By Nestor P.

Mondok

By this principle, the courts should look into the object to be accomplished, the evils and mischief to be remedied, or the purpose to be sub-served. The court should give the statute a reasonable or liberal construction which will best effects its purpose rather than one which will defeat it even though such construction is not within the strict literal interpretation of the statute. The court should give the statute a reasonable or liberal construction which will best effect its purpose, rather than one which will defeat it.

SPECIFIC INTENTIONS: (particular statute) *Object to be accomplished *Evils and mischief to be remedied *the purpose to be sub-served *manner of application GENERAL INTENTIONS: (Various PRESUMPTIONS COMMON in all statutes)

-Presumption of validity

-Presumption of Constitutionality - Presumption of good faith -presumption against injustice -presumption against inconsistency -presumption against absurdity -presumption against ineffectiveness -presumption against irrepealable laws -presumption against implied repeal

-presumption against violation of public policy

-presumption of knowledge of existing laws - presumption of acquiescence to judicial construction -presumption of jurisdiction -presumption of acting within the scope of authority -presumption against violation of international law

*In Pari Materia Rule *Statute must be read and construed as a whole. *Legislative intent must be ascertained from the statute as a whole. *Courts have the duty to reconcile or harmonize the different provisions of the statute, including the conflicting provisions thereof. *As a rule, statute of latter date prevails. *Generalia specialibus non derogant. *Special law prevails over a general law. *In interpreting reenacted statutes, the court will follow the construction which statutes previously received. *In case of adopted statute, the interpretation of the state from where it came from should be considered. *In case of conflict between a common law principle and statutory provision, the latter prevails.

VERBA LEGIS / PLAIN LANGUAGE RULE PRESUMPTION AGAINST INJUSTICE -ART. 10 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY PRESUMPTION OF GOOG FAITH PRESUMPTION AGAINST INCONSISTENCY PRESUMPTION AGAINSTABSURDITY PRESUMPTION AGAINST INEFFECTIVENESS PRESUMPTION AGAINST IRREPEALABLE LAWS PRESUMPTION AGAINST IMPLIED REPEAL PRESUMPTION AGAINST VIOLATION OF PUBLIC POLICY PRESUMPTION OF KNOWLEDGE OF EXISTING LAWS PRESUMPTION OF ACQUIESCENCE TO JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION PRESUMPTION OF JURISDICTION PRESUMPTION ON ACTING WITHIN THE SCOPE OF AUTHORITY PRESUMPTION AGAINST VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

ABSOLUTE SENTENCIA EXPOSITORE NON INDIGET INDEX ANIMI SERMO EST VERBA LEGIS OPTIMA STATUTULI INTERPRETATIX EST IPSUM STATUTUM VERBA LEGIS NON EST RECEDENDUM GENERALIA VERBA SUN GENERALITER INTELLIGENCIA UBI LEX NON DISTINGUIT NEC NOS DISTINGUIRE DEBEMOS INTERPRETATIO TALIS IN AMBIGUIS SEMPER FRIENDA EST, UT EVITATUR INCONVENIENS ET ABSURDUM UT RES MAGIS QUAM PEREAT IN PARI MATERIA RULE DURA LEX SED LEX LEGIS POSTERIORES PRIORES CONTRARIES ABROGANT GENERALIA SPECIALIBUS NON DEROGANT MENS LEGISLATORES RATIO LEGIS RATIO LEGIS EST ANIMA CESSANTE RATIONE (LEGIS) CESSAT IPSA LEX EJUSDEM GENERIS NOSCITUR A SOCIIS EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSIO ALTERIUS (INCLUSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSION ALTERIUS) REDENNDO SINGULA SINGULIS CASUS OMISUS CASUS OMISUS PRO OMISSO HABENDUS EST EX NECISSITATE LEGIS DOCTINE OF LAST ANTECEDENCE LEX PROSPICIT NON RESPICIT LES DE FUTURO JUDEX DE PRATERITO IN EO PLUS INEST SIT, SIMPER ET MINUS LEGIS INTERPRETATIO LEGIS VIM OBTINET

WHEN THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW IS CLEAR NO EXPLANATION OF IT IS REQUIRED

SPEECH IS THE INDEX OF INTENTION

PLAIN LANGUAGE RULE IF THE STATUTE IS CLEAR , PLSIN AND FREE FROM AMBIGUITY, IT MUST BE GIVEN ITS LITERAL MEANING AND APPLIED WITHOUT ATTEMPTED INTERPRETATION

THE BEST INTERPRETER OF THE STATUTE IS THE STATUTE ITSELF

FROM THE WORDS OF THE STATUTE THERE SHOULD BE NO DEPARTURE

WHANT IS GENERALLY SPOKEN SHALL BE GENERALLY UNDERSTOOD

WHEN THE LAW DOES NOT DISTINGUISH, WE SHOULD NOT DISTINGUISH

WHERE THERE IS AMBIGUITY, SUCH INTERPRETATION AS WILL AVOID INCONVENIENCE AND ABSURDITY SHOULD BE ADOPTED

THIS MEANS THAT IT IS NOT ENOUGH THAT THE STATUTE SHOULD BE GIVEN EFFECT AS A WHOLE BUT THAT EFFECT SHOULD BE GIVEN TO EACH OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE STATUTE

UNDER THIS RULE STATUTES RELATING TO THE SAME SUBJECT, OR HAVING THE SAME GENERAL PURPOSE, SHOULD BE READ AND CONSTRUED TOGETHER AS IF THEY CONSTITUTED ONE LAW.

