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The Darknet and The Future of Content Distribution: Peter Biddle, Paul England, Marcus Peinado, and Bryan Willman
The Darknet and The Future of Content Distribution: Peter Biddle, Paul England, Marcus Peinado, and Bryan Willman
Peter Biddle, Paul England, Marcus Peinado, and Bryan Willman Microsoft Corporation1 Abstract
We investigate the darknet a collection of networks and technologies used to share digital content. The darknet is not a separate physical network but an application and protocol layer riding on e isting networks. ! a"ples of darknets are peer#to#peer file sharing$ CD and D%D copying$ and key or password sharing on e"ail and newsgroups. The last few years have seen vast increases in the darknet&s aggregate bandwidth$ reliability$ usability$ si'e of shared library$ and availability of search engines. (n this paper we categori'e and analy'e e isting and future darknets$ fro" both the technical and legal perspectives. We speculate that there will be short#ter" i"pedi"ents to the effectiveness of the darknet as a distribution "echanis"$ but ulti"ately the darknet#genie will not be put back into the bottle. (n view of this hypothesis$ we e a"ine the relevance of content protection and content distribution architectures.
1 (ntroduction
)eople have always copied things. (n the past$ "ost ite"s of value were physical ob*ects. )atent law and econo"ies of scale "eant that s"all scale copying of physical ob*ects was usually unecono"ic$ and large#scale copying +if it infringed, was stoppable using police"en and courts. Today$ things of value are increasingly less tangible- often they are *ust bits and bytes or can be accurately represented as bits and bytes. The widespread deploy"ent of packet#switched networks and the huge advances in co"puters and codec#technologies has "ade it feasible +and indeed attractive, to deliver such digital works over the (nternet. This presents great opportunities and great challenges. The opportunity is low#cost delivery of personali'ed$ desirable high#.uality content. The challenge is that such content can be distributed illegally. Copyright law governs the legality of copying and distribution of such valuable data$ but copyright protection is increasingly strained in a world of progra""able co"puters and high#speed networks. For e a"ple$ consider the staggering burst of creativity by authors of co"puter progra"s that are designed to share audio files. This was first populari'ed by /apster$ but today several popular applications and services offer si"ilar capabilities. CD#writers have beco"e "ainstrea"$ and D%D#writers "ay well follow suit. 0ence$ even in the absence of network connectivity$ the opportunity for low#cost$ large#scale file sharing e ists.
1. 2ny widely distributed ob*ect will be available to a fraction of users in a for" that per"its copying. 3. 4sers will copy ob*ects if it is possible and interesting to do so. 5. 4sers are connected by high#bandwidth channels. The darknet is the distribution network that e"erges fro" the in*ection of ob*ects according to assu"ption 1 and the distribution of those ob*ects according to assu"ptions 3 and 5. 6ne i"plication of the first assu"ption is that any content protection syste" will leak popular or interesting content into the darknet$ because so"e fraction of users##possibly e pertswill overco"e any copy prevention "echanis" or because the ob*ect will enter the darknet before copy protection occurs. The ter" 7widely distributed8 is intended to capture the notion of "ass "arket distribution of ob*ects to thousands or "illions of practically anony"ous users. This is in contrast to the protection of "ilitary$ industrial$ or personal secrets$ which are typically not widely distributed and are not the focus of this paper. 9ike other networks$ the darknet can be "odeled as a directed graph with labeled edges. The graph has one verte for each user:host. For any pair of vertices +u$v,$ there is a directed edge fro" u to v if ob*ects can be copied fro" u to v. The edge labels can be used to "odel relevant infor"ation about the physical network and "ay include infor"ation such as bandwidth$ delay$ availability$ etc. The vertices are characteri'ed by their ob*ect library$ ob*ect re.uests "ade to other vertices$ and ob*ect re.uests satisfied. To operate effectively$ the darknet has a s"all nu"ber of technological and infrastructure re.uire"ents$ which are si"ilar to those of legal content distribution networks. These infrastructure re.uire"ents are1. facilities for in*ecting new ob*ects into the darknet +input, 3. a distribution network that carries copies of ob*ects to users +trans"ission, 5. ubi.uitous rendering devices$ which allow users to consu"e ob*ects +output, ;. a search "echanis" to enable users to find ob*ects +database, <. storage that allows the darknet to retain ob*ects for e tended periods of ti"e. Functionally$ this is "ostly a caching "echanis" that reduces the load and e posure of nodes that in*ect ob*ects. The dra"atic rise in the efficiency of the darknet can be traced back to the general technological i"prove"ents in these infrastructure areas. 