!"#$"% '"#()*"$"% )#+ ,#(-*-.

/
0)1-2 3"14
5-64 7#89"6$8(/% :-6-#(-

;2$(6)1(: Noues of piesentation aie often positeu to accommouate Fiege's puzzle.
Philosopheis uiffei, howevei, in whethei they follow Fiege in iuentifying moues of
piesentation with Fiegean senses, oi insteau take them to be foimally inuiviuuateu symbols
of "Nentalese". Builuing on Fouoi (199u; 1998), Naigolis anu Lauience (2uu7) uefenu the
lattei view by aiguing that the minu-inuepenuence of Fiegean senses ienueis them
ontologically suspect in a way that Nentalese symbols aie not. This papei shows how
Fiegeans can withstanu this objection. Along the way, a cleaiei unueistanuing emeiges of
what senses must be to seive as an ontologically benign alteinative to symbols of Nentalese.

When Woouwaiu anu Beinstein publisheu uetails of the Wateigate scanual in the Washington Post,
they calleu theii souice "Beep Thioat". 0pon leaining of the leak, Richaiu Nixon suimiseu that Beep
Thioat was a tiaitoi fiom within his auministiation. Bowevei, Nixon uiu not suspect that his
Beputy Biiectoi of the FBI, Naik Felt, was the tiaitoi. In fact, Nixon sent Felt a bottle of champagne
seveial yeais latei when he was paiuoneu by Ronalu Reagan foi authoiizing illegal seaiches of the
homes of membeis of the Weathei 0nueigiounu. 0bviously, Nixon woulu nevei have intentionally
uone the same foi Beep Thioat. But Nixon uiun't know that Naik Felt was Beep Thioat, anu neithei
uiu the public until 2uuS, eleven yeais aftei Nixon passeu away.
Explaining Nixon's piopositional attituues iequiies an appeal to !"#$% "' ()$%$*+,+-"*,
which stanu in a many-to-one ielation to theii iefeients. Beep Thioat .,% Naik Felt, but Nixon hau
two moues of piesentation of him. That's why Nixon was able to iationally believe both that Beep
2
Thioat was a tiaitoi anu that Naik Felt was not a tiaitoi. This much I take to be faiily
uncontioveisial. The *,+/)$ of these moues of piesentation, howevei, is moie contentious.
The tiauitional view tiaces to Fiege (1892; 1918) anu is systematically uevelopeu by such
thinkeis as Bummett (1981), Evans (1982), Peacocke (1992), anu Buige (2uuS). It iuentifies moues
of piesentation with %$*%$%, abstiact semantic entities that seive as the constituents of the contents
of piopositional attituues, which Fiege calls "thoughts" (0$#,*1$*). Because thoughts aie
composeu fiom senses, anu the senses 2,)1 3$4+ anu 5$$( 67)",+ aie uistinct, the thoughts 2,)1
3$4+ -% , +),-+") anu 5$$( 67)",+ -% , +),-+") aie also uistinct. It was thus possible foi Nixon to
iationally beai the believing ielation towaius the lattei thought but not the foimei.
Recently, an alteinative to the Fiegean view has been uevelopeu by Fouoi (199u; 1994;
1998; 2uu8) anu otheis (e.g., Naigolis anu Lauience 2uu7; Schneiuei 2uuS, 2u11; Rupeit 2uu8)
that seeks to banish senses in favoi of *"*-semantic moues of piesentation. Biawing on the
language of thought hypothesis, this alteinative accounts foi piopositional attituues in teims of two
components: iefeiential contents that consist of objects, piopeities, anu ielations; anu fine-giaineu,
foimally inuiviuuateu symbols of "Nentalese" that aie tokeneu in the biain. Accoiuing to this
alteinative, theie was no uiffeience in the 8"*+$*+% of Nixon's iepiesentations of Naik Felt anu
Beep Thioat; theie was only a uiffeience in the 9$7-84$% of those iepiesentations. Nixon hau two co-
extensive, yet foimally uistinct Nentalese symbols, NARK FELT anu BEEP TBR0AT, which is why he
was able to believe that Beep Thioat is a tiaitoi without believing that Naik Felt is a tiaitoi.
A numbei of consiueiations have motivateu this ieuuctivist piogiam ()$#/8+-9-%+ because it
seeks to )$#/8$ moues of piesentation to non-semantic entities). Beie I want to focus on just one of
them. Builuing on some iemaiks by Fouoi (199u, 12-1S; 1998, 17-21), Naigolis anu Lauience
(2uu7) aigue that senses aie ontologically suspect in a way that Nentalese symbols aie not. As they
see it, the fact that senses aie supposeu to be minu-inuepenuent abstiact semantic entities makes it
uifficult to see how thinkeis coulu be ielateu to them. While Fiegeans often claim that thinkeis
S
"giasp" senses, Naigolis anu Lauience woiiy that theie aie no plausible accounts of what the
giasping ielation coulu be. By contiast, because Nentalese symbols exist as tokens in thinkeis'
biains, they maintain that theie is no coiiesponuing pioblem about how thinkeis aie ielateu to
Nentalese symbols. Thus, Naigolis anu Lauience concluue that senses aie unsuitable to seive as
moues of piesentation.
0ff hanu, one might have supposeu that the question whethei moues of piesentation aie
semantic oi non-semantic shoulu be answeieu on bioauly empiiical giounus, such as whethei
scientific psychology pioviues eviuence of successful fine-giaineu explanations of behavioi that aie
coucheu exclusively in teims of foimal, non-semantic iepiesentations. If Naigolis anu Lauience aie
iight, howevei, then the question can be answeieu on a piioii metaphysical giounus. Psychology
neeus Nentalese symbols to seive as moues of piesentation to make its ontology acceptable.
This woulu be a tiuly iauical conclusionanu thus one that ueseives a coiiesponuingly
intense level of sciutiny. I'll begin in Section 1 by ieviewing Naigolis anu Lauience's woiiy that the
minu-inuepenuence of senses makes it mysteiious how thinkeis coulu giasp them. In Section 2 I'll
then shaipen this woiiy by uistinguishing seveial uiffeient types of minu-inuepenuence. This will
leau, at the stait of Section S, to a cleaiei foimulation of Naigolis anu Lauience's ontological woiiy
about senses. In the iemainuei of Section S I will then ciiticize this woiiy, aiguing that Fiegeans
have the iesouices to withstanu it. Whethei moues of piesentation consist of Fiegean senses oi
Nentalese symbols is thus not to be ueciueu on ontological giounus. In the couise of the uiscussion,
two conceptions of sense will emeige: one that tieats senses as abstiact paiticulais anu anothei
that tieats them as univeisals. In Section 4, I will aigue that theie aie goou ieasons to favoi the
conception of senses as univeisals. The upshot will be a cleaiei unueistanuing of what senses must
be to seive as an ontologically benign alteinative to symbols of Nentalese.

