Mysticism and understanding: Steven Katz and his critics

BRUCEJANZ
Interpretation is the only game in town. I Language is the universal medium in which understand ing occurs. Understanding occurs in interpreting.1! We are interpretation all the way down.!l

A current debate in theory of interpretation revolves around what has been called "universal hermeneutics," the position expressed by the above quo tations. On this position, there is no object of interpretation, no final refer ence for the defence of any interpretation, no guarantees about any of our attempts to understand. The distinction between truth and meaning is fuzzy or even non-existent. While debate continues concerning whether this anti foundationalism applies to natural science and our experience of the outside world, the position enjoys much greater acceptance in the human sciences. If this is the case, there is one interesting counter-instance in the human sciences worth considering: mysticism. Is mystical experience interpretive "all the way down," or is there bedrock? Is there something that anchors mystical experience, or is the very experience itself an interpretation? Does mystical experience require reference to mediating factors, such as tjJ.eo logical doctrine, culture, or whatever, or is it pure? Does interpretation con dition the experience, or merely follow the experience? Is mystical experi ence really part of the human sciences, or is it a natural science?

2 3

Stanley Fish, Is There a Text in This Class? (Cambridge, MA; Harvard University Press, 1980),p.350,352. H.-G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 2nd cd. (New York; Crossroad, 1989), p. 389. D. Hiley, J. Bohman and R. Shusterman, eds., The Interpretive Turn (Ithaca, NY; Cornell University Press, 1991), p. 7.

Bruce Janz is Assistant Professor of Philosophy in Augustana University College, 4901 46 Ave nue, Camrose, AB T4V 2R3.
Studies illReligiun / Sciences Religieuses 24/1 (1995): 77-94
1995 Canadian Corporation for Studies in Religion I Corporation Canadienne des Sciences Religieuses

78

Studies in Religion / Sciences Religieuses

24/1

1995

While Steven Katz was not the first to apply universal "hermeneutics to mysticism, he certainly gave its most eloquent expression, and has been the focus of most of the subsequent debate. In his essay "Language, Epistemol ogy, and Mysticism,"4 he argues that there is no "pure" mystical experience at the core of the various interpretations, at least no core that is available ei ther to the mystic or to the later interpreter. If a measure of the success of a philosophical article is how much atten tion it commands, Katz's article is a winner. Relatively little of the attention has been positive, however. A host of writers have attacked Katz on a variety of points. Gary Kessler and Norman Prigge,5 Peter Byrne,6 James Robert son Price m,1 J. W. Forgie,8 Huston Smith,9 Donald Evans,10 Sallie B. King,ll Robert Forman,12 Jonathan Shear,13 Michael Stoeber 14 Nelson Pike 15 have all argued against various aspects or implications of Katz's pro}

4 Steven Katz, "Language, Epistemology, and Mysticism," in S. Katz, ed., Mysticism and Philosaphical Analysis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), p. 22-74. For further work by Katz on this, see also "The 'Conservative' Character of Mystical Experience," in S. Katz, ed., Mysticism and Religious Traditions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983); and S. Katz, Mysticism and LanifUage (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992). 5 Gary Kessler and Norman Prigge, "Is Mystical Experience Everywhere the Same?," Sophia, 21 (1982): 39-55. 6 Peter Byrne, "Mysticism, Identity, and Realism: A Debate Reviewed," Internalionaljournal ofthePhilosaphy ofReligian, 16 (1984): 23744. 7 James Robertson Price, "The Objectivity of Mystical Truth Claims," Thom;sl, 49 (1985): 81-98. 8 J. W. Forgie, "Hyper-Kantianism in Recent Discussions of Mystical Experience," Religious Studies,21 (1985): 205-18. 9 Huston Smith, "Is There a Perennial Philosophy?," journal ofthe American Academy of Reli gian,55 (1897): 553-66. 10 Donald Evans, "Can Philosophers Limit \\-'hat Mystics Can Do? A Critique of Steven Katz," Religious Studus, 25 (1988): 53-60. II Sallie King, "Two Epistemological Models for the Interpretation of Mysticism," journal of the American Academy ofReligion, 61 (1988): 257-79. 12 Robert Forman, "The Construction of Mystical Experience," Faith and Philosaphy, 5 (1988): 254-67, and Robert Forman, "Paramartha and Modern Constructivists on Mysti cism: Epistemological Monomorphism versus Duomorphism," Philosaphy East and West, 39 (1989): 393418. 13 Jonathan Shear, "Mystical Experience, Hermeneutics, and Rationality," International Philosaphical Quarterly, 30 (1990): 391-40 I. 14 Michael Stoeber, "Constructivist Epistemologies of Mysticism: A Critique and a Revi sion," Religious Studies, 28 (1991): 107-16. 15 Nelson Pike, "Steven Katz on Christian Mysticism," in Mystic Unian: An Essay in the Phe nomenology ofMysticism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), p. 194-207. For other discussions of Katz, see also J. Gill, "Mysticism and Mediation," Faith and Philosophy, 1 (1984): 111-21; GraceJantzen, "Mysticism and Experience," Religious Studus, 25 (1988): 295-315; Bernard McGinn, The Foundations of Mysticism (New York: Crossroad, 1991), p. 321-24; A. Perovich, "Mysticism and the Philosophy of Science," Journal of Religion, 65 (1985); 63-82; and Wayne Proudfoot, ReligiottsExperience (Berkeley, CA: University of Cali fornia Press, 1985), p. 122-54.