2t the sa"e ti"e$ "ost atte"pts to fight the darknet can be viewed as efforts to deprive it of one or "ore of the infrastructure ite"s. 9egal action has traditionally targeted search engines and$ to a lesser e tent$ the distribution network. 2s we will describe later in the paper$ this has been partially successful. The drive for legislation on "andatory water"arking ai"s to deprive the darknet of rendering devices. We will argue that water"arking approaches are technically flawed and unlikely to have any "aterial i"pact on the darknet. Finally$ "ost content protection syste"s are "eant to prevent or delay the in*ection of new ob*ects into the darknet. =ased on our first assu"ption$ no such syste" constitutes an i"penetrable barrier$ and we will discuss the "erits of so"e popular syste"s. We see no technical i"pedi"ents to the darknet beco"ing increasingly efficient +"easured by aggregate library si'e and available bandwidth,. 0owever$ the darknet$ in all its transport#layer e"bodi"ents$ is under legal attack. (n this paper$ we speculate on the technical and legal future of the darknet$ concentrating particularly$ but not e clusively$ on peer#to#peer networks. The rest of this paper is structured as follows. 1ection 3 analy'es different "anifestations of the darknet with respect to their robustness to attacks on the
infrastructure re.uire"ents described above and speculates on the future develop"ent of the darknet. 1ection 5 describes content protection "echanis"s$ their probable effect on the darknet$ and the i"pact of the darknet upon the". (n sections ; and <$ we speculate on the scenarios in which the darknet will be effective$ and how businesses "ay need to behave to co"pete effectively with it.
These findings are re"arkably broadly applicable +e.g. A3?B$A5B,. The chains are on average so short because certain super#peers have "any links. (n our e a"ple$ so"e people are gregarious and have lots of friends fro" different social or geographical circles.. We suspect that these findings have i"plications for sharing on darknets$ and we will return to this point when we discuss the darknets of the future later in this paper. The s"all#worlds darknet continues to e ist. 0owever$ a nu"ber of technological advances have given rise to new for"s of the darknet that have superseded the s"all# worlds for so"e ob*ect types +e.g. audio,.
the use of a new distribution network- The internet displaced the sneaker net at least for audio content. This solved several proble"s of the old darknet. First$ latency was reduced drastically. 1econdly$ and "ore i"portantly$ discovery of ob*ects beca"e "uch easier because of si"ple and powerful search "echanis"s "ost i"portantly the general#purpose world# wide#web search engine. The local view of the s"all world was replaced by a global view of the entire collection accessible by all users. The "ain characteristic of this for" of the darknet was centrali'ed storage and search a si"ple architecture that "irrored "ainstrea" internet servers. Centrali'ed or .uasi#centrali'ed distribution and service networks "ake sense for legal online co""erce. =andwidth and infrastructure costs tend to be low$ and having custo"ers visit a co""erce site "eans the "erchant can display adverts$ collect profiles$ and bill efficiently. 2dditionally$ "anage"ent$ auditing$ and accountability are "uch easier in a centrali'ed "odel. 0owever$ centrali'ed sche"es work poorly for illegal ob*ect distribution because large$ central servers are large single points of failure- (f the distributor is breaking the law$ it is relatively easy to force hi" to stop. !arly M)5 Web and FT) sites were co""only 7hosted8 by universities$ corporations$ and (1)s. Copyright#holders or their representatives sent 7cease and desist8 letters to these web#site operators and web# owners citing copyright infringe"ent and in a few cases followed up with legal action A1<B. The threats of legal action were successful attacks on those centrali'ed networks$ and M)5 web and FT) sites disappeared fro" the "ainstrea" shortly after they appeared.
