1.

GAVINO CORPUZ vs. Spouses GERONIMO and HILARIA GROSPE Facts: Petitioner Gavino Corpuz was a farmer-beneficiary under the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). Pursuant to Presidential Decree (PD) No. 27, he was issued a Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) over two parcels of agricultural land (Lot Nos. 3017 and 012) with a total area of 3.3 hectares situated in Salungat, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija. The lots were formerly owned by a certain Florentino Chioco and registered under Title No. 126638. To pay for his wifes hospitalization, petitioner mortgaged the subject land on January 20, 1982, in favor of Virginia de Leon. When the contract period expired, he again mortgaged it to Respondent Hilaria Grospe, wife of Geronimo Grospe, for a period of four years (December 5, 1986 to December 5, 1990) to guarantee a loan of P32,500. The parties executed a contract denominated as "Kasunduan Sa Pagpapahiram Ng Lupang Sakahan," which allowed the respondents to use or cultivate the land during the duration of the mortgage. Before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in Cabanatuan City (Region III), petitioner instituted against the respondents an action for recovery of possession. In his Complaint, he alleged that they had entered the disputed land by force and intimidation on January 10 and 11, 1991, and destroyed the palay that he had planted on the land. Respondents, in their Answer, claimed that the "Kasunduan" between them and petitioner allowed the former to take over the possession and cultivation of the property until the latter paid his loan. Instead of paying his loan, petitioner allegedly executed on June 29, 1989, a "Waiver of Rights"[7] over the landholding in favor of respondents in consideration of P54,394. Petitioner denied waiving his rights and interest over the landholding and alleged that his and his childrens signatures appearing on the Waiver were forgeries. Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) Ernesto P. Tabara ruled that petitioner abandoned and surrendered the landholding to the Samahang Nayon of Malaya, Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija, which had passed Resolution Nos. 16 and 27 recommending the reallocation of the said lots to the respondent spouses, who were the "most qualified farmer[s]-beneficiaries." The appellate court also ruled that petitioner had abandoned the landholding and forfeited his right as a beneficiary. It rejected his contention that all deeds relinquishing possession of the landholding by a beneficiary were unenforceable. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner abandoned or voluntarily surrendered his rights as a beneficiary under PD 27? Held: Yes. The sale, transfer or conveyance of land reform rights are, as a rule, void in order to prevent a circumvention of agrarian reform laws. However, in the present case, the voluntary surrender or waiver of these rights in favor of the Samahang

Nayon is valid because such action is deemed a legally permissible conveyance in favor of the government. After the surrender or waiver of said land reform rights, the Department of Agrarian Reform, which took control of the property, validly awarded it to private respondents.

2. FRANCISCO ESTOLAS vs. ADOLFO MABALOT Facts: Subject agricultural land was awarded to respondent by virtue of PD 27 in 1973 and a CLT was issued in his favor. In need of money for medical expenses, respondent passed on the property to petitioner for P5,800.00 and P200.00 worth of rice. According to respondent, that was a verbal mortgage. According to petitioner, a sale had taken place and a transfer certificate of title was issued in petitioner's name. Unable to redeem the property respondent filed a complaint for reconveyance with the DAR office which found his act of surrendering the land in favor of petitioner as constituting an abandonment thereof. The DAR Central Office, however, reversed the assailed order and directed the petitioner to return the land to respondent. The CA also held that the transfer of the land to petitioner was void and that there was no abandonment because respondent tried to redeem the property but petitioner asked for a high purchase rice. Issue: Whether or not the transfer of the land to the petitioner was void Held: Yes. Land awarded under PD 27cannot be transferred except to the grantee's heirs by hereditary succession, or back to the government by other legal means; the law is clear and leaves no room for interpretation; agrarian laws must be liberally interpreted in favor of the grantees; the property was not abandoned as respondent continues to claim dominion over the land; and that even if respondent did indeed abandon subject property, any transfer may only be made in favor of the government.

3. CHAVEZ vs. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY Facts: President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued PD No. 1084 creating PEA. PD No. 1084 tasked PEA "to reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas," and "to develop, improve, acquire, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands." Then President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1085 transferring to PEA the "lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila Bay" under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP). Thereafter, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, granting and transferring to PEA "the parcels of land so reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP) containing a total area of 1,915,894 square meters." Subsequently, the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Paraaque issued Transfer Certificates of Title, in the name of PEA, covering the three reclaimed islands known as the "Freedom Islands" located at the southern portion of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road, Paraaque City. PEA and AMARI entered into the Joint Venture Agreement (JVA) through negotiation without public bidding. President Fidel V. Ramos, through then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, approved the JVA. The Senate Committees reported the results of their investigation: (1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of the public domain which the government has not classified as alienable lands and therefore PEA cannot alienate these lands; (2) the certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands are thus void, and (3) the JVA itself is illegal. Petitioner Frank I. Chavez as a taxpayer, filed a Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. Petitioner contends the government stands to lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI. Petitioner prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section 28, Article II, and Section 7, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. Issue: Whether or not the stipulations in the amended joint venture agreement for the transfer to AMARI of certain lands, reclaimed and still to be reclaimed is valid Held: No. The mere physical act of reclamation by PEA of foreshore or submerged areas does not make the reclaimed lands alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA. Likewise, the mere transfer by the National Government of lands of the public domain to PEA does not make the lands

alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA. There is no express authority under either PD No. 1085 or EO No. 525 for PEA to sell its reclaimed lands. PEA's charter, however, expressly tasks PEA "to develop, improve, acquire, administer, deal in, subdivide, dispose, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands . . . owned, managed, controlled and/or operated by the government." There is, therefore, legislative authority granted to PEA to sell its lands, whether patrimonial or alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may sell to private parties its patrimonial properties in accordance with the PEA charter free from constitutional limitations. The constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain does not apply to the sale of PEA's patrimonial lands. Moreover, the government is required to sell valuable government property through public bidding. In the case at bar the original JVA dated April 25, 1995 covered not only the Freedom Islands and the additional 250 hectares still to be reclaimed, it also granted an option to AMARI to reclaim another 350 hectares. The original JVA, a negotiated contract, enlarged the reclamation area to 750 hectares. The failure of public bidding on December 10, 1991, involving only 407.84 hectares, is not a valid justification for a negotiated sale of 750 hectares, almost double the area publicly auctioned. The grant of legislative authority to sell public lands does not automatically convert alienable lands of the public domain into private or patrimonial lands. The alienable lands of the public domain must be transferred to qualified private parties, or to government entities not tasked to dispose of public lands, before these lands can become private or patrimonial lands. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations.

4. LUZ FARMS vs. THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF DAR Facts: Luz Farms, petitioner in this case, is a corporation engaged in the livestock and poultry business and together with others in the same business allegedly stands to be adversely affected by the enforcement of Section 3(b), Section 11, Section 13, Section 16(d) and 17 and Section 32 of R.A. No. 6657 otherwise known as Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and of the Guidelines and Procedures Implementing Production and Profit Sharing under R.A. No. 6657 promulgated on January 2, 1989 and the Rules and Regulations Implementing Section 11 thereof as promulgated by the DAR on January 9, 1989 Hence, this petition praying that aforesaid laws, guidelines and rules be declared unconstitutional. Meanwhile, it is also prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order be issued enjoining public respondents from enforcing the same, insofar as they are made to apply to Luz Farms and other livestock and poultry raisers. Luz Farms questions the following provisions of R.A. 6657, insofar as they are made to apply to it: (a) Section 3(b) which includes the "raising of livestock (and poultry)" in the definition of "Agricultural, Agricultural Enterprise or Agricultural Activity." (b) Section 11 which defines "commercial farms" as "private agricultural lands devoted to commercial, livestock, poultry and swine raising . . ." (c) Section 13 which calls upon petitioner to execute a production-sharing plan. (d) Section 16(d) and 17 which vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the authority to summarily determine the just compensation to be paid for lands covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. (e) Section 32 which spells out the production-sharing plan mentioned in Section 13 The constitutional provision under consideration reads as follows: ARTICLE XIII x x x AGRARIAN AND NATURAL RESOURCES REFORM Section 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the rights of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing.x x x"

 It, however, argued that Congress in enacting the said law has transcended the mandate of the Constitution, in including land devoted to the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage. Livestock or poultry raising is not similar to crop or tree farming. Land is not the primary resource in this undertaking and represents no more than five percent (5%) of the total investment of commercial livestock and poultry raisers. Indeed, there are many owners of residential lands all over the country who use available space in their residence for commercial livestock and raising purposes, under "contract-growing arrangements," whereby processing corporations and other commercial livestock and poultry raisers Lands support the buildings and other amenities attendant to the raising of animals and birds. The use of land is incidental to but not the principal factor or consideration in productivity in this industry. On the other hand, the public respondent argued that livestock and poultry raising is embraced in the term "agriculture" and the inclusion of such enterprise under Section 3(b) of R.A. 6657 is proper. He cited that Webster's International Dictionary, Second Edition (1954), defines the following words: "Agriculture the art or science of cultivating the ground and raising and harvesting crops, often, including also, feeding, breeding and management of livestock, tillage, husbandry, farming. It includes farming, horticulture, forestry, dairying, sugarmaking . . . Livestock domestic animals used or raised on a farm, especially for profit. Farm a plot or tract of land devoted to the raising of domestic or other animals." ISSUE: Whether or not Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of R.A. No. 6657 insofar as the said law includes the raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its coverage as well as the Implementing Rules and Guidelines promulgated in accordance therewith is constitutional? HELD: No. The transcripts of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the word "agricultural," clearly show that it was never the intention of the framers of the Constitution to include livestock and poultry industry in the coverage of the constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform program of the Government. The Committee adopted the definition of "agricultural land" as defined under Section 166 of R.A. 3844, as laud devoted to any growth, including but not limited to crop lands, saltbeds, fishponds, idle and abandoned land The intention of the Committee is to limit the application of the word "agriculture."

