Task Force 77 engaged in resupply. On the west coast, aircraft from the British carrier Ocean attacked enemy installations southwest of pyongyang. UN naval surfaci craft bombarded enemy installations in the Tanchon and Wonsan area.
UN land-based aircraft flew 549 effectiVe sorties, of which 302 were coMbat. No enemy jets were Medium bombers attacked a vital rail target in central Korea. observed flying during the period, but UN aerial observers sighted 150 MIG-15's and 200 MIG-151s on Antung and Takuehan airfields. A maximum effort attack by 5th Air Force and Naval air units was made against enemy installations in the Pyongyang area in the late morning of 11 July. The raiding force consisted of 259 fighter-bombers. No damage reports have been received.
II,
UN rear areas
Another anti-guerrilla campaign is being organized in South Korea. oTask Force Mongoose," the special force being organized for the campaign, will include the crack ROK 1st Division and police units and will be commanded by ROK General Song YU-chan. The operation, to begin in the near future, will take place in three phases and will be concentrated against guerrilla remnants in southwestern Korea. SECRET
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A

Mka
Mr
Strong enemy defensive tactics characterized action along the front. In the west central Mabang area, a US 45th Division battalion raiding party, supported by armor, was forced to withdraw by a vigorously defending Chinese force of undetermin, ed size. . Similarly in the east central Tulsa area, patrols from the ROE Capital Division met with strong resistance from well-emplaoed Chinese defenders.
ritq
0?J!CTION
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General Situation
ttlitical
The ROK National AsseMbly, on 10 July, with 167 meMbers present, elected Sin Ik-hi as Speaker and Cho Pongam and Inn-Chiyong as vicespeakers. Sin and Cho are members of the opposition political party, while Yun is one of Rhea's
strongest supporters.
President Rhee's Liberal Party mill hold its convention on 19 July at Taejon according to an 11 July Pusan broadcast. Approximately 2,500 local delegates of the party will attend the convention to nominate presidential and vicepresidential candidates. (Since the next president and vicepresident must assume office by 15 August, their early election by popular vote is now a pressing problem.) The American EMbassy in Pusan comments that the atmosphere of fear among both the Assembly and the non.assembly opposition is by no means dissipated. The key to the future of constitutional governMent in South Korea depends to a great extent on the fate of Rhee's inner circle who have been riding high.
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Military Operations
Anz
Surface vessels maintained the blockade of both North Korean coasts, while UN naval aircraft flew a total of 189 missions.
UN land-based aircraft flew 1,532 effective sorties, including 1,189 combat missions. The 727 fighter bombers employed in a concentrated attack on selocted targets in the PyongYang area expended 405 tons of bombs, 230000 gallons of napalm, and 100,000 rounds of 50 calibre =munition. Fifty NIG's were observed during the afterncon; of the 30 encountered, two were probably lestroyed and two damaged.
A prisoner recently captured and interrogated by the RON Navy states that a North Korean front-line corps is to be relieved and that the North Korean Army is to uopen a now progressive change in the front." (The relieving force referred to by the prisoner is presumably th5 VII Corps, which has had a coastal security and training mission in the Wonson area. Which of the three front-line corps will be relieved is not clear' all have been in combat for an extended period.)

E22"
Air
On the east coast the enemy resumed operations for high Oemyon area and captured one hill from elements of the 5th MK counterattacks, by BOK forces forced tho enemy to withdraw from contested area. Elsewhere acrossthe2ront, action was light, probes and patrol clashes reported.
ground in the division. Two rent of the with Only.minor.
Ala
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A recently captured North Korean prisoner stated on 8 July that he had lenr,,Pd from some North Korean naval officers that a patroltorpedo boat bat talion vas located in the Wonsan area without any craft, and that there was a PT boat school at Unggi near the Soviet border. (The own prewar North Korean Navy was virtually wiped out in the early days of the war. Remaining war vessels, if there are any, are probably located in Korean ports near Sinuiju and near the Soviet border.)
General Situation

SECRRT
Photo interpretation indicated on 8 July that a new hydroelectric plant is being built in.the Kanggye area of North Korea near the Manchurian border. The photographs showed surge tanks, penstocks, a powerhouse, and transformer switchyards in the early stages of construction. (The Kokai hydroelectric system in the Kanggye area has been reported as the most nearly complete of the considerable number of installations originally planned by the Japanese, Frequent reports have been received indicating that the North Koreans con tinued work on this installation.)
.
Economic
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Central Intelligence Agenoy Office of Current Intelligence
NM, 14 July 1952

Military Operations
64MX
Fierce fighting between the ROK 5th Division and the North Korean 9th Division for a strategic hill north of Oemyon on the Korean east coast marked the week end's ground activity. Since enemy capture of the hill on 10 July, it has changed hands three times. Currently ROK forces hold the heights. During the night of 12 July, a raiding party from the lst Commonwealth Division, on the western front near Kigong, were engaged by determined Chinese defenders, Aftee a 50 minute engagement, during which time the enemy wed 1,200 rounds of mortar and artillery, the Commonwealth unit withdrew.
Naval aircraft from UN carriers on the east and west coast flew 230 sorties against enemy installations in North Korea. Naval surface craft bombarded the enemy's shoreline and maintained the blockade.
UN landbased aircraft, under For East Air Foice control, flew 1,021 effective sorties of which 664 were combat. Nine medium boMbers attacke an important transpo;tation point near Hadhung on the east coast. Thirty Cotunist MIG-15's were sighted flying during the period, Of the 12 encountered, one wae damaged. Near 1100 hours on 13 July, UN aeriel observers saw 200 aircraft on Antung airfield.
II,
On 11 July, two tanks or selfpropelled guns were sighted in the rear of positions of the North Korean 27th Division in eaatern Korea. These armored vehicles vere destroyed by US 25th Division artillery,
During the same period, UN aerial observers two other reveted tanks near the front lines of the Further to the east, five tanks were sighted moving into the sector of the North Korean 47th Division, in eastern Korea sighted North Korean 27th Division. southward down a main road (These sightings are un
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usual in that armor has been rarely encountered in the Mountainous, rugged eastern sector. There have been some fragmentary indications recently that greater emphasis is being placed on tank-infantry tactics in the North Korean Army.) The Far East Command reports that the North Korean 23rd Brigade is now deployed on the Ongjin peninsula in westernmost North Korea. The North Korean 21st Brigade, IV Corps, is accepted as deplqyed to the rear of the 23rd from Haeju to Changsaflot. (The 21st Brigade is a new unit in the North Korean Army.)
III,
General Situation
The AMbassador also speculates that Yi Pom-sok, "the urincipal villain of peace," is considered Rhea's logical choice as Vice-President,
Radio Peiping over the weak end gave heavy attention to Korea. In addition to the Chinese protests over the alleged bombing of the city of Antung, Manchuria, one commentator noted UN press source statements cautioning against optimism over the truce. Koje island brutalities and the bombing of UN P07 camps during the Pyongyang raids were stressed.
.
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Ambassador MUccio in Pusan reports that the initial reaction in South Korea to the passage of the constitutional amendment "was one of relief on all sides." After a month and one halfts "intolerable tension," even the hard core of Rheels opposition has welcomed the relaxation. Milccio comments, however, that the President seems to be making no new moves indicating that he is prepared to let by-gones be by-gones. Ehrtial law is still in effect and the conspiracy trial still continues.
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(Antral Intelligence Agency Office of Current Intelligence 8012, 15 July 1952

I.
Military Operations
Ground For the fifth successive dig, the struggle for high ground near Oemyon on the east coast continued. During the period, the North Koreans launched four compeny-sissed attacks, all of which were repulsed by ROK 5th Division elements who continue to occumr the contested ground. Elements of the ROK 9th Division on the central front attempted to drive out well-emplaced enemy units near Sagimak. After an eight-hour engagement, the enemy had not yielded. Elsewhere, brief patrol clashes occurred.
UM surface units continued to blockade both North Korean coasts. Only 39 naval sorties were flown, all from light carriers. Task Force 77 on the east coast was engaged in replenishing operations.
UN aircraft under Far East Air Force control flew 805 effective sorties, including 496 combat. Medium bomber sorties, totalling fourteen, bombed targets in the Hamhung area on the east coast and flew close support missions. Twentyfive Communist 1410-151s were observed flying. Of the seven enemy lets encountered, one was probably destroyed and one damaged.
Milit ray Intelligence
Far East Air Force reconnaissance flights over Korea during the week ending 10 July indicate that there is no let-up in the enemy's supply effort. Transport activity rose in the east central area with supply complexes in the PyonggangIchon area receiving this increased flow. As in previous weeks, the enemy rail traffic appeared to be concentrated on the vest and north central main supply routes and on the trans-peninsular rail route.

ALE
Ground
III,
General Situation
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Military Operations
Army
Employing five tanks in the role of artillery, delivering 25-minute of the preparatory fire, two small Chinese Communist groups attacked elements front. The of Kumsong on the east central ROK 6th Division two miles southeast After this engagement four enemy withdrew following the three-hour engagement. the support of 1,224 attacked another ROK outpost with more Chinese groups Elsewhere along The enemy was again repulsed. rounds of mortar and artillery. Across the the front, small probes and patrol clashes dharacterized the action. rounds of artillery and mortar. entire front, the enemy employed 4,027
UN carrier-based aircraft flew 213 sorties against enemy troop and supply installations in the northeastern Tanchon area and in western Hwanghae blockade and bombarded enemy province. Naval surface vessels maintained the shorelines on the east and west coast.
UN aircraft under Far East Air Force control flew 562 combat sorties in flown a total of 880 effective sorties flown. Of the 14 medium boMber missions railroad marshalling yard near the Chinese during the period, 12 were against a attacked an area border in northwestern Korea. Yesterday 175 UN fighter-bombers east of Pyongyang containing a cement factory, a locomotive repair shop, a transformer yard, and various barracks and buildings. Considerable damage to these installations was reported.
ler East Air Force reports that in enemy MIG encounters during the week ending 13 July, the pattern of aggressiveness remained sUbstantially unchanged: MIG pilots appeared willing to initiate attacks only when the prospects of escaping damage were heavily in their favor. Although MIG's were airborne an 11 July during the UN raid on Pyongyang, they did not attempt to interfere. Enemy night interception effort remained ineffective, as no damage resulted ton friendly aircraft, THEC.I.A.HASNOOBJECTION SECRET 0 THE W,CLASSIFICATION OF
HI;IDUOUMEAT.

Air
Air
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UN aerial observers reported on 15 July that bomb craters on the lightplane airstrip near Hoeyang ',ehind the central battle front have been filled in. (The Communibts nave shown considerable facility in constructing and maintaining emall air strips, suitable for light planes, throughout Korea, It is probable that these strips, when used, are for liaison craft and/or reconnaissance flights.)
III.
General Situation
Political
The executive committee of the Liberal Party has announced that Syngman Rhee Ind Yi Pom-sok wil/ be nominated for president and vice president respectively at the party's convention scheduled to open 19 July. The US EMbassy comments that if Rhee endorses Yi as a running mate, the latter's election would be a "shoo in." (Rhee continues to maintain that he is "not disposed" to run. Several. sources have indicated that the president is reluctant to accept Yi as vice president, preferring instead Ham Taeyong, the elderly nondescript chairman of the BOK Board of Audits.) The BOK National Assembly on 15 July completed voting on the governmentproposed bill for election of a president and a vice president. Some of the amendments put forward by the opposition were voted down, but the provision that "all officials who announce their candidacy" for office would resign their government jobs was upheld. Candidates far president, vice president and assemblymen were specifically exempted. The law is expected to be promulgated on 17 July with elections scheduled for early August. (The provision requiring resignation of officials prior to running for office was ineffectually aimed at the current Home Minister Yi Pom-sok, who will probably run for vice president.)
Propaganda
Peiping and Pyongyang radios were stressing on 15 July all the customary allegations on American atrocities to prove that the "adventurist policy" of anploying "so-called military pressure" can never attain the UN's objectives. A new Communist line with suggested propaganda overtones is the report in the American press that Communist China is conditionally aocepting the Geneva Conventions banning germ warfare,
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I.
Military Operations
Preliminary naval air sorties reported totalled 26, all on the east coast. Targets in the Hungnam area were attacked. Surface units on the west coast bombarded islands off western Hwanghae Province. Songjin and Chongjin were the principal targets of naval fire on the east coast.
Air activity during the period was light as UN aircraft flew 469 effective sorties of which 245 were combat. 52 MIGIs were observed and 25 encountered. One MIG and one F-86 were reported destroyed: Only 12 bomber sorties were flown.
UN naval forces operating off western Korea report that 300 North Korean Army troops invaded Changni island five miles off Ongjin peninsula during the early morning of 15 July. (A considerable build-up in enemy small boats in this area during the past week had painted to another enemy amphibious attempt.) Air

Air
Joint Operations
North Korean 9th Division elements cautiously probed ROK 5th Division positions on Hill 351 near Oemyon on the east coast. The enemy withdrew in every instance after a brief fire fight. In the east central sector ROK 6th Division positions were shelled by fire from six enemy tanks southeast of Kumsong. Two other tanks were sighted in the immediate area. Brief probes and minor patrol clashes occurred along the rest of the front.
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I special repair unit of regiment strength is now stationed at Antung rield. The majority of these men, who graduated from a six-month course at the Mukden ordnance school, take care of airfield facilities and minor aircraft damage. A special squad of some 20 men are engaged exclusively in the repair of aircraft with major damage. Heretofore, any damaged aircraft
SECRET
were sent to Mukden
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for repair. The Directorate of Intelligence, FEAT, connants that this report is the first "logical and acceptable idea" that maintenance facilities, similar to those of the US Air Force, now exist at the border airfields.
General Situation
Pblitical
Home Minister Yi Pom-sok reportedly was given a severe tongue-lashing by President Rhee at the State Council Meeting on 16 July. According to Ambassador Muccio, the President made it plain that he alone is running South Korea. MUccio also reports that, at the same meeting, Rhee made the extraordinary statement that he is no longer leader of the Liberal Party and has no connection with it. The Anbassador comments that Rhee may be encouraged by his recent.victory in the political turmoil and feel safe enough to make himself independent of the party which he originally organized only with reluctance. Having done so it would be easier to disavow and remove Yi from power.
(Recent reports from Pusan, perhaps inspired by Yi, have indicated that he might be Rhee's running mate in the coming presidential and vice presidential elections Tits control of the pence, his power in the Liberal Party, and his supporters in the Youth Corps make him the second most powerful South Korean politico.)
On the evening of 16 July Radio Pyongyang first time since 24 June thereby indicating that gave its program preview for the the station will resume its normal program schedules imMediately. Normal schedules have been suspended since 25 June without explanation by the station. (The suspension of programs coincided with the extensive bombing of the North Korean hydroelectric system.)
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Propaganda
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The Communist conspiracy court-martial trial involving seven National Assemblymen has continued daily since 9 July, adjourning during the hours the legislature is in session in order to permit the defendants to attena Assembly meetings. The major evidence introduced by tho prosecution is the confessions of the first three defendants although they have disavowed all testimony charging torture, intimidation and bribery. The unanimous opinion of foreign observers, according to the US Enbassy, is that the trial is a "farce" and a "travesty of justice." Adherence to western rules of court procedure would have resulted in the case being thrown out of court and the removal of at least the president el the court for incompetence.
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Central
Intelligence Agency of Current Intelligence 8015, 18 July 1952
Office
DAILI KOREAN BULLETIN

I.
Military Operations
AEMZ
The active west central front was the scene of the periodfs heaviest fighting. Left flank positions east of Sangnyong of the US 2nd Division, in process of relieving the 45th Division, were attacked by a battalion of Chinese troops supported by heavy artillery, mortar, and automatic weapons. Fire from an undetermined nuMber of tanks was also received. The attack continued through midnight of 17 July and subsided early in the morning of 18 July. Other strong probes, supported by heavy weapons, were absorbed by other 2nd Division elements, a few miles to the east. In the central sector, patrols from the Ethiopian battalion and from the 31st Regiment of the US 7th Division met heavy resistance from Chinese defenders south of Pyonggang.
No naval air sorties were flown from carriers operating off the east coast due to resupply operations. In the west, 22 sorties were flown from the US light carrier Bataan against enemy targets in liwanghae province. UN naval surface vessels, including the US battleship Iowa, bombarded the enemy shore line and maintained the blockade.
Bad weather prevented UN landbased aircraft from staging more than 238 sorties, of which 65 were combat The one medium bomber sortieflown was in close support of UN ground elements.
II.

Navy
Air
Enemy Materiel
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'identified a Chinese 3.5 inch rocket with fin stabilizers in line by the enemy in Korea. (The 3.5 inch rockets introduced by UN forces early in the Korean war were instrumental in combatting the enamyls initial superiority in armor.) //
THE C.T.A. H43NO ORJECTION TO THE XX-ASSIFICATION
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III,
General Situation
Political
In a conversation with ranking UNCURK member Plimsoll, President Rhee stated that he wanted to have several more constitutional amendments passed be fore hie term of office expired. In addition, Rhee complained of being in poor health, and made the observation that he did not expect to be around much longer. The US Embassy comments that the inference from Rhee's remarks would seem to be that the President does not expect to be in office after the forth coming elections. (There have been no firm indications to date that Rhee would not be available for a draft.) Economic
A pyongyang broadcast on 15 July stated that a great many people in that city are forced to sleep outdoors "since their homes have been destrqyed." Some citizens possess tiny huts and wooden shacks it is claimed, but the majority utilize as living quarters woven mats, pineneedle spreads and strawfilled sacks. Pyongyang, "like many another city," is said to be without light and effective air raid sirens. (While the Above statements are intended to point up the UN's alleged bombing of "peacebil North Korean civilians," it is an unusually bleak and candid portrayal of the living standard of the North Korean urban dweller.)
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I.
Military Operations
AEMX
A series of indecisive engagements were fought on 18 and 19 July between US 2nd Division elements and Chinese 39th Army elements in the west central Mabang area. The Chinese attempted during the early hours of 18 July to dislodge the US forces from an important hill. Over 2,400 rounds of artillery and mortar were fired by the enemy in this engagement. A few miles to the east, other US 2nd Division elements are attempting against heavy resistance to capture another strategic hill from the Chinese, who used aver 10,000 rounds of artillery and mortar fire in this sector alone during the period.
Weather prevented air operations from UN carriers on the west coast, and no report was received of operations in the east. Surface vessels of the UN fleet continued to bombard enemy-held shore lines on both coasts.
UN land-based aircraft flew 402 effective sorties, including 154 coMbat missions. One medium bomber sortie vas flown in close support of ground troops.
II.
Military Intelligente
III.
The Far East. Command reports that the 116th Division of the 39th CCP. Army has relieved the 118th Division of the 40th Army. The 118th Division has moved southwest and relieved the 187th Division of the 63rd Army, which has moved out of the line. (These moves may indicate further relief in the 19th Chinese Army Group, which now has its entire 64th Army in reserve.)
General Situation
President 'thee may publicly support Yi Yun-yong, a mat figure in the

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Choson Democratic Party, for Vice-President, Li
I
Knee, nowever, wils-actuase.ey
support Yi Pom-sok, vho will be the liberal Yarty's choice for Vice-President.
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(The Choson Democratic Party vas one-of the strongest political groupings in Kbrea immediately following the var. Its primary strength today is believed to be unsarground in North Korea, but a small vocal party, headed by Yi Yun-yong, still is active in South Kbrea.)

RWP11711
The US Embassy in Pusan states that Rhee can "unquestionably" be returned to office and therefore he will not need to use police and youth groups as far as the Presidential election is concerned. It is, however, too early to know whether Rhee's political police apparatus will go into high (The gear to assure the election of a favored vice-presidential candidate. United Nations ComMission for the Unification and Rehabilitation of Kbrea (UNCURK) will probably be officially invited to observe the elections which will be held on 5 August. The limited number of Commiesion members plus the disinclination of malcontent Kbreans to voice their grievances will proscribe UNCURK's observations.)
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Central'Intelligence Agency Office of Current Intelligence 8017, 21 July 1952
D-AILI KOREAN BULLETIN

I.
Military
Operations
gal
Heavy action continued over the weekend in the west central Mhbang area In the afternoon of 19 July, US 2nd.Division elements byre driven back fram their attack on strongly held Hill 266. In the early hours of 21 July, however, they overcame Chinese resistance and captured the crest of the hill. Minor probes by bOth Chinese and North Korean elements were reported on 19 and 20 July in the western sector and.in thamountainous eastern-seotor. UN raiding parties encountered strong resistance all along the line during the period.
UN carrier-based aircraft flew 94 sorties on 19 July and 120 on 20 July against enemy positions and transportation targets. Electric power targets in the Changjin system north of Hamhung were attacked. UN naval surface craft bombarded the enemy-held :opastline and.maintained the blockade.
UN land-based aircraft flew 442 sorties, including 205 combat, on 19 July, and 756 sorties, including 450 combat, on 20 July. During the night of 19 July, 23 medium bombers attacked electric installations in the Changjin system, and on 20 July, seven medium bombers attacked transportation targets in western Korea. UN F-861s patrolling in the Yalu River area on 20 July observed 68 14I0-15's airborne. Of those sighted, 14 were encountered and two damaged. One F-86 was lOst
II.

1St
Air
Joint Operations
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[the enemy has concentrated troops on the southernmost tip of the Ongjin peninsula preparatory to amphibious operations against BRheld islands in the area. Troops reportedly involved are 3,000 Chinese and 600 North Koreans. Both Kirin island, small and close to ahore, and Paengyong island, a major UN guerrillalespionage, and pilot recovery base, are slated for attack. (While no Chinese forces are currently known to be in the Ongjin peninsula area, it is quite certain that the enemy will attempt, in the coming THE C.I.A. FAS NO OBJECTION SECRET TO THE =A7SIVICATION OF
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weeks, to neutralize certain UN-held off-shore islands. An attack against Paengyong island, however, would probably fail due to UN command of the sea.)
III,
General Situation
Political
A Nationalist Chinese news service reports from Korea on 19 July that the ROK Liberal Party "unanimously nominated" Syngman Rhee as their presidential candidate and Yi Pom-sok as vice presidential candidate. (These nominations were a foregone conclusion. It remains to be seen whether Rhee will actively support Yi as a vice presidential candidate.)
Allan Winnington,Communist correspondent for the Iandon Daily Worker at Panmunjom, on 18 July blasted US actions in Korea, specifically the increased Amerioan air effort, which he said was designed to "force" a concession on the POW issue from the Communists. He stated that "every fresh adventure of the Americans endangers peace, and if carried too far . . can wreck the truce talks and endanger the whole world."
Similarly, a 19 July Peiping broadcast stated that alleged US asser. tions that the increased air activity will "speed up the negotiations" was only a propaganda smoke screen for the peace wreckers to destroy the hopes of an armistice in Korea, extend the war, and endanger peace." (In the past, Winnington's articles have foredhadowed shifts in the Communist negotiating position at the talks; there is no indication, however, that his implied threat is anything more than propaganda.)

Proraganda
SERE!
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Central Intelligence Agency Cffice of Current Intelligence 8018, 22 July 1952

I.
_Military Operations
AMY
In the vest central Nebang area, elements of the US 2nd Division again occupied Hill 266 without enemy opposition during the early morning hours of 22 July. Later in the morning, however, an attack by a Chinese company forced the US unit from the heavily disputed hill. Just to the west, in the Sangnyong area, Chinese platoon-size raiding parties were forced to withdraw by US 3rd Division elements. Although the enemy fired only 4,133 rounds of mortar n.nd artillery during the period, 313 rounda were counter-battery fire against UN artillery positions.
UN carrier based aircraft flew only 43 sorties on the east coast as Task Force 77 was engaged in refueling operations. Surface units bombarded targets in the Hungnam and Wonsan areas. No report was received concerning surface action on the west coast.
UN aircraft flew 704 effective sorties during the period of which 378 'were combat. Far East Bomber Command flew 26 sorties. Twenty-one bombers attacked Chosin hydroelectric plant number two and four aircraft bombed the Hungnam chemical plant. Eleven MIG-151s were observed by UN aircraft but none was encountered.
II.
Far East Command reports the Korean II Corps by the 15th Division Division, previously on the lime, is reserve area pending information as
relief of the 27th Division of the North of the North Korean I Corps. The 27th now carried unlocated in the II Corpe to its ultimate destination. (It ie rather unusua for a division of one corps to relieve elements of an entirely different corps. This move, however, may presage the relief of certain North Korean units that have long been committed to front line action.)
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III,
General Situation
Economic
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North Korean industry has been "very seriously burm".by mne Lobs 01 aLecmrac lacilities as a result of the UN bombing of the hydroelectric complexes. (The small number of industries in North Korea, plus the fact that many North Korean cities have small, independent thermal power stations that are adequate to supply the alrem3y greatly reduced need for power, limits the effect of the UN bombing there. The effect on Manchurian industry is much more serious, however, since the raids in, tensified an existing power shortage there.)
Political
The Liberal Party convention held in Taejon on July 19th endorsed Rhee for President and Yi Pom-sok for. Vice President. Before adopting their motion unanimously, the delegates were reportedly "emazedand embarrassed" by a coy message from Rhee requesting them not to nominate him. The President admitted, however, that he could not prevent people from expressing their preference for him "voluntarily."
One faction of the Liberal Party within the National Assembly nominated Assemblyman Yi Kap-song, a venerable patriot, for the.vicapresidency; and the Chosun Democratic Party selected Minister-Withont-Ebrtfolio Yi YunHyong as running mate for Rhea.

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I.
Military Operations
Naval air sorties totalled 294 during the period. On the east coast, carrier-based aircraft attacked targets in the Songjin-Chongjin area, while on the west coast, the area from Chinnampo to Haeju was attseked. Meanwhile, surface units continued the blockade of both Korean coasts.
UN aircraft under Far East Air Force control flew 875 effective sorties inclpAing 528 combat. Forty-three MIG-15's were observed, of which two were encountered. There was no damage to enemy or UN aircraft. FEAF Bomber Command flew 12 effective sorties, with Sinchang in north central Korea as the main target.
II.
The presence in Korea of the'gth Chinese Communist-North Korean Branch Unit" was accepted on 20 July by Far East Command. This organization is subordinate to the Chinese Communist 81st Unit, located in Tientsin, north China. The 81st, originally formed with Chinese and Koreans who were born in northeast China, is composed of 12 branch units the 9th being the only one committed to Korea. Four of the regiments of the 9th Branch Unit are Chinese troops while the remaining two regiments are North Koreans. This "mixed" or "allied" branch unit is charged primarily with security duties in Hwanghae Province. However, this unit, same 9,000 strong, also dispatches agents into
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?Am
Air
The fight for Hill 266 southwest of Mabang in west central Korea continued during the period. US 2nd Division elements made another attempt to recapture the conteated objective around noon of 22 July, only to be repulsed. Chinese troops now occupy the entire crest of the hill, although one US company is dug in on the southeast slope. In the same sector, to the east of Mabengs a Chinese company unsuccessfully probed outpost positions of a US regiment.. In the western sector, near Panmunjom, a US lst Marine Division outpost was subjected to three platoon-strength probes during the early morning hours of 22 July,
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SOuth"Korea and engages in attacks on IIN-held islands off the southern coast of Hwanghae Province.
III.
General Situation
Political
Reuters announces that President Syngman Rhee appointed Deputy Chief of Staff Lt, General Paik Sun-yop as Chief of Staff on 23 July. General Palk is regarded as Korea's best general officer and has commanded both the ROK I and (General Paik's professional and personal qualities are highly reII Corps. garded by American personnel in Korea.)
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Yi Yun-yong, Minister-without-Portfolio, who was nominated for the vicepresidency by the Chosun Democratic Party, reetgned hie candidacy on 21 July, according to R Adio Pusan. No specific reason for the resignation was offered. (This move leaves Home Minister Yi Pom-sok with only one relatively ineffective opponent for the vice-presideney.)
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Military Operations
Azmz
Elements of the Chinese 12th Army attacked a regimental outpost of the ROK Capital Division one and a half miles southeast of Yulsa in the east central sector. After a firefight of almost three hours the enemy withdrew. In the eastern sector elements of the ROK 7th Division engaged in sporadic fighting with elements of the Chinese 68th Army. Elsewhere, activity was limited to patrol clashes and probes.
UN carrierbased aircraft flew 287 sorties against enemy installations on both the east and west coast. Aircraft from Task Force 77 in the east con tinued destruction of power facilities. Surface vessels bombarded eneM7 installations in the Wonsan area and near the front lines.
Aircraft under Far East Air Force control flew 1,054 sorties, of which 674 were combat. The principal medium bomber target was the rail marshalling yard at Yangdok, a major enemy supply area, against which 13 sorties were flown. Only two MEG-151s were sighted during the period. .Both were engaged and one was damaged.

NEZ
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Ithe "507th and 508th Brigades have moved north towards Chongjin., (These are probably code numbers for the 25th Brigade and an unidentified brigade subordinate to the North Korean V Corps in the Hwnhung area. Recent observa tions have indicated the movement of a considerable number of troops northwards from the Hamhung area towards Chongjin. It is possible that this redeployment is occasioned by fear of another UN amphibious operation.)
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III,
General Situation
Political
The Mayor of Seoul, Kim Taisun, was appointed Minister of the Interior on 24 July, according to Reuters news agency. Kim replaces yi Pomsok who re signed on Wednesday to run for the vice presidency in the elections next month. (Mayor of Seoul for the past year, Kim has had experience in the police and in the Home Ministry.) Reuters also reports that South Korean labor leader Chon Chinhan announced on July 24th that he would run for the vice presidency. Chon was at one time in the Liberal Party, now headed by Yi Pom,sok, but is now a meMber of an independent group in the Assembly. He is regarded ns opposed to Rhee.

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noun., ninnt in nignilnblv ennahln of nrndunino a limited
Aerial photos taken on 14 July by UN aircraft indicate that the Supung amount of power
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8021, 25 July. 1952

I.
Military Operations
Aa
Only light action occurred during the period.
Chinese platoon-strength
mobee were directed against ROK marines in the US lst Marine Division sector
UN naval aircraft flew 289 combat sorties from carriers operating off the east and west coasts. Principal targets were enemy supply and troop installations. UN naval Kir/race vessels bombarded enemy transportation targets in northeastern Korea from Songjin to Tanchon.
UN land-based aircraft flew 692 combat missions in a total of 1,054 effective sorties flown during the period. Twelve medium bombers attacked,a rail marshalling pird in Ramhung on the east coast. No MIG-151s were observed during the period.
Far East Command reports that the Chinese CoMMunist 60th-ArMy, formerlY carried in contact on the central front, is now believed to be in reserve about 15 miles northwest of Kumsong. (The 60th Army moved from a western reactive position into the line almost two months ago. At the time it was speculated that the 60th would relieve the long-committed 12th ArmY. For a period elements of both armies were in combat in the sensitive Kumsong area.)

Alt
near Panmunjom and in the west central sector against a US 3rd Division outpost. In the vicinity of bitterly-contested Hill 266 a patrol from the US 2nd Division fought a 45-minute engagement with Chinese defenders.
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III,
General Situation
Kim Chong-won ("Tiger" Kim), who wis recently granted amnesty from a threeyear prison term by President Rho.), has been tendered an appointment as colonel in the ROK Army reserve and appointed chief of police in South Cholla Province. (Kim's appointment to be director of the South Cholla police places an avid Rhee henchman in one of the provinces where the Preeidentle opposition is strongest. Kim was imprisoned because of involvement in a nation-wide scandal in early 1951.)
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Cho Pong-am4 a vice-speaker of the ROK National Assembly, will run for the presidendy in the forthcoming 5 August elections, According to Radio Pusan. (Cho, a converted Communist and long-time ROK politician, is the leader of a amall independent bargaining group in the Assembly, He is generally considered antiRhee.)
AMbassador Mhccio reports his assumption that Rhea's motive in appointing Kim Tae-son to the Home Ministry was to head off former Home Minister Yi Pom-sokis bid for the vice-Presidency and to undermine hie Lmfluence generally. Kim has maintained contacts andAnfluence in the police, is loyal to Rhee and is far from the fascistic persuasion of Yi Pom-sok:ard Youth Corps leader Ahn Ho-sang, Despite his limitations, Kim appears to be the person most capable of mobilising the police in a hurry to prevent Liberal Party-Youth Corps pressure on the voters from electing Yi to the vice-presidency. Muccio comments that it is still not absolutely clear that Rhee is willing to make an all-out effort to stop Yi; additionally, Kim has only 20 days before the elections to counteract Tito wellentrenched influence,
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Military Operations
AEMZ
In the west, action was heavy because probing attacks up to battalion-strength were launched by Chinese forces. The Mabang area in the west central sector was the scene of the largest attack; here a Chinese battalion supported by 3,000 rounds of artillery and mortar fire was finally forced to withdraw by US 2nd Division elements after a three and a half hour fight. Both the VS 1st Marine Division near Panmunjom and'the US 3rd Division near Sangnyong in the west received determined probes from Chinese elements. UN patrols in the vast were heavily engaged by the defending enemy; some engagements lasting two hours. In the US IX and ROK II Corps sectors on the central and east central fronts, enemy vehicle sightings from ground obeervation posts provided the most unusual feature of the period.
The British carrier Ocean, off western Korea, launched its aircraft in 79 sorties against enemy installations south of Chintampo. No sorties were flown from Un naval Task Force 77 off the eastern shore as that force was engaged in resupply. surface vessels bombarded the enemy coastline in the vicinity of Tanchon, Hungnam and Wonsan.
Of 16 UN land-based aircraft flew 166 sorties, of Which 215 were combat. medium bomber sorties flown, 13 had the rail marshalling yard at Kowon on the east coast as a target. During this raid, a B-29 was attacked by three unidentified enemy aircraft. One enemy aircraft vas probably destroyed; the B-290 however, received no hits.
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Air
Joint Operations
I
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a North Korean Army brigade moved from Htngnam to Chongjin preparatory to an,
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attack on UN-held Yang Island. (It is probable that elements of the North Korean It is not V Corps in the Kowon-Hembung area have moved farther to the northeast. attributed to the enemy's fearce an =phiclear, however, whether these moves may be intend to neutralize Yang Island off bious operation or Whether they themselves Songjin.)
pulled by Yi without Rhee's awareness of the
The over-all retail commodities index in South Korea rose nine percent between 13 June and 13 .1%11mwhile the retail price of rice climbed 16.1 percent during the period. US officials state that the inflation spiral has not slowed down possibly due to the unsettled political conditions prevailing during the last month.

Economic
SECRET
In the pre-election registation of presidential and vice presidential candidates, a three-man delegation, composed of Liberal Party officers close to Yi Pom-sok, simultaneously filed for Syngman Rhee as President and Yi Pom-sok as Vice President. The US Embassy comments that although this joint filing apparently belies the Assumption that Rhee is atteepting to undercut Yi in the Vice Presidential campaign, the circumstances of the regietration may be a face-saving device to avoid the appearance of hostility between the two men. It could also be a slick maneuver
implications.
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Centra Intelligence Agency Office of Current Intelligence 8023, 28 July 1952
DAILY KOREAN BULLETIN I.

Military Operations
UN raiding parties and patrols met strong many reSistenoe along the entire front on 26 July. Ground operations on 27 July were hampered by heaVy rains. Patrol activity constituted the heaviest action of the period.
Nos
Non-operational weather accounted for the low number of Far East Air Force sorties: 246 on 26 July and 227 on 27 July. imong the 96:combat sorties flown on 26 July, only three medimbenher sorties were dispatched. Agallythe following day, only three medium bomber:sorties were nem out of.56 combat. sorties. No MIG-15's were encountered during the period.
II.
UN naval aircraft from Task Force 77 flew 74 sorties on 26 Jay against hydroelectric installations in the Furyong system, northeast of Hamhung. On 27 July, other electrio installations were attackedvalong with transportation targets, by 210 sorties frau Task Force 77. British carrier-based aircraft flew 69 sorties against enemy troop and supply installations in the Chinnampo area. UN naval surface craft on both coasts bombarded enemy positiona and maintained the blockade.
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regiment formed fram cadres of the now-disbanded lona ram Division. ne zursner revealed that there were two other artholred regiments in western Korea and'ons in eastern Korea. These units reportedly axe in the cadre stage andvill begin-a training cycle about 1 August with nev replaceMents..
The Far East Contend, relying on this preliminary interrogation and upon other intelligence reports recently received, accepts the deactivation of the
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North Kbrean 105th Armored Division and the activation of a nuMber of independent armored regiments subordinate to a "Mechanized Branch Headquarters."
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th_1819:emeats of the Chinese 193rd Division, 65th Army, in the sector held by e Division 63rd Army. Ithis may presage a ftwther relief of 63rd Arm; elements similar to that which occurred when Oth Army elements dieplaoed the 187th Division, 63rd Anqy further to the north. (ene'army of the Chinese 19th Army Group -- the 64th -- was relieved from combat over a month ago. It is now becoming apparent that a squeezing-out process may result in the eventual relief bf the 63rd ArMy. This will leave only the 65th Army of this army group in combat in the Panmunjom area.)
Politicea,
According to Radio Pusan, President Syngman Rhee announced on 26 July that he has "agreed" to be a presidential candidate. Rhea stated that "hundreds of thousands of . . men and wnmen asking me to stand for a second term" moved him profoundly end caused him to put aside his personal desires and accept the candidacy. The President, however, gave no indication as to whom he desired as a vice-presidential running mate.
The official registration of presidential candidates, as broadcast by Radio Pusan on 27 July, includes besides Rhee, Cho POng-wn Yi Si-yong and Hugh Cynn. There are nine vice-presidential candidates officially registered.
Radio Pusan has announced that martial law would be lifted, effeotive 28 July, in North and South Cholla Provinces and in South Kyongsang Province. This measure is being taken in order to insure a "free atalosphere" in the 5 August presidential elections. (Presumably the lifting of martial law also affects Pusan, which is located in South Kyongsang Province. Martial law wae instituted on 25 Mey.)

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Military Operations
Naval aircraft from carriers in Task Force 77 on tht.east.coast attacked enemy supply, troop and transportation targets in 207 effective sorties:H-80Se hydroelectric installations were attacked. On the west coast 68 sorties wee flown from the British carrier Ocean against enemy positions. On both coasts RN-surface vessels bombarded enemy shore installations and maintained theblockade. Electric installations'in the Hungnam area Were hit in the bombardment.
Land-based aircraft mnder Far East Air loroe control fleW only 231; effective sorties because of Weather. Among the 78:combat,sorties flOwn.: 14 medium bombers attacked various targets in North Korea. Principal target for ten B-29's was the rail marshalling yards at Hamhung. No MIG-15110 4jsre,iti4 countered.
,Acoording to Far East Ccamand. the North Korean II Corps has completely withdrawn from contact and is located same 15 miles behind the battle Um Is the eastern sector. The 15th Dilasien of the III Corps is occupYing:Pontiams vacated by-the Corps.: (This most recent relief is imilar to changes li Chinese-held sectors during the past month. The 63rd and 64th Armies of the 19th Army group were reoently squeezed out in the western Sector, while the brIalpcoMmitted 60th Am, was similarly relieved in the central sector.)
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Ailitary.Intelligence

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TO 7= n
Heavy rains for the second day reduced ground operations 'to a minim= Along the battle front. The most serious action of the period occurred in the west central Nabang area, where Chinese platoon,strength probes were launched against US 2nd Division elements during the night of 28-29 July. Some artillery and mortar fire was received in support of these enemy actions. In the east central Kumsong area, a brief Chinese probe was made against position& of ths ROK 6th Division.
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Enemy Rear Areas
During the week ending 24 July, both visual and photoreconnaissance revealed that the rainy season has not, as yet, caused any-disruption in enemy vehicular and rail traffic. An ana);yeis of rail traffic during the period indicates that the Communists are Wring advantage of the improved condition of the main rail supply routes in the northwest and north central areas to move materiel into Pyongyang and Wonsan.Pbr a second succeesive week vehicular traffic increased in thewestern sector, with the majority of the vehicles routed toward Haeju and Kaesong.
III.
General Situation
President Rhee has given no indication that he will repudiate Yi, but the President indicated in his statement accepting his own.nomination that he intends to reftse to take sides on the viceitoresidential candidates. (The large nuMber of vice-presidential candidates -- nine -- will split the votes and favor Xi Pom-sokgs election, rigs power in the Liberal Party and
the Tata Youth Corps greatly enhances his chances for victory.)
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Indications are that the 5 August election in South Korea will be held in an atmosphere relatively free of outright pressure tactics. More subtle campaign methods will be utilized in the vice-presidential election such as attempts of the candidates to identify themselves with Rhee. II Pom-sok hab already employed this stratagem, as Yi and Rhee posters, identical in format and carrying an endorsement of the Liberal Party, appeared throughout Pusan and Seoul on the morning of 27 July,
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Military Operations
AME
Minor probes and patrol clashes occurred in the western and central sectors. The heaviest aotion of the period took-place in the US 3rd DiVieion sector near Sangnyong, where an assault by an enemy company forced theLwithdrawal of an outpost. Two counterattacks by US troops to retake the outpost were unsuccessfUl.
Naval air sorties totalled only 39 as Task Force 77 was engaged in replenishing operations. Aircraft from the British carrier Ocean attacked targets in the Ongjin area. On the east coast blockade ships bombarded shore installations from Songjin to Tanchon. No report was received concerning surface activity on the west coast.
UN aircraft under Far East Air Force control flew only 186 effective sorties, of which 36 were combat. Only two bomber missions were flown as the weather continued to limit air strikes. No enemy planes were observed dnring the period.
II.
No significant reports have been received during ths past 24 hours.

III.
General Situation

ALE
Ceaae-fire
Ihigh-ranking North Korean and Soviet officials are leaving the Kaesong area. Most North Korean and Chinese troops had left the city during the past two weeks. (Eenent intelligenoe reports have confirmed the departure of the North Korean 82nd Regiment from Kaesong, prepumably to join its parent 8th Division on the east coast. There is no confirmation, however, for the above report that highranking officials are leaving the ci*y or that such officials are even in the city.)
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29 July Associated Press dispatch'from Pusan reports that-the ROK Military court trying seven National Assemblymen on conspiracy charges has distil:teed the case for laok of evidence. The eleven legislatora were arrested in late May on charges of conspiring vith Communb3ts to overthrow the ROK Government and of accepting Communist bribes. (As his re-election appears to be virtually assured, President Rhee is gradually reducing pressure on hie opponent's. On 28 July, martial lay vas lifted in Pusan and areas south-Of the Hen Ritrer. However, the military retrial of So Min-ho opposition Assemblyman oharged with homicide, still continues.)
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Central Intelligence Ageuoy Office of Current Intelligence 8026, 31 July 1952
-

I.
Military Operations
AEM
Elements of the US 3rd Division on the west central front reoccupied an outpost position, previously lost on 28 July, southeast of Sangnyong The Chinese Communists employed artillery and mortar fire in an unsuccessful attempt to defend the outpost position. Elsewhere, non-operational weather limited action to a few minor probes and patrol clashes.
The report on naval air sorties was incomOnte. On the east coast, 24 planes bombed targets in the Hungnam area. Blockade shire continued tflombard Shore installations on both Korean coasts,
During the period, UN aircraft flew 476 effective sorties of which 120 were combat. No enemy planes were observed CT encountered. On the night of 30 July, 66 B-2918 bombed a non-ferrous metal 'plant just south of Sinuiju. Preliminary reports from 37 of the 8-29 crews indicate that enemy fighter aircraft were encountered and that attacks in varying degrees of aggressiveness were received. No B -291s are reported downed so far.'
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'the North Korean regime in late April 1952 organizea a "Farmers, Army" composed of men who had been discharged from the regular Army and men %to were 31 years of age or older. The Communist authorities planned to use 300000 men at 'collective farms on the eastern front, while two units composed of 350000 men each were assigned tO faris on the central and western fronts.- Members of the ^Farmers! Army":4ear North Korean Army uniforms and are svbject to army discipline. (The existence of para-military agricultural .units.haerbeen confirmel by FW reports, but no organization previously reported.) of this sise has beta

Air
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III.
General Situation
According to Ambassador Maccio in Pusan, the Unitedliations Cemmission for the Unification and Reconstruction of Korea (WORK) plans to observe the 5 August presidential and vice-presidential elections. As no official invitation has been issued by the South Korean Government, UNCURK will probably proceed on the same informal basis as was followed in covering the April-May local elections. Owing to a shortage of personnel, UNGURK informally has asked-the US Embassy to cover the elections in two or three provinces, (A ROK Government source stated to the press on 27 July that his government was not contemplating inviting the UN to observe the elections, Indications so far point to a fairly orderly election.)
ROI( Prime Minister Chang Taek-sang and the newly-appointed Home Minister Kim Tee-son joined forces on 28 Jay, with the apparent backing of Rhee to defeat Yi Pom-sokte bid for the Vice-Presidency, according to Ambassador ;Imola. The struggle began when police under Kimos Home Ministry ordered Liberal Party posters bearing pictures of President Rhea and Xi Pom-sok torn down. Posters of another pro-Rhee organization with Rhee's picture were allowed to remain, Rhee issued a statement that he hoped no one was "chagrined" by this action, but that he sought to restrict lavish campaign expenditures.
The Liberal Party and Yi Dom-sok reacted characteristically by charging that these were "illegal actions" and threatened to expose the "man behind the curtain" who is trying to prevent the re-election of "our Doctor Rhee," Muccio adds that the struggle between the two factionmhas just begun and that the intensity of conflict can be expected to increase as ths election approaches.
A broadcast from pyongyang on 27 July bleakly and candidly atated that there will be nO chemical fertilizer available for North Korean farmers next year. The statement, released by the Central Committee of the Korean Labor.Party con,. tained an urgent appeal for the people to "stage a campaign for more home-made fertilizer," 03efore the war, commercial fertilizer comprised aPproximately one half of the total fertilizer consumption in North Korea, The dire straits of the North Korean agricultural situation is pointed up by this lack of chemical fertilizer, which even before the war, met only minimum requirementiO
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Central Intelligence Agency Office of Current Intelligence 8027, 1 August 1952

I.
Military Operations
La
On the vest central front, Chinese Communist units from positions atop Hill 266 near Sinhyon engaged elements from the US 2nd Division. The action started late on 31 July and by the morning of 1 August the US troops overcame enemy re sistance and secured the contested positions. The Chinese Communists, however, continued sporadic artillery md mortar fire, Elsewhere along the front, contact rdth the enemy was limited to brief patrol clashes,
Naval air sorties totalled 232 during the period, all on the east coast. There'were no air operations on the west coast due to inclement weather. Carrier based aircraft in the east attacked targets from Songjin to Wonsan. DM surface craft continued to bombard and blockade both Korean coasts.

EAU
Landbased sorties flown during the period totallei 244, of which 59 W970 combat, On the morning of 1 August, more than 60 MI045/6 and one Type 15 were encountered hy UN aircraft. Three MIO's were destrOyed, one probably destroyed, and three damaged. Only five bomber sorties were flown an the"night of 31 July. 1 Auguste
II.
Military Intelligens
III.
No eignificant reports hare been received during the past 24 hour.,
General Situation
PolitSjj
In tit. Pusan area, presidential candidate Oho Iting.am is staging en fallout anti.Rhse campaign, according to Ambassador Nucoio.. Ons mass meeting has been staged so far with sound trucks participating, and a small poster campaign is underwny. Oho also took it upon himself to urge MURK members to observe the
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elections whith he claimed Would be marked by "irregularities.." Meant/bile, the two remailing presidential aspirants, Ti Si-yong and Hugh Cynn, have not advanced their campaigns beyond initial declarations of principles which were carried in the local press.
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am
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1 a secretary and the wire or a uommunism generaA 'recently. Reportedly these ladies informed the I, 'they were moving shortly, This took place during the past two weeks,' ported previously that high-ranking Communist officials were moving oum ot Kaeecmg. No confirming reports have been received from any other sources. The exodus of officials from Kaesong, if confirmed, may indicate a CoMmunist expectation of significant developments at the truce talks.)
Iad not been
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Military Operations
Az
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Aircraft from Teak Force 77 flew 209 sorties in northeastern Korea, from Hamhung to Songjin, attacking hydroelectric installations and enemy troop and supply installations. No report was received on naval air operations in the west. UN naval surface craft bombarded the coast near Songjin, Tanchon, and Wonsan in northeastern Korea, and in the vest near Haeju.
Land-based aircraft under Far East Air Force flew 1,023 sorties, of which 654 were combat. Two hundred close-support sorties were flown, most of themcin the US I Corps sector in the west. Medium bombers flew 13 sorties against transportation targets, and on reconnaissance and close- , support missions.
I/.
Far East Command on 1 August reported the relief of the 117th Division, 39th Chinese Communist Army, by elements of the 38th Army which moved southwestward along the battle line. The 39th Amy-, in keeping with Chinese Communist military policy, now has two divisions on line and one in reserve. (The 117th sustained heavy casualties in June and Ju1y as a result of some bitter fighting in its sector, partioularZy in the vicinity of Hill 266.)
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Air
Ground
Action on 1 August vas limited to brief probes and patrol clashes. Chinese elements continued to harass newly-won U$ 2nd Division positions in the vest central sector. A patrol clash lasting an hour between elements of the ROE 2nd Division and Chinesetroope near Kumwha occurred early on 2 August.
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EMMY logistics
Sightings of anew vehicles by UN aerial observers was low during the period 26 July to 1 August, with only 3,069 seen. Although weather conditions prevented observation flight nothreedays, this number is considerably below the weekly average of the paws year of 14,443. Heaviest traffic appeared to be on the central route from Yangdok to Singye and from Kum-ri in the northwest to Pyongyang.
General Situation Political The verdict of the "Communist Conspiracy" courtmartial trial was returned on 31 July. Six of the seven civilian.defendantswere found guilty, and one wee released. Three of the defendants were sentenced to life imprisonment, and three were given three-year terms. At the end of the trial, according to the US Ambassador, foreign observers agreed that the ROE Government in no way justified the severity of the sentences vith any proof or firm evidence of the charges made in the indictments. The US Ambassador states that he intends to oall on President Rhee on 1 August to inquire about appeal proceduresIndia make known foreign reactions to the trial.
Meanwhile, in a retrial, So Min-ho vas found guilty of murdering a ROE Army officer and vas sentenced to eight years imprisonment. The military court approved the conviction by a two-thirds vote.
Economic
Ambassador Muccio reports that all part stevedores in the Pusan area struck on 29 July for higher wages. On 30 July, depot ana quartermaster corps contract laborers joined in a sympathy strike, virtually closing down the entire port area. Negotiations between Second Logistical Command and labor unions and contractors resulted on 31 July in an agreement to increase stevedores wages 100 percentorith no increase in contractors/ commissions. Stevedores returned to work on the evening of 31 July.

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Central
Intelligence Agency Office of Current intelligence 8029, 4 August 1952

I.
Military Operations
AEMZ
Two patrol clashes between elements of the ROE 9th Division and Chinese troops northeast of Chorwon highlighted the ground action on 2 August, The following day* the Chorwon area was again the scene of the heaviest fighting as a ROK 9th Division patrol fought a three-hour engagement with Chinese troops. A total of seven enemy probes and 13 patrol clashes occurred on 3 August.
Targets UN naval aircraft flew 116 sorties on 2 August and 341 on 3 August. attacked were undamaged hydroelectric plants and troop* supply and transportation installations. UN naval surface vessels botbarded the enemy shore and maintained the blockade. The British cruiser Belfast suffered minor damage from a shell fired from an enemy coastal defense gun.
Land-based airdraft under Far East Air Force control flew 466 sorties* 245 of them coMbat* on 2 August; and 878 sorties* of vbich 526 were combat* on 3 August* Medium bothers flew 5 sorties on 2 August and three the following day on close support and reconnaissance missions. On 3 August* UN P-861.6 observed 11 MIG-154 in flight but encountered none. An F-86 pilot earlier_in the 07 had observed 150 swept.ving aircraft on Tatungkuo airfield.
II,
No
significant
III,
General Situation
Political
The three presidential candidates opposing Syngman Rhee in the 5 August elections* according to Atbassador Mimeo* have one thing in commomscritioism and condemnation of the present South Korean administration. Granted tits over
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reports have been received during the past 48 hours.
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the government-owned and operated Korean broadcasting system, the three opposition candidates have outlined their political ViOWS in 15-minutes uncensored addresses.
ROK Home Minister Kim, in a 4 August broadcast, disclaimed rumors that a ceitain vice-presidential candidate had President Rhea's support and commented: "I fUlly understand why the President does not designate a vice-presidential candidate." (It is probable that the above statements were aimed primarily at Yi Pdm-sok and represent the closest Rhee will come to issuing a ptblic disavowal of Yi.)
Proraaanda
Radio Peiping on 3 August Again accused "the Americans" of shelling the Panmunjom conference site on 2 August.

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Military Operations
UN naval aircraft on the west coast flew an unreported number of sorties. Air operations were suspended on the east coast as Task.Force 77 engaged in
re-supay.
West coast targets attacked were hydroelectric plants, gun emplacements, and troop, supply and transportation installations. UN naval surface vessels bombarded the enemy shore and maintained the blockade.
UN land-based aircraft flew 1,009 effective sorties, of which 694 were4..' combat. Medium bombers flew six sorties in close support of ground troo on leaflet and reconnaissance missions. Seventy five MIG-15's were obsere in flight by UN 7-86 pilots. Of these, 12 were encountered,.with one destroyed, two damaged, and one other possibly destroyed.
The Far East Command reported on 4 August that the Chinese Ccamunist 42nd Army is now deployed in the area immediately southwest of Keesong. (The 42nd Army, relieved on the line in late June, was believed to have assumed a coastal security mission between Pyongyang and Sinanju. If tthe 42nd Army is confirmed in its new location, this may presage the relief of the 65th Army, the one remaining army of the 19th Army Group still on the line.)
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AEME
SrOURITY
Brief patrol contacts and minor enemy.probes took place along the front on 4 August. The heaviest actionoccurred inthe eastern sector near Mulguji where a ROK 7th Division outpost repelled a Chinese probe after a fire fight lasting an hour and a half.
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III,
General Situation POlitical
AMbassador Nhccio, on the eve of the South Korean presidential elections, reperted.that the atmosphere in Pusan was charged with tension because of the continued frenetic aotivities of political leaders and groups. While Hheets election is generally taken for granted, Cho Peng-ma's forthright attack on the administration has aroused a hesitant respect. Despite charges of interference in the campaign, there have been few visible signs of pressure. The Ambassador believes that rural citizens are not as concerned with this election as they were with local elections earlier in the year. He estimates that despite widespread ignorance of the issues, as mudia as SOL to 90 percent of the electorate will go to the polls.
In the vice-presidential raoe, Ambassador Mucci() estimates that despite the overt government opposition to Yi Pom-sok, Tile organization, which largely dominates the rural area, is still strong enough to push through his election.

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I.
Military Operations
Amsz
One outpost position of the ROE Capital Division near Yulsa in east Korea was neutralized after a determined Chinese platoons supported by over 2,600 rounds of mortar and artillery, forced the South Koreans to withdraw. A ROK counterattack early on 6 August met with a heavy volume of artillery and mortar fire and is still continuing. Two other Capital Division outposts were probed, with the enemy eventualZy withdrawing in both oases. Brief patrol contacts and minor enemy probes occurred along the rest of the line.
Naval aircraft from Task Force 77 on the Korean east coast flew 221 sorties against enemy eleOtric power installations and troop and' supay positions. No air operations were flown on the west coast. UN naval surface vessels on the east coast bombarded the enemy shore at Chongjin, Songjin, Tanohon Hungnaza, and Wonsan Ebemy troop and supply installations were destroyed and eransportation was hindered.
Land-based aircraft under Far East Air Force control flew 956 sorties on 5 August, of which 632 were combat. Medium bombers flew seven sorties in close support of ground troops; and the Hoechang ore processing plant was bombed by 18 planes. Fifty of the 110 airborne MI0-15ts observed were encotintt;H ered; four were destroyed and five damaged.
.
Cu 5 Augusts at 1300 hours, a flight of Uff fighter-bombers encountered 8 NIG-151a over Haeju, on the 38th parallel. One enemy aircraft was damaged. On the same day, MIC-15's were observed and encountered in strength over Pyongyang.
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The Far East Air Force comments that this is the deepest NIG penetration since 2 February 1952, when 20 MIG15is f011oWed a UNHfightere:bember. flight into this area (Enemy jet penetration this fer douth-is an Unusual OcOurrence. The Communists have pzeviously confined the bulk of their operations to the area north of the Chongchon river.)
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Between 18 and 20 July, 60 trucks passed through the vest coast city of Sunohon loaded with 50 "metal motor boats "I tirese were accompanied by 330 Chnese naval troops. Hair or mite coats' ed for use on the west coast and the rest for use against UN-held were cies (The enemy in Korea has demonstrated a considislands in the Wonsan Bay area. erable amphibious capability against the smaller UN-held islands immediately offshore. landing craft employed in past operations have generally been a mixture of Junks power launches, and rubber assault boats. Personnel have generally been dl.alin from North Korean security units and have had only minimal training prior to theoperation.)
III,
General Situation
Early press returns from appToximately half of South Korea's 153 eleotion districts give Rhee a lead in excess of 1,500,000 votes aver hianearest competitor. Rhea, however, won only a narrow victory in the temporary capital city of Pusan, Early Radio Masan returns on the vice-presidential race from some twenty distriots, including Seoul and Pusan, give Ham Tan.yong who is apparently (Yi is credited with favored by Rhee, 45,079 votes to 40,551 for Yi Pom-sok. a smooth organization in rural districts and will in all probability win unless there is widespread police interference.)

Political
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Pentral Intelligence Agenoi Office of Current Intelligence 8032$ 7 August 1952

I.
Military Operations
Naval air sorties totalled 23 on 6 August. Kojo and Hungnam were &fleeted on the east coast. There were no air operations on the vest coast. Blockade ships bombarded both Korean coasts.
UN aircraft under FEAF control flew 1,109 effective sorties of which 778 were combat. Singosan in the east central area was the main target of the 18 bomber sorties. Of the 239 enemy MIG's observed., 90 were encountered. UN aircraft destroyed six InGts and damaged three others.
General Situation
Politica],
The Liberal Party, which supports Yi Poe-sok, has accused Prime Minister Chang and Home Minister Kim of violating the election lay and interferingin the oampaign, according to Andbassador Mhccio. A lawsuit has been filed against' these officials, and the kibassador comments that further suits are to be expected.

Nit=
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SECRET
Heavy action centered around the ROK Capital Division outpost near Tulsa the in east central Korea on 6 August. The position changed hands twice during early morning hours and by late afternoon was again in ROK hands. A strong enemy probe materialized at uddnight and vaa still under way at the last report. The Chinese used over 7,000 rounds of artillery and mortar fire in eupport of this minor action. Another Capital Division outpost, a little to the meet, was under enemy attack as the period closed.
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amemla
North According to a 3 August Radio Pyongyang broadcast, a mebber of the Committee Mongolia stated that "the Central Milian Government delegation to head of of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party decided to send 70,000 (In an early 1952 North Korean liVestook tO Korea by the end of this year." Government broadcast relative to the severe depletion of the country's livehorses stock, it vas stated that over 300,000 head of cattle, several thousand and 700,000 pigs bad been loot.)

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I.
Military Operations
UN naval aircraft on the west coast flew an unreported number of sorties. No air operations were flown on the east coast. Naval surface vessels maintained the blockade and bombarded targets on both coasts.
UN land-based aircraft flew 955 effective sorties, of which 568 were coMbat. Medium bombers flew 15 sorties in attacks against two enemy marshalling yards on the east coast and on reconnaissance and leaflet-drop missions. Milted Nations F=86's observed 156 MIC-15's airborne on 7 August. Of these,,63 mere encountered, with 4 destroyed, 3 damaged, and 4 possibly damaged.
III.
General Situation
Propaganda
Radio Peiping's propaganda broadcast on 7 August in discussing thesIrl:ot
patriation,of-prisoners issue stated that "thousande:rroorBer:

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FAS in the morning on 7 August an additional two Chinese companies joined the two-day-old attack against the ROK Capital Division outpost near Tulsa in east central Korea. The defenders were forced back and pursued to the UN's main line of resistance by Chinese elements. South Korean elements again occupied the disputed position after the enemy withdrew. Late in the evening another Chinese company vigorously attacked the outpost, but was repelled after a 50-minute fight. Other probes of varying intensity occurred in the Capital Division sector during the period. The enemy employed a heavy volume of artillery and mortar fire in support of his operations.
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Chinese volunteers "cannot be repatriated for the simple reason that they have been murdered." The broadcast went on to repeat the charges that captured Communist personnel were forced to become secret agents and were air-dropped into North Korea. Many of these "secret agents" were said to be now "in the hands" of the Communists. (The first charge strikes a new note in Communist propaganda. UN forces have been previously charged with the murder of prisoners, but not in terms of "thousands." The second charge is becoming hackneyed.)
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Central Intelligence Agency OffiCe of Current Intelligence 8034, 9 August 1952

I.
Military Operations
Aiw
Late in the afternoon of 8 August, elements of the Chinese 12th Army resumed the attack on the ROK Capital Division outpost near YUlsa in east central Korea. They were supported by a heavy volume of mortar and artillery fire. Shortly after midnight the intensity of the operations increased, with an estimated two Chinese battalions engaged, but after 25 minutes of close combat the Chinese withdrew. Enemy casualties as of early 8 August were an estimated 389 killed and 90 wounded. In the west central sector, a patrol from the US 7th Division southeast of Pyonggang was heavily engaged by elements of the Chinese 15th Army. The US patrol withdrew after a 50-minute fight. The enemy used over 3,000 rounds of mortar and artillery in this action. In the west, US artillery engaged three self-propelled guns and two tanks about two miles behind the front of the Chinese 39th Army.
Naval aircraft flew 115 sorties on the east and west coasts of Korea against enemy troop and supply installations. Surface vessels on the east coast bombarded the enemy shore at Songjin, Tanchon Chsho, Hungnam and Wonsan. The west coast Enemy gun emplacements and supply installations were destroyed. bombardments were in the Haeju vicinity.
Air
UN land-based aircraft flew 1,142 effective sorties, of which 745 were combat. Medium bombers flew 13 sorties against a nwrshalling yard in eastern Kbrea, in support of ground troops, and on leaflet and reconnaissance missions. United Nations F-86Is observed 67 MIG-15's airborne on 8 August. Of these, 21 were encountered and three destroyed.
THE C. T
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III.
Muccio comments that Yi pom-sok's surprising defeat for the vicepresidency removes temporarily the principal threat to demoCratic development in South Korea, and if better elements are brought into the cabinet, further progress toward a reasonably honest and efficient government may be expected. Re cautions, however, that although Yi has pledged his support of Rhee he does not give up easily and is by no means powerless.

SECRET
The latest returns in the presidential race give Rhee 5,247)385 votes, apyroximately three-fourths of the total cast. Cho Pong-am and Yi Si-yong are far behind with just under 8001000 votes each. Ambassador MUccio believes that the large urban vote for Yi and Cho vas a protest vote indicating growing dissatisfaction vith the Rhee regime among intellectuals and the better-informed city proletariat.
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I.
Military Operations
AEMZ
On 9 August, two companies of Chinese troops, supported by an unprecedented high of 8,224 rounds of mortar and artillery fire, attempted for four hours to dislodge ROK Capital Division troops from a hotly contested outpost near Tulsa in the east central sector. The enemy finally withdrew and the sector vas quiet on 10 August. In the western sector near Punji, Chinese troops from the 40th Army fought a series of sharp battles with US 1st Marine Division elements for possession of a US outpost. In one attack, the Chinese used over 4,000 rounds of supporting fire. The position changed hands three times on 9 August and twice on 10 August, ending with enemy elements in possession. Sharp patrol clashes and minor probesoccurredelong the rest of the front during the 48-hour period.
Attacks by naval aircraft against enemy troop and supply installations on both Korean coasts totalled 88 on 9 August and 298 on 10 August. Surface units bombarded targets on the east coast from Songjin to Wonsan on both days, while on the west coast targets in the Haeju-Chinaampo area were bombarded.
Air
On 9 August land-based aircraft under Far East Air Force control flew 1187 effective sorties, 788 of which were sorbet; on 10 August 645 cotbat sorties out of a total of 1030 were flown. Mediumbothers flew 17 sorties on 9 August, concentrating their attack on a supply area near Pyongyang. On the following day, only three effective boMber sorties were mounted, with Hamhung as the main target. Thirty-four MIG's were observed on 9 August of whioh 20 were encountered. One enemy aircraft was probably destroyed and two probably damaged. None was destroyed on 10 August although 12 MIGIs were observed'and four of them encountered. On three occasions on 10 August, British naval aircraft were attacked by MSG's as far south as the Chodo4hinnampo area. //

Navy
Tr;
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II.
SECRET
Military Intelligence Air
UN 7-86 pilots patrolling the Yalu River on 9 August observed an unidentified huiber of aircraft taking off from an airfield near Fengcheng nearly 30 miles inland from Antung.
Far East Air Force notes that an airfield, designated as Ta Pao, is located in this area and i8 considered to be within the complex of airfields used hy the enemy in the Korean air war. FEAF further estimates that "at least a regiment of MIG-l5ls" is probably stationed at the field.
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Far East Air Force comments that bomb damage assessment shows that a string of bombs straddled an area reported to house important North Korean government offices.
III.
General Situation
The 9 August issue of Pravda reached a new low in fabrications on American "atrocities" in Korea, according to Ambassador Kennan. The reports which dealt with mass murder of civilians, sadism, rape, and mutilation during Ihe temporary UN occupation of North Korea, vere attributed to the Korean press. (Moscow Propaganda has weviousIy refrained from the extremism indulged in hy the North Korean press on the alleged American atrocities. It is of interest that Moscow, almost two years later, is now picking up the charges.) Both Pyongyang and Peiping are giving prominence to the UN announcement of the planned bombing of 78 selected cities. The broadcasts allege that the boMbing of "peaceful targets" is an attempt to wreck the peace negotiations and extend the war.

Propaganda
SECRET
uring the last UN daylight bombing of Pyongyang (mid-July), a bomb anesser use:Ily d important North Korean government officials and party members received a direct hit. An estimated 400 to 500 persons were allegedly killed.
Enemy Rear Areas
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Central Intelligence AgeneY Office of Current Intelligence 8036, 12 August 1952

I.
Military Operations
AZEZ
The most significant action of the day occurred in the coastal area of eastern Korea where two North Korean eompanies attacked positions of the ROK 5th Division near Oemyon. After a three hour fight the enemy withdrew. Patrol clashes and brief probes took place along the rest of the front. The press reports that US let Marine Division elements in the west succeeded in retaking the outpost lost near Punji over the weekend and in capturing a commanding ridge line.
A total of 286 naval air sorties were flown on 11 August. On the east coast targets in the vicinity of Chongjin, Wonsan and Yangdok were attacked, while on the west coast the planes concentrated on the area from Chinni:Napo to the Ban River estuary. Surface units continued the blockade of both Korean coasts while bombarding shore installations.
Land-based aircraft under Far East Air Force control flew 994 effective sorties during the period, of which 532 were =that. Of the eight enemy MIGvs observed, four were encountered. One MIG was probably destroyed and one damaged during the encounters. Medium bothers flew 24 effective sorties on the night of 11 to 12 August, attacking an industrial plant north of Wonsan,
I/.
The US Fifth Air Force reported on 10 August that UN pilots claimed 24 1CG-1510 destroyed and 27 damaged during the period from 1 to 9 August. UN casualties during the same period were three jets lost and seven damaged. (The 60 MIG-15 casualties in little more than a week give ample evidence of the in, creased tempo of the Korean air war.)
III.
General Situation
No significant reports have been received during the last twenty-four hours.
SIWIRFT

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No. 0 6 JUL 1978
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I.
Military Operations
PAM
UN carrier-based aircraft flew 278 sorties against enemy installations and supply lines in the Non area in the east and from Chinnampo to Haeju in the west. Surface vessels bombarded enemy positions on both coasts. An enemy attempt to land on Cho Island off western Korea was turned back by nava/ action.
UR land-based aircraft flew 829 effective sorties, of which 468 were coMbat, Only two sorties were flown by medium bombers on leaflet aud reconnaissance missions. No enemy MIG45ge were reported observed or contacted.
II.
III,
The North Korean propaganda preparation for the seventh anniversary of Japan's unconditional surrender extends Byongyang's weverlasting gratitude and friendahip to the Soviet Armed Forces and the Soviet people. The North Korean
No significant reports have been received during the past 24 hours,
General Situation
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In the afternoon of 12 August, after having occupied Hill 122 (Bunker Hill) near Punji in the western sector early in the morning, elements of the US lst Marine Division received a heavy artillerp-supported counterattack from a Chinese battalion. The attack vas contained, but action continued sporadically into the night. Just after nidnight another strong Chinese attack materialized which, according to press accounts, was repulsed with heavy enemy casualties. Other strong enemy probes occurred elsewhere in the CS 1st Marine Division sector and in the lst Commonwealth Division's area. Minor probes and petrol actions took place along the rest of the front.
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radio states that "the United States and Britain failed tO play a'dedisive tole in the war against Japan." The only noted reference to the USSRITO rdle in the present Korean donflict is a statement that Russia "has always supported us through the past two years."
&monde
The 1952 rice crop in South Korea is estimated at approximately 2,239,000 metric tons of polidhed rice as of 10 August, according to the DS EMbassy; All other crops, fruits and vegetables "look good." (Paddies watered by rainfall, which produce seven percent of the total rice crop, were affected hy the drought in South Korea and a small rice deficit is expected. However, UN relief supplies and ROK imports will cover any shortage.)
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I.
Military Operations
Alm
On 13 August, the fight for Hill 122 (Bunker Hill), southeast of Punji in the western sector continued. A reinforced Chinese battalion, supported by a heavy concentration of artillery and mortar fire, attacked elements of the US 1st Marine Division in an attempt to retake the twice hill. The five-hour and onehour enemy attacks failed. Elsewhere along the front, patrol clashes and probes were reported.
Naval air operations were suspended on August 13 as the task forces engaged in resupply. UN navel surface vessels boMbarded the enemy coast in the vicinity of Songjin Tanchon and Wonsan in the east and Choda in the west. Enemy troop and supply installations were destroyed and transportation was hindered.
land-based aircraft flew 916 effective sorties of which 561 were combat. Of the 207 close-support sorties flown, 168 were in the US I Corps sector in the west with the bulk of these being flown by Marine Corps aviation. Medium bombers flew 25 sorties against an enemy Supply area south of Sariwon in the west. During the morning of 13 August, the pilots of a flight of UN conventional aircraft observed 6 MIG-15's in the Chinnampo region. NO contact was reported.
UN
III.
No significant reports have been received during the past 24 hours

General Situation
Ambassador Nuncio, commenting on the whereabouts of the remaining three National Assemblyman in hiding since the crisis, reports that Om Sang-sop SECRET

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appeared in the AsSembIy Hall on 13 August for the first time. '0 Wiyong also emerged from hiding, but is reported to have "gone to the country." Kim Iongsen still remains unaccounted for.
has
A Nationalist Chinese news service reports that Kim Hongil, the South 'Korean Ambassador in Taipei, revealed on lA August that Korea, Nationalist China, and the Philippines have been exchanging opinions on the possibility of forming an antiCommunist defensive alliance. Nothing concrete has resulted from the negotiations. (These three countries have exchanged opinions on an anti Communist alliance in the past with negligible results).
,
frooattands
Radio Pyongyang broadcast on 9 August that six members of the "Inter national Committee of Scientists" went to Korea on 28 July to investigate "the actual state of affairs concerning the germ warfare being carried out by the American imperialist aggressors in Korea and China." The mission left Korea on 5 August. The six "scientists" are from Great Britain, France, Italy, Sweden, the USSR, and Brazil. (Undoubtedly the report of these scientists will be added to the mountain of "proof" on US employment of germ warfare).
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Central Intelligence Agency Office of Cutrent Intelligence 8039, 15 August 1952

I.
Military Operations
AIM
In the western Punji area US 1st Marine Division elements retained the outpost on Hill 122 after a twoLhour attack by Chinese 40th Army troops. The enemy fired approximately 3,000 rounds of artillery and mortar shells in support of this unsuccessful attack. In the US 3rd Division sector, 15 miles to the northeast, an outpost changed hands five times during a 24hoirr period, with the enemy currently in possession. In the central sector west of Chorwon, a patrol from the 187th Airborne Regiment, attached to the US 7th Division, fought a 3hour engagement With the Chinese. Other Chinese troops in the east central sector wrested an outpost from the ROK '3rd Division,
A total of 282 naval air sorties were flown on 14 August against enegy ground installations with the loss of one US Navy plane. UN blockade ships bombarded the enemy shore in the vicinity of Songjin, Tanchon, and Chaho in the east and Haeju and Chodo in the west.
bat.
UN landbased aircraft flew 770 effective sorties, of which 381 were cam, The night of August 14 to 15 medium boMbers flew two reconnaissance sorties and an additional two sorties dropping leaflets on 13 North Korean cities. On Antung airfield 12 MIG's were observed. No contact with aneW aircraft was reported.
II.
Ihe Far East Command aocepts on the basis of POW statements the presence in Korea of the Chinese Communist 40th and 41st Artillery Regiments. These regiments are assigned to the Artillery Section, Chinese Communist Headquarters in Korea, attached to the III Army Group, and further attadhed to its 12th ArmY on the line in east central Korea. Eaoh has a strength of 1,500 men, is motorized, and is equipped with 36 105mm howitzers and 75mm guns.

Air
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7HE C I A HAS NO OBJECTION 0 THE DECTASSIFICATION OF
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Air
Far East Air Force photo reconnaissance on 9 August revealed that the main runway and taxiway at Namsi airfield, north of the Chongohon River in North Korea, appear to be serviceable. (Namsi wasonefield in the three-airfield complex in the Chongehon River area that the enemy attempted to make operational in October 1951, only to be frustrated by UN bombings. At present it cannot be ascertained whether Namsi's present serviceability indicates that another such Communist attempt is under way.)
General Situation
As a result of recent political developments in the ROK, a reshuffling and regrouping of various factions in the National Assetbly will probably result, according to Ambassador Muccio. President Rhee's disavowal of the Liberal Part", coupled with the defeat of their leader Yi Pom-sok, leaves the future of that party in the balance. The Ambassador comments, however, that it is still too early to foresee the results of the new political alignments.
The US Enbassy in Pusan reports rumors that a major cabinet shake-up will take place immediately after Rhea's inauguration. Lending support to this talk is en open split in the cabinet with the Prime Minister, Home Minister, and other elements who supported the "Veep-elect" on one aide and El Pom-sok's backers on the other. The latter include the Ministers of Finance and Justice.
One responsible Assembly source is reported by the EMbassy as claiming that the President intends to reimpose martial law following his inauguration on 15 August.
Propaganda
Although foreign releases of Kim's speech contained references to a termination of the war on an "equal basis," they did not appear in the version broadcast to the Korean people.
North Korean Premier Kim's seventh liberation anniversary speech contained the usual eulogies to the "valiant" forces of North Korea, the Communist "volunpa teers," and the Korean people. He called for the People's armed forces to ready themselves "to deal further blows to the enemy" to achieve "final victory."
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I.
Military Operations
Army
In the western seotor near Punji, US lst Marine Division elements on Hill 122 held firm against an attack by a Chinese company on the afternoon of 15 August. Shortly after midnight, an estimated enemy battalion, supported by 3,000 rounds of mortar and artillery, again attaokeo the position. After a fight of nearly threw hours the Chinese withdrew. Enemy casualties inflicted by the Marines in the last four days in the fighting around Punji are estimated at 879 killed and 1,183 wnunded. In the east central seotor near Talohon, a raiding party from the ROK 3rd Division encountered.heavy resistance from well-entrenched Chinese elements. After a six-hour fight, during whioh the enemy used over 1,600 rounds of artillery and mortar fire, firing ceased with the ROK's still short of their objective.
UN oarrier-based aircraft flew 184 sorties against enmny installations from Songjin south to the lens= area in the east and from Chinnampo south to the Yonan area in the west. Naval surface vessels in the east bonberded enemy positions and lines of communioations from Songjin to Mbnsan, No enemy activity was observed by surface craft in the west.
II.
Aircraft under Far East Air Force control flew 686 effective sorties, of which 391 were combat. Medium bombers flew only 2 sorties on leaflet and reconnaissance missions. No enemy jets were observed operating over Korea during the period.
Military Intelligence Guerrilla Aotivitz
Ile ROK lnt Division on 5 August oonoluded "Operation Mongoose," an anti-guerrilla sweep in southwest Korea. A recapitulation shows that
RWIRRI"
THE C. I A. HAS No OBJECTION ITO THE 111.4S5IFICATION OF THIS DOCUNEHT.

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464 partisans were either killed or captured. The US Military Attache in Pusan comments that this "poor shoving" against the estimated 3,000 guerrillas in the area was due to the summer climate and vegetation whiCh enabled the guerrillas to live off the countryside without exposing themselves to capture. (Par East Command estimated in late July that there were only some 2,000 guerrillas in this area. Despite the relatively few guerrillas killed or captured, aggressive action by the South Korean troops has limited their attacks to small isolated groups seeking clothing, food and arms.)
Air
III.
General Situation
A Peiping broadcast on 15 August in commemoration of the seventh anniversary of the "Korean People's liberation. . . from Japanese imperialism" stated that "the mighty strength generated by the close unity between the Korean and Chinese people. . .can smash any schemes of the American aggressors." The Iropaganda blast claimed that over a half million UN soldiers had been killed or captured and 52900 planes had been shot down or damaged. while the'Communists have acquired an "ever strengthened air force and artillery." Peiping warned that if the US "should dare. .unleash a third world war. . . stretching from Germany to Korea. . it will inevitably be soundly thrashed and suffer a still more disastrous defeat."

Propaganda
SECRET
A corrected version of an Air Foree cable reveals that the main runway at Venni airfield, in the Chongchoa River area, vas not serviceable on 9 August.
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Central
Intelligence Agency Office of Current Intelligence 8041, 18 Aug 1952
D A'.1LY KOREAN BULLETIN

I.
Military Operations
Anz
In the western Punji area, Chinese troops the early morning of 16 August briefly and unsuccessfully probed a US 1st Marine Division outpost on Hill 122. Two enemy tanks were observed in the sector, but were not engaged. The following day, a US 1st Marine Division patrol fought an 11-hour battle with defending Chinese troops, before the American unit withdrew. In the east central Talchon area, a reinforced Chinese company probed outpost positions of the ROK 3rd Division for over an hour early on 16 August. The next day, elements of a ROK 3rd Division regiment in this sector retook an outpost, lost on 14 August, after a fight of almost 3 hours. An enemy counterattack caused the ROK's to withdraw slightly. The only other noteworthy occurrence of the period was in the ROK Capital Division sector where nearZy 100 rounds of effective counterbattery artillery fire were received on 17 August.
UW carrier-based aircraft flew 143 air sorties on 16 August. Naval air sorties flown On 17 Amgust were reduced to 76 as Task Force 77 engaged in replenishing. Targets attacked were uniamaged hydroelectric installations and troop, supply., and transportation positions. Surface units bombarded targets on the east coast from Songjin to Wonsan, while on the west coast targets in the Ohodo-Sokto and Upcho-Ri areas were shelled.
Land-based aircraft under Far East Air Force control flew 671 effective sorties inCluding 355 combat, on 16 August. Three boMber sorties were flown, engagini in reconnaissance and propaganda leaflet drops. Only one enemy plane was encountered, a conventional piston type, but no damage was inflicted on the enemy aircraft. The:following day, 17 August, a total of 578 sorties were flown of which 311 were combat. Ttio unidentified aircraft and one MIG-15 were observed but no enemy aircraft were encountered. Reconnaissance revealed four silver swept-wing aircraft and 10 dark swept-wing aircraft on Antung airfield on the early morning of 17 August. Only two botber sorties were flown during the period.

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II.
AIME
UN aerial observers on 17 August observed an artillery piece whose caliber was estimated at 240mm. The piece was located near Pyonggang in the Chinese 12th Army sector. (No enemy heavy artillery has been encountered in Korea to date. The largest pieces known to be in enemy hands are TIStype 155mm howitzers and Soviettype 152mm guns.)
III.
General Situation
Political

SECRET
Ambassador MUccio reports that South Korean newspapers have shown a con tinuing interest in the Honolulu conference of the ANMS powers. Editorial comment is generally agreed that a pact composed of only three nations is not enough to check the Communists and that a Pacific pact, along NATO lines and including Nationalist China, South Korea, and the Philippines, is needed,
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Central Intelligence Agency Office of Current Tntelligenee 8042, 19 Aug 1952
DAILY KOREAN BULL'ETIN

I.
Military Operations
No reports were received from either Task Force 77 off ihe east coast or the carrier task force off the west coast. Surface vessels fired bombardment missions northeast Of Hamhung and south of Wonsan. No firing was reported on the west coast. Air
Typhoon conditions brought the number of land-based sorties down to 85 on 18 August, of which 26 were combat. Medium bombers attacked a munitions factorY at Nakwon in the Sinuiju area. No enemy aircraft contact was reported, although press sources state that one non-effective enemy night fighter was encountered in the Nakvon B-29 raid,
II.
III.
General Situation
Political
A South Korean newspaper on 17 August, commenting on reactions to Liberation Dny, commemorating Japan's defeat, stated that Japan, "with its economy booming, is the only winner from the present wnr." The same paper two days before editorialised that "many . . . people have bitterly called thisday not a day-of-liberaSECRET
77.7 C, I
779 117",
An undetermined number of Chinese Communists near Tnehon on the central front briefly engaged a patrol of the DS 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team. After an engagement of over two hours, the US patrol was forced to withdraw slightly. On the east central front, three coordinated Chinese Communist probes against elements of the ROK 7th Division lasted for 45 minutes, followed by the enemy's withdrawal. Minor probes and patrol clashes occurred elsewhere along the front. During the report period on 18 AugLiet, the enepy employed 3,094 rounds of artillery and mortar shells.
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Um, but a day of suffering -- a dangerous trend since it presupposes preference
for Japanese domination.^
Economic
Radio pyongyang announced on 17 August the return of a North Korean trade delegation, led by Commerce Minister Chang Si-u. The group visited Czechoslovakia, Poland, the German Democratic Reptblic, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria. The conclusion of economic agreements with Poland, East Germany and Hungary was also announced. (This is the first reference noted to an agreement with Hungary.)

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Central Intelligence Agenoy Office of Current Intelligence 8043, 20 August 1952

I.
Military Operations
&SI
No reported air sorties were flown by UN carrierbased aircraftiduring the period under report. Surface vessels observed enemy targets at Wonsan and in the vicinity of Huryomlbut no bombardments were reported.
Landbased aircraft under Far East Air Force oontrol flew 299 effective sorties on 19 August of which 65 were combat. In the early evening, 15 MIG's were observed and 6 encountered. No enemy planes were reported destroyed or damaged but one UN Sabre sustained major damage. Only four bomber sorties were mounted during the period. One aircraft bombed marshalling yards in the Chinnampoareawhile the other bombera engaged in leaflet drops and close support missions. At 0200 19 August what appeared to be a pistontype enemy airoraft similar to a B-26 was observed by one of our planes.
II.
Ill.
'General Situation
Radio Peiping claimed on 17 August, under a Kaesong dateline, that UN planes once again violated the truce site on that date. The broadcast, claiming that the overflight was confirmed by a joint investigation of security officers from both sides, stated that this was the fifth violation since 4 August. As usual the alleged occurrence was characterized as an American trick to wreck the armistice negotiations, THE C.I.A. HAS NO OBJECTION TO THE DECIASSIFICATION OF SECRET THIS DOCUMENT.

Proraganda
Chinese Communist elements probed positions of the 25th British Brigade, let Commonwealth Division, on the western front during the night of 19 August. The action took place near Kigong and lasted two hours. Elsewhere along the front minor probes and patrol clashes occurred.
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DAILY. KOREAN BULLETIN

I.
Military Operations
&me
On the east central front, two Chinese Communist squads probed an outpost of the 6th ROK Division for one hour and then withdrew In the same sector, another probe by Chinese forces was repulsed by the ROK's in a 40-minute fight. Action along the remainder of the front was light with only brief probes and patrol clashes. The enemy employed 4,046 rounds of artillery and mortar shells during the report period, 20 August.
UN naval aircraft flew 152 sorties on 20 August against enemy troop and supply installations. Task Force 77 resumed activities off the Korean east; coast. Surface ships maintained the blockade and shelled enemy positions in-the vicinity of Songjin and Tanchon on the east coast and the Chodo-Sokto area on the west coast.
A total of 864 land-based sorties were flown on 20 August, including 541 combat. Of the 38 enemy MIG's observed, 14 were oncountered. Far East Air Force reports that two MIG's were destroyed, three damaged and one probelay damaged, .pending film assessment. Bomber sorties totaled 44 during the period, 19 of which attacked a Communist supply center near Pyongyang.
II.
Far East Air Force comments that the reduction in dommunist air activity during the last week represents a return to the norm maintained since mid-April. The MIG pilots flew only 90 sorties last week as compared with the previous week's 673. Forty-five MIG's were involved in 10 engagements. The enemy dis-: played slightly more aggressiveness and counterattacked UN planes when pressed, although he still preferred "jumping" the slower British Seafuries to tackling F-86's. FEU believes that the greatly reduced MIG effort is probably attributable to the heavy losses sustained by the enemy auring the previous week.

Air
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THE C.I.A. HAS NO OBJECT/ON
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III.
General Situation
Political
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!Finance Minister Paek Tu-chin will be impeached as soon as the National Assembly reconvenes. Paek will be charged with misappropriating 20 billion ROK won for political purposes. (The Finance Minister has been under investigation for misuse of funds accruing from the sale of tungsten. Paek is a Rhea follower and impeachment proceedings against him could be a move on the opposition's part to test ito strength. The US Embassy reported that during a brief period in June, the special tungsten fund in the Bank of Korea declined by about 18 billion won.) Economic

SECRET
Far East Command estimates that the Suiho power plant may be operating at near pre-bombing capacity by 23 August. The plant was non-operational for 3 to 7 weeks after the June bombing, with only limited power supplied since mid-August.
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I.
Military Operations
ALM
The US lst Marine Division sector was the most active area on the front on 21 August as a series of indecisive probes and patrol clashes took place. An unusual occurrence wae reported from the ROK 3rd Division sector near Talchon in east central Korea where the Chinese placed over 1,300 rounds of artillery and mortar fire on a single BOK outpost in little more than an hour. SOme 20 enemy pieces, 2- and 4-gun batteries widely separate from each other, were responsible for the concentration.
UN naval carrier aircraft from Task Force 77 on the east coast flew 227 sorties against enemy troop, supply and industrial installations. Blockade vessels bombarded the enemy shore line at Songjin.and Wonsan. No air operations have been reported from the west, and no heavy activity by surface vessels was recorded.
'
On 21 August land-based aircraft under Far East Air Force control flew 874 effective sorties of which 518 were combat. During the report period, 29 enemy MIGIs were observed, six encountered and two'damaged. There was no damage to UN aircraft. Thirteen effective bomber missions were flown on the night of 21 to 22 August. A supply center near Bambung was attacked by ten of the bombers while the remaining aircraft flew close support missions and leaflet drops.
II.

ists_v
Mr
NO significant reports have been received during the past 24 hours.
General Situation
Political
US Officials report that Yi Fbm-sok's Liberal Party holds Prime Minister Chang chiefly responsible for engineering Tile defeat in the election. Liberal
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. A. HAS NO OHJECTTON TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OF
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leaders believe that if Chang remains as Prime Minister the party's future is beclouded; on the other hand, if Chang is replaced by a man close to the party, Yi may be able to regain Rhea's favor. Yi, meanwhile, intends to continue a build-up of the party. (The expected resignation of some or all of Rbeele cabinet following the Assembly's reconvening on 20 August has not taken place.) Commenting on a low-level intelligence report that the Korean Communists in Japan had been ordered by North Korean Premier Kim Il-sung to organize five divisions, the Chosun Ilbo on 21 August editorialized that "to frustrate the enemy's efforts, our diplomatic approach to Japan and Japanese cooperation is indispensable." (A majority of the approximately 800,000 Koreans in Japan are North Noreen eympathizers,)
Propagarda
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An editorial in the New York Daily Worker on 19 August Called for an immodiate cease-fire, with the prisoner of war exchange problem to be settled later. The item stated that there is "only one logical sane solution to the impasse . . , call a cease-fire now and debate the sole remaining issue of POW's after the killing has stopped." (In the spring of 1951, the Daily Worker called for a cease-fire immediately prior to Malik's proposal in the UN.)
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Central Intelligence Agency Office of Current Intelligence 8o46, 23'August 1952

I.
Military Operations
hEEZ
Front-line action on 22 August %me confined to brief enem: probes and patrol clashes. The major engagement occurred in the US 2nd Division sector in the west-central Mabang area, where a small Chinese unit probed outpost positions of the attached Thai battalion for over,two hours. In the US lst Marine Division sector near Panmunjom in the west, the Chinese fired 32 132-mm rockets. An aerial observer reported sighting.two vehicles 'with rocket platforms south of Knesong.
No report of naval air operations on the,west coast.was received. Task Force 77 on the east coast was engaged in resupply activities. Blockading warships on the east coast bombarded enemy troop and supply inatallations and lines of communications in the Songjin Tanchon, and Wonsan areas. In the west, naval vessels fired at the approaches to HaejU harbor.
Land-based aircraft of the Far East Air Force flew 767 effective sorties ,on 22 August, of which 403 were combat. A total of 68 enemy jets were observed; 27 of these were encountered, and two were damaged, One F-86 was lost due to unknown causes. Far East Bomber Command flew only one effectiVe Sortie.
II.
Aerial photographs of Sinanju airfield on the Chongchon River in northwestern Korea taken on 17 AugUst show 3,000 feet of runway possibly serviceable. Numerous vehicle tracks and repair activity were noted on the runway. (Sinanju 75 miles southeast of Antung, is well within the protective range of MI015's operating from the Yalu River airfield complex. The-airfield has been used from time to time by conventional aircraft. There is no indication that the Communists are preparing for an intensified airfield repair effort of last October. THEC.I C.I.A. FT 70:::::610N SECRET TO THE DECLASSIFICATION
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The US Embassy reports that rumors are current in South Korea that An Ho-san has resigned as chairman of the Taehan Youth Corps. Presumably President Rhee's opposition to Yi Pom-sok, a close Ally of An, created a split in the organization which accounted for An's resignation. Although the acting head of the Youth Corps has stated that he will not use the organization for political purposes, the Embassy feels that this is "unlikely."
Tbe Department of State announced on 22 August that the United States will shortly pay the ROK $35,000,000 for won drawings used by UN forces in South Korea. The settlement will be made under terns of the economic agreement signed by the two countries on 24 Nay 1952. (The ROK press end government officials had begun to criticize the delay in payment', occasioned by the need to set up an adequate US control mechanism over the ROK's use of the foreign exchange. This payment should substantially retard the current inflation.)
2 5X 1
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Economic
Ambassador MUccio believes that the public trial of POW's by military commission for offenses coin-sifted in prison camps would lay the UN open to a new barrage of unfavorable propaganda, and give the Communists a pretext for charging that the defendants were being railroaded. He thinks that internal order can be maintained by apprehending, confining, and segregating the troublemakers.
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I.
Military
Operations
Armz
Ground action on 23 August was limited to minor enemy probes and patrol clashes. The two most serious engagements occurred at opposite ends of the front as a Chinese platoon briefly probed US lst Marine Division positions near Punji in the west and North Koreans for two hours fought a BOK 5th Division raiding party on the east coast near Oemyon. The following day, 24 August, is described as being "unusually quiet." Principal enemy contacts took place in the east central sector between BOK patrols and their Chinese opponents.
UN carrier-based on 24 August due to bad bombarded enemy targets Chodo-Sokto area on the
Land-based aircraft under Far East Air Force control flew 381 effective '.sorties, including 148 combat, on 23 August, The following day only 69 combat sorties were flown out of a total of 258. No enemy aircraft were observed or encountered on either day, On 23 August bomber missions totalled 23; a supply and industrial area near pyongyang was the main target attacked by 10 of the bombers. On 24 August, 14 effective bomber sorties were flown, 12 of which bombed a supply center at Anju.
II.
Guerrilla ActivitY
Active Communist strength in South Korea is estimated by the Far East Command at 1,098 armed and 766 unarmed guerrillas with only about 100 automatic weapons among these bands. While FECOM anticipates no danger to guarded in, stallations and localities at present, the fall harvest usually brings on increased guerrilla foraging which may affect agricultural activity in more remote areas. THE C.I.A. HAS NO OBJECTION 1.111
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planes flew 134 sorties on 23 August and none were flown weather. Surface ships maintained the blockade and between Songjin and Wonsan on the east coast ald in the west coast.
Air
SF/IRE'T
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Ground
Far East Command reported the relief of the Chinese 12th Army's 31st Division by the 34th Division in east central Korea. (This is apparently a routine change.)
III.
General Situation
Political
Kim also testified that he had received large bribes from Prime Minister Chang's Silla-ho Party and the Ministry of Justice to support the Hcompromise" constitutional amendment.

SECRET
The trial of 12 persons accused of participation in the attempted assassination of President Rhee opened on 22 August. Assemblyman Kim Si-hion testified that he planned to kill Rhee because of his increasingly tyrannical behavior, but decided at the last minute.to merely frighten Rhee. Accordingly he dampened the cartridges without the knowledge of the assailant to make sure the pistol would not.fire.
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I.
Military Operations
Amz
Chinese troops in the western sector near Punji again attempted to wrest Hill 122, Bunker Hill, from the US 1st Marine Division on the night of 25 August. A Chinese company, later reinforced to battalion strength, tried vainly for over two hours near midnight to take the Marine outpost, but finslly withdrew after suffering over 100 casualties. Before daylight on 26 August another brief probe by the Chinese was repulsed by the Marines. In the east central sector a Chinese platoon made an unsuccessful 45-minute probe against a ROK 7th Division outpost near Mulguji.
There were no air operations against the enemy on either Korean coast duo to inclement weather. On the east coast, naval surface units maintained the blockade and bombarded shore installations in the Wonsan area. Targets in the vicinity of Chodoand Chinnampo were bombarded by naval units in the west.
For the report period ending at midnight, 25 August, a total of 237 effective land-based aircraft sorties were flown, of which 59 were combat. No enemy aircraft were observed or encountered. Far East Bomber Command mounted six bomber sorties on the night of 25 August. Three of the aircraft bombed a Chinnampo mershalingyard while the remaining bombers flew leaflet and close support missions.
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The assistant chief of staff of the Nortflorean Armyi Istated on 6 August at his army is taking advantage of the delay in truce negotiations to train home guard units in North Korea and combat divisions in Manchuria. (While the North Koreans are undoubtedly training local defense units, there is no confirmatory intelligence to indicate a North Korean training program of any scale in Manchuria.)
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Air
During the US medium bomber attack in the early morning of 24 August against a rail target very near the Manchurian border, enemy night interceptors were encountered in six engagements. Only one of the unidentified aircraft involved made aggressive firing passes at the bombers, and this one was probably destroyed by the B-29 gunners. Some of the Communist planes had a high rate of speed and were observed to be swept-wing types. No damage was suffered by the US aircraft, Enemy Rear Areas
III.
General Situation
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1prior to 6 August the North Korean government decreed that all civilian ministries and agencies in the government would assume a paramilitary role and would be subordinate to a "Labor Party-Armed Forces Joint Council." The decree stated that this military state would continue until all Korea was unified. Reasons advanced for this change were that the North Korean and Chinese Communist governments were convinced that the US still entertained aggressive designs in the area, even if the cease-fire talks should succeed, and that the North Koreans must be prepared because the government "will never cease to fight for the unification of Korea." (There has been no indication of any major change in North Korean governmental organization. Immediately after the war began in 1950, all executive fUnctions in Communist North Korea were turned over to a "War Council', with supreme authority.)
In broadcasts on 23 and 25 August, Radio Peiping detailed additional atrocities allegedly perpetrated on Chinese prisoners held by the United Nations. The source of Peiping's comments are Chinese soldiers who were "forced to become spies." One broadcast described the burial of 3 Chinese soldiers who had been badly mutilated in "secret American experiments," while the other referred to a "previously unreported massacre." (Previous enemy propaganda claims of UN mistreatment of POW's have been general or have stopped short of detailed descriptioaF of the alleged atrocities. Another propaganda broadcast cited these alleged atrocity victims as being among the POW's the UN refused to repatriate,)
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Last week UN aerial observers reported sighting a eouthbound railroad train near Aoji-dong, a Korean village close to the Soviet-Korean-Chinese border. Far East Air Force believes the train came from Manchuria rather than the USSR. (A southbound train in this area could only be destined for the port cities of Najin and Unggi in eactreme northeastern Korea. There is no through rail link from this coastal area southward.)
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Central
Intelligence Agency Office of Current Intelligence 8049, 27 Auguat 1952

I.
Military Operations
No carrierborne aircraft flew sorties on 26 August due to replenishing operations. Surface ships maintained the blockade and bombarded targets in the vicinity of Songjin on the Korean east coast and Chodo on the Korean west coast.
Air
UN landbased under Far East Air Force flew 266 effective sorties, including 75 combat, on 26 August. UN medium bothers flew 10 effective sorties; seven were directed against a supply area in Pyongyang. No enew planes were encountered.
Eight enapy prisoners interrogated by UN forces during the period 14 to 19 Augustlevealed that none had any knowledge of a coming offensive. All had teen instructed to defend their present positions. (Indications still point to a determined wispy defense along the battle line in Korea.)
dp_.E
For the week ending 24 August MIG pilots flew 160 sorties, an increase of 90 over the week ending 17 August. In contrast to that week, the Communist pilots showed little aggressiveness as only 55 sorties engaged UN pilots. In
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Weather conditions on 26 August limited ground action to probes and brief patrol clashes across the front. Flood conditions in enemy territory appear to have made all roads south of Pyonggang in the central sector impassable and to have washed out all bridges over the Nam River in the eastern sector. The only significant probe occurred in the western sector where elements of the US 1st Marine Division turned back an undetermined number of Chinese Communists probing an outpost on Bunker Hill.
aircraft
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most of these engagements the MIG's seemed intent on evasion rather than combat. Although UN medium bothers penetrated to the Yalu River area on 18-19 August, only five Communist aircraft made ineffective interception efforts. During the report period, two N1G's were destroyed, six damaged and one possibly destroyed.
III.
General Situation
Cease-fire

SECRET
Speaking at a conference of North Korean general staff officers on 6 August, the North Krean assistant chief of staff for operations, Ki Sok-pona, reportedly stated that the Chinese and North Koreans had agreed to reach an accord with the UN at Panmunjom and "then mount joint political and espionage operations in South Korea and Japan." The North Korean general added that control of South Korea would be effected by increasing internal dissension and by guerrilla activity. Following the domination of South Korea, the next objective of the "solid Asian front" would be to "take Formosa." (The North Korean officer reportedly making these statements is a Soviet-Korean and would probably be aware of any major decisions made. While there are no indications of such a Chinese-North Kbrean agreement to Conclude a ceaseefirc or to act jointly, the line of action advocated against South Korea is entirely plauaible.)
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Central Intelligence Agenqy Office of Current Intelligence 8050, 28 August s952

I.
Military Operations
UN carrier-based aircraft flew 353 reported sorties on 27 August, with totals still incomplete. Targets attacked were undamaged hydroelectric installations and supply and transportation positions, primarily on the east coast. Naval surface units maintained the blockade and bombarded targets between Songjin and Wonsan in the east and Chinnampo to Haeju in the west.
UN land-based aircraft flew 989 effective sorties on 27 August, 644 of which were combat. Far Eastern Bomber Command flew 18 effective sorties. No enemy aircraft were sighted.
II.

III.
General Situation
Political
Prime Minister Chang in a 23 August broadcast stated that the ROK Government will hold by-elections for the 27 vacant seats in the National Assembly prior to elections for the newly created House of Councilors. Chang gave no specific dates as to when the two elections would be held but stated that they were of
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Navy
Ground action across the front on 27 August was light. The most significant action occurred in the east central secton where a Chinese Communist platoon attacked elements of the ROK 3rd Division on Hill 590 near Talchon. After three and a half hours of sporadic fighting, the enemy withdrew. Elsewhere action was limited to minor probes and patrol clashes. The enemy employed 4,227 rounds of artillery and mortar during the period,
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"urgent necessity." (Rhee probably feels that by holding the National Assembly by-elections in the near future, he can fill these vacant seats with his adherents before the opposition is fully organized. In addition, victory in the first instance would give Rhee a major psychological advantage in the House of Councilors elections.)
AMbassador Muccio reporte that the National Assembly probe of the tungsten dollar scandal was given top play in most South Korean newspapers. An undertone of considerable carping at the government ministers responsible was noted. The Assembly questioned the Finance Minister on 25 and 26 August; on the latter date, the Agriculture and Forestry Minister was also present.
PronaRanda
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Radio Peiping claimed on 27 August that American aircraft continued in.. trusion "over the territorial air of northeast China." Between 25 July and 25 August, 172 groups of American planes allegedly made 822 flights over various cities.in Liaotung and Kirin Provinces. (Several of the locations specified in the broadcast Are as much as 30 miles from the Rorea,Manchuria border.)
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DAILY KOREAN 'BULLETIN

I.
Military Operations
fl
Navy
The front line was very quiet on 28 August, with only minor patrol clashes and enemy probes. No probe was made in more than platoon strength and none lasted longer than half an hour.
UN carrier-based aircraft flew 168 sorties on 28 August against enemy troop and supply installations. Surface vessels bombarded enemy targets on the Korean east coast in the vicinity of Songjin and Tanchon and on the west coast in the Amgak and Haeju areas.
Far East Air Force land-based aircraft flew 529 effective sorties on 28 August of which 267 were combat. Medium bothers flew five sorties on close support, leaflet and reconnaissance missions. No enemy aircraft were reported,
II,
UN visual air reconnaissance indicates that the recent floods have caused considerable damage to bridges and road nets in North Korea. In the Pyongyang area, however, all main supply routes south to the coast appear to be in good condition; the rivers in this area were not particularly high.
General Situation
politica],
On 26 August it was announced in the ROK National Assembly that a caucus of negotiating groups had decided to abelve plans for holding by-elections for the 27 vacant assembly seats. Ambassador Mitccio observes that both President Rhee and Prime Minister Chang are pressing for these elections as soon as possible. (Such action on the part of the supposedly cowed Assemblymen indicates continued resistance to Rheels dictatorial methods against that body.)
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Air
EnemY Rear Areas
HASNaTECTION
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The Rational Assembly committee investigating the "tungsten dollar" scandal went to President Rhee on 26 August to advise him of their results so far. Rhee is reported to have diverted the conversation to the subject of the additional constitutional amendments iihich he has proposed. The President threatened that if the Assembly did not cooperate he would clean the "wrong doers"out of the legislature

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T.
Military Operations
Naval air sorties on 29 August tnialled 368 with pot all reports completed. Carrier-based aircraft from Task Force 77 on the east coast participated in the raid on Pyongyang and also attacked targets in the Wonsan area. Aircraft from the British carrier, Ocean, bombed and straffed west coast installations from Chinnampo to the Han River estuary. Surface units maintained the blockade of both Korean coasts. A UN vessel on the east coast captured an enemy sampan containing 23 North Koreans.
UN land-based aircraft on 29 August flew 10552. effective sorties, of which 1,229 were combat. The massive daytime raid on Pyongyang was conducted by 835 fighter-bomber sorties made up of US Air Fords, US Marine, Sbuth African, Australian, and South Korean air units. Considerable damage was inflicted on the North Korean capital at a cost of three UN aircraft lost and six damaged-b: antiaircraft fire..
Communist MIG-151s were out in force during the day, but did not venture soutli of the Chongchon River which is well north of Pyongyang. Of these, 63 were observed with 26 encountered by UN F-861s. One F-86 received major damage and one mlq-15 was destroyed ant.two were_damaged. Medium bombers flew 16 sorties against undamaged or repaired portions of the Changjin hydroelectric power system in the northeast and two other B-291s attacked a rail yard it Chinnampo. Seven other B-29's flew reconnaissance and close support missions. One B-29 is currently unreported and a search is under way. THE C.I.A. HASNO OBJECTION TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OF

lista
Air
The relative quiet continued across the front on 29 August with ground action limited to patrol clashes and brief probes. The longest engagement lasted a half hour and occurred in the western sector, where a Chinese CommUnist squad probed US lst Marine Division outpost on Bunker Hill.
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Military Intelligence Enemy Rear Areas US radio monitors report that Radio Pyongyang, North Korea's principal broadcasting station, failed 'to come on the air for its regularly2scheduled broadcasts on 30 August. (fhe 29 August raid of the UN on Pyongyang, coupled with the deteriorated power situation in North Korea, is probably responsible for the Communist radio's silence.)
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Central Intelligence Agency Office of Current Intelligence 8053, 2 September 1952
,

I.
Military Operations
UN naval flew 82 sorties on 30 August, no sorties on 31 August, and 435 on 1 Septedber, the largest naval raid in recent months. Chief targets on 1 September imrethe synthetic petroleum plant and coal mines at Aoji-dong on the Soviet-Korean border. Other important targets hit vere remaining facilities at the Chongjin iron works and at the Musan iron mines, the largest in Korea.
Surface vessels on 30 and 31 August And on 1 SepteMber maintained the blockade and bonbarded enemy gun positions on the Korean east coast in the vicinity of Chongjin and troop and supOly installations in the Songjin and Wonsan areas. UN naval vessels on the Korean west coast destroyed targets in the UPchon and Haeju areas.
On 30 August, a total of 656 land-based sorties were flown, including 337 combat. During the report period, 97 MIG's were observed, all in the Chongchon River-Yalu River area. Fifty-one MIGgs Were encountered, four destroyed, and one probably destroyed and 10 damaged. In addition, four more MIG's were claimed destroyed or damaged. Far East Bomber Command flew 18 effective aorties on 30 August, 11 aircraft bombing a Pyongyang supply center. The following day, 31 August, only 109 combat out of 291 effective sorties were flown. No enemy aircraft were observed or encountered. A supply center at Kangso south of Pyongyang, was attacked by 10 bombers during the night 31 August-1 September, On 1 SepteMber, 812 land-based sorties were flown of which 513 were combat. A total of 65 MIGIs were observed in TIMIG Alloy" in northwest Korea; 32 were encountered-and two , damaged with no damage to UN aircraft. There were only two bomber missions on 1 SepteMber, both propaganda leaflet drops over 23 North Korean cities-.

Lia_n
Enemy ground action in Korea on 30 and 31 August was limited to the usual actions and minor patrol clashes. On 1 September the ROK 5th Division sector on the east coast became active as a Nbrth Korean platoon attempted unsuccessfully to overrun a ROK outpost. A ROK force countered with a raiding party, but met heavy enemy resistance and was forced to withdraw. Minor probes and patrol clashes ocourred-elsewhere on the front on 1 September.
small probing
aircraft
installations
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II.
AMIE
The Far East Command reports that the North Korean 8th Division has replaced the 47th Division in the North Korean I Corps sector on the east coast. FECOM's acceptanee of this relief is based upon the statements of recently captured 8th Division POWs. (Little significance other than a routine relief is attached to this move. The lath Division has been long in combat while the 8th has had over a year out of the line.)
III.
General Situation
Also replaced in this latest cabinet shift was the reasonably campetent Minister of Agriculture Ham In,-sop. The new Minister is Sin Chung-mak, a strong pro-Rhee member of the National Assembly.
Prime Minister Chang Taek-sang, who, according to a recent conatitutional amendMent, must propose cabinet changes, was not inforned of this shuffle until it was announced.
(Rhea, by this move, has effectively, albeit illegally, stopped any serious bid for power that might.have emanated from Prime Minister Chang and former Home Minister Kim. The appointment of Governor Chin, an intimate of the defeated vice presidential candidate Yi Pom,sok, to the powerful Rome Ministry may indicate a resurgence of Yi Palls-sokts influence)
Under a pyongyang dateline, MoscowMeg on 31 August credited the'"Central News Agency" of Korea with a statement that 1,000 members of the Japanese:police reserve were sent to the Korean front in July. (American employment in Korea of Japanese police reservists has been periodically charged by Radio pyongyang in the past.)
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Proreaanda
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In a surprise move on 29 August, President Rhee replaced Hame Minister Xim Tae-son with a provincial governor, Chin Hon,sik. Chin is reported by the US Mission in Korea to be an extreme rightist and an associate of Louise lm and Yun Chi-yong, members of the inner clique surrounding President 2hee.
Political
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Military Operations
Ammz
The tempo of enemy activity increased across the front on 2 September. Heaviest action occurred in the RON 3rd Division sector near the east central Talchon area where two Chinese platoons, supported by over 3,000 rounds of mortar and artillery fire, tried for over an hour to take a ROK outpost. Other noteworthy enemy platoon-size probes took place southwest of Mabang in the US 2nd Division's west central sector and in the RON 8th Division's sector in the east. Patrol clashes were heavy, lasting in some cases over an hour.
Carrier-based aircraft flew 335 sorties on 2 September against enemy supply and transportation installations on both coasts. Surface vessels bombarded targets in the area between Songjin,and Wonsan on the east coast and in the Changson area on the west coast.
Land-based aircraft under Far East Air Force control flew 683 effective sorties on 2 September of which 388 were combat Sinanju airfield was attacked by 165 fighter-bombers in a daylight raid. The evening of 1 September,there was a deep southern penetration when four enemy MIGle were encountered by UN aircraft just north of Haeju. On 2 September 18 1410's were observed in the Yalu River area but none were encountered. Due to adverse weather conditions only one bomber mission was flown on the night of 2-3 SepteMber.
II.
Enemy Rear Areas
UN reconnaissance of vehicle traffic in North Korea for the week ending 28 August reveals that flood waters in the east and central zones has caused some dislocation in the enemy's movement of supplies. Damage in these two zones caused the Communists to increase their use of western routes which were reported to be in good condition. Twenty-five percent of all vehicles sighted during the week were traveling on the Pyongyang-Haeju-ICaesong 12:loutce.I.AThemumd77:7:7ngs SECRET
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during the week was extremely low, probably due to adverse weather conditions which hampered the UN reconnaissance activity.
III.
General Situation
Political

SECRET
The US Embassy in Pusan reports that there is "some talk" among National Assemblymen that if President Rhee does not oust Finance Minister Peek, because of his connection with the tungsten dollar scandal, a nonconfidence vote against the cabinet may be requested. (Rhea's dismissal of the Minister of Agriculture on 29 August was probably partially motivated by a desire to mollify the Assembly committee investigating the fraud. Rhee may be forced to dismiss Pm* as the probers have been quite vociferous, and the press has given the scandal much publicity.)
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Central Intelligence Agency Offioe of Current Intelligence 8055, 4 September 1952

I.
Military Operations
hasim
Due to a tropical storm UN carrier-based planes did not fly any sorties on 3 September. Surface vessels on the Korean east coast maintained the blockade and captured 14 prisoners from an enemy sampan. Korean west coast naval ships bombarded an enemy irrigation dam and gun emplacements near Haeju.
Only 130 effective land-based sorties were flown on 3 SepteMber of which 52 vere combat. UN fighters observed 22 enemy HMIs between the Chongchon and Yalu Rivers in the early morning of 4 SepteMber. Ten of the MIG's were en, countered with one reported damaged. There was no damage to UN airoraft. Far East Bomber Command mounted 58 sorties on the night of 3-4 September. Changjin hydroelectric plant number one, about 40 miles north of Ramhung, was attacked by 50 of the boMbers.
II.
III.
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las of 25 August President Rhee was planning the early replacement commerce and Industry Minister Yi Eyo-son. Finance Minister Paek Tu-ehin

Navy
Air
Politic4
THE C. LI
:
The Korean front on 3 September vas quiet with only a few patrol engagements and minor probes. The DS lst Marine Division in the west near Panmunjom received a 5,minute probe from a Chinese platoon. In the east central sector near Yuusil, a North Korean squad probed a US 25th Division outpost position. After an hour fight 11 enemy soldiers were killed and one was captured.
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reportedly is hoping to be assigned to the government's economic mission to the United States, 15in Sung-mo is to be appointed head of a "Maritime Inspection Committee," now under reorganization and will be sent to Japan to investigate potential salvage operations. (FinaLe Minister Paek has recently become deeply enmeshed in the National Assembly scandal investigations. Former Prime Minister Sin was for many months in semi-hiding in Japan. Reported to have made his peace with Rhee, he is back in Korea and is apparently scheduled to stage a comeback in the government.)
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Central Intelligence Agency Office of Current Intelligence 8056, 5 Septedber 1952

I.
Military Operations
ALM
After two very minor probes on 4 September, the US 1st Marine Division outpost on Bunker Hill in western Korea was subjected te an attack by two Chinese companies in the early hours of 5 September. This Chinese probe, supported by 2,250 rounds of artillery and mortar fire, was repulsed after a fight of nearly 2 hours.. Other Marine outposts to the north and east of Bunker Hill received minor enemy probes during the period. Small enemy probes took place in the lst Commonwealth and US 3rd Marine Division sectors in the west and in the ROK 2nd and US 25th Division areas in central and eastern Korea.
UN naval aircraft on the Korean west coast flew 97 reported sorties on 4 September with the total flight tally incomplete. Air activity by carrier based planes on the Korean east coast ceased as Task Force 77 engaged in re plenishing operations. Enemy targets were bombarded by naval surface vessels in the vicinity of Songjin and Tanchon on the east coast, and in the Amgak area on the west coast.
II.
On 4 Septenber landbased aircraft under Far East Air Force control flew 853 effective sorties of which 565 were combat. Installations in Sonchon, located in MIG alley, were attacked by 279 of the fighters. During the period, 110 MIG's were observed and 73 encountered by UN aircraft. A total of 13 M1G's were reported destroyed and 7 damaged. The UN lost four Sabres with one other suffering minor damage. There were only four bomber missions flown on the night of 4,5 Septenber. Three of the aircraft flew leaflet and close support missions while the remaining aircraft bombed Hwangju, a town located on the main supply route between Pyongyang and Haeju.
No significant reports have been received during the past 24 hours..(_
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III.
General Situation
Economic
General Harrison with threatening an extension of bacterial warfare against North Korea. While the article emphasized thii, the propaganda point was hinged on a five4tord quote, "disease and dislocation of homes," which Harrison may have employed in connection with the devastation created by bombing. (The Communist negotiators at Panmunjom have never brought up the question of bacterial warfare during the negotiations. It is possibly of propaganda significance that the Communists have gone to such lengths to associate the UN negotiators with threatening BW.
Radio Peiping on 4 September quoted an article by Alan Winnington of the London Belly Worker in which the correspondent accused American top negotiator
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Propaganda
The US Army representative on the US-ROK Combined Economic Board believes that the won-dollar exchange rate should, "as an opening wedge," be changed from 6,000 Won to One US dollar to 18,000 to 1 beginning 1 October. Army representatives point out that American and foreign nationals are receiving 24,000 to 1 in the open market and the exchange rate based on the present world market price of rice would be about 45,000 to 1. They add that the present rate is unrealistic and works against fair treatment for US troops. (The Republic of Korea,innegotiating the economic agreement which established the board,was adamant in demanding the retention of the current 6,000 to I rate. Although the rate is unrealistic, the US AMbassador feels that because the board has just started to operate and the US payment of $35,000,000 was made only recently.,the US should wait a few months for these arrangements to have some effect.)
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Central Intelligence Agency Office of Current Intelligence 9301: 6 September 1952

I.
Military Operations
AMY
Action continued heavy in the US 1st Marine Division sector near Punji in western Korea. A reinforced Chinese company attacked Marine outpost positions early in the morning of 5 September. The attack, coordinated with a squad-size probe nearby, was supported by 2,000 rounds of artillery and mortar fire. After a 35-minute engagement the enemy withdrew: leaving an estimated 50 killed in action. UN patrols along the rest of the front engaged in short fire-fights with Communist defenders, but no serious action developed.
Aircraft from Carrier Task Force 77 on the east coast flew 83 sorties against enemy initallations in the Kbwon-Wonsan area: while 43 UN naval aircraft on the west coast sortied against enemy troop and supply areas in the Changjon
area.
'
Wonsan.
UN surface vessels bombarded the east coast near Songjin: Hungnam: end No report of bombardment was received from the west.
Air
Land-based aircraft under Far East Air Force control flew 1,223 effective sorties on 5 September, of which 820 were combat. Fighter-bombers flew 415 daylight sorties, of which 226 were directed at a mining installation near Tokchon in north central Korea. This installation: where heavy activity had been observed: consisted of a crushing plant: ore processing plant and local electric power installations. Medium bombers flew 16 sorties during the night, Eleven of these were directed against enemy installations in the Hamhung area in northeastern Korea. Seventy-two Communist MIG-15's were observed by UN F-86 pilots, with 22 encountered. Four MIG's were reported destroyed and three damaged at a cost of one F-86 damaged.

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'tension between 600 loyal South Koreans and 100 North Korean sympathizers among the prisoners of war at Kangdong camp
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near Pyongyang resulted in a riot on 10 July. Armed guards restored order within two hours. Five leadera of the pro-ROK group were promptly executed and rations were reduced. On 18 July the refusal of strong South Korean sympathizers at another camp near Pyongyang to take part in propaganda leactures or work details resulted in an outbreak of fighting with pro-North Korean squad leaders. Ten prisoners were younded by rifle fire before order vas restored. Food restrictions were applied as punishment. (This is the first report of this nature.)
General Situation
Cease-fire Four Soviet officers in rivilinn clntheg accomoanied by a radio team are located in a house in Kaesong, I ihe leader or tins group is vsaulms Chekhalov, who has his headquarters in riping and is not associated with the Soviet Advisory Group in North Korea.
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Military Operations
havz
The following day, the east central sector erupted as the enemy fired an unprecedented 32,292 rounds of artillery and mortar shells in support of the Chinese defense of newly-won outpost positions. Hand-to-hand combat was con, tinuing between the ROMs and the Chinese at the end of the report period. Action also flared in the DS 25th Division sector farther to the east where North Korean elements closed to hand-to-hand coMbat On 6 September. Although the enemy's attaok was renewed the following day, no gains were made.
UN naval aircraft flew 227 sortiee and supply installations on both coasts. and bombarded targets between Songjin and the Chodo, Ongjin, and Haeju areas on the on 7 September has been received.
Land,-based aircraft under Far East Air Force control flew 819 effective sorties on 6 September of which 515 were combat. The UN aircraft observed 54 MIG's during the period and encountered 17. One MIG was damaged and one probably destroyed with no damage to friendly aircraft. FM' Bomber Command mounted 18 effective sorties on the night of 6-7 September. One of the bombers attacked a marshaling yard at Chinnempo while 12 additional aircraft bombed a supply center in Pyongyang. No report hae been received concerning air activity on 7 September.
THE C.I.A. HAS NO OBJECTION TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OF T IS DOCUMENT.

Sn
Air
Action was heavy over the weekend as the enemy demonstrated determination and considerable firepower in attacking UN positions along the line. Principal action on 6 September occurred in the US lst Marine Division sector near Punji in the west where Chinese attacks of up to battalion strength captured certain Marine outposts on Bunker Hill, but were repulsed elsewhere in the Marines sector. In the east central sector on Saturday, Chinese troops drove a ROK Capital Division unit from an outpost. The enemy brought up three tanks in support of this engagement.
on 6 September against enemy troop Surface vessels maintained the blockade Kojo on the Korean east coast and in west coast. No report for naval action
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II,
ROK ArmY
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IROK
Lieutenant General Chong Ilkwon expects to be appointee newsman os the pro posed ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff. When he obtains this position, Chong allegedly will attempt to "purge" the Japanese clique, including the former chief of staff and the two ROK Corps commanders, frum any important posts in the army. He anticipates the backing of Sin Songmo. formerly Prime Minister, and of Colonel
25X6
"Snake" Kixnl (Genere4. Chong, a highly competent officer, has JIM returnee to acres Irma -tau ul.)
(The Japanese clique, until recently in the ascendancy in the ROK Army, has
provided Many competent senior officers but has incurred President Bheets wrath
hy its neutrality in the recent political crisis. Officers loyal to Chong are reportedly those who have primarily been influenced by the US Advisory Group in Korea.)
III.
General Situation
North Korean civilians, captured from sampans by a US Naty vessel on 29 August, stated that there is a southward movement of civilians in the north eastern coastal area near Iwon because of the lack of food in the area. (This report further confirms the dire civilian food shortage in North Korea. Mbst of the rice grown north of the 38th Parallel: is collected hy the regime and doled out to the military, government officials, and other favored segments of the population.)

Economic
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Central Intelligence Agency Office of Current Intelligence 9303, 9 SepteMber 1952

I.
Military Operations
ham
Heavy action on two hills near Yulsa in the ROK Capital Division sector in east central Korea continued through 8 September. Despite heavy counterattacks by South Korean troops throughout the day, the Chinese still held the contested hills. In the defense of the hill nearest Masa, the enemy used over 6,000 rounds of mortar and artillery fire during a seven-hour period and fighting continued at the end of the report period. Elsewhere along the front limited enemy probes and patrol clashes occurred, the most notable a five-minute Chinese probe in the US lst Marine Division sector in the west.
Carrier-based planes flew 33 sorties on 8 September against targets located between Chinnampo and Haeju witn the tally of flights not complete. No sorties were flown on the Korean east coast as Task Force 77 engaged in replenishing, Blockade ships bombarded enemy positions in the vicinity of Songjin, Tanchon, and Chaho on the east coast and the Ongjin Peninsula on the west coast. Air
On 7 September, 192 land-based combat sorties out of a total of 470 effective sorties were flown. UN pilots observed 66 MIGps and encountered 48, all in the Yalu River area. Two MIGIs were destroyed, one probably destroyed and eight reportedly damaged with no damage to DN aircraft. Only six boMber sorties were flown on the night of 7-8 September in photo reconnaissance, close support or leaflet missions. A total of 811 land-based sorties were flown on 8 September of which 540 were combat. During the period, 120 MIGIs were observed in "NIG Alley" and 35 were encountered. The UN fighters destroyed five enemy aircraft, and eight others were reportedly damaged, again with no damage to friendly aircraft. On the night of 8-9 Septetber, 25 effective boSber sorties were mounted with 20 of the aircraft attacking a supply center in Yangdok.
II.
Military Intelligence No significant reports have been received during the past 24 hours. SECRET
THE C.I.A. HAS NO OBJECTION 0 THE DECLASSIFICATION OF
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III.
General Situation
Fblitioal
US officials in Korea state that the ROK Justice Minister and the Offioe of Legislation are reportedly working on drafts of the seven new constitutional amendments which President Rhee proposed in mid-July. It is reported that some of the legislators feel that the "dispirited assembly" will not block the amendments, while others fear a repetition of the recent political crisis. (The amendments, if passed, would severely circumscribe the powers of the legislature and all but do away with democratic government in South Korea. There are indications, however, that the National Assembly will offer vigorous opposition if the amendments are submitted.)

SECR.ET
Finance Minister Paek Tu-chin is to be replaced by xi chae-nyong, currently one of the ranking members of the Liberal Party in the National Assembly. (Peek has been under interpellation by the Assembly on several occasions recently because of his alleged involvmnent in a major South Korean scandal. His replacement in the near future is to be expected.)
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I.
Military Operations
AIM
Action in the ROK Capital Division sector near Yulsa in east central Korea continued to highlight the ground war. One of the contested hills was seized from the Chinese in the late evening of 9 September. The other hill nearest Yulsa was still held by Chinese troope, although South Korean elements-were only 50 yards from the hill's crest. Elsewhere on the front a slight increase in the number of enemy probes and patrol clashes took place. Notable was an attack by a Chinese squad against an outpost of the Colombian battalion in the US 7th Division sector in central Korea. This eight-minute probe was supported by mortar fire and appeared to be "extremely well organized and executed."
UN carrier-based planes flew 240 sorties on 9 September against enepy troop and supply installations and a power plant. No report has been received on air operations on the Korean west coast. Surface vessels maintained the blockade and bombarded enemy storage and transportation targets in the area from Songjin to Wonsan on the east coast and in the Chodo and Ongjin areas on the west coast.
Air
II.
On 9 Septetber 616 combat missions out of 1,016 effective land-based sorties were flown. A North Korean Army military academy at Sakchu was attacked by 76 UN fighter-bombers while Sabre jets flew cover. During this operation, 205 enemy MIG's were observed and 132 encountered in the Yalu-Chongchon River area. UN aircraft destroyed 6 MIG's, probably destroyed another, and reportedly damaged 13. Three F-84's were destroyed. Far East Air Force bomber command .mounted 16 effective sorties on 9 September, 11 of which bombed a supply area at Sopo, north of Pyongyang.
US aerial observers reported 10 pieces of heavy engineering equipment on an airfield runway outside the North Korean east coast city of Wonsan. (Sporadic' attempts are made by the Communists to maintain airfields in the Wonsan-Hathung
SECIRFT

Air.
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area in operational condition. The presence of this equipment indicates that another such attempt may be under way.)
General Situation
Political
Radio Pusan broadcast on 9 September a statement by Home Affairs Minister Kim regarding the tightening of controls on persons illegally leaving for Japan. Kim acknowledged that there are some individuals who are seeking personal safety in Japan, "still the target of our national rancor." The Home Minister threatened these individuals with "vigorous and strict measures." (South Korea has not previously made a very serious attempt to curtail the departure of illegal emigrants to Japan. The successful stoppage of these departures will somewhat ameliorate the now strained relations between the two nations.)
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SECRET
According to a Chinese Communist news dispatch from Mukden, a North Korean "autonomous people's government" has been established under Chinese auspices in Manchuria on the northeast Korean border. The government was set up on 3 September in the Yenpien district of Kirin Province according to the report and will operate at the "district level." It was added that the 540,000 Koreans in the district constitute 74 percent of the local populace. (It is certain that this district will not be an independent governmental unit. The Chinese have "established" about 150 of these autonomous governments, partly as a sop to the large national minority groups in China. Interrogation of North Koreans formerly resident in this area indicates that "cultural tolerance" is the extent of autonomy allowed.)
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I.
Military Operations
Carrier-based planes flew 235 sorties on 10 September with the total tally of flights incomplete. Targets included supply and transportation installations in the vicinity of Taehung Island and between Hyesanjin and Won in northeastern Korea. Naval air operations for the Korean west coast were not reported. .Blockade ships on the east coast destroyed buildings and warehouses in the vicinity of Chongjin and bombarded targets between Hungnam and Wonsan. The report for west coast naval surface operations was not received.
II.
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On 10 September land-based aircraft under Far East Air Force control flew 906 effective sorties, including 571 combat. Twenty-five UN &three on patrol in the Yalu River area observed 75 enemy swept-wing aircraft on Tatungkou airfield. There were, however, no encounters with enemy jet fighters during the report period. On the night 10-11 September only 5 bomber sorties were flown and these were on close support, leaflet drop, and photo reconnaissance missions.
Military intelligence
Ground
10,000 North Korean army troops are moving into barracks near majin in noruneaub Korea. At the same time enemy activity in the vicinity of Haeju in western Korea
'

, max
The fight for the two hills near Yulsa in the ROK Capital Division sector in east central Korea continued fiercely on 10 September. The hill nearest Tulsa was recaptured by the South Koreans during the period, but a heavy Chinese counterattack drove the UN troops from the prominence later in the evening. On the other hill, recaptured by ROK forces on 9 September, two Chinese companies, supported by 18,000 rounds of mortar and artillery fire, tried vainly to take the position. Fighting often hand-to-hand continued in the sector at the end of the period. Elsewhere on the front, the British Commonwealth Division in the west repulsed an enemy platoon-size probe, as did ROK 2nd Division elements in the centralsector,
Air
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appears to be increasing daily. (A number of intelligence reports recently have revealed that the enemy has had a growing fear that the UN is planning another amphibious operation; their anxiety may be reflected in this coastal security activity.)
III,
General Situation
The South Korean press has recently become increasingly critical of the Panmunjom negotiations and editorials have commented unfavorably on an alleged proposal to shift the conference site to the UN. There has also been a step-up in anti-Japanese newspaper comment. One South Korean paper views the bombing of North Korea and the consequent destruction of the North Korean economy as pleasing only to Japan which will thus find an opportunity for economic penetration.

Propaganda
SECRET
Communist air activity during the week ending 7 SepteMber was characterized by the Red pilots' general lack of aggressiveness, in contrast to previous weeks. In encounters with UN aircraft, there was an evident lack of experience or proficiency on the Communists' part and many of the encounters actually consisted of no more than fleeting engagements, From the staggering enemy losses coMbined with the lack of aggressiveness, Far East Air Force surmises that apparently in.experienced pilots were used to a large extent in the enemy's air effort. During the report period, 18 NIG019 were destroyed, 5 probably destrqyed, and 23 reportedly damaged. UN losses totaled four Sabre jets destroyed and two others damaged.
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I.
Military Operations
Due to technical communications difficulties, no Navy or Air reports are available at time of publication.
II.
Military Inteliigence
III.
General Situation
According to an Associated Press dispatch the South Korean National Assembly on 11 September passed a bill wohibiting standing votes on constitutional amendments. The bill, which was passed 89-0, also provided for the overriding of presidential vetoes by the Assembly and the confirmation of appointments of prime ministers by the president, (Use of the secret ballot would lessen the president's ability to pressure or punish opposition assemblymen, Passage of this bill, undoubtedly designed to block President Rhee's seven new constitutional amendments, is the clearest indication since the presidential elections that the legislature still contains a forceful and sizeable opposition.)
During Ambassador Mhcciots 7 SepteMber farewell call on the President, Rhea rehashed several themes. The first thing to be done, he said, was to curb inflation by providing the ROK with a sound currency. He again suggested a TB loan of $300,000,000, to be converted into bonds and left the DS as backing for a new currency issue. T M C. 1, A To 77p. SEORET c T rr; rp'?
..6r. Dcf;17

Navy - Aii
Political
There was no further action on the two hills near Tulsa in the ROK Capital Division sector in east central Korea on 11 SepteMber. Bunker Hill in western Korea was briefly probed by Chinese Communists but DS 1st Division Merinos success... fully repulsed the attack. Elsewhere along the front there were numerous enemy probes and patrol clashes with the enemy employing 28,335 rounds of artillery and mortar fire.
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Rhee again spoke of the determination of the ROK to press for complete liberation; he suggested that the ROK Army spearhead the attack, "maybe not all the way to the Yalu," with UN Forces in the rear as reserves. The President also expressed his intention to introduce the new series of constitutional amendments in the National Assembly. This is necessary, in his view, to prevent "traitorous groupe in the pay of Communists or the Japanese" from taking over the government.
Economic
UN naval air observers report that there is considerable repair activity (UN at a damaged power plant in the Hochon system in northeastern Korea. bombings of North Korean power plants have apparently had a continuing disruptive effect on what remains of the North Korean economy.)
At a meeting of the US-ROK Cotbined Economic Board, South Korean officials stated that this year's rice crop would net some 49,000,000 bushels as compared to the UN estimate of over 76,000,000. Because of the extreme difference in the forecasts, an immediate joint crop survey was decided upon to be completed the last week of September. Wanwhile, ROK officials are trying to increase rice purchases in Southeast Asia and the I.E.
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SECRET
During the month of August, the price of rice on the open market in South Korea reached an all-time high of 150,000 won per 20 liters. US officials cite persistent newspaper reports of droughts affecting this year's seemingly good rice crop and reports of shortages for September as having caused the recent increases.
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Central Intelligence Agenoy Office of Current Intelligenoe 9307, 13 September 1952

I.
Nalitary Operations
UN carrier-based aircraft flaw 241 combat sortieS against enemy power plants, industrial installations, and troop areas on both coasts. Surface vessels bombarded enemy transportation and industrial targets in the Rowena and Tandhon area in the east and near Cho Island in the west.
Aircraft Under Far East Air Force oontrol flew 855 sorties on 12 September, of which 523 were combat. Medium bombers were very active during the night as 28 B-29ts hit installations at the Suiho power plant in the Sino-Korean border. One B-29 was lost over the target and another .crashed in South Korea. Bomber crews reported intense and accurate antiaircraft fire and searchlights; four bombers reported sporadic attacks frms'enemy night fighters. Preliminary analysis of strike photos shows that the bombs were "short to on target." During the period, UN F-86ts observed 90'enemy SIG-151s; of which 20 were encountered. One NIG was downed and two reported damaged with DA UN losses.

Navy Air
A week of heavy fighting continued yesterday in the ROK Capital Division sector of the east central front. A task force from the ROK Cavalry Regiment attempted unsuooessfully for over two hours to force the enemy from "Finger Ridge," the hill nearest Yulsa. Just to the east, other South Korean ele-: meats repulsed an attack by a Chinese battalion on "Capital Hill" after almost four hours of fighting. The only other significant action along the front was in the west central sector held by the ROK 9th Division. Here a South Korean patrol was heavily engaged by a Chinese companyfor over an hour before the enemy withdrew. Both the ROKs and the Chinese used a heavy volume of artillery and mortar fire in the engagement.
No! 6.JUL
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A Chinese Communist soldier, oaptured on 11 September by US Marines near Panmunjom, reported that he was a member of tt4 Training DiVision, Northeast Military District. ( le it is possioas -I that &training division might be dePloyed in Korea for maximum utilization of training opportunities, it is more probable that the PM had only recently arrived on the lira and in Korea and did not know the tactical unit to which he belonged.)
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On 9 September., UN carrier-based aircraft observed and encountered 20 MIC-16's near Sok island off western Hwanghae province. In this southerInenetration, the enemy lost one MIG at the cost of a US Navy Corsair. (While the-pattern of enemy air operations this far south is erratic, the last month has seen a growing number of enemy interceptors south of Pyongyang.)
General Information
Radio Pyongyang on 10 September listed the North Korean delegates to the "Asian and Pacific Peace Conference," to be held in Peiping beginning 26 September. The Korean representatives will apparently be headed by Madame Pak Chong-ae. (Madame Pak, born and educated in the USSR, is a staunch and fairly influentialmember of the Soviet clique within the North Korean Government. She is secretary of the Korean labor Party and Chairman of the Korean Democratic Woments League.)

Air
Political
SECRET
UN aerial observers on 12 September observed two large tanks parked along the road near Punji, near the front in west central Korea. Other UN aircraft attaoked them with unreported results. Marge" enemy teaks have been sighted in the past in enemy rear areas, but no tanks 6ther than the familiar T-34 have been encountered. It is possible, however, that the ones sighted near Punji are JS-IIIs, believed to be organic in a Chinese armored regiment.)
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I.
Military Operations
Carrier-based aircraft on both the east and west coasts flew 317 sorties on 13 September and 301 sorties on the following day against enemy transportation and supply installations, a cement factory, and an unidentified enemy freighter. Surface vessels bombarded enemy troops and gun emplacements between Songjin and Wonsan on the Korean east coast and in the vicinity of Chodo and the Ongjin Peninsula on the west coast.
On 14 September 373 combat out of a total of 629 effective sorties were flown. A total of 96 MIG's was observed in the Yalu River area of which 41 were encountered. Two enemy aircraft were destroyed, two probably destroyed and two damaged. One UN Sabre was destroyed and another damaged during the encounters. There were 16 effective bomber sorties on the night of 14,15 September, 14 of which attacked a supply center at Sopo near Pyongyang.
Land-based aircraft under Far East Air Force control flew 813 sorties on 13 Septetber of which 491 were combat. Only eight enemy MIG's were observed airborne and two were mmountered, with no damage to either UN or enemy aircraft. Some 200 enemy jets were observed by F-86 pilots on Antung, Tatungkou and Takushan airfields. The 5 bomber sorties flown on the night of 13 SepteMber engaged in Photo reconnaissance and leaflet drop missions.
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SECRET
Action continued heavy over the weekend in the ROK Capital Division sector in east central Korea. The focus of fighting was "Finger Ridge" near Mina which the Chinese captured over a week ago, Early Sunday morning ROK elements succeeded in driving the enemy from the hill, only to be driven back themselves by a fierce Chinese counterattack later in the morning. The South Koreans attacked again before noon on Sunday, but were stopped just short of the crest. At 1100 hours the Chinese unleashed a heavy mortar and artillery barrage and at present hold the position. During Sunday's engagement, the Chinese used nearly 15,000 rounds of mortar and artillery fire. Elpewhere along the front there were minor enemy probes and patrol clashes.
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I/.
Military Intelligence No significant reports have been received during the past 48 hours.
III.
General Situation
Political
Radio Peiping on 14 September announced the conclusion of the work of the International Scientific'Commission far the Investigation of the Facts Concerning Bacterial Warfare in Korea and China The Commission "confirmed" that American armed forces have waged bacteriological warfare against Korea and China. Committee members included scientists from Sweden, France, Italy, the United Kingdom and Brazil, as well as from the USSR.
On 13 September Radio Peiping announced that the US Air Force from 26 August to 11 September flew a total of 740 sorties over Northeast China. The Chinese people are quoted as being "extremely indignant."
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Proraganda
American Charge Lightner reports that the Korean press and officials during the past week have engaged in an inspired campaign to convince the Korean people that (a) the flow of UN aid goods has been reduced, with a consequent acceleration of inflation; (b) the transfer of the librean problem to the UN and continuation of the truce negotiations are detrimental to Korean unification and the free world's stand against Communism; and (c) US-UN economic and military aid to South Korea is insufficient. (In line with this criticism, Assembly Vice Speaker Yun Chi-yong on 10 September blamed the US for the lose of China to the Communists, and expressed fear that the UNGA discussion might result in a similar error. He asserted that the CB should give more attention to Korea than Japan, and called for a five billion dollar loan, assistance in two million South Koreans., and inclusion of the ROK in a Pacific defense pact.
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Central'Intelligence Agency Office of Current Intelligence 9309, 16 Septetber 1952

I.
Military Operations
The tally on naval air sorties was incomplete with only 13 reported on 15 September. These planes attacked installations in the Chinnampo-Ongjin area on the west coast. Surfaoe units on the east coast bombarded targets in the Tanohon and Chaho areas and units on the west coast patrolled without any firing.
Land-based aircraft flew 587 combat sorties on 15 September out of a total of 896. In daylight raids, 223 fighter-bombers attacked targets in northwestern Korea including a major raid against installations near Sinuiju. During this raid 132 enemy MIG's were observed and 43 encountered in "MI0 Alley." UN planes destroyed 8 MIG's, probably destroyed 21 and damaged two others, with a loss of one UN Sabre. During the night 15 medium bomber missions were flown, 11 of which bombed a supply center in Pyongyang.
II
Analysis of enemy vehicle traffic for the week ending 11 September indicates that the Communists are continuing to pour supplies southward into the Haeju-Kaesong area in the west. One-third of the week's 9,609 vehicle sightings were on routes to this area. There was, however, an increase in vehicle activity in the central zone, probably exulained by the increased enemy ground action and the heavy artillery ammunition expenditures along the east central.front,

Ian
AAL
Enemy Rear Areas SECRET
The pace of action slowed markedly all along the front line in Korea on 15 September. Patrol contacts, generally of short duration, and small enemy probes in the sectors of the ROK 7th and 8th Divisions in the east constituted the day's fighting.
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III.
General Situation
Propaganda
On 14 SeptemberRadioPeiping in a home service broadcast alleged that the Chinese Communist soldier who deserted spectacularly by driving a truck through enemy lines at Panmunjom on 11 September was in fact, a UN espionage agent. The broadcast takes pains to point out that the 6 staged this demonstration to prove "their point for detaining our POW's" (The desertion of two North Korean at Panmunjom on 28 June was follawed soldiers by a nearly identical broadcast allegimg that the two deserters were UN agents. These broadcasts may indicate a hitherto suspected Communist sensitivity concerning unthe POW issue.)
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Central
Office
Intelligence
Agency
of Current Intelligence 9310, 17 September 1952

I.
Military Operations
4Emz
For the second straight day, the Korean battle front was relatively quiet. On 16 September an enemy probe of short duration in the US lot Marine Division sector in the west and minor probes in the ROK 3rd and 8th Division sectors and in the US 25th Division sector in the east constituted the heaviest action. Patrol clashes took place in most divisional sectors. The enemy used 4,800 rounds of artillery and mortar fire during the_report.period.
UN carrier-based planes flew 295 air sorties on both Korean coasts on 16 September against supply and mining installations including an ore processing plant. Surface vessels maintained the blockade and bombarded defense and tmansportation facilities between Chongjin and Chaho on the east coast and in the vicinity of Amgak, Chcdo and Haeju on the west coast.
On 16 September 903 effectivm sorties were flown by UN land-based aircraft of which 510 were combat. UN pilots observed 111 enemy MlOis and one type-15 in the Chongchon and Yalu River area and encountered 56 of the MIGis. A total nf four enemy aircraft were destroyed, 3 damaged, and 4 probably damaged with a loss of one UN Sabre. There were no bomber missions flown on 16 September,
II,
The Far East Command in a recent re-evaluation of Communist armored strength in Korea concludes that the enemy now has 450 tanks and 170 self-propelled guns. This rerresents an increase of 66 tanks and 36 SP guns aver yre VIOUB estimates. (The T-34 medium tank and the SU-76 light self-propelled gun comprise the bulk of armor believed availahle to Communist forces in Korea. Same captured US equipment, a few heavier but obsolescent Soviet taidcs, and some larger caliber self-propelled guns may also be rresent.)
THE C.I.A. HAS NO OBJECTION To THE DECLASSIFICATION OF THIS DOCUMENT.
NO.

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On 15 September, UN pilots observed an estimated 30 swept:.wing-aircraft taking off and landing on the Fengcheng east airfield while an additional 30 to 40 aircraft were yarked at the ends of the runway in an alert position.. The UN pilots comMented that after the enemy aircraft were airborne, it was impossible to see them as they appeared to be "excellently camouflaged."
General Information
Paitical

SECRET
Reaction in South Korean official circles to the Department 6f ptatels 14 September pamphlet on NATO is "anything but favorable," according to Clarence Ryee, ROK Office of Pnblic Information director. He delared that the pamphlet reveals that the US considers Asia only of secondary importance, and that the document is the latest in a series of "monstrous blunders" which the Department has made in Asia. He concluded that this "white paper" seemed designed to prove the Communist line that the US is not a dependable or consistent ally.
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Central Intelligence Agenoy Office of Current Intelligence 9311, 18 September 1952.

I.
Military Operations
LIM
The heaviest fighting along the front occurred in the east central sector where Chinese Communists attacked two ROK Capital Division companies on "Finger Ridge." For five hours in the early morning of 17 September the enemy attacked, and succeeded in securing some positions on the ridge. When the action subsided, however, the Rats had improved their fortifications. Elsewhere along the front, brief probes and .patrol clashes ensued.
A total of 398 naval air sorties wore flown on 17 September. On the east coast the aircraft attacked shore installations from Nanam to Hungnam while on, the west coast,the Chinnampaaaeju area was attacked. Surface units on the east coast maintained the blockade and bombarded targets in the Songjin, Tanchan and Wonsan areas While in the west, the coastline near Cho Island was the main target.
On 17 September, 1,033 effective sorties were flown by land-based aircraft of which 637 were combat. The UN pilots observed 72 enemy MIGIs and encountered 27 in the Yalu River area. One MIG was destroyed and another probably damaged, with no damage to UN aireraft. During the night 17 nedium bomber sorties were flown with 12 of the aircraft bombing a supply installation at Sopo, near the North Korean capital of Pyongyang.
II.
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The first meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the ROK forces was held on 10 September, according to US officials, who believe the aim of the ROK Army Chief of Staff is to get a Department The chairmanship of the Joint Chiefs of National Defense into actual operation. is scheduled to be rotated monthly between the three services with meetinas to be held at On hanannartnrn nf +hp nornn+4.egn
ang, A. HAS NO OBJECTION TO THE DECLASSIFICATION
THIS DOCUMc'NT.

Navy
ROKArmT
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General
Situation
Political
American Charge Lightner reports South Korean press Speculation that BOK forcer's are now able to hold the line without UN troops eo long aa arms, natal and air support are provided. This argument is reinforded iS outh Korea by the recent rumors of the BOK Capital DitisiOn in holding "Capitol Bill." (This appears-to be another manifestation of the recently-developed Smith Korean fear that decisions unfavorable to the Paean regime may be taken at the UNGA:- Part of this xenophobic anxiety has taken the form of demands for the buildup of the South Korean ArMY.)
Economic US officials in Korea report that the BOK Government has proposed to raise rice fram 150000 to 90,000 won per mal (16 lbs) in its sales to indigents. Considerable criticism from the press and National Assembly arose on the grounds that this would work an unnecessary hardship on these particular classes and that rations for government officials would continue at the old rate. The National Assembly on 10 SepteMber adopted a "compromise" price of 30,000 won per mal for all rationees, including government officials.
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I,
Military Operations
Amaz
The western front in Korea erupted during the night of 18.September. In the US 3rd Division sector north of Kangso-ari, two outposts late in the evening. Communications with Chinese companies attacked US the beleaguered unit were broken and a patrol was sent out to re-establish contact, but was forced back by heavy fire. At the same time all along the 3rd Division front, there was heavy artillery and mortar fire.
To the northeast, the Chinese launched another push to take "Old Baldy." An enemy battalion, supported by artillery, tortar and tank fire hand-to-hand combat and forced the closed to withdrawal of defending US 2n1 Division infantrymen from the left side of the hill. LB oounterattaCk this morning was meeting heavy resistance. Action continuedA. in both the US 2nd and 3rd Division sectors at the close of the report period.
In the east central sector, the Chinese again attempted to drive the ROC Capital Division from "Finger Ridge" near Tulsa. Two determined attacks company strength were launched during the in night of 18 Septembers but were repulsed by the South Koreans.
Sn
,Lil
Naval air sorties on 18 September totaled 294, Targets frcm Nanat to Yangdok on the east coast were attacked while on the west coast, aircraft from the British carrier Ocean strafed installations in the Chinnampo-Eaeju area, Surface units maintained the blockade and bombarded supply and troop installs. tions on both Korean coasts,
ALL'
landbased aircraft under Far East Air Force control flew 964 effective sorties on 18 September of which 591 were combat. In a daylight raid, bombers attacked a railroad bridge 24 light near Yangdok in central Korea. During the period, 32 MIG's were observed and 9 encountered in the Chongchon-Yalu River area, There was no damage to UN aircraft while one RIG was reportedly damaged. During the night, 16 effective medium bomber missions were flown; 12 of which botbed a supply center Just north of Pyongyang.
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Air
On 16 September UN pilots obserted two enemy aircraft taking off from Antung airfield which trailed white smoke siOilar to *MCP .- jet-assisted takeoff, The silver.Ooldred aircraft cliMbed rePidIy fres' 3,000 to 8,000 feet Far East Air Force OamMents that while the Communists are believed to hate developed JATO there has been no confirmation of its use in the Korean air War. It is con,cleded that the details of the above report are insufficient to confirm this sighting as JATO0
III,
General Situation.
Prot:agenda
The ES Embassy in Stockholm reports that in a press conference sponsored by the International Scientific Ccamthedxm4 most of the newspapermen -- some of them Communists -- were visibly or outspokenly critiaal of the Commission's "findings" concerning the DN's use of BW in the Korean war, The Embassy believes that the presentation of the "evidence" of germ warfare by the Swedish member of the Commission was a complete flop.
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DAILY KOREAN BULLETIN,

I.
Military Operations
On 19 September, UN carriers were engaged in replenishing. No air sorties were flown. Surface vessels maintained the blockade and bombarded enemy supply and defense positions in the vicinity of Wonsan on the Korean east coast. West coast naval vessels patrolled in the vicinity of Chodo and Haeju. Air
Land-based Sorties totaled 1,093 on 19 September, of which 704 were combat. There were no encounters with enemy MIG's during the period, but 50 enemy sweptSinmak southwing aircraft were observed on Tatungkou airfield in Manchuria. east of Pyongyanglwas attacked by 12 fighter-bombers. Far East Bomber Command mounted 38 effective sorties. These bomber missions were flown'in the late afternoon, the first daytime medium bomber raid in more than a year. Targets \L) in the Ramhung area were attacked by 35 of these bombers flying in formation.

Navy
On 19 September, heavy fighting on "Old Baldy" continued in the west central sector. Two Chinese Communist reinforced companies supported by two tanks, plus artillery and mortar, attacked elements of the US 2nd Division. The UN forces succeeded in holding their positions on the eastern and western slopes of the hill and the enemy was forced to withdraw. In the US lst Marine Division sector on the west coast, two Chinese companies supported by three tanks attacked friendly outposts. After a seven-hour fight, the enemy withdrew without gaining ground. Elements of the ROK Capital Division in the east central sector were again attacked on "Finger Ridge." The three-company attack against the South Koreans was repulsed. Elsewhere along the front, minor patrol clashes and probes were reported. The enemy employed 13,478 rounds of artillery and mortar during the 24-hour period.
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Military Intelligence Air During the week ending 15 September: a total of"555 enemy MIG's were observed bY UN pilots, of which 279 were encountered. MIG losses, for the second straight week, were "staggering" with 14 destroyed, 3 probably destroyed and 26 othere reportedly' damaged. In contrastto the previous week's generally evasive tactics, the enemy.piiot gave indications of increased willingness to encounter the UN Sabres and, in numerous inatanees, evidenced well-coordinated teamwork. For the first time in recent months, the enemy showed that he can penetrate the UN's Sabre screen and close with the fighter-bombers. In addition, the Communists concentrated on the fighter-bombers before boMbs-away in an obvious attempt to protect the.targets, whereas, in previous instances, the MIG's attacked as the bombers were pulling off the targets.
General Situation
American Charge Lightner reports the official confirmation of Hwang Hohyun, a minor official ot the Liberal Party, as Vice Home Minister and of Mun Pong-che, an extremist of unsavory reputation, as chief of the National Police. The Charge comments that Mtn's appointment to the key police job doei not bode welflor the future. Mtn has been a leader in various political action groups acCustomed to employing strong-arm methods. He has recently been the Liberal Party's Vice Chief Of the Politicel Section, and during the political crisis several months ago, he led an action group which terrorized nee's Opposition, especially Assemblymen. (There have been a few recent indications:1 of an impending struggle between Rhee and the Assembly. Rhee may be getting his "strong arm boys" into positions where they can exert maximum pressure on the opposition.)

