The Rumanians and the Habsburg Monarchy by STEPHEN FISCHER-GALATI *

The endless and frequently meaningless disputes involving the contribution of one or another nationality group to the maintenance or dissolution of the Habsburg monarchy have obscured the essential question: was the multinational empire viable? Different answers have been provided, usually on the basis of the historian's individual national prejudices, whether Hungarian, Yugoslav, Polish, Ruthenian, Italian, or Rumanian. The ranks of the disputants have been swelled by "volunteers" of non-East European origin ever ready to champion, on sentimental or ideological rather than historical grounds, whatever causes may have been appealing at a given time It is perhaps fortunate that the role of the Rumanians as an "integrating or disintegrating force" has not been as much discussed as that of the other nationalities of the Habsburg monarchy. This should at least make it a less difficult subject for historical reappraisal.1 It is also fortunate for the purpose of discussion that the Rumanians' problems were almost entirely connected with those of the Hungarians and Austrians and thus did not become involved in the extremely complex interrelationships of the South Slavs. On the other hand, historians and polemicists have generally given only perfunctory consideration to the part played by the Rumanian minorities of Bukovina, the Banat, Criana, and Maramure in the process of integration or disintegration and to the relationships between the Rumanians of these provinces and those of

Austrian History Yearbook, vol. III, pt. 2, 1967, pp. 430-449. Detailed bibliographical references on the Rumanian problem in Transylvania, the Banat, Criana, and Maramure can be found in Andrei Veress, Bibliografia romno-ungar [Rumanian-Hungarian Bibliography] (3 vols., Bucharest: Cartea Romaneasc, 1931-35); Ioachim Crciun, Bibliographic de la Transylvanie roumaine 1916-1936 (Cluj: Revue de Transylvanie, 1937); and Constantin Daicoviciu and Miron Constantinescu, Brve histoire de la Transylvanie (Bucharest: Editura Academiei, 1965), pp. 427-435. No comparable surveys are available for Bukovina. However, a satisfactory bibliographic
1

Transylvania. More serious, they have failed to define clearly the criteria for viability of the empire and the nature of the constructive or erosive forces exerted 'by the Rumanians. No matter what the errors of omission or commission, the conclusions reached by various writers on the Rumanian nationality question in the Habsburg empire have been, as a rule, categorical. If Rumanian or pro-Rumanian, they agreed that the dissolution of the monarchy was inevitable and that their conationals' greatest historical contribution was the acceleration of the process of disintegration. If Hungarian or pro-Hungarian, they concluded that even if the empire was not salvageable in its traditional form, it could have been pre served in its post-Ausgleich format had it not been for the destructive the attitude of certain Few non-Hungarian historians have minorities, particularly Rumanians.2

regarded the Rumanians as a force tending to stabilize the empire.3 On balance, the evidence would favor the thesis that, al though the Rumanians were among those forces that were most instrumental in bringing about the ultimate dissolution of the empire, prior to the final debacle they were among the most active supporters of the imperial order. This apparent anomaly will surprise only those who believe that nationalism per se is a destructive force which makes impossible com promise or coexistence with other nationalities in a multi national framework. This interpretation hardly applies to the Rumanians of the AustroHungarian empire, as a review of their problems and actions will show.

survey can be found in Erich Prokopowitsch, Die rumnische Nationalbewegung in der Bukowina und der Dako-Romanismus (Graz: Bohlau, 1965), pp. 171-175. 2 The classic statement of both positions is in Eugene Horvth, Transylvania and the History of the Roumanians (Budapest; Srkny, 1935). 3 Although clearly a work a these, Constantin Daicoviciu et al., Din Istoria Transilvaniei [The History of Transylvania] (2nd ed., 2 vols., Bucharest: Editura Academiei, 1961), provides the best analysis of the contribution of the Rumanians to the stability of the Habsburg monarchy.

The origins of the controversy regarding the aspirations of the Rumanian minority in the Habsburg empire may be traced to the Supplex libellus Valachorum.4 This petition, which was submitted by a group of Rumanian intellectuals to Leopold II toward the end of the eighteenth century, sought for the Rumanians of Transylvania rights equal to those enjoyed by the privileged nations of the province - the Magyars, Saxons, and Szeklers. Considered for a long time as a manifestation of Rumanian nationalism, disruptive and anti- Hungarian in character, the Supplex libellus has recently been reinterpreted by Rumanian Marxists and other historians.5 The conclusions reached vary in detail but agree essentially on the document's conservative purpose: the attainment by the Rumanian intellectuals and rising- middle class of the same status of a medieval natio which the Magyars, Saxons, and Szeklers had enjoyed since 1437. The justification of the petitioners' arguments in terms of the historic primacy and continuity of the "Rumanian nation" is not surprising considering the cultural background of the principal authors of the Supplex libellus, Georghe incai, loan Molnar, Samuil Micu, and loan Budai-Deleanu. Their appraisal of the "historic rights" of the Rumanians was remarkably modest. Their trump card, Latinity, was used mostly for identification purposes and as evidence of longevity of residence. The Supplex libellus did not per se entail the restoration of whatever rights and privileges the oldest inhabitants of the province had enjoyed prior to their arrogation by new comers. The status and rights of the existing three nations were not contested. The Supplex libellus was essentially a plea for the gradual and limited incorporation of the Rumanian bourgeoisie
4