Janz / Steven Katz and his critics

79

ect, in favour (usually) of the importance of purity of the pre-interpretive experience. The purpose of this article will be to outline the debate over the relation ship between the mystical experience and interpretation. I intend to show that both Steven Katz and his critics assume a certain metaphor for mysti cism which fuels this debate. I will then suggest another metaphor that, at least in part, resolves the debate by recasting mysticism as a hermeneutical issue (although not one that necessarily buys into universal hermeneutics) rather than an epistemological one. 1 Definitions and distinctions The first distinction that must be made is between the purity of a mystical experience and the phenomenological unity of mystical experiences. If a mystical experience occurs without any dependence on social, cultural, theological, religious or other mediation, it can be called "pure." This is not exactly the same use of "pure" that Horne l6 uses in discussing pure and mixed mysticism, for he limits the distinction to lack of doctrinal con tent, while in this context the purity of the experience refers to the lack of any mediation or influence at all in determining or producing the mystical experience. To assert that mystical experiences are unified means that they are identical despite different theological or cultural contexts. The unity of the experience is different from its purity. If we decide that the experience is pure, at best only the first step toward a unified experi ence has been achieved. In itself, demonstrating purity does not necessarily entail the unity or similarity of any mystical experiences across cultures and traditions. It is still possible, at least logically, assuming that the purity of the experience has been shown, that a Christian mystic and a Hindu mystic could have pure introvertive mystical experiences, but that these could be fundamentally different. Arguing that the purity of the experience entails the unity of experiences requires a metaphysical assumption about the na ture of reality that would negate the purity of the experience, because the arguer would have to claim that the mystic's experience had as part of it the experience of a single reality for all mystics. It could just as well be the case that one mystic directly experiences a reality different from that of another. Furthermore, demonstrating unity across traditions (for instance, the agreement of mystics with each other on important points) does not neces sarily entail purity. The seeming unity of experiences could be the result of later interpretation. To argue that unity implies purity means that the pu rity of the experience must already have been assumed. The interpreter

16

James Horne, The Moral Mystic (Waterloo,

ON:

Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1983),

p.39-40.

80

Studies in Religion / Sciences Religieuses

24/1

1995

must be able to show positively that differences amongst reports of experi ences are attributable to some later factor, and nothing else. It is very un likely that this could be done. Further, arguing that unity entails purity as sumes that we can get beyond the mechanism for reporting the experi ences to the experience itself. While this may be true for a particular mystic by that mystic himself or herself, it would require a meta-mystical experi ence to transcend particular experiences. What happens if we demonstrate lack of purity? Does this allow us to con clude that there is also either unity or a lack of unity? This does not neces sarily follow. We might show that there is no essence, or core, to mystical ex perience. Nevertheless, it still could be that the mediating factors are wide spread enough and similar enough to allow for a unity of the experience without purity. There may be mediating elements that transcend particular religious systems, perhaps ones common to all humanity, that could mean that the experiences of various mystics are still very similar. Experiences of death, for instance, could inform and structure the mystical experience, even though death is universally experienced. Finally, does the lack of unity allow us to conclude there is a lack of pu rity? No, this does not follow either. Mystics could have deep differences be tween reports of experiences, and it could be that we could in principle never get beyond those reports. Even mystics themselves have to rely on the reports of other mystics to determine whether there is unity. Perhaps the reports differ sufficiently to cast doubt, but that could just be a result of the necessity of the theologically and culturally biased reporting mechanism, not the experience itself. So, to summarize: (1) Purity does not necessarily entail unity, or lack of unity; (2) Unity does not necessarily entail purity, or lack of purity; (3) Lack of purity does not necessarily entail either unity or lack of unity; and (4) Lack of unity does not necessarily entail either purity or lack of purity. All this means that, if a person wanted to argue against Katz's position that mystical experience is not pure, it would not be sufficient to link it to the unity of mystics across traditions. On the other hand, it also would not work to point to the differences in mystical experiences to argue for Katz's position. Establishing unity does not necessarily mean anything for purity, and establishing lack of unity does not necessarily mean anything for lack of purity. Thus, Huston Smith's17 argument for perennial philosophy (meaning unity, as is clear by page 564) may be true, but it is strictly speak ing irrelevant if it intends to argue for the phenomenological purity of the mystical experience. Smith is not the only one to make this connection. One objection to this analysis (made by several earlier readers of this article) might be that it holds for all mystical experiences except those in

17

Smith, "Is There a Perennial Philosophy?," p. 553-66.