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I.
Military Operations
On 21 September in the central sector, UN troope repulsed a Communist assault against "Finger Ridge" in a two-hour fight. Elsewhere along the front, minor probes and patrol clashes took place
UN carrier-based planes flew 391 sorties on 20 September against enemy transportation and supply installations. On 21 September 317 naval combat air sorties were flown against electric power, troop and supply targets by Task Force 77. Air targets for Korean west coast operations were not reported.
Blockade ships attacked shore batteries on 20 Septetber in tke vicinity of Songjin, Tanchon and Chaho on the east coast. The USS Cunningham received three hits from enemy air bursts, wounding eight personnel. West coast targets of naval surface vessels on 20 September were between Chinnampo and the Han River estuary. Incomplete reports for naval surface attacks in the vicinity of Wonsan and Tanchon attacks on 21 September included against enemy transportation facilities.
Land-based aircraft flew 835 effective sorties on 20 September and 828 on 21 September. The combat missions for the two days totaled 531 and 481 respectively. On 20 September, 20 enemy MIGIs were observed and 4 encountered in the Yalu River area. There was no damage to either UN or Communist aircraft. On the SECRET
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Heavy fighting along the front continued on 20 September. In the western sector Chinese Communists supported by heavy artillery and mortar fire plus three armored vehicles attacked a US 1st Marine Division outpost. The marines withdrew initially but later recaptured the outpost. FUrther to the east, elements of the US 3rd Division attacked'an undetertined number of Chinese Communists on a hill near Kowang: The enemy counterattacked and forced the UN troops to Withdraw. This fighting continued on 21 September with the UN forces withdrawing after heavy fighting. In the east central sectof Oa 20 September, the fight for "Old Baldy" ceased with both the UN and the Communists holding their positions. Both forces tried to gain additional ground but the action endod in a stalemate after nine and a half hours; no fUrther action ensued on 21 September.
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following day 133 MIG's and one Type-15 were Observed, also in "NIG Alley." The UN pilots encountered 80 of the MIG's and the Type-15, destroying five of the MIG's. An additional 13 MIG's were damaged while only one UN Sabre jet was damaged. On Saturday only five medium bomber sorties were flown and Ahese en, gaged in photo reconnaissance, leaflet drop and close support missions. On 21 September Far East Bomber Command mounted 18 sorties, with 12 of the aircraft attacking a supply installation in pyongyang.
II.
Military Intelligence No significant reports have been received during the past 48 hours
General Situation
Reuters, under a 21 September dateline, reports that South Korean police fear the recent outbreaks of rioting by wounded former servicemen may be Communist influenced. The latest disturbance was at a railway station north of Pusan on 20 Septembei when 350 veterans attempted to take a train to Taegu. Defense chiefs and ministers met to discuss the riots. Pusan correspondents claim that public opinion is urging the government to reshape its veterans relief program. (South Korea's negligible social service program for its wounded and disabled servicemen reflects its bare-subsistence-level financial structure. Apy veterans' demonstrations would reflect genuine misery whether Communist inspired or not.) The ROK Foreign Ministry has announced that the japanese Government's dispatch of a marine patrol to Korean waters "under the pretext of protecting, Japanese fishing boats" constitutes a threat to Korea and causes doubt of Japanese sincerity. He warned that the ROK will hold Japan fully responsible for 'all consequences of the invasion." (The ROK has recently seized several Japanese fishing vessels which were in international waters, but inside a unilaterally established South Korean line. The establishment of the fishing patrol is to cause incidents.) likely
A US Navy reconnaissance flight on 18 September showed that there activity at any of the four plants was no of the North Korean Kyosen hydroelectric system, north of the east coast city of ( The prewar capacity of these four plants, which supplied both North Hungnam. and South Hamgyong provinces wit4 power, was 335,000 kilowatts. In June1 had installed new equipment whicn 'the USSR nen mace tne Ayosen system more effective than it was prior to the beginning of hostilities.)

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Military Operations
UN naval aircraft flew 80 sorties on 22 September witil the total tally incomplete. Air targets, primarily transportation facilities, on the Korean west coast were in the vicinity of Hanchon and Haeju. No report was received regarding east coast air activity of Task Force 77. SurfaCe vessels bombarded enemy troop and supply installations between Chongjin and Wonsan on the Korean east coast and in the vicinity of Cho Island on the west coast.
On 22 September, land-based aircraft flew 825 effective sorties of which 486 were combat. In a daylight raid 208 fighter-bombers attacked supply and troop installations near the enemy front line in the east and east central zones. During the report period, UN fighter pilots observed 19 MIG's and encountered 9 in the Chongchon-Yalu River area. In the encounters five 11I01s were damaged with no damage to friendly aircraft. During the night, Far East Bomber Command mounted 14 effective sorties. A supply area in Sopo, near Pyongyang, was bombed hy 10 of the aircraft.
Military Intelligence Air

On three occasions UN pilots have observed anF-84 Thunderjet which the Communists apparently have recovered and made operational. The first two sightings occurred on 18 and 19 September near the front line in the US I Corps
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The heaviest fighting along the front on 22 September eastern sector where North Koreans attacked outpost positions occurred in the of the ROK 8th Division at Hill 812. The enemy company withdrew after a seven-hour fight. Later in the day, the North Koreans, reinforced to battalion strength, again attacked and temporarily secured the objective. ROK companies counterattacked and ejected the enemy early in the evening. A total of 7,900 rounds of artillery and mortar fire fell during these encounters. Elsewhere along the front the action was characterized by patrol and probing action.
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sector. The third observation took place on 20 September in "NIG Alley." In two of the three observations, the UN pilots stated the plane had the standard US Air Force star insignia on the fuselage and wings. The Directorate of Intelligence, Far East Air Force, comments that a sufficient number of 7-841s have been lost in enemy territory to enable the Communists to recover and make operational this type of aircraft. (This is the first report of the enemy using an 7-84. There have been a number of previous occasions when hostile 7-801s were reported.)
III.
General Situation
Political
The South Korean Office of Public Information announced on 19 September that a delegation representing pro-Rhee Koreans in Japan had arrived in Pusan to discuss several "problems" with the ROK Government. The delegation submitted a petition which, inter alia, sought permission for the representatives of these Koreans to attend the now suspended Korean-Japanese talks, the granting of loans by the Bank of Korea to Koreans in Japan, and the improvement of relations between the Korean diplomatic mission in Japan and the residents there. (This right-wing group controls less than 30 percent of the 800,000 Koreans in Japan, who are predominantly North Korean sympathizers.)
'
Pronaganda
A 21 September Peiping broadcast stated that the "International Scientific Committee" presented "incontrovertible evidence" that the UN has engaged in bacteriological warfare in Korea. The harangue said the US "had the nerve" to repeat its call for an impartial investigation even after the findings of this unbiased group. (Newsmen, including leftists, indicated that a recent Committee press conference, held in Stockholm to present proof of the BW allegations, was a complete flop.)
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DAILY tOltIAN BULLETIN

I.
Military Operations
Amez
On 23 September heavy fighting occurred in both the eastern and western sectors. On the east coast, two North Korean battalions attacked elements of the 5th KM Division on two different bills in the area. The enemy employed 2,500 rounds of artillery and mortar fire and 200 to 300 rounds of counterbattery fire in support of the attack. The Communists occupied the south side of one bill but ROK troops were in complete possession of the other objective when the fighting ceased. In the 3rd US Division sector, Chinese Communists again tried to obtain an outpost position with sporadic attacks accompanied by local mope, geode broadcasts. The action continued at the end of the report period with the Chinese Communists still attempting to capture the outpost. Elsewhere along the front minor probea and patrol actions ensued.
UR carrier-based planes on the Korean west coast flew 89 sorties on 23 Septedber with the total tally of flights incomplete as reports from Task Force 77 on the eaet coast have not been received. A delayed tally on east coast naval air operations for 22 September included 285 sorties against enemy transportation installations, two foundries and one transformer station located between Hoeryong and Wonsan. Surface vessels on the 23rd maintained the blockade.
On 23 September land-based aircraft under Far East Air Force control flew 615 effective sorties of which 283 were combat. There were no enemy planes observed ow encountered during the period. During the night 15 boiler missions were flown, of which 11 attacked a supply area near Hungnam. Military Intelligence
Vehicle traffic analysis for the week ending 18 September showed increased activity on all main North Korean supply routes with that on the eastern gyongyangHaeju-Kaesong routes comprising, as in the previous week, approximately one-third

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of the observed traffic. On the west coast, sightings increased threefold with most activity centering around Wonsan. Rolling stock sightings totaled 4,074, continuing the gradual decline noted since mid-June when 7,096 rail cars were sighted. This decrease is attributed, in part, to the UNis effective use of butterfly bombs during the past several months. (This over-all increased activity can be.explained as enemy efforts to re-supply forward areas now that the rainy season is practically over.) The tremendous expenditure of artillery and mortar ammunition during the past few weeks probably has required largescale replenishment.
III.
General Situation
Political
Tokyo Central News reportafrom Pusan that a news dispatch alleging a secret conference in that city between Premier Chang Taik..sang and the former Japanese mayor of Seoul has developed into a major political scandal with wide repercussions. (This is the first report of the alleged meeting.)
Premier Chang commented on 23 September over Radio Pusan, relative to the recent deMonstrations by wounded servicemen, that the Ministries of National Defense, Social Affairs, Health and other authorities are drawing up concrete .msasures for wounded servicemen.
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Tokyp Central News, under a 24 SepteMber Seoul dateline, reports that some 6,000 residents of the South Korean capital demonstrated against the Japanese for alleged violation of the "MacArthur Line defining the fishing areas off the Korean coast. This is reported as the first anti-Japanese demon.. stration of its kind since 1945. Similar mass meetings were also scheduled for the 24th in Pusan and Taegu. (Last January Rhee unilaterally proclaimed a line, similar to the former "MacArthur Line" and far outside of Korean territorial waters, which established a boundary for Japanese fishing operations. A recent Japanese decision to operate an unarmed fishing patrol on the Korean side of the "Rhee Line" has irritated the South Korean Government and is the cause of these organized demonstrations.)
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I.
Military Operations
Anz
Heavy fighting continued in the west central sector where Chinese Communists attacked elements of the US 3rd Division at "Kelly Hill." The enemy, supported by heavy artillery and mortar fire, forced the UN trooys to withdraw after a six-hour engagement. Fighting slacked off in the western and eastern sectors of the front with only minor probes and patrol actions reported.
Planes from UN carriers flew 148 combat sorties on 24 September against enemy troop and supply installations located between Yangdok and Pukchon on the Korean east coast and in the vicinity of Changsan-Got, Cho Island and Sariwon on the west coast. Surface vessels maintained the blockade and bombarded two gun positions in the Changsan-Got area.
UN land-based aircraft flew 404 effective sorties on 24 September including 154 combat. The majority of these fighter and fighter-bomber sorties attacked No supply and troop installations along the front and in the immediate rear. enemy aircraft were observed or encountered during the report period. A total of 17 bomber missions was: flown on the night of 24 to 25 SepteMber, 12 of the aircraft attacking a marshaling yard at Sinmak in central Korea.
No significant
General Situation
Radio pyongyang on 22 SepteMber gave its version of the recent outbreaks of wounded former ROK soldiers in South Korea on 20 and 21 SepteMber. The Communists were quick to capitalize on these disturbances which they termed "rebellions," inspired by the "plundering of the American aggressors . . and . . . the pressure of military defeat." SECRET

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have been received during the past 24 hours.
Propaganda
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Radio Peiping on 24 September again repeated its charges about the UN's "provocative action" in releasing 11,000 "civilians." Repeating Nam Ills letter to General Harrison, the broadcast included the warning that thaN should end this "unlawful action" or bear "the responsibility for all the serious (The ominous note on which Nam Ilts text ended is consequences that may arise." nearly identical to previous warnings delivered during the course of the negotiations.)

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Centrentelligence Agency
9318, 26September 1952

I.
Military Operations
Only 41 naval air sorties were operations. There were no flights on the area from Chinnampo to Ongjin was installations at Songjin, Tanchon and Bwanghae Province in the west.
Adverse weather also limited landbased air operations as only 240 effective sorties were flown on 25 September. No enemy aircraft were observed or encountered during;the 52 oombat sorties. Far East Bomber Command flew 13 effective sorties, 9 of the aircraft attacking a supply area near 1:yongyang.
III
NO significant reppreeilhaveubeentmei7014P*0410t 24 hours.
III,
In a statement issued before leaving for the United States, S.M. Vinoc4nr, one of President Rime's unofficial American advisers, claimed that the UF shotild adopt a more decisive policy in Korea. Vinocour stated that the "shining record ofthe UNfighting forces mgy be corroded away by the slow acid of indecision," and that the Panmunjom negotiations are at. "nightmarish treadmill." thee has
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neril Situation. Political
Action along the front on 25 September patrol engagements and probes reported. Only mortar fire were expended by the enemy in the The most significant action took place in the repulsed five separate North Korean probes.
flown as inclement weather haagpered the east coast while on the vest coast bombed. UN surface units blasted shore Wonsan in the east and targets in western
SE3REr
vas light, with only scattered 1,652 rounds of artillery and comparatively quiet 24 hours. eastern sector where UN troops
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consistently surrounded himself with American advisers who aid aad abet his chauvinistic policy. Statements issued by these advisers are usually as opinionated and biased as those of Rhee. Vinocour has been assigned to repre sent ROK interests at the UM General Assembly.)
The American Embassy has noted that the Koreans' everpresent fear of a remilitarized Japan was increased this past week by a statement credited to' Ambassador Nnryby in Tokyo that if japan wished to rearm, the U3 would help. In addition some Japanese candidates hava been advocating rearmament. Several Korean editorials have warned America to "remedber Pearl Harbar."
Charge Lightner reporta that the possibility of a and Korea ims been greatly reduced following CI3OLINC's establishing a military restricted zone off the Korean vessels will be barred from this sone, which does not, from shore as the "Rhee line." dispute between Japan 23 September action coast. Japanese fishing however, extend es far

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Central Intelligence Agency Office of Current Intelligence 93190 27 September 1952

I.
Military Operations
Army
Scattered patrol engagements and probes were the only action reported across the front on 26 September. The US 45th Division relieved the ROK Sth Division on the line in the eastern sector and was subjected to a total of 14 brief, unsuccessful enemy probes. The Chinese Communists and North Koreans employed 4,756 rounds of artillery and mortar during the 24-hour period.
No report was received regarding naval air operations for 26 September. Inclement weather conditions of the previous day had cleared. Blockade ships destroyed 30 sampans and one factory, and shelled troop and supply areas in the vicinity of Odaejin, Sonjin, Tanchon, Sincbang and Mayangdo on the Korean east coast and in the Chodo area in the west.
Far East Air Force mounted 911 effective sorties of which 533 were combat. These fighter and fighter-bomber pilots observed a total of 134 enemy 14I0-15's and encountered 41. The UN aircraft destroyed 4 1410's, and damaged 7. One UN Sabre received minor damage during the encounters. Far East Bomber Command flew 14 effective sorties during the night, 10 of the bombers attacking a supply area in the town of Pachunjang, just south of Hungnam.
The Chinese Communist Forces in Kbrea are at present capable of replacing front-line casualties within seven days, according to Far East Command. Because of this, each Chinese army on the front is now assessed at a strength of 341000 men, while those currently out of contact are carried at a strength of 36,000 each.
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Central Intelligence Agenoy Office of Current Intelligence 9320, 29 September 1952

I.
lelitary Operations
Arm
On Saturday, 27 September, heavy fighting occurred in the west central sector where two Chinese Communist platoons attacked elements of the US 2nd Division. The Communists withdrew after two assaults in which they suffered heavy casualties. In the eastern sector, North Koreans continued to probe outposts of the US 45th Division. On 28 September, a Greek platoon attached to the U5-3rd-Division seized a Chinese Columnist outpost position in the western sector, but after four successive enemy counterattacks, they were forced to withdraw. Farther to the east, the Chinese attempted to secure positions on Capital Hill from ROK troops. The enemy was supported hy an undetermined number of tanks in this engagement which later developed into a hand-grenade fight. The enemy was dispersed but continued to remain in the area,
Carrier-based aircraft flew 182 sorties on 27 September with the total tally incomplete. The area from Tanchon to Wonsan was attacked on the east coast while no report was received concerning air operations on the west coast. Surface unite maintained the blockade and bombarded shore installations along both the east and west coasts. Transmission of Navy results for 28 September have been delayed.
Lan&based aircraft flew 989 effective sorties on 27 September of which 607 were combat. During these operations, 24 enemy BMWs were observed and 5 encountered. Two HMIs were damaged while UN planes went unscathed. During the evening UN pilots observed 37 swept-wing aircraft on Tatungkou and Antung airfields. On the night of 27-28 SepteMber, 15 effective bomber missions were flown. Transmission of Air results for 28 September have been delayed.
II,
No significant reports have been received during the past 48 hours. .110
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III.
General Situation
Ceasefire
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'the North Korean Government in late August was considering a proposal calling for a threemonth temporary truce in which the UN and economist to "study the POW issue and submit ceasefire delegations would hold_confarences new recommendations." North Koreans feel that if ouch Ithe action were'taken the UN would make changes in the prisoner issue enabling some minor the Communists to conclude a "facesaving" peace, (There is no firm evidence of the North Korea Government's attitude toward the truce; in any event, its role in deteruining Cominunist policy is a minor one). probably
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Military Operations
Amez
On 29 September heavy fighting occurred on the central front in the ROK II Corps area where Chinese Communists with supporting tank fire attacked outposts of the 6th ROK Division. Early on 30,September the engagement developed into hand-to-hand fighting. Further to the east, two enemy platoons attacked Finger Ridge. ROK Capital Division troops counterattacked and forced the Chinese to withdraw. In the same sector, the Chinese Communistlwithdrew completely from the Capital Hill area by early morning. The 3rd ROK Division was also subjected to enemy attacks and was initially forced from outpost positions. The battle continued at the close of the report period although the ROK troops had reoccupied their positions. A total of 30,260 rounds of artillery and mortar fire was expended by the enemy in the 3rd ROK Division sector.
UN carrier-based planes of Task Force 77 on sorties on 29 September egainst enemy supply and ports of air activities on the Korean west coast bombarded enemy troop areas and gun positions at Haeju in the west.
On 29 September 1,007 effective sorties were flown by land-based UN aircraft of which 624 were combat. During these sorties 102 enemy MIG's were observed and 46 Were encountered in the Yalu River area. UN F-866s.destroyed two mime, and probably damaged three. One UN Sabre received minor damage in the encounters. Only two medium bomber sorties were flown, engaging in leaflet and reconnaissance missions.
Enemy Rear Areas
Despite concentrated air attacks, enemy transportation facilities in Korea are now at a high level of efficiency, according.to a Far East Air Force analyThe major improvement in transportation has been in the shorter "turnsis. around time." The enemy is now considered capable of stockpiling materiel adjacent to the front, quickly replacing depleted supp117,[17:::::::::grogfill reserve transportation to meet emergencies.

411X
the Korean east coast flew 188 transportation facilities. Rewere delayed. Surface vessels Wonsan in the east and at
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North Korean "Kaesong "Kaesong Guard Unit" Unit" moves toward toward east: e a s t : The The commander of the t h e North Korean Ko r e a n 82nd 82nd Regiment reported r e p o r t e d on on 28 28 June June that u n i t had arrived a r r i v e d northwest northwest of of Chorwon Chorwon by b y early early t h a t his h i s medical unit balance morning of of 27 27 June. June. The b a l a n c e of the t h e message indicated i n d i c a t e d that that morning the entire Regiment, formerly special t he e n t i r e 82nd Regiment, f o r m e r l y on s p e c i a l guard duty d u t y at at Kaesong, was Kaesong, w a s moving toward toward the t h e eastern e a s t e r n sector, s e c t o r , possibly p o s s i b l y to to of the r rejoin e j o i n its i t s parent p a r e n t 8th 8 t h Division. D i v i s i o n . One battalion b a t t a l i o n of t h e 82nd may have remained RSM remained in i n Kaesong. Kaesong. (CANOE 15th 15th R S M Det D e t 151 151 Korea, Korea, 15RSM/15508, 29 June 15RSM/15508, June 52) 52) Comment: The implications i m p l i c a t i o n s of this t h i s move are are not n o t immediimmedia t e l y apparent. a p p a r e n t . The 82nd Regiment Regiment was in i n a special s p e c i a l category category ately i n t h e North o f its i t s assignment in I n Xaesong. .'<aesong. in the North Korean Army because of of some some special s p e c i a l North North Korean Korean non-. non-. With the t h e possible p o s s i b l e exception e x c e p t i o n of u n i t s in i n the t h e Kaesong area, area, this t h i s entire e n t i r e sector sector is is now now combat units occupied o c c u p i e d by the t h e Chinese Chinese 65th 6 5 t h Army Army and and its its command command post p o s t in in Ktiesong Kaesong.

.
9. 9.
P r e s e n c e of North North Korean Korean armored armored battalions b a t t a l i o n s on on east east coast coast Presence suggested: unknown Korth North Korean Korean unit, u n i t , using using a a system system An unknown prev ous y identified identified w i t h armored armored u nits i n w e s t e r n Korea, otipreviously with units in western Korea, n notiu n i t tentatively t e n t a t i v e l y identified i d e n t i f i e d as the t h e 7th 7 t h Division D i v i s i o n in i n the the f i e d a unit fied Wonsan area a r e a on on 24 24 June June that t h a t "the " t h e stamps stamps of of all a l l Wonsan Wonsan and and Wonsan Hamhung b a t t a l i s n s should s h o u l d be be sent s e n t back back at a t once." once." (CANOE 15th, 15th Hamhung battalions D e t 151 151 Korea, Korea, 15RSM/15218, 15RSM/15218, 25 25 June June 52) 52) RSM Det
=w:
I
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X t is is possible pOf38iblf3 that t h a t all a l l messages messages in i n this t h i s system' system Comment: It r e l a t e to t o an Armored Command Command of of the t h e North Korean Headquarters. Headquarters. relate
I f t a n k and s e l f - p r o p e l l e d artillery artillery b a t t a l i o n s are the the If tank self-propelled battalions s u b j e c t of o f this t h i s message, message, they t h e y are are probably p r o b a b l y subordinate s u b o r d i n a t e to t o the the subject North A r t i l l e r y Brigades B r i g a d e s in in North Korean 24th 2 4 t h and and 25th 2 5 t h Mechanized Mechanized Artillery eastern e a s t e r n Korea. Korea.
10. 10.
Chinese MIG's MIGesmore more aggressive a g g r e s s i v e over over,Korea: According to to Chinese Korea: Chinese Chinese voice v o i c e traffic t r a f f i c passed p?Rsed on o n the t h e ground-controlled g r o u n d - c o n t r o l l e d intercept intercept (GCI) n e t at a t Antung from 21 to t o 23 June, June, Chinese fighters f i g h t e r s were were (GCI) net b e i n g directed d i r e c t e d to t o attack a t t a c k UN UN planes. planes. being The Air A i r Force F o r c e comments that t h a t Chinese Chinese aircraft a i r c r a f t have have and avoided avoided attem,pted few interceptions i n t e r c e p t i o n s since early March, and attempted combat engagements engagements during d u r i n g April. A p r i l . (CANOE Air Air Force Roundup Roundup 126, 30 30 June June 52) 52)
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Most of of the t h e MIG's MIG's encountered e n c o u n t e r e d by UN planes p l a n e s over over Comment: Most Korea Korea have been 6een piloted p i l o t e d by by Russians. R u s s i a n s . However, However, Chinese Chinese jets jets have been flying missions over f l y i n g patrol p a t r o l and occasional o c c a s i o n a l combat m issions o ver aggressivei n c r e a s e in i n .Chinese Chinese a ggressivesince September September 1951. 1951. The increase Korea since ness n e s s coincides coincides with w i t h recent r e c e n t evidence e v i d e n c e that t h a t an a n additional a d d i t i o n a l Chinese Chinese t o t a l of of jet J e t division d i v i s i o n (the ( t h e 4th) 4 t h ) is is flying f l y i n g cohbat combat missions. m i s s i o n s . A total five Chinese divisionswith five C hinese d i v i s i o n q w i t h about a b o u t 250 250 jets, j e t s , are are now believed believed assigned to to operations.over operations over Korea. Korea.
11. 11.
I'
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of 52nd Regiment p planes is the t h e first f i r s t report r e p o r t of lanes Comment: T h i s is Comment: This combat. F l i g h t s by by elements e l e m e n t s of of 18th 1 8 t h Division D i v i s i o n jets j e t s in in in coMBit7--Vlights Manchuria been reported r e p o r t e d for f o r over over a a month. month. This T h i s message Manchuria have have been suggests s u g g e s t s that t h a t almost the t h e entire e n t i r e 52nd Regiment has been transferred transferred Canton to t o Takushan Takushan for for combat combat duty. duty. from Canton
Jets of Chinese 18th Division definitely Manchuria: A 18th D ivision d o f i n i t e l y in Manchuria: C h i n e s e Communist message on 29 29 June June scheduled s c h e d u l e d 18 18 MIG -13's of of Chinese MiG-15's the t h e 18th 1 8 t h Division's 52nd 52nd Regiment on a round-robin round-robin flight f l i g h t from Security Takushan o v e r Korea. Korea. (CANOE 6920 S e c u r i t y Group Johnson AB Takushan over Japan J a p a n AP-254, AP-254, 29 29 June June 52) 52)
TOP SECIIET CANOE
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6. 6 .
North Korean Korean units units feel feel loss loss of of electric electric power: power: on 27-war30 rwair1 7I on 27 and 30 June,
Messages Messages
the UN's ' give g i v e an indication indication of the extent to which th e UN' s bombing plants in has affected enemy of hydroelectric hydroelectric plants in North Korea ha8 units. units.

7. 7.
'
Comment: It is probable that the reference Comment: reference to to the the transpowerFRUFFing on 20 p owerning on 20July Julyrefers refersto to the the repair repair of of transstations and a reallocation sf of power power lines to utilize former stations electricity electricity derived derived from from undamaged undamaged plants. plants.
Chinese North Korean Korean west coast coast brigade relieves relieves Chinese regiment: message, %he Ihe commander commander of the North re i m h t : In In t i 27 June une message, kOrean 23rd Brigade ordered one &Srd Bria:d7eJordered one of of his his battalions battalions to to '7closely coordinate" its movements with ,"closely coordinate" i t s movements with those those of the the 564th 664th Regiment, 188th D Division i v i s i o n of the Chinese 63rd 63rd Army. This This Regiment, 184th Chinese regiment, apparently occupying Chinese regiment, occupying the North Korean coastline in of Kaesong, is west o f ' Kaesong, is to be ' coastline in the Yonan Yonan area, area, west replaced by elements (CANOE 35th 15th RSM t h e 23rd 23rd Brigade. Brigade. (CANOE Feplaced elements of of the Korea, Korea, 15RSM/15391, 15RSM/15391, 28 28 June June 52) 5 2 )
'
Comment: Comment: Elements Elements of the the 23rd 23rd Brigade Brigade further further west west and north of n m this this area area are are apparently ap.parenClybeing being relieved relieved by by the the Chinese Chinese 42nd 42nd Army. Army.
8. a.
New New North North Korean Korean unit unit moving-into moving into the the Kaesong Kaesong area: area: An unidentified unidentified North Korean Ksrean unit reported reported on on 25 5 June June that that "we. .arrived on d3 23 June at the Kunachon Kumchon area and are arealand are "we. resting resting now. now. The The assistant assistant military division division commander commander will, will leave on the the evening evening of Qf the the 24th. 24th. We We will will leave for for Kaesong Kaesong on arrive arrive at at the the destination destination on on a 3 Judy, July, but Supreme Supreme Headquarters Headquarters stid ." we should should arrive arrive there there by by 29 29 June. June. '' (CANOE (CANOE 15th 15th said we RSM RSM Det .Det151 151 Korea, Korea, 15RSM/15401, 15RSM/15401, 28 28 June June 52) 52j
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"as of the The earlier one noted that ' ' a s a consequence of bombing of in Hamgyong-pukto Hamgyong-pukto (Province) (Province) bornbang of the the power station station in construction can the oonstruction can not be done." done." The later message stated stated transmitting messages messages from that there was no power for transmitting Hamhung further Hamhung further up up the east coastcoast- and concluded concluded with the the statement that statement that there there will be "no "no power until 20 July." July." (CANOE USM-35, USM-35, Korea ALT-800, 29 (CdNOE 2 9 June; June; 5u1st 5ulst Comm COU Recon Recon Grp Grp Korea, 15RSM/15622, 1 July July 52) 5 2 ) Korea, 15RSM/15622, 1
3 July July 52 52 3
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Comment: The North Korean 82nd Regiment, long long the the KaesolirGE0d.Force, Kaesong Guar'd Force, began began moving moving to to the the east to rejoin its parent division in in late late June. June.
This still still unidentified North Korean unit unit is i s apparapparently to replace the the 82nd 82nd Regiment.
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3 July 1952
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OCI No. 6433

Copy No.
276

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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESpIONAGE LAWS TITLE 18, USC, SECS. 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMISSION oR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
41
SOVIET UNION
1.
According to the broadcast a huge dam and a deep navigable sluice have been built at the construction site. Building operations were reported to have continued without interruption even during the severe Siberian frosts when temperatures sometimes sank to 40 degrees centigrade.
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Comment: Construction on this project, one of several to utilize the waters of the Irtysh, began in 1939 and continued slowly throughout World War II. When placed in operation, it will supply the industrial enterprises and the mines of East Kazakhstan, which reportedly include zinc, tin, wolfram, molybdenum and gold.
2.
25X1 25X1
Joint Polish-Soviet maneuvers reported in Baltic coastal area: ron 28 June that o sh troops under BITITER-41177r1M117571 Defense Rokossovski and Soviet troops held joint division level maneuvers from 10 to 23 June in an area south and eastWard of Kolobrzeg on the Baltic coast. Approximately 100 MIG-16's supported the maneuver, which is reported to have been a repeat of the Soviet Army's 1945 campaign against the Germans from Warsaw-to Kolobrzeg.
1
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EASTERN EUROPE
New Soviet hydroelectric station reported almost completed: A TASS broadcast to North America on 30 June an113711E0 the approaching completion of a new and powerful hydroelectric station in the eastern part of the Kazakh Republic on the Siberian river Irtysh.
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Comment: Polish troops have been on field training for the past month. Imay,have seen Soviet advisers with these troops, which le'd him to believe that joint maneuvers were being held. There have been no known Polish maneuvers held above regimental level.
Unconfirmed reports from recent residents of Poland state that during May there was considerable military activity along the Polish Baltic coastal area from Stettin to Gdynia.
3.
The Rumanians are said to have always hated the invader from the East. They strongly resent the better life led by Soviet occupation forces, while the Russians lose no opportunity to show their contempt for the Rumanians. Perhaps in the not-too-distant future, concludes the broadcast, the Rumanians will unreservedly show their real feelings toward those who have robbed them of their independence.
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Russian troops allegedly clash with Rumanian frontier The Athens radio reports a bloody clash at Timisoara in western Rumania where drunken Russian soldiers fired on members of a Rumanian frontier guard regime-It, killing two and wounding several others.
guards:
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Comment: Although this particular report has not been confirmed, it is typical of many such reports and is supported by the fact that a Soviet mechanized division is stationed near Timisoara. There is no organized resistance movement in Rumania, however, which is capable of leading a move to "show the Rumanians' real feeling" toward Soviet occupation forces.
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4.
Tokyo Embassy reports growing rift in Liberal Party: Minister Yoshida has been Prime appoint Kanji Fukunaga as temporarily blocked-in his efforts to Secretary General of the Liberal Party, according to the American longed session on 1 July marked Embassy in Tokyo. In a proby general disorders and fist-fights, a Liberal Party caucus was forced out a decision. to recess withThe Embassy views the Prime Minister's inability to secure immediate approval of Fukunaga's nomination tion of the growing rift within the party between as a reflecand Hatoyama factions, and the Yoshida a lessening of Yoshida's over the party. 1 control
25X1
5.
Japanese request repatriation of Bonin Islanders: Minister Okazaki has raised with Ambassador Murphy the Foreign of eventual repatriation of question of the Bonin Islands who approximately 7,000 ex-residents were evacuated in Japan proper. He stated that it is in 1944 and are now to understand American hard for the Japanese in view of the previous resistance to this move, especially return of 135 Bonin residents Japanese blood and nationality of but descendants of American and European settlers.
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Ambassador Murphy reports that refusal to permit patriation is giving rise recrimination, territorial to charges in Japan of racial distarian action on the part aggrandizement and general unhnma of the United States,
group of Eurasians, in thi-Mias, formerly resident repatriated in 1946. The Japanese Office has been was urging
islands.
Comment: Hatoyama, who Liberal Party on to Yoshida passed the presidency of the when he was purged in been increasingly 1946, has critical of Yoshida's for control appears policies. A struggle to be developing, reach the point of which, if permitted to actual split, could the party's success an in the coming general seriously affect elections.
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Comment:
A small
Foreign reportedly are in dire the repatriation of the remainder, who financial straits but are capable of self-support in their native
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New North Korean coastal set-up reported: The North Korean Army on 1 June designated the IV Corps as the "West Coast Special Task Force" and the V Corps as the "East Coast Special Task Force,'
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Both corps are reported to be completely mobile and, while charged primarily with a defensive mission, are capable of "supporting offensive action." The IV Corps aggregates three infantry, one armored, and one mechanized division, in addition to a mechanized artillery brigade. The V Corps comprises three infantry divisions. one mechanized division, and two artillery brigades.
If this new organization is correct, presumably the North Korean VII Corps in the Wonsan area is now available for combat duty.
7.
25X1
Communist plans for economic rehabilitation of North Korea reported: A "Korean Rehabilitation Conference" reportedly took place in a town north of Pyongyang between 14 and 16 May, It was aLLencea oy tnree Chinese Eoreign Ministry officiari several North Korean Foreign Affairs officers and two Soviet representatives.
The North Korean Government attempted to place the POW issue on the agenda in the light of the acute manpower shortage in North Korea, but it was rebuffed in this effort. 25X1A 25X1A
Comment: It is probable that such planning conferences as thig-Mil taken place in the Communist Orbit in relation to the problem of rehabilitatingRorea.
The conference allegedly resulted in the formation of the "Democratic Nations Aid-Korea Rehabilitation Council" which was to be jointly administered by the USSR and Communist China and would be authorized to arrange for needed materials from Eastern Europe to North shipments of Korea.
This particular conference and its results cannot be confirmed. SECRET

4
Comment: The current deployment of these corps suggests a misiaTinach as described in this report, although not be completely confirmed. Organizationally, the this canreport credits the IV Corps with one too many infantry divisions and the V Corps with a mechanized division whose existence also cannot be confirmed.
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Chinese Nationalist guerrillas raid Communist-held island: F1,000 Nationalist guerrillas rrom the Tacnen islanas stagea a day-long raid on a Communist-held island near the Fukien coast on 10 June. The guerrillas reportedly killed 200 Communists, took 10 25X1 prisoners. and captured large quantities of equipment.
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Comment: This type of raid has often been reported in the al-UrThe Nationalists have recently stated that they have reinforced these islands with two regular regiments in order to release the guerrillas there for such operations more frequently.

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9.
East German paramilitary demonstration reportedly scheduled for 11 July: Units of all East German paramilitary organizations, with tin) latest equipment including tanks, are reportedly scheduled to march in East Berlin on 11 July, the last day of the Socialist Unity Party conference. Representatives of the party and contingents of the East German Youth organization will also participate in the parade. Meanwhile, documents of doubtful reliability have disclosed Communist plans for President Pieck, in an address to the party convention, to announce regulations for the conscription of all males between 18 and 45. Registration is to be started immediately, and the age limit extended to 59 if a state of emergenc- is proclaimed.' 125X1
Comment: 1previously reported that a law settiii-W-The East German armed forces would be announced on 10 or 11 July at the party congress. The report stated that some 12,000 infantrymen would then parade at the Marx-Engels Platz in
1
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Berlin.
10.
Soviet jets conduct target practice in Berlin air corridor: Two Soviet MIG-l5's were observed on 1 July making gunnery passes at a target towed by a single-engined Soviet plane, well within the southern air corridor to Berlin, approximately 50 miles southwest of the city. As four-power agreements specifically prohibit the towing of objects by aircraft within the corridors, American authorities in Berlin are protesting the incident. 25X1
11.
French-Saar relations seen as "very tense": The American Consul in Strasbourg reports that relations between the French and Saar governments are "very tense" as a result of the Saar cabinet's recent refusal, contrary to French Foreign Minister Schuman's wishes, to authorize Saar branches of the German Social Democratic Party and the Christian Democratic Union. Although the application of these parties for legal standing in the Saar must be acted upon by mid-July, neither the French nor the Saarlanders Annpnr tn now how to break the deadlock.
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Comment:
branefirbrauthorized in an effort to eliminate a source of
The French Government apparently recommended that
friction with the Germans, while the Saar cabinet's move seems to have been motivated by a desire to forestall additional internal political competition.
12.
Italy may retaliate against US trade restrictions: The United States refusal to raise the quotas on a few of its Italian imports to compensate for recent import restrictions on a number of other products may, according to an Italian Foreign Office official, lead to Italy's withdrawing tariff concessions made to the United States. The Italian official has also protested to the American Ambassador against possible US restrictions on garlic
imports.
Although the over-all economic loss resulting from restrictions on garlic would be small, several localities in the Po Valley, where 65 to 90 percent of the annual crop of eight million pounds is exported to the United Slates, would be seriously af25X1
fected.
I
Comment: The over-all impact on Italy's economy resulting from 717gaan trade restrictions has been small. The restrictions have, however, had adverse psychological repercussions on the Italian public and have contributed to the gevernment's insistence that it cannot prevent the export of strategic items ordered by the Orbit prior to the enactment of the Battle Act.
13.
25X1
Foreign Minister proclaims indivisibility of Spain's religious unity: The Ideal of perfect harmony between Church and State has been achieved in Spain, according to an announcement by Foreign Minister Martin Artajo on 29 June. Each entity, he said, is sovereign in its own domain, but assists the other in order better to serve God and country. Artajo asserted that Spain is determined to defend "this luxury of religious unity."
Comment: Artajo's remarks reflect the Franco government's growing concern over several disturbing trends in current ChurchState relations. They were apparently meant to offset especially the effect on the Spanish people of Cardinal Segura's recent accusations that the civil power is jeopardizing national religious unity by an inordinate desire to appease non-Catholic countries, notably the United States and the Arab countries.

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The Cardinal's repeated protestations against government censorship of Catholic publications, the intransigence of certain Spanish bishops on the question of the Church's autonomy in education, political and social organization, and welfare, as well as the absence of a Concordat with the Vatican, are other facets of a situation that can hardly be described as one of "perfect harmony."
14.
Although the present government will probably remain in office despite its loss in prestige because of this defeat, the election has intensified the bitter personal and party feelings which characterize the political climate in Iceland, and has thereby weakened the coalition cabinet already subject to severe strains. The US military forces in Iceland are not expected to encounter any serious difficulties with a new Icelandic government, except in the unlikely event that Communists are included in a new coalition. I 25X1 J
15.
Argentina may not renew contracts with US Naval Advisory 25X1C The US Naval Advisory Group contracts with the Argentine avy will probably not be renewed upon their expiration in December 1952,1 The US Embassy in Buenos Aires comments that with the US Air Force already ousted and the US Army mission expected to follow, this step would remove the last vestige of direct US military influence in Argentina. 25X1 / 26 June 52)
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Comment: Each member of the Naval Advisory Group has an individual cpntract. In mid-May the US Army Mission was informally notified that its contract would not be renewed.

LATIN AMERICA
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Government candidate defeated in Icelandic presidential election: Bishop Bjarni Jonsson, the official presidential candidate of the Conservative and Progressive Parties which comprise the coalition government, was defeated by Asgeir Asgeirsson, leader of the Social Democrats, Iceland's smallest political party, in a close election on 29 June. Asgeirsson enjoyed the official support of some Conservatives, and in addition was helped by the divisive candidacy of an independent Conservativ.
3 July 52

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16.
Argentina signs new trade agreement with Italy: A new trade agreement with Italy reportedly gives Argentina a 15-milliondollar credit each year for the next five years. Argentina is to repay a previous 80-million-dollar credit in wheat during the next Goods valued at 110 million dollars are to three to four years. be exchanged each way during the first year of the agreement.
Informed Italians are reportedly sceptical that Comment: In the past Argentina has Argentina will meet its obligations. been a principal supplier of Italian wheat and a good market for Italian industrial goods.
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Comment: These security inspections are probably in response to rumors that the next revolutionary movement may be launched from the interior. Cordoba has been the seat of considerable anti-Peron sentiment.
18.
The Colombian Colombian Acting President's term extended: Congress approved on 26 June a resolution permitting President- 25X1 Alzatistas, designate Urdaneta to continue in office until 1954. who claim his term should end on 7 August 1952, were defeated by the large administration majority in both houses.
I
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19.
Comment: This was the most important and most controversial matter scheduled to come before the special session. The bitter Alzatista opposition, which until recently claimed a majority in the all-Conservative Congress, apparently will be defeated on all other issues by the well-organized administration forces which have refused any concessions to the minority.
Guatemalan Army officers reportedly plotting a revolt: Disaffection in the armed forces is increasing and a revolt led by
SECRET
Argentine Air Force officers inspect outlying air bases: Righ-ranking Argentine Air Force officers have recently been making more frequent inspection trips to outlying military air basee. The US Embassy believes that this means a tightening up A purportedly important inspection was to of security measures. /25X1 be held in Cordoba on 29 June.
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Argentina is also trying to obtain credits from other countries in an effort to overcome its current financial difficulties.
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the military will overthrow the Arbenz g vernment before the end of August, 25X1 leading milit ry figures. The leaders of the plot allegedly plan to assassinate President Arbenz and "from twenty-five to thirty of the individuals with Communist leanings who have influenced the government." q
25X1A
Comment: General unrest haa the defection of key army officers been growing in Guatemala and would considerably raise the chances of successful revolt. However, this is the first recent report suggesting that the military may desert the Arbenz administration or that there may be a serious split within the armed forces.
25X11
Haiti orders expulsion of foreign Communists: The Haitian Government has ordered the expulsion from Haiti of four French nationals and one Italian citizen for carrying on Communist activities through thr Minerva bookstores.
I
20.
25X1
has been reported entering HaitiT7Z577rance, some of it through the mails. The Minerva bookstores, like Editorial Paginas and have apparently been used by Communist similar bookshops in Cuba, agencies for Communist literature, and elements as distributing may have been used as meeting places.
Comment:
Communist material
The outlawing of Hai,ti's Communist Party in 1950 and the suppression of its publication, La Nation, removed the only local source of organized Communnt-FaroTganda. This is the first time in a long interval that found it necessary to take action government authorities have against any Communist activity.
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Finnish Communists requested the government to send either Foreign Minister Tuomioja, a political independent, or an Agrarian Party leader to Berlin to speak on neutralit The Finnish Government informed them it was impossible to arrange. This decision was made by the President, Prime Minister and Foreign Ministerj
Finnish Government disturbed with Communist attempts to turn Mailics into peace festival: IH 25X1C Istates that the government is disturbed about the 25X1C iscussion of neutrality at the Berlin Conference of the World Peace Congress, 1-5 July 1952, and possible further efforts to turn the Olympics into a "peace festival."
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Comment: It is very likely that Finnish Communists will attempt to use the Olympic games as an opportunity to impress upon the visitors the benefits, i.e., FinlandEs steady postwar recovery, which can result from "neutralism" in the East-West struggle. This would be entirely in keeping with the current Communist strategy of capitalizing on the defeatist and pacifist attitudes which are currently prevalent in a number of European countries.
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Muccio believes "free" elections not solution to South Korean political impasse: Ambassador Muccio comments that in the near future tHi-United States cannot expect sufficiently free elections for the South Korean National
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Assembly to permit the return of a substantial number of the opposition because of the present police and pro-Rhee youth corps control of the political machinery. There is also the danger that Home Minister Yi Pom-sok and his cronies might get a large number of their followers elected who would be more of a problem for Rhee than the present Assemblymen.
Muccio is "convinced" that both Rhee and a majority of the opposition would prefer a face-saving deal. Yi Pom-sok, however, is the main obstacle to a compromise.
In commenting on the opposition's potential, Muccio states that it is now so completely cowed that there is hardly any possibility of a rrsort to force, particularly as it has no access to arms.
3.
Burma may be forced into premature military action against Chinese Nationalists'
the Burmese Defense Minister, U Ba Swe, believes that aboveground Communist agitation may force the government to divert its attention from theCommunist insurgents by becoming involved in a premature military campaign against the Chinese Nationalist troops in Kengtung. If the government is not obliged to undertake such action, Ba Swe expects the security situation will be so improved at the ena of the monsoons that a successful campaign against the Nationalists could be launched.
Ba Swel Ito approach Taipei authorities concerning a possible repatriation of Chinese Nationalist troops to Taiwan via Rangoon.
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Comment: The aboveground Communists and other leftist elements have been engaged in a concerted propaganda campaign against government failure to attack the Nationalists vigorously, and they have attempted to recruit "volunteers" for an irregular force to send against them.
This report indicates that the government has reversed its former policy of opposition to repatriation, which was based on fear of offending Communist China.
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NEAR EAST - AFRICA

4.
Eden fears consequences of Egyptian cabinet difficulties: Great Britain is seeking American support to prevent elimination of "the only sound elements in Egyptian political life" in Cairo's current cabinet shifts. Foreign Secretary Eden apparently fears a return to power of the corrupt palace elements and the Wafd party.
25X11
ex-Premier Hilali, is in the new cabinet announced as formed on 2 July.
corrupt palace favorite, a man who wiliiiigedly influential in undermining the position of
The Sirry cabinet includes only one hold-over from the relatively capable and friendly Hilali government Ambassador Caffery reports from Cairo that Sirry experienced difficulty in attracting responsible men into what they consider merely a temporary "caretaker" government.

,Comment:
At least one
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A high British official has stated that he regards the government crisis as a triumph for individuals with close Wafd ties. He feels that Hilali fell primarily because of his efforts to purge such elements, 25X1 and secondarily because of his failure to reach agreement with a Sudpnese delegation which recently visited Egypt.'
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5 . 5.
Attachment of of armor to divisions Attachment t o North Korean d i v i s i o n s raises fewmonths, months, the the evoluevoluenemy 'capabilities; c a p a b i l i t i e s : During During the t h e ji3ast kast few tion of a North Korean Armored Command in western Korea h has i n western as On1y recently was r e v e a l e d in i n enemy enemy messages. messages. Only recen'tly w a s it sugbeen revealed gested that t h a t the the armor subordinate s u b o r d i n a t e to this t h i s command, command, instead instead of operating disposed o p e r a t i n g as an a n organic o r g a n i c tactical t a c t i c a l force, f o r c e , was to t o be d iapoaed as supporting s u p p o r t i n g weapons weapons for for North North Korean Korean infantry . i n f a n t r y divisions. divisions. eastern On 29 June an armored regiment regiment in in e a s t e r n coastal Korea reported Armored Headquarters that "the problem c concerning r e p o r t e d to t o Armored that " t h e problem oncerning the coordination with the 7th Division t he c o o r d i n a t i o n activity activity w ith t he 7 t h Infantry Infantry D i v i s i o n was not decided." 27 June June message,rposaibly message,. pws'ibly from the t h e same decided." A 27 regiment, with armored r e g i m e n t , mentioned "the Itthe combat attachment w i t h the the west c coast unit 3 7 t h Division.11 o a s t armored u n i t reported in i n late late 37th Division." A west Messages of June "coordinating" "coordinating" with w i t h au an infantry i p f a n t r y division. division Messages of early divisions of the e a r l y June indicated i n d i c a t e d that t h a t infantry infantry d i v i s i o n s of t h e IV Corps were training t r a i n i n g in i n conjunction c o n j u n c t i o n with w i t h armored ampored elements. elements. Reflecting attachment, Korean Armored HeadHeadB e f l e c t i n g this this a t t a c h m e n t , North Korean quarters requested subordinate regiment t to gather q u a r t e r s on 30 June r equested a s u b o r d i n a t e regiment o gather information senior tank to whether i infantry i n f o r m a t i o n from s enior t a n k officers as t o whether nfantry division selfd i v i s i o n commanders had properly p r o p e r l y employed the t h e tank t a n k and s elfROK Int Int propelled p r o p e l l e d artillery a r t i l l e r y assigned a s s i g n e d to t o their t h e i r units. units. (CANOE ROK ROK Int G r p M, Korea SK-K-784, SK-K-784, 2 2 July; J u l y ; RQK I n t Grp dirp M, Korea Korea SK-K-645, SK-K-645, Grp 15RSM/15538, Korea, 28 June; 15RSW15538, Korea, 30 30 June June 52) 52)
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evidence still fragmentary to accept Comment: The e v i d e n c e is s t i l l too f ragmentary t o a ccept the attachMent of armored armored u units,in t he a m n t of n i t s p i n bbattalion a t t a l i o n strength s t r e n g t h or or higher, to North Korean Korean r reserve infantry divisions or to h igher, t o North eserve i nfantry d ivisions o r t o accept the deactivation of major major armored armored units, units, such such as as t the a ccept t he d e a c t i v a t i o n of he 105th Mechanized Divisions. Such a t t h e 10th 1 0 t h Yeehrsuized actical 1 0 5 t h Tank and the tactical doctrine would, however, keeping-with former P north d o c t r i n e would, however, be in in k e e p i n g with former o r t h Korean practices and would r represent considerable augmentation of practices epresent a c o n s i d e r a b l e augmentation the strength t he s t r e n g t h of North Korean infantry i n f a n t r y divisions. divisions.
6. 8.
7. 7.

4 4
New division may have have been formed formed i in North N e w infantry infantry,d l i v i s i o n may n N o r t h Korean 8 June, North Korean In n a message of o uno, a Nor o r e r n armored unit unit trmy: ion w i t h the R A northwestern r t L w e a t e r n ' KorePfrzf8e:red n Korea referred to doit: joint tot action with the '@20th "20th Infantry Division." The "439th "438th Infantry Regiment I nfantry D ivision." I n f a n t r y Regiment e . located .located at Sukchon"(just s south of t the Chongchon R River) is also also menmena t Sukchon"(just o u t h of h e Choragchon i v e r ) is tioned. ROK Int Grp M, Korea, SK-K-684, t ioned. (CANOE ROK Int G r p Y, SK-E-684, 29 June J u n e 52) 52)
Division is currently Comment: No 20th 2 0 t h Infantry Infantry D dvisiom i s c u r r e n t l y carried either North Korean Army o or by thg-TiF-last t h m a s t Command in in e i t h e r the thet North r in in the i n Korea. Korea. Recent messages from numbered regiregit h e Chinese Army in ments not menta n o t known to t o be subordinate s u b o r d i n a t e to t o any North Korean division division have been intercepted i n t e r c e p t e d from from this t h i s area. area. While speculative, possible another s p e c u l a t i v e , it i t is is p o s s i b l e that that a n o t h e r infantry infantry division d i v i s i o n has h a s been been organized o r g a n i z e d in i n the t h e North North Korean Korean army army and and is, is. currently c u r r e n t l y training t r a i n i n g in i n the the coastal region region between Pyongyang and Sinanju. S f n a nj u a Chinese relieve units north r e l i e v e North Korean tactical u nits n o r t h of of! Pyongyang: A major North Korean of the Xorean unit,"probably u n i t , ' p r o b a b l y one of 'the -Aivkions t h e IV ItY Corps in w e s t e r n Korea, infantry divisions of the western Korea, reported on 27 June that have established t h a t "we "we have e s t a b l i s h e d the t h e plan p l a p to to turn t u r n over over the the defense d e f e n s e line l i n e of of the t h e seashore seashore to to the t h e 373rd Regiment of of the the Volunteer Vo l u n t eer Army." Army. Another 27 27 June June message from an a n unidentified u n i d e n t i f i e d North Korean regiment north n o r t h of of Pyongyang Pyongyang added: added:, "nothing unusual unueual has has happened since we began the over business with the t h e handing o ver b usiness w ith t he Voluntary V o l u n t a r y (Volunteer?) (Volunteer?) Army." Army." (CANBE ROK RQK Int I n t Grp Grp M, M j Korea, Korea, (CANOE SK-K-881/and SK-K-Wl/and SK-K-599, SK-K-599, 28 28 June June 52) 52)
Comment: Comment: These These messages mesmges suggest s u g g e s t that t h a t elements e l e m e n t s of the the ChineArmy, of which the t h e 373rd Regiment is a L p a r t , are Chinese 42nd Army, part, also a l s o being b e i n g deployed deployed north n o r t h of of Pyongyang. Pyongyang. Other O t h e r recent r e c e n t intercepts intercepts
J u l y 5g 5$ 7 July
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have indicated i n d l c a t e d that t h a t 42nd Army units u n i t s relieved r e l i e v e d elements e l e m e n t s of of the the North Korean 23rd Brigade southwest s o u t h w e s t of Pyongyang. Pyongyang.
8.
a.
North Korean armored unit u n i t locates l o c a t e s southwest of of Wonsan: Wonsan: In report I n a r e D o r t of of 29 June June alforth a N o r t h Korean armored armored unit u n i t on on the t h e east east coast stated that "I of VI1 VII Corps Corps about about t the stationing coast that ' 1 inquired i n q u i r e d of he s tationing area of the t h e unit." unit." He was told t o l d that t h a t he h e should s h o u l d select a a place place Aftet reconnoitering "which is "which is proper for f o r tanks." tanks." A fteL: r e c o n n o i t e r i n g the t h e area, area, "Posongni is proper for the t h e reporting r e p o r t i n g officer o f f i c e r stated: s t a t e d : "Posongni f o r tanks tanks ROK I Int Grp 8, Korea, Korea, SK-K-747, to t o be stationed. s t a t i o n e d . . ." (CANOE ROK nt G r p Y, SK-K-747, July 1 J u l y 52) 52)
9. 0 .

F:
uarters:
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unit, probably regiComment: This T h i s unidentified u n i d e n t i f i e d armored u nit, p robably a r agiment strength, meat ln m n g t h , recently r e c e n t l y arrived a r r i v e d in in eastern e a s t a r n Korea. Korea. Although it m maintains communications w with it a i n t a i n s comnaunicativns i t h an armored headquarters h e a d q u a r t e r s in in the west, p probably will t h e west, r o b a b l y it it w i l l be attached for f o r operations o p e r a t i o n s to t o the the VII Corps. VI1 Corps.
Chinese 50th 5 0 t h Army still s t i l l in i n northwestern n o r t h w e s t e r n Korea: Korea: A North Chongchon.River northorthKorean afmered armored regimentregiment iin n tthe h e Chongchon R i v e r area of n western w e a t e r n Korea Korea reported reported on on 28 28 June June that that "we " w e visited v i s i t e d the theVolun-, Volunteer Army 248th Division D i v i a i o n which which is is at a t Yongampo Yongampo and and Cholsan. Cholsan. 11 teer Army 248th ." CCANOE CCWOE 15RSM/15461, 15RSY/15461, Korea, Korea, 29 29 June June 52) 52)
.
..
Comment: "248" ''2481' is is the t h e code code designation d e s i g n a t i o n of of the t h e Chinese Chinese on coastal c o a s t a l security s e c u r i t y duty duty l o c a t e d on 50th IFFIPT-148th Division, 5 0 t h -148th D i v i s i o n , located f r o m Sinuiju S i n u i j u to to Cholsan Cholsan in i n northwestern n o r t h w e s t e r n Korea. Korea. from
The The 50th 5 0 t h Army Army has has been been frequently'reported f r e g u e n t 1 y ) r e p o s t e d by by other other intelligence i n t e l l i g e n c e sources s o u r c e s as Moving moving southwards southwards into i n t o the t h e area area recently vacated v a c a t e d by the t h e Chinese Chinese 40th 4 0 t h Army which is l a now in in Combat. combat.
10.
la.
North Korean HeadV I 1 Corps Corps chief c h i e f of staff s t a f f visits v i s i t s Supreme HeadKorean VII 6n 29 9 June, June, a a North Korean Korean armored armored unit u n i t in in the the onsan o n s a n area areaOn reported r e p o r t e d that t h a t its i t a "unit ''unit commander commander and and the t h e chief chief of Headquarters this t h e VII VI1 Corps left l e f t for Supreme H eadquarters t his of staff s t a f f of of the (CANOE 15RSM/15570, morning. , ." morning. .I' (CANOE 15RSM/15570, Korea, KQrea, 30 30 June June 52) 52)
Comment: No reason r e a s o n for f o r this t h i s visit v i s i t is is indieated. i n d i q a t e d . The curreiiiI3tEilderway attachment of of armor armor tto VII Corps Corps units units and o VI1 and c u r r e m d e r w a y attachment the possibility the p o s s i b i l i t y of the t h e VII VI1 Corps Corps relieving r e l i e v i n g the t h e III I11 Corps Corps on on the the line might be be the t h e cause c a u s e of of this t h i s trip. tr.ip.
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5. 5 .
Trailning scheduled for for N North Korean armsred armored personnel Trtr$ning scheduled o r t h Korean personnel t h r o u a September: September: k A componenf-61-RiFfETOFFEE-AFRUF5a--cxmp0nen-t of North Korean Armored through Headquarters instructed i n s t r u c t e d an an unidentified unidentified subordinate subordinate Forces Headquarters armored armored unit u n i t in ina a 29 29 June June message message that t h a t ."a Ira special drill drill for for machine-gunners of 0% self-propelled Relf-propelled artillery artillery and and tanks tanks will will (CANOE c a r r i e d out out from from 1 1 August August to'30 t o 3 0 September. September. .Iv (CANOE be carried ." ROK Int I n t Grp Brp M, Y , Korea, K Q P O ~ , SK-K-740, 8K-K-740, 30 30 June June 52) 52)
C o r n nt: nt While far f a r from definitive, this ?,his message gives gives Comm n e e of of the low low state strsrtc of of training training in i n the tho newlynewlyfurther ev- s ence f a r t h e r ev scheduling c o n s t i t u t e d North constituted North Korean Korean armored armored forces. forces. The s c h e d u l i n g of of t r W g this far Par in i n advance snag M i c r a t e that a a t no uee use of Of training may indicate this t h l a Nerth XObrtb Korean Korean armor armesr is-coutemplated l i s cantemplateduntil u n t i lat atleast.. l e . % % September... September.
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6, 6.
Korean tank t a n k unit u n i t to t o operate o p e r a t e with with Chinese: Chinese: In In a a North Korean J u n e message message frdm frcim North. North Korean e a d q u a r t e r s to to a a 29 June Korean Armored Armored H Headquarters s u b o r d i n a t e armored armored unit u n i t it i t was was stated s t a t e d that t h a t the t h e "103rd 11103rd unit unit subordinate is going g o i n g to t o coordinate COOrdiAate with w i t hthe t h eVolunteer Volunteer Army, b uyou t you must is Army, but multst f o r further f u r t h e r information." i n f o r m a t i o n . " (CANOE (CANOE 15RSM/15539, lSRSM/15539, Korea, Korea, wait for 30 J u n e 52) 52) 30 June
'I
Comment: This T h i s message message suggests s u g g e s t s planning p l a n n i n g for for a a North North Comment: armored unit u n i t to t o operate operate with with a a Chinese C h i n e s e infantry i n f a n t r y unit. unit. Korean armored T h e r e is i s no indication i n d i c a t i o n whether whether this t h i s "coordinated" " c o o r d i n a t e d " action a c t i o n will will There be in i n combat combat or or in i n rear-area rear-area training. training.
I
7. 7.
t r a i n i n g progreSs:progress: training
Comment: Both Both of of these t h e s e Soviet S o v i e t officers officers have pave previously previously Comment: been i a e n t i f i e d in kn connection c o n n e c t i o n with w i t h North N o r t h Korean Korean armored armored been Adentified trai nine. training.
S o v i e t adviser advises to t o North N o r t h Korean Korean armored armored unit u n i t reports reports Soviet On 1 July J u l y "Najarenko" "Najarenkott at a t aEL North On 1 North Korean Korean artillery armordd u n i t c o n n e c t e d with,tank w i t h , t a n k and and self-propelled s e l f - p r o p e l l e d artillery armored-Unit-connected t r a i n i n g advised."Tulov" advised. T u 1 0 v ~at\North a ~t \ N o r t h Korean KoredLD Armored Headquarters Headquarters trainihg t h a t "the " t h e training t r a i n i n g is is in i n progress according a c c o r d i n g to t o the t h e schedule." schedule." that (CANOE 15RSM/14647, lSRSM/14647, Korea, Korea, 3 3 July J u l y 52) 52) (CANOE
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Capture Ambassador C a p t u r e of ranking r a n k i n g us Ug airman a i r m a n interests g n t e r e s t s Sovl.ot Sov#.qt Ambassador The.Stviet not fn e - a d v i e t ground tontrol c o n t r d l intercept i n t e r c e p t n8't i n northnorth'%%%orzk wdstern Korea on 16 16 May passed p a s s e d a meSsage message over o v e r its adminisadministrative stated "Makhurin" had had been c captured t r a t i v e link which s t a t e d that t h a t ''Makhurin" aptured and that t h a t an a n interrOgation i n t e r r o g a t i o n had had been been conducted: c o n d u c t e d ? The message s ugges t ed hat h a t "Razuvaev" "Razuvaev" was was present. p r e s e n t e (CANOE (.CmOE USSR ilitary sagges U0SR M Military Korea, Korea, 796, 796, 16 1 6 May May 52) 52)
in Korea;'
is probably p r o b a b l y US US Air A i r Force F o r c e Colonel Colonel Comment: "Makhurin" Waktauring9is Walte7-M7-Mihurinv Walter M. Mahurin, whose aircraft a i r c r a f t was shot s h o t down by b y ground f ire o n 13 fire on 13 May. May.
The suggested s u g g e s t e d presence p r e s e n c e of of Soviet S o v i e t Lieutenant L i e u t e n a n t General General of A v i a t i o n , Vladimir Vlrrdimir Razuvaev, Raeuvaev, at a t the t h e interrogation i n t e r r o g a t i o n of of' of.Aviation, C o l o n e l Mahurin Y a h u r i n is is another a n o t h e r indicatiOn i n d i c a t i o n of the t h e Soviet S o v i e t Upion's Uplongs Colonel i n t e n s e interest i n t e r e s t in i n the t h e military intense m i l i t a r y aspects aspects of of the t h e Koroan'war. Korean w p r .
8. 8 .
G e n e r a l Razuvaev is the the S o v i e t Ambassador o N ortb General Soviet Ambassador t to North Korea and and may be the t h e over-all o v e r - a l l commander of Soviet S o v i e t aircraft aircraft p a r t i c i p a t i n g in i n the t h e Korean Korean air a i r war. war. participating Communist air a i r effort e f f o r t made against a g a i n s t UN UM 4 July July Heavy Communist f fighter-bombers: i g h t e r - b o m b e r s : Both Russian R u s s i a n and Chinese C h i nese aircraft aircraft participated in participated . i n the t h e attempt a t t e m p t to t o disrupt d i s r u p t the t h e UN'e U N s g 4 July JuIy f fighter-bomber i g h t e r - b o m b e r attack a t t a c k on p North Korean M Military i T i t a r y Academy n e a r Sakchu in near i n northwestern n o r t h w e s t e r n Korea, r reports e p o r t s a US A Aix i r Force s security e c u r i t y unit u n i t in i n Japan. Japan. T h e r e were few R u s s i a n flights f l i g h t s prior p r i o r to t o noon on on 4 There Russian July J u l y when ."activity l l a c t i v i t ' y became became v very e r y heavy" heavy" and and a at t least seven s e v e n flights f l i g h t s were vectored v e c t o r e d by the GCI c controller o n t r o l l e r at at Tatungkuo airfield Tatungkuo a i r f i e l d on o n UN aircraft a i r c r a f t active a c t i v e in i n the area, areao Later in i n the t h e afternoon a f t e r b o o n three t h r e e and then t h e n four f o u r more flights flights were vectored v e c t o r e d against a g a i n s t UN UN airtraft. aircraft. t h e Chinese C h i n e s e GCI G C I net net a a little l i t t l e after a f t e r noon noon on on 4 4 July, July, On the the GCI n net et f filter ilter c center e n t e r iinstructed: n s t r u c t e d : tla+rcraPt "Orcraft 179 179 t to o t h e GCI go to t o the.school t h e .school place." place." This T h i s aircraft a i r c r a f t Was W a s advisell a d v i s e d that that "above t h e school s c h o o l there t h e r e are are light l i g h t bombers. bombers. The enemy is "above the bombing." A little l i t t l e later l a t e r another a n o t h e r flight f l i g h t was ordered o r d e r e d to to bombing." (CANOE 6920 AF S Security t h e "school" " s c h o o l " to t o "fight." "fight." (CANOE e c u r i t y Grp the Japan, CHICOMSUM CHLCOMSUM 889, 889, 7 July; J u l y ; RUSUM 76, 76, 6 Johnson AB Japan, J July u l y 52) 52)
10 J u l y 52 July
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omm nt: Communist MIG-15's 3qmm9n;: Communist M I G - 1 5 I s came cme up in i n numbers in in' ap at t empt to o disrupt d i s r u p t the t h e UN's atack. a t a c k . Of 84 enemy jets Jets ap a sighted, encountered with possibly ncountered w i t h at a t least least 10 and p ossibly s i g h t e ' d , 47 were e 12 destroyed. 12 destroyed.
9.
American4anks by North Korean Korean armored armored unit; unit: A a n k s used u s e d b7,North Korean Armored Armored ordnarrc8' .' section @ e c t i o nol of North. N o r t h Korean messaig7Mi7t e ordnance FOrces F6rces Headluarters d e a d q u a i t e r s 00 ab 5 5 July J u l y mentioned that t v a t six American Amerfcan model bb s sent from!dukchon mbdel tanks t a n k s visre'supppeOd qers 'supporaed tto o bb e n t from ,dukchon td an an 15RSM/15860 Korqa, Korsa, 6 fqmored t r a i n 4 n g regi*Ont. regihent armored training (CANOE 15RSM/id860
July 52) 52)
10.
N North o r t h Korean-piloted K w e a n - p i l o t e d 4ets j e t s operate o p e r a t e on o n Soviet S o v i e t GCI G C I net: net: On 3 3 July, su2y, reports' a US US A Air"Force field security reports' a WForce f ie'ld s e c u r i t y unit, unit, a a R u s s i a n GCl.net G C I $ n e t ground ground station s t a t i o n at a t Antung told told a a RussianRussianRussian p i l o t e d aircraft a i r c r a f t that t h a t "the p i g e o n s are c h a s i n g the the piloted pigeons chasing Sabres. S a b r e s . Fight F i g h t together t o g e t h e r with w i t h them." them."
The field f i e l d unit u n i t notes n o t e s that t h a t "pigeons" "pigeons" is i s the t h e cover cover word for f o r aircraft a i r c r a f t active a c t i v e on on the t h e North p o r t h Korean Korean GCI G C I net. net. (CANOE 6920 S e c u r i t y Grp Johnson Johnson AB, AB, Japan, (cANOE Security J a p a n , AP AP 706, 700, 7 7 J u l y 52) 52) July
Comment: Such c oordinated a c t i o n indicates indicates e ither Comment: coordinated action either the presence of-Russian-speaking pilots or t that net t he p r e s e n c e of R u s s i a n - s p e a k i n g Korean p i l o t s or hat n et control a t Antung is trilingual t r i l i n g u a l as has been p previously reviously c o n t r o l at indicated. indicated.
Previ040 references r e f e r e n c e s have been made to to Commen : Previoure capturedTJSarmor in i n North N b r t h Korean p o r e a n messages. messages. P Prior r i o r to t o this, this, however, it! was not n o t known w h e t h e r this this c a p t u r e d materiel however, it Whether captured materiel was w a s being b e i n g shipped s h i p p e d out o u t of Korea Kgrea or o r was being b e i n g placed p l a c e d in i n units units f o r futUre f u t u r e service. for aervice.
NR
5 5
10 J u l y 52 52 10 July
HR70-14
1
lip
/a 3,..k 52 C
FAR EAST
1. airman interests interests Soviet 1 . Capture of o f ranking US US airman Soviet Ambassador in in Korea: Korea:
ground control n 796/Sflhe 7/41iSitheSoviet Soviet ground controlintercept intercept net net L in 16 May May passed Korea on on 16 northwestern Korea passed a CANOE message over its itsadministrative administrativelink linkwhich which stated that "Makhurin" stated ltMakhurin" had been captured and that an interrogation had had been been conducted. conducted. The and The message message suggested suggested that "Razuvaev" flRazuvaev'twas present.
16 May 52
USSRMilitary Military USSR
The suggested presence presenceof of Soviet SovietLieutenant Lieutenant General of Vladimir Razuvaev, at the interrogation of Aviation, Vladtmir Razuvaev, at interrogationof o fColonel Colonel General Mahurin i is of the Soviet Soviet Unton's Union'stntense intense interest interest in Mahurln s another indication of'the military aspects aspectsof of the the Korean Korean war. the military
General Razuvaev is the Soviet Razuvaev is Soviet Ambassador North Korea and may to North may be be the the over-all commander of of Soviet Soviet aircraft aircraft war. participating in the Korean air air war.
NR NR
APPROVED APPROVED FOR FOR RELEASE RELEASE DATE: DATE: 22-Mar-2010 22-Mar-201 0
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is probably probably US US Atr Air Comment: "Makhurin" is Comment: Force Colonel Walter M. M . - Mahurin, whose whose aircraft aircraftwas wasshot shotdown down by by Force Colonel ground fire on 13 13 May. May. fire on
4:
1
1
I
HR70-14 HR70-14
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6. 6.
7. 7.
N o r t h Korean Korean unit u n i t reports r e p o r t s case case of of food f o o dpoieioning p o l q o n i p g by by UN: UN: North A' North Xorean Ko r e a n armored armored unit u n i t in i n northWestern:Korea northvlested'n: Kore'avies was adadA'North
vised'b y Armored Armored F orces H e a d q u a r k e r s on on 6 6 July J u l y that t h a t "enemy ".enemy vised by Forces Headquarters s p i e s invaded i n v a d e d our o u r unit u n i t area area to t o put put p o i s o n into i n t o the t h e drinking drinking spies poison w a t e r , food f o o d and and vegetables. vegetables. T h i r t e e n men h e VI1 water, Thirteen men of t the VII Corps are u f f e r i n g from from the t h e effects e f f e c t s of of the t h e vegetable v e g e t a b l e poison. p o i s o n . Do Do are s suffering n o t let l e t the t h e food food be be passed passed to t o the t h e civilians." c i v i l i a n s . 1 1 The message not The message ordered the t h e unit u n i t to t o organize o r g a n i z e prevention prevention m e a s u r e s , cooperating cooperating ordered measures, w i t h the t h e competent competent civilian c i v i l i a n organization. o r g a n i z a t i o n . (CANOE with (CANOE 15RSM/39 Korea, 8 July J u l y 52) 52) Comment'; T h i s message r e m i n i s c e n t of messages Comment':: This message is reminiscent t r a n e m bby y the t h e enemy enemy during d u r i n g the t h e height h e i g h t Of of the theb 'iologitransiitted Viologic a l warfare campaign in i n late l a t e February F e b r u a r y and and March. March. It It w ill cal warfare campaign will p r o b a b l y have have the t h e dual effect e f f e c t of raising r a i s i n g sanitary s a b f t a r y standards standards probably n t he l o c a l community, ontributing i n u n i t messes in unit messes and and i in the local community, $$us plus c contributing grist to t o the t h e Communist propaganda propaganda mill. mill.
bine-se Communists to t p pay com,pensation for f o r occupied ocwpied Chinese pay compensation dkean land: land: An u n d d d n t i f l ed Chin e s e CommunIst Comrnunlkt antiantiNorth KOrean untdentifiedChinese aircraft' regiment r e g i m e n t on on 7 July J u l y Mentioned mentioned "the problem of aircraft c o m p e n s a t i o n for f o r the t h e new new positions." positions." I t s tated t hat N orth compensation It stated that North Y o r e a n ' b k v i l i a n s whose l a n d s have been occu,pied by t h e Korean'avilians whose lands have been occupied by,tne C h i n e s e units u n i t s will will be be paid p a i d an an indemnity i n d e m n i t y by by the t h e latter. latqer. Chinese (CANOE 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, Korea, K-4295, K-4295, H 8 July J u l y 52) 52) (CANOE 501st.Comm Recon Grp
11 July 52
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VA) SECRET CAN&E

Comment: A certain c e r t a i n amount of of friction f r i c t i o n between between the the North-RUFFiii and tthe Chinese "Volunteers" has Northccivilians i v i l i a n s and he C hinese " Volynteers" h as existed e x i s t e d since slince the t h e latter l a t t e r entered the t h e war. There T h e r e have been been a number of of reports of recent r e c e n t incidents. i n c i d e n t s . The T4e plan p l a n of of paying may be part part of a l a n d mr)y p a y i n g North N o r t h Koreans for confiscated c o n f i s c a t e d land campaign to t o increase i n c r e a s e Korean-Chinese Korean-Chinese Communist Communist unity. unity.
8 . 8.
F First i r s t report r e p o r t in i n six six months of Chinese bomber bomber regiment: regiment: An air a i r force field f i e l d unit u n i t reportea reported that that d detailed e t a i l e d activity activity t h e Chinese C h i n e s e Communist 28th 2 8 t h Air Regiment was r ecently by the recently noted t i m e since s i n c e 12 1 2 January. J a n u a r y . On 8 July, J u l y , 15 15 n o t e d for f o r the t h e first f i r s t time TU-2 light l i g h t bombers of this t h i s regiment r e g i m e n t were s scheduled cheduled o on n day d a y and and night n i g h t training t r a i n i n g flights f l i g h t s in i n south s o u t h Manchuria. Manchuria. (CANOE 6920 S Security e c u r i t y Grp G r p Johnson AB AB Japan, J a p a n , AP-756, Ap-756, 9 9 July J u l y 52) 52)
equipped with bombers Comment; The 28th Regiment is e quipped w i t h bombers and ii-FiFf-of is p a r t of the the 10th 1 0 t h Division, D i v i s i o n , which has h a s aircraft a i r c r a f t at at Nanking, Liaoyang Liaoyang and and Harbin. Harbin. Although bombers constitute c o n s t i t u t e over o v e r ten ten p percent e r c e n t of of the 2,100 i r c r a f t in in C h i n a , and t h r e e of h e 20 2,100 combat a aircraft China, three of t the i d e n t i f i e d Chinese C h i n e s e air air divisions are are equipped e q u i p p e d with w i t h TU-2's, TU-2's, identified t h e enemy h a s made little the has little e effort ffort t to o u use s e them them in t the h e Korean Korean war.
. : " R
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1 1 July J u l y 52 52 11
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SECURITY INFGRMATION
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SOVIET UNION
1.
Comment: During 1951 and part of 1952, several thousand MGB troops were reported to have conducted intensive operations against the resistance groups in the western areas of the Ukraine, which have been a source of trouble to the Kremlin since the end of World War II. It is possible that these awards, together with previous awards given in April and May of this year to members of the security troops in this area, are the result of these anti-resistance operations.
2.
Soviet Union reports increase in higher institute graduates: Pravda reports that 220,000 students graduated from higher educational establishments in the USSR in 1952. (R FBIS Moscow, 8 July
52)
Comment: There were 70.000 graduates from higher educational institutes in the USSR in 1945. The total figure rose during 1950 and 1951 to between 148,000 and 195,000. Only 10 percent of these graduates were from universities offering a general curriculum. The remaining 90 percent attended technical schools, such as engineering, medical, coal-mining, journalism, and agronomy.
25X1C
3.
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EASTERN EUROPE SECRET
25X1A
lic.
Awards given to MGB troops in Ukraine: The American Embassy in Moscow reports that over 627 awards for long and irreproachable service were given out to the MGB security forces in the Ukraine in June. This is the hi hest total ublished this year by any repub-
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25X1C
Comment: Czechoslovakia has been emphatic in its approval of the SoVra-Froposals for the unification of Germany. Only recently has the Czech press made any reference to the need for East Germany to rearm in its own defense if Germany remains divided.
The Soviet Government may well wish to maintain tension in Germany to provide an excuse for the retention of Soviet forces in the country and the build-up of a German satellite army while at the same time blaming the Western powers for preventing a peaceful solution.
4,
Hungarian Minister of Mining and Power absent from miners' trade union meeting: Sandor Czottner, Hungarian Minister of Mining and Power, did not attend the meeting of the miners' trade union that opened in Budapest 5 July. His place was taken by Chief Deputy Minister Istvan Havran, Foreign Minister Karoly Kiss, representing the Politburo, 25X1A spoke of the "dire need for experienced union functionaries," while union leader Bela Blaha blamed the union for im ro er use of Socialist compOitive methods.
Comment: Severe criticism has been directed at Hungarian coal mining during the last two months. However, it is too early to say whether the Minister of Mining has been purged for the failure of the industry to meet its targets.
In its editorial comment on the miners' convention OD 5 July, the party newspaper called upon the union to use Soviet competitive methods and to overfulfill its plan targets. The editorial also made the significant statement that clerical reaction "and especially Social Democracy" were to blame for poor work discipline in the Hungarian mines.

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25X1X
5.
25X1X
Yugoslav military leaders anxious to coordinate defense plans reece an r e ugos av mil tary leaders strongly favor the conclusion of a verbal mutual defense pact with Greece and Turkey followed by staff talks detailing coordination of defense plans. While the Yugoslav General Staff believes that written pacts are unnecessary, it will sign a military agreement if Greece and Turkey insist. At the present time, however, political considerations prevent the opening of such talks.
with
25X1A
American military observers comment that while continued Yugoslav hesitation to discuss military matters with Greece and TUrkey is difficult to understand it fo lows the pattern of oast Yugoslav performances.
Comment: Last week, the Turkish Foreign Minister stated that Yugoslavia is now ready to engage in military talks if Turkey promises to participate in the positive defense of Thrace.
On 7 July, Marshal Tito told a Greek parliamentary delegation in Belgrade that although Yugoslavia rejects formal pacts, Greece and Yugoslavia must be ready to undertake a joint defense of their independence.

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FAR EAST
6.
25X1X
Final Sino-Soviet decision on Panmunjom talks reportedly scheduled before 20 July: Soviet and Chinese diplomats currently attending a conference at Peiping will reach a "final decision" on the cease-fire talks no later than 20 July.
25X1X
25X1X
no North Korean military or di.lomatic re.resentatives were attending the meeting.
There have been no other reports of the conference or the 20 July deadline.
7.
25X1X
High Soviet and Chinese officials arrive at Panmunjom for truce talks: In early July a high-ranking Soviet Voreign Ministry official and a Chinese counter art arrived at Kaesong with a staff of ei ht

Comment:
Comment: There have been recent reports of an increasing Chinese Communist role in major decisions concerning North Korea, hitherto exclusively a Soviet puppet. It is possible that truce talk policy is now decided jointly by the Chinese and the Russians without North Korean consultation.
25X1A
25X1X
These newly arrived Communist officials reportedly are empowered to "accept or reject" UN truce conference proposals on the spot, thus eliminating the need for consultation with Moscow and Peiping. They have final instructions as to the Communist .osition on the remaidn issue at the truce talks.
25X1A
Communist negotiators at Panmunjom are beconsulted Moscow and Peiping on all major decisions in the past. It is possible that the USSR and Communist China have agreed on their minimum position on the one remaining issue.
lieveCtritive
There is no apparent advantage however in dispatching "diplomatic experts" to Kaesong. Their presence has not been confirmed and to date the enemy has not demonstrated any urgency in concluding negotiations.
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25X1X
9.

NEAR EAST - AFRICA
Iranians optimisti
25X1X
over out.ut of new oil well:
25X1X
25X1X
the oil field at Qum, 90 miles south of Tehran, appears to be com arable to the rich fields in southern Iran. the well brought in at Qum on 2 Jul is ca able of a dail production of 1,000 barrels. had refused the equipment offered it by teNational Iranian Oil Company in order to prevent any le al entan lement in the Anglo-Iranian dispute.
I
25X1X
25X1A
Comment: These statements appear premature. Even if the equ pment for completing and testing the well were available, the process of determining its capacity should take about a month. Additional test wells will have to be brought in before the extent of the new field can be determined.
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10,
Greece may bring Cyprus issue before the UN: Greek UN Delegate Kyrou informed the American delegation on 9 July that public opinion was forcing his government to bring the Cyprus issue before the United Nations.
25X1A 26X1A
The American Ambassador in Athens reported on 8 July that Acting Prime Minister Venizelos has been pressing him for official American reaction to such a move. The Ambassador fears that the Greek Government will not be able to resist raising the matter.
Comment: Successful demonstrations in behalf of the union of Cyprus with Greece were held in Athens on 4 July.

SECRET
6
Although there is no indication that the current campaign will be more successful than its predecessors, the possibility that Cyprus may be a Western defense headquarters increases the importance of the issue. Widespread Greek support for union may tempt the government to promote it in order to remain in power.
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WESTERN EUROPE
11.
Recruiting for East German paramilitary forces lags: Reliable reports indicate that May recruiting quotas for the East German Alert and Border Police were missed by 80 percent in Saxony and 50 percent in Thuringia. In Saxony, only 700 men had been recruited by mid-June to fill the month's quota of 8,000 men.
Alert Police recru t ng teams ,ave now changed their tactics to bring pressure through personal interviews. Former security restrictions, such as the rule against recruiting individuals who were prisoners of war of Western powers have re.ortedl been relaxed.
25X1C
125X1A
Comment: Despite the pressure placed on some groups to serve in the Alert Police, regular conscription will probably be necessary to obtain any significant expansion of the paramilitary forces.
12.
Communist propaganda exploits West Berlin security countermeasures: The East Berlin press has been front-paging the announcement of the West Berlin government that it intends to erect barriers between the western sectors of the city and the Soviet zone. The Communists describe the security countermeasures as "self-encirclement." American observers believe that any West Berlin action taken to prevent further kidnappings will be used by the Communists to support their case for gradually sealing off the western sectors of the city. Thus far the East Berlin press has not mentioned the recent kidnapping incident.
25X1A
The West Berlin Senate, incensed by the kidnapping Mr-DrWalter Linse on 8 July, immediately adopted measures to prevent other such incidents. In addition, Allied officials have formally charged Soviet authorities with collusion in the
crime.
Comment:
25X1A
Members of Linse's organization, the Committee of Free Jurists, state that he did not have any highly "susceptible infort mation," but had been doing interpretive rather than investigative work. SECRET
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13.
Major powers attacked by other NATO countries on consultation procedures: Dutch permanent NATO representative Starkenborgh recently "scorched" the United States, France and Britain for not discussing in the North Atlantic Council their draft reply to the Soviet note which they showed to the other NATO members only 24 hours before delivery. Stressing that matters concerning Germany were of direct interest to all NATO countries, he remarked that opposition to NATO in his country, at least, came from the belief that it was compelled to support policies in Whose formulation its voice was not heard.
Starkenborgh's statement was quickly and forcefully endorsed by the representatives of Italy, Belgium, Norway, Greece, Denmark, Turkey, Portugal and Canada. As examples of instances where consultation on matters of concern to NATO countries was being carried on elsewhere, Starkenborgh cited, among others, the SACLANT appointment and command problems in the Mediterranean and the Near East.
25X1A
Comment: This is the strongest and most concerted protest yet voiced by the smaller NATO countries against what they consider big-power domination.
14.
Gaullist split does not strengthen Pinay's hand: The formal split in the Gaullist party does nol mean any added support for Pinay's government, according to the US Embassy in Paris. The Embassy points out that the new faction is composed of the conservative-minded Gaullist deputieS who have backed Pinay since his investiture, and warns that the dissidents have specifically announced their disapproval of the government's foreign policy. There is evidence that additional dissension may split the Gaullist ranks further in the fall, but the extent of the rift will depend on what Pinay's program has accomplished.
25X1A
25X1A
15.
Comment: Pinay is now assured of undisturbed tenure during the summer recess which begins on 12 July. The left wing of the Popular Republicans is becoming increasingly restive, however, and when the Assembly reconvenes in the fall, Pinny may be forced to make concessions on foreign policy in order to obtain support on the right to compensate for losses on the left.
Soviet offer on Danube shipping held best Austrians can obtain: American Embassy officlals in Vienna believe that Soviet
SECRET
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termS with respect to the resumption.of Austrian cargo and passenger traffic on the Danube within the Soviet-occupied sector are probably the best obtainable.
Austrian vessels under Austrian. colors and with Austrian crews operating within the Soviet zone will be allowed to land anywhere except at designated places involving Soviet security considerations. They will, however, be subjected to such Soviet checking as applies to Austrian interzonal rail traffic, and will be required to operate under interzonal permits valid for only three months at a time. The Austrians will be obliged to submit navigational information requested by the Soviet authorities, and to service agreed-upon Soviet landing points. The Austrian ships will not be allowed to transport goods and troops of the other occupation powers.
25X1A
Comment: While Soviet motives remain obscure, this ostensibly conci iatory gesture coincides with increased Austrian dissatisfaction over Soviet stalling on the Austrian treaty. Furthermore, the availability to the USSR of Austrian ships previously confined to US-controlled areas of the Danube will open up an important transportation outlet to Soviet interests in eastern Austria.
Through the revocation of permits, threat of vessel seizure, or charges of violations of regulations, the Soviet authorities are in position to terminate shipping at any time.
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25X1A
The Soviet Military Command reserves authority to modif any of the new re ulations if they are violated.
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17.
Italian Government to take firmer anti-Communist stand: The Italian Government's recent expulsion of certain foreign Communist journalists and the prosecution of some local Communists mark the beginning of a stronger anti-Communist policy, the American Embassy in Rome reports. The government intends to push through Parliament various anti-Communist measures, which include revision of the penal code, some restrictions press, closer control of trade union activities, and on the a new civil defense bill. The Embassy doubts whether this legislation, which will face much parliamentary opposition, can be put through in time to have "great effect" before the 1953 elections.
25X1A
Despite pressure from some Christian Democrats, the government reportedly will not interfere seriously at this time with strictly domestic activities of the Communist Party. However, it is expected to exercise stricter control over international contacts of the Italian Communists and v bit re resentatives in Italy.
25X1A
significantly the widespread appeal of the Communist Party, which now has the support of approximately one-third of the electorate.
18.
a far-reaching program of econoiTE-10 social reform, the government's proposed legislation is not likely to reduce
Comment:
Unless accompanied by
Comment: Switzerland will probably grant the East German Government de facto recognition, through the exchange of trade missions if satisfactory are made on Swiss interests in East Germany. American arrangements officials such recognition will be trumpeted by in Berlin believe that even the East Germans as a major diplomatic triumph.
25X1A
Swiss unmoved by US protests over possible recognition of East Germany: Despite a formal Amerlcan the Swiss have indicated they may grant the East German protest, Government de facto recognition. Swiss Under Secretary of State Zehnder has pointed out that there is little hope for the unification of Germany and that his government could not refuse such recognition if the East Germans were to make satisfactory concerning the 4,000 Swiss citizens living in Eastarrangements Germany as well as the Swiss investments, valued at 200 million francs, in that country. British officials have been discussing this problem with the Swiss since April. The Swiss have consistently maintained the same position.
SECRET
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SECRET LATIN AMERICA
19.
Bomb damages US Information Service Library in Argentina: A bomb was exploded at the door of the US Information Service in Buenos Aires at midnight on 8 July. No US Embassy personnel were injured, but the pround floor of the Lincoln Library was reduced to shambles.
Comment: Destruction of the heavily-patronized Lincoln Libra7TiBUId cut off a valuable source of information about the United States. The Peron government has gradually reduced the available amount of current information about the United States by banning many US news periodicals from the cbuntry and by establishing control over the importation of books.
25X1A
Responsibility for the bombing has not been established. Despite the serious damage, the Lincoln Library was reopened to the public on 10 July.
20.
25X1A
Brazilian Senate approves law allowing unions to affiliate with ICFTU: The Brazilian Senate on 7 July approved legislation allowing Brazilian labor unions to affiliate with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. Ministry of Labor officials ex.ected President Var as to sign the bill this week.
Comment: The bill was sponsored by the Vargas administration which has recently given other indications of a disposition to free the Brazilian labor movement from traditional government dominance.
21.
President and Foreign Minister of Panama suggest new Canal Zone treaty: Speaking before a group of Americans on 3-July, Panamanian Foreign Minister Molino spoke of the "need" for a new Canal Zone treaty. He added, however, that Panama has no intention of changing the rights the US has at present. Later, President Arosemena, in an equally friendly way, repeated the suggestion. Ambassador Wiley, after talking with Molino, believes that no definite proposals were in mind. 'Molino told him that in a new treaty the US could be assured of bases "wherever and whenever needed." The newspaper controlled by President-elect Remon immediately took up the issue and editorialized on the need for a new treat
25X1A
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Comment: The position taken by Remon's newspaper and the fact that he will be inaugurated in less than three months suggest that Remon may be indirectly testing reaction to a treaty revision.
Likely to figure prominently in any discussions on the revision of the 1936 treaty is strong local feeling that commercial competition from the Zone has contributed to Panama's present economic crisis. Resentment also exists over the unequal pay received by Panamanian and US employees in the Zone.

SECRET
12
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11 July 1952
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This digest of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the
Approved For Release/2000/04/19 : CIA-RDP79T01146/48.1100120001-7

TOP SECRET
25X1X
GENERAL
Comment: Czechoslovakia has so far been unsuccessful in reit-MET-an agreement with NIOC on the terms of an oil contract. The basic difficulty is the lack of transportation facilities, and there is no indication that this problem has been overcome. Even if a contract is signed, it probably will not be implemented in the near future, and therefore, the Battle Act will not apply. Signature of any oil contract, however, is of propaganda benefit to the Iranians in their effort to force the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company to permit the sale of Iranian oil.

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This form will be placed on toy of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency as it is downgraded, destrOyed, Or
DATE
NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detael ed from Top Secret mate tal it shall be completed in the appropriate space below and transrnitt d to Central Top Secret Contro for record
DO NGRADED
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sy (Signature)
Orr ICE
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WITNESSED BY
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BY
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ApproVed For ReleNte 2000/04/19 : CIPARDP79,T11`46A001100120IME-7

Vat PREVIOUS EDITIONS.
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TOP SECRET
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HR70-14
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FAR EAST
1 . Fhal Sino-Sovtet decision 1. Final Sino-Soviet decision on on Panmunjom Panmunjomtalks talks reportedly reportedly scheduled 20 July: July : before 20
Soviet and and Chinese Chinesediplomats diplomatscurrently currently attending a conference at at Peiping will will reach tending a a "final *'final decision" declsionflon on the the cease fire fire talks talks no no later 20 July. July4 later than than 20
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Comment: have been been recent recent reports reports Comment: There have of Communist role in in major decisions concernof an increasing lncreaslng Chinese Chlnese m s t role ing North Korea, hitherto hithertoexclusively exclustvelya aSoviet Sovietpuppet. puppet. It is Is possible possible that that truce trucetalk talkpolicy policyis isnow nowdecided decidedjointly jolntly by by the the Chinese Chtnese and and the the Russians without Russians without North North Korean consultation. consultation.
There have been been no no other other reports reports of o f the the conference conference or the the 20 20 July July deadline. deadline.
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FOR RELEASEDATE: RELEASEDATE: APPROVED FOR 24-Mar-2010 24-Mar-201 0
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E01175AW30700510001-7
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12 July 1952
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Copy No. 53
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NO CHANGE IN DECLASSIFIED CLASS. CHANGED TO: NEXT REVIEW DATE.
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Office of Current Intelligence Diq:

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SUMMARY
GENERAL
1.
Colombian Ambassador urges expression of confidence in decisions on Korea (page 3).

FAR EAST
US
NEAR EAST - AFRICA

4.
5.
2. 3.
Japan reportedly formulating new China policy (page 3). China unyielding on withdrawal of British firms (page 4).
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6.
New Egyptian Prime Minister to confer with.budanese leauer

(page 6).
WESTERN EUROPE
7.
East German Alert Police reportedly receives 74 Soviet tanks

(page 6).
LATIN AMERICA
8.
Senora de Peron near death; civil disturbances possible (page 7).
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Approve d For Release 2003/10/15 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000700510001-7
GENERAL
1.
Colombian Ambassador urges expression of confidence in US decisions on Korea:

The Colombian Ambassador I
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Comment: The Ambassador's suggestion, coming immediately after the Yalu river bombing, is further indication that Colombia, which until recently took little interest in world affairs, now considers itself directly concerned with international events. This favorable development probably stems from participation in the Korean action. Colombia is the only Latin American nation with troops serving in the UN command.
2.
Japan reportedly formulating new China policy:
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Japanese Foreign Minister Okazaki has expressed the view that the peace treaty signed with Nationalist China on 28 April ends the state of war with all of China, and that the "question of a peace treaty between Communist China and Japan does not present itseltr

FAR EAST
The Ambassador said that the European governments fail to realize that the action in Korea is diverting Russian pressure from Europe. He charged that they are tending to "disrupt most effectively" the United Nations' struggle.
joint declaration ct "perfect accord" with United States decisions there.
m ons fighting in Korea to issue a
trying to get a "strong majority"
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I this thesis shows a certain evolution in Foreign Office thinking on the Taipei treaty.
Comment: An assertion that peace has been established with all of China carries the implication that it is not only unnecessary but legally impossible to conclude a peace treaty with Communist China. This would also permit the establishment of de facto relations with Peiping without the formality of a peace treaty. Such an interpretation would represent a departure from the previous government position that the Taipei treaty had no effect on Japan's future relations with Peiping.
3.
China unyielding on withdrawal of Britishfirms:
25X1A
Peiping's reply to London's notes asking permission for British firms to withdraw from China states that Communist China has repeatedly proved its willingness to trade wieh other countries. Sino-British trade has declined, the reply charges, because of British embargo measures instituted under American pressure and because of the bad management of the individual British firms in China.
British businessmen wishing to withdraw from China may apply to local authorities, who will deal with each case on its merits under existing regulations.
withdrawal of British firms. Before receiving permission to close down, foreign firms in China must yield to exorbitant financial demands for severance pay to Chinese workers and for settlement of other inflated claims.
Comment: The tone of Peiping's reply does not suggest any interlo 1-7-eTitx its conditions for permitting the

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The American Embassy believes, for its part, that no actual change has occurred in the government's policy.
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6. New Egyptian Prime Minister to confer with Sudanese leader:

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Egyptian Prime Minister Sirry Pasha has invited El Mahdi, the leader al the proindependence Sudanese Umma Party, to Cairo as an official guest of the Egyptian Government. El Mahdi is expected to arrive on 22 July at the head of a large delegation of tribal chiefs and party leaders who are advocates of Sudanese independence.
This is the first evidence that Sirry Pasha will renew Egyptian-Sudanese talks in an effort to obtain Sudanese acceptance of Farouk's title of "King of the Sudan." El Mahdi, who himself has aspired to this title, has not yet indicated his reaction to the first Egyptian-Sudanese talks last month.
Commeunt:
7.
East German Alert Police reportedly receives 74 Soviet tanks:

WESTERN EUROPE
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a total of 74 tanks being transported from the Soviet Union to East Germany on 15, 18 and 24 June. American representatives in Munich believe that these tanks have been delivered to East German Alert Police units.
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Approved For Release 2003110115 : CIA-RDP79100975A0007 0510001-7
Comment:
in some time of the receipt of tanks by Alert Police units, although an issue of Soviet weapons to three units in May has been confirmed. It is believed that for the past year the Alert Police has had 90 tanks for training purposes.
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This is the first reliable report
8.
Senora de Peron near death; civil disturbances possible:

he demise of Senora de Peron appears to be a question of days. All major diplomatic unctions have been cancelled at the request of the Foreign Office.
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The US Embassy in Buenos Aires comments that her death could touch off civil disturbances.
Comment: Peron has stated privately that his wife is dying, and during the past few weeks the government's propaganda campaign has been concentrated on her. A high point of the campaign has been the allegation that the United States has banned her book.
This build-up increases the possibility that any demonstrations occasioned by her death might assume an anti-US character.

LATIN AMERICA
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Oenior Alert Police officers were negotiating for the purchase of military equipment and heavy armament of Soviet make and that the raising of a national army was to be entrusted to a special mission from the general staff of the Soviet forces in Germany.
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HR70-14
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ea
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6. 6.
Cryptic C r y p t i c message message suggests s u g g e s t s major North Korean Korean movement: movement: A 7 July J u l y message-passed message p a s s e d over a a North Korean Ko r e a n tactical tactical met, net, possibly Hamhung p o s s i b l y used used by elements e l e m e n t s of the t h e V Corps in i n the t h e Bamhung . March MaYch must must be .ebntinued "ihe area, tjtated: " t h e corps corpe is. is. cbntinued area, stated: (CANOh 15RSM/70 1SRSM/7O Let et m me e know when when they t h e y leave. leave. 't (CANOk a t night. night. L at Korea, 8 Korea, 8 July J u l y 52) 52)
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positive Comment: Cpm eot: While having no p o e i t i v e intelligence i n t e l l l g a p c e Value and'unidentifiable so4r6e, t this t o 1.s'U'ryptic a o r y p t i c nnatUre a t u r e and u n i d e n t i f i a b l e source, hie due to message tg message is a a further f u r t h e r slight s l i g h t _indication i n d i c a t i o n of of the t h e .enrrent o t i c d among uties n shifting of units and changing changing of of d duties noticed s h i f t i n g df rear areas areas of of t the eastHcoast, North Korean Korean units, u n i t e iin n tthe h e rear h e eaet coast.
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PPROVED FOR FOR RELEASEDATE: RELEASEDATE: 8-Mar-2010 1PPROVED
meqt! The "transfer" " t r a n s f e r " referred r e f e r r e d to t o is I s from the the Co mentf ChgnghflRiver Chwrv 0 r area area in i n northwestern n o r t h w e s t e r n Korea to t o an area northnortheast east o of qungnam. Hungnam. Messages Messages passed p a s s e d on the t h e North Korean Armored Forces F o r c e s network have made mrlde frequent f r e q u e n t mention of of units u n i t s in i n the the 101 101 to t o 110 110 series, s e r i e s , with the t h e implication implication that t h a t these t h e s e are are regimental-size r e g i m e n t a l - e i z e units. units,
At A t least l e a s t One one North Korean armored regiment is i s currently currently s p r o b a b l e that that l o c a t e d just j u s t southwest,of southwest of Wonsan, located Wonsan, and it i is probable a t least two o t h e r armored battalions b a t t a l i o n s are in the t h e Wonsan at other Mea. Hamhung area. and Himhung
North reaches North, Korean Itarean antiaircraft a n t i a i r c r a f t artillery a r t i l l e r y reginlent regiqpnt r eaches northeastern commander of of Ihe t h e North Korean ICorean aoytheasCe!qn interior: i n t e r i o r 8 /he ?h e commander A n t i a i r c r a f t Artillery A r t i l l e r y Regiment informed the 21st 2 l s t AAA t h Antiaircraft 24th J u l y that t h a t the t h e 24th 2 4 t h had arrived arrived Regimental commander on 5 Julr at a t Sinbukchong. (CANOE 15RSW/15907 Korea, 8 8 July July 52) 52) 15RSM/15907 Korea,
This new location location f or t h e North Korean 24th 24th Comment: This for the North Korean Comment: AAA A M RWirliFET R m is is west west of of Tanchon Tanchon in i n northeastern n o r t h e a s t e r n Korea. Korea. The The regiment regiment WaS was previously p r e v i o u s l y located l o c a t e d in in the t N e Hamhung-Wonsan Hamhung-Wonsan area, area, where it i t was was recently r e c e n t l y activated. activated.
Th$s movement away from from the t h e battle b a t t l e lines l i n e s has been This d e t e c t e d recently r e c e n t l y in i n other o t h e r North North Korean Korqan .units u n i t s in i n the t h e northnorthdetected east. east. As-yet 4s y e t no firm f i r m conclusion c o n c l u s i o n can;be c a n , b e reached as to t o the the s i g n i f i c a n c e of.these of t h e s e still s t i l l tentative t e n t a t i v e movep. move@. signifiCance
4
7, 7 .
Ano.$,her Koredn armored armored move move to t o east east coast coast Another North KoreAn suggested: n"'VnEidentlSi'gi4. uunit n i t informed o r t h Korean AniVriidentiffed informed N North Armored Yorces Headquarters %%%&irc:s H e a d q u a r t e r s on 5 5 July: "the " t h e transfer t r a n s f e r time's march, for Sagu for the t h e 107th 1 0 7 t h unit u n i t from Chongju to t o the'lOth t station, ." (CANOE 3 330 Comm Recon s t a t i o n , is is well well understood. understood. .'I (CANOE Korea, ALT Co Korea, ALT 946, 946, 6 6 July J u l y 52) 52)
JIM
9. 9.
Lack of i s c i p l i n e noted noted in i n North North K2rean KQrean unit: u n i t : The The of d discipline Chief'of S t a f f of 09 fhe t h e NOrth NorthX orean Z3rd Brigade on 8 July Julv Chief af Staff 'Korean 23reBrigade on 8 -" asked for for a a report on on the the personnel of a subordinate of a ,who had taken th0 the "nation's "natiods praperty." b a t t a l i o n ,who battalion had illegally illegally taken property.r The intimated that t h a t the t h e property ammunition and and The message message intimated property was was ammunition weapons which d e s p i t e the fact that t h a t there there which had been seized despite was no ?!ffinemy" !!$qemy" aactivity. c t i v i t y . (CANOE 330 was no 330 Comm Recon.Ca Recon Ca Korea, Korea, ALT 995, 998, 8 8 July July 52) 52)
,

-TOP SECRET 5
CANOE4 july, 52
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the enemy has been ab-r substantially to increase the operational strength of all its armies. This increase is attributed to greater troop efficiency replacement, a decided decrease in casualties since November 1951, and the addition of organic artillery to each CCF army.
Chinese armies which have been on the line for more than seven months are still carried at a strength of 29,000 men, the number accepted last October. However, the armies which have been recently committed reflect the new strength of 36,000 men. In addition, the remaining Chinese Communist armies in the rear area are in the process of regrouping and being brought up to the new operational operational strength. strength.
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11. 11.
North Korea expands railway security organization: The on the the continued continued fact that the the enemy places great great importance importance on line is le reflected serviceabilityof his rail line reflected in the organization security brigades brigades totalling totalling of three North Korean railroad security some 26,000 26,000 men. men. Although the exact area of responsibility North Korean Korean RR RR "Recovery" "Recovery" of these brigades, subordinate to the North Bureau 585th Army Unit, Wnit, is is unknown, it it is is believed that that the the first brigade is le responsible for for rail rail lines lines in in the the west, west, the the sec886ond for the east coast and the the third third for for areas areas along along the the Manchurian border I Manchurian border.
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Comment: Comment : The RR "Recovery" vfRocovery"Bureau Bureau, probably probably consistjng consisting of peFFSEE6I is carried under personnel unfit for for active military duty, 1,s the civilian Ministry of duties of RR RR Security. Security,, The principal duties of these these units units are are probably probably security security and rand maintenance. maintenance.
12. 12.
Peiping allegedly planning planning major military military move move in late July: I July: I regime will wili make make the Peiping regime a major in and that ~ J r move matre O 1n the tne near ncar ruture, future, land .that preparations are to be completed July. completed in in late late ] / . y l u J
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Comment: Comment : j1
bv Moscow Moscowphad been ordered by o be ready to ready for for world world war war by by autumn. autumn. I
1 Peiping Peiplng
____
1 the USSR USSR and and Communist Communist ithe China "final decision" decisionvqon the Korean cease-fire are to to reach a "final China are talks talks before before 20 20 July. July. There There is is no no reliable reliable evidence, evidence, however, however,
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t h a t the the Chinese Communists Communists are planning a military venture that direction during during July. July. in any direction

ffEeRET--7 7
14 July 52
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HR70-14 HR70-14
5. 5.
Message mentions Meseage m e n t i o n s new new Chinese Chinese division d i v i s i o n in i n Korea: Korea; On On Jul>, an.eIement-of ah. element" 'of the t h e Chinese Communist Communist 'Ith rtillery 9 July, 7th A Artillery Division's D i v i s i o n ' e supply s u p p l y unit u n i t reported r e p o r t e d its i t s entry e n t r y into i n t o Korea, Korea, apparently This a p p a r e n t l y from from Sinuiju, S i n u i j u , on on 5 5 July. July. T h i s element e l e m e n t stated: stated: "we advanced to '1wa t o the t h e north n o r t h of Sunchon Bunchon and and ran r a n out o u t of of gas. gas. found the 64th 6 4 t h Division's D i v i s i o n O e fifth f i f t h ta-tui t a - t u i (unit) ( u n i t ) and and obtained obtained (CANOE K-4330, 9 gas. t1 (CANOE 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, Korea, K-4330, ." July J U I . ~ 52) mi
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It I t is possible that t h a t the t h e "64th " 6 4 t h Division" Division!' referred an antiaircraft artillery r e f e r r e to o in this t h i s message is a n q ntiaircraft a rtillery division d i v i s i a n deployed d e p l o y e g in i n northwestern n o r t h w e s t e r n Korea. Korea. While identifiidentification c a t i o n cannot c a n n o t be be accepted a c c e p t e d on on this t h i s message message alone, alone, a a Chinese Chinese Communist Antiaircraft Artillery Division has been been Cornmunitst 61st 61st A ntiaircqaft A rtilldry D i v i s i o n ha6 accepted iin western Korea, s south of Pyongyang, Pyongyang, and and a a 63rd 63rd accepted n w e s t e r n Korea, o u t h of Antiaircraft Artillery Division has tentatively Antiaircraft A rtillery D ivision h a s been t entatively identified i d e n t i f i e d in i n eastern e a s t e r n Korea. Korea.
h
Comment: omment:
6. 8.
S e l f - p r o p e l l e d artillery, a r t i l l e r y , bbattalion a t t a l i o n operates i t h North Self-propelled operatet w with North Korean'-defeuse northeaetern Koroan defense fforce o r c e in n o r t h e a s t e r n Korea: Korea: A A North'Korean N o r t h Korean 'coastal 'coaataz secUrity s b c u r i t y unit u n i t in i n northwestern-Korea, n o r t h w e s t e r n Korea, probably p r o b a b l y the the 25th 2 6 t h Mechanized Artillery A r t i l l e r y Brigade of the t h e V Corps, Corps, informed informed its subordinates s u b o r d i n a t e s that t h a t "the " t h e Corps' C o r p s ' autoiatic a u t o m a t i c selfselfone of its propelled p r o p e l l e d battalion b a t t a l i o n was was permitted-to permitted . t o operate o p e r a t e from from our our
3 3
J u l y 52 52 15 July
ID
TOP SECRET CANOE

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defense front." front. The message message continued with instructforces defense providing infantry cover for /or this armor and ions about providing,infantry Statement that Pyou concluded with the statement "you will have the operationally automatic self-propelled artillery attached operationally the Grp kCANOE 330th Comm Recon Recon,Grp to t h e company commander. commander." (CAN04 ALT 043, 043, 10 10 July July 52) 52) Korea, ALT
may be a reflection from North North Comment: This message may Koreae infantry elements elements of KoreairafiEtry of the the recently recently observed observed trend trend of attaching armor to o major major tactidal tactical units. units.
7. 7 .
8. 8 .

4 4
Pyongyang,authorities Pyongyang authorities continue continue to to express express concern concern oVer 1'010 Communications: 'AA message messAge passed paSsed between between two over radio,communicationa: west coast =st coaet security security units unit6 on on 11 11 July July stated stated that that the the "Pyongyang. .higher .higher authorities are asking asking about the the wirelese wirelesta problem." problem." In addition, the the originator originator stated stPted that his unit was piagued by communication communication difficulties, difficultiee. 15R8M/37Ol 14 ld July July 52) 52) (CANOE 15R8M/370,
.
Comment: Comment: While this this message message may illustrate illustrate the the effect effect t h e b o m b i n gof of the the North North Korean Korean power power plants, plants, ,of thg,Wri'bombing shortage shortage of communication communiaation equipment equipment may may also also be be cauOing causing this t h i s concern. conceru.
Chinese.Communist Cb#.ne,sg Communist artillery artillery unit's unit's move may presage presage offenalve islands:The 27th Artill ArtlIlery off e n a v e against again8t UN-held' UN-held 1. slands: Th e 27th erY Reginent''s rear area areaCOMmana ccrlhmanfl poot post on on 11 11 July July informed informed its its Regiments rear 3,000 subordinate 3rd "your battalion's battalion's 3,000 3rd BattaTion Battalion that that"your rounds of ammunition ammunition w111 wiil go go to to Songhyon-ni,"_ Songhyon-ni,lf a town town rounds of located located on on the the southern southern Yonan Yonan Penineula. Peninsula. The message message indicated that the the ammunition ammunition was to to be be shipped shipped in in the the indicated immediate immediate future. future. (CANOE (CAdOE 501st Comm Comm Recon Recon Orp Grp Korea, Korea, 1P-4383, K-42183, 12 July July 52) 52)
.
Comment: possible that elements of the 27th Comment: It is poesible A r t i l m g i m e n t, heretoforein insupport support of of the the CCP CCF ArtilWiTNigiment, heretofore 39th Army, May may be moving moviqg into into southern southern Yonan Yonan Peninsula, Peninsula, west of of Kaesong; Krlesong, to to support support the the 564th 564th Regiment, Regiment, 63rd 63rd Army, Army, which which recently recently moved moved into into that that area. area.
this move indicates indicates a purely It is not known whether this defensive maneuver maneuver or or whether whether the the Communists Cowmunists intend intend to to defensive initiate i n i t i a t e offensive offensive action action against the the UN-held islands islands in in the the vicinity vicinity of of the the peninsula. peqinsula.
15 July JU&Y 52 52 15
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T6.13 SECRET CANCyi:

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9. 9.
Korean 8Qnd 82nd Infantry Regiment r returns to its North Korean I n f a n t r y Regiment eturns t o i ts divis'ion: f t e r a. t h e ' North North division: A After a number number of messages from the Wiiiigth Division welcoming !fo;'eaasth Division welcomina ita long l o n n absent a b s e n t 82nd 82nd -its Regiment back into the unit, July message i indicates Snto t he u n i t , a 9 July-mepaage ndicates that the relieve t hat t h e 82nd is $s to to r e l i e v e a "Hunting fpIuntingInfantry I n f a n t r y Regiment" in the i n t h e Tongchoh area of of coastal eastern e a s t e r n Korea. Korea. The (CANOE 501st 5018t meeeage message discusses d i s c u s s e s details d e t a i l s of the t h e relief. r e l i e f . (CANOE Comm Recon Grp Gyp Korea, Xorea, 8K-L-223, 8K-L-223, 10 10 July J u l y 52) 52) year in the Cnmment: The 82nd, 82nd, after a f t e r over a y ear I n t h e Kaesong comment: awayotibm area m m its i t s parent p a r e n t division, d i v i s i o n , apparently a p p a r e n t l y began began reaching regiment r e a c h i n g its Its destination d e s t i n a t i o n on on 9 9 July. J u l y . ' The r e g i q e n t left left Kaesong in two echelons Knesong e c h e l o n s in i n late late June. June. No information i n f o r m a t i o n is Is a v a i l a b l e as to t o the t h e identity i d e l l t i t y of t he'TIunting I nfantn available the-"Hunting Infantry whiqh the Regiment" which the ,82nd 82nd is is relieving. r e l i e v i n g . It I t is poseiblie possibIb that that this t h i B is is a a local l o c a l security B e c u r i t y unit. unit.
10.

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5 5
Chinese 20th 2 0 t h Army still s t i l l in i n Wohsan Woqs,an area: areas An element of the supply'unitottheXhineselCovildnist the s u-m 7 t h Artillery Artillery - l v ' u n i t of' the'JChinese 'CoduiiAiist 7th Divisicnon P ivisicnon 9 9 July J u l y reported reported a a trip t r i p along a l o n g the'north-south t h e north-souih road r o a d from from Wonsan Woqsan to t o Pyongyang. Pyongyang. The message stated that that ."our camouflage p position .the 20th 'Tour camouflage o s i t i o n is is not n o t too t o o good. good. . the 2 0th has many many vehicles v e h i c l e s camouflaged camouflaged along a l o n g the t h e highway. highway." Army has K-4325, 9 July (CANOE 501st Comm Comm Recon Recon Grp Grp Korea,' Korea, IC-4325, J u l y 52) 52)
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Comment: This T h i s major element element of the t h e Chinese 9 9th t h Army Grouri located iin area s south of Wonsan Wonsan f for G r o u has p m Open e n located n tthe h e area o u t h of o r the the past probably-serves a line of-cOmmunication parat six skx months. months. It It p robably ~ e r v g s of communication and anti supply s v p p l y function f u n c t i o n while w h i l e retaining r e t a i n i n g its its tactical tactics?, unity. unity.
11.
S o v i e t MIG's UIG'e in Soviet i n Manchuria Manohuria move move nearer n e a r e r Korean Korean border: border: S e v e r 3 recent Cinese Cbixieeemessages'scheduled m e s s a g e s ' s c h e d u l e dflairfield "airfield Several t r a n s f e r " flights f l i g h t s oY oaf Soviet S o v i e t aircraft a i r c r a f t between between Manchurian Manchurian transfer" airfields airfields. Since 6 6 July, J u l y , two two groups of of 32 32 MIG-15's to Since MIG-15's each were to t r a n s f e r from Mukden to t o Antung Antung and and from from Tungfeng Tungfeng to to transfer Fengcheng, Fqngcheng, a a new new jet j e t base b a s e near n e a r Antuag. Antung. TheA.atter The latter transfer transfer s t r i d e n t l y completed CompJeted because.26 b e c a u s e ' 2 6 Soviet S o v i e t MlG's was eVidently MIG's were echeduled for for two two training t r a i n i n g flights f l i g h t s h-am from Fengcheng Fengcheng on on 11 1 1July. July. scheduled (CANOE 6920 6820 Security S e c u r i t y Grp Grp Johnson Johnson AB AB Japan, J a p a n , AP AP 758, 758, 9 9 July; July; (CANOE AP A P 801, 801, 10 10 July J u l y 52) 52)
Comment: Comment : These These transfers t r a n s f e r s represent represent a a considerable, considerable, a l t h o v 8 i b l temporary, y temporary increase , i n c r e a s ein i nenemy enemy air a i r combat combat althoW66gsibly strength s t r e n g t h in i n the:Aatang tbe,Antang area. area. Probably P r o b a b l y ffive ive o r six of or sixof
15 July J u l y 52 S2 15
-MP-SECRET CANOE
Ia.
n i n e Russian-manned units in in Manchuria are now based the nine w i t h i n 50 50 miles miles of of Korea. Korea. within
MIG-15's of the the Chinese Chinese 12th 12th Air Approximately 41 41 MIG-15's Approximately Division also also moved moved from from Takushan Takushan to to Fengcheng Fengcheng on on 12 12 and and Division 13 July. July. Of Of the the four four jet jet airbases airbases in in the the Yalu Yalu River River area, area, 13 Fengcheng is is the tbe most most difficult difficult for for American American pilots pilots to to Fengcheng observe. observe.
la. 12.
Antung-based Antunik-based YIG'E MIG's on on photo photo reconnaissance reconnaissance mission: Chinese COmmunist Communlet messages messages Scheduled scheduled flights f l i ghts of o f as as many many as as Chinese 16 MIG-lS's on "photo reconnaissance" missions missions from Antung 16 MIG-15ts on i r Force over an an unknown unknown area area on on 9 9 and and 10 10 July. July. (CANOE over (CANOE A Air Force 134, 11 11 July July 52) 52) Roundup 134, Roundup
:I
~~
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6 6
Comment: The only previous reference reference in meiaages to Comment: messages to photo reconnaissance reconnaissance by by MIG-15's HIG-15's in in Manchuria Manchurla was'in was in August August 1951. This later later message message suggests suggests that that an an uhuSually u~usuallylarge large 1951. number of MIG-15's YIG-lS1sat at Antung Antung are are equipped equippedwith withcatheras cameras number of instead of of guns. guns. Single instead Single Communist aircraft have occasionally engaged in in what appeared to to be reconnaissance reconnaissance over over . Korea. Korea.
15 July July 52 52 15
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Chinese Communists suggest new approach to POW POWissue issue in Eorea: Korea: 3. Chinetre 2.
Former Former Indian Indian Ambassador Ambassador to to Peiping, Peiplng, K. M. Pmlkkaa; Panikkar, reportedly states states that the K.M. Chinese want to to avoid appearappearChtnese Communists Communiste want as sponsors ing as sponsorsof of any any plan plan involving Lnvolvlng the neutral rescreening rescreenlngof of unwilling unwilling POW returneesat atPanmunjom. Panmwjom. It pow returnees is inferred, however, that the Communists would consider this apapi s however, that the Communists would conslder this proach if it were advanced by UN negotiators. prowh If It were advanced UN
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Oomment: Comment: Chinese Communist propaganda adopted a more more optimistic optimisticline linetoward towarddevelopments developmentsat at Panmunjom Panmunjom earlier in the earlier inthe theweek, week, but butover over theweek weekend endit itshifted shiftedback backtO to vilifying vilifying the United United Nations. Nations.
3.
Soviet MIG's MIG's in in Manchurta Manchuria move movenearer nearer Korean Korean border: Several recent Chinese Chtnese messages messages scheduled scheduled US Air US A i r Force flights of of Soviet Soviet aircraft "airfield transfer" flights aircraft 9, 10 Ally 9,lO July 52 52 between between Manchurtan Manchurianairfields. airfields. CANOE P p 7JV r \ PSOI f80\ two groups groups of o f 32 32 MIG-15's MIG-15's Since 6 6 July, July, two each were from Mukden Tungfeng to were to to transfer transfer from Mukdento toAntung Antung and and from from.Tungfeng transfer was was latter transfer Fengcheng, Fengcheng, a a new new jet base base near nearAntung. 'Antung. The latter MIG's were scheduled evidently completed because 26 26 Soviet MIG's scheduled for for two training flights flights from fromFengcheng Fengcheng on on 11 11 July. training
transfers represent a Comment: These transfers considerable, although possibly temporary, increase In enemy enemy air alr cnnstderable, although p m m p o r a r y , increase in combat strength six of the nine ntne cOmbat strength in the Antung area, area. Probably five or six.of 50 mtles miles of tn Manchuria are are now now based within within 50 Russian-manned units in mrea. .Korea.
Approximately 41 MIG-15's MIG-15's of the Chinese Chinese 12th Air Dtvislon also moved moved from Takushan to to Fengcheng Fengcheng on 12 12 and Air Division from Takushan July. Of the four four jet jet airbases airbases in the Yalu River area, area, Fengcheng 13 JuIy. Of the Yalu River Fengcheng
is the the most most difficult dtffkult for for American American pilots to observe. is

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CANOE TOP S CRET CANOE

ry
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8. a.

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Communists in Ko~ela Korea emphasize antiaircraft operations: intercepts reveal reveal that that the the enemy enemy is is Recent Communist intercepts placing increasing increasing emphasis emphasis on on antiaircraft antiaircraft operations. operations. 12 July, a North Korean message stated that an antiairOn 12 craft battalion of of the the 9th 9th Division D i v i s i o n should be be ready for for the the inspection department chief" on of the the ,"antiaircraft ltantiaircraftdepartment on 20 20 inspection of 22 July. July. Another Korean intercept intercept on on the the same same day day dedeto 22 tailed "the the cruel enemy planes, planes bombardment" bombardmentttof Pyongyang Pyongyang commanders to to augment augment their their camouflage camouflage and ordered all unit commanders efforts and to strengthen "the "the watch service service for for enemy enemy planes. planes." Still another Korean message on 12 12 July July instructed instructed artillery battalion enfOrce the the counter-air counter-air battalion commanders commanders ."to "to enfbrce camouflage campaign, campaign, AAA unit unit activity activity and and effective effective blackout in in order to to prevent damage damage to to troop troop combat combat facilities." facilities .'* Elements of the Chinese Communist 1st Artillery Artillery D DiviiviThe sion also expressed expressed concern concern over over inadequate inadequate defenses. defenses. T he, sion Chinese C h i n e s e commander requested that that the the fire fire power power of his his unit unit be reconnaissanceplanes bo strengthened strengthened as as even even low-flying low-flying UN UN ra~onnwiarsanceplanes "can not be hit." hit." (CANOE 330th Comm Recon Co Korea, ALT 085, 13 14 July; .501st 085, 13 July; July; SK-L-322, SK-L-322, 12 12July; J u l y ; K-426, Kd426, 14 July; 501st .Comm Corm Reielian GrP,KorealfiBSY/415, 15RSM/415, 14 14 July July 52) Re&n Grtlp;,Karea 53)
52 16 July 52
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6, 6.
N o r t h Korean Korean GHQ GHQ fearful f e a r f u l of of UN amphibious amphibious operation o p e r a t i o n in in North t h e east: east: I n a a 12 1 2 July Ju l y message measage to t o',teach ?'each iinfantry n f a n t r y and rtilIn and a artilthe x m tbattalion a l i o n commander," commander." the t h e commanding commandina general g e n e r a l of the the lery Korean 21st 2 1 s t Brigade B r i g a d e in i n western w e s t e r n Hwanghae Province Province N o r t h Korean North repeats the t h e "radio "radio order o r d e r of of the t h e Corps" Corpst1 which stated: s t a t e d : "the repeats e n e m i e s are are p l a n n i n g to t o land l a n d on h e east i t h two enemies planning on t the east coast coast w with two u n i t s . " Fear F e a r is is also a l s o expressed e x p r e s s e d in i n the t h e message t h a t some some type type units." message that of UN operation o p e r a t i o n may may be be impending impending on OD the the west west coast. coast. of The brigade brigade commander commander cited c i t e d the t h e "more ltmore than t h a n 400 enemy enemy The f ighters. .over t he d e f e n s e area h e Corps for the the fighters. .over the defense area of of t the p u r p o s e of of reconnoitering r e c o n n o i t e r i n g our o u r remaining r e m a i n i n g strength s t r e n g t h and desdespurpose t r o y i n g the the buildings. buildings. .'I A l l brigade b r i g a d e units u n i t s were were inintroying ." All t o "strengthen " s t r e n g t h e n the t h e anti-airfiring a n t i - a i r f i r i n g power." power . I f (CANOE s t r u c t e d to structed (CANOE ROK Int Grp M Korea, SK-L-328, 15 July 52) ROK I n t G r p M Korea, SK-L-328, 15 J u l y 52)
.
7 . 7.
8. 8.
Comment: I t is Is e v i d e n t that t h a t the t h e enemy enemy is is still s t i l l exexIt evident t r e m e ' ly y 'conscious c o n s c i o u s of his his vulnerable v u l n e r a b l e flanks f l a n k s on on the t h e sea. sea. treme T h i s fear f e a r of of an a n amphibious amphibious operation o p e r a t i o n has h a s served s e r v e d to t o keep keep a a This c onsiderable p o r t i o n of o f the t h e enemy's enemyvs s trength t i e d down in in considerable portion strength tied a s t a t i c defensive d e f e n s i w e mission m i s s i o n on on both b o t h coasts. coasts. static
N e w North N o r t h Korean Korean brigade b r i g a d e may may be be subordinate s u b o r d i n q t e to to V V Corps Corps New 7 July J u l y message s e n t in in a a new y s t e m and and signed signed in the,qast: A'7 message sent new s system ~ the ~ wl/ &Corps?) & ' personnel perBonnel ? ) department d e p a r t m e n t chief" c h i e f t1 mentioned mentioned the the By " 2 0 t h Brigade." Brigade." (CANOE 3 3 0 t h Comm Comm Recon Recon Co Co Korea, Korea, ALT-079, ALT-079, "20th (CANOE 330th 13 July J u l y 52) 52)
Comment: Previously P r e v i o u s l y the the North North Korean Korean 25th 2 5 t h was t h e only only Comment: was the I t is is Korea. It b r i g a m g n e d t o ttheVCorps h a V C o r g s in i n eastern e a s t e r n Korea. brigade assigned to p o s s i b l e that t h a t another a n o t h e r brigade b r i g a d e has been been activated a c t i v a t e d in i n the t h e east east possible A similar similar situation s i t u a t i o n apparently a p p a r e n t l y exists exists for coastal c o a s t a l defense. defense. A for i n the t h e west the N o r t h Korean 2lst B rigade, s ubordinate in west where where the North Korean 21st Brigade, subordinate t o IV Corps, C o r p s s was w a s recently r e c e n t l y accepted a c c e p t e d by by the'ParEast t h e ' F a r E a s t Command. Command. to
C o n v e r s i o n to t o land line communications communications indicated indicated b x Conversion by chinese regiment: Tile The C h i n e s e 2 6 t h h i n e s e combat combat artillery a r t i l l e r y reflment: Chinese 26th r t i l l e r y Aegiment; Regiment,' 1st 1st Art A r t illeey l l e s ' y privision, Division, i n a 12 July July Artillery in a 12 message to to one one of of its its battalions b a t t a l i o n s stated s t a t e d that t h a t "each "each company company message l a y a line line t o b a t t a l i o n . 1 s The The message message discussed d i s c u s s e d the the will lay to battalion." of "tan-chi" " t a n - c h i " or or telephones t e l e p h o n e s needed, needed, and and lamented lamented that that number of number "only 29 29 at at p r e s e n t at a t regiment." regiment.'! (CANOE 501st 501st t h e r e were "only there present (CANOE Comm Recon K-4418, 14 14 July J u l y 52) 52) .Comm Recon Grp Grp Korea, K-4418,
4 4
1 7 J u l y 52 17 July 52
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Comment: W h i l e the t h e stated s t a t e d shortage shortvlge of i r e equipment While of w wire in t this h mregiment m e n t w will i l l probably p r o b a b l y prevent p r e v e n t its i t s going going over o v e r to to clearly the intention wire in i n the t h e immediate future, f u t u r e , it i t is iq c learly t he i ntention t o do so as soon soon as as possible. possible. to
I
This the part of e elements of t the T h i s going g o i n g over to t o wire on t he p a r t of l e m e n t s of he 1st A Artillery r t i l l e r y Division Division in i n west central c e n t r a l Korea Korea is is another another indication planning an i n d i c a t i o n that t h a t the t h e enemy is not p lanning a n immediate offensive o f f e n s i v e action. act i o n .
9. 9.

5
Chinese regiment attached to combat r regiment C h i n e s e artillery artillery r egiment a ttached t o combat egiment t h e tnnnt: f r 6 n t : An unidentified u n i d e n t i f i e d Chinese Chin e s e artillery a r t i l l e r y regiment, regiment, at the p o s s l b l g subordinate s u b o r d i n a t e to t o the t h e 1st 1st Artillery A r t i l l e r y Division, Division, possibly a 12 12 July J u l y message that t h a t it i t was attached to t o the the mentioned in in a mentiOned 343rd Regiment of o f the the 115th 115th Division. D i v i s i o n . The message also mentioned a a hill h i l l located l o c a t e d just j u s t south s o u t h of o f the t h e Mabang area mentioned i n the t h e west west central e e n t r a l sector. sector. (CANOE (CANOE 3 3 0 t h Comm Recon Recon Co Co 330th in Korea, K-4416, K-4416, 14 24 July J u l y 52) 52)
Comment: I t is is p o s s i b l e that t h a t this t h i s artillery a r t i l l e r y unit u n i t was was It possible assig-support t h i s infantry i n f a n t r y regiment r e g i m e n t in i n a specific specific assigal-f6-support this t h i s hill. h i l l . As of 16 1 6 July, J u l y , no no serious serious o p e r a t i o n against a g a i n s t this operation taken place in this t h l , e area. area. enemy c o n t a c t has h a staken enemy contact plal:!e
17 Julv 52
7 truly 52
TOP SECRET CANOE
4'Approved For Release S0108129 : ClA-RDP79T01146A04#100160001-3 SECRET

SECURITY INFCCMATION
US OFFICIALS ONLY
17 July 1952
OCI No. 6442 Copy N6. 280

(0

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SOVIET UNION
1.
Ambassador Kennan comments on Soviet policy in Rumania: Ambassador Kennan, in commenting on the Bucharest assignment of A. I. Lavrentiev, says that Moscow is placing the situation in the hands of its ace troubleshooter for the Satellite area. In the Ambassador's opinion, Rumania's strategic position is The Kremlin would like to make the Dobrudja the key factor. area a direct defensive responsibility of the Soviet army, but leave the Western area a Rumanian responsibility in order to avoid Soviet military contact with the Yugoslays. Ambassador Kennan feels that the appointment of Bughici as Rumanian Foreign Minister signifies a virtual Soviet takeover of the Bucharest Foreign Ministry and that Rumania is quietly belng changed into a Soviet constituent republic, alHe notes though for the present without formal incorporation. that Lavrentiev was previously assigned to Rumania in 1940 to arrange for the separation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina and their subsequent annexation by the USSR. The Ambassador concludes by noting that while three Deputy Foreign Ministers have recently left Moscow, only one replaceIn his opinion this may presage a ment has been announced. shake-up in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in which Vishinsky's position will bear watching.
2.
Local party officials criticize their Republic party secretaries: At the June plenum of the Tadzhik Republic Central Committee, a party secretary of the Stalinabad city committee criticized the secretaries of the central committee of the Communist Party of Tadzhikistan for failure to pay sufficient attention to industrial problems and for "unsatisfactory (U Joint Press Reading selection of executive cadres." $arvice, Pravda, 18 June 52)
SECRET
1

25X1A
17 July 52
Approved FOr Release SI960108129 : CIA-RDP79T01146A040100160001-3

SECRET
Commeitt:
June plenary session of the Belorussian central committee a secretary of the Mogilev city party committee criticized the Belorussian Party Buro for not yet having implemented a 1949 decision of its own. In the June plenary session of the Kirgiz central committee a secretary of the Talas Oblast stated that "responsibility for errors and distortions on the ideological point is borne primarily by the secretaries and the Buro of the central committee of Kirgiz Republic.
work 61-1-e-eretaries and members of the Euro of the Republic Party organization by officials of lower party units. In the
There have been other recent instances of the
3.
Orbit reportedly to dump lumber on European market: Soviet Orbit lumber and wood products will soon be dumped on the European market, according to persistent rumors in Austrian trade circles. The volume of Austrian lumber exports in the first half of 1952 is running about 10 percent below the same period in 1951. )25X1A Comment: It is unlikely that the USSR will undercut world markefFFIFFS, which are currently about 30 The Russians have been reluctant to increase percent below 1951. 1952 trade agreements with western countries timber exports in unless strategic goods were offered in exchange. Failures charged in of Hungarian coal mines: A party-directed campaignmechanization to uncover failures in mine mechanization in Hungary has revealed that machines awaiting repair in seven coal mines including are lying idle or the important Tatabanya mines in northwestern Hungary. The directors of two "model" enterprises stated that the machinery was unsuitable because of soil moisture. Mine technical leaders and rightist Social Democrats were charged with causing miners to boycott machinery in one northwestern mine. Much of the machinery is Soviet-made.
4.
This procedure seems to represent a definite pattern of criticism on the Republic level. It may well be that these local party officials were actually selected by representatives of the All-Union Central Committee organs to speak out against their Republic Central Committee.
EASTERN EUROPE
SECRET
2
17 July 52
Approved For ReleaseV000108129 : CIA-RDP79T01146AW1100160001-3

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The Soviet delegates to the recent Hungarian miners union congress stated in a recent interview that the mechanical backwardness of Hungarian mining was comparable to that of Russia in the early period of the First Five Year Plan. (
25X1A
5X1A
Comment: These developments indicate increasing concern probably Soviet-inspired, over the failure of the mines to meet coal demands of the Five Year Plan. The widespread disuse of Russian-made machinery implies that it is unsuited for the damp soil conditions prevailing in Hungarian mines.
25X1X
5.
25X1X 25X1X 25X1X
t at American-Yugoslav conversations on strategic and operational questions were "highly desirable." agreed that Britain and France should be included. He added that government also wished to consider the participation of Greece and Turkey, but he stressed that he did not wish
Comment: Yugoslavia has clearly indicated its wishes to avoid direct contact with NATO. This is the first official Yugoslav statement of willingness to engage in talks which presumably will lead to.limited joint planning.
to deal with an "organization." (1111.11)25X1A

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desires strate ic talks with the United States:
17 July 52
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FAR EAST
6.
Possible change in Japanese Communist strategy indicated: The lack ot widespread Communist violence in Japan on 15 July, 30th anniversary of the founding of the Japanese Communist Party, supports recent indications of a possible shift in party strategy away from militant tactics, according to CINCFE. These indications include a reported Communist directive to avoid violence on the anniversary day, and a speech by a prominent Communist urging the crowd to refrain from action which might provoke the police.
Comment: The publication of Tokuda's message in the CominY5FR-175urnal shows Soviet endorsement of a policy emphasizing peaceful activity. This may represent a recognition of the unfavorable consequences to the Japanese Communist Party of the recent disturbances in Japan. Moreover, this development supports previous indications of a possible general shift of emphasis from military to political action by other East Asian Communist movements.
7.
Break between Rhee and Home Minister Yi indicated: Home Minister Yi Pom-sok was reportedly given a severe tonguelashing by President Rhee at the State Council Meeting on 16 July. According to Ambassador Muccio, the President made it plain that he alone is running South Korea. Muccio also reports that, at the same meeting, Rhee made the extraordinary statement that he is no longer leader of the Liberal Party and has no connection with it.
The Ambassador comments that Rhee may be encouraged by his recent victory in the political turmoil and feel safe enough to shake free of dependence on the party which he originally organized with reluctance. Having done so it would be easier25X1A to disavow and remove Yi from power.
Comment: Recent reports from Pusan, perhaps inspired by Yi, hi.71-11Zicated that he might be Rhee's running mate in the coming presidential-vice presidential elections.

SECRET
4
The authority for this shift, according to CINCFE, may be a message which appeared in the Cominform Journal on 4 July from Kyuchi Tokuda, fugitive JCP leader. The message criticized the party's "struggles by force" and its negiect of such forms of struggle as election campaigns. (S CINCFE Telecon, 16 July 52)
17 July 52
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SECRET
Yi's control of the police, his power in the Liberal Party, and his supporters in the Youth Corps make him the second most powerful South Korean politico.
8.
The President, however, now maintains that a management company is not necessary, and he has attempted to replace it with a group of four or five US engineers, headed by a crony of Rhee's.
25X1A
American observers state that this unauthorized action is undoubtedly motivated by Rhee's desire to avoid any businesslike controls, which would be instituted by a management company, in order to siphon off a certain amount of profit for South Korean political "insiders." Meanwhile, it is estimated by US Army authorities that it will take at least a year after the selection of a management company to import and install the necessary equipment to begin the minin o erations. (C
9.
Peiping Radio urges Japanese Communists to be militant: Peiping Radio, commenting on the 30th anniversary of the Japanese Communist Party, asserts that the militant program adopted by the JCP in October 1951 is "the only way out" for the party. (R FBIS 15 July 52)
Comment:

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South Korean Government impedes implementation of US-ROK tungsten agreement: Since the signing of the US-ROK tungsten agreement over three months ago, the Korean Government has consistently impeded implementation of this program for increasing the production of tungsten in South Korea and its export to the US. Notwithstanding the fact that South Korea will derive considerable needed foreign exchange from the operation, Rhee,according to the the US Embassy, has hamstrung fulfillment of the agreement by failing to select an American management company which would be mutually acceptable. Such a company, specifically called for in the agreement, is to install machinery, initiate mining operations and train Korean nationals for future operations.
25X1A
This broadcast should be viewed against the backgThilinf the current Cominform Journal, in which the fugitive Secretary General of the JCP rebukes the present party leadership for paying "insufficient attention" to political forms of action.
17 July 52
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The apparent conflict between these messages is reflected in several Asian countries. "Armed struggle" is still officially prescribed as the "main form" of Communist action in East Asia. Nevertheless, several Asian Communist movements have shifted their tactics in the past year to emphasize political rather than military forms of action. The shift now extends to all Communist movements in East Asia outside the mainland.
10.
Comment: This unconfirmed report indicates that the Burme1UKMTT during the past months has successfully dispersed large concentrations of Communists in their base area of northcentral Burma. The reported route of Than Tun's flight suggests an intent to circle around Burmese forces and establish a new Communist base in upper Burma near the China border.
Other reports, however, state that Than Tun fled eastward into the Shan foothills after government forces overran his headquarters in the Pyinmana area in May. Recent Communist raids on towns and communications, in central Burma and elsewhere in the country, are evidence that the party still maintains organized forces.

25X1A
SECRET
6
Burmese Communist chief reported retreating toward India: The leader of the Burma Communist Party, Thakin Than Tun, with 300 followers is reliably reported to have crossed the Irrawaddy River about 100 miles southwest of Mandalay in late June. The report states that the Communists have proceeded toward the mountains of western Burma and that if they are blocked in an attempt to escape by turning to the north, they will try to reach Manipur Province in India. If not interned, the will later infiltrate back into Burma. 25X1A
'
17 July 52
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WESTERN EUROPE
110
Belgrade condemns Italian Trieste appointment: The authoritative Yugoslav news organ, Borba, condemns Rome's appointment of Professor Diego de Castro to the post of political adviser to the Anglo-American Military Government in Trieste. It characterizes the appointment as "one of the gros -Yugoslav provocations" undertaken by Italy. (R FBIS 15 July 521
25)(1A
Rome's appointment of De Castro vas leaked through the press before A.M.G. had the opportunity to ,,accept or reject him. Both the British and American Ambassadors Informed Premier de Gasperi on 11 July that the appointment of De Castro might prejudice Italian-YugoslavrelationsonTrieste.De Gasperi refused to withdraw the nomination.
12.

SECRET
7
Yugoslav officials associate De Castro with ItaliiirTiWdentist elemdnts. He is ,a member of the National Liberation Committee, an organization dedicated to the liberation of Italians residing in Istria. It will doubtless provide a basis for continued Yugoslav intransigence ,on Trieste.
Comment:
17 July 52
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25X1X
13.
25X1
25X1X
makes unusual plea for US aid: of France has sfiongly urged that the United States reconsider, its decision not to finance French military production to the extent requested by Defense Minister Pleven in Ma He twice ekpressed his personal disappointment to 25X1C durin the Bastille Day reception.
.
25X1A
domment: intervention highlights the French.Government's reluctance to publicize its bad budgetary position.
14.
Economic Commission for Europe believed hoping to seize initiative on East-West trade: The American delegate to the lconomic.Commission for Europe believes that Chairman Myrdal of theECE secretariat may be planning to seize the initiative in East-West trade gained by the Soviet Union as a result of the Moscow.Economic Conference. The delegate recommends a firm stand against a proposed September meeting on East-West trade, fearing that such a conference mi ht develop into a series of fruitless meetings. 25X1A )
in June mee ngs between Western and Eastern European trade experts might result in intensified bilateral negotiations rather than a general conference on trade. Myrdal holds that the p(roposed meeting would test the genuineness of Soviet trade offers'and would also offset the propaganda benefits of the Moscow Economic Conference.
that ITHOWd
notes that very rarely intervenes n!matters of this nature and interprets his action as an indication of the government's "serious concern."
(25X1A
domment: 11.1=11=rak
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8
17 July 52
Approved For Release#000/08/29 : CIA-RDP79T01146M01100160001-3 TOP SECRET

US OFFICIALS ONLY
17 July 1952
CIA Not 49745
Copy Nos
46

TOP SECRET
Approved For Relose 20001149112hatlierRDP79T01446A001100160001-3

THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS. 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMISSION OR RgVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
*
FAR EAST
1.
The previous figure submitted by the UN on the basisUTTEEomplete screening was 70,000. It is not expected, however, that the revised figure will prove any more acceptable to the Communists since the major gain is in the number of Koreans while the principal stumbling block in the negotiations is the future disposition of the Chinese.
Comment:
2.
ments are still unresolved. (=IIMMII.

25X1A
British approval of NATO Southern Europe command reorganization subject to reservations: British approval in the Standing troup of the proposed changes in the ground and air force command structure of Admiral Carney's Southern Europe command under SHAPE is subject to strong reservations by the British Chiefs of Staff. Britain retains the right to review the whole question in the light of future developments, particularly when the settlement of command arrangements in the Middle East and the Mediterranean comes up. The Chiefs of Staff hold that the proposed changes are only a partial solution of the southern flank command problem, and point out that naval command arrange-

WESTERN EUROPF
Figure for Communist POW's willing to be repatriated revised upwards: UN negotiators at Panmunjom advised the Communists on 13 July that the final screening of all POW's who would resist repatriation had been completed. The new figure is 83 000 broken down into 76,600 Koreans and 6,400 Chinese, 25X1A
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1
17 July 52

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FAR EAST EAST FAR

11. 11.
I
go back to their countries, then our Peoples Army will occupy all all of of South South Korea, KQrea, and and it i t will w i l l get g e t the t h e liberation," liberation," occupy s t a t e d an f 14 July ntercepted stated an alleged North Korean Korean message message o of July i intercepted b y a South S o u t h Norean Borean unit u n i t whose whose work work cannot cannot be be checked. checked. by
!
P u r p o r t e d North Korean KoFean intercept i n t e r c e p t outlines o u t l i Q e s Communist Purported Communist aims ere is is a a third t h i r d world world war, war, the t h e UN UN troops t roops will will in Korea: Korea: "if there g m t o t h e i r c o u n t r i e s , t h e n our .Peoples A r m y w i l l
The message message continued continued that,"to t h a t "to oppose oppose the the presidential' presidential e l e c t i o n inSouth i n . S o u t hKorea, Korea, we w e have have been been eending s e n d i n g thousands thousands election of the t h e political p o l i t i c a l men men to t o South South Korea." Korea." I t concluded i t h the the of It concluded w with t h a t "the " t h e day d a y when when our troops troops occupy l l of South s t a t e m e n t that statement occupy a all SoUth Korea, ,Japan Japan a lso w i l l belong o o u r Peoples Korea, also will belong tto our Peoples Re,public Republic of Korea." 18RSY/483, Korea, Korea, 16 16 July J u l y 52) 52) Korea." (CANOE 15RSM/483,
Comment: S t a t e m e n t s 'of t h i s nature n a t u r e have have never never appeared appeared Comment: Statements Cd this The fact f a c t that t h a t the the i n a an-i-RWIous n y o u s North North Korean Korean intercept. i n t e r c e p t . The in, c o n t e n t g of this t h i s message message are rare alien a l i e n to t o any any known known Communist Communist contents propaganda line l i n e suggest s u g g e s t that t h a t this t h i s may be a clumsy clumsy South propaganda South Korean attempt at a t fabrication. fabrication.
,11/ NR
13.
.areaon east coast:
North Korean armored unit in 37th Infantry Division A Nortli Korean armored unit, using a prem i e d call-sign, on 12 July J u l y stated s t a t e d that t h a i "the viousfY unidChtilied on 12 unit. .will h e holes u l y and the 3 7th unit. .will work work on on t the holes on on 14 14 J July and the 37th D i v i s i o n will.give w i l l g i v e us u s 50 50 men men to t o work on the t h e tank t a n k holes h o b s on Division on t h e 15th." 15th." (CANOE (CANOE 15RSM/390, 15kSAf/390, Korea, Korea, 14 14 July J u l y 52) 52) the
.
.
18 July 52
TOP SECRET CANOE a4' .9 sire

PPROVED FOR FOR RELEASEDATE: RELEASEDATE: APPROVED 18-Mar-2010
11,
Comment: major armored u unit n i t of r regimental egimental s size ize Comment: One major r e c e n m i v e d on on the t h e east east coast c o a s t near n e a r Wonsan. Wonsan. Armored recenTTYIFFived battalions, probably self-propelled e l f - p r o p e l l e d artillery, a r t i l l e r y , are b attalions, p r o b a b l y of s .already located already l o c a t e d in i n the t h e Wonsan and and in in the t h e Hamhung Hamhung area. area.
It possible that this a s subordinate battalion I t is p ossible t hat t h i s is IO ubordinate b attalion the recently regiment of t he r e c e n t l y arrived a r r i v e d armored armored r e g i m e n t attached a t t a c h e d for for
training t r a i n i n g to t o the t h e 37th 3 7 t h Infantry I n f a n t r y Division, D i v i s i o n , VII VI1 Corps. Corps.
14.
15.

