Journal of Indian Philosophy (2005) 33: 243284 DOI 10.

1007/s10781-004-6930-8

Springer 2005

TAO JIANG

  ANA ALAYAVIJN AND THE PROBLEMATIC OF CONTINUITY IN THE CHENG WEISHI LUN

This essay is an attempt to look into the key Yog ac ara concept of na in its more developed form as presented in the Cheng layavijn a a trata -siddhi-sa stra, The Treatise on the DocWeishi Lun (Vijn aptima trine of Consciousness-Only, hereafter CWSL).1 The authorship of the CWSL is traditionally attributed to Xuan Zang, the famous 7th century Chinese Buddhist pilgrim and translator. It is composed as  by incorporatan extended commentary on Vasubandhus Trim : sika  ing commentaries of Trim sik a by prominent Indian Yog ac ara Bud: dhists, of which only Sthiramatis survives today in Sanskrit.2 The text sides with Dharmap alas commentary and uses it as the ultimate .3 authority in the interpretation of Trim : sika

Unless noted otherwise, the CWSL texts cited in this essay are my own renditions. The only complete English translation of the CWSL is done by Wei Tat, from which I have beneted a great deal. However, Wei Tats translation, as impressive as it is, has made many interpretative insertions into the text which are helpful for the understanding of the text but might be too liberal as a translation. The paginations of my translations are from the Chinese portion of Wei Tats translation of the CWSL for those readers who might want to check both the original Chinese text and Wei Tats translation as well as his interpretation. Occasionally Wei Tats interpretative translations are used due to the terseness, and therefore vagueness, of Xuan Zangs text. In other words, this essay treats Wei Tats work more as an interpretation rather than a strict translation. Those cases are marked as Wei Tats work. 2  Katsumatas Bukkyo  ni okeru Shinshikisetsu no Kenkyu  (A Study of the Shunkyo na Thought in Buddhism) oers a detailed comparison between DharCitta-Vijna map ala, as represented by Xuan Zang, and Sthiramati on their interpretations of . Vasubandhus Trim : sika 3 Scholars have questioned various peculiar nature of the CWSL. For example,  Katsumata (910) laments that a translator as great as Xuan Zang Shunkyo composes the text through a compilation of selective translations of various

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ca ra In the CWSL Xuan Zang sets out to elaborate a key Yoga  doctrine described in the Trim sik a that all of our experience is the : result of the manifold transformation of consciousness, from Dharmap alas position. At the core of Xuan Zangs eort is the notion of na, usually translated as the storehouse consciousness. As layavijn a a na was layavijn a Lambert Schmithausen (1819) rightly points out, a initially postulated to provide the support for a meditator during two deep meditative states wherein all conscious activities are supposed to have stopped. However, once formulated, the development of na took a course of its own, and the concept was expanded layavijn a a to accommodate other doctrinal needs of Buddhism, the most important of which was to account for our sense of self and our cognition of external objects. Given the orthodox Buddhist doctrine of impermanence which applies to both the self and external objects, the Buddhists had to explain away identity. For this purpose, they found an appealing candidate, namely continuity. Accordingly, they argued that the self results from the misidentication of continuity as identity. That is, continuity is mistaken as identity. Now the task that faced the Buddhists was how to account for continuity without appealing to identity. This is precisely the challenge Xuan Zang takes up in the CWSL. There are three ways continuity can be conceived. First, continuity is change of properties of an unchanging substance. Second, continuity is due to an entity within change persisting from one stage into the next identity in dierence. Finally, continuity is nothing but an immediate contiguity, with the immediately preceding moment being the ecient cause of the immediately succeeding moment. All three

(Footnote 3 Continued). commentaries instead of translating all ten commentaries themselves, thus losing an invaluable source for us to learn more accurately about the works of the ten prominent Indian Yog ac arins, even though it is still an important source for their thought. He notes that such a practice is rather inconsistent with Xuan Zangs usual practice of staying overly faithful to the original texts in his translations (9). Traditionally it is believed that the particular style of the CWSL was adopted at the request of Xuan Zangs favorite disciple, Gui Ji. Dan Lusthaus goes even further in claiming that from its inception, the Cheng wei-shih Lun represents Kuei-chis [Gui Ji] aspirations, not Hsu an-tsangs, and it is Kuei-chi who has invested it with catechismic signicance (2002, 399). Here we are not concerned with these questions.

