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Collation Cases Raw for Wills

Collation Cases Raw for Wills

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NATIVIDAD P. NAZARENO, MAXIMINO P. NAZARENO, JR., petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ESTATE OF MAXIMINO A. NAZARENO, SR., ROMEO P.

NAZARENO and ELIZA NAZARENO, respondents. DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 39441 dated May 29, 1998 affirming with modifications the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in an action for annulment of sale and damages. The facts are as follows: Maximino Nazareno, Sr. and Aurea Poblete were husband and wife. Aurea died on April 15, 1970, while Maximino, Sr. died on December 18, 1980. They had five children, namely, Natividad, Romeo, Jose, Pacifico, and Maximino, Jr. Natividad and Maximino, Jr. are the petitioners in this case, while the estate of Maximino, Sr., Romeo, and his wife Eliza Nazareno are the respondents. During their marriage, Maximino Nazareno, Sr. and Aurea Poblete acquired properties in Quezon City and in the Province of Cavite. It is the ownership of some of these properties that is in question in this case. It appears that after the death of Maximino, Sr., Romeo filed an intestate case in the Court of First Instance of Cavite, Branch XV, where the case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. NC-28. Upon the reorganization of the courts in 1983, the case was transferred to the Regional Trial Court of Naic, Cavite. Romeo was appointed administrator of his father‟s estate. In the course of the intestate proceedings, Romeo discovered that his parents had executed several deeds of sale conveying a number of real properties in favor of his sister, Natividad. One of the deeds involved six lots in Quezon City which were allegedly sold by Maximino, Sr., with the consent of Aurea, to Natividad on January 29, 1970 for the total amount of P47,800.00. The Deed of Absolute Sale reads as follows:

DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS: I, MAXIMINO A. NAZARENO, Filipino, married to Aurea Poblete-Nazareno, of legal age and a resident of the Mun. of Naic, Prov. of Cavite, Philippines, -WITNESSETH-

That I am the absolute registered owner of six (6) parcels of land with the improvements thereon situated in Quezon City, Philippines, which parcels of land are herewith described and bounded as follows, to wit: “TRANS. CERT. OF TITLE NO. 140946” “A parcel of land (Lot 3-B of the subdivision plan Psd-47404, being a portion of Lot 3, Block D-3 described on plan Bsd-10642, G.L.R.O. Record No.) situated in the Quirino District, Quezon City. Bounded on the N., along line 1-2 by Lot 15, Block D3 of plan Bsd - 10642; along line 2-3 by Lot 4, Block D-3 of plan Bsd-10642; along line 3-4 by Aurora Boulevard (Road Lot-1, Bsd-10642); and along line 4-1 by Lot 3D of the subdivision plan. Beginning at a point marked “1” on plan, being S.29 deg. 26‟E., 1156.22 m. from B.L.L.M. 9, Quezon City, thence N. 79 deg. 53‟E., 12.50 m. to point 2; thence S. 10 deg. 07‟E., 40.00 m. to point 3; thence S. 79 deg. 53‟W., 12.50 m. to point 4; thence N. 10 deg. 07‟W., 40.00 m. to the point of beginning; containing an area of FIVE HUNDRED (500) SQUARE METERS. All points referred to are indicated on the plan and are marked on the ground as follows: points “1” and “4” by P.L.S. Cyl. Conc. Mons. bearings true; date of the original survey, April 8-July 15, 1920 and that of the subdivision survey, March 25, 1956.” “TRANS. CERT. OF TITLE NO. 132019” “A parcel of land (Lot 3, Block 93 of the subdivision plan Psd-57970 being a portion of Lot 6, Pcs-4786, G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 917) situated in Quirino District Quezon City. Bounded on the NW., along line 1-2, by Lot 1, Block 93; on the NE., along line 2-3, by Road Lot 101; on the SE., along line 3-4, by Road Lot 100; on the SW., along line 4-1, by Lot 4, Block 93; all of the subdivision plan. Beginning at point marked “1” on plan, being S. 65 deg. 40‟ 3339.92 m. from B.L.L.M. No. 1, Marikina, Rizal; thence N. 23 deg. 28 min. E., 11.70 m. to point “2”; thence S. 66 deg. 32 min. E., 18.00 m. to point “3”; thence S. 23 deg. 28 min. W., 11.70 m. to point “4”;

thence N. 66 deg. 32. min. W., 18.00 m. to the point of beginning; containing an area of TWO HUNDRED TEN SQUARE METERS AND SIXTY SQUARE DECIMETERS (210.60). All points referred to are indicated on the plan and are marked on the ground by B.L. Cyl. Conc. Mons. 15 x 60 cm.; bearings true; date of the original survey, Nov. 10, 1920 and Jan. 31-March 31, 1924 and that of the subdivision survey, February 1 to September 30, 1954. Date approved March 9, 1962.” “TRANS. CERT. OF TITLE NO. 118885” “A parcel of land (Lot No. 10, of the consolidation and subdivision plan Pcs-988, being a portion of the consolidated Lot No. 26, Block No. 6, Psd-127, and Lots Nos. 27-A and 27-B, Psd-14901, G.L.R.O. Record No. 917), situated in the District of Cubao, Quezon City, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the NE., by Lot No. 4 of the consolidation and subdivision plan; on the SE., by Lot No. 11 of the consolidation and subdivision plan; on the SW., by Lot No. 3 of the consolidation and subdivision plan; and on the NW., by Lot No. 9 of the consolidation and subdivision plan. Beginning at a point marked “1” on the plan, being S. 7 deg. 26‟W., 4269.90 m. more or less from B.L.L.M. No. 1, Mp. of Mariquina; thence S. 25 deg. 00‟E., 12.00 m. to point “2”; thence S. 64 deg. 59‟W., 29.99 m. to point “3”; thence N. 25 deg. 00‟W., 12.00 m to point “4”; thence N. 64 deg. 59‟E., 29.99 m. to the point of beginning; containing an area of THREE HUNDRED SIXTY SQUARE METERS (360), more or less. All points referred to are indicated on the plan and on the ground are marked by P.L.S. Conc. Mons. 15 x 60 cm.; bearings true; declination 0 deg. 50‟E., date of the original survey, April 8 to July 15, 1920, and that of the consolidation and subdivision survey, April 24 to 26, 1941.” “TRANS. CERT. OF TITLE NO. 118886” “A parcel of land (Lot No. 11, of the consolidation and subdivision plan Pcs-988, being a portion of the consolidated Lot No. 26, Block No. 6, Psd-127, and Lots Nos. 27-A and 27-B, Psd-14901, G.L.R.O. Record No. 917), situated in the District of Cubao, Quezon City, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the NE., by Lot No. 4 of the consolidation and subdivision plan; on the SE., by Lot No. 12 of the consolidation and

subdivision plan; on the SW., by Lot No. 3 of the consolidation and subdivision plan; on the NW., by Lot No. 10 of the consolidation and subdivision plan. Beginning at a point marked “1” on plan, being S. 79 deg. 07‟W., 4264.00 m. more or less from B.L.L.M. No. 1, Mp. of Mariquina; thence S. 64 deg. 59‟W., 29.99 m. to point “2”; thence N. 25 deg. 00‟W., 12.00 m. to point “3”; thence N. 64 deg. 59‟E., 29.99 m. to point “4”; thence S. 26 deg. 00‟E., 12.00 m. to the point of beginning; containing an area of THREE HUNDRED SIXTY SQUARE METERS (360), more or less. All points referred to are indicated on the plan and on the ground, are marked by P.L.S. Conc. Mons. 15 x 60 cm.; bearings true; declination 0 deg. 50‟E.; date of the original survey, April 8 to July 15, 1920, and that of the consolidation and subdivision survey, April 24 to 26, 1941.” “A parcel of land (Lot No. 13 of the consolidation and subdivision plan Pcs-988, being a portion of the consolidated Lot No. 26, Block No. 6, Psd-127, and Lots Nos. 27-A and 27-B, Psd-14901, G.L.R.O. Record No. 917), situated in the District of Cubao, Quezon City, Island of Luzon. Bounded on the NE., by Lot No. 4 of the consolidation and subdivision plan; on the SE., by Lot No. 14, of the consolidation; and subdivision plan; on the SW., by Lot No. 3 of the consolidation and subdivision plan; and on the NW., by Lot No. 12, of the consolidation and subdivision plan. Beginning at the point marked “1” on plan, being S.78 deg. 48‟W., 4258.20 m. more or less from B.L.L.M. No. 1, Mp. of Mariquina; thence S. 64 deg. 58‟W., 30.00 m. to point “2”; thence N. 25 deg. 00‟W., 12.00 m. to point “3”; thence N. 64 deg. 59‟E., 29.99 m. to point “4”; thence S.25 deg. 00‟E., 12.00 m. to point of beginning; containing an area of THREE HUNDRED SIXTY SQUARE METERS (360, more or less. All points referred to are indicated on the plan and on the ground are marked by P.L.S. Conc. Mons. 15 x 60 cm.; bearings true; declination 0 deg. 50‟E., date of the original survey, April 8 to July 15, 1920, and that of the consolidation and subdivision survey, April 24 to 26, 1941.”

C. 118886. 30. Bounded on the NE. 1941. TRANSFER.. administrators and assigns. on the SE. Conc. Mons. of Cavite. the receipt whereof is acknowledged to my entire satisfaction. 48‟W.00 m. 00‟W. No. of Cavite. 3 of the consolidation and subdivision plan. of legal age and a resident of the Mun.L. thence S. Nazareno. to point “3”.. 12. G. Prov. 00‟E. her heirs..00 m.00 m. 13 of the consolidation and subdivision plan. by Lot No. thence S.00) PHILIPPINE CURRENCY.R. to the point of beginning. more or less. 26. 4 of the consolidation and subdivision plan. 25 deg.800. date of the original survey. interests and participations in and to Lot No. 6. all my title. on the SW. being S. 30. 11 COVERED BY T.L. CONVEY and ASSIGN unto the said Natividad P. NAZARENO.M.. single.C.64 deg. all my title. 00‟W. by Lot No. to point “4”. 4258. by Lot No. Philippines. being a portion of the consolidated Lot No. 15. TRANSFER. by Lot No. declination 0 deg. I do hereby CEDE.T. 917).L. Prov. Nazareno. NO. Mp. the receipt whereof is acknowledged to my entire satisfaction. to point “2”.. 118886 above-described. 58‟E. 1920. of legal age and a resident of the Mun. 11 covered by T. I do hereby CEDE. her heirs.“A parcel of land (Lot No.. 65 deg. 50‟E. free of any and all liens and encumbrances. to me in hand paid by NATIVIDAD P. 1. rights. SELL. interests and participations to the abovedescribed parcels of land with the improvements thereon. 65 deg. Record No. single. 27-A and 27-B. and Lots Nos.78 deg. of the consolidation and subdivision plan Pcs-988. with the understanding .000.. of Naic.00 m.00) PHILIPPINE CURRENCY. Philippines. of Naic. and That for and in consideration of the sum of FOUR THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED PESOS (P4. of the consolidation and subdivision plan.O.L. 14. Filipino. and on the NW. April 24 to 26. All points referred to are indicated on the plan and on the ground are marked by P. to me in hand paid by NATIVIDAD P. Psd-14901.. 15 x 60 cm. Beginning at the point marked “1” on plan.” That for and in consideration of the sum of FORTY THREE THOUSAND PESOS (P43. bearings true. No. Block No. of Mariquina. with the exception of LOT NO.. SELL. situated in the District of Cubao. Filipino.. April 8 to July 15. more or less from B. free of any and all liens and encumbrances. CONVEY and ASSIGN unto the said Natividad P. Psd-127. and that of the consolidation and subdivision survey. thence N.S. 12. Quezon City. thence S. NAZARENO. Island of Luzon.. containing an area of THREE HUNDRED SIXTY SQUARE METERS (360). administrators and assigns. rights.20 m.T.