<= :>" ,#(-*-.81)* ?-66/
4
Fiege famously maintaineu that senses aie abstiact objects existing in neithei the physical iealm of
"things" noi in the mental iealm of "iueas" (:")%+$44/*;$*), but in a "thiiu iealm" that is ieminiscent
of Plato's heaven (e.g. Fiege 1918, SS7). Nany commentatois finu this talk of a thiiu iealm
uiscomfiting. Bow coulu theie be these things, senses, which exist outsiue of space anu time, in
neithei the minu noi the physical woilu. If we aumit the existence of senses, aien't we committeu
to eeiie entities.
It is impoitant, howevei, to be cleai about the piecise natuie of this woiiy, foi we uo not
want to holu senses to a highei stanuaiu than we holu othei abstiact objects positeu by scientists.
As Fouoi queiies, "if physicists have numbeis to play with, why shoulun't psychologists have
piopositions" (199u, 12). In othei woius, if theie is a seiious pioblem about wheie to fit senses in
the natuial oiuei, it uoes not plausibly stem fiomanu Naigolis anu Lauience uo not view it as
stemming fioma blanket nominalism that iejects the existence of any abstiact objects
whatsoevei.
In fact, the commitment to abstiact objects is closei to home than ieuuctivists typically
acknowleuge. Fiist, since ieuuctivists usually inuiviuuate token Nentalese symbols by the foimal
types to which they belong, they aie appaiently committeu to types. While a nominalist ieuuctivist
might tiy to iuentify such types with sets of theii actual tokens, this iesponse faces a seiious
obstacle. Bow aie ieuuctivists to explain the fact that theie aie concepts humans will nevei
acquiiefoi example, because of theii cognitive limitations, oi because human life will come to an
enu befoie humans have iealizeu theii full cognitive potential (Peacocke 2uuS, 169). The obvious
suggestion, enuoiseu by Naigolis anu Lauience (2uu7, S68), is to appeal to /*-*%+,*+-,+$#
Nentalese symbol types. Naigolis anu Lauience thus embiace a foim of Platonism, claiming that
theie is "no moie ieason to think that eveiy mental iepiesentation type must be instantiateu than
S
theie is to suppose that eveiy piopeity must be instantiateu" (2uu7, S89, n. 12).
1

Seconu, although ieuuctivists ueny that Nentalese symbols have senses as theii contents,
they uo not ueny that Nentalese symbols have contents. They just constiue these contents in a
Russellian mannei, taking them to consist of objects, piopeities, anu ielations. Thus, the Nentalese
symbol REB iefeis to the piopeity )$#. Notice, howevei, that piopeities aie often conceiveu as
abstiact objects. While a nominalist ieuuctivist might tiy to uispense with such abstiact entities by
iuentifying piopeities with theii instances, ieuuctivists such as Fouoi (199u) invoke uninstantiateu
piopeities to captuie the contents of oui thoughts about non-existents such as phlogiston anu tooth
faiiies.
2

What, then, is the ontological pioblem with senses. Accoiuing to Fouoi, "A moie plausible
sciupleone I am inclineu to take seiiouslyobjects to unieuuceu $(-%+$!-8 ielations like
;),%(-*; piopositions" (199u, 1S). Naigolis anu Lauience elaboiate that the ontological pioblem
with senses stems not fiom nominalism, but fiom "the fact that senses aie minu-inuepenuent
entities that aie supposeu to stanu apait fiom us, like numbeis oi Platonic foims" (2uu7, S8u). In
theii view, this minu-inuepenuence gives iise to the pioblem of how people can stanu in an
appiopiiate ielation to senses in oiuei foi those senses to be explanatoiily ielevant to theii
behavioi. As Fiegeans unueistanu it, a peison who believes that Albeit is fiienuly has to ;),%( the
senses <4=$)+ anu -% ')-$*#4>. But this giasping ielation can appeai mystifying. As Naigolis anu
Lauience wiite,
Cleaily, ;),%(-*; is a metaphoi foi a cognitive ielation that neeus to be explicateu. The pioblem is
that it is haiu to see how this can be uone in a way that is consistent with the view that senses aie
abstiact objects. Notice that the ielation can't be causal, since senses, as abstiact paiticulais, aie

1
A nominalist ieuuctivist might pait ways with Naigolis anu Lauience heie by appealing to possible but non-
actual tokens. This woulu commit hei to moual piopeities, but aiguably not types. Ny point, howevei, is not
that theie is no way foi a nominalist about Nentalese symbols to coheiently maintain hei nominalism, but
that nominalism is not motivating the ontological woiiies of ieuuctivists such as Naigolis anu Lauience.
2
Again, a uie-haiu nominalist might appeal to possible yet non-actual piopeity-instances. But my point, again,
is simply that nominalism is not motivating the ontological woiiies of Fouoi oi Naigolis anu Lauience.
6
supposeu to fall outsiue the iealm of physical causes anu effects. But if it's not causal, the natuie of
the ielation iemains utteily mysteiious. (2uu7, S8u)
I think that Naigolis anu Lauience aie motivateu by something like the following pictuie. They
allow that theie can be these abstiact objects, senses, which exist off in Plato's heaven. But they
uon't see how a peison, who is locateu in the causal oiuei of space anu time, coulu be ielateu to
those objects. Bow coulu }oe, who's seateu ovei heie at the bai stool, be ielateu to Plato's heaven.
It is woith consiueiing why the same pioblem uoes not aiise foi the abstiact objects
ieuuctivists invokeNentalese symbol types anu piopeities. Foi Nentalese symbol types, the
answei is stiaightfoiwaiu. A thinkei is cognitively ielateu to a Nentalese symbol type by viitue of
tokening that type. }ust as the English woiu "ieu" can be tokeneu on the page, the Nentalese
expiession REB can be tokeneu in the biain. In each case the token will be locateu in space anu time,
though wheieas a token of the woiu "ieu" might consist of an aiiangement of ink maikings, a token
of the Nentalese symbol REB might consist of a pattein of neuial fiiings.
While the question of how Nentalese symbols aie ielateu to theii iefeients is moie
contioveisial, ieuuctivists typically appeal to some type of lawful causal ielation. Roughly: the
Nentalese symbol B0u iepiesents the piopeity #"; if uogs ieliably cause the symbol B0u to be
tokeneu.
S
Foi ieuuctivists, the symbol-iefeient ielation is thus no moie mysteiious than the
ielation that exists between any two causally ielateu entities.
If the ielation between a thinkei anu a sense weie at bottom a causal ielation as
ieuuctivists take the ielation between a Nentalese symbol anu its iefeient to be, theie woulu be no
ontological woiiy about how thinkeis coulu be ielateu to them. Noi woulu theie be any concein if
senses weie like Nentalese symbols in aumitting of a type-token ielation. The woiiy exeicising

