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MASTER O F M I L I T A R Y A R T AND S C I E N C E
by
JERRY R.
THORNBERRY,
D.S.,
U n i v e r s i t y of
Fort Leavenworth,
b.ansas
I186
"fipproved
t o r p u b l i c release:
distrlbutlon i s
unlimited."
27- l R Y ( 1
MQSTER OF MILITARY
mr
FIND SCIENCE
The A r a b - I s r a e l i C o n f l i c t T i t l e of Thesis: The War of A t t r i t i o n and F r e p a r a t i o n s P r e c e e d i n y t h e flct.ober 1977 War. Approved by:
IPlaj.
c -
. L b L
John W.
L/ Stone,
7
,I
,.
\.IJc
r h e s i 5 Committee Chairman
M.M.A.S.
Accepted t h i s
__ d*
day o f
&%
,
1986 by:
Director,
The o p i n i o n s and c o n c l u s i o n s e x p r e s s e d h e r e i n a r e t h n s e
at t h e s t u d e n t a u t h o r and do n o t n e c e s s a r i 1 y r e p r e s e n t
A r m y Command and General S t a f f t h e v i e w s o f t h e U.5. (Heferencee C o l l e g e o r any o t h e r governmental agency. 1:a t h i s s t i i d y s h o u l d i n c l u d e t h e f o r e g o i n g s t a t e m e n t . )
i i
ABSTRACT
THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT: THE W A R OF ATTRITION A N D PREPARATIONS PRECEEDING THE OCTOBER 1973 WAR. An analysis of Israeli and Egyptian war preparations between the end of the Six-Day War in 1967 and the October War of 1973, b y Major Jerry R . Thornberry, USAF, 162 pages.
This study is a historical analysis of two definitive periods of t h e conflict between Israel and Egypt - the War of Attrition between July 1967 and August 1970, and the period of "No Peace, No War" between August 1970 and 6 October 1973. The study discusses the lessons learned by Egypt and Israel following the Six-Day War. The lessons of the Six-Day War were not lost on the Egyptian leaders. President Nasser's assessment of the military aspects of the war revealed several shartfal1.s in Egypt's military capabilities and superiarities of Israel's forces which needed modifying before Egypt could successfully mount a campaign against Israel. President Sadat believed Israel '5 intrasigence on retaining the occupied territories cauld only b e changed b y taking actions which would cause the United States, the Soviet Union, and t h e United Nations to become involved. Sadat's decision t o g o t o war was a political gamble designed to end the stalemate. Israel's military leaders' constantly underrated the : Egyptian*s armed forces potentials. Military and political leaders continually misread Nasser's and Sadat's intentions and their resolve to regain the occupied territories. Gmong the conclusions which were drawn from t h i s study are: The Egyptians prepared for t h e October War b y correcting their deficiencies in the Six-Day War restructured the High Command, improved training methods, developed new tactics. incorporated new equipment into the armed forces, constructed a highdensity surface-to-air missile system, and neutralized the Israeli superiorities of the air force, mobile ground forces, and rapid mobilization of reserves. The Israelis prepared by developing a static defense strategy along the Suez Canal. The study concludes that Egyptian preparations for the October War included recognizing their failures and Israeli strengths and weaknesses of the Six-Day War, then vigorously applying corrective measures, while the Israelis analyzed the weaknesses of the Egyptians and
i ij
their own strengths after the Six-Day War, then d i d little t o reassess those views, retaining the perception of their strength and the Egyptian weaknesses.
T A B L E O F CONTENTS
Chapter
Page
I .
11.
........ A p p r o v a l page ....... Abstract ......... T a b l e of C o n t e n t s ..... INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . Endnotes ...... .. THE WAR OF A T T R I T I O N . . . T i t l e Page
J u l y 1967
- . .. .. .. .. ..
. .. .. .. .. .. . .. .
.
. . . . . . .
. . ii . iii . . 1 . 10 . 11
1
V
August
1970
Endnotes
111.
47
51
IV.
THE
82
85
A u g u s t 1970
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 V. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109 Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12; VI. SURVEY O F L I T E R A T U R E . . . . . . . . . 125 Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132 ............................
Endnotes
APPENDIX
1 Appendix Appendix Appendix 1-1
1-2 1-3
.. ...... .....
Pre-1947 P a l e s t i n e UN P a r t i t i o n P l a n - 1947
V
.... .
143 144
Israel 1947-1967 Israel 1967-1973 Incidents along Canal IDF Casualties Egyptian C = .P r e 1967 Egyptian C" .P r e 1973
..... .. ...... ..
. .
.....
152
157
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
T h e M i d d l e E a s t e r n r e q i o n has a l o n g h i s t o r y o f
m i l i t a r y and p o l i t i c a l u n r e s t . c r e a t i o n of of the s t a t e of S i n c e 1947 and t h e a number
I s r a e l i n Palestine,
wars between I s r a e l and t h e n e i g h b o r i n g Arab s t a t e s The p r e c e d i n g t h r e e wars t h a t I s r a e l 1956, and 1967 ended
w i t h d e f e a t o f t h e Arab armies and expanded I s r a e l ' s borders (see Appendix 2-1 through 2 - 5 ) . The wars d i d
n o t b r i n g peace t o t h e r e g i o n ;
they o n l y increased t h e
h a t r e d between t h e b e l l i g e r e n t s . T h i s t h e s i s p r o v i d e s a comprehensive h i s t o r y and a n a l y s i s o f t h e p r e p a r a t i o n s made by E q y p t and I s r a e l between t h e Six-Day October 1973 War. War of June 1967 and t h e inform
I n d o i n g so, i t w i l l
show how Egypt a p p l i e d these lessons t o p r e p a r e f o r t h e l i b e r a t i o n o f t h e Arab t e r r i t o r i e s occupied by I s r a e l a f t e r t h e Six-Day War. Futhermore,
i t w i l l detail the
were i n p r e p a r i n g f o r t h e campaign
p o l i t i c a l l y and
militarily
the War
of Attrition between July 1967 and August 1970, and the period of "No Peace, No War" between August 1970 and 6 October 1 9 7 3 .
To better understand the events occurring
' , ,
. (
of affairs in Egypt and Israel immediately following the Six-Day War. The territorial gains made by the
Sinai Peninsula (more than 20,000 square miles of Egyptian territory east a+ the Suez Canal); the West Bank of t h e Jordan River, including all of Jerusalem (from Jordan); and the Golan Heights northeast and ea5t of the Sea of Galilee
(+ram
Syria).
The Golan
Heights was strategically important because i t overlooked much of northern Israel and the plains east of Damascus, Syria. For the first time in its short history, Israel had strategic defensive depth between its majar
'
population centers and the neighboring Arab states. This gave the Israelis a "false" sense of security and a strategic option. = This sense of security was well
Defense,
Moshe Dyan,
j u s t a few weeks p r i o r t o t h e
o u t b r e a k o f t h e October
1973 War.
He s t a t e d :
"The c o n c l u s i o n o f 1367 - 10 June 19671, w i t h t h e Arab world, c r e a t e d an i n Israel, indicating that i n t h e wars o f I s r a e l w i t h countries.
t h e Six-Day War C 5 June i t s r e s u l t a n t trauma for atmosphere, p a r t i c u l a r l y an end had been reached t h e v a r i o u s Arab
that after
t h e Arab armies i n June 1967 peace would come t o t h e nation of Israel. The c a p t u r e d t e r r i t o r i e s
war-torn
f i g h t i n g c a p a b i l i t i e s o f t h e I s r a e l i Defense Force
From t h e Arab
t h e e m o t i o n a l d e f e a t a f t e r t h e war can
He s t a t e d t h a t he f e l t :
'I. l i k e a man w a l k i n g i n a d e s e r t surrounded b y moving sands, n o t knowing whether, i f he moved, he would be swallowed up by t h e sands or would f i n d t h e r i g h t path."
..
I n s p i t e of
the great
1055,
t h e Arab p r i d e and
self-image of
1..
,
J
.'
I
;
i ,
happened.
The joint political policy of denial towards Israel was formulated at the Khartoum Summit Conference
29 August t o 1 September 1 9 6 7 .
;i
"The Arab heads of state have agreed t o unite their political efforts at the international and diplomatic level t o eliminate the effects of t h e aggression and t o ensure the withdrawal of the aggressive Israeli forces from the Arab lands which h a v e been occupied since the aggression of June 5 . This will b e done within the framework of the main principles by which the Arab states abide, namely no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiatians with it, and insistence on the right of the Palestinian people within their own country." By adopting this resolution, the Arab leaders refused t o accept the existence of their conqueror. They expressed this denial linguistically in descriptive phraseology a s uncompromising as their political statements. Officially, the description of (the setback or the
only infrequently t o explain the real situation. Occupation of Arab lands by Israel was characteristically termed, the "consequences of the aggression.
I'
cIdeologically, Arabs generally explained away their military defeat by Israel o n t h r e e fac:tors. Nasser elaborated o n t h e Cirst factor in June 1967, when h e stated that t h e Arab f o r c e s should not have expected t o win with Israeli receiving United States military, economic, and moral support. T h e second
factor w a s described by King Hussein of Jordan when h e stated that Arab morale had not been broken or weakened; therefore, Israel had not won a real military victory. Israel's war a i m s
radical regimes''
only a battle against Israel had been lost, not t h e war. T h e war w a s now entering a new phase.
I*
T h i s phase would adopt a new strategy developed by Egypt, who believed that Israel could b r defeated through a long-term "attritional war."
A war that
Nasser believed would decrease t h e Israeli technological and military superiority, make Israeli retention o f t h e lands t o o expensive in terms o f monetary and casualty losses, and attain parity between t h e IDF and Arab armies. President Nasser began planning how t o redeem Arab respect.
against t h e Israelis in an attempt t o restore Arab self-esteem and t o recover territories lost t o Israel
5
d u r i n g t h e Six-Day
War.
The n e x t t h r e e years
(1967
W i t h h i s death i n 1970,
i t s execution rest ed w i t h h i s
The c o n f l i c t
1973). a p e r i o d o f
Although t h e s t r a t e g y d u r i n g t h i s a i x year
i t d i d l a y the
p e r i o d d i d n o t recover l o s t t e r r i t o r i e s , groundwork f o r
t h e October War.
The October War i s a l s o known as t h e "Yom K i p p u r War" i n t h e W e s t and t h e "Ramadan War" i n t h e Arab c o u n t r i e s ;
I w i l l r e f e r t o t h e war t h r o u g h o u t t h i s
r e s t r i c t e d t o only Israeli-Egyptian
impact o p e r a t i o n s which o c c u r r e d a l o n g t h e Suez Canal and i n t h e areas a d j a c e n t t o t h e Canal. discuss e i t h e r the I srael i -Syri an and e a s t of t h e Sea of
I t does n o t
preparations north
G a l i l e e on t h e G o l a n H e i g h t s ,
or
Aqaba.
The
therefore,
t h e y w i l l n o t be d i s c x s s e d i n
Syria,
p r e p a r a t i o n s w i l l be discussed.
and p r o f e s s i o n a l m i l i t a r y s t u d i e s .
and arguments s u p p o r t i n g t h i s t h e s i s and i t s c o n c l u s i o n s and recommendations a r e based on these p r i m a r y and secondary m a t e r i a l s . Research o c c u r r e d i n
t h e F o r t Leavenworth Combined A r m s Research L i b r a r y . Documentation f o r t h i s t h e s i s w a s r e s t r i c t e d t o a v a i l a b l e u n c l a s s i f i e d sources. The War o f A t t r i t i o n , 1967 and August t h e p e r i o d between J u l y
1 9 7 0 , w i l l be discussed i n Chapter
11.
It w i l l
look a t t h e
t h r e e phases o f t h e a t t r i t i v e war Naeser would u n d e r t a k e t o r e c o v e r t h e occupied t e r r i t o r i e s and r e s t o r e Arab p r i d e and morale. Chapter I 1 1 w i l l analyze t h e E g y p t i a n p r e p a r a t i o n s from August t h e ascendancy of 1970 t o 6 October 1970.
W i t h
Egypt, the war with Isreal took a different course. will discuss the political and military preparations
the Egyptian Flrmy and the circumstances that led t o the "expulsion" of the Soviet advisors. Chapter I V will describe the Israeli preparations after t h e War of Flttrition.
I will
analyze t h e strategic changes Israel developed and how these changes led to a different concept of defense. will discuss the preparations that Israel takes t o prepare for war with Egypt. Finally, I will discuss
the Israeli intelligence failure and political and military miaperceptions about Egypt. In Chapter V I will provide some conclusions based on my analysis of the Egyptian-Israeli preceeding the October War. actions
attempts t o delimit the scope of literature available t o aid future researchers of this subject. Appendix 1 is a glossary of terms, acronyms, and abbreviations used in this thesis.
8
Appendix 2
CHAPTER I ENDNOTES
1 Harvey Sicherman, The Yom Kippur Wars Illusion? (1976): 5-6.
Chaim Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Peace in the Middle East (1984): 195.
Wars:
Wars:
195.
Peter Clllen, The Yom Kippur War (1982): 1 6 . John W. A m o s 1 1 , Arab-Israeli Military and Political Relations: Arab Perceptions and t h e Politics of. Escalation (1979): 69.
Ibid.
0
Ibid.
Ibid.
*O
Ibid.:
70.
(1975):
164.
CHCIPTER I 1
h i s estimate of the chances of Israel withdrawing from territories occupied since the Six-Day war without direct military force. He viewed Israel's refusal t o
accept a political settlement, United Nations' Security Council Resolution 242, which coincidentally had been endorsed by both the United States and the Soviet Union, as leaving only a military alternative to the problem.
i n t e r n a t i o n a l waterways i n t h e area;
j u s t s e t t l e m e n t t o t h e r e f u g e e problem;
territories,''
I s r a e l demanded t h e f o l l o w i n g steps:
"(1)
states,
I s r a e l i withdrawal t o t h e
I:!
pre-1967 lines, before ( 2 ) indirect negotiations through the United Nations, (and not directly with Israel, which would have meant recognizing Israel a s a legitimate entity) leading to (3) a peace agreement." It would be difficult t o have a more divergent requirement f o r peaceful negotiations than these steps outlined between Israel and Egypt. Although some
concessions were made by both Israel and Egypt, the gulf between them continued t o be insurmountable for peaceful negotiations. In the context of these
disagreements, Nasser elected to take the military option of forcing Israel t o return the occupied terr i tori es. In September 1967, Nasser delivered a speech to a mass demonstration prior to a meeting of the People's Assembly in Cairo. During this speech he elaborated on
. .that all that had been taken b y force could only b e returned b y force Egyptian military policy [ w o u l d be1 based on three phases: the 'defensive rehabilitation' phase, t h e 'offensive defence' phase and, finally, the ' 1 iberation * phase"
'I.
...
...
Sporadic fighting, at many times extremely fierce, continued between Egypt and Israel from 1 July
1967 t o 8 August 1970, when both countries agreed to a
ceasefire originally proposed b y the United States Secretary of State William Rogers.
13
This period of
conflict,
executed
N a s s e r ' s t h r e e m i l i t a r y phases. The " d e f e n s i v e r e h a b i l i t a t i o n " phase was r o u g h l y between 1 J u l y 1967 and September 1968, " r o u g h l y " because t h e r e a r e v a r y i n g d a t e s g i v e n f a r t h e s t a r t o f t h e War o f A t t r i t i o n . The purpose o f t h i s
s t a g e o f N a s s e r ' s p l a n was t o r e b u i l d t h e b a t t e r e d armed f o r c e s and p r e p a r e t h e c o u n t r y f o r a l o n g e r period o f c o n f l i c t t o eventually d r i v e the I s r a e l i s from t h e occupied t e r r i t o r i e s . During t h i s p e r i o d t h e
S o v i e t Union began a massive r e b u i l d i n g and rearming o f t h e E g y p t i a n f o r c e s w i t h q u a n t i t i e s and q u a l i t i e s of arms t h a t surpassed t h e equipment l o s t d u r i n g t h e Six-Day War. The c o s t o f m a i n t a i n i n g f o r c e s a l o n g t h e Canal proved expensive t o I s r a e l , and e s p e c i a l l y , Egypt.
