Gorgias on Nature or That Which Is Not Author(s): G. B. Kerferd Source: Phronesis, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Nov., 1955), pp.

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on natureor that whichis not Gorgias

G. B. KERFERD
T

remains of Gorgias' treatise 7rtc? 'rou [0 6v?oc m1) 7rrpL CA)q have not received very much attention from scholars during the last fifty years. This is probably due mainly to two reasons - the highly technical and indeed to many readers repulsive nature of its content, and the widely held view that it is not meant seriously but is simply a parody or joke against philosophers, or at best a purely rhetorical exercise. 1 The first of these views seems so obviously wrong that it is hardly necessary to devote much time to discussing it. The short answer must be that there is nothing humourous about the treatise and no indication that it was ever intended to be so. In this respect it is in exactly the same position as the second part of Plato's dialogue Parmenides. Its general thesis might conceivably amuse those to whom all attempts at philosophy are inherently absurd, but such persons could hardly be expected to work through the difficult arguments which make up the contents of the work. The view that it was purely a rhetorical exercise is no more plausible. But it is not intended to argue this question at length here. The final answer to both views must consist in showing just what is the content of the treatise and the serious purposes to which it is directed. There have indeed been those who have treated the work seriously. But its interpretation undoubtedly presents quite extraordinary difficulties, and those who have treated it seriously have arrived at very different views as to what Gorgias is saying.2 What follows is in part new, and as a consequence little space is devoted to previous interpretations, and where they are mentioned it is usually in disagreement. It is nonetheless the work of scholars in the past who have laid a foundation both in establishing the text and in interpreting it upon which all future studies must rest. Our information about the contents of the treatise comes from two separate accounts, the summnaryin Sextus Empiricus, Adv. Math. vii. 65-87, and the third section of the work De Melisso XenophaneGorgia
HE

Cf. H. Gomperz, Sophistik und Rhetorik, Leipzig 191 2, I 8 2 ff., H. Maier, Sokrates, Tlubingen1913, 2x9ff. For reflections of these views see e.g. K. Freeman, Companion
to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers,3 6 1- 2, and E. Brihier, Histoire de la Philosophie, 1.i. 8 S. 2 Notably G. Calogero, Studi sull' Eleatismo, Roma 1932. M. Untersteiner, I Sofisti, Torino 1949 (English Translation, The Sophists, Oxford: Blackwell 19S4). 0. Gigon in Hermes, lxxi (1936) I86-213. E. Dupreel, Les Sophistes, Neuchatel 1948 [actualy 19491. 1 have not seen D. Viale (= Adolfo Levi), Studi su Gorgia in Logos xxiv (1941).

(MXG) attributed to Aristotle. The date of this second work cannot be determined. While it is certainly not by Aristotle, it may contain Aristotelian or Peripatetic material and have some relation to Aristotle's MeX(aaou C, tpk a' Evop&vouc, aC, and tp6qTM, ropyLou a, 7rp6k M'& mentioned in the catalogue of Aristotle's works preserved in Diogenes Laertius v. 2g. Diels first" assigned it to a Peripatetic of the third century B.C. but later supposed that it came from the first century A.D. Gigon8 preferred the view that it was based on a series of Peripatetic studies in the Presocratics and in default of further evidence this is probably the most likely. It is usually supposed that the contents of both versions represent a summary of a more extended work by Gorgias himself, though it is not possible to assess the degree to which the original may have been compressed and curtailed. Recently it has been asserted 3 that the text shows 'a very high level of logical skill' unthinkable at the time of Gorgias. But the author does not offer any detailed analysis of the text. As against this view the discussion, e.g. of change, seems wholly prePlatonic in character. Above all the treatment of the verb 'to be', if the interpretation which is about to be offered is even partially right, would hardly be possible after the work of Plato and Aristotle. All that can be said with reasonable certainty is that Gorgias seems clearly to have committed himself to the central conclusion of the surviving summaries, since this is twice attributed to him by Isocrates.4 This would naturally refer to one of his writings and in fact it is clear that in later years there was a treatise circulating under the name of Gorgias 5, with the title sept yuaccor or 7tepL toi5 ,lu 6Vxo4 n ept Ypu'ae&g.It has never I think been seriously suggested that Sextus took his information from the author of MXG. The reverse possibility, that MXG drew upon Sextus is quite out of the question. Whether both or either used intermediary sources between themselves and the treatise circulating under the name of Gorgias cannot be known. But there seems to be no need for such a hypothesis in order to explain anything in the surviving versions and accordingly it is probably better left aside. Whether Gorgias was himself responsible for the contents of the treatise which certainly later circulated under his name is another question which once raised can never be conclusively answered. But an attempt will be made
2 3

1 Doxogaphi Gracci, (1879), Hermes lxxi (1936) 2 1 2.

4

io8f. Later view in Abh. Berlin Ak. igoo, p. 12. 17.

by X.M. Bochenski, Ancient Formal Logic, Amsterdami95i, 82 B X. IX.3 and XV.26 - Diels-Kranz6 5 Diels-Kranz6 82 A io and B 2.

to show that there is nothing in the treatise which might not have been expressedby Gorgiasin the fifth century and there the matteris perhaps best left. On the usual view there are fundamental differencesin the arguments as presented in the two versions and much discussionhas been devoted to the question which of the two versions should be preferred where they differ. Againon the usualview in the first part of both versions the arguments turn round the question whether Being or Not-Being can be said to exist or not. But it is fairlyclear that in the two later sections the interest centres round not the existence or otherwise of Being and Not-Being, but the status of objects of perception. A real advancein the study of the treatise came with the suggestion1 that the first section of the treatise also is concerned with the status of objects of perception, and that the question at issue was not the existence or otherwise of Being and Not-Being, but a different one, namely whether the verb 'to be' can be predicated of phenomena without leading to contradictions. It is the aim of what follows to present a fresh reconstruction of the argumentsof Gorgiasalong these lines, and in particularto show that the supposeddifferencesbetween the versions of MXG and Sextus in the first section of the treatise are more apparentthan real. First the general arrangementof the argumentsin the two versions.
Both MXG (g7ga 12-13) and Sextus (vii. 65) state the major divisions of the treatise in what are admitted to be identical terms: - Nothing is; If it is, it is unknowable; If it is and is knowable, it cannot be communicated to others. Sextus states the arguments for the first step, that Nothing is, according to a straightforward pattern which he summarises in ch. 66 and follows exactly in the succeeding chapters. He first takes the supposition ei T p. gv =t and gives two arguments against this. He then takes the supposition C'Ltz U 9=L and argues in the first place that if so it must be either eternal or generated or both eternal and generated, and in the second place it must be either one or many, and none of these concequences is tenable. He then discusses et r6 av g'rL xac T4 [L-1 6v and gives reasons against this, and so finally reaches the required conclusion o068v aT. MXG begins with a general statement dividing the arguments which are to follow into two groups (979 a I 3-24). Of these two groups the second in Gorgias' arrangement is described first in the general statement by the author of MXG. This is made clear by the words in 979 a 23- 24. >?Tr -? 7pnv &V tlOV cVO' a68LtL T oV OUt? h ?yeL 6trL oux am -voa o65T This sentence is elva. gl
Calogero, Studi sull' Eleatismo, 1932.