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views, with certain nuanced but important modications, are adopted by Xuan Zang. His strategy consists of three steps. First, he adopts the Madhyamika Buddhist position that all existents are empty of any intrinsic nature,4 and interprets this to mean that a being does not have any metaphysical identity but is itself a continuum of momentary entities. Second, he attempts to reduce the continuity of external objects to the continuity of conscious activities; this is the culmination of the idealist tendency of Buddhism. Third, once the primacy of consciousness is established, he then moves to the theorization of the possibility of enlightenment as a continuous process from the deluded state of consciousness to the enlightened one. Apparently, the second step holds the key towards a viable account of continuity for the Buddhist and in this essay we will focus on precisely this second step. We will evaluate Xuan Zangs eort to na. layavijn a ` -vis his presentation of a account for continuity vis-a  na is conceived as a grounding but evolving consciousAlayavijn a ness, consisting of ever-changing seeds whose subliminal existence warrants a congruity between successive dharmic moments. The basic na in the CWSL is a layavijn a argument of this essay is that a Mah ay ana Buddhist notion of the subliminal consciousness formulated to account for the continuity of our sense of self and the continuity of our experience of the world. Our attention will be na as it is presented in the layavijn focused on this question: does a a CWSL eventually solve the problematic of continuity within the parameters of Mah ay ana Buddhist discourse, and if so, how?

THE PRIMACY OF CONSCIOUSNESS

In order to argue for continuity within the dormain of consciousness, Xuan Zang has to establish the primacy of consciousness rst. His strategy is to challenge the reication of the two aspects of a cognitive experience, namely, consciousness and its object. That is to say, Xuan Zang considers conscious process and its object5 to be two aspects of the same cognitive experience; neither one is independent of the other. However, the mutual dependency of conscious activities and external objects alone does not establish the primacy of the former
According to Dan Lusthaus, Xuan Zangs eort to argue for the non-dierence of Madhyamaka and Yog ac ara is due to the inuence of Dharm apala while he was studying at N aland a (2002, 404). 5 This is what J.N. Mohanty calls consciousing (34).
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over the latter. That is, he still has to justify his approach which prioritizes the consciousness-aspect over the object-aspect. Hence, he needs to make the argument that the existence of an object is not independent of the cognitive structure through which it is cognized and veried. According to Xuan Zang, there are ultimately two kinds of beings, tman,6 corresponding to the two realms of existences, dharma and a tman the external and internal. Dharma refers to the external and a internal. Let us take a look at how he makes the argument that the real existence of the two is irrelevant to our philosophical endeavor.  Xuan Zang denes the way the two terms are used this way: Atman (Ch: wo) means ownership and domination whereas dharma (Ch: fa) tman and dharma means norms and grasping (8). He contends that a are the result of the misidentication of a continuum as identity or substance. It is with this observation that Vasubandhu begins his : Trim : sika
tmadharmopaca ro hi vividho yah a : pravartate/ naparin me sau parin mah / vijna :a :a : sa ca tridha ko manana khyas ca vijnaptir vis vipa : ayasya ca tman) and objects (dharma) is used For the various metaphorical usage of self (a on the basis of the transformation of consciousness. And that transformation is threefold: retribution, intellection, and perception of the sense-eld.

There are a number of points worthy of our attention here. First tman) and objects of all, Vasubandhu points out that self (a (dharma) are nothing but metaphors. As such, they have no reference to real self-contained entities. Then what are the referents
Various Hindu schools have made their own list of metaphysical categories. The most famous one is given by the Vais es : ika school which lists seven categories: sub stance, quality, action, universal, individual, inherence, and absence/negation. Atman is included under the category of substance. The Buddhists in general do not accept the validity of some of these categories, rejecting them as nothing more than the result of intellectual abstraction with no experiential correlates. This is evidenced in the CWSL where the Buddhist position is defended. The basic strategy in the CWSL in dealing with the opponents views on the metaphysical categories is to link the categories to consciousness in arguing that they are perceivable only through sense organs. Hence they do not have a separate existence apart from consciousness. Since the arguments are not directly related to the theme of this essay, they will be ltered tman) and elements out. The Buddhists reduce these categories to two, self (a (dharma), namely the non-physical/internal and the physical/external, or at least they pick up these two as the representatives of metaphysical categories the treatment of which should lay to rest any lingering concerns regarding other metaphysical cate treats metaphysical categories. gories. This is the way Trim : sika
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tman and dharma? According to Vasubandhu, a tman and of a dharma correlate to no reality beyond the realm of consciousness. tman and dharma are nothing but the result Instead, our sense of a of the transformation of consciousness.7 This transformation is threefold: the ve sense-consciousnesses together with the sixth or na) that discriminates and sense-centered consciousness (manovijn a cognizes physical objects; the seventh or thought-centered consciousness (manas) that wills and reasons on a self-centered basis; na). layavijn a and the eighth or storehouse consciousness (a tman and dharma are the results At rst sight, the claim that both a of the transformation of consciousness easily associates it with the position of a metaphysical idealist, if metaphysical idealism can be roughly understood as a view that holds the ultimate reality to be ac ara mental, spiritual, or mind-dependent.8 Is Xuan Zangs Yog Buddhism a form of metaphysical idealism? Let us look at how he accounts for the self and the external world by appealing to the transformation of consciousness. He begins by investigating our cognition. An examination of our cognition would reveal a distinct structure:
When a deled consciousness itself is born, it is manifested in two apparent charlambana; Ch. suo acteristics (Sk. laks : an : as; Ch. xiang): as the appropriated (Sk, a lambana; Ch. neng yuan). . . . As an apparent yuan) and the appropriating (Sk. sa object, the appropriated explains the perceived aspect of consciousness (Sk. ga; Ch. xiang feng). As an apparent subject, the appropriating explains the nimittabha ga; Ch. jian feng). (Xuan Zang, 138) perceiving aspect (Sk, darsanabha