293701 by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. Philippines. and the payment of damages. this 29th day of January.[10] On June 15. Aurea. The case was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. On August 4. 1982 to Maximino. 162739 (Lot 3).. 277968) in his name. filed a third-party complaint against the spouses Romeo and Eliza. 1970. 1986. I have hereunto signed this deed of absolute sale in the City of Manila. 1962 executed by Maximino Sr. the trial court ruled in favor of Maximino.[6] and TCT No..[12] They alleged that Lot 3.[13] They alleged that Lot 3 is being leased by the spouses Romeo and Eliza to third persons. IN WITNESS WHEREOF. 1988. Among the lots covered by the above Deed of Sale is Lot 3-B which is registered under TCT No. 162736 (Lot 11). the present case for annulment of sale with damages against Natividad and Maximino. CV No. Romeo in turn filed. They therefore sought the annulment of the transfer to Romeo and the cancellation of his title. 162737 (Lots 13 and 14).[8] for which reason the latter was issued TCT No. Romeo presented evidence to show that Maximino and Aurea Nazareno never intended to sell the six lots to Natividad and that Natividad was only to hold the said lots in trust for her siblings. This lot had been occupied by Romeo. 1990. Jr. He presented the Deed of Partition and Distribution dated June 28. 1970 to Natividad. 1983.[7] all of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City.. The issues having been joined. where it was docketed as Civil Case No. had been surreptitiously appropriated by Romeo by securing for himself a new title (TCT No. who was then abroad and was represented by their mother. the case was set for trial. transfer certificates of title were issued to Natividad.[3] TCT No. Natividad sold Lot 3-B on July 31. Natividad and Maximino. 162738 (Lot 3-B). the eviction of Romeo and his wife Eliza and all persons claiming rights from Lot 3. By virtue of this deed. 1982 to Maximino. Jr. 140946. brought an action for recovery ofpossession and damages with prayer for writs of preliminary injunction and mandatory injunction with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Jr. 162735 (Lot 10). Sr. which was included in the Deed of Absolute Sale of January 29. 88-58. On March 1. On December 12. In CA-G.[11] Romeo sought the declaration of nullity of the sale made on January 29. and by Maximino. 13 and 14. Jr. out of the house. except Jose.R. 1970 to Natividad and that made on July 31. Jr. 12932. the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.[4] TCT No. Jr.[9] When Romeo found out about the sale to Maximino. he and his wife Eliza locked Maximino. to wit: TCT No. Jr. Jr. and Aurea and duly signed by all of their children. Unknown to Romeo. his wife Eliza.that the title to be issued in relation hereto shall be separate and distinct from the title to be issued in connection with Lots Nos. on behalf of the estate of Maximino. Maximino. since 1969.[5] TCT No. Jr. on the ground that both sales were void for lack of consideration.[2] By virtue of this deed. although covered by the same title. the nine lots subject of this Deed of Partition were assigned by raffle as follows: .

. Lots 3. 12932 affirming the trial court‟s decision in favor of Maximino. on the other hand.000. Jr. 13.Lots 23 (312 m2) and 24 (379 m2) 3. Natividad insisted that she paid the amount stated in the Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 29. who agreed to give Lots 10 and 11 to Jose. Romeo .[14] while Maximino. Jose . Instead. However.1. Natividad and Maximino. Maximino. Romeo further testified that.Lot 25-L (642 m2) 2.00. Lots 3. 13 and 14. 11. She claimed she was surprised to learn that Romeo was able to obtain a title to Lot 3 in his name.[19] and Lot 3-B to Maximino.000. 10. The transfer was made in this manner in order to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes. Jr. claimed that the Deed of Partition and Distribution executed in 1962 was not really carried out. Pacifico . It appears that before the case filed by Romeo could be decided. i. to Natividad. Jr. for P175.00. and 14. 1969. Jr. Jr. Romeo said. 1970.500. Natividad said she sold Lots 13 and 14 to Ros-Alva Marketing Corp. .Lots 13 (360 m2) and 14 (360 m2) 5. their parents offered to sell to them the six lots in Quezon City.Lots 6 (338 m2) and 7 (338 m2) 4. was sold to third persons [16] because she allegedly did not like the location of the two lots. i. [17] However.. Jr.[15] Pacifico and Jose‟s shares were allegedly given to Natividad. he admitted that a document was executed by his parents transferring six properties in Quezon City. 1966 for the amount of P9. although the deeds of sale executed by his parents in their favor stated that the sale was for a consideration. in December of 1969.Lots 10 (360 m2) and 11 (360 m2) Romeo received the title to Lot 25-L under his name. in the event the latter came back from abroad.[20] Natividad admitted that Romeo and the latter‟s wife were occupying Lot 3 -B at that time and that she did not tell the latter about the sale she had made to Maximino. while Lot 3 was sold to him for P7. But. Q-39018) which had been brought against him by Maximino. the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in CA-GR CV No. Natividad . 3-B. it was only Natividad who bought the six properties because she was the only one financially able to do so. She could not get an original copy of the said title because the records of the Registrar of Deeds had been destroyed by fire. Natividad accused Romeo of filing this case to harass her after Romeo lost in the action for recovery of possession (Civil Case No. Natividad‟s share. Natividad said that she had the title to Lot 3 but it somehow got lost. the money realized from the sale was given to Natividad.00 by his parents on July 4.e. Jr. She alleged that their parents had sold these properties to their children instead of merely giving the same to them in order to impose on them the value of hardwork. . 10. 11. they never really paid any amount for the supposed sale.e. 3-B. received Lots 6 and 7 through a Deed of Sale dated August 16.[18] Romeo denied stealing Lot 3 from his sister but instead claimed that the title to said lot was given to him by Natividad in 1981 after their father died. Romeo also testified that Lot 3-B was bought for him by his father.

000. the trial court rendered a decision. the defendant Natividad shall hold the rest OF THE PROPERTIES COVERED BY THE DEED OF SALE DATED JANUARY 29. filed a motion for reconsideration.000 as and for attorney‟s fees. The Register of Deeds of Quezon City is directed to annotate this judgment on Transfer Certificate of Titles Nos. “LIKEWISE. “The Register of Deeds of Quezon City is directed to annotate this judgment on Transfer Certificates of Title No. THE SAID REGISTER OF DEEDS IS DIRECTED TO CANCEL TCT NO. judgment is hereby rendered declaring the nullity of the Deed of Sale dated January 29. Except as to Lots 3. judgment is hereby rendered declaring the nullity of the Deeds of Sale dated January 29. All other claims by one party against the other are dismissed. The defendants are hereby directed to pay to the plaintiff jointly and severally the sum of P30.[21] Natividad and Maximino. 1970 and July 31. the dispositive portion of which states: WHEREFORE. the third-party complaint is dismissed. Jr. Nazareno. 140946 IN THE NAME OF MAXIMINO NAZARENO SR. the third-party plaintiff is directed to pay the third-party defendant‟s attorney‟s fees ofP20.”[22] . Likewise. the defendant Natividad shall hold the rest in trust for Jose Nazareno to whom the same had been adjudicated. 162735 and 162736 as a lien in the titles of Natividad P. the plaintiff‟s Partial Motion for Reconsideration is hereby granted. “Except as to Lots 3. As a result. SO ORDERED. Likewise. 3-B. The defendants‟ counterclaim is dismissed. 293701 (formerly 162705) OVER LOT 3-B AND RESTORE TCT NO. 1970. 13 and 14 which had passed on to third person. 1992 the trial court modified its decision as follows: WHEREFORE. 1992 is hereby amended. on October 14. 13 and 14 which had passed on to third persons.On August 10. The judgment dated August 10. 1970 (LOTS 10 and 11) in trust for Jose Nazareno to whom the same had been adjudicated. AND AUREA POBLETE. 162735 and 162736 as a lien on the titles of Natividad P. 1992. Nazareno. 1982. such that the first paragraph of its dispositive portion is correspondingly modified to read as follows: “WHEREFORE.

140946 (covering Lot 3-B). 118886 (covering Lot 11). 1970 (EXH. 1) EXECUTED BY THE DECEASED SPOUSES MAXIMINO A. Except as to Lots 13 and 14 ownership of which has passed on to third persons. 2. NAZARENO CAN DESTROY THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT ACCORDED TO NOTARIZED DOCUMENTS LIKE THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE DATED JANUARY 29. Hence this petition. Sr. it is hereby declared that Lots 3. WHETHER OR NOT THE UNCORROBORATED TESTIMONY OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT ROMEO P. 1970 (EXH.On appeal to the Court of Appeals. AND AUREA POBLETE IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER NATIVIDAD P. ALL OF WHICH ARE NOTARIZED. 3. the appeal is GRANTED. NAZARENO. NAZARENO. B) THE EXECUTION OF AN EXTRA-JUDICIAL PARTITION WITH WAIVER OF RIGHTS AND CONFIRMATION OF SALE DATED MAY 24. as well as to Lots 10 and 11 were cancelled and ordered restored to the estate of Maximino Nazareno. the decision of the trial court was modified in the sense that titles to Lot 3 (in the name of Romeo Nazareno) and Lot 3-B (in the name of Maximino Nazareno.). TCT No. 1998 reads: WHEREFORE. NAZARENO. 1) IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOLLOWING: A) THE DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE. Jr. 14A) OF THE ESTATE OF AUREA POBLETE BY THE DECEASED MAXIMINO A. 2. . 10 and 11 shall form part of the estate of the deceased Maximino Nazareno. The decision and the order in question are modified as follows: 1. SR. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT GROSSLY MISAPPRECIATED THE FACTS OF THE CASE WITH RESPECT TO THE VALIDITY OF THE SAID DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE DATED JANUARY 29. and TCT No. Sr. TCT No. 118885 (covering Lot 10). 1999. The dispositive portion of the decision dated May 29. SR. HALF OF WHICH WOULD HAVE BECOME A PART OF AUREA POBLETE‟S ESTATE UPON HER DEMISE.. The Deed of Absolute Sale dated 29 January 1970 and the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 31 July 1982 are hereby declared null and void. 3-B. 1975 (EXH. AND THEIR CHILDREN INVOLVING THE ONLY REMAINING ESTATE OF AUREA POBLETE THUS IMPLIEDLY ADMITTING THE VALIDITY OF PREVIOUS DISPOSITIONS MADE BY SAID DECEASED SPOUSES ON THEIR CONJUGAL PROPERTIES. 132019 (covering Lot 3).[23] Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in a resolution dated May 27. The Register of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby ordered to restore TCT No. EXECUTED BY THE DECEASED SPOUSES DURING THEIR LIFETIME INVOLVING SOME OF THEIR CONJUGAL PROPERTIES. Petitioners raise the following issues: 1.