followed by the statementof three argumentsand it seems clear that all three are part of the 'special' demonstrationmentioned in the sentence quoted. This is confirmed by the words which conclude the statement of the three arguments- oroq tv o p&rog 1 6yoq bxevou(79 a 33)
which seem clearly to refer to the statement in 979 a 23 just quoted. The

three argumentsare then criticised by the author of MXG (979 a 34b i9) and he resumes the statement of Gorgias' views with the words o 'r6v M6yov (p-nxvx'rX. (979 b 20). There follow the jieT& 6ntov arguments about generated and ungenerated, one and many, and the argumentabout motion which has no parallelin Sextus. The arguments about generated and ungenerated, and one and many are clearly those described in the general statement by the author of MXG (979a I3-23) before he describes the 'special' demonstrationof Gorgias. This arrangementin MXG led Gigon2 to argue that the presentation of the argumentsdiffers fundamentallyin Sextus and MXG. He holds that in MXG the 'special' demonstrationcovers the groundof the whole of the first division in Sextus, namely et r? t 'ov 9=, ?etr6 v laTn and xcxl 'r6 ,u? 6v. On this view MXG deals with e't r gv I et 6 &v &crL about in quite a differentway from Sextus, without using the arguments eternal or generated, one or many at all for this purpose. In MXG these are held to form a supplement, after the special argument which has covered the whole ground already,while in Sextus they are the essential If this &T=L. and indeed only argumentsdirected to the question e't ' v is true we are confronted at the outset with a radical and perhaps insoluble problem. One of the two versions has completely recast the original treatiseat this point and there is no clear indicationas to which preserves the earlier arrangement. Alternatively we would have to supposethat in some sense there were two originalversionseachdifferent from the other. : MXG begins its statement of the 'special' demonstrationof Gorgias with the words oux XXs o5hr elvoL okhe jiu etvotL. That the text is sound is shown by the repetition of the phrasein g7gb i 8ti{ r oiv oVx Three differentrenderings might be t=v od?e elvoct ok, FL?) elva; offered for the phrase: i. 'neither Being nor Not-Being exists'. This is the commonest rendering and might be called the traditional interpretation. 2. 'neither Being nor Not-Being can exist'. 3. 'it is not
1 This word is a conjecture by Diels. See x below p. 17. ' Hermes lxxi (1936) 192-3. He is followed in this by Untersteiner, Sofisti, Testimonianze c Frammenti,Fasc. 2. p. 4o n. and T'heSophists, E.T. i66 n. 26. 8 as Untersteiner, The Sophists, 172 n. 75.

possible (for it) either to be or not to be.' 1 That the third meaning is the natural one cannot gain much support from the dubious doctrine that an infinitive without an article cannot be the subject of a verb in Greek 2, but seems to follow from the regularuse of the infinitive after la'n in the sense 'it is possible to....'. The obvious parallels to the present phrase are Parmenidesfr. 2.3 c oux .v &t&o {a'w ' xod (a
{as;
?tVL

andfr. 6.

2-3 gartL TYPclv?t,

/ tv8

8'oX gaLv and it is

in fact likely that Gorgias had these phrases of Parmenidesin mind. Unfortunatelythis does not absolutelysettle the meaning, as the phrases in Parmenides have been variously interpreted. We are here only concerned directly with the meaning of &rnfollowed by the infinitive. In the first case Kranz3, followed by Gigon 4 take the meaningof c's oiux Celvm to be 'dass Nichtsein niicht ist'. But the vast majority of I= scholars would probably agree that the natural meaning is 'it cannot be'. Certainlythis is suggested by the antithesis two lines later in the fragmentm (' Ag ou'xlO'TtV -re XtL 4 Xpec'v ea=TL ' cvaL where Xpe'V &CL li' eIvCL seems to show that the eIvct in the earlier line is a predicate.5 There is greater difficulty with the second passagefrom Parmenides,fr. 6.2 =t yap elvax. While possiblya majorityof scholars would prefer the meaning 'it can be', the meaning 'Being exists' has received considerable support.6 In fact both in this case and in the previous case a definite decision would require a full consideration of Parmenides' philosophy. Even if Parmenides' meaning could be established with certainty it would not necessarilyfollow that Gorgiaswas using the phrase with the same meaning since the extent to which Gorgias is discussing the position of Parmenidesis itself problematic. What must be decisive for Gorgiasmust be the argumentsby which he seeks to establish6'T oV'x =tLv oute elvat o6re * ? V(XLand it will be argued that these require the meaning 'it canot either be or not be'. The first argument in MXG is full of difficulties. The accepted text there reads oix 9aLV oU'T ?tVmL ou'e tJ etvaC (the phrase already discussed). e'Lpiv yap To6 etvaLea=t [ ?vact, ou8&vav Atov '6 p
1 Lovedayand Forster in the Oxford Translationof Aristotle, Vol. VI.
2

asserted e.g. in Burnet, Early GreekPhilosophy . 173 n. 2, given some support in Kiihner-Gerth,ii. 3-S, rejected with examples by Verdenius, Parmenides, somecomments

on his poem, 1942, 3g and Fraenkel ad Aesch. Ag. S84. 3 in Diels-Kranz i5 P. 231, as against Diels in ii3 p. IS2. 4 Ursprungder griechischen Philosophie, 1945, 251. a cf. Verdenius, op. cit. 32 n. S. 4 cf. Heidel, Proc. Am. Ac. of Arts and Sciences, xlviii (1913) Kranzil p. 232, Verdenius, op. cit. 37, Gigon, Ursprung, 257.

72x,

Kranzin Diels-

8,v

ToU

6voq et. t6 re yap tvj 6v

1 OCUX eVoCM CtVxL 'ra 7p0yM.

'cn

Lx

ov X&LT'0 8v 8v (e

ov86

FL0V

For this the Oxford translation

for example gives 'it is not possible either to be or not to be. For, he says, if Not-to-Be is Not-to-Be, then Not-Being would be no less than Being. For Not-Being is Not-Being and Being is Being, so that things no more are than are not'. Now after the preliminary statement 6'rLoUX la-Lv o6re evtvcLo5're ' EvavL we would expect to find one or other or possibly both of these alternatives taken up. We should expect the next sentence to be et j.iv yap X=>v elvtv or its equivalent, or e? v?v ydp c ?tv or both together. Even if the argument is compressed and gL something of this kind is to be understood, we should expect the conclusion to be something directly relevant to oi'x garv o5'm EttvL o&' ,L7t etvoxL. Alternatively if the argument began ?1 0&v yap r6 v? elvoc we might expect the conclusion to be some sort of ctvxr. ? denial of this hypothesis. In fact we have something quite different. But the really serious objection to the traditional interpretation here is a further point. As it stands, and as it has been translated, the argument makes nonsense of itself. Not only does it not produce the required conclusion, it produces the very opposite of the required conclusion. If Not-Being is no less than Being, the conclusi'on must be that both Not-Being and Being exist. It will not then be the case that things no more exist than not exist. The only conclusion possible would be that all things exist, both those that are Not-Being and those that are Being. But we must set a limit to the confusion of mind which we are justified in attributing even to a sophist. A fallacious argument is one thing and a fallacious argument leading to the wrong conclusion is quite another and we cannot allow the argument to rest in this condition until all other resources have been tried. The best edition of the text is that of Diels 1, which uses two manuscripts, L and R. Of these Diels remarks 'Codices LR satis fideliter ex libro corruptissimo descripti sunt. In universum accuratius L, sed variat fortuna legendi. Interdum R oculos magis intendit et imprimis finem versus L solito neglegentior. archetypi igitur imago clare enitescit, quem etiam pluribus et difficilioribus compendiis exaratum fuisse patet'. 2 He adds 'codicis L praestantia non ipsius diligentia ac fide sed etiam eo niti videtur, quod coniecturis subinde felicibus eius exemplar
1