S
This is an oveisimplification because of the uisjunction pioblem. See Fouoi's (199u) asymmetiic
uepenuence theoiy foi one influential attempt to ueal with that pioblem. I will assume, foi the sake of
aigument, that something like Fouoi's asymmetiic uepenuence theoiy can be maue to woik, anu thus that
ieuuctivists ieally can pioviue a satisfactoiy account of the symbol-iefeient ielation in bioauly causal teims.
This assumption has been wiuely, anu foicefully, challengeu. I piopose to ignoie this challenge, howevei,
since the question of how thinkeis aie ielateu to senses ueseives attention even if ieuuctivists have
unueiestimateu the uifficulty of answeiing the paiallel question of how thinkeis aie ielateu to iefeients.
7
Naigolis anu Lauience is that thinkeis aie not ielateu to senses in eithei of these ways. The
"giasping" ielation that thinkeis aie allegeu to stanu in towaius senses thus iemains "utteily
mysteiious".
Following Fouoi (1998, 17-21), Naigolis anu Lauience isolate a consequence of the failuie
to explicate the giasping ielation. They aigue that Fiegeans haven't explaineu 7". senses can solve
"the moue of piesentation pioblem"i.e., Fiege's puzzle of how thinkeis can iepiesent the same
iefeient in uiffeient ways. They put this woiiy as follows.
Senses, like most iefeients, aie exteinal to oui minus, anu because of this it's haiu to see why we
shoulun't be able to stanu in uiffeient cognitiveepistemic ielations towaius them as well (Fouoi
1998). }ust as we can have uiffeient moues of piesentation foi a numbei (the only even piime, the
sum of one anu one, Tim's favoiite numbei, etc.), we ought to be able to have uiffeient moues of
piesentation '") , ;-9$* %$*%$. 0i if we can't, then theie ought to be a ieason why we can't. But as
Fouoi points out, theie uoesn't appeai to be any ieason why senses themselves uon't geneiate the
moue of piesentation pioblem. (2uu7, S81)
Naigolis anu Lauience thus place a conuition of auequacy on any uemystifying explanation of the
giasping ielation: it neeus to explain why theie is only one way to giasp each sense.
Again, a compaiison is helpful. Foi ieuuctivists, symbols of Nentalese seive as moues of
piesentation. }ust as the English names "Naik Felt" anu "Beep Thioat" can have the same iefeient,
so too can the Nentalese symbols NARK FELT anu BEEP TBR0AT. Because thinkeis "giasp" Nentalese
symbols by tokening them, the woiiy that theie might be uiffeient ways of giasping a moue of
piesentation nevei aiises foi the ieuuctivist. Foi any given thinkei anu any given Nentalese symbol
type, the thinkei eithei tokens that symbol type oi uoesn't. What pioponents of senses thus seem to
be missing is an account of what giasping coulu be that woulu make it as obvious why senses aie
giaspeu in only one way; anu Naigolis anu Lauience woiiy that the minu-inuepenuence of senses
makes it uifficult to see what such an account coulu look like.

8
@= A)68"(8"$ -B '8#+CD#+"E"#+"#1"
As we have seen, Naigolis anu Lauience woiiy that the minu-inuepenuence of senses makes it
uifficult to explain the giasping ielation, anu (as a coiollaiy) why senses can be giaspeu in only one
way. In this section, I want to get cleaiei about the natuie of this woiiy by teasing apait seveial
uiffeient notions of minu-inuepenuence, anu consiueiing which, if any, aie uniquely pioblematic foi
senses. The iesult will be a bettei unueistanuing of the woiiy that is motivating Naigolis anu
Lauienceanu of the steps Fiegeans might take to auuiess it.
?@A B(-%+$!-8 2-*#CD*#$($*#$*8$
Let us say that X is $(-%+$!-8,44> !-*#C-*#$($*#$*+ just in case it is possible foi moie than one minu
to be epistemically ielateu to X. Thus, the weathei, the laws of physics, anu mathematical theoiems
aie all epistemically minu-inuepenuent since moie than one peison can know about them.
Conveisely, many philosopheis holu that sensations aie not epistemically minu-inuepenuent since
each peison's sensations aie piivate. You may ,%%/!$ that the sensation I expeiience when I call
something "ieu" is the same as the sensation you expeiience, but you cannot 1*". that the two
sensations aie the same since you ieally only know what youi own sensations aie like.
Fiege cleaily maintains that most senses aie epistemically minu-inuepenuent, taking caie to
contiast them with iueas (ioughly: mental images), which he views as accessible by only one minu
(e.g., 1892, 1S4-SS; 1918, SS4-S7).
4
Thus, while Nixon anu Agnew might not shaie any sensations,
they can both giasp the thought that Beep Thioat is a tiaitoi. This obseivation uoes not take us
veiy fai towaius unueistanuing the minu-inuepenuence of senses, howevei, since almost
eveiything is epistemically minu-inuepenuent, incluuing Nentalese symbols. Accoiuing to
ieuuctivists, I can leain about youi Nentalese symbols thiough the stanuaiu tiicks of the cognitive
science tiaue, such as ieaction time stuuies anu biain scans. Epistemic minu-inuepenuence thus