Janz / Steven Katz and his critics

81

which there is no intentional object. Experiences of pure consciousness, it might be said, must be exempt because they lack any content at all, and are therefore both pure (because there is nothing not to be pure) and unified (for there is nothing to distinguish one experience from another). The problem with this objection is that Katz would be unwilling to admit that these pure consciousness experiences actually exist at all. In other words, for this objection to have force it must assume the ultimate correctness of one side of the debate. The second distinction that must be made concerns the names used for each side in this debate. Katz uses a couple of terms for the other side: es sentialist, for instance, and also philosophia perennis. 18 The first term implies that there is a core, or essence to mystical experience which precedes inter pretation. The second (here used differently than by Smith, above) implies that this core extends universally. In other words, the first term implies pu rity and the second implies unity. Names for the other side are many and varied, ranging from the relatively neutral to the positively vituperative. Katz calls his own position the "contex tual thesis."19 The names given by others include constructivist, 20 hermeneut ical,21 mediated,22 neo-Kantian,23 hyper-Kantian 24 and pluralist. 25 Notice that these terms have different implications. Katz's "contextual thesis" is only about purity, not about unity, although he does make com ments about the diversity (lack of unity) of mystical experiences. To call the position "constructivist" is to change the emphasis from saying that the ex perience is understandable only in its context, to saying that the experi ence can be generated from other parts, and therefore may also be reduc ible to those parts. Katz himself calls the other side reductionist, in that its supporters reduce all reports of x to one claimed essence y.26 Contextual ism, on the other hand, does not imply reductionism for him. Constructiv ism is not the same as Katz' contextualism, because to say that a mystical ex perience happens within a context is not the same as saying that it is con structed from more basic parts. Associating Katz's position with Kant (neo-Kantian, hyper-Kantian) is ac tually to call it constructivist in a more specific way. The critics that charac

18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

Katz, "Language, Epistemology, and Mysticism," p. 24.

Ibid., p. 46.
Forman, "The Construction of Mystical Experience"; Forman, "Paramartha and Modern
Constructivists on Mysticism"; and Stoeber, "Constructivist Epistemologies of Mysticism." Shear, "Mystical Experience," p. 391-401. Gill, "Mysticism and Mediation," p. 111-21. Evans, "Can Philosophers Limit What Mystics Can Do?," p. 53-60. Forgie, "H)per-Kamianism," p. 205-18. King, "Two Epistemological Models," p. 257-79. Katz, "Language, Epistemology, and Mysticism," p. 24.

82

Studies in Religion / Sciences Religieuses

24/1

1995

terize Katz as neo-Kantian do so because of the family resemblance be tween Katz's position that the mystical experience is mediated by tradition and Kant's position that sensation is mediated by categories. These critics all attack Katz by saying that he has deviated from the transcendental (uni versal and necessary) nature of the Kantian categories and has thus made the mystical experience into a construction of personal experience. In other words, the mystical experience seems to be reduced to a psychologi cal experience, which undermines the possibility of any objective nature. There are two problems in characterizing Katz's work as Kantian though. First, the only place Katz mentions Kant is in a specific, limited context. 27 He is arguing against the phenomenologists' position that the given can be intuited. He points out that these intuitions lead to very differ ent descriptions of the given, and cites Kant approvingly that epistemic ac tivity requires bringing to light both the conditions of knowing in general, as well as the grounds of its own operation. He does not propose to outline what that structuring is, and says that it will not happen in the manner Kant worked out. Is this enough to argue for constructivism? I do not think so. It is not clear that Katz would agree with the claim that contextualization implies Kantian constructivism. In fact, I suspect that he would be more amenable to a comparison with Wittgenstein than with Kant, a comparison that Sallie King makes and critiques. The second problem is that Katz is being accused of not quite being like Kant. At least if he followed Kant faithfully (so the argument goes) he would be committed to (1) the transcendental nature of the categories, which would ensure at least the unity of experiences, if not their purity, and (2) the noumenal world, which provides the "stuff" for the categories to structure. But Katz seems to want to have the Kantian categories without the Kantian restrictions on relativism. He is therefore a constructivist of the crassest sort, who would reduce mystical experience to a collection of inter changeable parts. Criticizing Katz for almost looking like Kant, however, is not much of a criticism. Most contemporary critics of Kant also pointed out the problems with Kant's doctrine of transcendental idealism; it is only recently that that particular doctrine has been reconsidered and defended. And, even if Katz and Kant both depend on categories (which is by no means clear), it does not follow that these categories are identical or that their structure or im plementation is identical. In fact, Katz says that he does not follow Kant on the way to structure experience. Even if Katz does bear some resemblance to Kant, does this imply rela tivistic constructivism? Not necessarily. Katz nowhere wants to claim the re

21

Ibid.. p. 59.

Janz / Steven Katz and his critics

83

ductionist thesis. Perhaps there is a way to contextualize mystical experi ence that does not fall into the problem of arbitrariness or subjectivity, and retains the importance of the mystical experience. In short, I think the at tempt to critique Katz as if he was a Kantian strayed from the fold misses the point. Jonathan Shear calls Katz a "hermeneutical thinker," and characterizes such thinkers as holding that "the standard, seemingly commonsensical analyses of mystical experiences do not do justice to general, epistemologi cally related facts of the nature of human experience."28 This position is overly generalized, Shear argues, and is sometimes completely false. Shear wants to cast Katz as a constructivist, although the word he uses is "hermeneutical." For instance, consider this paragraph:
Let us now examine Katz's general argument a little further. His "basic claim," as we saw, is that all mystical experiences (like all others) are "shaped" by the ex periencer in terms of memory, apprehension, expectation, language, accumula tion of prior experiences, concepts, etc. Thus, as we saw, mystical experiences, like all others, are "built" of all these "elements."29

