LAO H.

ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships adversely affected by Republic Act No. 1180, petitioner, vs. JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO SARMIENTO, City Treasuer of Manila, respondent. FACTS Petitioner Ichong, a Chinese retailer questions the constitutionality of R.A. No. 1180 "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." The law nationalizes the retail trade business. The main provisions of the Act are: a prohibition against foreign persons and juridical entities from engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade with the exception of United States and those licensed to do so; a prohibition against the establishment by aliens of additional stores or branches of retail business, a provision allowing the heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail business who die, to continue such business for a period of six months for purposes of liquidation. Petitioner, in behalf of other alien residents, contends that: (1) it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives them of their liberty and property without due process of law; (2) the Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; (3) the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the retail business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution. In answer, the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila contend that: (1) the Act was passed in the valid exercise of the police power of the State, which exercise is authorized in the Constitution in the interest of national economic survival. ISSUE Whether or not R.A. No. 1180 "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business is constitutional HELD It was held that the disputed law was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens and country from such dominance and control; that the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State, through which and by which it protects its own personality and insures its security and future; that the law does not violate the equal protection clause of the

Constitution because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause, because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to be plainly evident and necessary and that in any case such matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the Judicial department of the Government may not interfere; and that it cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into on the subject and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional agreement. But even supposing that the law infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty is always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law and the same may never curtail or restrict the scope of the police power of the State. DISCUSSION A. POLICE POWER (PP) - Police Power derives its existence from the very existence of the State itself, it does not need to be expressed or defined in its scope; co- extensive with self-protection and survival - Needs and demands of public interest and welfare in this constantly changing and progressive world, so it cannot delimit beforehand the extent or scope of police power by which and through which the State seeks to attain or achieve public interest or welfare - Constitutions do not define the scope or extent of the police power of the State; what they do is to set forth the limitations thereof. The most important of these are the due process clause and the equal protection clause

1. Equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality; does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.
2. The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in pursuance of the police power; test of reasonableness of a law is the appropriateness or adequacy

under all circumstances of the means adopted to carry out its purpose into effect. B. ALIEN CONTROL AND DOMINANCE - With ample capital, unity of purpose and action and thorough organization, alien retailers and merchants can act in such complete unison and concert on such vital matters as the fixing of prices, the determination of the amount of goods or articles to be made available in the market, and even the choice of the goods or articles they would or would not patronize or distribute, that fears of dislocation of the national economy and of the complete subservience of national retailers and of the consuming public are not entirely unfounded. - They may be potential source of danger on occasions of war or other calamity; they are well organized and powerful groups that dominate the distribution of goods and commodities in the communities and big centers of population. They owe no allegiance or loyalty to the State, and the State cannot rely upon them in times of crisis or emergency. While the national holds his life, his person and his property subject to the needs of his country, the alien may even become the potential enemy of the State C. UNREASONABLENESS OF RA - Petitioner's main argument is that retail is a common, ordinary occupation, one of those privileges recognized as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men; that it is a gainful and honest occupation and therefore beyond the power of the legislature to prohibit and penalize. - However, the privilege has been so grossly abused by the alien, through the illegitimate use of pernicious designs and practices, that he now enjoys a monopolistic control of the occupation and threatens a deadly stranglehold on the nation's economy endangering the national security in times of crisis and emergency. - The law in question is deemed absolutely necessary to bring about the desired legislative objective, i.e., to free national economy from alien control and dominance. It is not necessarily unreasonable because it affects private rights and privileges

Principal objective is the conservation of the patrimony of the nation and as corollary thereto the provision limiting to citizens of the Philippines the exploitation, development and utilization of its natural resources; nationalization of the retail trade is only a continuance of the nationalistic protective policy laid down as a primary objective of the Constitution.