To put it simply, there is a dual structure in all of our obviously deled ga, cognitive activities, namely the perceiving aspect, darsanabha ga. and the perceived aspect, nimittabha  Katsumata (245) acutely observes, Xuan Zang makes As Shunkyo such a case through an adoption of Dharmap alas controversial  since it is commentary of verse seventeen of Vasubandhus Trim : sika
7 tman and dharmas] are metaphorical expressions, on what If such words [as a ground can they be established? They are both metaphorical postulates resulting from the transformations of consciousness (Xuan Zang, 10). 8 This is dierent from subjective idealism which emphasizes the ultimate reality of the knowing subject (and it may either admit the existence of a plurality of such subjects or deny the existence of all save one in which case it becomes solipsism). It will become clear that, to Xuan Zang neither the knowing subject nor the known object is the ultimate reality. Xuan Zangs Yog ac ara idealism is also dierent from objective idealism which denies that the distinction between subject and object, between knower and known, is ultimate and maintains that all nite knowers and their thoughts are included in an Absolute Thought.

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 can be read in such a way if we are to be not clear whether Trim : sika faithful to the literal meaning of the text.
naparin mo yam vijn a :a : vikalpo yad vikalpyate/ sti tenedam trakam//17// tena tan na : sarvam : vijnaptima The transformation of this consciousness is imagination. That which is imagined does not exist. Therefore all is cognition-only.

However, as Katsumata points out (245), in Xuan Zangs commentary which follows Dharmap alas interpretation, this verse is interpreted as stating that the transformation of consciousness is the result of its being bifurcated into the discriminating and the discriminated. Since neither of the two exists outside of consciousness, there can be nothing but consciousness. This interpretation
argues for the transformation of consciousnesses by pointing to the perceiving and the perceived aspects of the eight consciousnesses and their concomitant mental activities (citta and caittas), and as a result, the perceiving aspect of the transforming consciousness becomes the discriminating aspect and the perceived aspect the discriminated. Therefore, because the self and entities do not exist apart from the bifurcation of the transforming consciousness, it is said that all is consciousness. . . (Katsumata, 246)

This is an important departure from Vasubandhus text and a key development of the Yog ac ara teaching by Dharmap ala and Xuan Zang. What is signicant is that to Xuan Zang this dual structure is intrinsic to consciousness. That is to say that consciousness has an inherent structure to it, or to use the traditional terminology in ka ra) and Indian philosophical discourse, consciousness is formed (sa ka ra). The CWSL defends the position this it is not formless (nira way:
If the mind and its concomitant mental activities (citta and caittas) did not have in themselves the characteristics of the appropriated, they would not be able to appropriate their own objects. Otherwise they would be able to appropriate indiscriminately all objects, since they would appropriate their own objects as the objects of others and appropriate the objects of others as their own. (138)

What is being argued here is that if consciousness does not have the perceived aspect within itself, it would be impossible for consciousness either to perceive anything as its own object or to perceive discriminately. Two issues are at stake in this connection. First, how is it possible for consciousness to perceive its own object? If consciousness

