Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013 Lundeen/Pointer/Spraker

AFF

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Definitions of Economic Sanctions

Economic sanctions are actions taken to harm another countries economy Collins English Dictionary 2009
[Dictionary.com, Accessed 7/17/13, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/economic%20sanctions, chip] economic sanctions pl n: any actions taken by one nation or group of nations to harm the economy of another nation or group, often to force a political change

Economic sanctions are restrictions on international trade Investor Words

[Investorwords.com, Web Finance Inc., Accessed 7/17/13, http://www.investorwords.com/1649/economic_sanctions.html,] Economic Sanctions- Definition: Restrictions upon international trade and finance that one country imposes on another for political reasons

Economic sanctions include trade embargoes, denial of loans and assetsdiplomacy, military and quid pro quos are excluded Rennack, Analyst in Foreign Policy Legislation and Shuey, Specialist in U.S. Foreign Policy and National Defense, 1997
[Dianne E. Rennack, Robert D. Shuey, 10/20/97, Economic Sanctions to Achieve U.S. Foreign Policy Goals: Discussion and Guide to Current Law, CRS Report for Congress, Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, http://www.fas.org/man/crs/crs-sanction.htm, chip] Generally, economic sanctions might be defined as "coercive economic measures taken against one or more countries to force a change in policies, or at least to demonstrate a country's opinion about the other's policies.'' The most-often quoted study on sanctions defines the term as "...the deliberate, government-inspired withdrawal, or threat of withdrawal, of customary trade or financial relations."2 Economic sanctions typically include measures such as trade embargoes; restrictions on particular exports or imports; denial of foreign assistance, loans, and investments; or control of foreign assets and economic transactions that involve U. S. citizens or businesses. These definitions of economic sanctions would exclude diplomatic demarches, reductions in embassy staff or closing of embassies, mobilizing armed forces or going to war--tools clearly intended to change another country's behavior through other than economic means. The use of "carrots" (e.g., granting most-favored-nation status for another year; or selling advanced military aircraft to Taiwan to change China's behavior) would not qualify as a sanction.

Economic sanctions entail military weakening and punishment Baldwin, a Senior Political Scientist at the Woodrow Wilson @ Princeton, and Pape, Professor of Political Science @ UChigago, 1998

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013 Lundeen/Pointer/Spraker [David A. Baldwin and Robert A. Pape, Evaluating Economic Sanctions, International Security, Vol. 23, No. 2 pp. 189-198, The MIT Press, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539384, accessed 7/17/13, chip] Rather than treating economic sanctions as tools of statecraft, Pape defines them in terms of a particular strategy for using such tools (pp. 93-98). He then proceeds to differentiate this strategy (i.e., economic sanctions) from two other strategies for using economic instruments of statecraft-trade wars and economic warfare-in terms of the differing goals of each strategy. From this perspective, economic sanctions, trade wars, and economic warfare are not alternative policy options to be considered with respect to a particular set of foreign policy goals. Each is defined in terms of a different set of goals. Definitional ties between particular policy instruments and particular goals do not facilitate the comparative evaluation of the utility of policy instruments with respect to a given set of goals. In offering his definition of economic sanctions, Pape creatively interprets my posi- tion in the following passage: "Recently, however, Baldwin has argued that the concept of economic sanctions should be broadened to encompass all aspects of 'economic statecraft' including not only economic coercion for political purposes (the traditional understanding of sanctions), but also coercion for economic goals (trade disputes) as well as goals other than changing the target state's behavior, such as engaging in economic warfare, rallying domestic political support, demonstrating resolve to third- party audiences, or simply inflicting punishment" (p. 95). I have never argued in favor of broadening the concept of economic sanctions to encompass all aspects of economic statecraft. I have argued that the concept of economic statecraft is preferable to such concepts as economic coercion, economic warfare, economic leverage, and economic sanctions-partially on the grounds that such concepts usually fail to maintain a clear distinction between ends and means.3 I have noted that one of the common meanings of "economic sanctions" corresponds with the concept of economic statecraft and have sometimes used the terms interchangeably. Although the concept of economic statecraft, as I use it, allows for a wide range of possible goals, all of these involve attempts to change the target state's behavior. Attempts to weaken another state's economic poten- tial in order to weaken it militarily (Pape's "economic warfare"), demonstrating resolve, and inflicting punishment are included in my conception of economic statecraft only to the extent that they are potentially relevant to changing the behavior of the target state(s).4 This "behavior" is defined broadly to include beliefs, attitudes, opinions, expectations, emotions, and/or predispositions to act.5 And although I would not deny that economic sanctions are sometimes used for "rallying domestic political support," I have excluded such domestic considerations from my analyses of economic statecraft.6 Contrary to Pape's suggestion, I have never used "rallying domestic political support" as a criterion for judging the success of economic sanctions.