E g y p t ' s main source o f revenue w a s t h e Suez Canal, a p p r o x i m a t e l y 260 m i l l i o n d o l l a r s a year. source o f income, however, This
had been c l o s e d t o t r a f f i c
W i t h i t s closing,
source o f h a r d c u r r e n c y was l o s t .
t h e loss of
income f r o m t o u r i s m and l o s s o f
14
f l e w t o Moscow w i t h t h e weapon's
"shopping 1 , i s t . "
They
concluded t h e b i g g e s t S o v i e t arms d e a l t o date. I n c l u d e d i n t h e d e a l were 100 MIG-Zls, MIG-15, and SU-7 aircraft, missiles, sever-a1 MIG-17,
MI-8 h e l i c o p t e r s , a b r i g a d e
and ZSU-23rnm antiaircr.aft
o f m o b i l e SAM-6 guns.
t h e S0viet.s
and a l l b u t a few o-f t h e s e n i o r E g y p t i a n s t a f f members. t h e E g y p t i a n s were d e v e l o p i n g an even more l i m i t e d o f f e n s i v e plan, "The H i g h M i n a r e t s " p l a n .
T h i s plan:
'I. was based more c l o s e l y on t h e a c t u a l c a p a b i l i t y o f our armed f o r c e s , as opposed t o some n o t i o n a l c a p a b i l i t y a f t e r u n t o l d arms shipments. I t s o b j e c t i v e s were t h e l i m i t e d q o a l I [General S h a i l y l had s e t o f a f i v e o r s i x - m i l e p e n e t r a t i o n . "
..
1 3
O p e r a t i o n 4 1 was renamed G r a n i t e T w o i n
1972.
I t remained b a s i c a l l y t h e same w i t h o n l y v e r y
13
minor changes.
Before t h e Egyptians could launch t h e s u r p r l s e a t t a c k a c r o s s t h e Canal u s i n g e i t h e r t h e High M i n a r e t s o r G r a n i t e Two p l a n s , many p r e p a r a t i o n s were r e q u i r e d The E g y p t i a n improper o r
low morale,
15
insufficient training, officer shortages, unworkable mobilization plans, and unemployable t a c t i c s and insufficient equipment for river, or canal, crossing operations. Many lessons w e r e learned in t h e 1967 defeat and t h e War o f Attrition. Many of t h e problems and
lessons learned in t h e 1967 War had been corrected and incorporated into army doctrine, and many from t h e War of Attrition would b e corrected before t h e October War. O n e of the p r o b l e m s in t h e Six-Day War had been
t h e incompetent and highly political Egyptian senior military leadership. In 1967 and 1968 a purge of t h e
Nasser, w a s t o c r e a t e a unity of command and purpose with clear lines of authority and responsibility, which w a s missing during t h e Six-Day War.
Is
Preceding t h e Six-Day War, rivalry, mistrust, and political intrigue between Commander-in-Chief Field
Marshall Muhammad Abdul Hakim Amer, Chief of Sta.l.f General Muhammad Fawzi, and Minister of War Brigadier S h e m s al-Din Badran, led t o an unworkable chain of 16
c o n f u s i o n and d i s u n i t y . These problems were compounded when F i e l d M a r s h a l l Amer c r e a t e d a new command i n May 1967, t h e F r o n t Command, al-Mulsen l e d by an Amer c r o n y General Abd
Kamal M u r t a g u i .
A new h e a d q u a r t e r s was
I n t r o d u c t i o n of
Command ( M u r t a q u i ) between t h e C h i e f of
Staff
2-7.
c h a i n of
Murtagui,
r e q u i r i n g p r e s i d e n t i a l approval f o r a l l p r o m o t i o n s t o
17
deterrent effect upon the Egyptians, for an elevenmonth period of relative calm existed along the Canal, with the exception of occasional artillery fires, air battles, and cross canal patrols. continued into the summer of 1968. This period
L-
September 1968 saw the end of Nassers first phase, defenmive rehabilitation.
I
had rearmed the Egyptian Army quantitatively to a level exceeding pre-1967 strengths. New, higher quality
weapons had also been introduced into the army and air force.
MIG-21s replaced MIG-17s.
increased in the number of military personnel coming t o Egypt to train and h e l p organize the armed forces. Initially numbering only a few hundred in 1968; they eventually would number in the thousands becoming involved in virtually all aspects o f the Egyptian firmed Forces. The structure of the Egyptian high command had been reorganized t o improve unity of command and purpose (it was to undergo further changes which will
be discussed in Chapter 111).
Incompetent senior
officers had been removed, in some cases court-martialed. and replaced by competent,
18
professional commanders.
purpose was to raise the morale of the army and the country and t o erase the psychological effects o f the defeat of the S i x Day War.
To accomplish this Nasser
wanted t o begin a limited offensivr campaign against Israel t o dispel the "superiority" of the Israeli forces.
A second purpose was t o bring t o bear on t h e
Israeli military in the Sinai the strategy Of attrition. Nasser was well aware of the high value
He hoped that
concentrated attacks on the Israeli forces would bring pressure on the Israeli government t o withdraw rather than sustain high casualties. The forthcoming
offensive operations were to increase not only Israel's economic burden of retaining the occupied territories, but t o increase Israeli casualties. undermining their morale.
I7
During this second phase of Nasser's plan, through March 1969. fighting raged almost continually along the Canal, especially during the first few
1'1
months.
bombardment on 8 September and the second one on 26 October numbered 25 killed and 51 wounded.
am
It
appeared that the Egyptian strategy of attrition was working; Israel was taking heavy casualties. retaliation after the first bombardment was an artillery bombardment of the cities of Suez and Ismailia and the refineries in Suez. The scope of the war began t o spread as Egypt and Israel both conducted commando raids across the Canal, at times quite deep into enemy territory. On 31 Israeli
October helicopter borne Israeli commandoes staged a successful raid against three targets along the Nile River between Cairo and 4swan, over 200 miles west of the Canal in retaliation for the 26 October Egyptian artillery bombardment along the Canal. The Israeli-adopted policy of reprisal was meant to exploit Egyptian military, economic, and psychological sensitivities and was an extension of Israel's defense strategy. The Israeli strategy was
"at its source reaction t o and reprisal for Egyptian breaches of the cease-fire, accompanied by a policy o f refraining from any initiative that might lead to escalation of military activity along the canal." They initially believed that the ceaeefire could b e
20
reimposed by limiting military activity t o artillery counterstrikes against Egyptian artillery, economic, and civilian installations along the Canal. "These
counterbombardments were intended t o show the Egyptians the cost of their military activity, not only from tho military standpoint but also from the economic and ci vi 1 i an standpoint.
I'
ao
When Egypt increased the military activity along the Canal and commando raids on the east bank, the Israelis realized that merely returning the fire was no answer to Egypt's strategy.
I 4 new Israeli
military action was needed t o impose a ceasefire on the Egyptians. An appropriate response would b e reprisal
This led to the previously mentioned 31 October raids on the Nile River targets at Najh Hamadi and Qena, which a l s o demonstrated Egypt's vulnerability t o Israeli attacks. The Israeli's also hoped that the raids would force Egypt t o spread its forces and reduce the troop concentration along the west bank o f the Canal. Canal.
themselves against the Egyptian strategy of attrition. There were basically two alternatives.
The first
option for the Israelis was to pull back from the Canal, out of the range of artillery, and maintain armored forces capable of cauntrrattacking if, and when, the Egyptians attempted a crossing. This option
was more characteristic of the mobile, rapid reacting armored and mechanized maneuvers that the Israeli forces had successfully used in previous campaigns and wars. This option, however, meant EQypt might b e able
t o successfully cross the Canal and establish a bridgehead on the east bank before the IDF could repulse them.
the
The second option was to build a fortified line along the edge of the Canal. This option of static
defense meant deviating from the standard Israeli strategy of mobile defense.
I t would also leave the
defense strategy, which favored Egypt with its superiority in artillery tubes and its willingness to accept human and equipment losses f o r the long-range goal of regaining the occupied territories.
zaX
According to most sources, t h e Israeli military high command was divided on which option to select t o counter the growing Egyptian belligerence. Major
situate approximately 17 small fortifications along the length of the Canal t o give maximum coverage and observation.
A small contingent of infantry would man
each fortress while larger armored and artillery forces would be stationed behind the outposts, patrolling between the outposts and acting as reserves to b e brought to the Canal to stop any attemptad Egyptian crossing.
=*
Major General Yeshayahu Gavich, Commander of the Southern Command, and Lt. Gen Bar-Lev approved of Adan's plan. Major General CIriel Sharon, Head of
Training, IDF, and Major General Israel Tal, attached to the Ministry of Defense, disapproved of Adan's plan
c r e a t i n q an
surface.
z7
The b i g g e s t problem c o n f r o n t i n g t h e E g y p t i a n s was g e t t i n g a c r o s s t h e Canal and over t h e sand b a r r i e r . The fundamental problem, clearly, was t o d r i v e Compounding
passages t h r o u g h t h e sand b a r r i e r .
i n d i c a t i o n of
would a c t i v a t e t h e i r m o b i l i z a t i o n plan.
Israeli
m o b i l i z e d u n i t s c o u l d be i n b a t t l e p o s i t i o n s w i t h i n 48 hours o f n o t i f i c a t i o n .
I f t h e E g y p t i a n s were t o have
any chance o f d e s t r o y i n g t h e I s r a e l i f o r t i f i c a t i o n s . t h e y would have t o move a l a r g e number of equipment across t h e Canal v e r y q u i c k l y . The E g y p t i a n s b u i l t mockups of u n i t s and
ze
t h e sand
one b u l l d o z e r ,
500
a p p r o x i m a t e l y 1,200
manhours p e r
the
t i m e r e q u i r e d t o c l e a r t h e proposed 60 breaches a l o n g
24
forces.
reduced casualties while thwarting, or at least delaying, a crossing and enabling implementation of t h e mobilization plan of the IDF. The second defensive
line would consist of armored, artillery, and mechanized forces strategically stationed at positions to the rear of the main fortressas and stronqpoints. They could move laterally along the main defensive line
enemy crossings.
In early 1969 Lt. Gen. Bar-Lev accepted Adan's plan. in spite of the vehement arguments of Sharon, Tal, and their supporters. During the ceaeefire in
January and February 1969 the construction of the Bar-Lev Line, as it became known, was hastily completed. This complex network o f fortresses. patrol
roads, earth walls, mine fielde, approach roads, underground control centers, and tank and artillery positions was upgraded at least three times during the next two years. Massive sand ramparts were constructed
on the east edge of the Canal, transforming it into a "giant tank trap." The ramparts provided fields of
fire along the canal while providing obstacles to infantry and armored units. 25
There were basically three components of this defensive concept. and sand-reinforced The first was a series of stonebunkers "maozim," situated at
intervals of 10-30 kilometers (17 in all along the length of the Canal), which were the main observation posts and the first line of defense ( a trip wire for activating the mobilization of the IDF). Later another
as the Artillery Road, which paralleled the Canal 8-10 kilometers east of it. This road was t o be used t o
move artillery along the line as the flow o f battle dictated. Further east another road, the Lateral Road,
running parallel to t h e Canal and about 30 kilometers from it was constructed t o move the other two components of the defense concept, armored and artillery units, between sectors along the Canal. all approximately 500 million dollare was spent in constructing, upgrading, and repairing the defensive network. =o By early 1969 Nasser was totally dissatisfied and disillusioned with the diplomatic attempts to bring concessions from Israel concerning t h e occupied territories. In
reinforced h i s opinion of Israeli intransigence in remaining in the Sinai. He saw the l i n e not only as
26
Israel's attempt to insure the status quo of its presence and military superiority along the Canal and
ds
attempt t o impose a fixed political boundary along the Canal. These considerations were primarily responsible
of Attrition.
=a
Yet Narser was aware of several factors which would determine the level of war he pursued, a limited war rather than a general war against Israel. Egypt
had not fully recovered in military strength and was still unable to obtain a position of equality with Israel's military strength, especially air power. Although Egypt had received large numbers of modern aircraft from the Soviets and many pilots had been trained, they were still incapable of neutralizing or counterbalancing the IAF in the air-to-air arena.
Likewise, the ground forces did not have sufficient surface-to-air defenses to neutralize the Iawaeli close They
needed an improved air defense system because the IAF had effectively neutralized the SAM-2s during 1968. and SAH-3s
==
27
the
...
P r e p a r a t i o n s and r e f i n e m e n t s f o r G r a n i t e Two and High M i n a r e t s c o n t i n u e d a t an i n c r e a s i n g pace w i t h s e c u r i t y p r e c a u t i o n s r e m a i n i n g s t r i c t f o r High Minarets. plan. Very few p e o p l e were aware o f t h e second
were ever aware o f t h e e n t i r e High M i n a r e t s p l a n a5 i t evolved. Those i n t h e know were seven members of the
E g y p t i a n High Command,
s i x i n t h e S y r i a n High Command,
A s m i l i t a r y p r e p a r a t i o n s c o n t i n u e d i n 1972 and
1973 f o r t h e i n e v i t a b l e war w i t h I s r a e l P r e s i d e n t Sadat pursued d i p l o m a t i c i n i t i a t i v e s f o r a s e t t l e m e n t .
A 5 s t a t e d e a r l i e r Sadats attempts a t a d i p l o m a t i c
28
burdens o n t h e economy, and destroy a s much of t h e BarLev L i n e and Israeli war equipment a s possible. T h i s attritive war would, likewise, keep t h e political issue alive in t h e United Nations, intensifying pressure o n Israel f o r returning t h e occupied lands. Nasser also hoped t h e prolonged war
would increase t h e offensive spirit of t h e Egyptian f o r c e s and raise morale of t h e Egyptian public through a riucceesful campaign against t h e Israelis. Finally, h e hoped t h e war would elevate Egyptian s t a t u s and leadership in t h e 4rab world and establish a unified front against t h e Israelis which would ultimately lead t o a general war and Israel's destruction.
In accomplishing t h e limited a i m s of t h e
"liberation phase", t h e Egyptians possessed suppriority aver t h e Israelis in t h e o n e weapon required f o r t h i s type of war - artillery.
The Egyptian's primary tactic
was continued bombardments supplemented by commando r a i d s o n targets on t h e east bank of t h e Suez. static war would negate t h e IDF's advantage of maneuverability and speed. It would allow t h e This
Egyptians t o wipe out a significant portion o f t h e forward positions of t h e Bar-Lev Line a s well a s t h e mobile f o r c e s near t h e Canal, while allowing them t o seize a number of bridgeheads o n t h e east bank.
29
3L
I n mid-March
1969 t h e c e a s e f i r e ended w i t h
concentrated Egyptian a r t i l l e r y barrages against t h e I s r a e l i d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n s a l o n g t h e Canal. " l i b e r a t i o n phase" o f t h e War of begun. The
A t t r i t i o n had now
I t would c o n t i n u e w i t h o u t r e s p i t e f o r t h e n e x t
the
numerous r a i d s ,
and o t h e r c o n v e n t i o n a l and u n c o n v e n t i o n a l
b a t t l e s occurred. I s r a e l ' s b a s i c aims d u r i n g t h i s phase w e r e f u n d a m e n t a l l y what t h e y had been s i n c e June 1967 maintain the t e r r i t o r i a l , p o l i t i c a l , and m i l i t a r y War. To m a i n t a i n
to
t h e y f o r m u l a t e d f i v e i n t e r m e d i a t e aims: and
( 1 ) p r e v e n t Egypt f r o m c r o s s i n g t h e Suez
e s t a b l i s h i n g f o o t h o l d s on t h e e a s t bank;
( 2 ) remain
political-strategical
aims of
( 4 ) r e f r a i n from v i o l a t i n g t h e
which c o u l d l e a d t o e s c a l a t i o n and g e n e r a l
war t o a total war in the event Egypt initiated incidents along the Canal. =7 Throughout March, April, and early May, the Egyptians continued the heavy artillery barrages against t h e Bar-Lev Line and Israeli forces all along the eastern bank.
against the Bar-Lev Line, Israeli patrols, and logistic: routes and areas escalated the intensity of the
'
conflict.
