MUNICIPALITY OF SAN NARCISO vs. MENDEZ Facts : President C. Garcia, issued E.O.

353 creating the municipal district of San Andres,Quezon. By virtue of E.O. 174, issued by President D. Macapagal, the municipal district of SanAndres was later officially recognized to have gained the status of a fifth class municipality byoperation of Sec. 2 of RA 1515. It was then attacked of its validity. The Municipality of San Narciso filed a petition for quo warranto against the officials of theMunicipality of San Andres. The petition sought the declaration of nullity of Executive Order No.353 and prayed that the respondent local officials of the Municipality of San Andres bepermanently ordered to refrain from performing the duties and functions of their respectiveoffices. While petitioners would grant that the enactment of RA 7160 may have converted theMunicipality of San Andres into a de facto municipality, they contend that since the petition forquo warranto had been filed prior to the passage of said law, petitioner had acquired a vestedright to seek the nullification of E.O. 353, and any attempt to apply Sec. 442 of RA 7160 to thepetition would perforce be violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Issue : Whether or not the Municpality of San Andres legally exists. YES Held : The de jure status of the Municipality of San Andres in the province of Quezon must beconceded. Granting the Executive Order No. 353 was a complete nullity for being the result of anunconstitutional delegation of legislative power, the peculiar circumstances obtaining in thiscase hardly could offer a choice other than to consider the Municipality of San Andres to have atleast attained a status uniquely of its own closely approximating, if not in fact attaining, that of ade facto municipal corporation. Created in 1959 by virtue of Executive Order No. 353, theMunicipality of San Andres had been in existence for more than six years. On the contrary,certain governmental acts all pointed to the State's recognition of the continued existence of theMunicipality of San Andres. Thus, after more than five years as a municipal district, ExecutiveOrder No. 174 classified the Municipality of San Andres as a fifth class municipality after havingsurpassed the income requirement laid out in Republic Act No. 1515.Sec. 442(d) of the LGC of 1991, which provides that municipal districts organized pursuant topresidential issuances or executives orders and which have their respective sets of electivemunicipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of the code shall henceforth beconsidered as regular municipalities, is also curative statute, as it validates the creation of municipalities by executive orders which had been held to be an invalid usurpation of legislativepower. MUNICIPALITY OF JIMENEZ vs. BAZ Facts : The Municipality of Sinacaban was created by EO 258 of then Pres. Quirino pursuant toSec. 68 of the Revised Admin. Code. Sinacaban laid claim to several barrios based on thetechnical description in EO 258. The Municipality of Jimenez asserted jurisdiction based on anagreement with Sinacaban which was approved by the Provincial Board of Misamis Occidentalwhich fixed the common boundary of Sinacaban and Jimenez. The Provincial Board declared the disputed area to be part of Sinacaban. It held that the earlierresolution approving the agreement between the municipalities was void since the Board had nopower to alter the boundaries of Sinacaban as fixed in EO 258. Jimenez argued that the power

tocreate municipalities is essentially legislative (as held in Pelaez v Auditor General), thenSinacaban, which was created thru and EO, had no legal personality and no right to assert aterritorial claim. Issue : Whether or not Sinacaban has juridical personality. YES Held : Where a municipality created as such by EO is later impliedly recognized and its acts areaccorded legal validity, its creation can no longer be questioned. In the case of Municipality of San Narciso v Mendez, the SC laid the factors to consider in validating the creation of amunicipal corporation:1. The fact that for 30 years, the validity of the corporation has not been challenged;2. The fact that no quo warranto suit was filed to question the validity of the EO creating themunicipality; and3. The fact that the municipality was later classified as a 5th class municipality, organized aspart of a municipal circuit court and considered part of a legislative district in the Constitutionapportioning the seats in the House.In this case, the following factors are present:1. Sinacaban has been in existence for 16 years when Pelaez was decided in 1965 and yet thevalidity of EO 258 creating it had never been questioned.2. It was only 40 years later that its existence was questioned.3. Rule 66, Sec. 16 of the Rules of COurt provides that a quo warranto suit against