2.3.2. Gnutella The ne t technology that sparked public interest in peer#to#peer file sharing was Enutella. (n addition to distributed ob*ect storage$ Enutella uses a fully distributed database described "ore fully in A15B. Enutella does not rely upon any centrali'ed server or service a peer *ust needs the () address of one or a few participating peers to +in principle, reach any host on the Enutella darknet. 1econd$ Enutella is not really 7run8 by anyone- it is an open protocol and anyone can write a Enutella client application. Finally$ Enutella and its descendants go beyond sharing audio and have substantial non#infringing uses. This changes its legal standing "arkedly and puts it in a si"ilar category to e"ail. That is$ e"ail has substantial non#infringing use$ and so e"ail itself is not under legal threat even though it "ay be used to transfer copyrighted "aterial unlawfully.
2.4.2 Lack of Anonymity 4sers of gnutella who share ob*ects they have stored are not anony"ous. Current peer#to#peer networks per"it the server endpoints to be deter"ined$ and if a peer#client can deter"ine the () address and affiliation of a peer$ then so can a lawyer or govern"ent agency. This "eans that users who share copyrighted ob*ects face so"e threat of legal action. This appears to be yet another e planation for free riding. There are so"e possible technological workarounds to the absence of endpoint anony"ity. We could i"agine anony"i'ing routers$ overseas routers$ ob*ect frag"entation$ or so"e other "eans to co"plicate the effort re.uired by law#enforce"ent to deter"ine the original source of the copyrighted bits. For e a"ple$ Freenet tries to hide the identity of the hosts storing any given ob*ect by "eans of a variety of heuristics$ including routing the ob*ect through inter"ediate hosts and providing "echanis"s for easy "igration of ob*ects to other hosts. 1i"ilarly$ Mne"osyne A1?B tries to organi'e ob*ect storage$ such that individual hosts "ay not know what ob*ects are stored on the". (t is con*ectured in A1?B that this "ay a"ount to co""on#carrier status for the host. 2 detailed analysis of the legal or technical robustness of these syste"s is beyond the scope of this paper. 2.4.3 Attacks (n light of these weaknesses$ attacks on gnutella#style darknets focus on their ob*ect storage and search infrastructures. =ecause of the prevalence of super#peers$ the gnutella darknet depends on a relatively s"all set of powerful hosts$ and these hosts are pro"ising targets for attackers. Darknet hosts owned by corporations are typically easily re"oved. 6ften$ these hosts are set up by individual e"ployees without the knowledge of corporate "anage"ent. Eenerally corporations respect intellectual property laws. This together with their reluctance to beco"e targets of lawsuits$ and their centrali'ed network of hierarchical "anage"ent "akes it relatively easy to re"ove darknet hosts in the corporate do"ain. While the structures at universities are typically less hierarchical and strict than those of corporations$ ulti"ately$ si"ilar rules apply. (f the .co" and .edu T1 and T5 lines were pulled fro" under a darknet$ the usefulness of the network would suffer drastically. This would leave D19$ (1D/$ and cable#"ode" users as the high#bandwidth servers of ob*ects. We believe li"iting hosts to this class would present a far less effective piracy network today fro" the perspective of ac.uisition because of the relative rarity of high# bandwidth consu"er connections$ and hence users would abandon this darknet. 0owever$ consu"er broadband is beco"ing "ore popular$ so in the long run it is probable that there will be ade.uate consu"er bandwidth to support an effective consu"er darknet. The obvious ne t legal escalation is to bring direct or indirect +through the affiliation, challenges against users who share large libraries of copyrighted "aterial. This is already happening and the legal threats or actions appear to be successful ADB. This re.uires the collaboration of (1)s in identifying their custo"ers$ which appears to be forthco"ing due to re.uire"ents that the carrier "ust take to avoid liability 5 and$ in so"e cases$ because of corporate ties between (1)s and content providers. 6nce again$ free riding "akes this attack strategy far "ore tractable. (t is hard to predict further legal escalation$ but we note that the DMC2 +digital "illenniu" copyright act, is a far#reaching +although not fully tested, e a"ple of a law that is potentially .uite powerful. We believe it probable that there will be a few "ore rounds of
The Church of 1cientology has been aggressive in pursuing (1)s that host its copyright "aterial on newsgroups. The suit that appeared "ost likely to result in a clear finding$ filed against /etco"$ was settled out of court. 0ence it is still not clear whether an (1) has a responsibility to police the users of its network.