4
5$ %$ senses aie an impoitant exception. Fiege (1918) maintains that each thinkei has a unique way of
thinking about heiself that is unavailable to anyone else.
9
fails to uistinguish senses fiom Nentalese symbols, anu so cannot be what makes senses uniquely
pioblematic.
?@? E,/%,4 2-*#CD*#$($*#$*8$
Anothei type of minu-inuepenuence is causal, wheie X is 8,/%,44> !-*#C-*#$($*#$*+ just in case X
cannot entei into causal ielations with anything mental. Because senses aie abstiact objects, anu
thus not locateu in the causal fiamewoik of space oi time, it is uncontioveisial that they aie
causally minu-inuepenuent. Notice, howevei, that this fails to uistinguish senses fiom Nentalese
symbol +>($%, which aie likewise abstiact anu causally impotent. The causal minu-inuepenuence of
senses thus cannot be what makes them uniquely pioblematic eithei.
?@F <*,4>+-8 2-*#CD*#$($*#$*8$
A much stiongei type of minu-inuepenuence is analytic, wheie X is ,*,4>+-8,44> !-*#C-*#$($*#$*+
just in case oui best analysis of Xi.e., oui best chaiacteiization of X's natuieuoes not appeal to
anything mental. Putting iuealism to one siue, puiely physical entities such as iocks, tiees, anu
giavity aie thus analytically minu-inuepenuent. Putting psychologism to one siue, mathematical
entities such as numbeis will also be analytically minu-inuepenuent. By contiast, mental states such
as sensations anu beliefs will not be analytically minu-inuepenuent. Noi will aitifacts such as
hammeis anu soccei balls that owe theii functions to the intentions of minueu uesigneis, anu noi
will Nentalese symbols (consiueieu as tokens oi types).
Nost Fiegeans holu that senses aie *"+ analytically minu-inuepenuent eithei. As Buige
wiites of senses, "Theii abstiact iuentities aie not inuepenuent of patteins of activity by thinkeis in
time" (2uuS, S8). 0ui best analysis of what senses aie appeals to thinkeis anu theii activities.
While it iemains contioveisial how senses shoulu be fully inuiviuuateu, one constiaint that
is axiomatic among Fiegeans is Fiege's Ciiteiion of Biffeience (Fiege, 1892, 1S6; Evans, 1982, 18-
19; Peacocke, 1992, 2), which holus that two senses, G anu 6, aie uistinct if it is possible to iationally
believe that ...S... while withholuing enuoisement fiom the thought that ...T... (wheie .T. uiffeis
1u
fiom .S. only in the substitution of T foi S at one oi moie places). Thus, since it is possible to
iationally believe that Beep Thioat is a tiaitoi without believing that Naik Felt is a tiaitoi, 5$$(
67)",+ anu 2,)1 3$4+ aie uistinct senses. Fiege's Ciiteiion of Biffeience insuies that senses aie
sufficiently fine-giaineu to seive as moues of piesentation. Notice, howevei, that it appeals to the
notions of belief anu iationality. In oiuei to inuiviuuate senses, it thus makes an essential appeal to
the mental states of thinkeis.
While Fiege's Ciiteiion of Biffeience inuiviuuates senses insofai as it tells us when two
senses aie uistinct, it uoesn't tell us how to analyze the natuie of inuiviuual senses. Foi example, it
tells us that the senses 5$$( 67)",+ anu 2,)1 3$4+ aie uistinct, but it uoesn't tell us how the sense
5$$( 67)",+ shoulu be analyzeu. Beie too, howevei, the most influential appioaches among
contempoiaiy Fiegeans to analyzing senses appeal to mental activity. Foi example, accoiuing to
Peacocke (1992) inuiviuual senses aie to be analyzeu in teims of theii "possession conuitions",
which state, foi any given sense, the tiansitions in thought that a thinkei must finu "piimitively
compelling" in oiuei to giasp the sense. Foi example, Peacocke holus that giasping the sense ,*# is
a mattei of finuing the following infeiences piimitively compelling (1992, S).
S

P&Q P&Q P
P Q Q
P&Q
Whatevei the meiits of Peacocke's account, it cleaily uenies that senses aie analytically minu-
inuepenuent since it analyzes senses in teims of the mental activity of thinkeis, such as the
-*'$)$*8$% that thinkeis finu piimitively 8"!($44-*;.
6


S
That is, one must finu these infeiences compelling, anu not in viitue of infeiiing them fiom othei piemises.
6
To be suie, not eveiyone uenies that Fiegean senses aie analytically minu-inuepenuent. Theie is a tiauition,
tiacing at least to Kiipke (1972), anu echoeu iecently by Stalnakei (2u12, 7S9), of inteipieting senses as
piopeities that aie expiesseu by uefinite uesciiptions such as "the souice that leakeu seciets about
Wateigate to Woouwaiu anu Beinstein" oi "the fiist visible bouy in the night sky". But neo-Fiegeans aie
almost univeisally uniteu in iejecting this inteipietation (e.g. Bummett 1981, 11u-S1; Evans 1982, 18; Buige
1979). As they point out, Fiege nevei explicitly enuoises it, says things about ceitain senses (e.g., of the fiist
peison) that aie flatly incompatible with it, anu uefenus a ciiteiion foi inuiviuuating senses (the Ciiteiion of
Biffeience) that woulu seem to count the senses of most singulai anu pieuicative concepts as uistinct fiom
uefinite uesciiptions. Noieovei, whatevei Fiege himself thought, the theoiies of sense most neo-Fiegeans
11
Since neithei senses noi Nentalese symbol types aie analytically minu-inuepenuent, we
have once again faileu to finu an ontological uiffeience between them.
?@H I*+"4";-8,4 2-*#CD*#$($*#$*8$
Let us say that X is "*+"4";-8,44> !-*#C-*#$($*#$*+ just in case X uoes not uepenu foi its existence
on any minus, anu thus coulu exist if theie weie no minus.
7
Some ontologically minu-inuepenuent
entities aie physical, such as iocks anu tiees. But theie aie also many abstiact objects that aie
plausibly ontologically minu-inuepenuent, such as the numbei two. In fact, even abstiact objects
that aie not analytically minu-inuepenuent might be counteu as ontologically minu-inuepenuent.
Foi example, Platonists maintain that the piopeity of painfulness is ontologically minu-
inuepenuent because it exists inuepenuently of whethei it is instantiateu.
0nce again, we have no basis foi uistinguishing senses fiom Nentalese symbol types since
both emeige as ontologically minu-inuepenuent, at least foi Platonists. Senses aie ontologically
minu-inuepenuent since they aie abstiact objects that aie supposeu to exist inuepenuently of any
paiticulai thinkei. Tiue thoughts aie #-%8"9$)$#, not inventeu. Likewise, Platonists will maintain
that Nentalese symbol types aie ontologically minu-inuepenuent because they can exist without
being instantiateuanu as we have seen, Naigolis anu Lauience enuoise Platonism in oiuei to
explain the fact that theie aie concepts that no one will possess.
?@J G+)"*; I*+"4";-8,4 2-*#CD*#$($*#$*8$
Let us say that X is a /*-9$)%,4 just in case X can have instances, anu that X is a (,)+-8/4,) only if X is
not a univeisal. We can then say that X is %+)"*;4> "*+"4";-8,44> !-*#C-*#$($*#$*+ just in case (i) X is
ontologically minu-inuepenuent anu (ii) eithei X is a paiticulai oi some instances of X's aie

