JURISDICTION 1.

Dela Cruz v Moya

Facts: On February 23, 1979, Rodolfo Dela Cruz, a member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, together with other PC men, received a mission order to proceed to Barangay Pangi, Maco, Sto. Tomas, Davao for the purpose of verifying and apprehending persons who were allegedly engaged in illegal cockfighting. In compliance with said mission order, Dela Cruz and company proceeded to Maco, Davao del Norte and caught in flagrante the operators of said illegal cockfighting, but said operators resisted arrest. The soldiers left the place and brought with them to the PC Headquarters the evidence of the crime. The operators of the illegal cockfights, including the deceased Eusebio Cabilto, followed the soldiers on their way back to the PC Headquarters, catching up with them on the Tagum-Mati National Highway. Fighting ensued and in the scuffle, Dela Cruz shot Cabilto. Dela Cruz was charged with homicide in the Court of First Instance of Davao.While the case was pending trial, Presidential Decree Nos. 1822 and 1822-A were promulgated by the President of the Philippines on January 16, 1981, vesting in courts-martial jurisdiction over crimes committed by members of the Armed Forces or of the Philippine Constabulary in performance of their duties.Dela Cruz filed with the Court of First Instance of Davao a motion to transfer the case to the military authorities.The motion was denied. Issue: Whether or not the civil courts have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the criminal case at bar. Held: Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action In the instant case, the information was filed on August 2, 1979. On such date, military tribunals created under General Order No. 8 exercised exclusive jurisdiction over "(a)ll offenses committed by military personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines while in the performance of their official duty or which arose out of any act or omission done in the performance of their official duty; Provided, that for the purpose of determining whether an offense was committed while in the performance of official duty or whether it arose out of an act or omission done in the performance of official duty, a certificate issued by the Secretary of National Defense to that effect shall be conclusive unless modified or revoked by the President. . . " In the instant case, even as no certificate issued by the Secretary of National Defense was presented in court, the record contains a copy of Mission Order No. 7, signed by a certain Lieutenant Huerta The evidence of the prosecution presented in court likewise shows that Cabilto was shot while petitioner was executing the mission order. These undisputed facts compel this Court to declare that respondent court was without jurisdiction to try the case against petitioner Dela Cruz.

2. People v Chupeco
Facts: On or about Novemeber 28, 1947, in the City of Manila, the accused executed a Chattel mortgage on some of his properties, located at sitio Saguing, Dinalupihan, Bataan in favor of the Agricultural and Industrial Bank, whose capital, assets, accounts, contracts and choses in action were subsequently transferred to the herein complainant Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, to secure a loan of P20,000.00. The mortgagee avered that the accused willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to defraud the said corporation, pledged and incumbered, cause to be pledged and incumbered the same personal properties to one Mateo B. Pinile without having fully satisfied the mortgage, and, thereafter) knowingly transferred and removed the said properties to the municipality of Subic, Zambales. The accused moved to quash the foregoing information on the ground that more than one offense is charged and that the court had no jurisdiction. The Court denied the motion. After the case was partly tried, the defense counsel and the fiscal entered into an agreement to have the information amended to the effect that the charge be only for removal of properties mortgaged, eliminating the portion referring to pledging already pledged property. The information, however, remained un-amended. The accused then filed a motion to dismiss involving the agreement, but the court denied it, and ordered that the case be tried on the charge "of having pledged property which had been previously pledged or mortgaged". After trial, the court found the accused guilty of the said offense. Issue: Whether or not the Courts of Manila may exercise jurisdiction over the case.

Held: Yes. The original terms of the charge averred the crime of repledging already encumbered property without the creditor's consent, and one of the essential ingredients of the offense having been alleged, to have taken place in Manila, the court of first instance of that city acquired jurisdiction over the offense under the Rules of Court. It is well-established that once vested, the jurisdiction is not tolled by subsequent amendment or stipulation, which in this case amounted to no more than an avowal by the prosecution that it could not establish the other elements of the offense. Furthermore, the court actually rejected the defense motion to dismiss, and directed that the cue be tried on the original charge of repledging property already encumbered. The accused obeyed that directive, and by so doing it renounced the claim that the information had been so amended as to discard that particular averment.

3. People v Eduarte
Facts: On or about Novemeber 28, 1947, in the City of Manila, the accused executed a Chattel mortgage on some of his properties, located at sitio Saguing, Dinalupihan, Bataan in favor of the Agricultural and Industrial Bank, whose capital, assets, accounts, contracts and choses in action were subsequently transferred to the herein complainant Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, to secure a loan of P20,000.00. The mortgagee avered that the accused willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to defraud the said corporation, pledged and incumbered, cause to be pledged and incumbered the same personal properties to one Mateo B. Pinile without having fully satisfied the mortgage, and, thereafter) knowingly transferred and removed the said properties to the municipality of Subic, Zambales.The accused moved to quash the foregoing information on the ground that more than one offense is charged and that the court had no jurisdiction. The Court denied the motion. After the case was partly tried, the defense counsel and the fiscal entered into an agreement to have the information amended to the effect that the charge be only for removal of properties mortgaged, eliminating the portion referring to pledging already pledged property. The information, however, remained un-amended. The accused then filed a motion to dismiss involving the agreement, but the court denied it, and ordered that the case be tried on the charge "of having pledged property which had been previously pledged or mortgaged". After trial, the court found the accused guilty of the said offense. Issue: Whether or not the Courts of Manila may exercise jurisdiction over the case. Held: Yes. The original terms of the charge averred the crime of repledging already encumbered property without the creditor's consent, and one of the essential ingredients of the offense having been alleged, to have taken place in Manila, the court of first instance of that city acquired jurisdiction over the offense under the Rules of Court. It is well-established that once vested, the jurisdiction is not tolled by subsequent amendment or stipulation, which in this case amounted to no more than an avowal by the prosecution that it could not establish the other elements of the offense. Furthermore, the court actually rejected the defense motion to dismiss, and directed that the cue be tried on the original charge of repledging property already encumbered. The accused obeyed that directive, and by so doing it renounced the claim that the information had been so amended as to discard that particular averment.