5
technical innovations to sidestep e isting laws$ followed by new laws$ or new interpretations of old laws$ in the ne t few years.
2.4.4 Conclusions 2ll attacks we have identified e ploit the lack of endpoint anony"ity and are aided by the effects of free riding. We have seen effective legal "easures on all peer#to#peer technologies that are used to provide effectively global access to copyrighted "aterial. Centrali'ed web servers were effectively closed down. /apster was effectively closed down. Enutella and Ga'aa are under threat because of free rider weaknesses and lack of endpoint anony"ity. 9ack of endpoint anony"ity is a direct result of the globally accessible global ob*ect database$ and it is the e istence of the global database that "ost distinguishes the newer darknets fro" the earlier s"all worlds. 2t this point$ it is hard to *udge whether the darknet will be able to retain this global database in the long ter"$ but it see"s see"s clear that legal setbacks to global#inde peer#to#peer will continue to be severe. 0owever$ should Enutella#style syste"s beco"e unviable as darknets$ syste"s$ such as Freenet or Mne"osyne "ight take their place. )eer#to#peer networking and file sharing does see" to be entering into the "ainstrea" both for illegal and legal uses. (f we couple this with the rapid build#out of consu"er broadband$ the dropping price of storage$ and the fact that personal co"puters are effectively establishing the"selves as centers of ho"e#entertain"ent$ we suspect that peer#to#peer functionality will re"ain popular and beco"e "ore widespread.
What graph structure will the network haveI For e a"ple$ will it be connectedI What will be the average distance between two nodesI Eiven a graph structure$ how will ob*ects propagate through the graphI (n particular$ what fraction of ob*ects will be available at a given nodeI 0ow long does it take for ob*ects to propagate +diffuse, through the networkI
Juestions of this type have been studied in different conte ts in a variety of fields +"athe"atics$ co"puter science$ econo"ics$ and physics,. 2 nu"ber of e"pirical studies seek to establish structural properties of different types of s"all world networks$ such as social networks A3?B and the world#wide web A5B. These works conclude that the dia"eter of the e a"ined networks is s"all$ and observe further structural properties$ such as a power law of the degree distribution A<B$ 2 nu"ber of authors seek to "odel these networks by "eans of rando" graphs$ in order to perfor" "ore detailed "athe"atical analysis on the "odels A3B$ACB$A31B$A33B and$ in particular$ study the possibility of efficient search under different rando" graph distributions A1CB$A1>B. We will present a .uantitative study of the structure and dyna"ics of s"all#worlds networks in an upco"ing paper$ but to su""ari'e$ s"all#worlds darknets can be e tre"ely efficient for popular titles- very few peers are needed to satisfy re.uests for top#3? books$ songs$ "ovies or co"puter progra"s. (f darknets are interconnected$ we e pect the effective introduction rate to be large. Finally$ if darknet clients are enhanced to actively seek out new popular content$ as opposed to the user#de"and based sche"es of today$ s"all#worlds darknets will be very efficient.
and in the case of a satellite syste" this could be "illions of ho"es. C2#syste" providers take "easures to li"it the usefulness of e ploited session keys +for e a"ple$ they are changed every few seconds,$ but if darknet latencies are low$ or if encrypted broadcast data is cached$ then the darknet could threaten C2#syste" revenues. We observe that the e posure of the conditional access provider to losses due to piracy is proportional to the nu"ber of custo"ers that share a session key. (n this regard$ cable#operators are in a safer position than satellite operators because a cable operator can narrowcast "ore cheaply.
the world on web#sites$ newsgroups$ and even T#shirts$ in spite of the fact that$ in principle$ the Digital Millenniu" Copyright 2ct "akes it a cri"e to develop these e ploits. 2 final characteristic of e isting D@M#syste"s is renewability. %endors recogni'e the possibility of e ploits$ and build syste"s that can be field#updated. (t is hard to .uantify the effectiveness of D@M#syste"s for restricting the introduction of content into the darknet fro" e perience with e isting syste"s. ! isting D@M#syste"s typically provide protection for "onths to yearsH however$ the content available to such syste"s has to date been of "ini"al interest$ and the content that is protected is also available in unprotected for". The one syste" that was protecting valuable content +D%D video, was broken very soon after co"pression technology and increased storage capacities and bandwidth enabled the darknet to carry video content.
