(International Library of Philosophy and Scientific Method . } ‘A MATERIALIST THEORY OF THE MIND EDITOR: THD HONDERICI ADVISORY EDITOR: BERNARD WILLIAMS A Gaaloge of bok aledy pub nthe Ita iy of Py ad Sa Mead wit oud othe et af hylan bo by D. M. ARMSTRONG Pr dP tien Snr @ LONDON ROUTLEDGE & KEGAN PAUL NEW YORK : HUMANITIES PRESSPOLL First published 1$é8 by Rowtledge & Kegan Peal Lit. Broadsay Hae, 66-74 Carter Lane London, B.Cag Printed in Great Britain ‘by Richard Clay (Te Chaucer Press), Ltd. Bangers Safle © DM, Armstrong 1966 No part of this book may be reproduced in ay form witout permiison fron ‘the publisher, except forthe quotation Of brie posage in riticiom SBI 7100 36347 or ms Father sd MotherA CONTENTS \CKNOWLEDGEMENTS INTRODUCTION Parr One: Thomas oF Mixp A CLASSIFICATION OF THEORIES OF MIND DUALISM TL. Ceticism of ‘Bundle’ Dualiem TL Criticism of Cartesian Dualism IIT Difficulties for any Dualist theory ‘THE ATTRIBUTE THEORY ‘A DIFFICULTY FOR ANY NON-MATERIALIST THEORY OF MIND BEHAVIOURISM a<2 5 and ae. Preliminary Behaviourism aod the mental concepts (Ceticism of Behaviousism CENTRAL-STATE THEORY {she theory teal paradoxical? "Toe ony messed apt demands alas formate 2 fete icy Gormuae, and an answer dheched Views of Place aod Smart The compe of mend pate Discario betwen our view so Behaviours: Se anu of depose pages ty 5 8 4 ” 6 7 6 B B ”Contents VII The identication of mind and brain Base 89 VII Objecrions outstanding answered TX The nature of consciousness X The alleged indubitabiley of consciousness XI Unconscious mental processes XII_ Further objections to our theory XIN Advantages of the theory Parr Two: Tae Concer oF Mixp ‘THE WILL (1) T Tatroductory IT Purposive activity as activity witha mental use II Ryle’s Tainite egress TV. The natute of purpose activi V._The immediate acts of the will VI Means and ends VI Intending and trying VIL Desires we do not act from TX Wants and wishes X_ Deliberating and deciding XI Mental actions XII Belief and the will ‘IIT Need all actions be purposive? THE WILL () T Motives TI Pleasure and pain TI The emotions KNOWLEDGE AND INFERENCE 1 Phito's problem TI The nature of non-inferential knowledge TIT The narore of inferring IV’ Inferential knowledge 'V_ Further considesations shout knowledge PERCEPTION AND BELIEF Perception as acquiring of belief TI The role ofthe sense-organs TIT Belief is dispositional, but perception is an event 3 ny un ny 29 Br wn m 15 1” 187 187 189 198 208 209 a5 8 Contents, IV’ Perception without belief Page 26 'V. Perceiving things and perceiving that 7 VI Perception and causality 39 VIL Unconscious perception at VENT ‘Small perceptions" Be TX Immediate and mediate perception 33 X_ The nature of sense-impressions 336 XI Perception and knowledge 37 XII The nature ofthe physical world 339 PERCEPTION AND BEHAVIOUR 245 1 1 ™ v v vt THE I 1 m 1 0 ‘The manifeseation of perception in behaviour 245 Perception 2 mere necessary condition of dis- criminatory behaviour a8 ‘What is discriminatory behaviour? 30 Difference in perceptions without diference ia behaviour 6 ‘The intentionality of perception 360 Perceptual illusion 265 SECONDARY QUALITIES 270 "The problem of the secondary qualities a0 A priori objections to identifying. secondary ‘qualities with physical properties an ‘Empirical objections to identifying secondary ‘qualities with physial properties MENTAL IMAGES Preliminary investigations ‘The nature of meatal images Dreams m BODILY SENSATIONS 0 am wv v vi van va ‘Tactual and bodily perception Bodily sensations and bodily feelings ‘Transitive’ bodlly sensations Problems about ‘intransitive’ sensations “Intransitive’ sensations snd reactions “Totsanstive” sensations as bodily perceptions Intensity of sensations and intensity of reaction Bodily felings5 6 7 Contents INTROSPECTION 2 1 Recaption ee Ir Towrospection st iner sense: objections a8 TT Inerospecion and behaviour An TV Mental sates and the mind 336 BELIEF_AND THOUGHT 339 T Belch 3 1 Thinking oa Parr Tune: Tins Navore oF Mis IDENTIFICATION OF THE MENTAL WITH THE PHYSICAL as INDEX 367 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS PROFESSOR J. J.C. SMART converted me tothe view, e- fended inthis hooky that ment states ae nothing bt physical ste of the brain Fe in his tan has acknowledged the influence ‘OF, T. Place In the book I make certain crits of tome of the views that Start and Pace ave put forward in pent Bat for the most pare Tebnccive myself only to being ova tp inthe asgamen to which they have devote itl tention: the secouat ofthe comer of mind. My itlctal debt o them remains pro- found. Profesor CB, Mari, now my colleague a Sydney Univer: St made me aware ofthe cnt role played by the concept ‘fev in at account ofthe etl concepts. Previowsl had Sssigned the cental place to the notion of poston, conceived ofa Ryle conceives them in Th Con of nd. My change of ‘ew on this question was a curing pint in my conception of Phlosopticlpochology andy hough Mann oes no accept Bysclit account ofthe mind T owe him no less than Toe Smart and Place, “The following have read vatious drafts of al or some of the rans an have heped me pestly with erica sed com toent:Dr Belo, Profesors A.G. N. Flew, D. A. T, Gasking D.M. Mellum, J. 1- Mackie, B Medlin, G.C. Ned, J. JC. Sar, Mr. D.C Stove and Dr. W. A. Sechting. Other chow” eles rem ex. ned in pail For 2 mumber of sopgertions, at once ingeniows and Profound, (© Profesor MJ Devscer Ihave lant rest deat fom students a1 Yale, Melbourne, Spéoey snd Stanford Univers in the ‘course presenting to them portions of te material i this bookAcknowledgements (My shanks are also due to Roswitha Duly for typing the mani- nt have indeed rine so mach valuable lp fom so many petsons hit I eannot be certain that Lam responsi or 6 ertor that the book may contain. ve i DMA Universit of Sydney INTRODUCTION WHAT isa man? One sbvious thing to say is that he fea ceria sort of material object. A man’s ody fonction in amore complex and curious way than any other knowa material object, natural ‘tical, But isa material objet. The question then arses: Ts ‘man nothing but his material body ? Can we give a compete Ac: count of man in purely physical tems?” In the pas, there seemed fo be reo rest objections to giving a prey physieal account of man. In Uhe fst place, mn had a Property which he shared with animals and plats but which ‘ordinary mata objects lacked: he was aie. Could life be noth- ing but a purely physi property? Inthe second place, man had 8 property which he saced with many animals, but with noching clte in the physical world: he had a mind. He percrived, fet thought and had purposes. Could mentality be nothing but 4 potely physieal property? Tncreasing scentfe kaowledge bas largely answered the Get objection. Its now very probable even not cern, that ie isa Putely physico-chemical phenomenon. We do aot aed to post Tie ‘vegetative souls’ or "ital eatelechies to explain fe What of the second objection? More and more psychologists and neuto- physiologist explicitly or imple acep the view tats fa 8 ‘mental processes ate concerned, there iso need to porate 209 {hing but purely physi proses in man's central nervous tem: If we take the word “mind” to mean “tht in which mental Processes occu or ‘that which has mental stat thea we can put this view briefly and aot too misleadingly as: the mind ie nothing butthebrin If scent progeesssstais this View, seems that, sman is nothing but a matenal object having none but physical Proper.Introduction ‘Most pilozopbers, however, believe that there are conchutive seasons for tejecting euch a physicalist theory of mind. That is the occasion for wating this book. Itis writen by a philosopher, snd weitten primarily for philosophers. Its object is to show that there are 20 good philosophieal easaas for denying that mental processes ate purely physieal proceses in the central nervous 57$- tem and $0, by implication, that there are no good philosophical reasons for denying that man is nothing but a material object. “does not attempt to prove the tuth ofthis phycais thesis about the mind. The proof must come, if ic does come, from science: from neurophysiology in paricuae, Allie attempts t0 show is that there are no valid philosophical of logical reasons for rejecting the identification of mind and beain, Like Joha Locke, 1 conceive my task eegatively. Tam an underlabourer carting 2Way rubbish from che path along which I conecive, 0 guess, that scien- fife progres lies For this reason, the importance of this work for psychology, if any, is manly indirect. To vary Locke's metaphor, what Tam do- ing is eying to protect those psychologists Who explicitly of im plicily identify mind and brain against a harassing action on theit flank, a harassment, peshape, that some of them do not rake very seriously anyway. Ifthere i anything I say that i of asistance to ‘peychologist in dealing withthe logical problems involved in the ‘consideration of our ordinary mental concept, I shall be happy. But this will be an intellectual bonus over end above what <00- czive to be the special importance of this work for paychology. ‘The fist five chapters consider and ertcize what I take to be ‘he important alternatives to an identification of mind and brain. I regard the dificlties that bese these alternatives asa most com- polling reson for believing that my own theory is on the right track. Nevertheless, some readers may wish o omit these chapters inan already long book. Although a few references are made back ‘© the early chapters in the later course ofthe work, readers should have no great dificult if dhey begin ax Chapter 6 T should also warn that some of the things Tsay in the fst ive chapters are provisional, This aries because, if the position sketched in Chapter 6 is correct, ceria old positions and old arguments concerning mind and body appear in a sew light. Part One THEORIES OF MINDrz A CLASSIFICATION OF THEORIES OF MIND THERE are many possible ways of clescifying theories of mind. ‘The classification to be pur forward here is based upon different conceptions of the relationship of mind to bay. Some theories of mind and body try to reduce body to mind or some property of mind. Such theories may be called Mental theories. Thos according to Hegel and his followers, the Absolute ‘ealss, che whole material world is really mental or spictal ia ‘nature, litle as ie may appear so. According to Leibniz, material ‘objects are colonies of rudimentary souls. These are hh mentalist theories. It may be plausibly argued that Bishop Berkeley and his philosophical descendants the Phenomenslists, who hold that physical objects are constructions out of ‘ideas’ or ense-impees- sions, are putting forward mentalist cheotes of matter. Tn oppositi to these mentalist theories, we have Materialist theories which try to reduce mind to body oF to some property of body. Berween mentalist and materialist theories we find two sorts of compromise theories. In the first place, there are Dusit theories which teat nind and matter a two independent sorts of ‘thing. Tn the second place, we have theories like Spinoza's, which treat mind and matter as diferent attributes of the same under lying stuf, or Newre! Moniz, which holds that mind and matter ate diferent arrangements of 3 single sort of stuf. However, if we comider the edition of modera analytical a 5Theorie of Mind philosophy, within which this book is written, we fd that many ‘of these views are not living intellectual options, Some analytical philosophers have accepted Phenomenalism. But most have taken fhe common sease view that physical objects are not mental in nature, nor ae they attributes of, nor constructions out of, some, thing neutral in nature. For this feason, the only theories of mind and body that I will actually examine inthis fest part ofthe book are those that accept the ieducibly physical nature of physical things. I have two reasons for ignoring, Phenomenalism. Ta the {rst place, its intellectual credit has been shaken in eecat years In the second place, T have already said what [have to say in ctticism of Phenomenalism in Perception and the Phyiel World Routledge, 1961, Chs. and 6). ‘Having inthis way limited the field of theories to be examined, 4 new classification is tequited for those theories that remain. We ‘may distinguish between Duslir theories of mind and body, Attribute toeories and Materialist theses. ‘A Dualist theory is one that holds chat mind and body are d= inc things. For a Dualist a man is a compound objeee 2 material thing—his body—somehow related to @ non-material thing, Ot things—his mind. There are cwo main types of Dualis theory. in the frst place, we have Carttian Dualism. For the Castesan Dualise the mind is a sigdé son-material or spiritual substance tomehow related to the body. Although the term ‘Cartesan” fefers to Descartes, and we find his view of the mind and body expounded by Descartes in his Sivth Meditaian, the term, as Tose js not to be restricted to the exact theory put forward by Descartes. It isto be applied to any view that holds that a persa’t ‘mind isa single, continuing, non-material substance in some way related to the body. (Since this isthe first time thatthe term ‘substance’ has been used inthis work, and since it wll be used frequently inthe furare, it wil be convenient to say a word about the notion of substance hte, Locke conceived of substance asthe unknowable subststam of objects, Those who came after him often scjected the doctsine (of such a substratem, but the unforcunate effect was not to revise Locke's conception of substance, but to give the whole notion Of substance 4 bad odour. But when {present the Cartesian view #8 the view that the mind isa non-material substance, Ido not regutd the Cactesians as necessarily committed to a dovtuiae of ana" 6 A Classification of Theories of Mind \nowable meatal subst. understand by aubstanc nothing ‘ore ha thing tat sly pond xe) Inthe cond fc, we hve what eed Bune Das jum, te term und” ecoing Hames notorious description of the mind at unl of pcos “Ths form of Duals Charceiaaly ames on of eecton om th iets of Car tein Duan, When the gest Epica plesopher, Dad Hu ese ov ale a tt he could sem no coeiing tel pindpe within hms. ISedncnton of the moar Of the i io is Trt 9f Haman News Be Pu, See 6 heaps Fos my past, when fem mos itatl into what cll ya, 1 siwaps somble on tome patil pceion or ote of feat ot {eid igh or shoe, lve o hated pai or peso T ever cao sccm tine without a peteption, and ever at buerve ny thing tat the pereption (p 25%. Selby Diggs, Oxford Univesity Pres, 88). mei arguing here that here tno conning object in the metal sphere coresponding to the boy inthe phy sphere Nobody ever observer such spiral principle within msl, ‘ie eran oh son orm rea ‘tsuneo thought advo on Soe Beale De ‘Etats the ind obes screson of son physical prices ot ita dance from hough rested eo, the body " ‘Aiciough Bund’ Daan is lot Unked with Huse's same, ti sot abolstely cee wheter of ot Hume himsel ws "Bundle Dual His view ofthe mind crcly Ss our deli tin, butte legimat to doubt whether he holds a Meese theory of the body. For sometines he ses fo hold view ¢& pls object sini oth of Bekeley making them nothing Ettourpecepions ‘ot them. Tis would imply tas mind ad odes fe bh onstrated from perceptions. However, a ober Sines He's view seems to be let adil and lone comn Sense, Then he ks aif aman were amatrial hing somehow Sted to a bundle of non-materal tenes pescepaone or ex perience, “is another important way of casiying Dualit theories whch cus acon he Sten berwemn Cota aa Band 7Theories of Mind Daalism, This clasication is based on the particular nature ofthe relationship thought to hold between the pind aed the body: it the ditnction between Intractiont and Parle theonce ‘The diference Getween Interacionist sad Parallel theories smay be brought out by consideing the eats relations beswess (0) 4 0m and its thermostats (i) «room and et ermometen A {oom adits rma act upon each ote. A fseinte espe, ture of the room brings sbout changes in the thermos the changes in the thermostat in tara alee the room, binging back its temperature coa certain level. If ths Aton and reaction dot ‘occur the thermostat would noe be acting as thermovat, ‘Phe Dalit who isan Ineractionist thinks of body snd nied are lated like room and thermostat. The body ets on the ind the sind reacts back on the body, ‘On the other hand, although a oom sets pon its Hermemeti, 4 sein the temperacze ofthe room causing aren the merce, ofthe thermometer, the thermometer does ot tere tack ope {he room, (le fet it does ao to very smal extent but we poy ‘ignore this point) Ith thermometer afected the tempera the room, a8 a thermostat does, it would be no wie sy term meter. Now the Dualist who isa Parallels tale of body aed mind ss related ike room and thermometer. The body hee oath ind bu he i's incapable of racing ack oh Bait any vay al ‘There isa sill more extreme form of Pailelism according t0 which noc only isthe mind incpableo cng on te aie Body is alan incapable of acting on the mind. Instead shop a {vo parallel series ike the two nls ofa rallay line cro pet: fectly synchtonized clocks. However, Ido nos propece to does Sider this form of Paaleiso explicit. My reason do ot think tha its seriously considered by prerene-dnycighers Here ‘we concem ourselves oaly with those theories of Mind sod Baty ‘hich ar living options forthe thought of ose un Teis sometimes argved that if we scents Unifornny theory of TE might be dhought tit two such spinal substances, oF collection of spiral items, can be iferendated from each our in the following way. One connected to tis body, while the cer ie connected to Yet body For, unlike the two sil Sbstances oF collections of spinal tems, however much the bodies resemble they are aeverteless made dierent by beng in dieren places ‘But suppose the sprit substance, of collection of spiritual items wor dni? The Dual would ave oa that {his wae meaningfal posiblity on pain of making aonscse of hie Daienseva'f fe noua Gk uch decd ete should not be eld ‘minds What would make the ew diet then? And even ifthe yal abeance collections of iil 7Thoories of Mind ftems, were not disembodied, reference to the bodies would not really help. For might there not be just on spiital substance or collection of sista tems, identically related tothe ve bois? How would the Dualist diferente between this case, and the case where 0 spiritual substances or collections of sptitil items, were identical in nature and each related to their own body? “The problem just considered is that of the individuation of spiritual objects that exist at the same time. In what does thet dlerence consist? There is a parallel problem about the entity Of one spsiual object or collection of objects over a stretch of time. What makes a spiitual object that exists now the very sine ‘one as »spsitual object tha existed in the past? Resemblance ‘cannot be the mark of ieatcg Because there might be two of ‘ore spiritual objects identical in character and history. In the «ase of ordinary physieal objects we can appeal to ypu venga contiuity. My body is spatiotemporal coatinooas. with body yesterday, but not’ with any twin's body. This spatio: temporal continuity is what makes it one body. But inthe ease of the spittual objects postulated by the Dualit, there ean be 89 {question of any spatial continuity. So what isthe principle of com aay for pital objec s eis interesting t0 notice that thee problems troubled St ‘Thomas Aquinas. "The problem came vp for him in connection with angels. Angels are disembodied intlligence, and therefore sae the question what makes them numeral iereot om ach other. Aquinas solution was to say tat exch angel was OF ‘epaate species, diferent fort of object from any hiker angel Among angel, difeence of umber is simply diference of Lind. (See Summa Theta, Pt 5, Qu 50, At. 4) But Aguins resol eno he iui clei maki, Wy shoul ot God Greate two identical angels? Ie is surely an ineligise posi And what would dierent the wottea? usual the argument might be met by postulaton. One could Postulate a principle of ilividuation’ of aon-apaial nator 0 tate the numerical dierence of spinal object, And, indeed, 1 think tha the existence of such a'principle of datcon 22 intelligible conception. This last point has heen denied by some ‘modem philosophers. They sem to maintain thar f ve roppore ‘0 distinc objects that exist at the same time thea the oly s Duslitme ‘meaning we can give to cis suppottion is tha the objects ae in diferent places If we accepted what they say, then it would seem to bea logically necessary truth that object that are in time are also in space. But if this is 0, a logically necessary eth seems to be giving us positive information about the nature ofthe world, Wis. that whatever temporalisalsospatio-temporal-Now Tdon0t ‘eleve thar mere logic i capable of providing tis information, I believe that itis afc) about the world that every object that fin time is also in space (indeed, I believe tnt i is» fact about the ‘world that every object theres isin space and te), bua Yeannot think that this isa matter of logical necesiy. We xno rule out the existence of a non-spatial or even a non-temporl ‘principe ‘of individuation’ ¢ pri. Nevertheless, it does seem likely that the only ‘principle of individuation’ with which we have any count acpaintane i that feign dro ines nd plas The by of te Dut to sy anything at all about his spiritual ‘prncple of individus- “at savy apes athe cay way be cs antes fotion is a negative way: a3"x son-spatial principle of indvidea- Sion’. Te seems that be isnot infact aequaated with such a prin- ‘ple, nor is there any reason to postulate i. ‘The postion taken here is very simular to Immanuel Kane's view in the Criigue of Pare Reasm: For reasons that need not be lscused here, Kant speaks of space and time ab the forms of| intuition’. He recognizes, also, that i space and time which Secure the sumerical diference of dlstinet objects. (See, ag. rita, 8263]264 = Bsi9[s20. But albough space and time sre ‘he dum forms of isution, Kant thinks its perfectly possible that there might be other Forms of inition, although we have no concrete acquaintance with any. See, -£. Crier, Bra) Presum- ably, thea, he would have said that, auch ots forms of intui- tion existed, they would diferentate objects one from the othe: just as space and time do, (©) the Duals cst of the arigi of the mind plo one? Let us now consider whether Dualism is a plausible cheory ia the light of modern scientiie knowledge, in particular, inthe light of knowledge or plausible guettes about the working of the brain. 29Thores of Mind ‘We may begin by considering the question of exactly when the mind emerges inthe growth of mena animals I seems that the Dualist must conceive ofthe emergence of mind inthe folowing way At some ime after conception, When the nervous sytem of man and the higher animals reaches 1 cer sn level of physiological complexity, a completely new, oon ‘pita ei i bought into extence in cern completely cw ‘eof relation to the body. The emergence of this new existent ould not have been predicted from lars tht deal with the phys al properties of pyc things, Alteady the account is highly implausible from the scientife Poin of view. Iti aota paula aialt notion tat, when the crgu asem racers cern level of couple, should levelop new properties, Nor would there be anything parsicalaly ciicaltin the notion that when the nervous system teaches 4 cet {ain level of complexity ie should afer something that was 2 reaiy in existence ina new way. Butt ira quite diferent mate ® hold thatthe nervous system sbould have the power fo eteste something else, of «quite diferent nature fom sel, and crete Kou fo materials, Admin, here no conection nthe sation at the nervous system should have these powers, but what we know of the workings ofthe world makes the hypotheis 2 very unl one, ve ‘The need forthe ceston of a spiitual objector objects by the {ervous system would be ruled out if we assumed tht the td SEG before wat embed, and was spy broght toa ation tthe body at a certin level of physiological evelopment. But, of cours, this removes one sciatic im ‘But whether we assume tht at tata certain point, the body creates EE {pltiwal object or objects, or whether miod and body af sompleriy, and thete i no poat of witch ee tS sectia sharp physilogicl change here, that this pobably the ° Duslizm pint at which the body acquizes a mind’. Organisms develop by insensble gradations, and so iis natural tos the mind develops in the same way, But because the Duals sets up so sharp 4 gap berweca the material and the mental, he must find a definite pet ‘when the mental comes into existence. ‘The problem we are discussing here is closely connected with ‘one that used to be discussed (perhaps tll s2) by theologians: “When does the infant acquite a soul?" This question may appeat academic or scholastic in the worst sene, but it is one that thowe ‘who believe ip the soul as something distinct from the body have to consider. Equally, the Dualit has to consider the question ‘when his spiritual object or objects come into existence. To text the question as frivolous, while sill holding to Dualit theory of ‘mind and body, would itself be intellectual frivolity. (8 Do mind ad bay interact? We may now consider the dipute between the Interaction and the Pulls forms of Duly the ape between what tiled the thermostat and the themomter model of ef ‘ons between mind ad body. “The int hing tobe sald that the Interac view i the natural oe, and oly mot comping exons sould Oke 2 boy vo accept a Pain account, For consider te following, sequence, Tam track onthe had, ep, I weag had. iteomplely natura, and surely coneee to ay tat the Bow an ofl pal 0d he pian ur eff Wg oy ‘and Teappears obvious tain se like this body 2nd mind Interact body event cates a mena event which ete 4 fete Noy eves. "Thee ne, However, ie or te Dials in aceon the interaction of body 2 Before considering these difcites, however, we must be site carta hte eno egy in the notion that not yea eventa may ease phy event or verve. Tes a Purely empiri question, to be deaded by expen, wht a publ of aciglon whats As Hue sys dacesng ts very pa +10 consider the matter a prior, sy thing may prodoce any thing + Crean, Vo. I, Pe 1V, Sc. 24768 Slby Bigg)Tories of Mind (Acceptance of Hume's negative pons her, by the way, doesnot equie acceptance of his aotorious poltive analysis ofthe exe relationship in terms of constant conjuaction. The word an}- thing’, of course, must not be understood to mean ‘abalutely anything’. The umber 4, for instance, cannot be a cause. It ‘must mein ‘anything ofthe sore that ts intelligible to speak of tie or ste, aneen) Ite mind pad ke stance, or collection of spiral tems, there no contradiction it Supposing that it acts em the body oF is acted on bythe body. Bat, as we shall now see there are weighty enpiiereasons which ‘make a Duslistcheory of interaction dificult to sustain, ‘The dfcutes arise when we uy t think out an Iteratonst theory ina conerete way. Iescems that the mind will have © at on the body by acting on the brit. Now, to 4 physiologist, the bn i an enormously complex and highly organized snatral ‘system to which physical simul of various sorts are applied and hich in turn has certain physical efects on the rest ofthe bod. Inside the ba one physical event i followed by and is she cause of got phos ven fhe Dat ob nao to conditions most be susie. In the first pace share mst isp eventsn te an whch ae followed yar «asses of mental evens (Falfilment of just this condition does n0t tak off Ineractionism from Parallelism) Ta the second place, tere must be lst mental evens which are followed by, and are the causes of, evens inthe brain Let ws now consider the situation where a physi stimulus of ‘ome sort, say the sounds of human Voie, brings abou eeti9 ‘ental events, sty perceptions and thoughts, which then issue ia fare physical anon: On te ny oy thee must bes st Physical event inthe bitin before the mental events enase. The ental eves must then bring about a fst phyiel event inthe "ain on the ‘way down. So this second event wll have to be a9 ‘teat that snot soley determined by the previous physi ate Of the bia py eovtonment. Tis ean tu ee wl be, ast were, a “ga” between the state ofthe brain before the ‘mental event as ha its eect and the state ofthe bran ater the Socratic The eamon between the Stuer will ot take pace slely asa esl ofthe pysial wor elatigemnetal teeter Now, withthe gradual advance of kaowledge of the operation 2 Dualiter Of the brain and nervous system, physiologits ate becoming in ‘teasingly unwilling to thik thst there i any soch gap. “fe mid acts Om the bai, there must be One ot more fais appa te brain wre te st physical eects of mental events occur. Deseates, both Dualit and Toten, sw that he ‘must lo for such’ place and thought that he bad found in the pineal gland. He was aking his own lteractonism seriously, to his ternal intellectual ered: But Inter research has not backed him up about the pineal gland, nor bas any other pause cane diate been found forthe point or pont in the brsin where de fina physial efets of the mental appene. Ths suggests that the ‘pinta component of man cannot ston the mitral one, which ‘xplis wry vo many Dualit have not aceepted Interactions anu have toroed rloctatly to Pals. ‘One odera nevrophysologst, Sit John cles, as accepred a Dualit Interactionism. (See his Tae Newoplyslea! Bate Mind, Careadon Press 1933, Ch 8, “The Miad-Bran problem’ Bt beyond making the suggestion that ifthe mind could et the pattern ofalichange of relatively few netones ins systematic manner, it could quite emily produce quit large alterations i the total palterns of stimulation inthe bia, be does nothing i the “ay of producing 2 worked-ot theory of how interaction car. Nevertheless, hs idea thar dicharger might occur in pewooes that could noe be predicted by any phytic las, but hich, oc cuting systematicly, woul! bring about relatively Big aller on inthe wate ofthe Bra cen el a as io theory. Bur mort aeurophysiologists, I imagine, W astounded to find any such non-physical interference ia the work ings of the bain. A pusaling feature of Eccles view is tat he ‘ays it demands a ‘patiotempora patteming of the mind Appel he rps the mid both arp, Yt me. om is epee, On the Paralelist view, iastead of the spictat aecting the Physi evens inthe brain and events inthe soul ate eoreied ‘ith each other, running in double harness wth exc ober, the language of logicins, in one-to-one coreladon. Whenever there are event inthe bain of» certain sor spsta events ae brought into being ‘beside the brin-events but do not movi them. On this Parallels view, «complete scence eeting of the ‘elon of the brain to the mind wosld consist of + huge xBTheories of Mind ‘dictionary’, allowing us to pass front the curreat existence of a certain sat in the rain to @ certain state of mind, and seewerst But the dictionary would bea dictionary of contingent wats, fot ie would be experience that had taught us what the correlations ‘But, of course, Parallelism escapes the arguments (or pethaps we should sayy tore modesty, the intution) of modery PIE ‘logy only to fl foul of ordinary experience. If we consider the sequence () a blow on the hand; Gi) # pain in the hand; (i) ‘weaning ofthe hands ie sems imposible to deny that, wot only isthe fest event the cause ofthe second event, Dut seo thatthe second event is the cause of the third event. If this is aot a cavtal sequence, what is? Yet the Parallelist must, gaite im- ploy, ny Ghat the pin makes me cases me) weg my 1t may be objected, however, tht the Paalsist can provide foc the terion of ind and boy inthe following wy. When smyhand istic el ns. uli when ny hand ise, fettain processes occur in my brn. Whenevet these Proce ‘ctu, fee ditresn; and whenever I el dines, these processes ‘ecu, The et thing that happens is hat I wring my hand, aed the physio wold sy that he wringing was caused bythe processes in the brn But he Praline sy ic ot equally fore to say that the weinging was eased by my diet? In ‘ede to ase that this wero 0, we would have to find ‘whet the sme ror f rsn-poces aces the et dates dost 20%, but I sill wring ey hand But, on the Palle hypothesn we never ge such 4 ease, Whenever we have that sort of Bain Pragan eel des 7 ojgson a this ingenious rejoinder is tha, granted there {sno gap' inthe chai of phys causation nthe bra (and the aceepting of ths consequence that ends tothe ening 2 epeanc of Parallels), then we can in theory deduce the Wein {np ofthe hand giver eo more than the psc sae of te brs the body, the environment andthe psa insby Which they operte, Tis implies thatthe existence of the apieal objec aed the corrhtion beeen brinprocsss and Sita sa, os no tet on the way the physi world opeates, And C0 ‘Sieh vo deny that mind ats on bu. Thee is, howeses, one other line Wat Panelist can ke oe Dualisms He can argue that mind and body do seem to interact, bat tat this interaction i an illusion, an illusion brought about by the observed fact that wringing the hand in 2 cerein way is repulely precede by having x sensation of pin, The sequence i mistaken fora causal sequence, + mistake that is dacovered as «result of modem neurophysoiogcal knowledge. Ondinary speech (the pain made me wring my band’ bears witness tothe tne before the tibtake had been dncenered. ‘hiss posible ine of defence: But it must be eelized how very extensive the ‘error’ ture out to be. We ae constantly spetking, inal sors of contents, of mental events giving tise Body happesinge (An ea crosed my mind, said.» If oer evidence is suficendly pressing, we may fave o wit of a these ways of expressing ourselves 2s embodying 2 mistake. Buta theory the would allow for the interaction of mind and body ‘oul be prefer, Before leaving this dacuasion of Interactionism ana Paralel- lnm, a fartet objection to Paallsm may be meatoned brie. Everything in the physical worl interacts with is eavironmest. No mated thing is purely passive: iis acted on, but it also acs. The Pale maintaining thatthe spiritual compooeo. this tespect. Unlike everything ee in the tniverse the spr is powedes. We should ceraialy hesitate Daleve dt this exepion ocaus, So a Duals Intesctonism cannot be squared with phyilogy sad Dualit Parallelism sincompasble with ordinary experiens- ‘Yee a Dusit mast either be ap nteraeoaist or Pazlelit. There seem, thes, to be serious objections to any form of Dalam, Neverhets, thee is an inporant disdnction to be smade berween Bundle’ and Cartesian Dualism. Te was aepued that “Bundle Deals not wetey implausible, bt that iti gil incre For toe’ ow of wich teat bul Imind have not got the epacty for independent existence whi the theory tequies In hi respec, they ae like gins or soponife Powers, There mus ve wanting wit further characteristics of kts own, that ha the grin orth power to cause Seep inte ae ‘ay, there must be something, with further chareteristics of Own, lat has a peteption oF 3 sensation. But this contd “Bundle valine Now there is no sch logical incoberenct in ”VPeories of Mind Canesian Duals, Ifthe Cattsiag is prepared to postulate, of aim to observe, a spiritual substance; if he is peepated to post ‘Acyl to obsetvs a unique eonhip hats parte spiritual substances to partic if he is prepared to poste- late, ot claim to observe, a principle of numetieal diferentation to secure the numerical diference of spiritual tubstances; if he Prepared to accept the scientific implausbilities involved in the hypothesis of the emergence of spiritual substance; and if be is repated to accept ether the scientific implausibilties involved ia Ieteractionism, or the confit with ordinary experience involved in Parallelism; then no actual contradiction can be shown in his postion, But if we could find an account of the mind that avoids such awkward consequences, it would be preferble 1g OU discussion has not merely uncovered dificulties for Dual ‘sm but has the following positive valve. It has shown ws that 7Theories of Mind Howes, if Stavsons theory rely ian Abate theo, think that tis apparent dgrecment whee i a nee thing ora person tat has the ment propees tna on sothng its el da The en toe ee tine what son ofa substances thing iby whitinth etree ian And, since anything will ve many poker ee fail many, dierent popes, the sort of akstaee Soap is wil depend upon the properties that we comes pestle lmporot,o that we have spec interes ag Ate) What propre thee ae wil ier fom peo te pores sod even theme enon at aie tne Wha soko ng 's acc? Ie primary poison, or cum Te dopo beter we are concerned with murder rehome. Meee ‘ay living haman beng are substances aveg bot tal sod nonsateral properties, tseems thea vera oer whet ‘we say that a man is a material object having certain additional Sonsmaterl propertn, or whether we thankies te ae of such exh propericsshoald make wn sop lif abnt "uel object and sare peaking of pettons nse ee we ‘specially intreedin the exenblance beeen men a ony sunt ojects? Then we lls man mate soe nee ode havingspecial propentes Ore we concerned wih tiieeies bee oe ny onder Then we ex on 4 Spare son of objet and talk owe penton han beings. Bu the two ways of talking ae not eonmadicory, Pot By own convenience, whe wee dnsasne Be Aeetie 1 shal formate the theory in he mates ys an 8 tue substace having evan ext, soo, st ys oie ah fet pce, should these special atrbutes be taken t be {Beg tos of celation tht the body, or pars ofthe body, have iSR0 lngs in the weld, or should they be thought oft noe opal Ptopetties of the body? I shall present am argument © ‘The Attribute Theory ‘0 other things inthe world. IETam looking ata tre, it scems very ‘natural to say that my looking is, of involves, n uniqueireducble relation holding between me and the tree. If semember an event in my childhood, it may still sem plausible co say that there isan unique irreducible relation holding between myself at the present time and my childhood state. However, such a telation to the past seems more peculiar. Again, when Ilook forward to dinner ‘one might say that ths involves an unique irreducible relation holding between me now and the dinnee to come, although once ‘again the relation seems 2 peculiar one. However, there is 2 most serious objection to this attempt to ‘construe mental states a relations to things inthe world, Suppose, sis perfectly imaginable, that I have exactly the same perceproal experience as Fhad when f looked at the te, but suppose that this time there is no tree there. Or suppose that I have exactly the fame memory-experiences a Thad whea I remembered the event in my childhood, but no such event eves took place. Or suppose tit Tam in exactly the same mental state as When I anticipated dinner, but I never get any dinner. a all there cases, there is, by hypothesis, nothing in the world for me to be ‘meataly related” 10. So no unique, ireducible, elation can be involved. Yet, also by hypothesis, the mental sate is no diferent from the mental Sate inthe frst set of cases. So no relation of ourselves to things {inthe world is ever involved. Ite true, ofcourse that we do not ‘ormally use the aord ‘perceive’ and “remember” wales what is perceived or remembered really exists or eisted, But this only ‘means that the notions of perceiving or remembering involve something more than a reference to meatal sates, viz. the fac that ‘something in the world or inthe past corresponds to these sats. This argument does not sticly disprove the View that meotal states esentially involve unique tod irreducible relations to ob- jects lying outside the body. But once such ehings a5 what is Perceived” and ‘whats remembered” are rejected a the other tem Of these relations itis hard to find plausible substitutes. Realise philosophers like Samuel Alexander tried to deal with the problem in the following way. They argued that ia the ase, ‘say, of false memory, although the situation remembered bad a teal existence, nevertheless the contents of the situation did havea real existence. The event in my childhood never occurred, but I did have a childhood and the event, or the constituent part 39Theories of Mind of the event, dd oecur—pethaps in somebody cla’ eildhoe, My fe memory i therefore a relation holding hatwoee mac and these seatered constituent. Bur this acount of memory a8 « many-termed relation to the smemoryconsinens faces incredible problems. How camp arent relation to a past A and a B be a belie thac A por BP Nothing inthe telatonal sitution seems to correspond fo chs copulation. Another dificult is that Bat lest ay be sig = Property, such asa colour. Whit ate ‘ve to make ofa teaton that slates a particular mind to. universal inthis way? Te seems, then, that che Aesibute theory must sy tat meatal ites ae tome fort of nnrelion! propery ofthe body. Per haps mental sats involve relations, but i they do they wl met be elation to anything lying beyond the body of whic dey me sxsbutes, (The face tae my bead is above my ru i eeltion oon prt of my boy another par Bat ent loa property of ay body, beceose isnot urelaon my body hs 0 Jemeting ole. Equally, mental atcbutes could involve reson, ‘without being elatonal properties ofthe body) Bot before we turn to consider the view that mental sates are onrhional properties of bodes, tmnt bene tha ee ve stumbled upon a very important property of mental ste ‘What it sei fo think of ara elation of the mental sate something in the world is, in fact, what has been called the ‘ntatinaliy of sch sates. Tis word was used by the Scola Blorophers, and again by the Avsianphionopier Teams Brentano at the tin ofthe cetary, to capres the pectin ‘pole tog’ characer of mental states. Inthe presen day, fN. Hey England, and R. M. Chisholm nthe US As hare alowed Brea fano hee. (Se Findlay, Vale and Into, Allen Be Ua en y Pitted ‘Chisholm, Perceiving, Cornell, 1957, Ch. 474) Some, perhaps all, mena sate “pein beyond sheonsiven ™ "tual experience ofa te “pinto a ues, The fenton ‘The Attribute Theory does not. This isa quite special characteristic of mental states ‘hich isnot possesed by ordinary physial states or by physial objects. A knife does aot ‘point’ to cating, although ie may sungest cutting to somebody, and the word ‘hfe’ may bea word applied only to things that cat ‘The erm “intentionality” is somewhat wahappy. It suggests a ‘pci ink between intentionality and intentions which does not cast Intentions do have intenonaity, for they “point to what i lntended. Bus they are not distinguished herein fom other mental states, An alternative term i “intensonalisy Bat this may lead to coafasion with the (not unconnected) loican’s notion of in- tension, Despite disadvantages, it seems better to stick tthe commoner wage. "Now any theory ofthe mind mast beable to give some account or analysis ofthe intentionality of meatal sates, or ele t must accept as an ulimate, inducible, feature of the menial Breaino takes the second course, and be is fllowed ia this by Findlay and Chisholm. What is more, Brentano thinks that io dona he mek he men For not only tention Peculia co mental tates, but, according to Brentano, every ment tte pose lnenionaliy. (Ge sive Disindn, between ‘Meotal and Physical Phenomena, tandlated by D. B. Tere i the collection edited by R.