\\-'hile Katz does use words of this sort,30 and could therefore be taken in isolated instances to be advocating a constructivist program, most times he sounds quite different. For instance: "all experience is processed through, organized by, and makes itself available to us in extremely complex episte mological ways."31 This seems to be contextualization, not construction. Katz resists reducing mystical experience to component elements that are all naturally explainable. I myself do not believe he is driven to this kind of reductionism. My argument later will try to establish a rapprochement be tween purity and contextualism. But Shear's attempt seems to simply be a misunderstanding of both hermeneutics and Katz's position. Sallie King characterizes Katz's position as pluralist, as opposed to her own "Buddhist-phenomenological model.,,32 But "pluralism" implies lack of unity, while Katz is arguing for lack of purity. On the face of it, then, it seems that King too has missed the point. In calling her model phenome nological, however, she is clearly intending to address the question of pu rity. She seems to be following a modified form of Ninian Smart's posi tion. 33 It should be pointed out, though, that the most she can do (and per

28 29 30 31 32 33

Shear, "Mystical Experience," p. 392. Shear's use ofthe term "hermeneutics" is very dif ferent from my use later in this article. Ibid., p. 394. Katz, "Language, Epistemology, and Mysticism," p. 59. Ibid., p. 26. Sallie King. "Interpretation of mysticism," p. 258. 271. Ninian Smart, "Interpretation and Mystical Experience," in R. Woods, ed.. Understanding Mysticism (Garden City, NY: Image Books, 1980). p. 78-91.

84

Studies in Religion / Sciences Religieuses

24/1

1995

haps, the most that can be done) is to argue that the pure experience is at least possible. We could go on, but the point is this: confusing the two issues of purity and unity has led to misconstruing Katz's position. This misconstrual has its most clear manifestation in the names used for that position. This should not be taken as an apologetic for Katz; rather, I simply want to set the stage to consider the debate in a new way.

2 Mysticism as epistemology
Much discussion in mysticism has been carried on over the epistemological status of the experience the mystic has. Is the mystic's experience knowl edge? Is it verifiable or communicable? The present debate, I would argue, is also driven by epistemological concerns. Katz, on the one side, argues that the experience happens within a context. That could make the mys tic's experience almost a separate Wittgensteinian language game, not ac cessible from other language games. Or it could reduce the experience to the level of doctrine and tradition, making it accessible to anyone who cares to take a first-year religious studies course. If a contextualized experi ence is to be known, therefore, it entails either meta-mysticism-a mystical leap between mystical language games-or no mysticism at all. Either way, the concern affects the knowledge status of the experience. The first option rules mysticism out of court as knowledge at all. Many people find this unpalatable, because it is common to claim a kind of inner rationality to the mystical experience. The experience is not irrational, but super-rational, accessible only on its own terms. A contextualized mystical experience could easily be an arbitrary experience, undistinguishable from psychosis. The second option makes mystical knowledge trivial, simply a way of accessing publicly available doctrines. The experience itself could then be explained psychologically, and dismissed as an affectation of cer tain personali ty types. Katz meets some of these problems, as well as addressing the essentialist critique, by recasting his position as a dialectic between the "radical" (that is, the experience is completely unique-roughly equivalent to the essen tialist position) and "conservative" (that is, the experience conserves the tradition-the contextualist position).34 He even uses the term "herme neutical" of this position, as I do. 35 In shifting his emphasis, he recognizes that a balance must be struck between the two extremes. Unfortunately, the answer (that there is a dialectic between the two extremes) seems to in dicate a separation between "elements" within mysticism, and is far from

34 35

Katz, "The 'Conservative' Character," p. 3-60.

Ibid., p. 5.

Janz / Steven Katz and his critics

85

the unified experience that mystics actually report. His attempt at reconcili ation has not seemed to satisty the critics. So there are some problems with Katz's position, if we take it as operat ing within the realm of knowledge claims, although I do not think that Katz is ignorant of these problems. Despite them, there are benefits to advocat ing the position that mystical experience is mediated or constructed by doctrine, tradition or culture. One seeming benefit is that it enables us to explain why mystics from dif ferent backgrounds give different reports of their experiences. Buddhist mystics, after all, rarely have visions of the Virgin Mary. Even outside the visionary type of mysticism, experiences tend to confirm doctrinal posi tions. Of course, given what I said earlier about the difference between the purity and the unity of the mystical experience, this advantage looks better than it actually is. Katz wants to argue for lack of purity; this benefit applies to lack of unity (diversity). There would need to be some explicit argument given for why the first entails the second, for the implication is not a logi cally necessary one. Thus, we will have to look for better reasons for argu ing for the contextual thesis. Second, reports of mystics tend to confirm their own tradition. It is rare that a mystic reports experiences that are at variance with his or her tradi tion. Michael Stoeber does point out that mystics are sometimes heretics,36 but this heresy commonly pushes the boundaries of the stagnant metaphys ics of a tradition, rather than denying that tradition. These heretics are rad ical in the true sense of the word: they go to the root of the tradition, to re cover it. 37 This is a much better reason. At least it deals with the conver gence between theology and experience within a tradition. A third benefit of the contextual, or mediated version of mystical experi ence is that it undermines some of the traditional objections to mystical ex perience. For instance, some might argue that mysticism makes for a hier archical theology. There can be a two-tiered system-those who have had the mystical experience (the elite) and those who have not (the seekers). Contextualism can answer this objection by saying that the experience is still within the public world of dogma and culture, and therefore confirms that world. Essentialism's only answer is that this is just the way it is. Some are blessed and some are not. Furthermore, if mysticism is contextual, there could be an antidote to the perennial charge against some forms of mysticism: quietism. If some mystics are led to withdraw from the world, that is not the fault of the expe

36 37

Stoeber, "Constructivist Epistemologies of Mysticism," p. 112. Steven Katz also argues for this sense of the radical, although ironically, the sense of radi cal as "rooted" is really his category of "conservative" (Katz, "The 'Conservative' Char acter," p. ~).