4. Buaya v Polo
Facts: Petitioner was an insurance agent of the Counrty Bankers Insurance Corporation, who was authorized to transact and underwrite insurance business and collect the corresponding premiums for and in behalf of the respondent corporation. Petitioner is required to make a periodic report and accounting of her transactions and remit premium collections to the principal office of private respondent located in the City of Manila. Allegedly, an audit was conducted on petitioner's account which showed a shortage in the amount of P358,850.72. As a result she was charged with estafa. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss. which motion was denied by respondent Judge. The subsequent motion for reconsideration of this order of denial was also denied. Issue: Whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Manila has jurisdiction over the case at bar.

Held: Yes. Section 14(a), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: In all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any of the essential elements thereof took place. The subject information charges petitioner with estafa committed "during the period 1980 to June 15, 1982 inclusive in the City of Manila, Philippines . . . ." Clearly then, from the very allegation of the information the Regional Trial Court of Manila has jurisdiction. Besides, the crime of estafa is a continuing or transitory offense which may be prosecuted at the place where any of the essential elements of the crime took place. One of the essential elements of estafa is damage or prejudice to the offended party. The private respondent has its principal place of business and office at Manila. The failure of the petitioner to remit the insurance premiums she collected allegedly caused damage and prejudice to private respondent in Manila.

5. Crespo v Mogul
Facts: On April 18, 1977 Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. de Gala with the approval of the Provincial Fiscal filed an information for estafa against Mario Fl. Crespo in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City. When the case was set for arraigment the accused filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice of the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal for the filing of the information. The presiding judge, Hon. Leodegario L. Mogul, denied the motion. A motion for reconsideration of the order was but the arraignment was deferred to August 18, 1977 to afford time for petitioner to elevate the matter to the appellate court. A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction was filed by the accused in the Court of Appeals. The appellate court restrained Judge Mogul from proceeding with the arraignment of the accused until further orders of the Court. On May 15, 1978 a decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals granting the writ and perpetually restraining the judge. The then Undersecretary of Justice, Hon.Catalino Macaraig, Jr., reversed the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed against the accused. A motion to dismiss was filed by the Provincial Fiscal with the trial court, On November 24, 1978 the Judge denied the motion and set the arraignment. The accused then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with petition for the issuance of preliminary writ of prohibition and/or temporary restraining order in the Court of Appeals. A restraining order was issued by the Court of Appeals which was later reversed by the appellate court. Issue: Whether the trial court acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial on the merits. Held: Yes. The role of the fiscal or prosecutor is to see that justice is done and not necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused before the Courts. Thus, in spite of his opinion to the contrary, it is the duty of the fiscal to proceed with the presentation of evidence of the prosecution to the Court to enable the Court to arrive at its own independent judgment as to whether the accused should be convicted or acquitted. The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.

6. Cruz v CA

7. Cuyos v Garcia
Fact: Petitioner Alfredo Cuyos was charged with homicide with multiple serious physical injuries and damage to property through reckless imprudence before the Municipal Court of San Fernando, Pampanga. Cuyos entered a plea of not guilty at the arraignment and the judge set the case for trial, but before it could commence, petitioner filed a Motion to Remand the Case to the Court of First Instance. Cuyos claimed that there is lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Municipal Court and contended that the damages suffered by the Volkswagen he hit amounted to P18,000.00. He argued that under Art. 365, par. 3 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime would carry a fine in an amount ranging from the amount of the damage to three times the value of the damage alleged (i.e. 3 x P18,000.00=P54,000.00).Under 87 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, the Municipal Court of Pampanga only has jurisdiction over offenses punishable by a fine not exceeding P6,000.00. Cuyos filed an Urgent Motion to Postpone the Trial. The municipal judge denied the motion to transfer and set the case for trial. Cuyos verbal motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the present petition for certiorari. Issue: Whether or not the respondent Municipal Court of San Fernando, Pampanga has jurisdiction to try the case against Cuyos Held: The Court agrees with the position of the Solicitor General that the Municipal Court has no jurisdiction to try the present case. The case at bar involves a complex crime of homicide, multiple serious physical injuries and damage to property resulting from reckless imprudence. Art. 365,par.2 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty imposable upon petitioner, if found guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence, would be prision correccionalin its medium and maximum periods. At the time the complaint was filed, the Municipal Court had jurisdiction to impose a penalty of imprisonment not exceeding six(6) years or a fine not exceeding P6,000.00 or both. Thus, because the penalty for damage to property through imprudence or negligence as provided in Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code is, a fine ranging from the amount equal to the value of damages to three times such value, the case must be forwarded to the Court of First Instance. Art. 365 simply means that if there is only damage to property, the amount fixed shall be imposed, but if there is also physical injuries, there should be an additional penalty for the latter. The applicable rule on allocation of jurisdiction on cases involving cases of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide or physical injuries is summarized by justice Barrera. Barrera stated that in such cases, Art. 48 of the Revised Penal Code is applicable, but there may be cases when the imposable penalty is within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court, while the fine is under the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance. Since the information cannot be split into two, the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the fine imposable for the damage to property resulting from the reckless imprudence. The maximum fine imposable for the crime in this case is P54,000.00 and the maximum imprisonment for homicide is six (6) years. Therefore, the criminal charge falls outside the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court and within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court The order of the Municipal Court is SET ASIDE as null and void and the Temporary Restraining Order is made PERMANENT