uevelop aie patently not uesciiptive. Weie Naigolis anu Lauience to appeal to a uesciiptive theoiy of sense
to aigue that senses aie analytically minu-inuepenuent they woulu thus be guilty of attacking a stiaw man.
7
0ne featuie of this foimulation is that aitifacts such as hammeis anu soccei balls tuin out not to be
ontologically minu-inuepenuent since theii existence piggybacks on the intentions of minueu uesigneis. This
outcome coulu be avoiueu by uefining ontological minu-inuepenuence as a mattei of an entity's not
uepenuing on any minus foi its 8"*+-*/$# existence. A hammei may uepenu on a minu foi its -*-+-,4 existence,
but it coulu suivive a nucleai holocaust that wipeu out all thinkeis. Foi oui puiposes, howevei, the choice
between these two foimulations is not impoitant.
12
ontologically minu-inuepenuent. This categoiy allows us to uiaw a uistinction between two types of
ontologically minu-inuepenuent abstiact objects.
0n the one hanu, theie aie abstiact univeisals such as painfulness whose instances aie
nevei ontologically minu-inuepenuent. Platonists maintain that if theie weie no minus, painfulness
woulu still exist as a univeisal anu is theiefoie ontologically minu-inuepenuent. But theie is little
question that without minus theie woulun't be any -*%+,*8$% of pain, anu thus that painfulness is
not %+)"*;4> ontologically minu-inuepenuent. Likewise, even if Nentalese symbol +>($% uo not
uepenu on minus foi theii existence, Nentalese symbol +"1$*% suiely uo. Thus, Nentalese symbol
types aie not %+)"*;4> ontologically minu-inuepenuent eithei.
0n the othei hanu, theie aie abstiact objects that will count as stiongly ontologically minu-
inuepenuent. Fiist, theie aie abstiact univeisals such as tiiangulaiity, ieuness, anu piimeness,
whose instances aie (at least typically) ontologically minu-inuepenuent. Seconu, anu moie
impoitantly foi oui puiposes, theie aie ,=%+),8+ (,)+-8/4,)%abstiact objects that uo not have
instances. Foi example, many philosopheis claim that inuiviuual numbeis aie abstiact paiticulais.
If that's iight, then the numbei two will count as stiongly ontologically minu-inuepenuent since it
will not be the soit of thing that can be instantiateu.
We have come, at last, to what I believe Naigolis anu Lauience see as the funuamental
uiffeience between senses anu Nentalese symbol types. Because they take senses to be abstiact
paiticulais, Naigolis anu Lauience concluue that senses aie unlike Nentalese symbol types in being
stiongly ontologically minu-inuepenuent. As a iesult, giasping a sense cannot be a mattei of
tokening a type oi instantiating a piopeity, leaving the giasping ielation "utteily mysteiious".

F= G"BH$8#. (>" ,#(-*-.81)* ?-66/
F@A 67$ I*+"4";-8,4 K"))> L$'")!/4,+$#
We can now ieconstiuct Naigolis anu Lauience's ontological woiiy about senses.
1S
(1) If senses aie both causally minu-inuepenuent anu stiongly ontologically minu-inuepenuent,
the giasping ielation that thinkeis aie allegeu to stanu in towaius senses is mysteiious.
(2) Senses aie causally minu-inuepenuent.
(S) Senses aie stiongly ontologically minu-inuepenuent.
Thus,
(4) The giasping ielation that thinkeis aie allegeu to stanu in towaius senses is mysteiious.
The aigument is cleaily valiu, anu I take piemise (2) to be uncontioveisial, so my focus will be on
piemises (1) anu (S). I will aigue that both piemises aie questionable.
F@? <;,-*%+ M)$!-%$ NAO
Piemise (1) is pieuicateu on the assumption that we only have two mouels foi explaining how a
minu coulu be ielateu to a sense: a causal mouel anu a tokeninginstantiation mouel. If senses, as
abstiact objects, aie causally minu-inuepenuent, the fiist mouel can't apply to them; anu if senses,
as abstiact paiticulais, aie stiongly ontologically minu-inuepenuent, the seconu mouel can't apply
to them. Thus, if senses aie both causally anu stiongly ontologically minu-inuepenuent we aie left
no explanation of what giasping a sense coulu be.
Theie is, howevei, a foiceful objection to piemise (1) that Naigolis anu Lauience uo not
consiuei. The objection comes into focus when we ieconsiuei the analogy that they uiaw between
senses anu numbeis. Numbeis aie often taken to be abstiact paiticulais, anu thus both causally anu
stiongly ontologically minu-inuepenuent. Accoiuing to this common conception, the numbei two is
not locateu in space oi time, is causally ineit, anu uoes not have any instances. But notice how
absuiu it woulu be to concluue that physical objects coulun't stanu in a ielation to numbeisfoi
example, that the coins in my pocket coulun't possibly total five, that touay's aii tempeiatuie
coulun't be 28 uegiees Centigiaue, oi that the length of my nightstanu coulun't be two-thiius of a
metei. 0f couise, the ielation heie isn't causal. The coins in my pocket aie not causally ielateu to
the numbei five. Noi is the ielation plausibly akin to that between a univeisal anu its instances. The
14
numbei 28 is not tokeneu oi otheiwise instantiateu in the aii, noi is the fiaction two-thiius
instantiateu in my nightstanu.
8
So theie has to be some way of being ielateu to abstiact paiticulais
that is not a mattei of causation oi instantiation. The question thus aiises: coulu thinkeis not be
ielateu to senses in the same way that objects anu magnituues aie ielateu to numbeis.
The answei will suiely uepenu on how we unueistanu the ielation between objects oi
magnituues anu numbeis. This is a vexeu issue, but one plausible account appeals to the iuea of a
stiuctuial mapping, such as an isomoiphism. Both numbeis anu magnituues aie stiuctuieu, anu
sometimes it woiks out that theie is an oiueily mapping between theii stiuctuies. As a iesult, we
can -*#$P objects anu magnituues to numbeis once we settle on a ciiteiion of inuiviuuation foi the
objects, oi a scale of measuiement foi the magnituues. Foi example, we can map the coins in my
pocket to the numbei five because we have settleu on a paiticulai way of inuiviuuating those coins
(ioughly: by a ciiteiion of spatiotempoial sepaiability), anu a mapping to the natuial numbeis that
iespects the successoi ielation. Similaily, we can map physical lengths to ieal numbeis once we
settle on a scale of measuiement (e.g. metiic units) because physical lengths coiiesponu in an
oiueily way to ieal numbeis once such a scale is imposeu. It is likewise open to the pioponent of
senses to maintain that the minus of thinkeis have an inteinal stiuctuie that just so happens to map
in an oiueily way onto the stiuctuie of senses. 0n this view, giasping a sense is a mattei of having a
minu that is inuexeu to that sense accoiuing to the best available mapping.
This inuexing view of giasping a sense iaises many questions. What is the analog of the
ciiteiion of inuiviuuation oi scale of measuiement foi minus. What makes one mapping bettei than

