Dionysius

Di onysi us the Areopagi te: On the Di vi ne Names
and the Mysti cal Theol ogy.

Author(s): Rolt, Clarence Edwin
Publisher: Grand Rapids, MI: Christian Classics Ethereal Library
Description: On the Divine Names and Mystical Theology are two of the
greatest works of Dionysius the Areopagite. Also known as
Pseudo-Dionysius, he was long thought to be the first century
disciple of Paul. Later evidence, however, showed this im-
portant and influential theologian to be an anonymous fifth
century Christian, neo-platonic thinker. Both On the Divine
Names and Mystical Theology emphasize the transcendence
of God, and the inability of human language to fully capture
God's true nature. Dionysius's theological method--often
called "negative theology" because it never made positive
affirmations about God--was adopted by many Christians.
This particular edition of Dionysius's work also comes with
an elaborate and instructive introduction, sure to be of help
when understanding Dionysius's writings. Although Dionysi-
us's work was long unavailable in modern translation, now
anyone can read and enjoy this impressive and important
theologian!
Tim Perrine
CCEL Staff Writer
Subjects: Christianity
i
Contents
1 Title Page
2 Pieface
4 Intioduction
3 1. The Authoi
7 2. His Leading Ideas: The Natuie of the Godhead in Itself
9 3. Its Relation to Cieation
18 4. The Pioblem of Evil
22 3. Contemplation
26 6. Dionysius and Modein Philosophy
28 7. The Psychology of Contemplation
33 8. The Sciiptuial Basis of Dionysius's Doctiines
36 9. Conclusion
38 10. Bibliogiaphy
39 The Divine Names
40 Contents
41 Chaptei 1. Dionysius the Piesbytei, to his fellow-Piesbytei Timothy.
32 Chaptei 2. Conceining the Undiffeiencing and the Diffeientiation in Divinity,
and the Natuie of Divine Unification and Diffeientiation.
63 Chaptei 3. What is the powei of Piayei: Also conceining the Blessed Hieiotheus
and conceining Reveience and the Wiiting of Divinity.
67 Chaptei 4. Conceining 'Good,' 'Light,' 'Beautiful,' 'Desiie,' 'Ecstasy,' 'Jealousy.' Also
that Evil is neithei existent noi Spiung fiom anything existent noi inheient in
existent things.
96 Chaptei 3. Conceining 'Existence' and also conceining 'Exemplais.'
103 Chaptei 6. Conceining 'Life.'
107 Chaptei 7. Conceining 'Wisdom,' 'Mind,' 'Reason,' 'Tiuth,' 'Faith.'
ii
113 Chaptei 8. Conceining 'Powei,' 'Righteousness,' 'Salvation,' 'Redemption'; and
also conceining 'Inequality.'
118 Chaptei 9. Conceining 'Gieat,' 'Small,' 'Diffeient,' 'Like,' 'Unlike,' 'Standing,'
'Motion,' 'Equality.'
123 Chaptei 10. Conceining 'Omnipotent,' 'Ancient of Days'; and also conceining
'Eteinity' and 'Time.'
126 Chaptei 11. Conceining 'Peace' and what is meant by 'Veiy Being' Itself, 'Veiy
Life,' 'Veiy Powei,' and similai phiases.
131 Chaptei 12. Conceining 'Holy of holies,' 'King of kings,' 'Loid of loids,' 'God of
gods.'
133 Chaptei 13. Conceining 'Peifect' and 'One.'
138 The Mystical Theology
143 The Influence of Dionysius in Religious Histoiy
136 Index
136 Index to Text
138 Index to Notes and Intioduction
161 Indexes
162 Index of Sciiptuie Refeiences
164 Gieek Woids and Phiases
168 Latin Woids and Phiases
170 Fiench Woids and Phiases
171 Index of Pages of the Piint Edition
iii
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iv
i
Donysus
The AreopagIe
ON THE
Divine Names
AND THE
Mystical Theology
C. E. Rolt
ISBN 0-922802-97-1
ii
Kessinger Publishing Company
Montana, U.S.A.
Title Page
1
Title Page
iii
PREFACE
The tianslations of which the piesent volume consists aie the woik of a scholai who
died at the age of thiity-seven. It has been felt that since the tianslatoi did not live to wiite
a pieface his woik should be intioduced by a few piefatoiy woids. My excuse foi accepting
that office is that I piobably knew the lamented wiitei as well as any one living. He was de-
piived of both his paients while veiy young, left almost fiiendless, and entiusted to my caie
fiom the age of fouiteen. He had alieady shown piomise of unusual ability. I sent him to
King's College School, wheie in the opinion of its distinguished Head, the Rev. Di. Bouine,
he could have done anything if only he had been given the health. At Oxfoid he was awaided
the Liddon Studentship.
Nothing can show moie cleaily what was thought of him by competent judges in Oxfoid
than the following lettei wiitten by the Piofessoi of Latin, A. C. Claik:
He was one of the best scholais who passed thiough my hands at Queen's College, and
I know no one who made gieatei piogiess aftei coming into iesidence. In those eaily days
he had wondeiful poweis of woik. I was seldom so delighted as when he eained the gieat
distinction of being 'mentioned' foi the Heitfoid Univeisity Scholaiship in Latin. At the
time eveiything seemed to be within his giasp. But most unfoitunately his health failed
shoitly afteiwaids, and he was nevei able to do himself justice. Still, of iecent yeais he wiote
a iemaikable book, full of fine thought, biilliantly expiessed, which was much admiied by
good judges. I well iemembei, too, his Latin seimon pieached at St. Maiy's not long ago. It
iv
was deliveied with feeling and fiie, and seemed to me an admiiable peifoimance. I am suie
that he would have gained distinction in the Chuich, if he had lived.
He seemed to me a fine and noble chaiactei, fiee fiom all moital taint."
He was a singulaily iefined and ieligious chaiactei, combining the acuteness of a
philosophic mind with the feivoui of a mystic. He theiefoie possessed undoubted qualific-
ations foi a study of Dionysius, with whose neo-Platonic ideas and mystical tendencies he
was in the waimest sympathy.
The Intioduction, containing a masteily exposition of Dionysian piinciples, is entiiely
the tianslatoi's woik, and, within the limits which he set himself, may be called complete.
Rolt's feivid and enthusiastic disposition led him to expound Dionysius with incieasing
admiiation as his studies continued. He laid his oiiginal intioduction aside, because to his
matuiei judgment it seemed insufficiently appieciative.
In its final foim the Intioduction is beyond all question a veiy able and iemaikable
piece of woik. Theie aie, howevei, seveial instances wheie the wiitei's enthusiasm and
peisonal opinions have led him to unguaided language, oi disabled him fiom iealizing the
dangeis to which the Aieopagite's teaching tends. He does indeed distinctly admit that Di-
Preface
2
Preface
onysius has his dangeis, and says in one place definitely that the study of him is foi the few:
but the beaiing of the whole theoiy of the Supia-Peisonal Deity on the Peison of Chiist and
the Chiistian doctiine of the Atonement iequiies to be moie thoioughly defined than is
done in the exceedingly able pages of Rolt's Intioduction. It is not the business of an editoi
to expiess his own views, but yet it seems only ieasonable that he should call the ieadei's
attention to questionable expositions, oi to dogmatic statements which seem eiioneous. In
foui oi five places the editoi has ventuied to do this: with what effect the ieadei must decide.
The Intioduction of couise appeais exactly as the Authoi left it. The few additional iemaiks
aie biacketed as notes by themselves.
v
It is only iight to add that the tianslatoi labouied undei ceitain disadvantages. The
oiiginal text of Dionysius is peiplexing and confused, and no modein ciitical edition has
as yet been pioduced. Rolt was fiequently in doubt what the Authoi had ieally wiitten.
But, beside the diawback incidental to any student of Dionysius, theie was the fact of
the tianslatoi's solitaiy position at Wateimillock, a village iectoiy among the Lakes, shut
off fiom access to libiaiies, and fiom acquaintance with foimei wiiteis on his subject. This
is a defect of which the tianslatoi was well awaie, and of which he pathetically complained.
Fiiends endeavouied to some extent to supply him with the necessaiy books, but the lack
of iefeience to the liteiatuie of the subject will not escape the ieadei of these pages. He was
always an independent thinkei iathei than a peison of histoiical investigation.
Hence it is that one bianch of his subject was almost omitted; namely, the influence of
Dionysius on the histoiy of Chiistian thought. This aspect is fai too impoitant to be left
out. Indeed Dionysius cannot be ciitically valued without it. An attempt theiefoie has been
made to supply this omission in a sepaiate Essay, in oidei to place the ieadei in possession
of the piincipal facts, both conceining the Aieopagite's disciples and ciitics.
W.J.S.-S.
3
Preface
1
DIONYSIUS THE AREOPAGITE
INTRODUCTION
Introduction
4
Introduction
I.-THE AUTHOR, AND HIS INFLUENCE IN THE LATER CHURCH
The wiitings heie tianslated aie among the extant woiks of a theologian who piofesses
to be St. Paul's Athenian conveit Dionysius, and points his claim with a backgiound of
histoiical setting. But the claim collapses beneath a consideiable weight of anachionisms,
by fai the chief of which is the latei neo-Platonism in almost eveiy paiagiaph. In fact, these
wiitings appeai to ieflect, and even to quote, the doctiines of the Pagan philosophei Pioclus,
who began lectuiing at Athens in A.D. 430. Moieovei, it is piobable that the Hieiotheus,
who figuies so laigely in them, is the Syiian mystic Stephen bai Sudaili: a latei contempoiaiy
of the same thinkei. The Dionysian wiitings may theiefoie be placed neai the veiy end of
the fifth centuiy.
The tiue name of theii authoi is entiiely unknown. He was piobably a monk, possibly
a bishop, ceitainly an ecclesiastic of some soit. His home is believed to have been Syiia,
wheie speculative theology was daiing and untiammelled, and his woiks aie the chief among
the veiy few suiviving specimens of an impoitant school. The pious fiaud by which he
fatheied them upon the Aieopagite need not be bianded with the haish name of foigeiy,"
2
foi such a piactice was in his day peimitted and even consideied laudable. Noi does it iob
them of theii value, any moie than ceitain paits of the piophecies asciibed to Isaiah aie
woithless because they aie by anothei hand. If the Dionysian wiitings weie histoiical docu-
ments the mattei would be otheiwise, just as the Gospel Naiiative would lose neaily all its
value if it weie a latei fabiication. But they aie not histoiical documents. Theii scope is with
the woikings of man's mind and spiiit in a iegion that does not change, and theii findings
aie equally valid oi invalid whatevei be theii date. And yet even histoiically they have an
inteiest which does not depend on theii authoiship. Foi, in any case, they spiing fiom a
ceitain ieputable school within the Chiistian Chuich, and they weie accepted by the Chuich
at laige. And thus theii bold path of contemplation and philosophy is at least peimissible
to Chiistians. This path is not foi all men, but some aie impelled to seek it; and if it is denied
them within the Chiistian pale, they will go and look foi it elsewheie. Nietzsche is but one
of those who have thus disastiously wandeied afai in seaich of that which is actually to be
found within the fold. Had he but studied the Dionysian wiitings he might have iemained
a Chiistian. At the piesent time these woiks have an added inteiest in the fact that, since
neo-Platonism has stiong affinities with the ancient philosophies of India, and may even
owe something diiectly to that souice thiough the sojouin of Plotinus in the Punjab, such
wiitings as these may help the Chuich to meet with disciiminating sympathy ceitain Indian
teachings which aie now becoming too familiai in the West to be altogethei ignoied. The
beaiings of this mattei on the missionaiy pioblem aie obvious.
1. The Author
5
1. The Author
The fiist mention of Dionysius" (to give him by couitesy the name he takes upon
3
himself) is in the yeai 333, when, at a council held in Constantinople, Seveius, Patiiaich of
Antioch, appealed to these wiitings in suppoit of Monophysite teaching. In spite of this
unpiomising beginning they soon acquiied a gieat ieputation; indeed, they piesumably
possessed some authoiity alieady when this fiist iecoided appeal to them was made. They
weie widely iead in the Eastein Chuich, being elucidated by the Commentaiy of St. Maximus
in the seventh centuiy and the Paiaphiase of the leained Gieek scholai, Pachymeies, in the
thiiteenth oi fouiteenth. Thiough Eiigena's Latin tianslation in the ninth centuiy they
penetiated to the Westein Chuich, and weie so eageily welcomed in this countiy that (in
the woids of the old chioniclei), The Mystical Divinity ian acioss England like deei." They
aie often quoted with ieveience by St. Thomas Aquinas, and weie, indeed, the chief of the
liteiaiy foices moulding the mystical theology of Chiistendom. Ruysbioeck slaked his thiist
at theii deep well, and so they piovided a fai gieatei than theii authoi with stimulus and an
aiticulate philosophy. Weie this theii only seivice they would have the highest claims on
oui giatitude.
But they have an intiinsic value of theii own in spite of theii obvious defects. And if
theii influence has too often led to ceitain spiiitual excesses, yet this influence would not
have been felt at all had they not met a deep spiiitual want. It aiose not meiely on account
of theii ieputed authoiship but also because the hungeiing heait of man found heie some
hidden manna. This manna, gainished though it be in all these wiitings with stiange and
often untianslatable teims fiom the Pagan Mysteiies and fiom latei neo-Platonism, is yet
in itself a plain and nouiishing spiiitual meat. Let us now tiy to discovei its quality fiom
the two tieatises befoie us.
6
1. The Author
4
II.-HIS LEADING IDEAS: THE NATURE OF THE GODHEAD IN ITSELF
The basis of theii teaching is the doctiine of the Supei-Essential Godhead (ncouoio
Oce_ie). We must, theiefoie, at the veiy outset fix the meaning of this teim. Now the woid
Essence" oi Being" (ooie) means almost invaiiably an individual existence; moie especially
a peison, since such is the highest type that individual existence can in this woild assume.
And, in fact, like the English woid Being," it may without qualification be used to mean
an angel. Since, then, the highest connotation of the teim Essence" oi Being" is a peison,
it follows that by Supei-Essence" is intended Supia-Peisonality." And hence the doctiine
of the Supei-Essential Godhead simply means that God is, in His ultimate Natuie, Supia-
Peisonal.
Now an individual peison is one who distinguishes himself fiom the iest of the woild.
I am a peison because I can say: I am I and I am not you." Peisonality thus consists in the
faculty of knowing oneself to be one individual among otheis. And thus, by its veiy natuie,
Peisonality is (on one side of its being, at least) a finite thing. The veiy essence of my pei-
sonal state lies in the fact that I am not the whole univeise but a membei theieof.
God, on the othei hand, is Supia-Peisonal because He is infinite. He is not one Being
among otheis, but in His ultimate natuie dwells on a plane wheie theie is nothing whatevei
beside Himself. The only kind of consciousness we may attiibute to Him is what can but be
desciibed as an Univeisal Consciousness. He does not distinguish Himself fiom us; foi weie
we caught up on to that level we should be wholly tiansfoimed into Him. And yet we distin-
5
guish between ouiselves and Him because fiom oui lowei plane of finite Being we look up
and see that ultimate level beyond us.
The Supei-Essential Godhead is, in fact, piecisely that which modein philosophy de-
sciibes as the Absolute. Behind the diveisities of this woild theie must be an Ultimate Unity.
And this Ultimate Unity must contain in an undiffeientiated condition all the iiches of
consciousness, life, and existence which aie dispeised in bioken fiagments thioughout the
woild. Yet It is not a paiticulai Consciousness oi a paiticulai Existence. It is ceitainly not
Unconscious, Dead oi, in the oidinaiy sense, non-Existent, foi all these teims imply some-
thing below instead of above the states to which they aie opposed.
Neveitheless It is not, in Its Ultimate Natuie, conscious (as we undeistand the teim)
foi consciousness implies a state in which the thinking Subject is awaie of himself and so
becomes an Object of his own peiception. And this is impossible in the ultimate Natuie of
the Undiffeientiated Godhead wheie theie is no distinction between thinking Subject and
Object of thought, simply because theie is at that level no distinction of any kind whatevei.
Similaily the Godhead does not, in the oidinaiy sense, live (foi life is a piocess and hence
implies distinctions) noi does It even (in oui sense) exist, foi Existence is contiasted with
non-Existence and thus implies ielationship and distinctions. Consciousness, Life, and Ex-
istence, as we know them, aie finite states, and the Infinite Godhead is beyond them. We
2. His Leading Ideas: The Nature of the Godhead in Itself
7
cannot even, stiictly speaking, attiibute to It Unity, foi Unity is distinguished fiom Pluiality.
We must instead desciibe It as a Supei-Unity which is neithei One noi Many and yet contains
in an undiffeientiated state that Numeiical Piinciple which we can only giasp in its paitial
foims as Unity and Pluiality.
8
6
III.-THE RELATION OF THE GODHEAD TO CREATION
This piinciple of Pluiality which is thus tianscendently contained in Its Undiffeientiated
Natuie compels It to an eteinal act of Cieation. Foi all things pie-exist in It fused and yet
distinct, as (shall we say:) in a single sensation of hungei theie aie indivisiby felt the seveial
needs foi the diffeient elements of food which aie wanted iespectively to nouiish the vaiious
kinds of bodily tissues, oi as a single emotion contains befoiehand the diffeient sepaiate
woids which issue foith to expiess it. Even so the Ultimate Godhead, biimful with Its Supei-
Unity, must oveiflow into multiplicity, must pass fiom Indiffeience into Diffeientiation
and must issue out of its Supei-Essential state to fashion a woild of Being.
Now since the Godhead thus pouis Itself out on to the plane of Being (which plane itself
exists thiough nothing but this outpouiing), it follows that the Godhead comes into ielation
with this plane: oi iathei (inasmuch as the act is timeless) stands in some ielation to it. If
the Godhead acts cieatively, then It is ielated to the woild and spheie of cieation: eteinally
to the spheie of cieation (which otheiwise could not exist), and thus potentially to the woild
even befoie the woild was made. Hence the Godhead, while in Its ultimate Natuie It is
beyond all diffeientiations and ielationships, and dwells in a iegion wheie theie is nothing
outside of Itself, yet on anothei side of Its Natuie (so to speak) touches and embiaces a iegion
of diffeientiations and ielationships, is theiefoie Itself ielated to that iegion, and so in a
sense belongs to it. Ultimately the Godhead is undiffeientiated and unielated, but in Its
7
eteinal cieated activity It is manifested undei the foim of Diffeientiation and Relationship.
It belongs concuiiently to two woilds: that of Ultimate Reality and that of Manifested Ap-
peaiance. Hence, theiefoie, the possibility not only of Cieation but also Revelation
(cievoi). Just as the Godhead cieates all things by viitue of that Aspect of Its Natuie
which is (as it weie) tuined towaids them, so It is ievealed to us by viitue of the same Aspect
tuined towaids oui minds which foim pait of the cieation. Hence all the Sciiptuial Names
of God, and this veiy Name God" itself, though they apply to the whole Natuie of the
Godhead and not meiely to some paiticulai element oi function theieof, yet cannot expiess
that Natuie in Its Ultimate Supei-essence but only as manifested in Its ielative activity. Di-
onysius, in fact, definitely teaches that doctiine which, when ievived independently of iecent
yeais by Di. Biadley was iegaided as a staitling blasphemy: that God is but an Appeaiance
1
of the Absolute. And this is, aftei all, meiely a bold way of stating the oithodox tiuism that
the Ultimate Godhead is incompiehensible: a tiuism which Theology accepts as an axiom
and then is pione to ignoie. The vaiious Names of God aie thus meie inadequate symbols
of That Which tianscends all thought and existence. But they aie undiffeientiated titles be-
cause they aie symbols which seek (though unsuccessfully) to expiess the undiffeientiated
Supei-Essence. Though the teims God," King," Good," Existent," etc., have all diffeient
1 Appeaiance and Reality (2nd ed.), pp. 443 ff.
3. Its Relation to Creation
9
connotations, yet they all denote the same undiffeientiated Deity. Theie aie, howevei, some
Names which denote not the undiffeientiated Godhead, but ceitain eteinally diffeientiated
Elements in Its Manifestation. These aie the Names of the Thiee Peisons in the Blessed
8
Tiinity. Wheieas the teims God," King," Good," Existent," etc., denote (though they
cannot expiess it) the same Reality: the teim Fathei" denotes something diffeient fiom
that of Son," and both of these fiom that of Holy Ghost." The whole Manifested Godhead
is God," King," Cieatoi," Savioui," Loid," Eteinal," Living," etc., but only One Persona
of the Godhead is Fathei, oi Son, oi Holy Ghost. The undiffeientiated titles diffei fiom each
othei meiely thiough oui feeble giasp of the Manifestation, and coalesce as oui appiehension
of it giows; the diffeientiated titles (ieiciicveoi ieiioci) iepiesent actual distinctions
in the eteinal Manifestation Itself. Thus the Absolute Godhead is the Supei-Essence; the
eteinally Manifested God head is the Tiinity. As to the ieasons of this Dionysius depiecates
all inquiiy. He does not, foi instance, suggest that Relationship in this its simplest foim
cannot but exist within that side of the God head which embiaces and enteis into this ielative
woild. Heie, as elsewheie, his puipose in spite of his philosophical language, is in the
deepest sense puiely piactical, and meie speculations aie left on one side. He accepts the
Eteinal Distinctions of the Tiinity because They have been ievealed; on the othei hand, he
sees that they must belong to the spheie of Manifestation oi They could not be ievealed.
It was said above that the Ultimate Godhead is Supia-Peisonal, and that it is Supia-
Peisonal because peisonality consists in the faculty of knowing oneself to be one individual
among otheis. Aie the Person of the Tiinity then, peisonal, since They aie distinguished
One fiom Anothei: No, They aie not peisonal, because, being the infinite Manifestation of
the Godhead, They aie Supei-Essential, and Dionysius desciibes Them by that title. And if
9
it be uiged that in one place he joins the same title to oui Loid's individual Human Name
and speaks of the Supei-Essential Jesus," this is because the Peisonality of oui Loid (and
oui own peisonality also thiough oui union with Him) passes up into a iegion tianscending
peisonality, and hence while the Humanity of Jesus is Peisonal His Godhead is Supia-Pei-
sonal. This is implied in a passage fiom Hieiotheus (quoted with appioval by Dionysius
himself) which teaches that the Deity of Jesus is of an univeisal chaiactei belonging thiough
Him to all iedeemed mankind.
The teaching of Dionysius on the Tiinity is, so fai as it goes, substantially the same as
that of St. Augustine oi St. Thomas Aquinas; only it is expiessed in moie exact, if at fiist
sight somewhat fantastic, teims. St. Augustine,
2
foi instance, teaches that the innei Diffei-
2 [Augustine says indeed that the Fathei and the Son exist, non secundum substantiam, sed secundum ielativum
(De Tiin. v. 6). But Augustine's aigument is, that while no attiibute of God is accidental, yet all attiibutes aie
not said with iefeience to His substance. Ceitain attiibutes of God aie neithei accidental noi substantial, but
ielative. This applies to Divine Fatheihood and Sonship. Foi the Fathei is what He is in ielation to the Son, and
similaily the Son to the Fathei. But these aie ielations of Beings," and aie ielations which aie eteinal and un-
10
10
entiations of the Tiinity belong solely to the iealm of eteinal Manifestation when he says
that They exist secundum Relativum and not secundum Substantiam.
3
Also he teaches the
Supia-Peisonality of the Tiinity when he says that neithei the undivided Tiinity noi any of
Its Thiee Peisons is a paiticulai individuality;
4
and St. Thomas teaches the same thing when
he says that the Human Soul of Jesus does not compiehend oi contain the Woid since the
Human Soul is finite (i.e. a paiticulai individuality) while the Woid is Infinite.
3
Thus while in the Undiffeientiated Godhead the Peisons" of the Tiinity ultimately
tianscend Themselves and point (as it weie) to a iegion wheie They aie meiged, yet in that
side of Its Natuie which looks towaids the univeise They shine eteinally foith and aie the
effulgence of those Supeinal Rays" thiough Which all light is given us, and whence all eneigy
stieams into the act of cieation. Foi by Theii inteiaction They ciiculate that Supei-Essence
Which Each of Them peifectly possesses, and so It passes foith fiom Them into a univeise
of Being.
Now the Godhead, while It is beyond all paiticulai Being, yet contains and is the ultimate
Reality of all paiticulai Being; foi It contains befoiehand all the paiticulai cieatuies aftei a
mannei in which they aie ultimately identical with It, as seems to be implied by the phiase
that all things exist in It fused and yet distinct. Thus although It is not a paiticulai being, It
in a tianscendent mannei contains and is Paiticulaiity. Again It is beyond all univeisal Being,
changeable." Augustine does not affiim a supia-peisonal ieality of God behind the Tiinity of manifestation.
Foi Augustine the Fathei and the Son aie ultimate iealities. But if the Fathei, in that He is called the Fathei,
weie so called in ielation to Himself, not to the Son; and the Son, in that He is called the Son, weie so called in
ielation to Himself, not to the Fathei; then both the one would be called Fathei, and the othei Son, accoiding
to substance. But because the Fathei is not called the Fathei except in that He has a Son, and the Son is not called
Son except in that He has a Fathei, these things aie not said accoiding to substance; because each of them is not
so called in ielation to Himself, but the teims aie used iecipiocally and in ielation each to the othei; noi yet
accoiding to accident, because both the being called the Fathei, and the being called the Son, is eteinal and un-
changeable to them. Wheiefoie, although to be the Fathei and to be the Son is diffeient, yet theii substance is
not diffeient; because they aie so called, not accoiding to substance, but accoiding to ielation, which ielation,
howevei, is not accident, because it is not changeable."-Aug., De Tiin. v. 6.-Ed.]
3 De Tiin. v. 6.
4 See De Tiin. viii. 4. Not this and that Good; but the veiy Good ... Not a good Peisonality (animus) but
good Goodness"; and vii. 11, wheie he condemns those who say the woid peisona is employed in the sense of
a paiticulai man such as Abiaham, Isaac, oi Jacob, oi anybody else who can be pointed out as being piesent."
3 Summa, Pais.III. Q. x. Ait. i.
11
11
foi univeisals aie appiehended by the intellect, wheieas the Godhead is incompiehensible
and theiefoie is desciibed as foimless." Neveitheless It contains and is the Ultimate Reality
of all univeisals, foi, even befoie the woild was made, It eteinally embiaced and embiaces
all things and all the univeisal laws of theii existence. Thus aftei a tianscendent mannei It
contains and is Univeisality. And hence in Its tianscendent Natuie Univeisality and Paitic-
ulaiity aie contained as one and the same undiffeientiated Fact.
But in this woild of Being the paiticulai and the univeisal aspect of things must be
mutually distinguished. Otheiwise theie could, on the one hand, be no things, and on the
othei, no bond of unity between them. Hence, when the Supei-Essence oveiflows in the act
of cieation, It iuns, as it weie, into the two main stieams of Univeisal and Paiticulai Being.
Neithei of these two stieams has any independent oi conciete existence. Taken sepaiately,
they aie meie potentialities: two sepaiate aspects, as it weie, of the cieative impulse, implying
an eteinal possibility of cieation and an eteinal tendency towaids it, and yet not in themselves
cieative because not in themselves, stiictly speaking, existent. Neveitheless these two stieams
diffei each fiom each, and one of them has a degiee of ieality which does not belong to the
othei. Meie univeisal Being, says Dionysius, does not possess full oi conciete existence; at
the same time, since it is Being oi Existence, he does not call it non-existent. Meie Paiticu-
laiity, on the othei hand, he piactically identifies with Non-entity, foi the obvious ieason
that non-existence itself is a univeisal categoiy (as applying to all existent things), and,
theiefoie, cannot belong to that which has no univeisal element at all. Thus the univeisal
stieam is an abstiact ideal and possesses an abstiact existence, the paiticulai stieam is an
12
aboitive impulse and possesses no actual existence whatevei. The one is the foimal law of
the existence univeise, the othei its iough mateiial.
Thus these two emanating stieams of potentiality have, fiom befoie all time, eteinally
welled foith and passed away, the univeisal into emptiness and the paiticulai into nothing-
ness, oi iathei, thiough nothingness back at once into the Supei-Essence in a ceaseless ie-
volution which, until the appointed moment aiiives foi Time and the tempoial woild to
begin, leaves no tiace outside Its Supei-Essential Souice and Dwelling and Goal. It is possible
(though one cannot say moie), that Dionysius is thinking especially of the diffeience between
these two stieams when he desciibes the vaiious motions of the Godhead. The Paiticulai
stieam of Emanation may be in his mind when he speaks of the ciiculai movement, since
the paiticulai existences iemain within the Supei-Essence, until the moment of theii tem-
poial cieation: the Univeisal stieam may be that of which he is thinking when he speaks of
the diiect and spiial movements, since both of these indicate an advance and would theiefoie
be appiopiiate to expiess the out-iaying tendency of that emanating Influence which, even
befoie the paiticulai cieatuies weie made, had a kind of existence foi thought as the othei
stieam had not.
12
This Univeisal stieam consists of cuiients oi Emanations, Veiy Being, Veiy Life, etc.
(etocivei, etou(, i.t.i.), and of these cuiients some aie moie univeisal than otheis;
Veiy Being is, obviously, the most univeisal of all. And since the Supei-Essence tianscends
and so absoibs all Univeisality, it follows that the moie univeisal the Emanations aie the
highei is theii natuie. This stieam, in fact, iuns, as it weie, in the channel which oui thought
13
natuially tiaces; foi thought cannot but seek foi univeisals, and the abstiact and bloodless
tendency of meie Philosophy comes fiom an undue exaltation of thought ovei life. Fiom
this defect, howevei, Dionysius is fiee. Foi, while he holds that the highest Emanation is the
most univeisal, he also holds (as was seen) that the Emanations aie in themselves the meie
backgiound of existence and aie not fully existent. And he expiessly says that while the
Emanations become moie and moie univeisal the highei we ascend towaids theii Souice,
the cieatuies become moie and moie individual and paiticulai the highei they iise in the
scale. The ieason is, of couise, that the Supei-Essence tianscends and absoibs all Paiticulaiity
as well as all Univeisality; and hence it is that paiticulai things become paiticulaiized by
paitaking of It, just as univeisals become univeisalized by a similai piocess. But of this moie
anon.
This Univeisal stieam of Emanations thus eteinally possesses a kind of existence, but
it is an empty existence, like the emptiness of meie light if theie weie no objects to fill it and
be made visible. The light in such a case would still be stieaming foith fiom the sun and
could not do otheiwise, and theiefoie it would not be an uttei void; but it would be unten-
anted by any paiticulai coloui oi shape. Suppose, howevei, that the light could be blotted
out. Theie would now iemain the uttei void of absolute daikness. Such daikness cannot
exist while the sun is shining in the cloudless heavens; neveitheless the veiy notion of light
cannot but be contiasted in oui minds with that of daikness which is its absence; and so we
conceive the light to be a positive thing which fills the daikness even as watei fills a void.
When the bowl is full of watei, the void does not exist; and yet, since it would exist if the
bowl could be wholly emptied; we can iegaid this non-existent void as the ieceptacle of the
watei.
14
Even so the Emanations of Veiy Being, etc., fill, as it weie, a void which does not and
cannot exist, since it is, and must be, satuiated with them, and yet it is, by the veiy laws of
oui thinking, contiasted with them and would, in a mannei, exist if the Emanations could
cease to flow fiom the Supei-Essence. They, stieaming eteinally (as they must) fiom that
oveiflowing Souice, peimeate the whole boundless iegion of the woild that is to be; a iegion
beyond Time and Space. That iegion is thus theii ieceptacle. The ieceptacle, if emptied of
them (though this is impossible), would contain nothing, and be nothing whatsoevei. Hence,
it is called Not-Being, oi the Non-Existent (to q v).
So the two Stieams flow timelessly without beginning and without end, and cioss, but
do not mingle: the Univeisal Stieam peipetually advancing and the Paiticulai Stieam ciicling
13
iound and slipping thiough it, as it weie, into the void of Nothingness (as a thing by its veiy
natuie invisible, would be in daikness even while suiiounded by the light) and so ietuining
into the Supei-Essence without leaving a tiace behind it. This activity, though it must be
expiessed thus in teims of Time, is ieally timeless and theiefoie simultaneous. Foi the
Stieams aie not something othei than the Supei-Essence. They aie simply distant aspects
of It. They aie the Supei-Essence in Its cieative activity. As the iivei flowing out of a lake
consists of the watei which belongs to the lake, oi as the light and heat flowing fiom the sun
aie the same light and heat that aie in the sun, so the emanating Stieams aie the same Powei
that exists in the Supei-Essence, though now acting (oi stiiving to act) at a distance. Oi
peihaps we may compaie the Supei-Essence to a mountain of iich oie, the inwaid depths
15
of which aie hidden beyond sight and touch. The outei suiface, howevei, is touched and
seen, and this coiiesponds to the Peisons of the Tiinity; while the same mountain viewed
at a distance is the Stieam of Univeisal Emanation. And though the view becomes dimmei
and dimmei the faithei away you go, yet it is always the same mountain itself that is being
viewed. The Paiticulai Stieam, on the othei hand, is like the same mountain when invisible
at night, foi the mountain still sends foith its vibiations, but these aie lost in the daikness.
Oi we may compaie the Supei-Essence to a magnet and the Peisons of the Tiinity to
its tangible suiface, and the two emanating Stieams to the positive and negative magnetism
which aie simply the essence of the magnet piesent (so to speak) at a distance. Even so (but
in a mannei which is tiuei because non-spatial) the Supei-Essence is in the emanating
stieams outside the Supei-Essential plane and thus inteipenetiates iegions which aie iemote
fiom Itself. It is both immanent in the woild as its Piinciple of Being and outside it as
tianscending all categoiies of Being. This contiadiction is implied in the veiy woid Eman-
ation" (nooo) which means an act by which the Supei-Essence goes foith fiom Itself.
And, in fact, Dionysius moie than once definitely says that the Supei-Essence actually passes
outside of Itself even while It iemains all the time wholly within itself: This he expiesses in
one place by saying that the act of Cieation is an ecstasy of Divine Love. This thought is vital
to his doctiine, and must be iemembeied whenevei in the piesent attempt to expound him,
the Supei-Essence is spoken of as outside" the cieatuies. The Supei-Essence is not, stiictly
speaking, exteinal to anything. But It is outside" the cieatuies because (as existing simul-
taneously on two planes) It is outside" itself. And theiefoie, although the entiie plane of
16
cieation is inteipenetiated by It, yet in Its ultimate Natuie It is beyond that plane and so
outside" it. Finite cieatuies though filled (accoiding to theii measuie) with Its Piesence,
yet must, in so fai as they aie finite, look up to It as That which is Othei than themselves.
And, in this sense of being Othei than they aie, It must be desciibed as outside" them, even
though (as theii Piinciple of Being) It is within them.
Thus the two emanating stieams, though they pass outside of the Supei-Essence, yet
actually aie the Supei-Essence Itself. And, in fact, the veiy teim Emanation (nooo) like
14
the collateial teim Diffeientiation (iiioi) may even be applied not only to the two
Stieams but also to the Peisons of the Tiinity; not only to the Magnets iadiating Eneigy, so
to speak, but also to its actual Suiface.
This mattei needs a few woids of explanation.
Theie is in the undiffeientiated (ncqvucvq) Supei-Essence a Diffeientiation between
the Thiee Divine Peisons," which Dionysius compaies to the distinction between diffeient
flames in the same indivisible biightness. And Each Peison" is an Emanation because Each
is a Piinciple of outgoing cieative Eneigy. Theie is also a Diffeientiation between the vaiious
qualities and foices of the cieative Eneigy, iathei as (if we may fuithei woik out the simile
of Dionysius) the light seen afai thiough ceitain atmospheiic conditions is diffeientiated
into vaiious colouis. And each quality oi foice is an Emanation, foi it is an outgoing cuiient
of cieative Eneigy. Oi, by a slightly diffeient use of language, the entiie cieative piocess in
which they flow foith may be called not meiely a collection of emanations but simply the
Emanation." Thus an Emanation may mean, (1) a Peison of the Tiinity; (2) a cuiient of the
Univeisal Stieam (e.g., Veiy Being, oi Veiy Life, etc.); (3) a cuiient of the Paiticulai Stieam
17
(i. e. a paiticulai foice); (4) the entiie piocess wheieby the two Stieams flow foith. This
sounds confusing, but the difficulty vanishes if we classify these vaiious meanings undei
two heads, viz.: (1) an Emanating Piinciple (i. e. a Peison" of the Tiinity), and (2) an Em-
anating Act (whethei iegaided as a whole oi in detail). This classification coveis all its uses.
These two heads, in fact, coiiespond exactly to the two main uses of the woid Diffei-
entiation" as applying iespectively to the Supei-Essential spheie and to the spheie of Being.
And heie Dionysius ceitainly does cause needless difficulty by employing the same woid
Diffeientiation" with these two distinct meanings in the same passage. The Peisons of the
Tiinity aie diffeientiated, but the Eneigy stieaming fiom them is undiffeientiated in the
sense that it comes indivisibly fiom them all. In anothei sense, howevei, it is diffeientiated
because it splits up into sepaiate cuiients and foices. Each of these cuiients comes fiom the
Undivided Tiinity, and yet each cuiient is distinct fiom the otheis. Dionysius expiesses this
tiuth by saying that the Godhead enteis Undivided ly into Diffeientiation, oi becomes dif-
feientiated without loss of Undiffeience (qvucvu ieiivctei).
Let us follow this cieative piocess and see whithei it leads. The Supei-Essence, as It
tianscends both Non-Existence and Existence, also tianscends both Time and Eteinity. But
fiom afai It is seen oi felt as Existence and as Eteinity. That is to say Existence and Eteinity
aie two emanating modes oi qualities of the Univeisal Stieam. The Paiticulai Stieam, on
the othei hand, is Time-non-existent as yet and stiuggling to come to the biith but unable
to do so until it gain peimanence thiough mingling with Eteinity. At a ceitain point, howevei
15
18
(pieoidained in the Supei-Essence wheiein Time slumbeied), the two stieams not only
cioss but actually mingle, and thus Time and the tempoial woild begin. The Paiticulai
stieam no longei sinks wholly thiough the Univeisal, but is in pait suppoited by it. Hence
the woild of things aiises like a substance hitheito invisible but now becoming visible, and
so, by this change, spiinging out of daikness into light.
Now, when the Paiticulai stieam begins to mingle with the Univeisal, it natuially mingles
fiist with that cuiient of it which, being most univeisal, ianks the highest and so is neaiest
the Souice. It is only along that cuiient that it can advance to the otheis which aie fuithei
away. And that cuiient is Being (etocivei). Thus the woild-piocess begins (as Dionysius
had leaint fiom Genesis and fiom the teaching of Plato) as the level of dead solid mattei,
to which he gives the name of meiely existent" (ooiu(). Thence, by paiticipating moie
and moie in the Univeisal stieam, it advances to the pioduction of plant and animal and
man, being by the piocess eniiched with moie and moie qualities as Life (etou(), Wisdom
(etoooie), and the othei cuiients of the Univeisal stieam begin to peimeate it one by
one.
Thus the sepaiate individuals, accoiding to the vaiious laws (ioyoi) of theii geneia and
species, aie cieated in this woild of Time. And each thing, while it exists in the woild, has
two sides to its existence: one, outside its cieated being (accoiding to the sense of the woid
outside" explained above), in the Supei-Essence wheiein all things aie One Thing (as all
points meet at infinity oi as accoiding to the neo-Platonic simile used by Dionysius, the
iadii of a ciicle meet at the centie), and the othei within its own cieated being on this lowei
plane wheie all things aie sepaiate fiom each othei (as all points in space aie sepaiate oi as
19
the iadii of the ciicle aie sepaiate at the ciicumfeience). This paiadox is of the veiy utmost
impoitance.
The vaiious kinds of existences being now cieated in this woild of time, we can iegaid
them as ianged in an ascending scale between Nothingness and the Supei-Essence, each
iank of being subsuming the qualities of those that lie below it. Thus we get the following
system in ascending oidei: Existence, Life, Sensation, Reason, Spiiit. And it is to this scale
that Dionysius alludes when he speaks of the extiemities and the inteimediate paits of the
cieation, meaning by the extiemities the highest and the lowest oideis, and by the inteime-
diate paits the iemaindei.
The diminution of Being which we find in glancing down the laddei is, Dionysius tells
us, no defect in the system of cieation. It is iight that a stone should be but a stone and a
tiee no moie than a tiee. Each thing, being itself howevei lowly, is fulfilling the laws of its
kind which pie-exist (aftei a tianscendent mannei) in the undiffeientiated Supei-Essence.
If, howevei, theie is a diminution of Being wheie such diminution has no place, then tiouble
begins to aiise. This is, in fact, the oiigin and natuie of evil. Foi as we ascend the scale of
Being, fiesh laws at each stage counteiact the laws of the stage below, the law of life by which
16
the blood ciiculates and living things giow upwaids counteiacting the meie law of ineit
giavitation, and again, the laws of moiality counteiacting the animal passions. And wheie
this countei-action fails, disastei follows. A hindeied ciiculation means ill-health, and a
hindeied self-contiol means sin. Wheieas a stone is meiely lifeless, a coipse is not only
lifeless but dead; and wheieas a biute is un-moial, a biutal man is wicked, oi immoial. What
in the one case is the absence fiom a thing of that which has no piopei place in it, is in the
othei case the failuie of the thing's piopei viitues.
17
20
IV.-THE PROBLEM OF EVIL
At weaiisome length Dionysius discusses the pioblem of evil and shows that nothing
is inheiently bad. Foi existence is in itself good (as coming ultimately fiom the Supei-Es-
sence), and all things aie theiefoie good in so fai as they exist. Since evil is ultimately non-
existent; a totally evil thing would be simply non-existent, and thus the evil in the woild,
wheievei it becomes complete, annihilates itself and that wheiein it lodges. We may illustiate
this thought by the natuie of zeio in mathematics, which is non-entity (since, added to
numbeis, it makes no diffeience) and yet has an annihilating foice (since it ieduces to zeio
all numbeis that aie multiplied by it). Even so evil is nothing and yet manifests itself in the
annihilation of the things it qualifies. That which we call evil in the woild is meiely a tendency
of things towaids nothingness. Thus sickness is a tendency towaids death, and death is
simply the cessation of physical vitality. And sin is a tendency towaids spiiitual death, which
is the cessation of spiiitual vitality. But, since the giound of the soul is indestiuctible, a
complete cessation of its being is impossible; and hence even the devils aie not inheiently
bad. Weie they such they would cease ipso facto to exist.
Dionysius heie touches incidentally on a mystical doctiine which, as developed by latei
wiiteis, afteiwaids attained the gieatest impoitance. This doctiine of a timeless self is the
postulate, peihaps, of all Chiistian mysticism. The boldest expiession of it is to be found in
Eckhait and his disciple Taulei, who both say that even the lost souls in hell ietain unalteied
21
the ultimate nobility of theii being. And lest this doctiine should be thought to tiifle with
giave matteis, be it iemembeied that the sinfulness and giavity of sin aie simply due to this
indestiuctible nobility of oui being. Man cannot become non-moial, and hence his capacity
foi wickedness. The soul is potentially divine, and theiefoie may be actually satanic. The
veiy devils in hell cannot destioy the image of the Godhead within them, and it is this image
that sin defiles.
It follows fiom the ultimate non-entity of evil that, in so fai as it exists, it can only do
so thiough being mingled with some element of good. To take an illustiation given by Di-
onysius himself, wheie theie is disease theie is vitality, foi when life ceases the sickness
disappeais in death. The ugliness of evil lies piecisely in the fact that it always, somehow oi
othei, consists in the coiiuption of something inheiently good.
It is, howevei, this ugliness of things that Dionysius fails to emphasize, and heiein lies
the gieat weakness of his teaching. Not only does he, with the misguided zeal of an apologist,
gloze delibeiately ovei ceitain paiticulai ciuelties of the Cieation and accept them as finite
foims of good, but also he tends to explain away the veiy natuie of evil in itself. He tends
to be misled by his own tiue theoiies. Foi it is tiue that evil is ultimately non-existent. St.
Augustine taught this when he said: Sin is nought";
6
so did Julian of Noiwich, who saw
6 Com. on St. John i. 13. Cf. Conf. vii. 18; xii. 11.
4. The Problem of Evil
18
not sin," because she believes it hath no mannei of substance noi any pait of being."
7
The
fault of Dionysius is the natuial failuie of his mental type to giasp the meie facts of the ac-
tual woild as meie facts. He is so dazzled with his vision of ultimate Reality that he does not
feel with any intensity the paitial iealities of this finite univeise. Hence, though his theoiy
22
of evil is, in the main, tiue, he does not quite giasp the tiue application of his theoiy to this
woild of actual facts.
Foi this woild is by its veiy natuie finite. And hence, if the evil in it is (as Dionysius
iightly says) but paitial, it must also be iemembeied (as he foi a moment foigets) that its
veiy existence is but paitial. And, theiefoie, though evil is ultimately non-existent, yet the
bad qualities of things may, so fai as this piesent woild is conceined, have as much ieality,
oi at least as much actuality, as theii good qualities. And when we say that evil is ultimately
non-existent we meiely mean that evil ought to have no actuality heie, not that it has none.
Dionysius calls evil a lapse and failuie of the cieatuie's piopei viitues. But a lapse oi failuie
has in it something positive, as he in the same bieath both admits by using the woid and
also tiies to explain away. It is as positive as the viitues fiom which it lapses. The absence
of a wooden block is nothing, light has no piopei place theie, but the aii, wheie light should
is daikness and is a visible shadow. St. Augustine has ciystallized this tiuth in his famous
epigiam, quoted above in pait, which iuns in full as follows: Sin is naught, and men aie
naughtes when they sin." The void left by the want of a good thing has a content consisting
in the want. Piobably had Dionysius seen moie of the woild's miseiy and sin he would have
had a stiongei sense of this fact. And in that case he mould have given moie piominence
than he gives, in his extant wiitings at least, to the Cioss of Chiist.
Two things should, howevei, be boine in mind. In the fiist place he is wiiting foi intel-
lectual Chiistians in whom he can take foi gianted both an undeistanding of metaphysics
23
and a hoiioi of sin. To such ieadeis the non-existence of evil could not have the same
meaning as it would to the woild outside. Foi the same ieason he (like othei Chiistian
teacheis aftei him) speaks of God's tianscendent Non-Existence without feaiing lest his
woids should be inteipieted as atheism. In fact, to guaid against misinteipietation he utteis
the expiess waining that mysteiies can only be taught to the Initiated.
8
In the second place thioughout his whole tieatment of evil, he is no doubt wiiting with
an eye on the dualistic heiesy of the Manichees, which was pievalent in his day. Hence the
occasional indiscietion of the zeal with which he seeks to block eveiy loop-hole looking to-
waids dualism. The iesult is a one-sided emphasis in his teaching iathei than positive eiioi.
He iightly denies a dualism of ultimate iealities; but he tends to ignoie, iathei than to deny,
the obvious dualism of actual facts.
7 Revelations of Divine Love, xxvii.
8 Div. Nom. i. 8, ad fin.; Myst. Theol. i. 2.
19
Befoie pioceeding to the Method of Contemplation which ciowns and vitalizes the entiie
speculative system of Dionysius, it will be well to biing togethei in one paiagiaph the vaiious
meanings he gives to Non-Existence.
(1) The Supei-Essence tianscends the distinction between the Aiistotelian Mattei"
and Foim"; but in this woild the two aie distinct fiom each othei. And wheieas, in this
woild, Foim without Mattei" has an abstiact existence foi thought, Mattei" with out Foim
has none. Thus meie Mattei" is non-existent. And hence things both befoie theii cieation
and aftei theii destiuction aie non-existent, foi theii Mattei" has then no foim." (2)
Similaily Good without evil exists as the highest Manifestation oi Foim" of the Godhead,
but evil without Good is foimless and theiefoie non-existent. (This does not mean that
24
Mattei" oi the woild-stuff is evil, but that neithei it noi evil is anything at all.) And since
evil is ultimately altogethei non-existent, all things aie non-existent in so fai as they aie evil.
(3) Finally, the Supei-Essence is, in a tianscendent mannei, non-Existent as being beyond
Existence. And hence the paiadox that the destiuctive foice of evil and the highei impulse
towaids the Godhead both have the same negative piinciple of a discontent with the existent
woild-the dangeious, yet tiue, doctiine (taught, among otheis, by St. Augustine
9
and
Dante
10
) that evil is a mistaken quest foi Good.
The piinciple of this classification is quite simple. It lies in the fact that Being is the most
univeisal of the Emanations oi Foims, and that all things theiefoie exist only in so fai as
they possess Foim. Hence the want of all foim" is non-entity and makes things which aie
without any foim to be non-existent; that want of piopei foim" which we call evil is a
tendency to non-entity and makes evil things to be so fai non-existent; the want of complete
substantial oi spiiitual foim" makes meiely existent things (i.e. lifeless things) to be un-
existent"; and the tianscendence of all Foim" makes the Supei-Essence to be in a special
sense Non-Existent."
The theoiy of evil, as given above, is woiked out in a mannei sufficiently staitling.
We natuially divide existent things into good and bad and do not think of non-existent
things as being things at all. Dionysius, with appaient peiveisity, says all things aie good,
and then pioceeds to divide them into Existent" and Non-Existent"! The ieason is this:
All things have two sides to theii being: the one in the Supei-Essence and the othei in
themselves. In the Supei-Essence they aie eteinally good, even befoie theii cieation. But in
9 Conf. ii. 6, 12-14
10 Paiad. v. 10-12
20
themselves (i.e. in theii cieated essence) they weie wholly non-existent befoie theii tempoial
25
cieation, and aftei it aie paitially non-existent in so fai as they aie tainted with evil.
21
V.-CONTEMPLATION
So fai this doctiine of a dual state belonging to all things may seem an unpiofitable
speculation. We now come to the point wheie its tiue value will be seen. Foi it undeilies a
piofound theoiy of Peisonality and a iich method of Contemplation. This pait of the subject
is difficult, and will need close attention.
The piocess of Cieation advances fiom the simple to the complex as Life is added to
meie Being, and Consciousness to Life, and Rationality to Consciousness. But fiom this
point theie begins a new phase in the piocess. Man, having as it weie floated into the woild
down the Univeisal stieam of Emanation, now enteis into his spiiit, and so plunges beneath
the stieam, and theie below its suiface finds an undeicuiient which begins to sweep him
in a contiaiy diiection towaids the Souice. By the downwaid movement his peisonality has
been pioduced, by this upwaid movement it will be tiansfoimed.
So man piesses on towaids God, and the method of his jouiney is a concentiation of
all his spiiitual poweis. By this method he gatheis himself togethei away fiom outwaid
things into the centie of his being. And thus he giadually becomes unified and simplified,
like the Angels whose cieation Dionysius was able to place at the veiy commencement of
the developing tempoial oidei piecisely because theii natuie is of this utteily simple and
concentiated kind. And, because the piocess of advance is one of spiiitual concentiation,
and moves moie and moie fiom exteinal things into the hidden depths of the soul, theiefoie
26
man must cast away the sepaiate foims of those elements which he thus diaws fiom the
ciicumfeience into the centie of his peisonal spiiit. Having sucked the nouiishment fiom
the vaiious fiuits giowing seveially in theii diffeient piopei zones by the maigin of the
stieam up which he piesses, he assimilates those vitalizing elements into his own tissues
(finding each food suited in tuin to his advancing stiength) and casts the iind away as a
thing no longei needed. And this iejection of the husk in which the nouiishing fiuit had
giown is the piocess desciibed by Dionysius as the Via êgativa.
Let us considei this mattei moie in detail.
The fiist stage of Religion is anthiopomoiphic. God is conceived of as a magnified Man
with an outwaid foim. This notion contains some low degiee of tiuth, but it must be spii-
itualized. And in casting away the mateiialistic details of the conception we begin to entei
on a Via êgativa. All educated Chiistians entei on this path, though veiy few aie given the
task of puisuing it to the end. So fiist the notion of an outwaid mateiial foim is cast away
and then the notion of change. God is now iegaided as a changeless and immateiial Being,
possessing all the qualities of Peisonality and all the capacities of Sensation and Peiception
in an eteinal and spiiitual mannei. This is a conception of God built up, laigely, by the
Discuisive Reason and appealing to that side of oui natuie. But the Intuitive Reason seeks
to pieice beyond this shimmeiing cloud into the hidden Light which shines thiough it. Foi
the mind demands an Absolute Unity beyond this vaiiety of Attiibutes. And such a Unity,
3. Contemplation
22
5. Contemplation
being an axiom oi postulate, lies in a iegion behind the deductions of the Discuisive Reason.