The Israelis suffered heavy casualties, but d i d not lessen their resolve to maintain the status quo. mid-April
In
Israeli
However,
Egyptian resolve t o impose their will on Israel. The Israeli defensive measures during the March t o June period were primarily retaliatory. counter-artillery Israeli
fires answered the initial Egyptian When Egypt began using commando
artillery barrages.
raids on the eastern side of the Canal, the Israelis retaliated with commando raids deep into Egypt - a tactic that had worked in 1968 t o bring about a
ceasefire.
as
w e l l as Egypt,
f o r c e s i n any s i g n i f i c a n t r o l e i n t h e c o n f l i c t .
I n The War o f A t t r i t i o n ,
discusses t h e a i r f o r c e s ' of
Bar-Siman-Tov up t o t h e m i d d l e
"non-role"
1969.
u s i n g a i r power because of
IPF, because t h e y d i d n o t
p i l o t s capable o f combat. Likewise, The
proficient
d e f e a t i n g I A F p i l o t s i n head-to-head
i n t e n s i f y t h e war.
i nterest
3 -
Meanwhile, Israeli casualties continued to mount. In May and June 1969 Israel suffered 76
casualties (22 killed and 54 wounded), over one-half caused by artillery. On 10 July another incident
occurred which influenced Israeli strategy in t h e coming months. An Egyptian commando raid successfuly
attacked on Israeli armored unit south of P o r t Tewfik in daylight, inflicting eleven casualties on the Israeli force. The escalatory nature of the war,
public and political sensitivities towards the intolerable increase in casualties, and Israel 's reevaluation of Egyptian aims, led to formulation of new Israeli aims and strategy in mid-July; introduction of the air force into t h e war; and a switch from a defensive to a limited, offensive strategy.
4o
Dissent in the armed forces once again accompanied t h e decision to employ the air force. Among those opposing t h e use of the air force were Minister of Defense, Moshe Dayan; Chief of Staff Chaim Bar-Lev; and senior air farce staff headed by Commander Mordekhai Hod. Dayan opposed using the air
It
force due to the implied escalatory significance. should only b e used if a serious Egyptian threat occurred (i-e., an attempted crossing in force).
'3 '3
Others d i d not wish t o use air force due to the extensive Egyptian missiles along the canal. Unless
the IAF obtained new electronic countermeasure (ECM) equipment to counter the threat, they were not in favor of using the air force to bomb Egyptian infantry or gun emplacements.
**
In spite of these misgivings, on 19 J u l y 1969 the IDF and the Israeli government decided to use the
ICIF.
along the Canal was a prelude to a near-term crossing. The limited use of the IAF was designed to prevent this crossing b y showing the Egyptians that Israel still maintained superiority i n the air, and that no crossing attempt could succeed. Other Israeli aims were to
prevent Egypt from increasing the level of war t o a general war and force her to decrease the number of military along the Canal. decrease casualitiea. Israel believed this would
characterized this strategy by saying: putting planes into action currently on the canal is 'escalation for the sake of de-escalation,' an increase of activity for the purpose of securing a reduction of activity." 41
'I.
..
On 20 July the IAF initiated air attacks against the Egyptian forces on the west bank which lasted through 28 July. They hoped the Egyptians would Targets
were m a i n l y n o r t h o f Q a n t a r a and w i t h i n a few m i l e s o f t h e Canal. The a i r a t t a c k s were d i r e c t e d a t a r t i l l e r y SAM-2 sites, commando bases, radar
*=
He d i d n o t i n t e n d t o cancel t h e c r o s s i n g ,
*-
O n 19 J u l y t h e
o f Suez.
FI key
network has
The I s r a e l i s d e s t r o y e d t h e The I s r a e l i s
27 December 1969.
t o I s r a e l i aims,
v u l n e r a b i l i t y o f Egypt.
o f t h e s e s u c c e s s f u l r a i d s and t h e a i r f o r c e ' s e n t r a n c e i n t o t h e war would l e a d Egypt t o renew t h e c e a s e f i r e and end t h e i r be1 1 i gerency.
-*
35
On 9 September a f o r c e o f s e v e r a l hundred
Israelis, equipped w i t h S o v i e t t a n k s and personnel War, was t r a n s p o r t e d the G u l f of
c a r r i e r s c a p t u r e d i n t h e Six-Day
They proceeded s o u t h a l o n g a
by E g y p t i a n f o r c e s ,
a t Rae Zaafrana.
on
amphibious c r a f t and r e t u r n e d t o t h e S i n a i .
L a t e r i n December h e l i c o p t e r s t r a n s p o r t e d I s r a e l i f o r c e s t o an E g y p t i a n r a d a r s t a t i o n a t Ras t i h a r i b which was equipped w i t h a new, a c q u i s i t i o n radar, one of known as t h e P-12 low-level radar. target
This w a s
t h e S o v i e t s most modern r a d a r s w i t h
Israeli
h e l i c o p t e r s t o t r a n s p o r t them to I s r a e l .
t e c h n o l o g y and i n f o r m a t i o n o b t a i n e d from t h e I s r a e l i s t u d y was i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o t a c t i c s and ECM equipment used t o d e f e a t t h e E g y p t i a n s system. The r a d a r was
47
l a t e r s e n t t o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s f o r study.
36
The second phase of the air force's involvement began on 13 August and continued through 19 August
1969.
July and 13 August there were mainly small arms, mortar, and artillery fires. When Egyptian artillery
of
August, Israel reacted with air strikes against Egyptian artillery positions.
this phase was to bring moderation t o the Egyptian activity. Counter-bombing artillery positions failed
to deter Egypt's fires across the Canal. This led to a third period of Israeli air attacks against Egyptian positions along the Canal. The period continued from 9 September until the end of December 1969. During this time the Israelis waged
their own air war of attrition against the Egyptians. Strikes were still limited to targets along the length of the Canal. Israel's aim was still destruction of
Egyptian artillery position6 and air defense systems along the Canal and the Gulf of Suez, and continuation of Israeli air superiority throughout the region.
By
the end of December Egyptian defenses along the Canal were basically ineffective against the IAF.
49
But t h e continued
system d i c t a t e d m o d i f y i n g t h i s s t r a t e g y .
N a s s e r ' s a t t e m p t s a t Arab u n i t y d u r i n g
t h e Arabs were
world as i t s leader.
A t t h e end o f
1969 E g y p t ' s d e s i r e t o l a u n c h an
a t t a c k a c r o s s t h e Canal was f u r t h e r d e l a y e d due t o t h e s t a t u s o f t h e air defense systems and Arab d i s u n i t y . However, Nasser had no i n t e n t i o n o f d i s c o n t i n u i n g t h e He would merely delay i t . Although
planned a s s a u l t .
and
'38
Israeli air attacks. Early 1970 saw major changer in both belligerents attitudes and strategies.
The Israelis,
sensing a chance to exploit their successfully damaging the Egyptian air defense systems, escalated the air war to include military targets in t h e Egyptian interior. escalation. This was viewed as a major increase in Israel still had doubts about American and
Soviet responsrs to their campaign of. in-depth raids. Israel felt the USSR would not intervene militarily t o keep Nasser from losing control of the government o r risk a confrontation with the US should the Soviet Union take direct military action against her. The
Israelis believed that Soviet intervention would be very limited i n a worst case scenario. Israeli concerns with the Rmerican response were likewise considered. Lack of US response to
earlier raids caused Israel t o believe that the US would not condemn the raids. Likewise, Israel felt
that the US opposed Nasser's government and would be sympathetic to any action which would hasten h i 5 removal from office. Futhermore, Israel believed t h e
US was primarily concerned with its own interests i n the M i d d l e East. The prestige Nasser had gained in the
Finally,
Americans d i d not actually encourage the Israeli policy, they d i d not explicity oppose it.=' Israeli air raids began on 7 January 1970 and continued until 13 April. The first raid was
directed at Egyptian Army and Air Force bases near Inchas and Hilwan. Other targets near Cairo were
periodically bombed throughout the rest of January and February. There were civilian casualties from the
. a a
March and April the raids focused on SAM-2 sites and radar stations in the Nile Delta.
raids exposed the Egyptian's inability t o defend against the IAF. The Egyptian people's dissatisfaction
with the military's ineptness threatened t o bring down Nasser's government. Nasser needed t o d o something
es4
civilian unrest prompted Nasser t o send a delegation to Moscow t o secure solid Soviet assistance.
40
On 9
head of
F o r e i g n M i n i s t e r Mahmoud Riad,
o f Defense General Mohammed Fawzi l e f t C a i r o w i t h a m i s s i o n of Soviets. o b t a i n i n g more s o p h i s t i c a t e d arms from t h e They d i d n o t succeed i n g a i n i n g a n y t h i n g
other than a Soviet understanding o f Egypt's m i l i t a r y needs. The S o v i e t s were n o t convinced t h a t more
On 22 January a
t o g e t t h e Soviets d i r e c t l y involved.
p r o v i d e t h e s u p p o r t he r e q u i r e d .
SAM-3s.
missile,
a low-to-medium
a l t i t u d e surface-to-air
so he
T h i s would d i r e c t l y i n v o l v e S o v i e t
m i l i t a r y personnel i n t h e war w i t h I s r a e l
a major
4I
e s c a l a t o r y move.
S o v i e t Premier L e o n i d Rrezhnev
would a l s o be
Approximately
1000 E g y p t i a n s would be s e n t t o
t r a i n i n g on t h e new m i s s i l e .
Russia f o r six-months
d e c i s i o n was based i n l a r g e p a r t because o f t h e i r d e s i r e t o r e t a i n t h e Nasser government i n power. g0vernmen.t f r i e n d l y t o t h e USSR i n t h e r e g i o n was c r i t i c a l f o r them i n r e d u c i n g US presence i n t h e M i d d l e East. R e s t o r i n g t h e s t r a t e g i c b a l a n c e i n t h e Canal
FI
r e g i o n would a l l o w them t o pursue d i p l a m a t i c efforts. S o v i e t equipment and personnel began a r r i v i n g s h o r t l y a f t e r t h e Nasser-Rrezhnev February t h e f i r s t o f
i n place.
t h e SAM-3
conference.
In late
SAM-2
s i t e s and a t t h e SAM-3
A r t i l l e r y bombardments and E g y p t i a n r a i d s a c r o s s t h e
C a n a l continued.
I n F e b r u a r y an E g y p t i a n
42
Personnel and
a7
equipment losses on both sides of the Canal mounted. With the growing "Sovietization" of the war, Israel faced a dilemna.
of the missile sites, more frequently manned b y Soviet crews, and chance a direct confrontation with the Soviet Union, o r should it stop o r limit the attacks all together? Minister o f Defense Dayan initially
favored limiting t h e in-depth attacks t o avoid clashes with the Soviets. Vice Premier Yigal FIllon and many of They
viewed the Soviet intervention as limited in nature and not likely to expand. However, the government d i d not Israel d i d begin to l i m i t its
raids t o missile sites and radar stations in the northeast area of the Nile Delta. an In early CIpril Israel's dilemna war further compounded. MIG-Zls, piloted by Soviets, began
this. he proposed stopping the in-depth raids entirely to avoid confronting the Soviet Union. On 13 CIpril the
Israelis halted the in-depth raids, while continuing and intensifying t h e attacks along t h e Canal Zone.
By
"gentleman's agreement" c o u l d be reached w i t h t h e USSR, whereby I s r a e l would cease i t s bombing i f t h e S o v i e t s would r e s p e c t I s r a e l ' s s t r a t e g i c a i r s u p e r i o r i t y i n t h e area and would r e f r a i n from a t t a c k i n g i n t h e Canal Zone.
T h e S o v i e t answer came f i v e days l a t e r when an
w i t h an announcement o f
no i n - d e p t h r a i d s .
be d e t e r r e d f r o m a d i r e c t
c o n f r o n t a t i o n w i t h t h e S o v i e t Union ift h e y attempted t o i n t e r v e n e i n t h e f i g h t i n g i n t h e Canal area o r v i o l a t e t h e c e a s e f i r e l i n e s e t down a f t e r t h e Six-Day War. These l i m i t a t i o n s which,
if v i o l a t e d ,
could lead
( 1 ) no o p e r a t i o n a l a c t i v i t y by Soviet. a i r p l a n e s and p i l o t s i n t h e a i r space over t h e f r o n t (SO t o 4 0 k i l o m e t e r s f r o m t h e c a n a l l i n e ) , and ( 2 ) no i n s t a l l a t i o n of a n t i a i r c r a f t systems o f m a i n l y SA-3 m i s s i l e s on t h e western any k i n d bank o f t h e Canal." =-
". . .
When t h e i n - d e p t h
a i r r a i d s ended,
the
By t h e end
of
June t h e
SAM-3,
and antiaircraft network up to the edge of the battlezone, halfway between Ismailia and Suez, 30 kilometers from the Canal. The Soviets had transferred
The Israelis
directed their heaviest efforts at these sites, resulting in increased losses of Israeli aircraft and pilots. Between 30 June and 7 July Israel lost three
Phantoms while destroying or damaging five of the twelve SCIM-2 sites. Tawards the end of July
one of t h e
Russian-piloted
resolve remained
Israeli aircraft over t h e northern sector of the Gulf of Suez. In the ensuing dogfight, five Soviet-piloted
on
Egypt accepted an American proposal for a ceasefire negotiated through the United Nations Emissary Gunnar Jarring. It wa5 not an easy decision for Israel. The
details surrounding this decision will be discussed further in Chapter IV. After more than three years of conflict t h e War
45
af Attrition ended without a clear-cut military decision or victor. heavy casualties. Both Israel and Egypt had suffered The military-balance between the two Egypt
standpoint Egypt had failed because they had not succeeded in forcing Israel from the Sinai o r the Suez Canal. But the military failure was responsible for
S U C C ~ S ~ because ,
the political
it involved Soviet
intervention which prevented Israel from affirming its strategic superiority. Israel's military strategic
standing had declined signficantly from the clear superiority i t had during the Six-Day War. The
political balance was altered even though the territorial status quo remained unchanged. Israel's
acceptance of t h e ceasefire and the superpowers entrance into the process had reduced her political claut and could lead to future military and political pressures b y the US and USSR to secure Israeli withdrawal from part or all of the occupied territories.
46
CHAPTER I 1
ENDNOTES
Yaacov Bar-Siman-Tov, The I s r a e l i - E g y p t i a n Citing War o f A t t r i t i o n , 1969-1970 (1980): 44. 1 January 1968. 61-Ahram, 2
Times, I n s i g h t
a The I n s i g h t Team of
197.
le.
Ibid.:
195.
Wars (1980):
A.
J. Barker, A r a b - I s r a e l i
Israel,
100.
Nadav Sa+ran,
The Embattled A l l y
(1978): 260.
' O I t m a r Rabinovich and Haim Shaked, eds., From June t o October, The M i d d l e East Between 1967 and 1973
(1978): 1 4 1 .
' I
114-115.
105.
197.
s4
Victory: 348.
Herzog,
Arab-Israeli
Wars:
199.
LL George W. Gawrych, "Egyptian High Command i n t h e 1973 War: A n H i s t o r i c a l P e r s p e c t i v e " (undated) : 13-14. Paper used as a handout i n Army Command and General 5 t a f f C o l l e g e course i n " M i l i t a r y H i s t o r y of t h e Middle East."
l7
Barker,
Arab-Israeli
Wars:
47
Dupuy,
Elusive Victory:
357. 68.
Bar-Siman-Tov,
2o
War o f A t t r i t i o n :
Ibid.
Attri tion: -
Safran,
Israel:
263; Bar-Siman-Tov,
War of
62-63.
Ibid.
==
z4 Bar-Siman-Tov, War of A t t r i t i o n : 63; Herzog, A r a b - I s r a e l i Wars: 201. Both o f t h e s e a u t h o r s espouse t h e d i v i s i o n s i n t h e High Command an t h i s strategy. Avraham (Bren) Adan, O n t h e Banks o f t h e Suez (1980) s t a t e s t h a t a l l of t h e H i g h Command accepted t h e o p t i o n of s t a t i c defense.
~ ~ e Bar-Siman-Tov, a
War o f A t t r i t i o n :
63.
=-
Ibid.
(1982):
War o f A t t r i t i o n :
19-2@;
358-360.
War (1985):
3L
Frank Aker, October 1973, The A r a b - I s r a e l i 8; Herzoq, A r a b 220-221; and Adan, Banks o f t Ibid. Bar-Siman-Tov, Ibid.: War o f A t t r i t i o n :
47-51.
48-49.
==
=Israel:
261-262; Bar-Siman-Tov,
53-57, Dupuy, E l u s i v e V i c t o r y :
361-362.