Aristotelis qui fertur de Melisso Xenophane Gorgia libellus, Abh. der k. Akad. d. Wiss.

zu Berin, 9goo. The text is not in Diels-Kranz,though to be included in future editions. It is included in Untersteiner, Frammenti, Fasc. ii.
s ib. p. S.

correctum erat' and 'instructusautem erat archetypusvariislectionibus'. This raises the possibility that L has removed traces of other readingsin the archetype which R may have preserved through default of 'happy' conjectures. In the first sentence of the present argumentthe received
p' e1VocL. text is that of L. But R has et ,uv yxp t6 ,L rVXL i ca'rLt I believe that what lies behind this is eL ,udv yap g lvoL cat<t.v> fi t' e OLC [r1 EVXL and this is the right reading here. This will help to make sense of the argument as I will attempt to show shortly. But there are further reasons for adopting it which may be discussed first. Sextus begins his first argumentwith EL yap t6 [iq ov e'TL and his second with xcxL &),o dL T6 8 zV gaT The second argument in MXG begins with 9L El 8'6L T6 pJ LIVatL (979a 28). The second argument in MXG is clearly the same argument as the second argument in Sextus, and while discussion of the first argument in Sextus must be postponed for the present it is clear that it has at least some elements in common with the first argument in MXG. Accordingly a double symmetry will be

obtainedif in the first argumentin MXG we read eLCuev

yocp

T6 [0?

?v(XL

<9=Ltv>. Further support may be derived from the opening of the criticism of the first argument in MXG. Here R has d yap X xxl 7cO6V. L has a y&p x&L a (lacunaof two ' I letters) 7o8CLXVt%UaLV, ou6cTc8XtayEToCL. a oq ?lt7tCV dt T6 IOV g'TLV xoK 1TV 6C.tOLQV sU? 6v. Both manuscripts then continue To53to ?LI gi oUtre qaNCvT xLToiTg oure &voyxI and reasons are given for this remark. For the first sentence of the criticism recent scholars follow Diels and write & yocpx&ct&<'XXot oC>no8LXVtuuaLv, oVP OLUOg Ty<X>CT0CL. But the criticisms which follow refer to the 'special' demonstration of Gorgias which the author of MXG has already clearly distinguished from the proofs which Gorgias took from others, namely those concerned with the one and the many, etc. This being the case the introduction of &XXoL here makes the author of MXG contradict himself. Moreover whatever the second sentence means it must be some sort of recapitulation of what Gorgias has said. Only so can the ro&3oin the third sentence be explained.' Therefore 8Lao?ye'-roL should be retained with the manuscripts, and for the first sentence as a whole we should read something like a yap xcxL oc<&6raX>7ro8exLvuaLv 8L0CXeyZT0L.The OUSTcq second sentence may seem desperate. But it begins e Io r? 'ovgartL and there is nothing at all in the manuscripts to suggest an original di sZ tLh
Ca-tV

8?(X,VUa,V,WM;@ xL xO Lal C

gtOayeXeTML.

ELt T6

610LOV

'

[L

&V galV

9=L

aJXTC& CEtsEvet-

so Cook-Wilson in Class. Review vi

(1892)

4+1-2.

<Ll 8v> gcar which Cook-Wilson I saw would be required to representthe et vIv yap T IL etvoct=l piL ctvvL of the first sentence of the first argument in MXG. In fact et r6 ,i r* & Sv I= at the beginning *wrr in the criticism is the same as detap it supports the reading of the first argument in Sextus. Accordingly proposed for the first sentence of the first argument in MXG, Et J.v ymp 'r L ?ZevOC <ImTLV> h Im 0 ?tCv(c... Again the beginnig of the second argument in MXG, dE8' 6?acaq r? 1V lv fart, 'r6elvaL, cp*a, i I) by oux laTL r6 M<V'LxzLvzvOv,is represented in the criticism (979b r6 v ga'li xacx 'r 8v tv? elvaZt. Since in this case o6x &vck'yx-y&p d1 tLs 'r ri~8v crrt in the criticism corresponds to et 'r6 [i CtvL dart in the argument criticised, we may conclude that in the case of the first in the criticism implies et argument also et 'r r?h69v I ih ClVOL Iro in the argument critisised. For the second sentence in the criticism one might suggest cE-r6 tui 8v ot, h &nv, &(7A6)4 tCtCLV &ve6) &TLILV xocl &anv 6LoLov (or with Diels 6o1CAoq)tuh 6v. This is based on R and would explain how the manuscript reading appears there as it does. Moreover as will be seen it makes the whole passage of criticism intelligible and makes possible a single interpretation underlying the first argument in Sextus taken in conjunction with the first argument in MXG. The interpretation must now be discussed. With the reading proposed the first argument in MXG will run et ,uiv ydp 'r [L' elvtL <aTtLV>, v - O5 6G'rogct. '6 re ydp ! &V gai L 11L ?TVML, oV8 &v fvtrov tr6 '! p ?& 7CpOyCLOCM. ga'n .L, av xt 'T6 v 6v, (O)a'c OV86V [L&XXOVcvaL %oUx ?lvoCL This of course follows immediately after the introductory sentence oux eltVaL. The whole may be rendered: 'it is not gatV O5Tc elvOt Oe'4 possible (for anything) either to be or not to be. For if it is possible that it should not be, inasmuch as it is (possible for it) not to be, it would be no less that which is not than it would be that which is. For that which is not is not, and that which is, is, so that things will no more be than not be. (This is absurd, therefore it is not possible for things not This gives the to be - oix arTt I elva-L or tdZ elvocr oux 9=v). needed simple follow on from the initial proposition ou'x aTLv o5Tr cIvoc o6e t ctvoc. MXG like Sextus takes up the negative alternative v o'ux gaTnin the other. elvct in the one case, t6 tL?v first ou'x CgTI In the second part of the first sentence in MXG '6 pL9 ! 6v can easily be understood as a predicate once the reading f ga'L ji) ectvaCis adopted.
cv I=

<qk 6v> or &I 6 ILv

1 ibid. Reinhardt, Parmenides, p. 37 in fact proposed to read in the first argumentin Sextus cE y&p 'r6 t? 8v aTt <[L? 6v>.
I0