8. People v Magallanes
Facts: The Dumancas spouses complained with the police saying that a certain Rufino Gargar and Danilo Lumngyao swindled them. The accused together with civilian agents arrested and abducted the swindling suspects and forced them to produce the money they got from the spouses. The two were found dead a few days after. Two informations for kidnapping for ransom with murder were filed with the RTC against members of the PNP and nine other civilians who confederated with each other for the purpose of extorting money through kidnapping the two victims. Petitioner contends that the crime was committed in the course of the performance of duties of the accused, thus, Sandiganbayan should have jurisdiction by virtue of PD 1606. Issue: W/N the RTC of Bacolod or the Sandiganbayan that has jurisdiction over the two criminal cases for kidnapping for ransom with murder wherein some of the accused implicated as principals are members of the PNP.

Decision: At the time the informations in the said cases were filed, the law governing the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was section 4 of PD No 1060which provided that the Sandiganbayan has original jurisdiction in all cases involving public officers and employees who committed felonies in relation to their office, which must be alleged in the complaint. An offense is considered as committed in relation to the office if it cannot exist without the office or if the office is the constituent element of the crime as defined in the statute. It is a fundamental rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. In the case at bar, the information in the court do not indicate that the victims were killed in the course of the investigation. W h a t w a s a l l e g e d i s t h a t t h e a c c u s e d , f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f e x t r a c t i n g o r exhorting a sum of money, abducted, kidnapped, detained and killed the two victims. The allegation of taking advantage of his position incorporated in the information is not enough to bring the offenses within the definition of offenses committed in relation to public office. The Sandiganbayan partly lost its exclusive original jurisdiction in cases involving violation of RA 3019 as amended, RA No. 1379 and the RPC. It retains only cases where the accused are national and local officials classified as Grade 27 and higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. RA No 7975 cannot affect the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan since jurisdiction once acquired is not affected by subsequent legislative enactment placing jurisdiction in another tribunal. It remains with the court until the case is finally terminated. Hence, the Sandiganbayan or any other courts cannot be divested of jurisdiction. In the case at bar, Sandiganbayan has not yet acquired jurisdiction over thes u b j e c t c r i m i n a l c a s e s a s t h e i n f o r m a t i o n s w e r e f i l e d b e f o r e t h e R T C . A s s u m i n g t h a t t h e i n f o r m a t i o n s w e r e f i l e d w i t h t h e s a i d t r i b u n a l , t h e Sandiganbayan can no longer proceed to hear the cases in view of the express provision of Section 7 of RA 7975 that all criminal cases in which the trial hasnot yet begun in the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts. RTC was ordered to resume hearing the case

9. People v Mariano
Facts: Hermogenes Marioano, a Liason officer by then incumbent municipal mayor Nolasco of San Jose del Monte Bulacan, was authorized to receive from U S A I D f o r t h e u s e a n d b e n e f i t o f t h e s a i d m u n i c i p a l i t y e l e c t r i c c a b l e s measuring 150 ft and 250 feet and a cable power measuring 525 ft. with a total value of $717.50. Instead of delivering the said materials to the mayor, h e a p p r o p r i a t e d t h e s a m e t o h i s p e r s o n a l u s e t o t h e p r e j u d i c e o f t h e municipality. The provincial Fiscal of Bulacan then filed an information for Estafa against the accused with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. The accused filed a motion to quash on the ground contending that the court has no jurisdiction over him considering that the military commission had alreadytaken cognizance of the malversation case against Mayor Nolasco involving the same subject matter. The judge granted the motion, hence this appeal. Issue: W/N the civil courts and military commissions exercise concurrent jurisdiction over the offenses of Estafa of goods allegedly committed by a civilian. Decision: Jurisdiction is the basic foundation of judicial proceeding, which fundamentally means the po wer or capacity given by the law to court or tribunal to entertain, hear and determine certain controversies. It is the authority to hear and try a particular offense and impose the punishment for it. The jurisdiction of courts is derived from the constitution and statutes in force at the time of the commencement of the action. Under the Judiciary Act of 1949, courts of First Instance shall have jurisdiction over all crimes in which the penalty provided by the law is imprisonment for more than six months, ora fine of more than two hundred pesos. The crime committed by Mariano is punished by imprisonment from 4 months to two years. This falls under the original jurisdiction of courts of first instance. The rule is that the court which first take cognizance of the case acquires jurisdiction thereof exclusive of the other applies only where both courts have concurrent jurisdiction over particular case charged. The situation does not involve two tribunal vested with concurrent jurisdiction over a particular crime so as to apply this rule. As specifically stated in General order no 49, which redefined the jurisdiction of military tribunals, the military commission, is not vested with jurisdiction over the crime of Estafa. It must be noted that before the enactment of RA 7975, what matters is not the kind of offense so long as it is alleged in the crime committed in relation to the office of the public official, Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction try and hear the

case. This has been cured by Section 4 of RA 7975 by limiting its jurisdiction only to persons (principal accused) having a salary grade of 27. This, being a curative statute, may be given retroactive effect. Petition was denied.

10. People v Mercado*

Facts: Kalabaw case Issue: Held:

11. People v Purisima

Facts: There are twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the Philippines represented, respectively, by the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Samar, and joined by the Solicitor General, are consolidated in this one Decision as they involve one basic question of law. Before those courts, Informations were filed charging the respective accused with "illegal possession of deadly weapon" in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. On a motion to quash filed by the accused, the three Judges mentioned above issued in the respective cases filed before them the details of which will be recounted below an Order quashing or dismissing the Informations, on a common ground, viz, that the Information did not allege facts which constitute the offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9 because it failed to state one essential element of the crime. Issue: Are the Informations filed by the People sufficient in form and substance to constitute the offense of "illegal possession of deadly weapon" penalized under Presidential Decree (PD for short) No. 9? There are two elements to the the offense: first, the carrying outside one's residence of any bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon, etc. not used as a necessary tool or implement for a livelihood; and second, that the act of carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder. The petitioner by having one particular stand of the carrying of any dangerous weapon outside of the residence w/o regard to motive or intent makes this a case of statutory construction. Held: Court dismissed all motions made by the petitioner and affirms all decisions made by the respondent judges.