7 7
Ten North N o r t h Korean K o r e a g soldiers , s o l d i e r s die d i e from from poisoned p o i s o n e d food: food: between two two u units of an an u unidentified North A message' m e s s a a e ' p passed a s s e . d between n i t s of e!Ldentifidd N orth Korean east e a s i coast c o a s t brigade b r i g a d e on o n 12 1 2 July J u l y stated s t a t e d that t h a t "the "the the V Corps changed foods civilian troops of t he V foods at a t the the c i v i l i a n houses houses and t there was poison in i it so 10 10 men men were were kkilled." and here w a L 6 1 p o i s o n in t so i l l e d . f 1 The o r i g i n a t o r warned the originator t h e units u n i t s under under his h i s command command that t h a t they they "Must not w i t h the t h e civilians. c i v i l i a n s . (CANOE "must n o t change any any food" food" with 14 July J u l y 52) 52) 15RSM/381 Korea, 14 Comment: North N o r t h Korean KQPean and and Chinese C h i n e s e units u n i t s have have commanCornmand e e r efood m f rfrom o m the t h e North N o r t h Korean Korean civilians.when c i v i l i a n s . when the the deered n e c e s s i t y arose. arose. It I t is p possible o s s i b l e that t h a t in i n the t h e above instance instance necessity the food f o o d was poisoned p o i s o n e d intentionally. intentionally.
US reconnaissance r e c o n n a i s s a n c e plane,attacked p l a n e , attacked in in Korea Korea Bay: Bay: An up Atnericaa weather we'ather reconnaissap.ce reconnaissabce p l a n e was American plane was lattifcked attaCked by by a MXG-15 over Korea. Korea Bay,on Bay on the. t h e morning of of 16 1 6 July. J u l y . ':The "The MIG-15 over US U!3 aircraft a i r c r a f t successfully s u c c e s s f u l l y evaded evaded 15 15 passes. p a s s e s . The Tbe enemy enemy p i l o t appeared a p p e a r e d to t o be b e nervous n e r v o u s and and overanxious, o v e r a n x i o u s , The MIG pilot was l a s t sseen e e n hheading e a d i n g iin n a ou$heasterly d i r e c t i o n toward was last a ssoutheasterly direction Chefoo or o r Tsingtao T s i n g t a o on on the the.Shantung Shantung Peninsula. P e n i n s u l a . FEAF comments Chefoo t h e enemy has ha6 seldom exercised e x e r c i s e d his h i s known capability ca.pability that the 01' intercepting i n t e r c e p t i n g US US planes p l a n e s over o v e r Korea Korea Bay. Bay. (S FECOM of FEcom T a l e c o n , 5980, 5980, 17 1 7.july J u l y 52) 52) Telecon,
Comment: The 'Pew p r e v i o u s attacks a t t a c k s on US air a i r patrols patrols few previous or reConnaissance re-sance a i r c r a f t in i n this t h i s area area were were by by Soviet S o v i e t jet jet or aircraft f i g h t e r s from from Port P o r t Arthur A r t h u r and and Dairen. D a i r e n . However, However, this this XIG fighters tap c o u l d be from the t h e Chinese C h i n e s e 16th 1 6 t h Division D i v i s i o n based based at a t Tsingtao Tsingtao could is flying f l y i n g "air "air defense d e f e n s e combat combat patrol". patrol" m i s s i o n s , acacwhich is which missions, cording c o r d i n g to t o intercepted i n t e r c e p t e d Chinese C h i n e s e messages. messages. The Chinese Chinese pilots pilots a t Tsingtao T s i n g t a o are are probably probably less less experienced e x p e r i e n c e d than than Soviet S o v i e t pilots pilots at from Dairen. Dairen.
18 July J u l y 52 52 18
C TUP ASECRET N CAN(yE W E

/
FAR EAST FAR EAST
I d5 2 cla rB
3. Analysis reveals Soviet pilots engaged engaged in 75 percent of reveals Soviet of Korean Korean air air comWA: combat:
USAir Air Force Force An analysis analysis by by the the US USA Air Force Security US An i r Force 17 July 52 Service of enemy 17 52 enemy ground-controlled ground-controlled interinterCANOE cept communications in in Korea Korea from from March 4 4S6 HtS6 76 percent through May revealedthat K- ~ revealed that at at least least 75 percent of MIG-15's engaged in combat over North Korea were Sovieto f the X VIIG-~~ ~S in Sovietpiloted. were involved involved in only 10 percent and the Chinese pilots were remaining 15 16 percent percent could could not not be identified. identified.
The analysis revealed that that operational operational by Chinese Chinese pilots declined declined to such an extent that they were flights by flights airborne only to create createaashow showof of force force without without engaging engaging UN airborne only UNaircraft. aircraft.
in June June and and received in Comment: Intercepts received July show that the majority over Korea are are m a j 0 of r iMIG-15's ~ ~ - 1 encountered 5 ~ s over still Soviet-piloted. still Soviet-piloted. However, month and However, in in the past month and a a half, half, some increase increase in in the the aggressiveness aggressivenessof of Chinese ChineseMIG-15 MIG-15 pilots has been noted, and on occasion occasion atatand jet jet fighters fightersflown flown by North Koreans have have on noted, US planes. tacked US
4.
Air Force Force
Traffic Traffic intercepted Lntercepted on on the the' Chinese ChineseCommuCommunist air air warning warnlng nets from April through centers early July suggests that air warning centers on the China China coast coast and and in in Manchuria Manchuria are are co11 Rau/00UP 1J R. 13 ordinating their activities activities for the the first first time R O 1 3 ~ 9 ordtnating ~ ~ their ~ for by reporting It is i s believed believed that the center center may may be be reparting to a a central central point. point. in the Dairen-Port Arthur area.
Security Securlty Service Service 17 July 52 52 CANOE CANOE
'APPROVED FOR ~PPROVED FORRELEASE RELEASE (DATE: IDATE: 23-Mar-2010 23-Mar-2010

Communists strengthen air air defense: Chinese Communlsts defense:
4-4
The recent interception of radar tracking Lnterception o f radar tracklng reports area opposite opposite Formosa Formosa reveals reveals a further imin the the Swatow Swatow area Imreports in provement in China's China's air air defense. defense,
-TOP-SECRET- CANOE
I I
%of
HR70-14
-seaterI
FAR EAST
12. 12.
1 " ' :
USSR reportedly r e p o r t e d l y will w i l l reassert right r i g h t to to a a naval n a v a l base base in in
Korea:
t o build b u i l d a strong base at a t Wonsan immediimmedi_the t h e USSR USSR plans p l a n s to a,tely following f o l l o w i n g the t h e completion c o m p l e t i o n of ately of Korean Korean truce t r u c e talks. talks.
T h i s strong This s t r o n g base allegedly a l l e g e d l y will w i l l be needed to p protect rotect p e t r o l e u m iahipments S a k h a l i n through t h r o u g h the t h e Sea of apan petroleum shipments from Sakhalin of J Japan from the t h e "potential " p o t e n t i a l threat t h r e a t of of a a Japanese J a p a n e s e Navy." 1 1 1 1 8 18 July J u l y 52) 52)
~~

-steamfilimtm
7 7
I
Comment: Prior to t o the t h e outbreak o u t b r e a k of o f the t h e Korean war war there were I reports indicating i n d i c a t i n g that t h a t the the USSR had signed s i g n e d a long-term long-term lease lbase with w i t h North N o r t h Korea for the t h e use use of of various v a r i o u s ports p o r t s as as naval n a v a l bases. bases. t h e brief occupaoccupaDuring the t i o n of N o r t h Korea by r o o p s in late 1950, documents were tion North by UN t troops had leased leased t the ports of found which indicated i n d i c a t e d that t h a t North Korea had he p o r t s of U a S g i , and Chongjin C h o a g j i n to t o the t h e Soviet S o v i e t Union for p urely Najin, Unggi, purely commercial commercial purposes. p u r p o s e s . There is ie no indication i n d i c a t i o n that t h a t organized organized S o v i e t naval n a v a l units u n i t s ever ever garrisoned g a r r i s o n e d any any of of these t h e s e ports. ports. Soviet
21 July J u l y 52
C CD
TChi) SECRET CANGtel
HR70-14 HR70-14
NR
7. 7 .
"Airaircraft sortie over Enemy a i r c r a f t to to s ortie o v e r UN lines l i n e s in i n Korea: " AirArmy w will Off tto carry out planes of the t h e Peoplevis People's Army i l l ttake a k e off o c arry o u t their
duties...behind the enemies'lines," reported commander du*ies...behind t h e enemies' lines," r e p o r t e d tthe h e commander of t the Chinese 7 7th Artillery Division east c central Korea of h e Chinese th A rtillery D i v i s i o n iin n east e n t r a l Korea on 14 14 July. July.
Comment: Comqent:
The r recent e c e n t construction c o n s t r u c t i o n of several s e v e r a l small small dirt dirt
air sTFTR-IMmediately a ir a m m e d i a t e l y behind behind the t h e enemy's enemy ' 8 front f r o n t lines l i n e s suggests euggeste that future harassing missions, u using P0-2 b biplanes or YAK YAK t hat f uture h a r a s s i n g missions, s i n g PO-2 i p l a n e s or trainers, t r a i n e r s , may be flown flown from from the t h e strips. strips.
No light l i g h t aircraft a i r c r a f t have have been been encountered e n c o u n t e r e d recently r e c e n t l y in i n this thh area, although July US l light bomber b briefly engaged area, a l t h o u g h on 18 18 J u l y a US i g h t bomber r i e f l y engaged c o n v e n t i o n a l enemy fighter f i g h t e r aircraft a i r c r a f t about about 25 25 miles miles south south two conventional of the oj! t h e front f r o n t lines l i n e s in in central c e n t r a l Korea.
I
8. 8.
Messages indicate continuing N North o r t h Korean attacks on UN-held filands: Two messageicpassed on 16 16 and 17 July over nets associated with the North Korean 21st and 23rd Brigades i n the Ongjin Peninsula P e n i n s u l a area area of of western western Korea Korea indicate i n d i c a t e that that in , further f u r t h e r amphibious operations o p e r a t i o n s will w i l l be b e launched launched against a g a i n s t UNUNheld h e l d islands i s l a n d e off o f f western w e s t e r n Korea. Korea. One One message message mentiOned mentioned that t h a t a battalion battalion d did i d not need l a n d i n g craft."to c r a f t "to carry carry out o u t our o u r forthcoming forthcoming island i s l a n d liberaliberalanding t i o n campaign," campaign," and and the t h e other o t h e r message mesBage spoke spoke of o f an a n assembly assembly tion of boats boata and and personnel p e r s o n n e l at a t points p o i n t 6 in in the t h e Ongjin O n g j i n area. area. (CANOE (CANOE SSR SSR Tokyo, Tok 0 , TIK TIK 123 123 H H 76 76 W 99, 99, 19 19 July July B r i e f of Brief of SIB 546, 046, 19 1 9 July J u l y 52)
s indicate continuing Korean a t t a c k s on o m e s s a g e s ' p a s s e d on and 17 Ju l y over n e t s aeeociated w i t h t h e North Korean 21st and 23rd B r i g a d e s
Comment: Comment: Elements Elements of of the t h e North North Korean Korean 23rd 23rd Brigade B r i g a d e on on 15 JuTFBEapied Changnim Island J u v p i e d Changnim I s l a n doff o f fOngjin OngjinPeninsula: Peninsula, The The h a s the t h e capability c a p a b i l i t y of of proceeding p r o c e e d i n g against a g a i n s t many many of of these them enemy has small islands i s l a n d 6 that t h a t are a r e immediately immediately offshore. o f f s h o r e . Operations Operations
t h a t the t h e flights f l i g h t s would be made The message cautioned c a u t i o n e d that at night and t that these p planes could be rrecognized by a antia t n i g h t and h a t these lanes c o u l d be e c o g n i z e d by ntiaircraft units by their a ircraft u n i t s by t h e i r engine e n g i n e sound which is "similar to to the motor of a truck." truck." The s suggested operations t h e motor u g g e s t e d area of o perations was east central c e n t r a l Korea, Korea, with w i t h flights f l i g h t s originating o r i g i n a t i n g from from fields fields in i n the t h e Pyongyang valley. v a l l e y . (CANOE-50lst (CANOE 501st Comm Comm Recon Grp Korea, K-4459, K-4459, 16 16 July J u l y 52) 52)
4 4
2 1 July J u l y 52 52 21
0/ b
TOP SECRET CANOE
515-4
PPROVED FOR FOR RELEASEDATE: RELEASEDATE: 8-Mar-2010 k8-Mar-20,O [11/4PRROVED
11.
against asPaengyong a g a i n s t the t h e larger, larger, more important i m p o r t a n t islands I s l a n d s such a sPaengyang would be more difficult d i f f i c u l t to t o carry out because of of the t h e distance distance involved UN's control c o n t r o l of of the t h e sea. sea. i n v o l v e d and the t h e UN's
9. 9.
Joint J o i n t Chinese-Korean Chinese-Korean unit u n i t suggested s u g g e s t e d in i n western,Korea:. western.Korea: The chief-of c h i e f of staff s t a f f Of of a battalion b a t t a l i o n of of the the N North o r t h Korean 21st 21st Brigade brigade h headquarters on Korea rreported e p o r t e d tto o brigade e a d q u a r t e r s on B r i g a d e in i n western w e s t e r n Korea. 14 July that squad of the Branch of t the Volunt h e 1st Branch h e Volun1 4 J uly t h a t "the " t h e 1st squad tary Army (1 company; 156 persons) persons) are assembled assembled at S Sanjikol," t a r y Army (1 company; anjlkol," t h e Oagjin Ohgjin Peninsula, P e n i n s u l a , "is "as the t h e reserve force f o r c e of of this t h i s batbaton the t a l i o n , l t (CANOE ROK Int I n t Grp M Korea, Korea, SK-L-357, SK-L-357, 15 1 5 July J u l y 52) 52) talion."
Comment: While the t h e term t e r m "volunteer" 'Wolunteer" is is generally g e n e r a l l y apapplied p l i e to d nChinese n e s e units u n i t s in i n Korean messages, it i t is is posaible possible t h a t the t h e "Voluntary" V o l u n t a r y " used here h e r e also also means means Chinese. Chinese. that

'
is that t h a t the t h e "Voluntary "Voluntary Army" rerep o s s i b i l i t y is Another possibility ferred f e r r e d to t o in i n the t h e message represents r e p r e s e n t s so-called s o - c a l l e d North Korean paramilitary "Farmer-Soldier "Farmer-Soldier Units." U n i t s . " These p a r a m i l i t a r y units u n i t s are comcomp r i a e d of old o l d men and and disabled d i s a b l e d veterans v e t e r a n s organized o r g a n i z e d to t o supsupprised plement regular r e g u l a r units u n i t e on guard guard duties. duties.
10. 10.
Two North Korean armored units u n i t s officially o f f i c i a l l y organized: o r g a n i z e d : On 14 Chinnampo 1 4 July'a.North July a North Korean R o r e a n armored armored regiment r e g i m e n t nearnear,C h innamDo rep o r t e d - to t o Armored Armored Forces F o r c e s Headquarters H e a d q u a r i e r s that t h a t "the "the Kangso K a n G o unit unit ported color p r e s e n t a t i o n was w a 8 held...on held...on 13 13 July J u l y in i n the t h e presence p r e s e n c e of presentation 71 o f f i c e r s , 219 219 NCO's and and 56 56 privates." privates." officers,
b a t t a l i o n - s i z e armored unit unit p r o b a b l y on on S i m i l a r l y , a battalion-size-armored Similarly, probably i n the t h e Wonsan area reported r e p o r t e d that t h a t "the " t h e unit unit the east coast in color p r e s e n t a t i o n ceremony was held h e l d on o n 14 1 4 July, J u l y , and the the presentation m i l i t a r y affairs a f f a i r s inspection i n s p e c t i o n was carried out o u t on the t h e 15th." 15th." military and 15RSM/511, 15RSM/511, Korea, Korea, 16 16 July J u l y 52) 52) (CANOE 15RSM/486 and Comment: It It h a s become vident d uring t h e past has become e evident during the past month t hat m o r Korean e a n armored o r c e s have that North armored f forces have undergone a major rereorganization. o r g a n i z a t i o n . Organic O r g a n i c self-propelled s e l f - p r o p e l l e d artillery a r t i l l e r y battalions battalions and t ank u n i t s have s e v e r e d from from their t h e i r parent p a r e n t tactical tactical tank units have been been severed u n i t s and have been centralized c e n t r a l i z e d under the t h e command of of an an units Armored Forces F o r c e s Headquarters. Headquarters. T h e r e are are at a t least l e a s t five f i v e regimental-size r e g i m e n t a l - s i z e tactical t a c t i c a l armored armored There u n i t s and an a n armored armored training t r a i n i n g command command subordinate s u b o r d i n a t e to t o this this units headquarters. h e a d q u a r t e r s , These in in turn t u r n are are broken broken down into i n t o battalionbattalions i z e units, u n i t s , probably the t h e major operational o p e r a t i o n a l unit, u n i t , such s u c h as as the the size "Kangso unit" u n i t " and the t h e east coast battalion b a t t a l i o n mentioned above. above. "Kangso
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5 5
J u l y 52 52 21 2 1 July
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Rigid control over North Korean Korean armored o officers: R igid c o n t r o l exercised o v e r North fficers: A 12 message-addressed major armored training unit 12 JuIy J u l y message addressed to t o a major training u nit from a a r ranking officer in North Korean Armored Armored Forces Forces HeadHeadfrom anking o fficer i n N o r t h Korean quarters stated that vacation siofficer q uarters s tated t h a t "from "from now on a v a c a t i o n for s aofficer should be given permission commander." g i v e n only o n l y under under the the p e r m i s s i o n of the t h e commander." uhould officer addressed a another major armored u unit The same o f f i c e r addressed n o t h e r major nit on with statement officers o n 14 1 4 July July w i t h the the s t a t e m e n t that t h a t "the "the o f f i c e r s from the the 105th and 103rd u units being sent on l leave without the 1 0 5 t h and n i t s are b eing s e n t on eave w ithout t he commander's permission." commander's permiselon The ontinued t hat u nit The message message c continued that unit political officers g i v e n leave l e a v e to their their p olitical o f f i c e r s and and commanders had given c r y p t o g r a p h i c officers o f f i c e r s and that cryptographic t h a t since s i n c e "we are short s h o r t of perpersonnel...counter-measures, c o u n t e r - m e a s u r e s , which are severe" s e v e r e " should s h o u l d be concons onnel sidered. (CANOE 3 330th Recon,Co Korea, SK-L-329, 14 aidered. (CANOE 3 0 t h Comm Recon Co Korea, 14 July and ALT-113, Yuly ALT-113, 15 15 July J u l y 52) 52)
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chiefly Comment: These messages are c h i e f l y interesting i n t e r e s t i n g in that that they demonstrate t the degree of c centralized control in this t h e y -rate he d e g r e e of entralized c ontrol i n t his f o r c e and that t h a t the t h e shortage shortage of of newly formed enemy armored force p personnel, ersonne1,p particularly a r t i c u l a r l y competent competent o officers, f f i c e r s , is a again g a i n emphasized. emphasized.
N o r t h Korean mechanized division d i v i s i o n may have r e v e r t e d to to North reverted infantry:- On 14 July Korean armored r regitent, u l y a North Xorean e g i m e n t , prob%?%?~he?h:~n~mpo area. informed informed a staff s t a f f officer o f f i c e r at a t North North ably ln the Chinnampo area, Armored Forces Forci38 Headquarters: Headquarters: " the 1 0th I nfantry Korean Armored "the 10th Infantry D i v i s i o n . . . d i d not n o t arrive, a r r i v e , they t h e y will...to w i l l . . . t o headquarters h e a d q u a r t e r s as a6 Division...did soon aoDn as as they t h e y arrive." a r r i v e .I1
Other O t h e r recent r e c e n t messages have mentioned the t h e 10th 10th Division Division in i n a manner which suggests that t h a t it i t is is no longer l o n g e r associated associated with w i t h armor. armor. On 5 5 July J u l y this t h i s same same armored armored unit u n i t informed informed H e a d q u a r t e r s that t h a t "Comrade's 'Tomrade's drivers d r i v e r s are... are... Armored Forces Headquarters being Division's b e i n g sent s e n t to t o the t h e rear from the t h e 10th 10th D i v i s i o n ' s medical office." o:ef ice ' 1
armored regiment r e g i m e n t near n e a r Chinnampo Chinnampo A 15 15 July J u l y message from from the t h e armored t h a t "the "the order to t o move the t h e 107th 107th unit u n i t was sent s e n t to to complained that the t h e 10th 1 0 t h Division, D i v i s i o n , but b u t they t h e y burned burned it. I t . No one knew of of the t h e move from Chongju to t o Kangso Kangso at a t the t h e 107th 1 0 7 t h unit." u n i t . " (CANOE (CANOE 15RSM/541, 15RSM/541, Korea, 17 17 July; J u l y ; 15RSM/487, 15RSM/487, Korea, Korea, 16 16 July; J u l y ; PASAL PASAL 045, 045, Korea, Korea, 14 14 July J u l y 52) 5a)
Comment: I t is is a p p a r e n t from these messages that t h a t the the It apparent " 1 0 7 t h u n ia ta , tank "t a n k and and self-propelled s e l f - p r o p e l l e d artillery a r t i l l e r y unit, u n i t , is is "107t2717.17 l o n g e r subordinate s u b o r d i n a t e to t o the t h e 10th 1 0 t h Division. D i v i s i o n . The 10th 1 0 t h apparapparno longer e n t l y has has reverted reverlted to t o an a n infantry i n f a n t r y status. status. ently
21 21 July J u l y 52 52
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Analysis Soviet pilots A n a l y s i s reveals S oviet p i l o t 8 engaged in i n 75 75 percent p e r c e n t of of a n a l y s i s 53,by t the h e US A Air ir F Force orce S ecurity ITS Security Korean air a i r combat: combat: An analysis communications Service of of'enemy ground-controlled g r o u n d - c o n t r o l l e d intercept i n t e r c e p t communications in t h r o u g h May revealed r e v e a l e d that t h a t at'least a t ' l e a s t 75 75 i n Korea from March through percent MIG-15's engaged in combat combat o over North Korea p e r c e n t of the t h e MIG-lS's v e r North pilots were Soviet-piloted. Soviet-piloted. Chinese p i l o t s were involved i n v o l v e d in i n only only percent and t the remaining percent could not be i identi10 p e r c e n t and he r e m a i n i n g 15 p ercent c ould n o t be dentified. f :Led.
revealed that o operational perational f flights l i g h t s by by C Chinese hinese The analysis analysis r e v e a l e d that p ilots d e c l i n e d to t o such s u c h an an e x t e n t that that t h e y were irborne pilots declined extent they were a airborne only without engaging aircraft. t o create a show of force force w ithout e n g a g i n g UN a ircraft. o n l y to (CANOE o m m i t t e e , Supplement to R e p o r t of IndicaIndica(CANOE IAC IAC Watch Witch C Committee, Supplement to Report t i o n s of tions of Soviet-Communist Soviet-Communist Intentions: I n t e n t i o n s , pp 3-4, 3-4, 17 17 July J u l y 52) 52)
J u n e and July J u l y show show that that Comment: Intercepts Intercepts r e c e i v e d in June received majority MIG-15's e encountered over still the m -a of WIG-lS1s ncountered o v e r Korea are s till Soviet-piloted, S oviet-piloted, However, in i n the the p a s t month and a l f , some past and a h half, increase in aggressiveness of C Chinese MIG-15 p pilots has i ncrease i n the a g g r e s s i v e n e s s of h i n e s e MIG-15 ilots h as been noted, jet by N North Koreans have have on boen n o t e d , and j e t fighters f i g h t e r s flown flown by o r t h Koreans occasion o c c a s i o n attacked a t t a c k e d US US planes. planes.
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It is not not clear clear whether whether " "truce" refers simply Comment: I Comment: t Is t r u c e t t refers to toan an oover-all peace s settlement. t o a EWENW=Y4..re cease-fire o or r to v e r - a l l peace ettlement. Peiping's stated for settlement, prior P eiping's s t a t e d terms f or a s ettlement, p r i o r to t o the the cease-fire c e a s e - f i r e talks, t a l k s , included Included demands for admission admiseion to t o the t h e UN and and abandonment of of of American American "neutralization" llneutralizationr* of Formosa. Formosa.
Peiping has not introduced these during a s not t h e s e demands d u r i n g the t h e talks talks P elping h propaganda has as necessary necessary conditions c o n d i t i o n s for for a a cease-fire. cease-fire. Its propaganda has suggeSted, s u g g e s t e d , however, however, that t h a t they they will be.brought be brought forward in in the the political p o l i t i c a l Alscussions d i s c u s s i o n s which would follow a cease-fire. cease-fire. --
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of political political indoctrination indoctrination in North North Korean Korean unit unit Lack of reveared:' f nait" 16JulY JulyNorth NorthKorean Koreanmessage,' message',' passed between revealed: rn 16 passed-between two iwo unidentifled unidentified units, units, the originator originator reveals reveals that that in his his command "the level level of the political education is low." low." He points points out that a clique has "centralized their power" power" against the political political officers officers and and is zesponsible wesponsible for for the political instruction. lax political instruction. The garbled message' message also intimate8 mates that that a number of of desertions could have been prevented prevented indoctrination. (CANOE 501st if there had been better indoctrination. (CANOE 501st Comm Recon Co Co Korea, Korea, SK-L-37, SK-L-37, 16 16 July July 52) 52)
Comment: The Political Cpmment: Political Department Department of of the North North Korean Korean Army m r e representatives s e n t a t i v e s in i n each u n i t as low as platoon has unit platoon level. l e v e l . Continuous Continuous political propaganda leveled at the UN officers has prevented many North Korean soldiers soldiers by their officers from surrendering. from surrendering.
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El.cments 7th A r m y ma may be movin moving Elements of Chinese Communist 4 47th Arm
s ommun st A rmy t h ' C hinese h i n e s e Communist r m y is toward front. front': 1 l i nes: n e s f The 4 7t toward carrk e d b y l p p l n e a r Suan in i n the t h e immediate immediate 17071-0777 near area. Communications intelligence i n t e l l i g e n c e has h a s indicated, i n d i c a t e d , by by rear area.
d i r e c t i o n finder,-the f i n d e r , - t h e move of an ran unidentified u n i d e n t i f i e d net n e t control control direction station t h e Suan area some 17 1 7 miles south s o u t h toward the the s t a t i o n from the b a t t l e line. line. battle F a r East Far E a s t Command comments, however, however, that t h a t DF locations locations have not n o t been accurate a c c u r a t e in in the t h e past and therefore t h e r e f o r e the move of the 4 1;he 47th 7 t h Army from Suan is is not not accepted. a c c e p t e d . FECOM FECOM points p o i n t s out, out, nevertheless, that t h a t it it is is "plausible" " p l a u s i b l e " that t h a t 'elements e l e m e n t s of the the 47th Army may way bebe moving moving closer closer tto o tthe he b battle attle l line ine t to o r relieve elieve o r reinforce r e i n f o r c e front f r o n t line l i n e units. u n i t s . (CANOE (CANOE H Headquarters e a d q u a r t e r s United United or Nations 52) N a t i o n s and and FECOM, FECOM, Watch Watch Report weport 61, 6 1 , 14 1 4 July J u l y 52) North Korean Korean armored armored units u n i t e in in northwest n o r t h w e s t activated: activated: I In n messme message tb 8 a r ranking ankink o officer fficer a at t North North Korean Korean Armored Armored Forces Forces Headquarters B e a d q u a k e r b on o n 19 1 9 July, J u i y , an a n armored forces f o r c e s inspector i n s p e c t o r reported t hat " the m ilitary f l a g awarding ceremony or t he u nit a t that "the military flag ceremony f for the unit at
23 J July u l y 52 52
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continued Chongchong River R i v e r has has been been held." held.'' The in:Vector inspector c ontinued t h a t the that t h e activation a c t i v a t i o n ceremony "for "for the the u unit nit i in n S Sinuiju inuiju w will ill be held on the t h e morning of of the t h e 20th." 20th." He H e added that t h a t he will will have some contact contact w with i t h the t h e "208th," vf208th,17 an armored armored t training r a i n i n g regiregiI n northwestern n o r t h w e s t e r n Korea. Korea. (CANOE 15RSMj707, 15RSM1707, Korea, Korea, 20 ment in J u l y 52) 52) July
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A r m o r was o Armor observed.through b s e r v e d A h r o u g h communications communications istel'lf3da r r i v i n g in i n Korpa. 1n c onsiderable q uantities intellSgence arriving Korea in considerable quantities in late l a t e April. April. During May and and 4une, ,rune, the t h e newly-formed newly-formed units subOrdinate to North armored u nits s ubordinate t o N w t h Korean armored forces h e a d Q u a c t e r s were apparently a p p a r e n t l y organized o r g a n i z e d and given g i v e n basic heaftuatIers training. S i n c e about a b o u t 10 10 July,. July', armored n i t s have been Since armored u units training. inspected inspected anil and aactivated c t i v a t e d by by hheadquarters e a d q u a r t e r s sstaff t a f f ooUicers. zflcers,
Comment : .Comment:
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I Xnfantry nfantry p personnel ersonnel i in n North North Korean Korean Army Army t taught aught " "tank tank raidin "; A 17 July asSociated message, 'passed g a s s e d on on a a ' -nst a s t associate u l y message, the North I Corps 'W'itb s'No $,r K & eKorean an Corps on on the t h q east eas-i coast, c o a s t , requested requezted a "report "report on the t h e name and attachment a t t a c h m e n t of the o fficers-a nd officers and who went to t o attend a t t e n d the t h e lecture lecture non-commiss$oned o f f i c e r s who:went non-commissOned officers of the t h e 'division d i v i s i o n for for tthe h e ttank ank r raiding a i d i n g team." team." (CANOE Int (CANOE ROK Int Grp G r p M Korea, SK-L-436, SK-L-436, 18 18 July J u l y 52) 52) Comments Comment: This message offers o f f e r s further f u r t h e r evidence e v i d e n c e of t a n k - i n f antry training ttcrsining in i n the the North North Korean Kor8a.n 4rmy. firmy. tank-infantry
N o r t h Korean unit u n i t to send Rend personnel p e r s o n n e l "abroad" "abpmsd" to t o study: study: North A 19 h l y message passed passed between between two two Worth lortli Korean Korean units units Julymessage t o the t h e VII V I 1 Corps, stated s t a t e d that that a a number number p r o b a b l y s u b o r d i n a t e to probably:subordinate s o l d i e r s would be be sent s e n t "abroad "abroad to t o study." study.'' The personnel personnel of sOldiers selectdd f o r the t h e assignment, a s s i g n m e n t , according a c c o r d i n g to t o the t h e originator, originator, selected for m u s t carry carry a a personal p e r s o n a l history h i s t o r y form, form, a a physical p h y s i c a l examination examination must cord and "the.written I f t h e w r i t t e n judgement of of the t h e commanding officer." officer." card
(CANOE 330th Comm Co Korea, SK-L-532, SK-L-532, 20 20 July J u l y 52) 52) Comm Recon Recon.Co
Comment: I t is probable that t h a t the t h e term "abroad" flahro@lv refers It refers to M e m , w h e r e it i t is likely likely t h a t some N o r t h Korean to Manchuria,where that North Korean t e c h n i c a l and replacement r e p l a c e m e n t training t r a i n i n g facilities f a c i l i t i e s still s t i l l exist. exist. technical
There is no indication i n d i c a t i o n that t h a t the t h e enemy intends i n t e n d e to employ his augmented armored potential l g o t e n t i a l in in the the near n e a r future. future.
J u l y 52 52 23 July
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North Nor,th Korean unit u n i t receives r e c e i v e s large l a r g e shipments s h i p m e n t s .of o f infantrx infantry weaponsl A,North Korean%init, su6ordinate to t he orth K orean'unit, s u b o r d i n a t e to h e V COrpe, rps, m&Eaged on o n 20 20 July J u l y listing l i s t i n g the t h e amounts amounts of, g iapons sent two meSsage4 weapons and equipment which it i t had received. r e c e i v e d . The shipments s h i p m e n t s la^ icnrand eluded: 45mm c l u d e d : 132 1 3 2 light and 8 heavy machine guns, g u n s , 12 12 4 5 m m antiantit a n k guns, 214 rifles rifl,es and and some some 929 boxes boxes of of "light "light tank ammunition." (CANOE 330th 3 3 0 t h Comm Recon Co Korea, ALT 255 ammunition." (CANOE and ALT ALT 252, 262, 21 21 July J u l y 52) 52)
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Comment: the firsttime Comments This T h i s is t h e first t i m e in i n over over a a year.that year t h a t North-tiFe'WE: units haver e received a llarge arge s shipient h i p m e n t of of Northun i t s have c e i v e d ssuch uch a basic b a s i c infantry i n f a n t r y equipment, equipment.
5, 5 .
Attempted poisoning p o i s o n i n g of of North N o r t h Korean Korean troops troops revealed: reveqled: The commander of'an o f ' a n artillery a r t i l l e r y hattalien, b a t t a l i o n . possibly D o s a i b l v subiordiT sub'ordir nate td t d the t h e 8th 8 t h North N o r t h Korean K o r e a n -Division,.informed D i v i s i o n , Informed his superior superior J u l y that t h a t "in ';in the-troop t h s troop area arsenic a r s e n i c was p u t into i n t o the the on 20 July put well." w e l l . " There T h e r e wai was no "damage," "damage,1' but b u t the commander s stated t a t e d that that a search for f o r the t h e culprits c u l p r i t s was.under wa6 u n d e r way. way. (CANOE 3 0 t h Comm (CANOE 3 330th Recon Co C o Korea, Korea, ALT-260, ALT-260, 21 2 1 July J u l y 52) 52)
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Comment: Communicatioqs intelligence r ecbntly r eveaied Communications intelligence recently revealed. t h a t -th r e a n ssoldiers oldiers d i e d from o o d obthat TiriNET-th KKorean died from ,poisoned poisOned f food tained t a i n e d from from civilians. c i v i i a n s . This T h i s first f i r s t incident I n c i d e n t also o ccurred' occurred' on the t h e east coast coast but b u t farther f a r t h e r north n a r t h in i n the t h e Vreorps V Corps area. area.
I t is is possible, possible t h a t these t h e s e poisonings. p o i s o n i n g s were were perpetrated, perpetratedl It that b y NOrth NortP Korean civilians. c i v i l i a n s . These messages may, may, however, however, by indidate i n d i c a t e ground'work ground work for f o r further f u r t h e r propaganda propaganda blasts b l a s t s charging. charging the U nited N a t i o n s with s i n g BW and CW warfare, warfare, the. United Nations with u using
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Enemy r e p o r t e d l y concentrates on defense d e f e n s e of'Manchurian of'Manchurian ,Enemy reportedly border: between 1 14 and 20 20 J July on b o r d e r : Colimunications Coinmun'ications ppassed a s s e d between 4 and uly o n -sian GCI e t at n d i c a t e that t h a t enemy planes planes th9T.ussian GCI n net at Antung Antung i indicate t o be mote more active a c t i v e in In protecting p r o t e c t i n g the t h e Manchurian c o n t i n u e to continue b o r d e r than t h a n in i n defending d e f e n d i n g Pyongyang. Pyongyang. When UN bombers border 10 July, J u l y , 23 23 Communist Communist planes p l a n e s were, were r a i d e d Pyongyang Pyongyang on on 10 raided airborne. Instead I n s t e a d of of protecting. p r o t e c t i n g Pyongyang, h e y concenPyongyang, t they concenairborne. t h e Antung Antung area. area. (CANOE (CANOE Air Foree Force t r a t e d on on patrolling p a t r o l l i n g the trated Roundup 22 July J u l y 52) 52) Roundup 141, 1 4 1 , 22
Comment; Russian-manned jet j e t units u n i t s incllanchpria'have. in U a n c h p r i a have ComMent: In p u r s u m r r a t i c p o l i c y iin n i n t e r c e p t i n g UN bombers in pursuW3-071.grratic policy intercepting r e c e n t weeks. While failing f a i l i n g to t o disrupt d i s r u p t UN attacks on o n the the recent
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tS in in late late June June and and on on Pyongyang Pyongyang on on 10 10Julyi. Julyd power plVits power mad aa determined to break up the the they made, determined effort effort on on 4 4 July July-to break.uP on a a Nbrth North Korean Korean military military academy academy near near pakchu Sakchq in in attack on northwest Korea.
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ScivilW;marines reportedlycross cross border border to to protect protect two Sdvietmarines reportedly Tic, battalions battalionsai of-Soviet marinesu wah. North Korean:ports: Korean Dorts: Two Soviet marines rn coastal and and aptlaircraft antiaircraft artillery artillery pieces moved moved into toe the Najin-Unggi pQrt Port region Najin-Unggi tegion in the Soviet-Korean Soviet-Korean border area between 1 and'9 July,1 between 1 and 9 July, I -____ I22 52) 22 July 52)
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Namin-Unggi area has been used by The Namin-Unggi by the Soviets in the past for commercial reasons and frequent reports during the last two years have alleged that small Soviet military service service units units garrison garrison these these ports. ports. Chinese Army Day slogans continue to minimize ties with USSR: The 24 offiCial slogans for the 25th ,anniversary of the Chinese People's Liberation Army praise the army and the Chinese Communist Party and their leaders; decry the American "tinvasion" of Formosa, "stalling" in the Korean truce talks, rearmament of Japan and preparations for war; and call for improving the armed forces *II various ways, among them further study of Marxism-Leninism and "internationalism."
from Comment: These Theee slogans do not depart significantly from Comment: t those-U-TWWT h o s e $ year; year; they continue the trend, first noted in 1951, of minimizing minimizing the the regime's regime's bonds bonds with with the the USSR. USSR. In In July 1951, to 1950, 1950, neither neither the the Soviet Soviet Union Union nor Stalin Stalin is is men mencontrast to 1959 slogans, Slogans, although the current tioned in the 1951 and 1952 ones reflect reflect Peiping's Pelping's subscription subscription to to orthodox orthodox ideology. ideology. ones
There has been and aad is is no no reliable evidence evidence of of a a decline decline the strength and and warmth warmth of of the t h e Sino-Soviet Sino-Soviet alliance. alliance. Among in the of the past year's year's propaganda trend trend the possible explanations of of the the strength strength of of Chinese Chinese nationnationare Communist consciousness consciousness of are alism, a a Sino-Soviet Siao-Soviet interest interest in in building building up the the prestige prestige of of alism, as Asian leader ldader as as a counter counter to to Japan, Japan, or or a a Communist China as shift shift in in Asian Asian Communist Conmupist tactics. tactics. ,
Comment: While this information information cannot be confirmed, confirmed, it it is possible pan-SW-that defensive le that defensiveSoviet Soviet units units have have moved move4 across the border into into this this area. area. I iiidicated indicated a northward northward movement movement of of North North Korean Korean Army Army elemen elements s from the Wonsan-Hamhung Wonsan-Hamhuag area area to to the the Songjin-Chongjin Songjin-Chongjin area, area, possibly as as a a coastal coastal defense defense measure. measure.
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North N o r t h Korean V Corps Corps has h a s larger .larger east east coast coast defense d e f e n s e role: role: In a ZO 20 J July North I n'a u l y message a N o r t h Korean security s e c u r i t y officer, officer, perhap& perhaps, w with i t h the the I I Corps s south o u t h of of Wonsan, Wonsan, reported reported t that hat a security coastal s e c u r i t y unit, u n i t , possibly possllbly of of naval n a v a l subordination, subordination, "has become'attached a t t a c h e d to t o the the V V Corps." Corps.fc " h a s become
Farther Ho-san, the V Corps commancommant h e north, n o r t h , Pang Ho-san, the V F a r t h e r to the der and eist east cOast coast defense d e f e n s e commander, commander, ordered o r d e r e d the t h e newlyngwlyactivated Brigade July to to an area northwest a c t i v a t e d 22nd B r i g a d e on 15 J uly t o move t o a n a reg n orthwest of Tanchon between (CANOE ROK ROK I Int of between Hamhung Hamhung and and Songjin. S o n g j i n . (CANOE n t Grp M Korea, 23 July; July; ASAPAC ASAPAC Japan Spot Korea, SK-11,-576, SK-&-576, 23 S p o t 3687 3687 A,. 4 , 23 July July
If the V Corps is taking Comment: I f t he Y t a k i n g over o v e r naval n a v a l coastal coastal s e c u r npositions i t i o n s in i n the t h e area area south s o u t h of of Wonsan Wonsanalid 4.rid dePloying deploying security subordinate units of Hamhung, it possible that s ubordinate u n i t s northeast northeast o f Hamhung, i t is p ossible t hat responsible for east coast an expanded V Corps is solely solely r esponsible f or e a s t coast security. s ecurity.
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Previously P r e v i o u s l y the t h e VII $11 Corps was responsible r e s p o n s i b l e for f o r the t h e Wonsan area, the t h e I Corps for fdr the t h e area south s o u t h of Wonsan, the V Wonsan, and the Corps for the t h e Kowon-Hamhung area. area. Naval units u n i t s filled f i l l e d in in the gaps g a p s and were responsible r e s p o n s i b l e for f o r the t h e northeastetn northeaste$n S SongjinongjinChongjin area. Chongj i n area.
Manpower shortage s h o r t a g e indicated i n d i c a t e d in i n North North Korean Korean armored armored unit: unit: Manpower The N Northlorpan 21 July o r t h K o r e a nArmored ArmoredForces F o r c e sHeadquarters H e a d q u a r t h r sin.g, i n Es.21 JU l Y message to t o an a n unknown training t r a i n i n g regiment r e g i m e n t complained complainad about aboutthe of men men being b e i n g sent s e n t to t o headquarters. h e a d q u a r t e r s . The originator originator t h e calibre c a l i b r e of s t a t e d that t h a t "60 percent p e r c e n t of the t h e 40 men p e r day are the t h e men who wbo stated per are g going o i n g to t o be d discharged i s c h a r g e d from the the s service e r v i c e and and t the he o others thers are only o n l y good good for f o r working working in i n the t h e rear rear area." area." (CANOE 501st 501st Comm Recon Co Co Korea, Korea, 15RSM/780, 13RSM/780, 22 22 July J u l y 52) 52)
Comment: Comment: Manpower shortages s h o r t a g e 8 such s u c h as indicated i n d i c a t e d in in t h i s message probably p r o b a b l y hinder h i n d e r all a l l North N o r t h Korean Korean military m i l i t a r y units. units. this
u r g e nUmber number of of Soviet S o v i e t MIG's MIGt's at a t Manchurian Manchurianairfiejti: airfi@,l.d: large Chinepe scheduled 714"allied" Ooviet) C h i n e s e Communist messages s c h e d u l e d TI4 - '' allied" $ Soviet) MIG-15%3 in i nthree t h eegroup:4 g r o u p s of of 30 38 each each on on training t r a i n i n g flights flights at at MIG-15s (CANBE Anshan, 100 100 miles northwest n o r t h w e s t of o f Antung, Antung, on on 24 24 July. J u l y . (CANOE Anshan, 6920 Security AP-088, 23 July S e c u r i t y Group Group Johnson Johnson AB AB Japan-, J a p a n , AP-088, J u l y 52) 52)
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Comment: T h i s is is the t h e largest largest number of of Russian jets jete This Comment: noted-han; i s equivalent e q u i v a l e n t to to a Soviet j e t division noted-IT-righan; it is jet t h r e e regiments regiments at at full full strength. strength. As yet there is is no of three these aircraft a i r c r a f t were were recently r e c e n t l y trangferred tran$$erred evidence that t h a t any any of of these evidence j e t strength in i n Manchuria Manchuria has been been from the the USSR. USSR. Soviet jet 320 planes p l a n e s in in nine nine units u n i t s of of regimental regimental size. size. 320
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Chinese Chineae Communist armored armored unit u n i t in i n Korea still s t i l l hindered hindered A 21 21 July Ju l y message passed p a s s e d between two two ununt o be subordinate s u b o r d i n a t e to t o the t h e 61st 61st e r i t i f ied i e d units, u n i t s , thought t h o u g h t to enti C h i n e s e Communist Antiaircraft A n t i a i r c k a f t Artillery A r t i l l e r y Division, D i v i s i o n , stated stated Chinese that t h a t "because l q b e c a u s e of rain r a i n and overflowing o v e r f l o w i n g (streams?), (sLreams?), withdrawal withdrawal (CANOE 501at 501st Comm Comm Recon Grp from the ths line J i n e is i s difficult." difficult." Korea, K o r e a , K-4564, 8-4564, 23 23 July J u l y 52) 52)
ra'iny s eason: by raftly season:
4. 4.
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North Korea's p principal academy located in Pyongyang N o r t h KoreaPs r i n c i p a l academy located i n Pyongyang o u t a k i g t s : In outskirts:: In a IL 20 20 July Ju l y message message an a n officer o f f i c e r at a t North North -Korean Korean k n b r e f l Forces Headquarters H e a d q u a r t e r s stated s t a t e d that t h a t "four " f o u r students s t u d e n t s lor for Arm6reAlorces t h e Kanggon Q f f i c e r School w i l l leave leave f o r Sadong (just (just t o the-Kanggon Officer will for to the east of Pyongyang) Pyongyang) on t n e east o n the t h e 21st." 21st 15RSM/769, (CANOE 15RSM/769, Korea, 22 22 JUly J u l y 52) 52)
KanggomMilitary Academy, Academy, named named after after Comment: The Kwnggonblilitary the deceased commander of North Korean f forces the of N o r t h Korean o r c e s in t h e ininthe d v a s i o n of south S o u t h Korea, Korea, is the the p rincipal m i l i t a r y institute institute vasion principal military in North Korea, A p o l i t i c o - m i l i t a r y counterpart, c o u n t e r p a r t , the the i n N o r t h Korea. politico-military K i m Chaek Academy, is is located l o c a t e d in i n northeastern n o r t h e a s t e r n Korea. Korea. Kim NOrth N o r t h Koreans believe b e l i e v e move move of of US US battleship b a t t l e s h i p Iowa low& . t to o west may .presage p r e s a g e heightened h e i g h t e n e a operations: o p e r a t i o n s : In In a a meStage message p a s s e d o m * the t h e net of allorth a North K orean b r i g a d e in in w estern passed.oVer Korean brigade western P r o v i n c e on on 21 21 July, J u l y , the t h e brigade b r i g a d e chief c h i e f of of staff staff Hwanghae Province " t h e y say s a y that t h a t the t h e capital c a p i t a l ship s h i p Iowa moved to t o the the warns: "they west c o a g t . , . t h e y are are expected e x p e c t e d to t o start s t a r t their t h e i r activity activity coagt..they w i t h the t h e US Imperial Imperial Air Force F o r c e and the t h e 77 US A i r and Naval with Air Force in in a a few few days.". days." (CANOE (CANOE 151(SM/799, 15RSM/799, Korea, u l y 52) 52) ForCe Korea, 22 J July
Comment: This T h i s message message is is further f u r t h e r indication i n d i c a t i o n of of the the e n e m y 'continued minued u n c e r t a i n t y as o ffuture u t u r e UN eneMyle uncertainty as t to UN courses courses of of a c t i o n in i n Korea. Korea, action
In'previous operations during Comment: I n'previous o p e r a t i o n s in Korea d u r i n g the the r ainycs e a s o n , Communist u nits s u s t a i n e d heavy n rainy season, units sustained heavy losses losses i in equipment as r rivers ivers o overflowed v e r f l o w e d and d dirt irt r roads o a d s became became impasimpassable. Since that t h a t time, t i m e , the t h e Communists Communists have have selected selected their their position aneas in in an a n attempt to t o lessen l e s s e n the the e effects f f e c t s of of the p o s i t i o n areas rains. summer rains.
J u l y 52 82 28 'July
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E Engineer n g i n e e r troops t r o o p s of of r reserve eserve N North o r t h Korean Korean d division i v i s i o n at at f r o n t in i n east: east: An officer oi of the t h e North Korean 8 th D ivi8th Divifront s ion, I orps,on coastal s ecurity d uty s o u t h of I C Corps,on security duty south of Wonsan Orion, on 21 21 July J u l y reported the t h e disappearance d i e a p p e a r a n c e of a squad leader leader of "the " t h e engineer e n g i n e e r company directly d i r e c t l y attached a t t a c h e d to t o the t h e 81st Regiment." vanished N o r t h Korean soldier s o l d i e r was on a Regiment." The vanished North mine-removal m i s s i o n at a t the t h e front f r o n t near n e a r Xosong the mine-removal mission Kosong on the coast. (CANOE 330th 3 3 0 t h Comm Comm Recon Recon Co Co Korea, Korea,ALT-275, ALT-275, east coast: July 52) 52) 22 July
C mment: The North Korean 8th 8th D i v i s i o n , including including Division, Comment: i ts 8 s Regiment, egiment, r emains i n r eserve f or t he I its 81st remains in reserve for the I Corps an t h e east coast. coast. Its Its p rincipal m i s s i o n appears a p p e a r s to to be be principal mission on the coagtal s e c u r l t y . The use u s e of e ngineer p ersonnel o f a coastal security. engineer personnel of reserve r e s e r v e division d i v i s i o n at a t the t h e front f r o n t is is not n o t unusual. unusual,
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Basic training t r a i n i n g unit u n i t from North N o r t h Korean Army located located Basic near Uari4on: Sari*on: In I n a message message irom from the t h e North North Korean E e a n IV IV41Drps % i rps b f Y c e r 11 July, J u l y . an order is i s issued i s s u e d to t o appreamresecurity Oiticer on 11 hend three t h r e e deserters from various v a r i o u s battalions b a t t a l i o n s of the t h e "Prepa r a t i o n regiment," r e g i m e n t , I g which is located at a t Anak,west aration Anak,west of Sarii n western w e s t e r n Korea Korea. (CANOE won in (CANOE ROK Int I n t Grp hl SK-L-301, M Korea, SK-L-301, 14 JUly J u l y 52) 32)
Comna t : Other intelligence i n t e l l i g e n c e sources s o u r c e s have reported reported a a Comm t: N o r t h ' .or or at'basic gin basic training t r k i n i n g center center in i n the t h e vicinity v i c i n i t y of of North Sariwon. The p Bariwon. r i n c i p a l centers, centers, however, however, are in i n the the principal Chongchoa l l i v e r area area in i n northwestern. n o r t h w e s t e r n Korea i n an a n unlounloChongchon River Korea and in cated c a t e d area of of northeastern n o r t h e a s t e r n Korea. Korea.
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"Spies" captured c a p t u r e d by by North North Korean Korean 23rd 23rd Brigade: Brigade: A "Spies" A b a t t a l i o n of. of tthe h e North 23rd B r i g a d e stated n 14 14 July July battalion North Korean 1Corean-23rd Brigade stated o On t h a t it i t had had contacted c o n t a c t e d nine n i n e "spies," seven s e v e n of of whom whom were were that k i l l e d while while trying t r y i n g to t o escape, e s c a p e . The message revealed revealed that that killed The message t h e two two r b m a i n i n g prisoners were were turned t u r n e d over o v e r to t o "the " t h e Social Social the remaining S e c u r i t y Dept." I k p t . " (CANOE (CANOE 330th 3 3 0 t h Comm C a m Recon Recon Co Co Korea, Korea, 15 15 RSM/447, RSM/447, Security 16 July J u l y 52) 52)
/reports r e p o r t s and and POW POW interrointerroMost Com e t: Most t h a t the the Communist ommun 6 military m i l i t a r y authorities a u t h o r i t i e s handle handle gations shoW that The North N o r t h Korean Korean Ministry M i n i s t r y of of c a p t u r e d UN UN and and ROK ROK personnel. p e r s o n n e l . The captured S o c i a l Security S e c u r i t y is is a a powerful p o w e r f u l internal i n t e r n a l organization o r g a n i z a t i o n in in charge charge Social o v e r - a l l security, s e c u r i t y , both both m i l i t a r y and i v i l i a n , and of over-all military and c civilian, and prepresumably interrogates / n t e r r o g a t e s all a l l "spies." 'vapiep.*v One One bureau bureau of of the t h e Ministry Ministry sumably deals with w i t h espionage e s p i o n a g e activities. activities. deals
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Increasing_number I n c r e a s i n g number of Communist units u n i t s in i n Korea hampered by by An unidentified-Chinese u n i d e n t i f i e d Chin e s e Communfst Communist unit u n i t on o n 27 27 An rainy season: ;e;yn: I;a;ny u v stated s a e that t h a t the the r a i n f a l l in i n tthatunit's h a t u n i t ' s area was "heavy" "heavV July rainfall andthat t h g t "the 'Itbe river r i v e r cannot c a n n o t be be crossed crossed at a t present." p r e s e n t . I 1 The message and me&age a l s o reirealed also r e v e a l e d t that hat a a few few a air i r raid raid shelters shelters had had c collapsed o l l a p s e d and "transportation their kitchen already the " t r a n s p o r t a t i o n company and t heir k i t c h e n have a lready moved into (CANOE been moved i n t o homes of the t h e local local civilians." civilians." (CANOE 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea,K-4656, Korea,K-4656, 28 28 July J u l y 52) 52)
r e c e n t Communist Communist North hinese Comment: Numerous recent North Korean Korean and C Chinese messaiig-Urie messages have been been similar similar to t o the t h e above above intercept, i n t e r c e p t , revealing revealing t h a t the t h e summer rains r a i n s are beginning b e g i n n i n g to hamper the a ctivltes that hamper the activites of Communist units. units.
9. 9.
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tactiOsal t a c t i % a l 'unit: udit:
Two Worth u n i t s receive r e c e i v e ample p rovisions: North Korean armored units provisions An unideAtilied its. uniddxitflii3d North N o r t h Korean'armored Korean 'armored regiment r e g i m e n t informed informed' i ts s u p e r i o r On on 24 24 July J u l y that t h a t Y'we "we secured s e c u r e d 100 100 day day and and night n i g h t rationis rationb superior of geedi goods (from?) (from?) supply," s u p p l y . " Another armored unit u n i t on the t h e follOrfolloping i t had had provisions p r o v i s i o n s for for 70 70 days d a y s and and nights. nights. i n g day stated s t a t e d that t h a t it T h i s l a t t e r unit, u n i t aalso-revealed l s o - r e v e a l e d tthat hat i t had e c e i v e d clothes, clothes, .This'latter it had r received medicine lamp oil. o i l . (CANOE (CAHOE 501st Comm Recon Grp G r p Korea, m e d i c i n e and and lamp 15RSM/972, 26 July; J u l y ; SK-L-615, SK-L-615, 26 26 July J u l y 52) 52) 15RSM/972, 26
Comment: These messages.demonstrate messages d e m o n s t r a t e the t h e considerable considerable I p g i s m r e n g t h of the espite t he c o n c e n t r a t e d UN i lpgisticitStrength the enemy enemy d despite the concentrated UN 4 interdiction i n t e r d i c t i o n program. program. The current c u r r e n t rainy r a i n y season s e a s o n has h a s hampered UN air a i r strikes s t r i k e s and the t h e enewy h a s taken taken a d v a n t a g e of t his enemy has advantage this a s demonstrated d e m o n s t r a t e d by the t h e increased increased r a i l and v ehicular s i t u a t i o n as situation rail vehicular t h e past week. week. t raff$c n o t e d in the traffic noted
D e f e c t i v e hand grenades grenades, t o be repaired by N Defective to North o r t h Korean e A r t i l l e r y Chief Chief of S t a f f of t he N orth Th The Artilleri Staff of the North Rore'an 23i7d-Nrigade 2 5 r d Brigade informed n i t of h e 21st 2 1 s t Brigade B r i g a d e that that Iorean informed a u unit of t the renades w i l l be e p a i r e d ' ' by h e latter latter t h e "Tatioxial the liational hand g grenades will be r repaired" by t the u n i t . The Chief of of Staff S t a f f issupd i s s u p d lengthk length$ instructions i n s t r u c t i o n s on unit. t o repair r e p q i r the t h e grenades g r e n a d e s and and stated: a t a t e d : "the " t h e material which is how to t o repair them will w i l l be b e supplied s u p p l i e d from the t h e superior." superior." needed to (CANOE (CANOE 501st 5 0 1 s t Comm Recon Grp Grp Korea,15RSM/839, Korea,15RSM/839, 24 24 July J u l y 52) 52)
Co nt: Small, p r i m i t i v e hand renade f a c t o r i e s are Small, primitive hand g grenade factories N o r t h Korea and constitute.a c o n s t i t u k e * a significant significant scatterd t rogghout North I t is p robablp p o r t i o q * o f that t h a t country's c o u n t r y ' s munitions m u n i t i o n s output. o u t p u t . It portion.of probable t h a t these t h e s e "national" " n a t i o n a l ' l grenades g r e n a d e s -me n e of hose f actorieB that came from o one of t those factories e f e c t i v e when r e c e i v e d by the 2 1st B r i g a d e , a tactitactiand were d defective received by the 21st Brigade, u n i t located l o c a t e d in i n Hwanghae Hwanghae Province. Province. cal unit
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North N o r t h Korean Korean tactical t a c t i c a l unit. u n i t alerted a l e r t e d t0 o apprehend a p p r e h e n a UN UN POW POW elsca ees: An element orthe e b c a ees: element o f t h e North North Ibrean K o r e a n 7th 7 t h -Divlsion, D i v i H i o n , near near o n s a n on o n the t h e east coast, was warned on on 25 25 July J u l y by by a a circular circular onsan n o t i c e from from "Air " A i r and a n d Sea, Sea D efense H eadquarters" t o be n the the notice Defense Headquarters" to be o on . who who were a alert l e r t to t o recapture r e c a p t u r e "the " t h e American prisoners. prisoners. q uartered a t Pyok r o v i n c e . " The escape quartered at Pyok Tong, Tong, Hwanghae Hwanghae P Pmvince." escape apparapparently e n t l y took took place p l a c e on on 13 13 July. July.
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The same same day another a n o t h e r message message was passed on o n this t h i s 7th 7th Division net ag general of s security Divisionn e t w which h i c h oordered rdered a e n e r a l ttightening i g h t e n i n g of ecurity in a in all ll u units n i t s in the t h e area and a search of of the t h e perimeter p e r i m e t e r of of the the nnit escapeesand andfor for''enemy "enemy agents." agents." (CANOE 3 (CANOE 330th 30th u n i t : for f o r the t h eescapees Recon Co Co Korea,ALT-330, J u l y ; ALT-338, ALT-338, 26 July J u l y 52) 52) Comm Aecon Korea,ALT-330, 26 July;
Comme Comment: t: Despite the t h e fact f a c t that t h a t the t h e prisoners p r i g o n e r s escaped escaped i n we$ e r n Korea in weitern Orea south s o u t h of Pyongyang, Pyongyang, a a country-wide c o u n t r y - w i d e alert a l e r t was was disseminated. d i s s e m i n a t e d . The time time lag l a g between a a 13 1 3 ,Jnly J u l y escape escape and and a a 25 25 t h a t the t h e system s y s t e m is is not nOt as as efficient e f f i c i e n t as as J u l y message merasage suggests s u g g e s t s that Jnly i t m i g h t be. be. it might
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF SECS. 793 AND 794, THE WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
GENERAL
1.
25X1
Comment: It is increasingly apparent that focus the attention of Moscow intends to the forthcoming ence on the alleged struggles Asian-Pacific Peace Conferof the and US "occupation." against rearmament It appears that Japanese the USSR, fearful traditional predominance in of Japan's entice Japan into an "Asia the Far East, may use the conference for the Asiatics" to Communist leadership. movement under Chinese broadcasts advising the This has been suggested by recent Communist Japanese to profit from the Chinese and by a the experience of Moscow broadcast the people are unanimous which stated that in Asia in supporting the "remarkable of their Chinese friends." initiative 25X1
2.
25X1
Finland shipping radiosondes to China: Ithat a consignment of FInnish-made was enroute to China 1 in May. radiosondes The Chinese have had curing the delivery of difficulty seSoviet authorities to this order because of the refusal provide rail or air facilities for of the shipment. The radiosondes their were reported to have to Poland and thence The Chinese have made to Czechoslovakia where theybeen sent by sea urgent inquiries about the are at present. attempts are being made 25X1 C shipment, and to ship them by air also stated that the to China. consignment is not marked on the cases or in the as radiosondes either _ documents, but is entered gories of goods. under other cate- 25x1
Moscow urges Japan to consider China "trustworthy Moscow radio commentary ally": A stated that Japan's freedom and independence" "struggle for peace, can be successful only in with all Asian peoples cooperation 25X1 example" is that of the and that in such an Asian movement the "best Chinese whom as their "trustworthy the Japanese should consider ally and friend." [
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Comment: During the past two years China has undertaken a progriE-iraid at modernizing and extending the coverage of its meteorological service. This report may refer to the 2000 radiosondes which Finland was reported to have delivered to China in April.
SOVIET UNION
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Comment: The absence of both prototype and certain known Soviet models from the Air Force Day fly-past suggests tightened security, to prevent further observation of new Soviet aircraft. In the 1951 air show,prototypes of four new jet fighters demonstrated and the Type 31, the first Soviet long-range bomber, was also seen.
Development of the Type 31 and production of the Type 35 are undoubtedly continuing, despite their absence from the air show.
4.
Increase of Hoof and Mouth Disease indicated: A Poster entitled "Prevention of Hoof and Mouth Disease" has been published recently by the Agricultural Propaganda Section of the Soviet Ministry of State Farms.
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The US Embassy in Moscow comments that although this is the first known reference to the disease in two years, its incidence may now have reached sufficient proportions to warrant a poster campaign.
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Hungarian bauxite mine criticized for underproduction: The Budapest radio on 28 July attacked the Pecs bauxite mine as "the black spot" of the Ministry of Non-Ferrous Metals, of producing "barely half of its planned target." and accused it The trade union committee of the mine was criticized for not promoting competition
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No new Soviet aircraft appear in Air Force Day ceremonies: The US Air Attache in Moscow states that, in the "uneventful" show of 27 July, no prototype aircraft were shown. He further air notes that no new Soviet aircraft types, such as the Tynes 31 and 35, participated in the fly-past.'
30 July 52
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methods and the management excoriated for "inventing excuses" instead of t king the Five Year Plan seriously.
Comment: The Central Statistical Office's report on second quarter results omitted any mention of bauxite mining, probably because of poor results in the industry. The present criticism indicates the extent of non-fulfillment of the plan in one mine. All the bauxite mines in Hungary belong to MASZOBAL, the joint Hungarian-Soviet enterprise reportedly placed under full Soviet management on 15 June.
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1
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Comment: This is further evidence that the Rumanian armed forces are receiving new Soviet equipment. Earlier this year, \have observed approximately 50 with Rumanian markings near YAK-23 jet fighters Joseph Stalin heavy tanks in Ianoa in eastern Rumania, over 20 Bucharest, and one JSU-122 self-propelled gun near the tank school at Pitesti in south central ia. Ruman-

SECRET
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6.
Rumanian Army receives new Soviet Legation in Bucharest reports that 22 equipment: The American new ns-lp1 trucks belonging to the Rumanian Ar y were si7hted north of Bucharest on 19 July.
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FAR EAST
7.
Change in Peiping's propaganda on Amsrican The change in Peiping's propaganda on American air power: air power, since the btombing of the Korean power plants in late JunP4 may shed some light on the Communist failure to offer significant opposition to the bombing.
The previous propaganda emphasized the increasing strength of the Communist Air Force in Korea in contrast to the American air weakness. The current line features denunciations of UN air attacks as atrocities and provocations.
'The Communist failure to challenge the American bombers was generally attributed to surprise. The now line, emphasizing moral issues rather than material power, suggests the possibilitr of a much lower combat capability than has been supposed.
8.
25X1
Peiping's possible reaction to British decision on former Chinese aircraft: Peiping's reaction to the British decision to award the 40 aircraft impounded at Hong Kong to the Chennault-Willauer interests is expected to be prompt. Last year Aten the Hong Kong government requisitioned a 15,000-ton oil tanker claimed by both Communists and Nationalists, Peiping retaliated by requisitioning the Chinese.propertiSs, of the British Asiatic Petroleum Corporation.
At the present time, Peiping can increase its already exorbitant financial demands against British firms and thus hinder the plans of these firms claims and withdraw from China.
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25X1 25X1
9.
official in Indochina expresses deep pessimism: Ihas told tile merican Lonsui in Hanoi that Letourneau has accomplished nothing since his return to Indochina and that his lack of leaderphip has rendered hopeless the task of the remaining Icivil officialg.
1
TbpI official also stated that Bao Dai was "for nobody but Bao Dai" and that it had long been obvious that he was a failure. 1
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Comment: This criticism by other seurces. While most of betnurneau has been expressed officials have little reepect for Bao Dai, they sti elleve he is useful as an intermediary for dealing with the Vietnamese leaders.
10.
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25X.1
Nationalist Chinese internees riot in Indochina: A 24 July revolt by 1600 interned Chinese Nationalist soldiers working as "volunteers" in coal mines near,Hongay 11 nOrthern Vietnam was quickly quelled, according to a BsA labor consultant who recently visited that area. The riot began the Chinese soldiers when refused to obey a French work order; French officials were held captive two armored cars forced the rioters to until the arrival of capitulate d
I
25X1
state of unrest, plus a considerable Communist infiltration. degree of
concerning Chinese Nationalists interiienaran island off the southern coast of Indochina cated a similar indi-
Comment:
Previous reports
25X6
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12.
Burmese commander promises campaign against Chinese Nationalists: At the end ot a week-long conference with hiS field commanders, Burmese Supreme Commander Ne Win announced that the army would continue against the insurgents and would mount a campaign to operations drive the Chinese Nationalist forces out of northeastern Burma. The US Army Attache in Rangoon comments thal this is only propaganda. 1 25X1 Comment: In order to alleviate public criticism, the BurmareCoVernment has felt compelled, from time to have leading officials state to that vigorous action is time, About to be taken against the Chinese Nationalists.
13.
Plantation strike threatens Indonesian Strike a ec ng sugar croil A as ava sugar es a es, mos o in the midst of harvesting, w ieh are seriously threatens an estimatep crop Of 450,000 tons of sugar.
I
/ 25X1 The strike was called in protest wage awargran of the government's against a mediation board and undOubtedly was timed to impede the'harvest. At the 1951 congress of the Amalgamated Sugar Workers Union, Communists considerably increased their influence in the union.'''
Comment:
Although sugar has declined from its prewar POSition as Indonesia's largest export product, it'reMains the principal industry of East Java.
14.
25X1
Nationalists in Spanish Morocco demand trade unions: An ed or a n e u y ssue o e nationalist newspaper, Al-Umma, pan s oroccan called for the establishment of'labor "syndicates" f3F-MEFUncans. Appalling ditions, especially for women, was the principal working consuch a move. Although the argument for 1937 provides for optional compulsory labor law of 27 October membership for Moroccans, the nationalists state that Moroccans are unwilling to join these S anish Syndicates "b cause th ir problems are different."

NEAR EAST - AFRICA
SECRET
6
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Comment: Although the establishment of nationalist union-raja-a spotlight the lack of freedom in Spain to establish trade unions, Spanish officials might assent in this instance as a part of their heckling campaign against authorities in French Morocco. After several years of complete suppression of political activities in Spanish Morocco, authorities revoked their ban at the same time that French authorities stiffened against nationalists in their zone, thereby causing considerable annoyance to official circles in Rabat and Paris.
15.
--Medical panel reports Tunisian nationalist leader is in good health: According to the Residency General, a panel of three French Algerian physicians has made a preliMiniry'report Stating that Habib Bourghiba, imprisoned Tunisian nationalist leader, is in good health but "very depressed." the-R4Sidency sdded that Boutghiba has complete freedom of action on the island of La Galite, off the northern coast of Tunisia,' including access to books, radio, and conversation with any of the island's 400 residents, many of whom are fishermen. The Residency mav issue the dnetirs' findings in a communique.
25X1
Comment, The Residency will probably give this medical report wide circulation to combat persistent rumors that Bourghiba was ill.
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WESTERN EUROPE
16.
EAStAermans pressure Swiss on Official recognition:- Forthe pas .. ree wee s as ommerc a t ac e n erlin has _Ibuidd,lt*Imperssible.tortransmit to.the cotpetent East German OfAUdiel_inyAliatters.of a diplomatic nature: Since the 9 July-an_AzokUmbementzt:,an:East German party conference-that the "Swiss had ..;..,-propOisedto..establish normal relationships" with East Germany, lorMer,contacts of the Attache in the Emit German Ministry of Poreign.Trade.have either been "unavailable" or haye refused to .accept Aommunications of a noncommercial nature.
Comment: The Swiss Government has recently denied any intention of granting de jure recognition to the East GerMan Government, but has acknowledged its interest in some arrangement which would protect Swiss nationals and property in East Germany. Rejection by the East Germans of informal understandings indicates the importance they attach to official recognition.
17.
outh labor service seen as Communist compromer cant) a the planned formation of East German youth labor battalions is a typical "Communist compromise" designed to permit the East German GovernMent to create a "readily available labor force," to overcome youth resistande against military service, and to establish a military manpower pool without formal conscription.
mise on conscrpon:
'
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18.
Recruiting is expected to begin immediately for 660 brigades to be quartered in 66 labor camps. About 50,000 youth to 60,000 East German youths seventeen years old and older will probably receive "pre- and para-military training" in the new "Service for Germany" organization each year.1
1
25X1,.
The Swiss Attache believes that the East German Government Alas Airected that these irregular contacts with Switzerland be .8evered until the Swiss give diplomatic recognition to the East Germans,
New East German
casnerneeve
25X1
East German Government moves to curb flight 431 intellectuals to the West: The East German Ministry of Interior ia reliably reported to have ordered last June the confiscation of property and the resettlement of families left behind by East Germin ibientists who move to West Germany or West Berlin, EaSt German
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Autherltieflave allegedly been instructed to "exercise control" _Anilrevitenting intellectuals
suoh:a
move-6
from obtaining permission to make
25X1:
Akerican:officials in Berlin believe that the new directiVes.ire intendedYto'prevent the.flight of sorely needed .._adientlEte..apd to minimize contacts between East and West zone inhabitants.
1
19,
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20.
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9
increased the number of refugees in West Berlin during the last month. This new retaliation against property or families of refugees may not its purpose; such measures need publicity to be effective, serve and publicity could increase rather than curb the flow of refugees to the West.
deprivations in consequence of ne7-35Mies in East Germany has, despite increased border restrictions, considerably
Comment;
Expectation of further
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21.
'::Semet.,Bedgian ArMy Conscript's riet againSt 24-month service
Belgian.newspapers report that there have been three Hrecentriots'in'the armY barracks in Brussels and Namur among IheAkiSiscripts-who had'completed:18:months of militarY service proteSting the 24-month period. According to a laberal'Party. newspaper, there have been "similar less serious 25X1C _incidents" elsewhere in Belgium.
25X1C
25X1 -
The government may find it politically infeasible to hold off the release of Belgian inductees until the end of the year, if there is continued unrest. 25X1
22.
I
25X1 Comment: Although the government has promised to reduce the servfersiiirfod to 18 months,:unless the other EDC countries in...Crease their conscription period to 24 months, such a step would mean a delay in the fulfillment of Belgium's military commitments to NATO.
Dutch Communists plan "shadow Party" organization:

1
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I
25X1 The over-all scheme is apparently still in the developmental stage and few actual selections have been made.
I I
t49, 'hitch Communist Party is planning to select gshadow party" members in Amsterdam and three'provinees. In Amsterdam alone,'800 ten-man groups are scheduled to be headed by a top committee of three. The central lists are to be kept in code.
25X1
23.
Comment: According to a recent report, the Dutch Communists are plijnjng to provoke the government into placing a formal ban on their party, thus giving them the impetus to go underground.
LATIN AMERICA
Cuban counterrevolutionaries reputedly promised assistance by Mexican president,elect: Prior to his election on 6 July, Adolfo Ruiz Cortines, Mexico's president-elect, reputedly held SECRET
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30 July 1962
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CIA No. 49754 Copy No. 4 6

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This digest of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It does not represent a complete coverage of all current or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Commentsreports in CIA represent the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
Tap qrr14
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SEC. 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW,
FAR EAST
1.
25X1C
2.
Ambassador MacVeagh comments that the Spanish Government's reluctance to proceed with negotiations on the limited basis proposed by the United States stems from the argument that Spain's increased jeopardy under the agreement obligates the US to provide sufficient aid for Spain's self-defense. Furthermore, Franco fears that publication of the actual amount of aid to be received, after the expectations aroused by the controlled press, will stir TOP SECRET
1
Spain demands higher price for base agreement with United States: Foreign Minister Martin Artajo has "personally" suggested T5-Xligassador MacVeagh that Spain's price for a base agreement is not only greater military aid than the United States is now offering, but also a preliminary agreement giving assurances of American support in the event of war.

WESTERN EUROPE
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up dangerous resentment against himself, particularly in the army. The Ambassador does not believe that Franrn ends to break off the negotiations .
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Comment: In an "informal" memorandum, the Spanish Government recently asked for a military and economic aid program of far greater scopeS than is now projected and an agreement for the construction of bases whose use by American forces would be subject to later negotiation. It suggested that if these terms could not be met, aid now available be released at for the base agreement postponed until enough once and negotiations aid were authorized to meet Spain's demands.

TOP SECRET
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30 July 52
25X1

HR70-14 HR70-14
NR
6. 6.
ArtiJ.lery is is principal p r i n c i p a l , arm arm of of newly newly formed formed North Korean ArtillerT North Korean une Iodated oca s brigade: A recently available message of 16 June b % $ ; a $ e b a t t a l i o n s d the t h e recently r e c e n t l y identitied.North i d e n t i f i e d North Korean Korean Subordinate battalionscl A l l but but one he four 23nd brigade brigilrbq in i n northeastern n o r t h e a s t e r n KOrea. Korea. Ail 22nd one of of tthelour b a t t a l i b n g mentioned escribed a s."aechanized a rtillery,It battalitinS Mentioned were were d desCribed as."mechanized artillery.P (CANOE ABAPAC, Japan, PASAL-163, 26 26 July J u l y 52) 52) (0AMO AsOn, Japan, PA8AL-163,
L ,
7. 7.
8 . s.
An iapgarent de-emphasis de-emphasis on on artillery a r t i l l e r y brigades, b r i g a d e s , however, however, 4# Oparent The 23rd Brigade, B r i g a d e , formerly f o r m e r l y artillery, artillery, The 23rd provided thm t h e cadre-for ca@refor the t h e newly-formed newly-formed 21st 21st B r i g a d e , an an infaninfanprovided Brigade, try u n i t . i T1*26th, T h 4 . 2 6 t h ,the t h eremaining remainingNorth North Korean Korean west west coast coast try unit"
is under under a way n the t h e west. west. 4! i in
k r t i i t e r y W l g a d e unit, u n i t , has has not not been been identified i d e n t i f i e d through through any krtil:lerybtigade any intelligence source eauxce for for many many Months. months. intelligence
VI1 .Corps CQrps may e c e i v e d more more officers: officers: Bark Nortti Korkan preen VII may have have r received 4.july-usssage In a h s s a g e 7 W HR70-14 -vita the HR70-14 Nokth Koreaq VI1 Coipsin i nthe-Wonsan the Wonsan area, area, a a "personnel Itpersonnel staff staff Notth Ko*eanyu Corps off 1 ~ 3 t ~ ep 'o ~ r t e d tthe he a r r i v a l aP "77 p l platoon atoon lea d e r s .'I The officer"'reported arrival opf "77 leaderm" The message suggested Tugdested Ahat t h a t they t h e y were newly-commissioned o fficers message vete newly-commissioned officers r e t u r n i n g to t a their t h e i r unit u n i t from from Otticers o f f i c e r s school. s c h o o l . (CANOE returning (CANOE ASAPAC, ASAPAC) Korea, PASAL-174, 28 fu;ly 62) Korea, PASAL474, 28 Jiily 50)
.
The receiptof ofthis t h i s considerable c o n s i d e r a b l e number number of of Comment*The Comme4L receipt junior-& ottiCerS will w i l l probably probably increase i n c r e a s e the t h e combat fectivenesa junior combat ef etfectiveness of the t h e VII VI1 Corps. Carps. e n t e r coibsit combbt i o t h the e n enear ar f u ture to helong enter 0.41 future torelieve relieve one one of of tthelong engaged corps corps presently p r e e s n t Py at a t the t h e front. 9r o n t The VI4 Corps, untested u n t e s t e d in i n combat, combat, may be p r e p a r i n g to to The,VII,Corps, may be preparing
W t s l l point:ming p o i s b n i n g rreported e p o r t e d by armored Woll by North North Korean Korean east east coast coast armored e p o r t e ' d on on e a r Wonsan A 14' or Korean 'A North Korean arhored arRored qegiment' regiment n near Wonsan rreported m u L y thet'it t h q z t had had "captured "captured a d 15 15 year-old year-old girl g i r l who who was was Mt-/uly p v t t i n g poison i n t o the t h e drinking d r i n k i n g water.'' (CANOE 330th Comm pmtting poiion into water." (CANOE 330th Comm RBcon Co Korea, Korea, 15RSM/976, 15RSM/976, 26 26 July J u l y 52) 52) Recon Co
u nit! unit:
F y i k n t : Of t h e currently c u r r e n t l y identified i d e n t i f i e d North riOf the North Korean Korean b briadere n & k s t e r n Korea, r e e -- tthe h e 22nd, 2 4 t h , and and 25th 2 5 t h .-gades n -.eastern Korea,t h three 22nd, 24th, The ave beeh'identitied beeb i d e n t i f i e d as a s being b e i n g primarily p r i m a r i l y artillery a r t i l l e r y units. u n i t s . The' hive 2 0 t h Erigide, Brfigade, 'about 'about which 20th which lYttle little is is known, known, may may also also be be artilleyy. artillery.
--
--
31 July J u l y 52 52 31
TOP SECRET CANOE

>
Pb
SI 514
et)
FOR RELEASE RELEASE APPROVED FOR DATE: 8-Mar-2010 DATE. 18-Mar-2010
-TtrP SECRET
number of r recent messages from u units Comment: A number e c e n t messages n i t s on the the North-TUMTE east Northe a s t coast coast have havereported reportedincidents i n c i d e n t sof ofpoitioning. poiwoning. It is n not clear whether whether t this an expression of h hostility I:t o t clear h i s is a n e x p r e s s i o n of o s t i l i t y on the part the North Korean Korean p population, an enemy enemy p plant for t he p a r t of t h e North o p u l a t i o n , an lant f or purposes, propaganda p u r p o s e s , or whether it i t stems stems from from other other causes. causes.
9.
Usual bases of of Russian R u s s i a n jet , j e t units u n i t s in in Manchuria Manchuria reported: reported: ot fhe Russian MIG-15 units The location l o a ' a t i o n and activity a c t i v i t y of t h e nine R u s s i a n MIG -15 u n i t s in in determined by a study of GCI GCI communications Manchuria was determineds t u d y of throup 10 throbgh 10 July. July. T h r e e interceptor interceptor u n i t s are a t Tatungkou Three units at Tatungkou and also operate from from Anshan, Anshan, Fengcheng Fengcheng and and Mukden. Mukden. Two M IG MIG units Antung, but but were r relatively inactive u n i t s are at st Antung, elatively i n a c t i v e from March until u n t i l early e a r l y July. J u l y . On 10 10 J uly t he u nit a t Tungfeng n c entral July the unit at Tungfeng i in central
r -

5 5
Manchuria transferred t r a n s f e r r e d to t o Fengcheng Fengcheng near n e a r Antung. Antung. One unit u n i t at at Anshan and two at a t Mukden Mukden usually u s u a l l y operate operate at a t night. n i g h t . (CANOE Special Air A i r Information I n f o r m a t i o n Summary Summary 52-30, 52-30, 17 17 July July 52) 52)
COmm nt: Cowm nt These nine nine u n i t s contain contain a n estimated 320 units an 320 jet I G - 1 5 ' s are much more a c t i v e in i n comR ussian H j e t fighters. f&: Russian MIG-15's active combat v e r Korea than t h a n jets j e t s piloted p i l o t e d by by Chinese Chinese and and Koreans. Koreans. bat o over
31 July J u l y 52 52 31
TOP SECRET CANOE
*
FAR EAST EAST FAR
4. 4.
HR70-14 . .. .. . HR70-14
C h i n e s e MIG's M I G ' s unusually u n u s u a l l y aggressive a g g r e a s i v e over o v e r Korea: Korea: ChineseChineseChinese p i 1 0 t m -15's in i n o4er o 9 e r 60 sorties s o r t i e s on o n 27 July Ju l y displayed displayed piloted MIG-15's n - analysis a n a l y s i s of the o a " e x c e p t i o n a l aggreSsiveness," a g g r e 6 s l v e n e s s , ' ' according according t "exceptional to an of the C h i n e s e GCJ net. N o RusOlian Rusciiian m i s s i o n s were h a t day. day. Chtnese GO net. No missions were flown flown t that s u s t a i n e d level l e v e l of operations 0 , p e r a t i o n s was m a i n t a i n e d throughthroughA sustained maintained w i t h Chinese aircraft a i r c r a f t patrolling , p a t r o l l i n g and, a n d , for f o r the the o u t the t h e day, d a y , with out f i r s t time, time, being b e i n g ordered o r d e r e d to t o seek seek out o u t UN UN aircraft. a i r c r a f t . (CANOE (CANOE first 6920, S e c u r i t y Grp Grp Johnson Johnson AFB AFB Japan, J a p a n , Chicomsum Chicomsum 951, 9 5 1 , 28 28 6920 Security J u l y 52) 52) July
I ,
9. 5.
'
0 . 6.

officers: officers:
Comment: This T h i s high h i g h Chinese C h i n e s e sertie sdrtie r a t e , coupled coupled w ith Comment: rate, with t h e ariFENgTveness a-venees d i s p l a y e d , represents represents a c o n s i d e r a b l e dedethe displayed, considerable p a r t u r e from from'enemy p e r a t i o n s of he p a s t months. parture 'enemy air air o operations of t the past months. j e t s accounted a c c o u n t e d for f o r about about 75 75 percent p e r c e n t of P r e v i o u s l y Soviet S o v i e t jets Previously c o n t a c t s with-the w i t b W w UN,while Chinese C h i n e s e jets j e t s were were combat contacts g e n e r a l l y ordered o r d e r e d to t o avoid a v o i d combat. combat. generally
f o r qualified q u a l i f i e d junior junior N q r t b Koreans again a g a i n request r e q u e s t search s e a r c h for North The North Korean 21st 2 1 s t Brigade B r i g a d e requested r e q u e s t e d one o n e of its ife The t o "the " t h e person persont o transmit t r a n s m i t to s u b o r d i n a t e battalions b a t t a l i o n s on on 28 28 July J u l y to subordfnate 31 July J u l y the t h e names of all a l l officers o f f i c e r s and and enlisted enlisted n e l section" section!' by 31 nel men who had had ever e v e r Attended a t t e n d e d aa university, u n i v e r s i t y , aa ."middle "middle school," s c h o o l , " or or men who had taught t a u g h t at a t either e i t h e r level. l e v e l . The The message message also a l s o requested requested a a who had b r i e f biographical b i o g r a p h i c a l sketch s k e t c h on each qualified q u a l i f i e d man and !or for brief t o be be separated s e p a r a t e d into i n t o two two lists. lists. (CANOE (CANOE t e a c h e r s ahd and students s t u d e n t s to teachers 5 0 1 s t Comm Comm Recon Recon Grp Grp Korea, Korea, SK-L-686, 8K-L-686, 28 28 July J u l y 52) 52) 501st
C mment: Recent Recent messages, messages, such s u c h as a s the t h e above, above, point p o i n t up up Comment: the c urren c o n c e r t e d effort e f f o r t of North Korean Korean authorities a u t h o r i t i e s to to the current concerted d i s c o v e r perSonnel p e r s o n n e l qualified q u a l i f i e d to t o be be officers. officers. A A shortage s h o r t a g e of of discover competent l e a d e r s has h a s existed e x i s t e d in i n the t h e North Korean Army Army since since competent leaders t h e beginning b e g i n n i n g of of hostilities. hostilities. the
_et-.
'
F l o o d s in i n Korea Korea limit l i m i t Chinese Chinese Communist Communist resupply r e s u p p l y operaoperaFloods t i o n s : Only Only two t w o of twenty twenty trucks t r u c k s which which were were sent s e n t to t o the t h e rear rear tions: f o r e t r o l e u m on 28 J u l y r e t u r n e d t h e n e x t day w i t h t h e i r YUF-Fetroleum on 28 July returned the next day with their mirasion c o m p l e t e d , according a c c o r d i n g to t o an a n intercepted i n t e r c e p t e d message message passed passed mission completed, two unidentified u n i d e n t i f i e d Chinese C h i n e s e Communist Communist regiments. r e g i m e n t s . Seven Seven between two of the v ehicles r e t u r n e d empty, e m p t y , three three were unacof the vehicles returned were damaged or or unacc o u n t e d for, f o r , and and the t h e remainder remainder were u n a b l e to t o return r e t u r n because because counted were unable of a washed-out washed-out bridge b r i d g e on on the t h e main main supply s u p p l y route. r o u t e . (CANOE (CANOE of a 501st Comm Cornm Recon Recon Grp Grp Korea, Korea, K-4702,29 K-4702,29 July J u l y 52) 52) 501st
1 Aug 52
COD
I'
I 1
ty
Comment: This This message message gives gives an an indication indication of the extent extent Comment: of the hich z n and floods floods in in Korea Korea interfere interfere with with Communist Communist to w which ratn resupply operations. operations. The The rainy rainy season season prompted the Chinese Chinese resupply prompted the Communist attillery attilleyy divisions divisions in in Korea Korea to to double double their their supply supply Communist goals in in June Juhe and July July of of this this year. year.
I
7. 7.
North Korean Korean brigade briRade builds builds dummy dummy installations: installations: A A batbatNorth the North K orean 21st in western talion of talion of the North Yorean 21st Brigade Brigade it western lforea Korea starting its engineer engineer platoon 99 July that its reported op ;9 platoon wa6 was starting work on "three false warehouses, two false vehicles, three work on "three falseswarehouses, two false vehicles, three false antiaircraft guns, guns, three three false false tanks:" tanks." (CANOE 15RSY/ false (CANOE 15RSM/ 1180 Korea, Korea, 30 30 July July 52) 52) 1169
8, 8 .
Comm nt-: nt: The The building building of of false false installations installations has has been been Comm. previous y epployed by the enemy to divert UN airpower from previous y employed by the enemy to divert UN airpower from more profitable profitable targets. targets. The i s one the few few menmenThe message message is one of of the tions of of this this type type of of activity activity in in communications communications intelligence. intelligence. tions
rth, Korean unit unit on on east east coast coast engages engages in in rear rear area area road road prth Korean g am& and'reRafr: repair: A A subordinate' e North orean unit of building subordinate'unit of th the North K6rean th Divlelon,' south of 8th Divislon,-south of Wonsan, informed "division "division commander1' commander" on 26 26 July July that that a a total total of of 1,177 1,177 men men from from several several battalions battalions on were mobilized mobilised to to repair repair and and construct construct roads. roads. The The soldiers soldiers were built 837 meters roadway, repaired 1,335 meters and built built built 837 meters of of roadway, repaired 1,335 meters and one bridge, according according to to the the message. message. (CANOE (CANOE 330th 330th Comm Comm one bridge, Recon .Co Korea, ALT-360, ALT-360, 27 27 July July 52) 52) Recon Co Korea,
,/
NR
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1 Aug 52 1 Aug 52
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7. 7.
Possible P o e s i b l e ROK effort e f f o r t to t o enter North Korean vqice v q i c e net net Accordpng to a F ar E U t A i r Fdrce s e c u r i t y ACcorcqng to Fart0.4t 4ir,Fdrce-security noted on 24 'July: July: noted l3rOuPt on 3 J u l y an a n unknown unknown transmitter, t r a n s m i t t e r , "appar4ntly " a p p a r d n t l y South group,On' on244 Itjuly Korean," Korean," attempted a t t e m p t e d five five times t i m e s to t o break into i n t o the t h e North Korean Korean GCI net. (321 n e t . The North Koreans clearly c l e a r l y indicated i n d i c a t e d that t h a t their their oPerators o p e r a t o r s knew this t h i s transMitter t r a n a m i t t e r was w a s not not a a part p a r t of o f ' their t h e i r own own o f call c a l l Signs signs by by this t h i s unknown unknown transmitter transmitter o g e r a t l o n s . The use u s e of operations. revealed knowledge of of the the North North Korean Korean network network r e v e a l e d an a n extensive e x t e n s i v e knowledge operations. positive reaction o p e r a t i o n s . Thus far, f a r , hoWever, however, no p o s i t i v e enemy r e a c t i o n to to this t h i s effort e f f o r t to t o enter e n t e r the t h e net n e t has h a s bean bean noted. n o t e d . (CANOE 6920 S e c u r i t y Grp 955, AP-211, AP-211, 29 29 July J u l y 52) 52) Security Grp Johnson Johnson AFB AFB Japan, Japin,CHICOYSUM CHICOMM.955, Receiv( of Beceip$, o f Soviet-made Soviet-made medium medium tank t a n k acknowledged ackqowleqged by by North North Korean Unit: North-Korean armored.reginjent u n i t : 'The S he North Ko r e a n armored regiqent iin n tthe-Wonsan h e Wonsin area of of the t h e east coast coakt r reported e p o r t e d to-Armored.Forces t o Armored Forcefii H Headquarters eadquarters July tthatitsind on 30 July h a t its 2ndBattalion, B a t t a l i o n , separate separate from from the t h e regiment regiment and possibly p o s s l b l y near n e a r Pyongyang, had received r e c e i v e d "two T-34 T-34 tanks t a n k s from from the 15RSM/1272, Korea, 31 t h e 208th 208th Unit U n i t on on 25 25 July." July." (CANOE 15RSM/1272, 31 July July 52) 52)
Comment: probable Comment: It I t is p r o b a b l e that t h a t the t h e Wonsan armored regiment's ment ' s 2nd a t tBattalion a l i o n is is still s t i l l in i n the t h e organizational o r g a n i z a t i o n a l stage. stage. T This h i s is i s one of the t h e few few mentions of a a T-34 T-34 tank t a n k being b e i n g rereceived, c e i v e d , although a l t h o u g h it i t is is generally g e n e r a l l y accepted w c a p t e d that t h a t the t h e bulk bulk of of enemy tanks t a n k s are are of of this-type. t h i s type.
is widespread:* "Execution ttExecution of of camouflage camouflage 40 fO d deceive e c e i v e*(the, (the enemi) . is Is expected e x p e c t e d to t o be thoroughly t h o r o u g h l y completed complqted by 10 10
. .
i n North North Korea.to Korea t q divert d i v e r t UN UN air air Building B u i l d i n g of of dummy dummy targets t a r g e t s in
...
August," a a North N o r t h Korean Korean armored armored regiment r e g i m e n t loCated l o c a t e d near n e a r Wonsan Wonsan reported r e p o r t e d to t o Armored Armored Forces Forces Headquarters, H e a d q u a r t e r s , (CANOE (CANOE ROK ROK Det D e t M, M, Korea, Korea, SK-4-722, SK-L-722, 31 31 July J u l y 52) 52)
Comment: t h e buiIding.of b u i l d i n g of dummy installations i n s t a l l a t i o n s is is Comment: While the a number number of of messages messages not in n o t cUiFIT-indicated c-indicated i n this t h i s message, message, a from North Korean u units on west nits o n tthe he w e s t cooastindicate o a s t i n d i c a t e such such a a project p r o j e c t is is under.way. under way. A recent'intelligence r e c e n t i n t e l l i g e n c e report r e p o r t from from Sinuiju S i n u i j u indicated i n d i c a t e d that t h a t dummy dummy aircraft a i r c r a f t were were being belqg placed placed on on the t h e field f i e l d to t o deceive d e c e i v e UN UN air a i r observers. observers.
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R e s h u f f l e of of east coast c o a s t artillery artillery n e c e s s i t a t e d by new Reshuffle necessitated North Korean Korean brigades: ' b r i g a d e s : A 14 r 4 JUne Jline message messagefrom. from fhe t h e gortfi North Borean V v Cbrpsi co r p s , responsible r e s p o n s i b l e for f o r east east coast'security, c o a s t s e c u r i t y , ininKorean formed an an o f f i c e r in i n charge c h a r g e of "organization" " o r g a n i z a t i o n " in i n its subofficer subo r d i n a t e 22nd 22nd Brigade: Brigade: "three " t h r e e artillery a r t i l l e r y batteries b a t t e r i e s on. on Hodo ordinate are being b e i n g transferred t r a n s f e r r e d to t o the t h e 25th 25th Brigade." Brigade." ( n e a r Wonsan) (near Wonsan) are i n d i c a t e d that t h a t this t h i s transfer t r a n s f e r was a eplacement The message indicated a r replacement f o r an an artillery a r t i l l e r y battalion b a t t a l i o n transferred t r a n s f e r r e d from t h e 25th 2 5 t h to t o the the for from-the B r i g a d e . (CANOE (CANOE USM-86, Korea, 3719A) 30 30 July July 52) 52) 22nd Brigade. Korea, Spot 3719A, Comment: a r b o r , is I s in i n the the Comment: Hodo-Point, Hodo-Point, west west of Wonsan h harbor, area 6 fonsibility of the t h e North North Korean Korean VII V I 1 Corps. Corps. T his area iinrigFonsibility of This t r a n s f e r of artillery a r t i l l e r y from either e i t h e r VII V I 1 Corps or.naval or n a v a l responrespontransfer s i b i l i t y to to V Y Corps is a further f u r t h e r indication i n d i c a t i o n of the p rincipal sibility of the principal r o l e now now being b e i n g played p l a y e d by by the the V V Corps Corps in in east east coast coast defense. defenee. role
9. 9.

l ine: line: -mored
5
to c o n s e r v e its gasogasoarmored unit u n i t ordered o r d e r e d to North Korean armored conserve a f t e r n o o n of o f 30 30 July, Ju l y , the t h e North arDuring the t h e afternoon North Korean Xorean arr e g l m e n t near n e a r Wonsan reported r e p o r t e d to t o headquarters h e a d q u a r t e r s that t h a t it it mored regiment "one ton t o n of gasoline g a s o l i n e for f o r emergency use" use" to t o move its its had used "one ammunition dump. ammunition dump.
l a t e r , Armored F orces H e a d q u a r t e r s ordered ordered F i v e hours h o u r s later, Five Forces Headquarters n o t to t o use u s e any more g a s o l i n e and s tated t h a t the the t h e unit not the gasoline stated that Wonsan regiment would would be be held h e l d responsible r e s p o n s i b l e for f o r using u s i n g the t h e ton ton t o transport t r a n s p o r t ammunition. ammunition. (CANOE (CANOE ROK Det D e t M, M, Korea Korea SK-L-732; SK-L-732; to 15RSM, Det D e t 151, 151, 15R8M/1273, 15RSM/1273,31 31 July 52) 52) 15RSM, July. R e l u c t a n c e to t o authorize a u t h o r i z e the t h e use u s e of fuel f u e l for f o r an an Comment: Reluctance emerg-ansfer of ammunition ammunition suggests s u g g e s t s that t h a t this t h i s vital vital emerigiETTFansfer of commodity is still s t i l l in in short s h o r t supply s u p p l y in I n the t h e North Korean Army, Army. commodity is North Korean
.
I n t e r c e p t e d banking messages of arly s pring t h i s year Intercepted of e early spring this s u g g e s t e d that t h a t the t h e North Koreans were were to t o receive receive upwards of of suggested 6 5 , 0 0 0 tons t o n s of o f fuel f u e l in in the t h e first f i r s t quarter q u a r t e r of o f the t h e year. year. 65,000
10.
Chinese trntnsfer r e m a i n i n g bombers u t of s outhern Chinese transfer remaining bombers o out southern The 28th Manchuria: The 28t h Regiment of the t h e Chinese 10th 1 O t h .Air Air D i v i s i o n was was to t o leave leave Liaoyang Liaoyang in in southern s o u t h e r n Manchuria for for Division Nanking on on 31 31 July. J u l y . The The headquarters h e a d q u a r t e r s of the t h e 10th 1 0 t h Division Division Nanking i t s other o t h e r regiment, r e g i m e n t , the t h e 30th, 3 0 t h , are are at a t Nanking. Nanking. (CANOE (CANOE and its A i r Force F o r c e Roundup Roundup 147, 1 4 7 , 31 31 July J u l y 52) 52) Air
Comment: Since March, March, when the t h e light l i g h t bomber-equipped bomber-equippod Comment: t o Tsitsihar T s i t s i h a r in i n northern n o r t h e r n ManMan8 t h Division Division moved from Mukden to 8th c h u r i a , the t h e 28th 2 8 t h Regiment Regiment with w i t h at a t least l e a s t 15 15 TU-2's TU-2'8 was the churia, was the o n l y known known Communist Communist bomber bomber unit unit w i t n i n combat a n g e of the only witnin combat r range of the Korean front. f r o n t . The 2 8 t h Regiment Regiment was first n o t e d by intercepts Korean The 28th was first noted by intercepts in May 1951 1951 at a t Nanking. Nanking. I t t r a n s f e r r e d to t o Liaoyang i n September. September. It transferred Liaoyang in
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4 August 1952
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OCI No. 6454

Copy No,
280

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This digest of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Central Intelligence Agency. It cbes not represent a complete coverage of all current reports receive& Comments represent the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 180 USC, SECS. 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
GENERAL
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2.
Western Ukrainians hold few local jobs: A July editorial in Radyanska Ukraina criticized the oblasts of Western Ukraine for not appointing local people to government and party posts. The article notes that the party committees continue to request experienced workers from the higher party authorities instead of "patiently training" local personnel. "In Drogabych Oblast there are only six locil persons serving as Secretaries of Executive Committees of town and rayon councils, only nine local deputy chairmen, and many posts are not occupied at all."
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Comment: It is evident that party and government posts in thrnifirn Ukraine are still being staffed by imported personnel from other more reliable areas, because apathy towards Communist indoctrination and a reluctance to serve in any

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official capacity still exist among the people in the Western Ukraine.
EASTERN EUROPE
3.
Czech Government denounces payments in kind in effort to tighten control over distribution: Premier Antonin Zapotocky has recently denounced payments in kind which are still being made as bonuses to workers in certain consumer goods industries as apt to disrupt the rationing system and as unfair to workers in industries in which such bonuses are not given.
Comment: The Czech Government is attempting by all means to maintain strict control of the distribution of scarce consumer goods so that it can utilize them most effectively as a political weapon.
4.
Finnish Foreign Minister reportedly considering resignaThe American Legation in Helsinki reports that Foreign Wai'ster Sakari Tuomioja's wife has intimated that ne intends to resign hiS cabinet position because the combined jobs of Foreign Minister and Director of the Bank of Finland are too heavy a load. The Bank reportedly wishes to have him back full time in view of the unfavorable trend in foreign trade and the probable shift from inflationary to deflationary pressures in the Finnish economy.
tion:
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Comment: Tuomioja, a political independent, is highly respected in Finnish business and banking circles. He is considered to have a pro-Western orientation even though, like his predecessor in the Foreign Ministry, Ake Gartz, he is a member of the Board of Directors of the Finland-Soviet Union Society.
5.
In naming a successor, Prime Minister Kekkonen would be guided by tne necessity to appoint an individual who would not arouse the suspicion or distrust of the Soviet Union.
Hungarian factory leadership reproved for preventing workers from taking vacations: The Hungarian trade union newspaper on 30 July attacked work committees, social insurance councils and trade unions for poor control work that resulted in workers losing the benefit of their vacations. Instead of taking a
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rest, some miners reportedly cultivated their own farms, others took temporary employment, and some factory hands remained at their jobs during vacation periods in order to fulfill the plan. The newspaper reproved factory leaders who put plan fulfillment above the provisions of the labor code requiring vacations with pay. 25X1
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Poles contemplate a public trial for General Bor-Komorowski:A Polish Government broadcast announcing a commemoration ceremony on 1 August for those killed in the Bor uprising demanded a public trial of General Bor and other underground leaders. Josef Rokicki's book "Lights and Shadows" is quoted to condemn General Bor.1
1
This article shows unusual solicitude for the welfairrffungarian workers, who usually are exhorted to labor longer hours on Stakhanovite projects. It is possible that the trade union leadership is showing signs of opposition to the excessive demands made upon labor. However, the article simply may be a sop thrown to the workers. Certainly the party newspaper of the same day echoed the usual line, asking workers to fan "the flame of labor competitions" in honor of Constitution Day on 20 August.
Comment:
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Comment: The Communists consistently have called the famouniFirw Rising of August-September 1944 the "Bor Uprising" in an attempt to place the blame for the destruction of Warsaw and the annihilation of many thousands of its inhabitants on General Bor-Komorowski. These attempts have not proved successful, however, in removing the impression which still persists in Poland that Stalin and General Rokossowski's units of the Red Army were responsible for the catastrophe, by their refusal to send help until it was too late to prevent the brutal suppression of the rising by the Germans.
8.
Correction: The last sentence of Item 8, page 5, in the Current Intelligence Digest of 1 August, should read: "It is not unlikely, therefore, that discharged service men are being UTFected to essential indus tries."
The fact that a public trial is contemplated for General Bor and his Home Army associates suggests that the belief is still strong among the Polish people that the Russians were responsible, and that the Polish Communist leaders consider it necessary to take unusual measures to counteract it.
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Comment: Marshal Tito contends that the USSR, aided and abetted by "reactionary" enemies in the West, is attempting through fabrications and other devious means to isolate Yugo-1 slavia from the West.
The relaxation of Soviet-Satellite pressures on the Yugoslav frontier, the appearance of border stories in the Western press questioning the authenticity of the Cominform break, And conciliatory treatment accorded to Yugoslavia at the June session of the Danubian Commission, lend some credence to Tito's theory.
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Syngman Rhee's re-election as South Korean President asSyngman Rhee's re-election on 5 August for a four-year TIFEis a foregone conclusion, according to US Ambassador Muccio. His controlling position over the majority of social and patriotic organizations throughout South Korea, as well as the support of the government's propaganda machine, will assure Rhee an overwhelming majority.
sured:
In the important vice presidential race no less than nine candidates are registered with Yi Pom-sok, widely considered South Korea's second ranking politico and rated as the pre-election favorite. Yi's control of the Liberal Party and his influence in the Taehan Youth Corps give him a tremendous advantage over the other vice presidential aspirants. Stumping the countryside extensively, his major campaign technique has been to sew up the unanimous support of rural organizations. It has become increasingly clear, however, that Prime Minister Chang Taek-sang and the new Home Minister, Kim Tae-son--undoubtedly under Rhee's instructions--have been diligently trying to stop Yi's election. It appeared to Embassy officials on 1 August, however, that only a public disavowal of Yi by the President could prevent Yi from winning a plurality of the vice presidential votes
A fairly sizeable protest vote may develop, nevertheless, with the majority of these votes going to Cho Pong-am, former National Assembly vice-speaker. Cho has waged the most spirited campaign against Rhee while the two remaining presidential hopefuls have done little more than advance initial declarations of principles to the press.
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French official reports on Chinese economy and morale: The former French Consul General at Shanghai, who left China in late July, sees "no hope" for foreign trade and business interests in China. He states that the Communist administration is effective, but that commerce and industry are "completely ruined." He also reports that the Chinese populace is apathetic toward the regime and toward the Korean conflict in particu-
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There is no evidence that the strength of the has been seriously reduced by the current economic depression. The depression is acute among private businessmen, but agricultural production and the output of state-operated heavy industries are at comparatively high
Peiplarnegme
levels.
Comment:
Other sources have also reported popular apathy in China recently.

14.
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Meanwhile, the Lisbon government has instructed Macao authorities to avoid incidents, but to fight back when attacked.
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Comment: The Portuguese Government has firmly resisted American pressure to halt all strategic exports to China because of the "very serious consequences" this would have for Macao. Accordingly, it has applied for presidential exception from the provisions of the Battle Act for a select number of strategic goods.
15.

Chinese resume food shipments t9 Macao: 1
Portugal willing to bargain with Peiping on Macao: The American Embassy in Lisbon reports that Foreign Ministry officials fear that Chinese attacks on Macao this week have been directed from Peiping, and are directly related to restrictions on the Macao-China trade. A Foreign Ministry spokesman intimated that Portugal would be "quite willing" to make trade concessions in order to retain Macao. He asked for "understanding" on the part of the United States.
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unIna-macao border as of 1 August. No information has been received on the progress of negotiations between the Portuguese and the Chinese Communists, but food is again comin into the colony fmni China and prices are dropping.
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lall quiet, on Lne
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Comment: earlier report', stated on JO July that food contradicting shipments from China to Macao had been stopped.
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Although the resumption of food shipments relaxes Communist pressure on Macao, the threat on 1 August of a new embargo will assure Portuguese complaisance in negotiations with the Chinese. Macao depends on China for most of its food, and the Communists could starve the colony into surrender.
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are increasing, I
Viet Minh reported weakening in South Vietnam: Desertions of key personnel from Viet Minh security units in South Vietnam Deserters are going into French service or into hiding.
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In the western sector of South Vietnam, the source states, serious resistance to French operations is impossible benne of the weariness and indiffereneA or Viet Minh troops.
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1 1
17.
USSR-Indonesian trade discussions conducted in Bangkok: The American Charge in Thailand was reliably informed Wit Soviet Embassy officials have had discussions with the Indonesian Minister and his commercial staff looking to the signing of a barter trade agreement. The USSR reportedly offered capital goods in exchange for rubber, tin, and coconut oil and allegedly is sending trucks and passenger cars to Indonesia for demonstration. Apparently no understanding has yet been reached.
1
Comment: Actually there has recently been an increase in Viet Minh guerrilla warfare in this sector. However, if this report is true, the French may soon be able to shift some forces north to the Tonkin delta.
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Chinese-trained Burmese Communists reportedly enter The American Army Attache in Bangkok has-been told 1that 1,000 Burmese Communist troops, cJart or a rorce or three regiments training in China, recently entered northern Burma. Their exact location and mission are unknown.
Burma:
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Comment'
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19.
These reports are unconfirmed. A military training program for unknown numbers of Burmese Communists Kachins has been under way in China for some time. and
Burmese Defense Minister renews offer to repatriate Chinese Nationalists: A prominent anti-Communist has informed the American Embassy in Rangoon that uurmese Defense Minister Ba Swe is renewing his offer to Taipei to
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repatriate Chinese Nationalist troops through Rangoon, and intends to begin military operations against the Nationalists in the fall unless they are evacuated. The Embassy comments that Ba Swe is apparently sincere, but that his timetable appears to be optimistic and the repatriation of such a large number of troops who have no effective leadership seems impractical. Nevertheless, the Embassy feels that a solution is urgent because an open conflict between Burmese forces and the Nationalists would bring serious repercussions for local anti-Communist Chinese.
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20.
Communist military activity in Malaya apparently decreasing: During the week ending 24 July, Malayan police casualties and the total number of Communist-inspired incidents were the lowest in 19 months. This fact, coupled with low civilian casualties, reflects a continued trend toward a alai-lumina rif torririst activity.
Comment: A document captured during the spring of 1952 admitted the deterioration of the Communist position in Malaya and directed a reduction in military activity and the indoctrination of a wider segment of the population.
Comment: Burmese Commander in Chief Ne Win recently announced that he was planning an all-out campaign against the Nationalists, who number 7,000 to 10,000. A concentrated Burmese attack on the Nationalists would greatly benefit the Communist and Karen insurgents.
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21.
Defection of Liberal deputy eliminates Greek Government majority: The parliamentary majority of the Liberal-EPEK coilition disappeared on 30 July with the resignation from the party of a Liberal deputy from north-central Greece. The Liberal-EPEK coalition now controls 129 seats, exactly half of the membership of parliament.
Former Prime Minister and Greek Rally upporter Papandreou, who reportedly engineered the defection, told the US Embassy that another deputy would leave the Liberal Party
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within a few days. In Papandreou's opinion, this will force the King to dissolve parliament or compel the government to rely on the eight Communist-controlled EDA deputies in order to remain in office.
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Comment: Unable to vote the government out of office, the oFFSITTIon Greek Rally is trying to bring about its fall through defections.
The King is strongly opposed to Marshal Papagos, the probable victor in new elections, and may prefer to rely on the EDA deputies rather than dissolve parliament.
22.
Maher reportedly threatened to resign over question of Egyptian Army control: Egyptian Prime Minister Ali Maher reportedly threatened to resign on 30 July over the army's insistence that two of its candidates be appointed to cabinet posts. As a compromise, however, one of the army's candidates was made chairman of the new "Purification Committee," and the other, Colonel Mohanna, became Minister of Communications.
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purges in all political parties, and that the Army Committee even considered executing former Prime Minister Nahas, a Wafdist.
Comment: This and other recent reports strengthen the impression that the largely unknown army group which forced Farouk's abdication continues to be the determining factor in the present situation. Any action against the Wafd is certain to arouse determined opposition from that party.
23.
Colonel Mohanna reportedly held his cabinet post only three days. His appointment appears to have been an army maneuver to "legalize" his position on the Regency Council.
Residency officials in Ttnisia consider alternate drastic measures: French Residency officials are considering alternative drastic measures to be applied if the Bey continues to block the proposed administrative reorganization. Deposition of the Bey would remove children from the
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Palace entourage, but such action would be a last resort because of the probable Tunisian reaction and world opinion.
25X1 e alternative measure would be tol Ithe Bey nd appoint a Council of Regency. The French are not enthusiastic about this possibility since more problems might be created than solved by the elderly triumvirate of princes who would have to'be appointed. 25X1
The American Consul General believes that a prolonged stalemate would increase the probability that the French would take one of the alternatives mentioned.
25X1 Comment: The Tunisians would nOt in the present Bey's lifetTai-SFEept a successor.
The Residency is also extremely concerned at the virtual standstill of administrative machinery, caused by the Bey's refusal to put his seal oA routine decrees. This situation is growing more serious daily because the temporary budget under which the administration operates expires on 1 October.
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WESTERN EUROPE
24.
East German Alert Police now reported to number 82,000: American military authorities in Germany estimate that continued recruiting has raised the strength of the East German paramilitary Alert Police from 70,000 on 1 June to at least 82,000 by 30 July. Reportedly, individuals are now being recruited between the ages of 16 and 30, the bysic trainipg period has been extended from four to six weeks, and thekrecruiting campaign has procured about 34,000 men since 1 ApTil. RecruAting is expected to continue at the same rate. While each of the 24 Alert Police units consists now of about 3,000 officers and men, the Police must undergo extensive training before it attains any significant offensive capability.
25X1
25.
Fear of forced labor or military service increases number of East German refugees: The recent mass flight of refugees into Vest Berlin was touched off by widespread rumors that the Berlin sector crossing points would be closed on 1 August and by fear of induction into the East German labor and military organizations. Refugees now average 1,000 a day, five times the daily average last spring. Communist sensitivity to this exodus has been demonstrated by the modification of the propaganda slogans for the rally of Communist youth in East Berlin on 3 August. When the rally was first announced on 19 July, the appeals for youth participation emphasized the "overthrow the Reuter government" theme. This theme was altered on 31 July to "eliminate" the Berlin refugee settlements. The West Berlin police and the 12,000 Allied troops in the city should be able to handle any incursions from East Berlin. American officials' 'believe that the east and west sectors of the city will be completely separated in the near future.
I
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26.
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Closing of Allied autobahn to Berlin expected: Both the West German Transport Ministry and American officials now believe that the Helmstedt-Berlin autobahn will probably be closed for "repairs" around 1 September. Cranes and repair materials are being assembled near the Elbe River bridge, and a German truck driver was recently told by a Russian Ffficer that the road would soon be closed.
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Comment: Although the closing of the Helmstedt autobahn would block all highway access to Berlin by Allied natiobals, three roads would still be available for German use.
This move would come at a time when canal traffic to West Berlin is expected to be severely restricted because of "repairs" to the main canal and low water in the secondary canal. Soviet authorities have not yet replied to the Allied request for five additional daily trains to Berlin to compensate for the closing of the main canal.
27.
25X6
28.
French "anti-Communist" peace movement seeking British and American labor support: Leon Jouhaux, the prominent French Socialist trade union leader and head of the recently formed "anti-Communist" peace movement, Fighting Democracy, plans to visit Great Britain and the United States in September in order to solicit labor backing, which he considers indispensable to the new movement's success. Reportedly he has the support of President Auriol and eight Cabinet Ministers and is scheduled to meet American labor leaders at a dinner in Washington arranged by Ambassador Bbnnet.
According to Louis Dolivet, a promoter of Fighting Democracy who gave this information to American Embassy officials, Jouhaux intends to block the circulation of a left-wing manifesto against the German contractual agreement, and hopes with the aid of British labor to organize demonstrations against the forthcoming World Peace Congress in Vienna. I 25X1
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In mid-July the Embassy showed considerableComment: skepttaii7Wbout the effectiveness of Fighting Democracy as-an anti-Communist force.
25X1C
American officials in Bonn reported on 24 July that, according to a German Socialist leader, AF of L representatives in Paris intend to attack Fighting Democracy and Jouhaux for his "collaboration" with it.
29.
The Ambassador points out that the proposed French-Polish agreement is more advantageous to Poland than last year's. Furthermore, France's argument that it should maintain access to Polish coal for emergencies is not valid, since previous Polish behaviour suggests that coal deliveries would probably be curtailed in emergencies rather than increased. The Ambassador states that a United States offer to be an alternate source of supply in the event of an emergency would reduce the force of the French argument. 25X1
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France's arguments for trade treaty with Poland deviate from COCOM principles: Ambassador Dunn in Paris states that France's intention to maintain trade ties with Poland partly for political considerations is not consistent with the agreement in COCOM to judge each trade treaty on its strategic significance and economic advantages. EW predicts that France's position will probably be upheld by most of the COCOM countries, and adds that COCOM concurrence in French arguments for the export of List I items may lead to pressure for greater flexibility in COCOM reviews of other trade agreements.
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25X1C 25X1C
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Austrian Socialists charge nationalized bank buys political support: The Austrian Socialist Party is Ipreparing a "relentless campaign" against the Union of Independents (VdU) on the basis of evidence that the VdU is being subsidized by the Creditanstalt, Austria's nationalized. but People's Party-dominated, bank.
25X1C
Comment: A strong Socialist attack upon the VdU involves the danger of promoting VdU-People's Party relations with corresponding hazards for the Socialist-People's Party coalition.
Aug 52
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Although the People's Party remains publicly aloof from the VcIU, Isome People's Party leaders maintain Contact with the VdU and have taken steps to preserve the VdU as a functioning party.
The People's Party and the VdU recently defeated a Socialist resolution calling for reforms in Austria's two large nationalized banks, both of which have been accused of illegal diversions of foreign exchange, including ECA dollars. The VdU's support of the People's Party was considered somewhat unusual at the time in view of the former's frequent allegations that the latter is the party of corruption.
25X1
The Prime Minister states that unless the other EDC countries adopt a 24-month military service period before the Belgian Army maneuvers end in late September. Belgium will reduce its 24-month period.
I
Comment: Since there is no possibility that France and Italy will TWEFItige their 18-month conscription periods at this time, the issue for the Belgian Government has become one of announcing the reduction at such a time as to avoid further popular disorders and to minimize the cabinet's loss of prestige.
The 24-hour national protest strike for 9 August, announced by the Socialist Federation of Labor on 2 August, is unlikely to have effects much more serious than those of the sporadic token strikes which have already occurred.
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31.
Belgian Prime Minister disturbed by controversy over conscription period: The Belgian Prime Minister fears thit recent demonstrations against retention of the 24-month conscription period are wrecking army morale and can "definitely lead to a general strike." American officials in Brussels believe that the gravity of the situation is indicated by the Prime Minister's asking them to urge Socialist leaders to cease agitating the issue.
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33.
Peron reportedly desires to resign; army-labor clash seen likely: President Peron has told Argentine army leaders that he desires to resign,
25X1C
An army coup is expected in 15 to 30 days when crowds viewing Senora de Peron's body have cleared the capital. Brigadier General Filomeno Velazco, former Chief of Federal Police, has reportedly been designated as Peron's successor. The US Naval Attache in Buenos Aires comments that a clash between the army and organized labor seems likely, but Peron's desire to resign seems doubtful. 25X1
25X1
Comment: There are no other indications that Peron desires to reiliiT-ilthough he probably anticipates increasing difficulty in preventing a clash between labor and the army, which objects to labor's powerful political role.
34.
Little is known of General Velazco's activities during the past three years, although they have included governorship of the Province of Corrientes. He has, however, apparently maintained contact with some of the retired army officers involved in the September 1951 abortive revolt.
Guatemala buying munitions in Europe: Hubert F. Julian arrived in Geneva on 30 July with over $200,000 from the Guatemalan
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Government. The money, which will be put in a special account in Geneva by the Rexim Company, will be drawn on as munitions are purchased. Julian is now regarded as the chief buyer for the Guatemalan Government.
1
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Comment: The Guatemalan Army has long felt the need for more equipment, but presumably feels it politically inexpedient to request US military aid. Some army leaders are seriously concerned over the position of the army vis a vis Communistdominated organized labor which is reportedly well armed.
Rexim is an international trading company with headquarters in Switzerland. It reportedly acquires munitions from war surplus stocks in Italy and from Spain.

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The army has dealt with Julian, a US citizen long engaged in international arms deals, several times in the past two years. When Julian was in Guatemala last May, he reportedly signed a contract for $200,000 worth of arms and ammunition with the Guatemalan Minister of Defense.
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4 August 1952
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CIA No. 49762 Copy NO, 4 G

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This digest of significant reports has been prepared primarily for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. not represent a complete coverage of all current reports It' does in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.
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down" American troops in Korea witL Mao's policy was to "pin minimum Chinese losses. A request last February from the commander of Chinese forces in Korea, for five additional armored divisions and 500 more aircraft, was rejected by Mao on the above grounds, according/
25X1 Mao Tse-tung reportedly opposed to Mao Tse-tung is opposed to the launchingnew offensive in Korea: of a new Communist offensive in Korea,/
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Comment: Although this information supposedly reflects stateilarriad9.1 Pry. Chinese Communist leaders, none 25X1 of it has beent It is thus not clear whetheri Ifailed to report these developments at the time, or invented them for conversational purposes, or has been misrepresented 25X1 In any case, Mao Tse-tung's opposition to a new offensive in Korea has been inferred from the fact that no such offensive has been launched.
I
The Chinese commander in Korea may at one time have sought a southward commitment of Communist air power, but it is improbable that he would seek a specific amber of aircraft. The Korean terrain does not permit the deployment of an armored division as such.
Bao Dai's income revealed as $6,000,000 a year: On the basis of information from official sources, Ambassador Heath estimates that Bao Dai's annual $6,000,000, or about six percent cost to Vietnam is roughly of the national revenue. TOP SECRET
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In addition to his normal allowances, Bao Dai recently requested $450,000 for a trip to Paris. Letourneau,who contends that Sao Dai is indispensable, at least for the time being, has not pressed him to economize, apparently fearing that he would threaten to quit. 125X1
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There is little evidence that Hao Dai's permanent withdrawal from Indochina would be regretted by the Vietnamese.
25X1C Indonesian President and Defense Minister in conflict over Communists in army. J told Ambassador Cochran that 25X10 numerous Communists have infiltrated the army, but that the Defense Minister, the Sultan of Jogjakarta, was resisting President Sukarno's efforts to purge them. 25X1C Ithe "Cabinet situation was tense," and that the 25X1C L uefense Minister might resign and cause the government's fall.
3.
1 I
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Comment: Considerable information is available on the general disagreement between the Defense Minister and President Sukarno. The failure to improve internal security and the deterioration of conditions in West Java have increased sentiment for an authoritarian government led by Sukarno.
4.
25X1C
Comment: Since Bao Dai's return to Indochina in 1949, he has shown himself more concerned with personal pleasure than with affairs of state, despite the heavy financial burdens of the war which are borne almost entirely by France and the United States. He has exercised his broad, though ill-defined powers, in a desultory and irresponsible fashion and has opposed the establishment of representative government.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
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Nor.th Korean Korean infantry infantry regiment regiment in in reserve is underNorth uly the the trdeputy "deputy commander" On 29 July On commander" of of the Nor& North f m 3 83rd r d Infantry I n f 2 : n t " r y Regiment, Regiment, 8th 8th Division, Division, assigned wsigned to to Rorean east coast coast security security duty south south of Wonsan, east Wonsan, reported reported that that (CANOE 330th 330th Comm Coturn Recon Recon Co Co Korea, Korea, have 2,017 2,017persons." (CANOE "we have ALT-429, 1 Aug Aug 52) 52) ALT-429, 1
strengt6:
Commen : The The normal normal strength strength of a a North Korean infantry infantry Comment: that this this regiregimen is 8 2,700 2 , 7 0 0 men men and and officers. officers. The faat regiment fact that regiment, long in in reserve, reserve, is is not up to strength indiment, long strength further indio he cates the the generally tight manpoudr situation known t cates manpowdr situation to be facing the the North North Korean Korean Army. Army. facing
4. 4.

3 2
Radio transmission transmission in in North North Korean Korean Armored Command to to Radio Armored Command be limited: limited: A 2 2 August August message message from from the the North Korean be Korean Armored Command Command ordered ordered the the 208th 208th Armored Armored Training Armored Training ReKiment Regiment to discontinue llrecelving and transmitting transmitting radio radio messages" messages" to discontinue "receiving and (CANOE ROK Int Grp M Korea, Korea, SK-M-24, SK-Ed-24, except twice twice daily. daily. (CANOE except Grp M 3 Aug Aug 52) 52) 3 Comment: The The great great bulk of informatlon information available available on on Comment: the formation f w n and and status status of of the the North Korean Armored Command the has come come from from communications communications intelligence. intelligence. A significant A significant reduction this'coverage might increase increase the element of reduction of this.coverage surprise in future future enemy enemy employment employment of of his his armored armored units. units. surprise in
5 52 5 AUK Aug 52
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rains North disrupt.Chinese Heavy r a i n s in in N o r t h Korea d i s r u p t Chineee air a i r defense defense Mome "BpOtterr l*,ep'otterll s t a t i o n s of of the. tbe C h in e s e 'stations Chinese installationt: I n s t a ~ l a t i o n s ' : Mobile early-warning syttem in Korea'were e arly-warning i n North Korea were forced to t o move on on - system indicated 30 30 JuIy July because b e c a u s e of flood f l o o d conditions. c o n d i t i o n s , One message indicated that unit higher second t hat a u n i t was moving to to h i g h e r ground, g r o u n d , and a s e c o n d message message instructed another early-warning i nstructed a nother e a r l y - w a r n i n g unit: u n i t : "watch "watch out o u t for f o r floods. neighboring Go to to n e i g h b o r i n g places where there t h e r e are native n a t i v e country c o u n t r y peoI f there there ple If p l e and ask if if there t h e r e was a a flood flood there t h e r e last l a s t year. year. prepare to accomplish was p r e p a r e to t o move to to the t h e hills hills to a ccomplish your air defense." (CANOE 6920 S Security y our a ir d efense." e c u r i t y Grp G r p Johnion Johnson ArB AFB Japan, J a p a n , AP-288, AP-288, 44 .Aug Aug 52)
...
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.Comment: another m a n i f e s t a t i o n of t h e damage damage Comment: T h i s is another This manifestation of the from hFialains in North from eavyains In N o r t h Korea. Korea. O t h e r messages have indiindiOther cated rains c a t e d that t h a t the the r a i n s have caused caulsed a serious s e r i o u s transportation transportation of food, f o o d , and and inundation i n u n d a t i o n of of bunkers. bunkers. problem, spoilage s p o i l a g e of problem,
9. 9.
against large large western w e s t e r n Korean Korean p l a n operation o p e r a t i o n against Communists , plan 3 August the t h e 2nd 2nd Battalion B a t t a l i o n commander of of the the North North On 3 2 1 e t Brigade on Ongjin O n g j i n Peninsula P e n i n s u l a in I n western Korea Korea WAS wae Korean 21st o r d e r e d to t o "bring " b r i n g the t h e statistics stzhtletics of the t h e enemies location l o c a t i o n and and ordered t h e arms at a t Suui-do (probably (probably Sunwi-do) Sunwl-do) on the t h e 5th." 5th." The the The c o n t i n u e d that that a a report report is is to t o be be submitted s u b m i t t e d on on the the message continued s i t u a t i o n at a t "2000 1?2000hours h o u r s on the t h e fifth." f i f t h . " (CANOE 15RSM/1453, 15RSY/1453, situation Korea, 4 Aug Korea, Aug 52) 52)
island: island:
'
Comment: Is o ne o f the t h e largest l a r g e s t islands i s l a n d s off Ongjin Ongjia Sunwi is one of P e n i n s u l a , Its proximity p r o x i m i t y to t o the t h e mainland mainland -- a bout a m i l e -Peniniari7--Its about mile make6 it i t particularly p a r t i c u l a r l y vulnerable v u l n e r a b l e to to a a determined d e t e r m i n e d enemy enemy attack. attack. makes
'
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10. 10.
C h i n e s e and S o v i e t r a d a r coveqage o v e r l a , p s b u t a p p a r e n t l y i n o t i n t e g r a t e d : Th Chi nese Cou?nunist e a r l y war'ning f i l t er c e n t e r i n Manchuria r e c e i v e d radar t r a c k i n g

apparently 'is E not Integrated:
Chinese and Soviet radar coverage overlaps but e Chinese Coragunist early The warning filter center in Manchuria received radar tracking r e p o r t s from from northeast n o r t h e a s t Korea Korea near near the t h e Soviet S o v i e t border b o r d e r on on 26 26reports July. J u l y . On the t h e same same day d a y tracking t r a c k i n g reports reports which which plot p l o t in i n the the same area area were were independently I n d e p e n d e n t l y originated o r i g i n a t e d by by a a radar radar station station same i n the t h e Vladivostok V l a d i v o s t o k area area .on on tthe h e main.5oviet E a s t e r n air air in main.Soviet Far Eastern warning worning net. n e t . (CANOE (CANOE A i r Force Roundup 149f 149,. 4Akug 4 Aug 52) 52) Air
Comment: Comment: Chinese C h i n e s e and and Soviet air a i r warning nets n e t s have have often often s l m u l m l y t rtracked a c k e d US r r e t aaircraft i r c r a f t iin n Korea ithsirinlifiEiBialy VSf e ferret Korea Bay, Bay, w without o u t any any apparent a p p a r e n t coordination. c o o r d i n a t i o n . However, However, the t h e Chinese C h i n e s e and and R u s s i a n rradar adar s t a t i o n s which s e r v e tthe h e GCI t Antung .Russian stations which'serve GCI effort effort a at Antung work together. together. work
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A i r warning w a r n i n g system s y s t e m in i n Korth N o r t h Korea Korea "seemingly "seemingly infallible": infallible" : _Air h United. tfnited Nations o r t h Korea u Nations bomber bomber cannot cannot enter enter N North.Korea_un#efected . *_." n q e t e c t e d
I
by night-, thanks t h a n k s to to a a "seemingly "seemingly infallible" i n f a l l i b l e " early by night, early warning warning s y s t e m manned manned by by Russian, Russian, C h i n e s e and and Korean e r s o n n e l , acacsystem Chinese Korean p personnel, c o r d i n g to t o an a n Air Air Force F o r c e field f i e l d analysis. analysis. T h i s s y s t e m h a s been cording This system has been t h e past past eight e i g h t months. months. s t e a d i l y improved im;irroved in i n the steadily
air w a r n i n g systems s y s t e m s take take The Chinese C h i n e s e and and North N o r t h Korean Korean air The warning between the t h e Chongchon Chongchon o v e r where where the t h e Russian R u s s i a n coverage c o v e r a g e ends, ends, between over time loss l o s s in i n reporting r e p o r t i n g to t o the t h e GCI GCI and Yalu Rivers. R i v e r s . The The time c o n t r o l l e r at at Antung Antung is is negligible, n e g l i g i b l e , thus t h u s giving g i v i n g him him ample ample controller t i n e in i n which t o alert a l e r t his his airfields, a i r f i e l d s , pilots p i l o t s and and crews. crews. time which to (CANOE 6920 6920 Security S e c u r i t y Grp Grp Johnson Johnson AFB AFB Japan, J a p a n , SG SG 387, 387, 30 30 (CANOE J u l y ; SG SG 409, 409, 3 3 Aug Aug 52) 52) July;
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5.s,pp
early warning system is o one of Comment: The enemy e a r l y warning ne o f the the stronNiT-Wgpects Mans t r o n g e e t aspects of of the t h e air a i r defense d e f e n s e establishment e s t a b l i s h m e n t in Manchuria c h u r i a and North Korea. Korea.
6. 6.
7. 7.

4 4
More,Chinese More Chinese and and Korean jets j e t s noted n o t e d in i n training t r a i n i n g over over Korea 'but few I in combat: 'A of enemy air Korea but few n combat:' A ffield i e l d aanalysls n a l y s ' i s of air o operations p e r a t i o n s over o v e r Korea, Korea, as reflected in i n messages, messages, reveals reveals that MIG-15's more f flights I G - 1 5 ' s are making more lights t h a t Chinese and Korean Y over Korea, mostly mostly for for training t r a i n i n g purposes. purposes. From 1 1 to t o 29 29 J July, u l y , 353 Chinese and North North Korean j jets e t s were s scheduled c h e d u l e d to to fly f l y from from Manchurian bases over Korea, Korea, as as compared with w i t h 64 64 noted n o t e d in i n June. June.
I n t e r c e p t i o n of UN ircraft i s s till c o n t r o l l e d almost Interception UN a aircraft is still controlled wholly w h o l l y by b y the t h e Soviet, S o v i e t , rather than t h a n the t h e Chinese and Korean, Korean, GCI GCI network, network, and at a t least least 95 95 percent p e r c e n t of combat interceptions interceptions noted n o t e d on this t h i s network network are carried out o u t by Russian-piloted R u s s i a n - p i l o t e d jet jet fighters. (CANOE 6920 S Security fighters. e c u r i t y Grp Johnson AYR AFB Japan, Japan, SG IIG 387, 387, 30 30 July J u l y 52) 52)
A recent r e c e n t analysis a n a l y s i s by by the A Air ir F Force orce r revealed evealed Comment: that 85 percent of actual that n e n t of a c t u a l encounters e n c o u n t e r s over o v e r Korea, as reported reported bY by FEAF FEAF from March through through May, were reflected in i n Communist GCI communications of of the t h e same same period. period. At A t that t h a t time time nearly nearly p e r c e n t of combat encounters e n c o u n t e r s reported r e p o r t e d on all a l l three t h r e e GCI 90 percent nets n e t s were were by by Russian-piloted R u s s i a n - p i l o t e d MIG's. MIG's.
Greater Chinese C h i n e s e interest i n t e r e s t in i n air air defense d e f e n s e of,Korea of'\Koreanoted: noted: In late Sitly theChinese ainese Communist e early warning system late J u l y the a r l y warning' s y s t e m began passing p a s s i n g tracking t r a c k i n g reports r e p o r t s which plot p l o t in In northeast n o r t h e a s t and and southeast southeast Korea, outside o u t s i d e its i t s usual u s u a l area area of of operations. o p e r a t i o n s . One of of the the plots plots was 85 85 miles south south of the t h e present p r e s e n t battle b a t t l e line, l i n e , the the southernsouthernmost Air Force F o r c e Roundup Roundup 149, 149, most tracking t r a c k i n g noted n o t e d to t o date. d a t e . (CANOE Air 4 Aug; 150, 150, 5 5 Aug Aug 52) 52)
7 Aug Aug 52 52 7
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warning eyatem system Comment: Comment: On 30 July the Chinese early warning PI the passed its of UN UN bombers. bombers. Jn paased its first nighttime nighttime tracking tracking of Russian-manned early past such tracking had been done by Russian-manned warning stations. stations. warning activity activity may may This increased Chinese early warning presage a greater Chinese role in fighter defense of northwest Korea, Korea, now now almost almost wholly wholly a a Soviet Soviet responsibility. responsibility. There are six six Chinese MIG-15 YIG-15 divisions in Manchuria, with which could could be be assigned assigned a a total strength of about 300, which more active active combat combat mission mission than than heretofore. heretofore.
8. 8 .

5 5
Communists indicate satisfactory satisfactory front-line front-line Chinese Communiste The Chinese Communist 7th 1th Artillery Artillery e t r o b u m eupply: suppl : Th e Chi nese Commbnist petroleum Ddvlsion a message missage to to its its subordinate regiments on 3 iviaion in in a August, ordered that that its its vehicles returning to China from Korea Korea must carry carry gasoline gasoline with with them. them. The units were told told that they would be unable to procure gasoline at at rear area (CANOE 501st supply points. (CANOE 501st Comm C o r n Recon Recon Grp Grp Korea KoreaK-01796, K-4796, 3 Aug 52) 52)
Comment: This new new information information supports supports previous previous Comment: This messaigi-WRich messages which have have indicated Indicated that front-line petroleum in Korea Korea are are adequate. adequate. The restriction restriction against against supplies in drawing petroleum supplies from rear area installations is a normal supply control m measure, e a m r e , but but it would would not be rigidly enforced if petroleum at the front f r o n t were in short supply. supply *
7 Aug 52 52 7
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Soviet MIO's r reportedly very over S o v i e t YIG's eportedly v e r y aggressive aggressive o v e r Korea on on A United-States Air IOrce n i t e d States A ir F o r c e security s e c u r i t y unit u n i t in i n Japan Japan 4 August: reports that while only averaging ; h a : o n l y 31 31 flights, flights, a v e r a g i n g 4 aircraft a i r c r a f t each, each, were w e r e , detected d e t e c t e d on the t h e Soviet S o v i e t GCI net n e t in i n northwestern n o r t h w e s t e r n Korea Korea on on Adgust, 22 were directed directed toward UN aircraft. 4 August, 22 ,q,ithese *,'these fflights l i g h t s were aircraft.
:bile
+ k The field f i e l d unit u n i t comments that t h a t this t h i s reveals r e v e a l s more aggressiveaggressiveness n e s s on o n the part p a r t of Soviet S o v i e t pilots p i l o t s than t h a n previously p r e v i o u s l y noticed. noticed. Most of the t h e flights f l i g h t s were in i n the t h e Yalu River R i v e r area, area, but b u t some some were in i n the the Chongchon River R i v e r area area and, a n d , in i n one o n e case, case, as as far far Security south as Pyongyang. (CANOE (CANOE 6920 S e c u r i t y Grp Johnson AFB s o u t h as Japan, J a p a n , SG 426, 6 6 Aug Aug 52) 52)
T h e disparity d i s p a r i t y between between the t h e aggressiveness a g g r e s s i v e n e s s displayed d i s p l a y e d on on The be significaia. significaiil. combat contacts c o n t a c t s may be the t h e GCI net n e t and the t h e actual a c t u a l combat

3 3
Force The US 5th 5 t h Air F o r c e in Korea reports re,ports that t h a t 75 75 Comment: MIG-157g7WFFe 4 August, August, b but that only 12 MIG-15's were observed o b s e r v e d airborne a i r b o r n e on 4 ut t hat o nly 1 2 were encountered. encountered.
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N e w Soviet S o v i e t jet J e t units u n i t s rushed r u s h e d into i n t o Korean Korean combat: combat: Two Two New new jet j e t flgfiter fighter u n i t s , 'Ilorobablr.regimentd, p r o b a b l y v e g i r n e n t s ' , aaggressively ggressively units, engaged UN aircraft a i r c r a f t all h11 the t h e way from Antung to t o Pyongyang in Soviet GCI n net at Antung on the. the S o v i e t GCI et a t Antung i n their t h e i r first f i r s t appearance a p p e a r a n c e on on 6 6 August. The Tpe reporting r e p o r t i n g Air A i r Force field u unit n i t comments on that t h a t it i t is is highly h i g h l y unusual u n u s u a l for f o r new new Soviet S o v i e t elements e l e m e n t s to t o enter enter combat w without weeks training on the net, s e v e r a l weeks training o n t h e GCI n e t , and combat i t h o u t several regards Communist r reaction " f r a n t i c " Communist eaction r e g a r d s this t h i s development as a "frantic" ecurity Security to t o the UN."get UN " g e t tough" tough" bombing bombing policy. p o l i c y . (CANOE 6920 S G r p Johnson J o h n s o n AFB AFB Japan, J a p a n , AP AP 358, 358, 8 8 Aug Aug 52) 52) Grp
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Comment: Combat contacts c o n t a c t s between UN KIN aircraft aircraft and and Communist jets C o m m u m t s were unusually u n u s u a l l y high h i g h on on 6 6 August. August. Of 239 M MIG-15's I G - 1 5 ' s observed, o b s e r v e d , 90 90 made made contact c o n t a c t and and six s i x were were destroyed. destroyed.
8 . 8.
Chinese MIG's expand role C h i n e s e MIGfs expand. r o l e in i n Korean Korean war: w a r : Chinese C h i n e s e ComCommunis3 aiicraft aircraft' c o n t i n u e d ttole o b e "exceedingly lfexceedYngly aggressive" munist continued aggressive" between J u l y and 5 S August o over v e r Korea, Korea, a according c c o r d i n g to to a an n b e t w e e n 27 July Air Force A ir F o r c e field f i e l d unit. unit. A t least 228 Chinese C h i n e s e aircraft a i r c r a f t were were At n noted o t e d on o n the t h e Chinese C h i n e s e voice v o i c e ground-controlled g r o u n d - c o n t r o l l e d intercept i n t e r c e p t net, net, i n s t a n c e s of d efinite c ontact w i t h UN and there were many instances definite contact with aircraft. (CANOE 6920 Security S e c u r i t y Grp Grp Johnson Johnson AFB AFB Japan, Japan, a i r c r a f t . (CANOE AP 331, 6 6 Aug Aug 52) 52)
Comment: omment: Air A i r defense d e f e n s e of northwest n o r t h w e s t Korea c o n t i n u e s to to continues be primarily p r mar y a Soviet S o v i e t responsibility, r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , but b u t this t h i s increase i n c r e a s e in in C h i n e s e actiVity a c t i v i t y and aggressiveness, a g g r e s s i v e n e s s , coupled coupled w i t h a recent recent Chinese with e x p a n s i o n of of the t h e Chinese C h i n e a e early e a r l y warning w a r n i n g coverage c o v e r a g e of of Korea, Korea, expansion s u g g e s t s that t h a t the t h e Chinese C h i n e s e Communist Air Air F o r c e is assuming suggests Force a larger l a r g e r share share of of Aerial a e r i a l combat. combat.
&
9. 9.
10. 10.

.
.
E l e m e n t s of North Xorean rigade g a r r i s o n Yonan Elements Korean 21st B Brigade garrison Yonan area: the chief of staff staff bf a the area :7% e c h i ' e f of t h e 1st 1st Battalion, B a t t a l i o n , North N o r t h Korean z /IgT l s ' t Brigade on on 4 4 August reported r e p o r t e d to t o the the B Brigade's r i g a d e ' s operations operations section t h a t " f i v e women t h e border to to s e c t i o n that,"five had crossed the North N o r t h Korea Korea (and) ( a n d ) were were arrested arrested at a t Yujong-nok." Yujong-nok." (CANOE HOK Pet ROK D e t M, Y, SK-M-108, SK-M-108, 6 6 Aug Aug 52) 52)
..
.
Comment: Yujong-nok Yujong-nok is is on o n the t h e Yonan Peninsula P e n i n s u l a just just Korean 21st west BTKiliiong. o f o n g . The location of North Korean 2 1 s t Brigade l o c a t i o n of elements e l e m e n x s in i n this t h i s area area is is noteworthy n o t e w o r t h y in i n view of of the t h e acceptacceptance by the Far East of the Chinese 42nd Army Army i in a n c e by the F ar E a s t Command of the C h i n e s e 42nd n the Yonan area area with with a a coastal c o a s t a l security s e c u r i t y mission. mission.
n o t been mentioned in i n any messages The 42nd Army has not sent southern u n i t s located in the the s outhern Bent by the t h e North Korean units portion of of Hwanghae Province. Province.
Expansion E x p a n s i o n of of Soviet S o v i e t fighter f i g h t e r strength s t r e n g t h in in Manchuria may have h ave been planned Dlanned in i n May: Yav: Significant S i m i f i c a n t Communications communications changes chanaes .___ . Veen were made on the Soviet GCI net May. &-'the Soviet'GCI nGt in i n the t h e Antung area on o n 21 2l7'&y. The pilot p i l o t numbering numbering system s y s t e m was changed to t o permit p e r m i t an a n unlimited unlimitgd number of regiments r e g i m e n t s to t o use u s e it. i t . The previous p r e v i o u s procedures p r o c e d u r e s perpermitted m itted a a maximum maximum of of ten t e n regiments r e g i m e n t s on o n the t h e net. n e t . This T h i s capacapability planned b i l i t y to t o accommodate accommodate a greater g r e a t e r number could c o u l d suggest a p lanned build-up S o v i e t air a i r strength s t r e n g t h in i n the t h e Yalu area, according according b u i l d - u p of Soviet AFSA-251, JCAFEJCAFEto Security t o the t h e Armed A r m e d .Forces Forces S e c u r i t y Agency. Agency. (CANOE (CANOE AFSA-251, 42, 42, 5 5 Aug Aug 52) 52)
5 5
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Ma
Comment: No increase the number of f fighter units Comment: i n c r e a s e in In t h e number ighter u nits activeBEWe net C I n e thas h a soccurred o c c u r r e d since s i n c e it i t was a c t i v m Soviet e S o v i eGCI t G fact messages passed passed on this raised to t o nine n i n e in i n April. A p r i l . In f a c t messages this net July indicate that of t the nine regiments merged n e t in in J uly i ndicate t h a t two of he n ine r e g i m e n t s merged with only seven units, with o t h e r s at a t Antung, Antung, leaving leaving o nly s even u nits, w ith w i t h two others the s t r e n g t h , o p e r a t i n g on o n the t h e net. net. S Soviet o v i e t YIG-15 MIG-15 t h e same strength,opeTating strength s t r e n g t h in i n Manchuria has been eStimated estimated at a t 320 320 since s i n c e April. April.
11.
12. 12.

6 6
Chinese Air Division C hinese 1 18th 8th A ir D i v i s i o n transfer t r a n s f e r from from Canton to to Manchuria confirmed: 18th A Air Divisions M anchurir'c o n f i r m e d : Both the t h e 6th 6 t h and a n d '18th i r Divisions c c o r d i n g tto o t raffic a nalysis are definitely according traffic analysis ape d e f i n i t e l y in in lianchuria, Manchuria, a [ I i. This c conclusion o n c l u s i o n is supported s u p p o r t e d by flight f l i g h t messages passed passed on the the navigation n a v i g a t i o n network. network. The location l o c a t i o n of h e s e MIG-15 of t these MIG-15 units has been uncertain u n c e r t a i n since s i n c e May. Hay. The headquarters h e a d q u a r t e r s of the t h e 6th 6th Division D i v i s i o n left l e f t Takushan, Takushan, near n e a r Antung, for Nukden i n midMukden in midJuly, Division J u l y , and the t h e 18th '18th D i v i s i o n headquarters h e a d q u a r t e r s left l e f t Canton in early e a r l y July J u l y for for Takushan. (CANOE (CANOE A Air ir F Force o r c e Roundup Roundup 151, 151, Aug 52) 7 Aug 52)
-
Comment: E Elements l e m e n t s of both b o t h the t h e 6th 6 t h and 1 18th 8th D Divisions ivisions were noted -lying flying both b o t h at a t Canton and in I n Manchuria in in late late June, suggesting units might be in the J une, s u g g e s t i n g that t h a t the the u n i t s might in t h e process of exchanging However, this e x c h a n g i n g locations. l o c a t i o n s . However, t h i s was apparently a p p a r e n t l y not not planned, p l a n n e d , and and the t h e presence p r e s e n c e of o f 6th 6 t h Division D i v i s i o n aircraft a i r c r a f t at at Canton at a t that t h a t time time is is still s t i l l unexplained. unexplained.
The 18th seven D i v i s i o n O s move raises to to s e v e n the t h e number of 1 8 t h Division's Chinese d i v i s i o n s in i n Manchuria, Manchuria, leaving leaving C h i n e s e Communist MIG-15 divisions only two with two divisions d i v i s i o n s and and one o n e regiment equipped equipped w i t h MIG-15's in China in C h i n a proper. proper.
New Chinese C h i n e s e Communist Communist air air unit u n i t mentioned: mentioned: A 4 4 August August message from from Hsuchou Bsuchou in in'East E a s t China China to t o Nanking stated s t a t e d that that "the A i r Force Force (CANOE Air " t h e 64th 6 4 t h Regiment completed com,pleted flights." flights." Roundup 7 Aug Aug 52) 52) Roundup 152, 152, 7
Comment: The The 64th 64th Regiment is is subordinate s u b o r d i n a t e to t o the t h e 22nd 22nd Air message is i s the t h e first f i r s t reference r e f e r e n c e to t o the the T h i s message A i r Division. D i v i ' s i o n . This flight f l i g h t activity a c t i v i t y and and location l o c a t i o n of of this t h i s regiment. r e g i m e n t . The The highesthighestnumbered air a i r division d i v i s i o n in i n China China for f o r which activity a c t i v i t y has h a s been noted n o t e d was was the t h e 20th, 2 0 t h , although a l t h o u g h the t h e existence e x i s t e n c e of o f the t h e 21st, 21st, 22nd and 23rd referring eferring 2 3 r d has h a s been established e s t a b l i s h e d by messages r to t o or o r addressed addressed to t o them. them.
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1.
Comment: An intensified socialization drive has been apparent in both Czechoslovakia and Hungary since June. The Czech campaign points up the fact that the party has recovered from the effects of last winter's major purges.
2.
Czech Minister of Agriculture complains of "serious shortcomings" in harvesting progress: On 6 August Czech Minister of Agriculture Josef Nepomucky complained of "serious shortcomings" in the progress of the harvest. In an urgent appeal to all farmers, cooperatives, tractor stations and local government organizations, he stressed the importance of night work and proper organiaation in order to assure a satisfactory grain harvest. (R FBIS Prague, 6 Aug 52)
Comment: Earlier reports by government officials predicted-in-Wicellent harvest and indicated that the machine tractor stations and the cooperatives were making satisfactory preparations. These groups have been exhorted to aid private farmers in fulfilling their harvest quotas. The newly organized Ministry of Agricultural Supplies is authorized to "encourage" private farmers to join collectives. In the light of these facts, Nepomucky's complaint about shortcomings in organization appears to set the stage for the forceful collectivization of agriculture on a large scale.

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Czech Communists step up production and socialization campaign: The US Embassy in Prague believes that the Czech Communist regime now feels itself strong enough to take vigorous measures to increase industrial production and liquidate "class enemies." The Ministry of State Control and the newly created Ministry of Railroads have been given extraordinary powers to deal with production lags and labor problems. The drive against the kulaks is being intensified, and the Embassy anticipates that the deportations of "politically unreliables" from Prague, Bratislava and Brno will spread. (C Prague 80, 8 Aug 52)
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3.
Kennan sees civil war in Japan as Soviet aim: Ambassador eves a e pr mary o ec ve Eastern strategy is the capture oviet Far Communist-led civil rebellion. of Japan by an eventual an analysis of an article by the He bases this conclusion on fugitive Japanese Communist leader, Kyuichi Tokuda, which recently appeared in the Cominform journal and in the Moscow press.
Kennan e
The Japanese Communists are unlikely to gain sufficient popular support for a successful armed revolt in the foreseeable future.
4.
Murphy suggests that it would be desirable to again consider a bilateral approach by the United States Soviet Union. Although to the unlikely to succeed, it would be of significant he believes that sentiment on the eve of the value in satisfying Japanese coming elections. American interest could be further demonstrated by having American delegates to the Geneva meeting an0 ranking government officials prepare strong parallel statementsion this subject. (C Tokyo 519, 7 Aug 52)
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Japan disappointed over UN ineffectiveness on Japanese POW ques on: m assa or urp y repor s a e veness inThandling the question s ne feeof Japanese the Soviet Union has considerably POW's held by dampened Japanese enthusiasm toward this type of approach, and made them realize the limitations in the face UN's of Soviet intransigence. tions of this attitude Manifestabe seen by the Japanese apathy toward participating in can the UN's Geneva POW further by their attempts meetings, and to utilize other approaches POW problem. to the
This program, Kennan notes, would require "extensive united-front tactics," to lation to accept Communist induce large segments of the populeadership in armed insurrection. The Ambassador believes that use of the Soviet Army at some stage is possible, but that Moscow would prefer the conquest to come through a "domestic upheaval." (C Moscow 259, 7 Aug 52) Comment: The official has eauManed "liberation" Communist line in Asia since 1949 by Communist-led native armies. The Jabanese Communists belatedlyadopted this militant policy in October 1951. Tokuda's recent article, however, suggested a change in emphasis by criticizing the Japanese Communists for neglecting political activity.
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5.
Peiping reportedly plans to declare war on United States:
25X1X
Chinese Partisans of Peace and other Communist contacts that they expect an "early declaration of war" against the United States by the Peiping regime. The source, an official in the French Mplistry of Interior, surests that the reports ma/ be
a
I
[-
25X1X 25X1A 25X1X
Ideception.
25X1A
The significance of such a Chinese action would lie in its automatic invocation of the Sino-Soviet treaty of 1950. By designating its forces in Korea as "volunteers" and by failing to declare a formal state of war with the United States, Peiping has declined to invoke this treaty. Both Moscow and Peiping appear interested in avoiding an expansion of the Korean conflict at this time. Rice-rubber barter negotiations between China and Indonesia reported: A Hong Kong firm, acting on behalf of an Indonesian client, offered 5,000 long tons of rubber to a 25X1XChinese company in Tientsin, In exchan e ior mne rubber, tne uninese are to ship 45,000 metric tons of rice.
I
6.
25X1X Comment: Several other sources have reported that Pei ing was pFEITIFTWg for World War. III in the near future. I would not be likely to have access to information of this type.
25X1X
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The Indonesian client is said to be "very close" to his government and has already obtained a license for the barter
deal.
r
25X1C
Comment: Although different in some details, this reporrigfiliFilly supports information of a China-Indonesia barter deal According to 'the agreement has already been concluded.
25X1C
7.
MacDonald's statement emphasizes Vietnamese independence: British Commissioner General for Southeast Asia MacDonald may have been intending to force the French to clarify their relationship with the Associated States when he called
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attention to Letourneau's June statement in Washington that Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia enjoy what amounts to dominion status within the French Union. At a press-conference MacDonald praised Letourneau's sincerity which has "proved beyond doubt thatFrance's purpose is the complete national freedom of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia on abasis of fraternal equality with France and other free nations." MacDonald was in effect outlining the aims of Vietnamese nationalism, not current French policy. Letourneau's remark elicited a rebuke by President Auriol and was censored in Saigon and apparently in Paris. (Factual data from: U Saigon 332, 8 Aug 52)
8.
Communist coalition reported in Burma: The American Embassy in Rangoon has received several reports that the leaders of Burma's two Communist parties and the pro-Communist PVC insurgents agreed to form a coalition at a recent meeting in northern Burma. The Embassy comments that such a development would be in line with the current Communist line calling for unity among insurgents, and that their current desperation may encourage the effective integration which they have previously failed to achieve. (C Rangoon 202, 8 Aug 52)
Comment: The Burmese Army's pressure on the Communists in central Burma has been unusually constant through most of 1952. There have also been reports that the Chinese Communists have insisted on a united Communist front as a prerequisite to aid from China.
9.
Burmese Defense Minister seeks increase in military expen res: e mer can rmy t ac e n angoon as een confidentially informed that the Burmese Defense Minister is seeking 390,000,000 kyats for the armed forces in 1953 as compared to 220,000,000 in 1952. expects that the request will be granted. (S US ARMA Rangoon 78, 8 Aug 52)

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Comment: The Burmese have been expanding their armed forceg-NO-Intensifying anti-Communist operations during the past several months. The Defense Minister has stated that he expects to restore peace by the end of 1953.
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10.
Iranian note to Great Britain indicates no desire to compromise: Ambassador Henderson reports that the 7 August Iranian note to Great Britain which offered to reopen oil negotiations was ill-timed and appeared to nullify current American and British efforts to prepare a joint approach to Iran. (S Tehran 579, 7 Aug 52)
Comment: The intemperate Iranian note demands several million pounds allegedly owed to Iran by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. It shows that Mossadeq has no intention of compromising with the British despite Iran's desperate need for
funds.
11.
Iranian peasants becoming restive: Unrest in Iran is now spreading to the traditionally apathetic and conservative peasants. The American Embassy has been receiving a growing number of reports from various sections of the country which feature politically ambitious Mullahs inciting the peasants against landlords. Some of the arguments used by the Mullahs appear to follow the Communist line and to arouse class antagonism rather than to present a constructive approach to the land reform program. (C Tehran 571, 7 Aug 52)
Comment:
progriErris undoubtedly aware of its usefulness as a

supplement to the anti-British campaign.
The approach to the peasants, like so many other National Front maneuvers, lends itself to Communist exploitation.
12.
Britain to propose conference to safeguard free use of Suez Lanai: The British Foreign Office plans to propose a confidential conference of maritime powers using the Suez Canal, including the United States and France, to decide what action to take if Egypt should interfere with shipping, other than that bound for Israel. Also discussed would be guarantees which might be jointly sought from Egypt. (S London 659, 6 Aug 52)
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Comment: Egyptian Prime Minister Ali Maher has expressed a desiiii-f6-reach a general understanding with Great Britain, and appears anxious to encourage the development of an atmosphere of trust preparatory to negotiations between the

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Mossadeq is sponsoring an agrarian reform
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two countries. However, Great Britain evidently fears that the prevailing political forces in Egypt may eventually require the present regime to adopt a strongly nationalistic attitude and to express it in a dramatic move such as an attempt to restrict the use of the canal.

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13.
East Germans plan military vehicle production for Alert Police at freight car plants: The Lowa-wagenbauBautzen factory in East Germany is allegedly scheduled to convert from the production of railroad cars to the production of "military vehicles" at the end of 1952. Tracked vehicles of 120 horsepower and capable of towing artillery will reportedly be produced. American observers in Frankfurt report that the conversion of several freight car factories to the production of transport for the Alert Police is now "clear," although the plants involved and the level of production have not been established. (S Frankfurt Sitrep 29, C-3, 5 Aug 52)
Comment: Factories believed scheduled for conversion are niii-FF5UUcing for the Russians. The generally dilapidated condition of the East German railroad system will not, therefore, be aggravated by the move. Apparent willingness of the Soviet Union to relinquish at least some of its reparations or export claims on the East German economy may suggest one means by which the Russians intend to support East German remilitarization.
14.
Anti-Communists in West Berlin denied arms: Despite American objections, the Allied Commandants in West Berlin turned down a request by city officials that certain antiCommunists be allowed to carry arms in order to forestall future kidnappings. The French Commandant said that he would order the arrest and trial of any West German who was apprehended with arms even though authorized to carry them by British or American authorities.
In response to another West Berlin appeal for antikidnapping measures, the Commandants agreed that policemen should be stationed at major sector-crossing points, and that motor vehicles should be forced to slow down or stop at these crossings. The British Commandant indicated that he was "frightened" by the possibility of a shooting incident if a vehicle failed to stop when so ordered by the police. (S Berlin 248, 8 Aug 52)
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Comment: Thus far the West Berlin Senate has advocated far stronger anti-kidnapping measures than the Allies have been willing to countenance. The Allies, particularly British and French authorities,seem to feel that kidnappings cannot be prevented, and that strong measures might lead to an uncontrollable incident.
Except for the barricades set up between the city and the surrounding countryside on the order of the Berlin Senate, the countermeasures so far adopted will not effectively hinder further kidnappings.
15.
The Austrians are reportedly receptive to this proposal; they believe, however, that the possibility of concluding a new agreement in November will depend on the urgency of Poland's need to sell coal at a time when Austria is faced with a winter coal shortage. (C Vienna 390, 8 Aug 52)
Comment: The probability that Poland is counting on a weaerrilinf Austria's bargaining position emphasizes Austria's need to use its favorable coal credit with Poland immediately to increase its stockpiles

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Austro-Polish trade talks broken off: The Polish delegate at the Austro-Polish trade negotiations in Vienna has "temporarily" suspended discussions and returned to Warsaw. Prior to his departure, he proposed an interim three-month extension of the existing agreement with a 25 percent increase in selected quotas.
of coal.
16.
Austrian trade contacts may be sought by Russians during Vienna fair: The American-Embassy in Vienna believes that the anticipated arrival during the September trade fair of a Soviet delegation headed by Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade Zakharov may be related to recent Austrian proposals for trade talks. (S Vienna 377, 7 Aug 52)
Soviet Union, since it was under strong pressure from Austrian businessmen, and expected a Soviet initiative. Gruber, while agreeing to postpone an approach until September, urged an American expression of opinion by that time since he anticipated that the issue would "become public this autumn."
Comment: Foreign Minister Gruber recently informed the ATIUFTEER-Embassy that his government has tentatively decided to offer to negotiate a trade agreement with the
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17.
Dutch Foreign Minister disgusted with Schuman Plan meeting: Dutch Foreign Minister Stikker has informed the American Embassy in The Hague that at the recent meeting in Paris he told the Schuman Plan his disgust at their "pettiness, indecision ministers of and nationalism."
In an effort to put an end to the "scheming" of France, Italy, Belgium and Luxembourg for individual advantage in the organization, he offered to forego such advantages for the Netherlands provided the other countries would "get together, organize, and get something done." Monnet, the real author of the Schuman Plan, twice offered to resign and accused French Foreign Minister Schuman of having "sunk the cause of European unity."
Stikker does not expect any concrete results from the current meeting in Luxembourg. (S The Hague 1944 7 Aug 52)
18.
Third attempt to form a Dutch Cabinet being made: Cabinet formateur and Labor Party parliamentary leader Donker is attempting to form a coalition to include the Labor and Catholic Parties and two of the minor parties. Should the Anti-Revolutionary Party, one of conservative parties, continue to be adamantthe minor on the distribution of the cabinet portfolios, Donker will reportedly proceed to form a government without this party's participation. (C The Hague 193, 7 Aug 52)
Comment: Since the June Social-it-110 Catholic party elections, two attempts by have failed. Agreement has leaders to form a cabinet reportedly been reached on the prospective government's program, and the snag in the negotiations relates to the distribution of portfolios. Labor Party leaders would prefer a three-party coalition. Prolonged negotiations on forming a government are usual in the Netherlands.
19.
Danes fear US intends to eliminate all East-West trade: According to the US -Embassy in copenhagen, the Danes have long been concerned that American efforts to control the export of strategic items to the intentional or otherwise, toward Orbit may indicate a trend, the elimination of all trade with the USSR and its Satellites. They consider such a result undesirable both economically and politically.
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The Embassy believes that Danish willingness to cooperate in trade controls would improve if the US gave a clear and convincing demonstration that it is not seeking the abolition of all trade with the East. (S Copenhagen 169, 8 Aug 52)
Comment: Denmark has given only half-hearted cooperation Similar sentiments are evident in other in COCOS matters. Western European countries.
LATIN AMERICA
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Argentine labor may attempt coup: The General Confederation of Labor may attempt an early coup, Similar information comes
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The death of Senora de Peron has increased Comment: the likelihood of conflict between labor and the army. This is the first report suggesting that labor is prepared to take direct action to preserve its influence on the government. The reported existence of an army plot to overthrow Peron, tentatively scheduled for the near future, might cause the General Confederation of Labor to attempt a preventive coup to "protect" Peron. The General Confederation of Labor is effectively infiltrated by Communists.
21
Scattered violence continues in rural Guatemala over agrarian reform: An armed attack was made on a group of farm workers gathered to hear government officials explain the newly-enacted agrarian reform law. At least fifty The army and the police persons were reportedly wounded. were alerted and a state of siege may be declared in the area where the disturbance occurred. (R FBIS 7 Aug 52) This is just one incident in the scattered Comment: violera-TH-Fural areas during the past ten weeks. Opposition to the reform law is general among landowners. Opposition has also been evident on several occasions among the farm
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workers who are the presumed beneficiaries of the law. Some of them identify the law with Communism, and several times pro-government "agrarian reform missionaries" have been run out of villages by mobt of Indians shouting "Down with Communism!" and "We don't want a Communist law:" Incidents of local violence can be expected to continue after the initiation of expropriation proceedings next month.