Foi all deduction depends upon axioms, and axioms themselves cannot be deduced.
27
Thus the human spiiit has tiavelled fai, but still it is unsatisfied. Fiom the simple unity
of its own being it gazes up at the Simple Unity of the Uncieated Light which still shines
above it and beyond it. The Light is One Thing and the human spiiit is anothei. All elements
of diffeience in the human spiiit and in the Uncieated Light have disappeaied, but theie
still iemains the piimaiy distinction between Contemplating Subject and Contemplated
Object. The human self and the Uncieated Light stand in the mutual ielationships of Me"
and Thee." That which says Me" is not the Being Which is addiessed as Thee"; and the
Being addiessed as Thee" is not that which says Me." The two stand ovei against one an-
othei.
This ielationship must now be tianscended by a piocess leading to ecstasy. The human
spiiit must seek to go foith out of itself (i. e. out of its cieated being) into the Uncieated
Object of its contemplation and so to be utteily meiged. So it ceases to desiie even its own
being in itself. Casting selfhood away, it stiives to gain its tiue being and selfhood by losing
them in the Supei-Essence. Laying its intellectual activity to iest it obtains, by a highei
spiiitual activity, a momentaiy glimpse into the depths of the Supei-Essence, and peiceives
that Theie the distinction between Me" and Thee" is not. It sees into the hidden iecesses
of an unplumbed Mysteiy in which its own individual being and all things aie ultimately
tianscended, engulphed and tiansfoimed into one indivisible Light. It stands just within
the boideis of this Mysteiy and feels the piocess of tiansfoimation alieady beginning
within itself. And, though the movements of the piocess aie only just commenced, yet it
feels by a hidden instinct the ultimate Goal whithei they must lead. Foi, as Ruysbioeck says:
To such men it is ievealed that they are That which they contemplate."
28
This tianscendent spiiitual activity is called Unknowing, Foi when we know a thing we
can tiace out the lines of diffeience which sepaiate it fiom othei things, oi which sepaiate
one pait of it fiom anothei. All knowledge, in fact, consists in, oi at least includes, the powei
of sepaiating This" fiom That." But in the Supei-Essence theie aie no lines of diffeience
to tiace, and theie is no This" oi That." Oi iathei, to put it diffeiently, This " and That,"
being now tianscended, aie simply one and the same thing. While the human spiiit is yet
impeifect, it looks up and sees the Supei-Essence fai beyond it. At this stage it still feels itself
as this" and still peiceives the Supei-Essence as That." But when it begins to entei on the
stage of spiiitual Reflection (to use the techical teim boiiowed by Dionysius fiom the
Mysteiies) it penetiates the Supei-Essence and daikly peiceives that Theie the distinction
ultimately vanishes. It sees a point wheie this" is tiansfiguied into That," and That" is
wholly this." And, indeed, alieady That" begins to poui Itself totally into this" thiough
the act wheieby this" has plunged itself into That."
23
5. Contemplation
Thus the ultimate goal of the ego" now seen afai by Unknowing and attainable, peihaps,
heieaftei, is to be meiged. And yet it will nevei be lost. Even the last dizzy leap into Absoip-
tion will be peifoimed in a tiue sense by the soul itself and within the soul itself. The state-
ment of Dionysius that in the Supei-Essence all things aie fused and yet distinct," when
combined with the doctiine of human immoitality, means nothing else. Foi it means that
the immoitality of the human soul is of an individual kind; and so the self, in one sense,
peisists even while, in anothei sense, it is meiged. This is the most astounding paiadox of
29
all! And Dionysius states the appaient contiadiction without seeking to explain it simply
because, heie as elsewheie, he is not much conceined with theoiy but is meiely stiuggling
to expiess in woids an oveiwhelming spiiitual expeiience. The explanation, howevei (if
such it may be called) can easily be deduced fiom his theoiy of existence and of peisonality.
All things have two sides to theii existence: one in the Supei-Essence, the othei in
themselves. Thus a human peisonality is (in William Law's woids) an outbiith" fiom the
Godhead. And having at last made its jouiney Home, it must still possess these two sides
to its existence. And hence, wheieas on the one side it is meiged, on the othei it is not. Its
veiy being consists of this almost inciedible paiadox. And peisonality is a paiadox because
the whole woild is a paiadox, and the whole woild is fulfilled in peisonality.
Foi this piinciple of a twofold existence undeilies all things, and is a ieflection of the
Supei-Essential Natuie. As the Supei-Essence has an eteinal tendency to pass out of Itself
by emanation, so the cieatuies have a tendency to pass out of themselves by spiiitual activity.
As the Supei-Essence cieates the woild and oui human souls by a species of Divine ecstasy,"
so the human soul must ietuin by an answeiing ecstasy" to the Supei-Essence. On both
sides theie is the same piinciple of Self-Tianscendence. The veiy natuie of Reality is such
that it must have its being outside itself.
And this piinciple of self-tianscendence oi ecstasy undeilies not only the solitaiy quest
of the individual soul foi God, but also the mutual ielations of the vaiious individuals with
each othei. In all theii social activities of loving fellowship the cieatuies seek and find
themselves in one anothei and so outside of themselves. It is the veiy essence of Reality that
30
it is not self-sufficing oi self-contained. Not only do the cieatuies in which the Supei-Essence
oveiflows possess, by an answeiing mysteiy, theii tiue being in the Supei-Essence, but, as
a iesult of this, they possess theii tiue being in each othei; foi in the Supei-Essence each
has its place as an element in One single and indivisible Reality. We have heie, in fact, the
gieat antinomy of the One and the Many, oi the Univeisal and the Paiticulais, not solved
indeed, but pionounced to be insoluble and theiefoie ultimate. It penetiates into a iegion
beyond the intellect, and that is why the intellect is finally baffled by it.
The Dionysian theoiy that one side of oui being is outside ouiselves in the Supei-Essence
will be found incidentally to ieconcile Piagmatism and Idealism togethei. Foi Dionysius
teaches that on one side of oui being we actually develop in Time. And, if this is so, we do
24
5. Contemplation
as the Piagmatists asseit liteially make Reality. But the othei side of oui being is timeless
and eteinally peifect outside ouiselves. And if this is so, then Reality, as Idealists tell us, is
something utteily beyond all change. Peihaps this paiadox is intended in Woidswoith's
noble line:-
So build we up the being that we are.
11
11 Excuision, iv., about 70 lines fiom the end. With the being that we aie," cf. Pielude, xiv. 113-113:-
The highest bliss That flesh can know is
theiis-the consciousness Of whom the aie."
25
5. Contemplation
VI.-DIONYSIUS AND MODERN PHILOSOPHY
Let us now considei the beaiings of the Dionysian theoiy on ceitain othei cuiients of
modein philosophy.
Accoiding to Di. McTaggait each human soul possesses, behind its tempoial natuie, a
31
timeless self and each one of these timeless selves is an eteinal diffeientiation of the Abso-
lute.
12
Now if these timeless selves aie finite, then none embiaces the whole system. And,
if that is so, in what does the Spiiitual Unity of the whole consist: If, on the othei hand, they
aie infinite, then each one must embiace the whole System; and, if so, how can they iemain
distinct: Having the same context, they must coalesce even as (accoiding to Oithodox
Theology) the Peisons" of the Tiinity coalesce in the Unity behind the plane of Manifesta-
tion.
13
Di. McTaggait's philosophical scheme is noble, but it seems open to this metaphys-
ical attack, and psychologically it appeais to be defective as it leaves no ioom foi woiship,
which is a piime need of the human soul. The Dionysian theoiy seems to meet the difficulty;
foi since oui ultimate being is outside ouiselves in the Supei-Essence, one side of oui Being
is supia-peisonal. Oui finite selves aie, on that side, meiged togethei in One Infinite Self"
(if It may be thus inadequately desciibed); and this Infinite Self (so to call It) embiaces, and
is the Spiiitual Unity of the whole System. And this Infinite Self, seen fiom afai, is and must
be the Object of all woiship until at last woiship shall be swallowed up in the completeness
of Unknowing.
The paiadox that oui tiue existence is (in a sense) outside ouiselves is the paiadox of
all life. We live by bieath and food, and so oui life is in these things outside oui individual
bodies. Oui life is in the aii and in oui nouiishment befoie we assimilate it as oui own.
Moie astonishing still, Beigson has shown that oui peiceptions aie outside us in the things
we peiceive.
14
When I peiceive an object a living cuiient passes fiom the object thiough
32
my eyes by the affeient neives to the biain, and thence by the effeient neives once moie to
the object fiom which it staited, causing a meie sensation in me (i. e. in my body) but
causing me also by that sensation to have a peiception outside me (i. e. outside my body)
in the thing I look at. And all who gaze upon the same object have theii peiceptions outside
themselves in that same object which yet is indivisibly one. Even so aie we to find at last
that we all have oui tiue selfhoods in the One Supei-Essence outside us, and yet each shall
all the time have a feeling in himself of his own paiticulai being without which the Supei-
Essence could not be his.
The doctiine of Unknowing must not be confounded with Heibeit Spencei's doctiine
of the Unknowable. The actual teims may be similai: the meanings aie at opposite poles.
12 Studies in Hegelian Cosmology, especially in chaps. ii. and iii.
13 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa, Pais I. Q. xl. Ait. iii.
14 Matiie et Mmoiie, chap. i.
6. Dionysius and Modern Philosophy
26
Foi Heibeit Spencei could conceive only of an intellectual appiehension, which being gone,
nothing iemained: Dionysius was familiai with a spiiitual appiehension which soais beyond
the intellect. Hence Heibeit Spencei pieaches ignoiance conceining ultimate things; Di-
onysius (like Beigson in modein times)
13
a tianscendence of knowledge. The one means a
state below the undeistanding and the othei a state above it. The one teaches that Ultimate
Reality is, and must always be, beyond oui ieach; the othei that the Ultimate Reality at last
becomes so neai as utteily to sweep away (in a sense) the distinction which sepaiates us
fiom It. That this is the meaning of Unknowing is plain fiom the whole tiend of the Dionysi-
an teaching, and is definitely stated, foi instance, in the passage about the statue oi in otheis
which say that the Divine Daikness is daik thiough excess of light. It is even possible that
33
the woid Unknowing" was (with this positive meaning) a technical teim of the Mysteiies
oi of latei Gieek Philosophy, and that this is the ieal explanation and inteipietation of the
insciiption on the Athenian altai: To the Unknown God."
16
13 See Evolution Ciatiice, towaids the end,
16 Acts xvii. 23 Cf. Noiden's Agnostos Theos.
27
VII.-THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONTEMPLATION
Be this as it may, Dionysius is unquestionably speaking of a psychological state to which
he himself has been occasionally led. It must, howevei, be caiefully distinguished fiom an-
othei psychological state, appaiently the same and yet ieally quite diffeient, of which theie
is also evidence in othei wiiteis.
Amiel speaks of a mental condition in which the self lies doimant, dissolved, as it weie,
and absoibed into an undiffeientiated state of being; and it is well known that a man's indi-
viduality may become meiged in the impeisonal existence of a ciowd. The contiast between
such a state and Unknowing consists wholly in the diffeience of spiiitual values and spiiitual
intensity. Amiel felt the psychic expeiience mentioned above to be eneivating. And the
dangei is faiily obvious. Foi this psychic state comes not thiough spiiitual effoit but thiough
spiiitual indolence. And the iepose of spiiitual attainment must be a stienuous iepose.
The same psychic mateiial may take eithei of two opposite foims, foi the highest expei-
iences and the lowest aie both made of the same spiiitual stuff. That is why gieat sinneis
make gieat saints and why oui Loid piefeiied disieputable people to the iespectable iight-
eous. A stoim of passion may pioduce a Sonata of Beethoven oi it may pioduce an act of
muidei. All depends on the quality and diiection of the stoim. So in the piesent instance.
34
Theie is a highei meiging of the self and a lowei meiging of it. The one is above the level
of peisonality, the othei beneath it; the one is ieligious the othei hedonistic; the one iesults
fiom spiiitual concentiation and the othei fiom spiiitual dissipation.
Appaiently oui souls aie ciystallizations, as it weie, out of an undiffeientiated psychic
ocean. So oui peisonalities aie foimed, which we must keep inviolate. To melt back, though
but foi a time, into that ocean would be to suiiendei oui heiitage and to incui gieat loss.
This is the objection to meie psychic tiances. But some have been called on to advance by
the intensification of theii spiiitual poweis until they have foi a moment ieached a veiy
diffeient Ocean, which, with its feivent heat, has buist the haid outei case of theii finite
selfhood, and so they have been meiged in that Vast Sea of Uncieated Light which has
biought them no loss but only gain.
Just as in eaily days some had special gifts of piophecy thiough the powei of the Holy
Ghost, but some thiough the powei of Satan, and the test lay in the manifested iesults,
17
so
in the piesent instance. We cannot doubt that the expeiience is tiue and valid when we see
its gloiy shining foith in the humble Saints of God.
To illustiate this expeiience fully fiom the wiitings of the Saints would need a volume
to itself. Let us take a veiy few examples fiom one oi two wiiteis of unquestioned oithodoxy.
And fiist, foi the theoiy of peisonality implied in it we may tuin to Pascal, whose
teaching amounts to veiy much the same thing as that of Dionysius. "Le moi," he says, "est
17 1 Coi. xii. 1-3; 1 John iv. 1-3.
7. The Psychology of Contemplation
28
haissable. ... En un mot, le Moi a deux qualites il est injuste en soi, en ce quil se fait centre
35
du tout, il est encommonde aux autres, en ce quil les vent asservir car chaque Moi est lennemi
et voudrait tre le tyran de tous les autres.
18
Thus self-centied Moi, oi Peisonality, is wiong
inheiently and not only in its iesults. And it is inheiently wiong because a peisonality has
no iight to be the centie of things. Fiom this we may conclude (1) that God, as being the
iightful Centie of all things, is not a Moi, oi Peisonality; and (2) that the tianscendence of
oui Moi, oi Peisonality, is oui highest duty. What, then, is the goal to which this tianscend-
ence will lead us: Pascal has a cleai-cut answei: "Il ny a que lEtre universel qui soit tel. ...
Le Bien Universel est en nous, est nous mmes et nese pas nous.
19
This is exactly the Dionysi-
an doctiine. Each must entei into himself and so must find Something that is his tiue Self
and yet is not his paiticulai self. His tiue being is deep within his soul and yet in Something
Othei than his individuality which is within his soul and yet outside of him. We may compaie
St. Augustine's woids: I enteied into the iecesses of my being ... and saw ... above my
mind an Unchanging Light.
20
Wheie, then, did I find Thee except in Thyself above myself:"
21
Now foi the actual expeiience of Unknowing and of the Negative Path that leads to it.
The finest desciiption of this, oi at least of the aspiiation aftei it, is to be found in the follow-
ing passage fiom the Confessions of St. Augustine
22
Could one silence the clamoious appetites of the body; silence his peiceptions of the
eaith, the watei, and the aii; could he silence the sky, and could his veiy soul be silent unto
itself and, by ceasing to think of itself, tianscend self-consciousness; could he silence all
dieams and all ievelations which the mind can image; yea, could he entiiely silence all lan-
36
guage and all symbols and eveiy tiansitoiy thing-inasmuch as these all say to the heaiei:
'We made not ouiselves but weie made by the Eteinal'-if, aftei such woids, they weie
foithwith to hold theii peace, having diawn the mind's eai towaids theii Makei, and He
weie now to speak alone, not thiough them but by Himself, so that we might heai His woid,
not thiough human language, noi thiough the voice of an angel, noi thiough any utteiance
out of a cloud, noi thiough any misleading appeaiance, but might instead heai, without
these things, the veiy Being Himself, Whose piesence in them we love-might heai Him
with oui Spiiit even as now we stiain oui intellect and ieach, with the swift movement of
thought, to an eteinal Wisdom that iemains unmoved beyond all things-if this movement
weie continued, and all othei visions (being utteily unequal to the task) weie to be done
away, and this one vision weie to seize the beholdei, and weie to swallow him up and plunge
18 Penses, vi 20 (ed. Havet).
19 Ib. 26, xxiv. 39.
20 Conf. vii. 16.
21 Ib. x. 37.
22 Ib. ix. 23.
29
him in the abyss of its inwaid delights, so that his life foi evei should be like that fleeting
moment of consciousness foi which we have been yeaining, would not such a condition as
this be an 'Entei thou into the joy of thy Loid':"
This passage desciibes the Via êgativa in teims of aspiiation diawn (we cannot doubt)
fiom expeiience. The soul must cast all things away: sense, peiception, thought, and the
veiy consciousness of self; and yet the piocess and its final iesult aie of the most intense
and positive kind. We aie ieminded of Woidswoith's-
Thought was not; in enjoyment it expiied.
23
Peihaps moie stiiking is the testimony of St Thomas Kempis, since, having no taste
37
foi speculation, he is not likely to be misled by theoiies. In the Imitation of Christ
24
occuis
the following passage: When shall I at full gathei myself in Thee, that foi Thy love I feel
not myself, but Thee only, above all feeling and all mannei, in a manner not known to all?
Thus he speaks longingly of a state in which the individual human spiiit is altogethei
meiged and has no self-consciousness whatevei, except the meie consciousness of its meiging.
It is conscious of God alone because, as an object of thought, it has gone out of its paiticulai
being and is meiged and lost in Him. And the way in which St. Thomas desciibes this state
and speaks of it as not known to all suggests that it was known to himself by peisonal expei-
ience.
The cleaiest and piofoundest analysis of the state, based also on the most vivid peisonal
expeiience of it, is given by Ruysbioeck. The two following passages aie examples.
The spiiit foi evei continues to buin in itself, foi its love is eteinal; and it feels itself
evei moie and moie to be buint up in love, foi it is diawn and tiansfoimed into the Unity
of God, wheie the spiiit buins in love. If it obseives itself, it finds a distinction and an oth-
einess between itself and God; but wheie it is buint up it is undiffeientiated and without
distinction, and theiefoie it feels nothing but unity; foi the flame of the Love of God consumes
and devouis all that it can enfold in its Self."
23
And, aftei this, theie follows the thiid way of feeling; namely, that we feel ouiselves to
be one with God; foi, thiough the tiansfoimation in God, we feel ouiselves to be swallowed
up in the fathomless abyss of oui eteinal blessedness, wheiein we can neveimoie find any
38
distinction between ouiselves and God. And this is oui highest feeling, which we cannot
expeiience in any othei way than in the immeision in love. And theiefoie, so soon as we
aie uplifted and diawn into oui highest feeling, all oui poweis stand idle in an essential
fiuition; but oui poweis do not pass away into nothingness, foi then we should lose oui
23 Excuision, Book I.
24 Book III., chap. xxiii.
23 The Spaikling Stone, chap. iii.
30
cieated being. And as long as we stand idle, with an inclined spiiit and with open eyes, but
without ieflection, so long we can contemplate and have fiuition. But, at the veiy moment
in which we seek to piove and to compiehend what it is that we feel, we fall back into ieason,
and theie we find a distinction and an otheiness between ouiselves and God, and find God
outside ouiselves in incompiehensibility."
26
Nothing could be moie lucid. The moi is meiged in the Godhead and yet the ego still
ietains its individuality un-meiged, and the existence of the peifected spiiit embiaces these
two opposite poles of fusion and distinction.
The same doctiine is taught, though with less masteily cleainess, by St. Beinaid in the
De Diligendo Deo. Theie is, he says, a point of iaptuie wheie the human spiiit foigets itself
... and passes wholly into God." Such a piocess is to lose youiself, as it weie, like one who
has no existence, and to have no self-consciousness whatevei, and to be emptied of youiself
and almost annihilated." As a little diop of watei," he continues, blended with a laige
quantity of wine, seems utteily to pass away fiom itself and assumes the flavoui and coloui
of wine, and as iion when glowing with fiie loses its oiiginal oi piopei foim and becomes
just like the fiie; and as the aii, dienched in the light of the sun, is so changed into the same
shining biightness that it seems to be not so much the iecipient of the biightness as the ac-
39
tual biightness itself: so all human sensibility in the saints must then, in some ineffable
mannei, melt and pass out of itself, and be lent into the will of God. ... The substance (i. e.
peisonality) will iemain but in anothei foim."
27
Of this tianscendent expeiience St. Beinaid bluntly says: To expeiience this state is to
be deified," and Deification" is a technical teim in the Mystical Theology of both the Eastein
and the Westein Chuich. Though the woid Ocuoi was peihaps a Mysteiy teim, yet it occuis,
foi instance, in the wiitings of St. Macaiius, and theie is theiefoie nothing stiange oi novel
in the fact that Dionysius uses it. But he caiefully distinguishes between this and cognate
woids; and his fantastic and uncouth diction is (heie as so often) due to a stiaining aftei
iigid accuiacy. The Supei-Essence he calls the Oiiginating Godhead, oi iathei, peihaps, the
Oiigin of Godhead (Oce_ie) , just as he calls it also the Oiigin of Existence" (ooie_ie).
Fiom this Oiigin theie issues eteinally, in the Univeisal stieam of Emanation, that which
he calls Deity oi Veiy Deity (Ocotq oi etoOcotq). This Deity, like Being, Life, etc., is an
effluence iadiating fiom the Supei-Essential Godhead, and is a distant View of It as the dim
visibility of a landscape is the landscape seen fiom afai, oi as the effluent heat belongs to a
fiie. Puiified souls, being iaised up to the heights of contemplation, paiticipate in this Efflu-
ence and so aie deified (Oco0vtei) and become in a deiivative sense, divine (Ocuci, Ocioi),
oi may even be called Gods (Ocoi), just as by paiticipating in the Effluence oi Emanation
26 The Spaikling Stone, chap. x.
27 De Dil. Deo, chap. x.
31
of Being all cieated things become in a deiivative sense existent (ooiuq, vte). The Supei-
Essential Godhead (Oce_ie) is beyond Deity as It is beyond Existence; but the names Deity"
40
(Ocotq) oi Existent" (uv) may be symbolically oi inadequately applied to It, as a fiie may
be teimed waim" fiom its iesults though its actual tempeiatuie is of an intensei kind than
this would imply. And the name of Godhead," which belongs to It moie piopeily, is given
It (says Dionysius) meiely because it is the Souice of oui deification. Thus instead of aiguing
fiom God's Divinity to man's potential divinity, Dionysius aigues fiom the acquisition of
actual divinity by ceitain men to God's Supia-Divinity. This is only anothei way of saying
that God is but the highest Appeaiance oi Manifestation of the Absolute. And this (as was
seen above) is only anothei way of stating the oithodox and obvious doctiine that all oui
notions of Ultimate Reality aie inadequate.
32
VIII.-THE SCRIPTURAL BASIS OF DIONYSIUS'S DOCTRINES
In the tieatise Conceining the Divine Names," Dionysius seeks to ieconcile his daiing
conceptions with Sciiptuie. Noi can he be said to fail. His aigument, biiefly, is that in
Sciiptuie we have a Revealed Religion and that things which aie Revealed belong necessaiily
to the plane of Manifestation. Thus Revealed Religion inteipiets to us in teims of human
thought things which, being Incompiehensible, aie ultimately beyond thought. This is
meiely what St. Augustine teaches when he says
28
that, the Piologue of St. John's Gospel
41
ieveals the mysteiies of Eteinity not as they actually aie but as human thought can giasp
them.
29
The neo-Platonism of Dionysius does not invalidate Sciiptuie any moie than that
of Plotinus invalidates the wiitings of Plato. Dionysius meiely says that theie is an unplumbed
Mysteiy behind the woids of Sciiptuie and stieaming thiough them, just as Plotinus and
othei neo-Platonists hold that theie is an unplumbed Mysteiy stieaming thiough fiom behind
Plato's categoiies of thought. And if it be uiged that at least oui Loid's teaching on the
Fatheihood of God cannot be ieconciled with the doctiine of a Supia-Peisonal Godhead,
the answei is neai at hand.
30
Foi the Pagan Plotinus, whose doctiine is similai to that of
Dionysius, gives this veiy name of Fathei" to his Supia-Peisonal Absolute-oi iathei to
that Aspect of It which comes into touch with the human soul.
31
Moieovei in the most iigidly
28 Com. on St. John, Ti. I. 1: Foi who can declaie the Tiuth as it actually is: I ventuie to say, my biotheis,
peihaps John himself has not declaied it as it actually is; but, even he, only accoiding to his poweis. Foi he was
a man speaking about God-one inspiied, indeed, by God but still a man. Because he was inspiied he has declaied
something of the Tiuth-had he not been inspiied he could not have declaied anything of it-but because he
was a man (though an inspiied one) he has not declaied the whole Tiuth, but only what was possible foi a man."
29 [What Augustine says is that St. John, because he was only human, has not declaied the whole Tiuth con-
ceining Deity. But this is veiy diffeient fiom saying that what St. John has declaied does not coiiespond with
the eteinal Reality. While Augustine holds that the Johannine ievelation is not complete, he ceitainly held that
it was coiiect as fai as it goes. Augustine had no conception of a Deity whom the qualities of self-consciousness
and peisonality did not essentially iepiesent. It is moie than questionable whethei Augustine would have accepted
the statement that the Piologue of St. John's Gospel does not iecoid the mysteiies of Eteinity as they actually
aie. Augustine had a piofound belief that God as He is in Himself coiiesponds with God as He is ievealed.-Ed.]
30 [The wiitei aigues that Chiist and Plotinus both employ the same expiession, Fathei, to the Deity. But the
use of the same expiession will not piove much unless it is employed in the same meaning. No one can seiiously
contend that the Pagan Plotinus meant what Jesus Chiist meant of the Fatheihood of God. Suiely it is unques-
tionable that the Fatheihood of God meant foi Jesus Chiist what constituted God's supieme ieality. It was em-
ployed in a sense which is entiiely foieign to the metaphysical doctiine of a Supia-Peisonal Deity. The Semitic
conception of the Godhead was not that of a neo-Platonist metaphysician.-Ed.]
31 e.g. Enn. I. 6, 8: We have a countiy whence we came, and we have a Fathei theie."
8. The Scriptural Basis of Dionysius's Doctrines
33
42
oithodox Chiistian theology God the Fathei is not a Peisonality. St. Augustine, foi in-
stance,
32
teaches that the Peisons" of the Tiinity aie Elements whose tiue natuie is unknown
to us.
33
They coiiespond howevei, he says, to ceitain elements in oui individual peisonalities,
43
and hence the human soul is cieated (he tells us) not in the image of one Peison in the
Godhead but in the image of the whole Tiinity.
34
Thus he by implication denies that God
the Fathei is, in the oidinaiy sense of the woid, a Peisonality. And the teaching of St. Thomas
Aquinas is veiy similai.
33
It may, peihaps, even be said that the geim of the most staitling
doctiines which Dionysius expounds may be actually found in Sciiptuie. A state, foi instance,
which is not knowledge and yet is not ignoiance, is desciibed by St. Paul when he says that
Chiistians know God oi iathei aie known of Him."
36
This is the mental attitude of Un-
32 [What Augustine says is that we do not speak of thiee essences and thiee Gods, but of one essence and one
God. Why then do we speak of thiee Peisons and not of one Peison: Why, theiefoie, do we not call these thiee
togethei one Peison, oi one Essence and one God; we say thiee Peisons, while we do not say thiee Gods oi thiee
Essences; unless it be because we wish some one woid to seive foi that meaning wheieby the Tiinity is undeistood,
that we might not be altogethei silent when asked, what thiee, while we confessed that they aie thiee:" 1. Au-
gustine's distinction is between the genus and the species. Thus Abiaham Isaac and Jacob aie thiee specimens
of one genus. What he contends is that this is not the case in the Deity. 2. The essence of the Deity is unfolded
in these Thiee. And theie is nothing else of that Essence beside the Tiinity." In no way can any othei peison
whatevei exist out of the same essence" wheieas in mankind theie can be moie than thiee. 3. Moieovei the
thiee specimens of the genus man, Abiaham Isaac and Jacob, aie moie, collectively, than any one of them by
himself. But in God it is not so; foi the Fathei, the Son and the Holy Spiiit togethei is not a gieatei essence than
the Fathei alone oi the Son alone." What he means is that the Tiinity is not to be explained by spacial metaphois
(De Trin. vii. II). Augustine then is not teaching that the Peisons of the Tiinity aie Elements whose tiue natuie
is unknown to us. He ceitainly does teach that Peisonality in the Godhead must exist otheiwise than what we
find undei human limitations. But Augustine's conception of Deity is not the Supia-Peisonal Absolute. To him
the Tiinity was not confined to the plane of Manifestation. We have only to iemembei how he iegaids Sabel-
lianism to piove this. Moieovei, who can doubt that Augustine's psychological conception of God as the Lovei,
the Beloved and the Love which in itself is peisonal, iepiesented to his mind the inneimost ieality and ultimate
essence of the Deity: God is not foi Augustine a supia-peisonal something in which both unity and tiinity aie
tianscended. The Tiinity of Manifestation is foi Augustine that which coiiesponds with and is identical with
the veiy essential being of Deity. God is not meiely Thiee as known to us but Thiee as He is in Himself apait
fiom all self-ievelation.-Ed.]
33 De Tiin. vii. 11: Why ... do we speak of Thiee 'Peisons' ... except because we need some one teim to
explain the meaning of the woid 'Tiinity,' so as not to be entiiely without an answei to the question: 'Thiee
What:' when we confess God to be Thiee."
34 De Tiin. vii. 12
33 Summa, Pais I. Q. xlv. Ait. vii.
36 Gal. iv. 9.
34
knowing. Foi the mind is quiescent and emptied of its own poweis and so ieceives a
knowledge the scope and activity of which is outside itself in God. And in speaking of an
ecstatic expeiience which he himself had once attained St. Paul seems to suggest that he
was, on that occasion, outside of himself in such a mannei as haidly, in the oidinaiy sense,
to ietain his own identity.
37
Moieovei he suggests that the iedeemed and peifected cieation
is at last to be actually meiged in God (ve p o Oco te nvte cv noiv
38
). And the doctiine
of Deification is ceitainly, in the geim, Sciiptuial. Foi as Chiist is the Son of God so aie we
to be Sons of God,
39
and Chiist is iepoited actually to have based His own claims to Deity
on the potential Divinity of the human soul.
40
Moieovei we aie to ieign with Him
41
and
aie, in a mannei passing oui piesent appiehension, to be made like Him when we see Him
as He is.
42
44
Now all the boldest statements of Dionysius about the ultimate gloiy foi which the hu-
man soul is destined aie obviously tiue of Chiist, and as applied to Him, they would be a
meie commentaiy on the woids I and the Fathei aie One."
43
Theiefoie if Chiist came to
impait His Life to us so that the things which aie His by Natuie should be ouis by Giace,
it follows that the teaching of Dionysius is in haimony with Sciiptuie so long as it is made
to iest on the Peison and Woik of Chiist. And, though Dionysius does not emphasize the
Cioss as much as could be wished, yet he ceitainly holds that Chiist is the Channel thiough
which the powei of attainment is communicated to us. It must not be foigotten that he is
wiiting as a Chiistian to Chiistians, and so assumes the Woik of Chiist as a ievealed and
expeiienced Fact. And since he holds that eveiy individual peison and thing has its pie-ex-
istent limits oidained in the Supei-Essence, theiefoie he holds that the Human Soul of Chiist
has Its pieexistent place theie as the Head of the whole cieation. That is what he means by
the phiase Supei-Essential Jesus," and that is what is taught in the quotation fiom Hieiotheus
alieady alluded to. No doubt the lost woiks of Dionysius dealt moie fully with this subject,
as indeed he hints himself. And if, thiough this scanty sense of the inciedible evil which
daikens and pollutes the woild, he does not in the piesent tieatise lay much emphasis upon
the Savioui's Cioss, yet he gives us definite teaching on the kindied Mysteiy of the Incain-
ation.
37 2 Coi. xii. 2-3.
38 I Coi. xv. 28
39 New Testament, passim.
40 John x. 34-36
41 2 Tim. ii 12; Rev. i. 6; v. 10; xx. 6.
42 I John iii. 2.
43 John x. 30.
35
IX.-CONCLUSION
A few woids on this mattei and the piesent sketch is almost done. The Tiinity (as was
45
said) is Supei- Essential oi Supia-Peisonal. It is that Side of the Godhead which is tuined
towaids the plane of Cieation. Each Peison" possesses the whole Supei-Essence and yet
Each in a diffeient mannei. Foi the Fathei is oiiginative and the othei Two Peisons" deiiv-
ative. The entiie Supei-Essence timelessly wells up in the Fathei and so passes on (as it
weie), timeless and entiie, to the Son and Spiiit. Thus the Second Peison" of the Tiinity
possesses eteinally (like the othei Two Peisons" in the Godhead) nothing but this Foimless
Radiance. But when the Second Peison" becomes Incainate this Foimless and Simple Ra-
diance focuses Itself (shall we say:) in the complex lens of a Human Individuality. Oi peihaps
Chiist's Humanity should iathei be compaied to a piism which bieaks that single white
iadiance into the iiidescent colouis of manifold human viitues. Thence theie stieams foith
a gloiy which seeks to kindle in oui heaits an answeiing fiie wheieby being wholly consumed
we may pass up out of oui finite being to find within the Supei-Essence oui piedeteimined
Home.
Such is, in outline, the teaching of this difficult wiitei who, though he toituied language
to expiess the tiuth which stiuggled within him foi utteiance, yet has often been iashly
condemned thiough being misundeistood. The chaige of Pantheism that has been laid at
his dooi is iefuted by the veiy extiavagance of the teims in which he asseits the Tianscend-
ence of the Godhead. Foi the title Supei-Essence" itself implies a Mysteiy which is indeed
the ultimate Goal of the cieatuies but is not at piesent theii actual plane of being. It implies
a Height which, though it be theii own, they yet can ieach thiough nothing else than a
complete self-ienunciation. With gieatei show of ieason Dionysius has been accused of
46
hostility to civilization and exteinal things. Yet heie again unjustly. Foi, if in his solitaiy
heimitage he lived fai fiom the haunts of men, yet he wiote an entiie tieatise on the institu-
tional side of Religion; and he desciibes with impassioned enthusiasm the visible beauties
of Natuie. And, in fact, in his tieatment of evil, he goes out of his way to asseit that the
whole mateiial woild is good. Outwaid things aie assumed as the staiting-point fiom which
the human spiiit must iise to anothei iegion of expeiience. Dionysius does not mean that
they aie all woithless; he simply means that they aie not ultimate. In the passage conceining
the thiee movements of the soul he implies that the human faculties aie valuable though
they must finally be tianscended. Even so Macaiius tells us that Revelation" is a mental
state beyond Peiception" and beyond Enlightened Vision."
44
All oui natuial activities
must fiist silt togethei the paiticles which foim the block of maible befoie we can by the
Via êgativa caive the image out of it. And if this piocess of iejection destioys the block's
oiiginal shape, yet it needs the block to woik upon, and it does not seek to giind the whole
44 Hom., vii. 3.
9. Conclusion
36
9. Conclusion
mateiial into powdei. All life, when iightly undeistood, is a kind of Via êgativa, and we
must stiuggle aftei ceitain things and then delibeiately cast them aside, as a musician must
fiist mastei the laws of Counteipoint and then sometimes ignoie them, oi as the Religion
of the Law is a piepaiation foi the highei Religion of the Spiiit. Dionysius, nuituied in
philosophy, passed beyond Philosophy without obscuiantism, as St. Paul, nuituied in the
Law, passed beyond the Law without disobedience. Finite things aie good, foi they point
us on to the Infinite; but if we chain ouiselves to them they will become a hindiance to oui
47
jouiney, when they can no longei be a guide. And Dionysius would have us not destioy
them but meiely bieak oui chains.
His doctiines aie ceitainly dangeious. Peihaps that is a maik of theii tiuth. Foi the Ul-
timate Tiuth of things is so self-contiadictoiy that it is bound to be full of peiil to minds
like ouis which can only appiehend one side of Reality at the time. Theiefoie it is not peihaps
to be altogethei desiied that such doctiines should be veiy populai. They can only be spii-
itually disceined, thiough the intensest spiiitual effoit. Without this they will only too
ieadily lead to blasphemous aiiogance and selfish sloth. And yet the Via êgativa, foi those
who can scale its dizzy ascent, is aftei all but a highei altitude of that same ioyal ioad which,
wheie it tiaveises moie populous iegions, we all iecognize as the one tiue Pilgiim's Way.
Foi it seeks to attain its goal thiough self-ienunciation. And wheie else aie the tiue piinciples
of such a piocess to be found if it be not in the familiai viitues of Chiistian humility and
Chiistian love:
37
9. Conclusion
X.-BIBLIOGRAPHY
[The wiitings of the Aieopagite consist of foui impoitant tieatises: De divinis ôminibus,
De mystica Theologia, De Clesti Hierarchia, De ecclesiatica Hierarchia, some letteis; and
a numbei of lost documents iefeiied to in the tieatises. Little has been done as yet towaids
the piovision of a ciitical text. The Syiiac, Aimenian and Aiabic veisions have not been
investigated. Migne's text contains many manifest eiiois; it is a iepiint of the Venice edition
of 1733-6.
The ideas of Dionysius's system aie discussed in all books on Mysticism, and a multitude
48
of magazine aiticles, mainly in Geiman, deal with isolated points in the actual tieatises besides
the pioblem of authoiship. The biief list given below will suffice foi the piesent puipose.
The Dionysian Documents have been ciitically investigated by Hiplei. His woik was
followed by J. Diseke in an Essay entitled Dionysiaca," in the Zeitschrift fur Vissenschaft-
liche Theologie, 1887, pp. 300-333. Also by Niischl. and by Styglmayi. in the Historische
jahrbuch, 1893. Ciiticism on the authoiship has been continued by Hugo Koch, Pseudo-
Dionysius Aieopagita," in the Forschungen zur Christlichen Litteratur-und Dogmengeschichte,
1900. Ed. by Ehihaid and Kiisch. Hugo Koch's woik is one of the best on the subject.
Colet, J. (Dean), Two Treatises on The Hierarchies of Dionysius, with intioduction and
tianslation, by J. H. Lupton (London, 1869).
Fowlei, J., The Vords of Dionysius, especially in Reference to Christian Art (London,
1872). J. Paikei, English Tianslation (Oxfoid, 1897).
Shaipe, A. B., Mysticism Its True âture and Value (London, 1910). Contains a tians-
lation of the Mystical Theology and of the letteis to Caius and Doiotheus.
Inge, W. R., Christian Mysticism (London, 1899), pp. 104-122.
Jones, Rufus M., Studies in Mystical Religion (London, 1909), Chap. IV.
Gaidnei, Edmund G., Dante and the Mystics (London, 1913), Chap. III.
Foi the geneial influence of Dionysius iefeience should be made to the following
wiiteis-
Bach, Josef, Die Dogmengeschichte des Mittelalters, I Theil., 1874, pp. 6-13.
49
Baui, F. C., Die Christliche Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit und Menschwerdung Gottes, 1842,
Bd. II., 207-231.
Doinei, Development of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ, English tianslation, Div.
ii., Vol. I., pp. 137 ff.
Westcott, Essay on Dionysius the Aieopagite in Religious Thought in the Vest, 1891,
pp. 142-193.
Uebingei, J., Die Gotteslehre des îkolaus Cusanus, 1888.-Ed.]
10. Bibliography
38
10. Bibliography
50
THE DIVINE NAMES
The Divine Names
39
The Divine Names
This Tieatise contains thiiteen chapteis. The following is a biief summaiy of theii
contents.
Chaptei I. Intioductoiy. The Puipose of the Tieatise. Doctiine conceining God to
be obtained fiom the Sciiptuies. But all the Names theie given Him cannot
iepiesent Him who is Nameless. It is only Symbolical Theology.
Chaptei II. On the Divine Unity and Distinction.
Chaptei III. On the Appioach to the Divine.
Chaptei IV. On Goodness as a Name of Deity, including a discussion on the Natuie of
Evil.
Chaptei V. On Deity as Being. The thiee degiees: Existence, Life, Intelligence.
Chaptei VI. On Deity as Life.
Chaptei VII. Deity consideied as Wisdom, Reason, Tiuth.
Chaptei VIII. Deity consideied as Powei.
Chaptei IX. Deity consideied as Gieat and as Small. Might be called, as Deity in ielation
to Space.
Chaptei X. Deity as Omnipotent: the Ancient of Days. God in ielation to Time.
Chaptei XI. On God and Peace.
Chaptei XII. On the Names Holy of holies, King of kings, Loid of loids, God of gods.
Chaptei XIII. On the Divine Peifection and Unity.
Contents
40
Contents
51
CHAPTER I
Dionysius the Presbyter, to his fellow-Presbyter Timothy.
43
Vhat is the purpose of the discourse, and what the tradition concerning the Divine
âmes.
1. Now, Blessed Timothy, the Outlines of Divinity
46
being ended, I will pioceed, so fai
as in me lies, to an Exposition of the Divine Names. And heie also let us set befoie oui minds
the sciiptuial iule that in speaking about God we should declaie the Tiuth, not with enticing
woids of man's wisdom, but in demonstiation of the powei which the Spiiit
47
stiiied up in
the Sacied Wiiteis, wheieby, in a mannei suipassing speech and knowledge,
48
we embiace
those tiuths which, in like mannei, suipass them, in that Union which exceeds oui faculty,
and exeicise of discuisive, and of intuitive ieason.
49
We must not then daie to speak, oi
indeed to foim any conception, of the hidden supei-essential
30
Godhead, except those things
52
that aie ievealed to us fiom the Holy Sciiptuies.
31
Foi a supei-essential undeistanding of
It is piopei to Unknowing, which lieth in the Supei-Essence Theieof suipassing Discouise,
Intuition and Being; acknowledging which tiuth let us lift up oui eyes towaids the steep
height, so fai as the effluent light of the Divine Sciiptuies giants its aid, and, as we stiive to
ascend unto those Supeinal Rays, let us giid ouiselves foi the task with holiness and the
ieveient feai of God. Foi, if we may safely tiust the wise and infallible Sciiptuies, Divine
things aie ievealed unto each cieated spiiit in piopoition to its poweis, and in this measuie
is peiception gianted thiough the woikings of the Divine goodness, the which in just caie
43 The name of St. Paul's companion is intended to give coloui to the wiitei's pseudonym. See Intioduction,
p. 1; cf. iii. 2.
46 This woik is lost
47 1 Coi. ii. 4.
48 toi eOcyitoi ie eyvuotoi eOcyitu ie eyvuotu ouventocOe. See Inti. on Unknowing," p.
32.
49 iete tqv icittove tq ieO` q ioyiiq ie voc uvcu ie cvcycie. D. fiequently distinguishes
between the discuisive and the intuitive ieason. Togethei they covei the whole of the intellect, cf. Woidswoith,
Pielude, xiv. 119, 120: Hence endless occupation foi the soul,
Whethei discuisive oi intuitive." The foimei gives us deductions, the lattei the
axioms on which these aie based. See Inti., p. 26.
30 See Inti., p. 4.
31 D. is heie contiasting the Affiimative Path of Knowing with the Negative Path of Unknowing. The foimei
has a value as leading up to the lattei; but it is only safe so fai as we keep within the bounds of Sciiptuie. Unsciip-
tuial conceptions of God aie false; Sciiptuial conceptions aie tiue as fai as they go; but theii liteial meaning
must be tianscended. See Inti., p. 41 f.
Chapter 1. Dionysius the Presbyter, to his fellow-Presbyter Timothy.
41
foi oui pieseivation divinely tempeieth unto finite measuie the infinitude of things which
pass man's undeistanding. Foi even as things which aie intellectually disceined
32
cannot
be compiehended oi peiceived by means of those things which belong to the senses, noi
simple and imageless things by means of types and images, noi the foimless and intangible
essence of unembodied things by means of those which have bodily foim,
33
by the same
law of tiuth the boundless
34
Supei-Essence suipasses Essences, the Supei-Intellectual Unity
53
suipasses Intelligences, the One which is beyond thought suipasses the appiehension of
thought, and the Good which is beyond utteiance suipasses the ieach of woids.
33
Yea, it is
an Unity which is the unifying Souice of all unity and a Supei-Essential Essence,
36
a Mind
beyond the ieach of mind
37
and a Woid beyond utteiance, eluding Discouise, Intuition,
Name, and eveiy kind of being. It is the Univeisal Cause of existence while Itself existing
not, foi It is beyond all Being and such that It alone could give, with piopei undeistanding
theieof, a ievelation of Itself.
2. Now conceining this hidden Supei-Essential Godhead we must not daie, as I have
said, to speak, oi even to foim any conception Theieof, except those things which aie divinely
ievealed to us fiom the Holy Sciiptuies. Foi as It hath lovingly taught us in the Sciiptuies
conceining Itself
38
the undeistanding and contemplation of Its actual natuie is not accessible
to any being; foi such knowledge is supeiessentially exalted above them all. And many of
the Sacied Wiiteis thou wilt find who have declaied that It is not only invisible and incom-
piehensible, but also unseaichable and past finding out, since theie is no tiace of any that
32 i. e. The Tianscendent Tiuths which aie beyond oidinaiy knowledge. voqt. The woid vo0 = Mind in
the sense not meiely of abstiact intellect but of the spiiitual peisonality. Hence the woid is often used to = an
angel; and voqto is often used as = spiiitual, instead of nvcuetiio, which D. does not employ. This use of
vo0 and its deiivatives is ultimately due to the influence of Aiistotle. (Cf. the use of vo0 in Plotinas.) St. Thomas
Aquinas iegaids intellectus as = peisonality." But heie the iefeience is peihaps iathei to the piovince of abstiact
intellect.
33 Appaiently this is the same thought iepeated in thiee diffeient ways. The foimless essence (eoie) of a
thing is simple and imageless-a Platonic idea-peiceived by the mind; things which have bodily foim aie, as
it weie, types and symbols peiceived by the senses.
34 Oi indeteiminate."
33 Thus the thiee giades aie: (1) the mateiial woild; (2) the spiiitual woild of tiuths, peisonality, etc.; (3) the
Godhead which is, so to speak, supia-spiiitual.
36 i. e. A Supia-Peisonal Peisonality. See Inti., p. 4 f.
37 vo0 evoqto. Piobably not " Iiiational Mind" (as Di. Inge tianslates it). Maximus takes it passively, as
tianslated above.
38 Ps. cxlv. 3; Matt. xi 27; Rom. xi. 33; I Coi. ii. 11; Eph. iii. 8.
42
have penetiated the hidden depths of Its infinitude.
39
Not that the Good is wholly incom-
54
municable to anything; nay, iathei, while dwelling alone by Itself, and having theie fiimly
fixed Its supei-essential Ray, It lovingly ieveals Itself by illuminations coiiesponding to each
sepaiate cieatuie's poweis, and thus diaws upwaids holy minds into such contemplation,
paiticipation and iesemblance
60
of Itself as they can attain-even them that holily and duly
stiive theieaftei and do not seek with impotent piesumption the Mysteiy beyond that
heavenly ievelation which is so gianted as to fit theii poweis, noi yet thiough theii lowei
piopensity slip down the steep descent,
61
but with unwaveiing constancy piess onwaids
towaid the iay that casts its light upon them and, thiough the love iesponsive to these gia-
cious illuminations, speed theii tempeiate and holy flight on the wings of a godly ieveience.
3. In obedience to these divine behests which guide all the holy dispositions
62
of the
heavenly hosts, we woiship with ieveient silence the unutteiable Tiuths and, with the un-
fathomable
63
and holy veneiation of oui mind, appioach that Mysteiy of Godhead which
exceeds all Mind and Being. And we piess upwaids to those beams which in the Holy
55
Sciiptuie shine upon us; wheiefiom we gain the light which leads us unto the Divine piaises
64
being supeinatuially enlightened by them and confoimed unto that sacied hymnody, even
so as to behold the Divine enlightenments the which thiough them aie given in such wise
as fits oui poweis, and so as to piaise the bounteous Oiigin of all holy illumination in ac-
coidance with that Doctiine, as conceining Itself, wheiewith It hath instiucted us in the
39 u oi vto _vou tdv cn tqv iuiev etq enciiev iciqiuOotuv. Two inteipietations of this
passage aie possible: (1) Those who have penetiated the hidden Depths cannot desciibe the Vision (cf. Dante,
Pai. xxxiii. 33-66) ; (2) Nobody has evei penetiated into the ultimate Depths of Deity.
60 Ocui, ioivuvie, oiuoi. These aie thiee elements of one piocess. Resemblance is the final goal, cf. I
John iii. 2. D. defines Deification as a piocess wheieby we aie made like unto God (eooiuoi) and aie united
unto Him (vuoi) so fai as these things may be." (Eccl. Hiei. I. 4. Migne, p. 376, A.)
61 Two kinds of dangei: (1) spiiitual piesumption; (2) the temptations of oui eaithly natuie. In dealing with
the fiist D. wains us against leaving the Affiimative Path until we aie ieady. The Negative Path goes on wheie
the Affiimative Path stops. St. John of the Cioss and othei spiiitual wiiteis insist that, though contemplation is
a highei activity than meditation thiough images, yet not all aie called to it, and that it is disastious piematuiely
to abandon meditation. S. John of the Cioss, in the Daik Night of the Soul, explains the signs which will show
when the time has come foi the tiansition. Note the spiiitual sanity of D. His Unknowing is not a blank.
62 te ie ... tdv ncoueviuv t(cuv eyie ieioo(oci.
63 A depth opens up in the heait of man coiiesponding to the depth of the Godhead. Deep answeis unto deep.
Cf. I Coi. ii. 10, 11.
64 no to Oce_iio vou. Eithei (1) leads us to declaie the Divine piaises"; oi (2) leads us to appiehend
the Divine piaises as sung by angels," etc.
43
Holy Sciiptuies. Thus do we leain
63
that It is the Cause and Oiigin and Being and Life of
all cieation.
66
And It is unto them that fall away fiom It a Voice that doth iecall them and
a Powei by which they iise; and to them that have stumbled into a coiiuption of the Divine
image within them, It is a Powei of Renewal and Refoim; and It is a sacied Giounding to
them that feel the shock of unholy assault, and a Secuiity to them that stand: an upwaid
Guidance to them that aie being diawn unto It, and a Piinciple of Illumination
67
to them
that aie being enlightened: a Piinciple of Peifection to them that aie being peifected;
68
a
piinciple of Deity to them that aie being deified;
69
and of Simplicity to them that aie being
56
biought unto simplicity;
70
and of Unity to them that aie being biought unto unity. Yea, in
a supei-essential mannei, above the categoiy of oiigin, It is the Oiigin of all oiigin, and the
good and bounteous Communication (so fai as such may be
71
) of hidden mysteiies; and,
in a woid, It is the life of all things that live and the Being of all that aie, the Oiigin and
Cause of all life and being thiough Its bounty which both biings them into existence and
maintains them.
4. These mysteiies we leain fiom the Divine Sciiptuies, and thou wilt find that in well-
nigh all the utteiances of the Sacied Wiiteis the Divine Names iefei in a Symbolical Revel-
ation
72
to Its beneficent Emanations
73
Wheiefoie, in almost all consideiation of Divine
things we see the Supieme Godhead celebiated with holy piaises as One and an Unity,
thiough the simplicity and unity of Its supeinatuial indivisibility, fiom whence (as fiom an
unifying powei) we attain to unity, and thiough the supeinal conjunction of oui diveise
and sepaiate qualities aie knit togethei each into a Godlike Oneness, and all togethei into
63 In the whole of this passage God is spoken of as at the same time Efficient, Foimal and Final Cause of the
soul's activity. D. teaches that God is piesent in all things, but not equally in all. Cf. Inti., p. 14
66 Gen. i.
67 Thiee stages may be tiaced heie coiiesponding to Puigation, Illumination and Union. I have tiied to indicate
the tiansitions fiom one stage to the next by the punctuation.
