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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

IN RE ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN,
ESQ.
NEVADA BAR NUMBER 9473
Supreme Court No: 60838

notice

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Petitioner, ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN, representing himself., files I

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respectfully submit
Coughlin submits this Notice/Motion which is intended to function as a
as well and Coughlin sought to file this yesterday
but a computer issue prevented his doing so and ask that any lateness hereof

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(though Coughlin does not believe such is late, especially given the returned mail

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item referenced in the docket) be given an excusable neglect analysis. Coughlin

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as to the

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7/24/13 Order of this Court and believes that the Remittitur issued was premised

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upon a mistake that the Order of 6/7/12 was of 6/7/13, which is was not, and

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Coughlin does not believe it just to run any 18 days to file a Petition for Rehearing

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from the 6/7/12 Orders date given his numerous filing in the interim and the effect

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of the 7/23/13 Order, and Coughlin also respectfully requests a brief extension to

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file something more in the manner of a showing of Good Cause to reinstate his
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license pursuant to SCR 111(7) and asks that this Court's 7/24/13 Order

characterizing a previosu filing over one year old as such be amended to allow for

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such.
Dated this 8/13/13

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/s/ Zach Coughlin, signed electronically

Zach Coughlin, Esq.

Appellant

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Proof of Service:
On this date, I, Zach Coughlin electronically served a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document to all registered efilers, and to those whom are not I placed a
true and correct copy of the foregoing document in the usps mail on this date:

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State Bar of Nevada's Patrick O. King and David Clark.

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DATED THIS: Dated thi s8/13/13

/s/ Zach Coughlin
Zach Coughlin
Appellant

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INDEX TO EXHIBITS:

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1. Exhibit 1: various relevant materials.

However, the Nevada Supreme Court's Order of 7/24/13 in 60838 may say
otherwise, where it reads:
Hill's associate Baker's 4/19/12 Motion for Attorney's Fees in 03628, reads:
MOTION FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES Respondent, MATT MERLISS, by
and through his counsel, RICHARD G. HILL, LTD., and CASEY D. BAKER,
ESQ. moves the court, pursuant to NRS 69.050 and NRS 7.085, for an award of
attorney's fees. This motion is based on the above-referenced statutes, the record
on appeal ("ROA"), the points and authorities below, and all papers and pleadings
on file herein. POINTS AND AUTHORITIES FACTS AND PROCEDURAL
HISTORY
1. This is an appeal from a summary eviction entered in the Reno Justice
Court ("RJC"). Reference is made to the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and
Order for Summary Eviction entered by the RJC on October 27, 2012 for the facts
of the underlying eviction. ROA, Vol. II, pp. 75-80.
2. Coughlin filed his first notice of appeal in the eviction case on November
3, 2011, two days after he was properly and lawfully locked out oft he property.
ROA, Vol. III, pp. 229-233. Coughlin inexplicably filed an additional notice of
appeal on November 23, 2011. ROA, Vol. III, P.5.
3. Since filing his first notice of appeal, Coughlin has deliberately engaged
in a pattern of abusive, vexatious, and most importantly, expensive behavior in both
this appeal and in the case below. Coughlin continued to file motions and other
documents, and engage in other inappropriate and time-consuming behavior in the
RJC, both before and after the first ROA was finally sent up to this court, some
seven weeks after the first notice of appeal was filed. The court is asked to take
judicial notice, pursuant to NRS 47.130, that the RJC sent up a supplement to the
ROA on January 4, 2012, which consisted of 21 additional items.
(NOTE: Actually, as evinced by the RJC's Supplement filed in the 2JDC on
4/1/13, which did actually contain those 21 additional items (though, still,
curiously, failed to contain three of Coughlin's filing on 12/22/11 speaking to his
right to a stay pursuant to NRS 40.385, including the fact that Coughlin deposited
the required $250, not once, but twice (on 12/13/11 and, again, on 12/22/11). Also
troubling is the fact that, even in such 4/1/13 Supplemental, which contained filings
between 12/19/11 and 1/4/12, the RJC failed to file stamp Coughlin's timely Notice
of Appeal of 12/26/11 appeal Judge Sferrazza horrific 12/21/11 Order Resolving
Motion to Contest Personal Property Lien, which may be the most abominable
eviction order ever entered in the Western States...such failure to originally transmit
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Coughlin's 12/26/11 Notice of Appeal, in addition to failing to file stampe it, for
whatever reason, is of concern too where footnote 5 on page 5 of Judge Flanagan's
3/30/12 Order Denying Coughlin's appeal purports to justify Judge Flanagan's
failure to adjudicate the portion thereof appeal such 12/21/11 Order Resolving
Coughlins' 11/16/11 Motion to Contest Personal Property Lien, where Judge
Flanagan, strangely, indicates that Coughlin's alleged failure to identify any
procedural error in the RJC's setting of the hearing somehow absolves Judge
Flanagan of his duty to adjudicate Coughlin's appeal of such 12/21/11 Order, which
was appealed for a multitude of reasons, not all of which even related to the RJC's
failure to abide by NRS 40.253(7)-(8), which, regardless, was indeed one of the
procedural errors in the RJC's setting of the hearing that Coughlin identified.
What Flangan's Order reads like at footnote 5, on page 5 of such 3/30/12 Order is,
some might say, watch this, I am a judge and if I make a finding, poof, there goes
any liability my friends at the RJC may face as a result of violating Nevada law
requiring such hearing be held within ten days of your filing such Motion to
Contest Personal Propert Lien...have fun with that collateral bar, buddy... which is
not the most judicial of looks for Judge Flanagan to be donning.)
NRS 40.253(7)-(8) required the RJC to hold such hearing within 10 days of
Coughlin's 11/16/11 filing...instead, Richard G. Hill, Esq., in his 11/21/11 written
correspondence to Coughlin committed professional misconduct in implying an
improper ability to influence a tribunal (and implication which, apparently, turned
out to be prescient, as Hill indeed was able to legislate away such hold the hearing
on Coughlin's Motion to Contest Personal Property Lien within 10 days of its
11/16/11 filing, on account that Hill, allegedly was to be traveling on vacation for
the six weeks following the original 11/22/11 hearing date which Hill and Baker
simply failed to show up to, (where Hill indicated Coughlin would not get a
hearing until after Hill returned from his vacation six weeks later.
Hill was not even the attorney of record in that matter, which brings the
utility of his testifying to matters involved in the justice court proceeding in 1708
into question (especially where the SBN's allegedly filed its 10/12/12 DowSoE and
therein limited those matters to which Hill would be allowed to testify to pursuant
to SCR 105(2)(c), where such designation of witnesses and summary of evidence
required included with such Notice of Hearing (which must be provided by the
Hearing Panel (ie, not by Asst. Bar Counsel King weeks before such Hearing
Panel is even chosen by the Board Chair...with such misconduct by King being
more clearly put in relief upon a review of SBN President Flaherty's 2/25/13
Petition in ADKT No. 0484 in the Matt of the Amendment to SCR 103, SCR 105,
SCR 105.5....
Regarding Appointment of Disciplinary Hearing Panel Members filing with
the Nevada Supreme Court. SBN Presdent Flaherty's assertions therein strongly
indict the misconduct committed by Asst. Bar Counsel King and Clerk of Court
Laura Peters, where such reads: Board Chairs also hear all preliminary motions on
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a case until the appointment of a Hearing Panel, at which time the Hearing Panel
Chair (panel Chair) hears such motions. (NOTE: such may be the practice, but it
goes against express text of SCR 110(4), which provides that it is the Chair of the
Disciplinary Board not the Chair of the Hearing Panel, whom rules on motions to
quash subpoenas (they tend to be extremely important, such as in Coughlin's case,
where a multitude of essential issue involved therein required to use of subpoenas
to adequately litigate (such as addressing the insufficiency of service of process of
the Complaint issue wherein Clerk of Court Peters made express indications to
Coughlin with respect to the practices and policies and SCR 105(4) rules of
procedure adopted by the NNDB (after receiving approval from the SBN Board of
Governors...though both NDB Chair Susich and Panel Chair Echeverria, and the
SBN as a whole, refuse to provide Coughlin with any actual written, published such
rule of procedure so adopted...) vis a vis whether Peters mailing via Certified
Mailing on 8/23/12 the Complaint at issue in 62337 would be asserted, per SCR
109 as effecting service of the Complaint should such Certified Mailing not yield
the return of a signed by the Respondent Return Receipt Request card (SBN
Clerk of Court Peters own 10/9/11 Affidavit of Laura Peters (which the SBN never
served on Coughlin until including such within 3,200 pages of materials the SBN
only had delivered to Coughlin some four judicial days before the 11/14/12 formal
hearing (an SCR 105(2)(c) violation compounded by the SBN refusal to allow
Coughlin to inspect up to three days before the hearing where such violation
is particularly unethical given the SBN's fraudulent failure to disclose (never mind
promptly disclose) the summary...of the evidence against the attorney...together
with a brief stament of the facts to which each will testify... with respect to any of
the witnesses, really, but particularly with respect to the two witnesses whom were
only designated as such one judicial day prior to the 11/14/12 formal hearing,
where, as was the case with all the witnesses, the SBN completely failed to provide
anything in the way of satisfying its obligation under SCR 105(2)(c) to give
Coughlin a summary...of the evidence against the attorney much less a brief
statement of the facts to which each witness will testify where witnesses or
evidence, other than for impeachment, which became known to bar counsel
thereafter, and which bar counsel intends to use at the hearing, shall be promptly
disclosed to the attorney...
(NOTE: The which became known to bar counsel thereafter bit was
allegedly the case with respect to witnesses NVB Judge Beesley and WLS's Elcano,
despite Beesley himself testifying that he contacted the SBN via letter about
six weeks after the 3/15/12 hearing in the NVB wherein Coughlin appeared less
than an hour after being burglarized by Gayle Kern, Esq., and the WCSO, in direct
violation of RJC Judge Schroeder's wrongfully issued anyway summary eviction
Lockout Order of that morning) (11/14/12 HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 24:10 to
24:13).

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Such failure to promptly disclose witnesses Beesley and Elcano is

particularly prejudicial where the Panel Chair refused to for good cause
shown,...allow additional time, not to exceed 90 days, to conduct the hearing.
So, where SCR 105(2)(c) requires the Hearing Panel provide Coughlin at
least 30 day's written notice of the hearing, 62337 saw such Hearing Panel not
even being chosen and constructively noticed to the NRCP 6(e) made applicable
via SCR 119(3) until six judicial days prior to the 11/14/12 formal disciplinar
hearing where NNDB Board Chair Susich's 10/30/12 Order designating the
Hearing Panel and Panel Chair was allegedly (though not sufficiently indicated
pursuant to Mikohn where Clerk of Court Peters Certificate of Mailing of such
Order fails to indicate such was placed in the mail to be picked up for mailing to
go out that day) placed in the SBN's outgoing mail box (before or after the mail
was picked up for that day is not clear) on that day, 10/30/12.
Now, consider that, in the context of SBN President Flaherty's 2/25/12
Petition in ADKT 0484, where such reads:
Also, HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 180:13 to 180:22) MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr.
King, you cited in one of your pleadings a request that all issues pending before you be
heard at one hearing. There was a letter you sent to the state Bar that you quote in one of
your pleadings. THE WITNESS (COUGHLIN): I requested that? MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Yes, sir. THE WITNESS: You haven't read my pleadings. My whole point was
bifurcating, how ridiculous it is to glom all these together. I'm so glad you just said that on
the record.
King's SCR 111(4) Petition in 61901 provides a defensive collateral estoppel bar or
party opponent admission that the dubious criminal trespass conviction reported therein
somehow supports an attempt to permanently disbar Coughlin in 62337: 3. As evidenced
by the documentation submitted herein, Respondent has been convicted of a crime which
triggers the reporting requirements of Bar Counsel under SCR 111(4). Further,
King's failure to file any such SCR 111 Petition (whether one under (4) or (6)) for the
alleged crimes the 12/14/12 FOFCOL characterizes the criminal contempt convictions
to be provides a further defensive collateral estoppel bar.

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As there was not motion to dismiss pending in the precursor non-payment

summary eviction proceeding brough in Rev2011-001492, the landlord (and justice court
Judge Sferrazza ) should have been collaterally estopped from ordering any NRS
118A.355(5) rent escrow deposit, and also from finding that, rather than evicting Coughlin
in retaliation for engaging in various protected activities under NRS 118A.510, that the
lanldord utlized a no-cause summary eviction proceeding to evict Coughlin for nonpayment of rent).
Plaintiff retains right to dismiss complaint voluntarily while motion to dismiss is
pending. Rules Civ.Proc., Rules 12(b), 41(a). Gallen v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court In and
For County of Clark, 1996, 911 P.2d 858, 112 Nev. 209.
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It was completely inappropriate for 2JDC Judge Elliott to dismiss Coughlin's suit
in CV11-01896 against WLS and the same CAAW whose Executive Board Judge Elliott
sat on on a NRCP 12(b)(4) insufficiency of service of process basis, where such does not
even get to the merits of the case (and was not dismissed on the pleadings but on the
sufficiency of either the service or the process), only to then award attorney's fees.
Conclusiveness of adjudication: Dismissal of case for plaintiff's failure to state
claim upon which relief can be granted constituted adjudication on merits so as to
render matters raised res judicata where plaintiff on appeal from judgment of dismissal did
not assign as error abuse of discretion of court in not granting leave to amend, did not
thereafter seek any leave to amend its complaint and order of dismissal had been made
with prejudice as to each defendant. NRCP 12(b) and (1-7), 41(b), 56. Zalk-Josephs Co. v.
Wells Cargo, Inc., 1965, 400 P.2d 621, 81 Nev. 163. Judgment 654
In assessing motion to dismiss on pleadings, trial court assumes that underlying
facts support allegations of claim, but in assessing motion for attorney fees, trial court
must determine whether plaintiff had reasonable grounds for its claims, which analysis
depends on actual circumstances of case rather than hypothetical set of facts favoring
plaintiff. N.R.S. 18.010, subd. 2(b); Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 12(b)(5). Bergmann v. Boyce,
1993, 856 P.2d 560, 109 Nev. 670.
Where the 12/14/12 FOFCOL purports to find that Coughlin still has not filed a
verified answer or response, Coughlin cannot be said to have waived all the detailed an
intricate basis for dismissing the SBN's Complaint that are not more readily apparent to
him, which is good, considering that the SBN still has not served Coughlin the Complaint
in the matter now on appeal in 62337:
Waiver of defenses: Before a defendant files a responsive pleading such as an
answer, that defendant may move to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, insufficiency
of process, and/or insufficiency of service of process, and such a defense is not waived by
being joined with one or more other defenses. Hansen v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel.
County of Clark, 2000, 6 P.3d 982, 116 Nev. 650.
Now, just like how 2JDC Judge Elliott dismissed Coughlin's case in CV11-01896
against the very Elcano and the WLS for which he is the Exec. Director, so to must this
Court (via a Writ, or otherwise) or the Panel dismiss the SBN's Complaint for failing to
effect service of process within the 120 days allowable under NRCP 4, by way of SCR
119(3). Fair's fair. See 60317.
A defendant may raise its defenses, including those relating to jurisdiction and
service, in a responsive pleading; objections to personal jurisdiction, process, or service of
process are waived, however, if not made in a timely motion or not included in a
responsive pleading such as an answer. Hansen v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel.
County of Clark, 2000, 6 P.3d 982, 116 Nev. 650.
To avoid waiver of a defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person, insufficiency
of process, or insufficiency of service of process, the defendant should raise its defenses
either in an answer or pre-answer motion. Hansen v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel.
County of Clark, 2000, 6 P.3d 982, 116 Nev. 650.

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Alleged tortfeasor's appearance, after its motion to quash service of process for
lack of personal jurisdiction was denied, would not amount to a waiver of its challenge to
the district court's jurisdiction. Hansen v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. County of
Clark, 2000, 6 P.3d 982, 116 Nev. 650.

Defense of insufficiency of service of process was waived by defendant's

responsive pleading filed in aid of its motion to set aside default judgment. NRCP
12(b). Phillips v. Incline Manor Ass'n, 1975, 530 P.2d 1207, 91 Nev. 69.

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which shall...give the attorney at least 30 days' written notice of its time and
place where the notice shall be accompanied by a summary prepared by bar
counsel of the evidence against the attorney, and the names of the witnesses
bar counsel intends to call for other than impeachment, together with a brief
statement of the facts to which each will testify, all of which may be inspected
up to 3 days prior to the hearing (which the USPS Track & Confirm proves was
not even picked up for mailing by the USPS until 10/16/12, and not even delivered
to Coughlin's mail box until 10/22/12 (seemingly owing to the delay's incident to
Coughlin's SCR 79 address being changed upon the Reno Police Departments
Sargent Olive Miller and Alan AJ Weaver continuing with their 42 USC 1983,
Soldal v. Cook County rampage that RJC Judge Scott Pearson so thoroughly
endorsed in Rev2012-078432 at the 10/2/12 hearing on Coughlin's Verified
Complaint for illegal lockout; where Coughlin submitted his Official USPS Change
of Address on 10/5/12 to the downtown Reno Postal Station personally)
As
though Coughlin did (though he was not granted a default like the one
Gayle Kern, Esq., obtained on 3/15/12 (at 8:33 a.m., for a summary eviction
proceeding based on Kern's pursuit of a no cause summary eviction that was set for
8:30 a.m., where Kern smirked at Coughlin as she was walking out of the
courtroom while he was walking in (NV Energy and Kern's conspiring to refuse to
allow Coughlin electricity for an entire week in his former home law officer at
1422 E. 9th St. #2 put some limitations on Coughlin's alarm clock navigation, as did
RMC Judge Nash Holme's five day summary incarceration of Coughlin's between
2/27/12 and 3/2/12 (and the concomitant $300 bill from the towing/impound yard
where Coughlin and his mother, Mary Barker had to retrieve Coughlin's 1996
Honda Accord with 115k miles on it (a gift in 2002 from his beloved grandmother
Ruth Hugh Mom Barker, whose tradition of activism he carries on...also,
Coughlin, with a ton of help from his mother, managed to get his CLE done and bar
dues paid by the 3/1/12 deadline as well...) and her, not incident to arrest, and
without any written order or warrant, confiscating from where such had already
been booked into Coughlin's personal property at the Washoe County Jail, then
practicing attorney Coughlin's smart phone, a separate micro sd data card
(apparently the in Rev2012-000374 against Coughlin incident to her very own RPC
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3.5A violation (RPC 3.5A Relations With Opposing Counsel: When a lawyer
knows or reasonably should know the identity of a lawyer representing an
opposing party, he or she should not take advantage of the lawyer by causing any
default or dismissal to be entered without first inquiring about the opposing
lawyer's intention to proceed.) where Kern, via Coughlin serving on her his
3/7/12 Tenant's Answer therein, identifying himself as his own attorney in the
matter, was well aware that she was taking a default (though NRS 40.253(6)
does not allow for such taking a default where Coughlin had filed a detailed
Motion/Tenant's Answer of 3/8/12), as Kern was still plenty able to test the
truthfulness and sufficiency of the affidavit to a more full extent than Coughlin
would have been able to so test Kern's or her client's landlord's affidavit, given
such had not even been filed by the time Kern was walking out of RJC Judge
Schroeder's courtroom at 8:35 a.m. (the audio record reveals Kern did not file such
affidavit in open court...which would have violated NRS 40.253(6) anyways, but
Judge Sferrazza let Hill's client do that, so...), smirking at Coughlin while he
walked in, where the landlord's unlawful detainer affidavit on file in that matter
bares a time/date stamping of 8:39 a.m., 8/15/12 and a signature that is more of an
initialing lacking anything in the way of an indication as to whom such signature
belongs...and regardless, such 3/15/12 unlawful detainer affidavit (funny, a
voice mail to Coughlin has been all the RJC ever needed previously to set a hearing
in a landlord tenant matter involving Coughlin (an email worked in a criminal
matter for the 11/13/12 hearing in RCR2011-063341, even)).
I can't because I don't have a credit card and my pacer account is past due. I need
the audio of my hearings before the NVB Judge Beesley. these are available for $2.60
each online. it only takes 2 minutes to sign up.
SCR 105(2)(c) requires the State Bar to notify respondent Coughlin of potential
witness, in writing, 30 days before the hearing. The SBN only notified me that Judge
Beesley would testify 1 judicial day before the hearing (same with Beesley's 1977
classmate at McGeorge School of Law, Washoe Legal Services Paul Elcano, whom joined
both of their 1977 McGeorge School of Law classmate Reno Municipal Court Judge
Dorothy Nash Holmes as three of the four witnesses at Coughlin's formal disciplinary
hearing on 11/14/12. Somehow the SBN was able to quash Coughlin's subpoenas on
Judges (like the 2JDC's Flanagan, Elliott, RMC's W. Gardner, K. Howard, etc, apparently
based on some argument that one may not query judges about their thought processes,
only for the SBN to then call Judge Nash Holmes and query her about her though
processes in an attempt to apply some offensive collateral estoppel or claim preclusion to
her 2/28/12 and 3/12/12 Orders in a "simple traffic citation" case in RMC 11 TR 26800
where she found Coughlin in contempt for, amongst other things,
The only cases Coughlin had in the Federal Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Nevada (NVB) (and the first three bankruptcy cases Coughlin ever worked on) necessarily
would be those Judge Beesley testified to, however, vaguely and devoid of any specifics
whatsoever (but its not like his testimony was pointed to as a basis for taking away,
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permanently, the property right under the Fourteenth Amendment that Coughlin and his
parents worked so hard for over decades and decades...oh wait...strike that, as the 12/14/12
Findings of Fact; Conclusions of Law by NNDB Panel Chair John Echeverria ("you
haven't lived in Nevada long enough" said Judge Beesley upon the SBN King's butchering
the pronunciation of Echeverria's last name, on the record of the 11/14/12 formal
disciplinary hearing) :
HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 9:8 to 9:15) MR. KING: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Judge Beesley, the panel consists of John Echeverria -- I'm not pronouncing the name
-- but there's five panel members. JUDGE BEESLEY: John Echeverria. You have not
spent enough time in Nevada. MR. KING: That is correct. Thank you for that.
Those NVB cases are: NVB 10-05104, Cadle Company v. Keller; NVB 11-05078
Allison Taitano Moore v. John Gessin; and NVB 11-05077 Stacey Rissone v. John Gessin
(all Adversary Proceedings); NVB11-05078 was appealed and decided on 3/4/13:
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/bap/2013/03/05/Gessin%20%20Memo%20121330.pdf
While Asst Bar Counsel King was too embarrassed by the purported emailed
grievance against Coughlin Richard G. Hill, Esq., sent to the SBN to offer such into
evidence (which really ought be detrimental to the SBN's attempt to establish by clear
and convincing evidence the allegation in its 8/23/12 Complaint that Coughlin violated
RPC 8.1, but this was a specially chosen Panel, with a very special Panel Chair, so, no,
King's failing to put into evidence whatever it was Coughlin was supposed to respond to
(ie, some written complaint with specific allegations made by somebody, like, say,
Richard G. Hill, Esq.) really did not get in the way of the Panel finding a violation by
Coughlin of RPC 8.1 (failing to cooperate with disciplinary authorities pursuant to a
lawful demand for information (though the SBN did not subpoena Coughlin, and though
Coughlin, where Rules of Professional Conduct were repeatedly applied against him as to
his own self representation (even Judge Nash Holmes findings that Coughlin violated
duties to himself were given the ol' offensive collateral estoppel treatment by the Panel),
Coughlin certainly should be able to assert attorney-client privilege as to any demand for
information...but regardless, Coughlin responded to all of the allegations in King's
Complaint, denying each and every last one made in that insipid four and a half page, typo
ridden slapdash, unethical, tacky bit of jibberish, which, as to RPC 8.1, alleged:
1. Multiple grievances were received by the Office of Bar Counsel between the
period of January 14 and March 15, 2012, concerning Respondent. Due to the serious
allegations of misconduct, grievance files were opened and an investigation was initiated
by Assistant Bar Counsel Patrick King.
2. Respondent was advised of the grievances via U.S. mail, e-mail and by a brief
meeting with Mr. King at the State Bar Office in Reno. Respondent did not cooperate with
the investigation and rather than respond to the grievances as requested, Respondent sent
non-responsive and disparaging e-mails.
King's Complaint reveals serious misconduct where it indicates Multiple
grievances were received by the SBN between 1/14/12 and 3/15/12, especially where
Coughlin's cross-examination of Judge Beesley (which Chair Echeverria seemed to have a
real hard time finding the relevance in) managed to nail down the date any purported letter
from Judge Beesley to the Bar regarding Coughlin was sent by Beesley to the SBN (no
testimony that such letter was a grievance or evidence of such, and, typically, the SBN
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failed to even produce such purported letter by Judge Beesley regarding Coughlin to
Coughlin, even where Beesley was a witness at the formal hearing).
HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 10:6 to 11:15) BRUCE BEESLEY Having been first
duly sworn, testified as follows: DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. KING: Q Judge
Beesley, can you explain to the panel your knowledge in this relevant time frame 20112012 regarding Mr. Coughlin and his conduct in your court? A Mr. Coughlin appeared
in my court a couple of times, at least two or three times. The first time I recall him
coming to my court he came in, he was wearing, I think, a T-shirt and a tie, and no jacket.
And he indicated that he had been evicted from his residence or his office, indicating it
was not because of not paying the rent, and that that was why he wasn't what I would
consider appropriately dressed. I apologize. I don't have my letter in front of me. But my
recollection is that he had filed a pleading on behalf of his client in regard to some aspect
of a bankruptcy case, and that the pleading was lengthy, didn't make any sense, and just
sort of rambled through a great deal of irrelevant stuff.
I had him a couple other times in my court and had the same experience, that -he was dressed appropriately the other times I had him there, and he was very polite and
appeared to be a very intelligent man. But his pleadings didn't make any sense. His
arguments didn't make any sense. And I became concerned that he was suffering from
alcohol or drug abuse or had some sort of mental issues which were preventing him from
being able to represent his client. I talked to -- I made some inquiries of the court and State
Bar if there was anything -- the federal court first, if there was anything that I had
authority to do to try and get Mr. Coughlin some help and learned that I could not.
HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 13:4 to 14:7) THE WITNESS (BEESLEY): I'm not
quite sure where I was in my testimony, but based on the discussions I had, and the
information I got from other people, it became apparent to me that there wasn't a program
that was going to -- MR. COUGHLIN: Objection. Foundation. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr.
King? MR. KING: The testimony is clear. He's explaining the actions he took relative to
Mr. Coughlin's conduct, which is the purpose. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Overruled. MR.
COUGHLIN: He was specifying -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin. MR.
COUGHLIN: -- no foundation for what he was asserting. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr.
Coughlin, I've overruled your objection. MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Please proceed, Judge. BY MR. KING: Q I apologize, your Honor, for
the interruption. But you were just about to testify as to what action you took with respect
to the information you learned. A What I did was I wrote a letter to the State Bar
explaining what had occurred with Mr. Coughlin, indicating, I believe, that I thought that
in his current state he was not able to represent his clients adequately, and that the State
Bar should look into it. I think that was the extent of what I did in summary.
(ie, Judge Beesley did what 2JDC Judges Elliott, Flanagan, and L. Gardner, and
RMC Judges Howard and W. Gardner did not do (RMC Judge Dilworth indicated to
Coughlin on the record in a 12/5/12 trail in RMC 12 CR 12420 that Judge Nash
Holmes had indicated the SBN would have the full cooperation of...the other RMC
Judges where she had no such authority or permission to make any such statement,
and that, combined with Nash Holmes' allusions to problems Coughlin gave even our pro
tempore judges when Coughlin never appeared before any, is beyond troubling,
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especially when considering all the lying attendant to her disassembled a recording
device and hid a piece of it in the bathroom narrative, whether the lying is hers or the
RMC Marshals, or a group effort, is really not that important where, at the very least, her
egregious negligence (at best) as to the truth (not to mention her using probably and
by clear and convincing evidence so interchangeably when (not just during the 11/14/12
formal hearing, but on the audio record of the 3/12/12 hearing wherein she rendered one
Order, only to whip it into more offensive collateral estoppel hoping worthy shape the
following day upon reducing such to writing, in her transparent attempt to transmogrify a
simple traffic citation trial into some Bloody Mary worthy summary disbarment
proceeding), clearly, there is a rather salient difference that one would hope one holding
judicial office might readily grasp) and unimaginable arrogance is beyond worrisome) ,
that being, take some Canon 2, Rule 2.15 appropriate action where he felt such prudent.
Obviously, defensive collateral estoppel (oh no, Pat King might have to do some actual
work beyond attaching orders from judges, which, by the way, King was too lazy to even
manage to do, or even incorporate by reference Mirch-style with respect to FHE 2, 3,
4,applies to defeat the various allegation by King and findings or conclusions by the Panel
that any orders by 2JDC Judges
One important hearing to obtain for $2.40 electronically off of Pacer.gov would
probably be the one on 3/15/12 that Judge Beesley testified to at Coughlin's formal
disciplinary hearing, where Coughlin had been burglarized by the Washoe County
Sheriff's Office (along with Gayle Kern, Esq.'s associates) just an hour before the hearing
(they refuse to post an eviction order and wait 24 hours like the law requires under NRS
40.253(5)(a), and where every other county in Nevada manages to so comply.
HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 20:13 to 21:4) BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Judge
Beesley, what in particular did you notice about my work product -- when did you first
contact Mr. King about me? A When did I first contact who? Q Mr. King. Bar counsel
for the State Bar. A I don't know that I ever contacted Mr. King. I sent a letter to the
State Bar. I think it was probably addressed to Mr. Clark, but I'm not positive. Q So I'm
sorry for that, your Honor. I do recall you saying you sent a letter now. Did you ever speak
with Bar counsel Patrick King with regard to me? A The only time I recall speaking to
him was a few weeks ago or a few days -- probably a few weeks ago when he asked me
if I would be able to testify at this hearing.
Where King only constructively noticed Coughlin of Judge Beesley's anticipated
testimony one judicial day before the formal hearing, its hard to decide which is more
troublesome: that King may have failed to so notice Coughlin via supplement to his SCR
105(2)(c) Designation of Witnesses, Summary of Evidence for a few weeks or that
King's witness Beesley can not seem to remember whom he addressed his letter to at the
SBN, not even one specific with respect to any of the cases or filings by Coughlin or court
appearances to which he testified to having such strong feelings about (sufficient to take
Rule 2.15 action, even, perhaps), or whether it was a few weeks ago or a few days that
Judge Beesley spoke to King and King asked Beesley if he would be able to testify at this
hearing. And Judge Beesley became concerned that Coughlin was suffering from
alcohol or drug abuse or had some sort of mental issues? HEARING - Vol. I, (Page
11:7 to 11:10).

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The SBN violated SCR 123(3) by contacting Coughlin's then client, a former
WCSO Deputy named Peter Eastman (CV11-00820, whom has some Canon 2, Rule 2.15,
RPC 8.3 things to say about RJC Judge Sferrazza that LCL's Coe Swobe ought be made
aware of, and whom alleged to Coughlin that his friends in the courthouse informed him
that Judge Sferrazza is out to get you, which makes troubling Judge Sferrazzas quashing
Coughlin's subpoenas on 11/19/12 based upon some non-existent requirement in Nevada
law to pay witness fees in criminal misdemeanor trials (never mind the fact that Sferrazza
clearly waived any such imaginary requirement anyway during the 10/22/12 hearing:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ajOqx4xFCK4 at the 49:40 mark Judge Sferrazza rules:
I am allowing you to subpoena them without advancing the fees, I may at a later point
order that you pay those fees, but in the meantime, I will allow you to subpoena witnesses
without advancing those fees...at a later point in time I will determine your financial
ability to pay witness fees Further, at the 52:10 mark Judge Sferrazza denies Coughlin's
motion to be provided the sealed portions of the record in that matter which bare on the
Marsden and Stankewitz issues that Coughlin was required to argue and preserve prior to
any appeal...also, at the 11:25 a.m., WCPD Jim Leslie contradicts his own statements on
the record on 8/29/12 (where he indicated that in misdemeanors, Coughlin must make his
ineffective assistance of counsel claims and preserve them in the trial court.)
Particularly troubling in RCR2011-063341 and revealing the extent to which Judge
Sferrazza's bias has impermissibly tainted the entirety of this disciplinary matter (given his
presiding over the initial summary eviction in Rev2011-001708 involving Hill and the
intial arrest of 8/20/11 in RCR2011-063341, and his rejection of the plea deal Coughlin
and the WCDA's Office voluntarily agreed to at the 8/27/12 hearing therein) is illustrated
by the following vis a vis his failing to hold subpoened witness Nicole Watson in
contempt and failing to grant a continuance upon her failure to appear at the 11/19/12 trial,
in addition to the flagrantly inconsistent rulings by Sferrazza where teh WCDA is
permitted to put forward all the hearsay it pleases when it comes to explaining why the
officer took the steps he did next, while, in the following excerpt, Judge Sferrazza can
hardly imagine how the fact that Nicole Watson was captured on tape admitting that a still
unidentified man picked up a phone off the concrete ground next to the Truckee River in a
skate plaza and announced to those dispersed throughout the plaza that he would throw the
phone in the river if someone did not claim it immediately:
MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir, Your Honor. I'll call Mr. Nathaniel Zarate.
THE COURT: Okay. Come up and be sworn and then if you'll spell your first
and last name for the record. I believe you testified before. So, Mr. Young
will have the right to object if it's something which has already been testified
to before. Raise your right hand. (The witness was sworn.) THE COURT:
Would you state and we spell your first and last names. THE WITNESS:
Nathaniel Zarate, N-A-T-H-A-N-I-E-L. Last name Zarate, Z-A-R-A-T-E.
THE COURT: All right. Go ahead, Mr. Coughlin. MR. COUGHLIN: Yes,
sir, Your Honor. NATHANIEL ZARATE, called as a witness, having been
first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows: DIRECT
EXAMINATION BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Good afternoon, Mr. Zarate.
Thank you for being here today, sir. I am going to ask you, do you recall on
the night in question, August 20th, 2011, someone you 197 might have
referred to earlier as the man with the six pack holding the iPhone while
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offering it up to people in the park? MR. YOUNG: Your Honor, objection.