-M. Chisholm: Realm ond te Bake seed of Phenomemlgy, Glencoe Feee Press, 1960.) Tis leat that ‘0 physicals can accepe the iteducbity of intentionality, al- though he could accep Brentano's view that intentionality i the atk of the mental ‘The notion of intentional, incidentally, eaables 2 defender oft Ate dary 6 aa cae what eines by 420 physi property of the pysical body Ifthe fotentionality of men reece aha et seaus, The Atcibute theory can mark thi special satus by speak- ing of mena sats a non materi tates ofthe mate boty Ta terms of our presen parposes, however, we have been i aresing. At present we are concerned oly with the point that ‘he mental attibates postulated by the Artabute theory cannot be relations berween the body and other things in the world. The ‘ext question that arises is whether these mental properties ate Dropertes of the body as a whole, or whether sey are simply Properties of some par, and, if so, which part? This question “Theories of Mind smay seem tbe eather peclar on, bu think ti one tata SSppore ofthe Arriote theory as got 0 anaes Fore Ss) shat the properties se nite properties of the hse Boy ter f some proper pach postion hm to ave cos i affect the physical order ia any ‘way is completely correct? The fact that the situation was one _where properties were predicated ofthe brain instead of situation ‘where non-physical items were correlated with states of the brain ‘would seem to be aa irelevant distinction. ‘This means that, if we are to have form of the Attribute theory that isto allow 2 genuine iteration of mind and body, then it must clam chat che portions of the brain which have these special mental properties are also distinguished by operating in a ‘way that could aot be predicted on the bass ofthe laws govern- ing other, ordinary, matter. The emergeore of new ‘mental properties in the brain must carry with it the emergence of new Jaws of physical working in the brain. Only thus could the Ataribute theory save the specifically mental from a mere spec- ‘atorsole. ‘This means that, in order to save the common sense view that ‘what is specifically meatal plays a causal role in the physical ‘world, the Attribute theory willbe freed t take a cerain view of the scientific facts about the workings of the bran. But, as we saw in discussing the dificultes for a Dualit Interactonist, this view conteadicts the findings, ofa any rate the intuitions, of most ‘modern neurophysiologists. For there is increasing evidence that the workings of the brain involve nothing more than the physical, chemical, and biological laws that govern the rest of organic ‘matter. To be forced to oppore this view ofthe bran, or else £0 condemn the specifically mental properties to impotence, isthe ‘unhappy choice that the Atcrbute theory must make. (Gi) We saw that one of the dificulies for Dualism is that it ‘ust asign the coming into existence ofthe immaterial mind £0 1 definite point of time in the development of the organism, “7Theories of Mind although here seems tobe no atl pinta which chan enti could emerge, The sme dfcalty hols for the Artabute tary ‘Avehat poat inthe ral growth ofan organ dete sey non-material properties ofthe substance appear? Imre Is tobe seskonad an redocl fete of mental proses fe iss great metaphysial gulf fixed between pie sd eal rors (nd intonation etc fo mental what analysis of loteaonaly ean the ‘Atte theory ofer2) Yet on the physical se we seem to hve no mote than a gradu increse in pial comply without» bret a ‘ny point tht might betoken the emrence of someting new 1c fost be admited that realy ses cious forte ‘Accibute theory than forthe Dat, Por In he ee 8 he Arete theory we have only the emergence of relay nce Properties; white inthe ete ofthe Duss theory we have te fteaon of new sor of subrtnce, Bat te probe ls ‘erout one even frat Atubute theone G) The fal cits to be rough apuiast the Ate theory is avery snple oe. I at that the noon of these nique propets of the brn i a mytrous one, We eto thiakef the cent nervous atm a somehow spied over th 4 changing patter ofthese special properties, Tacs nc poferies of whlch takes no sect ask Dew the porto of. an Rha as the property have il ver ot not They hav, ose Sound up with itenionaliy. Jas how do these peopetes can form no cleat conception of 1g a et re ey i ees eee Sat em ni ey ns oy cbmc ed atte tects ne creer ermais omy hoy, tied ceo ean please nis 2 SiG ech ley ce Boia eee een cw ere choose the Attribute theory. Butt wer veto choose the Ae FJ. But it would be preferable to ha 4 A DIFFICULTY FOR ANY NON-MATERIALIST THEORY OF MIND BEFORE leaving the Dualit and Attribute theories of mind 1 shall mention a icaty which os rece been anveted on 2 puns ofocasons by) J. Sa ena ong wat ‘eas suid, but the arguments too import ro be ignored, We fave alteaiy come neat it but only eat when we discus the dials facing an Interactions theory 1 eee nny ey he logy comely rede to chemistry which, nt torn, completely edule to physics ‘Piatto yt een inceigy ely at al Gemicl d Biologic! happenings are expiable Principle a parcclar applictions ote ines of pis tat govern non-heme 2 aon-biologia phenomena. Cini che hn nes for ano Matt ory of he lade eas tat the whole word stale by scr contig Nothing but py hinge opeaing according the av Phy wt de xe of he mid Only poe fore ‘scone anew tng, oa any ate 4 now 208 Pope this inthe or lve elev phy soe nd he {aleonfiguraon ofthe hing pss deal with he freee to be prediuble in theory (OF course he fondant aes Of pies are nation sree ned tenon 2 Stata prediction ‘will be possible) Mental hsppenigs, °Theories of Mind sme happenings aloe, would espe. ‘They, and they alin could not be predicted, even in principle, by physic “This conclsion would hold, tented vce here wer the suicts prailon between pysieal events inthe Bele od eval lt For nn ses spree py wal teed, besides his knowledge of physics aphyacegeat pore Teel “dcconary By meas of ta’ devon” hare fot worked out what the physi sate of partuas shor shea dott be ata eri ine, he could thea tay what sega Smeal event in hea ind mae Bh 4y'could never be compet inte fst place siya Pa knowlege of pa peso Now is this cede picture ofthe world? Unt selavely tecetly it didnot seem sceniealylkely tat iolegy ea core etl reduce to chemi, sad chamnty combos coe {bef physi. Under thee Cheumstnces war pe lea to think that pyeholgy dest wih ute new case ie sew laws, which emerged when we hal organo of eae fomplex biologic ststre Bur fal te scenes carp tology ae, in theory vexy comple partes; evo be fom amen since of Pipe stn ery wey tht ye ehelogy is an exception Ie would follow tat cone Mackie thar Oh nd the oe ven tisha not done fil sce to the scent implaus aioe Merten fein Cees ote of he cnet that must be ssn to ent bere aod the sonsateril mind, The process dat goon the brain when I fel pin in my hand ae own te incediby compler Bo, we can tat fo itospection he an nel na reltvely simple ae. Now the non Matern eet fostuste ‘en very il with the rn of the stewetate of eae. atgumnents ace aot lel} compeling anes, Tete is nothing sel-contradictory in ying that al thee alent ‘educible to physics, but ta peychlogy i otto edule Not ls shee anything sel contradictory a connecting she completes brainprocesses with the relative snplsin of coed rents Tels oly being argued that tia very innate hypotsedtat ‘here ate ireduiby novel events sce withthe pecion of so A Difeuty for any Non-materialst Theory of Mind that enormously complex mechanism, the central nervous system, while no such ‘emergent enites ae found anewhere else In the tniverse, We may baptize this argument the “Argument from the supremacy of physic. “There ate various objections that may be made to this aga- rent, and the rest ofthis chapter willbe devoted toa brief con- ‘idzztion of them, Ta the fist place, some philosophers will be inclined to protest shat inpoul fors ten samen ft ost & point of philosophy. (This protest may also be made bout some ofthe arguments advanced in the two previ chapter.) They sep inthe fing way. Ponty ot cone with gs, but with our concepts of things. Now conceptual truths are ine independently of any sienisc discovery. Philosophical ‘questions about the mind are therefore questions about the con- ‘xpt of mind, and scientific ndings have no bearing on these “Now it may be questioned whether hiss the whole th about Philosophy, and, indeed, if the detene of mind to be pat for- ‘ward in this book is correct, philosophy isnot solely conceptual alysis. But at present I wll grant that philosophy is concerned solely with concepts because, even if hii tru, I think the ob- jection i sl invalid. Here i is worth consdesing G. E. Moore proceduze in another context. Certs philosophers have vanced 1 prior arguments for dsbeleving inthe existence of the physical ‘orld, of of tim. But, Moore pointed ou, we ae actually far smoce certain of the existence ofthe physical world and of Hine, than we ae ofthe alii of hee dl povopical ge sents, He drew th conclusion thas it would be rational t accept the elsteee ofthe pie std and of ine eet than he Phlosophial aguments, oven i me cmv ie wat ir wrong with te Eon similares obvi ey dil hilo sep cog sae ie rane cma ‘Clin wil ard ob inssch comers we my wel take scientific results and likelihoods to be as good ‘iat te rhs any cer comdemon. We are te eho vu emierion nen td fcr ‘Nong nthe sue wat ee ght 0 ob ‘Sie peal je, ot of clang, uemelgh + Pin ”Theories of Mind ssgsmenation. So sbjetions to nom Matra theo of he ind drawn from eric scence not ends et ashe 10 be, consideration that inoene the plilonopieimeloce Inte second ple, howeer asl ove gener ejection out procedure maybe mised Let be pated tat a om like the “Argument ftom the supremacy of Pyic fae some fore Bat where nit pial frees Income ee pant of mind, why shold we give speci weigh te he fing oF Snridons of science? Way ot pay at Inet seh heal slg ot moro ai or ee oo as? iota ae of airy neta coie te pin epee et tothe scenic vision when we te seching top a acc of the meae of man? But there sin fc, howeves, very simple eon for ping secial weight to scentife considerations. Historialy, sete investigation bas proved tobe the only way tats sum of pinion aout dspated mates of theory hus eves een sccred tong those who have given the mar seous td inliget tention, Onl sine a ed dpputed oceans Ts the serentecoth centr sania inte eet story of the human sce From that ine ond tees een 2 a growth of Koowledg in fli wher ee wus previous oly ‘ssngling speculation. And the reson fortis spleton fseenthc method tothe fas flows tat sees Sierstione shouldbe pivena quite pei weg aceon ueions of theory wich sili pute seat sare Te may be repli thatthe els in which science ca give ws sclable knowledge are ite, so that in some elds we Ms of gece ttt less slab pues This meyer tt T hardy think that hasbeen mae oo. Le pareane ha not See make ot or the gion of tea of min. On te fone, asl have teed to thow inh chante fees Smar, scientific considerations do point in 4 certain dicetion In the third place, descending fom the ‘of high gene. from these matters of high gene ‘lig itmay be objected tha there is one body of alleged stentifc Teenie Of 8 highly controversial mature, which may show that (ie elm of mind is not governed solely by the laws of physics: 2 prschical research. Although the whole question i very cot 2 A Dificulty for ony Now-materalst Theory of Mind “pri hte sme ct eves fo the exten of telepathy and pestape evidence for other ‘paranormal powers mind algo, The exitenceof such powers would not tect ont» purely materialist aceount of mana that might be necessary would be the admission that this material objec, man, ad vey spedal abilies, But thee is iiculty forthe view that this objet is behaving solely in accordance with the laws of Discs, Fore is ao tall ext to ee how these special powers, F they do exis, could be reconted with out presen conceptions of physics. T refer only brief to this point here: nthe ial chapter ile smote willbe sud. Bue the consideration of paychiealresetch ust introduce a ote of eatin ito the tse of the “Argument {tom the sopremacyof physics For frases areal doubt whether physics i supeeme, Ta the fourth pice, it may be objected tht there ft least one aroup of properties that cannot be fied into the structure of Byes: the secondary quaiies such as colour, sound, taste and nde doesnot mate orth ction wher he conn Seales are coneived of x qualifying pial objecs oF mental items sacha sense-mpressons. All het vse for this ob jection to maiain stat they are imate properties, ieducle to the properties ck objects th whch physics concerns tale TF this is granted we wil eed extra correation ws to correlate these properties with such tinge athe wave length of ght ora eran sort of neural letekemicaldcarge Ie wll hen be ‘much more plausible to mnt that the emergene of mind involves the emergence of specal qian or ents, corcated ‘ith the existence of phyiel sates of the brn. " ‘But the ery cei rsdence sped this bape ives 3 ean to spt tha the econ uals ae oo Bt ize a Caper a teen, be aged at hei aothing lg in cenit a eens od det {y them, with purely physial properties of physsal ects vents If this (obviously conttoversia) lin of argument suc- cst, the fourth objection tothe “Argument fom the sop macy of physi5 BEHAVIOURISM ee dune eee argued that Bundle’ Duaism is an incoherent theory, the Cartesian Dualism involves many implasibiisen, sad that {ittbute theory, although more satisfactory than Cartesian ism, still involves behave of men’s bodies. eran Sompletely precise, Nehavioursm does not ental Max To aes conceivable that a philosopher should give an compls sd sphiscned ar no sate atitcouldnorhasea EERE Jn pactice, however, suppose that no Behave cea serastara ms sie oe Ura org pagemmac Gilbert Ryle's book The Concept of Min ‘seems sna i mane i adage ed ee ia Behavourism hotly denied by many disciples. ‘The problem of interpreting ‘Witgenstei’s book may pethaps be reduced tothe problem of interpreting a single sentence: sto, An ‘inner process stands ia aced of ourwatd criteria When Wittgenstein speaks of ‘outward criteria’ he means bodlly behaviour. The phrase inner proces’ refers to mental happenings ofthe sore that, frime face, seem quite diferent from body behaviour: such things a8 thoughts and sensations. In saying tht “inner processes’ stand in need of outwaed criteria Witgenstein seems to be saying that there isa logically neasiry connection beeween the former and ce ate. But if this isso, Wittgenstein seem: committed ether to asserting the existence of 2 logically ‘necessary connection between ‘distint existence’, which seems 4an implausible interpretation of his view, oF else to saying that “inner processes’ are. not really anything distinct from bodily behaviour, although there may be wo diferent ways of ling about what men do, Bu this is a form of Behaviour. Tis iv terpretation is strengthened ifwe aadice the quotation marks that ‘enclose the phrase “nner proces’, maths absent in the case of the Phase ‘ounward ete. ‘Bot thee i one dificult in interpreting Wittgenstein and Ryle a5 Behaviourists, Both writers deny tat they bold this doceine! think, however, that the only reason that these philosophers devied that they were Behavioursts was that they took Behaviou?- lism to be the doctrine that thre are no such things as minds. Since they did nor want eo deny the existence of mind, but imply ‘wanted fo give an account ofthe mind in terms of behaviour, they denied that they were Behaviourist. ‘But this raises a further problem. Why did these philosophers {nterpret Behavioursm inthis stringe way: an interpteation that ie would be dificult ro ad any actual Behaviourist to endorse? T think the reason for this was the doctrine held by Witgenstein (and apparently acceped by Ryle) chat philosophy, when done roperly, issues in iluminations, but notin doctrines In order taints cus view fib ater co pertude one that any philosophical doctrine one holds is aot realy a doctrine. {rehe dostine in quesionsBeavioussn, the wiles help to redefine Behaviourim in such a way that entails that one ‘ot Behaviourst, One's own view will ack a name, and then it 8‘Theories of Mind will easier overlook tat ity 0 ia doe. Ta thi way, thik he plwptrs ong pean cer ey However, wheter thi pice of interpretation i right o ot does aot ely matter. The secounts of renal process given thee lilosopbers were cersily very cleo Bekeooy, tod ic weal to consider tem ne Bebo I ey ae ok Behaviours, we muy challenge tes of tl fllowes tll us in what wy thei iow dies ftos Behe [Ab 2 theory of mind, Bhnvourom has coi antes. @ Weis lee tha Bharat en aceasta ey {ha tik holdsberwsen mind and bay. For scoring ht theory, he mind Ij the body inno (@) ike the Atabute theory, Behaviorism can ety give anaccout of tc nese difrcace bern two minds Por he ‘Binds ae disingusbed by the two bole involved, to bods le et ei din pas oe te, Gs) Behaviour ie compatle with moder sciatic kaow- ledge of body and brain. a ‘On the other hang, However, Behaviorism has cern di ateanages, (eile haa Behaviour canoe allow the logical poss bi of the disembodied exten of mind, Yate ate tat this seemed to bes mening conan (What can the Behari male othe intratin of ind sad body? As we have sey argued, e flowy sognnee peat to be 2 cal one) my hand ees ONT el son (GT my band We wan toy tn the ble ate fl lo and the pain in tum mates ne wring oy hoa, Con the Echivou eat tian. cal sequences For hiss he pla simply diposiion or tensncy,«dpotion eaten ons feted io things ke wenging o's hand Cos Se ber te Blow case the disposition (sic is the pa) which ears the ‘iogng? Since the whole point of Behaviour sto den the usenet ofinne mental events bree he pa sa td th physical sexponse, be cannon onder fr tee ob toe acta thre mus be tne to msec, The Beker dones Sat te mind ia ting. So it canot stent oie set Yet the eat of the struck hand is naturally construed as ease of iater- 6 Bebavioriem (Gi) Ieis nota all lear how the Behaviousistis going to explain the intentionality or “pointicg’ character of mental proceses Here he may claim that he is ao worse position than a Dualit for a defender of the Attribute theory. But his is not quite tue, for no Materialist can claim tha inteationality san unique, ua. analysable property of mental processes and still be consistent ‘ith his Mateialiem. A Materialist forced to attempt an anahet Of intentionaliey. But a non-Materialist is under no auch oblig- atioa, s0 that he has more freedom of manoeuvre when he is ‘ying to deal with the problem. (iv) These dificultes for Behaviourism are all manifestations of fone central dificuly. Most implausibly, the Behaviourst denies the existence of iner mental procesres. There seems to be some- thing more going on in us than mere outward physical behaviout ‘The great problem for the Behaviourst sto say why, if his view is correct, we are so wildly misled inthis mace. ‘Now Ido not think that this problem canbe solved, but theres ‘0 doubt that heroie efforts were made to solve it. What is more, these efforts led to new insights into the nature ofthe mental con. cepts which are of permanent value forthe philoscphy of mind. [Before embarking on further cttciem of Behaviours, therefore, it will be well worthwhile to look at the various considerations by which the Analytieal Behaviours tried to make the deaial of nner mental processes plausible. There is much tobe lezt from their ingenious excuses for Behaviourism. to ind als te ented snets ines cafe cuter arent taetemactes oem gtanar esomeue Soiree aceeanaty sae Peter ere Seni mamaemaetanses eestor eran "Tories of Mind Pprtulate mysterious inner states. We shall say instead that to bee lieve thatthe earth is fat isto be disposed to cary out cen ‘edly actions: aceting, and speaking defence othe statement “the earth is flat’, and many similar hinge ‘As we have mentioned etl, dispoaional predates are not Applied to people only. We say that alas is bela that is Alsposed to beak easily—and if we can apply dispositional pad. {ates to glass then we cur apply them to 2 human body eis frac that when we say glass is bute we believe that there ome urtent state ofthe glass which accounts for is ritlenss, (The molecular structure ofthe glass, pehaps) Io the same way ifs tran believes tha the earth fat, no doube she curcene state of is brsin dies from the site ofthe brain of one who doce not be lieve this. But, the Bebavioucet maintains, the existence of sich 0t involved inthe concept of belie ofthe importance of dsportions in atiba- allows us tosee, the Reheviourt raitained, espenatons of fman ‘conduct ate dispositional i ‘ature Iti tempting to construe‘ drinks because be ity after the model of ‘He falls becasse hes pushed Being posted an event which precedes, and brings about, his il So the Bev haviourist argues, when we cnaider ‘He dinks beetse be is this’ we ae inclined to look for an event preceding the dink {nt which tit cause, We may fll to find hach an eve inthe fublee’s behaviour, nd so we conclude that ‘being thisty" saa Inne paychil event which bing abut he sein Bee ae Behaviourst goes on, once we ae alive to the mportacce of di Pasiios in an account of the mind we shall fonstae ‘being {hiry' as 2 mere disposition to drink, We shall compare te {tins because he is thirsty” to “The gias breaks beesos it is bet’ and not o ‘He falls beciuse he is posted Ad then the ‘eed to postulate an inner event wil be gene, Ja the aro place, the Behaviours pointed to an asymmetry between ny koowledge of my own dispositions, and another see fon's knowledge of my disposition, Iris an empiral fact tot T Bebaviowrism scching. nor ave ay oer evidence to goon. Another pesca ‘ould not have the power to mak sch ve dapsone, Bent abowe me witout evens, but {have Mp power hee ‘omehig like my power oy whee my ft had seen en tyes ate shor nT have ot wonced ny a se here Fe Sippose fam blinded sd sometay mone the and about) But in the oe ofthe thin, what Tit fo that oy Boy i ins ccin sat, bu thot has a ceraindpostion ‘This ‘piveged sce! fo oar own doosion is probly the mst importa suggestion hs ale Beto as te sok forthe slation of the mind bey problem ces f Sele comes very conf he ea te mystery enbes Se Behaviowie to epi the oii any oe os) of wat he takes tobe the ry of tne mental prccenes ite Sallowing way IT haves pecot mange Sates shot Bron eopostions tat hes poole bck, oneal oak thin statements ae bed ot sone evidence Te evidence lady nobody happening, forme lean bei hapening ay be czuring. Hence weeny conc nt te eae ea be some inner popes pons which we alone sere Ba Ba ma ny gels ey stostons is knowledge that fot bed ons evidence alli only oorincule tendency fo ink that al owe ie use pon evidence tat ns deve (Gf eo he Bebavioui il ot day the existence ofa ‘tal mechan hate esponsb for ospecl ity oak SStenees abot oar os cue dispositions to behave onthe bel oo eee er we oe an ak sbi would be maya. What happen ihe Belo a St atthe cipotion ce ce ie Sin soocsposvel se, preumabl sat of the tain, Suitable creumstanes this brain gate causal factor that en tbls us to make te saement shout or cure dpostionn, ‘tenet, bowevey, tint we a abe ack wp fy a Beha 3, 10 apply Ta the tind place he Behaviours ainsi, © 3 correctly the sae predate to's numberof mena peiformantet Sees not aecrnty nen at hy fave one oman foe a ttc of which the reise lei recog tc of individ covered bythe word “ge hen iis pale 9Theories of Mind say thatthe word is applied to individual grafes in viewe of festces that are common and pect them all Now fs sy to goon to think hat thie the cxse with ll gene words The assumption lies behind Socrates’ earch for definition, wat i= hesited by Plto, and throagh him became an unoestiond assumption of Wesem philosophy. Bat Wigensten argued tat the assumption is nat always true (C. Pibvphcel loess, Sect. 69, He sas that if we conser a word ike “game” we ‘annot find 2ny common and peculiar featue in vito of which ‘he word is correctly applied, Instead we shall only ‘semblance’ between diferent sors of games (chides games, board-games, Olympic games, and so 08) There ae, Were paths connecting cern speiesof game’ that iso ea, cy fe semble one another in certain respects but these path ae atthe same path which link them to other species: they resemble these ‘other species in diferent respect. And in the case of some species of game they may be connected only iste resemblance {9am intermediate spesey, and hardly rvomble exch thet in 207 relevant respect. Witgensten ud thatthe word ‘game’ was a ‘farilyword oF that games form a fay’. Perhaps we can put his contention another way by saying thatthe concept of game has eran ‘seater’. Now the whole topic of amily-oeds demands 2 rest deal more investigation than has yet been givea to i Bat Ont ‘hing des seem obviow: if chris anything in the pation ea concepts can exhibit this "seater fn gre oh Now the Behaviour came, een seid Tene of te Josey of the mental concepts that they eit soch "cate? in gh eget dey ae fies of seseiing snes Bld gcthet ina partially loose way. Suppor, for isan, that Re look fora single sore of behaviour that consittes 2 alt being angry We shall aoe Gnd ie Iam angey with Jones Tm suk hm, speak il of him, work aguns he meres, o simply ignore him. But none of thee things hoecesry for me tobe angry with Jones. Now, the Behaviours argues if we ate sll ‘ele the Soca delsion thatthe word ge” applied in ‘itu of some single feature that ll eases of anger have incom” son, then we shall cerainly have to eject any behaviourtc scout of anges, We sal be foreed to sy that ager «sae ier sate which, under dierent crcumanees, fives Tae 1 © Bebaviourtme ate ofan ot eee nt ety Seo Pia ct ete eal Seefeld pittance od Sete sco andl ha ‘ee nage pe So unl eee Ligeti rr pnd Sen Ta pal a ee cea olga tent da SLRS Spal ee ies an einige tae oie sper ne wie ca ee kala Se eroiaee eieinem es Seo ee 2 In the fourth place, the Behaviourists dew a distinction between ae ee a een tater eam eae ef ary eT ater cs a oa a fo Se atte a eat eras ean rr ruben ee SATS hearer ole o Sal ican aoe abe ey apse Seer a rr deel og faci ttar™ hc cr tee (mens tape ee Secnattagep beeen oie eri Serie te eae any Saga Erat Slgetacrpes goer Sea erp nl st a Sears SYA We ets ar ne ewig or tacoma sag sma ea fr tl yl Sintec a cebu Siena a pang cnr eee ce ETRte no fy cele tn could have ten mo tie ee cer eS ne eed Soon me ee cat arate acl lta ese Srey reek arte amt dg pcs pet phe ee oe ae ‘ccounted members ofthis family only by a cern courtesy.Theories of Mind ‘The point may be brought out, the Behaviovrists thought, by ¢onsierng tat, although unexpcised anger ina en of sages is not the sort of ease we can ure to teach a child the meaning Of the word ‘anger’. For such ttching we mst go to eases whese there is overt and unambiguous angry behaviour. Thi indieates that these latter eases are the cea cate, and the cases of UP ‘expressed anger ae peripheral In the fd plac, the Behavioucst argued that, even although there are central cases of behaviour falling undee acer meatal oncept i is almost impossible to find behaviour which is onplily woambiguous instance falling under 2 certain meatal oacept. A man is insulted, and strikes his eormenton, Wat he ‘7? ei possible wo ener ths doube. The behaviour dos ‘ot actually ena! anget. In spite of the insult, the blow might have been ginen for some other tason tha sop, ok et ‘may again lead us to think thatthe anger i an inner mental ate flisuinct from the behavious. But, che Bchaviourist argues the fact thas it is almost impossible to describe a patten of Behaviout {hat actually entails anger means only that we ean conceive of farther buhviowr, or a wider context forthe original behavious, ‘he poor made here ell the micorinaye of eet rely the micorimage of he made it peviwly. There we sl hat oe ete eel Cais of behaviour whieh we count mili ale tee set coneep although the bshaont isnot ene seas ucental ces fling under ta once Suck cea be spi Only if there ace cena canes can ter be pesphca ones Srsecivise, ‘it is possible to find cases where the beha- iow involeed i th socited With the cots oy ex cera concep, bat he behaviour aot eked nes that concept. But again we my Bega Bet again vemay ad ha such exceptions coud ot of ampli, we of spicy, we can say of any aia iat a hes one is 90% he ds of gras asx sharp boundary, Bee ne SRE e tors of behaviour ay, according toe Analy al py btviot we sal qu nd at Bebaviourism cern sorts of behaviour can hardly be casi a angey be- havioue, aoe yet be described ae Behaviour that isnot angry. (his was the point of Wittgenstein’ question ‘Cen you play chess without the queen?) Even if we ate fall apprised of the {acts ofthe station we may sl be doubfl beyond any remedy save that of linguistic decision whether to cll eran behaviont ‘angry’ oF not. OF course, thei a feature of other concept bee sides the mental ones, bat its specially prominent fertre ofthe ‘mental concepts. “This feature of mental concepts is clay linked with, but x severheless distinct from, the “ay-nature’, of “sates” ha they also characteristclly exhibit. ei very likely chat a "aly? concept will delimit clase this also without fixed boundaries, but a concepe could have one feature without the other. The concept of aumber may bea concep that family one, but the class of things we cal “numbers has a prety defaite boundary. ‘Many deze sors of things count as aumbes: natural umber, real numbers, imaginary nimbers, infinite numbers, et. And it tight be hard to find anything common and pecule to all hese Alierene sorts of sumer, But the cas of umbers may sil ave ‘definite boundary: there need aot be things of which we cannot sy shee they ate murs og ot. Contain alu ‘concepts do not seem t0 be family covcepts, but & shades picked ovt by the word blue, for example, does got have 4 defnte boundary. There are shades that make os doubifl ‘whether to ell them Be oF 00 Teis easy to overook the ft dat the cas picked out by most mental coocepes fas this vague boundary. And then ft sexy #9 {oon aking Fries ‘Was ieraly ange, or aot? If we do his the Behaviour argue, we sal tf it eany vo aczpt an ac count of mental conceps inter of behaviour, for behaviour i Sid and there ie an sbtence of oy sharp breaks berween one tor of hv nd ater. nea esl ily os late some inne item which is efter presen Of aot, and Which is the ete of cenun sons of behavoue Bot once we dose that mental concepts delimit classes with very vague boundaties, we Shall Gad it much easier to accept 2 Behaeousse acount ofthe nd. Tn the sooth place, the Behavioussts pointed tothe extent to which the use ‘of the mental concepts is built upon certain %Theorie of Mind mpisial presuppositions. f we consider the concept of giafe once again, we can ty tat i ses up a clearer dvaon the animal kingdom, Among present-day animals at any tte eth am animal i a gale or ite not, We Can, however imagine ant where, in can phrase, ‘we should not kaow what tsa, We Cenc. Now "iat pam spetal word. The extosnes of this wayof speaking stingy, and he more singly beeuse She tacoma bough ut by Hane Forint cure of Poti forward theory of nd storing to which not a iyo apce, be sage Seppote we cos se clay note bof nother ad oberve Gi teconatperepon whichconsinah nor king pence nea be Pu Soe po aby Dass Sy a) He's way of talking here, indeteouble on hit own theory, seems tous allt bes axa way of aking, shough we might now sy ‘head’ aot brenst Bt Dualit st ya the mind fe ot inthe body in any gross material sense ofthe word i ‘Whit hi own seine sue of the word ys mystery (@ Cental wate Materia can provide + sinpl pape of sumer difernce for minds vie cree of lac js 2 he ‘Autbute and te Blavourt thebry en Ci) Cente Matera a cx very simply the iter acon of mind and body. Brain aod body interac 50 mind td idy ineret (Gs) Ceosistate Maen allows vs vo sy thatthe mid ‘omer ito being in + grad way, and that tere i 90 sharp teak between aot having mind and baving one. Por in the Evolution ofthe species, ad inthe development of he inva, the brain comes Et Deng in «geal way. The simplifeason of our worldpcce that reals the epeial advange of Satria theo cling Boavourin) (@) Ba ute Behaviounen, 2 Contsate teary doesnot deny the existence of inner mentl sates. On the conteay, i Astra thereitences they are physeal sae ofthe brain ‘Neveriley, a Ceta-tate theory ems ace some esis objections. n‘Theories of Mind (@) We argued that aay satsfutory theory of end ought to allow for the logical possibilty of disembodied minds. If the ‘mind is the brain, it might seem that a mind logically cannot exist in a disembodied state in any but the erudest sense, that isto SY. as a brain without a body. This ie not what we mean by 2 dis- embodied mind, (Gi) In ettczing the ‘Bundle’ theory, we saw that mental states are incapable of independent existence. It is not clear how the CCentral-state theory can account for this. Bran-states or processes seem to be things that could be conceived to exist independently of anything else. They do not even require a brn, for we could conceive them as, ef, patterns of electieal discharge in space. of Nika at moun « Cate hoy cn ghee the ‘intetionalty” oF ‘Poining’ natace of mental processes. I Is ore that no thet we have Caned hu at any paar light on this problem so fa, But, as We noticed when discussing Behaviourism, Materialist theories ar at a special disadvantage in dealing with “intentionality, because they cannot teat it a8 an irreducible, unanalysable,festure of mental processes on pain of| contradicting thie Materialism, (iv) In discussing Behavioutism, we conceded that behaviour and dispositions to behave do enter into the concept of ein in some way. It is not clear how a Centea-state theory does justice to this feature of the mental. ‘But the dificulties considered inthe previous section pale before ‘one powerful line of argument that may seem to be 2 conclusive season for denying thatthe mind isthe brain, Take the statement “The mind is the brain’. (Mental processes are beain-processes’ ‘may be subsite if preferred.) Does the statement purport (0 bbe a logically necessary truth, or is it simply claimed to be con tingently erue? Does a defender ofthe Centrl-sat theory Waatto sssimilate the statement to “An oculist iran eye-doctor’ oF 7 +5 12,01 the one hand, or to “The morning star the evening sat" (or *The gene isthe DNA molecule’, on the other? It is perfectly clear which way the eat mos jump here. If there 6 Toe Central state Tory is anything certain philosophy, es ceri that “The mind ie the brains nota logcllyaeceray tth. When Arto sid ‘hate bia wav noting but an orga for Keeping the ody coe, eas certainly not ily of denying 8 recexry tah, His mise thke was anempitialooe So firs ee tat he minds eben, ‘model ast be foun! among contingent statements of eat. ‘We mast compare the statement t0 "The mong sti he treaing star of “The gene i the DNA molecle, of ome other ‘Saringentsscton of ideniy. (The atement “The genes he [DNA molecules nota very ext one fom the biological pint of view, Bot it wil prove to bes wate expe in the deveon- Stent ofthe argument, and it iv aecorste enough for OB Purpons kere) oti “The mind is the bein’ contingent statement then it follows that it must be poasle to ive logic independent ‘slonaons on alternatively, ‘stentve defn) of themes ing ofthe to. worde mind” and “bi Foe cosies, ‘The oshng oi heveig sa? iaoningstcmes We ce ‘pina the meaning of the pha “the morning se thats BEG tig se sen fle sy on cermin oming® of te ‘eae We ean explain che mesning of the phrase the evening Sar thos: it isthe very bughe ssn in dhe sky om certain evenings ‘the year Wecan ge lopealy independent explanations of te tmeaing ofthe wo pats "The gene is tbe DNA molec’ isa Contingent statement. We cn exlin the rani ofthe word ‘geoe’ thos: ts dat dingo pape within we that eapoo- ‘ble forthe tansmission of Pereditarychatceitic, sch 36 Colt af jen, We en en the messing of he pie DNA ‘molecule slong the following ines isa molec of cea “ery complex chemial consti which forms the maces the cl We can give logealy independent explanations of ‘Word gene and the phrase ‘DNA mec : ‘Now if mening to sy that "The mind is the Bo) ste ponile ro eat the words mid’ ad bai inthe same vy, “The word ‘hin? gives no eouble, Ce its posible "2 ‘pha te meaning fa quaiomtenive way. The probe Boved by the word mind, Whae ceria explanation o ostesive “iio an we give ofthe meaning Of ns woed witha limplying» deparare rom physica View ofthe woxd?TH9 ”‘Theories of Mina scems tobe the great problem, or, at ny rate, one gret problem, faced by a Centol-state theory. "The object that we calla “brai’ is calle a beta i virwe of certain physical caracerstica tea certain sor of physical b+ ject found inside people's skulls. Yeti we say tat this objec is also the mind, then, ace the word mind does aot mean thesame asthe word bran’ it seems thatthe bai cam only be the mind ia Virte of some fier characteris thatthe brit as. But what fam this characteristic be? We sem on the verge of being Forced Brack into an Ateibute theory. Pat the problem another way. Cenrabstate Materialism holds that when tear aare of our mental Sats what we ae aware of axe mere physical states of our brio. But we ae certainly ot aware ofthe mental states ar states ofthe brain. What then ae €e aware of mental states a? Are we not aware of them a states oF ‘ite peculiar, mental, sort? “The problem hus so daunted one physical, Paul Feyenbend, that he has suggested thatthe mateialstoughe simply to fee08- size that is world-view does no allow statements that asset OF imply the existence of minds. A true physicalism wil simply tal alot the operation of the centll nervous system, and wil Write ‘ff ll about the mind span intellectual loss. (See his ‘Mental ‘events and the Brae’, The Jornal of Philrpty, Vol. LX, 1965) Think that if the stutin as desperate as hiss derperate indeed, Isat least our fist daty to see i we can give an explana- tion ofthe word “mind” which will meet the demands that have just been outlined. Ta onder to do thi let us tun t a way of Uinking about man that has been popularized by peychology. Peychologsts very often preset us with the following Pictu. Man is an object continually acted upoa by certain physical ‘imal Thee simul ii from him certain behavion, dat st ‘sy, a certain physi response Tn the causal chin between the stimulus andthe esponse all the mind. The mind is tat which ally mediates our responce to stimuli. Now the Centalstate ‘theory wants o sy that between the stimulus and te esponse fall, physical processes in the cea nervous stem, and nothing le Atal not even something ‘piphenomenat’ At the same time he ‘heory cannot mention the cenual nervous system in its account of the concept of mind. 1we now thnk of the psychologists Pictute, the Outline ofa soltion isin ourbands, Asa fst approx 7” ‘The Contralstate Theory ration we can ay that what we mean when we elk about the tind, e bow particular metal proceses, thing but the [Hec wihins an of cexun stim and te ruse within «man ‘of cerain responses, The lntinge saute ofthese eflects and au ot omting at inline cnet mind ot the parclar went concep: The conept of 2 mental ae i the eomeepe ofthat, whatever it may rm out t be, which i ‘rooghtabour ina man by certain stimul sd which in trn brings about certain responses, What sn sown natures something Forseince to dacover: Modern cence eclaesthat ths mediator tetween sumuls and response i in fet the cent nervous ‘system, or more crudely and inaccurately, but more simply, the Bain 1 ne ow cor ths ope at hed al Ss Sea Fes ae Ciao aa Roane Tas a, SEs atl CS ss Be ep hata vor Lavi, te aca ae eosin weap ina SEARS re Senden arn ey Sc hr ee Sona oS sian see a! wer yee np lg sci: Sig Sn Lae te ieee Eine renga tora eerie nL ats eb cao oe [Here the having of an orsage after-image is explicate in terms (of the stimulus: an orange acting on a person in suitable condi- ns Place tok ima ne. "Now if we consider seme other mental processes it is at once ler that thi sort of aly solely in ers of te et of 2 Stimulus can have no hepe of success. Suppose I form the inten- tion to go ou and ger a drink, There may well be no typical Dhysieal situations which have the efect of creating this state in fhe. The account of istentions must clearly proceed instead inTheories of Mind terme of the behaviour that such an intention initiates, The inter- tion isan inner cause of a certain tot of response, not the ianer ‘effect of 2 certain sort of stimulus, OF eautse, the intention iran ‘effect of certain causes, but it cannot be dfned in terms ofthese Tn fact, however, the point just made about intentions would constitute no ertieism of Place’s and Smart's position as put for ‘ward in these articles. For with respect to things like intentions they are not Centeal-state Mateialists, but Behaviousists. Place 1m the case of eopitive concepts ike “kaowing, “believing ‘under- standing, ‘temembering’, and volitoral eneept ike "wanting and ‘intending’, there canbe litle doubt, 1 think, that an analysis ime. of dispositions to behave is fundamentally sound. On the other hand, there Would seem fo bean inttable esd of concepts lustering around the nodons of consciousness, experience, sensation, and mental imagery, wher some sort of nae proce tr) wnavoi- Panera yet whtn ed Cer ans grad See eyes wen a ae omg terme, te owt el andy ei emir terre be emoned igen i Seas cme ade omnes, Teg Se rear courting mal ht marchers fom are, nie oe i acpi of nee ging aot caer eek se pe eae ome ee eget dens ee Te macy acta ae penne octyl acl wae ara of a pesionas ase eae, nme ie Nr oa ye ty ee cy tt we egies a Ste tei ter ra at snr an crm Paige ete tow serge ee es ewe of a pk sesh As ine rem goa et aes emgage carrer ‘ The Central-state Theory tue, but, agala, perhaps they sometimes are. Tein, indeed, that Place’s and Smarts portion is 2 mere hang-over from the Sen- sationalism of the British Empiticists which atcempts to reduce all fctual mental items to impressions, images and sensations. But ‘once we have aceepted any sort of inner mental tem, strong argu" ‘ments should be needed to exclude what ae, prim facie also items ‘Smart hatin fact changed his view on this matter. He now accepts 4 Centra-state accoust of all the mental concepts. His ‘tiginal position was in Tat, I shink, an interesting example of ‘quite false speit of economy. The motive was dear: if we have to admit inner items, et us admit as few as posible. But in fct ‘once one has admitted the necessity for a cetain sort of entity in ‘one's cheoretial scheme then it will often lead fo a more econ0- ‘ical theory if this sore of entity is postulated to explain the ‘Widest possible range of phenomena. Theoretical economy about atities isnot like being economical with money. To be economi- cal with money isto spend as litle quantity of money a is Com fistent with one’s purposes. But theoretical economy about en- tities is matter of portulating the smallest number of srt of| entity that will explain the phenomena. I analogue with fespect to money would be a coinage that had che minimum number of ‘pes of coin consistent with all the sosts of financial operation {hatha to be undertaken. So once one Admits inner meal states Atal it is actually a theoretical economy to give a Censal-state scaount ofall the mental concepts. ‘But even if we confine ourselves tothe ground originally chosen ‘by Place and Smar, it is clear chat their account of such things as perceptions in terms ofthe characteristic eects of certain stimuli [Sinadequate. Iam aot denying that what they say is part of the truth. As we shall ae when we come to discuss the concept of perception in detail it par of our notion of seeing or seeming to ec something yellow that itis the srt of inner event chacactes- igtcally produced in us by the ation of a yellow physical object. ly p ‘Bata fu aceosntof the visual experience involves more than this, ‘To show us that he can perceive, san must show us that he can do certain thinget that he ean systematically discriminate in his bbehaviout between certain claser of objects. As Anthony Kenny emma in his tion, Emotion and Will Roaledge, 1963, D- $9) ‘We pick 4 man’s lack of perceptual powers by a ceri incfi- ‘Sency in conduct. So, even in such a ease as perception, referenceTheories of Mind to cernia sons of respon for which the perception gives vt 4 ‘apsty it lent at inpoant for ducing the nee seb to eran srt simul, ‘The difcuties in Places and Smarts position incline me to look to the response rather than the stintulas in seeking = general account ofthe mental concepts. ‘The concept ofa mental state primarily the concept ofa at of te persn opt for bringing abo! « ‘rai ort of bebe. Sactfcing all secuacy for brevity we say tha, although mind is not behaviour, iti the sane of bea ious Inthe cate of some mental states only they are als ser Of the pero apt. for bing breght about by actin sor of tia. Bat this atc formula ie «secondary one 1 wll be advibl to del athe carefully om thi fin rola: state son apt for bringing about 4 certain Of behaviour, ono” *P (@r Bringing abo = In the fist place, T attach no special importance to the word ‘state’ For instance its nt meant to rule out ‘proces or even "think that in fae wsefl distinctions can be made between ate Processes and events, and chat mental “tems, to ote 4 acta {etm can be vatiously cased under these quite separate head This point will emerge in Par H (fin particular, Ch 7, Sec. But inthe meanwhile ‘stat’ isnot rea to exclude “process OF Ta the second place Teall attention tothe word ap’ Here there ‘two points to be made: (c) By saying only that mental sats ae stats ep for bringing about behaviour we allow for some mental states being actual ccurreaes, even although they result inno behaviour. (2) Th formula is intended to cover mote thn o0e sor of relationship between mental sate and behav. If "Be consider intentions, for instance, then they are naturally construed (pore Ryle) 3b cases within our minds that tend © initiate and sustain certin courses of behaviout. Bu itis most ipa sy ht perception forint, ae cose ng {0 inte certain courses of behaviour, Suppone Tee 2 magpie on the lawn. Tt may well be that magpiesafe things which bean ‘take or leave and tat no impulse todo anything at ls involved & The Contralstate Theory Jn the perception, What must be sid about perception (s will be labored late) i hati isa mater of sequin capaces to trake systematic physical diciminaons within oot environ: tent fe sold Impl (I intentions ae like presses 004 door, perceptions at like aoqitng a key tothe door. You can put the key in your pocket, and sever do anything witht) Other frental ster will hen ou to sand instil diferent causa eae done to the behaviour which const tht ‘expres’ In ome cases indeed, it-will emerge that erain sors of mental states can only be described inter of this resemble to thet ‘mental state hat stand in val elations to behaviour. Here the ‘elton to behaviour i ver indict inded . ‘A closely connected point i that in many cts, an acount mena sates invaves ar onl tek etal retin to bevoae, but thelr causa ation to ocr mental tates. Te may even be at tt account of etn metal states wl proceed soll in terms of the thee mental aes they ae sp for Bringing abot. An inte toe work outa sum in one's head woald be ase in poiat ‘Theintentioniramental ute pt for binging abou the choughis that are the sacceive step i the clelation. So all that i demanded is that our aulyis must alah reach mental seta ae Sessa in tee oft buoy ot Ta the cid pac, the ‘bringing about iavolved isthe “bing- ing abou” of ordinary, eficen, ceualy. Te is 20 diferent ia Pancple fom the ‘brnging about involved whea the impact of ne billed bal Brings about the motion of another ball But the ‘mention of Hume's paradigm sould not mislead Ido not wish {© commit myself for of ageinst 4 Human oF semi-tfunean Stalin ofthe mature ofthe cel elton Tam simply ying that causality inthe mental sphere ino diferent fom casey in the physica sphere. ‘The further sumption T wil make aboot the maare ofthe cal cation in hit work Will ony be two in umber. Ta the Fee place, Iwill sume thatthe cate sod its fect are “tnet tsinences, so tht the exitence of the ease Joes 20 logically Imply the existence ofthe eft, or niwr Tn the second pace, Tl usone that if sequence is a causal one, then fi a 3. ‘gence tat fall under some law. The stone ese the gs 10 ireake'There may be no aw connecting the impact of stones oa aTheories of Mind sass withthe breaking ofthe glass, But in speaking of he - Spence as «causal sequence, we imply that thee ism dene lon ofthe sation ot necessarily known toa) tat liane Alas. These assumptions are not enilysncontoversil, bat at leas ate relatively modest, Ta the fourth plce, the word “bchavout is ambiguous, We may disuaguish between ‘physical behaviour’, which refers fo ay merely physical action ox pasion ofthe hody, and ‘betvioae Proper, which implies relationship to the mind, “Behaviout proper” entals ‘physical behaviout, but not all ‘physic be haviour’ is “behaviour prope, for the later springs fom the tind ina cerain particule way-A reflex kn et is physic be- haviow?, buttis not ‘behaviour proper. Now if in our forma “behaviou’ were to mean “behaviout proper, then we would be giving an account of mental concepts in ters ofa concept that alteady presupposes mentality, which would be circa. 80 clear that in oue formula ‘behaviout” must mean ‘physical be haviour’ (And itis les also tha thi going to make ox pro- jected account of the mental concepts that much more diet © eerie eee 1s willbe seen that our formula “state of the person apt for bringing about certain sort of behaviour someting hat mst betanded with ce, Pechaps iis beat conceived of slog of eatch-phetse which indetes the geoe ines along which accounts ofthe individual mental concepts are tobe sought, but does no more than this pew kes This lends on to fal point to be made about the frm. Ts should not be regarded a «gue tothe producing of and Hons of meatal statements, Ie may well be tha isnot poste {tutte mental statements into statements that mention nothing but physical happenings, in any but the toughest way. Iemay nul te, nevertcenthat we can gives stactry snd co Plete account ofthe situations covered by the mental conept ia Purely physical nd openeta ema el 1 think the station isa follows. We apply certain concept, the menial concepts, co human beings. That ff ny, we aterbute ‘ental states 0 them, Then the question artes whether fit Possible todo ful uc othe mature of these mental sates bY seins of purely physel or neuteal concept, We therefore CP to sketch an account of typical mental sats in purely physic i ‘The Contral-tate Theory ‘or neutral teems. The account might fll indefinitely shor of fing tations of mental stttment, yet it mpht stl be Psuale to say thatthe account had done justice fo the phe- ‘Ofcourse tht does leave ws withthe question ow acing the test of transation, we ean ever know tae we have sacoeeded in fur enterprise. But thir is Just one Instance of the perenil problem of nding a deciion-procedure fo piesopical peob- Kes. 1 thin in fac tha all we can do i hs: we produce =n account of a cran ange of Phenomena in tems ofa favoured Set of concepts; we then try fo text this account by lolng for deta and possible situaons fling within this cage of pheno tena which seem to defy complete deseipon in tems ofthe favoured concepts. Ir we can des socesfuly with all the di cal cases we have done all thet we can do, But tees i uniikely to be any way of proving tothe general satisfaction tat our enter Prisha een setessl I there wa, philosophy Would be eer Trurmtoa question tat may be worrying some reader Now hat have given an accunt of th concept of mental sy dst tov apt that Lam a Behaviour in dggune? Ate {heer on rst divergence frm Betuoutam he mind nt {0 beanie it ciao, ot oly withthe nse pine cf behiou ha cating Ou fom thre as Bena Shout tenders iin, and capuctes fo, Bhavou And ot thse pou cle tote Behaviours postions? “ere is sme fore i isting sot dapstios fo behave Behave id come ite lose othe von of he Gon ste toy ing fended ear oer kee Shen aled shove feavinritelBst Bearman the Comsat theory al emai Sepa oe oat oy Di tb nce Speaking of dponicalproperies in Thr Comp of Mind Ry wee pas “oon potions propery mvp te sips par tgs tse be bound lac fo bet <‘Theories of Mind article ate, or to undergo particule change, when 4 pat nae condition is elized (My als) * = ‘We might cal this the Phenomenalist or Operstionalist account of dps. A sl moe ming Stent of ts vice provided by H. H. Price in his Thinking nd Expres (Huhne 500, 1993, P. $33) although Price is no Behaviourist. He sid: There it 90 pri! necessity for supposing that al postion! ropers most havea ‘categorical bas In patil, there ay be metal dispositions which ae sitimate ss ” ‘To this we may oppose what may be called a Realist account of dispositions. According tothe Realist view, to speak ofan object having a dispositional propery entail thatthe objec isin some ‘0-dispostional state or that ie bas some property (there exists a ‘categorical basis?) whichis regponsible forthe object manifest ing certain behaviour in certain citcumstances, manifestations ‘whose nature makes the disposition! property the particular Alispositional property itis. Teis true that we may aot know any- thing ofthe natute ofthe non lispostonal sate, But the Reise view assert, in asserting tha certain piece of plas is brite, fot instance, we ate ipo fact aserting that itis in certain 500° Alispositional state which disposes ito shatter and ly apart 2 wide variety of circumstances. Ignorance of the nature of the state does not afect the issue. The Reals view uns some SuP- Port from ordinary language, where we often seem t0 ideal & disposition and its ‘categorical basi (Tt bas been found that Sritinese is cerin sort of molecular patter in the mates) will now present an pried argument which © pment nh irtabrtean? naa ‘onsider the following cae. Suppose that, on a umber of = sions a certain rubber band has the same fore, Fy applied is {24 tt om ach acon it stiches one ac: We ca he tribute a disposition to the band. Tis to steteh one finch under force F tips Now one essential thing about dispositions is that we can t= tribute them to objects even at times when the eircuetances ia which the object manifests its dispositions do got obtain. Sup- ose, now, that I sy ofthe band tha, iit had been subjected 0 force Fat T, a une when it was not so subjected, t would have stretched one iach. What warrant have I for any statement? Con «6 ‘The Central site Theory sider frst the answee that a Realist about dispositions will give. “He will say that there is every reason to believe thatthe categorical state ofthe band whichis responsible for it stretching one inch unde foree F obtains at T;. Given that it does obtain aT, then, 48 a mater of physical necesiy, the band must stretch one inc ‘under force F ‘But what answer can the Phenomenait about dispositions tive? For him, 2 disposition does not entail the existence of ‘ategorcal stat. The oaly eason he can give for saying tat the band would have stretched one inch undee force Fat, is that, ‘umercaly the same band bebavedi this way on other occasions. But now we may ask the Phenomenalist “What is the magic in numerical identity? A thing can change its properties Over & Pesodof ine Why should toot change ts dapotsoal oper ties? How does the Phenomenalist know what the band’s dispo- sitional properties are a T,? He may reply ‘We have every reason to thnk thatthe relevant categorical properties ofthe object are “unchanged aT, s0 we have every reason to think that the ds positional properties are unchanged.” But since he has asserted that the connection berween ‘ategorical basis and dispositional rope is nota necesary one, he can only be arguing that there 1s a cofingnr connection between categorical properties snd the fact thatthe band has that dnpostional propery 2¢ T. But how could one ever establish a coatngatcnneron beeen te sorial properties and unfulfilled possbites? Te is not as if one ould oberve the unflilld posses independent, in ordex to see how they tre correlated with the categorical properties! 