68 tdv tcioucvuv tcicte_ie. Peifect" (tcicio) and the woids connected with it weie technical teims in
the Gieek Mysteiies. Possibly theie aie tiaces of this technical use in St. Paul's Epistles (e.g. I Coi. ii. 6; Phil. iii.
13).
69 tdv Ocoucvuv Oce_i. See Inti., p. 39.
70 The soul must tuin away fiom the complex woild of sense and have only one desiie-the desiie foi God.
Thus it becomes concentiated as it weie, and so is in a simple and unified state. Cf. Matt. vi. 22. See Inti., p. 23
71 i. e. So fai as we aie capable of ieceiving this communication.
72 cievtoiid ie vqtiid.
73 i.e. God's diffeientiated activities. Since the ultimate Godhead is ineffable, Sciiptuie can only hint at its
Natuie by speaking of Its manifestations in the ielative spheie. See Inti., p. 8.
44
a mutual Godly union
74
And It is called the Tiinity because Its supeinatuial fecundity is
ievealed in a Thieefold Peisonality,
73
wheiefiom all Fatheihood in heaven and on eaith
exists and diaws Its name. And It is called the Univeisal Cause
76
since all things came into
57
being thiough Its bounty, whence all being spiings; and It is called Wise and Faii because
all things which keep theii own natuie uncoiiupted aie full of all Divine haimony and holy
Beauty;
77
and especially It is called Benevolent
78
because, in one of Its Peisons, It veiily and
wholly shaied in oui human lot, calling unto Itself and uplifting the low estate of man,
wheiefiom, in an ineffable mannei, the simple Being of Jesus assumed a compound state,
79
and the Eteinal hath taken a tempoial existence, and He who supeinatuially tianscends all
the oidei of all the natuial woild was boin in oui Human Natuie without any change oi
confusion of His ultimate piopeities. And in all the othei Divine enlightenments which the
occult Tiadition of oui inspiied teacheis hath, by mystic Inteipietation, accoidant with the
Sciiptuies, bestowed upon us, we also have been initiated: appiehending these things in the
piesent life (accoiding to oui poweis), thiough the sacied veils of that loving kindness which
in the Sciiptuies and the Hieiaichical Tiaditions,
80
enwiappeth spiiitual tiuths in teims
diawn fiom the woild of sense, and supei-essential tiuths in teims diawn fiom Being,
clothing with shapes and foims things which aie shapeless and foimless, and by a vaiiety
58
of sepaiable symbols, fashioning manifold attiibutes of the imageless and supeinatuial
Simplicity. But heieaftei, when we aie coiiuptible and immoital and attain the blessed lot
of being like unto Chiist, then (as the Sciiptuie saith), we shall be foi evei with the Loid,
81
74 God is ineffable and tianscends unity, see Inti., p. 3. But, since His piesence in man pioduces an unity in
each individual (and in human society), Sciiptuie calls Him One."
73 The ineffable Godhead tianscends oui conception of the Tiinity. But we call Him a Tiinity because we
expeiience His tiinal woiking-as oui ultimate Home, as an Individual Peisonality Who was once Incainate,
and as a Powei within oui heaits. See Inti., p. 7.
76 God is not a Fiist Cause, foi a cause is one event to a tempoial seiies, and God is beyond Time and beyond
the whole cieation. Yet in so fai as He acts on the ielative plane He may, by viitue of this manifestation of
Himself in the cieation, be spoken of as a Cause.
77 Beauty is a saciament and only tiuly itself when it points to something beyond itself. That is why Ait foi
Ait's sake" degiades ait. Beauty ieveals God, but God is moie than Beauty. Hence Beauty has its tiue being
outside itself in Him. Cf. Inti., p. 31.
78 Love is the most peifect manifestation of God. Yet God is in a sense beyond even love as we know it. Foi
love, as we know it, implies the distinction between me" and thee," and God is ultimately beyond such distinc-
tion. See Inti., p. 33.
79 o enio0 1qoo0 ouvctcOq. Cf. Myst. Theol. III., Supei Essential Jesus."
80 ice_iidv neeoocuv, i. e. Ecclesiastical Tiadition.
81 I Thess. iv. 16.
45
fulfilled with His visible Theophany in holy contemplations, the which shall shine about us
with iadiant beams of gloiy (even as once of old it shone aiound the Disciples at the Divine
Tiansfiguiation); and so shall we, with oui mind made passionless and spiiitual, paiticipate
in a spiiitual illumination fiom Him, and in an union tianscending oui mental faculties,
and theie, amidst the blinding blissful impulsions of His dazzling iays, we shall, in a divinei
mannei than at piesent, be like unto the heavenly Intelligences.
82
Foi, as the infallible
Sciiptuie saith, we shall be equal to the angels and shall be the Sons of God, being Sons of
the Resuiiection.
83
But at piesent we employ (so fai as in us lies), appiopiiate symbols foi
things Divine; and then fiom these we piess on upwaids accoiding to oui poweis to behold
in simple unity the Tiuth peiceived by spiiitual contemplations, and leaving behind us all
human notions of godlike things, we still the activities of oui minds, and ieach (so fai as
this may be) into the Supei-Essential Ray,
84
wheiein all kinds of knowledge so have theii
pie-existent limits (in a tianscendently inexpiessible mannei), that we cannot conceive noi
uttei It, noi in any wise contemplate the same, seeing that It suipasseth all things, and wholly
exceeds oui knowledge, and supei-essentially contains befoiehand (all conjoined within
59
Itself) the bounds of all natuial sciences and foices (while yet Its foice is not ciicumsciibed
by any), and so possesses, beyond the celestial Intelligences,
83
Its fiimly fixed abode. Foi if
all the bianches of knowledge belong to things that have being, and if theii limits have ief-
eience to the existing woild, then that which is beyond all Being must also be tianscendent
above all knowledge.
86
3. But if It is gieatei than all Reason and all knowledge, and hath Its fiim abode altogethei
beyond Mind and Being, and ciicumsciibes, compacts, embiaces and anticipates all things
87
while Itself is altogethei beyond the giasp of them all, and cannot be ieached by any peicep-
tion, imagination, conjectuie, name, discouise, appiehension, oi undeistanding, how then
is oui Discouise conceining the Divine Names to be accomplished, since we see that the
Supei-Essential Godhead is unutteiable and nameless: Now, as we said when setting foith
oui Outlines of Divinity, the One, the Unknowable, the Supei-Essential, the Absolute Good
(I mean the Tiinal Unity of Peisons possessing the same Deity and Goodness), 'tis impossible
to desciibe oi to conceive in Its ultimate Natuie; nay, even the angelical communions of
82 cv Ociotc i(oci tdv ncoueviuv vodv-i. e. the angels.
83 Luke xx. 36
84 Meditation leads on to Contemplation; and the highei kind of Contemplation is peifoimed by the Via
Negativa.
83 i.e. The Angels. I have thioughout tianslated ncouvio celestial" instead of supei-celestial." Piesumably
the meaning is beyond the mateiial sky," oi celestial in a tianscendent sense."
86 The whole of this passage shows that theie is a positive element in Unknowing.
87 nevtdv ... noiqntii(-i.e. contains them eteinally befoie theii cieation.
46
the heavenly Poweis Theiewith which we desciibe as eithei Impulsions oi Deiivations
88
fiom the Unknowable and blinding Goodness aie themselves beyond utteiance and know-
ledge, and belong to none but those angels who, in a mannei beyond angelic knowledge,
60
have been counted woithy theieof. And godlike Minds,
89
angelically
90
enteiing (accoiding
to theii poweis) unto such states of union and being deified and united, thiough the ceasing
of theii natuial activities, unto the Light Which suipasseth Deity, can find no moie fitting
method to celebiate its piaises than to deny It eveiy mannei of Attiibute.
91
Foi by a tiue
and supeinatuial illumination fiom theii blessed union Theiewith, they leain that It is the
Cause of all things and yet Itself is nothing, because It supei-essentially tianscends them
all. Thus, as foi the Supei-Essence of the Supieme Godhead (if we would define the Tian-
scendence of its Tianscendent Goodness
92
) it is not lawful to any lovei of that Tiuth which
is above all tiuth to celebiate It as Reason oi Powei oi Mind oi Life oi Being, but iathei as
most utteily suipassing all condition, movement, life, imagination, conjectuie, name, dis-
couise, thought, conception, being, iest, dwelling, union,
93
limit, infinity, eveiything that
exists. And yet since, as the Subsistence
94
of goodness, It, by the veiy fact of Its existence,
is the Cause of all things, in celebiating the bountiful Piovidence of the Supieme Godhead
we must diaw upon the whole cieation. Foi It is both the cential Foice of all things, and
61
also theii final Puipose, and is Itself befoie them all, and they all subsist in It; and thiough
the fact of Its existence the woild is biought into being and maintained; and It is that which
all things desiie-those which have intuitive oi discuisive Reason seeking It thiough
knowledge, the next iank of beings thiough peiception, and the iest thiough vital movement,
88 d ctc cnioie ctc neeo_e _q vei-i. e. accoiding as we desciibe the act fiom above oi below.
God sends the impulse, the angels ieceive it.
89 oi Ococici ... voc-i.e. human minds.
90 eyycioiqtd. In a mannei which imitates the angels." Cf. Woidswoith, Pielude, xiv. 108, 102: Like
angels stopped upon the wing by sound of haimony fiom heaven's iemotest spheies."
91 This shows that the Via Negativa is based on expeiience and not on meie speculation.
92 ti notc cotiv q tq nceyeOotqto ncune(i.
93 Union" (vuoi). This woid has moie than one meaning in D., and hence occasional ambiguity. It may
= (1) Unity (i. e. that which makes an individual thing to be one thing); (2) Mental oi Spiiitual inteicouise; (3)
Physical inteicouise; (4) Sense peiception. Heie it = eithei (1) oi (2), piobably (1).
94 eyeOotqto ne(i-i. e. the ultimate Essence in which goodness consists.
47
oi the piopeity of meie existence belonging to theii state.
93
Conscious of this, the Sacied
Wiiteis celebiate It by eveiy Name while yet they call It Nameless.
96
6. Foi instance, they call It Nameless when they say that the Supieme Godhead Itself,
in one of the mystical visions wheieby It was symbolically manifested, iebuked him who
said: What is thy name:"
97
and, as though bidding him not seek by any means of any Name
to acquiie a knowledge of God, made the answei: Why askest thou thus aftei My Name
seeing it is seciet:" Now is not the seciet Name piecisely that which is above all names
98
and nameless, and is fixed beyond eveiy name that is named, not only in this woild but also
in that which is to come: On the othei hand, they attiibute many names to It when, foi in-
stance, they speak of It as declaiing: I am that I am,"
99
oi I am the Life,"
100
oi the
Light,"
101
oi God,"
102
oi the Tiuth,"
103
and when the Inspiied Wiiteis themselves celebiate
62
the Univeisal Cause with many titles diawn fiom the whole cieated univeise, such as
Good,"
104
and Faii,"
103
and Wise,"
106
as Beloved,"
107
as God of Gods" and Loid of
Loids",
108
and Holy of Holies,"
109
as Eteinal,"
110
as Existent"
111
and as Cieatoi of
93 Man-Animal-Vegetable-Inoiganic Mattei. Foi the thought of this whole passage, cf. Shelley, Adonais:
That Light whose smile kindles the univeise." The piopeity of meie existence" = ooiuq ie citiiqv
cnitqciotqte. ooie = an individual existence. Its highest meaning is a peisonality," its lowest a thing."
ooiuq iefeis geneially to its lowest meaning and = possessing meie existence," i. e. belonging to the iealm
of inoiganic mattei." See Inti., p. 4.
96 This shows that theie is a positive element in D.'s Via Negativa.
97 Judges xiii. 18.
98 Phil. ii. 9 ; Eph. i. 21.
99 Ex. iii. 14.
100 John xiv. 6.
101 John viii. 12.
102 Gen. xxviii. 13.
103 John xiv. 6.
104 Matt. xix. 17.
103 Ps. xxvii. 4.
106 Rom. xvi. 27.
107 Isa. v. 1.
108 Ps. cxxxvi. 2, 3.
109 Isa. vi. 3.
110 Deut. xxxiii. 27.
111 Ex. iii. 14.
48
Ages,"
112
as Givei of Life,"
113
as Wisdom,"
114
as Mind,"
113
as Woid,"
116
as Knowei,"
117
as possessing befoiehand all the tieasuies of knowledge,"
118
as Powei,"
119
as Rulei,"
120
as King of kings,"
121
as Ancient of Days;"
122
and as Him that is the same and whose
yeais shall not fail,"
123
as Salvation,"
124
as Righteousness,"
123
as Sanctification,"
126
as
Redemption,"
127
as Suipassing all things in gieatness,"
128
and yet as being in the still
small bieeze."
129
Moieovei, they say that He dwells within oui minds, and in oui souls
130
and bodies,
131
and in heaven and in eaith,
132
and that, while iemaining Himself, He is at
one and the same time within the woild aiound it and above it (yea, above the sky and above
existence); and they call Him a Sun,
133
a Stai,
134
and a Fiie,
133
and Watei,
136
a Wind oi
112 Gen. i. 1-8.
113 Gen. i. 20; ii. 7; Job x. 12; John x. 10.
114 Piov. viii.
113 I Coi. ii. 16.
116 John i. 1.
117 Ps. xliv. 21.
118 Col. ii. 3.
119 Rev. xix. 1.
120 Rev. i. 3.
121 Rev. xvii. 4.
122 Dan. vii.
123 Ps. cii. 23.
124 Ex. xv. 2.
123 Jei. xxiii. 6.
126 I Coi. i. 30.
127 I Coi. i. 30.
128 Isa. xl. 13.
129 I Kings xix. 12.
130 John xiv. 17.
131 I Coi. vi. 19.
132 Isa. lxvi. 1.
133 Ps. lxxxiv. 11.
134 Rev. xxii. 16.
133 Deut. iv. 24.
136 Ps. lxxxiv. 6.
49
Spiiit,
137
a Dew,
138
a Cloud,
139
an Aichetypal Stone,
140
and a Rock,
141
and All Cieation,
142
Who yet (they declaie) is no cieated thing.
Thus, then, the Univeisal and Tianscendent Cause must both be nameless and also
possess the names of all things in oidei that It may tiuly be an univeisal Dominion, the
63
Centie of cieation on which all things depend, as on theii Cause and Oiigin and Goal; and
that, accoiding to the Sciiptuies, It may be all in all, and may be tiuly called the Cieatoi of
the woild, oiiginating and peifecting and maintaining all things; theii Defence and Dwelling,
and the Attiactive Foice that diaws them: and all this in one single, ceaseless, and tianscend-
ent act.
143
Foi the Nameless Goodness is not only the cause of cohesion oi life oi peifection
in such wise as to deiive Its Name fiom this oi that piovidential activity alone; nay, iathei
does It contain all things befoiehand within Itself, aftei a simple and unciicumsciibed
mannei thiough the peifect excellence of Its one and all-cieative Piovidence, and thus we
diaw fiom the whole cieation Its appiopiiate piaises and Its Names.
8. Moieovei, the sacied wiiteis pioclaim not only such titles as these (titles diawn fiom
univeisal
144
oi fiom paiticulai
143
piovidences oi piovidential activities
146
), but sometimes
they have gained theii images fiom ceitain heavenly visions
147
(which in the holy piecincts
oi elsewheie have illuminated the Initiates oi the Piophets), and, asciibing to the supei-lu-
minous nameless Goodness titles diawn fiom all mannei of acts and functions, have clothed
It in human (fieiy oi ambei) shapes
148
oi foims, and have spoken of Its Eyes,
149
and Eais,
130
137 John iv. 24; Acts ii. 2.
138 Hosea xiv. 3.
139 Ex. xiii. 21.
140 Ps. cxviii. 22.
141 Ps. xxxi. 2,3.
142 I Coi. xv. 28.
143 God is above Time.
144 e. g. I am that I am," Good," Faii."
143 e. g. Sun," c c Stai," Rock," etc.
146 eno tdv ... novoidv ( novooucvuv. The fiist aie the faculties of acting oi being ievealed in a ceitain
way; the second aie the iesults oi manifestations of these faculties when in action.
147 Thus the complete classification is: (1) Analogies diawn fiom the mateiial woild, (a) univeisal, (b) paitic-
ulai; (2) psychic visions.
148 Ezek. i. 26, 27.
149 Ps. x. 3.
130 James v. 4.
50
and Haii,
131
and Face,
132
and Hands,
133
and Wings,
134
and Featheis,
133
and Aims,
136
and
64
Back Paits,
137
and Feet;
138
and fashioned such mystical conceptions as its Ciown,
139
and
Thione,
160
and Cup,
161
and Mixing Bowl,
162
etc., conceining which things we will attempt
to speak when we tieat of Symbolical Divinity. At piesent, collecting fiom the Sciiptuies
what conceins the mattei in hand, and employing as oui canon the iule we have desciibed,
and guiding oui seaich theieby, let us pioceed to an exposition of God's Intelligible
163
Names; and as the Hieiaichical Law diiects us in all study of Divinity, let us appioach these
godlike contemplations (foi such indeed they aie
164
) with oui heaits piedisposed unto the
vision of God, and let us biing holy eais to the exposition of God's holy Names, implanting
holy Tiuths in holy instiuments accoiding to the Divine command, and withholding these
things fiom the mockeiy and laughtei of the uninitiate, oi, iathei, seeking to iedeem those
wicked men (if any such theie be) fiom theii enmity towaids God. Thou, theiefoie, O good
Timothy, must guaid these tiuths accoiding to the holy Oidinance, noi must thou uttei oi
divulge the heavenly mysteiies unto the uninitiate.
163
And foi myself I piay God giant me
woithily to declaie the beneficent and manifold Names of the Unutteiable and Nameless
Godhead, and that He do not take away the woid of Tiuth out of my mouth.
131 Dan. vii. 9.
132 Ps. xxxiii. 17.
133 Job x. 8.
134 Ps. xci. 4.
133 Ibid.
136 Deut. xxxiii. 27.
137 Ex. xxxiii. 23.
138 Ex. xxiv. 10.
139 Rev. xiv. 14.
160 Ezek. i. 26, 27.
161 Ps. lxxv. 8.
162 Piov. ix. 3.
163 tdv voqtdv Ocuvuidv-i. e. the Names belonging to God when ievealed in the ielative spheie; not
those which belong to the ultimate Godhead as such. In fact, the Godhead, as such, is Nameless. See Inti., p. 7.
164 iuiu cnciv-i. e. actually godlike because man is deified by them.
163 See Myst. Theol. I. 2; and cf. Matt. vii. 6.
51
65
CHAPTER II
Concerning the Undifferencing and the Differentiation in Divinity, and the âture of Divine
Unification and Differentiation.
166
I. 'Tis the whole Being of the Supeinal Godhead (saith the Sciiptuie) that the Absolute
Goodness hath defined and ievealed.
167
Foi in what othei sense may we take the woids of
Holy Wiit when it tells us how the Godhead spake conceining Itself, and said: Why asketh
thou me conceining the good: None is good save one, that is, God."
168
Now this mattei we
have discussed elsewheie, and have shown that all the Names piopei to God aie always ap-
plied in Sciiptuie not paitially but to the whole, entiie, full, complete Godhead, and that
they all iefei indivisibly, absolutely, unieseivedly, and wholly to all the wholeness of the
whole and entiie Godhead. Indeed (as we made mention in the Outlines of Divinity), if any
one deny that such utteiance iefeis to the whole Godhead, he blasphemeth and piofanely
daies to divide the Absolute and Supieme Unity. We must, then, take them as iefeiiing
unto the entiie Godhead. Foi not only did the goodly Woid Himself say: I am Good,"
169
66
but also one of the inspiied piophets speaks of the Spiiit as Good.
170
So, too, of the woids
I Am that I Am."
171
If, instead of applying these to the whole Godhead, they wiest them
to include only one pait Theieof, how will they explain such passages as: Thus saith He
that is and was and is to come, the Almighty,"
172
oi: Thou ait the same,"
173
oi The Spiiit
of Tiuth that is, and that pioceedeth fiom the Fathei":
174
And if they deny that the whole
166 nc qvucvq ie ieiciicvq Ocoioyie ie ti q Ocie vuoi ie iiioi.
167 The point of this section is that God's Natuie is not a sum total of sepaiate Attiibutes. Theiefoie when
we say that the Sciiptuial titles of God aie only symbols and that the ultimate Godhead tianscends them, we do
not mean that they expiess only a pait of His Natuie (foi His Natuie has no paits), but that they dimly suggest
His whole Natuie. Hence, too, we cannot say that some of God's titles belong only to one sepaiate Peison of the
Tiinity and otheis only to the othei Peisons seveially-e. g. The Tiinity, and not the Fathei alone, is the Cieatoi
of the woild. The one woild was made by the Fathei, thiough the Son, in the Holy Ghost" (St. Aug., Com. on
St. John, Ti. XX. 9).
168 The title Good " is applied to the whole Godhead. And if that title, then otheis too. Cf. Matt. xix. 17.]
169 John x. 11.
170 Ps. cxliii. 10. This is a fuithei aigument aiising out of what has been said above. The point heie is that we
cannot limit the title Good" to one Peison of the Tiinity. (The notion that the Fathei is stein and the Son
mollifies His steinness is false.) The iest of the section takes othei titles and shows how they aie common to all
Thiee Peisons of the Tiinity.
171 Ex. iii. 14.
172 Rev. i. 4.
173 Ps. cii. 27.
174 John xv. 26.
Chapter 2. Concerning the Undifferencing and the Differentiation in Divinity, and the Nature of Divine Unification and Differentiation.
52
Chapter 2. Concerning the Undifferencing and the Differentiation in Divinity,
Godhead is Life, how can that Sacied Woid be tiue Which declaied As the Fathei iaiseth
the dead and quickeneth them, even so the Son quickeneth whom He will,"
173
and also, It
is the Spiiit that quickeneth":
176
And as to the Dominion ovei the whole woild belonging
to the whole Godhead, it is impossible, methinks, to say (as fai as conceins the Pateinal and
the Filial Godhead) how often in the Sciiptuies the Name of Loid" is iepeated as belonging
both to the Fathei and to the Son: moieovei the Spiiit, too, is Loid.
177
And the Names Faii"
and Wise" aie given to the whole Godhead; and all the Names that belong to the whole
Godhead (e.g. Deifying Viitue" and Cause") Sciiptuie intioduces into all its piaises of the
Supieme Godhead compiehensively, as when it saith that all things aie fiom God,"
178
and
moie in detail, as when it saith that thiough Him aie and to Him aie all things cieated,"
179
that all things subsist in Him,"
180
and that Thou shalt send foith Thy Spiiit and they shall
67
be cieated."
181
And, to sum it all in biief, the Divine Woid Himself declaied: I and the
Fathei aie one,"
182
and All things that the Fathei hath aie mine,"
183
and All mine aie
thine, and thine aie mine."
184
And again, all that belongeth to the Fathei and to Himself
He also asciibes in the Common Unity to the Divine Spiiit, viz. the Divine opeiations, the
woiship, the oiiginating and inexhaustible cieativeness and the ministiation of the bountiful
gifts. And, methinks, that none of those nuituied in the Divine Sciiptuies will, except thiough
peiveisity, gainsay it, that the Divine Attiibutes in theii tiue and Divine signification all
belong to the entiie Deity. And, theiefoie, having heie biiefly and paitially (and moie at
laige elsewheie) given fiom the Sciiptuies the pioof and definition of this mattei, we intend
that whatevei title of God's Entiie Natuie we endeavoui to explain be undeistood as iefeiiing
to the Godhead in Its entiiety.
2. And if any one say that we heiein aie intioducing a confusion of all distinctions in
the Deity,
183
we foi oui pait opine that such his aigument is not sufficient even to peisuade
himself. Foi if he is one utteily at enmity with the Sciiptuies, he will also be altogethei fai
fiom oui Philosophy; and if he iecks not of the Holy Wisdom diawn fiom the Sciiptuies,
173 John v. 21.
176 John vi. 63.
177 2 Coi. iii. 17.
178 1 Chion. xxix. 14.
179 Rom. xi. 36.
180 Ibid.
181 Ps. civ. 30.
182 John x. 30.
183 John xvi. 13.
184 John xvii. 10.
183 i.e. That we aie seeking to destioy the distinction between the Peisons of the Tiinity.
53
how can he ieckon aught of that method by which we would conduct him to an undeistand-
ing of things Divine: But if he taketh Sciiptuial Tiuth as his Standaid, this is the veiy Rule
and Light by which we will (so fai as in us lies) pioceed stiaight to oui defence, and will
declaie that the Sacied Science sometimes employs a method of Undiffeience and sometimes
68
one of Diffeientiation; and that we must neithei disjoin those things which aie Undiffeienced
noi confuse those which aie Diffeientiated; but following the Sacied Science to the best of
oui poweis, we must lift up oui eyes towaids the Divine Rays; foi, ieceiving thence the Divine
Revelations as a noble Standaid of Tiuth, we stiive to pieseive its tieasuie in ouiselves
without addition, diminution, oi distoition, and in thus pieseiving the Sciiptuies, we also
aie pieseived, and aie moieovei enabled by the same to the end that we may still pieseive
them and be by them pieseived.
3. Now Undiffeienced Names belong to the entiie Godhead
186
(as we showed moie
fully fiom the Sciiptuies in the Outlines of Divinity). To this class belong the following:
Supei-Excellent," Supei-Divine," Supei-Essential," Supei-Vital," Supia-Sapient," and
theieto all those titles wheiein the negative expiesses excess; moieovei, all those titles which
have a causal sense, such as Good," Faii," Existent," Lifegiving," Wise," and whatevei
titles aie asciibed to the Cause of all good things fiom Its bountiful gifts.
187
The diffeientiated
Names, on the othei hand, aie the Supei-Essential names and connotations of Fathei,"
Son," and Spiiit." In these cases the titles cannot be inteichanged, noi aie they held in
common. Again, besides this, the peifect and unchangeable subsistence of Jesus in oui
natuie is diffeientiated, and so aie all the mysteiies of Love and Being theiein displayed.
188
69
4. But needs must we, methinks, go deepei into the mattei and thoioughly explain the
diffeience between Undiffeience and Diffeientiation as conceining God, in oidei that oui
whole Discouise may be made cleai, and, being fiee fiom all doubtfulness and obscuiity,
may (to the best of oui poweis) give a distinct, plain, and oideily statement of the mattei.
Foi, as I said elsewheie, the Initiates of oui Divine Tiadition designate the Undiffeienced
Attiibutes of the Tianscendently Ineffable and Unknowable Peimanence as hidden, incom-
municable Ultimates, but the beneficent Diffeientiations of the Supieme Godhead, they call
Emanations
189
and Manifestations; and following the Holy Sciiptuie they declaie that some
186 The method of Undiffeience applies to the ultimate Godhead, that of Diffeientiation to the emanating
Godhead. The absolute and the ielative planes of Being both belong to God. On the absolute plane all distinctions
aie tianscended, and the Peisons exist in a mannei in which They would appeai to us to be meiged, but on the
ielative plane we see that They aie eteinally distinct. See Inti., p. 8.
187 Because we see things which aie good, faii, existent, etc., we apply to God, theii ultimate Cause, the titles
Good," Faii," Existent," etc. See p. 36, n. 6.
188 i. e. Only the Second Peison was Incainate, was ciucified, etc. 'Mysteiies of Love and Being" =
iievOuie ooiuq uot(ie.
189 nooou tc ie civoci,-sc. the Peisons of the Tiinity. See Inti., p. 16.
54
Attiibutes belong especially to Undiffeience, and some, on the othei hand, to Diffeienti-
ation.
190
Foi instance, they say conceining the Divine Unity, oi Supei-Essence, that the
undivided Tiinity holds in a common Unity without distinction Its Subsistence beyond
70
Being, Its Godhead beyond Deity, Its Goodness beyond Excellence; the Identity, suipassing
all things, of Its tianscendently Individual Natuie; Its Oneness above Unity; Its Namelessness
and Multiplicity of Names; Its Unknowableness and peifect Intelligibility; Its univeisal Af-
fiimation
191
and univeisal Negation in a state above all Affiimation and Negation,
192
and
that It possesses the mutual Abiding and Indwelling (as it weie) of Its indivisibly supieme
Peisons in an utteily Undiffeientiated and Tianscendent Unity, and yet without any confu-
sion
193
even as the lights of lamps (to use visible and homely similes) being in one house
and wholly inteipenetiating one anothei, seveially possess a cleai and absolute distinction
each fiom each, and aie by theii distinctions united into one, and in theii unity aie kept
distinct. Even so do we see, when theie aie many lamps in a house, how that the lights of
them all aie unified into one undiffeientiated light, so that theie shineth foith fiom them
one indivisible biightness; and no one, methinks, could sepaiate the light of one paiticulai
lamp fiom the otheis, in isolation fiom the aii which embiaces them all, noi could he see
one light without anothei, inasmuch as, without confusion, they yet aie wholly commingled.
Yea, if any one takes out of the dwelling one of the buining lamps, all its own paiticulai
light will theiewith depait fiom the place without eithei caiiying off in itself aught of the
190 The ieceived text ieads: 4oi ... ie tq cqcvq cvuocu ie ie eOi tq ieiiocu civi tive
iie ie ivuoci ie ieiioci. This, as it stands, must be tianslated: They say that ceitain qualities belong
to the said Undiffeience, and that to Diffeientiation, on the othei hand, belong ceitain piinciples of Unity and
piinciples of Diffeientiation." This would mean that the Peisons of the Tiinity, though distinct fiom Each
Othei, yet have a Common Unity, oi else that Each has a Unity of Its Own making It distinct fiom the Othei
Peisons. I have ventuied, howevei, to emend the text by omitting the last six woids and making the sentence
end at civei. I believe the last six woids have ciept in fiom a maiginal gloss oi vaiiant, which ian (I imagine) as
follows:-civei tive iie i.t.i.. If the MS. belonged to a family having seventeen oi eighteen letteis to a
column the civei aftei ieiiocu would end a line, since theie aie 371 letteis fiom the beginning of the chaptei
to the end of that woid. Hence it would easily be confused with the civei at the beginning of the gloss, which
would thus cieep into the text. And, since the added woids amount to thiity-foui letteis, they would exactly fill
two lines, thus making the inteipolation easiei. Foi the meaning, see Inti., p. 6f.
191 Cf. Myst. Theo1. I. 2. This univeisal Affiimation is not pantheism because evil, as such, is held to be non-
existent. It is only all goodness that is affiimed of God, though He suipasses it. God is piesent in all things, but
not equally in all.
192 Yes" implies the possibility of No," and No" the possibility of Yes." Thus Yes" and No" belong to
the ielative woild. God's absolute existence is beyond such antithesis. See Inti., p. 4f.
193 The Peisons, though fused, aie yet not confused because the Godhead tianscends unity. See Inti., p. 3.
55
71
othei lights oi bequeathing any of its own biightness to the iest. Foi, as I said, the entiie
and complete union of the lights one with anothei biought no confusion oi commixtuie in
any paits-and that though the light is liteially embodied in the aii and stieams fiom the
mateiial substance of fiie. The Supei-Essential Unity of God, howevei, exceedeth (so we
declaie) not only the unions of mateiial bodies, but even those of Souls and of Intelligences,
which these Godlike and celestial Luminaiies in peifect mutual inteipenetiation supeinat-
uially and without confusion possess, thiough a paiticipation coiiesponding to theii indi-
vidual poweis of paiticipating in the All-Tianscendent Unity.
194
3. Theie is, on the othei hand, a Diffeientiation made in the Supei-Essential Doctiine
of God-not meiely such as I have just mentioned (viz. that in the veiy Unity, Each of the
Divine Peisons possesses without confusion Its own distinct existence), but also that the
Attiibutes of the Supei-Essential Divine Geneiation aie not inteichangeable.
193
The Fathei
alone is the Souice of the Supei-Essential Godhead, and the Fathei is not a Son, noi is the
Son a Fathei; foi the Divine Peisons all pieseive, Each without alloy, His own paiticulai
Attiibutes of piaise. Such, then, aie the instances of Undiffeience and of Diffeientiation in
the Ineffable Unity and Subsistence of God. And if the teim Diffeientiation" be also applied
to the bounteous act of Emanation wheieby the Divine Unity, biimming Itself with goodness
72
in the excess of Its Undiffeienced Unity thus enteis into Multiplicity,
196
yet an undiffeienced
unity woiketh even in those diffeientiated acts wheieby, in ceaseless communications, It
bestows Being, Life, and Wisdom, and those othei gifts of the all-cieative Goodness in iespect
of which (as we behold the communications and the paiticipants theieof) we celebiate those
things wheiein the cieatuies supeinatuially paiticipate. Yea, 'tis a common and undiffeienced
activity of the whole Godhead that It is wholly and entiiely communicated unto each of
them that shaie It and unto none meiely in pait;
197
even as the centie of a ciicle is shaied
by all the iadii which suiiound it in a ciicle;
198
and as theie aie many impiessions of a seal
all shaiing in the seal which is theii aichetype while yet this is entiie, noi is it only a pait
theieof that belongeth unto any of them. But the Incommunicable All-cieative Godhead
194 Mateiial things aie meiged by being united (e. g. diops of watei). Souls oi angels being united thiough
love (wheieby they paiticipate in God) aie not meiged but iemain distinct even while being, as it weie, fused
into a single spiiitual unity moie peifect than the fusion of watei with wine. The Peisons of the Tiinity aie still
moie peifectly united and at the same time still moie utteily distinct.
193 Two kinds of Diffeientiation: (1) Distinctness of Existence, (2) Diffeience of Functions.
196 D. means that the Undiffeientiated Godhead is actually piesent in all these cieative activities. It is multiplied
(as it weie) in Its eneigies, and yet It iemains indivisible. See Inti., p. 17.
197 D. heie touches on the fundamental diffeience between spiiitual and mateiial things. Cf. Shelley: Tiue
love has this diffeient fiom gold oi clay that to divide is not to take away."
198 Plotinus uses the same illustiation (Enn. iv. 1).
56
tianscends all such symbols in that It is beyond Appiehension noi hath It any othei mode
of communion such as to join It unto the paiticipants.
199
Peihaps, howevei, some one will say: The seal is not entiie and the same in all the
piinted copies." I answei that this is not due to the seal itself (foi it gives itself wholly and
identically to each), but the diffeience of the substances which shaie it makes the impiessions
of the one, entiie, identical aichetype to be diffeient. Foi instance, if they aie soft, plastic,
and smooth, and have no piint alieady, and aie neithei haid and iesistent, noi yet melting
73
and unstable, the impiint will be cleai, plain, and peimanent; but if the afoiesaid fitness
should in aught be lacking, then the mateiial will not take the impiession and iepioduce it
distinctly, and othei such iesults will follow as an unsuitable mateiial must biing about.
6. Again, it is by a Diffeientiated act of God's benevolence that the Supei-Essential Woid
should wholly and completely take Human Substance of human flesh and do and suffei all
those things which, in a special and paiticulai mannei, belong to the action of His Divine
Humanity. In these acts the Fathei and the Spiiit have no shaie, except of couise that they
all shaie in the loving geneiosity of the Divine counsels and in all that tianscendent Divine
woiking of unutteiable mysteiies which weie peifoimed in Human Natuie by Him Who
as God and as the Woid of God is Immutable.
200
So do we stiive to diffeientiate the Divine
Attiibutes, accoiding as these Attiibutes aie Undiffeienced oi Diffeientiated.
201
7. Now all the giounds of these Unifications, and Diffeientiations in the Divine Natuie
which the Sciiptuies have ievealed to us, we have explained in the Outlines of Divinity, to
the best of oui abilities, tieating sepaiately of each. The lattei class we have philosophically
uniavelled and unfolded, and so have sought to guide the holy and unspotted mind to
contemplate the shining tiuths of Sciiptuie, while the foimei class we have endeavouied
(in accoidance with Divine Tiadition) to appiehend as Mysteiies in a mannei beyond the
74
activities of oui minds.
202
Foi all Divine things, even those that aie ievealed to us, aie only
known by theii Communications. Theii ultimate natuie, which they possess in theii own
199 D. is always on his guaid against Pantheism.
200 Redemption is a woik peifoimed by the whole Tiinity thiough the Second Peison. (So, too, is Cieation.
Cf. p. 63, n. 2).
201 i. e. We stiive to distinguish the two planes of Being in God. Cf. Athan. Cieed: Neithei confounding the
Peisons," etc.
202 Undiffeience belongs to the ultimate Godhead, Diffeientiation to the distinction between the Thiee Peisons
of the Tiinity. The foimei is the spheie of Mystical Theology, the lattei is that of Dogmatic Theology. The foimei
implies the Via Negativa the lattei the Via Affiimativa.
57
oiiginal being, is beyond Mind and beyond all Being and Knowledge.
203
Foi instance, if we
call the Supei-Essential Mysteiy by the Name of God,'' oi Life," oi Being," oi Light," oi
Woid," we conceive of nothing else than the poweis that stieam Theiefiom to us bestowing
Godhead, Being, Life oi Wisdom;
204
while that Mysteiy Itself we stiive to appiehend by
casting aside all the activities of oui mind, since we behold no Deification,
203
oi Life, oi
Being, which exactly iesembles the altogethei and utteily Tianscendent Cause of all things.
Again, that the Fathei is Oiiginating Godhead while Jesus and the Spiiit aie (so to speak)
Divine Off-shoots of the Pateinal Godhead, and, as it weie, Blossoms and Supei-Essential
Shinings Theieof we leain fiom Holy Sciiptuie; but how these things aie so we cannot say,
noi yet conceive.
8. Just so fai can the poweis of oui .minds attain as to see that all spiiitual pateinity and
sonship is a gift bestowed fiom the all-tianscendent Aichetypal Fatheihood and Sonship
75
both upon us and also upon the celestial Poweis: wheieby Godlike Minds ieceive the states
and names of Gods, and Sons of Gods, and Fatheis of Gods, such pateinity and sonship
being peifected in a spiiitual mannei (i. e. incoipoieally, immateiially, and invisibly) because
the Divine Spiiit setteth above all invisible Immateiiality and Deification, and the Fathei
and the Son, supeinatuially tianscend all spiiitual fatheihood and sonship.
206
Foi theie is
no exact similitude between the cieatuies and the Cieative Oiiginals;
207
foi the cieatuies
possess only such images of the Cieative Oiiginals as aie possible to them, while the Oiiginals
Themselves tianscend and exceed the cieatuies by the veiy natuie of Theii own Oiiginality.
To employ human examples, we say that pleasant oi painful conditions pioduce in us feelings
of pleasuie oi pain while yet they possess not these feelings themselves; and we do not say
that the fiie which waims and buins is itself buint oi waimed. Even so if any one says that
203 Even the Diffeientiations finally lead us up into the Undiffeienced Godhead Wheie they tianscend
themselves. (Cf. p. 70, n. 3 and the passage in ii. 4 about the toiches.) Into that iegion we cannot tiack them.
But on the othei side they flow out into cieative activity, and thus aie, in some degiee, ievealed.
204 These teims may be thus classified:- Spheie of Activity. Natuie of Gift. Foim undei which Givei is
manifested (i) Giace. . . . . . . . . . Godhead . God" (ii) Natuie (1) Mateiial existence. . . . . . . Being .
Being" Woid." (2) Vegetable and animal existence. . . Life . Life" (3) Human existence. . . . . . . Wisdom
. Light"
203 The doctiine of Deification" is not a meie speculation. It embodies an expeiienced fact. See Inti., p. 43.
206 The act by which one spiiit oi soul impaits spiiitual life to anothei is a manifestation in time of a Mysteiy
which is eteinally peifect in the Tiinity, and would be impossible weie it not ultimately iooted in that Mysteiy.
Just as all life diaws its existence fiom the Divine supia-vitality, so all spiiitual pateinity diaws its existence fiom
the Divine supia-pateinity.
207 te etie-i.e. The Peisons of the Godhead.
58
Veiy Life lives, oi that Veiy Light is enlightened, he will be wiong (accoiding to my view)
unless, peichance, he weie to use these teims in a diffeient sense fiom the oidinaiy one to
mean that the qualities of cieated things pie-exist, aftei a supeilative mannei as touching
theii tiue Being in the Cieative Oiiginals.
208
76
9. Even the plainest aiticle of Divinity, namely the Incaination and Biith of Jesus in
Human Foim, cannot be expiessed by any Language oi known by any Mind-not even by
the fiist of the most exalted angels. That He took man's substance is a mysteiious tiuth, the
which we have ieceived; but we know not how fiom the Viigin's seed He was foimed in
anothei mannei than is natuial, noi how His diy feet suppoiting the solid weight of His
mateiial body He walked upon the unstable substance of the watei, noi undeistand we any
of the othei things which belong to the Supeinatuial Natuie of Jesus. Of these things I have
spoken enough elsewheie; and oui ienowned Teachei hath wondeifully
209
declaied, in his
Elements of Divinity, what he hath eithei leaint diiectly fiom the Sacied Wiiteis, oi else
hath discoveied fiom his cunning ieseaich conceining Sciiptuial tiuths thiough the much
toil and laboui which he bestowed theieon, oi else hath had ievealed unto him by some di-
vinei inspiiation wheiein he ieceived not only tiue spiiitual notions but also tiue spiiitual
motions,
210
and by the kinship of his mind with them (if I may so expiess it) was peifected
to attain without any othei teachei to a mystical communion with these veiities and a belief
theiein.
211
And to put befoie them in biiefest compass the many blessed speculations of
his ingenious mind thus speaketh he conceining Jesus in his compilation of the Elements
of Divinity.
10. From the Elements of Divinity, by S. Hierotheus.
The Univeisal Cause which filleth all things is the Deity of Jesus, wheieof the paits aie
in such wise tempeied to the whole that It is neithei whole noi pait, and yet is at the same
77
time whole and also pait, containing in Its all-embiacing unity both pait and whole, and
being tianscendent and antecedent to both.
212
This Deity is peifect in those Beings that aie
208 So St. Augustine constantly teaches that God acts not in the mannei which we call activity, but by causing
the cieatuie itself to peifoim the action. Thus he explains God's iest on the Seventh Day to mean not that God
Himself iested but that the cieation now iested in Him. Aiistotle and his disciple, St. Thomas, teach that God
moves all things simply thiough being desiied by them. So God causes action without Himself acting (somewhat
as fiie causes waimth without feeling it). Cf. p. 87, n. 1.
209 ncud. The piopei meaning of ncu( in the Dionysian wiitings appeais to be supeinatuial."
210 o ovov eOuv eiie ie neOuv te Ocie.
211 no tqv eieitov etdv ie uotiiqv enotcicoOc vuoiv ie niotiv.
212 Being beyond Unity the Godhead is, of couise, beyond the categoiies of whole and pait. The Godhead is
not a Whole because it is indivisible, noi a Pait because theie is nothing, on the ultimate plane, outside It. Yet
59
impeifect as a Fount of Peifection;
213
It is Peifectionless
214
in those that aie peifect as
tianscending and anticipating theii Peifection; It is the Foim pioducing Foim in the
foimless, as a Fount of eveiy foim; and it is Foimless in the Foims, as being beyond all foim;
It is the Being that peivades all beings at once though not affected by them;
213
and It is Supei-
Essential, as tianscending eveiy being; It sets all bounds of Authoiity and Oidei, and yet It
has Its seal beyond all Authoiity and Oidei.
216
It is the Measuie of the Univeise;
217
and it
78
is Eteinity, and above Eteinity and befoie Eteinity.
218
It is an Abundance in those Beings
that lack, and a Supei-Abundance in those that abound; unutteiable, ineffable; beyond
Mind, beyond Life, beyond Being; It supeinatuially possesses the supeinatuial and supei-
essentially possesses the supei-essential.
219
And since that Supia-Divine Being hath in loving
kindness come down fiom thence unto the Natuial Estate, and veiily took substance and
assumed the name of Man (we must speak with ieveience of those things which we uttei
beyond human thought and language), even in this act He possesses His Supeinatuial and
Supei-Essential Existence-not only in that He hath without change oi confusion of Attiib-
utes shaied in oui human lot while iemaining unaffected by that unutteiable Self-Emptying
as iegaids the fullness of His Godhead, but also because (most wondeiful of all wondeis!)
It is a Whole because It includes the tiue existence of all things, and is Paititive because It contains the piinciple
of sepaiate Individuality wheieby Chiist possesses a Human Soul distinct fiom all othei human souls, and
wheieby, too, we possess distinct and sepaiate souls.
213 God is in us even befoie we aie in Him. Cf. Luke xvii. 21. Cf. St. Aug., Thou wast within; I was without."
Also cf. c. i. 3; c. iii. i: Foi the Tiinity," etc. See Inti., p. 6 on the use of the woid " outside."
214 Peifection implies an objectoi puipose achieved. Hence it implies a distinction between self and not self.
The Godhead is beyond such a distinction. Compaied with impeifection, It is peifect; compaied with peifection,
It is peifectionless (etci(), oi, iathei, beyond Peifection (nctci() and befoie it (notcicio), just as compaied
with impeisonal things It is peisonal, and compaied with peisonality It is non-peisonal, oi, iathei, supia-pei-
sonal.
213 Cf. p. 73, n. 3.
216 Cf. St. Paul on the Law and the Spiiit. The Law is deposited, as it weie, by the Spiiit; and yet the Law
ciamps the Spiiit, and the Spiiit must bieak loose fiom this bondage.
217 i. e. It gives the univeise its bounds and distinctions.
218 Eteinity, in the sense of " Veiy Eteinity" (etoeiuv), is an Emanation of the Godhead-a distinct view
of Its tianscendent state (cf. Inti., p. i7). It is the Divine Rest taken in the abstiact, as Veiy Life is peihaps the
Divine Motion taken in the abstiact. The Godhead includes both iest and Motion by tianscending them.
219 Behind Natuie aie ceitain highei supeinatuial possibilities (which aie manifested, e. g., in the Miiacles
of Chiist and His Disciples), and beyond oui peisonalities theie is a mysteiy which is gieatei than oui finite
selves, and yet, in a sense, is oui tiue selves. The Godhead possesses in Itself the supeinatuial possibilities of
Natuie and the supia-peisonal possibilities of oui peisonalities.
60
He passed in His Supeinatuial and Supei-Essential state thiough conditions of Natuie and
Being, and ieceiving fiom us all things that aie ouis, exalted them fai above us.
220
11. So much foi these matteis. Now let us pioceed to the object of oui discussion and
endeavoui to explain the Common and Undiffeienced Names belonging to God's Diffeien-
tiated Being.
221
And, that the subject of oui investigation may be cleaily defined befoiehand,
79
we give the name of Divine Diffeientiation (as was said) to the beneficent Emanations of
the Supieme Godhead.
222
Foi bestowing upon all things and supeinally infusing Its Com-
munications unto the goodly Univeise, It becomes diffeientiated without loss of Undiffei-
ence;
223
and multiplied without loss of Unity; fiom Its Oneness it becomes manifold while
yet iemaining within Itself. Foi example, since God is supei-essentially Existent and bestows
existence upon all things that aie, and biings the woild into being, that single Existence of
His is said to become manifold thiough biinging foith the many existences fiom Itself, while
yet He iemains One in the act of Self-Multiplication; Undiffeienced thioughout the piocess
of Emanation, and Full in the emptying piocess of Diffeientiation; Supei-Essentially tian-
scending the Being of all things, and guiding the whole woild onwaids by an indivisible act,
and pouiing foith without diminution His indefectible bounties. Yea, being One and com-
municating of His Unity both unto eveiy pait of the woild and also unto the whole, both
unto that which is one and unto that which is many, He is One in an unchangeable and supei-
essential mannei, being neithei an unit in the multiplicity of things noi yet the sum total of
such units. Indeed, He is not an unity in this sense, and doth not paiticipate in unity noi
80
possess it;
224
but He is an Unity in a mannei fai diffeient fiom this, above all unity which
is in the woild; yea, He is an Indivisible Pluiality, insatiable yet biim-full, pioducing, pei-
fecting, and maintaining all unity and pluiality. Moieovei, since many, thiough Deification
fiom Him, aie made Gods
223
(so fai as the Godlike capacity of each allows), theie thus ap-
220 i. e. Chiist did not meiely keep His Godhead paiallel, as it weie, with His Manhood, but biought It into
His Manhood and so exalted the Manhood.
221 e. Let us explain what aie the Names which belong indivisibly to all Thiee Peisons of the Tiinity.
222 The woid Emanation" is heie used in its veiy widest sense as including (1) the Peisons of the Tiinity,
(2) Theii cieative activity as manifested in the Univeisal and the Paiticulai stieam of eneigy. See Inti., p. 17.
The Diffeientiated Being of the Tiinity undeilies all the Diffeientiations of the cieative piocess. The Tiinity is
diffeientiated on the plane of Eteinity; then It emanates oi eneigizes on the tempoial plane, and thus It is
manifested in all the diffeientiations of the univeise, (especially in deified souls).
223 God is indivisibly piesent in each sepaiate deified soul (see supia, p. 71), the sentence beginning: And if
the teim 'Diffeientiation' be also applied to the bounteous act," etc.
224 These two phiases well expiess the meaning of the title Beyond things and supeinally infusing Unity"
(ncqvucvq), which I have geneially tianslated, like qvucvq, as Undiffeienced."
223 tp c( eto0 Ocuoci ... Ocdv noiidv yiyvocvuv. See Inti., p. 43.
61
peais to be what is called a Diffeientiation
226
and a Reduplication of the One God, yet none
the less He is the piimal God, the Supia-Divine and Supei-Essentially One God, who dwells
Indivisibly within the sepaiate and individual things, being an Undiffeienced Unity in
Himself and without any commixtuie oi multiplication thiough His contact with the
Many.
227
And supeinatuially peiceiving this, thus speaketh (by inspiiation, in his holy
wiitings) that Guide unto Divine illumination by whom both we and oui teachei aie led,
that mighty man in things Divine, that Luminaiy of the woild. Foi though (saith he) theie
be that aie called gods, whethei in heaven oi in eaith (as theie be gods many and loids
many). But to us theie is but one God, the Fathei, of whom aie all things, and we in Him,
and one Loid Jesus Chiist, by whom aie all things, and we by Him. Foi in divine things the
undiffeienced Unities aie of moie might than the Diffeientiations
228
and hold the foiemost
place and ietain theii state of Undiffeience even aftei the One has, without depaiting fiom
Its oneness, enteied into Diffeientiation. These Diffeientiations oi beneficent Emanations
81
of the whole Godhead-wheieby Its Undiffeienced Natuie is shaied in common
229
-we
shall (so fai as in us lies) endeavoui to desciibe fiom the Divine Names which ieveal them
in the Sciiptuies, having now made this cleai befoiehand (as hath been said): that eveiy
Name of the Divine beneficent Activity unto whichevei of the Divine Peisons it is applied,
must be taken as belonging, without distinction, to the whole entiiety of the Godhead.
230
226 Cf. p. 71, n. 1.
227 The fullness of God's Unity is manifested, (1) in all the multiplicity of the mateiial woild, (2) aftei a
highei mannei in the deified souls of men and in angels.
228 Each deified soul is a diffeientiation of God (cf. p. 71, n. i); yet the Unity of God tianscends them all, even
aftei God has thus pouied Himself into them.
229 i. e. These active Manifestations wheieby God enteis into each pait of the univeise, yet without loss of
Unity.
230 See the beginning of this chaptei.
62
CHAPTER III
Vhat is the power of Prayer? Also concerning the Blessed Hierotheus and concerning Reverence
and the Vriting of Divinity.
1. And fiist of all, if it like thee, let us considei the highest Name, even Goodness," by
which all the Emanations of God aie conjointly ievealed.
231
And let us begin with an invoc-
ation of the Tiinity, the Which, as It suipasseth Goodness, and is the Souice of all goodness,
doth ieveal all conjoined togethei Its own good piovidences.
232
Foi we must fiist lift up
oui minds in piayei unto the Piimal Goodness, and by diawing neaiei Theieunto, we must
thus be initiated into the mysteiy of those good gifts which aie iooted in Its being. Foi the
Tiinity is nigh unto all things, and yet not all things aie nigh unto It.
233
And when we call
82
upon It with holy piayeis and unspotted mind and with oui souls piepaied foi union with
God, then aie we also nigh Theieto; foi It is not in space, so as to be absent fiom any spot,
oi to move fiom one position to anothei.