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North North Korean Korean pilots p i l o t s may may be be training t r a i n i n gfor f o rbomber bomberescorts,: escorts: Early E a r l y on 6 August, A u n u s t . a ground r r r o u n dcontroller ' c o n t r o l l e r on the the N North o r t h IC Korean or e a n GCI net, largely devoted to instructed G C I n e t , which is is-l argely d evoted t o training, training, i nstructed a plane p l a n e to t o "go "go there t h e r e and and protect p r o t e c t the the bomber." bomber." A little l i t t l e later, later, the t h e same ground station s t a t i o n queried, q u e r i e d , "Did "Did you you see t the h e bomber? bomber? You must protect the t h e bomber."; bomber,",
The US A Air Force this ir F o r c e field f i e l d unit u n i t comments that that t h i s is the the first o b s e r v a t i o n of what first observation what appears a p p e a r s to to b be e t the h e training t r a i n i n g of North Korean fighter f i g h t e r pilots p i l o t s in in a a bomber bomber escort e s c o r t role. r o l e . (CANOE (CANOE 6920 6920 Security S e c u r i t y Grp G r p Johnson Johnson AFB AFB Japan, J a p a n , AP AP 382, 382, 10 10 Aug Aug 52) 52)
3. 3.
S Soviet-piloted o v i e t - p i l o t e d aircraft a i r c r a f t again a g a i n come come to t o assistance a s s i s t a n c e ofofC h i n e s e in i n Ieorea: Korea: 'Tn he e arly a f t e r n o o n of 5 Chinese In t the early afternoon August, 5 A u g u s t , the the c on'troller o n the the C hinese G controller on Chinese GCI C I net net v vectored ectored a f flight light o of f ChiChinese piloted p i l o t e d MIG-15's l l I G - 1 5 ' ~onto onto UN UN aircraft a i r c r a f t in i n the t h e Changyon Changyon area. area. Ten m minutes i n u t e s later, l a t e r , the t h e Russian R u s s i a n ground c controller ontroller s scrambled crambled two Soviet S o v i e t flights f l i g h t s with w i t h instructions i n s t r u c t i o n s to t o "aid "aid , t he the Islands I s l a n d s (cover ( c o v e r for f o r Chinese). Chinese). t h e y are in in b attle w ith they battle with S a b r e s south s o u t h of of the t h e (Tae (Tae Dong Dong River) R i v e r ) ." .I' Sabres

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North Air F Force to Comment: o r t h Korean Air o r c e is estimated t o Comment: The N have a division d i v i s i o n of of MIG-15's, MIG-lSPs, and a division d i v i s i o n of c conventional onventional f i g h t e r aircraft, a i r c r a f t , but b u t no no bombers. bombers. The Communists in i n China fighter and Manchuria are believed, b e l i e v e d , however, however, to t o have have 260 260 li4ht light bombers. bombers.
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The US Fifth F i f t h Air A i r Force F o r c e reports r e p o r t s that t h a t one MIG-15 MIG-15 wa6 was destroyed d e s t r o y e d in in combat in i n the t h e Chinnampo area at a t the t h e same time time t h e above above activity. a c t i v i t y . The last l a s t preirious previous o occurrence c c u r r e n c e of of t this his as the t y p e wag type Security was on on 11 1 1 March. March. (CANOE 6920 S e c u r i t y Grp Johnson Johnson AFB Japan, J a p a n , AP 360, 360, 8 8 Aug Aug 52) 52)
4. 4.
S enior N o r t h Korean IV LV Corps o f f i c e r s on inspection Senior North officers on inspection near Uesong: The e chief c h i e f of of staff s t a f f of o the' e' N North o r t h Korean 2lst 27st Brigade In an 8 Z iAugust u g u s t message reports repokiht the h e presence.in p r e s e n c e . i n his his sector of "the " t h e artillery a r t i l $ e r y (chief?) ( c h i e f ? ) of t a f f of t h e corps and of s staff of the the o p e r a t i o n s section s e c t i o n chief c h i e f of h e 17th 1 7 t h (Infantry (Infantry D i~ision?).~~ the operations of t the Division?)." message indicates i n d i c a t e s that t h a t these t h e s e officers o f f i c e r s are on an a n inspection inspection The message t o u r in i n the t h e Yonan area tour area west w e s t of of Kaesong. Kaesong. (CANOE ROK Int I n t Grp Grp M Korea, SK-M-180, Y SK-M-180, 9 9 Aug Aug 52) 52)
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Comment: The presence p r e s e n c e in i n the t h e 21st 2 1 s t Brigade B r i g a d e sector, sector, immediately behind front, of senior senior o officers i mmedmbe h i n d the the f r o n t , of f f i c e r s from IV Corps and from from one of the t h e infantry i n f a n t r y divisions d i v i s i o n s on o n the t h e west west probable, however, however, that coast is unexplained. u n e x p l a i n e d . It I t is probable, t h a t an an inspection of inspection'o f coastal coastal and and antiaircraft a n t i a i r c r a f t artillery a r t i l l e r y positions positions is l e under u n d e r way. way. More remotely, remotely, this t h i s inspection i n s p e c t i o n could c o u l d foreforecast the t h e move move of o f other o t h e r IV IV Corps Corps elements e l e m e n t s into i n t o this t h i s sector. sector.
5. 5 .
Since early Comment: S ince e a r l y spring, s p r i n g , both b o t h Chinese C h i n e s e Communist and North NUFEEOresn units Korean u n i t sin i nstatic s t a t i c defense d e f e n s e positions p o s i t i o n s have engaged in i n agricultural a g r l c u l t u r a l pursuits. p u r s u i t s . The use of the the m military ilitary in t h i s ro e is i s a North o a lleviate t he this ro1e North Korean Korean attempt attempt t to alleviate the d dire i r e manpoSer manpo er shortage s h o r t a g e in in rural r u r a l areas as w well e l l as a8 to augment the t h e military's m i l i t a r y ' s own own food f o o d supplies. supplies.
,,,'
North Korean unit u n i t continues c o n t i n u e s agricultural a g r i c u l t u r a l activities: activities: I In n a an't n 8 August meesage message beiween between two two units u n i t s ihought t h o u g h t ' to to be be R u b o r d i n a t e to t o the t h e North Korean Xorean 8th 8th D i v i s i o n , the t h e addressaddresssubordinate Division, 'was ordered ordered ""to a rreport on tthe area c cultivated ee was t o ssubmit ubmit a e p o r t on h e area ultivated ee He requested report for autumn vegetables." vegetables." H e was also also r e q u e s t e d to to r eport t he p o t e n t i a l harvest h a r v e s t as compared w ith l ast y ear's, p lus the potential with last year's, plus (CANOE 3 330th 3 0 t h Comm Recon Grp t h e period of cultivation. the c u l t i v a t i o n . (CANOE Korea, AIt AIt 010, 610, 9 9 Aug Aug 52) 52) Korea,
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Preparations P r e p a r a t i o n s for for 15 15 August celebration c e l e b r a t i o n under way in in North N o r t h Korea: A 9 A u g u s t message on the t h e 24th 24th N o r t h Korean August North antiaircraft I mobilize m o b i l i z e one a n t i a i r c r a f t artillery a r t i l l e r y net n e t queried q u e r i e d "shall "shall I v e h i c l e to t o receive r e c e i v e the t h e ammunition for f o r the t h e 15 15 August cerevehicle I w will at this mony? I i l l dispatch d i s p a t c h the t h e musicians. musiciaqs. . a t t h i s time." time.'' Another r recent message d detailed the pwovisions Another e c e n t message e t a i l e d the r o v i s i o n s to t o be be made 330th available a v a i l a b l e for for the t h e celebration. c e l e b r a t i o n . (CANOE 3 3 0 t h Comm Recon Co Korea, AIa-625, AbY-625, 10 10 Aug Aug 52) 52)
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4. 4.
Joint Korean-Chinese unit mentioned in J o i n t North Korean-Chinese in message: message: On 8 August the t h e 2nd Battalion B a t t a l i o n of of the the North Korean 21st 2lst B r i g a d e ordered ordered a a subordinate s u b o r d i n a t e unit u n i t on the t h e Ongjin O n g j i n Peninsula Peninsula Brigade to t o "report " r e p o r t about a b o u t the t h e spy s p y who who came came from from Mu-do. Mu-do. the . whom whom the U n i t captured." captured." (CANOE 3 0 t h Comm Recon Recon Co Co Korea, Korea, 81st Unit (CANOE 3 330th 15RSM/1735, 15RSH/1735, 8 8 Aug Aug 52) 52)
Comment: The 15th 1 5 t h of of August is is the t h e anniversary a n n i v e r s a r y of Korea's liberation Korea7s l i b e r a t i o n from from the t h e Japanese J a p a n e s e and and is is celebrated c e l e b r a t e d in in both b o t h the t h e North North and and South. S o u t h . No significant s i g n i f i c a n t enemy activity a c t i v i t y is is anticipated on a nticigated o n 15 15 August, August, although a l t h o u g h one recent r e c e n t POW stated stated that Chinese units t hat C hinese u n i t s were alerted for a "push "push against a g a i n s t the the UN lines"and 1ines"and that t h a t they t h e y expected expected to"have t o ' h a v e Seoul S e o u l by by 15 15 August." August."
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Comment: The 81st U n i t is allegedly a l l e g e d l y a joint j o i n t North North Comment: Unit Korean-Chinese Korean-Chinese organization o r g a n i z a t i o n of of army army group group size size (100,000 (100,000 men) which was formed in men) i n Manchuria in i n the t h e past p a s t few f e w years. years. It I t has h a s been reliably r e l i a b l y reported r e p o r t e d that t h a t the t h e divisional-strength divlsional-strength " 9 t h Branch s u b o r d i n a t e to t o the the 81st 81st Unit, U n i t , is is gargar"9th Branch Unit;'" Unit" subordinate risoning r i s o n i n g portions p o r t i o n s of of western w e s t e r n Korea. Korea.
gigh-level H i g h - l e v e l inspection i n s p e c t i o n in i n west Korea may forecast f o r e c a s t more more commander Of amphibious operations: o p e r a t i o n s : The Th = c o m m a n d e r of the t h e 2nd 2nd Battalion Battalion o r d e r e d on on 8 8 August to to 2 1 a t Brigade B r i g a d e was ordered t he N o r t h Korean Ko r e a n 21st of the North 'ijp t o headquarters h e a d q u a r t e r s dor f o r "inspection " i n s p e c t i o n at a t the t h e General General Bureau come to of of the t h s Corps." Corps.'1 The battalion b a t t a l i o n commander was instructed i n s t r u c t e d to to bring with w i t h him the t h e "wooden "wooden boat b o a t situation." s i t u a t i o n . 1 1 (CANOE (CANOE 15RSM/ 15RSY/ 1714 1714 Korea, 10 10 Aug Aug 52) 52)
5. 5.
Comment: The presence p r e s e n c e in i n the t h e 21st 2 1 s t Brigade sector sector of of Comment: high h i g h ranking r a n k i n g officers o f f i c e r s from the t h e North Korean IV IV Corps Corps has has been previously p r e v i o u s l y reported. reported. The reference r e f e r e n c e to t o the t h e "wooden "wooden boat situation" s i t u a t i o n " may indicate i n d i c a t e that t h a t further f u r t h e r amphibious amphibious operations operations are are being b e i n g planned. planned.
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North Korean foraging processes noted: noted: An unidentified supply officer on 10 10 A August ugust informed informed a unrt unit of of the North North had "trouble" "trouble" obtaiaobtainKorean 23rd Brigade that if the latter had n the Ongjin ing meat meat and poultry poultry from civilian officials i in area, the unit was authorized to procure procure food in the Sinchon area. The intercept intercept also also stated stated that that the the addressee addressee would, would, area. meat and poultry poultry from a ''peoples "peoples 600 kilograms of meat receive 600 (CANOE 330th 330th Comm Comm Recon Bacon Co farm?)" by by 12 12 August. August. (CANOE (poultry farm?)" Korea, ALT-632, ALT-632, 11. 11.Aqg 52) Aug 52)
This out the local foraging COmment; h i s message points out COmment: T p r a c t m North North Korean Korean army army units, units, which which probably probably conpractICW-67 contribute to the already great distress of the civilian ciVilian population. population.

7. 7.
capacity.:
Iron ore mine in in North Korea operating in in limited limited 216% Antiaircraft Antiaircraft attalion commander'of tte the 21st A battalion-commander'of Artillery Regiment on on 7 7 August informed Informed a subordinate subordiqate unit < g ! m e n t that "when Tanchon, load "rhea the one mobilized vehicle comes to Tmchon, (CANOE 330th 330th Comm CommBecon it it with with ore from the mines." mines." (CANOE Recon Co Korea, 8 Aug Aug 52) 52) Korea, ALT-571, 8
Comment: There There are are many magnetite-bearing magnetite-bearing deposits in in Comment: the v vicinity m of of Tanchon, T m c h o n , but most of of them them are are small. small. Before produced only only about about 5 5,000 6,000 metric the war these mines produced 000 to 6,000 report, the to a tons of iron aT ' - I the iron ore. ore. According to tona little mined i is exported to the Jittle ore that is ie currently being mined s exported Soviet SoViet Union.
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S o v i e t pilots p i l o t s show show reluctance r e l u c t a n c e to t o engage engage UN UN aircraft: aircraft: Soviet d i r - g r o u n d communications i n e second ,Itir-ground..communications int h the second week week of of August August i n d i c a t e d that t h a t many many Soviet Soviet p i l o t s were e l u c t a n t to to indicated pilots were again r reluctant engage UN fighter f i g h t e r aircraft. a i r c r a f t . While the t h e enemy enemy air a i r defense defense engage.UN a c onsistent d etermination t o i n t e r c e p t UN network shows shows a consistent determination to intercept p l a n e s , the t h e pilots p i l o t s have have not n o t always always been been equally e q u a l l y aggressive. aggressive. planes, T h i e contrasts c o n t r a s t s with w i t h the t h e first f i r s t week of August, This August, when iver h e Yalu t h e r e was a i l y combat there, was ddaily combat which which ranged ranged from from tthe Yalu R River t o south s o u t h of of Pyongyang. Pyongyang. During During the t h e latter l a t t e r part p a r t .of of the the to week, all a l l nine n i n e regiments r e g i m e n t s heard h e a r d on on the the G C I net were week, GCI were a c t i v e l y engaged. engaged. (CANOE AF 2 Aug; 6920 actively (CANOE AF Roundup RoUndup 154, 154, 1 12 Aug; 6920 S e c u r i t y Grp G r p Johnson Johnson AFB AFB Japan, J a p a n , SG SG 444, 444, 12 1 2 Aug Aug 52) 52) Security
p i l o t s probably probably Comment: United Nations N a t i o n s fighter f i g h t e r pilots Comment: d e s t m enemy aircraft a i r c r a f t and and damaged 30 uring t he destroyed 26 enemy 30 d during the f i r s t two two weeks weeks of of August. August. first
A new high h i g h in i n air a i r activity a c t i v i t y was was recorded r e c o r d e d on on the t h e GCI GCI A n e t during d u r i n g the t h e first f i r s t week, ith a n a v e r a g e of 37 d aylight net week, w with an average daylight 15 night n i g h t flights. f l i g h t s . On 6 6 August 264 MIG's noted and 15 MIG's were were noted
of which which 250 250 were were d a y l i g h t flights f l i g h t s on on the t h e OCI G C I net, n e t , of in daylight s i g h t e d by by Allied A l l i e d pilots. p i l o t s . During the t h e second week, sighted week, howe v e r , there has been a a p rogressive d e c l i n e in i n the t h e number ever, progressive decline Y I E 1 5 ' s observed observed and and engaged engaged by by UN UN fighters. fighters. of MIG-15's
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North Korean gorean division d i v i s i o n fears fears UN UN communications communications intelligenCe i n t e S l l g e n c e ' effort: e f f o r t : 'On On 11 1 1 August, a a communications communications officer'of t h e North N o r t h Korean Korean 8th 8 t h Division D i v i s i o n on on coastal coastal officer of the s e c u r i t y duty d u t y south s o u t h of Wonsan Wonson ordered: ordefed: "since l f s l n c e there is is security security leak due due t to using apprehension that t h a t there is a s e c u r i t y leak o u sing the t h e code for f o r a long long time time . draw draw up up a new code , s i m i $ a r to t o the t h e code drawn drawn up up by by Corps. (CANOE similar (CANOE 330th ." Comm Recon Co Co Korea, Korea, ALT-655, ALT-655, 12.Aug 1 2 Aug 52) 52j
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Comment: The North Korean 8th 8th D Division's i v i s i o n ' s communicatione communications traffic has been been a DroUfic prolific s source o u r c e of of iinformation n f o r m a t i o n for for a a l long ong
time.
I
7. 7.
8. a.
North Korean unit u n i t obtains o b t a i n s eight e i g h t oxen oxen for for meat meat ration: ration: A supply s u p p l y offccer o f f i c e r of a North Korean uhit, unit, possibly possibly eubordinate subordinate to t he 2 1st B rigade, r e v e a l e d on 1 August hat h is u n i t had the 21st Brigade, revealed on 1 11 August t that his unit had received,"eight r e c e i v e d l'eight oxen oxen for for meat." meat." According to to the t h e originator, originator, t h e 'regimental "regimental commander commander himself" himself1' was to t o decide decide what what units units the allowed to t o have have the t h e meat. meat. (CANOE (CANOE 8 3 0 t h Comm Recon would be allowed 330th -Co Korea, ALT-675, 13 Co Korea, 13 Aug Aug 52) 52)
Comment: Most North Korean POW's POWrsreveal r e v e a l that t h a t they they r a r e l m v e any rarelT7T5Tve any meat; meat;dried d r i e dsalted salted fish f i s h constitutes c o n s t i t u t e s the the c h i e f protein p r o t e i n food. food. It I t is known that t h a t a critical c r i t i c a l shortage s h o r t a g e of of chief farm North Korea. farm animals animals exists e x i s t s in' in'Nor2h
Korean aid a i d program mentioned mentioned in i n Hungarian Hungarian message: message: A recently a v a i l a b l e Hungarian i p l o m a t i c message June recently' available' Hungarian ddiplomatic message of 26 June from Pyongyang to t o Budapest requested r e q u e s t e d that t h a t "inasmuch "inasmuch as as the the under way," way," p periodic progress reports Korean aid a i d program is under eriodic p r o g r e s s reports are to t o be forwarded for t o r dissemination d i s s e m i n a t i o n to to the t h e local local press. press. (CANOE D-20993, Pyongyang-Budapest, (CANOE D-20993, Pyongyang-Budapest, 26 26 June June 52) 52)
and Radio Radio CoMment: Comment: Both communications intelligence i n t e l l i g e n c e and Pyongyang periodically North Korea p e r i o d i c a l l y discuss d i s c u s s the t h e receipt in i n North Cif of rrelief e l i e f ssupplies u p p l i e s from the t h e Satellites. S a t e l l i t e s . There has been no indication i n d i c a t i o n to t o date that t h a t any any of of the t h e Satellites S a t e l l i t e s have have impleimplemented a rehabilitation a program for f o r the t h e economic r e h a b i l i t a t i o n of North Korea.
1 4 Aug 52 52 14
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Chinese C h i n e s e artillery a r t i l l e r y unit u n i t in i n Korea anticipateS a n t i o i p a t e k l "long lTlongwar": war": The C h i n e s e Communist 1st A r t i l le r v D ivisron i n combat n Chinese Communist lsi Artillery Divis4on in combat i in w e s t e r n Korea on 10 10 August ordered o r d e r e d -one o n e of of its i t s regiments regiments western to t o refrain r e f r a i n from using using a a certain c e r t a i n type ty,pe of of ammunition ammunition now,"in now,"in of a long l o n g war." war." (CANOE 0 1 s t Comm anticipa (CANOE 5 501st Comm Recon Recon Grp Korea, ant T-54, T-54, 13 13 Aug Aug 52) 52) Korea, L
icipaD
C,omment: t h i s is is a a fragmentary f r a g m e n t a r y message message and and does does Comment: While this n o t necessarily n e c e s s a r i l y reflect r e f l e c t Communist strategy s t r a t e g y in i n Korea, Korea, it it not s u g g e s t s that t h a t the the C hinese p lan a n i ndefinite s tay i n Korea suggests Chinese plan an indefinite stay in Korea under combat combat conditions. conditions.

8. 8 .
9. 0.
North N o r t h Koreans Koreans expected e x p e c t e d UN UN operations o p e r a t i o n s on on 15 15 August: August: Two Two c u r r e n t North N o r t h Korean K o r e a n messages messacces pointed Dointed o u t an enems ear current out enemy f fear t h a t UN forces would attempt an ah operation o p e r a t i o n on on 15 15 August, August, the the that a n n i v e r s a r y of Korea's independence independence from from Japan. Japan. anniversary
c o a s t a l security s e c u r i t y unit u n i t in i n the t h e Wonsan Wonsan area area on on 11 1 1 A coastal August stated: s t a t e d : "during " d u r i n g the the s p e c i a l warning week h e 14th 14th special week from t the t h e 16th 1 6 t h of August, August, the t h e members members of of intelligence i n t e l l i g e n c e will w i l l all all to the be o b i l i z e d in i n order o r d e r to t o nip n i p the t h e incident i n c i d e n t at a t the t h e bud. bud. , I1 be m mobilized ." Similarly S i m i l a r l y on the t h e west coast, coast, a b battalion a t t a l i o n commander commander of the the 21st Brigade, Ongjin area, r reported 21st B r i g a d e , on on coastal coastal ssecurity e c u r i t y iin n tthe he O n g j i n area, eported .on August." t h a t "we "we anticipate a n t i c i p a t e their t h e i r landing l a n d i n g activity. activity. .on 15 15 August." that (CANOE 15RSM/1930, 13 13 Aug Aug 52) 52) (CANOE 15RSM/1924 and 15RSM/1930,
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prone signiS i n c e the t h e Communists are p r o n e to t o select s igniComment: Since ficant operations, they apparently f i c a n anniversaries m e r s a r i e s for their t h e i r own o perations, t hey a pparently t h o u g h t the thought t h e UN UN might might do do likewise. likewise.
N o r t h Korean unit u n i , t .receives r e c e i v e s shipment shipment of of Chinese C h i n e s e rice: rice: North u n x d e n t i f i e d Nort1 North torean Korean brigade, b r i g a d e , probably p r o b a b l y subordinate subordinate An unidentnied to the V Corps, to t he V C o r p s , on 5 5 August stated s t a t e d that t h a t it it had had received r e c e l v e d the the previous p r e v i o u s day day "827 "827 (tons?) ( t o n s ? ) of of Chinese C h i n e s e rice." rice." The rice r i c e had a r r i v e d at at a a small town town near n e a r Hamhung; Hamhung, according a c c o r d i n g to t o the the arrived (CANOE 330th Recon Co Koreq, Korea, ALT 670, (CANOE 3 3 0 t h Comm Recon 6 7 0 , 13 13 Aug message.
52) 52)
Comment: Most of of the the rice r i c e grown grown in i n North North Korea Korea is is Comment: collected c o l l e by m the t h e government government for for military m i l i t a r y and and special s p e c i a l use. use. This however, meet meet r requireThis domestic d o m e s t i c rice r i c e supply s u p p l y does not, n o t , however, equirements and and North N o r t h Korea Korea has has been been forced f o r c e d to t o import import grain. grain. In mid-May, North Korean intercepts I n mid-May, intercepts revealed r e v e a l e d that t h a t rice r i c e for for m i l i t a r y consumption was b eing s h i p p e d in i n from C hina v ia military being shipped China via routes. east coast routes.
4
52 15 Aug 52
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C rD T D
10. 10.
Chinese C h i n e s e Communists send s e n d vehicles v e h i c l e 6 from Korea to t o China: China: In a message to t o its its subordinate s u b o r d i n a t e units u n i t s an 'an unidentified uniflentified a ntiaircraft d i v i s i o n described its antiaircraft division its p plan l a n to t o send s e n d military military v e h i c l e s from from the t h e Korean front f r o n t to t o China. C h i n a . The vehicles v e h i c l e s were vehicles a p p a r e n t l y to t o be sent s e n t to t o the t h e immediate rear for f o r such s u c h prelimiprelimiapparently n a r y repairs r e p a i r s as were necessary n e c e s s a r y to to p u t them "in good enough enough nary put c ondition o d condition drive r i v e to t o China." Cbirza." (CANOE 501st Comm Recon Grp (CANOE Grp Korea, L jLP20, 1 1 Aug Aug 52) 52) Korea, T20, 11
Comment: $omme;t: Since the C Cninese a l n e s e Communists do most of their their repa rs on military military v e h i c l e s from Korea a t o rdnance i natalmajor repairs vehicles at ordnance install a t i o n s in In Manchuria, he v e h i c l e 8 of t h i s unit presumably are are lations Manchuria, t the vehicles of this being sent s e n t there t h e r e for f o r major maintenance m a i n t e n a n c e repairs. repairs,

5 5 15 Aug 52 52 15
TOP SECRET CANOE
Approved For Re leave 2005109/28 : CIA-RDP79T01146A004.00060001-3
SECRET
25X1
15 August 1952
25X1
OCI No. 6463

Copy No.
'295
DIA, USAF AND DOS REVIEW COMPLETED

SECRET
Approved For Release zuv5/09/28 : CIA-RDP7aTO I 116A001200060001-3
25X1
Approved For Re leee 2005109/28 : CIA-RDP79T01146A006000060001-3

SECRET
SOVIET UNION
1.
25Xf
Soviet Fleet Admiral Isakov reportedly in command of Caspian-Black Sea area: An unconfirmed report indicates that ?leet Admiral Ivan S. Isakov has been appointed Commander of the Caspian-Black Sea area with headquarters at Makhach-Kala on the western shore of the Caspian. Isakov, allegedly "number one Communist Party member in the Soviet Navy," is charged with the task of organizing this command for future tactical operations when the Volga-Don and'Manych Canals are completely operational. In addition, he will direct a high priority project of logistic support for the Iranian Tudeh Party "bv small boat via the Caspian Coast."
Comment: This report appears to supplement a press noticriTOE-Yerivan, capital of Soviet Armenia, which listed Soviet naval officers of Armenian origin who hold important posts in the Caspian area and indicated that Admiral Isakov had been appointed to this command.
25X1
2.
Moscow says West wants weak international law on war crime trials: The United States and Britain were accused of attempting to undermine the principles of international law which establish that the preparation and waging of aggressive wars, crimes against humanity, and war crimes committed in violation of war laws and regulations should be regarded as criminal offenses.
The charge was made by Candidate of Juridical Sciences Morozova in a Moscow Home Service broadcast reviewing a book entitled, "UNO and War Crimes," written by former Lord Chancellor of England Maugham and Lord Hankey. Morozova, claiming that similar attempts "to justify leaving war criminals unpunished" previously had been made by
SECRET
1
1 5 Aug 52
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SECRET
American lawyers, asserted that this book further reveals the fear of the imperialists that therbe held responsible for the crimes committed in Korea. She added that "the peoples are raising their yoices in demand of a severe trial.of the criminals" (American military) -- "demands supported by.the firm principles of international law which were confirmed in the statute and sentence of the Nuremberg tribunal and approved by the special resolution of the UN General Assembly."
25X1
1
Pravda published Chou En-lai's 8 March protest which stated that "members of American armed forces who fly over Chinese air space using bacteriological weapons will be treated as criminals if captured." There was no Moscow comment, however, nor was that line exploited during the world-wide Communist BW campaign. Chinese Communist propaganda haS given Some play to snch a threat as: "The criminals and their accomplices will be pilloried and severely punished."
EASTERN EUROPE
3.
25X1
Czech Legation in'Rio reported apparently preparing to depart: The American Embassy in Prague reports that it has FialiFed information from the Brazilian Legation that the Czech Legation is "apparently preparing to depart" from Rio de Janeiro.
I
1
Comment: This is the first report indicating a possible Czech-MOW-to cut down its diplomatic representation in Latin America. It appears very doubtful in view of the recently extended Czech-Brazilian trade agreement which is reported to envisage a trade valued at about $15,000,000 in each direction. Under this agreement Czechoslovakia expects to import about $6,500,000 worth of Brazilian hides essential to the Czech shoe industry.
4.
Rakosi becomes Hungarian premier: The extraordinary session of the Hungarian parliament elected Communist Party leader Rakosi as premier after accepting the resignation of SECRET
2
Comment: This is the second known Moscow propaganda hint of thg-Failbility of demands for a war-crimes trial of American military personnel accused of atrocities in Korea and Cltina. The references to such demands are veiled, however, and originate from unofficial Soviat sources.
15 Aug 52
Approved For Raise 2005109128 : CIA-RDP79T01146A0S00060001-3

SECRET
In his speech of acceptance Rakosi promised to Istvan Dohi. tighten Hungarian relations with the other Satellite countries and especially Czechoslovakia and Rumania.
25X1
1
25X1
Comment: The election of Matyas Rakosi resembles recent shifts in Rumania and Czechoslovakia where top party and top government positions have been delegated to one- person. The changes in Rumania and Czechoslovakia were accompanied by top level purges and an intensification of the socialization
program.

SECRET
3
A step-up in Hungary's socialization program has already been noted, and Rakosi's appointment as premier may indicate that a top level purge will follow. There have been numerous rumors that Erno Gero, the party's Number 2 man and president of the People's Economic Council, and party theoretician Jozsef Revai are slated for purging.
15 Aug 52
Approved For RelSsie 2005/09128 : CIA-RDP79T01146A06,60060001-3

SECRET
FAR EAST
5.
US-Japan conclude agreement on controls over trade with Communist China: A US-Japan agreement, subject to approval of the two governments, has been concluded on export controls over trade between Japan and Coimunist China. The agreement provides that commodities included in any International Control List, US Security List, or Battle Act List, will continue to be embargoed. Commodities not on these lists, which are mutually regarded as of strategic value to Communist China, may be traded at the discretion of the Japanese Government, provided they are favorably exchanged for goods contributing to the basic economy of Japan or to the defense production of the free world. Contracts in this category are subject to prior American-Japanese discussion. Goods of lesser strategic value are limited to "reasonable quantities." 25X1
25X1
Comment: This agreement will permit the Japanese Government to ship a number of items currently prohibited by its SCAP-imposed export control regulations. With elections in the offing, it can be expected that the government will take prompt action to meet public and Diet demands for development of trade with Communist China.
6.
25X1
7.
Korean broadcast of Kim's speech omits reference to peace on "equal basis": North Korean Premier Kim's seventh liberation aniairdirgiry speech contained the usual eulogies to the "valiant" forces of North Korea, the Communist "volunteers," and the Korean people. He called for the People's Armed Forces to ready themselves "to deal further blows to the enemy" to achieve "final victory." Although foreign releases of Kim's speech contained references to termination of the war on an 'equal basis," this did not appear in the version broadcast to the Korean people.
Recently encountered MIG-15 pilots over Korea are inexperienced: Far East Air Force, in a discussion 0 enemy capabilities,observed on 11 August that while enemy pilots encountered in the past two weeks were more aggressive, their ability was limited. This conclusion was reached
SECRET
15 Aug 52
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because MIG-15 pilots, using proved positioning tactics, "lost their kills through poor gunnery, inept maneuvers, and overeagerness."
FEAF comments that "the inference unavoidable that new units comprised a substantial part" seems of the inereaspd Communist effort in 'early August.
I
25X1
25X1
8.
25X1
Comment: The Assembly's action demonstrates that despite Rhee'l-Ffeigure tactics, his opposition in the legislature is still organized and has considerable strength. When the Assembly reconvenes on 20 August, Rhee is expected to try to push through his new constitutional amendments, which will offer a true test of the opposition power.
9.
Power shortage in Manchuria is revealed: broadcast of 13 August revealed a large-scale A Peiping campaign to conserve electricity in Manchuria. "power-conserving missions" had been The broadcast said that sent to Dairen, Chinchou, Fushun, Anshan and Penchihu.
I I
President Rhee's opposition in National Assembly shows streniTE7 The South korean Nalional Asseffibly on 13 August refused at first to approve President Rhee's plan to hold inauguration ceremonies in Seoul, 54 out of 118 voted for approval. rather than in Pusan. Only When the Assembly speaker pointed out that detailed arrangements already had been made for the ceremony in Seoul, the plan was approved by a bare majority.
25X1
Manchuria's electric power supply, which has been Taa&Tdate for some time, was further reduced by about one-fourth as a result of the late June bombing of the Suiho hydroelectric plant on the Yalu River. directly referred to the effect of the Radio Peiping has not bombing on Manchurian industry, but this power conservation campaign appears to be
one result of it.
Comment:
Dairen and Chinchou used to depend for most of their power on Suiho, which also supplied some electricity to the iron and steel plants in Anshan and Penchihu.
SECRET
5
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Aug 52
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25X1
I I
10.25X1X Existence of new Manchurian railroad confirmed:

25X1
line.
Ithe existence I11 of a rail route alternate to the main Mukden-Antung-Chongju
25X1 25X1
This new line, which was finished in December 1950, leaves the Mukden-Antung line at Penchihu, 40 miles south of Mukden, and crosses into Korea near the Suiho Dam. 25X1X Ithat the new line was single tracked, although from Mukden to Penchihu the main line was double-tracked.
Comment: The Communists have undertaken considerable improVirigNE-of railroads between Mukden and Korea since the Korean war began, double-tracking the main Mukden-Antung line and building this new alternate route. Photographs have shown that the railway bridge across the Yalu River at Supung was in use, but it was not known that the line had been finished as far back in Manchuria as Penchihu.

25X1C
25X1X
11.
25X1X
25X1
25X1A
Gasoline supplied Viet Minh by China: It Communist China has shipped at least 917,000 liters of gasoline to the Viet Minh since the start of its aid program.
25X1A
Comment: China's aid program to the Viet Minh is thought to have begun approximately two years ago, although it probably had little practical effect until the latter part of last year. The amount of gasoline reported, equal to about 4,700 drums, is credible.
12.
!situation in Burma: Although aware of thTTF-TETEIrrtrIo overthrow the Government, the Burmese CommUnists have not suffered decisive military reverses or a serious reduction in over-all capabilitigsl
I
25X1A
25X1
Ithe recent
25X1
lull in u mmunist military activity is due mainly to a new concentration on political methods which, in the long run, :maY Prove a more serious thrat to Western interests.
1
25X1
Comment: Communist overtures for peace and a coalition regime have been repeatedly rejected by government spokesmen in the last several months. There are as yet no clear indications of the nature of the Communist reaction to this rebuff.
SECRgT
6
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13.
British military in Singapore concerned over Communist terrorism in Sarawak: Although British Commissioner General MacDonald has not shown alarm at the recent Communist act of terrorism in the British colony of Sarawak, British Army headquarters in Singapore views the incident seriously. It points out that the city of Pontianak in Indonesian Borneo, 100 miles south of the Sarawak border, could easily become a "focus of infection," from which Sarawak could be harassed. There is a large Chinese population in Pontianak, and the Indonesian Government has resettled several hundred armed dissidents in a nearby area.
The American Military Liaison Officer in Singapore comments that although the Communists do not have the capacity to threaten the British position in Sarawak, a Communist operation could develop which would force an expenditure of government resources out of all proportion to .the Communist investment, as.in the case of Malaya.
25X1
14.
25X1X 25X1X
reporiney aire-EIT-1
25X1
hall evidence points to an early showdown between Egyptian Army Commander Nagib and the powerful Wafd Party. The 'probable arrest and possible deportation of ex-Prime Minister Nahas Pasha, Wafd leade Serageddin. Serreterv neneral of the Wafd Party. 25X1A
J
Comment: Although there are indications that relations between the army and the Wafd are strained, there is no other evidence that a showdown between the army and the Wafd is imminent.
The army-sponsored reform program, if carried out, will directly affect many prominent members of the Wafd. The army's continuing interest in political affairs and its apparent determination to effect reforms may induce it to take strong action.
It is not known how fully the various military leaders support Nagib.
SECREt
7

NEAR EAST - AFRICA
25X1X
Clash between Egyptian Army clique and Wafd ParM
15 Aug 52
25X1

Approved For Release 2005109128 : CIA-RDP79T01146A004.100060001-3

SECRET
WESTERN EUROPE
16.
25Xt
Soviet officials in Berlin protest alleged air corridor violations: On 11 and 12 August the Soviet controller ot the Berlin air safety center lodged three oral protests on alleged American overflight of East German territory. The incidents, involving two commercial aircraft and one fighter, are being investigated by American authorities in Berlin.
Comment: The series of protests of air corridor violations which began last May could be designed to build up a record for any future action to interfere with Allied use of the corridors. These latest protests assume particular importance in view of the current Soviet harassment of traffic to Berlin.
17.
French delay decision.regarding UN discussion of Tunisian The French Foreign Ministry has informed the British Charge in Paris that "official level opinion" favors inclusion of the Tunisian question on the UN General Assembly agenda, but that the question of UN discussion will nct be put to the cabinet for some time. The reason for delay is fear that Tunisian intransigence would increase,pending developments in the United Nations,should an expected favorable decision become known!
question:
25X1
Meanwhile the French Charge in Washington has told the State Department that France is reluctant to favor UN consideration without some support such as an American public statement on the French reform program.
I
125X1
Comment: The French probably are waiting for a reply from the Bey on reforms before making a decision as to their position in the United Nations. Furthermore, Pinay may fear intensified parliamentary criticism of his Tunisian policy in the forthcoming fall debates should the government show signs of yielding in the present crisis.
SECRET
15 Aug 52
I
' I
FAR GAST EAST
6.
HR70-14
Korea re orted: Korea reported:
Improvements i in Communist a air defense system Im,provements n Communist ir d efense s y s t e m in i n North Anal of messages1 messa es A n a l ysis s i s of r eveals a c onsiderable reveals considerable
1
1
extension of early warning coverage. Tne new grid provides for reports of UN aircraft approaching North Korea when they are well out in Korea Bay or the Sea of Japan "as far south as required."
I
7. 7 .
8. 8.

.
.
.
Other recent messages on the Soviet early warning net indicate the presence of a radio range station, valuable for night interception operations, located near Huichon in north central Korea. A Soviet OCI station and two Chinese searchlight companies, to be used "in operations. .with fighters," are also located at Huichon. (CANOE AF Roundup 157, 14 Aug; AF Roundup 158, 15 Aug 52)
.
Unidentified U n i d e n t i f i e d Chinese Chinese unit u n i t alludes a l l u d e s to t o possible p o s s i b l e future future operations: o p e r a t i o n s : A recent r ec e 11 t Chinese C h i n e s e COmmunist Communist message, signed signed wrciranteer Rear H Headquarters 5th Branch U Unit," congratulated R e a r eadauarters 5 t h Branch n i t ,'I c o ngratulated a n o t h e r unit, u n i t , identified i d e n t i i i e d as as the t h e "4th " 4 t h Branch Unit," U n i t , " on o n their their another "high pro-revolutionary s t a r t on the t h e Anti-America, Anti-America, Help Help "high p r o - r e v o l u t i o n a r y start Korea campaign." campaign." The message continued c o n t i n u e d that t h a t "although " a l t h o u g h our our f r o n t line l i n e battle front b a t t l e area a r e a is is secure, s e c u r e , the t h e Americans still s t i l l have have their jand are). t h e i r savage savage disposition. disposition. .(and are). . securely e ntrenched .securely entrenched inthe If w we again fight hard battle e a gain f ight a h ard b a t t l e this this i n t h e front f r o n t lines. l i n e s . If (winter?), with courage, we can break dark e c an b r e a k up the the d a r k plans p l a n s of of the the ( winter?), w ith c ourage, w (CANOE American imperialists i m p e r i a l i s t s and and win win t he f i n a l victory." victory." (CANOE American the final ASAPAC, 3789, 14 14 Aug Aug 52) 52) ASAPAC, PASAL PASAL 288, 288, Spot Spot 3789,
Comment: Comment; The text t e x t of of this t h i s plain p l a i n language language undated undated message message suggests from one Communist supply suggests a a propagandaexhortation propagandaexhostationfrom supply element to t o another. a n o t h e r . While the t h e allusion a l l u s i o n to t o future f u t u r e operations operations still is vague and conditional, conditional, s t i l l it i t represents r e p r e s e n t s a departure d e p a r t u r e from from the s t a t i c defensive d e f e n s i v e indications i n d i c a t i o n s noted n o t e d previously. previously. t h e static
downe
Enemy sensitive about possible UN attempt to recover a :

I
a 7 August message signed by the "9th Unit Commander" Commander'' stated: s t a t e d : "According "According to t o the t h e message of the t h e United United Command .our air Command Headquarters. Headquarters. .our a i r force f o r c e fought f o u g h t against a g a i n s t the the F-86's F-86vs in i n the t h e sky s k y over over Nampo. Nam,po. .Sariwon, and shot s h o t down one one of of .Sariwon, .at the time, our .at t h e same t i m e , one of o u r aircraft a i r c r a f t was shot s h o t down." down." them.
.
4 4
I
18 Aug 52 52 18
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515410p
TOP SECRET CANOE

T&P SECRET CANOE

The North Korean message then then stated that that "according "according to to the enemy radio," the the UN wanted to to recover the the missing aircraft. aircr-_ft. was then then requested requested to to "investigate "investigate it it The subordinate subordinate unit was .and you cannot bring completely and and if if it it is is our our aircraft. aircraft. .and it, you will explode it to to kep,our keep our secret from the the enemy." enemy." (CANOE FECOM FECOM Brief of SIB (CANOE SIB #559, 9 9 Aug Aug 52) 52)
.
.
Comment: This message contains much positive intelligence. intelligence. Comment: It p provides r m a n oanother t h e r clue to to the the nature nature of the the "9th "9th Branch Branch Unit" Unit" of the joint joint Chinese-North Chinese-North Korean Korean 81st 81st Unit, Unit, tentatively' tentatively' located in this area; it it indicates indicates an enemy communications communications intelligence effort; effort; and it it points to to enemy sensitivity sensitivity conconcerning the the recovery of their their aircraft. aifcraft.
NR
18 Aug 52
-TOP-SECRET CANOE
HR70-14
W
-SEeRET
FAR EAST
,,,,'
NR
9.

reported: 1 reported:
Chinese Communist control of North Korean economy by May the supply headquarters of
t/he
tChinese Communist Army in Korea was directing, through the
North Korean Ministry of Commerce, the operation of a "comprehensive economic rehabilitation agency." This "ageincy" distributes military and industrial goods, controls land and sea transport, and plans the reconstruction of damaged areas. North Korean commerce officials feared complete Chinese control of the Korean social and economic framework.
the Chisese Chinese Army transportation transportation corps controls the the railroads north of Chongjin in Chonajin in northeast northeast Korea and all rail traffic between between Sinuiju and Pyongyan! Pyongyan in in the the northwest. northwest. 8 8 Aug Aug 52) 52)
1
I
Comment: It is i a doubted ihat that the Chinese Chinese Communist Communist Comment: forces exercise such pervasive control over the North Korean little economy. economy. Most reports reveal that the Chinese have little or no overt responsibility for administration of North Korea, officials. prefgrring instead instead to to work work through through Korean Korean officials. preferring the other Other hand, Soviet supremacy in non-military On the Korean affairs affairs has has yet yet to to be be disproved. disproved.
-SECRET-tmeREr
5 5
. .
'
52 19 Aug 52
0. (2
I D
DATE: 23-Feb-2010 ATE: 23-Feb-2010 IDPPROVED
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-BLeeRrs-T-
reveal that the operation
reg:eattatIjOiloirg=eand administration of rai. lines in North Korean venture. The North Korean Railroad Recovery Bureau, some 26,000 men, is responsible for maintenance work in all Korea.
NR

-saeiter-km?iwF
6 6
19 Aug Aug 52 52 19
HR70-14
.!
FAR EAST
4. 4.
5. 5.

problems.:
Chinese and North North K Koreanjets C h i n e s e and o r e a n j e t s seen s e e n continuing c o n t i n u i n g to t o avoid avoid combat I The combat: The "usual " u s u a l pattern" p a t t e r n " of of both b o t h Chinese Ch ine s e Communist Communist and and 1/37-5Korean aerial NorthKorean a e r i a l operations o p e r a t i o n s over over Korea Korea during d u r i n g the the past past t h a t - this this three t h r e e months has h a s been been- to t o avoid a v o i d combat. combat. Evidence that will continue, c o n t i n u e , at a t least least for for t the h e immediate immediate f future, u t u E e , is found found enemy ground-to-air ground-to-air transmissions ordering in enemy transmissions o r d e r i n g non-Soviet non-Soviet flights f l i g h t s to t o avoid a v o i d combat. combat.
While the t h e North North Koreans Koreans did d i d not n o t become become aggressive aggressive during t h e period, p e r i o d , the t h e Chinese Chinese on on two two occasions occasions sought s o u g h t to to d u r i n g the engage UN aircraft. a i r c r a f t . The T h e first f i r s t took place over over a a four-day four-day period i n late l a t e June, J u n e , but b u t was was cut c u t short s h o r t by by the t h e Chinese Chinese GCI G C I p e r i o d in net's n e t ' s loss l o w of of power resulting r e s u l t i n g from Prom the'bombing the'bombing of of the t h e Yalu Yalu River R i v e r power power plants. p l a n t s . The The latest l a t e s t flurry f l u r r y of of activity, a c t i v i t y , from from 27 July J u l y to t o 8 August, has h a s decreased d e c r e a s e d markedly, in i n part p a r t due due to to excessive e x c e s s i v e enemy enemy aircraft a i r c r a f t losses. losses. (CANOE (CANOE 6920 Security S e c u r i t y Grp Grp Johnson AFB AFB Japan, J a p a n , SG SG 462, 462, 16 16 Aug Aug 52) 52) North North Korean Korean supply s u p p l y officers O f f i c e r s to t o confer c o n f e r on on current current e North g orean The Korean e principal p r i n c i p a l supply s p p p l y officer o f f i c e r of o the II. ebrps, w%h which is is iin immediate r reserve on the n immediate e s e r v e 0: t i e east e a s t coast, coast. on 14 14 August instructed i n s t r u c t e d his h i s subordinate s u b o r d i n a t e divisional d i v i s i o n a l supply supply. a f f i c e r s to t o report on a wide v a r i e t y of officers variety of non-combat non-combat activiactivities ties by by 16 1 6 August. August. Apparently these t h e s e reports r e p o r t s are are required required
#?%%:
3 3
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CI D
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for a meeting on logistics l o g i s t i c s "which "which is is to to be be held h e l d at at the the 330th Comm Recon Co Korea, Su.preme Headquarters." Headquarters.fv (CANOE 930th Supreme ALT-753, ALT-753, 17 17 Aug Aug 52) 52)
Comment: The nature of the t h e reports reports required by by the t h e II I1 CorpsSUFFTF Chief CorpsChief provide provide no no indication i n d i c a t i o n of of any any change in in enemybs present static the enemy's s t a t i c defense defense position. position.
NR
19 Aug 52
1 IV
A& M.
HR70-14 HR70-14
TOP SECRET CANCt

FAR EAST
6.
North Koxeans Ky!eans expect use use of of BW by by United United Nations: Nat-ions: On 17 August the Nor'th K Ibrean o r e a n m21st s t Brigade tfie'North Brigadenotified notaied a A battalion battalion commander of of a a Chinese Chinese Communist Communit intelligence commqnder intelligence report report that that on 13 August for experiment" experiment" August the the US US Army Army shipped shipped ."creatures "creatures for from a a Seoul Seoul suburb suburb to to Taegu. Taegu.
On the the same same day, day, the the Chinese Chinese report report continued, continued, another another American Army unit u n i t transported transported five f i v e tons tons of of "experimental "experimental material," probably dead rats, from Taegu to an unspecified air base. all units units should should be be on on base. The sender sender cautions cautions that that all the watch for for the the "anticipated" lsanticipated"enemy enemy use use of of bacteriological bacteriological warfare. (CANOE 15118M/2253 Korea; 330th 330th Comm Comm Recon Recon Co Korea, 15RsM/2253 Korea; Korea, warfare. (CANOE ALT-765, 17 ALT-765, 17 Aug A u 52) ~ 52)
Comment: Comment: On several several occasions occasions during during the the Korean Korean war, war, the Communist C m t device device of of passing passing this this type type of of intelligence intelligence to subordinate units has been a sufficient cue for return reports which are then used as "proof" of Communist propaganda charges.
21 Aug Aug 52 52 21
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believed nearly nearly operational operational again: again: Suiho power plant believed The Suiho Suiho hydroelectric hydroelectric power plant, damaged 57-UN-fiiEferby UN fighterin late late June, June, may be Producing DrOdUCinR power Dower at a t the the prebombers in bombers bombing level level by 23 23 August, August,I , I I '
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lthe principal the principal damage in the late late June raids raida was inflicted on the transformers and other surface equipment of the plant, while the generators, deep deep inside inside the the dam dam itself, itself, were were not not damaged. damaged. generators, 19 Aug 52) [ 119 Aug 52) Comment: The Suiho power syatem system was reportedly furnishing and Mani n g over o n ,200,000 0 0 0 kilowatts of of power to North Korea ,and churia prior prior to to the the late late June June air air raids. raids. 1 1 day6 reports that all power was out in that city for three days from after the the raids. raids. Radio Pyongyang, Pyongyang, deriving its power from off the air a i r for a considerable period, but by Suiho, was off 17 July the quality of of Radio Pyongyang transmissions had mqrkedly. improved markedly.
22 22 Aug Aug 52 52
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DATE: 23-Feb-2010 IDATE: 23-Feb-2010
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Coordination C o o r d i n a t i o n of o f Chinese C h i n e s e Communist air a i r warning w a r n i n g nets nets Chinese o b s e r v e d : Chi n e s e Communist early e a r l y warning w a r n i n g nets n e t s in i n ManManobserved: churia, c h u r i a , Korea and and China C h i n a are are now now using using a a common common reporting reporting procedure as well as as a a common cdmmon plotting p l o t t i n g grid, g r i d , according a c c o r d i n g to to an A ir F o r c e report. report. The air air w warning a r n i n g nets n e t s in i n Manchuria, Manchuria, Air Force Korea and'East.China and E a s ' t China were observed o b s e r v e d using u s i n g the t h e same same systems systems in early July in e arly J u l y and communications nets n e t s in i n the t h e Swatow and and Canton areas areas have have noW now adoptedthem. a d o p t e d t h e r n . (CANOE (CANOE AF Roundup Roundup 161, 161, 20 Aug Aug 52) 52)
Comment: The T h e use u s e of a a common common plotting p l o t t i n g system s y s t e m is is new new ir d e f e n s e techniques t e c h n i q u e s by by e v i d e n c e t h e improvement evideriC7-6r-the improvement of of a air defense the Chinese t he C h i n e s e Communist air a i r force. force.
apd Soviet S o v i e t air air defense defense t h e Chinese C h i n e s e Communist Communist and Although the s y s t e m s overlap o v e r l a p geographically, g e o g r a p h i c a l l y , there t h e r e is, i s , as as yet, y e t , no no systems evidence e v i d e n c e of their t h e i r integration. integration.
3. 3.
4. 4.

2 2
C h i n e s e Communist air a i r school s c h o o l now now using u s i n g MIG-15: MXG-15: One One Chinese MIG-1's MIG-16 as a s well w e l l as as one o n e YAK-17 YAK -17 trainer t r a i n e r of the t h e Chinese Chi n e s e Communist Communist A i r School S c h o o l were scheduled s c h e d u l e d for for a a cross cross country c o u n t r y flight flight 3rd Air r e c e n t l y intercepted i n t e r c e p t e d message. on 17 17 A u g u s t , according a c c o r d i n g to t o a recently August, A i r Force F o r c e notes n o t e s that t h a t this t h i s is is the t h e first f i r s t time t i m e that that The US Air MIG-15 MIG-15 fighters f i g h t e r s have been b e e n used u s e d in c connection onnection w with ith t training raining a c t i v i t i e s at a t this t h i s school. school. P r e v i o u s l y only only Y A K - 1 7 ' s and and Previously YAK-17's activities MIG-9's MIG-S's were were observed o b s e r v e d there. t h e r e . (CANOE 1 6 1 , 20 20 (CANOE AF AF Roundup 161, Aug 52) 52)
Chinese Communist 3rd A Air Comment: The C h i n e s e Communist i r School S c h o o l is is It located at locatm h iChinhsien n h s i e n in i n southern s o u t h e r n Manchuria, Manchuria, I t is known to to have h a v e four f o u r battalions b a t t a l i o n s equipped e q u i p p e d with w i t h trainers t r a i n e r s as as well w e l l as as c o n v e n t i o n a l and and jet j e t fighters. fighters. conventional
" Allied" f l i g h t activity a c t i v i t y indicates i n d i c a t e s MXG-15 strength "Allied" flight MIG-15 strength a t Mukden: Mukden: A Activity c t i v i t y at a t Yukden Mukden airfield a i r f i e l d in in i n c r e a s e s at increases Manchutia on 18 and a n d 19 19 August indicates i n d i c a t e s that t h a t there t h e r e may Manchuria o n 18 have een a r e c e n t increase i n c r e a a e in i n "allied" " a l l i e d " MIG-15 fighte; have b been recent MIG-15 fighter s t r e n g t h there. t h e r e . Two separate s e p a r a t e flights,each f l i g h t s , e a c h of of 30 30MIG-15's., MIG-l5's, strength were scheduled s c h e d u l e d for f o r patrol p a t r o l duty d u t y to t o Korea during d u r i n g daylight daylight 18 AugUst. August. Three T h r e e additional a d d i t i o n a l flights f l i g h t s involving i n v o l v i n g at a t least least on 18 37 M MIG-15's I G - 1 5 ' s were scheduled s c h e d u l e d for night n i g h t flying f l y i n g on o n the t h e same same day. day.
22 Aug 52 52
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FOR RELEASE RELEASE APPROVED FOR DATE: 18-Mar-2010 DATE: 18-Mar-2010
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Air The US A i r Force estimates that t h a t these-flights t h e s e f l i g h t s indicate indicate t h a t there t h e r e are that are a a minimum minimum of of 60 60 ."allied" " a l l i e d " MIG-15's MIG-15's c currently urrently based at a t Mukden, 37 more more than than were there t h e r e on on 1 1 August. August. (CANOE AF 161, 20 20 Aug Aug 52) 52) (CANOE AF Roundup 161,
Comment: h i s activity a c t i v i t y at Mukden Mukden does d o e s not n o t necessarily necessarily Comment: T This refle-ncrease in Soviet-manned Soviet-manned fighter f i g h t e r strength s t r e n g t h in in reflect an:increase in Manchuria. I t is p resently e s t i m a t e d that t h a t there t h e r e are 320 It presently estiMated Soviet-manned e t fighters f i g h t e r s in t he s o u t h Manchurian irfield Soviet-manned j jet the south Manchurian a airfield complex.
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North Korean air a i r trainee t r a i n e e moves from c Conve4tional o n v e 6 t i o n a l to c c o r d i n g to t o APSA,, in in the t h e last l a s t wiesk w6ok of uly a According of J JurV A t ,Awho previous;;':lew flew a a conventional c o n v e n t i o n a l fighter fighter Xorean pilot, who previously at Fengcheng, was noted messages r relating jet a t Fengcheag, n o t e d in i n messages e l a t i n g to to j e t traintraini n g . (CANOE (CANOE CC/CAP-205, Korea, 21 2 1 Aug Aug 52) 52) ing. CC/CAP-205,Korea,
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Comment: This is the t h e first f i r s t evidence e v i d e n c e of of a a Korean Korean pilot pilot ComMent: t o jet j e t aircraft aircraft in i n the t h e KoreaKoreat r a n s f e r r i n g f r o m c o n v e n t i o n a l to transniTriffromconventional Manchuria area. area. P r e v i o u s l y it i t was w a s belipved b e l i e v e d that t h a t Koreah Korean jet jet Previously t r a i n i n g ttook o o k place i n the t h e Soviei S o v i e t Union. Union. .training place in
9. 9.
Unide,nt#.fied Unidentified Communist u unit nit o ordered r d e r e d to t o attack a t t a c k UN recent a $ r f i a d s iin n Korea: e c e n t message message in in Chinese Chinbse plain plain airfields Urea: A r Ilanguage a q g u a g e on on an a n unidentified u n f d e n t i f i e d net n e t stated: stated: "Request "Request your 132nd 132nd b r a n c h unit u n i t (to) branch ( t o ) attack a t t a c k Han-River Han..River airfield a i r f i e l d and and Suwon." Suwon." (CANOE (CANOE 501st Comm Recon Crp Grp Korea, Korea,L1---7T200, L ~ ~ T 2 0 17 17 0 , Aug 52) 52)
mearing Comment: The m e a r i n g of of this t h i s cryptic c r y p t i c message is is unclear. The llikeliestpossibility North uncle--The i k e l i e s t p o s s i b i l i t y is i s that that a P o r t h Korean air a n u unit n i t located in in w western e s t e r n Korea a attempted ttempted t to o u use se t the he C Chinese hinese language t o secure s e c u r e this t h i s transmission. t r a n s m i s s i o n . If If t that h a t is i s the t h e case, case, l a n g u a g e to probably p r o b a b l y the t h e message portends p o r t e n d s another a n o t h e r attemptpd a t t e m p t p d night night h a r a s s i n g sortie harassing s o r t i e by b y an a n obsolescent obsolescent N North o r t h Korean t training r a i n i n g airaircraft c r a f t against a g a i n s t UN airfields a i r f i e l d s in i n the t h e forward f o r w a r 4 area. area.
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Hydroelectric H y d r o e l e c t r i c plant p l a n t in i n northeastern n o r t h e a s t e r n Korea operational: operational: On 19 NorthIorean 1 9 August August the the N o r t h Ko r e a n 21st 2 1 s t Antiaircraft A n t i a i r c r a f t Artillery Artmery Regiment, stationed Regiment, s t a t i o n e d north n o r t h of Hungnam Hungnam in i n northeastern n o r t h e a s t e r n Korea, Korea, subordinate unit to to regimental headordered a s ubordinate u nit t o come t o r e g i m e n t a l headquarters to charge batteries "if you c cannot o c harge b atteries " i f you a n n o t recharge. recharge. . q uarters t .Kong a t the. the. .Kong power plant." plant." at
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unit replied later in The unidentified u n i d e n t i f i e d antiaircraft antiaircraft u nit r eplied l ater i n the t h e day that t h a t "since " s i n c e it i t is is said s a i d that t h a t we w e will w i l l be be able able to to r e c h a r g e after a f t e r two'days two d a y s a t the. the. .Kong lant," recharge at .Kong power p plant," the will disrupt communications by by coming i l l not not d i s r u p t its communications t h e unit unit w ALT-810, totheregimcnt.(CANOE 3 0 t h Comm to the regiMent.(CANOE 3330th Comm Recon Recon Co Co Korea, ALT-810, 20 Aug Aug 52) 52)
.
11. 11.
Communist Communist tactical t a c t i c a l units u n i t s still s t i l l expect e x p e c t UN UN action a c t i o n in i n Korea: Korea: a c continuing Two recent r e c e n t gorthitoreadthessages N o r t h Korean'bes'sages iindicate ndicate a ontinuing Communist fear that offensive t h a t the t h e UN will w i l l attempt a t t e m p t to t o renew o ffensive action a c t i o n in i n the t h e near n e a r future. future.
'
a 19 19 August August mestiage mesiage from Corps One, a from a a North North Korean V Corps coastal c o a s t a l security s e c u r i t y element element on on the t h e east east coast, c o a s t , stated s t a t e d that that "since l l s i n c e it i t is is foreseen f o r e s e e n that t h a t the t h e enemy enemy wili w i l l plan p l a n to t o take take advantage a d v a n t a g e of the t h e rainy r a i n y season, s e a s o n , you you will'make w i l l make (complete (complete preparations?)." A n o t h e r , dated 20 August from a a combat preparations?)." Another, brigade western Korea, p passed b r i g a d e on coastal security s e c u r i t y in in w e s t e r n Korea, a s s e d inforinformation unit predicting "that the will a .Chinese Chinese u nit p rediating " that t h e enemies w ill m a t i o n from from a land l a n d on the t h e Shore S h o r e and and attack p t t a c k (us) (us] suddenly." suddenly." ,(CANOE (CANOE 3 330th 30th Korea, ALT-811, ALT-811, 20 Aug; Comm Recon Co Korea, Aug; 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, 8K-1f-494, SK-M-494, 21 2 1 Aug Aug 52) 52)
Comment: C mment: The general-impression g e n e r a l i m p r e s s i o n gathered g a t h e r e d from from enemy enemy POW's and rom intercepted i n t e r c e p t e d enemy enemy messages suggests s u g g e s t s that that POW'S% an from I + continuous state of agitation enemy tactical t a c t i c a l units u n i t s are in in a c ontinuous s t a t e of agitation concerning UN intentions. intentions. c o n c e r n i n g UN
12. 12.
noted; n o t e d : An additional a d d i t i o n a l seven.mobile s e v e n ' m o b i l e spotter s p o t t e r units u n i t s in i n the the G s e Communist early-warning e a r l y - w a r n i n g air a%r d e f e n s e network Chinese defense network have have been noted 11 August August callsign c a l l s i g n change. change. The The n o t e d following f'ollowing an a n 11

5 5
Comment': Comment: The present p r e s e n t location l o c a t i o n of of the t h e 21st 2 1 s t Antiaircraft Antiaircraft Regimia-Wigests that the Regiment suggests tha-c t h emessages messages refer r e f e r to t o aa plant p l a n t in i n the the Changjin C h a n g j i n (Chosen) (Chosen) system. system. y b n 28 uly ion 28 J July confirmed was operating. operating. c o n f i r m e d that t b a t plant p l a n t number number one one was
C h i n e s e early-warning e a r l y - w a r n i n g facilities f a c i l i t i e s in i n Korea Expansion of Chinese
Chinese mobile e early-warning spotter C h i n e s e Communists now have 15 15 mobile arly-warning s potter units u n i t s active a c t i v e in i n Korea. Korea.
25 Aug 52 52
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According to Air Force A ccording t o a US A ir F o r c e field f i e l d analysis, a n a l y s i s , this t h i s inincrease i in spotter units crease n s potter u n i t s was necessitated n e c e s s i t a t e d by the t h e recent recent southward early-warning expansion of of the t h e .Chinese Chinese e a r l y - w a r n i n g and GCI s o u t h w a r d expansion coverage c o v e r a g e from Chinnampo to t o the t h e SariwOn Sariwon and and Sinchon S i n c h o n area. area. 52) (CANOE e c u r i t y Grp Johnson AFB J a p a n , AP 575, 5 7 5 , 20 Aug 52) (CANOE 6920 6920 S Security Japan,
13.
Chinese Korea s still conducting san C h i n e s e regiment r e g i m e n t in_ in. Korea till c onducting s a n fan fan Officers Communist a artillery c6rs fiv.om fi-'om a a Chinese n e s e Communist rtillery east-centra?h:ront o a ttend regiment on the east-central front in Korea Korea were were t to attend a san Ban f fan meettagfrom a a n meeting from 19 A ugust, a c c o r d i n g to t o an a n 18 18 August, according August message. message. '(CANOE August (CANOE L M T -T-141 1 4 1 Tokyo, 19 19 Aug Aug 52) 52)
campaiel:,
on%^

6 6
Comment: T h e r e has h a s been little p ublicized a c t i v i t y in in There been,little publicized activity t h e siriari-compaign s m c o m p a i g n either e i t h e r in i n China C h i n a or o r Korea Korea since s i n c e A?ril. Ajril. the This campaign campaign against a g a i n s t "corrupiion, " c o r r u p t i o n , waste waste and and bureaucratic bureaucratic d e v i a t i o n " by b y communist Communist officials was begun in i n late l a t e 1951 1951 deviation" and reached r e a c h e d iis i t a peak peak in i n January J a n u a r y or or February. February. I n Korea ach In Korea e each a s s i g n e d a quota of a j o r and C h i n e s e "Volunteer" l l v o l u n t e e r l v unit u n i t was asSigned ChineSe of m major i t was.to was t o uncover. uncover. minor offenders o f f e n d e r s it
25 Aug Aug 52 52
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T&P SECRET CANOE

FAR EAST
3. 3.
Chinese C h i n e s e in In Korea continue c o n t i n u e atomic atomic warfare w a r f a r e defense d e f e n s e training: training: August an Chinese Communist a antiair6raft On 22 August a n unidentified QlliSe'ntified C h in e a e Communist ntiaircraft u n i t notified n o t i f i e d a subordinate: s u b o r d i n a t e : "You he p ersonnel unit "You must must select select t the personnel to t o attend a t t e n d the t h e training t r a i n i n g at a t the t h e division. division. ..(on). (on). .knowledge ainst bomb." (CANOE (CANOE 501st 501st Comm Recon Grp of defen defen a i n s t atomic bomb." Grp Korea, P 200, 23 Korea, Pre-> 200, 33 Aug.52) Aug, 52)
.
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4 . 4.
5. 5.
Previous references atomic weapons weapons d defense Comment: P revious r e f e r e n c e s to atomic efense have appeared a p p e a r e d in i n Chinese C h i n e s e messages messages in i n 1952. 1952. I t is b elieved It believed that this is carried c a r r i e d on principally p r i n c i p a l l y for f o r its its that t h i s training t r a i n i n g is propaganda value reflect v a l u e and that t h a t it i t does not n o t necessarily necessarily r eflect Communist expectations e x p e c t a t i o n s of of UN UN use u s e of of atomic atomic weapons weapons in i n Korea. Korea. North Korean intercept of UN UN message l leads village Worth i n t e r c e p t of e a d s to v illage evacuation: e v a c u a t i o n : A 23 August u g u s t message measage from from the t h e North N o r t h Korean Korean 21st fit brigade to to a a subordinate s u b o r d i n a t e battalion b a t t a l i o n stated: stated: "According t o the the Brigade "According to 350 North North Korean spy's radio radio report r e p o r t to to their t h e i r superiors', s u p e r i o r s ' , 350 enemy spy's troops. .are at. troops. at. .on t h e US map. Therefore T h e r e f o r e they t h e y requested requested .on the that t h a t this t h i s place p l a c e be bombed." bombed.'' The message ordered all a l l battalions battalion8 f i e l d and t o s tay and detachments to stay d e t a c h m e n t s to t o take t a k e supplies s u p p i e s to t o the t h e field away from ANOE 5 0 1 s t Comm Recon Grp Korea, Korea, (CANOE 501st Recon.Grp from civilian c i v i l i a n areas. areas. ( SK-M-562, SK-M-562, 24 24 Aug; Aug; 6920 6920 Security S e c u r i t y Grp Grp Johnson Johnson AFB AFB Japan, J a p a n , AP-643, AP-643, 24 Aug Aug 52) 32)
Comment: Comment: This T h i s is is the t h e third t h i r d recent r e c e n t incident i n c i d e n t in i n western western Korea-WEiFi-enemy messages have indicated Korea-enemy i n d i c a t e d a Communist communicommunications c a t i o n s intelligence i n t e l l i g e n c e effort. effort.
Chinese C h i n e s e Communist unit u n i t obtains o b t a i n s substantial s u b s t a n t i a l amount amount of of North The,Chinese 402nd Antitank N o r t h Mrean Rdrean money: money: T h e , C h i n e s e Communist 402 nd A ntitank Regiment informed its headquarters, h e a d q u a r t e r s , the t h e 7th 7 t h Artillery A r t i l l e r y Division, Division, informed its on 21 2 1 August Augbst that t h a t it it had dispatched d i s p a t c h e d a truck t r u c k to t o the t h e division d i v i s i o n rear to yuanin to pick p i c k up up "300,000 "300,000y u a n i n Korean Korean money." money.'I The The originator originator then s s t a t e s that t h a t the t h e vehicle v e h i c l e "up '(up to t o this t h i s time. time. B not not t h e n states arrived." T186, 22 (OANOE 501st.Comm S O l s t Comm Recon Grp G r p Korea, L L r 7 22 a r r i v e d . " (CANOE Aug Aug 52) 52)
,I
Comment: probable Comment: It I t is p r o b a b l e that t h a t the t h e Chinese C h i n e s e Communists intend Ilse amount of of N North Korean money i n t e fo n m e t this h i s ssubstantial u b s t a n t i a l amount o r t h Korean t o pay pay for f o r indigenous i n d i g e n o u s labor labor costs, c o s t a , food food procurement and other to procurement and other expenses. i s o l a t e d incidents, i n c i d e n t s , the t h e Chinese Chinese e x p e n s e s . Previously, P r e v i o u s l y , in i n isolated have North ill will w i l l by taking t a k i n g food from the the N o r t h Korean h a v e created c r e a t e d ill civilians it would would be be returned r e t u r n e d later. later. c i v i l i a n s and and stating s t a t i n g that t h a t it
3 3
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HR70-14 HR70-1 4
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5. 5 .
N o r t h Korean a ir u n i t engages n p o s s i b l e night-bombinb North air unit engages i in possible night-bombing On two occasions o c c a s i o n 8 between 16 16 June June and and 15 15 July, JU l Y # groups of of N North Korean-piloted aircraft were o observed gr'oupe orth K orean-piloted a i r c r a f t were b s e r v e d in in night group p o s s i b l y bombing, bombing, exercises. e x e r c i s e s . The first first g roup n i g h t training, t r a i p i n g , possibly on July the second on 1 10 July u l y numbered 7 aircraft a i r c r a f t and t h e second 0 J uly o n 9 J numbered 25 25 planes. planes. numbererd
exercise:
I It t is probable that t h a t the t h e aircraft a i r c r a f t used in i n these t h e s e exercises exercises conventional at Sinuiju, since are c o n v e n t i p n a l YAK-18 YAK-18 trainers t r a i n e r s based a t S inuiju, s i n c e the the Chinese C h i n e s e navigational n a v i g a t i o n a l net n e t reported these these aircratt aircrattt active a c t i v e on t the h e nights n i g h t s when the t h e training t r a i n i n g missions m i s s i o n s were were flown. flown. (CANOE 263, 6920 Security S e c u r i t y Grp Grp Johnson Johnson AFB AFB Japan,'AP1 Japan,'APl2 6 3 , 25 25 Aug Aug 52) 52)
6. 6.
Maneuvers held h e l d by by North N o r t h Korean Korean east east coast coast defense d e f e n s e units: units: A 20 August message on o n a net n e t associated w i t h the t h e North Korean with 7th Division 7 th D i v i s i o n in i n the t h e Wonsan area area states s t a t e s that that "since "since there will w i l l be be a a coordinated c o o r d i n a t e d command command reconnaissance r e c o n n a i s s a n c e of number number A and B stations s t a t i o n s from from 21 2 1 to t o 23 23 August make the t h e coordination coordination p r e p a r a t i o n s and and arrive a r r i v e at a t Changim-ni Changim-ni by by 20 20 August." August." The The preparations " d i v i s i o n ckief ch$ef of of staff" s t a f f " is is mentioned. mentioned. (CANOE (CANOE 3 3 0 t h Comm "division 330th Recon Co C o Korea, ALT-839, ALT-839, 21 2 1 Aug Aug 52) 52)

...
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Comment: The North N o r t h Korean Air A i r Force possesses no conveconventional bombers. bombers. In I n the the p a s t , however, o b s o l e s c e n t P0-2 PO-2 past, however, obsolescent biplanes b i p l a n e s have h a v e been been referred referred to t o as as "bombers" "bombers" during d u r i n g night night harassing h a r a s s i n g sorties sorties over o v e r the t h e UN UN lines. l i n e s . It I t is possible p o s s i b l e that that these t h e s e YAK-18's Y A K - 1 8 ' s will w i l l be be used used in in a a similar s i m i l a r role. role.
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Comment: N o r t h Korean 7th 7 t h Division, D i v i s i o n , along along w i t h other other The North with VII V I 1 Corps units, u n i t s , completed a coastal defense d e f e n s e maneuver in i n the the Wonsan Wonsao area area less less than t h a n two two months months ago. ago. The current c u r r e n t training training exercise lends lends doubt d o u b t to t o the t h e thesis thesis that t h a t the the N North o r t h Korean VII VI1 Corps C o r p s is is to t o relieve r e l i e v e one o n e of of the t h e combat corps at a t the t h e front f r o n t in in the t h e near n e a r future. future.
7. 7.
Chinese C h i n e s e aircraft a i r c r a f t over o v e r Korea Korea use use "combat "combat callsigns": callsigns": Analysis Chi n e s e Communist Communist air a i r communications on o n the t h e combat A n a l y s i s of o f Chinese OCT Air Force field unit GCI net n e t in i n Korea and elsewhere e l s e w h e r e by a US A ir F orce f ield u nit r e v e a l s that t h a t there there are two categories c a t e g o r i e s of callsigns c a l l s i g n s used u s e d by reveals pilots t h e Chinese C h i n e s e Communist Communist Air A i r Force. Force. p i l o t s in i n the
h e a r d in i n combat v e r Korea n tthe he G C I n e t or When heard combat o over Korea o on GCI net or on patrols p a t r o l s in i n the t h e Korea-Manchuria Korea-Manchuria area, area, Chinese C h i n e s e pilots p i l o t s are apparently a p p a r e n t l y assigned assigned c callsigns a l l s i g n s falling falling w within i t h i n a so-called so-called
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Pilots elsewhere "combat bloc:" bloc." P ilots e l s e w h e r e in i n China use u s e different. different, callsigns, duplicate those f found in the c a l l s i g n s , which in i n some cases d u p l i c a t e those ound i n t he (CANOE 6920 S Security "combat bloc." bloc." (CANOE e c u r i t y Grp Johnson Johnson AFB AFB Japan, Japan, AP 603, 603, 22 22 Aug Aug 52) 52)
pilots the air h e Korean a i r war are Comment: Soviet Soviet p i l o t s engaged engaged in t assigTerTIT1signs a s s i g n l a i g n s on on aa similar similar arbitrary a r b i t r a r y pattern p a t t e r n and and Soviet Soviet callsigns have duplicated by t those heard c a l l s i g n s heard in i n Korea h a v e been d u p l i c a t e d by hose h eard in t a c t i c a l units u n i t s in i n the t h e Soviet S o v i e t Union. Union. i n tactical
probably While p r o b a b l y designed d e s i g n e d to t o facilitate f a c i l i t a t e combat combat operations, operations, the of Chinese "combat" c callsign t h e establishment establishment o f an a n arbitrary arbitrary C h i n e s e "combat" allsign bloc pilots heard o over Korea are u under s u g g e s t s that that p i l o t s ljeprd v e r Korea nder a b l o c also suggests different elsewhere China. d i f f e r e n i t command cotumand structure s t r u c t u r e than t h a n pilots e l s e w h e r e in in C hina. Chinese over a i r units u n i t s in combat o v e r Korea are identified i d e n t i f i e d on o n the the C h i n e s e air C h i n e s e navigational n a v i g a t i o n a l net, n e t , not n o t on on the t h e combat combat air a i r defense d e f e n s e net. net. Chinese
Comment: T h i s message indicates i n d i c a t e s that t h a t the the p ervading This pervading f e a r in i n t the h e NNorth o r t h Korean military m i l i t a r y of another a n o t h e r successful s u c c e s s f u l UN fear amphibious am.phibious operation o p e r a t i o n extends e x t e n d s up up to to Supreme Supreme Headquarters. H e a d q u a r t e r s . Over 5 0 p e r c e n t of e ffective N o r t h Korean combat n i t s are p res50 percent effective North combat u units prese n t l y , assigned a s s i g n e d to t o direct d i r e c t or o r indirect i n d i r e c t coastal c o a s t a l security security ently, missions. missions.
8. 8 .
N o r t h Korean east coast c o a s t commander commander alerted in i n early e a r l y June June North for f o r UN UR landing: l a n d i n g : Pang Ho Ian, S a n , highly h i g h l y competent N o r t h Korean North commander and and chief c h i e f of of east east coast defenses, d e f e n s e s , instructed instructed V Corps commander 15 June J u n e to t o "increase "increase t he d efense h i s division d i v i s i o n commanders on o n 15 his the defense f r o m Supreme b s e r v a t # o n mission," m i s s i o n , " because b e c a u s e "a message from and o observa0.on 1st Cavalry C a v a l r y Division D i v i s i o n was H % a d q u a r t e r s l ' stated s t a t e d that t h a t the t h e US 1st Miadquarters" r receiving e c e i v i n g amphibious a m p h i b i o u s training t r a i n i n g in i n Hokkaido, Hokkaido, Japan. Ja,pan. (CANOE ASAPAC Japan J a p a n Spot S p o t 3824A, 38244, 22 22 Aug Aug 52) 52)
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North N o r t h Korean Korean east e a s t coast coast defense d e f e n s e communications communications system system set up in The principal Army communications i n early e a r l y August: August: Th e p r i n c i p a l US A rmy communicatibns intelligence unit Far East reported on ar E a s t Command r eported o n 14 intelligence u n i t in the F August that t h a t an an "East " E a s t Coast Coast Cooperative C o o p e r a t i v e net" n e t " was established established the t h e previous p r e v i o u s week. week. This T h i s communications net n e t consists c o n s i s t s of of four f o u r stations s t a t i o n s -- EaSt East Coast C o a s t Defense Headquarters, H e a d q u a r t e r s , and the the North N o r t h Korean Korean I, I, V V and and VII VI1 Corps. C o r p s . Defense Headquarters Headquarters still still reports to t o Navy Navy Headquarters H e a d q u a r t e r s in i n Pyongyang. Pyongyang.
f i e l d unit u n i t observes o b s e r v e s that t h a t the t h e establishment e s t a b l i s h m e n t of of such such The field a net n e t reveals r e v e a l s an a n attempt to t o achieve a c h i e v e command cpmmand coordination coordination t h e corps c w p s charged c h a r g e d with w i t h guarding g u a r d i n g the t h e extensive e x t e n s i v e coast among the Japan Bulletin l i n e . (CANOE J a p a n Special Intelligence Intelligence B u l l e t i n 564, 564, 19 19 Aug Aug 52) 52) line. 52 28 Aug 52
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-RIP-SECRET eANt1EComment: The inclusion i n c l u s i o n of I I Corps, C o r p s , which has h a s two d i v i s i o n s in i a combat combat with w i t h UN UN troops t r o o p s in i n the t h e eastern e a s t e r n sector, sector, divisions apparently a p p a r e n t l y reflects r e f l e c t s the t h e role r o l e of the the N North o r t h Korean 8 8th th D Diviivision, of Wonsan. Wonsan. s i o n , charged c h a r g e d with w i t h coastal c o a s t a l security s e c u r i t y south s o u t h of
of The establishment establishlneqt o f this t h i o command network is i s a further further indication preoccupation with vulnerable i n d i c a t i o n of the t h e enemy's p reoccupation w i t h his his v ulnerable coast line. line.
*
11. 11.
Political P o l i t i c a l activities a c t i v i t i e s preoccupy preoccupy North N o r t h Korean Korean military: military: D u r i n g the t h e past few few weeks intercepted i n t e r c e p t e d messages from from North During Korean tactical t a c t i c a l units u n i t s have have indicated i n d i c a t e d that that c onsiderable considerable a t t e n t i o n is b e i n g devoted d e v o t e d to t o internal i n t e r n a l political p o l i t i c a l activity. activity. attention being
Comment: While this this p olitical a c t i v i t y is in i n no way Comment: political activity unusuiTTITthay r e f l e c t an a n effort e f f o r t on o n the t h e part p a r t of of the t h e enemy u n u s u a l , i t may reflect t to o e%pand expand t the h e ,party party o organization r g a n i z a t i o n in i n military military u units nits a and, nd, a at t the t h e same time, t i m e , to t o tighten t i g h t e n party p a r t y discipline. discipline.
12. 12.
Maj.or North N o r t h Korean Korean unit u n i t has has "amphibious" llamphibiousf'unit: unit: I n a Major In 23 Augudt paesed by nit Augudt message passed by a major major North Korean u unit subordinate west Corps, a b battalion s u b o r d i n a t e to t o the the'w e s t coast security s e c u r i t y IV Cor,ps, attalion commander r e p o r t e d that t h a t Labor Labor P arty c e l l members were to to reported Party cell be elected company." b e e l e c t e d on 7 September in i n the t h e "amphibious "amphibious company." (CANOE 3 3 0 t h Comm Recon Recon Co Co Korea, K o r e a , r l T T275, 2 7 5 , 24 330th 24 Aug Aug 53) 5)
Comment: P r o b a b l y the t h e reporting r e p o r t i n g unit u n i t is the the N orth Comment: Probably North K o r e a 23rd m B r Brigade, i g a d a , which h as c arried o u t the the b u l k of Korean has carried out bulk of Communist amphibious operations o p e r a t i o n s against a g a i n s t UN-held UN-held islands i s l a n d s off western w e s t e r n Korea. yorea.
North N o r t h Korean brigade b r i g a d e secures s e c u r e s horses: horses: In I n a 20 August of Staff S t a f f of of the t h e North Korean 21st 21st t h e Chi e f of message, the.Chief Brigade in i n the t h e Ongjin-Yonan Ongjin-Yonan area area ordered ordered a a unit u n i t from from an an Brigade a r t i l l e r y battalion b a t t a l i o n to t o pick p i c k up up some some horses. horses. i n f a n t r y and an a n artillery infantry
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T y p i c a l of of these t h e s e is is a a message from from the t h e North N o r t h Korean Typical a r t y cell cell 2 1st B r i g a d e scheduling s c h e d u l i n g elections e l e c t i o n s of 21st Brigade of Labor P Party o f f i c i a l s in i n various v a r i o u s companies d u r i n g late l a t e August early officials during August and early a r t i l l e r y regiment r e g i m e n t on on the the September. In In a n antiaircraft a n t i a i r c r a f t artillery an east coast, coast, a a "general " g e n e r a l meeting m e e t i n g of of the t h e Democratic Youth L e a g u e ' s junior j u n i o r organization" o r g a n i z a t i o n " is scheduled scheduled f o r 29 August. League's for August. N e w members members are are to t o be b e inducted i n d u c t e d at a t many of these t h e s e meetings meetings New w i l l be be undertaken. u n d e r t a k e n . (CANOE (CANOE 330th 330th and "self-criticism" " s e l f - c r i t i c i s m v v will 3 0 t h Comm Recon Co Co Comm Recoil Recon Co Co Korea, Korea, ALT-032, ALT-032, 24 24 Aug; Aug; 3 330th Korea, K o r e a , l t ' TPr275, 2 7 5 , 24 Aug Aug 52) 52)
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The group numbered 28, 2 8 , and was to t o meet another a n o t h e r group group which had had picked p i c k e d up up horses h o r s e s at a t Kanggye. Kanggye. (CANOE 501st 501st SK-M-567, 24 Aug; Aug; 330th 3 3 0 t h Comm Recon Comm Recon Grp Korea, SK-M-567, Co Korea, Korea, ALT-914, ALT-914, 24 24 Aug; Aug; 15RSM/2369, 15RSM/2369, Korea, 22 22 Aug Aug 52) 52)
is negligible, negligible, Comment: Although the t h e number of of animals a n i m a l s is x i s t e n c e of acilities t h e s e messages indicate.the indicate the e these existence of remount remount f facilities in i n the t h e mountainous mountainous Kanggye Kanggye area area of of north n o r t h central c e n t r a l Korea. Korea.
14. 1 4.
15. 15.
Co ment: Several S e v e r a l air a i r transport t r a n s p o r t flights f l i g h t s have p receded preceded Copment: t h i s latest a t e s t flight f l i g h t from F iutung t o Yangtsun flights this Liutung to Yangtsun and these these flights i n d i c a t e that t h a t the t h e 16th 1 6 t h Air A i r Division D i v i s i o n is is being b e i n g transferred. transferred. may indicate S i n c e Yangtsun has h a s not n o t been d e s i g n a t e d as a f inal d estinaSince designated final destinat o Manchuria. Manchuria. The 16th 1 6 t h Air Air t i o n , the t h e division d i v i s i o n may be be moving moving to tion, D i v i s i o n is is the t h e only o n l y Chinese C h i n e s e Communist MIG-15 MIG-15 division d i v i s i o n which Division y e t been been stationed s t a t d o n e d in i n Manchuria. Manchuria. h a e n o t yet hasnot
Korea draw draw combat combat pay: pay: An C h i n e s e front-line f r o n t - l i n e troops t r o o p s in i n Korea Chinese t h e Chinese C h i n e s e Communist 20th 20th A rtillery u n i d e h t i f i e d element e l e m e n t of the unidentified Artillery h e a d q u a r t e r s to t o report report "on "on how Regiment requested r e q u e s t e d a rear headquarters ay gpes gses to t o each e a c h man." man." (CANOE 0 1 s t Comm much com (CANOE 5 501st Comm Recon Recon Grp Korea,,L Korea,, T223, T223, 24 24 Aug Aug 52) 52)
Comment: Extra E x t r a compensation in i n the t h e form of of s supplemental upplemental daily rat ons d a i l y m s for f o r wounded soldiers s o l d i e r s has h a s been a a recognized recognized i n Korea. Korea. T h i s is the the f i r s t message indicating enemy practice in This first Message indicating that t h a t front-line f r o n t - l i n e troops t r o o p s are are drawing drawing extra e x t r a pay. pay.
New N e w Chinese C h i n e s e air aSr division d i v i s i o n probably p r o b a b l y moving moving to t o Manchuria: Manchuria: t h i r d "batch" "b a t c h " ofrsix of s i x MIG-.15 MIG 15 jjet et a i r c r a f t of he C h in e s e A third aircraft of t the Chinese Communist 6th 8th A Air Division moved on on 26 26 August August from Liutung ir D i v i s i o n moved L i u t u n g on on t h e Shangtung P e n i n s u l a to Yangtsun, ear P e i p i n g , almost the Peninsula Yangtsun, n near Peiping, 300 miles m i l e s to t o the, t h e , north. h i s fflight l i g h t followed h e movement of of north. T This followed t the 19 o t h e r aircraft a i r c r a f t of h i s d i v i s i o n to t h e same a i r f i e l d on other of t this.division the airfield 25 2 5 August. August. (CANOE S e c u r i t y Grp Johnson Johnson AFB AFB Japan, Japan, (CANOE 6920 Security AP 713, 733, CHICUMSUM CHICUMSUM 1948, 1 9 4 8 , 26 26 Aug Aug 52) 52)
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a r t i l l e r y unit u n i t hampered by swollen swollen Chinese Communist artillery North torean Korean rivers: r i v e r s : A message passed between two two units u n i t s of of the C Chinese h i n e s e Communist 1st 1st Artillery A r t i l l e r y Division D i v i s i o n on on 25 25 August August s t a t e d that t h a t "if " i f the t h e river r i v e r does not n o t - subside, subside, w e w i l l be u nable stated we will unable to t o transport t r a q s p o r t ammunition ammunition for f o r half half a a month." month." T h e ,originator originator The he thought thought might be an alternate a l t e r n a t e route r o u t e which he mentioned an passable" even even though though it i t continues c o n t i n u e s to t o rain." rain." 501st (CANOE 501st 25 Comm Recon Grp Grp Korea, 14----T221, L{--'T221, 25 Aug Aug 52) 52)
ne
Comment: United Nations N a t i o n s visual v i s u a l air air r econnaissance reconnaissance t b a t the t h e current c u r r e n t rainy r a i n y season s e a s o n in i n Korea and the the h a s iiiarafid i n d i c a t e d that has concomitant flood flood conditions c o n d i t i o n s have caused aaused considerable c o n s i d e r a b l e damage to b bridges r i d g e s and road road nets n e t s in in Communist Communist territory. t e r r i t o r y . The enemy, however, is is believed b e l i e v e d to t o have have stockpiled s t o c k p i l e d sufficient s u f f i c i e n t rations rations and and ammunition in areas to t o last l a s t through through the t h e rainy r a i n y season. season. i n forward forward areas
13. 13.
Power shortage s h o r t a g e affects a f f e c t s communications communications in in Manchuria: Manchuria: A Chinese commUnIst shipping Manchurian'port CO~UnlSt s h i p p i n g message from the the M a n c h u r i a n - p o r t of of Yingkou to t o coastal c o a s t a l vessels v e s s e l s and shore stations s t a t i o n s stated s t a t e d that t h a t "this "this station s t a t i o n is subject s u b j e c t to t o recent r e c e n t frequent f r e q u e n t power power cut-offs, c u t - o f f s , at at irregular (CANOE CCS-497, Yingkou-All Yingkou-All coastal Ships i r r e g u l a r times." times." (CANOE CCS-497, Ships and Shore Shore Stations, S t a t i o n s , 13 13 Aug Aug 52) 52)
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Comment: The power shortage s h o r t a g e in Manchuria, Manchuria, which has been chronTE-TUF-several recent c h r o n m s e v e r a l years, years, was aggravated a g g r a v a t e d by the the r e c e n t UN bombing of of the t h e Yalu Yalu River R i v e r installations. i n s t a l l a t i o n s . A campaign to t o concons e r v e electricity serve e l e c t r i c i t y in i n the t h e area area is is now now under under way. way.
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North Korean brigade commander misinformed North m i s i n f o r m e d as a s to t o UN UN order order of baTTUT commander o f b a E The The commanderof ofthe t h e North N o r t h Korean K o r e a n gist 2 1 s t Brigade Brigade e s t e r n Korea. in w western Korea, in i n informing i n f o r m i n a his h i s battalion b a t t a l i o n commanders commanders on on August of 28 August of UN amphibious a m p h i b i o u s intentions, i n t e n t i o n s , stated s t a t e d that t h a t the t h e US US Marine 3rd M a r i n e Division D i v i s i o n had arrived a r r i v e d in i n Korea from from Japan J a p a n "to "to continued relieve r e l i e v e its i t s friendly f r i e n d l y forces." f o r c e q . . " He c o n t i n u e d that t h a t each battalion should "strengthen the services of c coastal watch b attalion s hould " strengthen t he s e r v i c e s of oastal w atch (CANOE 501st Grp Korea, SIC-gel-694, and (CANOE 501st Comm CommRecon Recon Grp Korea, SK-M-694, a n d guard." guard." 28 2 8 Aug Aug 52) 52) This is a further f u r t h e r example example of of the the h i s meSsage message is Comment: T NortnKOWiWs' of UN UN amphibious a m p h i b i o u s operations. operations. N o r t h m s 'overriding o v e r r i d i n gfear f e a rof The 3rd 3rd US U S Marine Division D i v i s i o n is is currently c u r r e n t l y under u n d e r activation a c t i v a t i o n in in the t h e United U n i t e d States. States.
3. 3.
4. 4.
Chinese C h i n e s e Communist and and Soviet S o v i e t air a i r warning war'ning systems s y s t e m s may may be integrated: i n t e g r a t e d : A radio station s t a t i o n heard h e a r d conticting c o n g a c t i n g the t h e Soviet Soviet air warning air w a r n i n g center c e n t e r at a t Vladivostok V l a d i v o s t o k on on 3 August had had earlier earlier in the day been i n t he d ay-b e e n noted n o t e d using u s i n g the t h e Chinese C h i n e s e Communist Comkunist grid grid s y s t e m . The station s t a t i o n had had a a Soviet S o v i e t call c a l l sign, s i g n , which suggests suggests system. a d irect t ie-in o f S o v i e t and h i n e s e Communist ir w arning direct tie-in of Soviet and C Chinese Communist a air warning efforts e f f o r t s in i n the t h e Far F a r East. E a s t . (CANOE S e p t 52) 52) (CANOE AF AF Roundup Roundup 169, 2 Sept
CommcInt: Commynt: The Soviet S o v i e t and Chinese C h i n e s e Communist uir fzir defense defense systems Korea, but but s y s t e m s overlap o v e r l a p geographically g e o g r a p h i c a l l y in i n Manchuria Manchuria and and Korea, this t h i s is is the t h e first f i r s t evidence e v i d e n c e that t h a t these these systems s y s t e m s are are also also integrated early August it estabi n t e g r a t e d operationally. o p e r a t i o n a l l y . In In e a r l y August i t was established l i s h e d that t h a t the t h e Chinese C h i n e s e Communists are using a a common common g r i d covering c o v e r i n g Manchuria, M a n c h u r l a , Korea, K o r e a , and a n d South S o u t h China. China. p l o t t i n g grid plotting
North unityractices N o r t h K..,rean Kbrean u n i t . p r a c t i c e s offensive o f f e n s i v e tactics: tactics: An unidentified North unit, possibly u n i d e n t i f i e d and unlocated unlocated N o r t h Korean u nit. D o s s i b l v an an artillery on a r t i l l e r y element e l e m e n t of o f a major tactical t a c t i c a l force, force,'o n 28 28 August August reported the t h e scheduling s c h e d u l i n g of of a training t r a i n i n g lecture l e c t u r e on the t h e timing timing for f o r assuming a s s u m i n g the t h e offensive o f f e n s i v e and a n d for f o r supporting s u g p o r t i n g artillery artillery movements. The The message also a l s o stated s t a t e d that t h a t lectures l e c t u r e s were were to to be held h e l d on on "battalion " b a t t a l i o n fire f i r e orders o r d e r s and. a n d . . .firing" . f i r i n g " because because "corps will w i l l inspect." i n s p e c t . " (CANOE 3 330th 3 0 t h Comm Recon Co Co Korea, Korea, ALT-049, ALT-049, 28 28 Aug AUg 52) 52)
Comment: Of Of no no immediate i m m e d i a t e significance, s i g n i f i c a n c e , such s u c h offenoffensive is normal normal in i n any any army. army. The message is is notenotes i v e training ' t r a i n i n g is as it i t demonstrates d e m o n s t r a t e s some d e v i a t i o n from f r o m the the w o r t h y insofar i n s o f a r as worthy deviation s.iTrong defense-mindedness d e f e n s e - m l n d e d n e s s of svrong of the t h e North N o r t h Korean Korean armed armed forces. forces.
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Chinese armored armored unit unit supports a division of the 38th h Chinese Army in in western western Korea: Korea: A series of messages, Army iddicates that an unidentified Chinese Chinese Communist iridicates Communist armored company company is is supporting supporting elements elements of the the Chinese Chinese Communist 38th in west central central Korea. Korea. .Communist 38th Army in The earliest earliest available available message, message, of The of 26 26 July, July, mentioned mentioned the 113th 113th Division Division of of the the 38th 38th Army in in concona regiment regiment of the "my company's company's tank tank area." area. More recently,on recently,on nection with "my 30 message carried carried on on this this net net again again mentioned mentioned 30 August, August, a message the the 113th 113th Division Division and stated stated that that "officers "officers from from a a NorthNorth.Training .Training Group Group coming to our company company to to west Military. Military. inspect the battle line practical experience t9 have practical experience of of inapect line and to capabilities." tank capabilities."
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That this Chinese Chinese tank tank company company has has seen seen limited limited combat combat is indicated indicated by a 26 August message message from from a a higher higher unit unit asking for an an ammunition ammunition expenditure expenditure report. report. The The possibility possibility of future action is is also also suggested suggested by a a reconnaissance reconnaissance future action report of report of 29 29 August August in in which which road road cpnditions conditions lead::A leadin into into 113th Division's Division's rear rear are are discussed. discussed. (CANOE (CIVIOE~~~~ll73B, the 113th 1739, 26 July; July; ASAPAC ASAPAC Japan Japan Spot Spot 3844A, 38446, 26 26 Aug; Aug: Spot Spot 3 3 29 and Spot 38552, 3855Z, 2 Sept; Sept; 501st 501st Comm Comm Recon Recon Grp Grp Korea, Korea, Au 30 Aug Aug 52) 52) T298,, 30
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4 Sept Sept 52 52 4
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North Korean Korean Government Government gives gives land land to to Chinese Chinese unit unit for for The 202nd regiMent, Chi Chinese lumbering pur poses : Th e 202 nd artillery artillery regiment, nese lumbeFIETWposes: Division, was was informed by by Communist 21st 21st Rocket Launcher Division, one of its one its subordinate subordinate units.on units.on 1 September that the "North Korean Government has handed over the timber (stands?) (stands?) and Korean places for for the the construction construction work." work." The then stated stated The message then soldiers would be sent sent to to reconnoiter reconnoiter the the timber timber that some soldiers areas, Ichon areas, located located in in the the west west central cen 1 : Ichon area. area. (CANOE 501st Comm Recon Grp Grp Korea, Korea, L L[-P344, 344, 1 1 Sept Sept 52) 52)
3. 3,

4
~
The Communists Communists probably will utilize the lumber for The building and repairing repairing defensive defensive bunkers, building bunkers, artillery positions positions of which which have have been been and transportation transportation facilities, facilities, many of damaged in in the the current current rainy rainy season. season.
Chinese Communist Communist units in Korea apparent apparently preparing Chinese for message passed on on the the net net of of a a dhinese for winter: w'inter: A message on 1 1 September September stated stated that that an a i 1 officer officer of of artillery division division on artillery the division division had had been been sent sent to to Antung, Antung, Manchuria Manchuria to to arrange arrange the of winter winter clothing. clothing. for transportation transportation of for
On the the previous previous day, day, another ahother Chinese Chinese unit unit indicated indicated On that its headquarters headquarters had sent out a report report on on the amount and of winter winter clothing clothing needed. needed. (CANOE weight weight of CANOE 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, Korea, L---7T398, lT398, 2 2 Sept Sept and and L A rT333, 1 Sept Sept 52) 52) T333, 1 Comment: are the the first first messages messages of of this this type type Comment: These are interceptedthis year. They offer further intercepted this year. Chineee further evidence evidence of Chinese preparations to remain remain in in Korea Korea through through a a third third winter. winter. preparations to
Comment: While Chinese Chinese units in Korea on occasions occasions have Comment: this message message expropriated land land from from the the North North Koreans, Koreans, this expropriated illustrates a a certain certain formality formality in in Chinese-North Chinese-North Korean Korean illustrates relations. relations.
2 2
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TOP SECRET CANOE APPROVED FOR RELEASE RELEASE ATE: 18-Mar-2010 DATE: 18-Mar-2010 IDPPROVED
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i n t e l l i g e n c e in i n Korea;j!orewarns UN bombing Communist intelligence Korea;forewarns of of.UN bn On 27 2m August a message message] lstated stated that t h a t a "large large UN naval n t v a l air a i r raid raid t ake piace,-apparently p l a c e , a p p a r e n t l y on on 28 28 August. August. The incomplete would taxe incomplete intercept_did not mention the the tar tarrts interce t did n o t mention e t s to t o be be attacked. attgcked. 27 Aug Aug 52) 52) (CANOE P I 1 0 11055, 55 (CANOE1
raid: ratd:
,I
h e ffirst irst i ntelligence n o t e d being being Comment: .This T h i s is is tthe intelligence noted passed the No p a s s on e m e Soviet S o v i e t early e a r l y warning net. net. N o major naval n a v a l air air strikes s t r i k e s took t o o k place'on p l a c e on 28 28 August. August. On 29 29 August, August, however, however, UN naval aircraft aircraft , participated p a r t i c i p a t e d in in t the h e major major a air ir a attack ttqck o on n Pyongyang and on 1 1 September c arrier-based a ircraft c arried carrier-based aircraft carried o u t an a n extensive e x t e n s i v e raid r a i d ia out i n northeastern n o r t h e a s t e r n Korea. Korea. i d e n t i f i e d Chinese C h i n e s e Communist air a i r ddvision d i v i s i o n equipped equipped Newly identified w i t h ground ground attack a t t a c k aircraft: with a i r c r a f t : At A t least least five f i v e "batches" % a t c h e s t of of R - 1 0 conventional c o n v e n t i o n a l ground attack IL-16 a t t a c k aircraft a i r c r a f t flew f l e w from from Hsuchow Hsuchow a i r c r a f t were to t o the t h e Peiping P e i p i n g area a r e a -on on 2 2 September. September. These aircraft o b s e r v e d to t o be part p a r t of of the t h e Chinese Chinese Communist Communist 22nd 22nd Air Air observed Division. (CANOE AF D ivision. (CANOE A F Roundup 172, 172, 5 5 Hept gept 52) 52)
The 22nd Division only recently has been 22nd Air Air D ivision o nly r ecently h as b een Comment: i d e n t m in n Chinese C h i n e s e Communist air identified a i r traffic t r a f f i c and and so so far f a r no no i n f o r m a t i o n as to t o its i t s internal i n t e r n a l organization o r g a n i z a t i o n has h a s been been availavailinformation first a b l e . This T h i s message provides p r o v i d e s the the f i r s t indication i n d i c a t i o n that t h a t the the able.
2
8 Sept S e p t 52 52
$1
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32nd i v i s i o n is is composed of of conventional c o n v e n t i o n a l ground ground attack attack 22nd D Division planes. p lanes.
5. 5 .
units: u nits:
Soviet GCI stations in Korea located with searchlight Air Force US A ir F o r c e analysis a n a l y s i s of ef messages messages]
I
i n n o r ' t h w e s t e r n Korea eveals t hat a t l e a s t nine in northwestern Korea r reveala that at least nine radarradarG C I stations s t a t i o n s are are associated with w i t h searchlight s e a r c h l i g h t units. units. equipped.GCI Three T h r e e major stations, s t a t i o n s , at a t Pyongyang, Pyongyang, Sinanju, S i n a n j u , and and Sonchou, Sonchon, each control c o n t r o l two e a r c h l i g h t uunits n i t s and i x lesser tations two ssearchlight and s six lesser s stations a l o n g the t h e coast from from Sinuiju S i n u i j u to t o Pyongyang control c o q t r o l one o n e unit unit along each. (CANOE AF Roundup Roundup 171, 171, 4 4 Sept Sept 52) 52)
6.
Comment: A Soviet S o v i e t early e a r l y warning w a r n i n g radar installation i n s t a l l a t i o n at at Huich-orth c e n t r a l Korea as b een n oted i n c onnection Huich.arlii-Worth central Korea h has been noted in connection w i t h two two Chinese C h i n e s e searchlight s e a r c h l i g h t companies and w i t h a radiowith with radiorange r a n g e station. station.
The largely l a r g e l y ineffective i n e f f e c t i v e Communist ight a ir i nterception Communist n night air interception e f f o r t in Korea has h a s appArently a p p a r e n t l y been been geared g e a r e d to t o the t h e use u s e of of effort radar-controlled r a d a r - c o n t r o l l e d searchlights. searchlights.
fronra Chinese r e g i m e n t . possibly P o s s i b l y the t h e 3rd 3 r d Engineers, E n g i n e e r s . and Mi-a Chinese regiment,
b e l i e v e d to t o be be located located near n e a r Tokchon Tokchon on o n the t h e Taedong T i e d o n g River River believed i in n n northwestern o r t h w e s t e r n Korea, reveals r e v e a l s a,strenuous a s t r e n u o u s supply s u p p l y and and reinfOrcing r e i n f o r c i n g effort e f f o r t in i n August. August.
h e Korean A d d i t i o n a l Chinese C h i n e s e artillery a r t i l l e r y !polling woving toward Additional toward tthe Korean front: a late f r o n t : A series of l a t e August August and and early e a r l y September September messages
of 4 September and 26 August r e v e a l that t h a t from Messages of reveal 1 1 to t o 25 August over o v e r 670 670 trucks, t r u c k s , 5,000 5 , 0 0 0 men, hundreds h u n d r e d s of of horses, horses, and and many tons t o n s of food f o o d and equipment had had been ferried ferried by the t h e unit u n i t across across the t h e river. river.
Of messages indicate Of greater interest, i n t e r e s t , however, however, the t h e messages indicate that a that a considerable c o n s i d e r a b l e amount amount of of artillery a r t i l l e r y had had been been moved moved across across the t h e river. r i v e r . Specifically S p e c i f i c a l l y mentioned are are four battalions of of S o v i e t 122mm 122mm gun-howitzers, gun-howitzers, a a battalion b a t t a l i o n of of heaVy heavy 120mm 120mm mortars, mortars, Soviet b a t t a l i o p of of 57mm 57mm anti-tank a n t i - t a n k guns, guns, and and a a battalion b a t t a l i o n of of a battalion antiaircraft a n t i a i r c r a f t artillery pieces and machine guns. (CANOE 501st 26 Aug; bug; T259, 26 .econ Grp Korea, T255, 26 Aug; L 1T259, T283, 28 Aug; LI 304, 29 Aug; J25, 31 Aug; T373, 1 SSept; Sept T373, 1 e p t ; L LLJT392, 4 Sept; IJJr393, 4 4 S e p t 52) 52)
Comment: The The Chinese C h i n e s e are a r e apparently a p p a r e n t l y augmenting their their alreaUTTEilderable a l r e a m i d e r a b l eartillery a r t i l l e r yforce f o r c e deployed d e p l o y e d at a t the t h e front. front, It I t is is possible p o s s i b l e that t h a t these t h e s e battalions b a t t a l i o n s represent r e p r e s e n t replacements replacements rather r a t h e r than t h a n reinforcements. reinforcements.
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7. 7 .
Communist alarm over Communist o v e r UN amphibious intentions i n t e n t i o n s reaches reaches new high: Although though the t h e enemy has h a s been constantly c o n s t a n t l y alert alert against any operations, ~ ~ n y A ~ attempted t t e m , p UN t eamphibious d o p e r a t i o n s , three three messages messages of late l a t e August August and and early e a r l y September September demonstrate demonstrate t he d e g r e e to t o which their t h e i r fear f e a r of such s u c h an a n operation o p e r a t i o n has has the degree grown.
The earliest e a r l i e s t one, o n e , of 24 24 August, August, is is from from the t h e North Korean 21st 21st B Brigade r i g a d e in i n the t h e west. west. This T h i s alert a l e r t of of coastal coastal d e f e n s e battalions b a t t a l i o n s cites c i t e s a menacing s t a t e m e n t allegedly allegedly defense statement made on 22 August h e "Commander he 9 t h US August by by t the "Commander of of t the 9th US Combined Combined Special F leetf1 r elative t o o perations w ith t h e US Cavalry Fleet" relative to operations with the US 1st lst,Cavalry Divis2--CLi., a n i intercepted n t e r c e p t e d order or " t h e enemy p e c i a l intelliintelliDivis.,,c,an order ffor "the enemy s special g e n c e uni:;" LUL :*I tto o c o l l e c t iinformation,"immediately" n f o r m a t i o n "immediately1' on on gence collect Communist i n a l l y , an p a r e n t interinterCommunist Troop troop deployment, deployment, and and f finally, ana p apwent cept of a US A i r Force message tated t hat t h e OngjinAir message which which s stated that the OngjinYonan area in i n the t h e west was was the t h e "strategic "strategic point p o i n t on on the the coast," On 3 September, the t h e situation s i t u a t i o n was believed b e l i e v e d Jo do 4 September, s e r ' d u s that t h a t the t h e brigade b r i g a d e chief c h i e f of of staff s t a f f ordered ordered aa bat.;alion batL;alion se:ecus t o " l a y the t h e anti-tank a n t i - t a n k mines. mines. .where enemy tanks tanks commander to."lay .where are expected" and to t o "prepare for f o r destroying d e s t r o y i n g the t h e roads r o a d s and and bridges." bridges." T h i s message message states s t a t e s that t h a t "the " t h e enemies enemies are. are. , This southeast s o u t h e a s t of Yonan," Yonan," presumably p r e s u m a b l y at a t sea. sea.
.
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I n the t h e east n e a r Wonsan, t h e North N o r t h Korean 7th 7 t h Division Division In near Wonsan, the r e c e i v e d "information l ' i n f o r m a t i o n from from the t h e Allied A l l i e d Headquarters. Headquarters. .on received .on ( t h a t ) the t h e enemy, enemy, having h a v i n g failed f a i l e d in i n the t h e plot p l o t to to 28 August, August, (that) bear down on us bear u s by the t h e Kaesong negotiations n e g o t i a t i o n s and and the t h e air air p r e s s u r e , has assembled assembled a a strength s t r e n g t h of of approximately a p p r o x i m a t e l y two two pressure, d divisions." ivisions." c o n t i n u e s that t h a t this t h i s force force may may The message continues make a a landing l a n d i n g near n e a r Wonsan and warns that t h a t "we "we s hould p repare make should prepare mbat, , perfectly p e r f e c t l y and and firmly." firmly." (CANOE ASAPAC Japan, Japan, T49, 24 24 Aug; 501st 5 0 1 s t Comm Comm Recon Recon Grp Grp Korea, Korea, SK-N-74, SK-N-74, T49, ept; SK-N-83, 4 4 Sept S e p t 52) 52)
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8 September 1952
US OFFICIALS ONLY
OCI No., 8869 Copy No. e_t;c

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GENERAL
1.
The Canadian Government does not consider that any useful purpose would be served by the introduction of the Korean question in the General Assembly. (S Ottawa 66, 4 Sept 52)
Comment: A number of other countries contributing to the UN operations in Kbrea have advanced similar proposals in recent weeks.
2.
Czech pension system to be reorganized along Soviet Czech Prime Minister Antonin Zapotocky complained re&wary that nine percent of the national income was being devoted to pensions and relief payments to the detriment of increased productivity. Warning that the state could not afford to pay pensions equal to wages, he indicated that the pension system would soon be "improved" by reorganization along Soviet lines. (S Prague Weeks. 34, 22 Aug 52)
lines:
Comment: Zapotocky has spearheaded the Czech Government's attack on the extensiveness of the pension system. Last November he warned that social benefits must be adjusted
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1
Canada offers proposals for settlement of Korean prisonerof-war question: The Canadian Government considers the time opportune to attempt to break the stalemate over prisoner-ofwar exchange in the Korean peace negotiations, and thus forestall any Soviet intent to introduce the issue at the forthcoming UN General Assembly. The Ambassador to the United States may be instructed to urge that specific proposals for an armistice be made.involving the immediate exchange of prisoners willing to be repatriated and leaving the question of those unwilling for future settlement.
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in accordance with the rise in labor productivity. In May he condemned widespread pension and relief abuses and urged the voluntary relinquishment of social benefits.
The government now appears to be planning a sharp reduction in the number of people receiving benefits, as was done in Hungary last March.

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FAR EAST
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North Korean Government concerned over civilian morale: n o n orma on the concentrated UN a r attacks on North Korea brought a North Korean request for a greater air defense commitment from the Chinese, in order to prevent a complete collapse of civilian morale. The Chinese refused, arguing that the UN's real target was Manchuria. They agreed, however, to a joint approach to the USSR for additional aircraft.
Accor
Comment: This is the first report on the effect of the intensified bombing on civilian morale. Enemy propaganda, by its vilification of the attacks, had previously indicated some degree of effectiveness.
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4.
Effects of intensified bombing weighed by FECOM: The UN's program of intensified bombing of North Korea, beginning with the raids against power plants in late June, has had a "substantial effect on the enemy," the Far East Command believes.
Reports from North Korea indicate that the loss of electric power caused considerable disruption of both military and civilian activities through early August. Civilian morale, already lowered by the long and costly war, has been subjected to additional strains by the mass bombing. Rigid Communist control techniques, however, have counterbalanced them. The military has not suffered any material lowering of morale. The enemy is still able to keep his front line units supplied despite destruction of some arms plants and supply areas. (S CINCFE Telecon 6121, 6 Sept 52)
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ne e a oscow con erence w request extens ve military and economic aid, including a long-term loan, and additional shipping. Some military items wanted by Peiping are equipment for more armored and airborne divisions, 500 jet planes, and 60 submarines. SECRET
3

Re orted Chinese aims in Moscow talks:
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Peiping will request restitution of the Port ArthurDairen area, but will be satisfied with nominal control. It desires return of the Changchun railroad, but will agree to joint Sino-Soviet operation for a stated number of years. The Chinese hope to obtain Moscow's agreement to a truce in Korea, to the timing of an invasion of Formosa, and to the loan of 50,000 tons of shipping as well as Soviet naval and air assistance for the invasion.
Comment:
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comments cover the entire spectrum of SinoSoviet relations except policy toward Southeast Asia. The composition of the Chinese delegation to Moscow indicates that the talks will be concerned primarily with economic matters.
6.
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Peiping allegedly seeks Soviet commitment to air defense: asserts that, as of 9 August, Peiping to its request for a statement of Soviet policy in the event of UN bombing of Manchuria.
Comment: formulated.
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It is improbable that a policy has not yet been
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The Soviet Ambassador and the Soviet Counsellor in Peiping, on separate occasions in late 1950, told that the Soviet Air Force would "takell1,111/111 111111,1t bombed Manchuria. No Soviet official has been known to make such an assertion since that time, and no reliable information as to Soviet policy in this matter has come to hand from any other source. Sino-Soviet talks allegedly precede "general offensive": alleges that the current Sinoboviet taits oscow were undertaken two months ahead of schedule and that the Chinese Communists are "planning a general offensive shortly after" the talks are concluded.
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The offensive will "probably" take place in Korea and Southeast AsiR and "may possibl " extend to "other areas."
Comment: Speculation of this type apparently derives from a pregriEga-Fonnection between the Sino-Soviet talks of early 1950 and the Korean Communist invasion of South Korea in June
1950.
25X1A
Just as the 1950 Sino-Soviet talks culminated in the conclusion of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Aid, so the current talks are expected to result, inter alia, in increased Soviet aid to China for long-range military and economic programs. The Chinese Communists have long been capable of mounting a new offensive in Korea and of invading any or all contiguous areas of Southeast Asia. Although Chinese capabilities will presumably be enhanced by the current Moscow talks, there is no reliable evidence of a Communist intention to break off the Korean talks or to invade Southeast Asia in the near
future.
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8.
Chinese workers sub ected to forced resettlement: A told the mer can onsu nera a e new o wor ers e ng forced to leave Shanghai to work in the coal mines of North China. He also knew of persons being forced to move from Shanghai to the outlying province of Sinkiang and of workers on water conservation projects who reported that they were working under virtually forced labor conditions.
In this connection, the Consul General has recalled Communist references to expanding acreage in northern Manchuria cultivated by persons from southern Manchuria and China proper. Peiping authorities, furthermore, have provided for the resettlement of unemployed persons in a recent directive. The Consul General believes that many Chinese are scheduled for forced resettlement. (C Hong Kong 537, Joint Weeka 35, 29 Aug 52)
Comment: Peiping has stated that its measures to reduce unempraTWIFF will "fit into the pattern of the forthComing large-scale national construction program." This program emphasizes the economic development of outlying areas, where

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there are now relatively few people. Unemployed persons in the cities are being given the alternatives of accepting "government-sponsored work" or of returning to their native villages.
9.
Comment: The Chinese, who have been paying premium pricei-Y6F-Ceylon rubber, have probably stopped buying in view of the early prospect that they will be able to barter rubber for rice rather than pay cash. These two shipments in September will raise to 17,700 tons the quantity of rubber shipped from Ceylon to China in 1952.
10
Peiping reaffirms confidence in Viet Minh victory: Radio Peiping, commen ng on seven ann versary of the proclamation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, quotes the Viet Minh Ambassador to Peiping as declaring that the Communist movement in Indochina will "have to go through arduous times" but, backed by the Soviet bloc, "will undoubtedly win final victory." Liu Shao-chi, vice chairman of both the Peiping regime and the Chinese Communist Party, is quoted as hailing the "friendly cooperation" of Communist China and the Viet Minh, and as expressing confidence e Viet Minh struggle will "end in (R FBIS 2 Sept 52)
Ili"victory."
STATSPEC'
Comment: Peiping's comment provides no clue as to whether the Chinese Communists envisage a prolonged stalemate in Indochina, plan to increase their aid to Ho Chi Minh, or anticipate a negotiated settlement of the Indochina conflict.

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Unexpected drop in Chinese orders for Ceylon rubber reported: Two Polish vessels, the Mickiewicz and the Kilinski, ETZ-Brai-to load at Colombo in September a total of only 2,900 tons of rubber for China. The American Embassy in Colombo reports that a lack of other Chinese orders for rubber has forced down the local market price and left several dealers with an estimated 2,000 to 3,000 tons of unsold rubber. The Embassy believes that the Chinese may have suspended purchases until after discussions with the Ceylon rice-purchasing mission, now due to leave for Peiping on 11 September. (C Colombo 98, 5 Sept 52)
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Current Communist propaganda, in connection with the forthcoming Pacific "peace" conference, calls for peaceful settlement of existing conflicts in Korea, Indochina and Malaya. There is as yet no convincing evidence that the Communists in Indochina or Malaya will follow the lead of the Korean Communists in seeking truce talks.
11.
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The disposition of these prisoners has not been deterThe commander on Chinmen has already registered an official objection to having any assigned to his command, fearing that the would create a disci.linar roblem.
mined.
Comment: Another report stated that the Nationalists executed over 200 Communist agents in early August. These are the first such raids conducted on Formosa this year, and they may have been occasioned by the reported arrest on 15 August of a lieutenant general and his brother for espionage.
12.
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Chinese Nationalist Overseas delegates may remain for meeting of National Assembly: The Chinese Nationalists hope that many of the overETarWeIegates to the Seventh National Congress of the Kuomintang scheduled for 10 October and the conference of Overseas Chinese immediately following will remain for the National Assembly meeting in January. The lack of a quorum has previously deterred the Nationalists from convoking a National Assembly meeting and no official announcement has been made; Chiang Kai-shek, however, does not appear to be concerned with this problem at this time.
states that Lntang intengs to ue tne aona ssemyoconsolidate his control over the government prior to the outbreak of World War III, which he expects in 1953.

SECRET
7
Chinese Nationalists apprehend 6,000 persons in August police raids: The 26 and 30 August police raids on Formosa have netted about 6,000 persons who are accused of vagrancy, desertion, or not possessing proper documentation. The purpose of the raids was to arrest vagrants and criminals who could be impressed into military service, to eliminate Formosan dissidents, and to apprehend Communists.
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Comment: The Seventh National Congress of the Kuomintang is expected to call for a meeting of the National Assembly, which would have power to institute impeachment proceedings against Vice President Li Tsung-jen.
13.
Macao obtains strategic goods from Portugal: The Hong Kong government has given the American Consul General a copy of the manifest of the Portuguese vessel India, which arrived in Macao from Lisbon on 24 August. As in past instances, thea cargo included several strategic items. Quantities of ball bearings, chemical products, auto parts, analine dyes, and steel wire in most cases obviously exceeded Macao's own requirements. (C Hong Kong 537, Joint Weeka 35, 29 Aug 52)
Comment: The authorities in Lisbon insist that the prospeTITTTnd security of Macao require the continuation of strategic shipments to China. The recent border incidents have stiffened the Portuguese in this attitude, since they fear that stopping the strategic trade might provoke further
clashes with the Chinese Communists.
14.
British may refuse Hong Kong visas to "peace" delegates: A British official in Tokyo has "indicated" that Britain has decided not to grant transit visas through Hong Kong to persons desiring to attend the Pacific "peace" conference in Peiping this month. (C Tokyo 812, 4 Sept 52)
Comment: About 500 persons from more than 30 countries have been invited to attend the "peace" conference. British refusal to permit transit through Hong Kong would discourage many of the delegates from attending, particularly those of Southeast Asian countries.
15.
Reports of Viet Minh hardships increase: Embassy in Saigon reports that recent accounts The American conditions in the Viet Minh zone dwell increasingly on the of deterioration of the enemy economy, the shortage of food, and the dissatisfaction of the people with the onerous taxation and police measures. The Embassy also notes lowered morale among
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SOUTHEAST ASIA
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military units, but warns against drawing too optimistic conclusions from these reports. (C Saigon 523, 5 Sept 52)
Comment: The bulk of evidence suggests that civilian morale in the Viet Minh zone is poor, but that this factor has been largely neutralized by the impossibility of organized opposition and by the widespread conviction among Vietnamese that in relation to the Bao Dai regime the Viet Minh is the lesser evil.
The morale of Viet Minh troops in general is fair and in some cases, notably those divisions which have been resting and regrouping since February, it is probably good to excellent.
16.
British suspect French proposal for tripartite statement on Southeast Asia: The American Consul General in Singapore reports that British officials there suspect that the French are preparing to propose an Anglo-American-French declaration of aims regarding Southeast Asia which will primarily disregard British problems. The Consul General believes the British' would resent American approval of the French statement as an indication that the United States is also unconcerned with British problems. (C Singapore 266, 4 Sept 52)
Comment: The French reportedly favor a tripartite pledge to help Southeast Asian nations "realize, maintain and defend their independence." They probably believe that it would be popular in Indochina. Such a statement would be embarrassing to British officials in Malaya as it would draw attention to the fact that Malaya is the only Southeast Asian country not nominally independent.
17.
Philippines may soon ratify Japanese peace treaty: A high official of the Japanese Foreign Office has confidentially informed the American Embassy in Tokyo that his government has tentative assurance that the Philippine Nacionalista Party will soon support ratification of the Japanese peace treaty. The official indicated that Japan would be willing to discuss reparations only within the terms of the treaty. (C Tokyo 779, 2 Sept 52)

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Comment: The opposition Nacionalista Party, which controls the Philippine Senate, has blocked ratification since President Quirino submitted the treaty in March. By insisting on larger reparations and expressing fear of a resurgent Japan, the Nacionalistas have hoped to gain popular support for the 1953 elections.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA

18.
Mullah Kashani reportedly ready to act against Mossadeq: Mullah Kashani notified Prime Minister Mossadeq before his departure for Mecca that he will take matters into his own hands if the government does not take measures "to re resent situation " Kashani expects Majlis support and will probably a so he Tudeh cooperation. The timing of the plan is not known but it is believed to call for action shortly after Kashani's return. Kashani wishes to become the next prime minister. His ultimate aim is to oust the Shah and become president of an Iranian republic.
Comment: An anti-Mossadeq group in the Majlis, composed of conservatives and followers of Kashani, sought American support in August. Kashani also apparently has the support of several street organizations which, combined with the Tudeh, could have a powerful effect. Kashani's acceptance of Tudeh cooperation is probable, since he has always maintained that he could easily control the Tudeh once he has used it.
25X1C
25X1C
25X1A
25X1X
19,
Iranian Cabinet reportedly imcom etent and anti-American:

that most of
Lie acicted that they
25X1C
the causpe,. memuers are anti-american.
probably would change their attitudes if United States policy were more favorable to Iran.
25X6
25X6
Only the Minister of Interior and the Minister of Health are reported as friendly to the United States. The rest of the cabinet is chararterized as opportunistic Moreover, the Minister o uca on e ng a e tist. Aug 52)
25X1A
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10
8 Sept 52
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Comment: Mossadeq's cabinet was hand.picked and has been characterized as a "rubber stamp" with incompetent members. When Foreign Min Hague he was described b e gen and man w o e a eep thoughts, certainly keeps them hidden."
20.
25X1C
25X1C
In view of the concern expressed by the American Embassy in London over the suddenness of this decision, the Foreign Office agreed to try to delay the instructions to its missions until the State Department could offer its views. (S London 1264, 4 Sept 52)
Comment: This decision relaxes the British position taken in September 1950 to halt all high-priority arms exports except to NATO and Commonwealth countries. The Middle East states are very eager to obtain jet equipment, and this policy change comes at a time when Britain is seeking a friendly Arab attitude toward its proposal for a Middle East Defense Organization.
21,
Comment: Maher's forced resignation will obviously change these plans, but there is no reason to believe that Nagib, despite his new duties as Prime Minister, will abandon them or lose interest in the Sudan. Nagib's few cautious statements on this issue do not clearly indicate what his position will be.
General Nagib may visit Sudan: The British Foreign Office reports that General Nagib and Prime Minister Ali Maher intend to visit the Sudan within the next month or two. The Foreign Office feels that in some ways such a visit would be advantageous but that the question of timing should receive careful consideration. (S London 1305, 5 Sept 52)

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Britain to permit jet aircraft exports to Middle East states: The British Foreign -Unice has decided to notify the governments of Iraq, Israel, Syria, and Lebanon that they can each purchase a maximum of 12 combat and 2 training jet aircraft. Deliveries will be phased over a period of several years. The French and Turkish Governments are being informed of this decision, which stems from increased efforts to expand the arms export program to help Britain's economic situation.
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The new constitution, bringing almost complete selfgovernment to the Sudan, will go into effect in November unless the two condominium powers agree on changes. Past British efforts to secure Egyptian cooperation on the Sudan have been rebuffed.
22.
French alarmed over implied American support of Tunisian nationalists: The Acting French Resident General in Tunis has expressed grave concern over an alleged statement by UN delegate Gross that the United States hopes the "consultations between France and the true representatives of the Tunisian people will result in an agreement prior to the UN General Assembly." The Resident General stated that the Neo-Destour Party will interpret the word "true" as full American backing for their thesis that Baccouche is not a Tunisian representative. (C Tunis 076, 4 Sept 52)
Comment: France may now request clarification of the alleged statement in the hope that an American reply might indicate more positive support for the French position.
In a UN information program on 1 September Ambassador Gross stated that the United States hoped Tunisian difficulties might be solved by "fair and friendly consultations between the French and the Tunisians -- by that I mean representative Tunisians."

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WESTERN EUROPE
see little ho e of blockin EDC: erman as that rs in mid-August Minis er ro ewo that little the then forthcoming Soviet note on Germany assumed He chance remained of preventing a European Defense Community. primarily as Soviet nete would serve allegedly stated that the Kremlin proof of Russian desires for German unity, and that the did not expect a four-power talk to result.
ortedl
25X1C
A1111
25X1C
In East Germany, the Soviet Union would respond to the American system of Western European alliances with a "completely closer new policy" featuring accelerated socialization and a and other organizations herecontrol over East German parties ed because of their West German connections.
25X1A
25X1A
reported, may Comment: Grotewohl's remarks, if accurately his subordinates that their well have been designed to reassure positions would be secure despite Soviet proposals for all-German This suggests that the East German parliament's elections. recent nomination of delegates to an all-German electoral commission is primarily intended to further the Soviet propaganda line rather than to lead to serious negotiations.
24.
West German Socialist forecasts ratification of treaties: Carlo Schmid, a leader of the opposition Social Democratic Party and chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee now considering the Bonn and Paris treaties, believes that final Bundestag action cannot be completed before early November, but that ratification Since he did not mention his party's case against is certain. the constitutionality of the treaties during his talk with ,American officials, he apparently assumes that Chancellor Adenauer will win on this issue as well.
21.
Neither the Bonn coalition parties nor the cabinet have yet seriously discussed the timetable for ratification. Adenauer and his party continue to favor speedy action, but the minor coalition parties, dissatisfied over the war criminal and Saar (C Bonn 974, 4 Sept 52) issues, are showing less eagerness. The French France considering new plan for Saar voting: Foreign Ministry is working out a plan for holdings referendumin
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Saar as soon as a French-German agreement on the broad lines of a settlement has been reached and other interested countries If the Saarlanders approve the proposed have been consulted. settlement, details will be worked out with the Saar Government.
No final decision on this plan will be made, however, before the 8 September meeting between Chancellor Adenauer and (S Paris 1397, 4 Sept 52) Foreign Minister Schuman.
Comment: Saar government leaders agreed on 3 September that elect ons must be held, under the Saar constitution, not later They recommended that a prior referendum be held than December. on the question of Europeanization.
2e.
Soviet blast against Austrian Government believed tied to treaty negotiations: American Embassy officials in Vienna report that available evidence indicates that the recent Soviet blast against the Austrian Government for alleged failure to carry out Allied democratization directives was concocted for use in future Austrian treaty negotiations. A high Soviet repre-sentative is reported to have informed an Austrian official that the Soviet statement was prepared some time ago and that no (C "positive results" were anticipated in the Allied Council. Vienna 656, 4 Sept 52)
Comment: The Soviet Union appears to have been more disturbed than heretofore believed by the introduction last March of the short treaty draft and subsequent Austrian moves Charges aimed at the demoto appeal to the United Nations. cratic character of the Austrian Government may lead to Soviet demands for prior Austrian guarantees not to enter "aggressive Western alliances."
27.
NAC considers political implications of military exercises: Referring to forthcoming NATO exercises in Germany, NAC Secretary General Ismay recently suggested advance discussion of future large-scale maneuvers which might be accompanied by political repercussions. The British, French, Norwegian and Danish representatives expressed full agreement, the latter two citing recent experiences in connection with this month's NATO
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Chancellor Adenauer is strongly opposed to a referendum before a French-German agreement has been reached. He hopes to get French agreement to a postponement, failing which he plans to raise the "human rights" issue in the forthcoming Council of Europe Assembly,
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naval exercise. The Standing Group is aware of the need for working nut a procedure for the future, according to its liaison officer. (S Paris POLTO 259, 4 Sept 52)
28.
France seeks three-power MEDO Standing Group: France wants a Middle East Defense Organization Standing Group composed of the United States, Britain, and France, as in NATO, according The French hold that their to preliminary Foreign Ministry views. agreement last year to support Turkey's NATO membership and to join in the first approach to Egypt on the so-called Middle East Command was based on a definite three-power understanding of this Standing Group concept.
Comment: The preliminary British MEDO draft makes no provisiori-3170-i Standing Group at this stage. The French, who have no forces to contribute at present, see the Standing Group concept as their only means of retaining any top-level control.
29.
Schuman Plan members oppose outside control: According to the American Embassy in Paris, the German vice-president of the coal-steel pool's High Authority believes that the governments and parliamentarians already favoring an independent Schuman Plan Assembly are more determined than ever to keep the Assembly free of outside control. Their determination has been stimulated by the administrative difficulties between Jean Monnet, president of the High Authority, and the secretary general of the Council (C Paris POLTO 252, 3 Sept 52) of Europe.
Comment: Monnet has taken vigorous action to ensure the His bickering with indepWRTEEW of the Schuman Plan Assembly. the secretary general of the Council of Europe over procedural matters, however, has aroused criticism which may be voiced at the forthcoming meeting of the coal-steel pool Assembly.
30.
Belgian Cabinet weakens: The resignation of Belgian Minister of Justice Pholien over the government's "leniency" toward two wartime collaborators has not mollified public opinion. The government has failed to explain that its policy remains unchanged, and the Socialist opposition has reaped an electioneering (C Brussels 245, 4 Sept 52) advantage by exploiting the question.
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The French oppose any approach to the Arab states until the establishment of MEDO is announced. The Foreign Ministry still (S Paris desires an early tripartite meeting in London on MEDO. 1394, 4 Sept 52)
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The present Social Christian'tabinet commandS only Comment: a SlirliiFTTamentary majority. Any cabinet overturn would result more'from domestic than from foreign policy issues', and the successor cabinet would probably also be dominated by the Social Christians.
31
During Principal anti-Franco organization disintegrating: Socialist Party its congress at Toulouse last month, the Spanish monarchists. voted to end the 1948 pact with the pro-Don Juan The resolution, which reportedly resulted from objections by party members in Spain to agreements that "compromise" their actions, places future cooperation with anti-Franco groups on a project-by-project basis.
According to the American Embassy in Madrid, this move may lead to a radical reorientation if not the complete dissolution of the clandestine monarchist-led Coordination Committee of the (S Madrid Joint Weeka 35, 29 Aug 52) Interior (CIC).
Comment: The CIC, which is based on the 1948 pact, has been Spain's most important non-Communist anti-Franco organization.
Monarchists were recently ordered by the Conde de los Andes, Don Juan's personal representative in Spain, to cease all clanThe Socialist resolution appears as a reaction destine activity. to this decision, and conforms to a similar step taken last year by Spanish Socialist exiles in Mexico.
LATIN AMERICA
32.
Chilean Congress will probably name Ibanez president next month: Since no candidate has obtained the necessary majority in the Chilean election, the naming of a president rests with Congress, which must choose between the top two candidates, Although the Ibanez forces have little Ibanez and Matte. strength in Congress, as against Matte's approximate 40 percent control, there are indications that Congress will respect Ibanez' 47 percent plurality and select him. The very recent "go easy on Ibanez" attitude on the part of the administration, in strong contrast with its previous desire to smear him as linked with Peron, lends credibility to a reported deal between Ibanez and the administration forces, which also control 40 percent of Congress.
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Should The Congress probably will not act until 24 October. expected. it not proclaim Ibanez president, a revolt can be (Factual data from: C Santiago 77, 5 Sept 52; La Prensa (NY), 5-7 Sept 52)
25X1C 33.
A Opposition to Batista regime in Cuba reported growing: reports that opposition to the Batista government has increased to where an armed revolutionary attempt He states that ever since the may be made in the near future. 10 March coup, rapidly increasing numbers of small groups have been organizing and preparing for revolt, and that efforts to unite them under the major opposition groups are well under way. It is believed that aggressive action will be taken when the opposition is properly organized.
Reportedly the leading forces in the movement are the Authentic Party group under Antonio Varona, the Orthodox Party group led by Emilio Ochoa, the pro-Prio (deposed president) group now in exile, and a group of army officers deprived of their 25X1A positions by the coup.
Comment: Reports concerning impending revolutionary attemptflia-TEst the Batista regime have been received periodically. Batista is One attempt is reportedly scheduled for 10 October. said to know of all such plans and has instructed the military to take extraordinary precautionary measures.
A counterrevolutionary effort, probably involving the assistance of Cuban exiles and other Caribbean revolutionary elements, is considered a definite possibility, particularly between now and the promised November 1953 presidential elections.

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c
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NR

3. 3.
I
F a r East East Command Command comments comments on on heavy heavy enemy enemy ground ground action: action: Far The The Far F a r Easi E a s t Command Command believes b e l i e v e s that t h a t the t h e powerful Powerful limitedlim i tedobjective o b j e c t i v e attacks a t t a c k s launched launched against a g a i n s t three thre; points p o i n t s in in the t h e UN UN line l i n e on 6 and 7 September are are not the t h e forerunner f o r e r u n n e r of a Communist offensive. o f f e n s i v e . These These attacks a t t a c k s appear appear to t o have have as as their t h e i r objective o b j e c t i v e the t h e capture capture of of key terrain t e r r a i n features, f e a t u r e s , or or to t o be "spoiling" ' l s p o i l i n g l l attacks d t t a c k s in i n anticipation a n t i c i p a t i o n of of A a UN offensive. offensive.
The unprecedented amount of artillery a r t i l l e r y fire f i r e used by the t h e Chinese against a g a i n e t South South Korean Korean troops troops in in east east central central Korea Korea on on 7 7 September September reflects r e f l e c t s the the enemy's enemy's generally g e n e r a l l y imim6123, proved forward Telecon 6123, forward supply s u p p l y situation. s i t u a t i o n . (S CINCFE TelecQn 8 Sept Sept 52) 52)
Comment: Comment: Intercepted I n t e r c e p t e d enemy enemy messages messages of of late l a t e August August and ellaqy have clearly clearly i indicated e m S e pSeptember t e m b e r have n d i c a t e d the t h e Communists' Communists very real r e a l fear of another a n o t h e r UN UN amphibious amphibious operation o p e r a t i o n or or ground ground offensive. offensive.
2 2
9 Sept Sept 52 52 9
C 6
St 5,, pp
a. I
111/
The enemy has made increasing use of artillery in in past few months, months, and recent Chinese messages indicate the past indicate the arrival of of some additional artillery units in Korea.
4, 4 .
North Korean Korean west west coast coast brigade brigade sees seSS imminent imainent.UN North UN amphiE4ous S4nding: In What'appears wHat appears to to be be a a flnal final'alert amphiiiious UndIng:1I In alert foriWthe 'form, 'theNOOth Nqith Korean Korean 21st 21st Rrigade Brigade on,30 on.30 August August notified notified and artillery artillery battdlion battalion coiamanders that the all infantrY, infantrf and cohanders that US "1st Marine to land land on on the the Ongjin Ongjin Peninsula Peninsula Marine Divisionf9 Division" is iwto while lVthree divisions in in depth. while."three .are trying trying to occupy Kaesong," presumably pregumably in in a a UN land land offensive. offensive.
.
.
5. 5.

...
3 3
Subordinate commanders are ordered to to remain remain at at their their posts and to to .report report immediately on on ."even "even a posts and a little little movement" movement" on the the part Of of UN UN forces. forces.
Of equai. interest, battalion equal.interest, battalion commanders are are ordered ordered to "have close coordination with the the 63rd Corps and and the the 64th 64th .Corps of the the Volunteer Volunteer Army, Army, located at the central Corps of central Part part of your own own defense defense area." area." (CANOE 501st Comm Recon Grp Korea, Korea, SK-M-726, 30 30 4ug i ) U g 52) 52)
.Commeni; Comment: Reports such as this this may have been been behind behind the the by Chinese Chinese troops troops h eavy m d - o b j e c t i v e attacks attacks made by heavy limlied-objective against the the US lst 1st Marine Division Division opposite opposite Kaesong Kaesong on on 6 6 September. September.
Chinese Communist Communist unit unit coordinates coordinates activities activities with with unidentified North Korean Korean Army: Army: The The commander of an ubidentifi ed miriese Comrnunirst unit, unit, possibly Chinese Communist possibly part of an engineer regiregiment engaged in in ferrying ferrying duty duty across across the the Taedong Taedong River, River, August that he had had contacted contacted the North North Korean Korean stated on 31 August "in reference reference to to the the Taechon Vaechon bridge... bridge .question.11 Army "in .question." the Chinese' Chinese: unit the According unit was was to await the to the the message, message, the According to arrival of the the North Korean military before before beginning beginning contructrn7 the bridge. n the bridge. (CANOE 501st Comm Recon Grp Recon Grp cont r uc t HR70-14 Korea, L L mT330, T330, 31 3 3 Aug AUg 52) 52) HR70-14
Comment: Comment: This This information information further further points points up up the the apparent appqrent coordination coordination and and formality formality existing existing between between North North Koreans and and Chinese Chinese even even on on the the tactical tactical level. level.
9 Sept 52 52 9
6. 6 .
Communists to t o Gonduct a i d on UN-..eld gonduct amphibious r raid UN-held islands: September meesage ppassed Brigade's l ands: A 7 S eptember mds'sqge a s s e d ooverthe v e r ' t h e 21st 2 1 s t Brigade's Eif-Fevealed NOrt4 Eoreans Koreans were p planning Z e v e a l e d that t h a t the t h e Nor'tq l a n n i n g an amphibiousTaid the Ongjin h e Ongjin amphibious r a i d against a g a i n s t UNrheid UN-held islands i s l a n d s off t Peninsula on 10 10 September,' Septembe: The,message h a t wooden P e n i n s u l a on The message stated t that wooden ships, eleven mortars, two tWo 45mm 45mm guns guns and and numerous numerous small small s hips, e l e v e n mortars, reidy.for the Operation, which is t to be a a h hit-and-. arms are ready for t he o p e r a t i o n , which o be it-and-. run iven r u n assault. a s s a u l t . After,asAembIing, After,.assemblins;,the t t a c k i n g force the aattacking force is is g given to the river, four hours t to for the "one hour t o cross t he r iver, f o u r hours o search f or t he en m one.and withdraw." (CANOE and one and a half h a l f hours to t o withdraw." (CANOE T453,77 Sept T453, S e p t 52) 52)
Comment: T h i s message illustrates illustrates t h e enemy's This the enemy's concont i n u i n g attempt t o n e u t r a l i z e ,UN sland b a s e s off he w est tinuiliraTiimpt to neutralize UN i island bases off t the west of Korea which are a r e used for espionage, e s p i o n a g e , guerrilla coast of g u e r r i l l a and air rescue missions. missions.
7. 7 .

4 4
Chinese u n i t s engage in i n local s ecurity s c r e e n i n g and units security screening searches: An element of of the t h e Chinese Chin e s e 402nd 402 nd Antitank A n t i t a n k Artillery Artillexy Regiment' in i p east central c e n t r a l Korea was ordered on 4 September SeDtt3mber Regiment to services t o "write two reports on rear s e r v i c e s anti-spy a n t i - s p y work for (the) were ( t h e ) months of June through August." August." These reports were to "careful t o include i n c l u q e the t h e number of times times " c a r e f u l investigations i n v e s t i g a t i o n s were made made in in the t h e mountains and and in in all a l l buildings b u i l d i n g s , and how many LI-TT384, a g e n t s were were apprehended." apprehended . I 1 (CANOE LI---?T384, enemy secret agents 4 Sept S e p t 52) 52)
Comment: Considerable C o n s i d e r a b l e intelligence, i n t e l l i g e n c e , both b o t h from f r o m message i n t e r c e p t s and agent interaiiti-ind agent r reports, e p o r t s , is available on North, North Korean counterespionage This,, however, is is one.of' ond.of the c o u n t e r e s p i o n a g e activities. activities. T h i s , , however, the few r reports details extent security pree p o r t s which d e t a i l s the the e x t e n t of s e c u r i t y precautions c a u t i o n s taken t a k e n by by aa Chinese Chinese tactical. t a c t i c a l unit. unit.
9 Sept S e p t 52 52 9
TOP SECRET CANOE
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FAR EAST EAST FAR
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N o r t h Korean Korean antiaircraft a n t i a i r c r a f t defenses d e f e n s e s may may be organized o r g a n i z e d on on North A 4 4 September S eptember message message from from an an A u n i d e n t i f i e d North N o r t h- K o r e a n unit u n i t was addressed a d d r e s s e d to t o the the unidentified Korean (CANOE L Lip]T531, " A n t i a i r c r a f t Artillery A r t i l l e r y Department Department Chief." Chief "Antiaircraft (CANOE T531, S e p t 52) 52) 4 Sept
a Supreme Supreme Command CommandJevel: a 'level:
."
7. 7.
t h a t the t h e five, f i v e , or or Comment: This T h i s message message suggests s u g g e s t s that Comment: p o s s i b l y six, s i x , independent i n d e p e n d e n t North North Korean Korean antiaircraft a n t i a i r c r a f t artilartilpossibly l e r y regiments r e g i m e n t s are are subordinate s u b o r d i n a t e to to a a major headquarters lery major headquarters similar to t o the t h e "Artillery" l l A r t i l l e r y " and "Armored" "Armored" Commands at similar Commands at H e a d q u a r t e r s . Previous P r e v i o u s antiaircraft a n t i a i r c r a f t artillery artillery Supreme Headquarters. messages have also a l s o indicated i n d i c a t e d the the possibility p o s s i b i l i t y of of a a divisiondivisionmessages have a l echelon. echelon. al
C h i n e s e Communist Communist paratroop p a r a t r o o p capability c a p a b i l i t y assessed: assessed: Chinese Communist C h i n a has bas 138 138 twin-engine twin-engine transports t r a n s p o r t s which could could Communist China be used for paratroop p a r a t r o o p operations, o p e r a t i o n s , according a c c o r d i n g to to a r ecent be used recent a n a l y s i s of of intercepted i n t e r c e p t e d messages. messages. If I f based based on on airfields airfields analysis i n s o u t h e r n Manchuria, ircraft c ould c arry a t l east in southern Manchuria, these these a aircraft could carry at least 2,200 p a r a t r o o p e r s t o t h e f r o n t l i n e s i n Korea on a s l n gle 2,200 paratroopers to the front lines in Korea on a single T h e Communists Communists have have as as manv a s 244 c onventional f l i g h t . The flight. many as conventional
3 3
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serp
TPS
bombers which could be be used used to to drop drop supplies. supplies. (CANOE 6920 6920 Security Grp Johnson Johnson AFB AFB Japan,AP Japan,AP 848, 848, 5 5 Sept S e p t 52) 52)
messages have identlfied identified Comment: Chinese Communist messages only iiiiria7borne division, division, and and paratroop paratroop training has o n l y -borne been undertaken at three three separate separate installations. installations. No * strength figures are available from communications intellibut estimates based on other sources have put put overgence, but all paratroop parabroop strength strength as as high high as as 25,000 25,000 men. men.
,:)
NR

4 4
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HR70-14
i -
T&I) SECRET CANt1E

FAR .EAST EAST
, : " R
5. 5.
6.