 It is evident from the foregoing discussion that Section II of R.A. 6657 which includes "private agricultural lands devoted to commercial livestock, poultry and swine raising" in the definition of "commercial farms" is invalid, to the extent that the aforecited agro-industrial activities are made to be covered by the agrarian reform program of the State. There is simply no reason to include livestock and poultry lands in the coverage of agrarian reform. Hence, there is merit in Luz Farms' argument that the requirement in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A. 6657 directing "corporate farms" which include livestock and poultry raisers to execute and implement "production-sharing plans" (pending final redistribution of their landholdings) whereby they are called upon to distribute from three percent (3%) of their gross sales and ten percent (10%) of their net profits to their workers as additional compensation is unreasonable for being confiscatory, and therefore violative of due process

6. PHILIPPINE NATURAL RAILWAYS vs. DEL VALLE Facts: Philippine National Railways (PNR) owned three strips of land along the Manila- legazpi route, part of its railroad right of way. Some portions of the land were occupied by people, prompting disputes. PNR adopted temporary rules for the possession of the land through rentals. PNR awarded the use of the land after a bidding to Pantaleon Bingabing for a period of three years creating a civil law lease expressly stipulating Bingabing to "occupy and us the property. temporarily for agriculture." Bingabing failed to take possession of the said piece of land as Pampilo Doltz had occupied the land and claims that he is a tenant of the previous awardees and Bingabing too. In response to this, PNR and Bingabing filed suit against Doltz for recovery of the possession of the land, to remove the house of Doltz and pay for compensation to Bingabing. Doltz defenses state that he is inter alia tenant on the property for 20 years placed by deceased lessor Pablo Gomba, and successor Demetrio de Vera. He also claimed that he had given Bingabing 1/3 of the crop harvest profits and by effect become a tenant of Bingabing.Upon the court's request, Doltz and Bingabing agreed to temporarily liquidate the harvest on a sharing ratio of 70-30 in Doltz' favour. While the case was pending, Doltz registered with the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR) a petition against Bingabing for security of tenure, the adoption of a sharing ratio of 70-30 of the crops, and reliquidation of past harvests. PNR intervened in the case. Petitioners herein there maintained the position that the premises in controversy are not an agricultural land within the contemplation of the Agricultural Tenancy Act (Republic Act 1199) or the Agricultural Land Reform Code (Republic Act 3844); that no tenancy relationship existed between the parties; that CAR, therefore, lacked jurisdiction over the case; and that there is a pending case between the same parties in another court involving the same subject matter and the same cause of action. CAR decided in favor of Doltz and that the sharing ratio be maintained. Issues: (1) Is the land in dispute agricultural land within the Agricultural Tenancy act and the Agricultural Land ref orm code? (2) Is Doltz considered a tenant? Held: (1) No. Section 3 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act, "agricultural tenancy is the physical possession by a person of land devoted to agriculture belonging to, or legally possessed by, another for the purpose of production through the labor of the former and of the members of his immediate farm household, in consideration of which the former agrees to share the harvest with the latter, or to pay a price certain or ascertainable, either in produce or in money, or in both Section 166(1) of the Agricultural Land Reform Code, "agricultural land" means

land devoted to any growth including but not limited to crop lands, salt beds, fishponds, idle land and abandoned land as defined in paragraphs 18 and 19 of this section. The land here in controversy does not fit into the concept of agricultural land. PNR cannot devote it to agriculture because by its own charter, Republic Act 4156, PNR cannot engage in agriculture. Agricultural activities may hamper the operation, security and safety of the PNR. (2) The contract of lease executed by PNR in favour of Bingabing was merely temporary and may be revocable at any time the PNR needs the leased land for its own use. Also, the contract rules stipulate that any form of sublease of the land is prohibited and that previous awardees de Vera, Gomba or present leaseholder Bingabing cannot create one, since PNR did not consent to the creation of such.

7. KRIVENKO vs. REGISTER OF DEEDS Facts: Petitionerm a foreigner, bought residential lot from the Magdalena Estate, Inc. in December 1941, but the registration was interrupted due to war (Second World War). In May 1945, he tried to accomplish the registration of the aforementioned residential lot but then he was denied by the Registry of Deedsof Manila because he was not a Filipino citizen. The constitutional provision in question is Section 1 of article XIII of the Constitution (1935) which provides; Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated. And with respect to public agricultural lands,their alienation is limited to Filipino citizens. Krivenko contends that the land he bought is not covered by the said constitutional provision because it was a private residential land and not a public agricultural land. Issue: Whether or not an alien may acquire residential lang Held: No. Section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution (1935) provides; save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines. Ir is rue in statutory construction t h a t a word o r phrase repeated in a stature will bear t h e same meaning throughout the statute, unless a different intention appears. The only difference between agricultural land under Section 1 and agricultural land under section 5, is that the former is public and the latter is private. But such difference refers to the ownership and not the class of land. The lands are the same in both sections and for the conservation of national patrimony, what is important Is the nature o r class of the property regardless whether it isowned by the State or by its citizens.