1c seems that the Phenomenalise about dispositions will be re- ‘daced to uter scepticism about dispositions, exept on occasions that they are actualy manifested, T think we can imagine the possibilty thatthe band should be acted upon by foree F on diferent occasions, and behave quite ‘Meret on these oceans although tte wi no slr diffrence inthe categorical properties of on these occa: Sion Tati tsyr tha we can imagine thatthe Pile of Safin: Rewon may be en he tof the band: Ba i only 40 the extent that we accept he Principe of Suficient Resin that we cn intodce te noo of dps, Iti caly to the extent that we relate disposition to ‘categorical basi’, and dlifetence of disposition to diference of ‘categorical basi, that "Theories of Mind ‘we can speak of dispositions. We must be Realists, not Pheno- smenalists, about dispositions. Al this is of central importance to the philosophy of mind. ‘Thus, if belief, for instance, is « disposition, then itis enuiled that while T believe p my mind is in'a certain non-dispositional state, 4 state which in suitable circumstances gives rise to ‘mani- festations of belief that p’. The fact that we may not know the concrete nature of this state is irelevant “The tremendous diference between this and the ‘Phenomenal- ist account of disposition emerges when we consider that, om this ‘Realist’ view of dispositions, we can think of them as cues OF ‘assl fastors. On the Phenomenalist view, dispositions cannot be ‘causes. To say the glass breaks because iti brite i only to #37 that it breaks because itis the tort of thing that does break extily in the circumstances it is in. But if briteness can be identified ‘wi an actual feof the glass, then we can think of tas a cause, fof, more vaguely, 2 causal factor, inthe process that brings aboot breaking. Dispositions are seen to be states that actualy sed Uebind theit manifestations. Ie is simply that the states are ient= edi terms of thei masfestations in suitable conditions, eather ‘than in terms of thei intrinsic nature, “t ‘Our argument fora ‘Realist’ account of dispositions can equally bbe applied to capacities and powers, They, too, muse be conceived ‘of as states of the object tha has the capacity or power. Ie will now be seen that a Behaviourst mus reject this account ‘of mental predicates involving dispositions, capacities or powers. For if he subscribed to it he would be admitting that, in elking about the mind, we were committed to talking about inner states ‘of the person. But to make this admission would be to coatradict his Behaviourism. Tt would contradict the eriperalisie ot osiisistc dive that is involved in Bchaviourism. Behaviourism ‘concentrates on the case of other minds, and thee csubstiutes the evidence that we have for the existence of other minds—beht- viour—for the mental states themselves. To admit dispositions 28 states lying behind, and in suitable circumstances giving rise 10, ‘behaviour is to contradict the whole programme. I, however, the reader sill wishes to call my view a form of Behaviourism, this is no more than a matter of verbal conceca, For it mains 2 ‘Behaviourism’ that permits the contingent identification of mind and brain, The Contral-state Theory Suppose now we accept for arguments sake the view that in inking abou mental sates we ate simply talking about sates of the petson apt forthe bringing about of behaviour of a cern sort. (The deniled working out and defence ofthis view will in fact occupy the major pat of his book—Part Two.) The question then arises "What infact iste nate ofthese ine states? What ae these inner exuses like” And here ne logical analysis can help ts. Its a matter of highslevel scientific speciation ‘At tis point we have one of those exciting turn-sounds where old theoties appeat ina quite new light. We suddenly ge a new view of Dualism and of the Areibute theories, not t0 mention any wilder views that may be proposed, They are not, 38 we have insisted upon testing them up to this point, accounts ofthe ep of mind all ine that the concept of meta ate the concept ofa suite of the person apt for Bringing about certain sorts of (physical) bebaviout, then we should view the diferent accounts ofthe mind that have been advanced through the ages 48 diferent scenic answers to the question of the intinsic ature ofthese states. ‘Take the primitive view thatthe mind or spits breath, Con- sider the diference between living man and a corse. A living tan behaves ina quite diferent, and far moce comples, ay thas any other sort of thing, buta corpse i ite diferent from any ‘other material objec. What isthe ianee principle of the living ‘man's behaviour? One obvious diference is thatthe living man breathes, the corpse does not. So itis plausible preliminary hypothesis dat the ianer principle of maa’s unique behaviour— Boor mod iret Ora ‘Again, ic isa meaningful suggestion that the mind i 2 ame in Ey rs colleen of seals a motile toms dispersed dhroughous the members. It is a meaningful suggestion that iis a spiritual subse, o a et of special properties of the body of cet arvoe stem which fe at edo co te sco-chemical properties of mutter. Or pethaps, 28 Centrale Te Marsan fbn Fe chem workings ofthe central nervous sytem. (Gome theories, ofcourse, do have tobe rejected for conceptual %9Tories of Mind seasons. We have argued that ‘Bune’ Dualism is logically io- herent, Bebavioussm is unacceptable because, sine the mind is the inner prindple of behaviour, ie cannot fe behaviour. Any Parllelise theory most be ejected becnise the exental thing about the mind is that ie stands and operates inthe aus chain beween stimulus and response. But these are unnatral views of the mind, only adopted sowilingly under the sires of geet Invellcral dicalies) "At this poine we sce thatthe statement “The gene is the DNA molecule’ provides very good model for many features ofthe Sptement "The mind ste baie’. (Lam greatly indebted to Bean Medlin for this very important model) The concept ofthe gene, “when i was introduced nto biology aa result of Mendes wor, 12s ie concept of factor inthe person or animal apt for th Production of eerain characterises in that person or atinal The «verti then afowe what infact the gene wa Alsons of easwe vere posible For insane, the gene might have been an i= ‘teil principle which somehow brought it about that my Jes are the colour they are. Ta fac, however, biologists have CO” cluded that thee is sficen evidence to Henty that which pt forthe production of hereditary chractetcs asthe 0D" ance to be found atthe centre of cel: deoxyrbo-audee ai. ‘This idendication is «theoretical one. Nobody fas deel ob- served, or could ever hope to observe in practic, the deal of the usa hain from DNA molecule to the coloring of the ee Bat the idenieation i afin cerein Teay now be ater tha once ibe rated it he om cept of «mental state isthe concept ofa sat of the person apt forthe production of cerain sorts of behaviour, the idenietion ofthese states with physico-chemical ses ofthe brains, fa te Diesnt sate of knowledge, acatly as good abet asthe ents ton ofthe gene withthe DNA maleste. This completes the pelminary sketch of my version of the Geniclsate theory. I wil be noiced thatthe argument ha #0 distinct ‘movement. As the Gs step, a certs logical analysis ofthe mental concept is proposed. This ia concepoal thei It ‘must be established, or sefuted, in the same way (whatever that ° Toe Cetrastate They say be hat ay other pice of pomprted opal aay i bed or see tay pesaps be cle he Ca Sf he tel concep. Te des not ena, ote does Exe Mace The second step heute Sy eet Inne stats wth pico themes ofthe ban ‘Tis t's cominget or eat Menon ad is Enact Mat ot once thse to eps in the argent are dei ii ish it becomes evident, I think, that teeet defenders of & Etna theory, sch Sar, fave concen on de fg tel ik en ot they have sd to my dcuson of ths second sepia Pa “Threw be ris Bot it cers to me tat thee ach work tobe done onthe fst or conepenh sep. Pet Tw, which 2 manctin og certsn hs cans pe tere he nts cee of thi book Nw no doubt the render sendy hs many jens pro> pote to this projected progsmine of argument ome of te Sijctons wil be conticed in the follwing scion. Ine Seow T wil ay to show that wha has wey Ben ad Sowers alos al he eels for Cem wate Natriin {Savvis mentioned i Secon wl be seneberd that a tat capees ey of aman sane demand eich ‘Sccemed"desable tat theory of id be ale to met la Scion I of tis caper ve menionel four of hse demands the the Ceca state ory secmed ote dicate 6 Te i fey sn Ce atne Naon en tobe incompatible wis the spate opel poss Embodied stent Teds te conte of our tory, smehody who aes the logical posi ef dened mind i oly sein at ‘nal fates (oth ar tof te peso peo be Beng ‘Sout of cern sor of betas) reno eal sts of Krsn, ot ae nats of tal since capable of exer siete talon of tbody. And ssw re lowed ofa posbty of rem physical subancey a ine for tral Matelion sere conngnt ta id the bay thee im bn to ach» loi pos ei i ‘ompatle with she th of Comlste Mater, bu hat ‘Benya be oly conanpety te oTiare of Mind (i The second dcity was that Centra state Materialism secmed incompatible with the admission that mental sats are logically incapable of Independent exitence: For processes in ‘he bain might have independent exivence Bot ifa mental sate gur moa tte gothing but ‘a state of the person apt forthe binging about of certsinsorts of havi? then tis easy ose that there coud not be objecn which jst had the charcteisticof being mental stats, and no otters For 00 thing or even an be simply sp for bringing shout othe even it must have further independent carstristice of is on. SO rental states, ger mental states, ae incapable of independ (i) We said tht 4 Cental-state Mteslism must give a0 analysis of the “intentionality” of mental processes, This + Aemand chat we willbe able to met only 0 ou detaled sales ofthe mental concepts unl Gs) Fnaly ia summing up ou discussion of Behavioutsm, YE il dha ctor sory of mind ought Bash allow the existence of inner mental events, ye lso preserve Logi connection berween these inner events and outwael behaviour. Itis lee thatan secount of mental sates sates ap fr the Pro- duction of certain sorts of behaviour wil fll hi demand Indeed, its staring to observe that Witgenteins dca, "AN “inner proces” stands in need of ourwstd ster, might Bethe slogan of 4 Caal analy of the mental concepts. ent eo- gies hve ae ofthe over sought ue ecly given to ws. Ye, gua mental process, they “wand in teed of outward eter’ that ito say, they are the mental PPO- cesses they arin virtae of the beaviowr they are ap for bring ahout. But, unlike Wisgenscn, we can remove the qooetion tas from the phrse inner proces 1t will seem obvious to some philosophers that the account of ‘mental states given in the previous sections is unsatisfactory be- cause it leves out consciousness or experience. Their protest ‘might take the following form. The argument, +0 far, they would say, bas a quite uosatistactory otherperson character. Te ie as iF ‘we took the very complex behaviour of other persons, and ssid 3° Tie Contralstate Theory that this behaviowe mutt be astumed to havea cause within the Peron «cause which maybe elles mental ate and we then trenton to identify these posted "mental states with sates Df the bran. This the procedure hat ocr inthe eae of the gene, Compex pavers of insted characteris ate obserreds ff inner eros postolated; and finaly this inner eneple i ‘denied with the DNA molecule. Bu, alte the gene, the mind isnot mere theoreti concept In out own cs, x lest, We fave « direct awareness of mena stacs. We are concn, we have experiences, Indeed twas this very fact that led othe re jection ofthe phyiaist programme with sespet to the mind Sponsored by Behavioursm. Conscousness i omehing more than the occurence of an inet sate ape forthe proton of cern sorts of behavione “There i something in ths protest, Coscousnes something snore than an nner tate apt forthe proacsion of cen sors of lchasour But what mores Before we ny to anewerthi question, ler os te to become bit clearer, by means of exe, about what meant by “aneiousnes here A contnvum of cases could be Sonstacte, sperap thee mens ofthc wl sete ‘Gite. This is someting that can happen when one diving ‘ery log dntnces in monetonos condions. One ean ‘amet 2 ome point andre that coe as deven many males wihoat Conseiosnes ofthe diving, or getaps, anything ee. One hat ep the car on the rad, change gens, even, or used the bake, tall ina sate of atone. (ise = Ones thinking furiously about problem, 0 fariosaly that one ison tothe world Case 5. Under the direction of an old-fashioned psychologist, cost Seon wing fo esi wat go on Ho Now when eres ay that an account of the mind ofthe sot ve have adumbrated aves out consciousrst or experince, J ‘Bink they have in mind the dtncton bern ae ke Cae onthe one hand and Cases + and om te oer, Despite al the dierences bern Cases sand bth eases there conscious tes Tn Cae tis acing, A Svein aceount of the mind, ‘hey say, cannot explain Cte 40 1 Case one matt nome ar have been perceiving, s0dactog ”Theories of Mind pein se tne adh tare is ena i iy ad nae ee Se SE LEUSiai on apantte gaa ay cence op I Sean tsar hehe Sites cpticetere ime tied gota pl iene sry Gciinite Parma) ecb Peas sta Somes ghee man ge SCE hematoma te Pom ien ets cence memen wi psa ce pares SLO ata nee ceo oe gate Hint deren ‘sciousness, Consciousness is somet ‘more. But, ag with SNCS Chisel a a ee ind nets Tee Reena a a slat iach te hay Sout een meen ame ce ee ede Ser oe aac SOT aaarrns ree Sonera ee eae pens rae ee spl ee ey aa ‘hoc upg ie Ean ene try to give an account of when we discuss perception in de- wae Firat carats Sah ssid ieee ae ie ced iL neh cna bea ihe dag) Oar pal ease ie ne Tne reese one cna toe eres Thea etches ssa re Seinintaaune ae Fees ig ate Frc sce ret Se ei ‘The Contral-state Theory Farther awareness of that awareness would also be posible: a archer scanning of the original inner scanning. Consciousness, or experience, then (as opposed to completely wenselfconscious mental activity which is perfectly possible, and which occuss ia the case of the ‘automatic deving’) is simply awareness of out own state of mind. The technical term for such awareness of our own mental state is ‘introspection’ oF ‘intro- spective awareness’ It is trae that the term ‘introspection’ is sometimes reserved for the particular sort of self.inspection in- volved in ous thed ease, But since the diereace seems to be n0 ‘more than one of degree, I shall in this work use the term to cover all consciousness of mental state, however litle'sel-consciousness is involved, A completer elucidation of the nature of introspection must await Part Two. But it wil be helpfl hereto discuss some of is features. believe chat Kant suggested the correct way of thinking about introspection when he spoke of our awareness of our own ‘mental states as the operation of ‘inner sens’. He took sense- Perception as the model for introspection. By sense-perception ‘we become aware of current physical happenings in our environ- ‘ment and our body. By innef tense we become aware of current happenings in our own mind. Itmay be though that there is no need to liken introspection to perception. All we need postulate is a capacity to make trve statements about mental happenings. But it Seems clear that its possible to be aware of one's meatal states without saying any- ‘thing, Nor does such awareness seem to be a mere disposition oF capacity to make a statement, Ie seems likely that animals, who cannot speak, have some rudimentary awareness of their own inner states. At any rat, ii an intelligible supposition, So think We should reject an account of introspection purely in terms of It's sometimes argued that introspection cannot be compared to sense-perception because no sense-organ is involved. We say “Lee with my eyes’, but there is nothing with which I can say that I discover Iam thinking. Now I donot believe that this ob- jection would carry much weight, even the diference from sense- ception could be made out But in ay cae thee one Sor of Ssease-pereeption where we do not say that we perceive wi ‘anything: bodily perception, When I become aware that [am hot, 9Theories of Mind or that my limbs ace moving, and Ido not gain this knowledge by touch, there is no organ that I can say that I perceive these things wit, Yet any paychology textbook would take these to be cases of sense-pereesion. Bodily perception, indeed, serves as an exellent model with which to grasp the astute of introspection, or ihas further im Portane resemblance to “nner sense. In introspection we 42 fate only of sates of our own mind, not of other people's ‘hinds. In boy perception we are aware only of sates of our Own body, and not of other people's bodies. The biological wseflness to the organism of a specal knowledge ofits own bodily and meatal site is obvious in both eases, Some. philosophers respond to. these points about bodily perception by saying that these diferences prove tat itis wrong!) alle bodily percpron. But then they ae left wth no way tls fy such things as ou direct (lehough no infalible) awareness of such things a8 bodily posture and temperature In any cate, a8 will emerge in ou discssion of the nature of sese-orgen in Part ‘Tw0(Ch 1, Sect. I) there must be some perceptions that do not involve the (as opposed to the mere mulation) of an oFpan- ‘So much for certain general objections to the account of ntro- spection as ‘inner sense. It may sil be objected that if we accept the Causal analysis of mental stats (the frst step in ou argument for Cente Materia) itospecion cannot possibly be compe to sense-peeeption, even bodily sense pereepion. For consider what we would be intospectively aware of.) We would be dreel aware of an extrordinaily abstract, and purely r2- Yona, state of afhis. We would be aware that something Of ‘hose non-relitional properties we had no dice awareness all vas operating to produce certain bekavious (i) The awareness ‘would be a direct awareness of sau: a dicect awarenes that ‘certain behaviour wat being produced. Indeed in some cases the dlizect awareness would be a direct awareness ofthe mete poss bility of the behaviout being produced if circumstances Were dlferent, It would bea direct awareness of counterfactual tuths ‘Now, it ay be objected, this incredibly far from the dealed avarcness ofthe intrinsic properties of objects that ie yielded by “When plllovophers think of all too liable to think of wii, But ie wl fom vison to touch FE 96 The Central-state Theory duce osama taken leh apy uc pe gears of mecca oe! Pcl si Sy 2 tm inthe sl of ey ae Wat aT erence trae eal ot te ene Sag ete et Tamar of oem a ome Seely oo ria vas roc Leer era ete ta a ico ae ee of eg pres Cae er rece fe shige meting fice Boe a ame Pat peepee p= bee apres oak cha metres oo en cea Sr sey veh ao me aa ol nc rae Os eo a ee tin: eae ee Sarg ee ae ee ec eee my ae dle ope ee Ce ae eae ra epee p Soe eee tm rene Tein a ete SI coe eee reer re Caer ee Oi Petia coma recy marae eet) Brea en cocker ar tnd rahe Ne a cee ea nk eset es cen ea rome ae ere Te te a occ sal nt 1 ato esti afta ashen Seee TS re tee a peg a ed tears et infereacal knowledge of caues is compatible with almost 20 Sepa ate cee gra oe eg tase cement es Beene meting eee ead zTheories of Mind exerted in a greater or lessee degree, even although our body is fat yielding tothe pressure. In this case we can ay that we are aware thatthe objec is exerting a force ape forthe bringing about ‘of motion in our body, although itis not actaly bringing about such motion, Te may be objected tha, in such a cate, athoogh our body asa whole it not being moved, nevertheless parts of our flesh are factually being moved by the object exerting the pressure. The greater the pressure, the grester the distortion of the flesh. If there were no diferent degrees of distortion of the flesh, how could we be aware of diferent deqres of pressure? ‘However, although there is n0 doubt that it a the diferent degrees of distortion of the fesh that cause us t0 be aware Of diferent degrees of pressure, tis far from cleat that What we A avwate of is the distortion ofthe flesh. (Ia my discussion ofthe ‘perception of pressure in Budi Semaroc, Routledge, 1962, PP 22-3, fled to notice this point) Sometimes, a any rate, are fot aware of pressure on our body, of grester ox lesser dear, yet nor aware of ayy movement of our flesh? If so, all we af 2 tually anare of sa proces for bringing about a motion in out body, without being awate of any actual effect. The parle ‘with our account of introspection is then complete. ‘Te must be admitted bere that the parallel between introspective awareness and the tactual perception of physica presoate {allifthe later were no mote than an fee mater ho® 3380- ‘matic and unselfeoscious fom independent given resetion of presre, Buin ny iw which fw vero by n Cet "4 tatu perceptions of physical pressure are no mor inferences from seasttons of prewute than vistal perceptions of coloured physical surfaces are inferences fom vital clout npessions 1 must also be admitted tha the parallel betweea the Perep- tion of pressure and the direct awareness of our own states is more plausible ia the case of some mental sates than others Intentions, desires, et, may be plautbly construed 38 standing in the sare causa elation tothe thing intended or de- sired 8 the pressure does to its efector potential eect. As as already been pointed out, is causal elation does not seem to old berween such mental sttes ape ‘ad the behaviout in which they ate expressed. Nevertheless, thete other mental sates stand in causal relations o behaviour, although dierent and more 8 The Contral-state Theory {nitet causal relations From those iavolved in intentions. Now if wwe have made direct awareness of One sort of causal relation pine, by eling steno to certain pereepos, then tbe: Eomes aie tose the possibility of diectawarenss of other sors of eau eelation Tis clear that thete are good biologial reasons why into- section should give us such meapre information about the n- Ccnsie nature of mental events. Knowledge ofthe presence with- in us of potential causes of behaviour is obviously vakable in the conduct of lie fT know that Tam set towards bitdig you before Thit you, I may be able to coatrol my impulee, in 2 way that | ‘ould not do if new nothing about the impulse wai it mani fested self. But to know the intrase ature ofthe proces, oF ven wherein the body the process was, would be of ite valbe Jn the ste of sature. For the acual (or spits cates that control behaviour are processes fa 00 delicate fora man to mai plate deel. (IFT could contol my impulse by putting a probe Jay bai, that would bea diferent matter) Ja modern philosophy we are accustomed to distinguish be- tween observational concepts such as “blue-eyed, and theoretical concepts sach as ‘gene’. Genes ae things Dat are not sbvetved, bout ate postulated in order to explain things that are observed, such as blue eyes, The intrinsic mature of the Rene i not given by the concep of gene: the nature hat tobe discovered by scientific ‘esearch ind theorizing, The pecans feanute ofthe concept of ‘ind ih, na way tsa his dstinetion between observa~ Sionalandtheoredieal concepts. Lik theoretical concep = ind isa mere “that which brings about certain effects. Yet, ke en- {i fling under cberrataal cone there can be diet sareness of meatal happenings. Howeret, I hope the soalogy Wid the tatual pereepion of pare hs shows that there ae ‘othe cases which yn at too distant pall, Bat all his time, however, we have been neglecting the most important argument ofall agunst treating awareness of oUF own tins as “inner sense’ an argument th if valid, would sil- feceously refute any form of Cetralsate Materialism. This Pjeion deserves new scion, ‘ext two sections ae bated 08 a paper Ts Introspective KaovledgeIncordgvle”, Pipi Rv, VoL 3360, 96, PP. 417-32. But T have made many addons and altertions) 8Theories of Mind Many philosophers argue, in Cartesian fathion, that we logical cso tae aout our own cant mt es We ae table or incortigile Knowledge concerning our own mental dite (The wont nba ate nce all be a interchangeably from now on) Te moder philosophy, the doctine of indabiabiliy is wp- porte in the folowing way If mistakes were posible shout the urrentcontets of ou own conciousness, then t wool make Sense vo ay things lke “think Iam in pun now, but pea fm wrong” of Think I sem tobe seeing something green 0%, tint pernps Tam wrong’ But such sentence are nonce, ‘tit and a0 atospecton is indubiable(Nouce tha, ving alrey rejected Anaya! Bebavioursm, we are asaning tat there ae inne mental states and that we can be delaware of them. The only gueton before usb wheter this swacenes i logicilyindublable or aot. We ae therfore suming the sty of the doctine that fet person statements of curent metal #3 Cannot ar Feston 8 epors) (0) Defition of ndeitailty Before going on to show how the truth of this doctrine would refute Centra-state Materialism, it may be advisable 10 ty (0 define the notion of indubitabiity more carefully. This is parties larly important in view of the widespread tendency to confuse the ‘notion of indubitablty with that of logical necessity. In fact, hhowever, litte thought sulices to see that the two notions af istinc. IFT think Tam in pain now, perhaps Leannot be mistake But she setement ‘I am in pain gow" is certainly aot logically aecestary. We can conceive of 2 world in which I do not even ‘exist, much less am in puin. Conteaiwise, a logically necasaty Statement need not be indubitable. For we can think that sO” thing is not logically necessary when infact ti. Even if Ihave indubitable awareness of my own mental at ‘other people lack indubitable awareness of that sate. This #0 ‘ests cha it is most convenient to define the notion of indubitable- ‘The Contral-state Tory for-A rather chan simple indubicability. So let us say that pis gill indabitcle for A if, and only if: (A betiovesp, {GCA bli ha 9 logclly implies (2) ‘The definition employs the notion of logical necessity, but is Ics distinct action from logical neces. Those who acept the indubibilty of introspective awarenes ill go on ty that these conditons aze satisfied when pis 4 proposion about ‘Ns curent state of mind Tam assuming that ese conditions de satisfied we ate entitled to speak of As bei as «pice of Jndobitable bmn (I should acknowledge my debt © G. C- Netlchinarving st this definon) “This definition of logic indubitabily or incoeigibieysug- gests parle definition of «notion tht, following Glber® Rye, hal eal eiimaton We can say pi lf itimatng fr Ai, ant oly if Op. (@)(p) logically implies (A believes #). ‘Many philosophers have wished to argue tat fp isa proposition ows cguet sate of tind, en the edn fo sl Incimation lid down here ae sts fed ‘The notion of ‘self-intimation’ has not always been clearly: Alstinguste fromthe notion of acon, the ner action ‘ing taken to cover both. But there are great advantages in di- Ainguhing the ewe, Using ove defitons ia saying ta into- spective awareness i incotigible we ae simply saying that 207 belief we have about cur own corent mental sat is inevitably tue. Eror ists ruled out, but oot ignorance. In saying tat our arent men ate ae wliitng we rl out it pws ty of ignorance. We rile oot the possbilty of unconscious ‘mental ater: mental states tha we enor awe of athe tine of taving them, We alo rule out the possi of festres of mental slater of which we ae not aware ” we say both that our introspective awareness of our cent mesa sates incorrigible abd ta our eurent men tates ae {eititimating, we have what may be led the docne of "he Perecy ranepareat mind. What we sein our own mind at he Present moment we fee eighty, and me see everything tere iTheories of Mind Te canst pty pe oT snr ae, a en Dee. 1 ot nay ii i wy ‘Perey rosy gto oe meig ni ov icorsplty we stould comnides enolate eee cr een goon a ee ‘Tiguan enti Made on tet SN gt rom crt mel ‘Stier cial ire ney Coen o eee amen ree oye aa ae selma nay erent ese teen Ce Pg 4 Ae com cana Sar aegpenereh ceucn oma ie ae ee Ee eee rong ng cts coal omen or eT further introspective awareness. - (©) The contradiction with Contra-state Mateos Temustaos be shown that thee doctinesfincosgibleawareness Of, logically privileged access to, and sel ntimating nature of OOF ‘ova corsent mental states etal the falsity of Cenatsate xa cen tates ental the falsy of Cen ‘Ass preliminary point notice tha if any of i notice that if any ofthese dotrnes is tear chte is «wide gulf berwen introspection and perepion Pescepual statements make a claim about the piel wot td its always logically possible hat such 4 chmn i mivahew thik ee something pee, bor perhaps Tam wrong peel) Jnteligible, Novis any perceive a logielly privilege poston shia ning he prev Nori dre ay eae of thew logically imposible for pereivers to Ove But far worse follows. If mental processes ate sates of the fetion ap for he bringing about of ein torts of eos, Af these stats are in fat physic sats of te bray heh introspection sl, whichis «mental procs wil have bet physleal process inthe brsn. It wll have to be slescanming process inthe brain. Now it isa once clea that salway loge The Contral-state Theory typos ah ery et suchas sig ei rR cog ta Reap becuse epee eth Sot epctne Weoley coapbicT es Tact Cematate Mnetabee fate Nr pooe eae see eter cease ¢ Bay Ciregclacs Attn nine o omekeate ea, PRE pena aia eee tae ase belies mec berierereeree erp Teeny by hy ae Sauron Seta el Mju Pap Wak tne Beta cea ted end the view hat the cn Sit toca a of epee rer pce toner aca ese see mer Shastry tee ineepeon Eke tie aaah ta ae Bence? SIP cect nh cara Sens orp ee, Sea ae tate a recs ew of Re re cmns et eis ae he COTES Seared af coma ofa trae te tne canton myers kavee incorrigible, as is alleged, then our account of the concept of a iment function ead tet ged set cus or old cl ta ave aetna cer Tenant hr, for the defender of « Cn sote dca te se ogy Knowledge of tgs riget secon wor stints rou cree mea sti Amat howe oe Seda ceunpets reo se dene open sg Ten apo hs nd ly dace, The pe ue lage a Contant oat wae to Boll our tn ofan roped dogs my be tre eco ee of tas bot ee Fil ot {Gf Savi eo previous bots muir pve Gomera ate pb etd (ce Pepto nd Poul ond heticge nce Ce sal ty rar, Fe Re cal che ply cm eee oe eel aod pepe SERS eerie Selene het 0sTheories of Mind (© Arguments aginst indabitableintrspetve kncleige Thegin by advancing wo closely connected arguments which do not strictly disprove the existence of incortigiie ‘introspective knowledge, but which do cast the most sexious doube on its (6) Ie is cles that if there is incotigible knowledge of our own mental sates, then it cannot apply to the past, but only to the Present. Put the met sate even» faction of second in the past and ertor becomes logically possible, Two evens that occu 4 diferent times must be ‘isin existences:it is always logically possible that one event might occur but the other not oceut If T think that I was in pain a fraction of «second ago, then, despite the brevity of the Ume-gap, the thought and the pain must be “distinct existences’. So ie must be logically posse fox there to have been no pain to cortespond to my thought. haul we comsides the hood hat sn pin a aon a second ago, it is cleat that this isa paradigm of empl! indabitable knowledge We en hurly imagine in sy coerce way, shai would be ike to make a mist ach # cae Te tistake is ony logically posible. Now what the upholder of logiealinduitabty of current introspective knowiedge most ‘maintain e thatthe Togical character of our certainty changed 48 ‘we move fom this immediate past to the present. Prom being ‘empirically impossible, eror becomes logically impossible, Now fate we really prepared to say that «fraction of a second changes the nature of out certainty? Ts our certainty that we are in pit ‘now really any diferent from our certainty that we were ia pain an instant ago? Yet the later cannot be beter than eat cenainy. Nothing I have said here is a strict disproof of the thesis of indubitabilty, bat consideration of the ease of the immediate ‘ast shoul, chink, make us suspect the thesis. (hanes enc cones, aguent shows ct i (empirically) impossitie thar oue ordinary reports of our current ‘ental sate shouldbe indabiables Suppose I eport'Tam in pain now". Ifwe take the view that the latter reports apiece of indubitable knowledge, o what period of time does the word “aow" refer? Not to the time before I started 104 The Contratstate Theory speaking, for there T am depending on memory, which can be ‘challenged, Not to the time after I finish speaking, for then T ‘depend on knowledge ofthe futute, which can be chalenged too. “The time in question must therefore be the time during which che report is being made. But then it must be remembered that any- thing we say takes time to say- Suppose, then, that {am at the ‘beginning of my report. My indubitable knowledge that 1 am in pun can surely embrace only the curreat instant; it czanot be Togically indubieable that 1 will stl be in pain by the time the sentence is finshed. Suppose, again, ehat am just finishing my sentence. Can Ido better than rememier what my sate was when I began my sentence? So to what period of time does the “sow” refer? "Athi poine it seems ht the defender of indabiable nro spective knowledge wl ave ointoice the tion ofthe into Spectv ina Ltw conie fst the more obvious nto of a perepeal insane Suppor a light i rwtehed on and of very fapulyoo dat we ate are and 0 moe than stable o follow vey ep inthe cele, We can say tat, within this sition the fine th the light remain steed om of ffs 2 ‘exept Inman eis che sale unto ime sisal dscerible within {fat ataton fn paral fashion, te dintorpectv instar’ wold rth smal uit of time cacernble with espe fo nee ex Pevenca, Now T think that the defender of indubiableino- eave knowledge would have to say that our knowledge f IBRabaue ony while i i knowledge of the cunt ‘ito- tpectve instant, During that instant we know indubably what {Peeing om tat insane but past eens ae on remembered tol fare evans only foresee, so at dvbt would be at ast rmesingtl ‘ar the consequence of his that the defender of acon iy il vet ai that it i pace, io a theory postle to mae 4 seemet ofthe feud logic sarc about oes mental sate Fo, by the tare one has ised speaking, the moment to which one ws eecing ein the past. Oa She could complete the satement within the “intospecive or Stunt’ would t'be beyond challenge. So what becomes ofthe Ilegd indubiabiity of the statement Tam in pa 20s" whee T Spel at ondary sped? ein any diferent potion fom she Topical indbiile statements" ave and aow" or "Tat ToTheories of Mind in prin a moment ago’? Logical indubtabilty has to retreat from speech tothe iostant’s awareness, But at that point we may well ‘Become sceptical whether there is any such lopclly indubitable awareness, After al, the alleged indubieability was supposed tobe trtblshed by a consideration of sdefements, Certsnly, “incor bility ofthe instant” would stil be slfiient to refute Cente “Materialism But docs it seem likely that thee is sucha thing? Gi)1 now put forward an argument which is mean to be an apodzictic disproof of the thesis of indubtabiliy. (A. similar stgument was hit upon independently by J. J. C. Smart. See his reply to Bair inthe “nutralrion Jornal Pbk, ost) Bot, 42 wil emerge, at eriteal point in the argument I have been ‘unable co donde chat what | say is necessarily true, although believe ito be necessarily tre, and can ofer some arguments fo its being necessarily tue, Ina certain sense, therefore, thi i a0 4 probable argument, ‘thas already been pointed out that, ifthe mental state lis ia the past, chen our swareness that we wore in that mental Sates “distin existence’ from the mental state itself. I fllows that there isa logical possibility hat the awareness is false arenes. Suppose, however, that our pain (say) and our awareness that -we ae in pan le within the sme ‘introspective instant’. Are the pain and the awateness of pain still disuact existences ? 1 they se, the logical possiblity of awareness of pain without the pin 8 til present, and the doctrine of indubisbiliy fll. Tefellows that the incorigiblst rust say that awarenes of pain is nota ‘distinct existence’ from the pain itself. How i this secestary connection to be conceived? The incorgibilist might ‘maisaia that ‘pin’ and ‘awareness of pai’ are simply two der cnt phrase having the same recaning, However, be aeed not take thisextemesnd implausible view. ‘Shape’ does nt mean the same Pye X basa shape, X logically must have siz XC shape is nota *dscinet existence’ ftom X's sie, inthe Way that X's colour and Xs sell could be said to be ‘istct ext ences. Again ‘coloo? does rot mean ‘extension’, but if X as 4 cola, hen X loge must ave an exes, Now, te ‘orrgibilit can claim, awareness ofa pain stands tothe pala 254 Shing bape ads oe its color stands to ts etea- ‘But now let us consider the mechanical analogue of awareness 106 The Centrl-state Theory of our own mental sites the scanning by& mechanism ofits own internal ster Ie is ler here that the operation of seanaing and the situation teanned mutt be “distinct existences. A machine Can sean elf only inthe same sense tata man ean eat hinsel “There must emai an absolute dsdncion beween the ete and the esten: mouth and hand, say. gully, there must bean abso- love dsintion between the scanner and the seanned. Consider an je (taken solely ar a mechanism) seanaing itself by means of a ‘miror. Certain features f the eye, such sits colour and shape, will egister onthe eye. But the registering will have 0 be some: {hing logily disc fom dhe features that ae seistered. "Now what reason is there t think dt awareness ofits own states i the cate, of 3,4 spittual substance, wil dif in ts logical strvaze from that of slfscanning device ina mechan- jim? Why should the sobstivaton of sprit for material sub- stance abolish the emed fora distinction between object and sub- ject? I mas admie that I cam see no way to prove that there ‘ust be sucha paral, hich ia law in my argument. Bot itszems clear tat the natural view co take is that pai and awaee- ‘es of pain are ‘tine existences so, fase awatees of pin ‘sat leas lopielly possible. it wl be seen, indent, that ithe argument hee is valid ie eqully shows that thet ca be current mental states of which ‘weare aot aware, We hav refuted the doctrine of wi itimation 28 well a that of incorsgbility. Th bet ht the dene of ina an sow score a verbal vitory by saying that he will ot Soles the mental tie involved is correctly apprehetded. Bot Since the very same state might have been mistkealy appre headed, the point is worthless, and we would do best not 10 follow such a usage. (6) Rejection of legal preg acess _Atthis pong, somebody may concede that it has ben proved that to intospecive awareness can be logically gusanted to be fee from mezake but sil maintain hat we havea logically piv- leged secens 6 oar own current nner ste. t may be aitned, (tacks hat wear the logically ultimate suthostes on our inner fetes cren while itis alewed that evea we can be mistake. 17Theories of Mind Te seems clear, however, at sis compromise i inadmissible, Once it has been admited that T can be weong about my erent inner sates, then wwe must allow the posfbiity tha somebexy lee teaches true belief about my mental stat when Trach 4 fale one- Now might not this person have goo rex t think that a mistake had occurred? Suppose that certain sorts of neuro logial proceses were necessary forthe occurrence of pain. Sup pote ferson reported that he wa in pin, but infact he was not In puny and tat an observes dscovered tha the equiste brite proces had not occured, ff brain-Deory wate in 2 suliceny developed sate might not the observer conclude with good fe fon thatthe subject was notin pain? It might be objected that the tbseever would have no way of ruling out two other hypotheses: @ the subject had made ae insincere report; i) the brain theory previously developed had been flied. Now no doubt the logic Dossy of these hypotheses could ever be ruled ou, but i Enough were known stove the behavioural and physiologic Corres of mental sates might not vese bypotheses be ruled ‘nt forall practical purposes? And fo, the observer weld bea better authority than the subject on the subject’s mental state. ‘So it seems that, once incorrigibility is given up, logically pri- vileged access caanot be sustained, No doubt we have a pave deged acess (at times) to our own mental stats, but iis ah em pirealy privileged aces. Some philosophers may attempt a athe diferent line of com- sr Tey ay gaye vig kee nt Tental expenences and simply faving the meatal expedence Allowing that there Is no logcally nubile knowledge Of ‘aperencs, there at experiences themselves. Mental experienc, {ut mental objects, ae aot indie, aor ae they aubiabl, Because they ae nt tha sort of thing They ae no more tut fale than a stone. But ‘pevileged aces” is sll involved, BE ‘use only can tave my own experiences. “The question is what ‘iene experience’ means hee. fall hit i mt he ie el ve! hn ue tht BY simply occur, Bet then tosay that only Thave my own experience istouuer the poids easlogy that only Thave my own etl states The sume bois for my own pyseal sates I think, bow ver hat to talk of mental experiences” normally brings in the furaker suggestion that they aze ot only mental sates, bot : ‘The Contralstate Theory rental states of which we are conscious or aware. They are ex- perience. But once this suggestion is made, the possibility of false Consciousness or awareness ofthe states is introduced, "The situation is complicated by a further verbal ambiguity. 59 king of mentl states as experiences we might simply be s8Y- lng that they, or some of them, ae experiencigs Thus, suppose T feel cold, This may be said to be an experiencing because it in volves my body feeling to me to be cold a bodily perception tat ‘may of may not correspond to physieal realty. But that does not fecessaily mean that te feeling cold is an experience in the sense Of something experienced. It may be an ‘experiencing of cold ‘which Tam not aware of having, tn ind SSeS about our eureat mental sates? Only if you can describe cases ioc ameabte od Beko careers “Non there do seem oe cae whee weare confused abot he wr nemnnern eng ah cere Ponce ene ace Sete es ora ape cee hai meeereeteae Crecrk te acento terlears Sobor teeta Se Te tig es et sera tance ae gue fers “icc mates oe eae Sritceme en a ae eee Seti ina seems Once oun fore mttake On the evidence fered bythe echnican ree rer pee tee STheories of Mind somthing wrong with brain theory ? Now there i no dob that ‘hit ea posible eoinde, and that if brain theory were not wall founded it would be the ratnal rejoinder; but why isi the ‘ejoinder that we must acept? Any Bypoesis whateret may be ‘protected’ if we ate prepared to makes suficont numberof a ‘Be assumptions, at to protect a hypothesis inefniei t9 ‘ational atte. The fc that we could cling to every deliverance of introspection even agunst the best attested brain theory does ‘othing fo show that it would be incorrect to sie with the baa technician, Io fc, Y hin it would be tana to ede with he technician against the deliverance of ineapestion, govided that the bran theory was well founded. This does ot mean tha we logialy mose accep the evidence ofthe brain technician. Bat there is ao logically absolute need fo accept the deliverance of cf intospection ete. Tels er, of course, that the brain technician would have 19 buildup hb eoey inthe est place by accepting people's into- spective reports and corcelaing these with braia states. Bt a ‘el-estblthed brain theory coud sll be used to ct doubt 00 Some ofthese introspective feports. Inthe same ay, ou ROW ledge of the physical word is got by perception but this in a> ‘way prevents us casting dovbt on sme perceptions. Consider another case 8m asked ify had is hartng. 