Korea. Korea. sector: sector:
North N o r t h Korean troops t r o o p s placed p l a c e d under Chinese C h i n e s e command command in in amphibious am,phibious Scare: s'care: In In a n t i c i p a t i o n of p e r operation a tion anticipation of v UN amphibious o n 5'September, 5 'Septdmber, the t h e commander of of the t h e North N o r t h Korean 21st 2 l s t BriBrion gade in in western w e s t e r n Korea Korea instructed i n s t r u c t e d his h i s battalion b a t t a l i o n commanderS commanders t o .."follow " f o l l o w t the h e ddirection i r e c t i o n of h e commanders" hinese to of tthe commanders" of of C Chinese r e g i m e n t s located l o c a t e d nearby. nearby Communist regiments (CANOE L L I [ T 187, 187, (CANOE 1 1 Sept S e p t 52) 52)
Comment: H e r e t o f o r e , tactical t a c t i c a l integrity i n t e g r i t y along a l o n g national national Heretofore, l i n e s h a s w a y s been m a i n t a i n e d by Communist forces in in lines-Hi-Li-Mays maintained
This departUre T his d e p a r t u r e may be explained e x p l a i n e d by b y the t h e fact f a c t that t h a t these these North are on on Hwknghae Hwanghae Peninsula Peninsula with w i t h larger larger N o r t h Korean Korean battalions b a t t a l i o n s are Chinese are separated s e p a r a t e d by by considerable c o n s i d e r a b l e distance distance C h i n e s e forces f o r c e s and and are from from other o t h e r North N o r t h Korean Korean groups. groups. Chinese C h i n e s e artillery a r t i l l e r y regiment r e g i m e n t relieved r e l i e v e d in i n east central central The Chinese C h i n e s e 21st 2 1 s t Artillery A r t i l l e r y Regiment, Regiment, subordinate subordinate The td'the to the 7th 7 t h Artillery A r t i l l e r y Division supporting s u p p o r t i n g the t h e 68th 6 8 t h Army in in c e n t r a l Korea, Korea, reported r e p o r t e d on on 8 8 September September that t h a t they t h e y were were east central i n the t h e process p r o c e s s of o f turning t u r n i n g over o v e r ammunition and positions p o s i t i o n s to to in t h e 41st Artillery A r t i l l e r y Regiment. Regiment. The entire e n t i r e turnover t u r n o v e r will w i l l be be the complete qprT /11 467, 8 c o m p l e t e by by the t h e end end of o f September. September. (CANOE (CANOE L 467, 8 Sept S e p t 52) 52)
3 3
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.Comment: The independent independent C hinese 4 1st A rtillery Chinese 41st Artillery Regimeni has been a accepted through PW r reports supporting R e g i m m been ccepted t h r o u g h PW e p o r t s as s upporting elements of the Chinese to the west e l e m e n t s of the C h i n e s e 12th 1 2 t h Army immediately t o t h e west of the t h e 7th 7 t h Artillery A r t i l l e r y Division's D i v i s i o n ' s positions. positions.
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I n v In view of iew o f the t h e abnormally high h i g h rate r a t e of artillery a r t i l l e r y fire fire t h e 12th 1 2 t h Army sector in t he p ast r e c e i v e d by by the UN from the received sector in the past r o b a b l e that t h a t the the 4 1 s t Regiment a s been week, week, it is p probable 41st Regiment h has been rereplaced by a larger organization p l a c e d by l a r g e r artillery artillery o r g a n i z a t i o n and is now availavaila b l e to t o relieve r e l i e v e the t h e 21st 2 1 s t in i n the t h e 68th 6 8 t h Army Army sector. sector. able
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7. 7 .
Elements of Chinese Air Division of C h i n e s e Communist 15th 15th A ir D i v i s i o n based based at a t new airfield: airfield: A n a l y s i s of several s e v e r a l Chinese C h i n e s e Communist Communist Analysis r e c e i v e d since s i n c e 8 September confirms c o n f i r m s that t h a t elements elements messages received o f the t h e Chinese C h i n e s e Communist 15th 15th A ir D i v i s i o n are now based at at of Air Division a i r f i e l d in i n Manchuria. Manchuria. A 9 September message Tungfeng airfield s c h e d u l e d a "round-robin" "round-robin" flight f l i g h t of of 15 15 MIGl5 j e t fighter fighter scheduled MIG-15 jet a i r c r a f t of this t h i s division d i v i s i o n from from this t h i s field. f i e l d . (CANOE A F aircraft AF Roundup 175, 175, 10 10 Sept S e p t 52) 52) Roundup
i v i s i o n , a MIG-15 e t fighter fighter Comment: The 15th 1 5 t h Air D Division, MIG-15 j jet unit,=st oobserved b s e r v e d iin n ttraining raining f lights a t Kungchuling unit,-Viii-TWst flights at Kungchuling a i r f i e l d , also a l s o in in Manchuria. Manchuria. The reason r e a s o n for f o r the t h e transfer transfer airfield, some of of its i t s elements e l e m e n t s to t o Tungfeng cannot c a n n o t be b e ascertained ascertained of some at a t this t h i s time. time.
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Chinese artillery a r t i l l e r y units u n i t s shifting s h i f t i n g .at a t battle b a t t l e front: front: Reconnaissance e l e m e n t s of of the t h e Chinese C h i n e s e 21st 2 1 s t Artillery A r t i l l e r y RegiRegiReconnaissance elements ment, message, set set a out the ment, according a c c o r d i n g to t o a 5 September September message, u t ffrom r o m t6e regiment's positions r egiment's p o s i t i o n s in i n the t h e east central c e n t r a l sector to t o go go to to t h e 15th 1 5 t h Army's sector sector on on the t h e central c e n t r a l front. frbnt. the
On 12 1 2 September, September, the t h e reconnaissance r e c o n n a i s s a n c e party p a r t y reported r e p o r t e d that that terrain t e r r a i n in i n the t h e 15th 1 5 t h Army sector s e c t o r was flat f l a t with w i t h little l i t t l e cover, cover, a l t h o u g h the t h e roads r o a d s were were good. good. Apparently this t h i s same s a m e reconreconalthough naissance n a i s s a n c e unit u n i t had had received r e c e i v e d orders o r d e r s to t o "go "go to t o the t h e 9th 9 t h Army Army Group and and investigate i n v e s t i g a t e the t h e terrain." terrain.'' (CANOE Li---1/T-519, L D - 5 1 9 , 12 S e p t ; L-/T-522, S e p t 52) 52) 12 Sept; LF--7T-522, 55 Sept
Comment: Comment: T4e The 21st 2lst Artillery A r t i l l e r y Regiment, Reqiment, subordinate s u b o r d i n a t e to to the t h e lth 7th D Division, i v i s i o n , is is to t o be completely completely relieved r e l i e v e d by by the t h e indeindep e n d e n t 41st 4 1 s t Artillery A r t i l i l e r y Division D i v i s i o n by by the t4e end end of of September. September. pendent These messages indicate These i n d i c a t e that t h a t the t h e 21st 2 1 s t - and and possibly p o s s i b l y the the entire e n t i r e 7th 7 t h Artillery A r t i l l e r y Division D i v i s i o n - may either e i t h e r be be redeployed r e d e p l o y e d to to s u p p o r t the t h e 15th 1 5 t h Army Army in i n ' the t h e central c e n t r a l sector sector or o r be be rotated rotated support t o the t h e 9th 9 t h Army Army Proup %oup in i n the t h e Wonsan-Yangdok area area for f o r rest rest to and training t r a i n i n g - arid ahd f for o r ppossible ossible u use s e aagainst gainst a an n e expected x p e c t e d UN UN amphibious operation o p e r a t i o n in i n that t h a t area. area.
7. 7.
Chinese Chipese armored armored "regiments" 'lregiments" mentioned ment i-oned in i n recent r e c e n t messages: messages : On 28 syStem 28 gugust;in'ethinese-communicAtions August,'-in~a-,Chineee-cotiimunications s y s t e m assOcIitdd associhted with unidentified regiw i t h armor, armor, a a message was passed p a s s e d from an u n i d e n t i f i e d regiment to to a supordinate s-rdinate company. The message stated s t a t e d that that a a company. to "T-34 man was to t o be sent s e n t to t o the t h e front front t o investigate investigate a " T~34 tank abandoned by the t h e 2nd Regiment." Regiment."
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A later l a t e r message of of / 7 September, September, passed p a s s e d from from the t h e same same company to t o the t h e aboMe ab0Y.e unidentified u n i d e n t i f i e d armored armored regiment r e g i m e n t was was .re /mental. heading regiment. a d d r e s s e d to t o ". lt i ng r egiment. .re i m e n t a l head.tr addressed T-502,, 7 7 S Sept 28 quatters." ( ChOE* l4, 28 Aug; Aug; L LdJIT-SOa, ept (CANOE G g f i T -T-14, quatters."
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Comment: Little L i t t l e is known about the t h e Chinese Chinese armored argored u n i t s deployed iin n Korea. i n d i c a t e d the the indicated units-aiiiraiied Korea. 1 presence re-evaluation p r e s e n c e of two divisions, d i v i s i o n s , but b u t a subsequent s u b s e q u e n t !e-evaluation Far by the the F a r East E a s t Command Command suggested s u g g e s t e d that t h a t there there are a r e only o n l y three three independent.Chinese 1ndependent.Chinese tank t a n k regiments. regiments.
The above messages suggest that FECOK's estimate may may be t h a t FECOM's valid present Korea o on regiv a l i d and that t h a t Chinese armor is is p r e s e n t in Korea n a r egimental m e n t a l basis b a s i s only. only.
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C h i n e s e units u n i t s to t o assume assume North Korean brigade's b Chinese coastal security s e c u r i t y role: role: According to t o an a n incomplete incomplete 11 September e p t ember message from from a a political P o l i t i c a l officer o f f i c e r of of the t h e North Norlth Korean Korean 21st 21st message B r i g a a e , "It " I t was was decided d e c i d e d that t h a t all a l l Volunteer V o l u n t e e r troops t r o o p s will will Brigade, move t o the t h e front. front. .and t he P e o p l e ' s Army Army tropps. tropps, .will move to .and the People's .will remaiti in in the t h e interior i n t e r i o r Sinchon Sinchon zone zone and and take t a k e part p a r t in i n combat combat remain i n i n g . The The V olunteers w ill d e p a r t on h e 1l;tjh." politic ining. Volunteers will depart on tthe 110." ?%??-*7-573, 1 1 Sept S e p t 52) 52) (CANOE -573, 11
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9.
New p l a n p e d railroad r a i l r o a d construction c o n s t r u c t i o n and and steel s t e e l rail r a i l proNew planned d u c t i o n in i n Southwest Southwest China: China: Th e M i n i s t r y of Railways in duction The Ministry Railways in P e i p i n g was was expected Wkpected to t o ship s h i p in in July J u l y 20,000 20,000 tons t o n s of of 3838Peiping k i l o g n h ? r a i l s to t o Chungking Chungking via v i a Hankow Hankow for f o r the t h e SzechwanSzechwankilogrkm7rails Yunnan railroads, r a i l r o a d s , according a c c o r d i n g to t o purported purported * i n t e r c e p t s obYunnan intercepts obt a i n e d from from a a foreign f o r e i g n source. s o u r c e . From From similar similar material i t is is tained material it also reported r e p o r t e d that t h a t the t h e 101st l O l e t Factory F a c t o r y in i n Chungking Chungking shipped shipped also No teel r a i l s to t o Hankow o n 5 and 18 July. J u l y . No 1 ,098 t o n s of s 1,098 tons steel rails on preNious h i p m e n t s of a i l 5 tto o Chungking been observed, observed, prev.ious sshipments of rrails Chungking have have been a lthough r a i l shipments downriver from Chungking were noted although rail were noted i n late l a t e 1951. 1951. (CANOE.CC/CAP-307, (CANOE CC/CAP-307, Commodity Movements in in in N o 19, 25 Aug dug 52) 52) China No
Comment: The The 420-mile 420-mile Yunnan-Szechwan Yunnan-Szechwan line l i n e is is one one of of .Comment: some m i lmiles e s of of new new railroads r a i l r o a d s in i n western western China China which which the the some 3,000 onstruction h a s Probably Communists have have surveyed. s u r v e y e d . Its Communists Its c construction has Probably w i l l soon. soon. begun, o r will begun, or The unexplained u a e x p l a i b e d shipment shipment of rails r a i l s both b o t h to t o and and from from f a c t that t h a t the the The fact may be be a a case case of of misplanning. misplanning. The Chungking may Chungking shipment toward toward Chungking Chungking is is much much larger l a r g e r may indicate i n d i c a t e that that t h e 101st lOlst F a c t o r y ' s rail r a i l output, o u t p u t , which has h a s been enough for for the Factory's t h e laying l a y i n g of of perhaps p e r h a p s 250 a50 miles m i l e s of track a a year, yBar, is is inadequate inadequate the in the t h e Southwest. Southwest. f o r future f u t u r e planned construction c o n s t r u c t i o n in for
t h e North 2 l s t Brigade has a a i n c e the Comment: S Since North Korean Korean 21st Brigade has in western w e s t e r n Hwanghae Hwanghae Province, ProYince, it it is is c o a s t defense m n s e mission m i s s i o n in coastal p r o b a b l e that t h a t the t h e "front" l l f r o n t l ' toward toward which which the t h e Chinese Chinese will w i l l move move probable is the t h e coast. c o a s t . Both t h e Chinese Chinese 63rd 63rd and 64th 64th A r m i e s , and and is Both the Armies, p o s s i b l y the t h e 42nd, 42nd, are are in I n this t h i s area area and and are are far f a r better b e t t e r fittpd fittgd possibly t h a n the t h e Korean Korean brigade b r i g a d e to t o repel r e p e l the t h e UN landing l a n d i n g expected e x p e c t e d by by than t h e enemy eagmy in i n the t4e west. west. the
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Chinese Force C h i n e s e Air Air F o r c e may concentrate c o n c e n t r a t e on on UN ground-attack ground-attack planes: Air F Force o r c e field Pield unit unit s study t u d y shows t that hat d during uring l a n e s : An Air t h e efficienpy e f f i c i e n p y of the the C h i n e s e Communist ilots i n August the Chinese Communist p pilots in combat with w i t h F-86 F-86 Sabres S a b r e s was was apparently a p p a r e n t l y seriously s e r i o u s l y limited, limited, continuing are and c o n t i n u i n g indications i n d i c a t i o n s show that t h a t their t h e i r sorties s o r t i e s are principally aimed p r i n c i p a l l y at a t UN ground-attack g r o u n d - a t t a c k type t y p e aircraft. aircraft. Chinese C h i n e s e aggressive a g g r e s s i v e intentions, i n t e n t i o n s , at a t least l e a s t toward toward UN UN ground-attack g r o u n d - a t t a c k planes, p l a n e s , are a r k evidenced e v i d e n c e d by by the t h e increasing increasing s o r t i e s in i n Korea over o v e r the t h e past parat five f i v e months, heir p enetration sorties months, t their penetration s outhward o n t h e west o t he 3 8th P a r a l l e l , and he southward on the west coast coast t to the 38th Parallel, and t the extension of the t h e Chinese C h i n e s e GCI G C I grid g r i d zone z o n e system system beyond beyond the the e x t e n s i o n of Pyongyang Pyongyang area. area. (COOF (CbNOE 6920 6920 Security S e c u r i t y Grp G r p Johnson Johnson AFB AFB Japan, Japan, AP-977, 13 13 Sept S e p t 52) 52) AP-977, In the ten-day p period ending August, u g u s t , 228 228 In t h e ten-day eriod e nding 5 A Comment: C h i n w m u n i s t MIG-15 MIG-15 sorties sorties into i n t o Korea Korea were were observed. observed. Chinegg-niiunist During D u r i n g this t h i s period p e r i o d both b o t h Soviet S o v i e t and Chinese C h i n e s e Communist pilots were were noticeably n o t i c e a b l y reluctant r e l u c t a n t to t o engage e n g a g e F-86 F-86 aircraft. aircraft.
NR
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5. 5.
C h i n e s e - t r a i n e d North North Korean Korean officers o f f i c e r s being b e i n g registered: re Chinese-trained An 8 Qeptember September message from the the c chief h i e f of of s staff-of t a f f of t tio North Korean 21st 2 1 s t Brigade Brigade in i n western w e s t e r n Korea Korea to t o subordinate s u b o r d i n a t e 'units 'units ordered a complete c o m p l e t e dossier dossier drawn,up drawn.up on on "officers " o f f i c e r s whose whose to be listed address is I s in i n China." ,China.ll Items t o be l i s t e d are permanent address e e r v i c e in i n the the C h i n e s e tbmmunist 'Commullist Army, &my, rank r a n k held, h e l d , and and service Chinese address address and and family f a m i l y connections. connections.
On 13 13 September deptember the t h e 22nd 22nd Brigade B r i g a d e in i n northeastern n o r t h e a s t e r n Korea was also rdeed ed to t o make m a k e up up a as s r r roster roster by by 1 15 5 Sept&nber. SepOmber. (CANOE IL ILrdQk-602, -602, 8 Sept; S e p t ; IL I L RT-756, 13 Sept S e p t 52) 52) (CANOE T-756, 13
6. 6 ,
A d d i t i o n a l North.Korean i r force ctivities r evealed: *Additional North7 Korean a air force a activities revealed: Analysis messages on, A n a l y s i s by a a US Air A ir Force F o r c e field f i e l d unit u n i t o f messages oq the N North o r t h Korean voice v o i c e GCI G C I net n e t reveals r e v e a l s that t h a t ground c control o n t r o l of of night is limited l i m i t e d to t o take-offs, t a k e - o f f s , landlandn i g h t flying f l y i n g Korean aircraft a i r c r a f t is i n g s , and occasional o c c a s i o n a l communication communication checks. ings, checks. For F o r daytime daytime flights, the hand, the controller directs f l i g h t @ , on t h e other o t h e r hand, t h e ground c ontroller d irects a l l maneuvers. Prom From ,1.t0.10 tQ 10 SepteMber,992 September,992 aircraft a i r c r a f t calls calls all t h e Korean GCI net, n e t , representing r e p r e s e n t i n g a new high high were heard on the for a period. f o r such such a
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The embryoniC embryonic North Korean air aic defense d e f e n s e system s y s t e m became a c t i v e again active a g a i n on on 5 5 August w with i t h early e a r l y warning messages b being eing North Korean Korean fflights have been been i increasing l i g h t s have ncreasing p a s s e d . Since S i n c e then. t h e n North passed. area. P o s s i b l y concurrent concurrent w ith a l o n g the t h e North Korean border area. along Possibly with r e c e n t changes c h a n g e s in i n both b o t h the t h e Soviet 9 o v i e t and Chinese grid g r i d locating locating recent tation s y e t e m s in Korea, systems Korea, on 9 September September a Korean Korean ground ground s station i d e n t i f i e d UN aircraft identified a i r c r a f t : in i n "Zone "Zone 46." 46." T h i s is is the t h e first first This time that t h a t a two-digit two-digit grid g r i d designator designator h has a s been been b heard e a r d on the an expana i r defense d e f e n s e system s y s t e m and may indicate indicate a n expant h e Korean air sion of coverage. c o v e r a g e . (CANOE (CANOE AP 964, 964, NK NR Air A i r Voice Sp Sp Rpt R p t 24, s i o n of 24, 10 10 Sept S e p t 52) 52) Enemy.fears major UN land, Enemy f e a r s grow to t o include i n c l u d e mador l a n d , air a i r and sea offensive: offensivet I In n a 1 14 4 9 September eptember message, Message, h headquarters e a d q u a r t e r s of of the the eastern t h e line l i n e in e a s t e r n coastal D i v i s i o n , on the North Korean-9th Ko r e a n g t h Division,
7. 7 .

3 3
Comment': These messages indicate Commentj: i n d i c a t e that t h a t North Korean offic-h C h i n e s e background background are b e i n g identified identified officers wiih a Chinese being wherever wherever they t h e y are are in in the t h e North North Korean Korean Army. Army. Although ighly Although h highly s p e c u l a t i v e , it i t is is possible p o s s i b l e that t h a t the t h e long-standing long-standing a ntagonism, speculative, antagonism, largely Chirlese, Soviet S o v i e t and and native n a t i v e North North l a r g e l y dormant, between Chihese, offioers is is behind b e h i n d this t h i s move. move. Korean officers
18 S e p t 52 Sept
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Korea, cited c i t e d "information " i n f o r m a t i o n gathered from the t h e Supreme Command1*which was interpreted i n t e r p r e t e d as indicating indicating a n Combined Command" an UN land l a n d offensive. o f f e n s i v e . The evidence e v i d e n c e listed l i s t e d by the the imminent UN Supreme Headquarters H e a d q u a r t e r s included i n c l u d e d extensive e x t e n s i v e air a i r reconnaissance reconnaissance and bombing t h e east east by by ROK ROK I I Corps Corps elements elements bombing requests r e q u e s t s in i n the t h e US 45th 4 5 t h Division, D i v i s i o n , the t h e presence presence w i t h the t h e US 25th 25th and the with i n Japan," J a p a n , " the the D i v i s i o n of of "the " t h e combined unit u n i t which wae Division was in t a n k s by by "ROK %OK units. units. .deployed t t he c entral receipt of tanks .deployed a at the central f r o n t , " the t h e increased i n c r e a s e d UN usage u s a g e of smoke shells, s h e l l s , and h eightfront," heightened troop t r o o p and and transport t r a n s p o r t activity a c t i v i t y in i n the t h e US 25th 25th D Division ivision sector. sector.
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Comment:. Comment: Enemy Enemy fears f e a r s of of a a major major coordinated c o o r d i n a t e d UN IJN ofoff e n s i m o r e a appear a p p e a r to t o have have reached reached a a new new all-time all-time high. high. fensiiii-17Korea Available material suggests s u g g e s t s that t h a t the t h e enemy enemy envisages envisages a a oneone-A v a i l a b l e material d i v i s i o n amphibious amphibious landing l a n d i n g on the the O ngjin P eninsula division Ongjin Peninsula c o o r d i n a t e d with w i t h apiree-division a.thi-ee-division ground grouqd offensive o f f e n s i v e and an an cOordinated a i r b o r n e force f o r c e to t o isolate ieoIate Kaesong. Kaesong. In airborne I? the t h e east, east, a a threetHreed i v i s i o n ground ground offensive o f f e n s i v e toward toward Wonstin, Wonsan, c o u p l e d with an division coupled amphibious landing l a n d i n g and an a n airborne airborne o p a r a t i o n in in t h e Hamhung operation the area, is expected. expected. R e f e r e n c e s to t o UN units u n i t s in i n the t h e center center area, is References i n d i c a t e that t h a t the t h e enemy enemy expects expects a a strong s t r o n g holding h o l d i n g action a c t i o n there. there. indicate
In Hwanghae P Province west, a Chinese I n Hwanghae r o v i n c e in i n the t h e west, C h i n e s e artillery artillery r e p o r t e d , also a l s o on on 14 14 September, September, that t h a t the t h e 63rd 6 3 r d Army, Army, u n i t reported, unit alerted a l e r t e d for a UN amphibious ambhibious o operation, peration, d decided ecided t that hat a an n area northwest n o r t h w e s t of of Kaesong Kaesong would would be be the t H e 'Idrop '!drop zone." zone." S i m i l a r l y , in i n the t h e northeast, northeast, a Similarly, a North N o r t h Koiean Koliean antiaircraft antiaircraft a r t i l l e r y officer o f f i c e r reported on the t h e same day h a t he artillery day t that he hqd had r e t u r n e d from from the t h e coastal security s e c u r i t y 46th 4 d t h Division D i v i s i o n with w i t h plans plans returned f or d e f e n s e against q g a i n s t the for defense t h e enemy landings l a n d i n g s and c coordinated oordinated area. (CANOE (CANOE Hamhun defense d e f e n s e area. aac1ite drops in the Hamhun /T-764, IL T-761, L (T-550, T-550, IL ILmlT - 7 6 0 , 14 1 4 Sept Sept 52) 52)
18 S e p t 52 52 18 Sept
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GENERAL
1.
Official Chinese Communist releases argue that the two agreements are to the "practical interest" of China. From Peiping's point of view, the reasons cited for extending the Port Arthur agreement -- the threat posed by Japan and the possible expansion of the Korean war -- are valid. Peiping's assertion that the USSR "is prepared to shoulder all responsibilities beneficial to peace" in the Far East hints at the possibility that a larger Soviet military guarantee resulted from the talks. Peiping's position in Chinese eyes would be greatly improved by announcement of agreements on further Soviet economic and military aid. Moscow and Peiping may still be working out the details of such agreements. (Factual data from: C Hong Kong 729, 18 Sept; R FBIS Peiping, 17 Sept 52)
2.
Communist bacteriological warfare campaign being revived: Soviet propaganda media publicized Peiping's 15 September announcement that the International Scientific Commission has "concluded its work and confirmed that the armed forces of the United States have waged bacteriological warfare against Korea .and northeast China." The Peiping radio on 14 September broadcast the scientists' statement made at a press conference held on 31 August, and subsequently began to broadcast "confessions" of recentlycaptured American officers and contents of the commission's report,. This report consists of 19 chapters and 46 appendices
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Peiping's reaction to Moscow talks: Chinese Communist comment to date on the announced results of the Sino-Soviet talks reveals sensitivity to possible charges that Peiping was outmaneuvered by its ally.
19 Sept 52
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containing 300,000 words, and has been published in English, French, Russian and Chinese.
Embassy officials in Stockholm reported that the presenta7 tion of the "evidence of germ warfare in Korea" at a press conference given by Dr. Andrea Andree, a member of the investigating commission, was a "complete flop." (R Stockholm 341, 17 Sept; R FBIS Moscow, 17 Sept; II Moscow 509, 17 Sept 52) The report of this investigating commission is among-THU-Wet serious efforts to date to substantiate the familiar BW charges. The release of this material seems timed to coincide with the Asian Peace Conference, where the BM issue most likely will be discussed. The document may be presented at that time as "authoritative scientific proof" of Communist charges.
3
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4.
French delegation visits Soviet Union: According to the French Communist press, a sixteen-member delegation from the Franco-Soviet Friendship Association left Paris on 11 August for a visit to the Soviet Union. This was the second such French group to go to the Soviet Union in a month and a half.
19 Sept 52
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The American Embassy in Paris points out that the Communist press made every effort to show that the delegations included non-Communists. (R Paris Desp 370, 14 Aug 52)
Comment: Soviet sponsorship of a visit designed to foster cooperation between Communists and non-Communists is in line with efforts of the "peace" movement and statements of various national Communist Party leaders on the need for united front tactics. Moscow also attempted to give impetus to the united front tactics of the Italian Communist Party by the interview granted by Stalin to the left-wing Socialist
leader Nenni..
5.
Czechoslovakia appoints administrator for assets of American business machine company: On 5 September the Czech Minister of Heavy Engineering appointed a "national administrator" to control all the assets in Czechoslovakia of the International Business Machines Corporation of New York. .The effect of this measure, which is in violation of a 1948 agreement between the Czech Government and IBM, is to remove all IBM assets in Czechoslovakia from the company's jurisdiction, while permitting it to retain technical title to them. (R Prague 174, 17 Sept 52)
Comment: This is the latest step in the Czech Government's program of restricting the activities of American business offices in Czechoslovakia. On 8 September the PanAmerican Airways ticket office in Prague was ordered to close by the end of the month.
ment.
6.
The Czech Government had continued at least until July to make regular'payments in dollars to IBM for leased equip-
Poles to implicate US in Martyka trial: The Polish press and radio have announced the opening on 18 September of the
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3

EASTERN EUROPE
In a recent speech before the French Communist Party Central Committee, Duclos emphasized the need of a "united national front." Since the failure of direct action tactics in the late spring, the French Communist Party, as has been its practice following earlier failures, has emphasized a call for unity of action.
19 Sept 52
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SECRET
trial of the "murderers" of the Polish radio commentator Polish reStefan Martyka. The eight accused, described as American have reported to the actionaries, are alleged to Embassy in Warsaw following the murder, and to have "offered (i1 FBIS Warsaw, 18 Sept 52) their further services." in almost a year to Comment: This is the first attempt crime of this type. It implicate the United States in a Satellite trials which have follows the pattern of other with espionage and anticharged American representatives Satellite activity.
7.
Yugoslav Government dissolves 1800 farm cooperatives: A Yugoslav official has stated to the American agricultural attache that 1800 of the 6800 cooperatives existing at the beginning of 1952 have been dissolved as being unsuccessful. The cooperatives dissolved were mostly in mountainous and un(R Belgrade Weeka 37, fertile sections of the country. 13 Sept 52)
Comment: Most of the cooperatives dissolved probably were the least advanced form of cooperative, not peasant working collectives, and the main effect of their dissolution is to relieve a drain on the government treasury. It is significant that the Communist leaders will retreat'from a dogmatic to a more realistic position, risking possible loss of support from their Communist followers.
8.
Unsettled Yugoslav economic plans may delay IBRD loan: The IBRD mission chief in Yugoslavia has told the Yugoslav Government that the IBRD will be unwilling to grant the second section of its loan unless Yugoslavia presents an import and investment program based only on resources available. Yugoslav officials have told the mission chief that they are planning on a tripartite aid program of more than $150,000,000, although US officials have told them that they cannot expect more than the $99,000,000 program so far approved by the (S Belgrade TOMUS British, French, and American governments. 101, 11 Sept 52)

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Martyka, chief commentator on the notorious Polish antiWestern radio program, Wavelength 49, was murdered a year ago in his apartment by an unidentified band of assailants. It was recently announced that this band had been captured.
19 Sept 52
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SECRET
Comment: Yugoslav officials are re-examiningtheir whole finanEril-TFOgram, including imports, capital investment, and defense spending. They have not yet requested additional foreign assistance. However, in view of a drought-induced maximum foreign exchange loss of over $100,000,000, they are in a position where they will either have to ask for grants above the present'MSA program, possibly in the form of a food aid program, or else tighten their belts, cut back their present investment programs, and use much of the $99,000,000 for food imports. Until the policy is settled, further IBRD money, the major Yugoslav source of foreign investment capital, will probably not be forthcoming.

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19 Sept 52
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FAR EAST
9.
Inflationary spiral in South Korea continues: The orea rose es n ou commo retai pr ce n ex or a The price index, 5.3 percent in the week ending 5 September. now at an all-time high, is more than 24 times what it was in June 1950. Since the beginning of the war,the free market exchange ratio between the dollar and the won has increased (C Pusan Weeks 38, 17 Sept 52) from 2,200-1 to 15,700-1.
Comment: The counterinflationary effects of increased aid 1166-driad locally produced items has been largely nullified by inadequate distribution facilities. The dollarwon exchange rate has been reported as high as 24,000 to 1 in some open market transactions.
10.
A Chinese students assigned to work in Manchuria: Chinese Communist 11 September broadcast announced that over 6,000 students have just graduated from 26 institutes of higher learning in Shanghai. According to the Communists, all the graduates "expressed their willingness" to take jobs in "yarious localities in China." Some 1,900 have already (R FBIS Shanghai, been assigned to work in Manchuria. 17 Sept 52)
Comment: It has been one of the objectives of Communist propaiiiiffi-To overcome student resistance to the compulsory job assignment kogram. A high proportion of the graduates are reportedly averse to assignments in the frontier areas of the northeast and northwest.
11
Since over half of China's tin output usually Comment: comes from the mechanized Kochiu mines, this announcement indicates a considerable rise in tin production this year. China's total output of tin in 1951 has been estimated at 7,100 tons, compared to 15,440 tons mined and refined in
1938.
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6
Rise in Chinese tin production reported: Chungking radio stated on 2 September that state-operated tin companieS at Kochiu, Yunnan Province, raised their output of tin in the first half of 1952 by 226 percent over production in the first six months of last year. (C FBIS China Abstracts, 16 Sept 52)
19 Sept 52
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SOUTHEAST ASIA
12
1
All-out offensive by Viet Minh seen less likely. Ian all-out Viet Minh fall or winter offensive is "less likely now" because of continued low morale and lack of supplies and recruits.
25X1C 25X1C
25X1C
anticipates intensified guerrilla activity and infiltration of the delta, however, and considers as still probable an offensive limited to the northwest corner of the delta by the two best Viet Minh divisions, with diversionary action elsewhere.
Comment: Previous reports have suggested that the usual However, there have also been fall 51Tgifffive was expected.
indications of fatigue, and to some degree low morale, among Viet Minh units. A principal logistic bottleneck for the Viet Minh is the inadequate transportation network within Indochina. French bombing of roads and bridges used by the Viet Minh has recently been unprecedentedly heavy.
13.
Philippine Communists emphasize propaganda and infiltration tactics: A Philippine Communist Party circular, believed to have been prepared in July, emphasizes the party's tasks of propaganda, infiltration and sabotage. The document reveals "considerable improvement" in the party's analysis of its position and suggests that the Communists are embarking on a propaganda battle with the government. In,such a contest the government is handicapped by the necessity to support propaganda claims with concrete reforms.
Comment: Since the decline of Huk military strength, other-MBSWEist documents have indicated that the party will seek to regain popular support by relying on propaganda tactics and by exploiting government weaknesses. Two recent reports alleged that the Communist revolutionary offensive would be renewed in 1954.
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SOUTH ASIA
14.
First China Friendship Association to be established in Ceylon: The Peiping radio announcement on 12 September that
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19 Sept 52
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the first Ceylon-China Friendship Association would be established in Colombo on 1 October indicates that the Communists are extending to Ceylon a propaganda medium which has been successful in both India and Pakistan. There is no Chinese political or economic mission in
Ceylon. The new association will therefore be the first permanent institution propagating Chinese influence. It is
being launched at a time when Ceylonese economic ties with the Orbit are becoming stronger and restrictive American trade policies are subjected to severe criticism. If the association avoids domestic political issues and follows the cultural pattern of its Indian and Pakistani counterparts, it should become an effective means of dissectnating the Communist line. (Factual data from: R FUN Peiping, 12 Sept 52)
15.
USSR and Pakistan conclude barter agreement: The Soviet Union and Pakistan signed a barter agreement in Karachi on 16 September for the exchange of Soviet wheat for Pakistani jute and cotton. According to the agreement, which does not involve the transfer of any funds, the USSR will deliver 150,000 tons of wheat before the end of 1952, the first shipments to arrive in October. Soviet ships will carry the wheat to Pakistan and return with 22,000 tons of jute and 13,150 tons of cotton. The total value of goods to be exchanged under the agreement is approximately six million pounds sterling on either side. (R Karachi 412, 17 Sept 52)
Comment: This is the first official trade agreement between Pakistan and the Soviet Union. In conducting these negotiations, Pakistan was faced with the urgent need to import large amounts of wheat to ease a serious food shortage. The Pakistani Prime Minister told the US Ambassador a month ago that he was negotiating with the Soviet Union for 300,000 tons of wheat. He added that if the 300,000 tons of wheat requested from the US were not forthcoming, he would have to ask the USSR for an additional 300,000 tons.
16.
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Former Iranian official warns of imminent Tudeh coup: expressed visiting Iran his belief hat the
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NEAR EAST - AFRICA
19 Sept 52
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Tudeh will attempt a coup in October or November.
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I the Communists throughout the country. The have made considerable gains in Mossadeq's ability to security forces have lost faith and the Tudeh support them financially, 30 key army officers. hasaready subverted more than
k
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Comment: The Tudeh has profited from the deteriorating econoiTE-fira political situation in Iran. There is no evidence, however, that the Communists have been able to buy the allegiance of any key army officers or are now strong enough for a successful coup.
25X1C
17
Egypt protests British failure to deliver jets: The Egyptian Government has handed the British Ambassador in Cairo a sharp note concerning the British failure to deliver the 65 jets now on order. The note charged that nonfulfillment of the contract is due to a British-imposed arms embargo.
Ambassador Caffery states that the Foreign Minister and the chief of the Egyptian Air Force are not interested in explanations. He understands that Egypt wants 36 jets (S Cairo 723, 17 Sept 52) immediately.
Comment: As a gesture of goodwill to the Nagib government, Great Britain has recently made available trainers and spare
parts.
18.
Egyptian Ambassador to London urges postponement of Sudanese elections: Commenting on the recent British proposals for the Sudan, Mahmud Fawzi, new Egyptian Ambassador to London, strongly urged that the Sudanese elections, scheduled for 6 November, should be postponed until the end of the year. He also stated that "real consultations" should take place
SECRET
9
In September 1950, the British Government postponed delivery of all high-priority items, including jets, to other than NATO and Commonwealth nations because of critical shortages.
19 Sept 52
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with all Sudanese factions, including those parties which now support union with Egypt. (S Cairo 720, 17 Sept 52)
19.
Lebanese Commander in Chief appointed President and Prime Minister: General Chehab, the Lebanese Commander in Chief, was appointed President and Prime Minister on 18 September, following the resignation of President el-Khouri. The US Military Attache in Beirut, in reporting this information, stated that the governmental change in Lebanon was not a military coup. (C US ARVA Beirut 342 and 343, 18 Sept 52)
Comment: For the present, Chehab appears to control LebanUirgUSlitical future. He is believed to have most of the army behind him and also has substantial political support, including that of two former premiers.
The new chief of state, who is a Christian, is faced with the problem of easing the Moslem-Christian tension built up over the past weeks. He must also deal with Lebanese political leaders who are opposed to military direction of civil affairs. Moreover, Chehab's past friendship with Khouri can be exploited by any military and civilian opponents. Chehab, or a succeeding government leader, must still cope with basic economic problems as well as with widespread corruption, which caused Khouri's fall.

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19 Sept 52
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WESTERN EUROPE
regis'East German communities allegedly given compulsory maiors and At a meeting of 40 East German tration quotas: _ several Socialist Unity. Party (SED) functionaries on 12 September in Pasewalk, it was allegedly decided that three to five percent 25X1C of the inhabitants of communities in the vicinity should be m ." J "compulsorily relistered for the national the action was 25X1C L___d_swelreferzmfle conscription" without any pretense of . volunteer service. 25X1A
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Imisinterpretation This report may also be due to1 of East German efforts to obtain volunteers for the Dienst fuer Deutschland. Adenauer avoids serious attack in debate on war criminal issue: lest German Chancellor Adenauer succeeded in "keeping the ITTation under control" in the 17 September Bundestag debate on the question of German war criminals held by the Allies. Although certain deputies indicated that ratification of the Bonn and Paris treaties might be endangered unless the issue is settled satisfactorily, local American observers doubt this. The opposition Social Democrats made a "surprisingly intemperate attack" during the largely moderate two and one-half hour debate. Contrasted to the party's earlier disinterested attitude, this new line indicates a realization of the importance of the war criminal issue in public opinion. Although all parties attacked the Allied judgments as having served "political ends rather than justice" and demanded that the (C question be solved soon, no formal resolution was adopted. Bonn 1220, 17 Sept 52)
Comment: Adenauer was aided in the debate by his being able to announce that two-thirds of the German war criminals jailed by
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11
In current recruiting Comment: This report is unconfirmed. driverlirEist Germany the line between voluntary and compulsory service has become increasingly vague, and difficulties in obtaining volunteers could be leading to efforts to enforce local Formal conscription as well as the announcement of an quotas. East German army still appears contingent upon similar action in West Germany.
19 Sept 52
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the WeStern powers have been released since 1950, with only 1,017 still imprisoned. A recent public opinion survey in West Germany has revealed widespread disapproval of Allied handling of the war criminals, with a majority of Germans feeling that imprisoned ex-generals should be assigned important posts in the future German army.
22.
"Lot consignments" cover strategic shipments on Austrian railroads. a number of Swiss and other Western European firms are regularly utilizing the cover provided by "lot shipments" to transship strategic goods to the Soviet bloc. Only the forwarding agent is named on international freight letters as consignor and only general terms are used to describe consignments containing small, but strategic, items. This system is reportedly being used particularly by firms routing shipments via Austrian railComment: While the volume of strategic goods which could be coiaaria in this manner is limited, the importance of the items to the Orbit might be considerable.
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Crisis in French Communist Party seen as serious: The demotion of two top-level members of the French Communist Party, Andre Marty and Charles Tillon, is expected 25X1C Ito have "deep repercussions" in Communist ranks.
1 1
23.
25X1C
The purge is interpreted as evidence of Duclos' victory over the hard militant faction of the French Communist Party which tried to assume control during Duclos' imprisonment in
25X1A June.
24.
Impending oil crisis may force Italy to seek Iranian oil: According to an article in the London Financial Times of 15 September, a possible 290,000-ton shortage of crude oil in Italy during the next three months, resulting from a recent MBA
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Comment: There is no indication that Marty and Tillon are considering a break with their party. Since they controlled its central military committee, a general shake-up of the Communists' paramilitary apparatus may be in process.
19 Sept 52
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decision to discontinue financing oil supplies, may lead the Italian Government to support the efforts of EPIM, an Italian firm, to import Iranian oil.
Noting that Italy's former Iranian imports have been made up from Saudi Arabia, which requires payment in dollars, the paper states that there is no sterling area source from which the anticipated crude oil deficit can be made up, even though American companies in Italy will finance their own purchases. (U London 1448, 15 Sept 52)
Comment: There is no indication that the Italian Government intenU1-76-Feverse its attitude and permit the import'of Iranian oil. Since MSA has suspended only the financing of Middle Eastern oil, Italy may be able to obtain MSA-financed oil from the United States and Latin America. Furthermore, Italy may avoid a crisis for the time being by making limited purchases from its own dollar resources and by stepping up oil imports from the USSR under the 1952 trade agreement.
Iranian Prime Minister Mossadeq's reaction to an offer from the Italian Government to buy oil would depend on the amount of assistance he could get from Italy. LATIN AMERICA
25.
Uruguay asks US to guarantee its security: The Uruguayan Foreign Minister asked the American Ambassador on 17 September to inform Washington that Uruguay would rely on United States aid in the event of a threat to its security or independence, and that the government would limit itself to strictly legal measures in coping with current labor strikes. The Embassy notes that while the increasing number of strikes appears to be the primary cause of the Foreign Minister's anxiety, other, sources have reported that Uruguayan officials are firmly convinced that Argentina is fomenting strikes and trying to undermine the present government. The Foreign Minister's comment that Uruguay needs economic assistance may foreshadow a plea for dollar aid. The American Ambassador adds that Montevideo is "still filled with rumors of a coup by Batlle Berres" but that there is no information to substantiate them. (S Montevideo 75, 17 Sept 52)
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Comment: A general strike, should one develop from the increTiiiii-Tabor unrest in Montevideo, might threaten the stability of the present administration and enhance the popularity of the pro-labor ex-president Batlle Berres.
Uruguayan officials frequently charge to the American Ambassador that Argentina is interfering in their country's internal affairs. Argentina's recently accelerated and improved propaganda efforts indicate that there may be some substance to the current Uruguayan accusations.
26.
The Embassy, which has recently noted unusual security precautions in the country, believes that the Dominicans are seriously concerned over these reports. (S Ciudad Trujillo 50, 17 Sept 52)
Comment: Reports of a "Caribbean Cominform" and "Communist Central Committee for Latin America" with headquarters in Prague have been of questionable reliability. This is the first report of subversive literature openly inciting riot being shipped with Czech exports.
Dominican intelligence reports often tend to be alarmist. The Dominican Government seldom neglects any precautions to absure itself against surprise movements of any kind and will probably take extra care on 12 October, a holiday.

SECRET
Czechs said to be inciting incendiarism in Dominican Republic: The Dominican Foreign Minister informed the US Embassy on 17 September that his government is taking extraordinary precautions against a riot allegedly being prepared for 12 October by "the Communist apparatus in Prague." He stated that several "technicians" are being smuggled into the country to organize the riot, and added that riots are also planned for other American republics. The Foreign Minister said that recent shipments of Czech glassware have contained printed packing material openly encouraging incendiarism and. assassination.
14
19 Sept 52
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Comment: reported that that Comment: US Navy reconnaissance reconnaissance pilots reported on 17 17 September September there there was was no no activity at at any of the the four four Kyosen hydroetectric plants plants which which normally supply supply power Kyosen hydroblectric to Songjin and other cities cities in in both North and South South Hamgyong Hamgyong Provinces. Provinces. j /the the USSR by March March 1952 1952 had-iSii-Iled had installed new new machinery machinery in in the the Kyosen Kyosen system making it more effective effective than before the the Korean Korean war. war.
8. 8.
The Chinese Communist Communist medical medical unit unit sent sent to to front: front: The Chinese ery Regiment, Regiment, Chinese Chinese rkar rear headquarters of of the the 21st 21st Artill Arallery Communist 7th Artillery Division, Division, stated stated on on 14 Communist 7th 14 September September send!its complete complete medical t o send'ics that it had received orders to unit "with unit, " w i t h the the exception exception of of the the pharmacy," pharmacy,"to koi;he-front. Lhe-front. The-&ddreFagethen inquired inquired if if some some elements elements of The-Addresseethen of the the medical medical large unit could could be retained retained "because "because there there are are qu qu e T-553, 16 units in in the the rear rear area." area." (CANOE (CANOE L[ l T % .; f 16 number of units Sept 52) Sept 52)

4 4
T Y
The forward Comment: forward movement of this this medical unit Comment: Artillery Regiment, located in the east of the t h m'21st Arti l l e r y Regiment, east central central sector, sector, might possibly possibly be be explained explained by the the recent recent bloody bloody fighting for "Finger I'Finger Ridge" Ridge? in in the the same same area. area. fighting for
.
7. 7.
North Korean Korean naval naval unit reports reports lack lack of electricity electricity in in Son in:: On 16 16 September, September, the the commander-Of commanderrOf an unidentified unidentified orean navy navy unit unit at at Songjin, Songjin, reporting reporting on on his his current current North Korean communications situation, stated stated that "as "as for for the the radio, radio, communications situation, icity has e ectricity has been cut off o f f continually." (CANOE 91, 91, 17 17 $ppt 8ppt 52) 52)
22 Sept Sept 52 52
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9. 9.
Chinese personnel to return to C h i n e s e artillery artillery p e r s o n n e l in i n Korea t o r eturn t o China f r a g m e n t a r y 16 1 6 September message' message.' passed passed f o r training: t r a i ' n i n : A fragmentary for b------g etween two two units u n i t s of of the t h e Chinese C h i n e s e Communist 1st l e t Artillery Artillery between Division D i v i s i o n revealed r e v e a l e d that t h a t an a n undisclosed u n d i s c l o s e d number of men from the t o China China for f o r study." study." t h e division d i v i s i o n should s h o u l d "assemble "assemble for f o r return r e t u r n to (CANOE L L r t T -T-584, 5 8 4 , 16 16 Sept S e p t 52) 52)
Comment: I t is p r o b a b l e that t h a t these t h e s e ChineRe C h i n e s e troops, troops, Comment: It probable possin7gUie from each from e a c hregiment, r e g i m e n t , will w i l l be be sent s e n t to t o Manchuria Manchuria p o s s i b l y some for further artillery a r t i l l e r y or or antiaircraft a n t i a i r c r a f t artillery a r t i l l e r y training. training. Such p r o c e d u r e has h a s been noted noted b e f o r e in i n communications procedure before communications intelligence. l igence.
10. 10.
C h i n e s e Communist air a i r transport t r a n s p o r t regiment regiment p ossibly Chinese possibly a t Peiping: P e i p i n g : A garbled g a r b l e d Chinese Chi n e s e Communist message l o c a t e d at located on 16 16 September September from Manchuria implied i m p l i e d that t h a t the the h eadquarters headquarters of the t h e Chinese C h i n e s e Communist 3rd 3 r d Independent A i r Regiment was Air located (CANOE AF AF Roundup 182, l o c a t e d at Peiping. P e i p i n g . (CANOE 1 8 2 , 19 19 Sept S e p t 52) 52) Comment: T h e 3rd 3 r d Independent Inde,pendent Air Regiment was was first first The C h i n e s e Communist Air A i r Regiment in i n August. August. identified as a Chinese its aircraft a i r c r a f t have h a v e been observed o b s e r v e d at a t other other Although many of its bases, this t h i s is i s the t h e first f i r s t indication l n d i c a t i o n that t h a t the t h e regiment r e g i m e n t is is bases, b a s e d at a t Peiping. Pelping. based
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C h i n e s e Communist unit u n i t in i n Korea to t o begin b e g i n chemical chemical warChinese fare Chinese f a r e ttraining! r a i n i n g : A cE37 n e s e Communist message of 20 30 September 9e p t e m b e r p a s s e d betw6en passed beween two two units, u n i t s , possibly p o s s i b l y subordinate s u b o r d i n a t e to t o the t h e 7th 7th Artillery A r t i l l e r y Division, D i v i s i o n , stated s t a t e d - that t h a t "our 'tour regiment's r e g i m e n t ' s chemical chemical (warfare?) ( w a r f a r e ? ) students. students. ..will will b egin t r a i n i n g tomorrow." tomorrow." begin training Each battalion b a t t a l i o n commander commander is is ordered o r d e r e d to t o inform i n f o r m the t h e trainees trainees t h a t they t h e y should s h o u l d bring their t h e i r gas gas masks with w i t h them them to t o the the that s p e c i a l clothing c l o t h i n g would be issued. i s s u e d . (CANOE ng area where special T-683, 22 T-683, 22 Sept S e p t 52) 52)
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3 5
CoMment: Comment: Previous references r e f e r e n c e s to t o the t h e issuance i s s u a n c e of gas gas masks-HiWg-ippeared masks h a v e a p p e a r e d in i n Chinese,Communist Chinese.Communist messages, m e s s a g e s , and and it i t is is b e l i e v e d that t h a t this t h i s defensive d e f e n s i v e training t r a i n i n g is is carried c a r r i e d on on principrincibelieved pally p a l l y for f o r propaganda p r o p a g a n d a value. value.
Chinese, Communist units u n i t s in i n Korea Korea apparently a p p a r e n t l y conducting conducting Chinese major ordnance check: The Chinese Artillery n e s e Communist 21st 2 1st Artillery e r y Division, D i v i s i o n , was was ordered o r d e r e d on o n 18 18 Regiment, 7th Artillery September to t o report report by b y -that t h a t afternoon a f t e r n o o n on on the t h e number number and and condition c o n d i t i o n of of its its rifles, r i f l e s , revolvers r e v o l v e r s and and submachine submachine guns. guns. (CANOE LPI/T-639, (CANOE L r r T - 6 3 9 , 21 21 Sept S e p t 52) 52) Comment: A spate s p a t e of of similar s i m i l a r messages has h a s been b e e n noted noted r e c e n which n c h indicate i n d i c a t e that t h a t the t h e Communists Communists are are conducting conducting recently a major ordnance o r d n a n c e maintenance m a i n t e q a n c e check c h e c k in in Korea. Korea. This T h i s survey, survey, to be completed t o b e c o m p l e t e d by b y the t h e third t h i r d week in i n September September by most most units, u n i t s , may in in part p a r t be be motivated m o t i v a t e d by by a a desire desire to t o assess assess the the e f f e c t s of the effects t h e rainy r a k n y season s e a s o n on o n small small arms. arms.
24 Sept S e p t 52 52
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China-Korea air a i r activity a c t i v i t y at a t lowest lowest level l e v e l since since April: April: China-Korea Communist air'activfty air'activity in i n China China and and Korea Korea for for the t h e week ending Communist week ending reveals a a further f u r t h e r decline. decline. Averaging only 19 September reveals anly 125 125

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flights flights per per day, day, the the current current level l e v e l of of activity activity is is the the lowest lowest ' AF observed observed since since the the last last week week in in April. A,pril. (CANOE A F Roundup Roundup 184, 184, 23 Sept Sept 52) 52) 23
'
C o m m e n t : This This low low average average is is due due mainly mainly to to decreased decreased jet jet Comment: fighter operations operations in Korea, which declined to only 21 flights flights in Korea, per day. day. Activity Activity in in China China proper proper continues continues high. high. Over Over 400 400 per aircraft aircraft recently recently gathered gathered at at Peiping, Peiping, probably probably for for a a1 1 October air air show. show. October
5. 5,
USSR reportedly agrees to send more MIG's and antiaircraft
unitsTU nrea:
that the USSRhiaa on he augusL itgresa TO Berm an mmicnown number of MIG-15's to the Chinese Communist and North Korean the USSR air forces by October 1952. would increase the number oiJ soviet antiaircraft units in North Korea by moving crews and equipment from the Dairen and Aiitung areas areus by mid-September. mid-September Antung 23 Sept 52)
Although "allied" antiaircraft units have Comment: frequently been referred to in Communist messages, there has been no firm identification of Soviet units in Korea.
The USSR has regularly shipped MIG-15's MIG-15's to the Chinese and North Koreans Koreans since since the the beginning beginning of of hostilities. hostilities.
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DIA and DOS Reviews Completed

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GENERAL
1
Eight members of the Chinese delegation, including four top economic figures and two military leaders, still remain in Moscow, presumably working out the details of unpublished Similarly, the continued presence.in Moscow of agreements. the Mongolian defense minister, following the departure of the Mongolian premier, suggests further discussion of a tri(Factual data partite agreement involving Outer Mongolia. from: R FBIS Peiping,23 Sept 52)
2.

SOVIET UNION SECRET
1
The conEight Chinese negotiators remain in Moscow: clusi6W-6rthe basic Sino-Soviet agreements on Soviet economic and military aid to China is suggested by the departure from Moscow on 22 September of Chinese Communist Premier Chou EnOn leaving, he cited the published agreements on the lai. Changchun Railway and Port Arthur, but emphasized that the talks had included "important political and economic problems."
"
Britain seeks American support to delay Japanese accession to GATT: The British Foreign Office plans to ask
American siiiiii677t for a resolution which would have. the ef-
fect of postponing Japanese accession to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) until after the conclusion of regular GATT tariff negotiations sometime next year. The British will argue that the Labor government gave a pledge to the Lancashire textile industry that Japan would not be given most-favored-nation treatment, and will state that it is politically impossible for Britain to support any move to (C London 1648, 22 Sept 52) admit Japan immediately.
3.
Following Top party officials elected in Georgia SSR: ongress, the Centtal its e ec on y e org an epu
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Committee met on 18 September to elect secretaries and executive committee (buro). A. Mgeladze, V. Budzhiashvili, and V. G. Tskhovrebashvili were again confirmed as secretaries. Elected to the buro were the three secretaries and the following nine members: Z. N. Ketskhoveli, Chairman of the Georgian Council of Ministers; Chkhuhanishvili, former Secretary of the Georgian Central Committee; ,V. M. Bakradze, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers; A. I. Kochlabashvili, Minister of the State Security; Balavadze, First Secretary of the Kutaisi Oblast Party Committee; Sh. Getia, First Secretary of the Abkhaz ASSR Party Committee, I. D. Kochlamazashvili, Georgian Minister of State Farms; and K. Budzhiashvili, First Secretary of the Tbilisi Oblast Party Committee. (R FBIS Moscow, 19 Sept 52)
Comment: In conformance with the proposed revisions of the Party Statutes only three instead of the previous five secretaries and a buro of eleven were elected. While one of the ex-secretaries was excluded altogether, the other, Chkhubanishvili, was made a member of the buro.
4.
Bulgarian Agrarian Party resolutions follow series of

purges: At its meeting on 29 and 30 August, the board of the BrailiFian National Agrarian Union resolved that the party should
"play an even more active part in the execution of the people's government measures ... in indestructible brotherly alliance with the Bulgarian Communist Party and under its guidance:" (R FBIS Sofia, 9 Sept 52)
Comment:
Natioal-Warian Union has served only as a propaganda agency

25X1 C
for conveying to the peasants the will of the Bulgarian Govern1Sofia reported in May that the purge of Agrarian elements snowing any vestige of independence was becoming "endemic," and commented that this was perhaps "a heartening sign of the Bulgarian people's resistance to the present regime." Since that time a wave of purges which reached a peak during the first week of August, has resulted in the expulsion of members in at least ten localities throughout Bulgaria.
ment.
I
5.
Bulgarian espionage indictment implicates French and Vatican officials: According to an indictment filed on 20 September against-n priests and 11 other members of an alleged Catholic spy organization, a number of "plotting centers ... operating under the leadership of the imperialist and -Vatican
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For the past several years the Bulgarian
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intelligence services" have recently been uncovered in Bulgaria. One of these organizations was allegedly supplied and heavily The indictment subsidized by the French intelligence service. named several French and Vatican diplomatic representatives (1 FBIS Sofia, said to have been involved in the operation. 22 Sept 52)
Comment: The present indictment is similar to one served in 1949 against 15 Protestant pastors who were subsequently given sentences ranging from one year to life imprisonment. There are believed to be some 120 Roman Catholic priests in Bulgaria at the present time, 30 of whom are already serving prison sentences.
6.
Hungarian Government campaigns to eliminate waste in metallliFinal industry: The Hungarian official party newspaper Szabad Nep on 23 September carried an editorial demanding thia-iiiFkers and technicians in the metallurgical industry improve the quality of their output and eliminate the excessive number of rejects in order to save "many millions of forints." (R FBIS Budapest, 23 Sept 52)
Comment: A national conference sponsored by the party, the MIETITiy,of Foundry and Machine Industry, the Iron and Metal Workers Union and the Association for Mining and Metallurgy recently convened to cope with the problem of waste in the metallurgical industry and set as its special target the effecting of economies in raw materials imported both from the West and from the USSR.
The new economy campaign indicates that Western export restrictions are making themselves felt and also lends some planners will force Orbit countries.to practice the greatest possible economy in order to concentrate all available Soviet resources on Asia.
7.

SECRET
As far as can be determined, none of the French officials named in the espionage indictment are currently resident in Bulgaria. The Vatican no longer maintains an apostolic delegate in the country.
Hungarian Government calls for extensive stockbreeding program by socialized sector of agriculture: The Hungarian Council of Ministers and the Central Committee of the Hungarian Workers Party adopted a joint resolution on 14 September calling for an increase in livestock and fodder The figures on projected livestock increases show a crops.
credence I
I Soviet
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vast increase for cooperatives and state farms in contrast to the modest over-all increases. The US Legation at Budapest interprets the measure as an indication that the regime plans to collectivize three fourths of the country's arable land by the end of 1954, compared with the present estimated 27 percent. Hungarian Minister of Agriculture Erdei emphasized the importance of the measure and also conceded that the drought had increased the problem of winter feeding of livestock and caused some people to try "to get rid of livestock in a reckless manner." (R Budapest 266 and 269, 19 and 20 Sept 52)
Hungarian newspaper reports of numerous cases of punishment of peasants for the illegal slaughter of livestock indicate that the peasantry is taking the usual means of sabotaging collectivization and that shortage of feed is not the only reason for the wave of slaughterings.
8.
Hungarian Workers Party apparently conducting limited The US Legation at Budapest reports that all Hungarian Wagrs Party membership cards expire on 31 December 1952 and will have to be exchanged. The Legation believes, in view of recent criticism of the party's recruitment policy, that the action may indicate that a limited purge of the nearly one million members is in progress. (S Budapest Weeks 38, 19 Sept 52)
purge:
Comment: Recent indications have pointed strongly to the probability that the Hungarian Workers Party has been conducting a general screening of its membership since last February when a Central Committee directive demanded higher qualifications for admission. The revelation that all membership cards are being reviewed and the recent convocation of all local party units strongly implies that a purge on the low and middle levels is in progress.

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Comment: Although the new measure stresses livestock breeding it appears that the government intends to build up collective farm livestock holdings by the transfer of animals from free peasants who still possess a large share of the country's livestock. The peasants then lacking necessary farm animals may be more easily forced into cooperatives. However, it is too early to attempt to determine the government's exact goals.
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9.
First medium antiaircraft battery observed in.Pest area of Budapest: The US Army Attache in Budapest reports observing the first 85 mm antiaircraft battery in'the Ujpest district of Budapest. (S USARMA Budapest L 2939, 12 Sept 52)
-
Comment: Only light automatic antiaircraft weapons have 'previBUITTeen observed on the east bank of the Danube. This report indicates further extension of the air defenses of Budapest. Two Hungarian antiaircraft artillery divisions are known to be stationed in the Budapest area, but semipermanent emplacements had not been observed until April of
this year.
10.
Annual call-up initiated in Poland on schedule: The US Army Attache in Warsaw reports that the induction ofconscripts of the class of 1932 has begun. Groups of young men under the command of non-commissioned officers are appearing daily at the military hospital in Warsaw for physical examination. (S USARMA Warsaw MA 127-52, 22 Sept 52)
Comment: The reported call-up follows the pattern prescribed in the 1950 decree on military service. The inductees registered for the second time in March of this year and were notified on 18 August of their approaching induction.
11.
Polish Catholic newspaper advocates participation in electiW An editorial in an authoritative and independent Polish Catholic newspaper has called upon Polish Catholics to drop their "political negativism" and participate in the October elections. The editorial warned Church members not to listen to foreign elements advocating resistance and sabotage, since this might lead to "harsher governmental systems." It cautioned Catholics, however, to take care that the exercise of the officially guaranteed religious liberties is not lessened. The writer said Catholics should act according to the present situation in Poland, but should remember the inkportance of the ideological differences between Communism and Catholicism. (A FBIS Warsaw, 23 Sept 52)
Comment: This apparent concession to government policy is inIEEFF0 contrast to the attitude displayed last month by Archbishop Wyszynski, when he vigorously protested government seizures of lower seminaries. It may reflect recognition of the fact that a display of open resistance to the elections

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by Catholics, who make up over 95 percent of the population, would doubtless provoke severe retaliation on the Church. The Church has previously gone along with government policies without endorsing them, thus avoiding an open conflict. The newspaper, the weekly organ of the Archdiocese of Krakow, is widely read and considered to represent the views of the Church hierarchy.
12.
Comment: Poland has had some success in purchasing merchant ships from Western countries, but not enough' have been acquired to provide adequate cargo space for shipping, especially to the Far East.
13.
Rumania reportedl, sets up a Ministry of State Security: According to the Unite. Press, the Rumanian Government has announced that the former Ministry of the Interior has been divided into a Ministry of Internal Affairs and a new Ministry (U New York Times, 22 Sept 52) of State Security.
25X1C
Comment: There is no confirmation of this move as yet, all the although Satellitercountries are dividing their Interior distries according to the Soviet pattern. Poland since 1945 and Czechoslovakia since 1950 have had such a division. The other Satellites still carry security administrations within their Interior Ministries.
I

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6
Plans for Plans call for increases in Polish shipping: Minister of increases in Polish shipping were outlined by 2 SepNavigation PopIel at a Gdansk maritime conference on tember, according to the American Embassy in Warsaw. Cargo tonnage and vessels for transport are to rise 12 and 10 percent respectively, and cargo norms have been raised to meet the planned increase in cargo volume. Emphasis is being placed on measures to improve the efficiency and reduce the cost of shipping, such as more repairs by crew members and (R Warsaw Joint Reeka 90, the reduction of demurrage charges. 10 Sept 52)
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FAR EAST
15.
Peiping regime avoids large paper money issues: A source who len-Tientsin in August has reported that most of the currency in use was old and worn. He did not feel, therefore, that the Communist authorities were issuing much new paper (C Hong Kong Desp 410, 22 Aug 52) money. The comments of this observer support other Comment: evideWEFTErt the Peiping regime is able to finance its high military expenditures without resort to large issues of paper money. The Communists themselves claim to be operating on a balanced budget.
16.
Central-South China military headquarters reportedly moved China military to Cara-6E7 The headquarters of the Central-South apparently moved from Hankow to Canton area and 4th Field Army the separate South China during July, preparatory to abolishing General Yeh Chien-ying, commander military district command. of the South China military district, is the commander of the 25X1C newly established headquarters. 22 Sept 52)
1
With commander Lin Piao of the Central-South Comment: military area and the 4th Field Army absent from his command and possibly in Peiping for the last few months, the Chinese Communist press has been listing yeh Chien-ying as "acting commander" of the area and army the area and army headquarters have movel to 25X1C Canton, Yeh's headquarters as commander of the South China military district, governor of Kwangtung, and secretary of the Communist Party's South China sub-bureau. SECRET
I
Effects of UN air offensive in Korea reported: The North Korean Army headquarters has issued a report stating that during the period from 23 June to 15 August UN air attacks caused three times as much damage as in the previous two years, The report'stated 25X1C that 52 cities and 520 villages had been comPletely or partially destroyed, with 9,000 civilians killed. The situation was allegedly discussed at a meeting of a Communist-tront organization chareed with drafting propaganda to counter the air offensive. 123 Sept 52) 25X1C Comment: These are the first purported enemy statistics on thriffects of the intensified UN air campaign.
14.
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It is not yet clear whether the headquarters of the Central-South military area or only the headquarters of the It is also possible 4th Field Army has- moved to Canton. both headquarters have moved. that merely elements of one or headquarters have invariably Military area and field army been loeated in the seats of regional governments, and there is no evidence to date that the Central-South Military Administrative Committee, the top governing organ of the region, has moved to Canton. SOUTHEAST ASIA Indonesian official despairs of negotiated New Guinea Information Minister Mononutu in speeches in settlFERTE: Central Java stated that there is no hope of a negotiated settlement in the New Guinea dispute with the Dutch. He said that the Indonesian people themselves are responsible for this development since they have not worked for a spirit of unity in the country, thereby making Indonesia appear (R FBIS Djakarta, 23 Sept 52) weak.
Comment: Queen Juliana's throne speech of 16 September, although inviting renewed negotiations with Indonesia on the Netherlands-Indonesian Union, failed to mention further discussion on New Guinea.
17.
It is possible that the Indonesian Government, realizing its poor bargaining position, is testing popular response to the probable failure to obtain Netherlands New Guinea.
SOUTH ASIA
18.
Pro-Communist Indian delegate appointed to UN General Assembly: The announced appointment of V. K. Krishna Menon to rndia's UN General Assembly delegation suggests that Indian Communists will soon have direct prior information regarding the positions to be taken in General Assembly sessions by India and other nations with whom it has friendly contacts.

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Krishna Menon, who until recently was Indian High Commissioner in London, is violently anti-American and proHe has been connected with a scandal involving Communist. the purchase of jeeps for the Indian Government. Menon, a close confidant pf Prime Minister Nehru, was a member of India's UN delegation in 1946 and 1947 and reportedly advised his colleagues to vote with the USSR on such issues as disarmament.
19.
Saudi Arabia protests flight of British aircraft over dispurEa-hrea: Saudi Arabia has delivered a note to Great pritain piOrilting the flight of aircraft over the disputed Buraimi area, near the entrance to the Persian Gulf. The note maintains that the act violates Saudi Arabian sovereignty and threatens, unless such activities cease, that the (S Jidda case will be referred to the UN Security Council. 165, 22 Sept 52)
Part of the Buraimi area is claimed by the BritiNE=TRTected Sultan of Muscat. On 15 September the British Charge in Jidda presented to King Ibn Saud a note protesting the presenre of Saudi Arabian troops in the area
Comment:

NEAR EAST - AFRICA
SECRET
Krishna Menon'S appointment to the General Assembly, like that of.K. M. Panikkar as Indian Ambassador to Cairo, places a veiy influential pro-Communist in a strategic position. (Factual data from: U New Delhi 1246, 22 Sept; 1262, 23 Sept 52)
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20.
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British army chief favors evacuating troops from Suez base: Britain's Secretary of State for War, Brigadier Head, WE3conferred in the Suez Canal zone on 18 September with British Ambassador Stevenson, believes that all British troops, with the exception of "technical" and RAF fighter units, should be evacuated from the zone. According to Ambassador Caffery, the low morale of the (S Cairo 765, troops is a primary British consideration. 23 Sept 52)
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IComment:
In the past Great Britain has rejected suggestions that even a token withdrawal should be undertaken in order to facilitate a settlement of the Anglo-Egyptian dispute.
21
Comment: Shell's plan, as well as the proposed construction UT-17-7Wtinery by AIOC at Aden, indicates that the major British oil companies may not anticipate early access to Abadan's 500,000 barrels per day production. The estimated Shell production would be approximately 25,000 barrels per day. The company probably contemplates using Kuwait crude
oil.

SECRET
10
Shell Oil plans major Kenya refinery: The Shell Oil Compairii-planning a 40,000,000 pound sterling refinery at Mombasa in Kenya as a partial substitute for Abadan. According to a Shell Oil-Kenya Government joint announcement on 5 September, this refinery will be the largest in Africa. Significantly, it will be built in a British colony and will probably supply African, Middle Eastern and Far Eastern markets. (R Pretoria Desp 150, 12 Sept 52)
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22
East Germans ma be ready to discuss restitution with Israel: yo an e'poss Comment ng on press stories regar ng AMeridan represents-. Israelitailt German restitution agreement, tives'in Berlin assert thilt the German Democratic 11613011c (GDR)may,beprpared to negotiate With Israel. _If So, they State, the question.of_Israeli,recognition_of.the GDR_mill_proliably arise befOre negotiations start, or shortly thereafter. They believe that the GDR might ask for trade talks in return for such a restitution agreement.
Comment: Despite some internal opposition to dealing with any Germans, Israel may try for a restitution agreementsimilar to that reached recently with West Germany. Though the GDR Agriculture Minister has said that his government has no basic objections to negotiations with Israel, the East Germans, in contrast to the West Germans, would probably demand substantial Israeli concessions.
23
Communists make all-out effort to delay contractuals: The US High Commissioner's office in Berlin believes that the East German delegation's letter to the Bundestag and the East German press reaction to the delegation's visit to Bonn represent an allout Communist effort to divide West Germany from its allies and to delay the EDC and contractual agreements. HICOG considers that the letter's omission or under-emphasis of controversial issues, and the proposals for three separate commissions to consider a peace treaty, sn all-German government and flection conditions, are hints of Soviet readiness to compro(C Berlin 483, 23 Sept 52) mise. It is very doubtful that the Kremlin is ready to Comment: It is, howcomplartilerfte own position on the German problem. ever, supporting East German efforts to delay ratification of EDC and the contractuals, as indicated by an article distributed by TASS on 23 September stating that the East German letter marks the beginning of all-German negotiations. The Kremlin apparently has given the initiative to the East German Government, which can make compromising and conciliatory proposals without committing the USSR.
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11
The head of the East German Christian Democratic Party told West German newspapermen on 20 September that Israel had not yet approached the GDR on the restitution matter. (S Berlin 489, 23 Sept 52)
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24.
Bonn dissidents reported to have suggested visit of East German Volkskammer delegation: The 19 September visit of the Eastfierman_Volkskammer_delegates to Bonn- was originally sug-
,4eSted Sua group of 13 Bundestaddputies, according to:Hermann

EtZ614 S_BaVarlan Patty Bmndestag-member:. Etzel_states-that a Secret letter mias sent-to the testGerSaigoVerniont lAsit June :Stigned by .the_13Jie1egates,-alniembers of the coalitionpartiesor of the Bavarian Party which normally votes with the coalition.
One Volkskammer delegate came to Bonn on 10 September to lay the groundwork for the later visit of the whole delegation. He talked with Etzel and eight other Bundestag members, but failed in his attempts to contact 30 more members. (S Bonn 1317, 23 Sept 52)
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Comment:
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25.
Aden:mar discourages Saar parties on return of territory to GermaiFT-M recent conversations with the leaders of three unauthorized pro-German parties in the Saar, West German Chancellor Adenauer emphasized Europeanization as the only practical solution of the Saar problem. The party leaders, who had counted on encouragement for their "home in the Reich" line, were gravely
disappointed.
Comment: Adenauer is not known ever to have encouraged the pOlterof an outright return of the Saar to Germany, but raiher has consistently promoted Europeanization ever since he proposed it last March. He does not, however, have the wholehearted support Of even his own party, much less of the minor coalition parties.
26.
Noting that the leader of Adenauer's party in the Bundestag also favors EurOpeanilation, American representatives in Bonn believe that these developments constitute real progress, however slight, offering the possibility of postponing a final Saersettlement Until the establishment of a European political community provides the frame for the Saar'S Europeanization. (S Frankfurt Sitrep 36, 24 Sept 52)
Lar e-scale diversion of Austrian aluminum

American m assy o
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quantity of raw aluminum ingots produced by the United Aluminum Works of Ranshofen has been diverted to the Orbit. According to preliminary investigation, about 1,000 tons of aluminum have been exported to well-known East-West traders in Switzerland, Sweden, and Belgium, and bave probably been traneshipped-through Switzerland and Antwerp. Additibnal orders from the same firms for 5,450 tons of aluminum have not been filled pending end-use checks directed by the Embassy. The aluminum diversion was suspected last spring when applications for Austrian export licenses ceased. Inquiry revealed that the exports were being authorized under a special "customs processing arrangement" which permitted the licensing of exports (S Vienna 819, by a regional yffice of the Ministry of Finance. 22 Sept 52)
25X1C
Comment. c;---1150 to 200 tons of aluminum were being diverted zec oslovakia each month from the Ranshofen plant. ments were allegedly routed to Czechoslovakia on the "fraudulently obtained end-use certificates" through Switzerland, and Antwerp.
to The shipbasis of Trieste,
25X1C
27.
French Communists reportedly planning vigorous anti-American Communist activity tactics: 25X1C against Americans in France will be renewed in October with progressively increasing vigor.
I I
A propaganda effort to represent Americans as enemies of the French will be started in port areas and will lead up to a mass demonstration and a march on the American Consulate at Bordeaux. Plans for November and December call for French nationals to provoke more serious incidents with individual Americans and for the sabotage of American troop trains and equipment. (S CINCUSAFE Wiesbaden ECIGC 7236, 19 Sept 52)
Comment: There is no other information to substantiate thie FeTTOIT The plan as reported would be a reversal of the trend in current French Communist policy, which since the failure of the May demonstrations has been to avoid direct action, to emphasize the workers' economic demands, and to employ unitedfront tactics.
28.
Italy's attitude toward EDC ratification clarified: Prime Minister de Gasperi did not mean to imply in his 16 September speech to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe
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that ratification of the EDC treaty should await the Creation of the proposed European political community, according to Italy's representative on the EDC Interim Commission. The Italian Government does, however, believe that the IOC will not fanctiOn effectively until a European political community is edtablished and that progress toward that ohjeCtive would help parliamentary ratification. A further obstacle tO early ratification is De Gasperi's view that the paesage of a new electoral law has priority over EDC legislation. (C Strasbourg 90, 23 Sept 52)
'
29.
Leaders of Italian Democratic Socialists' left wing may join Cucchi-Magnani movement: Current talks between ex-Communist Magnani and Democratic Socialist left-win& leaders Codignola and Greppi suggest that the latter are considering bolting their party to join the Movement of Italian Labor (MLI). Codignola, who controls about 10 percent of his party's strength, recently assailed other Democratic Socialist leaders for not taking an unequivocal stand in favor of the proportional representation system.
The American Embassy in Rome comments that an announcement of such a move would probably be deferred until the party congress which opens on 4 October. (C Rome 1283, 23 Sept 52; S Rome Joint Weeks 38, 19 Sept 52)
Comment:
allegolli-Iiia May that the MLI, having failed to draw adherents
from the Communists and Nenni Socialists, was raiding his party and "buying over" left-wing leaders.
30.
Spanish press reportedly told to begin new anti-US campaign: According to a source considered reliable by the American Charge d'Affaires in Tangier, all newspapers in Spain have been instructed to begin immediately a violent anti-United States caMpaign based on current US-Spanish negotiations. (C Tangier 114, 23 Sept 52) SECRET
14
Comment: Since the Communists and Nenni Socialists are expected to.filibuster, and since the center parties have natiOnal congresses scheduled during the neat three months, it is Unlikely that the EDC treaty will be ratified at Rome in the near future. Progress toward European political integration would help De Gasperi stem the increasing dissatisfaction both within and outside the government with his foreign policies.
The secretary of the Democratic Socialist Party
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Comment: Although such a campaign would be'a departUre from the rather friendly attitude shown by the Spanish press only two-weeks ago, it would hot be inconSistent with eaklier -Anti-US propaganda in Spain. The.government may.have issued Stith instkuctiOns to justify the leek of rogress in its negotiations with the United States.
LATIN AMERICA
31.

SECRET
Brazilian Communists waging campaign against US-Brazilian military agreement: Brazilian Communists are,pressing Congressmen _to _ oppose ratification of the US-Brazilian military assietance agreement. A "peace" petition, which includes an attack on the agreement, already has 4,000,000 signatures
25X1C
25X1C
Nevertheless, the American Embassy reports, indications are that the Brazilian Congress will ratify the agreement with few opposing votes. Obstructionists have so far been delaying ratification by such measures as a demand for full translation of all pertinent United States legislative acts. (C Rio de Janeiro Joint Weeka 38, 23 Sept 52)
Comment: Although the Communists have been campaigning against the military assistance agreement, they are apparently not cognizant Of the secret part of the agreement known as the Military Plan.
32.
Democratic-Action Party reportedly threatens revolt in Nenezuela: A recent pamphlet attributed to the outlawed Democratic Action'Tarty (AD) warns that there will be an armed revolt in Venezuela if the government persists in making a "farce" of the elections scheduled for 30 November. The US Embassy at Caracas and various Venezuelan officials believe that there may be some trouble in the next two months, 'buethat the government will be able to Control it. Many observers see the tone and content of the pamphlet as an indication of "increased Communist influence" on AD thinking. (C Caracas Weeks 38, 16 Sept 52)
Comment: The pamphlet, if it is actually an AD publication, repralliiiri shift in the party's public Stand against violence, but is not necesSarily a sign of "increased Communist influence."
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Communist handbills during the past, year have repeatedly denounced violence as a political weapon.
25X1C
Although the AD denied any implication in last October's uprisings, there is considerable evidence to the contrary, and IAD activities in the Caribbean area suggest that another attempt, either just before oi shortly after the election, may be planned. Such an-attempt could scarcely .succeed without at least some army support, which the AD does not appear to have.

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25 September 1952
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CIA No. 49819

Copy No.
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HR70-14 HR70-14
Correction C o r r e c t i o n to t o 25 26 September article a r t i c l e - on o n China-Korea China-Korea air air Article 4 in Special to activity: activ'ity: Article in the the S p e c i a l lateiligence Ih ' t e l l i g e n c e Supplement t o the Current Digest September, reporting t he C u r r e n t Intelligence Inteltigence D i g e s t of 25 S eptember, r eporting a decline air activity over China and Korea Korea d during d e c I i n e in i n Communist a ir a ctivity o ver C h i n a and uring t h e week e n d i n g 19 S e p t e m b e r , was based the ending September, based on on communications communications intelligence did not reflect information from other eflect i nformation f rom o ther i n t e l l i g e n c e alone a l o n e and d id n ot r sources. s ources.
7. 7.
A c c o r d i n g to to F a r East E a s t Air A i r Force, F o r c e , the t h e number number of' According Far of Communist planes by UN p pilots over p l a n e s actually a c t u a l l y sighted s i g h t e d and engaged by ilots o v e r Korea durirgthe higher noted navigational a u r i a t h e period was h i g h e r than than n o t e d on n a v i g a t i o n a l netnetw o r k s . . Although A l t h o u g h only o n l y 21 works 2 1 flights f l i g h t s per p e r day d a y were r reported e p o r t e d on n a v i g a t i o n a l network6_ network&. in i n Korea, Korea during h e week n d i n g 29 19 navigational during tthe week e ending S September, e p t e m b e r , UN pilots encountered e n c o u n t e r e d and engaged a d daily aily a average verage of 64 Communist aircraft a i r c r a f t that t h a t week. week.
Soviet S o v i e t aircraft a i r c r a f t active a c t i v e off. o f f . Hokkaido Hokkaldo coast: c o a s t : Radar tracks tracks indiciTe-that Hoviet air flights i n d i c a t e t h a t on on 20 20 September September -fen ten S oviet a ir f l i g h t s crossed t he d e m a r c a t i o n line l i n e between the t h e Kuril K u r i l Islands I s l a n d s and and Hokkaido, Hokkaido, the demarcation with of penetration p e n e t r a t i o n ranging r a n g i n g up u,p to t o 15 15 miles. miles. On 24 w i t h depths d e p t h s of September a a single s i n g l e aircraft a i r c r a f t flew f l e w beyonti beyon@ ttheline heline f o r 56 m inutes. for minutes. American F-84's which intercepted i n t e r c e p t e d two flights f l i g h t s were u unable n a b l e to to o v e r t a k e the t h e intruders. intruders. overtake
I '
Far F a r East E a s t Air A i r Force F o r c e believes b e l i e v e p that t h a t the t h e objective o b j e c t i v e of of this this activity a c t i v i t y may be either e i t h e r reconnaissance r e c o n n a i w a n c e or the t h e testing t e s t i n g of US air d e f e n s e s and a n d radar. r a d a r . (S ( S CINCFE T e l e c o n , 25 25 Sept S e p t 52) 52) defenses Telecon,
strait Comment: Since S i n c e the the s t r a i t is is less less than t h a n 20 20 miles miles wide wide at narrowest a t its its n a r r o w e s t point, p o i n t , some of of thdse the'se flights f l i g h t s must must have have -
e xtended o v e r Japanese J a p a n e s e territory. territory. extended over
During D u r i n g ' August there t h e r e was one o n e Soviet S o v i e t overflight o v e r f l i g h t of northnorthclose approach a p p r o a c h to t o the t h e coast coast of of e astern B o k k a i d o , and and one one close eastern Hokkaido, pursuit of US r reconnaissance airc e n t r a l Japan. Ja.pan. Both involved involved p u r s u i t of econnaissance a ircentral c r a f t and and may have have been been inadvertent. i n a d v e r t e n t . The concentration c o n c e n t r a t i o n of of craft planes duration of one ohe of the i n this t h i s latest l a t e s t operation o p e r a t i o n and the the d u r a t i o n of p l a n e s in Except for the f l i g h t s suggest s u g g e a t that t h a t it i t was was planned. p l a n n e d . Exce.pt t h e instances instances flights cited, Hokkaido-Kuril c i t e d , Soviet S o v i e t aircraft a i r c r a f t have obsdrved o b s k r v e d the t h e Hokkaido-Kuril demarcation d e m a r c a t i o n line. line.
NR
26 Sept S e p t 52 52
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Central I n t e l l i g e n c e Agency Intelligence Office of of Current I ntelligence Intelligence 9322, 1 1 October October 1952 1952
DAILY D A I L Y
Military Operations
KOREAN K O R E A N 1 HULLETIN B,ULLETIN
e
in tht ROK Division Division s sector east central Heavy fighting f i g h t i n g continued i n t h t 6th ROK e c t o r on the e aet c entral attacks Communists succeeded in After three a t t a c k s the Chinese Communist8 front on 30 September. fkont on 30 September. After forcing t h e withdrawal of o m one the of South 'SouthKorean Koreantroops troopsf rfrom oneoutpost outpostposition. position. An An fighting enassault against another another ACK ROK outpost outpost was was repulsed. repulsed. The savage f ighting enemy assault against To the the east, e a s t , in in closed to t o hand-to-hand hand-to-hand range range in i n the the early early morning morning of of 1 1October. October. To 3rd Division sector, sector, t the fighting of the the previous day day continued. continued. the 3 r d ROK Division h e heavy f i g h t i n g of Action ceased evening of of 30 30 SepteMber September with both sides remaining in in their their Action ceased the t h e evening positions. employed 32,326 rounds of of mortar and and a artillery enr t i l l e r y fire during positions. The enemy the period. period.
Ulf Ulcarrier-based carriex4xised paanes planes flew flew a a reported reported 207 207 sorties sorties on on 30 30 SepteMber. September. Re= Rsports have have not not yet y e t been been received received regarding regarding west west coast coast air a i r activity. a c t i v i t y . Surface vessels installavessels maintained nmintained the blockade and bombarded enemy e n w troop and supply installac tions in the Wonsan on the e east and a at Amgak U o n s in t h e vicinity of of Chaho and Woman a s t coast and t m k on the west west coast. coast.
UN land-based aircraft aircraft flew flew 1,070 1,070 effective e f f e c t i v e sorties sorties on on 30 30 September, September, of of UN71sndbased
wthich 688 were were combat. Forty-eight medium bombers attacked a n enemy ehemieal chemical an which 688 combat. Forty-eight a t Namsanp-ni Namsan-ni near h e Sino-Korean border. Observed Observed bomb hits hits were on on plant at plant near t the Sino-Korean border. target. Although enepy eneqy fighters f i g h t e r s were were observed, observed, no attack was made and no no UN Urm t a r g e t . Although l t F-86 i n t e r c e p t o r s observed observed only only 24 2 . 414I0-151s MIG15's aircraft a i r c r a f t were were lost l o s t on on the t h e raid. raid. U UN P-86 interceptors during during the t h e period period of of which which ten ten were were encountered, encountered, with with 2 2 damaged. damaged. During During the the
morning morning of of 30 30 September, September, UN UN aerial aerial observers observers sighted 200 enemy swept-wing swept-wing fighters f i g h t e r s on on Tatungkuo Tatungkuo and and Antung Antung airfields. airfields.
General Oeneral Situation

Cease-Fire Cease-Fir0
A new o have A. new prisoner prisoner of of war war incident incident is is reported reported tto have broken broken out out on on Cheju Cheju Island Prisoner casualties c a s u a l t i e s are are claimed claimed to t o have have totaled totaled Island off off southwestern southwestern Korea. Korea. Prisoner 45 45 dead and and 100 100 to t o 120 120 wounded. wounded. (The (!he demonstration for demonstration apparently apparently was timed for 1 October to t o coincide with t h e 3rd Anniversary of h e founding of t h e Peiping 1 the of t the the regime,) regime

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No.0 7 Jill
1978
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Political PoUtica&
According to agency, Prime Minister C Chang Taek,eang sub= sUbBooording to a a Japanese Japnese news agency, h a w Taehang mitted 30 September, SepteMber, citing ill health as mitted his hi8 resignation resignation to t o President President Rhee on 30 (nee may as a pretext the his hie reaSom. reason. (Wee my have have forced forced Chang into i n t o resigning, using aa recent widespread Minister had made widespread rumors rumors and and press reports that that the Prime Hnieter special special arrangements arrangements for for a a Japanese Japanese "spy "spg ring" ring" to t o enter enter Korea.) Korea.)
chaw

Securiiq Information
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Security Information Central Intelligence Agency Agency Office of of Current Current Intelligence 9323, 2 2 October October 1952 1952 9323,
D A I L Y KOREAN K O R E A & BULLETIN B U L L E T I U DAILY
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' y l r
Military Operations
m AMIE
in central Korea, Action continued heavy in i n the ROK 3rd Division sector i n east c e n t r a l Korea. to A South South Korean Korean company company attempted attempted on on 30 30 September September and and 1 1October t o recapture the smU. prominence Fominence taken taken by by the the Chinese Chinese last last weekend. weekend, Although Although fighting fighting was very small heavy by North heavy, the ROK's failed to retake the position. the R W s f a i l e d t o retake t h e position, Another probe by heavy, Korean in east, but was Korean elements took place in i n the U3 16 45th Division sector i n the east,
repulsed. The enemy of a artillery and mortar mortar fire i in enemy used over 500 500 rounds of r t i l l e r g and n support of this attack. of considerable duration, duration, took of attack. Extensive ESrtensive patrol patrol contacts, contacts, some of place in in other other UR IPJ divisional divisional sectors sectors along along the the front, front.
Reports on on UN lJB naval n a v a lair a i r operations operations for for 1 1October Surface Reports October were delayed. delayed. Surface the blockade blockade and and bombarded positions and troop vessels maintained maintained the vessels boMbarded gun gun positions troop and and harbor i n s t a l l a t i o n s in i n the t h e vicinity vfcinlty of of Tanchon, o k j i n and Sinpo installations Tanchon, S Songjin Sinpo on the east east coast coast and in in the the Chodo Chodo and and Haeju Haeju areas areas in i n the the west. west. and
Air &
Aircraft under Far Far East East A i r Force Force control control flew flew 952.sorties 952 s o r t i e s on on 1 October, Aircraft under Air 1 October, 618 of of which Only mediumbomber bomber sorties, sorties, on on close close support support 618 which were were tormbat. combat. Gay 33 medium missions and leaflet leaflet drops, drops, were were flown. flown. I misaions and Na i r c m f t observed UN aircraft observed only 6 6 enany enemy MIG-IS*a during the the period, period, and and none none were were encountered, encountereel. NIG-15's during
General Situation General
Radio Pyongyang Fyongyans on on 1 1October October broadcast Radio broadcast a North Korean Korean cabinet cabinet decision decision which exempts exempts indigent indigent farmers farmers from from paying paying taxes taxes in in kind kind on on the the remenDder of which remainder of the 1952 1952 crope c r o p and and from f'rom all a l l unpaid unpaid taxes taxes on on crops crops prior prior to t o 1951. 1951. The ddcision decision W S promulgated wEmnilgated "in "in order order to t o improve improve the l i v i n g condition was living condition of of poor poor farmers farmers and and t o insure jnsure suecessfUl succsssful preparations preprations for f o r farming farming next next year." yearof* (Taxes in n to (Taxes. in kind kind iin North Korea, Korea, levied levied on on estimated estimated rather oa a North rather than than actual actual yield, yield, had had amounted amounted t to staggering staggering portion portion of of the t h e farmers' farmers' crops. crops. This This new new move further confirms the further confirms the d i r e straits straits of of the the North North Korean Korean agricultural agricultural situation.) situation.) dire
THEC.I.A. HASNO BJECTION THE C. I. A. HAS NOO OBJECTION

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TO E C L A S S I F I C A T I O N OF TO THE THE D DECLASSIFICATION OF

THIS DOCUMENT. THIS DOCUMENT.
Seouri4 S w u r i t y Info Info
No.
NO. 7 7 JUL JUL 1978 1978
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t ion tion
Information Security I nformtion
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Central I n t e l l i g e n c e Agency Intelligence Agency Office ntelligence Office of of Current Current I Intelligence 9324, 3 3 October 1952 1952 9324,
DAILY D A I L Y
Military Operations Operations
KOREAN, BULLETI KOREAN. B U L L E T I
n the No report On r e p o r t was was received received concerning concerning naval naval air a i r sorties s o r t i e s for for 2 2 October. October. O e a s t coast coast UN UN surface surface units units bombarded bombarded shore shore installations i n s t a l l a t i o n s from from Tanchon Tanchon to t o Wonsan, Wonsan, east while while in i n the t h e west the the Chinnampo Chinnampo area area was was attacked. attacked.
Air
O n 2 2 October UR Wland-based i r c r a f t flew 654 f f e c t i v e sorties On land-based a aircraft 654 e effective sorties of of which which 331 t o t a l of 16 16 medium medium bomber bomber missions missions were were flown, flown, 11 U of o f the the 331 were were combat. combat. A total t h e period, a i r c r a f t attacking aircraft attacking a a supply supply center center in i n north north central c e n t r a l Korea. Korea, During period, During the 33 enemy enemy MIG's MIG's were were observed observed and and 6 6 encountered encountered in i n the t h e Yalu Yalu River River area. area. UN UN 33 pilots p i l o t s destroyed one one NIG N I G and and damaged damaged two two others. others,
Military Militarg Intelligence Intelligence
crew of The crew of a US I S B-29 over Sinanju i in n northwestern Korea Korea on 27 27 September SepteMber The observed from From 4 4 to to 6 6 salvos salvos of of what w h a t appeared appeared to t o be be ground-to-air ground-to-air rockets. rockets. The observed d s s l l e s , trailing trailing a a 10-foot lOIroot exhaust, exhaust, reached a a bursting altitude a l t i t u d e of of 20,000 20,OOO to to missiles, 24,000 feet feet in i n from from three t h r e e to t o five f i v e seconds. seoonds. The Tho US t6 aircraft a i r c r a f t was not damaged.
Far ground-toFar East East Air A i r Forces comments comments that t h a t previously meviously reported Communist ground-t* air a i r rockets rockets burst b u r e t at a t from from 10,000 10,000 to t o 15,000 15,000 feet. f e e t . All A l l such such antiaircraft a n t i a i r c r a f t unpunguided missile missile fire fire has has been been ineffective. ineffective. The The greater g r e a t e r range range of of these these latest latest guided rockets suggests suggests that t h a t missiles missiles similar 6imihr t o the t h e German y be n limited rockets to German tlTaifuntt "Taifun" m may be i in limited use use in in Korea. Korea.

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Enemy E n e m materiel materiel
fighting place i in ROK I1 II Corps Corps s sector The heaviest f i g h t i n g on 1 1 October October took place n the ROK e c t o r iin n east central all three ROK front-line front-line divisions divisions repulsed repulsed probing probing east c e n t r a l Korea where a ll t h r e e ROK attacks. The ROK Hill to the attacks. ROK 3rd 3rd Division' Division won back H i l l 748, 748, llost ost t o t h e Chinese last Monday, after over 2 24 of hand-to-hand hand-to-hand action.Both actionaoth the 4 hours of the South South Koreans Koreans and and their troops i in conflict nearly r regithe enemy Chinese had reinforced t h e i r troops n tthis his c o n f l i c t tto o nearly eamental strength. Late however, another strong Chinese counterhowever, cOuntera t e on 2 October, October, mental strength. I attack action continued at t the a t t a c k against a g a i n s t the t h e hill h i l l developed and the t h e aotion h e end of the report west, the r e p o r t period. period. In In the t h e west, t h e US 1st 1st Marine Division Division received six six separate separate attacks heaviest took place place southeast of of Kaesong Kaesong probing a t t a c k s along along their t h e i r front. front. The heaviest Where to withdraw a after an hour's f fight. where a Chinese Chinese battalion b a t t a l i o n forced Marine elements t o withdraw fter a n hour's ight.
Securitftrmation Security %tion I

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THE C.I.A. C . I . A . HAS NO OBJECTION THE TO DECLASSIFICATION OF T O THE TH5 D3CLASSIFICATION OF THIS DOCUMENT. THIS
7 HAS NO OBJECTION
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Nc0. 7 Jill 1q78
General S ituation General Situation
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Noe C
Securittmation
Economic
I US E observers report report a a s significant ignificant r retail e t a i l price price change change iin n tthe h e past past week weak invo/ving ercent drop drop involving a a 3.5 3 . 5 percent percent decrease decreass in in rice r i c e prices prices in I n Pusan Pusan and and 3.3 3.3 P percent i n Seoul. in Seoul. The change is all the the more more s significant since iit is over over aa month month bebe i g n i f i c a n t since t is the will be completed, completed, and and r rice stocks are are n normally at fore t h e new harvest \dl1 i c e stooks omlly a t ttheir heir level at a t this this time. time. lowest level
Security Izirerination tion

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Central Central Intelligence Intelligence Agency Agency Office of ntelligence of Current Current I Intelligence 9325, 9325, 4 4 October 1952 1952
DAILY D A I L Y
Military Operations Military Operatione
KOREAN K O R E A N BULL.ETIN BULLETIN
A=
the 1st Marine Marina Division Division s sector the On 3 3 October heavy fighting occurred in the e c t o r on t he western front f r o n t where the t h e Chinese CommUnists Communists engaged South Korean marine corps units. units. After a nine-hour fight, t the UNtroops nine-hour fight, h e UN troops were were forced forced to to withdraw w4thWaw from from their.outpost t h e i r outpost positions. The South Koreans mounted three abortive abortive counterattacks, counterattacks; e each positions a c h ' lasting laeting about two hours. hours. The heavy heavy fighting fighting continued continued at at the the end end of of the.report the report period. period. The about tim enemy employed 8,492 rounds round8 of of artillery a r t i l l e r y ind and mortar mortar fire f i r e against against the UN UN troops in in emplOyed.8492 this t h i s seCtor. s e c t o r , Elsewhere along along the the front, front, scattered ecattered probe6 a t r o l clashes were probes and p patrol reported. reported.
A still e t i l l incomplete total total on UN naval sorties sorties is is 213, 213, including including 12 close support 1 missions by the lst ~l86iOns 1st Marine Marine Air Wing. Wirg. Planes Planes from from Task Task Force Force 77, '17, off eupport off the the Korean east eaet coast, coaet, attacked attacked Nanam, Nanam, Songjin SongJin and t h e Important ail l i n e between Korean the important r rail line Yangdok Yangdok and and Wonsan. Woman. Blockade Blockade ships ships bombarded bombarded an an area area near near Tanchon. Tanchon. Report8 from Reports from the west werrt coast have have been been delayed. delayed.
Air
UIV land-based lend-based aircraft a i r c r a f t under under Far Far East A i r Force control control flew effective UN Air flew 993 993 effective sorties s o r t i e s on on 3 3 October October of of which which 628 628 were were combat. combat. During During the t h e report r e p o r t period, 107 107 enemy enemy MIG's MIG's were were destroyed dertroyed and and 6 6 reported reported damaged. w e d . A total total of of 22 22 bomber bomber missions ~88lOnS flown during during the t h e night, night, 18 18 of of which attacked troop troop installations i n s t a l l a t i o n s at a t Yonpo, were flown Yonpo, near near Hungnam. Hungnam.

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THEC.I:A. THE C.I:A. HASNOOBJECTION HAS NO OBJECTION DECLASSIFICATION T O THE THZ DECLASSIFICATION OF OF TO -THIS THIS DOCUMENT.
110. 7' JUL 197
Security Info
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Central Central Intelligence Agezray Agency Office of Current Current Intelllgenae Intelligence 9896, 9896, 6 6 October 1952 1952
D A I L Y
Idlitary Operations
DAILY KOREAN K O R E A N BULLETIN B U L L E T I N
a
US let lst Marhe Marine Division Heavy fighting fighting continued contimed over wm the weekend in the Ifi; Chinese wpture capture of a a h hill i l l southeast of sector sector in in western western Korea. Korea. Following the Chinees Kaesong last last week, week, the Marines attempted attempted on Saturday Saturday and and Sunday Sunday tto the Xaesong o rretake e a the furious Chinese resletance, resistance, position position without without success. e~nccese, Both Both attempts attempts were were met by furioua rho sector, the % Marines supported by artillery supported artillery and and mortar mortar fire. f i r e , Elsewhere in their aeotor, at an attack t to re-establish a a t the the end end of of the the report period, period, were were continuing continuing an o re-establish ntensity lost hill and Sunday, Sunday, the i intensity loet h i l l outpost outpost near near Korangpo-ri. Korangpa-Fi. On both Saturday and of patrol a activity of o t i v i t y across the the front f r o n t oontinued oontinued at at a a relatively relatively high high level. level,
UN carrier-beed carrier-based planes flew 337 337 s sorties and 398 398 eorties sorties on o r t i e s on 4 October and the following folluuing day day against against troop, troop, supply, supply, transportation and defense defense inetaUainstallations Wonsan on between Chinnampo Chinnampo ard and tiona from f i o a n Nanam Nanam to t o Woman on the Korean east coast and between Ongjin in west. Surface 0ngjI.n in the west. Surface vessels veseels during during the same same period period bombarded enemy engun at Wonsan in the between Chodo and and gun positions position8 and and supply eupply areas areaa a t Wonaan in t h e east and between Ongjin Ongjin in in the the west. west.
General Qeneral Situation Situation Political hUtiCtQ
heriaan Charge Charge Lightner Lightner reports reports that that South Korean press press comment, camnent, attriattriAmerican South Korean buted to to a a "high "high BOK Foreign Ministry Ministry official," official," regarding buted ROK Foreign regarding the most most recent recent ulll threhpoint truce truce plan plan reached reached a a new new low low l e v e l of "misinformation, "nrlsinfarnurtlon, bmUNfthree-point level irresponsibility spOnslbiUty and and irrelevance." irrelevance," Typical Tgpical of of South Korean objections objections wcas the South Korean was the
~
On 4 October aircraft Air Force control f flew On 4 October land-based laad-based a i r c r a f t under Far East A i r Force lew 941 941 effective affeetive sorties, sorties, including including 643 643 combat. combat, During During these fheae operations operations 35 35 MIG's MlG~s Alley." Two were observed obeerved and and 20 20 encountered enaountered in i n "MIG "MIG Alley." Two MIG'a were destroyed destroyed and Mins were 7 18 bomber missions were were flown, flown, 12 of 7 reportedly reportedly damaged. damaged. During During the night 18 the aircraft in north c central Korea. aircraft attacking attacking a a supply area in in Pongchongol, Pongchongol, in e n t r a l Korea, The day, 5 October, October, 918 918 effeotive effective land-baed land-based sorties sorties were were flowqof flownof The following day, which which 565 565 were were combat. oombat. A A total t o t a l of of 12 12 MIGIs MIQ's were were Observed observed and two encountered encountered and two during damaged with with no during the the period, period, One Ope MIG was damaged no loss lose to t o UN UN aircraft, a i r c r a f t . Only Only 4 bomber sorties sorties were were flown flown on on the t h e night 5-6 5-6 October and these engaged in leefboMber leaflet l e t drop drop and and photo photo reconnaissance reconnaissance missions. missions.

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comment that that the neutral zone will actually be controlled by the zone w i l l aatually controlled by t h e Communists. CoPlmunirtrr. oaamnent (The South Korean Government is opposed to any armistice plan which f fails to (The South Korean Government is opposed t o aqp armletice plan which ail6 t o unite both South Smith Korea and North Korea under under the former's control.) W t e both control.) Pronaganda
A pyongyang broadcast on on 2 2 October October gave gave Han Han S Solya Ppongyang broadcast o L p as 8 8 head head of of the the Korean Korean delegation o the Peiping h i p i n g Peace Peace Conference e . h k Chong-ae. delegation t to Conference instead of of h MMe.fek Chong-ae, The The latter's name was not mentioned in the U list of Koreana Koreans attending attending the the oonferenae. conference. latterfs e t of (Han, a member meMber of of several Horth North Korean C Communist front organizations, is ( ! a n , a d e t Front is a a e is considered fair)y influential He considered fairly influential official offiaial in in the the North North Korean Korean hierarchy. hierarahy. R to be aligned with the domestic or t o be the d mest~c or national national faction.) faction.)

Secur:tftlthation
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Security I
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Central Intelligence Intelligence Ageaajr Agency Office ntel.lipioo Office of of Current Current I Intelligence 9897, 9897, 7 7 Ootober October 1952 1952
D A I L Y
Hilitary Operations: Militam Oreratione:
DAILY KOREAN K O R E A N BULLETIN B U L L E T I M

Army dnny
Only air sorties, a all the west west coast, coast, were were flown flown on on 6 6 October October O n l y 93 9 naval a i r sorties, l l on the as carriers a8 camlers on on the the east east coast coast engaged engaged in in replenishing replenishing operations. operations. on On the the we8t west coast, the and the ??an Han River River oosst, t h e aircraft a i r c r a f t attacked attacked targets targets in in the vicinity of Haeju an8 estuary.' O n the east coaat, On coast, surface units units bombarded boMbarded shore shore installatlone installations &am from estuarg, Songjin to t o Woaean Songjin Wonsan while in were attacked. attacked. in the the west targets targets near Cho Island were
UM aircraft Air Force aontrol control flew flew 999 999 efleot$ve effeotive DgIr land-based land-baaed a i r o r a f t under Far East Air s o r t i e s on on 6 6 October October including 632 combat. A total total of of 67 67 enemy enMIGts were sorties Combat. A MIG's observed observed and and 41 4.l encountered, encountered, all aU in i n the the Chongchon-Talu ChongohoacYalu River River area. area. .UN .aEt pdlots pilots damaged four During the the damaged four enemy enemy MIOts MIGIs while while one one uNrF-86 ulcl F-86 Sabre Sabre was was destroyed. destroyed, During night, 16 16 effeative 11 aircraft a i r c r a f t attacking attacking a 8 supply rrupply night, effective bornber bomber missions missions were were fluwn, flow% 11 center aenter near near Pyongyang. Epongyang.
Military Militarcs Intelligence& Intelllnencer
On UNIFSOls on On 4 4 October October two UrJI F-801~ onreconnaissance reconnaissance near near the the front front line line in In western Korea Korea observed observed four four enemy eneqy MIG-151s MIG-1JIs flying flying over mer the the center center of of the the Kaesong Kaesong western neutral are neutral sone. aone, (Enemy (Euemy aircraft a r e rarely observed observed this this far south.) south,)

Navy bvY
In the of 6 6 October, October, Chinese Chinese Communist Communist foraes forces on on tthe western I n t h e early evening of h e western front launched a eerie8 series of heavy heavy coordinated coordinated attacks attacks agclinst against e selectoleob and central front and main Line line positions i in the'US l lst Marine, BOK a lst, US 2nd, BOK 9kh, 9th, ed outpost and n thelS et b r i n e , ROK t ,I E2 n d , ROE US 7th, BOK 6th, succeeded rS Tth, ROK 6th, and and ROK ROK Capital Capbtal Division Division sectors, seotors. The enemy ensucceeded in hcap.. aap. positions, but but was was foroed forced tto withdraw generam generally a across the turing three outpost poeitione, o withdraw aro~b fihe front. Fighting continued a at of the report report period period for for certain certain key key front. t the end of terrain features. Surprisingly little fire was wed used by by the the Carmunirta Communists l i t t l e supporting f i r e was t e r r a i n features. as artillery were reportedly reportedly reaeived received l.g~ by a s only only 10,700 1 0 , 7 0 0 rounds of mortar and a r t i l l e r y fire were UN fOl@ws. forces. m
Air
Air
d u x
Secur:tyInE5RIrmation
0 7 j
T:IE C.I.A. c. I .A. IIAS KAS T:O THE r0 OBJECTION OBJECTION
TO THE OF TO THE DECLASSIFICATION DECLASSIFICATION OF TIIIS DOCUMENT. THIS

UL 1978
' d
Security Info
ion
Agency Central Intelligence Agenoy Offiee u r r e n t Intelligenoe Office of of C Current Intelligence 9898, 9898, 8 8 October 1952 1952
DAILY D A I L Y
Military U t a r Y Oneratlons: ouerationa t
KOREAN! RULLETIN KOREAN1 E ULLLTII

Army Brnor
%vy carrier-based carriez4xtsed planes planes off the Korean Korean weat l e w 86 o r t i e s on Navy west coast Coast f flew 86 s sorties 7 October with with no no reports reports received reaeived regarding regarding east east coast coast air air operations. operations, Targets Targets 7 attacked included between Chinnampo Chinnampo and Haeju. Haeju. inoluded troop troop and supply supply installations installation8 betueen Surface transportation facilities Surface vessels veasela maintained maintained the the blockade blocikade and bombarded t ransportation f acixtie8 and gun positions iin n the and Sohori Sohori in i n the east the vicinity vicinity of of Songjin, Songjin, Tanchon, Tanchon and and and Cho Cho Island Island in in the the west. west.
Air A i r
On 7 o t a l of On 7 October October a t total of 930 930 effective effective laad-baeed land-based eorties sorties were were flown, flown, of of which which 600 600 were.combat. were combat. Same 400 of o f these these sorties e o r t b s were elose support missions Some 400 were olose missions along the t h e battlefront battlefkontin i n 8Upport of W ground In t h e ChongchonSalu along support of 1.21 ground aotion. action. In the Chongchon4alu River area, area, 28 28 F-86 F-86 Sabre Sabre jets j e t s observed observed 30 MIGfs and encountered eneountered five. River 30 MIG's five. One One MIG M I 0 was was reported reported damaged damaged with with no no UN 1Ro losses. losses. D u r i n g the the night night 15 Z5 bomber bomber lgissione During missions were flown, flown, 12 12 of of the t h e aircraft a i r u r a f t attacking attauking an me processing plant plant a tT amoag were an ore at Taeym-dong in i n northeastern northeastern Korea. Korea. The Ths plant plant produced produced gold, gold, eilver, silver, lead, lead, graphite graphite and tungsten. tungstea.
MilitarY Intelligence:
Ground
-*is of enemy o r m y vehicle vehicle traffic traffio for for the the week 2 October Analysis of week ending 2 October revealed a In recent recent 8 definite definite change uhange in in the t h e pattern p a t t e r n that t h a t prevailed prevailed during during the the summer. emmer. In
tion SeOtaritnignotZtion
1 1
THE c. I . A . HAS THE C.I.A. HAS NO NO O3JECTION OBJECTION TO THE THSDCCLASSIFICATION OF TO DECLASSIFICATION OF THIS DOCUMENT. DOCUMGNT. THIS

Nay'," loavy
During t the the enemy's heavy heavy Ilmited-objeative limited-Objective a attacks, the During h e second day of t h e enerqfs t t a o b , the principal weight was f felt Noltari area area near near Chomn Chorwon iin west central central Korea, Korea. prinaipal e l t in the Noltari n west Here Chinese Chinese C Communist from the the I US and Here o m u n i s t elements elemente captured captured outpost positions fkm s 2nd an8 RUC 9th the resistance i in this probes reached reached t h e main line of resistance n tbiS ROIC 9th Divisions, Divisionis. Enemy probes sector In west both both the ts US let let Eaarine Marine Division Division n the west a m t o r but effected effeuted no no penetrations. penetrations. I and the ROK ROK lst Division were were urrder under heavy heavy attack attack ffrom Chinese elements, elements, but but little little l e t Division i n m Chinese ground was lost. ground as the east oentral Although fighting was not a8 intense in t h e -8% oenkral ground wa8 loat, sector during the forces fired an an unprecedented unprecedented 43,500 43,500 rounds rounds seator t h e period, period, Chinese force6 artillery and of artillery and mortar mortar fire fire against a g a i n s t positions positions of of the the ROK ROK Capital Capital Division, Division. The The tempo of of enenemy aution action seema seems tto have diminished 14min4shed sonewhat somewhat f r from yesterday. A t total temp o have o m yesterday. otal of over rounds artillery and mortar mortar f fire fell UN positions positions mer 93,000 93,OOO r d s of Communist a r t i l l e r y and ire f e l l on m0 an on 7 7 October. Ootober.
7
No.
7 vitn
7(478
tion months, moat most observations routes south of of Psongyang Pyongyang and and Woman, Wonsan, but. but months, o b s m t l o n a occurred on routes report period, period, the the trend trend vas was reveraed reversed with with over over 20 20 percent percent of of the the during the report sightings noted noted on the S%aanJu Sinanju and and K Kunuri Pyongyang mutes, routes, along along with with a as slight sighting8 u n u r l tto o Pgongyang light in Air Force Force comments increase i n traffic t r a f f i c into Pyongyang Pgongyang from f'rora Yangdok. Yangdok, Far East Air by the that this new trend might be explained explained by the enemy's enemy's desire to t o augment augment his his supplies I in Pyongyang and and tto place winter winter material material in in areas areas readily readily available available aupplies n PyOngsang o place front line supply to f r o n t =e supply depots. depot&
Political
named). mea).

;CRI%op
Security security Info Info
2 2
Preeident statementon on 55 October Ootober accepting accepting the the resignaresipPresident Rhee Rhee issued issued aa public pane statement tiona h a n g TaeWang tions of of prime Prime Minieter Minister C Chang Taek-eang and and Vice Vice Foreign ForeignMinieter MinisterKarlHong-ki. MO-Hong-kJ. &eels statement took took recognition of tho Rhee's statement recognition of the allegations againet against both both officials that that permitted the entrance of of Jqsneee Japanese in*O into K Korea permission who who l left they had permitted m e a without psrmiWi(3n eft after after "cleaning "cleaning all a l l national national secrets." mecrets." (NO (Hb smoes8or t o C h a w has y e t been successor to Chang has yet been
on
w-
.0" Y
tion Security Izifoination

Central Central Intelligence I n t e l l l g e n c e Agency Office Office of Current Intelligence Intelligence 9899, 9899, 9 9 October October 1952 1952
DAILY D A I L Y KOREAN K O R E A N BULLETIN B U L L E T I N

HUtars Operations: Operatiomr Military

Rau
Air A!&
Political Political
Fighting to Fighting continued continued at a t an an accelerated accelerated rate r a t e on on 8 8 October, October, but appears t o be in ROK 9th 9th Division Division s sector just n the ROK ector j ust a c t i o n was i more localized. l o c a l i m d . The heaviest action more east of of C Chorwon the west c central where a a Chinese Chinese b battalion took White White east h w o n on t h e west e n t r a l front where a t t a l i o n took a South South Korean Korean main main defense defense line l i n e position, position, early e a r l y in i n the t h e day. day. A Horse Ridge, Ridge, a Horse series of battalion regimental-size actions actions took took place place during during t the day of heavy b a t t a l i o n and reglmental-size h e day and by nightfall n i g h t f a l l the t h e South South Koreans Koreans had ha? regained regained the t h e position. position. The action, action, howhawand west, the ROK 1st lst Division Division succeeded in rereFurther to t o the t h e westr ever, continuos. continues. Ftrther ever, In east the ROK Capital Capital Divlsion Division l lost another n the e ast t h e ROK o s t another a lost l o s t outpost. outpost. I occupying a occupying 7 t h Division near Mnnoutpost, outpost, but had had almost almost recaptured recaptured Finger Finger Ridge. Ridge. The ROK 7th dung in also to Chinese attacks and and i n the t h e eastern sector sector a l s o lost l o s t an outpost position t o Chinese despite back by by t the successive counterattacks; counterattaeke, had not driven the enemy back he d e s p i t e three successive 35,000 rounds of mortar mortar and ulose close of t the h e report r e p o r t period. period. The enemy enfired over 35,000 artillery fire fire in in support support of of their t h e i r operations operations on on 8 8 October, October. artillery
On 8 October carrier-based On carrier-based planes flew 3 346 1 1 6s sorties o r t i e s with with t the h e ttotal o t a l tally of of Plmnes of of Task Force "7 77 off flighta incomplete. incomplete. Planes off the east coast coaot in i n joint j o i n t operaopemflights t i o n with t h e FEAF Bomber Command Command attacked attacked transportation transportation and and supply aupply facilities faoilities tion the FEU Bather Kojo, while west coast coast gsval i r operations were gainst between Kilchu Kilohu and Kojo, naval a air ware a against t r a n s p o r t a t i o n installations i n s t a l l a t i o n s in in the t h e vicinity Vicinity of of Hanchon Hanchon and and Haeju. Haeju. Naval surtransportation bombarded troop areas areas and and gun positions face vessels maintained the t h e blockade and bombarded between Songjin and and Tanchon Tanchon in in the t h e east east and andat a t Changsanp.got Changsarpgot on on the the' west west coast. om&, between Songjin
taw
On 8 o t a l of 8 September Septetber a t total of 862 effective effective rilopties sorties by by Land.-based land-based planes planes were were of which 491 491 were were combat. cambat. Included i n t h e aombat o r t i e s were 0 ' 7 flown, flown, of in the coMbat s sorties were 2 207 mission8 n support along the t h e front f r o n t line. line. During the t h e report r e p o r t period, periodr missions I in support of of u1o(troops =troops along 28 I W s were observed and and eight e i g h t encountered enuountered with with one one MIG MIG reportedly repoPtedly damaged. damaged. 28 M MIG's were observed No UN!aircraft a r East f f e c t i v e bomber No UNi aircraft were were damaaed. damaged, F Far East Bomber Ccmmand Command mounted mounted 13 e effecttve sorties t h e period. peri2. - In I n a daylight daylight raid, raid, 10 B-298s B-29's attacked attacked a a supply supply sorties during during the center a t Kowon on the t h e eastern e a s t e r n coast. coast. at Kowon on
general i t u a t i o g8 General S Situation:
According t o Radio Radio Pyongyang, Pyongyang, a delegation of of t he c e n t r a l committee of t According to a delegation the central committee of the he Korean Party headed Ank Chong-ae e f t Pgongyang Korean fabor Labor Party headed by by Hue, Mhe.Pak Chong-ae lleft Pyongyang for for Moscow Moscow on on
Security Security % ' t i o n I Inmation
1 1
THE THEC.I.A.HASNATECTION C . I . A . HAS NO THE DECLASSIFICATION DECLASSIFICATION OF TO TEE THISDOCUMENT. THIS DOCUMSIENT.
No.
0 7 o JUL 197a JUL
orb w e 01%
WI
Nor"' 4
Securit;13Tormation s e c u r i t '% y tion
25 September September t to participate in the 25 o p artiaipate i n t h e 19th 19th Congress of the the Soviet Communist Communist Party. Party. Mthe.Fak, secretary of of tthe Korean Labor Labor arty, Party, previously was t to h e , Rik, secretary h e Korean o have have headed headed the the to the Conference. (Born and and educated educated iin North Korean delegation t o t h e Peiping Peace Conference, n USSR, ehe she is a a fairly fairly iinfluential meMber of of the the T3oviet "Soviet factiodl faction" iin the North North the USSR, n f l u e n t i a l member n the Korean Government.) Government. )
Propaganda
the indefinite recess of of t the Radio Peiping Peiping on on 8 October, October, in i n commenting on t he i n d e f i n i t e recess he Wnmunjom f ' tthe h e Washington o Panmunjom negotiations, negotiations, described described it it as as part part o of Washington %onepiracy "conspiracy tto of i t a unwilling 'allies' 'allies' by a c e impossible burn t h e boats of the its by making making p peace impossible in in Korea," Korea," and plunging them and them deeper deeper into into Far Far Eastern Eastern military military ventures. ventures. The broadcast alleged that t h a t Nam Il*s latest l a t e s t proposal had o r refusing o Nam Ills had removed removed all all pretexts pretexts f for refusing t to let l e t the t h e POW's KWe return r e t u r n home. home, The broadcast concluded with calling calling Americans Americans of the t h e armistice." armistice," the "wreckers %reckers of
.
Security Security I I

tion
2 2
- '.
w'
tion Security Intcation
4
Intelligence Agency Central I n t e l l i g e n c e 8g-W of Current Current I Intelligence Office of ntelligence 99000 10 10 October 1952 1952 WOO,
DAILY D A I L Y
Militam operations: MilitarY Operations:
KOREAN: BULLETIN K O R E A N B U L L E T I N
Army
aircraft of Task Force 77 flew 285 s sorties On 9 October naval a i r c r a f t of o r t i e s against enemy troop n a v a l air a i r operations o p r a t i o n s were suspended were suspended ent r o o p and and supply supply positions. positions. West coast naval Blocknde vessels bombarded ransportation as bodbarded t transportation as shipe shim were were engaged engaged in i n replenishing. replenishing. Blockade and and defense defense installations i n s t a l l a t i o n s in i n the t h e vicinity Vicinity of of Wonsan Woman in i n the the east e a s t and Cho Cho Island IaI.ar@ and and Haeju Haeju in in the t h e west.. west. Air Bir
On Air effective Iand-based sorties On 9 9 October Far East A i r Force mounted 1,110 1,UO e f f e c t i v e land-based sorties of which whioh 773 773 were were coMbat. combat. While While on on patrol p a t r o l in i n the the Yalu Yalu River River area, area, 75 75 UN UN F-86 F-86 p t l o t s observed observed 93 93 enaMy enmy MIG1s MIG's and and encountered encountered 33. 33. Two !Two MIGIa destroyed pilots MIG1s were were destroyed and six reportedly reportedly damaged with no no UN UN losses. losses. During During the the night, night, 20 20bordber banber missions were were flown, flown, including including attacks a t t a c k s against a g a i n s t supply supply centers centers at a t Sop0 near missions Sopo near gyongyang, Wonsan, Pyonggang, Hoechang in i n central c e n t r a l Korea, Korea, and Toegumi Toe+ near Woman, Military Militam Intelligence& Intelligence;
t h e afternoon afternoon of of 7 7 October, October, conventional oonventional US Iff Navy Navy carrier c a r r i e r aircraft aircraft off off I n the In e a s t e r n Korea Korea were were suddenly suddenly attacked attaoked by by a t least least four four MIG-Uts. eastern at MIG-15t8 . The The a t t a c k took attack took place over over the t h e Hamhung-Hungnam Hamhung-Hungnam area area and and ons one US Ifis aircraft aircraft was Ghot down. down, The place was shot The enemy planes, planes, after after a a nuMber number of of passes, passes, departed departed to t o the the north, enemy north. (This (This is is the the three days days of of active a c t i v e enemy enemy interceptions interceptions on on the the east east second incident i n c i d e n t within within three second coast. ooBst, It It is is still s t i l l too early early to t o assess t h e significance eignificance of of t h e s e new new enemy e n qopio p assess the these erations or or to t o determine determine the t h e enedy's enemy's capability c a p a b i l i t y for f o r continuing continuing them.) them.) erations
THE C.I.A. HAS NO OBJE,TION TO THE DErLASc:TFICATION
THI#DOCINENT.
Security I
OF

NavY lvavy
Air
to heavy action action the intensity i n t e n s i t y of of fighting f i g h t i n g continued continued t o decrease, heavg Although the continued i in the ROK ROK 9th Division Division s sector near Chorwon Chorwon and and on on tthe ROK lat 1st Dlvlsion Division oontinued n the e c t o r near h e ROK In t the battle for for White White Horse Horse H Hill near Chorwon, Chorwon, Chinese Chinese and and front f r o n t in i n the t h e west. west. In h e battle i l l near South Korean mere locked bitter for this commanding terrain. South Korean forces f o r c e s were locked in in b i t t e r codbat combat f or t h i s cammanding terrain. The according to The position p a s i t i o n changed changed hands hands a nudber number of of times on on 9 9 October, October, but according t o the the i n the ROK Ist DiviDivi40K 1st press, is is presently presently in i n South South Korean Korean hands. hands. Chinese attacks in sion sector sector succeeded in the troope from from two two outpost outpost positions. positions. Subsion succeeded i n forcing forcing t h e UN I B troop~l South Korean sequent South Korean counterattacks counterattacks were were unsuccessful. ~118uccessf'ul.
rmation
No.
1 1
Security Security n O \ IInfbition
General General Situation: Situation,

Political PoLLtical Minister Paek Turchin t to the concurrent concurrent post post of of The appointment of Finance Minister mek Tu-ohin o the .Acting announced hy the the South South Korean Korean Government Government 0 on Acting Prime Prime Minister Elinieter was was pliblicly publicly announced 1 ) . will It is i a understood understood to t o be be an an interim interim appointment appointment as as Yi Yi Yun,4yong Pun-yong Will 9 October. It probably be proposed to the National National Assembly AsseMbIy as as p permenent Prime Minister Minister when when e d e n t Prime (Peek hek i is s a a olose close follower follower o of f thee's Rheels and and ia is considered by body convenes, that body 0onmne8. ( .Anerican be one of the more able cabinet officers.) American observers tto o be officers.)

security %Ion I
2 2
W'
S ET % t i o n Security I. I Security
w
tion

Military Operations Operations Military
Army
Action ablso ablao broke out out in i n the the ROK 3rd 3rd Division Division sector in in east central central Korea. Action Here,Chinese elements elements launched laundwd three three company-size company-size attacks attacks against against South South Korean Korean T w o attacks attacks were were turned turned back back by the the defenders, but the the third.was t h i r d was still still outpoetr. Two outposts. in progress. Elsewhere Elsewhere aloug alopg the the battle battle front f r o n t only only scattered scattered patrol patrol activity activity was was reported. reported.
Naval air action action was WBB confined confined to to the tlie west coast as Task Force 77 77 in in the the east east flown in carrier missions were flown engaged in resupply. reeupply. Eighty-nine carrier in the west against against engaged in vessels bombomenemy troop troop and and supply supply positions positions near near Chinnampo Chinnampo and and Haeju. HaeJu. Surface veeselo barded Wonsan in barded enemy enemy shore shore installations installations at at Songjin, Tanchon, and and Wonean in the the east east and and near Ongjin in the the vest. Ongjin in vest.
Land-based Land-based aircraft aircraft under under Medium which 312 312 were were combat. combat. W um which areas in North North Korea. Korea. UN F-86 areas in during the period but observed in the afternoon. af'ternoon.
Military Intelligence Intelligence

Facilities Air Facilities
UN ghoto on ,UN photo coverage of Sasmchsm Saamcham airfield new near SinanJu Sinanju in northwestern Korea on 8 October revealel revealed repairs repairs being being made made on revetment8 revetments and and on on the the aircraft aircraft taxiways taxiways some 3,100 feet of the and the the runway. runway. Although the runway was unserviceable, 60me the taxiway was operational. There There -8 was heavy activity with many vehicular tracks tracks just way just depot in in the the vicinity vicinity of of the the airfield. airfield. north of of the the runway runway and and an an apparent apparent 'supply supply depot (Saamcham was was one one of of the the airfields airfields in the the SinanJu Sinanju area area that that the the enemy enemy attempted attempted to (Saamcham
make a year make operatioasl operational a year ago.) ago.)
S

.
Navy
Air A ir ET
tion
1
The The fierce fierce fighting fighting for for White White Horse Horse Hill H i l l near near Chorwon Chorwon in in west central central Korea Korea ROK 9th 9th Division Division troops troops secured secured the the hill hill twice twice dominated the the action action for for 10 10 October. October. ROK dominated during the the day day but but were were forced forced off off again agaln late late in in the the afternoon. afternoon. Late Late press press reports reports during state that that the the Koreans eventually Horse only to be thrown thrown off it state eventually recaptured White Horae it again by by the the Chinese. Chinese. again
Central Central Intelligence Intelligence Agency Office of Current Intelligence Intelligence 9901, 990i, 11 11 October October 1952 1952
Far Force control Far East Air Force control flew flew 563 563 sorties sorties of of flew 18 18 sorties bombers flew sorties against major enemy supply supply jet Jet interceptors interceptore encountered no enemy aircraft some 70 swept-wing planes on Antung airfield late some 70 late
THE C. T .A. T1AS P,4S rrO CY '"ZTION THE C.I.A. NO 07 --.;CITION TO Tl!E TEE CLCL1SSIFICRL'lON DECLASSIFICATION OF
niis THIS ww,ii:a;ir. DuCUMENT.

7 Jill JUL 1978
,
Security I
ng. .!TE
-.w
10
Security
General Situation Situation General

Political Political US US Charge Charge Lightner Lightner reports reports that that President President Rhee has again again ordered the the ROK Navy Navy to to seize seize all all non-UN non-UBT vessels veeeels within the sea sea defense zone and bring them to to conflictswiththe UN Puesn. This Thie order conflictewltbthe UN Command Command order,which order,whlchplaces places the the ROK ROK patrol patrol Pusan. unit under under operational operational control control of the the US authorities. A,ightner Lig)ltner believes that is a UN Rhee Rhee must m e t be be told told in in no no uncertain uncertain terms terms that that enforcement enforcement of the the zone zone is ROK Government and press press Interpret interpret the the order order as as barriag barring responeibility. (The (The ROK responsibility. Japanese, but but not not KOrean Korean fishing fishing vessels vessels from from the the area.) area.)

Security Inf
n c 2
VII
ha6 been featuring featuring a series o f gloomy editorials on conditions The ROK press has of in South Korea. These items, which refer suicides, milllone millions of refer to "increasing "increasing suicidee, South Korea. destitute civilians, unemployment, starvation, I' a r e being uneMployment, and starvation," are being exploited exploited by by north North Korean propaganda. The The Embassy Embasay suspects suspects the the articles may be an inspired inspired campaign campaign Korean to build build up up a a case case for for increased increased UN UN assistance. aesistance. to
tion
Security IxIThrmation
Central Intelligence Agency Central I n t e l l i g e n c e hemy Office of of Current Current I Intelligence Offiue ntelligence 9902, 13 October October 1952 1952 9902,
D A I L Y
Orerations: Military Omrations 8

Army grnor
On fighting the 9th ROK ROK Division Division eection section f for O n 12 October heavy f i g h t i n g continued iin n t h e 9th or hill positions, positions of the 29th MU. positions. The 30th ROK regiment attacked through positions Friendly regiment and succeeded succeeded in in reaching reaching the the forward farward slope elope of of Hill H i l l 395. 395. Friendly regiment and Els* elements elements were were continuing aontinuing the the attack a t t a c k at a t the the close close of of the t h e report report period. period. Else-
where scattered scattered probes probes and and patrol p a t r o l clashes clashes occurred. occurred.
Navy lJavg
n t he On the NO report air activity No r e p o r t was received regarding regarding naval navalair a c t i v i t y for f o r 12 12 October. October. O previous day oarrier-based carrier-based p planes flew 75 sorties against North Korean.transportahnea s o r t i e s a g a i n s t North Korean traneportation in vicinity of Tanohon, Tanchon, Iwon and and Wonsan Wonoan on tthe t i o n and supply targets targets i n the v i c i n i t y of h e east surface vessels coast vessels u o a s t and and between between Chinnampo Chinnampo and and Ongjin Ongjin on on the t h e west west coast. coast. Naval surface on 11and 11 and 12 October bombarded enemy gun positions and and supply supply routes routes iin the n t he Songjin Ongjin in the west, Songjln and and Chaho Chaho areas areas in i n the t h e east and at a t Cho Island and O ngjin i n t h e west.
Air Air
On On 11 ll October October a a total t o t a l of of 945 945 effectif6 effectifre sorties s o r t i e s by by land-based land-based planes planes was was flown flown of of which whiuh 554 554 were were coMbat. oombat. UN Il1y pilots p i l o t s observed 95 95 eneqy enemy MIGtS MIG's and and encountered 45, all all in i n the t h e Ialu-Chongchon YalucChongohon River River area. area. Six S i x MIGIs M I W s were destroyed, deetrayed, and seven 6even 45, damaged with with a a loss lass of of one one UE E 4 F-86, F a , During D u r i n g the the night night Far Far East Egst Bomber Bomber Command Command damaged mounted 16 16 effective e f f e c t i v e sorties sorties, attacking attacking ground ground installations installations a t Pongchongol Pongchongol in In at north central o e n t r a l Korea Korea and and TaegUmi Taegumi on on the t h e east east coast coast and f'urnishing l o s e support north furnishing c close support for f o r the the US u6 II IX Corpe. C o r p s . On O n the t h e following following day, day, 1,407 1,407 sorties sorties by land-based land-based planes planes were flown, flown, including including 991 991 coMbat. combat. During D u r i n g these these sorties sorties 147 147 MIGIs NIGta were were observed observed and and 69 69 encountered, enoountered. Ulf uI1 ppilots i l o t s destroyed four others. others. destroyed four four MIG's MIGIs and and damaged damaged.four One UN UW F-51 a 6 was h e aair i r battles. One 1-51 was destraged destroyed and and one one F P-86 was damaged damaged during during t the battles, A A t o t a l of of 29 29 bomber bomber missions flown, 26 of t h e aircraft total missions wa8 was flown, 26 of the aircraft attauldng attacking troop concon, centrations on on Haeju Haeju Peninsula, Peninsula.

~ e c ~ i ~
Security Inforination
fighting 11 positions on Hill Hill 395 395 iin 9th ROK ROK Heavy f i g h t i n g raged on 1 1 October October for positions n tthe h e 9th Communists, attacking attacking in battalion battalion Division sector sector on on the t h e central c e n t r a l front, front. Chinese Commdats, strength, succeeded i in effecting 100;yard penetration of of ROK ROK positions positions in in tthe strength, n e f f e c t i n g a lOO-prd he late afternoon. =troops contained the penetration l a t e afternoon. UlRi troops contained the penetrationand andfighting f i g h t i n g continued oontinued with with the enemy in the crest of the hill hill i in the early early morn= morni n possession of of positions on t he e r e s t of n the In the Division sector ing i n g of 12 12 October. October. In t h e third t h i r d ROK Division seotor on on the t h e east e a s t central a e n t r a l front, front, the South South Koreans repulsed repulsed attacks a t t a c k s after after severe severe fighting. fighting.
THE C.I.A. C. I . A . HAS HAS NO OBJECTION THE OBJECTION TO THE DECLASSIFICATION TO DECLASSIFICATION OF ~ THIS NoD THIS t DOCUMENT. DOCUMENT. i * ~
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General General Situation: Situatioqr
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Political
The Central Committee of the South South Korean pro-gwermment pro-government Uberal Liberal The Central Executive &ecutive Conmdttee 'Party addressed a a lletter on 1 10 October tto General lrkrrk Nark Clark Clark b bitterly Party addressed e t t e r on 0 October o General i t t e r l y protesting protesting the employment of of Japanese Japaneee stevedores etevedoree and and barges bargee in In South South Korean Korean porta. porta.
Propaganda -Fagaada

Security Izionatton.
The to Conference In in Peiping The principal prlnclprl North North Korean delegate t o the Asian Peace Eeace Conference body, acoordlng according t to October, of tthe "concrete informed that body, o Radio pyongyang Pp-ongyang on 9 Ootober, h e "concrete The aotions actions advocated advocated were weme the the s t e p for steps for putting putting an an end end to t o the the Korean Korean war," w a r . " The return all immediate seeetXtion cessation of 06 DS germ warfare warfare and and indisclYlminate indiscriminate r e t u r n of of a l l POW's, R"e, an Immediate boMhing, punishment of withdrawal of all all foreign foreign troop troops bombing, of war criminals, criminale, and the uithdrawal of the BU, and war BW, bombing, and war from Korea after from after a a truce t r w e is l e reached, rewhed. (The addition of first l introduction of these these eleslents elements ab as oondicondic r i m i ~ punishment punishment l lines iS 16 the first n t r o d w t i o a of criminal lines %ions for for the the successful eucceaeFul conclusion conclusion of o f the t h e war.) war.) tions
Security %ion Inf

Central Central Intelligence I n t e l l i g e n c e Agency Agency Office of Current Current Intelligenoe Intelligenoe 9903, 9903, 14 16 October October 1952 1952
D A I L Y KOREAN K O R E A N BULLETIN BULLETIN DAILY
Militam Operations: Owrationst Military
Army
Due to report has been received on UN mv.d navA. t o communications c o m d c a t i o n s difficulties, d i f f i c u l t i e s , no r e p o r t ha8 and air a i r activities a c t i v i t i e s for f o r 13 13 October. October. and
Military Intelligence: InteUiaenQet Military
At noon on flight of four I US Air Force Force conventional conventional f fighters A t noon on 12 12 October, October, a f l i g h t of E Air ighters, over Kowon, Kowon, just north of of Wonsan Wonsan on t the east coast, coast, were were attacked attacked by by four four wer h e east aircraft was shot down down with with no damage damage t to of the t h e US a i r c r a f t was o the Communist MIc)-l5Is. One of Communist MIO-151s. altitude duration of have not been l t i t u d e and duration of the t h e encounter have been reported. reported. enemy. The a enemgr. (This lpakes in little l i t t l e more than a a week, week, after a f t e r aver mer a a year year (This makes the third incident in more than of n a c t i v i t y in this area, n which of enemy air air i inactivity area, i in which US US conventional conventional aircraft aircraft have have previous enenbeen l o s t to t o enemy enjet interceptors i n t e r c e p t o r s over over eastern eastern Korea. Korea. The two previous been lost jet counters, u r t h e r tto o tthe he counters, involving US naval planes, planes, took place place over over HungHungnam ffurther north.) north.)

Navy and Air
The ROK 9th White Horse Hill in t the Chorwon The ROK 9th Division Divlsion secured a position position near White he C hmon area on on 13 13 October October in in spite spite of of: heavy enemy enartillery and mortar fire fire and and countercounterarea Kunthwa i in the c central sector, tthe US 7th Mvlsion, Division, in in coordination attacks, Near Near Kunihwa n the e n t r a l sector, he T B 7th ooordination attacks, with limited with elements element6 of of the t h e ROK ROK 2nd 2nd Division, Division, launched launehed a series of of l i m i t e d objective attacks commanding terrain t o retake retake lost l o e t outpost outpoet positions positions and to t o seize certain cormnanding terrain attacke to from the the Chinese. Chinese. Although Although some some success success was was achieved achieved and and the the action a c t i o nwas wascontinu,continufrom ing a t the t h e end end of of the t h e report period, period, heavy enemy r e s i s t a n c e was ing at resistance was being being encountered. encountered. t o the east, e a s t , the the ROK osition Farther to BOK Capital Capital Division recaptured another another outpost p position on Finger Finger Ridge Ridge after after a a fierce fierce hand-to-hand hand-t&wId battle. battle. on
Air
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Central Centpal Intelligence I n t e l l i g e n c e Agency Office of of Current Intelligence Office 9904, 15 15 October 1952 9904, 1952
D A LILY BULLETIN D I L Y KKOREAN O R E A N B U L L E T I N

Military M i l i t a r y Operations
Army Ariny
White Iorse Horse H Hill near Chorwon i in west c central i l l near n west entral The ROK 9th Division advanced on White press accounts accounts s state that the Korea against against determined determined enemy enemy resistance. resistanco. Late k t e press tate t hat t h e South Korea to Koreans have have finally f i n a l l y recaptured recaptured the the position. position. From 6 t o 13 13 October Chinese Chinese forces forces Koreans from Army lost killed, 3,897 wounded, wounded, and from the t h e 38th 30th Army l o s t 2,295 2,295 known killed, k i l l e d , 1,351 estimated k i l l e d , 3,897 Farther t to the e east, 42 prisoners in i n the t h e battle b a t t l e for f o r White White Horse. Iorse. Farther o the a s t , tthe h e US 7th Division Hill near Kumwha, be forced o off on 14 14 October October by by heavy heavy captured Triangle H i l l near Kumwha, only tto o be f f llate a t e on attack wus also turned back back and at t t a c k was at artillery enemy a r t i l l e r y and and mortar m o r t a r fire. f i r e . A subsequent US a the end of the report period US units had withdrawn to the main line of resistance. of U S units withdrawn t o t h e main l i n e of rosistance. The ROK of the the US 7th captured an enemy h hill position, BOK 2nd Division on on the right r i g h t flank of i l l position, sector the later withdraw. In but was l a t e r forced to t o withdraw. I n the ROK Capital Division s e c t o r on t h e east east centralfront, Chinese forces used over 11,000 rounds of supporting f fire centralfkont, rounds of i r e during a 4-hour attack against 4-hour attaoka gainst a a ROK ROK position position on on Finger Finger Ridge* Ridge.
the h e east east s o r t i e s for f o r 14 14 October has has been been delayed. delayed. On t The report on naval air sorties coast, UN surface units bombarded shore i installations in the Songjin 8ongjin and Wonsan Wbnsan areas. areas. coast, nstallations i n the Targets near Haeju Ilaeju and and Upchori Upchori were were bombarded bombarded on on the t h e west west coast. coast.
On 1 4 Ootober otal o f 1293 1293 s o r t i e s by land-based 14 October a t total of sorties land-based planes planes was wus flown, flown, of of whioh which n the Yalu Rivor area mea but nons nolle 904 were combat. in Yalu.River combat. UN u10 pilots p i l o t s observed observed 36 36 enemy enemy MIG's MIG's i wemencountered. In the a r l y afternoon 20 i r c r a f t were the e early 20 swept-wing swept-wing a aircraft were sighted eighted on on weleencountered. During the the night, night, 17 missions were were flown, 1 7 medium medium bonther bomber missions flown, with with Takushan Taknshan airfield. a i r f i e l d , During eight e i g h t aircraft a i r c r a f t attacking attacking troop troop and and supply supply installations i n s t a l l a t i o n s near near Wonsan. \Ilonsan.
Militarv Intelligence Intelliaence Military
On 8 8 October an an enemy enemy conventional conventional aircraft a i r c r a f t dropped four 250-pound in On 250-pound bombs bombs in the t h e ROK ROK 5th 5th Division Division area area on on the t h e eastern e a s t e r n front. f r o n t . There were no UN casualties. oasualties. Five days later, to were dropped on UN-held UN-held Cho Island o off the west coast later, four t o six bombs were ff t h e west ooast soldiers killed o l d i e r s were k i l l e d and several ground by three t h r e e conventional conventional planes. planes. Five ROK s A UN UN F-94 F-94 attempted attempted to t o intercept i n t e r c e p t the enemy, enemy, but could installations were damaged. damaged. A i n s t a l l a t i o n s were not make contact, unidentified aircraft's its oontact, possibly possibly because of the unidentified a i r c r a f t ' s slow speed or or i ts Air knowledge East A i r Force comments comments that that Fnr East knowledge of o f the t h e UN UN plane's plane's presence presence in i n the the area. area. Far
S

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Air A ir
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Security Inf. ation
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THE I . A . HAS THE C. C.I.A. HAS NO NO ORTY'CTIOY 0117CTION TO THS THE D.?C':filSITI2ATION DFCTA7SIFICATION 01 01 THIS DOCUMEAT. THIS DOC?;N,JJT.
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Security Info Security Info
the these aircraft assistance were able t h e possibility p o s s i b i l i t y exists e x i s t s that t h a t those a i r c r a f t had radar a s s i s t a n c e since they were r a d a r is is known known to t o be be located located as RS far f a r south south as as t o evade evade interception. interception. Communist radar to attacks indicate o f the a t t a c k s and and reported speeds speeds i n d i c a t e tthat h a t tthe h e attacking Haoju. The nature of Haoju. aircraft a i r c r a f t were were probably probably IIrlO's. IIrlO1s.
Enemy Enemy Rear Areas Areas

Security Inf
2 2
Analysis of Analysis of enemyvehicle eneiyvehicle traffic t r a f f i c for f o r the week ending ending 9 October reveals a concondeorease from the tinued decrease the heavy activity a c t i v i t y reported from 12 12 t to o 25 September. September. In In contrast, rail the wereacceedingly heavy with with t the number o of contrast, r a i l sightings sighting8 during t h e period were aceedingly heavy h e number f a c t i v i t y was concentrated concentrated on on looomotives locomotives and and cars c a r s observed observed the t h e highest highest in i n 1952. 1952. Rail activity east coast lines pilots that the enemy has given up up temporarily temporarily h his e a s t ooast l i n e s as UN p i l o t s report t hat t h e enem is attempt tozepair Province on on the thewest t o m p a i r rail r a i l bridges in i n liwanghae Ewanghae Provinoe w e s t coast. coast. Far East Air that are full of the lack of of UN air Force comments t h a t the Communists Comunists a r e ttaking aking f u l l advantage o f the coverage of northwestern Korea, moved large q quantities supplies Korea, having apparently moved u a n t i t i e s of of s upplies south toward Wonsan Vonsan during during the t h e week.
ation
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Central. IIntelligence Agency Centrai n t e l l i g e n c e Agency Office of of Current Intelligence 9905, 16 1952 9905, 16 October 1952
DAILY D AILY
Oper a t i o n s Military Operations
B U L L E T I N KOREAN K O R E A N BULLETIN
ArmY Elements of to in vicinity of the the ROK 9th 9 t h Division continued t o occupy positions i n the v icinity In the t h e eastern eastern of White White Horse Horae Hill H i l l and and secured secured high high ground ground northwest northweat of of the the crest. c r e s t . In action c t i o n conconpart p a r t of of the the 9th 9th ROK ROK DiTision Division sector, eector, a a hill h i l l position position was was lost. l o s t . Heavy a tinued in troops continued t to the i n the t h e UB Us 7th 7th Dtvision Division sector as American troops o press t he of the 7th Division, Division, the the ROK ROK 26 2d Division attack Triangle Hill. To the east of a t t a c k against Triangle took a hill h i l l point but was was forced forced back back by by a a Chinese Chinese counterattack. counterattack. The South Koreans east c central sector the the ROK ROK Capital Capital Division Division received received In the eaet e n t r a l eector later regained the area. area. In 14 14 minor minor probes. probes.
15 with total t tally incomplete. There were 178 178 naval air a i r sorties s o r t i e s on 1 5 October w i t h tthe h e total a l l y incomplete. Carrier-based shore'installations in ViciCarrier-based aircraft a i r c r a f t on on the t h e east coast attacked shore installations i n the v iciwas received received concerning concerning west w e t coast coa8t operations. operations. Surface nity n i t y of of Chongjin. ChongJin. No report was units the blockade blockade and and bombarded bombarded both both Korean Korean coasts. coaste. u n i t s maintained maintained the
UN land-based land-based aircraft a i r c r a f t under Far Eaet I 2 Force control f l e w only 398 e ffective East A Air flew effective No sorties o enemy aircraft were observed sortiels on on 15 15 October, October, of of which which 219 2lg were were combat. combat. N to 16 October, October, FEU' FEAF o r encountered encountered during during the t h e report report period. period. On On the t h e night of of 15 15 t o 16 or Bomber Command Command thounted mounted 17 17 e effective f f e c t i v e ssorties o r t i e s With with four four d different i f f e r e n t supply supply areas areas i in n Bomber North Korea Korea being being boMbarded bombarded by by 13 13 of of the t h e aircraft. aircraft. North
General ituation General: S Situation
President Rhee called of the the National Assembly Assembly which which met on Preeident c a l l e d a special speciaL session seseion of the because of the recall r e c a l l of of the the legislature legislaturebecause "urgent problems," problems," including including confirmation confirmation of Of tthe new prime prime minieter, minister, tthe passage of of "urgent h e new h e paerrage supplementary budget b bill, a b bill concerning by-electiona by-elections f for vacant assembly assembly a eupplementary i l l , and a i l l concerning o r vacant eeate ' seats.
15 October. The president preeident requested requested 15 October.
15 October Radio Radio Peiging, Peiping, for for t the first time, time, talked talked 8 as if Korean On 15 h e first 8 i f tthe h e Korean Communist armisticej armistice negotiations negotiations had had disintegrated. disintegrated. A dispatch from Conrmuniet

Navy Navy Air
Political Political
Propaganda
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No.0 7 JUL
1978
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headquarters negotiations "were headquarters at at Kaesong is i s quoted quoted as as saying that the negotiatione were abruptly and 13 Radio Pyongysng Pyongyang was scuttled by by the t h e Americans." Americana. (As late as a8 12 12 and 13 October Radio was scuttled still referring t to Panmunjom on 8 8 October October aa as a a receaa "recess" for for an an o the UN action at Panmunjom indefinite period.) period. ) indefinite

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Securi'417Lma,tion Security Info ion

Central Intelligence I n t e l l i g e n c e Agency Agency ntelligence Office of Current I Intelligence 9906, 9906, 17 17 October 1952
DAILY D A I L Y KOREAN K O R E A N BULLETIN BULLETIN

M i l i t a r y Operations Military
Army
ROK 9 9th Divih e ROK t h DiviEnemy artillery a r t i l l e r y and infantry i n f a n t r y forced withdrawal of elements of tthe sion t to o the east of Chorwon, Chorwon, but a South K Koream.counterattack o r e a counterattack drove drove tthe h e enemy enemy from enemy counterattacks counterattacks failed t o dislodge the Tim enemy to the South Korean6 Koreans who had Bill 391. 391. Two Hill t h e east, east, in i n the t h e vicinity v i c i n i t y of of secured h i l l by by the t h e end end of of the t h e report r e g o r t period. period. To the secured the hill US 7th Division Division positions positions were were thrown thrown back Tupo, three enemy counterattacks against US a t e r forced t o withlater to despite intense intense enemy enemy mortar mortar and and artillery a r t i l l e r y fire. fire. The enemy was l In the central sector of d r a w as friendly f r i e n d l y forces f o r c e s captured captured high high ground ground nearby. nearby. I n t he c entral s e c t o r east of draw Kumwha, back, l losing to Chinese elements element8 attacked briefly briefly but buk were thrown back, o s i n g ground t o Kumwha, Chinese counterattacking ROK 2nd 2nd Division Division infantrymen. infantrymen.
The reported total t o t a l nuMber number of naval a i r aortiem air sorties on 16 16 October was was incomplete, incomplete, w i t h only only 215 2l.5 indicated. indicated. O n t h e east coast carrier-based i r c r a f t from with On the carrier-based a aircraft from Task Task Force 77 attacked shore installations vicinity of Kojo, Kojo, while while on on the the west west coast 77 i n s t a l l a t i o n s in the v i c i n i t y of n i t s on the east coast units land-based Marine Marine pilots p i l o t s bombed bombed targets t a r g e t s near near Haeju. Haeju. Surface u land-based o report report m e received concerning Concerning No was p a t r o l l e d from patrolled from Chongjin Chongjin to t o the the battle b a t t l e line. line. N on the t h e west west coast. coaet. surface activity a c t i v i t y on
Air Air
General Situation Situation
Air 1,262 e effective UN land-based aircraft a i r c r a f t under Far East A i r Force control flew 1,262 ffective A total t o t & of of 196 196 fighters fighters and fighter-bombers flew s o r t i e s of of which 894 894 were were combat. combat. A fighter-bombers flew sorties No aircraft o enemy a i r c r a f t were observed or or close support missions missions for f o r UN UN ground ground troops. troops. N close-support On n t the h e night night of 16 16 tto o 17 17 October, October, 21 e effecffec-encountered during t the report -encountered during he r e p o r t period. period. O ti& tive bomber miesions miseions were flown, t ten e n of of these aircraft aircraft attacking' attackini supply c centers enters support miesions missions in the the US US IX and X Pyongyang. Five other bombers flew close eupport near Pyongyang. Corps sectors. sectors.
Radio Pusan Pusan announced announced on on 17 17 October that t h a t Preeident Radio President Rhee's nomination of Lee Yun-yong as as premier premier had had been been rejected r e j e c t e d by by the t h e National National Assembly. Aesembly. Out of of 166 166 members present, only only 35 35 favored favored Rhee'e h r e e members present, Rhee's nominee while 128 128 oppoeed opposed him him and t three bility abstained. abstained. (Finance Minister Minister Paek Tu-chin w will i l l in i n all all pro b i l i t y continue as as Acting Prime Minister.) Minister. )
'

Navy
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TA T!I, C. 1.A.HAS BAS X OOBTECTION OSJXCTIOM C.I.A. NO !I33CF,C5AZSIFICATION TO THE D17:7,ASSIFICATION 01 OF

! C H I SDOCUMENT. D 0 CUi.:EN T THIS
1109 7 JU1 n78
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a tion ation Central n t e l l i g e n c e Agency Central I Intelligence Agency f Current Intelligence Intolligence Office o Office of $907, 18 18 October October 1952 1952 9907,
D A I L Y
Military M i l i t a r y Operations Operations
K O R E A i T BULLETIN B U L L E T T I ? DAILY KOREAN
Aruy Army
In the ROK 9th Division sector, fighting continued cis RS two two companies I n tho 9 t h Division sectorc heavy f i g h t i a g continuod of withdraw from positions Hill of Chinese Chinose infantry infantry forced f o r w d friendly f r i o n d l y troops to t o vdthdrwl ;Tositions on 1 3 . U DS 7th repulsed several 391 followin(l; hand-to-hand fighting. The US Division repulgod s e v e r a l 391 following hand-to-hand fighting. enemy attempts 598 and other high ground t o dislodge dislodgo them them from from 11111 IB11 508 ground in i n the the silomy attompts to vicinity and mortar fire, the v i c i n i t y of of Kumwha, Kum~fia, and, and, despite d o s p i t o intense intenso artillery artillery nrid fire, t he mortars and artillery a r t i l l e r y broke up a eiiomy enemy was forced forcod to t o withdraw. withdrnw. Friendly niortars subsequent attempted subsequent afternpted enemy enemy thrust t h r u s t as RS he ho was w.s massing massing to t o attack. attack. Action on the remainder of the front was limited to minor probes patrol tho o f t h e front w s . ~linutcd t o probes and md p h t r o l actions. notionso
The tally October was incomplete t a l l y on on naval naval air a i r sorties sorties for f o r 17 1 7 Ootrobor incomplete as RS only o n l y 43 43 These cnrrior-basod carrier-based aircraft aircraft attnoked attaoked wore reported, roportod, all a l l on on the t h e west w e s t coast. ooast. Thooa units in patrolling surfaoe u n i t s engaged only i n y tttrollfng targets h r g e t s from Chinampo Chinmpo to t o Haeju. Ilaoju. UN surface activities n c t i v i t i o s with vdth no no firing f i r i n g reported roportod on on tho t h o east oastcoast,, coast, while while Haeju Hasju and and Songchon Songchon were T i e r e bombarded bombarded in i n the the west. vrost~
On East A Air O n 17 1 7 October, October, land-based Inlid-basad aircraft a i r c r a f t under under For Fnr Be.,st i r Force Force control control support flew 1,232 effective sffoctive sorties, s o r t i e s , of of which whlcli 856 856 were w0re oombat. oombat, Close support missionn f o r UN UN ground ground troops troops were wore flown flow1 by by 271 271 of o f these theso fighters f i g h t e r s and iaissiono for During the t h e ported, poriqd, a n total total of of 228 228 enemy enemy E'aG's ere obobDuring MIG's a were fighter-bombers, fighter-bombers. probei1d.y destroyed ilostroyed and nnd another another NIG was probably m d 41 4 1 encountered. encounkered. One ITIG served and O n the tho night of o f 17 1 7 - 18 18 October, October, damaged, dnmngod, with no loss loss to t o UN UIJ aircraft. d r c r u f t . On 1 6 of of the t h c bombers bombers attacked nttacked s o r t i e e j 16 iGAFBomber 13omborCommand Cormmidmounted inountod21 2 1effective offootive sorties; FEU izidustrinl instal.l~bions and su2ply su;?,dy areas ni-eas in i n Norch ITorch Korea. Korea. industrial installations and

Navy
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General Gonorhl Situation Situation
Politicnl Political
Social Affairs press conference Social A f f a i r s Vinister L'inistor Pak Fak indicated ot 0.1; a pross conferonce on 16 16 October that t h a t his Ministry's Minj.?.tryfs current currant planning planning calls onlls for f o r the t h o allocation.of allocgtion.of sufficient housing ffacilities 10,000 s u f f i c i e n t UN UPT relief r o l i o f supplies fiupplios tie t o rrepair e p a i r housine a c i l i t i e s ffor o r 10,000 T:LO Ministry Llinistry is is refugee families f a m i l i o s and ,and to t o construct construct 200 200 new n w housing u n i t s - The unite, undertaking vaclertnlciqg the tho repair r e p a i r of o f three tlirurd rural r u r a l rest r o s t centers centers for f o r the t h e disabled disablod and m d is is Only 2,868 2,868 have Iicrvo boen rodded been p provided also trying n lso t r y i n g to t o find f i n d employment emplo.pmnt for f o r them. thorn. Only 1C9 THE C. T. A. 17Y1 S ORJF,CTION RET TO TIP r7(77SrFICATI0N OF rmation Security THIS DOCULIENT.
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with jobs, his Central tabor:Exohange last ten however, through through hie tabor Escohange in the l ast t en with jobs however, (OverwhelMed by its refugee problem, Problem, the tQverwhehod *he Sotth Qobth Korean Korean Government Government months. months. ex-soldiers has negleoted neglsoted its i t s disabled disabled servicemen. servioearen. Demonstrations by these ex-soldiers in mid-September mid7Eeptember brought their brought their plight plight into into the %he public publio eye. eye. Pak's Pak's planning planning appears to to.be the f first efforts a at ameliorating their their plight, plight, exoept except f for a appears be tho i r s t efforts t ameliorating or a small peritonal gift from from Rhoe.) Rhee.) small pereonal gift

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Central Agoncy Centr a 1 Intelligence Int o l l i gem e A p n cy Office O f f i c e of o f Current Intelligence I n te l l i g e n o e 9908, 9908, 20 October Ootober 1952 1952
DAILY K KOREAN O R E A N B BULLETIN U L L E T I N

D A I L Y
Military Operations Oporations

Army
the ROK ROK 1 1st O n Saturday Saturday action a c t i o n was was comparatively coinparatively light. l i g h t . In the s t Division On sector, two enemy s o o t o r , tvto anomy companies, companies, supported supported by by heavy heavy mortar mortar and and artillery a r t i l l a ' y fire, fire, attacked UN UN positions on on Big Big and and little L i t t l e Nori Nori and find other other high high ground, ground, but but 21,000 artill9ry a r t i l l w y and ad Over 21,000 in i n all all cases casos the l ; h z onemy onemy subsequently subsequently withdrew. withdrew. Ovor mortar rounds fell f e l l Saturday. Saturday. Heavy the ROK 9th, 7th, and ROK ROK 2nd Division Division Hoavy fighting f i g h t i n g occurred in i n tho 9th, US 7th, 9th Division troops secured socurad sectors and Monday Monday morning. morningI ROK 9th soctors on on Sunday Sunday and positions on on Iron I r o n Horse Horse Mountain Mountain but later l a t e r withdrew southward under enemy On the was continuing at a t the end of of t the h e report report period. period. On the Action wws pressure. pressure. Action US 7th battalion 7th Division Division front front a a Chinese b a t t a l i o n launched attacks on UN positions positions Hill, mid-morning t the found f friendly i l l , but by mid-morning h e continuing action found riendly atop Triangle H of the ROK 2nd D Division f the i d sion elements e b m a n t s conducting conducting mopping-up operations. operations, Elements o forced ,to to withdraw, withdraw, but but t the enemy pulled pulled on Sniper Snipor Ridge were attacked and foroed h o enemy as aotion back under UN UI? artillery a r t i l l e r y fire. f i r e . ROK troops were reported mopping up a8 continued et at t the h e end of the report period. period.
Only 49 naval air October ag as Task Task Force Force 77 a i r sorties s o r t i e s were flown on 18 October engaged in i n replenishing replenishing operations. oporations. On On the west coast, coast0 on the east coast engaged shore-based shore-based Marine Marine aircraft a i r c r a f t attacked attaoked targets t a r g e t s in i n the the vicinity v i c i n i t y of o f Chinnampo. Chinnampo. NO report was received activity either coast No reoeived concerning surface a c t i v i t y on e i t h e r Korean o oast O n the following day, day, 252 naval n a v a lair a i r sorties s o r t i e s were were reported. reported. f o r 18 18 October. October. On for Aircraft targets Aircraft from from east east coast ooast carriers carriers attacked attacked coastal coastal t a r g e t s near Tongchon, Tongohon, On the the west west coast, coast& land-based land-based ldarine Marine a aircraft bombed i r c r a f t bombed Yangdok Ymagdok and Wonsan. On units maintained t the he f r o m Ongjin Ongjin to t o Chinnampo. Chinnampo. Surface unite i n s t a l l a t i o n s from installations blockade and and bombarded both both Korean Korean coasts. coasts.
On 18 under FEAF FEAF c control flew 1,089 On 18 October Ootobar land-based land-based aircraft a i r c r a f t under ontrol f l e w 1,089 During these operations effective sorties of which 699 were combat. e f f e c t i v e 6Orties o f whioh 699 were oombat. During these operations MIGIs were observed 36 enemy MIG's observed and and 16 16 encountered encountered in i n the t h o Yalu Yalu River Ri,ver area. area. UN pilots p i l o t s destroyed destroyed two two MIGIs MIG'a at at a a cost cost of o f one one UN UN Sabre. Sabre. 'YEAF 'FELIF Bomber Bomber t Command mounted 18 18 e effective sorties the night; night; 8upply supply areas areas a nt Coimnand ffective S o r t i e s during the Namsi, and Sunchon Sunchon were were attacked attacked by by 13 13 medium medium bombers. bombers. The Namsi, Pyongyang and following day, of 900.effective sorties were flovm flown following day, 19 1 9 October, Ootober, a.total a,total o f 900 effective s o r t i e s were on patrol p a t r o l in in "MIG "IMIG While on 656 oombat. oornbat. While by land-based land-based planes, planes, including 555

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No0 7 Jul
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h r i n g the the Allay," UN p pilots observed 97 97MIG's =Ws and Allay," i l o t s ObSQrVed and encountered encountered three. three. During night from medium bomber missions -re mere flown, flown, 16 from 19 1 9 to t o 20 20 October, October, 18 18 medium of of the the aircraft a i r c r a f t attaoking attaoking supply supply and and troop troop installktions. installations. M i l i t a r y Intelligenoe Intelligence Military
Army Army
A White Horse Hill A search searoh mmong mong the the bodies bodies of of 3,546 3,546 Chinese Chinese dead on onYOhite Hill on 16 of the the Chinese was wes wearing wearing winter minter clothing* clothing. 16 October Ootober revealed that that none of is particularly (Thie discovery i s p articularly All #u. had had on on two two sets s e t s Of of summer sunnner uniforms. uniforms. (This that winter uniforms interesting i n t e r e s t i n g in i n view v i e w of of Communist Comunist ptopagaada propaganda charges charges tht men, while while no UN troops were were being being o outfitted had been provided to t o all d l their t h e i r men, utfitted for winter. winter. for
The South south Korean Korean press press has has reported reported President President Rhee's Shees statements to Tho statoments t o a group of technicians i in Mhich he he urged urge& them tto join barring J Japanese n which o j o i n iin n barring ames0 technicians teohnioians from from Korean Korean industries. i n d u s t r i m . Charge ILghtner Ughtnar at a t Pusan Pusan comments comments that the Command i is using Japanese Japanese teohnioians teohnioians t h a t sinoe only t h e United Nations Comand s using i s indirectly i n d i r e c t l y an an attaok attaok against ngajnst the the United United States. States. For For i n Korea, Knrea, this t h i s is in the mati-Japanese campaign has has proved proved useful useful t h e South Korean Government, Government, tthe h e anti-Japanese in public a attention from the the regime's regimes failure i n defleeting deflecting pubUo t t e n t i o n from f a i l u r e to t o solve solve domestic problems. problems.