PROC. THE ESTATE OF MAXIMINO A. 1995 WHICH WAS APPROVED BY THE INTESTATE COURT IN SP. SR. [25] The lone testimony of a . NC-28 AND EXECUTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE LATTER COURT‟S FINAL ORDER DATED JULY 9. WHETHER OR NOT THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE DATED JANUARY 29. NAZARENO THUS BELYING THE CLAIM OF ROMEO P. 5. 1992 AND AN ANNEX APPEARING IN HIS ANSWER TO THE COMPLAINT IN CIVIL CASE NO.C) THE ADMISSION MADE BY MAXIMINO A. 1970 IS ONE AMONG THE DOCUMENTS EXECUTED BY THE DECEASED SPOUSES TO BE WITHOUT CONSIDERATION. NAZARENO. the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and carry even more weight when these coincide with the factual findings of the trial court. AND AUREA POBLETE DURING THEIR LIFETIME INVOLVING THEIR CONJUGAL PROPERTIES IS AN INDIVISIBLE CONTRACT? AND IF SO WHETHER OR NOT UPON THEIR DEATH. NAZARENO PURSUANT TO THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE EXECUTED IN THE LATTER‟S FAVOR ON JANUARY 29. WHETHER OR NOT THE SALE OF LOT 3 UNDER THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE DATED JANUARY 29. SR. 81B) THAT HE HAD SOLD CERTAIN PROPERTIES IN FAVOR OF NATIVIDAD P. ALONE CAN SEEK THE ANNULMENT OF SAID SALE? 4. This Court will not weigh the evidence all over again unless there is a showing that the findings of the lower court are totally devoid of support or are clearly erroneous so as to constitute serious abuse of discretion. E) THE PARTIAL PROJECT OF PARTITION DATED MAY 24. WHETHER OR NOT AS A CONSEQUENCE. IN HIS TESTIMONY IN OPEN COURT ON AUGUST 13. 81. TCT NO. NAZARENO HIMSELF CONTAINED IN A FINAL DECISION OF THE RESPONDENT COURT IN CA-GR CV NO. D) THE ADMISSIONS MADE BY ROMEO P. NAZARENO. To begin with. Q-39018 (EXH. NO. ROMEO NAZARENO ADMITTED THAT HE DID NOT PAY THE CONSIDERATION STATED IN THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE DATED JULY 4. NAZARENO. First. SR. M-2). 1991 DETERMINING WHICH WERE THE REMAINING PROPERTIES OF THE ESTATE. 3. 1970 EXECUTED BY THE DECEASED SPOUSES MAXIMINO A. 1970 BY THE DECEASED SPOUSES.[24] We find the petition to be without merit. 277968 (EXH. NAZARENO THAT THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE DATED JANUARY 29. 1969 EXECUTED BY THE DECEASED SPOUSES IN HIS FAVOR (EXH. IS VALID CONSIDERING THAT AS PER THE ORDER OF THE LOWER COURT DATED NOVEMBER 21. ONE OF THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION THAT THE SAID PROPERTY IS OWNED BY PETITIONER NATIVIDAD P. 12932 DATED AUGUST 31. NAZARENO. Petitioners argue that the lone testimony of Romeo is insufficient to overcome the presumption of validity accorded to a notarized document. NC-712 (EXH. 11-B) INVOLVING LOT 3B. 1970 IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER NATIVIDAD P. NAZARENO. NAZARENO. 1980 DURING HIS LIFETIME IN CIVIL CASE NO. M) SHOULD BE CANCELLED AND DECLARED NULL AND VOID AND A NEW ONE ISSUED IN FAVOR OF NATIVIDAD P. 1990. THE TITLE ISSUED IN THE NAME OF ROMEO P.

When her parents died. has not progressed beyond mere speculation. have no reason to overturn the findings by the two courts giving credence to his testimony. there must be evidence that is clear. Sr. intended to have any binding legal effect upon the parties thereto. Natividad P. Revised Rules on Evidence). the Court of Appeals upheld the right of Maximino. Nazareno. the testimony of Romeo that no consideration was ever paid for the sale of the six lots to Natividad was found to be credible both by the trial court and by the Court of Appeals and it has not been successfully rebutted by petitioners. Nazareno had long been the exclusive owner of the property in question. As held in Suntay v. convincing and more than merely preponderant (Yturralde vs. her mother Aurea Poblete-Nazareno in 1970 and her father Maximino A. Court of Appeals. We. in a letter of demand to vacate addressed to their tenants (Exhibits “P”. 162738 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. CV No. admitted that the house and lot . 12932. Natividad P. Nazareno acquired the property in dispute by purchase in 1970. 19 and 23. Nazareno included the same property in an inventory of the properties of the deceased Maximino A. She was issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. to contradict the same. Nazareno. Nazareno. Petitioners make capital of the fact that in C. Court of Appeals:[26] Though the notarization of the deed of sale in question vests in its favor the presumption of regularity. therefore. There was no way therefore that the aforesaid property could belong to the estate of the spouses Maximino Nazareno. “P-1” and “P-2”) in said apartment. and Aurea Poblete. which was declared final by this Court in G. Being themselves the owner of a ten-unit apartment building along Stanford St. being a public document (Rule 132. Aganon. In this case. in the first place. No. Cubao Quezon City. Sr. His barefaced allegation on the point not only is without any corroboration but is even belied by documentary evidence. in 1980. The deed of absolute sale (Exhibit “B”). The fact that the deed of sale was notarized is not a guarantee of the validity of its contents. 194 SCRA 308). Jr. 107684.R. if credible.R. to recover possession of Lot 3-B. The mere fact that Romeo P. Secs. Favor vs.witness.A. The intention of the parties still and always is the primary consideration in determining the true nature of a contract. In that case. is entitled to great weight. defendants-appellants.Defendants-appellants‟ own conduct disproves their claim of co-ownership over the property in question. Appellant Romeo P. will not adversely affect the ownership of the said realty. to be divided upon their demise to all the compulsory heirs. Second. the Court of Appeals held: As shown in the preceding disquisition. Nazareno‟s suspicion that his parents had entrusted all their assets under the care and in the name of Natividad P. Sr. is sufficient. their eldest living sister who was still single.-G. 28 SCRA 407.. it is not the intention nor the function of the notary public to validate and make binding an instrument never.

as defendants. Third. is whether these sales were made for a consideration. The fact that other properties had allegedly been sold by the spouses Maximino. over Lot 3-B binds Romeo and Eliza only.. Jr. The question. What is more. All these convince the Court that Natividad had no means to pay for all the lots she purportedly purchased from her parents. 162738 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City in the name of Natividad Nazareno (Exhibit “O” and submarkings. Indeed. 1970 should also be deemed valid. The parties in that case were Maximino. Sr. and Aurea does not necessarily show that the Deed of Sale made on January 29. 1970 is valid. as defendants. Among the documents submitted to support their application for a building permit was a copy of TCT No. and not Lot 3-B. this third-party complaint concerned Lot 3. and the spouses Romeo and Eliza. Sr.[27] To be sure.. Natividad‟s title was clearly not an issue in the first case. however. 4-5).. As already stated. The trial court and the Court of Appeals found that the Nazareno spouses transferred their properties to their children by fictitious sales in order to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes. the parties in the present case for annulment of sale are the estate of Maximino. 1985. that case was for recovery of possession based on ownership of Lot 3B. and Aurea during their lifetime. If the first case resolved anything. as plaintiff. Sr.located at No. when they applied for a permit to repair the subject property in 1977. Petitioners allege that. The estate of a deceased person is a juridical entity that has a personality of its own. the judgment in CA-GR CV No. which also has a right to recover properties which were wrongfully disposed. it was found both by the trial court and by the Court of Appeals that Natividad had no means to pay for the six lots subject of the Deed of Sale. pp. the latter has a separate and distinct personality from the former. Romeo and Eliza were named third-party defendants after a third-party complaint was filed by Natividad and Maximino.[28] Though Romeo represented at one time the estate of Maximino. Sr. 979 Aurora Blvd. and Natividad and Maximino. This is a non-sequitur. over Lot 3-B alone. Hence. Also. Jr. Nazareno. 12932 regarding the ownership of Maximino. as plaintiff. they stated that the property belonged to and was registered in the name of Natividad P. however. Jr. Sr. the title to the other five lots subject of the present deed of sale was not in issue in that case. as shown by several deeds of sale executed by Maximino. the intention to dispose of their real properties is clear. Jr. Quezon City where they were residing did not belong to them. Romeo does not dispute that their parents had executed deeds of sale.. In othe r words. Jr. it was the ownership of Maximino. tsn March 15. Romeo‟s admission that he did not pay for the transfer to him of lots 3 and 25-L despite the considerations stated in . Furthermore. they argue that the Deed of Sale of January 29.. On the other hand.. and not the estate of Maximino.Consequently.

[29] In affirming this ruling. the present suit must fail. p. can not cause its annulment while its validity is sustained by the estate of Aurea Poblete.e. Sr.. Records. and Aurea as vendors while defendant-appellant Natividad signed as witness. 1970 supposedly conveyed the six lots to Natividad. Sr. without including the estate of Aurea Poblete. Anyway. He even truthfully admitted that the sale of Lot 3 to him on 04 July 1969 (Deed of Absolute Sale. Court of Appeals (251 SCRA 430 [1995]). i. otherwise the value of what is transferred is diminished. when she is admittedly the closest to her parents and the one staying with them and managing their affairs? It just seems without reason. it being indivisible. The indivisibility refers to the prestation and not to the object thereof. The obligation is clearly indivisible because the performance of the contract cannot be done in parts. The question is. alone can not contest the validity of the Deed of Sale because the estate of Aurea has not yet been . it can not be annulled by only one of them.[30] Fourth. II. Per the testimony of Romeo. the Deed of Sale of January 29. The estate of Maximino A. It appears that it was the practice in the Nazareno family to make simulated transfers of ownership of real properties to their children in order to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes. with consideration for the sale to her. Vol. why should Natividad be treated any differently. 1970 is an indivisible contract founded on an indivisible obligation. the Court is convinced that the questioned Deed of Sale dated January 29. the Supreme Court held that badges of simulation make a deed of sale null and void since parties thereto enter into a transaction to which they did not intend to be legally bound. Nazareno. And since this suit was filed only by the estate of Maximino A. the Court of Appeals said: Facts and circumstances indicate badges of a simulated sale which make the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 29 January 1970 void and of no effect. “A” or “1”) is simulated for lack of consideration. This document was signed by the spouses Max. he acquired Lot 25-L from his parents through a fictitious or simulated sale wherein no consideration was paid by him. 1970 (Exh. As such. Nazareno. In the case of Suntay vs. if petitioners‟ only point is that the estate of Maximino. 453) likewise had no consideration. and therefore ineffective and void.[32] In the present case. whatever may be the nature of the thing which is the object thereof.the deed of sale is a declaration against interest and must ring with resounding truth. Petitioners argue further: The Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 29. Sr.[31] An obligation is indivisible when it cannot be validly performed in parts. Sr. Petitioners are therefore mistaken in basing the indivisibility of a contract on the number of obligors. In any case.

The rule is settled that “every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go behind the certificate to determine the condition of the property. the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. and in the account of the partition. Natividad never acquired ownership over the property because the Deed of Sale in her favor is also void for being without consideration and title to Lot 3 cannot be issued in her name. As Romeo admitted. it cannot be denied that Maximino. SO ORDERED. Sr. intended to give the six Quezon City lots to Natividad. in order that it may be computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir.settled. [33] A void contract is inexistent from the beginning. alone contests the validity of the sale. must bring into the mass of the estate any property or right which he may have received from the decedent. 1061 which states: Every compulsory heir. we find that this has been passed upon by the trial court and the Court of Appeals. Nonetheless. during the lifetime of the latter. Therefore. the sale was void for having been simulated. she intended to convey Lots 10 and 11 to Jose in the event the latter returned from abroad. As she herself admitted. Art. . 1449 of the Civil Code states: There is also an implied trust when a donation is made to a person but it appears that although the legal estate is transmitted to the donee. 1979[35] will have to be upheld for Ros-Alva Marketing is an innocent purchaser for value which relied on the title of Natividad. As held by the trial court. or any other gratuitous title. the sale of Lots 13 and 14 to Ros-Alva Marketing. on April 20. even if the estate of Maximino. Fifth. There being an implied trust. the lots in question are therefore subject to collation in accordance with Art. Corp. As to the third-party complaint concerning Lot 3. their parents executed the Deed of Sale in favor of Natividad because the latter was the only “female and the only unmarried member of the family. the argument would nonetheless be without merit. by way of donation. he nevertheless is either to have no beneficial interest or only a part thereof. There was thus an implied trust constituted in her favor. The validity of the contract can be questioned by anyone affected by it. the outcome of the suit will bind the estate of Aurea as if no sale took place at all. who succeeds with other compulsory heirs.”[36] WHEREFORE. Hence. no consideration was paid by him to his parents for the Deed of Sale.”[34] She was thus entrusted with the real properties in behalf of her siblings. As Romeo testified. Sr.

the instant petition is GRANTED and the challenged decision as well as the subsequent orders of the respondent court are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. for the reasons hereinabove set forth and discussed. thus. LUGOD. 1970 is DECLARED valid and binding upon herein parties. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads: [1] [2] [3] [4] “WHEREFORE. 1992 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. EVELYN LUGOD-RANISES and ROBERTO S. ALFREDO T. 44-M and 1022 are deemed CLOSED and TERMINATED. the proper remedy to correct orders of a probate court nullifying certain deeds of sale and. LUGOD. respondents. ARTURO S. SANCHEZ and MYRNA T. J. 1992 is made PERMANENT. petitioners. vs. 28761 which annulled the decision of the trial court and which declared the compromise agreement among the parties valid and binding even without the said trial court‟s approval. effectively passing upon title to the properties subject of such deeds? Is a compromise agreement partitioning inherited properties valid even without the approval of the trial court hearing the intestate estate of the deceased owner? The Case These questions are answered by this Court as it resolves the petition for review on certiorari before us assailing the November 23.: Is a petition for certiorari. FLORIDA MIERLY SANCHEZ. SP No. DECISION PANGANIBAN. 1969 as modified by the memorandum of agreement of April 13. ROSALIA S. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on October 14. LUGOD.” [5] The Antecedent Facts . SO ORDERED. The compromise agreement dated October 30. in lieu of appeal. And Special Proceedings No. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS.R.ROLANDO SANCHEZ. SANCHEZ.