Hearsay. It's the truest definition of hearsay as I objected to already.
MR. COUGHLIN: Your Honor, if I could quickly offer a counter to that.
THE COURT: Well, you can just ask him the question if recalls some -- you
said that you testified to earlier. You asked him to recite testimony from a
prior proceeding. You can ask him the question, if he saw someone hold up
the phone. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Did you see -- did someone hold up a
phone that night? A Yes. Q He offered up to the people in the park? MR.
YOUNG: Your Honor, again, I object to that, hearsay. THE COURT: I'm
going to overrule that because it was asked before and answered by this
witness I believe. If not, it was answered by the officer, one or the other 198
BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q You may answer that, sir. THE COURT: because I
heard that testimony and I have no way of knowing it except for that. BY
MR. COUGHLIN: Mr. Zarate, will you answer that, please. Yes. There was a
man holding up a phone. Q A Q Did the man say something to the affect that
somebody claim the phone or I'll throw it in the river? MR. YOUNG: Your
Honor, I object to that. I know for a fact that it's not been introduced into
evidence . THE COURT: MR. YOUNG: All right. And again there's no -- I
have not heard an exception to the hearsay rule provided by Mr. Coughlin, I
think it is clearly hearsay.
MR. COUGHLIN: And Your Honor, may I just offer a hearsay objection?
Exception. THE COURT: What's the hearsay exception? MR. COUGHLIN: I
would say I believe that then existing mental or emotional or physical
condition would apply as would present sense impression. THE COURT: I'm
going to overrule the objection. Go ahead. 199 BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q A Q
You may answer, sir. To which question? Did somebody hold the phone up
and (indiscernible) in the river if somebody doesn't claim (Indiscernible)? A I
don't remember that man specifically saying I'm going to throw the phone in
the river. that? Q A Q Anything like that? I don't remember him saying
anything like that. Do you recall Nicole Watson admitting to hearing MR.
YOUNG: THE COURT: Your Honor, again That is sustained. This witness
can answer what hearsay is. MR. YOUNG: THE COURT: MR. YOUNG:
Mr. Coughlin knows what hearsay is. What? Mr. Coughlin knows what
hearsay is. Throughout the entire day, he's attempted to elicit almost nothing
but hearsay. THE COURT: That's fine. But that prior question, the one that he
answered I think is an exception but this one is not and it is double hearsay on
top of that, sir. MR. COUGHLIN: Okay, Your Honor. It's not 200 offered to
proof the truth of the matter asserted. THE COURT: Well, I don't care. I've
sustained it. MR. COUGHLIN: Okay. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Do you
recall seeing me with some cameras and recording equipment about a week
after the arrest MR. YOUNG: THE COURT: Objection, relevance. What's the
relevance? MR. COUGHLIN: One, I believe it goes to the exculpatory
material and it's been said that someone -- if Mr. Zarate heard me ask that
question and heard someone admit to hearing a man say he's going to throw it
in the river THE COURT: I sustain the objection.

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MR. COUGHLIN: Okay. Can I ask Mr. Zarate to authenticate a recording

that was made with him present in which his voice is on? THE COURT: You
may. MR. YOUNG: Your Honor, I would -- if this is a video taken a week
after the incident -- THE COURT: Oh, a week after? MR. YOUNG: Which
he was just referring to, I would object to that. THE COURT: Then I sustain
the objection. If it 201 was contemporaneous with the incident, then I'll allow
it. MR. COUGHLIN: Well, it was a week after the incident and -- THE
COURT: So the objection is sustained. It's not relevant to this charge today,
sir. MR. COUGHLIN: So if the individual had percipient knowledge of the
events of the night of the arrest a week later our videotape describing the
arrest, that's not relevant for the event involved? THE COURT: The arrest is
not the issue. It's whether or not you stole the cell phone. MR. COUGHLIN:
Well, the action incident to the arrest or resulting in the arrest if they are
testifying -- not go testifying but commenting a week later on videotape
knowing they are being recorded as to what actions were involved in the
arrest, what precipitated what, that's not relevant? THE COURT: Sir, tell me
specifically you can make an offer of proof, a brief one, as to what is
allegedly on this video that deals with the arrest on the night of the incident.
MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir. And I'll just note quickly, I reviewed the tape of
the October 22nd hearing date and at the 48 minute mark of the second file on
that you note that I'll be afforded the right to waive the 202 witness fees for
subpoenas and therein I would suggest that my properly serving Nicole
Watson incident NRS 174.345
THE COURT: Well, I see that is a proper service but it's not one she has
to obey because it's by mail. So if she doesn't get it, and if she doesn't sign for
it, then it's not evidence that she was served. It may comply with the
technicality of the statute but it doesn't give me the power to order,
(Indiscernible) or to issue an warrant for her nonappearance. MR.
COUGHLIN: I do believe it provides a basis for a continuance. THE
COURT: No, sir, not unless you made a proper motion based on that.
MR. COUGHLIN: I'm making that now, sir. THE COURT: It's denied.
MR. COUGHLIN: Okay. Well, as to your prompting me to issue an offer of
proof, this recording, and I have a video of it and an audio of it swell -- might
remember Mr. Templeton (indiscernible) it will show Mr. Zarate standing
next to Ms. Watson when Ms. Watson admits to hearing the man with the 6pack holding the iPhone and threatening to throw it in the river if somebody
didn't claim it immediately. MR. YOUNG: How Mr. Coughlin does not see
that 203 as hearsay, Your Honor -- THE COURT: All right. MR.
COUGHLIN: And I think it's THE COURT: You are saying that Ms. Watson
said that on the video? MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir, with Mr. Zarate there.
Further I think it's relevant to the extent that Mr. Zarate then clearly appears
to dissuade her from further contradicting what he allegedly told the police
that night and I believe there is indicating a motive on his part to cover up the
extent to which his misstatements to the police resulted in my arrest.
THE COURT: All right. I'm going to sustain the objection. Go ahead. MR.
COUGHLIN: Your Honor, I would note for the record I do believe I
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complied with the statute with respect THE COURT: I believe you complied
except that you did not provide for the witness fee. But you indicated that I
waived it which I still haven't seen or heard. But even if I had, the evidence is
that she's no longer here. So I don't know what MR. COUGHLIN: Well, she
wasn't here today, is that-- THE COURT: No, she's no longer in this
204 .----...... community. MR. COUGHLIN: She is. I confirmed that she's a
student at McQueen High School. THE COURT: According to the testimony
earlier today, there is testimony that she's no longer. MR. COUGHLIN: Mr.
Lichty, I recall him saying he wasn't aware of -- he hadn't talked to her in a
year. THE COURT: And he also indicated that he believed that she had
moved. MR. COUGHLIN: I don't recall that. I believe he indicated to me that
no THE COURT: Okay. Let me look at the -- actually I don't have one for her
but I assume you have a certificate for her. Do you have it with you? MR.
COUGHLIN: I provided it to the Court, Your Honor. THE COURT: Well,
the one that I have did not show it. MR. COUGHLIN: Would it be all right,
Your Honor, if I reviewed THE COURT: Well, it doesn't matter right now. I
am ruling that what she would have testified to would have been hearsay and
also probably not relevant to whether or not it was a theft. I know your
argument somehow this was found property but what some third party 205
did or didn't do is not going to be at issue in this case when we finish it.
MR. COUGHLIN: So if the phone was going to be in the river but for
someone's intervention, that's not bearing on the fact whether or not,
comparing someone's walking up
THE COURT: If somebody said that, I don't know, No . 1, that they did
because it hearsay as objected to by Mr . Young. So I'm sustaining his
objection as to hearsay. But even if it wasn't hearsay, the bottom line is I
don't know, No . 1, if the person would have done that or not. I don't know
how they came into possession of the cell phone and, thirdly, you did claim
the phone from that person, according to what I heard. MR. COUGHLIN:
But if you had heard all the things from me, then you would then perhaps
reconsider allowing this excited utterance or (indiscernible). THE COURT:
No, I ruled. Okay. I'll allow you to argue it. All right. You can argue anything
you want but the bottom line is the evidence will be what I decide on and that
is not evidence that the hearsay testimony of someone who's not here and
even if they were here, it would be still be hearsay . MR. COUGHLIN: Yes,
sir, Your Honor. And if it's not going to offer to prove the matter asserted
but 206 rather to demonstrate a bias or motive on this witness' part to
shush anybody who is suggesting something that is counter to what he
told the police in which affected a wrongful arrest. THE COURT: Still
sustained. I think it's at best marginally relevant by some tangential issue
to this case which is whether or not -- and I told you this three times -whether or not you did willfully and unlawfully steal, take and carry away
the personal property of another. That's one count. The other count is
whether on or about the 20th day of August, you did willfully and unlawful
possess or withheld stolen goods. All right. You can make any argument you
want. MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir. If I could just quickly -- this isn't the right
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time -- but if he could quickly indicate, Your Honor, respectfully, I believe it

goes to the willfulness aspect of -- and the aspect of another. If something
is going to be in the river, I think, one, it arguably no -- THE COURT: You
can, you're done. I've already ruled on it twice now. MR. COUGHLIN:
Perhaps it's just my inexperience, Your Honor All right. THE COURT:
Perhaps it is. But the bottom line 207 is I have ruled and you can proceed.
MR. COUGHLIN: Granted, but isn't there a negative THE COURT: I'm not
getting through to you. MR. COUGHLIN: I'm sorry, Your Honor, but THE
COURT: I've denied -- I've sustained the objection and denied your request
for a continuance to bring in this witness. MR. COUGHLIN: the record why
-- All right. Go ahead . And I'm not able to preserve for THE COURT: You
already have preserved for the record. I think it's quite apparent. I understand
what your argument is... 208
However, Judge Sferrazza himself made a completely inconsistent ruling
while WCPD Jim Leslie was still representing Coughlin:
PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS (11_18 A.M.), (Page
123:6 to 123:24) BY MR. LESLIE: Q So the other guy picked up the
iPhone and said, "Does it belong to anybody," or words to that effect? A
Yes, sir. Q Did that guy also say something to the effect of he was going
to throw it in the river or anything like that? MR. YOUNG: Your Honor, I
object on the grounds that it's hearsay. THE COURT: On the grounds of
what? MR. YOUNG: Hearsay. MR. LESLIE: Well, your Honor -- THE
COURT: I don't think it's offered for the truth of the matter. So I'm going
to overrule the objection. BY MR. LESLIE: Q So did he say anything
along those lines? A I did not hear him say that.
Compare, also, such to Judge Sferrazza's approach during the 8/27/11
hearing on the Motion to Suppress (the entirety of which WCDA Young was
allowed to copy and paste into the trial that followed, despite his many
arguments that certain testimony and questions was permissible in that is was
only occurring within the hearing on the Motion to Supress):
PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS (11_18 A.M.), (Pages
24:23 to 26:17) A So then Mr. Coughlin was left with the other officers
who were on scene. I made contact with the victim. Q (WCDA Z. Young)
Do you recall the victim's name? A (Witness RPD Officer Nicholas Duralde)
I recall his last name. Q What was that? A Zarate. Q Okay. A I
asked him what occurred. In summary, he told me that his phone had been
taken. MR. LESLIE: Objection, hearsay. MR. YOUNG: It's not hearsay
because it goes to the effect with respect to this motion to suppress. THE
COURT: I'll overrule this objection, it's not admitted for the purposes of
the truth of the matter. MR. LESLIE: Well, your Honor, I would also object
based on relevance. We're attacking the pat-down. This is not germane to the
pat-down. This is investigation so it's not relevant. THE COURT: So you're
objecting that there was a pat-down? MR. LESLIE: We're attacking, in our
Motion to Suppress, the validity of the pat-down search. This testimony now
about his discussions with witnesses is part of his broader investigation which
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is not relevant to whether or not he was justified in patting down Mr.

Coughlin at an earlier stage. THE COURT: Well, I agree with that. So a patdown -- inaudible, if I understand this correctly. MR. LESLIE: I've stated my
objection. MR. YOUNG: Your Honor the motion to suppress also attacks the
plain field doctrine talking about this reaching into the phone. This goes
directly to that part of the motion to suppress. THE COURT: Reaching in for
the phone, I mean it wasn't part of the pat-down, wasn't it? MR. YOUNG:
Well, that's what I'm attempting to show to the court through testimony. THE
COURT: I'm going to overrule the objection because I'm not clear I
understand the facts of this case. MR. YOUNG: Sure.
Further, the State offered double hearsay successfully: PARTIAL
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS (11_18 A.M.), (Pages 28:3 to 29:10) Q
Okay. When speaking with Mr. Goble, what was it that Mr. Goble advised
you? A He advised me that his phone had been taken. A friend had seen it
be taken and pointed the person out who had the phone to him. Q All
right. A He had confronted the subject that he identified as Mr. Coughlin
and asked for his phone back. He was told by Mr. Coughlin that he didn't
have a phone. So he called the phone and when he dialed his phone number,
he saw the phone screen -- MR. LESLIE: I again object on hearsay. THE
COURT: It's overruled again. MR. LESLIE: I won't keep doing it every
time, but I just want to be clear. THE COURT: I think it goes to the
officer's P C possibly for the arrest or whatever happened. MR. YOUNG:
Yes, sir. MR. LESLIE: Why don't I state it this way, may I have a
continuing objection in the Motion to Suppress to the officer testifying to
what witnesses told him? MR. YOUNG: That's fine. THE COURT:
Absolutely. MR. LESLIE: Thank you, your Honor, then I don't have to
interrupt every time. THE COURT: Maybe at some point, the objection
would be sustained so that's my only concern but at this point, I'm going to
overrule the objection because I don't believe it's offered for the truth of the
testimony.
However, when WCDA Young wants witness Zarate to testify as to what
the still unidentified man whom picked up the phone off the concrete ground
said in a loud voice heard throughout the skate plaze, its not hearsay?:
PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS (11_18 A.M.), (Pages
101:13 to 102:2) Q (WCDA Young) So what happened? A (Witness
Zarate) From then, I see one man. I don't know who this man was. He was
carrying a sixpack of beer. He walked up to my friend's hat, Cory Goble's hat.
He saw that and he waved it around and said, "Oh, is this anybody's," because
I assume that he was going to claim it for himself. Then we saw Cory -- my
friends and I saw Cory, wearing that hat. So we said, "Oh yes, that's Cory's
hat." Then he saw the phone with what -- we got the hat back and then we
saw the phone on the ground or he saw the phone on the ground, and he was
doing the same thing waving it around to see if anyone was going to claim
it.
Further, WCDA Z. Young suborned witness Nathaniel K. Zarate's
perjury where he proffered the following testimony despite Coughlin
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providing a video taped admission by Zarate that such was not true, and that
he did not personally eye witness Coughlin receive such phone from the
unidentified man:
PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS (11_18 A.M.), (Pages
102:12 to 103:15) Q Okay. Go ahead. A From then, I saw -- that's when
Mr. Coughlin approached the man with the phone. The man with the sixpack, he said, "Oh, is this anybody's phone," and that's when the person who
was trying to take the hat and claim the hat -- Q And just to be clear, do
you see the first man in the courtroom today? A No. He's not here. Q
Okay. Do you know who that guy is? A No. Q Okay. You were saying?
A From then, I witnessed Mr. Coughlin look at the phone and then since
the first man gave the hat back to us, I assumed he was asking if it was his
phone and then Mr. Coughlin claimed it was his phone. I saw him take it
from him and then Mr. Coughlin was on his bike. Then we weren't sure
whose phone it was, at the time. So we called my other friend to see if it was
his phone, but he answered his phone so we weren't sure whose phone it was
at first. Then we -- since the phone was right next to Cory's hat, we went up
and asked Cory if that might have been his phone and that's when we started
to put two and two together.
In the investigatory video and audio recordings taken by Coughlin, which
he declares under penalty of perjury he has not altered in any way, Robert
Dawson and Nate Zarate admit that they believe the "man with the six-pack"
gave Coughlin the phone based upon the circumstantial evidence that they
personally eye-witnessed Coughlin go up to the man with the six-pack shortly
after he held it aloft, offered it up, and after the man threatened to throw it in
the river if someone did not claim it immediately (Nicole Watson admits
hearing the "man with the six- (page 3 of 293 of Coughlin's 10/18/12 and
11/15/12 Motion for Mistrial in 63341) pack" say this, whereupon, in
VIDEO0099, Zarate is seen and heard attempting to dissuade her from saying
anything further with regard to the material facts as she witnessed them,
particularly where they depart from the version Zarate has provided to the
RPD and or in his witness statement). Dawson and Zarate both admit in the
videos taken by Coughlin that they did not personally eyewitness the man
with the six-pack give Coughlin the phone, but rather made that inference
upon questioning that man and determining that he no longer had the phone
after Coughlin finished interacting with him. Zarate states something in
VIDEO0099 to the effect that he knew Coughlin had the phone because the
man with the six-pack no longer had the phone upon their questioning him.
However, in his trial testimony Zarate indicates, in response to a direct
question from Judge Sferrazza, that he did, in fact, "personally eye-witness"
Coughlin be given the phone by the man
In one of the subsequent investigatory videos that Coughlin filmed Nicole
Watson blurts out in response to one of Coughlin's questions that yes, she did
in fact here the man who picked up the phone threatened to throw the phone
in the River if someone did not claim it immediately. At that point in the
video filled by Coughlin Zarate can be seen attempting to quiet Nicole
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Watson down and then later pulling her aside and seemingly dissuading her
from testifying or submitting further to an interview with Coughlin. It is clear
that Zarate sought to obstruct justice (in the videos Coughlin filmed and
provided to both the WCPD and WCDA's Offices, including "VIDEO0099"
(length: 5:15) (and Zarates's sworn testimony at trial is contradicted by 184/293 - MOTION FOR MISTRIAL AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW
statements of the form and 26 second mark video 0099 wherein rather than
asserting that he personally eye witnessed Coughlin received the phone from
"the man with the six-pack", but instead Zarate indicated that he saw the man
hold the phone aloft and heard him offer it up and then Zarate stated on that
investigatory video Coughlin filmed upon his release from jail: at 4:05 mark
of "VIDEO0099 watson we saw you take a phone from a man" (length:
5:15)
Also, WCDA Z. Young suborned the perjury of RPD Officer Nicholas
Duralde with respect to his fraudulent assertion that his receipt of a report
from dispatch of a possible fight was factored into this reasonable suspicion
and probable cause analysis:
(from the Motion for Mistrial Coughlin served on the WCDA's Office and
submitted for filing on 10/18/12 (well in advance of the 11/19/12 trial date, at
which Coughlin was not permitted to cross-examine arresting Officer
Duralde) and where, by 10/18/12, Coughlin had still not been provided the
ECOMM recordings of verbal communications between the RPD and
ECOMM's dispatchers (one of whom is the arresting officer's wife, Jessica
Duralde, where the RPD Detective wrongfully arresting an overcharging
Coughlin on 3/8/13 (SBN's fraudulent TPO/EPO violation allegations) ,
Detective Yturbide, also has an ECOMM dispatcher wife, Jodi Ytrubide), and
where the disc finally provided by RCA Skau following the ridiculously
scheduled, fraudulently noticed 11/13/12 Emergency Hearing still failed to
included all the 911 calls/ and communications between RPD and ECOMM
required by both Coughlin's subpoena and his public records request (ie, such
hearing was scheduled the day before Coughlin's 11/14/12 formal disciplinary
hearing...we get it Sferrazza, you really hate Coughlin, are really pulling out
every last stop you can to torpedo not only the summary eviction from his
former home law office, but also convict on both counts in the iphone petty
larceny/receiving stolen property case, on top of severely prejudicing his
defense in the formal disciplinary matter which you purposefully schedule a
trail in 63341 as close to as possible and permitted two emergency hearings
immediately before (11/8/12 and 11/13/12) wherein you quashed all of
Coughlin's subpoenas, some might say) on various Motions to Quash
Coughlin's subpoenas (which Skau fraudulently asserted to Coughlin he had
been given authority to serve Coughlin notice thereof via email)
(What follows is DDA Young's barrage of attempts to mislead the court,
and, basically lie...as Young continually tries to get across that the first
dispatch report was about "a possible fight", rather than a "CK FOR LARC
OF ACELL PHONE JUST", on multiple occassions. 1:55:45 pm state of a
few questions Your Honor Mr. Leslie asked you or do you recall Mr. Leslie
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asking you that once dispatch advised of am update that it was a potential
larceny he asked something along the lines of...would that alleviate any
concern for threats or violence ...weapons... And I know I am misstating his
exact words but it was something along those lines you recall the question?
(There Young misleads the Court and shows a lack of candor, again, to the
tribunal in suggesting, based upon some imaginary "possible fight" dispatch
report, that there was, therefore, some fear of threats or violence that such an
update, downgrading the situation to a a mere larceny, would necessarily
"alleviate". Duralde yes state and are called by written your response was
could be Duralde I don't recall the exact response but many times we put
information from dispatch that inaccurate or mixed as police officers we have
to keep our guard up for whatever might be there when we arrived for safety
1:56:47 pm state and in this case the larceny was additional information that
you receiving from the first report Duralde yes - 185/293 - MOTION FOR
MISTRIAL AND MEMORANDUM OF LAW (Actually....there he goes
again...Young and Duralde continue attempting to purport that the report of a
larceny was not the first part of the first report, period...but rather some
"additional information" in some, necessarily, subsequent update. (Curiously,
Duralde's narrative and his November 28, 2011 narrative does not mention
this alleged initial report by dispatch the State so perseverates on in fact that
narrative begins thusly: "On August 20, 2011 at approximately 2327 hours I
was dispatched along with Reno PD Officer R. ROSA to the plaza at on a
report of a larceny of a cell phone at that location. Dispatch relayed
information that the victim had set his phone down and that he was now
calling the phone and it was lighting up in the suspect's pocket. The suspect
was described as a white male adult, 35 years of age, 6'02", 210 Ibs, wearing
a red Chicago hat and a white or yellow shirt and plaid shorts. Dispatch also
relayed that the suspect was still on scene" And, in fact, the dispatch logs do
not reveal any notation of "a possible fight". Actually, this "possible fight"
garbage seems more and more to be professional misconduct on DDA Young
and Duralde's part, as there is no indication in any of the contemporaneous
records or statements by Duralde that he was under the impression there was
any "possible fight", though both Duralde and Young have misled the Court
in that regard, and, not surprisingly, who else, Leslie has joined in on the act,
mentioning a "possible fight" several times, despite the record, as far as what
Officer Duradle was made aware of upon arriving on scene then immediately
handcuffing Coughlin shortly after Coughlin broached the topic of
constitutional rights. Further, DDA Young continually refers to the dispatch
report of "a larceny" being "additional information" or an "update from the
first report", when, in fact, the first report's first message is "CK FOR LARC
OF CELL PHONE"...so again DDY Young and Duralde are playin' fast and
loose with the facts. Rather, the first entry at 11:23:36 pm indicates:
"TEXT:ICE RINK AREA - CK FOR LARC OF CELL PHONE JUST SUSP OS - LOUD VERBAL DISTR". Sure, a "loud verbal distrubance"...but,
all this about "possible fight" appears to be nothing more than DDA Young's
creation in an attempt to shore up an exigency/safety analysis for his pat
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down rationale. That is sanctionable conduct. Further, the next update in the
dispatch log, from 11:25:20 pm still fails to mention any "possible fight", but
rather reads: "STILL LOUD DISTR - RP LEFT HIS CELL PHONE ON
POST AND CALLED THE CELL PHONE AND ITS LIGHTING UP IN
SUSPS POCKET.". YOung and Duralde really need to explain their attempts
to mislead the Court and lack of candor to the tribunal to the extent that they
purported the phrase possible five to be up bit of information included in the
dispatch communications rather than their interpretation of of something that
may be incident to a loud disturbance where dispatch only reports a loud
disturbance particularly one of a "VERBAL" variety. 11:25:47 pm marks the
time of another dispatch text (apparently sent to the officer's in their vehicles,
not that Leslie would ask anything like that): "SUPP TEXT:RP WAS
SCREAMING AT SUSP AND LINE DISCONNECTED." The fact that the
dispatcher described the call as"RP (reporting party, ie, Goble) SCREAMING
AT SUSP" is telling and would strongly suggest that Duralde would have had
more reason to pat down Goble or his compatriates than Coughlin, and it is
possible Goble was in his vehicle or otherwise aware of this dispatch report
(Leslie failed to ask any questions about how and when these officers were
apprised of information by dispatch, including whether they were so even
after arriving on the scene, but the video Coughlin took of the arrest clearly
contains the sounds of dispatch radios, though, curiously, the smart phone in
Coughlin's right front shorts pocket displays no "sound of the iPhone
vibrating" such as what Duralde and DDA Young pin most of the "probable
cause" in their case on. Lastly, there is strong evidence to suggest Duralde
never received the information from dispatch (prior to arriving on the scene
and conducting the pat down, cursory "investigation" and arrest of Coughlin)
that was contained in the dispatch text from 11:27:11 pm: TEXT:RP (Goble)
CALLING BACK ON 911 ADV'ING SOMEONE JUST HIT A "MINOR" RP (reporting party) JUST SAID "THERE IS A COP THERE WAIVE HIM
DOWN". Duralde appears on the sidewalk near the Center Street Bridge in
the video Couglin took of the arrest at approximately 11:27:55 pm, and, that,
in combination with an utter paucity of mentions by the State or Duralde
respecting the "socked a minor" ruse, indicates Duralde was not even privy to
any dispatch information in that regard, and, of course, if it was, in fact
Duralde (who testified he was "first to arrive on the scene" (and, as is
customary, took the lead on the investigation), the bit in the dispatch log that
"RP JUST SAID "THERE IS A COPY THERE WAIVE HIM DOWN" is
likely referring to Duralde. Further, Duralde's laconic, relaxed tone and
approach upon arriving on scene further belies the lack of sincerity in the
State's "possible fight" message, which, it seems clear, dispatch never made
(not that the DA, the RPD, or Emergency Dispatch Services has supplied any
tapes thereof, contrary to Goodnights duly made request therefor.

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NNDB Panel Chair Echeverria is the only Panel member to sign his 12/14/12
FOFCOL, which made the following Findings of Fact:
29. State Bar Counsel called Coughlin to testify at the hearing of the matter.
Coughlin was questioned with regard to a letter dated February 14, 2012 from Assistant
Bar Counsel King to Coughlin in which Bar Counsel forwarded to Coughlin
correspondence received from Richard G. Hill. See Transcript of Hearing Wednesday,
November 14, 2012, P 163, L 13 -P 164, L 23. See Hearing Exhibit 6. Coughlin's
response, dated March 9, 2012, asked for additional time in which to respond. See Hearing
Exhibit 7. No evidence was presented that Coughlin substantively responded to Bar
Counsel's letter of February 14, 2012 prior to the filing of the Complaint in this matter.
Coughlin failed to directly respond to Bar Counsel's questions inquiring if Coughlin ever
subsequently responded to Bar Counsel's letter of February 14, 2012. See Wednesday,
November 14, 2012, P 169, L 13 -P 172, L 16.
30.
Coughlin also failed to directly respond to questioning regarding whether
or not he had substantively responded, prior to the filing of the Complaint in this matter, to
a letter forwarded to him from Bar Counsel regarding the letter received by the Nevada
State Bar from Judge Dorothy Nash Holmes and dated March 14, 2012. See Transcript of
Hearing Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 174, L 13 -P 180, L 4. See Hearing Exhibit 8.
31.
On March 7, 2012 Coughlin caused to be filed an "Affidavit of Poverty in
Support of Motion to Proceed Informa Pauperis." See Hearing Exhibit 9. In his Affidavit,
Coughlin represented that he was self-employed as a "Jack of all Trades." See Hearing
Exhibit 9. The Affidavit does not identify Mr. Coughlin as a lawyer or identity any income
from the practice of law. See Hearing Exhibit 9.
32. The record also indicates that Coughlin had also filed a motion on November
14, 2011 to proceed In Forma Pauperis in case number 11CR 22176 pending in the Reno
Municipal Court before Judge Kenneth R. Howard. See Hearing Exhibit 10. Judge
Howard's Order denying Coughlin's motion specifically noted that Coughlin's "affidavit of
poverty" did not identify any income from the practice of law yet Coughlin had implied to
the court when sentenced to incarceration for contempt that his incarceration would
adversely affect his clients. See Hearing Exhibit 10, P 2, L 19 -23.
Chair Echeverria's FOFCOL then made the following Conclusions of Law:
Competence
(H) RPC 1.1 states "A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client.
Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation."
(I) The record clearly and convincingly establishes that Coughlin lacks the
competency to represent clients, including himself.
(J) First, the record demonstrates severe criticism by the trial court in the handling
of the Joshi matter, including Coughlin's lack of understanding of a balance sheet, his
failure to conduct discovery, his lack of knowledge of the rules of evidence and trial
procedure. Supra' 25
(K) Second, Judge Beesley testified that the pleadings filed by Coughlin on behalf
of his client in a bankruptcy case were "lengthy, didn't make any sense, and just sort of
rambled through a great deal of irrelevant stuff." Judge Beesley also testified that
Coughlin's pleadings and arguments on behalf of his client "didn't make any sense." Supra
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' 16 Judge Beesley became concerned enough about Coughlin's competency as a lawyer
that he contacted the State Bar. Supra' 17
(L) Third, Judge Nash Holmes questioned Coughlin's competency as a lawyer and
in her Order finding Coughlin in Contempt of Court noted that Coughlin disregarded the
rules of evidence, continually imposed improper questions, failed to properly examine
witnesses, repeatedly asked the question, misstated answers, injected irrelevant material,
argued with witnesses and mischaracterized testimony. Supra' 7
(M) Fourth, Judge Nash Holmes found that Coughlin's pleadings failed to address
topics listed 'in the caption, contained rambling references to Coughlin's personal life and
other irrelevant material, were overly lengthy, disjointed and incoherent. Supra' 9 & 10
(N) Fifth, the State Bar called two judges and two practicing attorneys (Elcano is
not listed as an "active attorney" at www.nvbar.org, nor has he been for over 5 years), each
with significant experience with Coughlin and each of whom rendered an expert opinion
regarding Coughlin's competency as a lawyer. Judge Beesley testified that in his opinion,
Coughlin was not competent to practice law. Supra 18. Judge Nash Holmes testified that
in her opinion, Coughlin violated numerous Rules of Professional Conduct including his
lack of competency to practice law. Supra 15. Attorney Richard Hill also testified that in
his opinion Coughlin is not competent to practice law. Supra 22 Attorney Paul Elcano,
who once supervised Coughlin as a lawyer and ultimately terminated him from Washoe
Legal Services, also testified that, in his opinion, Coughlin is not competent to practice
law. Supra 28
(O) Sixth, the record establishes that Coughlin offered no expert opinion or evidence as
to his competency.
Diligence
(P) RPC 1.2 states "A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness
in representing a client." The record is less clear as to whether or not Coughlin violated
RPC 1.2 on more than on occasion.
(R) Judge Howard, in the Joshi case, certainly found that Coughlin failed to
conduct discovery on behalf of his client in that matter. Supra 25
(S) The record and Pleading Docket in this case establish that Coughlin failed to
provide a verified responsive pleading even in the defense of his own disciplinary
action. Supra 38
(T) The record and Pleading Docket in this case establish that Coughlin habitually
files numerous, untimely and repetitive motions...
Meritorious Claims and Contentions
(U) RPC 3.1 in pertinent part states "A lawyer shall not bring or defend a
proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis in .law and fact
for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension,
modification or reversal of existing law."
(V) The record clearly and convincingly establishes that Coughlin continuously
and repetitively files irrelevant pleadings. pleadings unrelated to the issue at hand and
continuously and repetitively injects irrelevant matters into proceedings.
(W) Judge Nash Holmes found, for example, that Coughlin repeatedly injected
allegations of bribery, perjury and police retaliation in a simple traffic case involving the
failure to stop at a stop sign. Supra 7 She also found that Coughlin repeatedly injected
attorney Richard Hill into questions and statements when Mr. Hill was in no way involved
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in the traffic citation trial. Supra 7 She also found that pleadings filed subsequent to
Coughlin's incarceration were lengthy (more than 200 pages) contained scant discussion
of, or relevance to, the matter and contained irrelevant discussion of facts unrelated to the
proceedings at hand. Supra. 10
(X) The record establishes that in the Merliss eviction action, Coughlin's conduct
was so vexatious and frivolous as to result in substantial sanction of attorney's fees. Supra
21 See Hearing Exhibit 2, P 2, L 8 -13; P3, L 4 -11.
(Y) The Pleading Docket in this matter establishes also that Coughlin's filings,
even in his own defense of the disciplinary matter, inject lengthy, irrelevant facts and legal
issues into this proceeding...
Candor to the Tribunal
(Z) RPC 3.3(a)(1) states "A lawyer shall not knowingly: (m)ake a false statement
of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement .of material fact or law
previously made to the tribunal by the lawyer."
(AA) The record clearly and convincingly establishes that Coughlin violated RPC
3.3(a)(l) when he lied to Judge Nash Holmes as to whether or not he was surreptitiously
and without permission to record the proceeding. Supra 7 Of note, Coughlin did not
deny that he had lied to Judge Nash Holmes. Instead, his cross examination of Judge Nash
Holmes focused on how she had learned of the true facts. See Transcript of Hearing
Wednesday, November 14, 2012, P 139, L
(BB) Attorney Richard Hill testified that based on his experience in litigating with
Coughlin, Coughlin was not truthful with either counsel or the Court. Supra Paragraph 23.
(CC) The record also establishes that Coughlin was less than candid with the Court
in two separate applications to proceed in forma pauperis, when he failed to disclose his
true occupation as an attorney and instead indicated he was self-employed as a "Jack of all
Trades" failed to identify any income from the practice of law after having represented to
the court that his incarceration would adversely affect his clients. Supra 31 & 32...