The text of the Supplex libellus Valachorum can be found in David Prodan, Supplex libellus Valachorum (Cluj, 1948), pp. 243-273 5 The most comprehensive Marxist interpretation is in Istoria Rominiei [The History of Rumania], Vol. Ill (Bucharest: Academia Republicii Populare Romine, 1964), pp. 492-513. Consult also the excellent study by Keith Hitchins, "Samuel Clain and the Rumanian Enlightenment in Transylvania," Slavic Review, Vol. XXIII, No. 4 (December, 1964), pp. 660-675.

and "bourgeois intellectuals" into the Magyar- dominated oligarchy and for meaningful Rumanian representation in Transylvania's political institutions. The suppliants' concern with the problems of the Rumanian serf was minimal. Far from regarding Horea, Cloca, and Crian as representative of the Rumanian nation and its socioeconomic desiderata, they condemned the revolt of 1784 as the illegal work of savages. Only the brutality of the repression was condemned, and this on humanitarian rather than political grounds. If any thing, the authors of the Supplex libellus, in that document and in related writings, questioned the wisdom of Joseph IIs social reformism and asked his successor Leopold II not to repeat Joseph's errors but to exercise his authority and influence on behalf of themselves as the representative segment of the Rumanian population. No threats or even intimations of political action in case the petition were denied by the emperor or rejected by the privileged nations were made in the Supplex libellus Valachorum. The petitioners had no thought of making common cause with the Rumanians of Moldavia and Walachia; their principal argument was that both Transylvania and the Habsburg monarchy would be strengthened by making the local diet representative of the interests of all the nations and by ending discriminatory socioeconomic practices against the Rumanian commercial and intellectual elite. The narrow scope of the aspirations of the Rumanian intellectuals was typical of the representatives of the so-called "coala Ardelean" (Transylvanian School).6 No matter how extravagantly the writings of Micu, incai, or Maior have been interpreted, they were nationalist only in the sense that they stressed
6

the

ethnic

and

historical

differences

between

the

On the nature and message of the "Scoala Ardeleana" consult Vasile Maciu et al., Outline of Rumanian Historiography until the Beginning of the 20th Century (Bucharest: Editura Academiei, 1964), pp. 30-36. It is an original interpretation. See also coala ardelean [The Transylvanian School] (Bucharest: Editura Academiei, 1959).

Rumanians and the other inhabitants of Transylvania.7 With one notable exception, loan Budai-Deleanu's iganiada (The Gypsy Epic), these writings were fundamentally linguistic exercises. The iganiada alone contained novel political ideas.8 This poem has been acclaimed by Marxist historians as the initial formulation of a common political goal for all Rumanians of Transylvania - social and national emancipation.9 Such an interpretation of Budai-Deleanu's work may be correct, but it must be noted that his concept of social reform was far more developed than that of other champions of national liberation. Actually, the iganiada, is a plea for the political emancipation of all the inhabitants of the monarchy, not just the Rumanians, from the feudal and medieval order. Budai-Deleanu does not envisage the establishment of separate nationality groups in the Habsburg empire or the union of the Rumanians north and south of the Danube. Instead, he postulates the revolutionary democratic reorganization of the empire within the existing geographic and multinational framework. Similar motifs, in more rudimentary form, are also to be found in the folk ballads of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. However, the tendency of certain nationalist and Marxist historians to interpret popular demands for reform and expressions of discontent with the feudal order as nationalist manifestations seems unwarranted.10 Such interpretations are based on the simplistic concept of the inherent conflict between Magyar and Rumanian or landlord and serf and ignore the fact that, even if a majority of the latifundiaries were Hungarian and a majority of the

Compare Hitchins, "Samuel Clain and the Rumanian Enlightenment in Transylvania," pp. 660-675, with Maciu, Outline of Rumanian Historiography, pp. 30-36. See also Daicoviciu, Din Istoria Transilvaniei, Vol. I, pp. 278-297. 8 D. Popovici, La littrature roumaine l'poque des lumires (Sibiu, 1945), pp. 109-116 and 448-475. 9 Most forcefully stated in Daicoviciu, Din Istoria Transilvaniei, Vol. I, pp. 296-297. 10 See also Cornelia Bodea, "Preocupari economice si culturale in literatura transilvan dintre anii 1786-1830" [Economic and Cultural Preoccupations in Transylvanian Literature between 1786 and 1830], Studii, Vol. IX, No. 6 (1956), pp. 87-104.

peasant ry Rumanian, the latter's discontent was social rather than national in character. It has been argued, incorrectly I think, that Budai-Deleanu's views reflected those of the Rumanian bourgeoisie. The reform and reorganization of the empire along the lines contemplated in the iganiada were not desired by the mer chants, who thought in terms of class rather than mass privileges. The early nineteenthcentury Rumanian merchant remained conservative while the feudal order was being relentlessly undermined, to use Marxist terminology, by the development of capitalism. The development of the Transylvanian mining industry and commercial and industrial enterprises with imperial encouragement and protection, if anything, reduced his already minimal inclination for political change, for he feared that any change might entail social upheaval or threaten the imperial order. He sought closer ties with fellow merchants, regardless of nationality, for the furtherance of common economic interests. He did not favor the emancipation of the peasantry and was at best unenthusiastic about uniting with his Rumanian "brethren" in Moldavia and Walachia. If he was a nationalist in any sense, it was still in the medieval one of natio.11 Reformist and nationalist tendencies were even less in evidence among the few Rumanian landowners, the military frontiersmen (Grniceri), and the Church hierarchy. The landowners' privileges were based on their social, not their national, status. Hence, they had no interest in supporting the merchants' demands for the recognition of the Rumanian nation or in aiding any program of social reform that would alter the status quo. The Grniceri were also jealous of their special privileges which derived directly from the emperor. Churchmen, whether Orthodox or Uniate,