Herzog,
Arab-Israeli
Wars:
207.
x7 Bar-Siman-Tov, War o f A t t r i t i o n : 60-41. C i t i n g Moshe Dayan, H a ' a r e t z , (23 March and 30 A p r i l , 1969) and Chaim Bar-Lev, Album of 1,000 Days (Hebrew), Yetzhah Arad. ed, ( T R ~Aviv, Defense M i n i s t r y , undated) : 1.
Wars:
208-210: Dupuy,
War o f A t t r i t i o n :
71-74,
84-90.
Herzog, Ibid.: 83; Dupuy, E l u s i v e V i c t o r y : A r a b - I s r a e l i Wars: 208-210. Bar-Siman-Tov,
-ZI
363;
W a r of
attrition:
85-86.
Bar-Lev,
86-87.
Bar-Siman-Tov, War of A t t r i t i o n : 107-109. C i t i n g t h e postponement of t h e c r o s s i n g from K h a l i d i , 44; and S e h i f f , Phantom Over t h e War o f A t t r i t i o n : Nile: 53.
--=
-=I
-7
108; Dupuy, E l u s i v e V i c t o r y :
363.
Ibid.:
T a b l e 4.7, 100-101.
Dupuy, E l u s i v e V i c t o r y : Ibid.:
363-364.
Wars:
363; H s r z o g , A r a b - I s r a e l 1
War o f A t t r i t i o n :
212-213 .
-a Bar-Siman-Tov,
89-90.
**
90. 117-122.
130-131.
=is
Ibid.:
132.
, L?l
'\)
'.. '.. .\ '. , == Mohamed H e i k a l , The Road t o Ramadan (1975): 82. I s r a e l i a u t h o r s (Herzog, Bar-Siman-Tov, and S a f r a n ) do n o t mention t h e s e a t t a c k s .
34
>Y
.,
'I
Safran,
Israel:
264; Herzog,
Arab-Israeli
Wars:
213-214;
t s r a
Dupuy, E l u s i v e V i c t o r y :
36-366.
137. 83-88.
Bar-Siman-Tov, Ibid.:
149-151;
37
Herzog,
Arab-Israeli
Wars:
214-21s.
Bar-Siman-Tov,
OV
War of A t t r i t i o n :
152-153.
Ibid.:
154-155.
218;
Lo Herzog,
Israel:
265;
Li
A r a b - I s r a e l i Wars: Dupuy, E l u s i v e V i c t o r y :
Safran,
367.
190-191.
Bar-Siman-Tov,
War of A t t r i t i o n :
50
CHAPTER I11 EGYPTIAN PREPARATIONS F O R LIBERATION O F THE S I N A I August 1970 - October 1973
He was succeeded by V i c e - p r e s i d e n t
Anwar el-Sadat.
changes i n t h e E g y p t i a n government;
c o n t r o l o f t h e government and t h e armed forces. One change was t h e appointment i n November 1970 of
A l i
Sabri,
and would
A f t e r F a w z i ' s appointment,
l e d a c o n s p i r a c y a g a i n s t Sadat which was p r o m p t l y discovered. The c o n s p i r a t o r s were d i s m i s s e d from t h e i r . jailed, tried, and g i v e n l o n g
government p o s i t i o n s , j a i l terms.
Another c a s u a l t y of
Mohammecl Sadeq,
t h e C h i e f of S t a f f .
W i t h h i s power base
diplomatic
consolidated,
Sadat s e t o u t on a c a u t i o u s ,
p r i m a r i l y the
problem of Israel.
When h e assumed the office, President Sadat decided not to follow Nasser's War of Attrition.
He
believed it had served its purpose but was no longer a viable means of getting concessions from the Israeli government. Attritive operations against them would He believed it
His
"The regaining of l o s t Egyptian territories of the formula that not one inch of Arab territory will b e lost, and there will b e no bargaining over the rights of the Palestinian people." 3
By mid-1970,
more concessions from us and not a single one from the Israelis."
" T h i s i s what w e want and i n s i s t on because w e t i e l i s v e t h e b a t t l e i s g o i n g t o be imposed on us, and t h a t t h e d e c i s i v e word w i l l b e spoken on t h e battlefield. W e t r i e d , and a r e s t i l l t r y i n g politically. W e s h a l l n o t c l o s e t h e door o r miss a chance. Even if t h e r e i s a one p e r c e n t chance f o r But i n a peaceful s o l u t i o n , w e s h a l l work f o r i t . t h e end w e s h a l l f i g h t t o l i b e r a t e our land, f o r thi!; i s our d u t y and a l e g i t i m a t e t h i n g t o do."
He had been p r e p a r i n g f o r t h e e v e n t u a l i t y of war.
he s i g n e d a f i f t e e n - y e a r
Treaty of Friendship
and Cooperation w i t h t h e S o v i e t s .
Lt.
General Shazly,
appainted
Shazly
t h e U n i t e d Arab Forces i n t h e
Congo i n 1960-1961,
" A 1 1 t h a t our c a p a b i l i t i e s would p e r m i t c o u l d aim t o c r o s s t h e c a n a l . d e s t r o y t h e Bar-Lev L i n e and t h e n t a k e up a d e f e n s i v e p o s t u r e . Any f u r t h e r , more a g g r e s s i v e moves would then need d i f + e r e n t equipment, d i f f e r e n t t r a i n i n g , and a l o t
.W e
more preparation.
I '
This plan was initially rejected by General Mohammed Ahmed Sadek, War Minister and Commander-in-Chief, Egyptian Armed Forces.
He felt it
was of no value either politically or militarily. Sadek believed the required weaponry t o accomplish this limited plan wa5 neither currently available in the Egyptian Army nor l i k e l y to be available from their reluctant supplier
He did not
believe that the plan went far enough; he believed that given "sufficient weapons"
the Egyptian Army should continue all the way t o the international frontiers of Egypt and into the Gaza Strip.
0
However, to Sadat and Shazly: "The objective was not so much to produce an outright victory or even military gains, as such, but to end the state of 'no war, no peace' and t o compel the United Nations intervention." General Sadek finally accepted a compromise plan, Operation 41. This offensive plan was limited,
"to the seizing of the k e y Sinai passes 30 - 40 miles east o f the canal."
lo
equipment and would lei5 likely b e rejected b y the Soviets from which equipment was required for the plan to be implemented.
1971.
f l e w t o Moscow w i t h t h e weapon's "shopping l i s t . " concluded t h e b i g g e s t S o v i e t arms d e a l t o date. I n c l u d e d i n t h e d e a l were 100 MIG-2ls, MIG-15, and SU-7 aircraft, missiles,
They
s e v e r a l MIG-17,
MI-8 h e l i c o p t e r s , a b r i g a d e
and ZSU-23mm antiaircraft
o f m o b i l e SAM-6 guns.
The E g y p t i a n s b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e s e a r m s were
s t i l l i n s u f f i c i e n t t o r e p e l I s r a e l i a i r s t r i k e s if t h e y were g o i n g t o c r o s s t h e Suez Canal. Behind t h e scenes and i n secrecy o f t h e S o v i e t s and a l l b u t a few of t h e senior Egyptian s t a f f members,
was based more c l o s e l y on the a c t u a l c a p a b i l i t y o f our armed f o r c e s , as opposed t o some n o t i o n a l c a p a b i i t y a f t e r u n t o l d arms shipments. I t 5 o b j e c t i v e s were t h e l i m i t e d g o a l I [General Sha;:lyl had s e t of a f i v e o r s i x - m i l e p e n e t r a t i o n . "
I I
". . .
1971
1972.
I t remained b a s i c a l l y t h e same w i t h o n l y v e r y
low morale,
insufficient training, officer shortages, unworkable mobilization plans, and unemployable t a c t i c s and insufficient equipment for river, or canal, crossing operat i ons. Many lessons w e r e learned in t h e 1967 defeat and t h e War of Attrition. Many of t h e problems and
lessons learned in t h e 1967 war had been corrected and incorporated into army doctrine, and many from t h e War
of Attrition would b e corrected before t h e October
War.
z-
O n e of t h e problems in t h e Six-Day War had been t h e incompetent and highly political Egyptian senior military leadership. In 1967 and 1968 a purge of t h e
also w a 5 a major structural realignment within t h e high command. The goal of t h e s e changes, initiated by
Nasser, w a s t o create a unity of command and purpose with clear lines of authority and responsibility, which w a s missing during t h e Six-Day War.
*=
Preceeding t h e Six-Day War, rivalry, mistrust, and political intrigue between Commander-in-Chief Marshall Muhammad Abdul Hakim Amer, Chief of Staff General Muhammad Fawzi, and Minister of War Brigadier S h e m s al-Din Badran, led t o an unworkable chain of Field
56
confusion and d i s u n i t y . These problems were compounded when F i e l d a y 1967, t h e Marshall Amer created a new command i n M Front Command, l e d by an Amer crony General Plbd
A new headquarters was
introduced between t h e Command f o r t h e Eastern M i l i t a r y District, commanded by L t . General Salah al-Din Mohsen,
The Eastern in
a l l assets i n the
I n t r o d u c t i a n of tho Front
Command (Murtagui) between t h e Chief of S t a f f and the F i e l d firmy Command was disastrous i n t h e S i x - D a y
War
because t h e command created confusion i n the chain of command, and s t r a i n e d r e l a t i o n s developed between (See Appendix 2 - 7 ,
s7
chain of
Murtagui,
r e q u i r i n g p r e s i d e n t i a l approval f a r a l l promotions to
57
of Staff
had d i r e c t command and c o n t r o l over a l l The Ground Forces Command was abolished. command was uncomplicated and brought command t h a t had been missing
t h e services.
S t a f f was a three-star
command p r i o r t o t h e 1973 War which followed t h i s structure. 1 I n h i s book, The Crossing o f t h e Suez, General
t r a i n i n g d e f i c i e n c i e s i n t h e Egyptian Armed Forces. Increas~d command i n t e r e s t i n f i e l d t r a i n i n g result.ed i n commanders going t o t h e f i e l d t o oversee t r a i n i n g and becoming acquainted w i t h t h e troops.
or
Directives,
How-to-Books,
d i s t r i b u t e d t o t h e troops.
58
Thirty-five
" L i b e r a t i o n " e x e r c i s e s were h e l d between t h e 1967 W a r and t h e October W a r . these exercises. Shazly was i n charge o f
18 of
He f e l t t h e s e e x e r c i s e s were v e r y
i m p o r t a n t i n p r e p a r i n g t h e t r o o p s f o r t h e October War.
%-'
M i l i t a r y academies were a b l e
o f f i c e r s a year.
A s h o r t a g e o f li0,000
e l i m i n a t e t h i s s h o r t a g e of
officers.
T h e new r a n k ,
..
. .
. . . -
1973,
In t h e
,"
Swedish system all heavy weapons were stockpiled in strategic points where t h e deployed t r o o p s would report when mobilized. Personnel manning t h e equipment
usually resided in t h e general area or in close proximity t o it. If an individual moved from t h e
region, h e w a s replaced by someone else in t h e local area. There were several advantages t o t h i s system that t h e Egyptian leadership believed would make it adaptable t o Egypt's use. It cut mobilization t i m e t o
a minimum; personnel lived and trained in t h e unit and became familiar with each other; annual training was easily accomplished; and there w a s t h e added incentive of defending one's country by defending one's home. Mobilization points in Sweden were spread throughout t h e country in preparation for a threat from any direction. Egypt ' s threat w a s Israel; therefore,
t h e mobilization concentrations needed only face t h e Israeli border. Geographically based reserve units
went directly t o deployment points, where stockpiled weapons were stared. These units were t o b e ready for This mobilization plan was
exercised 22 times between January and 1 October 1973, for periods of a few days t o t w o weeks. This
It
I
T o accomplish Sadek's
he demanded f a r more
involved i n p o l i t i c s .
==
General Ahmed I s m a i l A l i was a p p o i n t e d as t h e new M i n i s t e r o f War and Commander-in-Chief E g y p t i a n Armed Forces. Sadat f e l t t h a t of the
I s m a i l was a
I s m a i l had f o u g h t i n
1 1 a5 an i n t e l l i g e n c e o f f i c e r and i n t h e
1956, and 1967. He was
He was p r o f e s s i o n a l ,
hanest,
and w h o l l y
61
above p o l i t i c s .
p r o f e s s i o n a l s c h o o l s i n Egypt; warfare
i n England;
1969 on t h e
south of El-Khafir.
Sadat r e t u r n e d h i m t o d u t y as i n t e l l i g e n c e c h i e f i n May
1971,
r e p l a c i n g one o f t h e S a b r i c o n s p i r a t o r s .
In
h e was a s t r o n g as w e l l as
a technocrat,
t h e cautious,
S o v i e t mini/max
=-
The d i s m i s s a l o f General Sadek was a v e r y unpopular move w i t h t h e m i l i t a r y , particular. and General Shazly i n Heikal states t h a t
S h a z l y ' s d i s a p p r o v a l may n o t have been so much i n defense o f Sadek, dislike for as h i s a n i m o s i t y towards I s m a i l . His
he was commander of
N a t i o n s auspices i n t h e Congo.
62
Shazl y appeared throughout the year of preparation for the war. However, their differences were generally put
seizure o f the
The largest obstacle t o overcome for the military crossing was the Suez Canal. The Canal is 1 0 7 There is a 6.5
foot shoulder of rock and concrete on each edge of the canal. Because of the steepness of this shoulder, it
would require knocking off before an amphibious tank could cross o r a floating bridge be erected. Israelis had
dl50
The
side that was as much as 60 feet above the water. current:, always strong, peaks every six hours.
Tidal
variations were a s much as six feet between high and low tides. depending on the phase of the moon.
xb
Immediately on the east side, adjacent to and extending t h e length of the Canal. was t h e Bar-Lev Line with its 17 primary fortresses. Subsequent defensive
lines were located behind these fortresses which provided an in-depth defense 30-35 kilometers f r o m the Canal. The Israelis had also installed storage tanks
with inflammable liquids at probable crossing points along the canal. to the Canal.
could be pumped into the Canal and ignited, creating an inferno on the Canal's surface.
27
The biggest problem confronting the Egyptians was getting across the Canal and over the sand barrier. "The fundamental problem, clearly, was to drive passages through the sand barrier."
=en
Compounding
this problem was the requirement of doing it quickly. The Israelis held a brigade o f armor in reserve within
60 kilometers of the Canal.
indication of a major attack across the Canal, Israeli would activate their mobilization plan. Israeli
they would have t o move a large number of units and equipment across the Canal very quickly.
=*
The Egyptians built mockups of the sand barriers in the desert and experimented with many methods of breaching them. Dynamiting and bulldozing To make one
breach in the barrier took 60 men, one bulldozer, 500 pounds of explosives and five to s i x hours of uninterrupted work - approximately 1,200 manhours per passage. This approach was unacceptable because of the
the Canal and because the personnel would be lucrative targets for the Israeli artillery and air strikes.
A young engineer discovered
that h i g h pressure
water pumps effectively gouged holes in the sand barriers within three hours. Later, they found
improved pumps in Germany that reduced the time t o two hours. T o disguise the purchase of the numbers of
pumps required, the buyers explained that the pumps were being used t o modernize fire brigades in Cairo. Teams cif engineers exercised experimenting with different numbers o f pumps needed to reduce t h e time to breach the sand barriers.
31
Mobilizations of the reserves continued with several maneuvers up to the Canal. Training was The
Egyptian military staff made concise and accurate assessments of Israels strength and weaknesses. General Ismails conclusions were:
. Israel possessed four basic advantages: it5 air superiority, its technological s k i l l ; its minute and efficient training; and its reliance upon quick aid from the United States Thias enemy a l s o had h i s basic disadvantages. His lines o f communication were long and extended to several fronts, which made them difficult to defend. His manpower resources d o not permit heavy losses of life. His economic resources prevent h i m from accepting a long war. He is, moreover, an enemy who suffers the evils of wanton conceit. ==
I.
..
63
disadvantages,
t h e s t r a t e g y t h a t e v o l v e d would: t h e Canal,
attack
a l l o w simultaneous
r e s e r v e a5 p o s s i b l e f o r counterattack.