a corporationfor forfeiture of its charter must be commenced within 5 years from the time the act complanedof was done or committed.4. The State and even Jimenez recognized Sinacabans corporate existence by entering into anagreement with it regarding the boundary. Ex.: AO 33, Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, etc.5. Sinacaban is constituted as part of a municipal circuit for purposes of the establishment of MTCs in the country.Moreover, the LGC of 1991, Sec. 442(d) provides that municipal districts organized pursuant topresidential issuances or executive orders and which have their respective sets of electiveofficials holding office at the time of the effectivity of this Code shall henceforth be considered asregular municipalities. Sinacaban has attained de jure status by virtue of the Ordinanceappended to the 1987 Constitution, apportioning legislative districts throughout the country,which considered Sinacaban as part of the 2nd District of Misamis Occidental.II. Sinacaban had attained de facto status at the time the 1987 Constitution took effect. It is notsubject to the plebiscite requirement. It applies only to new municipalities created for the firsttime under the Constitution. The requirement of plebiscite was originally contained in Art. XI,Section 3 of the previous Constitution. It cannot be applied to municipal corporations createdbefore, such as Sinacaban MUNICIPALITY OF MALABANG vs. BENITO Facts: The petitioner Amer Macaorao Balindong is the mayor of Malabang, Lanao del Sur, whilethe respondent Pangandapun Bonito is the mayor, and the rest of the respondents are thecouncilors, of the municipality of Balabagan of the same province. The municipality of Balabaganwas created by EO 386 of President Garcia out of barrios and sitios of Malabang. The petitionersseek to nullify the EO. Petitioners relied on the Pelaez ruling that the Presidents power to createmunicipalities under Sec. 68 of the Administrative Code is unconstitutional. Respondents arguedthat the Pelaez ruling is inapplicable because Balabagan is a de facto corporation, having beenorganized under color of a statute before this was declared unconstitutional, its officers havingbeen either elected or appointed, and the municipality itself having discharged its corporatefunctions for the past five years preceding the institution of this action. It is contended that as ade facto corporation, its existence cannot be collaterally attacked, although it may be inquiredinto directly in an action for quo warranto at the

instance of the State and not of an individuallike the petitioner.Issue: Whether the municipality of Balabagan is a de facto corporation, as it was organized before the promulgation of the SC's decision in Pelaez. NOHeld: The following principles may be deduced. (1) The color of authority requisite to a de factomunicipal corporation may be an unconstitutional law, valid on its face, which has either: (a)Been upheld for a time by the courts; or (b) Not yet been declared void; provided that a warrantfor its creation can be found in some other valid law or in the recognition of its potentialexistence in the general constitution of the state; (2) there can be no de facto municipalcorporation unless either directly or potentially, such a de jure corporation is authorized by somelegislative fiat; (3) there can be no color of authority in an unconstitutional statute alone, theinvalidity of which is apparent on its face; (4) there can be no de facto corporation created totake the place of an existing de jure corporation, as such organization would clearly be ausurper.In the cases where a de facto municipal corporation was recognized as such despite the fact thatthe statute creating it was later invalidated, the decisions could fairly be made to rest on theconsideration that there was some other valid law giving corporate vitality to the organization.Hence, in the case at bar, the mere fact that Balabagan was organized at a time when thestatute had not been invalidated cannot conceivably make it a de facto corporation, as,independently of the Administrative Code provision in question, there is no other valid statute togive color of authority to its creation.Executive Order 386 "created no office." This is not to say, however, that the acts done by themunicipality of Balabagan in the exercise of its corporate powers are a nullity because the executive order "is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed." The Act of Congress, having been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it wasinoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for thechallenged decree. It is quite clear, however, that the actual existence of a statute, prior to sucha determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. There is then no basis for the respondents' apprehension that the invalidation of the executiveorder creating Balabagan would have the effect of unsettling many an act done in reliance uponthe validity of the creation of that municipality. ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted, ExecutiveOrder 386 is declared void, and the respondents are hereby permanently restrained fromperforming the duties and functions of their respective offices MUNICIPALITY OF CANDIJAY vs. CA Facts : The Municipality of Candijay claimed that the barrio of Pagahat is within its territorial jurisdiction and that it is not a part of the Municipality of Alicia. The trial court ruled for Candijayb u t t h i s wa s r e ve r s e d b y t h e C A . Th e CA f o u n d t h a t t h e p l a n s s u b mi t t e d b y t h e t wo municipalities are inadequate insofar as identifying the monuments of the boundary lineb e t we e n t h e p e t i t i o n e r a n d t h e M u n c i p a l i t y o f Ma b i n i . Th e C A r u l e d t h a t i n c a s e s o f equiponderance of evidence, the courts must find for the defendant. The petitioner argues that the CA improperly applied the rule on equiponderance of evidence,and that respondent municipality does not have a juridical personality since it was created undera void executive order. Petitioner contended that Exec. Order No. 265 issued by PresidentQuirino creating respondent municipality is null and void ab initio, inasmuch as Section 68 of

theRevised Administrative Code, on which said Executive Order was based, constituted an unduedelegation of legislative powers to the President of the Philippines, and was therefore declaredunconstitutional. Issue : Whether or not a municipality, created under a void executive order, can be consideredas not having a juridical personality in light of the passage of the Local Government Code of 1991. NO Held : The petitioner commenced its collateral attack on the juridical personality of therespondent on 19 January 1984 (35 yrs after its creation in 1949) during the proceedings in thiscase. After presentation of evidence, Candijay asked the trial court to bar the respondent frompresenting evidence on the ground that it had no juridical personality. Candijay argued that EO265 issued by Pres. Quirino is null and void ab initio since Sec. 68 of the RAC constituted anundue delegation of legislative power to the President.Respondent municipality's situation in the instant case is strikingly similar to that of themunicipality of San Andres. In that case, Executive Order No. 353 creating the municipal districtof San Andres was issued on 20 August 1959 but it was only after almost 30 years that the municipality of San Narciso finally decided to challenge the legality of the executive order. In themeantime, the Municipal district, and later the Municipality of San Andres, began and continuedto exercise the powers and authority of a duly created local government unit. Created in 1959 byvirtue of Executive Order No. 353, the Municipality of San Andres had been in existence for morethan six years when, on 24 December 1965, Pelaez vs. Auditor General was promulgated. The ruling could have sounded the call for a similar declaration of the unconstitutionality of ExecutiveOrder No. 353 but it was not to be the case. On the contrary, certain governmental acts allpointed to the State's recognition of the continued existence of the Municipality of San Andres. Thus, after more than five years as a municipal district, Executive Order No. 174 classified theMunicipality of San Andres as a fifth class municipality after having surpassed the incomerequirement laid out in Republic Act No. 1515. The Municipality of Alicia was created by EO 265, or ten years ahead of the Municipality of SanAndres, and had been in existence for 16 years when Pelaez was promulgated. Variousgovernmental acts through the years all indicate the States recognition and acknowledgementof its existence. Alicia must benefit from the effects of Sec. 422 (d) of the LGC and should beconsidered a regular, de jure municipality. According to Sec. 442 (d) of the LGC, municipal districts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which have theirrespective sets of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivity of theCode shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities. Curative laws, which in essenceare retrospective, and aimed at giving validity to acts done that would have been invalid underexisting laws, as if existing laws have been complied with, are validly accepted in this jurisdiction, subject to the usual qualification against impairment of vested rights. WHEREFORE,the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED, with costs against petitioner. CAMID vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT Facts : This is a petition for Certiorari arguing the existence of Municipalityof Andong in LanaoDel Sur. This decision have noted the earlier decision of Pelaez where the Executive orders of