11

A well balanced and carefully documented account of these problems is in La Transylvanie (Bucharest: Acadmie roumaine, 1938), pp. 337- 378.

encouraged only such national self-assertion or social reform as was authorized by Vienna. The Church was indeed a pillar of strength for the Habsburg emperors.12 Admittedly, this situation changed in the 1840's, primarily because of the socio-economic and political attitudes of the Hungarian aristocracy. As has been pointed out recently by Rumanian historians of Transylvania, the demands of the Rumanian bourgeoisie were forced into a nationalist mold because they were rejected by the Magyar aristocracy on the basis either of medieval prerogative or modern nationalist doctrine.13 Indeed, it was the "aristocratic nationalism" of the Hungarians, with its crass intolerance of the rights and aspirations of national minorities, that led to the equating of socio-economic reform with national rights and the acceptance of this formula by the Rumanian population at large. It mattered relatively little whether Hungarian nationalist intransigeance was a reflection of the magnates' conservatism or of the lesser nobility's chauvinism, since, whatever the source, it invariably stressed the primacy of the Hungarians. It is true that the reformist nobility favored the emancipation of the bourgeoisie, but their plans for the creation of a "landlordbourgeois" Hungary excluded the Rumanian middle class and would thus have perpetuated its political and socio- economic inferiority. It is not surprising, therefore, that the Rumanian bourgeoisie feared Kossuth more than the Hungarian traditionalists and relied on the emperor to prevent the victory of the "reformists." As Victor Cheresteiu and other serious students of Transylvanian history have correctly recognized, the majority of the Rumanian bourgeoisie' preferred reform within the existing framework or even

12

The significance and influence of the conservative forces has been reassessed in recent years. A comprehensive summary of the latest findings and current interpretations can be found in Istoria Romniei, Vol. IV (Bucharest: Editura Academiei, 1964), pp. 25-35. 13 Daicoviciu, Din Istoria Transilvaniei, Vol. I, pp. 318-350.

the maintenance of the status quo to any change that would have jeopardized the stability of the imperial order.14 But the number of those favoring a more comprehensive assertion of the Rumanians' rights than that contained in the Supplex libellus through the inclusion of an emancipated peasantry in an enlarged Rumanian natio or perhaps even through the establishment of a Rumanian region directly subordinated to the emperor was increasing. Nevertheless, the historian should be ware of current exaggerations concerning the importance of the minority viewpoint, since the broader doctrine of "national" and "social" change was formulated and accepted only by a very small segment of intellectuals of bourgeois origin.15 It is also noteworthy that even among the most vociferous exponents of "bourgeois nationalist" views few contemplated common action with the Moldavians and Walachians, and none favored the establishment of a Greater Rumania. The generation of 1848 was aware of the similarities in the several Rumanian basis of doctrines, an but the Transylvanian of Rumanians were in concerned primarily with the attainment of their own goals on the "objective" analysis historical conditions Transylvania alone. They were basically bourgeois social (not national) revolutionaries who were ready to collaborate with fellow bourgeois liberals of Hungarian, Saxon, and Szekler origin for the attainment of a common end: the pro motion of the interests of the enlightened bourgeoisie, threatened, on the one hand, by traditional Magyar feudal conservatism and, on the other, by a nationalistic, aristocratic-led bourgeois revolution. No matter whether it was strictly class, class nationalist, social, or "social" and "national" oriented, on the eve of 1848 the "bourgeois nationalism" of the
14

Victor Cheresteiu, A magyarorszgi romn sajt politikai vezreszmi s munkja a szabadsgharc eltti vtizedben [The Principal Political Ideas and the Activity of the Rumanian Press in Hungary in the Decade before the War for Independence] (Budapest, 1917), pp. 3-33; Victor Cheresteiu, "Luptatorul revoluionar Eftimie Murgu" [The Revolutionary Eftimie Murgu], Studii, Vol. IX, No. 1 (1956), pp. 65-86; Nicolae lorga, Istoria romnilor din Ardeal i Ungaria [The History of the Rumanians of Transylvania and Hungary] (Bucharest: Gutenberg, 1915), pp. 136-148. 15 Daicoviciu, Din Istoria Transilvaniei, Vol. I, pp. 340-349.

Rumanians militated in favor not only of the maintenance but actually of the strengthening of the empire and imperial authority.16 The frequent characterization of the revolution of 1848- 1849 as either a nationalist or a "social" and "national" movement does not bear rigorous critical analysis.17 It was nationalist or national only in a very narrow sense. The elements of social revolution, which were most manifest in Transylvania proper, were generally devoid of national identification. The issues were simple: for the peasant, emancipation from serfdom; for the middle class, economic and political equality with the other natios. In 1848 only the intellectuals debated the degree to which Rumanian national and social aspirations should be pressed. The nationalism of the Transylvanian bourgeoisie was as modest as their program for social reform. The extremists among them asked for nothing more than the recognition of the Rumanian nation as a political entity enjoying national autonomy under the direct jurisdiction of the court in Vienna.18 Their nationalism was anti-Hungarian in character only to the extent to which the interests of the Rumanian bourgeoisie were in conflict with those of the Hungarian aristocracy. The Transylvanian bourgeoisie identified their interests with the Hungarian, Saxon, and Szekler merchant class far more than with the Rumanian peasantry. In fact, emancipation of the Rumanian masses was a sentimental idea rather than a political requirement. The bourgeoisie shied away from collaboration with the intellectual "extremists," leaders of separate revolutionary movements like Avram lancu, peasant
16 17