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AT: Cap K
The intent of the sanctions is to prevent the success of the Cuban socialist model. Lamrani, specialist on Cuba-US relations, 2013
(Dr. Salim Lamrani is a lecturer at Paris Sorbonne Paris IV University and Paris-Est Marne-la-Valle University and French journalist, specialist on relations between Cuba and the US, The Economic War Against Cuba: A Historical and Legal Perspective on the U.S. Blockade, p. Kindle Edition, Location 945)

According to Cuban authorities, this is the objective of the economic sanctions and the reason for maintaining them over two decades after the end of the Cold War. The former Cuban Minister of Foreign Affairs, Felipe Perez Roque, has denounced this state of affairs before the United Nations and provided an interpretation: Why does the U.S. government not lift the blockade against Cuba? I will answer: because it is afraid. It fears our example. It knows that if the blockade were lifted, Cuba's economic and social development would be dizzying. It knows that we would demonstrate even more so than now, the possibilities of Cuban socialism, all the potential not yet fully deployed of a country without discrimination of any kind, with social justice and human rights for all citizens, and not just for the few. It is the government of a great and powerful empire, but it fears the example of this small insurgent island. Thus, in the light of international conventions, the United States imposes on the Cuban population living conditions that seriously undermine their well-being and their physical and mental security.

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NEG

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AT: Intervening Actors

Blame can be shared-if one predicts that another actor will commit murder because of ones actions, it is morally equivalent to intending the murder Zimmerman, UNC-Greensboro philosophy professor, 85 (Michael, Philosophical
Quarterly, Intervening Agents and Moral Responsibility, http://libres.uncg.edu/ir/uncg/f/M_Zimmerman_Intervening_1985.pdf, KR) "Hence"? Why think this? One reason might be put as follows: "Our idea of responsibility requires that it should be uniquely ascribed." 29 But this is false. If two people pick up a heavy rock and chuck it on a third person's head, both will be responsible for the consequent injury. But, it might be retorted, in su ch a case the responsibility is shared, while in the original cases it is clear that the intervening agent is fully responsible; hence the responsibility cannot be shared; hence the original agents are not responsible. This, too, seems to me clearly false. To say that someone is fully responsible is not to say that he is solely responsible; responsibility is not to be cut up, like a pie, so that the more people that join in a wrongdoing, the less responsibility to be allocated to each. On the contrary, responsibility may be multiplied; for to be fully responsible is to be totally without excuse, and many persons may each be totally without excuse with respect to one and the same event.30 This seems to me clearly true in the rock - throwing case, and I see no reason to think that a secondary agent cannot be fully responsible for what he does qua agent. (Surely we have learned not to automatically excuse someone who was "only following orders", even though we also blame the one who gave the orders.) I suppose that someone might seek to "combine" (4b) and (4c) thus: (4d) P1 is not morally responsible for El, if P2 is not P 1 's secondary agent with respect to El and P2 is (full y) morally responsible for El. But, again, why accept this? If I knowingly give a murderer an opportunity to murder not intending that he should murder, mind you, but "merely" waiting to see what he will do, given the chancesurely I am to blame for the death that results. 31

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Discourse Not Key

Discourse doesnt shape reality truth exists externally to social construction and even if it doesnt we must approach policymaking from this perspective