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Central I n t e l l i g e n c e Agency Intelligence Agency Office of o f Current Intelligence Intelligence 9909, 1952 9909, 21 21 October 1952 D A I L Y K O R E A N B U L L E T I N DAILY KOREAN BULLETIN
Military M i l i t a r y Operations Operations -
Army
Heavy fighting ROK 9th, Ddvision Heavy fighting oontinued in i n the ROR 9th, US 7th, 7th, and 2nd ROK Division he o rest o f Iron retained t h e i r hold on t Enemy troops retained their the crest of sectors s e c t o r s on on Monday. Monday. Enmy roops i n an intense grenade Horse Mountain after a f t e r engaging ROK 9th Division t troops in At t Triangle Triangle Hill H i l l just just east e a s t of Kumwha, K m h a , elements elemelits of of and bayonet encounter. encounter. A the t h e US 7th 7th Division Division were were attacked attaaksd by by the tho enemy enemy some some 300 300 yards yards from from the the t o hold Pikes Pikas Peak, Peak, northern spur spur o of f Triangle crest. The enemy continued to crest. resisted Ridge. e s i s t e d heavy enemy attacks on Sniper Ridge* Hill. ROK 2nd Division troops r Hill. One regiment attacked an battalion in fight M estimated estimated enemy b attalion i n an intense f ight resulted a sslight enemywithdrawal. n a l i g h t enemy withdrawal. A A total t o t a l of o f nearly nearly 26,000 26,000 which r e s u l t e d iin rounds of of mortar mortar and and artillory a r t i l l - r y fire f i r e fell f e l l during during the t h e report r e p o r t period. period.
t o t a l of o f naval naval air a i r sorties sorties f o r 20 October was The total for wes incomplete, incomplete, with a i r c r a f t attacked attacked only 31 31 reported reported on o n the the east e a s t coast. coast. These carrier-based only carrier-based aircraft patrolled atrolled t a r g e t s in i n the thc vicinity v i c i n i t y of o f Kilchu Kilchu and and Wonsan. Wonsan. Blockade ships p targets o r o p o r t was the No report t h e east e a s t ooast ooast but but did did not not engage engage in i n any any bombardment. bombardment. N received received concerning conoerning west w e s t coast coast surface surface activity. activity.
A ir Air -
A total t o t a l of. of 956 o r t i e s by flown on on 20 20 October, October, 956 ssorties by land-based land-based planes planes was wes flown planes were were engaged engaged o or N o enemy plane8 r encountered during 6 2 1 combat. combat. No including 621 the night FEAF FEU Bomber h o night Bomber Command Command mounted 12 1 2 these operations. oporations, During t in An industrial i n d u s t r i a l installation i n s t a l l a t i o n at n t Taeju-dong i n northnortha f f e c t i v e sorties. s o r t i e s . An effective eastern Korea w was a s attacked by by 10 10 of o f these these medium medium bombers. bombers.
M ilitary. I n t elli p c e Military Int elliunce -
On 14 On 14 October October the t h e USS. USS Vasuvius, Vesuvius, While While engaged engaged i in n r replarishing eplsrishing tho of the operations observed 16 MIG's. Four of operations in i n the the Wonsan-Hungnam Wonsan-Hunpam area', area., o'bserved 16 MIG'sn enemy enemy aircraft a i r c r a f t orbited orbited over over the the ships ships but but did did not not make make hostile h o s t i l e moVes moves or o r cone come 16 October, October, 15 US Navy planes reported within withiri gun gun range. rmge. Tmo Two days later, l a t e r , on 16 howevers aggressive MIG's, hawever, aggressive pursuit p u r s u i t by by eight eight MIG's EG1s in i n the t h e same s m n Area. nrea. The MIG's, broke Dn'17 October October e eight airoraft *contrails* broks off off the the attack a t t a c k before firing. firing. On'17 ight a i r o r a f t mcontrails" were sighted sighted by by UN UN pilots p i l o t s over over Abnsan. Wonsan. (These (These latest l a t e s t MIG-15 intrusions intrusions represent a continuation of effort air repreaent of an an apparent communist e f f o r t tto o expand a ir e a s t coast.) coastr) defenses over the east THE THE c C.I.A. . 1 . A . IlAS HAS NO NO OnJECTION OnJECTION TO TO THE THE DZC:ASSIFICATION DECLASSIFICATION OF OF THIS DOCUMENT. tion Seourity Inf o 7 JUL 1970
No.

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tion .Central Intelligence Agemy Agency Central ItrteUigenae Office of Current Current Intelllgsnoe Intelligenme 9910, 9010, 22 October Ootober 1952 1952
D A I L Y
Military Operations W.Utary Operatioas
rn Army
Folbwlng a One one hour hour and 50 50 minute artillery a r t i l l e r y preparation, Following a preparation, two ba%taUone battalions of of Chinese Chinese Communist OorrnauPiet infantrymen inftuitrymen wreeted wrested outpost outpos0 positions on on Sliiper Sniper Ridge from ROK 2nd MPision n an Division ttoops troops iin an engageMent engagameht on on Tuesday Tuesday night. lighting Fighting bedeme artillery Mortar beaane sporadio-felloking eporadio following the &e intense interne aMtien, abtion, and heavy UN a r t i l l e r y and Ihortar fire was being directed end-of the the r report period. f l r e wa8 direofed againSt against the enemy at tthe h e end'of e p o r t period. The 114th U4th Chinese Chinese DiVision-repulsed'a Dideion--ispulaed-a ROK 9th.Diiision 9th Division attemPt atCempt to t o retioCupy reoooupy ROK IrOn Rorie Mountain'northeast beak I r o n Horse Mountain northeast )f if ChoreOn, Chomn, driving-Seuth-Koread drirtng-Soukh Korean eleMentgi dements baok 160 the hill in i n aa bitter b i t t e r greUide-and goaade-and hand716-hand hallid-%o-haxzd 160 3arde Yards f'rom from the the orest crest of' o the-hili duel. Elsewhere along the front, f r o n t , eoattered a t r o l aotione dUel.--Elseehere soattered probee probes and and p patrol actions were mere reported. reported.
Due report on naval action in the h e to t o oommunioation oommunioation diffioulties, d i f f i o u l t i e s , no r e p o r t op aotion i nt h e last bet
24 hours has been reoeived. reoeived.
InOlaMent UN air activity only 362' a o t i v i t y on 21 2 1 Ootober as o nly S 62. Inolement weather hampered WI effeO*LYO sorties by larid-based aircraft aircraft wereflown, f&m,including inoluding123 3.23 oombat. effeetiVe sortiee bY lai&baied were Oombat.'., No period. During Eo enAMY-aitoraft-were ensohy ' a i r c r a f t were observed er or encountered'during emountered-during the period. %wing the n i g h t 15 15 mediran misaiona were flown, flown, 11 U of of 'these these a i r o r a f t atatthe night mediun bomber missions aireraft taoking o d o a t i o n s oenter near Woncan. Woaoan. tacking a o oommunioations center at at owl-ai, Ounni, near
Military Intellienoe M . l i t ary Int e l l i gem e
-EnekY *ehieuler t traffic was high-Enemy vehioular r a f f i o during the week ending 16 16 Ootober wae lighted-by the-reekitiarinCeoOf asedneiderablenumber nUmberof ortruoks in immedZghted-li~ he-reappearrkoe f a'adheiderable truoka i n tthe h e innnediate rear, plus trucks and oxoarts oxoarti i in BWanghae i a t e rear! p l u s large movements of both truoke n Ehrrrnghas 62.neioint-of-the-tota1-iightinge, h i . 82 pei?cent of -the-total-eigh%ing6, the the highest highest pereeitage peroentage Provinee. bovlmiec Oier Rail on reoot;d;- h r e on '*e d n Eupplj."route6 aouth Of of the t h e 39th 39th Parallel. Paralhl. B ail iOuti iouth MA-f666id;-iiro-On'the Mein ao%id~*deolin e from a the heavy-aotiiitY heavy a o t i v l t y of o f the the preceding preoeding week. wek. Far East aCtivitidielined froin-the Air Fered-66Mmintelhat A i r Forod'oements Ohat the the enemy ensmy is is apparently.making apparentIy-making a a definite d e f i n i t e effort effort to t o supSupthe report ply adociUite i aMMUnitien Units on on the the front. front. During t n n a d t i o n ff6r o r ianits he r e p o r t period p l y ideqiiate the exceeded that of t h e COMMUniet Conmadst itpenditure etqeliditure of of artillery a x t i l l s r y ammunition ammunition slightly s l i g h t l y exoeeded the previous prsrlous weeks. feeka~ SE

Navy
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O 03JXC 03JECl/I0 91 ABAS THE C .I.A . IIAS N N3 C.I.. TO THE THE DZCLASS2PICAT10N DECIASSIFICATION OF TIiIS DOCUMLi<T. THIS DOCUMENT.
I 4 A
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Central-Intelligence AgentY Cen+al InteUlgenoe Agenoy Offibe Office of of Current CUrrent Intelligenoe Intelligence 9911, QQU, 23 October 1952 1952
D A I L Y Military Operation6 Military Operations

Army
only 36 86 naval mval air air sorties, 80rtie8, all a l l on t h e west Only the west ooaet, coast, wbre mere flown on 22 aifkssd-based Land-based marine airOctober* Ootober, as as inclement inolanent weather weather hampered hampered operations. operations craft on on'the oraft t h e west coast attacked troop and supply iinstallations n s t a l l a t i o n s from n i t s maintained t h e blockade blookade units the Chinnampo ta 0 the-Ran the Han River River estuary. estuary. Surface u ChinnampO and bombarded n s t a l l a t i o n s on both Korean bambarded ahore shore i installations Korean coasts. coasts.
Air Air
-land-based aircraft under F'EAF FEAF oontrol control flew flew 689 effective Iaad-Based a i r o r a f t under e f f e c t i v e sorties s o r t i e s on on 22 October; Octber; inoluding inolUding 412 412 combat. coMbat. While Male on o n patrol p a t r o l in in the t h e Chongchon-Yalu Chongohon-Yalu TWO enemy River area, UN enemy MIGts encountered 16. 1 6 . Two River--area, UN pilbts-observed pilets-Obserired 44 44-enemy MIG's and and'encountered airor&.were probably probably destroYed destroyed and*four and' four damaged. damaged. During the night 18 18 airOrift-were effective-bOMber Missiaba of the a aircraft lead effeo%tvebomber m i s s i o b were flawn, flow& 10 10 of i r o r a f t attacking a l ead Merihaling yards at mine at a t Okung Okung in i n nertheastern northeastern Korea. Korea. Marshaling a t Chinnampo and mine liwangju were bombed by by two two medium bombers. Rwangju w e r e bombed bombsre.
Military Intelligence Intelligenoe Military
A Far Bait Command-study of the current North Korean Army replacement syitem indicated the availability of more than a sufficient nUmber of recrUits to meet requirements under present battle conditions.
____

Navy
Ridge i in central Korea* ROK ROK In tthe h e ROK 2nd Division seotor on Sniper Ridge n c e n t r a l Korea, ir4i an esfimafed estimated thi.ee three enemy enemy companieej companies; they they llater seeured and and ooncon*oops engaged ehgaged. an a t e r seoured solidated o the eolidated their t h e i r positions, poaitiom, foroing foroing the t h e enemy enemy to to withdraw. withdraw. Farther bo the seat action was was reported. reported. eaef on the ROK ROK Capital Division &vision front f r o n t one minor enemy aotion iOtions took plaos. place. along the the battle b a t t l a line Uno only probes probee ind and patrol a o t i o n e took Elsewhere along Slightly.more in Thursday's S l i g h t l y more than t h a n 23,000 23,000 rounds of artillery a r t i l l e r y were employed i n Thursday's fighting. fighting.
J ArmY Y
Not
7
the is to be oapable capable of furnishfurnish t h e North Korean population i e estimated t o be ing 6,000 males per month for military service. (The North Korean People's Army haw has elements of only five divisions on the line in eastern Kbrea. The soale of figbting on this front has been below normal in the last few
T
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THIS DOCUILIST.
Security Info
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monthi, thus accounting aaoounting for for the surplus of replaoemeata m r oasualties.) months, thus replacements o over oasualties.)
General Situation Osperal
Propaganda Propaganda
Ridio'Peigng Radio Poipingon on22-OctOber-biOadcaat 22 Oatoljer-broadcastfurther f'urther accusations aoausationa of of US Us Air Air Pro tranigressions Manchuria. The Communist radio Foroa tranigreerions*over over Manahuria. radio claimedthat claimed that from 8,to 8,to 1 17 7 October 06tObei a a'total ' f a t a l of Of 617 517 sdrtiea sOrties by by 92 groups groups o of f nAmerioan "American airarafi" aircraft" (These acousations ao~usationshave boooms were Were-flown flown over border border provinoes. provinosa. :(These become a familiar T h e apparent aLppareat intent of the the allegations allegationa is is theme in the ensahypropaganda enekipropaganda line. line. The intent of to "prove" ear.) "pmvo" DI UB provocation provocation in in the Korean war.)

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Central Agenoy Central Intelligenoe Intelligeaoe Agenoy Offibe Offlbe of of Current Intelligence fntelllgenoe 9912, 9912, 24 24 October Ootobsr 1962 1962

Milltiarg Operations Operations Military
Army
Attaking infantrymen on onWhite Atta6klng ROK ROX 9th 9th Division Division infantryman Olhite Horse Horse Hill engaged engaged a a Chinese platoon, foroing forcing t h the enemyto tou withdraw undercover intense Chinese _Communist Conmnmist platoon, e enemy i t h d r a s under oovw of i nterne To the t h e east, east, on on the t h e central oentral self-propOll6il gr;ii fire'dUring fife' d s i n g Friday'S Friaayts fighting. fighting. To fraft battalion Wnt uOrtA-Cf-Itiiihalsueoeleive zortK-of-Wiiiha,-ruooerrive attaoks attaoke by Chinese Ohinere units of up to to b ittalion strength'Were strength +re broken broken up up and and repulsed repulsed by troops troop8 of o f tthe h e US UB 7th 7th M Division. v i ~ I o a . Aside Arid0 from a a one one and ahd one-half one-half hour hour enemy enemy attack attaok against against ROE Capital positions positions on on trot ROK Capital Finger-Ridge, to small &..b unit Finger'Bidge, action a o t i o n on on the t h e remainder of of the t h e front Front was confined oonf'ined t o small probes probes.
mll
There weie'only naval the fiere were o n l y 41 41n a v a l air a i r sOrties rorties on o a 23 23 October Ootober as a s carriers oarriers on t he Iand-based W US b Marine r i n e aircraft alroraf't eist-Ooiet-eigiged-in-rePlenishing eaeb"'doab'f;-en&sd ' i n repbllirrhing aetivities. aoti~d.tiee. bnd-baaed Surfaoe faoo on h a t t oCest'ettaokedtargets wasti alhaokad t a r g e t 8in inwestern We48tWnEWanghae akanghaePI-Ovine*. Provinoe. k on the i **et units u n i t s maintained ru3ntained the t h e blockade blookade and and bombarded bombarded both both Korean Korean coasts. ooarto.
oon%rol flww f l e w 1,050 1,060 effective eff'eotiv, sorties 8orfies UN m0. land-based land=baeed aircraft airoraft under FEAF oontrol on October, of of uhioh whioh 746 748 were were oambat. combat. While ora 23 23 Ootober, Rhile on on patrol p a t r o l in in the the ChongohowahopgohonTwo Yalu Yip's and eneountered Yalu River River area, area# UN UB pilots p i l o t s observed obsrerwd 53 59 enemy enemy MIG's enoountered 28. 260 Rrr) Wass were lyDG)(a wereprobably probablydestroyed d e a t r o p d and and another another damaged damaged with with no PO losses losaee to t o UN UM airairnight medium bomber bather mirsiom missions were flown, oraft. i g h t 15 l6 effective s f f e o t i v e medium flown, craft. During the n nine of nins of these %heso airoraft a i r o r a t %attacking attaaking aa oement oemsnt plant p l a n t at a$ Rokusen, Hokuaen, near nearlronsan. Woman.
HUtery InteUgeaoe Military Intelligence
On 20 Ootober October trro two UB US Navy airbraif aircraft over Wonean Wonsan harbor harbor obrerved observed four four On unidentified which olroled circled M twice fire. u n i d e n t i f i e d enemy enemy aircraft a i r o r a f t wMah a s but did not open f i r e . In the morning of DE medim mediuM bnmber bomber obrerved obverted an unlde2ltifled unidentified t h e early e a r l y mordng of 21 21 October, Ootober, a WI (This represents represents an an a apparent oontinuation parent oontinuation enemy enemy airoraff airoraft southeast of of Ilonsan. Wonsan. (This enemy's e efforts defenses in in the the e east.) of the enemy*8 f f o r t a to expand air defezlsee aab

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General Information Information General

Political PoUtioal South Director Clarenoe Clarence Ryes Ryee on South Korean Korean Office OfMoe of o f PUblic Publio Information Information Mreotor 1 7 OctOber Ootober issued i s s u e d one one of o f the the most mos0 bitter b i t t e r statements.yet statemente'yet encountered encountered in i n the tha 17 The etafsmslvt accused acoused ourrent anti-Japanese anti-Japanese press press campaign oampaign in in South South Korea. Korea. The-statement .as in t their Japansee of of plotting plotting to t o "invade "invade neighboring neighboring countries. countries. . e a in heir the Japanese the heyday and threatened threatened that thatsif they d did not modify modify "their "their heyday of o f imperialism'. imperiallem" and if they i d not haiitile,attitudes, they would mould have have t to expect to be made made an h6stiIe. attitudes, they o expeat an enemy enemy of of the the EMbassy i in no information infOrmation t to Korean Korean people." people.* The US Embassy n Pusan states states it has no o timing or motivation o of this virulent addition addition t to explain the timine; f t h i e virulent o tthe h e already strong "hate-Japan" "hate-Japanm movement. movementn strong
Seourity Infnation tion

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100' u @
Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Agency Office of Current Intelligence Intelligence 95113, 25 25 October October 1952 1952 9913,
Security I

Army
Heavy 9th Heavy action action continued continued in i n the US 7th 7th and the t h e ROK 2nd and 9 t h Division sectors. sectors. To To the the east e a s t of of Chorwon, Chorwon, South South Korean Korean troops troops of of the ROK 9th 9 t h Division Division on on 24 24 October October launched a Horse H Hill repulsed. a counterattack against Chinese troops troops on Iron Horee i l l but were repulsed. Near Kumwha, K m h a , farther f a r t h e r to t o the east, east, US 7th Division troops were stopped in their assault assault on Pike's Pike's Peak on Hill artillery fire on Triangle H i l l by heavy enemy mortar and a rtillery f i r e and by an was attack was w a s resumed resumed on on 25 October, October, but w a s again again f i e l d . The attack anti-personnel mine mine field. anti-personnel South Korean Korean 2nd 2nd DivDivforced back, back, the the enemy enemy using using 5,000 5,000 rounds rounds of of supporting supporting fire. fire. South sion indecisive see-saw see-saw battle battle atop atop Sniper SniperRidge s i o n elements fought an indecisive R i d g e on on the the flank flank of of 2nd Division Division s sector Aleo in in the. the 2nd e c t o r a Chinese Triangle Hill Hill on on 24 24 and and 25 25 October. October. Also battalion b a t t a l i o n attacked attacked ROK ROK main main line l i n e positions, p s i t i o n e , but was turned back during the t h e early early mortar and a artillery fire morning of of 25 25 October. October. Over 11,000 rounds of enemy mortar rtillery f i r e were morning i n east c central e n t r a l Korea, Korea, but no a active ctive received in i n the t h e ROK Capital Division sector in ground fighting f i g h t i n g developed. developed. ground
UN naval naval aircraft a i r c r a f t flew flew 306 306 sorties s o r t i e s from from carriers c a r r i e r s against enemy enemy targets t a r g e t s on on the the UN bombarded east coast installae a s t and west coasts on on 24 24 October. October. Surface vessels bombarded imtalla.east and.west t i o n s at a t Songjin, Songjin, Tanchon Tanchon and and Wonsan. Wonsan. tions
Air Air
which 626 626 were were combat. combat.
A i r c r a f t under Far Fer East East Air A i r Force Control control flew flew 963 s o r t i e s on on 24 24 October, October, of of Aircraft 963 sorties n s t a l l a t i o n s in i n the Light bombers attacked enemy supply i installations Hongwon area east of of Hamhung; Hamhung, as six six medium i t Hungnam s i x hit hit Hongwon medium bombers h hit HUngnam and another six a supply area near Wonsan. the 158 158 UN UN counterair counterair s sorties o r t i e s flown flown by by US US.F-86's P-86's a supply area near Wonsan. During the. only MIG-15's were were observed. observed. Eight of of theae these were encountered, encoUntered, w with only 26 26 Conminist Comminist MIG-15's i t h one enemy damaged. eneMy plane plane being being damaged. General ituation General S Situation
Political P olitical
The progovernment South Korean press, press, continuing i its of current cUrrent t s exaggeration of economic and ocial d i f f i c u l t i e s , alleges inand s social difficulties, alleges that that South South Korean Korean unemployment unemploymen has increased tten e n percent h a t there percent during 1952, 1952, tthat there are are now tow over over a a million million jobless joblest persons persons iin n South h a t one i v e ffarmers a m e r e is h e normally South Korea, Korea, and and t that One out out of of f five is idle idle even even during during tthe normally busy season. American Charge Lightner a t Pusan states that t h e United busy hervest harvest season. at the United States Information Service has has sought sought to t o counter counter these these stories,z1:: s t o r i e s , which ich regularly regularly appear appear on on Information Service Radio Pyongyang propaganda broadcasts, broadcasts, by emphasizing emphasizing US-UN c i v i l a s s i s t h c e and _, Pyongyang propaganda
rehabilitition effort's.

Navy Navy
Security I ormation
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TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OF THCS,DOCUMENT.

do/
No . No.
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Jui '97$ 1978
0 s 0 23
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Seourity \tion Inf Security Inf
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Central Intelligence I n t e l l l g e m e Aggnay Central Agency Offibe of Current Izrtelligenoe Offibe Onvent Intelligenoe 9914, 27 October 1952 9914, 1952
DAILY
Military l d i u t a r y Operations
DAILY KOREAN K O R E A N BULLETIN BULLETIN

Army
On elementa opened an gttack attack on a series o of On Sunday Sunday afternoon, afternoon, Chinese obmente f outpost8 h e US Lst h e western outposts in t the 1st Marine Division seotor sector on t the western front. front. Although action was was oontinuing a at report period, no no a significant the aotion t tthe h e end of the r e p o r t period, igdficant Press reports sfate, state, however, however, that t the g a i r k had'been by the t h e enemy. enemy. 'rem he gains had been made by Hill and and enemy enany pressure pressure was was being being exerted exerted againsf against Chinese captured oaptiured Bunked. Bunker IUU. the main Une of resistance. resiatanoe~ main line
On planes, a all east On 25 26 October Ootober 189 189 sorties sorties by barrier-based barrier-based planes, l l on the e ast cbiat, c o b % , Were-repOited, were reported, With with Siingjin, Songjin, Wonsan Wonsan and and Chongjin Chongjin as-targets. a s ' t a r g e t s . No Surface units -8 'received oonoerning oonoerhing *est west OCist coast inirfaoe surfaoe a c t i v i t y . Surfaoe units r e p o r t waii-reeeied iepOrt activity. on the e a s t aoast nstallations. east coast maintained maintained the the bloakade bloakade and and bombarded bombarded shore shore iinstallations. On oi1i92-sOities by carrier-baesd oirrierbieed planes O n SunaaY-,-26-06tober, Sunaay, 26- Ootober, -oLLy-93sorties by planes Wire were flown, In t the as 6&rriersr on the e a s t ocOeit-engagedin o a e t engaged in iejileniehineoperatiOns. replo-nishing operations. Jn he is'ear-iieii-on the-east *esti:an-Craft Britieh o Cairier-Oneen-ittaoked'targets fraa Haeju Haeju +st, 'drcrah fioni.the fkm t h e Erifish a r r i b r Ooean attaoked t a r g e t s f'rom Surfaoe Units unife in-the i n t h e east-bOmbarded eastbombarded Songjin and Woman to Wonsan while while t o 10Y64Yang. mngyang. -SUrface Chlnnampo was wa8 the the main main target targ8.t; on on the the west w e s t coast. ooaet. Chinnampo
A t o t a lof of 975 976 effeotive.sorties e f f e o t i v e s o r t i e s by land-based planes MAO was flnwn flown ou Atotal landbased planes on 26 25 Oetber, inoluding 647 While on Ootober, 647 combat. oombat. 'IAN1e on patrol p a t r o l in i n the t h e Yalu River area, mea, UN UN Pilots p i l o t 8 obserired-45Inety-MIG's observed 48 en&my-MIG8sand and four four unidentified unidentified enemy enemy aircraft. aircraft. Of Of the'14 MIG'i was the l ~ 4 MIGre eneountered, enoountered, two'lsre two were deStroyed destroyed and and four four damaged. demaged. There was no-daMageto-UN no'damaze to- Ms aircraft. 8ircraf-k. Durinp: During the the night night 36 15 bomber bomber miasions missionswere werellown; .flown;
THE c. I. A HAS . HAS NOOBTECTION (7E TXCTION THE C.I.A. NO Seourify I onnation TO THE, DTC;:,?SLFICATION OF TO THE DI C-2,:T)IFICATION OF Security I. ormation THISDOCUMENT. DOCUICXT. THIS
Oh the antion again oentered centered i in O n Saturday Saturday and early e a r l y Sunday Sunday t h e prinoipal aotion n the ROK 2nd Ridge w were rea d Division Division sector seotor where several several enemy enemy attacks on Sniper Rldge e r e repuieed.- On SthDivision Division i in oentral pulsed.On thefrentrof the front- ofthe: t h e ftelislyarrived'ROK newly-arrived ROK 8th n eeast ast o entral Korea, a Chinese battalion heavy gittaok attack against Finger Finger Ridge EtOrea, Chineae b a t t a l i o n launched a heavy east, enemy probing which was thrown thrown beck-after baok a f t e r heavy heavy fighting. fighting. To the east, Whia. Was attaeke atf;aok6 of of UP up to t o battelion'strength b a t t a l i o n strength were were launched launched against against the t h e US US 40th BOth Division, Division, shortlY hadrelieved relievedthe theUS VS 26th 25th Di*8iOn DiVision on on the the e eastern skbdw after after it it .had a e t e r n front. front. The enemy to Division's main enemy suooeeded suooeeded in in pressing preesing t o within 35 yards of the Mvision'e line resistance before being line of o f resistanoe being repulsed. repulsed.
Navy
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Security Infohaion
a oommunioations communications center Mine at a gold mine a t Taeyudong Taeyudong in in northwestern northwestern Korea Korea and and a oenter Chungsan were bombed bombed by by 11 at Chungsen 11 of of these t h e s e airdraft. airbraff.
On the by land-based planes On the following following day, day, 1,005 1,006 effective effeotive 'sorties sorties by pleneer MIG's were observed t o t a l of o f 45 MIG'e were were flown flown of'which of'whioh 664 664 were were combat. oombat. A total MIG's were destroyed in in "NIG "RliIG Alley," of o f whioh whioh 21 21 were were encountered. enoountered. Two MIQ's FEAF Bomber Bomber CommAnd Co-d mounted 16 16 effecttve effeotive and three-Probibly mounted atid three probably damaged:damage& FEAF beabor ids.siolhs MiseionS-on the.night Of 26-27 2647 Oetober, bom%er on t h e night of Ootober, with with sik six light l i g h t boMbers bombers bombed airtrafi bombed attacking a supply center attaoldng oenter near Pyongyang. Pyongyang. Five other aircraft enemy enemy troop troop installations installations near near the t h e front front line. line.

Security
.,tion
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Sbcurity I
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4'
Central Intelligence Agency Central I n t e l l i g e n c e Agenoy Offioe ntelligenoe Office of Current I Intelligence 9915, 9916, 28 28 October Ootober 1952 1962
rmation
DAILY KOREAN K O R E A N BULLETIN BULLETIM

D A I L Y
Military Mlli t a r y Operations
On t the A A total t o t a l of of 322 322 naval naval air a i r sorties s o r t i e s was flown f l o w n on on 27 27 October. October. On h e east east coaat, coast, c&rier-based carrier-bated airoraft a i r c r a f t attaoked attabked t targets a r g e t s from tthe he b battle attle l line i n e north north t to o Chongjin, ChongJin, while *lila in i n the the west, west, Chinnampo and Haeju Haeju were t the h e main targets. t a r g e t s . Surfiee-Uniii'Meintained the installations both faod dts~dntained t h e blockade and bombarded shore i m t a l l a t i o n e on both Korean coasts. Korean coasts
October UN landbased airoraft On 27 b tober U I Laad-based aimraf't under under FEAF FEAF control c o n t r o l flew flew 1,137 1,137 e f f e c t i v e sorties. a o r t i o ~ . NO effective KO enemy e n o w airoraft airoraft m were r e observed or encoUntered encountered during t the he bombers'flew oloee clew, support and l leaflet e a f l e t drop dkssione mtssions period. Three medium bombere'flew period. on t h e night of of 27-28 27-28 October. Ootober. the Situation General S ituation Politioal Poll t i c a1
announoed that t the Radio Pusan on 27 October announced h e South Korean Government his the technicians now new employed a at has decided deoided to t o send back t h e Japanese teohnioiana t various oategories Kbrean Korean ports porta and and to t o replace replaoe them them with with Korean G r e e n speoialists. s p e o i ~ s t s oVarious categories of South Korean teohnicians technicians suoh as radio operators and and ealva salvage-ship of e-ship operators were t o register register immediately i m e d i a t e l y with wlth the t h e government. governmento (This This iis e a were requested requested to I

Navy Navy
On wystern front, up 1st Nhrine Mvisioa Division awoeeded succeeded i in 3n the western front, the US lst Marine n driving the enemy in whioh whidh Chiheae Chinese elements b briefly enemy from from "The Hook" after a f t e r heavy fighting f l g h t i n g in riefly n this action, Inthis action, the the press press reported reported that that l i n e Of-reiiitinoe. of 'red8tanoe. I penetrated the'main t h e main line penetrated which had been overrun overrun i in the Nhrines Marines re-stored rebtored tthree h r e e outpost positions p o a i t i o m whioh n the enemy advanoe.' The Chinese Ohinese used 11,000-rOunds 11,000 rounds of a r t i l l e r y and mortar earlier enemysadVance.. of artillery fire inthie f l r e in this enoounter. enoounter. 'To To the t h e oast, east, in-the i n ' t h e vioinity v i o i n i t y of of Iron I r o n Bbrse Horae Hill, Hill, the the enemk counterattack enabled enabled f friendly enemy attaaked15-3rd'Diviriion a t t a o k e d v W 3rd Division POeitions, positions, bUt but a a TIN On counterattaok riendly trOops troops t to o reocaUpy reoooupy t their h e i r poSitiOns poeitioas after a f t e r a one hour and 15 minute minute engagement. engagement. The 7th US-Division US'Mvision repulsed repuleed several s e v e r a l enemy ellsmy t thrusts h r u s t s on t the h e right flank flank of o f Iron H6rSd Hill; Hill, although although one one friehdlY friendly position poeition was temporarily temporarily overrun. overrun. Almost Horde 23,000"rounds of of a artillery mortar fire were were employed employed during during tthe report 23,000'rounds r t i l l e r y and mortar he r eport period. period.
Air
Security I
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HASNO TO TII2D3'..CLASSIFICATION OBJECTION THIS DOCUMENT.

-)1/ATHE
C.I.A.
OF
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111.4.1na
Seourity Seourity s % I I t i o n
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unilateral on the part o of and will unihteral announoement OR f the tihe South Korean Government a n d w ill serve f further u r h e r to oonf'use oonfuse or or embitter Korean-Japanese-United Korean-Japanese-United Nations Nations Cornnand Command relations. relations. The Japanese Japanese techniciamm technicians are are currently ourrantly under under contract contract to to UNC UNC and not t h e South Eorean the Korean Oovermenh) Government.)
..
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Seourity Security In rmation
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Army
Intelligence Agenoy Agency Central Intelligence of Current Intelligenoe Office of Intelligence October 1952 1952 9916, 29 Ootober
D A I L Y
M i l i t a r y Operations LAIALtaa!altra92112.
ROK 2nd Division atop Sniper Ridge was WAS attacked attaoked by by Chinese elements The BOK the first moving up up behind a a heavy heavy artillery a r t i l l e r y and and mortar barrage. barrage. Although tho first moving enemy assault one pushed pushed tthe South Koreans Koreans baok baok a s s a u l t WAS was repulsed, repulsed, a a emu:seeding suooeeding one h e South BOK 8th sector of of east east c central Korea, very very heavy heavy 8 t h Division seotor e n t r a l Korea, 200 metere, meters. In the ROK 200 artillery fire was received (over 14,000 14,000 rounds), rounds), b but no s signifia r t i l l e r y and mortar f i r e was u t no ignifiIn i n mountainous mountainous cant ground ground aotion aotion developed. developed. I n tthe h e US 40th Division sector in eastern Korea, Chinese elements made s slight in the main main defense e a s t e r n Korea, l i g h t penetrations i n the Iine, but US troops restored t their before tthe report period period ended. ended. line, h e i r position before h e report
total was incomplete incomplete with with only The t o t a l of naval air air sorties for 28 October WRS Carrier-based a airoraft east instali r o r a f t on tthe he e a s t coast attacked shore instal209 209 reported. reported. Carrier-based air operations operations lations Nana% Songjin, and l a t i o n s at a t Nanam, Songjin, Hungnam H~mgnam and Wonsan. Plonsan. There were no air Surfaoa on operations. Surfaoe on ths t h e west coast coast as a8 oarriers carriers engaged engaged in i n replenishing operatione. units u n i t s on on the t h e east e a s t coast ooast bombarded bomberded Songjin, Songjin, Ohaho Chaho and and Wonsan. Wonsan. One US destroyer received reoeived 40 40 rourds r o m d s of of shore shore battery b a t t e r y fire. f i r e . Only minor shrapnel damage with no concerning we& west personnel personnel casualties oasualtiea wus n s reported. reported. No report was received concerning ooast o o a s t surface surface activity. activity.
UN UN land-based land-based aircraft aircraft; under under FEAF FEAF' control control flew flew 870 870 effective e f f e c t i v e sorties s o r t i e 8 on on enemy aircraft a i r o r a f t were observed observed or or Ootober, of of Which whiah 554 554 were w e r e combat. combat. No enemy 28 October, On the the night of of 28-29 28-29 October, October, 22 medium encountered the period. period. On encountered during during the supply center center near neac Pyongyang Pyongyang was was attacked attaokod by by bomber wore flown. flown. AA supply bomber missions were 14 of of t h e UN f i v e others others bombed a t e .I stel 14 the UN bombers bombers while wtile five bombed a a marshaling marshaling yard yard and and mill m5 X I . near near Chinnempo. Chinnampo.

Navy Navy
Fighting oontinued along almost the the e entire front on 28 October as as the the fighting ntire f r o n t on Chinese launched a s series battalion-size attaoke attacks on UN UN outposts. outposts. e r i e s of company and battallon-size The US 1st recaptured t their positions w with 1st Marines near Kaesong reoaptured h e i r lost outpost position8 ith In t the h e Chorwon Chorwon area,_the area,-the US 3rd Division reoeived received little l i t t l e enemy enemy opposition. opposition. In attacks, mortar fire, battalions attacks, supported by heavy heavy artillery a r t i l l e r y and mortar f'ire, from Chinese b attalions enemy was was on Iron Iron &rse i l l and on JRokeoa Heights j ust t o tthe h e east. Bbrse H Bill on Jackson just to east. The anemy the e a s t of Chorwon, t h e US 7 t h MviTo east Chormon, the 7th Diviforced to withdraw to w i t h d r a w in i n both both oases. CRS8Sm sion was entire front front by a series of of small platoon and sion m s harassed along its i t s elitire N o s i g n i f l o a n t action aotion developed. developed. signifioant company-size oompany-size Chinese Chinese attacks. attacks. NO
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THE C.I.A. C.1.A. HAS HAS NO ORTECTION THE NO OB TECTION tion %ionTO TO THE THE DECLASSIFICATION OF OF Tlip TH S DOCUMENT. DOCU~~IL'T.
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1978
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Security I In Sscrurity n
Mpitary l i t a r y Intelligence Intelligence
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Air Air the week week ending 25 October October was was characterized dharacterized Enemy air a i r activity a c t i v i t y during during the by a general genoral lack laok of aggressiveness aggressiveness as MIG pilots p i l o t 8 continued corrtinued t their h e i r evasive f i v e of the 18 18 air b a t t l e s were n i t i a t e d by the Co~r~tunists, Although five battles were i initiated Communists, t a o t i c s . Although tactics. all five h e hit-and-run a r i e t y and n t heir five were were of of t the hit-and-run v variety and indioatod indicated no no change change iin their present defensive pattern. pattern. The enemy enemy efforts e f f o r t s to t o intercept i n t e r c e p t UN UN medium medium bombers bombers Alley," but were were widely dispereed. dispersed. were not particularly p a r t i c u l a r l y concentrated concentrated in i n "MIG Alley," Far East Air Foroe comments comments that t h a t this t h i s change ohange might possibly have been stimustirnuLated he t a r g e t s lhit l i t by lated by the Commuaistst Communists' growing growing conoern concern over over tthe targets by recent recent VN UN tbe longer n nights for bombings and and by by a a desire to CO take advantage of o f %he ights f o r improving their early e a r l y warning warning GCI GCI oapability. oapability. their

Security I
rmation
k
Army Army
ormation Central Intelligence Intelligence Agency Agency Intelligence Office of Current Intelligence 9917, 1952 9917, 30 October 1952
D A I L Y KOREAN K O R E A N BULLETIN. BULLETIN DAILY

W Military l litary Operations Operations
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the There were 307 307 carrier-based carrier-bnned air air sorties s o r t i e s on on 29 29 October. October. On t h e east coast, on coast, shore installations i n s t a l l a t i o n s from from lOnsan Wonsan to t o Chongjin Chongjin were were attacked attacked -while while on B r i t i s h carrier c a r r i e r Ocean bombed and strafed strafed a i r c r a f t from from the British the t h e west coast, coast, aircraft units on both both coasts melntained maintained t a r g e t s near Haeju Haeju and and Ongjin. Ongjin. UN murface surface units targets the t h e blockade and and bombarded bombarded troop troop and and supply supply installations. installations.
Air
UN land-based land-based aircraft control effeotive s sorties ZRJ a i r c r a f t under FEAF c o n t r o l flew 880 effective orties on 29 October October of of Which which 542 542 were were combat. combat. Included in i n these these operations operations were were on 221 sorties of UN UN ground 221 close-support close-support and armed-reConnaissance armed-reconnaissance s o r t i e s in support of o enemy a i r c r a f t were No aircraft ware observed observed or or encounterenoountertroops along along the t h e battle b a t t l e line. line. N n the f 29-30 Ootober, On the night night o of Ootober, FEAT FEAF Bomber Bomber Commend Command ed during the t h e period. period. O mounted mounted 16 16 effective effeotive sorties. sorties
Mi IAt ary Intelligence Int e 1llgence Military
its air s strike South Korea's Koreas air a i r force carried out i t s first independent air trike i n the the on on 28 28 October as two %wo waves of ROK F-51's F-51s attacked enemy troops in operation climaxed climaxed two two eastern eastern seotor, seotor, according according to t o press press reports. repcrts. The operation Heretofore, US US months months of of intensive Intensive training t r a i n i n g of of RON ROK ground ground controllers. controllers. Heretofore, Air Force Force pilots p i l o t s had flown flown with each each ROK ROK formation to t o coordinate communicomunications with with mixed teams of American and and South South Korean Korean ground ground controllers controllers d i r e c t i n g the Che planes toward directing toward the t h e targets. targets.

Navy
fighting in the and ROK ROK 2nd 2nd Division Division sectors sectors In in Heavy f i g h t i n g continued i nt h e US 7th and central c e n t r a l Korea Korea on on Thursday. Thursday. The most important hction action involving the t h e former former saw reinforoalenemy positions on the the right right flank of of saw a r e i n f o r d enemy oampany compaqv attacking UN positions I r o n Horse H i l l . AA counterattack Iron Hill. counterattack failed f a i l e d to t o dislodge dislodge the the enemy enemy and and UN UN troops Kumwha, ROK 2nd Division returned to t o the t h e main main line l i n e of of resistance. resistance. North of Kunwha, battalion forcing t the to troops attacked a a Chinese b a t t a l i o n on on Sniper Ridge foroing h e enemy t o withdraw slightly. However, late reports indioate indioate t that the l a t e press reports hat t h e ROK forces withdraw slightly. However, ware again pushed off positions. were o f f their t h e i r Sniper Ridge positions.
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THEC.1.A. HASNO THE C.I.A. HAS NO OBJECTION OBJECTION TO THE DECLASSIFICATION TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OF OF THISDOCUMENT. DOCUMEIJT. THIS
No.
7)10
07 7 JUL WELSLI an
Nor
SE Seourity Infe.mation I ation Security
Situation General S ituation
Political
ROK National Aasembly Assembly committee nonpartisan POK oommittee on 29 October introduced introduced A nonpartisan resolutiun or -confidenoe in in Rheels Rhea's oabinet, oabinet,retroaotive a resolution o r no no-confidenos retroactive to t o 26 26 September, September, resolution r e s u l t s from t h e Assembly's results the Assembly's reports Charge report8 Charge Lightner Ughtner in 3 . n Pusan. h a a n . The resolution investigation -oalled "Tungsten i n v e s t i g a t i o n into i n t o the the Cabinet's.part Cabinet's part in i nthe theso so-oalled "Tungsten Dollar Dollar Soandal." Soandal."

SecurityIn Seourity In ation ation
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must be put put t to vote by by noon today, today, 30 30 Ootober, Ootober, and and many many The resolution m u s t be o vote members believe has developed i in n Assembly menibera belleve it will w i l l be carried. carried, No opposition ha8 the t h e Assembly Assembly nor has ha6 President President Rhee ahee indicated what approaoh approach he will take t a k e to to (The National Assembly, Assembly, perhaps emboldened emboldened this newest 2.1is supremacy. this newest threat t h r e a tto to 33.6 supremaoy. by Rhea's m most by its i t s recent recent overwhelming overwhelming success suocesa in i n defeating defeating President F'realdent Rhee's o s t recent step in damonstrating i its nominee for f o r the the premiership, premiership, has taken another s tep i n demonstrating ta independence of Rhee. Independence of Rhee. 1
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Seourity I
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Central Intelligence Agenoy Agenoy Office of Current Intelligence Intelligenoe 9918, 31 31 October 9918, Oatober 1952 1952

Military Operations 2.121112.17_11222a92222
Army
Heavy Heavy action aotion took took plaoe plaoe in i n the t h e US U S 7th 7th Division sector seotor in in central o e n t r a l Korea Korea as Triangle Hill H i l l changed ohanged hands twioe t w i o e during t the h e repork report period. period. On Thursday a heavy Chinese attack the hill a t t e c k foroed defending American troops from t he h i l l orest, orest, bu-b late ltite Friday Friday press press reports r e p o r t s state s t a t e that t h a t 7th 7th Division Divieion elanents elements have recaptured recaptured but the Ridge, t the ROE 2nd Division Division was was to t h e east, east, on Sniper Ridge, h e ROK the position. position. Just to battalions heavily engaged engaged by by an an estimated three Chinese Chinose b a t t a l i o n s who effected a slight slight penetration. Sniper Hills Hills a a Chinese Chinese foroe force estimated a at penetratioa. Between Triangle and Sniper t a regiment attacked main line resistance the valley attacked the t h e South South Korean Korean main l i n e of of r e s i s t a n c e in in t he v a l l e y and and at the of occupied oocupied some some positions. positiona. This latter l a t t e r action a c t i o n -was m s oontinuing a t t h e end of the report period. period.
C UiVea. ceived.
Radio Peiping reported on 30 that eight 30 October Ootober t hat e i g h t US F-84 fighter-bombers fighter-bombere Manchuria, just across the Yalu r river. overflew the Chian area in i n Mbanohuria, j u s t acrose i v e r . Reportedly killed two two Chinese civilians. civilians. The these aircraft a i r c r a f t "bombed and strafed," strafed," and k.i.11ed raiders was was brought down down Chinese broadcast further f'urther claimed that t h a t one of tthe h e raidero o n l y once onoe (The Chinese have only f i r e and and the t h e pilot p i l o t WAS was captured, captured. (The by antiaircraft antiaircraft; fire or twice in the inflicted US.raiding o r t wice i nt h e past listed l i s t e d casualties cRsiialties i n f l i c t e d by alleged US .raiding airairh e capture has oleimed claimed t the I n addition this is the first f i r s t time the enemy has c r a f t . In craft. Peiping b blast the a UN UN pilot p i l o t over over Manchuria. Manchuria. This latest l a t e s t PHiping l a s t may be t h e opening of a of of a new will Americans. new propaganda campaign campaign which w i l l include "confessions" "confessions" by Americans. Political Po I l . ti c a l The'no-oonfidence Assembly on 30 October The no-confidence vote taken in the National Assembly failed two-thirds majority majority of of t the Assembly f a i l e d tto o obtain the necessary two-thirds h e total Assembly membership. (Though WAS defeated, membership. (Though the measure was defeated, the t h e sizable siztthle number of assemblyassembly= men, 103, who voted voted for for tthe nooonfidence motion men, 103, who h e no-oonfidenoe motion clearly c l e a r l y demonstrates demonstrates the the strength o of f Rhee's Rhea's opposition i in n the the AaeemSly.) Assembly.) 73
ET Security In
THE C.I.A. HAS NO OBJECTION TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OF TH4 DOCUMENT.
No .

Navy Navy - Air
Duo to t o communication o m m i o a t i o n difficulties d i f f i c u l t i e s no naval naval or o r air n i r information i11fonnetAoii has has been boon rereDue
Propaganda
ation
j1/4 79?
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Central Central Intelligenoe Intelligence Agency Aqency Office Office of of Current Intelligence InteUlgence 9919, 9919, 1 1November November 1952 1962

E l i t m y Operations Operations Military
Army
Heavy on the t h e ROK BOK 2nd 2nd Division Division front f r o n t Saturday Saturday as as Heavy fighting f i g h t i n g raged raged on attacks foroed foroed friendly f r i e n d l y ttroops roops t o withdraw 200 yardo Chinese attacks to withdraw aoo yards from the The o r e s t of of Triangle Triangle Hill H i l l northeast northeast of of Kumwha. K\;o;naha. crest The press press noted that three three companies of South South Korean Korean infantry i n f a n t r y were overrun and about 550 of of them "died in i n their t h e i r tracks* traoksq to t o prevent prevent a a Chinese Chinese breakthrough. breakthrough. On *died On nearby Wiper Ridge, Sniper Ridge, strong enemy press indicated enmy probes were repulsed and the press %that UN troops holdine fast uo b o Pinpoint Pinpoint Hill, pinnacle pinnacle of of the t h e ridge. ridge. that troops were wereholdinefast The US 7th successive attacks attadar by attalion 7th Division repuisea repulsea two sucoessive The by ?%Chinese aChinese b battalion enemy more than 15,000 in the t h e vicinity v i c i n i t y of Iron I r o n Horse Horse Hill. Hill. The e n q r employed more 15,000 in rounds of artillery a r t i l l e r y and mortar fire f i r e during the day's day's fighting. fighting.
an,
A total t o t a l of of 245 245 naval naval air air sorties sorties were flown flown on on 31 3 1 Ootober. Ootober. CarrierCarrierA basod aircraft a i r c r a f t on on the the east e a s t ooast coast attacked attacked shore installations i n s t a l l a t i o n s at a t Songjin Songjin Chaho, while on t the coast, the area from ChLnnampo Chinnampo to Ongjin was was and Chaho, h e west ooaet, Surface units Japan Sea bombarded enemy troop and in the bombarded troop under f i r e . under fire. Haeju wa8 wes t the main t target supply installations i n s t a l l a t i o n s near near Songjin Songjin and and Tanohon. Tanohon. Haoju h e main arget supply of surface units on the west coast. coast.
lead-based a aircraft Iand-based i r o r a f t under FEAF FEllF oontrol control flew flew 431 431 effective effective sorties sortie8 Again. no 110 enemy aaircraft were on n c l u d h g 148 oombat. enemy i r c r a f t were on 31.0otober, 31_0otober, i including oombat. Again. the night, night, FEAF FEAF Bomber Bomber Comaad Command mounted mounted observed or o r encountered. encountered. During the at Naewonsan on on t the east coast and and 18 sorties. Supply areas a t Naeewonsan he e a s t coast 18 effeotive effeotive sorties. bombers. Anak on on the northwest nOr'thW813t coast coast were attaoked attacked by 12 1 2 of the medium bombers.
General ituation General S Situation
Aocording to Peek According t o Radio Radio Pusan, ROK Minister of Education George Paek the Civil reeigned 31 October October at a t his his own own request. request. The chairman of t h e CivS1 resigned on on 31 Servioe Commission, Commission, Kim Icim Pong-yun, Pow-yun, was appointed appointed to t o take take Peek's fisk's plame. place. Service ( I t had (It had been been rumored rumored that that Past, Peek, the senior member member of Rhee's cabinet, oabinet, convening was t to the U UNESCO sessions convening was o resign because he desired tto o attend the N E S C O eeesiona Boon n Paris.) soon iin Paris.)
enNiarma

Navy Navy
Air Air
Po lit i o a 1 Political
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THE C.I.A. HAS NO OBTICTION

TO Tfl1;: D:CLA7SIFICATION OF
THIS DOCUMENT. TH IS DOC UMUISNT
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JuL 1978 JUL 1978
02 3 0;')
ligiCREm Security Infc ation
Eoonomic Eoonomi c
The American American Embassy Embassy in rumor that that the the oabinet cabinet has has i n Pusan Pusan reports a rmor ordered the Minister of won to the of Finance to out off further m n advances t o t he bilbassy iis inclined tto believe that the s inclined o believe the United Nations Nations Command. Command. The Rnbassy the UIE UNC t to secure overdue monthly monthly payments payments report represents pressure on the o seoure of four million million dollars. dollars.
The South Tke South Korean Korean press press continues oontinues to to speculate speculate about aboutsecret secret arlpistice anflistioe UN General Assmbly, l l editorials conferenoes at a t the UN conferences Assembly, and a all editorials voiced voiced bppoeiOpposit tion i o n to any any truoe without unifioation. unifioation.

EibOR4ca
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Central Intelllgonce Intelligence Agency Agency Office of of Current Current Intelligenoe Intelligence 9920, 3 November 1952 9920, November 1952 D A I L Y
Military Mi lit a r y Operations Ope ratione

Army
In t the he b battle a t t l e on Sunday for f o r Triangle H Hill i l l and Sniper Ridge, Ridge, ROK 2nd heavy Chinese attacks. attaoks. late Iate press press reports reports Division elements repulsed several s e v e r a l heavy s d d that t h a t Chinese Chinese troops had foroed the South South Koreans Korean8 from from dominating dominating terrain terrain said in t in this h i s area. arear Elsewhere i n the ROK 2nd Divieion area, numerous nurnerous enemy enemy probes Elsewhere in Division area, were made made but but were were repulsed repulsed by by the t h e South South Korean Korean defenders. defenders. On On Saturday Saturday and and were e a r l y Sunday, Sunday, DB US 7th 7th Division Division elements elementa west w e s t of of Kinnwha Kmwha w e r e heavily early were heavily attacked once again again but the the enemy enemy was repulsed. repuhd. Navy
The total air incamplete as i r sorties s o r t i e s on 1 1November is incomplete a s only 44 44 t o t a l of naval a carrier-based aircraft aircraft; have been a l l on on the t h e east east- coast. ooast. These carrier-based been reported, reported, all Songjin, attacked targets t a r g e t s near near the t h e battle b a t t l e line. liiie. Surface units bombarded Songjin, Tanchon Tanchon and and Chaho Chaho on on the t h e east east coast coast while while the t h e area area near near Cho Cho Island Ieland was was the the On the t h e following following day, day, 313 313 naval air a i r sorties main main target t a r g e t on on the t h e west west coast. coast. On were were flown. flovm. Aircraft A i r c r a f t from from Task Task Force Force 77 77 on on the t h e east oaet coast coast bombed ?ombed from from the end O nt h e west coast, coast, Chinnampo e n d Haeju were attacked by Chongjin Chongjin to t o Wonsan. Woman. On Surface Surface units u n i t s again again bombarded both enemy coasts and and carrier-based carrier-based airoraft. airoraf't. maintained the t h e blockade. blockade. Air Air
hnd-based aircraft a i r c r a f t under FEAF FEAF control o o n t r o l flew f l e w 1,046 1,046 effective e f f e c t i v e aorticv Land-based sortics on h e report roport period, period, 123 125 enemy enem3 MIGIs MIG's the 1 1November, including including 693 6937ombat. -ombat, During t MIG's were destroyed and nine others were were observed observed and and36 36encouictered. encou1:tered. Two MIG's flown on on the the A total t o t a l of of 14 14 medium medium bomber bomber missions miseions were were flown reportedly reportedly damaged. damaged. A

Securtty In 1
Heavy positions on on the the Heavy enemy enemy attacks attacks continued oontinued against ROK 2nd Division positiona riendly .iouth slopes slopes of of Triangle Triangle Hill Hill on on Saturday Saturday and early Sunday. Sunday. One f .,outh friendly counterattack took South to the crest, Scuth Korean troops t o within 30 yards of t he o r e s t , but the laLer foroed t to o withdraw wlthdraw t to o t the h e main line line o of f resistance. resistance. the ROK troops were later TWO further and in tthe fighting Two f u r t h e r South South Korean Korean counterattaoks counterattaoks were were unsuooessf,11 ~n6ucce6sf a n ~d~ in ~ he f ighting tha-b ensued ensued friendly f r i e n d l y elements elemants were were not n o t able able tc t c re--ostablish h e i r former fomlor that re-establish t their positions. The enemy hit positions. h i t the the main main line l i n e of of resistamt# resistanra on on 'Jane Jane R Ruascli u s s o l l id11 nill repeatedly and and the t h e outpost line l i n o of WAS also o f resistance resistanoe was a l s o probed several several times times enemy attack a t t a c k against US 7th Division positions on on the the by Chinese troops. troops. An enemy western western slopes slopes of of Triangle Triangls Hill H i 1 1 was was repulsed. repulsed.
No.
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HAS N HAS NAICTIO11 !HE DECLASSIFICATION OR TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OF
TIbIS DOCUMENT.
THE C .I.A. THE C.I.A.
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%tion Security Security IInThmation
night of of 1-2 1-2 November, November, 10 10 of of the t h e airoraft airoraft attacking supply supply centers near the following day, day, 1,003 1,003 land-based land-based sorties sorties O n t h e follawing Chinnampo. On Pyongyang and Chinnampo. flown Of were flown df whioh which 641 641 were wtre oombat. oombat. While While on on patrol p a t r o l in i n the t h e Chongchon-Yeau Chongohon-Yalu airoraft River area, area, UN UN pilots p i l o t s observed observed 106 106 MIG's. MIG's. Of the t h e 29 enemy a i r o r a f t enoounenoounRtver tered, tered, one one WAS was destroyed, destroyed, two two probably probably destroyed-and destroyed and another another damaged. damaged. DurDuri n g the night n i g h t FEAF F M F Bomber Command Comand mounted 14 14 effective e f f e c t i v e bomber miscrions. ing missions.
M i l i t a r y Intelligence Intelligence Military

Political P olltical At the Minister, President A t t h e presentation of of credentials credentials by the new new British Minister, oommented at at soma some length length on on the the "unpatriotic "unpatriotia attitude" a t t i t u d e " of o f many assemblyRhee oommented many assemblytheir men1 He asserted that he would o r any nonsense qonsense about t heir men. would not not &and stand ffor immunity immunity in in view v i e w of of the t h e universal universal corruption corruption and and irresponsibility i r r e s p o n a i b i l i t y prevailing prevailing a f t e r the t h e upper house is organized and among them. them. Rhee indicated that after upper'house among t h e 27 seats s e a t s formerly formerly occupied by assemblymen taken north by the Communists the are f i l l e d , he would f o r a constitutional o o n s t i t u t i o n a l amendment permitting the are filled, wDuld press for (Rhee's oomments are reminiscent of his op:manta ( ~ h e e f oommeuts s arrest of assombIymen. assomblymen. a r e reminisoent ooments arrest before and and during during his his quarrel q u a r r e l with the t h e Assembly Assembly last last spring epring and and summer. smer. before taking action, the Presumably before action, Rhee will fill fill the upper house and t he assembly seats w i t h pro-Rhee pro-Rhee men.) 27 vaoant vacant assembly with men.)

It i o tion Security k141ua. n
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Central Intelligenne Intelllgenoe Agenoy Agency Intelligenoe Offioe of Current Intelligence 1952 9921, 4 November 1952
DAILY KOREAN K O R E A N BULLETIN BULLETIN

D A I L Y
Operations Military Operations

Army
Only air the west coast, were were flown on 3 Only 41 4 1 naval a i r sorties, s o r t i e s , all a l l on t he w e s t ooast, November as Task Task Force Force 77 77 engaged engaged in i n replenishing replenishing operations. operations. These carrier-based aircraft carrier-based a i r c r a f t attacked attaoked targets t a r g e t s at a t Chinnampo Chinnampo and and Haeju. hejuD UN surface unite n the Japan nstallations a t Songjin and units i in Japan Sea blasted shore i installations at and Tanohon, Tanohon, while in Province were bombarded. bombarded. i n the the Yellow Yellow Sea Sea targets t a r g e t s in i n western HWanghae Ifwanghae Provinoe
UN UN land-based land-based airoraft a i r c r a f t under FEAF command comniand flew f l e w 704 effective e f f e c t i v e sorties aortiee on 3 3 November November of of which which 367 367 were were combat. combat. One enemy YAK-15 YAK-16 was was enoountered and destroyed by UN aircraft while unidentified enemy a aircraft esairoraft w h i l e another unidentified i r o r a f t esTheae were t h e observations and encounters during the These the only observations and encounters during the capod unscathed. cerpod unsoathed. \ the h o night of of 3-4 3-4 November, November, 22 22 effeotive e f f e c t i v e medium medium. boMber bomber missions mission8 periode period. On t Supply areas ereas naar n3er Anju and Pyongyang he Pyongyang were were attacked by by 11 11 of of t the were were flown. flown. Supply bombers. bombers
1
General General Situation Gituation
The Far East that the newly-built r rail line connecting E a s t Command reports t hat t h e newly-built ail l i n e conneoting North Korea has a maximum capacity Korea and and the t h e USSR USSR in i n extreme northeastern Korea ha6 oapaoity of tons daily, daily, limited bv by single-tracking single-tracking and t the necessity of of ttransfer7 h e necessity ransfero f 6,000 6,000 tona (This (This cars. gaugeoars. ring the r i n g loads from from t h e Soviet Soviet gauge gauge oars o a r 8 to t o Korean Korean standard standard gauge rail ruehed t to oompletien by by tthe Communists i in 1954 potentially r a i l line, line, rushed o oompletiolr h e Communists n 1961, p o t e n t i a l l y oould in Korea, Korea, Once in provide an an important i m p o r t a n t supply supply artery,for a r t e r y f o r the the enemy enemy in i n Korea. Korea. Onoe Najin line line would would have have toi tor however, suppliee however, supplies shipped shipped on on the t h e Kraskino-Hongui-Najin Kraskino-Hon Najin take a roundabout r o u t e beoauee raoke l a i d south f'rom route beoause there are are no no tracks laid from Najin conneotions.) to Chongjin, the of through r rail t o Chongjin, t h e northeasternmost northeaaternmost point of a i l conneotion8.)

Navy
aotion on Tuesday again ocourred The most important action occurred iin n tthe h e BOX RON 2nd DiVision unsuccessfully Division seotor northeast northeaat of Kumwha where UN troops attempted unsuooessfully t o r e t a k e positions to retake positions on Triangle Triangle H Hill. i l l . An An enemy enemy attack a t t a c k in i n company company strength strength against UN positions atop atop Sniper Sniper Ridge Ridge was repulsed repulsed after a f t e r severe severe fighting. fighting. To tho the east, east, an e eettnated stimated b battalion attalion o of f North Korean troope troops attaoked attacked tthe h e US US 40th Division main line of of resistance resistance on Heartbreak Heartbreak Ridge, Ridge, b but u t were were thrown thrown back after a f t e r nearly nearly four four hours hours of o f heavy heavy fighting. fighting. The enemy back enemy employed employed more more 10,000 rounds of a r t i l l e r y and mortar ire i n tthe h e day's than 10,000 of artillery mortar f fire in day's fighting, fighting.
Air
Enemy Unes of of Communication Enemy lines
P-
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TO THE THE DSCLACSIPICATION DECLASSIFICATION OF THISDOCUMENT. DOCUMENT. THIS

0 7 7 JUL JUL tI78 1978
()A
W Seourity 'Inforntamion
Central Central Intelligence Intelligenoe Agenoy Agenoy of Current Inkelligence Intelligence Office of 0408, 0408, 5 6 November 1952 1952
DAILY D A I L Y KOREAN K O R E A N BULL. B U L L ETIN E T I N

Military Operations Opera%ions
I
Military communications mith the Far Far East Command Comnamd were were out of of order a at MiUtary comrnunioations with t the t h e tine time of of publication p u b u c a t i o n of of this this bulletin. bulletin.
Army

Air d in
Pres6 Press report6 reports indioate indicate t that h a t the heaviest heaviest fighting fighting iin n Korea Korea oolltinued oontinued tto o t a k e plaoe plaoe in i n the t h e Triangle Triangle Hill-Gniper seotor of e n t r a l Korea. South take Hill-Sniper Ridge seotor of o central Korea. South Korean 2nd Divieion Division troops have been unsuooeesful unsuccessful i in retakm n ttheir h e i r attempts to retake Hill from from the Chinese, Chinese, who captured t h a t poaition Triangle Hill that position on Friday. Friday. Heavy enemy enemy attacks attacks on on Sniper Sniper Ridge Ridge apparently apparently effeoted slight penetrations, penetrations, Heavy but b u t at a t last last report report the t h e South South Koreans Koreans still s t i l l held that t h a t eminence. eminence.
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NO Communist aircraft were enoountered encountered by UAT UN Sabre j jets No e t s over North Korea yesterday, according yesterday, acoording to t o press presa a000unts. acoouuta. UN UN fighter-bombers flghter-bombers were motive a o t i w in in attacking enemy rear area i installations front-line a artillery mortar attaoking n s t a l l a t i o n s and front-line r t i l l e r y and mortar positions. positions a Military Imtelligenoe WiUtary Ixtelligence
Army A w
Analysis of week ending 90 30 Ootober rereAnalyais of enemy enemy vehicle traffic t r n f f i c for the ike week affiomoved s in the that, as the preceding preceding period, period, the the major major portion portion of of t r traffionoved vealed t hat, a south Haeju, Kaesong Keesong and Sibyon-ni Sibyon-ni i in the south from from Pyongyang Pyongyang to t o depots near Haeju, n the west points near Pyongyang Kumsong. w e s t and and in i n the t h e east east from from Wonsan Wonsan to t o supply .supp~y Pyongyang and KLurmsong. figure of 3,57E. Rolling stock stock sightings sighting8 declined deollned to t o the abnormally low f igure o f 3,572. UN aerial be responsible responsible for a portion o of Incomplete DN a e r i a l reconnaissance reconnaissanoe may be f the be, however, however, that the deorease, according aooording to t o Far Far East East Air Air Force. Force. It may be, t h e drop drop decrease, is of i s also also a a result r e s u l t of of a a general northern rail movement and presages a period of' intense in the vicinity of Wonsan Wonsan i n t e n s e railroad railroad activity a c t i v i t y to t o resupply depot stocks I n t he v i c i n i t y of and Pyongyang. pyongY=g.
Geiioral General Information Information

Political Poli ti 0 a 1 Anti-Japanese to occupy considerable Anti-Japanese fulminations have continued oontinued t o oooupy oonaiderable space the I n addition to to t h e usual usual i n South South Korean Korean newspapers newspapers during during the t h e past p e t week. week. In in
Security
THE . I . A .HAS HAS NO OBJECTION OBJECTION J l THE C C.I.A. NO ion TO THE E C L A S S I Y I C A T I O N OF THE D DECLASSIFICATION Iiation THIS DOCUMENT. DOCUMENT.
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tirades about fishing areas areas and the the presence presence tirades about Japanese encroaching snoroaohing on Korean firsung in mar correspondents, looal press press claimed in Korea Korea of o f unauthorized unauthorized Japanese Japanese WELT oorrespondents, the the local claimed that the the Japanese Japanese intend intend to to boycott boycott Korean Korean marine narine products. products. The The press press warned Asiatic oountries." mhioh warned the the US US of of this this "Japanese "Japanese indifferenoe indifferenoe to t o Asiatio oountriee," whioh may bring disaster if the US negleots its surveillanoe. m y bring disaster if t h e US negleo'cs ite surveillame.
Koomomio Eoonomi o
joint UN-ROK UN-ROK press release release on on 4 4 November November detailed detailed the the proposed proposed expansion expansion The program calls for on-the-job training of South Kbrea's maritime industry. of South Korea's maritime industry. The program o a U a for on-the-job training for stablishment o of merchant marine marine aoademy for Korean Korean maritime maritime vorkers, mrlcers, e e stab~shment f a merchant aoademy and md the to the States and other other the inauguration inauguration of of a a project project to t o send send Koreans t o t h e United States countries countries for sohooling sohoollng in in hielly technioal technioal and and specialized specialized fields. flelds.

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Central Intelligence Intelligence Agency Agency

Office o of f Current Intelligence 0409, 6 November 1952 0409, 1952
D A I L Y
K O R E A N BULLETIN B U L L E T I N DAILY KOREAN
CarrierA total t o t a l of of 237 237 naval naval air air sorties s o r t i e 8 were flown flown on on 5 November. November. Carrierbased airoraft the on t h e east e a s t coast ooast attacked the Choshin and Fusen hydroa i r o r a f t on the West west i t i e s . On On the oastal c electric) complexes iin addition 3overal c coastal cities. e l e c t r i o complexee n a d d i t i o n tto o ;overal coast, t h e vicinity v i o i n i t y from from Chinnampo Chinnampo to t o Changyon Changyon was was the t h e main m e n target. target. Surface coast, the units Wonsan and Hungnam, Hungnam, while whils u n i t s in i n the the Japan Japan Sea Sea bombarded bombarded Songjin, Songjin, Tanohon, Tanohon, Woman in the west, the VAS subjected barrage. i n t h e west, the Ongjin Ongjin Peninsula was subjeated tto o a heavy barrage.
UN Air control flew 906 UN land-based land-based aircraft airoraft under Far East A i r Force oontrol e ffective so r t i e s on h i o h 585 combat. While on on patrol patrol effect:11re sorties onE 5November November of of w whiCh 585 were ware combat. in i n the t h e Chongohon-Yalu Chongchon-Yalu River A i v s r area area UN UbT pilots p i l o t s observed and encountered snco:~ntsred16 16 enemy enemy Dvring There were no UN claims nor cor any any damage damago to t o friendly f r i e n d l y planes. phne8. b i n g MIG '8. MIG's. n 11 1 1of o f these, these, In night, 14 the night, 14 effective medium medium bomber bomber missions missions were were flawn. f'lovm. I superforts blasted troop and supply i installations at Kunu-ri near W Anju and nstallations a t Kunu-ri um d a at t Hoeohang Hoeohang east east of Pyongyang. Pyongyang.

Navy Air Mr
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The most important action action on Wednesday Wednesday and early Thursday oontinued continued in slight the ROTC ROK 2nd v i s i o n seotor n central c e n t r a l Korea. Korea. UN troops registered slight 2nd M Division sector i in against Triangle H Hill, Ridge, ~ and Jane Russell Russell H Hill but were were gains againsi; i l l , Sniper Ridge, n Jane d i l l but later forced t towithdraw o withdraw to t o main main line l i n e of o f resistance resistance positions positions following following patrol marked t the heavy fighting. fighting. Elsewhere soattered soattersd probes and p a t r o l clashes marked he action. employed some 12,800 roundsof ofaartillery and mortar mortar fire :p;leiw employed 8ome 12,600 rounds r t i l l s r y and fire action. The ,:nleuty during during the t h e day's day's activities. aotivities.
THIS DOCUMENT.
TWE C. I.A. RAS NO OBJECTION TO THE DECLA3SIFICATION
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Securi-tMLkation
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Security + t I I Security
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Central Intelligence Agency Agency Office of ntelligence of Current I Intelligence 0410, 7 Eovember 1952 0410, 7 November 1952
DAILY
Militarv Oneration8 1111!Lati_20221.112122.

ArnlY
this total f o r 6 November, November, but t his t o t a l was Only 28 2 8 air eorties s o r t i e s were reported for carrier-based a i r c r a f t bombed n s t a l l a t i o n s on tthe he aircraft bombed shore iinstallations incomplete. inoomplete,, These carrier-based Surfaoe u units n i t s on the east eaet west coast in i n the area area from Chinnampo to t o Ongjin. Ongjin. Gurfaoe bombarded Songjin, the w west hit t targets coast bombarded Songjin, Tanchon and Chaho,while Chalw,while in the e s t tthey h e y hit argets Cho Island Island and near Cho and Haeju. Haeju.
Noveober, land-based c o n t r o l flaw f l e w 1,100 1,100 On 6 November, land-based aircraft aircraft under under FEAF FEU control Wnile on on patrol patrol in i n the t h e ChongohonChongohone f f e c t i v e sorties 80rtie6 of which which 779 779 were were combat. conhat. While effective Yalu MIG-151s of Yalu River area, area, pilots p i l o t s observed observed 108 108 eneMy enmy MIGU's o f which 54 were enqntwo w o medium medium NIG was destroyed and countered. One MIG and seven seven others damaged. damaged. Only t countered. bomber missions were flown in n close close flown during during the night, night, and these engaged i aid leaflet l e a f l e t drop drop missions. missions support and General Situation Situation Gensral
was handed another rebuff rebuff by t tht National Assembly Assembly ou on President Rhee wae h e Mhtional prowhen t the legislative judiciary committee committee r rejectad hi i s pro31 October when ho l e g i s l a t i v e and judiciary ejectad h posal by-elections to the of the Assemblymen kidnapped by posal for by-elections t o fill fill t h e seats o f t h e 27 Assemblymen stated for the r rejection t a t e d reason f o r the ejection the t h e Communists Communists when whsn Seoul Seoul fell fell in i n 1950. 1950. The s has suggested (Rhee has was W ~ that S that by-elections by-elections would be be "legally "legally inappropriate." inappropriate." on will be one o of on at a t least l e a s t one occasion occaeion that t h a t filling these 27 seats s e a t s will f the the preliminary take before moving against his assembly preliminary steps steps he will will have to to t a k e beforo assembly opposition. ) opposition.)
THE C.I.A. HAS NO 0111CTICIF

Navy
During which characterized t the During the period period of relative r e l a t i v e quiet q u i e t whioh h e fighting fighting on Thursday Thursday and and early early Friday, Friday, enemy enemy action aotion was on was highlighted highlighted by a battalionbattaliona t t a c k against against 3rd 3rd US US Division Division positions positions on on Jackson Jackson Heights. Heights. UN sized attack troops withdrew temporarily and later l a t e r reoccupied t h e i r positions ithout their positions w without the e east, a s t , Chinese Chinese troops troops twice twice attacked attacked BOK ROK 2nd enemy. To the contacting the enemy. 8nA.per Ridge northeast o f Kumwha, Division outpost positions on Sniper of Kumwha, but were were forced to withdraw. Elsewhere bi.ief boief probes probes aad and lwrtrol patrol clashes clashes occurr6d. occurred. forced t o withdraw.
Bir Air
Security Info Ikc ation
1 1
TO THE DECLASSIFICATION 07 THIS DOCUMENT.

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SecuritYtniation
gim Kim Pop-in, Pop-in, Chief of of the Civil Service Service Comm%ssion, Commission, was was appointed appointed Education on 30 30 October. October, Embassy 0 f f i c i e . l :foment :oment that Eduoation Minister Minieter on EMbassy offioisls that Kim camparatively well well qualified qualified for for the the poet post and and iis widely respected respected appears comparatively s widely The appointment appointment i s considered considered t;c n is to have been been based based o on f o r his integrity, for integrity. The merit rather rather than merit than political p o l i t i c a l considerations. oonsiderations
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Central Intelligence Ageney Offioe of Current Intelligene 0411, 8 November 1952
Ir.

Military Military Operations Operations
Army Army
Aotion the front November was was relatively relatively quiet. quiet. A Aotion along t he f r o n t on 7 November A rereinforced against position8 positions of of t the inforoed enemy company oompany made probing attacks against h e US Division on the w west central front; it was was repulsed repulsed after after a ab brief 2nd Division est c entral f r o n t s it rief In sector, an enamy enemy oompany company attaoked attacked US US 46th 46th n the eastern seotor, engagement. I engagement. Division main main line of resistanoe positions, was thrown baok back after a positions, but was there mere only scattered probes and p patrol Elsawhere t h e r e were soattered probes atrol one-hour fight. Elsewhere one-hour 0 1B~he~o clashes.
Only Novedber s since Task Foroe Force Only 21 21 naval air a i r sorties s o r t i e e were flown on 7 November h o e Tadc Buildings ihd 77 was in replenishing rerAenlshiag operations. operations. Buildknge &Adbridges in in tbe thb was engaaed engaged in U t 6 Surface'units v i o i n i t y ' o f the Han Han estuary-were, estuary were. destroyed by a ir u n i t s . Surf'aoe vicinity'of destroyedby air units. shelled targets t a r g e t s in i n the the vioinity v i o i n i t y ot ot .Langdos dngdo, Chaho, on the'east the e a s t shelled Chaho, and Wopsan Wonsan on minor surllaoe surface R aotivity There was was only minor O t i d t y on ooast with with unobserved unobserved results. r e s u l t s . There coast
the t h e west coast. ooast.

Wiry
No. NO
.
.
Air Air
On O n 7 November, lommber, 309 809 effeotive effeotive land-based land-based sorties, s o r t i e s , including inoluding 77 77 combat, oombat, eqemy aircraft airoraft were observed obeervad or o r encountered. encountered. On On t h e ai&t the night were -re flown. flown. No enemy November, 13 missions were f'lorm, flown, 1 11 of them them of 7-8 7-8 November, l . 3 effective effeotive medium bomber d a a i o n a were 1 of directed direoted against against supply supply areas areas near near Chinnempo. C h i m p .
Military Military Intelligence Intelllgeaoe
During October October Far Far East Air Force Foroe continued continued its i t a "road "road blot*" blook" During I n the the teohnique in in the i interdiction against enemy supply llines. teohniqua n t e r d i o t i o n effort against i n e a . In 31-day UN aircraft destroyed or damaged 2,287 2,287 enemy enemy 31-day period, period, UN aircraf% probably deetroyed Nine portion8 portions of vehicles, 49 vehioles, 49 locomotives, looomotivaa, and and 283 283 railroad r a i l r o a d oars. OBFS. trackage on main supply routes were brought under attack by a a ttotal of on mein supply brought attsrok by o t a l of Combined attacks attaoks 169 sorties s o r t i e 6 pftzioh expended 84.5 84.5 tons.of tons of explosives. explasiwa. Combined 189 Which expended of UN air of a i r units u n i t s denied denied through through rail rail traffic t r a f f i o to t o the t h e Communists Oonrmunists on on these these routes r o u t e s for for continuous continuous periodd periods of o f up up to t o eight eight days. days.
THE C.I.A. HAS NO OBJECTION T HEC . 1 . A . HASNOOBJECTION
Air
THE DECLASSIFICATION DECLASSIFICATION OF TO THE
iORN;ma tion Security Seourity Info I&o
THIb11.9CUMENT.
JUL Z978
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Seouri42: 7Info maation Seourity ation

Central IntelUgenoe Intelligenoe Agenoy Agency Offioe Office of of Current Current IntelUgence Intelligence 0412, 10 10 NoveMber Novamber 1952 1962 0412*
,-T%l

Military Operations
Army Arm?y
Saturday and early was limited On Saturday e a r l y Sunday Sunday action aotionwas lintited to t o two two enemy e n o w attaoks. attaoke. the western front, front* enany enemy troops attaoked Outpost Outpost Reno Reno in the the 1st 1st Marine Marine On t h e western Division two-company attaok attack was launched Divialon sector seotor while on on the t h e central oentral front, Pront, a two-company HON 8th positions on Finger Ridge, Ridge. Both were were unsuccessful against ROK 0th Division position8 Elsewhere minor reported. minor probes probes and and patrol p a t r o l actions aotions were reported.
o t a l of ir s o r t i e 8 were lom. On Saturday, Saturday, 8 November, NoveMber, a t total of 217 naval naval a air sorties were f flown. Oa On t the installations h e east e a s t coast c o a s t carrier-based carrier-based aircraft a i r o r a f t attacked attaoked shore i n e t a l l a t i o n e near units Wonsan, while w h i l e in i n the t h e west w e s t Chinnampo Chinnajnpo WAS was the t h e main =in target. target. Surfaoe W f s in in the the west the Japan Japan Sea Sea bombarded bombarded Songjin, Songjin, Yangdo Y q d o and and Chaho Chaho while in in t he w e s t the tho area area near Cho Island was WRS blasted. blasted. Sunday, Bunday, due to t o inclement inolsmant weather, weather, there t h e r e were were o n l y 92 oarrier-based carrier-baaed air 80rties. Wonsan and and Yonghung Yonghung were were attacked attacked on on the the only sorties. Mbnsan Surfaoe east w e s t coast ooast Chinnampo Chinnampo and and Haeju Haeju were ware boMbed. bombed, Surface e a s t coast, c o m t , and on on the tho vest units maintained the the blockade blookade and bombarded both ooasts. ooast8.
Air Air
A A total t o t a l of of 1,010 1,010 effective effeotive land-based land-based sorties sorties were flown flwpn on on 8 8 November November enemy aircraft a i r o r a f t were shot shot down, down, one one jet j e t airnirof whioh 642 of which 642 were were combat. combat. Two enemy FEAF Botber Bomber Command Command mounted mounted 14 14 effective effeotive craft craft and and an an unidentified unidentified fighter. fighter. FEAF medium medium bomber bomber sorties s o r t i e s during during the t h e might, xdght, 11 1 1of the aircraft a i r o r a f t bombing a a supply supply On 9 9 November, November, 599 effective effeotive sorties sortie8 were inoluding were flown, inoluding area area at at Pyongyang. Pyongyang. On 288 enemy aircraft a i r o r a f t were observed observed o r enoountered or encountered during the poriod. period. 288 combat. aombat. No enemy Supply O n the t h e night night of of 9-10 9-10 November, November, 15 15 medium medium bomber bomber sorties s o r t i e s were were flown. flown. Supply On areas at Yongsan, in northwestern northwestern Korea, Korea, and and Unha-ri, Unha-ri, on on t h the east ooast ooast/xtre a t Yongsan, e east attaoked by by 12 12 of of the t h e bombers. bombera.
O n Sunday On Sunday night on on the t h e east coast, ooast, North Icorean Korean troops launohed launched a twob a t t a l i o n attack a t t a c k against against ROK ROE 5th 6th Division Division hill h i l l positions. positions. Although two UN battalion positions were lost to the enemy's i initial attack, t the had lost t o t h e eneany@s n i t i a l attaok, h e South Koreans had recovered rooovered one one and and were oounterattaoking counterattaoking the t h e second seaond lost l o s t outpost early Monday morning. morning.
Navy
No.
THEC.I.A.HASN THEC.1.A. HASN OBJECTION rikaJ ECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION OF TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OB -THLS DOCUMENT. v 7
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Central Intelligenoe 1n.teU.i gonoe Agency Office of o f Current Intelligence 0413, 0413, 1 12 2 November 1952 1952
D A I L Y
P , ! i lit a r y Operations Opor Rt i o na Military
Army
The major action took place place on on the tho extreme extreme eastern eastern end end of o f the the front, front, a c t i o n took where a a series a e r i e s of o f hills, h i l l s , dominated dominated by by Anohor Anchor Hill, H i l l , changed changed hands hands several several times.' times. Enemy attacks ROE 5th Enemy attaoka up to t o two battalions b a t t a l i o m in i n size s i z e were launched against ROK 5th Division l i n e of resistance positions positionn from from Sunday through Tuesday, Division main main line Tuesday, but; but several UN counterattacks eventually s e v e r a l Ubl eventually caused oausad enemy enmy withdrawals; withdrawals ;by by Tuesday, Tuesday, west, both sides s i d e s had had reoccupied their t h e i r original o r i g i n a l positions. positions. To the w e s t , on on Monday, MOIIdRy, . both two positions on trso enemy enemy companies oompanies supported supported by by heavy heavy artillery attacked Thai positions Porkchop Hill in i n the the US US 2nd 2nd Division Division sector. sector. The The attack a t t a c k subsequently.ceasod, subsequently ceasod, Porkehop Hill but the t h e enemy enemy remained in i n the area. area. O n Tuesday these attacks woro renewed, renewed, On but this t h i s time timo the t!:s enemy enemy was forced forced to t o withdraw from Porkchop Hill H i l l under prespress u r e from from US US 2nd 2 i d Division Division elements. elements. sure
Late attack in the c central Kumwha k % e Tuesday Tuesday afternoon a heavy Chinese a ttack i n the e n t r a l Kmfha sector dilslodged dislodged BOK ROE dofenders defenders from positions positions on on Triangle Triangle Hill Hill and and Sniper Sniper sector Ridge. A two-battalion Ridge. two-battalion counterattack counterittaok by by ROE ROB 2nd Division troops early Pbednesd:l:* morning o s t positions, was a s continuing continuing at at 1%dnesda,t: morningrecovered recovered the the llost positions. Action w t h o end end of of the the report report period. period. the
the Naval Naval air a i r sorties s o r t i e s totalled t o t a l l e d 252 252 on on 10 10 November. November. On O nt h e east en.st coast ooast czArrier -based bombedshore shore i n installations coastal cities carrier-based a iaircraft r o r a f t bombed s t a l l a t i o n s iin n tthe he a oastal c i t i e s of of Songjin, Hamhung Songjin, Hamhung and and Wonsan Wonsan while while on on the t h e west west coast, coast, Chaeryong, Chaeryong, Ongjin, Ongjin, Changyon and Chsmgyon and Haeju Haaju were were attacked* attacked. Surface units in i n the t h e Japan Japan Sea Sea bombarded bombmdad Surfaoe units I n the west, t h e area near Cho Island Island was Songjin, west, the Chaho. In Songjin, Tanehon Tarinhon and and Chaho. report was received concerning concerning naval naval activity activity on on 11 1 1November. November. blasted. blasted. No report
November, UN land-based aircraft under Far Far E East Air Force c control On 10 10 November, larid-based a i r c r a f t under est A i r Force ontrol flew f l e w 933 933 effective e f f e c t i v e sorties s o r t i e s of of which which 548 548 were were combat. combat. No enemy a aircraft were i r c r a f t wer0 observed obaerved or or encountered encountered during during the t h e period. period. On On the night of o f 10 10 to t o 11 l l November, Novombm, FEAF Supply areas at FEAF Bomber Bomber Command Comtnand mounted mounted 15 15 effeotive effective sorties. sorties. Supply a t Pongchork% Pongchon:, L Kangdong in and Kangdong i n central c e n t r a l Korea Korea were w r e attacked attacked by by 12 12 of of these these medium medium bombers. bombers. No was received N o report WRS recoioed concerning concerning air air activity a c t i v i t y for for 11 1 1November. November.

Navy Navy
Air
Socurity Seourity Infor
*
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TFIE .1.A. H A S NO OBJECTION THE c C.I.A. HAS NO ,,BJECTION TO T H ~ ~; : < ! , . I ~ S X F K C A T I O N OF TO THE Dc:CLASSIFICATION
DOl;'jh23N". THIS DOUJM.L:f4...
NS. 7 JUI 7970 (13
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M i U t ary Intelligenca Inta 1 Ugence Military
Army
Chinese US I I Corps Corps in i n western western Korea Koraa is is Chinese artillery a r t i l l e r y deployed deployed against against the t h e US capable capable of of effectively e f f e c t i v e l y supporting supporting limited l i m i t e d objective objeotive attaoks attaoks and, and, when whon the the Enemy artillery artillery time t i m e comes, comes, of of supporting'the supporting'the initial i n i t i a l stages stages of o f an an offensive. offensive. Enemy in improving, with noteworthy s sucoess in i n this t h i s sector s e c t o r has been been constantly constantly improving, ucoes~ i n well-bunkered firing Although still s t i l l deployed deployed in i n depth depth in I n well-bunkered firing defensive fire. f i r e . Aathough defensive positions alternate positions throughout throughout most of of the t h e western western sector, sector, numerous forward a lternate t h e boundary line l i n e of the t h e US US positione are are available available for for immediate inmediate use. use. Along the positions lst Divisions, Chinese a artillery has displaced 1st Marine and British British Commonwealth Cornonwealth Divisions, r t i l l e r y has w e l l forward. forward. well
An An additional a d d i t i o n a l new new development d e v e l o p e n t in i n this this sector sector has been the t h e forward forward disdisplaoament antiaircraft weapons f for use against plaoement of a considerable oonsiderable number of a n t i a i r c r a f t weapons o r use UN observation observation aircraft a i r o r a f t and and ground-attack ground-attack sorties. corties. (The Chinese Communist UN their artillery very e effectively the units in i n western Korea have used t heir a r t i l l e r y very f f e o t i v e l y during the post two two months In support support of of a a series s e r i e s of of limited limited objective objeotive attacks. attacks. There There post months in the of a artillery is no indication at a t present that that t h e forward displaoement of r t i l l e r y iin n this seotor is i s a permanent feature. feature. ) )
Gaiiaral .-S ituation Golleral Situation
The American t h e government government has oonsolidated oonaolidated its its American Embassy reports that the c o n t r o l over t h e Korean Federation of control the of Labor Labor Unions Unions (KF'IX]) (KFIU) by by ousting ousting nonnonith IiLberal Party Assemblyman s laader Liberal Assemblyman Chon Chin-han Chin-han a as leader and and replaoing replaoing him him w with three-man "supreme "supreme committee" committee" which which iis more amonable amenable t to party oontrol. oonrol. a three-man s more o party Although the mechanics mechanios of o f tthe h e election e l s c t i o n at at t h e KFUJ owwention were Although the the KF1U oonvention were prcporly properly exeouted, most most of of t the exeouted, h e delegates delegatas had been been instructed how how to t o vote vote in i n advance, advance, end h e voting "suggestions" f r o m President and t the vOting was influenced by "suggestions" from President Rhee, Rhee, by by the the presence of of police and detectives, detectives, and by by the the actbre active p participation of presenoe articipation o f government off iciale officials.

Politioal Politioal
Seourity Info Security
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Central Centr a 1 Intelligence Into 1lig enc e Agency of Current Intelligence Offioe of 0414, 13 13 Novedber Novaiber 1952 1952

E l l i t a r y Operatiorm Operatiom Military
Army Army
Aotion was tbe f front Wednesday. A ROK Action W a 8 relatively r e l a t i v e l y light l i g h t all a l l along the r o n t on %dnesday. against enemy positions positions on on Sniper Sniper Ridge Ridge north north o of 2nd Division counterattack counterattaok against f KUmwha won gains, Kumwha dislodged the Chinese from from their t h e i r previously won gains, and the South South
Inclement weather weather prevented prevented any navalair naval air s sorties from e east coast o r t i e s from a s t coast Inclement carriers.on NoveMber, and carriers on 12 November, and no report was received received concerning concerning air a i r and and units the e east surface operations operations on on the the west west coast. coast. Surface Surfaoe u n i t s on the a s t coast surface bombarded Wonsan Tanchon. Wonsan and Tanchon.
East Air Air Force control flew o only UN land-based land-based aircraft airoraft under Far East n l y 368 UN F-86 e f f e c t i v e sorties g o r t i e s on on 12 I 2 November November of o f which which 190 190 were were combat. combs+. Four UN effective pilots, area, observed observed s six.enemy MIG-15's. p i l o t s , while on patrol patrol in i n the the Yalu River area, i x enemy MIG15's. effeotive medium bomber bomber night, 14 14 s f f e o t i v e medium There were no engagements. engagements. During the night, sorties were flown. flown. A and aa coal coal mine mine at at bridgeat a tPyongyang Pyongyang and A railroad railroad bridge s o r t i e s were Sangam in i n north central central Korea Korea were were attacked attacked by by 12 12 of o f the t h e B-29's. B-29's.

Navy
Air
No.
The, enemy employed about Koreans reocoupied reocoupied all all their t h e i r former former positions. positions. The Koreans 11,000 rounds of of artillery artillery and and mortar mortar fire f i r e during during the t h e day's day's action. action. Probes Probes and patrol p a t r o l aotions marked the the fighting f i & t i n g elsewhere. e18eWhere.
TO THE DECT::STETCATION
Till pD,Q COME T .
THE C. LA. F7.49 NO OPJECTION

OF
Seourity In!ointation
tains Wormation aka; the This material he United States within the national defense meaning of the espies e laws, 'fitle USC, Sem 793 and 794, the tr mission or revelation of which in any manner 10 a unauthorized person is
4
Security Info
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Intelligence Agency Central IntelUgence O f fi c e o f Current I n t e l l i gence Office of Intelligence 0416, 0416, 14 14 November November 1952 1952
prohibited by law.
D A I L Y

Army
Naval air sorties on 13 to 13 November were limited t o 71 7 1 due to inclement inolement weather. the O n the t h e east e a s t coast, coast, aircraft a i r c r a f t from t h e carriers c a r r i e r s Kearsarge and weathr. On Oriskany Ofiskany struck struck at a t targets t a r g e t s near Kilohu Kiloliu while in i n the west carrier-based carrier-baaed in t h e Japan Sea the c u r c r a f t ranged aircraft rangod from fron Chinnampo Chinnampo to t o Haeju. Iiaeju. Surface units in bombarded.shore installations at Songjin, Songjin Chaho, Chaho, Samho Semho and Wonsan, Wonsan. Mainland bombarded. shore i n o t a l l a t i o n o at Haeju and and Upohori Upchori were the the main targets t a r g e t s fired fired installations i n e t a l l a t i o n s near Cho Cho Island, I s h n d , Haeju on by surface units on on the west coast. coast. Air A ir
UN land-based aircraft a i r c r a f t under FEAF FEAF control control flew flew 880 880 effective e f f e c t i v e sorties sorties on 13 13 November of o f which which 544 544 were were combat. combat. During these operations, operations, UN UN pilots pilots on observed 11 1 1enemy enemy MIG's MIGs and engaged four, f o u r , all all in i n the the Chongohon-Yalu Chongchon-Yalu River area. 12 area. One MIG addition, 12 MIG was damaged damaged with with no no damage damage to t o UN UN aircraft. a i r c r a f t . In addition, Antung, Tatungkou Sabre pilots observed 80 80 swept wing aircraft a i r c r a f t on Antung, Tatungkou and and night, 14 14 effective e f f e c t i v e medium bomber sorties sorties Takushan airfields. Takushan a i r f i e l d s . During the night, the Cholsan Peninsula were mere were flown. flown. Supply areas near Pyongyang and the attacked by 12 of of the bombers. bombers.
Military Mi lit a r y Intelligence I n t e llig ence ROK Army ROK Amy
The Far Far East Command Command reports r e p o r t s the activation activation on on 8 8 November of o f the t h e ROK ROK Division, composed the training 12th Division, composed of of t h e existing 37th, 37th, 51st Slst ami and 52nd t r a i n i n g regiregiwill mill be combati l l be activated activated later Later and and will combatl%,visional artillery artillery w ments. Divisional ments. Other d divisional will rctady h e summer summer of of 1953. 1953. Other i v i s i o n a l service and combat units w ill roady by t the be organized by drawing bo drawing cadre cadre strength strength from from existing e x i s t i n g units in i n the ten t e n active active its to U t h , minus i t s artillery, artillery, t o be combatoornbatROK ROX divisions. divisions, FECOM expects the 12th,
S

Navy
T
A A reinforced reinforced Chinese Chinese battalion, battalion, attacking attacking in i n the the wake of o f an.intense an intense artillery barrage, overran a r t i l l e r y barrage, ovqrran ROK 2nd Division troops on Sniper Ridge north of Kumhwa late to withdraw. Early Friday Kunhwa l a t e Thursday, Thursday, forcing the South Koreans t o withdraw. morning heavy heavy fighting f i g h t i n g was continuing continuing in i n an an action action which which saw 8aw nearly nearly 1200 1200 to was limited to rounds of o f artillery artillsry and mortar fire used. used. Elsewhere action was probes and lninor minor patrol p a t r o l skirmishes. skirmishes.
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ready ready by by the t h e end end of of this t h i s year. year. The The ROE ROK 15th 16th Division Division is i s to t o be be similarly s i m i l a r l y activated activated on on 10 10December December utilizing t h e 38th, 38th, 39th 39th and ard 50th 50th training t r a i n i n g regiments. regiments. u t i l i z i n g the
General General Situation Situation

Political Political The The establishment establishment of of a a veterans veterans administration administration is is being discussed discussed at at high high levels l e v e l s in i n the t h e South South Korean Korean Government. Goverment. The The ROK Army has hRs appointed appointed a a Brimadler Brimd! e r General General to t o take.care take. care of of the the army army responsibility r e s p o n s i b i l i t y involved and and a a colonel colonel from f r o m the the US US Army Army has has been been appointed appointed as as advisor. advisor. (Another (Another upsurge of of lawlessness f e w days and may have lawlsscness allegedly allegedly by veterans broke out in i n the past few added added impetus impetus to t o the the discussion discussion of of a a veterans veterans administration. administration. Mhilc Whilo long long overdue, will, overdue, an an organization organization of of this type typo w i l l , in i n the t h o opinion of o f US Embassy officials, o f f i c i a l s , be exploited exploited by by radical r a d i c a l politicians.) politicians. )
SE T Security Inform Seourity< o n

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Central Central Intelligence Intelligence Agency Agency Office of Intelligence o f Current I ntelligence 0416, 15 Movember November 1952 0416, 1962
B U L L E T I N K O R E A N BULLETIN DAILY D A I L Y KOREAN

Army h Y
Friday and early fighting the Friday e a r l y Saturday Saturday witnessed sporadic but heavy f i g h t i n g on t he where Qhinese Chinese and and BOK ROK 2nd 2nd Division Division troops troops waged waged central front f i o n t north north of o f Kirthwa Kumhwa where the reoccupied another b a t t l e for f o r Sniper Sniper Ridge. Ridge. Early Early Saturday Saturday t h e South Koreans reoocupied battle Pinpoint Hill Friday's plnpoint Hill which the t h e enemy enemy had seized and held throughout Friday's the vicinity two enemy pla-boona platoons attacked fighting. fighting. In In t h e same v i c i n i t y on Friday twr, friendly to line of resistanoe, resistance, and o establish e a t a b l i s h an outpost l i n e of f r i e n d l y troops attempting attempting t Eleven thousand rounds of' of enemy forced the t h e South South Koreans Koreans to t o withdraw. withdraw. ELswn artillery Division seator sector on E'riday Friday a r t i l l e r y and mortar fire f l r e fell fell on o a tthe h e ROK 2nd Divieion
and Saturday. Saturday.
To the west, west, two enemy enemy attaoks attaoke against US 3rd Division outposts outposts on Jackson Heights caused Jackson oaused friendly troops 60 to withdraw slightly. s l i g h t l y . The remainder of o f the t h e front f r o n t reported reported ninor minor probes probes and and patrol patrol clashes. Ola8h0~.
'i
O On n the east coast, ooast, on 14 14 Nommber, November, blockade blockade ships ships i in n tthe he v vicinity icinity o of f and Chaho bombarded a d m and t h r e e harbor areas Tanchon mad dam three areas with with unobserved unobserved results. Wonsan. South of Kojo, results. No firing f i r i n g was waa reported at a t Wonsan. 13 harbor areas, area8, Kojo, 13 were h hit by naval naval ffire. A delayed delayed i t by a supply area area and t h r e e troop areas were ire. A three report r e p o r t of o f 13 13 November November indicates indicate8 that t h a t naval craft c r a f t bombarded five f i v e rail r a i l yards and one train t r a i n in i n the t h e area area around around Wonsan. Wonsan. No naval naval a air sorties were reported.\ reportedk ir s o r t i e s were
Air
at m midnight Novetber, UhT UN land-based land-based a aircraft During the period ending at; i d n i g h t 14 November, ircraft under FEAF FEAP control flew which 89 w were ootbat. f l e w 261 261 effective e f f e c t i v e sorties s o r t i e s of whioh e r e oombat. Sorties Hoedhang and Kurzu-Bi. Kunu-Ri. o f supply supply areas around Hoechang S o r t i e s included bombardment of FEAF claims claims that t h a t 121 1 2 1 enemy enemy V e h i C l Q f ~were l ost i n t h e day's FEAF vehicles lost in the day's operations. operations. Five Unidentified unidentified enemy enemy planes, planes, one one possibly possibly a jet, jet, were sighted by UN pilots. pilots. Military M i l i t a r y Intelligence I q t e l l i genoe
informed COUNAVFE 11 COMNAVFE on 11 November that in January 1952 PT boat training was in progress at a spoaial school in extrema northeastern Korea. Training reportedly was also being
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There were three F l ' boats PT given in "now-type magnetic magnetic homing homing torpedo." torpedo." gtven in a "now-type at the school, additional e equipment was tto be f'urnished furnished later later in tthe a t the sohool, and additional q u i p e n t wae o be he of about 100 100 naval officere, nstruotclase of minter. officers, taught taught by by Ruaeian Russian i instructwinter. The class or8 and and advisers, advi8er6, was was to t o graduate graduate in i n the t h e fall fall of of 1952. 1952. Other North Korean ors (This is t the naval -officers -offioere had had received-PT received PT boat boat training training i n the USSR. he naval in USSR. (TNs third report reoeivqd reoeived i in the the alleged rseurgenoe resurgence of of t the t h i r d reporC n t h e past six months on the he It is probable h a t some r a i n i n g of probable t that same t training of this this nature on an North North Korean Korean navy. navy. It undetermined scale sogle is i s presently presently under way in i n North North Korea.) Korea.)
General General Information
Politioal P0litio;l -

Security Infoitio s e c u r i t yxI n fo n
2 2
President Rhee Prime Minister Minister and and Rhae on on 14 14 November named Yi Kap-song Kap-song as Prim submitted his nomination nomination t to the Assembly f for approval, acoording according o t h e National National Assembly o r approval, to (Yi, an unsucoessf'ul unsuccessful V vice presidential candidate in in t o Radio Pusan. Pusan. (Yt, ios p r e s i d e n t i a l candidate Assemblyman and August 1952, 1952, is i s a.liberal a,IiLberal Party Party Aeeemblyman and fairly staundh staunch Rhea supsupporter. entirely possible t that Assembly, whioh which has has ahown shown porter. It iis s e n t i r e l y possible h a t tthe h e Aeaembly, surprising in the last surprising opposition opposition to t o the thb Pi'esidentls &esiddnt's demands i n tho last, few few weeks, woeks, will Yils W i l l reject re$& Yi's nomination, nomination, as as they t h y did d i d that t h a t of OF his h i s leas leas popular colleague, colleague, Yi meeks ago.) Y i Yun-yong, Yun-yong, a a few few weeke ago.)
Security Info tion

Central Agency C a n t r a l Intelligence Agenoy Office of Current Intelligence Intelligence 0417, 0417, 17 17 NoveMber November 1952 1952
DAILY D A I L Y KOREAN K O R E A N BU B U LLETIN L L E T I N

Military Operations Operatiom
Army
US 3rd Division attempts t to Jackson Heights north of Chorwon o retake Jaokson Saturday Saturday were unsuccessful after a f t e r sporadic sporadic fighting f i g h t i n g which continued throughout t h e day. day. On Sunday, forced the the withdrawal withdrawal o of outsunday, a Chinese company compaiiy foroed f another outthe the east, t the ROK 2nd h e east, h e enemy engaged ROB on Jackson Jackson Heights. Heights. Further to t post on in on Pinpoint H Hill, Division troops i n intense intonse hand to t o hand fighting o n Pinpoint i l l , and an enemy Saturday, but but eaoh s side enemy platoon attacked UN positions positions on Sniper Ridge Saturday, ide was v a s in i n its i t s former former positions positions as as of of late l a t e Saturday Saturday night. night. .Small .Small scale s c a l e platoon platoon engagements continued throughout Sunday atop Sniper Ridge Ridge without without any o i q n l f i c m t gains gains on on either e i t h e r side. slde. On On the the extreme extreme eastern e a s t e r n end end of of the t h e front, front, significant Ncrth Korean Korean elements attacked a ROK 5th Division main line of resistance Una o f reeistanoe were repulsed repulsed after after heavy heavy fighting. fighting. positions but were
A total t o t a l of o f 143 143 naval naval air a i r sorties s o r t i e s were flown on on 15 15 November November against against Surface W units and supply installations i n s t a l l a t i o n s on on both both NorthTtorean North%rean coasts. coasts, Surfaoe it8 troop and,supply in the Wonsan, while on t the in t h e Japan Japan Sea Sea fired f i r e d on on Songjin, Songjin, Tanchon, Tanchon, Chaho and Woman, he On'16 n 16 November west ooast, the t h e area m o a near near Sokto Sokto and and YOngmaedo Yonpaado was west coast, WAS bombarded. bombarded. O Aircraft from from east e a s t coast coast carriers o a r r i e r s ranged ranged 334 n a v a l air a i r sorties s o r t i e s were were flawn. flown. Airoraft naval from 8Oil;cjin Sonjin to west from t o Wonsan YVunsan while while the t h e area mea from Prom Chinnampo C h i m p 0 to t o Haeju Hae j u on on the the w est units maintained maintained the the blockade blockade and and bombarded bombarded coast was attacked. attaoked. Surface unite both Korean Korean coasts coasts on on Sunday. Sunday.
Air Air
land-based aircraft under under FEW FEAF control f flew effective s sorties UN land-baaed l e w 819 effeotive orties operations, 17 17 enemy enemy 15 November of of which which 494 494 were were combat. combat. During these operations, on 15 One MI0 MIG-15's were observed and 7 MIG was was destroyed and two MIG-15's 7 encountered. onoountered. .0ne others.probably no f friendly damage.. During During tthe night, 13 others .probably damaged with no r i e n d l y damage., h e night, 1o f tthe he a i r c r a f t attacking e f f e c t i v e medium o r t i e s were effective medium bomber bomber s sorties wtre mounted, mounted, 1 11 of aircraft On n the following a marshaling and troop troop concentration concentration near near Humhung. Hemhung. O marshaling yard and day, 16 Novenibor, November, 638 538 land-based landbased sorties day, s o r t i e s were Were flown, f b m J including including 254 254 combat. oombat. No were observed N o enemy enemy aircraft wero observed or o r encountered encountered during during the t h e report report period. period. the On t h e night n i s h t of of 16-17 16-17 November, 16 16 effective effective medium medium bomber bomber missions missions were were in central the Kyo&po Kyomipo s steel mill n c e n t r a l Korea and the teel m ill mountod. mounted. Troop concentrations i were bombed bombed by by 12 12 of of these these 8-29's. B-29's.

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h a t 6 North Korean The Far East A Air i r Force Foroe reported on 13 November tthat a i r f i e l d s are a r e serviceable serviceable and and 8 airfields 8 are a r e partly p a r t l y serviceable. serviceable. In In addition to to Sinuiju, the River and and Chongjin i in Uiju and Chunggangjin Chunggmgjin on t h e Yalu River n northSinuiju, Uiju In eastern Korea, Korog Wonsan Tonsan city c i t y airfield a i r f i e l d is is now now considered aonsidered operational. operational. In Saamoham, Taeohon and N Namai airfields, just of northwestern Korea, Korea, Samohani, tuwi a irfields, j u s t north of the River, all in from t h e Chongohon Chongchon River, a l l have usable taxiways varying i n length from (Some r repair aotivity has been sighted during the 1,500 to t o 3,000 3,000 feet. feet. (Soma epair a otivity h R s been the past month on p a s t month on all all of o f the t h e newly newly and and partly p a r t l y operational operational airfields. airfieldpl. There have a s yet, yet, that t h a t enemy enemy tPotical t e c t i a a l aircraft aircraft are are hem been bean no indications, indications, as operating from f r o m fields f i e l d s other than than Sinuiju Slriuiju and and Uiju.) Uiju.)

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Central Central Intelligence I n t e l l i g e n c e Agency Office of Current Intelligence Intelligence 0418, 0418, 18 18 November 1952 1952

Army
The front f r o n t line l i n e was generally generally quiet on 17 17 November with action a c t i o n confined to to South Korean Korean 2nd 2nd Division troops continued c o n t i n u e d to t o consolidate area. South t h e Knmhya Kumhwa area. the their were,engaged t h e i r positions atop atop Sniper Sniper Ridge, but late l a t e in in the t h e evening evening were engaged for f o r over over Chinese mortars mortars Action ceased ceased before before midnight. midnight. Chinese three hours hours by by a a Chinese Chinese platoon. platoon. Action three and the Division and artillery a r t i l l e r y fired fired over 4,000 4,000 rounds against ROK positions in In t h e 2nd Division sector. sector.
Aircraft' from i r c r a f t ' from A t o t a l of 347 347 naval air sorties s o r t i e s were flown on 17 total 17 November. November. A the UN carriers Essex on cslrriers Kearsarge, Oriskany Oriskany and and Eesex on the t h e east e a s t coast attacked indusOn west coast, naval air air n the w e s t coast, trial areas areas at a t Chongjin, Chongjin, Kyongsong ICyongsong and and Kildhu. Kilchu. O trial units the Surface u n i t s maintained t h e blockade u n i t s ranged ranged from from Chinnampo C h i n m p o to t o Haeju. Haeju. units and p a r t i c i p a t e d in in the-air the air units' u n i t s ' attacks a t t a c k s on on east e a s t coast.cities. coaat c i t i e s . participated
UN landAlased Air flew 700 e effective land-baaed aircraft a i r c r a f t under Far East A i r Force control f l e w TOO ffective in 17 November November of of which which 476 476 were,combat. were combat. ' Included i n these operations s o r t i e s on on 17 sorties were 202 fighter f i g h t e r and fighter-bomber sorties s o r t i e s in in eupport support of of UN UN ground a activity. ctivity. While on on patrol p t r o l in i n the t h e Chongchon-Yalu Chongchon-Yalu River area, area, UN p i l o t s Observed observed 64 64 enemy enemy While pilots MIG's were destroyed, destroyed, two probably destroyed MIG-15's and engaged engaged 31. 31. Five MIG's MIG-15's and During t the and three reportedly reportedly damaged damaged with w i t h no no loss l o s s to t o UN UN aircraft. a i r c r a f t . During h e night, night, of B-29's bombed a a 14 e f f e c t i v e medium bomber missions were flown. Ten of these B-29's bombed 14 effective medium bomber missions were flown. supply area n near e w Pyongyang Pyongyang and t the h e Choak-tong Choak-tong mining mining and and processing processing area area east of i n u ij u of S Sinuiju.

Army
1
The r e p o r t s that, that,/ The Fas Far Eaet East Command reports -1 t the h e relief of of the Chinese Chinese Communist Communist 39th Army Army by by tthe h e 47th 47th A Army-in m y i n western western Korea Korea (This s shift has been been expected expected momentarily momentarily ffor past is ttentatively e n t a t i v e l y accepted. accepted. (This h i f t has o r tthe he p ast few weeke not change over-dU. enemy ce;pabilities a t t k e f r o n t . It weeks an4 anddoes does not change over-all enemy capabilitierisu::::::BI:170 appears o ffall a l l within the same p a pattern t t e r n of of r e l reliefs iefs that r e c e n t l y took place appears t to within the same thatx(r):::::::::::::op in e a s t e r n Korea.) in eastern Korea.)
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Ttl DOCUMENT.
tion ----61*ZYChe. Security Inf
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Central Intelligence Agency Agency Office of Current C i m e n t Intelligence Intelligence 0419, 0419, 19 19 November Movember 1952 1952
D A I L Y KOREAN K O R E A N BULLETIN B U L L E T I N DAILY

Army
Throughout major ground a action Throughout Tuesday Tuesday and and early early Wednesday, Wednesday, the maJor c t i o n occurred on on Rocky Rocky Point Point and and Pinpoint Pinpoint Hill H i l l in in the t h e ROK ROK 2nd 2nd Division Divlaion sector s e c t o r on on the t h e central c e n t r a l front. front. Repeated Repeated attacks attacks by by small small enemy enemy groups groups were either e i t h e r repulsed or o r met m e t by countercounterattacks period, both sides remained i in their a t t a c k s and and at at the t h e end end of of the t h e report period, n t heir patrol of short duration a t r o l clashes of Scattered probes and p original poeitlons. Scattered original positions. characterized action a c t i o n on characterized on the t h e remainder remainder of of the the front. front.
The was for 18 November. November. !Phe incomplete total total of 162 162 naval air s i r sorties eorties w a s reported f o r 18 A i r c r a f t from from east e a s t coast coast carriers c a r r i e r s attacked attacked targets t a r g e t s from from Hoeryong Hoeryong to t o Najin. NaJin. Four Four Aircraft MIG's enemy MIG's were were encountered encountered by by three three Panther Panther jets jets during during the the period. period. Two MIff'S enemy addition, surface unite sighted. s i g h t e d .15 15 I n addition, surface units were destroyed destroyed and and two two others others damaged. damaged. In west MIG's and 40 40 were were tracked tracked by by radar. radar. No report r e p o r t was received concerning weat MIG's and west targets air activity a c t i v i t y or or east east coast coast surface surface operations. operations. On the w e s t coast, coast, tmgets coast air and Haeju Haeju were were bombarded. bombarded. near Sokto, Songchonni and Sokto, Chodo, Chodo Songchonni
UN East flew 1/180 effective UlV land-based aircraft a i r c r a f t under under Far E a s t Air Force control f l e w 1,180 effectLve reconnaissance m missorties of 815 were combat. combat. Close support suppo29t and armed reconnaissance isof which 815 sions were flown 213 fighters f i g h t e r s and and fighter-bombers. fighter-bombers. While on patrol p a t r o l in I n the the flown by 213 MIG vas I 0w as 102 MIG's MIG's and encountered 48. 48. One M Yalu River area, area, UN pilots p i l o t s observed obeerved 102 night, 13 e effective destroyed and aqd five f i v e others others probably probably damaged. damaged. During the night, ffective destroyed medium bomber sorties 11 Of these B-29's B-29's attacking a supply a area medium s o r t i e s were flown, 1 1 of rea a t Sonchon new h e Manchurian Manchurian border and and Unpari, Unpari, just at near t the j u s t south south of of Sariwon. Sasiwon.
Sightinge Sightings of of enemy vehicle8 vehicles during the week week ending ending 13 13 Noveinber NoveMber revealed revealed Reversing l last week's pattern, pattern, a a large increase over the preceding week. week. Reverslag s e t week's considerable considerable amount of of truffic traffic was was apparent apparent on on the the western western main main supply supply routes routes leading into i n t o HseJu, h e number Haeju, Kaesong and Sibyon-ni, Sibyon-ni, while while tthe number of of vehicles vehicles on on roah4i roads i n the eaetern central sectors sectors declined declined slightly. s l i g h t l y . UN air and in eastern and central and naval naval. surface aurface 664 enemy enemy vehicles vehicles during during the t h e week. week. Railroad sightings, sightings, which u n i t s destroyed deetroyed 664 units increased during the i t h major the period, period, were were concentrated concentrated on on east east coast coast routee routes w with major a c t i v i t y on on the.Manpojin-Kunuri-Sinanju-Pyongyang t h e Manpo3in-Kunuri-Sirranju-Pyongyang rail r a i l lines. lines. activity
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Central Central Intelligence I n t e l l i g e n c e Agency Office Office of of Current Intelligence Intelligence 0420, 0420, 20 November 1952 19%
D A I L Y KOREAN DAILY K O R E A N BULLETIN B U L L E T I N

Army Army
Fighting Fighting flared flared Chinese troops troops tried tried Chinese B r i t i s h 29th 29th Brigade Brigade British mortar and and artillery artillery mortar again again in in western western Korea Korea during during the night of 18-19 18-19 November November as a6 three t h r e e times times without without success success to t o seize seize a a position p o s i t i o n held h e l d by by the the of of the t h e Commonwealth Commonwealth Division. Division, Over 4,193 rounds of enemy f e l l in i n the t h e Commonwealth Commonwealth sector. sector. fell
report was received received concerning concerning nnavaledr the west coast coast on on No r e g o r t was a v a l . a i r activity a c t i v i t y on t h e weat 19 November, while Task Task Force 77 the 1 9 November, 77 on on t h e east coast engaged in i n replenishing units the fired Tanchon, Chaho Cheho and Wonsan Wonsan operations. n i t s in in t h e Japan Sea f i r e d on Tanchon, operations. Surface u and on on the t h e west west coast coast bombarded bombarded the t h e area area near near Sokto. Sokto.
Air A ir
East UN land-based aircraft a i r c r a f t under Far E a s t Air Force control flew 1,336 1,336 effective effective sorties 19 November November including including 942 942 combat. combat. A s o r t i e s on 19 A total t o t a l of 324 324 close c l o s e support eupport and and i n the above operations. on s o r t i e s were included in armed reconnaissance sorties operations. While on patrol River area, area, UN UN p pilots observed 71 71 enemy enemy MIG-15 MIG-15's p a t r o l in in the the ChongchOn.4Yalu Chungahon-Yalu River i l o t s observed '6 Two BUG'S MIG's were damaged during the engagements w with and nnd engaged engaged 28. 28. Two i t h no friendly friendly damdge. n addition, irfields In addition, 100 100 MIG's MIG's were observed on on Antung Antung and Tatungkou Tatungkou a airfields damage. I of 19-20 19-20 November, November, 15 15 e effective medium bomber during the period. period. On the night of f f e c t i v e medium missions were were flown. flown. A troop concentration a at Changhari i in north c central t Cha~ngbari n north e n t r a l Korea and a d an ore o r e processing area mea at a t Moktong, Moktong, northeast of Pyongyang were attacked by 10 of the t'ae B-29's. B-29's. 10 of
Military 16t.:"rTIcie/1
The nomination of Y i Kap-song as premier f ailed t o receive the l egally Yi failed to legally h e National required required number of votes votes at at t the National Assembly Assembly session session on on 20 I%Wember, November, according to t o Radio Pusan. O f t h e 173 i'S Of the 173 Aseemblymen Assemblymen present, present, 94 94 opposed opposed Y Yi's Radio Pusan.

Navy
In Kbrea,Chinese 15th Army elements continued Kumhwa area in i n east earst central c e n t r a l Korea,Chinese continued I n the Kuthwa to to make make sporadic 8 g O r a d i C efforts e f f o r t s to t o knock knock South South Kbrean Korean 2nd 2nd Division troops from from Sniper Sniper there smd Rocky Rocky Point. Point. During the t h e night of 19-20 November t h e r e were four f o u r enenRidge and Ridge gagements on on the disputed disputed positions position6 with w i t h no no significant s i g n i f i c a n t gains by by either e i t h e r side. side.
ation
THE C.I.A. HAS NO OBJECTI N T HEC . 1 . A . HASNOOBJECT1 N
Security Inf
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TO THE THE DECLASSIFICATION DECLASSIFICATION OF TO OF THIS DOCUMENT. THIS DOCUMENT.

Noa 7 JUL 15,
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(In nomination Three of of the the secret secret ballots b a l l o t s were were invalid. invalid. ( ncmlnation while while 76 76 favored favored it. it. Three In order t to get tried to concessions from from t the President o g e t confirmation, confirmation, Yi t ried t o obtain concessione h e President mollify the Assemblymen Assemblymen but but apparently apparently f failed in both inetanccs.) instances.) which would mollify ailed i n both
Economic Economic
Prime Minister Paek Tu-chin Tu-chin has informed UlWEU UNKRA Officiab3 officials that 6 a Acting Prlme prospective large April large budget deficit d e f i c i t for f o r the t h e year yeas commencing 1 A p r i l 11953 9 5 3 will conthe budget, if it is to h e new budget, iS t o provide tinue recent recent inflationary inf'lationssy pressures. pressures. He said t tinue for the the full full needs of of the government,would govet.nment,wodd have to call call f or t o m expenditures for for total of r i l l i o n won, won, 5 5 trillion trillion of of which which would would be be for for military m i l i t a r y expenditures. expenditures. of 9 t trillion He e stressed s t r e w e d the overriding importance Income would only only be be about about 2 2 trillion trillion won. won. H of Of providing for an adequate volume of of Imported imported ConstlIllCrs consumers goods goods i in n order order t to o pre-vent prevent the the collapse collapse of of the whole economy. economy.
Security Info Security Info

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Central Intelligence Intelligence Agency Agency Central. Office of Current Intelligence Intelligence 0421, 1952 0421, 21 21 November 1952

M i l i t a r y Operations Oger a t i o n s Military
Army
the Three enemy enemy attacks a t t a c k s against Rocky Point and two on Pinpoint Hill in in t h e 2nd 2nd ROK Division Dlvieion sector, sector, the the latter l a t t e r characterized characterized by close close combat, combat, marked narked the t h e major Both' sides sides remained remained in in position position after after these these attacks, attacks, b but a c t i o n on on Thursday. Both ut action total o t a l of of action a c t i o n was w8ta continuing continuing on on Pinpoint at at the t h e end end of of the t h e report period. period. A t more than 3,000 was used 3,000 rounds rounde of of artillery a r t i l l e r y and and mortar fire fire wa8 used by the the enemy enemy during during
t h e day's day's fighting. fighting. the
An November. A n incomplete total t o t a l of 190 190 Naval Navd air a i r sorties s o r t i e s was reported for for 20 November. Aircraft from east-coast east-coast carriers c a r r i e r s attacked attacked the t h e Pujon Pujon hydroelectric system, syetem, and an8 A i r c r a f t from units in the t a r g e t s near near Hamhung Hambung and and Wonsan. Wonean. Surface u nite i n t h e Japan Sea bombarded the the targets vest coast air or area near near Chaho. Chaho. No flo report was received concerning west o r surface area activity activity.
UN Air Ul V land-based land-base8 aircraft a i r c r a f t under Far Far East A i r Force control flew 1,086 effective effective total of 128 close aupport support sorties o t a l of on 20 20 November of of which which 727 727 were were combat. combat. A t e o r t l e s on and armed armed reconnaissance sorties e o r t i e s were flown in i n support eupport of of UN ground activity. activity. While on on patrol p a t r o l in i n the the Yalu Y a l u River area, area, UN UN Sabre Sabre pilots p i l o t s observed observed 110 U O enemy enemy MIG's MIG's and engaged engsged 30. 3 0 . Five Five MIG's MIG's were were destroyed destroyed and and three three were were probably probably damagedAat damagedwt a a the night, 18 18 effective cost h e ni&t, effective medium bomber C 0 8 t of of one UN u10 Sabre Sabre damaged. w e d . During t ore processing area at a t Cholsaa in northwestern Korea, Korea, Cholsan in misaione missions were flown. An ore supply a area Kyomipo steel mill yere attacked by 12 a aupply r e a near Sinanju SinanJu and the Kyoxnlpo steel m i l l were 12 of of the B-29's. t h e B-29'8.
in Mukden on the arrival i n Mukden 17 October of 2,500 officers and men and 3,000 horses from Inner Mongolia. troops from Reportedly they departed the following day for North Korea. the Mongolian People's Republic have frequently been reported in Korea, Such troops may appear in Korea as "volunteers.")
!INS I10 013r..,CTION 0/ 11. VIE C Di.CI.:165131CATION Inf tion TO VIE Securit 313113zina TIIISipOCUVILNT. v
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General Situation
Political lxcluded frorp from the the amnesty for crhirrslr now now in in jails Jallr and . a d penitentiaries. pcbniteatiariee* Esrcluded uanerty for criminals
The November tleclrred declared (L a grrdurfsd graduated m amnesty Tbe North North Korean Korea Government Oovsrnarent on on 18. 18 Movmber eaty are
r w o n for +he unasrty is i r that that prisoners priroaerr are m "burning "burrring w i t h hortility the reason for the.amnesty with hostility again#% against the h r i a a a imprialist" ipqperislirt" urbthis t h i swill w i l l give ivethem them an an opportunity opportunlty "to "to atone rforrs for for their their American and (The release of of thara these orimlnrlr criminals i is probably crimr by their dovoted struggle." 8t2%##lOrt1 Tha releare r probebly crimes their devoted an s expedient more productive manpower and vacate ovetorw&d overcrowded perul penal an x p b i o n tto t o gain g r i n more productive mapover aad to vacate
counterfeitera, felonirta, mbthose thoro guilty guil%y o f "antistate "urfirtate o r h i , " The counterfeitersi Monists, and of crimes.", Th rn~ouncsd announced
iaoilitioer) facilities.)

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tion t ion Central Intelligence Agency Office of nf Current Intelligence Intelligence 0422, 0422, 22 November 1952 1952
DAILY D A I L Y
Military Oper a t i o n s M i l i t a r y Operations
KOREAN K O R E A N BULLETIN BULLETIN

Army Army
In western Korea, Korea, two South Korean 1st Division outposts were were attacked by Chinese elements elements in i n up up to t o company company strength. strength. Both positions were maintained after after Chinese fights fights lasting lasting up up to t o in an hour. hour.
I n the the UN November. In UN carrier c a r r i e r aircraft a i r c r a f t flew flew 231 231 offensive air air sorties s o r t i e s on 21 21 November. east, t transportation supply t targets Kilchu, Songchon Songchon and and Wonsan Wonsan were were east, r a n s p o r t a t i o n and eupply a r g e t s near Kilchu, attacked, the Chinnampo a area attacked, while in I n the t h e west, we&, enemy enemy installations i n s t a l l a t i o n s in in t h e Chlnnampo r e a were bombed. Surface Surface craft c r a f t in i n the east e a e t bombarded bombarded shore shore installations i n s t a l l a t i o n s at a t Songjin, Songjin, bombed. In the west, t the harbor approaches approaches tto Haeju and and tthe coastn t h e west, h e harbor o Haeju h e coastTanchon, and and Wonsan. Woman. I l line i n e near Cho Cho and Sok Sok islands islands were were subjected subjected to t o naval naval gunfire. gunfire.
Air A ir
UN land-based aircraft 21 IVovember November of of which U" a i r c r a f t flew f l e w 1,118 1,118 effective e f f e c t i v e sorties on 2.1 757 were combat. raids a against 757 combat. Medium bombers bombera flew f l e w 14 14 effective e f f e c t i v e sorties s o r t i e s in I n raide gainst a tl railroad railroad Over 200 of these nf these damaged, bridge in In north central c e n t r a l Korea Korea and and a supply area m e a bn the east coast. coast. MIG-15 jets pilots the period and 61 61 MIG-15 jets were observed by UN F-86 p i l o t s during t h e period were engaged. engaged. The Communists Communists suffered suffered three aircraft a i r c r a f t downed and two two t h e UN U I V lost l o s t two two F-86's F-86'e and and two two F-84's P-84'~ damaged. while the damaged.
M i l i t a r y Intelligence Intelligence Military Grofind Graand

Far Far East E a s t Command Command reports, reporte,I that the 106th 106th Regiment Regiment of of t the 34th Division, Division, Chinese Chinese Conrmunist Communist 12th 12th A Army, may t h a t the h e 34tb nnyv =Y have joined Communist 15th 15th Army in the battle for joined forces with the Chinese Chineee Communiet in t he b attle f o r Sniper

Navy Navy
The The principal p r i n c i p a l fighting fighting again occurred in i n the t h e Kumhwa area where ROK 2nd Atop Sniper Division elements elements defended defended againit against repeated repeated small Division small enemy enemy probes. probes. Atop Ridge, Chinese Chinese platoon-size platoon-elze attacks attack8 Were were repulsed repulsed at a t Rocky Point and and Pinpoint vest of Sniper, enemy platoons H i l l early e a r l y in i n the t h e morning morning of of 21 21 November. November. To the west Rill o hand-to-hand i n one one instance instance closing t positions, in a l s o aggressively aggressively probed ROK positions, also to hand-to-hand combat.
- A
THE C. I .t-AIFIAS NO
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Ridge. If the If t h e presence of this t h i s regiment is i s confirmed, confirmed, a a total t o t a l of of nine nine regiments regiments from Prom four f o u r divisions divisions have have been been used used in I n action a c t i o n on on Sniper Sniper Ridge Ridge since eince 16 16 October. October.
Information General Information Political Political

Radio Pyongyang of the North Korean Radio Pyongyang on 20 X, November announced an ordinance of People's Assembly Assenbly which which appointed appointed Choe Choe Chang-ik Chang-ik and Presidium of of the t h e Supreme Supreme People's ChongIl-yong as as vice-premier8 vice-premiers of of t the Chow 11-yong h e Democratic People's Republic Republic of of Korea. Korea. (Choe, who had been Minister (Choc, Minister of Finance Finance eince since e early a r l y 1950, 1950, i is s ta i member member of of t the he Yenan f a c t i o n within within the t h e North Korean Korean governmental hierarchy while Chong, Yenan faction most moat recently r e c e n t l y Minister of of Heavy Heavy Industry, Industry, is thought t to o be pro-Yenan.) pro-Yenan.)

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Central Central Intelligence Intelligence Agency Agency Office ntelligence Office of of Current Current I Intelligence
0423, 0423, 24 24 November November 1952 1952
DAILY D A I L Y KOREAN K O R E A N
Military Mi 1 itar y Operations Operot ions
BULLETIN B U L L E T I N
ArmY
activity place In in the the ROK ROK 2nd 2nd Divieion Division s sector north The major a c t i v i t y on Saturday took place e c t o r north where a a t total four enemy probing probing a attacks against Pinpoint Hill Hill and and of Kumhwa where o t a l of four ttacks a g a i n i t Pingoint
Two small emall enemy enellry probing attacks attack8 were -re reported reported in i n the t h e same rame vicinity v i c i n i t y on on Sunday, Sunday, which two Chinese cornpanlee companies drove drove on on ROK ROK position8 positions atop atop Sniper Sniper Ridge. Ridge. following which halted his attack met hlm him with with a The enemy enemy h s l t e a hi6 a t t a c k and withdrew when friendly elements met rocket and and artillery a r t i l l e r y concentration. concentration. Late Sunday night, night, in the the ROK BOK llst o t Division Division sector to the west, Chineae Chinese elements temporarily temporarily occupied occupied e an outpost poeltion position but but s ector t o t h e west, m outpost were driven driven off off by by heavy he8vy UN UN artillery a r t i l l e r y fire. fire.
Navy
air were reported reported on 22 November, November, all An incomplete total t o t a l of of 36 36 naval a i r sorties s o r t i e e were on Aircraft installations on the t h e west west coast. coaet. A i r c r a f t fram from west coast carriers c a r r i e r s attacked shore i nstallations from argets I n units on on the the east east coast coast bombarded bombarded ttargets in from Chinnampo Chinnmpo to t o Changyon. Changyon. Surface unite the Tanchon Sokto and Songchonni were were f fired Tanchon and and Chaho Chaho areas, areas, while the t h e areas near 8okto ired On the t h e following following day, day, 230 230 carrier-based carrler-based sorties s o r t i e s were were flown. flown. on in in the t h e west. west. On Wonsan, Hungnam, Pukchon and Kllchu Kilchu were attacked by e east coast carrier-based Wonssn, Hungnam, Pukchon ast C O a 6 t carrier-baaed Bongwha and Ongjin were h e main a r g e t s on t he aircraft, were t the main t targets the a i r c r a f t , while Chinnampo, Chinaamgo, Sokto, Sokto, Song0ha west Surface units u n i t s maintained the t h e blockade and bombarded on both Korean west coast. coast. Surface coasts. cosets e Air Air
UN UN land-based land-based aircraft a i r c r a f t under Far Far East A Air i r Force control control flew flew 1,051 1,051 effective effective sorties During the night, night, Far East East s o r t i e s on on 22 22 November November of of which which 696 696 were were combat. combat, During Bomber bombers attacking Bomber Command Command mounted mounted 13 13 effective effective sorties, s o r t i e s , 12 1 2 of o f the t h e medium bomber8 attackiEg supply aupply and and troop troop installations i n s t a l l a t i o n e at a t Haeju Haeju and and Pyongyang. Pyongymg. While While on on daylight daylight patrol patrol in the Yslu Yalu River area, i n the area, UN UN pilots p i l o t s observed observed 87 87 enemy enemy MIG-15's MIG-15's and and encountered encountered 34. 34. One damaged, while two UN Sabree Sabres were One MIG MIG was was destroyed, destroyed, and and four others othere probably damaged, damaged. the 100 MIG's MIG's were were observed observed on on Tatungkou Tatungkou a airfield and four four iiamaged. In In t h e morning, 100 i r f i e l d and on o t a l of f f e c t i v e land-based on Sinuiju Slnuiju airfield. a i r f i e l d . On Sunday, 23 November, November, a t total of 821 e effective land-based sorties including 515 515 combat. combat. While While on on patrol p a t r o l in in the t h e Chongchon-Yalu Chowchon-Yalu s o r t i e s were were flown, flown, including River River area, area, UN UN pilots pilots observed observed eight eight enemy enemy MIG's MIG's of of which two were encountered. encountered.

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n each In each case case the the enemy enemy -8 was subsequently subsequently rorced forced tto o withwith. Rocky Point were recorded. recorded. I r t i l l e r y and rounds of of a artillery draw and break contact with UN UN troops. troops. Approximately 8,000 rounds mortar fire mortar fire were were expended expended in in the the day's day's fighting. fighting.
AS NO OBJECTION TO TM DECLASSIFICATION OF
THE C.T.A.
c?
nip DOMENT.
vo.
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SE Security %ion Info
U Nesoi
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One destroyedand and one one UN UN Sabre Sabre received received major major damage. One MIG MIG was w a s .destroyed damage. Far East Air Force Force Bomber Command night of 23-24 23-24 November, November. Command mounted 16 16 effective e f f e c t i v e sorties a o r t i e e on on the night Communications at Yongml-dong, near near Sinanju and YonpungYonpungCommunications and and supply installations installations a t Yon@-dong, ni, east Chinnampo were of Chlnnampo were attacked attacked by by 12 12 of of the t h e B-29's. B-29's. ni, e a s t of
General Information Information
E conorpic Economic
Radio Pyongyang that Radio Pyongyang announced announced on on 21 2 l November t h a t during October North Korean Premier Kim Il-sung 11-sung presented Ma0 Tee-tung with g i f t s of Mao Tse-tung gifts of Korean farm producto products this from t h i s year's yeax's "bumper "bumper crops." trope." ((All A l l indlcations o a serious food indications point point t to shortage in i n North Korea. Korea. These !C'hese "gifts" " g i f t s " are probably designed t to counteract o courrteract psychologically an an apparent apparent growing growing feeling f e e l i n g of of despair deepais in. i n North he psychologically North Koren Korea over over tthe desperate state of of the the food food situation.) situation.) deaperate state On November, the ROK ROK presented a note note t to UN Command Command r reiterating its O n 23 23 November, o tthe h e UN e i t e r a t i n g it8 demand f for o r Immediate o l l a r s of i l l i o n won o the demandimmediate repayment repayment in in d dollars of 458 458 b billion won advanced advanced tto the UN UN forces, and and stating s t a t i n g that t h a t no no further f u r t h e r advances advances would would be be made made after after 15 15 December. December. forces, The note note also also requested requested a a $300,000,000 $300,000,000 loan loan from from t h e US as a s an anti-inflationary The the anti-inflationary measure. (Approximate1 measure. t h e won advances have been repaid repaid to to (Approximately 46 46 percent of the date by the t h e UN Command.) Comma.nd.

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Central Central Intelligence Intelligence Agency Agency Office Ofrice of Current Intelligence Intelligence 0424, 0424, 25 25 November 1952 1952

Military Operations Ope r s t l o a s Military
Army Army
Ground was limited l largely to brief probes probes and and p patrol Ground action on on Monday wa8 argely t o brief atrol The only significant action took place in the US 3rd Division sector, The only s i g n i f i c a n t action took place in the US 3rd Division sector, actions. actions. Where briefly from an where two two small e W 1 enemy enemy attacks attacks caused caused friendly f r i e n d l y troops to t o withdraw b r i e f l y from an outpost position. position. Subsequently UN troops, troops, reinforced reinforced and and aided aided by by artillery, artillery, Subeequently UN outpost able to to reoccupy reoccupy the t h e positions. positions. were able were The ROK 2nd Division in vital KUmhwa h hills The ROK ROK 9th 9th Division Division relieved the ROE[ in the v i t a l Kumhwa ills of the the central c e n t r a l front. front. s e c t o r of sector
There There were as Carrier Carrier Task Force were no no naval naval air air operations operations off off the east e a s t coast a8 west, aircraft from the light l i g h t carrier c a r r i e r Badoeng Badoeng I n the t h e west, a i r c r a f t from 77 engaged engaged in i n resupply. resupply, In 77 Straits attacked attacked troop troop and and supply supply installations i n s t a l l a t i o n s in in HWanghae Hwanghae Province. Province. Navy Straits Navy surface u units n i t s bombarded t the h e shore 8hore line i in n the the eaet east near near Slnpo, Sinpo, Songdin, Songjin, Tanchon Tanchou Hanna was hit with with 66 66 rounds rounds o of artillery from enemy enemy and r a r t i l l e r y iron and Woman. Wonsan. The destroyer Hanna west, guna, with w i t h only only one one death death and and minor minor damage damage resulting. resulting. In the west, shore-baaed guns, shore-based the Haeju harbor harbor and and the the v vicinity of Cho Cho surface units bombarded t h e approaches to HaeJu i c i n i t y of Island. Island.
On O n 24 24 November bad bad weather r restricted e s t r i c t e d the number of s sorties o r t i e s by by land-based land-based Medium bombers a i r c r a f t to t o 290, of of which which only only 86 86 were were combat. combat, Medium bombers flew flew 15 15 sorties, sortiee, aircraft t Hoechang, a s t of of of which 12 12 were directed against a troop and supply supply area area a at Hoechang, e east of Pyongyang. There were no Pyongyang. no air-to-air a i r - t o - a i r engagements engagements during during the t h e period. period.
Military Intelligence Military Intelligence
Far East Command now places the Chinese Communist 42nd Army in the area between Kangso and Sinanju in western eoorts had located this armv in ths south coastal regions Korea. lit deployed to the of Hwanghae Province, butl Kangso-Sinanju area following its relief in July by the 38th Army and remained there.

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8 Security Infbrmation 1 1
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Air A ir
straightOn 22 22 Bovember November two UN Sabre On t w o UN Sabre pilots pilots observed observed four four single-engine single-epglrre straightin revetments at a wing aircraft wing aircraft and and four four twin-engine twin-engine straight-wino straight-wing aircraft afrcraft i n revetmenta at a The aircraft large highway intersection about five miles south of Sinuiju. large highway Intersection about five miles south of Sinuiju. T h e aircraft presence of of twin-engine twin-engine aircraft aircraft on on appeared to be well appeared t o be w e l l camouflaged. camouflaged. (The (The presence North Koresa territory is unusual.) North Korean territory i 6 unusual.)
Security Iflfomtion
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Nft.
793 end 794, the transmission
This materiel cents Information effecting the national defense of -the *ted States within the meaning of the espionage Is Title Ilk USC, Sea.
Security x IInIbation i o n Security

Agency Central Intelligence Agency Office Off ice of of Current Intelligence 0425, 1952 0425, 26 November 1952
which in any manner to an wan prohibited by law.
nivoiation a
Perm k

Army
in sector, where where an The main action on on Tuesday took place i n the US 3rd Division sector, estimated estimated enemy enemy company company attacked attacked outpost outpost positions positions on on Jackson Jackson Heights. Heights. Friendly elements withdrew to withdrew slightly, slightly, but after approximately two hours were able t o rethe west, a company-size CommonTo west, a company-size raiding party of the Commonoccupy the positions. occupy the positions. to the wealth 1st l e t Division Division made made a a limited l i m i t e d advance, advance, but subsequently returned t o t h e main rounds of of a artillery fire line resistance. A total t o t a l of nearly 5,000 rounde r t i l l e r y and mortar f ire l i n e of resistance. w a s employed emgloyed during during the the report report period. period. was
A t o t a l of 157 157 naval naval air air sorties sorties were total were flown flown on 25 October. October. Aircraft from Sindong, Chongdongni, Chongdongni, Sinpo and Wonsan, Wonsan, while while on the east coast carriers attacked Sindong, w e s t coast coast the the main main targets targets were were Kasaengni, Kasaengni, Sagari S a g a r i and and Ongjin. Ongjin. Surface units in west Taewhado and the Japan Sea bombarded bombarded Sohori Sohori and and Wonsan. Wonsan. The coastal area area near Taewhado Japan Sea Cho Cho Island Island was fired f i r e d on on by by west w e s t coast coast surface surface units. units.
Air Air
UN land-based aircraft Air 702 effective a i r c r a f t under Far East A i r Force control flew 702 s o r t i e s on on 25 25 November November of of which which 391 391 were were combat. combat. While on on patrol in i n the the ChongphonChongchonsorties MIG'was Yalu River area, area, UN UN pilots p i l o t s observed observed 16 16 MIG-15's MIG-Yj's and and engaged engaged five. five. One MIG'wae night, 12 12 effective effectqve reported damaged, damaged, with with no no loss 108s to t o UN UN aircraft. aircraft, During the night, reported t?oop An enemy enemy headquarters near Chongju and troop Chongju and medium bomber medium bomber sorties s o r t i e s were were flown. flown. An barracks barracks at a t Songi-ri, Son@-ri, west w e s t of of Pyongyang, Pyongyang, were were attacked attacked by by nine of the t h e B-29's. B-29's.
the Analysis of enemy enemy vehicle traffic t r a f f i c during t h e week ending 20 November reveals a larger number number of of sightings sightings but little l i t t l e change change in in pattern as compared compared with the the A total t o t a l of of 21,918 21,918 vehicles vehicles vas was sighted sighted during during the the seven-day seven-day preceding period. period. A preceding period; period; however, however, had had the two two nights which which produced negative observations due due to to inclement weather s quite h a t the inclement weather permltted permitted normal normal operations, operations, it it i is quite probable probable t that the record record of of 24,867 24,867 sightings sightings (18-24 (18-24 April April 1952) 1952) would would have been exceeded. exceeded.

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THE C.I.A. THE C - 1 . A . HAS HASNO BO 0 J ECTIOl ;MOTION TO DvCrACSIFICATION TO THE THE D L : C G A Z S I F 1 C ~ ~OB ~0~ 01 THIS TI1 I SDOCUIAENT. DOC UMEXT.
Security <tion IInfbation Security

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Rolling week, with 3,361 Rolling stock stock sightings sightinge decreased decreased slightly elightly over over the t h e previous week, 3,361 units observed. observed. The The major ma,jor activity activity was apparent on on the Sinuiju-Sinanju-Pyongyang SinulJu-SinanJu-Pyongyang units line, while all PYongyang from the north, north, as is well well se as those acros6 across all rail lines into Pyongyang the period. the peninsula peniaeula via via Iangdok Yeslgdok and'Kowon and Kowon to to Wonsan, Woman, were serviceable serviceable during the the period.
General Information Information General

Political Political

Security Int
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The South South Korean Korean press pres8 continued continued to to print he The print aptI-Jap&neee anti-Japanese storlee stories during t the past week. week. One One daily daily newspaper newspaper reported.that reported that eight Japanese elipped past Japanese crewmen crewmen slipped ashore ashore from from an an American American military vessel and, and, while While drinking, drinking, quarreled with with and in3ured a a Korean. The story story stated stated that the Japanese injured Japanese were were arrested and have been held "despite "deapite the the influence influence of of US US military military authorities." authorities." Other stories held stories concerned concerned the "illegal" "illegal" deportation deportation of 245 245 Koreans from Japan and the the refusal refusal of the the Japarepresentatives of the Korean mission mission In in Japan japan to enter a nese police to permit reprcsentativee p i e o n following disturbances disturbances involving involving Koreans Koreans interned interned there. there. prison,following
tion
S ET SecuritY Securitj. I I h yrmation tytion
Central Central Intelligence I n t e l l i g e n c e Agency Agency Office Office of Current Intelligence Intelligence 28 November 1952 0426, 28

Army h Y
On three-pronged O n Thursday an enemy enemy company company in i n western Korea launched a three-pronged against outpost on Jackson Heights, Heights, temporarily temporarily ococattack a g a i n s t a US 3rd Division outpost to the h e outpost elements subsequently moved back t o t cupying the t h e position. position. Friendly elements cupying
without contact. contact.
An pn . tthe west c coast, An incomplete incomplete total t o t a l of of 46 46naval navalair airsorties, s o r t i e s ,all all pp h e west o a ~ l t ,was was reported reported on on 26 26 November. November. The area area from Chinnampo t o Haeju was to was 8ttaCked attacked by units the bombarded Songjin, Songjin, Tanchon n i t s in in t h e Japan Sea bombarded carrier aircraft. a i r c r a f t . Surface u carrier and Wonsan, Wonsan, while the v vicinity Changyonsan waa was attacked on the i c i n i t y near Chodo and Changyonean On the day, 2 27 November, the the r report on naval naval a air sorties h e following day, ' 7 November, e p o r t on ir s orties n t weet coast. O west coast. Of the sorties reported, all all were were on on tthe east coast was again f t h e nine e o r t i e s reported, h e east wae again incomplete. incomplete. O units where Myongchon, Songjin Songjin and and Hongwon Hongwon were were attacked. attacked. Surface u n i t s on the t h e east Chongjin tto Wonsan, and and Haeju, Haeju, ChangChangcoast bombarded shore installations i n s t a l l a t i o n e from Chongjin o Wonaan, yonsan, yGnsanp and and Changsangot Chscngsasgot were were blasted b l a s t e d by by west west coast coast surface surface units. units.
aircraft effective sorties UN land-based land-based a i r c r a f t under FEAF control flew 830 e ffective s o r t i e s on 26 November, of which 529 529 were were combat. combat. While on on patrol patrol in i n the t h e Yalu Yalu River River area, area, November, of MIG's were probably p i l o t s observed obecrved 54 54 enemy enemy MIG's MIG's and and engaged engaged 12. 12. Two MIG's UN pilots night, 16 16 effective t h e night, effective destroyed w with i t h no no damage damage to t o friendly f r i e n d l y aircraft. a i r c r a f t . During the medium of these B-29's B-29's attacking a t troop medium bomber missions miseions were flown, nine of r o o p and On the supply supply area at Haeju and and a a railroad r a i l r o a d bridge at a t Pyongyang. Pyongyang. O n t h e following day, day, effective land-based s sorties were flown flown as as inalement inclement weather weather hampered hampered only 319 319 e f f e c t i v e land-based o r t i e s were operations; of these MIG's were observed o or encounoperutions; these 104 104 were combat. combat. No enemy EaIo's r encountered On the night of 27-28 27-28 November, November, 1 11 effective medium medium period. O n t he p i g h t of 1 effective t e r e d during the period. bomber miorions missions were flown, flown, seven a aircraft attacking a a r railroad bridge and and i r c r a f t attacking a i l r o a d bridge In addition, one one B-29 3-29 bombed bombed a a marshaling marshaling y8rd yard marshaling yard yard at a t Huichon. I n addition, at Hamhung. a t Hamhung

Navy
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platoon-sized probe a against ROK-held With the t h e exception exception of one one minor enemy platoon-sized g a i n s t ROK-held a c t i o n was wa8 limited l i m i t e d to to brief b r i e f patrol p a t r o l clashes. clashes. Some Some 3,000 3,000 Sniper Ridge, Friday's action fire Thursday's fighting, fighting, more more rounds of artillery a r t i l l e r y and mortar f i r e were employed in Thureday's on Friday. than 10,000 rounds on
No.
A similar ROK 9 9th positions s i m i l a r company-sized company-sized attack a t t a c k on ROK t h Division p ositions atop Sniper Sniper Ridge was w a s repulsed. repulsed.
blilvma
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THE C.I.A. HASNO TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OBJ CTION
THAspocumzuT. v 7
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ormation Security I
Mi 1ttary Intell1p;ance 1111121ELIntALLImmt

Air
Gene~al. Situation General Situation
m e South South Korean National Assembly Assembly has has selected rel.ected a R. committee comniittee of of 18 18 member*, uemtera The Korean National t o welcome President-elect o him to President-elect Eisenhower Eisenhower and and to to submit submit recommendations recommendations tto him Illustrative of the wcording to t o two two South South Korean Koreau newspapers. newspapers. Illuatr&Ave t h e extreme extreme to to according which t h e reported Teported recommendations recommendationsgo go is i s aademand. demand t o esGab7.1sh a better bvffer zone zone which the to establish a It wa5 l s o recommended that that, Korean Korean authoriauthnrion the r i d e of of the the Yalu. Y d u , It was s also the Chinese side executive-begf#lci*..l d e t l m should should handle handle future future economic economicplannleag. planning. (The current executive-legislative ties quarrel i R such that the Asrcably'e quarrel is Assembly's committee committee might might take take advantage advantage of' of 8 a meetkg meetieg w i t h Eisenhower Eisenhower to to denounce denounce President Presldent Rhee.) Rhec ) with

Political
nemy MIG activity November wa8 was 8t at ite its highest highest 3mmy activity Suring Alirine; the week ending 22 Novmher l c v e l since ajucc the the first first week we2k in i n August, Auguot, as a8 583 583 MIG-15's MIG-15's were were observed observed airborne. airborne. level Of tfie the 213 aircraft, were initiated initiated by by the 213 engagements between UN and enemy a i r c r d t , 27 were Communists, weeks. Cmnunlsts, a a decided decided increase lncreaae in i n aggressiveness aggreseiveneea over the tho past three weeks. Increased aggressiveness aggreseivenesr was was also also evidenced evidenced by by the the loss loss of of five f i v e UN UN aircraft aircraft and, m d rose to the the highest highest in recent recent weeks weeks a8 as 15 damugc to two two others. others. UN claims also XOBC damage to MIG's reportedly damaged. MIC's were were destroyed, de8tTOyed, five five others others probably grobably destroyed deatroyed and 20 reportedly damaged. Varying Varying ability a b i l i t y on on the the part part of of the the Red Red pilots during the period indicates indicate8 to FEAF FEAF that khat the the Communists Comunists are are continuing continuing to to intersperse combat-tested combat+teeted pilots w with ith new personnel parsonriel committed committed for for training trafnlllrj purposes. puryoree. The The most significant significant of 27 27 inInetances Htances of enemy night activity activity occurred on 18-19 18-19 November, November, when when enemy fightem fighters attacked and destroyed deetroyed a a UN UN B-29. B-29. The The attack attack was wa6 well coordinated between the the attacked and target indicating that that the the attacking aircraft and and searchlights in i n the t a r g e t area indicfitlng 8uccesE of the enemy enemy night intercept lriterceyt effort succesc effort dependR depends on optimum weather weather and and light conditions. conditiono. light
Security s ia!gtme, I k t , .tion * n

2
Securl Ion Security Information
C e n t r a Intelligence Intelligence Jlgency Central Agency Office of of Current Office CUrrent Intelligence 0427, 0427, 29 2 9 November 1952 1952
DAILY AILY _ D
Military Military Operations operatiom
KOREAN K O R E A N BULLETIN BULLETIN

Army A l w
only Only 51 51 n naval a~a a air i r .ortier sorties were flown on on 28 28 rmdve8aber, November, all all on the the mrt vest coast, coast, aa as US carrier Tark cagagcd in In replenishing replenirhing operations. operationr, Aircraft from f'rom the Us Task Force Force 77 engaged B BadOing sdang S Strait t r a i t attacked attacked rhore shore irutallatloru initallations on onthe thewort vestcoaat coastIromChangyon from Chsngyon to to I G ' r ia UN aircraft obrerved observed and engaged engaged four four M MIG's in the the viciavicinHssju and ChaeryOng. Chaeryong, Six UB Haeju and Surface units i t y of there were were no no claims c l a w of of damage damage to t o enemy enemy planes. planer. Burface Wtr ity of Charryong; Chaeryong; there on the east earrt coast c-t bombarded gun gun positions poritloa8 culd On bombarded and hsrbor harbor areal area4 at Sohori and'wonran, and'Wonsan, While the area Changsongot and Sokto w was blasted on the wert vest while area near ne- Changyonsen, Cbansyonaan, Changrongot a r blerted coast. cwt,
'
A total total of o f 612 612 effective effective land-based land-bared sorties rortlcr w a r flown on 28 28 Bavember, of whiCh which A vas flown on Novetber, of 390.were Chongchon-Yalu River River area, area, UH UN p pilots 390 were cotbat. combat. While on on patrol patrol in in the Chongchon-Yalu i l o t r obobMIG vas damaged with no lloss to air5 6 WIG-15's M10-151r and and engaged engaged four. four. One M I 0M I w e d with orr t o UN sirrerved served 56 night, 48 48 effective effective medium medium bomber bomber ~missions were flown. A craft. c r & . During the night, I I ~ ~ I were O M flown, locoitotive repair iinstallation an airfield airfield at at Sinuiju, l o c h t i v e repair r u t s l l a f i o n and ap 8inuiju, on on the the Yalu Yalu River, River, addition, 14 14 aircraft banbed bombed an a airwere attacked attacked by by 20 2 0 of of these there B-29's. B-29'r. In In addl%lon, bwere field and center Ulju, while While Hseju Haeju rrad and HUngnam were were attacked field aud communications co~cationr center at Uiju, E by two two other other 3-29's. B=2g1r.
General Qeneral Situation Situation
President November that that the governirrued an an official official statement rtatement on 21 Ibvember Prerident Rhee issued to to spring, a IF8 US m Embassy ment tentatively plans plana t o return t o Seoul next a p i n g , according to a ~ r y !Che report. "Advance government partier" parties" are now preparing preparing for move. The f o r the move, Etbassy believes expects to reride reside in Seoul Seoul and have have the top Embarry believer that t h d the the President expect@ echelons ministries with hlm him while the Bationsl National hrembly Assembly and t the echelon8 of of the various vculour mlnirtrier he mass m a a r of o f government government workers workerr remain remain in In Pusan Puranfor for the the winter. wlnter.
THE C. C. THE

Navy
The ROK l lst Division rector, sector, vhere Where a The only only action action on on Friday took took place in In the ROIC r t Divirion An enemy company friendly raiding-party friendly raiding party assaulted arraulted enemy enemy positions poritlonr atop atop Hill Bill 167. 167. An enemy company Action elseelrecounterattacked South Korean troopr troops vere were forced t to withdraw. Action counterattacked and the South o withdraw, where where vas ycu confined confined to t o brief probes prober and and minor minor patrol patrol engagements.. engagements.
Air A i r
.
.
Political Polificd
Security InomatiOn
S NO OBJECTION OBJECTION A. HiS I. A. TO THE THE DECLASSIFICATION DECLASSIFICATION OF THIS DOCUMXNT. THIS DOCUMENT. 2 No. wut /44
fO
I .
Nair W
SE Security I
Central Intelligence Agency Agency Office of Current Intelligence 0428, 0428, 1 1 December December 1952 1952

M i l i t a r y Operations Operations Military
Army
On Saturday Saturday and and early early Sunday i v e minor On Sunday f five minor prober probes on on UN UN positions positions were were reported reported rector, one in the U S 40th he i n the ROIC in ROK 9th Divirion Division sector, US 40th Divirion Division rector, sector, and and two two in t the US 45th 45th Division Division sector. sector. The The enemy enemy expended expended nearly nearly 16,000 roundr US rounds of of mortar and a r t i l l e r y fire f i r e during during the the day's day'r fighting. fighting. artillery
and early e a r l y Monday O n Sunday On Sunday and Monday Chinere Chinese troops troops continuedtheir continued their ineffective ineffective probing probing tactics tactics against aga1n.t ROK ROK 9th 9th Division Divirion positions poritionr in in the t h e vicinity v i c i n i t y of of Sniper Sniper Ridge. Ridge. To To w e s t , an the west, the UB 1st Division raiding party, party, causing an enemy enemy company company engaged engaged a a US 1st Marine Divirion cauring the latter l a t t e r to t o withdraw withdraw to t o UN UN lines linea following following a a 50-minute 50-minute fire f i r e fight. fight. the
Navy
A total t o t a l of of 290 290 naval naval. air air sorties r o r t i e r were were flown flown on on 29 29 November. November. Enemy Enemy shore rhore i n r t a l l a t i o n r on a r t and installations on the e east and wert west coartr coasts were were attacked attacked by by there these carrier-bared carrier-based a i r c r a f t . Surface unitr a r t coart and aircraft. units on on the the e east coast bombarded bombarded Sohori, Sohori, Tanchon, Tanchon Chaho Chaho and Wonran. Wonsan. No report was war received received concerning concerning vest w e r t coast coamt surface surface activity. activity. On the the following day, 30 30 November, November, an an incomplete incomplete t o t a l of of 24 i r sorties rortier w a r following total 24 naval a air was reported, all a l l on on the the east eart coast. coast. There reported, These aircraft a i r c r a f t attacked i installations nrtallationr a at t Songjin and and Wonsan. Wonran. Surface Surface u n i t r in in the Japan Sea bombarded coastal i t i e r from Songjin units coastal c cities SongJin to t o Wonsan Woman while the the Sokto Sokto and and Haeju Haeju areas areas were coart Songjin were attacked attacked by wert west coast units. unitr
Far a s t Air A i r Force 1,004 land-based o r t i e s on 29 Far E East Force mounted mounted 1,004 land-based s sorties 29 November, November, of of which 623 623 were were combat. combat. While While on on patrol patrol in in the the Yalu Yalu River River area, mea, tin tJN pilots pilots observed 32 enemy enemy MIG's MIG's and and engaged engaged four. four. One MIG was reported served 32 reported damaged with with no losses to t o friendly friendly aircraft. a i r c r a f t . Only four medium medium bomber bomber s sorties were flown flown during during o r t i e s were the night, i r c r a f t engaging in leaflet drop and night, these a aircraft and photo photo reconnaissance reconnaissance missions. miesions effective land-based land-based s sorties were flown, flown, including including On Sunday 354 effective o r t i e s were 109 combat. 109 combat. No enemy a aircraft or encountered during during the the 24-hour 24-hour i r c r a f t were observed or period. O period. On night of of 30 November4 November-1 December, December, nine nine effective effective bomber bomber miseiona missions n tthe h e night were flown. A supply area a were flown. at Nahwasan-ni, j just south of of Worman, Wonsan, was was attacked attacked t Nahwasan-ni, u s t south by seven seven of of the B-29's. B-29's.