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Chair Echeverria insisted upon finishing the hearing in one day's time, no matter
what, not even if the Reno Justice Court failed to comply with Coughlin's subpoena, which
former RJC Chief Civil Clerk Karen Stancil on 8/2/13, finally indicated to Coughlin at
her new position as a filing counter clerk at the Sparks Justice Court, that RJC Judge
Clifton had instructed her not to respond to Coughlin's SCR 110 subpoena (some might
say those who are not big enough team players get shipped to the Sparks Justice Court, to
be replaced by those whom are. Christine Erickson is the new Chief Civil Clerk at Reno
Justice Court). On that note Coughlin was unable to move to quash the subpoena on
Judge Beesley that Pat King never filed or notified Coughlin of in any way (Coughlin
managed to spy a copy of the waiver of service that Judge Beesley faxed to the SBN only
over the lunch during Coughln's 11/14/12 formal disciplinary hearing, where such was
discarded in a far corner of the room for no apparent reason). Pat King, of course, was
able to get his 11/2/12 Emergency Ex Parte Motion to Quash Coughlin's Subpoenas
granted, however, in the Chair's 11/7/12 Order.)
Coughlin was not permitted to call Judge Beesley as a witness in his case in chief
because Judge Beesley's schedule did not permit for such a level of due process be
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afforded to Coughlin where he was only available, by telephone (which made it fairly
difficult to refresh his memory with anything like, say, handing him or otherwise
providing him with any of the filings by Coughlin that Judge Beesley had the vaguest of
recollections of, including Coughlin's filing of 3/30/12 filing in Cadle Co. v. Keller (NVB
10-05104) wherein Coughlin detailed the extensive prejudice to both his client's John
Gessin (NVB 11-05077, 11-05078, and that 3/19/12 Opposition by Coughlin does not
seem too bad viewed through the prism of circumstance yielded through knowing about
the 2/27/12 summary contempt incarceration (no stay of any sort for a practicing attorney,
said Judge Nash Holmes...strange that Coughlin's subsequent 3/7/12 Motion to Proceed In
Forma Pauperis and Affidavit In Support Thereof would be offered (well, pages 2 and 3 of
that three page filing...after all, page 1 thereof did clearly identify Coughlin as an attorney,
with Esq. after his name, and his Nevada Bar number above the caption)to support an
allegation that Coughlin committed professional misconduct by filing an Affidavit in
Support of his Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis that failed to disclose that he was an
attorney (Coughlin's pleading for a stay on 2/27/12 to Judge Nash Holmes and arguing that
the failure to grant a stay of any sort would necessarily prejudice his client's cases, like
those before NVB Judge Beesley, of Gessin and Keller would sort of disclose the fact that
Coughlin was a practicing attorney and kind of undermine such allegation in King's
8/23/12 Complaint, no? King's Complaint alleged) and allegation and Robert Keller
stemming from RMC Judge Nash Holme's having Coughlin's smartphone, cell phone,
micro sd card, and electric shaver, taken out of Coughlin's personal property, into which it
was booked on 2/27/12 at 5:15 p.m., and given to the Reno Municipal Court Marshals
(whom should have been held in contempt for failing to respond to the subpoena that
Coughlin's mother served on them on 11/6/12, but NNDB Chairman Susich could not be
bothered with complying with SCR 111(3)-(4), so.... just like Judge Nash Holmes failed to
abide by NRS 22.030(2)-(3) in failing to follow the requirement that any alleged
contemptuous conduct not occurring within the "immediate view and presence" of the
court be supported by an sworn affidavit under NRS 22.030(2) (Judge Nash Holmes also
struck Coughlin's request for audio of the 2/27/12 hearing from the record, as well as his
notice of appeal.
Further, the SBN attempted to (and succeeded) in have Coughlin convicted of
professional misconduct incident to an allegation that he failed to disclose that he was an
attorney in his 3/7/12 Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Affidavit (Declaration
works under Buckwalter, but since so many judges choose to violated NCJC Canon 1,
Rule 1.1, and strike such filings by indigents when they cannot afford a notary's signature,
Coughlin as forced to utilize an older in forma pauperis affidavit). Preposterously
fraudulent was the SBN's King's admitting as an exhibit only a portion of Judge Nash
Holmes' reprehensible 3/13/12 Order wherein she struck from the record such Motion to
Proceed In Forma Pauperis and Affidavit in Support Thereof (which sought to waive the
$35 fee Coughlin's mother ultimately had to pay in sneakily seeking a copy of such
proceeding (which is a part of the public record) from the RMC after the RMC repeatedly
refused to provide such to Coughlin, even where he attempted to pay for it, and the SBN
refused to provide such to Coughlin until 6/27/12, some three and a half months after the
SBN initially indicated it would provide such to Coughlin (which makes the SBN's
allegation that Coughlin failed to respond to some alleged letter to Coughlin from the
SBN seeking a response to "grievances" from Judges Nash Holmes, and, apparently,
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some unnamed other (the SBN, due to its own fraudulent approach, was unable to admit
into evidence the purported 3/16/12 letter it wrote to Coughlin wherein King allegedly
requested a response (though such lacks any within ten days language like that in
FHE 7;, and where King put on no argument that Coughlin violated RPC 8.1 with respect
to any grievance other then Hill's (which King failed to put into evidence, completely
undermining his attempt to establish such by clear and convincing evidence) with the
dicey terrain King found himself on upon Coughlin exposing King's fraudulent attempt to
avoid the strong defensive collateral estoppel arguments provided to Coughlin by Judge L.
Gardner deciding not to take any Canon 2, Rule 2.15 appropriate action by contacting an
appropriate authority like the SBN (see the former Canon 3(D)(2)) by initially indicating
that the SBN had received a grievance from Judge L. Gardner, when, in fact, the SBN was
forced to admit (along with Judge Nash Holme) that Nash Holmes herself included FHE3,
Judge L. Gardner's ancient three year old FHE3 (which King knew or should have known
from the materials Coughlin provided him had been vacated by virtue of the superseding
final Decree of Divorce, especially given the attendant Proposed Decree and alteration by
Judge L. Gardner to the very sections therein involving subject matter originally purported
to support some such sanction)...
HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 154:3 to 154:25) BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Did you
or anyone with the Reno Municipal Court transmit or otherwise deliver Judge Linda
Gardner's order for sanctions to the State Bar of Nevada? A (JUDGE NASH
HOLMES) I'm sorry. I didn't hear all that. Did I what? You'll have to repeat the question.
Q Did you or anybody with your court, the Reno Municipal Court, transmit or
otherwise deliver Judge Linda Gardner's April 2009 order sanctioning me to the State
Bar of Nevada? A I'm sorry. Deliver to whom? MR. ECHEVERRIA: The State Bar,
Judge. THE WITNESS: Oh. After -- let me explain quickly. My trial was my first
experience in exposure to Mr. Coughlin. After everything happened, and I held him in
contempt, then Judge Gardner told me that his sister, Judge Gardner, has a life
experience with Mr. Coughlin, and he provided me a copy of her opinion from a couple
years earlier. And that may have been in the package I forwarded to the court.
HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 155:4 to 157:2) MR. COUGHLIN: Can I ask one
more question about the pending -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin -- MR.
COUGHLIN: -- competency evaluation or -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin. MR.
COUGHLIN: -- with the trial? It's a good question. MR. ECHEVERRIA: It's an
interruptive question, and it's improper conduct. MR. COUGHLIN: You're not going to
let her (NOTE: her being RMC Judge Nash Holmes) answer that, huh? You are not
going to make her answer that? ... MR. COUGHLIN: She held a trial with a pending
competency evaluation in violation of law. ... I just got it on the record. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Thank you, Judge. We appreciate you taking your time into the lunch
hour. THE WITNESS: Thank you. I'll hang up now. MR. KING: Thank you, Judge. ...
MR. COUGHLIN: I'd like to call Judge Nash Holmes in my case in chief and ask her
why she persists in holding trial if she was aware of a pending competency order. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: You had the opportunity to ask her those questions. MR. COUGHLIN:
No, I didn't. You just refused it to me. MR. ECHEVERRIA: No, I gave you -- MR.
COUGHLIN: You did another basis for an impartiality finding. ... You're not letting
me ask any question that would tend to implicate impropriety on the part of a judge.

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MR. ECHEVERRIA: You can characterize the rulings as you wish. I have made the
rulings.
HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 83:19 to 84:16) MR. ECHEVERRIA: Do you intend to
call him on direct in your case in chief? MR. COUGHLIN: I might. MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Mr. Hill, would you mind being on telephone standby? And, Mr. Coughlin, if you intend
to call him, I want a half-hour notice. THE WITNESS: That will be today? MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Yes. Are you available this afternoon? THE WITNESS: I will cancel
whatever I have to make myself available for the panel. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Thank you.
THE WITNESS: Do you want me to come back out here or do you want me to be
available telephonically? MR. ECHEVERRIA: I just want you to be available by a phone
call, because I'm not sure Mr. Coughlin has committed that he, in fact, will call you this
afternoon. But he's asked us not to release you from the subpoena. I'm asking Mr.
Coughlin to give us at least a half-hour notice if you intend to call Mr. Hill in your
case.
However, despite Chair Echeverria's indication that if Coughlin provided a halfhour notice of his intent to call back witnesses (with, for some reason, Judge Beesley's
busy schedule making him off limits), Coughlin was not permitted to call witnesses such
as Elcano, Nash Holmes, and Hill back for a direct examination during his case in chief
(allegedly lengthy objections therein did not result in Coughlin being given more time,
in contrast to the approach Chair Echeverria took during King's presentation of his case in
chief: HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 54:18 to 54:22) MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, I'm
going to afford you extra time also for cross-examination. Part of it, the length of the
direct, was due to lengthy objections, and I have to take that into consideration. So please
proceed, and I will give you additional time.
Such giving additional time to King for his direct examination of Hill proved
unduly prejudicial to Coughlin's case where so much of what the Panel cites to as
supportive of the various findings and or conclusions respecting the alleged misconduct
issued from such direct examination of Hill after the passing of the fifteen minutes per
witness dictated contained in Chair Echeverria's 11/7/12 Order (never mind that such
Order also required both sides to make offers of proof for all they sought to introduce
into evidence where King was never once grilled for an offer of proof and nearly
everything Coughlin sought to introduce was put through the offer of proof parallel
universe in which Chair Echeverria likely believes he is somehow a just and honorable
human, which, clearly, he is not)
HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 83:7 to 83:17) MR. ECHEVERRIA: As soon as we
release Mr. Hill, we'll take a break. MR. COUGHLIN: And I can't call him on direct?
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Pardon me? MR. COUGHLIN: I can't call him -- do I have
direct? Do I have a case in chief? MR. ECHEVERRIA: Sure. MR. COUGHLIN: So
he's not released from the subpoena. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Do you not want him
released? MR. COUGHLIN: No
HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 236:1 to 236:5) MR. COUGHLIN: I would like to
give you the 30-minute notice that I would like to cross-examine Judge Nash Holmes and
Richard Hill or call them in my case in chief, rather. I'll do that now. I note that I have a
time of 2:55.
And with respect to the audio transcripts for the petty larceny trial incident to
60838 (from which the FHE11 11/30/11 Order Punishing Summary Contempt also stems),
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and both the 2/28/12 and 3/12/12 audio trancripts of the hearings from which FHE4,5 are
drawn: HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 224:21 to 224:25) MR. COUGHLIN: Can I call Pat
King and say, Pat, were you provided these copies of the audio? Everything is a copy,
okay, it's not -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: What's the offer of proof? What are you intending
to prove?
However, given the 2/28/12 Order involves an allegation of direct or summary
contempt implicating NRS 22.030, and where such (and the most inflammatory
accusation therein, clearly, was the charge that Coughlin lied to Judge Nash Holmes
with respect to some alleged activities by Coughlin in the restroom (ie, clearly outside the
immediate view and presence of the court, and therefore NRS 22.030(2)-(3) (see
McCormack) now require Judge Nash Holmes, where Coughlin is and has objected to her
presiding over any trial of the contempt, in addition to Coughlin filing NRS 1.230 and
Canon 3(E) Motions to Disqualify Judge Nash Holmes (who will need to comply with
NRS 1.235 and answer, by affidavit, within 5 days, Coughlin's allegations as to just where
she went for an hour between starting the cases on her stacked docket at 1:30 p.m.,
clearing the courtroom of every last person and case to leave Coughlin's for last (but she
only heard about Judge W. Gardner's sister's life experience after she found Coughlin in
contempt? Right), and just what the Washoe County Public Defender's office
communicated to her or any of her functionaries in any way related to its then client
Coughlin, as to whom WCPD Biray Dogan (the one whom violated NRS 178.397 in
failing to appear at Coughlin's 2/14/12 arraignment on the gross misdemeanor misuse of
911 emergency communications referenced in King's Complaint, from which King also
drew upon Coughlin's 2/21/12 filing responsive to Dogan's misconduct (8. Respondent
was again arrested on January 13, 2012, for allegedly abusing 911 services, a gross
misdemeanor. ...9. On February 21. 2012. Respondent filed a document entitled, Notice of
Appearance Entry of Plea of Not guilty, Waiver of Arraignment, Motion to Dismiss, etc. in
one of his pending criminal matters, Case No. RCR-2012 065630 (NOTE: the only gross
misdemeanor case or charge Coughlin has faced, ever, and, therefore, the exact case
Judge Nash Holmes referenced in her 3/14/12 letter to the SBN, (FHE8 reads: It is my

understanding that Reno Justice Court also has a matter pending on this attorney.
My Judicial Assistant was contacted by the Washoe Public Defender in February
when I had Mr. Coughlin jailed for Contempt of Court and they stated that they
represent him in a Gross Misdemeanor matter in RJC. I have no other information
on that.), City of Reno v. Zachary Coughlin. The document clearly shows Respondent's
unprofessional, disruptive conduct, and lack of respect for the court and opposing
counsel.)
Judge Nash Holmes and Judge Clifton of the RJC, along with RMC Judge W.
Gardner and Judge Howard, and RJC Judges Schroeder and Sferrazza (especially
troublesome is the menacing behavior by RJC Bailiff Reyes and Sexton during the
12/20/11 Hearing on Coughlin's 11/17/11 Motion to Contest Personal Property Lien and
Judge Sferrazza's unhinged performance therein, and the unbelievably coercive setting
such courtroom took on (clearly Judge Nash Holmes has been receiving reports of the
tiresome and tireless glowering mixed with gossiping mixed with busy bodying and rights
trampling continually demonstrated by RJC Bailiff Reyes (apparently looking to score
some points and just enjoy being domineering and inappropriate) (note, SCR 229 applies
to reporters not litigants, and not to attorneys, and why are these courts and their bailiffs
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and marshals so spooked that litigants and or their attorney might be recording the
proceedings? It likely is not just motivated by wanting to get that $35 for a copy of the
disc...but more out of a desire to avoid the kind of oversight and accountability that is
inevitable in an age where vast numbers of even ordinary people walk into courtrooms
with smart phones equipped with enough technology to bring levels of Sunshine Senator
Grassley could have never imagined...and the old school brown nose bullying bailiff
approach by those like RJC Bailiff's Reyes and Sexton needs to be put out to pasture
immediately, as does the abuse of the contempt power demonstrated by Judges Sferrazza,
Nash Holmes, Howard, Elliott, etc.)
(Coughlin's 11/14/12 FORMAL DISCIPLINARY HEARING IN 62337 - Vol. I,
(Page 140:9 to 140:19) THE WITNESS: Mr. Coughlin asked for a bathroom break. I
originally said I would not give the break. And then I said that I would, but he had to leave
all his materials in the courtroom. And I said that because I suspected that he was taperecording the court proceedings without my permission, and without asking permission
first. Because he's apparently been known to do that. MR. COUGHLIN: Objection,
hearsay. Lack of foundation. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Overruled.
The 12/20/11 hearing in RJC Rev2011-001708 before Judge Sferrazza, finally
held, on Coughlin's 11/16/11 Motion to Contest Personal Property Lien, beyond being an
enormously disturbing recording, touches on many of the key issues in 62337, including
the extent to which the 10/27/11 FOFCOL lacks the within 24 hours language
presenting a jurisdictional prerequisite to such order even being valid, and displaying the
extent to which Judge Sferrazza and most of the RJC have been carrying out summary
evictions in Washoe County in a ridiculous manner that is violative of Nevada law. Even
RJC civil clerks have indicated to Coughlin in the past that these evictions are carried out
ridiculously fast. Also, Coughlin goes into the jurisdictional bar presented by NRS
40.254(2) where the summary procedures of NRS 40.253 are not available against one
using property for commercial purposes unless the non-payment of rent is alleged, which
Baker make clear, it was not (in fact, the precursor non-payment of rent case in Rev2011001049 not only provides a defense to the no-cause eviction in Rev2011-001708 pursuant
to NRS 118A.510(e), but also a collateral bar to any assertion that Coughlin owed any rent
(which should have also operated to prevent any requirement under NRS 118A.355(5) that
Coughlin must deposit $2,275 in rent escrow in order to assert his retaliatory eviction
defense to the no-cause summary eviction). It is hard to understand what could be
motivating these judges to approach this area of the law in the manner in which they do,
where they permit, and sometimes even seem to encourage, the WCSO to race over to a
tenant's home and or business almost immediately after the hearing and not post the
summary removal order and wait 24 hours, but just dive right in to conducting the lockout.
Its horrific, as is the display by RJC Bailiff Reyes, Chief Bailiff Sexton, Judge Sferrazza,
and Richard G. Hill, Esq., here:
Part one of 12/20/11 hearing: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HkAvvUvv7kA
Rather amusing to hear the judge litigating, er, establishing for the record some alleged
spurious and false statement with the court respecting why Coughlin did not get the
hearing required by NRS 40.253(8) within 10 days as required by Nevada law.
Part two of 12/20/11 hearing: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QkTf_a_cLOY
(see RJC Bailiff Reyes accosting Coughlin at 2:37 pm and Reyes and Sexton misconduct
at 2:41:20 p.m., and then at 2:53:30 witness Richard G. Hill, Esq., with the same Bailiff
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Reyes whom on 11/28/11 growled at a seated Coughlin that he would take him to jail and
or put my foot up your ass, and the same Chieff Bailiff Sexton whom on 11/22/11
interfered with Coughlin's attempts to post a supersedeas bond in making menacing
commentary in the filing office to Coughlin about Coughlin's ass as where Hill remarks
to Sexton and Reyes, all three of whom are within 10 feet of Coughlin, I'd like to put
something up Coughlin's ass to, to which Coughlin reported to Judge Sferrazza, along
with the put my foot up your ass threats of Reyes and those of Sexton, at which point
Judge Sferrazza indicated he himself would threaten Coughlin.
Oddly, upon Coughlin pointing out the masturbatory gesture Richard G. Hill, Esq.,
was making in respone to Coughlin elucidating the extent to which the abusive litigation
tactics Hill and his associate, Casey D. Baker, Esq., engaged incident to their preposterous
personal property lien over the client's files of the opposing counsel in the summary
eviction from such counsel's former home law office. At the 3:32:00 p.m., Coughlin spells
out the tremendously big liability Hill and Baker may face for prejudicing Coughlin's
respresentation of middle class people in foreclosure defense cases wherein Coughlin
was trying to save them from losing there homes...at which point Judge Sferrazza engages
in an tremendously inappropriate screaming fit at 3:33:25 p.m. (the type of judicial
misconduct that only encourages the rampant misconduct the RJC Bailiff's Reyes, Medina,
Chief Bailiff Sexton, Ramsey, and Heibert have been engaging in (flat out refusing to
accept documents for filing, refusing to allow Coughlin access to review even files in
cases where his liberty is at stake, or exigent landlord tenant matters...) , for no apparent
reason of any legitimacy, but rather to indicate the extent to which Coughlin has just
pointed out the tremendously suspect approach taken not just by Hill and Baker, but by the
RJC its self in not granting Coughlin a default upon his showing up to the 11/22/11
hearing that Judge Sferrazza called a witness for the purpose of proving the RJC provided
such hearing within 10 days of Coughlin's 11/16/11f filing of a Motion to Contest
Personal Property Lien (of course, when such inquiry began to reveal the extent to which a
default was indicated where Hill and Baker failed to show up, Judge Sferrazza
immediately lost intrest in making a record of anything related thereto).
Further, between approximately
HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 139:9 to 146:14) BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Judge
Nash Holmes, what did your marshals tell you about a bathroom break? A I'm sorry.
What marshals when? Q Well, the ones you reference on the audio from the March 12th
hearing? A Well, again, which -- my marshals. Could you be more specific, please, in
your question? Q How much have they told you about the hearing -- MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, you interrupted the judge. She asked you a question. Do
you want to be specific as to a particular conversation? BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Yeah.
There was one bathroom break in the hearing. What were you told during the bathroom
break by either a marshal or the city attorney? MR. ECHEVERRIA: With respect to any
particular issue, Mr. Coughlin? BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q No. Just anything. Anything
connected to me? MR. ECHEVERRIA: That's what I'm asking. Is it involving you, sir?
MR. COUGHLIN: Yes. MR. ECHEVERRIA: All right. THE WITNESS: Mr. Coughlin
asked for a bathroom break. I originally said I would not give the break. And then I said
that I would, but he had to leave all his materials in the courtroom. And I said that because
I suspected that he was tape-recording the court proceedings without my permission, and
without asking permission first. Because he's apparently been known to do that. MR.
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COUGHLIN: Objection, hearsay. Lack of foundation. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Overruled.

THE WITNESS: So I required one of my marshals to accompany him to the restroom.
MR. COUGHLIN: She just gets to say a bunch of hearsay? MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr.
Coughlin, she is responding to your question. Go ahead, Judge. THE WITNESS: When
the marshals came back from the restroom, they told me that Mr. Coughlin had, in fact,
been recording the proceedings because he had disassembled a device and left parts of it in
the bathroom. Or left -- disassembled parts of it, and then they discovered parts of it. In
any case, when he was taken into custody and held in contempt of court at the jail, he had
physically two recording devices on him, a cell phone -- either two cell phones or a cell
phone and some other recording device. I assumed that was pieces of which he was
messing with in the bathroom. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Which marshal told you that? A
I'm sorry? I can't hear that. Q Which marshal -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin,
you don't need to yell. THE WITNESS: It was Marshal Harley that told me that, Joel
Harley, H-a-r-l-e-y. He said when they went in and checked the bathroom after Mr.
Coughlin left, and he had found evidence that he had disassembled some object or
something in there. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q What evidence, and what object? A I just
described it as some sort of a recording device. Whether it was a cell phone and he took
the SIM card out or whatever it was, I wasn't sure. But I had asked you, Mr. Coughlin,
point blank in court if you were recording, and you told me no. And then you asked
immediately to go to the bathroom, and I said no. And then you begged and squirmed and
said you had to relieve yourself, and I had to let you go to the bathroom. And then when
you did that, you went into the bathroom -- BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Really? A Took
apart and disassembled a recording device. Q Really? Would audio show that, Judge?
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin. I've asked you repeatedly to please not interrupt
people. MR. COUGHLIN: I thought she was done. MR. ECHEVERRIA: It was clear she
wasn't when you were interrupting her. MR. COUGHLIN: All right. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: You will cease that conduct. MR. COUGHLIN: Okay. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: You've asked a question of the judge. She answered it. Do you have a
question? BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Judge, was there one bathroom break during the
trial? A I'm sorry. The crowd has recessed here, and let me move across the hallway,
because I can't hear anything right now, there's a big crowd. Q Don't worry. Just my law
license, Judge. No biggie. Was there one bathroom break? MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr.
Coughlin, I for one do not appreciate your side comments. I think you should focus
seriously on the issues to be addressed here. The judge simply asked for accommodation
so she could hear. MR. COUGHLIN: I only have so much time, your Honor. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: I know. Quit wasting it. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Was there one
bathroom break during the trial? A There was one bathroom break. Q Have you
reviewed the audio of that trial? A I'm sorry, I can't hear you again. Say it again. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Did you review the audio of the trial? THE WITNESS: I have not
reviewed them recently, no. I did at the time. I did when I entered my contempt order and
sent my package to the discipline board. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Why does the audio of
the trial indicate that you did not ask any questions about recording until after the one
bathroom break? A I'm not sure that's the case. I don't know. Q That is the case. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin -- BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Yet you testified today that
Mr. Coughlin asked to use the bathroom right after I asked him about recording. How do
you explain that? A I don't know the sequence of events. I don't recall -- Q You just said
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you -- A I listened to the audio at the time when things happened. And when you came
back from the bathroom, either way I determined from -- I concluded that you were most
likely recording without my permission. Q Earlier your testimony was that you asked Mr.
Coughlin if he was recording, and he got real squirmy and asked to use the bathroom. Is
that correct? A Yes. Q Now are you remixing that testimony? A No. Q You just said,
I don't know the sequence of events. A Well, I don't recall the sequence of events. I know
that I asked you if you were recording. You denied you were. I asked you a couple times if
you were recording, if you had gotten permission to record, what you were doing. And at
some point it was determined that you most likely were. Q You know there is an audio of
these things you're testifying to, right, that we can like compare to what you're saying;
right, Judge? MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, please exhibit a civilized tone. BY MR.
COUGHLIN: Q You're aware there's an audio? A Yes, there's an audio. I have not -- Q
That we can compare -- A -- I'm giving you my best recollection at this time. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, you're trying my patience with your continuing
interruptions. That's not evincing the conduct of a competent lawyer. You should wait
until the witness finishes before interrupting her. MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Go ahead. Ask your next question. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q So the
marshals said Mr. Coughlin left some disassembled part of a recording device in the
bathroom, and they retrieved it from there; is that correct? A I don't recall the exact
words. The impression I got from what the marshal said is that you had gone into the
bathroom, disassembled some sort of recording device, and they went in the bathroom
after you and checked that and determined that. That's my recollection of the events.