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is formless, and all the forms, namely its content, would come from without; since that which external to consciousness is publicly available, it cannot become the private object of consciousness as is required if consciousness is to have its own object. If, however, consciousness has an inherent form, such a problem can be easily ` -vis the object/content is resolved since in that case the form vis-a intrinsic to itself. Second, if consciousness is formless, how can it perceive objects discriminately instead of indiscriminately perceiving all objects? Why does it perceive some objects instead of others at one point or another? This is especially problematic when any apparent external object is absent. As is well known, the Hindu realists, such as the Ny aya philosophers, argue that consciousness is formless and all distinction is derived from outside of consciousness (Mohanty, 34). But there are at least two diculties associated with the realist position, namely how to account for misperception and dream experience, since in both of these cases there are no corresponding external objects. Without going into the complexities of the arguments,9 it should be clear that formlessness or receptivity is at least not sucient in explaining consciousness. The realists take the view that consciousness is formless, hence receptive, whereas the Yog ac arins think that consciousness has an intrinsic structure to it, hence it is formed. The realist theory of the receptivity of consciousness, such as Ny ayas, has an easier time in explaining the collectivity of experience since according to it, the foundation of the collectivity is from without, therefore independent of consciousness. However, it has a much harder time in explaining misperception, dream and the personal nature of cognitive experience. The idealist theory of formed consciousness, such as Yog ac aras, has just the opposite advantages and disadvantages. It is admittedly more successful in explaining the private aspect of our cognition, but how can an essentially private cognition become publicly available in the Yog ac ara theory? We will deal with this issue later in the essay.
In order to solve this problem, the Ny aya philosophers argue that misperception is not misperception of objects but rather misperception of place. In defending such a solution, they resort to rather convoluted arguments as to how that can be the case. I will not go into the details of those arguments which are interesting but unconvincing, or to use Hiriyannas words, subtle rather than profound (228) (although he was not necessarily referring to this particular point when he made the comment about some of the Naiy aika theories).
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On the subjective aspect of consciousness,

If the mind and its concomitant mental activities did not have in themselves the characteristics of the appropriating, they, like space, would not be able to appropriate any object. Otherwise we would have to say that space itself can appropriate objects. (Xuan Zang, 138)

This point is less controversial since, after all, the distinguishing characteristic of consciousness is its subjectivity and cognitive ability. However, what is of special interest to us here is that Xuan Zang takes the subjectivity of consciousness as just one of its components; both subjectivity and objectivity are intrinsic to the structure of consciousness. Therefore the mind and its concomitant mental ga) activities must have two aspects, the perceived aspect (nimittabha ga) (ibid.). and the perceiving aspect (darsanabha However, there is still a problem in this view:
ga and darsanbha ga depend on is itself called the thing. This That which nimittabha ga. If this bha ga did not exist, there is the self-corroboratory aspect, svasam : vittibha would be no recollection of the mind and its concomitant mental activities (cittacaittas), just as there is no memory of situations that have never been experienced. (Xuan Zang, 140)

To put it simply, according to Xuan Zang, each conscious moment has to be aware of itself so that memory or recollection of that moment can be possible. In other words, aside from the aspects of the perceiving and the perceived, there has to be an awareness of this perception of the perceived so that this perception can be recollected; otherwise, each perceptive moment would be self-contained. If that were the case, successive moments of perceptive experience would be rendered unrelated, resulting in the impossibility of memory and recollection of experiences. Be this as it may, he has to address the following concern: is this self-corroboratory aspect also contained within each moment of perceptive experience or does it lie without? If it is outside of each moment of perception, it would resemble some notion of an uninvolved self, or to use Bina Guptas word the disinterested witness10 ks tman. (sa : in) which is the empirical manifestation of the eternal a This would mean that some metaphysical concept of self, already rejected by the Buddhists, would sneak back into the Buddhist
10 ks This is the title of her book which is a study of the concept of sa : in, critical to nta epistemology. The translation of the term sa ks the Advaita Veda : in as disinterested witness is attributed to Husserls idea of the phenomenological ego as disinterested on-looker (Gupta, 5).

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discourse. On the other hand, if the self-witnessing division is within each cognitive moment, the succession of moments becomes unaccounted for, hence defeating the very purpose of its postulation in explaining the possibility of memory and recollection. In this connection, we nd the following statement in the CWSL:
ma) of consciousness means that consciousness itself is Transformation (parin :a ga and darsanabha ga. These two aspects transformed into two aspects, nimittabha ga). (10) originate in dependence upon the self-corroboratory aspect (svasam : vittibha