Former President Macapagal creating 33 Municipalities of Lanao Del Sur was considered null andvoid due to undue delegation of legislative powers. Among the annulled executive orders is EO107 creating Andong. The petitioner herein represents himself as resident of Andong (as aprivate citizen andtaxpayer). Camid contends/argues the following: (1) Municipality of Andong evolved into a fullblown municipality (since there is a complete set of officials appointed to handle essential tasksand services, it has its own high school, Bureau of Post, DECS office, etc. (2) 17 baranggays withchairman; (3) he noted agencies and private groups recognizing Andong and also the CENROand DENR Certification of land area and population of Andong.In the Certification of DILG, there is an enumeration of existing municipalities including 18 0f the33 Municipalities invalidated in Pelaez Case. Camid finds this as an abuse of discretion andunequal treatment for Andong. Likewise, Camid insists the continuing of EO 107, arguing that inMunicipality of San Narciso v. Hon. Mendez, the Court affirmed in making San Andres a de factomunicipal corporation. San Andres was created through an executive order. Thus, this petition. Issue : Whether or not the Municipality of Andong be recognized as a de facto municipalcorporation. NO Held : Municipal corporations may exist by prescription where it is shown that the communityhas claimed and exercised corporate functions, with the knowledge and acquiescence of thelegislature, and without interruption or objection for period long enough to afford title byprescription. Camid does not have shown factual demonstration of the continuous exercise bythe municipal corporation of its corporation of its corporate powers as well as acquiescence bythe other instrumentalities of the state like charters or the legislatures action.May any action on the Certification be an appropriate solution to Camids prayer? NO. TheC e r t i f i c a t i o n h a s n o p o we r o r i t d o e s n o t b e a r a n y a u t h o r i t y t o c r e a t e o r r e va l i d a t e a municipality.Should the case of Andong be treated same as the case of San Andres? No, for the followingreasons:(1) There are facts found in the San Andres case that are not present in the case at bar: (1) The Executive Order creating San Andres was not invalidated in Pelaez Case, (2) Themunicipality existed for 30 years before it was questioned and (3) The municipality wasclassified as a fifth class municipality and was included in the legislative district in the Houseof Representatives apportionment.( 2 ) A n d o n g d i d not meet the requisites set by LGC of 1991 Sec.442 (d) r e g a r d i n g municipalities created by executive orders. It says: Municipalities existing as of the date of the effectivity of this Code shall continue to exist and operate as such. Existing municipaldistricts organized pursuant to presidential issuances or executive orders and which havetheir respective set of elective municipal officials holding office at the time of the effectivityof this Code shall henceforth be considered as regular municipalities.(3) The failure to appropriate funds for Andong and the absence of elections in themunicipality are eloquent indicia (indicators) that the State does not recognize the existenceof the municipality.(4) The Ordinance appended in the 1987 Constitution (which apportioned seats for the Houseof Reps to the different legislative districts in the Philippines, enumerates the variousmunicipalities encompassed in the various districts) did not include Andong.Is there an unequal treatment since 18 of the 33 invalidated municipalities are now consideredexisting? NONE. The DILG Certification and the Ordinance in the1987 Constitution validatesthem. The fact that there existing organic statutes

passed by the legislation recreating thesemunicipalities is enough to accord a different treatment as that of the municipality of Andong.SC DISMISSED petition for lack of Merit. Note the following Sections with regards to juridicalpersonality of corporations in relation to the reasons why San Andres have a different treatmentwith Andong: Batas Pambansa Blg. 8: Section 2. Corporation defined. A corporation is anartificial being created by operation of law, having the right of succession and the powers,attributes and properties expressly authorized by law or incident to its existence; Section 4.Corporations created by special laws or charters. Corporations created by special laws orcharters shall be governed primarily by the provisions of the special law or charter creating themor applicable to them, supplemented by the provisions of this Code, insofar as they areapplicable. Moreover, under Art.44 of the New Civil Code with relation to Art. 45 of the New CivilCode, those considered as juridical person includes the State and its political subdivisions andOther corporations, institutions and entities for public interest or purpose, created by law; theirpersonality begins as soon as they have been constituted according to law. These two aregoverned by the law creating them. Since Andong has no law recreating it and that it is not arecognized olitical subdivision, it is not also considered a juridical person.What happened with the people from Andong?