Although amended informations may be filed where such essential elements should be alleged distinctly and sufficiently thereafter.

12. People v Savellano 13. Republic v Sunga

Facts: On 10 August 1964, an information for Attempted Homicide was filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Sur against accused-private respondents Rafael Anadilla, Ariston Anadilla and Jose Anadilla. Trial of the case was set on 11 and 12 March 1974. The hearing set on 11 March 1974 was, however, postponed in view of the absence of one of the accused, respondent Rafael Anadilla who had not yet been arrested by the police authorities. On the same date, the court a quo issued an order for the arrest of said accused, and at the same time set the trial of the case for 29 and 30 July 1974. On March 20, 1974, the court a quo assailed an order dismissing the case. The dismissal was based upon an affidavit executed by the offended party. The Provincial Fiscal moved to reconsider the order of dismissal. This was denied by the court a quo. Issue:

Whether the court a quo may dismiss a criminal case on the basis of an affidavit of desistance executed by the offended party, but without a motion to dismiss filed by the prosecuting fiscal. Held: Yes. Once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation." In the case at bar, the Court has taken note that before the case was set for trial, almost ten (10) years had elapsed from the date of filing of the information. It was not, therefore, unusual that the complainant-offended party, in his affidavit of desistance manifested that his material witnesses could no longer be contacted, but, without their testimony, the guilt of the accused could not be proved beyond reasonable doubt.

RULE 110: PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES 1. Crespo v Mogul

Facts: On April 18, 1977 Assistant Fiscal Proceso K. de Gala with the approval of the Provincial Fiscal filed an information for estafa against Mario Fl. Crespo in the Circuit Criminal Court of Lucena City. When the case was set for arraigment the accused filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice of the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal for the filing of the information. The presiding judge, Hon. Leodegario L. Mogul, denied the motion. A motion for reconsideration of the order was but the arraignment was deferred to August 18, 1977 to afford time for petitioner to elevate the matter to the appellate court. A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction was filed by the accused in the Court of Appeals. The appellate court restrained Judge Mogul from proceeding with the arraignment of the accused until further orders of the Court. On May 15, 1978 a decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals granting the writ and perpetually restraining the judge. The then Undersecretary of Justice, Hon.Catalino Macaraig, Jr., reversed the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed against the accused. A motion to dismiss was filed by the Provincial Fiscal with the trial court, On November 24, 1978 the Judge denied the motion and set the arraignment. The accused then filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with petition for the issuance of preliminary writ of prohibition and/or temporary restraining order in the Court of Appeals. A restraining order was issued by the Court of Appeals which was later reversed by the appellate court.

Issue: Whether the trial court acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial on the merits. Held: Yes. The role of the fiscal or prosecutor is to see that justice is done and not necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused before the Courts. Thus, in spite of his opinion to the contrary, it is the duty of the fiscal to proceed with the presentation of evidence of the prosecution to the Court to enable the Court to arrive at its own independent judgment as to whether the accused should be convicted or acquitted. The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not

matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.

2. Republic v Sunga
Facts: On 10 August 1964, an information for Attempted Homicide was filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Sur against accused-private respondents Rafael Anadilla, Ariston Anadilla and Jose Anadilla. Trial of the case was set on 11 and 12 March 1974. The hearing set on 11 March 1974 was, however, postponed in view of the absence of one of the accused, respondent Rafael Anadilla who had not yet been arrested by the police authorities. On the same date, the court a quo issued an order for the arrest of said accused, and at the same time set the trial of the case for 29 and 30 July 1974. On March 20, 1974, the court a quo assailed an order dismissing the case. The dismissal was based upon an affidavit executed by the offended party. The Provincial Fiscal moved to reconsider the order of dismissal. This was denied by the court a quo. Issue: Whether the court a quo may dismiss a criminal case on the basis of an affidavit of desistance executed by the offended party, but without a motion to dismiss filed by the prosecuting fiscal. Held: Yes. Once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation." In the case at bar, the Court has taken note that before the case was set for trial, almost ten (10) years had elapsed from the date of filing of the information. It was not, therefore, unusual that the complainant-offended party, in his affidavit of desistance manifested that his material witnesses could no longer be contacted, but, without their testimony, the guilt of the accused could not be proved beyond reasonable doubt.

3. People v Ocaya
Facts: On or about the 23rd day of July, 1977, in Don Carlos, Bukidnon, Philippines accused Esterlina Marapao, Leticia Marapao, and Diosdado Marapao, attacked and assaulted one Mrs. LOLITA ARES, a mother who was then still on the twelfth (12th) day from her child delivery, wrestling her to the ground and thereafter throwing and hitting her with a fist-size stone at the face, which injury considerably deforms her face, and further causing upon said Mrs. LOLITA ARES to suffer a relapse (nabughat in the local dialect) arising from her weak constitution due to her recent child delivery, which relapse incapacitated her from performing her customary labor for a period of more than thirty days. The records do not show that arraignment or trial on the merits has been held, much less that warrants for the arrest of the accused had been issued. Instead, after "scanning the records of (the) case", respondent judge motu proprio ordered the dismissal of the case "as the crime of slight or less physical injury is not within the jurisdiction of the court". The fiscal's motion for reconsideration proved futile with respondent judge. Issue: Whether or not respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in dismissing teh case for alleged lack of jurisdiction. Held: Yes. It is elemental that the jurisdiction of a court in criminal cases is determined by the allegations of the information or criminal complaint and not by the result of the evidence presented at the trial,' much less by the trial

