Notes on Kripke and the Description Theory

Jonathan Cohen
In [Kripke, 1980] (lectures originally given in 1970), Kripke gives a sustained attack on what he calls description theories of proper names. He claims that according to such theories, which he identies with Frege and Russell, a proper name, properly used, simply was a denite description abbreviated or disguised ([Kripke, 1980], 27).1 Kripke attacks a version of this position which has come to be associated with Searle and Dummett. The description theory Kripke attacks involves the following theses: (6470; collected again on 71) 1. To every name or designating expression X there corresponds a cluster of properties, namely the family of those properties such that A believes X . 2. One of the properties, or some conjointly, are believed by A to pick out some individual uniquely. 3. If most, or a weighted most, of the s are satised by one unique object y , then y is the referent of X . 4. If the vote yields no unique object, X does not refer. 5. The statement If X exists. then X has most of the s is known a priori by the speaker. 6. The statement If X exists. then X has most of the s expresses a necessary truth (in the ideolect of the speaker).
Department of Philosophy, University of California, San Diego, 9500 Gilman Drive, La Jolla, CA 92093-0119, joncohen@aardvark.ucsd.edu 1 Although it wont matter too much for present purposes, Kripkes historical attribution demands qualication. As Kripke himself points out ([Kripke, 1980], 27, note 4) Russell did not hold anything like a description theory of the semantics of the genuine (logically proper) names. But even concerning logically improper names, it seems a bit odd to understand Russell as advocating a description-based theory of reference, since he denied that descriptions are genuinely referring expressions. Moreover, the evidence generally cited in support of the attribution of a description theory to Frege ([Frege, 1892], note 2; cf. the Gustav Lauben story in [Frege, 1918]) is, in some ways, in tension with Freges other remarks about the notion of Sinn; although I cant pursue the matter here, there is a serious case to be made that Frege would have repudiated a description theory. In any case, there certainly were and are some theorists who have espoused the views Kripke attacks, and it is possible to evaluate his criticisms independently of such historical questions.

7. For any successful theory, the account must not be circular. The properties which are used in the vote must not themselves involve the notion of reference in such a way that it is ultimately impossible to eliminate.

Kripkes Arguments

Kripke gives three kinds of objections against this theory: his modal objection is aimed at thesis (6), his epistemic objection challenges thesis (5), and his semantic objections threaten (2), (3), and (4).2

1.1

Modal Argument

The basic structure of Kripkes modal objection against description theories is this: he argues that names are rigid designators, while denite descriptions are not, and concludes that names cannot be synonymous with denite descriptions. For Kripke, if an expression e rigidly designates x (/is a rigid designator), then it refers to x in every possible world.3 If an expression e is a non-rigid designator, then it designates dierent things in dierent worlds.4 Kripke claims that Aristotle designates a certain individual rigidly,5 while the teacher of Alexander designates that individual non-rigidly. The intuition here is just that the actual and counterfactual truth conditions of a sentence such as Aristotle was bald depend on Aristotle (the actual referent of the name) and whether he satises the property of being bald in each world. In contrast, the actual and counterfactual truth conditions of The teacher of Alexander was bald depend on whether whatever individual happens to have taught Alexander in each world satises the property of being bald there. But now consider (a) Aristotle was the teacher of Alexander. If, as Kripke has claimed, the name Aristotle is a rigid designator, while the description the teacher of Alexander is not, then there will be some worlds
2 (1) is denitional, while (7) is a condition of adequacy on description theories; therefore, Kripke doesnt inveigh against these theses. 3 I am ignoring questions about the distinction between strong and weak rigid designation (as well as a host of other interesting questions about the correct understanding of rigid designation) for present purposes. 4 An important metaphysical presumption behind Kripkes notion of rigid designation, for which Kripke argues in the Preface of [Kripke, 1980], is that particulars can occupy dierent possible worlds. However, it is possible to dene an analogous notion of rigid designation which will undergird the Kripkean arguments and intuitions we shall be discussing in terms of Lewiss metaphysics of possibility, which rejects Kripkes metaphysical presumption. In particular, we can say that the referring expression a in F (a) is a rigid designator just in case for any world w, F (a) is true in w i (if a has a unique counterpart c(a, w) in w, then F (c(a, w)) is true in w). 5 Kripke points out (e.g., p. 49) that his claim that Aristotle refers rigidly is not to be understood as the claim that the name couldnt change its semantic properties across worlds. Rather, the claim is that, given the actual semantic properties of the name, it refers in all possible worlds to whatever it refers to in the actual world.

