A Report on St.

Thomas Aquinas Teachings on Virtues

I.

Virtue in General It is generally agreed that a virtue is something good and positive. The virtues render our

activities and emotions in agreement with right reason or, according to some, with our duty and with the law. The virtues cover the vast field of our emotions and our interpersonal relationships. But it is not easy to define what virtue is. The difficulties mentioned in the first article of Question 55, Secunda Secundae of the Summa Theologica give expression to the many uncertainties concerning the concept of virtue. Aquinas shows that virtues are habitus. He does so by generally stressing the generally acknowledged fact that a virtue is something valuable, i.e. an improvement and accomplishment of our faculties. Since the purpose of our faculties is to act, their perfection must consist in their being adapted to and capacitated for those acts which are fitting to them. Contrary to natural functions such as the activities of vegetative life and the perceptions of the external senses, mans rational faculties, the intellect and the will, are not determined to one type of acts but can go in different directions. But by the different habitus they are ordered to certain acts. Virtues are dispositions to good actions and so the moral virtues consist essentially in making us seek the good.1 If so, can moral virtues have the intellect as their seat? Aristotle speaks of intellectual virtues such as the understanding of first principles, but also of the habitus of the different sciences. This use of the virtue agrees with its original meaning in Greek, but our word virtue is hardly apt to express this sense. In his answer to this question Aquinas points out the difference between the typical habitus of the intellect and those of the other faculties. Purely intellectual habitus such as those of the different sciences have no connection with the will. However, virtues are dispositions which make us act rightly. Since all human acts depend on the will which moves the different faculties, the moral virtues must have their seat in
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (Westminster, Maryland: Christian Classics, 1948), Q. 56, a. 2 ad. 2. Henceforth ST.
1

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the will or in the other faculties insofar as they are moved by the will. 2 The intellect is also moved by the will, and therefore, insofar as it is ordered to the will, it can be the seat of authentic virtues. This is the case with supernatural faith and, above all, with the virtue of prudence, inasmuch as the intellect recognizes the natural order of the will to the different goals which people purse and in view of this gives practical indications for acting. 3 This is the task of what is called the practical intellect. The habitus of the sciences, however, have their seat in the speculative intellect. The moral virtues have their seat in the appetitive faculties insofar as they belong to our rational nature. This raises the question of whether the irascible or concupiscible appetite could be the seat of virtues. One would be inclined to give a positive answer insofar as a virtue like temperance seems to belong to the concupiscible, courage or fortitude to the irascible appetite. However, Aquinas makes a distinction between these faculties as such, and the aspect under which they are subject to reason. In these faculties as such, there are no virtues, for we do not speak of virtues in animals, although they possess appetitive faculties. But in human beings these faculties are subject to reason and will with which they collaborate end, therefore, they can be the seat of virtues.

A. Different Classes of Virtues 1. Intellectual Virtues A first question which has already been answered implicitly is whether the habitus in the speculative intellect should be called virtues. Insofar as they help the intellect to carry out its work correctly, one may call them virtues, though in the full sense of the term they are not, since they are not directed to a correct moral use of the other faculties or even the sciences. 4 They are directed to the knowledge of the truth. Virtues of the will, on the other hand, enable us to act rightly and to use the sciences responsibly.

Cf. Q. d. de virtutibus, q. 1, a. 8. Such goals are to stay alive, to take care of ones own well-being and that of others, to work for ones spiritual development, to live in society, etc. 4 See op. cit., Q. 58, a. 3 ad 2 where self-control and perseverance are studied.
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Article 2 of Question 57 considers the three habitus of the speculative intellect in detail, as Aristotle presented them, viz. wisdom, scientific knowledge and the habitus of the first principles. Related to this topic is the question of whether arts or crafts can be called virtues. By art we mean the required habitual knowledge of how to carry out certain tasks. In this field good results are not due to an intervention of the will and the inner attitude with which one carried out a task does not make a difference. For this reason here we do not speak of virtue.