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However, that's the downside to the SBN's King and Peters in lying about whom
filed which grievance (the SBN initially attempted to play it off like Judge L. Gardner (the
RMC Judge W. Gardner's sister), out of the blue, three years after the fact, took some
Canon 2 Rule 2.15 "appropriate action" and submitted a grievance with the April 13, 2009
Order After Trial she entered that Judges Beesley and Nash Holmes' 1977 McGeorge
School of Law classmate Washoe Legal Services Exec. Director Paul Elcano claimed was
the "sole reason" for Coughlin's firing (which resulted in NSCT cases 60317) from
Washoe Legal Services, where he worked as a domestic violence attorney in a legal aid
setting. Its hard to tell what embodies what ails Nevada legal circles more, an attorney
being now temporarily suspended over a year for a candy bar he did not steal, where the
petty larceny trial included so many patent due process deprivations (no counsel appointed
to an indigent applying for such whom had been wrongfully evicted, burglarized by
opposing counsel and the Sheriff under the guise of conducting a summary eviction
lockout (11/1/11, even where the RJC continued to retain over ten times the amount of
Coughlin's money required for the mandatory, non-discretionary stay Coughlin filed for
under NRS 40.385 (the RJC failed to return the $2,275 in rent escrow Judge Sferrazza
fraudulently insisted, under an inapplicable NRS 118A.355(5) approach in a no-cause
summary eviction where NRS 118A.360 more than handled any of the rent Sferrazza felt
was owed, where, again, it was a no-cause summary eviction being litigated?), then
burglarized again by the Reno police (beyond the void/staleness/prematurity/not ripeness
of the eviction order vis a vis the 24 hour lockout per Russell v. Kalian, Mayes v. UVI,
Coughlin's 11/3/11 Motion for Stay under the disability provision in NRS 40.251(4)
provided Coughlin an additional five days from the notice of entry of a still yet to be made
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order denying it (Judge Sferrazza was too busy awarding attorney's fees where none are
permitted whilst alleging he had been divested of jurisdiction as to anything Coughlin
sought (like the NRS 40.385 stay request further enunciated at the 11/7/11 hearing) to
enter any actual order addressing such 11/3/11 NRS 40.251(4) Motion for Stay by
Coughlin...) ...its never a civil matter when Richard G. Hill, Esq., comes a calling, huh,
RPD?) , whom wrongfully arrest Coughlin for criminal trespass (a jail stay with
concomitant outlay of cash for bail between 11/13/11 and 11/15/11)
As to 60317, the appeal of case where 2JDC Judge Elliott (whom failed to disclose
that he was on WLS's co-defendant CAAW's Exec. Board, then failed to recuse himself,
which any judge who reads this is now required to report pursuant to Canon 2, Rule 2.15,
to the NCJD (not to mention 2JDC Judge Elliott's misconduct revealed in the attached
transcript of the hearing on the curiously timed 2/27/12 Order for Competency Evaluation
by RJC Judge Clifton (apparently, the 2/21/12 filing in RCR2012-065630 by Coughlin
that King referenced in his Complaint (9. On February 21. 2012. Respondent filed a
document entitled, Notice of Appearance Entry of Plea of Not guilty , Waiver of
Arraignment, Motion to Dismiss, etc. in one of his pending criminal matters, Case No.
RCR-2012 065630, City of Reno v. Zachary Coughlin. The document clearly shows
Respondent's unprofessional, disruptive conduct, and lack of respect for the court and
opposing counsel.) was not sufficiently punished by the RJC upon its judicial secretary
Lori Townsend voluntarily providing the SBN in her 4/11/12 email to King, with dockets
and that filing (with offers to provide more), where such Coughlin filing pointed out the
fact that Coughlin's WCPD, Biray Dogan, Esq., (King swiftly sent Coughlin a letter in
response to his grievance against Dogan indicating King would not investigate such
matter), whom had agreed to enter a not guilty plea for Coughlin at the 2/14/12
arraignment that Dogan failed to appear at (a violation of NRS 178.397 by Dogan where
the charge was a gross misdemeanor) when Coughlin and his then attorney of record
Dogan discussed the case on 2/8/12 (Upon Coughlin writing and calling Dogan to see if a
mandatory status conference date had been provided at the arraignment, and Dogan
revealing he failed to appear at such, Dogan rebuffed Coughlin's imploring him to take
some immediate action to ameliorate such failure to appear by Dogan, sufficient to avoid a
warrant being issued for Coughlin's arrest, to which Dogan refused to take any such
action, and incorrectly (again, NRS 178.397 and all) insisted that, despite his then being
listed as attorney of record, he had no obligation to attend such arraignment (the RJC
subsequently listed such 2/14/12 arraignment date as vacated, covering up for Dogan's
own RPC inquiries worthy failure to appear and concomitant refusal to ameliorate such (a
true Jim Leslie, Esq., protege is Dogan), and, instead, apparently filed a grievance with the
SBN, in addition to its judicial secretary sending King her 4/10/12 letter and Coughlin's
2/21/12 filing pointing out such NRS 178.397 violation by Dogan) (that is apparently, as
at the 1/4/13 TPO extension hearing in RCP2012-000607 King alleged, while violating
RPC 3.7, that he had received a grievance from a justice court judge...though none was
ever provided to Coughlin...) ...wherein Judge Elliott (whom also dismissed all of
Coughlin's criminal conviction appeals based on the most suspect of rationale in CR112064 and CR12-1262) managed to dismiss Coughlin's lawsuit against WLS, before even
getting to the merits of Coughlin's Complaint (only to to then award attorney's fees to
Coughlin's opponent purportedly based upon some assessment of the merits of
Coughlin's Complaint), based on the most inventive (see the whole "judges failing to
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recognize Buckwalter's holding that Declarations in Lieu of Affidavits (especially those on

the 2JDC's own Proof of Service of Process forms held out to the public which prompt for
a "Declaration") theme above for any idea of why Coughlin's lawsuit was dismissed for
alleged "insufficient service of process") approach to finding service of process
insufficient, which included a finding that the copy of the Complaint and Summons that
Coughlin had served were too blurry or illegible... the irony in the SBN King's Complaint
attaching a very blurry copy of Judge Nash Holmes 3/12/12 Order (formal hearing exhibit
5 at the 11/14/12 formal disciplinary hearing resulting in a NNDB Panel recommendation
that Coughlin be permanently disbarred in Nevada) purporting to copy and paste the
entirety of the Rules of Professional Conduct in her intemperate carpet bombing of
"findings" by, coincidentally, the "clear and convincing evidence" burden of proof
standard that the SBN had fed her just that day) is not lost where Judge Elliott's various
orders dismissing Coughlin's lawsuit against Elcano and the WLS he is Exec. Director for
was premises upon a finding that such copies of the Complaint and Summons therein
Coughlin had served were not legible. The SBN's King apparently fearing similar such
legibility issues incident to the laughably slapdash/illegible/askew photocopy of Judge
Nash Holmes' 3/12/12 Order (FHE 5) that he attached to his 8/23/12 Complaint, went to
fraudulent lengths to ameliorate such legibility issues by simply replacing the illegible
pages from his 8/23/12 Complaint (reproduced in the packet in FHE1) with cleaner,
more legible copies thereof (thereby holding out such reproduction of his 8/23/12
Complaint in FHE1 as a true and correct copy thereof, when, actually, it was a doctored up
more legible copy thereof with respect to the illegible Judge Nash Holmes Order King
attached thereto. Again, Bomer worthy.
Speaking of 60317 and 60302, WLS's Elcano's daughter, Tyler Elcano was
recently hired by the same Washoe County District Attorney's Office that managed to
score a hat trick of vindictive wrongful prosecutions of Coughlin in one calendar year,
with more on the way, incident to the RJC Bailiff Reyes attacking Coughlin on 5/23/13 in
the courthouse and throwing him over a bench in retaliation for Coughlin seeking copies
of documents in the public record that the RJC wishes he would just forget about (like the
2/5/13 audio recordings in RCR2011-063341 and RCR2012-065630 wherein RJC Judges
Pearson and Clifton, along with WCDA Zach Young violated NRS 178.405 (a regular
occurrence in the RMC and RJC) and the mandatory stay of "all proceedings in all
departments" required incident to Judge Pearson's Order for Competency Evaluation that
morning at 8:45 a.m....which begat an impermissible extra-judicial communication
between former WCDA criminal prosecutors turned RJC Judges Pearson and Clifton
(detailed in CR13-0552 in Coughlin's short-lived 4/2/13 Petition for Writ wherein
Coughlin detailed such NRS 178.405 violation in an attempt to get the 2JDC to order the
RJC not to hold the 4/2/13 trial before Judge Clifton in RCR2012065630: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VxrqMs6XU-o )
and
Gessin
11-05077 and 11-05078 (one is Taitano Moore v Gessin, the other is Rissone v. Gessin)

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11/14/12 SBN V. ZACHARY BARKER COUGHLIN (62337) FORMAL

DISCIPLINARY HEARING - Vol. I, (Page 3:12 to 3:23)
STATE BAR EXHIBITS
MARKED ADMITTED
1 - Index of Documents
32 35
2 - Attorney Fees Order
45 48
3 - Order After Trial
87 114 (2JDC Judge L. Gardner's 4/13/09 Order)
4 - Contempt Order
129 132 (RMC Judge Nash Holmes 2/28/12 Order)
5 - Order attached to complaint
132 137 (RMC Judge Nash Holmes 3/12/12
Order)
6 - Letter dated February 14, 2012 to
Mr. Coughlin from Mr. King
159 165
7 - Two-page letter dated March 9, 2011
from Mr. Coughlin to State Bar 165 169
8 - Two page letter dated March 14, 2012
(RMC Judge Nash Holmes letter to SBN
(where's the SBN's purported letter to Coughlin attaching such and requesting a response?
Not in evidence, that's for sure, as it reveals to much about the fraudulent Bomer worthy
conduct of Asst. Bar Counsel King and Clerk of Court Laura Peters)
from Judge Holmes to Mr. Clark
171 175
9 - Affidavit of Poverty
179 187 (pages 2 and 3 of Coughlin's 3 page 3/7/12
Motion to Proceed IFP and Affidavit in Support Thereof, and the Certificate of Service to
the RMC Judge Nash Holmes
10- Order in Case 11CR 22176
187 188
11- Order for Summary Punishment
191 193
12- Order Affirming Rules
197
13- Order Granting Respondent's Motion
to Dismiss Appeal
197
14- New Verified Response
262
15- Redacted and Verified Response with
two DVD discs
264 268
16- Emergency Ex Parte Motion
267 268

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Now, while the RMC and Judge Nash Holmes claimed to have so much
trouble tracking down Coughlin, Coughlin's various filings in the RMC, which
the RMC Judges admit to discussing in their several meetings wherein an approach
to Coughlin was developed (like, say, Coughlin's 2/21/12 Motion for New Trial in
RMC 11 CR 22176 (see 60838), or the 1/9/12 submission to the RMC by Coughlin
in the other case before Judge Nash Holmes, RMC 11 CR 00696 (the 1/12/12
custodial arrest of Coughlin for jaywalking outside the same former home law
office that the same Richard G. Hill, Esq., that Judge Nash Holmes found Coughlin
in contempt for seeking to interject the name of where such person had no
relevance to the proceedings of 2/27/12 (the simple traffic citation trial for the
three tickets Coughlin was given by RPD Sargent Tarter minutes after Tarter
directed Coughlin to leave Hill's Officer at 652 Forest St., where Coughlin had
ventured to retrieve from Hill Coughlin's wallet, keys, client's files, smartphone,
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hard drives, etc., that Hill had arguably stolen from Coughlin incident to Hill's
office's burlaries of Coughlin's law office (and all the Sierra Glass professional
misconduct incident to Hill going through Coughlin's confidential client's files (Hill
had to walk a pretty fine line while testifying at Coughlin's criminal trespass trial on
6/18/12 before 2JDC Judge L. Gardner (see the 11/14/12 formal hearing exhibit 3,
which the SBN King originally attempted to play off as having been received from
2JDC Judge L. Gardner herself (because, otherwise, any failure by 2JDC Judge L.
Gardner to report any such alleged misconduct by Coughlin to the SBN would yield
to Coughlin an offensive collateral estoppel argument that such decision by Judge
L. Gardner not to take any such Canon 2, Rule 2.15 (the old Canon 3(D)(e)
addressed in Mirch).

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Dear Reno Direct, and Reno Police Department, and RPD Internal Affairs,
IAConcerns@reno.gov
askrpd@reno.gov.

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I am being attacked by the County and City, please help.

Theres a smorgasbord of things detailed at the following:
http://www.youtube.com/user/25teddyjames
http://www.youtube.com/user/NevadaGadfly
and in the Nevada Supreme Court cases 61901, 62337, 61383, 60838, 62104,
63342, etc. much of which is available on the Courts site and or scribd.com
The WCSO refuses to follow Nevada law, and instead systematically burglarizes
tenants, which the RMC, RJC, and 2JDC, and SBN, some might say, all
countenance
Here's how the Clark County Assistant Manager approached a similar situation:
http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/crime-courts/victim-family-court-gropingincident-files-federal-lawsuit
The Reno City Attorney's Office is bringing two cases to trial on 8/28/13 against
Coughlin alleging violations of a fraudulent Workplace Harassment Protection
Order obtained against Coughlin by the State Bar of Nevada, prosecuted by Chief
Criminal Deputy City Attorney Wong in 13 CR 3913, 3914, where the RMC filing
office continues its criminal misconduct in refusing to accept documents Coughlin
submits for filing (Judge Dilworth indicates he is not aware of any outstanding
motions...indicating that even when Coughlin obtains a filing stamp on a motion he
has submitted, the RMC filing office is continuing on with its past criminal
misconduct.

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The Reno Police Department burglarized Coughlin's former home law office on
11/13/11, then retaliated against Coughlin for submitting written complaints by
harassing him continually and arresting him six times, and the wife of RPD Officer
Nicholas Duralde and RPD Detective Yturbide are both ECOMM 911 dispatchers,
with Coughlin's written complaint of the wrongful arrest of 8/20/11, misconduct,
and perjury at trial in RCR2011-063341 by Duralde resulting in the wrongful
11/13/11 (custodial arrest for criminal trespass in RMC 11 CR
26405: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Eh2xyc-9cg0 where the RPD and
opposing counsel in the summary eviction from Coughlin's former home law office
case in Rev2011-001708 were actually burglarizing Coughlin's rental (see Russell
v. Kalian, 414 A.2d 462 (R.I., Apr 28, 1980), and Mayes v. UVI Holding, LLC
(301 A.D.2d 409 [1st Dept 2003])):
Mayes v. UVI: It is law of the case that no application for a new warrant
was ever made in connection with the second judgment of possession. The record
contains no documentation with respect to the warrant of eviction actually executed
by the Marshal. A secretary for the law firm testified that she thought she had
mailed a copy of the stipulation vacating the first judgment and warrant of eviction
to the Marshal. However, no copy of an accompanying cover letter has been
produced, which the witness testified would have been included as a matter of the
firm's general procedure. Nor could the witness state when the stipulation
might have been sent to the Marshal. Significantly, the record does contain a
cover letter dated August 23, 1996, directed to the Marshal from the law firm,
which enclosed the judgment of possession. The cover letter bears the anonymous
handwritten notation, good warrant 8/26/96. It is not clear what the law firm
was attempting to accomplish by means of this correspondence.
Whether plaintiffs' eviction on an invalid warrant was deliberate or inadvertent,
there is no question that neither the landlord nor its attorneys can evade
responsibility for the wrongful eviction. Generally, a landlord is not responsible
for the manner in which an officer executes a valid process duly issued *** the
officer only becomes his agent where the process is irregular, unauthorized or void
(Ide v. Finn, 196 App.Div. 304, 314-315, 187 N.Y.S. 202; see also, Campbell v.
Maslin, 91 A.D.2d 559, 560, 457 N.Y.S.2d 40, affd. 59 N.Y.2d 722, 463 N.Y.S.2d
440, 450 N.E.2d 246 for reasons stated below). Civil Court has ruled that plaintiff
tenant was wrongfully evicted from her apartment based upon a void warrant. On
a previous appeal in the instant action, this Court held that the landlord was
afforded a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of its wrongdoing in Civil
Court and is collaterally estopped to dispute its liability (268 A.D.2d 209, 700
N.Y.S.2d 682). Moreover, as lessor, the landlord is liable to its tenant for any
contract damages plaintiff sustained as a result of the breach of her lease.

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It is a principle of long standing that conduct of litigation is the prerogative of

counsel. As stated in Hallock v. State, 64 N.Y.2d 224, 230, 485 N.Y.S.2d 510,
474 N.E.2d 1178, From the nature of the attorney-client relationship itself, an
attorney derives authority to manage the conduct of litigation on behalf of a client,
including the authority to make certain procedural or tactical decisions (see Code of
Professional Responsibility, EC-7-7; Gorham v. Gale, 7 Cow 739, 744; Gaillard v.
Smart, 6 Cow 385, 388). It is counsel's responsibility to maintain control over
the proceedings; to this end, counsel is chargeable with the misuse of process by
agents employed to further the course of litigation, even if liability is only vicarious
(see, Kleeman v. Rheingold, 81 N.Y.2d 270, 276, 598 N.Y.S.2d 149, 614 N.E.2d
712)....
As between the law firm and the Marshal, the firm, as the entity in control of
the litigation, had superior knowledge of its course (see, Bevona v. Judson Realty,
213 A.D.2d 349, 350, 624 N.Y.S.2d 416). Thus, the firm bore the responsibility to
keep the Marshal informed concerning the status of a warrant that appeared
valid on its face (see, Chelsea Marina v. Scoralick, 94 A.D.2d 189, 193, 463
N.Y.S.2d 489 [failure to advise Sheriff of temporary restraining order]), and any
misapprehension necessarily implicates a lapse by counsel (supra, at 195, 463
N.Y.S.2d 489). ...
(NOTE: while such authority is more applicable to the summary eviction by
Hill's firm, given it prepared the proposed FOFCOLOSE utlized as a lockout order,
where such curiously contained nearly every other term lifted verbatim from the
various statutes involved (save, of course, an elegant misstatement of NRS
118A.510(e) inserted by Hill's associate Casey D. Baker, Esq., done to get around
to thorny collateral estoppel problems vis a vis any allegedly owing rent presented
by Hill's firm initially bringing a summary eviction proceeding based on nonpayment of rent in a prior proceeding filed 9/6/11 in Rev2011-001492, only to
abandon such course (with all the attendant collateral estoppel consequences
associated therewith, arguably) and, instead, pursue what it felt was the path of
least resistance in maintaining a subsequent summary eviction proceeding in
Rev2011-001708 based on a no-cause landlord's affidavit pursuant to NRS
40.254(2), fraudulently alleging that the lease had expired where the term of the
lease was misstated by Baker and lanldord Merliss as being for 12 months when
the lease, plainly, on its face, reads that such term is for not less than 12 months
and where both Baker and Merliss's unlawful detainer affidavits (should one
allow Merliss' testimony midway through the trial to satisfy that required under
NRS 40.253(6) to be filed before the justice court shall hold a hearing) swore that
the landlord's claim for relief was authorized by law where, plainly, the landlord
had no such no-cause termination right upon a reading of paragraphs 2, 3, and 20 of
the lease, and where, given the fraudulent misstatement as to the lease having
expired upon the passing of 12 months on 3/1/11, the subsequent purported
8/22/11 30 Day Notice to Vacate was of no legal consequence given it wrongly
concluded that the lease had already expired, and, therefore, failed to operate to
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terminate such lease, even had the landlord possessed any such right to do so
under a no cause, holdover tenant basis (which, again, the landlord did not have any
such right under the lease).
Witness where Baker's proposed FOFCOLOSE (which Judge Sferrazza
signed with on one minor alteration) elegantly glosses away from Nevada law
pursuant to NRS 118A.510(e), where such reads:
The transcript of the 10/25/11 proceeding reveals such further: Landlord
(Baker): Your Honor moving down the statute to subsection e the tenant has
instituted or defended against judicial or administrative proceeding or arbitration
in which the tenant raised an issue of compliance with the requirements of this
chapter respecting habitability of dwelling units. That cannot be. He notices the
first no cause termination notice to vacate exhibit B was served on August 22,
2011 Mr. Coughlin did not institute or defendant any proceeding on any
habitability issues until after those notices were provided. Dr. Merliss can't
retaliate for something that is going to happen in the future that has not happened
yet Mr. Coughlin cannot proceed under that statute to the extent Mr. Coughlin is
complaining about this mold business first of all the may e-mail in Exhibit 8 does
not qualify in or satisfied the statutes regarding notice to a landlord about a
habitability issues and Dr. Merliss drove this point home when he testified that he
didn't understand what Mr. Coughlin was asking for I mean if you look through
these e-mails what Mr. Coughlin does is he identifies something he claims is some
sort of problem and then he tries to bargain some money off of the rent for he has
not produced to mean he does not say in then they e-mail this is my notice to you
under NRS 118A.355 I am going to withhold this rent unless you fix this he just
says we've got this issue he is later come for the court and he has (NOTE: why
would Coughlin reference NRS 118A.355 when he proceeded, to any extent the
landlord's written acquiesence of 6/2/11 makes such approach even necessary,
under NRS 118A.360?)... ...
Judge: well I tend to agree that under subsection e, sorry of 118A.510 one he he
has to have instituted or defended against a judicial or administrative proceeding
based on habitability...
(NOTE: Judge Sferrazza presided over the prior non-payment summary
eviction proceeding filed on 9/6/11 in Rev2011-001492, where NJCRCP RULE
102.FILING OF SUMMARY EVICTION CASES becomes relevant to an
analysis of bring or threaten to bring an action for possession and instituted or
defended against a judicial...proceeding language in NRS 118A.510(e), where
Rule 102 reads: A summary eviction case shall be deemed filed with a justice
court upon the timely filing of an affidavit by a tenant and the payment of the
required filing fee by the tenant or upon the filing of an affidavit by the landlord
with an application for an order of summary eviction, together with the payment
of the required filing fee by the landlord.... Baker's argument that NRS
118A.510(e) is not satisfied where notes that the first no cause termination
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notice to vacate exhibit B was served on August 22, 2011. Mr. Coughlin did not
institute or defendand any proceeding on any habitability issues until after
those notices were provided is premised upon Baker's hope that his allegedly
having a notice to vacate served on August 22, 2011 where the Tenant's Answer
of 9/6/11, pursuant to NV JCRCP Rule 102 manes such summary eviction case
shall be deemed filed with a justice court upon the timely filing of an affidavit by
a tenant.... The phrase instituted or defended against like relates to the point at
which a summary eviction case shall be deemed filed with a justice court,
which, in Rev2011-001708, would be 9/7/11 upon the timely filing of an
affidavit by a tenant, Coughlin. So, regardless of if the landlord's allegedly
serving a 30 Day No Cause Termination Notice to Vacate on 8/22/11 suffices as
threaten(ing) to bring and action for possession, such hardly operates to foreclose
a determination that Merliss then, subsequently, in retaliation did, in fact bring
an action for possession in retaliation (via Coughlin's filing of a second Tenant's
Answer or Affidavit on 10/6/11 in the no-cause summary eviction proceeding, as,
certainly, without more, the landlord's allegedly serving a 30 Day Termination
Notice to Vacate on 8/22/11 would not operate to bring an action for possession,
as, indeed, a requisite to doing so would be the service of the 5 Day No Cause
Notice of Unlawful Detainer, in addition to the landlord then, should the tenant fail
to file a Tenant's Answer, pursuant to NV JCRCP 102 filing...an affidavit by the
landlord with an application for an order of summary eviction, together with the
payment of the required filing fee by the landlord.) for Coughlin's, by filing a
Tenant's Answer on 9/7/11 in the non-payment summary eviction proceeding,
institut(ing) or defend(ing) against the prior non-payment summary eviction
proceeding in )
...which that is different than complaining about habitability which he can
interests through a separate lawsuit
Plaintiff: yes
Judge: so I simply Simply complaining about habitability issues does not
satisfy the retaliatory conduct provision (NOTE: actually, it does under NRS
118A.510(b) if the landlord evicted the tenant in retaliation for simply
complaining about habitability (ie, its only in NRS 118A.510(e) that the tenant
need show they instituted or defended against a judicial proceeding...arguing
habitability, to which the landlord then in retaliation evicted them).
Plaintiff: that is exactly right Your Honor and in any event Mr. Coughlin has not
shown as is his burden to do that any of his complaints were in good faith under
that statute or that Dr. Merliss acted in a retaliatory fashion Dr. Merliss said I
didn't evict you because of these things you didn't pay your rent we tried to help
you you would let us that's not retaliation. Your Honor he's, Mr. Coughlin, is
attempting to make logical leaps between him threatening to sue for retaliation
and Dr. Merliss is hiring our office that that is you know per se retaliatory well
what are you supposed to do when you're tenant threatens to sue you? You gotta get
a lawyer..."
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Also, with respect to the failure of the 9/27/11 Notice to contain the
jurisdictional predicate enacted by the legislature in 2009 ("NRS 40.253(3)(b)
(2):"That if the court determines that the tenant is guilty of an unlawful
detainer, the court may issue a summary order for removal of the tenant or an order
providing for the nonadmittance of the tenant, directing the sheriff or constable of
the county to remove the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of the order; and), the
10/27/11 FOFCOLOSE fails to to contain such language, and where the legislature
requires landlord's to place it in the 5 Day UD Notice, the failure to include in the
10/27/11 FOFCOLOSE any language whatsoever "directing the sheriff to remove
the tenant within 24 hours after receipt of the order..." makes such order void as
well.
Despite Baker's proposed FOFCOL being remarkably faithful to most
every other verbatim passage of NRS chapters 118A.510 and 40.251, 40.280,
40.253, and 40.254, the little bit about "24 hours" needing to elapse from the
time of the Sheriff's posting, at the very least (tenant's receipt could involved
a Brahams or Zammarippa analysis similar to receipt of suspension of one's
drivers license scenarios, or the 90 days to file suit from the receipt of the EEOC's
right to sue letter line of cases) such order to Coughlin's door (at least
according to the Order in Anvui) Baker carefully excised, (as he also did with
respect to several of the finer aspects of NRS 118A.510(b)-(g)) which is too bad
for him, his firm, the Sheriff (thought the Sheriff, per the Mayes v. UVI decision,
can sue the law firm now), and the landlord, given Russell v. Kalian and its ilkage
(see Coughlin's correspondence with the NNDB and SBN's OBC specifically citing
to such line of cases vis a vis the fact that it was actually Hill and Merliss, the
WCSO, and RPD doing the trespassing, not Coughlin. Proper notice to quit has
also been described as a jurisdictional necessity. HUD/Willow Street
Apartments v. Gonzalez, 68 Conn. App. 638, 792 A.2d 165 (2002); Cincinnati
Metro. Hous. Auth. v. Morgan, 155 Ohio App. 3d 189, 2003-Ohio-5671, 800
N.E.2d 64 (1st Dist. Hamilton County 2003), appeal allowed, 101 Ohio St. 3d
1487, 2004-Ohio-1293, 805 N.E.2d 538 (2004) and judgment rev'd on other
grounds, 104 Ohio St. 3d 445, 2004-Ohio-6554, 820 N.E.2d 315 (2004). ).
The 10/27/11 FOFCOLOSE Baker managed to get the justice court's
Sferrazza to sign read: "That the sheriff... be, and hereby is, directed to remove
each and every person found upon the rental unit at 121 River Rock, Reno,
Washoe County, Nevada, by no earlier than October 31, 2011 at 5 pm." Now,
Judge Sferrazza did intineate "no later than" in place of "no earlier than", but, the
real problem is that NRS 40.253(3)(b)(2) is what it is. The legislature works hard
on this stuff, and makes these laws for good reason, and they are not to be
selectively applied and gerrymandered to Judge Sferrazza's heart's content, for
whatever reason it is he so chose to here. As he did with respect to the "USPS
Certificate of Mailing" requirement in NRS 40.280(3)(b) (at the very least such
subsection required the 9/27/11 to "be served" by mailing it (whether NRS
40.280(3)(c)'s requirement that "before an order to remove a tenant is issued"..."the
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landlord shall file...a proof of service" of the 9/27/11 notice, which "must consist
of" one of the three options set forth in subs. (a)-(c) therein may be read to require
that the "other process server" must provide an "endorsement" "stating the time and
manner of service", with such "service" (as defined in NRS 40.280(1)(a)-(c))
carrying a requirement that the "mailing" (which is absolutely required per the
record on its face in the instant matter) be represented by a simple indication in the
"proof of service" required by NRS 40.280(3) that such was mailed, or whether a
USPS Certificate of Mailing is also required, even where such posting was
purportedly done, as here, by a "licensed process server" is unclear.
What is very, very clear is that, at the very least, the landlord was required to
mail a copy of that 9/27/11 notice to Coughlin, and that Coughlin preserved his
objection to the landlord's failure to do so, and that such is not waivable by
Coughlin or the justice court. While a deficiency in a proof of service, per NRCP 4
may not normally render service that actual did comply with the requirements
therein invalid, where a statutory dictate is involved, such as in NRS 40.280(1)(a),
which provides that an order "shall not issue" until compliant proof of service is
filed by the landlord, and subsequent assertion that Merliss would now make that
(in contrast to MROA 655, where NCS's prepaid postage/stamped Pitney Bowes
envelope addressed to Coughlin was attached to that 8/22/11 Notice (found
attached as Exhibit 1 in "Exhibit D", Merliss's deficient "Unlawful Detainer
Affidavit"), no such envelope (and certainly not and USPS Certificate of Mailing)
is evidence by the record as to the 9/27/11 5 Day Notice found at MROA 662 (Exh.
2 to Exh D.), which consists of Baker's "Certificate of Service" indicating he
"personally handed at the hearing in the above reference matter" such 9/27/11
notice, but then completely fails to indicate any mailing thereof was done. Even if
Baker's violation of courthouse sanctuary rule/atty defendant immunity from
service while attending court was overlooked, NRS 40.280(3)(a) is still quite clear
in requiring the signature of a witness thereto (in addition to the attestation of the
server) and the tenant acknowleding such service) as such Baker's Certificate of
Service at MROS 662 needs more to comply. Which requires an analysis of the
"Certificate of Service" at MROA 640 by the "licensed process server for NCS, and
a determination as to whether such satisifies NRS 40.280(3)(c)'s:"The
endorsement of a sheriff, constable or other process server stating the time and
manner of service." There would seemingly be an argument that such is compliant,
where it not for the fact that the court indicated an "envelope" (like that associated
with the 8/22/11 Notice at MROA 655).
As such, the collective landlord's affidavit presented by Baker's 10/19/11
Declaration Pursuant to NRS 40.254(2), Merliss's unlawful detainer affidavit
only admitted as an exhibit midway through the 10/25/11 trial/proceeding, and
Merliss's testimony to supplement such all are fraudulent where they assert the
notices were served in accord with NRS 40.280 when they plainly failed on the
USPS Certificate of Mailing requirement as to both the 8/22/11 and 9/27/11
notices, particularly where the 9/27/11 notice's proof of attempted service failed to
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even include the photocopy of the envelope with postage that Judge Sferrazza
indicated he had allowed, in the case of a licensed process server to suffice for
the requirement to file a USPS Certificate of Mailing under NRS 40.280(3)(c), in
addition to the fact that there is really no indication, under Mikohn, that even NCS's
Durden placed to go out for mailing that day any copy of such notice in the
mailbox, and certainly, Baker's 9/27/11 Certficate of Service completely fails to
indicate any mailing at all took place.
Generally,Litigants, their attorneys, and witnesses are immune from service
of process while attending court. Lamb v. Schmitt, 285 U.S. 222, 52 S. Ct. 317, 76
L. Ed. 720 (1932); Stewart v. Ramsay, 242 U.S. 128, 37 S. Ct. 44, 61 L. Ed. 192
(1916); Moreo v. Regan, 140 A.D.2d 313, 527 N.Y.S.2d 547 (2d Dep't 1988);
Commercial Bank & Trust Co. v. District Court of Fourteenth Judicial Dist. In and
For Tulsa County, 1980 OK 3, 605 P.2d 1323 (Okla. 1980). AMJUR PROCESS
21.
The 10/27/11 proposed FOFCOLOSE Baker was able to get Judge Sferrazza
to briefly sign on to (until his 11/7/11 rendition of an order amending such at the
hearing on that date) read: 10.3 Coughlin failed to present any evidence that
prior to being served with the referenced termination and eviction notices,
Coughlin had "instituted or defended against a judicial or administrative
proceeding or arbitration in which [he] raised an issue of compliance with the
requirements of [NRS Chapter 118A] respecting the habitability of dwelling units"
as required by NRS 118A.510(1)(e). (NOTE: here Baker attempts to
mischaracterize the language of the statute to get around the fact that Couglin, by
defending against the non-payment summary eviction proceeding following the 5
Day Non-Payment Notice of Unlawful Detainer purportedly served on Couglhin on
8/22/11, in RJC Rev11-1708, and therein arguing habitability issues, did, thereby,
invoke the protections of NRS 118A.510(1)(e), as, only thereafter did Merliss
bring...an action for possession in 1708. While Baker attempts to argue that
Couglin need have instituted or defended against a judicial...proceeding prior
to being served with the referenced termination and eviction notices the
statute simply does not say that. Now, Baker can argue that his client did not
thereafter bring and action for possession (and, given the unique nature of
Nevada's approach, it is not entirely clear at which point one can be said to bring
an action...is it upon serving a 5 Day Notice of Unlawful Detainer? Did the
landlord bring an action upon his purportedly terminating Coughlin's month to
month tenancy on 8/22/11? Hard to imagine that qualifies (particularly where
such Notice of 8/22/11 is deficient in that is incorrectly asserts that Coughlin's lease
had expired, where, clearly, such is not the case upon a close review of
Paragraphs 2, 3, and 20 of the 2/24/10 Standard Rental Agreement).
A close review of the FOFCOLOSE, particularly Findings of Fact 1-8 reveal
something curious....Baker's provided to Judge Sferrazza a proposed FOFCOLOSE
that does not actually make any indication as to the key inquiry with respect to the
NRS 118A.510(e) analysis vis a vis just when one can be said to bring an action
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for possession or have instituted or defended against a judicial ... proceeding. It

is likely that Nevada law will view the landlord to be said to bring an action for
possession either upon the service of the 9/27/11 5 Day No Cause Notice of
Unlawful Detainer, or, upon Couglin's filing his Tenant's Answer in response
thereto on 10/6/11, and the landlord thereafter communicating some intention to the
Court to follow through with a hearing, and (or, perhaps, upon nothing more than
the Tenant filing a Tenant's Affidavit...that is, the landlord need not do anything
further thereafter to be said to have brought (bring) and action for possession).
However, Baker's attempt to characterize the mere service of some 30 Day Notice
to Vacate as the bring(ing) of an action for possession is simply unsupportable,
in light of the fact that there is no legally operative effect to Baker's doing so absent
his then serving a 5 Day Notice of Unlawful Detainer, at which point, should tenant
Coughlin have failed to file a Tenan'ts Answer within 5 days thereof, Merliss would
be able to obtain a lockout Order from the court.
The thing is, Couglin argued that his Litigation Demand Letters to Merliss
between May-September of 2011 suffice to meet the instituted or defended
against requirement (and there are instances of such letters from Coughlin to the
landlord that predate even a finding that the service of the 30 Day Notice to Vacate
of 8/22/11). Indeed, how is Baker's service upon Couglin of a 30 Day Notice to
Vacate bring(ing) an action for possession if Coughlin's litigation demand
letters are not instituting or defending against a judicial proceeding where
habitability an issue (and Coughlin's Litigation Demand Letters specifically invoke
habitability issues and warn Merliss against any anticipated retaliatory conduct by
the landlord.
Further, the NRS 118A.510 inquiry is not limited to a comparison of the
mere temporal relation between the landlord's bring(ing) or threatening to bring
an action for possession and the tenant's instituting or defending against (NOTE:
and such is especially not limited to a strict race to see whether the landlord
allegedly served on 8/22/11 a 30 Day Termination Notice to Vacate prior to the
tenant instituting or defending against the no-cause proceeding by filing a
Tenant's Answer on 10/6/11 where the Tenant had filed a Tenant's Answer on
9/7/11 in the precursor non-payment summary eviction proceeding in Rev2011001492).
Paullin v. Sutton, 102 Nev. 421, 724 P.2d 749 (1986). (NOTE:
Paullin was a civil action where the former tenant brought a claim for wrongful
eviction, as such, it was a plenary civil action, not a summary eviction
proceeding...so the standard of review applicable thereto is a sterner one to meet in
order to overturn such judgment (S & D first contends that the evidence does
not support a finding of retaliatory eviction. In considering such a claim, this court
must assume that the jury believed all the evidence favorable to the prevailing party
and drew all reasonable inferences in her favor. The verdict of the jury will be
overturned only if there is no substantial evidence to support it. E.g., General
Motors v. Reagle, 102 Nev. 8, 714 P.2d 176 (1986).). Incidentally, that same
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supported by substantial evidence standard is the one 2JDC Judge Flanagan