15, perfec sincerely, thot itis not. Yer the hand is physi erage and my Sehavosanenpect ofthe band sari the hand ir hurting. [protect four it and perfore aka with iin 9 singel fashion. One possible interpretation ofthis evidence that think Tam not ty pla when infact 1am, Pethaps ote cxplanations are posble, but ean see ao reason, except the dogma of incorigiity, to exclude this explanation, “This purports to be & posible cae wheve I think Tam not fa pain bue realy am in pun, A case can algo be described which Could be interpreted 28 case where] whi T am in pain bit fm not If asked, Tay, perfectly sacra, that my hand St Bat my behaviour seme no mote tan & perfunctory imitation oft in witha hun wing he and ey bu te tmoment I behave sei it were aot hart at all Perhaps To think Tam in pain? ee 1s muy be bjected at this point that f extraordinary siutons lke the thre Thave ust conser’ mere tae, we should OTHE Ti Cnt Tho so much coin tse et on chore demo eats ee a ee alt sling a tt ane eae Se DY reac ret Seater ae Vc mie eee ec me nn ans Fe Se te tae po akg Tom go nebo ies yo rs ae ee a eared ot crea ried Think tat ai ec ewe ini ae icing er ace ee eee eT mn Flea ee se a eet eee ela at i Ties He Fao lo ay funees ce ar tage ete pee ey nse, oy iad Cie gua ate geen a pana oat el st il we i er i ol oe en cece ona Lame Ae aa ere schon Ba ara esos ee AES there sno dou that inompetive knowledge 0 Fee ne semencs esc fo me at 1 aa pid ee ed tobe a stagonvar wna, oe es ome tows seence mpl 7 # an et moon wha sca to mato be thease Bt Ree Ee uch nerprt of out bli inthe truth f# we ae ey et mental fae ndaable? I ned be 90 Seton on win pono J-E McGehe) Fe re a esti res pas oF 0% 28 HHTheories of Mind presuppose, and so do not doubt, that there are such things 25 horses and geass. (Consider ‘I doubt whether unicoms would best cenuauss over seven furlongs’. Since we think that there are no ‘uch things as unicoras and centaurs the doubt cannot ge started) But this does not mean that the existence of horses and rss is logically indubitable. it is simply the presupposition of my starting-point. Inthe same way, when Descartes set out to examine his thoughts, to see if any were logically indubinabe belief, he presupposed that he had thoughts, For he could not examine his thoughts unless he had some to examine! But, pcr Descartes, this did not make his statement T am thinking sow" a logically indubitable one It was simply the presupposition of his stating point: Descartes only got out what he put in. Tn the same way it is given that T make the sincere report ‘Tam in pain a0’, thes that presupposes that I believe that I am in pain now. But this does not make my belief an indubitable one. Ie is simply & presupposition of the given starting-point: I get out what I put So report of ourcurent mental state cn incide“T believe tt 1am in pain ow, Thelewe that nieve that Tam inp 208 and 10.0n indefinitely a8 fra logic concerned. Thats 05, there iso logical objection to the itrospective awareness of ‘mental wats, 0 the simaltneous introspective swateness of that fwarenes, and s0 on as fara we plete: Bat there wl Be 9° logically guaranteed freedom from error at any point. How At such aatenes goes infact san cipal question, to which answer Seems to be ‘Not very fir. We can speak of awareness of awareness of awareness of awareness of . . .x, but no psycho- logical ratty seems to conespond to our words ‘Because our awareness cannot be an awareness of itself, there must always be ultimate awareness which is not itself am object of swarenes, In Materia terms, although the brain ay Oo- tain selescannrs which sean the fest ofthe brainy and seme" which in turn scan the self-scanners, and so on as far as we peasy ‘Ye must come in the end to scanned seannes, ‘This seem © ‘Ssclighton what piloophers have called the systematic elsve ‘ness of the subject’. When we look into our own mind, they have Complies aay apr We bre ‘mental states, but where is that which is doing the observing? ‘We finda doctrine ofthis or in Kant when he speaks of he“ The Centrat-state Theory Tihs mace ethanage ums Ey enn pce about our current inner state are not indubitable, theo they really aanrancntehaaren (aS het te cee tar me else oe Tart tet edt Sogcaaciecrast image Se aoa eet tt at SORE he comets of our owen randy ae mys. No® ony eerie If the reasoning ofthe previous Setson hat been corrects we #6 tao forced to admit te logical possiblity of on being 3 men ta ast, bue not being avare of being in that sate. That 8 © Bae imate sami te lop possibility of unconscious metal Bee we meat ec the view tha ou current mental wats a ‘tbincimating. _ “fae conte such phrases a8 “meatal exerimer or “anet aS‘Theories of Mind experi” hen i's not waeatual to say that thes are the to- Topical acurtives of ‘inne sense’, just a ‘eights are the tao- Togiel aecsatves ofthe sense of vision, When we see we mist, see sights; when we introspect we mus be aware of experiences Tf this is correct, of if itis adopted as azole of language, thea will make no sense to speak of experiences of which we aft not ‘But this only postpones the real question. For we can now ask ‘Are the happenings of which we aeintospecively aware—such things a8 pains, senseimpresions, mental images, ec—aec sarily experiences, or can they exist when we ate not aware of ‘hem? I think we ought co sty the later. For suppose that we decide that pain, sense-impresions, images, et, logically mutt ‘seapprchended, the logical possibility must sil be admited of inser happesings which resemble these mental ste inal sects except that of bring objects of introspective awareness. Por if introspective awareness apd objects ate ‘stint exist ences’ as we have argued then if must be pose for the object to exist when the awareness docs not exist. And once we conse this, we have every fason to cal such states pais, sensei P Nor ned ior ned we restrict ourselves to bare logical possibilty, thece ate plenty of empirical cases which ean be ntl = texpreted 2s implying the cutent existence of mental sates Of ‘which we are not aware: states which do not intimate themseVE Consider the cae of the patient who screams and rruggles he having a tooth extracted although under the influence of tous oxide. He is not conscious of pain. But he is exhibiting pate behaviour, and i is at least 2 natural induction to say that this t caused by 4 mena ote which fevembles te ordinary men sat of being in pain, excep forthe fact hat i not expeses To say that nothing but mere pain‘behaviour an possibly be jovolved sems to be only an exhibition that one is prisoner of 4 dogma. Iam not arging tht pain mat be present, but onl that its pretence is one possible way of expuiing the facts. A Sal decision might onl come when we know far mote about the ‘working of the bri than we do now. ‘Again, consider the interesting case ofthe chicken-exer, He «2, mote or less accurately, say thats chicken will gow up tobe 4 cock oF shen, but he does aot kaow, and nobody else Knows, 4 The Contrast ery ‘shat visual cues he tung (Chicken sexes ae taney being Towa photos of chicks whose Inter cater i known. They are fold whe they guess correct and they prada come to goes better and beer) It is natural tay that Fle and ale Sicks give ie to diferent sete impressions in the chicken: Sener a hut ther impresons are tesponnibl forthe sxe? ‘st, but yet hat he eae as no ditetawarenes of thee presons. And they might have every propery of ‘onlinaty tee impressions, exept tat of being objects of awarcoes. Tt ec then that any theory of mind ought to atthe posible” andy indeed, ie actual existence, of toconsoes Fema sree We shall sume theese of sch tats in what IS fellow, (4 oor, we shall sro that mental sates of Stich we are sire may have metal properties of which 8 ‘ut alicugh our concuson i independent ofthe Material theory of mit, the Matsa theory allows a peculiarly simple theory af the ature of unconscious meotal states. For he atcal- ise wl ay thats at tater of ep! fac, the a simply Phyl sates ofthe bain, Now mos modern pliloropber ‘ould adm tht in och cate a the patient stealing ender ror nor the cishensner sing» Gy ee a Trunepeocnes going on which ae responsible for, of 23 ‘re coulyconneted wit, hr bchaviowr Now fw ae frend fo admit the posblity of wnconcoae mental sates 20763) it Wwllbe a gre econony to sy that they ae thing bat bn: ® ‘T do not think we can overestimate the importance for the philosophy of mind of» completly ungradring acreptance of the potty of vores ra nd of sont el sends Aga ud apn, he Canesianpictre of or owe mind a torch perfec espe ue sands i he way of pl opal propre We mun see our eogeive ration to our ‘unin ike ovr cognitive ration to anything es in pature. ‘know in pages in pare in part we ae mstaken and ia Innge pt we are snl iynorant. Being in + ena state enc toting bow ovr warncs ofthat nyTheories of Mind XI, MURTHER ONjECTIONS To OUR THEORY have emphasized tha he argument pot forward fora Nae in theoey of ind involves two tee. In the fs place aged tat ameatal stat ia state of peson ap fore bagi aout of behaviour of 4 eerarn sort. Thy ir intended tbe ce af logical arly. Inthe second plac, tis argued on gene Scene grounds that dhs ince ease i asa mater Ec the bin Some objection to the second scp of the stgumnes—ta general, objections of sm erpiial nature shal lear nal Part Thre ofthe book, wher che wl be belly tested I begin withthe tative feeolous ebjecons the that 42¢ based on 3 fore to undettand the pongon being sacked, In he st plc, tay be objeced thatthe theory tates sud consequence that, whens person is wre ef Ding ln and 4 the same tie sBrainsutgeoa looks his ban, the eo Of ham maybe awae ofthe ver sae hing, ‘The objection i vols, becuse the comequence i nt absurd tal The pent andthe sugean may be aware of Oe same thing, bu they are aware of very fetes characters of it. An analogy would be: one petson smells the cheese, but docs Bo se fs te oer tases bdo aot me Te cet isaware hc theres something within him apt forthe predorion of ezrin behaviour, the srgeon ie aware of eran annie characteristics of this something. Ad, unlike she ease of che hese, needs theoreti argument show tat at Sb va fat oo nd he ae ig i) Wis ually fevolos wo object that yellow ser image cane othe a state ofthe bain becase, when we haves yellow a Image there is nothing yellow ox eed be nothing elle bi, For the theory des not ser tht aferinuges ests (of the bezin, Tt asserts that statements like ‘I am_ having a yellow afterimage are to be analysed slong the following Hae 12 in a certain state apt for the bringing about of certain sors of behaviour (fought, ylow-dtcrmeatng, bebssout) Now ‘here may be lon of doub whee an napa of ts ot satsicory, ad, indeed, ul we have given» dete acct of the once of perception, it cannot he developed an defended Propey. But it the sate mentioned in the popes sas m6 The Centrab-state Tlesry chat ito be (contingent iene with state ofthe bai, and tothe aferimages Ifthe propoved stay, or anything lie here tno elon thing lavolve ia ‘aving yellow rage’ stall The ate reply can be made o those who point ou tht fe itages are oot in space, or ih elect cage. (Having mde chs pot that it isthe whole station ‘he having of an aferimage” and not the afer image inl wich onststs the mena) te that is consingetyHletifed ae + Brminstate, Taal refer fel a iberty to ood in the est secure way whet itis convenint odo so Tt wil fen aid 9 sats polity if we can ter to after iages, pina iene tions, a states f the person pe forthe produc of een Sons of behaviour, whe, erly spaking, is the rig Sach ‘hing hat shold be sid to be such sates) (i) Bor sow i maybe objected ha even ii in the baving of an aterimage’ and ot he afer age, tat to be idencd ‘ith 2 sate ofthe ran al doesnot mike Sense to m9) 2ae this having ofan aBeramage i eabing place i some pr of the ies Tee 1 would simply deny that tach statement fil to make sent. They are only unl. Thy rexenble oldu ine peecy sense smement lke Paste som clordet Ifthe mind's che brant toy tay be te i) amy sl be objected tat hog we senate of or men tases oe are dcetyawaze tha they ae hg at a 0 ‘pail in ono Ps is an observation.claim, and if it is correct, of course it seats my view bat I oe go tomato gat hats re (1 {he nxt ction we wll ce why i seemed to plato sy that the lntogpecive dat were arpa My pein realy strengthened bere bythe eechom ofthe dagen of the [Eeublabig of cosclousess Ont is dogma ejected st ityas in Seton it eto be sad thatthe objector simply ‘ahtshen aout what inosertion fees Tt mst bended, bowers that when we ate ae of ut coum meatless nx sae othr ang yp froperies Bort doce no ll frm tte mene Sates ein spat poperien Tr woul onl ow swe sed fine mena ses cannot ave peoperde of which we remain ; “Thats of Mind latospecively unaware, But this i the doctriae of the a img of ml sey shih ve al a (© Now to come so more seis objections. It may wel ke auestioned whether ii tea posible oxy on the ays Of al mental occurences purl in tems of the body beavoet that they are apf binging about But the ony wat ase this queton into prodte a ktuled anal fal esa on ‘eps filing unde she concep of ind, Ths tsk we sal pia tender shomy, bat forthe present et ode ths pose doubt. Nodes howéve that wean be very ange nsec bout the seen of out presen, beef we al inet all the astonishing progres ade by “Anaya Behaviours ia sfolng the mate of the mental concep, witoot avg Accmp he dctne that proved the dowhfl af Baviou tbe Sent of inner mest sete (G9 We have spoken vga ofanr sats apt forthe esng ot behaviour of certain art: But now we may be challenged to 58) Shes af Sour we ae min Une ween ak of s behaviour fom othr pysalbekaviowt, may Be 8 ot dfn i peed eg " STHowcten dno at we aed oo wos yh jection. Exactly these bjetion might he Soup tai ‘he Behaviouist doctrine that vo have amd i to beta BE Sipe ihe nein way tk the Bot could answer ths objeson by spy poi toa mel ‘ypes of behavious which we sormaly thnk betokea the presence oF ind in the cate tat ers such envious, He tlclone sper emt shat th ros hit can sap, fr instance tine benswiou that ives * gece Aeclty of response to eterna wim But he cee ‘sine the behaviour exe by pointing to tp tance aod trying that behaviour eee the preseee of ind when ‘bore or less esembls seep induces Por‘ at betoken mig ra ooe fry of cares ‘Now the Behaviour sarees her will ako sre for oof ene ay at a of he pen orl Se eof pron Spec ne eiceengen alae ik The Centrat-state Theory instance, may be apt forthe production of ill-tempered behaviour. ‘Yet it ie aot mental sate. “This objection forces us to say that aot all states ofthe person apt for the production of certain sors of behavious are mental States, What marks off che mental states from others? If we con- sider the secretions of the liver it is clear that, considered 25 causes the lack the complexity to bring about such complexities (of behaviour a8 are involved even in il-tempered behaviour. It is not wat the chai of causes teaches the bra that processes of sufficient complexity occu. Only then do we get processes which are sulicient to produce and sutai ill-tempered behavics. We are handicapped here by the absence of any widely accepted logical analysis ofthe notions of complexity and siay- plicty. Nevertheless, we do have tome clear intuitions in this matte. It is quite clear thar a motor-ar is a mote complex mechanism than a bieyce—and not simply because the ear has a greater aumber of pats. tis because of this complexity that the car i¢ more diffcult to desiga and manufacture. Equally, irks quite clear that the brain is a more complex object than the livers And the completes of the brain are necesary if the secretions of the liver are to isue in such a sophisticated effect 4 illtempered behaviour. think we can therefore form the notion ofan ‘adequate’ cause ofill-tempered behaviour. The secretions of the liver bring about happenings in the brain which bring about actions. Only when the ‘aual chain reaches the brain can we call the series of causes ‘adequate’, because only then does it have a compleity adequate to the complexity of the behaviour it initiates. The ‘adequate cause in the series of causes is what we call the mental event. OF course, it is a purely empisical question where that ‘adequate cause isto be found, Ie is not contrary to reason to suppose it to lie in the liver. Modem physiology simply happens to lose it chewhere. . ‘Temay be objected that ts oly a contingent ct chat complex behaviour should have an inner cause of comparable complexity. ‘We can imagine complex stater of afaes arising from less com plex causes. However, I chink i can be replied that our concept ‘fa mena state isthe concept ofa cause whose complexity mirrors the complexity ofthe behaviout its apt for bringing about. Ft ‘were discovered that complex behaviour did not spring from 19ad Theories of Mind equally complex cautes, then tis would amount to the discovery {fat ths complexity of behaviour was not an expesion of ind Te-would simply be an accidental complexity like twigs ling the ground and forming an intiate and meaningful poten. If this answer is unsustacory, the problem can peta be dele with in another way. Ease, we hotied Brentano's ier that “intentionality” was 4 peculiar mark of meatal proses Mental process ‘point to sates of sluts that ay of may 9 exist in 3 way thay it seems, no phsia thing or poceses could do. Tis posuble to argue that there are mene sacs tat lack intentionality: pechape otjectless depression an example. But rental ser ‘ypicaly have intentionality, and states that lack intentionality (thee ae any) might be deGned by thet resem blanc in other cespects to the mote typical ass. Now Brentano thought that intentonaiy was an ultimate uoanalysable, property of mental processes; Cenea stateMateti- fam, on the Other hand, must give an analysis ofthe notion on pain ofcontaditng Materalism, But to anus snot o aml sea. Why should fot the Materalst appeal fo intentional © help mark off mental states from other sates ofthe person? WHY should he no uy that mental sate is an intentional state pt for the production of certain sors of behaviour on, if iti nt le tion ha its very ike some ineional statin oter respects? ‘An analysis of intentionality must follow later, but, une the Pethape, ths answer wil sufce hope that enough bas now been done by way of answeting arial objecons to out version of Centea-sae Matralste “The final section ofthis chapter wil be devoted fo consiertion of some advantages of the theory. () Im the fist place, it is not one of the least merits of the theory that i explains why an anti Materialist theory of mind and body is so intuitively plausible Philosophers such as Descartes correctly realized that statements like ‘Lam thinking now’ entail that some event is going on now in the thinker. (They would have correctly rejected an account of ‘thinking interns of dispositions conceived of in an operationalist ‘The Contral-state Theory way) They ako cealred corecty that suck statements Jo not ‘oul that tome ppl procs going oni he thinker, (he Bescaresayeulyl have sngcds fipcocciable hat I shold tink though Ihave no body) hy ry excaalyjmped to the conconon that such statements ntl that something a0 physicals going on inthe thisher, The conleion was fl a Fal been they fled to ote tha, wile sch saree do ‘ot ena that something pyc x going om, they eqaly do ‘ot ental that something, non physi is going Om Toe tae ‘ens can have specular propery beets, according o out ‘ct, inspening of mental es we dono in anyway fede the question ofthe nal nature Inti espe statements lite Tam aking now eae) Som pti, pia “They oy that onshing i oi within oy smeang ap for tho causing of certain sors of behaviour, bt they say oth oF th nto of this proces (sf foo fncfl to suggest that the Daalsts who reasdocd ths rapusy appended the ol dat ‘we can give the mind no poise desripon, but wen! on © ‘lsu hs loge eansparency’ for the “immaterial” of ‘pia eubtace ox evens) ‘The Dualst mise war all the mote excable because, util very recent arly seemed pose that man contained With ints mater body a mechan complex enough to serouat for the whole of his ekavour, Asso fe happens, heli pss bly of Matealm fled to be noted reas the hypothesis fad empisial plausblly. Ons fe sets suc Hobie and Spnors would st ao limit to the powers of he ban. (Desees might scm to Ive les ence than some others, because bedi old tat animals were ere machines. But Thue the inpresion Ghar s doco ofthe rote machine was adopted a an anempt tron eran fares i tino mind ih Cae Shelogy, and dd not comespond to an profound conviction ‘Aer alli only recently at aos ave even been ale 0 discern the oultes of » purely ppl explanation of che fehaviour of plans, While sl eemel ecsay to postu 2h imate principle to explain he growth oa tomato, twat Ath more ney to have asia pine to explain the bebavion of man “@ Cloy inked with this Gist point i the dificty that plilwopers hae aves fabost ing what mental ate aeTheories of Mind Jit, cas always ben elt to be a mater of pela dil 10 five any deserprion ofthe iin ature of mental states (Ts, fou a fen ou of id and emir fhe ev. ‘Now, ifthe concep ofa mental stati simply the concep f= seat ap forthe production of ertsn sot of psc Bebviot, ‘cis dea why it hasbeen so hard to give any account of what 2 rental state isin it own natu. Ant yeti not necessary Aecept Behavoutiam {Gl Ta the thd pice, our theory bles us to understand, ad in tome degree sppatize with, a Caousdocsine ofS Thomas Acjiaas conceming the sos, Tn his Summa Thee, Pete Ql Act e say of the soul that tobe separsted om th Body's ot in acca wih ute At he te ie that "iti pomble fori to exit apa fom i posi 2° Now if'we tke the view that a mental state isa sate the person ape forthe casing of certain sort of havior, Ds or feay to Materialism, go onto sty thatthe inne naar othe tind snot mater, Aquina’ view becomes perfectly ineligible. Forif the mind is only known tos a fat which has cea ‘fects onthe body, then itis eay to goon tay that itis arly tnted with the Body although at the same time, i sil» spa obj i apable of wees inden fe (G8) The fact that Central-nate Materialism has to be defended by an argument involving evo steps enables us to understand, and to explain, the existence of two widely diferent traditions of ‘opposition to a purely Materialist view of the mind. “There ae some philosopher, particularly those associated with Brith empicicism or with modern empiricist and analytical Philosophy. who think that the great objection to a Materialist theory les inthe existence of perceptions, sensations and mental images, These mental tems seem to them to be irreducibly 000- Anguments based on purpose, thought ofthe creative sctvites of man impress them mich les. On the other hand, there ‘ze other philosophers, associated with more conservative trad Hons of thought, and in particular with Thomism, for whom the {great objection to Materalism is not perception, but the ‘highe? Activities of maa, in particular: thought. The Contra-state Theory From our point of view, each group may be std ro have seized ‘upon what is indeed the main diiculty forthe diferent steps of| the argument. “Those who iasist on the dificultes for ous theory posed by perceptions, sensations and images may be suid to be pointing © the great dificuly of giving an analytical accoune ofthese pur- ticula sorts of mental happenings at faner states that ace ape for, ‘orate capacities for certain storts of outward behaviowt. They ae ‘Sbjecting to the logeal or analytical step in che argument. And, fas we shall see, they have this much justiseation: a logical ana- Iysis ofthe perceptual concepts that is compatible with our general formula is the most difficult analytical task to be undertaken in this work, ‘On the other hand, those who insist onthe dificalty of giving sn account of thought and the “higher activities of man that is Compatible with Materialism, may be ssid to be pointing to the greatest dificulty in the second step in the argument: the sep ‘where the ‘inner states’ are identified with ordinary physical states ofthe brain. For while it may seem to be (elatvey) simple to give an account of physical happenings in the bran which will account fof things like pereeptions, the problem of how a mere physical mechanism could think creatively is obviously much ‘more difficult to solve. If any inner states are to be denied to be purely physical states of the bran on the grounds that no physical ‘mechanism could be adequate to produce behaviour of such sophisicaton, chen, clearly, it must be the ‘higher? mental So both schools of thought have seized on 2 real difcuty for san identification of mind and braia, but they are dificltes for diferent steps in the Materialist argiment. () Finally, let us noe that our accouat ofthe nature of mental states makes the problem of our knowledge of the existence of other minds peculiaely easy to solve. "Notice inthe fis place that ou rejection of ny sort of logically pivleged awareness of our ovwn minds means that there is cer- tainly nothing wrong with the eaditinalargumenc from analogy. Given awareness of our owa mind together with perception of our body and the bodies of others we can certainly say that there is| some probability that there isa mind stading to the other body ‘sour mind stands to our body. The inferred objecis unobserved, esTheories of Mind but itis rot logically unobservable, so the cates quite uneonto- vetsil case of inductive inference, Tn introspection we have dies, nom-inferentil, awareness of ‘our own mental states. We have no suc dtect, oon-inferental, srwarencst of the mental states of other people. Is, however, perfectly conceivable that we should have diect awareness of he fectal states of others. In Materialia terms, we have eae that Car scan some of out own inner states, But no scanners that cia Sci the inner states of others. However, I take the claim that telepathic knowledge exists to be the claim that we do in ct have some direct awareness of the mental states of othe. 1g noting pedants who might accuse vs of eel-contraiction, we cn sty ht luc know edge ntonpecive swe oer people's mental stater, ory if prefered, that introspection TSchatic owelge cout owt ment sates ‘We are therefore in a positon t0 understand how we cold teach children to speak about ment sates, and how We, 36 childeen learnt to speak abost such sates, Ifa cil eres ed has a splinter in its finger, «a8 assume on an inductive bas, ultimately based on my own cate, thatthe child eee ain init fager. fits eyes are open, i¢ as ced spectacles on and ir Looki9g at white object then I can atsume tht, inal likelihood, i having sese-impressions as of something red. Lcan therefore SE such phrases as pain in Your Finger’ and looks red to yo a though it isnot cally red. Further testing ofthe eld in simi siceation will tell me whether of not the child bas ‘cage ‘Once we are fail se thatthe child can respond with correct descriptions ofits onental stat in such situations, then the Wa) open for ito describe i nner state inthe absence of 0 {njores or normal ‘ri-look produciag’ conditions. We wil have 10 direct check on such eserptions, aor wll te child, but We can trust the child, and ican tus isl, boenuse oft sees Performance inthe other cates, where there was a check. Te is tre, qeverteless, that an argument from analogy i6 4 rather slender bass fr out complete assurance about many things that go on in the minds of others, So itis intersting t0 realize that a account of mental states as stntes ofthe peso ape forthe bringing about of ceria sorts of physical behaviour makes the problem of ovr knowledge of other minds sll more tractable. ‘Soppose 2 human body exhibite the right sort of bebaviout 14 The Centra-state Theory Given our analysis of the nature of mental states we need only thc premisses to infer the existence of a mind that this behaviour isan expression of. () The behaviour has come cause (i) the cause lies in the behaving person; i) the cause isan ‘adequate’ cause thas 2 complenity that corresponds to the complexity of the behaviour. Given only these quite modest assumptions, the exist tence of another mind is necestatY- Thus although our Knowledge of other minds is inferential, the inference is more secure than that provided by the Argument from Analogy. nyPart Two THE CONCEPT OF MIND7 THE WILL (1) [IN tis Pee ofthe book a attempt is made to give an account of ‘ental sates ab states ofthe person apt fo the bringing bout of certain sors of physical behaviour Csi theones of rind saw icas an inne arena. Ia Hegelian terms hii the Thesis 12 reaction, Behaviorism saw the mind at ovtwatd act This the Antthesis. We see the mind as an ianeratena identified by it ‘tual zelatons co outward at, This is proposed the Synthesis. Recent phidosophical work has shown that a detailed account ofall the mental concepts will involve almost indefinite complica- tion. This means that, even ifthe proposed account ofthe metal concepts is corect, in actually working it out omission wil be {nevtabe, and erors all to likely. In general, the disresson inthis ar will be confined to those Sore of mental sore tat ant Materialist particulaly anti-Materlists ia the analytic trad on, have choughe to raise special dificulies for Maerlism. ‘Some mode philosophers may thnk that one has go business to be putting forward a general theory of mind in this way ntl the results of innumerable detailed investigations into particlar ‘mental concepts ae at hand. But this rests upon a fale view of| ‘whats the most elective method of discovery in plorophy. As a result ofthe work of Kel Popper, tis now widely conceded by Piloophers that, in most scien investigation, the puting forward of hypotheses precedes the making of observations, Its ‘ot always seen tha the same is ere in philosophy, even where ngThe Conapt of Mind x concern it with ohn but lope ama IF wet 0 Seve a larg conclsions by puinsakingly making snd puting together minute observations concerning parila mental con ‘eps, one of two results sky, We wil eter end incomplete onfion, of we wil select the evidence unconsctouy inorder, to Gta mode of he mind that was leading an derground, ad fe unexamined, life in ont thought. “The ssker, but potentally more rewarding, couse i to put forward some quite general hypothesis sb the nature ofthe rental concepts, and then t0 see wheter plasible analyser of puricalr concept can be produced which wil the hypothesis "The hypothesis will both be a guide through the conceal Inbyrinty aod will nthe gas in the abit, That 10 say, i wil sopgestpatcuar accounts of individual concep ScCounts which can then be examined for plausibly on lade: Pendent grounds thus esting the hypothesis And ifthe examina. thon given tothe acounte bythe propounder ix isuicently ‘igorous, 2 psychologically all too key, this deficiency can, 42 Popper emphatized, be remedied by his cries. Philosophical inguty is « co-operative endeavour to reach euth by mutual Now that we are embasking upon a detailed examination of the individual mental concepts it will be useful to introduce distinctions between sees, process and eens. T propose these as stipulative definitions only, but they are define meant to cor- ‘respond reasonably clorely to an ordinary meaning of exch word. ‘A sate endures for a prester or lser time, butt exists entire at each instant for which i endutes, Heat is « physical state. Ifa body is hot for a certain tine, i is hot at every instant of that time. Anget is a mental state, If persoa is angry for a certain time, he is angry ¢ every instant of that time "The word ‘nate’ can be used more loosely. A man can be said to be in an ansiey-sate all week, yet have carefree moments ‘during that time. Bue in such a cage he most be in a state of nxiety, in the strict sense of ‘state’ just defined, for 2 good part ‘of that week ‘States may be contrasted with processes. A process is not en tire at each instant thatthe process is occurring. A proces takes time to complete, and at any instant while the process i going on 130 ‘The Wil (2) 4 certin amount ofthe process has ben completed while a cer {sin amount remains tobe completed. Rotning ance phys process etalk ime to complete, and ay instant Gating that {ine acertain mount of the ee Ri been competed. Caleusing in one's head sa mental proces takes time t complet and any instant doring that te ceri proportion i tecalalar tion bas been compleed. Sometimes the word ‘even i used to mean proces. Bat we stall ue ‘event ony to mean the coming tobe ox pasing away fof sate, oF the itating or termining of «process. fa this sens, winning a ace ia phil evnt. ti the erminating of Bly proces. Becoming angry sa mental even Ts the Come Ingo be of mena vate in desing with the various mental concepts we will consider whether they are concepts of sats, proceses of event Bt, Sls exp sference i ade to ths threefold casfction, the eo one of these words or words ike ocstence or happen: ing is nt mean to bear otha exact sense. cis convenient to begin the account of the mental concepts with discs of the Wil, When Tapes ofthe WaT ited ‘he phrase to be taken nthe broadest possible ene Tis intended to cover every sort of mental procs hati ofthe contive so, ts opposed tothe cogtive om or any oer sot there may be. ip Sibel fora whole pret department of mental actives. The Philosophy ofthe wil has recived good deal of steno in Fecenr fats, but these dscosons, alae a they have been, Five in some eespets only left the subject in deeper ober. telewe hate oot ofthe trouble the misao nadeate rounds, of te view thatthe wil an inner exe: Here the {pea door tat we have only to go through, and an account of ‘oon such at intenson wll ot prove 20 wry dial ogi. 1 begin by asking what it ie for 4 human being, or other animal witha mind, to ace purposively. The words ‘to act purposively" ae to beat a wide sence If somebody raise his arm withthe i ‘cation of striking anocher, then he raises his arm witha purpose ‘Bt if he ruses his arm with no further action in mind, simply "31‘The Concept of Mind because it comes into his head to do 50, we may not alivays wih to say that he bas ny purpose in rising his arm, But fre the phrase ‘ting porponively" is intended to cover both these cases. Tris a mistake to think tha all poposive acting isa matter of 2 tea of physic ss opposed to mental, happenings. Working out {Jong division som in one’s bead s a8 mucha exe of purposive activity as deliberately striking somebody. Modern philosophy tas shown a tendency to ignore the eaes where the purposive Ceain of events is porely ments. Doubtless this is doe to the Behaviourist orientation of modem philosophical psychology, with ts tendency to deny the existence of, or at any rte the portance of inner mental happenings. However, simply for com ‘enience of exposition, I propose for the present 0 concentrate ‘on cases where the activity i physical, or primal physic ‘Wittgenstein has given #clasieal formulation ofthe ptob- Jem of purposive activity. To say chat I rise my aren ena at amy sem race. But my arm can rte without my having essed it ‘What must beaded tothe rising of my arm to give the raising ‘of my am? a the terminology ietroducedin the previous capt, ‘what must be ‘added? to tere physial behaviour to pve "be haviour proper ? ‘The aniwer to be defended here wa rejected by Witigenstein, tnd following him, by most modern analytical philosophers. (It ‘at rejected with parucular contamely by Ryle) But before Wi oaein twas unchallenged onthodoxy. tis the simple and mitur ‘view that my raising my atm ie dtingoithed from the mere fising of my acm by the fact hat, in the former case, any am ses ‘84 cusal esl of certain sot of antecedent in ny ind. When ‘iy sem merely ries ir sort of causal antecedent lacking "Now itis at one cles that not every tain of physical events caused by something in my mind i cate of acting purposely. ‘The main problem forthe “aus” theory of porgosive activity 6 therefore to suggest mazks which wil datinguish between ins of purposive activites, on the one hand, and tains of events that ‘re mentally used but which ae aot purposive activites, onthe other. The solution to this problem isthe key tothe account of the wil tobe defended ia thie wock. The solution wil be sketched in the fourth section, In this present section, snd the next al tat willbe attempted is to answer argument which have bad wie ‘currency in tecent philosophy: arguments designed to show that oe The Will (2) posroive acy canoe posity be eet of mel ce inanswering these arguments, we shal se the quite pecal power ofan analy of mental occurences in tens of ae of ep 0a at forthe bringing sbout of certain behaviour efor toing os Howeer, we may by eno ofthe ob- jection hat notall behaviot proper ced spring from purpose, Init not posable or somebody tort is atm, kad forts tobe something more than the mere ssing of hie arm, but fr thi c- tion to involve a0 purpose, not even the purpose of rising his atm? May not the acon be gu idle, yt be an atin be "bee iu proper fr all hat? Tage that this is pouble, But I think that sch cass of ‘be- tuvioue prope’ ate logially secomlasy. The Topilly cent caset of "behaviour proper involve purpose. tbece wat 90 Purposive behaviour there could be no ‘behaviour proper’ tat lacked purpose. An account of purposive behaviour will therefore be given ist, andin the final section ofthis chapter the secondary cases wil be bref considered. I proceed now to examine the eguments against the view that purporve activity isthe eft of mena cause me ‘Theis argument tobe examined is a very persuasive one nd st onetime it seemed to me to prove conclusively that purposive fctiviycould not be acounted for as behaviour cased by some: thing mental, Conse, fr instance, the cise where I form aa in- tention to stike somebody, and then do s. Can we conde the forming ofthe intention tobe a mental case tat beings about the physial happenings tut follow Contrast with this cas, 3 ce fof an ordinary physical aural sequence, such a the thst of pistonagins the air inacyinder. The pistons thrust is one event, {he compression ofthe ar (or ack of eompresion of the ir tt thrust insuiiendy vigorous) is anoer divin’ even. We aa Snmcerz citer event wihoct reference to the other. But how fan we characterise my intention t srk exept by meationing {he sate of afi that would constiat it falflment: ny sing ‘ke other person? Aguin, itis clear thatthe connection between the pston's tact and its eet, of lack of eect, isa contingent ‘one: Teisa mater of fc, tobe covered by expeenc, that the pistons thrust does, or doesnot, succeed in comptessng the aie Batis the connection between the intention andthe occurence of the thing intended purely contingent one? Admittedly, she x usThe Concept of Mind intention does not logically necessitate the oecurrence ofthe thing intended. Buti it just a contingent fact that having the intention to strike somebody is faisly regularly followed by hitting the per- son and only ieregulsely by the poathase of portage stamps? ‘Might ic have been otherwise in 2less ordered universe? There seems to be some logical bond between intention and the occus- rence ofthe thing intended that there cannot be between ordinary cause and effect. ‘But the argument loses much of its persuasiveness if we con sider # parallel case that we have already discussed. Ie may be argued that britleness cannot be a cause of, of 2 eausal factor ia, the subsequent breaking ofthe glass. For, inthe fst place, the notion of brittleness cannot be characterized independenty ofits putative ‘effect: the glass breaking. Inthe second place, although the brittleness ofthe glass does not logically necessitate the subse- quent breaking of the glass, itis no mere contingent fact that brite chings regularly break. ‘But there isin fact nothing in these points to prevent us from arguing, a8 we argued in Section VI of the previous chaptes that Diriteleness is an actual state ofthe glass, and so a eausal factor in its subsequent breaking. Although speaking of britleness in- volves a reference to possible bresking, the state hasan atrinsic nature ofits own (which we may oF may not know), and this in- trinsic matate can be characterized independently ofits effect. ‘And itis 4 mere contingent face that, in suitable circumstances, ‘things with this aature break, Now may not the relation of the intention t0 the occurrence of the thing intended stand ia much the same relation as britenes stands to actual subsequent break ing? And, if so, imentions may still be causes of the occurrence ‘of the thing intended. Suppose I form the intention to strike somebody. My mind is ina certain state, a state that can only describe by introspection in terms of the effect i is apt for bringing about: my steiking that person. It is'& meatal cause within me apt for my striking the person. Inthe order of being it has 2 nature ofits own. According, {to Central-state Materialism, itisa material sat, according t anti- ‘Matera theories itis an immaterial state, Whatever its nature, it is simply a contingent fac thar that sort of thing is apt for bringing about the striking ofthe other person. Bt, if we turn to the order of knowledge, my dicect awareness of this mental 134 The Wi) cos sin an avn ofthe Sr of fit ti ap for ringing about ei thi hae prevents ve from being able to Chamcteze the mental caste, except in terms of te et tt sptforbnging about, and which gives the appearance of gus ‘cenrycoantcton berween ie ad eect “Tae peclar"wunspareney’ of ach mental states ste having of inion, ose teabty fo characte them exept i ten ofthe sate of ae that woul ale thus expe with tout having 10 pve up the view that purposive atv ie the Cir eal aaa cre cotngest ee a Before going ony it may be wie 10 cet pa pose mi andertning. It must not be though ha our weteness of oot ‘vn aime snd imendns is bal up ndtv. We do aot noice Coin sore of dituane in ou mins, nd tas flowed ‘ele somebody, aa then mae nde me of th ence in father intosections. This would iiply tha into. ‘fecton cold chanciesse mental sates indepensendy of the ‘haviour sey ae ape or bringing soot, whch hat hasbeen Consistently desed: Rather, we ae dite, that t0 sy, 200. Inferenally, swace of sortbing “ape for'banging abose the making of “This dos not imply ths capaci for dtectawarnes of our sins and lntetion bora in. Te ray wel ke # lng time, fd hong exjeuence ofthe word to develop sch awerencs, Bat ‘what ime and experience bint birch ot induce knowledge Of concions but non-inrental swareoos of eases. The Poston fine to the visa pecepon of isance Te seems that, despite Berkeley, at leet some vial perception of dance docs aot ret upon the consour or unconscious perception of “eve, bo soins All hese, aes tine 20d ex- erence fors baby oF person lind frm bith and sewly made {o se, to develop tis dec awareness of distance ot belnginsined that this on nent arenes neces fee tom eer. In Pa One (Ch 6 Sect X) wat Argued the there away at eet the loi pss of being maken about the atore of our ow cutest mental ste Porposes are no exception. At the bepening of a tin of ations Tay be convinced tat my am eto ep somebody. Later ont tay become et to the mode and pertap 0 me iso, tht ‘eam was to hinder him, We donot have to scope the Endings aThe Concept of Mind of psycho-analysis in an vactitial way to agree that they have pointed to cases where people have deceived themselves about ‘what their purposes were. And if it said that in simple eases, such a8 going to stike somebody, T can hardly be mistaken in ‘what my aims, the anawer that mistakes in such cases may wel be empiscally imporsibe. It 8 only maintained that eror 8 Iogically possible. For instance, the following sequence is con: cevable, {go to hit somebody (sit seems), but the action ends ‘with my patting him gentiy on the back, One way we could ex- plain this sequence would be by saying shat only thought 1 Ineant to hit him. ‘Should having intentions, and having purposes generly, be classed az ates, processes or events? Te seems cleat tht it the coming,to-have of purpose or intention that isan even, ad ‘00tthe having ofthe purpose of intention itself, So the question reduces to *Are Savings of purposes and intentions sates Ot processes Now the tain of ations, physical or mental, that are the effects of purposes and intentions are certainly procsses. ‘They ate not entire at every instant thatthe tain of actions is taking place, But what ofthe purpotes ad intentions themselves? Suppose we consider the stietch of time from the moment ‘Purpose of intention is Formed up tothe moment itis flélled or Soandoned. At each moment we have the purpose of intention. ‘We cannot be sid to be bale-way through having the purpose oF intention, we can only be halfway through the acuvides that constitute its flfiment. So i seems shat the having of purposes ad intentions are not events, or processes, but are fer of out emind, They ate sates ‘with chusal powers: power to intate and stain esns of phys oF mentl activity. There may be, indeed there undoubtedly ae, processes associated with the maintenance of these states, td with the eausal operas of these tates, But they themselves ae sates, not process. But there isa second argument, of inferior but sil of consider- able persussiveness, which has seemed to many philosophers to be another good reason for reeting the “aa theory of purposive activity. Is the “infnite regress’ argument proposed by Ryle in The Compt of Mind. ® 136 The Will (2) Like al inne regres arguments thas the frm of iti sd abnedom, Let os support that purposive avy 16 acy heard by anne ofthe wl Now ipa act of wil ul lee of Donpsive activity? I ti the act rogues to be eased by a Foret 2t of wll an od fin: Ba hss absurd. The fernve et tay that ce ct Of wi note x pes of er pure sts. Theis qual abso. Ryle sean eat pa a Sigoment to prove dat itligent action not ston thats Caused by inelgent ment stir) it, let us aoe that there someching dite Res argument prove incontestable proves tat at al purposive activity ean Bethe cleo ch higs a deeraing,Desiberstng what odo iris prposive activity: purposive cal activity the bas a8 its objec the forming of a parpre to undertake some frat ction, So if delibenton ie reed for purposive setion, peat deliterton wil be required for dlberuton, ads a ita ‘Bt does the aguanene prove that purposive sett is nor Aiviy witha mental ruses A causal fay Of prponive sty Gan tie the second horn of Ryser, We matin he Sst lice distinguish ereeee ato the wil and mere operation oF Footon ofthe wil Anat something tt we do at opponed Something that merely bappens. An set springs fom out wl. AS At ofthe wil sheefre somthing sat i tet bros ito Existence by the wil An steno formed atest of eer tion would bean example. I follows that not all out aes can ‘peng from ac of wl bt that we most in the end come 1a ‘Sit sing ffom mere operations ofthe wil Operations ofthe wl re mere happenings Ths have ess, no doub, but hese Secor ete wl he ow operations of the wl are not purposive in these sense that ations are Actions are parpste ithe sense that they fe ‘sed bythe wll Operations of the wil re porponie in he Sense that thy ese action, Oni a of wil sre porposie in Both senses So there sno reiesavolved in apng tht aon se cused bythe operations othe wll Purposive activity, then, is behaviour with a mental esse. Bu not all behaviour brought about by a mental state is purposive 337The Concept of Mind activity. Anxiety may produce api hear beat, but che beating of the heat isnot 2 purposive activity. What marks of purposive activities? This section will tempt aa answer "ay be said tha the Beating ofthe heat is werely a body Ippening, while srking somebody on purpose ian ation, But thie seems to give ao more than vebalsxtisfaction if we want £9 uphold a ‘cxstalcheory of purposive activity. For we cant sy ‘hat thedferaceis beeween rere bodily happenings and actions prope, exept by saying th ato ae physio sets tha a ‘auted ins certain ways In ord to give a real, as opposed to a verbal, solution ofthe problem let us begin by 28 anaiyi of the way tt a simple goal Seeking mechani, euch 2 “homing” rocket, reaches it target Tewill serve asa simple model that ia Get approximation othe complex phenomenon of purposive acivity- The analy has become fag to pllosophers and others ia recent yest s the concep of ‘negative feedbuel’. Ie importance to the argument here ust excuse repetition Tn order that a homing socket may teach its determined target there must ist be a thrust of some sore which propels i towards the target. For the sake ofthe analogy It us suppose that the thrust i wholly contained within the socket, tht in, thatthe rocket provides is own power. Clesly, however, the continuous ‘operation of such a chust will ant, by isl, sce to get che rocket to the detained target except by sheer chance. For the icishieues that the rocket encountes i is fight—vinds blow ing across is path for instance —will gradually change the dire tion in which the thrust is impel i Tn order that such vis tudes may be overcome, there must est be some way in which ‘information’ about changes of course can be registered in the rockets they occu. This might consis in a gyroscopic compu inthe nose ofthe rocket which registered the amouat and dec ‘ono the deviation ofthe rocket rom the course that would take ictothe target. Then comes the eset thing. The registration of ‘he deviation must have power to seatback upon the that chat ropeing the fckt so har te tat bodied cha ‘ay that the socket is brought back on to ts proper cours “tormation’ about deviation i fed back tothe trast, which ‘modified correspondingly. In general, i the nose ofthe rocket falls away in one direction, che feedback wll have to operate #0 us The Wil (1) thatthe thrust compensates by favouring the opposite direction. "The feedback is therefore ‘negative. The homing rocket ie 4 relively demensry mechasism, and when it reaches i arget ie simply explodes. In a more complex goahseeking mechanism the reich ofthe goal would have alo #0 feghner a ‘informa Lion? ithe machine, and this ‘informacion’ would have to fed back tothe dws with the causal esl that he eres exsed o open, ‘Now to considera case of purposive activity diet. Suppose for instance, {orm the itetion to go Ou fora denk, and pro- ‘ead wo executelt My having the intention must get me tothe bat despite doors bing shut, people blocking ty path, heary tai in the road T ave to eros, and er obstacles. OF course he Jntetion will not ensure dat Teach the bain alk zeumstances. Tell not do s0 fT am told on the tephone eat my house is on ft, or if Tam