La Transylvanie, pp. 370-378. The standard "nationalist" interpretation is by I. Moga, "Luttes des Roumains de Transylvanie pour lmancipation nationale," La Transylvanie, pp. 379-451. The standard Marxist interpretation is in Daicoviciu, Din Istoria Transilvaniei, Vol. II, pp. 1-132. 18 Simion Barnuiu, Romnii i ungurii [The Rumanians and the Hungarians] (Cluj, 1924). This work has valuable annotations by G. Bogdan-Duica. See also Silviu Dragomir, Studii i documente privitoare la revoluia romnilor din Transilvania in anii 1848-1849 [Studies and Documents concerning the Revolution of the Rumanians of Transylvania in 1848-1849] (4 vols., Cluj, 1944-46); and G. BogdanDuica, Viaa si ideile lui Simeon Bnuiu [The Life and Ideas of Simeon Brnuiu] (Bucharest, 1924).

meutes, and the Moldavian and Walachian rebels, whether active or in exile. They gave national identification to their socio-economic and political goals only for the purpose of differentiating themselves from the anti-imperial Magyar revolutionaries and, to a lesser extent, the conformist Szeklers and Saxons. The abolition of the medieval nations in Transylvania by imperial action and the granting of equality to all subjects in 1849 generally satisfied their "nationalist" yearnings. It is also erroneous to overemphasize the nationalism - or national aims - of the more radical revolutionaries, particularly Iancu's.19 It must not be forgotten that lancu was basically a social revolutionary who collaborated with his Magyar counterparts for the attainment of the radical aim of emancipation of the peasantry and bourgeoisie and "democratic rule" in a multinational Hungarian state. His estrangement from the Hungarians and subsequent turning to the Habsburgs for protection of Rumanian interests occurred only after the Hungarian revolutionaries had rejected his political principles, or rather, had denied the need for Rumanian national identification in social revolutionary movements. Iancu's position thus was very close to that of the Rumanian intellectuals of the Banat, Criana, and Maramures who had initially sup ported the Hungarian "democratic revolution" in the expectation that a united yet multinational Hungary would be ruled by and for the benefit of all its nationalities and who turned to the emperor in 1849 only because of the intransigeance and dogmatism of the Magyar revolutionary leaders.20 It must be recognized, however, that like lancu and other Transylvanians, the "radical" Rumanian intellectuals were conscious of the incompatibility of their aims with those of the
19

Avram Iancu's views are best expressed in his Raportui lui Avram lancu [The Report of Avram lancu] (Sibiu, 1884). Silviu Dragomir, Avram lancu (Bucharest, 1924), is still the most authoritative study of lancu. 20 Silviu Dragomir, Tratativele romno-maghiare din vara anului 1849 [Rumanian-Magyar Negotiations in the Summer of 1849] (Cluj, 1947), pp. 1-35; Cheresteiu, "Lupttorul revoluionar Eftimie Murgu," pp. 65-86.

10

conservative monarchy, as well as of the advantages that might eventually be derived from linking social discontent with national discrimination. At the same time, they were aware of the fact that their position was not shared by most Rumanian cultural and spiritual leaders and the peasantry whose cause they sought to promote. The majority of the intellectuals and clergy in all parts of the monarchy were mainly concerned with cultural autonomy.21 They remained loyal to the emperor throughout the crisis and regarded him as their protector against Magyar, Serbian, or Ruthenian domination. Their political formulae also reflected their unquestionable Kaisertreue. Most of them were sympathetic to the aspirations of the peasantry, but they opposed social violence as a means of securing emancipation. They were generally successful in steering the masses away from radical influences and actions and exploited the fundamental faith of the peasants in the Church and the emperor.22 By 1849, they, like all Rumanians whose desiderata were at least superficially satisfied by the emperor, were among the staunchest supporters of imperial rule. A controversy persists over the nature of Rumanian

nationalism in the Habsburg monarchy between the end of the 1848-1849 revolution and the Compromise of 1867.23 Neither the nationalist historians outside Rumania nor the Marxist school has been prepared to accept the fact that during this period "bourgeois

21

. See the summary statement in Daicoviciu, Din Istoria Transilvaniei, Vol. II, pp. 36-62. See also a similar statement on Bukovina in Prokopowitsch, Die rumnische Nationalbewegung in der Bukowina, pp. 39-45. In addition, see loan Lupa, Mitropolitui Andreiu aguna (Sibiu, 1911), pp. 48-67; and N. Popea, Memorialul arhiepiscopului i metropolitului Andreiu baron de aguna [The Memorial of Archbishop and Metropolitan Andreiu aguna], Vol. I (Sibiu, 1889), pp. 248-249. 22 See the summary statement in Victor Cheresteiu, "Contribuiii la istoria micrilor raneti n Transilvania n anul revoluionar 1848" [Contributions to the History of Peasant Movements in Transylvania in the Revolutionary Year 1848], Studii i referate privind istoria Romniei [Studies and Reports concerning the History of Rumania], Vol. II (Bucharest: Editura Academiei, 1954), pp. 11591199. 23 See Daicoviciu, Din Istoria Transilvaniei, Vol. II, pp. 133-186; and Moga, "Luttes des Roumains de Transylvanie pour l'mancipation nationale," pp. 403-423. An interesting interpretation may also be found in Istoria Romniei, Vol. IV, pp. 398-440.