A t t a c k i n g a l o n g t h e l e n g t h of
t h e Canal
and opening a t w o - f r o n t
ground and a i r c o u n t e r a t t a c k s .
d e l a y i n g and r e d u c i n g t h e c o n c e n t r a t i o n a f t h e I s r a e l i Counterattacks.
33
t h e t h r e e primary m i l i t a r y leaders.
l i k e I s m a i l and
t h e U n i t e d States. p l a n n e r and t r a i n e r .
t h e Western Desert i n World War 1 1 , and had command experience. He was t h e Deputy D i r e c t o r o f Intelligence
i n 1968 and t h e D i r e c t o r o f
O p e r a t i o n s and D i r e c t o r o f
T r a i n i n g i n 1970.
f a r c e between Shazly and I s m a i l . General Shazly handled morale problems, training. leadership. and t h e sand b a r r i e r s . general
The
f o r advancing f o r c e s a l l a l o n g t h e Canal and covered a i r space o u t t o 16 k i l o m e t e r s over tne e a s t bank o f t h e Suez. After that, t h e E g y p t i a n s would have t o hall:
as t h e E g y p t i a n s had
a c r o s s t h e Canal had been planned and executed i n maneuvers. New d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n s on t h e west bank of Canal were b u i l t . the
67
Israeli view into Egypt and helped conceal some of the preparations for the upcoming battle.
xb
An enormous logistic and communications network was built behind the defense wall as well. "Extensive communicatian networks were built, roads, railroads, docks; on these, both military and civilian vehicles, railroads, and water transport were used t o move supplies and equipment to the front. A series of fuel depots especially secured against air attacks were Water tanks constructed, most of them underground. were set up from Port Said north, in all sectors of Much of the material was moved t o the front the front prior to October 6; special care was exercised to transpart it gradually t o avoid alerting the Israelis." 2z7
...
Preparations and refinements for Granite Two and High Minarets continued at an increasing pace with security precautians remaining strict for High Minarets. Very few people were aware of the second
plan. According t o General Shazly only fourteen people were ever aware of the entire High Minarets plan as it evolved. Those in the know were seven members of the
Egyptian High Command, s i x in t h e Syrian High Command, plus one Egyptian officer who ran the special staff set up in January 1973 to coordinate Egyptian and Syrian planning.
=sa
r e s o l u t . i o n t o t h e problems were f r u s t r a t e d by I s r a e l i i n t r a n s i g e n c e and what he saw as American i n d i f f e r e n c e . D i s c u s s i o n o f t h o s e d i p l o m a t i c a t t e m p t s i n 1971 and 1972 i s now needed. The d i p l o m a t i c a t t e m p t s by Swedish d i p l o m a t Gunnar J a r r i n g , o r i g i n a l l y a p p o i n t e d by U n i t e d N a t i o n s
i n Novermber 1967,
to r e s o l v e
showed
b u t o f f i c i a l l y n o t h i n g had
the differences
responsive t o h i 5 i n i t i a t i v e s .
'I. ( 1 ) t e r m i n a t i o n o f a l l c l a i m s o r s t a t e s of b e l l i g e r e n c y , ( 2 ) r e s p e c t f o r and acknowledgement o f I s r a e l ' s s o v e r e i g n t y , t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y , and p o l i t i c a l independence, ( 3 ) r e s p e c t f o r and acknowledgement o f I s r a e l ' s r i g h t t o l i v e i n peace w i t h i n secure and r e c o g n i z e d boundaries, ( 4 ) r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o do a l l i n i t s power to ensure t h a t a c t s of b e l l i g e r e n c y o r h o s t i l i t y da n o t o r i g i n a t e from o r a r e n o t committed f r o m w i t h i n Egypt a g a i n s t I s r a e l , and ( 5 ) n a n - i n t e r f e r e n c e i n I s r a e l ' 5 domestic a f f a i r s . " =-
..
...
From I s r a e l he requested:
'I.
..
( 1 ) committment t o withdraw
i t 5
f o r c e s from
the Sinai t o the pre-1967 lines, which was dependent on satisfactory arrangements for demilitarized zones, ( 2 ) freedom of access by Israeli s h i p s t o the Gulf of f4qaba past Sharm el Sheikh, and (3) freedom of navigation through the Suez Canal." -o
A week later Sadat replied t o Jarring's
initiative and agreed t o all the stipulations provided Israel agreed. borders. Egypt would accept a UN force on the Many of
the proposals were agreed to, but the central committment was not accepted. Israel agreed to
"withdraw to the secure, recognized and agreed boundaries to b e established in the peace agreement Israel will not withdraw to the pre-June 5, 1967 lines." -* Jarring and U-Thant continued t o try to persuade Israel t o accept the proposals t o at least the pre-1967 Sinai borders, but Israel remained f i r m in its stance. On 7 March, Sadat refused to extend the
..
ceasefire which had been in effect since h g u s t 1970. There were no further UN attempts to arrange any agreements until the following year when the new Secretary General Kurt Waldheim requested Jarring t o make another attempt to start negotiations. attempt ended with the same results.
41
That
Near the end of 1970, Israeli Minister of Defense Dayan had made a proposal for an interim
70
pull back a short distance from the Canal, enabling the Egyptians to reopen the Canal and allawing civilians necessary for operating it to come t o the east bank.
He
settlement.
Canal, but diverged from the Israeli proposal; it defined the initial withdrawal as only the first step in a total withdrawal from the Sinai.
CIS
with the
On 4 May American Secretary of State William Rogers, accompanied by Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Sisco, arrived in Cairo to discuss t h e negotiations with Sadat. Their arrival was complicated
by the internal problems Sadat was facing with A l i Sabri and his followers. The proposals that Rogers and
Sisco brought for a settlement were basically t h e same ones they had proposed in 1967-1968. Their proposal
called for a partial settlement f o r continuation of the ceasefire, reopening the Suez Canal, and a limited Israeli withdrawal, which was basically the Israeli counterproposal to the Jarring request earlier in t h e
71
year.
seemingly trying t o extract concessons from Egypt while supporting Israel's stance. Sadat's frustrations and
the Soviet Unions alarm at the US-Egyptian negotiations prompted quick Soviet reaction. Soviet Union President
At approximately this point in time Sadat believed that 1971 would b e a "year of decision." Egypt, meaning Sadat, would have to make a d@cision during 1971 about the course the country would take on
t h e Israeli issue.
earlier in 1971 were attempts to arrive at a political solution to the problem. By mid-year h e was becoming
A5
military solution, but d i d not totally discard the diplomatic course. Relations with the Soviets in 1971 grew increasingly tense a s the year progressed. the Soviet presence had grown considerably. Since 1970 Upwards of
the country b y the end of 1971. Sadat made two trips to Moscow i n 1971 seeking
72
sought t h r e e things:
military and political strategy towards Israel, ( 2 ) arms that would g i v e Egypt military equality (as Heika.1 c a l l s it) with Israel, and (3) a continued flow of arms from t h e Soviet Union t o Egypt with no strings attached. Evidently t h e Soviets were willing t o
provide defensive arms, but requests for offensive weapons w e r e met with either denials o r conditions that: they only b e used with Soviet authority. These
His
w e r e becoming intolerable.
Friction g r e w between t h e
advisor!; and Egyptian officers and soldiers because of t h e Soviet arrogance and candescending manner. Soviet
reluctarice t o turn over control of weapon systems t o trained Egyptian c r e w s likewise increased tensians. At
higher 1.evels of command, Soviet refusal t o give Egypt t h e most sophisticated equipment (i.e., MIG-21s instead of MIG-Z3/25s) frustrated Egypt's military leaders.
October 1971 arms agreement began f a l l i n g b e h i n d schedule i n e a r l y 1972. The S o v i e t Union a l s o began
This
He b e l i e v e d t h e growing American-Soviet
I t appeared t h e S o v i e t
was o n l y
l i k e t h e American government,
i n t e r e s t e d i n m a i n t a i n i n g t h e s t a t u s quo i n t h e M i d d l e East.
47
I n a conciliatory
Sadat a l l o w e d a l i m i t e d number of
technical Sadat
a r m s shipments.
While t h e e x p u l s i o n o f t h e S o v i e t s
wanted t o m a i n t a i n an ongoing
74
r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h them,
i n c l u d i n g arms d e l i v e r i e s which
n a v a l f a c i l i t i e s on t h e
In
early
I s m a i l went t o Moscow t o
t h e Rogers-Sisco
I s m a i l t h e d i s c u s a i o n s were u n p r o d u c t i v e .
Prime M i n i s t e r Golda M i e r ' s t r i p t o Washington a few l a t e r and t h e announcrnent t h a t t h e US would s u p p l y a d d i t i o n a l Phantom and Skyhawk a i r c r a f t t o I s r a e l p l a y e d an i m p o r t a n t p a r t i n S a d a t ' s subsequent d e c i s i a r i
75
t o go t o war. P r e s i d e n t Sadat began d i p l o m a t i c o v e r t u r e s w i t h Syria, Jordan. 1973. and Saudi A r a b i a i n e a r n e s t d u r i n g t h e C o n t a c t s w i t h S y r i a were made i n 1970 had taken over t h e c o u n t r y Both r e a l i z e d a t w o - f r o n t
war w i t h
summer o f
s h o r t l y a f t e r &sad f o l l o w i n g a coup.
Complicating t h i s
F r o m t h e S y r i a n p o i n t o f view,
the strategic
Golan H e i g h t s ,
which o f f e r e d t h e I s r a e l i f a r c e s
p o s i t i o n s w i t h i n s i g h t o f Damascus, m i g h t be s o l d o u t
if t h e Egypt s i g n e d an agreement w i t h t h e UN o r US t h a t
a l l o w e d t h e r e t u r n of
t h e Sinai.
Egypt remembered t h e
1967 War when S y r i a dragged them i n t o t h e war and t h e n refused t o f i g h t . T h i s c o n f l i c t o f i n t e r e s t s remained n e a r l y unchanged u n t i l e a r l y 1973 when a number of b r o u g h t t h e two c o u n t r i e s ' l e a d e r s t o g e t h e r . events
In
January t h e I s r a e l i s launched a i r a t t a c k s a g a i n s t
7h
I s r a e l t h r e a t e n e d t o i n t e n s i f y t h e a t t a c k s if The
1973 caused by E g y p t i a n i n a c t i v i t y
t h e government c o n t r o l s on p o l i t i c a l I s m a i l as War M i n i s t e r
and t h e appointment o f
i n 1972 i n c r e a s e d S a d a t ' s d e s i r e f o r c o o p e r a t i o n w i t h
Syria.
T h i s l e d t o i n c r e a s e d a c t i v i t y between E g y p t i a n
2,000 armed g u e r r i l l a s of
77
Israeli retaliation against Jordan placed Hussein in an uneasy position. a half years.
1 9 7 0 .
Hussein dismissed t h e civil government and installed a new military government staffed by some antiPalestinian army personnel. Heavy fighting between On 20 September a
Syrian armored brigade moved across t h e border and attacked Jordanian units. T h e Syria-Jordan
confrontation ended o n 26 September when t h e Jordanians drove t h e Syrians b a c k across t h e border. Sporadic fighting continued between guerrillas and Jordan Army units through July 1 9 7 1 when t h e army waged a six-day campaign against t h e guerrillas and effectively eliminated t h e P L O a s an entity in Jordan. S y r i a subsequently broke off diplomatic relations. Llnited States shipments of arms t o Jordan in early 1 9 7 3 and Hussein's overtures of a separate peace with Israel shortly thereafter did little t o ease Arab fears of Jordan's motives.
34
King Fiesal of Saudi Arabia broke t h e impasse between Jordan, Egypt, and Syria during t h e summer of
1 9 7 3 .
m i l i t a r y campaign a g a i n s t I s r a e l .
S a d a t s one f i n a l
e s c a l a t e d t h e i r p l a n s and a c t i v i t i e s .
By Septembmr
i n t h e morning b u t o n l y b a t t a l i o n s were r e t u r n i n g a t
n i g h t a f t e r f i n i s h i n g t h e t r a i n i n g day.
Two-thirds Guns,
of
t h e men remained i n t h e i r b a t t l e p o s i t i o n s .
heavy equipment,
n i g h t and b u r i e d o r camouflaged t o p r e v e n t daytime detection. Canal c r o s s i n g equipment was moved t o t h e When i t was f i n a l l y b r o u g h t
f r o n t iie l a t e as p o s s i b l e . forward,
i t was d e l i v e r e d i n s p e c i a l c r a t e s so t r u c k s
p i t s s p e c i a l l y dug f o r them. I s r a e l i and American i n t e l l i g e n c e sources had n o t i c e d t h e i n c r e a s e d movement o f b o t h i n t h e west and t h e n o r t h . t r o o p s and equipment The i n d i c a t o r s showed
70
an ominous buildup of forces larger than previous mobilizations. Israel was skeptical of Egyptian
intentions. believing they could not, and would not, attack Israel. Israel casually dismissd t h e activity Israel had mobilized in
May following increased military activity in Syria and Egypt, the collapse of t h e Lebanese government, and the increase in terrorist activity directed against northern Israeli villages. increased tensions. Nothing came of the
The Egyptians used another deception to feed false information to t h e Israelis. "The press was used cleverly by the Egyptians. They planted items in a Lebanese newspaper about the neglect and deterioration of Soviet equipment in the Canal Zone. The Egyptian press carried the story of an American oil company which had signed an agreement t o begin construction of a pipeline in the Canal area. . a public notice was made in Al-Clhram [ t h e semi-official Cairo newspaper1 encouraging officers t o put their names down f a r leave to make the Umhar, o r small pilgrimage which is frequently made after Ramadan. A1-Ahram was chosen for many of these leaks because it was known Israel received copies of the paper via Cyprus and t h e Al-Ahram editor, Mohamed Heikal, was a confident of Sadat."
..
30
Final preparations for t h e operation - the date and t i m e .- had t o be set. Hydrological tables were
analyzed to f i n d dates and times for optimal Canal tides and currents. Several possible dates were
YO
selected.
b r i d g e s and f e r r i e s up t o and a c r o s s t h e Canal d u r i n g t h e e a r l y p a r t o f the n i g h t w i t h i l l u m i n a t i o n fading l a t e r t o p r o v i d e cover o f darkness f o r moving t r o o p s and equipment. o r f o u r dates. p o s s i b l e date. month of crossing. T h i s narrowed t h e s e l e c t i o n s t o t h r e e The f i r s t week o f October was one
T h i s was d u r i n g Ramadan,
the Islamic
was
s e l e c t e d as t h e o p t i m a l date. t r a d i t i o n a l anniversary o f
T h i s wa5 a l s o t h e
t h e date t h e forces of t h e
Thus.
became O p e r a t i o n Badr.
The s i x t h of
a siqnificant
the I s r a e l i
IV.
mobilization of
as w i l l be seen i n Chapter
6 October
=-
1973, t h e c o o r d i n a t e d a t t a c k
on I s r a e l ,
CHAPTER 1 1 1 ENDNOTES Trevor N. Dupuy, Elusive Victory: The Arab-Israeli Wars. 1947-1974 (1984): 372-373; Mohamed Heikal, The Road to Ramadan (1975): 114-122. Edgar O'Ballance, No Victor, No Vanquished: The Yam Kippur War (1970): 13.
a
John W. Amos 1 1 , Arab-Israeli Military/Political Relations: Arab Perceptions and the Politics o f Escalation (1975): 100. Insight Team o f the Sunday (London) Times, Insight on the Middle East War (1974): 29.
a
Amos, & I s r a e l i
Relati=:
101.
Chaim Herzog, The Arab-Israeli Ware: War and Peace in the Middle East f r o m t h e War of Independence through Lebanon (1982): 1 6 1 ; O'Ballance, No Victor: 21-22.
(1980):
Amos, Arab-Israeli
'i
28.
*I
Ibid.:
29; O'Ballance,
No Victor:
14.
29.
Ibid.: Ibid.:
30.
41-89.
O'Ballance, No Victor: 23; George W. Gawrych, "Egyptian High Command in the 1973 War: an Historical Perspective" (undated): 1-2. Gawrych, "High Command":
t7
8, 11-12.
Ibid.:
4-5.
Ibid.:
**
=to
S h a z l y , C r o s s i n g t h e Suez: Ibid.:
Dupuy, E l u s i v e V i c t o r y :
S h a z l y , C r o s s i n g t h e Suez:
=a
Heikal
Ibid.:
Road t o Ramadan:
181-182; Amos, A r a b - I s r a e l i
Road t o Ramadan:
141.