2. Moral or Cardinal Virtues At the beginning of Question 61 Aquinas stresses that he is speaking about human virtues. One can distinguish between perfect and imperfect virtues. The first effect that our inclinations have the right direction, render us capable of acting well and make us accomplish good deeds. Imperfect virtues, on the other hand, give the aptitude to act in a morally correct way, but do not demand that all inclinations are directed correctly and do not necessarily cause a faculty to perform only good actions. The virtues which give the right direction to the fundamental inclinations are more perfect and primary. How many virtues are there? Their number can be determined either by the number of subjects (faculties) in which they are or according to their different definitions, which depend each time on how the intellect sees them. This good they bring about can consist in the deliberations of reason itself, which are governed by the virtue of prudence. But reason can also regulate other things: thus the order in our dealings with our fellow men is brought about by justice. Insofar as the passions move us in a direction contrary to the order of reason they must be regulated and governed, which is the task of the virtue of temperance. Insofar, finally, as an emotion such as fear threatens to prevent us from doing what we should do, the virtue of fortitude must intervene.

II.

The Cardinal Virtues

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A. Prudence Prudence has its seat in the intellect insofar as it deliberates and is moved by the will to regulate our actions. Its field of operation comprises our entire life. 5 Since our acts concern individual objects and situations and must be ordered with a view to our final end, prudence must both know the general principles and be able to assess the concrete situations to which these principles must be applied. Aquinas differs from Aristotle insofar as he argues that both the knowledge of general principles and their application fall under prudence. Prudence is a virtue since it makes our actions agree with the fundamental inclinations of our nature, so that they are directed to the good end. At the level of the intellect it produces proper insight 6; it is distinguished from the other moral virtues by its association with the intellect, but since it is directed to mans activity, it differs from such intellectual virtues as wisdom and the knowledge of the first principles.7 While prudence applies general principles to concrete actions, it does not assign goals to what we do: these goals have already been chosen and so it is the task of prudence to help find and determine what leads us to these goals. This means that in everyday life prudence helps us reach some balance (the mean) in our actions. Its task comprises examining, deliberating over and judging the different options and, next, indicating what is to be done. For Aquinas this last function is an essential part of prudence, which includes more than deliberations alone which would not really engage us.8

1. Parts of prudence Before going into details on the functioning of prudence Aquinas mentions some distinctions. a. Certain parts taken together constitute a whole, as do the parts of a house. These are called integral parts. Prudence has some integral parts.
5 6

Loc. cit., Q. 47, a. 1 and 2. Ibid., Q. 47, a. 4. 7 Ibid., Q. 47, a. 5. 8 Ibid., Q. 47, a. 8.

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b. Other parts are juxtaposed to the main virtue and belong to the same genus. So we distinguish between prudence in respect of private affairs and prudence in the direction of a community. These juxtaposed virtues are called subjective parts (what is meant is the division of a genus into a species). c. Finally there are auxiliary virtues which concern secondary aspects and are called potential parts. With regard to the first, Aquinas found a good number of valuable suggestions as to virtues active in a prudent deliberation and decision. He distinguishes eight stages in the exercise of prudence, which are discussed in Q. 49, article 1. The classification proposed in the second are relatively straightforward. To the third belong the ability to take counsel ( eubulia), knowledge of what happens normally (synesis) in similar cases or in a particular fields and insight ( gnome) which allows us to project on an act the light of higher principles, so we do not have to follow the usual views of the majority of people.

2. Elements of a prudent decision Question 49 has eight articles which successively discuss the eight stages or components of a prudent decision. A first step is remembering what normally happens in similar cases. For this experience is required, which can be gained only in the course of time and is stored in ones memory. At this level remembrance is of great importance. In his answer to the second objection Aquinas notes that one can train ones memory and offers a method of doing so. 9 Next he discusses intellectus by which he means the right insight into and evaluation of a self-evident principle. Willingness to learn from others (docility) is another component of prudence. In view of the enormous variety of situations and possibilities an individual person cannot easily reach an overview of everything involved, and certainly not within a short time. For this reason he must allow others to help him and in particular seek the advice of the elderly, experienced people. In this connection, Aquinas also stresses the importance of consulting diligently, frequently and respectfully the writings of ones predecessors and warns us not to neglect or despise them out of laziness or pride.10
9 10

Ibid., Q. 49, a. 1. Ibid., Q. 49, a. 3.