knocked down inthe sect on my way tothe Towel Buc any diferent things could happen tome onthe wy get the donk, sad 1 would sell ge te dink. Now, if 12 10 bring of this fet, things ik che shut door, the obstructing Per scas, the tle, mut al be things that T become aware of, and this awareness aut ave the elle ofausing my beaviou so that, despite the obstacles, Iv gett the bat. “The pull berween the purposive activity and he homing socket fhould now be cleat. Purposive activity, we may su, is {cin of activities inated and sustained by 2 mena “hrs or ‘lus state At the bepinning ofthe ait, and as che activity ‘Eevelops, pereepdoos ofthe cazrent state OF the agent and his tavironment occur, Where the information (or misinformation) ‘Sonined inthe perceptions relevant feds back the cas Sate, mouying the biter ie a way sabe (or belived bythe age © be sulable) forthe achievement ofthe “end ofthe ac {iy The ede smply dhe sate of ais such Yat prcepion ‘hat thas ben rachel feeds back tothe sustaining, causal state ti stops the causal state operating, Purpsive acuity satin facies, intnted and sustained by 2 mental state, and con- twolled fom beginning to end by perception acting #8 & feedback ‘se on the mental state To put forward a sloga & purpose it ‘information sensitive mental ease. neon Tn the cae of geving the drink, perception dat the objective tas been achiened may extinguish the ex sate comply 19The Concept of Mind But itis possible to have cases where what i sought isnot some Particular event, but a continuing condition (keeping watt, for instance, or “a session of drinking’) In such a case, the ex tinction ofthe causal state 2 contingent extinction: contingent ‘pon my body temperature femaining up oc there being bee i iy glass. If actual conditions stat to fall away from the con tinuing condition sought, and if that falling away is perceived, then the mental cause begins to operate again. The model here isa ‘thermostat rather chan a homing rocket. ‘The essential role of information in purposive action tha ene abies so understand a phenomenon very clearly brought out by Miss Anscombe in her book Inetion Blackwell 1938): the fact that behaviour can be intentional behaviout under one descip- tion, and yet not be intentional behaviout under another de ctiption. Suppose that I am pumping water to 2 hovse, ad thatthe motion of my arm is throwing peculiae shadows on the around. Tt may be a true description of my action, gua physical veal, that Tam pumping water, and also chat 1 am throwing peculiar shadows de ground. Bu, itmay be also although action is intentional under the Ses description, hat iin. 00 "2 intentional under the second description. Now if Lam pumping the water itentionally, 1 am aware that the water is being pumped. This awareness reacts back upon state of mind, and, a5 2 causal result, my arm keeps on moving UP ‘nd down. 1fT suddealy noticed that my actions were fling "0 Pump any water, te causal result would be that T would stop ‘moving my arm, Tes these facts that rake my ation intentional under the description ‘pumping water’. Bu, in the matter of te peculiar shadows, I may be quite unawaee that Tam making the shadows, so that there can be no question of any feeding buck of information to the mental case, And even if Tam awate of the shadows, the awareness will ave a0 effect upon what I do. IF ‘he shadows ace ot formed because the sun is obscured, never- theless I will ot stop moving my atm up and down It is these facts that make my action not intentional under the Bestipion ‘easing shadows" Tis of great importance that the feedback cause should be & matter of perception oF some other form of awareness. Tt sts & slstinction (aot an absolute distinction, as we shall see when We ‘ome ta give an account of perception) between purposive ac we The Wilts) tivity and the mere simulation of puponive Behaviour that we find Inte eve ofthe horing rocket In sach mechanisms ere rust be what engineer cll information fed back to the thew ‘Bt unless genuine rman involve, of the ort ha given by perception, fr instars, we Go ot ave genine prponve sein. Sach belo information may. of curse be sabe ‘eral fr sims and small children, who eno ses cite Information in perception. "Now thie meta thatthe notion of purposive aii involves petting with sma, eve if often sberetbal concep, For i sly in wo fa a0 we bing objects evens, nde concep, thats wo say irony in fara we take temo be instances of things of certain sor, that we aogie information of Belles ‘oi thom Themen ue wich te and sro posi act mit terefoe, sot a, be concept sense "There mst be something inthe men ec which Be forthe This account of what iti fr smeting te te obeine sPosive act is yery cor and indeed derive nis on from, RB, Bridie count of goa-deted behaviour in. Chapter X of he Sonne Explntio (Cambeidge Univerixy ress, 1953). But, for the behaviour to be purposive behaviour, tt aceoant demande more thn 3 tendency to ative at exc the same point under diverse possible creumtaaces, which all ‘hat Brithwai's account segue, We also demand that the ™The Coneps of Mind behavioue be initiated and sustained by » mental exuse regulated bby perceptual and other informational feed-back, We have given an account of what it is to be the objective of| purposive activity in terms of the ouscome of the activity in ‘normal cxcuratancer, This implies that there is a logieal connec- tion between persons having objectives and thie actually achiew- ing theis objectives. It is clear, of course, that having an objecive does not ental achieving the objective, But unless objcsives were segulacly achieved, there would be no place for the notion of objective. I do not chink that there is anything very mysterious here. ‘The notion of 2 homing-mechanism (as opposed some- thing that somebody mnt to be a koming-mechanism) is the sotion ofa mechanism that, when it operates, regularly homes on some target. Now we have argued that purposive activity is act vity inated and sustained by a mental cause openting like hhoming-mechaniem. Of course, mea do purtue parposes that are spite impossible of flilment in any circumstances, But, it sems plausible to argue, we can only understand what itis fo have a [Purpose ofthis sort in terms of ts resemblance wo pucposes of the sort that are regularly achieved. Tc will be seen that in giving an account of the objective of purposive activity we have given an account ofthe intentionality of purposes. The ‘itentional objective’ of « purpose is simply that State of afi twas which the mental use dives the organism. ‘The fact thae the ‘intentional object may aot eit is simply the fact that the mental exze is not aleayrsuicient to bring the ob- jective to pass: We may think of the mechanism that drives & hhoming-rocker as having a fest erude approximation to intention- ality. The rocket contains 2 cause apt for bringing about the rocker’s aval at a certain tatget. So the cause ‘points’ to the target. Yet, atthe same time, he socket med never reach the carget ‘Since we have accepted the classical view that purposive action is action initiated and sustained by 2 mental cause, we are also com ‘mitted to the view that the causal chain involved begins inthe ‘mind (whether of not this is deatifed with the brain), that itn~ ppalses then travel along the nerve-paths, changes occur in the a4 Tain) soc si in te es of yan ely bjt ome. Secs gis cox wlisoe tomy, Taso hong ip wee he cpa rhtoapbe te wel eres oe Ceara ee re Tey mov am, eta Sevan gh wal Tog pee Seer ee ee mes cone Fe ne xan of eos aces ipo Seno ne sa of er cee ie ea Ce A eee lee tmnt We ae stare Se ee sane pineal mee Ne ds pose sy, eB or oe ee a Pole ingot Fo ee ark SE et re ee me Le ee Ee ee Se ete ae ee eae ae Te a See nee me rE oe fr ft ZC el cae eee cee See lenreedeen ft Heenan et ai potent een ready cane we ae te oe eee hf vvolve perceptions of which we are unawate, including those sub- LS Pe ag Eee CR Sleeve et eS an ee yee aes ale ng ely of on ci on a Saar cr Geass) Stet oneal ny a Ce ee ee Oe onc Ere ee ee esaThe Concept of Mind physical adjustments involved in trying to return + tenn ball ‘ver the ne at largely determined by pereptiens othe develop ing simation tat we ae quite incapable of becoming avare except by long and difeutsclenie investigation, We cul if wwe thought ie valuable, distinguish berwecn the "immediate conscious ats of the will, where conscious perception fe de tanded, andthe ‘immedité acts ofthe wilh where the demand that we must be latospecively aware of the perceptions involved ie deopped. ‘The limmediate acts of the will are mone oc lx the same in ll amen. That st sy, each of us has in his immediate power mae Gr es the same range of bodily moverneats. OF eoute, thee att some diferences Some people can waggle their eis, or ae onl7 ‘ne eyebrow, wile others cannot In some eates people acquire few powers That is to sty, they brig boeity movements that ‘vere previously not potential immediate aces of thle wil uadet itsoway. Presuraly ths can only oceur where potential ‘cic? already exist berweea the brain fed the part ofthe body tobe moved. How these powers develop~-whetier tes gf0W UP spentaouy, of bough no exe e o e iy og though cert procedus—expesiene sone candecces 7 = eis imapinable chat the frst perceived effect ofthe operation ‘of a mental cause should be something quite other than s move- tent in out own body Te might be a movement in another bod ‘or in an inanimate objet Bats an oportant fact sbout oot concept of "immediate ats ofthe wil” tat ssch hinge do ot Sceue (Notice that wiling something to move, even if scent fa, would not be such a cise, For hee the immediate at of the vill i something mental: the coneentation of one's mind that Constates the fal of “wiling”) If movements of this Sr ‘eceutred in another body, or in naniate object, then Out <0" ‘Epcot what constwed our body would tend to expand, Fortis art ofthe concept of aur body tha it is that whichis unde he Jenmediate conta of out wl, OF eos, otal bodily app” ings are under the immediate contol of the will, indeed mest bodily happesings are not. But te only movement that A i ‘et under the immediate control of our wll re al Heated ithe Unitary phystal objec tha is ous body. Tei true Bat we do have an independent citerion foe what M6 The Will (2) coi ou dy ws he ps te we nee co seis oe pe we emer sepa Toad in aoc out SOT Se cmnee en ar y eo ttre ree he neg ome oes wight gn tc on iletalgy Ele pln nye sce ily ayer: eres me peace el a a a ely eae ee ps Sed merce se ome ie In the case of most of our achieved objectives, ts posible to ask by what meon the objective was achieved. How was the cat started? By runing on the ignition, and pressing a cern button. Starting the cari in tuen, a means 0 deving inthe eae which may be'a means to further objectives. Someone lating to drive ‘may ask by what meaas the ignition i turned on, and be aswered ‘pbeagshown thai done by iverig hey ina cerain pace Tt would sem strange in ordinary Snare 0 speak of ar sering 9 key, ening # key and pushing 2 buon 2 al being (Gubsidiaes) ct, and then asking by what means they ar achieved. Nevertheless, itis a perfec” intligible question and has 2 peefectyintligible answer. Ie sa matter of grasping the Key in 4 cersin way with the hand, making ceain motions with the hand and so on, Our answer beginning to become rague—we begin to speak of ‘a certain way” of ‘certain motions’—but I do ‘ot think that cis means tat the question has eco senseless. All icmeansis tha its becoming dificult for ws «0 4y bow itis ‘we achieve these simple ends, The matter might be lavetgated, in time-and-motion study for instance, and ap answer found. Te guson by what means we achive end rome sles (as opposed to pointless of uninteresting) only when we rea those bodily dotnge which are immediate acs ofthe wil. (No ‘ime and-motion study would go beyond “sr doings.) “Koowldge of mein then it iavolved in the simplest pur. ‘sing of objectives, but itis regularly aknowledge tht we eannot MTThe Concept of Mind pot into words. To use Rye's aow catia distinton, tsa owing how" and nt a knowing that To posses kaceelge oF this sor ito possess certain skill The ski stnds toa verbal description ofthe sil something as perception stands to Yer {Al ddcapdon of te pec: Gobo cus te veel Se sceiption is more explicit, but iss ch, chan that which it describes) “This makes it clear that ovr original account of purposive 2c sy in Secon 1s eto ipl: We tn ow oy ae the mental cause which inten and suitains progres toads the objective is able to operate becuse we have ceria sll (ormally acquired, ater than inate). Given tat we know how to get feom sate Ato state B, and piven that we ae in sate A and imend to bef se B, the mental ence wil inate aed cy through the sil behaviour. (Ths implies mechani in the ‘brain or spiritual substance whereby the menal cause gins “acca fo the shill in suitable sivations) The skill or knowledge ow ik something within usa state of our minds—but its Said to be the skill iti by viru of the bavi gives ws the Capacity for. Prposive behavioat involves the atual pale tion of sach capac in the service of some objective. “The conscious thinking about mesns, or cleslaton of mens to end, which cceot inthe course of sophisticated purposive dvity, is more complex. Here the thovght or calculation # iult «piece of purposive mental acivisy which isa means of achiev the ulate objective. But in order to make use ofthe though oF eacsaton it will have to be applied to the cute “uation, and, a Ryle bas insted, vc aplication cannon the tnd be 2 matter of thought or ealelaion on pain of¢ vicow infinite regres. The thought or cleuation i simply followed by the appropriate aplication. “At the begining Of thie vection we say that ti acbitary how ‘many actions we 2 ae involved inthe eatying out of aera purpose (for instance, starting» eat). There no eablihed way of earving up the coninaupy of action hee. This enables ws © fnywet one of Rle's rcs in The Coe of Mido he aoiod of fw cheb ces of pre tarot I Points out that ti impowble to say how many “ects of ceut during a given pti of ime, ade thinks that thi fc 8 2 reprouch to the doctin, But ace of will are defied by oy Tee il!) ie behaviow they init nd ssn, ad if dee is 20 oe mtual way of dividing ths behaviou ito unit of action, then a uncesent about the umber ofc of wl eacy ‘hat we should expect ‘Nove, howeven that ou doctine shold not have een stated in ern of rs of il, as Ryle ste, Bo spy terms of ‘penton ofthe wll For to speak of mental acts sos that {hey oe themelees tings at weds prposve meatal activites, But or all the ental roses that inate aod sustain Purpose civ ean theaelves be prposive avis. hae of cou, spoken of inmsate acs ofthe will inthe previous scion, Bur thee ate te xe perceived oi of the ment case, tefl seu apt of will ae sapped be yin, ryrENDING AND TRIING Tan agent has a certain objective it soy aot be right to say that he ito achive tis obective. For maybe at be can do ‘ho more than fy ot atts to achieve this objective. How do we ftutk off the having of intentions from the having of purposes ‘or objectives generally? ihatems tht we ea an objective zp mein vied at the objective is something the agent thinks tobe within his power. Ieis not neceary thar oer persons should ihre te Spats cision before they can speak of hs inerding co do something ‘can say ie intends vo come’, even although we know tat is quite imposible for him to achieve hie objective, provided aly that de thinks iis within his power to come. The agent can look back on his pase tod say intended alk though he ow realize tht it was quite imposible for him to have achieved his objective. An infeation is a purpest the agent thinks to be within his power a he time of having the purpose. “The existence of the concept of intention is presumably, die to the special vefulness of statements of intention, as opposed 0 mere statements of objective, in everyday Ui. Such statemente enable us to let ocher persons kaow what may be expected: in partculat, what we may be expected to do, FX says 10 Y ‘T fotend tobe thee” then ¥ can have considerable confidence that X wil in fact be there. If we excde the possibility of insincerity of speech, whichis possibilty involved i all discount, o¢ X * “49‘The Concept of Mind ‘making mistake about his own mental tte, there ae ony thee reasons why X should not be there: () X may think that being there ie within his, Xs, power whenia tits aot. But ia gese eer wil ve god iden of what i ox twin power (i) X may simpy change his nd. (We may ana sch 2 change of mind 2 ce where the Meat te ating and sustaining the purposive activity cates to exist before the pur fe fulled, but not because the agent comes to believe that the purpose not be flied) But X can enchde thi five hy saying that he has a fr or sted intention. (i) Untowae ciccumstances may frustrate X's intention. But, by debi, fech circumstances ae iatvly uy. So sient of tention have 2 predictive fore, And are corresponding!y wf torent sale we Suppote, however, tha the agent has an objective, but though the agent docs not tisk tat the objective i impose of fulment, he does not think that tix something deiniely ‘within his power. We can then only speak of tying ce setempeng, and not of intending, The objecive may infact be well witue the agent's power, bt ie doesnot belive hat his so, he and we an ony speak of his teying of attempting. Ths, he agent may belive that he will be ueky if be suteed in moe 8 previously paralysed limb when he sets himself to move i although we Know that his enterprise will present ao dite We cannot sy that he intends to move the limb, but ony dt will atmpr to do 40, a0 attempt which wll present no deal. Conicarivise, the fat that an objective is ether empiily O© logically imposible doesnot prevent an agent from atemting i provided the agent hinds that success posible, (bbe athomped to “quate the cele’ an, ded, thought he had soe ceeded) ‘Why are the notions of intending and tcyng inked vo what the agent thinks about the chances of succes, and not the actah chances? The answer lis in the fact thatthe wil sa formato dent mental cause: mental cause where operation is consoled by what the agent believes to be the case “The fact that the wil isan information seastve crus expias hy, ifthe agent believes or comes to believe thatthe objective s impossible of achievement, he cannot even be Sid 0 ty achieve it. (He can onl be sid o want the objective.) For soch4 0 The Will (1) lel feeding back to aninformation sensitive caus behaviour, must inhibie action, If activity ‘dzeced towards the objective is nevertheless undertaken, then either the agent does not fully believe the objective is impossible, or he Believes it bt his beliet isnot infucocing his conduct, tat i, his behaviour is ierationa. Before concluding this section, fnal question may be caa- ‘assed, IT am acting with the Intention of achieving a certain abject, 3 an be aid to be tying or aremping achieve ‘Thereasonforthinking that sentiment doesholdisthateven purposive activity witha certain intention ray fal of its objective, odin such case we say thatthe agent tied or attempted ofall the eee Boe ange op ht he get ido attempted onl if he sabsequently fled. Perhaps the clearest cate hee is that ofthe man who goes to move hit arm, andy ute} unexpectedly, finds it paralysed. We can certainly say that he {tied to move his arm, Yet the ment cause that hee fils to move the atm mighe be exactly the same as the mental cause tat, i #2 ‘ordinary situation, initiates and sustains the moving of the am. (The paralysis, ee us suppose, i simply due vo damage in the tm) Soit seems natural to hold that, even in an ordinary station, we silly 10 marve our 2m. Te must be admited, of course, chat it will be quite unnatural to speak of trying to move our arm in ordinary circumstances. But Tink that this is only because there i rule of candour ‘operating in soch situations which forbids us to say dr than what ‘We think isthe ext. IFT have ten pounds in my pocket, then Ihave five pounds in my pocket, bu fT sy Ihave Sve pounds in my Pocket willbe taken that I have Bie pounds in my pocket and more, Equally, iT say T wil ty to move ray arm then it will be talien that do not Believe thatthe action is definitely within By power. Its possible to have desires to actin a certain way, and yet not act in that way. The most obvious case here is where the desire fs not enacted because ofa stronger, contary, desire to do some- thing incompatible. Let us consider what account we can give of| this siuatoa, aThe Compe of Mid Suppose have get dito go ou and gt ink at ing teary ou ut estertored inion rac ee What account sal we gv ofthe dee at wasnt esc ‘Aer wat har ben tid aboot purest seg soon fy Siu: Wien Ihave» eo go sua ncaa ‘nina cera malt dnt fom a proces on eh ‘teat b denna by tog solipa cae ste lnting and snag 9 conse of conis ie owes of pla out ad gig s das Betis ease ‘tied or ihibed bys toe Power resem npc Ime ined the charter wy that Pups ope) re Me pu of uy The eae to goon fe ek weld are Gono cot bu forte stoner mental ce whch Inpeled te wo wate he letie in tng vole (2 pe Voice) 10 my unfulfilled desire for a drink, Tam simply payin ‘he oe suppeed cae UUMist beg propsed he thors sn he old Ata’ deste ts many ese scng upon ce SAS cea me's Cte he inane) the cnet aualy pres ang be ae from which a man acts. sual preva being Sat Re he doe ad aoe die there fre mena ts or penis shee tapes forthe tanltion of deszes into acon, Desires ae eel action-producing although they may be inhibived or prevented fomptocing scion oes lens tna ined npn the Will is not a separate faculty from Desire. Our purpose if Sipy she dese vit dminang er cones “odnvone who dein tht we may put oling adit] aiemn Eiher ews eine sy by ot ses fn Gt contr breen dey the ingest dey of Iino preven oes cacon Dthfoe ce its ale wie not moth pong, Yer ae 0 pce bhavou el peste had be oh a another desire? Posposie: An , However doa fata 2 contour die What do we mean by his? We may erly mene acting conta 19 or mon! imp: ur nay, Tae nd {oa emo dtincon inthe mateo aut deste: bere desis at eno praca she ta Betws ot The Wil (#) sie that ake no account of what the results of ation wll be in the long un and chose dat do ake account, betwee he waem and the coo! passions as Hume put i When Lac coatary to my desires (which I may do for mor, immorl or amoral rasor8), fome o all of my short-term or impulsive deste ae inhibited by desies that do not have this chaser. OF course, ast a4 umber of physical paesures ating on a material object may ise, not simply inthe objet raving along, the line dicated by one ofthe presues, bu aber along Une determined by a sum of all the forces at Work, s0 competing dssres may produce action that isa compromise between the diferent lines of action that exch desire would have iiinted ft tad been alone inthe fed. This is one instance ofthe phenome: 10a that Freud elle ‘compromise-formation' Desires may wax and wane in stength, and to experience 2 ang of dest isto become awate tata deste has suddenly and temporal ictesed in strength (Pethaps coming to be Eom nothing at al), What does ie mean to speak of the stength of 4 desire? There seem to he at lst wo diferent ctr, loosely connected. In the fist place,» deste is stong to the extent it aes ot might afect one's conduct, In this sense of song, we sce at from the strogest desi. Thu, 2 pang of dete tay real i incpient movements towards doing the thing de sired. The stonger the dese, the more Ut hast be dane to onto it ft controest at all ln the second place, desire is ‘fon to the extent that it creates, of ends to crete, 3 condiuon Of bouily agiation A deste that fs stron in the st sensei ot secesariy strong in the second seve, and viewer. Intro- Specive estimates of stength of desire (a either sense) may be ‘ore, or les, celal Te tay be iid that inthis account of desire Ihave given the ‘word ‘deste’ a very wide sense in oder to make wha I sty te by definition. "There i some, but onl some, trath in this, The ‘Word deste may be said tobe «concertina word: it moves be ‘sen natrower and wider sense But the widest sa have employed, ea perfect legitimate sene. Tete «perfectly 00d sense in which everything which we do, meaning to doi, Ss what we want to do andi which ll detract hich we donot act from are azo things we wast todo, This sense the great advantage of bringing out te sma berwen she BS‘The Concept of Mind Purpose we act from and the desie that we do not at fom. We an say: purposes are desires that we act from, or we ean say de= sires we do not act from ate inhibited purposes, ‘The account of the previous section may serve for the desires that would guide our conduct but for the presenre of che, stronger, desires. But what of eases where the things that we de site are completely unobtainable, of, if obtainable, are thingy that ‘we can do nothing to obtain? What about desires to liveforever, or to know everything there is to know? What about a desire that certain political actions be taken by groups over which we hhave no control at all? In giving an account of desires of the srt, it may be helpful fo draw a parallel between the relation of sense perception t© beliefs on the one hand, and the relation of desire to action, on the other In the frst place, we have thote central eases of pescep- tion which involve acquiring beliefs, whether true or false, about the curren sate ofthe physical world, To these we may compare fhe havings of deste which bring about tins of action, some of which achieve their goal and some of which do not, that iso 84, ‘mental causes of purposive activity. Inthe second place, we have Perceptions which we do not accept as veridial, but which We have some inclination to think ate veridical, an inclination bel incheck by a stronger contradictory belie. To these we may om pte desires which press to be exprested in action, but which ae ‘eld in check by a stronger inhibiting desice, These ace the cates lscussed inthe last section. In the third place, we have percep" tions which we do not think are verdicl, and which we have 00 inclination to think vetiiea, but of which itis the ese that, but for independent knowledge that we have, we would take to be ‘eridical. They ae perceptions about which a true counterfactual ‘atement can be made: “IFT did not know, on independent grounds, that my perception is not veriical, / would take itt ‘be veridical’ 1 suggest that a paalel account can be given of those wants and wishes which do not govern our actions, or even press towards ‘governing our actions. Let us make the conteary-to-fact suppos!= ‘Hon that certain want or wish of this sort can be quite easly 154 Te Will (a) satised by scons on ou part, Would it not fllow that, under SSchconilion pe weld steric ll sch vata hes er, a any rt, tha they would become dees dat preted ‘tds flblment? Tf they did ot, woud tot follow tt the Stor wate to So perhaps wean make the rth of such counter facta state- sents the citeon forthe extene of sucha want ores Te aves want ce wish concerning tings Lnown fo be beyond our power sto be ina mental ste such that, if we were to bebve thee ofthe state could be easly alld by certain courses of action we would atempet alo, easy there would be 2 endeny to stempe to fll it Sappos, for insnce, I wish that had attended the st ght of Peis Nghe My mca states such thay i had ved in E¥aaethen England, bat known something of whats kaon of Sakepetetouny, T wold have a lest had some impute £0 send this performance, Oe mighs, on occston, have justifable confidence that such @ counteract sistent Wat tue Of nese can know that my caren ste iv such that if or ‘npocile Las pu ins sitable Erabethan context T would ‘ve an active dei to attend thi fist igh ‘Wants and wishes that we vn do nothing t sy may never theless bested «ren of omer exes, Prepon tat te desized tate of ais obins extinguishes the mental sate hat isthe having of the want. Ie maybe of course that the coming be ofthe desired wate of afte tives no sufaton. Tht ple to the ease where a cera objective is parsed, but thes, fring achieve, is nc found to be what i sl wanted. Thee i= stothing paradoxical incites cae: Tere tn reson Why OS Potposes and oor wants should not change in the ew station hich anes when the purpoe is achieved o the want said (CTese cases are diferent fom the ete, which ae ls pose, ‘where we ate mistaken about wht we wan. In the former ees, ‘We really did want to get X. It is simply that, having got it, we no Jonges waned it acy more: In-onimay language there issn location to label bod sors of cae ‘nt fey wating some thing’) “To rerun tothe comparison with perception May there not be tome pereeptons, or a any rte 2, of which 418 aor te that they would give tae to bel tt verdad usThe Concept of Mind peteption was occuring, bt forthe powsetion of indeptet ESR tothe comacy? Tiny woul no be bli en, seen oy ie, i eo gm runes whey We oma to del wih mel hnages) Now SES SS Sib ot bani ‘at iad hice would ot acm to puso, ox Be tepted Dur, een i icened ov tat sch seat a Spal weule ute tomiate ne ord ih geo ade, Die on Sateen a yo “ud. Teas we an gen seh ies prose th ts el tena oF he et Gt ret Sa) fn ee hte stan tr fn we cr hich sn no way goth prodscton of Pombl fehavour, how eaa tbe Sued ine eur scene fe the ala Shih edi concep rate ii energies sole ate! tatoo be ope ite tn gw denna ical Sm-predacng. (eraps they may ge oe © iateren. Gen auatiters ike they wil nox be evn px pres ete finen of hls onesie eieeven) Bat what dor wn eal ering oe ren oy ve ap forte producion ef oly erin ‘Cede dco ests pe So win ihe pg treble sh ine a ving et Seger yn ron, Sappee semody an te folowiag pow He 20 ot aaylguohi lips od then pronounce conden whee Citar lc pls lean righ Dut hs howe at 4 perc sane of ‘ig panos sso vate CUR oy tt here wd mo ol ome my ine coming into existence of the knowiede.) Me testo ete ili poring ene Now one te case, Suppose 2 cas, Suppose ht sme slot of ton sed With aan Sagose ta he eer ae pon fe Te Will (2) infremnly pick the dlilerence between () som-pisonrus Hig crete) pon bts) poss Lu ba Co aoe In te cave the poss gud tit cot ire ae aettfne he ene correctly enuf Has quid ‘apt for Tamar dS at drunk bur for an inhibiting sbsance. Th GREE She Gator one wtoiineospectvly aaretbathe fas Pin desire to whieh be does ncn propos tae for other ree STE Sehe naw anno be filled es agate dt erent Pee apt fo causing, etain behasiour i inhibited ste mena pressure, oF i snhibited by the Keown He onto satin the desi Tae thd reinement. Suppose thar some sy weak solalans ot pohon are mined Soppose the taxer can comely eee cy maying:powon, ut avon wea 2 conentation wpm He mama ot igh teem pono gud, The liquid is deseriable by him a eng dhe apt fr essing deat funk, Pat £09 Sulla concencation seul to case det esas tis pall othe ease of ne who ta ale! are e is aeare of sxe win sel which in Tee Chce eveues tis or ot aot operating # Cen, Ne ceducebeiaour, ven if bicion wee femoncd aerer etances were prior favourable. But 4 fate Fe eT operand moe rong, ul = a2 eee fd pencer of parposive avis. alike porPose PSP ied dance from betas, But Sarl Sootoc a iin terme of i elasons to betavios Te {Ba ghost ofthe Wa. ‘Before concluding this section we may noe that purpost, de sires lias and wither may ben har we may call oie) se She in a mobilised” sate. “At that time his pomPene 08 sr ncaw ihe gowernment: “PIN what year the Byes wanted 3 Dieyele” These remarks do. not imply that the fe Fafa wa guiding a conauct at ery amiment dann Pees iat the desire wan active op he Poe mind 3 Se ee oat yet Tey impos tat ef" Fe eee Seaman i certain sacs whic CO aaa er cormals of wutable crctancs, brass ae ee pone of orerbvowsng the government ese 197The Cope Mind for a bicycle to become sive in he bor et Thing te won ota eae suena. Foy, Tee vn et sedi wa of a aaa net {pra ear minds The real ee rs cs lan tnt cated ye ee eH ae purer epost ete fs pal tno ice pwn, rts eu Spe ce fo bj cent ep oa ge ee though Hi cee in sen ae . "eo wore of cation ee he ee pce, oa dat putpre odie cuenta et Sy tar we ae eey ues mere nthe mini Js te eon pce ana ea een etn began yey canes ‘over-simplified. A purpose or a desire might be mote, or it might fis, comeny uy orserugh eee ght tthe deste whch he ae id and acorn emighcce hare 3 Tiare shes dgcane aa SSrvcr amply tleing pong amon een ip ante cher on aise es 22d scaly et ihe cca agpantin veiianaaed Rares ateaele t@ ‘currently thinking of p, then the beliefs in swbived sate blog, and he cates where we come to haves purpose so de, tert sesult of prior purposive acti. The eto sto cse {ubsdvides in str. Tere are ther peeling cases where ee sk upon some course of action with tne objective of arming We The Wit) 2 purpose whose objective comply given by the rial purpose. These cst willbe ced ite et seo Bat themor oil eset tne where we eat op ome couse ef toma pay eal ihe spe Toxming «purpose whot bjeive tc not given, rot empty sive by the onghal purpore Tei hs couse of acon hat Wr ell deta, if the debating ress in he opt Coming fo have & purpose, we cl the rel mig dean ‘his sion coneral wth deliberating, and oth decding But Gees word about rae sophie sort purpose wich sed oy however, involve pos mental ac. Doss for putponee to rer To furte conce may frm Seton to go out fora dank raw miter Herewebave he coming to be of an inns ene, whch, howeve, he epson ‘Ee ant begins ope. A daying mechani iat. tomb saa obvious forer-dmple metab analogy. Csi i cree for such relay sophie rental ees to ite Sd sot atiy ib acesny tat we beable to recog, ted to ave the once of the passage of few mince The Sie mor bebe vil i enpazed hat 2 ow mites fave paved, ‘Sich an lntction, since isa sophie cae, regulaly the prac of dln. And athe ie set for the tation to be ect here wl eel be sabia eberaton be fore emermen: begin But Sere 0 loi eit hat Sch Pupotes shold tvave soy Slbertion ay aage ‘Now to conser dlbernion. Ar at hen ld, delberas is tsl’s purpose acts although « porporive actly dat fo the mont par involves ene ot phys cons. Tan a vi wih an objec: the ejecve of forming another objec the ehich wl the be pursed perhaps tera neha elapsed ‘alteration about what to doa wo aspects a nella ands praca on, n orde to see he Sst spect ina pure sate Censider the case of looking for checkmue in ess, The {Eibersion may involve nothing but th solving of a imellera problem: what moves by Wie wil const a checkmate of Bisck bere? Once tt problem solved, action cn fllow. intesing 16 notie tfc wth prely metal quesione ween ai speak of dlbang folowed by a dior at the wer ia soadso) 189The Concept of Mind Ti pct ape may te exe eth na pr su by on ‘tg an pe he poi gad jo heey ‘nde be poston ite Se seu oe i tlle Win uct hate genes ae rhe esc’ iavcion oe at ie See re pete "What coun of cn sal pane owe coe af inp oe cares as oes they afte mand wi cera ‘ccm te selon une ie fns'y) orcee stent cues of aoa a fn pas Aatea Ee sp conning te pst wns a eee ing cal ones pled Tt ce crete ie afte ne We Seng tt eles te cof seh fe shapenere hm u's prs of dukcnton ne oe Sin aa lenin of cue hind et ala aio esc inaled Nne ee thei i of detent ee ah ck ton lating comic tal ele fate Cour of action’. full acounof hte noon ke poe feted tite peta hig Faye lin has of deen ie cat ptt ann by Set Hagan Mago ‘Aton {Gm Winks, 9). pe inrambl ti: Tui tce9 ate that a tg de Forno now ten ae tealjte iso dh eae Hompe wali stacking implications for the question ofthe freedom of the sil Re Fle tr pond a ef rn POSI, "Belk nd aces Cleo pach ce en agree en od ew : Selena 1) can predict what I will do as a result of Now aug ha Hap eke tnt Tora pining 1 gl lil pecalaity involved inthe aves of deberton to, onan eweseln Precip in this Geld seem quite unwarranted. a Goer thecal Tes at es involved in deliberation. Ii clear that i we cold know the so The Will(s) result of such cleulation ie advane, the caleation itself would be pointless, or would have been steady performed So aman cannot predic the ree of his clelations But the reason ob ‘ious and uninteresting. Sch ealculation isa matter of going Through certain sep with the object of enaking an itll ton gis resson for believing» NOW if aso apropos Tonite seme, for proportions enna be use, AI, However sexmatobe meri slingsinisbeny, Abebetharg,The Coneps of Mind ot his acguiting the bliFdaeg, can pefeedy well be spoken of ((emay be advisable to insert word about propositions hee. ICA believes or entertains phe can be said to beleve of enteraia {he proposition, . But this does aot mesa that A stands in a er tal elton, te believing of supposing tation, toa ea, Redeleving/p and A’septerainingp ace mental states which do ot contin detachable portions elled propositions. But, tthe Same time, the two mental ses do resemble each other—a resemblance which may be rendered by saying that they have 3s their objet the same proposition. Propositions may be sid to be the itentins! objects of such mental states. TFT deste to do x, then “the doing of the intentional objet of ary desc. My dese ‘point’ to this site of asim, which, howeres, eed not ‘exist. FT believe p, then the proposition pis the inteational objet ‘of my bei. My belie point this state of asics, which, how fever, eed not exist Oot account of deste has ied to giv a Sccount ofthe intentionality of desire ta is conspatble with 4 purely materialise view of man, Our account of believing and Entertaining, whea we come to give it, must also give an account ofthe imtentionaly ofthese sates thats compaile with mate als Novice tata the tem sured in it Book, proposition fave no special connection with langage There can be sole ‘eral beles—~animals and young children have beli—and in uch eaes ‘what s believed” wl be suid oe a proposion) Tis aow time to discuss the question what itis to be 4 good season fon cerain piece oF knowledge, altnough postession of this kaowledge did aot lad us (id not ease a) to aqui the knowledge. Teseems lear htt A has good reasons gfor knowledge th, but gis nots reson which led to this nowledge-that, chen it ices tate @.Ataows 9; (A koowe gs (Gi) 6g then 9 i good principle of inference. Bot these thece conditions ca handy be jinysuficient. 19 t ‘ot possible that these two pices of knowledge, p and 4, exist alongside each oterin A's mind withowt standing in any clation to-etch other? And could g be cilled a reason then? One might Kove and Ieee try o anes this by saying that in such cate Aa ttn for tSitvng pt alco ease tate har aseton. Rodin suppor oF th aay e pointed os thar we doy of people a ey vernon fr Ecering someting ever shouph te do 20 Tse hat tey hve ach tone, Nevers trey es ‘ot lesa Isao st at A fall to rein tate ha ‘ein for pf the lmowedgeshaey bess o tation vo the Exowtege latin Avid te nesion nora ati ‘hon Hig reton ay y court, “This suggests that we sould ad's founh conto, a co dion that has the gra adage of singing out the param eevee our secuat het ad the previous scout of reons that actly nd co the sein of owls: Gr) A's koowledgethatg i ott oe of Ms neguing knowledge. “Te ncn of potent cask’ maybe expiant by meas of he {tioning compan, Wey tk wf eons at aul sae © protace byowedge tsa sap tat sakes» cert ‘Eprom Ge toon fy she wat the mod Ooo ee totutint ws hnve fora pacer kawvlede bur which ae esos thar id nor lado de Knowledge, ay tought of 3 sam Sha sinc the peso let By he Ba amp. Te woul have Brough she knowlege into exten, creep ats work a lady done “Thee are however, vo objections to this fou eieron which eae me ait unssy. Th te fst pc, ient pes hat he it thre codons sould be alsa even that Abe pepe to ade 9 #2 feson fran et tat, for ome psy chologiealo physiol ‘Eason, kicwlegesthary isnot eve» poeta ese of 8 Slog the lovlegetanp? Net into ceameanee ‘et we vould be prepared out gat on of As eons fe ot must ot A at lent bee hs koowledge thar 10 be someting thats eapale of binging about he knowledge ae {n°X td a thee And th 20 psp we can ay that 98 ‘host Newson in meted x coe ve, whee Hy {ok tag ro Bea tenen aes ea rear Th secon icy has ben poate ot to me by Dou Gashng Ie sexms pone oor pol eas fo NG mIThe Concept of Mind a chim to current knowledge 4 run of post successes ia smile ‘iecumstances, (Consider the case of the skilled jadge of distances tho aevertheless does not know how his feat is accomplished. He mighe back up his claim 0 current knowledge by pointing out fat he ba been eight in the past) Now these reasons’ are not ven 4 potential cause of the curtent knowledge, because unless the current knowledge was already in existence it would not be possible to back up the claim to current knowledge inthis wa. ‘Buti the ‘eason” really 2 featon forthe person who possesses the eattent knowledge? Might he not sa, if challenged to give ‘easons for his current claim, ‘Stricty, } have 90 renga, but you will ind Uhave never been Wrong about such matters,” The reason ‘sonly a run for his heaters. Learning of his past successes might lead them to the knowledge that he now had knowledge. But it Ss not een for him, Ti these answers to the two objections ae eatisactory, we have sven an account of what it is to have reasons for a piece of know: ledge, where these reasons did not lead us to the sequiring ofthe knowledge. If we have succeeded, an account has been given ofthe closely ‘connected notions of kaowledge, inferring, and having reasons fot 4 belief without appealing to any specifically pyetolgical concept except that of belie. ‘This san ieportnt simplification. But be fore leaving the topic of knowledge I shall append three furtes considerations. pints iste iisclea thc hnowledge mas ete tobe knoe ige with the passing of time, We may simply lose the knowledge, but the more interesting cate isthe one where the knowledge does no more than degenerate to mere true belief. What aceon shall ‘We give ofthis? ‘Consider in the frst place non inferential knowledge. We sid that A knows p nof-interentily if (A betieves pi (0) A's belief that p i empirically suicient forthe erth ofp Now in the case we are considering, after alse of time it m0 longer the ease that A's belithatp i stl sufficient forthe truth 304 Kroes and Inference cof pakbough A sil rly beievesp. A's bli ow auch that Stone be absoately eid om. That thi Sor of thing arent is) commonplace When Iam pen scene ori ater ards, may be empirically imposible that my belies abo ‘Thats happenings or has jos happened should be fle But 2 Unylnter tay be only a pice of ek that my belies about what ‘opened corespond with realty. Tribe ce of knowledge bed on good reasons, if we sill have good rettons (and they ae stil good reaons for Sy hen ve automaticaly have the knowledge, Suppose, however, tat Se have fonpoten the restore. Have we sil got knowledge? ‘gain ths depends on whether our cotent belie yor isnot Cri stent orn ath ble thatthe earth uh, SECT have fmonen the sesons tat oil Ted me 0 belcne it'Dottnow the cath sound Wel, si empire poole for men inthe situation Tam in #9 have that belt unless the ath sin fet ound? If is empiilly impossible, ow. Tathe second plac, clea that, i ou accoun of knowledge is conc A may know pb ck tha! be on p Tiss not 2 pundoncl rv athough does conc with te prjuies ‘oP many philosophers. To ind such ass ia ordinary Iie, we do test to go to asta and smaler children. They know many things, but, soc they lack el-consciouses, they do nt koow that hey kaow, But even al may know without koowing hat they know I may dey that [know the answer vo «certain probe Je to be tld that Telly do know the aswer, ad ado my Sorpone that do kaow i We alo have such idioms a8 think Tow and wonder kc Uemay be td tat these jest sloppy was of ssing Tlceve "and Twondet {Pecan guess 1 Prime ate, however, thse ome are to be taken ler Soanalle, however, we not ons kao, but koow that we ee Aes ho hs ee wee he wore and he Apples irl to amseltom spice nes i, sry ke nm Ket ow tha he kevows, What then, Fok Resin hat he knee po i spy for At bbeve be eens ted fo oe ene pone ha tan that he sul have the at he knows unl fat he det now 205The Conept of Mind 1 may be tre chat the phase I know pis not ordinal used solely to make a descripve statement about the speaker but to perform a variety of other tasks: induding, for setae, peeing fe athonty oh peaks tat pit Dut sch + Bagi edging of authors surely presupposes tae the speaker believes I aescpave swbigephal satenent tthe fect dat he Knows po be tre ~ Ta the thie place, we must consider whether this whole account of knowledge that we have advanced does not lead to septs. ‘According to our doctrine, to have knowledge is for a cetain Sort of empirical connection to hold between» bel an the fact that iis true, How then, it may be aked, can we pik aa instance of knowledge? Not by eablshing chat the empirical connection xs, Fert establish this we must know tat out procedures for cstblishing the connection ae reliable, 20 tat knowledge will be requted to establish the existence ‘of kaowledge, And 2c corling o our view there ate no incon tus about which itis logical impossible to be wrong. So given the purely formal definition of knowledge tat we have aud for, i sce ine oss dan grou rsa tat any of curb com “Theonly possible reply to these cepticaldoubesisthat we must logically mist, stat ftom the bel hat we ae in fe certain of Given we have not the sighest reason vo think something i= fale and given that we ate abeolutely cera ts tue, cane at ok it tht 9 hae itor atin jst 2 "pragmatic piece oF ‘wisdom. A belie xeaae but be judged innocent unless theee ate Teas for thinking ito be uly, This nvolved inthe concept of bi, bease fo believe omcthing ie bleve f ind (0 tay that Iam absolutely cern tat something i cata chiming hat know it to be wo. So, given for instance that Iam absoluely cerain that my lege ate crossed, T mut, logielly must, accep tas tra that my legs are in fat erste. "si then being argoed tha ctanty conser 4 reaon fOr acepting belitas tre? Tes Bot. Complete ceraity incor fruble with being wrong. AM Tam saying f tha we must art from complee certainty becuse the notion of "complete et tainty” nal thae thie» ace her we da tae Gomt Peas this sno answer to the seep, But, if 0, has he aot asked an tanswerable question? 