8
When we consiuei caiuinalities theie is, peihaps, a gieatei temptation to view natuial numbeis as
univeisals, anu thus to say that the coins in my pocket instantiate the numbei five. I think, howevei, that this
view is optional, anu that theie is a coheient alteinative view that uistinguishes caiuinalities fiom theii
associateu natuial numbeis. Accoiuing to this alteinative view, while the coins in my pocket might instantiate
a paiticulai caiuinality, they uo not instantiate the natuial numbei that we associate with that caiuinality. In
any case, nothing tuins on this issue. Even if natuial numbeis can sometimes be instantiateu, the fact that
numbeis can also be useu in ways wheie they aie not instantiateu, as when they aie useu to measuie
tempeiatuies anu lengths, is sufficient to suggest the alteinative mouel of how abstiact objects can be ielateu
to woiluly entities that I am about to uiscuss.
1S
otheis. Night theie be consiueiable inueteiminacy in how senses aie inuexeu to thinkeis. Ny
piesent point, howevei, is not that the inuexing view can uefinitely be uevelopeu into a compelling
account of giasping a sense, but that Naigolis anu Lauience ignoie it altogethei. If senses aie
supposeu to be like numbeis, anu numbeis can be helpfully inuexeu to objects anu magnituues, the
question at least ueseives asking whethei thinkeis can be helpfully inuexeu to senses. 0nly if we
weie confiuent that the answei is "no" woulu we have ieason to accept piemise (1).
F@F <;,-*%+ M)$!-%$ NFO
The obvious alteinative to iuentifying senses with abstiact paiticulais is iuentifying them with
abstiact univeisals that aie instantiateu by thinkeis. In that case, senses woulu be like painfulness
anu Nentalese symbol types, anu so theie woulu be no special obstacle to explaining the giasping
ielation. To giasp a sense woulu just be to instantiate a univeisala mental piopeity oi type. The
challenge is to explain what soit of piopeity oi type senses coulu be. Theie aie suiely many
possibilities. Beie I will focus on just two of them.
0ne possibility is to equate senses with uispositions, anu the giasping of a sense with the
instantiation of a uisposition. This view has echoes in Peacocke's (1992) account of possession
conuitions: to finu a mental tiansition "piimitively compelling" is, ioughly, to be uisposeu to
unueitake it in a piimitive way. The sense ,*#, foi example, might be analyzeu as the uisposition
shaieu by all peisons who can think conjunctive thoughtsto uiaw the infeiences associateu with
the intiouuction anu elimination iules foi conjunction. Thinkeis then count as giasping the sense if
anu only if they have, oi instantiate, this uisposition. (Note: the instantiation of a uisposition is to be
uistinguisheu fiom the manifestation of a uisposition. A glass can instantiate the uisposition of
fiagility at a time, +, even if it isn't bieaking at +. Likewise, if senses aie uispositions then a thinkei
can giasp a sense at + even if she isn't manifesting that sense at +.)
16
A seconu possibility takes senses to be capacities oi abilities, anu the giasping of a sense to
be the instantiation of a capacity oi ability.
9
(Again, the instantiation of an ability is to be
uistinguisheu fiom the exeicise of an ability. At the piesent moment you have, oi instantiate, many
abilities that you aie not cuiiently exeicising.) This iuea sits natuially with the theoiy of sense
uevelopeu by Evans (1982), who explicitly maintains that episoues of thinking aie stiuctuieu fiom
the exeicise of uistinct abilities.
Thus, someone who thinks that }ohn is happy anu that Baiiy is happy exeicises on two occasions the
conceptual ability which we call 'possessing the concept of happiness'. Anu similaily someone who
thinks that }ohn is happy anu that }ohn is sau exeicises on two occasions a single ability, the ability to
think of, oi think about, }ohn. (Evans 1982, 1u1)
Foi Evans, "possessing the concept of happiness" anu "giasping the sense 7,((-*$%%" aie equivalent
bits of jaigon, both of which aie to be casheu out in teims of having a paiticulai ability.
Notice that these two accounts of senses uo not claim to be ieuuctive. In iuentifying a sense
with a uisposition oi ability, one neeu not insist that those uispositions oi abilities can be explicateu
in non-semantic oi non-mental teims. Inueeu, most Fiegeans ueny that senses can be so explicateu.
But that's to be expecteu. Nost uispositions anu abilities can only be explicateu by way of a small
ciicle of closely ielateu teims. Foi example, the piopeity of being a comeuian is, plausibly, best
analyzeu in teims of a uisposition oi ability, though the chances of ieuuctively explicating that
uisposition oi ability without the help of comeuic teims such as "funny" oi "laughtei" seem slim.
To be cleai, while neo-Fiegeans often iuentify the ;),%(-*; of a sense with the possession oi
instantiation of a ceitain type of uisposition oi ability, anu the +7-*1-*; of a thought with the
manifestation oi exeicise of ceitain uispositions oi abilities, I am not awaie of anyone who