D. LEGISLATIVE DISCRETION - exercise of legislative discretion is not subject to judicial review; Legislature is primarily the judge of the necessity of an enactment or of any of its provisions, and every presumption is in favor of its validity, and though the Court may hold views inconsistent with the wisdom of the law, it may not annul the legislation if not palpably in excess of the legislative power. E. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND OBLIGATIONS - Declaration of Human Rights contains nothing more than a mere recommendation, or a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations; members of the United Nations Organization, such as Norway and Denmark, prohibit foreigners from engaging in retail trade, and in most nations of the world laws against foreigners engaged in domestic trade are adopted. - All that the Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of China guarantees is equality of treatment to the Chinese nationals "upon the same terms as the nationals of any other country." But the nationals of China are not discriminated against because nationals of all other countries, except those of the United States, who are granted special rights by the Constitution, are all prohibited from engaging in the retail trade - But even supposing that the law infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty is always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law, and the same may never curtail or restrict the scope of the police power of the State

THE CITY OF MANILA vs. CHINESE COMMUNITY OF MANILA ET AL. *BAD TRIP NA PONENTE SI JOHNSON!!! RAWR!! Paulit-ulit and PUNO ng rhetorical question! FACTS In December 1916, the City of Manila presented a petition in the Court of First Instance of said city, praying that certain lands, therein particularly described, be expropriated for the purpose of constructing a public improvement. namely, the extension of Rizal Avenue, Manila and claiming that such expropriation was necessary. Herein defendants, on the other hand, alleged (a) that no necessity existed for said expropriation and (b) that the land in question was a cemetery, which had been used as such for many years, and was covered with sepulchres and monuments, and that the same should not be converted into a street for public purposes; that if the construction of the street or road should be considered a public necessity, other routes were available, which would fully satisfy the plaintiff's purposes, at much less expense and without disturbing the resting places of the dead. The lower court ruled that there was no necessity for the expropriation of the particular strip of land in question. Plaintiff assails that once it has established the fact, under the law, that it has authority to expropriate land, it may expropriate any land it may desire; that the only function of the court in such proceedings is to ascertain the value of the land in question; that neither the court nor the owners of the land can inquire into the advisable purpose of the expropriation or ask any questions concerning the necessities thereof; that the courts are mere appraisers of the land involved in expropriation proceedings, and, when the value of the land is fixed by the method adopted by the law, to render a judgment in favor of the defendant for its value. ISSUE: WON the courts may inquire into and hear proof upon the necessity of the expropriation

HELD: The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the lower court. It was held that the courts have the power to restrict the exercise of eminent domain to the actual reasonable necessities of the case and for the purposes designated by the law. The legislature, in providing for the exercise of the power of eminent domain, may directly determine the necessity for appropriating private property for a particular improvement for public use, and it may select the exact location of the improvement. There is a wide distinction between a legislative declaration that a municipality is given authority to exercise the right of eminent domain, and a decision by the municipality that there exists a necessity for the exercise of that right in a particular case. The first is a declaration simply that there exist reasons why the right should be conferred upon municipal corporation, while the second is the application of the right to a particular case. Whether it was wise to confer upon a municipality the power to exercise the right of eminent domain, is a question with which the courts are not concerned. The necessity for conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain is admittedly within the power of the legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the conditions imposed by the general authority, or when that right or authority is exercised for the purpose of depriving citizens of their property, the courts are authorized, in this jurisdiction, to make inquiry and to hear proof upon the necessity in the particular case, and not the general authority. In the present case, even granting that a necessity exists for the opening of the street in question, the record contains no proof of the necessity of opening the same through the cemetery. The record shows that adjoining and adjacent lands have been offered by Tambunting to the city free of charge, which will answer every purpose of the plaintiff.