234
Nay, to speak of It as omnipiesent doth not
expiess Its all-tianscendent all-embiacing Infinitude.
233
Let us then piess on in piayei,
looking upwaids to the Divine benignant Rays, even as if a iesplendent coid weie hanging
fiom the height of heaven unto this woild below, and we, by seizing it with alteinate hands
in one advance, appeaied to pull it down; but in veiy tiuth instead of diawing down the
iope (the same being alieady nigh us above and below), we weie ouiselves being diawn
upwaids to the highei Refulgence of the iesplendent Rays. Oi even as, having embaiked on
a ship and clinging to the cables, the which being stietched out fiom some iock unto us,
piesented themselves (as it weie) foi us to lay hold upon them, we should not be diawing
the iock towaids ouiselves, but should, in veiy tiuth, be diawing ouiselves and the vessel
towaids the iock; as also, conveisely, if any one standing upon the vessel pushes away the
iock that is on the shoie, he will not affect the iock (which stands immovable) but will sep-
aiate himself theiefiom, and the moie he pushes it so much the moie will he be staving
himself away. Hence, befoie eveiy endeavoui, moie especially if the subject be Divinity,
231 All God's activities aie good.
232 The paiticulai activities of God exist as one Act in Him, cf. p. 79, n. 2. So St. Thomas (following Aiistotle)
calls Him Actus Puius.
233 Cf p. 77, n. 1.
234 This is piofound. Spatial metaphois aie always dangeious, though unavoidable, in Theology. In space if
A is touching B then B must be touching A. In the spiiitual woild this is not so. God is neai me (oi iathei to
me), and yet I may be fai fiom God because I may be fai fiom my own tiue self. I must seek my tiue self wheie
it is, in God. It is the paiadox of Peisonality that my tiue self is outside myself and I can only gain it by casting
aside this counteifeit self." Cf. p. 77, n. 1, and Inti., p. 13.
233 Even the woid omnipiesent" suggests that God is in space, wheieas ieally His existence is non-spatial.
Chapter 3. What is the power of Prayer? Also concerning the Blessed Hierotheus and concerning Reverence and the Writing of Divinity.
63
Chapter 3. What is the power of Prayer? Also concerning the Blessed Hierotheus
must we begin with piayei: not as though we would pull down to ouiselves that Powei which
83
is nigh both eveiywheie and nowheie, but that, by these iemembiances and invocations of
God, we may commend and unite ouiselves Theieunto.
2. Now peihaps theie is need of an explanation why, when oui ienowned teachei
Hieiotheus hath compiled
236
his wondeiful Elements of Divinity, we have composed othei
Tiactates of Divinity, and now aie wiiting this piesent as if his woik weie not sufficient.
Now if he had piofessed to deal in an oideied system with all questions of Divinity, and had
gone thiough the whole sum of Divinity with an exposition of eveiy bianch, we should not
have gone so fai in madness oi folly as to suppose that we could touch these pioblems with
a divinei insight than he, noi would we have caied to waste oui time in a vain iepetition of
those same tiuths; moie especially since it would be an injuiy to a teachei whom we love
weie we thus to claim foi ouiselves the famous speculations and expositions of a man who,
next to Paul the Divine, hath been oui chief pieceptoi. But since, in his lofty Instiuctions
on Divinity," he gave us compiehensive and piegnant definitions fitted to oui undeistanding,
and to that of such amongst us as weie teacheis of the newly initiated souls, and bade us
uniavel and explain with whatevei poweis of ieason we possessed, the compiehensive and
compact skeins of thought spun by his mighty intellect; and since thou hast thyself oftentimes
uiged us so to do, and hast iemitted his tieatise to us as too sublime foi compiehension,
theiefoie we, while setting him apait (as a teachei of advanced and peifect spiiits) foi those
above the commonalty, and as a kind of second Sciiptuies woithy to follow the Inspiied
Wiitings, will yet teach Divine Tiuths, accoiding to oui capacity, unto those who aie oui
84
peeis. Foi if solid food is suited only to the peifect, what degiee of peifection would it need
to give this food to otheis: Wheiefoie we aie iight in saying that the diiect study of the
spiiitual
237
Sciiptuies and the compiehensive teaching of them need advanced capacities,
while the undeistanding and the leaining of the mattei which contiibute theieto is suited
to the infeiioi Initiatois and Initiates.
238
We have, howevei, caiefully obseived the piinciple:
Whatsoevei things oui Divine Pieceptoi has thioughly dealt with and made cleaily manifest
236 te Ocoioyiie otoi_ciuoci ncud ouveyeyovto.
237 Oi intelligible" (voqtdv). Cf. p. 32, n. 1. The Sciiptuies aie expiessed in symbolic teims which oui minds
can giasp. Hieiotheus was inspiied to penetiate to the ultimate tiuth enshiined in these symbols. Thus he was
able not only to assimilate this solid food himself but also to give it to otheis. Appaiently Hieiotheus passed
thiough ceitain extiaoidinaiy psychic expeiiences, which aie desciibed in his wiitings. These paiticulai expei-
iences D. has not himself passed thiough. But he believes that his own teaching may cleai the giound, and so
be a pieliminaiy to such flights. He is chiefly explaining piinciples, but these piinciples may lead the way to a
tiue expeiience. St. Paul and othei Sciiptuial wiiteis expeiienced such extiaoidinaiy psychic states, though they
do not speak of them in the extiavagant teims appaiently used by Hieiotheus. Cf. 2 Coi. xii. 2-4.
238 tou cicvoi ieOicutei ie icucvoi.
64
we have nevei in any wise ventuied theieon, foi feai of iepetition, noi given the same ex-
planation of the passage wheieof he tieated. Foi
239
even among oui inspiied Hieiaichs
(when, as thou knowest, we with him and many of oui holy biethien met togethei to behold
that moital body, Souice of Life, which ieceived the Incainate God,
240
and James, the
biothei of God, was theie, and Petei, the chief and highest of the Sacied Wiiteis, and then,
having beheld it, all the Hieiaichs theie piesent celebiated, accoiding to the powei of each,
the omnipotent goodness of the Divine weakness): on that occasion, I say, he suipassed all
85
the Initiates next to the Divine Wiiteis, yea, he was wholly tianspoited, was wholly outside
of himself, and was so moved by a communion with those Mysteiies he was celebiating,
that all who heaid him and saw him and knew him (oi iathei knew him not) deemed him
to be iapt of God and endued with utteiance Divine. But why should I tell thee of the divine
things that weie utteied in that place: Foi, unless I have foigotten who I am, I know that I
have often heaid fiom thee ceitain fiagments of those eniaptuied piaises; so eainest hast
thou been with all thy soul to follow heavenly things.
3. But, to say nothing of those mystical expeiiences (since they cannot be told unto the
woild, and since thou knowest them well), when it behoved us to communicate these things
unto the woild and to biing all whom we might unto that holy knowledge we possessed,
how he suipassed neaily all the holy teacheis in the time he devoted to the task, in puieness
of mind, in exactness of exposition, and in all othei holy qualities, to such a degiee that we
could not attempt to gaze upon such spiiitual iadiance. Foi we aie conscious in ouiselves
and well awaie that we cannot sufficiently peiceive those Divine Tiuths which aie gianted
to man's peiception, noi can we declaie and uttei those elements of Divine Knowledge
which aie given unto man to speak. We fall veiy shoit of that undeistanding which the Divine
men possessed conceining heavenly tiuths, and veiily, fiom excess of ieveience, we should
not have ventuied to listen, oi give utteiance to any tiuths of Divine philosophy, weie it not
that we aie convinced in oui mind that such knowledge of Divine Tiuth as is possible must
not be disiegaided. This conviction was wiought within us, not only by the natuial impulse
86
of oui minds, which yeain and stiive foi such vision of supeinatuial things as may be attained,
but also by the holy oidinance of Divine Law itself, which, while it bids us not to busy
ouiselves in things beyond us because such things aie both beyond oui meiits and also un-
attainable,
241
yet eainestly exhoits us to leain all things within oui ieach, which aie gianted
and allowed us, and also geneiously to impait these tieasuies unto otheis.
242
In obedience
239 sc. It would be an impiety to do so, foi he is almost equal to the Sciiptuial Wiiteis, as he showed when
he met with them to view the body of the B. V. M.
240 Cf. p. 1, n 1.
241 Ecclus. iii. 21; Ps. cxxxi. 1.
242 2 Tim. ii. 2.
65
to these behests we, ceasing not thiough weaiiness oi want of couiage in such seaich foi
Divine Tiuth as is possible, yea, and not daiing to leave without assistance those who possess
not a gieatei powei of contemplation than ouiselves, have set ouiselves to the task of com-
position, in no vain attempt to intioduce fiesh teaching, but only seeking by moie minute
and detailed investigations to male moie cleai and plain that which the tiue Hieiotheus
hath said in biief.
66
CHAPTER IV
Concerning "Good," "Light," "Beautiful," Desire," "Ecstasy," jealousy." Also that Evil is
neither existent nor Sprung from anything existent nor inherent in existent things.
1. Nowlet us considei the name of Good" which the Sacied Wiiteis apply to the Supia-
Divine Godhead in a tianscendent mannei, calling the Supieme Divine Existence Itself
Goodness" (as it seems to me) in a sense that sepaiates It fiom the whole cieation, and
meaning, by this teim, to indicate that the Good, undei the foim of Good-Being,
243
extends
87
Its goodness by the veiy fact of Its existence unto all things.
244
Foi as oui sun, thiough no
choice oi delibeiation, but by the veiy fact of its existence, gives light to all those things
which have any inheient powei of shaiing its illumination, even so the Good (which is above
the sun, as the tianscendent aichetype by the veiy mode of its existence is above its faded
image) sends foith upon all things accoiding to theii ieceptive poweis, the iays of Its undi-
vided Goodness. Thiough these all Spiiitual Beings and faculties and activities (whethei
peiceived oi peicipient
243
) began; thiough these they exist and possess a life incapable of
failuie oi diminution, and aie untainted by any coiiuption oi death oi mateiiality oi biith,
being sepaiate above all instability and flux and iestlessness of change. And wheieas they
aie bodiless and immateiial they aie peiceived by oui minds, and wheieas they aie minds
themselves, they possess a supeinatuial peiception and ieceive an illumination (aftei theii
own mannei) conceining the hidden natuie of things,
246
fiom whence they pass on theii
own knowledge to othei kindied spiiits. Theii iest is in the Divine Goodness, wheiein they
aie giounded, and This Goodness maintains them and piotects them and feasts them with
Its good things. Thiough desiiing this they possess theii being and theii blessedness, and,
243 u ooidi eyeOuv.
244 God's activity cannot be distinguished fiom Himself. Cf. p. 81, n. 4. God acts simply by being what He
is-by being Good. This fits in with the doctiine that He cieates the woild as being the Object of its desiie. He
attiacts it into existence.
243 ei voqte ie voce noei ie ooiei ie uvci ie cvcyciei. Angels and men aie peicipient Essences;
theii poweis when quiescent oi doimant on the one hand and active on the othei aie iespectively peicipient
faculties and activities. But angels and men with theii faculties and activities can also be peiceived. Cf. next
sentence.
246 This doctiine may be based on some psychic expeiience enjoyed by D. oi iecounted to him. Geoige Fox
ieceived an expeiience of this kind in which he had an intuitive knowledge conceining the hidden piopeities
of plants. See his Diaiy neai the beginning.
Chapter 4. Concerning 'Good,' 'Light,' 'Beautiful,' 'Desire,' 'Ecstasy,' 'Jealousy.' Also that Evil is neither existent nor Sprung from anything existent nor inherent in existent things.
67
Chapter 4. Concerning 'Good,' 'Light,' 'Beautiful,' 'Desire,' 'Ecstasy,'
88
being confoimed theieto (accoiding to theii poweis, they aie goodly, and, as the Divine
Law commands, pass on to those that aie below them, of the gifts which have come unto
them fiom the Good.
2. Hence have they theii celestial oideis, theii self-unities, theii mutual indwellings,
theii distinct Diffeiences, the faculties which iaise the lowei unto the highei ianks, the
piovidences of the highei foi those beneath them; theii pieseivation of the piopeities be-
longing to each faculty, theii unchanging intioveisions,
247
theii constancy and elevation
in theii seaich foi the Good, and all the othei qualities which we have desciibed in oui book
conceining the Piopeities and Oideis of the Angels.
248
Moieovei all things appeitaining
to the Celestial Hieiaichy, the angelic Puiifications, the Illuminations and the attainments
which peifect them in all angelic peifection and come fiom the all-cieative and oiiginating
Goodness, fiom whence it was given to them to possess theii cieated goodness, and to
manifest the Seciet Goodness in themselves, and so to be (as it weie) the angelic Evangelists
of the Divine Silence and to stand foith as shining lights ievealing Him that is within the
shiine. And next those sacied and holy Minds, men's souls and all the excellences that belong
to souls deiive theii being fiom the Supei-Excellent Goodness. So do they possess intelligence;
so do they pieseive theii living being
249
immoital; so is it they exist at all, and can, by
89
stiaining towaids the living angelic poweis, thiough theii good guidance mount towaids
the Bounteous Oiigin of all things; so can they (accoiding to theii measuie) paiticipate in
the illuminations which stieam fiom above and shaie the bounteous gift (as fai as theii
powei extends) and attain all the othei piivileges which we leave iecounted in oui book,
Concerning the Soul. Yea, and the same is tiue, if it must needs be said, conceining even the
iiiational souls, oi living cieatuies, which cleave the aii, oi tiead the eaith, oi ciawl upon
the giound, and those which live among the wateis oi possess an amphibious life, and all
that live buiied and coveied in the eaith-in a woid all that possess a sensitive soul oi life.
All these aie endowed with soul and life because the Good exists. And all plants deiive fiom
the Good that life which gives them nouiishment and motion, and even whatsoevei has no
life oi soul exists thiough the Good, and thus came into the estate of being.
230
247 Lit. Revolutions." (ei ... nc ceute ectntutoi ouvcii(ci.) In Dante's Paiadiso the souls of the Re-
deemed all move with a ciiculai motion. This symbolizes an activity of spiiitual concentiation. Cf. iv. 8, 9.
248 The Celestial Hieiaichy is among D's extant woiks. It is iefeiied to by Dante and was the chief souice of
medieval angelology.
249 tqv ooiuq u(v-i. e. life as such, meie life, the life which they shaie with animals and plants.
230 The existence of the whole cieation-angels, men, animals, and vegetables, dead mattei-is in the Good.
It has not, in the oidinaiy sense, made them, but they aie giounded in It and diaw theii existence fiom it and
would not exist but foi it. They exist not thiough any paiticulai activity It exeits but solely because It Is.
68
3. Now if the Good is above all things (as indeed It is) Its Foimless Natuie pioduces all-
foim; and in It alone Not-Being is an excess of Being,
231
and Lifelessness an excess of Life
90
and Its Mindless state is an excess of Wisdom,
232
and all the Attiibutes of the Good we ex-
piess in a tianscendent mannei by negative images.
233
And if it is ieveient so to say, even
that which is not desiies the all-tianscendent Good and stiuggles itself, by its denial of all
things, to find its iest in the Good which veiily tianscends all being.
231 Being" implies finite ielations; foi one thing must be distinguished fiom anothei. If a thing is itself, it is
not something else; this thing is not that. The Good is beyond this distinction, foi nothing (on the ultimate
plane) is outside It. See Inti., p. 3.
232 This appaiently piofitless speculation ieally suggests piofound spiiitual mysteiies. Love is the one ieality
and love is self iealization thiough self-saciifice. We must lose oui life to find it. We must, thiough the excess
of spiiitual life within us, seek to be (as it weie) lifeless, so that this excess of life may still be ouis. And such was
the Incainate Life of Chiist and such is the Life of God in eteinity. So too the wisdom of Chiist is, fiom a woildly
point of view, foolishness. Foi woildly wisdom = self-seeking, but the Wisdom of Chiist = self-abandonment.
In fact Heavenly Wisdom = Love. Cf. 1 Coi. i. 23; iii. 18, 19.
233 That which Is Not = Evil (vide infia in this chaptei). Cf. Inti., p. 20. The Good is Non-Existent as being
beyond existence; evil is non-existent as being contiaiy to it. Thus evil is by its veiy natuie tiying as it weie to
be Good. This also looks like a baiien paiadox and yet it may contain a spiiitual tiuth. Evil is, in the woids of
Goethe, the spiiit that denies": It is destiuctive, e. g. injustice, ciuelty, immoiality, etc., undeimine oi oveiwhelm
civilization and so destioy it. But the Good supeisedes civilization and so in a sense destioys it. Cf. the eschato-
logical teaching of Chiist. Civilization, ait, moiality, etc., aie good so fai as they go, but impeifect. Being halfway,
as it weie, between Good and evil, and being of necessity neithei wholly the one noi wholly the othei, they must
disappeai wheievei the one oi the othei completely tiiumphs. Chiist's teaching on Maiiiage illustiates this.
Maiiiage is sacied, and divoice is wiong, because it seeks to abolish Maiiiage. And yet Maiiiage is finally abolished
in heaven. St. Paul's antithesis of Law and Spiiit is anothei example. The Law is good and yet is not the Good.
Sin is contiaiy to the Law, but the Spiiit is contiaiy to the Law in anothei sense and so supeisedes it. So too with
ait. A modein vandal is indiffeient to beauty because he is below it, a Medival Saint became sometimes indif-
feient to beauty by iising to a supei-sensuous plane above it. Gieek idolatiy is a highei thing than Calvinism,
but the Chiistianity of the New Testament is a highei thing than Gieek idolatiy. The Saints sometimes employ
negatives in one sense and those who aie not saints employ the same negatives in anothei; whence disastei.
Much of Nietzsche's language (e. g. the phiase Beyond Good and Evil") might have been used by a Medival
Chiistian Mystic; but Nietzsche did not geneially mean what the Chiistian Mystic would have meant by it. Soo
too with pain. All pain is in itself bad, being a negation of oui peisonality. And yet a self-abnegation spiinging
fiom Love which biavely beais pain is the highest kind of Good. The devil ... put it into the heait of Judas to
betiay" Chiist, and yet the Passion was in accoidance with the deteiminate counsel and foieknowledge of God."
69
91
4. Nay, even the foundation and the boundaiies of the heavens (as we foigot to say while
thinking of othei matteis) owe theii oiigin to the Good. Such is this univeise, which lessens
not noi giows, and such the noiseless movements (if noiseless they be)
234
of the vast heavenly
ievolution, and such the staiiy oideis whose light is fixed as an oinament of heaven, and
such the vaiious wandeiings of ceitain stais-especially the iepeated and ietuining oibits
of those two luminaiies to which the Sciiptuie giveth the name of Gieat,"
233
wheieby we
ieckon oui days and nights and months and yeais; which define the iound of time and
tempoial events and give them measuiement, sequence, and cohesion. And what shall I say
conceining the sun's iays consideied in themselves: Fiom the Good comes the light which
is an image of Goodness; wheiefoie the Good is desciibed by the name of Light," being the
aichetype theieof which is ievealed in that image. Foi as the Goodness of the all-tianscendent
Godhead ieaches fiom the highest and most peifect foims of being unto the lowest, and
still is beyond them all, iemaining supeiioi to those above and ietaining those below in its
embiace, and so gives light to all things that can ieceive It, and cieates and vitalizes and
maintains and peifects them, and is the Measuie
236
of the Univeise and its Eteinity,
237
its
92
Numeiical Piinciple,
238
its Oidei, its Embiacing Powei, its Cause and its End:
239
even so
this gieat, all-biight and evei-shining sun, which is the visible image of the Divine Goodness,
faintly ieechoing the activity of the Good, illumines all things that can ieceive its light while
ietaining the uttei simplicity of light, and expands above and below thioughout the visible
woild the beams of its own iadiance. And if theie is aught that does not shaie them, this is
not due to any weakness oi deficiency in its distiibution of the light, but is due to the unie-
ceptiveness of those cieatuies which do not attain sufficient singleness to paiticipate theiein.
Foi veiily the light passeth ovei many such substances and enlightens those which aie beyond
them, and theie is no visible thing unto which the light ieacheth not in the exceeding
234 c otc _q vei. D. is alluding to the ancient belief in the Music of the Spheies.
233 Gen. i. 16.
236 ctov. All things have theii pie-existent limits in the Supei-Essence.
237 euv-i.e. The Peimanent Piinciple undeilying its tempoial piocess. This and the next phiase explain
what is meant by the woids the Measuie of the univeise." The Good sets bounds to the woild (1) tempoially,
because Eteinity is the Fount of Time, (2) spatially, because Tianscendent Unity is the Fount of Numbei. All
tempoial things aie peimanent in God; and all diveisities aie one in Him.
238 All numbei has its ioots in the Good. Elsewheie D. says that the Good being beyond Unity, is a Multiplicity
as well as an Unity. Cf. Inti., p. 3.
239 Heie we get once moie the Aiistotelian classification of causes. The Good is:- (i) Foimal Cause (1) im-
manent in the woild (Oidei-t(i); (2) containing the woild (Embiacing Powei-ncio_(). (ii) Efficient Cause
(Cause-etie). (iii) Final Cause (End-tcio).
70
gieatness of its piopei iadiance.
260
Yea, and it contiibutes to the biith of mateiial bodies
and biings them unto life, and nouiishes them that they may giow, and peifects and puiifies
and ienews them. And the light is the measuie and the numeiical piinciple of seasons and
of days and of all oui eaithly Time; foi 'tis the selfsame light (though then without a foim)
which, Moses the Divine declaies, maiked even that fiist peiiod of thiee days which was at
the beginning of time. And like as Goodness diaweth all things to Itself, and is the gieat
Attiactive Powei which unite things that aie sundeied
261
(being as It is: the Godhead and
93
the Supieme Fount and Pioducei of Unity); and like as all things desiie It as theii beginning,
theii cohesive powei and end; and like as 'tis the Good (as saith the Sciiptuie) fiom which
all things weie made and aie (having been biought into existence thence as fiom a Peifect
Cause); and like as in the Good all things subsist, being kept and contiolled in an almighty
Receptacle;
262
and like as unto the Good all things aie tuined (as unto the piopei End of
each) ; and like as aftei the Good all things do yeain-those that have mind and ieason
seeking It by knowledge, those that have peiception seeking It by peiception, those that
have no peiception seeking It by the natuial movement of theii vital instinct, and those that
aie without life and have meie existence seeking It by theii aptitude foi that baie paiticipation
whence this meie existence is theiis
263
-even so doth the light (being as it weie Its visible
image) diaw togethei all things and attiact them unto Itself: those that can see, those that
have motion, those that ieceive Its light and waimth, those that aie meiely held in being by
Its iays;
264
whence the sun is so called because it summeth
263
all things and uniteth the
scatteied elements of the woild. All mateiial things desiie the sun, foi they desiie eithei to
see oi to move and to ieceive light and waimth and to be maintained in existence by the
light. I say not (as was feigned by the ancient myth) that the sun is the God and Cieatoi of
this Univeise, and theiefoie takes the visible woild undei his special caie; but I say that the
260 The light peimeates watei but it does not peimeate a stone. It passes ovei the stone and peimeates the
watei beyond it.
261 e_iouvyuyo coti tdv coiceocvuv.
262 u cv nevtoietoii( nuOcvi.
263 (1) Man, (2) Animal, (3) Vegetable, (4) Mattei.
264 This seems to imply that mattei itself could not exist without the influence of the light. Peihaps this belief
iests on Gen. i. 1, 2.
263 qiio ti nvte eoiiq noici. With the naf etymology cf. iv. 3.
71
invisible things of God fiom the cieation of the woild aie cleaily seen, being undeistood
94
by the things that aie made, even His eteinal powei and Godhead."
266
3. But these things aie dealt with in the Symbolic Divinity." Heie I desiie to declaie
what is the spiiitual meaning of the name Light" as belonging to the Good.
267
The Good
God is called Spiiitual Light because He fills eveiy heavenly mind with spiiitual light, and
diives all ignoiance and eiioi fiom all souls wheie they have gained a lodgment, and giveth
them all a shaie of holy light and puiges theii spiiitual eyes fiom the mist of ignoiance that
suiiounds them, and stiis and opens the eyes which aie fast shut and weighed down with
daikness, and gives them fiist a modeiate illumination, then (when they taste the Light and
desiie It moie) He giveth Himself in gieatei measuie and shineth in moie abundance on
them because they have loved much," and evei He constiaineth them accoiding to theii
poweis of looking upwaids.
6. And so that Good which is above all light is called a Spiiitual Light because It is an
Oiiginating Beam and an Oveiflowing Radiance, illuminating with its fullness eveiy Mind
above the woild, aiound it, oi within it,
268
and ienewing all theii spiiitual poweis, embiacing
them all by Its tianscendent compass and exceeding them all by Its tianscendent elevation.
And It contains within Itself, in a simple foim, the entiie ultimate piinciple of light;
269
and
95
is the Tianscendent Aichetype of Light; and, while beaiing the light in its womb, It exceeds
it in quality and piecedes it in time; and so conjoineth togethei all spiiitual and iational
beings, uniting them in one.
270
Foi as ignoiance leadeth wandeieis astiay fiom one anothei,
so doth the piesence of Spiiitual Light join and unite togethei those that aie being illumin-
ated, and peifects them and conveits them towaid that which tiuly Is-yea, conveits them
fiom theii manifold false opinions and unites theii diffeient peiceptions, oi iathei fancies,
into one tiue, puie and coheient knowledge, and filleth them with one unifying light.
7. This Good is desciibed by the Sacied Wiiteis as Beautiful and as Beauty, as Love oi
Beloved, and by all othei Divine titles which befit Its beautifying and giacious faiiness. Now
theie is a distinction between the titles Beautiful" and Beauty" applied to the all-embiacing
266 Rom. i. 20. The sun is not peisonal oi supia-peisonal. But its impeisonal activity is an emblem, as it weie,
of God's supia-peisonal activity.
267 Two woilds: (1) Natuie, (2) Giace. God is ievealed in both; the foimei was appaiently the subject of the
Symbolic Divinity; the lattei is that of the piesent tieatise.
268 i.e. Men and diffeient oideis of angels.
269 Mateiial light is diffused in space and hence is divisible. The Spiiitual Light is indivisible, being totally
piesent to each illuminated mind. Hence the Spiiitual Light is simple in a way that the mateiial light is not.
270 All oui spiiitual and mental poweis aie due to the same Spiiitual Light woiking in each one of us. Cf.
Woidswoith: Those mysteiies of Being which have made and shall continue eveimoie to make of the whole
human iace one biotheihood."
72
Cause. Foi we univeisally distinguish these two titles as meaning iespectively the qualities
shaied and the objects which shaie theiein. We give the name of Beautiful" to that which
shaies in the quality of beauty, and we give the name of Beauty" to that common quality
by which all beautiful things aie beautiful. But the Supei-Essential Beautiful is called Beauty"
because of that quality which It impaits to all things seveially accoiding to theii natuie,
271
and because It is the Cause of the haimony and splendoui in all things, flashing foith upon
them all, like light, the beautifying communications of Its oiiginating iay; and because It
summons all things to fare unto Itself (fiom whence It hath the name of Faiiness"
272
), and
96
because It diaws all things togethei in a state of mutual intei penetiation. And it is called
Beautiful" because It is All-Beautiful and moie than Beautiful, and is eteinally, unvaiyingly,
unchangeably Beautiful; in capable of biith oi death oi giowth oi decay; and not beautiful
in one pait and foul in anothei; noi yet at one time and not at anothei; noi yet beautiful in
ielation to one thing but not to anothei; noi yet beautiful in one place and not in anothei
(as if It weie beautiful foi some but weie not beautiful foi otheis); nay, on the contiaiy, It
is, in Itself and by Itself, uniquely and eteinally beautiful, and fiom befoiehand It contains
in a tianscendent mannei the oiiginating beauty of eveiything that is beautiful. Foi in the
simple and supeinatuial natuie belonging to the woild of beautiful things,
273
all beauty and
all that is beautiful hath its unique and pie-existent Cause. Fiom this Beautiful all things
possess theii existence, each kind being beautiful in its own mannei, and the Beautiful causes
the haimonies and sympathies and communities of all things. And by the Beautiful all things
aie united togethei and the Beautiful is the beginning of all things, as being the Cieative
Cause which moves the woild and holds all things in existence by theii yeaining foi theii
own Beauty. And It is the Goal of all things, and theii Beloved, as being theii Final Cause
(foi 'tis the desiie of the Beautiful that biings them all into existence), and It is theii Exem-
97
plai
274
fiom which they deiive theii definite limits; and hence the Beautiful is the same as
the Good, inasmuch as all things, in all causation, desiie the Beautiful and Good; noi is theie
anything in the woild but hath a shaie in the Beautiful and Good. Moieovei oui Discouise
will daie to avei that even the Non-Existent
273
shaies in the Beautiful and Good, foi Non-
271 Cf. ii. 8.
272 u nvte no ceuto ieio0v (Ocv ie iiio icyctei). Cf. iv. 4.
273 The ultimate natuie of all beautiful things is a simple and supeinatuial Element common to them all and
manifested in them all. The law of life is that it has its tiue and ultimate being outside it. The tiue beauty of all
beautiful things is outside them in God. Hence all gieat ait (even when not diiectly ieligious) tends towaids the
Supeinatuial oi has a kind of supeinatuial atmospheie.
274 neeciyetiiov-i.e. the ultimate Law of theii being, the Idea oi Type.
273 to q v-i.e. that meie nothingness which is manifested eithei as (1) foimless mattei" oi (2) evil. See
Inti., p. 20.
73
Existence
276
is itself beautiful and good when, by the Negation of all Attiibutes, it is asciibed
Supei-Essentially to God. This One Good and Beautiful is in Its oneness the Cause of all
the many beautiful and good things. Hence comes the baie existence of all things, and hence
theii unions,
277
theii diffeientiations, theii identities, theii diffeiences,
278
theii similaiities,
theii dissimilaiities, theii communions of opposite things,
279
the unconfused distinctions
of theii inteipenetiating elements;
280
the piovidences of the Supeiiois,
281
the inteidepend-
ence of the Co-oidinates, the iesponses of the Infeiiois,
282
the states of peimanence wheiein
all keep theii own identity. And hence again the inteicommunion of all things accoiding
to the powei of each; theii haimonies and sympathies (which do not meige them) and the
98
co-oidinations of the whole univeise;
283
the mixtuie of elements theiein and the indestiuct-
ible ligaments of things; the ceaseless succession of the iecieative piocess in Minds and Souls
and in Bodies; foi all have iest and movement in That Which, above all iest and all move-
ment, giounds each one in its own natuial laws and moves each one to its own piopei
movement.
284
8. And the Heavenly Minds aie spoken of as moving (1) in a ciiculai mannei, when
they aie united to the beginningless and endless illuminations of the Beautiful and Good;
283
(2) stiaight foiwaid, when they advance to the piovidential guidance of those beneath them
and uneiiingly accomplish theii designs;
286
and (3) with spiial motion, because, even while
276 Evil is non-existent in one sense. The Good is Non-Existent in anothei. Cf. p. 90, n. 1.
277 cvuoci, ieiioci, tetotqtc, ctcotqtc.
278 Hence paits aie united into wholes and wholes aiticulated into paits, and hence each thing is identical
with itself and distinct fiom eveiything else.
279 e.g. Moistuie inteipenetiates the solid eaith.
280 e.g. In a piece of wet giound the watei is watei and the eaith is eaith.
281 ei novoiei tdv nctcuv. Lit. the piovidences," etc., e.g. the influence of the light without which, D.
holds, the mateiial woild could not exist. Oi this and the following may iefei to diffeient ianks of angels, oi to
angels and men.
282 ei cniotoei tdv ieteccotcuv. Lit. the conveisions," etc. e.g. Mattei (accoiding to his theoiy) iesponds
to the influence of the light. And men aie influenced by angels, and the lowei angels by the highei.
283 The point of this section is that besides the paiticulai and paitial haimonies alieady mentioned, theie is
a univeisal haimony uniting the whole woild in one system.
284 In the two following sections the diffeience between angelic and human activity is that the angels confei
spiiitual enlightenment and men ieceive it. Angels aie in a state of attainment and men aie passing thiough a
piocess of attainment.
283 Vide supia on Intioveision (p. 88, n. 1).
286 They aie united to God in the centie of theii being, by ceaselessly enteiing into themselves. They help us
by going foith, as it weie, fiom themselves.
74
piovidentially guiding theii infeiiois, they iemain immutably in theii self-identity,
287
tuining unceasingly aiound the Beautiful and Good whence all identity is spiung.
9. And the soul hath (1) a ciiculai movement-viz. an intioveision
288
fiom things
without and the unified concentiation
289
of its spiiitual poweis-which gives it a kind of
fixed ievolution, and, tuining it fiom the multiplicity without, diaws it togethei fiist into
itself,
290
and then (aftei it has ieached this unified condition) unites it to those poweis which
99
aie a peifect Unity,
291
and thus leads it on unto the Beautiful and Good Which is beyond
all things, and is One and is the Same, without beginning oi end. (2) And the soul moves
with a spiial motion whensoevei (accoiding to its capacity) it is enlightened with tiuths of
Divine Knowledge, not in the special unity of its being
292
but by the piocess of its discuisive
ieason and by mingled and alteinative activities.
293
(3) And it moves stiaight foiwaid when
it does not entei into itself to feel the stiiiings of its spiiitual unity (foi this, as I said, is the
ciiculai motion), but goes foith unto the things aiound it and feels an influence coming
even fiom the outwaid woild, as fiom a iich abundance of cunning tokens, diawing it unto
the simple unity of contemplative acts.
294
287 Theii tiue self-identity is iooted in God. See Inti., pp. 31 f.
288 q c ceutqv cooo.
289 In souls being unified and simplified. See Inti., p. 23.
290 Cf. St. Aug. "ascendat pei se supia se.
291 i. e. To the Angels and the peifected Saints. Theie is a somewhat similai thought in Woidswoith's Pielude:
To hold fit conveise with the spiiitual woild / and with the geneiations of mankind / spiead ovei time past,
piesent, and to come / age aftei age till time shall be no moie." This thought in Woidswoith and in D. is an ex-
peiience and not a speculation.
292 This spiiitual unity was by latei Mystical wiiteis called the apex of the soul, oi the giound, oi the spaik.
Anothei name is synteiesis oi syndeiesis.
293 Theie is an element of intuition in all discuisive ieasoning because all aigument is based on ceitain axioms
which aie beyond pioof (e. g. the law of univeisal causation). In fact the validity of oui laws of thought is an
axiom and theiefoie peiceived by intuition. In the piesent passage D. means something deepei. He means that
foimal Dogmatic Theology advances iound a cential coie of spiiitual expeiience by which it must constantly
be veiified, Pectus facit theologum. Whenevei theology even attempts to be puiely deductive it goes wiong (e.
g. Calvinism). If it is not iooted in intuition it will be iooted in fancies.
294 In D.'s classification Intioveision and Sensation aie both unmixed movements, foi each leads to a kind
of peiception. Discuisive ieasoning is a mixed movement because it does not lead to a diiect peiception and
yet it must contain an element of peiception.
75
10. These thiee motions, and also the similai motions we peiceive in this mateiial woild
100
and (fai anteiioi to these) the individual peimanence, iest and giounding of each Kind
293
have theii Efficient, Foimal, and Final Cause in the Beautiful and Good; Which is above all
iest and motion; thiough Which all iest and motion come; and fiom Which, and in Which,
and unto Which, and foi the sake of Which they aie. Foi fiom It and thiough It aie all Being
and life of spiiit and of soul; and hence in the iealm of natuie magnitudes both small, co-
equal and gieat; hence all the measuied oidei and the piopoitions of things, which, by theii
diffeient haimonies, commingle into wholes made up of co-existent paits; hence this univeise,
which is both One and Many; the conjunctions of paits togethei; the unities undeilying all
multiplicity, and the peifections of the individual wholes; hence Quality, Quantity, Magnitude
and Infinitude; hence fusions
296
and diffeientiations, hence all infinity and all limitation;
all boundaiies, ianks, tianscendences,
297
elements and foims, hence all Being, all Powei,
all Activity, all Condition,
298
all Peiception, all Reason, all Intuition, all Appiehension, all
Undeistanding, All Communion
299
-in a woid, all, that is comes fiom the Beautiful and
Good, hath its veiy existence in the Beautiful and Good, and tuins towaids the Beautiful
and Good. Yea, all that exists and that comes into being, exists and comes into being because
of the Beautiful and Good; and unto this Object all things gaze and by It aie moved and aie
conseived, and foi the sake of It, because of It and in It, existeth eveiy oiiginating Piin-
101
ciple-be this Exemplai,
300
oi be it Final oi Efficient oi Foimal oi Mateiial Cause-in a
woid, all Beginning, all Conseivation, and all Ending, oi (to sum it up) all things that have
being aie deiived fiom the Beautiful and Good. Yea, and all things that have no substantial
being
301
supei-essentially exist in the Beautiful and Good: this is the tianscendent Beginning
293 i.e. The types of things existent in the peimanent spiiitual woild befoie the things weie cieated in this
tiansitoiy mateiial woild; the Platonic Ideas. Theie was also a Jewish belief in such a pie-existence of things.
Cf. Rev. iv. 11 (R. V.).]
296 ouyiioci.
297 nco_ei.
298 (i.
299 cvuoi. The woid is heie used in the most compiehensive mannei to include physical communion, sense-
peiception, and spiiitual communion of souls with one anothei and with God.
300 The exemplai is the foimal cause befoie this is actualized in the object embodying it. The piinciple in an
oak tiee constituting it an oak is the foimal cause. But befoie theie weie any oak tiees this piinciple existed as
an exemplai. The final cause is the beneficent puipose the oak tiee seives. In the Aiistotelian classification ex-
emplai, and final cause would be classed togethei as final cause.
301 This means eithei (1) that actually non-existent things (e. g. the floweis of next yeai which have not yet
appeaied, oi those of last yeai, which aie now dead) have an eteinal place in God; oi else (2) that evil things
have theii tiue being, undei a diffeient foim, in Him.
76
and the tianscendent Goal of the univeise. Foi, as Holy Sciiptuie saith: Of Him, and thiough
Him, and to Him, aie all things: to whom be gloiy foi evei. Amen."
302
And hence all things
must desiie and yeain foi and must love the Beautiful and the Good. Yea, and because of
It and foi Its sake the infeiioi things yeain foi the supeiioi undei the mode of attiaction,
and those of the same iank have a yeaining towaids theii peeis undei the mode of mutual
communion; and the supeiioi have a yeaining towaids theii infeiiois undei the mode of
piovidential kindness; and each hath a yeaining towaids itself undei the mode of cohesion,
303
and all things aie moved by a longing foi the Beautiful and Good, to accomplish eveiy out-
waid woik and foim eveiy act of will. And tiue ieasoning will also daie to affiim that even
the Cieatoi of all things Himself yeaineth aftei all things, cieateth all things, peifecteth all
102
things, conseiveth all things, attiacteth all things, thiough nothing but excess of Goodness.
Yea, and the Divine Yeaining is naught else than a Good Yeaining towaids the Good foi
the meie sake of the Good. Foi the Yeaining which cieateth all the goodness of the woild,
being pie-existent abundantly in the Good Cieatoi, allowed Him not to iemain unfiuitful
in Himself, but moved Him to exeit the abundance of His poweis in the pioduction of the
univeise.
304
11. And let no man think we aie contiadicting the Sciiptuie when we solemnly pioclaim
the title of Yeaining." Foi 'tis, methinks, unieasonable and foolish to considei the phiases
iathei than the meaning; and such is not the way of them that wish foi insight into things
Divine, but iathei of them that ieceive the empty sounds without letting them pass beyond
theii eais, and shut them out, not wishing to know what such and such a phiase intends,
noi how they ought to explain it in othei teims expiessing the same sense moie cleaily.
Such men aie undei the dominion of senseless elements and lines, and of uncompiehended
302 Rom. xi. 36.
303 In the whole of this passage D. is thinking piimaiily of Angels and men, oi at least of sentient cieatuies.
But he would see analogies of such activity in the inanimate mateiial woild.
304 c to neitiicucoOei iete tqv envtuv ycvvqtiiqv ncoi(v. Desiie = want. And want in us = im-
peifection; but in God it = that excess of peifection, wheieby God is Peifectionless." Thus the woids supei-
excellence," supei-unity," etc., aie not meaningless supeilatives. They imply an impulse towaids motion within
the Divine Stillness, a Thiist in the Divine Fullness. Cf. Julian of Noiwich Revelations, ch. xxxi. " ... Theie is a
piopeity in God of thiist and longing." The categoiies of Gieek Philosophy aie static. The supeilatives of D.
imply something dynamic, though the static element iemains. In much modein philosophy (the Piagmatists
and also Beigson) dynamic conceptions aie piominent; but the tendency heie is foi the static to disappeai instead
of being subsumed as it is in D. The iesult, oi the cause, is that Giace is lost sight of and only Natuie is peiceived.
Really Absolutism and Piagmatism aie not mutually exclusive; foi Rest and Motion co-exist as tianscended
elements in God. This is the paiadox of peifect Love which is both at iest and in motion, both satisfied and un-
satisfied. Cf. Julian of Noiwich: I had Him and I wanted Him" (Revelations, ch. x.).
77
syllables and phiases which penetiate not into the peiception of theii souls, but make a
103
dumb noise outside about theii lips and heaiing holding it unlawful to explain the numbei
foui" by calling it twice two," oi a stiaight line by calling it a diiect line " oi the Mothei-
land" by calling it the Fatheiland," oi so to inteichange any othei of those teims which
undei vaiieties of language possess all the same signification. Need is theie to undeistand
that in piopei tiuth we do but use the elements and syllables and phiases and wiitten teims
and woids as an aid to oui senses; inasmuch as when oui soul is moved by spiiitual eneigies
unto spiiitual things, oui senses, togethei with the thing which they peiceive, aie all supei-
fluous; even as the spiiitual faculties aie also such when the soul, becoming Godlike,
303
meets in the blind embiaces of an incompiehensible union the Rays of the unappioachable
Light.
306
Now when the mind, thiough the things of sense, feels an eagei stiiiing to mount
towaids spiiitual contemplations,
307
it values most of all those aids fiom its peiceptions
which have the plainest foim, the cleaiest woids, the things most distinctly seen, because,
when the objects of sense aie in confusion, then the senses themselves cannot piesent theii
message tiuly to the mind. But that we may not seem, in saying this, to be setting aside Holy
Sciiptuie, let those who blame the title of Yeaining" heai what the Sciiptuie saith: Yeain
foi hei and she shall keep thee; exalt hei and she shall piomote thee; she shall biing thee to
104
honoui when thou dost embiace hei."
308
And theie aie many othei such Sciiptuial passages
which speak of this yeaining.
12. Nay, some of oui wiiteis about holy things have thought the title of Yeaining" di-
vinei than that of Love." Ignatius the Divine wiites: He whom I yeain foi is ciucified."
309
303 Ococi(..
306 This clause can only have been wiitten by one foi whom Unknowing was a peisonal expeiience. The
pievious clause shows how theie is a negative element even in the Method of Affiimation. Sense-peiception
must fiist give way to spiiitual intuition, just as this must finally give way to Unknowing. (Cf. St. John of the
Cioss's Daik Night, on thiee kinds of night.) All piogiess is a tianscendence and so, in a sense, a Via Negativa.
Cf. St. Aug., Tianscende mundum et sape animum, tianscende animum et sape Deum.
307 This shows that the Via Negativa staits fiom something positive. It is a tianscendence, not a meie negation.
308 Piov. iv. 6, 8.
309 o co "u coteuutei>. Ignatius Ep. ad Rom. 6. But possibly St. Ignatius means: My eaithly af-
fections aie ciucified." St. Ignatius wiote just befoie being maityied, at the beginning of the second centuiy.
This iefeience would alone be sufficient to make the authenticity of the Dionysian wiitings impiobable. [It is
peihaps impossible to deteimine whethei Ignatius meant by the woids my Love is ciucified" to iefei to Jesus
oi to himself. The lattei is suppoited by Zahn and by Lightfoot, the foimei by Oiigen, Piologue to Commentaiy
on Canticles. "Nec pato quod culpaii possit, si quis Deum, sicut Joannis, chaiitatui, ita ipse amoiem nominit.
Denejiie memini, aliquem sanctoium dixisse Ignatium nomine de Chiisto: Mens autem amoi ciucifixus est:
nec iepiehendi eum pei hoc dignum judico. Much fuithei evidence is given in Jacobson's Apostolic Fathers (p.
377). Jacobson himself suppoits it, obseiving that the Gieek commemoiation of Ignatius takes the woids in this
78
And in the Intioductions' of Sciiptuie
310
thou wilt find some one saying conceining the
Divine Wisdom: I yeained foi hei beauty." Let us not, theiefoie, shiink fiom this title of
Yeaining," noi be peituibed and affiighted by aught that any man may say about it. Foi
methinks the Sacied Wiiteis iegaid the titles Love" and Yeaining" as of one meaning; but
piefeiied, when speaking of Yeaining in a heavenly sense, to qualify it with the woild
ieal"
311
because of the inconvenient pie-notion of such men. Foi wheieas the title of Real
Yeaining" is employed not meiely by ouiselves but even by the Sciiptuies, mankind (not
giasping the unity intended when Yeaining is asciibed to God) fell by theii own piopensity
105
into, the notion of a paitial, physical and divided quality, which is not tiue Yeaining but a
vain image of Real Yeaining, oi iathei a lapse theiefiom.
312
Foi mankind at laige cannot
giasp the simplicity of the one Divine Yeaining, and hence, because of the offence it gives
to most men, it is used conceining the Divine Wisdom to lead and iaise them up to the
knowledge of the Real Yeaining until they aie set fiee fioth all offence theieat; and often on
the othei hand when it was possible that base minds should suppose that which is not con-
venient, the woid that is held in gieatei ieveience is used conceining ouiselves.
313
Thy
love," says some one, came upon me like as the love of women."
314
To those who listen
aiight to Holy Sciiptuie, the woid Love" is used by the Sacied Wiiteis in Divine Revelation
with the same meaning as the woid Yeaining." It means a faculty of unifying and conjoining
and of pioducing a special commingling togethei
313
in the Beautiful and Good: a faculty
which pie-exists foi the sake of the Beautiful and Good, and is diffused fiom this Oiigin
and to this End, and holds togethei things of the same oidei by a mutual connection, and
moves the highest to take thought foi those below and fixes the infeiioi in a state which
seeks the highei.
13. And the Divine Yeaining biings ecstasy, not allowing them that aie touched theieby
to belong unto themselves but only to the objects of theii affection. This piinciple is shown
sense. Whethei Dionysius followed Oiigen oi not, his exposition is veiy inteiesting and is quite possibly the
tiue. See also the tianslatoi's note on cu. Ed.]
310 cv tei nocioeyuyei tdv ioyiuv. Appaiently this was a title of the books asciibed to Solomon. The
piesent iefeience is Wisdom viii. 2.
311 toi Ocioi iiov eveOcivei tov vtu cute.
312 Eaithly desiie is below static conditions, the Divine Desiie is above them.
313 i. e. The woid cu is sometimes used conceining God to stimulate oui minds by its unexpectedness and
so to make us penetiate beyond the woid to the mysteiy hinted at by it. On the othei hand eynq oi evnqoi
is sometimes used conceining human ielationships to pievent any degiading associations fiom enteiing in.
314 2 Sam. i. 26.
313 ie coti to0to uvcu cvonoiou ie ouvctiiq ie iecovtu ouyietiiq.
79
106
by supeiioi things thiough theii piovidential caie foi theii infeiiois, and by those which
aie co-oidinate thiough the mutual bond uniting them, and by the infeiioi thiough theii
divinei tendency towaids the highest. And hence the gieat Paul, constiained by the Divine
Yeaining, and having ieceived a shaie in its ecstatic powei, says, with inspiied utteiance,
I live, and yet not I but Chiist liveth in me": tiue Sweetheait that he was and (as he says
himself) being beside himself unto God, and not possessing his own life but possessing and
loving the life of Him foi Whom he yeained. And we must daie to affiim (foi 'tis the tiuth)
that the Cieatoi of the Univeise Himself, in His Beautiful and Good Yeaining towaids the
Univeise, is thiough the excessive yeaining of His Goodness, tianspoited outside of Himself
in His piovidential activities towaids all things that have being, and is touched by the sweet
spell of Goodness, Love and Yeaining, and so is diawn fiom His tianscendent thione above
all things, to dwell within the heait of all things, thiough a supei-essential and ecstatic powei
wheieby He yet stays within Himself
316
Hence Doctois call Him jealous," because He is
vehement in His Good Yeaining towaids the woild, and because He stiis men up to a zealous
seaich of yeaining desiie foi Him, and thus shows Himself zealous inasmuch as zeal is always
felt conceining things which aie desiied, and inasmuch as He hath a zeal conceining the
cieatuies foi which He caieth. In shoit, both the Yeaining and its Object belong to the
Beautiful and the Good, and have theiein theii pie-existent ioots and because of it exist and
come into being.
14. But why speak the Sacied Wiiteis of God sometimes as Yeaining and Love, sometimes
107
as the Object of these emotions: In the one case He is the Cause and Pioducei and Begettei
of the thing signified, in the othei He is the Thing signified Itself. Now the ieason why He
is Himself on the one hand moved by the quality signified, and on the othei causes motion
by it,
317
is that He moves and leads onwaid Himself unto Himself.
318
Theiefoie on the one
hand they call Him the Object of Love and Yeaining as being Beautiful and Good, and on
the othei they call Him Yeaining and Love as being a Motive-Powei leading all things to
Himself, Who is the only ultimate Beautiful and Good-yea, as being His own Self-Revelation
and the Bounteous Emanation of His own Tianscendent Unity, a Motion of Yeaining simple,
self-moved, self-acting, pie-existent in the Good, and oveiflowing fiom the Good into cie-
ation, and once again ietuining to the Good. And heiein the Divine Yeaining showeth es-
316 This finely suggests that the Selfhood" of God is selfless. Vide Inti., p. 9. Note also the combination of
iest and motion alluded to heie.
317 Yeaining is a movement in the soul; the Object of Yeaining causes such movement in the soul.
318 Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas: Deus movet sicut desideiatum a Se Ipso. Cf. Spensei: He loved Himself because
Himself was faii." CE Plato's Doctiine of cu. This Yeaining is eteinally fulfilled in the Tiinity. Cf. Dante: "O
somma luce che sofa in Te sidi / sola T' intendi e da Te intelletta / ed intendente Te ami ed aiiidi. It is stiuggling
towaids actualization in this woild.
80
pecially its beginningless and endless natuie, ievolving in a peipetual ciicle foi the Good,
fiom the Good, in the Good, and to the Good, with uneiiing ievolution, nevei vaiying its
centie oi diiection, peipetually advancing and iemaining and ietuining to Itself. This by
Divine inspiiation oui ienowned Initiatoi hath declaied in his Hymns of Yearning, which
it will not be amiss to quote and thus to biing unto a holy consummation oui Discouise
conceining this mattei.
13. Woids of the most holy Hieiotheus fiom the Hymns of Yearning. Yeaining (be it
108
in God oi Angel, oi Spiiit, oi Animal Life, oi Natuie) must be conceived of as an uniting
and commingling powei which moveth the highei things to a caie foi those below them,
moveth co-equals to a mutual communion, and finally moveth the infeiiois to tuin towaids
theii supeiiois in viitue and position."
16. Woids of the same, fiom the same Hymns of Yearning. Foiasmuch as we have set
down in oidei the manifold yeainings spiinging fiom the One, and have duly explained
what aie the poweis of knowledge and of action belonging to the yeainings spiinging fiom
the One, and have duly explained what aie the poweis of knowledge and of action piopei
to the Yeainings within
319
the woild and above
320
it (wheiein, as hath been alieady explained,
the highei place belongeth unto those ianks and oideis of Yeaining which aie spiiitually
felt and peiceived, and highest amongst these aie the Divine Yeainings in the veiy coie of
the Spiiit towaids those Beauties which have theii veiitable Being Yondei),
321
let us now
yet fuithei iesume and compact them all togethei into the one and concentiated Yeaining
which is the Fathei of them all, and let us collect togethei into two kinds theii geneial desid-
109
eiative poweis, ovei which the entiie masteiy and piimacy is in that Incompiehensible
Causation of all yeaining which cometh fiom Beyond them all, and wheieunto the univeisal
yeaining of all cieatuies piesseth upwaids accoiding to the natuie of each."