=a H e i k a l ,
S h a z l y , C r o s s i n g t h e Suez: 9 ; Dupuy: Elusive_ Victory: 395-396; Avraham ( B r e n ) Adan, On t h e Banks of. t h e Sukz - (1980): 42-48. S h a z l y , C r o s s i n g t h e Suez: Ibid.: Ibid.: Ibid.:
xz
54.
Amos,
142.
xs
22;
Heikal,
42; A m o s , 147-148.
Flmos,
At-ab-Israeli
Relations:
=:s*
S h a z l y , C r o s s i n g t h e Suez: I n s i g h t Team,
201-202.
I n s i g h t on t h e M i d d l e E a s t War:
28.
eo
-1
Ibid.
Ibid.: Ibid.:
28-29.
29.
Atonement:
43
Herzog, War of
17-18.
44
Ibid.:
132-138.
*a
175.
Ibid.:
47
118-119.
374.
Ibid.;
e9
Herzog,
War o f Atonement:
22.
Ibid. Ibid.:
201-203.
117-118.
378-381.
8-9.
Ibid.:
No Victor:
42-43.
a7
Estimates: 359.
Avi Shlaim, "Failures in National Intelligence The Case of t h e Y a m Kippur War" (1976):
Insight Team o f the Sunday (London) Times, The Yom Kippur War (1974): 80-81.
==a
--Israeli
CHAPTER I V
The o v e r a l l b a l a n c e o f power i s i n our f a v o r , and t h i s f a c t i s overwhelmingly d e c i s i v e i n t h e f a c e o f a l l o t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n s and p r e v e n t s Our military t h e immediate renewal o f war. advantage i s t h e outcome of b o t h t h e weakness o f t h e Arabs and o u r i n c r e a s i n g s t r e n g t h . Their weakness a r i s e s f r o m f a c t o r s t h a t I do n o t suppose w i l l q u i c k l y disappear. Our s u p e r i o r i t y can, i n m y o p i n i o n , be m a i n t a i n e d i n t h e coming y e a r s as we1 1.
..
Moehe Dayan,
I s r a e l s Defense M i n i s t e r ,
made the
I t summed up t h e p r e v a i l i n g o p i n i o n o f
t h e end of
o u t b r e a k o f h o s t i l i t e s a t 1400 h o u r s on 6 October
By August 1970 t h e f o u n d a t i o n of
d e t e r r e n c e was based on f o u r f a c t o r s :
Israels
( 1 ) the
( 2 ) the
s u p e r i o r i t y of t h e I s r a e l i A i r Force ( I A F ) ,
(3) t h e I s r a e l i Defense
and (4)
85
Plan
c e a s e f i r e was implemented,
moved t h e SAM b e l t up t o t h e west edge o f t h e Canal. The IAF now c o n f r o n t e d an e l a b o r a t e and e x t e n s i v e m i s s i l e system of
SAM-65,
SAM-25,
SAM-35,
and t h e new m o b i l e
m i l i t a r y f o r c e s d u r i n g t h e p r e c e e d i n g year. t h e Bar-Lev
Li ne w a s s t i l l impartant t o I s r a e l s c r i t i c s i n t h e m i l i t a r y and t h e
defensive strategy,
Yb
A debate
1970 on c o n t i n u i n g t h e c u r r e n t s t r a t e g y and
Line,
i m p r o v i n g t h e Bar-Lev
or r e v e r t i n g t o the
m o b i l e defense. The
commonly adhered t o s t r a t e g y of
t h e Ear-Lev
A second l i n e of
sand r a m p a r t s were designed t o make t h e e a s t s i d e of t h e Canal impassable t o t a n k s and armored personnel carriers. minefinlds, Other improvements, w i r e defenses, including extensive and
improved a i r f i e l d s ,
underground headquarters,
d e f e n s i v e c a p a b i l i t i e s t o t h e IDF.
t h i s was spent on t h e f o r t i f i c a t i o n s .
War.
A s stated
u n a v a i l a b l e i n t h e paet,
I s r a e l were now f a r t h e r
prr-emptive imminent,
The l a t t e r o p t i o n was i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y
=
In
During t h e p e r i o d t h a t t h e a l a r g e p o r t i o n of the
Any sudden
t h r u s t a c r o s s t h e Canal by t h e E g y p t i a n s c o u l d occur
This i s
1973.
t he I s r a e l i s t a t i c character
88
They
Egypt
viewed Israel's abandoning their mobile defense for static defense as negating Israeli superiority in swift offensive movement with their armored and air forces. T h e previous Israeli doctrine of mobility had involved carrying t h e war into enemy territory. Their
mobility and growing emphasis on armor and aircraft during t h e f i f t i e s and sixties, necessitated by t h e small geographical s i z e and proximity of its population centers t o t h e Prabs. were t h e weapons which allowed Israel t o pursue t h i s operational capability. f o r c e s developed far superior capabilities in conducting mobile operations then their enemies. National and international constraints also dictated limitations on t h e duration of t h e wars and a heavy reliance on a reserve system. T h u s Israel had to be T h i s major shift in Israel's
Israeli strategic doctrine developed after t h e Six-Day War. T h i s change of basic doctrine, from carrying t h e
war into t h e enemy's territory to a doctrine of strategic depth, was perceived by t h e P r a b s a s allowing f o r major changes in both Israel and Egypt. T h e Egyptians viewed t h i s c h a n g e a s totally o u t
HC)
t h i s magnitude.
strategy p r i o r countervalue
Then a new d e t e r r e n t p o s t u r e of
T h i s was an e x t e n s i o n of
i n addition t o the
t h e F-4 Phantoms,
t h e a i r f o r c e by t h e m i l i t a r y .
t h e i r b o r d e r s now a g a i n s t an Wab i n v a s i a n .
i t were c o n s i d e r e d ,
seemed workable.
and t h e c o u n t e r v a l u e s t r a t e g y a t t a c k s would be c o u n t e r e d
The Arabs'
w i t h r e t a l i a t o r y a t t a c k s a g a i n s t t h e i r economic
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e d e t e r r i n g any f u r t h e r a t t a c k s . L i k e w i s e , t h e Arabs would know t h e p r i c e o f t h e s e a t t a c k s p r i o r t o i n i t i a t i n g them.
Thus,
secure b o r d e r s
I s r a e l were t o
90
defend itself and prevent a war f r o m actually occurring. It became essential to Israel t o deter war, not only because she did not want war, but because the Israeli political position from 1970 to 1973 was based on the assumption that the status quo created in 1967 was paramount; Israel should not be pressured into changing it, even by the United States. This positian The
air force became the major instrument of maintaining the status quo. Futhermore, the perception that Egypt could not successfully mount an offensive against Israel was based on Israel's intelligence collection capabilities and their assumption the intelligence network would give them adequate warning t o mobilize forces for an impending attack. An impending attack is normally indicated many military, diplomatic, and civil signals. Traditional military signals include mobilization of troops and reserves and movements of equipment to staging areas. Warning signals in the civilian
by
community include air raids drills, food stockpiling, and media announcements concerning preparations to b e made. Abrupt rhetoric changes increaed and heated
or
decreased and cooled through diplomatic channels are also an indicator of possible hostilities.
A competent
intelligence network acquires, collates, and evaluates these signals and passes them on t o the government policy and decision-makers action. for political or m i l i t a r y
the government believed the intelligence community would b e able t o read developments in the region and provide adequate warning of an Egyptian crossing to t h e troops on the Ear-Lev Line and g i v e them time t o implement the IDF mobilization plan so the mobilized forces could counterattack and move on the offensive. Israels overall defense system and survival was based on this capability and advanced warning.
z
The intelligence service of Israel was composed of four agencies prior t o the October War. The primary
agency was the Military Intelligence Branch (Modin), which had grown in size and scope and now held a monopoly over national intelligence evaluations. Central Institute for Intelligence and Security (Mossad) operated primarily in foreign countries and conducted counterintelligence. The
Beth, was responsible for internal security, counterespionage, and combatting Arab terrorist
activity.
the years the Modin had produced a cadre of experts known worldwide a s the best intelligence people regarding information on the Middle East. The agency
had thwarted other agencies attempts to expand or prepare independent evaluations. This created a
problem; Israel was beginning to realize its military organization was only equipped with research and evaluation facilities t o prepare intelligence data. They were not equipped to pass on their intelligences to the decision makers. There was no apposing
intelligence agency t o provide another opinion. The growth of the numbers of aspects of intelligence affecting Israel grew dramatically during the late 60s and early 70s. The country soon found
itself dealing with vast amounts of data which was beyond the capabilities af a purely military intelligence organization. The military collected,
collated, and evaluated the raw intelligence information. There was no other Israeli government
institution which could evaluate or check the evaluations of the military's intelligence data used to make policies or decisions.
s-
". .
independent political evaluation of the political intentions of political enemies based on the political, as opposed to the purely military situation."
As
Avi Shlaim, noted British historian, stated in his asses~,ment of the Israeli intelligence function prior t o the October War: in the absence of any machinery or staff work at Cabinet level capable of'providing an evaluation of its own o r checking the evaluations presented b y the Director of Military Intelligence, the acceptance of the latter 's C i n t e l liqencel estimates was a forgone conclusion. The influence of Military Intelligence was alsa enhanced by the absence of an orderly procedure for the for-mulation of national intelligence estimates, a situation that left i t t o the professionals t o tell the politicians what they thought the politicians should know, instead of the usual practice whereby the politicians tell t h e professionals what information they need to have." l L Prior to Moshe Dayan's becoming Minister of Defense, uniformed military personnel did not appear before the Israeli Cabinet to present intelligence briefings. Dayan made it a practice to attend meetings
". . .
of the Cabinet and the Foreign Affairs and Security Council of the Knesset, accompanied by the Chief of Staff and the Directory o f Military Intelligence. This
practice decreased the separation between military and civilian responsibilities in the Cabinet. The
combination of military personnel's appearances, their prestige, and t h e lack of any other element's capabilities ta criticize, confirm, or dispute the
made t h e
17
t h e i r e s t i m a t e s a foregone c o n c l u s i o n .
the
and t h e c i v i l war
l e d t o a f e e l i n g i n t h e armed f o r c e s t h a t
T h i s was r e i n f o r c e d by I s r a e l i s a t i s f a c t i o n
b o r d e r s and t h e sense of
19
w i t h t h e post-1967
security
Increased s o c i a l pressures from the p u b l i c f o r decreases i n t h e defense budget and t h e e s t i m a t e s o f t h e Arab.5 i n a b l i l i t y t o conduct a war i n t h e near
F u r t h e r c o m p l i c a t i n g t h e problem was I s r a e l ' s r e l i a n c e on what became known as t h e "Concept." " c o n c e p t " o r i g i n a t e d s h o r t l y a f t e r t h e Six-Day The War and
p r o b a b l y r e f l e c t e d I s r a e l ' s assessment o f E g y p t i a n M i n i s t e r o f War General Sadeq's s u p p o r t f o r an all-or-nothing st rat egy against I srael .
T h e "concept"
05
estimated t h a t :
w i t h Syria.
But,
Egypt advanced t h e
This
diplomacy which would s e r v e h i s l i m i t e d aims and g o a l s . By 1973 t h e " c o n c e p t " had n o t been a d e q u a t l y reexamined i n l i g h t of t h e subsequent e v e n t s between 1970 and 1973 date.
1o
i t was s i m p l y o u t of
A p r i m a r y p a r t of
t h e I s r a e l i defense p l a n was
O n t h a t basis,
o p e r a t i o n a l p l a n s which i n c l u d e d t h e f o l l o w i n g
Oh
scenari 0 :
(1)
H-hour
minus 48 hours:
t h e intelligence warning
is received.
reserve formations a r e at t h e front within 24 hours, most available power in 48 hours, and full compliments within 72 hours. Within a few hours of initial
notification t h e air f o r c e is nearly 1 0 0 % manned. Frontline farces a r e reinforced and backup frontline armored units t a k e blocking positions within a f e w hours. Frontline mobile artillery is similarly
( 2 ) H-hour
t h e enemy thrust is
effectively contained by ground forces, without too much loss of life or loss of ground. T h e air f o r c e
suppresses enemy air defenses, maintains air superiority, and strikes targets of opportunity. reserve forces reach t h e front and armored forces counterattack
(3)
The
.
plus 72: t h e counterArmored forces break
H-hour
plus 24 t o H-hour
through t h e enemy lines and envelope them, t h e air f o r c e h a s destroyed t h e enemy air defense system and destroys enemy positions. T h e destruction o f enemy
21
97
T h i s became t h e f o u n d a t i o n of plans.
t h e I D F ' s defense
Israeli
I n t e l l i g e n c e Branch processed l o t s of
"law" o r "lower
t h a n l o w " p r o b a b i l i t y of
The Modin m a i n t a i n e d t h e i r b e l i e f i n t h e c o r r e c t n e s s o f t h i s e v a l u a t i o n up t o t h e morning of October. because: They s t u b b o r n l y adhered t o t h e s e e s t i m a t e s first, and foremost, was t h e c o n t i n u e d the
r e l i a n c e on t h e "concept.
As s t a t e d p r e v i o u s l y ,
08
Secondly, t h e
Intelligence Branch believed that t h e military, political, and civilian indicators o f increased tensian would g i v e sufficient waining t o t h e branch t o mobilize t h e reserves. But that required a political analysis
of t h e intelligence material, and Israel did not have that capability in i t 5 monopolistic intelligence community.
==
1 9 7 3
w e r e moved t o t h e Canal; during t h e previous month 65 r a m p s had been built along t h e Canal; tank ramparts had been built on t h e west bank overlooking t h e Israeli positions; new d e s c e n t s t o t h e Canal had been opened: t h e Egyptian civil d e f e n s e had been mobilized; a black-out w a 5 declared in t h e cities; blood d o n o r s w e r e
called for; and Sadat issued war declarations and talked of t h e upcoming phase of confrontation. The
Modin, however, issued a very low probability of war. T h i s w a s overruled by Chief of Staff General Daniel Elazar and t h e government. T h e r e s e r v e s were Did t h e
wolf in order to
lull the Israelis into a false sense of security? Whichever it was, it validated the Modins assessment and proved General Elazar, and those who supported him, wrong. =Indirectly contributing to Israels lack of readiness in October 1973 was their preoccupation with increasing problems from Palestinian guerrillas o r Fadayeen (those who are willing t o sacrifice themselves for the sake of their cause). Objectively, the
activities of the guerrillas were of no consequence, but psychologically, they were important because they hardened the Israeli attitudes towards the Arabs. In
t h e winter of 1972-73 the IDF devoted a large portion of its time ta combating the Fadayeen and terrorist activity. Beginning with the 1972 Munich Massacre, the
guerrillas effectively countered on the battlefield, attempted to disrupt international travel and attack Israeli targets abroad. They were financed and
zs
The Fadayeen presented two problems to Israel, which disrupted their concentration on the Egyptian preparations along the west bank. The first was the
potential that the Fadayeen would exert pressure on Israel t o give up the occupied territories without
100
adequate s e t t l e m e n t terms.
Secondly,
the I s r a e l i s
and c r e a t i o n o f
t h r o u g h c o n t i n u a l a c t s o f t e r r o r i s m and sabotage.
= .
them c o n s t e r n a t i o n .
enroute t o I s r a e l .
'
101
I s r a e l i i n t e l l i g e n c e i n d i c a t e d increased E g y p t i a n maneuvers and b u i l d u p s a l l a l o n g t h e Canal and S y r i a n b u i l d u p s a l o n g t h e b o r d e r on t h e Golan H e i g h t s by 1 October. alarm, These s i g n s s h o u l d have been cause f o r
O n 2 October,
b u i 1dup and maneuvers,
General Avraham ( A l b e r t ) Mandler was p l a c e d on a l e r t a l o n g t h e Canal by t h e Southern Command. of t h e Southern Cammand, The Commander
c r o s s e d t h e Canal w a s a c c e l e r a t e d . S i n a i increased s e c u r i t y .
CI 3 October i n t e l l i g e n c e b r i e f i n g t o t h e
Cabinet i d e n t i f i e d t h e d i s p o s i t i o n of t h e Egyptian l a u n c h i n g an
f o r c e s and i n d i c a t e d t h e i r c a p a b i l i t y o f a t t a c k momentarily.