206 Keowledee and Inference We may sum up the view of Kote pu fore in he ctopeerby siyng Bur not ledges belt which ts impose falc og bes itetow yong nse Sorte impos ut ot be interpreted a el impos Biya ste cor of hte wh sug wo nad ow Tee on stevident or lope intl tts, The > fobtily of mite fan emptied inposliy. Nott Repent of being masa? aly er of nee fr the die cover of th. 2710 PERCEPTION AND BELIEF WE come now oan acount ofthe concept of perception Here have been unable wo ee anyway of preseting the penton exept ‘by a analyse that has wo stags. heft stage, argued {ata account of perepron canbe given inter ofthe acquit dng of belifs abou the phyied worl Many of the matin? problems ofthe pilosphy of perception ean be valved a this Sage. Such an acount, howerer, must tke as pei the byhologieal concept of bel. Ii therefore inlet fom the point of view ofthe stempt to give an account of mest state simply as ster of the peson pt for the prodecion of certain physical behaviour, oF sate apt fr being brought ost by certain physical objec or stustions. The second uage of he atgument tics 0 show thatthe acquiiags of hale encved ia betception ae sasepble of thi sot of taae ‘The present chapter i solely concesed to give an account of person the suing of ee Testun mao the fine ge that proposed in my book Parpon ed tt Phyl Wel Routledge, 1960) especaly Capes and to Bat hope Ihave een ale comet raion es tage seal seta more seapable viw. Renders who ae tere Smpatheie oth view of perepion, or whose prepa © fant infor the sake of argument, ould go saight onto Chaplet Perception and Beli 1 PERCEPTION AS ACQ It is clear chat the biological function of perception is to give the ‘organism information about the current state ofits own body and its physical environment, information chat will asst the ‘organism inthe conduct of lif. This is a most important clue to the atare of perception. Te leads us tothe view that perception i nothing but the cquiting of tre of fale beliefs concerning the current stte of the organism’s body and eavitonment. "True Dele’, hese, is meant to cover both knowledge and mere true belief. (Gn the previous chapter the attempt was made to define Knowledge without recourse to any peychologieal concept except belie.) Veriical perception is the acquiring of tue belies, sensory illusion the acquiring of false belief, ‘The beliefs involved must be conceived of as sub-verbal be- lis. Animals can perceive, sometimes, we believe, beter chan ‘we ean, bur they lack words ently. And we ourtelves ae often hnaed put co translate our perceptions into words. If we think of the wealth and subtler of the information that we gaia by ox yes to take one example only, we see that much of i eludes the relatively course mesh of the net of language ‘The word ‘belie ie a stumbling-block. To talk of beliefs may seem to be to tlk in avery sophisticated and self-conscious way, {golte unsuited to such an unsophiticated thing as perception. Do animals have beifs? It may seem a strange way to talk ubowt them. Bue the dificuly ie to find another Word. Judgement is even worse than ‘belief. A word ike ‘awareness’ would be nearer the mack in some ways, but it has the most serious dssdvantage that iti linguistically improper to speak of fale awareness. Yet any theory of perception must cover both veridieal perception and seasory iltision, Perhaps one could say that perception is a ‘continuous “mapping” of what is going oa ia our body or our environment, for mapping can be correct or incorrect. It is cettaily useful to think of our rensory Bld at 20y one time asa partial 2nd sometimes faulty map of Out body and its environ- ‘ment. But to tall of mapping may be to ere ia an opposite way to talking of believing. It suggests that iis Jost a matter of our body and our eavisonment sepstering upon, oF making an im- pression upon, our minds. Amap, after all is just a physical 299The Concapt of Mind object which we have to we to tellus where things are, But Petceptions are not ike tha If hey are maps, they ate maps that Csseaialy refer beyond themuelves to the object they cin (0 ‘map. Unlike ordinary maps, peteepion have inteuitality. ne usfal alternative othe word “bel is the word “informa: tion’. I ha in fact already bee employed i this secon, and will beemployed agin in future. I has the advantage that we can then speak of sensory illusion as misinformation” However, the word does have one misleading association Itt often natura to think ‘of information or misinformation as something distinct from the true or false beliefs one acquites a3 esult ofthe iformation or risinformation. Spoken of writen words are often nately spoken of as information, and they aze distinct from the bee ‘hich the word create in hearer or Fader, But when person # spoken off this work a the acquiing of information, ust less understood thit no distinction at alli intended betwee the information and she beliefs to which it gives ie Information snd belies are idensicl. Given this warning, the tam “nos tion’ will often be coavenient 1f perception is the acquiting of beliefs or information thea cleat it must involve the posesion of concepts, For to tlie that A is B entails possessing the concepts of A and B. Bat since petception can occur inthe total sbeene of the ability 10 speak, ‘We aze commited tothe view tha there can be concep thst volte a0 linge ailiy. More wil be std about petcepal Cone in the ea haps, T have spoken of perception asthe acquiting of eve or false beliefs about the caren state of out body and envtonoent. Tt smay be objected that itis posnibe to se, inthe leal sense ob ‘se’ that somebody came in with muddy boots lst aight How ver, such a case can always be regarded as 2 ewe of iferenc, even if quite unselconscious inference, an inference bated upon ern of some can! ste of the niente bot ‘narks).T acquire the belie that there i certsin muday patter of masks on he foor now, and his eases met acge the far ther belief that somebody came in with muddy boots ast aight. (Gee the discussion of infering in the previo chapter) 1 is Sigaifcane tha in such cases we speak only of seing Ha. It ‘would be improper to say we saw the person othe mea boot perceptions are acquiring of bei, then the corespondence Perapion and Belg flue of eorreapondence of pereptons to physical ret is simply the corres sondence ‘ot failure of correspondence of beliefs to te facts An the intentionality of perception reduces to che Imenonaliy ofthe belts acquired. {eis tempting to include» reference the ene onpas: the ees eats ot, ey inthe loi nays of perception, That co say itis tempting to vay ht seing i the soulig oft or fae bela he cal rel ofthe operation of the eye, hes ing is the soquiing ore or fle bea the ctl esl of the operon ofthe ese, and 0 0 ‘Ur the suggestion iavolves « number of dificuies. Ia the ft place, iia say what the onpan of nh Most of ‘he body is tactly eave Peeps tis fel can be et OY ‘aying that touch Gernot involve + spec ongeo but she + Special procedre: objects coming int contact with the Ash. “This procedure cuss certain soe of belie ro be ace we el such acquldngs of belief tctalpercepdons inh wed lc Se one om of prep wee doesnot seem poste to specify even sucha procedure fora Sing belt This is bol perception. Wheve 1 perce the Totion or poston of my limb and body, oe the heating ep oF cooling down of pats ofthe whol of my body thee 0 pro sist etn organ at ln oom my iy lowiedge at causally responsible for sch ereptions Of coune, Sige tn fct means inthe by hick reaver bodily perception, but only physiologists know anything about them, freee noting we onary sy we prety the ton of our lbs with, Ta the third place, it i posible o have experiences resembling cordiary perceptions which do at involve lation of nse organs kaown or aaknown, Ifthe central nervous yer i acted ‘pon a varioe waye or instance, by contin inking or by 2 probe being stack in certain ran-ares), the subject may have “dor oter sorts of halicination without any somulaion of the senseorgane, * "athe fourth place, even if we wave al shese objections it isThe Concept of Mind ‘imaginable that we should ave much the same perceptoalex- Derieaes that we have now even although we eo inaoeer fothing that we could deny a seep gui, we cat itapin that stimulation of peur snse-organs might luce gute diferent pereptal experiences fom thove that me ‘ctully produced. Stislrcon ofthe eas, for lance might lead to what we now cll visalexpesinees But even when al thew points have been admited, it sill termine toe that the sensc-organ playa prinout concept of Perception, of, peshap it would be beter vo syn da pea of perception. Quit ery in life we lata thatthe sogeing of ‘certain very compler and idiosyncratic patems of internation hott the current sate ofthe word is booed up withthe opens Som of cra organs combo of og Ins ose ee of the word “presuppose” our concept of perception comes fo Presuppose such knowledge. If we sured to segs Beles ahout the curent sate of our body and envionment in 22) that did aot conform to esablihed pattern, we might sot talking of new sense, or even of new facly dierent from sense pereption- eis this knowledge that che aoquiing of cern puters of infostion about the environment is bouad ep with te ope don of certain organs that makes ws talk for seampls of Hal Iullucintons even when no rimsacion ofthe yess involve Macbeth, while considering the hypsess that the dapser 2 ‘mete hancisation, says ‘Tes the bloody business whieh fort ‘hut to mine oe” in the very proces of puting foneird the suf. gestion that itt mf ny simulation of hi ever han Fesporsbe| His way of talking strikes us as natural The pater of mi information involved isso like the pateans of tue td fle ‘elie acral asuied as rest of te mulation ofthe ee Sati yo thik of ane by aon oe se Je ca therfore sy, fw ke, tat perepion ste en of tut of fale belts about the caren nate of out boly an Environment by mae of be ner Bot we unt emer tat he Sina pe, although hep has ots fll ight to apenla3 What i our concept of a senseongan? One matk ofa sense ortan is abviou: aia portion ef oat body which when sma. IMted produces + characterise singe of porcepion, A feret Poreption and Belief important mark as been pointed ou by Anthony Kenny in his ‘Aton, Ent, ond Wily 99s spoon ood which ‘ habiaally move at will with the object of perceiving win is going on in our body and environment. The two etter seem © be joiny necessary and sufiient fr calling something a sense. orga “The receptor involved in bodily perception Full the Sst ctteron fr being seneongens, bt of he eco. In thi work, however twill sometimes be convenient alk about thet Jaton ofthe sense-organs” in Sonests where bodily perception is inched. In that case we wil be wing a ean ts for sense ongar* where only the fst siteion i equited. "The second criterion fas the ineretng consequence that not all perceions can arise aa result ofthe use (a Opposed fo the ‘net stimilation) of oar Sene-organs. We saw in Chapter 7 that the operation ofthe wil s logy bound up with the occurrence of perceptions acing a ‘information’ which aultably modify the T think the distinction between sensei ib ren senseimpresions and pet- ‘zptons can be made by appealing to out Gtinaion between immediate and mediate petcetion, When we speak of sen Properties ate the ‘proper sensible’ ofthe sense ia question te ‘ether wih such common sensible’ 2s pentane er eee) We can then understand walk about a peat scr lla 4 period of ume at the totality of that perso vheal ee 36 Perception and Belief Impression, that is, immediate viual perception, vedic! or ory, tng that ine “Viua fel a the edad ftom ‘el oF vw. The vinta el, we may ay, somedhing in the perion’s mind. Bat the fld of view is tht portion of phy space over which the pesos seeing eye ale to rng nat time. Parallel tothe fotion of vista Held are she notions of auditor field tata eld et. They az embraced inthe genera ‘oton of the Seoey or phenomenal ld ‘ur sensesinprecons mut not be conceived ofa evidence for ou aominferential belts about the current state of ur boly ‘ad cavronment, fr they ae themselves the acquings of hee bis (And thos philosophers who sd or were tempted to, that seseimpresions are rd, were confusing intorpecive awareness of sense impresions with erespon) But sae Pression canbe tulsa tobe the foundation ofl ott fr ual beli about the envionment Ite sid hat the matt compat 0 hich T wth ore imo peptone cones of + pocolgd theory, nots piece oflopiel anally I tf comet to He the foton of seaseimpression to immediate perception, tfllows that although there must be seas impression tere ls per ‘ception, the patil content that senteimprssons have fe 2 mater of psychological theory. In those cates whete perception involves the acquiing of bei, we have spoken of weil perception othe souling of ae lel, sing the phrse tae bee” eutaly to covet bor eowiedge td mere tue bee Ta the previous chaper we dscssed the nature of knowledge: both nomafeental knowledge and knowledge to which we are Sy oad aos eb car ht he ie cd el erica perception will regulary sty oar condo for knowledge: Thun, iby using my eyes 1 segue the toe bel that there is someting edad found bone me, tis wil on State knowledge provided only than the crcumaances 1m isan cmpincal rath that the physi exitene of someting ‘ed and round before me ex necessary condom of my aequtng that hele Tf my belie elble ia hi sense, Ihave sequied 7‘The Concept of Mind knowledge. And, since our knowledge of the physical woeld begin in perception, perception isthe major source of eur none inferential knowledge ‘But itis posble to have verdial perception that isthe 2c suiting of mr tue belie. One set of sch exes has bee already ‘noticed in our discussion of perception and essay I percep tions correspond with physi! reality but are nat brought ito Iain by that reality, we may have achuied tre beliefs, ut ean ad be said to have aquired knowledge Fo ie would be fst an accident that perception and reity corresponded (Apostle ‘aception might be where physical station snd perception both Spring from s common cause) However, we may ot be wiling to count thes ass as cases of ‘eriical perception. We might want os that they were siply cpl in dat peed wo crtpond ol ie Inverestng cases of veri tions tat are acguiings of sere tae belt ae those where the eae condion sted Que simple but ingenious cae has been suggested by Max Deachers em ae ‘An unsophisticated person watches cojuro. The conuro, using 20 deception a al tasters» ball fom oae hand te ott. This means thatthe following conditions are wade The spectator acquires the belief (by means of his eyes) {aE the conjror transferred the ball fom one hand #0 the (i) The transfer ofthe ball caused the belief that it was tans ferred to be acquired. Let us consider what we should say about this case, Tn the Est place, itis clearly sight to say thatthe spectator sow the transfer ‘of the ball. Is i also right to say that he saw /bof the ball was ‘eansfetred? This is not quite so clear, but Iam inclined to think that itis tight, But, in the third place, although the specator fcauied «true bel, ti clear that he did not acqeie kno¥~ ige. For we know that conjurors can easly deceive people ia such matters, and so we think the spectator trusted his eyes in situation where it was unwise to do 40, even if in his ease, his trust was not misplaced, Tf the aotion ofa cause was that of a meter condition ofits ‘effec, then, of course, the conditions for knowledge would auto- 238 Pepin and Bei Ina be ied in very ec perepion vhich noted Seanging of ble Dut fr oniay comet of ese, whch ithe one vled Ino comet of eo persion i tote cote enay conten, Tae canbe iy ns lily i lot way fo ene A vor vine Spence of bal Sng tance fom spas had ‘ol ther hand stl fo et uch sone Shenoy Bar's jot tan ce Ae fave te eae ind Sees wiht ny sot tee vse ‘Plemocs ble although ened by aa st nk Efile somone te foe dt makers te ts cst haste “coat of nopcn snus nd sting ae Bat snore nyc ca oud, Supoe tt ante Eedisane sce pon Ns je a rs ely A cps bein tee blo bal i tenance I ay ye oe Mee objec bo far aay free jdgemet. Tn 0 ty iiny not bet cane the pees oe bal i Gavan ws nccnary condo of A set at let inte crema tn thn nln Aegan {retell ut not Laide ‘evento i vel perepton the aquing of be da the ear tne he ning Of ns to atte ‘lively ecentc ee Te eon fort wl be nde a Seen caper 1 shall nih thi chapter by showing that the anal of ereep- tion in terms ofthe squiing of bles, or the occurence of ‘mena crents that resemble the scgiring of bel, can eey Sinply Solve pressing problems abovt ont conception of the Pigs word “Thee ib a cersn picture ofthe physial word chat we all chedsh in or heart, itough a ou phlorphie thinking We Sy sender toed anon i et lege. According fo this pictte the physical wodd inca our bodies consis of gl renin of material oes and pe ps oer objets, reed in space and enduring an ang tine, Maer objects have spe and sin, they move of # 39The Concept of Mind test they are Hot oF cold, bard of sft, ough of smooth, heavy Dt light they ae colouged, they may have a taste, and they may ‘emit sounds of smells. ‘These properties of objects are, on occ Sion, perceived; ut dbjecs connie to have these properties in 4 perfectly etsightforward way when, as is usoally the case, the ‘beets, particular properties ofthe objects, are nor perceived. "This is che pictare of the physical world to which we are al instinctively drawn (even Berkeley was). We may think tae rela- tively abstruse evidence garnered from scenic iavestigaions forces us to modify this picture. But itis the picture we have ‘pane through penneption, and wien we are not considering per ‘eption as philosophers, we do not think that the evidence of ordinary peciption tends to overtheow itn any way. ‘But as soon 25 we start to think reflective, dificates fo this picture begin 0 appear. Most ofthe problems arie in connection ‘wah vision, and the excessively Gllareases now to be mentioned are mostly, but not exclusively, visual. Consider fist the case of tmitrorimages. When somebody looks into 2 mirror, the image that they see appears as far behind the physical suface the gh as the thing that is imaged isin front of that physical surfice. (ne image, of course, ako severtes the left-right relations of the thing imaged.) Now where are we to place the mirror-image {athe physical world? There can hardly be an actual visual ob- ject ofthat sort behind che mizeor’s surface. The mirror may be backed by thick stone wall which would certainly exclude ch an objec. (Two maetial objects cannot beat the same place atthe ame time, Neither cn two visual object, such 34 migror images ‘at rainbows, Equally it seems, a material object cannot beat the same plce at the same time 282 visual object) Js the image rll {two-dimensional piture temporatily formed on the surface of ‘he miezoe? Te certainly does nek Tock to be. Bur wees cls i the physical world ean the image be located? ‘Or consider the case of the sick tha looks bent when bal lunmersed in water. Does this mean that there is a bent viswal ‘object inthe water stan angle to the physical stick? Does puting 2 stick into water spit i ito 2 visual and a tzcteal component hie copy” deen perso he wate, a inthe eret wa Consider, again, a case mentioned by Joha Austin in Seer ad Sense (Onford, 196, p. 98). On the horizon a white dot 40 Perception and Belief canbe see, fay “That white dois my owt’ Yer would mot SES Lo) Tie in white doe. Where, ee all we Dla the wt do in the Pyne world? Ad what ree Shon to my howe? the bright dis of the won. Yet what Le fa sake han tes, and pany ove a perception of su 8 ‘tus cght minutes apo, Where sal we place the bright dic hat ‘Eis fiw! Tietie blue dome othe sb. Neco re dome Ene poy ecaliys The le in my toh ele gee sage okey ee A ther v0 hk of er ct sein pia ely? ‘ch pier may be multiplied indefiely, a8 6 well a of the physical world Tr isposible to preserve our pictre ofthe phys wold more orient by dotnguingbenwcen the pial Word and Toncphyial mediate ebjects of perception. We cn asin. unk berceen our immediatly peeved sual Gly ctl EG, and so on and mediately perceived ps oes, The inal fld coning murror-iages vial ent objet oie ows bigh dnsand be domme, bur noting eorespoat {hos jets the physiol word. The eo fell coals & tnsge emibole, but nothing comesponds co i he phys wold “Take this way outs eo embrace he Representa heoy of pertinence i oeked ia bead eo schory fel, and becomes hard ose bo! we could fave any ell kage ofthe phys wood dat allegedly Tics byoad is ad the Phenomenal aerate, which 0 five tcoune of phi ety 24 an eboete contin Sato subjective sesony fd faces il geste als, "Another attempt to. deal with the problem posed by these sermon} phenome thar appesr ot #0 corespond co physic Tey isto complicate opt account of lyse rey, Soe images visaly Ent objects white ds bight diss, ae domes Ro auly lee holes ape ah given ace abe pull worl. he af the simplest ape too tis fo daigalh Bewese al tts ta the svar Fees each rl el <> ‘eived of as paling, The physi words en fn cherate creation or concomitane® between te ere Tealms or spaces”. This view preserves our direct perecptalThe Concept of Mind svarenes of he physical word atthe com of complicating, indeed overthrowing ovr onary pcre ofc woe Se which cums to have been gained Gees Salter, more comple slain ofthe pobiem have een ered Bur thin sat say tal of theme hones 2 Prhlem of how we ca know of the eens of he poe OH; or) make hac word depend fot ctnance of at tome dese, on the pecsvng tin or (i) desoy or ie ary pit the pied wo Bot we cones of petpton a nothing but the aquing of re ad alse bls aout thereto he peers Soy and covronment, or of menu events tat ree the scsssog of mach bey aa exisnetsnly sti sed ened Stl ofthe problem is pose Miroringes canbe xeledc fem our account ofthe psc orld There reno sachs nue agen ed ee 2 simply ise beet of thane whe an ae coe tas iio hee se things behind the gh tht one things ia fon of When we looks mons we see le Sel jst camera pointed am mtr prdectes ike ree tznaon of the worl (And forthe spd reason) In tie we lear about the despive proper af motes the te ental even ole i omar than the neg ofa ote til beet Tit an even tht reset gee os eli but of hich we ean sy no moe tan tt te se a comes © be would ave ivolved ble bt fete eines of cmtny Selethn wehold However bcs theinnae nessa pane itor corsponds pin by pont tthe een nt ee ffs we can we arr Sei bout objec a front of the glass. fein amie abou ob ‘in, when steaighe stk is poy immersed in wats, nd ie isloked ayit isa eof mature tht the sheer ence fst Bele that the ick bento ele amental coat occ ke the sequin of that belt witht any sel Seeing ot Be Wheo I look towards my house when iis fa away, T acquire {he ft belief tat it is nya very small (dotsized) white objec ee the soresponding bel ess event occurs Tok like 3 Bhite dotsized objet although it actually a house. Bat if ‘fails with this deception, and kaow that others looking t tae Perception and Belief the house from the same pce have he same perceptual experi ‘ence, Lean speak Ooosel) of tat white dt When look up atthe sky Taoqiethe fle belie that there i 4 smallish ho, bight dite above me now. Infact 1 ltr lene, {his belief was caused in me by an enormously large, but also aormously distant, object dat existed eight minster ago, (Given information of this sor, T can se this sensory ison {© seguite true information about the physeal world, working ‘ck frm che nature ofthe illusion tote nature of things) On cloudless day Yaqui the file bli that am below the cente ofa great, blue, dome lke objee cat encloses my Fld of view, When ptimy tongue ip ia the olen my tooth aire the bl thatthe hele is a bigger than trey te tT do act acquit tise bles, « mental event lite the acing of bei ‘ctu (‘potent belie), bu no bli scqlted. And 0 on, In this account cher is simply the mind acquing tre or fale Ielife(or ele the occurence of mental events resembling tebe fale belie abou the physical world of common sense. “This view eas the miro ages, ben sick white dots hot bright dss, blse domes, ete, ap speces of lion One icy about this accoune is Wat they may 208 involve fe Bele T hope that what hasbeen said in Section IV ofthe chapter answers this diel. They do always involve the sequning of mi information, but, because of independent knowledge, hb mi ion sy “Usenet A wind sunblock {he publi ofthe phenomena. Tis may be answered by pointing tulips cocci nfnspensn see Jaws of nature and the more of less uniform nature of human sease-organs The same crus give tte t0 te same ilsion very perceiver ‘Publi’ illsions ate logis! constructions ost (ofthe ilusions that everybody it subjet to i certain dreum- ‘Bat there i 2 closely. connected difcly for ous analysis that demands a ite closer coniderion. Te may be argued tht 29 fas from tbeing a illesion when the stick alfmeeredin water looks bent, it would be sign that the stick was not stright if Aid not lok beat in those conditions. Aga, when ft, ound, object looks eliptial from cern oblige point of view then So ar rom it being an illusion, would be sign ta the object. ‘as ot round field not look lip ia tat station. In bo osTie Cocrptof Mind cate, prcteting just these appeacances under jus these cond tions seems to he pact of what makes the physedl objet the objets they ae ow he, can hese apse e acon Think the answer to this cht ur primi conepts of night sticks and round fat object do not involve saying tat they pee teat these illusory appearances, Bat afermaasy fis discovered that hee llsory appearance arab a seul of the ws of tae 4od the uniform nature ofthe human sensory appa, peste to all percrivers under cern conditions, Now there eae teadetcy to pack widelyknown facts about an objet i he concept of that object. Ar knowlege ictetes, ur concep tend f0 presappose more and more empincl facts This is what happens in the cases we are considering. I becomes pt ofthe concept of a steight stick ors round Bs objet tat y pest Geran ilsory appearances fo all oberers ues ce ‘This chapter as involved the dicusion of many complies. But single simple, tread hat ron heough the argument. I ‘he contention that we ea ive a acrunt of peseption i eras othe aquiing of true o file bets or afteoation, 244 Ir PERCEPTION AND BEHAVIOUR THE previous cpr ening bt pein rea rent of the tpieo pereecon, fr its count of perespion in teams ofthe sequisiago bie or iformations ete opel, Sufiiet nor neces for an aoa of pecepion ste of the person apt forthe production oferta behaviour But has accomplished a peat dal of pclninay cating of the ground ‘The present chapter atempts ti furtier analy ofthe concept of perepon Ie th etl caper of he wheboke Torin giving an account of pereption ge wil have 1 give 4 dzeperSecunt than that given hither ofthe other gest etal tena concept the ation of purpose ot wil The notions of Perception and purpose, we shal i,t nevcy bound wp Sith each ober Most moder philosophers accep the view that sy A beives ‘isto make 1 dpoetiona statment about A. thik i ee that they ae rg, Now, if ty tat A bles p 0 makes dispsional statment sbovt Ay shea, since we have weed 4 {Pleomerla? or Opson hero donne Jnpiyng tat A fina certain steven ahough a state tat on ny be erred in tex fit mcs, 8, in ters of he ‘iabreation ow theory of perception advanced in the re our chaper toy tat A peresive tht pity that A comes to be ins cerain sate 2 ate which can only be desebed in * osThe Concept of Mind terms of its possible manifestations. Now if we want to give aa analysis of the concept of petception which is compatible wid! (without entailing) a Materials view of man, we shall have to 347 ‘that these manifestations ate simply certain sort of purely physical ‘behaviour. (The sate itself, which is causally responsible for the manifestations, may tata out fo be a material or an immaterial state. The comp of peeption entails no decision on tis point) Let us consider a simple ease. We place a aumber of blocks in front of a baby. To ordinary perception the biecks are identical except for the fact that some are coloured blue and some f=. Inthis situation the child may be expected to make various move ‘ments, including pethaps reaching ovt for individual blocks. Whea the child happens to reach out fora blue block we sewaed it ia some way; when it reaches out for green block we do not re- ‘ward it, Suppose that eventually the child ceaches out for blue blocks, but never reaches out for green blocks, (Thi is B. F. ‘Skinne’s ‘opesant conditioning’) Ie not its behaviour 2 mani- festaton ofa reve belief, acquired by means ofits eye, that thee ‘xa diference in colour between the blue and the green blocks? ‘And could s aot be std to possess the cnepr of blve and green, (ot at any rate the cnet ofthe difference between blue nd green, even if in # very primitive form? It is true that certain doubts may be mised. 1 the child really discriminating between the diferent colours ofthe blocks? Peabays itis diselminating between some other feature in which the 10 sons of block difer, such asthe diferent brightneses of the 0 sors of surface? However, such a possibility can be eliminated by further experinen Can the child discriminate between bla ad green, ori it simply sliscriminating between the particular shade of shades of blue and _reen painted on the blocks? Further testing with blocks of other Shades ofthe two colours would be necessary. Again, even if this ‘question is settled, has the child learnt to discriminate berween blue and green, of simply between a be block and a gren black? Farther tests would be necessary to decide whether the baby could tell blue things from green things peserily. ‘There are also doubts ofa slighely deren vox, Was the child aware of the difference between the blue and the green blocks before the taining procedure was undertaken, or did the tuning ‘ase ito become aware of dsference that it had not been aware 246 Pereption and Bebaviour of before? This seems to be a perfectly rea qvestion, one that ‘roa be dif bt by 80 means impossible osnpwer on Be Sasi of poychologial x piysilogial evidences Fortuna however is nor important for ust newer i here, (ithe it ‘te the cil saa ast Beli snd the experimen Simply lied inanietacons of thee elf nthe second ce, te {mining gave the ld new dnsoninatry powers, snd so Was tle to sequie new bela aboot the word The decsion be {een the two posible iy ofcourse, ofthe geste imporance foxporiay, But we can lee an open question here) ‘Now, despite ll he doubts that may be ated about exscy wha fever of the situation the Baby cn persis, te deren Ted behaviow towards the blocks doce provide good reasons For saying tha ican pereiveadferenc erween the blocs 08 40 can acgaze tre Beles on this mare when he) are ul Sty simulated by the blocks. And if we arrange that green Hock be wewed der conditions in which r would look ioe fo the nova pertives, andthe baby teaches out towards the block the tewarded behaviour toward blr block) webave good reasons 0 think tha it sel Believes tha hs ia blue bloc So the behaviour manifested i the reson for thinking that a certain ble has en aired. Bot just how ae behaviour and Sele conned? nh tion scout ofthe ate, the escepion involves no lopcly necessary esesence ro behaviour. {The tabs actions in retcing out fr bv locks but not for {ren blocks are mete sip tate preies a difeence berwees {he'two, Henaviaur and pereecon ae condngeny connected (On such view, only an tgument by analogy fom our own case Sows ts osoume tat te baby peretes a all Behavious, Gin the oter hand ruth toss othe oppose eee, and says tha the baby's perception to be idee with be- [viour. The Behavousat admits there canbe perception with ‘out behaviour, bo sys that och preepton ia mere dapoion tobehave sppeopently. The dsposiion i conerved according fo the Phencrseast deony of nponions, 26 at eaaling the txitence of non diponitional sat. Agno this view we are Tkelytoproest aa percepoon ean nner afar and ota mater ‘of behaviour, which seems to thtow us back again on the view that shee iv merely contingent conection betwee perepton sd behav wT‘The Concept of Mind Bat if we say tat the baby’s perception 8 the coming tobe of 4 sate of the Baby apt for the bringing about of cet sors of Alserninative behaviour, we get the bes of both seals. We Preserve the ‘nner charcer of perepton, yet atthe sme tne ‘we cote a logical de between the inner event and te ostwael behaviour ‘What geneal formula can we ind to cover al a behaviour of ‘he baby which may be proper taken to be manifestation that it ean perecive the difrence between te be andthe green locks? ‘The following formula looks hopeful funder cern conditions, 4 blue block acs on the baby’s eyes, ad ifthe baby follows tis ‘with one oF many patterns of haviout, which iavolve cx {ain defite reson, rs tbe Be block and if under the same conditions, whe a green block acts on the baby's eyes, it Sor tak follow ths with behaviour ofthe som, then this io «mane tion of perception of the dierenceberveen the be and green ‘locks, Thar i os if he baby behaves towards the blo and fren Blocks ins apetematilly deren way, thes i fas shows {Eien te dence, The go othe lt ‘locks and’ not forthe geen is simpy parla ease Ealing under this formula, * py Ps "This cas of the baby i itended eo presen a model of a 8 count of perception as. state ofthe petton ape for binging bask en ua mh al if ne Tee important objections tha can be made tothe account proposed: "Thee sjeclons ean only be anewered by fre eficeang anid deepening thi analysis ofthe matte of perepton, The st of ehis chaps willbe devoted tots sk, It is clear that pereprual beliefs can be acquired which ae aever ‘manifested ia behaviour Nor eed there be any pressure towards such behnvloue, For T ean perceive something yet be completely uninterested in what J pefeeive, and so have a the slightest tendency to manifest appropriate behaviour. The stecture ofthe 708 of eats is said to be such tha they should be expable of per proved he bas the concept of Dat, confining gurelves tothe eld of perception, what maa festons would show that a penon fad the concept of ted? ‘Surely this thatthe perceiver involved, in some cumstances at leat able to behave in 2 sytematalydiferene way towaeds zed object on the one hand, snd objets that are notre onthe other, when tar poreciverssenseongans ate suitably stimulated bby et objects ‘This implies that preepoaluson pesopposes "6Tie Comp of Mind that thece ae circumstances in which the person subject to itis capable of veri pereeption with respect to the proper ot properties about which ber deceived. Treo lopli prep Doses a capacity for freedom from eror on cenain ther otaions ‘Nor is this all ht i prenupposed, Since dscrmanaive be haviour involves the will, and since preepion ofthe develo Ing nat fh sua logy avlved acted 37 the wil the possession of the concept of red implies the pose Sion of: number of fstce espa concepts us wits hey fem be gy ay which pei tc cme saviour by supplying propriate perceptual capaci ane ah ty iin imine brio 3m feraton of pereeptual illusion only beense we pact tat Pet eet oftpcie oder teaver wih {paces for veri perception. The notion of percep il soni deeply rooted inthe notion of caput for veil pe Ception, This ves deeper force tothe contention that ‘pe Sie ia stad he city spit tt we ‘we sy we perceive a something ithe case we imply tha is indeed the case, * my However we must be cael to dfise the limit ofthis op istic and anicepicalconcosion. €) Inthe fst place, thisconlsion doesnot entail that, wen & Perceiver takes something to be red when it is not, this must be a attcally unusual oceurtenee by comparison withthe reeves ‘eridieal perceptions that objects ae ted. All ha ig neces 6 {bat thet be ai of cremate of «arti inhi te ee iver is capable of vesaal perception of ed things, This se oF ‘Sreumstances need not be one tht eepuar obi. The ctem- ances need os even be ones that actly ebtai al. I simpy be empisially tue that if they dia obtain the perever ‘ould have veridcal perception of ed hing. tis tre tat if perceive only manlested success selection- Ichaviour towards ved objects in» certain very limited context buc proved unable to manifest euch Behaviour in most ondary Contests, we should cersniy want evidence thay outside t= Special context, he ever ad spent experiences that could be Propet described a objects loking ted to him hough they ‘ete not infact ed. Bo such evidence might be fortheaaing might be dat the perceiver seed in rlaton fo ceria objects 366 Perption ond Bebvcwr tha wer not ed inal the ute way hat he ced towards things ncn limited crater were he ores dicated ted ings fm cae things Or py concen might (Sst to lev iat he mest be ming ote something tds FSeintaace be sgh Saver gins in tn of hee Atte foro god vies aug no erdece that weap Sit int position to pode would be evdece proved by 4 Selly elle theory of the working of ce ria ft was at that process wee going on in the peices rnin that were trode with conctyscing red sje in he ted one tc ere the porter wae rptay scent, we might hve rod eaton to hk thatthe peeve tered to seaming ‘Se. Filly, wih perceives who have + good command of innguage, we can lyon te vt report Ae we have sea in Chaps 6 in diclsing the sleged nconigilty of lar ‘perton, hee sports st no mote ogily ili ha sy Ciher may of sicalaing what he petesve perepons ar But with tphisicted language-we, they at a price gute mabe Inthceame way, wecaneveniagin evidence tht wood show tint a pacer sho nove in aethadn vet poepion of Sentng wl svete dave peep ase to Howeret, this conctton co sep sot i i mn be stymied. Fora these way of dacovering tat oecody (Corse o sane) hn bnnsbjet to perrpial lon de- fed upon the ascipton tat, i epect ofthe evidence nap Fred vo prove he ocasence fica, we ate capable of pe (cing corey, Wesrune that we can preven in fir tcaving ins crn wy, o tot he subj a ed gaes ot hat hs isn sins cei ste, or tat el ueing e- tls won, Only aunt the backgroud ofthe stumpoe hat cena yeti ey peer os (@) There «second linieaion t be placed ypon the op aise and sotcepeslconcsion sppaeny pede by out ‘count of eon sion. The scout ay tert suppor the tow elbrated atacepcal Argument frm Parag eet Zope oil prope, et donot think it des "Po ondany Argues fn Pend ce 8 understand eaThe Concept of Mind ‘may be formalated inthe following way. Suppose i tobe the ‘ise that all users of a language agte in plying a certain de scrptive word or phase, iv, to 4 certain cate of instances Suppose these instances ae just te sor of instances that we wou ‘we to teach person or child ignorant ofthe word or phrase what i meant. Suppose, tat is htt they are paradigm cases. Theat follows of logial necessity that thse things ae >and 30 that eit NNow this arpument has come under much criticim in recent yes. There it, however, an almost cxacly paral argument applied to sensory properties, an argument which may be call the Argon! from Paradigm cans of sory property, wk il enjoys widespread underground suppor although itis tldom cxplicily formulated. To normal perceiver certain lat of b- jects look red. This class includes ripe Jonathan aples, pos bore in England and Australia, tomatoes the fag of the Soviet Union and Blood, These aze the sot of objects wed t0 tach 2 uM or a animal with elourvio, what eens The Argument from Paradigm eases of sensory properties ers ht, Biven chet empirical fat, follows of logical necesita hee objects are infact red. We cannot amit the facts, yet refuse © aucbute the property. Now ie might seem that our argument has aloled us tothe sme concasion by diferent, although ot de However, T do not think we should accept this angument, aot oT think thatthe same contusion is ely entailed by oa ov sequent. Ie would be possible (logially possible, at 307 ete) © teach an animal or child the diference between fed and none things by pretetig i with objec tha simply beled ted 0 Such aperecivermightacquite the cpa to dstninatbetvera ‘ed things and non-ed things, and so have the concept off although neve having pereciveda thing that wi ely ro NOW, XE this so, why should we not adit the (logic) possibly that {he sored paradigm objects might tur out to be things at lok ed bate au’ anne fw th ito edo Bot to admit soch a logial pony eo jet the Argument 700 Paradigm cise ofseasory proper nS ‘Of course, we can only have the slightest reason to think that dn fet he ‘pacadig objects are not telly red, but instead 0) 4ook red to normal peceivers ia normal conons, provided 26 Perception and Behaviour there ie god evidence for such view, And that evidence mast in the end be bazed upon perception, which means that we shall have to accept ofr poreptual paradigms if we are to have reason for suspecting the pandigms of red. We pain ove knowledge of the ‘world by perception, and so we can do no beter than overthrow ‘one section ofthe belies acquired in pereption bya theory which is supported by appeal to another section of our perceptually acquired beliefs. But no partadar set of paradigm objec is logically sacrosanct. Depite these qualifications, it remains true that perceptual illusion is, of logical necessity, posible only against a back- ‘round of at lest a capacity for veridical perception. ‘Now a eaparity for veridcal perception implies thatthe veridi- cal perceptions involved are acquiring of knowledge as opposed to mere true belie. For according to the analysis of knowledge in Chapter 9, if in certain circumstances, one's beliefs about 2 certain mates ae of empl neceity tu then ths belt constitute knowledge. But a espa for veridial perception im- plies cha thee are posible ctcumstances where one's pereepual beliefs about a certain sort of matter are, of empisial necessity, In the previous chapter it was pointed out (ia Section X1) that ‘veridical perceptions might ether be acquirings of knowledge or of true belief. Bu it was said, without argument being offered, tht he cnt caes were tote where knowledge was cite. Tis now possible to see the logical bass for ths. All perception, ‘eridial or illusory, presupposes a capacity in the pereiver for ‘eridical perception in certain circumstances. This entails that the perceptions in which the capacity is actualized ae aequtings of knowledge If the argument ofthis chapter has been correct, then, we can give an account of the concept of perception solely in terms of ates of the person both apt for being produced by physical situations in the body and environment of the perceiver, and also pt for discriminatory or selective behaviour directed towards these same physical situations, Such an account is atleast com= patible witha purely physicals view of man. %12 THE SECONDARY QUALITIES 1, THE PROBLEM OF THE SECONDARY QUALITITES TN what we have said of, thas been asumed that he ‘second 2a sultescolou, sod tt sly eat and cake objective properties of phyial objets or physi proces We dsover the colour oan sje ort take nj ese way that we discover its shape oie tentae, But maybe seeds such aly sei std to the utes ined ie. For modem science finds no oom for sich properties its account of the physical word Some properies of phsial objects and processes are suscep ible of logical analysis in tems of other properies, Ths, 8 ‘might give an analysis of hardness in terms of 2 csposiion in he hard object not wo change is shape or beak up easly when wade? rene But colo ound tt, eat ad cl, even 20 other quis sec oss any such sanyo They sem 0 be ieduibe qualities. Any connection thatthe have wi oe Proper of phil objects sxms to bes condnge™ one. lower, a ie wellknown, the conception of te scondaY squales 36 ieducible or unanalysable properties of physic! ‘objects or proceses has led to the greatest problems: The dl cles have been with us at lest since the bine of Calo, and ‘have only become more pressing with every advance in physical ‘aowledge. How ae we to fe sch redone properties no the Posi woud sit conceived by ppc? For insane ‘Bodern physics pictures an ordinary tncrocopic objects 39 Indeftly large swarm of ‘Rndamentl parce moving in 2 The Secondary Qualities space that, despite the numbers ofthese particles, relatively emp '9. Only in the densest stars, where matter exists in a “collapsed” state ae the fundamental particles packed in at all closely. Now ‘what can we predicate the secondary qualities of? They surely cannot be predicable of individual “fundamental particles’. Are they, then, ‘emergent’ properties ofthe whole area or surfice of the area “occupied” by the particles? Perhaps thie is a barely possible line to take, but i is not one that a physicist o, 1 think, Anyone else, could look upon with much enthusiasm, In the excellent terminology of Wilfad Sellars, there is a prima face contradiction between the ‘manifest image’ of the [Physical world that ordinary perception presents us with, andthe “acleuic image’ of the world that physicists are gradually 2r- Leulating for us. Ifthe secondary qualities are taken to be iere- ducible properties of physical objects, they can be Sted into the ‘manifest, bt not the scientific, image ofthe world Some philosophers and scientists have sought to remove the ‘contradiction by arguing thatthe “écientise image’ of the world Droposed by physics isa mere manner of speaking. The ral world is the world of the manifest image, and th ‘scientific image isan abstraction of certsin features from the manifest world, ois 2 fition that has only heuristic and predictive value. I ve said ‘what I have t0 sayin eitciem of this view in Perpton and the Physical Wer, Chapter 12, Section 2. There is very forceful cxtcsm in J. J.C. Stoare's Pliliaphy and Scetic Rear (Rout ledge, 1963), Chapter 2. Here I wll sy only that I tink the scien- tificimage of the world hast be taken seriously. Iehas tobe taken ntologieally. If this isso, thee is sll a problem of how the Secondary qualities can be fitedtnco the physical world. ‘But most philosophers and xientsts who have tried to tackle this problem have reached a diferent conclusion. They have coa- tluded thatthe ireducibl gale cannot realy qualify the physical ‘objects they appear 10 qualify. The qulis qualify items in the mind of the perceiver. To say that a physical surface i coloured ‘cannot truly imply anything more than that this surface has the power of producing items having a certain ireducble quality In the miad of a normal perceiver. Bur fom this conclusion further conclusions follow Ja the fest place, Berkeley was surely right in arguing tha i ‘he secondary Gualities qualify mental tems, then the other directly 7The Concept of Mind Peeceived properties are alo properties of mena, not physi objects. Colour and vsile extention, for instane, are next ably bound up with each other, If colour gualier something smental, so does visible extension. And so We ae led to the View that what we are on-iferenially aware of in perception is never 4 phyial situation but »stuaon in our own ids out OW current senseimpresions, petbape We aze forced to accept 2 Represent thon of petepcon, witha difil, el, indeed, we accept the sill more desperate doctrine of Pheno- -menalism, - “ee Tn the second plac, we are back in that bifurcation of ment snd physical celty which isthe object of «physiaiae doctrine of man to overcome Man's mind becomes a gute diferet sort of abjec rom physical objec: because itis quail by, or ia Some way linked with quis that physial selene need tke Bo account of To accept the view thatthe secondary Guaiies dereduible gua of mental tems would be to abandon the Whol Progeamme ofthis work. It is eae, the, that @ Materaise account ofthe mid mst coffer some new account ofthe secondary gules a chis chapter therefore, I put forward the vew that they ae nothing but fs «al propeties of piysial objects oe proceses. Colour of ut faces, on thit view, wll be simply physval properties of tho surfaces, And by ‘physical properties” is meant the sor of Propet ta pei would be pepe to atte hse ee, the som of properties ha would iat athe teat Iage Notice that itis a physical surtace's seat phys ed hat sb fd with physical prope ofthat ture oe on at tne ooking ted. Something looking red is a matter of a person of Berson having certain perceptions a8 result ofthe cual a00 of tha surface on thei eyes. These perceptions, we have argued, sate not themselves red, and so do not aceesiute the posalating ‘of any guia at all. The perceptions ate scquirngs of bli 0 potential belie, that something physical i eds ot dept Ke of ars hey are acgutge of eps for wlectne saviour towards particular red objects, epaciies chaste ‘silly bought inte existence by the red objec As we may put i red objects ate red, butted sensations ae notre, ve PoP aie, m The Secondary Qualities In what follows I will conceen myself chiefly withthe colouts ‘of surfaces. There are other physical things that ate coloured, such as tansparent cubes of coloured glass There are slso other Secondary qualities, But in the case of colours of surfaces vatious problems for our identification come up in an expecially acute form, So I do not think that this conceatration of attention will involve any evasion of issues. Twill proceed by considering in tue two sorts of objection to 1 physicals accouse of the secondary qualities: priori objes- ‘ions, and empitial objections. 11, 4 PRIORI OB}ECTIONS 70 IDENTIPYING SECONDARY (QUALITING WITH PHYSICAL PROPERTIES Objection 1. We kaw what redness was long before we knew what physical properties are necessary and suificient for edness of| physical surface. So redness is aota physical property of surfaces. Reply, The claim thst redness is 4 purely physical property of| ‘surfaces isnot intended tobe a logial analysis of the concept of red. Tris nota necessary truth that redness ig pusely physical property of that surface, We have argued in this work that, asa Contingent matter of fact, mental states ae putely physical sates ‘ofthe central nervous system, In just the same way, tis now being hid ht, at of cong! ft ees i prey Physical property of surfaces Gbjcon 2, The secondary qualities of things might be imagined to change completely, although the physical characteristics with which they are correlated did not change at all. (What is being imagined here isa change In quality that everybody mice.) So the secondary qualities cannot be identified with physial chcac- Repl The objection depends wpon covertly treating the connec tion beeween the secondary qualities and physical chareceeistics as fie were necessary, and aot condiagent. tis perfec possible, Jn the Ingicita’ssente of ‘possible’, thatthe redness of surfaces is not a physical property of the aueface. And if this i so, itis perfecdy possible that the redness ofa susface should begin to vary Independently of the physical properties of the surface, Now t0 imagine 2 migration of the secondary qualities is simply to im- agine that both these conditions ae fulled. 