Sokal, Professor of Physics at New York University, 1996 [Alan, A Physicist Experiments With Cultural Studies, http://www.physics.nyu.edu/faculty/sokal/lingua_franca_v4/lingua_franca_v4 .html]
Why did I do it? While my method was satirical, my motivation is utterly serious. What concerns me is the proliferation, not just of nonsense and sloppy thinking per se, but of a particular kind of nonsense and sloppy thinking: one that denies the existence of objective realities, or (when challenged) admits their existence but downplays their practical relevance. At its best, a journal like Social Text raises important questions that no scientist should ignore -- questions, for example, about how corporate and government funding influence scientific work. Unfortunately, epistemic relativism does little to further the discussion of these matters. In short, my concern over the spread of subjectivist thinking is both intellectual and political. Intellectually, the problem with such doctrines is that they are false (when not simply meaningless). There is a real world; its properties are not merely social constructions; facts and evidence do matter. What sane person would contend otherwise? And yet, much contemporary academic theorizing consists precisely of attempts to blur these obvious truths -- the utter absurdity of it all being concealed through obscure and pretentious language. Social Text's acceptance of my article exemplifies the intellectual arrogance of Theory -- meaning postmodernist literary theory -carried to its logical extreme. No wonder they didn't bother to consult a physicist. If all is discourse and ``text,'' then knowledge of the real world is superfluous; even physics becomes just another branch of Cultural Studies. If, moreover, all is rhetoric and ``language games,'' then internal logical consistency is superfluous too: a patina of theoretical sophistication serves equally well. Incomprehensibility becomes a virtue; allusions, meta phors and puns substitute for evidence and logic. My own article is, if anything, an extremely modest example of this well-established genre. Politically, I'm angered because most (though not all) of this silliness is emanating from the self-proclaimed Left. We're witnessing here a profound historical volte-face. For most of the past two centuries, the Left has been identified with science and against obscurantism; we have believed that rational thought and the fearless analysis of objective reality (both natural and social) are incisive tools for combating the mystifications promoted by the powerful -- not to mention being desirable human ends in their own right. The recent turn of many ``progressive'' or ``leftist'' academic humanists and social scientists toward one or another form of epistemic relativism betrays this worthy heritage and undermines the already fragile prospects for progressive social critique. Theorizing about ``the social construction of reality'' won't help us find an effective treatment for AIDS or devise strategies for preventing global warming. Nor can we combat false ideas in history, sociology, economics and politics if we reject the notions of truth and falsity.

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Placing representations and discourse first trades off with concrete political change and makes no difference to those engaged in political struggles. Taft-Kaufman, Professor of Speech at Carnegie Mellon University, 5
[Jill, Southern Comm. Journal, Spring, v. 60, Iss. 3, Other Ways, Proquest]
The postmodern passwords of "polyvocality," "Otherness," and "difference," unsupported by substantial analysis of the concrete contexts of subjects, creates a solipsistic quagmire . The political

sympathies of the new cultural critics, with their ostensible concern for the lack of power experienced by marginalized people, aligns them with the political left. Yet, despite their
adversarial posture and talk of opposition, their discourses on intertextuality and inter-referentiality isolate them from and ignore the conditions that have produced leftist politics--conflict, racism, poverty, and injustice. In short, as Clarke (1991) asserts, postmodern emphasis on new

subjects conceals the old subjects, those who have limited access to good jobs, food, housing, health care, and transportation, as well as to the media that depict them. Merod (1987) decries this situation as one which leaves no vision, will, or commitment to activism. He notes that academic lip service to the oppositional is underscored by the absence of focused collective or politically active intellectual communities. Provoked by the academic manifestations of this problem Di Leonardo (1990) echoes Merod and laments: Has there
ever been a historical era characterized by as little radical analysis or activism and as much radicalchic writing as ours? Maundering on about Otherness: phallocentrism or Eurocentric tropes has become a lazy academic substitute for actual engagement with the detailed histories and contemporary realities of Western racial minorities, white women, or any Third World population. (p. 530) Clarke's assessment of the postmodern elevation of language to the "sine qua non" of critical discussion is an even stronger indictment against the trend . Clarke examines

Lyotard's (1984) The Postmodern Condition in which Lyotard maintains that virtually all social relations are linguistic, and, therefore, it is through the coercion that threatens speech that we enter the "realm of terror" and society falls apart. To this assertion, Clarke replies: I can
think of few more striking indicators of the political and intellectual impoverishment of a view of society that can only recognize the discursive. If the worst terror we can envisage is the threat not to be allowed to speak, we are appallingly ignorant of terror in its elaborate contemporary forms. It may be the intellectual's conception of terror (what else do we do but speak?), but its projection onto the rest of the world would be calamitous....(pp. 2-27) The realm of the discursive is derived from the requisites for human life, which are in the physical world, rather than in a world of ideas or symbols.(4) Nutrition, shelter, and protection are basic human needs that require collective activity for their fulfillment. Postmodern emphasis on the discursive without an accompanying analysis of how the discursive emerges from material circumstances hides the complex task of envisioning and working towards concrete social goals (Merod, 1987). Although the material

conditions that create the situation of marginality escape the purview of the postmodernist, the situation and its consequences are not overlooked by scholars from marginalized groups. Robinson (1990) for example, argues that "the justice that working people deserve is economic, not just textual" (p. 571). Lopez (1992) states that "the starting point for organizing the program content of education or political action must be the present existential, concrete situation " (p. 299). West (1988) asserts that borrowing French post-structuralist discourses about "Otherness" blinds us to realities of American difference going on in front of us (p. 170). Unlike postmodern "textual radicals" who Rabinow (1986) acknowledges are "fuzzy about power and the realities of socioeconomic constraints" (p. 255), most writers from marginalized groups are clear about how discourse interweaves with the concrete circumstances that create lived experience. People whose lives form the material for postmodern counter-hegemonic
discourse do not share the optimism over the new recognition of their discursive subjectivities,

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because such an acknowledgment does not address sufficiently their collective historical and current struggles against racism, sexism, homophobia, and economic injustice. They do not appreciate being told they are living in a world in which there are no more real subjects. Ideas have consequences. Emphasizing the discursive self when a person is hungry and homeless represents both a cultural and humane failure.