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Another quality which helps us to form prudent judgments is called solertia. This is the ability, zeal and accuracy which helps us find with ease and rapidly the required means for reaching a given goal.11 Aquinas often distinguishes between intellect and reason. Both belong to prudence. In this connection, he understands by intellect a direct intellectual knowledge of the principles. Deliberating in order to reach certain insights is the work of the mind as reason. The human mind cannot in one act understand and penetrate everything, in particular as regards concrete events. It must compare and draw conclusion.12 As has been said above, it is the task of prudence to arrange what can be ordered to the end in such a way that the end is reached. Past events are now definite and cannot be changed, but what lies in the future and will not necessarily happen can be ordered to the end. This is done by the act of providence, foreseeing what lies in the future and directing what one does now in regard to it. It goes without saying that, in order to do this, deliberation and a right judgment are required. The terms forethought and prevision express this function of prudence.13 Forethought and prevision often go together with circumspection. The end and what is ordered to the end must be good, but it happens again that what as such is good becomes undesirable or even bad because of certain circumstances. Circumspection makes us take into account the situation and the circumstances. 14 What is good is often accompanied and hampered by something bad. It also happens that what is bad presents itself under the appearance of a good. For this reason great caution is required.15

3. Different kinds of prudence The virtue of prudence is like a genus which comprises several species. The first and most striking kind of prudence is the one everybody must use in organizing his own life. Aquinas now discusses the prudence needed to govern a state or community. The reason why a particular kind of prudence is required to do so is that wherever a special way of administering and governing is found a special form of prudence is needed. As is obvious, governing a country and a whole people and directing them to the common good is one of the highest forms of prudence for which the virtue of justice is a foremost requisite.
11 12

Ibid., Q. 49, a. 4. Ibid., Q. 49, a. 5. 13 Ibid., Q. 49, a. 6. 14 Ibid., Q. 49, a. 7. 15 Ibid., Q. 49, a. 8.

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The family stands between the political society and individuals. In order to direct the family a special form of prudence is required. In addition there is a particular type of prudence concerning military matters. What we do with deliberation and art, he explains, agree with what happens in nature, as God has established it. For nature not only sees to it that things maintain and develop themselves but also that they ward off outside influences which attack and harm them. It is thus Aquinas understanding that organizing oneself against a hostile threat or waging military campaigns demands a special form of prudence.

4. Virtues which assist prudence The title of Question 51 is potential parts of prudence. The words means virtues or habitus which help prudence. The first of these assisting virtues mentioned is eubulia, the aptitude for consideration which makes one find the right way to the intended goal within a reasonable time without protracting deliberations and without much hesitation. It is proper to a virtue to make our actions good,16 so that the power of deliberation which perfects them with regard to our human life and our true end must be called a virtue. Aquinas considers commanding the performance of a particular act to be the most proper task of prudence, while deliberation and evaluation prepare for this command.17 The last virtue assisting prudence is gnome. The term is used in the sense of a correct understanding of what is equitable, in particular by taking into account the position of other people. Aquinas sees this virtue as a prolongation of synesis,18 by noting that sometimes one must evaluate an act in the light of higher principles and do something that goes beyond the rules for ordinary human conduct.

5. Vices opposed to prudence

In his answer to the second objection Aquinas observes (against those who doubt whether the gift of deliberation should be called a virtue) that whatever has to do with mans activities must be perfected by some virtue: Oportet enim circa omnia humana percifi per virtutem. He reaffirms that the virtues cover the entire field of human actions. 17 Op. cit., Q. 51, a. 2. 18 Knowledge of what normally happens in similar cases.