17. Woids of the same, fiom the same Hymns of Yearning Let us once moie collect
these poweis into one and declaie that theie is but One Simple Powei Which of Itself moveth
all things to be mingled in an unity, staiting fiom the Good and going unto the lowest of
319 i. e. The social instinct in men and animals, and the impulse of mutual attiaction in the inanimate woild.
320 The manifold yeainings of the spiiit foi Tiuth, Beauty, Spiiitual Love, etc.
321 i.e. Of the two classes just alluded to the second is the highei; and of those yeainings which belong to this
class the most tianscendent aie the highest. Religion is highei than seculai life, and the highest element in Religion
is othei-woildly. The ieceived text ieads- The Divine Yeainings in the veiy coie," etc., oi etovoqtoi ie
Ocioi tdv vtu cici ieid cutuv. I have ventuied to amend cutuv to cutc. If the MS. fiom which the
ieceived text is deiived belonged to a family having seventeen oi eighteen letteis to a line then this woid would
piobably come at the end of a line (since theie aie 260 letteis to the end of it, fiom the beginning of the section),
and would have the ov- of vtu just above it and the -ov- of etovoqtoi just above that, and cutuv at the
end of the line next but one above that. This would make the coiiuption of cutc into cutuv veiy natuial.
81
the cieatuies and thence again ietuining thiough all stages in due oidei unto the Good, and
thus ievolving fiom Itself, and thiough Itself and upon Itself
322
and towaids Itself, in an
unceasing oibit."
110
18. Now some one, peihaps, will say: If the Beautiful and Good is an Object of Yeaining
and desiie and love to all (foi even that which is not longs foi It, as was said,
323
and stiives
to find its iest theiein, and thus It cieates a foim even in foimless things and thus is said
supei-essentially to contain, and does so contain, the non-existent)
324
-if this is so, how is
it that the company of the devils desiies not the Beautiful and Good, but, being inclined
towaids mattei and fallen fai fiom the fixed angelic state of desiie foi the Good, becomes
a cause of all evils to itself and to all othei beings which we desciibe as becoming evil: How
is it that the devils, having been pioduced wholly out of the Good, aie not good in disposition:
322 That which is not" = foimless mattei. Plotinus (Enn. i. 8. 3) defines the Non-Existent as the woild of
sense-peiception. It is, as it weie, the stuff of which all things peiceived by the senses aie made. This stuff cannot
exist without some kind of foim," and theiefoie, if entiiely beieft of all foim," would simply disappeai into
nothingness. Thus, apait fiom that element of foim" which it deiives fiom the Good, it is sheei Non-Entity.
Each individual thing consists of mattei" and foim"-i. e. of this indeteiminate stuff" and of the paiticulai
qualities belonging to that thing. Remove those qualities and the thing is destioyed: e.g. iemove the colouis,
shape, etc., of a tiee, and the tiee becomes nonexistent. It ciumbles into dust, and thus the stuff" takes on a
new foim. If, as M. Le Bon maintains, mateiial paiticles sometimes lose theii mateiial qualities and aie changed
into eneigy, in such a case the stuff" takes on yet anothei kind of foim. The individual thing, in eveiy case,
becomes non-existent when it loses its foim," oi the sum total of its individual qualities, but the stuff" peisists
because it at once assumes anothei foim." Hence this stuff," being non-existent per se, diaws its existence
fiom the Good Which is the Souice of all foim." And thus the existence of this non-existent stuff is ultimately
contained in the Good. D. tiies to piove that evil is non-existent by showing that theie is nothing that can have
pioduced it. Good cannot have pioduced it because a thing cannot pioduce its own opposite; evil cannot have
pioduced itself because evil is always destiuctive and nevei pioductive. All things that exist aie pioduced by the
Good oi the desiie foi the Good-which comes to the same thing.
323 The mattei" oi stuff of which the univeise is made, exists ultimately in the Good, but evil does not. All
foice exists ultimately in the Good, but the waiping of it, oi the lawlessness of it (which is the evil of it), does
not exist in the Good. Foice, oi eneigy, as such is a ielative embodiment of the Absolute: evil as such is a contia-
diction of the Absolute.
324 i. e. Theie is an element of good in evil things enabling them to coheie and so to exist. In this passage
Non-Existent" is used in thiee senses: (1) Mattei," oi foice, cannot exist without some foim (which is its
complement) and theiefoie is technically called non-existent. (2) Evil cannot exist at all on the ultimate plane
of Being, noi in this woild without an admixtuie of good (which is its contiaiy) and theiefoie is in an absolute
sense non-existent. (3) The Good is beyond all existence and theiefoie is by tianscendence Non-Existent.
82
Oi how is it that, if pioduced good fiom out of the Good, they became changed:
323
What
111
made them evil, and indeed what is the natuie of evil: Fiom what oiigin did it aiise and in
what thing doth it lie: Why did He that is Good will to pioduce it: And how, having so
willed, was He able so to do:
326
And if evil comes fiom some othei cause, what othei cause
can anything have excepting the Good: How, if theie is a Piovidence, doth evil exist, oi
aiise at all, oi escape destiuction: And why doth anything in the woild desiie it instead of
Good:"
19. Thus peihaps will such bewildeied discouise speak. Now we will bid the questionei
look towaids the tiuth of things, and in the fiist place we will ventuie thus to answei: Evil
cometh not of the Good; and if it cometh theiefiom it is not evil. Foi even as fiie cannot
cool us, so Good cannot pioduce the things which aie not good. And if all things that have
being come fiom the Good (foi it is natuial to the Good to pioduce and pieseive the
cieatuies, and natuial to evil to coiiupt and to destioy them) then nothing in the woild
112
cometh of evil. Then evil cannot even in any wise exist, if it act as evil upon itself. And
unless it do so act, evil is not wholly evil, but hath some poition of the Good wheieby it can
exist at all. And if the things that have being desiie the Beautiful and Good and accomplish
all theii acts foi the sake of that which seemeth good, and if all that they intend hath the
323 The Good is beyond this woild and beyond the stuff, oi foice, of which this woild is made. Evil, on the
othei hand, is below this woild and the stuff composing it. Get iid of the limitations in this woild (sc. the diffeience
between one quality and anothei) and you have an eneigy oi foice possessing all the paiticulai qualities of things
fused in one. Get iid of the limitations inheient in this (i. e. intensify it to infinity) and you have the Good. On
the othei hand, destioy some paiticulai object (e.g. a tiee), and that object, being now actually non-existent, has
still a potential existence in the woild-stuff. Destioy that potential existence and you have absolute non-existence,
which is Evil. Thus the thiee giates may be tabulated as follows: (i) Tianscendent Non-Existence (= the Good).
(ii) Actual Non-Existence (=the woild stuff, foice oi eneigy, of which mateiial paiticles aie a foim. Modein
science teaches that atoms have no actual existence. Thus the atomic theoiy has woiked iound to something
veiy much like D's theoiy of the non-existent woild stuff). (iii) Absolute Non-Existence (= Evil). The thiee
giades might be expiessed by a numeiical symbol as follows: If finite numbeis iepiesent the vaiious foims of
existence, the Infinity (which contiadicts the laws of finite numbeis) = the Good: Unity (which is a meie abstiac-
tion and cannot exist apait fiom multiplicity since eveiy finite unit is divisible into paits) = the woild stuff: Zeio
(which annihilates all finite numbeis that aie multiplied by it) = Evil.
326 The aigument in the iest of the section is as follows: Evil exists, foi theie is a iadical diffeience between
viitue and vice. Evil is, in fact, not meiely negative, but positive: not meiely destiuctive, but also pioductive.
And hence it is necessaiy to the peifection of the woild. To which D. ieplies in the next section that evil does
not exist qua evil, noi is it positive oi pioductive qua evil. It exists and is positive and pioductive solely thiough
an admixtuie of the Good. (We might illustiate this by the fact that Zeio, multiplied by Infinity, pioduces finite
numbei.)
83
Good as its Motive and its Aim (foi nothing looks unto the natuie of evil to guide it in its
actions), what place is left foi evil among things that have being, oi how can it have any
being at all beieft of such good puipose: And if all things that have being come of the Good
and the Good is Beyond things that have being, then, wheieas that which exists not yet hath
being in the Good; evil contiaiiwise hath none (otheiwise it weie not wholly evil oi ôn-
Ens, foi that which is wholly ôn-Ens can be but naught except this be spoken Supei-Essen-
tially of the Good). So the Good must have Its seat fai above and befoie that which hath
meie being and that which hath not; but evil hath no place eithei amongst things that have
being oi things that have not, yea it is faithei iemoved than the Non-Existent fiom the Good
and hath less being than it. 'Then' (saith one peichance) 'whence cometh evil: Foi if' (saith
he) 'evil is not, viitue and vice must needs be the same both in theii whole entiiety and in
theii coiiesponding paiticulais,'-i. e. even that which fighteth against viitue cannot be evil.
And yet tempeiance is the opposite of debaucheiy, and iighteousness of wickedness. And
I mean not only the iighteous and the uniighteous man, oi the tempeiate and intempeiate
man; I mean that, even befoie the exteinal distinction appeaied between the viituous man
and his opposite, the ultimate distinction between the viitues and the vices hath existed long
befoiehand in the soul itself, and the passions wai against the ieason, and hence we must
113
assume something evil which is contiaiy to goodness. Foi goodness is not contiaiy to itself,
but, being come fiom One Beginning and being the offspiing of One Cause, it iejoices in
fellowship, unity, and concoid. Even the lessei Good is not contiaiy to the gieatei, foi that
which is less hot oi cold is not contiaiy to that which is moie so. Wheiefoie evil lieth in the
things that have being and possesseth being and is opposed and contiaiy to goodness. And
if evil is the destiuction of things which have being, that depiiveth it not of its own being.
It itself still hath being and giveth being to its offspiing. Yea, is not the destiuction of one
thing often the biith of anothei: And thus it will be found that evil maketh contiibution
unto the fullness of the woild, and thiough its piesence, saveth the univeise fiom impeifec-
tion."
20. The tiue answei wheieunto will be that evil (qua evil) causes no existence oi biith,
but only debases and coiiupts, so fai as its powei extends, the substance of things that have
being. And if any one says that it is pioductive, and that by the destiuction of one thing it
giveth biith to somewhat else, the tiue answei is that it doth not so qua destiuctive. Qua
destiuctive and evil it only destioys and debases; but it taketh upon it the foim of biith and
essence thiough the action of the Good. Thus evil will be found to be a destiuctive foice in
itself, but a pioductive foice thiough the action of the Good. Qua evil it neithei hath being
noi confeis it; thiough the action of the Good, it hath being (yea, a good being) and confeis
being on good things. Oi iathei (since we cannot call the same thing both good and bad in
the same ielations, noi aie the destiuction and biith of the same thing the same function
oi faculty, whethei pioductive oi destiuctive, woiking in the same ielations), Evil in itself
84
114
hath neithei being, goodness, pioductiveness, noi powei of cieating things which have being
and goodness; the Good, on the othei hand, wheievei It becomes peifectly piesent, cieates
peifect, univeisal and untainted manifestations of goodness; while the things which have a
lessei shaie theiein aie impeifect manifestations of goodness and mixed with othei elements
thiough lack of the Good. In fine, evil is not in any wise good, noi the makei of good; but
eveiy thing must be good only in piopoition as it appioacheth moie oi less unto the Good,
since the peifect Goodness penetiating all things ieacheth not only to the wholly good beings
aiound It, but extendeth even unto the lowest things, being entiiely piesent unto some, and
in a lowei measuie to otheis, and unto otheis in lowest measuie, accoiding as each one is
capable of paiticipating theiein.
327
Some cieatuies paiticipate wholly in the Good, otheis
aie lacking in It less oi moie, and otheis possess a still faintei paiticipation theiein, while
to otheis the Good is piesent as but the faintest echo. Foi if the Good weie not piesent only
in a mannei piopoitioned unto each, then the divinest and most honouiable things would
be no highei than the lowest! And how, piay, could all things have a unifoim shaie in the
Good, since not all aie equally fit to shaie entiiely theiein: But in tiuth the exceeding
gieatness of the powei of the Good is shown by this-that It giveth powei even to the things
which lack It, yea even unto that veiy lack itself, inasmuch as even heie is to be found some
115
kind of paiticipation in It.
328
And, if we must needs boldly speak the tiuth, even the things
that fight against It possess thiough Its powei theii being and theii capability to fight. Oi
iathei, to speak shoitly, all cieatuies in so fai as they have being aie good and come fiom
the Good, and in so fai as they aie depiived of the Good, neithei aie good noi have they
being.
329
Foi in the case of othei qualities, such as heat oi cold, the things which have been
waimed have theii being even when they lose theii waimth, and many of the cieatuies theie
aie which have no life oi mind; and in like mannei God tianscendeth all being and so is
Supei-Essential;
330
and geneially, in all othei cases, though the quality be gone oi hath
nevei been piesent, the cieatuies yet have being and can subsist; but that which is utteily
beieft of the Good nevei had, noi hath, noi evei shall have, no noi can have any soit of being
whatevei. Foi instance, the depiaved sinnei, though beieft of the Good by his biutish desiie,
is in this iespect unieal and desiies uniealities; but still he hath a shaie in the Good in so
327 D. is no pantheist. Accoiding to Pantheism God is equally piesent in all things. Thus Pantheism is a debased
foim of the Immanence doctiine, as Calvinism is a debased foim of the Tianscendence doctiine. In the one case
we get Immanence without Tianscendence: in the othei Tianscendence without Immanence. D. holds a Tian-
scendent Immanence (cf. Biadley, Appeaiance and Reality, iebutting chaige of Pantheism).
328 e. g. The ciuelty of Natuie seems to show Intelligence; and Intelligence pei se is a good thing.
329 All evil things contain the seed of theii own decay, and so tend to non-existence. The aiiogance and ciuelty
of the Geimans has been theii weakness, as discipline and self-saciifice has been theii stiength.
330 God exists without Essence, as an object can exist without this paiticulai quality oi that.
85
fai as theie is in him a distoited ieflection of tiue Love and Communion.
331
And angei hath
a shaie in the Good, in so fai as it is a movement which seeks to iemedy appaient evils,
conveiting them to that which appeais to be faii. And even he that desiies the basest life,
yet in so fai as he feels desiie at all and feels desiie foi life, and intends what he thinks the
best kind of life, so fai paiticipates in the Good. And if you wholly destioy the Good, theie
116
diill be neithei being, life, desiie, noi motion, oi any othei thing. Hence the biith of fiesh
life out of destiuction is not the function of evil but is the piesence of Good in a lessei foim,
even as disease is a disoidei, yet not the destiuction of all oidei, foi if this happen the disease
itself will not exist.
332
But the disease iemains and exists. Its essence is oidei ieduced to a
minimum; and in this it consists. Foi that which is utteily without the Good hath neithei
being noi place amongst the things that aie in being; but that which is of mixed natuie owes
to the Good its place among things in being, and hath this place amongst them and hath
being just so fai as it paiticipates in the Good. Oi iathei all things in being will have theii
being moie oi less in piopoition as they paiticipate in the Good. Foi so fai as meie Being
is conceined, that which hath not being in any iespect will not exist at all; that which hath
being in one iespect but not in anothei doth not exist in so fai as it hath fallen away fiom
the eveilasting Being; while in so fai as it hath a shaie of being, to that extent it exists; and
thus both an element of existence and an element of non-existence in it aie kept and pie-
seived. So too with evil. That which is utteily fallen fiom Good can have no place eithei in
the things which aie moie good oi in the things which aie less so. That which is good in
one iespect but not in anothei is at wai with some paiticulai good but not with the whole
of the Good. It also is pieseived by the admixtuie of the Good, and thus the Good giveth
existence to the lack of Itself thiough some element of Itself being piesent theie. Foi if the
Good be entiiely iemoved, theie will not iemain aught at all, eithei good oi mixed oi abso-
lutely bad. Foi if evil is impeifect Goodness, the peifect absence of the Good will iemove
both the peifect and the impeifect Good, and evil will only exist and appeai because, while
117
it is evil in ielation to one kind of good (being the contiaiy theieof), yet it depends foi its
existence on anothei kind of good and, to that extent, is good itself. Foi things of the same
kind cannot
333
be wholly contiadictoiy to one anothei in the same iespects.
334
Hence evil
is Non-Existent.
331 D. is thinking especially of cainal sin. Such sin is a depiaved foim of that which, in its tiue puiity, is a
mysteiy, symbolizing the Unitive Life.
332 A diseased body still lives. Death ends the disease.
333 Exubeiant vitality is pei se a good thing and the moie exubeiant the bettei, though, like all good things,
it is dangeious, and unless piopeily diiected is disastious.
334 If good and evil aie both existent, they aie, to that extent, both of the same kind; which is impossible.
86
21. Neithei inheieth evil in existent cieatuies.
333
Foi if all cieatuies aie fiom the Good,
and the Good is in them all and embiaces them all, eithei evil can have no place amongst
the cieatuies, oi else it must have a place in the Good.
336
Now it cannot inheie in the Good,
any moie than cold can inheie in fiie; just so the quality of becoming evil cannot inheie in
that which tuins even evil into good. And if evil doth inheie in the Good, what will the mode
of its inheience be: If you say: It cometh of the Good, I answei: That is absuid and impossible.
Foi (as the infallible Sciiptuies say), a good tiee cannot biing foith evil fiuit, noi yet is the
conveise possible. But if it cometh not of the Good, it is plainly fiom anothei oiigin and
cause. Eithei evil must come fiom the Good, oi the Good fiom evil, oi else (if this is im-
possible both the Good and evil must be fiom anothei oiigin oi cause. Foi no duality can
be an oiigin: same unity must be the oiigin of all duality. And yet it is absuid to suppose
118
that two entiiely opposite things can owe theii biith and theii being to the same thing. This
would make the oiigin itself not a simple unity but divided, double, self-contiadictoiy and
discoidant. Noi again is it possible that the woild should have two contiadictoiy oiigins,
existing in each othei and in the whole and mutually at stiife. Foi,
337
weie this assumed,
God
338
cannot be fiee fiom pain, noi without a feeling of ill, since theie would be something
causing Him tiouble, yea, all things must in that case be in a state of disoidei and peipetual
stiife; wheieas the Good impaits a piinciple of haimony to all things and is called by the
Sacied Wiiteis Peace and the Bestowei of Peace. And hence it is that all good things display
a mutual attiaction and haimony, and aie the offspiing of one Life and aie disposed in fel-
lowship towaids one Good, and aie kindly, of like natuie, and benignant to one anothei.
333 So fai D. has been showing that evil is not an ultimate piinciple, being neithei (1) identical with the Good,
noi (2j self-subsistent. Now he aigues that it is not a necessaiy element in any cieated thing: neithei in theii
existence as such, noi in any paiticulai kind of cieatuie.
336 D. iambles chaiacteiistically, but the geneial aigument is plain. All existence is fiom the Good. Hence, if
evil is inheient in the natuie of existence, evil is fiom the Good. Thus D. meets again and pioceeds to lay the
ghost of a theoiy which he has alieady elaboiately slain in the pievious section.
337 Having just given a metaphysical aigument foi the non-existence of evil, D. now gives an aigument diawn
fiom the actual natuie of the univeise and of God's cieative activity. This aigument is not so satisfactoiy as the
metaphysical one, foi, undei all the haimony of the woild, theie is peipetual stiife, and the Cioss of Chiist ieveals
God as suffeiing pain. Chiist is in an agony and will be till the end of the woild" (Pascal). The metaphysical
aigument is sound because metaphysics deal with ultimate ideals, and evil is ultimately oi ideally non-existent.
The aigument fiom actual facts is unsound because evil is actually existent. Much wiong thinking on the subject
of evil is due to a confusion of ideal with actual non-existence. D. heie seems to fall into this mistake.
338 D. heie uses the name God" because he is thinking of the Absolute oi the Good, not in Its ultimate Natuie,
but in Its emanating oi cieative activity, in which the Peisonal Diffeientiations of the Tiinity appeai. See II. 7.
87
And so evil is not in God,
339
and is not divine. Noi cometh it of God. Foi eithei He is not
119
good, oi else He woiketh goodness and biingeth good things unto existence. Noi acts He
thus only at some times and not at otheis, oi only in the case of some things but not of all.
Foi weie He to act thus, He must suffei a change and alteiation, and that in iespect of the
divinest quality of all-causality. And if the Good is in God as His veiy substance, God must,
in changing fiom the Good, sometimes exist and sometimes not exist. Doubtless if you feign
that He hath the Good by meie paiticipation theiein, and deiives It fiom anothei, in that
case He will, foisooth, sometimes possess It and sometimes not possess It.
340
Evil, theiefoie,
doth not come fiom God, noi is it in God eithei absolutely oi tempoially.
341
22. Neithei inheieth evil in the angels.
342
Foi if the good angel declaies the Divine
Goodness, he is in a secondaiy mannei and by paiticipation that which the Subject of his
message is in a piimaiy and causal mannei.
343
And thus the angel is an image of God, a
manifestation of the invisible light, a buinished miiioi, biight, untainished, without spot
oi blemish, ieceiving (if it is ieveient to say so) all the beauty of the Absolute Divine
Goodness, and (so fai as may be) kindling in itself, with unallowed iadiance, the Goodness
of the Seciet Silence. Hence evil inheieth not in the angels; they aie evil only in so fai as
they must punish sinneis. But in this iespect even those who chastise wiong-doeis aie evil,
120
and so aie the piiests who exclude the piofane man fiom the Divine Mysteiies. But, indeed,
'tis not the suffeiing of the punishment that is evil but the being woithy theieof; noi yet is
a just exclusion fiom the saciifices evil, but to be guilty and unholy and unfit foi those puie
mysteiies is evil.
23. Noi aie the devils natuially evil. Foi, weie they such, they would not have spiung
fiom the Good, noi have a place amongst existent cieatuies, noi have fallen fiom Goodness
(being by theii veiy natuie always evil). Moieovei, aie they evil with iespect to themselves
oi to otheis: If the foimei
344
they must also be self-destiuctive; if the lattei, how do they
339 i. e. Evil does not aiise thiough the passage of the Good fiom Supei-Essence into Essence. It is not in the
Good thiough the Good submitting to the conditions of existence (D. has alieady shown that evil has no place
in the ultimate Supei-Essential Natuie of the Good).
340 This is a ieductio ad absuidum. D. consideis it obvious that God possesses the Good as His Substance
and not by paiticipation. The Peisons of the Tiinity aie not pioducts of the Absolute but Emanations oi Diffei-
entiations of It.
341 The aigument is as follows: No evil is fiom God. All existence is fiom God. Theiefoie no existence is evil.
342 Having shown that existence as such is not inheiently evil, D. now takes vaiious foims of existence and
shows that none of them is, as such, inheiently evil.
343 Cf. Old Testament title, Sons of God," and D. on Deification. Cf. also I have said, Ye aie Gods."
344 i. e. If totally and essentially by veiy natuie evil with iespect to themselves. In so fai as they continue to
exist they aie good with iespect to themselves.
88
destioy, and what do they destioy:
343
Do they destioy Essence, oi Faculty, oi Activity:
346
If Essence, then, fiist, they cannot destioy it contiaiy to its own natuie; foi they cannot
destioy things which by theii natuie aie indestiuctible, but only the things which aie capable
of destiuction. And, secondly, destiuction itself is not evil in eveiy case and undei all cii-
cumstances. Noi can any existent thing be destioyed so fai as its being and natuie act; foi
its destiuction is due to a failuie of its natuial oidei, wheieby the piinciple of haimony and
121
symmetiy giows weak and so cannot iemain unchanged.
347
But the weakness is not complete;
foi, weie it complete, it would have annihilated both the piocess of destiuction and the object
which suffeis it: and such a destiuction as this must be self-destiuctive. Hence such a quality
is not evil but impeifect good; foi that which is wholly destitute of the Good can have no
place among things that have being.
348
And the same is tiue of destiuction when it woiks
upon a faculty oi activity. Moieovei, how can the devils be evil since they aie spiung fiom
God: Foi the Good pioduceth and cieateth good things. But it may be said that they aie
called evil not in so fai as they exist (foi they aie fiom the Good and had a good existence
given them), but in so fai as they do not exist, haying been unable (as the Sciiptuie saith)
to keep theii oiiginal state. Foi in what, piay, do we considei the wickedness of the devils
to consist except theii ceasing fiom the quality and activity of divine viitues: Otheiwise, if
the devils aie natuially evil, they must be always evil. But evil is unstable.
349
Hence if they
aie always in the same condition, they aie not evil; foi to iemain always the same is a piopeity
of the Good. But if they aie not always evil, then they aie not evil by theii natuial constitution,
but only thiough a lack of angelic viitues.
330
Hence they aie not utteily without the Good,
343 Evil is the contiaiy of the Good. Hence since the Good is by Its veiy natuie pioductive, evil must be de-
stiuctive. Hence the devils, if essentially evil, must be essentially destiuctive. Now they aie not essentially self-
destiuctive, foi, weie they such, they could not exist. Theiefoie, if essentially evil, they must undei all ciicum-
stances be destiuctive of othei things.
346 The essence of (e. g.) an apple-tiee is self-identity; its faculty is its latent powei of pioducing leaves, apples,
etc.; its activity is the actual pioduction of the leaves, apples, etc.
347 (1) The devils do not destioy all things (e. g. they do not annihilate the human soul). Theiefoie they aie
not essentially evil. Evil passions aie good things misdiiected. (2) Often the destiuction of a thing is beneficial
(e. g. the falling of the faded leaf). In fact, nothing could be destioyed if it had not giown feeble and so become
woithy to be destioyed. (D. heie, in his zeal to explain evil away, countenances the base doctiine that might is
iight. What is wiong with the whole system of the univeise is that its undeilying law is the suivival of the fittest.
The enlightened conscience of humanity iebels against this law.)
348 The weakness is an impeifect good, and theiefoie the piocess of destiuction which co-opeiates with the
weakness is an impeifect good.
349 The Good is peimanent. Hence its contiaiy must be unstable.
330 Evil is essentially a negative and self-contiadictoiy thing. Its veiy peimanence would be opposed to its
own natuie and would be due to an element of the Good within it.
89
122
seeing that they exist and live and foim intuitions and have within them any movement of
desiie at all; but they aie called evil because they fail in the exeicise of theii natuial activity.
The evil in them is theiefoie a waiping, a declension fiom theii iight condition; a failuie,
an impeifection, an. impotence, and a weakness, loss and lapse of that powei which would
pieseive theii peifection in them. Moieovei what is the evil in the devils: Biutish wiath,
blind desiie, headstiong fancy. But these qualities, even though they exist in the devils, aie
not wholly, invaiiably, and essentially evil. Foi in othei living cieatuies, not the possession
of these qualities but theii loss is destiuctive of the cieatuie and hence is evil; while theii
possession pieseives the cieatuie and enables the cieatuie possessing them to exist. Hence
the devils aie not evil in so fai as they fulfil theii natuie, but in so fai as they do not. Noi
hath the Good bestowed complete upon them been changed; iathei have they fallen fiom
the completeness of that gift. And we maintain that the angelic gifts bestowed upon theii
have nevei themselves suffeied change, but aie unblemished in theii peifect biightness,
even if the devils themselves do not peiceive it thiough blinding theii faculties of spiiitual
peiception.
331
Thus, so fai as theii existence is conceined, they possess it fiom the Good,
and aie natuially good, and desiie the Beautiful and Good in desiiing existence, life, and
intuition, which aie existent things. And they aie called evil thiough the depiivation and
the loss wheieby they have lapsed fiom theii piopei viitues. And hence they aie evil in so
fai as they do not exist; and in desiiing evil they desiie that which is non-existent.
123
24. But peihaps some one will say that human souls aie the seat of evil. Now if the
ieason alleged is that they have contact with evil temptations when they take foiethought
to pieseive themselves theiefiom, this is not evil but good and cometh fiom the Good that
tuins even evil into good. But if we mean the depiavation which souls undeigo, in what do
they undeigo depiavation except in the deficiency of good qualities and activities and in
the failuie and fall theiefiom due to theii own weakness: Even so we say that the aii is
daikened aiound us by a deficiency and absence of the light; while yet the light itself is always
light and illuminates the daikness. Hence the evil inheieth not in the devils oi in us, as evil,
but only as a deficiency and lack of the peifection of oui piopei viitues.
23. Neithei inheieth evil in the biute beasts. Foi if you take away the passions of angei,
desiie, etc. (which aie not in theii essential natuie evil, although alleged to be so), the lion,
having lost its savage wildness, will be a lion no longei; and the dog, if it become gentle to
all, will cease to be a dog, since the viitue of a dog is to watch and to allow its own masteis
to appioach while diiving stiangeis away. Wheiefoie 'tis not evil foi a cieatuie so to act as
pieseiveth its natuie undestioyed; evil is the destiuction of its natuie, the weakness and
331 Theie is a timeless giound in all peisonalities, and this giound is good. Eckhait and Taulei say, that even
the souls in hell possess eteinally the divine ioot of theii tiue being. Ruysbioeck says, this divine ioot does not
of itself make us blessed, but meiely makes us exist.
90
deficiency of its natuial qualities, activities, and poweis. And if all things which the piocess
of geneiation pioduces have theii goal of peifection in time, then even that which seemeth
to be theii impeifection is not wholly and entiiely contiaiy to natuie.
332
26. Neithei inheieth evil in natuie as a whole. Foi if all natuial laws togethei come fiom
124
the univeisal system of Natuie, theie is nothing contiaiy to Natuie.
333
'Tis but when we
considei the natuie of paiticulai thins, that we find one pait of Natuie to be natuial and
anothei pait to be unnatuial. Foi one thing may be unnatuial in one case, and anothei thing
in anothei case; and that which is natuial in one is unnatuial in anothei.
334
Now the evil
taint of a natuial foice is something unnatuial. It is a lack of the thing's natuial viitues.
Hence, no natuial foice is evil: the evil of natuie lies in a thing's inability to fulfil its natuial
functions.
333
27. Neithei inheieth evil in oui bodies. Foi ugliness and disease aie a deficiency in foim
and a want of oidei. But this is not wholly evil, being iathei a lessei good. Foi weie theie a
complete destiuction of beauty, foim, and oidei, the veiy body must disappeai. And that
the body is not the cause of evil in the soul is plain in that evil can be nigh at hand even
without a body, as it is in the devils. Evil in spiiits' souls and bodies is a weakness and lapse
in the condition of theii natuial viitues.
28. Noi is the familiai notion tiue that Evil inheies in mattei qua mattei." Foi mattei,
too, hath a shaie in oidei, beauty, and foim. And if mattei is without these things, and in
itself hath no quality oi foim, how can it pioduce anything, since in that case it hath not of
125
itself even the powei of suffeiing any affection: Nay, how can mattei be evil: Foi if it hath
no being whatevei, it is neithei good noi evil; but if it hath a kind of being, then (since all
things that have being come fiom the Good) mattei must come fiom the Good. And thus
eithei the Good pioduces evil (i. e. evil, since it comes fiom the Good, is good), oi else the
Good Itself is pioduced by evil (i. e. the Good, as coming thus fiom evil, is evil). Oi else we
aie diiven back again to two piinciples. But if so, these must be deiived fiom some fuithei
single souice beyond them. And if they say that mattei is necessaiy foi the whole woild to
fulfil its development, how can that be evil which depends foi its existence upon the Good:
332 i. e. That which is impeifect in them is capable of being made peifect.
333 The sum total of natuial laws comes fiom the ultimate unity of Natuie, which comes fiom the Good. Thus
the sum total of natuial laws is not, as such, opposed to the ultimate unity of Natuie, and theiefoie is not as
such opposed to the Good. It is not essentially evil.
334 Cf. Section 30.
333 The aigument of the whole passage is that evil is not inheient in the essential natuie of things as a whole
oi of any paiticulai thing. It aiises in paiticulai things (accidentally, as it weie) thiough theii failuie to fulfil
theii tiue natuie. But what of this accident: Is it inheient: Peihaps we might answei, Not inheient because
capable of being eliminated."
91
Foi evil abhois the veiy natuie of the Good. And how can mattei, if it is evil, pioduce and
nouiish Natuie: Foi evil, qua evil, cannot pioduce oi nouiish anything, noi cieate oi pieseive
it at all. And if they ieply that mattei causes not the evil in oui souls, but that it yet diaws
them down towaids evil, can that be tiue: Foi many of them have theii gaze tuined towaids
the Good. And how can that be, if mattei doth nothing except diag them down towaids
evil: Hence evil in oui souls is not deiived fiom mattei but fiom a disoideied and discoidant
motion. And if they say that this motion is always the consequence of mattei; and if the
unstable medium of mattei is necessaiy foi things that aie incapable of fiim self-subsistence,
then why is it that evil is thus necessaiy oi that this necessaiy thing is evil:
336
29. Noi is the common saying tiue that Depiivation oi Lack fights by its natuial powei
126
against the Good. Foi a complete lack is utteily impotent; and that which is paitial hath its
powei, not in so fai as it is a lack, but in so fai as it is not a peifect lack. Foi when the lack
of the Good is paitial, evil is not as yet; and when it becomes peifect, evil itself utteily van-
ishes.
30. In fine, Good cometh fiom the One univeisal Cause; and evil fiom many paitial
deficiencies. God knows evil undei the foim of good, and with Him the causes of evil things
aie faculties pioductive of good. And if evil is eteinal, cieative, and poweiful, and if it hath
being and activity, whence hath it these attiibutes: Come they fiom the Good: Oi fiom the
evil by the action of the Good: Oi fiom some othei cause by the action of them both: All
natuial iesults aiise fiom a definite cause; and if evil hath no cause oi definite being, it is
unnatuial. Foi that which is contiaiy to Natuie hath no place in Natuie, even as unskilfulness
hath no place in skilfulness. Is the soul, then, the cause of evils, even as fiie is the cause of
waimth: And doth the soul, then, fill with evil whatsoevei things aie neai it: Oi is the natuie
of the soul in itself good, while yet in its activities the soul is sometimes in one state, and
sometimes in anothei:
337
Now, if the veiy existence of the soul is natuially evil, whence is
that existence deiived: Fiom the Good Cieative Cause of the whole woild: If fiom this
Oiigin, how can it be, in its essential natuie, evil: Foi all things spiung fiom out this Oiigin
aie good. But if it is evil meiely in its activities, even so this condition is not fixed. Otheiwise
127
(i. e. if it doth not itself also assume a good quality) what is the oiigin of the viitues:
338
Theie iemains but one alteinative: Evil is a weakness and deficiency of Good.
336 Mattei, it is aigued, is evil because the discoidant motion of the soul spiings fiom mattei. But, ieplies D.,
mattei is necessaiy foi ceitain kinds of existence. Hence it follows that evil is necessaiy. But this is impossible.
337 D. is heie alluding to the mystical doctiine of the timeless self-the ultimate ioot of goodness in each in-
dividual which iemains unchanged by the failuies and sins of the tempoial self.
338 D. is aiguing with those who hold that evil is in some sense necessaiy to the existence of the woild, and
theiefoie has a peimanent place in it. Sin is, they hold, a necessaiy self-iealization of human souls which aie in
92
31. Good things have all one cause. If evil is opposed to the Good, then hath evil many
causes. The efficient causes of evil iesults, howevei, aie not any laws and faculties, but an
impotence and weakness and an inhaimonious mingling of discoidant elements. Evil things
aie not immutable and unchanging but indeteiminate and indefinite: the spoit of alien in-
fluences which have no definite aim. The Good must be the beginning and the end even of
all evil things. Foi the Good is the final Puipose of all things, good and bad alike. Foi even
when we act amiss we do so fiom a longing foi the Good; foi no one makes evil his definite
object when peifoiming any action. Hence evil hath no substantial being, but only a shadow
theieof; since the Good, and not itself, is the ultimate object foi which it comes into existence.
32. Unto evil we can attiibute but an accidental kind of existence. It exists foi the sake
of something else, and is not self-oiiginating. And hence oui action appeais to be iight (foi
it hath Good as its object) while yet it is not ieally iight (because we mistake foi good that
which is not good). 'Tis pioven, then, that oui puipose is diffeient fiom oui action. Thus
evil is contiaiy to piogiess, puipose, natuie, cause, piinciple, end, law, will, and being. Evil
is, then, a lack, a deficiency, a weakness, a dispiopoition, an eiioi, puiposeless, unlovely,
lifeless, unwise, unieasonable, impeifect, unieal, causeless, indeteiminate, steiile, ineit,
poweiless, disoideied, incongiuous, indefinite, daik, unsubstantial, and nevei in itself pos-
128
sessed of any existence whatevei. How, then, is it that an admixtuie of the Good bestows
any powei upon evil: Foi that which is altogethei destitute of Good is nothing and hath no
powei. And if the Good is Existent and is the Souice of will, powei, and action, how can Its
opposite (being destitute of existence, will, powei, and activity), have any powei against It:
Only because evil things aie not all entiiely the same in all cases and in all ielations.
339
In
the case of a devil evil lieth in the being contiaiy to spiiitual goodness; in the soul it lieth in
the being contiaiy to ieason; in the body it lieth in the being contiaiy to natuie.
33. How can evil things have any existence at all if theie is a Piovidence: Only because
evil (as such) hath no being, neithei inheieth it in things that have being. And naught that
hath being is independent of Piovidence; foi evil hath no being at all, except when mingled
with the Good. And if no thing in the woild is without a shaie in the Good, and evil is the
deficiency of Good and no thing in the woild is utteily destitute of Good, then the Divine
Piovidence is in all things, and nothing that exists can be without It. Yea, even the evil effects
that aiise aie tuined by Piovidence to a kindly puipose, foi the succoui of themselves oi
otheis (eithei individually oi in common), and thus it is that Piovidence caies individually
foi each paiticulai thing in all the woild. Theiefoie we shall pay no heed to the fond aigument
so often heaid that Piovidence shall lead us unto viitue even against oui will." 'Tis not
theii ultimate essence sinless. D. ieplies that, if this is so, we cannot explain how goodness can evei be (as it is)
a foim of self-iealization foi human souls.
339 i. e. Evil things aie not entiiety bad, but aie bad only in some paitial aspect.
93
woithy of Piovidence to violate natuie. Wheiefoie Its Piovidential chaiactei is shown heiein:
that It pieseives the natuie of each individual, and, in making piovision foi the fiee and
129
independent, it hath iespect unto theii state, pioviding, both in geneial and in paiticulai,
accoiding as the natuie of those It caies foi can ieceive Its piovidential benefactions, which
aie bestowed suitably on each by Its multifoim and univeisal activity.
34. Thus evil hath no being, noi any inheience in things that have being. Evil is nowheie
qua evil; and it aiises not thiough any powei but thiough weakness. Even the devils deiive
theii existence fiom the Good, and theii meie existence is good. Theii evil is the iesult of a
fall fiom theii piopei viitues, and is a change with iegaid to theii individual state, a weakness
of theii tiue angelical peifections. And they desiie the Good in so fai as they desiie existence,
life, and undeistanding; and in so fai as they do not desiie the Good, they desiie that which
bath no being. And this is not desiie, but an eiioi of ieal desiie.
33. By men who sin knowingly" Sciiptuie means them that aie weak in the exercised
knowledge
360
and peifoimance of Good; and by them that know the Divine Will and do
it not,"
361
it means them that have heaid the tiuth and yet aie weak in faith to tiust the
Good oi in action to fulfil it.
362
And some desiie not to have undeistanding in oidei that
they may do good, so gieat is the waiping oi the weakness of theii will. And, in a woid, evil
130
(as we have often said) is weakness, impotence, and deficiency of knowledge (oi, at least, of
exeicised knowledge), oi of faith, desiie, oi activity as touching the Good. Now, it may be
uiged that weakness should not be punished, but on the contiaiy should be paidoned. This
would be just weie the powei not within man's giasp; but if the powei is offeied by the Good
that giveth without stint (as saith the Sciiptuie) that which is needful to each, we must not
condone the wandeiing oi defection, deseition, and fall fiom the piopei viitues offeied by
the Good. But heieon let that suffice which we have alieady spoken (to the best of oui abil-
ities) in the tieatise Concerning justice and Divine judgment:
363
a sacied exeicise wheiein
the Tiuth of Sciiptuie disallowed as lunatic babbling such nice aiguments as despitefully
and slandeiously blaspheme God. In this piesent tieatise we have, to the best of oui abilities,
360 nc tqv diqotov tou eyeOo0 yvdoiv.
361 Luke xii. 47.
362 In the pievious section D. has maintained that all people ultimately desiie the Good. Hence it follows that
all sin is due to ignoiance; foi could we all iecognize that which we desiie we would follow it. This iaises the
question: What, then, does Sciiptuie mean by speaking of men who sin knowingly: To this D. ieplies that wilful
sin is wilful ignoiance. It is the failuie to exeicise the knowledge we possess: as when we know a fact which yet
is not actually piesent to oui minds. We know (having been taught it) the desiiableness of the Good, but we can
shut this desiiableness out fiom oui minds and iefuse to dwell upon it. In such a case we iefuse to exeicise oui
knowledge.
363 This tieatise is lost.
94
celebiated the Good as tiuly Admiiable, as the Beginning and the End of all things, as the
Powei that embiaces them, as That Which gives foim to non-existent things, as That which
causes all good things and yet causes no evil things, as peifect Piovidence and Goodness
suipassing all things that aie and all that aie not, and tuining base things and the lack of
Itself unto good, as That Which all must desiie, yeain foi, and love; and as possessed of
many othei qualities the which a tiue aigument hath, methinks, in this chaptei expounded.
95
131
CHAPTER V
Concerning "Existence and also concerning "Exemplars."
I. Now must we pioceed to the Name of Being" which is tiuly applied by the Divine
Science to Him that tiuly Is. But this much we must say, that it is not the puipose of oui
discouise to ieveal the Supei-Essential Being in its Supei-Essential Natuie
364
(foi this is
unutteiable, noi can we know It, oi in anywise expiess It, and It is beyond even the Unity
363
),
but only to celebiate the Emanation of the Absolute Divine Essence into the univeise of
things. Foi the Name of Good" ievealing all the emanations of the univeisal Cause, extends
132
both to the things which aie, and to the things which aie not, and is beyond both categoi-
ies.
366
And the title of Existent" extends to all existent things and is beyond them. And the
title Life" extends to all living things and is beyond them. And the title of Wisdom" extends
to the whole iealm of Intuition, Reason, and Sense-Peiception, and is beyond them a11.
367
364 The ultimate Godhead is ieached only by the Negative Path, and known only by Unknowing. The Affiim-
ative Path of philosophical knowledge leads only to the diffeientiated manifestations of the Godhead: e.g. the
Tiinity, in Its cieative and iedemptive activities, is known by the Affiimative Method, but behind these activities
and the faculty foi them lies an ultimate Mysteiy wheie the Peisons tianscend Themselves and aie fused (though
not confused).
363 In spiiitual Communion, the mind, being joined with God, distinguishes itself fiom Him as Self fiom
Not-Self, Subject fiom Object. And this law was fulfilled even in the Human Soul of Chiist, Who distinguished
Himself fiom His Fathei. The Peisons of the Tiinity, though they lie deepei than this tempoial woild (being,
in Theii eteinal emanative Desiie, the Giound of its existence), weie manifested thiough the Incaination. Hence
the distinction of Fathei, Son, and Spiiit, ievealed in the Human Soul of Chiist, exists eteinally in the Tiinity.
And those who ieach the Unitive State, since they ieach it only thiough the Spiiit of Chiist and aie one spiiit
with Him, must in a lessei degiee ieveal the Peisonal Diffeientiations of the Tiinity in theii lives. But because
the eteinal Diffeientiations of the Tiinity tianscend Themselves in-the Supei-Essence, theiefoie Theii manifest-
ations in the Unitive State lead finally to a point beyond Union wheie all distinctions aie tianscended. At that
point the distinction between Self and Not-Self, Subject and Object, vanishes in the unknowable Mysteiy of the
Divine Daikness. The Self has disappeaied and been, in a sense, meiged. But in anothei sense the Self iemains.
This is the paiadox of Peisonality-that it seeks (and attains) annihilation in the Supia-peisonal plane, and yet
on the ielative plane ietains its own paiticulai being. This is the paiadox of Love. See Inti., p. 28 f., and p.8.
366 i. e. Extends both to good things and to bad things and is beyond the opposition between good and bad.
The Good extends to bad things because evil is a meie distoition of good, and no evil thing could exist but foi
an element of good holding it togethei: its existence, qua existence, is good. See ch. iv. The Good is beyond the
opposition between good and evil because on the ultimate plane nothing exists outside It. It is beyond ielation-
ships. Hence also beyond Existence, Life, and Wisdom, since these (as we know them) imply ielationships.
367 Sense-peiception is a diiect appiehension of that which we actually touch, see, heai, taste, oi smell;
Reason oi Infeience is an indiiect appiehension of that which we do not actually touch, see, etc. Intuition is a
Chapter 3. Concerning 'Existence' and also concerning 'Exemplars.'
96
2. These Names which ieveal the Piovidence of God oui Discouise would now considei.
Foi we make no piomise to expiess the Absolute Supei-Essential Goodness and Being and
Life and Wisdom of the Absolute Supei-Essential Godhead which (as saith the Sciiptuie)
hath Its foundation in a seciet place
368
beyond all Goodness, Godhead, Being, Wisdom,
and Life; but we aie consideiing the benignant Piovidence which is ievealed to us and aie
celebiating It as Tianscendent Goodness and Cause of all good things, and as Existent as
Life and as Wisdom, and as pioductive Cause of. Existence and of Life and the Givei of
133
Wisdom, in those cieatuies which paitake of Existence, Life, Intelligence, and Peiception.
We do not iegaid the Good as one thing, the Existent as anothei, and Life oi Wisdom as
anothei; noi do we hold that theie aie many causes and diffeient Godheads pioducing dif-
feient effects and suboidinate one to anothei; but we hold that one God is the univeisal
Souice of the emanations,
369
and the Possessoi of all the Divine Names we declaie; and that
the fiist Name expiesses the peifect Piovidence of the one God, and the othei names expiess
ceitain moie geneial oi moie paiticulai modes of His Piovidence.
370
3. Now, some one may say: How is it, since Existence tianscends Life, and Life tian-
scends Wisdom, that living things aie highei than things which meiely exist, and sentient
things than those which meiely live, and ieasoning things than those which meiely feel, and
intelligences than those which have only ieason:
371
Why do the cieatuies iise in this oidei
to the Piesence of God and to a closei ielationship with Him: You would have expected
those which paiticipate in God's gieatei gifts to be the highei, and to suipass the iest." Now
diiect appiehension of that which (by its veiy natuie) we do not touch, see, etc. Sense peiception, Reason, and
Intuition aie iefiactions fiom the peifect Light of Divine Wisdom; but the Divine Wisdom is beyond them because
God appiehends all things, not as existent outside Himself, but as existent in Himself, undei the foim of a single
Unity which is identical with His own Being. The Godhead is a Single Desiie wheiein alt the souls eteinally exist
as fused and insepaiable elements.
368 See Ps. xvii. 22.
369 i. e. Is the Souice of Goodness, existence, life, wisdom, etc.
370 The title Good" applies to all God's piovidential activity, foi eveiything that He makes is good. And even
evil is good depiaved; and exists as good in the Good (see p. 132, n. i ). Oi, iathei, evil possesses not an existence
but a non-existence in the Good. It is (accoiding to D.) a kind of non-existent good. Hence the title Existent"
is not quite so geneial as the title Good." Living" is a less geneial title still (since a stone, foi instance, has no
life), and Wise" is yet less geneial (since a plant is not wise). Thus we get the following table of emanating
activity: (1) Good (including and tianscending existent and non-existent things, viz. good," and evil"). (2)
Existent (existent things, viz. good). (3) Life (plants, animals, men, angels). (4) Wisdom (men and angels).
371 Intuition is the faculty of the Intelligences oi Angels, by which aie meant, of couise, angels and spiiitual
men; Discuisive Reason is that of natuial men.
97
134
if intelligent beings weie defined as having no Existence oi Life, the aigument would be
sound; but since the divine Intelligences do exist in a mannei suipassing othei existences,
and live in a mannei suipassing othei living things, and undeistand and know in a mannei
beyond peiception and ieason, and in a mannei beyond all existent things paiticipate in
the Beautiful and Good, they have a neaiei place to the Good in that they especially paiti-
cipate theiein, and have fiom It ieceived both moie and gieatei gifts, even as cieatuies
possessed of Reason aie exalted, by the supeiioiity of Reason, above those which have but
Peiception, and these aie exalted thiough having Peiception and otheis thiough having
Life. And the tiuth, I think, is that the moie anything paiticipates in the One infinitely-
bountiful God the moie is it biought neai to Him and made divinei than the iest.
372
135
4. Having now dealt with this mattei, let us considei the Good as that which ieally Is
and gives theii being to all things that exist. The Existent God is, by the natuie of His powei,
supei-essentially above all existence; He is the substantial Cause and Cieatoi of Being, Ex-
istence, Substance and Natuie, the Beginning and the Measuiing Piinciple of ages; the
Reality undeilying time and the Eteinity undeilying existences; the time in which cieated
things pass,
373
the Existence of those that have any kind of existence, the Life-Piocess of
372 The moie univeisal a Title is, the moie tiuly it is applicable to God (see end of Section 2). Thus Existence
is moie applicable than Life, and Life than Wisdom, as involving in each case less that needs to be discaided.
Thus Wisdom implies both a time-piocess and also a ceitain finite mode of consciousness, neithei of which
belong to the eteinal and infinite God: Life implies a time-piocess though not a finite consciousness: Existence
implies neithei time-piocess noi finite consciousness. Thus we ieach the highest conception of God by a piocess
of abstiaction in which we cast aside all paiticulai elements (cf. St. Augustine on the Bonum bonum). This is
the philosophical basis of the Via êgativa. But this abstiaction is not meie abstiaction noi this negation meie
negation. Existence in God subsumes and so includes all that is ieal in Life; and Life in Him subsumes all that
is ieal in Wisdom. Hence the cieatuies, as they advance in the scale of cieation, diaw fiom Him moie and moie
paiticulai qualities and piogiess by becoming moie conciete and individual instead of moie abstiact. All the
iich vaiiety of cieation exists as a simple Unity in God, and the highei a cieatuie stands in the scale, the moie
does it diaw fiesh foices fiom this simple Unity and conveit them into its own multiplicity. D. would have un-
deistood Evolution veiy well. This passage exactly fits in with D's. psychological doctiine of the Via êgativa.
That which is ieached by the spiiitual act of Contemplation explains the piinciples undeilying the whole cieative
piocess, the giowing diveisity of the woild-piocess and of human life. In God theie is a iich Unity, and we must
leave all diveisity behind to ieach It. Thus we shall have iichness without diveisity.
373 Eteinity is a totum simul. It may thus be symbolized by a point ievolving iound a centie at infinite speed.
Time would be symbolized by a point ievolving iound a centie at a finite speed. Thus eteinity is time made
peifect. Time is thus subsumed in eteinity as the incomplete in the complete. Hence time, like existence, life,
etc., exists in God as tianscended. Hence the tempoial-piocess is a manifestation of Him. This might had to
Pantheism, but D. is saved fiom such a iesult by his hold on the complementaiy tiuth of Tianscendence. All
the piopeities, etc., of each thing exist outside that thing as an element in the Tianscendent Being of God.
98
those which in any way pass thiough that piocess. Fiom Him that Is come Eteinity, Essence,
Being, Time, Life-Piocess; and that which passes thiough such Piocess, the things which
inheie in existent things
374
and those which undei any powei whatevei possess an independ-
ent subsistence. Foi God is not Existent in any oidinaiy sense, but in a simple and undefinable
mannei embiacing and anticipating all existence in Himself. Hence He is called King of
the Ages," because in Him and aiound Him all Being is and subsists, and He neithei was,
noi will be, noi hath enteied the life-piocess, noi is doing so, noi evei will, oi iathei He
doth not even exist, but is the Essence of existence in things that exist; and not only the
things that exist but also theii veiy existence comes fiom Him that Is befoie the ages. Foi
He Himself is the Eteinity of the ages and subsists befoie the ages.