DISCUSSION A. ROLE OF THE COURT IN EXPROPRIATION The Charter of the city of Manila contains no procedure by which the said authority may be carried into effect; Act No. 190 was examined to ascertain how the said authority may be exercised. Sec. 241 - "The Government of the Philippine Islands, or of any province or department thereof, or of any municipality, and any person, or public or private corporation having, by law, the right to condemn private property for public use, shall exercise that right in the manner hereinafter prescribed." Sec. 242 - provides that a complaint in expropriation proceeding shall be presented; that the complaint shall state with certainty the right of condemnation, with a description of the property sought to be condemned together with the interest of each defendant separately Sec. 243 - provides that if the court shall find upon trial that the right to expropriate the land in question exists, it shall then appoint commissioners. INTERPRETATION: Court shall examine the statutes simply for the purpose of ascertaining whether a law exists authorizing the petitioner to exercise the right of eminent domain. Power of the court is not limited to that question. The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal corporation, and before it can exercise the right some law must exist conferring the power upon it. When the courts come to determine the question, they must not only find: (a) that a law or authority exists for the exercise of the right of eminent domain (b) also that the right or authority is being exercised in accordance with the law. Section 248 - provides for an appeal from the judgment of the CFI to the Supreme Court; gives the Supreme Court authority to inquire into the right of expropriation on the part of the plaintiff. If the Supreme Court on appeal shall determine that no right of expropriation existed, it shall remand the cause to the Court of First Instance with a mandate that the defendant be replaced in the possession of the property and that he recover whatever damages he may have sustained by reason of the possession of the plaintiff.

B. EXPROPRIATION OF PROPERTY (EMINENT DOMAIN) - The legislature, in providing for the exercise of the power of eminent domain, may directly determine the necessity for appropriating private property for a particular improvement for public use, and it may select the exact location of the improvement. - But when the law does not designate the property to be taken, nor how much may be taken, then the necessity of taking private property is a question for the courts. - The taking of private property for any use which is not required by the necessities or convenience of the inhabitants of a state, is an unreasonable exercise of the right of eminent domain - if the legislature under proper authority should grant the expropriation of a certain or particular parcel of land for some specified public purpose, that the courts would be without jurisdiction to inquire into the purpose of that legislation. - On the other hand, if the Legislature should grant general authority to a municipal corporation to expropriate private land for public purposes, the courts have ample authority in this jurisdiction, under the provisions above quoted, to make inquiry and to hear proof, upon an issue properly presented, concerning whether or not the lands were private and whether the purpose was, in fact, public C. APPLICATION - Two conditions imposed upon the authority conceded to the City of Manila: First, the land must be private; and, second, the purpose must be public. - The city of Manila can only expropriate private property. - Where a cemetery is open to the public, it is a public use and no part of the ground can be taken for other public uses under a general authority. And this immunity extends to the unimproved and unoccupied parts which are held in good faith for future use. - The cemetery in question may be used by the general community of Chinese, which fact, in the general acceptation of the definition of a public cemetery, would make the cemetery in question public property. If that is true, then, of course, the petition of the plaintiff must be denied, for the reason that the city of Manila has no authority or right under the law to expropriate public property. - Whether or not the cemetery is public or private property, its appropriation for the uses of a public street, especially during the

lifetime of those specially interested in its maintenance as a cemetery, should be a question of great concern, and its appropriation should not be made for such purposes until it is fully established that the greatest necessity exists therefor While cemeteries and sepulchers and the places of the burial of the dead are still within the memory and command of the active care of the living; while they are still devoted to pious uses and sacred regard, it is difficult to believe that even the legislature would adopt a law expressly providing that such places, under such circumstances, should be violated. Even granting that a necessity exists for the opening of the street in question, the record contains no proof of the necessity of opening the same through the cemetery. The record shows that adjoining and adjacent lands have been offered to the city free of charge, which will answer every purpose of the plaintiff.

PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE, INC., for and in behalf of 139 members, represented by its President Amado P. Macasaet and its Executive Director Ermin F. Garcia, Jr., petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. Petition for certiorari and prohibition FACTS Respondednt COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2772, particularly Sec. 21 directing newspapers to provide free print space of not less than one half (1/2) page for use as Comelec Space which shall be allocated by the Commission, free of charge, among all candidates within the area in which the newspaper, magazine or periodical is circulated to enable the candidates to make known their qualifications, their stand on public issues and their platforms and programs of government. Philippine Press Institute, a non-stock, non-profit organization of newspaper and magazine publishers asks the Court to declare said resolution unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon the government, and any of its agencies, against the taking of private property for public use without just compensation. PPI also argues that Section 82 of Resolution No. 2772 is violative of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech, of the press and of expression. The Office of the Solicitor General, on behalf of Comelec alleged that the resolution does not impose upon the publishers any obligation to provide free print space in the newspapers as it does not provide any criminal or administrative sanction for non-compliance with that Resolution. It merely
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established guidelines to be followed in connection with the procurement of Comelec space. And if it is viewed as mandatory, the same would nevertheless be valid as an exercise of the police power of the State- a permissible exercise of the power of supervision or regulation of the Comelec over the communication and information operations of print media enterprises during the election period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election. ISSUE Whether or not the resolution was a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain HELD: The court held that the resolution does not constitute a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain. To compel print media companies to donate Comelec-space amounts to taking of private personal property for public use or purposes without the requisite just compensation. The extent of the taking or deprivation is not insubstantial; this is not a case of a de minimis temporary limitation or restraint upon the use of private property. The monetary value of the compulsory donation, measured by the advertising rates ordinarily charged by newspaper publishers whether in cities or in non-urban areas, may be very substantial indeed. The threshold requisites for a lawful taking of private property for public use are the necessity for the taking and the legal authority to effect the taking. The element of necessity for the taking has not been shown by respondent Comelec. It has not been suggested that the members of PPI are unwilling to sell print space at their normal rates to Comelec for election purposes. Indeed, the unwillingness or reluctance of Comelec to buy print space lies at the heart of the problem. Similarly, it has not been suggested, let alone demonstrated, that Comelec has been granted the power of eminent domain either by the Constitution or by the legislative authority. A reasonable relationship between that power and the enforcement and administration of election laws by Comelec must be shown; it is not casually to be assumed. The taking of private property for public use is, of course, authorized by the Constitution, but not without payment of just compensation (Article III, Section 9). And apparently the necessity of paying compensation for Comelec space is precisely what is sought to be avoided by respondent Commission. Wherefore 1.Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772, in its present form and as interpreted by Comelec in its 22 March 1995 letter directives, purports to require print media

Sec. 2.Comelec Space. The Commission shall procure free print space of not less than one half (1/2) page in at least one newspaper of general circulation in every province or city for use as 'Comelec Space' from March 6, 1995 in the case of candidates for senators and from March 21, 1995 until May 12, 1995. In the absence of said newspaper, 'Comelec Space' shall be obtained from any magazine or periodical of said province or city
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Sec. 8.Undue Reference to Candidates/Political parties in Newspaper. No newspaper or publication shall allow to be printed or published in the news, opinion, features, or other sections of the newspaper or publication accounts or comments which manifest favor or oppose any candidate or political party by unduly or repeatedly referring to or including therein said candidate or political party. However, unless the facts and circumstances clearly indicates otherwise, the Commission will respect the determination by the publisher and/or editors of the newspapers or publications that the accounts or views published are significant, newsworthy and of public interest.

enterprises to "donate" free print space to Comelec. As such, Section 2 suffers from fatal constitutional vice and must be set aside and nullified. 2.To the extent it pertains to Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772, the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition must be dismissed for lack of an actual, justiciable case or controversy.