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a. Imprudence What sort of sin is this imprudence? It is a general sin inasmuch as prudence is involved in the practice of all virtues and consequently its opposite, imprudence, has a repercussion on whatever one does. Imprudence can also be called a general vice inasmuch as it comprehends several vices, which correspond to the divisions of the virtue of prudence. These concern ones own personal life, the direction of the affairs of ones family, the government of the community. Furthermore the following vices are opposed to the virtues assisting prudence: superficiality in ones judgment, rashness, thoughtlessness, inconstancy and carelessness. Other vices are reduced to these, such as unwillingness to learn from others.19 In order to reach a prudent decision one has to pass through several stages, such as remembering what happened in the past in similar circumstances, making a correct appraisal of the present situation and foreseeing how things will develop in the future. One must compare the different options, be willing to learn from older or more experienced people. If one of these stages is omitted, one acts with precipitation, i.e. one is unwise. Another vice leads to wrong judgments. This vice consists in a failure to take into account those factors which contribute to a correct evaluation.20 Another factor is the lack of resoluteness and constancy in carrying out what has seen to be the correct way to do something.

b. Negligence Negligence is a vice since it makes us omit an action which reason has deemed to be correct. Negligence can concern all sort of actions but as such it is contrary to the circumspection and attentiveness which should characterize the work of reason. 21 It results from a lack of constancy and tenacity in the will. The objects of negligence are the good actions one should perform but which are abandoned or only performed in part.22 When the will slackens our reason
19 20

Loc. cit., Q. 53, a. 2. Ibid., Q. 53, a. 4. 21 Vices in the field of reason have a repercussion on all our actions. 22 Op. cit., Q. 54, a. 1.

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is not moved to command what it should or to do it in the right way. Quite often this kind of negligence will not be a serious sin. But it is a serious sin when what are at stake are questions of the utmost importance such as concern about ones final end.23

B. Justice Justice is described as the steady and permanent will to give everyone what is due to him. This definition expresses well the properties of the virtue of justice, provided one does not understand the will to give everyone what is due as an incidental act but as a habitual disposition. The object of justice is indicated by to everyone what is due to him, its various character by the steady and permanent will. In order to possess this virtue one must not act with justice only occasionally, but be disposed to do so always and everywhere.24 Justice concerns actions directed to other persons. This means that there are always persons involved, capable of independent behavior. In a metaphorical sense, however, one can speak of a just treatment of ones own body or of ones faculties. In fact, actions which concern ourselves and our emotions are ordered by the other moral virtues, while justice takes into account what these actions mean for others.25 Insofar as the other person to whom justice addresses itself is a member of civil society the due which one gives him is at the same time for the benefit of the community. This is also the case with the acts of the other virtues by which one makes oneself a better person. To strengthen his argument Aquinas writes that man is a member of society and that whatever a member has can be ordered to the good of the whole. This does not mean that the human person is in everything subordinated to the state, but that the good he does is advantageous to the society. Insofar as the government of a state but also citizens give the community (and hence its members) its due and justice they act with is legal justice, i.e. justice directed to the society, also called social justice.26
23 24

Loc. cit., Q. 54, a. 3. Ibid., Q. 58, a. 1. 25 Ibid., Q. 58, a. 2. 26 Ibid., Q. 58, a. 5.

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Besides social justice there is a kind of justice by which one gives individual persons their due, something that social justice does only indirectly. The two virtues are different since their objects are different, i.e. the common good and the good of individual persons. 27 This particular justice has an object of its own, i.e. what is due to the individual persons.28 Because the proper object of justice is actions directed to what lies outside us, justice does address our passions. Yet just actions are accompanied by a certain pleasure.

1. Divisions of justice Aquinas distinguishes between distributive justice and commutative justice (concerned with exchanges between people and barter). The first is the virtue persons in government must possess, by which they give each member of the community proportionally what is due to him. Commutative justice, on the other hand, regulates the relations between the citizens as they exchange the goods and services among themselves. In commutative justice the mean which the virtue must attain is the precise quantity of what is due. In distributive justice this is different because the government must take into account the rank of persons and their place in the state.29 Both virtues may concern the same things, e.g. objects for use or of value. But the acts differ. In commutative justice these acts involve an exchange between two persons, in distributive justice things are assigned.30 After a description of the different ways in which justice can be done and injustice committed in inter-human relationships, Aquinas mentions the concept of reciprocity: one who has inflicted damage on somebody else must himself suffer the same damage. This reciprocity also applies to what the citizens must do for the community and what they receive from it.