What interests us in the above passage is that the perceiving and the perceived divisions originate from the self-corroboratory division of consciousness. This means that the two functional divisions of the perceiving and the perceived are within the self-corroboratory division of each conscious moment. Consequently, this third self-corroboratory division is apparently not outside of the two functional divisions. But the question remains: how can the momentary selfwitness division warrant the continuity of the cognitive experience in order to account for the possibility of memory and recollection of a particular experience? On the one hand, this self-corroboratory aspect gives rise to the two functional divisions, while on the other hand it retains the eects generated by the cognitive experience of the two functional divisions of each conscious moment. In other words, the self-corroboratory division and the two functional divisions are mutually causal. Apparently, the self-corroboratory division is not simply witnessing the activities of the other two divisions, but is also involved itself. The self-corroboratory division is involved in two ways, according to Xuan Zang: it gives rise to the two divisions and receives the seeds as the eects retained from the function of the two divisions. This means that the continuity of consciousness relies on its self-corroboratory division, not the two functional divisions; even though the two functional divisions can appear to be continuous, their continuity derives from the continuity of the third division as its manifestations. Hence, the CWSL concludes that it is on the basis of these two tman and dharmas are established, because there is no aspects that a other basis (ibid.). On the issue of the existence of dharma, the external world in this connection, a typical metaphysical idealist position, such as that held by the famous eighteenth century British philosopher George Berkeley, denies the independence of a world apart from our cognition of it. Xuan Zangs claim that dharma is the result of the transformation of consciousness appears to be the

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quintessential metaphysical idealist position. However, the CWSL apparently tries to steer itself clear from the metaphysical question here. Accordingly, after carefully examining the structure of our cognitive experience of an external object, the non-controversial conclusion is that within each cognitive moment there are an experiencing subject and an experienced object, putting aside the self-corroboratory division for the moment. So far this is acceptable to Xuan Zang, and any step further is to him an unacceptable move, since it means to posit the existence of that which is independent of this cognitive structure. Here is how Xuan Zang raises the objection:
How can we tell that there really are no external objects, but only internal contman sciousness appearing as external objects? It is because the existence of a real a and real dharmas cannot be ascertained. (12)

tman or In fact, Xuan Zang is not denying the possibility of a real a real dharmas, but is simply pointing out that their reality cannot be ascertained independent of consciousness. This means that the perception of an external world does not, by itself, warrant the existence of such a world, and that there is no a priori reason to either arm or deny, within the parameters of consciousness, the existence of the real external world. In fact, Xuan Zang argues that to posit an external world independent of our cognition of it is an unnecessary theoretical complication insofar as the adequacy of explaining our cognition is concerned; and I call this qualied metaphysical idealism.11 It is not simply a reection of the relationship between consciousness and the world, which would be epistemological, but rather how the realm of consciousness becomes the world as we experience it. Therefore, it is a form of metaphysical idealism in the sense that it holds the view that the
The Yog ac ara system dealt with in this essay is along the line of Vasubandhus major works and their commentaries compiled by Xuan Zang in the CWSL. Regardless of whether Vasubandhu himself was an idealist or not, his teaching has been interpreted along the line of metaphysical idealism in the mainstream Indian Buddhist tradition, represented by Dharmak rti, with only a few exceptions. As for what Vasubandhu himself advocates in this respect, there are the following positions found in modern Buddhist scholarship: Lusthaus: epistemological idealism; Kochumuttom: realist pluralism; Wood: idealist pluralism; Sharma: absolute idealism; Stcherbatsky: spiritual monism; Murti: idealism par excellence; Conze: metaphysical idealism. Amongst them, Lusthaus and Kochumuttom can be grouped together since both of them reject the ontological idealist interpretation of Yog ac ara; the others can be viewed as variations on interpreting Yog ac ara as advocating metaphysical idealism.
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realm of consciousness is the world. It is qualied in the sense that any existence outside the realm of consciousness is neither armed nor denied.12 This qualied metaphysical idealist position is evidenced by the following remark, In all of the graspings of dharmas, there might or might not be dharmas exterior to the mind, but there always are dharmas interior to the mind (Xuan Zang, 88). It is revealing to note that Xuan Zang actually starts by conceding that in certain cases our experience of a physical object may indeed have a corresponding object exterior to the mind. The caveat in this connection is the contingent nature of such a correspondence; as he rightly observes, not all experience of an external object has its corresponding object external to the mind. A stock example would be dream experience, wherein the experience of an external object does not have any correspondence beyond the realm of the mind. Obviously in some of our experiences of external objects, their externality is not a necessary condition. This amounts to saying that the externality of objects is only a contingent factor in our experience of physical objects, whereas their internal representation within the realm of consciousness is a necessary component of all our experiences of physical objects. Or to be more exact, our experience of objects is real but their external existence is not necessarily so. The opponents might argue that unless there is a real external world it would be impossible for the sense of externality to arise in the rst place, including in dreams. Such an argument is a typical realist line and Xuan Zang, being an idealist, albeit a qualied metaphysical idealist, cannot accept the realist presupposition in the argument. In any case, Xuan Zang is simply not interested in tracing the origin of our cognition, which would result in a hopelessly circular inquiry into whether it is the real existence of the external world that