judge's personal appraisal of the affidavits and exhibits attached by the fiscal to the record of the case without hearing the parties and their witnesses nor receiving their evidence at a proper trial. It is equally elementary that the mere fact that evidence presented at the trial would indicate that a lesser offense outside the trial, court's jurisdiction was committed does not deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction which had vested in it under the allegations of the information as filed since "(once) the jurisdiction attaches to the person and subject matter of the litigation, the subsequent happening of events, although they are of such a character as would have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance, will not operate to oust jurisdiction already attached. Respondent judge's actions and premature and baseless declaration that the victim's declaration as to the period of her incapacity is "self-serving" raise serious doubts as to whether the State and the offended party may expect a fair and impartial hearing and determination of the case from him, since seemingly with his erroneous pre-conceptions and predilections, he has adversely prejudged their case as one merely of slight or less serious physical injuries. The case below should therefore be transferred to another court presided by another judge.

4. People v Bernabe
Facts: On October 29, 1998, around 1:30 o' clock in the morning, Maria Esnelia Bernabe was sleeping with her sister in a room of their house located at No. 1919-D Leveriza St., Pasay City, when her father (herein appellant) came home 'bangag' or very drunk. Appellant entered said room, approached Maria Esnelia and started kissing her nape as well as other parts of her body. Then, appellant removed her panty and inserted his penis into her vagina. She resisted by pushing him but to no avail. Appellant succeeded in satisfying his beastly desires on his own daughter just like what happened in the previous years starting 1994. At 2:00 o'clock in the morning of the same day, she was accompanied by her aunts to the Pasay City police headquarters, where she lodged a complaint for rape against appellant and executed a sworn statement. At 4:00 o'clock in the morning, policemen came to Maria Esnelia's house and arrested appellant. The trial court found accused guilty and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death. Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in sentencing the accused to suffer the penalty of death. Held: Yes. Before the death penalty can be properly imposed for the crime of rape in accordance with Republic Act No. 7659, an allegation of the complainant's age as well as filial relationship with the accused is essential. Both minority and actual relationship between the parties must be alleged and proved, otherwise, barred is any conviction for rape in its qualified form. In the case at bar, while the Information alleged both the minority of the victim and her relationship with appellant, the prosecution failed to prove the victim's age when it presented only the baptismal certificate of Maria Esnelia and not her birth certificate. It is elementary that a baptismal certificate only proves the fact of baptism but not the circumstances of birth. Without essential proof on the matter of the date of birth of complainant, or other convincing evidence in the absence thereof, we cannot rule with certainty whether Maria Esnelia was indeed a minor at the time of the commission of the crime, especially so because she does not appear to be obviously a minor, as she allegedly was already 17 years old at the time of the assault. Verily, with our young girls now looking, acting, and dressing up more maturely, one would be hard put to conclude with any measure of certainty, that a budding lass is 13 or 18 years of age.

5. People v Gano
Facts: Castanito Gano a.k.a. Allan Perez, a former employee of Ponciano Salen in the latters bakery. The former was tagged as the culprit in the "massacre" of his family. Ponciano Salen, Anicia Salen, and their daughter Conchita were brutally murdered. Issue: Whether or not the aggravating circumstance of dwelling should be appreciated as to warrant the imposition of the penalty of death. Held: No. Secs. 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.

Sec. 8. Designation of the offense. - The complaint or information shall state the designation of the offense given by the statute, aver the acts or omissions constituting the offense, and specify its qualifying and aggravating circumstances. If there is no designation of the offense, reference shall be made to the section or subsection of the statute punishing it. Sec. 9. Cause of the accusation. - The acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense and the qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be stated in ordinary and concise language and not necessarily in the language used in the statute but in the terms sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is being charged as well as its qualifying and aggravating circumstances and for the court to pronounce judgment. Pursuant to the aforequoted amended provisions, the Rules now require that the information or complaint allege not only the qualifying but the aggravating circumstances as well, otherwise, the same cannot be properly appreciated. Guided by the consecrated rule that when a penal statute, substantive and remedial or procedural, is favorable to the accused, the courts shall give it a retroactive application and so we must in this case as the Information does not allege dwelling as an aggravating circumstance.

6. People v Nuevo
Facts: Roberta Cido recalled that at about 9:00 oclock in the evening of December 4, 1994, Sanico Nuevo passed by their house and invited her husband Anselmo Cido, Jr., to a drinking spree at the house of Anselmo, Sr., her father-in-law. She was left at home with her 10-month-old daughter and her nine-year-old niece. At around 11:00 P.M., appellant surreptitiously returned and entered their room. She was awakened when appellant held her neck, pinned down her arms and took off her clothing.. While she was lying on her back, appellant laid on top of her and proceeded to forcibly have sexual intercourse with her, at the same time pinning her down with a bolo. As this was happening her niece Gemma, who was present, witnessed what was being done to her. He thereafter left the house. Although Roberta testified on cross-examination, that she did not see him because it was very dark that night, she identified him through his voice. She was certain it was he because she was very familiar with appellants voice. Not only have they been neighbors since childhood, she also heard the appellant when he invited her husband earlier that evening, and when he warned her and her niece not to tell anyone what happened. The Trial Court ruled in favor of Plaintiff Cido. Issue: Whether or not the appellant was sufficiently identified by hte offended party based only on her regnition of hte sound of his voice. Held: Yes. Once a person has gained familiarity with another, identification becomes quite an easy task even from a considerable distance. In a number of cases, we ruled that the sound of the voice of a person is an acceptable means of identification where it is established that the witness and the accused knew each other personally and closely for a number of years.. Appellant did not deny that he and Roberta had known each other since childhood and that appellant and Robertas husband were "barkada."It is not impossible then that complainant could immediately recognize appellant through his voice alone. In addition, appellants face was very near the victim such that the victim could not have misidentified him, even only by voice recognition. Considering the circumstances in this case, in the light of the testimony by the victim and her witnesses as well as of those for the defense, the trial court correctly concluded that Roberta had sufficiently identified appellant as the person who raped her, by means of force, violence and intimidation, against her will and without her consent. Appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. However it was an error to appreciate the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and the use of a deadly weapon since pursuant to the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure that every complaint or information must state not only the qualifying but also the aggravating circumstances with specifity. As these were not alleged, the crime will now be only of simple rape with a punishment of reclusion perpetua only.