where the name and the description pick out dierent individuals. Consequently, Kripke claims, (a) expresses a truth which is contingent rather than necessary. Prima facie, this creates a worry for the description theory (assuming that the descriptive property in (a) is one of the s associated with the name Aristotle) because that theory predicts that attributions like (a) are necessary. This sort of realization led description theorists to drop the demand that sentences attributing single properties of the identifying cluster to the individual must be necessary, and to adopt a claim more similar to (6): it is a contingent fact that Aristotle ever went into pedagogy, though I am suggesting that it is a necessary fact that Aristotle has the logical sum, inclusive disjunction, of properties commonly attributed to him ([Searle, 1958], quoted in [Kripke, 1980], 74). But this move seems unpromising to Kripke. He claims, plausibly enough, that among the properties commonly attributed to an individual (life achievements, relations to other people, qualitative appearance, etc.) there will be no properties which apply to that individual in all worlds. That is to say, the possibility imagined concerning (a) generalizes to all other such property attributions: Aristotle might not have been Greek, Aristotle might not have written De Interpretatione, Aristotle might not have been ve foot seven, etc. Therefore, Kripke concludes that Searles claim, and likewise thesis (6), is false. However, there is a maneuver which would allow the description theorist to escape this attack. On this response, the description theorist can use a rigidifying operator to ensure that the descriptions she claims determine the reference of each name designate rigidly.6 Thus, for example, the description theorist might claim that the description associated with the name Aristotle is the actual teacher of Alexander. However, although this line of response would block Kripkes modal argument, there are two reasons for thinking that it will not serve to resuscitate the description theory. First, as we shall see, Kripke deploys independent semantic arguments against the description theory, and these will be equally eective against rigidied and non-rigidied forms of the theory. Second, if the rigidied description theory is right, then (a) is equivalent to the apparently contingent (a ) The actual teacher of Aristotle was the teacher of Aristotle. Since (a ) is contingent, it would seem that the rigidied description theory wont entail (6). Therefore, even if the rigidied description theory could evade Kripkes semantic arguments, it would still give us no reason to accept (6).

1.2

Epistemic Argument

Kripkes epistemic argument is based on his claim that when theses (2)(4) happen to be satised (according to his semantic arguments, they will not be satised in general; see below), this is a lucky accident, and certainly not something which can be known a priori by the speaker, as required by (5). Consider
6 Something

like this response is advocated in ([Searle, 1983], 343344).

(a) again. Whether (a) turns out true or false is presumably an empirical matter for the historians to decide. But if, as description theories would have it, Aristotles having instructed Alexander is one of the conditions which gives the meaning of the name Aristotle in my ideolect, then I will know a priori that (a) is true. Again, similar considerations apply to each of the descriptive conditions in a cluster, so it would appear that (5) is false.