27The Concept of Mind Consider parle case Ii logilly posible that the morning sari not the eveing san. And ithe moming sar no veing sare ao poate that one day the shoul pest in the shy sdebyside Bu, of coats, gon tha he mora ar ‘infu the ning te iti pon tat the eo shoul appt inthe sky sideby side Inthe sae way, t's poe at teers of sue ino physical propery of he sauce If tis 0, 1s fae possible tat sees of trtace should vay independ cody of the physic properacs of the suriee. Bat of ean, {en that aes of ftir dl propery ofa fra isnot possible at edness ure shold vn indepen ofthe py properties ofthe suice Otjin 3. Buti the enty of redass with some physic propery of sures is contingent one, ten it mute pole fo give an acount of the meaning ofthe worded” tems logy independent of ny nefeence co the pis popes ofboth sec Tha spaton of mang at fake he form of ying that Ye! sade fora unig, de Popeye nee rat that we most give an account ofthe meaning of the worded in terms ta lavolve no tcfeeae tothe physi Properties of sorters, Bat | eny that this explanation mt talk the form of saying that rede” stands fora tee pet mer BUC before going on wo develop my own account ofthe mesn- Sago he wo ew ny that in ha is ea cfjection tthe deotiction of secondary ques with properies I thedensicaronsinomey it teste tat [ome When te contngen dente fens ih states of he ceo ervou tem was proposed in Chapt we concede objection tat ns requ sche of the meaning ofthe Pte mental inter ie ie Fenda fay, ac py so tea. objection was then to be an oberon of coil importance, 08, Indeed, our account ofthe contept of «mew take ss sac of {he pen a forthe production of cen sr of beaviout EEE sith men nee tt sion Now hse Jeon wear current coniering to the proposed recount the secondary qualities isexenialy the same objection, We mY ‘sepet tat ban objection of pecaae imooreace, 7 Tie Secondary Qualities A mental sate ia state ofthe person apt for the production of certain sorts of behavior, but the further mature ofthis state ofthe person is not given by our concept of «mental ste Thi Ulnk o gap in che formula enables us o make Sense ofthe aster: sion that these sates aze purely physi sates of the bein Physical sates can, as it were, be plugged into the gap. Now if ‘we want «make « contingent ientieation of edocs with Some piel property, must oe ou account of what redness involve some simlar blank or gup? Thete seems to be a0 other way to cary through a reductive programme. ‘But a this poe ie may sem that inthe cate of colour there is no hope of working the sxe tick that was worked wth the ‘concept ofa mental ste Tel plasible fo say that the concep of ‘mental sate ies complex concep, ands tat the phase ‘mental State’ adite of definition or vafolding. The blank or gap then Sppeats within the definition. Buta word lik ‘ed Seems t be Indefeable excep by synonyms. In Lockesn tems, the concept cof ted ea ‘simple idea And so there isa were, 0 room for ny blank or gap within our concept of redness. ‘Bat this line of thought has overlooked one possibly. Sup- pore that oar concept of edi alban or gap? May tot be that, ‘elow ming about what redness isin ts owe nature? May it ‘ot be that we only know cootingent truths about redness—stch teuths a that it property detected by the eye and possessed, or apparenly poseaed, by such things a8 the surice of fipe tomatoes and Jonathan appier? Then it would be posible to g0 fn toa contigentidenthcstion of redness with » physical pro perty ofthe ed thing ‘Bue the concep of redness is all bank or gap, would it not follow thatthe weeded lacks & meaning, + conclsion which ie manifestly fae? By 20 means. Conidet the following imagi- sary station Let ur suppose that there isan indefinitely lege sr0up of people who fll into 2 number of quite distinct sub- (roups! ale” hat donot overlap. Members of the same "amu all have cea subedes of fexure and behaviour in ‘ominon that set them of fom the members ofthe other ‘ami- les: Normal observers an be ily easly taught to sort mem ters ofthe group 4 whole into these mutually excisive subs groups, Nogmal observers spontaneously agree that individuals Diced at random belong in parialar subgroup, Nevertheless, msThe Concept of Mind because the differences between the sub-groups are very sbi, sch observers can make no comment om, and, indeed, have no Anowledge of, the way that they sort out these people. They sitmply sort individuals ito geoups ina spontaneous way a8 the fesul of the action of these individeals pon the perciver® Sent onpans Now under such circumstances, I suggest, observers would be catitled to tlk about the diferenatng proper, abd bestow ‘ames upon thee properties, ogh thy ould Ew aig tll hot the intrinsic nate of the propertie. Cetin persons ate Pt into one group. They can then be said to haves certain property Pot possessed by those who are putin other groups, 8 Be the name‘. But what can the observers say aboot P? Only that icataches to cenin nvidia and oct Bat tat ate ‘o these individuals i sutely only a comtingent fet about "suggest that this imaginary station wil serve a2 mel Ot four knowledge of redness. Red objects all have a propery ommon which ll normal observers ean detect Dat we na observers are not avare of the nature of this property. We en only identify the propery by reference to the way i detected (bythe eyes) and by mentioning objects that happen to be td What principally stands inthe way of our accepting this olen isthe illusion that perception pives us 4 through and-tkough Knowledge of, of acquaintance with, such qualties m redness. (There is also ie objection tat we seem to have a geter kao ledge ofthe intrinsic nate of redness than this scout would slow an chjestion tht wil be contdered an anseed sho) ur imaginary case an exly be developed 0 that ft © pal the varius tinge at we nt tay aout el Here are two imponaat parallels Te was argued in the previous chapter that an object, or eas of objects, that rma cberes normal conditions fake ob red nay ot be edn ft bat ‘nly appears. This possibility ean be dupleated inthe magia model certain individ case ofa ayo sverybad to ong to subsgeoup A. But investigate misht dvcine that he bce phys characteris he fala iivlals are those of subgroup By alt, fo furibe: eawon, thse chasteritiay when they attach thee individual, have the eflecs upon percevers that member. sub-group A normally have. Here we have individuals that Hook 26 The Secondary Qualities tere A’s ut are infact B's. And, because they lk tbe Be they woul be just ae useful ae teal A's im teaching: somelvaly what an A was, Te was alsa argued in the previous chapter that t was meaning ful to say that diferent observers might have “nverted spectra” with respect to each other, s0 that one man's red? shuld he the other's green, and iceterta and 0 for allother colours although this inversion is behaviouty undetecuble. Again, the possiblity ‘an be duplicated in our model. Suppose investigators discover that individuals in group A afect some people in manner x. The ‘objects stimulate their sense-organs, and then bring about pe ‘esses in theie brain, sociated with perception of the sort = Individuals ta group B aflect the same pereeivers in manact 7 But suppose there ate other perceivers who are alected by in: dividuals i group A in manner y, and by individuals in group B in manners, although this invetsion is behaviourly undetectable 1 would follow that A's look t0 one group as B's look to the ther group, and reer, Here then, ian account ofthe concept of edness, and so ofthe meaning of the word “red. Now, i the account i correct, then, just as there artes the question what, a8 a contingent matter of fact, a mental state is, 50 there ass the question what, a8 2 ‘contingent matter of fac, the property of redness actully is. And Ihre, just asin the case of mental sates, various answers seem to be in good logical order, Iti an intelligible hepothesis that ed ‘ess is an iereducible propery that is quite diferent from the properties considered by physicists. Bus, from the standpoint of total science, the most plauable answer is dhat redness i purely physical properry In this way we solve the difficulties raised in the se section of his chapter. Tf properses such a8 redness are not identifed with purely physi! properties, then, presumably they will ave 10 be corre Iited with the physical properties. But every enmideranon of conomy speaks an favour uf the idenueation. If we rake 2 Realise view of the entities of puis, then we have the psa propernes on our hands in any cate Sov why. iat ents the secomiary qualines with the pseal prperien ‘Oiyetin 4. ‘The attempt we have piven to chatactenve redness 28 an sarksore property of certain wurfces and jects, breaks ‘down when we member that redaess i see to have something t 7The Conc of Mind in common with blue, gren, orange, ct. They are all ors. If out eyes became sensitive o ultra-violet and infaed dation ‘we might become aware of hitherto unperceived visual qualities. ‘Yer we might secognize at once that they were colours, that i, that they zesembled the known colours. How could we do this if perception gave us no acquaintance with the nature of colours? ‘Agata, we fecognize thatthe colours resemble and der fom tach other in certain complex ways, For instance, rede more ike ‘orange than itis like yellow. Does not this imply some acqusit- tance with the nature ofthe three colours? ‘Reply. This objection shows tha there has been an omission in four account of redness in particular and colour-concepts in general, It is tue that we recognize that red, green, blve, orange, ft, have something in common. To be precae, what We f0038- nz is that they areal deteminates falling under a common de terminable, Calling them all ‘colours isa verbal acknowledge ment ofthis recognition. But this does not mean tat we have any concrete knowledge of what this determinable, colou, 8. We simply secognize that red, green, blue, orange and the other ‘oloutsare“determnates faling ‘under a single detcemicable, ita baring an vitae awarnes of what Pht determinable. To Particular colours ate identified an visually detected propestis of erin sotaces and object. We recognize further that ese Properties are determinates falling under a common determinable: Buc further than this, perception fil to inform us, an eens of hi vw, We may rel he notorious iy philosophers have found in eaying what iti that all ‘lous have in common. Any alternative view ofthe narze of colout, of other ‘ranger’ of secondary qualities, may be chat lenged to give an account ofthe uniting principle of such range ‘Tam proposing to solve the problem by saying that, although We Perceive that the individual colours, ete, have something ia ‘common, we do not perceive what is, Now we also recognize further similates and diferences be- tween the colours besides the fact that they are all determinate Gling under the one determinable. The perceived relationship beoween ed, orage and yellow is case in point. On our account this is interpreted asa recognition that rel things are more like ‘orange things than they ae like yellow things ina cerain respect. ‘saaccompanied by aay awareness of what that respect i. a8 oe Swonery rates (nr ccont it alo abet gir cation ofthe problem of colour incomplete sated here hate slo EScompatiies ae lpia compat tat i logaly ‘pote fortwo difereot colours bo to chance he sole ofa surce atte te time the copay npc then sine of sluon apply toni) Eads fst a moe sign forencd ee ofthe prep sccoption oft lncompay.SoppreTeanse ats es SF fcerain enh lr binging the line we he coep of Iegch ti tw sr de spl by ein yoy ts tutcimatlly gen cae te ln snot of aoter og kT Edd oes a us een my coef length oid be detec on perciing tthe oe wo ea lng mein ann eee ‘Now, in perceiving tht censured I prcive ix cannot be another colour, Just as diferent lengths are in= Sv elle lB i ny st af ob Fereptal cquaisnce with eu is come ey wae the {Ste of lengthy vision doesnot inform us what ealous ae. All fiat we ks th thy te nome Sots peep sat fred tues thnot Seianeouy hve anocercoowe 4 Feteption ia ih an unknown propery ops io. Fortis wit erin cer sini wknoen popes By str sure The sean af he esoemcompby obli simplyt eco th a cs, he ene Of the incompatbly of certain propertics i unaceompanied by fy knowledge af are of he Peper Tt suppor thatthe consent Wenteation of elours of sures ik prey ghyeedproperes of oe sce were fone, Supp, fea snp ssmpon hat the fil prof of the sce ta ons Sedan of Bites batty ne geuned gad, whee phys propery tke sree tat constitd renee of rile 2 ‘Chul couse pind gs A get coon be Se gsned 1d ‘use paned il ve tte sue tie, od 0 the aca lity Would re o be = quite unmyicows ncompaty phys propestes Perepon of oun, des so ifm vs {Ea the incompatiiyian inceopaty of hs spl sor. {esinpy infor uta she propre ae ncompesb Thpton may beUlreued oy somos nel alo. ™The Comsptof Mind Suppose that pss of statements ae pu in wpante envelopes, td woppose that some ofthe psn lncompade Sateen although some ae not Now soppose thats chirvoyan has {sin nominfrental hnowledge cncescing ces tact pls. He always knows iflibly whether any given cavelope consi 8 comple ran incompatible pai of satemnenty But he neve knows wha he content ofthe teens i Tha eves picture of out knowlege deived fom perception of the em Prides and incompathles of th secondary quali Je the tadional view i acxped shat poopees such rl est and preenness ze redicibe quate: whose whole mtu Bereepualy piven, then some oder account of how clos !ncompatblies are posible mat be produced. The history of plhlosopical discussions of thi problem shows tat asi Account isnot eal fond Tes powesflaguneat fc ‘ou vew that it solves the peck n Note, fly, belore moving on to consider the nest ob econ, tha the fcr hat color ae ecognined to be eect bes fling und’ a sminon ceteemiate ele + Plait theory of coloue to give worky hostage to forte XE the physi properties connsced withthe cle of suis aid not cum out to be determines fling under dees ale physial propery, eis would count agains this theory of Tn the fame way, we can predict that the physi properties oatected wih ed orange aed yellow surat el be oes tt in some eespect they form 3 sale a sae on which the psc Property connect wth orngei te intermediate mame Sach * prediedon might be fused Olpetos. Colo sucacs ate homogeneous. is pat of he ise of what itso be a ed sac teat part at fies lo te Const this wth shaped kes a. Noveney Pf gdshaped thing i uc gasped Cea sae 2c not homogentous inthis epee: Now he payed popes? of the uae with which the sedges of the surg no be po vey Wend may aot bes homogeneous propery. Bt noe «22 something homogeneous be denise! wih sessing tat ‘ot homogeneous? Reply. May we not distinguish between relative and complete vlna ete is The Secondary Qualities side any miniature, by wih en ee eye prt af he suc ac ode a BUEN ertn hen peang Tsien at search ter rope pesos centr sites] Sante ee nel Cue oa RPSRCAAE ger pcos guy fener ees eet wt ac ten at perdu cease Sy prea ergs of se Wy ToallWosrbe sane wile wes i Sta ttn be pita ts ase sd wih widen emdaie berpeerprmaclreleoe! Sees aarti! Tecetracsnpapny fave We cama hvac er cee re cat ace ce ae is made up of water-molecules which have a certain complex tent! hylan tl sae ser inked pee at Sara een eng ae uo sch SSipetyoftracu wis perth dns pope CE ed bee we an tet pl ata a ap occas Gleemtopad nc cfelepcl Clee sayn ee ase Fare ne te aa tt Fe ee ee a fect See ees er a tae ae ene aes canopy Se fr eeepc lo he ge Sinplebnta fered seucacns hale brea es Bopeptey Tecan usa eng he pee par os te nna pve Sg Sul poper aang go Beton fl win ds som scp pay he ee a Perception gives us a through-and-throwgh acquaintasce with ce in 6 Clots, ee, eat ad eld te tone docrnined yacht ne Soy ies prey nen Sse on "phe aa tcs bang pel part fhe nation a quay suchas ethan seblances a i Sean ah pope aspectThe Conept of Mind aware that all the colours ae determinaes fling under «sage Scseisabie, Agua, wear ely sue that ed tone the rage than ici ke yellow. And x0 on, We are aware of many ‘esemblnces ad diferences between red andthe ater colours So weare not completely inthe dark a tothe incase ature of 4 secondary quality even if ll we perceive ofthis stare ie ‘siemblance to, and diferece fom, other qualities Tis, Thope, rare dition bree ou ons of cy ‘qualities, on the one hand, and mere theoretical coa¢ on the other. ‘reeves cones Objection 7. we ‘edace the secondary quales of objects to purely physical properties of objec then sms that We wil ‘ote able to form a coherent conception of 2 physi objet, ‘This is an argument I myself advaneed in the lat capt of Peraption ond he Piel World. ei abe fond in embryo fo in Berkeley, and was very arefully worked out by Hume io # brine section of the Trani (Bk Pe TV, Sect. 2). Fp the argument in the form “iow ae we dere 4 Blyseal object from empty space > Mere spatal properties fulicent, because physical objects sare thse with empty space Bucif we look atthe properties of phys! objects dat pyc 4 prepared (oa them sch a mat elec ge, ot ‘momentum, these show 1 distesing tendency to disolve lato ‘ean that one object has to apoter. What, the, ae the hing that have thete relations to each other? Mus they not have ot felon nature if they ate to sustain celations? But what tit ae? Physic dos not ll mis here ta he ony ules, conceived of as eredcble propery, ae throw it? the breach to provide the sting foe mater, Raph, Whatever the solution thi ifclty—and it isa ceo tal ificsty in that complex of problems thar consti he problem of substance’™itis certain tat appeal othe seconde] sues cannot solve it. Gregory O'Haichas devwa ey atetod £0 the fllowingconideation, which sens que desiree Ihave Sui, although t have not argued it hore, tat we must ke “Reali as opposed to an Opentionalis be Phenomenlit e ofthe sGeaie image’ of the psc workl Now ifwe doth, {hen we must admit thet Sach things ws electrons are ide shies. Bat, a that case, the problem jut bey ied must ome wp fot individual electrons. Yet it seems does a ‘The Secondary Qualities that the electron has any ofthe secondary qualities. fe would be plainly contrary to what we know of the physical conditions sociated with the exitence ofthe secondary qualities. So the problem of non-laional mtace mart be solved for elecons ‘without bringing inthe secondary qualtes. And ifthe problem Sin be sane fr ceenons wit appeiag tothe ondary ‘quale, surely it can be solved for physical objects generally ‘Without appealing tothe secondary qualities? ‘What ifthe solution to the problem of the non-lationat snature of physical objects? Tao not know. In Philowply and Seite Relie Smart canvases thece suggestions (9p. 74-3) "There ae other posible slurions. But here we may excuse ou selves further consideration of the dificly, on the grounds that iiss quite eprteproblns om the problen conser inthis 00k. I, BMPIRICAL OBJECTIONS 70 IDENTIFYING SECONDARY (QuaLirins wiri PHYSICAL PROPERTIES So much fora priori objections to our physcalist doctrine of the secondary qualiie. But what actual physical properties of ob- jects are the secondary qualities to be identified with? lathe case of the colouss, the colour ofa surface of the colour of an object, sch a6 apiece of amber may be identified with a certain physical Consitution of the surice or object auch that, when acted upon by sunligh, surfaces or objects having that constitution emit light-waves having cerain frequencies. The sound an object emits may simply be ideried with the sound-waves it emits. ‘Heat and cold are the mean kinetic energy ofthe molecules of the hot or cold substance, The exact idenibeation of tastes ad smells is ail a mater of controversy. ‘There are, however, sll a numberof empirical diicabties that can be mised against these identifications. As befor, these i- cies cente chiefly around colour. Objection . We have suggested that the colour of a surface i to bbe contingenly identified with that physical constitution of su fee wich ens ig-wavs of ein uni wien aed ‘upon by sunlight. Now under sunlighe surfaces assume one col- Obes unc oes forms of HumiztoyThey tune ase. ‘What we eal blue surface looks blue in sunlight, but i looks purple under fuorescen light. Yet we say the surface is blue, not ayThe Concept of Mind purple. Why do we do this? Why isthe colour presented in sun- light std to be the ea coloac? What privilege does sunlight con- fer, beyond the coatingent fact that fi, at present, the natural form of illumination in out life? Rep. Tt seems to me tat we must admit that real change in quality occurs at sutaces that, as we ay, "appear to change’ wien conditions of illumination are changed: T ean see a0 ground for saying that such chaoges ate in any way illusory or merely 2p. pareot Bu seems that there is room hete for two diferent 7s of talking about colours. In one way of taking, the colour of a surface is determined by, an 0 canbe contingently dented with, the acteal nature of te lightovaves currently emitted atthe surface. In this way of tl ing, the colour of surface is constantly changing, really changing, as changes in conditions of illumination occut, Such x way Of talking about colours is one that naturally commends itself t0 those who ste concerned withthe visual ats. Batin another, more usul, way of talking, colour is determined by the nate ofthe light waves emitted under nrmal lswiato: condinary sunlight, It is therefore dipoion of tutaces to exit certain sors of ight-waves under certain conditions. And so, URE all dispositions, colou, inthis way of talking, ean be denied ‘wth dhe state that underlies the manifestation of the dispontion: certsin physical properties ofthe surface, In this way of talking of course, colour does not change very easily, and so eh idiom 4s better suited to the demands of ordinary ite. ‘The former way of talking i, however, less ahropomorphic because it does not depend upon the conditions of jlumization that ate normal in the human environment Iti also logieally he ‘more fundamental, because we can give an analysis of colour in the second sense in terms of colour inthe fst sense: Wis. coloat (a the fest sense) assumed wader normal illumination. Te may be ‘oted the it sems natural to identify sound withthe sound- ‘waves being emitted. That i t0 say, our account of sound is Bane to ur acount of color ih tm Ther ino wa} of talking about sound corresponding fo the second way of talk- 40g about cols, for obvious reson es two ways of ulkng abou coloure maybe compared With ‘0 poste ways of ting about tanta In ose way of talking, tennis-balls are, from time to time, very far from bea 34 The Seoonary Qualities sound. For instance, at the moment of being struck by a racquet “qotmal conditions: when they are under no particular pressure. Bot in another, more usual, way of talking, teanis-balls are never snything but round. If they became elliptical they would be dis carded. ‘The factory ‘makes them sound” just asa dyer ‘dyes the cloth blue” Vet we could give an account ofthis second, more ‘tual, sense of ‘round in term ofthe fi, es sil, but Logie: ally more fundamental sente of ‘ound, “This distinction between diferent ways of talking aboot colours enables us to solve Locke's problem about porphyry losing ts fed cousin the dark (Esey, Bll, Ch 8, Sect. 19). the fist, ‘or uausual, way of talking porphyry de love sted color inthe ‘ack. In the dat, the surface of the porphyry emits no light weaver a all. So in this way of talking, porphyry is black in the again. There i aching in the precedence of peeepion to images to norm us how to casily Jrelast rr menal tems Awe now is tat the ist ‘experience of x mat be pecepon. (6) Mental ime oe etal rod Perceptions, may be argued rise only 2 result of he stimula tiomof the sense onpas or ecetor Now the emote use of the tring of tal age tay be the sition of the ese conga, bur what such saulaton gives ein the dt instance ie Perecpion which oly later exes ws to have the meal ‘mage, We cn therefse sty that mena images as opposed &O perepions ae cnraly aroused. (Which does not ental ha they Semen aoused “Unoraatly,owere i see metod of dnguihing perception and mel igre ovetoks the ae of ality creepions Extemive sensory depetaton, for instance, ay Elsie seve haluciasiony inthe subject ofthe expemen, yet the whole pont of the experiment i 0 avoid simulating the 351The Concept of Mind sense-organsas fat aspossble. Now, although Flume, fr example, seems to classify hallucinations as dest eather than impressions, they must be treated a5 2 species of perespton. For, unless Ihave independent information, when I am hallvclnstedT take melt to be perceiving. For istane, {claim tose that there ia black catbefore me. Even when Ireiize that Lam merely halluceate, ic remains the case that I would believe Iwas perceiving but fot independent beliefs that I hold. Teis posible to argoe tat in ll sch eates we mia a mental image fora perception, Bat 2a feaplausible and uneconomical suggestion, So T think we must, allow that hallucinations are a species of sory perepion, Hence some perceptions are cently aroused, and the proposed smatk doesnot diferente images and pereepons () Pepin are mot ded he will Betkeley argued that mena images are under the diect control of the wil hile pereepons ate not can summon up oF ti mel image tw he ede way tat Tan sy arm, but I cannot summon up or dismiss perceptions a cept by means of some other voluntary ation, such 5 pening or hueting my eyes As atands this wa of making the distinction isunsatisactory, for if ty to summon up a partes mage, or dams one tat ‘sin my mind, Imay not be abe to do 50 Nevericles, even when Ilck thi direct control over my ‘mental images, it makes sense to speak of so contolag them, Here iss possible field forthe dec aplication of the wil To the terminology adopted in Chapter 7, Seton V, the summoding vp or dismissing of images are ‘eimediate 2c of the will (Gee alao Section Xf, ‘Mesal actions") But to speak of having Such dle’ contol over our perespions seems tbe some for of nonscase So ther isa eal station beeen preps 2t images here. (© The special relation of pereepions to belief Tis clear that the having of mental images does not involve belief. If having a mental image ofa red ball involved the belief tha the subject was current sng aed bal te image would ‘ot be an image, buta perception. Perception, on the other hand, ‘charncterstically involves the acquiring of beliefs a8 Mental Images Of course its tre thts possible to have peteptons with- cout having oF seqirng any be tht anything conesponds to the content ofthese perceptions. Bat such cases ehancecstily involve what, in Chapter oy we called “penal bel. ef nly bette we hav independent information which anes os tht higs cannot be at hey ae peeved to be that we dicount ou perepion, Tedoes sem, however, tit we can conceive of having per ceptcn which neither involves belt nov even “potenti beet Wear conceive tat, despite the complete absence of inde feaden information soggesing deception, we simply fill o Erle thar reat ra percepally sped to be But now it say be sugested that we did ave such» perception, it would fot fra peeeyion but a mental image, Mental images, aon ing to ths soggetion are simply ouplny lr oreo. "Aton time opt thatthe Was the slut to te prc of dterentiting peceptions from mena images ata Counter ‘ate was poate ot me by Gregory Oak Suppose Tae a sui of completly bel re perceptions, perceptions that donot even ilve ‘potential els But sp Prose that thee perception are brought a existence by the en ‘itonment ating spon my senseorgans, and suppor that hey Compo at ole hen of he vith ‘ay tat ordinary perceptions do Despite the absene of bel or potential ble weal we sot wan to say tat these mental fappeings were perception, and m/ meat inages? 1 think (tari ety an so scene tat mental images a nt sinply completely belt fee perceptions ‘The previous section as yielded tantalising clue, without giving ay la cout of he tang tems person td ‘mental images. In this section i will be argued that if we take 29° ofthe putative criteria of distinction already considered, they will bbe seen to be jointly necessary and sufcient to mark off percep- tions from mental images. In ordinary perception, the enviconment acts upon the sense organs, and gives rise to the perception. Even in illssory percep- tion, when a bush i taken to be a bear for example, there is still the bac in the environment, acting upon the seascorgans and 299The Concept of Mind fring ri wo a peeon a of + bea, Thee ae, towers, ‘xcepioalcses of perepions that te sal aotsed. These weal hallscaatonn, ° ‘Again in ordinary perception, the perception igvoles the scguiing of belts Wis posnble to have perepion witout tele, bot twill monmally be the case that bles absent only becasie we have independent information suggesag tat the pereption i anclable, So there wil be a lea potential bie Iti, however, possible to imagine exesponl ech where there is perception bu nt even “poten bet, We might scot Out perceptions fr no rascal ‘Bt suppose we had» persion that was exceptional in both these ways, Suppose we had s preston Gat nee eae int beings 2 result of the eavifonment acing pon out seme organs nor involved any bli or ‘poteoial bee sggent nt these eteptons would not be peeepions but would be mental iaper, Hallucinations are centrally aovted, Bt they involve bel potential belie and so they ae tl pereeptons Thee can be esceptons that involve neither belt hor ‘potential ble Bat 8 they come into existence a8 result of the eovitonment oc pon our sense-organs they ate tll perceptions, Buti pee Soot ae doubly eccentie~if they at bots cently arte wd involve no belief or ‘potential belief—then they are mere mental ‘ages This acount of mena images most now be inked with ut seductive analysis ofthe nature of perception fa Chapters tos 1 Tewas arged there that the logical ene eso pete tion ate acirngs of knowlege or information about fur eo ‘ronment 4s «causal result ofthe scon of tat envigoment pon th perceiver. We gate an sccunt ofthe bel acl In terms of «capacity for aleve behavior towards se fests of he environmen that are the sbject-oaterof the belt Nowe 1 his ns, 1 pereption tat involves nes Sel not Os section ofthe environment on the perceiver must Se opal secondary case Temas bea men cet tat defoed ens Of its semblance to the central case, mach as qui broken dwn ove ina junkyard can tl be clled stove ony because of resemblance to those cent ues of stoves whieh ean be nd ate, used t cook food with, 300 Mental Images ‘Ieenay be objected that this compatzon i not fir on. Inthe case ofthe broken-down stove we have descriptions of the stove lndependenr oft dbious resemblance to stoves tat work. Ts, for insane, “that twisted mas of old metal’ But, on ovr 2 count of meatal images, pio to thei problematic ideation ‘vith states ofthe central nervous system, they can be described only in terms oftheitreemblance to the central eases of pereep- tions. ‘We have met this diiculty before. It came up in the case of, “ile” wans and wishes, which canbe defined only interme of hee objectives but which involve neither actal noe potential pressure towards felling them onthe parvo the agent. The case Was chen suggested of a person who had the capacity, fer tasting liquids, to pronounce erly, on ao evidence whatsoever, that these sli. tions () contained poisons (i) but that the poison wa in too weak 2 concenteation to do the job of poisoaing. All ha he would be {ble to say about the liguld was at it resembled the paradigm ‘ses of polaonods ligui, although lacking an exsental sete of poisonous liquid: power to potion. Inttospective swareness of “ile wants and wishes was compared to this imaginary ease of ‘om inferential knowledge. ‘The comparison scems apt ia our present ease also. Metal lmges may be said tobe idle’ pereptons. They ate events that resemble the acquiring of bel about the environment asthe ‘eal oftheaction ofthat envionment onthe perceiver although 10 belt or ‘potential ble? aor any action ofthe environment, is involved. Out ineospetve awareness of mental images i a0 aveaeness of mental occurences ofthis sor. remains to show that this account of mental images enables sto understand the other points of distinction between percep- ‘ons and imager which emerged inthe ou of Seton Io ths ater. ‘We saw that if we interpret ‘greater force and vivacty’ in a Phenomenological way we ean Se up 1 distinction between Petecpons and mental mages. Butifweioterpretitas mensuring thedac of he mental erent ivolved rom evens hat invare bel, then we can give it = good sense. Mental images la and vivaiy in the sense tha, ofl perceptual event they are the ‘ost completely divorced fom belie. Tis clee why there se Behaviour teste for ordinary percep yorThe Concept of Mind tions but none for mental images, except linguistic ones. These are behavioural et for bli, but none for ental events tat sesemble the acquiring of beliefs although no beliefs are acquired. Ik should follow, a is indeed the cas, that there will be special Aificunizs in teaching people to speak about their mental images. ‘The priotity of perceptions to mental images is aso easly cx. Plned. The concept ofa meatal image, we have see, ean ony be slucidted in terns ofthe resemblance that a mental image has {flSlowspeepon chat inles bel. The snl hing bout a mental image isis resemblance to flly-blown perception’ “The concep of percepson therefore lopilly prior toe com. ‘cept of mental image, that i to say, we ean have the latter com ‘cept only if we have the former concept, although we could have ‘ad the concept of perception withoet having the concept Of © mental image. ‘This does not mean to say that we might not discover evidence fo indicate that, for example, persons blind from htth bu later made to see bed visual images before they gained ther sight. But if they lacked the notion of ‘seeing’ until they gained theit sight, they could not be avers of the visual images because the concept of visual image can only be elucidated by reference tothe concept of seeing. If; however, we allow that a/man blind from birth can understand what sight is (perhaps by comparison and contrast with the other forms of sense perception), then we could allow that he could become «sare that he was having visual images. ‘The fact that it makes no sense to speak of perceptions bel under the direc or edite contol athe wi bak taeda tau eet sy sis of metal nage linked both wth he lef and wien that involving caumton, To the eat at pee ‘canbe ser, for ie aye poe to magne = ate scanning operation. Although the series logically mus end 300 ‘hae ned aos have cde atthe prlr lae cd stinetion berween the introspectng and the intoepect state casts light on the much-amented“sprcmatieclusiveness of the subject The eusivnes ofthat mental et which 22 awareness of some other state of sft, physi or ment 4 sete logical elusiveness, the consequence Of the fact that he arenes of somthing logy cannot also be an awareness of Tithe case of most forms of sense perception we say tat we 4 Introspection perceive it certain parts ofthe body. These pars ofthe body we ‘all sense-ogans. The fll concept of seae-rgan iavaves both thar pereptions of a certain characterise ange aise 22 ‘tus cul ofthe simulation ofthese parts of the bod (that, certain aerations in these pa of the body are wer the dct onto ofthe wil alterations which enable uo perceive die et features ofthe envionment. As we sew in disestng pete. tion, itis logically import for every perception to be tion guned bythe dlierate we of some sent-ongen, Porte el an only Fenetion where theze perception; to ater deitestly the stat of a sease-organ we mst percive what i happeing 10 the senseongan Ie this perception eel demands 3 sete gam, 1d $0 adit, we are involved in a vicious infinite regres “This argument docs not idenfy thore perceptions that do not involve the deliberate use ofan ong, bu infact aces thal bodily perception fal into this cle, The socalled propticep- tor, sumulation of which gives cise o boy perception ate not ‘ri the fle sense beaut thie operon i ot ander the tintin beeween beng bile ad not being brite? The suse fal soning does aoe demonsteate thi ‘What must be added? Inthe Bs place, the perceiver mot be able to discriminate between shove occurrences which constate the manifestation ofthe disposition of bitleness and those which Go not For instance, 4 number Of amples of material ae sick sharply. Some break-up, shatter of Ay apart. Some do aot. The 333The Conept of Mind perceiver mast demonstrate that he can dtciminate between the First sort of performance and the second sor. “This addition, although necessary, is clay inufcent. The perceiver has sil got to demonstate that he understands the link between the fist sort of discrimination (where nothing actly happens to the samples of material) and the occurrence oF non- ceeurtence on other occasions of breaking, shattering ot fying part at ¢ result of being struck. What sort of behaviour will demonstrate understanding ofthis link? ‘The answer is thatthe behaviour mst have a its abject che actualization ofthe disposition oF the prevention ofthe actual tion ofthe disposition. Suppore the pereiver is rewarded when samples of material do not break, bot punished whea they do break. Suppose after touching samples of materi the perceiver sons them into fo groupe which aze infact the group ofthe Ine and the group of the non-briede materials. Suppose farther. more that he teats objets in the two groups diferedl, The fst group are handled very carefully, that sto say they ae handled ia {hea that, as an objective mater of physical fact, nt conducive to thee breaking, The other group ae handled int guite normal ‘ay, that i to ay, a way at would a an objective matter of physial far be conducive to theie breaking if, contrary to the facts, they had been brite. Does not such behaviou show that the pereeiver perceives the connection betwen te original ctl discrimination and the britleness or lack of britdeness ofthe samples? The perceiver has shown 8 expacty tink the orgial discrimination’ with Inter easy breaking and absence of €38) breaking. Tet us now use tht caze as « model (oversimple and over schematic perhaps) to unfold the behaviour that wil broken the making of non-nferntl introspective discriminations. Let take af our example the aoniafrenial awareness that we A angry. ‘We mus in the fst place exhibit a capacity to behave towards ‘ourselves in a systematialy different way when we ae angry and when we are not angry. (Such behaviour, of course, must be something more than the behaviour the anger itself expresse® itself in, if it does express ise For thie would allow ao distioe- tion between a mere angry sate and bvng are that one Wasi a8 angry state) To take a quite aticial example, we might exhibit 334 Intraspcton the behaviour of presing a boton that lighted vp a red ight when, and only when, we te angry. (lis cles, acdetaly, that Se teaching and leeningof toch disctininatone wll bes father icky basa te cat of anger thar aoe expcted in sogey behtvione Neverthe, eves if there are (empiri) ificaes in ceding on whether icriina- don hasbeen succes, we can tl ave the possi that er ‘Sct tin weit pe ligt whe oly “Ts behviot fr oly shows that we can ciate be tween the canes where wea infactangey, ad the aes where we ‘re not. does aor show that we ae sete ofthe itneon ar discon berween being angry and ot ting angry. What fre ther cpaciis for beavionr nt we exist? "the next pace, we mast have the cacy to acrimiate syvermtily berecenangey behavior tnd non angeybeavoor {n oumeles tnd other, When say gry belaou? here do ‘ot mean Bebavior ta actualy pings fom anger, Lean ary [eh ‘Tere sabe sageybeioar that has 0 pean fom ager sod some bebavour brought sboe by angers not what ste woul clang beaviou: Bt there ae ceraia pia se of ‘avious which our when we se age. (The elation of ange? {0 ts expression is more complicated tan the retin of rite testo is munfexauons) We mun have the epacy 10 di Crimiat tht sort of beavion from other beter ia, we must eaibit te opi to Kk the eigial da ciation with angey betavoue, We must show oumelves ‘Spuble of bohaviour having at bitte siding o thei blag ofthe expression of anger. Suppo fr insane we ex Iibie the following behavioes Aer picking out howe cases ‘hich are infact ents where we ate angy, wee action tht at Ilnhibing efecto anger but ost eet on oter meatal fates We put on heads in cold water, or adress soothing words to oul! We take no such action in the ober eases. Have we shown that oignalinsospectve nates wu 20208- 28 of oar? ‘No dou what Ihave sid heres oversimplified But hk it tas thown tat there no difcly in principle i giving an acount ofthe intespectveaequing of tformation about ost ‘a meatal tates sofa suing ofa cacy for ert sort of oSThe Concept of Mind native behaviour. The ps introspection is therefore maintained. lel between perception and (nia ope remais tobe dscuseia hisehaper: The acount fren nthe nt scton wuld seam to be segue than an awareness os carent hppenag apt fe prodcion of a cerain sore of behaviour it cei ody. (eked “What body the amore ta the saree el se ing of apc for derma beni oy Sera ad, tou that the dtrimiauve eho sdnened ese asa. sna Now ie considera sateen uch ‘lam angy sow (aken ss purely desrpve remark, se to ay ore tan Coived inthe inopecve nearness: For doc oot the we he ‘ord Thee imply among oer tings) th he caret pp ing apt forthe practioner ot ote: blogs tram organized set of happening mind al of wih tpenings ape forthe peodicion of bchavirin te etd? ‘Thana of the ls scton doe no doje tas ip One might try to brush aside this difficulty by arguing that tats maby ai iin it group apes eich Ze pt or the pocion of evan ero beleout alr tay Ustorunmcy however ic der se en be tomes, For ne ean pst wel undrnd hesggenon at ‘ctthing which Sot ar mad shld inves capes band ‘bout cern behaviour by ou bey af testa berks Bod. The notion of much pone of out bse» Fe fy imei oe, even ue nk wat eet seer eco ‘What then, der const the uty ofthe geo of ape ing tha conte singe mands We se ae was eet that proved Hume's downfall. Is it a matter of the resemblance Iigterace he mene ence ea emer aon (ahi ae pes soba oesl fclaon Av we have seen in Chapters, home ave tment happenings vhichve would pre vomy ev ta Jet which flilled none of these ene 336 Intrpcion 1 do mot see anyway to sl the ple excep sa thatthe ssoxp nt happenings comstite + sige mind herve they ae al states of processes in or event, single stn, Reseblance, rgued in Chapter 9 P: Wefan say gre account of eeton a othig ba the aeqirng of tr or alt belts (or “intormation) about ut vironment sa resol of the ensal action ofthat evizonment ‘pon our minds To perceive tht ther i somthing red before us isto aeguire the (re bel! tha theres something rd before us ‘53 renlt ofthe cae ction ofthat ed thing enor minds What tre such beliefs temtves? Te was argued that they Ae meatal States ape for selective behaviour towards the environment. The Perception of the red thing tthe coming-o.be of 4 sate that Allows the perceiver oscriniaute in is behaviour between this Object and objet that are not ed ithe perceive should beim pelle soto behave, ‘Bele Involve concepts, Acqiing the ble ha partial bjs te inves fhe one ofl, Pow Sesion ofthe concep ental + gener capaci ofthe peecver, iat leat some st of ttcunstances, to dieenine bere things that ae fe sod things tat are aot zed. And 20 4 pet- cepeual bel, which involves capacity for sleatvebekaviout to 389The Concpt of Mind vari a patcuar object on a particlar ocesion, entails the Tossesion of higherorder capacities: cpacies for sequting Capacities for selective behaviour towards particular objets of patcolr ocasons, "Now I wish to advance the view that these perceptual bli and the concepts that they involv, af the lop fundamental belies, andthe logically Fondamental concepts, We can under stand the notion of bei gene, andthe concepts involved in bie generally, only in terms ofthese fundamental belts and concepts. This 1 ake to be the truth enshrined, however con {use inthe Empincit doctrine of ident pu forward in Book ot Locke's Exay Te isconceivable that abelng should have none bot perceptual bles, Presumably some onan ar acai in ths hiation, Boy Tam contending, iconetable hat beng that uid not pereive could acquire or have any er wel ™ * * ‘hat isthe reason for such a contention? I the cate of pet ‘eptual belies, there isthe posility of sective behaviout by the perceiver towards the perecived stunion. Exhibition of + ‘apaiy for such selective behavior isl the evidence needed for saying thatthe perceiver has acquired the particular bee But now compare this with beliefs of a mote abstract sor, oF about ‘sats ha ate femot frou in ine ad pace: What be viour can be spciied which would be an uokmbiguoussiga shat the subject holds a eran bet? ‘The only behaviou that sceme fo have any very intimate rel Seip to such ee al avi. My belts aos ius Caesar, oF about philosophy ae expresed in word 20 iT had ao language iti impossible to ee how they could be pressed at al But, even fe ignore the posi of since 4s of speech, what iit that makes the word speck an expression of jut the beliefs that they are an expresion of? Whats the Engh sentence “Julius Caesar was murdered by Brutus’ to the ramiculr historia happening tha records? In perception, oF 4 any ete, inthe lopli ental cscs of erent be haviour thats am exprenion af the perception bmpht nt existence bythe stuation perceived apd ete tows st that tation, where ‘ected toward can be unpacked in ere ‘of further causal relations Between te perecivet andthe sation (08 Ch 11) Butin the eae of Cactr's murder thee 00 8h se Beli and Vhought losmate ie between the linguini behaviour tat gives expression to the bic and the happenings in- mcs This suggests that perceptual belts ae the logically fundamental set nf ble Tn the cate of some nom percept belts, it seems that this diicalty might be overcome by invoking tmptcal Counter factual tthe. If our position in space and time, or even our ‘Spaces and powers, were diferent, them it might be tue that ‘ee would be able to cay out selective behavior which would be appropinely ed tothe station believed to cist. And so we ould make the truth of such counterfacal conte of the possession of erin bei. But inthe ext of our more sopise {Sted and sbsract elif sch simple tescton ofthe diel seem imadequate Ife take the roti of ou percep beliefs we an think of ‘hem asa complex srtrute tat bat amore or less conning existence in our minds, and which constitutes a mote, of less Complete ‘map’ of our environment. It sof course, aot sap io the ondinary tens of the word it not something wee, we se ordinary maps, st evidence ofthe mate of he cvionment. Ieisa map which st were, doesnot have tobe read, but whieh of its ow nature points tothe physical sate of ssc that ‘maps, (Cader the heading of ‘peteption” here Tinlie itro- ‘pectin. The phrase the environment” fe therefore to be under Stood as including out own body and our ow mund) The sen. fences in which we would cxpess these ele (ve aid express then) coniae Comper veut of enesety mow of Is accurtely correlated with the perceptual ap", Now I want (0 SSF that our nompereprual belts maybe conceived of 3 tenon of th perp mp Let me try t ll this out, The perceptual ‘map" ofthe world that we each posses may he thought of a8 ga paced over cern physi surface, Our emvtonment, including rien ben an mind in eprsented bythe pyweal eric The she oui em which we wo eapre peret ts we dl expen them all maybe th of ater fu, roughly, atest, omephi With the ge that conatten ‘rar perepl belts ‘Now the perceptual map’ andthe ing sracte hich it ts verbal expression, ae hnked withthe envionment in certain ‘omples fasion Iis here that out pereptualcowsps pay acetal 2 sa‘The Concept of Mind role. lewas argued in Chapter 1 that, we possess partcalar perceptual concept, thea there must be at east ome set of elas Stance in which we ean perecive correctly tha certin objets fll Under this concept, The relationship of pereepual concepts to objects inthe environment, sad in patel toe selatonskip of pereepea! concepts to objects unde these cogaitivlysoccessful Ecnltions, are the backbone of the tlationshipbetweca out pe teptual belies (and the language we expres them in) and the ‘Suppose that we now think of the original grid as surounded by extesions of the ged, extensions that projet beyond the ciginalsutie thatthe grid was placed upon. These extensions ‘epresent our nonperepral belts thote belies that te not expressible in sleeve behaviou towards features of our envzon- tment Like our pereepual beliefs these bela are to be