-The constituent barrios of the voided townreturns to its original municipalities (Lumbatan, Tubig and Tubaran) which are recognized andstill existing. The solution to have Andong recognized is through legislation and not judicialconfirmation of void title SURIGAO ELECTRIC, CO. vs. MUNICIPALITY OF SURIGAO Facts : On June 18, 1960, Congress further amended the Public Service Act, one of the changesintroduced doing away with the requirement of a certificate of public convenience and necessityfrom the Public Service Commission for "public services owned or operated by governmententities or GOCCs," but at the same time affirming its power of regulation, more specifically asset forth in the next section of the law, which while exempting public services owned or operatedby any instrumentality of the government or any GOCCs from its supervision, jurisdiction andcontrol stops short of including "the fixing of rates."Petitioner Surigao Electric, a legislative franchise holder, and Arturo Lumanlan to whom therights and privileges of the former as well as its plant and facilities were transferred, challengethe validity of the order of respondent Public Service Commission wherein it held that it had "noother alternative but to approve as [it did approve] the tentative schedule of rates submitted bythe applicant," the other respondent herein, Municipality of Surigao.Respondent Commission contends that a municipal government or a municipal corporation suchas the Municipality of Surigao is a government entity recognized, supported and utilized by theNational Government as a part of its government machinery and functions; a municipalgovernment actually functions as an extension of the national government and, therefore, it isan instrumentality of the latter; and by express provisions of Section 14(e) of RA 2677, aninstrumentality of the national government is exempted from the jurisdiction of the PSC exceptwith respect to the fixing of rates. This exemption is even clearer in Section 13(a). Issue: Whether or not a municipal government can directly maintain and operate an electricplant without obtaining a specific franchise for the purpose and without a

certificate of publicconvenience and necessity duly issued by the Public Service Commission. YES Held: Here, the Municipality of Surigao is not a GOCC. It cannot be said, however, that it is not agovernment entity. In Mendoza v. de Leon, there has been recognition by the Court of the dualcharacter of a municipal corporation, one as governmental, being a branch of the generaladministration of the state, and the other as quasi-private and corporate. Legislative and governmental powers are "conferred upon a municipality, the better to enable it to aid a state inproperly governing that portion of its people residing within its municipality, such powers beingin their nature public.An alleged error imputed to respondent Commission, however, needs further discussion.Petitioners seek refuge in the legislative franchise granted them. Whatever privilege may beclaimed by petitioners cannot override the specific constitutional restriction that no franchise orright shall be granted to any individual or corporation except under a condition that it shall besubject to amendment, alteration or repeal by Congress. Such amendment or alteration need notbe express; it may be implied from a latter act of general applicability, such as the one nowunder consideration.Reference by petitioners to the statute providing the procedure for the taking over and operationby the government of public utilities, in their view "to further strengthen their contention", as tothe commission of this alleged error is unavailing, even if such statute were applicable, which itis not. In the language of their own brief: "This Act provides for the procedure to be followedwhenever the Government or any political subdivision thereof decides to acquire and operate apublic utility owned and operated by any individual or private corporation." That is to beregulated, therefore, by this enactment is the exercise of eminent domain, which is a taking of private property for public use upon the payment of just compensation. There is here no taking. There is here no appropriation. What was owned before by petitioners continue to remain theirs. There is to be no transfer of ownership.Rather, a municipal corporation, by