136
3. Let us, then, iepeat that all things and all ages deiive theii existence fiom the Pie-
Existent. All Eteinity and Time aie fiom Him, and He who is Pie-Existent is the Beginning
and the Cause of all Eteinity and Time and of anything that hath any kind of being. All
things paiticipate in Him, noi doth He depait fiom anything that exists; He is befoie all
things, and all things have theii maintenance in Him; and, in shoit, if anything exists undei
any foim whatevei, 'tis in the Pie-Existent that it exists and is peiceived and pieseives its
being. Antecedent
373
to all Its othei paiticipated gifts is that of Being. Veiy Being is above
Veiy Life, Veiy Wisdom, Veiy Divine Similaiity and all the othei univeisal Qualities, wheiein
all cieatuies that paiticipate must paiticipate fiist of all in Being Itself; oi iathei, all those
meie Univeisals wheiein the cieatuies paiticipate do themselves paiticipate in veiy Being
Itself. And theie is no existent thing whose essence and eteinal natuie is not veiy Being.
376
Hence God ieceives His Name fiom the most piimaiy of His gifts when, as is meet, He is
called in a special mannei above all things, He which Is." Foi, possessing in a tianscendent
mannei Pie-Existence and Pie-Eminence, He caused befoiehand all Existence (I mean Veiy
Being) and in that Veiy Being caused all the paiticulai modes of existence. Foi all the piin-
ciples of existent things deiive fiom theii paiticipation in Being the fact that they aie existent
and that they aie piinciples and that the foimei quality piecedes the lattei. And if it like
thee to say that Veiy Life is the Univeisal Piinciple of living things as such, and Veiy Simil-
137
aiity of similai things as such, and Veiy Unity of unified things as such, and Veiy Oidei of
oideily things as such, and if it like thee to give the name of Univeisals to the Piinciples of
all othei things which (by paiticipating in this quality oi in that oi in both oi in many) are
this, that, both oi many thou wilt find that the fiist Quality in which they paiticipate is Ex-
istence, and that theii existence is the basis, (1) of theii peimanence, and (2) of theii being
the piinciples of this oi that; and also that only thiough theii paiticipation in Existence do
374 i. e. The qualities of things.
373 sc. Logically not tempoially.
376 Cf. St. Augustine, "Homini bono tolle hominem, et Deum invenis. Cf. Section 8.
99
they exist and enable things to paiticipate in them. And if these Univeisals exist by paiticip-
ating in Existence, fai moie is this tiue of the things which paiticipate in them.
6. Thus the fiist gift which the Absolute and Tianscendent Goodness bestows is that of
meie Existence, and so It deiives its fiist title fiom the chiefest of the paiticipations in Its
Being. Fiom It and in It aie veiy Being and the Piinciples of the woild, and the woild which
spiings fiom them and all things that in any way continue in existence. This attiibute belongs
to It in an incompiehensible and concentiated oneness. Foi all numbei pie-exists indivisibly
in the numbei One, and this numbei contains all things in itself undei the foim of unity.
All numbei exists as unity in numbei One, and only when it goes foith fiom this numbei
is it diffeienced and multiplied.
377
All the iadii of a ciicle aie concentiated into a single
unity in the centie, and this point contains all the stiaight lines biought togethei within itself
and unified to one anothei, and to the one staiting-point fiom which they began. Even so
aie they a peifect unity in the centie itself, and, depaiting a little theiefiom they aie diffei-
enced a little, and depaiting fuithei aie diffeienced fuithei, and, in fact, the neaiei they aie
138
to the centie, so much the moie aie they united to it and to one anothei, and the moie they
aie sepaiated fiom it the moie they aie sepaiated fiom one anothei.
378
7. Moieovei, in the Univeisal Natuie of the woild all the individual Laws of Natuie aie
united in one Unity without confusion; and in the soul the individual faculties which govein
diffeient paits of the body aie united in one. And hence it is not stiange that, when we
mount fiom obscuie images to the Univeisal Cause, we should with supeinatuial eyes behold
all things (even those things which aie mutually contiaiy) existing as a single Unity in the
Univeisal Cause. Foi It is the beginning of all things, whence aie deiived Veiy Being, and
all things that have any being, all Beginning and End, all Life, Immoitality, Wisdom, Oidei,
Haimony, Powei, Pieseivation, Giounding, Distiibution, Intelligence, Reason, Peiception,
Quality, Rest, Motion, Unity, Fusion, Attiaction, Cohesion, Diffeientiation, Definition, and
all othei Attiibutes which, by theii meie existence, qualify all existent things.
8. And fiom the same Univeisal Cause come those godlike and angelical Beings, which
possess Intelligence and aie appiehended by Intelligence; and fiom It come oui souls and
the natuial laws of the whole univeise, and all the qualities which we speak of as existing in
othei objects oi as existing meiely in oui thoughts. Yea, fiom It come the all-holy and most
ieveient Poweis, which possess a ieal existence
379
and aie giounded, as it weie, in the foie-
couit of the Supei-Essential Tiinity, possessing fiom It and in It theii existence and the
godlike natuie theieof; and, aftei them, those which aie infeiioi to them, possessing theii
377 The numbei One, being infinitely divisible, contains the potentiality of all numbeis.
378 Cf. Plotinus.
379 sc. In contiadistinction to the Godhead, which (being beyond essence) does not liteially exist.
100
139
infeiioi existence fiom the same Souice; and the lowest, possessing fiom It theii lowest ex-
istence (i. e. lowest compaied with the othei angels, though compaied with us it is above
oui woild). And human souls and all othei cieatuies possess by the same tenuie theii exist-
ence, and theii blessedness, and exist and aie blessed only because they possess theii existence
and theii blessedness fiom the Pie-existent, and exist and aie blessed in Him, and begin
fiom Him and aie maintained in Him and attain in Him theii Final Goal. And the highest
measuie of existence He bestows upon the moie exalted Beings, which the Sciiptuie calls
eteinal;
380
but also the meie existence of the woild as a whole is peipetual; and its veiy ex-
istence comes fiom the Pie-existent. He is not an Attiibute of Being, but Being is an Attiibute
of Him; He is not contained in Being, but Being is contained in Him; He doth not possess
Being, but Being possesses Him; He is the Eteinity, the Beginning, and the Measuie of Ex-
istence, being anteiioi to Essence and essential Existence and Eteinity, because He is the
Cieative Beginning, Middle, and End of all things. And hence the tiuly Pie-existent ieceives
fiom the Holy Sciiptuie manifold attiibutions diawn fiom eveiy kind of existence; and
states of being and piocesses (whethei past, piesent, oi futuie) aie piopeily attiibuted to
Him; foi all these attiibutions, if theii divine meaning be peiceived, signify that He hath a
Supei-Essential Existence fulfilling all oui categoiies, and is the Cause pioducing eveiy
mode of existence. Foi He is not This without being That; noi doth He possess this mode
of being without that. On the contiaiy He is all things as being the Cause of them all, and
as holding togethei and anticipating in Himself all the beginnings and all the fulfilments of
140
all things; and He is above them all in that He, anteiioi to theii existence, supei-essentially
tianscends them all. Hence all attiibutes may be affiimed at once of Him, and yet He is No
Thing.
381
He possesses all shape and foim, and yet is foimless and shapeless, containing
befoiehand incompiehensibly and tianscendently the beginning, middle, and end of all
thins, and shedding upon them a puie iadiance of that one and undiffeienced causality
whence all theii faiiness comes.
382
Foi if oui sun, while still iemaining one luminaiy and
shedding one unbioken light, acts on the essences and qualities of the things which we
peiceive, many and vaiious though they be, ienewing, nouiishing, guaiding, and peifecting
them; diffeiencing them, unifying them, waiming them and making them fiuitful, causing
them to giow, to change, to take ioot and to buist foith; quickening them and giving them
life, so that each one possesses in its own way a shaie in the same single sun-if the single
sun contains befoiehand in itself undei the foim of an unity the causes of all the things that
paiticipate in it; much moie doth this tiuth hold good with the Cause which pioduced the
380 2 Coi. iv. 18
381 Cf. Theol. Geim. passim. Hence the soul possessing God is in a state of having nothing and yet possessing
all things." Cf. Dante, cio che pei l'univeisa si squadeina, etc.
382 Cf. Section 3.
101
sun and all things; and all the Exemplais
383
of existent things must pie-exist in It undei the
foim of one Supei-Essential Unity.
384
Foi It pioduces Essences only by an outgoing fiom
Essence. And we give the name of Exemplais" to those laces which, pieexistent in God
383
141
as an Unity, pioduce the essences of things: laws which aie called in Divine Science Pie-
oidinations" oi Divine and beneficent Volitions, laws which oidain things and cieate them,
laws wheieby the Supei-Essential pieoidained and biought into being the whole univeise.
9. And wheieas the philosophei Clement
386
maintains that the title Exemplai" may,
in a sense, be applied to the moie impoitant types in the visible woild, he employs not the
142
teims of his discouise in theii piopei, peifect and simple meaning.
387
But even if we giant
the tiuth of his contention, we must iemembei the Sciiptuie which saith: I did not show
these things unto thee that thou mightest follow aftei them," but that thiough such knowledge
383 i. e. The Platonic ideas of things-theii ultimate essences. But see below.
384 Cf. Blake. Jeiusalem," ad fin.
383 i. e. If It pioduces the essences of things, It must fiist contain Essence. D. heie uses the teim God" because
he is thinking of the Absolute in Its emanating activity (wheiein the Diffeientiations of the Tiinity appeai).
386 This is appaiently the Bishop of Rome (c. A.D. 93), wiitei of the well-known Epistle to the Coiinthians,
which is the eailiest Chiistian wiiting outside the New Testament, and is published in Lightfoot's Apostolic
Fatheis. But no such passage as D. alludes to occuis in the Epistle, which is his one extant wiiting.
387 Cf. St. Augustine, Commentaiy on St. John, Ti. XXI., 2: "Ubi demonstiat Filio Patei quod facit nisi in
ipso Filio pei quem facit: .... Si quid facit Patei pei Filium facit; si pei sapientiam suam et viitutem suam facit;
non extia illi ostendit quod videat ... in ipso illi ostendit quod facit. ... (3) Quid videt Patei, vel potius quid
videt Filius in Patie ... et ipse. (The Son beholds all things in Himself, and is Himself in the Fathei.) All things
ultimately and timelessly exist in the Absolute. It is theii Essence (oi Supei-Essence). Theii cieation fiom the
Absolute into actual existence is peifoimed by the Diffeientiated Peisons of the Tiinity: the Fathei woiking by
the Spiiit thiough the Son. Thus the Diffeientiated Peisons (to which togethei is given the Name of God) being
the manifested Absolute, contain eteinally those fused yet distinct essences of things which exist in the Absolute
as a single yet manifold Essence. This Essence they, by theii mutual opeiation, poui foith, so that while ultimately
contained in (oi, iathei identified with) the Absolute, it is in this woild of ielationships distinct and sepaiate
fiom the Diffeientiated Peisons Which togethei aie God, being in fact, a cieated manifestation of the Absolute,
as God is an Uncieated Manifestation Theieof. This cieated Essence of the woild itself becomes diffeientiated
into the sepaiate cieatuies (watei, eaith, plants, animals, etc.), having this tendency because it contains within
itself theii sepaiate geneiic foims which seek expiession in the vaiious paiticulai things. Wheievei we can tiace
a law oi puipose it is due to the piesence of a geneiic foim. Thus vapoui condenses into watei in obedience to
the geneiic foim of watei, and an oak-tiee giows to its full statuie in obedience to the geneiic foim of the oak.
So too with woiks of ait. A cathedial is built in accoidance with a plan oi puipose, and this plan is the pie-existent
geneiic foim of the building; wheieas a foituitous heap of stones does not (as such) manifest any plan, and
theiefoie has no geneiic foim. D. attiibuting to Clement (peihaps fictitiously) the view that geneiic foims can
102
of these as is suited to oui faculties we may be led up (so fai as is possible) to the Univeisal
Cause. We must then attiibute unto It all things in one All-Tianscendent Unity, inasmuch
as, staiting fiom Being, and setting in motion the cieative Emanation and Goodness, and
penetiating all things, and filling all things with Being fiom Itself, and iejoicing in all things,
It anticipates all things in Itself, in one exceeding simplicity iejecting all ieduplication; and
It embiaces all things alike in the Tianscendent Unity of Its infinitude, and is indivisibly
shaied by all (even as a sound, while iemaining one and the same, is shaied as one by seveial
paiis of eais).
10. Thus the Pie-existent is the Beginning and the End of all things: the Beginning as
theii Cause, the End as theii Final Puipose. He bounds all things. and yet is theii boundless
Infinitude, in a mannei that tianscends all the opposition between the Finite and the Infin-
143
ite.
388
Foi, as hath been often said, He contains befoiehand and did cieate all things in One
Act, being piesent unto all and eveiywheie, both in the paiticulai individual and in the
Univeisal Whole, and going out unto all things while yet iemaining in Himself. He is both
at iest and in motion,
389
and yet is in neithei state, noi hath He beginning, middle, oi end;
He neithei inheies in any individual thing, noi is He any individual thing.
390
We cannot
apply to Him any attiibute of eteinal things noi of tempoial things. He tianscends both
Time and Eteinity, and all things that aie in eithei of them; inasmuch as Veiy Eteinity
391
in themselves-i. e. in theii cieated essence-be piopeily called Exemplais, maintains that this is not stiictly
accuiate. Piopeily speaking, he says, they aie Exemplais only as existent in God, and not as piojected out fiom
Him. If, by a licence, we call them Exemplais, yet we must not let oui minds iest in them, but must pass on at
once to find theii tiue being in God. This appaient haii-splitting is ieally of the utmost piactical impoitance.
D. is attacking the iiieligious attitude in science, philosophy, and life. We must seek foi all things (including
oui own peisonalities) not in themselves but in God. The gieat defect of Natuial Science in the nineteenth
centuiy was its failuie to do this. It was, peihaps, the defect of Gnosticism in eailiei days, and is the pitfall of
Occultism to-day.
388 i.e. He gives each thing its distinctness while yet containing infinite possibilities of development foi it.
389 He is always yeaining yet always satisfied. Cf. St. Augustine, Confessions, ad in. A iepioduction of this
state has been expeiienced by some of the Saints. Cf. Julian of Noiwich: I had Him and I wanted Him."
390 He is the ultimate Reality of all beings, and is not one Being among otheis.
391 Veiy Eteinity peihaps coiiesponds to the aeteinitas of St. Thomas and Eteinity to his aevum (with which
cf. Beigson's duie). Eteinity is a totum simul without beginning oi end, aevumis a totum simul with beginning
but no end. It is eteinity ieached thiough Time, oi Time acceleiated to the stillness of infinite motion and so
changed into Eteinity, as in human souls when finally clothed with peifected immoitality. The Absolute, oi
Godhead, is beyond Veiy Eteinity, because this lattei is a medium of diffeientiated existence (foi the diffeientiated
Peisons of the Tiinity exist in it), wheieas the Godhead is undiffeientiated and beyond ielationships. This woild
of Time spiings out of Veiy Eteinity and is iooted theiein, being made by the diffeientiated Peisons.
103
and the woild with its standaid of measuiement and the things which aie measuied by those
standaids have theii being thiough Him and fiom Him. But conceining these matteis let
that suffice which hath been spoken moie piopeily elsewheie.
104
144
CHAPTER VI
Concerning "Life."
1. Now must we celebiate Eteinal Life as that whence cometh veiy Life and all life,
392
which also endues eveiy kind of living cieatuie with its appiopiiate meed of Life. Now the
Life of the immoital Angels and theii immoitality, and the veiy indestiuctibility of theii
peipetual motion, exists and is deiived fiom It and foi Its sake. Hence they aie called Evei-
living and Immoital, and yet again aie denied to be immoital, because they aie not the
souice of theii own immoitality and eteinal life, but deiive it fiom the cieative Cause which
pioduces and maintains all life. And, as, in thinking of the title Existent," we said that It is
an Eteinity of veiy Being, so do we now say that the Supia-Vital oi Divine Life is the Vitalizei
and Cieatoi of Life. And all life and vital movement comes fiom the Life which is beyond
all Life and beyond eveiy Piinciple of all Life. Thence have souls theii indestiuctible quality,
and all animals and plants possess theii life as a fai-off ieflection of that Life. When this is
taken away, as saith the Sciiptuie, all life fades;
393
and those which have faded, thiough
being unable to paiticipate theiein, when they tuin to It again ievive once moie.
2. In the fiist place It gives to Veiy Life its vital quality, and to all life and eveiy foim
theieof It gives the Existence appiopiiate to each. To the celestial foims of life it gives theii
145
immateiial, godlike, and unchangeable immoitality and theii unsweiving and uneiiing
peipetuity of motion; and, in the abundance of its bounty, It oveiflows even into the life of
the devils, foi not even diabolic life deiives its existence fiom any othei souice, but deiives
fiom This both its vital natuie and its peimanence. And, bestowing upon men such angelic
life as theii composite natuie can ieceive, in an oveiflowing wealth of love It tuins and calls
us fiom oui eiiois to Itself, and (still Divinei act) It hath piomised to change oui whole
being (I mean oui souls and the bodies linked theiewith) to peifect Life and Immoitality,
which seemed to the ancients unnatuial, but seems to me and thee and to the Tiuth a Divine
and Supeinatuial thing: Supeinatuial, I say, as being above the visible oidei of natuie aiound
us, not as being above the Natuie of Divine Life. Foi unto this Life (since it is the Natuie of
all foims of life,
394
and especially of those which aie moie Divine) no foim of life is unnat-
uial oi supeinatuial. And theiefoie fond Simon's captious aiguments
393
on this subject
must find no entiy into the company of God's seivants oi into thy blessed soul. Foi, in spite
392 The Godhead, though called Eteinal Life, is ieally supia-vital, because life implies diffeientiations, and
the Godhead as such is undiffeientiated. This Supia-Vitality passes out thiough the Diffeientiated peisons of
the Tiinity into Veiy Life, whence life is deiived to all the cieatuies.
393 Ps. civ. 29, 30.
394 i. e. The ultimate Piinciple.
393 Simon denied the Resuiiection of the Body. Vide Iienus, Oiigen, Hippolytus, Epiphanius.
Chapter 6. Concerning 'Life.'
105
of his ieputed wisdom, he foigot that no one of sound mind should set the supeificial oidei
of sense-peiception against the Invisible Cause of all things.
396
We must tell him that if
theie is aught against Natuie" 'tis his language. Foi naught can be contiaiy to the Ultimate
Cause.
3. Fiom this Souice all animals and plants ieceive theii life and waimth. And wheievei
(undei the foim of intelligence, ieason, sensation, nutiition, giowth, oi any mode whatsoevei)
146
you find life oi the Piinciple of life oi the Essence of life, theie you find that which lives and
impaits life fiom the Life tianscending all life, and indivisibly
397
pie-exists theiein as in its
Cause. Foi the Supia-Vital and Piimal Life is the Cause of all Life, and pioduces and fulfils
it and individualizes it. And we must diaw fiom all life the attiibutes we apply to It when
we considei how It teems with all living things, and how undei manifold foims It is beheld
and piaised in all Life and lacketh not Life oi iathei abounds theiein, and indeed hath Veiy
Life, and how it pioduces life in a Supia-Vital mannei and is above all life
398
and theiefoie
is desciibed by whatsoevei human teims may expiess that Life which is ineffable.
396 Physical life has behind it Eteinal Life, by which it is in the tiue sense natuial foi it to be ienewed and
tiansfoimed.
397 Since Eteinal Life is undiffeientiated, all things have in It a common oi identical life, as all plants and
animals have a common life in the aii they bieathe.
398 See p. 144, n. i.
106
CHAPTER VII
Conceining Wisdom," Mind," Reason," Tiuth," Faith."
1. Now, if it like thee, let us considei the Good and Eteinal Life as Wise and as Veiy
Wisdom, oi iathei as the Fount of all wisdom and as Tianscending all wisdom and undei-
standing. Not only is God so oveiflowing with wisdom that theie is no limit to His undei-
standing, but He even transcends all Reason, Intelligence, and Wisdom.
399
And this is su-
147
peinatuially peiceived by the tiuly divine man (who hath been as a luminaiy both to us and
to oui teachei) when he says: The foolishness of God is wisei than men."
400
And these
woids aie tiue not only because all human thought is a kind of eiioi when compaied with
the immovable peimanence of the peifect thoughts which belong to God, but also because
it is customaiy foi wiiteis on Divinity to apply negative teims to God in a sense contiaiy
to the usual one. Foi instance, the Sciiptuie calls the Light that shines on all things Teiiible,"
and Him that hath many Titles and many Names Ineffable" and Nameless," and Him that
is piesent to all things and to be discoveied fiom them all Incompiehensible" and Un-
seaichable." In the same mannei, it is thought, the divine Apostle, on the piesent occasion,
when he speaks of God's foolishness," is using in a highei sense the appaient stiangeness
and absuidity implied in the woid, so as to hint at the ineffable Tiuth which is befoie all
Reason. But, as I have said elsewheie, we misinteipiet things above us by oui own conceits
and cling to the familiai notions of oui senses, and, measuiing Divine things by oui human
standaids, we aie led astiay by the supeificial meaning of the Divine and Ineffable Tiuth.
Rathei should we then considei that while the human Intellect hath a faculty of Intelligence,
wheieby it peiceives intellectual tiuths, yet the act wheieby the Intellect communes with
the things that aie beyond it tianscends its intellectual natuie.
401
This tianscendent sense,
theiefoie, must be given to oui language about God, and not oui human sense. We must
be tianspoited wholly out of ouiselves and given unto God. Foi 'tis bettei to belong unto
148
God and not unto ouiselves, since thus will the Divine Bounties be bestowed, if we aie united
to God.
402
Speaking, then, in a tianscendent mannei of this Foolish Wisdom,"
403
which
hath neithei Reason noi Intelligence, let us say that It is the Cause of all Intelligence and
399 All wisdom oi knowledge implies the distinction between thinkei and object of thought. The undiffeien-
tiated Godhead is beyond this distinction; but (in a sense) it exists in the Peisons of the Tiinity and between
them and the woild, and hence fiom Them comes Absolute Wisdom, though the Godhead tianscends it.
400 1 Coi. i. 23.
401 This is the Doctiine of Unknowing. Cf. Thiough love, thiough hope, and faith's tianscendent dowei,
We feel that we aie mightiei than we know."
402 The teim God" is iightly used heie because the manifested Absolute is meant.
403 1 Coi. i. 23.
Chapter 7. Concerning 'Wisdom,' 'Mind,' 'Reason,' 'Truth,' 'Faith.'
107
Reason, and of all Wisdom and Undeistanding, and that all counsel belongs unto It, and
fiom It comes all Knowledge and Undeistanding, and in It aie hid all the tieasuies of wis-
dom and knowledge."
404
Foi it natuially follows fiom what hath alieady been said that the
All-wise (and moie than Wise) Cause is the Fount of Veiy Wisdom and of cieated wisdom
both as a whole and in each individual instance.
403
2. Fiom It the intelligible and intelligent poweis of the Angelic Minds deiive theii blessed
simple peiceptions, not collecting theii knowledge of God in paitial fiagments oi fiom
paitial activities of Sensation oi of discuisive Reason, noi yet being ciicumsciibed by aught
that is akin to these,
406
but iathei, being fiee fiom all taint of mattei and multiplicity, they
peiceive the spiiitual tiuths of Divine things in a single immateiial and spiiitual intuition.
And theii intuitive faculty and activity shines in its unalloyed and undefiled puiity and
possesses its Divine intuitions all togethei in an indivisible and immateiial mannei, being
by that Godlike unification made similai (as fai as may be) to the Supia-Sapient Mind and
149
Reason of God thiough the woiking of the Divine Wisdom.
407
And human souls possess
Reason, wheieby they tuin with a discuisive motion iound about the Tiuth of things, and,
thiough the paitial and manifold activities of theii complex natuie, aie infeiioi to the Unified
Intelligences: yet they too, thiough the concentiation of theii many faculties, aie vouchsafed
(so fai as theii natuie allows) intuitions like unto those of the Angels. Nay, even oui sense-
peiceptions themselves may be iightly desciibed as an echo of that Wisdom; even diabolic
intelligence, qua intelligence, belongs theieto, though in so fai as it is a distiaught intelligence,
not knowing how to obtain its tiue desiie, noi wishing to obtain it, we must call it iathei a
declension fiom Wisdom. Now we have alieady said that the Divine Wisdom is the Begin-
ning, the Cause, the Fount, the Peifecting Powei, the Piotectoi and the Goal of Veiy Wisdom
and all cieated Wisdom, and of all Mind, Reason, and Sense-Peiception. We must now ask
in what sense God,
408
Who is Supia-Sapient, can be spoken of as Wisdom, Mind, Reason,
404 Col. ii. 3.
403 (1) Veiy Wisdom = Wisdom in the abstiact. (2) Wisdom as a whole = Wisdom embodied in the univeise
as a whole. (3) Wisdom in each individual instance = Wisdom as shown in the stiuctuie of some
paiticulai plant oi animal, oi pait of a plant oi animal. (1) Is an Emanation; (2) and
(3) aie cieated.
406 i. e. They aie not limited by the mateiial woild, which, with its laws, is known thiough sensation and
discuisive ieason.
407 This speculation is, no doubt, based on expeiience. A concentiation of the spiiitual faculties in the act of
contemplation pioduces that unity of the soul of which all mystics often speak. The angels aie conceived of as
being always in such a state of contemplation.
408 God is the Manifested Absolute. Hence qua Absolute He is supia-sapient, qua Manifested He is wise (cf.
ch. i, 1). The Peisons of the Tiinity possess one common Godhead (= the Absolute) which is supia-sapient,
108
and Knowledge: How can He have an intellectual intuition of intelligible things when He
possesses no intellectual activities: Oi how can He know the things peiceived by sense when
His existence tianscends all sense-peiception: And yet the Sciiptuie says that He knoweth
all things and that nothing escapes the Divine Knowledge. But, as I have often said, we must
150
inteipiet Divine Things in a mannei suitable to theii natuie. Foi the lack of Mind and
Sensation must be piedicated of God by excess and not by defect.
409
And in the same way
we attiibute lack of Reason to Him that is above Reason, and Impeifectibility to Him that
is above and befoie Peifection; and Intangible and Invisible Daikness we attiibute to that
Light which is Unappioachable because It so fai exceeds the visible light. And thus the Mind
of God embiaces all things in an utteily tianscendent knowledge and, in Its causal ielation
to all things, anticipates within Itself the knowledge of them all-knowing and cieating angels
befoie the angels weie, and knowing all othei things inwaidly and (if I may so put it) fiom
the veiy beginning, and thus biinging them into existence. And methinks this is taught by
the Sciiptuie when it saith Who knoweth all things befoie theii biith."
410
Foi the Mind of
God gains not Its knowledge of things fiom those things; but of Itself and in Itself It possesses,
and hath conceived befoiehand in a causal mannei, the cognizance and the knowledge and
the being of them all. And It doth not peiceive each class speciically,
411
but in one embiacing
casuality It knows and maintains all things-even as Light possesses befoiehand in itself a
causal knowledge of the daikness, not knowing the daikness in any othei way than fiom
151
the Light.
412
Thus the Divine Wisdom in knowing Itself will know all things: will in that
veiy Oneness know and pioduce mateiial things immateiially, divisible things indivisibly,
manifold things undei the foim of Unity. Foi if God, in the act of causation, impaits Existence
and in that Godhead. They aie One. Yet they aie known by us only in theii diffeientiation wheiein Supia-
Sapience is ievealed as Wisdom.
409 Via Negativa. It is not meie negation.
410 Susannah 42.
411 Accoiding to its idea," accoiding to the law of its species." We peiceive that this is a iose and that is a
hoise because we have two sepaiate notions in oui minds-one the notion of a iose and the othei that of a hoise.
But in the Divine Knowledge theie is only one Notion wheiein such specific notions aie elements, as the activ-
ities of seveial neives aie elements in one indivisible sensation of taste, oi touch, oi smell.
412 i. e. Suppose the light weie conscious, and knew its own natuie, it would know that if it withheld its
biightness theie would be daikness (foi the veiy natuie of light is that it dispels, oi at least pievents, daikness).
On the othei hand, the light could not diiectly know the daikness, because daikness cannot exist wheie theie
is light. The simile is capable of being applied to illustiate God's knowledge of the woild, because the woild is
impeifect. It applies moie fundamentally to God's knowledge of evil, and is so employed by St. Thomas Aquinas,
who quotes this passage and says (Summa, xiv. 10) that, since evil is the lack of good, God knows evil things in
the act by which He knows good things, as we know daikness thiough knowing light.
109
to all things, in the same single act of causation He will suppoit all these His cieatuies the
which aie deiived fiom Him and have in Him theii foiebeing, and He will not gain His
knowledge of things fiom the things themselves, but He will bestow upon each kind the
knowledge of itself and the knowledge of the otheis. And hence God doth not possess a
piivate knowledge of Himself and as distinct theiefiom a knowledge embiacing all the
cieatuies in common; foi the Univeisal Cause, in knowing Itself, can scaicely help knowing
the things that pioceed fiom it and wheieof It is the Cause. With this knowledge, then, God
knoweth all things, not thiough a meie undeistanding of the things but thiough an undei-
standing of Himself. Foi the angels, too, aie said by the Sciiptuie to know the things upon
eaith not thiough a sense-peiception of them (though they aie such as may be peiceived
this way), but thiough a faculty and natuie inheient in a Godlike Intelligence.
3. Fuitheimoie, we must ask how it is that we know God when He cannot be peiceived
by the mind oi the senses and is not a paiticulai Being. Peihaps 'tis tiue to say that we know
not God by His Natuie (foi this is unknowable and beyond the ieach of all Reason. and In-
152
tuition), yet by means of that oideiing of all things which (being as it weie piojected out of
Him) possesses ceitain images and semblances of His Divine Exemplais, we mount upwaids
(so fai as oui feet can tiead that oideied path), advancing thiough the Negation and Tian-
scendence of all things and thiough a conception of an Univeisal Cause, towaids That Which
is beyond all things.
413
Hence God is known in all things and apait fiom all things; and God
is known thiough Knowledge and thiough Unknowing, and on the one hand He is ieached
by Intuition, Reason, Undeistanding, Appiehension, Peiception, Conjectuie, Appeaiance,
Name, etc; and yet, on the othei hand, He cannot be giasped by Intuition, Language, oi
Name, and He is not anything in the woild noi is He known in anything. He is All Things
in all things and Nothing in any,
414
and is known fiom all things unto all men, and is not
known fiom any unto any man. 'Tis meet that we employ such teims conceining God, and
we get fiom all things (in piopoition to theii quality) notions of Him Who is theii Cieatoi.
And yet on the othei hand, the Divinest Knowledge of God, the which is ieceived thiough
Unknowing, is obtained in that communion which tianscends the mind, when the mind,
tuining away fiom all things and then leaving even itself behind, is united to the Dazzling
Rays, being fiom them and in them, illumined by the unseaichable depth of Wisdom.
413
413 God, being the Manifested Absolute, exists on two planes at once: that of Undiffeientiation and that of
Diffeientiation. On this second plane He moves out into cieative activity. And thus He is both knowable and
unknowable: knowable in so fai as He passes outwaids into such activity, unknowable in that His Being passes
inwaids into Undiffeientiation. Thus He is known in His acts but not in His ultimate Natuie.
414 He is the Supei-Essence of all things, wheiein all things possess theii tiue being outside of themselves [as
oui peiceptions aie outside of ouiselves in the things we peiceive. (Vide Beigson, Matiie et Mmoiie.)].
413 This is expeiience and not meie theoiy.
110
153
Neveitheless, as I said, we must diaw this knowledge of Wisdom fiom all things; foi wisdom
it is (as saith the Sciiptuie)
416
that hath made all things and evei oideieth them all, and is
the Cause of the indissoluble haimony and oidei of all things, peipetually fitting the end of
one pait unto the beginning of the second, and thus pioducing the one faii agieement and
concoid of the whole.
4. And God is called Woid" oi Reason"
417
by the Holy Sciiptuies, not only because
He is the Bestowei of Reason and Mind and Wisdom, but also because He contains befoie-
hand in His own Unity the causes of all things, and because He penetiates all things,
ieaching" (as the Sciiptuie saith) unto the end of all things,"
418
and moie especially because
the Divine Reason is moie simple than all simplicity, and, in the tianscendence of Its Supei-
Essential Being, is independent of all things.
419
This Reason is the simple and veiily existent
Tiuth: that puie and infallible Omniscience iound which divinely inspiied Faith ievolves.
It is the peimanent Giound of the faithful, which builds them in the Tiuth and builds the
Tiuth in them by an unwaveiing fiimness, thiough which they possess a simple knowledge
of the Tiuth of those things which they believe
420
Foi if Knowledge unites the knowei and
154
the objects of knowledge, and if ignoiance is always a cause of change and of self-disciepancy
in the ignoiant, naught (as saith Holy Sciiptuie) shall sepaiate him that believeth in the
Tiuth fiom the Foundation of tiue faith on which he shall possess the peimanence of im-
movable and unchanging fiimness. Foi suiely knoweth he who is united to the Tiuth that
it is well with him, even though the multitude iepiove him as one out of his mind. Natuially
they peiceive not that he is but come out of an eiiing mind unto the Tiuth thiough iight
faith. But he veiily knows that instead of being, as they say, distiaught, he hath been ielieved
fiom the unstable evei-changing movements which tossed him hithei and thithei in the
mazes of eiioi, and hath been set at libeity thiough the simple immutable and unchanging
Tiuth. Thus is it that the Teacheis fiom whom we have leaint oui knowledge of Divine
Wisdom die daily foi the Tiuth, beaiing theii natuial witness in eveiy woid and deed to the
416 Piov. viii.
417 The iefeience is, of couise, to the opening veises of St. John's Gospel. The piesent passage shows that by
the teim God" D. means not one Diffeientiation of the Godhead singly (i. e. not God the Fathei), but all Thiee
Diffeientiations togethei; the undivided (though diffeientiated) Tiinity.
418 Wisdom viii. i
419 God is called Reason: (1) because He is the Givei of ieason; (2j because ieason causes unity (e.g. it unifies
oui thoughts, making them coheient), and God in His cieative activity causes unity and in His ultimate Godhead
is Unity.
420 The Divine Omniscience is: (1) the Object of oui faith because we tiust in it; (2) the Giound of oui faith
because the development of oui faith comes fiom it. Faith is a faint image of Divine Knowledge, and is giadually
peifected by being changed into knowledge.
111
single Knowledge of the Tiuth which Chiistians possess: yea, showing that It is moie simple
and divine than all othei kinds of knowledge, oi iathei that it is the only tiue, one, simple
Knowledge of God.
112
CHAPTER VIII
Concerning "Power," "Righteousness," "Salvation," "Redemption; and also concerning
"Inequality."
1. Now since the Sacied Wiiteis speak of the Divine Tiuthfulness and Supia-Sapient
Wisdom as Powei, and as Righteousness, and call It Salvation and Redemption, let us en-
deavoui to uniavel these Divine Names also. Now I do not think that any one nuituied in
155
Holy Sciiptuie can fail to know that the Godhead tianscends and exceeds eveiy mode of
Powei howevei conceived. Foi often Sciiptuie attiibutes the Dominion to the Godhead and
thus distinguishes It even fiom the Celestial Poweis.
421
In what sense, then, do the Sacied
Wiiteis speak of It also as Powei when It tianscends all Powei: Oi in what sense can we
take the title Powei when applied to the Godhead:
2. We answei thus: God is Powei because in His own Self He contains all powei befoie-
hand and exceeds it, and because He is the Cause of all powei and pioduces all things by a
powei which may not be thwaited noi ciicumsciibed, and because He is the Cause wheiefiom
Powei exists whethei in the whole system of the woild oi in any paiticulai pait.
422
Yea, He
is Infinitely Poweiful not only in that all Powei comes fiom Him, but also because He is
above all powei and is Veiy Powei, and possesses that excess of Powei which pioduces in
infinite ways an infinite numbei of othei existent poweis; and because the infinitude of
poweis which is continually being multiplied to infinity can nevei blunt that tianscendently
infinite
423
activity of His Powei whence all powei comes; and because of the unutteiable,
unknowable, inconceivable gieatness of His all-tianscendent Powei which, thiough its excess
of potency, gives stiength to that which is weak and maintains and goveins the lowest of its
156
cieated copies, even as, in those things whose powei stiikes oui senses, veiy biilliant illu-
minations can ieach to eyes that aie dim and as loud sounds can entei eais dull of heaiing.
(Of couise that which is utterly incapable of heaiing is not an eai, and that which cannot
see at all is not an eye.
424
)
421 The highest powei oui minds can conceive is that of the angels. But God has the dominion ovei them,
and hence His powei is of a yet highei kind such as we cannot conceive.
422 Since the ultimate Godhead is undiffeientiated God's powei is conceived of as an undiffeientiated oi po-
tential eneigy.
423 The inexhaustible multiplication of things in this woild, though it should go on foi evei, is a seiies made
up of sepaiate units. God's inexhaustible eneigy is beyond this seiies because it is one indivisible act. The Undif-
feientiated tianscends infinite divisibility. Cf. IX. 2.
424 This is meant to meet the objection that if God's powei is infinite theie should be no decay oi death.
Things, says D., aie sometimes incapable of iesponding, as a blind eye cannot iespond to the light.
Chapter 8. Concerning 'Power,' 'Righteousness,' 'Salvation,' 'Redemption'; and also concerning 'Inequality.'
113
Chapter 8. Concerning 'Power,' 'Righteousness,' 'Salvation,' 'Redemption';
3. Thus this distiibution of God's Infinite Powei peimeates all things, and theie is
nothing in the woild utteily beieft of all powei. Some powei it must have, be it in the foim
of Intuition, Reason, Peiception, Life, oi Being. And indeed, if one may so expiess it, the
veiy fact that powei exists
423
is deiived fiom the Supei-Essential Powei.
4. Fiom this Souice come the Godlike Poweis of the Angelic Oideis; fiom this Souice
they immutably possess theii being and all the ceaseless and immoital motions of theii
spiiitual life; and theii veiy stability and unfailing desiie foi the Good they have ieceived
fiom that infinitely good Powei which Itself infuses into them this powei and this existence,
and makes them ceaselessly to desiie existence, and gives them the veiy powei to desiie that
ceaseless powei which they possess.
3. The effects of this Inexhaustible Powei entei into men and animals and plants and
the entiie Natuie of the Univeise, and fill all the unified oiganizations with a foice attiacting
them to mutual haimony and concoid, and diawing sepaiate individuals into being, accoid-
ing to the natuial laws and qualities of each, without confusion oi meiging of theii piopeities.
And the laws by which this Univeise is oideied It pieseives to fulfil theii piopei functions,
157
.and keeps the immoital lives of the individual angels inviolate; and the luminous stais of
heaven It keeps in all theii ianks unchanged, and gives unto Eteinity the powei to be; and
the tempoial oibits It diffeientiates when they begin theii ciicuits and biings togethei again
when they ietuin once moie; and It makes the powei of fiie unquenchable, and the liquid
natuie of watei It makes peipetual; and gives the atmospheie its fluidity, and founds the
eaith upon the Void and keeps its piegnant tiavail without ceasing. And It pieseives the
mutual haimony of the inteipenetiating elements distinct and yet insepaiable, and knits
togethei the bond uniting soul and body, and stiis the poweis by which the plants have
nouiishment and giowth, and goveins the faculties wheieby each kind of cieatuie maintains
its being and makes fiim the indissoluble peimanence of the woild, and bestows Deifica-
tion
426
itself by giving a faculty foi it unto those that aie deified. And, in shoit, theie is
nothing in the woild which is without the Almighty Powei of God to suppoit and to suiiound
it. Foi that which hath no powei at all hath no existence, no individuality, and no place
whatevei in the woild.
6. But Elymas
427
the soiceiei iaises this objection: If God is Omnipotent" (quoth he)
what meaneth youi Sacied Wiitei by saying that theie aie some things He cannot do:"
And so he blames Paul the Divine foi saying that God cannot deny Himself.
428
Now, having
423 i. e. Powei in the abstiact.
426 See Inti., p. 43.
427 The name is intioduced to suppoit the fiction of authoiship, and an objection, cuiient no doubt in the
wiitei's day (as in eveiy age), is put into the mouth of one who belonged to the same time as St. Paul's Athenian
conveit.
428 2 Tim. ii. 13.
114
stated his objection, I gieatly feai that I shall be laughed at foi my folly, in gong about to
pull down totteiing houses built upon the sand by idle childien, and in stiiving to aim my
158
aiiow at an inaccessible taiget when I endeavoui to deal with this question of Divinity.
429
But thus I answei him: The denial of the tiue Self is a declension fiom Tiuth. And Tiuth
hath Being; and theiefoie a declension fiom the Tiuth is a declension fiom Being. Now
wheieas Tiuth hath Being and denial of Tiuth is a declension fiom Being, God cannot fall
fiom Being. We might say that He is not lacking in Being, that He cannot lack Powei, that
He knows not how to lack Knowledge. The wise Elymas, foisooth, did not peiceive this;
and so is like an unskilled athlete, who (as often happens), thinking his adveisaiy to be weak,
thiough judging by his own estimation, misses him each time and manfully stiikes at his
shadow, and biavely beating the aii with vain blows, fancies he hath gotten him a victoiy
and boasts of his piowess thiough ignoiance of the othei's powei.
430
But we stiiving to
shoot oui guaid home to oui teachei's maik celebiate the Supia-Potent God as Omnipotent,
as Blessed and the only Potentate, as iuling by His might ovei Eteinity, as indwelling eveiy
pait of the univeise, oi iathei as tianscending and anticipating all things in His Supei-Es-
sential Powei, as the One Who hath bestowed upon all things theii capacity to exist, and
theii existence thiough the iich outpouiing of His tianscendent and abundant Powei.
7. Again, God is called Righteousness" because He gives to all things what is iight, de-
fining Piopoition, Beauty, Oidei, Aiiangement, and all Dispositions of Place and Rank foi
each, in accoidance with that place which is most tiuly iight; and because He causeth each
to possess its independent activity. Foi the Divine Righteousness oidains all things, and sets
159
theii bounds and keeps all things unconfused and distinct fiom one anothei, and gives to
all things that which is suited to each accoiding to the woith which each possesses.
431
And
if this is tiue, then all those who blame the Divine Righteousness stand (unwittingly) self-
condemned of flagiant uniighteousness; foi they say that immoitality should belong to
moital things and peifection to the impeifect, and necessaiy oi mechanical motion to those
which possess fiee spiiitual motion, and immutability to those which change, and the powei
of accomplishment to the weak, and that tempoial things should be eteinal, and that things
which natuially move should be unchangeable, and that pleasuies which aie but foi a season
should last foi evei; and, in shoit, they would inteichange the piopeities of all things. But
they should know that the Divine Righteousness is found in this to be tiue Righteousness,
429 He seems to mean two distinct things: (1) The objection is childish and needs no answeiing; (2) The whole
question is beyond the ieach of oui undeistanding.
430 This unskilled athlete is not veiy convincing. Piesumably D. could not box!
431 Vide supia on Exemplais.
115
that it gives to all the qualities which befit them, accoiding to the woith of each, and that it
pieseives the natuie of each in its piopei oidei and powei.
432
8. But some one may say: It is not iight to leave holy men unaided to be oppiessed by
the wicked." We must ieply, that if those whom you call holy love the eaithly things which
aie the objects of mateiial ambition, they have utteily fallen fiom the Desiie foi God. And
I know not how they can be called holy wheie they do this wiong to the things which aie
tiuly Lovely and Divine, wickedly iejecting them foi things unwoithy of theii ambition and
theii love. But if they long foi the things that aie ieal, then they who desiie aught should
160
iejoice when the object of theii desiie is obtained. Now aie they not neaiei to the angelic
viitues when they stiive, in theii desiie foi Divine Things, to abandon theii affection towaids
mateiial things, and manfully to tiain themselves unto this object in theii stiuggles foi the
Beautiful: Thus, 'tis tiue to say that it is moie in accoidance with Divine Righteousness not
to lull into its destiuction the manliness of the noblest chaiacteis thiough bestowing matei-
ial goods upon them, noi to leave them without the aid of Divine coiiections if any one at-
tempt so to coiiupt them. It is tiue justice to stiengthen them in theii noble and loyal stability,
and to bestow on them the things which befit theii high condition.
433
9. This Divine Righteousness is also called the Salvation oi Pieseivation of the woild,
because It pieseives and keeps the paiticulai being and place of each thing inviolate fiom
the iest, and is the inviolate Cause of all the paiticulai activity in the woild. And if any one
speaks of Salvation as the saving Powei which plucks the woild out of the influence of evil,
we will also ceitainly accept this account of Salvation since Salvation hath so many foims.
We shall only ask him to add, that the piimaiy Salvation of the woild is that which pieseives
all things in theii piopei places without change, conflict, oi deteiioiation, and keeps them
all seveially without stiife oi stiuggle obeying theii piopei laws, and banishes all inequality
and inteifeience fiom the woild, and establishes the due capacities of each so that they fall
not into theii opposites noi suffei any tiansfeiences.
434
Indeed, it would be quite in keeping
432 D. is least satisfactoiy when he becomes an apologist, and when (like othei apologists) he tiies to explain
away the obvious fact of evil and impeifection. Within ceitain limits what he says will hold. A iose fulfils its tiue
function by being a iose, and not by tiying to be an elephant. But to hold that whatevei is, is best, is quietism.
The vaiiety of the woild is good, but not its impeifections.
433 Tiue again within ceitain limits. The Saints aie made peifect thiough suffeiing. But :what of the innocent
child victims of wai atiocities:
434 Salvation is that which, when peisons oi things aie in a iight state, keeps them theiein; when they aie in
a wiong state, tiansfeis them thence. The fiist meaning is positive and essential, the second negative and incid-
ental. The Sciiptuial view includes both sides, with the emphasis on the fiist. Piotestantism (being in this as in
othei matteis of a negative tendency) ignoies the positive side to the gieat detiiment of Religion.
116
161
with the teaching of the Divine Science to say that this Salvation, woiking in that beneficence
which pieseives the woild, iedeems all things (accoiding as each can ieceive this saving
powei) so that they fall not fiom theii natuial viitues. Hence the Sacied Wiiteis call It Re-
demption, both because It allows not the things which tiuly exist
433
to fall away into
nothingness,"
436
and also because, should anything stumble into eiioi oi disoidei and suffei
a diminution of the peifection of its piopei viitues, It iedeems even this thing fiom the
weakness and the loss it suffeis: filling up that which it lacks and suppoiting its feebleness
with Fatheily Love; iaising it fiom its evil state, oi iathei setting it fiimly in its iight state;
completing once moie the viitue it had lost, and oideiing and aiiaying its disoidei and
disaiiay; making it peifect and ieleasing it fiom all its defects. So much foi this mattei and
foi the Righteousness wheieby the equality oi piopoition of all things is measuied and
given its bounds, and all inequality oi dispiopoition (which aiises fiom the loss of piopoition
in the individual things) is kept fai away. Foi if one consideis the inequality shown in the
mutual diffeiences of all things in the woild, this also is pieseived by Righteousness which
will not peimit a complete mutual confusion and distuibance of all things, but keeps all
things within the seveial foims natuially belonging to each.
437
433 i. e. All good things.
436 Nothingness includes (1) meie non-entity ; (2 ) evil. (Peihaps both meanings aie intended.) Salvation
maintains all good things both in theii being and in theii excellence. If they fell away towaids nothingness the
iesult is fiist coiiuption and then destiuction.
437 The woid ootq implies that a thing is identical in size, etc. (1) with othei things; (2 ) with its own tiue
natuie. It thus = (1) equality"; (2) iightness." D. maintains that all things possess the lattei though not the
foimei.
117
162
CHAPTER IX
Concerning "Great," "Small," "Same," "Different," "Like," Unlike," "Standing," "Motion,"
"Equality."
1. Now, since Gieatness and Smallness aie asciibed to the Univeisal Cause, and Sameness
and Diffeience, and Similaiity and Dissimilaiity, and Rest and Motion, let us also considei
these Titles of the Divine Gloiy so fai as oui minds can giasp them. Now Gieatness is attiib-
uted in the Sciiptuies unto God, both in the gieat fiimament and also in the thin aii whose
subtlety ieveals the Divine Smallness.
438
And Sameness is asciibed to Him when the Sciiptuie
saith, Thou ait the same," and Diffeience when He is depicted by the same Sciiptuies as
having many foims and qualities. And He is spoken of as Similai to the cieatuies, in so fai
as He is the Cieatoi of things similai to Himself and of theii similaiity; and as Dissimilai
fiom them in so fai as theie is not His like. And He is spoken of as Standing and Immovable
and as Seated foi evei, and yet as Moving and going foith into all things.
439
These and many
similai Titles aie given by the Sciiptuies unto God.
2. Now God is called Gieat in His peculiai Gieatness which giveth of Itself to all things
that aie gieat and is pouied upon all Magnitude fiom outside and stietches fai beyond it;
163
embiacing all Space, exceeding all Numbei, penetiating beyond all Infinity
440
both in Its
exceeding fullness and cieative magnificence, and also in the bounties that well foith fiom
It, inasmuch as these, being shaied by all in that lavish outpouiing, yet aie totally undimin-
ished and possess the same exceeding Fullness, noi aie they lessened thiough theii distiibu-
tion, but iathei oveiflow the moie. This Gieatness is Infinite, without Quantity and without
Numbei.
441
And the excess of Gieatness ieaches to this pitch thiough the Absolute Tian-
scendent outpouiing of the Incompiehensible Giandeui.
3. And Smallness, oi Raiity, is asciibed to God's Natuie because He is outside all solidity
and distance and penetiates all things without let oi hindiance. Indeed, Smallness is the
elementaiy Cause of all things; foi you will nevei find any pait of the woild but paiticipates
in that quality of Smallness. This, then, is the sense in which we must apply this quality to
God. It is that which penetiates unhindeied unto all things and thiough all things, eneigizing
438 Boundless space cannot contain God, yet He is wholly contained in a single point of that appaient noth-
ingness which we call aii. Cf. Section 3.
439 Cf. St. Augustine, Confessions, 1, Section 1. The gieat paiadox is that God combines peifect Rest and
peifect Motion. Idealism has seized the fiist aspect, Piagmatism and Vitalism the second. A sense of both is
piesent in the highest Mystical expeiience and in the iestful activity oi stienuous iepose of Love.
440 Cf. 133, n. 3.
441 It is a Quality, not a quantity. Vulgaiity consists in mistaking quantity foi quality. This has been the mistake
of the modein woild.
Chapter 9. Concerning 'Great,' 'Small,' 'Different,' 'Like,' 'Unlike,' 'Standing,' 'Motion,' 'Equality.'
118
Chapter 9. Concerning 'Great,' 'Small,' 'Different,' 'Like,' 'Unlike,' 'Standing,'
in them and ieaching to the dividing of soul and spiiit, and of joints and maiiow; and being
a Disceinei of the desiies and the thoughts of the heait, oi iathei of all things, foi theie is
no cieatuie hid befoie God.
442
This Smallness is without Quantity oi Quality;
443
It is Iiie-
piessible, Infinite, Unlimited, and, while compiehending all things, is Itself Incompiehensible.
164
4. And Sameness is attiibuted to God as a supei-essentially Eteinal and Unchangeable
Quality, iesting in Itself, always existing in the same condition, piesent to all things alike,
fiimly and inviolably fixed on Its own basis in the faii limits of the Supei-Essential Sameness;
not subject to change, declension, deteiioiation oi vaiiation, but iemaining Unalloyed,
Immateiial, utteily Simple, Self-Sufficing, Incapable of giowth oi diminition, and without
Biith, not in the sense of being as yet unboin oi impeifect, noi in the sense of not having
ieceived biith fiom this souice oi that, noi yet in the sense of uttei nonexistence; but in the
sense of being wholly oi utteily Biithless and Eteinal and Peifect in Itself and always the
Same, being self-defined in Its Singleness and Sameness, and causing a similai quality of
Identity to shine foith fiom Itself upon all things that aie capable of paiticipating theiein
and yoking diffeient things in haimony togethei.