That it should be so understood is supported by the criticism where is clearly a predicate (979a 36). It is only A 6v after 6FoLovor poLoccoq if the argumentis interpreted in this way that the conclusion ceases to 6v and or 6v exist, be nonsense. If Gorgias is arguing that both r6 &tu he cannot possibly conclude that things areno more existent thannonexistent, he can only conclude that things exist in any case, whether they are sZ 6v or tZ 6v. But if in the first sentence of the argumentGorgias 6v and 6v then the conclusion follows maintins that things are both ILh and all is well." Again the occurrence of the expression 'r rcp 'xra in the conclusion makes it clear that it is not the existence of Being or Not-Being which is in question, but somethingmuch wider. This seems in the criticism at 979b 8. confirmed by the occurrence of &ravTM2, The criticism by the author of MXG must next be considered, more particularlyas it has not always received proper attention in the past. With the proposed reading in the first sentence this will run: For what he himselfgives as a demonstrationhe expressesas follows. If that which is not is (possible), in so far as it is so it would be possible to say simply that it is, and yet all the same it is that which is not. But this is not self evident, nor is it a necessary conclusion. For suppose there are two things, one of which is (something) and another which is not. Of these the first is, but in the case of the other it is not true that it is that which is not.' (Reading &mepel uolv6vroLv,'rou [Av6vtro, 'rO5i 6Oux6vTo4, Xdv fl, 'r 9' oiux "?qOk 6&t*art 'r p.v tr? 6v). The point of this 'r criticism is this: Gorgiashas supposedthat if you say of anythingthat it is that which is not something else, e.g. if you say 'X is not Y' then you are sayingthat it both is and is not. The author of MXG replies that if you say that something is something, you are sayingthat it is (existential import), but if you say that something is not something, you are not saying that it is something that is not, i.e. you are not saying that it is not (no negative existential import is this case). Accordinglyif you say 'X is not Y' you are not saying 'X is not' and so Gorgias' supposed contradiction does not result. Here the use of the dual6vtotvshows that it is things in general which are being discussed, and not simply Being and Not-Being since the latter would not be included under 6vrotv. Moreover it is only in this way that the proper force is given to the PZv which has bothered editors in piv tz1 6v.
1 There is no question here of o686v ~?&Xov having a sceptic sense - it involves a positive assertion that 7pyFawa both are and are not, as in the case of Democritus' Diels-Kranz, 68 B i S6. tLhVXXov'r68iV M 'r- "i86 ctvOCL,
2

So L. R has

'&

winv

cf. MXG 97fa 30-36 - Diels-Kranz6, 3o A E.

II

In the next sentence the readingis uncertainbut the general sense is clear. &L&' Tr 0oV O0X 9=LV o5tre ?ZV(XLt o6Te .L0 eIVaXL, 'r 8& &Iqxt o5O
1tepov oux 1=v; 1 'Why then is it not possible for anything either to be or not to be, why are not both or either alternatives possible?' This. is followed by a further statement of Gorgias' argument introduced by yap which shows that the preceding rhetorical questions are to be interpreted in the light of what follows as well as in the light of what precedes them. The statement as given in L and completed by Foss reads: oWv a'r )ou t ?eVXlv, dtnep et-I tL xOxL 'r Et tva y&dp<~jrov>, qpVJcT(v, reb) Iv?) The clause 8rL Il0 EtVOCL, 6TE OUgE? vT-aLV eVMo T6 IL' EtVOLo06x.t6. T6 er? tvci o068tuL is difficult. The Greek can hardly etIVL ou8e(3( op-qaLv carry the meaning given by Apelt 2, 'no one says that there is no sense in which Not-Being is'. But the other meaning 'no one says that Not-Being is in any sense' is not satisfactory either. Firstly it is not true,the atomists being a well known case to the contrary.3 Secondly, as Cook-Wilson saw4, what is wanted is not some external objection, but something which Gorgias has himself said and which is inconsistent with the previous is read statement ?tncp Ct7 TL xxl T6 [ CtVML. This is secured if o&v8d in place of oie8e.5 In this case qnlat refers to Gorgias as it does elsewhere in the criticism 6 and the meaning will be 'while at the same time he denies absolutely that Not-to-be involves being.' With this change the course of the whole criticism down to and including the present passage will be: Gorgias argues that 'is not' involves both 'is' and 'is not' and this is a contradiction. So 'is not' is not possible. To this the criticism replies that 'X is not Y' does not involve 'X is not' in the sense 'X does not exist.' Accordingly we have no reason to conclude that things cannot either be or not be. They may be both, or at any rate things can be. For Gorgas is saying that 'not-to-be' would involve being no less than 'to-be' would involve being, if it is true that (ererp) 'not-to-be' involves being something. This last is what Gorgias is saying, while at the same time curiously enough he says that 'not-to-be' absolutely excludes being. Another way of putting the point might have been this: If 'X is not' involves 'X is and is not' this in turn involves 'X is and is', as the second 'is not' itself involves 'is and is not' and so on indefinitely.
1 possibly -r68i &pca A '6 repovo4x Masrtv; cf. Plato, Hipp. Min. 376a 3. 2 Rh. Mus. xliii (i888) 208. 3 cf. Aristotle, Met. A. 98sb 4. Diels-Kranz6,67 A 6. 4 Class. Review vi (1 89 2) 443-4. 5 This suggestion by Cook Wilson is adopted in the Oxford translation. Another

&vin place of o48kv. possibility would be oUC8'

6

cf. 978 a i 8, 979 b 2. For a corrupt o)8lc( with c7)n7Lvsee 980 a i i .

I 2

The criticism then proceeds to the second line of attack. 'Even if that which is not something is non-existent, even so it does not follow that which is not is in the sense in which that which is, is. For that which is not is not, while that which is, still is'. Suppose we concede to Gorgias what we refused to concede earlier, that if you say 'X is not Y' you are saying 'X is not,' i.e. 'X does not exist,' this still does not lead to the contradiction which Gorgias supposes to follow. The contradiction occurred in the conclusion 'X is and is not'. But when we say 4X is not Y' we are not using 'is' of X in the same sense in which we are using it when we say 'X is Y.' This last case implies that X exists, while 'X is not Y' does not involve the existence of X. Consequently, suppose 'X is not Y' does involve supposing that X does not exist, there is no resultant contradiction, since 'X is not Y' does not involve supposing that X exists. Finally we have the following criticism. 'Suppose it is true to say simply that which is not exists, strange though it would be to say so, does the result follow that all things are not rather than are? For exactly the opposite seems to emerge. For if that which is not exists, and that which is exists, then all things exist. For both the things which are exist and the things which are not exist'. If the received text is sound, the author of MXG misrepresents what Gorgias says, though it does not affect the point of his criticism. Gorgias did not say <=ae tai&?ov oux EIV(L i aVOxL r(t& Ta Op&yjT but 45X?re ou&v [X&ov ?tVXL oVx ?IVML -i i.e. he did not say that all things are not rather than are, 7rpotyjOCs, but that they no more are than are not. But in the criticism R has
lvaL h
jL

elvXL and L has

FA elva. ?tLvaL

In both cases elvaL is placed

and it is likely that the right reading is &6repov <oU> L vL7 Zcov CIVeL; This would bring the criticism into tutL &Ptcvv'nx 0tYLRov accord with Gorgias' words and the whole will run 'Suppose it is true to say simply that that which is not exists, strange though it would be to say so, does the result follow that all things no more are than they are not? For exactly the opposite seems to emerge. For if that which is not exists and that which is exists, then all things exist. For both the things which are exist and the things which are not exist'. This criticism might be expressed in the following way. If 'X is not Y' involves us in supposing that X exists, strange though this supposition may seem, there is no need to conclude 'X is and X is not'. The right conclusion would be the opposite, namely 'X exists' since 'X is not Y' involves 'X exists' and 'X is not Y' involves 'X exists'. It is time now to turn to the version of Sextus. Here fortunately the before
{cA dvocl