applied to uphold the justice court's ruling...which is clear error, and arguably
Mandamus worthy in that such ruling was made in excess of the district court's
jurisdiction.
52B CJS LANDLORD 1576: C. Statutory Dispossession Proceedings;
Summary Proceedings 7. Appellate Review 1576. Standard of review , Landlord
and Tenant 291(18), 315(1), 315(3) A decision of the trial court in a summary
dispossession proceeding may be reviewed for abuse of discretion, but under some
statutes, a de novo review is conducted. The reviewing court will give weight to the
opinion of the trial court[1] and will not disturb an exercise of discretion by the trial
court in the absence of an abuse of the court's discretion.[2] The appellate court will
indulge in reasonable presumptions in support of the findings of the trial court on
conflicting evidence[3] and in support of the judgment appealed from.[4] Under
some statutes, however, dispossession proceedings are triable de novo on appeal.[5]
Where there is a trial de novo, the appellate court should consider the facts of the
case[6] and render a proper judgment.[7] Whether the unlawful detainer notice
requirement is calculated in accordance with the timing provisions of the civil rules
is a matter of statutory interpretation to be reviewed de novo.[8] An order granting
a summary eviction under a lease providing for periodic rent reserved by the
month, or any shorter period, should be reviewed on appeal based upon the
standard of review for an order granting summary judgment, which is de novo
review, because such proceedings are analogous.[9] [FN1] N.Y.Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. v. Carroll, 43 Misc. 2d 639, 251 N.Y.S.2d 693 (App. Term 1964).
[FN2] Cal.Whipple v. Haberle, 223 Cal. App. 2d 477, 36 Cal. Rptr. 9 (5th Dist.
1963). Reviewing decision regarding issuance of a protective order D.C.Graham
v. Lanier Associates, 19 A.3d 361 (D.C. 2011). Plenary review of sufficiency of
notice to quit Conn.Bayer v. Showmotion, Inc., 292 Conn. 381, 973 A.2d 1229
(2009). [FN3] Ala.Hyde v. Isbell, 254 Ala. 373, 48 So. 2d 465 (1950). Ill.
Woodson v. Benson, 330 Ill. App. 248, 70 N.E.2d 742 (1st Dist. 1947). [FN4] Ill.
Mitchell v. Tyler, 332 Ill. App. 577, 76 N.E.2d 237 (1st Dist. 1947). Mass.
Staples v. Collins, 321 Mass. 449, 73 N.E.2d 729 (1947). [FN5] Ala.Hyde v.
Isbell, 254 Ala. 373, 48 So. 2d 465 (1950). Mo.Conley v. Dee, 246 S.W.2d 385
(Mo. Ct. App. 1952). [FN6] Ariz.Olds Bros. Lumber Co. v. Rushing, 64 Ariz.
199, 167 P.2d 394 (1946). [FN7] Ariz.Olds Bros. Lumber Co. v. Rushing, 64
Ariz. 199, 167 P.2d 394 (1946). Mo.Conley v. Dee, 246 S.W.2d 385 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1952). [FN8] Wash.Christensen v. Ellsworth, 162 Wash. 2d 365, 173 P.3d
228 (2007). [FN9] Nev.Anvui, LLC v. G.L. Dragon, LLC, 123 Nev. 212, 163
P.3d 405 (2007). CJS LANDLORD 1576
However, the landlord's attorney, Baker, adopted the same fraudulent
approach to restating the law in a way that conveniently, and uncolorably,
mistakenly indicates a different standard (RPC 3.1, 3.3, 3.4 violations, much?)
than that which is really controlling (similar to Baker's conveniently leaving out of
the 10/27/11 proposed FOFCOLOSE the within 24 hours of receipt by the
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tenant (note: the actual language in the statute merely implies it is the tenant's
receipt of such summary order for removal of the tenant, rather than, as the
RJC and apparently the WCSO (in contravention of the view and approach taken by
every other county in Nevada) purport to believe, such receipt being that of the
order by the Sheriff (though, tellingly, former RJC Chief Civil Clerk Karen Stancil
recently admitted to Coughlin that RJC Judge (not even Chief Judge at the time on
October 30th, 2012...) Clifton instructed her not to answer Coughlin's subpoena on
her, RJC Court Administrator Steve Tuttle, and the RJC Custodian of Records,
which sought, amongst other items, the fax log to indicate just when the RJC faxed
either or both the 10/25/11 Eviction Order and Decision and the 10/27/11
FOFCOLOSE to the WCSO (with the importance being that, should Nevada law be
what Stancil and the RJC and WCSO have been purporting it to be, ie, that NRS
40.253(5)(a) requires of the Sheriff to perform such summary eviction lockouts
within 24 hours of the Sheriff's receipt of such summary order for removal of
the tenant that any failure to so conduct such lockouts (and this is detailed in the
very 3/5/12 Motion to Dismiss in the criminal trespass prosecution against
Coughlin in RMC 11 CR 26405 (see the SCR 111 Petition in 61901 that operates as
a defensive collateral bar to King and the Panel now purporting that such is a
serious offense sufficient to buttress numerous violations of the rules of
professional conduct: (from the 12/14/12 FOFCOL now on appeal in 62337:
In the 10/27/11 proposed FOFCOLOE Baker submitted, which Judge
Sferrazza signed, Baker artfully omitted the required within 24 hours of receipt
language required by NRS 40.253(5)(a), and replacing it with, initially no later
than 5:00 p.m., October 31st, 2011 (which Judge Sferrazza caught before signing
the FOFCOLOSE, changing such to no earlier than 5:00 p.m. in a telling example
of the manner in which Baker fraudulentl approaches litigation, in addition to
Baker's remixing what Judge Sferrazza actually indicated in his order as rendered
with respect to the $2,275.00 in some half baked NRS 118A.355(5) rent escrow
deposit required of Coughlin in a no cause summary eviction proceeding).
Judge: alright I am prepared to rule and I do first of all I do want to say I
acknowledge the defendant's argument with respect to rule 44 And Justice Court in
Las Vegas and I have been unable to find a similar rule with respect to Reno justice
court so my decision with respect to the escrow money will be separate from this
but I do find number one that the landlord met its burden of proof with respect to
unlawful detainer that the exhibits and the testimony submitted to the court
specifically exhibit B the tenant was notified of the no cause termination in a timely
manner and with proper service exhibit C the tenant was notified five day notice of
unlawful detainer and compliance with the statute and with proper service and
therefore the defendant was an unlawful detainer effective as of the date of the
beginning of these proceedings which was on artists I'm sorry well certainly by
October 10 when the landlord's affidavit was filed but certainly today without
question further I have sitters the tenant's arguments with respect to it retaliation
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specifically under 118A.510 with respect to subsection a although the tenant has
complained about violations of building housing or hope code I do not find there is
any evidence that he made said complaint to a government agency charged with
responsibility for enforcement of that code second with respect to this subsection be
although defendant did present evidence today of destruction of carpet and alleged
that it was a crime under NRS 206.330 205.270 206.040 there is no evidence that
said complaint cited a specific statute to the landlord but rather a general complaint
about the structure of this carpet and therefore I find it that subsection of the statute
was not satisfied as will him and I further find that even if it was even if the
landlord knew what you're trying to say the landlord did not retaliate against you
for that the landlord eviction was based on nonpayment of rent not your
complaining of your destruction of carpet and I also at the prior court proceeding I
made findings with respect to the damages and those damages in total were $2725
and that was the outside number and so I found that you owed at least $2275 even
giving you the benefit of all the doubts and today there was evidence presented that
the stairs were only $75 I gave you $1250 for the stairs credit there was an e-mail
presented today that indicated that it's all you are asking for was $75...and then with
respect to the noxious weeds first of all I find that that is not a habitability issue
second of all I find that under the lease you were required to maintain the lawn and
third this is under subsection a you didn't make a complaint the governmental
agency and there is no evidence that you did with respect to the noxious weeds the
mold insulation I do find that that could be a habitability issue clearly could be
whoever again under 118A.510 subsection to make it retaliatory it has to be have
been presented either in action suit. By you or defendant against you against by you
and the judicial administrative proceeding or arbitration in which the tenant raised
the issue of compliance with the requirements of habitability and sense you didn't
raise this issue until after the landlord had in fact file the complaint I find that that
did not violate the habitability statute did not violate the retaliatory eviction statute
for all those reasons I find that the defense of retaliation does not meet the
requirements of chapter 40 specifically one second here, specifically, 40.253
subsections 6
The Court determines that there is not a legal defense to the
alleged unlawful detainer and therefore the court grants the eviction. With respect
to the money in escrow, the court finds that that money is owing to the landlord;
however, I am not going to order that today since the defendant has made argument
that the court does not have enough, in fact, a proper rule with respect to escrow as
similar to Las Vegas Justice Court Rule 44, and, therefore, since the tenant still has
the ability to appeal in this matter I will give him 10 days to file a proper appeal
which is the statutory time frame, and if he does so, that money will be used to
satisfy his appeal bond in this matter. If he does not do so, then at that time a
proper motion can be made by plaintiff's counsel, on this matter. The eviction will
be effective October 31 at 5 PM.

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The proposed FOFCOLOSE Baker was able to get Judge Sferrazza to sign
on 10/27/11 read: 10.3. Coughlin failed to present any evidence that prior to
being served with the referenced termination and eviction notices, Coughlin
had "instituted or defended against a judicial or administrative proceeding or
arbitration in which [he] raised an issue of compliance with the requirements
of [NRS Chapter 118A] respecting the habitability of dwelling units" as required
by NRS 118A.510(1)(e). (NOTE: that last little bit, as required by NRS
118A.510(1)(e) is a possible RPC 3.1, 3.3, and 3.4 violation by Baker where he
presented his proposed FOFCOLOSE containing such a misstatement of the
text of NSR 118A.510(1)(e)).
Compare that to what the statute actually states, verbatim: NRS 118A.510
Retaliatory conduct by landlord against tenant prohibited; remedies;
exceptions.
1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 3, the landlord may not, in
retaliation, terminate a tenancy, refuse to renew a tenancy,... or bring or
threaten to bring an action for possession if:..(e) The tenant has instituted or
defended against a judicial or administrative proceeding or arbitration in which the
tenant raised an issue of habitability...
Baker's 2/24/12 Answering Brief in that appeal of the summary eviction in
1708 read: III. STANDARD OF REVIEW: "[A]n order granting summary
eviction under NRS 40.253(6) should be reviewed on appeal based upon the
standard for review of an order granting summary judgment under NRCP 56
because these proceedings are analogous.,,8 Anvui, LLC v. G.L. Dragon, LLC,
123 Nev. 212, 215,163 P.3d 405 (2007). "To successfully defend against a
summary judgment motion, the nonmoving party must transcend the
pleadings and, by affidavit or other admissible evidence, introduce specific
facts that show a genuine issue of material fact. 9 Torrealba v. Kesmitis, 124
Nev. 95, 178 P.3d 716 (2008).
'"A case appealed must not be tried a new."10 NJCRCP 76A. Further, "a
[lower court's] findings will not be disturbed on appeal unless they are clearly
erroneous and are not based on substantial evidence."11 Gibellini v. Klindt, 110
Nev. 1201, 1204, 885 P.2d 540 (1994) (emphasis added). "The notice of appeal
shall specify the party or parties taking the appeal; shall designate the judgment,
order or part thereof appealed from ...,,12 NJCRCP 72(c). "Only those parts of the
judgment which are included in the notice of appeal will be considered by the
appellate Court.,,13 Reno Newspapers, Inc. v. Bibb, 76 Nev. 332, 335, 353 P.2d
458 (1960).
The eviction apparently resulted from a series of disputes between Sutton
and the manager
of the Las Vegas Manor Apartments, Robert Paullin. In March of 1983, Paullin
received a
memo from his supervisor directing him to inspect all storage areas and make sure
they were
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cleaned out. Paullin testified that he went to the storage shed near Sutton's
apartment, discovered
that none of his keys fit the lock, and instructed a handyman to break the lock. At
that
time, Sutton came out and informed Paullin that the items in the storage shed
belonged to her.
Sutton claimed that use of the shed had been part of her lease when she first moved
into the
building in 1964 (NOTE: such is similar to Coughlin asserting his rights under
paragraph 22, 23, and 28 of the lease, especially with regard to the proportionate
reduction of rent resulting from the landscapers (from any cause) damaging the
property and Coughlin's personalty)...On April 22, 1983, Paullin delivered a letter
to Sutton instructing her **750 to (1) bring her apartment into a clean and sanitary
condition
within ten days FN1; (2) vacate and clean the storage unit within thirty days; (3)
immediately
remove from her window a sign which read, Please inquire at the office about
names
and addresses. Thank you. FN2 ; *423 and (4) put current license plates on her
car, inflate
the tires, and bring it into operable condition within ten days, or it would be towed
away at her
expense.FN3 Paullin testified that, upon receiving this letter, Sutton stated that she
was not
going to do a damn thing. Paullin spoke to his supervisor later that day concerning
the problems
with Mrs. Sutton, following up the call with a letter detailing the problems he was
having
with her. His supervisor instructed Paullin to serve a notice to quit upon Sutton.
This decision
was made within four days of the April 22 demand served upon Sutton. The notice
was
served May 2. At that time, Sutton had not removed the sign or the items in the
storage shed,
and had not repaired or removed the automobile. She vacated the premises on June
2, 1983,
and brought this action against S & D Management Inc. (S & D), the owners of the
apartments,
and against Robert Paullin. S & D appeals from a jury verdict awarding Sutton
$12,000
in compensatory and $88,000 in punitive damages.

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Tenant's Rights and Remedies Against Retaliatory Eviction by Landlord, 45

AMJUR POF 3d 375 (2011); 99 Am. Jur. Trials 289, Retaliatory Eviction Claims
(2011).
B Retaliatory Eviction with Respect to Particular Kinds of Leases
7 Fixed-term leases
C Retaliation for Particular Conduct by Tenant
9 Complaint of housing code violation or unfit condition of premises
10 Exercise of other legal rights
D Proof and Effect of Retaliatory Eviction
12 Tenant's burden of proof; rebuttable presumption of retaliation
12.5 Proof of intent; mixed motives; pretext
E Landlord's Defense of Retaliatory Eviction Claim
14 Rebutting evidence or presumption of retaliatory eviction, generally
15 Tenant's complaints made after notice to quit
16 Tenant's complaints not related to habitability of leased
premises
19 Effect of tenant's failure to pay rent or renew lease
III Model Discovery
23 Defendant tenant's interrogatories to plaintiff landlord
24 Tenant's request for production of documents
24.5 Other discovery considerations
IV Elements of Proof
25 Proof of landlord's retaliatory eviction of tenant; checklist
V Proof of Landlord's Retaliatory Eviction of Tenant For Reporting
Housing Code Violations
A Testimony of Tenant
26 Rental of premises
27 Landlord's violation of housing code
28 Tenant's complaint to landlord of unsatisfactory condition of premises
31 Service of notice to quit
32 Landlord's refusal to state reason for eviction
33 Absence of good cause for eviction
Judge Sferrazza, in his order as rendered at the conclusion of the 10/25/11
summary eviction proceeding and or during the 11/7/11 Hearing ruled that he was
finding that the landlord evicted Coughlin for non-payment of rent. Such is
reversible error where the court was foreclosed from making such a finding given
the defensive collateral estoppel bar presented by such (especially where it was
actually litigated) in the prescursor non-payment summary eviction case, in
addition to the landlord's failure to plead that any rent was owing in Rev2011001708, the subsequent no-cause summary eviction.
Presumptions and burden of proof 3,8-11,13[b],14[a],16:
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Particular Circumstances Affecting Application of Retaliatory Eviction

Remedy or Defense
8 Notice of eviction following report within short period of time
10[a] Tenant fails to pay rent or renew leaseRetaliatory eviction
established or supportable
11[a] Tenant's report follows evictionRetaliatory eviction established
or supportable
16 Other or unspecified considerations
Many statutes prohibiting a landlord from evicting a tenant out of retaliation
for the tenant's reporting of the landlord's violation of law include a rebuttable
presumption against the landlord once certain facts are established. The burden of
proof is then shifted to the landlord to rebut that presumption. In one case, a tenant
created a rebuttable presumption by establishing that an eviction proceeding was
initiated against her after she made a report to code enforcement authorities that her
furnace was not in good working condition. The burden of proof was shifted to the
landlord, who failed to rebut the presumption that the eviction proceeding was
brought in retaliation. Cornell V Dimmick (1973) 73 Misc 2d 384, 342 Nys2d 275.
The 10/27/11 FOFCOL was changed by Judge Sferrazza's 11/7/11 Amended
Order, especially where the 10/27/11 FOFCOL reads:
10.2. Coughlin failed to present any evidence that he
"complained in good faith to the landlord or a law enforcement agency
of a violation of [NRS Chapter 118A] or of a specific statute that
imposes a criminal penalty" as required by NRS 118A.510(1)(b).
10.3. Coughlin failed to present any evidence that prior to being
served with the referenced termination and eviction notices, Coughlin
had "instituted or defended against a judicial or administrative proceeding
or arbitration in which [he] raised an issue of compliance with the
requirements of [NRS Chapter 118A] respecting the habitability of
dwelling units" as required by NRS 118A.510(1)(e). (NOTE: that last little
bit, as required by NRS 118A.510(1)(e) is a possible RPC 3.1, 3.3, and
3.4 violation by Baker where he presented his proposed FOFCOLOSE
containing such a misstatement of the text of NSR 118A.510(1)(e)).
Landlord Merliss violated NRS 118A.510 in retaliating against Coughlin.
NRS 118A.510 Retaliatory conduct by landlord against tenant
prohibited; remedies; exceptions.
1. Except as otherwise provided in subsection 3, the landlord may not, in
retaliation, terminate a tenancy, refuse to renew a tenancy,... or bring or
threaten to bring an action for possession if:..(e) The tenant has instituted or
defended against a judicial or administrative proceeding or arbitration in which the
tenant raised an issue of habitability...
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Actually, Dr. Merliss evicted Coughlin in retaliation for Coughlin

asserting his rights pursuant to Merliss's own 6/2/11 written agreement to the setoffs for fixing issues as detailed therein, in addition to, to whatever extent such is
even necessary, the rent deductions provided for in the lease where for any
reason the premises are rendered untenatable (such as Merliss's landscapers
wreaking havoc thereupon on May 23rd, 2011, of which Coughlin complain to
Merliss in writing, including about the criminal law violations referenced in NRS
118A.510(b)), and the NRS 118A.510(b) violation of this Chapter attendant to
Merliss bringing or threatening to bring an action for possession upon Coughlin
asserting his rights to a NRS 118A.360 fix and deduct approach upon Merliss
failing to address Coughlin numerous such notices within the allotted 14 days, in
addition to Merliss immediately hiring an attorney and referring Coughlin to such
upon Coughlin asserting his rights to 48 hours notice, pursuant to the lease, prior to
any entry by the landlord or his agents, as detailed in the written exchange between
Merliss and Coughlin on 8/16/11. Not such great logical leaps, really.

So, as to the holding in Mayes, while the WCSO Civil Division ought have a
hard time keeping a straight face in alleging it need rely on the 10/27/11
FOFCOLOSE to know whether or not Nevada law requiring, at the very lease, the
posting of such summary eviction 24 hour lockout order and the passing of 24
hours prior to such lockout being carried out, Hill's associate Baker provides the
WCSO with a good argument that Hill's office bares a higher degree of culpability
where such 10/27/11 FOFCOLOSE fails to include the required within 24 hours
language mandated by NRS 40.253(5).
Furthermore, the Marshal, as an officer of the court, is entitled to rely on
the presumption of regularity (see, CPLR 4520), which has long been accorded to
the conduct of the affairs of her office (see, Burkhard v. Smith, 19 Misc. 31, 42
N.Y.S. 638 [1896]), and defendant law firm has failed to make a prima facie
showing to overcome the presumption by demonstrating that she knowingly or
negligently executed an invalid warrant (cf., De Zego v. Bruhn, 67 N.Y.2d 875,
877, 501 N.Y.S.2d 801, 492 N.E.2d 1217). Nor do plaintiffs suggest that the
outcome should be otherwise. They state that counsel, in the person of Jacob
Goodman, admitted his office instructed the Marshal to execute a warrant that he
himself had agreed to vacate, and that led to a major screw-up. The law firm
defendants are therefore responsible as a matter of law for the illegal eviction.

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As to the Washoe County Sheriff's Office's (and the RPD) burglaries on

Coughlin (at least 4).(2) Initially, Kalian and Pari contend that the clerk of the Sixth
Division District Court acted contrary to the provisions of G.L.1956 (1969
Reenactment) s 9-25-21 in entering the return date of June 13, 1977, upon the
execution for possession of Elsie's apartment. Since the execution was issued on
May 23, 1977, it was valid for twenty days. According to Kalian and Pari, this
alleged error would render the execution irregular but not void because the statute
affords a successful plaintiff a three-month period during which the execution can
be served. This argument is not persuasive, for the execution's twenty-day return
date is clearly sanctioned by s 9-25-21, which requires that (e)very execution
issued by any district court shall, unless otherwise specifically provided therein, be
returnable three (3) months after the date thereof, and be returned to the district
court which issued it. (Emphasis added.) This language indicates that, in the
absence of a date specified on the execution, the date of return is to be three months
after issuance. June 13, 1977, was the date inserted on the execution in question;
thus, Kalian and Pari could not lawfully act on the execution after this date. It may
be that the execution in question was issued as the result of the summary procedure
set forth in s 34-18-9(a), where the ground for the ejectment is nonpayment of rent.
In the event judgment is issued for the landlord, this statute specifically requires
that the execution shall be issued only to the sheriff. If the sheriff or his deputy does
not execute the mandates of the execution within twenty days of its issuance, the
sheriff must appear before the justice of the court issuing the execution on the
day following this twenty-day period to show cause why the court's mandate was
not carried out. .... If Kalian and Pari were dissatisfied with the execution, they
could have returned to the District Court and sought the issuance of an alias
execution. Instead, they chose to evict Elsie under an invalid execution, thereby
subjecting themselves to liability for trespass. Russell v. Kalian, 414 A.2d 462
(R.I., Apr 28, 1980). 17 Causes of Action 809, Cause of Action Against Landlord
for Conversion of Personal Property in Possession of Tenant (2012) HN: 2,3
(A.2d).
RMC Judge Howard abused the contempt power in summarily sentencing an
attorney actively engaged in representing clients to three days in jail while also
violating the Sixth Amendment (refusing to appoint counsel in violation of
Aigersinger where Coughlin's 10/26/11 application for such met the per se
indigency standards established by the 2008 Indigent Defense Order) in
countenancing a violation of both NRS 171.136, and NRS 171.1255 (Reno Sparks
Indian Colony Police routinely make misdemeanor arrests at the Indian Colony
Walmart despite Nevada law forbidding such misdemeanor arrests by "tribal police,
so just as the WCSO has potentially vast liability for the systemic burglaries its
deputies conduct in failing to accord the passing of 24 hours from, at the very least,
posting a 24 hour summary eviction lockout order on a tenant's door, so to does the
RMC, RCA, and City of Reno where the RCA continually offers "evidence"
obtained via searches incident to unlawful misdemeanor arrests by tribal police)
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that RCA prosecutor Pamela Robert was fully aware of when she suborned the
perjury of RSIC Officer Kameron Crawford and Walmart's Thomas Frontino in
RMC 11 CR 22716 (see NSCT 60838): http://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=JEn3phdRVgI
Further, Judge Howard violated the following as well, especially where
asserted basis for the three day summary incarceration were plainly pretextual and
he was punishing Coughlin for his 11/29/11 Motion For Sanctions against RCA
Pamela Roberts, Esq., and an interaction with RMC Marshal Menzel, and filing
office staff occurring outside the court's presence, where Coughlin (also, in
violation of NRS 1.230, 1.235) moved for Judge Howard to recuse himself form the
contempt trial: Statute providing that in all cases of contempt arising without
immediate view and presence of court, judge of court in whose contempt defendant
is alleged to be, shall not preside at such trial over objection of defendant, is
constitutional. N.C.L.1929, 8943. McCormick v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court in
and for Humboldt County, 1950, 218 P.2d 939, 67 Nev. 318.
1/12/12 (RMC 12 CR 00696) a shameful custodial arrest for jaywalking
outside Coughlin's former home law office Sifre ordered RPD Officer's Leedy and
Look to make, where all officers violated the law in failing to inform Coughlin he
was being arrested, then again in failing to indicate why he was being arrested):
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=7vlEI1fJJWc ,
1/14/12 (RPD Sargent Sifre ordered his second custodial arrest of Coughlin
in 48 hours, working with ECOMM dispatchers (where RPD Officer Duralde's
wife, Jessica is an ECOMM dispatcher) in the joint vindictive misconduct
displayed therein, where Sifre was also caught on tape indicating a level of
complicity with the Reno Justice Court in that regard), and in retaliation for
Coughlin obtaining a confession from RPD Sargent Marcia Lopez just the day
before, on 1/13/12 regarding the misconduct by she and RPD Officer Chris Carter,
Jr. in burglarizing Coughlin's former home law office incident to the wrongful
11/13/11 wrongful arrest of Coughlin for criminal
trespass: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VcVDVjFK64g

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The City of Reno Marshals Harley, Coppa, etc. got in on the act on 2/27/12
in lying to Judge Nash Holmes in 11 TR 26800 (integral to the fraudulent attempt
to permanently disbar Coughlin in 62337) incident to the 5 day summary
incarceration Coughlin ws subjected to where NRS 22.030(2) was violated.
The City of Reno Marshals have lied in a fraudulent attempt to have an
attorney disbarred incident to RMC 11 TR 26800 (a "simple traffic citation" trial
stemming from the three traffic tickets RPD Sargent John Tarter issued Coughlin
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outside the law office of opposing counsel in the summary eviction from Coughlin's
former home law office in Rev2011-001708, Richard G. Hill, Esq., shortly after
Sargnet Tarter directed Coughlin to leave (which Coughlin did) where Coughlin
appeared as Hill's law office seeking the return of his wallet, smartphone, hard
drives, client's files, state issued identification, and client's files incident to Hill and
RPD Sargent Marcia Lopez and Officer Chris Carter, Jr. burglarizing Coughlin's
former home law office on 11/13/11.
The State Bar of Nevada seeks to mischaracterize such summary contempt
Order of 2/28/12 as "criminal contempt" in hopes of taking advantage of SCR
111(5), though Asst Bar Counsel has failed to file any SCR 111 petition reporting
any such "criminal conviction" presenting a defensive collateral estoppel bar of
Coughlin's own in that regard, beyond the fact that Judge Nash Holmes cited to a
plenary civil contempt statute anyways in her 2/28/12 Order. The best way to
distinguish civil from criminal contempt is to examine the penalty sought or
imposed. If the defendant holds the keys to the jail and can purge himself from
the contempt finding by committing an affirmative act (such as Coughlin's paying
the $500 Judge Nash Holmes ordered as an alterantive to incarceration on 2/27/12),
the contempt is civil in nature. An example of such civil contempt punishment is a
judges ruling that a defendant shall be incarcerated until he brings current his
support arrearage. If the defendant brings his arrearage current, he may be released.
In this situation, the defendant has an opportunity to purge himself of the civil
contempt. Conversely, if the defendants punishment is unmodifiable by action
from the defendant, then the contempt is criminal. An examples of such criminal
contempt would be a fixed unconditional jail sentences. Richmond Black Police
Officers Assn v. City of Richmond, 548 F. 2d 123 (4th Cir. 1977); Steelworkers v.
Newport News, 220 Va. 547 (1979); and Mine Workers v.Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821
(1994). Coughlin's summary five day incarceration, however, was conditional,
with Judge Nash Holmes admitting that she ruled that Coughlin could, in the
alterantive, pay a $500 fine and avoid such incarceration.
Sanction for civil contempt is characterized by court's desire to compensate
contemnor's adversary for injuries which result from noncompliance; however,
award to opposing party is limited to that party's actual loss. State, Dept. of Indus.
Relations, Div. of Indus. Ins. Regulation v. Albanese, 1996, 919 P.2d 1067, 112
Nev. 851.Contempt 74 Contempt 75
In the case of Kessler v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 14, 441 S.E.2d 223
(1994), the court of appeals set forth the test for distinguishing civil from criminal
contempt. In that case, the trial court found the defendant in civil contempt for his
willful failure to pay child support as ordered. The trial court then sentenced the
defendant to eleven months in jail without any provision allowing the defendant to
purge himself of such contempt by payment of all or a portion of his support
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arrearages. On appeal, the court ruled that the contempt was criminal not civil since
there was no opportunity for the defendant to purge himself of the contempt. 9
Order requiring Indian tribe to post $10,000 bond if it violated injunctions in
contempt order was a civil contempt order rather than a criminal contempt order; ?
condition was designed to coerce tribe's compliance. In re Determination of
Relative Rights of Claimants and Appropriators of Waters of Humboldt River
Stream System and Tributaries, 2002, 59 P.3d 1226, 118 Nev. 901. Since a civil
contempt sanction is designed to coerce the contemnor into complying with a court
order, it must be conditional or intermediate, i.e., it must end if the contemnor
complies; ?in contrast, a criminal contempt sanction is intended to punish the
contemnor for disobeying a court order and, thus, must be determinate or
unconditional. Warner v. Second Judicial Dist. Court In and For County of
Washoe, 1995, 906 P.2d 707, 111 Nev. 1379. Part of judgment for contempt,
directing imprisonment in county jail until fine imposed is paid, held invalid.
Comp.Laws 1929, 8950, 8951. State v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court in and for
Humboldt County, 1931, 1 P.2d 105, 53 Nev. 343. A witness was asked a number
of questions, all being addressed to the same point, which he refused to answer. The
court found him guilty of a separate contempt for every question that he refused to
answer. Held, that he was guilty of but one contempt, and the court had jurisdiction
to impose but one sentence. Maxwell v. Rives, 1876, 11 Nev. 213. A witness was
asked a number of questions, all being addressed to the same point, which he
refused to answer. The court found him guilty of a separate contempt for every
question that he refused to answer. Held, that he was guilty of but one contempt,
and the court had jurisdiction to impose but one sentence. Maxwell v. Rives, 1876,
11 Nev. 213. (Judge Nash Holmes took two turns at the plate in adjuciatory
Coughlin's alleged contemptuous conduct in both her 2/28/12 and 3/12/12 Order in
11 TR 26800).
Presence of court: Though a grand jury is an adjunct of the court, it is not
such part thereof as, under Comp. Laws, 3556, authorizing summary punishment
for a contempt in the immediate presence of the court, permits the judge to
summarily punish offenders for any act before the grand jury, without proceeding
on affidavit and citing the offender to show cause why he should not be punished.
Ex parte Hedden, 1907, 90 P. 737, 29 Nev. 352, 13 Am.Ann.Cas. 1173. Contempt 6
Affidavits: Order to show cause complaining of alleged contemptuous
conduct of wife and her attorney in recording property settlement agreement with
county recorder's office after district court had ordered all records in the matter to
be sealed should have been accompanied by affidavit, as complained of conduct
was not committed in immediate view and presence of court or judge in chambers.
N.R.S. 22.030, subd. 2. Awad v. Wright, 1990, 794 P.2d 713, 106 Nev. 407.
Where suit was begun in 1907 to establish water rights of various
appropriators on river system, and decree was entered in 1919, changes in
ownership were understandable, and contempt petition for violation of decree
containing information and belief verification of allegations setting forth history
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of suit and rights granted to each of parties thereto, was sufficient. N.C.L.1929,
8943. McCormick v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court in and for Humboldt County,
1950, 218 P.2d 939, 67 Nev. 318.
An affidavit that defendants had continued to enlarge a ditch across
plaintiff's ranch in violation of an injunction held sufficient to confer jurisdiction on
the court to proceed against them for contempt, under Rev. Laws 1912, 5396, as
amended by St. 1913, c. 94, requiring that the affidavit present the facts
constituting the contempt, though tested by an original proceeding in prohibition
rather than on certiorari, in which there is no chance to amend the affidavit;
lack of jurisdiction being the only ground on which either writ will issue. State
v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 1922, 211 P. 105, 46 Nev. 410.
To give jurisdiction of a proceeding for contempt, a substantial and general
statement in the affidavit is sufficient. Strait v. Williams, 1884, 4 P. 1083, 18 Nev.
43.
Judge: In case of contempt arising outside view of court, judge should have
recused herself in response to peremptory challenge. N.R.S. 22.030, subd. 3.
Awad v. Wright, 1990, 794 P.2d 713, 106 Nev. 407. Judges 51(4)
Counsel's failure to appear for scheduled hearing before the Supreme Court,
conduct occurring within immediate view and presence of the court, was a direct
rather than a indirect, contempt; hence, the Supreme Court was not disqualified
from presiding over the contempt proceedings. N.R.S. 22.030, subd. 3. Gipson v.
State, 1986, 714 P.2d 1007, 102 Nev. 61. (
NOTE: the holding in Stuhff, that
for conduct to disrupt a tribunal such must occur in a courtroom arguably brings
the utility of Gipson into doubt).
Order of court - In general: For purposes of statute governing summary
contempt proceedings for direct contempt committed in judge's presence, which
requires court to enter an order, while a trial court's oral contempt order is
immediately enforceable, a written order including the statute's required elements
must be promptly entered. Houston v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. County
of Clark, 2006, 135 P.3d 1269, 122 Nev. 544. Contempt 52
Order of court Sufficiency: Appropriate remedy for attorney who had been
found in direct contempt of court in divorce proceeding in which he represented wife,
where contempt order had been found to be insufficient by Supreme Court, in that it did
not contain a sufficient statement concerning what conduct was held to be contemptuous,
was to permit trial court to enter amended order, given that Supreme Court's opinion
addressed issue of first impression and announced standard for contents of written
contempt order. Houston v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. County of Clark,

2006, 135 P.3d 1269, 122 Nev. 544. Contempt 66(8)

A written summary contempt order, issued pursuant to statute governing
summary contempt proceedings for direct contempt committed in judge's presence,
must set forth specific facts concerning the conduct found to be contemptuous.
Houston v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. County of Clark, 2006, 135 P.3d
1269, 122 Nev. 544.
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Written summary contempt order finding attorney for wife in divorce proceeding
in direct contempt of court failed to indicate what particular comments by attorney were
held to be contemptuous, and, thus, order was insufficient, under statute governing
summary contempt proceedings for direct contempt committed in judge's presence.