11

nationalism,"

or

the

"social"

and

"national"

struggle

of

the

Rumanians, was largely checked, first by the absolutist methods employed by Vienna between 1849 and 1860, and after 1860 by the "liberal regime." It may, of course, be argued that the socio-economic and political changes that occurred between 1849 and 1867 paved the way for the Ausgleich and subsequent nationalist manifestations. One of the merits of Marxist historians is that they have analyzed the Rumanian "social" and "national" movement on that basis. On the other hand, the contention that the political consciousness of the Rumanian population at large increased during those years and in the process veered toward the idea of union with Walachia and Moldavia is inaccurate. The post-revolutionary solutions propounded by Rumanian political exiles such as the national integration of all Rumanians or the international union of all social and national revolutionaries represented the views of a tiny and non-influential minority.24 The overwhelming majority of the population, it must be recognized, either favored the acceptance of Habsburg reform and political patronage or else sought the improvement of their status through channels leading directly to the imperial court. Even the intellectuals, the most outspoken critics of the inequities inherent in both the absolutist system- and the brief period of liberal rule, were seeking only equality of rights with the Saxons, Szeklers, and Magyars and the introduction or maintenance of the Rumanian language in the ad ministration, courts, and schools. It is true that men such as loan Maiorescu, August Treboniu Laurian, George Barium, and Ioan Raiu aspired to attain more equitable political
24

Representative arguments may be found in Cornelia C. Bodea, "Lupta pentru unire a revoluionari lor exilai de la 1848" [The Struggle for Union on the Part of the Exiled Revolutionaries of 1848], Studii privind Unirea Principatelor [Studies concerning the Union of the Principalities] (Bucharest: Editura Academiei, 1960), pp. 129-133; and in Dan Berindei and Vasile Curticpeanu, "Revoluia de la 18481849" [The Revolution of 1848-1849], Studii, Vol. XV, No. 6 (1962), pp. 1592-1593.

12

representation in the diet or political rights in general for the Rumanians of Transylvania and the Banat, but, like' those who expressed their gratitude to Vienna for political and socio-economic largesses, they were concerned only with effectuating a change within the post-1849 framework.25 For them the main victory was gained with the general recognition of the equality of rights of all inhabitants of the empire, relative and theoretical though this equality may have been in practice, and the specific recognition of the status and rights of the Rumanian nation by the Transylvanian diet of 1863.26 It is incontestable, however, that the devotion of the Rumanians to Vienna declined somewhat in the 'sixties. The deterioration of the economic position of the Rumanian peasantry after emancipation caused some dissatisfaction and unrest among the masses. Even though the peasants' discontent was essentially directed against the Hungarian landlords rather than the benevolent emperor, Francis Joseph himself was not absolved from blame for the Magyars' defiance of the principles of imperial reform. Yet it would be inaccurate to depict the Rumanian peasant as a radical nationalist or a "national" or "social" revolutionary favoring political independence under Rumanian rule, whether in Transylvania alone or in a Greater Rumania.27 Also questionable is the recent contention that the Rumanian peasantry of the Habsburg monarchy applauded the political support given Alexandru Ion Cuza by the Walachian and Moldavian masses at the time of the union of the principalities, both per se and in anticipation of social reform and the national unification of all

25

Characteristic is Gheorghe Bariiu, Pri alese din istoria Transilvaniei [Excerpts from the History of Transylvania], Vol. II (Sibiu, 1890), pp. 128-133 and 154-164. See also Enea Hodo, Din corespondent lui S. Brnuiu i a contemporanilor si [The Correspondence of S. Brnuiu and His Contemporaries] (Sibiu, 1944), pp. 8-45. 26 V. Moldovan, Dieta Ardealului din 186S-1864 [The Diet of Transylvania of 1863-1864] (Cluj, 1932). 27 For an excellent summary, see Daicoviciu, Din Istoria Transilvaniei, Vol. II, pp. 135-164.

13

"oppressed" Rumanians.28 In the 'sixties the peasant's Kaisertreue still transcended any other political or national allegiance. Similarly, the Rumanian middle class, although somewhat disappointed with "imperial liberalism," entertained neither animosity toward the emperor nor a desire for political autonomy or union with Moldavia and Walachia. The bourgeoisie's dissatisfaction with Habsburg economic policies was not so great as to blind them to the fact that their status and prosperity were comparable to that of all but the Austrian mer chants and capitalists in the empire and certainly superior to that of their counterparts in Moldavia and Walachia. Al though a complete reconciliation between their socioeconomic interests and those of Vienna appeared Utopian, the modus vivendi made possible by imperial reform was acceptable enough in the 'sixties and, for that matter, half a century later. In fact, any objective assessment of the attitudes of all the Rumanians in the monarchy even after the Ausgleich leads to some rather startling conclusions. The most important is that the opposition of the Rumanians, regardless of social status, to the discriminatory and chauvinistic policies of the Hungarians was much less pronounced and certainly more apolitical than the nationalist historical school would have us believe. It was also less "national" and "social" in character than is claimed by the Marxists. Of equal importance, perhaps, is the fact that the growing disenchantment with Vienna did not diminish the Rumanians' fundamental loyalty to the emperor. Moreover, their refroidissement was based on disapproval of the encouragement and support which the imperial government gave to the Hungarians' discriminatory economic policies and practices rather than on the court's toleration of Hungarian political excesses. Finally, no real unionist sentiments were voiced by the Rumanians in Transylvania, however disaffected
28

Ibid., p. 146.