13

text is sound 1, and there is only one major problem of translation, namely the meaning to be assigned to the phrases r6 [h 6v and 'r 6v. We have first a summaryand then the statement of the first argument (chs. 66-7). On the one view this would be translated.That nothing exists he argues after the following manner: if anything exists, either Being exists or Not-Being exists, or both Being and Not-Being exist. But Being does not exist as he will establish, nor does Not-Being exist as he will explain, nor do Being and Not-Being exist, as he will make plain. Therefore nothing exists. Now Not-Being does not exist. For if Not-Being exists, it will both exist and not exist at the same time. For in as much as it is thought of as not being, it will not exist, but in as much as it is not being, it will exist again. But it is absurdthat a thing should both exist and not exist at the same time. Therefore Not-Being does not exist'. On the other view we would have 'That nothing is he arguesafter the following manner: if anythingis, either that which is is, or that which is not is, or that which is and is not is. But neither that which is is, as he will establish, nor that which is not is as he will explain, nor that which is and is not, as he will make plain. Now that which is not is not. For if that which is not is, it will both be and not be at the same time. For in as much as it is thoughtof as not being, it will not be, but in as much as it is not being 2, it will be again. But it is absurdthat a thing shouldboth be and not be at the sametime. Therefore that which is not is not). As far as concerns the Greek of Sextus there seems little reason to prefer either rendering to the other down to this point.3 There is clearly a close relation to the first argumentin MXG and an attempt has been made above to show that the argumentsare in fact identical. It has been pointed oUt 4 that in the statement of Gorgias' arguments MXG uses a terminologyattested for the fifth century, at least in related forms, while Sextus is at least to some extent rewriting Gorgiasin later philosophic terminology. In the criticism by the author of MXG which and r6 , elvhat replaced by has alreadybeen discussedwe find r6 eIlvot case of direct of Gorgias' the in 6v L quotation 'r except 'r66v and words.5 There is every reason to suppose that the same thing has
1 it is included in Diels-Kranz,but without translation.

or possibly 'in as much as it is that which is not,' keeping the i6 of N. On the traditionalview Diels felt the need to insert 'r6into the text after Bekkerat the end of the summary.This is unneeded on the second view. 4 Calogero, Studi sull' Eleatismo, 1932, IS8 n. 4; for the language,of Dc Melissoand Dc Xenophanesee Diels' Praefatiop. ioff in his edition of MXG. 5 This helps to confirm the proposed oWv in the criticism, above p. io.
2
3

'4

happenedin Sextus. It has been arguedabove that the use of the infinitive was rather agaist the meaning Being and Not-Being. Buatso far the questionmust be left open as far as concerns Sextus. The second proof in the version of Sextus as usuallyunderstood is as follows: And again, if Not-Being exists, Being will not exist. For these are opposites one to another, and if existence is applied as a term to Not-Being, then non-existence will be applicable as a term to Being. But it is not the case that Being does not exist. On this view of what Gorgiasis saying, he proves that Not-Being does not exist by showing that if it does exist, the consequence will be that Bei does not exist. This he clearly regardsas a reductio ad absurdum- we cannot say that 86 ye t'o U o'ux =rLv. Therefore we must Being does not exist - o'UXI we must saythat deny the statementwhich would producethis absurdity, Not-Being does not exist. Yet it is hard to believe that Gorgias could have argued in this way. He apparentlyappealsas to a decisive agreed principle to the fact that we cannot say that Being does not exist. Yet immediately after the conclusion of this second argument he goes on with the words 'Nor does Being exist. For if Being exists it is either eternal or generated or both eternal and generated...' The decisive agreed principle is thus immediately denied by Gorgiashimself. In fact it is clearlythe essence of Gorgias'whole position to deny that 'r 8v g&r' and for him seriously to assert the contrarywould destroy his position utterly on the usual view of the way in which he is arguing his case. This difficulty was seen already by Foss in 1828 1, but so far no satisfactorysolution has been propounded. The phrasedoes not occur in the correspondingargument in MXG and Gigon 2 argued that it was an additionby Sextus. The second argumentin MXGis as follows: eL8' 6?cs ' TO elvoc, eL yap T6 t6 pn e,vO(L gaGTL, , o1x gTL T OtLXEt(LeV.
PL] EIVOLL (CL
TO etVOL [L?' EaV L IMpO 'xe. faTe o0x

&v o05ro,

ca(v,

a 28-30) which may be rendered: If all the same that v&v s things should not be, is (possible), that they should be, this being the opposite, is not (possible). For if that they should not be, is, then it is proper to say 'is not' of that they should be. So that not even in this way, he says, would anythingexist. This is criticised by the author of MXG in the following terms: He first simply denies that if we say nro ,- elvmL eTt it follows that To evxr. oux gaTL, but does not give reasons, presumablybecause he regardsthe
ou
1 De Gorgia Leontinocommentarium. Halis Saxonum, 1828, p. 174. Similarly H. Gomperz, Sophistik und Rhetorik, 23-4, and Gigon. Hermes lxxi (1936) 195. 2

ibid.
Ig

point as obvious. He then goes on to argue that supposing we say t6 ,uh ov 9=L does involve '6 8v oux aTTLit does not follow that nothing would exist. For although ta 6vx on this view would not exist, t& >h

a valid 6v'Twouldexist, sincewe havesaid'6 IL Uv cart. Thisis clearly as statedby the authorof MXG, of Gorgias criticismof the argument wouldnot andit is so obviousthatit is difficultto believethat Gorgias which haveseen it. The answeris that, just as in Sextus,the argument ad absurdum. The difference Gorgiasis using proceedsby a reductio step in the betweenthe two versionsis that in Sextusthe penultimate 86 ye T6 8v oux gTn whereas in argumentis expresslystated o?uxc
' elvcxt an this leads to MXG it must be understood. 1 If we say r6 oux 9cL. We cannot say this. Therefore we cannot say x! t '6 ?tv(XL So far as this argument goes we still have nothing of which dvXL 9. we can say 90rTL. Thus the step ouxl 8s ye t6 6v oux ga'L is vital to the

as an argumentboth in Sextus and MXG, and cannotbe dismissed

intrusion. How then is it to be explained? The answer surely is that Gorgias was not concerned to deny the existence of Being and NotBeing at all. What he was concerned with was the status of phenomena, which are quite plainly the subject of discourse in the second and third divisions of the treatise where he argues that if anything is it cannot be known, and if it is and can be known it cannot be communicated to other human beings. What he is saying is that the verb 'to be' cannot be used of phenomena either positively or negatively without contradiction resulting. If this is realised it becomes possible to approach the arguments both in Sextus and MXG from a different point of view. The question confronting us is this: is it possible to say of something that it is not? Gorgias has two arguments to show that it is not possible. In the first argument he claims that it would lead to the contradictory assertion that it both is and is not. In the second argument he claims that it would lead to the equally intolerable result that that which is is not. In each case we should suppose that behind the phrases r6 tv' 6v and '6 6v in Sextus lie an original r6 ji' eIvat and 6 ?tvcat. The subject of the infinitives will be an indefinite 'it' which is naturally expanded on occasion into 6v'rac or so 7rp&iocyroin MXG. If we say that it is possible for things not EatL - this leads us to the assertion that that which to be - fE rtLz e is is not, which is a contradiction and so impossible. The conclusion of the second argument in MXG has a qualification and this s?L 'T(xu'v la'LV eIvct -rc xaL ?Xti c attached to it I