rthas interpretation of Yoga ca ra also falls According to Diana Paul, Parama along the line of qualied metaphysical idealism although she did not use that term: Although there are philosophical inconsistencies from one text to another, for Param artha, at least, Yog ac ara is a system in which the world we experience evolves from acts of cognition continually in operation, and no other world is ours to experience (which is not the same thing as saying that no other world exists) (Paul, 8). Param artha, as a prominent translator of Buddhist texts into Chinese during the 6th century, greatly inuenced Xuan Zangs understanding of Yog ac ara philosophy (Paul, 4).

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gives rise to the sense of externality or the other way around.13 What fascinates him is this question: why is consciousness able to create an external world in the absence of it? In order to respond to such a question, a thorough inquiry about the nature of consciousness is called for, and this is precisely Xuan Zangs goal. Hence we nd the CWSL claiming that
On the basis of the manifold activities of inner consciousnesses which serve as conditions for one another, the cause and eect are dientiated. The postulation of external conditions is not of any use. (574)

Put simply, external objects are reduced to cognitions of them in the realm of consciousness and their actual existence is rendered irrelevant within Xuan Zangs Yog ac ara paradigm. To Xuan Zang, the same logic is applicable to both the subject and the object of our experience with regard to the positing of their existence. In other words, if the experience of an external world does not warrant the existence of one, the experiencing of a subject, cannot by the same token, be used to justify the existence of a self, either. Xuan Zang, in keeping his commitment to the Buddhist doctrine of tman, rejects the existence of a self as the owner, as it were, of the ana experience. The line of defense launched by Xuan Zang is similar to the one against the existence of an external world. That is, the existence of the self cannot be ascertained within the parameters of consciousness. Although he agrees that there is a subject/object structure in our cognitive experience, the subject cannot be translated tman, independent of the cognitive structure since the into a self, a subject itself also undergoes changes in the course of experience. In this way, Xuan Zang has successfully established the primacy of consciousness by rendering irrelevant any speculations of real existence outside the cognitive structure of consciousness. What he needs to do next is to explain the relationship amongst dierent kinds of consciousnesses and their transformations. The success or failure
Matilal comes up with four possible positions regarding the nature of physical objects. One is regressive: the physical object is there in the rst place to give rise to the sense-datum, and thus we have a causal theory or representationalism. The other is progressive: the physical object is a construction out of these immediately given data, and thus we have phenomenalism, which says that we build up our world with these bits and pieces of what is given in immediate sensory experience. Moreover, we know that there is also a third position that is possible: physical objects do not exist, and it is a myth to assume that they do. This is the position of Vasubandhu in his trata siddhi. . .. The third position may or may not be implied in the secVijnaptima ond, although the critics of the second assert, more often than not, that it leads to the third position. The fourth position is . . . direct realism. . . (Matilal, 23233).
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of his eort depends on whether he is able to address this critical question: is consciousness alone sucient to account for our cognitive experience? To this end, Xuan Zang has engaged in a painstakingly detailed analysis of consciousness, centered around a new form na in the na. The signicance of a layavijn a layavijn a of consciousness, a Yog ac ara system lies in the fact that until the postulation of this consciousness the Buddhists did not really have a good and convincing explanation of the apparent continuity of our everyday experience, memory and sense of self, given the central Mah ay ana Buddhist . Let us now turn to  doctrine of non-substantiality of reality, sunyat a na as Xuan Zang presents it in the CWSL. layavijn a this concept of a