DISCUSSION A. POLICE POWER - As earlier noted, the Solicitor General also contended that Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772, even if read as compelling publishers to "donate" "Comelec space," may be sustained as a valid exercise of the police power of the state. This argument was, however, made too casually to require prolonged consideration on their part. - Firstly, there was no effort (and apparently no inclination on the part of Comelec) to show that the police power essentially a power of legislation has been constitutionally delegated to respondent Commission. Secondly, while private property may indeed be validly taken in the legitimate exercise of the police power of the state, there was no attempt to show compliance in the instant case with the requisites of a lawful taking under the police power. - Sec. 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is a blunt and heavy instrument that purports, without a showing of existence of a national emergency or other imperious public necessity, indiscriminately and without regard to the individual business condition of particular newspapers or magazines located in different parts of the country, to take private property of newspaper or magazine publishers. - No attempt was made to demonstrate that a real and palpable or urgent necessity for the taking of print space confronted the Comelec and that Sec. 2 of Resolution No. 2772 was itself the only reasonable and calibrated response to such necessity available to Comelec. Sec. 2 does not constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the State. B. ACTUAL CONTROVERSY (CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SEC. 8) - Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772 appears to represent the effort of the Comelec to establish guidelines for implementation of the above-quoted distinction and doctrine in National Press Club, an effort not blessed

with evident success. Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772-A while possibly helpful, does not add substantially to the utility of Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772. The distinction between paid political advertisements on the one hand and news reports, commentaries and expressions of belief or opinion by reporters, broadcasters, editors, etc. on the other hand, can realistically be given operative meaning only in actual cases or controversies, on a case-to-case basis, in terms of very specific sets of facts. - At all events, the Court is bound to note that PPI has failed to allege any specific affirmative action on the part of Comelec designed to enforce or implement Section 8. PPI has not claimed that it or any of its members has sustained actual or imminent injury by reason of Comelec action under Section 8. Put a little differently, the Court considers that the precise constitutional issue here sought to be raised whether or not Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772 constitutes a permissible exercise of the Comelec's power under Article IX, Section 4 of the Constitution to "supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchise or permits for the operation of media of communication or information [for the purpose of ensuring] equal opportunity, time and space, and the right of reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public-information campaigns and forums among candidates in connection with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections " is not ripe for judicial review for lack of an actual case or controversy involving, as the very lis mota thereof, the constitutionality of Section 8. The Court carefully distinguished (a) paid political advertisements which are reached by the prohibition, from (b) the reporting of news, commentaries and expressions of belief or opinion by reporters, broadcasters, editors, commentators or columnists which fall outside the scope of prohibition, and which are protected by the constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press

CRISTINA DE KNECHT and RENE KNECHT, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS FACTS The instant case is an unending sequel to several suits commenced almost twenty years ago over the same subject matter. This involves a parcel of land with an area of 8,102.68 square meters, more or less, located at the corner of the south end of the EDSA and F.B. Harrison in Pasay City. The land was owned by petitioners Cristina de Knecht and her son, under TCT No. 9032 issued in their names by the Register of Deeds of Pasay City. On the land, the Knechts constructed eight houses of strong materials, leased out the seven and occupied one of them as their residence. In 1979, the Republic of the Philippines initiated a case for expropriation against the Knechts' property. The government sought to utilize the land for the completion of the Manila Flood Control and Drainage Project and the extension of the EDSA towards Roxas Boulevard. The Court however, held that the choice of area for the extension of EDSA was arbitrary, and thus annulled the writ. In 1982, the City Treasurer of Pasay discovered that the Knechts failed to pay real estate taxes on the property from 1980 to 1982. As a consequence of this deficiency, the City Treasurer sold the property at public auction at the amount of the deficiency taxes. The highest bidders were respondents Babiera and Sangalang couples. The petitioners failed to redeem the property within a year from date of sale. Babiera then filed for registration of the land to his name. The trial court granted the petition. The Knechts, who were in possession of the property, allegedly learned of the auction sale only by the time they received the orders of the land registration courts. The De Knechts also filed civil case to prevent the titles from being given to the contending spouses. They put up lack of notice to the sale as defense. This was dismissed for lack of counsel to appear on the last hearing. In 1985, Sangalang and Babiera sold the land to respondent Salem Investment Corp. (Salem). Meanwhile, on February 17, 1983, the Batasang Pambansa passed B.P. Blg. 340 authorizing thenational government to expropriate certain properties in Pasay City for the EDSA Extension. The just compensation for this purpose was docketed by the OSG under Civil Case 7327. The De Knecht property was covered by the expropriation. On August 30, seven of the eight houses of the Knechts were demolished and the government took possession of the portion of land on which the houses stood. Salem instituted against them a civil case for unlawful detainer.