7. People v Yaoto
Facts: At 3:00 in the afternoon of June 2, 1997, seventeen-year old Angeline Yaoto and her father, herein accusedappellant Eduardo Yaoto, were the only persons left in the house of Angelina's grandmother. Accused-appellant

suddenly hit Angeline with a belt, then tied her hands to the sofa with a piece of rope, removed her shorts, panties, blouse and bra. When Angeline was completely naked, accused-appellant had sexual intercourse with her. Angeline's resistance proved futile as accused-appellant easily overpowered her. At 10:00 in the morning of June 7, 1997, Angeline was sleeping in the sala when accused-appellant lay down beside her, touched her thighs and whispered his intention to have sexual intercourse with her again. Just like the first time, he mauled her but this time, he tied her feet when she refused. When accused-appellant fell asleep after the intercourse, Angeline seized the opportunity to escape. She proceeded to the Valenzuela Police Station, where she narrated her ordeal at the hands of her father, causing the police authorities to apprehend accused-appellant. The trial court rendered a decision finding the accused guilty beyong reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.He was sentenced the penalty of death. Issue: Whether or not the penalty of death is proper in the case at bar. Held: No.While the qualifying circumstance of minority was alleged in the two Informations, accused-appellant's relationship with Angeline was not. The failure to allege in the information the relationship of the victim to the offender concurrently with the minority of the victim bars accused-appellant's conviction for rape in its qualified form. The requisite for the complete allegations on the particulars of the indictment is based on the right of the accused to be fully informed of the nature of the charges against him so that he may adequately prepare for his defense pursuant to the due process clause of the Constitution.

RULE 111: PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTION 1. Casupanan v Laroya

Facts: Two vehicles, one driven by respondent Mario Llavore Laroya and the other owned by petitioner Roberto Capitulo and driven by petitioner Avelino Casupanan, figured in an accident. Two cases were filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac. Laroya filed a criminal case against Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property. On the other hand, Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya for quasi-delict. When the civil case was filed, the criminal case was then at its preliminary investigation stage. Laroya, defendant in the civil case, filed a motion to dismiss the civil case on the ground of forum-shopping. The MCTC granted the motion. The MCTC denied the motion for reconsideration . The Capas RTC rendered judgment dismissing the petition for certiorari for lack of merit. Casupanan and Capitulo filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the Capas RTC denied the same. Issue: Whether or not an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence can validly file, simultaneously and independently, a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private complainant in the criminal case.

Held: Yes. The offended party can file two separate suits for the same act or omission. The first a criminal case where the civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted, and the other a civil case for quasi-delict without violating the rule on non-forum shopping. Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or omission he is accused of in the criminal case. This is expressly allowed in paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 which states that the counterclaim of the accused "may be litigated in a separate civil action." This is only fair for two reasons. First, the accused is prohibited from setting up any counterclaim in the civil aspect that is deemed instituted in the criminal case. The accused is therefore forced to litigate separately his counterclaim against the offended party. If the accused does not file a separate civil action for quasi-delict, the prescriptive period may set in since the period continues to run until the civil action for quasi-delict is filed.

2. Cruz v CA

3. DMPI Employees Credit Cooperative v Hon. Velez

Facts: On February 18, 1994, the prosecuting attorney filed with the Regional Trial Court, Misamis Oriental, an information for estafa against Carmen Mandawe for alleged failure to account to respondent Eriberta Villegas the amount of P608,532.46. Respondent Villegas entrusted this amount to Carmen Mandawe, an employee of petitioner DMPI-ECCI, for deposit with the teller of petitioner. Subsequently, respondent Eriberta Villegas filed with the Regional Trial Court, Misamis Oriental, Branch 20, a complaint against Carmen Mandawe and petitioner DMPI-ECCI for a sum of money and damages with preliminary attachment arising out of the same transaction. In time, petitioner sought the dismissal of the civil case. The trial court issued an order dismissing the civil case filed against Villegas. On January 21, 1997, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the order. The trial court issued an order granting respondent's motion for reconsideration. Issue: Whether or not the civil case could proceed independently of the criminal case for estafa without having reserved the filing of the civil action. Held: Yes. as a general rule, an offense causes two (2) classes of injuries. The first is the social injury produced by the criminal act which is sought to be repaired thru the imposition of the corresponding penalty, and the second is the personal injury caused to the victim of the crime which injury is sought to be compensated through indemnity which is civil in nature. However, with respect to civil actions for recovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code arising from the same act or omission, the rule has been changed. There is no more need for a reservation of the right to file the independent civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. "The reservation and waiver referred to refers only to the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the offense charged. This does not include recovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission which may be prosecuted separately even without a reservation."

