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PROSPERO A. PICHAY, JR. v. OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS, et al.
G.R. No. 196425, 24 July 2012, EN BANC (Perlas-Bernabe, J.)
Executive Order No. 13 which abolishes the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission
and transfers its functions to the Investigative and Adjudicatory Division of the Offce of the
Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs, is constitutional pursuant to the Presidents
continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Offce of the President in
order to achieve simplicity, economy and effciency.

In 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III issued Executive Order No.
13 (E.O. 13), abolishing the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) and
transferring its functions to the Investigative and Adjudicatory Division of the
Offce of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (IAD-ODESLA).
Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima later on fled before the IAD-ODESLA a
complaint affdavit for grave misconduct against Prospero A. Pichay, Jr. (Pichay),
Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Local Water Utilities Administration
(LWUA) for the purchase by the LWUA of shares of stock of Express Savings
Bank, Inc. In defense, Pichay fled a Motion to Dismiss Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam
manifesting that a case involving the same transaction is already pending before
the Offce of the Ombudsman. Alleging that no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy is available, Pichay has resorted to the instant petition for certiorari and
prohibition assailing the constitutionality of E.O. 13.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not E.O. 13 is constitutional
2. Whether or not there is usurpation of legislative power to appropriate
public funds in view of such reorganization
3. Whether or not the IAD-ODESLA encroaches upon the powers and
duties of the Ombudsman
4. Whether or not Executive Order No. 13 violates Pichays right to due
process and the equal protection of the laws
HELD:
E.O. 13 is constitutional
Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292 (E.O. 292), otherwise known as
the Administrative Code of 1987, vests in the President the continuing authority
to reorganize the offces under him to achieve simplicity, economy and effciency.
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The Offce of the President must, in order to remain effective and effcient, be
capable of being shaped and reshaped by the President in the manner he deems
ft to carry out his directives and policies.
Clearly, the abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a
division specially created within the ODESLA is properly within the prerogative
of the President under his continuing delegated legislative authority to reorganize
his own offce. Since both of these offces belong to the Offce of the President
Proper, the reorganization by way of abolishing the PAGC and transferring its
functions to the IAD-ODESLA is allowable under Section 31 (1) of E.O. 292.
There is no usurpation of the legislative power to appropriate public funds
There is an express recognition under Section 78 of Republic Act No.
9970 or the General Appropriations Act of 2010 of the Presidents authority
to direct changes in the organizational units or key positions in any department
or agency. This recognizes the extent of the Presidents power to reorganize
the executive offces and agencies under him, which is, even to the extent of
modifying and realigning appropriations for that purpose. Thus, while there may
be no specifc amount earmarked for the IAD-ODESLA from the total amount
appropriated by Congress in the annual budget for the Offce of the President,
the necessary funds for the IAD-ODESLA may be properly sourced from the
Presidents own offce budget without committing any illegal appropriation. After
all, the President simply allocates the existing funds previously appropriated by
Congress for his offce.
The IAD-ODESLA does not encroach upon the powers and duties of the
Ombudsman
The primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute
cases refers to criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and not to
administrative cases. It is only in the exercise of its primary jurisdiction that the
Ombudsman may, at any time, take over the investigation being conducted by
another investigatory agency. Since the case fled before the IAD-ODESLA is
an administrative disciplinary case for grave misconduct, Pichay may not invoke
the primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to prevent the IAD-ODESLA from
proceeding with its investigation. In any event, the Ombudsmans authority to
investigate both elective and appointive offcials in the government, extensive as
it may be, is by no means exclusive. It is shared with other similarly authorized
government agencies.
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Moreover, as the function of the Ombudsman goes into the determination
of the existence of probable cause and the adjudication of the merits of a criminal
accusation, the investigative authority of the IAD-ODESLA is limited to that
of a fact-fnding investigator whose determinations and recommendations remain
so until acted upon by the President. As such, it commits no usurpation of the
Ombudsmans constitutional duties.
Executive Order No. 13 does not violate Pichays right to due process and
the equal protection of the laws
Pichays right to due process was not violated when the IAD-ODESLA
took cognizance of the administrative complaint against him. In administrative
proceedings, the fling of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the
person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum
requirements of due process, which simply means having the opportunity to
explain ones side. Hence, as long as Pichay was given the opportunity to explain
his side and present evidence, the requirements of due process are satisfactorily
complied with because what the law abhors is an absolute lack of opportunity to
be heard.
Also, Pichay is a presidential appointee occupying the high-level position of
Chairman of the LWUA. Necessarily, he comes under the disciplinary jurisdiction
of the President, who is well within his right to order an investigation into matters
that require his informed decision. There are substantial distinctions that set
apart presidential appointees occupying upper-level positions in government
from non-presidential appointees and those that occupy the lower positions in
government.
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES v. AGUSTIN DIZON
G.R. No. 171182, 23 August 2012, FIRST DIVISION (Bersamin, J.)
The funds of the UP are government funds that are public of character which could
not be validly made the subject of a writ of execution or garnishment.
The University of the Philippines (UP) entered into a General
Construction Agreement with respondent Stern Builders Corporation (Stern
Builders) for the construction of the extension building and the renovation of