The Court allowed for the expropriation this time. As prayed for by Salem, the trial court issued an order on September 13, 1990 for the release of P5,763,650.00 to Salem by the Philippine National Bank (PNB) as partial payment of just compensation. The CA quashed their motion to intervene due to the lack of legal interest. They filed an original action for the annulment of TC judgments. Therein, the Knechts challenged the validity of the orders of the land registration courts in the two petitions of the Sangalangs and Babieras for registration of their names, the reconveyance case and the just compensation proceedings. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit on November 24, 1992. Hence the filing of G.R. No. 108015. In a Resolution dated February 1, 1993, the SC denied the petition finding "no reversible error" committed by the Court of Appeals. The De Knechts alleged: 1. CA committed a reversible error when it claimed Civil Case 7327 was not an eminent domain proceeding 2. Error when CA upheld res judicata to bar the MFR 3. Error when CA refused for respondent judge to rule for the motion for inhibition ISSUE 1. WON the De Knechts denied due process when they were not sufficiently notified of the tax delinquency, the auction sale, and the surrender of the owners duplicate for the tax lien 2. WON 7327 is an expropriation case HELD 1. No. The De Knechts claimed that they did not receive the notices for tax delinquency and the auction sale. That was why they were unable to claim the property. It has been ruled that the notices and publication, as well as the legal requirements for a tax delinquency sale, are mandatory; and the failure to comply therewith can invalidate the sale. The prescribed notices must be sent to comply with the requirements of due process. The De Knechts claim was a factual question and not to be answered in the SC. Moreover, the question had already been answered in the previous cases in the appellate courts.

2. The Court of Appeals erred in declaring that Civil Case No. 7327 was not an expropriation case. It was precisely in the exercise of the state's power of eminent domain under B.P. Blg. 340 that expropriation proceedings were instituted against the owners of the lots sought to be expropriated. B.P. Blg. 340 did not, by itself, lay down the procedure for expropriation. The law merely described the specific properties expropriated and declared that just compensation was to be determined by the court. It designated the then Ministry of Public Works and Highways as the administrator in the "prosecution of the project." Thus, in the absence of a procedure in the law for expropriation, reference must be made to the provisions on eminent domain in Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court. The complaint must join as defendants all persons owning or claiming to own, or occupying, any part thereof or interest therein. The defendants in an expropriation case are not limited to the owners of the property condemned. They include all other persons owning, occupying or claiming to own the property including a mortgagee, a lessee and a vendee in possession under an executory contract. Every person having an estate or interest at law or in equity in the land taken is entitled to share in the award. The Knechts insist that although they were no longer the registered owners of the property at the time Civil Case No. 7327 was filed, they still occupied the property and therefore should have been joined as defendants in the expropriation proceedings. They claim that they still occupied the land when it was expropriated and therefore had a share. Four months earlier, in January 1990, Civil Case No. 2961-P for reconveyance was dismissed with finality by this Court and judgment was entered in February 1990. The Knechts lost whatever right or colorable title they had to the property after we affirmed the order of the trial court dismissing the reconveyance case. The Knechts' possession of the land and buildings was based on their claim of ownership not on any juridical title such as a lessee, mortgagee, or vendee. Indeed, the Knechts had no legal interest in the property by the time the expropriation proceedings were instituted. They had no right to intervene and the trial court did not err in denying their "Motion for Intervention and to Implead Additional Parties." Their intervention having been denied, the Knechts had no personality to move for the inhibition of respondent Judge Sayo from the case. Petition is dismissed