The need for this step in the argument in MXG is recognised by Untersteiner, The

Sophists, E.T. p. 146.

qualification is taken up in a separate argument (g7 a 31-33). This states that if 'to be' and 'not to be' are the same, even so nothing would be. For that which is not, is not, and that which is, is not. Of this argument the criticism says: if 'to be' and 'not to be' are the same, even so it would not follow that nothing is rather than that something is. For just as he argues that if that which is not and that which is are the same, then that which is and that which is not alike are not; so, reversing the position it is equally possible to say that everything is; for that which is not is and that which is, is, so that everything is. At first sight this criticism seems correct - indeed it might seem proper to go further and say not only is it possible to make the reversal but necessary to do so. The preceding argument began by asking us to suppose that it is possible that it should not be. We are then told that this involves us in saying that 'to be' is 'not to be' which is a contradiction unless 'to be' and 'not to be' are the same. If they are the same and we suppose that it is possible that it should not be, then in whatever way we work out the following steps, we should surely arrive at only one conclusion, namely that it is. But closer inspection of what Gorgias is made to say in the third argument suggests a different chain of reasoning. He takes as his starting point T6 'r yap ,uh 6v oUx *GL. If ElIVocL and CIvoLare the same then the inference to be drawn will depend on whether you start from the proposition tr LJ'ovgato or rL7' 'v o x lart. Gorgias chooses to start from t6 p3) ov oiux laTL and from this as a starting point his conclusion follows with sufficient show of reason. But how can he take such a starting point? He has already posited for the sake of argument that p3) edVOCL gtCL and has admitted that this is not so far disproved if we How then can he appeal to this posit the identity of [3) etVlL and Vac.L. 'v oux 9T as a starting point? The only possible answer principle 'Z6 &u is that for Gorgias there is a distinction in meaning between 'r6 p3 FtvmL 9CM and '6 p) 'ovgorc, the first meaning 'it is possible that it should not be' and the second meaning 'that which is not is' or something similar in each case. The first involves the second but is not the same as it. Gorgias holds it as self-evident, or at any rate as beyond possible dispute that that which is not is not. The supposition that it is possible for it not to be involves the further supposition that that which is not is. This is impossible, and so the original supposition must be rejected. We thus have the position that in the second argument it was necessary to appeal to the principle that that which is, is, and in the third argument in MXG we have an appeal to the principle that that which is not is not. In each case these are not principles which Gorgias is setting out to 17

prove, but principles which he feels able to use in order to establish other contentions. A similar problem arises in the argument which comes at the end of the first section in Sextus (ch. .5). As usually interpreted this runs something like this: and that they do not both exist, Being and NotBeing, is easy to prove. For if Not-Being exists and Being exists, NotBeing will be the same as Being in respect of existence. And for this reason neither of them exists. For that Not-Being does not exist is agreed, and Being has been shown to be the same as Not-Being. Therefore, it, Being,will not exist. Thleobjection to this argumentwas seen by Calogero:1 From the identity of Not-Being with Being the conclusion should be that both exist, not that neither exists. Once againthe answerdependsupon the startingpoint which is adopted. Let us suppose the identity of 'Z 6v and 'r61c 6v. Take next the proposition that r6 &v I=? and it would follow that therefore both 'c 6v and 'r [u' 6v are. and it Alternativelytake as a second proposition that r6 t v o6x M=r; would follow that both are not. Gorgiasin fact takes the second course -&p r6 ,uh5v. Here the source of his adoptedstarting with the words 'rLt point is not clear. Becauseof the place in which the argumentunder discussionoccurs in the account of Sextus it may be that Gorgiason this occasion regarded &rL '6 tL3 8v oux =tLv as something established earlier, namely in the first two arguments at the beginning of the
treatise. But the antithesis between o66oyov and
WeCxTLa

suggests

that this is not so. The second has been shown, the first is something which does not need to be shown but can be appealedto as something upon which there is general agreement. If this is the case, then once againwe have an appealto an agreedprinciple outside the course of the argumentitself. And againas in the previous case we have a superficial tv ?GL and in the course of inconsistency. He begins by saying tLT6 &? o&Vx o6'6Xoyov.This suggeststhat the 0rrLV, refutation says 6X1T6 t Zv original course of the argumentmay have been somethinglike this: For if it is possible that it should not be and also that it shouldbe, that which is not will be identical with that which is in respect of being. And for this reason neither of them will be (possible). For that which is not is not, as is agreed, and it has been shown that that which is is the sameas that which is not.
1 op. cit. z69-170.

The attempted answer of Untersteiner, The Sophists, E.T. p. 146 and

note 33 does not seem to meet the difficulty.The point is tbat once it has been said as here that -r6Gvexists and sb i?h 8v exists, then their identity in respect of existence must be an identity in respect of 'positive existence', i.e. they must both exist, and not both not exist. i8

This argumentin Sextus has obvious similaritiesto the third argument

in MXGwhich hasalready been discussed(979a 31-33).

It hasin fact

been maintained that the two are identical and that we have here a further example of the different arrangementof the argumentsin the two versionsof the original. This may be true. But the fiuctions of the two argumentsare different in each case. In MXG the argumentoccurs within a frameworkof discussion directed to establishthat 'r6 [t va o?x &an and it purports to be an answer to a possible objection that might be taken to the previous two arguments.In Sextus on the other handits finction is to deal with ihe combined possibilitythat bothr6 6v and 'r ' 6v may be, and it is rounded off by a further argumentwhich expressly deals with the same combined possibility (ch. 76). There is nothing unlikely in supposing that Gorgias may have used the same argument in different connections and in effect repeated himself, and this is probablythe easier hypothesisin the present case. The statementof the third argumentin MXG is followed by the short pv o5v O aUT6X6yo &xeEvou while R sentencewhich in L readsOU6'W oiuv o For this Diels proposed oroa uidv has o0roqin place of o&rwq. and exEvou it would be equally possible to read taoq in 7rp&')oqXyoq In either case of the is to the earlier reference clearly place 7p&oq. statement at 979a 23-24 where we have the phrase pt& 'cT-v tpw'rqv
Y.&OV

oCUrO5 &not8eLELV EV

?&EyL 6rt

OVX 1=tv

0t)

Oa CtYOLL

C I.t'Y

elvocL.