86

Studies in Religion / Sciences Religieuses

24/1

1995

rience, but of the theology and culture which made that experience pos sible. And this theology or culture can be addressed in ways that the experi ence cannot. Of course, the critics do not object simply because of whim. The appeal of the essentialist position differs for different critics, but there are some important benefits to holding essentialism and denying contextualism: One commonly mentioned benefit is this: while there are many differ ences in the reports mystics give of their experiences, there are also many similarities. The essentialist position takes these similarities seriously and accounts for the differences through later interpretation. This reason, like the first reason for the contextual thesis, is not compelling because it con fuses the purity/unity distinction. Similarities do not entail purity any more than differences entail lack of purity. Second, it ensures that mystical experience is not reduced to cultural ex perience. If mysticism is mediated by theology, tradition or culture, the fear is that it will be regarded as nothing more than an intense appreciation of that theology, tradition or culture. Mysticism will in some way become "nat ural," and that will take something important away from the experience. Third, it ensures that the mystical experience is unique, not reducible to psychological experience. The mystic is not simply a particular brand of psychotic or religious fanatic. If the experience is naturalized, however, that danger exists. Fourth, following from the previous two reasons, if mysticism is reduc ible, it is also explainable. A hallmark of mysticism is mystery and paradox; yet, if we find that it is reallyjust intensely felt theology, or psychological ab erration, we can ignore the question of the meaningfulness of the experi ence. This isJonathan Shear's concern. 38 Finally, if mystical experience is mediated by expectations of some sort, it seems difficult to account for the reports of many mystics, that there is a "pure consciousness" in the experience. It is not an intentional experience at all. The concerns of both sides seem legitimate. Furthermore, the argu ments for one side or the other seem to rely in part on a conceptual confu sion (purity/unity) and mislabelling of positions. This is not to say that there are no good arguments for each side; in fact, I think there are. How ever, they seem to balance each other out. How are we to decide between them? I would like to suggest one reason for the impasse, and propose a way out.

38

Shear, "Mystical Experience, Hermeneutics, and Rationality," p. 400.

Janz I Steven Katz and his critics

87

Mystical experience vs. mystical understanding

There is an important presupposition in this debate which must be brought to light. Virtually all discussants, including Katz, assume that mystical expe rience is analogous to sense experience. The debate then becomes one over whether experience is structured in itself (Katz's position, and one cri tiqued as neo-Kantian by J. William Forgie, Donald Evans and, to a certain extent, Michael Stoeber), or whether experience is primitive (the position most of the critics hold) .39 Why are mystical experience and sense experi ence so easily related? There are some good philosophical and historical reasons for this. The first and most obvious concerns light imagery used by many mystics, leading one to believe that the mystical "vision" or "insight" or "illumina tion" is like sight, only enhanced. As well, some mystic experiences are re ported as auditory, rather than visual. The mystic might hear voices or mu sic. Again, there is an easy connection between the experience and a heightened sensory state. Furthermore, the mystics that do not use vision or sound as metaphors use touch, smell and taste. It is the difference be tween Augustine (light/intellectual presence) and Gregory of Nyssa (dark ness/immediate presence). In general, if a mystic wants to communicate the experience he or she has had, metaphors must be used that the audi ence will understand. In philosophical tradition, the most significan t forms of knowledge are that derived from the senses and that derived from rea son. But the second also uses the first as its metaphor. So, knowledge that people already have is infused with the sensory metaphor. Another benefit is that the analogy to sensation ensures the reality of the experience. The fact that we sense cannot be disputed, although what we sense may be questioned. In the same way, if mysticism is like sensation, it seems more difficult to dismiss the experience. Furthermore, sensation is something that everyone can relate to. By using this metaphor for mysti cism, the experience is easily communicated, even if the meaning is not. As well, the analogy to sensation reinforces the immediacy of the experience. There is a tradition (probably due to British empiricism) that sensation is primitive and immediate, and forms the building-blocks of our mental

39 It should be noted that, when I refer to the metaphor of sensation, I mean the traditional empiricist position that sensation is primitive, the building blocks for later interpreta tion. Much discussion of mysticism has assumed this version of sensation. I realize that it is quite possible that sensation is itself hermeneutical, but that is not how most scholars of mysticism have taken it. This is, after all, a metaphor which is assumed in making the mystical experience into an epistemological event, and so the issue concerns what episte mology has been inherited, not which one could be consciously argued for. One good source that argues for the hermeneutical nature of sensation is Graeme Nicholson, Seeing and Reading (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1984).