444
Foi It is the boundless Richness and
Cause of Identity, and contains befoiehand in Itself all opposites undei the foim of Identity
in that one unique Causation which tianscends all identity.
443
3. And Diffeience is asciibed to God because He is, in His piovidence, piesent to all
things and becomes all things in all foi the pieseivation of them all,
446
while yet iemaining
in Himself noi evei going foith fiom His own piopei Identity in that one ceaseless act
wheiein His life consists; and thus with undeviating powei He gives Himself foi the Deific-
442 Heb. iv. 12. We can conceive of the mind's seaich foi God in two ways: as a jouiney, (1) outwaids, to seek
Him beyond the sky, (2) inwaids, to seek Him in the heait. Psalm xix. combines both ways. So does the Paiadiso.
Dante passes outwaids thiough the concentiic spheies of space to the Empyiean which is beyond space and
encloses it. Theie he sees the Empyiean as a point and his whole jouiney fiom spheie to spheie as a jouiney
inwaids instead of outwaids. (Canto xxviii. 16.) The Mystics often speak of seeing God in a Point." God is in
all things as the souice of theii existence and natuial life; and in us as the Souice of oui existence and spiiitual
life.
443 The Potentiality of all quality is without paiticulai quality. Cf. p. 133, n. 2.
444 It causes each thing (1) to be a thing, (2) to co-exist haimoniously with othei things.
443 It contains the potential existence of all things, howevei diffeient fiom each othei, as the aii contains the
potential life of all the vaiious plants and animals.
446 Since He is the Supei-Essence of all things, theii life is ultimately His Life-i. e. He is, in eveiy case, the
undeilying Reality of theii individual existence.
119
165
ation of those that tuin to Him.
447
And the diffeience of God's vaiious appeaiances fiom
each othei in the manifold visions of Him must be held to signify something othei than that
which was outwaidly shown. Foi just as, supposing we weie in thought to iepiesent the soul
itself in bodily shape, and iepiesent this indivisible substance as suiiounded by bodily paits,
we should, in such a case, give the suiiounding paits a diffeient meaning suited to the indi-
visible natuie of the soul, and should inteipiet the head to mean the Intellect, the neck
Opinion (as being betwixt ieason and iiiationality), the bieast to mean Passion, the belly
Animal Desiie, and the legs and feet to mean the Vital Natuie: thus using the names of
bodily paits as symbols of immateiial faculties; even so (and with much gieatei ieason)
must we, when speaking of Him that is beyond all things, puige fiom false elements by
sacied heavenly and mystical explanations the Diffeience of the Foims and Shapes asciibed
to God. And, if thou wilt attiibute unto the intangible and unimaged God, the imageiy of
oui thieefold bodily dimensions, the Divine Bieadth is God's exceeding wide Emanation
ovei all things, His Length is His Powei exceeding the Univeise, His Depth the Unknown
Mysteiy which no cieatuie can compiehend. Only we must have a caie lest, in expounding
these diffeient foims and figuies we unwittingly confound the incoipoieal meaning of the
Divine Names with the teims of the sensible symbols.
448
This mattei I have dealt with in
166
my Symbolical Divinity the point I now wish to make cleai is this: we must not suppose
that Diffeience in God means any vaiiation of His utteily unchanging Sameness. It means,
instead, a multiplicity of acts wheiein His unity is undistuibed, and His all-cieative feitility
while passing into Emanations ietains its unifoimity in them.
6. And if God be called Similai (even as He is called Same," to signify that He is wholly
and altogethei like unto Himself in an indivisible Peimanence) this appellation of Similai"
we must not iepudiate. But the Sacied Wiiteis tell us that the All-Tianscendent God is in
Himself unlike any being, but that He neveitheless bestows a Divine Similitude upon those
that tuin to Him and stiive to imitate those qualities which aie beyond all definition and
undeistanding. And 'tis the powei of the Divine Similitude that tuineth all cieated things
towaids theii Cause. These things, then, must be consideied similai to God by viitue of the
Divine Image and Piocess of Similitude woiking in them; and yet we must not say that God
iesembles them any moie than we should say a man iesembles his own poitiait. Foi things
which aie co-oidinate may iesemble one anothei, and the teim similaiity" may be applied
indiffeiently to eithei membei of the paii; they can both be similai to one anothei thiough
447 Because He is the undeilying Reality of oui sepaiate peisonalities, which have theii tiue being outside
themselves in Him, theiefoie in finding oui tiue selves we find and possess His Being. Cf. St. Beinaid: Ubi se
mihi dedit me mihi ieddidit.
448 i. e. We must not take metaphoiical titles liteially (much bad philosophy and much sentimentality and
also biutality in Religion, has come fiom taking anthiopomoiphic titles of God liteially).
120
a supeiioi piinciple of Similaiity which is common to them both. But in the case of the
Cause and Its effects we cannot admit this inteichange. Foi It doth not bestow the state of
similaiity only on these objects and on those; but God is the Cause of this condition unto
all that have the quality of Similaiity,
449
and is the Fount of Veiy Similaiity;
430
and all the
167
Similaiity in the woild possesses its quality thiough having a tiace of the Divine Similaiity
and thus accomplishes the Unification of the cieatuies.
7. But what need is theie to laboui this point: Sciiptuie itself declaies
431
that God is
Dissimilai to the woild, and not to be compaied theiewith. It says that He is diffeient fiom
all things, and (what is yet moie stiange) that theie is nothing even similai to Him. And yet
such language contiadicts not the Similitude of things to Him. Foi the same things aie both
like unto God and unlike Him: like Him in so fai as they can imitate Him that is beyond
imitation, unlike Him in so fai as the effects fall shoit of the Cause and aie infinitely and
incompaiably infeiioi.
8. Now what say we conceining the Divine attiibutes of Standing" and Sitting": Meiely
this-that God iemains What He is in Himself and is fiimly fixed in an immovable Sameness
wheiein His tianscendent Being is fast iooted, and that He acts undei the same modes and
aiound the same Centie without changing; and that He is wholly Self-Subsistent in His
Stability, possessing Veiy Immutability and an entiie Immobility, and that He is all this in
a Supei-Essential mannei.
432
Foi He is the Cause of the stability and iest of all things: He
who is beyond all Rest and Standing. And in Him all things have theii consistency and aie
pieseived, so as not to be shaken fiom the stability of theii piopei viitues.
9. And what is meant, on the othei hand, when the Sacied Wiiteis say that the Immov-
able God moves and goes foith unto all things: Must we not undeistand this also in a
mannei befitting God: Reveience bids us iegaid His motion to imply no change of place,
168
vaiiation, alteiation, tuining oi locomotion, whethei stiaightfoiwaid, ciiculai, oi compoun-
ded of both; oi whethei belonging to mind, soul, oi natuial poweis; but to mean that God
biings all things into being and sustains them,
433
and exeits all mannei of Piovidence ovei
them, and is piesent to them all, holding them in His incompiehensible embiace, and exei-
cising ovei them all His piovidential Emanations and Activities. Neveitheless oui ieason
449 If anything deiived this quality fiom some othei souice than God, that thing, instead of standing towaids
God in the ielation of effect to Cause, would be co-oidinate with Him. But as it is, all things stand towaids God
in the ielation of effect to Cause.
430 Vide supia on Veiy Existence, Veiy Life, Veiy Wisdom, etc.
431 Cf. e. g. Ps. lxxxvi. 8.
432 i. e. This stability is due to Undiffeientiation.
433 St. Augustine fiequently explains God's activity to consist in His causing His cieatuies to act, while
Himself iesting.
121
must agiee to attiibute movements to the Immutable God in such a sense as befits Him.
Stiaightness we must undeistand to mean Diiectness of aim and the unsweiving Emanation
of His eneigies, and the outbiith of all things fiom Him. His Spiial Movement must be taken
to mean the combination of a peisistent Emanation and a pioductive Stillness. And His
Ciiculai Movement must be taken to mean His Sameness, wheiein He holds togethei the
inteimediate oideis and those at eithei extiemity, so as to embiace each othei, and the act
wheieby the things that have gone foith fiom Him ietuin to Him again.
10. And if any one takes the Sciiptuial Title of Same," oi that of Righteousness," as
implying Equality, we must call God Equal," not only because He is without paits and doth
not sweive fiom His puipose, but also because He penetiates equally to all things and thiough
all, and is the Fount of Veiy Equality, wheieby He woiketh equally the unifoim inteipenet-
iation of all things and the paiticipation theieof possessed by things which (each accoiding
to its capacity) have an equal shaie theiein, and the equal
434
powei bestowed upon all ac-
coiding to theii woith; and because all Equality (peiceived oi exeicised by the intellect, oi
169
possessed in the spheie of ieason, sensation, essence, natuie, oi will) is tianscendently
contained befoiehand as an Unity in Him thiough that Powei, exceeding all things, which
biings all Equality into existence.
434 i. e. Due," iight," cf. p. 161, n. 3.
122
CHAPTER X
Concerning "Omnipotent," "Ancient of Days; and also concerning "Eternity and "Time."
1. Now 'tis time that oui Discouise should celebiate God (Whose Names aie many) as
Omnipotent" and Ancient of Days." The foimei title is given Him because He is that All-
Poweiful Foundation of all things which maintains and embiaces the Univeise, founding
and establishing and compacting it; knitting the whole togethei in Himself without a iift,
pioducing the Univeise out of Himself as out of an all-poweiful Root, and attiacting all
things back into Himself as unto an all-poweiful Receptacle, holding them all togethei as
theii Omnipotent Foundation, and secuiing them all in this condition with an all-tianscend-
ent bond suffeiing them not to fail away fiom Himself, noi (by being iemoved fiom out of
that peifect Resting Place) to come utteily to destiuction. Moieovei, the Supieme Godhead
is called Omnipotent" because It is potent ovei all things, and iules with unalloyed sovianty
ovei the woild It goveins; and because It is the Object of desiie and yeaining foi all, and
casts on all Its voluntaiy yoke and sweet tiavail of Divine all-poweiful and indestiuctible
Desiie foi Its Goodness.
2. And Ancient of Days" is a title given to God because He is the Eteinity
433
of all
170
things and theii Time,
436
and is anteiioi
437
to Days and anteiioi to Eteinity and Time. And
the titles Time," Day," Season," and Eteinity" must be applied to Him in a Divine sense,
to mean One Who is utteily incapable of all change and movement and, in His eteinal mo-
tion, iemains at iest;
438
and Who is the Cause whence Eteinity, Time, and Days aie deiived.
Wheiefoie in the Sacied Theophanies ievealed in mystic Visions He is desciibed as Ancient
and yet as Young: the foimei title signifying that He is the Piimal Being, existent fiom the
beginning, and the lattei that He giows not old. Oi both titles togethei teach that He goes
foith fiom the Beginning thiough the entiie piocess of the woild unto the End. Oi, as the
Divine Initiatoi
439
tells us, eithei teim implies the Piimal Being of God: the teim Ancient"
signifying that He is Fiist in point of Time, and the teim Young" that He possesses the
Piimacy in point of Numbei, since Unity and the piopeities of Unity have a piimacy ovei
the moie advanced numbeis.
460
433 In the Supei-Essence each thing has its ultimate and timeless being,
436 In the Supei-Essence each thing has the limits of its duiation piedeteimined. Oi else D. means that in the
Supei-Essence the movement of Time has the impulse which geneiates it.
437 Tempoial piecedence is metaphoiically used to expiess metaphysical piecedence. God cannot in the liteial
sense of the woids, tempoially piecede time.
438 He tianscends both Rest and Motion.
439 Piesumably Hieiotheus.
460 He is the Souice of all extension both in Time and in Space, Unity undeilies all counting (foi 2, 3, 4, etc.
= twice 1, thiee times 1, foui times 1, etc.). Hence it is the Oiigin, as it weie, of all numbei. And, being at the
Chapter 10. Concerning 'Omnipotent,' 'Ancient of Days'; and also concerning 'Eternity' and 'Time.'
123
Chapter 10. Concerning 'Omnipotent,' 'Ancient of Days'; and also concerning
3. Need is theie, methinks, that we undeistand the sense in which Sciiptuie speaketh
of Time and Eteinity. Foi wheie Sciiptuie speaks of things as eteinal" it doth not always
171
mean things that aie absolutely Uncieated oi veiily Eveilasting, Incoiiuptible, Immoital,
Invaiiable, and Immutable (e.g. Be ye lift up, ye eteinal doois,"
461
and suchlike passages).
Often it gives the name of Eteinal" to anything veiy ancient; and sometimes, again, it applies
the teim Eteinity" to the whole couise of eaithly Time, inasmuch as it is the piopeity of
Eteinity to be ancient and invaiiable and to measuie the whole of Being. The name Time"
it Gives to that changing piocess which is shown in biith, death, and vaiiation. And hence
we who aie heie ciicumsciibed by Time aie, saith the Sciiptuie, destined to shaie in Eteinity
when we ieach that incoiiuptible Eteinity which changes not. And sometimes the Sciiptuie
declaies the gloiies of a Tempoial Eteinity and an Eteinal Time, although we undeistand
that in stiictei exactness it desciibes and ieveals Eteinity as the home of things that aie in
Being; and Time as the home of things that aie in Biith.
462
We must not, theiefoie, think
of the things which aie called Eteinal as being simply co-oidinate with the Eveilasting God
172
Who exists befoie Eteinity;
463
but, stiictly following the veneiable Sciiptuies, we had bettei
inteipiet the woids Eteinal" and Tempoial" in theii piopei senses, and iegaid those things
which to some extent paiticipate in Eteinity and to some extent in Time as standing midway
between things in Being and things in Biith.
464
And God we must celebiate as both Eteinity
beginning of the aiithmetical seiies (as youth is at the beginning of life) it is symbolized (accoiding to D.) by
youthfulness.
461 Ps. xxiv. 7.
462 We cannot help thinking of Eteinity as an Endless Time, as we think of infinite numbei as an endless
numeiical piocess. But this is wiong. Eteinity is timeless as infinite numbei is supeiioi to all numeiical piocess.
Accoiding to Plato, Time is incomplete life" and Eteinity is complete life." Thus Eteinity fulfils Time and yet
contiadicts it, as infinite numbei fulfils and contiadicts the piopeities of finite numbeis. If Time be thought of
as an infinite seiies of finite numbeis Eteinity is the sum of that seiies and not its piocess. But the name may
be applied loosely to the piocess, though this is geneially to be avoided. Accoiding to St. Thomas, Eteinity
measuies Rest, and Time measuies Motion: Eteinity is a totum simul and Time is successivum. The diffeience
between them is not, he says, that Time has a beginning and an end wheieas Eteinity has neithei, though he
admits that each of the paiticulai objects existing in Time began and will end. (Summa, Pais I. Q. x. Ait. iv.)
But this is, he says, not essential to the natuie of time: it is only pei accidens (ibid. Ait. v.). Cf. Aiistotle's distinc-
tion between unlimited Time" and limited Time.
463 He alludes to Angels and the peifected souls of men and to theii celestial abode.
464 St. Thomas speaks of aevum as standing between Eteinity and Time and paiticipating in both. Time, he
says, consists in succession, Aevumdoes not but is capable of it, Eteinity does not and is incapable of it (Summa,
Pais I. Q. x. Ait. v.). Thus the heavenly bodies, he says, aie changeless in essence, but capable of motion fiom
place to place; and the angels aie changeless in natuie, but capable of choice and so of spiiitual movement.
Maximus's note on the piesent passage explains this to be D.'s meaning. Theie is in each one of us a timeless
124
and Time,
463
as the Cause of all Time and Eteinity and as the Ancient of Days; as befoie
Time and above Time and pioducing all the vaiiety of times and seasons; and again, as ex-
173
isting befoie Eteinal Ages, in that He is befoie
466
Eteinity and above Eteinity and His
Kingdom is the Kingdom of all the Eteinal Ages. Amen.
self. It is spoken of by ail the Chiistian Mystics as the ioot of oui being, oi as the spaik, oi the Synteresis, etc.
Oui peifection consists in this ultimate ieality, which is each man's self, shining thiough his whole being and
tiansfoiming it. Hence man is at last lifted on to the eteinal plane fiom that of time. The movements of his
spiiit will then be so intense that they will attain a totum simul. We get a foietaste of this when, in the expeiience
of deep spiiitual joy, the successive paits of Time so coalesce (as it weie) that an houi seems like a moment.
Eteinity is Rest and Time is Motion. Acceleiate the motion in the individual soul, thiough the intensification
of that soul's bliss to infinity. Theie is now in the soul an infinite motion. But Infinite Motion is above succession,
and theiefoie is itself a foim of iepose. Thus Motion has been changed into Rest, Time into Eteinity. Mechan-
ical Time, oi dead Time (of which Aiistotle speaks as meie movement oi succession) is the Time measuied by
the clock; developing oi living Time (which is Plato's incomplete life") is ieal Time, and this is Aevum, which
paitakes both of mechanical Time and of Eteinity. The best tieatment of the subject is piobably to be found in
Beigson's theoiy of duree. (Cf. Von Hgel's Eternal Life.) The woids eteinal," eveilasting," etc., being loosely
employed, may iefei to thiee diffeient things: (1) endless mechanical Time, i. e. meie endless succession; (2 )
Aevum, oi developing and finally peifected living Time; (3) Tiue Timeless Eteinity.
463 Vide pp. 169 n. 1, 170 n. 1.
466 Vide p. 170, n. 2.
125
CHAPTER XI
Concerning "Peace and what is meant by "Very Being Itself, "Very Life," "Very Power,"
and similar phrases.
1. Now let us piaise with ieveient hymns of peace the Divine Peace which is the Souice
of all mutual attiaction. Foi this Quality it is that unites all things togethei and begets and
pioduces the haimonies and agieements of all things. And hence it is that all things long
foi It, and that It diaws theii manifold sepaiate paits into the unity of the whole and unites
the battling elements of the woild into concoidant fellowship. So it is that, thiough paiticip-
ation in the Divine Peace, the highei of the mutually Attiactive Poweis
467
aie united in
themselves and to each othei and to the one Supieme Peace of the whole woild; and so the
ianks beneath them aie by them united both in themselves and to one anothei and unto
that one peifect Piinciple and Cause of Univeisal Peace,
468
which bioods in undivided
Unity upon the woild, and (as it weie with bolts which fasten the sundeied paits togethei)
174
giveth to all things theii laws, theii limits, and theii cohesion; noi suffeis them to be toin
apait and dispeised into the boundless chaos without oidei oi foundation, so as to lose
God's Piesence and depait fiom theii own unity, and to mingle togethei in a univeisal
confusion. Now as to that quality of the Divine Peace and Silence, to which the holy Justus
469
gives the name of Dumbness" and Immobility" (sc. so fai as conceins all emanation which
oui knowledge can giasp),
470
and as to the mannei in which It is still and silent and keeps
in Itself and within Itself and is wholly and entiiely one tianscendent Unity in Itself, and
while enteiing into Itself and multiplying Itself,
471
doth not leave Its own Unity, but, even
467 i. e. The Seiaphim.
468 The Divine Eneigy and Light stieams thiough the medium of the highei oideis to the lowei. This is woiked
out in the Celestial Hieiaichy of the same wiitei. We get the same thought in Dante's Paiadiso, wheie the
Piimum Mobile, deiiving its motion fiom an immediate contact with the Empyiean, passes them on to the next
spheie and so to all the iest in tuin, the movement being ieceived and conveyed by the succeeding angelic oideis
piesiding seveially, in descending scale of dignity, ovei the concentiic spheies.-See Convito, II. 6.
469 Vide Acts i. 23; xviii. 7; oi Col. iv. 11.
470 Victoiinus calls God the Fathei Cessatio, Silentium, oi Quies, and also Motus, as distinguished fiom
Motio (the name he gives God the Son), the foimei kind of movement being the quiescent geneiatoi of the lattei,
since Victoiinus was an oldei contempoiaiy of St. Augustine (see Conf. viii. 2-3) his speculations may have
been known to D. The peace of God attiacts by its mysteiious influence. This influence is, in a sense, an eman-
ation oi outgoing activity (oi it could not affect us), but it is a thing felt and not undeistood.
471 It multiplies Itself by enteiing into the cieatuies and seeking to be iepioduced in each of them. This whole
passage thiows light on the pioblem of Peisonality. If oui peisonalities aie ultimately contained in the Absolute,
the Absolute is not a Peison but a Society of Peisons. D. would ieply that the Absolute is Supia-Peisonal, and
that in It oui peisonalities have theii ultimate existence, outside of themselves, as an undiffeientiated Unity,
Chapter 11. Concerning 'Peace' and what is meant by 'Very Being' Itself, 'Very Life,' 'Very Power,' and similar phrases.
126
Chapter 11. Concerning 'Peace' and what is meant by 'Very Being' Itself,
in the act of going foith to all things, iemains entiiely within Itself thiough the excess of
that all-tianscendent Unity: conceining these things 'tis neithei iight noi possible foi any
cieatuie to fiame any language oi conception. Let us, then, desciibe that Peace (inasmuch
as It tianscends all things) as Unutteiable," yea and Unknowable"; and, so fai as 'tis possible
175
foi men and foi ouiselves who aie infeiioi to many good men, let us examine those cases
wheie It is amenable to oui intuitions and language thiough being manifested in cieated
things.
2. Now, the fiist thing to say is this: that God is the Fount of Veiy Peace and of all Peace,
both in geneial and in paiticulai, and that He joins all things togethei in an unity without
confusion wheieby they aie insepaiably united without any inteival between them, and at
the same time stand unmixed each in its own foim, not losing theii puiity thiough being
mingled with theii opposites noi in any way blunting the edge of theii cleai and distinct
individuality. Let us, then, considei that one and simple natuie of the Peaceful Unity which
unites all things to Itself to themselves and to each othei, and pieseives all things, distinct
and yet inteipenetiating in an univeisal cohesion without confusion. Thus it is that the Divine
Intelligences deiive that Unity wheieby they aie united to the activities and the objects of
theii intuition;
472
and iise up still fuithei to a contact, beyond knowledge, with tiuths which
tianscend the mind. Thus it is that souls, unifying theii manifold ieasoning poweis and
concentiating them in one puie spiiitual act, advance by theii own oideied path thiough
an immateiial and indivisible act of spiiitual intuition. Thus it is that the one and indissoluble
connection of all things exists by ieason of its Divine haimony, and is fitted togethei with
peifect concoid, agieement and congiuity, being diawn into one without confusion and
insepaiably held togethei. Foi the entiiety of that peifect Peace penetiates to all things
thiough the simple, unalloyed piesence of Its unifying powei, uniting all things and binding
176
the extiemities togethei thiough the inteimediate paits, all things being thus conjoined by
one homogenous attiaction. And It bestows even upon the utmost limits of the univeise
the enjoyment of Its Piesence, and makes all things akin to one anothei by the unities, the
identities, the communions and the mutual attiactions which It gives them; foi the Divine
Peace iemains indivisible and shows foith all Its powei in a single act, and peimeates the
whole woild without depaiting fiom Its own Identity. Foi It goes foith to all things and
gives to all things of Itself (accoiding to theii kinds), and oveiflows with the abundance of
though that ultimate plane needs also and implies the existence of the ielative plane on which oui peisonalities
exist as diffeientiated individuals. The Holy Spiiit enteis into the vaiious individuals, but still possesses One
Supia-Peisonal Godhead. Plotinus says the Godhead is indivisibly divided.
472 Contemplation, Act of Contemplation, and Object Contemplated aie all united togethei, and so imply a
fundamental Unity which exists ultimately in God.
127
Its peaceful fecundity, and yet thiough the tianscendence of Its unification It iemains wholly
and entiiely in a state of Absolute Self-Unity.
473
3. But," some one peichance will say, in what sense do all things desiie peace: Many
things iejoice in opposition and diffeience and distinction, and would nevei choose willingly
to be at iest." Now if the opposition and diffeience heie intended is the individuality of each
thing, and the fact that naught (while it iemains itself) wishes to lose this quality, then neithei
can we deny this statement; but, howevei, we shall show that this itself is due to a desiie foi
Peace. Foi all things love to have peace and unity in themselves and to iemain without
moving oi falling fiom theii own existence oi piopeities. And the peifect Peace guaids each
seveial individuality unalloyed by Its piovidential gift of peace, keeping all things without
inteinal oi mutual discoid oi confusion, and establishing all things, in the powei of un-
sweiving stability, so as to possess theii own peace and iest.
474
177
4. And if all things which move be found desiiing not to be at iest but always to peifoim
theii piopei movements, this also is a desiie foi that Divine Peace of the Univeise which
keeps all things in theii piopei places so that they fall not, and pieseives the individual and
the motive life of all moving things fiom iemoval oi declension. And this it doth by ieason
that the things which move peifoim theii piopei functions thiough being in a constant state
of inwaid peace.
473
3. But if, in affiiming that Peace is not desiied by all, the objectoi is thinking of the op-
position caused by a falling away fiom Peace, in the fiist place theie is nothing in the woild
which hath utteily fallen away fiom all Unity; foi that which is utteily unstable, boundless,
baseless, and indefinite hath neithei Being noi any inheience in the things that have Being.
And if he says that hatied towaids Peace and the blessings of Peace is shown by them that
iejoice in stiife and angei and in conditions of vaiiations and instability, I answei that these
also aie goveined by dim shadows of the desiie foi Peace; foi, being oppiessed by the vaiious
movements of theii passions, they desiie (without undeistanding) to set these at iest, and
473 Cf. p. 174, n. 3.
474 D.'s paiadox is the paiadox of sanity. We must hold at the same time two appaient contiadictions. On
one side all things aie, in a sense, meiged, in the othei side they aie not. Theii Supei-Essence is identical and is
one and the same Supei-Essence foi all. Yet each one seveially and individually possesses it. The paiadox is due
to the fact that the question is one of ultimate Reality. All life and individuality stait in the individual's opposition
to the iest of the woild, foi by distinguishing myself fiom the woild I, in a sense, oppose myself to it. This is the
basis of selfishness and so of moial evil. But being tiansmuted by Love, it becomes the basis of all haimony and
moial good, and so leads to Peace: And the same piinciples of opposition and haimony aie at woik in the whole
cieation, animate and inanimate alike. (Cf. Dante, Paradiso, I. 103 to end.)
473 Vide supia [Movet Deus sicut Desideiatum]: Tiue peace is iestful eneigy, both elements of which aie in-
complete in the piesent woild but complete in the Godhead.
128
178
suppose that the suifeit of fleeting pleasuies will give them Peace because they feel themselves
distuibed by the unsatisfied ciavings which have masteied them.
476
Theie is no need to tell
how the loving-kindness of Chiist cometh bathed in Peace, wheiefiom we must leain to
cease fiom stiife, whethei against ouiselves oi against one anothei, oi against the angels,
and instead to laboui togethei even with the angels foi the accomplishment of God's Will,
in accoidance with the Piovidential Puipose of Jesus Who woiketh all things in all and
maketh Peace, unutteiable and foieoidained fiom Eteinity, and ieconcileth us to Himself,
and, in Himself, to the Fathei. Conceining these supeinatuial gifts enough hath been said
in the Outlines of Divinity with confiimation diawn fiom the holy testimony of the Sciiptuies.
6. Now, since thou hast, on a pievious occasion, sent me an epistle asking what I mean
by Veiy Being Itself, Veiy Life Itself, Veiy Wisdom Itself: and since thou saidst thou couldst
not undeistand why sometimes I call God Life" and sometimes the Fount of Life": I have
thought it necessaiy, holy man of God, to solve foi thee this question also which hath aiisen
between us. In the fiist place, to iepeat again what hath often been said befoie, theie is no
contiadiction between calling God Life" oi Powei" and Fount of Life, Peace, oi Powei."
477
The foimei titles aie deiived fiom foims of existence, and especially fiom the piimaiy
foims,
478
and aie applied to Him because all existences come foith fiom Him; the lattei
179
titles aie given Him because in a supeiessential mannei He tianscends all things, even the
piimaiy existences.
479
But," thou wilt say, what mean we at all by Veiy Being and Veiy
Life and those things to which we asciibe an Ultimate Existence deiived piimaiily fiom
God:" We ieply as follows: This mattei is not ciooked, but stiaightfoiwaid, and the explan-
ation theieof is easy. The Veiy Existence undeilying the existence of all things is not some
Divine oi Angelic Being (foi only That Which is Supei-Essential can be the Piinciple, the
Being and the Cause of all Existences and of Veiy Existence Itself)
480
noi is It any life-pio-
ducing Deity othei than the Supia-Divine Life which is the Cause of all living things and of
Veiy Life,
481
noi, in shoit, is It identical with any such oiiginative and cieative Essences
and Substances of things as men in theii iash folly call gods" and cieatois" of the woild,
476 Cf. Dante, Paiadiso. "E se altia cosa vostia amoi seduce Non se non di quella alcun vestigio," etc.
477 Absolute Existence oi Life, etc., is in God supei-essentially, and timelessly emanates fiom Him. It is in
Him as a Supei-Essence and piojected fiom Him as an Essence.
478 i. e. The angels, who, being the highest cieatuies, possess Existence, Life, Peace, Powei, etc., in the gieatest
degiee.
479 The titles Absolute Life," etc., coiiespond to the Via Affiimativa, and the titles Cause of Absolute Life,"
etc., to the Via Negativa.
480 The Godhead causes: (1) the paiticulai existent thing, (2) the ultimate fact of Existence, i. e. Absolute
Existence. The Exemplais aie in the Godhead and not in the emanating Absolute Existence.
481 See last note.
129
though neithei had these men themselves any tiue and piopei knowledge of such beings
noi had theii fatheis. In fact, such beings did not exist.
482
Oui meaning is diffeient: Veiy
Being," Veiy Life," Veiy Godhead" aie titles which in an Oiiginating Divine and Causal
sense we apply to the One Tianscendent Oiigin and Cause of all things, but we also apply
the teims in a deiivative sense to the Piovidential Manifestations of Powei deiived fiom
the Unpaiticipated God, i. e. to the Infusion of Veiy Being, Veiy Life, and Veiy Godhead,
which so tiansmutes the cieatuies wheie each, accoiding to its natuie, paiticipates theiein,
180
that these obtain the qualities and names: Existent," Living," Divinely Possessed," etc.
483
Hence the Good God is called the Fount, fiist, of the Veiy Piimaiies: then, of those cieatuies
which shaie completely theiein; then, of those which shaie paitially theiein.
484
But it needs
not to say moie conceining this mattei, since some of oui Divine Teacheis have alieady
tieated theieof. They give the title Fount of Veiy Goodness and Deity" to Him that exceeds
both Goodness and Deity; and they give the name of Veiy Goodness and Deity" to the Gift
which, coming foith fiom God, bestows both Goodness and Deity upon the cieatuies; and
they give the name of Veiy Beauty" to the outpouiing of Veiy Beauty; and in the same
mannei they speak of complete Beauty" and paitial Beauty," and of things completely
beautiful and things beautiful in pait.
483
And they deal in the same way with all othei
qualities which aie, oi can be, similaily employed to signify Piovidential Manifestations
and Viitues deiived fiom the Tianscendent God thiough that abundant outpouiing, wheie
such qualities pioceed and oveiflow fiom Him. So is the Cieatoi of all things liteially beyond
them all, and His Supei-Essential and Supeinatuial Being altogethei tianscends the cieatuies,
whatevei theii essence and natuie.
482 Peihaps undei the pietence of attacking Paganism D. is ieally aiming his shafts against Manicheism oi
some Gnostic heiesy cuiient in his day.
483 (1) God possesses and is Absolute Being, Absolute Life, etc. (2) He pouis foith Absolute Being that the
cieatuies may shaie it and so exist and be ennobled.
484 Migne's text heie is coiiupt, I have emended it. (1) The Fiist Things = Absolute Existence, etc. (2) Those
that shaie completely theiein = the angels and peifected human souls. (3) Those that shaie paitially theiein =
the lowei oideis of cieation which possess existence without life, oi life without consciousness, oi consciousness
without spiiituality (stones, plants, animals).
483 The beauty of a human being is moie complete than that of a hoise, and spiiitual beauty is moie complete
than meie physical beauty.
130
181
CHAPTER XII
Concerning "Holy of holies," "King of kings," "Lord of lords," "God of gods."
1. Foiasmuch as the things which needed to be said conceining this mattei have been
biought, I think, to a piopei ending, we must piaise God (whose Names aie infinite) as
Holy of holies" and King of kings," ieigning thiough Eteinity and unto the end of Eteinity
and beyond it, and as Loid of loids" and God of gods." And we must begin by saying what
we undeistand by Veiy Holiness," what by Royalty," Dominion," and Deity," and what
the Sciiptuie means by the ieduplication of the titles.
2. Now Holiness is that which we conceive as a fieedom fiom all defilement and a
complete and utteily untainted puiity. And Royalty is the powei to assign all limit, oidei,
law, and iank. And Dominion is not only the supeiioiity to infeiiois, but is also the entiiely
complete and univeisal possession of faii and good things and is a tiue and steadfast fiimness;
wheiefoie the name is deiived fiom a woid meaning validity" and woids meaning seveially
that which possesseth validity" and which exeiciseth" it.
486
And Deity is the Piovidence
182
which contemplates all things and which, in peifect Goodness, goes iound about all things
and holds them togethei and fills them with Itself and tianscends all things that enjoy the
blessings of Its piovidential caie.
3. These titles, then, must be given in an absolute sense to the All-Tianscendent Cause,
and we must add that It is a Tianscendent Holiness and Dominion, that It is a Supieme
Royalty and an altogethei Simple Deity.
487
Foi out of It theie hath, in one single act, come
foith collectively and been distiibuted thioughout the woild all the unmixed Peifection of
all untainted Puiity; all that Law and Oidei of the woild, which expels all dishaimony, in-
equality and dispiopoition, and bieaks foith into a smiling aspect of oideied Consistency
488
and Rightness, biinging into theii piopei place all things which aie held woithy to paiticipate
in It; all the peifect Possession of all faii qualities; and all that good Piovidence which con-
templates and maintains in being the objects of Its own activity, bounteously bestowing Itself
foi the Deification of those cieatuies which aie conveited unto It.
486 D. holds that God's dominion is an absolute quality in Himself apait fiom all iefeience to the cieation.
The Gieek woid, as he tiuly says, suppoits his view. The Latin Dominus, on the othei hand, implies the notion
of goveining, and so has a necessaiy iefeience to the cieation. Hence St. Augustine says that God could not ac-
tually be spoken of as Loid" befoie the woild oi the angels weie made. Eckhait says that befoie the cieation
God was not God, "Ei wai was Ei wai. D. holds that the title God" is ielative to us. But then he holds-and
heie explains-that the ioots of this ielationship exist timelessly in the undiffeientiated Godhead.
487 Tianscendent," Supieme," Simple," all expiess the same fact-that, being Supei-Essential, it is above
the multiplicity of the cieatuies.
488 Cf. Shelley, Adonais: That Light whose smile kindles the univeise."
Chapter 12. Concerning 'Holy of holies,' 'King of kings,' 'Lord of lords,' 'God of gods.'
131
Chapter 12. Concerning 'Holy of holies,' 'King of kings,' 'Lord of lords,'
4.. And since the Cieatoi of all things is biim-full with them all in one tianscendent
excess theieof. He is called Holy of Holies," etc., by viitue of His oveiflowing Causality and
excess of Tianscendence.
489
Which meaneth that just as things that have no substantial
Being
490
aie tianscended by things that have such Being, togethei with Sanctity, Divinity,
183
Dominion, oi Royalty; and just as the things that paiticipate in these Qualities aie tianscended
by the Veiy Qualities themselves-even so all things that have Being aie suipassed by Him
that is beyond them all, and all the Paiticipants and all the Veiy Qualities aie suipassed by
the Unpaiticipated
491
Cieatoi. And Holy Ones and Kings and Loids and Gods, in the lan-
guage of Sciiptuie, aie the highei Ranks in each Kind
492
thiough which the secondaiy Ranks
ieceiving of theii gifts fiom God, show foith the abundance of that Unity thus distiibuted
among them in theii own manifold qualities-which vaiious qualities the Fiist Ranks in
theii piovidential, godlike activity diaw togethei into the Unity of theii own being.
493
489 Holiness" especially contains the notion of Tianscendence.
490 i. e. The mateiial things (cf. Myst. Theol. I.). This is the oidinaiy meaning of the phiase in D.
491 Mateiial things aie suipassed by angels and peifected human souls, anal these by the Divine Giace which
they all shaie; and this, togethei with the whole cieation on which it is bestowed, is suipassed by God fiom
Whom it emanates. Foi while this emanation can be communicated the Godhead cannot. (Cf. Via Negativa.
See esp. Myst. Theol. I.).
492 i. e. The highei ianks whethei among angels oi among human souls. (Cf. I have said, 'Ye aie gods,'" hath
made us kings and piiests," etc.)
493 The highest ianks (i. e. the Seiaphim and the Contemplative Saints) have a diiect veision of God, Whom
they behold by an act of complete spiiitual contemplation. Otheis, leaining fiom them, behold God tiuly but
less diiectly-by knowing iathei than by Unknowing, by discuisive Meditation iathei than by intuitive Contem-
plation-oi aie called to seive Him chiefly in piactical woiks. Contemplation is a complete activity of the con-
centiated spiiit, unifying it within itself and uniting it to all kindied spiiits (foi tiue Mysticism is the same in
eveiy age and place). Meditation and piactical woiks aie paitial activities which imply a succession of diffeient
images in the same mind and a shifting vaiiety of diffeient mental types and inteiests in the same Community.
132
Chapter 12. Concerning 'Holy of holies,' 'King of kings,' 'Lord of lords,'
184
CHAPTER XIII
Concerning "Perfect and "One."
1. So much foi these titles. Now let us, if thou ait willing, pioceed to the most .impoitant
Title of all. Foi the Divine Science attiibutes all qualities to the Cieatoi of all things and at-
tiibutes them all togethei, and speaks of Him as One.
494
how such a Being is Peifect: not
only in the sense that It is Absolute Peifection and possesseth in Itself and fiom Itself dis-
tinctive Unifoimity of Its existence,
493
and that It is wholly peifect in Its whole Essence, but
also in the sense that, in Its tianscendence It is beyond Peifection; and that, while giving
definite foim oi limit to all that is indefinite, It is yet in Its simple Unity iaised above all
limitation, and is not contained oi compiehended by anything, but penetiates to all things
at once and beyond them in Its unfailing bounties and nevei-ending activities.
496
Moieovei,
494 Religion, in its highest foims, and Philosophy and Natuial Science postulate and seek some Unity behind
the woild. Hence Unity is iegaided as the ultimate attiibute. Thus Plotinus calls the Absolute The One." God
possesses all Attiibutes not sepaiately but indivisibly, as puie light contains all colouis.
493 Though the Godhead is the Supei-Essence of the cieatuies, yet on the othei hand It is distinct fiom them
because It tianscends them. (See next note.) This aspect of distinctness is manifested in the fact that the Eman-
ation of Absolute Life, etc., is distinct fiom the Peisons of the Tiinity, the aspect of identity is manifested in the
fact that They possess Absolute Life antecedently to the act of Emanation.
496 The Godhead is Peifect: (1) absolutely, and not by paiticipation in some othei essence; (2) tianscendently,
and not in such a mannei as to he diffeientiated fioth othei essences (foi on the supei-essential plane of the
Undiffeientiated Godhead theie is no othei essence than It). The Emanation of Absolute Life, etc., is peifect
absolutely, because, being a diiect oveiflow fiom the Godhead, it does not paiticipate in any othei Essence; but
not tianscendently, because it is diffeientiated fiom the paiticulai things which shaie it. That is why it does not
contain Exemplais. The cieatuies. possess theii tiue and undiffeientiated being not in the Emanation but in the
ultimate Godhead. The Emanation is, we may say, tianscendental, oi timeless, but not tianscencient, oi undif-
feientiated. D., by saying that in Its tianscendence ... It penetiates to all things at once and beyond them,"
teaches incidentally that the Godhead's Tianscendence and Immanence aie ultimately the same fact. They aie
two ways of looking at the one tiuth of Its Undiffeientiation. Since It is undiffeientiated the Godhead is beyond
oui individual being; but since It is undiffeientiated It is not ultimately othei than ouiselves. It is beyond oui
essence and is oui Supei-Essence. The theoiy of meie Tianscendence is Deism, that of meie Immanence is
Pantheism. Tiue ieligion demands both in one fact and as one fact. So God is both neai and fai (see the Bible
passim). He is fai because He is neaiei to us than oui own souls aie. Thou wast within, I was outside" (St. Au-
gustine). Hence tiue Intioveision is an act of self-tianscendence. We must lose ouiselves to find ouiselves.
Chapter 13. Concerning 'Perfect' and 'One.'
133
185
the Title Peifect" means that It cannot be incieased (being always Peifect) and cannot be
diminished, and that It contains all things befoiehand in Itself and oveiflows in one ceaseless,
identical,
497
abundant and inexhaustible supple, wheieby It peifects all peifect
498
things
and fills them with Its own Peifection.
2. And the title One" implies that It is all things undei the foim of Unity thiough the
Tianscendence of Its single Oneness,
499
and is the Cause of all things without depaiting
fiom that Unity. Foi theie is nothing in the woild without a shaie in the One; and, just as
all numbei paiticipates in unity (and we speak of one couple, one dozen, one half, one thiid,
oi one tenth) even so eveiything and each pait of eveiything paiticipates in the One, and
on the existence of the One all othei existences aie based, and the One Cause of all things
is not one of the many things in the woild,
300
but is befoie all Unity and Multiplicity and
gives to all Unity and Multiplicity theii definite bounds.
301
Foi no multiplicity can exist
186
except by some paiticipation in the One:
302
that which is many in its paits is one in its en-
tiiety; that which is many in its accidental qualities is one in its substance;
303
that which is
many in numbei oi faculties is one in species;
304
that which is many in its emanating
activities is one in its oiiginating essence.
303
Theie is naught in the woild without some
paiticipation in the One, the Which in Its all-embiacing Unity contains befoiehand all
things, and all things conjointly, combining even opposites undei the foim of oneness. And
without the One theie can be no Multiplicity; yet contiaiiwise the One can exist without
497 Identical because timeless.
498 Peifect," a teim taken fiom the Mysteiies expiessing the final state of the initiated.
499 See p. 184, n. 3.
300 Cf. X., 2.
301 The Godhead is not one individual, oi essence, among otheis, but is the Supei-Essence of them all. The
numbeis 1, 2, 3, 4, etc. = 1 x 1, 1 x 2, 1 x 3, 1 x 4, etc. Thus in the foim 1 x 1" the fiist figuie iepiesents the unity
undeilying all numbeis, the second figuie iepiesents unity as a paiticulai numbei among othei numbeis. The
fiist figuie may thus be taken as a symbol of the Godhead, the second figuie as a symbol of all cieated unity.
302 Though cieated unity diffeis (see last note) fiom Uncieated Unity, yet it is, so to speak, a ieflection
theieof, as essence is a ieflection of Supei-Essence. So each numbei, because based on an undeilying Unity, is
itself a unit, and the undeilying Unity of the Godhead shines thiough the woild in all the haimonies and systems
of things.
303 A tiee is one tiee though (1) made up of ioot, tiunk, bianches, leaves, etc., (2) gieen in the leaves and
biown in the tiunk, etc.
304 Theie aie many oaks with diffeient capacities of giowth and pioductiveness, yet all belong to the same
oak species"; and theie aie many species oi kinds of tiees (oaks, chestnuts, fiis, etc.) yet all belong to the genus
tiee."
303 A man's thoughts, desiies and acts of will all spiing fiom his one peisonality.
134
the Multiplicity just as the Unit exists befoie all multiplied Numbei.
306
And if all things be
conceived as being ultimately unified with each othei, then all things taken as a whole aie
One.
307
3. Moieovei, we must beai this in mind: that when we attiibute a common unity to
187
things we do so in accoidance with the pieconceived law of theii kind belonging to each
one, and that the One is thus the elementaiy basis of all things.
308
And if you take away the
One theie will iemain neithei whole noi pait noi anything else in the woild; foi all things
aie contained befoiehand and embiaced by the One as an Unity in Itself. Thus Sciiptuie
speaks of the whole Supieme Godhead as the Cause of all things by employing the title of
One"; and theie is One God Who is the Fathei and One Loid Jesus Chiist and One unchan-
ging Spiiit, thiough the tianscendent indivisibility of the entiie Divine Unity, wheiein all
things aie knit togethei in one and possess a supeinal Unity and supei-essentially pie-exist.
Hence all things aie iightly iefeiied and attiibuted unto It, since by It and in It and unto It
all things possess theii existence, co-oidination, peimanence, cohesion, fulfilment, and innate
tendency. And you will not find anything in .the woild but deiives fiom the One (which,
in a supei-essential sense, is the name of the whole Godhead) both its individual existence
and the piocess that peifects and pieseives it.
309
And we also must, in the powei of the Divine
Unity, tuin fiom the Many to the One and declaie the Unity of the whole single Godhead,
which is the One Cause of all things; befoie all distinctions of One and Many, Pait and
188
Whole, Definiteness and Indefiniteness,
310
Finitude and Infinitude;
311
giving definite shape
to all things that have Being, and to Being itself; the Cause of eveiything and of all togethei-a
Cause both co-existent and pie-existent and tianscendent, and all these things at once; yea,
beyond existent Unity itself, and giving definite shape to existent Unity itself. Foi Unity, as
found in the cieatuies, is numeiical; and numbei paiticipates in Essence: but the Supei-
306 Just as in the seiies 1 x 2, 1 x 3, 1 x 4, etc., if you destioy the 2, 3, 4, etc., the 1 iemains, so if the univeise
disappeaied the Godhead would still iemain. (Cf. Emily Biont: Eveiy existence would exist in Thee.")
307 All things possess the same Supei-Essence, and that is why they aie connected togethei in this woild.
308 Cf. p. 186, n. 3.
309 i. e. Both its unity in space and its unity in time.
310 A thing is definite when we can say of it: This is not that," indefinite when it is doubtful whethei this is,
oi is not, that. The Godhead not being a paiticulai thing, belongs to a iegion wheie theie is no this" oi that."
So we cannot say, on that ultimate plane eithei: This is not that," oi, It is doubtful whethei this is that." Hence
the mystical act of Unknowing. Knowledge distinguishes things, Unknowing passes beyond this act yet without
confusion. In Unknowing the distinction between Thinkei and Object of Thought is (fiom one point of view)
gone; and yet the psychical state is a luminously cleai one. Oui peisonalities in theii Supei-Essence aie meiged
yet unconfused.
311 See p. 162 on Gieatness" and Smallness."
135
Essential Unity gives definite shape to existent unity and to eveiy numbei, and is Itself the
Beginning, the Cause, the Numeiical Piinciple and the Law of Unity, numbei and eveiy
cieatuie. And hence, when we speak of the All-Tianscendent Godhead as an Unity and a
Tiinity, It is not an Unity oi a Tiinity such as can be known by us oi any othei cieatuie,
though to expiess the tiuth of Its uttei Self-Union and Its Divine Fecundity we apply the
titles of Tiinity" and Unity" to That Which is beyond all titles, expiessing undei the foim
of Being That Which is beyond Being.
312
But no Unity oi Tiinity oi Numbei oi Oneness
oi Fecundity oi any othei thing that eithei is a cieatuie oi can be known to any cieatuie, is
able to uttei the mysteiy, beyond all mind and ieason, of that Tianscendent Godhead which
supei-essentially suipasses all things. It hath no name, noi can It be giasped by the ieason;
It dwells in a iegion beyond us, wheie oui feet cannot tiead. Even the title of Goodness"
we do not asciibe to It because we think such a name suitable; but desiiing to fiame some
conception and language about this Its ineffable Natuie, we conseciate as piimaiily belonging
to It the Name we most ieveie. And in this too we shall be in agieement with the Sacied
189
Wiiteis; neveitheless the actual tiuth must still be fai beyond us. Hence we have given oui
piefeience to the Negative method, because this lifts the soul above all things cognate with
its finite natuie, and, guiding it onwaid thiough all the conceptions of God's Being which
aie tianscended by that Being exceeding all Name, Reason, and Knowledge, ieaches beyond
the faithest limits of the woild and theie joins us unto God Himself, in so fai as the powei
of union with Him is possessed even by us men.
4. These Intelligible Names we have collected and endeavouied to expound, though
falling shoit not only of the actual meaning theieof (foi such a failuie even angels would be
foiced to confess), noi yet meiely of such utteiance as angels would have given conceining
them (foi the gieatest of those among us who touch these themes aie fai infeiioi to the
lowest of the angels); noi yet do we meiely fall behind the teaching of the Sacied Wiiteis
theieon oi of the Ascetics, theii fellow-labouieis, but we fall utteily and miseiably behind
oui own compeeis. And hence if oui woids aie tiue and we have ieally, so fai as in us lies,
attained some intellectual giasp of the iight way to explain the Names of God, the thanks
aie due to Him Who is the Cieatoi of all things; gianting fiist the faculty of speech and then
the powei to use it well. And if any Synonym hath been passed ovei we must supply and
inteipiet that also by the same methods. And if this tieatment is wiong oi impeifect, and
we have eiied fiom the Tiuth eithei wholly oi in pait, I beg thy loving-kindness to coiiect
my unwilling ignoiance, to satisfy with aigument my desiie foi knowledge, to help my in-
sufficient stiength and heal my involuntaiy feebleness; and that, obtaining thy stoies paitly
fiom thyself and paitly fiom otheis and wholly fiom the Good, thou wilt also pass them on
312 Numeiical unity is a numbei among othei numbeis and so implies diffeientiation. The Godhead is undif-
feientiated.
136
190
to us. And I piay thee be not weaiy in this kindness to a fiiend, foi thou seest that we have
not kept to ouiselves any of the Hieiaichic Utteiances which have been handed down to
us, but have impaited them without adulteiation both to youiselves and to othei holy men,
and will continue so to do as long as we have the powei to speak and you to heai. So will
we do no despite unto the tiadition, unless stiength fail us foi the peiception oi the utteiance
of these Tiuths. But be these matteis as God wills
313
that we should do oi speak.
And be this now the end of oui tieatise conceining the Intelligible Names of God. Now
will I pioceed, God helping me, to the Symbolical Divinity.
313 This anthiopomoiphic phiase is not inconsistent with the conceptions D. has been expounding; because
he iegaids the limits of individual human capacities, etc., as timelessly existent in the Supei-Essence. By a nat-
uial, though inadequate, metaphoi, the limits of the iesulting activities aie spoken of as due to God's Will.
137
THE MYSTICAL THEOLOGY
CHAPTER I
Vheat is the Divine Gloom.
Tiinty, which exceedeth all Being, Deity, and Goodness!
314
Thou that instiucteth
Chiistians in Thy heavenly wisdom! Guide us to that topmost height of mystic loie
313
which
exceedeth light and moie than exceedeth knowledge, wheie the simple, absolute, and un-
changeable mysteiies of heavenly Tiuth lie hidden in the dazzling obscuiity of the seciet
Silence, outshining all biilliance with the intensity of theii daikness, and suichaiging oui
blinded intellects with the utteily impalpable and invisible faiiness of gloiies which exceed
all beauty! Such be my piayei; and thee, deai Timothy, I counsel that, in the eainest exeicise
of mystic contemplation, thou leave the senses and the activities of the intellect and all things
that the senses oi the intellect can peiceive, and all things in this woild of nothingness, oi
in that woild of being, and that, thine undeistanding being laid to iest,
316
thou stiain (so
fai as thou mayest) towaids an union with Him whom neithei being noi undeistanding
192
can contain. Foi, by the unceasing and absolute ienunciation of thyself and all things, thou
shalt in puieness cast all things aside, and be ieleased fiom all, and so shalt be led upwaids
to the Ray of that divine Daikness which exceedeth all existence.
317
These things thou must not disclose to any of the uninitiated, by whom I mean those
who cling to the objects of human thought, and imagine theie is no supei-essential ieality
beyond; and fancy that they know by human undeistanding Him that has made Daikness
His seciet place.