Accordingly there can be no doubt that the three argumentsin MXG which have alreadybeen discussed together constitute what the author regarded as the special demonstration of Gorgias. It has been argued above that all three of these argumentsare concerned only with the possibility 6tcL 'Z !L' EIVaL IaL. In this case the words oGr e1VML O6Tc and this may ILI elvoc do not correctly characterisethe three arguments be taken as an objection to the interpretation offered above. But the situation can perhaps be explained if the author of MXG is actually quoting the words of Gorgias at the beginng of the so called special demonstration,and if Gorgiaswere there statingor repeatinghis whole thesis andnot merely that part of it which he proposedto deal with first. So far we have been concerned with the possibility that that which is not might be and the consequences which would follow from the adoption of that supposition. Next comes the consideration of the possibility that that which is might be. Here the version of Sextus is relatively full and easy to follow. The version in MXG is briefer and in places the text is quite uncertain. But it will be arguedthat there is no differencebetween the two versions in the substanceof what they give,
I9

and both accord with the general interpretation of Gorgias' position which is here being propounded.Sextus begins: Moreoverthat which is is not (possible). For if it is, it is either eternal or generated or at the same time eternaland generated. But it is not eternalnor is it generated, nor is it both, as we shall show. Thereforethat which is is not (possible). to this in MXG we have simply el 8i tortv ffrOL&y6v7yrov Corresponding lvtoL. No subject is expressed and the meaningmust be: h yev6tLevov which if anythingis, it is either ungeneratedor generated.The arguments follow all have no expressedsubject but an implied indefiniteone. In the general summaryprovided by the author of MXG at 979a i8 we have
avc xV
eap,

tiv,

TL I=?L

FLJTC IV ,M7

L7T? 'T&IVMZ 7tOXAOC ?tIVOCL

and the same form is used in the recapitulatorypassage 4rc yev6,zevoc

at 979b 33: c' ONi &VXyx71 Riv Et7rep &aL TL ?JroL&y6v-n'rov X ye9v6tLvov etvaL. These expressions confirm that the subject of the arguments is an indefinite 'anything'. There is every reason to suppose that the phrase 'if anything is' is a shorter and more convenient formulation of the full formula'if it is possible that it should be' eld8 gaLV elvot, and both expressions point against the view that the subject of discourse is the existence or otherwise of Being and Not-Being. In support of the contention that that which is is neither eternal nor generated Sextus gives the following. If that which is, is eternal, it is infinite, and if it is infinite it is nowhere. For in order for it to be somewhere there must be that in which it is. If that in which it is is other than that which is it will be larger than it, which is impossible if that which is is infinite. On the other hand if that in which it is is that which is, then that which is will be two things, namely space and body, which is impossible. So if that which is is nowhere it is not. (Therefore that which is, is not eternal). In the first part of this argument it is clear that Gorgias is proceeding equivocally from infinite in a temporal sense to infinite in a spacial sense. Aristotle appears to have charged Melissus with making the same equivocation 1 and it is probable that the charge is correct." In MXG the corresponding argument is stated much more briefly: If it is ungenerated he concludes that it is infinite by the princi. &r7CLpOv o'X xv avvoct; ples of Melissus. 8 The text then continues: 7iou (for nore of LR) o6'm yap 'v ai6'-r o6r' Lv&dp c1voL. &uoyocp&v r6 -re xal 'r v P. The objection that 'it would &s6v ?XvXL o6Tco; 7rXetco be two' will not refer to the first step in Sextus, where the objection was
1 2 3

Soph. El. i68b 39 = Diels-Kranz, 3o A io. see Ross, Aristotle's Physics, pp. 471-2.

for which see Diels-Kranzs, 3o B 2-3.

20

not this, but that it would not be infinite if in something other than itself, but to the second step in Sextus' argument,namely if it is located within itself. This is seen from Sextus' words xact&'o yeAae'rakc r 6v. In MXG it is usual to read 7rtdp&in place of 7 s\eEc of LR. But the completion of the argument in MXG is referred to Zeno, and Zeno supposednot only that the place of 'r 6v would be distinct from -r66v but thatan infinite series of placeswould need to be posited.l Accordingly there is no reason to reject j 7cel@. The next step in the argumentis to show that it cannotbegenerated. This in both versionshas two parts. If it is generatedit mustbe generated either out of that which is or out of that which is not. But the arguments used to deny these alternative possibilities are different in the two versions. In Sextus we have: If it is something which is, it has not come into being but alreadyis. (Thereforeit hasnot come into being out of that which is). Secondly it cannot be generated out of that which is not. For that which is not cannot generate anything since that which is to generate anything must possess substance. Both these arguments are attributed by Aristotle to early philosophers in general terms (Phys. a possible I91 a 23-3 I). This suggests to the discrepancy answer between the two versions - it may be that Gorgiasgave a series of argumentsto
establish each point, and as the theme was a well worn one, only one

argumentis reported in each case. MXG has for the first step el yo&p -rb
&V Lteromk6aOL, OUX &v 9t' elVocL'r
oux

6v, &o=ep y' ?et xAo'L T'

.L' 6v ykVOLtO,

&ai 9L e 6v. The soundness of the opening words seems established by the similar statement by Melissus 2 and the meaning must be: If that which is were to change into something it would no longer be that which is, just as, if that which is not were to become something, it would no longer be something which is not. The first half of the sentence is clearly an argument against generation out of that which is. The contention is that if anything came into being out of that which is, then that which is would become that which is not, i.e. that which is not what it was. This must be rejected - we cannot say that that which is is not, as this is a contradiction. Once again Gorgias is making an appeal to a principle regarded as independently established, the principle o5XL8e ye Sr6ov o6x 9=cv. A difficulty has been found in the second half of the sentence because it has seemed to be offering a proof that nothing can come into being out of that which is not, and this is the problem

1 Diels-Kranz6, 29 A 24. For 8vo and 977a 25 = 21 A 28. 2 Diels-Kranz", 3o B 8, par. 6.

-trcXc( cf. MXG 975a x2 - Diels-Kranz*,30 A S

2I

attacked in the following proof in such a way as to imply that it has not previously been established.' But it is probable that the purpose of the second half of the sentence is differentfrom this, andthatthe comparison between the two halvesis simply formal. If that which is were to change it would not then be that which is, just as if that which is not were to become somethingit would not then be something which is not, and if anythingelse were to change it would no longer be that which it had been before the change took place. In other words we are not here asked to suppose that there is any absurdityinvolved in sayig 'if that which is not were to become something which is'. The reasons for supposingthat this is impossible have yet to be given. These are given next. If we say that that which is not is not, nothing can come out of it, since it is nothing. On the other hand if we say that that which is not is, 2 then nothing will come into being out of it for the same reasonthat nothing will come into being out of that which is. In other words that which is not would be the same as that which is and so the argument about that which is will apply. The argumentsabout generated and ungeneratedare followed both in in Sextus Sextus and MXG by a further group introduced by xal &) and by 9Tnin MXG, which makes it clear that we are to be concemed with further argumentsto establish that that which is is not (possible). It may be noted that this time both Sextus and MXG have an indefinite subject. It is argued that if it is, it is either one or many.In Sextusthe first alternative is discussed under four headings and it is argued that whichever of these is adopted the result is that that which is is not one. The text in MXG does not allow of restorationwith any certainty, but we seem to have a summarystatementcoveringtwo of the four headings used by Sextus, namely a6lcx and 6Eye0Oo. For the second alternativewe
have only broken words in MXG which require supplements in order to make sense but there is no indication that they refer to a different argument from that which is provided by Sextus. Finally something must be said about the argument concerning XtnaLc which appears only in MXG. It is usually treated as an argument to show that change does not exist. It falls into two parts, the first concerned with change other than movement in space and the second with locomotion. The text is quite unreliable in each case, but the conclusions and the general nature of the arguments seem clear. In the first case it is argued that, if anything changed, it would not be the same as it was
1
2