14

they may have been with Magyar and imperial rule, nor, for that matter, by those in the Banat and - for a long time - Bukovina. The most striking aspect of the history of the Rumanians of Transylvania and the Banat after the Ausgleich was the improvement in economic status of all classes except the peasantry. Rumanian Marxist historians have rendered' a major service to students of the dual monarchy and at the same time have undermined their own arguments by describing and analyzing the vast economic progress made by the bourgeoisie and the rapidly growing landlord class in the closing decades of the nineteenth century.29 The development of capitalism favored the growth of a wealthy industrial, commercial, and, above all, financial bourgeoisie. Even if on a comparative basis the Rumanians were no longer as well off as their Austrian or Magyar counterparts, the evidence does not support the theory that their inferior economic status increased their "social" and "national" revolutionary ardor. On the contrary, Rumanian merchants, industrialists, and financiers chose to adopt a most moderate attitude toward the several Hungarian regimes beginning with Klmn Tisza's, despite the obvious "national" and "social" humiliations to which they were subjected. It is indeed noteworthy that the so-called "passivists" were primarily merchants and businessmen and that their own National Party, at least under Ilie Mcelariu's leadership, took refuge in the negative but safe formula of non-participation in Hungarian political life.30

29

See ibid., pp. 189-231, for a good summary. See also Ludovic Vajda, Despre situaia economic i social-politic a Transilvaniei n primii ani ai secolului al XX-lea" [The Economic and Socio-Political Situation in Transylvania in the First Years of the Twentieth Century], Studii i referate privind istoria Romniei, Vol. II (Bucharest: Editura Academiei, 1954), pp. 315-320; and losif Kovcs, "Date n legatur cu descompunerea rnimii din Transilvania dup desfiinarea iobagiei din anul 1848" [Information concerning the Decomposition of the Peasantry after the Abolition of Serfdom in 1848], Studii si cercetari de istorie [Historical Studies and Researches], Academia R. P. R., Cluj, Vol. VIII, No. 1-4 (1957), pp. 244-251. 30 The classic and most explicit account is still T. V. Pcean, Cartea de aur sau luptele politice ale Romnilor sub Coroana Ungariei [The Golden Book, or the Political Struggles of the Rumanians under the Hungarian Crown], Vol. IV (Sibiu, 1906).

15

This abstention, nominally based on the refusal of the Rumanians to recognize Transylvania's incorporation into Hungary, was not, however, an expression of implacable hostility to the Hungarians. It merely reflected the de facto, if not de jure, acceptance of a status quo which did not rule out an improvement of relations with them. The "passivists" were pre- pared to tolerate all the restrictions imposed upon the Rumanians by successive Hungarian regimes as long as their enforcement could be circumvented by tacit acquiescence or, inconspicuous imperial intercession. The National Party of Transylvania was thus essentially an unofficial intermediary between the Rumanian middle class, and by extension the peasantry, and the still unrecognized Magyar governments. It also served as an official link with the Rumanians' only legitimate" ruler, the Habsburg emperor. It has been correctly pointed out that the attitude of the members of the National Party of Transylvania differed from that of the "activist" Rumanian National Party of the Banat and Hungary.31 However, even though the landowning class and the more belligerent intellectuals who formed the hard core of the "activists" advocated a more determined anti- Hungarian, and, in this sense, nationalistic line, they still sought coexistence rather than conflict with the Magyar power elite. For however critical of the Hungarian order "activist" leaders like Alexandru Mocioni or Vinceniu Babe might have been, they shied away from drastic political action. Neither the leaders themselves nor the various newspapers and journals published under the party's auspices sought active imperial intervention in behalf of the Rumanians or even so much as threatened mass demonstrations or economic boycotts against the Magyar "oppressors" or waved the flag for a Greater Rumania.32
31

lorga, Istoria romnilor din Ardeal i Ungaria, Vol. II, pp. 221-225; Daicoviciu, Din Istoria Transilvaniei, Vol. II, pp. 232-251. 32 On these points, consult loan Lupa "Inceputurile i epocele istorice ale ziaristicii romneti transilvane" [The Beginnings and the Historical Periods of Transylvanian-Rumanian Journalism], Studii

16

Their moderation may be ascribed, at least in part, to their "class" interests and inherent conservatism, but it is also connected with their growing mistrust of Vienna and contempt for the Old Kingdom. Mocioni's National Party was in fact more anti-Habsburg and antiHohenzollern than anti-Hungarian, since it operated on the assumption that the Magyars would respect and even extend the rights of the nationalities in return for acceptance of the dual system and Magyar primacy in their half of the Austro-Hungarian empire. Only when the expectations of the "activists" were frustrated after the enactment of the odious Trefort Law, which magyarized the educational system, did their organization seek a rapprochement union, to be with sure, the Transylvanian an National in Party, which eventually resulted in the joining of the two groups in 1881.33 This reflected increase anti-Hungarian sentiment, but it did not represent an irreparable break with either Budapest or Vienna. As recent Rumanian writers have correctly pointed out, the union of 1881 was as much anti-Habsburg as anti-Magyar. The growing realization by the bourgeoisie, the landowners, and the intellectuals that the Ausgleich was not only a com promise between the emperor and the Austrian and Hungarian aristocracies, but also a means for furthering the interests of the Austrian and Hungarian bourgeoisie was a determining factor in the formation of a united National Party.34 Although the Rumanians may have been aware in 1881 of the "landlord- bourgeois" alliance and the exploitation of other nationalities in "social" and "national" terms, their immediate reaction and subsequent political behavior were not characteristic of militant "nationalist" or "social" and "national" revolutionaries or
istorice [Historical Studies], Vol. V (Sibiu-Cluj, 1945-46), pp. 325-332; and loan Lupa, Contribuiuni la istoria ziaristicei romnesti ardelene [Contributions to the History of Transylvanian Rumanian Journalism] (Sibiu, 1&26),pp. 19-52. 33 The political program of the Rumanian National Party can be found in Eugen Brote, Chestiunea romna n Transilvania i Ungaria [The Rumanian Question in Transylvania and Hungary] (Bucharest, 1896), pp. 208-209.

