[G.R. No. 145443. March 18, 2005]RAQUEL P. CONSULTA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PAMANA PHILIPPINES,INC., RAZUL Z.

REQUESTO, and ALETA TOLENTINO, respondents. FACTS: Consulta was Managing Associate of Pamana. On 1987 she was issued a certificationauthorizing her to negotiate for and in behalf of PAMANA with the Federation of Filipino CivilianEmployees Association. Consulta was able to secure an account with FFCEA in behalf of PAMANA. However, Consulta claimed that PAMANA did not pay her commission for the PPCEAaccount and filed a complaint for unpaid wages or commission. ISSUE: Whether or not Consulta was an employee of PAMANA. HELD: The SC held that Pamana was an independent agent and not an employee. The power of control in the four fold test is missing. The manner in which Consulta was to pursue her tasked activities was not subject to the control of PAMANA. Consulta failed to show that she worked definite hours. The amount of time, the methods and means, the management and maintenance of her sales division were left to her sound judgment. Finally, Pamana paid Consulta not for labor she performed but only for the results of her labor. Without results, Consultas labor was her own burden and loss. Her right to compensation, or to commission, depended on the tangible results of her work - whether she brought in paying recruits. The fact that the appointment required Consulta to solicit business exclusively for Pamana did not mean Pamana exercised control over the means and methods of Consultas work as the term control is understood in labor jurisprudence. Neither did it make Consulta an employee of Pamana. Pamana did not prohibit Consulta from engaging in any other business, or from being connected with any other company, for as long as the business or company did not compete with Pamanas business. The exclusivity clause was a reasonable restriction to prevent similar acts prejudicial to Pamanas business interest. Article 1306 of the Civil Code provides that the contracting parties may establish such stipulation, clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided that they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. There being no employer-employee relationship between Pamana and Consulta, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC had no jurisdiction to entertain and rule on Consultas money claim. Consultas remedy is to file an ordinary civil action to litigate her claim. Petition is dismissed.

CALALANG v. WILLIAMS, 70 PHIL 726, GR No. 47800, December 2, 1940 FACTS: The National Traffic Commission resolved that animal-drawn vehicles be prohibited from passing along some major streets such a Rizal Ave. in Manila for a period of one year from the date of the opening of the Colgante Bridge to traffic. The Secretary of Public Works approved the resolution on August 10,1940. The Mayor of Manila and the Acting Chief of Police of Manila have enforced the rules and regulation. As a consequence, all animal-drawn vehicles are not allowed to pass and pick up passengers in the places above mentioned to the detriment not only of their owners but of the riding public as well. ISSUE: Does the rule infringe upon the constitutional precept regarding the promotion of social justice? What is Social Justice? HELD: No. The regulation aims to promote safe transit and avoid obstructions on national roads in the interest and convenience of the public. Persons and property may be subject to all kinds of restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health, and prosperity of the State. To this fundamental aims of the government, the rights of the individual are subordinated. Social justice is neither communism, nor despotism, nor atomism, nor anarchy, but the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular conception may at least be approximated. Social justice means the promotion of the welfare of all the people, the adoption by the Government of measures calculated to insure economic stability of all the competent elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and social equilibrium in the interrelations of the members of the community, constitutionally, through the adoption of measures legally justifiable, or extra-constitutionally, through the exercise of powers underlying the existence of all governments on the time-honored principles of Salus Populi est Suprema Lex.(Justice Laurel)

Filamer Christian Institute vs IAC and Kapunan

NOTE: This case reversed Filamer vs IAC (October 16, 1990)
Daniel Funtecha was a working student of Filamer. He was assigned as the school janitor to clean the school 2 hours every morning. Allan Masa was the son of the school president and at the same time he was the schools jeepney service driver. On October 20, 1977 at about 6:30pm, after driving the students to their homes, Masa returned to the school to report and thereafter have to go home with the jeep so that he could fetch the students early in the morning. Masa and Funtecha live in the same place so they usually go home together. Funtecha had a studen t drivers license so Masa let him take the drivers seat. While Funtecha was driving, he accidentally hit an elderly Kapunan which led to his hospitalization for 20 days. Kapunan filed a criminal case and an independent civil action based on Article 2180 against Funtecha. In the independent civil action, the lower court ruled that Filamer is subsidiarily liable for the tortious act of Funcheta and was compelled to pay for damages based on Article 2180 which provides that employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. Filamer assailed the decision and it argued that under Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Labor Code IRR, working scholars are excluded from the employment coverage hence there is no employer-employee relations between Filamer and Funcheta; that the negligent act of Funcheta was due to negligence only attributable to him alone as it is outside his assigned task of being the school janitor. The CA denied Filamers appeal but the Supreme Court agreed with Filamer. Kapunan filed for a motion for reconsideration. ISSUE: Whether or not Filamer should be held subsidiarily liable. HELD: Yes. This time, the SC ruled in favor of Kapunan (actually his heirs cause by this time Kapunan was already dead). The provisions of Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Labor Code IRR was only meant to provide guidelines as compliance with labor provisions on working conditions, rest periods, and wages is concerned. This does not in any way affect the provisions of any other laws like the civil code. The IRR cannot defeat the provisions of the Civil Code. In other words, Rule X is merely a guide to the enforcement of the substantive law on labor. There is a distinction hence Section 14, Rule X, Book III of the Rules is not the decisive law in a civil suit for damages instituted by an injured person during a vehicular accident against a working student of a school and against the school itself. The present case does not deal with a labor dispute on conditions of employment between an alleged employee and an alleged employer. It invokes a claim brought by one for damages for injury caused by the patently negligent acts of a person, against both doer-employee and his employer. Hence, the reliance on the implementing rule on labor to disregard the primary liability of an employer under

Article 2180 of the Civil Code is misplaced. An implementing rule on labor cannot be used by an employer as a shield to void liability under the substantive provisions of the Civil Code. Funtecha is an employee of Filamer. He need not have an official appointment for a drivers position in order that Filamer may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act, it being sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of Filamer (the act of driving the jeep from the school to Masas house is beneficial to the school because this enables Masa to do a timely school transportation service in the morning). Hence, the fact that Funtecha was not the school driver or was not acting with the scope of his janitorial duties does not relieve Filamer of the burden of rebutting the presumption juris tantum that there was negligence on its part either in the selection of a servant or employee, or in the supervision over him. Filamer has failed to show proof of its having exercised the required diligence of a good father of a family over its employees Funtecha and Allan.