On September 30. Lugod are the legitimate children of [herein private respondent] Rosalia. On January 14. to deliver deficiency of 24 hectares and or to set aside compromise agreement (Annex „E‟. Petition). a petition for letters of administration over the estate of her mother and the estate of her father. Sanchez. 1022) over the intestate estate of Juan C. 1968. thru counsel. or nine years later. Under date of April 13. [herein private respondent] Rosalia. Juan C. [herein petitioners] filed a motion to require administratrix. who was at the time in state of senility (Annex „B‟. are the illegitimate children of Juan C. [Herein petitioners] Rolando. submitted an inventory and appraisal of the real and personal estate of her late mother (Annex „C‟. Evelyn L. Alfredo and Myrna. Petition) wherein they agreed to divide the properties enumerated therein of the late Juan C. [herein petitioners] as heirs of Juan C. 1969. Petition) On October 25. Lugod is the only child of spouses Juan C. On November 3. all surnamed Sanchez. Sanchez. however. Maria Villafranca. Petition). [herein private respondent] Rosalia filed on January 22. Juan C. 1970. [6] On October 30. Florida Mierly. (herein private respondent) Rosalia and [herein petitioners] entered into and executed a memorandum of agreement which modified the compromise agreement (Annex „F‟. on September 29. 1979. [herein private respondent] Rosalia and [herein petitioners] assisted by their respective counsels executed a compromise agreement (Annex „D‟. died on October 21. which petition was opposed by (herein private respondent) Rosalia. thru counsel. On January 19. filed a petition for letters of administration (Special Proceedings No. Petition). 1968. 1969. as administratrix of the intestate estate of her mother. [herein petitioners] filed. Sanchez. Sanchez. petitioner Rosalia was appointed by [the trial court]. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca while [herein private respondents] Arturo S. 1968. Ranises and Roberto S. 1970. Following the death of her mother. [herein private respondent] Rosalia‟s father. Before the administration proceedings in Special Proceedings No. 44-M could formally be terminated and closed. a motion to require [herein private respondent] Rosalia to submit a . Lugod. 1969. [herein private respondent] Rosalia. Sanchez. 1967.The facts are narrated by the Court of Appeals as follows: “[Herein private respondent] Rosalia S. Sanchez. and took her oath as the administratrix of her father‟s intestate estate.

Annex „G‟ and „H‟ (Annex „I‟. Sanchez shall be inherited by his only legitimate daughter. premises considered. Sanchez. 1022 consists of all his capital properties. They likewise filed a motion to defer the approval of the compromise agreement (Annex „H‟. the [trial] court issued an order directing [herein private respondent] Rosalia to submit a new inventory of properties under her administration and an accounting of the fruits thereof. the [trial court].That one-half (1/2) of the entire intestate estate of Juan C. Sanchez under Special Proceedings No. The parties were subsequently ordered to submit their respective position papers. 1980 (Annex „K‟. judgment is hereby rendered as follows by declaring and ordering: 1.44-M consists of all her paraphernal properties and one-half (1/2) of the conjugal properties which must be divided equally between Rosalia Sanchez de Lugod and Juan C. Petition). counsel for [herein petitioners] moved to withdraw his appearance and the two motions he filed. this time presided by Judge Vivencio A. 1980.That the entire intestate estate of Juan C. On September 14. Petition) to which [herein private respondent] Rosalia filed an opposition (Annex‟M‟. Ibid). Petition). thru new counsel. former counsel of (herein petitioners) entered his re-appearance as counsel for (herein petitioners). promulgated its decision on June 26. On May 12. Ibid). 1980. 3. Galon.That the entire intestate estate of Maria Villafranca Sanchez under Special Proceedings No. 1991. On February 4. Rosalia V. filed a motion to change administratrix (Annex „L‟. Sanchez de Lugod while the other one-half . 1980. which prompted [herein private respondent] Rosalia to file a rejoinder on March 31. which they did (Annexes „N‟ and „O‟. 2.new inventory and to render an accounting over properties not included in the compromise agreement (Annex „G‟. one-half (1/2) from the conjugal partnership of gains and one-half (1/2) of the intestate estate of Maria Villafranca under Special Proceedings No. the dispositive portion of which states: „WHEREFORE. however. [herein petitioners]. 44-M. Petition). On the bases of memoranda submitted by the parties. in which they prayed for the annulment of the compromise agreement on the ground of fraud. Petition). On February 28. 1989.

between and among the six (6) illegitimate children. 1963 and June 26. de Lugod is hereby ordered to submit two (2) separate certified true and correct accounting. (the trial court) hereby orders Rosalia Sanchez Vda.000. namely: Patricia Alburo. the Register of Deeds and Assessors of the Provinces and Cities where the properties of Juan C. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca are located. as exemplary damages.000.For failure to render an accounting report and failure to give cash advances to the illegitimate children of Juan C.That within thirty (30) days from receipt of this decision. should appeal be made. Maria Ramuso Sanchez. Sanchez. Lugod. Sanchez from October 21. Florida Mierly T. 1968 up to the finality of this decision. Lugod. which adversely prejudiced their social standing and pursuit of college education. Evelyn S. are all ordered to register and . Lugod on July 26. Sanchez. 4. Sanchez. 1967 are all declared simulated and fictitious and must be subject to collation and partition among all heirs. de Lugod to pay her six (6) illegitimate brothers and sisters the sum of Five Hundred Thousand (P500.Upon release of this decision and during its pendency. Administratrix Rosalia Sanchez Vda.00) Pesos for attorney‟s fees. Rolando Pedro T. with the task to prepare the project of partition and deliver to all heirs their respective shares within ninety (90) days from the finality of said decision. Sanchez.00) Pesos. If she fails to do so within the said thirty (30) days. one -half (1/2) of the net income of the estate of Juan C.That within thirty (30) days from finality of this decision. 8. Lugod and Roberto S. Sanchez under Special Proceedings No. Sanchez under Special Proceedings No.That all the Deed (sic) of Absolute Sales executed by Juan C. who are all entitled to honorarium and per diems and other necessary expenses chargeable to the estate to be paid by Administratrix Rosalia S. 7. and another for the properties of the entire intestate estate of Juan C. 44-M. Arturo S. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca in favor of Rosalia Sanchez Lugod. Sanchez during their minority and hour of need from the net income of the estate of Juan C. 1022 duly both signed by her and both verified by a Certified Public Accountant and distribute and deliver to her six (6) illegitimate brothers and sisters in equal shares. 1022 and distribute and deliver to all heirs their corresponding shares. and also the sum of One Hundred Fifty Thousand (P150. Alfredo T. appointing the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer (CENRO) of Gingoog City as members thereof. Sanchez and Myrna T. 5. one for the income of all the properties of the entire intestate estate of Maria Villafranca under Special Proceedings No.(1/2) shall be inherited and be divided equally by. 6. then a Board of Commissioners is hereby constituted. Rosalia Sanchez Lugod is hereby ordered to prepare a project of partition of the intestate estate of Juan C.

annotate in the title and/or tax declarations. Petition). that the decision at issue had become final and executory. On June 26. Petition). 1991. 1991 (Annex „P‟. among other things.‟ [Herein private respondent] Rosalia filed a motion for reconsideration dated July 17. 1991. 1991. Petition). On September 3. Petition) declaring. On August 13. [the trial court] issued an Omnibus Order (Annex „S‟. Petition). II The [trial court] has arbitrarily faulted [herein private respondent] Rosalia S. private respondents elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via a petition for certiorari and contended: “I The [trial court] has no authority to disturb the compromise agreement. 1991. [Herein private respondent] Rosalia then filed a motion for reconsideration of said Omnibus Order (Annex „T‟. Petition) on August 6. the dispositive portion of this decision for the protection of all heirs and all those who may be concerned. Said [herein private respondent] was allowed to file a memorandum in support of her motion (Annex „V‟. Lugod when [the trial court] decided to annul the deed of sale between the said [herein private respondents] and Juan C. Sanchez without affording them their day in court. [the trial court] issued and Order denying petitioner Rosalia‟s motion for reconsideration (Annex „W‟. [herein petitioners] filed a motion for execution and opposition to [herein private respondent] Rosalia‟s motion for reconsideration (Annex „Q‟. SO ORDERED. Lugod for alleged failure to render an accounting which was impossible. IV . Lugod. Ranises and Roberto S.”[7] Thereafter. Evelyn L. III The [trial court] acted without jurisdiction in derogation of the constitutional rights of [herein private respondents] Arturo S.

born out of wedlock on March 17. That the deceased Juan C. out of whose wedlock Rosalia Sanchez Lugod. 2. Oppositor herein. born out of wedlock on May 9. Lugod‟s right to appeal. the parties in the above-entitled case. this Court hereby reproduces verbatim the compr omise agreement of the parties: [9] “COMPROMISE AGREEMENT COME NOW. (3) (a) Rolando Pedro Sanchez. 1949. left illegitimate children. That the said deceased Juan C. thus making her the sole and only surviving legitimate heir of her deceased parents. Misamis Oriental. IntervenorsOppositors and Petitioners. (2) Maria Ramoso Sanchez. (1) Patricio Alburo. agree to the following: 1. born on May 19. born on February 16. and.” [8] For clarity‟s sake. Philippines. to Alberta Ramoso. for mutual valuable considerations and in the spirit of good will and fair play. V [The trial court] grossly misinterpreted [herein private respondent] Rosalia S. 1968 was legally married to Maria Villafranca de Sanchez. 1967. Sanchez who died intestate on October 21. Sanchez. born on July 21. motivated by their mutual desire to preserve and maintain harmonious relations between and among themselves. now. to Emilia Alburo. (c) Alfredo Sanchez. (b) Florida Mierly Sanchez. 1937 at Gingoog. respectively. who predeceased her on September 29. herein namely. Gingoog City.and . 1926 at Cebu City. 1947. was born. 1950. for the purpose of this Compromise Agreement.[The trial court judge] defied without rhyme or reason well-established and entrenched jurisprudence when he determined facts sans any evidence thereon.