17

reformers. That their Kaisertreue was not too rudely shaken in 1881 can be seen in the fact that the new party looked to Vienna for redress of grievances. Their continued efforts to reach an accommodation with the Magyar regime also indicate that their anti-Hungarian positions had still not crystallized. Not even the emperor's rejection of the party's famous Memorandum of 1892 and the virulent Magyar reaction to it resulted in anything but a tactical readjustment of their modest program for "national" and "social" reform. In view of the exaggerated significance attached to the Memorandum by Rumanian historians, past and present, it seems to be necessary to emphasize its conservative character and the moderation of* the petitioners' reaction to the negative response of the Austrians and Hungarians.35 The reasons for the "landlordbourgeois" attitudes of the petitioners, as Marxist historians have pointed out, are to be found in the search by the "dominant classes" among the Rumanians for a Rumanian Ausgleich with either Budapest or Vienna, or even with both. It is, however, just as erroneous to claim that the Memorandum was an expression of militant nationalism as to view the moderation of the petitioners as a betrayal by the propertied classes of the "social" and "national" desiderata of the Rumanian masses. The document itself refutes the former interpretation, while the latter presupposes the existence of an acute class struggle among the Rumanians, which, in fact, did not exist, and the prevalence of "national" and "social" sentiments

34 35

Daicoviciu, Din Istoria Transilvaniei, Vol. II, pp. 263-259. See ibid., pp. 269-264, for a concise summary of contemporary Marxist interpretations. Characteristic of earlier interpretations is Moga, "Luttes des Roumains de Transylvanie pour l'emancipation nationale," pp. 441- 451. See also Z. Pclianu, "Guvernele ungureti i micarea memorandist a Romnilor din Ardeal" [The Hungarian Governments and the Memorandum Movement of the Rumanians of Transylvania], Revista, Fundaiilor Regale, Vol. I (1934), pp. 343-347; I. P. Papp, Procesul Memorandului Romnilor din Transilvania, [The Memorandum Trial of the Rumanians of Transylvania] (2 vols., Cluj, 1932-33); tefan Pascu, Din rsunetul procesului memorandist n masele populare [The Echo of the Memorandum Trial among the Popular Masses] (Sibiu, 1944); and M. Danciu, "Din frmntrile maselor populare n timpul procesului memorandist" [The Unrest of the Popular Masses during the Memorandum Trial], Studia Universitatis Babe-Bolyai. Historia, Vol. IV, No. 1 (1959), pp. 107-122.

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among the peasantry and working class that were irreconcilable with the selfish "class interests" of the landlords, middle class, churchmen, and "bourgeois" intellectuals. The available evidence fails to reveal the existence of a clearly defined national sentiment among the peasantry and workers beyond an awareness of being Rumanian or of any thing more than elementary social antagonism toward landowners, merchants, and industrial entrepreneurs. The reason why the "propertied classes" sought an accommodation with the Habsburgs and even the Hungarians was ultimately rooted t, in their own prosperity and lack of confidence in the Rumanians of the Old. Kingdom. To them, life with Francis Joseph and Tisza was still preferable to life with Carol, Carp, or Brtianu. This was also true of the peasantry and the proletariat, for whom the very notion of union with their Rumanian "brethren" was alien in the 'nineties and became ever more distasteful when they became acquainted with the conditions which prevailed in Rumania proper during and after the great peasant revolt of 1907. If anything, mass identification with the National Party and support of its policies, which was already strong- in the 'nineties, increased in the decade ante dating the First World War. Thus, the majority of Rumanians, though dissatisfied with the existing order and disappointed by Austro-Hungarian indifference to their pleas, contemplated no radical movements and sought no change outside the imperial framework.36 Recent historians of Transylvania and the Banat have accused the leaders of the Rumanian National Party of selling out the true "national" and "social" interests of all Rumanians to the Habsburgs in the years preceding the First World War. Such arguments are as questionable as those of the nationalist historians who depicted the
36

In addition to the references provided in note 35, see also Traian Lungu and Anastase lordache, "Romnia la nceputul secolului al XX-lea" [Rumania at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century], Studii, Vol. XV, No. 6 (1962), pp. 1639-1651.