Cook Wilson, op. cit., 44S-6. ' 6v with the Oxford translators. 6 6 Reading cE8' I

22

before, and that which is would become that which is not 1, and that which is not would have come into existence. In the second case, if anything moved, it would cease to be because movement involves division, and this, in some way not at all clear from the argument as stated, involves the non-existence of that which moves. Now as Gorgias leads to maintainsit as true that nothing is, the conclusion thatx[viaLq not being or non-existence can hardlybe for him a groundfor rejecting the existence of motion or change. And in fact the argumentsoffered are quite intelligible on a different supposition, namely if his contention was 'if anythingis, it would not be liable to change or movement. But things are liable to change and movement, therefore they are not'. This suggested interpretation gains support from the way the argument opens - ou8'&vxtLw 7vo (GLV oiov. Here the &vimplies a preceding 'if' clause either expressed or understood. The &vshould be retained and not changedto av3 with Apelt. The preceding 'if' clause is obviously the 'L {CL which is also the hypothesis preceding the argumentsabout generated and ungenerated and about one and many. With this as a starting point we can read and understandthe whole argumentin the following way. 'Nor, he says, if anything is, would it move. For if it moved, it would no longer be in the same state as before, but that which is would not be, and that which is not would have come to be. And further if it moves and changes position, being no longer continuous, that which is is divided, etc. So much for the detailed argumentsin the first division of Gorgias' treatise. Much must necessarily remain uncertain, more especially in view of the state of the text for the version in MXG. But it is hoped that enough may have been said to suggest that there is no reason to think that the argumentswere differently arrangedin the two versions nor that their contents are at variance.Moreover it had been arguedthat the main question with which Gorgias is concerned in the first division of the treatise is not the existence or otherwise of Being and Not-Being but the question how far the verb 'to be' can be used of phenomena without contradictions resulting. A complete investigation would require an examinationof the Eleatic tradition in order to determine
Gorgias' relation to it, since obviously if the interpretation here offered

is sound, this also will need to be stated differently from the way in which it has been commonly stated. This cannot be attempted here. The interpretationis put forwardas one which arisesout of a readingof
1 or possibly'that which is would cease to be', tr6aLv

cb instead of TO' p.iv <&v> oiux&iv 23

4&v> oDx&vcEl2.

the text of the two versionsof the treatiseof Gorgiasand which explains the difficulties in them better than the usual way of readingthem. But two generalpoints maybe mentioned in conclusion. The interpretation here propounded accords well with the way in which Sextus introduces his summaryof Gorgias' views. Sextus treats Gorgias immediately after Protagoras. He begins with the statement 'Gorgiasof Leontini belonged to the same group as those who abolished the criterion, although he did not adopt the same line of attack as and his followers'. He concludes his account with the words Protagoras 'the criterion of truth is thus abolishedas far as concerns the difficulties raisedby Gorgias.For there would be no criterion of that which neither is nor can be known nor is of such a natureas to be communicatedto another'. Now Sextus makes it clear that, on his view at least 1, Protagoraswas concerned with phenomenaand the truth of statements which made about them. In the example used by Plato in the Theaetetus, is not Sextus' example, but is none the less a convenientone, Protagoras would say that the same wind is both hot and not hot, so that in any one case we could alwayssay with equal truth 'it is' and'it is not.' Since all appearancesare both true and false we are left with no criterion for distinguishingtrue from false, and consequently for Sextus the theory comes close to scepticism, though he will not accord him of Protagoras that title since on certain matters he dogmatizes. Gorgias, on the view arguedfor in the present paper, held that we cannot say of phenomenal objects either that they are or that they are not because in either case absurdresults would follow. This in the eyes of Sextus amounts to the abolition of phenomenaand consequently he concludes that there can be no criterion of truth for Gorgias, since there can be no criterion of that which has no being. If Gorgiashad been merely concerned with the status of Being and Not-Being it is not so clear how his views could have been linked with those of Protagoras.But this is perfectly naturalif both Gorgias and Protagoraswere regarded as developing their distinctive doctrines with primaryreference to phenomenalobjects. Anotherpiece of evidence concerning Gorgias points in the same direction. When Isocratesbrieflyand quite incidentallyhas occasion to refer to the views of Gorgias, a man whose work he knew and admired, he twice 8 expresses the paradox of Gorgias in the fonn ou'&vrc-ov6vrcwv lCr'v.
Here the plural o'r6v'rxis natural enough if Gorgias was concerned with
1 Cf. his Pyrr. Hyp. 1. 2I6-219. Journal, Dec. 1949, 20-26.

For discussion I may refer to Durham University

IX.3 and XV.26,

= Diels-Kranzg, 82 B i.

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phenomena,but much less naturalif his main contention was that neither Being nor Not-Being exists. Secondly there is an interesting piece of evidence to be found in Aristotle's PhysicsA. 2. i85b 2g (Diels-Kranz6, 83. 2). According to this passage the sophist Lycophron wished to remove the I=L from sentences in order to avoid makingthe one many, while others adjusted the form of the expression, saying of a man not Xeux6 ea-t but Xe bx&zL. According to Themistius1 Lycophron would say simply in place of Icoxpa& ELV, and would confine q ?eux6q Xxxpa'nq Xeux6q the use of the verb 'to be' to existential uses. The attempt to abolish FaTLas a copula was not confined to Lycophton as Aristotle shows and Aristotle discusses the matter in a rather Eleatic context. But he tells us that the matter was one of considerableconcern to oL 6=epot ?i-V among whom he apparently includes Lycophron. As to the oppoXcxv identity of the others speculation has suggested Antisthenes, the Megariansand the Eretrians.1The question must have continued to interest philosophers long afterwardsas we find in Cicero, Tusc.Disp. i. I 3 that because Crassusis dead we are asked to prefer the formula MiserM. Crassus to Miserest M. Crassus because the latter expression would imply that Crassusis alive while at the same time he is dead. The origin and extent of the movement to abolish the copula cannot now be determined. But it seems clear that Lycophronwas in effect a disciple of Gorgias in other matters 3 and the abolition of the copula would have been an extremely appropriatestep for him to take if he also subscribed to Gorgias'doctrine that its retention is bound to lead to contradictions. Manchester.
I
2 3

In Ar. Phys.Paraphrasis 6.28 (Schenkl), not in Diels-Kranz. cf. Ross ad Ar. Phys.,loc. cit. cf. Zeller-Nestle, Ph. d. Gr. i6, 1323 n. 3.

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