5.5 1oftware
The D@M#syste"s described above can be used to provide protection for software$ in addition other ob*ects +e.g. audio and video,. 2lternatively$ copy protection syste"s for co"puter progra"s "ay e"bed the copy protection code in the software itself. The "ost i"portant copy#protection pri"itive for co"puter progra"s is for the software to be bound to a host in such a way that the progra" will not work on an unlicensed "achine. =inding re.uires a "achine (D- this can be a uni.ue nu"ber on a "achine +e.g. a network card M2C address,$ or can be provided by an e ternal dongle. For such sche"es to be strong$ two things "ust be true. First$ the "achine (D "ust not be 7virtuali'able.8 For instance$ if it is trivial to "odify a /(C driver to return an invalid M2C address$ then the software#host binding is easily broken. 1econd$ the code that perfor"s the binding checks "ust not be easy to patch. 2 variety of technologies that revolve around software ta"per#resistance can help here A;B. We believe that binding software to a host is a "ore tractable proble" than protecting passive content$ as the for"er only re.uires ta"per resistance$ while the latter also re.uires the ability to hide and "anage secrets. 0owever$ we observe that all software copy#protection syste"s deployed thus far have bee broken. The definitions of =6=!# strong and =6=!#weak apply si"ilarly to software. Further"ore$ software is as "uch sub*ect to the dyna"ics of the darknet as passive content.
; )olicing 0osts
(f there are subverted hosts$ then content will leak into the darknet. (f the darknet is efficient$ then content will be rapidly propagated to all interested peers. (n the light of this$ technologists are looking for alternative protection sche"es. (n this section we will evaluate water"arking and fingerprinting technologies.
;.1 Water"arking
Water"arking e"beds an 7indelible8 invisible "ark in content. 2 plethora of sche"es e ist for audio:video and still i"age content and co"puter progra"s. There are a variety of sche"es for e ploiting water"arks for content#protection. Consider a rendering device that locates and interprets water"arks. (f a water"ark is found then special action is taken. Two co""on actions are1, Restrict behavior For e a"ple$ a bus#adapter "ay refuse to pass content that has the 7copy once8 and 7already copied once8 bits set.
3,
Re!uire a license to play- For e a"ple$ if a water"ark is found indicating that content is rights#restricted then the renderer "ay de"and a license indicating that the user is authori'ed to play the content.
1uch syste"s were proposed for audio content for e a"ple the secure digital "usic initiative +1DM(, A1FB$ and are under consideration for video by the copy#protection technical working group +C)TWE, A13B. There are several reasons why it appears unlikely that such syste"s will ever beco"e an effective anti#piracy technology. Fro" a co""ercial point of view$ building a water"ark detector into a device renders it strictly less useful for consu"ers than a co"peting product that does not. This argues that water"arking sche"es are unlikely to be widely deployed$ unless "andated by legislation. The recently proposed 0ollings bill is a step along these lines A11B. We contrast water"ark#based policing with classical D@M- (f a general#purpose device is e.uipped with a classical D@M#syste"$ it can play all content ac.uired fro" the darknet$ and have access to new content ac.uired through the D@M#channel. This is in stark distinction to reduction of functionality inherent in water"ark#based policing. !ven if water"arking syste"s were "andated$ this approach is likely to fail due to a variety of technical inade.uacies. The first inade.uacy concerns the robustness of the e"bedding layer. We are not aware of syste"s for which si"ple data transfor"ations cannot strip the "ark or "ake it unreadable. Marks can be "ade "ore robust$ but in order to recover "arks after adversarial "anipulation$ the reader "ust typically search a large phase space$ and this .uickly beco"es untenable. (n spite of the proliferation of proposed water"arking sche"es$ it re"ains doubtful whether robust e"bedding layers for the relevant content types can be found. 