Houston v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. County of Clark, 2006, 135 P.3d
1269, 122 Nev. 544.
Sufficiency, order of court: Appropriate remedy for attorney who had been
found in direct contempt of court in divorce proceeding in which he represented wife,
where contempt order had been found to be insufficient by Supreme Court, in that it did
not contain a sufficient statement concerning what conduct was held to be
contemptuous, was to permit trial court to enter amended order, given that Supreme
Court's opinion addressed issue of first impression and announced standard for
contents of written contempt order. Houston v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel.

County of Clark, 2006, 135 P.3d 1269, 122 Nev. 544. Contempt 66(8)
A written summary contempt order, issued pursuant to statute governing
summary contempt proceedings for direct contempt committed in judge's presence,
must set forth specific facts concerning the conduct found to be contemptuous.
Houston v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel. County of Clark, 2006, 135 P.3d
1269, 122 Nev. 544. Contempt 52
Written summary contempt order finding attorney for wife in divorce
proceeding in direct contempt of court failed to indicate what particular comments
by attorney were held to be contemptuous, and, thus, order was insufficient,
under statute governing summary contempt proceedings for direct contempt
committed in judge's presence. Houston v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel.
County of Clark, 2006, 135 P.3d 1269, 122 Nev. 544. Contempt 52
Both the 11/30/11 Order Punishing Summary Contempt by RMC Judge
Howard and the 2/28/12 Order summarily punishing direct contempt by Coughlin
via citing to a plenary civil contempt statute are violative of all the precedent
presented in Houston.
The RPD continued its misconduct incident to the summary eviction in
Rev2012-001048, with Officer Alan Weaver, Sargent Brian Dye, Sargent Oliver
Miller, and Lt. Kevin Brown all actively involved in violating Soldal v. Cook
County and committing other 42 USC 1983 violations, including those in
connection with the 7/3/12 arrest in RMC 12 CR 12420.
On 1/16/13 RMC Judge W. Garnder (whom failed to reveal during the 2/2/12
hearing in the criminal trespass prosecution in RMC 11 CR 26405 that his sisters is
2JDC Judge L. Gardner (see NSCT cases 54844, 53833, 60302, 60317, 62337)
Also, see Nevada Supreme Court cases 61901, 62337, 61383, 60838, 62104,
63342, etc. much of which is available on the Courts site and or scribd.com
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The WCSO refuses to follow Nevada law, and instead systematically burglarizes
tenants, which the RMC, RJC, and 2JDC, and SBN, some might say, all
countenance
Here's how the Clark County Assistant Manager approached a similar situation:
http://www.reviewjournal.com/news/crime-courts/victim-family-court-gropingincident-files-federal-lawsuit
Sincerely,

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NVB Judge Beesley's testimony at Coughlin's 11/14/12 FORMAL

DISCIPLINARY HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 4:2 to 32:20) RENO, NEVADA;
WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 14TH, 2012; 9:00 A.M. -oOo- MR.
ECHEVERRIA: This is the date set for the disciplinary hearing en re Zachary B.
Coughlin. The time is now 8:56. The hearing was originally noticed for 9:00
o'clock. Last week on November 7th the panel met by telephone conference, and
given some issues to be dealt with we issued an order requiring the hearing to start
at 8:45. It is now 8:56. Mr. Coughlin is not present. We have information that he
did phone the State Bar office and said that he would be late. The reason we're
proceeding in the absence of Mr. Coughlin is that one of the witnesses, Judge
Beesley, is in Las Vegas and can only testify between 9:00 and 9:30, and so we're
commencing the hearing in the absence of Mr. Coughlin, despite his absence,
because the hearing was noticed to commence at 8:45. With that, does any panel
member have any other comments before we proceed with the testimony of Judge
Beesley? Mr. King? MR. KING: Could I ask the chairman for the record to
introduce the panel members in attendance, and then I will -- MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Panel members for this hearing are Mr. Steve Kent, Mr. Clark Vellis, Mr. Michael
Johnson, and Karen Pearl. And I'm the chairman, John Echeverria. MR. KING: My
name is Patrick King on behalf of the State Bar of Nevada. With the chairman's
permission, I would like to take a witness. The honorable federal Judge Bruce
Beesley, has information that I think the panel will find relevant to Mr. Coughlin's
hearing, and I would ask permission to call him at this time. MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Has Mr. Coughlin been notified that Judge Beesley is an expected witness? MR.
KING: Yes, he has. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Thank you. MR. KING: In candor, Mr.
Coughlin has sent via e-mail many, many pages, and I'm not exaggerating when I
say hundreds of pages of e-mails. And in many of those e-mails he's protested my
calling any witnesses, proceeding with the hearing, and specifically protested
against having any judges not physically present testify by phone. I had noticed that
these people would be testifying via phone, which is why he's aware of that. And I
would ask that the chair allow any judge to testify by phone. MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Unless any panel member has an objection, that's so ordered. MR. KING: Thank
you. I will now try to reach Judge Beesley. (Placing call to Judge Beesley.) MR.
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ECHEVERRIA: Let the record reflect that it's now 9:02, and Mr. Coughlin has
joined the hearing. Mr. Coughlin, we're waiting to connect with Judge Beesley who
is the first scheduled witness to appear between 9:00 and 9:30. MR. COUGHLIN:
I object to him appearing. He wasn't noticed until far too close in time -- MR.
ECHEVERRIA: I didn't hear. Can you speak louder? MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir.
I don't believe he was appropriately noticed of the hearing, this hearing. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Mr. King? MR. KING: As the record reflects, Mr. Coughlin was
served a copy of the complaint to the address that he is mandated to provide to the
State Bar. MR. COUGHLIN: I don't believe that's correct. MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Please don't interrupt, Mr. Coughlin. Go ahead. MR. KING: Subsequently, Mr.
Coughlin filed, immediately after we mailed the complaint via certified and regular
mail, Mr. Coughlin filed a motion to dismiss the complaint. MR. ECHEVERRIA: I
think his argument here is that he wasn't notified that Judge Beesley would be a
potential witness. MR. KING: We sent a supplemental notice to Mr. Coughlin that
we intended to call Judge Beesley. MR. COUGHLIN: I'm sorry. If I can just
interject quickly. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin. MR. COUGHLIN: -before the proceeding -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin. MR. COUGHLIN:
Yes, sir. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Please don't interrupt. MR. COUGHLIN: May I
record the proceedings? MR. KING: I'm handing, with the chairman's permission,
a copy of the supplemental notice. In addition, as I indicated, the purpose of calling
Mr. Beesley is to assist the panel to understand Mr. Coughlin's conduct in his court,
and also as a potential rebuttal witness. Unfortunately, Judge Beesley is in Las
Vegas and is only available between 9:00 and 9:30. So what I would ask the panel
to do is to allow, as an offer of proof, allow Judge Beesley to testify. And then if
the panel subsequently determines for some reason that it's not appropriate, rebuttal
testimony -- MR. COUGHLIN: I'm sorry. I need to enter, this is a special -- MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin. MR. COUGHLIN: -- I need to submit that for the
record. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Please don't interrupt. MR. COUGHLIN: I need to
submit that for the record. MR. ECHEVERRIA: You'll get your opportunity. MR.
KING: Judge Beesley, my name is Patrick King. I represent the State Bar of
Nevada in a disciplinary hearing involving Zach Coughlin. Did you understand that
that was the matter in which you were going to testify to this morning? JUDGE
BEESLEY: Yes. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Just a second, Mr. King. Let me state on
the record that because of the time constraints, I'm going to rule that we can take
the testimony of Judge Beesley, subject to Mr. Coughlin's later objection. He does
have an objection. Given the time constraints, he has not had an opportunity to put
on the record his objection. I'd like to take the testimony of Judge Beesley, and then
listen to Mr. Coughlin's objection. MR. COUGHLIN: I did file a -- MR. KING:
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Judge Beesley, the panel consists of John Echeverria -I'm not pronouncing the name -- but there's five panel members. JUDGE
BEESLEY: John Echeverria. You have not spent enough time in Nevada. MR.
KING: That is correct. Thank you for that. Across from me is sitting Mr. Coughlin,
Zachary Coughlin. And in the room also is a court reporter. There's no one else in
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the room other than some court security. So what I'm going to ask you, Judge
Beesley, if you could explain to the panel your knowledge of Mr. Coughlin relative
to the Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct related to -- MR. COUGHLIN:
Objection. Relevancy. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Excuse me, Mr. King. We probably
should administer the oath to Judge Beesley. MR. KING: Judge Beesley, the court
reporter will administer you the oath. MR. COUGHLIN: I'm going to object on
relevancy grounds. BRUCE BEESLEY Having been first duly sworn, testified as
follows: DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. KING: Q Judge Beesley, can you
explain to the panel your knowledge in this relevant time frame 2011-2012
regarding Mr. Coughlin and his conduct in your court? A Mr. Coughlin appeared
in my court a couple of times, at least two or three times. The first time I recall him
coming to my court he came in, he was wearing, I think, a T-shirt and a tie, and no
jacket. And he indicated that he had been evicted from his residence or his office,
indicating it was not because of not paying the rent, and that that was why he wasn't
what I would consider appropriately dressed. I apologize. I don't have my letter in
front of me. But my recollection is that he had filed a pleading on behalf of his
client in regard to some aspect of a bankruptcy case, and that the pleading was
lengthy, didn't make any sense, and just sort of rambled through a great deal of
irrelevant stuff. I had him a couple other times in my court and had the same
experience, that -- he was dressed appropriately the other times I had him there, and
he was very polite and appeared to be a very intelligent man. But his pleadings
didn't make any sense. His arguments didn't make any sense. And I became
concerned that he was suffering from alcohol or drug abuse or had some sort of
mental issues which were preventing him from being able to represent his client. I
talked to -- I made some inquiries of the court and State Bar if there was anything -the federal court first, if there was anything that I had authority to do to try and get
Mr. Coughlin some help and learned that I could not. I then talked to, I think I
talked to Coe Swobe, who is Lawyers Concerned for Lawyers -- MR. COUGHLIN:
Objection. Relevancy. This wasn't noticed either or -- no -- or mentioned in the
DOSEAL, which you didn't serve appropriately, and you're violating SCR 102 -1052(c). MR. ECHEVERRIA: Overruled. THE WITNESS: I talked to Mr. Swobe
who indicated that the State Bar did have some services available, and that he had
been in contact with Mr. Coughlin. That's really all he told me. And it became
apparent to me that over a period of a couple months at least and I also learned of
some other odd behavior in some of the courts with judges that I knew. MR.
COUGHLIN: Objection. Hearsay. THE WITNESS: But based on -- MR.
COUGHLIN: Objection. Can I get a ruling on my objection before you continue
testifying? MR. KING: I'm going to ask the chairman to direct Mr. Coughlin not to
shout or make speaking objections. MR. ECHEVERRIA: I'm going to do that. You
can do it -- I appreciate being able to be heard, but we can do it at a lower level, Mr.
Coughlin. MR. COUGHLIN: You didn't seem to hear me. MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Madam Reporter, would you please read back the answer to which Mr. Coughlin
was objecting. (Record read by the reporter.) MR. ECHEVERRIA: The objection
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is hearsay. Mr. King? MR. KING: The judge was just about to testify as to the
action he took based on the information he received, and that is the purpose of the
information is to show why he took the action he did. MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Overruled. MR. KING: Thank you, Judge. THE WITNESS: I'm not quite sure
where I was in my testimony, but based on the discussions I had, and the
information I got from other people, it became apparent to me that there wasn't a
program that was going to -- MR. COUGHLIN: Objection. Foundation. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Mr. King? MR. KING: The testimony is clear. He's explaining
the actions he took relative to Mr. Coughlin's conduct, which is the purpose.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Overruled. MR. COUGHLIN: He was specifying -- MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin. MR. COUGHLIN: -- no foundation for what he
was asserting. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, I've overruled your objection.
MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Please proceed, Judge. BY MR.
KING: Q I apologize, your Honor, for the interruption. But you were just about to
testify as to what action you took with respect to the information you learned. A
What I did was I wrote a letter to the State Bar explaining what had occurred with
Mr. Coughlin, indicating, I believe, that I thought that in his current state he was
not able to represent his clients adequately, and that the State Bar should look into
it. I think that was the extent of what I did in summary. BY MR. KING: Q Based
on your actual personal knowledge of Mr. Coughlin, would you believe that he has
violated Nevada Rules of Professional Conduct? MR. COUGHLIN: Objection.
Calls for an expert opinion. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Excuse me. Overruled. MR.
COUGHLIN: I said objection, Pat. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin. Settle
down. You do not need to yell in this proceeding. BY MR. KING: Q Would you
be of the opinion -- MR. COUGHLIN: I said objection, Pat. MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Mr. Coughlin. MR. COUGHLIN: Can we get a ruling from the judge? Can we
have some due process here, Pat? MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, do not raise
your voice again in this proceeding. MR. COUGHLIN: If this is a proceeding, it
needs to be handled like a proceeding according to the rules of evidence. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: That's true. And that's what we're doing. MR. COUGHLIN: No,
it's not. MR. ECHEVERRIA: And I'm going to overrule your objection. Please
proceed. BY MR. KING: Q Have you formed an opinion, your Honor, as to
whether or not Mr. Coughlin is competent to practice law? A Yes. Q And what is
that opinion? A I don't believe he is, unfortunately. MR. KING: Thank you very
much. I have no further questions. I really appreciate your time. The panel in these
settings may ask you questions or they may have questions for you, as well as, I
suspect, Mr. Coughlin. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, do you have any
cross-examination? MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir. CROSS-EXAMINATION BY
MR. COUGHLIN: Q Good morning, Judge Beesley, your Honor. A Morning. Q
I'm sorry to hear you feel that way about me, sir, but I would like to ask you a few
questions. A Certainly. Q I would bet that your statements are made out of
concern. A They are. Q So I appreciate that, sir. And I don't mean for my
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reactions this morning to indicate anything other than a complete and utter lack -- a
complete and utter respect for you, sir. A I don't take it any other way. Q Thank
you, sir. But it's out of a profound respect for the law and due process that I'm
acting the way I am. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Do you have a question, Mr. Coughlin?
MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, I do. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Did you have Karen Sabo
as a member of your firm at one point? A Yes, I did. Q Can you describe any
connection between myself and Karen Sabo that you might be aware of? A I'm not
aware of any. MR. KING: Objection. Relevance. MR. ECHEVERRIA: The
relevance, Mr. Coughlin? MR. COUGHLIN: I couldn't hear the judge, sir. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: I'm asking you the relevance of that question. MR. COUGHLIN:
But to the extent that the judge's speaker is right next to Mr. King, I believe it's
affording him an impermissible advantage. I couldn't hear what the judge just said.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Doesn't matter. You asked a question about was Judge
Beesley aware of any relationship between you and this lady. MR. COUGHLIN:
Yes. Just for -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: Wait a minute. Mr. King objected on
relevance. Your proffer of relevancy? MR. COUGHLIN: Well, sir, if I can just
preserve for the record. You said that if Mr. King is obtaining an impermissible
advantage it doesn't matter to you. MR. ECHEVERRIA: I didn't say that. MR.
COUGHLIN: That's what I heard. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Please address the issue
at hand. What is the relevancy of your relationship with this former lawyer and Mr.
Beesley's law firm? You're pausing on that -- MR. COUGHLIN: Because this is a
respected federal judge, sir. But I am suing Ms. Sabo's organization right now. MR.
KING: I would object on the ground that it goes beyond the scope of direct. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: The relevancy of that? MR. COUGHLIN: His objection is
relevant. My response, with all due respect to the Honorable Judge Beesley, it goes
somewhat to witness bias. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, the issue is very
narrow. The question is what is the relevancy of your relationship with this Ms.
Sabo? How is that relevant to the issues in this proceeding? MR. COUGHLIN: I
believe it bears on Judge Beesley's testimony. I don't know quite the extent to
which -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: Objection sustained. MR. KING: For the record,
the judge did answer. And for Mr. Coughlin's benefit, he said he was not aware of
any such relationship. Did I mischaracterize your testimony, your Honor? THE
WITNESS: That's what I said. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Next question, please. MR.
COUGHLIN: Can I clarify? He wasn't aware of any such relationship meaning?
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, please address another issue. MR.
COUGHLIN: A basis for conflict. Yes, sir. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Judge
Beesley, did you testify on behalf of Stephen R. Harris recently? MR. KING:
Objection. Relevance. MR. ECHEVERRIA: The relevance, Mr. Coughlin? MR.
COUGHLIN: I didn't hear Judge Beesley again. MR. ECHEVERRIA: That
doesn't matter. MR. COUGHLIN: It doesn't matter that Pat can hear him, but I
can't hear him? MR. ECHEVERRIA: No. I can't hear the judge either, because you
interrupted him. MR. COUGHLIN: Just now? MR. ECHEVERRIA: Yes. There's
an objection as to relevancy as to whether or not what relevancy -- MR.
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COUGHLIN: I objected. I didn't interrupt him. MR. ECHEVERRIA: I asked you

to explain the relevancy. MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir. I'm trying to remember the
question. MR. ECHEVERRIA: The question was did he testify on behalf of Mr.
Harris. The relevance of that issue in this proceeding? MR. COUGHLIN: Well, I
think it provides a basis for me comparing Judge Beesley's response to me being
evicted to his response to Mr. Harris's issues. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Overruled -I'm sorry, sustained. Next question, please. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Judge
Beesley, what in particular did you notice about my work product -- when did you
first contact Mr. King about me? A When did I first contact who? Q Mr. King.
Bar counsel for the State Bar. A I don't know that I ever contacted Mr. King. I sent
a letter to the State Bar. I think it was probably addressed to Mr. Clark, but I'm not
positive. Q So I'm sorry for that, your Honor. I do recall you saying you sent a
letter now. Did you ever speak with Bar counsel Patrick King with regard to me? A
The only time I recall speaking to him was a few weeks ago or a few days -probably a few weeks ago when he asked me if I would be able to testify at this
hearing. Q Are you aware of any extent to which Mr. King has violated SCR 121's
confidentiality dictates by contacting my clients prior to any SCR 11 petition? A
Hold on one second. Go ahead. I'm sorry. Am I aware that Mr. King violated a
particular statute? In what manner? Q Whether or not he violated one? A No,
I'm not, one way or the other. Q Do you have knowledge of there being a motive
for Mr. King to all of a sudden seek to bring you into this forum in that he has been
subject to an accusation setting forth a basis for this proceeding that relies primarily
upon some contention that you or -- I believe you yourself, your Honor, because
you're the only bankruptcy judge I appeared before -- but Mr. King telling his boss
and, apparently, at least one of my clients prior to my being suspended or even the
petition being filed, that your court had issued an order preventing me from
practicing there? A I have no idea what Mr. King may or may not have said to
anybody. But I do not recall issuing an order that said you couldn't practice there. Q
So can I take that to mean you haven't issued any such order? A I don't think so. I
sign probably 150 orders every day. So I don't remember all of them. I think
certainly I would have remembered a case not allowing you to practice there. But if
I did, it would have been because I was concerned that you weren't able to represent
your clients adequately, and they were being hurt. But I don't know that I did that.
Q What review did you undertake of my work product and filings in your court to
come to your opinions? A I looked through two or three pleadings that you had
filed in, I think you had one or perhaps two cases, and read them. And I observed
you arguing in court. Q When specifically? A I don't recall. Q Was your
testimony earlier today that the first time you recall being aware of me was when I
appeared at the March 15th hearing in Cado Company v. Keller at 2:30 P.M.
shortly after being evicted at gunpoint by the Washoe County Sheriffs -- A I
actually think you had appeared in front of me one time before that. But that was
my first strong recollection of you appearing in front of me. Q And it was that
brief interaction whereupon you formed your opinion that I wasn't fit to practice? A
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No. I thought it was odd, but I do understand that people have adversity in their
lives sometimes, which happens -- Q You took it to be adversity rather than
misconduct by the sheriff? MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, you interrupted the
witness. MR. COUGHLIN: Yes. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Go ahead, Judge. THE
WITNESS: And I believe that you had filed some pleading in that case. And I went
to the pleadings, and they frankly didn't make any sense. And I think you
subsequently filed pleadings in other cases which also didn't make any sense,
and I became concerned. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q At what point did you -- MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Excuse me, Mr. Coughlin. Quit interrupting the witness. MR.
COUGHLIN: I thought he was done, sir. I'm sorry. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Go
ahead, Judge. THE WITNESS: I became concerned, and I undertook further
inquiry with Mr. Swobe following that. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Your Honor, I
would like to narrow it down. When did you first contact the State Bar about me? A
I don't recall. I actually contacted Coe Swobe who works for the State Bar, but is
independent of them in most ways. Q When did you first contact Mr. Swobe? A I
think it was perhaps a month or six weeks after my first recollection of you
appearing, my first recollection of you appearing in front of me after you had been
evicted. Q You would be referring to the T-shirt and tie incident? A Yes. Q
With a suit jacket on though? A Yeah. And your apology was satisfactory,
although I thought your appearance was odd. Q Do you recall a hearing prior to
that in that same Cado Company v. Keller wherein Cado sought to amend their
adversary proceeding charges, and there was maybe a five- to ten-minute hearing
on that incident to which I submitted about a 15-page motion addressing the salient
points of law in that setting? A I cannot place it in the context of that case. But I
do remember you submitting a motion describing some points of law on something,
and I didn't think that that was competent work, frankly. Q You're referring to
which motion? A I don't know. I don't have any motion in front of me. Q So you
have a fairly strong opinion on it, yet you don't recall any specifics. Would that be
an accurate assessment of your testimony? A What I recall is that your appearance
in court was odd, and your pleadings were not truly comprehensible, and that and
further inquires made me concerned that you were having some difficulties that
prevented you from serving your client appropriately. Q Did you find any of my
work competent? A I don't believe I did. Q Not a single filing? MR. KING:
Objection. Argumentative. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Sustained. BY MR.
COUGHLIN: Q Sir, are you aware I was ranked 10th in my law school class, and
a National Merit finalist? MR. KING: Objection. Beyond the scope of direct. MR.
COUGHLIN: He testified as to my competency and my credibility as a lawyer and
a professional. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Your question had to do with what time
frame? MR. COUGHLIN: It has to do with my capabilities. MR. ECHEVERRIA:
In law school? MR. COUGHLIN: In life. MR. ECHEVERRIA: But you asked
about a specific event. Did that occur in law school? MR. COUGHLIN: What
event? MR. ECHEVERRIA: The merit scholar thing. MR. COUGHLIN: No.
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That's a standardized test. The top half of one percent of all high school juniors are
selected as national merit finalists. MR. ECHEVERRIA: You're inquiring about a
high school test? MR. COUGHLIN: I'm inquiring about the judge's representation
that he hasn't found one filing of mine competent. And the reason I'm going into
that is I believe it goes to this judge's credibility, frankly. MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Sustained. Next question, please. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Your Honor, I'd like to
narrow down some of these assessments you've made vis-a-vis when they occurred.
A Unless you can show me the document, I don't think I can help you with that. Q
But you've testified pretty definitively here today. So wouldn't that indicate some
negligence on your behalf in that regard? MR. KING: Objection. Argumentative.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Sustained. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Your Honor, do you
have any specific points of law or issues with which you can elucidate why you
question my competency to practice in your court? MR. KING: Objection. Asked
and answered. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Sustained. BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Do you
recall any of my work product in Cado and Company? A Not specifically, no. I
remember a fairly lengthy brief that you filed which, I think, was that case, that I
thought was rambling, addressing points of law which weren't relevant. I think had
some discussions of historical matters and some discussions of perhaps
constitutional law, but it wasn't really relevant to the matter that was in front of me.
MR. KING: Mr. Chairman, if you could be mindful of the fact that the judge has a
hearing he needs to attend, and advise Mr. Coughlin that he needs to be judicious in
his questions. MR. ECHEVERRIA: We have issued an order, Mr. Coughlin, that
limits the examination of witnesses on each side to 15 minutes. You have slightly
exceeded 15 minutes. If you have a few more questions to rapidly wrap this up. BY
MR. COUGHLIN: Q Your Honor, on Cado Company, wouldn't it indicate a fairly
high level of skill, particularly for one who hadn't been practicing in a bankruptcy
setting for very long at all for, one, to deduce that in that case Cado had issues with
respect to the fact that they had not renewed a dormant foreign judgment in that
under the Texas statute at issue, given the fact that the judgment was over ten years
old, and within the two years under the statute within which they had to take some
act to revive a dormant judgment, they failed to do so. Wouldn't the fact that I
pointed that out in a brief, and specifically cited to relevant legal research with
respect to what particular acts would qualify as reviving a dormant judgment in that
respect, wouldn't that indicate some level of competency? A I did not ever say that
I did not think you are highly intelligent. I think you are. But intelligence and legal
competence are not the same thing. I think you have a significant lack of ability to
focus on the issues at hand, but you're very smart. Q If I pointed out, which I
believe I did in that case, that Cado, by having a vice president file an affidavit
seeking to register a foreign judgment, that their doing so violated NRCP 11, in that
a corporation such as Cado is not entitled to appear pro se, to wit through a vice
president who is not an attorney, wouldn't that evince some level of capability as an
attorney sufficient to avoid having a federal judge respond to Mr. King's imploring
him to badmouth me at a hearing? MR. KING: Objection. Argumentative. MR.
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ECHEVERRIA: Sustained. MR. KING: Thank you. MR. COUGHLIN: I

appreciable your time, your Honor. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Anything further, Mr.
King? MR. KING: No. Any questions of the panel? MR. ECHEVERRIA: Any
questions of the panel? Thank you, Judge Beesley. MR. KING: Appreciate your
time this morning. Thank you very much. MR. ECHEVERRIA: We took that
testimony under consideration of your objection. Let's hear your objection, Mr.
Coughlin. MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir. Well, I believe Judge Beesley was
identified in a supplement to Mr. King's, I'll call it a DowSoE, and I hope the panel
will know what I mean, designation of witness's summary of evidence. I've
shortened it in my filings. Which, incidently, SCR 1052(c) is one of the few
procedural rules in the supreme court rules designed to afford attorneys or
suspended attorneys, such as myself, some due process. That rule requires that the
DowSoE be served in the same manner in which the complaint is served upon the
respondent by the panel with at least 30 days notice, or at least 30 days prior to the
hearing. This panel wasn't even empaneled until, I believe the order was October
30th. Mr. King purports to have sent the DowSoE himself rather than in some
separation in accord with the rule, but he sent it himself. On October 12th he filed
material suggesting that he sent a certified mail October 12th, and in that way it's
completely violative of the rules. Completely. And Steve Harris, who the judge
testified to, who was -- he admitted to misappropriating 800K. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Harris is not the subject matter of this hearing. You are. MR.
COUGHLIN: He got David Grundy. And he got his DowSoE sent by the panel.
And he got his full 30 days. And I sent that forward -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: I'm
not concerned with Mr. Harris. Did you get notice that Judge Beesley would be
testifying? MR. COUGHLIN: Maybe -- I would like to check my records, but like
a couple days before this hearing. A couple days. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Was that a
supplemental designation? MR. COUGHLIN: Yeah. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Is that
permitted? MR. COUGHLIN: I think it is permitted, perhaps if something comes
up out of the blue that's really bearing, but Mr. King's known about this for quite
some time. And, in fact, I've filed a complaint with, I believe I included this in my
complaint with State Bar president Lardon -- I hope I'm saying that correctly -under SCR, I want to say 104(3) in that I believe upon information and belief that
Mr. King contacted one of my clients or maybe one of my clients contacted him in
early May -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: I'm focusing on your objection to the testimony
of Judge Beesley. Do you claim any prejudice because of that? MR. COUGHLIN:
Yes. MR. ECHEVERRIA: What is that prejudice? MR. COUGHLIN: Lack of
notice. MR. ECHEVERRIA: How does the lack of notice lead to prejudice? You
seem to be very familiar with cases that appeared -- in which you appeared in front
of Judge Beesley. MR. COUGHLIN: I wasn't. I wasn't as sharp on that Cado stuff,
because I didn't think I needed to be this morning, and I could have been a lot
sharper on that. I really could have. MR. ECHEVERRIA: I'm going to overrule the
objection. I think the notice was sent. Mr. Coughlin was aware that Judge Beesley

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would be testifying, and unless the panel has any objection to Judge Beesley, would
accept that testimony. Next witness, Mr. King.