1.3

Semantic Arguments

Kripkes semantic arguments, which are his strongest, challenge the adequacy of (2), (3), and (4). Here Kripke asks what happens when the properties ordinary speakers commonly apply to individuals in fact turn out to apply to (i) no individual, (ii) the wrong individual, or (iii) more than one individual. (i) If historians were to discover that the properties we all commonly apply to Jonah (going to Nineveh to preach, being called upon by God, being swallowed by a big sh, etc.) turn out not to apply to any individual in the history of the universe, then, according to (4), Jonah would not refer to anyone. But this seems wrong to Kripke: he thinks we would still refer with the name in such cases if we corrected our story (perhaps saying, Jonah was not swallowed by a big sh, but instead swallowed a big sh.). (ii) If I associate the description the originator of the New Theory of Reference with the name Saul Kripke, and Quentin Smith were correct in his contention that, in fact, Ruth Barcan Marcus originated the theory in question, then (3) would entail that my uses of the name Saul Kripke refer to Marcus.7 Again, this sort of prediction seems incorrect to Kripke: he would claim that my uses of the name would still refer to him rather than to Marcus, despite my ignorance ([Kripke, 1980], 84). This shows that knowledge of a set of properties whose best (weighted) satiser is X is not sucient for reference to X by the name X . (iii) Speakers unsophisticated in contemporary physics sometimes use the name Feynman. According to (1), they associate with this name some cluster of properties. But, since these speakers are unsophisticated about physics, the descriptions they have at their disposal will typically fail to pick out Feynman uniquely; perhaps they apply as well to six other leading contemporary physicists who have died in the last ten years. Here the description theory seems to make two false predictions. First, as before, (3) predicts that such speakers dont refer by their uses of the name. But second, (2) requires that these speakers believe (erroneously, in this case) that their descriptions pick out someone uniquely. This, too, seems incorrect; I may know perfectly well that I lack sucient descriptive information about an individual to pick her out uniquely, and nonetheless refer to her by using her name. This shows that knowledge of a set
7 Kripke rules out a response on which Kripke could be paired with the description the person to whom the New Theory of Reference is commonly attributed on the grounds that this proposal amounts to the claim that we attribute this achievement to the man to whom we attribute it ([Kripke, 1980], 89). This suggestion obviously fails to provide an independent criterion for the reference of the name.

of properties whose best (weighted) satiser is X is not necessary for reference to X by the name X . For these reasons, Kripke thinks each of (2)(6) is false.

Evaluating Kripkes Arguments

Kripkes arguments against description theories of reference have been extremely convincing to the philosophical community. These arguments, which are fairly simple in their form, seem to rest largely on intuitions of various sorts, and these intuitions have been surprisingly robust and widespread. Therefore, rather than attempting to challenge Kripkes intuitions, most objections to his arguments have tried to show that description theorists can in fact accommodate Kripkean intuitions better than Kripke had supposed. A well-known objection (from [Dummett, 1973]; see also the discussion in ([Dummett, 1981], 574585)) of this sort to Kripkes modal argument is this. Kripke had objected that (a) is contingent, and that this conclusion is unavailable from within the apparatus of the description theory. This is because, for the description theorist, the referent of Aristotle is known to the speaker (necessarily) to be whatever individual satises the descriptions associated with that name.8 Therefore, a proponent of the description theory would regiment (a) as something like (a ) The teacher of Alexander was the teacher of Alexander. Kripkes complaint is that if one reads (a) as (a ), one must read (b) as (b ): (b) It is possible that Aristotle was not the teacher of Alexander. (b ) It is possible that the teacher of Alexander was not the teacher of Alexander. Kripke thinks this is unacceptable, since (b) is true, while (b ) is false. But Dummett has proposed to explain these data in terms of certain scope interactions which can be handled adequately within a description theory of reference. In particular, Dummett replies that the description theorist should treat (b ) as ambiguous between (b1 ) (The teacher of Aristotle)i is such that 3 (hei was not the teacher of Alexander),9 and (b2 ) 3 (The teacher of Alexander was not the teacher of Alexander). Since (b1 ) is true (although (b2 ) is false), Dummetts suggestion gives the description theorist a way to read (b ) so that it comes out true; hence, we cannot immediately reject (b ) as a reading of (b), as Kripke recommends.
8 I shall continue to make the simplifying assumption that the set of descriptions is exhausted by was the teacher of Alexander; for reasons discussed above, nothing important to the current concern hangs on this. 9 Notation: shared subscripts mark anaphoric co-reference.

