1) @)*I #X[ a@]b GR Y UNXR SYZ Y a@I[ @O U] bfF N #X[@[ Bb UkP (

housing bubbles) TI Y<Z[ XQ PZ SOX aXR #a *b a@II @WU N[ b] N SOX

*@I U^P PA R<Z Y@ aU SbX baa U YaU UP[ >M ^Q @[[ XN #Z Rb NP[@<
Bb>M P<Z[ SZ E]F] #R@ PR Q[b 1982 a] O@ *@P@ #X[@[ >M[ aP[ b[
J@ @[[ W[ Y ay[ bN [ZF ab TK[] [GW ay aP[ b[ @XN }[ @[aP[ b[
@X XR >M[ PX @XR, >M@ #[ abG]W @[ *b aP[ b[ 2000 a][ S[ O@ US@
@X #a 2000 a] O@ 2003 a] aP[ b[ 6.5 ^N^ O@ @X 1 ^N^ E] #a >M
abG ]W bN S[U NARb YARb SE[ I@ (money) >MPR@[ ayP[ bN *aF *b #OBX[
Ka @OZ F]? 1996 O@ 2004 a][ XQ #X[@[ U] #U SXm ( #XPR < [R[
XI T[@) SE[ UK YZ 1996 a] Y F] XI G.K.S.[ 1.5 ^N^ Y 2004 a] UK b]
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XQX >M @[N }[ @[] *[ SZ aO aOb UWl TRZ] ay U@ < RR U ay[<
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A)X@R #ORNN *b SYZ[ *@I U^t RZ #X[ bNXQb #]ER @[F N b] @WU
, 1980 a][ S[ O@b @RGKX[ ]R KI @K, BK[ ]R bNP[ XQX SM[ UG[@ E
[A[ SZ R<Z bZF (PtU ]AE, TK T [I) U^_ @[ 1990 a][ S[ O@ X@R
axGUP[ S]a YI aXR #a Nb] *@P@ *baU >M[ XQX SM[ UG[ < EbP@ KyR
#RP@ Y S[XM EbP UKU ab S[XM UWl SM[ PX UKN O@U #U[ SM[ UQN PX[
#^[ KS[ TI@ A][ RR[@X SkN RZ *[ KS[ TI@[ RNR RNR SK N[ @[ bZF*b
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Governments, led by the US, have underwritten ever greater volumes of debt, through ever more
baroque channels, to subsidise purchasing power...since the mid-90s they have had to resort to more
powerful and risky forms of stimulus to counter the tendency to stagnation, replacing the public
deficits of traditional Keynesianism with the private deficits and asset inflation of what might be
called asset-price Keynesianism or, with equal accuracy, bubblenomics
B) @w SGUP aX G aAB[ N[ b] yWUNb XG[ ^X@ UBN U^ @F UF[ Q [ SZ 1970
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#aU bZ YZ *b SZI Y @R aXZ Y @R UmPN TI YN UQ #[ Nb CI] #X[@Z
C)David Harvey N[ The Enigma of Capital UbIN UNXR a@II[ a[a@]N SYUM bG[
@[N B Z ]A FR ....... A synoptic view of the current crisis would say ..... the underlying problem is

excessive capitalist empowerment vis-a-vis labour and consequent wage repression, leading to problems of
effective demand papered over by a credit-fuelled consumerism of excess in one part of the world and a too
rapid expansion of production in new product lines in another.( Enigma of Capital, p- 118) #X[ R E[
]AE -1 O@ PAN S[F Y U^_ @[ 1980 a] O@ @ S[XM KSPR^]N UK B ZF *U
#sEYGR@WU S@N XG[[ S[XM SZ ab a] O@b RxBN RZF Y S[XM KSPR^]N UK
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#wRbN kmk[ Ta] *U *@b a O N #N KSPR *U #N aZ[ W , aUaXZ[ XN *b kmkI UNXR
SYZ< @G @[ B F

]AE -1 #X[@[ ^X@P[ S@N XG[ < KSPR^]N ( K][) a The Credit Crisis: Where
It Came From, What Happened, and How It Might End / Anush Kapadia, Arjun Jayadev, Economic &
Political Weekly EPW december

]AE -2 #X[@[ ^X@ P[ UBN aZ[ S[XM ,a -The Credit Crisis: Where It Came
From, What Happened, and How It Might End / Anush Kapadia, Arjun Jayadev, Economic & Political
Weekly EPW december 6, 2008

2) UBN SYZ U^_ @[ 2000 a][ S[ O@ }QX UKC[[ KS[ TI@UG[ Y SZ RZ #X[
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N[ PX UKZ E] bZF
In February 2008, analyst Gary Dorsch wrote:
commodities have historically been regarded as wildly volatile and risky, but since 2006, crude
oil, gold, copper, silver, platinum, cocoa, and grains have soared, hitting record highs, and have
trounced returns in the mismanaged G-7 stock markets... A remarkable run-up in prices of wheat,
corn, oilseeds, rice, and dairy products, along with sharply higher energy prices, have been blamed
on supply shortfalls, strong demand for bio-fuels, and an inflow of $150 billion from investment
funds. From a year ago, Chicago wheat futures have soared +120%, corn +20%, and soybeans
are +80% higher. Rough rice is up 55%, and platinum touched $2,000 /oz, up 80% from a
year ago, while US cocoa futures hit a 24-year high... Fund managers are pouring money into
commodities across the board as a hedge against the explosive growth of the world's money
supply, and competitive currency devaluations engineered by central banks.
Source --Gary Dorsch (14 February 2008). "Central Bankers Fueling Global Commodity Inflation". SafeHaven.com. Retrieved 9 July 2010.
@WU TKE[ IK *[ XQX SM[ PX UKR bZF, N RE[ ]AE O@ S[y[ bU a
-"Central Bankers Fueling Global Commodity Inflation". SafeHaven.com. Retrieved 9 July 2010.

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T[@Rb
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labour process is restricted or in some instances completely stopped, real (productive) capital is
destroyed.( Theory of surplus value, pt2, pp 495-96). *[ #B S@N SG[ *b Ua[ XQXb #N
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Materialism 17 (2009) 3583)

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UER[ GR 7.2 I]ZR K][ U] #KI @[ a the Bank of England 2008, Financial Stability
Report, n. 24 (October 2008) *b SYZ #X[ PAU [t SZ SGUP[ @Y@[ XRGXm[ (Executive management)WX@ RN }[ @[F SGUP [t *AR B[m[[ WX@ RN }[
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@ baU N[ b] ( a From Financial Crisis to World-Slump:Accumulation, Financialisation,
and the Global Slowdown David McNally, Historical Materialism, 17(2009).

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