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"ORDER DENYING MOTIONS On June 7, 2012, we issued an order

temporarily suspending attorney Zachary B. Coughlin from the practice of law and
referring him for disciplinary proceedings, based on his conviction of petit
larceny/theft.1 (fn1 lWe note that our order was based solely on Coughlin's
conviction. It was not based on any alleged failure to report the conviction or on the
SCR 117 petition subsequently filed by bar counsel.) Coughlin has since filed
motions entitled: (1) Motion for Leave to File Opposition to Suspension and
Opposition to Petition of Bar Counsel for Temporary Suspension from the Practice
of Law Pursuant to SCR 111 and Request for Extension of Time to Supplement
Opposition (hereafter, Motion for Leave to File Opposition); (2) Motion for Leave
to Supplement or Amend Emergency Motion to Alter or Amend, or Set Aside
Temporary Suspension and Notice of Supreme Court Clerk's Failure to Timely File
Opposition to Bar Counsel's Petition for Temporary Suspension (hereafter Motion
for Leave to Supplement); (3) Motion for Leave to File Opposition to SCR 117
Petition (hereafter, SCR 117 Motion); and (4) Motion for Order to Show Cause
Regarding Improper Attempt by Bar Counsel and, Possibly, NNDB to Delay and
Obstruct Hearing Required by Court's June 7th, 2012, Order in Case 60838 and
Coughlin's SCR 102(4)(d) Petition in Case 61426 (hereafter, Motion for Order to
Show Cause).
With regard to all the motions, we note that none of them
comply with the rules of appellate procedure pertaining to motions. NRAP 27.
Further, we have disregarded factual assertions in the motions which are not
supported by references to the record or which are outside the record. Carson
Ready Mix, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 97 Nev. 474, 476, 635 P.2d 276, 277 (1981).
To the extent the motions attempt to relitigate the conviction underlying the
instant matter or other legal problems Coughlin faces, this SCR 111
proceeding is not the proper forum for doing so. We therefore do not address
such claims. With regard to the Motion for Leave to File Opposition filed June 11,
2012, we elect to treat it as a motion to set aside the suspension pursuant to SCR
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111(7). We are unconvinced by Coughlin's arguments that good cause exists to

set aside our order, however, and therefore deny the motion.2 (fn2 2To the extent
these arguments can be construed as claims that mitigating circumstances exist,
such contentions are more properly addressed in the context of the disciplinary
proceedings. SCR 102.5(2).)
With regard to the Motion for Leave to Supplement filed June 18, 2012, we
note that Coughlin was properly advised to seek leave of court in writing;
moreover, he was not prejudiced by any alleged failure to timely file his
opposition, because he succeeded in filing an opposition and we have
considered it on the merits. Despite Coughlin's attempts to elaborate on claims
made in his previous motion that good cause exists to set aside our order, we
remain unconvinced. We therefore deny the motion.
With regard to the SCR 117 motion filed June 18, 2012, it is identical to the
Motion for Leave to Supplement filed that same day. It is therefore likewise
denied.3 (fn3 To the extent it challenges the SCR 117 petition filed in Docket No.
60975, such claims are more properly addressed in the context of that proceeding.)"
Finally, with regard to the Motion for Order to Show Cause filed
October 5, 2012, such claims are more properly addressed in the context of the
petition for a writ of mandamus filed in Docket No. 62104. We note, however,
that the language in our June 7, 2012, order stating that "the sole issue to be
determined shall be the extent of the discipline to be imposed" does not limit the
hearing panel from considering other disciplinary matters. Rather, it limits the
hearing panel from making a contrary factual finding that no crime was
committed. SCR 111(5). We therefore deny the motion. It is so ORDERED. /s/
Pickering, C.J., Hardesty, J., Saitta, J."
While SCR 111(5) holds: "5. Certified document conclusive. A certified
copy of proof of a conviction is conclusive evidence of the commission of the
crime stated in it in any disciplinary proceeding instituted against an attorney based
on the conviction", the NNDB Panel completely overextended such rule to an
absurd degree, refusing to allow Coughlin to put on any mitigation evidence, even,
as to the conviction in 60838 or even any evidence offerred for any number of other
legitimate purposes (including, pursuant to Claiborne and, by analogy, SCR 114, to
demonstrate that the conviction from which 60838 springs, and the the denial of
Coughlin's appeal were so patently devoid of due process as to render such
convictions devoid of the quality necessary to apply SCR 111(5) therto).
Additionally, Couglin would really prefer that the Court did not "with regard to the
Motion for Leave to File Opposition filed June 11, 2012, we elect to treat it as a
motion to set aside the suspension pursuant to SCR 111(7)."
This is particularly true where such 6/11/12 Motion is over a year old now
(as is the temporary suspension, which really comes across as ridiculous when
considering the Las Vegas attorney convicted of someting along the lines of
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attempted statutory seduction of a fifteen year old only received a six month
temporary suspension and the attorney whom admitted to misappropriateing
$750,000 from clients received no temporary suspension and only a three month
suspension, ultimately, especially where Coughlin's ability to put forward a more
compelling SCR 111(7) good cause showing for why his temporary suspension
should be set aside has been unduly compromised by a raft of misconduct by judges
(on no less than three occassions was Coughlin summarily incarcerated while
representing clients, where all three judges (RMC's Howard and Nash Holmes and
2JDC's Elliott) refused to grant any stay of such summary incarceration whatsoever
to avoid prejudice to Coughlin's client's affairs and Coughlin's practice) and local
law enforcement (Coughlin has been burglarized on no less than four occassions by
local law enforcement in connection with the practice of the Washoe County
Sheriff's Office incident to effecting lockouts in summary eviction in violation of
NRS 40.253(3)(b)(1),(5)(a), where the WCSO simply refuses to comply with the
statutory requirement, that every other county in Nevada appears to comply with,
that the sheriff (or contsable) must wait at least "24 hours" from the tenant's
"receipt" of a summary eviction or "lockout order" before effectuating such a
lockout (the WCSO simply posts the summary eviction lockout order to a tenant's
door and burglarizes the tenant's rental in one fell swoop, somehow convincing
itself it is just and in compliance with Nevada law to draw their guns, on some
occasions, fail to identify themselves prior to entering, then do a protective sweep
(often while having the tenant handcuffed or "detained", whereupon the tenant is
given five minutes or so to grab those items deemed really necessary, before they
are ordered to leave the premises under threat of arrest for criminal trespass by the
WCSO. In Coughlin's case in Rev2012-000374, this occurred a matter of four
hours after the 3/15/12 summary eviction hearing resulted in a Lockout Order by
RJC Judge Schroeder (whom endorsed such misconduct by the Sheriff in his
subsequent jurisprudence in that case, incredibly, not to mention repeating himself
again in Rev2012-001048 (in both cases the jurisdictional prerequisites required
under Davidsohn were absent (in Rev2012-000374, the landlord failed to file an
affidavit prior to the summary eviction hearing, and the "unlawful detainer
affidavit" eventually filed failed to include nearly all of that required by either NRS
40.254(2) or NRS 40.253(5) (the confusion as to which applies relating to Gayle
Kern, Esq. apparently switching up her basis for moving for such a summary
eviction upon reading Coughlin's 3/8/12 filign therein where Coughlin pointed out
that his pleading a tenancy that uses the premises, at least in part, for commercial
purposes precluded a no cause summary eviction...the only problem for Kern and
her client being that the 30 Day No Cause Termination Notice and 5 Day Unlawful
Detainer Notice failed to alleged non-payment of rent (as did, really, her 3/15/12
"unlawful detainer affidavit"; in Rev2012-001048, the 5 Day UD Notice failed to
contain an of that required by NRS 40.253(3)(b)(1)-(3) (such actually listed the
wrong court to file the Tenant's Affidavit in, and Coughlin's submitting for filing
just such a Tenant's Affidavit in the court listed as the forum in which to file it in
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the 5 Day Unlawful Detainer Notice failed to register with the RJC), then the
"landlord's affidavit" alleged a "dwelling unit or apartment" was rented to
Coughlin, despite the "landlord's agent" alleging that a summary eviction for
"breach of lease" should issue based upon an allegation that Coughlin utilized such
unit as a "dwelling unit or apartment")
Scribd AmJur 7 Am. Jur. 2d Attorneys at Law B. Disciplinary
Proceedings
2. Discipline as a Judicial Function
33. What courts have disciplinary power
However, a court's authority in the discipline of attorneys practicing before it
is limited to the jurisdictional boundaries of that court and cannot extend to other
courts beyond that boundary.[FN4] Unless restricted by the constitution or a statute,
a court of general jurisdiction has inherent power to suspend or disbar an attorney
who is found guilty of conduct unbecoming the standard of propriety that should be
maintained by members of the legal profession.[FN5] Courts of special or limited
jurisdiction have no power to disbar an attorney unless that power has been
expressly conferred on them.[FN8] [FN4] In re Moseley, 643 S.E.2d 190 (Va.
2007). - [FN5] Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 2 S. Ct. 569, 27 L. Ed. 552 (1883).
[FN8] Appeal of A Juvenile, 61 Ohio App. 2d 235, 15 Ohio Op. 3d 400, 401
N.E.2d 937 (11th Dist. Lake County 1978). 34. Preliminary general investigation by bar

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4. Grounds for Discipline

b. Misconduct as an Attorney
(1). In General
44. Generally
(2). In Relation to Court or Judge

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50. Disrespectful, abusive conduct

51. Criticism of judicial acts
52. Contempt

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d. Nonprofessional Misconduct
(1). In General
82. Generally
83. Alcohol or drug abuse
(2). Conviction or Commission of Crime
86. Generally
91. Other crimes and offenses
Use, in attorney or physician disciplinary proceeding, of evidence obtained by
wrongful police action, 20 A.L.R.4th 546 (60838 violation of NRS 171.136)
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92. Effect of appeal or probation

93. Effect of pardon
94. Conviction in another jurisdiction
96. Effect of acquittal, dismissal, or nolle prosequi
5. Defenses to Disciplinary Action
98. Mental or emotional illness
99. Entrapment
100. Other defenses
6. Procedure
101. Nature of proceeding
102. Who may institute proceeding
103. Limitations and laches
104. Right to jury
105. Due process requirements; notice and opportunity to be heard
106. --Presumption of innocence
107. Failure to answer
108. Discovery
109. Right to subpoena witnesses
110. Evidence; admissibility
A foreign jurisdiction's adjudication of guilt will be accepted as conclusive
proof of guilt of the misconduct charged unless the attorney demonstrates why the
foreign judgment is not valid. The Florida Bar v. Friedman, 646 So. 2d 188 (Fla.
1994).
"This March 22, 1960, at Chambers in Cookeville, Tennessee.
[1] [2] [3] The record sustains the Special Chancellors decree and it is affirmed.
However, there are two legal propositions in connection with this appeal which we
should like to discuss briefly. The first is, that it is not the rule that an opinion of a
chancellor, or of this Court, or a decree thereon, any more than a judgment of the
Circuit Court in a civil matter as distinguished from one criminal in nature, in a suit
not brought to disbar an attorney, has *147 the effect of estopping a lawyer in a
subsequent disbarment proceeding so as to prevent the introduction of any proof
therein contrary to the opinion and decree. The rule is that records,that is
pleadings and proof in cases in which an attorney appeared either as an attorney or
as a partycan be offered in evidence to the extent they are relevant to the issue of
fitness to practice, but that such records and judgments are not res judicata and do
not necessarily work an estoppel in a subsequent disbarment suit.
The law on this subject is best discussed in the case of In re Santosuosso, 318 Mass.
489, 62 N.E.2d 105, 107, 161 A.L.R. 892. In that case which was an inquiry into
certain alleged misconduct of Santosuosso, an attorney, upon a petition of the Bar
Association of the City of Boston, the petitioner offered in evidence the entire
printed record in the files of the clerk of the Supreme Judicial Court for the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts in a civil case in equity in which Santosuosso had
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been a defendant, and the findings and order in the case. Santosuosso objected that
the evidence was not admissible under the doctrine of res adjudicata and also that
apart from the doctrine of res adjudicata, the statements made by a judge in his
findings and decree were not admissible as evidence. In holding that the paramount
considerations supporting proceedings to investigate the worthiness of members of
the bar to practice law could not be defeated by the application of strict rules of
evidence governing the trial of adversary proceedings between parties, and that the
necessity for the preservation of the integrity of the courts and the safety of the
public rises above strictly technical rules of evidence that govern such adversary
proceedings between parties, the court said:
*148 We are of opinion that the evidence contained in the record offered by
counsel designated by the court to conduct the proceeding, that is, the evidence
adduced at the hearing in the Superior Court of the equity suit in question, at which
the respondent, a party thereto, was present and represented by counsel, testified
and had full opportunity to present and examine witnesses and to cross-examine
those called by the plaintiff, is admissible in the present inquiry. See State ex rel.
Nebraska State Bar Assn v. Gudmundsen, [145] Neb. [324], 16 N.W.2d 474. We
reach this conclusion without dependence upon such cases as Selling v. Radford,
243 U.S. 46, 37 S.Ct. 377, 61 L.Ed. 585, Ann.Cas.1917D, 569, and Matter of
Ulmer, 268 Mass. 373, 167 N.E. 749, in each of which a judgment of disbarment in
another judisdiction was held to settle the issue that the attorney in question was
unfit to practice. We are unwilling to attach such conclusive effect to a judgment at
law or a final decree in equity, based upon alleged corrupt conduct on the part of a
defendant attorney, where the judgment or final decree entered rests upon findings
that the attorney has been guilty of corrupt conduct. * * * we are of opinion that the
evidence in the proceeding in equity in question is admissible in an inquiry such as
the present, and like any other evidence is to be given such weight as the single
justice shall deem proper, when considered together with all other evidence that the
respondent may produce **571 at the hearing, in the course of which he must be
heard with full opportunity to present all relevant evidence that he may wish to
adduce.

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*149 The foregoing view finds support in such cases as In re Lacy, 234 Mo.App.
71, 112 S.W.2d 594; In re Pate, 232 Mo.App. 478, 119 S.W.2d 11; State ex rel.
Nebraska State Bar Assn v. Gudmundsen, 145 Neb. 324, 16 N.W.2d 474; Werner
v. State Bar, 24 Cal.2d 611, 150 P.2d 892, and Fairfield County Bar v. Taylor, 60
Conn. 11, 22 A. 441, 13 L.R.A. 767. See also Matter of Becker, 229 App.Div. 62,
6566, 241 N.Y.S. 369; Id., 255 N.Y. [223] 233, 174 N.E. 461; Wigmore on
Evidence, 3d ed. 4(7). In the Gudmundsen Case the court, after stating that there
had been some doubt as to the admission of evidence such as that offered in the
present proceeding, said: It is thought, however, that this question should no longer
remain in doubt. It is therefore the holding of this court that the finding in a civil
action that an attorney at law has been guilty of conduct justifying disbarment is not
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conclusive on the same question when presented for determination in an action for
disbarment; that notwithstanding the finding in the civil action the culpability of the
attorney must be established in the disbarment action by a clear preponderance of
the evidence. For this purpose the evidence taken at the trial of the civil action and
all other competent evidence is admissible (page 476 of 16 N.W.2d).
Other cases holding, in general, to this same effect are: In re Berkeley, 174
App.Div. 205, 160 N.Y.S. 1093; In re Bailey, 31 Ariz. 407, 254 P. 481; Fairfield
County Bar v. Taylor, 60 Conn. 11, 22 A. 441; In re Durant, 80 Conn. 140, 67 A.
497; State ex rel. Nebraska State Bar Association v. Gudmundsen, 145 Neb. 324,
16 N.W.2d 474; Metropolitan Street R. Co. v. Oppenheim, 58 App.Div. 510, 69
N.Y.S. 524.
*150 State v. Bomer, 179 Tenn. 67, 162 S.W.2d 515, supports this view. This was a
proceeding against Bomer for his disbarment on the ground he had instituted prior
disbarment proceedings in Chancery Court against two attorneys for no just reason
and without any probable cause, being actuated by motives of personal hatred and
ill will, and had thus abused the courts process as a means of carrying out his
desire for personal vengeance. Upon Bomers objection to the introduction of the
decrees of the Chancery Court in the suits which he had filed against the two
attorneys (which decrees recited the suits were without merit), our Supreme Court
said that such decrees could be received in evidence, not as conclusive proof of the
charges against Bomer, but only as evidence in the case, to show the result of the
prior trials, and in that case the recitation in the decrees that the suits were without
merit, was not taken as foreclosing that issue to Bomer and other proof in regard
thereto was offered by him and heard.
[4] [5] The second proposition upon which we should like to comment is with
respect to the application of the doctrine of laches to this case. The doctrine of
laches may be applicable in a disbarment proceeding and the Special Chancellor
could very well have predicated his opinion and decree in good part thereon. The
incident out of which this disbarment proceeding arose occurred in 1950. It was
fully investigated by the Chattanooga Bar Association in that year with the result
that that Association recommended that no disciplinary action be taken against
Berke. The petitioner had immediate notice of the incident and caused investigation
to be made of it. However, no court action was taken against Berke until the
commencement of these proceedings in 1959, nine years after *151 the incident.
We think such long delay, unexplained as it is in this record, coupled with proof
that witnesses have died or otherwise have become unavailable, constitutes laches
(Gibsons Suits in Chancery, 5th Ed. 81) and was a ground for **572 dismissal
of the petition. In 7 C.J.S. Attorney and Client, 25b, it is stated Staleness in a
charge against an attorney may prevent its being considered, because an
unreasonable delay in the presentation of a charge of misconduct may make it
impossible for an attorney to procure the witnesses or the testimony which would
have been available at an earlier time to meet such charge. That is the condition
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here. The gravity of the charges demanded that they be examined fully at the first
opportunity. That this was not done does not appear to have been the fault of Berke,
who offered to appear before the petitioner and submit to an investigation. Nor,
does it appear the delay has been to his benefit but rather, strongly, to his detriment.
Moreover, it appears that in the nine year period Berke has not transgressed against
the ethics or the morals of the legal profession, but to the contrary sustains a good
reputation as a lawyer. In such case, the doctrine of laches was applicable."
Tennessee Bar Assn v. Berke, 48 Tenn.App. 140 (1960) 344 S.W.2d 567
Also, see, In re McCarty, --- A.3d ---- , Vt. S.W.2d ; Attorneys at law: delay
in prosecution of disciplinary proceeding as defense or mitigating circumstance, 93
A.L.R.3d 1057 (especially as to NG12-0435's three and a half year old Order After
Trial that was vitiated by a subsequently entered Final Decree anyways...permitted
the equitable defense of laches to bar an attorney disciplinary action, Tenn. Bar
Assn v. Berke, 344 S.W. 2d 567, 571-72 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1960), where the vast
majority of courts leave the ultimate question of whether laches is available in legal
malpractice unaddressed. See In re Tenenbaum, 918 A.2d 1109, 1113-14 (Del.
2007); In re Johnson, 2004 MT 6, 20-21, 84 P.3d 637 (2004); In re Siegel, 708
N.E.2d 869, 871-872 (Ind. 1999); Ching v. State Bar of Nevada, 895 P.2d 646, 64849 (Nev. 1995); In re Wade, 814 P.2d 753, 764 (Ariz. 1991); Harris v. State Bar of
Cal, 800 P.2d 906, 910, (Cal. 1990). Courts have found similarly in other
professional disciplinary proceedings, such as physician disciplinary actions.
"In State v. Bomer, 179 Tenn. 67, 162 S.W.2d 515 (1942), the grounds of
disbarment were unjustified and malicious prosecution of disbarment suits against
two other lawyers. (Pat King would be playing the Bomer role in this movie) The
fact of the filing, manner of prosecution and disposition of the prior disbarment
actions were proven by the records in said cases. The following is found in the
Bomer opinion: In determining the question of malice, it is proper for the Court to
consider the entire record, including *648 the bill and answer, as well as attending
circumstances. * * * * * * This proceeding is in no sense a review of the decrees
rendered in the **302 Boyd and Gerber cases. The question for consideration in
the instant case is, whether or not the charges made in these cases were false and
malicious, made without investigation and without probable cause. 179 Tenn. at 79,
162 S.W.2d at 521. In Tennessee Bar Association v. Berke, 48 Tenn.App. 140,
344 S.W.2d 567 (1960) we find: Complainant predicates its cause wholly upon
two decrees rendered against the defendant, (1) the opinion of the Chancery Court
of Knox County, Tennessee, wherein the defendant was found guilty of gross
negligence in exchanging Nine Thousand Nine Hundred and No/100 ($9,900.00)
Dollars of new money for old, the new money having been stolen from DobynsTaylor Hardwere Company, located at Kingsport, Tennessee, and (2) the opinion of
the Court of Appeals of Tennessee, Eastern Division, rendered on November 28,
1958, wherein that Court affirmed the judgment of the Chancellor in the Knox
County Chancery cause, but further held that the defendant, Harry Berke, had been
paid a substantial fee as a remuneration for his part in a conspiracy to conceal the
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identity of the money, which opinion and judgment of the Court of Appeals became
incontestable on or about the 8th day of April, 1959, when the Supreme Court of
Tennessee denied the writ of certiorari. 48 Tenn.App. at 142, 344 S.W.2d at 568. *
* * *649 The rule is that records,that is pleadings and proof in cases in which an
attorney appeared either as an attorney or as a partycan be offered in evidence to
the extent they are relevant to the issue of fitness to practice, but that such records
and judgments are not res judicata and do not necessarily work an estoppel in a
subsequent disbarment suit. 48 Tenn.App. at 147, 344 S.W.2d at 570. Referring to
State v. Bomer, the Court further said: * * * Upon Bomers objection to the
introduction of the decrees of the Chancery Court in the suits which he had filed
against the two attorneys (which decrees recited the suits were without merit), our
Supreme Court said that such decrees could be received in evidence, Not as
conclusive proof of the charges against Bomer, but only as evidence in the case, to
show the result of the prior trials, and in that case the recitation in the decrees that
the suits were without merit, was not taken as foreclosing that issue to Bomer and
other proof in regard thereto was offered by him and heard. 48 Tenn.App. at 150,
344 S.W.2d at 571. In Tennessee Bar Association v. Freemon, 50 Tenn.App. 567,
362 S.W.2d 828 (1961) this Court held inadmissible the testimony in a former case
to which the accused attorney was not a party, and said: To sustain the action of the
Chancellor in admitting the testimony of Mrs. Spinks as evidence in this case the
Bar Association relies most strongly upon the leading case of Re Santosuosso, 318
Mass. 489, 62 N.E.2d 105, 161 A.L.R. 892. That case involved an inquiry into the
professional conduct of Attorney *650 Santosuosso. As the opinion points out, it
was not a truly adversary proceeding but an information asking not for disbarment
or other disciplinary action but rather for such action as the court might deem
proper. But, we think, A more acute distinction lies in the fact that the evidence
admitted was contained in the transcript of evidence in a Case to which
Santosuosso was a party, in which he appeared in person and by counsel and cross
examined the witnesses against him and in which there was an adjudication of
misconduct personal to him from which he could, if he chose, appeal. **303
(emphasis supplied) 50 Tenn.App. at 572, 362 S.W.2d at 831. It thus appears that
there was a finding in the former case that the attorney had been guilty of conduct
justifying the disbarment. There was no such finding in the present case. 50
Tenn.App. at 573, 362 S.W.2d at 831. In Schoolfield v. Tennessee Bar
Association, 209 Tenn. 304, 309, 353 S.W.2d 401 (1962) the Supreme Court
affirmed a disbarment decree and said: In the trial court the complainants relied
upon the record of the impeachment proceedings in the State Senate * * *. (p.
306," Berke v. Chattanooga Bar Assn, 58 Tenn.App. 636 (1968) 436 S.W.2d
296.
Evidence that would otherwise be hearsay may be admitted if not offered to prove
the truth of the matter asserted. fn5 Although a referee may not go behind a
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conviction to determine the attorney's guilt of an ethical violation, a referee may

consider evidence concerning the circumstances behind a conviction in determining
the recommended discipline.[FN7] Where a disciplinary proceeding is based on
acts disclosed in the record of a civil action in which the attorney was a party, the
record of the other cause is admissible in the disciplinary proceeding.[FN8]
Nontestimonial evidence from other civil proceedings to which an attorney was a
party are admissible in a disciplinary proceeding against the attorney where the
factual issues in the underlying proceeding and the disciplinary proceeding are
essentially identical.[FN9] A foreign jurisdiction's adjudication of guilt will be
accepted as conclusive proof of guilt of the misconduct charged unless the attorney
demonstrates why the foreign judgment is not valid.[FN10] A statement made
during a disciplinary proceeding enjoys an absolute privilege against a civil action
based thereon as long as the statement is relevant and material to the proceeding.
[FN11]
[FN7] The Florida Bar v. Cohen, 908 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 2005). - [FN8] In re
Disciplinary Action Against Perry, 494 N.W.2d 290 (Minn. 1992). - [FN9]
Rosenthal v. State Bar, 43 Cal. 3d 612, 238 Cal. Rptr. 377, 738 P.2d 723 (1987). [FN10] The Florida Bar v. Friedman, 646 So. 2d 188 (Fla. 1994). - [FN11] Hecht v.
Levin, 66 Ohio St. 3d 458, 1993-Ohio-110, 613 N.E.2d 585 (1993).
Certain documents produced in the course of investigation of respondent
attorney, including a trust account ledger for client's account and a statement for
client's checking account, did not constitute hearsay in attorney disciplinary matter;
attorney provided the documents in response to a subpoena, such that the
documents were presumably what the attorney represented as his own work and
records, and because attorney prepared and submitted the documents, he arguably
manifested a belief in the validity of the documents. Rules of Evid., Rule 801(d)(2).
In re Crews, 698 S.E.2d 785 (S.C. 2010). (NOTE: reversible error for Echeverria to
rule that Coughlin could not authenticate or provide foundation for the various
audio and video recordings he sought to introduce into evidence.
In attorney disciplinary proceeding; relevant, testimony presented may
involve where attorney's counsel was able to attack the opposing counsel in a
former matter testifying as a witness as the disciplinary hearing's credibility and
establish any potential bias or prejudice other attorney may have had against
attorney. In re White, 378 S.C. 333, 663 S.E.2d 21 (2008), reinstatement granted,
380 S.C. 200, 669 S.E.2d 588 (2008). Hearing officer in attorney disciplinary
proceeding could omit portions of expert testimony on standard of care and was not
required to give any weight to the testimony that was admitted; one expert was
judge who had been retired for twenty-four years, another expert improperly
referred to rules of lawyer discipline as only general guidelines, no expert had
specialty in ethics, and attorney failed to show that any expert was more
knowledgeable that hearing officer. Burtch, In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against,
162 Wash. 2d 873, 175 P.3d 1070 (2008).

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Attorney's decision to call his own character and reputation witness at the
beginning of disciplinary hearing opened the door on the subject of his character;
thus, allowing later witnesses to testify concerning attorney's reputation as a lawyer
and his reputation for honesty was rebuttal testimony after attorney's own character
witness testified. Burtch, In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against, 162 Wash. 2d 873,
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"HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 213:25 to 229:13) MR. COUGHLIN: I'm going to put
on some evidence right now. This is the audio from the trial, Judge Nash Holmes'
deal. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Do you have a copy for us? MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, I
do. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Do you have a transcript? MR. COUGHLIN: The audio
transcript? MR. ECHEVERRIA: I don't know what you are offering, so I would
like to see a transcript. MR. COUGHLIN: The official audio from the muni court.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: What is it exactly that you're proffering here? MR.
COUGHLIN: It's a court of record. They record the proceedings. And it's the audio
from that proceeding. Pat King has it. I got it from Pat King. MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Which proceeding is this? MR. COUGHLIN: The traffic case that she testified to
today where she said, I asked you if you were recording, and then you got all
sneaky, and then you wanted to go to the bathroom. And I want to show this and
show whether or not the going to the bathroom occurred before the sua sponte
interrogation about the recording, and we'll see how truthful Judge Nash Holmes
will be. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Do you have a transcript of that proceeding? MR.
COUGHLIN: The problem is I appealed it. And under the law she is supposed to
order the transcript whether I pay a down payment or not, but they keep breaking
the law in the muni court. They just flat out break the law. Some people might say
it helps their bottom line not to prepare the transcript, even though the law says
they have to. MR. ECHEVERRIA: My question is, do you have a transcript? MR.
COUGHLIN: Yes. MR. ECHEVERRIA: May I see it, please? MR. COUGHLIN:
No. It's an audio transcript. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Do you have a transcribed
transcript? MR. COUGHLIN: You mean like a typed out? Some of this stuff I
typed out. If you had read the stuff I submitted to you, you would see I typed some
of it out myself. MR. ECHEVERRIA: So it's not a certified transcript? MR.
COUGHLIN: The only certified one I have, I believe, is that Richard Hill trespass
case. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Well, what is it exactly that you're offering now? MR.
COUGHLIN: The audio from the trial. MR. ECHEVERRIA: I don't want it just
played into evidence. MR. COUGHLIN: You let him just read stuff into evidence
from an order. MR. ECHEVERRIA: No, it was after it was admitted into evidence.
MR. COUGHLIN: All right. I would like to admit into evidence the DVDs that I
gave you, that I attached. MR. ECHEVERRIA: I have three or four DVDs. Can
you be specific? MR. COUGHLIN: Yeah. The one attached as exhibit, I believe
it's Exhibit 4 to the ex parte motion. MR. ECHEVERRIA: I don't have an Exhibit
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4. MR. COUGHLIN: But I also was told that you consented -- is it not the case
that you consented to electronic service to some extent? MR. COUGHLIN: I did
not consent to that. MR. COUGHLIN: Then how did you rule on a motion if -MR. ECHEVERRIA: The motion was written, presented to me, and I ruled. MR.
COUGHLIN: How did you get the motion? MR. ECHEVERRIA: The State Bar
provided it to me. MR. COUGHLIN: Oh. So did the State Bar provide all the
DVDs I gave them? MR. ECHEVERRIA: That's their function, Mr. Coughlin.
MR. COUGHLIN: Did they provide the DVDs I gave them? MR. ECHEVERRIA:
No. MR. COUGHLIN: They didn't? I thought that was their function. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: No. If you have evidence to present, identify it. Let's be specific.
MR. COUGHLIN: Yes. The DVDs. MR. ECHEVERRIA: That's not specific, sir.
MR. COUGHLIN: It's the file on the DVDs that is 11 TR 26800R -- I only have a
limited time. Can I play this? MR. ECHEVERRIA: I don't know anything about it.
MR. COUGHLIN: It has my name on the file, and it's on the DVDs attached. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: That does not lay a foundation. MR. COUGHLIN: It's the
official court audio from the muni court case that Judge Nash Holmes testified to.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Lay the foundation. You object to documents that have a
certification by the county clerk or the city clerk. MR. COUGHLIN: Mr. King
gave me this. He gave it to me as part of the leftovers from his screening panel,
which he still won't tell me who was on the screening panel. It's the court of record
audio recording by the muni court of that. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Do you have that
on a separate DVD or disk or whatever? MR. COUGHLIN: I gave it to Mr. King.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: As a separate document? MR. KING: Actually, it's not. It's
not, Mr. Chairman. I encouraged Mr. Coughlin to go to the municipal court and
purchase or acquire, however it's done appropriately, official records -- MR.
COUGHLIN: And I did. Actually, my mom did. MR. KING: Mr. Coughlin said, I
can't get them. They won't give them to me. MR. COUGHLIN: Yeah, they
wouldn't. MR. KING: I said that's not my responsibility. You get them. And I
contacted the court myself just to find out, and they said all he needed to do is come
in, fill out a short form, and he can acquire them. MR. COUGHLIN: Which was a
total lie. MR. KING: So that's what they told us. So I explained to Mr. Coughlin
that I don't have the official version. I have copies which are, in essence, copies of
copies. The reason I object to any use of audio records -- MR. COUGHLIN: I was
wrong, Mr. King. I'm sorry. My mom actually bought an official version, just to cut
to the chase. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin. Can you tell me how many times
I need to remind you not to interrupt? At what point do you get it? MR.
COUGHLIN: Sir, I just thought it would be helpful to the court, given the limited
time we have here today to make sure the court is aware I might have misspoke
earlier when I said -- I did get a copy from Mr. King -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: Can
you answer my question, sir, and quit interrupting? MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. King. MR. KING: Thank you. The reason I object so
strongly to these recordings is a transcript you can look at, you can fill in the
blanks, if you want to read on either side of something to put it in proper context,
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you can. And that's why a court requires a written transcript. I was punished to sit
through the recordings of all these proceedings as part of my job as Bar counsel
doing an investigation. They go on for hours. And in the case of this particular
matter more than one day. So to suggest that anything is going to be proved by
having Mr. Coughlin pull out excerpts and have you listen to it where there is no
ability to put it in proper context, no ability to see the entire record, I think is highly
prejudicial, and no doubt would confuse the matter as opposed to assisting the
matter. Dorothy Nash Holmes' order as she said it speaks for itself. Those were her
findings. That's when she testified that this is what I believe took place with regard
to the audio transcript. But that wasn't the sole reason for her contempt order, and
he was convicted. So him wanting to burden us by having you listen to an excerpt
of a video recording I think is highly inappropriate. Plus, Mr. Coughlin has
demonstrated an ability to post matters to YouTube, to do editing, and we have no
way to know whether or not, in fact, these have been edited. I have listened to a
couple of excerpts from him regarding an arrest, and it is my opinion that they were
extremely altered. So for those reasons, either an official transcript be produced of
which he's had plenty of time to acquire one, or they not be admitted for that
purpose. Thank you. MR. ECHEVERRIA: I'm going to require you to lay a
foundation for whatever it is you proffer. MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir. I provided to
this court and the Bar true and accurate copies of the official audio transcripts. And
in some instances the pleadings have gone in typed out things. In one instance for at
least probably 80 percent of the summary eviction I took advantage of a free trial.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: I'm focusing on what you're proffering now. MR.
COUGHLIN: Yes, sir. MR. ECHEVERRIA: This is a transcript of the trial for
your traffic citation? MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir. MR. ECHEVERRIA: The one
that Judge Holmes issued an order finding you in contempt? MR. COUGHLIN:
Yes. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Did you appeal it? MR. COUGHLIN: I tried to. She
wouldn't let me. MR. ECHEVERRIA: And it's a final order? MR. COUGHLIN: I
did the research on that, but she is saying -- I don't know what she is saying. But
she is not letting me appeal it. MR. ECHEVERRIA: We know what she said in her
order. So I'm not going to entertain an inquiry into the conduct of the trial on your
traffic citation itself. That issue has been litigated. And if you are offering portions
of that transcript without a foundation, without a witness here to tell us that what
you are about to play is an official part of the transcript, without an official written
transcript that is easily obtained, I'm going to sustain the objection. MR.
COUGHLIN: Did he have a witness to say the order was such and such? MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Yes. It's called a certification. MR. COUGHLIN: He got orders
that weren't certified into the record today. Mr. Elcano -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: He
laid a separate foundation for them. I'm giving you an opportunity to lay a
foundation for what you are about to play. MR. COUGHLIN: Okay. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: I'm not going to take it on your word. MR. COUGHLIN: Why
not? MR. ECHEVERRIA: Because the law requires a foundation to be laid.
Independent. MR. COUGHLIN: Independent of what I can lay for it? MR.
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ECHEVERRIA: Right. I want something from the court that says this is an official
transcript. MR. COUGHLIN: My objection, I believe I am able to lay a
foundation. I'll testify under oath this is an official copy of the audio transcript in
that case. MR. ECHEVERRIA: But you don't know that. MR. COUGHLIN: Yes,
I do know that. My mom had to go pay for it because they would not give it to me
for months. They wouldn't let me buy one. Pat King played his little game and
wouldn't give it to
me. He wouldn't give me any of the screening panel things, because he's so
dishonest. It's disgusting. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, from my view one
of the rules of professional conduct is to treat opponents with respect. MR.
COUGHLIN: I agree. MR. ECHEVERRIA: I'm not sure that comment you just
made is respectful. So let's proceed. If you're about to play some audio, I'm not
going to permit it without an adequate foundation being laid. So move on. MR.
COUGHLIN: Can I -- without an adequate foundation being laid. And I can't say
it's the audio my mom had to pay for, 35 bucks, to get from the court? MR.
ECHEVERRIA: No. Your mother is not here. If you want to call her, we'll listen to
what she has to say. MR. COUGHLIN: I don't have a phone. I can call her? MR.
VELLIS: Can he use this one? MR. COUGHLIN: Should I get up and dial? MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Pardon me? MR. COUGHLIN: Should I approach the phone and
dial? MR. ECHEVERRIA: However you think you need to lay a foundation. MR.
COUGHLIN: Mr. King, he can't lay the foundation? He was provided these by the
muni court. MR. ECHEVERRIA: This is your case, sir. MR. COUGHLIN: Can I
call Pat King and say, Pat, were you provided these copies of the audio? Everything
is a copy, okay, it's not -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: What's the offer of proof? What
are you intending to prove? MR. COUGHLIN: To show she is so reckless. To
show a lot of things. But one, this idea that a conviction is completely dispositive,
he cited no authority for that. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, the supreme
court issued an order in your case that says with respect to, in essence, a conviction,
that the sole issue to be determined here is the nature and extent of the punishment.
MR. COUGHLIN: But that's the candy bar thing. You guys made a hearing about
30 other things. MR. ECHEVERRIA: I'm sorry. I kept talking while -- MR.
COUGHLIN: You were done talking, and I responded. You keep trying to bait me,
and you keep trying to make a record of that, and it's dishonest the extent to which
you do that. You stop talking, and I respond. I didn't talk over you that time. And I
resent the fact that you keep appearing to want to do that. MR. ECHEVERRIA:
The supreme court, as I read its order, tells this panel that the only issue to be
determined with respect to a conviction is the nature and extent of the punishment,
if any. So if you have testimony on that issue with respect to any conviction, or
order holding you in contempt, please present it. MR. COUGHLIN: Not under
Claiborne. Claiborne says a conviction is not the end of the inquiry. That in fact,
the panel and the Bar have a duty to look beyond the conviction. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: We have a specific order in your case with respect to what the
issues to be determined in this proceeding are with respect to a conviction. So do
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you wish to offer evidence as to the nature and extent of punishment, if any, that
should be rendered by this panel? MR. COUGHLIN: Yes. And I -- MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Please proceed. MR. COUGHLIN: Okay. So I'll play that audio
with your permission. MR. ECHEVERRIA: I'm sustaining the objection because it
lacks foundation. MR. COUGHLIN: Then I'll call my mom. May I approach to
call my mom? MR. ECHEVERRIA: Sure. (Telephone call being placed.) MR.
COUGHLIN: Mom, it's Zach. MRS. BARKER: Yeah. MR. COUGHLIN: Listen,
you're on the record right now, okay? The panel can hear you. Are you there?
MRS. BARKER: I'm having trouble hearing you. But anyway -- I'm in a store. Go
ahead. MR. COUGHLIN: You're being listened to right now and recorded. Okay?
MRS. BARKER: I understand that. MR. COUGHLIN: I need to ask you -- MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Let's put her under oath. Would you swear the witness in, please.
(The oath was administered telephonically to the witness.) MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Would you tell us your full name and address, please. MRS. BARKER: Mary
Eleanor Barker. 94 -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: Spell your last name. MRS. BARKER:
B-a-r-k-e-r. MR. ECHEVERRIA: And your address, please. THE WITNESS: 945
West 12th Street. MR. ECHEVERRIA: West what street? MRS. BARKER: 12th.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: South? MRS. BARKER: 12th. Reno, Nevada 89503. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Thank you, Ms. Barker. Mr. Coughlin, you may proceed. MRS.
BARKER: No, it's Barker. MARY BARKER having been first duly sworn,
testified as follows: DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. COUGHLIN: Q Mom,
did you have to buy an audio of the trial with that Judge Nash Holmes? A Did I
have to buy an audio? Q Yeah. Did you buy a copy of the proceeding? A Yes. Q
Did you give it to me? A Oh, God. I think so. I did several things. I paid $100 for
something -- no, that was something else. Q Right. You paid a hundred dollars for
bail, and she wouldn't let me out, but she kept the money anyway? A Yes. And the
man that I gave the money to told me that you would be released within several
hours, and you weren't. Q They did the old switcheroo, right? A I'm sorry? MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Coughlin, I would appreciate it if you would refrain from
interrupting even your own mother. THE WITNESS: Especially his own mother.
MR. COUGHLIN: Is that good enough? MR. ECHEVERRIA: No. BY MR.
COUGHLIN: Q Mom, was it an official copy? A I don't know. Q Did you go to
the court and say I want a copy of the proceeding, and you paid the money they
asked you to pay? A I don't know that it was official or not. But I requested a
copy, yes. I would assume it would be official. I was requesting it in the
courthouse. Q And you filled out whatever form it was they made you fill out, and
paid whatever money it was they wanted right? A Yes."