Air A ir ET Security Iiermation
f.)
NO OBJECTION THE H S s NO THEC.1.A. C.I.A. H TO THE D k , : ~ r ~ ~ : OF OF ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ O DI.S.-IFICATION TO THE
s\
THIS 1)OCL:.1..,T. DO:L:.iAT.
No. No.
1 1
+awl d
Security I1frmation
Situation General Situation
Truce Talks Tallce

Comuniet China China and and North North Korea Korea have "categorically" "categorically" endoreed Communist endorsed the Soviet resolutions for a solution solution of the Korean POW queetion question offered at the the UN, UN, acaccording to broadcasts from Pelping Peiping and cording t o practically Simultaneous simultaneous 28 November broadcasts propoeale include that of of 10 November for t the h e formation Pyongyang. The Soviet proposals Pyongyang. "neutral commission" commi~~ion and ' ~ that of 24 of a "neutral 24 November calling for an an immediate armistice and and a a transfer transfer of of the the POW POW question question to to the the neutral neutral commission. commission.

I Security I. Security
K
RET
2
rmation rmation
ity ILF42im Inf Secur% Security \tion Info tion
Central Intelligence Intelligence Agency Agency Central Office of Curreat Intelligence Ofrice or Current Intelligepcc 0429, 2 2 December December 1952 1952 0429,

Military Military:Operations Operatlono
AM, m
major action Monday aab and orsly early Tuesday o occurred Rocky Point Point and The maJor sction on on Monday cc~rr~ on a Rocky Several terrain features nearby terrala features in i n the the ROK ROK 9th 9th Division D i v l r l o n sector rector in in central central Korea. Korea. Several troops, enemy af&acka attacks involving as plblw many a8 as throe three plstoom platoons were were repelled repelled by by ROK ROK troops, in eaemy involving a8 In Some 3,600 rounds of mortar and ararsome roma cases carre6 following f o l l o w l q hand-to-hand hand-to-hand fighting. fightin&. Bomn 3,600 rou& o f morand Minor prober probes and sad patrol clashes were tillery fire were employed t illery f i r e mro eqdoywd in i n the the action. action. Hlmr clrrher wero along the the froat. froat. reported elsewhere elrewhere aloag
Surface report wae vas received naval a air sorties o on December. Burface No report received concerning concerning =vel i r 60rtier r 1 December. units Tanchon, Chaho and and Woracua. Wonsan. No units on o r the the east eart coast mart fired f i r e d on or Songjin, SoagJia, Taachor, X V o report report vas M I received received conceraiag corcernlmg west wert coast coarrt surface surface activity. activity. Air Air
On December UH UN land-bsred land-based a aircraft =der Far On 1 1December i r c r a f t uder Far East E e r t Air Air Force Force control control flew flew During the the fight, night, 17 17 effective effective 352 effective sorties, rortles, of o f which which 131 131 were wre combat. combat. During medium were 8-29's attacking a supply area at medium bother bomber missions mirsio~ were flown flown with with 11 1 1B-29'r sttacklrg a supply =ea at No enemy enemy a aircraft'were observed Yangdok Y8ngdok and and troop troop concentratioas coacentrrtiou near sear Woasan. Wouan. lo i r c r a f t were obrerved or or encountered encountered during during the the period. period.
Military, Intelligence Mllitrrg ImtelliRence

Navy yaw
Air Air
zi
'JUL
Far the UN boPrb1bombing raid raid 0. on tho the U1Ju Ulju communiFar East Ea& Air A i r Force Force estimates orfirnufor that that the connnurications NoveMber COlDple~ly completely dortroyed destroyed 107 107 dmllillgdwellingcation8 center confor on 08 the t h o night ni@t of of 28-29 28-29 lovanbec -type and type buildings buildirgr *ad u4 one om administration r ~ n i r t r a t i o building bulldirg r and partially partially destroyed brtroyod one ore assessment rhmd-tbrf showed-that BIruiJu Sinuiju rairfield =serviceable warehouse. w e h o u r e r Bomb damage w e a8rer#mert l r f i e l b iis r w ervlceable while the Uiju Uiju f field a l l 0 tho i e l d iir partly partly serviceable. rerviceabler
e'
THE C.I.A. flAs NO OBJECTION TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OF TBIS DOCUMENT.
Security Iafbration Bocurlty * t i o Inf a
''AT?ma
SecuriitCRFty Info
tion Central Intelligence Agency Office of of Current Intelligence 0430, 0430, 3 3 December 1952 1952
D A I L Y
Military Military Operations Operations

Army
or west There were no no naval air operations on on either e i t h e r the east o r w e s t Korean coasts activity because of of inclement inclement weather. weather. The only report on UN surface a c t i v i t y on either coast concerned off Wonsan, Wonsan, where f five harbor area8 areas were were damaged by coset concerned operations off i v e harbor naval gunfire. gunfire.
East Air effective UN land-based land-baeed aircraft a i r c r a f t under Far E ast A i r Force control flew 550 e ffective on 2 2 December December of of which which 347 347 were were combat. combat. During During the night, night, FEAF Bomber Bomber e o r t l e s on sorties airfield, i r f i e l d , a supply area and Command mounted mounted 16 16 effective effective sorties. sorties. A Pyongyang a Pyongyang, and a troop concentration near near Sinanju Sinanju marshaling yard northwest northwest of of Pyongyang, 'were attacked 2 of While on atrol I n the Yalu River area, area, UN UN 'were attacked by by 1 12 of the B-29'8. B-29's. .While on p patrol in Two were damaged, damaged, and one probably p i l o t s observed observed 97 97 MIG's MIG's and and engaged engaged 31. 3 1 . !ho pilots destroyed with destroyed w i t h no no damage damage to t o UN UN aircraft. aircraft.
General General Situation Situation
The UN was again again charged charged by Communist Communist China China with violating Manchurian air space and bombing near the Chinese c city i t y of of Antung, Antung, according according tto o a a 2 2 December December The four US US B-26's B-26's during the the broadcast from from Peiping. Peiping. m e Communists allege that four broadcast night of nzght of 28 November dropped dropped over 40 40 bombs, bombs, inJuring injuring f five i v e people people and and deetroydestroying property. (Bimllar o (Similar Chinese Chinese propaganda propaganda charges charges have have been been made made from from time time tto ing property. t i m e in I n the past. past. A major US medium bomber r e i d was h e night time raid was conducted on on tthe night of of 28-29 November against Korean 28-29 November Korean installations installationq along a l o n g the the Yalu Yalu River.) River.)

Navy
Air Air
against ROK ROK 9th 9th Division Division position8 positions on Six separate enemy attacks were made against The attacks the final one Sniper Ridge Sniper Ridge on on TUesday. !Tuesday. The attacks were were all all repulsed repulsed except except for, for t h e final one reports indicate indicate that t h a t the the Prees reports which which continued continued at at the the end end of of the the report report period. period. Pres8 Koreans l lost in'the action on on Pinpoint Pinpoint Hill Hill atop South Korean6 o s t and later regained ground i n the action rounds of of mortar mortar and and artillery enemy employed employed more than 5,000 5,000 rounds Sniper Sniper Ridge. The enemy d o n g the front, front, minor probes and and fire f i r e in i n this t h i a central c e n t r a l Korean Korean fighting. fighting. Elsewhere along p a t r o l actions actions were patrol were reported. reported.
Propaganb Propaganda
SECRET
THE C. T.A. HAS NO OBJECTION
>
TO THE DECLASSIFICATION
THIS DO C UMEN
Security Infbation
OF
.
N.
Wd ET Securi6Y IQ,rInation
Central Central Intelligence Agency Agency Office of of Current Intelligence Intelligence 0431, 049, 4 4 December December 1952 1952
DAILY B U L L E T I N D A I L Y KOREAN K O R E A N BULLETIN

Military Operations
Army
No N o offensive offensive air strikes were made by UN naval aircraft on the east coast as the carrier c a r r i e r task task force force engaged engaged in i n supply supply activities. a c t i v i t i e e . No report was rein east bombarded the craft i n the eaat ceived from from the the west w e s t coast coast command. command. Surface craft ceived west I n the w e s t the approaches enemy shoreline shoreline at a t Songjin, Songjin, Tanchon Tanchon and and Wonsan. Woman. In enemy t o Haeju Haeju harbor harbor were were bombarded. bombarded. to Air Air
concentrations at Sunchon Sundhon and Taeyu-dong Taeyu-dong In in northwestern northwestern Korea. Korea. quarters and concentrations i l o t s observed54 54enemy enemy MIG-15's MIG-15's and and engaged engaged 27 27 of of them. them. Two Two MIG's MIG's UN F-86 F-86 p pilotsObserved were destroyed destroyed and and one.damaged one,damaged at at a a cost co8t of of one one F-86 F-86 damaged. -ed. were
effective sortie8 sorties on 3 December of which which Land-based aircraft aircraft flew flew 1,053 effective 16 sorties headIn 16 s o r t i e s attacked enemy troop head797 were combat. 797 combat. Medium bombers in
Military Intelligence M1112E7TAILLIAMIE
During the I G ' s were .During the week week ending ending 30 30 November, November, only only 265 M MIG's were obaerved observed airborne, airborne, four by US Navy Corsairs. Corsairs. Two of 57 were engaged engaged by by UN UN Sabres Sabre8 and four of which 57 MIG's were destroyed, the MIG's destroyed, one probably destroyed, destroyed, and two damaged during t he In period at at a a cost cost of of one one F-86 F-86 destroyed destroyed and and three three others other8 damaged. damaged. I n southerly penetrations, penetrations, Cho Island was was bombed bombed by by PO-2'8 PO4's on on 26 26 November, November, while while two, two days days This near Sariwon. Sariwon. This l a t e r , six Navy Corsairs were later, were engaged by by four four PIIIG's near l a t t e r action, o Far E ast A i r Force, latter action, according t to East Air Force, regresents represents a a renewal renewal of of the tactic utilized primarily when when UN UN Sabres Sabres a are not airborne. airborne. t h e MIG penetration t actic u t i l i z e d primarily r e not

Navy Navy
Air
Securitn!Lnation Gecurlty I
the night night 3-4 3-4 December, December, Chinese Comrmunist During the Communist elements made numerous unsuccedsful unsuccessful attacks attacks against against ROK ROK 9th 9th Division Division positions in in the Sniper Ridge area on on the the central central front. front. The The enemy enemy attacked attacked in in groups. groups of and Rocky Point area Rocky Point 6,000 rounds of of a artillery 40 tO t o 50 50 and and were supported by more than 6,000 r t i l l e r y and mortar fire. Elsewhere along along the the front front action consisted of minor probes and patrol patrol fire. contacta. contacts.
THEC.I.A.HASNOOBJECTIOW THE C. I.A. H A S NO OEJECTIOW DECDASSIFICATION TH E U TO TkIE S C L A S S I F I C A T I O N OF THIS THIS DOZUJulE!43T. DOCUMENT.
NA 7 JUT
1979
Security %ion Info Info
tion
Central Intelligence Agency Agency Office of of Current Intelligence Intelligepce 0432, 0432, 5 5 December 1952 1952

Army
was The Korean Korean front f r o n t was quiet quiet on on 5 5 November as ae only scattered action w as Kuthwa bore the reported. The The South South Korean 9th 9th Division Divieion on Sniper Ridge near Kwnhwa repOrted. brunt of of a a number number of of squad-size squad-size attacks by Chinese elements without any any loss loee of of west, a US l lst Msrine Divleion Division raiding party party eoutheast southeast of I n the west, e t Marine position. In Kaesong fought fought a a seven-hour seven-hour engagement engagement with with defending defending Chinese troops troop8 before before Kaesong artillery mortar f fire fell across the wlthdrawing. Over 5,000 rounds of of a r t i l l e r y and morter ire f e l l acrose withdrawing. f r o n t during during the the period. period. front
Carrier-based aircraft total Carrier-based a i r c r a f t flew flew an an incomplete iqcomplete t o t a l of 200 sorties,'all s o r t i e s , ' a l l on on the the bombed from from Kilchu to t o Wonsan. Wonean. Surface vessels e a s t coast. coast. These aircraft bombed east bombarded targets Songjin and Wonsan in the e east bombarded t a r g e t s in i n the area of of SongJin a s t and near Cho Island i n the the west. west. Island in
Land-based aircraft Air 1,175 effective a i r c r a f t under Far East A i r Force control flew 1,175 effective the BomBer Command Command s o r t i e s , of which 881 881 were were combat. combat. During t h e night FEAF Bomber sorties, ten hit the 21 effective effective sorties, eortiee, of which t en h it t h e Communication Center at at mounted 21 River area, area, UN p pilots MIG's, Cholsan. While on on patrol p a t r o l in i n the Yalu River i l o t s observed 86 MIG'e, Cholsan. One wae destroyed and four probably damaged, was destroyed damaged, with of which 50 were were engaged. engaged. One of which 50 UN aircraft. aircraft. no damage damage to t o UN no
Korean acting acting Prime Prime Minister Minister A recent informal Informal conversation between South Korean a US o Paek and a official f f i c i a l indicated indicated that settlement settlement of of the the c critical r i t i c a l problem problem of The basis of repayment for f o r won won advances advances to t o UN UN troops troops may may be be attainable. attainable. Tbe poseible agreement calls calls f o r immediate dollar dollar repayment a t a realistic possible agreement for at realistic exexchange atc.f o r all won drawn, change r rate for drawn, providing providing the the United United Nations Nations Command Command is prepret o negotiate negotiate settlement settlement of of won advances made p r i o r to pared to prior to 1 1 January January 1952. 1952. Paek mentioned a r a t e of 18,000 - 20,000 o one ealistic rate 20,000 won won tto one dollar dollar a8 as the the r realistic rate. (The suggested r a t e would represent rate. (The rate represent a a coneiderable considerable concession concession oy-th" 9.-the p a r t of South Korean Government.) part of the the South Korean Government.)

Navy
Air Air
Economic
TETE C.I.A. HA
TO TFT(.11)For."'-iTi-r;ATI.,-;u
C? T7CTION
Security Iiotion
op
07
s '
Security %tion I Iemation Security

Central Central Intelligence Intelligence Agency Office Office of of Current Current Intelligence Intelligence 0433, 0433, 6 6 December December 1952 19%
D A I L Y KOREAN K O R E A N B U L L E T I N DAILY BULLETIN

M i l i t a r y Operations Operat ions Military
Army
On to made four w unsuccessful On 5 5 Decebber December the enemy in in strength etrength up t o platoon size made uccesrful against the the ROK ROK 9th 9th Division Divieion on on Sniper Sniper Ridge on on the t h e central central front. front. ElseElseprobee against probes where where across acroes the the front, front, action action consisted coaeieted of of light l i g h t patrol contacts contacts and one enemy enemy probe of platoon platoon strength strength against against the t h e US U8 45th 45th Division Division on on the the eastern eastern front. front. probe of
Navy Navy
Surface units unite damaged m o d three gun gun positions, pooltiom, an ananunition Surface ammunition etorage storage area, one positions in Gkur position8 in the vicinity vicinity factory and other other targets target8 at a t Wonsan Woman on on the the east east coast. coaat. Gun factory and of Chodo on on the the west west coast coaet were were also a l e 0 damaged. damaged. Reports Reparte on on naval naval activity a c t i v i t y were were of incomplete , however. however incomplete,
Air A ir
UA land-based land-based aircraft aircrtxft under under Bar i r Force control flew UN Far East East A Air Force control flew 1,161 1,161 effective effective Bomber Connuand Command mounted mounted s o r t i e s of of Which which 864 864 were were combat. combat. During the night FEAF Bomber sorties, 16 rortier, of of 'which which 1 1hhit i t troop t Sungemg-nl 16 effective effective sorties, 11 troop concentrations concentrations a at Sungang-ni and and Yalu pilote observed 45 45 M MIG's Chonysng. While on on patrol patrol in In the Y 3 u River area, area, UN p i l o t e obeerved IO'r Chonyang. While MIG war was probably damaged, and and engaged four. four. One MI0 asd one UN UN F-86 F-86 was wae lost. loaf. and engaged
Late presr reports reports state state that that in in the the largest lsrgert enemy enemy night night raid raid of of the t h e war, ~LT, Late press a of 11 1 1aircraft aircraft attacked attacked the the Seoul Seoul area area Friday Friday night. night. a force force of

Security Y3Lnatib-n Securi:yEMation
!D. )
e-
Cr
Po'
Ro. 0
_JL,7
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NO OR 7!"CTIC:7
4
Security Inftation tion
Central Intelligence Intelligence Agency Office of Current Intelligence 0434, 8 December 1952 1952 0434, 8

Army
An incomplete incomplete total t o t a l of of 168 168 naval naval air.sorties air s o r t i e s was w a s reported reported for for 6 6 December, December, An all on on the the east east coast. coast. These carrier-based carrier-based a aircraft ranged from Kilchu Kilchu t to o i r c r a f t ranged Wonean. Wonsan. Surface Surface units u n i t s on on the the east coast coast f i r e d on shore i n s t a l l a t i o n s at Songjin, fired installations Songjin, Tanchon, Chaho Chaho and and Wonsan, Wonean, while while the the area area near near Cho Cho Island Island and was Tanchon, and Changyonsan Changyonsan was 7 December 52 carrier-based air s sorties bombarded on on the the west weet coast. coast. On 7 52 carrier-based o r t i e s were bombarded flown. Task Task Force Force 77 on on the the east e a s t coast coast engaged engaged in i n replenishing replenishing operationqwhlle operations,while on the wcet coast aircraft r i t i s h carrier c a r r i e r Glory Glory attacked attacked Changyon, Changyon, aircraft fromthe from the B British on West coast Rseju and and Ongjin. Ongjin. Surface Surface units units continued continued the blockade and bombarded both Haeju Korean coasts. Korean coasts.
Air A ir
sorties UN land-based aircraft aircraft under FEAF control flew 1,006 effective s o r t i e s on UN F-86 F-86 pilots, pilots, w while on p patrol in 6 December of of which which 717 717 were were combat. combat. Six UN h i l e on atrol i n 6 Chongchon River area observed four unidentified enemy aircraft aircraft but but did not not the Chongchon engage them. During the night, night, 18 18 effective effective medium medium bomber bomber mission8 missions were were flown. flown. center a at Songa-ri, both near A communications center at a t Tochumyon and a supply eupply center t Songs-ri, were attacked attacked by 12 12 of of the the B-29's. B - 2 9 ' ~ . On Sunday 778 778 effective effective land-baeed land-based Wonsan, Wonsan, were patrol were flown, flown, including including 484 484 combat. combat. UN pilots pilot8 on on p a t r o l in i n "MIG "MIQAlley" s o r t i e s were sorties MIG's were destroyed, Seven MIC)'e destroyed, one 41 enemy enemy MIG's MIG's and and engaged engaged 34. 34. Seven obeerved 41 observed Sabres received received minor minor damage. damage. probably destroyed and one damaged damaged while two UN Sabres O n the night of 15 bomber bomber missions missions were were flown. flown. A supply center On of 7-8 7-8 December, 15 at Yangdok was was attacked by by eight eight B B-29's as the the other other bombers bombers flew flew reconnaissance reconnaissance a t Yangdok - q ' s as and close eupport missions. close support missions.

Navy Navy
On 6 6 December December the the action action across.the acros8 the 8th 8th Army front f r o n t consisted consisted chiefly chiefly of On Kumsong area in central minor patrol p a t r o l clashes clashes and and small emall enemy enemy probes. probes. In I n the Kumeong in c entral minor Korea BOK 6th Chinese Korea a a company-size company-size raiding raiding party party from from the ROK 6th Division engaged engaged a Chinese it to t o withdraw withdraw after after a a 40-minute 40-minute engagement. engagement. On O n the t h e followplatoon and and forced forced it platoon i n g day day enemy enemy elements elements of of squad squad and platoon s i z e unsucceesfully ing size unsuccessfully probed ROK ROK 9th Division positions positions on on Sniper Sniper Ridge R i d g e on on the the central central front. front. Elsewhere, Elsewhere, action Division of minor minor patrol patrol engagements. exqagementa. consisted of consisted
No.
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TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OBJZCTION THISDOCUMUT.
HASNO
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Security Security I Infma no i h t tion ion

Political Political
The US Embasey Embassy in Pusan reports reports t that initial Korean press press reaction reaction !he in hxsan hat i n i t i a l South Korean The Yonhap yonhap Shinmun Shinmun claimed claimed that that to t o the t h e Eisenhower visit'is v i a i t is rather r a t h e r sparse. sparee. The President-elect Eisenhower Eisenhower promised Rhee t to Korea m militarily and economieconomiPresident-elect promised Rhee o aid Korea i l i t a r i l y and The same paper paper quoted cally and to t o greatly increase increase South South Korean Korean forces. forcee. The quoted .on the basis of what (Eisenhower) . Acting Premier Peek Paek as a8 saying: saying: ". .on the basis of w h a t (Eisenhower) said, said, Paektu lies I believe we we'will I believe will be be able able to t o hoist h o i s t our our flag flag on on Mt. M t . Paektu." Paektu." (Mt. (Mt. Paektu lies on the tremendous sentimental appeal to on t h e Korean-Manchurian boundary and has tremendous the t h e Korean Korean people people as as the the birthplace birthplace of of the the Korean Korean people.) people.)
'I.

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Security Security %s I I
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S RET Security I I&orme,tion ormation
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Military Mllitary Operations Operat ions
Central Intelligence Intelligence Agency Agency of Current Intelligence Intelligence Office of Office 0435, 8435, 9 9 December December 1952 1952
Army
On On 8 8 December December Communist Communist forces forces of up to two-platoon two-platoon strength strength -de made f five ive the in Ridge area on the the c central attacks against t h e ROK 9th Division i n the Sniper Ridge entral An enemy platoon platoon made an f r o n t . The front. The enemy enemy was was repulsed repulsed in in each each engagement. engagement. AA of the ROK ROK 8th Division Division on Finger Finger R Ridge unsuccessful probe against against elements elements of i d g e on of minor probes probes and p patrol the east central c e n t r a l front. front. Elsewhere action consisted of atrol claehes clashes.
was 8 December. A total t o w of of 287 287 air air sorties s o r t i e s by carrier-based carrier-baaed planes w a s flown on 8 the 77 attacked attacked shore i installations On t h e east coast, coast, aircraft a i r c r a f t from Task Force 77 n s t a l l a t i o n s at at Kilchu, Chinnampo, Changyon, UpKilchu, Hamhung Hamhung and and Wonsan, Woman, while while on on the west coast, coast, Chinnampo, Upchori and and Ongjin Ongjin were were strafed strafed and and bombed. bombed. Surface units u n i t s in in the Japan Sea Sea fired fired on Songjin, Songjin, Tanchon, Tanchon, Chaho and Wonsan Wonsan while While the areas near near Haeju Haeju and Sok Island were bombarded bombarded on on the t h e west west coast. coast. were
Air A ir
UN land-based land-based aircraft a i r c r a f t under under Fax i r Force control control flew 986 effective Far East A Air 986 effective patrol 8 December December of of which which 709 709 were were combat. combat. UN pilots, p i l o t s , while on p a t r o l in s o r t i e s on on 8 sorties MIQ was wa8 One MIG the t h e Yalu Yalu River River area, area, observed observed 11 11 enemy enemy MIG's MIG's and and engaged engeged two. two. One the night, night, 16 16 e effective medium no damage damsge to t o UN UN aircraft. a i r c r a f t . During the f f e c t i v e medium destroyed with no destroyed the B-29's attacking a supply area a at 12 of t h e B-29's t Yongyonbomber sorties s o r t i e s were flown; 12 east of Pyongyang, ore processing plant t Tokchon In entral chan, east chan, Pyongyang, an ore plant a at in north c central snd a a troop troop installation i n s t a l l a t i o n at at Yongpung-ni Yongpung-ni near Chinnaunpo. Korea, and Korea, Chinnampo.
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Military Intelligence Intelligence Military
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During During November,Far, IVovember,Far EEast a s t Air Air Force Force continued continued tto o improve improve i its t s "road block" block" UN aircraft aircraft technique in i n the the interdiction.effort interdiction e f f o r t against again& enemy enemy supply supply lines. lines. UN observed 67,830 for year 67,830 vehicles f o r the second highest monthly sighting this y e q and of portions of deetroyed 3,034 3,034 vehicles, vehicles, 20 20 locomotives locomotive8 and and 156 156 rail r a i l cars. cars. Seven portion8 destroyed trackage on on main main supply routes, routes, in i n addition t o marrhalling to marshalling yards yards and rail bridges, were brought under a t t a c k by ail bridges, were brought under attack by UIQ UN air air units, units, disrupting disrupting Communist Communist r rail t r a f f i c along along these these routes. routes. traffic
2)
:

Enemy Rear Areas Enemy
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THE C.I.A. HAS NO OBJECTION TO THE DECIASSIFICA.TION OF
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General General Situation

Radio Moscow on Radio Moscow on 8 8 December December picked picked up the North Korean Korean propaganda propaganda broadcast on on the 3 3 December December defection defection of of a a South Korean liaieon liaison p pilot i l o t to the Comunists. Communists. (The number of of South Koreans who who have have Willingly willingly defected defected to to the the enemy enemy is is Bursursmall in i n view of the considerable conriderable number of North prlsingly small prisingly North Korean Korean deserters. deserters. The Cohunisto t om a k e a maximum Communists are expected to make maximum propaganda play play on thia this incident.) incident.)
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Fl+CT ormation
Central Intelligence Agency Office of Current Intelligence 04360 10 December 1952
PPM Is
D A I L Y M i l i t a r y Operations Operations Military
Army Army
9 December December brief Chinese On 9 Chinese probes probes i in n tthe h e Sniper Sniper Ridge Ridge area on the central central t i l l e r y and mortar fire f i r e fell fell in i n support tillery the f r o n t consisted coneieted of of small small probee and front probes and continued continued against against the ROK 9th 9th Division, Diviaion, t o t a l of 1,843 1,843 roundi rounds .of of araxfront. A total Other action across across of these probes. Other p patrol a t r o l contacts. contacts.
Navy
UN UIJ carrier-based carrier-based aircraft a i r c r a f t flew flew 391 391 sorties, sortiee, principally against enemy enemy rail rail hubs Hongui, on the KoreanKoreanhubs in i n northeastern northeastern Korea. Korea. Press sources indicate that Hongul, 8 major iron Iron mining and r a i l center; SinoSoviet Sino-Zoviet border; border; Muean, Mnsan, a rail center; and Hyesanjin, Hyesanjin, on the the Sino-Korean Sino-Korean border, border, were were the the principal principal targets. targets. No information information was W&B received on on the t h e activity a c t i v i t y of of naval naval surface eurface vessels. vessels.
Air A ir
land-based aircraft a i r c r a f t under under Far Far East East A i r Force control control f l e w 479 479 effective effective UN land-based Air flew pilots patrol U N p i l o t s on p a t r o l in i n the sorties sorties on on 9 9 Decetber, December, of of which which 254 254 were were combat. combat. UN I 0w a s destroyed, destroyed, Yalu River area area observed observed 52 MIG was 52 enemy enemy MIG's MIG's and and engaged engaged four. four. One M Yalu n the night f f e c t i v e medium On night of of 9-10 9-10 December, December, 13 13 e effective medium with no no damage damage to to UN UN aircraft. aircraPt. O with flown, 1 1 of the B-29's n d u s t r i a l area a t bomber sorties s o r t i e s were flown,.11 B-29's attacking an i industrial at Yongpongdong, near near the t h e Manchurian Manchurian border border in i n northwestern northwestern Korea. Yongpongdong, Korea.
Analysis of of enemy enemy traffic traffic during during the the week ending ending 4 4 December a Analysis DeceMber reveals a general general decrease decreaee in i n vehicle sightings sightings and a pronounced increase from the prepreThis ceding week week in ceding in rail r a i l sightings sightinge in i n the the western western zone zone south south of o f ' Pymngyang. Pyongyang. This Increase may be a ttributed t o enemy enemy efforts t o move increase attributed to to mmve harveeted harvested crops northward from h e fertile f e r t i l e Hwanghae Hwanghae plains. plains. UN air a i r crews observed 5,784 5,784 vehicles during from t the the seven-day eeven-day period period and and destroyed destroyed 310. 3 0 . Over-all r rolling o l l i n g stock stock sightings sightings decreased with only only 3,373 3,373 units u n i t s observed. observed. decreased slightly s l i g h t l y over over the the previous previous week week with

Eneiny Areas Enemy Rear Areas
No. NO.
THE C.I.A. HAS HO T HEC .1.A. H ASN O OOBJECTION BJECTION TO TH3 THE DECLASSIFICATION DECLAS'SIFICATION OF OB THIVD9C !MEN T T. . THI 9DfCUMEN
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Central Intelligence Agency Office of Current Intelligence 0437, 11 11 December 1952 1952 0437,
D A I L Y
Military Military Operations Ogeratione
Army
The The scene scene of of the the heaviest heaviest activity a c t i v i t y shifted shifted from central c e n t r a l Korea to t o the t h e ROK 1st 1st Division sector in i n the t h e west. weet. Three Three separate attacks were launched by Chinese elements in of 1 11 December. i n more mare than company company strength strength during the early e a r l y morning of 1 December. The enemv third, by by nearly nearly a a f full enemy was eventually eventualiy repulsed repuleed in i n two attacks, attacks, but the third, ull Chinese battalion, was still s t i l lunder under way way at a t the the close cloee of of the the report report periOd. period. battalion, was Chinese elements Sauth Korean position8 positions elements in in the t h e central c e n t r a l sector continued to to harass Sohth atop Sniper Ridge with of a artillery w i t h little l i t t l e success, success, although nearly neerly 3,000 rounds of rtillery and and mortar fire f i r e were were received received in i n the the ROK ROK 9th 9$h Division Division sector. sector.
the O n t h e east t o t a l of of 361 , 3 6 1naval naval air air sorties s o r t i e s was wan flown flown on on 10 10 December. December. On A total carrier-based a aircraft HUngnam, Chosen, Chosen, Hamhung Hamhung and and Woman, Wonsan, while coast carrier-baeed i r c r a f t attacked Hungnam, against troog troop concentrations concentrations on on Ungdo Ungdo from on the the west west coast coset the the major.effort major effort vat; was against units which an invasion invasion of of the the UN-held Sok Sok Island Island could could be made. n i t s in i n the made. Surface u Tanchon, Chaho and Wonsan. Wonsan. Japan Sea fired f i r e d on on shore installations i n s t a l l a t i o n 8 at a t Songjin, Songjin, Tanchon, No activity. N o report was received concerning west weet coast surface a ctivity.

Army Army
The Far East Conunand Command t tentatively relief of the Chinese Chinese 194th 194th e n t a t i v e l y accepts the r e l i e f of FECOM's 193rd Divieion Division in Army southeast southeast of of Kaesong. Kaesong. FECOM'S Division by the 193rd i n the 65th Army of this relief relief is based on statements statements of of a a recently recently captured captured 193rd acceptance of (Little ( Little O W , agent agent reports reports and and an an unusual unusual amount amount of of vehicle vehicle traffic. tref'fic. Division P POW, The 194th significance other other than than a a routine routine relief r e l i e f is is attached attached to t o this this move. move. The 194th significance Dmbat 1951 while the 193rd Division Division has beenSeptember in combat since September 1951 while t h e l93rd Divisionhas has ivision since co
had over a year off the line.
UN Vn land-based aircraft a i r c r a f t under Far East Air A i r Force control control flew 778 "78 effective effective 160 Included in these combat missions were 160 sorties s o r t i e 6 of of which which 480 480 were were combat. combat. Included'in During sorties s o r t i e s in i n close close support support and and armed armed reconnaissance reconnaissance for for UN UN ground ground troops. troops. During period, UN pilots MIG's, of which 27 were engaged. 2bhour period, p i l o t s observed observed 70 70 enemy MIO's, engaged. the 24-hour One MI(3 MIG wa8 was destroyed and losses t to and four four reportedly damaged damaged with no losees o UN aircraft. aircraft. addition, a US Navd Naval aircraft aircraft was believed believed t to have shot shot down off off the the west west In addition, o have coast enemy P0-2 PO-2 at a t 2,000 2,000 feet feet by by means means of of radar-controlled radar-controlled guns. guns. On the the coast an enemy An of 10-11 10-11 December, December, 18 18 effective effective medium medium bomber botber missions missions Were were flown. flown. A night of n processing area a at at Kang-dong, both both ore proceasing t Moktong and a communications center a t Kang-dong, near Pyongyang, Pyongyang, and the Kyomipo s steel mill were attacked attacked by by 1 12 of tthe B-29's. teel m i l l were 2 of h e B-29's.

Navy
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TO THE: DECLASSIFICATION
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tion Security L'41a Info Central Intelligence Intelligence Agency Office of Current Intelligence O f f ice of 0438, 12 12 December 1952 1952 0438,

Array Army
On 11 11 December December a a total t o t a l of of 47 47 sorties s o r t i e s was was flown flown by by naval naval aircraft. & i r c r a f t . Task On Force 77 to 77 on on the t h e east east coast reported no air a i r activity a c t i v i t y due t o replenishment operations. O On n the w west e s t coast naval air units h hit i t Kuryonni, Kuryonni, Amgak Amgak Peninsula, Peninsula, Wolsari Wolsari tions. the bombarded from from Songjin Songjin Peninsula, h e east coast surface ships bombarded Peninsula', and and Ongjin. Ongjin. On t to Wonsan, while on the west coast Ungdo, Ungdo, ChingangBo Chingangyo and Changsangot Changsangot Peninsula Peninsula t o Wonsan, on. were fired f i r e d on. were
Air Air
East Air flew 862 effective UN land-based land-based aircraft aircraft under Far E ast A i r Force control f l e w 862 effective East BoMber CoDiinand CoMmand a s t Bomber s o r t i e s of which 654 654 were were combat. combat. During the night Far E sorties flew 1 15 5 e effective f f e c t i v e sorties, s o r t i e s , 10 10 bombers h hitting i t t i n g a cannnunicationa communications center a at t Pingjang. units n i t s obeerved observed but but did not not engage engage 19 M MIG's I C ' r in the the Pingjang. UN air force u Y a l u River River area. area. Yalu

Navy
Fighting Fighting on on 11 1 1December continued continued at a t an accelerated rate in i n the South South Korean Korean battalion-strength attack 1st Division Division sector sector in i n western western Korea. Korea. The Chinese battalion-strength a t t a c k rere1st ported yesterday succeeded in Little i n forcing ROK elements from both Big and L i t t l e Nori Nor1 Small-scale fighting flared up during t the day, along with with a heavy heavy artilh e day, hills. h i l l s . Small-scale in the l e r y and and mortar mortar eXchange. exchange. A South.Kbrean lery South Korean counterattack early i n t h e morning of 12 December Deceiber w was unsuccessful although the the military military c crest Little Nori was was 12 a s unsucceseful r e s t of L i t t l e Nori of artillery reached. During the report period, period, the enemy used over 8,000 rounds of artillery significant action and and mortar mortar fire f i r e against against the the ROK ROK 1st 1st Division. Dlvision. The only other significant the front the Ridge area where where Chinese squads squads.sporadialong t he f r o n t took place in in t h e Sniper Ridge sporadithis a r t i l l e r y in i n this cally harassed South c a l l y harsseed South Kbrean Korean 9th 9th Division Division defenders. defenders. Chinese artillery fired sector f i r e d over 1,500 1,500 rounds on on 11 1 1December. December.
t i o .I Security
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THE C. T. A . HAS !q0 011,772CTION TO THE DIT',A17S Qr./CATION OF THIS DOCUPD:NT. 0 p
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Seourity %at IInfruation nfo ion Security Central I n t e l l i g e n c e Agency Intelligence Agency Office o of f Current Current I Intelligence ntelligence 0439, 13 December 1952 1952

Military M i l i t a r y Operations Operations
Army
Elements of of the t h e ROK ROE 1st 1st Division made four separate attacks attack8 against against positions atop L Little Nori on t the western f front on 1 12 Deoember, enemy outpost poeitions i t t l e Nori h e western r o n t on 2 Deoember, but f a i l e d during during the t h e report report period period to t o dislodge dirlodge enemy enemy troops from from their their b u t tthey h e y failed reports indicate that newly-won position. However, However, late l a t e press r eports i ndicate t h a t South Korean newly-won position. "one of of t the greatest troops oaptured the t h e height this morning behind "one he g r e a t e s t artillery artillery An estimated estimated 1,000 1,000 enemy enemy troops, troops, accordaccordh e war." and air bombardments of of t the war." An ing to killed wounded since t the Nori fighting i ng t o the t h e press, press, have been k i l l e d or o r munded h e Little Uttle N ori f ighting began. began. On On Big Big Nori, Nori, two attacks attack0 by an an undetermined nuMber number of Chinese troops were made made on on Friday, Friday, but b u t the the enemy enemy withdrew withdrew following following both both attacks. attacks. The were rounds of of mortar mortar and a artillery fire the enemy anployed employed 15,500 round8 rtillery f i r e in t h e Big and little Nori actions Friday, out of of 21,000 21,000 rounds rounds used used along t the entire I S t t l e Nori aotions on on Friday, he e ntire front. f ront
No reoieved on UN naval air during the the period. period. N o report r e p o r t was reoieved a i r operations during the Songjin, on the t h e east e a s t coast bombarded t h e enemy shoreline near Songjin, Surface vessels on west, enemy Mu Island, Amgek Amgak In the t h e west, enemy installations installations near M u Island, Sohori, Sohori, and and Wonsan. Tonsan. In Peninsula, Peninsula, and and Haeju Haeju were were attadked attaoked by by naval naval units. units.
UN sorties on 12 December, o of mJ land-based land-based airoraft airoraf't flaw f l e w 769 effective effective s orties o n 1 2 Deoember, f bombers flew 12 of v which f l e w 16 l . 6 sorties, a o r t i e e , 3. 2 of h i o h were 403 were combat. combat. Medium bomber8 which 493 B-29's directed d i r e a t e d at a t the t h e troop troop concentration conoentration area area west w e s t of o f Pyongyang. Pyongyang. Other B-29ts No engagements between attaoked rail rail bridges bridge6 and and enemy enemy front-line f'ront-Uno targets. t a r g e t s . no were reported, reported, although although 14 enemy j jets were UN F-86t3 F-86'5 and Communist lMIG-15ts d I G - 1 5 ' ~ wero e t s were sighted airborne in i n the t h e Yalu-Chongchon Yalu-Chongchon River area. aream
Situation General S ituation

Political Politioal ROK Minister Chin is press sources sources t to ROK Home Uinister Chin i s reported reported by South Korean press o have stated that he had had been been informed informed o of formation by by propros t a t e d on 13 Deoember t h a t he f tthe h e formation Japanese for Japanese and Communist Communist Koreans in i n Japan of of a "oommittee "oodttee f o r unifying North
Seourity Seourity In In 1 1

Navy
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ationT0 atioqs;j Tx,:1JEC:...1.:S1FICATION D>:C. ,\ZS1PICATI()N OF T9
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Korea." Chin added t that this to hat t h i s group group plans plana t o establish establish a a proproand South Korea." government. Mile visional government. Whilenot notdefinitely definitelylinking linking any any groups groups naw now in i n Korea, Korea, be miggeeted suggested that there were wyre some domeatio domestic conneotions connections which which would mould have have t to he o investigated and be imreetigated and suppressed. suppressed.
The US bbaessy &basally in Korea aononents ommments that this this etory story is is "reminiscent of of Communist oonspitemy for Rhea's the Connauniat oonspiraoy case," case," given as the principal excuse f o r Rhee's dictatorial diotatorlal actions aotioaa against against the the Assembly Assembly last last summer. aunnner.

Seourity Infoiat.on
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Central Intelligence Intelligence Agency Agency Office Off i c e of of Current Intelligence 0440, 15 15 December 1952 1952 0440,

Army
Preeeure decreased somewhat somewhat On Pressure decreased on Big and L Little i t t l e Nori outposts i in n western Korea during the report period, u t increased increased a c t i v i t y was noted period, b but activity-was noted in the the Eniper Sniper Ridge Ridge
In Ridge KUmhwa, there were were Increased increased Chinese Chinese prober probes In the Sniper Sniper R i d g e sector sector near Kumhwa, continued t to o b build u i l d up u until n t i l company-size attack8 attacks were Saturday morning. on Saturday mrnlng. These continued being ROK 1st Divleion Division positions were overrun, overrun, being received received early early Monday Monday morning. morning. Some ROK but were were later l a t e r recovered. recovered.
A total t o t a l of 317 317 naval naval air air sorties sorties was was flown flown on on 13 13 December. December. Carrier-baeed Carrier-based h e area near Amgak, a i r c r a f t on on the the east eaet coast coast ranged ranged from from Kilchu t o Wonsan while t aircraft to the Amgak$ Pungchon and Ongjin Ongjin was v88 attacked attacked on on the the west west coast. coast. Surface u nits i n the Pungchon and units in the Japan Sea west Sea fired fired on on Changjondong, Changjondong, Changmunni, ChangmuMl, Sohori, Sohori, Hungnam Hungnam and and Wonsan. Wonsan. On the vest Sunday an incomplete total coast UN warships bombarded bombarded Amgak Amgak and and Haeju. Haeju. On Sunday Incomplete t o t a l of of 297 291 naval naval air air sorties sorties was WSB reported, reported, all all on on the the east eaet coast. coast. These Theee aircraft aircraft bombed Chongjin, HaMhung Hamhung and and Wonsan. Wonsan. Surrace Chongjin, Surface units bombarde'd bombarded the eastern coastal c cities ities of o f Songjin Songjin and and Wonsan Wonsan while Amgak Am@ on on the the west coast coast wae was wain again blasted. blasted.
Air
periodl engaging, engaging, wlthout without results, results, one one YAK-15 YAK-15 which which attacked attacked aircraft during the period, UN B-26. During a UN During the the night 22 22 effective effective medium bomber bomber mleeione missions were were flown with with 14 - 2 9 ' s attacking a communications t Uiju 14 B B-29's communications center a at Uiju in northwestern northwestern Korea Korea near the t h e Manchurian Manchurian border. border. On On 14 14 December 538 538 s o r t i e s by land-based sorties land-based planes planes were were flown, flown, including including 280 280 coMbat. combat. No enemy enemy aircraft a i r c r a f t were were observed observed or or encountered. encountered. On the night night of of 14-15 14-15 December, December, 19 19 medium medium bomber bomber missions missions were were flown. flown. Seven Seven B-29'8 attacked a a supply supply area area at a t Happochan, Happochan, near Sinanju, i v e other B-29's attacked Sinanju, while while f five aircraft blasted an ore processing plant plant a at t Taebau-dong Teebau-dong in northwestern northwestern Korea Korea a troop troop concentration concentration near near Chinnampo. Chinnampo, and a
737 sorties, of of which.460 which 460 were were combat. cgmbat. UN p i l o t s observed 737 effective sorties, pilots observed eight eight enemy enemy
UN land-based land-baaed aircraft aircraft under Far East A i r Force lew Air Force control on on 13 December December f flew

Navy
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sector sector in i n central central Korea. Korea, On 14 e t Division 14 December 8outh South Korean Korean l 1st Division troop6 troops BUCsucceeded in reoccupying reoccupying Little L i t t l e Nori Nori and and the the south south slope elope of of Big Nori, Nori, but b u t early early Sunday Sunday morning morning two two Chinese companies, campaniee, supported supported by 1,200 rounds of of mortar and a artillery r t i l l e r y fire, fire, launched launched a a heavy heavy one-hour one-hour attack attack against against Little L i t t l e Nori. Nori.
t z
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THE C.I.A. RAS NO OBJECTION TO TrE DECLAL7SIFICATION OJ THF DOCUMENT.
.1
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Central Intelligence Agency Office O f f Ice of Current Intelligence 0441, 16 16 December 1952 1952 0441,
D AILY DAILY
K O R E A N BULLETIN B U L L E T I N KOREAN
ArmY
15 December Chinese Conxnuniete n,up t o two-platoon On 15 ComMunists made four probes probes i in.up to two-platoon 9th Division Divieion in i n the the Sniper Sniper Ridge Ridge area. area. Elsewhere strength against-the against'the ROK ROK 9th Eleewhere across the t h e front,action front,actlon consisted consisted of of brief brief probes probes and and patrol p a t r o l clashes. clashes. across
No report report was received on UIJ n western reCeived on UN naval sir air operations operations i in western Korea Korea as Task Force Force 77 77 on on the the east east coast coaet engaged engaged in i n resupply resupply and f flew l e w no combat sorties. sorties. Surface craft c r a f t attacked attacked the shoreline shoreline in i n the area of SongJin in t he Surface Songjin and Wonean Wonsan in the east and the harbor harbor approaches approaches to t o Haeju Haeju in in the t h e west. west.
Air Air
UN land-based land-based aircraft aircraft f l e w 905 o r t i e s on 15 flew 905 effective effective s sorties 15 December, December, of which which flew 15 sorties; sorties; four four againet against a a supply supply area near 600 were were combat. combat. Medium bombers f l e w 15 600 the mouth of the Chongchon Chongchon River and eight'against barracks area e east eight against a barracks a s t of Sunchon. i l o t s observed observed 100 i n the Yelu chon. u14 UN F-86 p pilots 100 MIO-l5's MIG-15's in Yalu River River area area and engaged engaged 33 Two enemy jets Jets were definitely definitely damaged and aeven seven others are l listed isted 33 of them. them. Two as damaged, with w i t h no no losses 1.06ees to t o UN UN aircraft. aircraft. ai probably damaged,
Military M i l i t a r y Intelligence Intelligence
vehicle t traffic for week ending 1 11 The significant sighting in In enemy vehicle raffic f o r tthe h e week 1 vehicles in northwestern Korea Korea moving moving December was an an estimated estimated 2,000 enemy enemy vehicles i n noqhweetern toward Sinanju SinanJu on on the t h e night night of o f 9-10 9-10 December. December. UN armed armed reconnaissance of this this restricted evident that that the the enemy enemy iis taking advantage advantage sector has been r e s t r i c t e d and it is evident a taking of with little l i t t l e fear f e a r of of air air attacks. attacks. A second of this t h i s factor to t o move move about about freely Freely with highlight was the weekly total vehicles sighted, sighted, a figure figure double double t o t a l of of 23,564 23,564 vehiclee This activity that of previous comparable comparable periods. perlode. This a c t i v i t y was w a s centered in In the the Singye, Singye, t h a t of I n central central Korea and appeered o be Slbyon-ni sector8 in Sibyon-ni sectors appeared t to be connected with with an acactraffic normal area. Rail t r a f f i c appeared normal celerated supply effort e f f o r t for f o r depots depots in i n that t h a t area. f for o r this this report report period. period. (94

Ground
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NO0OBJEMOS ~ 3 c.1. 5 A. HAS HI\S NO 3JECTEa TITS C.I. A. DSC;JAnSIFLCATION OF T o TH7, Til-? ~ ~~cGA:;sIFL OB u~IO~ TO
THIS DOCUlan.
140,0 7 JUL 197a
tion
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Security Security %tion Inf I n f '

General Situation General Situation
Political Political
tion
President Syngman Rhee is l a drawing drawing up up emergency emergency "total "total war" war" legislation legislation SyngmanRhee that would give the power to mobilize national resource6 resources and c control that would give him him the o n t r o l the t o an an American American press press report. regort. A legislative pres8 and and manpower, nanpwer, according according to press A legislative i e anticiPated'betweenRheete anticipated between Rhee'a sUPPortero supportersand'opposition and'oppoeition leaders who fight fight is leader's are unWilling to to grant grant the the President President further further power. power. .(The (The above above report report may may are unwilling refer to to the the seven seven conetitutional constitutional amendments amendments which Rhee proposed last refer last August, which which Would would give give the the President President sweeping sweeping powerd. powers* Relations Relations between between August, the exeCutive haVe become increasingly increasingly strained in in the the Assemblymen have the executive and the,AsSemblymen few weeks week6 and and a a political political crisis crisis could could erupt erupt at at any any time.) time,) past few

Security In:toInation Info tion Security
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Seourity Info
tion
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Cent r a 1 Ink e 1ligenoe hgen cy Central Intelligence Agency Intelligence Office of Current Intelligence 0442, 1952 0442, 17 17 December 1952
D A I L Y
Military M i l l t a r y Operations

Army
Aircraft UN naval air a i r sorties s o r t i e s on on 16 16 December Deoember totaled t o t a l e d 230. 2300 A i r c r a f t from from the tho carriors Bon Homme H o m e Richard and Essex on the t h e east coast c o a s t attacked attacked o a r r i o r s Oriskany, Oriskany, Bon installations while on tho the west west c coast Wolsari, i n s t a l l a t i o n s near Songjin Songjin and nnd Hyesanjin, Hyesanjin, while o a s t Wolsari, units in i n the th An:60.k Peninsula and and Chinnmpo Chinnempo were were t the main targets. ArI& Peninsula h e main t a r g e t s . Surface units Japan Sea fired while t the warships p patrolling h e UN warships atrolling Jnpm f i r e d on Songjin, Songjin, Chaho and Wonsan while in the in t h e Yellow Yellow Sea Sea bombarded bombarded Amgak, Amgak, Wolsari Wolsari and and Changangpo. Changangpo.
Military M i l i t a r y Intelligence Intelligence
under Far Eaet East Air Air Force Force c control On 16 16 December UN land-based land-based aircraft a i r u r a f t under ontrol flew f l e n 787 787 effective e f f e c t i v e sorties s o r t i e s of o f which which 479 479 were were combat. oombat. Included was an an attack attack on t the h e Pyongyang Pyongyang area area by by eight e i g h t light l i g h t bombers. bombers. While on on patrol p a t r o l in i n the the Chongchon-Yalu River R i v e r area, area, UN UN Sabre pilots p i l o t s observed 66 enemy MIG's o f which Chongchon-Yalu MIG's of 41 MIG's were destroyed, destroyed, two two others o t h e r s probably probably destroyed destroyed 41 were engaged. engaged. Four MIGIs n the the n i g h t of of and three to o UN aircraft. airoraft. O t h r e e reportedly r e p o r t e d l y damaged damaged with wlth no damage t On night 14 effective e f f e c t i v e modim 16-17 medium bomber 16-17 December, December, FEAF F W Bomber Command mounted 14 area8 at a t Hadok-tong sorties. Hadok-tong and Aechort, Aeohort, both near near Sariwon, Sariwon, were were s o r t i e e . Supply areas a t t a c k e d by by 11 attaoked 1 1of of these these 8-291s. B-29'8.
Communist December produced Comunist air a i r aotivity a o t i v i t y during the week ending 14 Decembor t o t a l of of 219 219 MIG's MG's no indioation i n d i o a t i o n of of a LX change ohange in in enemy enemy air a i r capabilities. c a p a b i l i t i e s . A total was observed which observed airborne, airborne, of ofw h i o h 69 69 were engaged engaged by F-8619 F-86'8 in i n 24 24 engagements. ongapments. Although was little Although enemy enemy pilots p i l o t s initiated i n i t i a t e d ten t e n of o f the t h e engagements, engtxgements, there t h e r e wa3 little true -and,Tun tactics t r u e aggressiveness, aggressiveness, as as hit hit-and-run t a c t i c s prevailed. prevailed. Encmy Encmy losses losses were ten destroyed and and ttwo damaged, while tt-UN w o damaged, t e n MIGIs MIG's destroyed, destroyed, one probably deatroyed

Navy N av
principal action in the war again took took p place the The p r i n c i p a l ground a ction i n t h e Korean war l a c e iin n t he n i t s unsuccessfully Korea. Chinese squad-size Sniper Ridge area a r e a in i n central c e n t r a l Korea. squad-size u units unsuccessfully South Korean Korean 9th 9 t h Division Divlsion outposts on on the the h i l l during the evening evening probed two South hill of built to almost company s strength before o f 16 1 6 December. Dooember. One enemy enemy action action b u i l t up t o almost trength b efore of the front f r o n t was uiet w l t h only minor atrol was q quiet with minor p patrol wee repulsed. repulsed. The rest of it wae clashes probes reported. reported. c l a s h e s and probe6
Air Air
Air Air
TffEC.I.A.HASI80BJECTION
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TO THE DECLASSIFICATION OF THIS DOC1MENT.

No.
7 JUL
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lost two F-86's.
%
S
tion tion
The enomy enemy mounted mounted 27 observed observed night night sorties, sorties, but but made made no no ooncentrated concentrated the report period intercept UN UEI night night intruder Intruder aircraft. aircrafi. During tho effort to interoept small Communist aircraft, aircraft, possibly PO-2'5, P0-2's, dropped dropped propaganda l leaflets e a f l e t s on friendly lines, first this type of activity since November friendQ lines, the f i r s t report of t h i s type 1950. 1950,
seourity Seourity Info I~O2 2
On
Security Inforation . tion
Central Intelligence Agency CUrrent Intelligence Office of Current Intelliglence 0443, 18 18 December 1952 1952 0443,
D DAILY A I L Y
Military Military Operations Operation6
KOREAN K O R E A N BULLETIN B U L L E T I N
Army
December. Principal action took place The Korean Korean front f r o n t was w86 very.quiet very .quiet on on 17 17 December. on Sniper Sniper Ridge R i d g e near near Kumhwa Kumhwa where where five f i v e brief brief ineffective ineffective enemy enemy probes probe6 were were made made on against agalnrt ROK ROK 9th 9 t h Division Division positions. posit1On8.
A total t o t a l of of 358 358 naval naval air air sorties r o r t i e s was war flown flown on on 17 17 December. December. Aircraft from east coast carriers struck target# t Najin, Kilchu and and Wonsan, Woman, while while on on targets a at Najin, Nanam, Nana% Kilchu the west coast coart aircraft a i r c r a f t from from the B r i t i s h carrier c a r r i e r Glory attacked Wolrarl, OngJin British Wolsari, Ongjin i n the Japan Sea blarted blasted Songdin, Songjin, Tanchon, Tanchon, Chaho and and and Haeju. Haeju. Surface units in Wonsan, Wonran, while while the the approaches approacher to t o Haeju HaeJu and and Chanyonsan Chanyonsan were were bombarded bombarded on on the the vest wert
coast. COt36t.
UN land-based aircraft aircraft under Far East East Air A i r Force control control flew flew 910 910 effective effective h e Yalu obpilots on patrol in t the Yalu River River area obsorties, 549 combat. combat. UN pilot8 r o r t i e r , including including 549 One MIG was wan destroyed, dertroyed, rerved served 115 115 enemy enemy MIG's MID'S of of which which 30 30 were were engaged. engaged. One another probably Sabre' probably destroyed, dertroyed, and and four reportedly damaged, w e d , while one UN Sabre n the night of o t a l of On of 17-18 17-18 December December a t total of 20 effective received received major major damage. damage. O at Yongsan-dong, just medium clorties was w a s flown. flown. Troop Troop installations inrtallationr a t Yongran-dong, Jut medium bomber sorties and Yongpung-nl, near Kyomipo, bombed by by north of River, and Yongpung-ni, near Kyomipo, were bombed of the Chongchon Chongchon River, 12 of the the B-29's. B-29'8. 12
Integlected i in familiar propaganda propaganda attack attack ftom from Peiping Peiping on on the the Indian Indian Intqjected n aa familiar cease-fire cease-fire proposal and and the American American desire desire to t o continue the t h e Korean Korean war, war, Communist Conununlat correspondent corrergondent Burchett in i n North Korea is 18 quoted quoted on on 16 16 December December that the Chinese are as saying raying t h a t "it "it needs restating also that t h e Koreans and Chinere i n the mood t o adminlrter ( t h e Ul V forcer) he in to administer them (the UN forces) a rmashing smashing blow and have t the means m R I l l to to do do so." 8 0 . "

Navy
Air
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10C1
THE . I . A . FLU BJECTIN THE C C.I.A. HAS KO /70OOBJECTION
TO THE THE DECL&SSIFICATION DECLAS'UFICATION OB OF

THIS DOCUAENT.
Security Infbtion
No-cLNUL_We_
iksak Security Information

Central Central Intelligence Intelligence Agency Office Office of of Current Current Intelligence Intelligence 04440 0444, 19 19 December December 1952 1952
*
ArzY Arw
DAILY D A I L Y KOREAN K O R E A N BULLETI B U L L E T IN N

The Korean Korean front f r o n t remained remained unusually unurually quiet quiet on on 18 18December. December. There were only only The f i v e minor minor enemy enemy probes prober and aad a a few f e w patrol patrol skirmishes rkirmlrher reported during during the period. period. five The enemy enemy fired f i r e d 3,500 3,500 rounds rounds of mortar mortar and and artillery a r t i l l e r y into i n t o UN positions. poritiom. The
Navy
land-based aircraft East Air flew UN land-bared a i r c r a f t under Far E aat A i r Force control f l e w 929 effective FEAF Bomber r o r t i e r on on 18 18 December December of of which which 595 595 were were combat. combat. During the night F%AF sorties Command mounted hit mounted 15 1 5 effective sorties, rortier, 12 12 of or which h i t supply areas southwest routhwert of Command Pyongyang. Pyongyang. While While on on patrol in in the t h e Yalu Yalu River area, area, UN pilots p i l o t 8 observed obaerved 68 68 MIG's, MIQs, MI0 was dertroyed, destroyed, one one damaged damaged and one probably probably of 1 3 were were engaged. engaged. One M I 0 vas of which which 13 damaged w l t h no losses l o r r e r to t0 UN aircraft. aircraft. with

Air Air
A total t o t a l of of 310 310 naval naval air air sorties r o r t i e r was was flown flown on on 18 18December. December. Task A Tark Force 77 77 on the the east eart coast coast hit h i t targets targetr from from Kapsu k p r u to t o Kilchu, at Songjin, on Kilchu, and at Songjin, Tanchon Tanchon and Woman, Wonsan, while Kangso and the while on on the the west wert coast coart targets targetr at a t Kangro the areas area. from from Changyon to t o Sariwon Sariwon and and from from Ongjin Ongjin to t o Haeju Hseju were were hit. h i t . Surface Surface ships rhlpr report no no yon firing firing on on the the east eart coast, coart, while while on on the the wert west coast coart Cho Island Irland and Haeju approaches approachers were hit. were hit.
Security Security I
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Security Info Security % t i o Info n
tion Central Central Intelligence Intelligence Agency Agency Office of of Current. Current.Intelligence Intelligence Office 04451 0445, 20 20 December December 1952 1952

Army Army
were only only The Korean The Korean front front remained remained unusually unusually quiet quiet on on 19 19 December. December. There There were The enemy fired brief probes and patrol contacts reported during the period. brief probes and patrol contacts reported during the period. The enemy fired approximately 30000 approximately 3,000 rounds rounds of of mortar moPtar and and artillery artillery into into UN Urn positions. positions. Navy
UN fighters raid on 19 19 December December attacked fighters and and fighter-bombers fighter-bombers in in a daylight raid attacked troop installations Paegyang behind 25 5 miles north north troop installations at at Paegyang behind the western front about 2 UN F F-86's patrol in Kaesong0 according of Kaesong, according to to US US press press dispatches. dispatches. UN - 8 6 ~on on patrol in the the Yalu Yalu One MIG NIG was was River area MIG,s for for the the fifth fifth successive successive day. day. One River area fought fought with with enemy enemy MIG:s damaged damaged with with no no damage damage to to UN UN aircraft. aircraft. Military Intelligence Military Intelligence
A twinA UN UN Sabre Sabre pilot pilot patrolling patrolling in in "MIG MIG Alley" Alley on on 17 17 December December observed observed a. a twinengined enemy jet aircraft moving at a comparatively low rate of speed. engined enemy jet aircraft moving at a comparatively low rate of speed. Another plane on Manu1J pilot pilot on on the the same same day day observed observed a a similar similar enemy enemy plane on the the ManAnother UN the first churian churlan side side of of the the Yalu. Far East Air Force considers these the reports of IL-28's Korean theatre since its acceptance of the reports IL-28s in in the Korean 'presence of this this type type aircraft aircraft in in Manchuria. Manchuria. pleeence of

Air Air
No report been received because of report on on naval naval operations operatione on on 19 December has been communication difficulties. communication difficultiee.
Air
It
THE C.I.A. HAS NO OBJECTICI TO THE DECuA3SIFICATION OF THIS DOCUMENT.
No. 7 JUL 1q76
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Security InfoiIation Security % t i o n Info
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Security Infrmtion Security %tion Info
Central Intelligence Intelligence Agency Agency Office Office of of Current Current Intelligence Intelligence 0446, 22 December 1952 04460 22 December 1952
D A I L Y K O R E A N B U L L E T I N
Operations Military Op erat ions Army
the weekend took took place place i in the US US 2nd The heaviest action during the n the Division sector sector in i n western Korea where a Chinese company, company, heavily heavily supsupartillery qnd fire, forced a withdrawal withdrawal from two two outoutported by artillery s.nd mortar fire, posts early e a r l y Sunday Sunday morning. morning. By By dawn, reoccupied withwithdawn, the t h e Outposts outposts were reoccupied out enemy enemy opposition. opposition. Only contacts were reported reported Only minor probes and patrol contacts along along the t h e rest rest of of the the front f r o n t on on 20 20 and and 21 2l. December. December.
An on An incomplete incomplete total t o t a l of 66 66 naval air sorties s o r t i e s was reported flown on 20 December, carrier-based a i r c r a f t attached aircraft attacked all on on the the west west coast. coast. These carrier-based December, all n i t s on the east e a s t coast coast shore units Haeju. Surface u shore installations i n s t a l l a t i o n s near near Chodo Chodo and and Haeju. fired Wonsan, while on t the and Wonsan, h e west coast areas near f i r e d on on Songjin, Songjin, Hungnam, Hungnam, and Chodo, On Sunday 21 December, December, 214 Chodo, Taedong-man Taedong-man and and Haeju Haeju were were bombarded. bombarded. On naval air sorties s o r t i e s were flown flown with aircraft a i r c r a f t on the east coast attacking from Songjin Songjin to t o Chaho Chaho and and from from HaMhung Hamhung to t o Wonsan. Wonsan. There were 110 no naval from There were naval Surface air air operations operations on on the t h e west west coast coast due due to t o replenishing replenishingoperation's.. operations. Surface blockade and and bombarded bombarded shore, shore units Korean coasts maintained theblockade u n i t s =both on both Korean coasts maintainedthe installations. installations.
On Far East East A Air Force control On 20 20 December UN land-based aircraft a i r c r a f t under Far i r Force No enemy enemy aircraft aircraft flew f l e w 850 850 effective effective sorties s o r t i e s of of which which 531 531 were were combat. combat. No On tthe h e night during the the period. period. .0n night of of 20-21 were observed observed or or encountered encountered during December, Far East East Bomber Bomber Command Command mounted mounted 16 16 effective effective sorties. sorties. Supply December, Far Supply areas at a t Temsang-ni Tansang-ni and and Pyongyang Pyongyang were were attacked attacked by by 12 12 of of the the B-25's. B-2S's. On O n areas Sunday Sunday 863 863 effective effective land-based land-based sorties sortiee were were flown, flown, including including 563 563 combat. combat. UN pilots 47 enemy MIG's MIG's of of which p i l o t s on on patrol petrol in i n the Yalu River area m e a observed 47 four were were engaged. engaged. There were were no no claims c l a m of of enemy enemy or o r friendly friendly damage. demage. During During the Eleven Of bf these these t h e night 13 1 3 effective effective medium medium bomber bomber missions missions were were flown. flown. Eleven B - 2 9 ' ~botbed bombed supply supply and and troop troop areas areas north north of of Pyongyang. Pyongyang. B-29's
General Situation
Political Political Radio fiftieth Radio Pyongyang Pyongyang announced announced on on 21 2 1 December the t h e holding of the f iftieth plenary Korean Labor Party f for or plenary meeting meeting of of the Central Central Committee of the North Korean four four days days from from 15 15 December. December. In In addition addition to t o aa report report by by Premier, Premier,K i m Il-sung, 11-sung, Kim it is is of of possible posaible significance significance that the t h e broadcast broadcast singled out out a report on on it "Korean-Chinese "Korean-Chinese affairs" affairs" for f o r mention. mention.

Navy Navy
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THEC.1.A. THE C.I.A. HASNOOBJECTION HAS NO OBJECTION TO THE DECLASSIFICATION DECLASSIFICATION OF THISDOCUMENT. THIS DOCUMENT.
No.
7 JL- P97 b
This materia
8
Mains information effecting the
national defense o United States within the moaning of the e4onage I, Title 18, USC, Secs. 793 and 794 the transmiss revelation of which le any manner to an unautimr person is Prohibited by law.
Security Central Intelligence Agency Office of Current Intelligence 0447, 23 December 1952

Military Operations Military. Operations
Army Army
On brief probes and On 22 22 December December the t h e Korean Korean front vas waa very quiet quiet as only brief' and A total t o t a l of of 3,335 3,335 rounds of of artillery a r t i l l e r y and and mortar p a t r o l clashes clashes were were reported. reported. A patrol f i r e fell f e l l during during the the period. period. fire
Navy
UN land-based aircraft under Far Far E East AirForce UB land-based a i r c r a f t under a6t A i r Force control contxol flew flew 490 490 effective effective on patrol p a t r o l in in the Yalu While on sorties on 22 22 December December of of which which 176 176 were'combat. were' combat. While sorties on River area, of vere engaged. area, UN u10 pilots pilot6 observed observed 98 98 enemy enemy MIG-15's MI(F1~'s of which 32 32 were engaged. MIG's were destroyed, destroyed, and three Bameged damaged Three MIG's destroyed, two others other6 probably destroyed, Vas l lost, with the the p pilot as J e t *e o s t , with i l o t llisted i s t e d a8 in'the air battles. battles. One UN F-86 Sabre jet in the air 14 effective effective medlm medium bomber bomber missions missions were d S S i n g in in action. action. During the night 14 missing flown; 12 at Tangdong, near near Pyongyang* Pyongyang. flown; 1 2 of the t h e B-29's B-?g'e attacking attacking a a supply 8ugpI.y area. area a t Tangdong,

Air A ir
O n the t h e east eaet On 22 22 December December a a total t o t a l of of 333 333 naval naval. air air sorties s o r t i e s was was flown. flown. On On coast, carrier-based carrier-based aircraft aircraft attacked Iwon, Wonsan, while while on the coast, Iwon, Hungnam and Woman, weat coast aircraft aircraft from f r o m the t h e British B r i t i s h carrier c a r r i e r Glory Glory attacked attacked HaeJu, OngJln and and vest coast Haeju, Ongjin Surface units unite in Songjini Tanchon and Chaho. Chaho. in the t h e Japan Japan Sea Sea fired f i r e d on Songjin, Changyon. Surface Changyon. The approaches Wolsari Peninsula fired warships approaches to t o Haeju HaeJu and and Wolsarl Penimula were f i r e d on by UN warehips on coast. on the west Coast.
THEC.1.A. HASROORJECTION THE C.I.A. HAS NO OMECTION TO TO THE THEDECLASSIFICATION DECLASSIFICATION08 07 THIS DOCUMENT. THIS DOCUWJNT. 0 7 JUL 1978 No. 7 JUL 1978 No.
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Central Intelligence Intelligence Agency Office of of Current Intelligence o448, 0448, 24 December 1952 1952

Military Operations MIlamx_aataaat
Army Army
of 24 D December highlighted a Action on on the t h e Korean front in i n the early morning of e ember was highlight 'by by a a battalion-size battalion-size Chinese Chinese attack attack against against two two outpost positions of the US 2nd 2nd attack preceded by by a ten-minute ten-minute a artillery t t a c k was preceded r t i l l e r y and west of Chorwon. Chorwon. The a Division west withdrew. mortar preparation. preparation. Friendly outposts were reinforced and the enemy withdrew. mortar minor patrol Elsewhere along the front fro& action action consisted coneisted of of brief brief probes and a nor p atrol contacts. contacts ,.
total flown on 23 December. December. Aircraft from A t o t a l of 351 351 naval air a i r sorties s o r t i e s was flown the Chongjin to to t h e east coast coast carriers c a r r i e r s Essex, Kearsarge, Kewsarge, and Oriskany ranged from Chongjin Wonsan while aircraft the west coast coast attacked attacked Chinnampo, Chinnampo Chaeryong, h e west ahaeryong, Haeju heju Wonsan a i r c r a f t on t units on tthe east coayt coaltfired on Songjin, Songjin Tanchon and h e east f i r e d on Tanchon and and Ongjin. Ongjin, Surface u n i t s on Chaho. Wolsari were the targets west t h e main t a r g e t s bombarded by w e n t coast Chaho. Upchori and Wolsarl surface craft. craft.
Air A ir
On aircraft Far E East On 23 23 December UN Urn land-based a i r c r a f t under Fas a e t Air Force control flew flew UN pilots p i l o t s observed 48 48 enemy enemy MIG's MIG's 887 effective combat.. 887 effective sorties, sorties, including including631 631 combat. ZM these air b battlee in the Yalu Yalu River River areao area, one MIG attles i n the of of which which 12 12 were were engaged. engaged. In these the was w a s destroyed destroyed with no losses losses to t o UN aircraft. a i r c r a f t . During t h e night Far East Bomber Bomber Command 3-29's Command mounted mounted 28 28 effective effective sorties, sorties, 17 17 of these B - 2 9 ' ~attacking troop installations Pungpo-ri and and S Salli, Wonsan. s t a l l a t i o n s at a t Hahwasan-nis, Hahwasan-ni, Pungpo-ri a l l i , near Wonean,
General Information Xnformation
The National Assembly.in Assemblyin its i t 6 closing closing session session on on 22 22 December December passed passed a a resolution t h a t the ROK Government take appropriate o bring that appropriate measuree measures t to bring under under Parallel Occupied ROK jurisdiction j u r i s d i c t i o n those territories t e r r i t o r i e s north of of the 38th P a r a l l e l now occupied UN and under martial law., sponsors of of the the resolution resolution argued argued t that by the uI9 law. I The sponsors hat to.come under South Korean Korean j jurisdiction the people in In these areas are a r e anxious t o come under urlrdlctlon obstacles t to relief programi, the because martial law l a w interposed Interposed obstacle8 o government r e l i e f programs, to lands, and *he the educstiond. educational problem problem wae was farmers were eager to t o return t o their lsnde, urgent, with teachers who had been trained i in Communist doctrines doctrines s still active. urgent, n Communiet t i l l active.

Navy Political P olitical
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THE C.I.A. HAS NO OBJECTION TO THE DECSASSIFICATION Og

THIS DOCwit::NT.
No. 0 7 JUL 1978
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Noir' i
deourity I n Seourity
tion ti on
Central Intelligence Agency Central I n t e l l i g e n o e Agency of Intelligence f Current I ntelligenos Office o C449, 26 December b449, Deoember 1952 1952
DA I
DAILY KOREAN BULLETIN LY K 0R EA N B U L L E T I I?

Army
M i l i t a r y Operations Operatiom Military
o r t i e s WRS l l on h e west A.t total of 69 69 naval naval aair was flown flown on on 24 24 December, December, a all on tthe west i r ssorties A o t a l of These carrier-based oarrier-based a aircraft attacked Chinnampo, Chinnampo, Chaeryong Chaeryong and and Sohung. Sohung. Thene i r c r a f t attaokad aoast. coast. Surface u units fired Chaho, Sinpo Sinpo and Wonsan, Wonsan, n i t s on the east e a s t coast coast f i r e d on Songjin, Songjin, Chaho, On 25 26 while Peninsula were were bombarded on while Ongjin Ongjin and and Arolsari Wolsari Peninsula on the t h e west west coast. c o a s t r On the December, December, 158 158 carrier-based carrier-basod sorties s o r t i o s ware were flown. flown. On t h e east coast, Tanchon, Tanchon, Sinpo and Hungnam blasted; the west ooast, coast, the a area Kiyangni Hungnam were b l a s t e d ; on t h e wes% r e a from Kiyangnl. vessels on on both both Korean Korean coasts t o Sohung Sohung was bombed bombed and and strafed. strafed. UN U T : ..Aval :,rLval vossols coasts to maintained the t h e blockade bloekade and and bombarded shore installations. installations.
Air Air
UN land-basad a i r o r a f t under i r Foroe ontrol f l e w 854,md land-based aircraft under Far Far East East A Air Force c control flew 854,and 936 935 On Wednesday, 560 effective sorties and 25 25 Decombor. December. rroopotively. effective s o r t i e s on 24 and c q ~ 3 A i ~ d y On . Wednesday, 560 h i n g these operations, operations, 129 129 enemy enemy combat aombat sorties s o r t i e s were wore included included in in the t h e total. total. DUring NIG-U's were observed observed in in the t h e Yalu Yalu River River area, area, of o f -which which 52 52 were wero engaged. engaged. UN MIG-15's were pilots damaged nine,vdth nine,with no loss o or p i l o t s probably destroyed two M1G's MIG's and darnaged r damage combat missions missions on Thursday, Thursday, UN p pilots i l o t s on %ring the 674 674 comb& -kn UN aircraft. aircraft. DUring 1,: 7TN f tthe h e 67 MIG's three p a t r o l in i n "MIG "MIG Alley". Alloy" observed patrol observed 115 115 MIG's. MIG's, O Of MIG's engaged, engaged, three were reported while received minor minor damage. damage. h i l u one UN F-86 reoeived r e p o r t e d protWoly prokn'nly destroyed, destroyed, w Mednesay night, On Vednosay night, ftve f i v e effective e f f o o t i v e medium msdium bombor bombor sorties s o r t i e s were were flown; flown; these these On t the he aircraft engaged aircraf't ongagod in in reconnaissance reconnaissance and aild leaflet l e a f l e t drop drop missions. missions. On following only f ~ : ~ l . J v ~ inight, night, ng only twe two effective effeotive boMber bolliber missions missions were t e r emounted mountedand andthei, thet.: were in i n support support of of UN UbT ground ground troops. troops.

Navy Navy
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Brief, patrol were t the Brief, ineffective, i n o f f e o t i v e , and scattered saattered p a t r o l engagements were h e only ground fired slightly more t than actions reported up up to to late lato Thursday. Thursday. The enemy f ired s l i g h t l y more han aa+ions 6,600 rounds rounds of mortar f fire report period. 6,G3@ of artillery a r t i l l e r y and mortar i r e during tthe he r e p o r t period.
TT
only action early the next d day was an The o n l y reported a e t i o n on 24 December and e arly t h e next q was attack of a t t a o k by aa &TI estimated estimated reinforced Yeinforood enemy company company against a g a i n s t the main Iine Une o f resistance r e s i s t a n c e positions p o s i t i o n s of of the t h e US US 45th 45th Divizion Division on on the t h e eastern e a s t e r n front. f r o n t . Following a a one one hour hour and and 35-minute 35-lrlnute fire f i r e fight, fight, aR UN UN counterattack counterattaok forced forced the the enemy enemy to to of mortar mortar and mad a artilIsry rtillery withdraw. The Communists withdraw, C o m n i a t a employed employed some some 6,434 6,434 roundJ round2 of fire f i r e during the t h e period. period.
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S e a u r i ts y Inf Inf~ Security

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D.I:Ctik.iSIFiCATION OF T 3 T:I L!JI:L,A ;SlPlCATION OB THIS Dr.),:gillEa.e. tion t ~ 1ii15 o C!l':+J+lEtii. n
O. 7 JUL JUL 1978 0 '.1978 No * 7 - . .---
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T SE Security In nation S e o u r i t y In rmation
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Army
A review review by by the the Far Far East E a s t Command Camand of of information information on North North Korean AAA regiment:.; indicatestho thopresence presence oof an aadditional regiment, t the regiment-: indl,cs.?os f nn d d i t i o n a l reginont, h e 24th 24th in in also reports reports t the rodisposition the t h e North North Korean Korean order order of o f battle. b a t t l e . FECOM ala0 h e rodisposition to the t o t h e east coast coast sector seotor from from the t h e Pyongyang PpngpriG area area of o f two two other o t b r regiments, regirnents, possibly the the 19th 19th and and 20th. 20th.
General Information Gener a1 Informati on
Economin

SE
T
The ECK that it will mill undertake a n national The ROE Government Government has announced announced t h a t it ational for the according t to census f or t h e first f i r s t time t i m e since since the Communist invasion, according o South The project, intended to provide provide data for for the d distriKorean press reports. projeot, intended istriKotenn reports. The bution mill commence o f relief r e l i e f items i t e m and and not for f o r tax tax purposes, purposes. will oomence on on 31 31 b u t i o n of The Amerioan Amerioan EMbassy this proDecember. Tho EnibRssy in in Pusan Pusancomments commentsthat i2~tl-t t h i s1:love xova iis s proDecember. bably not designed to establish accurate census statistics but to provide bably not dasigned to o s t a b u s h accurate censu~statisti06 but t o provsde the BOK Government US-UN t h e ROK Government with w i t h data data to t o support support its i t s requests. requests ffor o r aadditional d d i t i o n a l US-UN aid. aid.
Security In rmation
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Security In S emrity I n
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Army
ation .a tion
Central I n t e l l i g e n c e Agency Intelligence Office of of Current Intelligence Intelligence 0450, December 1952 27 Docember 1952 0450, 27
DAILY KOREAN BULLETIN D A I L Y K O R E A N B U L L E T I N

UN sorties the UN carrier-based oarrier-based aircraft a i r c r a f t flew flew 258 effective effective s o r t i e s against t he n eastern waters, In waters, US planeo planes from the the Essex Essex and enemy i in onermy n Korea. Korea. I installations near Wonsan, Iwon and and Yangdok, Yangdok. Kearsarge attacked enemy er,emy i nstallations ? e m Wonsan, B r i t i s h aircraft a i r c r a f t from fromt he c a r r i e r Glory ranged In t the h e west, west, British the carrier ranged ov0r over IIwanghae Province. Provinoe. Naval surfaoe 8uri"aoe units u n i t s bombarded bombarded the the enemy enemy coast coast line line Hwanghae at Songjin, Tanchon Wonsan in the east and t the a t Songjin, Twchon and ~ n Vononn d in t h e oris% h e approaches tto o Haeju R v o western peninsulas, peninsulas, Amgak and Wolsa, were were also also Harbor in in t he w e s t . Two the west. hit h i t by naval naval guns. gum.
Military M i l i t a r y Intelligence Int elligencre
effective s sorties 26 DecemDecemUN land-based land-based aircraft a i r c r a f t flew 1,033 1,033 effective o r t i o s on 26 14 of of ber, of which which 698 698 were combat. combat. Medium bombers flew 21 2 1 sorties, s o r t i e s , 14 ber, of which d l i c h were directed directod against against a communication communication center at a t Chongju i in n sorties o r t i e s were in i n close olose support, support, or o r on on leafloafKorea, Other s northwestern Korea. l e t and and reconnaissance reconnaissance missions', missions. UN UX F-86 F.86 pilots p i l o t s observed 73 73 MIG-15's EO-16's let in t h e Yalu-Chongohon River River area a r e a during the t h e report period and engaged in the No damage demerge was suffered suffered by by either e i t h e r side. aide. 16 of of them. them, No
The Far East E a s t Command Comnand on on 26 December Deoember reported reported the t h e movement movement of o f the the North Korean the area to front-line roserve reserve Korean VII VI1 Corps from t h e Wonsan a rea t o a front-line addition t h e immediate immediate rear rear of of the the combat combat III 111 Corps. Corps. In In a ddition position to the the Korean II I1 Corps has apparently replaced the the V VII I 1 Corps i in n t h e North Korean the Wonsan region on a c coastal oastal s security e c u r i t y mission. mission. FECOM FECOM adds adds further further
- 1 TT3C.T.A.H4-; 02JEdrio TO TiJEDSCLACSIFICATIONOF
THIS DOCUMENT.

Navy
Air
Army hw
RET Security I. .rmation
Only minor probes patrol actions actions wore were reported reported up up t to early Only probes and pa-(;rol o e arly a t r o l contact n t h e ROK ohief p patrol contact occurred occurred i in the ROK of evening o f 26 December. December. The chief 8th Division s sector the central front where a a 40-minute 40-minute hand-to-hand hand-to-hand e c t o r on t he c entral f r o n t where f fight i g h t developed between UN and and Chinese ttroops, roops, a after f t e r which which f friendly riendly 4,300 rounds of o f artillery a r t i l l e r y and a d mortar m o r t a r fire fire elements broke contact. contact. Some 4,300 were employed employed in i n the t h e day's day's fighting. fighting.
no. 0 7 JUL
Wr I))
Security Info
ation
that that the the future Future relief r e l i e f of of the III I11 Corps Corps by the t h e VII V I 1 Corps is i s considered oonsidered Korean VI1 VII Corps, probable. (The North Korean Corps, trained and and organized o r g a z e d in in probable. Manchuria Manohurla in In the the winter of o f 1950-51, 195041, has never never been oommitted committed to t o camoomSinoe its mave from the the west west t to the.east coast in e early hoe i t s mme o the east ooaet arly bat as a a unit. unit. S 1951, it has had a coastal security mission mission in the the W Mbnsan area.) 1951, o n a m area.)
ROK Army
The Far East Command reports h e present r t i l b r y strength reports that that ttha present a artillary of Army is nine headquarters, 28 105mm of the the South douth Korean Koreandrmy nine group group headquarters, l05m howitzer battalione battalions and and 10 10 155mm lSsOmn howitzer howiteer battalions. battalions.

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151Wrm Seourity i t , % I : ation on Seourity I
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wSecurity . %ion Info Security Info

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Central Intelligence Intelligence Agency Agency Office of Current Intelligence 0451, 29 December 1952 1952 0451,
D A I L Y

Army
Military Operations
AirA total Saturday, 27 December. Airt o t a l of of 218 218 naval air a i r sorties s o r t i e s was flown flown on Saturday, 27 December. c a r r i e r s ranged from Kilchu t o Wonsan while on the w est craft from from east coast carriers to west I n the Chinnampo area area four four coast Amgak Amgak and and Song-chonni Song-chonni were were the the main main targets. targets. In F-44'~ F-44's were were attacked attacked by by four four enemy enemy MIG1s. MIG's. There There was, was, however, however, no damage damage to t o UN UN or o r Communist Communist aircraft. a i r c r a f t . Surface u units Songjin, Chaho Chaho n i t s in i n the Japan Sea bombarded Songjin, on the and Wonsan, the vicinity v i c i n i t y near near Amgak and and Cho Island Island was blasted on and Wonsan, while the west coast. coast. On 28 December 215 sorties s o r t i e s by carrier-based carrier-based planes planes were were flown. flown. Aircraft in i n east east coast coast operations operations attacked attacked targets t a r g e t s from from Songjin Songjin to t o Wonsan, Wonean, while while Blockade ships ships on on the t h e west w e s t coast coast Amgak Amgak and and Sariwon Sariwon were were bombed bombed and and strafed. strafed. Blockade bombarded both bombarded both Korean Korean coasts coasts on on Sunday. Sunday.
Air A ir

Navy
and patrol p a t r o l contacts were reported across acroes the 8th Army front front Numerous probes probe6 and on 27 December. ROK 6th 6th Divtsion Division sector where In the ROK December. The principal action was in two enemy was forced to witht o withenemy platoons platoons attacked attacked an an outpost outpost position. position.' The enemy wa8 draw of mortar and artillery d r a w after a 50-minute 50-minute engagement. engagement. A total t o t a l of of 5,219 5,219 rounds of artillery fire On f e l l during during the t h e report report period. period. O n 28 December the principal action occurred f i r e fell on Division sector where a Chinere Chinese company on the central c e n t r a l front f r o n t in i n the ROK 9th 9th Divieion company unsuccessfully attacked an succesefully an outpost outpoet position. position. The m e enemy enemy expended expended a total t o t a l of 5,196 5,196 rounds of mortar and and artillery a r t i l l e r y fire. fire.
Only 353 353 effective effective sorties s o r t i e s by by land-based land-based planes planes were were flown flown on on 27 27 December, December, Only including Five enemy enemy aircraft aircraft were were observed during during the period but but including 171 171 combat. combat. Five none On the night of 27-28 27-28 December, December, 14 none were were engaged. engaged. On 14 effective medium bomber s o r t i e s were mounted mounted with with 10 10 of of the the 11-29's B-29's attacking t Pugwon sorties attacking marshaling marshaling yards yards a at Pugwon in O n the the following following day, i n northwest Korea Korea and and Haewonsan-ni, Haewonsan-ni, near near Hamhung. Hamhung. On day, 28 28 December, land-based aircraft a i r c r a f t under Far East A i r Force control f l e w 10004 1,004 December, Air flew effective Sorties s o r t i e s of of which which 674 674 were were combat. combat. UN UN pilots p i l o t s on on patrol p a t r o l in i n the t h e Yalu Yalu Two MIG's were destroyed, destroyed, River area River area observed observed 97 97 enemy enemy MIG's MIG's and and engaged engaged 32. 32. Two MIG's were another probably destroyed, another destroyed, and four reportedly damaged while while one UN UN Gabre Sabre jet jet received major damage. During t h e night, 15 e f f e c t i v e medium bomber s o r t i e 8 . receivedinajordamage'Duringtherlight,15effectivemediumborbersorties were were flown; 12 1 2 B-29'5 B-29'8 attacking attacking an an airfield a i r f i e l d at a t Pyongyang. Pyongyang. -.I
THE C. c. LA. I.A. HAS HASNO NO OBJECTION THE OBJECTION OB TO THE: THE DECLASSIFICATION DECLASSIFICATION OF THIS DOCUMENT. DOC1JMEBT. THIS Security Inf6matIon 0 7 JUL tOt Nn No.
1
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Security Security %ion I Infbation

It was publicly announced announced on 28 December that that Preatdent President and and Mrs. Mts. Rhee Rhee have accepted from General and Mrs. Mts. Clark Clark t to make a brief brief v visit accepted a a personal personal invitation from o make leit to trip, 5 January, January, w will be unofficial unofficial and and without without r i p , scheduled ocheduled for 5 i l l be t o Tokyo. The t p o l i t i c a l signifiCance, significance, according to the announcement, l a r k ' s guest political announcement, and as C Clark's (In view view of of Rhee's Rhee's Rhee will make make no no appointments appointments or or program program of of his h i s own. own. (In is v isit w i l l not be hie visit will be welcomed welcomed by recent anti-Japanese public statements, statements, h Japanese.) many Japanese.)
Security \tion Info Security Irfrmajion

2 2
tion
Central Central Intelligence Intelligence Agency Agency Office of Current Intelligence office of 0452, 0452, 30 December Decenber 1952 1952

Military itam Operations Operation8
Army
DeceMber stepped-up stepped-up enenemy probing probing actions actions took took place place acro8s across the the On 28 December west of Chorwon Chorwon i in US n the U 5 8th 8th Army Axmy front. front. The principal action occurred west Division sector where a reinforced Chinese company supported by by heavy heavy 2nd Mvbion a r t i l l e r y and and mortar mortar fire fire forced foraed a a friendly friendly outpost outpost to t o withdraw. After a artillery withdraw. After forces reoooupled reoccupied the two-hour engagement engagement the enemy enwithdrew and friendly force8 mortar f fire fell during t o t a l of 4,961 4,961 rounds of artillery and mortar ire f e l l during position, position. A total the report report period. period.

Navy lrJavg
On. on.
Task Task Force Foroe 77 TI an 011 the the east east coast aoast engaged i in n replenishing replenishing operations on December and no report has been reoslved received aonoerning concerning air a activity 29 Deoember c t i v i t y on the west n the UN naval naval vessels vessels i in the Japan Sea Sea bombarded bombarded Songjln, Songjin, Chaho Chaho west coast. coaat. IW and Wolsari, Upchori Haeju were f fired and Wonsan, while while on on the t h e west west coast, coast, Wolaari, Upchori and Haeju ired
Air
UN Ul? land-based land-based a aircraft ircraft W under e r Far East Bast A Air i r Form Force control flew only 333 333 effeotive eorties on on 2 9 Deoember effective sorties 29 December of which which 94 94 were were combat coMbat as as low low overeast overcast aloude and snow snow flurries f l u r r i e s hampered hampered air air operations. operations. NO Bo enemy enairaraf't were were clouds and aircraft observed or or encountered encountered during during the the period. period. On of 29-30 29-30 DeceMber, December, On the night of 15 effective effeative medium a s i o n e were An enemy enemy troop troop headhead15 medium bomber boMber d missions were flovn. flown, An qmrtere at at Taegan-ni, Taegan-ni, north north of of Pyongyang, Pyongyang, was 1 of of the the B-29's. quarters was attacked attacked by 1 11 B-2918.
General Situation
Political Political
I n connection connection with with President Resident Rheels Rheels visit v i s i t to t o General General Clark Clark in in Tokyo, Tokyo, In scheduled for for 5 5 Janwry, scheduled January, a a South Korean spokesman has has announced announced that that Rhee Rhee would would not not refuse refbe to t o meet meet Yoshida. Yoshida. The spokesman spokesman added added that that the Resident President w88 not going going to t o Tokyo Tokyo with with "cap neap in I nhand" handnand and "any "anyprogrese progressin inJapan,-Korea Japan-Korea was:not the Japanese Japanese attitude." attitude." A relations depends on the A Japanese Japanese Foreign Foreign Ministry Ministry spokeeman h a t Premier o spokesman has has announced announced t that Premier Yoshida Yoshida is is "undoubtedly "undonbtedly willinp willing" t to meet President President Rhee Rhee to t o improve improve relations relations between the two two countries, countries. meet between the
Security I I Security
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THEC.I.A.HASNOOBJECTI0~ THE C.I.A. HAS NO OBJECTION TO THE DECLASSIFICATION DECLASSIFICATION OP OF

THISDOCUMENTTHIS DOCUMENT. 0 JUL 1378 1378 C) No. 7 No-JUL -.-.---.______-
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Security Infotmation
Ambassador DeceMber assuranoe assurance Ambasaador Briggs in i n Pusan Pusan reports that despite a 26 December from does not not from the acting acting foreign foreign minister that the South Korean Government does plan Washington f for Zanuary inauguration, inauguration, the plan a special special mission mission to Washington o r the 20 Janlocal government i is and local press press insists insists that the government s sending the acting premier and that t h a t the the assembly assembly also also intends intends to to send send a a representative. representative.

Security Info tion
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Central Central Intelligence Agency of Current Current Intelligence Office of 0453, 0453, 31 31 December 1952 1952
D A I L Y
Military Operations
B U L L E T I N K O R E A N RULLETIN DAILY KOREAN
Army Bmqv
On 30 On 30 December December in i n the the 9th 9th ROK ROK Division Division sector, sector, an anenemyeneIUy platoon platoon After Ridge, After an outpost position position on Sniper Ridge. reinforced by two squads probed an Elsewhere across the front, Elsewhere the front, a 30-minute engagement, the enemy withdrew. 30-minute engagement, the e n w withdrew. action probes of up up to t o platoon strength and minor patrol action consisted of probes fire fell actions. A total t o t a l of of 5,906 5,906 rounds of artillery a r t i l l e r y and mortar f ire f e l l during actions. the period. period.
An was reported on An incomplete incomplete total t o t a l of of 207 207 naval naval air air sorties sorties vas on DeceMber, a all carrier-based a aircraft 30 December, l l on on the east coast, coast, where carrier-based i r c r a f t ranged ooaat also bombarded from t o Wonsan. Wonsan. Surface units on the east coast from Chongjin Chongjin to O n the the west coast, mast, the areas area8 near near Cho Cho and and Sunwi SUan these two two locations. looatlone. On them Wolsari were were bombarded bombarded by by Dl UN naval ~ vessels Islands and Woleari V naval esse18~
land-based aircraft aircraft under under Far Far Eaet East A Air Force control control fflew 551 UN land-baaed i r Force l e w 551 Bo eneM7 effective sorties on on 30 30 December, December, of of whiCh vhiah 278 278 were were combat. ombat. No enemy effective sorties UN fighters fighters and fighter-bambers a i r c r a f t were were observed observed or or encountered encountered by UN aircraft fighter4potbers 21 effective effective during period. On during the report period. On the the night night of 30-31 December, December, 21 m e d i u m bomber sorties sortie8 were A supply supply area area at a t Wollyon,ni, Wollyon-ni, near near medium were flown. flown. A Sinanju, and the the Kyomipo K y d p o steel s t e e l mill mill were were bombed bombed by by 12 12 B-291s. B-2918. I n addition, In Sinanju, and f i v e other other bombers bombers attacked attacked an an ore ore processing processing plant plant a t Choak-tong the five at Choak,tong near the Mandhurian Manchurian border border in i n northwestern northwestern Kbrea Korea and were m met e t by an unidentified of enemy enemy fighters. fightere. number of nuPber
)4ilitars Intelligence Intelligence Military

Air A ir
Communist pilots pilots during the week ending 28 December showed an unusually Communist 28 Decekber unusual1y high degree of proficiency, proficiency, according acoording to t o the the Far Far East East Air A i r Force. Force. Although high degree of avoiding engagements with UN F-861~~ avoiding engagements with UN F-86ts, the the Comrmvliets Communists displayed displayed an an unusual unusual variety of of tactics t a c t i c s designed designed to t o position position themselves f o r brief i r i n g passes. variety for brief f firing passes. This departure departure from f r o m the the pattern pattern of of the the previous previous six six weeks suggests auggests that that more more This experienced pilots pilots are are again again over over Korea Korea for f o r additional additional combat combat training. training. experienced FEBFbelieves believesthat thatwell-trained well-trained units units are are experimenting experimenting with w i t h tactics t a c t i c s to to FEU I_ develop an intercept intercept pattern pattern against i r c r a f t of develop an against F-86's F-861s or or a aircraft of oomprable comparable performance. performance. THEC.I.A.HASNOOBJECTIOB THE C.I.A. HAS NO OBJECTIOli TO THE THE DECLASSIFICATION DECLASSIFICATIOS OF OF . Security Inf tion THIS THIS DOCUMENT. JUL :'#';'; r!, 0 7 JUL No. No.

Navy b % r
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APPROVED FOR ~ PPROVED FOR RELEASE RELEASE DATE: 23-Feb-2010 PATE: 23-Feb-2010

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O c t 52 52 2 Oct For a comprehensive guide on OCR and PDF Compression visit our website
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in Korea reportedly heightened heightened to to bolster bolster Enemy operations in The staged by the troop morale: morale: Th e limited objective attacks stagea the CornmunisnnAugust August and and those those planned planned for for September September are are ininCommunisa-in tended to keep the the troops troops active, active, The combined C Communfit-head.1 &e ommunTsieadquartere allegedly was was encouraging encouraging the the rumor rumor that that the the attacks attacks quarters were actually a "major timajorautumn autumn offensive." offensive." 1 ___ __ -~ 27 27 Sept Sept 52) 52)
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Comment: The intensity of enemy operations has greatly Comment: increaria-rE the the past two two months. months. Seizure of key terrain 1ncre-T features and "spoiling" ttspoilingl* operatlons appear to be the principal operations for these these operations. operations. reasons for
Most recently captured enemy POW's P O W ' S still still maintain that that defens$ve missions, thus thus tending tending to to their units were assigned defensive refute the ,the reported psychological aspects aspects of of the the attacks. attacks.
10. 10.
New Chinese Chinese Communist troop troop movements to to Manchuria Manchuria reporriTT men tota1 of o r 45 45 troop troop trains trains carrying carrying -50,000 9 men reporte-d: AA total passed through Tientsin paelsea .through Tientsin destined destined for for Manchuria Manchuria between between 28 28 August and 8 September, September, 1 _ 1. troops the men, including ground troops from the t h e Third and Fourth Four& Field Armies, and paratroops from from East China, were being to being sent sent to to Mukden, Mukden, where where they they were were to receive receive new now Soviet Soviet equipment. equiprpent. 30 30 Sept Sept 52) 52)
Comment: Catnment: While the receipt of new Soviet equipment by th679115Wkie Communists at at Mukden Mukden cannot be confirmed, confirmed, t h e z s e Commnnistf3 replacements f o r the the armies armies in in Korea, Korea, presumably presumably transferred transferred replacements for from units in In China, are often assembled at Mukden.
have been been no no recent recent reports reports indicating indicatingthat. that ChiChiThere have nese Communists are sending paratroops to to Manchuria. Manchuria.
2 Oct 52 52 2
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to c o n t i n u e heavy a t t a c k s in w e s t e r n Korea uring Enemy to continue attacks western Korea d during dn 27 geptembef Chinese October: On September a C h in e s e artillery a r t i l l e r y regiment r e g i m e n t in western t h a t all a l l three three r e g i m e n t s of the western Korea reported that regiments of the Chinese Division were scheduled "counterattack" C h i n e s e 116th 1116th Division s c h e d u l e d to to-" counterattackTt certain ern " i n the t h e first first c e r t a i n terrain t e r r a i n features f e a t u r e s in in e r n Korea "in part October." (CANOE p a r t of of October." (CANOE L L m T-898, 27 Sept S e p t 52) 52)
Comment: These T h e s e scheduled s c h e d u l e d attacks a t t a c k s apparently a p p a r e n t l y have as as their-WITCTive t h e i r m i v e key key terrain t e r r a i n features, f e a t u r e s , including i n c l u d i n g "Kelly " K e l l y Hill," Iill,~l p r e s e n t l y held h e l d by by UN forces presently f o r c e s in i n the t h e west. west. T h i s message reinforces r e i n f o r c e s the t h e assumption a s s u m p t i o n that that r ecently This recently intensified perations a t t he f r o n t are limited l i m i t e d in in intengified Communist o operations at the front t their h e i r objectives. objectives.

7.
Communists improving improving Manchurian Manchurian airfield: a i r f i e l d : The airfield airfield at be c closed for repairs between a t Takushan in i n Manchuria is to be losed f o r repairs 14 October, O c t o b e r , according a c c o r d i n g to to a a Chinese C h i n e s e Communist Communist message. message. 3 and 14 The reporting r e p o r t i n g unit u n i t notes n o t e s that t h a t 40 MIG-15's MIG15's of the t h e Chinese Chinese 1 8 t h Air A i r Division D i v i s i o n have been based at a t this t h i s airfield. airfield. Communist 18th AP-236 SPOT (CANOE AP-236 SPOT 426, 426, 30 30 Sept Sept 52) 52) Comment: Takushan, with with a Comment: a 7p00-foot 7$lOO-foot concrete c o n c r e t e runway, runway, t h e airfields a i r f i e l d s in the t h e Manchurian complex from f r o m which is one of the t he C h i n e s e Communists conduct c o n d u c t their t h e i r air air o p e r a t i o n s in i n Korea. the Chinese operations Korea. Whether the is being b e i n g closed c l o s e d for f o r ordinary o r d i n a r y maintenance maintenance t h e field f i e l d is o r major reconstruction r e c o n s t r u c t i o n has h a s not not been b e e n determined. determined. or
i-
" : .R
2 O Oct c t 52 52
TOP SECRET CANOE 4

5/
HR70-14 HR70-14
L' 'Nevi
-steRET"
NR NR
II
11. 11. Limited-objective operations by Limited-objective by Communists in Korea to limited-objective attacks along continue: Present Communist Communist limited-objective arong the f i e whole whol'e front are are to to continue continue indefinitely,l indefinitely.1
.
1I
r1 . Supplies SupPlies L stockpiled will support now stockpiled until support such such operations operations only only' until
November. November.

r I--APPROVED FOR RELEASE RELEASE DATE: 23-Feb-2010 23-Feb-2010 DATE:
Iwith l w i t h increased air support promised by the USSR for mid-October, mid-October, the Communists would be better better able able to to protect protect their their supply supp.ly lines. lines. If nists If the supply situation becomes critical because of of UN IJN air air action action before the.promised the promised air air support support becomes becomes available, available, it it is is 6 before "negotiators at Panmunjom are prepared re ared to-alleged that the "negotiators to steps toward a cease-fire agreement." take step6 3 3 Oct ~ c 52) 5t2 )
1
rP_Rp 1
Coniment: In the past Comment: past few weeks, weeks, enemy ground action has increasean extent extent which which would would demand demand a a larger larger volume volume of of increWEVETU an supplies. supplies.
h e statement There is no information tending to confirm t the that Communist air operations operations will be be increased increased in in October. October.
SECRE -sEeREF
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SECURITY DIFORMATION
7 October 1952
US OFFICIALS ONLY
OCI No. 9394

Copy No.
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STATE, USAF, DIA declassification & release instructions on file

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GENERAL
1.
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The American Ambassador believes this conversation indicates that the USSR is aware that the French are the least enthusiastic of the Western powers over the short treaty; and that Soviet efforts to obtain its withdrawal will therefore be concentrated on them. (S Vienna 945, 4 Oct 52)
Comment: Since the Soviet note of 27 September which completeirrejgcted Western proposals for an abridged treaty, the French have appeared willing to accept Soviet insistence upon the old draft treaty. They apparently assume that the United States will undertake the financial burdens of Austrian compensation to
the USSR.
2.
Soviet refusal to negotiate longtterm grain contract seen as retaliation for British position on fubber exports; The British Foreign Office believes that the Soviet Union has negotiated only a short-term grain contract with Britain at this time because of Britain's refusal to give firm advance commitments on next year's rubber exports. The grain contract will expire in January, at about the same time as British rubber commitments, thus enabling the USSR to counter British requests for Russian grain with simultaneous demands for increased rubber shipments. Britain has not increased its rubber commitments beyond its 18,000ton quota for this year. As a result of heavy shipments early in the year, licenses for rubber exports for the fourth quarter of 1952 will be far below the level of the first six
months.
(C London 1879,
1 Oct 52)

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1
French susceptible to Soviet demands on Austrian treaty: An official a 27 September conversation with a Soviet official the latter argued that "the Soviet Government was forced to reject the short Austrian treaty," but that once it was withdrawn, negotiations for a long draft treaty could be completed quickly.
llamilM. reported that in
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The short-term contract, which has been referred to Comment: Mosco7-17F-Ypproval, calls for the shipment of 200,000 tons of grain over a four-month period as compared to the 1951-1952 annual rate of 1,000,000 tons.
SOVIET UNION
3.
Speculation over the failure to announce the fulfillment of compulsory grain deliveries has increased, since activity at most Ukrainian grain procurement points has ceased and most of the grain harvest in the southern regions has been successfully completed. (C Moscow 591, 1 Oct 52) It now appears that the Ukrainian grain crop will Comment: approximate normal yields in spite of the late spring and difficult harvesting conditions. The protracted delay in announcing the fulfillment of compulsory grain deliveries may be due to a decision to withhold such information until it can be fully publicized at the current party congress.
EASTERN EUROPE
4.
A "naInterdenominational peace conference held in Sofia: tional-TITterdenominational peace conference" was held in Sofia on 5 October. Delegates of all religious denominations in Bulgaria were present at the meeting, which was convened on the initiative of the Bulgarian Orthodox Church. A "representative of Catholics in Bulgaria" delivered a speech condemning "the criminal actions of a group of Catholic priests," and stated that "all honest Catholics in Bulgaria are on the side of peace and will make every 5 Oct 52) (R FBIS Ticker, effort to preserve it." STATSPEC
some =Veen a useful propaganda instrument in the hands of the

regime.

Comment:
SECRET
2
Status of Ukrainian harvest reported: American Embassy personnel recently returned to Moscow froM-Udessa report that the Ukrainian harvest of winter and early spring grain has been completed. Losses which had been anticipated from flattening of grain by the weather now seem negligible. Millet, corn and sugar beets are in the process of being harvested, with a fair crop expected. Farther north, spring grains remain partially unharvested, while winter sowings appear satisfactory in all areas.
The Communist-dominated Orthodox Church has for
The convention of the interdenominational peace confer-
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ence reflects the success of Bulgarian efforts to usurp control of other religious groups for similar propaganda purposes. The policy of cutting off churches from foreign contacts, as set forth in the 1949 "Law for the Cults," was brought to its culmination on 3 October with the conviction and sentencing in Sofia of a group of alleged Catholic "spies." A group of Protestant pastors was similarly convicted and sentenced in 1949.
5.
The American Legation in Budapest reports that the Soviet Union had originally seized over 200 German firms and that virtually all either have now been sold to Hungary or are jointly operated by the USSR and Hungary. The Legation believes that Hungary will have to pay for these firms by increasing exports to the USSR to offset the end of reparations payments next January, ana that it has had to agree to greater Soviet control over the joint companies. (R Budapest 314, and 317, 3 Oct 52)
6.
Polish troops back in winter quarters: The Polish Army definitely has returned to winter quarters from summer field training and maneuver areas. American Embassy officials report that the army is now being put to work on the late harvest, and on such construction projects as railroads, public buildings and communication lines. (S Warsaw Joint Weeka 92, 3 Oct 52)
Comment: For the second year now, information on the return of PoTigE-iiiiits to winter garrison was first available from the Polish press, highlighting the inability of Western officials in Poland to secure reliable warning of troop movements.
7.
Church episcopate directs Catholics to vote in Polish elections: The e5iFF5Date of the Catholic Church in Poland has declared in a public statement that it is a moral duty for Poles to vote in the forthcoming elections. According to the statement, participation in the elections will enable Poles to express support for the consolidation of internal unity and the safeguarding of peace, and
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3
Russians sell 69 former German companies to Hungary: On 3 Octobeir-TEZ Hungarian press announced the signing of an agreement between Hungary and the USSR for the sale to Hungary of 69 Soviet enterprises in that country formerly owned by Germans. Joint Soviet-Hungarian companies, which dominate the key oil, aluminum, bauxite, shipping and air transport industries, will continue to operate under former agreements.
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also to acknowledge that the common efforts of all citizens are needed by Poland for reconstruction and for the defense of Polish rights to the"recovered territories." In addition, the declaration states that Poles will be able to express their faith that the principles of the church-state agreement of April 1950 will be observed in the work of the new Sejm. U.S. Embassy officials in Warsaw comment that this is apparently another effort of the church to achieve a modus vivendi with the state without sacrificing basic principles. They add, however, that the official Communist newspaper currently continues to attack Vatican support for German revisionists. (S Warsaw Joint Weeka 92, 3 Oct 52)
Comment: The statement by the episcopate is in accordance with FEagEf-articles in the Polish Catholic press which have advocated participation in the elections. While Archbishop Wyszynski has supported the state in non-church matters, he has seriously opposed recent government measures to undermine the church-state agreement.
8.
Rumanians reorganize heavy industry administration: The Rumanian Ministry of Metallurgical and Chemical Industries has been divided into two new ministries, one for each industry. (C Bucharest 110, 3 Oct 52)
Comment: This split follows a similar division of the Ministry of PeIFFTWVE and Coal Industries in late August and copies the Soviet pattern of breaking down economic ministries according to specific expanding industries. It also reflects the increasing buildup of Rumanian industry with the aid of other more industrialized Satellites. In June a joint Rumanian-Hungarian chemical company was set up, and in September a joint company was formed with East Germany for exploiting Rumania's chemical resources.

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9.
Soviet aircraft penetrates deep into Japanese territory: Radar-5lots indicate -Chat fim aircraft, presumably Soviet, on 1 October overflew northeastern Hokkaido, one penetrating to a depth of 55 miles. This aircraft flew southward as far as Kushiro in the deepest overflight of Japanese territory yet noted. The other plane reached the vicinity of the radar site at Nemuro in a possible test of US tracking capabilities. (S FEAF INTSUM 829, AX1405C, 3 Oct 52)
Comment: These overflights, together with those of 20 and 24 September, suggest initiation of a Soviet air reconnaissance program in the Hokkaido area.
10.
Communist jets in combat over eastern Korea: Cm 4 October US Navy conventional fighter-bombers, raiding an airfield near Hamhung in eastern Korea, were unexpectedly attacked by four Communist MIG-15's. One US aircraft was shot down during the 90-second encounter and the enemy jet departed northward unscathed.
American pilots claim to have heard Chinese-language radio chatter during the encounter and have stated that the enemy was under "positive GCI control prior to and during the attack." (S CINCFE Telecon 6209, 5 Oct; R COMNAVFE OPINTSUM 1186, 4 Oct 52)
Comment: The brief duration of the encounter, in additioti-UrTilot reports and observations,supportsthe belief that the Communist GCI network, reported in northwestern Korea, has been expanded to eastern Korea. It is probable that the enemy jets were from fields in Manchuria.
Although an isolated incident, it is possible that this attack may be the forerunner of an enemy effort to afford a degree of air cover to the long, vulnerable, east coast supply line. Previously UN pilots have had to contend only with antiaircraft fire in this area.
25X1C
11.
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Mongolian troops reported in North Korea: , who claims to have talked with a Mongolian 1.1111.111.,reported that 1,200 Mongolian cavalry troops moved from central Korea to a position near the western front in late September.
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The solidarity of the Communist Far East has Comment: been aqiIINized in recent weeks, with Sino-Mongolian relations in the given prominence. Although to date. Mongolia's part minimal, consisting of contributions Korean conflict has been of food, clothing and livestock and promises of "assistance," it is possible that in line with recent developments a token force of Mongol cavalry has been sent to Korea. The presence of Mongolian troops in Korea has often been reported in the past but has not yet been confirmed.
12.
Comment: Peiping has not announced an over-all Five Year ITIEF-f5r China, although such plans have been prepared for certain sectors of the economy, for example, the Five Year Irrigation Plan in the Central-South District. A comprehensive economic plan in Chira is foreshadowed by the study now being undertaken of the production capacity of the country's machine factories.
13.
Peiping-Colombo agreement guarantees continued rubber sales to China: Radio Peiping announced that the governments of Ceyl5E-03-Communist China signed a trade agreement in Peiping on 4 October. China is to ship 80,000 tons of rice "within a short period" to ease Ceylon's food shortage, and in return the government of Ceylon guarantees that Peiping will be able to use the proceeds from its rice exports to (R FBIS 5 Oct 52bTATSPEC buy rubber on the Ceylon market.
Comment: Ceylon, China's principal source of raw rubber for the past year, has been under pressure from the United States to stop such trade. This agreement will insure for Communist China continued availability of Ceylonese rubber.
14.
Communists flood Hong Kong market with China productS: The Chinese Communist8 have been flooding Hong Kong with goods in the past six weeks, and August shipments to the colony have reached a record high for the year. Hong Kong
SECRET
6
Russian article refers to China's first Five Year Plan: Excerpts from a Pravda article broadcast by Radio Moscow on 1 October included the statement that the "outlines of the first Five Year Plan for the economic and cultural development of China are now being elaborated on the initiative of STATSPEC 3 Oct 52) the Communist Party of China." (R FRIS
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traders are of the opinion that the Communists have abandoned their hopes of forcing up world prices and are now willing to clear their stocks to obtain foreign exchange. (R Hong Kong 875, Joint Weeka 40, 3 Oct 52)
Comment: Observers from the Communist mainland have reported a scarcity of warehouse space to accommodate the backlog of unshipped cargo. With the end of Peiping's antivices campaign against the bourgeoisie,it was expected that business would improve and merchants would succeed in moving their inventories.
15.
The Kuomintang's Central Daily News on 22 September said the Korean hostilities were only part of the global war against Communism. The possible use, of Nationalist troops in Korea, therefore, was only a side issue, since they also had the burden of retaking the China mainland. The article implied that the troops should be reserved for the counteroffensive(C Taipei Joint Weeka 40, 3 Oct 52)
Comment: Chiang Ching-kuo has stated that the Nationalistg-Tia-Be ready to launch an attack on the Mainland in six months if the United States provides air and naval
support.:
The failure of the Kuomintang in the past to live up to its claims of invading the mainland has reportedly caused the people there to lose faith.
16.
Six foreign Communists present at Indonesian labor conference: national conference of SOBSI, Indonesia's Communist-led and largest labor federation, opened on 27 September for the announced purpose of "consolidating SOBSI, expanding labor and national fronts, and tightening SOBSI-WETU contacts." Present at the cenferenCe were twd
SECRET
7

SOUTHEAST ASIA
Nationalists tell mainland guerrillas invasion plans almost completed: The Political Department of the Ministry of National Defense, headed by the Generalissimo's elder son Chiang Ching-kuo, in an open letter to the mainland guerrillas, declared that preparations for an attack on the mainland are almost completed.
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representatives of the WFTU and two Communist leaders each from the Netherlands and Australia. The American Embassy comments that the congress probably resulted from pressure by NFTU headquarters, which has expressed disappointment (C Djakarta 626, over the lack of contact with Indonesia. 3 Oct 52)
17
peacerFowever, the shortage of Government security

forces there has made it an attractive area for penetration by Communists from both China and lower Burma.
SOUTH ASIA
18.
Independent home guard reportedly formed in Indian in New Delhi forwards a report Kashmir: that at !!!!!!!!1.11,91Rattalion was formed in IndianThe new guard is comheld Kashmir between May and August. It is said to be distinct posed entirely of Kashmiri Hindus. from the Kashmir militia and the state police, and is not controlled by the Indian army. Guard units operate independently along the cease-fire line between Indian-held and Pakistani-controlled Kashmir The and Indian army commanders resent their activities. guard apparently has intelli ence contacts in Pakistani 1 Aug 52) territory.

Comment:
Burmese Communistsreportedexpanding activities into Shan State: The Burmese Home Minister stated in parliament that a state of emergency had been declared in the Shan State because of insecurity in the area. The American Embassy in Rangoon has been informed that martial law will probably be declared in the vicinity of Lashio along the Chinese border and in the southern part of the Shan State. The Embassy comments that this action was probably motivated by a combination of rumors that Chinese-trained subversives were filtering into the Shan State and of army pressure forcing (C Rangoon 544, 3 Oct 52) local Communists northward.
The Shan State has heretofore been relatively
25X1A
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Since the Kashmir militia is now controlled Comment: by the Indian army, the organization of a home guard would appear to be an unpublicized attempt by Sheikh Abdullab, who favors the independence of Kashmir, to develop an indigenous armed force completely independent of Indian influence. SECRET
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WEAR EAST - AFRICA
France is considering alternate solution to Thnisian quest on. President Aur.ioi and Prime Minister Pinay asking the Tunisian Government to present are considering its case to the High Council of the French Union on condition that if an agreement is reached, Tunisia will request the Arab-Asian group to withdraw the case from the UN agenda.
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Comment:
Schuman on the advice of the Minister of Affairs and Senator Colonna of Tunisia. State for Foreign
a previous plan of Auriol's si111111/11.11,111Tocked by Foreign Minister
25X1A
Comment: Settlement in the High Council would be unlikelrblialase French colonists in Tunisia will continue to exert pressure on Paris to make no concessions. It is difficult to envisage a Tunisian delegation which would able both to the colonists and to the nationalists. be accept20.
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Moroccan chieftain's Visit to UN may be to support France: Hadj Thami el Glaoui, Pasha Marrakech, will visit the United States request of the French Residency General in this month at the taneous volunteer" witness for the French Rabat as a "sponthesis in the event of UN discussion about Morocco.
El Glaoui is reportedly
25X1A
21.
American acceptance of Moroccan entertainment protested: The French Residency General in Rabat has strongly protested the acceptance by American naval personnel of invitations to luncheon and tea with a prominent Moroccan family residing in Tangier on the grounds that nationalists will also be present.
excesses in Morocco. Another report from Tangier that El Glaoui had broken with the may have been inspired by the French to add Residency General credence to any statements which he is likely to make in support of France.
a member of a nationalist-agrration which will attend UN hearings on Arab-Asian charges of French
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A heavy entertainment schedule has been visiting naval units, and American officials arranged for the Moroccan invitation a nonpolitical, goodwill consider the gesture. (S Tangier 138, 2 Oct 52)
of the Resident Generarg-dEnunciation of the American Consul in Rabat in October 1951. At that time the Resident threatened to ask for the Consul's recall if he continued to see nationalists.
Comment:
This protest is reminiscent
22.
Comment: This native secret society was formed in 1947 to awFWeirite largest tribe in Kenya to the dangers of increased European landholding. The Mau Mau maintains by oath-taking ceremonies and terrorization its secret identity of the tribal population. Since a curfew was imposed by the government in August, violence against white settlers has increased.

SECRET
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Kenya legislates against tribal secret society: On 1 October the Kenya legislature approved sweeping emergency measures aimed at destroying the Mau Mau secret which in its effort to drive European settlers society from the country has been responsible tor the murder of at least 20 whites and Africans in this British colony. The Colonial Office has agreed to these legislative measures and they will be enforced immediately. They provide for rigid restriction of the movements of the society's members, control of the press, registration of non-labor societies, permission for the legal use of confessions to the police, and a vast increase in the penalties for sedition. (R FBIS London, 1 Oct 52)
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WESTERN EUROPE
23.
'
East German statements on Rothensee ship-lift reportedly forbid4en: East German waterway officials have reportedly been forbidden_to discuss the key Rothensee ship-lift on the Mittelland Canal with West Germans or the Allies. This report, together with an earlier East German statement that repairs on the lift had been completed so that it could be opened on 28 September, has led HICOG officials to believe that the lift may be being kept closed for political reasons. (C Bonn 1500, 4 Oct 52)
24.
Chuikov note seen as attempt to justify new Berlin harassment : HICOG officials in Bonn believe that the recent note 176E-Soviet General Chuikov to the Allied High Commissioners reflects Soviet concern over Allied charges against the Communist kidnapping of Dr. Linse and was designed to justify both past and future measures aimed at isolating West Berlin. The note is seen as also reflecting concern that various antiCommunist groups in Berlin are effectively hampering Communist efforts to consolidate control over East Germany.
In demanding that the cited anti-Communist groups be banned by the Allies, the USSR may also be trying to plant the idea that Linse might be freed in return, and to take advantage of certain West German and West Berlin opposition, particularly in church4circles, to the activities of West Berlin resistance organizations. (S Bonn 1507, 5 Oct 52)
25,
West Germans may not reply to East German unity proposals: The Win-German Bundestag is not considering a direct communication to the East German government in reply to the unity proposals brought to Bonn by the Volkskammer delegation on 19 September. American representatives in Bonn state that although there is some disagreement among the deputies, the most the Bundestag will do is pass a resolution declaring that direct negotiations with the puppet East German regime are out of the question. The Social Democrats are opposed to such a resolution, preferring to let the matter die a natural death. (C Bonn 1492, 3 Oct 52)
SECRET
Comment: Various reports have indicated that the Rothensee lift,ErEgIU on 1 August 1952, did in fact need repairs, although the total work was supposed to take only four weeks.
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of various items on the mnity agenda. Elements discussions in the coalition parties were revealed as welcoming the East German visit to Bonn, toward the proposals has not been clarified. but their attitude
26.
asked the Bundestag to send W-UFMation to Berlin for further.unity discussions, and suggested simultaneous
Comment:
The Volkskammer letter
As a result of two meetings 011enhauer and Chancellor Adenauer, a "change of between atmosphere" is already noticeable in Bonn. (C BOnn 1493, 3 Oct 52)
27
West German Socialist evidence of French-Soviet talks held Chancellor Adenauer, who had asked for the evidence on which West German Socialist Wehner based his charges of French-Soviet negotiations to preserve the status quo in Germany, now states that "anything serious" in the way of Wehner has failed to produce documentation.
unconiiiiiling:
To "support" his charges, suspicion to contacts of French Wehner merely referred with sentatives in Moscow and Berlin, officials with Soviet repreto alleged contacts in Switzerland, to pro-Soviet remarks of a French labor leader,and to the Soviet unity notes, which he considers directed mainly at France. Wehner also noted the continued French-Soviet pact of 1944, existence of the will relax tension in Europe and his suspicion that the USSR to make Germany appear the main danger to France. (S Bonn 1505, 4 Odt 52; C Bonn 1498, 4 Oct 52)
Comment: Wehner's charges seem to spring chiefly from the SZFrii-Eamocratic fear that France will always oppose the SECRET

12
West German Socialists hold aloof from EDC work for "consistency": Although Bonn coalition leaders are disappointed by the decision of the Social Democratic Party (SPD) not to participate in the work of the EDC ad leaders, including Chairman 011enhauer hoc assembly, the party's admit privately that they will participate after the EDC treaty goes into effect. They explain that they must appear consistent in their opposition to EDC, and are therefore reluctant to help French ratification. HICOG believes that if European integration plans succeed, the SPD may decide in a relatively short policy on integration, so that its shift time to discard its will not come so close to next year's election as to be embarrassing. On the other hand, if integration plans seem to be failing, the party may increase its propaganda against "Little Europe."
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unification of Germany. French Foreign Minister Schuman has told Adenauer that the Frenchmen at the meeting in Switzerland were Communists.
28
Austrian position held "deteriorated" during last year: American Embassy and MSA officials in Vienna acknowledge that the political-economic situation in Austria has weakened in the last year and is in some respects alarming. Mounting discouragement over the stalemated state treaty discussions, friction within the coalition government, a high foreign trade deficit, and greater acceptance in some quarters of East-West trade propaganda are cited as evidence of this deterioration.
Comment: Forthcoming national elections are decisITZ-Iiiitrian expected to make action in meeting economic problems difficult. The outlook for a noninflationary budget, still more improved credit controls, and firm action against restrictive business practices is still not considered bright.
29.
Schuman's vulnerability on Tunisia stressed: Henri Teitgen, the Popular Republican leader in the -French National Assembly, warns that unless Foreign Minister Schuman can demonstrate that the United States is solidly behind Tunisian question, he will probably France in the UN on the be forced out of office. Teitgen, who anticipates a foreign policy debate soon after the Assembly reconvenes on 7 October, states that without Schuman the French Government could probably not carry out his European integration policies. (C Paris 2079, 4 Oct 52) Comment: In any parliamentary showdown on Schuman's Tunisiii7DBIicy, his critics would probably be Joined by opponents of European integration who are unwilling to tip their hana that issue, and by deputies who on prefer an oblique attack on Premier Pinay's economic policies.

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Although inflation has been "substantially arrested," these officials believe that the more immediate and discouraging problem is the maintenance of "tenuous stabilization" in the face of the politically difficult problem of unemployment. They are hopeful that Soviet efforts to exploit will be defeated by unfavorable public this basic instability reaction to continued Soviet intervention in Austrian domestic affairs. (C Vienna TOMUS 205, 3 Oct 52)
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30.
Italian Government to crack down on Communists in Sicily: The Italian Government is initiating a more aggressive policy toward Communists in Sicily. According to a reliable report, the prefects of Palermo and Trapani will soon be replaced by officials better equipped to deal forcefully with subversive activities of the extreme left in these provinces.
A number of retired and separated Italian army officers are allegedly prepared to take over command of the Communist clandestine armed groups. (C Palermo 45, 2 Oct 52)
It has long been known that a considerable number of Italian army officers of reserve or retired status are pro-Communist in their sympathies.
31.
Bevan's success at party conference seen benefiting British Labor moderates: The American Embassy in London believes that the long-re-inffects of the British Labor Party conference may be good if the moderate leaders now concentrate on educating the rank and file and working out a constructive policy as an alternative to Bevanism. The official party leadership has been "jolted" out of its complacency and will be urged and aided by trade union leaders to reassert its control of the party. The Embassy notes that Attlee's seemingly apathetic attitude engendered some resentment among the delegates while both Morrison and Gaitskell emerged from the conference with added prestige. For the immediate future, the Embassy considers that the Bevanites will exert more influence on party policies. However, if they should gain two or three seats in the opposition's shadow cabinet, they would probably be forced to assume responsibility for a "coalition" Labor policy. (R London 1984, 4 Oct 52)
32.
Bolivian officials do not expect mass disturbances to accompany tin nationalization: After consulting with Bolivian

LATIN AMERICA
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Comment: This is the first indication of government concern overCommunist clandestine activities in Sicily. The government may be intending to use the island as a test case in order to refute charges of the right that it is unable to check Communism.
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government officials and mining technicians, the American Embassy in La Paz is inclined to discount a rumor that the miners may attempt mass seizure of the "big three" tin mines when nationalization is announced. Some disturbances are possible, especially if the miners are harangued by extremist agitators, but the government hopes to keep the situation under control. (C La Paz 108, 2 Oct 52)
Comment: Some extremist labor leaders differ with the government's view that the tin companies should be compensated for expropriation of their properties. They would like to convince the miners that the central labor federation, rather than the government party, brought about nationalization.
33.
-
National Directorate of Colombian Liberal Party "recesses": FollowTHE the exile on 1 October of Directors Lleras Restrepo and ex-President Alfonso Lopez, the Liberal Party's National Directorate has recessed. (R IBIS 3 Oct 52) 25X1A The departure of Colombia's two top liberals was by the 6 September ConAervative mob assault on their homes. The recess of the Directorate, which leaves no Liberal Party organization for the Urdaneta administration to deal with, is further proof of Colombia's deteriorating political situation.
prison-AM-a

Comment:
Nationalization is expected shortly after the study commission renders its report on 7 October. President Paz recently mentioned 20 October as a probable date.
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US OFFICIALS ONLY
37
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for the internal use of the Office of Current Intelligence. It cbes not represent a complete coverage of all current reports in CIA or in the Office of Current Intelligence. Comments represent the immediate views of the Office of Current Intelligence.

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THIS MAI-diAL CONTAINS 1NtORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES dITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U3C, SECS. 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
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1.
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Indonesian Cabinet crisis reported imminent: a cabinet crisis in The largest parb in the country, the Masjumi, has imm nen . decided to withdraw support from the Minister of Defense if he, in turn, refuses to discharge the Chief of Staff of the The National Party, Indonesia's second largest Armed Forces. political organization, is willing to cooperate with the Mas-

WESTERN EUROPE
TOP SECRET
1
IniMils
umi in its proposed action. 0.11MIMMINIMI
25X1A
25X1A
FOR CRITICAL SECURITY REASONS thisWitf.snoo
her transmitted within the United States or beyond the borders of the United States without the express permission of the releasing office.)
Comment: The Defense Ministry was subjected to strong, leftist-inspired parliamentary criticism in September. During these attacks, however, neither the Masjumi nor the National Party joined in the censure of the Minister of Defense.
2.
If the report of the Masjumi decision to withdraw support from the Defense Minister is true, there is an imminent possibility of a cabinet crisis or even the fall of the cabinet. However, other information indicates that both the Masjumi and the National Party hope to avoid a cabinet crisis and will support the Minister of Defense on a nenconfidence motion scheduled for 10 October.
Denmark remains firm towards USSR: Hans Hedtoft, chairman of the Social Democratic Party, has informed the American Ambassador that the chairmen of all political parties in Denmark, with the exception of the Communist,support the
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TOP SECRET government's intention not to answer the recent Soviet note for at least a month. The Communists were not consulted. Hedtoft believes that the Soviet note will help him overcome opposition within his party to the stationing of NATO forces in Denmark. (TS S/S Copenhagen 417, 4 Oct 52)
Comment: The Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister informed the DiETFEMinister on lOctober that the granting of bases in Denmark would be considered a "threat to th3security of the USSR." While the Danish Government has not granted any bases, it plans to construct airfields to NATO specifications and is engaged in educating the public as to the need for ultimately permitting the stationing of NATO air units in Denmark.
25X6

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PREvIouT EDITIONS.
HR70-I 4 HR70-14
FAR'EAST FAR 'EAST

6. 6.
Chinese com lains misuse of of t transport C h i n e s e Communist Communist unit unit c omp l a i n s of misuse ransport n 2 0ctober e forward post o of t e vehic es: On c o er t h e orwar command comman post th e vehic'les:' C Chinese h i n e s e Communist Communist 21st 2 l s t Artillery a r t i l l e r y Regiment Regiment stated s t a t e d .that t h a t "there still s t i l l aren't a r e n ' t enough enough vehicles v e h i c l e s assembled assembled for f o r the t h e shipping s h i p p i n g of of orginator that "someone i in the ammunition.'1 r g i n a t o r complained t h a t "someone n t he ammunition." The o .is s still shipping blackboards, t thereby wasting rear area. area. till s h i p p i n g blackboards, hereby w asting vehicles and manpower, manpower, and and adv advme1yyinfluencing v e h i c l e s and i n f l u e n c i n g the t h e transtransT1039, 52) port of ammunition." (CANOE L T1039, 4 Oct 52)
.
.
7. 7 .
8. 8.

4 4
r e g i m e n t in i n a 20 20 September message message Comment: The same regiment complained of 6f ammunition ammunition shortages s h o r t a g e s due d u e to to a a lack lack of o f vehicles. vehicles. This T h i s is is probably p r o b a b l y a local local problem as the t h e Communists have have continued a heavy heavy volume volume of of a artillery c o n t i n u e d to t o employ empby a r t i l l e r y and mortar fire during the t h e past p a s t two two weeks. C h i n e s e .Communist CommuniEIt armored nit i n Korea has neav heavy tanks: tanks: Chinese armored u unit in In ep em er message message Passed passe. by y a C h in nese e s e armore armored un unit I n a 29 Segtember in w estern-K o r e a , it i t was stated s t a t e d that t h a t the the " division n otified in western Korea, "division notified us u s to t o go go and and pick p i c k up up the t h e 85mm 85mm and and 122mm 122mm ammunition." ammunition.11 Later L a t e r the t h e sender s e n d e r said s a i d he he had had proposed proposed that t h a t "four Ilt'our: heavy heavy tanks t o participate p a r t i c i p a t e in i n direct d i r e c t bombardment." bombardment." t a n k s be selected to (CANOE G G r \ T T-65, (CANOE -65, 3 3 Oct O c t 52) 52) Comment: Although accepted by he F a r East in by t the Far East Command in Chineg(r-dUaunist vehicles e h i c l e s mounting C h i n e m u n i s t units, u n i t s , heavy armored v 1.22mm guns have have n never been e encountered 122mm guns e v e r been n c o u n t e r e d at a t the t h e front. f r o n t . Aerial s sightings, i g h t i n g s , however, however, have p previously r e v i o u s l y indicated indicated t the he p presence resence in i n Korea of either e i t h e r JS-I JS-I or or JS-II JS-I1 heavy heavy tanks t a n k s or or JSU-122 JSU-122 It apparent this self-propelled s e l f - p r o p e l l e d guns. guns. I t is a p p a r e n t from t h i s message that that this t h i s heavy armor armor is is to t o be be employed employed as as "mobile I'mobile pill pill boxes." boxes." Of collateral colAatera1 interest i n t e i e s t in i n this t h i s message is t h e reference the t o '"division." l d i v i s i o a . ' l It I t would p p e a r from the t h e text t e x t of the t h e message message to would a appear that t h a t an a n armored armored division d i v i s i o n is is implied. i m p l i e d . Recent indications, indications, however, have Chinese have pointed p o i n t e d to t o the t h e presence p r e s e n c e of independent indegendent C hinese t a n k regiments r e g i m e n t s in i n Korea, rather tank rather than t h a n divisional d i v i s i o n a l formations. formations. C h i n e s e Communist Communist u n i t in i n Korea issued i s s u e d Korean c urrency Chinese unit currency f o r local l o c a l expenses: e f p e n s e s : The The Chinese C h in e s e dommunitt Communist 21st 2 1 s t Artillery Artillery for October stited s t a t e d that t h a t it i t had received r e c e i v e d orders orders o n " 1 Odtober Regiment on71 from its its division d i v i s i o n headquarters h e a d q u a r t e r s "to " t o pick p i c k up up Korean Korean currency." currency." o r i g i n a t o r , explaining e x p l a l n i n g how how the t h e money money would would be be used, used, The originator, s t a t e d that t h a t "each "each man man will w i l l receive r e c e $ v e an a n increase i n c r e a s e of. of 3,000 stated 3,000
8 Oct O c t 52 52
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won for for bathing bathing expenses," e x p e n s e s , " but those units u n i t s with w i t h shower won receive any additional money. (CANOE (CANOE ties were were not to receive T1035, 4 4 Oct Oct 52) 52) T1035,
:m
Comment: Presumably, Presumably, those those Chinese Chinese troops troops that that do do not not Comment: equipment would use civilianbathing bathing facilities. facilities. have have shower WAWYequipment would use civilian Recent Recent messages messages indicate that the Chinese are making making efforts the Korean civilians civilians for for local local expenses. expenses. to pay the

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THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECS. 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMISSION.OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.
SOVIET UNION
25X1
The air attache suggests that the 748th Guards Bomber Regiment may be returning to the Soviet Zone of Austria from Tokol airfield in Hungary. The 748th Guards Bomber Regiment was transComment: ferrea-T5-175kol airfield from Austria in October 1951. At the time of the transfer it was equipped with PE-2 type aircraft, and it is believed to have started conversion to jets during the last part of 1951. The other regiments of the 164th Guards Bomber Division, which were also equipped with PE-2 aircraft, are reported to have moved to the Veszprem airfield in Hungary in December 1951 or January 1952. There is no evidence that these regiments have converted to jet aircraft.
1.
Possible return of bomber regiment to Soviet Zone of Austrigi The US Air Attache in Austria reports that seven 1L-28 twin jet light bombers arrived at Wiener Neustadt airfield south of Vienna on 26 September. This brings the total of IL-28 aircraft observed at that airfield to ten.
25X1
2.
US:
Return of the 748th Guards Bomber Regiment to Austria could indicate the beginning of the return of the entire division.
French official sees hardening of Soviet attitude toward TE6 Kremlin's top priority objective for some time will Fit to divide the Western allies, particularly to separate the United States from the others, according to a high French Foreign Ministry official. He believes this policy was manifested by Stalin's,article in Bolshevik, the jettisoning of the militants Marty and Tillon, and the adoption of a more
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Comment: Stalin's article indicates that the USSR envisages a prolonged period of coexistence contingent upon the dissolution of the aggressive Western alliance and isolation of the United States as principal aggressor.
EASTERN EUROPE
3.
Cominform reorganization reported: According to the American Legation in Bucharest, the Yugoslav Charge reports a rumor that the USSR is planning to dissolve or reorganize The Legation the Cominform to achieve still greater control. believes this to be the same rumor as that from the Yugoslav Charge in Budapest which the American Legation there reported in September. There is no confirmation of the report. Western diplomats in Bucharest believe that dissolution is unlikely, and that any reorganization would be purely administrative since the USSR already exercises maximum control.
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Comment: Aside from publishing a weekly newspaper which provides ideological direction for ali communist parties, the Cominform has not been very active for the past two years. The last known general meeting was held in November 1949.
4.
A reorganization to include other Communist parties may be held as a means of coordinating cold war strategy and tactics. The reported meeting of Secretaries-General of all Communist parties after the party congress in Moscow is perhaps intended for this purpose. There may also be some connection between the above and the recent statement of Vittorio Vidali, Trieste Communist party chief, that his party had been approved for membership in the Cominform.
Radio Moscow attacks IRB loan to Finland: Radio Moscow charges that the International Reconstruction Bank loan
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recently granted to Finland is means for furthering American interests in Finland and is a pretext for American "inspectors" to enter the country and gather political and economic information. According to the broadcast, the Bank has been "most conscientious" in carrying out such inspections in countries bordering the Soviet Union, not only in Finland, hut also in Turkey and Iran.
I
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The American Legation in Budapest notes that this requirement is more than twice as great as that decreed for cooperatives last month and that since most kulaks will be unable to follow the order because of a shortage of fodder and heavy crop surrender requirements, the measure mai be used to liquidate them. 25X1
1
Comment: Kulaks have been under heavy pressure this It is a common Satellite practice to essummer in Hungary. tablish requirements for kulaks at such a high level that they cannot be fulfilled in order to open the way for punitive action against the kulaks and collectivization of their land.
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Hungarian Government decrees very high stock requirements A decree issued by the Hungarian Council of Ministers on 2 October requires all kulaks to have on hand by 1 January a minimum of six head of livestock including cattle, swine or horses for each ten yokes of land (14 acres) they own. They are forbidden to butcher any animals until they comply and are liable to priSon sentences and fines of up to 5,000 forints for non-compliance.
for kriTaks:
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8.
Heavy enemy artion in Korea not seen as prelude to offensive: The Far East Command believes that the 6 October coordinated Communist attack in western and central Korea is not preliminary to a general offensive. FECOM warns, however, that limited-objective attacks will probably increase in size and number until colder weather sets in or until the UN Command assumes the offensive. The primary objective of the attacks, as interpreted by FECOM, is the seizure of key terrain features and areas still in question at the cease-fire talks. Another objective may be to keep UN forces off balance.
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9.
North Koreans expect UN to give in soon at Panmunjom: At a INTe August meeting of the Kaesong branch of the Labor
Party (Communist), I
I
I,
an
official from the party's central committee stateo that the UN "will find it necessary to make concessions and that a break in the truce deadlock could be expected before
-November."
I
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Comment: This statement is probably intended as a morale booster for local officials. It is possible, however, that the Labor Party official was-hinting at a new Communist tactic to secure UN concessions at Panmunjom through military pressure.
10.
25X1
Rail traffic in China predominantly northward since July: The Mliintry of Railways is reportedly concerned by a preponderance of northbound rail traffic which has developed since July,' 25X1 The reasons tor tills new trarric pattern are tour: the large shipment of food and materials for industrial construction to North China and Manchuria, the exports of fruit and nonferrous ores to the USSR, the increased military shipments to Korea, and fewer southbound coal shipments as a result of rising coal production in South China. The Ministry of Railways has not found a solution to this problem, but is strenuously attempting to find more goods for southbound trains.
1 1 1
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11.
Comment: This traffic imbalance may well develop into a chronIFTFUElem, as the industrialization of southern China lags behind that of Manchuria. Assuming that the agricultural areas of China proper receive no more than an equal value of imports for exports, the weight of agricultural and mineral shipments northward to Manchuria, Korea and the USSR should exceed the weight of industrial goods and petroleum products shipped to the south.
Production of some Chinese food crops believed up: The American Consul General in Hong Kong estimates that 21,659,350 metric tons of wheat were harvested in China proper in the late spring of 1952 and that the total harvest of winter crops was 38,492,800 metric tons. This total is 2.5 percent over the Consul General's estimate of the 1951 harvest, although still two percent under the 1931 to 1937 average harvest

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of these crops in China proper. The Consul General believes that weather was more favorable in the 1951-1952 season and acreage increased as a result of Communist emphasis on increasing wheat production and on reclamation and water conservancy projects.
25X1
Peiping reported in early 1952 that the food for the year was eight percent over the 1951 yield. Since the winter crop harvest estimated by the Consul General constitutes only about one-third of China's total harvest for the year, Peiping's goal can still be reached if production of rice and other grains which have just been harvested is eleven percent better than in 1951.
produMbrearget
Comment:
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Chinese Nationalists concerned over high suicide rate in armed forces: Admiral Ma Chi-chuang, Commander in Chief of the Chinese Nationalist Navy, told the American Naval Attache that he was concerned over the suicide rate in the Nationalist Navy. There were over 50 suicides during the first six months of this year. Lieutenant General Kwei Yun-chin, a Senior Advisor to President Chiang Kai-shek, observed that the Chinese Nationalist Army and Air Force suicide rates were equally alarming. Ma added that welfare and recreation programs were being promoted in the Navy to combat this suicide trend which has involved mostly young people, but he blamed anxiety over relatives on the mainland as a leading factor.
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Comment: The American Military Mission on Formosa has estinaWd the morale of the Nationalist armed forces as good.
Nationalist officials, including Chiang Kai-shek, in their conversations with Americans continually emphasize the need and desirability of returning to the mainland in the immediate future. In addition, they have made repeated promises to the people on Formosa to invade the mainland, and the failure of these promises to materialize has undoubtedly had its effect on morale.
25X1
Comment: Premier Chen, after a reported protracted illneWFT-F-5Eurned to Taipei on 2 October. The press states that he will soon resume office and will attend the Kuomintang ongress and conference of Overseas Chinese.
Chiang Kai-shek will dominate the congress and the Central Executive Committee which the congress is expected to appoint. In the continual struggle between factions of the Kuomintang, Chiang can be expected to follow his usual pattern of proposing an agreement acceptable to both sides.