Kripke has made two kinds of comments which can be taken as responses to this suggestion. The rst (in the Preface of [Kripke, 1980]) has not challenged the viability of the readings just considered, but rejects the general idea that rigidity can be reduced by or replaced with scope distinctions. But this claim seems a bit beside the point: the suggestion we are considering does not require that the notion of rigidity can be totally reduced by or replaced with scope distinctions it is merely that, by reading (b) as (b1 ), a description theorist can disarm Kripkes modal argument. And Kripkes general points about the autonomy of the notion of rigidity give no direct reason for rejecting this move. However, Kripkes second line of response has been more direct. Here he claims that his data concerning (b) and (b ) cannot be understood in terms of a distinction of scope; for not only is it true of the man Aristotle that he might not have gone into pedagogy; it is also true that we use the term Aristotle in such a way that, in thinking of a counterfactual situation in which Aristotle didnt go into any of the elds and do any of the achievements we commonly attribute to him, still we would say that was a situation in which Aristotle did not do those things. ([Kripke, 1980], 62) The problem, Kripke emphasizes in this passage, is that the description theorists response in terms of scope distinctions just misanalyzes how we evaluate sentences containing names in dierent possible circumstances. For the description theorists explanation of the truth of (b) depends on the properties of the satiser of the description inside the modal operator (whoever that satiser turns out to be) between worlds, not on the properties of Aristotle (the actual referent of Aristotle) in dierent worlds. Thus, its not that the solution in terms of scope distinction is inadequate as a reply to the modal argument; rather, the solution clashes with Kripkes intuitions about the semantics of sentences containing names.10 A further response to Kripkes modal argument, discussed above, involves an appeal to rigidied denite descriptions. The description theorist can understand (b) as (b ) 3 (The actual teacher of Alexander was not the teacher of Alexander). Because (b ) is true, this strategy provides the description theorist with another way of understanding how (b) could be true. However, as we have said, this rigidifying strategy cannot save the description theory from Kripkes semantic arguments. Indeed, Kripkes semantic arguments against the description theory stand on stronger ground. It seems quite unlikely that a description theory worthy of the name could agree with Kripkean intuitions about how names would refer in the
10 Because Kripke rests this defense of his modal argument on a claim about what contributes to the truth-conditions of sentences, it seems that the so-called modal arguments are less modal (and more semantic) than they might initially appear. As we have seen, Kripke provides several semantic arguments to defend the intuition on which he is relying here.

counterfactual circumstances Kripke describes; therefore a description theorist can only respond by denying Kripkes intuitions. But this avenue of reply has remained relatively unconvincing to most theorists.11

References
[Dummett, 1973] Dummett, M. (1973). Frege: Philosophy of Language. Harper and Row, New York. [Dummett, 1981] Dummett, M. (1981). The Interpretation of Freges Philosophy. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. [Frege, 1892] Frege, G. (1892). On sense and meaning. In [McGuinness, 1984], pages 157177. [Frege, 1918] Frege, G. (1918). Thoughts. In [McGuinness, 1984]. [Kripke, 1980] Kripke, S. (1980). Naming and Necessity. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts. [Martinich, 1990] Martinich, A. P. (1990). The Philosophy of Language, second edition. Oxford University Press, New York. [McGuinness, 1984] McGuinness, B., editor (1984). Basil Blackwell, Oxford, England. [Searle, 1958] Searle, J. (1958). Proper names. Mind, 67:166173. Reprinted in [Martinich, 1990]. [Searle, 1983] Searle, J. (1983). Intentionality. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Portions reprinted in [Martinich, 1990].

11 That

said, such responses have been mounted in, e.g., [Searle, 1983].