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same leaders as champions of national unification. The "bourgeois" leaders, tefan Pop, Iuliu Maniu, Alexandra Vaida, Teodor Mihali, Aurel Vlad, and even the much-maligned "federalist" Aurel Popovici, acted in good faith and with the support of their constituents.37 As long as the emperor and the Hungarians held out some hope of compromise, as long as the prosperity of the Rumanians seemed to be increasing, as long as the political actions and propaganda emanating from the Old Kingdom held out little promise of an improvement of existing conditions, the party's course of action was acceptable on both "national" and "social" grounds, at least to the Rumanians of Transylvania, the Banat, Criana, and Maramures. Even the Marxists have not been able to demonstrate that the dissatisfaction of the peasants and workers with their worsening economic condition and the related "demonstrations" and minor "revolutionary manifestations" implied a rejection of the policies of their leaders or of the imperial order.38 Even more erroneous is the notion that in those years the, supreme goal of the National Party and of the Rumanians of Transylvania, the Banat, Criana, and Maramure was the establishment,, of a Greater, Rumania.39 It ignores the generally apathetic response to the unionist propaganda from Bucharest, particularly after the peasant revolts of 1907. This lack of correlation between propaganda and political action has been recognized in Marxist historiography, but its meaning has been distorted to comply with the thesis of "social" and "national" dualism

37

The most detailed summary of contemporary views can be found in Constantin Daicoviciu and Miron Constantinescu, Destrmarea Monarhiei Austro-Ungare 1900-1918 [The Dissolution of the AustroHungarian Monarchy] (Bucharest: Editura Academiei, 1964), pp. 93-189. A summary of pre-Marxist positions may be found in loan Lupa, "La dsagrgation de la monarchie austro -hongroise et la liberation de la Transylvanie," La Transylvanie, pp. 453-468. 38 Daicoviciu and Constantinescu, Destrmarea Monarhiei Austro-Ungare 1900-1918, pp. 11-92 and 231-262. 39 Clopoel, Revoluia din 1918 i Unirea Ardealului cu Romania [The Revolution of 1918 and the Union of Transylvania with Rumania] (Cluj, 1926); Daicoviciu and Constantinescu, Destrmarea Monarhiei Austro-Ungare 1900-1918, pp. 175-189.

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in mass movements.40 It is claimed that Rumanian nationalist propaganda in Transylvania and the other provinces failed because the conservative regime in Rumania and the king himself were opposed to the dismemberment of the Habsburg monarchy and national union. This explanation fails to take into account the absence of a powerful unionist movement and of "social" and "national" manifestations in Transylvania and the Banat which, on the whole, aspired to anything more than the mere reorganization of the Rumanian nation in a manner compatible with the principles of the Memorandum and the preservation of the Habsburg monarchy. The idea of union with the Old Kingdom became acceptable to the population at large only when the defeat of the Austro-Hungarian collapse. It is perhaps paradoxical that the unionist propaganda disseminated by the Rumanian government was more effective in Bukovina than in Transylvania and the Banat in the decade before the collapse of the Habsburg monarchy.41 This phenomenon is, however, indicative of the commitment to the Habsburg monarchy on the part of the leading classes and political organizations of the more prosperous (and more Rumanian) provinces. In Bukovina the intellectuals and peasantry, lacking comparable vested interests and resentful of economic domination by foreign landlords, merchants, and "capitalists," were far more susceptible to the crude, chauvinistic,, and often anti-Semitic propaganda emanating from the Old Kingdom. Are we then to regard Eudoxiu Hurmuzaki, loan Grmad or Lazr Gherman as more imbued with the "nationalist" spirit or more convinced of the need for "social" and "national"
40

empire

seemed

probable,

and

it

became

genuinely appealing only when the monarchy was on the verge of

Daicoviciu and Constantinescu, Destrmarea Monarhiei Austro-Ungare 1900-1918, pp. 105-116 and 131-136; Lungu and lordache, "Romnia la nceputui secolului al XX-lea," p. 1649, n. 5. 41 A lucid summary will be found in Prokopowitsch, Die rumnische Nationalbewegung in der Bukowina, pp. 130-158.

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Justice than Maniu, Pop, or Vaida? Hardly, it seems to me, unless we equate nationalism with chauvinism and regard its supreme goal as the creation of a national state regardless of its political and economic viability. The criteria of viability differed from province to province in the monarchy. Enjoyment of political rights and cultural autonomy did not prevent the Rumanians of Bukovina from harkening to the siren song promising them a better national life in a Greater Rumania. It is noteworthy, however, that, historically, neither the intellectuals nor the peasantry of that province doubted the viability of the Habsburg monarchy or expressed resentment over their status in any degree com parable to that of the Transylvanians or the inhabitants of the Banat, Criana, and Maramure.42 Their "Twelve Points" of 1848 were, after all, accepted and provided the framework for peaceful coexistence with Vienna and their Ruthenian neighbors. Although the Rumanians of Transylvania, the Banat, Criana, and Maramure had more serious doubts about the stability of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy than those of Bukovina, they persisted to the end in their search for a compromise. Even as late as the First World War they believed that the reshuffling of the empire's assets and liabilities could still produce a stronger state in which the conflicting but not irreconcilable interests of all its inhabitants could be accommodated. The attainment of the "social" and "national" goals of the Rumanians within the imperial frame work seemed quite feasible to them. The problem of the viability of the Habsburg empire in the twentieth century is still unresolved. As far as the Rumanians of the monarchy were concerned, the answer was generally positive. Their

42

See, politice Points" History

for instance, the penetrating contemporary account by G. Bogdan-Duica, Bucovina. Notie asupra situaiei ei [Bukovina. Political Notes on Its Situation] (Sibiu, 1895). The "Twelve may be found in Ion Sbiera, O pagin din istoria Bucovinii din 1848-1850 [A Page from the of Bukovina in 1848-1850] (Cernaui, 1899), pp. 9-10.

22

appraisal of the problem and the solutions which they offered may have been unrealistic, unhistorical, and/or class-oriented and may have reflected the views of ignorant, scared, or selfish men; but the attainment of a political and socio-economic utopia in a Greater Rumania was not necessarily the ideal of the majority of the Rumanian in habitants of the Habsburg monarchy before 1918.

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