  ANA ALAYAVIJN : A NEW FORM OF CONSCIOUSNESS

The early Buddhist model of consciousness consists of ve senses: visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory and tactile, and the mind whose object is mental. The Yog ac ara theory of consciousness signicantly revises and expands this traditional model.14 It splits the mind in the na is na and manas. Manovijn a traditional model into two: manovijn a called sense-centered consciousness, and it works in conjunction with na and the ve senses, the ve senses. These six, namely manovijn a constitute one kind of consciousness which appropriates crude objects (Xuan Zang: 96). This means that the objects of this group of consciousnesses are external objects. Any perception of external objects requires the co-presence of such factors as the act of attenna, the sense-organs (indriyas), (whose ras) of manovijn a tion (manaska na), the external attention is directed in accordance with manovijn a objects (vis : ayas) towards which this attention is directed (Wei Tat, na is to direct the attention 479). In other words, the role of manovijn a of sense organs towards their objects in order to produce clear perna also has a cogitative or ceptions of those objects. Manovijn a deliberative function, but such a function is crude and unstable and it might be interrupted in certain states.15 The uninterrupted mind is called manas, which is related to the view of the existence of self
14  Some sutras say that there are six consciousnesses and we should know that this is only an expedient way of explanation. They pronounce six consciousnesses on the ground of six sense-organs, but the actual categories of consciousnesses are eight (Xuan Zang, 336). 15 na is lacking: birth among Xuan Zang lists ve states in which manovijna _ patti and nirodhasama patti), asamjnidevas , two meditation states (asam : jnisama ) (48092).  mindless stupor (middha) and unconsciousness (murcch a

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(Xuan Zang, 314). This means that manas is responsible for the genesis of the idea of personhood, the essence of a person. Its function is intellection and cogitation: It is called cogitation or deliberation because it cogitates or deliberates at all times without interruption in contradistinction to the sixth consciousness (manona), which is subject to interruption (Wei Tat, 97). Compared vijn a na, manas is ne and subtle in its activities (Xuan with manovijn a Zang, 478). Hence the delusion it generates, namely the idea of self, is much more resistant to being transformed in order to reach na works with the ve senses in cognizing enlightenment. Manovijn a external physical objects; manas works with another consciousness, which is for the rst time postulated by Yog ac ara, the storehouse na) or the eighth consciousness. Manas is layavijn a consciousness (a na and regards it as the inner self (Xuan Zang, layavijn attached to a a 104).  na is also known as vipa kavijn a na, ripening consciousAlayavijn a na, root consciousness. [It] is the eighth  ness, or mulavijn a consciousness, the maturing or retributive consciousness (Sk. na; Ch. yishu shi) because it has many seeds that are of the kavijn a vipa nature of ripening in varied ways (Xuan Zang, 96). This consciousness is meant to account for the karmic retribution within the doctrinal boundary of Buddhism in that it stores the karmic seeds till their fruition, and this karmic continuity is one crucial kind of continuity that the Buddhists try to explain without reication. The tactic here is to render this retributive consciousness subtle and subliminal whose activities surface only when conditions allow, that is, when karmic retribution is fullled. This is a completely dierent form of consciousness from those in the traditional model in that the traditional forms of consciousness are strictly causal, meaning they are  na, by cona object-dependent in their cognitive activities. Alayavijn trast, does not depend upon any specic object and it grounds the other seven consciousnesses which include manas as one kind and na and the ve senses as the other. manovijn a
These three kinds of consciousness are all called consciousnesses that are capable of na). The manifestation (parin ma) mi vijna transformation and manifestation (parin :a :a ma) of consciousness is of two kinds: manifestation with respect to cause (hetuparin :a ma). (Wei Tat, 97) and manifestation with respect to eect (fruit) (phalaparin :a

The manifestation as cause refers to the seeds, b ija, stored in layavijn a na, and the manifestation as eect to the eight cona sciousnesses. In other words, according to the Yog ac ara theory, the

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seeds give birth to the eight consciousnesses. It is obvious that the na is premised upon the theory of b layavijn a ija. conceptualization of a na with a closer layavijn a Therefore, let us continue our study of a examination of the Yog ac ara theory of b ija.
 ARA   XUAN ZANGS YOGAC THEORY OF BIJA