1080.(d) Myrna Sanchez. SANCHEZ AND MARIA VILLAFRANCA DE SANCHEZ (1) Agricultural Land. Covered by Tax Decl. ms. to wit: I. 06449. containing an area of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVENTY TWO (183. Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Lot Nos. Lot No. Lumanao. located at Murallon. SEPARATE CAPITAL OF JUAN C. Cad. 1952. DESCRIPTION AND AREA ASSESSED VALUE (1) Agricultural Land. Lot No.900. Philippines. Lot No. That the deceased Juan C. 2742. 2746. South by Lot Nos. Lanao. more or less. 2748. 954. 3. 1057 & 1056. West by Lot No. 2745. ms. C-7 located at Agay-ayan. 1038. Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Lot Nos. West by Lot Nos. 06447. SANCHEZ NATURE. Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Lot No. 1035. 3271 C-7 located at Panyangan. 1040. 2319.600) sq. No.580. Lot No. South by Lot No. 1039. Covered by Tax Decl. CONJUGAL PROPERTY OF JUAN C. No. Covered by Tax. East by Panyangan River & F. 2739. 06449. P11. 1089. 06458. No. located at Murallon.0 0 (2) Agricultural Land. 2900 & 3462. 2741. 1036. South by Lot No. containing an area of FOURTEEN THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED (14. 2744. all born out of wedlock to Laureta Tampus in Gingoog City. Decl. 1033. Gingoog City and bounded on the . P1.00 (3) Agricultural Land. and West by Samay Creek. more or less.00 II. Cad. 1042 & 1043.690. East by Lot No. ms. 1037. 3270. 1087 & 1084. P21. 672) sq. 1041 C-2.700) sq. born on June 16. Case 2. No. more or less. Cad. East by Lot Nos. and Part of Lot 3272. containing an area of ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED (104. Covered by Tax Decl. Cad. 1061 & 2319. Sanchez left the following properties. 1088.

and West by Lot No. Lunao. P61. South by Lot No.North by Lot No. Lunao. Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Lot Nos. 3272. and West by Lot No. ms. 1061. more or less. Cad. East by Lot Nos. 1044. Covered by Tax Decl. Case 7 located at Agayayan.00 . Covered by Tax Decl.880.370. being claimed by Damian Querubin.225) sq. C-7 Part 4 located at Panyangan. containing an area of FIFTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED (55. Lot No. located at Sunog. ms. 06457. South by Victoriano Barbac. 1041. 3273. 3270. ms. 3269 & 3273.600) sq. Lot No. (4) Agricultural Land. East by Panyangan River. No. Lunao. contaning an area of THIRTY FOUR THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED (34. being claimed by Miguel Tuto. more or less. P380. East by Panyangan River. South by Hinopolan Creek. Covered by Tax Decl.00 (7) Agricultural Land. Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Lot No. Lot No. containing an area of FOUR HUNDRED EIGHT THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED (483.600) sq. No. 3269. ms. P2. No. and West by Lot Nos. South by Panyangan River. contaning an area of SIX THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVENTY SIX (6. South by Lot Nos. P3. 3271 & 3272. 06453. 3272. more or less. 12000. ms.680. Cad. Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Agayayan River. 3270 & 3271.00 (6) Agricultural Land. Cad. 3270 & 3273. Covered by Tax Decl. and West by Samay Creek.676) sq. No. 06452. 2806. Cad. Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Samay Creek & Lot 3267. C-7 Part 2 located at Panyangan. more or less. containing an area of THREE THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE (3. Lot No.300) sq. 3270 Case 7. East by Isabelo Ramoso. more or less.00 (5) Agricultural Land. East by Lot No. and West by Restituto Baol.

South by Road-Lot 613 Condeza St. Covered by Tax Decl. Covered by Tax Decl.. 12926. containing an area of EIGHTEEN THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY EIGHT (18. Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Lot No. 6. 5554. and West by Lot No. ms. 1207. 1207. No. containing an area of ONE THOUSAND FORTY TWO (1. 1206 C-1 located at Cahulogan. and West by Lot No. block 2. ms. and West by Lot No.00 (10) Agricultural Land. Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Tinaytayan Creek & Lot Nos. more or less. Lot No. ms. 12925. by Lot No. Cad. South by Lot No. Pigsalojan. Lot No. more or less. located at Tinaytayan. Lot No. 3487. 5355.776) sq. 06484. Pigsalohan. Covered by Tax Decl.320. 5557 & 5558. East by Lot No..00 (12) A Commercial Land. block 2. Lot No. 3496. 1209. ms.. Covered by Tax Decl. 4. block 2. No. 5559 & 5558. West by Road-Lot 614-Guno St. Lot No. P740. 63.. Block 2. No. containing an area of FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED THIRTEEN (4. East by Lot No. 5555.240. 8. 3491 & 3496. Covered by Tax Decl. P9. 06454. Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Lot Nos.00 . 5555 C-7 located at Tinaytayan. located at Cabuyoan. East by Cr. 3486. Cad. 12924.042) sq. 5554. containing an area of SEVENTY SEVEN THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED SEVENTY SIX (77. & Lot No. East by National Highway. by Lot No.(8) Agricultural Land.513) sq. more or less. 3488. containing an area of FOUR HUNDRED (400) sq. No.00 (11) A Commercial Land. 3486. South by Lot Nos. P320.350. more or less. East by Lot Nos. SW. No. 61-C-1 located at Guno-Condeza Sts. South by Lot No. more or less.00 (9) Agricultural Land. Cad. Cad. West by Subdivision Road. 5. P1. and 62.528) sq. Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Lot 64. Gingoog City and bounded on the NW. P12. ms.

Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Lot No. Inc. 5158.00 per P5. containing an area of TWO HUNDRED SIXTEEN (216) sq. considering not only their respective areas but also the improvements existing thereon. South by SE-Steep Bank. Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Lot No. Lot No. Lot No. 5158. P1. 7-A-18Road. 7-A-16-0. East by Lot No. 5157-C-7. 3270 Case 7. Sanchez. Covered by Tax. containing an area of NINETY SIX THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED (96. Cad. 06789. That.00 share 2. LOCATION APPRAISAL Fifty (50) shares of stock Rural Bank of Gingoog.00 4. Block No.050. Maria Ramoso Sanchez.00 (14) Agricultural Land. No.(13) A Commercial Land.00 III. Florida Mierly Sanchez. South by Lot No. Agayayan. 15798. 7-16-0. Sanchez.200) sq. to wit: (a) To Patricio Alburo. Four (4) shares of Preferred Stock with San Miguel Corporation 400. the parties hereto have agreed to divide the above-enumerated properties in the following manner. PSU-120704-Julito Arengo vs. Covered by Tax Decl. Gingoog City and bounded on the North by Samay Creek & Lot 3267.370. 7A-16-0 located at Cabuyoan. Sanchez and Myrna T. 5156. at P100. 06453. No. Covered by Tax Decl. West by Lot No. Roland Pedro T. Villafranca. located at Sunog. East by NW. South by Lot . Cad. in equal pro-indiviso shares. PERSONAL ESTATE (CONJUGAL) NATURE AND DESCRIPTION 1. ms.000. more or less. 5159. P3. to wit: Agricultural Land. located at Kiogat. ms. Alfredo T. Lunao. No. Restituto Baol. by Lot No. Decl. more or less. 8.

which two shares she is ceding in favor of Patricio Alburo. Florida Mierly Sanchez. Lot No. Sanchez and his deceased wife Maria Villafranca Sanchez to the Lugod Enterprises. both real and personal. and Cad. share and participation which they have or might have in all the properties. Alfredo and Myrna.94) and NINETY-FOUR CENTAVOS. (b) To Rosalia Sanchez Lugod all the rest of the properties.00. all their rights and interests.680. in the sum ofP43. Block 2 together with the improvements thereon and identified as parcel No. 30217. That the parties hereto likewise acknowledge and recognize in the indebtedness of the deceased Juan G. and assessed in the sum of P61. jointly and individually.533. and West by Samay Creek.Nos. 1968 the aggregate sum of EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED THIRTY-THREE PESOS (P8. enumerated above with the exception of the following: (1) Two Preferred Shares of Stock in the San Miguel Corporation. in equal pro-indiviso shares.99. Florida Mierly. II-13 in the above enumerated. That Rolando Pedro. II-12. 3269 & 3273. all surnamed Sanchez. (2) 5. in a manner that is absolute and irrevocable. which is identified as parcel No. lot covered by Tax Decl. That Patricio Alburo. 15798 identified as Parcel No.064. Inc.600) sq.. ms. The house and lot designated as Lot No. East by Lot Nos. relinquish and renounce. 6. Roland Pedro Sanchez. containing an area of FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED (483. and/or which might . both real and personal. 8. II-14 of the above-enumeration of properties. Alfredo and Myrna. Alfredo Sanchez and Myrna Sanchez hereby waive. 7. Lugod is likewise ceding and renouncing in favor of Rolando Pedro. indicated in San Miguel Corporation Stock Certificate No. or in excess of the areas listed or mentioned herein. Maria Ramoso Sanchez. 3271 and 3272. which said Rosalia S. 5. all surnamed Sanchez hereby acknowledge to have received jointly and severally in form of advances after October 21. Florida Mierly. 5157-C-7 together with the improvements thereon. known or unknown and/or which may not be listed herein. That the parties hereto shall be responsible for the payment of the estate and inheritance taxes proportionate to the value of their respective shares as may be determined by the Bureau of Internal Revenue and shall likewise be responsible for the expenses of survey and segregation of their respective shares. No.

the administrations of said parcel of land shall be vested jointly with Laureta Tampos. That the expenses of this litigation including attorney‟s fees shall be borne respectively by the parties hereto. guardian ad litem of petitioners and Maria Ramoso. and that she likewise waives. all surnamed Sanchez. share. That Rosalia S. Inc. 12. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca de Sanchez. the parties hereto mutually waive and renounce in favor of each other any whatever claims or actions. Rosalia S. and Myrna all surnamed Sanchez. connected with. transferred. and Myrna. Lugod without any bond. and particularly of the properties. Rosalia S. the parties hereto agree to have letters of administration issued in favor of Rosalia S. or donated to any person or persons or entity and which parties hereto do hereby confirm and ratify together with all the improvements thereon. of the sum of P51. Lugod likewise agrees to deliver possession and enjoyment of the parcel of land herein ceded to petitioners and intervenors immediately after the signing of this agreement and that the latter also mutually agree among themselves to have the said lot subdivided and partitioned immediately in accordance with the proportion of one sixth (1/6) part for every petitioner and intervenor and that in the meantime that the partition and subdivision is not yet effected. real and personal listed herein. as well as demandable obligations due to the deceased spouses Juan C. Sanchez. Lugod. Alfredo. Sanchez or Maria Villafranca de Sanchez or both. or both. Lugod. That Laureta Tampus for herself and guardian ad-litem of her minor children. Lugod shall assume as she hereby assumes the payment to Lugod Enterprises. Lugod.93 representing the indebtedness of the estate of Juan C. namely: Florida Mierly. to give effect to this Agreement. mentioned in paragraphs 5 and 6 hereof and. That. That. as well as all the produce and proceeds thereof.have been. 44-M and 1022 of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental. arising from. before and after the death of the aforementioned spouses Juan C. 11. one of the intervenors who shall see to it that each . and which either one or both might have sold. and as a result of Special Proceedings Nos. renounces. Sanchez and/or Maria Villafranca de Sanchez. ceded. hereby declare that she has no right.. Mierly. interest. warranting that the parcel of land ceded to the other parties herein contains 48 hectares and 36 acres. share and participation whatsoever in the estate left by Juan C. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca de Sanchez and the advances made to Rolando Pedro. 10.598. in favor of oppositor Rosalia S. at one time or another. participation or interest therein which she has or might have in favor of Rosalia S. Alfredo. 9. registered or placed in the name of either of the spouses Juan C. and relinquishes whatever rigid. owned by.