THE LAW MAY BE HARSH BUT THAT IS THE LAW

IN CASE OF IRRECONCILABLE CONFLICT OF TWO LAW OF DIFFERENT VINTAGES, THE LATTER ENACTMENT PREVAILS

BY THIS PRICIPLE COURTS SHOULD LOOK INTO THE OBJECT TO BE ACCOMPLISHED, THE EVILS AND MISCHIEF TO BE REMEDIED, OR THE PURPOSE TO BE SUBSERVED. THE COURT SHOULD GIVE THE STATUTE A RASONABLE OR LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION WHICH WILL BEST EFFECT ITS PURPOSE RATHER THAN ONE WHICH WILL DEFEAT IT EVEN THOUGH SUCH CONSTRUCTION IS NOT WITHIN THE STRICT LITERAL INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTE.

INTERPRETATION ACCORDING TO THE SPIRIT IN CONSTRUING THE STATUTE, THE COURT MUST LOOK INTO THE SPIRIT OF THE LAW OR THE REASON FOR IT. THE SPIRIT OR INTENTION OF THE LAW PREVAILS OVER THE LETTER THEREOF. THE STATUTE MAY BE EXTENDED TO CASES WHICH WERE NOT INCLUDED WITHIN THE LITERAL MEANINGOF THE WORDS, IF SUCH CASE IS WITHIN THE REASON FOR THE STATUTE

THE REASON FOR THE LAW IS ITS SOUL.

WHEN THE REASON OF THE LAW CEASES, THE LAW CEASES TO EXIST.

WHERE THE GENERAL TERM FOLLOWS THE DESIGNATION OF PARTICULAR THINGS OR CLASSES OF PERSONS OR SUBJECTS, THE GENERAL TERM WILL BE CONSTRUED TO INCLUDE THOSE THINGS OR PERSONS OF THE SAME CLASS OR OF THE SAME NATURE AS THOSE SPECIFICALLY ENUMERATED.

UNDER THIS RULE, THE MEANING OF A PARTICULAR TERM IN A STATUTE MAY BE ASCERTAINED BY REFERENCE TO THE WORDS ASSOCIATED WITH OR RELATED TO THEM IN A STATUTE. WHRWER PARTICULAR WORD OR PHRASE IS AMBIGUOUS IN ITSELF OR IS SIMPLY SUSCEPTIBLE OF VARIOUS MEANINGS, ITS TRUE MEANING MAY BE MADE CLEAR AND SPECIFIC BY CONSIDERING THE COMPANY IN WHICH IT IS FOUND OR WHICH IT IS ASSOCIATED. WHERE THERE ARE TWO OR MORE WORDS OF ANALOGOUS MEANING ARE IN ITSELF TOGETHER IN A STATUTE, THEY ARE UNDERSTOOD TO BE USED IN THEIR COGNATE SENSE TO EXPRESS THE SAME RELATIONS AND GIVE COLOR AND EXPRESSION TO EACH WORD.

MENTION OF ONE THING IMPLIES THE EXCLUSION OF OTHERS. WHEN A STATUTE ENUMERATES THE SUBJECTS OR THINGS ON WHICH IT IS TO OPERATE, IT IS TO BE CONSTURED AS EXCLUDING FROM ITS EFFECT ALL THOSE NOT EXPRESSLY MENTIONED.

LET EACH BE PUT IN ITS PROPER PLACE DOCTRINE OF COLLOCATION (REFERRING EACH TO EACH) WHERE A SENTENCE HAS SEVERAL ANTECEDENTS AND SEVERAL CONSEQUENTS, THEY ARE TO BE READ DISTRIBUTIVELY. THE ANTECEDENTS SHOULD BE REFRRED TO THEIR PROPER CONSEQUENTS AND VICE VERSA. EACH WORD OR PHRASE OR CLAUSE MUST BE GIVEN ITS PROPER CONNECTION IN ORDER TO GIVE IT PROPER FORCE AND EFFECT, RENDERING NON OF THEM USELESS OR SUPERFLUOUS.

UNDER THIS RULE, THE WORDS OR PHRASE MAY BE SUPPLIED BY THE COURTS AND INSERTED IN A STATUTE WHERE THAT IS NECESSARY TO ELIMINATE REPUGNANCY AND INCONSISTENCY IN THE STZTUTE , TO COMPLETE THE SENSE THEREOF AND TO GIVE EFFECT TO THE INTENTION OF THE LEGISLATURE MANIFESTED THEREIN.

UNDER THIS RULE, A PERSON, OBJECT OR THING OMITTED FROM AN ENUMERATION MUST BE HELD TO HAVE BEEN OMITTED INTENTIONALLY.

DOCTRINE OF NECESSARY IMPLICATION WHAT IS IMPLIED IN A STATUTE IS AS MUCH PART THEREOF AS THAT WHAT IS EXPRESSED. EVERY STATUTE IS UNDERSTOOD BY IMPLICZATION, TO CONTAIN ALL SUCH PROVISION AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO EFFECTUATE ITS OBJECT AND PURPOSE.

THE LAW LOOKS FORWARD, NOT BACKWARD.

THE LAW PROVIDES FOR THE FUTURE, THE JUDGE FOR THE PAST

UNDER THIS RULE, RELATIVE AND QUALIFYING WORDS, PHRASES, AND CLAUSES ARE TO BE APPLIED TO THE WORD OR PHRASE IMMEDIATELY PROCEEDING AND NOT TO OTHERS MORE REMOTE.

THE GREATER INCLUDES THE LESSER.

THE INTERPRETATION PLACED UPON THE WRITTEN LAW BY THE COMPETENT COURT HAS THE FORCE OF LAW.