2. Restitution

Ibid., Q. 58, a. 7. Ibid., Q. 58, a. 8. If one objects that not only justice but also certain passions are directed to other persons, the answer is that not so much the passions themselves as their effects are directed to others. 29 Ibid., Q. 61, a. 2. 30 Ibid., Q. 61, a. 3.
28

27

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At the beginning of Question 61 Aquinas observes that restitution comes in under commutative justice. The term restitution means that something belonging to a person is given back to him. One may be keeping a thing which belongs to someone else, with or without the latters consent. In the strict sense of the word restitution consists in the same thing being returned to its owner, but often it will be something else of equal value. 31 To return what one has taken away illegitimately from someone is a serious obligation in justice. One can also cause damage to others by violence and threats. It is up to the judge to impose a punishment in such cases. If one is condemned, one must both make restitution and undergo the imposed punishment.32 When because of our fault the other party looses what is possessed, restitution is required.

3. Vices opposed to justice a. Favoritism and respect of persons A frequently occurring form of partiality is the attribution of offices and positions to certain persons, not because of their suitability and competence, but for other reasons such as family relations, graft or expected benefits. Such favoritism is against commutative justice since it does not respect the required proportion between the aptitude of candidates and the requirements for a post. Homage is paid and honors are awarded on account of a persons excellence. But one can also be honored because of the work of others: leaders of a country may receive such honors as due to their country. In this field awards are not always deserved, while others who deserve special homage, go unnoticed.

b. Homicide Homicide, which belongs to the first category, is the most serious violation of rights possible. By way of introduction the question is raised as to whether one may kill living beings.
31 32

Ibid., Q. 62, a. 1. Ibid., Q. 62, a. 3.

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The answer is that one may use things for the purpose for which they are made or have been destinedthis includes plants and animals which man need for nourishment. Is it right to apply capital punishment to human beings in certain cases? Basing himself on the doctrine that man as part of society must serve this society Aquinas concludes that when some individuals threaten or greatly damage the community they can be removed by execution. Criminals act against the order of reason and in this way they lose their human dignity. But the amount of punishment must correspond to the seriousness of the crime, protect society and have a deterrent effect.

c. Theft and robbery Theft is contrary to justice inasmuch as it consists in taking away what belongs to others. Theft concerns things and not the person of the owner. Theft is characterized by the secrecy with which it is carried out. Receiving stolen goods also falls under theft. 33 Theft, both in itself and in acts of violent robbery, deprives the owner of his goods.34 From a moral point of view theft is a serious offense which causes damage to another person. Moreover by frequent thefts civil peace is jeopardized.35 The right to private property does not do away with the fact that natural things serve for keeping everyone alive and allowing them to reach a certain well-being. But how one respects this and looks after the destitute is left to the discretion of the property owners. A single person can never alleviate the misery of all the poor, even with his entire fortune. 36 Is someone is starving and thus in urgent need, he may take someone elses belongings to nourish himself insofar as necessary.37 The public authorities can in some cases use force to repossess or requisition property illegally acquired.38

d. Injustice in court proceedings and jurisdiction

33 34

Ibid., Q. 66, a. 3. Ibid., Q. 66, a. 4. 35 Ibid., Q. 66, a. 5 and 6. 36 Aquinas weakens Augustines words who say that what people have in abundance belongs to the poor. 37 Op. cit., Q. 66, a. 7. 38 Loc. cit., Q. 66, a. 8.