LUGOD Oppositor ASSISTED BY: (Sgd. SANCHEZ Petitioner (Sgd. FERNANDEZ Gingoog City PABLO S. October 30.) FLORIDA MIERLY T.petitioner and intervenor is given one sixth (1/6) of the net proceeds of all agricultural harvest made thereon. REYES R-101-Navarro Bldg. all surnamed Sanchez ASSISTED BY: TEOGENES VELEZ. Misamis Oriental.) ROLANDO PEDRO T.) ASSISTED BY: (Sgd. it is most respectfully prayed that the foregoing compromise agreement be approved.) MYRNA T. Medina.) ROSALIA S. SANCHEZ Petitioner (Sgd.) ALFREDO T. (Sgd. Velez St. 1969. Counsel for Petitioners .) MARIA RAMOSO SANCHEZ Intervenor-Oppositor (Sgd. and Myrna. SANCHEZ Petitioner (Sgd. WHEREFORE.) LAURETA TAMPUS For herself and as Guardian Ad-Litem of the minors Florida Mierly.) PATRICIO ALBURO Intervenor-Oppositor (Sgd. Alfredo. Cagayan de Oro City (Sgd. SANCHEZ Petitioner (Sgd. Don A. JR.) REYNALDO L.

respectively. on a motion for reconsideration and a supplemental motion for reconsideration dated September 14. as earlier stated. Acting. [10] [11] [12] In due course. (Sgd. REYES FERNANDEZ” (Sgd. 1992. Mis. 30. this appeal to this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The Memorandum of Agreement dated April 13.) PABLO S. (It will be reproduced later in our discussion of the second issue raised by the petitioners. which the parties entered into with the assistance of their counsel. 1992. Greetings: Please set the foregoing compromise agreement for the approval of the Honorable Court today. in a Resolution dated September 4. Or. 1992 and September 25. 1970.) The Court of Appeals.Cagayan de Oro City The Clerk of Court Court of First Instance Branch III. initially dismissed private respondents‟ petition. amended the above compromise.) TEOGENES VELEZ. (Sgd.) REYNALDO L. Hence. The Issues In this appeal. setting aside the trial court‟s decision and declaring the modified compromise agreement valid and binding. Oct. Medina. however. JR. the Court of Appeals. rendered its assailed Decision granting the petition. petitioners invite the Court‟s attention to the following issues: “I The respondent court grossly erred in granting the petition for certiorari under Rule 65 considering that the special civil action of certiorari may not be . Respondent Court thereafter reinstated private respondents‟ petition in a resolution dated October 14. 1992. 1969.

as the court construed the same to be. hence. and (3) the . executed by the parties on October 30. private respondents herein.availed of as a substitute for an appeal and that. Lugod to deliver the deficiency of eight (8) hectares due petitioners under the compromise agreement and memorandum of agreement. and in not further directing her to include in the inventory properties conveyed under the deeds of sale found by the lower court to be part of the estate of Juan C. they are hereby consolidated into three main issues specifically dealing with the following subjects: (1) the propriety of certiorari as a remedy before the Court of Appeals. V The respondent court grossly erred in declaring the termination of the intestate proceedings even as the lower court had not made a final and enforceable distribution of the estate of the deceased Juan C. in any event. VI Prescinding from the foregoing. II Prescinding from the foregoing. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca just before their death in favor of their daughter and grandchildren. the respondent court erred in annulling the decision of the lower court for the reason that a compromise agreement or partition. IV In any event. III The respondent court grossly erred in ignoring and disregarding findings of facts of the lower court that the alleged conveyances of real properties made by the spouses Juan C. the respondent court grossly erred in treating the lower court‟s declaration of fictitiousness of the deeds of sale as a final adjudication of annulment. hence. the grounds invoked in the petition are merely alleged errors of judgment which can no longer be done in view of the fact that the decision of the lower court had long become final and executory. are tainted with fraud or made in contemplation of death. the respondent court grossly erred in not at least directing respondent Rosalia S. collationable. Sanchez. (2) the validity of the compromise agreement. Sanchez.” [13] The salient aspects of some issues are closely intertwined. 1969 was void and unenforceable the same not having been approved by the intestate court and that the same having been seasonably repudiated by petitioners on the ground of fraud.

. 29. 21. Mar. L23600. Jun 30. This Court disagrees. L-27860 and 27896. 1968). alleged errors of the trial court which. Cf. Zulueta. Inc.. Campos. et al. as where 33 appeals were involved from orders issued in a single proceeding which will inevitably result in a proliferation of more appeals ( PCIB vs. 1982). Sept. et al. petitioners allege that the Court of Appeals erred in allowing private respondent‟s recourse to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. [16] [17] .” Even in a case where the remedy of appeal was lost. First Issue: Propriety of Certiorari Before the Court of Appeals Since private respondents had neglected or failed to file an ordinary appeal within the reglementary period. 1974). May 31. 1975). Nov. Sarmiento. there could be no remedy (People vs. 1970. 78 Phil.. 1961 and the cases cited therein). in case of acquittal. et al. (3) for certain special consideration. -16598. Tan. 28. as public welfare or public policy (See Jose vs. They contend that private respondents‟ invocation of certiorari was “procedurally defective. being merely errors of judgment and not errors of jurisdiction.. in their petition before the Court of Appeals.presence of fraud in the execution of the compromise and/or collation of the properties sold. the court rejects rebuttal evidence for the prosecution as. L-29077. et al. et al. Pajarillo. were not correctable by certiorari. (4) where in criminal actions. vs. [14] [15] Doctrinally entrenched is the general rule that certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal.: “(1) where the appeal does not constitute a speedy and adequate remedy (Salvadades vs.” They further argue that private respondents. However. L-38280. Escolin. Abalos. Bautista. (5) where the order is a patent nullity (Marcelo vs. L-45137. viz. 77). et al. Regalado lists several exceptions to this rule.. De Guzman. (2) where the orders were also issued either in excess of or without jurisdiction (Aguilar vs. et al. L029039. Justice Florenz D. the Court has issued the writ of certiorari where the lower court patently acted in excess of or outside its jurisdiction. as in the present case. Peter Memorial Park. and (6) where the decision in the certiorari case will avoid future litigations (St. vs. The Court’s Ruling The petition is not meritorious. June 29. 231985). Mar.

Rosalia Sanchez Lugod. we are convinced that all these requirements were met. Evelyn S. namely. and grandchildren. it clearly overstepped its jurisdiction as a probate court. the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it rendered its decision in disregard of the parties‟ compromise agreement. Lugod. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. Lugod. the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve with finality. on July 26. speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.” is tantamount to “an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation and within the bounds of law. board or officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca executed in favor of their daughter. This pronouncement no doubt applies with equal force to an intestate proceeding as in the case at bar.” [22] [23] [24] . In doing so. 1963 and June 26. and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so. Citing Article 1409 (2) of the Civil Code. (2) such tribunal. If there is not dispute. Lugod and Roberto S. the administrator. due to its limited jurisdiction. Jurisprudence teaches: [19] [20] “[A] probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties. it could resolve questions of title only provisionally. 1967. or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Juan C.A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is appropriate and allowable when the following requisites concur: (1) the writ is directed against a tribunal. but if there is. It is hornbook doctrine that “in a special proceeding for the probate of a will. Arturo S.” In the instant case. then the parties. the trial court was exercising judicial functions when it issued its assailed resolution. [18] As a probate court. the trial court rendered a decision declaring as simulated and fictitious all the deeds of absolute sale which. After a thorough review of the case at bar. The trial court ruled further that the properties covered by the said sales must be subject to collation. board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. well and good. Such disregard. on the ground that the compromise agreement “was not approved by the court. and (3) there is no appeal or any plain. the lower court nullified said deeds of sale and determined with finality the ownership of the properties subject thereof. The said court had jurisdiction to act in the intestate proceedings involved in this case with the caveat that.” [21] Furthermore.

199 SCRA 381). Since the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction.The foregoing issues clearly involve not only the correctness of the trial court‟s decision but also the latter‟s jurisdiction. which may thus be challenged or attacked at any time. judicial approval is . “A void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. Here. [herein private respondent] Rosalia‟s resort to the instant p etition [for review on certiorari] is all the more warranted under the circumstances. as a probate court. it has no jurisdiction to do. Hence. speedy and sufficient (Echauz vs. Indeed. We deem ordinary appeal is inadequate. which.” [27] [28] We thus hold that the questioned decision and resolutions of the trial court may be challenged through a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. not merely errors of judgment. They encompass plain errors of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion. or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head. Considering further the [trial court‟s] granting of [herein petitioners‟] motion for execution of the assailed decision. the following disquisition by respondent appellate court is apt: “As a general proposition. it can never become final and any writ of execution based on it is void. appeal is the proper remedy of petitioner Rosalia here under Rule 109 of the Revised Rules of Court. this case is a clear exception to the general rule that certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal because the trial court‟s decision and resolutions were issued without or in excess of jurisdiction.” [25] [26] Consistent with the foregoing. a petition for certiorari is certainly a proper remedy. „x x x it may be said to be a lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight.‟ ” [29] Second Issue: Validity of Compromise Agreement Petitioners contend that. 1969 and declared null and void the deeds of sale with finality. It cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of any obligation. Court of Appeals. All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. But the availability of the ordinary course of appeal does not constitute sufficient ground to [prevent] a party from making use of the extraordinary remedy of certiorari where appeal is not an adequate remedy or equally beneficial. At the very least. because the compromise agreement was executed during the pendency of the probate proceedings. considering that the respondent court has disregarded the compromise agreement which has long been executed as early as October. it is well-settled that “(a)n act done by a probate court in excess of its jurisdiction may be corrected by certiorari.

de Ugarte. Cortes. through Justice Irene R. said agreement was executed only after the fourth draft.) And from that moment not only does it become binding upon the parties (De los Reyes v.” (Italics found in the original. where the Court. 23 SCRA 762 [May 27. 23 Phil. 132 Phil. with all the parties ably striving to protect their respective interests and to come out with the best they could. by making reciprocal concessions. To be valid. 34 [1946]. [30] These contentions lack merit. 76 SCRA 361). David. Article 2028 of the Civil Code defines a compromise agreement as “a contract whereby the parties. 1969.” Being a consensual contract. Cloribel. L-27070-71 [April 22. 599 [1912]. the same was raised in Mayuga vs. They add that Petitioners Florida Mierly. Since this compromise agreement was the result of a long drawn out process. A compromise is a consensual contract. see also De los Reyes v. 1969. 1977]. Judicial approval is not required for its perfection. they should be bound thereby. De Guilas v. in fact. 75 Phil. followed. 2037). it is perfected upon the meeting of the minds of the parties to the contract. Vda. ruled: [31] [32] “It is alleged that the lack of judicial approval is fatal to the compromise. Adequately assisted by their respective counsels. De la Rosa. which was finally signed by the parties on October 30. it is perfected upon the meeting of the minds of the parties. the first and second drafts were prepared successively in July. Alfredo and Myrna were all minors represented only by their mother/natural guardian. 241. Accordingly. supra ). De Ugarte. Petitioners‟ argument that the compromise was not valid for lack of judicial approval is not novel.) In the case before us. [33] [34] [35] Indeed. and the fourth draft. They stress that the probate court had jurisdiction over the properties covered by said agreement. it also has upon them the effect and authority of res judicata (Civil Code. the third draft on September 25. Article 2029 of the Civil Code [36] . avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced. As such. 1968]. Laureta Tampus. even if not judicially approved (Meneses v.necessary to shroud it with validity. 77 Phil. there can be no doubt that the parties entered into it freely and voluntarily. it is merely required under the law to be based on real claims and actually agreed upon in good faith by the parties thereto. L-24280. Art. As noted by the trial court itself. Barcelon. Court of Appeals. (Hernandez v. compromise is a form of amicable settlement that is not only allowed but also encouraged in civil cases. they each negotiated its terms and provisions for four months. 1969. 505 [1945]. Cochingyan v. it is ineludible that the parties knowingly and freely entered into a valid compromise agreement.

Alfredo and Myrna. we observe that although denominated a compromise agreement. the latter are represented by their judicial guardian or legal representatives. petitioners neither raised nor ventilated this issue in the trial court. the 27-page Memorandum dated February 17. Section 1. (2) the decedent left no debts. We find that all the foregoing requisites are present in this case. Rule 74 of the Rules of Court.” In opposing the validity and enforcement of the compromise agreement. pursuant to Article 1082 of the Civil Code which provides that “[e]very act which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition. or any other transaction. [38] In any event. how much then is the rightful share of the four (4) recognized illegitimate children?”[39] Furthermore. In their comment before the Court of Appeals. although it should purport to be a sale. or if there were debts left. This new question or matter was manifestly beyond the pale of the issues or questions submitted and threshed out before the lower court which are reproduced below. We therefore affirm the validity of the parties‟ compromise agreement/partition in this case. [37] However. Citing Article 2032 of the Civil Code.mandates that a “court shall endeavor to persuade the litigants in a civil case to agree upon some fair compromise. and (4) the partition was made by means of a public instrument or affidavit duly filed with the Register of Deeds. the document in this case is essentially a deed of partition. petitioners harp on the minority of Florida Mierly. petitioners based their objection to said compromise agreement [40] [41] . a compromise. all had been paid. 1990 filed by petitioners before the Regional Trial Court readily reveals that they never questioned the validity of the compromise.” For a partition to be valid. requires the concurrence of the following conditions: (1) the decedent left no will. an exchange. (3) the heirs and liquidators are all of age. or if they are minors. viz.: “I Are the properties which are the object of the sale by the deceased spouses to their grandchildren collationable? II Are the properties which are the object of the sale by the deceased spouses to their legitimate daughter also collationable? III The first and second issues being resolved. they contend that the court‟s approval is necessary in compromises entered into by guardians and parents in behalf of their wards or children.