2 second inade.uacy lies in unrealistic assu"ptions about key "anage"ent. Most water"arking sche"es re.uire widely deployed cryptographic keys. 1tandard water"arking sche"es are based on the nor"al cryptographic principles of a public algorith" and secret keys. Most sche"es use a shared#key between "arker and detector. (n practice$ this "eans that all detectors need a private key$ and$ typically$ share a single private key. (t would be naNve to assu"e that these keys will re"ain secret for long in an adversarial environ"ent. 6nce the key or keys are co"pro"ised$ the darknet will propagate the" efficiently$ and the sche"e collapses. There have been proposals for public#key water"arking syste"s. 0owever$ so far$ this work does not see" practical and the corresponding sche"es do not even begin to approach the robustness of the cryptographic syste"s whose na"e they borrow. 2 final consideration bears on the location of "andatory water"ark detectors in client devices. 6n open co"puting devices +e.g. personal co"puters,$ these detectors could$ in principle$ be placed in software or in hardware. )lacing detectors in software would be largely "eaningless$ as circu"vention of the detector would be as si"ple as replacing it by a different piece of software. This includes detectors placed in the operating syste"$ all of whose co"ponents can be easily replaced$ "odified and propagated over the darknet. 2lternatively$ the detectors could be placed in hardware +e.g. audio and video cards,. (n the presence of the proble"s described this would lead to untenable renewability proble"s ### the hardware would be ineffective within days of deploy"ent. Consu"ers$ on the other hand$ e pect the hardware to re"ain in use for "any years. Finally$ consu"ers the"selves are likely to rebel against 7footing the bill8 for these ineffective content protection syste"s. (t is virtually certain$ that the darknet would be filled with a continuous supply of water"ark re"oval tools$ based on co"pro"ised keys and weaknesses in the e"bedding layer. 2tte"pts to force the public to 7update8 their hardware would not only be intrusive$ but i"practical.
(n su""ary$ atte"pts to "andate content protection syste"s based on water"ark detection at the consu"er&s "achine suffer fro" co""ercial drawbacks and severe technical deficiencies. These sche"es$ which ai" to provide content protection beyond D@M by attacking the darknet$ are rendered entirely ineffective by the presence of even a "oderately functional darknet.
;.3 Fingerprinting
Fingerprint sche"es are based on si"ilar technologies and concepts to water"arking sche"es. 0owever$ whereas water"arking is designed to perfor" a"priori policing$ fingerprinting is designed to provide a"posteriori forensics. (n the si"plest case$ fingerprinting is used for individual#sale content +as opposed to super#distribution or broadcast although it can be applied there with so"e additional assu"ptions,. When a client purchases an ob*ect$ the supplier "arks it with an individuali'ed "ark that identifies the purchaser. The purchaser is free to use the content$ but if it appears on a darknet$ a police"an can identify the source of the content and the offender can be prosecuted. Fingerprinting suffers fro" fewer technical proble"s than water"arking. The "ain advantage is that no widespread key#distribution is needed a publisher can use whatever secret or proprietary fingerprinting technology they choose$ and is entirely responsible for the "anage"ent of their own keys. Fingerprinting has one proble" that is not found in water"arking. 1ince each fingerprinted copy of a piece of "edia is different$ if a user can obtain several different copies$ he can launch collusion attacks +e.g. averaging,. (n general$ such attacks are very da"aging to the fingerprint payload. (t re"ains to be seen whether fingerprinting will act as a deterrent to theft. There is currently no legal precedent for "edia fingerprints being evidence of cri"e$ and this case will probably be hard to "ake after all$ detection is a statistical process with false positives$ and plenty of opportunity for deniability. 0owever$ we anticipate that there will be uneasiness in sharing a piece of content that "ay contain a person&s identity$ and that ulti"ately leaves that person&s control. /ote also that with widely distributed water"arking detectors$ it is easy to see whether you have successfully re"oved a water"ark. There is no such assurance for deter"ining whether a fingerprint has been successfully re"oved fro" an ob*ect because users are not necessarily knowledgeable about the fingerprint sche"e or sche"es in use. 0owever$ if it turns out that the deterrence of fingerprinting is s"all +i.e. everyone shares their "edia regardless of the presence of "arks,$ there is probably no reasonable legal response. Finally$ distribution sche"es in which ob*ects "ust be individuali'ed will be e pensive.