10%
and the IAF and recommended leaving them at their exi.;t.ing strengths.
dissented or asked questions about the intelliqence evaluation or recommendations to increase the alert measures. On the evening of 4 October the Israelis received reports the Soviets were evacuating their families from Egypt. These reports, along with other
reports of activity along the borders, prompted t h e General Staff to order a "C Alert" for the army highest alert condition short of mobilizing t h e reserves
the
==I
On Friday 5 October the Cabinet met to be updated on the situation and to make decisions. Along
the Canal the Egyptian Army was at a level o f readiness and deployment not previously seen b y the IDF.
All
five Egyptian divisions were f u l l y deployed, five concentration areas for bridging and crossing equipment were filled, and all the ramps were prepared. The
Israeli division in the Sinai requested reinforcements, including more troops at the etrongpoints along t h e Canal and near the passes 30-35 kilometers east.
10'1
The
chief
of
staff
and t h e Modin r e s t a t e d t h a t t h e
General E l a z a r suggested t h e p r i m e m i n i s t e r
s t a t i n g t h e E g y p t i a n e x e r c i s e was
commencing a t l S O Q h o u r s t h a t day.
Modin c o u l d n o t g i v e i t s "guaranteed"
48 hours.
a l e r t n o t i c e of
The s i t u a t i o n was assessed a t a Q6QQ General E l a z a r urged t o t a l m o b i l i z a t i o n and Dayan opposed t h e a i r solely
meeting.
an a i r ' f o r c e p r e e m p t i v e s t r i k e .
f o r c e s t r i k e but favored a p a r t i a l m o b i l i z a t i o n ,
I s r a e l wa5 aware o f
LO/&
Elazar objected and Dayan took both proposals to Prime Minister Meir for her consideration at 0800. Elazar
went ahead and issued orders for mobilization of several thousand ground force reserves and the air farce. By 0930 Meir had reached her decision, deciding
on Elazar's proposal for total mobilization withaut the air strike and for Dayan's warning. s"The Prime Minister as well as the defense minister wanted t o establish beyond doubt that Israel d i d not want war and d i d not start it, even at the cost of forfeiting to the enemy the advantage of striking first." zws At noon the members of the Cabinet were summoned. Mrs. Meir discussed the situation and the
A
probability of war breaking out late that afternoon. discussion developed about the steps that would be taken to hold the attack prior t o develaping the counterattack. During the discussion, Mrs Meir'i
military secretary interrupted the meeting at 1255 and announced that the war had begun. It began four hour-s
earlier than anticipated and only four houri after mobi 1 i z atian was initiated.
3L
CHAPTEK I V ENDNOTES
* Abraham Ben-Zvi., "Hindsight and Foresight: Conceptual Framework for the Analysis o f Surprise Attacks," World Politics 23 (April 76): 387.
Amos Perlmutter, "Israel's Fourth War, October 1973: Political and Military Misperceptions," 0 2 19 (Summer 1975): 440-441.
Walter Laqueur, Confrontation: and World Politics (1974): 45-46. The Middle East
(1979): 11.
Ibid.:
4.
of
Itamar Rabinovich and Haim Shaked (eds), From June t o October: The Middle East Between 1967 and 1973 (1978): 105, 110. Bar-Siman-Tov, War of Attrition:
63. 111.
Ibid.:
111-112.
tiathryn A. MacKinney. "Egypt and Israel: The Intelligence Prelude to the October War of 1973," Research paper for Master o f Science in Strategic Intelligence, Defense Intelligence School (March 1978):
8 .
'= Herzog, The War of Atonement: 40; Nadav Safran, Israel: The Embattled A l l y (1978): 281.
Is Avi Shlaim, "Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Yom tiippur War," World Palitics 28 (April 1976): 368.
2e
40.
8.
lL
Shlaim, "Failures":
369.
17
41.
a-
Mactiinney,
Egypt and I s r a e l :
9.
Israel:
= c . Schlaim,
Failures: Israel:
364-365; S a f r a n ,
282-283.
Safran, Ibid.: Ibid.
a- H e r z o g ,
281-282. 352-353.
283; S c h l a i m , F a i l u r e s :
The W a r o f Atonement:
42,
Safran, End o f
Israel:
Illusion?
3-
283.
The Y o m K i p p u r War:
268.
=a H a r v e y S i c h e r m a n :
(1976): 29.
Israel:
Safran,
z7 I b i d . ; H e r z o g , The W a r o f Atonement: 48. In H e r z o g s book h e s t a t e s t h a t t h e A r a b s t o o k f i v e Jews and a n A u s t r i a n customs o f f i c i a l h o s t a g e and demanded a n a i r c r a f t to f l y t h e m a n d t h e h o s t a g e s t o a n FIrab During t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s t i r e l s k y proposed country. c l o s i n g Schonau C a s t l e .
E d g a r Q R a l l a n c e , No V i c t o r , No V a n q u i s h e d : W a r (1978): 43-44: I n s i a h t Team of t h e . S u n d a y (Lo;\ion) Times, I n s i g h t o n t h e M i d d l e E a s t W a r (1974): 46-48; H e r z o g , The W a r o f Atonement: 48.
zc9
Tho V n m K i n n a l r
...-
__
zc*
30
45.
45-46. 284.
S a f r a n , Israel:
==
33
Ibid.: Ibid.;
49.
Safran, I s r a e l :
Atonement:
=* S a f r a n ,
286.
,
07
3 6
Herzog,
The W a r af A t o n e m e n t :
54.
CHAPTER V CONCLUSIONS
The perioi
time of peace and tranquility Israel had hoped would follow the Six-Day War. Conversely, it was one of the
longest periods of conflict experienced in the region. The Israelis had reason to be optimistic following the Six-Day War. They had soundly defeated
the combined Arab armies while sustaining few casualties. Israel ' s borders had been extended and
this provided a buffer zone between the hostile Arabs and Israel 's major population centers. Israel ' s
demonstrated military superiority should have been a warning t o the Arabs that any further hostilities directed against Israel would be severely dealt with. Following t h e Six-Day War the fesling of peace and security was broken by the Egyptian initiation of the War of Attrition. In response, the Israelis
strategy evolved from mobile defense to static defense with weapons acquisitions and tactics continuing for a mobile defense. Israel made large weapon
' 5
purchases
during these years of armor, aircraft, and APCs, armaments best used in mobile operations rather than static defense. Purchases of weapons more idealy
I 0')
suited
suffered a distinct disadvantage t o Egypt, would have been artillery. Israels military leaders condescending
continually misread Nassers and S a d a t s intentions and their resolve t o regain the occupied territories. believed Nasser and Sadat had alternately tried military and political means, with ineffectual results They
in both.
. . . he
can
He knows this.
developed included electronic countermeasure equipment t o defeat the SAM-2s and SAM-3s.
policy was a new concept developed during the War of Attrition. Israeli responses to Egyptian attacks were Commando raids
deep into Egypt and introduction of the air force escalated the war but d i d little to deter Egypts
a t t r i t i v e war. further
Th@ S o v i e t e n t r y i n t o t h e f o r a y i n 1970
e s c a l a t e d t h e war and i n t r o d u c e d d i r e c t
a d o p t i n g a s t a t i c defense
t h e I s r a e l i s i n t h e l o n g run.
the l i n e t o t h e Egyptian f o r c e s
l i v e s and l o s s o f equipment.
t h e advance
o f t h e SAM network n e u t r a l i z e d t h e I A F ' 5 a i r s u p e r i o r i t y i n t h e Canal s e c t o r which hampered defense of t h e Bar-Lev L i n e d u r i n g t h e October War. I s r a e l 5 r e l i a n c e on t h e "concept" and
Finally,
t h e m o n o p o l i s t i c m i l i t a r y i n t e l l i g e n c e network were p r i m a r i l y responsible f o r the f a i l u r e t o anticipate the October War. The I s r a e l i s d i d n o t b e l i e v e Egypt was
war.
undertake a Canal crossing; however, they did not believe that Egypt would attempt that until they had t h e air assets available t o strike deep at Israel's airfields t o neutralize t h e IAF. T o accomplish this,
they would require numerous medium bombers and fighter-bombers such a s t h e SU-7,
MIG-21,
Military Intelligence believed t h e Egyptians could not produce enough pilots and receive enough aircraft prior t o 1975. Therefore, Israel believed Egypt would not g o Sadat sought another 5alution t o
t h e Israeli problem d u e t o t h e pressures he felt from internal problems with student unrest, t h e coming and going of t h e "year o f decision" in 1971 with no action against Israel, and deteriorating public morale. felt h e could not wait until h i s air force could neutralize t h e IAF. In essence, Israel saw t h e world through Israeli eyes.
She failed t o s e n s e t h e Egyptian mood
He
and gauge their deterimination t o regain t h e occupied territories, their honor, and their pride. However,
these
:.'
the
The E g y p t i a n s i t u a t i o n f o l l o w i n g t h e Six-Day
W a r
was d i s m a l ,
a t best.
blame.
Shock,
u t t e r confusion.
p r e v a i l e d t h r o u g h o u t Egypt.
F o l l o w i n g h i s speech
h i s purpose and h i s g o a l
r e c o v e r t h e occupied
N a s s e r s assessment o f t h e
t h e war r e v e a l e d s e v e r a l s h o r t f a l l s
i n E g y p t s m i l i t a r y c a p a b i l i t i e s and s u p e r i o r i t i e s o f
( 2 ) confusion
the
( 3 ) i n a b i l i t y of
l e v e l s of
t h e command.
The E g y p t i a n l e a d e r ' s
energies
I s r a e l i advantages t o be c o u n t e r e d These
the I A F s a b i l i t y t o
s t r i k e deep,
I s r a e l i armored f o r c e s ,
and t h e I s r a e l i m o b i l i z a t i o n c a p a b i l i t i e s .
To e f f e c t i v e l y n e u t r a l i z e t h e I A F s u p e r i o r i t y
a complex,
along w i t h t h e p r o v i d e d an a i r
c o n v e n t i o n a l a n t i a i r c r a f t weapons,
of t h e Suez Canal.
D u r i n g t h e Six-Day War t h e E g y p t i a n H i g h
Command was r i d d l e d w i t h incompetence and p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o v e r s y which impacted i t s command and c o n t r o l significantly. Nasser r e s t r u c t u r e d t h e High Command t o
lli
purpose. an army of
w i t h i n t h e H i g h Comand d u r i n g t h e Six-Day
s u r f a c e d u r i n g t h e Canal c r o s s i n g and t h e f i r s t days o f t h e October War. The E g y p t i a n s conceived a long-range t o recover t h e S i n a i , t h e Golan H e i g h t s , strategy
and t h e West
The s t r a t e g y i n v o l v e d They r e a l i z e d
m i l i t a r y as w e l l as p o l i t i c a l a c t i o n s . whatever m i l i t a r y a c t i o n s t h e y t o o k ,
however l i m i t e d , They o p t e d
They r e a l i z e d
t h i s a t t a c k would r e q u i r e t i m e ,
s p i r i t were b r o u g h t t o t h e E g y p t i a n Army between 1971 and 1973 w i t h t h e appointments o f Generals I s m a i l , Shazly, and Gamasy t o t h e p o s i t i o n s of M i n i s t e r o f War,
Chief 04 S t a f f , respectively.
The s o l d i e r s became i n t i m a t e l y + a m i l i a r
I IT'
w i t h t h e techniques,
weapons,
use i n October
1973.
Ift h e E g y p t i a n
crossing the
i n f a n t r y were t o f a c e t h e s e u n i t s a f t e r canal,
such as t h e S o v i e t
were i n c o r p o r a t e d i n t o a t a l l l e v e l s o f command.
E g y p t i a n t a n k h u n t i n g teams,
A v e r y t h o r o u g h a n t i t a n k defense
b e l i e v e d t h e y had t h r e e t o f o u r days a f t e r
an a t t a c k b e f o r e I s r a e l '5 r e s e r v e s c o u l d be committed
f u l l y t o t h e Counterattack.
The need f o r
surprise
d r o v e t h e E g y p t i a n s t o i n n o v a t i o n about t h e p l a n s f a r t h e crossing. high-pressure The need fat- speed w i t h t h e use o f water pumps t o break t h r o u g h t h e sand To
r a m p a r t s f u r t h e r delayed t h e I s r a e l i c o u n t e r a t t a c k . accomplish t h i s s u r p r i s e ,
w h i l e p r e p a r i n g t h e O p e r a t i o n Radr p l a n .
I10
and t h e n w i t h d r a w i n g .
l u l l i n g t h e I s r a e l i s i n t o a f a l s e sense of familiarity.
p e r c e p t i o n s o f E g y p t i a n f o r c e s and t h e n s u p p l i e d i n f o r m a t i o n which s u b s t a n t i a t e d I s r a e l preconceived i d e a s o f E g y p t s s t a t e o f r e a d i n e s s and f i g h t i n g capabilities. The E g y p t i a n o b j e c t i v e f o r c r o s s i n g t h e Canal was t o b r i n g an end t o t h e s t a l e m a t e and t h e c o n d i t i o n of No War,
No Peace.
Sadat reached a
or t h e S o v i e t Union.
end t h e no war, action!;
Sadat b e l i e v e d t h e o n l y way t o
no peace s t a l e m a t e was t o t a k e
U n i t e d N a t i o n t o become i n v o l v e d .
II?
inevitable.
He and I s m a i l agreed t h a t a l i m i t e d
defeat I s r a e l i forces
on t h e west bank o f t h e Canal by a d e l i b e r a t e a s s a u l t c r o s s i n g aimed a t s e i z i n g f i v e o r more bridgeheads 10 t o 15 k i l o m e t e r s deep; repel I s r a e l i counterattacks: and p r e p a r e
and UN i n t e r v e n t i o n . The p e r i o d between 1967 and 1973 was a c r i t i c a l p e r i o d f o r E g y p t i a n and I s r a e l i m i l i t a r y p r e p a r a t i o n s l e a d i n g t o t h e October 1973 War. This
I18
an
P r i o r t o the
maneuvers.
non-palitical,
defeat of
I s r a e l i farces,
r e s t i t u t i o n of Arab
t h e occupied t e r r i t o r i e s , pride.
and r e s t o r a t i o n of
restructured.
and t h e m i s i n f o r m a t i o n
such as o c c u r r e d
E g y p t i a n and S y r i a n s t a f f p r i o r to t h e a t t a c k .
conduct e f f e c t i v e t r a i n i n g ,
119
equipment, and Canal crossing preparations without arousing u n d u e Israeli intelligence suspicions. This
w a s d u e in large part t o t h e carefuly orchestrated misinformation program t h e Egyptians used. planted t o justify and supplement Israeli misconceptions about Egyptian g o a l s and capabilities w a s well placed. Limited military g o a l s t o c h a n g e t h e Information
political s t a t u s q u o w e r e designed t o u s e t h e 1973 c a p a b i l i t i e s of t h e military services. Israel's s t a t u s after t h e Six-Day War was o n e
of
superiority in t h e region.
Iirael f e l t that it
"concept" that w a s t h e b a s i s for Israeli strategy between t h e wars. It w a 5 a viable tool immediately
'5
superiority was
unquestionable, but it failed t o t a k e i n t o account c h a n g e s in Egyptian g o a l s and Egypt's r e s o l v e t o regain t h e occupied territories, pride, and honor after t h e War of Attrition. Israel refused t o believe that Egypt
w a s committed t o settling t h e conflict by military means. T h i s adherence to t h e "concept" contributed t o Israel's intelligence community failure. non-military T h e lack of a
120
balance t o military assessments of intelligence data contributed t o t h e errars in political evaluations of Egyptian actions. T h e mobilization of reserves, which
Israel w a 5 so dependent upon, required at least 48 hours notification before they could b e effectively employed in battle. T h e intelligence community had guaranteed that notification time and operational plan!; were developed upon that guarantee. hnd finally, Israel's adoption of t h e static defense while equipping t h e military for mobile defensive operations created an atmosphere o f confusion. The Israeli's still maintained t h e T h e strategic depth afforded b y
t h e Bar-Lev Line and t h e Sinai led t o t h e deterrent strateqy of static defense, a revolutionary doctrine for t h e IDF. This static defense denied t h e IDF t h e
initiative, mobility, and surprise that it was accustomed to; t h e IDF was unable t o s e i z e t h e initiative and t a k e t h e battle t o t h e enemy. Ta summarize t h e preparations leading t o t h e October- War in a f e w short words: t h e Egyptians
learned from their failures and from their knowledge of Israeli strengths and weaknesses during t h e Six-Day War, then vigorously applied corrective measures. The
their own strengths after the Six-Day War, then d i d little t o reassess those views, retaining the perception of their strength and the Egyptians weaknesses.