88

Studies in Religion / Sciences Religieuses

24/1

1995

world. But just as this view of sensation has been questioned, so too this view of mysticism has been questioned by Katz and others. Finally, the discussion about mysticism has been driven, in part, by the question of whether mystical knowledge is legitimate. This stems from the early philosophical discussions of mysticism, as a branch of the "religious experience" argument for the existence of God or for the legitimacy of a particular religion. While mystical insights have for centuries been ap propriated enthusiastically by mainstream philosophers (often without giv ing the true source its due recognition), mystical experience has been harder to deal with. It is relatively recent that respectable philosophers have been able to talk about mystical experience without being accused of falling into psychology or, worse yet, religion. But how did philosophy deal with mystical experience when it began to take it seriously? By using its own metaphors. And the most important, the most ready metaphor, was that of knowledge. But knowledge comes with its own metaphors, which are often based on sensation. Walter Ong does a marvellous job of showing the pervasiveness and usefulness of the sensory metaphors for knowledge.40 The argument, then, goes like this: mystical experience provides knowledge, just as other experience provides knowl edge; knowledge is not only normally derived from sensation, but is best understood through sensory metaphors; therefore, mystical experience is best understood through sensory metaphors. There are, though, differences between the mystical experience and the empiricist version of sensation. Sensation is, after all, only a metaphor for the mystical experience, albeit one that has held such powerful sway that most people simply assume that the mystical experience is just another kind of sensation. One difference is that the mystic does not report the experience as one which requires further understanding, but as one characterized as pure un derstanding. The mystic does not have the sensation first and understand it later. The "raw data" of the experience does not require any inbred func tions of the mind, like judgment, memory or whatever, to be understood. Any empiricist must combine an active mind and passive sensations. This is not what happens in mystical experience, though. The experience is the understanding. This is a very important difference, for it collapses the tra ditional empiricist/pragmatist structure of mysticism (critiqued by, among others, GraceJantzen 41 ) and opens the door for characterizing mystical ex perience as hermeneutical. We need an account that deals with mysticism

40 41

Walter Ong, "I See What You Say: Sense Analogues for Intellect," in Interfaces (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1977), p. 121-44. Jantzen. "Mysticism and Experience." p. 313-15.

of the Word

Janz / Steven Katz and his critics

89

as understanding at its most basic level, not as knowledge that has been constructed from some raw data. It is this hermeneutical model I favour. There is another difference. Many mystics report that there is conscious ness without any object at all. Sensation typically is intentional-it is of something. Scholars who recognize the non-intentional nature of many mystical experiences, but still hold on to the sensation metaphor, are likely simply to drop the "object" and retain the "subject." Or, if there is an ob ject, it is an onto/theological one. It is a metaphysical thing, like the objects of normal sensation. The point is that the subject/object split is tacitly maintained in the metaphor used, even though the scholar may try in other ways to transcend that distinction. Sallie King goes partway in resolv ing this subject/object split by relying on Husserlian descriptive phenome nology. My modification of her position (which actually turns out to argue against her conclusion that there is a core to mystical experience) is that phenomenology must be hermeneutical, not simply descriptive. It is important to note in this analysis that I am not suggesting that most analyses of mysticism claim that mysticism is like sensation, and therefore falls into the traditional empiricist distinction between the knowing subject and the empirical object of that knowledge. Many theorists explicitly reject the idea that mysticism is a subject/object type of experience. However, they may be implicitly committed to that split, in that they may hold that mystical experience gives or forms the basis for knowledge. It is this con nection I really take issue with, because the metaphor of many discussions of knowledge has been sensory. Thus, the problem does not lie in the claim that mysticism is like sensation, but that mysticism is knowledge, which is like sensation. The fact that some mystics report sensory-type experiences is used as a support of the epistemological character of the experience. Identitying the places where mysticism is not like sensation could argue for a "neo-Kantian" version of sensation, but that is not the only conclu sion possible. It might also mean that mysticism is more like an act in which experience and understanding are co-temporaneous-like reading, for in stance. If a person does not understand at least at some basic level while reading, the person is not reading but only looking. The idea that the mys tical experience is hermeneutical, like textual experience, opens up inter esting possibilities. These are well expressed in another context by one of Paul Ricoeur's works on interpretation theory.42 In a series of lectures, Ricoeur argues that reading a text consists of the tension and in terplay be tween two parts, variously portrayed as code and message, meaning and event, langue and parole. In each case, the message is imbedded in the code, but the code exists only through the message. Which is more real? The

42 Paul Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning (Fort Worth, Texas Christian University Press, 1976).

TX:

90

Studies in Religion / Sciences Religieuses

24/1

1995

unique message is what I am saying now; the grammar (structure. code) is virtual. or assumed. Therefore the message is more real. But the language will remain long after the message is gone; therefore, the code is more real. Is the message unique? It relies on the reference to the structure of previous messages for its meaning. and therefore does not seem to be unique; yet. it is a new message with a sense of its own, not reducible to the other messages nor generatable from them, and therefore does seem to be unique. Ricoeur's point is that, even though the message (meaning) is imbed ded in a structure, the message (event) is still unique. For example, a novel ist may write a novel, and that novel will follow the conventions of novel writing. Is the novel reducible to its implied references? No; it is unique. But could the message be understood without its implied references? No. These implied references point to other instances within a genre (we un derstand novels from having experienced other novels), to other writing outside the genre (the novel differs from the factual report, and the reader can become disoriented if that boundary blurs), and to experience apart from writing (the novel makes sense ifitrings true to experience). What is the experience of the novel? Is it reducible to the sensory inputs of reading? No, because we could imagine experiencing the same novel through different senses-hearing, for instance-or through different media, such as drama. Understanding the novel is not reducible to the sen sations involved in reading. Reading the novel is an irreducible act of un derstanding. That understanding may not be complete, but it exists apart from the sensation of the means of transmission of the novel. Is the understanding of the novel only an intellectual act? No; there may be strong emotional components to it. If you "see yourself" in a novel, that does not necessarily mean that you simply agree with concepts contained therein. It means that a character or situation reflects your experience in all its rational, pre-rational, and non-rational diversity. Understanding is not reducible to knowledge about the novel, nor is it reducible to proposi tions about the novel. Understanding catches us up in our totality. How does this apply to the mystical experience? One might argue that the mystical experience, whether visionary or not, is totally unique, and does not have a literature. Or, if it has a literature, it comes after the fact, as an attempt to rationalize the experience. In Ninian Smart's schematization, whether there is auto- or hetero-interpretation, there is always some degree of ramification. 43 In other words, all mystical experience is phenomenolog ically the same; it is the later interpretation that makes the difference. But how can this be defended? It seems to be no more than an assump tion. While there are problems with the contextualist model, there are also problems with the "primitive experience," or essentialist model. It is not