virtue of Commonwealth Act No. 2677, may further promotecommunity welfare by itself engaging in supplying public services, without the need of acertificate of public convenience. If at all then, the exercise of this governmental prerogativecomes within the broad, undefined scope of the police power. It is no t here, of course, theordinary case of restraint on property or liberty, by the imposition of a regulation. What theamendatory act in effect accomplishes is to lend encouragement and support for the municipalcorporation itself undertaking an activity as a result of which, profits of a competing private firmwould be adversely affected.C l e a r l y, t h e n , t h e r e l e va n c y o f t h e s t a t u t e p r o vi d i n g f o r t h e t a k i n g o r o p e r a t i o n o f t h e government of public utilities, appears, to put it at its mildest, far from clear. Petitioners'contention as to this alleged error being committed, therefore, far from being strengthened bysuch a reference, suffers from a fate less auspicious. WHEREFORE, the orders of respondentPublic Service Commission denying the motion for reconsideration are affirmed LINDASAN vs. COMELEC Facts : Lidasan is a resident of Parang, Cotabato. Later, RA 4790, which is entitled "An ActCreating theMunicipality of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao del Sur," was passed. Lidasanc a m e t o k n o w l a t e r o n t h a t b a r r i o s To g a i g a n d M a d a l u m j u s t me n t i o n e d a r e

wi t h i n t h e municipality of Buldon, Provinceof Cotabato, and that Bayanga, Langkong, Sarakan, Katbo,Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko,Colodan, and Kabamakawan are parts and parcel of another municipality, the municipality of Parang,also in the Province of Cotabato and not of Lanao del Sur. [Remarkably, even the Congressman of Cotabato voted in favor of RA 4790.]Pursuant to this law, COMELEC proceeded to establish precints forvoter registration in the saidterritories of Dianaton. Lidasan then filed that RA 4790 be nullified forbeing unconstitutionalbecause it did not clearly indicate in its title that it in creating Dianaton, it would be including inthe territory thereof barrios from Cotabato. Issue : Is RA 4790, which created Dianaton but which includes barrios located in anotherprovince - Cotabato -to be spared from attack planted upon the constitutional mandate that "Nobill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall beexpressed in the title of the bill.Held: The baneful effect of the defective title here presented is not so difficult to perceive. Suchtitle did not inform the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprisethe people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and in the province of Cotabato itself that part of their territory is being taken away from their towns and province and added to theadjacent Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what towns and provinceswere actually affected by the bill that even a Congressman from Cotabato voted for it only tofind out later on that it is to the prejudice of his own province. These are the pressures whichheavily weigh against the constitutionality of RA 4790. LINA vs. PAO Facts : On December 29, 1995, respondent Tony Calvento was appointed agent by the PCSO toinstall Terminal OM 20 for the operation of lotto. He asked Mayor Calixto Cataquiz, Mayor of SanPedro, Laguna, for a mayor's permit to open the lotto outlet. This was denied by Mayor Cataquizin a letter dated February 19, 1996. The ground for said denial was an ordinance passed by theSangguniang Panlalawigan of Laguna entitled Kapasiyahan Blg. 508 which declared its policyagainst the operation of lotto within the province.As a result of this resolution of denial, respondent Calvento filed a complaint for declaratoryrelief with prayer for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. On February 10,1997, the respondent judge, Francisco Dizon Pao, promulgated his decision enjoining thepetitioners from implementing or enforcing resolution or Kapasiyahan Blg. 508.Petitioners contend that the assailed resolution is a valid policy declaration of the ProvincialGovernment of Laguna of its vehement objection to the operation of lotto and all forms of gambling. It is likewise a valid exercise of the provincial government's police power under theGeneral Welfare Clause of Republic Act 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1 9 9 1 . Th e y a l s o ma i n t a i n t h a t r e s p o n d e n t 's l o t t o o p e r a t i o n i s i l l e g a l b e c a u s e n o p r i o r consultations and approval by the local government were sought before it was implementedcontrary to the express provisions of Sections 2 (c) and 27 of R.A. 7160. Issue (1) : Whether or not Kapasiyahan Blg. 508 and the denial of a mayor's permit basedthereon is valid.