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Dealing with unjust accusations Aquinas distinguishes between denunciation and accusation. The first should lead to reprimands or criticisms meant to make the person who has been denounced change his conduct. When a crime has been committed which endangers society one us obliged to lodge a complaint or an accusation, provided one has sufficient evidence. If a crime is not important or one does not have sufficient evidence them filling a complaint or accusation is not necessary, for no one is obliged to undertake something which he cannot bring to an end in the required way.39

e. Injustice caused by the spoken word Contumely, in the strict sense of the term, means that one publicly humiliates or damages the honor of a person. This is usually done by words but can also be done in other ways. Considered as sounds, words do not cause damage, unless one speaks very loud, but as signs expressing things they can do so, in particular by making known what is contrary to a persons honor.40 When judging contumely and offensive words we must take into account the inner disposition of the offending person. As an offense, contumely or destroying anothers honor can be as bad as theft.

f. Fraud in buying and selling/Interest on loans and usury With regard to commerce and doing business, fixing the prices of products and services and charging interest on loans have always raised important questions. Aquinas had no knowledge of the economic system in force, but he draws attention to a number of fundamental truths which deserve to be considered. A first question is whether it is licit to sell things at a higher price than they are worth. The principle is simple: to cheat, insofar as one requests a higher price than the value of a product, is utterly reprehensible. Aquinas explains his answer as follows: if we leave aside deceit, we can speak in two ways of buying and selling. A) The practice of buying and selling has been introduced because of the advantage it has for both
39 40

Ibid., Q. 68, a. 1. Ibid., Q. 72, a. 1.

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parties. Now, what has been instituted for both may not favor one party more than the other, so that in a transaction the value and the counter-value must be equal. The value of articles for peoples use is stated in their price expressed in money. When the price exceeds the value, or vice versa, there is no equality. To sell something for too high a price, or to buy it too cheaply is unjust. B) One can also speak of selling and buying insofar as something more useful for one person or its loss more disadvantageous to another, due to extraneous circumstances, e.g. when the buyer urgently needs something, while the vendor will suffer a serious inconvenience when he no longer has that thing. In such a case the price not only depends on the objective value, but also upon the inconvenience the vendor suffers. For this reason he may sell the object in question for a higher price. But if the one who sells will hardly miss the object in question while the buyer will derive considerable benefit from it then it should not be sold for a higher price, even if it is equitable that the buyer of his own accord makes a proportionate payment. Since the law cannot prohibit everything that is unjust, but limits itself to what undermines the society, unfair practices in buying and selling are often punished, unless deceit and swindle are involved.41 Question 78 discusses the immorality of usury and the question whether one may charge interest for lending money. The term usury is some kind of despicable practice, but here it has a broader meaning and signifies also what is now called interest on loans or investments. It is illicit for Aquinas to demand a compensation for lending money just as one does not pay extra when buying wine for using it later on. If one does, one demands a compensation which has no basis in reality.

C. Fortitude Fortitude allows us to overcome the fear which makes us recoil from difficult and dangerous tasks and deviate from the right insight of reason. Fortitude moderates or even suppresses fear so that this emotion cannot have a paralyzing effect, i.e. it makes us resist fear in a reasonable way. On the other hand, fortitude also keeps audacity within bounds. 42 This means that by fortitude our will holds to a course of action which our reason presents as good, in particular when we must confront that greatest of all evils, death. In times of war, fortitude
41 42

Ibid., Q. 71, a. 1. Ibid., Q. 123, a. 3.

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allows us to engage ourselves in defending others even at the risk of our own life. Standing firm and holding ones own is the principal act of fortitude, more than actively opposing evil. The numerous difficulties and countless obstacles which we encounter in the course of life are the field where fortitude has to carry out its task. We hold on and stand firm, not out of recklessness but by directing ourselves to the right end. 43 Despite the surrounding dangers and the effort this standing firm may cost, fortitude can give us inner joy.44 When there is an occasion to practice the virtue of fortitude a passion such as anger can be of some use, provided it remains under the control of reason. Anger will be helpful when one has to resist a threatening evil. Since on many occasions in life we must suffer pain, confront dangers and stand firm in the face of opposition, the virtue of fortitude is indispensible. 45 Insofar as fortitude makes us direct ourselves to a good which reason presents as right and helps us to make an effort to reach and keep it, fortitude is, after prudence and justice, the most important of the moral virtues. One can distinguish degrees in this virtue according to the nature of the difficulties and dangers which we face when following the right insight of reason. The highest form of fortitude is the willingness to suffer martyrdom in order to bear witness to the truth.