” [42] [43] [44] [45] [46] The petitioners likewise assail as void the provision on waiver contained in No. Lugod‟s alleged fraudulent acts.” zeroing specifically on the alleged fraud committed by private respondent Rosalia S. Article 777 of the Civil Code provides that “(t)he rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent.” Hence. Questions raised on appeal must be within the issues framed by the parties and. issues not raised in the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. because it allegedly constitutes a relinquishment by petitioners of “a right to properties which were not known. the parties agreed in the compromise to confirm and ratify said transfers. The assailed waiver pertained to their hereditary right to properties belonging to the decedent‟s estate which were not included in the inventory of the estate‟s properties.their hereditary right which was already vested in them by reason of the death of their father. The waiver is valid because. attended the actual execution of the compromise agreement. petitioners contend that Private Respondent Rosalia T. 8 of the aforequoted compromise. public policy. there is no legal obstacle to an heir‟s waiver of his/her hereditary share “even if the actual extent of such share is not determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate. for to do so would plainly violate the basic rule of fair play. The Court disagrees. specifically her concealment of some of the decedent‟s properties. This argument is debunked by the absence of any substantial and convincing evidence on record showing fraud on her part.on the solitary “reason that it was tainted with fraud and deception. It also covered their right to other properties originally belonging to the spouses Juan Sanchez and Maria Villafranca de Sanchez which have been transferred to other persons. In addition. The issue of minority was first raised only in petitioners‟ Motion for Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals‟ Decision. for the first time on appeal. As aptly observed by the appellate court: [50] “[Herein petitioners] accuse [herein private respondent] Rosalia of fraud or deception by alleging. this Court cannot now. justice and due process. the parties waived a known and existing interest -. that the parcel of land given to them never . inter alia. entertain this issue. thus. consequently. [47] [48] [49] Finally. contrary to petitioners‟ protestation.” Hence. such waiver is consistent with the intent and letter of the law advocating compromise as a vehicle for the settlement of civil disputes.” At any rate. it “is as if it was never duly raised in that court at all.” They argue that such waiver is contrary to law. morals or good custom. We take this opportunity to reiterate and emphasize the well-settled rule that “(a)n issue raised for the first time on appeal and not raised timely in the proceedings in the lower court is barred by estoppel. Lugod.

Supplemental Reply). And when [herein petitioners] discovered that the land allotted to them actually contained only 24 hectares.e. then why did they agree to the memorandum of agreement whereby their share in the estate of their father was even reduced to just 36 hectares? Where is fraud or deception there? Considering that [herein petitioners] were ably represented by their lawyers in executing these documents and who presumably had explained to them the import and consequences thereof. 1969 so as to include the following: .” [51] The memorandum of agreement freely and validly entered into by the parties on April 13. a conference between the parties took place which led to the execution and signing of the memorandum of agreement wherein [herein petitioners‟] distributive share w as even reduced to 36 hectares. forty-eight (48) hectares. We find this argument unconvincing and unmeritorious. i. [Herein petitioners‟] averment of fraud on the part of [herein private respondent] Rosalia becomes untenable when We consider the memorandum of agreement they later executed with [herein private respondent] Rosalia wherein said compromise agreement was modified by correcting the actual area given to [herein petitioners] from forty-eight (48) hectares to thirty-six (36) hectares only. Note that Tax Declaration No. this circumstance is not enough proof of fraud or deception on [herein private respondent] Rosalia‟s part. 06453 plainly discloses that the land transferred to [herein petitioners] pursuant to the compromise agreement contained an area of 48 hectares (Annex „A‟. happened to be different in area to the stated area of 48 hectares in the compromise agreement. If the actual area allotted to them did not conform to the 48 hectare area stated in the compromise agreement. the allegation of fraud and deception cannot be successfully imputed to [herein private respondent] Rosalia who must be presumed to have acted in good faith. To amend the compromise agreement executed by them on October 30. In the absence of convincing and clear evidence to the contrary. If the parcel of land given to [herein petitioners]. 1970 and referred to above reads: “MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT The parties assisted by their respective counsel have agreed as they hereby agree: 1. it is hard to believe their charge that they were defrauded and deceived by [herein private respondent] Rosalia.conformed to the stated area. when actually surveyed. as stated in the compromise agreement..

a. That the said 36-hectare area shall be taken from that parcel of land which is now covered by O.) TEOGENES VELEZ. 1970. all surnamed Sanchez Assisted by: (Sgd. Mierly. then the additional area shall be taken from what is designated as Lot B.) LAURETA TAMPOS For herself and as Guardian ad-litem of Rolando. The subdivision survey shall be at the expense of the said petitioners and intervenors prorata. Counsel for Petitioners . Zalles pursuant to the Court‟s commission of March 10. (Sgd. April 13. Correction of the actual area being given to the petitioners and intervenors. c. forty-eight (48) hectares. d. That the administratrix agrees to deliver temporary administration of the area designated as Lot 5 of the Valles Sketch Plan pending final survey of the said 36hectare area.C. thus enabling each of them to get six (6) hectares each. that if the said 36-hectare area could not be found after adding thereto the areas of said lots A and C. 146 (Patent No. all illegitimate children of the late Juan C. Jr. That the partition among the six illegitimate children of the late Juan C. thirty-six (36) acres as embodied in the aforementioned compromise agreement to thirty-six (36) hectares only. Sanchez. however. Cagayan de Oro City. Sanchez (petitioners and intervenors) shall be effective among themselves in such a manner to be agreed upon by them. likewise also reflected in the said sketch plan attached to the records. 1970 provided. each undertaking to assume redemption of whatever plants found in their respective shares which need redemption from the tenants thereof as well as the continuity of the tenancy agreements now existing and covering the said shares or areas. No. Alfredo and Myrna. 30012) and the adjoining areas thereof designated as Lot A and Lot C as reflected on the sketch plan attached to the record of this case prepared by Geodetic Engineer Olegario E.T. e. b.

including the then minors. Bolstering this conclusion is the fact that petitioners questioned the compromise only nine years after its execution. Moreover. While we may sympathize with this rueful sentiment of petitioners. REYES Counsel for Administratrix (Sgd. This Court has consistently ruled that “a party to a compromise cannot ask for a rescission after it has enjoyed its benefits. In hindsight. Barber Steamship Lines. 1979. 488) because courts have no power to relieve parties from obligations voluntarily assumed. by its very nature as a perfected contract. simply because [53] [54] [55] [56] [57] . foolish.” By their acts.) PABLO S.(Sgd. or disastrous contract. entered into with all the required formalities and with full awareness of what he was doing” and “a compromise entered into and carried out in good faith will not be discarded even if there was a mistake of law or fact. It is also significant that all the parties. it is not at all farfetched that petitioners filed said motion for the sole reason that they may have felt shortchanged in their compromise agreement or partition with private respondents.) MARIA RABOSO SANCHEZ Intervenor” [52] Not only did the parties knowingly enter into a valid compromise agreement. is binding on the parties. had already consummated and availed themselves of the benefits of their compromise. courts have no jurisdiction to look into the wisdom of a compromise or to render a decision different therefrom. which in their view was unwise and unfair. they even amended it when they realized some errors in the original. the parties are ineludibly estopped from questioning the validity of their compromise agreement. dated October 26. we can only stress that this alone is not sufficient to nullify or disregard the legal effects of said compromise which. 45 Phil. It is a well-entrenched doctrine that “the law does not relieve a party from the effects of an unwise.) ROSALIA S. when they filed with the trial court their Motion to Defer Approval of Compromise Agreement. Such correction emphasizes the voluntariness of said deed. LUGOD Administratrix Assisted by: (Sgd. (McCarthy vs.

(Herein petitioners) also retained a house and lot. This order for the distribution of the estate‟s residue must contain the names and shares of the persons entitled thereto. the compromise of the parties. who also absorbed or charged against her share the advances of Rolando T. and expenses of administration.93 was shouldered by Private Respondent Rosalia.94 were received by (herein petitioners) after October 21. [58] be disastrous deals or unwise Corollarily. 44-M and 1022 “CLOSED and TERMINATED. A perusal of the whole record. it is undoubtedly stated therein that cash advances in the aggregate sum of P8. 20988. the allowance to the widow. 5)” [62] All the foregoing show clearly that the probate court had essentially finished said intestate proceedings which. reveals that all the foregoing requirements already concurred in this case. 1968 (Compromise Agreement. Supplemental Reply) in the respective names of (herein petitioners). the Court sees no reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals. in the compromise agreement per se. funeral charges. which shares had also been delivered. Ibid. . a residential lot and a parcel of agricultural land (Annexes „I‟.” Volenti non fit injuria. 20986. we agree with the following discussion of the Court of Appeals: [59] [60] [61] “But what the (trial court) obviously overlooked in its appreciation of the facts of this case are the uncontroverted facts that (herein petitioners) have been in possession and ownership of their respective distributive shares as early as October 30. the petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion in deeming Special Proceedings Nos. On this point. an order for the distribution of the estate may be made when the “debts. Moreover.their contracts turned out to investments. In view of the above discussion. if any. 20985.” arguing that there was as yet no order of distribution of the estate pursuant to Rule 90 of the Rules of Court. 20989 and 20990 (Annexes „B‟ to „H‟. 20984. which is the law between them.94. par.” had been paid. particularly the trial court‟s conclusion. Under Section 1. should be deemed closed and terminated. 1969 and they have received other properties in addition to their distributive shares in consideration of the compromise agreement which they now assail. consequently. Furthermore. 20987. and inheritance tax. Lugod in the sum of P8.598.533. all for the year 1972. already contains the names and shares of the heirs to the residual estate.533. Proofs thereof are Tax Declarations No. We disagree. Rule 90 of the Rules of Court. The payment of the indebtedness of the estates of Juan C. They add that they had not received their full share thereto.) all of which were not considered in the compromise agreement between the parties. in compliance with Article 1061 of the Civil Code on collation. Sanchez and Maria Villafranca in the amount of P51. „J‟ and „K‟.

whether testimonial or otherwise. It must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.” Hence. and not by mere conjectures or speculations.” However. nor was there “a trial on the merits of the parties‟ conflicting claims. petitioners‟ allegations of fraud in the execution of the questioned deeds of sale are bereft of substance. In the trial court. the petitioners “moved for the deferment of the compromise agreement on the basis of alleged fraudulent concealment of properties -. and subsequently admitted by the probate court below”. Lugod to deliver to them the deficiency as allegedly provided under the compromise agreement. Lugod to install her as administratix of the estate of Maria Villafranca. has not been overcome. these were contracts of sale perfected by the decedents during their lifetime. there was only one hearing conducted. collation mandated under Article 1061 of the Civil Code contemplates properties conveyed inter vivos by the decedent to an heir by way of donation or other gratuitous title. Geodetic Engineer Idulsa did not comply with the court‟s subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum. [66] [67] Similarly. There was no other evidence. formally offered to. We stress that these deeds of sale did not involve gratuitous transfers of future inheritance. Hence. The legal presumption of validity of the questioned deeds of absolute sale. and it was held only for the reception of the evidence of Rosalia S. being duly notarized public documents. there is no hard evidence on record to back up petitioners‟ claims. “to bring records of his relocation survey. On the other hand.NOT because of any deficiency in the land conveyed to them under the agreements. Neither did he furnish the required relocation survey. the trial court noted Private Respondent Rosalia‟s willingness to reimburse any deficiency actually proven to exist. fraud is not presumed. in view of the palpable absence of evidence to support them.Third Issue: Fraud and Collation Petitioners fault Respondent Court for not ordering Private Respondent Rosalia T. No wonder. the properties conveyed thereby are not collationable because. We see no such error. this Court cannot find any evidence to support petitioners‟ allegations of fraud against Private Respondent Rosalia. “received. even after a thorough scrutiny of the records. [68] [69] .” In fact. It subsequently ordered the geodetic engineer who prepared the certification and the sketch of the lot in question. [63] [64] [65] In any case. essentially. and who could have provided evidence for the petitioners. They further contend that said court erred in not directing the provisional inclusion of the alleged deficiency in the inventory for purposes of collating the properties subject of the questioned deeds of sale.