4. Elcano & Elcano v Hill

Facts: Reginald Hill, a minor yet married at the time of occurrence, was criminally prosecuted for the killing of Agapito Elcano (son of Pedro), and was acquitted for lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake.Pedro Elcano filed a complaint for recovery of damages from Reginald and his father Atty Marvin. CFI dismissed it. Issue: WON the civil action for damages is barred by the acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case wherein the action for civil liability was not reversed. Held: No. The acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar to the instant action against him. -Barredo v Garcia (dual charactercivil and criminal of fault or negligence as a source of obligation): "The above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act may come under both the Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the agent was unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could have been the subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was held to be also a proper subject of a civil action under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it was the employer and not the employee who was being sued." "It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in a criminal case because his negligence causing the death of the child was punishable by the Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear instance of the same act of negligence being a proper subject matter either of a criminal action with its consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an entirely separate and independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1402 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate individuality of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case aria for which, after un a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime.

5. Maniago v CA
Facts: Petitioner Ruben Maniago was the owner of shuttle buses which were used in transporting employees of the Texas Instruments, (Phils.), Inc. On January 7, 1990, one of his buses figured in a vehicular accident with a passenger jeepney owned by private respondent Alfredo Boado. As a result of the accident, a criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and multiple physical injuries was filed on against petitioner's driver, Herminio Andaya, with the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City. A month after the criminal action was instituted, a civil case for damages was filed by private respondent Boado against petitioner himself. Petitioner moved for the suspension of the proceedings in the civil case against him, citing the pendency of the criminal case against his driver. But the trial court denied petitioner's motion. Petitioner took the matter on certiorari and prohibition to the Court of Appeals, but the Court of Appeals dismissed his petition. Issue: Whether or not despite the absence of a reservation to bring a separate action, private respondent may nonetheless bring an action for damages against petitioner. Held: Rule III of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, while reiterating that a civil action under these provisions of the Civil Code may be brought separately from the criminal action, provides that the right to bring it must be reserved. The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made before the prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation. To begin with, paragraph 1 of Rule III quite clearly requires that a reservation must be made to institute separately all civil actions for the recovery of civil liability, otherwise they will be deemed to have been instituted with the criminal case. Such civil actions are not limited to those which arise "from the offense charged," as originally provided in Rule III before the amendment of the Rules of Court in 1988. In other words the right of the injured party to sue separately for the recovery of the civil liability whether arising from crimes (ex delicto) or from quasi delict under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code must be reserved otherwise they will be deemed instituted with the criminal action.

6. Sapiera v CA
Facts: On several occasions, petitioner Sapiera, a sari-sari store owner, purchased from Monnico Mart certain grocery items, mostly cigarettes, and paid for them with checks issued by one Arturo deGuzman. These checks were signed at the back by the petitioner. When presented for payment, the checks were dishonored because the drawers account was already closed. Private respondent Roman Sua informed De Guzman and petitioner about the dishonor but both failed to pay the value of the checks. Hence, four (4) charges of estafa were filed against petitioner but consequently she was acquitted for insufficiency of evidence but the court a quo did not rule on whether she could be held civilly liable for the checks she indorsed to private respondent. On appeal, the respondent court ordered petitioner to pay private respondent the remaining P210, P150. After deducting the amount already collected by the latter as civil indemnity in the criminal cases against De Guzman. Hence, this instant petition.

Issue: Can petitioner be required to pay civil indemnity to private respondent after trial court had acquitted her of criminal charges?

Held: Yes. It is undisputed that the four (4) checks issued by DeGuzman were signed by petitioner at the back without any indication as to how she should be bound thereby and, therefore, she is deemed to be an indorser thereof. The NIL

clearly provides Sec. 17.Construction where instrument is ambiguous. --- Where the language of the instrument is ambiguous, or there are admissions therein, the following rules of construction apply: x x x (f) Where a signature is so placed upon the instrument that it is not clear in what capacity the person making the same intended to sign, he is deemed an indorser. x x x The dismissal of the criminal cases against petitioner did not erase her civil liability since the dismissal was due to insufficiency of evidence and not from a declaration from the court that the fact from which the civil action might arise did not exist. An accused acquitted of estafa may nevertheless be held civilly liable where the facts established by the evidence so warrant. The accused should be adjudged liable for the unpaid value of the checks signed by her in favor of the complainant.

RULE 112: PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION 1. Go v CA

Facts: An information was filed charging herein petitioner Rolito Go for murder before the Regional Trial Court of Metro Manila. Petitioner voluntarily presented himself together with his two lawyers to the police upon obtaining knowledge of being hunted by the latter. However, he was immediately detained and denied his right of a preliminary investigation unless he executes and sings a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Upon omnibus motion for immediate release on recognizance or on bail and proper preliminary investigation on the ground that his warrantless arrest was unlawful and no preliminary investigation was conducted before the information was filed, which is violative of his rights, the same was granted but later on reversed by the lower court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The appellate court in sustaining the decision of the lower court held that petitioner's warrantless arrest was valid in view of the fact that the offense was committed, the petitioner was clearly identified and there exists valid information for murder filed against petitioner. Hence, the petitioner filed this present petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court. Issue/s: The issues assailed in the case at bar are the following: 1. whether or not the warrantless arrest of herein petitioner was lawful, and 2. whether or not petitioner waived his right to preliminary investigation. Ruling: The general rule on arrest provides that the same is legitimate if effected with a valid warrant. However, there are instances specifically enumerated under the law when a warrantless arrest may be considered lawful. Despite that, the warrantless arrest of herein petitioner Rolito Go does not fall within the terms of said rule. The police were not present at the time of the commission of the offense, neither do they have personal knowledge on the crime to be committed or has been committed not to mention the fact that petitioner was not a prisoner who has escaped from the penal institution. In view of the above, the allegation of the prosecution that petitioner needs to sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code before a preliminary investigation may be conducted is baseless. In this connection, petitioner has all the right to ask for a preliminary investigation to determine whether is probable cause that a crime has been committed and that petitioner is probably guilty thereof as well as to prevent him from the hassles, anxiety and aggravation brought by a criminal proceeding. This reason of the accused is substantial, which he should not be deprived of. On the other hand, petitioner did not waive his right to have a preliminary investigation contrary to the prosecutor's claim. The right to preliminary investigation is deemed waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a pleas at arraignment. The facts of the case show that petitioner insisted on his right to preliminary investigation before his arraignment and he, through his counsel denied answering questions before the court unless they were afforded the proper preliminary investigation. For the above reasons, the petition was granted and the ruling of the appellate court was set aside and nullified. The Supreme Court however, contrary to petitioner's allegation, declared that failure to accord the right to preliminary investigation did not impair the validity of the information charging the latter of the crime of murder.