Held : YES. The entire controversy stemmed from the refusal of Mayor Cataquiz to issue amayor's permit for the operation of a lotto outlet in favor of private respondent. According to themayor, he based his decision on an existing ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto in theprovince of Laguna. The ordinance, however, merely states the "objection" of the council to thesaid game. It is but a mere policy statement on the part of the local council, which is not self-executing.As a policy statement expressing the local government's objection to the lotto, such resolution isvalid. This is part of the local government's autonomy to air its views which may be contrary tothat of the national government's. However, this freedom to exercise contrary views does notmean that local governments may actually enact ordinances that go against laws duly enactedby Congress. Given this premise, the assailed resolution in this case could not and should not beinterpreted as a measure or ordinance prohibiting the operation of lotto. The game of lotto is agame of chance duly authorized by the national government through an Act of Congress.Republic Act 1169, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 42, is the law which grants a franchiseto the PCSO and allows it to operate the lotteries.Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise onlydelegated legislative powers conferred upon them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of thelatter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress,from which they have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance themandate of the statute. Issue (2) : Whether or not prior consultations and approval by the concerned Sanggunian areneeded before a lotto system can be operated in a given local government unit. Held : NO. The SC held that petitioners erred in declaring that Sections 2 (c) and 27 of RepublicAct 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, apply mandatorily in thesetting up of lotto outlets around the country. From a careful reading of said provisions, theseapply only to national programs and/or projects which are to be implemented in a particular localcommunity. Lotto is neither a program nor a project of the national government, but of acharitable institution, the PCSO. Though sanctioned by the national government, it is farfetchedto say that lotto falls within the contemplation of Sections 2 (c) and 27 of the LGC MAGTAJAS vs. PRYCE Facts : PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. To this end, it leased aportion of a building belonging to Pryce Properties Corporation Inc., renovated and equipped thesame, and prepared to inaugurate its casino there during the Christmas season. The reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City was swift and hostile. On 7 December1992, it enacted Ordinance 3353 (An Ordinance Prohibiting the issuance of business permit andcanceling existing business permit to any establishment for the using and allowing to be used itspremises or portion thereof for the operation of Casino). On 4 January 1993, it adopted a sternerOrdinance 3375-93 (An Ordinance prohibiting the operation of Casino and providing penalty forviolation therefore). The contention of the petitioners is that it is violative of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayande Oro City Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino andOrdinance No. 3375-93 prohibiting the operation of casinos. On the other hand, the respondentsinvoke P.D.

1869 which created PAGCOR to help centralize and regulate all games of chance,including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. Issue : Whether or not the Ordinance No. 3353 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 are valid. Held : NO. Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is empowered to enactordinances for the purposes indicated in the Local Government Code. It is expressly vested withthe police power under what is known as the General Welfare Clause now embodied in Section16 as follows:Sec. 16. General Welfare. Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expresslygranted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, orincidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to thepromotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, localgovernment units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation andenrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balancedecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific andtechnological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic pros perity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preservethe comfort and convenience of their inhabitants. There is a requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute. Municipalgovernments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only delegatedlegislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegatecannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the LGUs can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derivedtheir power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree has the status of a statute that cannotbe amended or nullified by a mere ordinance. The morality of gambling is not justiciable issue.Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally considered inimical to the interests of thepeople, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or penalizing gambling or,for that matter, even mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it seesfit. In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature may prohibit gambling altogether or allowit without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whateverreasons it may consider sufficient. Further, there are two kinds of gambling, to wit, the illegaland those authorized by law. Legalized gambling is not a modern concept; it is probably as oldas illegal gambling, if not indeed more so. The suggestion that the LGC authorize LGUs toprohibit all kinds of gambling would erase the distinction between these two forms of gamblingwithout a clear indication that this is the will of legislature