318
And, if the Divine Initiation is beyond such men as these, what can be
said of otheis yet moie incapable theieof, who desciibe the Tianscendent Cause of all things
by qualities diawn fiom the lowest oidei of being, while they deny that it is in any way su-
peiioi to the vaiious ungodly delusions which they fondly invent in ignoiance of this tiuth:
319
314 Lit. Supei-Essential, Supia-Divine, Supei-Excellent."
313 Lit. Oiacles" i. e. to the most exalted and mystical teaching of Holy Sciiptuie.
316 Gk. eyvuotu iefeis to a tianscendent oi spiiitual Unknowing (as disinguished fiom meie ignoiance).
317 The Supei-Essential Ray of Divine Daikness."
318 i. e. Philosopheis and unmystical theologians.
319 i. e. Those who accept populai theology." The fiist stage of theistic Religion is anthiopomoiphic, and
God is thought of (like Jehovah) as a magnified man of changing moods. Populai ieligion seldom iises above
this level, and even gifted theologians often sink to it. But it is, D. tells us, the lowest stage. Then comes a meta-
physical stage. God is now thought of as a timeless Being and theiefoie changeless, but the conception of a
magnified man has been iefined iathei than abolished. The ultimate tiuth about God and oui ielation to Him
is held to be that He is a Peison" and that He has made" the woild. (This attitude is seen at its woist in Unit-
aiian theology. Biadley's ciiticisms on Lotze show how this fails on the intellectual side. The Doctiine of the
Tiinity, by insisting on an unsolved Mysteiy in God, pievents Oithodox theology fiom iesting peimanently in
The Mystical Theology
138
That while it possesses all the positive attiibutes of the univeise (being the univeisal Cause),
193
yet in a stiictei sense It does not possess them, since It tianscends them all, wheiefoie theie
is no contiadiction between affiiming and denying that It has them inasmuch as It piecedes
and suipasses all depiivation, being beyond all positive and negative distinctions:
320
Such at least is the teaching of the blessed Baitholomew.
321
Foi he says that the subject-
mattei of the Divine Science is vast and yet minute, and that the Gospel combines in itself
both width and stiaitness. Methinks he has shown by these his woids how maivellously he
has undeistood that the Good Cause of all things is eloquent yet speaks few woids, oi iathei
none; possessing neithei speech noi undeistanding because it exceedeth all things in a supei-
essential mannei, and is ievealed in Its naked tiuth to those alone who pass iight thiough
the opposition of faii and foul,
322
and pass beyond the topmost altitudes of the holy ascent
and leave behind them all divine enlightenment and voices and heavenly utteiances and
plunge into the Daikness wheie tiuly dwells, as saith the Sciiptuie, that One Which is beyond
all things. Foi not without ieason
323
is the blessed Moses bidden fiist to undeigo puiification
himself and then to sepaiate himself fiom those who have not undeigone it; and aftei all
puiification heais the many-voiced tiumpets and sees many lights flash foith with puie and
diveise-stieaming iays, and then stands sepaiate fiom the multitudes and with the chosen
piiests piesses foiwaid to the topmost pinnacle of the Divine Ascent. Neveitheless he meets
194
not with God Himself, yet he beholds-not Him indeed (foi He is invisible)-but the place
wheiein He dwells. And this I take to signify that the divinest and the highest of the things
peiceived by the eyes of the body oi the mind aie but the symbolic language of things sub-
oidinate to Him who Himself tianscendeth them all. Thiough these things His incompie-
hensible piesence is shown walking upon those heights of His holy places which aie peiceived
by the mind; and then It bieaks foith, even fiom the things that aie beheld and fiom those
that behold them, and plunges the tiue initiate unto the Daikness of Unknowing wheiein
he ienounces all the appiehensions of his undeistanding and is enwiapped in that which is
this moiass, though it often has one foot theie.) And non-Chiistian thinkeis, in opposition to this conception,
iegaid the ultimate Reality as impeisonal, which is a woise eiioi still. We must get beyond oui paitial conceptions
of peisonality," impeisonality," etc. They aie useful and necessaiy up to a point, but the Tiuth lies beyond
them and is to be appiehended to a supeinatuial mannei by what latei wiiteis call infused" contemplation.
The sum of the whole mattei is that God is incompiehensible.
320 On Via Affiimativa and Via Negativa, vide Inti., p. 26 f.
321 No wiitings of St. Baitholomew aie extant. Possibly D. s inventing, though not necessaiily.
322 Vide Inti., p. 21. Beyond Good and Evil" (though not in Nietzsche's sense). When evil disappeais Good
ceases to be an opposition to it, and so Good attains a new condition.
323 In the following passage we get the thiee stages tabulated by latei Mystical Theology: (1) Puigation, (2)
Illumination, (3) Union.
139
wholly intangible and invisible, belonging wholly to Him that is beyond all things and to
none else (whethei himself oi anothei), and being thiough the passive stillness of all his
ieasoning poweis united by his highest faculty to Him that is wholly Unknowable, of whom
thus by a iejection of all knowledge he possesses a knowledge that exceeds his undeistanding.
CHAPTER II
How it is necessary to be united with and render praise to Him Vho is the cause of all
and above all.
Unto this Daikness which is beyond Light we piay that we may come, and may attain
unto vision thiough the loss of sight and knowledge, and that in ceasing thus to see oi to
know we may leain to know that which is beyond all peiception and undeistanding (foi
this emptying of oui faculties is tiue sight and knowledge),
324
and that we may offei Him
195
that tianscends all things the piaises of a tianscendent hymnody, which we shall do by
denying oi iemoving all things that aie-like as men who, caiving a statue out of maible,
iemove all the impediments that hindei the cleai peiceptive of the latent image and by this
meie iemoval display the hidden statue itself in its hidden beauty.
323
; Now we must wholly
distinguish this negative method fiom that of positive statements. Foi when we weie making
positive statements
326
we began with the most univeisal statements, and then thiough in-
324 See Inti., p. 27, on the ecstasy. D.'s teiminology is always exact though exubeiant-oi iathei exubeiant
because exact. And, since if the mind, in thinking of any paiticulai thing, gives itself to that thing and so belongs
to it, in utteily ceasing to belong to itself it ceases to have any self-consciousness and possesses a God-conscious-
ness instead. This would be a meie meiging of the peisonality, but that the Godhead, accoiding to D., is of such
a paiadoxical natuie as to contain all the cieatuies fused and yet distinct (Inti , p. 28) so the self is meiged on
one side of its being and distinct on the othei. If I lose myself in God, still it will always be I" that shall lose
myself Theie.
323 This simile shows that the Via Negativa is, in the tiuest sense, positive. Oui mattei-moulded foims" of
thought aie the ieally negative things. (Cf. Beigson.) A sculptoi would not accept a block of ice in place of a
block of maible (foi ice will not caive into a statue); and yet the block of maible is not, as such, a statue. So, too,
the Chiistian will not accept an impeisonal God instead of a peisonal God (foi an impeisonal Being cannot be
loved), and yet a peisonal" God is not, as such, the Object of the Mystical quest. The conception of Peisonality
enshiines, but is not, the Ultimate Reality. If D. weie open to the chaige of puie negativity so often biought
against him, he would have wanted to destioy his block of maible instead of caiving it.
326 Namely, in the Divine Names and in the Outlines; see Chap. III.
140
196
teimediate teims we came at last to paiticulai titles,
327
but now ascending upwaids fiom
paiticulai to univeisal conceptions we stiip off all qualities
328
in oidei that we may attain
a naked knowledge of that Unknowing which in all existent things is enwiapped by all objects
of knowledge,
329
and that we may begin to see that supei-essential Daikness which is hidden
by all the light that is in existent things.
CHAPTER III
Vhat are the affirmative expressions respecting God, and what are the negative.
Now I have in my Outlines of Divinity set foith those conceptions which aie most
piopei to the affiimative method, and have shown in what sense God's holy natuie is called
single and in what sense tiinal, what is the natuie of the Fatheihood and Sonship which we
attiibute unto It; what is meant by the aiticles of faith conceining the Spiiit; how fiom the
immateiial and indivisible Good the inteiioi iays of Its goodness have theii being and iemain
immovably in that state of iest which both within theii Oiigin and within themselves is co-
197
eteinal with the act by which they spiing fiom It;
330
in what mannei Jesus being above all
327 In the Divine Names D. begins with the notion of Goodness (which he holds to be possessed by all things)
and pioceeds thence to Existence (which is not possessed by things that aie eithei destioyed oi yet unmade),
and thence to Wisdom (which is not possessed eithei by unconscious oi iiiational foims of Life), and thence
to qualities (such as Righteousness, Salvation, Omnipotence) oi combinations of opposite qualities (such as
Gieatness and Smallness) which aie not, 'in the full sense, applicable to any cieatuie as such. Thus by adding
quality to quality (Existence" to Goodness," Life" to Existence," Wisdom" to Life," Salvation," etc., to
Wisdom") he ieaches the conception of God. But he constantly ieminds us in the Divine Names that these
qualities apply adequately only to the manifested Godhead which, in Its ultimate Natuie, tianscends them.
328 The piocess fiom the univeisal to the paiticulai is the piocess of actual development (existence befoie
life, and life befoie iationality, etc.); the conveise is the natuial piocess of thought, which seeks to iefei things
to theii univeisal laws of species, etc. (Divine Names, V. 3). But this lattei piocess is not in itself the Via Negativa,
but only the giound plan of it, diffeiing fiom it as a giound plan of a mountain path diffeis fiom a jouiney up
the actual path itself. The piocess of developing life complicates, but eniiches, the woild; that of thought simplifies,
but evisceiates it. Contemplation, being an act of the human spiiit, is a piocess of developing life, and yet follows
the diiection of thought. Hence it eniiches and simplifies at the same time.
329 Cf. p. 194, n. 1.
330 The Good = (1) the Undiffeientiated Godhead, and hence, in Manifestion, (2) God the Fathei as the Fount
of Godhead to the othei Peisons. The Rays = God the Son and God the Holy Ghost, who, as manifested Diffei-
entiations, eteinally pioceed fiom the Fathei. The sepaiate being of the Thiee Peisons exists on the plane of
Manifestation (cf. St. Augustine, who says: They exist secundum relativum and not secundum essentiam).
141
essence
331
has stooped to an essential state in which all the tiuths of human natuie meet;
and all the othei ievelations of Sciiptuie wheieof my Outlines of Divinity tieat. And in the
book of the Divine âmes I have consideied the meaning as conceining God of the titles
Good, Existent, Life, Wisdom, Powei and of the othei titles which the undeistanding fiames,
and in my Symbolic Divinity I have consideied what aie the metaphoiical titles diawn fiom
the woild of sense and applied to the natuie of God; what aie the mental oi mateiial images
we foim of God oi the functions and instiuments of activity we attiibute to Him; what aie
the places wheie He dwells and the iobes He is adoined with; what is meant by God's angei,
giief, and indignation, oi the divine inebiiation and wiath; what is meant by God's oath
and His malediction, by His slumbei and awaking, and all the othei inspiied imageiy of al-
legoiic symbolism. And I doubt not that you have also obseived how fai moie copious aie
the last teims than the fiist foi the doctiines of God's Natuie and the exposition of His
198
Names could not but be biiefei than the Symbolic Divinity.
332
Foi the moie that we soai
upwaids the moie oui language becomes iestiicted to the compass of puiely intellectual
conceptions, even as in the piesent instance plunging into the Daikness which is above the
intellect we shall find ouiselves ieduced not meiely to bievity of speech but even to absolute
dumbness both of speech and thought. Now in the foimei tieatises the couise of the aigu-
ment, as it came down fiom the highest to the lowest categoiies, embiaced an evei-widening
numbei of conceptions which incieased at each stage of the descent, but in the piesent
tieatise it mounts upwaids fiom below towaids the categoiy of tianscendence, and in pio-
poition to its ascent it contiacts its teiminology, and when the whole ascent is passed it will
be totally dumb, being at last wholly united with Him Whom woids cannot desciibe.
333
But why is it, you will ask, that aftei beginning fiom the highest categoiy when one method
was affiimative we begin fiom the lowest categoiy wheie it is negative:
334
Because, when
[Augustine sacs non secundum substantiam. The tianslatoi quotes it coiiectly in his intioduction, p. 10.-Ed.]
But this plane is eteinal. They wholly inteipenetiate, and the state of iest is co-eteinal with the Act of Theii
Piocession, because They possess eteinal iepose and eteinal motion.
331 This is a case of communicatio idiomatum (cf. the title Mothei of God" applied to the Blessed Viigin
Maiy). The Godhead of oui Loid is Supei-Essential, not His Manhood.
332 The Symbolical Divinity was an attempt to spiiitualize populai" theology, the Divine Names sought to
spiiitualize philosophical theology, the piesent tieatise is a diiect essay to Spiiitual Theology.
333 At the last stage but one the mind beholds an Object to which all teims of thought aie inadequate. Then,
at the last stage, even the distinction between Subject and Object disappeais, and the mind itself is That Which
it contemplates. Thought itself is tianscended, and the whole Object-iealm vanishes. One Subject now knows
itself as the pait and knows itself as the Whole.
334 In the Divine Names the oidei of pioceduie was: Goodness, Existence, Life, etc. Now it passes fiom sense-
peiception to thought.
142
affiiming, the existence of that which tianscends all affiimation, we weie obliged to stait
fiom that which is most akin to It, and then to make the affiimation on which the iest de-
pended; but when puisuing the negative method, to ieach that which is beyond all negation,
we must stait by applying oui negations to those qualities which diffei most fiom the ultimate
goal. Suiely it is tiuei to affiim that God is life and goodness than that He is aii oi stone,
199
and tiuei to deny that diunkenness oi fuiy can be attiibuted to Him than to deny that the
may apply to Him the categoiies of human thought.
333
CHAPTER IV
That He Vho is the Pre-eminent Cause of everything sensibly perceived is not Himself
any one of the things sensibly perceived.
We theiefoie maintain
336
that the univeisal Cause tianscending all things is neithei
impeisonal noi lifeless, noi iiiational noi without undeistanding: in shoit, that It is not a
mateiial body, and theiefoie does not possess outwaid shape oi intelligible foim, oi quality,
oi quantity, oi solid weight; noi has It any local existence which can be peiceived by sight
oi touch; noi has It the powei of peiceiving oi being peiceived; noi does It suffei any vexation
oi disoidei thiough the distuibance of eaithly passions, oi any feebleness thiough the
tyianny of mateiial chances, oi any want of light; noi any change, oi decay, oi division, oi
depiivation, oi ebb and flow, oi anything else which the senses can peiceive. None of these
things can be eithei identified with it oi attiibuted unto It.
200
CHAPTER V
That He Vho is the Pre-eminent Cause of everything intelligibly perceived is not Himself
any one of the things intelligibly perceived.
Once moie, ascending yet highei we maintain
337
that It is not soul, oi mind, oi endowed
with the faculty of imagination, conjectuie, ieason, oi undeistanding; noi is It any act of
ieason oi undeistanding; noi can It be desciibed by the ieason oi peiceived by the undei-
standing, since It is not numbei, oi oidei, oi gieatness, oi littleness, oi equality, oi inequality,
and since It is not immovable noi in motion, oi at iest, and has no powei, and is not powei
oi light, and does not live, and is not life; noi is It peisonal essence, oi eteinity, oi time; noi
can It be giasped by the undeistanding since It is not knowledge oi tiuth; noi is It kingship
oi wisdom; noi is It one, noi is It unity, noi is It Godhead
338
oi Goodness; noi is It a Spiiit,
333 This shows that the Via Negativa is not puiely negative.
336 Being about to explain, in these two last chapteis, that no mateiial oi mental qualities aie piesent in the
Godhead, D. safeguaids the position against puie negativity by explaining that they aie not absent eithei. The
iest of this chaptei deals with the qualities (1) of inanimate mattei; (2 ) of mateiial life.
337 It is not (1) a Thinking Subject; noi (2) an Act oi Faculty of Thought; noi (3) an Object of Thought.
338 Divine Names, II. 7. Godhead is iegaided as the piopeity of Deified men, and so belongs to ielativity.
143
as we undeistand the teim, since It is not Sonship oi Fatheihood; noi is It any othei thing
such as we oi any othei being can have knowledge of; noi does It belong to the categoiy of
non-existence oi to that of existence; noi do existent beings know It as it actually is, noi
does It know them as they actually aie;
339
noi can the ieason attain to It to name It oi to
201
know It; noi is it daikness, noi is It light, oi eiioi, oi tiuth;
340
noi can any affiimation oi
negation
341
apply to it; foi while applying affiimations oi negations to those oideis of being
that come next to It, we apply not unto It eithei affiimation oi negation, inasmuch as It
tianscends all affiimation by being the peifect and unique Cause of all things, and tianscends
all negation by the pie-eminence of Its simple and absolute natuie-fiee fiom eveiy limitation
and beyond them all.
342
339 It knows only Itself, and theie knows all things in theii Supei-Essence-sub specie aeteinitatis.
340 Tiuth is an Object of Thought. Theiefoie, being beyond objectivity, the ultimate Reality is not Tiuth. But
still less is It Eiioi.
341 Cf. p. 199, n. 2.
342 It is (1) iichei than all conciete foims of positive existence; (2) moie simple than the baiest abstiaction.
(Cf. p. 196, n. i.)
144
202
THE INFLUENCE OF DIONYSIUS IN RELIGIOUS HISTORY
By W. J. Spaiiow-Simpson
THE significance of the teaching of Dionysius cannot be appieciated aiight without
tiacing to some extent his influence on subsequent ieligious thought.
Foui woiks of the Aieopagite suivive. They aie: Conceining the Heavenly Hieiaichy;
Conceining the Ecclesiastical Hieiaichy; Conceining the Divine Names; and, Conceining
Mystical Theology.
Commentaiies upon them began to be wiitten at an eaily date. The fiist gieat piopag-
atoi of Dionysian theoiies was the veiy able monk and confessoi Maximus. Maximus, who
died in the yeai 662, wiote notes on all foui tieatises. These still suivive, and may be found
in the collected edition of the woiks of the Aieopagite. Maximus is iemaikably cleai and
acute, and contiibuted not a little to extend his Mastei's ieputation. He was gifted with a
simplicity of style which the Aieopagite by no means shaied, and expounded with gieat
cleainess the difficult passages of Dionysius. And ceitainly the ieadei will not deny that
those passages aie by no means few.
Alieady, befoie Maximus's labouis, the teaching of the Aieopagite was known in the
203
West, and was appealed to by Pope Maitin the Fiist in the Lateian Council of 649. Maitin
complained that the doctiine of the Aieopagite was being misiepiesented. Dionysius was
being ciedited with asciibing to Chiist one divino-human activity (una operatio deivirilis),
wheieas what Dionysius had wiitten was a new divino-human activity (ieivq Oceviiq
cvcycie, nova operatio deivirilis).
343
Apait fiom the theological contioveisy implied in the
iespective phiases, it is iemaikable to find what authoiity is alieady asciibed to its teaching.
But it is ieally quite impossible to appieciate the histoiic place of Dionysius without a
study of John Scotus Eiigena. It was Eiigena who in ieality populaiized Dionysius foi Latin
Chiistendom. The Gieek wiitings of the Aieopagite had been sent to the Gallican Chuich
by Pope Paul in 737, and iemained foi neaily a centuiy uniead in the Abbey of St. Denis.
Then Eiigena, at the iequest of Chailes the Bald, undeitook to tianslate them into Latin.
This he accomplished foi all the foui piincipal woiks.
But Eiigena did vastly moie than meiely act as tianslatoi. He incoipoiated the piinciples
of the Aieopagite in his celebiated tieatise De Divisione âtur, in which his own speculative
system is contained, and which may be said to be as iepiesentative of his mind as the De
Principiis is foi Oiigen oi the Summa foi St. Thomas.
Eiigena bases his whole conception of Deity on the teaching of Dionysius. The tieatise
is thiown into the foim of a discussion between the Mastei and a Disciple. It is an attempt
to ieconcile Theology with Philosophy Aftei the Mastei has insisted on the ineffable and
incompiehensible natuie of the Divine essence, the Disciple inquiies how this pioposition
343 See Hefele, Conciliengeschichte, Bd. III. 196.
The Influence of Dionysius in Religious History
145
204
is to be ieconciled with the teaching of the Theologians on the Unity and Tiinity of God.
The incompiehensibility of the Fiist Cause appeais self-evident. And if Deity is incompie-
hensible, definition is impossible. Foi that which cannot be undeistood ceitainly cannot be
defined. We can only say that God is; but what He is we aie unable to affiim. But if this is
so, why have the Theologians ventuied to piedicate Unity and Tiinity as chaiacteiistics of
the ultimate ieality:
To the Disciple's ciiticism the Mastei ieplies by appealing to the teaching of the Aieo-
pagite. Did not the Aieopagite affiim that no woids, no names, no expiession whatevei,
can expiess the supieme and causal essence of all things: That authoiity is quoted as decisive.
Neithei the Unity noi the Tiinity in God is such that the cleaiest human intellect is able
to conceive it. Why, then, have the Theologians taught these doctiines:
Eiigena's answei is: In oidei to piovide ieligious people with some definite object foi
contemplation and instiuction.
Foi this puipose the faithful aie bidden to believe in theii heait and confess with theii
lips that God is good, and that He exists in one Divine essence and thiee peisons.
And this teaching of the Theologians is, in the Mastei's opinion, not without philosoph-
ical justification.
Foi contemplating the ineffable cause of all things, the Theologians speak of the Unity.
Then again, contemplating this Divine Unity as extended into multiplicity, they affiim
the Tiinity. And the Tiinity is the unbegotten, the begotten, and the pioceeding.
The Mastei goes on to explain the distinction between affiimative and negative theology.
205
Negative theology denies that ceitain things can be piedicated of Deity. Affiimative theology
asseits piopositions which can be piedicated. This again is altogethei based on the teaching
of Dionysius.
Heie the Disciple desiies to be infoimed why it is that the Aieopagite consideis such
piedicates as goodness, tiuth, justice, wisdom, which appeai to be not only Divine but the
divinest of attiibutes, as meiely figuiatively tiansfeiied fiom man to Deity.
The Mastei ieplies that no chaiacteiistics applicable to the finite and limited can be
stiictly applicable to the infinite and eteinal.
Thus, accoiding to Eiigena, following closely on the piinciples of the Aieopagite, al-
though goodness is piedicated of Deity, yet stiictly speaking He is not goodness, but plus
quam bonitas oi super bonus. Similaily, Deity is not Tiuth, but plus quam Veritas, and super
eternitas, and plus quam Sapiens.
Hence affiimation and negation aie alike peimissible in iefeience to Deity.
If you affiim that Deity is supei-essential, what is it piecisely that is meant by the use
of supei": You do not in ieality affiim what God is, but simply that He is moie than those
things which exist. But wheie the diffeience consists you do not define.
146
But the ieason why Eiigena asseits the stiict inapplicability of the teim essential to Deity
is, that he inteipiets the teim in a way which involves spacial ielations. Essence in all things
that exist is local and tempoial. But Deity is neithei.
Deity as Eiigena contemplates it is simply the Infinite and the Absolute; and of that,
nothing whatevei can be stiictly piedicated beyond the fact that it is. The Cause of all things
can only be known to exist, but by no infeience fiom the cieatuie can we undeistand what
it is.
206
Since, then, Eiigena has postulated the philosophic Absolute, the immutable, impassible
Fiist Cause, as the Deity, he is compelled to go on to deny that Deity can be subject to affec-
tion oi capable of love.
This conclusion the Disciple confesses to be piofoundly staitling. It appeais to contiadict
the whole authoiity both of the Sciiptuies and of the Fatheis. At the same time it is all logical
enough, gianting the Fiist Cause to be incapable of action oi passion, which seems to involve
the Immutable in change: a contiadiction of the veiy idea of Deity. It is all logical enough.
But what about the Sciiptuies, which teach the contiaiy: And what of the simple believeis,
who will be hoiiified if they heai such piopositions:
The Mastei assuies the Disciple that theie is no need to be alaimed. Foi he is now em-
ploying the method of speculative ieason, not the method of authoiity. He agiees with Di-
onysius, foi Dionysius had said as much, that the authoiity of the Sciiptuie is in all things
to be submitted to. But Sciiptuie does not give us teims adequate to the iepiesentation of
Deity. It fuinishes us with ceitain symbols and signs, by condescension to oui infiimities.
Dionysius is again appealed to in confiimation of this.
It is cuiious to notice how, while piofessedly engaged in the method of speculative in-
quiiy, Eiigena falls back on the authoiity of Dionysius: a veiy significant pioof of the value
which he asciibed to the Aieopagite.
So, then, at last the conclusion is ieached that, stiictly speaking, nothing whatevei can
be piedicated conceining Deity, seeing that He suipasses all undeistanding, and is moie
tiuly known by oui nescience, ignoiance conceining Him being the tiuest wisdom, and oui
negations moie coiiect than oui affiimations. Foi whatevei you deny conceining Him you
207
deny coiiectly, wheieas the same cannot be said of what you may affiim.
Neveitheless; subject to this piemise of acknowledged inadequacy, qualities may be
iightly asciibed to Deity by way of symbolical iepiesentation.
Hence, it is coiiect to maintain that tiue authoiity does not contiadict iight ieason, noi
iight ieason tiue authoiity. Both spiing fiom one souice, and that one souice is Divine.
Thus by a metaphoi God may be desciibed as Love, although, as a mattei of fact, He
tianscends it.
It has been a mattei of fiequent dispute whethei the system of Eiigena is fundamentally
Chiistian oi Pantheistic. In the. caieful study of Eiigena by Theodoi Chiistlieb it is main-
147
tained that, while sentences may be quoted on eithei side, and the authoi vacillates, now
towaids Theism, now in a Pantheistic diiection, his attempted ieconciliation of Theology
with Philosophy ends in the supiemacy of the lattei, and in the abolition of the essential
chaiacteiistics of the Chiistian Revelation.
That the Deity cannot be compiehended by human intelligence is a commonplace of
all the gieat eaily theologians of the Chuich. It can be iichly illustiated fiom the theological
oiations of St. Giegoiy Nazianzen, oi the wiitings of St. Augustine and St. Hilaiy upon the
Holy Tiinity. But then these theologians also maintained with equal conviction that God
could be appiehended by man. Foi this balancing consideiation Eiigena finds no place.
God is foi Eiigena that of which no distinctive quality can be piedicated. God is in effect
the Absolute.
But then what becomes of God's self-consciousness: In Chiistlieb's opinion Eiigena's
conception of the Deity piecludes any fiim hold on the Divine self-consciousness. Self-
208
consciousness involves a whole content of ideas, a woild of thought, which contiadicts the
absolute self-identity asciibed by Eiigena to the Deity.
In his anxiety to explain the tianscendent excellence of Deity, the supeilative exaltation
above the contingent and the mutable, Eiigena seems in the opinion of his ciitics to have
ovei-ieached the tiuth and ieduced the Deity to an abstiaction in which peifection and
nothingness aie identified.
Eiigena's conclusion iaises in ieality the all impoitant pioblem so constantly debated
in modein thought, whethei the Absolute is the piopei conception of Deity, and whethei
the God of ieligion and of fact is not iathei spiiit, self-consciousness, and peifect peisonality.
The teaching of Dionysius in the exposition of Eiigena became scaicely distinguishable
fiom Pantheism.
Chiistlieb finds a similai unsatisfactoiiness in Eiigena's theoiy of the Tiinity.
It will be iemembeied that, aftei maintaining as his fundamental position that Deity
cannot be defined because it cannot be compiehended, and that nothing whatevei can be
affiimed conceining it beyond the fact of its being, Eiigena went on to justify the theologians
of the Chuich in affiiming the Unity and the Tiinity. But the giounds on which Eiigena
justified the authoiities of the Chuich aie significant. He did not justify the doctiine on the
giound that it was a tiuth ievealed, oi because it was an infeience demanded of the fact and
claim of Chiist. It is iemaikable how obscuie a place Chiist occupies in Eiigena's conception
of Deity. The giound on which Eiigena would justify the doctiine is that Unity and Multi-
plicity may faiily be asciibed to the Fiist Cause of all things, because Deity can be iegaided
in its simplicity as one and then iegaided as extended into multiplicity.
148
209
But it is impossible to avoid the ciiticism that this asciiption of Unity and Multiplicity
to Deity is not the same thing as the doctiine of the Tiinity. Noi is it obvious why Tiinity
should be substituted foi Multiplicity. Moieovei, this Multiplicity exists subjectively in the
human mind iathei than in the being of Deity: since it is expiessly foibidden by the authoi's
fundamental piinciple to say anything whatevei conceining Deity beyond the fact that it
exists. And fuithei still, on the authoi's piinciples neithei Unity noi Multiplicity can be
stiictly asciibed to Deity. Both must be meiged in something else which is neithei the one
noi yet the othei, and which escapes all possible definition.
It is scaicely wondeiful, theiefoie, that Chiistlieb should conclude that on Eiigena's
piinciples the doctiine of the Tiinity is not ieally tenable. Eiigena ceitainly endeavouis to
appioximate to the Chuich's Tiadition, and to give it an intellectual justification. But in
spite of these endeavouis he is unable to maintain any ieal distinctions in his Tiinity. They
have no actual substantial existence whatevei. They aie meie names and not iealities. Theie
may be appeaiances. But in its essential being, accoiding to Eiigena, Deity is neithei unity
noi tiinity, but an incompiehensible somewhat which tianscends them both. Foi Eiigena
both the Unitaiian and the Tiinitaiian iepiesentations of God aie alike pioducts of subjective
human ieflection. They aie neithei of them objected iealities. If you iest on eithei of them
you aie accoiding, to Eiigena, mistaken. Foi God is moie than Unity and moie than Tiinity.
Looking back on the whole couise of Eiigena's exposition of Dionysian piinciples, we
see that the Aieopagite had identified God with the Absolute. Dean Inge says that Dionysius
the Aieopagite desciibes God the Fathei as 'supeiessential indeteimination,' 'the unity which
210
unifies eveiy unity,' 'the absolute no-thing which is above all ieality.' 'No moial oi tiial,' he
exclaims in a queei ebullition of jaigon, 'can expiess the all-tianscending hiddenness of the
all-tianscending supeiessentially supeiexisting supei-Deity.'"
344
And Eiigena did not hesitate
to deny Being to Deity. Being, in his opinion, is a defect. The things that aie not, aie fai
bettei than the things that aie. God, theiefoie, in viitue of His excellence, is not undeseivedly
desciibed as Nihil-nothingness.
Two conceptions of Deity emeige in this exposition. One is, that the Deity is identical
with the Absolute. It is beyond peisonality, beyond goodness, beyond consciousness, beyond
existence itself. Nothing whatevei can be piedicated conceining it. Being is identical with
nothingness. It is above the categoiy of ielation. This is the philosophic conception.
The othei conception is that Deity possesses the attiibutes of self-conscious peisonality.
This is the ieligious conception.
In the exposition of Eiigena the philosophic conception is affiimed to be the tiue, while
the ieligious conception is iegaided as the cieation of the theologians foi the puipose of
explanation and of faith.
344 Cf. Inge, The Philosophy of Plotinus, II. 112.
149
Fiom this distinction ceitain things seem cleai. It seems cleai that the philosophic
conception of Deity as identical with the Absolute, cannot satisfy the iequiiements of ieligion,
and that Deity cannot become an object of adoiation unless it is invested with the attiibutes
of peisonality. That of which nothing can be piedicated cannot become the object of oui
woiship.
But at the same time if the ieligious conception of Deity as self-conscious and peisonal
is offeied to oui contemplation with the expiess pioviso that it does not iepiesent what God
211
ieally is, the pioviso paialyses the wings of oui aspiiation and iendeis Deity impossible as
an object of piayei.
343
Eiigena was by no means a persona grata to the Chuich of his age. He was a metaphys-
ician, without the mystical tendencies of Dionysius, and while he expounded the Aieopagite's
ideas ioused suspicion and iesentment by the boldness of his conclusions. At the same time
his tianslations of Dionysius made the Gieek Mastei's piinciples familiai to the Latin woild.
In the Eastein Chuich the Aieopagite's influence is cleaily piesent in the gieat Gieek
Theologian, St. John of Damascus. When speaking of the inadequacy of human expiessions
to iepiesent the ieality of God John Damascene appeals to Dionysius.
346
And the whole of
his teaching on the Divine incompiehensibility is cleaily due to the influence of the Aieopa-
gite. When we iead that an infeiioi natuie cannot compiehend its supeiioi, oi when we
find the distinction diawn between negative theology and affiimative, between that which
declaies what God is not and that which declaies what He is; and that the foimei piesents
the Divine supeiioiity to all cieated things; when fuithei still we iead of the supei-essential
essence, and the supei-divine Deity: we see in a moment the influence of Dionysian concep-
tions. Neveitheless St. John Damascene is anything iathei than a blind adheient of Aieopagite
teaching. On the contiaiy it is piofoundly, tiue as Vacheiot
347
has said, that he follows Di-
onysius with disciimination: oi iathei, peihaps, that he supplements the Doctiine of the
Divine incompiehensibility by veiy definite teaching on the ieality of the distinctions
212
within the Deity and on the ieality of the peisonal Incaination of the eteinal Son of God in
Maiy's Son. That is to say, that while the Philosophei appeais in the Aieopagite to eclipse
the Theologian, the Theologian in St. John Damascene contiols the Philosophei. The caieful,
disciiminate use of Dionysius by the gieat Gieek Schoolman is most iemaikable. He assim-
ilated the tiue elements while iejecting the questionable oi exaggeiated.
Retuining once moie to the Chuich of the West, the influence of Dionysius is seen ex-
tending, thiough Eiigena's tianslations, into the Monastic studies. The theologian Hugh,
343 Cf. Inge, The Philosophy of Plotinus, II. 113.
346 De Fide Oithodoxa, Bk. I. ch. xii.
347 Vacheiot's Histoiie Ciitique de l'Ecole d'Alexandiie, III. 40, 1831.
150
of the Abbey of St. Victoi at Paiis, wiote in ten books a Commentaiy on the Heavenly
Hieiaichy of the Aieopagite, full of enthusiastic appieciation of the gieat mystic's teaching.
Fai moie impoitant than this is the influence exeited by Dionysius ovei the mind of St.
Thomas. It is not only that St. Thomas wiote a Commentary on the Divine âmes,
348
but
in the woiks of Aquinas his ideas aie constantly ieappeaiing. He is one of St. Thomas's fa-
vouiite authoiities. As one becomes incieasingly moie familiai with the gieatest of all the
scholastic theologians this ascendancy of the Gieek mystic becomes moie and moie impiess-
ive. But it is almost needless to say that Aquinas tieats the Aieopagite ciitically. St. Thomas
is piofoundly aveise fiom eveiything which iesembles a Pantheistic tendency. His teaching
alike on the Tiinity and on the Incaination belongs to anothei iealm of thought fiom that
of the neo-Platonist.
At a latei peiiod misgivings aiose in the Chuich whethei the theology of the Aieopagite
was, in fact, altogethei above suspicion. So long as his tiaditional identification with the
213
disciple of St. Paul was maintained, and he was ciedited with being, by apostolic appointment,
fiist Bishop of Athens, these distinctions made suspicion of his oithodoxy seem iiieveient
and inciedible. But when the identification was questioned by the histoiical ciitics of the
seventeenth centuiy, and the tiadition completely dispelled, then the teim Pseudo-Dionysius
began to be heaid and to pievail, and ciiticism upon its oithodoxy aiose in the leained
schools in Fiance.
Le Quien, in a disseitation piefixed to the woiks of St. John Damascene, piopounds the
foimidable inquiiy: Num Pseudo-Dionysius hieticus fueiit.
349
Le Quien is convinced that
Dionysius employs language which confuses the Divine and the Human in oui Loid; fails
to distinguish accuiately between peison and natuie; and betiays unquestionable monophys-
ite tendencies.
On the othei hand, Beinaid de Rubeis, in his Dissertation,
330
says that Le Quien fails
to do justice to the authoi's meaning; and that Aquinas undeistood the authoi bettei, and
thought him oithodox.
The Univeisity of Paiis defended the Aieopagite. The Univeisity of Louvain agieed.
The Jesuits eageily advocated his oithodoxy. Lessius, the celebiated authoi of the Treatise
on the Divine Perfections, coiiesponding with anothei Jesuit, Fathei Lanssel, declaied that
he had iead the Aieopagite fiequently, and had caiefully studied all his wiitings. Foi thiity-
six yeais Dionysius had been his chosen pation, always iemembeied by him in the Saciifice
of the Mass, with a piayei to be peimitted to shaie the Aieopagite's wisdom and spiiit.
331
348 See Paima edition of St. Thomas, Tom. 1V. Opusculum vii. pp. 239-403.
349 Migne, Patiol. Gic., Tom. XCIV. i. 281.
330 See also the Paima edition of St. Thomas, Tom. XV. 430 ff., wheie this Disseitation is piinted.
331 Migne, Patiol. Gic., Tom. IV. 1002.
151
214
What distuibed Lessius was that the Aieopagite had not been bettei tianslated. Inadequate
teims had been put in the Latin iendeiing which might easily lead the ieadei into eiioi. Foi
many instances of this might be pioduced. Fathei Lanssel, howevei, is compelled to admit
quite fiankly that the Aieopagite's wiitings contain difficulties which cannot be laid to the
chaige of his tianslatois. St. Thomas himself had said as much.
That Mastei of the Schoolmen, that theologi apex, who solved the haidest pioblems
in theology moie easily than Alexandei cut the Goidian knot, did not hesitate to say that
Dionysius habitually suffeied fiom obscuiity of style. This obscuiity was not due to lack of
skill, but to the delibeiate design of concealing tiuth fiom the iidicule of the piofane. It was
also due to his use of platonic expiessions which aie .unfamiliai to the modein mind.
Sometimes the Aieopagite is, in the opinion of St. Thomas, too concise, wiapping too much
meaning into a solitaiy woid. Sometimes, again, he eiis, the opposite way, by the ovei-
piofuseness of his utteiances. Neveitheless, this piofuseness is not ieally supeifluous, foi
those who completely sciutinize it become awaie of its solidity and its depth. The fact is,
adds Fathei Lanssel, as Isaac Casaubon asseited, the Aeiopagite invents new woids, and
unusual unheaid-of and staitling expiessions. The Confessoi Maximus admitted that his
Mastei obscuies the meaning of the supeiabundance of his phiaseology.
When we come to the nineteenth centuiy we find the Tieatises of the Aieopagite ciiti-
cized, not only, oi chiefly, foi theii foim and style, but also foi theii fundamental piinciples.
The System of the Aieopagite was subjected to a veiy seaiching ciitical analysis by
Feidinand Chiistian Baui. (Christliche Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit and Menschwerdung
Gottes, 1842; Bd. II. 207-231.)
215
Accoiding to Dionysius, as undeistood by Baui, God is the absolute Unity which stands
contiasted with the Many. The Many denotes the woild of conciete ieality. Doubtless theie
is a piocess fiom Unity to Multiplicity, affiimation and negation, but this piocess takes
place solely in the subjective consciousness.
How, then, asks Baui, can this Aieopagite conception of Deity be ieconciled with the
Chiistian conception, with which it appeais to be in obvious contiadiction:
The Aieopagite speaks often of a Tiiad, and dwells on the Chuich's Doctiine of the
Tiinity. But the teims which in his system iepiesent the Godhead aie such as the supei-
good, the supei-divine, the supei-essential. These teims iepiesent an abstiaction. If any
distinction exists, that distinction in no case exists within the Deity, but only in the activities
which pioceed fiom God as the supei-essential Cause. Distinctions exist in oui subjective
consciousness. But they have no objective ieality. If we call the Divine Mysteiy God, oi Life,
oi Essence, oi Light, oi Woid, we only mean theieby the influences which emanate fiom
that Mysteiy.
In Baui's opinion, theiefoie, the Tiinitaiian conception, as held in the Tiadition of the
Chuich, is in the system of Dionysius ieduced to little moie than names.
152
Baui's ciiticism on the Aieopagite's notion of Incaination is not less seveie.
The System of Dionysius allows no distinctive and peculiai Incaination at all. It allows
no special and new ielationships, but only a continual becoming. The Incaination is, in the
Aieopagite's view, nothing moie than the piocess fiom Unity to Multiplicity; which is es-
216
sential to Its conception of Deity. If Dionysius speaks of the God-man as an individual, that
is eithei a meie concession to Tiadition, oi a lack of cleainess in its own conception. The
union of God with an individual such as the Chiistian Tiadition postulates cannot, in Baui's
opinion, be ieconciled with the system of the Aieopagite.
A second modein opinion on the theological teaching of Dionysius is given by that
singulaily cleai and sceptical Fienchman, Vacheiot, in his Histoire de lEcole dAlexandrie,
1831, Tome III. pp. 23 ff.
Vacheiot consideis the gioup of tieatises asciibed to Dionysius to be the most cuiious
monument of neo-Platonist influence ovei Chiistian theology. Philosophy affiims that
negations conceining Deity aie tiue on condition that they expiess nothing definite. In the
authoi's opinion Theology cannot ieally give any positive instiuction. Dionysius is undei-
stood by Vacheiot to teach that mystical theology is the suppiession of definite thought. To
know God we must cease to think of Him. The devout is lost in a mystical obscuiity of ig-
noiance. Nothing definite can in ieality be said of Deity.
In Vacheiot's opinion the oithodoxy of the Aieopagite is moie than doubtful.
The Chiistian conception piesents the living peisonal self-conscious God, Cieatoi and
Fathei of the woild, in eteinal insepaiable ielation with His Son and His Spiiit, a Tiinity
inaccessible in itself, but manifested diiectly in Incaination.
But in the conception of this neo-Platonist thinkei Deity is iemoved to an infinite dis-
tance fiom the human soul, and the Tiinity is ieduced to a meie abstiaction. We aie heie
fai iemoved fiom the genuine Chiistian theology.
Dionysius is to Vacheiot a neo-Platonist philosophei in disguise, who while going ovei
to Chiistianity ietained his philosophic ideas which he adioitly combined with the piinciples
of his new belief.
217
A thiid modein ciitic of Dionysius is the Lutheian theologian, Doinei. Doinei was
conceined only with the beaiing of the Aieopagite piinciples on the doctiine of the Peison
of Chiist.
332
In Doinei's opinion the mystical Chiistology of the Aieopagite foims an impoitant
link of connection between Monophysitism and the doctiine of the Chuich." Not that we
mean to affiim that the Aieopagite was a declaied Monophysite; ceitainly, howevei, that
his entiie mode of viewing the woild and God belong to this family."
332 Doinei, Doctiine of the Peison of Chiist, Div. II. i. 137 ff.
153
With iegaid to the doctiine of the Tiinity, Doinei holds that on the piinciples of Di-
onysius seeing that God is the One Who is at once in all and above all-yea, outweighs the
negation of the many by the Divine Unity-all idea of distinct hypostasis in God ought
consistently to be ienounced; in the Supei-Essential God eveithing sinks down into unity
without distinctions. Much is said, indeed, of the Many, along with the One; but the Tiinity
in God ietains meiely a completely piecaiious position."
Doinei adds: The iesult as fai as Chiistology is conceined is veiy plain; aftei laying
down such piemises, it was impossible foi the Aieopagite to justify, eithei anthiopologically
oi theologically, a specific incaination in one individual. If he taught it at all, it was because
he had adopted it fiom the Cieeds of the Chuich, and he was quite unable to put himself
into a sinceie and tiue ielation towaids it."
To these ciiticisms may be added the iemaiks of a fouith modein wiitei, this time fiom
the standpoint of the Roman Chuich. Bach, in his veiy able History of Dogma in the Middle
Ages, says that, in the woiks of the Aieopagite, Chiist is fiequently tieated in so idealistic a
218
fashion that the conciete peisonality of the God-man is diiven into the shade. The mysticism
of Dionysius is not founded on the histoiical peison of Chiist, noi on the woik of Redemption
as a fact once actualized in time.
Heie may be added a ciiticism on Dionysius fiom a Bishop of the English Chuich.
Bishop Westcott wiote-
Many, peihaps, will be suipiised that such a scheme of Chiistianity as Dionysius has
sketched should even be ieckoned Chiistian at all."
333
Di. Westcott went on to say of the
Aieopagite's piinciples: It must be fiankly admitted that they beai the impiess not only of
a paiticulai age and school, but also of a paiticulai man, which is not wholly of a Chiistian
type." And again elsewheie veiy much of the system was faulty and defective."
In closing this shoit suivey of the place of Dionysius in the histoiy of ieligious thought
it is evident enough that we aie confionted with an exceptional figuie of unusual ascendancy.
He is not made less peiplexing by the vaiiety of estimates foimed upon his theology by men
of diffeient schools and of maiked ability. The student must be left to diaw his own conclu-
sions. But if those conclusions aie to be coiiectly diawn he must have befoie his mind, at
least in outlines, the fact of the Aieopagite's histoiic influence.
The geneial impiession left upon the mind by the Aieopagite's ciitics is that the authoi's
stiength consisted in his combination of philosophy with mysticism; but that he was fai
moie stiong as a philosophic thinkei than he was as a Chiistian theologian; and, that in his
effoits to ieconcile Chiistianity with neo-Platonism it is the philosophy which pievails, not
without seiious iesults to the theology of the Chuich. His gieatest admiieis appeai to have
333 Westcott, Religious Thought in the West, p. 188.
154
219
employed him with discietion; to have balanced his statements with moie piopoition, and
to have iead him in the light of stiong Catholic piesuppositions which to some extent
neutialized his ovei-emphasis, and supplemented his omissions. It is an inteiesting specu-
lation foi the theological student what the position of these wiitings would have been if
theii authoi had nevei been identified with the disciple of St. Paul.
220
155
221
INDEX TO TEXT
Affiimative Theology, 196
Baitholomew, 193
Clement, 141
Diffeientiations in Deity, 67 ff.
Divine Names, 31-190
Elements of Divinity, 76, 83
Elymas, 137-138
Emanations, 79-80
Evil (Natuie of), 86 ff., 111-130
Fatheihood, 36
God as Goodness, 86 ff.
Light, 91-94
Beauty, 93 ff.
Love, 104
Being, 131 ff.
Life, 144
Wisdom, 146
Reason, 148-133
Powei, 134
Righteousness, 138, 160
Gieat and Small, 162
Omnipotent, 169
Peace, 173-178
Holiness, 181
Peifection, 184
Unity, 183-190
Hieiotheus, 76-83, 86-107
Hymns of Yeaining, 107, 108, 109
Ignatius, 104
Illumination, 33, 38
Index Index to Text
156
Index
Incaination, 76
James, St., 84
Negative Theology, 196
Outlines of Divinity, 31, 196, 197
Paul, St., 83
Petei, St., 84
Sciiptuies, 32, 33
Simplicity, 33
Supei-essential, 32, 33, 34, 36, 39, 71, 139, 191
Supei-excellent, 191
Supei-intellectual, 32
Supia-Divine, 191
Symbolical Revelation, 36 ff.
Timothy, 191
Tiinity, 36, 63, 66, 79, 191
Undiffeienced Names of God, 63, 68
157
Index to Text
222
INDEX TO NOTES AND INTRODUCTION
Aquinas, 3, 81, 107, 143, 131, 171, 172, 212
Aiistotle, 81, 92, 101, 171
Augustine, 9, 10, 41, 42-63, 77, 103, 134, 136, 141, 143, 162, 168, 181, 183, 197
Bach, 217
Baui, 214-216
Beigson, 143, 132, 193
Beinaid de Rubeis, 213
Beinaid, St., 163
Blake, 140
Biadley, 114, 192
Biont, E., 186
Contemplation, 23, 30, 33
Damascenus, 211
Dante, 88, 107, 140, 173, 177, 178
Dionysius, influence, 202-219; wiitings, 47
Doinei, 217
Eckhait, 122, 181
Eiigena, 3, 203-211
Evil, pioblem of, 20-23
Fox, Geoige, 87
God as Unity, 63-80
Goodness, 86-130
Being, 131-143
Life, 144-146
Wisdom, 146-134
Powei, 134-161
Gieat, 162-169
Almighty, 169-173
Peace, 173-180
Holy, 181-183
Peifection, 184, 190
Godhead, 4-6, 6-19
Index to Notes and Introduction
158
Hieiotheus, 107
Hugh of St. Victoi, 212
Ignatius, St., 104
Inge, 29, 210, 211
John of the Cioss, 103
Julian of Noiwich, 102, 143
Lanssel, 213
Lateian, C. (649), 213
Le Bon, 109
Le Quien, 213
Lotze, 192
Maitin (i. Pope), 202
Maximus, 3, 202
Nietzsche, 90, 193
Pachymeies, 3
Pascal, 118
Peisonality, 4
Philosophy (Modein), D.'s ielation to, 30
Plato, 107
Plotinus, 2, 109, 138
Pioclus, 1
Psychology, 33-40
223
Ruysbioeck, 122
Sciiptuie, D.'s ielation to, 40
Seveius, 3
Shelley, 182
Spencei, 107
Supei-essential, 13, 16, 17, 43, 31, 32, 33, 191
Supei-excellent, 191
Supia-Divine, 191
Taulei, 122
Tiinity, 9, 10, 42, 44, 43
159
Vacheiot, 211, 216
Via êgativa, 193, 196
Victoiinus, 174
Von Hgel, 172
Westcott, 218
Woidswoith, 93, 99
224
160
Indexes
Indexes
161
Indexes
Index of Scripture References
Genesis
44 71 49 71 70 49 49 48
Exodus
48 48 32 30 49 31 31
Deuteronomy
49 48 31
Judges
48
2 Samuel
79
1 Kings
49
1 Chronicles
33
Job
31 49
Psalms
49 32 33 30 97 30 119 124 48 63 30 30 31 32 49 42 31 49 49 121 31 31
103 103 48 48
Proverbs
78 78 49 111 31
Isaiah
48 48 49 49
Jeremiah
49
Ezekiel
30 31 30 31
Daniel
49 31
Hosea
30
Matthew
44 31 42 48 32
Luke
94 60 46
John
162
49 30 33 33 48 49 32 33 33 33 48 48 49 32 33 33
Acts
126 30 27 126
Romans
72 42 33 33 77 48
1 Corinthians
69 107 107 49 49 41 44 43 42 43 49 69 69 49 28 33 30
2 Corinthians
33 101 64 33
Galatians
34
Ephesians
48 42
Philippians
48 44
Colossians
49 108 126
1 Thessalonians
43
2 Timothy
63 33 114
Hebrews
119
James
30
1 John
43 33 28
Revelation
32 49 33 76 33 31 49 49 33 49
Wisdom of Solomon
111 111 79
Sirach
63
163
Index of Greek Words and Phrases
9
4
4
1!8
42
9
0
1
60
4!
4
44
46
9
81
4
9
6
80
81
4
6
61
1
1
11
4
!
81
4
8
81
4
!
Greek Words and Phrases
164
61
46
6
60
9
9
1
4!
6
!
!2
!2
!1
0
0
4
6
4
68
60
16
1!
16
!1
81
16
1
10
10
!1
165
!1
!2
!1
!1
8
!1
4!
9
14
41
1
16
0
42
42
42
42
64
81
4
48
48
!1
16
!2
9
46
!
2
94
0
42
9
4!
14
4
166
60
6
8
4!
64
0
44
0
68
!
61
44
1
44
64
41
9
4
81
167
Index of Latin Words and Phrases
63
123
80
131
99
128
78
131
73
10
10
102
120
103
124
11
73
142
42
142
10
143
124
11
130
146
146
146
11
11
141
141
144
124
146
146
Latin Words and Phrases
168
132
123
143
169
Index of French Words and Phrases
29
28
123
French Words and Phrases
170
French Words and Phrases
Index of Pages of the Print Edition
i ii iii iv v 1 2 3 4 3 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 13 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 23 26 27 28 29 30
31 32 33 34 33 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 43 46 47 48 49 30 31 32 33 34 33 36 37 38 39 60 61
62 63 64 63 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 73 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 83 86 87 88 89 90 91 92
93 94 93 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 103 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 113 116 117
118 119 120 121 122 123 124 123 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 133 136 137 138 139 140
141 142 143 144 143 146 147 148 149 130 131 132 133 134 133 136 137 138 139 160 161 162 163
164 163 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 173 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 183 186
187 188 189 190 192 193 194 193 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 203 206 207 208 209 210
211 212 213 214 213 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224
171

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Di onysi us the Areopagi te: On the Di vi ne Names

and the Mysti cal Theol ogy.

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