which affirmed the Orders dated July 21. J. 1997. Case No. SP No. private respondent-minors Karen Oanes Wei and Kamille Oanes Wei. 20033 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. His known heirs are his surviving spouse Shirley Guy and children. Presiding Judge. concealment of properties and fraud in the deeds of sale are factual in nature which. HON. 20002 and July 17. petitioner. (Chairman). Rufino Guy Susim). son of the decedent. these alleged errors and deficiencies regarding the delivery of shares provided in the compromise. George and Michael. who died intestate in Makati City on October 29. No. the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. The case was docketed as Sp. COURT OF APPEALS. JR. Cristina. 4549 and entitled Intestate Estate of Sima Wei (a. 79742. Private respondents alleged that they are the duly acknowledged illegitimate children of Sima Wei.In any event.R. KAREN DANES WEI and KAMILLE DANES WEI. all surnamed Guy. Melo and Francisco. Branch 138. leaving an estate valued at P10. they have not persuaded us that said Court committed any reversible error to warrant a grant of their petition. DECISION YNARES-SANTIAGO. JJ. SIXTO MARELLA. 4549 denying petitioner's motion to dismiss.k. GUY. we find that the Court of Appeals has sufficiently addressed the issues raised by them.000. respondents. Narvasa. 1992. Indeed. Makati City and minors. Proc. petitioner Michael C. RTC. and its May 25. They likewise prayed that... C. are not reviewable by this Court in petitions under Rule 45. 2004 Resolution4 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Guy. Emy. Branch 138. vs. Romero. be . SO ORDERED. represented by their mother Remedios Oanes (Remedios). The facts are as follows: On June 13. as a rule. MICHAEL C. in the meantime. Private respondents prayed for the appointment of a regular administrator for the orderly settlement of Sima Wei's estate. filed a petition for letters of administration5 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. represented by their mother.00 consisting of real and personal properties. 2004 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.a. [70] WHEREFORE. HON. Jeanne. REMEDIOS OANES. Petitioners have failed to convince us that this case constitutes an exception to such rule.000. All in all. concur.: This petition for review on certiorari assails the January 22.J. Branch 138 in SP Proc.

Consequently.k. In a Manifestation/Motion as Supplement to the Joint Motion to Dismiss. 2003 are hereby both AFFIRMED. the dispositive portion of which states: WHEREFORE. He asserted that his deceased father left no debts and that his estate can be settled without securing letters of administration pursuant to Section 1. the trial court also rejected petitioner's objections on the certification against forum shopping. Sedfrey A. Private respondents contend that their counsel's certification can be considered substantial compliance with the rules on certification of non-forum shopping. Rufino Guy Susim. They contended that Remedios should have executed the certification on behalf of her minor daughters as mandated by Section 5. In his Comment/Opposition. He filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals which affirmed the orders of the Regional Trial Court in its assailed Decision dated January 22. .9 petitioner and his co-heirs alleged that private respondents' claim had been paid. waived. and that private respondents do not have the legal personality to institute the petition for letters of administration as they failed to prove their filiation during the lifetime of Sima Wei in accordance with Article 175 of the Family Code. 1993 Release and Waiver of Claim stating that in exchange for the financial and educational assistance received from petitioner. premises considered. Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. that the Release and Waiver of Claim executed by Remedios released and discharged the Guy family and the estate of Sima Wei from any claims or liabilities. Remedios and her minor children discharge the estate of Sima Wei from any and all liabilities. Thus. It ruled that while the Release and Waiver of Claim was signed by Remedios. 2000 and July 17. this petition. 2004. abandoned or otherwise extinguished by reason of Remedios' June 7. for lack of merit. the assailed Orders dated July 21. SO ORDERED.a. Attached to private respondents' petition was a Certification Against Forum Shopping6 signed by their counsel. it had not been established that she was the duly constituted guardian of her minor daughters. Rule 7 of the Rules of Court. The Regional Trial Court denied the Joint Motion to Dismiss as well as the Supplemental Motion to Dismiss. Ordoñez. the present petition is hereby DENIED DUE COURSE and accordingly DISMISSED.10 The Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. He further argued that private respondents should have established their status as illegitimate children during the lifetime of Sima Wei pursuant to Article 175 of the Family Code. The other heirs of Sima Wei filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss8 on the ground that the certification against forum shopping should have been signed by private respondents and not their counsel. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied.appointed as Special Administrator of the estate. Applying a liberal application of the rules.7 petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the petition. Atty. hence. and that the petition raises no new issues to warrant the reversal of the decisions of the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals. Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals disregarded existing rules on certification against forum shopping. Respondent Judge is hereby DIRECTED to resolve the controversy over the illegitimate filiation of the private respondents (sic) minors [-] Karen Oanes Wei and Kamille Oanes Wei who are claiming successional rights in the intestate estate of the deceased Sima Wei. no renunciation of right occurred. a.

such waiver will not bar the latter's claim."15 Considering that the document did not specifically mention private respondents' hereditary share in the estate of Sima Wei. InSy Chin v. this procedural lapse may be overlooked in the interest of substantial justice. we find that there was no waiver of hereditary rights. it cannot be construed as a waiver of successional rights. even assuming that Remedios truly waived the hereditary rights of private respondents. This is because repudiation amounts to an alienation of property16 which must pass the court's scrutiny in order to protect the interest of the ward. and 3) whether private respondents are barred by prescription from proving their filiation. the Release and Waiver of Claim in the instant case is void and will not bar private respondents from asserting their rights as heirs of the deceased. a waiver must be couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a party to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. The Release and Waiver of Claim does not state with clarity the purpose of its execution. Any inheritance left to minors or incapacitated persons may be accepted by their parents or guardians. Moreover. Article 1044 of the Civil Code. Failure to comply with the requirement shall be cause for dismissal of the case. Court of Appeals. provides: ART. to those mentioned in Article 1030.00 and an educational plan for her minor daughters "by way of financial assistance and in full settlement of any and all claims of whatsoever nature and kind x x x against the estate of the late Rufino Guy Susim. The right to accept an inheritance left to the poor shall belong to the persons designated by the testator to determine the beneficiaries and distribute the property. 2) whether the Release and Waiver of Claim precludes private respondents from claiming their successional rights. or in their default. To be valid and effective. The petition lacks merit. A waiver may not be attributed to a person when its terms do not explicitly and clearly evince an intent to abandon a right. .12 So it is in the present controversy where the merits13 of the case and the absence of an intention to violate the rules with impunity should be considered as compelling reasons to temper the strict application of the rules. Rule 7. It merely states that Remedios received P300. As regards Remedios' Release and Waiver of Claim.11 we ruled that while a petition may have been flawed where the certificate of non-forum shopping was signed only by counsel and not by the party. 1044. a liberal application of the rules is proper where the higher interest of justice would be served.14 In this case.The issues for resolution are: 1) whether private respondents' petition should be dismissed for failure to comply with the rules on certification of non-forum shopping. Parents or guardians may repudiate the inheritance left to their wards only by judicial authorization. However. Section 5 of the Rules of Court provides that the certification of non-forum shopping should be executed by the plaintiff or the principal party. (Emphasis supplied) Parents and guardians may not therefore repudiate the inheritance of their wards without judicial approval. the same does not bar private respondents from claiming successional rights. Not having been judicially authorized.000. Any person having the free disposal of his property may accept or repudiate an inheritance.

It would thus be inconsistent to rule that they waived their hereditary rights when petitioner claims that they do not have such right. except in the following cases: (1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child.17 In the present case. petitioner's invocation of waiver on the part of private respondents must fail. 285. Before the Family Code took effect. which superseded Article 285 of the Civil Code. the governing law on actions for recognition of illegitimate children was Article 285 of the Civil Code. Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver. in which case the latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority. private respondents could not have possibly waived their successional rights because they are yet to prove their status as acknowledged illegitimate children of the deceased. (2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which nothing had been heard and in which either or both parents recognize the child. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment. it must be emphasized that waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. Articles 172. Alejo18 that illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the Family Code took effect and whose putative parent died during their minority are given the right to seek recognition for a period of up to four years from attaining majority age. Anent the issue on private respondents' filiation. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents.19 On the other hand. Hence.Furthermore. or (2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned. This vested right was not impaired or taken away by the passage of the Family Code. 172. the action must be commenced within four years from the finding of the document. 173 and 175 of the Family Code. Petitioner himself has consistently denied that private respondents are his co-heirs. and waiver cannot be established by a consent given under a mistake or misapprehension of fact. (Emphasis supplied) We ruled in Bernabe v. we agree with the Court of Appeals that a ruling on the same would be premature considering that private respondents have yet to present evidence. provide: ART. Where one lacks knowledge of a right. In the absence of the foregoing evidence. to wit: ART. the legitimate filiation shall be proved by: (1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child. In this case. . or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest.

in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. or .20 That the two causes of action. except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172. though not heretofore explicitly formulated by this court. Tiamson vs. 5. Such matters may be resolved only by the Regional Trial Court after a full-blown trial. Certainly. there is no absolute necessity requiring that the action to compel acknowledgment should have been instituted and prosecuted to a successful conclusion prior to the action in which that same plaintiff seeks additional relief in the character of heir.. provided always that the conditions justifying the joinder of the two distinct causes of action are present in the particular case. evidence as legitimate children. While the original action filed by private respondents was a petition for letters of administration.ART. we have held in numerous cases. the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action. when filiation of an illegitimate child is established by a record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment. Thus. the trial court is not precluded from receiving evidence on private respondents' filiation. is undoubtedly to some extent supported by our prior decisions. including the determination of the status of each heir. Its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers in handling the settlement of the estate. The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or both of the parties. In these cases.. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. it may only be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent. 32 Phil. the action for recognition may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime. 62). Tiamson. Briz:22 The question whether a person in the position of the present plaintiff can in any event maintain a complex action to compel recognition as a natural child and at the same time to obtain ulterior relief in the character of heir. that a natural child having a right to compel acknowledgment. 8 Phil. ART. but who has not been in fact acknowledged. 175. However. It is clear therefore that the resolution of the issue of prescription depends on the type of evidence to be adduced by private respondents in proving their filiation. is one which in the opinion of this court must be answered in the affirmative. or an admission of filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned. Under the Family Code. may be joined in one complaint is not new in our jurisprudence. Siguiong. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same. there is nothing so peculiar to the action to compel acknowledgment as to require that a rule should be here applied different from that generally applicable in other cases. This Court is not a trier of facts. if the action is based upon open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child. may maintain partition proceedings for the division of the inheritance against his coheirs (Siguiong vs. In other words. or any other means allowed by the rules or special laws. x x x The conclusion above stated. one to compel recognition and the other to claim inheritance. and the doctrine must be considered well settled. 173. However. it would be impossible to determine the same in this case as there has been no reception of evidence yet. and the same person may intervene in proceedings for the distribution of the estate of his deceased natural father.21 As held in Briz v. The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173.

SO ORDERED.J.J. Austria-Martinez. Let the records be REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. Panganiban. J. WHEREFORE. 8 Phil. 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. C. Callejo. Sr.. 42 Phil. SP No. 13 Phil. Abaya. Chico-Nazario... 855). are AFFIRMED. 79742 affirming the denial of petitioner's motion to dismiss..mother (Capistrano vs. . In neither of these situations has it been thought necessary for the plaintiff to show a prior decree compelling acknowledgment. the instant petition is DENIED. Fabella. The obvious reason is that in partition suits and distribution proceedings the other persons who might take by inheritance are before the court. 249. Chairperson.. and the declaration of heirship is appropriate to such proceedings. Branch 138 for further proceedings. and its Resolution dated May 25. Ramirez vs. The Decision dated January 22. Gmur. 2004 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.R. concur.. Conde vs. 135.

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