43

Smart, "Interpretation and Mystical Experience," p. 78-91.

Janz / Steven Katz and his critics

91

true that all mystics report the same thing, although there are similarities. To decide that the experiences are all the same is itself a philosophical deci sion not derivable from the evidence alone. A contextualist will always be able to see mediation and context; an essentialist will always be able to see the primitive experience. Simply asserting one or the other will not solve the issue. I believe that it is possible both to understand that the experience hap pens within a tradition and to regard it as unique. While it is not true that all mystical experiences happen within a tradition that encourages the ex perience, most do. While it is not true that all mystics have experiences that are part of their religious or cultural heritage, most do. And very few have experiences that actually contradict their heritage, St. Paul's experience notwithstanding. Even in his case, one could argue that the vision ex tended, rather than negated, his Jewish heritage. This is a hallmark of mys tical experience, that the edges of orthodoxy are pushed; but this is not necessarily a contradiction of orthodoxy. It could be a deepening or grounding of orthodoxy. Changing from the metaphor of sensation to the metaphor of under standing a text is the first step in breaking the impasse. The metaphor of sensation is a useful one, and should not be thrown out; however, it is a par tial one. The danger has been that we have forgotten that it is just a meta phor. So, this second metaphor should be put in tension with the first. How is mysticism like reading a novel? There is the obvious parallel be tween the understanding that characterizes both. It is immediate, and at the best of times, it can "take over." I am not suggesting that reading a novel is a form of mystical insight; this is just a metaphor. But a good novel can create a new consciousness. It is an event. The reader can become lost in a new world. The mystic typically is called back to the experience, as the reader is called back to a good book. Both find new things all the time. For both, the understanding is one of opening new possibilities when before all possibilities were stagnant or non-existent. The mystical experience, like the novel, is new. unique and exciting. And yet ... it exists in a context. It works only because the mystic, or the reader, is ready for the experience. It works because the mystic has come to terms with his or her existence, and found that existence to be lacking. This may be a conscious realization or something that is only realized when the experience highlights life as it is, and as it could be. The novel, and the mystical experience. then. might be something that has had a long prepara tion, or it might take the person by surprise. Of course, reading the novel is not an act of pure consciousness. Meta phors can only be pushed so far. Nevertheless, the very act of setting up an alternate metaphor to the sensation image highlights the fact that these are only metaphors that open up some ways of understanding, but close off

92

Studies in Religion / Sciences Religieuses

24/1

1995

others. The problem for both Katz and most of his critics is that they forget the metaphor. Is the mystical experience really primitive or is it really con structed? This is a false dichotomy, brought on by the metaphor of sensa tion. Like the novel, the mystical experience can be both. Why should anyone prefer this hermeneutical account to either the es sentialist or the contextualist account? Mainly because it avoids the prob lems of either pole of the debate, it gives an account that recognizes the sig nificance of the uniqueness of the mystic's understanding while at the same time recognizing what most mystics would claim about themselves, that they are rooted in a tradition. Robert Forman 44 critiques both sides (which he calls "perennialism" and "constructivism") and proposes a solution which incorporates "forgetting." I believe my hermeneutical account in corporates his answer, as I will try to show in the next section.
4 Structure and uniqueness

While it is true that many mystics have experiences where elements of cul ture or doctrine are present, the more interesting structural connections happen in absence, rather than presence. Some writers have pointed out that there is a great deal of negativity involved in mysticism. While not want ing to be committed to Derrida's entire project, we could also draw on his notion of absence. 45 The meaning of a text comes not because of the pres ence of certain elements, but due to their absence. In the case of mysticism, perhaps it is not the fact that the mystic makes specific references to a dogma or tradition that is important, but that the mystic's experience exists in the negation of his or her other experiences. But that only goes so far. The mystic, after all, is not the objective ob server of his or her own experiences. We hardly expect the mystic to com pare the present experience with absent experiences, and thereby begin to understand. The understanding is immediate, not inferential, even though this immediacy does not necessarily imply total understanding. What is ab sent, then? Robert Forman and Michael Stoeber both give us a hint. Forman 46 points out that the mystical pure consciousness is the process of forgetting. While he uses sensory analogies (perhaps unavoidably), he also uses doctrinal examples. Eckhart talks of letting go of all notions of

44 45

46

Robert Forman, "Of Deserts and Doors: Methodology of the Study of Mysticism," Sophia, 32 (1993): 31-44. I am aware that Derrida has rejected the idea that deconstruction is a kind of apophatic the ology. The best treatment of the negativity in theology and deconstruction, that avoids the route of apophatic theology but affirms the relevance of deconstruction for theology is It Hart, The Trespass ofthe Sign (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). Forman, "The Construction of Mystical Experience," Faith and Phiwsophy, p. 254-67, and Forman, "Of Deserts and Doors," p. 31-44.