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"HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 215:24 to 217:19) MR. ECHEVERRIA: Well, what is

it exactly that you're offering now? MR. COUGHLIN: The audio from the trial.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: I don't want it just played into evidence. MR. COUGHLIN:
You let him just read stuff into evidence from an order. MR. ECHEVERRIA: No,
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it was after it was admitted into evidence. MR. COUGHLIN: All right. I would
like to admit into evidence the DVDs that I gave you, that I attached. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: I have three or four DVDs. Can you be specific? MR.
COUGHLIN: Yeah. The one attached as exhibit, I believe it's Exhibit 4 to the ex
parte motion. MR. ECHEVERRIA: I don't have an Exhibit 4. MR. COUGHLIN:
But I also was told that you consented -- is it not the case that you consented to
electronic service to some extent? MR. COUGHLIN: I did not consent to that. MR.
COUGHLIN: Then how did you rule on a motion if -- MR. ECHEVERRIA: The
motion was written, presented to me, and I ruled. MR. COUGHLIN: How did you
get the motion? MR. ECHEVERRIA: The State Bar provided it to me. MR.
COUGHLIN: Oh. So did the State Bar provide all the DVDs I gave them? MR.
ECHEVERRIA: That's their function, Mr. Coughlin. MR. COUGHLIN: Did they
provide the DVDs I gave them? MR. ECHEVERRIA: No. MR. COUGHLIN:
They didn't? I thought that was their function. MR. ECHEVERRIA: No. If you
have evidence to present, identify it. Let's be specific. MR. COUGHLIN: Yes. The
DVDs. MR. ECHEVERRIA: That's not specific, sir. MR. COUGHLIN: It's the
file on the DVDs that is 11 TR 26800R -- I only have a limited time. Can I play
this? MR. ECHEVERRIA: I don't know anything about it."
Hardly anything that came out of the Panel Chair's mouth was true on
11/14/12: HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 215:24 to 216:7) "MR. ECHEVERRIA:
Well, what is it exactly that you're offering now? MR. COUGHLIN: The audio
from the trial. MR. ECHEVERRIA: I don't want it just played into evidence. MR.
COUGHLIN: You let him just read stuff into evidence from an order. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: No, it was after it was admitted into evidence..."
"HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 45:5 to 47:15) BY MR. KING: Q Mr. Hill, do
you recognize that document? A This is the attorney's fees order from Judge
Flanagan. MR. COUGHLIN: I object, your Honor. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Wait a
minute, Mr. Coughlin. Wait. MR. COUGHLIN: Yes, sir. MR. ECHEVERRIA:
There's a question, Mr. King? MR. KING: Yes. I asked Mr. Hill if this was the
order that he was testifying about regarding the judge ordering of sanctions of
$40,000 in attorney's fees. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Do you have an objection to that
question, Mr. Coughlin? MR. COUGHLIN: Well, sir, I thought he was putting it
into evidence. So I probably was too early to object. MR. ECHEVERRIA: That's
why you interrupted too early? MR. COUGHLIN: Yeah. I'm sorry. MR.
ECHEVERRIA: Mr. Hill. THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. This is the award regarding
attorney's fees in accordance with NRS 69, I believe it's 050. There is also an order
granting us approximately $2500 in costs. BY MR. KING: Q In this particular
order at Page 2, is this the order signed by Judge Flanagan? A Yes, sir. Q What
date did Judge Flanagan sign this order? A This is dated June 25th, 2012, and it
bears a file stamp of the same date. Q Could you read the paragraph regarding
"Merliss goes even further and states." Could you read that paragraph on Page 2. A
Beginning at line 4? Q Line 9 on Page 2. A Okay. "Merliss goes even further and
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states: As proven above and below, the frivolity and vexatiousness of Coughlin's
maintenance and extension of this matter has been so beyond reason, and so
outrageous, and the nexus of his behavior to the fees incurred by Merliss so direct
and indisputable, that nothing less than a full award of those fees should even be
considered by the court. To not impose the full measure of the harm Coughlin has
caused would reward and encourage his vexatiousness in this and other cases.
There needs to be a day of reckoning for Coughlin's antics." Q In this order did
Judge Flanagan accept that by granting the full amount of fees requested? If you
read the last sentence of Page 3. A Yes. "Accordingly, Merliss's motion for
attorney's fees is granted in the sum of $42,065.50. Q Do you have personal
knowledge of whether or not, as the attorney for Dr. Merliss, whether or not that
award has been paid by Mr. Coughlin? A It has not. MR. KING: Mr. Chairman,
we have provided you with certified copies of each of these orders. I would move
that Exhibit No. 1 be admitted pursuant to the NRS statute 52 --"

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111. --Sufficiency; standard of proof

Attorney and Client 53(2)
An attorney has no less rights than any other party, and as such, his or her
discipline must be based upon more than speculation.[FN1] Perhaps it is owing to
the relatively skint due process afforded to attorney respondent and the dint of
availability of discovery (particularly where King cheats the system and Coughlin
only gets one tenth of the time to "inspect" the evidence and witness lists and other
items provided in SCR 105(2),(2)(c) that the Panel and King, under SCR 119,
should be held in contempt for failing to accord Coughlin) that the standard of
proof required in Nevada disciplinary matters is comparatively high to that in other
states. The courts have used different expressions to indicate the degree or
quantum of proof necessary to justify disbarment or suspension of an attorney.
Courts have held: that a convincing preponderance,[FN2] a clear preponderance,
[FN3] or fair preponderance of the evidence is sufficient;[FN4] that competent,
substantial evidence is required;[FN5] that the evidence is full, clear, and
convincing;[FN6] that substantial, clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence is
needed;[FN7] or that clear and convincing evidence is essential.[FN8]
Because evidence that was not presented to the bar is virtually impossible
to evaluate in the absence of cross-examination, the supreme court will
generally not consider it.[FN10] It would be inordinately unfair to allow King
to purposefully fail to timely supplement his DOWSOE (especially as to the
testimony of Beesley and Elcano and the entry of FHE2, an Order by Judge
Flanagan where nothing in the 8/23/12 Compliant in any way notice-pleads
Coughlin that such would be included in any allegation or was otherwise at
issue. Further, the Panel Chair was obviously either clueless to the concepts
of notice and notice-pleading, or, more likely, just fraudulently ran roughshod
over them in a more than willful manner.
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HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 72:23 to 75:5) "MR. KING: Mr.

Chairman, if I could respond by pointing out the fact that the order from
Judge Flanagan, which has been admitted, suggests that that was -- that those
fees were generated because of Mr. Coughlin's vexatious conduct. And that
the fees were reasonable and were awarded against Mr. Coughlin, not one
cent of which has been paid. So I think any suggestion to the contrary is
irrelevant, because Judge Flanagan's order is to be accepted by the panel.
MR. COUGHLIN: ...I don't know that's actually pled in your complaint,
Mr. King, or included amongst one of the three grievances. ... Am I here
today on Judge Flanagan's sanction? Is he a grievant and accorded a case
number too? ... MR. ECHEVERRIA: I believe you're here today to
measure all of your conduct as a practicing lawyer. ... MR. COUGHLIN:
So we're not here today based on what's been noticed? MR.
ECHEVERRIA: We're not here today to relitigate orders that have been filed
that you have appealed, and that you have lost. MR. COUGHLIN: ... I'm
asking what is it limited to? Because it sounds like from what you just said
it's not limited. MR. ECHEVERRIA: I don't intend to impose any limits on
you in terms of what you attempt to proffer as evidence. I will rule on what
you proffer as evidence. MR. COUGHLIN: I'm saying what he's limited to,
your Honor. MR. ECHEVERRIA: The issue here, sir, as I understand the
supreme court's order with respect to your conviction of theft, and the issues
here with respect to the other grievances that have been filed against you are
to the extent as to what, if any, should be the punishment that you should
sustain as a result of your conduct. MR. COUGHLIN: Yet this is entered into
evidence. MR. ECHEVERRIA: This is what? MR. COUGHLIN: This order
has been entered into evidence. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Exhibit 2 has. MR.
COUGHLIN: But it's not pled in any complaint. Judge Flanagan's not a
grievant. I wasn't noticed that that was the purpose of this hearing to some
extent today. MR. ECHEVERRIA: You were noticed that the issue of your
conviction of trespass was an issue, that your handling of that case was an
issue, and it's relevant as to that." (NOTE: Panel Chair Echeverria time and
time again reverts to non-sequitur as his trusty workhorse when confronted by
Coughlin with the appalling lack of due process his Panel presents, something
he mixes up with only the occasional outright lie (confronted with the
quandry presented by the rules that require these hearings be limited to what
is notice-pled, Echeverria reaches for the ol' "not here today to relitigate
orders" regardless of the fact that such order was neither notice-pled (not even
identified in the DOWSOE or any supplemental, as Hill's testimony is limited
therein to that occurring in 1708, not the appeal in 03628, to say nothing of
the fact that King purposefully eliminated all reference to Hill or that
summary eviction appeal in his 8/23/12 Complaint, choosing also to avoid
seeking admission of any written grievance by Hill (its like that Seinfeld
where Jerry takes his less than attractive girlfriend to the Chinese restaurant
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way across town to avoid the embarrassment of being seen with her);
confonted again as to the notion that such hearing is limited to that which is
notice-pled, Echeverria lamely responds that he does not "intend to impose
any limits on you" rather than address Coughlin's contentions as to the limits
imposed on bar counsel's presentation of his case, then, where Coughlin
persists, Echeverria shows he is a real five tool player, and attempts to make
some nice broken field running by riffing on his ridiculously fraudulent
assertion that the "supreme court's order with respect to your convict of theft"
somehow provides a basis for finding Coughlin guilty of all that alleged in
any of the grievances (including imaginary ones that were not notice-pled)
and insisting Coughlin just bend over and skip straight to the "big mea culpa"
mitigation, mitigation dancey dance, finally Echeverria, who just will not let
it go, asserts that the Complaints referencing the trespass conviction (any
allegation that such is a SCR 111(6) "serious" offense is undone by King's
SCR 111(4) Petition reporting such "crime" in 61901, so...), stating: "You
were noticed that the issue of your conviction of trespass was an issue, that
your handling of that case was an issue, and it's relevant as to that". The
only problem is that where Echeverria wants to assert Coughlin's "handling of
that case" involved the appeal (appeals have their own case numbers, and just
because Baker and Hill billed some hours in the justice court does not make
there moving for an award of fees based upon NRS 69.050 acceptable) of the
summary eviction proceeding that Hill's associate handled (making Hill's
testimony, rather than Baker's rather dubious as to relevancy and or best
evidence notions) rather then the criminal trespass case (that case? Which
case? Whichever one the witch trial needs the most, apparently, rather
than whichever one lazy, entitled, assist. bar counsel with no training in his
first week on the job Pat King manage to notice-plead).
However, quite clearly, that statutory remedy provided by NRS
40.253, and Anvui, not to mention CG Wallace, make quite clear that the "de
novo review" in the appeal "case" (03628) that Flangan's Order is found
within, involves not, in an analysis of Coughlin's "handling" of it (beyond the
fact that such "case" was in no way notice-pled), anything to do with any
criminal trespass prosecution or conviction. Hill's client is free to file a
lawsuit for damages incident to the criminal trespass (though, he should
probably not given he was actually himself participating in a burglary, in
addition to lying to and with the police and Hill to accomplish a fraudulent
arrest), and King was free to notice-pled any such "handling" of that "case" in
his Complaint, much less his DOWSOE, but, darn it, he just did not manage
to, so, no, Chair Echeverria, its not appropriate to make Flanagan's Order
(FHE2) King's lead-off hitter in a Rickey Henderson star of the show kind of
way...
This, in addition to the fact that the SBN and far too many of the
judges in Reno and Washoe County are insipidly allowing this situation to
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turn into an embarrassing rock fight in the street/dumpster grease fire of epic
proportions (apparently not to help Hill purchase his twenty-fourth Porsche,
but rather, to indulge base vindictiveness), that, like some Russian egg, peels
away layer after layer of misconduct and the incestuous relationship between
bailiffs (Medina, Reyes, Chief Bailiff Sexton, Ramsey, and Heibert, they of
the ripping up Coughlin's filings/throwing them away/making up new
wrinkles to the dubious at best "Administrative Order" requiring Coughlin to
conduct all business with the RJC through its abusive, unprofessional bailiffs,
such as "only one filing per day", or "only fifteen minutes a day to review any
and all files" (that is when the bailiffs aren't bizarrely indicating that "all your
eviction files are in Carson" or providing some other misdirection non-sense,
such as citing to JCRRT 10 in relation to "landlord tenant matters' or criminal
cases)), marshals (Coppa, Thompson, Harley, Menzel), sheriffs (Durbin,
Canizzaro, Stuchell, Machen), police officers (Sifre, Look, Leedy, K. Brown,
Duralde, Rosa, Crawford, Braunworth, Weaver, Dye, O. Miller, Schaur),
DAS Officers (Ramos, Wickman, C. Brown), bar counsel, Clerk of Court of
the SBN, juni courthouse security detail (A. Perez, M. Greene), and judge
after judge (Sferrazza, Flanagan, Elliott, Sattler, Schroeder, Clifton, Pearson,
Nash Holmes, L. Gardner, W. Gardner, Howard) process server companies
(Nevada Court Services, Jeff Chandler, Wray, Durden) and property
managers (Sue King, Jared Scalise, Western Nevada Managment) cum
unauthorized practitioners of landlord law, and the Hill, Baker, Kern,
(Loomis, Puentes, Sotelo, Dogan, Leslie, Lindsay collective of Washington
Generals court appointed defenders), (Skau, Christensen, Hazlett-Stevens,
Wong, Roberts, Ormaas, Drake, Sooudi, Young, Stege purveyors of
prosecutorial misconduct), Elcano, Springgate, and other Goya-esqe
archetypes of the Northern Nevada legal landscape, with the only silver lining
being that Coughlin more than paid Elcano back for hiring him on at Washoe
Legal Services by single handedly doing more for tenant's rights than the
WLS's Marc Ashleys of the world would even come close to were they to
continue collecting a paycheck for two hundred years (exposing the state
sponsored burglaries by the Washoe County Sheriff's Office, and the
complete indifference to jurisdictional prerequisites (at least as far as they
benefit tenants) demonstrated by the RJC as a whole), not to mention bring
light to an epidemic of unprofessional, abusive, bullying, and fraudulent
behavior by RMC Marshals and RJC Bailiffs, and some court staff (C.
Erickson, R. Baker, C. Wood, L. Matheus):
HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 73:23 to 75:5) "MR. COUGHLIN: So
we're not here today based on what's been noticed? MR. ECHEVERRIA:
We're not here today to relitigate orders that have been filed that you have
appealed, and that you have lost. MR. COUGHLIN: ...I'm asking what is it
limited to? Because it sounds like from what you just said it's not limited.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: I don't intend to impose any limits on you in terms of
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what you attempt to proffer as evidence. I will rule on what you proffer as
evidence. MR. COUGHLIN: I'm saying what he's limited to, your Honor.
MR. ECHEVERRIA: The issue here, sir, as I understand the supreme
court's order with respect to your conviction of theft, and the issues here
with respect to the other grievances that have been filed against you are to
the extent as to what, if any, should be the punishment that you should
sustain as a result of your conduct. MR. COUGHLIN: Yet this is entered
into evidence. MR. ECHEVERRIA: This is what? MR. COUGHLIN: This
order has been entered into evidence. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Exhibit 2 has.
MR. COUGHLIN: But it's not pled in any complaint. Judge Flanagan's
not a grievant. I wasn't noticed that that was the purpose of this hearing
to some extent today. MR. ECHEVERRIA: You were noticed that the
issue of your conviction of trespass was an issue, that your handling of that
case was an issue, and it's relevant as to that."
Special judge did not abuse his discretion, in disbarment proceedings, in
excluding exhibits evidencing attorney's pattern of writing checks on trust account
to pay for personal obligations, to extent such exhibits were generated outside time
span covered by disbarment complaint, especially given that attorney was not
afforded prior notice of such exhibits and pleadings were not amended to reflect
such exhibits. Ligon v. Dunklin, 368 Ark. 443, 247 S.W.3d 498 (2007).
Attorney misconduct must be established by substantial, clear, convincing,
and satisfactory evidence; the touchstone of the clear and convincing standard is
that the evidence must establish that the truth of the facts asserted is highly
probable. In re Swanson, 288 Kan. 185, 200 P.3d 1205 (2009).
Attorney misconduct must be established by substantial, clear, convincing, and
satisfactory evidence. In re Nelson, 288 Kan. 179, 200 P.3d 1262 (2009).
Attorney misconduct must be established by substantial, clear, convincing, and
satisfactory evidence. In re Crow, 285 Kan. 1110, 179 P.3d 1093 (2008).
Attorney misconduct must be established by substantial, clear, convincing, and
satisfactory evidence, in an attorney disciplinary proceeding. In re Bishop, 285
Kan. 1097, 179 P.3d 1096 (2008).
Attorney misconduct must be established by substantial, clear, convincing, and
satisfactory evidence. In re Trester, 285 Kan. 404, 172 P.3d 31 (2007).
In an attorney disciplinary proceeding in which the lawyer does not answer
the formal charges, (Coughlin absolutely did answer all of the charges, denying
guilt as to each an every one, and its especially pathetic where King and Peters
had to attempt to excise Coughlin's filings of 10/30/11 and 11/9/11 from the
ROA, amongst others) if the legal conclusion the Office of Disciplinary
Counsel (ODC) seeks to prove (i.e., a violation of a specific rule) is not readily
apparent from deemed admitted facts, additional evidence may need to be
submitted in order to prove the legal conclusions that flow from the admitted

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factual allegations. Sup.Ct.Rules, Rule 19, Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement

Rule, 11(E)(3), 8 LSAR.S. In re Hackett, 42 So. 3d 972 (La. 2010).
Clear and convincing evidence did not support referee's finding that
attorney violated disciplinary rule prohibiting a lawyer from failing to
communicate with client or failing to diligently work on her case; record was
almost entirely silent on issues. State ex rel. Counsel for Discipline of
Nebraska Supreme Court v. Wintroub, 277 Neb. 787, 765 N.W.2d 482 (2009).
In disciplinary proceedings against attorney, documents disbarring attorney in
Colorado for conversion of client's trust fund were prima facie evidence that he
committed the acts described therein, and thus attorney had the burden of proving
that the findings forming the basis of the Colorado disbarment were not supported
by the evidence or that the findings were not sufficient grounds for discipline in
Oklahoma. State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Rymer, 2008 OK 50, 187 P.3d 725
(Okla. 2008).
[FN1] Kentucky Bar Ass'n v. Craft, 208 S.W.3d 245 (Ky. 2006). -[FN2] Iowa
Supreme Court Attorney Disciplinary Bd. v. Joy, 728 N.W.2d 806 (Iowa 2007). [FN3] In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Marshall, 160 Wash. 2d 317, 157 P.3d
859 (2007). - [FN4] Matter of Capoccia, 59 N.Y.2d 549, 466 N.Y.S.2d 268, 453
N.E.2d 497 (1983). - [FN5] The Florida Bar v. Greene, 926 So. 2d 1195 (Fla.
2006). - [FN6] In re Disciplinary Action Against Nelson, 733 N.W.2d 458 (Minn.
2007). - [FN7] In re Comfort, 159 P.3d 1011 (Kan. 2007). - [FN8] In re Pharr, 950
So. 2d 636 (La. 2007); State ex rel. Counsel for Discipline of Nebraska Supreme
Court v. Petersen, 272 Neb. 975, 725 N.W.2d 845 (2007). - [FN9] Maddy v. First
Dist. Committee of Virginia State Bar, 205 Va. 652, 139 S.E.2d 56 (1964). [FN10] Baca v. State Bar, 52 Cal. 3d 294, 276 Cal. Rptr. 169, 801 P.2d 412 (1990).
- [FN11] The Florida Bar v. Roberts, 626 So. 2d 658 (Fla. 1993). - [FN12] Connor
v. State Bar, 50 Cal. 3d 1047, 269 Cal. Rptr. 742, 791 P.2d 312 (1990). - [FN13]
Rosenthal v. Justices of the Supreme Court of California, 910 F.2d 561 (9th Cir.
1990).

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112. Protection against self-incrimination

113. Judgment and award of costs; enforcement
Where, however, the bar takes an excessively broad approach to a
disciplinary proceeding and fails to abandon counts against the attorney which
could not be proved, each party should bear its own costs even though the
proceeding results in the disbarment of the attorney.[FN5] If the state bar fails to
prove allegations by clear and convincing evidence, costs should not be assessed
against the attorney in a disciplinary proceeding.[FN6] [FN5] The Florida Bar v.
McCain, 361 So. 2d 700 (Fla. 1978). - [FN6] State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v.
Albert, 2007 OK 31, 2007 WL 1417160 (Okla. 2007).
Pat King failed to seek costs until after Coughlin concluded his closing
argument, and for that reason alone, and in addition to the favorable comparision to
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footnotes 5 and 6 above, costs should not be awarded to the SBN, but Coughlin
should be awarded costs of $50,000, plus both a NRS 7.085 and NRAP 38 attorney
fee award (and Coughlin, unlike Springgate, Hill, or Baker, did comply with the 21
day safe harbor procedural requirement):
HEARING - Vol. I, (Pages 330:16 to 331:20) "I thank you for your time
today. MR. KING: I have no further argument as the panel chair directed, but I do
have something I need to put on the record. If the panel chooses not to disbar Mr.
Coughlin, but instead afford him some opportunity through reinstatement,
regardless, he should be held responsible for paying the costs of the investigation of
these proceedings. They shouldn't fall on the other members of the Bar to pay. And
I believe it would be appropriate since you heard evidence on the issue of the court
order that he pay Dr. Merliss's fees. That any reinstatement, if you don't disbar him
permanently, would be he would be required to follow that court order to pay those
fees. Thank you. MR. ECHEVERRIA: Anything further? I'm going to propose,
because it's getting late, I would like to circulate an e-mail to the panel members
tomorrow to arrange a date when we can either get together in person and/or on the
phone and discuss the situation. We have 30 days, I believe, in which to issue a
written opinion. I would like to set up a meeting sometime within the next week
where we can all discuss this issue and come up with a ruling, and then I'll offer a
tentative ruling, then I'll offer to write the opinion and circulate it for approval or
disapproval. At this time is the hearing will stand adjourned, and I will circulate an
e-mail tomorrow. (Proceedings concluded at 5:30 P.M.)"
Also, it just ridiculous for King to be cheerleading for Hill's client to get
paid above all else.
114. Review
7. Reinstatement of Disbarred Attorney
115. Generally; procedure
116. Considerations affecting right to reinstatement
117. Burden of showing present good character
118. Review
Attorney and Client 56 As a general rule, because a referee in an attorney
disciplinary proceeding is in the best position to judge the credibility of witnesses,
[FN1] the court will not second-guess a referee's recommended discipline as long
as that discipline is authorized under the state standards for imposing lawyer
sanctions and has a reasonable basis in existing case law.[FN2] When reviewing a
referee's recommended attorney discipline, the court's scope of review is broader
than that afforded to the referee's findings of fact because the court has the ultimate
responsibility to determine the appropriate sanction.[FN3] However, since the court
has exclusive authority and wide latitude in determining disciplinary sanctions over
lawyers,[FN4] a referee's recommendation for discipline receives less deference by
the court than a referee's guilt finding.[FN5] Thus, although a referee's
recommendation in an attorney disciplinary proceeding is persuasive, the court does
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not grant it the same deference as it does to guilt recommendations, because the
ultimate responsibility for determining the appropriate sanction rests with the court.
[FN6] It has been stated elsewhere that the court may impose whatever sanction it
deems appropriate, regardless of the referee's recommendation, since the court does
not accord the referee's recommendation as to appropriate attorney discipline great
weight or consider it conclusive, and that the court is entitled to impose discipline
more or less severe than the discipline recommended by the referee.[FN7]
Similarly, another court has stated that recommendations of a bar association board
of governors are advisory in nature, and the court makes an independent review of
the record and findings of fact.[FN8] It has also been stated that, although the court
generally accords great weight to a review department's recommendation, its
findings and recommendations are merely advisory.[FN9] Although the attorney
sanctions for professional misconduct standards are not binding on the court, they
promote the consistent and uniform application of disciplinary measures, and the
court will not reject a recommendation arising from application of the standards
unless it has grave doubts as to the propriety of the recommended discipline.[FN10]
The ultimate decision regarding attorney discipline rests with the court, which has
not hesitated to impose a harsher sanction than that recommended by the review
department, and when the facts have warranted doing so, the court has even
rejected a recommendation of suspension and disbarred the attorney.[FN11] While
the court's scope of review over disciplinary recommendations of a referee is
broader than that afforded to the referee's findings of fact, the referee's
recommendation of discipline is nevertheless afforded a presumption of correctness
unless the recommendation is clearly erroneous or not supported by the evidence.
[FN12] Unlike a referee's factual findings in an attorney disciplinary proceeding,
which are entitled to deference from the court, a referee's order granting summary
relief in an attorney disciplinary proceeding is reviewed de novo by the court.
[FN13 Where neither party filed a petition for review of the hearing officer's
findings in the attorney disciplinary proceeding, the Supreme Court would accept
and adopt those findings but would reserve final judgment as to misconduct and
disciplinary sanction. In re Powell, 893 N.E.2d 729 (Ind. 2008). Generally, the
Supreme Court will not second-guess a referee's recommended attorney discipline
as long as it has a reasonable basis in existing case law and the Florida Standards
for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions. The Florida Bar v. Glueck, 985 So. 2d 1052 (Fla.
2008). Factual findings by the hearing judge in attorney disciplinary proceeding
will not be interfered with by Court of Appeals if they are founded on clear and
convincing evidence. Attorney Grievance Com'n of Maryland v. Pawlak, 408 Md.
288, 969 A.2d 311 (2009). A unanimous decision of state bar association
disciplinary board will be upheld in the absence of a clear reason for departure.
Burtch, In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against, 162 Wash. 2d 873, 175 P.3d 1070
(2008). Evidentiary rulings made by the hearing officer in an attorney disciplinary
proceeding will be reviewed for abuse of discretion. Burtch, In re Disciplinary
Proceeding Against, 162 Wash. 2d 873, 175 P.3d 1070 (2008). The hearing
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officer's denials of motions for mistrial are reviewed for an abuse of discretion in
attorney disciplinary proceeding. Burtch, In re Disciplinary Proceeding Against,
162 Wash. 2d 873, 175 P.3d 1070 (2008). A de novo standard applies to a review
of the adjudicatory record made before the Lawyer Disciplinary Board as to
questions of law, questions of application of the law to the facts, and questions of
appropriate sanctions. Lawyer Disciplinary Bd. v. Cavendish, 700 S.E.2d 779 (W.
Va. 2010). The Florida Bar v. Senton, 882 So. 2d 997 (Fla. 2004). - [FN2] The
Florida Bar v. Greene, 926 So. 2d 1195 (Fla. 2006). - Absent a showing that a
referee's findings in an attorney disciplinary proceeding are clearly erroneous or
lacking in evidentiary support, the court is precluded from reweighing the evidence
and substituting its judgment for that of the referee. The Florida Bar v. Senton, 882
So. 2d 997 (Fla. 2004). - [FN3] The Florida Bar v. Greene, 926 So. 2d 1195 (Fla.
2006). - [FN4] In re Tenenbaum, 918 A.2d 1109 (Del. 2007). - [FN5] The Florida
Bar v. Feige, 937 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 2006). - [FN6] The Florida Bar v. Cohen, 908
So. 2d 405 (Fla. 2005). - [FN7] In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Nunnery,
2007 WI 1, 298 Wis. 2d 289, 725 N.W.2d 613 (2007). - [FN8] Kentucky Bar Ass'n
v. Craft, 208 S.W.3d 245 (Ky. 2006). - [FN9] In re Silverton, 36 Cal. 4th 81, 29
Cal. Rptr. 3d 766, 113 P.3d 556 (2005). - [FN10] In re Silverton, 36 Cal. 4th 81, 29
Cal. Rptr. 3d 766, 113 P.3d 556 (2005). - [FN11] In re Silverton, 36 Cal. 4th 81, 29
Cal. Rptr. 3d 766, 113 P.3d 556 (2005). - [FN12] The Florida Bar v. Barcus, 697
So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1997). - [FN13] The Florida Bar v. Gold, 937 So. 2d 652 (Fla.
2006). , I declare this is true under penalty of perjury pursuant to nrs 53.045:

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