< Conclusions
There see" to be no technical i"pedi"ents to darknet#based peer#to#peer file sharing technologies growing in convenience$ aggregate bandwidth and efficiency. The legal future of darknet#technologies is less certain$ but we believe that$ at least for so"e classes of user$ and possibly for the population at large$ efficient darknets will e ist. The rest of this section will analy'e the i"plications of the darknet fro" the point of view of individual technologies and of co""erce in digital goods.
@eferences
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2dar and =. 2. 0uber"an$ Free Riding on #nutella, http-::www.first"onday.dk:issues:issue<O1?:adar:inde .ht"l W. 2iello$ F. Chung and 9. 9u$ Random evolution in massive graphs$ (n )roceedings of the ;3nd 2nnual (!!! 1y"posiu" on Foundations of Co"puter 1cience$ pages <1?P<1>$ 3??1. @. 2lbert$ 0. Qeong and 2.#9. =arabRsi$ $iameter o% the world"wide web$ /ature ;?1$ pages 15?P151$ 1>>>. D. 2ucs"ith$ &er Resistant 'o%tware, (n )mplementation$ (nfor"ation 0iding 1>>F$ )roceedings- 1pringer 1>>C. 2.#9. =arabRsi$ @. 2lbert$ Emergence o% scaling in random networks$ 1cience 3CF$ pages <?>P<13$ 1>>>. (. Clarke$ 6. 1andberg$ =. Wiley and T. 0ong$ Freenet ( distributed in%ormation storage and retrieval system$ (nternational Workshop on Design (ssues in 2nony"ity and 4nobservability$ 3???. @. Clarke$ ( de%endant class action lawsuit http-::www.kentlaw.edu:perritt:honorsscholars:clarke.ht"l C. Cooper and 2. Frie'e$ ( general model o% web graphs$ )roceedings of !12 3??1$ pages <??#<11$ 3??1. F. Dabek$ !. =runskill$ M. F. Gaashoek$ D. Garger$ @. Morris$ (. 1toica and 0. =alakrishnan$ Building peer"to"peer systems with *hord, a distributed lookup service$ (n )roceedings of the !ighth (!!! Workshop on 0ot Topics in 6perating 1yste"s +0ot61#%(((,$ pages C1PCF$ 3??1. 1. 0and and T. @oscoe$ Mnemosyne peer"to"peer steganographic storage$ (n )roceedings of the First (nternational Workshop on )eer#to#)eer 1yste"s$ 3??3. 1enator Frit' 0ollings$ *onsumer Broadband and $igital &elevision Promotion (ct+ http-::www.cptwg.org http-::www.gnutelladev.co":protocol:gnutella#protocol.ht"l http-::www.napster.co" http-::www.riaa.org http-::www.sd"i.org M. Qavanovic$ F. 2nne tein and G. =er"an$ 'calability )ssues in ,arge Peer"to" Peer -etworks " ( *ase 'tudy o% #nutella $ !C!C1 Depart"ent$ 4niversity of Cincinnati$ Cincinnati$ 60 ;<331 Q. Gleinberg$ /avigation in a s"all world$ /ature ;?F$ 3???. Q. Gleinberg$ 'mall"world phenomena and the dynamics o% in%ormation$ 2dvances in /eural (nfor"ation )rocessing 1yste"s +/()1, 1;$ 3??1. 1. Milgra"$ The s"all world proble"$ )sychology Today$ vol. 3$ pages F?PFD$ 1>FD. M ./ew"an$ 'mall worlds the structure o% social networks $ 1anta Fe (nstitute$ Technical @eport >>#13#?C?$ 1>>>. M. /ew"an$ D. Watts and 1. 1trogat'$ Random graph models o% social networks$ )roc. /atl. 2cad. 1ci. 412 >>$ pages 3<FFP3<D3$ 3??3. (. 1toica$ @. Morris$ D. Garger$ M. F. Gaashoek$ 0. =alakrishnan$ *./R$ ( scalable peer"to"peer lookup service %or internet applications $ (n )roceedings of the 2CM 1(EC6MM 3??1 Conference ')#*/MM"01$ pages 1;>P1F?$ 3??1. D. Q. Watts and 1. 0. 1trogat'$ *ollective dynamics o% small"world networks $ /ature$ 5>5-;;?#;;3$ Qune 1>>C.