RULE 113: ARREST 1. Go v CA

Facts: An information was filed charging herein petitioner Rolito Go for murder before the Regional Trial Court of Metro Manila. Petitioner voluntarily presented himself together with his two lawyers to the police upon obtaining knowledge of being hunted by the latter. However, he was immediately detained and denied his right of a preliminary investigation unless he executes and sings a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Upon omnibus motion for immediate release on recognizance or on bail and proper preliminary investigation on the ground that his warrantless arrest was unlawful and no preliminary investigation was conducted before the information was filed, which is violative of his rights, the same was granted but later on reversed by the lower court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The appellate court in sustaining the decision of the lower court held that petitioner's warrantless arrest was valid in view of the fact that the offense was committed, the petitioner was clearly identified and there exists valid information for murder filed against petitioner. Hence, the petitioner filed this present petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court. Issues: The issues assailed in the case at bar are the following: 1. whether or not the warrantless arrest of herein petitioner was lawful, and 2. whether or not petitioner waived his right to preliminary investigation. Ruling: The general rule on arrest provides that the same is legitimate if effected with a valid warrant. However, there are instances specifically enumerated under the law when a warrantless arrest may be considered lawful. Despite that, the warrantless arrest of herein petitioner Rolito Go does not fall within the terms of said rule. The police were not present at the time of the commission of the offense, neither do they have personal knowledge on the crime to be committed or has been committed not to mention the fact that petitioner was not a prisoner who has escaped from the penal institution. In view of the above, the allegation of the prosecution that petitioner needs to sign a waiver of the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code before a preliminary investigation may be conducted is baseless. In this connection, petitioner has all the right to ask for a preliminary investigation to determine whether is probable cause that a crime has been committed and that petitioner is probably guilty thereof as well as to prevent him from the hassles, anxiety and aggravation brought by a criminal proceeding. This reason of the accused is substantial, which he should not be deprived of. On the other hand, petitioner did not waive his right to have a preliminary investigation contrary to the prosecutor's claim. The right to preliminary investigation is deemed waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a pleas at arraignment. The facts of the case show that petitioner insisted on his right to preliminary investigation before his arraignment and he, through his counsel denied answering questions before the court unless they were afforded the proper preliminary investigation. For the above reasons, the petition was granted and the ruling of the appellate court was set aside and nullified. The Supreme Court however, contrary to petitioner's allegation, declared that failure to accord the right to preliminary investigation did not impair the validity of the information charging the latter of the crime of murder.

2. People v Doria
Facts: On November 1995, members of the North Metropolitan District, Philippine National Police (PNP) Narcotics Command (Narcom), received information from two (2) civilian informants (CI) that one "Jun" was engaged in illegal drug activities in Mandaluyong City. The Narcom agents decided to entrap and arrest "Jun" in a buy-bust operation.

On December 5, 1995, "Jun" appeared and the CI introduced PO3 Manlangit as interested in buying one (1) kilo of marijuana. P03 Manlangit handed "Jun" the marked bills worth P1,600.00. "Jun" left and after one hour he took out from his bag an object wrapped in plastic and gave it to Manlangit. P03 Manlangit forthwith arrested "Jun" as SPO1 Badua rushed to help in the arrest. They frisked "Jun" but did not find the marked bills on him. Upon inquiry, "Jun" revealed that he left the money at the house of his associate named "Neneth. The team found the door of "Neneth's" house open and a woman inside. SPO1 Badua asked "Neneth" about the P1,600.00 as PO3 Manlangit looked over "Neneth's" house. Standing by the door, PO3 Manlangit noticed a carton box under the dining table. He saw that one of the box's flaps was open and inside the box was something wrapped in plastic. The plastic wrapper and its contents appeared similar to the marijuana. Simultaneous with the box's discovery, SPO1 Badua recovered the marked bills from "Neneth Gaddao" After trial, the Regional Trial Court convicted the accused-appellants. The trial court found the existence of an "organized/syndicated crime group" and sentenced both accused-appellants to death. Issue: Whether or not the the arrest of accused-appellant Gaddao, the search of her person and house, and the admissibility of the pieces of evidence obtained therefrom was valid. Held: No. Accused-appellant Gaddao was not caught red-handed during the buy-bust operation to give ground for her arrest under Section 5 (a) of Rule 113. She was not committing any crime. Contrary to the finding of the trial court, there was no occasion at all for appellant Gaddao to flee from the policemen to justify her arrest in "hot pursuit." In fact, she was going about her daily chores when the policemen pounced on her. Neither could the arrest of appellant Gaddao be justified under the second instance of Rule 113. "Personal knowledge" of facts in arrests without warrant under Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 must be based upon "probable cause" which means an "actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion." 115 The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based an actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. 116 A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.