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The belief that representations create everything would destroy human condition and would collapse upon itself. Postmodern representationalism actually alienates us instead of liberating Colebrook, Professor of English Lit University of Edinburgh, 2k
[Claire, Questioning Representation, SubStance Vol. 29 No. 2 Issue 92, p47-67 JStor] The second way in which postmodernity is characterized by the problem of representation is in both the post-structuralist and conservative critiques of the first position.' Representation is targeted in many post-structuralist theories as the very problem of overcoming a history of Western thought that has subordinated itself.2 The idea that there is a logican ultimate ground or foundation of the giventies thought to some outside or some "proper image" of itself. Ideas of being, truth, presence logic, or the real have defined thought as re-presentation: the faithful image, copy or doubling of the present.3 Western thought, it is argued, has always posited some unquestioned "transcendence" or being that is there to be represented. To liberate thought from representation would be to render thought ungrounded. No longer an act of mimesis or recognition, thought would have to be responsible for its own event. The postmodern idea that all we have are representations of the world with no possibility of an ultimate presence is still too foundationalistfor representation then comes to stand in for some grounding logic or condition. Thus, both Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault attack the very notion of the "signifier," the idea that there is a representation, sign or token that is other than some presence or sense (Derrida 1978, 281; Foucault 1972: 229). From this critique of representation as signification there are two possibilities. The post-structuralist endeavor, undertaken by Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze and Irigaray, is to question the very project of a grounding logic, a project that they see as exemplified in the modern motif of representation. This strand of poststructuralism is deeply critical of the structuralist appeal to sign systems, semiotics and representational conditions, conditions that attenuate the final moment in a Western tradition of perpetual self-grounding (Deleuze 1994 xix; Derrida 1978, 155; Foucault 1970, 208; Irigaray 1985, 133). How can the representational domain be posited as the limit point of our questioning? Surely one cannot remain within some representational totality such as a culture, discourse, or epoch, for any recognition of such a totality implies the possibility of questioning either its legitimacy or its limit. The post-structuralist critique of postmodern representationalism often issues in an apocalyptic or utopian projection of a point beyond representation, a radical homelessness in which thought no longer locates itself within a totality, logic or scheme. And this freedom from grounding or totality would also overcome a sense of the world as being or presence, in favor of a continual becoming, effect, or non-presence. Against the location of thought within the point of view of a representing subject, this anti-representationalism strives to think beyond all subjectivism.

Focus on representations sanitizes powerful structures and destroys the predictive power of IR Stokes, Professor of Politics at Bristol University, No Date
[Doug, Gluing the Hats On: Power, Agency, and Reagan's Office of Public Diplomacy, http://web.archive.org/web/20060221025303/http://www.aqnt98.dsl.pipex.com/hats.htm, accessed 7/15/13, AR] In her discursive practices approach, Doty argues that more poststructurally inclined questions as to "how" foreign policy is made possible (that is, an examination of the prior conditions of