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner vs. HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, respondent. FACTS The petitioners invoke the right of retention granted by P.D. No. 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding seven hectares as long as they are cultivating or intend to cultivate the same. Their respective lands do not exceed the statutory limit but are occupied by tenants who are actually cultivating such lands. According to P.D. No. 316, which was promulgated in implementation of P.D. No. 27: No tenant-farmer in agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn shall be ejected or removed from his farmholding until such time as the respective rights of the tenant- farmers and the landowner shall have been determined in accordance with the rules and regulations implementing P.D. No. 27. The petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention because the Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules required under the above-quoted decree. They therefore ask the Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent to issue the said rules. The public respondent argues that P.D. No. 27 has been amended by LOI 474 removing any right of retention from persons who own other agricultural lands of more than 7 hectares in aggregate area or lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or other purposes from which they derive adequate income for their family. And even assuming that the petitioners do not fall under its terms, the regulations implementing P.D. No. 27 have already been issued, to wit, the Memorandum dated July 10, 1975 (Interim Guidelines on Retention by Small Landowners, with an accompanying Retention Guide Table), Memorandum Circular No. 11 dated April 21, 1978, (Implementation Guidelines of LOI No. 474), Memorandum Circular No. 18-81 dated December 29,1981 (Clarificatory Guidelines on Coverage of P.D. No. 27 and Retention by Small Landowners), and DAR Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1985 (Providing for a Cut-off Date for Landowners to Apply for Retention and/or to Protest the

Coverage of their Landholdings under Operation Land Transfer pursuant to P.D. No. 27). For failure to file the corresponding applications for retention under these measures, the petitioners are now barred from invoking this right. The petitioners insist that the above-cited measures are not applicable to them because they do not own more than seven hectares of agricultural land. The Constitution of 1987 was not to be outdone. Besides echoing these sentiments, it also adopted one whole and separate Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights, containing grandiose but undoubtedly sincere provisions for the uplift of the common people. These include a call in the following words for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program: SEC. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations and subject to the payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall respect the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives for voluntary land-sharing. ISSUE: Whether or not all rights acquired by the tenant-farmer under P.D. No. 27, as recognized under E.O. No. 228, are retained by him even under R.A. No. 6657. HELD: P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-farmer as October 21, 1972 and declared that he shall "be deemed the owner" of a portion of land consisting of a family-sized farm except that "no title to the land owned by him was to be actually issued to him unless and until he had become a full-fledged member of a duly recognized farmers' cooperative." It was understood, however, that full payment of the just compensation also had to be made first, conformably to the constitutional requirement.

When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that: All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October 21, 1972 of the land they acquired by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 27. The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on receipt by the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated either. This should counter-balance the express provision in Section 6 of the said law that "the landowners whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained by them thereunder, further, that original homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead." R.A. No. 6657 does provide for such limits now in Section 6 of the law, which in fact is one of its most controversial provisions. Retention Limits. Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person may own or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private agricultural land, the size of which shall vary according to factors governing a viable family-sized farm, such as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5) hectares. Three (3) hectares may be awarded to each child of the landowner, subject to the following qualifications: (1) that he is at least fifteen (15) years of age; and (2) that he is actually tilling the land or directly managing the farm; Provided, That landowners whose lands have been covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained by them thereunder, further, That original homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead. All rights previously acquired by the tenant- farmers under P.D. No. 27 are retained and recognized. Landowners who were unable to exercise their rights of retention under P.D. No. 27 shall enjoy the retention rights granted by R.A. No.

6657 under the conditions therein prescribed. Subject to the above-mentioned rulings all the petitions are DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.