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French in Indochina prepare Chinese refugees for repatFirtion: F labout 5,000 Chinese refugees In Indochina will ne reaay sor repatriation to Formosa before The the end of the year if transportation can be arranged. Chinese Consul General in Saigon has been informed that unless the Chinese Government is willing to accept this first group of 5,000, about half of wham are women and children and most of the other half unfit for military service, the French will not go through with the repatriation of military
Comment: Contrary to a long-standing impression, it has recentingin revealed by the French that only about a third of the 30,000 refugees interned by the French in Indochina since 1949 are troops, the other two thirds being camp followers. Since the Nationalist Government apparently has attached some importance to the repatriation of these refugees as a source of military manpower, it is not likely to be gratified by the French terms.
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Cabinet crisis threatens in Indonesia: The Indonesian Government is threatened with an imminent cabinet crisis, Demands y elements of the two largest politicai parties that certain officials in the Defense Ministry and the army be purged are likely to result in the resignation of the Minister of Defense, and possibly in the fall of the cabinet.
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President Sukarno has not revealed his position, but is believed to be displeased with the present government. I
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effectives.
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Comment: The government has made little or no progress in del:ITU-With widespread dissidence, but the impending crisis is more the result of political rivalries than of a genuine concern over the country's security.
Public and parliamentary criticism of the Defense Ministry is apparently Communist-inspired and purposely directed at undermining the position of the strongly antiCommunist Minister of Defense.
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Trieste Communist Party approved for membership in CominVittorio Vidali, leader of the Communist Party in Wristo, has reportedly announced that his party has been approved for membership in the Cominform and that it would receive directives from Cominform headquarters and not through the Italian Communist Party as in the past. Vidali also announced that a complete reorganization of the party would begin on 1 November in order to replace present leaders who have become passive.
form:
The Trieste Communist Party would be the first party to be added to the Cominform since its establishment in 1947.
20.
East Germans bid boldly for support of former Nazis with new legislation: Legislation approved last week by the East for the restoration of "civic rights of former officers of the fascist armed forces and of former members and supporters of the Nazi Party" and the accompanying amnesty granted political prisoners by President Pieck is an open bid for support from former Nazis on both sides of the interzonal border.
GermanWirnent
Contrasting East German rehabilitation policies with alleged West German persecution of the "small-fry" while the war criminals go free, spokesmen for the new measure called upon former Nazis to "take their place in the democratic order," to rally to the "peace banner," and to oppose American efforts to organize former Nazis in the West "for fratricidal war." This is clearly an attempt not only to broaden support among an important segment of the East German population and to utilize existing military talents, but also to encourage nationalist dissidence in West Germany.
Comment: IVidali's party is suffeFIETTFom weak internal discipline and severe financial troubles. Freeing the party from Italian Communist control may be intended to give it added prestige.
I
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Continued East German pressure for all-German talks consiTiFid likely: After hearing a report from the delegation to Bonn, the East German Volkskammer last week unanimously endorsed a resolution noting that West German Bundestag approval
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of the East German proposals is "expected" and expressing the hope that authorized delegations of the two parliaments would be able to reach agreement on "questions vital to the German nation." Although the East Germans may be awaiting a reply from the Bundestag or possibly a new Soviet note on four-power talks, there is still a strong possibility of renewed East German overtures in the near future. While the statement from the delegation spokesman contrasted in belligerence and threats with the "reasonableness" previously displayed by the delegation, statements by President Pieck and Deputy Minister Nuschke immediately prior to this week's East German anniversary celebrations again strongly emphasized the theme of all-German negotiations.
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Continued East German zassure o proclaim a national army and tormal ties with the Soviet Union would suggest, however, a bitter-end continuation of current unification propaganda for the sake of the record.
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23.
Top Italian official in Trieste chafes at restrictions on his authority: The Italian Senior Director of Administration in Zone A of Trieste, Giovanni Vitelli, has complained that his freedom of action is restricted without control of police and legal affairs, according to Gioacchino Palutan, the Italian president of the zone. Local Christian Democrats and members of the Istrian Committee of National Liberation have accused Vitelli of trying to concentrate all responsibility in his hands.
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Comment: Following the London agreement of 9 May 1952, which gaigitaly a substantial share in the administration of Zone A, the British commander of the zone expressed the opinion that it would be politically impossible to resist, for any length of time, Italian encroachments on his authority and directing powers. Vitelli has impressed American and British authorities in Zone A as "cagey and assured in the strength of his position:"
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Lie believes that the proposal should be taken up at Panmunjom since there is no risk of Communist acceptance. 25X1
2.
Yugoslays discuss strategy with Greeks and Turks: Members of the Yugoslav military mission to Greece and Turkey have tol!d the G-3 of the Turkish General Staff that they do not think Soviet troops will be used against YugoThe Yugoslav officers feel that the Satellites, with slavia. to make some 50-60 ftivisions, have more than enough forces such an attack alone. The Yugoslays asked the Greeks what action they would take in case of a simultaneous attack on the two countries. The Greeks allegedly answered they would commence their defense along the border, and the Yugoslays then said that since they were not directly threatened by Soviet troops, they would place one army close to the Greek border and concentrate their main effort in northern Yugoslavia.
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EASTERN EUROPE
1.
Mexican proposal for ending Korean truce deadlock being Ambassador Austin reseriously considered by UN delegates: FURT-Fileral agreement among Secretary General Lie and various United Nations delegates, including leading members of the British and Brazilian delegations, that the Mexican proposal to end the Korean truce deadlock must be taken seriously, They believe though it present:3a difficult propaganda problem. delegations and that it that the proposal will interest many Assembly that the onus for any should be wade clear to the be placed on the Communists. rejection of the proposal will
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Comment: abe Yugoslav mission's talks with Greek and TurkirErritary leaders were unofficial, and no detailed or specific commitments or plans were discussed. Greek and Turkish military delegations will visit Yugoslavia in the near future, and it is expected that these meetings will lead to more specific coordination of defense plans.
WESTERN EUROPE
3.
Adenauer claims to have made his maximum offer, which he says is supported by the government coalition and the opposition Social Democrats, when he proposed placing the territory under a European body, as well as local licensing of the proGerman parties and replacing the French-Saar conventions with new economic arrangements. The settlement would be provisional for five years. Schuman agrees to Europeanization, but opposes licensing the pro-German parties and wants the French-Saar economic ties to be severed gradually as European integration progresses. He also insists that any steps taken now be permanent. If the two positions are not reconciled by 10 October, the final date for parties to register for the Saar elections, the Saar Government will probably reject the applications of the In that event, Franco-German negotiations pro-German parties. will be considerably complicated. If an agreement is reached, however, the ejections and the registration date will probably be postponed and no action taken regarding the pro-German par-
ties
Schuman-Adenauer negotiations on the Saar at standoff: The unresolved issues between Chancellor Adenauer and French Foreign Minister Schuman over the Saar question center on the permanency of the settlement, France's economic ties with the Saar, and political freedom within the territory.
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FAR EAST
4. 4.
Chinese Russians believe aircraft operating over C h i n e s e and p ussians b e l i e v e UN a ircraft o perating o ver Manchuria: In In a s e r i e s of messages between 29 29 September Se p t e m b e r and and series warning 3 October, Chinese C h i n e s e Communists on their t h e i r early early w a r n i n g nets nets t h e i r GCI G C I nets n e t s reported r e p o r t e d that t h a t UN airaira n d Soviet Soviet p i l o t s on their and pilots c r a f t were operating o p e r a t i n g over o v e r three t h r e e separate Manchurian airfields. airfields. craft The field f i e l d unit u n i t observes o b s e r v e s that t h a t although a l t h o u g h it i t cannot c a n n o t be determined w h e t h e r these t h e s e reports r e p o r t s reflect r e f l e c t actual a c t u a l UN flights f l i g h t s over over M anchuria, whether Manchuria, it i t would appear that t h a t the t h e enemy enemy is is convinced c o n v i n c e d of of their t h e i r reality. reality. (CANOE AF Roundup 194, 194, 7 7 Oct O c t 52) 52) (CANOE
5.
'
C h i n e s e artillery a r t i l l e r y unit in west Korea reports low Chinese ammunition: Th e thinese Chi ammunITIBII: The 27th Artillery Regiment, supporting late i n t h e even? he 3 9 t h &my i n western Korea, the 39th Army in Korea, reported late in the evenc t o b e r that t h a t two of its its b attalions h ad e x p e n d e d 590 i n g of ing of 6 O October battalions had expended rounds r o u n d s "in " i n the t h e attack." attack." The message requests r e q u e s t s that t h a t the t h e 1st 1st b a t t a l i o n be be supplied s u p , p l i e d with w i t h 2,300 2,300rounds r o u n d s and a n d the. t h e 2nd battalion battalion battalion with prenared r ed to t o fire'n fire?) w i t h 1,800 1 , 8 0 0 because b e c a u s e the t h e battalions b a t t a l i o n s "mast "must Cue b p when the t h e enemy enemy (counterattacks?) ( c o u n t e r a t t a c k s ? ) ." .'' (CANOE (CANOE 14 LnTl.111, 6 HR70-14 O c t 52) Oct 62) Comment: The 39th Army is actively a c t i v e l y engaged in i n the the serieirff-Timited-objective s e r i e s o f l l m i t e d - o b j e c t i v e enemy enemy attacks a t t a c k s that t h a t began b e g a n at at twilight t w i l i g h t on on 6 6 October. O c t o b e r . The small s m a l l ammunition ammunition expenditure expenditure mentioned t h e relatively r e l a t i v e l y small smail amount amount required r e q u i r e d are m e n t i o n e d and a n d the f u r t h e r indications i n d i c a t i o n s of the t h e limited l i m i t e d nature n a t u r e of the t h e enemy's enemy's further p r e s e n t operations. operations. present
~
A l t h o u g h the t h e Chinese C h i n e s e Communist Comment: Although Communist messages desdesc r i b e G Tactual t u a 1 bombing by the t h e UN p l a n e s they t h e y reported r e p o r t e d in in cribea-E6 planes Manchuria, M a n c h u r i a , the t h e Peiping P e i p i n g press,in p r e s s , i n propaganda p r o p a g a n d a blasts b l a s t s on 7 O c t o b e r , claimed that t h a t 120 120 UN planes p l a n e s had "ruthlessly" " r u t h l e s s l y " bombed October,claimed v villages i l l a g e s in i n Liaotung L i a o t u n g on on 1 1 October. October.
NR
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President Rhee_nominatem Prernidaat R h e e . d n a t a s new new South South Korean Korean prime prime minister: minister:
President Syngman Rbee on 8 0 October named former P Minister of Syngaaa Rhea c t o m r nalllsa l n l s t e r ai Social S o c i a l Affairs Alfairs Yi Y i Yun-yong Yun-yomg tO t o succeed succeed Chang Chang l'aek,sang TaekcsPng as Prime Prime Minister.of of Korea, Korea, according to a Japanese Minister o f the t h e Republic of Japanrrrre news agency. Chang.resigned 36.September, agency. Chang r e s i g n e d on OD 30 Septeuber, allegedly because because, of of invnvement involvement'in i n the the illegal...entry i l l s g a l s n t r y of of the the former former Japanese Mayor_of Ja anoia8 Ma or of Seoul Seoul into into South.Korea, South Korea,
r "
Comment: 0ne.tl.m Methodint Comment: Yi, onetime. Methodist min.ister, minister, was was active active in anti-dommunist.movements North Korea Korea folzOwing following World War anti-bamunist .movameats in. in. North Wer II. and, a8 as a close as11. He escaped Q8CapOd from from the the North North in..1946 in 1946 and, associate of Rhee, held two ministerial oociate m i n i s t e r i a l posts in the early days days of the South of Souih Korean Korean Government. Govrernmant. A 6 Yi Yl is. is wall i k e d by As well l liked Koreans and considered Korean8 canoidsrsd a capable administrator, his nomination may gain the approval approval of of the the National National Assembly. Assembly.
NR
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O c t 52 52 9 Oct
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NO CHANGE IN CLASS. pt, El DECLASSIFIED

CLASS. CHANGED TO:
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 70.2 AUTH:
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REVIEWER' 5
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SUMMARY
FAR EAST
1. 2.
North Korean Navy reportedly augmented by PT boats (page 3). Rhee contravenes UN orders to South Korean Navy (page 3).
SOUTHEAST ASIA
4.
5. 6.
7.
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WESTERN EUROPE
3.
Burmese debate retention of British Services Mission (page 4).
Adenauer willing to compromise on permanency of Saar solution

(page 4).
German Socialists seen swinging to support for Eric (page 5). Paris Embassy comments on controversy with French over 1953
budget (page 6).
LATIN AMERICA
Uruguay may break relations with the USSR on 15 October

(page 6).
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FAR EAST
1.
North Korean Navy reportedly augmented by PT boats:
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The North Korean Navy recently received 14 patrol-torpedo craft from the Soviet
Union,'
These boats, with their crews, are under trainint in Unggi harbor on the Korean east coast a few miles from the Soviet border.
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A similar report,
was received by the US Navy in September.
Comment:
a result of US naval action.
its small patrol-torpedo ForfcifFe at the beginning of the war as
Heightened Communist efforts to defend the east coast were evidenced by MIG-15 interception of US naval aircraft over Hungnam on the east coast on 4 and 7 October, the first such incidents in over a year.
2.
Rhee contravenes UN orders to South Korean Navy:
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President Rhee has directed his chief of naval operations to intercept japanese fishing vessels in the Korean sea defense zone and escort them into Pusan, according to US Charge Lightner. This contravenes orders of the United Nations Command which has assumed operational control of South Korean patrol craft in the area.
Lightner believes that Rhee should be told "in no uncertain terms" that this is a UN Command responsibility and that no contravention will be tolerated. He notes, however, that an effort to curb Rhee might raise the question of UN operational control over the South Korean Armed Forces, and the equally delicate problem of Japanese civilian personnel used by the UN forces,

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The North Korean Navy lost
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Comment:
The UN Sea Defense Command
was recently established to preclude threatened Japanese-Korean incidents over fishing rights near the Korean coast. The move has been incorrectly interpreted by the Koreans as excluding Japanese but not Korean fishing operations in the designated zone.
SOUTHEAST ASIA
3.
Burmese debate retention of British Services Mission:

The Burma War Office reportedly is discussing I the advisability of retaining the British Services Mission, which provides training and supplies for the Burmese armed forces. thai decision is not expected until the return to Rangoon of Burmese Commander in Chief Ne Win, who is to head a military mission to the United States late this month.
The agreement under which the mission operates terminates on 3 January 1953 unless it is renegotiated. Relations between the mission and the Burmese armed forces have never been wholly satisfactory. The Burmese frequently complain that the British have not adequately met their requests for arms.
Comment:
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4.
Adenauer willing to compromise on permanency of Saar solution:
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Chancellor Adenauer reportedly is willing to consider some form cf guarantee that would permit a provisional solution of the Saar problem to become permanent, provided sufficient progress has been made in over-all European integration.

WESTERN EUROPE
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American officials in Bonn hold that without some form of European political union, the Chancellor would find it difficult to obtain German consent to Europeanization of the Saar. They suggest that an acceptable alternative might be a Europeanization, whichipermanent in practice, would theoretically be subject to revision in the event of a final peace treaty or German reunification.
Most German politicians are said to believe that retention of some legal link between the Saar and West Germany
is necessary if the legal basis of Germany's claims to the territories across the Oder-Neisse is not to be jeopardized.
5. German Socialists seen swinging to support for EDC:

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I Mayor Kaisen of Bremen, an influential Socialist leader, has informed American officials that the Socialist party, since its recent party conference, is prepared o accept the pr nc p e of a West German contribution to European defense prior to German reunification.
Kaisen personally supports the Bonn and Paris agreements and believes they will be ratified. He feels that if a "truly generous policy" can be worked out, the Socialists might withdraw their opposition. In Kaisen's view, Franco-German understanding is the key to European integration, and, while the Soviet system "will eventually defeat itself," Western defenses must be built up in the meantime.
Kaisen's reported views are in line with recent evidence that the new Socialist leadership is trying to work out some compromise with the West, without abruptly reversing previous opposition to the Bonn and Paris agreements.
Comment:

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Comment: Permanency of steps now taken toward the solution of the Saar question has long been a principal French demand. Since Piney has recently injected a strong nationalistic note into French foreign policy, the chances of the French agreeing to a German-proposed compromise are slim.
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6.
Paris Embassy comments on controversy with French over 1953 budget:
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American officials in Paris report that it is not yet clear whether the French Government will now refuse to discuss with NATO as well as with the United States, the size and content of its 1953 military budget. They warn that the French in their present frame of mind could seriously prejudice the NATO Annual Review and might line up other meMber nations to restrict examination of military budgets.
7.
Uruguay may break relations with the USSR on 15 October:
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October, I

LATIN AMERICA
In the opinion of these officials,Premier Pinay, hypersensitive on the subject of raising taxes, probably has inferred that the United States is seeking to encourage such a policy. His firm stand against higher taxes is already jeopardized by the concessions he has had to make to demands for increased expenditures in the civil and investment portions of the proposed 1953 budget.
There is a strong possibility that the Government of Uruguay will break diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union at its next National Executive Council meeting on 15
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USSR.
There is no other evidence regarding the agenda of the National Executive meeting. In recent years government officials and the press in Uruguay have periodically questioned the desirability of continuing relations with the
Comment:
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FAlf EAST EAST FAR'
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b a t t l e morale morale suggested: s u g g e s t e d : On 8 October a forHlgh Fhinese battle nd Chinese C h i n e s e Rocket hauncher Regiment ward e emeni of the 202nd Rocket Launcher supporting White Horse s u p p o r t i n g 38th 3 8 t h Army elements in i n the t h e attack on White-Horse 4th company Mountain in in west central c e n t r a l Korea reported r e p o r t e d that t h a t its 4 t h oompany asked to t o "be allowed to t o carry out o u t this t h i s mission to t o avenge the sacrifice t he s a c r i f i c e of the t h e comrades of the t h e 5th 5 t h and and 6th 6 t h Companies." Companies.'' "demand" to The message continued c o n t i n u e d that t h a t subordinate s u b o r d i n a t e units u n i t s "demand" continue c o n t i n u e the t h e fight. fight.
Later L a t e r that t h a t day, day, 202nd 202nd regimental r e g i m e n t a l headquarters h e a d q u a r t e r s replied replied that that such could parshowed "good "good spirit" g p i r l t f l and that t h a t the t h e unit unit c o u l d pars u c h demands demands showed ticipate Headquarters t i c i p a t e in i n combat combat "if " i f there is is an a n opportunity." opportunity Headquarters warned, Battalion might w a r n e d , however, that t h a t the t h e morale of of the t h e 2nd B a t t a l i o n might be adversely a d v e r s e l y affected a f f e c t e d if i f additional a d d i t i o n a l heavy casualties c a s u a l t i e s were Chinese s u f f e r e d , Other O t h e r messages passed p a s s e d on this this C h i n e s e artillery artillery suffered. n e t indiatethat indi t h a t the t h e unit unit s 8 c o n s i d e r a b l e casualties. casualties. ed considerable net (CANOE LT-a't-e-iTim4, e Oct; oct ; T1240, 10 10Oct, OCtk 52) 52) T1240, T1204, 8 (CANOE L.
."
It possible I t is p o s s i b l e that t h a t this this reported pugnacity p u g n a c i t y is 1s Comment: f o r urfiliaTE U ~ domestic G propaganda for domestic propaganda consumption.
5. 5.
C h i n e s e combat unit u n i t shows sensitive s e n s i t i v e concern c o n c e r n for Korean Chinese 0ctober an a n unidentified u n i d e n t i f ied element e l e m e n t of of the t he c i v i l 3 a n s : On 7 atober civilians: Chinese-M.st Division subordinate C h i n e s e Z'lot Rocket Launcher D i v i s i o n queried queried a s ubordinate Included the u n i t about a b o u t battle b a t t l e results. results. I n c l u d e d in in t h e message was a reprireprlunit mand to t o the t h e effect e f f e c t that t h a t "yesterday "yeeterday the t h e artillery a r t i l l e r y position. position. send destroyed the t h e civilian's c i v i l i a n ' s wheat. wheat.' Please Please s e n d men to t o cultivate cultivate 14-71'1235, 7 (CANOE L(p7T1235, 7 Oct O c t 52) 52) it." i t . " (CANOE
.
(f-ml
..
.
This oversolicitous Chinese concern, the T his o versolicitous C hinese c o n c e r n , in In t he , Comment: midst-Cif-Tattle, the w well-being of a a Korean f farmer m i d s t o f 6 a t t l e ' ffor o r the e l l - b e i n g of armer suggests behavior toward t the native s u g g e s t s that t h a t rigid r i g i d rules r u l e s of b e h a v i o r toward he n ative Past p o p u l a t i o n are are being b e i n g followed f o l l o w e d by by the t h e Chinese. Chinese. P a s t messages population have t o * a v o i d antagonizing antagonizing h a v e indicated i n d i c a t e d an a n urgent u r g e n t Chinese C h i n e s e desire to.avoid their unwilling t heir u n w i l l i n g civilian c i v i l i a n hosts. hosts.
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3. 3.
Rhes c o n t r a v e n e s UN t o S o u t h Korean Navy: Rhee .contravenes UN order8 orders to.South. Korean Navy: rec e h iE cbief of Presi em Rhee ee. h as.. o _nava. operations to Presiiient a s directed n a v a l operations to intercept. Japanese. in sea. ddefense t h e Korean sea efense i ntercept J a p a n e s e ffishing i s h i n g vessels, vessels i n the.Korean. zone and them. into Pusan,. to US US C Charge zone and escor.t escort .. them int o Pusan, a c according cording t o harge Lightner. L ightner. T h i s contravenes c o n t r a v e n e s orders. orders of t h e United Nations This of.the United Nations Command,which_has_assumed.operational_control Command,which h a s asaumed operational c o n t r o l of South Korean_patrol Korean patrol craft c r a f t in i n the t h e area. area.
.
Comment: The UN Sea Defense Command was recently recently established.to establishad t o preclude p r e c l u d e threatened.Japanese-Korean t h r e a t e n e d Japanese-Korean incidents incidents over near the.Korean_coast. o v e r fishing f i s h i n g rights, rights n ear t h e Korean coast, The move has.been h a s been i n c o r r e c t l y interpreted, i n t e r p r e t e d by e Koreans as e x c l u d i n g Japanese Japanese incorrectly by t h the Koreansas excluding b u t not. not Korean fishing o perations i n t he d e s i g n a t e d zone. zone. but Korean.fishing operations in the designated
4.
North Korean Navy reportedly r e p o r t e d l y augmented. by. PT b o a t s : The N o r t h x r e a n Navy r e c s , n t l v received 14 Datrol. t . maf t North-rarean. Navy recen from the Soviet Union, f r o m t h e S o v i e t Union, These boats, b o a t s , with their t h e d r crews, are.under are under training t r a i n i n g in in Unggi Unggi harbor on the t h e Korean.east Korean east coast c o a s t a few miles from the t h e Soviet Soviet border.

,
1
Ligh.tner b e l i e v e s tthat h a t Rhee h o u l d bo o l d "in no u ncerLightner believes. Rhee sshould be ttold "in.no uncertain t a i n terms terms" t h a t t this. h i s isis.a a UN Command s p a n s i b i l i t y and hat that. UN Commandr e responsibility and tthat no w i l l be. be ttolerated. o l e r a t e d . .He...notes, Hs n o t e s , however, that n o contravention. c o n t r a v e n t i o n wi/1 however, that an effort e f f o r t to t o curb. c u r b Rhee Rhee might might raise r a i s e the. t h e question q u e s t i o n of of UN UN opera.oparat i o n a l con-trol o v e r the.South t h e S o u t h Korean. Korean Armed o r c e s , and the the tional,control. over Armed. F Forces,.and problem of_Japanese of Japanese civilian c i v i l i a n .personnel p e r s o n n e l used s q u a l l y .delicate problem equally-delicate used by the t h e UN UN forces. forces.
I
.
__
. ..
A similar, . s i m i l a r report r e p o r t, A was received r e c e i v e d by B y the 3 h e US Ud Navy N avv, in in September. Sepkember.
North Korean Korean Navy Navy last lost its its small small p patrolComment: The. The North atroltorpeaTTarf force. the force at. at t h e beginning b e g i n n i n g of of the .the war war as asa. a result result torpecboat of US US naval n a v a l action. action.
f f o r t s to t o defend the.east t h e east coast coast Heightened Communist s efforts were US.naval.aircraft were evidenced evidenced by by MI0-15. MIG-15 iinterception_of n t e r c e p t i o n of US naval.aireraft over Hungnamon Hungnam onthe t h eeast_coast e a s t . c o a s ton on4.and 4 . a n d7. 7 October, O c t o b e r , the t h e first first such a year. year. s u c h incidents i n c i d e n t s in i n over over a
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5. 5 .
Top_ Korean. Communist reported. at Soviet . Party_ Congress : .Ho_ Ka,i, Korean, Labor .Party
Korea, central_committeeman_ figure in iw North North Korea, central.commitkseman and a a powerful. powerful figure and other_leading. North Korsan Korean_Labor men. departed departed and two, twa other..leading.North Labor Party_ Par.ty men on 21 September Ssptenber for for Moscow Moscow to to attend attend t1e.19th t4e 19th Communist Communist Party Party Congress. Congress.
]this group while en en this.group.while route to to Moscow. route would confer confer.with with Mme. Mme. Pak Pak Chong-ae Chong7ae, who who is Moscow would allegedlv, attending. the.Peining Peace Conference. Conference. all e 1 . at di he el Comment: Official Communis% presa indicate press releases releases indicate Comment.: Official,Communist. did. not to Peiping,but but instead instead headed headed that Mme....Pak G K T E k did not gogo to Peiping, the Nor-th Korean Korean delegation delegation to. to Moscow the'Notth Moscow and and addressed the the on 99 October. October. Party Cnngress Congresson
r'P-1
6. 6.
In: view.a.MmeIn. vinw of-Yme, PaVs. Pak'a relatively relatively low low position. position in.the in the North Ka-i, reportreportI t is_possible I s possiblethat. that no. E b Ka-i, North Korean.hierarchy,. Karean hierarchy, it edly the.real also in in Moscow Moscow the m a l party party powar_in_North,Korea,.is power.3.n North Korea, is also in an unpublicized unpublicized capacity. capacity.
New New enemy enemy military military plans. plans in Korea reported: At a joint joint on20 20September,. September, it it C b i n e m t h Korean Korean Command Command conference conferenceon Chine4W=Mith. was decided decided.to order new newunits unitsinto, into Korea Korea and, and to the was to order to maintain maintain the S I temno of front-aine oneretional
AUsgadly a Chinese-army group-from the.Third_rield. Thir4. Field Army Allegedly a.Chinese_army.group.from the Army at Liaoyang In ManYan(about 120,000 (about .120,000.men),. men), presently presently stationed stationed_at Liaoyang.ln
churia -vith.considerablsarmored strength, will move. into churia.mith_considerable,armored,strength,.will moveinto Korea In,.the .first two weeks. wdeks of October. These fa r m s , along Korea in, the_first_two. of_October.... These. forces,_along with with two. twr, Manchurian-trained Manchurian,,trained. Norkh. North. Korean. KoreanAivisions, divisiona, will be be deployed.as deep.defenssforce. force on .the Pyongyang-Wonsan deployedas_aadeep,defense the Pyongying-Monsan line. line.
I
Also ]planned at..the meeting was a. a continuatipn 'Also.planned.at. the.meeting_was continuation of of the the UN fighter-bombers "limited front-line to divert divert UN. "limited, front-line attacks" attacks" to fighter,bombers from rear from rear area area transportation.and,supply transportation and.supplytargets.to. targets to ground ground support. roles. 1 support roles. 1
.
additraTir-Commtinisttroops.into addit~~onrPPu'nist,traop into s
Comment: There..is no of the movement of of Comment:..There_is. no confirmation confirmation,of ltorsa. It Korea. I t is_possible, is possibls, however, in view a UlV offensive however,_in. view,of ofwidespread widespreadenemy enemy fears fears of of_a_UN offensive and amphibious amphibious operations, operations, that that the the enemy will reinforce reinforce the the strategic Pyongyang-Wonsan Pyongyang-Wonsan lateral lateral with additional additionrl troops. troops.
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.
FAR EAST
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HR70-14 HR70-14
Chinese unit u n i t in i n Korea reveals scope scope of of its i t a farming farming 29 September the t h e Chinese Communist 21s1 2 1st a c t l v m e s : On 0-September activTabs; Artillery Regiment, in X-y-Regiment, in a a report r e p o r t for for division d i v i s i o n headquarters, headquarters, mentioned its i t s acreage a c r e a g e under cultivation c u l t i v a t i o n and the the p robable probable food to t o be be produced. produced. The regiment was farming farming amount of food approximately 45 acres a c r e s and and expected e x p e c t e d to,produce t o , p r o d u c e 1,650 1 , 6 5 0 pounds pounds of cabbage, 650 of 050 pounds of of melons, and and some some 8flOpounds pounds of of T976, ,peppers, eggplants e g g p l a n t s and a'nd tomatoes. tomatoes. (CANOE Lf8nfT976, peppers, L 1 1O c t 52) 52) 11 Oct Comment: Previous P r e v i o u s messages have alluded a l l u d e d to t o Chinese Chinese u n i t s engaging in i n agricultural agricultural p ursuits, b ut t his Communist units pursuits, but this t h e first f i r s t intercept i n t e r c e p t to t o give g i v e definite d e f i n i t e production p r o d u c t i o n figures figures is the f o r a particular p a r t i c u l a r unit. unit. for
5. 5 .
4. 4.
fields f i e l d s in i n Manchuria now have v very e r y high high f frequency r e q u e n c y (VHF) (VHF) c control ontrol f a c i l i t i e s . All 411 of these t h e s e fields f i e l d s are tied t i e d into i n t o the t h e Soviet Soviet facilities. GCI net n e t at a t Shenyang Shenyang and and Anshan. Anshan. (CANOE 197, (CANOE AF AF Roundup Roundup 197, 10 O Oct c t 52) 52)
F i v e Manchurian Manchurian *airfields ' a i r f i e l d s have Five have impsoved improved communications communications facilities: eveals t hat f ive a irCommunications analysis r reveals that five airfacilities: CotnmunicaZons
Comment: The use u s e of VHF facilities f a c i l i t i e s in i n Manchuria and and Koreaa recent development. development. To d ate o n l y Soviet-manned Soviet-manned Korea-ri a date only a i r c r a f t have been reported r e p o r t e d using this t h i s equipment. eqhipment. aircraft C Chinese h i n e s e Communist air a i r division d i v i s i o n transfer t r a n s f e r noted: noted: A irAirc raftt h e Chinese Communist 9 th A ir D i v i s i o n were eported craft-Ea the 9th Air Division were r reported to t o be moving from Tunhua to t o another a n o t h e r Manchurian airfield a i r f i e l d on on either Kaiyuan o or 7 O c t o b e r . Their destination d e s t i n a t i o n was e i t h e r Kaiyuan r Lalin October. CHICOMSUM 1174, AP-414, a i r f i e l d l . (CANOE CHICOMSUM AP-414, 10 1 0 Oct O c t 52) 52) airfield. Coniment: The reason r e a s o n for for this this transfer t r a n s f e r is is unknown. unknown. Comment: Tunhurt-Eig-Fecently become an an iintermediate base f for Soviet T u n h u a e c e n t l y become n t e r m e d i a t e base or S oviet a i r c r a f t flying f l y i n g between between Dairen D a i r e n and and Soviet S o v i e t Russia. Russia. aircraft
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14 O c t 52 52 14 Oct
TOP SECRET CANOE

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DOCUMENT NO.

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SUMMARY
SOVIET UNION
1. 2.
Malik attempts to sound out US on Korea (page 3). Kennan comments on Soviet approach to France (page 3).
FAR EAST
3.
4,
Ambassador Murphy comments on political situation in Japan (page 4).
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NEAR EAST - AFRICA
5.,
Iranian cabinet ministers reportedly refuse to resign (page 5).

Egypt maintains reservations on Sudan statute (page 6).
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6.
7.
8.
Yugoslav relations with Vatican deteriorate (page 7).
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SOVIET UNION
1.
Malik attempts to sound out US on Korea:
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Malik supported the Chinese stand on repatriation of prisoners, although his remarks suggested to the Israeli that the USSR is less opposed than the Chinese Communists to the most recent UN proposals.
The Israeli delegate commented that Malik appeared uninformed on current Soviet policy pending Vyshinsky's arrival. He believed Malik would assume that their conversation would be reported to the United States.
2.
Kennan comments on Soviet approach to France:
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Ambassador Kennan reports that the recent approach of Soviet Foreign Minister Vyshinsky to French Ambassador Joke for a new understanding with France s a 'major Soviet move aimed at splitting the Western community." Kennan believes the Soviet move fits in completely with foreign policy laid .down last April and recently made public in Stalin's article in Bolshevik.

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Soviet UN delegate Malik asked the Israeli delegate on 10 October what UN action the United States desires on Korea. Malik questioned whether the US really wants peace in Korea, citing the election campaign speechesi and Eisen ower's "admission" that American prosperity depends on a war economy.
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The Ambassador feels that if talks take place the French will not fail to recognize "the Soviet ill will and duplicity which underlies all of its diplomatic moves toward non-Communist governments."
FAR EAST
3.
Ambassador Murphy comments on political situation in Japan:
election has brought about a changed n uncer n po ca situation in Japan. He notes that the new Diet will include 132 wartime leaders and a substantial number of other new members whose stand on current issues is at present unknown. He believes that although the election failed to produce a clear mandate on any specific issue, it can be interpreted as a general endorsement of the principle of American-Japanese cooperation. Murphy points out that n o prominent Japanese who held office during the occupation was defeated, despite predictions that this group would be repudiated at the polls.
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4.

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Ambassador Murphy believes that, despite the success of the Liberal and
Progressive Parties, the recent
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5.
Iranian cabinet ministers reportedly refuse to resign:

The cabinet ministers whom Mossadeq planned to replace have refused to
r esign,
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Mossadeq can novi remove them only by himself resigning, obtaining reappointment and forming a new cabinet.
Mossadeq hesitates to resign because he is not sure that Kashani will support him for reappointment. Recently he called on the mullah to ask his advice.

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Comment: Even the National Front has criticized the cabinet for its inefficiency. Mossadeq's opponents may hope to use the ministers' refusal to resign as a way to force parliament to discuss the cabinet, which could lead to an attempt to vote the Prime Minister out of office.
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7.
Egypt maintains reservations on Sudan statute:

The Egyptian Government has serious reservations on the British draft statute for the audan, according to
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representatives of General Nagib's inner circle. The military regime considers that it will be necessary to consult with the various Sudanese political factions before Egypt can state its objections to the present draft.
According to Ambassador Caffery, the real objective of the Cairo regime is selfdetermination for the Sudanese. He points out that, although this is a departure from past Egyptian policy of "unity of the Nile Valley," it would free the Sudan from de facto British sovereignty as well as from nominal Egyptian suzerainty.
B.
Yugoslav relations with Vatican deteriorate:
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Ambassador Allen reports that tension in official Yugoslav-Vatican relations has sharply increased as a result of the press campaign attacking alleged interference by the Vatica.n in internal Yugoslav affairs. The press charges that the Vatican instructed the recent bishops' conference in Zagreb to order the clergy not to join government-sponsored priest associations.
The Papal Charge d'Affaires in Belgrade is extremely worried about the future position of the Nunqiate.
Comment: Assistant Yugoslav Foreign Minister Bebler recently told the French Ambassador that it was very likely that Vatican representation in Yugoslavia would soon be terminated.
The increasinly vehement press claims that the actions of the Papal Charge go "beyond the bounds" of diplomatic immunity further indicate that the government is considering a complete break in relations.

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A bre* with the Vatican would largely negate the popular good will which the Yugoslav regime obtained in the West by its release of Archbishop Stepinac in late 1951.
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Comment: These messages, Conuaos: messages, in contrast contrast w i t h the t h e 1950 1950 with greetniii, clearly greet=, c l e a r l y show show that t h a t the t h e Communists are a r e less sure s u r e of of t h e outcome outcoine of the t h e Korean Korean war war than t h a n they t h e y were were then. then, A t that that the At Sta:Lin expressed e x p r e s s e d hope for f o r a "united, " u n i t e d , independent, independent, demotime, Stalin craticl' Korea, Korea, w h i l e the t h e Soviet S o v i e t press quoted Kim K i m as a s saying saying cratic" while t h e "Soviet @'Sovietforeign f o r e i g n policy p o l i c y strengthens s t r e n g t h e n s our o u r people's p e o p l e l s bet h a t the that l lief i e f in a triumphant conclusion c o n c l u s i o n to t o the t h e sacred sacred war." war."
1. 1.
S t a l h n and Kim Il I 1 Sun Sung exchan exchange g reetin r e e t i n g s on fourth f o u r t h amiStalin anniaD versar e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f dip1omatic relations: On 11 and 12broadcast Radi o Moscow b r o a d c a s t an exchange of g greetings reetings K i m Il I 1 Sung and Stalin S t a l i n on the t h e fourth f o u r t h annianaibetween Premier Kim versary v e r e a r y of ole the t h e establishment e s t a b l i s h m e n t of o f diplomatic d i p l o m a t i c relations r e l a t i o n s between North Korea Koraa and and the t h e USSR. USSR. Kim e x p r e s s e d gratitude g r a t i t u d e for f o r the the expressed S o v i e t Union, Union, * 1 s e l f 1 e 8 s assistance and friendly f r i e n d l y supportv1 t h e Soviet "selfless support" of the w h i l e Stalin Sta:Lin hoped that t h a t the t h e Koreans Koreans would have "successes **successes in while in t heir h e r o i c fight f i g h t for the t h e freedom and independence of their their heroic motherland." mother l a n d . *I I
versary o esasac_reaons: n
15 Oct O c t 52 52 15
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10. 10.
Comment: The press p r e s s campaign was probably probably inspired i n s p i r e d in in b y S o u t h Korea's esire t o b u i l d up its case for ininp a r t uy-szzall part Korea's d desire to build creased UM a s s i s t a n c e in i n food and o t h e r conUN and American assistance other sumer goods. goods. Among other o t h e r things, t h i n g s , the p press ress a articles r t i c l e s claimed that destruct h a t 9,000,000 9,000,000 civilians c i v i l i a n s are destitute d e s t i t u t e and that t h a t war d estructo a p o i n t where a ttempted t i o n has reduced ROK morale to tion point attempted suicides alarming proportions. are rreaching eaching a larming p r o p o r t i o n s . The Communists e u i c i d e s .are q u i c k to have been quick t o utilize u t i l i z e these these stories s t o r i e s in i n their t h e i r propaganda broadcasts. broadcastrr.

SECRET -!meRwP
6 6
Solith r e s s exaggerates e x a g g e r a t e s economic situation: situation: Smith Korean p press American UN Clarence Iyee, director director Ameri-nd and U N officials c i a l s called on C l a r e n c e Ryee, of the t h e ROK ROK O Office f f i c e of Public P u b l i c Information, I n f o r m a t i o n , in in a an n attempt attempt to to s e c u r e official o f f i c i a l South Korean cooperation c o o p e r a t i o n in i n checking t he secure the c current u r r e n t Korean press campaign e exaggerating x a g g e r a t i n g the the s social o c i a l and d i s t r e s s in i n South South Korea. Korea. Ryee at a t first claimed economic distress t h a t the campaign that c:ampa;Lgn was part p a r t of of the t h e usual u s u a l carping c a r p i n g of of the the o p p o s i t i o n press, p r e s s , but b u t when confronted confronted w i t h the the f a c t that that opposition with fact t h e stories s t o r i e s were actually a c t u a l l y initiated i n i t i a t e d by by pro-government pro-government the papers, he h e shifted s h i f t e d to t o a general g e n e r a l condemnation of all a l l Korean e d i t o r s as a@ "rascals" ~~ra6cals who " changed changed policy p o l i c y daily. daily. H e agreed, agreed, editors who He however, to t o take take the t h e matter up UP with w i t h the t h e editors at a t his next next press press conference. conIerence. 1
15 c t 52 52 15 O Oct
F A R EAST FAR
4. 4 .
North vacate airfields in Yalu N o r t h Korean aircraft aircraft v a c a t e combat a irfields i n Yalu River 15 0ctober of 6069 R i v e r complex: complex: m a planned n n e d movement on 15-October The Rorth North Korean Ko r e a n conventional c o n v e n t i o n a l aircraft a i r c r a f t from combat airfields airfields in the R i v e r complex, including I n c l u d i n g Sinuiju, S i n u i j u , to t o airfields airfields i n t h e Yalu River was reported r e p o r t e d on o n the t h e Chinese Chinese i n the t h e Manchurian interior i n t e r i o r was in navigational October. a i r net n e t on on 14 1 4 October. n a v i g a t i o n a l air
r e p o r t i n g Air A i r Force F o r c e field f i e l d unit adds that t h a t a similar The reporting Chinese that Korean-piloted C h i n e s e message of 12 1 2 October indicated indicated t h a t 34 K orean-piloted MIG-15's were to River MIG-15's t o move from from Antung on the t h e Yalu R i v e r to to Anshan in i n the t h e interior. i n t e r i o r . (CANOE F J a p a n , AP-462, SPOT 451, 451, (CANOE A AF Japan, AP-462, SPOT
will practically Comment: These transfers transfers w ill p r a c t i c a l l y empty the aUniTas in the t h eYalu YaluRiver R i v e r complex complex of of North N o r t h Korean t he a i r f : m sin air units, u n i t s , still still largely l a r g e l y in in a a training t r a i n i n g phase. p h a s e . The move may be designed d e s i g n e d to t o provide p r o v i d e facilities f a c i l i t i e s for f o r additional a d d i t i o n a l trained trained Soviet or Chinese C h i n e s e combat combat units. units.
Communist fears fears of of UN UN amphibious amphibioue operations o p e r a t i o n s still e t i l l high: high: OCTober the North Kbrean 21st Z Brigade in western m On 5 G Hwanghae Province P r o v i n c e instructed i n s t r u c t e d subordinate s u b o r d i n a b battalions b a t t a l i o n s that that "according Headquarters, t o the t h e report r e p o r t of the Supreme H e a d q u a r t e r s , 3,000 3,000 " a c c o r d i n g to Japanese September and t three J a p a n e s e soldiers s o l d i e r s landed l a n d e d at a t Inchon Inchon on 15 September hree divisions of the t h e US and and British B r i t i s h army assembled there." there." d i v i s i o n s 3 of The message admonished the t h e subordinate s u b o r d i n a t e units u n i t s to t o be b e especially especially alert a l e r t for any indication i n d i c a t i o n of of UN amphibious amphibious operations. operations. (CANOE SKO-95, FECOM Special (CANOE SKO-95, S , p e c i a l Intelligence I n t e l l i g e n c e Bulletin B u l l e t i n 595, 595, 9 9 Oct Oct 52) 52)
Comment: Comment: Beginning in i n late l a t e August, August, Communist forces f o r c e s in in K o r e a x m e e n on a semd-alert semd-alert s t a t u s in i n anticipation a n t i c i p a t i o n of a KoreaThTiirbeen status UN coordinated c o o r d i n a t e d land-air-amphibious land-air-amphibious offensive. o f f e n s i v e . It I t is is apparent apparent from this thici message that t h a t the t h e enemy is still s t i l l fearful f e a r f u l of of such s u c h an operation. operation.
E. E.

Korea. Korea.
3 3
h a s alleged, a l l e g e d , both b o t h in i n intercepted intercepted m ilitary The enemy has military messages and and propaganda propaganda broadcasts, b r o a d c a s t s , that t h a t a considerable considerable force of Japanese with J a p a n e s e troops t r o o p s is is serving serving w i t h UN forces in in
14 Oct 14 O c t 52) 52)
16 O c t 52 52 16 Oct
--TOPSECRET CANOE
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1. North Korean Korean aircraft aircraft vacate 1. North vacate combat combat airfields airfields in inYalu Yalu River River complex: complex:
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movement on on 15 October of o f The planned planned movement 69 North North Korean Korean conventional conventionalaircraft aircraft from combat airfields in combat airfields in the the Yal Yai t s River River 52 14 Oct 52 complex, including Sinuiju, to airfields complex, including Sinuiju, to airfields CANOE CANOE APflp-fb* ;W 144, ' fAr' in tn the Manchurian Manchurian interior interior was reported on the Chinese navigational air net on 14 October. navigational net on 14 October.
US US A Air i r Force Japan
v '

units.
The reporting Air Force Force field field unit unit adds adds that a similar similarChinese Chinesemessage messageof of 12 12October October indicated indicated that that 34 34 Korean-ploted MIG-15's River Korean-pihted MIG-15's were were to to move move from fromAntung Antung on the Yalu R iver to Anshan Ansha:? the interior.
Comment: These These transfers will practically Comment: inCiac. tke Yalu empty the airfields airfieldsin YaluRiver River cov.plex complexof ofNorth North Korean Korean air air The movemay maybe be designed designed units, still move units, stilllargely largely in in a atraining tratning phase. phase. The to provide facilities facilities for for additional additional trained trained Soviet Soviet or o r Chinese Chinese combat combat
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19 October 1952
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SUMMARY
FAR EAST
1.
Communist ground capabilities in western Korea significantly reduced (page 3).

NEAR EAST - AFRICA
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3.
4.
5.
6.
7. 8.
9.
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(page 3).
2.
Britain now favors early approach to Arab states on MEDO
US Ambassador doubts success of Point Four in Lebanon (page 4). Syria signs agreement for the resettlement of Arab refugees
(page 5).
EASTERN EUROPE
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WESTERN EUROPE
Austria opposes US views on peace treaty (page 6). French Government optimistic on lifting parliamentary immunity of top Communists (page 7). Spain reportedly evading strategic export ban (page 7).
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FAR EAST
1
Communist ground capabilities in western Korea significantly reduced:
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This army's new position further west leaves the Communists with no immediate reserve known to be in support of the front line from the west coast to Pyonggang in the central sector.
2.
Britain now favors early approach to Arab States on MEDO:

Britain is now prepared to join with the other sponsoring powers of the Middle East Defense Organization in an early approach to the Arab States. The British Foreign Office recommends the presentation of a written statement to the Arab governments asking for their preliminary views on Middle East defense planning, but warns against entering into any extended negotiations. An approach to Egypt would be accompanied by further British attempts to solve the Suez problem.
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Comment: Britain had previously argued that no approach should be madeTo the Middle East states until after the actual establishment of the proposed Middle East defense planning organization.

NEAR EAST - AFRICA
The recent movement of the Chinese Communist 63rd Army from the immediate rear in the western sector of the front reduces significantly the probability cl a Communist general offensive, according to Far East Command. It also represents a serious weakening of the enemy's immediate defensive capability.
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4. US Ambassador doubts success of Point Four in Lebanon:

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Ambassador Minor doubts that the Point Four program can be successfully carried out in Lebanon and believes that even the present programs should be delayed until there is 6idence of true Lebanese cooperation.

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The Ambassador feels that the program has been pressed on Lebanon to the point of imposing aid and adds that the entrenched interests and high government officials of the country have no desire for the Point Four type of assistance.
Comment: The states of the Middle East in general have been reluctant to enter the Point Four program. Since Beirut is the center for the program in the area, the failure of Point Four in Lebanon would have unfavorable reactions in other Arab states.
5.
Syria signs agreement for the resettlement of Arab refugees:

On 13 October Colonel Shishakli,
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$30,000,000 agreement with the United Nations Belief and Works Agency for the resettlement of 80,000 Palestine Arab refugees now in Syria. The agreement is to remain secret until public opinion in the country is prepared. Syria has not
yet publicly accepted the principle of resettlement of Palestinian refugees, and the text of the agreement refers only to "amelioration of living conditions:'
Comment: Although the lengthy negotiations over the resettlement of Arab refugees have been concluded, implementation of the agreement may be slow because Shishakli is aware of the general Arab sentiment which insists that the refugees be returned to their original homes.

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Ambassador Berry in Iraq has also reported strong local criticism of the program.
military dictator of Syria, signed a
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7.
Austria opposes US views on peace treaty:
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American officials in Vienna report that the consensus of opinion in the Austrian Government is that mere evacuation of occupation forces and the end of the occupation regime would be preferable to an indefinite prolongation of t he wasting situation. Austrian officials believe that their observers at the UN would encourage such a proposal there if it were presented be another power.
Comment: The Austrian attitude toward the American-supported draft Irei(Thon before the UN, calling the occupation powers to resume negotiations for a "state treaty," has been considerably in doubt. The present development suggests that Austria is in clear disagreenient with the American view that the evacuation of troops without sufficient guaeantees of Austrian national integrity would be hazardous.

WESTERN EUROPE
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8.
French Government optimistic on lifting parliamentary immunity of top Communists: A French Defense Ministry official has informed the American Embassy that the case for, lifting the parliamentary immunity of five leading Communist members of the National Assembly has been carefully prepared and is fairly well documented. The case has been presented by the Paris Military Tribunal to the Parliamentary Immunity Commission, and a favorable recommendation to the Assembly is hoped for within the.next few weeks.
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Comment: Lifting of parliamentary immunity wotild enable thilaiFiment to put the Communists on trial for having encouraged disobedience in the armed forces and having attempted to obtain secret military information. Material seized during recent raids on Communist organizations would be used to document these charges.
9.
Spain reportedly evading strategic export ban:
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The purchaser was R. J. Antonioni of Geneva, an East-West trader.

I
A shipment of 1,460 tons of lead ignots, which left Spain early in October for delivery to Hamburg, is destined for transshipment to the Soviet bloc, I
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strategic materials to the Soviet bloc. By last summer, however, Spain's dollar position had deteriorated to such an extent that the government authorized the sale of low-grades pyrites with the full knowledge that these materials were ultimately destined for the Soviet bloc. Spanish authorities have in the past blocked direct sales ci lead to Antoniolli, but they have disclaimed responsibility for indirect transactions,presumably like the present one.
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in December 1951 pledgeatooThieTation in controlling exports of
Comment: Spain's Ministry of Commerce
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7. 7
Communist ground ground c capabilities in western Korea Communist apabilities i n w e s t e r n Korea significantly reduced: recent movement of of t the Chinese s igni'Pican~~ ~ d r ~ ~ ~ The cyed r e fc : e n t movement he C hinese CommudiSt 63rd Army from Communist rom the t h e immediate immediate rear r e a r in i n the the western w e s t e r n sector of the t h e front f r o n t reduces r e d u c e s significantly s i g n i f i c a n t l y the the probability offensive, according p r o b a b i l i t y of a a Communist Communist genera!l genera'l o ffensive, a ccording It also represents serious weakento Far to F a r East E a s t Command. Command. I t a lso r epresents a s e r i o u s weakening of of t the enemy's immediate defensive ing h e enemy's d e f e n s i v e caphbility. capaSility.
T h i s army's army's new p osition f urther w This position further west e s t leaves leaves t the he Communists with w i t h no no immediate immediate reserve r e s e r v e known to t o be in in support west coast coast to s u p p o r t of the t h e front f r o n t line l i n e from the t h e west t o Pyonggang in central Telecon, i n the the c e n t r a l sector. s e c t o r . (S CINCFE T e l e c o n , 18 18 Oct O c t 52) 52)
8. 8 .
C h i n e s e artillery a r t i l l e r y moves into i n t o west oast d efense Chinese west c coast defense positions: - v unit, D o s i t i o n s : An unidentinea u n i d e n t i f i ed Chinese Ch i n e s e artillery a r t i l_l_e r u --nit. using a c cryptographic to ;sing r y p t o g r a p h i c system s y s t e m similar similart o that t h a t of of the $he 1st 1st Artillery A r t i l l e r y Division, D i v i s i o n , reported r e p o r t e d on 5 October that t h a t it i t had contacted c o n t a c t e d the t h e headquarters h e a d q u a r t e r s of the t h e Chinese C h i n e s e 63rd Army in in western w e s t e r n Hwanghae Bwanghae province p r o v i n c e and had received r e c e i v e d orders o r d e r s to to "reconnoiter sand in " r e c o n n o i t e r the t h e area area north n o r t h of of Yonan. Yonan. . .aud i n the the vicinity of Paekchon Paekchon, 5 v i c i n i t y af P d! (CANOE L E / ~ I - ~ T-134J, YZU, 5 Oct O c t 52) 52)
I
Commen,..: Cornmen.,: . The area of reconnaissance r e c o n n a i s s a n c e is i s a coastal coastal one, Taiiii-Mentioned enemy messages messages a as a p possible o ne, n x r m e n t i o n e d iin n enemy s a ossible landing f o r an a n expected e x p e c t e d UN UN attack. a t t a c k . This T h i s early early l a n d i n g area for October movement of additional a d d i t i o n a l artillery a r t i l l e r y is i s an indicaindication of the t h e enemy's enemy's continued c o n t i n u e d anxiety a n x i e t y about a b o u t a possible possible amphibious attack. amphibious attack.
9.
Chinese e US C h i n e s e armor armor reluctant r e l u c t a n t to t o enga engage US tanks: t a n k s : The The Chineii-Communist C h i n e s e Communist 2nd 2nd Tank Tank Company, Company, support s u p p o r t i ng n g elements elements of the Hill, t h e 38th 3 t ) t h Army in i n the t h e battle b a t t l e for f o r White W h i t e Horse H i l l , rereported p o r t e d on on 11 11 October that t h a t "our "our tanks t a n k s were ordered o r d e r e d to to counterattack c o u n t e r a t t a c k the t h e enemy enemy tanks." t a n k s . " The message concluded concluded with t h e laconic l a c o n i c statement s t a t e m e n t that t h a t "after " a f t e r we stated s t a t e d our our w i t h the L T I T -T-1332, 1 3 3 2 , 11 11 Oct O c t 52) 52) opinions, (CANOE L w e did d i d not not go." go.'' o p i n i o n s , we
This i n t e r p r e t e d as providing providing T h i s message may be interpreted Comment: additUiiii-ividence t h e thesis t h e s i s that t h a t the t h e current c u r r e n t role role a d d i t E n l v i d e n c e for the of Chkaese direct C h x e n e armor at a t the t h e front f r o n t is is one of d i r e c t fire-support fire-support rather r a t h e r than t h a n an a n anti-tank a n t i - t a n k weapon. weapon. It I t is further f u r t h e r possible possible that the Chinese, C h i n e s e , with the t h e lighter l i g h t e r T-34, were being b e i n g realistic realistic t h a t the in refusing in r e f u s i n g to t o face f a c e heavier-gunned heavier-gunned US US medium medium tanks. tanks.
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10. 10,
N o r t h Korean attem a t t e m pt t to t o contact c o n t a c t guerrilla u e r r i l l a unit u n i t in i n South North sort orean messaze messa:e of o 24~ Korea: A recen r e c e n t l y ava a v a i l as a b le e N o r t h Korean =revealed th at th e Communists t tthat h a t time lanning 3U:71g-revealed that the Communist aat time were ware p planning t to o c contact o n t a c t Communist Communist guerrillas g u e r r i l l a s in i nSout:h Sciuth Korea. Korea. The linelinecrossers were to t o deliver d e l i v e r storage s t o r a g e batteries b a t t e r i e s to t o the t h e insurgents insurgents t h r o u g h a local through local S South o u t h Korean Korean labor labor p party arty o organization. rganization. (CANOE CI-IT-2, SPOT 4026A, 4026A, 15 15 Oct O C t 52) 52) (CANOE CI---7T-2, SPOT

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Comment: As a result r e s u l t of of vigorous v i g o r o u s UN antiguerrilla antiguerrilla a c t i v i t y , -54-Sgun activity, b e g u n i n in December December 1951, 1951, Communist Communistg guerrilla u e r r i l l a sstrength trength in the Republic of Korea is now r reduced i n t he R e p u b l i c of e d u c e d to t o less than t h a n 2,000. 2,000. P a r t i s a n raids r a i d s at a t present p r e s e n t are are conducted c o n d u c t e d primarily , p r i m a r i l y to t o obtain obtain Partisan food i t h sabotage s a b o t a g e effo:ts effo::s only o n l y secondary. s e c o n d a r y . On the the food and arms, arms, w with basis b a s i s of communications intelligence, i n t e l l i g e n c e , there there has h a s been been no no r a d i o contact c o n t a c t between the t h e guerrillas g u e r r i l l a s and and North North Korea Korea in i n over over radio year. a year.
20 O Oct c t 52 52
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6. 6.
N North o r t h Koreans apparently a p g a r e n t l y expanding e x p a n d i n g their t h e i r antiaircraft antiaircraft defenge-gi-A series of of North North K Xorean o r e a n messages dated d a t e d from from 3 3 d e f e n m series to 13 13 October 0c t o b e r suggest s u g g e s t that that a a further f u r t h e r expansion e x p a n s i o n of of antiairantiairc r a f t units u n i t s is is currently c u r r e n t l y undar undor viay. bvay. craft
Messages from from three three antiaircraft a n t i a i r c r a f t regiments r e g i m e n t s in i n the the Wonsan-Hamhung-Tanchon east c o a s t area in in t he f i r s t week Wonsan-Hamhung-Tanchon east coast the first week i n October s t a t e d that t h a t many persons p e r s o n s had gone to t o Kanggye, Kanggye, in stated i n ,..Lath in central Korea on on tthe main s supply i.urth c e n t r a l Korea h e main u p p l y route. r o u t e . One message suggested s u g g e s t e d that t h a t 37mm 37mm antiaircraft a n t i a i r c r a f t guns g u n s were were to t o be be picked p i c k e d up up there. there.
Messages Messages dated dated from f r o m 10 10 to to 13 13 October O c t o b e r detailed d e t a i l e d the the w i t h d r a w a l of of antiaircraft a n t i a i r c r a f t gunners g u n n e r s from f r o m divisions d i v i s i o n s suborsuborwithdrawal I 1 and and V Corps Corps on o n the t h e east east coast coast and and their their d i n a t e to t o the t h e II dinate subsequent s u b s e q u e n t departure d e p a r t u r e for f o r Pyongyang. Pyongyang. A message on on a a net net associated w i t h the t h e Antiaircraft A n t i a i r c r a f t Command Command spoke of of the the with "newly o r g a n i z e d regiment" r e g i m e n t " on on 13 13October October a,,d a d on the t h e same same "newly organized addressed a a message message to t o the t h e "32nd "32nd regimental r e g i m e n t a l commander" commander" day addressed r e l a t i v e to t o the t h e recei recei t t of of ammunition, ammunition guns u n s and and primer primer relative movers. m o v e r s . (CANOE IL mQ-1154 /T-1154 3 3 o Odt, ct, i IL d p / T -T-l22j izzsi 5 ci Oct, oct, RSM/4278 7 FECOM pecial 7 Oct, O c t , FE p e c i a l Intelligence I n t e P l i e n c e Bulletii B u l l e t i k , 596, 596, 11 1 1 Oct 52; IL /T-1342, 11 1 1 Oct. Oct. I L d T 1 3 6 6 , 13 13 Oct; Oct; /T-1342, /T-1366, IL /T-1 O IL cDTf f;@ 14 Oct; 14 O c t ; IL ILAp)T-1401, T-1401, 14 14 Oct O c t 52) 52)
,
the Comment: These messages would indicate i n d i c a t e that t h a t the Comment; N o r t h Koreans may e aactivating c t i v a t i n g two ntiaircraft North-n-Fitifis mayb be two new new a antiaircraft regiments. r egiments.
7. 7.
C h i n e s e tank t a n k company company to t o withdraw withdraw from from the the Battered Chinese front-F--A-Chinese front-Chinese ttank a n k company, company, p probably r o b a b l y the t h e 2nd, 2nd, whiCh which has-d-een s u p p o r t i n g the t h e 38th 3 8 t h Army has been supporting Army in i n the t h e battle b a t t l e for f o r White White Horse Hill, Hill, was instructed i n s t r u c t e d by by its i t s parent p a r e n t regiment r e g i m e n t on on 16 16 O c t o b e r that t h a t it October i t must remain remain in i n position p o s i t i o n for f o r "a "a couple c o u p l e of of days" and tha'; if if" "the t h e s situation ituation d does oes n not ot c change, h a n g e , there there and tha',; w i l l be be a a (uniform?) ( u n i f o r m ? ) withdrawal." withdrawal." will
A message from from the t h e 2nd 2nd company company to t o the t h e regimental regimental headquarters on t the previous day ay d detailed e t a i l e d t the h e ccondiion o n d i - r , i o nof of h e a d q u a r t e r s on he p revious d seven T h r e e were were operational, operational, s e v e n tanks t a n k s under under its I t s control. c o n t r o l . Three but b u t four had met with with a a variety v a r i e t y of of noncombat noncombat mishaps and and r required e q u i r e d at a t least least some some repairs. repairs. (CANOE L(-YT-l40L, LE-11T-140E,, 15 15 790, O ct ;i ) . 7 9 0 , 16 16 Oct O c t 52) 52) OctH
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Cornmen$: The The standard standard table table ,f ,f equipment equipment of oP a a Chinese Chinese Comment: line tank company s i xT-1.4 T - ~ 4tanks. tanks. It is is possible, possible, line mota d a n y calls callsfor forsix therefore, that the above reporthg unit was was reinforced reinforced for for therefore, reportng unit its special support mission. mission. special support
The The reference reference to to a a future future "withdrawal" is further further evievi"withdrawal" is dence of dence of the the limited limited nature nature of of present present Communist Communist operations. operations,
8. 8.
North Korean Korean coastal coastal security security unit's unit'a strength, strength, equipment equipment dep and d r oyment m e nt listed: 1is ted : The e 2nd 2nd battalion battalion of o thee Iforth Nort t & Brigade on on coastal czbstal security security in in southern zoithern Hwanghae Hbanghau Korean 21st Brigade province reported reported that that it it was was defending defending 131 131 kilometers kilometers of of the the province coast coast extending extending inland inland a a depth depth of of 17 17 kilometers. kilometers. The The unit's as 415 415 soldiers. soldiers. Attached Attached was was a a 232-man 232-man strength was was given given as strength battalion battalion of of Chinese Chinese light light (76mm) (76mm) artillery artillery and and a a 113-man 113-man 82mni mortar mortar battalion. battalion. Korean 82mm Korean Weapons in in the the possession possession of of the the battalion battalion and and its its Weapons supporting unit were were 344 344 rifles, rifles, 117 117 submachine submachine guns, guns, 29 29 supporting unit machine machine guns, guns, 29 29 mortars, mortars, 12 12 light light artillery artillery pieces, pieces, and and two 107mm 107mm coastal coastal defense defense guns. guns. The same day the 21st brigade warned the 2nd battalion that a report report from from the the Chinese Chinese 63rd 63rd Army, Army, also also in in western western troops were to stage a Hwanghae, stated stated that that 8,000 UN troops Hwanghae, practice landing landing in in the the area. area. The The battalion battalion was was alerted alerted practice to strengthen strengthen the the guard guard and and stand stand by by for for combat. combat. (CANOL (CANOL SK- 400 -400 and and 428, 428, 16 16 Oct Oct 52) 52) SK-'
NR
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8. 8.
9. 9.

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Comment: Comment:
of o f Hungnam. Hungnam.
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Chinese C h i e e s e "Armored "Armored Headquarters" mentioned in I n Korea: Korea: In In 11 October t C h i n e s e tank t a n k unfi u n i t Vas was instructed instructed an 11 October message, message, a aChinese to t o "wait until u n t i l after a f t e r theipattle" t h e ' b a t t l e " to t o install i n s t a l l radios r a d i o s."sup"supplied mentioned p l i e d by _Armored 4Armored Headquarters." Headquarters." The message t h e receipt r e c e i p t of of 19 19 additional a d d i t i o n a l tanks. t a n k s . (CANOE (CANOE G , I T - 1T-142, 42, the 13 c t 52) 52) 13 O Oct
Comment: A regimental r e g i m e n t a l command command level l e v e l has been been the the Comment: h i g h e s t Chinek.e Chinehe armored rganization y e t ffirmly irmly i dentified highest armored o organization yet identified in i n Korea. Both communications dxnmunications intelligence i n t e l q i g e n c e and and prisoner prisoner. r e p o r t s , however, however, have suggested s u g g e s t e d the t h e presence p r e s e n c e of of reports, a divisional level. level.
T This h i s message, message, although a l t h o u g h it i t may be referring r e f e r r i n g to to a a known known
Korean armored armored command a Chinese'comnm.2 .uZtSide oi!'Kwra@, Korean command or or a Chinese'comma,...d,-,,ItElide of-Korea, suggests s u g g e s t s that t h a t Chinese Chinese armor armor in in Korea Korea is i s subordinate subordinq.te to to a a command and and is isattached attachedonly onlyfor for o p e r a t i o n to s to corn7 major command operations coin-, b a t armies. armies. bat
North Koreans evacuate e v a c u a t e civilians c i v i l i a n s from from east east coast c o a s t island; island: 19-bctober anan u n i d e n t i f i e dNorth North Xorean Korean unit u n i t on on coastal coastal On 19atober unidentified security s e c u r i t y near n e a r Hungnam Hungnam in i n eastern e a s t e r n Korea Korea reported reported a a transportransport a t i o n problem in i n the t h e area because "all " a l l of of the t h e citizens c i t i z e n s of of tation Hwa-do have to Hwa-do t o be be removed removed to t o the t h e refuge reguge area." area.*? (CANOE (CANOE IL rT-1507, 20 Oct O c t 52) 52) 1~r--t11-1507,
is a a small small island island a a few few miles mile8 southwest southwest Hwa-do is Hwa-do I t is probable p r o b a b l e that t h a t its i t a evacuation e v a c u a t i o n is i's either either It a security s e c u r i t y measure or o r is is in i n anticipation a n t i c i p a t i o n of of UN amphibious aqphibious or o r naval n a v a l operations o p e r a t i o n s in i n the the area. area.
22 Oct O c t 52 52
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10. Manchx: ManchUM: Chinese Communist 16th 1 6 t h Air A i r DSvisPm d e s t i n e d for for Division destined P r o b a b l v as Probably 8 8 'a 8 preliminary D r e l i m i n a r v to to a a transfer t r a n s f e r flight, flight. an a n LI-2 transport t r a n s p o r t carrying c a r r y i n g ' -10 l G passengers p a s s e n g e r s was scheduled s c h e d u l e d to to tk.. unidentified airfly ShanLun,,.; Peninsula. fly from fromthe the ShandunC; P e n i n s u l a . -cb anan un identified a irwas f i e l d in i n South S o u t h Manchuria. The mission miSsion of of the t h e aiz-craft a i x r a f t was field stated s t a t e d to t o be a a "test " t e s t flight" f l i g h t " for f o r the t h e 16th 1 6 t h Air A i r Division. Divrsion. (CANOE AF (CANOE A F Roundup 242, 242, 20 20 Oct O c t 52) 52)
One regiment .cec*DatCornmebit: Commeat: regiment of of the t h e 16th 16thAir A i rDivision Division remiitly returned from P Peiping took part l y returned-from e i p i n g where it it t ook p a r t in i n the t h e 1 October a i r show. show. This division d i v i s i o n is the t h e only o n l y MIG-15 unit u n i t which has air not n o t been previously p r e v i o u s l y based baeed at a t forward forward fields f i e l d s in i n Manchuria.
11. 11.
New engineer e n g i n e e r regiment regiment identified i d e n t i f i e d in i n China: China: The Chinese Chinese Commurin C o r n m u s t15th l a t h'Engineer 'En g i n e e r Regiment was was identified i d e n t i f ied in i n the t h e Canton Canton of Kwangtung P Province October. area of r o v i n c e during d u r i n g the t h e second week of O ctober. This regiment This r e g i m e n t is is the the first f i r s t engineer e n g i n e e r unit u n i t in i n China China which has has been mentiomal mentionud in i n communications communications intelligence. i n t e l l i g e n c e . (CANOE (CANOE CC/CAP CCKAP 347, 317, 20 20 Oct O c t 52) 52)
located in i n Korea Korea Comment: Four engineer e n g i n e e r regiments r e g i m e n t s now now located are tUFZETT, theonly e n g i n e e r regiments r e g i m e n t s previously p r e v i o u s l y identified i d e n t i f i e d in in engineer o f such such a regiment regiment Chinese Communist messages. messages. The presence p r e s e n c e of a t Canton is is new evidence e v i d e n c e that t h a t the t h e Chinese Communists Communist8 are are at a d d i n g supporting s u p p o r t i n g elements to t o their t h e i r ground forces f o r c e s in i n China. adding
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NO CHANGE IN CLASS. V/e 0 DECLASSIFIED CLASS CHANGED TO: T ". S._ CA

NEXT REVIEW DATE.
AUTH: HR 70-3.at
DX1E110* /7REVIEWER:
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SUMMARY
SOVIET UNION
I.
Soviet UN delegate points out change on prisoner of war issue

(page 3).
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4.
5.

sales to Chi141. (page 4).
SOUTH ASIA
FAR EAST
Peiping-Colombo agreement to permit sharp increase in rubber
Pakistan faces serious financial problem despite bumper crop of jute (page 4).
WESTERN EUROPE
West German official hints at reiection of reduced US aid (rage

1
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SOVIET UNION
.
1.
Soviet UN delegate points out change on prisoner of war issue:

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of the Soviet delegation pointed out that there were important differences between the Chinese-North Korean proposal of 8 Octob r on Korean prisoners of war and Vyshinsky's paraphrase in the General Assembly debate. The Soviet delegate emphasized that Vyshinsky's statement had omitted the specific details of the original proposal.
lithe Soviet
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spokesman described this omission as significant, stating t at the offer gave in to the US demand for reclassification.
maintained a more flexibiting position on the Korean problem

than the Chinese and North Koreans. For the remainder of the General Assembly meeting, Soviet tactics can be expected to continue to concentrate on undermining support for the US negotiating position at Panmunjom and creating dissension among UN members.
Comment:
The USSR has consistently
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FAR EAST
3.
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Peiping-Colombo agreement to permit sharp increase in rubber sales to China: China is to buy up to 50,000 tons of rubber I annually from Ceylon under the terms of a five-year agreement offered by Peiping, accorqing to information received by the
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The agreement also provides for Chinese shipments to Ceylon of 200,000 tons of rice annually at a cost of 56 pounds sterling per ton.
m as
olombol
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Comment: These details may have been disclosed to the Embassy in the hope of obtaining a favorable counteroffer from the United States. If none is forthcoming, Ceylon will probably ratify the agreement because of the favorable terms offered.
The quantity of rubber under negotiation is more than double the amount obtained from Ceylon in the past year and is sufficient to meet China's rubber requirements. Ceylon's approval of the agreement would effectively nullify the UN-sponsored embargo on rubber shipments to China and strengthen the growing sentiment in Indonesia and Malaya for ending the embargo.
SOUTH ASIA
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Pakistan faces serious financial problem despite bumper crop of jute:
Preliminary estimates by reliable trade sources indicate that the new crop of Pakistani jute, which will.soon enter the market, may total 8,000,000 bales.
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and Pakistan now producelawice as much jute as was produced

annually prior to 1947, it is probable that they will be able to dispose of the new crop because of present low prices.
The Government of Pakistan normally obtains a major part of its income from export duties on jute and cotton. Since the present price for jute does not permit any substantial export levies, the government faces a serious financial problem.
Comment:
Despite the fact that India
5.
West German official hints at rejection of reduced US aid:

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offer of less than $100,000,00U in American assistance for fiscal year 1953 might lead ederal Republic to decline aid entirely. He took the position that aid to Germany should be commensurate with that extended to other countries, and should not be based on need alone.
He also indicated that Germany should not be required to make an early large financial contribution to defense, but should be permitted to strengthen its economic position for the next two years, after which it could make a "real contribution to defense."
Aid to Germany for fiscal year 1952 amounted to $106,000,7n is probable that Germany would decline a substantially smaller amount for the next year if present conditions on use of aid funds were reimposed.,
Comment!

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Chinese troops integrated North C hinese t roops i n t e g r a t e d in in N o r t h Korean brigade: brigade: I n In a a 20 20 bctober October message the t h e "br'igade ilitary a f f a i r s commander," "bfigade m military affairs commander," probably p r o b a b l y of the.21st t h e 2 1 s t Korean Korean Brigade Brigade on o n Ongjin O n g j i n peninsula, peninsula, i nstructed t h e "brigade " b r i k a d e commander" commander" as to t o the t h e deployment of of instructed the troops. Mentioned n his n s t r u c t i o n s as eing s ubordinate Mentioned i in his i instructions as b being subordinate t o t he b ri to the brigade were a company and a platoon p l a t o o n of of Chinese C h i n e s e troops. troops.
(CANOE IL (CANOE I Libdl
T-1532, 20 20 Oct O C t 52) 52)
same brigade b r i g a d e is is also a l s o known known to t o have have a , T h i s same Comment: This i g h t aartillery rtillery u n i t attached to t o it. it. small-7thalcise unit s m a l l 7 6 i n e s e l light I n t e g r a t i o n has h a s been reported r e p o r t e d previously p r e v i o u s l y in i n the t h e "8th "8th Integration Sino-Korean Sino-Korean Brqnch Branch Unit," Unit," also believed believed t to o be be deployed deployed in in Hwanghae province. Hwanghac p r o v i r l c e . This is the t h e first instance i n s t a n c e where direct direct s u b o r d i n a t i o n of of Chinese C h i n e s e elements e l e m e n t s to t o Korean commanders commanders subordination has h a s been b e e n evidenced. evidenced.

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North Koreans allegedly allegedly will will call call Labor Labor Party Party Congress: Congress: central committee cotamittee meeting of o f the the North North Korean Rorean Labor L&b or At a central Party (Communist) (Communist) on on 3 3 October October the the decision decision was was made m a d e l ] congress to call a party congress rfor T o r December 1952 1952 or or January January 1953. 1953! Allegedly the the principal principal aim of the t h e congress congress will will be be to to reassert reassert the the supremacy supremacy of of the the Soviet-oriented Korean Korean leaders leaders and and to to purge purge the the Chinese Chinese and and nationalist elements elements from from the the party. party.
1
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Comment: There These is is no no other other information information available available on on the the Comment: possible convocation of is of such such a a congress. congress. While it i s recognized that the the war has has placed placed many strains strains on on the the supremacy supremacy of the Soviet faction faction in in the the North Korean Korean regime, regime, there there is is no evidence evidence of any any serious serious schism schism or or of of any any movement movement on on the the to challenge this this supremacy. supremacy. part of other factions to Ka-i's presence in in Moscow Moscow has has not not been been confirmed. confirmed. Ho Na-i's
In line with this intent Intent it was also revealed at the the committee Io Ka-i, Ka-i, reportedly reportedly in in Moscow Moscow for for the the committee meeting meeting that that Ho Congress, would Communist Party Congress, would bring bring back back 30 30 Soviet-trained Soviet-trained Koreans to to fill fill high posts posts in in the the government, governmentp Labor Labor Party Party and and the army. army. ( j18 1 1 8 Oct 52) 52) the
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Delayed Communist Communist reaction r e a c t i o n to t o UN amphibious amphibiohs feint feint e North o r e a n 22nd 22nd B r i g a d e on coastal ecurity The Korth K Korean Brigade coastal s security reported: r e p o r t e d : Th n o r t h e a s t of Hamhung 21 October informed a subordinate subordinate northeast Hamhung on 21 element 1st Cavalry C a v a l r y Division. Division. . departed e l e m e n t that t h a t "the " t h e American 1st .departed on beaches of of Hokkaido, Japan, J a p a n , and and it I t is is o n 9 October O c t o b e r from fr-om the t h e beaches s a i d that t h a t the t h e American Special S p e c i a l Task Force F o r c e warships w a r s h i p s will will said start s t a r t the t h e attack a t t a c k at a t 0600 0600 hours, h o u r s , 16 16 October." October.1f The message cited c i t e d the t h e number number of parachute p a r a c h u t e flares f l a w s dropped in i n the t h e brigade's brigade's r e s p o n s i b i l i t y andithe a n d , t h e increased i n c r e a s e d UN air a i r activity, activity, z o n e of responsibility zone stated t h a t "it is assumed that t h a t it i t is for f o r an a n attack." attack." and s t a t e d that (CANOE T ILF--7T-1568, 22 Oct O c t 52) 52) (CANOE L r r T - 1 5 6 8 , 22
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Comment: The time t i m e delay d e l a y in i n reporting r e p o r t i n g this t h i s major UN a c t i o n may may reveal r e v e a l communications communications difficulties d i f f i c u l t i e s on on the t h e part part action East of the t h e North N o r t h Korean Korean E a s t Coast C o a s t Defense D e f e n s e Command. Command. A namber of of intercepted i n t e r c e p t e d messages during d u r i n g the t h e feint feint r e v e a l e d the t h e enemy's of revealed enemy's alarm a l a r m and and. indicated i n d i c a t e d that t h a t land l a n d line l i n e communications had been destroyed. destroyed.
Significantly, a i r defense d e f e n s e GCI G C I net n e t in in S i g n i f i c a n t l y , the t h e Communist air Manchuria was completely c o m p l e t e l y silent s i l e n t during d u r i n g the t h e operation, operation, possibly p o s s i b l y indicating i n d i c a t i n g that t h a t the t h e enemy enemy air a i r force f o r c e was standing s t a n d i n g by by to t o intervene i n t e r v e n e if if a a landing l a n d i n g took took place. place. Chinese C h i n e s e artillery a r t i l l e r y division d i v i s i o n well w e l l supplied s u p p l i e d with w i t h food f o o d and and 2 1 October 0ctober messages passed p a s s e d over o v e r the t h petroleuM p e t r o l e u m products: p r o d u c t s : Two 21 net C h i n e s e Communist 1st 1st Artillery A r t i l l e r y Division D i v i s i o n reveal n e t of:the of t h e Chinese that division pouOds of "white"Wheat t h a t the the d i b i s i o n had 110,500 110 ,500 pourids " w h i t e 'meat flonr"and f 1our"and 31,62C pounds of nonstaple n o n s t a p l e rations r a t i o n e to t o be b e delivered d w l i v a r e d to t o its 31,62E LJounas of It also various v a r i o u s units. units. I t was a l s o reported that t h a t there was enough enough oil to "be u ueiLnti1 il t o "be n t i lthe t h eend end of of November." November." g a s o l i n e nd o gasoline VT-1529, (CANOE L L n T - T-1528 1 5 2 8 and aad Lu L n T-1529, 22 Oct O c t 52) 52)
Commeni;: The enemy enemy capability c a p a b i l i t y for for adequately a d e q u a t e l y supplying supplying Comment. appears undiminished. u n d i m i n i s h e d . The Far F a r East E a s t Command Command f r o n t line xroops appears front-Mg-7Croops believes b e l i e v e s that t h a t the t h e Communist forces f o r c e s can c a n logistically l o g i s t i c a l l y support support the scale of of combat combat indefinitely. indefinitely. t h e present p r e s e n t scale
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Chinese artillery unit seeks "mighty v victory" to C hinese a rtillery u nit s e e k s "mighty ictory" t o celebrate anniversary: 22 October, a.Chinese Communist r rocket launcher a n n i v e r s a r y : On 2 2 0 ctober a C h i n e s e Communist ocket l auncher FiliTIZTY-Ttlement, enemy troops troops iin battle for a r t i l l e r y e l e m e n t , ssupporting u p p o r t i n g enemy n tthe he b attIe f or Triangle and S Sniper Ridge i in central Korea, noted that T r i a n g l e Hill and n i p e r Ridge n c entral K orea, n oted t hat "tomorrow w will one y year since our regiment left China, so "tomorrow i l l mark one ear s ince o ur r egiment l eft C h i n a , so we w e must send s e n d all a l l of of our o u r comrades out o u t in i n full f u l l strength s t r e n g t h to t o fight. fight. In this battle we must o obtain mighty victory to celebrate our I n t his b attle w e must btain a m ighty v ictory t o c elebrate o ur n t '3 f i r s t anniversary a n n i v e r s a r y since s i n c e leaving l e a v i n g China." C h i n a m v l (CANOE nt's first (CANOE T-1542, 23 T-1542, 23 Oct O c t 52) 52)
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Comment: No enemy r ocket f i r e was e g o r t e d by rocket fire was r reported by UN UN troops in thireTefor fire i n t h i s sector on o n 23 23 October O c t o b e r and a n d the t h e volume volume of artillery artillery f ire was generally g e n e r a l l y light. light.
10. 10.
Comment: North N o r t h Korean antiaircraft a n t i a i r c r a f t artillery a r t i l l e r y units u n i t s were p r e v i o u s l y - 6 e l i e v e d subordinate s u b o r d i n a t e to t o an a n "Antiaircraft " A n t i a i r c r a f t Command" Command" previarTITTelieved at a t Supreme Supreme Headquarters. Headquarters. T h i s message indicates i n d i c a t e s that t h a t the t h e subsubThis o r d i n a t i o n of of the t h e unit u n i t shifts s h i f t s to t o the the major local local command in i n an an ordination emergency emergency situation. s i t u a t i o n . It It h a s been b e e n indicated i n d i c a t e d that t h a t the t h e East Coast Coast has Defense D e f e n s e Command, Command, of of which which the t h e 5th 5 t h Corps Corps is is the t h e principal p r i n c i p a l eleelem e n t , is is currently c u r r e n t l y on o n an a n alert a l e r t status s t a t u s as as a a result r e s u l t of the t h e 15 15 ment, October O c t o b e r UN UN amphibious a m p h i b i o u s feint f e i n t off off Kojo. Kojo.
11. 11.
Korean coal coal provided p r o v i d e d for f o r Chinese C h i n e s e artillery a r t i l l e r y troops: t r o o p s : The The A r t i l l e r y Regiment 2 6 t h Artillery t r a n s p o r t a t i o n company of the transportation t h e Chinese C h i n e s e 26th " l e f t for Sam-dung Sam-dung to t o make r e p o r t e d that t h a t an a n individual i n d i v i d u a l had "left reported arrangements f u r t h e r reports r e p o r t s that that The message further f o r the t h e coal." The a r r a n g e m e n t s for " i f the t h e coal coal is is not n o t good, good, it it is is still s t i l l usable." usable." "if
The of a a Chinese C h i n e s e supply s u p p l y headquarters h e a d q u a r t e r s at a t SamSamThe existence e x i s t e n c e of d u n g is i s also also revealed r e v e a l e d by by the t h e statement s t a t e m e n t that t h a t "the " t h e 1st 1st branch branch ' dung headquarters hereafter. will h e a d q u a r t e r s at a t Sam-du Sam-du hereafter. . . w i l l handle h a n d l e your your (CANOE coal -1546, (CANOE I -1546, 23 23 Oct O c t 52) 52) coal needs." needs."

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Emer e n c y subordination s u b o r d i n a t i o n of of North Korean rear-area rear-area east Emergency 24th North Korean Anticoast units uxi t s noted: n o t e d : On 21 Z w October e r the the 2 4th N orth K o r e a n Antiaircraft Regiment r requested subordinate to a i r c r Artillery a f t w y Regiment equested a s ubordinate t o pass a message to to the t h e "Tong "Tong Hung Antiaircraft A n t i a i r c r a f t Artillery A r t i l l e r y Department" Departmentt1 instructing "first obey the 5th i t to to " f i r s t of all all o bey t he 5 t h Corps o r tions tions i n s t r u c t i n g it command during (CANOE ILiLlT-1593, d u r i n g the t h e period p e r i o d of of emergency." emergency . l l T-1593, (CANOE IL 23 Oct O c t 52) 52)
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Sam-dung i is the of t the nationalized Comment: Sam-dung Comment: s t h e location l o c a t i o n of he n ationalized This Toksan Coal Mine. T h i s installation i n s t a l l a t i o n has an approximate annual capacity of 60,000 tons of low-grade which, however, c a p a c i t y of t o n s of low-grade anthracite a n t h r a c i t e which, must be made made into I n t o briquettes b r i q u e t t e s for f o r most most efficient e f f i c i e n t use. use. This presently T h i s message suggests s u g g e s t s that t h a t the t h e mine is p r e s e n t l y under at least partial a t l east p a r t i a l control c o n t r o l of a Chinese supply supply organization. organization.

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North Korean military training in Manchuria reportedly During the late summer of 1952, 18,000 recently contiFues: inducted Korean residents of Manchuria were traininz at Mutanchiang in northeast Manchuria The training cadre.for this force was augmented by 250 officers and NCO's from the deactivated North Korean VI and VIII Corps. An additional 60,000 men were to be drafted by February These Koreans, born and trzined in Manchuria, will be held in strategic reserve to be deployed only in case of_a malor major UN UN land lan or amphibious offensive.
1953.
Comment: In 1950 there were an estimated eetimated 200,000 200,000 Koreans Koreaps Comment: fit fUriEratary for milrtary service service in in Manchuria. Manchuria. Since this manpower by the North Korean Army, pool has been Been drawn d'rawn on continuously continuously by it is 78,000 could be obtained I s doubtful d o u b t f u l that that an additional 78,000 February 1953. 1953. by February
The North Korean Army is presently presently able to more than replace its casualties casualties with trainees, as an estimated 6,000 6,000 recruits become recruits become available available monthly. monthly.
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North Korean Korean antiaircraft antiaircraft defenses defenses may shift shift from Prom transtransport to October to supply supply installations: installations: In a 26 0 ctober message a a North K oroan antiaircraft antiaircraft battalion, battalion, defending defending rail rail bridges bridges Korean Wonsan on on the the east east coast, coast, was was ordered ordered to to turn turn over over north of Wonsan this of its its 37mm 37mm guns, guns, to to this reponsibility, reponsibility, and and possibly possibly some some of the "32nd Regiment." The latter latter may be an infantry infantry unit unit being being converted converted to to antiaircraft antiaircraft artillery. artillery. This transfer This transfer is to be effected is effected by by 30 30 October. October. The unit being relieved relieved i is s to proceed by 5 November November to the the "main "main army supply supply warewareprepared for for combat combat by by 7 7 November. November. (CANOE (CWOE hois " and be prepared IL T-31642, 26 Oct Oct 52) 52) T-1642, 26
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Unidentified Unidentified Chinese artillery unit moves up on western western Korean unidentified Korean front: front: An unident ified Chinese Chinese artfriery artillery regiment regimept informed one one of its informed its subordinate subordinate battalions battalions on on 25 25 October October that "they are are to to take take over over all all the the positions positions and and (bivouac?) (bivouac?) areas Artillery Regiment" Regiment" in in combat combat in in western western areas of the the 25th Artillery Korea. Korea. message passed passed by the the same same unit on 5 October indicated indicated A message that elements elements of of this this force force had had been been in in the the Yonan Yonan coastal coastal This earlier message mesRage area west of of Kaesong Kaesong at at that that time. time. This area _120.ieferred to a a vehicle vehicle of of the "126th Division.ft Division." (CANOE eferred to T-185, 28 Oct 52; T-185, 52; L4 7 ' -T-1622, 1 6 2 2 , 27 27 Oct Oct 52) 52) Comment: The artillery artillery regiment regiment being being relieved relieved by by Comment: The this forceis is subordinate subordinate to to the the Chinese Chinese lst this raraiiiiTified unidexified force 1st Artillery 38th and and 39th 39th Armies Armies in in Artillery Division, Division, supporting supporting the the 38th western western Korea. Korea. The mention mention of of the the 126th 126th Division, Division, subordinate subordinate to to the the The Chinese Chinese 42nd 42nd Army, Army, lends lends credence credence to to the the reports reports that that eleelements of that that army army were were in in the the Yonan Yonan area area in in early early October. October. ments of It is is further further possible possible that that the the nortaward nort.iward move move of of this this artillery artillery unit unit was was coincident coincident with with a a similar similar move move on on the the part of of the the 42nd 42nd Army Army into into reserve reserve positions positions behind behind the the western western front. front.

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Comment: The The most logical logical reason reason behind behind this this unit unit is the the changed changed pattern pattern of of the the UN UN air air interdiction Interdiction transfer is transfer program. program. Transportation Transportation targets targets previously previously received received the the attention while while more more recently recently the the emphasis emphasis has has shifted shifted most attention to enemy enemy supply supply installations. installations.
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North N o r t h Korean air a i r force f o r c e may be reaching r e g c h i n g combat readiness readinese Analysis North Korean A n a l y s i s of of N orth K o r e a n air a i r force messages from from 15 15 September ep ember to t o 15 15 October by an a n air a i r force f o r c e field f i e l d unit u n i t reveals reveals that t h a t this t h i s force is is becoming increasingly i n c r e a s i n g l y proficient p r o f i c i e n t in i n night night operations o p e r a t i o n s and and in i n ground ground attack a t t a c k and and bombing bombing tactics. tactics.
Four huria and F o u r principal p r i n c i p a l air a i r units, u n i t s , loc l o c ated t e d in i n Man Manchuria and North N o r t h Korea, Korea, have been identified identifiedl
4eT h i s latter latzer g r o u p of of This group I. ffighter-escort aircraft appears concentrating ighter-escort a ircraft a p p e a r s tto o e c o n c e n t r a t i n g its its
9.

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On 23 October, O c t o b e r , North N o r t h Korean aircraft a i r c r a f t in in the t h e fighterfighterescort eard o v e r tthe he G C I n et o perating n ear escort group group were were h heard over GCI net operating near F-86's in i n the t h e Pyongyang Pyongyang area. area. This T h i s is is unusual unusual American F-86's b o t h for for the t h e southerly s o u t h e r l y penetration p e n e t r a t i o n of of the t h e flight f l i g h t and and its its both continuance c o n t i n u a n c e for f o r 15 15 minutes m i n u t e s in i n an a n area area where where Sabres S a b r e s were were operating. operating. P r e v i o u s l y the Worth f l e d as as soon soon Previously North Koreans had fled as a s F-86'e F-86's were reported r e p o r t e d on o n the t h e way way north. n o r t h . (CANOE (CANOE 6920 6920 Security S e c u r i t y Grp Johnson AFB Japan J a p a n AP-652, AP-652, 25 25 Oct; O c t ; AP-674, AP-674, 25 25 Oct O c t 52) 52)
C h i n e s e Communist air d i v i s i o n may rom Chinese Communist air division may have have transferred transferred f from MukdeliTo M u k d e n Takushan: Takushan: Sixteen B i x t e e n MIG-15 MIG-13 aircraft a i r c r a f t of o f the t h e Chinese Chi n e s e Communis 1 12th Air Division scheduled to fly communisi; 2 t h Ai r D i v i s i o n were s cheduled t o f l v from destination October. The Mukden to t o an a n un;located un'located d e s t i n a t i o n on 24 October". route r o u t e of of the t h e flight f l i g h t and and the t h e fact f a c t that t h a t the t h e 12th 1 2 t h Air A i r Division Division was recently r e c e n t l y active a c t i v e at a t Takushan Takushan suggest s u g g e s t that t h a t the t h e destination destination is p probably SPOT 4646, 4646, 24 r o b a b l y Takushan. Takushan. (CANOE AP-637, SPOT 24 Oct O c t 52) 52)
Comment: The Takushan airfield a i r f i e l d was improved improved by the the from the t h e size size of o f the the A.part from Communists in C o m m u m n early e a r l y October. O c t o b e r . Apart flight, i s no no indication i n d i c a t i o n that t h a t the t h e 12th 1 2 t h Air A i r Division Division f l i g h t , there t h e r e is will w i l l be be permanently p e r m a n e n t l y based b a s e d at a t Takushan. Takushan.
efforts e f f o r t s on becoming proficient p r o f i c i e n t in i n night n i g h t operations. o p e r a t i o n s . The The other past eight months, e engaging o t h e r groups g r o u p s have been, b e e n , for f o r the the p ast e i g h t months, ngaging in i n intensive i n t e n s i v e specialized s p e c i a l i z e d training. training.
29 Oct O c t 52 52 29
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More Soviet-manned receive Soviet-manned fighter f i g h t e r units u n i t s in i n Korea area r eceive VHF E i g h t of t h e twelve twelve Soviet-manned Soviet-manned MIG-15 15 of the VHF e q u i p m e n t : Eight 3-t which o operate Korea h have jet f fighter-Units i g h f e n n i t s which p e r a t e iin n Korea a v e VHF (Very High High Frequency) F r e q u e n c y ) communications c o m m u n i c a t i o n s equipment, e q u i p m e n t , according a c c o r d i n g to,interceptsto intercepts. Apparently units in the area_are A p p a r e n t l y the the remaining r e m a i n i n g Soviet-tnanned Soviet-fnanned u nits i n t h e area are (CANOE (CANOE in i n the t h e process p r o c e s s of of converting c o n v e r t i n g to t o this this new new equipment. equipment. AF,Roundup A F .Roundup 207, 2 0 7 , 28 28 Oct O c t 52) 52)
has been noted Comment: VHF communications c o m m u n i c a t i o n s equipment equipment h as b een n oted recent-I-rat Manchurian a airfields which are are a also bases lso b ases r e c e n F X f five i v e Manchurian i r f i e l d s which for Soviet-manned Soviet-manned jet j e t fighter f i g h t e r aircraft. aircraft.
Chinese.Communist C h i n e s e Communist division d i v i s i o n receives r e c e i v e s large 1 , a r g e number number of of C h i n e s e dOmmunist Communist 21st 2 m A Artillery r t i l l e r y Regiment m motorcycles: o t o r c y c l e s : The Chinese revealed r e v e a l e d on 2 October O c t o b e r that t h a t its i t s division d i v i s i o n had been b e e n allotted allotted Acmotorcycles 45 m o t o r c y c l e s "by "by the t h e volunteer v o l u n t e e r army army headquarters." h e E d q u a r t e r s . l l According message, the was t to receive c o r d i n g to t o the t h e message, t h e regiment was o r e c e i v e from the t h e divisional d i v i s i o n a l allotment a l l o t m e n t three t h r e e of of "the " t h e side-carrier s i d e - c a r r i e r type," type," (CANOE and s i x of "the " t h e two-wheel two-wheel type" t y p e " vehicles. vehicles. a n d six Oct L-T-1615, - /T-1615, 27 O c t 52) 52)
Chinese Comment: The C h i n e s e Communists in i n Korea Korea have h a v e equipped. equipped 31-TEiTr artillery divisions with relatively large each o fFheir a rtillery d ivisions w ith r e l a t i v e l y large of t these divisions known t to numbers of,vehicles. o f , v e h i c l e s . None of hese d i v i s i o n s is known o have receiVed h ave r e c e i v e d motorcycles m o t o r c y c l e s previously. previously.
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North Korean Korean air unit unit demonstrates demonstrates improved improved proficiency: proficiency:
USA Air US i r Force units in in Manchuria Manchuria and and North Korean Korean air air units Japan Korea, which whtch have been been increasingly 28 Oct 52 62 two months, months, have have active during the past two CANOE emphastztng training in tn night night been emphasizing Aru,44.11-i-litA. >10 - 7 2 operations, operattons, according according to to a a25 25 October October This activity follows .Air Force field analysis of communications. This activity follows o f communtcations. Force field a a long long training period period in in ground attack techniques and in fighterescort roles.
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As of an advanced advanced state state A s possible evidence of on 23 23 October October a flight of North Korean south of training, on Korean aircraft aircraft south o f Pyongyang US F-86's .of Pyongyangremained remainedfor for 16 15minutes minutes i.n in an an area area where US Were were operating. operating. This is unusual unusual both both for for the the depth depth of d the the southward southward This is by North NorthKorean Korean aircraftand andfor fortheir theirapparent apparent disregard disregard aircraft penetration by for the the presence presenceof of UN UN Planes., planes., Previously had avoided UN UN jets Previously they had jets on on all occasions.
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SECuRITY INFORmATION
31 October 1952
US OFFICIALS ONLY
OCI No. 0090

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GENERAL
1.
The story alleged that a high French official engaged in the talks,.which were instigated and financed by "powerful French industrial interests in North Africa" in an effort to impair American policy in Western Europe and so relieve United States "pressure" on France concerning North Africa. American officials investigating Alsot's alleged documentation concluded that the whole story was fabricated. Embassy files in Paris describe Alsot as a Communist and a suspected Moscow agent.
Commeni: This information tends to confirm the theory that Moscow has inspired the oft-repeated rumors of secret Franco-Soviet negotiations. Recent efforts to investigate such rumors have shown that they originated with obscure journalists who personally admitted giving them no credence.
Moscow suspected of planting rumors of Franco-Soviet Simon Alsot, an employee of the independent negotiations: leftisf-dilTy Franc-Tireur, attempted in early October to sell a leading American newspaper a story regarding secret Franco-Soviet conversations.
25X1A
2.
Indian Ambassador believes Peiping "feeling way" toward compromise on POW Issue: Chaese Communist Premier Chou Enlai recently summoned the Indian Ambassador at midnight for a two-hour talk. Chou denounced the United States for refusing to discuss the latest Chinese proposals on the prisoner of war issue and insisted that all Chinese prisoners must be repatriated.
The Ambassador believes that the "feeling the way" toward a compromise distinction between Chinese Communist (S New Delhi 1796, 29 Oct prisoners.
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to threirat of reducing their repatriation demands from

134,000 to 116,000 prisoners. Chou En-lai has further suggested a willingness to settle for repatriation of 100,000 provided they include all 20,000 Chinese of whom some 16,000 are unwilling to be repatriated.
Comment:
Communist negotiators already have compromised
Soviet officials have recently hinted in private conversations in New York that the Communists are approaching the UN position on the POW issue. Although Peiping may be preparing to compromise on its demand for the 20,000 Chinese, neither the latest Chinese proposals nor Chou's remarks to the Indian Ambassador provide specific evidence of such an intention.
3.
Czechs seen attempting political move to break COCOM The -French delegate has reported to COCOM his governunity: ment's opinion that the Czechs' increased demand for strategic items, most of which are not normally imported from France, is a political move to break the solidarity of France recently suspended Western export controls. negotiations in Prague on a new trade agreement. The French feel that other COCOM countries should watch for similar (S Paris tactics in their trade negotiations with the East. 2626, 29 Oct 52) The Dutch also recently suspended trade Comment: talksThirse of Czech insistence on the import of strategic These attempts to increase strategic imports may items. be an effort to break the Western control system and contribute to the disruption of Western political unity. The shortage of hard currency, however, may be forcing the Czechs to attempt to increase essential imports under Western trade agreements in exchange for Czech exports. Previous efforts to orient its trade almost exclusively toward the Orbit appear to have failed because Czechoslovakia was unable to satisfy its needs for strategic imports from that area and was forced to import them illegally from the West at premium prices.
Poland reduces price on coal exports to' Finland: During recennegotiations in Poland, Finnish trade officials obtained SECRET
2
4.

EASTERN EUROPE
31 Oct 52
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SECRET
significant price reductions on various grades of Polish The agreed prices, however, are still from $1.00 to coal. by the $1.60 per ton higher than those negotiated recently Trade agreements provide other Scandinavian countries. for deliveries to Finland of 1,500,000 tons of coal in 1952 and 1,150,000 tons in 1953. According to officials of the Foreign Ministry, the Poles stated that the coal deliveries to Finland were covered by the trilateral trade agreement with the Soviet Union, implying that deliveries from the USSR would not compensate for a larger price reduction. The Poles were apparently aware of Finland's shortage of foreign exchange which prevented it from purchasing coal from other sources. (C Helsinki Joint Weeka 43, 24 Oct 52)
Polish officials reportedly desire continued services of American shipping company: Captain De Barr, representative of Moore-McCormack Lines at Gdynia, has informed an Embassy the official that in discussions held recently in Warsaw at request of the Ministry of Shipping, Polish officials received him more cordially than ever before. He believes that the Polish authorities desire that his shipping line should continue services to Gdynia, and are ready to arrive at a definite agreement or arrangement to that effect. Discussions are scheduled for resumption next week, pending (S Warsaw 231, the receipt of instructions from his company. 29 Oct 52) Comment: In retaliation for alleged ill-treatment accorded to the Batory in New York, the license of the American Scantic Lines, the company representing MooreMcCormack in Poland, was officially revoked in July 1951, and the company given until 31 December to liquidate its interests in Poland. Nevertheless, at the urging of Polish officials, Moore-McCormack vessels have continued to call at Gdynia on the basis of short term permits after the expiration date set by the Polish Government.
5.
The cordiality of the Polish officials, and their desire for the company's ships to continue to call at a Polish port is an indication of the value they place on keeping open this channel of communication with the United States, and suggests that the official revocation of American Scantic's license was merely a propaganda measure.

SECRET
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Nor
SECRET
6.
Satellite reaction to Yugoslav control of Danube towing The Yugoslav Home Service radio reports that the service: Czechoslovak Danube Shipping Company has withdrawn its offer to pay the advance fees for use of the Yugoslav-controlled The report also towing service on the Danube ShipCanal. towing apparatus on its states that Rumania is buijding a (R FBIS Belgrade, 29 Oct 52) side of the Danube.
Comment: The Czech withdrawal, if confirmed, indicates that-Tfiniviet bloc will attempt to avoid paying the fees, It is doubtful, however, that Rumania at least in advance. could complete the construction of a satisfactory alternate The existing canal is on towing service for a long time. and a ledge of rock blocks the Yugoslav side of the river, the remainder of the river except for a natural channel on the Rumanian side which is open less than four months of the year because of insufficient depth.

SECRET
4
31 Oct 52
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SECRET
FAR EAST
7.
25X1A
Chinese Mongols allegedly to choose between China and Outer Mongolia: Outer Mongolian Premier Tsedenbal's recent visit to Peiping reportedly concerned the question of allowing "groups" of Inner Mongols to decide whether "to join Outer Mongolia or to remain part of Communist China." The report did not make clear whether any territorial question 24 Oct 52) (S StateA was involved.
Comment: The Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region, occupyiET-Wgiern Manchuria and adjoining Outer Mongolia, is a part of Communist China. Its Mongol population, according to Peiping, is about 800,000, as against 1,600,000 Chinese and lesser ethnic groups.
Although the Peiping regime appears to be in firm control of the IMAR, there are occasional reports of a Soviet plan to contrive a plebiscite in Inner Mongolia for its absorption by Outer Mongolia. An unconfirmed report stated that certain Inner Mongols on the Outer Mongolian border have voted in Outer Mongolian elections, but it is not known whether this took place in the elections held on 19 October. Tsedenbal came to Peiping in late September after leading the Outer Mongolian delegation to Moscow for the Sino-Soviet talks. On 4 October Peiping announced a SinoMongolian agreement on economic and cultural cooperation. A Sino-Mongolian or tripartite military agreement may also have been concluded. There has been no announcement, however, to suggest that any part of the populace or territory of Inner Mongolia will soon affiliate with Outer Mongolia.
8.
Chinese plan to improve another route toward Tibet: The CETWUse Communists planned in mid-October to begin improving the trail from Yingkuanchai, west of Kangting in eastern Sikang Province, to Pa-an on the Yangtze River. A Chungking broadcast stated that the old road is rugged and steep in many places, with most of the bridges badly damaged. This highway will be a principal route in the southern part of the Tibetan Autonomous Region. (C FBIS China Abstracts, Chungking, 14 Oct 52)

SECRET
5
3 1 Oct 52
SECRET
Comment:
This information does not indicate whether
the narnihway" will be motorable as are two highways

toward Tibet built by the Chinese Communists in areas north of this route. The route to Pa-an covers 283 miles of a 1,322-mile caravan road from Kangting to Lhasa. This southern route has 12 passes over 15,000 feet, and is more rugged than the northern route from Kangting through Kantzu and Yushu, which has only six passes over 15,000 feet. The northern route is probably the principal one used by Chinese Communist troops entering Tibet.
9.
Ceylon-China Friendship Association holds first meeting: The first meeting of the Ceylon-China Friendship Association Theja Gunawardena, Presiwas held in Colombo on 1 October. dent of the Association and owner-publisher of the new antigovernment, anti-American weekly newspaper Trine, acted as Pieter Keuneman, one of Ceylon's-rataing Commuchairman. nists, addressed the meeting. Also present were other prominent members of the Communist Party (Stalinist) and the Lanka Sama Samaj Party (Trotskyite), as well as some Chinese. The American Embassy in Colombo comments that the Association may embark on a propaganda campaign based on current Ceylonese-Chinese trade negotiations. (R Colombo Desp 228, 9 Oct 52) The Ceylon-China Friendship Association is Comment: the fIFIT-UVert medium established in Ceylon to disseminate pro-Peiping propaganda. Announcemonts regarding the intended foundation of the Association coincided with the dispatch of Its first formal a Ceylonese trade mission to Peiping. meeting was held four days before the Peiping radio announced that a trade agreement had been signed. In India and Pakistan, Chinese Friendship Associations have not engaged in overt anti-government activities.

SOUTH ASIA
SECRET
6
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NEAR EAST - AFRICA Turkish copper may find its way to Orbit through Lebanon: Turkerl-Fg still negotiating with Lebanon for the export of 2,000 tons of copper, according to a US Embassy despatch of 27 October. There is no assurance that the copper would not be transshipped to the Eioviet bloc from Beirut. Ankara has offered to cancel the pending transaction if the US State Department does not approve, despite the fact that such action would add to Turkey's present economic hardships. (S Ankara 549, 27 Oct 52)
10,
true nature, cancelled the contract.
Since Lebanon does not have domestic requirements for copper in the above amount, this appears to be another attempt by the Chinese Communists or another Soviet bloc member to obtain copper by a circuitous route.
11.
The acting South Africa to reduce air unit in Korea: Air-Force informed Air Chief of Staff of the South African that the Union would the American Embassy on 29 October from 25 to 18 reduce the number of its planes in Korea following conversion to jets. This action will permit a reduction in South Africa's present manpower commitments (S Pretoria 119, 29 Oct 52) in Korea.
Comment: Although South Africa has talked of reducing its fUFEgg-In Korea because of criticism in the United Nations over the government's racial policies, the above action is probably being taken to return South African pilots and maintenance men who are urgently needed in the Union for the air training program.

SECRET
7
attemrarai purchase Turkish copper through a Swedish middleman who had obtained an end-use certificate by bribery The transaction was from the Chamber of Commerce at Beirut. Government, apprised of its not completed when the Turkish
Comment:
In June 1952 the Chinese Embassy in Warsaw
31 Oct 52
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vs'
SECRET
WESTERN EUROPE
West Germandiplomaticdelegation to Arab states to discuss commairrelations: A spokesman of the West German Foreign Ministry declares fgat the specially appointed diplomatic delegation to Saudi Arabia and Iraq will discuss commercial relations while seeking to ameliorate Arab criticism of the West GermanIsraeli restitution settlement. Bonn will not establish regular diplomatic missions in these states for the present because West German-Arab relations are not yet fully developed, and the Foreign Ministry is not only short-handed, but also demoralized by recent press and parliamentary attacks on its personnel. (S Bonn 1936, 28 Oct 52)
Comment: The Foreign Ministry was censured last week in a formai parliamentary resolution for having former Nazis in its employ. The resolution instructed Chancellor Adenauer to report by December how he intends to rectify this situation.
12.
This development along with the shortage of experienced diplomatic officers may in part explain Bonn's failure to establish a permanent mission in Iran, where the Allied High Commission has already authorized the establishment of an embassy.
13.
French Communists seek to obstruct government's case against The French Communists are conducting a ruthless campaign of organized pressure and intimidation in an attempt to persuade the National Assembly to reject the government's request for a waiver of the parliamentary immunity of five Communist leaders. Signature drives have been organized and Communist delegates are being sent to the deputies' homes and offices to register protests and veiled threats against those who might vote for the waiver.
leaders:
Comment: The Communists, in an effort to exploit the traditional extreme sensitivity of French parliamentarians on threats to their immunity, have prominently published the names of the members of the Immunities Commission who voted against postponement of this case. They have also requested a roll-call vote in the Assembly on the immunity question.
A member of the Immunities Commission has issued a formal statement denouncing these methods and warning that the campaign is likely to accomplish the opposite of its purpose. (C Paris 2639, 29 Oct 52)

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LATIN AMERICA
14.
25X1C Batista reportedly adopting more lenient attitude toward [the CubarrraRimists: 1Batista Government, faced with continuing Communist-inspired strikes, public disorders, and anti-regime propaganda, has decided to abandon its recent policy of open interference with The Military Intelligence Communist organizations and activities. Service and the Bureau of Investigations have reportedly been ordered to cease violent measures against the PSP and other Communist organizations. 25X1A
I
Presumably the measure for the formation of a "Committee to Investigate Communist Activities," now up for approval by President Batista and his Council of Ministers, may now not be passed. The bill's defeat would prevent the first real move against Communists in Cuba apart from the government's recent harassing activities.
15.
Panamanian Assembly passes resolution criticizing US policies in Canal Zone: On 28 October, the Panamanian National Assembly approved by a large majority a resolution, introduced by a member of the opposition, criticizing United States policies in the Canal Zone, but expressing confidence in United States willingness to adjust them in accordance with the 1936 Canal Zone Treaty. The resolution implied that the United States had violated the 1936 treaty by allowing commercial competition from Canal Zone enterprises to cripple Panamanian business. It also criticized racial discrimination and wage differentials between Panamanian and North American workers in the Zone. A special hearing on the resolution was scheduled to begin on 30 October. Prominent business and political leaders are expected to testify. (U Panama City 218, 29 Oct 52)
Comment: President Remon has already indicated that he will Tia-i-revision of the 1936 treaty. He is assured of virtually unanimous support in the National Assembly on this

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9
Comment: This reportedly more lenient attitude probably reflects no basic change in government policy toward Communism, but rather a temporary move dictated by political expediency to diminish anti-Batista agitation and avoid further internal difficulties.
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However, the small opposition group in the Aspopular issue. sembly may try to seize the initiative by demanding revisions more drastic than those contemplated by Remon.
16.
?5X1X
Dominicans may purchase British planes if delivery of US Istates that Dominican Air aircraft delayed: T Force officers recently visited the United States apparently to check the readiness of F-47 aircraft committed for delivery to The US Embassy considers it essential to the their government. protection of US-Dominican relations and to the success of the proposed bilateral military assistance agreement that deliveries proceed exactly as scheduled.
Comment: In line with the expansion program of its air force7TEUMEminican Republic has on order with the US Government 25 F-47 aircraft to be delivered not later than June or July 1953. It has also recently contracted for the purchase of 32 1-51's from the Swedish Air Force.
Thn British Government recently arranged for the sale of 70 jet Gloucester Meteors to Brazil and presumably has more to sell. It is believed that the Dominicans would be interested in adding jet fighters to their present conventional aircraft strength.
17.
position and the desire to avoid international friction, provision for some payment will be made. Paz stated that American attorneys have studied his government's case and are satisfied that it could be upheld in American courts. (C La Paz 138, 29 Oct 52)
Comment: The compensation contemplated is probably intended primarily for American shareholders who have important holdings An one of the Patino companies. So far as is known, there is no significant American investment in the Hochschild or Aramayo companies, although these companies have some Swiss, Spanish, Chilean, Argentine, and Canadian shareholders.
Bolivian nationalization decree to provide for some compensation: President Paz Estenssoro has expressed his conviction that Bolivia has a right to take over the big three mining companies without compensation since claims against them exceed any reasonable payment; but in recognition of the United States

SECRET
10
In view of the current British drive to sell jets to Latin America and the scheduled visit to the Dominican Republic of the British "jet air circus" in November, the Embassy also considers it likely that the Dominicans will cancel their F-47 order and buy British jets if delivery of the US aircraft is delayed even a few days. (C Ciudad Trujillo 93, 29 Oct 52)
31 Oct 52
Approved For Release 2f8/95atrittoP791-04.1.46A001300290001-7

NIP"
SECURITY
INFORMATION
31 October 1952
CIA No. 49875 Copy NO.
US OFFICIALS ONLY
37

DIGEST TO THE CURRENT INTELLIGENCE
outside 0/CI Not for dissemination
and 0/NE.
reports has been prepared primarily of significant It does This digest Office of Current Intelligence. use of the in CIA for the internal of all current reports represent the not represent a complete coverage Comments Current Intelligence. Office of or in the of Current Intelligence. immediate views of the Office
Approved For Release 2002/05/P IASIMITI1146A001300290001-7
ApprovedW Release farggereDP79T01146A001300290001-7

WESTERN EUROPE
1.
In Paris, Schuman is reported to have said that little possibility exists for a compromise of the disputed economic issues until a new West German Government is elected in 1953. Minister President Hoffman of the Saar territory has declared that the Saar elections will be held on 30 November, and that no further postponement is possible unless France and West Germany reach an agreement before 8 November, when the electoral campaign will begin. (S S/S Bonn 1967, 29 Oct 52; S S/S Strasbourg 171, 30 Oct 52)
Comment: Chancellor Adenauer seems convinced that'West German ratification of the Bonn and Paris treaties is assured, and apparently feels that an immediate settlement of the Saar dispute is now less urgent. West German diplomats also have suggested that the French Government may be more amenable to compromise when its domestic political position improves.
New French-German Saar negotiations appear distant: The West German Government appears unperturbed by the recent breakdown of the Saar negotiations, and there is little indication that it will ask for a resumption of French-German talks soon,
31 Oct 52
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HR70-14
/-1 K)ov sPzFAR EAST

1. Chinese Chinese schedule attack for 4 4 November November in central central Korea: Korea:
A Chinese Chinese armored company company in A in reserve reserve US Army US Army Korea in central Korea Korea reported reported on on 1 1 November November Nov 52 1 Nov that of its tanks had been that some of been ordered CANOE CANOE forward and that the the ftassault "assault departure is is and that / cdfrf ( m 7 w 0 hours on atFT3tUhurs onthe the4th 4thof ofNovember." November." The The apparent apparent mission mission of of this unit unit is to to give give direct direct fire firesupport supportfor forattacking attackingChinese Chinese infantry. infantry.
2.
Comment: series of of Comment:, The The early October October series heavy heavy 1 limited-objective tml ted-ob j ect ive a attieriTY-the t t m T h e Communists Communists was Similarly indicated by the forward movement movement of of Chinese Chinese armored elements. elements, There is that this attack will be more severe than is no no indication indication that will be than those which have have occurred occurred in the past past two two months. months. which
3 Nov Nov 52
Relief of Chinese Chinese armies armies decreases cawability in in Korea: Relief of decreasesimmediate immediate capability
November that the the relief relief of November that o f two frontChinese Communist the line Chinese Communistarmies, armies, the 12th anti andthe the68th, 68th, in in east east central Korea 12th in week has decreased the the enemy's enemy's immediate capabilities. capabilities, in the past week
O -n _1 =
on 3 3
Strong Strong centrally centrally located locatedreserves reserves are still available available for early early commitment, commitment, however, however, as the relieved in close close proximity proximity to to the the front. front. armies remain in armies remain
Cornmefit: Comment: In addition addition to these substantial substantial communications reserves, recent recent inter cept-rese mi1itarycommunications reserves, intercepts of Chinese military suggest that the Chinese Chinese 42nd 42nd Army moved forward Army has moved forward into an immediate position in western and that elements immediate reserve reserve position western Korea, Korea, and of the 66thlArmy 06thArmy possibly in of possibly have have returned returned to.Korea and are in immediate immediate reserve reserve in the the eastern sector.
- 3 3 -
APPROVED FOR FOR RELEASE RELEASE ATE: 22-Mar-2010 DATE:22-Mar-2010 'DPPROVED
Approved For ReleifeposEeRET 0140)00900270001.2

25X1 25X1
11 November 1952
25X1
1...Opy NO.
57
25X1
DOCUMENT NO. NO CHANGE IN CLASS. CI DECLASSIFIED CLASS. CHANGED TO: T NEXT REVIEW DATE: 70-2 AUTH:
DATE
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25X1A
SUMMARY
GENERAL
1.
West German note attempts to lessen Arab-West German tension

(page 3).
25X1
3.
4.
5. 6. 7.
B.
25X1A
9. 10.

FAR EAST
Peiping suggests some Chinese POW's need not be repatriated
Moslem guerrillas reportedly recapture northwest China base

(page 4).
(page 4).
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
Mossadeq again attempts to curb the Shah's power (page 5). Tribal unrest in northern Iran increases (page 5). Britain attempting to forestall general release ci arms to Egypt
(page 6).
British advisers support Libyan demand for increased US compensation for air bases (page 6).
WESTERN EUROPE
New Soviet move on German POW's seen likely (page 7). Austrian support for East-West trade controls weakening (page 7).
-225X1A
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25X1A
GENERAL
1.
West German note attempts to lessen-Arab-West German tension:

The West German Ambassador in Cairo believes that a note he delivered to General Nagib on 9 November will probably forestall the impending break in West German-Arab the note states that the West German Government econom c relations. is most anxious to beg n conversations with the Arab League over the controversial West German-Israeli restitution agreement, and in effect assures the League that Bonn will not ratify the agreement prior to such conversations.
25X1A
Comment: On 7 November Nagib promised to use his influence with the Arab League to postpone its threatened economic boycott provided that Bonn would make such assurances.
While the Bonn government steadfastly refuses to abrogate the signed agreement, it might defer to the League by delaying implementation of the agreement or altering the procedures. The West German press, spurred on by Arab threats to turn to East Germany for its imports, strongly urged that substantial concessions be granted.
25X1

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FAR EAST
25X1A
The British delegate to the UN General Assembly reports that the Peiping regime recently advised the Indian Government that it would not demand the repatriation of "Chiang Kai-shek agents" among the Chinese prisoners taken in Korea.
Comment: Peiping has previously insisted on the repatriation of all 22,000 Chinese POW's, of whom about 16,000 are unwilling to return. There is no indication, however, that Peiping would agree to the classification of any large number of Chinese POW's as "Chiang Kai-shek agents."
UN that all prisoners should be repatriated regardless of their wishes.
4.
Moslem guerrillas reportedly recapture northwest China base:
25X1A
25X1
3.
Peiping suggests some Chinese POW's need not be repatriated:
On 10 November Vyshinsky stated in the
Moslem guerrillas recaptured their base in eastern Tsinghai Province on 16 October,

25X1
IThe battle took place 120 miles west of Lanchow and there were "thousands" of guerrilla and Chinese Communist casualties.
-425X1A
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25X1A
Comment: A large-scale Moslem rebellion in the adjacent province of Kansu was reported in April.
NEAR EAST - AFRICA
5. Mossadeq again attempts to curb the Shah's power:

According to Minister of Court Ala, Mossadeq has told the Shah that the Constituent Assembly of 1949, which gave the Shah the right to dis-
solve the Majlis, was created by the British therefore invalid. When the Shah suggested s ec o an that he should dissolve the present Majlis and thus delay approval of its legislation until a new parliament is elected, Mossadeq insisted that the Shah has "no other choice but to bow to the will of the Majlis and sign the bills" without awaiting senate approval.
Comment:
The measures which the Majlis has passed recently are all designed to reduce the power of the traditional ruling class.
6.
Tribal unrest in northern Iran increases:
25X1A
Unrest in the Kurdish tribal areas in northwestern Iran has increased appreciably in recent weeks, according to the American Consulate in Tabriz. Kurdish opposition has already forced the government to suspend its agrarian reform program in these areas.
Arms smuggling and banditry are increasing as army control is gradually being restricted to the larger cities and garrisons. Tribal chiefs are showing a tendency to unite despite thefl lack of a strong leader. Should the government attempt to enforce its reform program, a serious clash is expected.

25X1A
25X1A
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Comment: Although Kurdish chieftains have always resented government attempts to regulate tribal affairs, this is the first time in recent years that they have presented any determined resistance. Tribal opposition to the government will increase as government control of the area deteriorates.
7.
Britain attempting to forestall general release of arms to Egypt:

The British Government will stress to the North Atlantic Council that-the release of any considerable quantity of arms to Egypt would undermine Britain's bargaining position for o ta ning Egyp an association with Western defense plans. Future British arms policy toward Egypt will depend on Cairo's reaction to the release of 15 jet planes.
Other countries will not be asked to refrain from supplying Egypt with arms,but will be asked to conform to the British policy.
British Foreign Office officials have stated that once Britain has released the 15 jets, it will be almost impossible to prevent other countries from supplying Egypt with arms.
Comment:
25X1A
8.
British advisers support Libyan demand for increased US compensation
25X1A
British financial advisers to the Libyan Government, if asked for advice by Premier Muntasser, will recommendthat the United States pay $2,000,000 a year for the use of ases In Libya, according to British adviser Haley. He told a member of the American Legat on in Tripoli that Muntasser would gain a great psychological advantage in parliament if he could state that he had doubled the sum previously agreed on.
I

-625X1A
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25X1A
Because of the influence of these advisers and the known attitude of Muntasser, the American Charge believes that Libya will not accept a lower figure.
Muntasser informed American Minister Villard in August that the $1,000,000 previously agreed on as annual compensation for US bases in Libya was not sufficient. Muntasser has maintained that unless the compensation is increased, the treaty will not be ratified.
Comment:
9,
New Soviet move on German POW's seen likely:
25X1A
American officials in Berlin believe that East German initiative in publicizing recent discussions between Prime Minister Grotewohl and leaders of the West German Communistfront "Deutsche Sammlung" may portend some surprise act on from Moscow on the release of German prisoners held since the end of World War IL This is the fivst time that the Communists have admitted discussing the POW problem with West German representatives.
A Soviet move at this time could be intended to deprive Bishop Dibelius of credit for any favorable Soviet action following his forthcoming visit to Moscow.
Comment A Soviet concession at this time would more likely be intended to facilitate continuing East German overtures to Bonn for all-German talks.
10.
25X1A
Austrian support for East-West trade controls weakening:

Austrian officials are now "definitely stiffening" against American pressure on trade controls and some concessions may

-725X1A
WESTERN EUROPE
Approved -or Release 2003/10122 : CIA-RDP79T00975A00090027 0001-2
25X1A
be necessary to ensure their long-run cooperation, according to American Embassy officials in Vienna. They attribute this change in sentiment to mounting unemployment, difficulties in finding alternative Western markets, and the rejection of recent proposals for trade with the Orbit.
Foreign Minister Gruber has urged careful consideration of the plight of a large Tyrolean metals firm whose inability to fill certain Orbit orders will aggravate an already serious
unemployment problem.

-B25X1A
Comment: Recently proposed tungsten and molybdenum processing agreements with Satellite countries would help alleviate the unemployment problem, but have generally been considered too beneficial to the Orbit. With the elections only about four months away, the coalition government will be particularly vulnerable to pressure for an expansion of foreign trade.
Approved
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25X1
18 November 1952
25X1
Copy No. 57
25X1
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NO CHANGE IN CLASS, X 0 DECLASSIFIED

C
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS

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25X1
ALITH: HR 70-2
DATEAPIA0RES/ EWER: .
25X1
DIA and DOS review(s) completed.

Approved For Re le
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nrcripapmeSeicatEmT975,
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000900320001-6
25X1
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SUMMARY
FAR EAST
1.
Republic of Korea threatens to deny currency advances to UN forces (page 3).

NEAR EAST - AFRICA
3.
4.
5.
6.
25X1A

EASTERN EUROPE
2.
Papagos reported likely to remove top Greek military figures

(page 3). Indian backing of Mau Mau in Kenya reported (page 4).
Albanian exile group favors cooperation with Yugoslavia (page 5). Polish Chief of Staff claims populace fears American war preparations (page 5).
WESTERN EUROPE
West German political orientation dependent on French treaty action (page 6).
**
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1.
Republic of Korea threatens to deny currency advances to UN forces:

The South Korean Government informed the UN Command on 14 November that unless immediate dollar repayments for all outstanding won drawings were made, no further advances would be available to the UN after 15 December. Pointing out that only 46 percent of the advances made since July 1950 have been repaid, the Finance Minister blamed the present inflation on the constantly increasing issues of Korean currency to the UN and the latter's delay in making dollar repayments.
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Comment: This problem is one of the principal sources of friction between the South Korean Government and the UN Command. Won drawings by the United Nations forces, which have been averaging 30 to 40 billion per month at the official rate of 6000 to the dollar, are one of the primary causes of the tremendous inflation in South Korea. Dollar repayments, however, will not alleviate the economic situation appreciably until Korea develops a practical import program.
2.
Papagos reported likely to remove top Greek military figures:

Marshal Papagos' deputy Markezinis told an American Embassy official on 15 November that he would urge Papagos not to remove precipitously the high-ranking army officers w o ave oppose m. He thought, however, that Papagos could not be dissuaded from replacing Chief of Staff Tsakalotos and the Chief of the National Defense General Staff, Grigoropoulos.
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Comment: After Papagos resigned as commander in chief, numerous pro-Papagos officers were reassigned or retired. The Marshal was disturbed by this reintroduction of political influence in the armed forces and has repeatedly insisted that their politically appointed replacements must be removed. It is not likely that Papagos,since he has been given an overwhelming mandate, will be easily dissuaded from any moves he thinks necessary to free the army from political intrigue.
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Ambassador Ward, who previously served in Kenya, comments that the Indian High Commissioner in East Africa has in the past given lip service to African movements in an effort to drive a wedge between Africans and Europeans in East Africa and thereby create a "middle position" for Asians.
Indian Government playedraale part in the organization of the secret society or that it is giving material support to the movement.
On the other hand, India generally gives open encouragement to nationalism in the colonial areas.
The Indian Congress Party is publicly collecting funds to aid the Indian minority in 8outh Africa, which is participating in the passive resistance campaign against the government's racial policies.

-425X1A
3.
Indian backing of Mau Mau in Kenya reported:
The Indian Ambassador to Afghanistan recently told American Ambassador Ward in Kabul that "India and possibly Pakistan have organized and supported the Mau Mau movement and are continuing to do so."
Comment: There is no evidence that the
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EASTERN EUROPE
4.
Albanian exile group favors cooperation with Yugoslavia:
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Albanian nationalistirefugee circles are rapidly changing their opinions on cooperating with oslavia to liberate Albania, The realization that will be almost impossible to liberate Albania without Yugoslav help and the belief that increased Western influence n Yugoslav affairs is gradually moderating Tito's brand of Communism contribute to their more favorable attitude toward the Yugoslav-sponsored Prizren Committee.
it
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Comment: This is the first firm evidence that the Western-oriented BKI is becoming receptive to Yugoslav invitations and pressure to collaborate against the Hoxha regime. If BKI leaders decide to support the activities of the Prizren Committee, a significant increase in subversive action inside Albania
may follow.
5.
Polish Chief of Staff claims populace fears American war preparations:

The Polish Chief of Staff, General Korczyc, stated recently
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the Polish people fear the United States is now preparing for war. As reasons for this fear he cited the election of General Eisenhower and the establishment by the United States of air and other military bases along the Orbit perimeter.

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Comment: Similar views have frequently been expressed in public addresses by Polish officials and given prominence in Polish propaganda media. It is unusual, however, for them to be stated by one of the top government leaders on an official occasion of this nature when usually only the most general amenities are exchanged. The Chief of Staff, a former Red Army general, ranks just under Marshal Rokossovski.
6.
West German political orientation dependent on French treaty action: American officials in Bonn believe that French action on the European Defense Community treaty will largely determine the future course of West German foreign and domestic developments. Should France ratify the treaty, a continuation of Chancellor Adenauer's present policy of FrenchGerman rapprochement is practically assured after the forthcoming federal elections.
Rejection of the treaty would compel Adenauer to abandon this policy, and to call for direct West German participation in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the elimination of Allied controls over West Germany in the present contractual conventions. Rejection would probably cause a revival of extreme nationalism in West Germany, and possibly the establishment of a Social Democratic government dedicated to neutrality and reunification. Such a government might present the Kremlin with a new opportunity to attempt to divide the West.
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WESTERN EUROPE
Shortly following the US elections, the American Military Attache reported nuMerous instances of Polish popular approval of the results. Large segments of the non-Communist Polish population have long believed that the only way by which they will be relieved of the Russian yoke is through a general war.
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Comment A French attempt to modify the treaty extensively would probably be interpreted by the West German Government as tantamount to outright rejection.

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A
19 ko
FAR EAST
52CAP)
Communist air air force in 1. 1 . Communist in Korea Korea may may be be preyaring preparing for for expanded expanded air war: war:
The Communist air force may Communist air may be be preparing prepartng expansion o of f the the Korean Korean aair t r war, war, for an expansion
f 17 MIG-15 The weekly weekly total total o of MIG-15sorties sorties observed from 9 9 to to 16 10November November is is the the lowest lowest in in 15 15 months. months. Visual served from reconnaissance of o f the Yalu Yalu River combat airfields also shows shows that River combat airfields also the enemy enemy is f aircraft is no no longer longer basing basing large large numbers numbers o of aircraft there.
the withdrawal from maximum number num r o ercep or6 and and a a reduction reduction of d the the combat of of a maximum of 111 Interceptors Communists were were vulnerability would would be logical moves if the Communists enemy's vulnerability contemplating an contemplating an attack attack with with the the newly-arrived newly-arrived X IL-28 I , 2 8 jet light bombers. are,however, however,no no further indications cd an impendingoffensive. affensive. There are, further indications of an impending
o f up up to to 45 45 Comment: The presence of Comment; Manchuria represents significant jet light bombers in northern Manchuria represents a significant gain in the combat potential potential of of Communist Communistair air forces forces in the area. There is, is, as asyet, yet,no no indication indication bf bf the the readiness readiness or or availability availability of of aircraft or o rtheir theircrews crewsfor forcommitment commitment in in the Korean Korean air war. these aircraft
On 17 November 64 MIG-15 flights On November 64 flights were observed, of of which which 31 were encountered. encountered.
/NR
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Principal anti-Communist powers at UN favor Indian resolution

(page 3).
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7. 8.

FAR EAST
Comment on establishment of National Planning Committee in Communist China (page 5). '
WESTERN EUROPE
Serious setbacks seen in Bundestag EDC action (page 7). Delay seen in Italian and Dutch ratification of EDC (page 8).
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GENERAL
1.
Principal anti-Communist powers at UN favor Indian resolution:
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The principal anti-Communist powers in the UN favor the Indian resolution for solving the Korean POW impasse, according to the American UN delegation.
Comment: The Indian proposal is objectionable to the United States chiefly because it includes no provision for the release of POW's unwilling to be repatriated.
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Britain, France and Canada feel that support of the Indian proposal might gain ground for the West with India and other Asian nations. The British delegation argues that if the Commur nists accept the Indian resolution"Nve will have an armistice," and if they reject it the West will gain an important propaganda victory.
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4.
Comment on establishment of National Planning Committee in Commuhist-China: The establishment on 15 November of a National Planning Committee provides Communist China with an organization, comparable to the Soviet Union's State Planning Commission, charged with the formulation of long-range plans for increasing industrial and agricultural production.
The committee includes top Chinese Commm-
nist officers, and its creation lends support to other evidence that China is preparing for economic expansion under a five-year plan. Peiping has already stated that "planned construction will begin in 1953," and the Moscow radio declared on 1 October that China was preparing "the outlines of the first five-year plan."

FAR EAST
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Serious setbacks seen in Bundestag EDC action:

I
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The Bundestag's rejection of the government's Imotion to consider the Bonn and Paris treaties this month is a serious setback to Chancellor Adenauer because it makes more likely a onstitutlonal Court ec sion on the legality af the treaties prior to Bundestag action. The Chancellor has been hoping through Bundestag ratification to present the court with a "political fact"and thus influence its decision.
The new delay may encourage some coalition deputies to press for further postponement of ratification until the court has rendered its decision.
Comment: Unless the court renders an unfavorable decision beforehand, the Bundestag is now expected to ratify the treaties by mid-December, or at the latest in January.

WESTERN EUROPE
-7-
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Delay Seen in Italian and Dutch ratification of EDC:
8.
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The chief Italian delegate to the EDC treaty interim committee believes that his government, unless subjected to strong US pressure, may submit the EDC treaty to parliament too late to obtain approval before the 1953 spring elections. In his opinion, the government is holding back in the hope that one or more of the other member countries may act first.

-825X1A
Meanwhile, the US Embassy at the Hague reports that the lack of progress on EDC ratification by other countries has weakened the Netherlands' desire to be in the forefront. The political director of the Foreign Ministry now believes that the Netherlands will not ratify the treaty before February.
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TOP SECRET CANC.,E CANW

2-1
oV
FAR EAST
1. 1 .
USSR-based MIG-15's USSR-based MIG-15's engage US US Navy Navyjets jets off off Korea:
Air Force
Security Service Service, Securtty Nov 52 19 Nov
Although Soviet Comment: Although Soviet fighters fighters based have patrolled patrolled the the Soviet-Korean Soviet-Korean in the Southern Maritime Maritime area area have border during during previous prevtous UN UN attacks in northeastern Korea, border attacks on on targets targets in this is is the the first ftrstcombat combatcontact. contact,
of the engagement to the The proximity of U W R has Soviet border border suggests that the USSR hasestabltshed establishedin inthis this area area a line well out to sea beyond beyond any any claimed claimedterritorial territorial jurisdiction jurisdtctton which which it will defend against potenttally potentially hostile hostile penetrations. penetrations. The TheUSSR USSR has taken a similar similarposition position with with regard regard to to the the Hokkaido-Kurils Hokkaido-Kurils demardemarcation line. line.
NR
MIG-16's engaged engaged on on 18 18 November by The MIG-15's US Navy the Japan Japan US Navycarrier-based carrier-based jets over the south of d Sea, approximately approximately 65 miles south CANOE CANOE Vladivostok, were Vladivostok, were directed "to give battle" h 2 2 .;-by %by the Fifth Fleet air defense defense controller based at Vladivostok, f three adivostok, The The Soviet Sovtet aircraft aircraftbelonged belonged to one o of three o f the theVladivostok Vladivostok Fifth Fleet fighter fighter regiments regimentsalerted alertedfor fordefense defenseof areawhen when the UN UN task carrying out out an attack attack on on the the Base area task force force was carrying cities of o f Hoeryong Hoeryong and cities and Najin, Najin, tn in northeastern Korea close to the Soviet border. Sovtet
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2.
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5. 6,
Allied air access to Vienna again challenged by Russians (page East German ordinance hurts West Berlin (nage 6).
I

WESTERN EUROPE
LATIN AMERICA
More Chinese Communist troops may be destined for Korea (page 3).
5).
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S.
Left-center of Italian Christian Democrats shows great strength at party congress (page 7).
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9.
Venezuela opposition party reportedly victorious in election (page '7).
****
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2.
More Chinese Communist troops may be destbied for Korea:

About 6,000 Chinese Communist troops, formerly stationed in Hupeh and Kiangsi Provinces, arrived in Hankow on 31 October,
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FAR EAST
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The troops were said tole awaiting ran transportation for their departure to Northeast China.
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5.
Allied air access to Vienna again challenged by Russians:

At a 28 November meeting of the Allied Council in Austria, the Soviet member presented a resolution to prohibit American and British combat
25X1A
the flight to Vienna of other than "communications or transport" planes.

In view of Soviet High Commissioner Sviridov's insistence on reciprocal overflight privileges in the Western zones, Ambassador Thompson believes that the Russians may intend to test this prerogative.
Comment: American use cf the Tulin airport and the corridor to it for commercial and military planes has been the subject of frequent exchanges between the Soviet and American High Commissioners, The Russian protests, however, have not gone beyond disagreement with the American view that existing agreements place no restrictions on the types of planes which may service occupation forces in Austria.

-525X1A
WESTERN EUROPE
ng o e owe interpretation, a 1945 Allied protocol precludes
aircraft from using the air corridors to Vienna.
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6,
East German ordinance hurts West Berlin:
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American observers in ller lin believe that the East German ordinance restricting West Berlin purchases in East Berlin will bring about a further deterioration in the ng con on o t Berlin low-income groups. The PeOple's Police have reportedly increased surveillance of West Berliners at sector borders. No major disruption of the West Berlin economy is foreseen.
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Comment: Although East German propaganda has strongly emphasized that the new measure is directed against the policies of the West Berlin government, the ordinance also bears out reports of serious food shortages in East Germany.
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8.
Left-center of Italian Christian Democrats shows great strength at party congress:

At the recent Christian Democratic national congress, the left-center faction, which has supported an electoral coalition of the moderate parties, emerged as the strongest force. The merman Embassy estimates that it has picked up about half the seats in the party's national council, and is therefore in a position to challenge the predominantly right-center leadership, although it is unlikely to do so before the elections.
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Premier de Gasperi, the Embassy notes, remains the "unquestioned" leader of his party.
Comment: Should the left-center succeed in halting or slowing the party's trend toward collaboration with the Monarchists and other right-wing parties, the government coalition's prospects for victory in the spring elections would be substantially
improved.
9.
Venezuela opposit on party reportedly victorious in election:

LATIN AMERICA
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The government party has lost the Constituent Assembly election in Venezuela.f
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Unofficial reports indicate a victory of "possible landslide proportions" for the Republican Democratic Union (URD), whose leader, Villalba, has publicly claimed victory. Venezuelan morning newspapers of 1 December, however, carried no elections
results.
tary to substantiate oppositroms of a landslide.
left-wing party headed by the demagogic Jovito Villaiba. Villalba recently retracted his campaign allusions to nationalization of the oil and steel industries and has professed friendship for the United States.i
Comment: Unofficial returns are too fragmen-
The URD, the third-ranking party, is a moderate

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A government overturn at the polls would be unprecedented and might lead to a fabricated revolt and "palace coup" or other drastic action.
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FAR EAST EAST
1. 1 .
9DeLsX 7Dee..2-
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charges; North Koreans lay lay groundwork groundwork for renewal renewal of of BW BW charges:
Two recent recent North North Korean Korean military military messages Two US Army Army Korea US may indicate a revival of o f the Orbit's Orbit'sBW BW may lsdicate 29 7 20 Nov, NOV, 7 Dec Dec 52 62 propagandacampaign. campaign. The The first first message, CA OE propaganda mesaage, 29 November, November,was wasa areport report of of "insects" "insects" on 20 I' 1.1 6 X. which apeared on 20 November November and and Whtch "which have have been been positively positively identified tdentlfied as being belng unusual." unusual," The The sender sender added added that there there had had been been "no "no cases and cases of o f illness" illnessTv andthat that preventive preventlve measures measureswere werebeing being taken. taken.
"discoveries" by byenemy enemy.' Comment: Similar "discoveries" field units in early 1952 provided the basis for a major Communist early 1952 p r m a major Communist in Korea. propaganda theme'of propaganda themeof 1952--American 1952--American use use of ofBW BW in Korea. The The primary primary purpose of that campaign was to to further further the "hate America" theme campaign was theme with a secondary controlling '.disease disease in secondary aim aim of of improving improving sanitation sanitation and controlling in North North Korea.
timing o of f this effort may may be intended intended to The timing coincide with the scheduled consideration of of Communist Communist BW BW charges in in the UN. UN. the
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A second message, message, on 6 December, December, located A second on 6 "quantities of "quantities o f .insects that carry carry bacteria" bacteria" in in the the North North Korean Korean sector of the the front front lines and attributed their spread to the "barbarous of %arbarous United United States empire." empire." Preventive Preventive measures measuresagainst againstsmallpox smallpoxand and typhus, typhus, both endemic endemic in in North NorthKorea, Korea, were were stressed in in the message. message.
---TOP-SEeRET F A ' CANOE
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North Korean Korean Air Air Force may receive IL-28's: 2. North -National National Security Agency 8 52"Ilsfi )1S1() * 8 Dec Dec 52 CANOE CANOE zcAPF-10. j c i) f F - b b
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FAR EAST EAST
"'
use of of Soviet Soviet IL-28 twin twin The possible future use in the North Korean jet bombers in Korean Air Air Force i s suggested suggested in in a recent recent National National Security is Agency summary. Agency
In early November, November, a a North North Korean "operation group" established communications 42 groupvv communications facilities facilities at atKungchuling, Kungchuling, where where 42 In mid-November, mid-November, two IL-28's two high-ranking high-ranking North North IL-28's are arenow now located. located, In Korean air air officers, concerned techilical activities, concerned with with training and techbical Korean Beginning ih inlate late November, November, North North Korean Korean flights flights in flew to the field. field, Beginning light bombers bombers were scheduled TU-2 conventional conventional 1Jght scheduled from Kungchuling, Kungchuling, the first firstconfirmed confirmed instance instanceof o f such such Korean Korean activity. activity,
Comment: While no connection Comment: While no direct Korean connection with the the newly. newly.arrived arrived L IL-28's has yet yet been been established, established, the coincidence with Is of IL-28 s, of timing timing and and location location suggests suggests that that some some light bombers, possibly IL-28's, will be made available to the North Korean Korean Air Air Force.
-3 3 --
-TOP-SECRETh T X ? SECREF CANOE
3.
-TOP-SECRET CANOE
President Rhee ready ready for fornew new move move against political political opposition: opposition P r sident Rhee
In commenting commenting on on President President Rhee's Rhee's inflammatory anti-Assembly speeches o f 2 and 9 December speeches of Home Minister and the 11 December December statement by Home Chin that "organizations opposing opposing the government government Chin that "organizations ou e ee em mnate nate , I f the American American Embassy Embassy in in Pusan Pusan states states that many many Koreans feel that the the "timing, 'timing, tone tone and and content" content" of o f these these provocative provocative announcements may signal announcements stgnal the beginning beginning of of the anticipated anticipated campaign campaign against Rhee's political political opposition, opposition, particularly particularly in inthe theNational National Assembly. Assembly.
Comment: Comment: There have have been been increasing indications in recent recent weeks weeks that that Rhee-IFFej3iring Rhee i s preparing for another showdown with his hts for another showdoWn in the National Assembly. Having won.partial. victory victory in his opponents in Having won,partial. his power last summer, summer, Rhee Rheemay may now now attempt struggle for power attempt to have have the the AgAssemblY dissolved, dissolved. sembly
The Embassy E m b s s y adds that Rhee's move move appears to to be be carefully timed to to follow the Eisenhower Elsenhower visit visit to to Korea Korea and and the the UN UN discussions on on the the Korean Korean conflict. conflict. cussions
NR
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1.
2.
plans for UN action on Arab-German dispute (page 3). Liechtenstein firm reportedly offers large quantity of aluminum to Poland (page 3).
Bonn
FAR EAST
3.
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6. 7.
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NEAR EAST - AFRICA
Peiping attacks alleged US "Asians to fight Asians" plan (page 4)
Comment on Nagib-Shishakli statements at Cairo meeting (page 5). Egypt reportedly willing to let Sudan negotiations fail (page 6).
WESTERN EUROPE
French deputy in US to press for NATO alternative tc) EDC (page 7). Early fall of Pinay government seen possible (page 7).
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A
GENERAL
1.
Bonn plans for UN action on Arab-German dispute:

I
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Blankenhorn believes that Nagib will agree to the UN intervention proposal, which has already been approved by the Israeli Covernment. The West German Federal Senate will consider ratifying the restitution agreement on 10 January.
Comment: Discussion of the dispute in the UN might further strain re ations between Western and Arab countries and would seriously delay the delivery of industrial equipment needed by the Israeli economy.
2.
Liechtenstein firm reportedly offers large quantity of aluminum to

Poland:
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The Liechtenstein firm of Max Linker is reportedly negotiating with Poland for the immediate sale of 750 tons of 99. 5 percent pure aluminum sheets now in Antwerp. Both this shipment and an additional 750 tons, which will also be offered to the Poles, were allegedly obtained by means of a counterfeit order from an Argentine purchasing commission in Italy.

-325X1A
The Bonn government will soon ask the Egyptian Government to approve placing the Arab-West German dispute over the Israeli restitution agreement on the UN eneral Assembly agenda for 1953. According to a West German spokesman,Herbert Blankenhorn, such a procedure would provide the Arabs with a face-saving device and give General Nagib more time to soothe Arab resentment.
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Comment; Aluminum shipments to the Orbit from the West are believed to have amounted to about 11,000 metric tons in 1951, and to be continuing at a high rate.
FAR EAST
3.
Peiping attacks alleged US "Asians to fight Asians" plan:
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Peiping's line, emphasizing the racial aspects of the manpower question in Korea, asserts that the United States intends to use Asian troops in increasing numbers in Korea. The propaganda urges Asians not to fight for "American interests."
Comment: This theme, introduced into Peiping propaganda the past week, will almost certainly be increasingly exploited by the Communist world.
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The American Consul General at Hong Kong believes that Chinese Communist psychological strategists have an "effective theme" its,
their current attacks on an alleged American plan to use "Asians to fight Asians."
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Comment on Nagib-Shishakli statements at Cairo meeting:
The inflammatory statements made by General Nagib and Syrian Colonel Shishakli during the latter's current visit to Cairo appear to be aimed at bolstering their domestic positions. Both men emphasized Arab union and a readiness to use force, and voiced hostility to those opposing Arab aspirations.

NEAR EAST - AFRICA
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Egypt and Syria; nor does it indicate any forthcoming military action against Israel. The statements do reflect Arab anger at recent UN action on Tunisia and an Arab-Israeli peace, as well as a growing determination to make the Arab League an effective force in international politics.
The meeting in no way aims at union between
The emphasis on themes popular with the street crowds shows the unwillingness of Arab leaders to challenge mob rule and to urge moderation in solving Arab problems.
7.
Egypt reportedly willing to let Sudan negotiations fail.

Egypt will permit Anglo-Egyptian negotiations on the Sudan to break down if Great Britain continues to insist on special treatment for the southern Sudan, the chief remaining point of disagreement.
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According to the Embassy, there are indications that the regime is tempted to forego protracted negotiations and to revert to the appealing theme of "national struggle" to increase popular support. Comment: This is the strongest evidence to date that the military regime may drop its bold policy on the Sudan and return to the unyielding nationalist position of former regimes.
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8.
French deputy in US to press for NATO alternative to EDC:
25X1PJ
In Devinat's opinion, the only way out el the impasse is for NATO to work out a solution leading to admission of the Federal Republic to membership. Otherwise, the French Government will be forced to delay indefinitely its attempt to obtain ratification.
Comment: While the Paris Embassy previously reported that "a NATO solution" was gaining adherents in the French National Assembly, a majority of the deputies probably do not attangent favor creation of a German national army or Germany's admission
to NATO.
9.
Early fall of Pinay government seen possible:
25X1A
The American Embassy in Paris believes that Premier Pinay will find it exceedingly difficult to win the vote of confidence which he has suddenly asked from the National Assembly on his request for powers to effect tax reforms by decree. The date for this vote is to be determined on 16 December.

-725X1A
French Radical Socialist leader Paul Devinat, who will endeavor to discuss the EDC treaty situation with President-elect Eisenhower, told the American Embassy in Paris before is scheduled departure for New York on 13 December that some way must quickly be found "to save face" on this question lest the entire European cooperation concept suffer a serious blow. He believes that the recent developments in Bonn will make Bundestag approval impossible or at least further discourage the French deputies from ratifying the treaty.
Approve I For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975A00090 3550001-1
25X1A
The Embassy feels that Pinay has weakened his position by giving in to farm interests while standing firm against increases in family allowances and pensions, and warns that his prospects look worse almost daily.
25X1

25X1A
Comment: The prospective new test for Pinay is much more serious than other recent ones in view of what the Embassy calls a "radical change" in the Gaul lists position. The recent announcement by De Gaulle's spokesman in the Assembly that his party is ready to enter a coalition government in the next cabinet crisis means that some deputies in Pinay's coalition may now wish to overthrow him. Their motive would be to bring about a stronger coalition government by participation either of De Gaulle's party or of the dissident Gaul lists, whose ranks would be swelled if the general set unreasonable conditions for participation.
Appro ved For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-R0P79100975A000E 00550001-1
se 20536962kfrelittiyeT00,e
25
19 December 1952
Copy No.
25,
25X1

Aa
Dr.
DOCUMENT NO. NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
o DECLASSIFIED Clit4WPHANGED TO: TS
N43.11r14,13.AJT
A 70-
25X1
25X1
Id
Sae 204X1P2SEXAMPF9TorlyeleS
1
Approve For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-R0P79T00975A00090 0580001-8
25X1A
SUMMARY
GENERAL
1.
Communist literature on BW distributed in Vienna (page 3).

25X1
FAR EAST
2.
25X1
major Korean political crisis in
4.
5.
6.
25X1
25X1A

NEAR EAST - AFRICA
EASTERN EUROPE WESTERN EUROPE
January (page 3).
Serious rioting in Morocco expected within 30 days (page 4).
Yugoslays believe they have excellent bargaining position on Trieste issue (page 5).
Schuman sees Saar settlement by late February (page 5).
-225X1A
Appro
d For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975A0009 00580001-8
25X1A
GENERAL
1.
Communist literature on BW distributed in Vienna:
25X1A
Several publications summarizing "evidence" on the American use of biological warfare are being distributed at a BW exhibition currently being held in Vienna under the sponsorship of the Chinese and us r n peace councils.
25X1
2.1
25X1A

FAR EAST
Comment: There is no evidence that the recent revival of Communist charges of American use of biological warfare foreshadows another concerted Communist propaganda campaign of proportions similar to the one earlier this year. The current accusations seem designedto up-date such charges in order to document Soviet arguments on the subject in current international forums.
Imajor Korean political crisis in January:

25X1
'Mee undoubtedly faces another major political battle with opposition Assemblymen during January. The forthcoming political crisis, which will probably be similar to last spring's, will involve the appointment of a prime minister by Rhee and elections for the upper house of the National Assembly.
25X1 Rhee's choice for prime minister, either Pam k Tu-chin or vi Ki-pong, will not be acceptable to the Assembly while the creation of the upper house will meet with "blast-furnace resistance" by the legislators, who realize that a second house would limit their powers.
I
25X1
Comment: American officials in Korea believe that Rhee's recent public threats against the Assembly are the opening moves in another attempt to curb its powers. With the Assembly apparently as intractable as Rhee, there is little likelihood that it would be susceptible to Rhee's requests.
- 3
-25X1A
Approve cl For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-R0P79T00975A000900580001-8
Approved For Release 2003110122 : CIA-R01379100975A000900580001-8
25X1
4.
25X1
Serious rioting in Morocco expected within 30 days:

NEAR EAST - AFRICA
25X1
25X1A
further serious rioting
in Morocco is expected within 30 days.
some.
French security officials state that the nationalist Istiqlal party is organizing shock troops to aid in inciting riots in Casablanca. It is estimated that approximately 10,000 fanatics are involved. With 71000 to 109000 wellequipped police and soldiers in that sector, the French are confident that the situation can be kept in hand.
Widespread riots are most likely to occur if the French depose the Sultan, a possibility previously reported. French security measures would probably prevent large-scale disturbances in Casablanca; predominantly native towns such as Fez and Meknes might prove more troubleComment:
25X1A
-4-
Approve d For Release 2003/10/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975A00( 900580001-8
25X1A
EASTERN EUROPE
5.
Yugoslays believe they have excellent bargaining position on Trieste issue:

25X1
25X1
25X1A
Foreign Minister Kardelj recently stated that Yugoslavia's increasing value to the West and its possession of Zone B make its bargaining position on Trieste particularly strong. Kardelj concluded that time is on Yugoslavia.'s side.
If serious negotiations develop, Yugoslavia will demand specific safeguards to protect the Slovene minority both in Trieste and in Italy. In the absence of any new proposal; however, Yugoslavia would support the establishment of an ItaloYugoslav condominium; conceivably with some Austrian participation.
Comment: .1
25X1 25X1
much of Yugoslav action on the Trieste issue reflects the reasoning presented. On 16 December Tito publicly expressed extreme irritation at Italian demands for pressure on Yugoslavia to force a Trieste solution, and stated that Yugoslavia would make no concessions in Zone B. Previously, however, Belgrade had professed willingness to concede some of the northern coastal area in Zone B for substantial concessions in Zone A, such as a corridor to the sea at Zaule.
25X1A
6.
Schuman sees Saar settlement by late February:
French Foreign Minister Schuman recently told British Foreign Secretary Eden that France and Germany were "more than three quarters of the way" toward a Saar solution and that he believed the issue could be settled by late February. He said that he realizes the importance of making further progress before the 1953 German national election campaign.
25X1A

WESTERN EUROPE
-5-
Approv d For Release 2003110/22 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000 00580001-8
Approvei For Release 2003/10122 : CIA-RDP79T00975A000
0580001-8
25X1A
According to the British Foreign Office; Schuman stated that France does not expect to receive all of the Saar's coal production, and that if the territory is "Europeanized," other countries will have to receive their.share.
Comment: This is the first suggestion of French willingness to share the Saar's coal or steel production. This apparent shift in the French position provides some basis for Schuman's prediction of an early settlement; which otherwise appears over-optimistic in the light of numerous other still unresolved Saar economic questions.
25X1

25X1A
Appro
-6
d For Release 2003110/22 : CIA-RDP79100975A000900580001-8
HR70-14 . .. _ . - . .
HR70-14
SECRET CAN.:2---2-1
t
2--
GENERAL
1. 1.
L-
..ovietattitude attitudetoward toward Korean Korean conflict: -boviet
Kremlin's Kremlin's sensitivity sensitivityto toSoviet Soviet defections defections in in World World War War II II is is a a big big factor factor in in the the present mmunist attitude toward the repatriation however, that the main obstacle s in orea. to an armistice now is a Soviet estimate that a continuation of the conflict favors the USSR's strategic position and increases Peiping's
dependence on Moscow.
i the

EAST FAR EAST
2.
Comment: Of Of the theestimated estimated4,000,000 4,000,000 Soviet Soviet Comment: eTh-G-7inans during the first six monthso of World World personnel captured by the h te s during the first six months f captured by 1 , at at least least 1,000,000 1,000,QOOare considered to have The War War 1 II, have been beendefectors, defectors, The want to convince convince potential potential defectors defectors in in any any future future war that Kremlin may want 'repatriation and would be inevitable. 'repatriation andpunishment punishment would
L - 2 8 ' reported ~ reported flying flying along along Yalu Yalu River: 1L-28's
A A large, straight-winged, straight-winged, twin-jet twtn-jet plane plane moving moving at at a a comparatively low low rate rate of of speed on 17 17 December by an F-86 F-86 was observed on pilot flying flying over over northwest Korea Korea near the Yalu River, Yalu River, Other Other UN UN pilots report report having having sighted a similar similartype typeplane plane at atabout about the the same sametime timeon on the the Manchurian Manchurian side side of of the the Yalu. Yalu.
Far East East Air Air Force Force believes believes that that these these aircraft were aircraft were IL-28 IL-28light light bombers. bombers.
Comment: This Comment: This tp ig the the first first reported observation o of theater. I f such planes in the Korean theater, vation
- 3 -
I-1R76.214 R7 0 : 4 l H
GENERAL
1. 1 .
c t(
pilots in Korea demonstrate high degree of Communist pilots o f proficiency: 2. Communist

Communist pilots during the week ending 28 December showed an unusally high degree of
rafFiciency,
PPROVED FOR RELEASE RELEASE ATE: 22-Mar-201 0 22-Mar-2010 [DPPROVED

FAR EAST EAST
Dec 52
Although avoiding engagements with - 'Et, the Communists displayed an unusual variety of tactics designed to position themselves for brief firing
passes.
This departure from the pattern of the previous six weeks suggests that more experienced pilots are aitain over Korea Well-trained units for additional combat training. are experimenting with tactics to develop an intercept pattern arainst F-86's,ok aircraft of 'cOmparable performance.
-3 3 --

1952년 CIA 한국전 일일보고서 안치용

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1952년 CIA 한국전 일일보고서 안치용

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3 January isarC2--CIA No. $94.82 Copy Nock if

State Dept., USAF reviews completed

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In announcing the 1952 million dollars),

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build-up near border:1

!denies reports of recent Chinese Communist

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domairinaton for its textile industry in 1952:

(5) to send0100 UN Mos to Peiping to work in "cinenm propaganda."

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ars:tour:reduction of the buying quotation of the pound sterling while

The Japanese Foreign EXchange Control Board recently

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Yomiuri on 30 December reported a "movement in the air" aimed at

revivriEI defunct Home Ministry.

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ApproveciForillase 2002105/20: Ch442DP79T0114640700020001-3

.29 Dec 51)

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---..fied when filled in form is detached from controlled document.

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CIA No. 49482-A

S/S CABLE SUPPLEMENT