1. Parts of fortitude Fortitude has some integral parts, which one may consider its principal acts, i.e. to stand firm and to attack opponents or enemies. In order to perform these two main acts some assistant virtues are required. To attack one needs confidence, 46 which makes us think that we can succeed. But perseverance is also needed in order not to give up when we are half way in what we are doing. Patience, for its part, helps us not to become afflicted by threatening dangers or difficulties. These virtues can also function on their own, but when associated with fortitude itself they become its auxiliary virtues.
43 44

Ibid., Q. 123, a. 4, 5 and 6. Ibid., Q. 123, a. 8. 45 Ibid., Q. 123, a. 11. 46 Aquinas speaks of magnanimity.

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2. Vices opposed to fortitude Fortitude is weakened or rendered impossible by fear, fearlessness and audacity. Fear is produced when a good we like threatens to get lost. Fear can be right when it makes us flee what reason tells us to avoid, but it is wrong when it makes us flee from what we should support or suffer. The emotion of fear can remain limited in us to the sensory appetite but may also influence the will and so become the vice of cowardice. If so then the will may act moved by fear, but nevertheless remains free. If in this case the choice of the will is contrary to our obligations, fear is the cause of a sinful act, even if what one does out of fear is not fully voluntary.47 Fear originates from our love of certain things and persons that we are afraid to lose. Everyone wills his own life and whatever is ordered to it. This love, however, should develop in the right way, so that one does not lose from sight what is ordered to ones last end. No one, not even a person who commits suicide, is entirely devoid of this self-love. But it happens that out of dullness, pride or because of a lack of natural love of oneself one does not fear dangers or threats. It is not right either not to care at all about the loss of ones possessions, since these are needed for living a humane and moral life.48 Fearlessness affects the right measure of emotions which normally should make us anxious, even if we have the virtue of fortitude. A fearless person no longer fears what he should fear.49 Audacity as rashness is also contrary to fortitude since it makes us lose the sense of the right measure in matters where one should feel some fear. For this reason it is opposed to the virtue of fortitude.50

D. Temperance Temperance has the function of keeping within reasonable limits what attracts most the sensory appetite. It gives us inner rest and opens the mind for higher values.51 However, the object of temperance must be further determined. The good which the sensory appetite seeks to attain is, as such, not opposed to the order of the intellect, but rather serves it. But when the
47 48

See Op. cit., Q. 125, a. 1-4. Loc. cit., Q. 126, a. 1. 49 Ibid., Q. 126, a. 2. 50 See Q. 127, a. 1 and 2. 51 Ibid., Q. 141, a. 2.

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appetite seeks to reach such a good in an unreasonable way it must be restrained and subjected to a rule. This means that the primary object of temperance are the passions which are concerned with sensible things and also with the sadness which may result when one does not reach or have these goods. By controlling these passions, temperance also exercises a regulating influence on the other emotions.52 What is simply necessary for human life can be used without restriction by a person possessing the virtue of temperance. This comprehends also what is needed to live as is becoming to ones rack and the circumstances of the moment. Elaborate meals on feast days come in under this rule. However, we must always avoid what causes damage to our health. What does not can be used in a moderate way, taking into account what accords with ones social position.53 Temperance has a regulating effect, as have other virtues. Its task is to give us certain reserve in performing those natural activities which produce the greatest pleasure. But the desire for pleasure remains always present in man.54 Since the virtue of temperance concerns the sphere of private activities, it is of lower rank than justice and fortitude which fulfill important functions in respect of society.55