Janz / Steven Katz and his critics

93

God (going as far in one place as saying that he must be rid of God in order to see God). A famous Zen Buddhist aphorism is "If you see the Buddha on the road, kill him." Examples of this type of forgetting could be compounded from StJohn of the Cross,Jacob Boehme and many other mystics. Now, is this forgetting an attempt to negate one's knowledge? Is the mys tic yearning for a time before knowledge? Is pure experience something that happens in the denial of experience or in the transcendence of experi ence? I would contend that the mystic's knowledge is part of the necessary path that brings him or her to the place where that knowledge can be given up. It is a Hegelian Aujhelntng, the simultaneous transcending and destruc tion of a state, which recognizes that state was necessary for the higher one to take place. There is plenty of evidence that mystics travel a path-the dark night of the soul, the eight-fold path-to mystical insight. Of course, not everyone who has a mystical experience has followed this path. Never theless, it seems clear that the experience of most mystics was necessary in order to arrive at the place where mystical experience can happen. This is contextualized experience necessary for understanding, but which does not reduce to doctrine or tradition. And recognition of this contextualiza tion is important both for the mystic and for the later interpreter. This can be put in another way for some mystics. The path the mystic takes to enlightenment is often one of struggle with the seeming contradictions of received theology, tradition, or culture. The mystic (from the perspective of Western theology for the moment) cannot make coherent the love of God with the evil in the world, or the oneness of God with the fragmentation of creation. This problem becomes an all-consuming existential issue. The an swer, if it comes (and there are no guarantees). comes as the solution to this problem. Some mysticism can be seen as a kind of existential release to an ir resolvable dilemma. Because of the high stakes, this is not simply Ar chimedes' intellectual "Eureka" upon realizing how to determine the mass of Hiero's crown. The problem has taken over the person's very being, and therefore so does the answer. It is understanding-perhaps understanding that defies ready communication-but understanding nonetheless. And this understanding is multifaceted: emotional, intellectual, volitional. While this is not an explanation of the mystical experience, it is a contex tualization. It does help both the mystic and the scholar to understand the path that led to the experience. The understanding is unique, yet situated. Michael Stoeber47 seems to be sympathetic to this as well. Although he seems caught up in the sensory analogy (along with an unfortunate tend ency to regard mystical experience as a kind of information processing-a computer metaphor that does more harm than good), his critique of the

47

Stoeber, "Constructivist Epistemologies of Mysticism," p. 107-16.

94

Studies in Religion / Scie'lces Religieuses

24/1

1995

"constructivist" pOSItIOn (represented by John Hick48 rather than Steven Katz) amounts to a revision rather than a rejection. While he sees serious problems with Hick's extreme constructivism, he is also uneasy with the es sentialist position on mysticism. His answer is an "experiential-constructivist" position that understands mystical experience "in terms of a diversity of both experiences and interpretations. ,,49 As he put it, "though mystics do not nec essarily experience that which they expect, they can only experience that which they are prepared for or that which they can assimilate. "50 This fits well with my position. The mystic is placed in the position to have an experience, and will have the experience his or her background al lows. Katz made this point in the original essay.51 Stoeber wants to argue that the experience can outstrip interpretation,52 which I can also accept, as long as a distinction is made between interpretation and understanding (perhaps along Heidegger's lines). Interpretations change over time as mystics receive new insight and struggle with their own metaphors for ex pressing that insight (Jacob Boehme is a good example of this develop ment). But the insight is still irreducibly understanding, not sensation, a point Stoeber obscures by his continual use of sense metaphors. This hermeneutical account can, I think, be applied to individual mysti cal experiences profitably. It would dissolve the impasse between the con textualist and the essentialist position, and enable us to get on with address ing the accounts of mystics. It would take seriously mystics as mystics, rather than as closet theologians or psychotics; yet it would also take seriously the self-perception of many mystics to be part of a tradition that the mystical ex perience confirms and grounds. A last word: is this hermeneutical metaphor necessarily true for all mysti cism? I do not think so. I have no desire to give a totalizing account, to give a new "essence" of mysticism, to require that mystics must live up to myac count or they are not mystics. I give a narrative, a metaphor that I believe makes sense of much mystical experience. There will always be some who will appeal to a personal mystical experience, and on that basis claim that my account is wrong or irrelevant, that the hermeneutic metaphor is also only partial. This partiality is, of course, something I admit. The preroga tive of the mystic is to break through the totalization of rational or non rational accounts, whether essentialist, contextualist or hermeneutical. For a scholar to deny that would be hybris.

48 John Hick, An Interpretation o/Religion (London: Macmillan, 1989).

49 Stoeber, "Constructivist Epistemologies of Mysticism," p. 108.
50 Ibid., p. 113.
51 Katz, "Language, Epistemology, and Mysticism," p. 59.
52 Stoeber, "Constructivist Epistemologies of Mysticism," p. 114.