9
0ne auvantage of this appioach ovei a uispositional appioach is that theie aie ceitain senses that we giasp
but aie not uisposeu to employ. I might giasp the sense associateu with a iacial epithet, but neveitheless fail
to be uisposeu to uiaw any of the tiansitions associateu with that epithet (i.e., fail to finu any of the
tiansitions associateu with that epithet "piimitively compelling").
17
unequivocally iuentifies senses +7$!%$49$% with uispositions, abilities, oi any othei univeisal.
1u
But I
am now suggesting that we coulu take this extia step, which woulu then pioviue us with a simple
explanation of how thinkeis can be ielateu to senses. If giasping a sense weie just instantiating a
univeisal, theie woulu be no moie of an ontological woiiy about how thinkeis aie ielateu to senses
than of how thinkeis aie ielateu to Nentalese symbol types. Notice, moieovei, that we woulu also
have a stiaightfoiwaiu explanation of why senses can solve Fiege's puzzle. Because eveiyone who
instantiates a given sense shaies a .,> of being ielateu to a iefeienta way that is embouieu in the
uisposition oi ability that constitutes the sensetheie is no issue of theie being iauically uiffeient
ways to giasp a sense.
This last point ueseives gieatei emphasis. Naigolis anu Lauience aie leu to woiiy about
how senses can solve Fiege's puzzle because of the misleauing analogy they uiaw between giasping
a sense anu thinking about a numbei. As they point out, theie aie uiffeient ways to think about the
numbei two. I can think of it as the successoi of one, as the only even piime, oi as my favoiite
numbei. All of these uiffeient ways of thinking about the numbei two have nothing in common
except the numbei two. Thus, if giasping a sense weie like thinking about a numbei, the vaiious
ways of giasping a sense woulu have nothing moie in common than theii iefeient, in which case
senses coulu not be useu to solve Fiege's puzzle. But if senses aie univeisals, the analogy is
wiongheaueu. }ust as thinking about the coloi ieu is to be uistinguisheu fiom instantiating that
coloi, thinking about a sense is to be uistinguisheu fiom giasping a sense. Ny hanukeichief
instantiates the coloi ieu, but it cannot think about that coloi. Similaily, if giasping a sense is a
mattei of having the uisposition oi ability to uiaw the infeiences associateu with the intiouuction
anu elimination iules foi conjunction, my five-yeai-olu cousin giasps the sense ,*#. Be can anu
uoes uiaw those infeiences. But he cleaily lacks the highei-oiuei uisposition oi ability to think

1u
Peihaps Buige (2uuS, 29-Su) comes the closest. Replying to the woiiy that the giasping ielation is
mysteiious, he comments that the "iole" of senses is to "type-iuentify explanatoiy kinus", incluuing
psychological capacities, states, anu events, anu thus that the giasping ielation is no moie pioblematic than
the ielation between a biological kinu anu its instances.
18
about the sense ,*#i.e., he lacks the uisposition oi ability to think about the uisposition oi ability
to uiaw the infeiences associateu with the intiouuction anu elimination iules foi conjunction. 0nce
this uistinction between giasping a sense anu thinking about a sense is kept fiimly in minu, theie is
no obstacle to using senses to uistinguish co-iefeiential concepts.
Tieating senses as abstiact univeisals cleaily unueimines piemise (S), anu seems to be
compatible with the thiust of the inteipietations of sense given by Peacocke, Evans, anu othei
Fiegeans. So why uo Naigolis anu Lauience assume that senses must be abstiact paiticulais. I am
not entiiely ceitain, but it is notable that at one point they wiite that the uiffeience between
Nentalese symbols anu senses is that senses "uon't aumit of a type-token uistinction" (2uu7, S89, n.
7; see also Sutton 2uu4). So peihaps they ieason that theie is nothing left foi senses to be but
abstiact paiticulais. If this is theii ieasoning, howevei, then it is uoubly pioblematic. It is
pioblematic, fiist, because the claim that senses uo not aumit of a type-token uistinction is open to
question anu goes unuefenueu. Foi example, if senses weie abilities, it is not obvious that they
woulu fail to aumit of a type-token uistinction. Peihaps what all thinkeis have in common who
giasp a sense is just that they token a ceitain ability type. Seconu, while all types aie plausibly
univeisals (they have tokens as theii instances), the conveise is uoubtful. Theie aie plausibly some
univeisals that aie not types. Paiauigmatic piopeities such as ieuness aie often conceiveu as
having instances, anu thus as being univeisals, but aie unlike types at least in that they aie moie
ieauily expiesseu by pieuicates than by singulai teims.
11
Thus, even if Naigolis anu Lauience weie
iight that senses weien't types, it woulun't follow that they weien't univeisals.
Aumitteuly, Fiege nevei wiites of senses being instantiateu, anu his appeal to "giasping a
sense" (e.g., 1892, 1SS; 1897, 2S7; 1918, S28) uoes not seem on its face to invoke the instantiation

11
Biawing on Wollheim (1968), Wetzel (2uu9, xii) points to othei uiffeiences between paiauigmatic
piopeities anu types: types (e.g., the lettei "A", the giizzly beai, 0lu uloiy) aie all objects, but paiauigmatic
piopeities (e.g., ieuness, tiiangulaiity, happiness) aie not; types shaie moie qualities with theii tokens than
piopeities shaie with theii instances (e.g., the giizzly beai anu its tokens aie both biown, fuiiy, feiocious, etc.,
but the piopeity of ieuness shaies little with its instances); anu piopeities nevei exemplify theii uefining
qualities (e.g., ieuness isn't ieu) but types uo (e.g., 0lu uloiy is iectangulai).
19
ielation. So peihaps Naigolis anu Lauience aie motivateu by a uesiie to iemain felicitous to Fiege's
texts. But whatevei the histoiical Fiege may have thought, the iuea that giasping a sense is a mattei
of instantiating an ability is not foieign to contempoiaiy Fiegeans, among whom the phiase
"giasping a sense" has become something of a teim of ait. As Buige wiites, "uiasping a thought is
simply a misleauing metaphoi. Any view shoulu cash out the metaphoi in teims of having a ceitain
ability to think" (2uuS, Su).
0ne might woiiy that allowing senses to be instantiateu collapses the uistinction between
senses anu Nentalese symbol types. But it is one thing to instantiate a semantically inuiviuuateu
uisposition oi ability, anu quite anothei mattei to instantiate a foimally inuiviuuateu symbol. Foi
one thing, symbols of Nentalese aie supposeu to be naiiowly inuiviuuateu in teims of the intiinsic
piopeities of thinkeis. Nost contempoiaiy Fiegeans, by contiast, inuiviuuate senses wiuely, in
ielation to the enviionment. Auuitionally, senses have theii semantic piopeities essentially. Each
sense is inuiviuuateu by its semantic value, the contiibution it makes to the tiuth conuitions of the
thoughts it can entei into. By contiast, symbols of Nentalese aie inuiviuuateu foimally, by analogy
to the oithogiaphic piopeities of expiessions in wiitten languages. A symbol of Nentalese may
have a semantic value, but it will have that semantic value only contingentlyjust as the
oithogiaphically inuiviuuateu expiessions of wiitten languages have theii semantic values only
contingently. Thus, even if senses weie abstiact univeisals the uebate between Fiegeans anu
ieuuctivists woulu iemain substantive.