1. Parts of temperance The two parts of temperance are the feeling of shame and decency. The first is not a complete virtue in its own right. It consists in the fear of doing something blameworthy in the eyes of other people. Who has the virtue of temperance, will not be seduced by the shameless conduct of others, but will nevertheless experience a feeling of shame when confronted with it. This feeling may be of help in acquiring temperance. 56 People are ashamed of the evil they have done, especially if others come to know about it. But whoever acts virtuously does not fear being blamed.57 One is above all ashamed in front of people in ones own environment, especially

52 53

Ibid., Q. 141, a. 3. Ibid., Q. 141, a. 6. 54 Ibid., Q. 141, a. 7. 55 Ibid., Q. 141, a. 8. 56 Ibid., Q. 144, a. 1. 57 Ibid., Q. 144, a. 2.

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when they are virtuous, for one is afraid of losing good opinion they have of one. 58 However, totally criminal or immoral people lose this feeling of shame. Elderly people are generally far removed from behavior and so for them there is no reason to be ashamed and the same applies to the very virtuous.59 Conduct is called decent if it is praiseworthy and it is praiseworthy if it is virtuous. For this reason modesty coincides in general with virtuousness. Decency regulates human behavior so as to make it agree with the order of reason and gives it a certain dignity and nobility which are opposed to what is unbecoming and shameless. Temperance makes us reject what is unbecoming or indecent, in particular violent and unbridled passions. What is decent is by its nature agreeable to us, for everyone likes what is adapted to him. Decency is a part of temperance in that it brings us to a fitting behavior.60

2. Vices opposed to temperance By helping us to keep the right measure virtue establish the mean between excess and deficiency thus avoiding vices. Aquinas names insensitivity with regard to pleasure as the first vice in the field of temperance. To refuse any kind of pleasure or delight is against our human nature and, therefore, not right. One can, of course, forsake one kind of pleasure for some good purpose. A simple example is refraining from smoking or from eating sweets for medical reasons or using periodical abstinence in a marriage to avoid dangerous complications which a further pregnancy might cause. This is not to deny the significance of delight, but means that one renounces certain of its forms in view of a higher end.61 The other extreme, i.e., excess, is intemperance and insobriety. Intemperance is that when one seeks pleasure without listening to what reason tells us. We may also add that concupiscence gets stronger when one does not resist it. It becomes a sort of habit which pushes and forces us. If one resists and represses the craving for pleasure it is reduced to reasonable proportions.

58 59

Ibid., Q. 144, a. 3. Ibid., Q. 144, a. 4. 60 See Q. 145, a. 1-4. 61 Ibid., Q. 142, a. 1.

19 AQUINAS ON VIRTUE

To explain further the nature of intemperance Aquinas compares it with timidity and cowardice. Intemperance is a more serious vice than the latter. It is more positively willed because timidity and cowardly behavior can be explained by fear which one feels for ones own life. Intemperate people seek pleasure in particular fields, for nobody wants to be intemperate in all respects. Therefore, in order to triumph over ones intemperance one should not busy oneself opposing whatever causes pleasure. In the case of cowardice things are different, since in the individual situations which give occasion to it cowardice is less willed than lust. There is just the general will to save ones life by fleeing from danger. 62 In people who are affected by intemperance one seeks least of the splendor of reason, which constitutes the beauty of the virtues. In order to comply with ones daily duties one has to use ones reason, while surrendering to the desire for pleasure does not require much reflection.

62

Ibid., Q. 142, a. 3.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY
A. Books 1. Primary Sources Aquinas, Thomas. Summa Theologica. Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. Westminster, Maryland: Christian Classics, 1948. 2. Secondary Sources Elders, Leo. The Ethics of St. Thomas Aquinas: happiness, natural law and the virtues. Frankfurt am Main and New York: Peter Lang, 2005. Gilson, Etienne Henry. Moral Values and the Moral Life: the system of St. Thomas Aquinas. Translated by Leo Richard Ward. St. Louis: B. Herder, 1941. Pope, Stephen J., ed. The Ethics of Aquinas. Moral Traditions Series. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2002. Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association. Virtue and Virtue Ethics. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly: Annual Supplement Washington, D.C.: ACPA, 1998.