CHAPTER V
ENDNOTE
The Y o m K i p p u r W a r
CHAPTER V I SURVEY
OF LITERATURE
T h i s c h a p t e r r e v i e w s p e r t i n e n t l i t e r a t u r e used
i n r e s e a r c h and development o f t h i s s t u d y .
The
E g y p t i a n and I s r a e l i sources.
A s would be expected,
as w e l l as o t h e r n o n - r e g i o n a l
r e s e a r c h m a t e r i a l were used:
periodicals,
and u n p u b l i s h e d m a t e r i a l s .
I n a n a l y z i n g E g y p t i a n p o l i t i c a l and m i l i t a r y
W a r
book, The I s r a e l i - E g y p t i a n
WaEf-
t o be i n v a l u a b l e sources o f
information.
tedious, is thorough and generally f r e e of biases. relies heavily o n diversified, non-military Arab sources t o formulate h i s analysis
amos intended t o f o c u s on t h e events that led t o t h e October War. He addressed three specific issues:
(1)
decision t o attack, and what their strategic and tactical g o a l s were ( 2 ) t h e Arab military operations conducted during t h e war and their assessments of t h e operations and ( 3 ) t h e political and military implications of t h e war with specific references t o t h e superpowers' interests.
To
required a n analysis o f events in Egypt and Syria in previous years, specifically 1971-1973. Egyptian
preparations far t h e October War were conducted with a thorough examination and adoption o f lessons learned t h e 19h7 War.
i n
changes in
relationships that occurred inter- and intra-regionally between: Egypt and t h e West, specifically Egypt and
Arab s t a t e s ;
He shows t h e
as w e l l as
the
a n a l y z i n g t h e m i l i t a r y and
I . f e l t t h e book was
He r e v i e w s each s t a g e a f t h e war,
Israel,
and t h e
conclusion:
(1) the l i m i t e d
! 26
t h e Israeli and Egyptian perceptions of t h e results of t h e war. Primarily, Bar-Siman-Tov focuses on each stage
military activity they u s e t o achieve their strategies and a i m s (4) t h e principal military means utilized (5) t h e initiatives in belligerent activity ( 6 ) t h e nature of t h e interaction between Israels and E g y p t s activity o n the Canal and (7) t h e diplomatic activity o n t h e part of t h e superpowers relating t o t h e regian. H e asserts t h e transition from o n e s t a g e t o t h e next was caused by escalatory actions of o n e of t h e belligerents. H e describes t h e changes taking place in each belligerents concept of war, a s will a s t h e develcipment of t h e war because of these escalatory moves. Elusive Victory, written by Colonel Trevor N. Dupuy, U.S. Army, retired, is a historical commentary
an t h e Arab-Israeli conflicts beginning in 1947 and ending after t h e October War in 1974. Sources for h i s
work a r e English versions and translations af Arab and 1srael.i documents, interviews with Israeli and Arab military personnel, and United Natians Truce
17
Supervision Organization o f f i c e r s .
The work p r o v i d e s
some v e r y g e n e r i c h i s t o r i c a l d a t a on e v e n t s o c c u r r i n g
i n t h e region.
There i s v e r y l i t t l e i n - d e p t h
analysis
or p o l i t i c a l o r i d e o l o g i c a l aims and s t r a t e g i e s
u t i l i z e d by e i t h e r n a t i o n . The book p r o v i d e s good
c h r o n o l o g i c a l d i s c u s s i o n s o f m i l i t a r y e v e n t s between t h e Middle Eastern b e l l i g e r e n t s . Two books by Chaim Herzog, and The A r a b - I s r a e l i Wars. The War o f Atonement
I used h i s sequence o f e v e n t s
t h e war,
concepts o u t l i n e d i n Bar-Siman-Tovs
d e f i n i t i v e a n a l y s i s o f t h e I s r a e l i aims d u r i n g t h e War
of. A t t r i t i o n .
H e r z o g s o t h e r book,
12s
fallibility of the intelligence and political climate in Israel. Insight in the Middle East War b y the Insight Team o f the Sunday (London) Times, is an excellent, but limited, source of material. Basically the book is a
compilation of reports from Sunday Times correspondents and reporters, regional Journalists, and documentary material from United States Department of Defense. book deals less with the military aspect of the six-year period of this thesis and more on the political aspect. The substance of the material seems road with n o particular bias.
is
The
to b e very middle-of-the
the theme
The Intelligence Prelude to the October War of 1 9 7 3 , " discusses the intelligence problems in the United State.; and Israel which led to Israel's lack of
preparedness.
belieis in its military superiority and its ability t o halt any Egyptian attack. She continues with the psychological problems i n Israel which decreased its perceptions of the situation and Egyptian intentions. The paper is a goad start for research into Israeli intelligence activities and perceptions following t h e
120
conducted during visits to Israel and Egypt. O'Ballance's account is grandiose i n its style. He
Hs
uses more statistics that most sources I reviewed. gives a good description of the order of battle for both belligerents and provides more details on the
Israeli forces composition and structure preceeding the outbreak. Some facts on the political views of Israel and Egypt are discussed. The Crossing of the Suez, by Lt. General Saad El Shazly, is an excellent source of material on Egyptian military preparations for crossing t h e Canal, the crossing itself, and post-crossing events. Shazly
involvement. a5 t h e Egyptian Chief of Staff, tasked to prepare the crossing plan by Sadat. However, a note of
caution needs to accompany the use of this source. Shazly wrote this book t o counter accusations and misrepresentations made principally b y Sadat of Shazly's role in the October War. In essence, Shazly
had an "ax to grind," and may have given too much credit to himself for h i 5 role in the war.
I")
However,
p r e p a r a t i o n f o r t h e Canal c r o s s i n g .
A n e x c e l l e n t source + o r i l l u s t r a t i n g t h e
i n t e r n a l o p e r a t i o n s and t h i n k i n g of t h e r o l e of t,he E g y p t i a n s and period
A2
e . and E g y p t i a n
1970 and 1974. Nasser and Sadat. the presidents,
He was a l s o a c o n f i d a n t o f P r e s i d e n t s
A s a f r i e n d and p o l i t i c a l a d v i s o r t o
b e h i n d t h e scenes.
c o n f l i c t between t h e Six-Day
W a r and
t h e October War.
CHAPTER V I ENDNOTES
' Jahn W. Amos 1 1 , Arab-Israeli Military/Political Relations: Arab Perceptions and the Politics of Escalation (1979): 3 .
a
Ibid.:
206-208.
of
'j',
L
APPENDIX
APC .- Armored personnel carrier ECM - Electronic countermeasures HEAT - High explosive anti-tank munition IAF
2.
.3.
4.
5 .
4 .
7.
8.
4.
10.
- Unian
of
Appendix
1-2
Terms D e f i n e d
1. Air s u p e r i o r i t y : That degree of dominance i n t h e a i r b a t t l e of one f o r c e over another which p e r m i t s t h e conduct of o p e r a t i o n s by t h e former and i t s r e l a t e d l a n d , sea and a i r f o r c e s a t a g i v e n t i m e and p l a c e w i t h o u t p r o h i b i t i v e i n t e r f e r e n c e by t h e opposing f o r c e .
2. Al-Naksa: degeneration.
A r a b i c meaning t h e s e t back o r t h e
3 .
4. A r r t i - t a n k G u i d e d Weapon S y s t e m (ATGWO: A missile system o f c o m p a r a t i v e l y s h o r t range and h i g h l e t h a l i t y designed f o r use a g a i n s t armor by i n f a n t r y o r a r t i l l e r y units., 5. Arnc.wed F o r c e s : A f o r m a t i o n which c o n t a i n s a preponderance o f armor, e 9 . tanks. armored c a r s and s e l f - p r o p e l l e d guns. U s u a l l y supported by i n f a n t r y i n APCS.
6. Armored P e r s o n n e l C a r r i e r s (APCs): A n armored v e h i c l e w i t h c r o s s c o u n t r y c a p a b i l i t y f o r t r a n s p o r t oi, t r o o p s w i t h i n t h e b a t t l e area.
10.
Ceasefire:
The o r d e r t o suspend h o s t i l i t i e s .
20. Hazima:
21. Haozia:
Arabic f o r defeat.
22. M o b i l i t y :
24. M o d i n : The Military Intelligence Branch of Israel's intelligence community which was t h e primary collection, evaluation, and assessment agency.
25. U o s s a d : The Central Institute for Intelligence and Security operating primarily in foreign countries and conducting counterintelligence.
2 6 . Speed o f S o u n d : The speed at which sound travels in a given medium under specified conditions. The speed of sound at sea level in the International Standard Atmosphere is 1,108 ftlsecond, 658 knots, 1 . 2 1 5 km/hour.
27. Strategy: The plans for conducting a war in the widest. sense including diplomatic. political, and economic considerations was well an those of a purely military nature.
28. S t r o n g p o i n t : A key point in a defensive position, usually strongly fortified and heavily armed with automatic weapons, around which other positions are grouped for i t 5 protection. 2 9 . Subsonic: Of o r pertaining to speed less that the speed of sound.
3 0 . Supersonic: Of or pertaining to speed i n excess of the speed of sound.
51.
S u r f a c e - t o - A i r Uissile (SAM): Missile firsd from the ground to destroy enemy aircraft o r missiles.
52. T a o i i m : The 20 strongpoints of the Ear-Lev Line along the Artillery Road, 8-10 kilometers behind the 17 maoziin. o r fortresses.
SOURCE:
by Brigadier P.H.C.
Jane's Dictionary of Military Terms, Compiled Hayward, London: MacDonald & Co (Pub1 ishers) Ltd (1975).
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..
2. MIG-I7 ( N A T O code name - FreSCCJ): single-seat daylight fighter/bomber and limited all-weather interceptor. Supersonic, single-enqined aircraft armed with t h r e e Z3mm c a n n o n s p l u s underwing pylons for varying t y p e s of ordinance.
3. HIG-I3 ( N A T O code name - Farmer): single-seat fighter/bomber and all-weather interceptor. Supersonic, twin-engined aircraft armed with t w o o r t h r e e 30mm cannons p l u s six external points f o r carrying varying air-to-air o r air-to-ground weapons. * 4 . HIG-21 ( N A T O code naae - Fishbed): single-seat fighter, limited all-weather multi-role, and reconnaisance aircraft. Supersonic, single-engined with twin-barrel internal 23mm gun and four underwing pylons for weapons a r drop tanks. **
5 . WIG-23 ( N A T O code name - Flogger): single-seat, variable geometry tactical attack and all weather interceptor. Supersonic, single-engined aircraft with o n e five-barrel 2 3 m m gun in fuselage belly pack, o n e pylon under center fuselage, one under each engine air intake, and o n e under each fixed inboard wing panel for rocket packs, air-to-air missiles, or other external stores. *MIG-25 ( N A T O code naae Foxbatl: single-seat interceptor. Twin-engined, supersonic aircraft with four air-to-air missiles o n underwing attachments. *6.
7. SU-7 ( N A T O code name - Fitter): single-seat ground attack aircraft. Single-engine with t w o internal 30mm guns and six external pylons f o r rocket pods, fuel tanks, and other air-to-ground munitions. *8.
M I - 8 ( N A Y 0 code nawe Hip?: twin-turbine powered transport helicopter. Capable o f transporting between
25 and 32 pasengers, depending o n variant. up t o 8820 l b s of cargo internally, 6614 l b s of c a r g o externally, o r combinations not exceeding max takeoff load of 8820 lbs.
SAM-,? ( N A T O code name - Guideline): medium r a n g e surface-to-air missile. Radio commanded with a highexplosive promixity-fuse, solid propellant booster and liquid propellant suetainer capable of Mach 3 . 5 . Range of 40-50 kilometers and max ceiling of 18,000 meters.
9.
***
1 0 . SAM-J ( N A T O code name - Goa): two-stage, short.-.range surface-to-air missile. High-explosive. proximity-fuse missile with solid propellant booster and sustainer rocket capable of Mach 2+. Range of 25 kilometers and ceiling of 13,000 meters. ***
11. S A n - 6 ( N A T O code name - Gainful): single-stage. f ull y mobile surf ace-to-air missi le. High-expl osive, proximity- o r impact-fuse, rocket-ramject engine missile capable of Mach 2.8. Maximum high-altitude range 60 kilometers and low-altitude maximun range of 30 kilometers and ceiling of 18,000 meters. -*-
1 2 . AT--.3 ( N A T O code name - Saggerl: portable surfaceto-surface guided antitank missile. A wire-guided, line-of-sight, solid propellant, two-stage missile with a ranqe of 500-3,000 meters.
---
1 3 . RPG-7: antitank grenade launcher with a rocket-assisted HEAT round having a n effective range of 300-500 meters and capable of penetrating 320mm of armor plate. -*** 1 4 . ZSU-23: four-barrel 23mm automatic low-level antiaircraft gun with a rate of f i r e of 3,400 round/minute. It h a s an effective r a n g e of 2,000/2,500 meter 5:. --* 15. T - - 3 4 : medium tank with an 8 5 m m gun and two 7.62mm machine g u n s manned by a crew of f i v e (commander, gunner-, 1 oader , driver , and hull gunner) ***--
1 6 . T - - 5 4 : main battle tank with a l00mm rifled-gun, t w o 7..62mm machine g u n s and o n e 12.7mm antiaircraft machine gun. Manned by a crew of four (commander, gunner, loader, and driver.) -**-T-54
17. T - 5 5 : main battle tank with s a m e armament a s t h e less t h e 12.7mm antiaircraft machine gun.
I '?O
Improvements over t h e T-54 included a more powerful engine and modified transmission, stabilized gun platform, and increased ammunition capacity. Manned by a crew of four. ***-1 8 . T-62: main battle tanks developed from the T-55. Armament included one 115mm smooth-bore gun, one 7.62mm machine gun, and one 12.7mm antiaircraft machine gun. It has a crew of four. Improvements over the T-55 included a larger engine and improved transmission, increased range, improved suspension, and fully stabilized gun platform. ---*19. P - 1 2 ( N A T O code name - Spoon R e s t - A ) : early warning. very high frequency radar used in conjunction Mobile in two with the SAM-2 Guideline missile. vehicles - one carrying the generator and the other carrying the antenna array and radar consoles. --*
Israeli
1. F - 4 ( N A T O c o d e n a m e - PhantnR): Single- o r dual-seat all-weather interceptor and ground attack aircraft. Supersonic, twin-turbojet engine aircraft with external mounted ZOmm gun and underwing pylon attachments f o r assorted air-to-air and air-to-ground munitions and missiles.
2. A - 4 ( N A T O code name - Skyhawk): single-seat light attack aircraft. Subsonic, single-engine aircraft armed with two 20mm cannons and wing pylons for assorted air-to-ground munitions. *
SOURCES :
Rill Gunston: An Illustrated Guide to the A r c 0 Publishing Modern Soviet Air Force. New York: Company Incorporated (1982).
Jane's A l l the World's Aircraft (1985-1986). Jane.5 Publishing Company, Limited ( 1 9 8 5 ) .
**
London:
+++
Jane's Weapons Systems (1985-1986). London: Jane's Publishing Company, Limited (1985).
+*+* The Sovlet War Machine: C\n Encylclopedia of Russian Military Equipment and Strategy. New York: Chartwell Books, Incorporated (1976).
New
# Bill Gunston: An Illustrated Guide t o U.S. Air Arco Force: The Modern U.S. Air Force. New Y o r k : Publishing Company Incorporated ( 1 9 8 2 ) . ##
John Jordan: An Illustrated Guide t o Modern Naval Aviation and Aircraft Carriers. New Y o r k : Arco Phblishing Company Incorporated (1983).
APPENDIX 2
Appendix 2-1
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
I &'I
Appendix 2-2
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
J e w i s h State
Es7
UNITED NATIONS PARTITION PLAN
1947
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