conceived ofa actu ety of our mind. They ace the belie that they a0 Snuly, in vrtue ofthe concepts tat they contain and second, in rte ofthe ordering ofthese concepts, The concepts themseves are cithe the concepts that are alresdy involved in out peeeptal belief or ele an account can be given of them tat cle oes back to the perceptual concepts, The conten of the pet Cel ones is ed by he elnontip othe envionment 40, indtecy, the content of our now peeps! bes i fixed by this same relationship, Percept ‘To our perceptal beliefs corespond the sentences in which the lif are expeesed verbally if they ate exprened Inthe ime iy, to our Bon perceptual belies correspond the entesce a hich soy ae exprewel if they are expresed. And to the ele, tion between pereepral and nom pereepoal belies, the con cepts they involve, covrespond the teations berwces the Setenees sed to express our pereepoal heli and te sentences that ext ress our on-percepua beliefs, and the word they involve, Bot the verbal expression of our ‘om-percepual beliefs i of fat fueater importance tha inthe case of ont pereptual belt, For dn the non-pecepal cae the verbal expreson doesnot etl} serve to communicate belie; it may be the only behaviou ia terms of which the belt can be denied ‘A Ge same ime, of coir ti perfec posible hat we ma ave bei that we are ule to formalte verbal. Tis fe- sent experience 1 be wae to express oureves but the ater ue Belief end Thonght to find some form of words which seems to sto render out be- lis adequately. Graeting that there is much room for self deception in ch mates, T think we an give a quite stright ferwand account of ths ttation. We rly wet in cen ‘mental state that involved certain concep inked in erin ways Given our language ad is resource, then there wae certain verbal utterance that best sered to communiate that sate. At frst we were unable wo find this verbal formulation, ler we sic- ceeded, OF course, the conclusive verfeation and fasfation of such csims about ove belies might be impossibly dificult ia Practice. But « sulicienty powerful acurophysiologicl theory mig be able we aele the materia penile wea ‘This acount of non-perceptal bel is sketchy, but tis bes Thave en able od, iso height ins we Ser hat the notion of a non-pereproal belie i very much 4 1 ‘notion, not only when applied to the cate of other people, but also in our own case. Such beliefs cannot simply be defied in terms of what we oF another might say or doin certain dreum- stances, if impelled to act, although such possible behaviour has th lie conezon wih ou lng sch bly Ras, in sturbting & non perceptual belef to another orto ourselves, we 2c poring the eutence nit ora ont mind of nate With 4 certain formal sruture. This structure has a8 its elements the fame elements that form the stractore of out pereepal belies. ‘And so sch states form a map” of reality that is an extension of the ‘map’ formed by out pesceptal belies. ‘The concept of thinking i a somewhat polymorphous one. But vwint I uke to be the fundamental notion of thinking may be ‘lucidated by the considerstion of a cate. Consider the following situation. I alk to a ftiend and, a8 it happens, Ihave recently acquired certain information, p, which T ‘know him to lack, but which Talso know to be of gees interest 10 him. I have no motive for failing to pass the information on. "Nevertheless, I fil to give him the information. ‘Now, looking back of the incident, it would be natural for me to descibe what happened by saying "failed to chink of pat the time’. Such thinking need not involve any conscious contempla- 43The Concept of Mind ton of p before speaking, In orderto sec that conscious contempl ton need not be involved, consider a care where I do pss the information on. What happens, lee us suppose, is that I simply see my friend and straightaway launch into giving him the informa tion p. Now would not such proceedings be suficient to rebut an accusation that I flled to think of pat the time? ‘So far from fail- ing 10 think of p, I actually passed on the information!” So, in some clear sense, T did think of p, although there was ‘no ‘conscious contemplation ofp before T spoke. This sense of think ing I take to be the fundamental notion of thinking. What account shall we give of ie? ‘We can gain help here from a point made about purposes and estes in Chapter 7. ‘There we asked what account was t0 be sven of the diference in mental state between a boy who wants 4 bicycle, but is, say, currently asleep, and the same boy gazing into a bicycle-shop window. We offered the following simple account. When the boy it aeleep, his mind i8 in a certain state, state whose concrete nature we may aot know, which constitutes his desir fora bieycle. But the sate is not carey causal ative in his mind. By contease, when he i gazing into the bicycle shop window, this state is currently causally acuve in his mind. Ie has ‘caused fim to embark upon a course of behaviour gazing into the bicycle-shop window—which be would aot have embarked ‘upon unless he had the desire for «bicycle ‘Now, when [filed ‘to think ofp’ on meeting my fiend, what failed to happen? The answer, Tsvggest, is simply that the know- ledge-tharp although a state of my mind, filed to be causally active in my mind at tht time. In particulas, it failed to act upon ‘my will 50 that T imparted the information. And it failed to have any other effect within my mind. ‘Aa analogy with a computer seems very helpful here. After information tas been fed into a computer, the information may bein one of two current sates. Itmay be eausaly inactive: simply sored in the memory-baaks. Ox it may be causally active: ether playing a part in prodvcing 4 certain carput on the ape, or ese acting upon and changing other ineenal states of the computer. ‘The first or inactive state is parallel to the case where Ikrow that ‘is true but fal to tell my friend although Thave every motive © {do s0. The second ot active state is parallel tothe ease where I do pass the information on. Py Bul and Thong ‘The knowledgethat-p may be curently cusilly active in my mad in all sors of ways Tt might case me to acgze the bel thatg. (Under suiable conditions this would be a case of ine feerag) Kemight make me sad, or cause me to have certain ental limes, Given only that tis eueently acting on my mind 3033 to change my mental tte, then, Tam suggesting, we can speak of the thougheotp Yeag carrey in my mind (although not neces cnc in my ad) ‘Bat now what ofthe case where, before Inform my frend that ‘isthe case, p comes consciouly before my mind? T think we ean fay thatthe fa mpc ofthe wide notion of thinking tha 8 Inve aleady defined. Whats it for p to come before my mind ia this conscious way? Thisis simply irene aaren of eft that Tknow p. Such introspective awarcoes isa patculas cate of the curent causal operon of the kaowing state within out minds. For we have eater argued tht introspective aWarcoess tnay be compared to pereption, and further that isa feature of perception, and with i iteospection, that the situation perceived Singers sul tg hs de prep or Specon of it So inwospeciveavarences Ut we poses know- ledge-that-pisa curren eect in our minds ofthe keowingp sate Het, then, we have a particular ease falling under our general account of thinking a8 belie this carrenty easily active ia our minds. Tn some assitmay be causally necessary that become inteospectively aware of my knowledge ox ble that hoe Lam able expres this knowledge ex belie in speech oF other overt, behaviour eis sucha ease which we dese By saying that we have to think before we speak, In terms of what has been sid o fa we can undemtand the familiar ematk T know it but Teannot think of it atthe moment What is being claimed is that Ido have certain knowledge, but that, contrary a least to my’ conscious wishes, the knowledge is not curently available to conseousnes (introspective awarenes), ‘nd, a causal result ofthis unavlablity, Lam unable to mani fest the knowledge verbally. Ta the cases considered fo fr the subject alteady has certain kowledge (or bebe, and itis « mater ofthis causally inactive knowledge (bli) becoming cualy active inthe subje’s mind. Bat, of course, there ae cases where thinking is simultaneously spring the knowledge or bele-hatP M43‘The Concept of Mind ‘Thepointhereis thatthe moments after which on has acqused cerain knowledge or certuin belief are frequently moments then the belief causally active in one's mind. This Ts not 2 "ecessay truth. The anultng of kaowledge or belief maybe un Sccompanied by thought, All hat happen isthe tind nay be te acquzing ofa dispositional state. But, very frequently, the segue ing of Knowledge or belief has immediate further effects in the sind. Ii likely, For instance, that one who acquires kaowledge fox beief wil simultaneously become svar that has acquired {his knowledge or belie. (How long one continues to deel” on such newly acquired knowledge or bei io ofcourse, 4 Purely "Paik htt ans back some lit onthe exe of ok thatthe cats back some light om the nature of fora sie. Wr have given an account of perception a te aoquling of knowledge or beliefs about the environment asthe eel ofthe ‘tion ofthat eavitonment upon the mind. Now, ia very may ‘sey, this knowlege or belie has futher nmedite elec with in the mind of the perceiver. (The blologial importance of Ou" perceptions regulaty having some euch immediate renut obvious) We may be moved to embark vpon courses of sca, ny spy become sae hat wee ving te Fe tons we are having. And siee these perceptual bcifeare cosy activein our minds at that time we ean sy that thought i present, ven if thought in its most prize form, Pethap this helps € flout the phenomenological picture of perepton lite ‘Themention of perception reminds us that hee i no e900 reset thinking (o cate where the naturel expression of the thought i in words. oppose that inthe past whenever an A Bat been perceived in circumstances Bit has proved on ivestigation to be accompanied by Gand tht a special policy hasbeen found appropriate towards A's which ae accompanied by ©. Suppose theo, that a perceiver who kaows all this percive an Amn cf cumstances B but at st filet act towards iin the way fodged appropri. Suddenly, however, be docs act towards 2p" Drtely. May we aot say that it hag suddenly sack ir tha, 1 circumstances, As ate invariably accompanied by C? And isthis nota thought? Our aceouat of what ts though skin him consists of wil simpy be tha, at that moment, the bei hat ‘Asin drcumstances Bare always secompaned by C's had becorne ‘ausaly active in hsm. Bot the poise T wish to make heres 46 Belg and Dowie thatthe thought net not be something whose natorl expression [slings The perciveremy ack veal conceps for A,B and Cine may even lack guage together, Yet itll seems corect, to ay that a thought stack him. ‘Kchlee's famous experiments with spes provide evidence of quite sophisticated thought on the pat of animal, Suppose sn ape ‘taught ro ge suspended bananas by potting box unde hem, hott then he bananas ae sxpended sl ugher so that the ape can only reach them by puting one box upon another If ints Situation the ae frst pauses or time, and thea docs put one box Spon anothers cle hatte ape has vgh of «way to get the boson, He has acquced a beiee, which, if expesied in words, would be ofthe form If [take sbor and pot ton another thea T {an reich the banana’, This belie at onceinlucces his behaviour. ‘Note, by the way, that jst as we can Gininguish between knowledge or ble thats corenty essay active in out ind, snd knowledge or bel hati not t0 we an distinguish between Dries! sks or ‘knowings how that are corenty caealy Ectivein our minds and those tht srenot. The acta wisi of 2 kl onan appropriate occasion ight be called pac think- lng Thecus wiicspeson cms o sninon op is ‘Knowledge how before applying ito the tsk in hand may be analysed slong the ste lies a the pale cts of theoreeal Keowledge of belie eit 2 matter of becoming ineompectively aware of what i ivolved ina cera sll an awareness tat thea Permits the accomplishment ofthe ta i hand. P'Bot sow we must conser the diel Hit we in ave oughts where the thing thought isnot something known oF beleted Tesh eatenpiton of ere ponies There 2 sposons or iain tha ee Known cx bre 10 ontaty to fac. Our account of thinking wp ths pot wil aot Sufcc to cover such ese. In sme caer, of cere atough there i no bel, there incision to believe of grr or eset Serength, Such eves preseatno parla probe. The diialy for our analy posed by thoughts that involve no bel tall ‘Now such thoughts will if they lve in word, ise in he ‘words ofthe “bli tat sot in fact held Bot the words wl be hedged around either by explicit verbal devies or spt by the satire ofthe contet, in 2 way designed to make it ler © & Iearer tat the hearer is aot to think the speaker Belews wha is vrThe Coneptof Mind ssid, Te is mere thoughts, not belies, that ar being commuri- ate ‘What most be sid shat ‘mere thought are logically second: ayeaesof thoughts (however important in ‘tei ofthe med), ‘When we makes sepposion, but no bee or degree of belt involved then wearin a mental site tat can oly be character ied by ty resemblance the onespondng sate of eet. Bat 10 elie is involved. The acount sheady given of perception, And ofthe wll, should make i cuy to sect such an twee A> ‘hough we have given an account of perception ia terms ofthe tings of beliefs abo what i eattenty going on out ew ‘itonment, we have called attention tothe foil secondary Cates of purceptions without belt of even without “potenti belie. The later sorts of perepion canbe defined only by thet resemblance to thor central ete of perception that do ivolve theacquiting of belies Inthe sameway we have givenan account ‘of wants and wishes that involve no impule to seion, or evens the cae of idle’ wants and wishes, tat do nt involve renal impolesto action, interme oftheir resemblance to dese that actually steer our conduct, In the same way, when we make 2 ‘uppotion but ao bell or degre of belt nvelved, hen ‘rc ina mental stat that can only be charncterzed by hs tee ‘ance to the corresponding sate of bl What isthe nature ofthis resnblnee? If we bleep, then this mental sate mast have ceri features which concspad © the content ofthe bebe and mask io from belts wa ule. 2 content. So if we simply entrain the proposition pth, since what is believed and what supposed are he same ia, ‘he mental sate involved will have to nave he same fetus at Corcespond to the content ofthe bali The diference between ‘heb that andthe mere suppontion that pis the oe hat she "0 states play in our mentale ad behavout Ifthe beet i {one that can ind expression in aon linguistic behaviour then ost Preparedness to adjust oor conduct noe ight the beet mars Atoll fom the corresponding mere thought IF the belie that ean only be expressed verbal then is are rom te forzesponding mete thought by the absence ofthe expe ‘impli linguste quaifatons which emabe ws to pt forward Proposion witout being commited ot A mental ages se shows of perception, aod ‘ide want and wishes phono he ue Belitf and Thoaght wil, 0 ‘mete thought” that involve no belie are ghosts of etc or at we can distinguish betwee beliefs that ate ot ae not cuitenly causally active in our minds, so, ces, we can distin fuish between mere suppouiions that are or are not currently Siutly active nour lode And when sich spposion cur rently cally active, we canbe sid tobe actos thinking that ough "The notion that we have ben eliciting i tha of ig sing though, Ie seems plas to say that hii the asc notion of thinking, in tee of which oxer notone canbe explicate. Besides spesng ofthe thought her something shee, We alo speak of thinking of something or someone This ingle Alisintonconesponts fo the dstntion between persiving tat Something ithe cod percving ngs even, ete. We ald {hat he second perepal tom wa, among, ober things a ort of holdal It ates thatthe perceiver sid fo be prcervng the thing or even is sequting iformaton ot misinformation of ‘erin sort, without commiting the speaker to saying exactly Eh thifomaton oon Aimar aecot be given of thinking of somthing or someone. To sy that A i thiting OFX, whee Xs some ting or person oy tat he is having cern thoughts that something i he cx, without spectying what there thous are excep tha they relat to “Tre non-Comaital mature ofthe som ust what makes oen ef ‘Xsigle thought may be contrasted with 4 sicesson of thought: The later may be 4 mete socesion of thoughts. Tema, however, be more than mere sacesson snd bea rain of thoughes The notion of stein becomes clear I we eoosider a Dhyseal inns och ara ror gunpowder. A tainof gunpowder 12 tian vie of he cata elaons in which exh suecesive Poon of the tan stands tote adjoining portion, In in of thought, opposed toa mere succerson of thous eah ste evs hough orngs about the next thought On ur analy thinking th ia mater ofthe casa active within he mind oa lle, tninauon to believe, or sippontinn bringing seat 2 forte tlieinclnaion to beeve oe sppoitin, and 300. ‘A tin of thoughes may bea meetin of thought Thi he phenomenon of sociation of ew Bot it may be more than & 9‘The Conesps of Mind mete tai of ideas, as in the cases where we try to decide what to do, of we make 4 calevation. These difer fom mere trains of oought by being perp. "They ate trains of thought with an ‘object: to come toa decision of to find an answer. Oa our View ‘of purposive activity, cis implies that they are tains of thought initiated and sustained by a mental cause extemal to them. But JBsdes not meta dhs they ar ot il ui, becuse ach ep Jn the tai is still cqusally essential for going on to the next thought, : mee Consider fist trying to decide what to do If the end is given, snd the only question is what are the best means to this end then the question isa purely intelleersl one and the process reduces 10 one of ealelation, ox some similar species of thinking. But there may also be a question of ends a well a means: we. ay be Ut decided what ends to pursue, In Chapter 7, Section X, we aged that such ‘making vp our minds & « matter of contemplating possible sctions-out doing X, our doing Y—all in some degree attractive to us, with the purpose that, a «causal reslt of con” ‘templating these alternatives, « purpose will form to do one rather ‘than another. Now this ‘contemplation of possible actions seems to be simply che thinking of, and thinking abou, ean poss bilities, viz. cerain actions currently within ove power. Ovt account ofthat sort of thinking where the thing thought of is not believed wil theredote cover this sort of contemplation. ‘Ta mental calculations we have «purposive tain of thooght= where each successive thought comes into being a the resul of ‘manipulation of the previous thought according to tome faed rule. Tn many cases, such calculation involves inference: she fequing of new belt as & eas eof bles pereoi “This discussion of thinking concludes the accoust ofthe meatal ‘concepts In each case, thas been argued, an account can be given of mental evens, sates and processes sce in terms of physical behaviour of the body and pysial acon upon the body. Inthe simplest cases, mental occurences are deGnable as sates of the ‘etion tat are causes of certain bodily behaviout aad ects of the action ofthe envionment. In mart cies, however, the res tionship between meatal state and behaviour, and mental sate snd stimulus, is much more complex than that of simple caus and simple effec, But it is always a relationship definable in terms of 330 Belief and Thought sch aut and such In hs way, ontwatd rites ate pro- ded for ner proce. fc an rocoto men happen. [ngatas been mace good, he way In now open to angie a 84 sie of contingent thoy ae inhi wn eaare othng but sign chemical happenings inthe central nervous system. So we te eet tapi we comngent ideation. atPart Three THE NATURE OF MIND7 IDENTIFICATION OF THE MENTAL WITH THE PHYSICAL ‘THIS final chapter will be brief. There are a numberof reasons for ths. Inthe Brat place, a cerain aumber of arguments forthe ‘identification of the mental and the physical have already been ‘mentioned in Part One. Inthe second place, this empirical step in ‘our argument ha already been defended at length, beter than T ‘could do i, by 2 number of writers. (See in particular J. J. C. Smat’s Philwephy ond Stitife Realism, Routledge, 1963.) Uhave almost nothing ra add to what they have sad, and go have judged it better to devote my energies to 2 sk to which they seem to hhave paid less attention a elucidation ofthe concept of mind and. the particular mental concepts. Inthe third pace, ifthe arguings in Part Two have been succetsfl and the account of the concept fof mind is on the tight track, the contingent identifnion of, ‘mental with che physical seems neither particulaely paradoxical aor Particolaly bold, Nevertheless, I have given the chapter the dignity ofa final Pare of the book. My reason in doing this is to reemphasize as sharply as possible the logical independence of this final step inthe argument from what hat gone before. Exeept for incidents) remarks, nothing I have suid in Part Two enalr the tuth of © saterialstcheory of mind. The best that can be said of Part Two is that ini the way has been made smooth for such an identifica- tion, ‘But oow we can ask ‘What objection is there to idensifying 35he Nat of ind merle wit ppc lo ne moa cant oe seers yo am digas dhe sre Scots ef etm rg sa Sade He ens ee sn nel {heir causal relations to hereditary characteristics, (Fhane hee sms i ea a, Sele pint tac Sih ino an aD ree mtn fete DA Sete Ct ef oe ie cen cco en ec Sere tenets neha ee een de oh ‘a tt snl gree Pen oeet baad ee fe ames aman behaviout. In the second place, ie may be granted tat Priel pre sce era ttc ae et ree ater of dispute, The fax cee aoe that ee is an crm before us’ and ‘adding five to to ‘writing the plays of Shakespeare’ and ‘making the discoveries of Newton’. Th wcond lat isthe che af art ‘manifestations. it incades och alleged faces Ue coeur ‘eoce of telepathy and earvoyance, Let us opis by conden former or incoatesable manila of nd te tow moving in the realm of science and empiical fact, not i the tem of logical poablty that apace fo com, Tdentfcation of the Mental with the Physical higher animals. All that may be questioned is whether such pro: cessts ate sol responsible for bebaviowt. Tf we consider the known activities of man, itis car thar sch things as intellectual discovery and artistic cretion, and in pat- ticular such transcendent facts asthe discoveries of Newron or the plays of Shakespeare are the faces that preset Materials ‘ith Brea dificult. For intellectual dseorery and attic creation ‘may he sad to be ‘higher’ acivities of man ina perfectly objective senses chey are activities of greater complesity and sophistication than other human activities Ie wll be paticulaely hard to see how they can be products of a mere physical mechanism. ‘TheantiMatrialist may here take his tad ether on stronget ‘rons weaker contention In the firs place, he may maintain that itis empirically imposible for any physical mechanism to produce such manifestations. Inthe second place, he may gran the posi- bility of «physical mechanism producing such manifestations, but ‘may maintain that in fact man's body cptains no mechsaisn that ‘an undertake the tsk, ‘The fae contention is being. gradually undermined by the Aesiging, and bulding, of machines that can dopliate an in- easing range of human Tis tue that no machine has yet been built which cn besaid to exhibit ingenuity or ereativ- ity in what it does, Present machines, for instance, can solve ‘mathematical problems only if they ae the sor of problem that can he answered by a set step-by-step procedure. But its very unliely that this represents the Uppet limit of the performances cof machines and suggestions already exist forthe desigaing of a ‘machine that will exhibit ingenuity. (CE. Smart, oft, Ch. VI Sect. 3, ‘Problemolving ingenuity”) Aad if the “ingenuity” Darter is broken it will be very arbitrary stil ro maintain that there are other expressions of mind that are beyond the powers of ‘mechani to produce, ; However, an aniMaterialst who concedes that a machine ‘hich coud duplicate the expression ofthe fll range of human rental activity is physically possible may still maintsin that ‘mental states ate not physical sates ofthe central nervous system ‘because in fact no mechanism that has this eapacity canbe found in the human body. In practice, however, this line of defence is seldom taken, Once the anti-Materialise has been convinced ofthe Physical possibility of « mechaninm thar can produce a cern ” a7‘The Nature of Mind ‘ange of mindtike menifestations he generally concedes that such 4 physical mechanism, or something not too disila, wll be found at work in the central nervous system. (ladeed, the con struction or projection of mechanisms that produce mind lke sanifesations has turned out to be one ofthe best sources of feuitfol hypotheses about the workings of the cnt nervous system) Nevertheless, someone may argue thatthe snt-Materaist has lethimself be satisfied s easly only beeause out knowledge ofthe central nervous system is a8 Yet 20 slight, e may be dats cally detiled knowledge of the workings ofthe brain would mate it cleat that it was inadequate for the discovery of the Law of Gravitation orth writing of King Leer. ‘The possibilty may be feely admitted, and ie may be fcely admitted that tis mote than s bate logial possibilty” But wat reasons ae thereto chink tat it isa possbity that ae any peat probability? Tam not aware of any such reasons, ‘Thete i an interesting compromise possiblity here which fll berween a pure physico-chemical Materialism and an, Attute theory ofthe mind eis possible to argue thatthe whole range of man's behaviour springs causally from physial peocses i is central nervous system, but stl to sy that some at lat of thse Physical processes are aot the sort of thing that ean be accounted for in terms ofthe laws of physics and chemisty. Thats 5), ‘ne can hold that cerain processes in the central nervous syst) eas acorn oem ila hat ee dela «ven in principle, from the laws of physics and chemist). AS 2 seal ive om ol notbe produced by somebiog working according to purely physicochemical principles Such 2 view would stil be a Materialism, for it would not Gemaad any ‘emergent qualities, stil eran emergent substance, but would ‘ot be a pyc! Materials ‘The most natural hypothesis here would be that these emergent Jaws were something that developed in ol! physical systems that seached a certain degre of comple intereaion. In this Way one would avoid the apbirariness of associating the emergent les wih a high degree of complexity in holga s)stems only. One ‘ight expecta man-built machine ofthe requisite degeee of com: Pletity to operate according tothe emergent laws juts meh 43 the central nervous system di, we Ldentfcation of the Mental with the Physical ‘Ania, if one did acept an hypothe of this sore one would need tobe more spathei to he ides of emergent awe genera Ip. One would exes to nd that ol biologie sya, which, afc al nvolve mich more complex inertlaion of compon: tats thin erlany pial syste, operate aserding Tove tha tameand tne pncls of pyc and cheng Tt would bea suprisingly asbitenyfemae ofthe system of sckac laws it the physicochemical ws applied to all ovinary collections of teeth he wa one pun wee» op mgt ses occurred with the emergence of mi “As T have said aleady, I bnvw of 0 compeling scenic sont mae sh at en te dicen of Rewon of thet of Shakespeare rauite that we porate cnege a ‘pertion inthe cena nerwous sytem. Neverthe, ach ‘easons exit, oat later cscoveted, then fling back pon this "Bmergearine” Matera wil be + quite eatral and onto. Jogi gute economical move {ity be erated here, inPasing, tata Panelist of any som mut gre that the workings ofthe baa are by themselves ‘ficient account for the whole range of human behaviour, although itis toe that he say take an exengetist view ofthe laws according to which the ban works. For according to the Parlement sates play no pat inthe caveton of behaviour fone watts o sy tht te bins inrfien to account eusaly for the whole range of human behaviour one will have to be & Duals and an Intraclonet about he mind) may be objected to-Emergont-lnw Material tat it ould sot be dtinglsed fro Inctaconi Daisy Suppose hat phys event inthe cota nervous system followed set i ata by anciber phat evens, but the occurrence ol the sera evs ines ia pyc terme The “Brerpe ln” Matera potas erent as of mater to clan the phenomenon, Bots Dualit could explain what hap- ened by sang date at pia event bought about changes {ne spinal stintance which im fora brought about the second Bera ‘event, How could we choose between the two hypo- me? 1h answer to this objection it mst be poate out tha dhe Dials slew ce deve in two dient ways If developed the in way, there woul be no posible experimental decon ws‘The Nature of Mind ‘between Dualism and ‘Emergentlaw* Materialism, Considers tioas of economy, however, Would favous the later view. If de- ‘veloped in the second, more plausible, way, it would be possible in principle ro decide the question empirically. Suppose that the central nervous system isin a certain physical state. A physical event in the system brings about a spiritual event about a further physical event, Js the causal efficacy ial substance on this occasion determined solely by the first physical event? Suppose fistly that its. There are then laws to be discovered which permicus, given the current physica state of the central nervous system, to predict in principle the second physical event from the fist physieal event. Now how in this ease do we decde tht a speiual event does pay a part inthe ‘causal chain? How do we rule out the view thatthe fist physical event gives rise to the second physical event directly, althoug Scot "cmegea’ ve? Ween There o pone observational diference berween the theories at they are pre- seated. However, every consideration of ontological economy tells agains the Dualist view. Suppose, more plausibly, that what happens inthe spiral sub- stance, and the nature ofthe second physical event, is determined fot simply by the frst physical event bu ali by wat ba happened 1 the spiritual seston in the past, No Staightforwatd prediction from the fist physical event to the second event will then be possible. The impossibility of such a prediction would then be ‘evidence forthe truth of Interacionist Dualism. Of course, given thatthe geoess and sabsequent hiscory of che spiritual substance is determined solely by physical factors in the central nervous system, it would sill be possible to argue that the second psical event followed on disecty, by ‘emergent’ laws, but without 2 spiritual eveot as intermediary, from the fst physical event i ‘conjunction vith otber physical events in the past. Bia the hypothesis ‘would become so complicated that postlation of «spiritual sub- stance that interacted withthe brain would clearly be the better ‘hypothesis. “Emergenc-law" Materialism can therefore be distia- ‘gushed from Interacioniet Dualism, ‘The Materialist also has another line of stent availble in face of evidence that appears to contradict a materialist view of the rind, that may be even more congenial to him, I is conceivable thatthe whole range of human behavious can be explained as an 360 Téentifcation of the Mental with the Plyical fect ofthe working of the brain, bus that that working cannot be explained in terms ofthe physical principles that we mow have. Temight lb explained by 4 ecating Of physics Intend of admiting the existence of emergent laws We might discover a new basis for physis in terms of which the apparently special way of ‘working of the brain becomes something decivable in principle from the basi laws of physics, applied to the particular physical structure of the brain. fnew bate principles for physies could explain, and could pre- dict, ordinary (that is, non-mental) phenomena af last as well as those currently accepted, and iin addition they were able to pre~ dict the anomalous behaviour ofthe central nervous system, then ‘we could ewitch to the new physics in the interest of 2 unified scheme of explanation, Of eauce, it is easy enough co rk arly of a new physics when one isnot faced with the task of actually producing one, But its one way that the Materialist could defted his moaistie vision, ‘Nevertheless, eis conceivable chat it should prove impossible to explain some human activites—presumably the “higher” activities—either in terms of emergent laws of working of the ‘central nervous system of by recasting our physic, In that case ‘Centeal-sae Materialism would be filse, although the arabs of the mental concepts put forvard in Part Two~the Causal analysis—might stl be ea. ‘So much fr those manifestations of mind that everybody grants to have been manieed, We may now const Taanormal ‘phenomena, These include telepathy, clairvoyance, precognition, psychokinesis (the direet action of mind on material objects) and ‘disembodied existence. ‘The fist great question that faces us here is whether these ‘phenomena exieeatal. I they do not, they constitute no objection to Central-state Materialism, Yor ther mere logical possibilty i 20 objection to. coningenidemtfcation of mind ant bain. Now, not all those who have studied the subject closely ae convinced of tie ‘occurrence of any ofthe alleged phenomena. (An article such a5 Michael Seriven's ‘New Frontiers of the Brain’ Jol of Pars Poebology, Vol. 25, 196%, pp. 305-18, gives & physicalist a great eal of comfort) Tn considering this question, it seems sessonable to let the smite tum on whether exprnmtaly probe phenomena cn a6The Nature of Mind be Found, Admin this rgotoas ettron, but, sac itis Alnowt lpi pretodion of the scenic invesigian othe eeoomen, it ooe hati seams methodologic ere! fo mate ‘Now the amount of suggestive expesimentl materi is oot very ge but thre isl body of ess which ae at 27 [edict expan crept by ading that some parse Ei isbeng xeric Ta partcan, thes tome opine tence for heathy, andor cievojance, andor precogation G have pu he conelasion inthe sbiguons ay becse the Sides i eglacy seep of dierent inerpretnons. To {Fre ovepl livtraton Suppose tts select appe fo Fveprccngatve knowledge of wet eardins pct ilo trned ‘ip wo times ahead. we were dealing with pack hat was not hie berwcen turns sheet could eal el be expaned by oalang mere catwoyant kawwledpe of he card ta om fe from the top: Given this ievoyane knowledge peecly cxdiary inference wil sufce vo yeld the appeal “peeopak She" iow) And one alowed dhe experimen teil gives poste fs many of the alleged pense tha aid dor ecu unr expetinena eons become pas Ise candies for parsons phenome Suppose, then tat thre eft panormal phenoens “The guenon ses whethe they sand fr any eceianyOPPOa tion to Central sate Matra Conder teat for zee We might dene ilputy at the. ging of somfetenal Laowege of what gost on in the mit of tis, Or to pt 2 dinion that i beter acon withthe expert fc, isthemaling of gucscs without evidence sbowrwht icurey going on in the mind of another, guesses that are significantly toe secre the rns at could bebe to mere ‘hance. Thi phesomenon, fires prone becase he foal normal way to docover what goag on ia the sind of other tt make an inference fom what his body does. Bat ‘hy doc this phenomenon coax Cette Meas? ould there no be sore a yor unaconeed phys proces (Gxtape process of» peste find notes come) Which link one cena arvous ster with saotber, snd vo pe Int the tamtnon of iformsin’ And sna sggeons ‘ght be made aboot other petaormal eaomes sen entfation of tbe Mental vith he Plyscal Such suggenions may torn out to disave the problem poted by these phesomena without in any way dstrbing Cent state Mates: Neverhels, if we eouslde the partis narae of the alleged phenomena then, if they actually occu, it is nt easy to find explnatons within te framework of physics as we know fe For intnce iti an nally aot unpromising suggestion that ic communication of laformation i mediate by some Dhybical radiation emited by one cental nervous system and Dickedupby another. Thishypothess can be texted by conducting {eepatie experiments with abject isle from each other by ‘dation proof contunes, Now such experiments have araly Been cried out in the USSR and itv camed that guesses, fade about what was going on ia the other minds in such con: ‘dons were sill signicantly better than chance expectation. (Cf Experimets in Met! Seaton, LL. Vaso, Eagish eats lations Teste for the Stay of Menta Images, 1963) It the experiments canbe epeted, an explanation of elepathy in tems Of tadaion wil seem very implausible, Bu, given the cael design of moder experiments what otier channels of physical ‘communication between subject aad subject can be suggested? ‘We could say chat the radiation involved is ite uke the physial radiation blocked by “tadiaon-proo?” boxes. But then ‘ve are beginning to sbandon the known structure of physics. Ti precognition isa realty ities more dial vo expla. Te Js true that there is no pares dificult in underanding the shart possiblity of som inferential knowledge of the fare, Suppose system, 1s moving ina certain direction. Let us make the suppostion that ii lily tobe unimpeded, and tnt, i draped, i will come to be in state Sy I 1 ost imagine chat Sete the sytem come tobe in sata portion of energy hives of aod acts upon + mind, producing in that min Sonnfeental Knowledge that Swill hor bein state Sy, Any ‘uring system, suchas the oll-light faa ext, works on sil Principe, although ie produces 4 less sophisated emul: the {ming on of ight, aot noninferental knowledge. Indeed, itis posible that we sometimes sequteinformation ofthe sort ike ‘T ie going to bel not om the bass f any evidence, but simply a 1 result the operation of uch a mechanism producing in us o0n- {afereacal knowledge of ou fare bodily states. : Dur if we consider senal cases where precopative ability is 363‘The Natere of Mind claimed, it is dificle x0 apply an explanation of this sort For Instance, suppose a subject guesses with beter than chance resus ‘what sot of card wil be turned wp, but besveen each gues he pack is thoroughly shfied by a random procedure. Ths physical ‘huses shat goto taking particular card tarn up are incredibly ‘many, and incredibly complenly interrelated. It den becomes al- ‘nos impossible to sce how “information” could be transmitted from that concatenation of eausee which Would be correlated in any degree wih the res that the causes ate about to bring ind txisence. So this sort of precogniton, iit occurs, scems co defy sil accepted patteras of explanation. eis tue that this isnot the end ofthe argument. The Materialist righ sil tke on of the ewo ways of expe dscusedinconnee- ton i noma a opposed wo ‘pannomal phenoment He might try 0 workout an emergent muterlism, with special laws for the eental nervous system not desvabl, even in principle, fiom ordinary physics. Ore might ee fora new physis which, ‘Within #unifled et of principles, would expan and predict not nly the ordinary eapacitie of mater and of mea, but also the partnormal shlls of men. Buti these ways of exeape prove wn Satisfactory, Cental-state Mates cannot be the whole tuth about the mind. 1 consider that the claims of psychical rescrch ae the smal black cloud on the horizon of 2 Materialist theory of mind. f thete were no questions about paranormal phenomena to co0- Sider, there would seem tobe ltl serious obstacle othe complet idenication of mental sstes with physico-chemical states of the ‘ental nervous system. (This, of course, is assuming that the ogi objecsons can be met.) The idenication would be ae ce ‘ina the identification ofthe gee with the DNA molecule. THe apparent existence of paranormal phenomena mas leave a sll, ‘doubt. The upholder Of aay scentife downe has an intellect ‘duty t consider very carefully the evidence tha seme mot likly “to undermine his view. So the Centralstate Materialist i 22 ‘ntelecoal duty to consider very earelly the alleged results of pehical esearch Filly, we may bity conser the postion of those who grant thatthe physico-chemical processes inthe central nervous stm ate adeyuate causes of the whole of human behaviour, but who, teverheles eit the ideneaion of mental vates with states of 364 Tdantfcation of the Mental with the Physical the brain, Tis hs postion I described athe begining of his iper ltlectly fous ‘PiSimporst once aan, oreemphasz that in hs caper Tam assning the genet fhe secu ofthe mental com {cp gien i are Fw, We may thsfoe ignore ete the pos CB of tose who aga for iatane, that ei vient 1 nto Specion tat mental aes ate soon dierent fom, oF 6 ‘Greig ewe tha, sates ofthe arom ap forthe production i een sor of behena, Now i one scp an cunt of trea satsnteemsof tec excl Tnons to behaviour: abd ihe sme time oe apes tha physic peations of the bra Ee adequate to bing abou all en behaviors ane net To ret be Menton of amen ses and rain Sas Tareas oly one posign one cn adopt, One mus 87 tht pyc procencs inte bein gve He omental prone of mata sort which in tar ves obser. The fren proces mus be inetd nthe eal cha ot some Ping sah cata waels in xa he ame way tat Senile ar sh nin (he uae cee ees SOM iRcratsm and for of nection ist Dualism whete the interaction curs isa wy th theo ld exe the some predictions See MDS Sny st tli compasble wth the sbcred es Bak evesy principle of simply Ho sce ‘pest san adopig the ot der fo sett ti 8 ‘Beetham: tel poy, Peshaps thease tn a2 eran at cate of topes the DNA molce Foe ee ee mater pinile This ate Pee ie cae, her eles th tnumxon of heey iret The whole cnn of cue oper ca aii ‘eeepc cai bint comin sone ea Tak One an ancealy chat aldbough this hypothesisisalogiclly Poni egal compe with e observed merit tccmmen The ste may bes ofthe Pull Iypothesbot te ind “Thisbrings ous long argument to anend, Oneof the grea prob- Jems that must be Sed in any attenpe to work out & scientific ‘worldview is that of bringing the being who puts forward the ‘Worldwiew sizin the world-view. By resting man, including his 365The Nature of Mind ‘mental proceses, sa purely physial object, operating according to exactly the same laws a all other physical things this objec is achieved with the greatest possible intellectual economy, The Kkaower difes from the world he knows only in the greater com- plexity of his physical organization. Manis one with nature. ‘We must recognize, however, that even ifthe doctrine of mid ppt forward in this book is correct, physicals philorophy is not tthe end, bu rather a the beginning, ofits problems. The deae- ing away ofthe problem of mind only brings ws face to fice With the deeper problems connected with matter. Such notions as sub- stance, caus, law, space and time, zemaia in as much obscurity a5 ‘ever when we have given an account of the local and temporaey phenomenon of mind purely in terms of such concep. A phys cali theory of minis « mere prolegomenoa to physicist metaphysics, Such a metpts, ke the theory of mind, wll n0 ubt be the joint product of scentife invesigaion and pilo- sophia eetion we 366 INDEX bola Heal, 5 estou, pps behaviour and “Aeblevementwor and prcep- “peitlour proper, 8, 32, tion 84-16, 266 53,250 12458 Aberin I 96-19, 291-2 pain Alexindet 8 1239 Behavior, 54-72, 90,981 ‘Amoore, J. E289 ear Atala Bekeiouram, combined wih other theories of ‘ehavioun| tind peta 2837 “elie 12 embod exiteace 19, 6 ‘positions, sy. 9-8 perception, 47 Pace, U 30 Ryle. 34-6 77 ne 50 Sina JC 8290 Be frat in 68 7 9012 ‘bly ao 209 Wigenwein La 36 cerand colourperepton, 4b Beli S343 omer, tat “dsponons, 7-8 Iewospetion, 95-3278 ‘otons, 13 Knowle 2) Indterminsy 25-6 ‘machines, Intersing 193-204 sin ‘Bent agen 296 Knowledge, tiy.soy pain, Asacombe, CoE: Mo, 140, 65-7, 379 ee menial images 298-30, 3012 Again, Se Thomas, 2,122 ‘pocepion sob pi ‘wale Teoma {pore 23,2808 238 Argue om Analogy, Other tetons, #74. ‘Made ‘Biaking, 18, 345-9 dept tom Pandan, i oe ra Tl tte il gh 954 at fe pal sions BEES. we Ae ae tana “tlic pinta, Semen 7 Soon re ite ant PEI, Peres foe Ajeet SoM ana a oe is 0 adnveral bea = 3Index bes scale tela, SR a foferting, 197 eae “eoties of mind and body Gres, Ja 40 Cleataica 3,14, 550 “elibenion 160 “in the hen 6-75, 38 resin Duala 2 at Theor of mind wd ody “Causa acai ofthe mental cone Se 9 917, 0 causity 3 “Bundle” Dali, +7 dliporions, 8 intring co mel eonep 3 ‘onnferetl knowledge of, "oy ast Peceion, 29-3125, a6 Cette) 4 ‘poet 39 ree 9 Thiers tory, 9 Centatte heoty of mad 1-11, hicks, Thee {hiker Aue hiss, Meant Ghirvoyne, yoo" teen 9 66,2790 pai ‘elourblndoen: she ‘ecminaes yao Sncompniy op to "Common sense’ Proper veoubler Comparer 199,344 Concept eso 98 perceptual, 210, 246, 340-2 consciousness 163 ‘neal Espen, Inonpetion, Counter 96,195, 28+ itr 5,92 Desig, 158-6166, 350 Deliberation. 37, 18s, 68 Dae 20 ye indubieabe Knowledge of mental Totem 9,35 pled ste, 83-4 Deaies 98 151-8, 185 269, 176%, oe Deapate 86 Determinale and determinate, Deetcher, J 194298 ire est 27. hemi xen 1m Serb 9380 ug tte Dia! Beatin, 7-9, owen Knowles of 3-4 petepon and bel 04 382- snalla us ‘Pheaomeonlt view, ayo, 0,96 098 Bil eh oe ob Agee cher ted bye e937 vale Reroute theories of ied ‘sed boty Paes 8 Dream, 7-1 65, 167, 169 30-8 360 Tries Dualit chores of mind ae bod, 15, 5°36, 434 aR ‘Bhai’ Deals, 7, 15-14, 15— 3335-6 ah To 0 caren Dust, 618,98, 1 Drees ‘Perey tranepaten nnd scent theory, 89 staid, 69 Bates 135 “Eien Elen 223 Enact 85 "Brcsgen’ pope at, arn sr 364 oi tt Timer fang co Epic, 93 Eb m Obie Epica, 91 ent bygoe96 065397 ses apt, 18-9 16 tam, Corceann I= “pen, Uncomeat ne ‘Fam wond, 60-1, 63 Feed bach, negative, 138-9, 149, eaings 7 280 ‘Bodily fnogs, 307-6 320-8 Fleming Na 38,233 Flew, AG. Neth Fora of loraon, 33 Freud, 53,172 "Fandaeetl pares, 270-1 Gali, G70 Gting, B-AL Tx, 305 Gach Ps 3536 (Gene 90 98 3550368 Giddiness, 308, 16-17 “Gontlesed sev, 148 Ga 79,18 alcinaions Reception Hampabive Sy Se 68 Bate ae Hea apd ol 285-90 Hebb, D-O. 74 Hoge GW. Py $5139 Hibben, 14286490, 082 “Hinged 38-9540, ope tas aie, D, 13,155, 208 “Dndle?theory of mind, 7,9, tes, 20-8 caunain, 34, 88 Aipreons and Leth, 292 Titration 9, 31-8 intern, 296 Introspection, 332-3. 36-7 secondary gua, 382 ‘ple ies, 297 Homliy, 196 longs, 320 Hl. Hl» “ee 97 Sn on Mental image, Sese- “impresions dent tory of mind 2d body, Inmediate act ofthe will 144-7 "67 Inclination to belie, 1-4 Inconel, toot, 18,19 “ened to. Ineostion (min), £79. ay on ndubiabtiy, we Tocorsgiity Iferting, 194-305 50 Inte egry, 36-7 Informs, 13h, 0,12 Bitsy. ha, 3867 Inger seas, Ietorpection Incligene, 1,137 Thscstoal, 0 ‘a ale Iteooalay 369 ssIndex Intentions, 40-1 44 48,5776, bodily sensations, 10, 315-16 motions, 179. 186 inwospecon 33, mental images 93-4 peseepton enon, 4179-89 85-5 98-9, 33-69 HE 150 16ST, Interaction, 828 3-6, 4-7. 3 pacers Tasronpetinn 95-11-24 124, a8 ged indian, 100-15, 267 Senne of patpon, 135-8 TORY seraoon 318 Beam 30053, interting, 299 Invospective image, 329-32 ituronpetve ima, 2o) Ikea to body peeepion, 95-6, gon 335-4 perepaleteoce, 399 ‘inking, 343 ‘why ie exit, 26-5, 327 (tet Consionteae Eaper- Kaos 134 Iniopetho, 9,1 Da et serene, Kony, e082) Koowlg bow, uf Krowidge 1,3, 7-307 Taishi a8 ite gn etecpan 23,379. xbieceesg 200, ngage 205, 125, 8163 3403 Mets 68. Heke, J. “Aube eheoey of ind 12 Locke, J. ows) fom incr, 120-1 Love 184 Macbeth, 2t2 Mecallu, D. ai MeGechi, Jy 108 Mackie, JL x 18 70 Metaggat, J: MeT. Ba 329 Malai, 72-1 “aie mage’ “Scenic ‘Map; and perception, 209-10 Main C. By 33 258 388-9 ‘Mates heres lod so ody jo tors 3, $4 57 ‘Memory, £918 39-4, 65 29% Ber Mendel, G90 ‘Mental imagen, 15 70, 128-3 136, pe 169 apt 30h 3873 Mental tories of tind wad Mirortmes Moore, G31 196-8 Moses, 72°5 Netlch, Gy ah 10, 16, 304-5 Newtoa, b, 395-6 338 amber §5 Objective 9. 4 Onin Cabo ang “Open tare, “Opera condoning’ 246 a0 Operation, 271, 283,292 ‘bapostions, 364 ‘o'Sbnughntys By 252 ther mindy 5-5 ig to ai 684 ass spe pin andign iguent fom Pak gm cnc Panel 9, 3-6. 50 entpion oon my one ell pis soba 298-9 iho gn 9s Sol 2 53h ss es ‘Sleciaion, 27-05 04 Iason spre 9 Picea pts a6 Titer fw’ ode ag ‘recmccan compos wt paar in scwalinape Cmpurion wh, objeto to Materialism devwn Fesppoe boty, ‘iene hing eines ‘Seg moder thw sa wie oy aso eon 74,398 Foto lin 3,31, Fleweni 7 Pei ind 3 Pore Palsth Po, er Pea 9 Ronen Rr sapse ‘Poet nao recon 330 3 Fe poco a 931° “Paleged ace 39 6,10, Prose 890-96 16, ar

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