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013 Lundeen/Pointer/Spraker possibility) provides a more nuanced account of foreign policy formation than questions which ask "why" (that is, why a particular decision or policy was pursued). She rightly argues that "why" questions pre-suppose a discursive matrix, a mode of being and a background of social practices. Furthermore, these "why" questions fail to account for "how these meanings, subjects, and interpretative dispositions are constructed".66 However, in arguing for the superiority of analyses of possibility conditions, she misses a crucial point and simplifies the very nature of the "how" of foreign policy practice. Whilst it is important to analyse the discursive conditions of possibility of policy formation, in failing to account for how various discourses were employed and through what institutional mechanisms, how some discourses gained ascendancy and not others, and how social actors intervene in hegemonic struggles to maintain various discourses, Doty seriously compromises the critical potential of her analysis. By working with a notion of power free from any institutional basis and rejecting a notion of power that "social actors possess and use",67 she produces a narrative of foreign policy whereby the differential role of social actors is erased from foreign policy processes and decision making. For Doty it seems, power resides in discourses themselves and their endless production of and play on meaning, not in the ability on the part of those who own and control the means of social reproduction to manipulate dominant social and political discourses and deploy them institutionally and strategically. The ability to analyse the use of discourses by foreign policy elites for purposeful ends and their ability to deploy hegemonic discourses within foreign policy processes is lost through a delinking of those elites and discursive production (her "dispersed" notion of power). Furthermore, Doty assumes that the "kind of power that works through social agents, a power that social actors posses and use" is somehow in opposition to a "power that is productive of meanings, subject identities, their interrelationships and a range of imaginable conduct". But these forms of power are not mutually exclusive. Social agents can be both subject to discourse and act in instrumental ways to effect discourse precisely through producing meanings and subject identities, and delineating the range of policy options. Through her erasure of the link between foreign policy processes and purposeful social agents, she ends up producing an account of hegemonic foreign policy narratives free from any narrator.68 This is particularly problematic because the power inherent within representational practices does not necessarily operate independently from the power to deploy those representations. The power to represent, in turn, does not operate independently from differential access to the principal conduits of discursive production, sedimentation and transmission (for example, the news media).69 Thus, Doty's account fails to provide an adequate analysis of the socially constructed interests that constitute the discursive construction of reality. As Stuart Hall argues "there are centers that operate directly on the formation and constitution of discourse. The media are in that business. Political parties are in that business. When you set the terms in which the debate proceeds, that is an exercise of symbolic power [which] circulates between constituted points of condensation."70 The overall critical thrust of poststructurally inclined IR theorists is blunted by both the refusal to examine or even acknowledge the limits and constraints on social discourses and the denial of any linkage between identity representations and the interests that may infuse these representations.

The assumption that language shapes reality is empirically flawed they must support their claim by proving that we meant to be derogatory Roskoski & Peabody, Florida State Debaters, 91

Gonzaga Debate Institute 2013 Lundeen/Pointer/Spraker [Matthew and Joe, 1991, A Linguistic and Philosophical Critique of Language "Arguments, http://debate.uvm.edu/Library/DebateTheoryLibrary/Roskoski&Peabody-LangCritiques, accessed 7/15/13, AR] Initially, it is important to note that the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis does not intrinsically deserve presumption, although many authors assume its validity without empirical support. The reason it does not deserve presumption is that "on a priori grounds one can contest it by asking how, if we are unable to organize our thinking beyond the limits set by our native language, we could ever become aware of those limits" (Robins 101). Au explains that "because it has received so little convincing support, the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis has stimulated little research" (Au 1984 156). However, many critical scholars take the hypothesis for granted because it is a necessary but uninteresting precondition for the claims they really want to defend. Khosroshahi explains: However, the empirical tests of the hypothesis of linguistic relativity have yielded more equivocal results. But independently of its empirical status, Whorf's view is quite widely held. In fact, many social movements have attempted reforms of language and have thus taken Whorf's thesis for granted. (Khosroshahi 505). One reason for the hypothesis being taken for granted is that on first glance it seems intuitively valid to some. However, after research is conducted it becomes clear that this intuition is no longer true. Rosch notes that the hypothesis "not only does not appear to be empirically true in any major respect, but it no longer even seems profoundly and ineffably true" (Rosch 276). The implication for language "arguments" is clear: a debater must do more than simply read cards from feminist or critical scholars that say language creates reality. Instead , the debater must support this claim with empirical studies or other forms of scientifically valid research. Mere intuition is not enough, and it is our belief that valid empirical studies do not support the hypothesis. After assessing the studies up to and including 1989, Takano claimed that the hypothesis "has no empirical support" (Takano 142). Further, Miller & McNeill claim that "nearly all" of the studies performed on the Whorfian hypothesis "are best regarded as efforts to substantiate the weak version of the hypothesis" (Miller & McNeill 734). We additionally will offer four reasons the hypothesis is not valid. The first reason is that it is impossible to generate empirical validation for the hypothesis. Because the hypothesis is so metaphysical and because it relies so heavily on intuition it is difficult if not impossible to operationalize. Rosch asserts that "profound and ineffable truths are not, in that form, subject to scientific investigation" (Rosch 259). We concur for two reasons. The first is that the hypothesis is phrased as a philosophical first principle and hence would not have an objective referent. The second is there would be intrinsic problems in any such test. The independent variable would be the language used by the subject. The dependent variable would be the subject's subjective reality. The problem is that the dependent variable can only be measured through selfreporting, which - naturally - entails the use of language. Hence, it is impossible to separate the dependent and independent variables. In other words, we have no way of knowing if the effects on "reality" are actual or merely artifacts of the language being used as a measuring tool.