I= ?>)( !"#$"$ 'H$( 3"
In the couise of evaluating Naigolis anu Lauience's aigument, we encounteieu two conceptions of
senses anu, coiiesponuingly, two conceptions of giasping a sense. Accoiuing to the fiist, senses aie
abstiact paiticulais like numbeis, anu giasping a sense is a mattei of being inuexeu to a sense in a
maximally peispicuous stiuctuial mapping. Accoiuing to the seconu, senses aie univeisals such as
2u
abilities oi uispositions, anu giasping a sense is a mattei of instantiating a univeisal. So fai, I have
iemaineu neutial between these two conceptions. I believe, howevei, that the seconu view is
piefeiable to the fiist.
The pioblem with taking senses to be abstiact paiticulais like numbeis is that it makes a
mysteiy of theii analytic minu-uepenuence. If senses weie like numbeis, we woulu have no
explanation of why they aie always analyzeu in teims of the minus of thinkeis. 0n most plausible
accounts, numbeis aien't analyzeu in teims of physical objects such as coins oi magnituues such as
tempeiatuies. Noi aie they plausibly analyzeu in teims mental attiibutes. While some think that
oui best analysis of numbeis appeals to Bume's piinciple, anu otheis think that numbeis simply aie
ceitain sets, almost no one holus that numbeis aie best analyzeu by iefeience to physical objects oi
minus. By contiast, contempoiaiy Fiegeans almost always analyze senses in teims of the mental.
The pioblem I am iaising is *"+ that it is unpieceuenteu foi an entity to be both analytically
minu-uepenuent anu stiongly ontologically minu-inuepenuent. Consiuei the view that iuentifies
ieu with whatevei physical piopeity gives iise to such-anu-such expeiiences in noimal human
peiceiveis in noimal conuitions. Suppose that, as it tuins out, the physical piopeity meeting this
uefinition is a ceitain geiiymanueieu set of spectial ieflectances that we can call P. Cleaily P uoes
not uepenu foi its existence on any minus. A iipe tomato has its paiticulai spectial ieflectance
inuepenuently of whethei anyone is evei aiounu to notice it. Thus, ieu will be ontologically minu-
inuepenuent on this view of coloi. But if we accept that the best ,*,4>%-% of ieu neveitheless appeals
to the $P($)-$*8$% of noimal peiceiveisanu the geiiymanueieu natuie of P suggests that it uoes
we will have to accept that P is analytically minu-#$($*#$*+.
This example shows that theie is nothing incoheient about something's being analytically
minu-uepenuent anu stiongly ontologically minu-inuepenuent. Theie is, howevei, a big uiffeience
between senses anu colois. 0n the view of colois in question, we have two ways of inuiviuuating
them: as whatevei causes ceitain expeiiences in us; anu as spectial ieflectance piopeities of
21
physical objects. The natuialness of the fiist moue of inuiviuuation might make it piimaiy, but the
seconu moue of inuiviuuation is theie all the same. By contiast, senses uo not have this uual
existence. 0ui "*4> way of inuiviuuating them is in teims of the minus of thinkeis. It is thus much
haiuei to see how theii analytic minu-uepenuence can be squaieu with theii stiong ontological
minu-inuepenuence.
To put the point anothei way, theie aie two ways foi an abstiact object to be stiongly
ontologically minu-inuepenuent: by having no instances (being an abstiact paiticulai) oi by having
non-mental instances. Colois aie stiongly ontologically minu-inuepenuent because they meet the
lattei conuition; they have non-mental, puiely physical instances. As a iesult, theie is a way of
inuiviuuating colois that appeals to the puiely physical. But on a view that tieats senses as stiongly
ontologically minu-inuepenuent they have *" instances. As a iesult, they cannot be inuiviuuateu
accoiuing to some puiely physical ciiteiion in the way that colois can. In itself, this uoes not iule
out the possibility that senses coulu be inuiviuuateu, like numbeis, in some way that is neithei
mental noi physical. But in point of fact, mental activity appeais to be the only ioute we have to
theii inuiviuuation.
To be suie, theie is no 8"*+),#-8+-"* in the supposition that senses aie both analytically
minu-uepenuent anu abstiact paiticulais. 0ne coulu holu that senses have a ieal objective existence
as abstiact paiticulais, but that we just uon't know enough about them in oiuei to explicate theii
natuies except by ielation to oui own minus. But at the same time, noi can I think of any ieason to
take this possibility seiiously.
Like Naigolis anu Lauience, I have been ciiticizing senses conceiveu as abstiact paiticulais.
Theie is, howevei, a significant uiffeience between Naigolis anu Lauience's ciiticism anu mine.
Naigolis anu Lauience woiiy how senses can be ;),%($# if they aie abstiact paiticulais. I aigueu,
howevei, that the availability of an inuexing view unueimines this woiiy. The pioblem with
supposing that senses aie abstiact paiticulais is iathei that it fails to explain why oui full
22
unueistanuing of senses comes fiom the mental activity of thinkeis. In othei woius, the pioblem is
not how senses as abstiact paiticulais can be giaspeu, but why the entiiety of oui knowleuge of
them ueiives fiom theii being giaspeu.
If I'm iight, Fiegeans shoulu not look to numbeis foi theii mouel of mental contents, but to
abilities, uispositions, oi othei univeisals. Fiom an ontological peispective, senses anu Nentalese
symbols will thus be ielateu to thinkeis in much the same way, as a univeisal to its instance. The
choice between them will, theiefoie, not tuin on matteis of ontology, but on moie eaithly
consiueiations, such as empiiical eviuence foi the ieality of a puiely foimal level of psychological
explanation. That is suiely as it shoulu be.
12


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12
I'm inuebteu to Richaiu Beck foi uiscussion, anu to Eli Chuunoff, Wayne Bavis, Biian Buss, Nuhammau Ali
Khaliui, anu }on Litlanu foi wiitten comments on eailiei uiafts.
2S
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