Xuan Zang denes b ija this way in the CWSL: They are those na (root-consciousness), generate their  which, found in the mulavijn a 16 ija is own fruits (108). One point of interest in the denition of a b na. This has to do with the layavijn a the stipulation that b ijas are in a na which will be crucial in the layavjn relationship between b ija and a a Yog ac ara eort to account for continuity without reication. We will leave this for later in the essay. What concerns us at this juncture is the point that b ija is a potentiality which immediately engenders an actual dharma. Being potential, a b ija is not actual, compared with the fruit to which it gives birth, a dharma, which is actual. Does this mean that a b ija does not have a real existence, but only a nominal one? Aware of such possible confusion, Xuan Zang immediately moves to clarify this by stating that the b ijas are real entities and that those which have only nominal existence are like non-existent entities and cannot be a causal condition, hetupratyaya (ibid.). Apparently, Xuan Zang categorizes entities into two kinds, real and nominal. Both actual and potential are regarded as real by Xuan Zang, but nominal is regarded as merely ctional, hence unreal. When we compare Xuan Zangs denition of b ija with William Waldrons interpretation of it which is based on the Abhidharma literature it may shed more light on the struggle Xuan Zang has in dening b ija as a potentiality. According to Waldron, b ijas are
not real existents (dravya) at all, but simply metaphors for the underlying capacities rthya), potentials and developments of mind in terms of the life (sakti or sama According to Yokoyamas observation: The view that all b ijas were planted by linguistic activities has always been the common understanding in the Yog ac ara  . . . Later in the CWSL the terminology was thought since Sam : dhinirmocana Sutra. simplied to habitual energy of naming (ming yan xi qi) or seeds of naming (ming yan zhong zi) and it became the general term for b ija. However, what is b ija? It is the na through linguistic activities, and conlayavijn a potential energy planted into a versely the driving force giving rise to our linguistic activities (142). What is striking is the prominence of linguistic activity in dening b ija, in that the linguistic activities plant some potential energy into the storehouse consciousness which in turn generates our linguistic activities. In other words, b ija is essentially linguistic. However, Xuan Zangs denition of b ija in the CWSL is broader than linguistic.
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vita), growth (vr processes of insemination (paribha : ddha) and eventual fructication ka-phala; ripened fruit). (1994, 220) (vipa

It is conceivable that Xuan Zang would dispute the wording of Waldrons interpretation of b ija as not real existents but simply metaphors. Indeed, the CWSL tells us that Sthiramati maintains the view that a b ija has only a nominal existence. This position is shared by the Sautr antikas, but it is rejected by Xuan Zang (108). Waldrons interpretation somewhat echoes Sthiramatis position on b ija. Apparently, Xuan Zang is struggling to give b ija a higher sense of reality than simply nominal or metaphorical. Hence, the distinction Xuan Zang makes is between potentiality and actuality, instead of reality and nominality as is the case with Sthiramati. Accordingly, there are entities that are actually real, like dharmas, and there are also those that are potentially real, like the b ijas. What kinds of potentials does the postulation of b ija register? B ija sana ) and Xuan is also called habit energy or perfuming energy (va sana , namely image (nimitta), name Zang lists three kinds of va ma), and discriminating inuence (vikalpava sana ) (138). The (na image (nimitta) refers to. the dual structure of our perceptual activsana ) to the dual strucities, and discriminating inuence (vikalpava ma refers to the linguistic ture of our conceptual activities. Na activities which involve naming and conceptualizing.17 Xuan Zang sums them up in explaining seeds as the potential proceeding from has and the potential producing the two gra has (580). The the two gra has refer to the grasping (gra haka) and the grasped (gra hya). two gra This means that all of our conscious activities, be they perceptual, conceptual or linguistic, share the same dual structure, the grasping and the grasped. Such a discriminatory function of our mental activities is that which produces b ijas, and the b ijas thus produced also perpetuate this discriminatory function, dragging us back into the transmigratory realm. Therefore we nd the CWSL declaring that
has. None of them are The wheel of life and death turns by karma and the two gra separate from consciousness, because they are, by nature, dharmas of cittas-caittas. (582)

17 ma: One are those which express meanings: The CWSL lists two kinds of na they can explain the dierences in meanings and sounds; the other are those which reveal their objects: they are the mind and its concomitant activities that perceive their objects (582).

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According to the CWSL, b ijas have six characteristics: they are momentary, constitute a continuous series, belong to a denite moral species, depend on a group of conditions, lead to their own fruits, and are simultaneous with their fruits (12628). The momentariness of seeds means that they necessarily vanish right when they are born (Xuan Zang, 126) which makes them the most active elements capable of generative activity engendering either succeeding seeds or actual dharmas. Their generative activities bring about two results. First is the succession of seeds constituting a continuous series, and second is the simultaneous support as the ground for actual dharmas. Moreover, a seed can only give rise to a fruit, either a succeeding seed or an actual dharma, whose nature is similar to that of the seed itself. Otherwise, if a seed can generate a succeeding seed or an actual dharma of a dierent kind, the world would be haphazardly ordered without any regularity. Therefore, for Xuan Zang, a deled seed can only give rise to a deled dharma and a pure seed to a pure dharma. Hence, seeds belong to a denite moral species: deled, pure or nondened. For potential to become actual, there has to be a collaboration of conditions. In addition, each b ija produces its own fruit  generates whose nature is similar to its own. That is, the b ija of rupa  , and the b rupa ija of citta generates citta (128). However, what attracts our attention is the characteristic of b ijas being simultaneous with their fruits.
When the b ija engenders the actual dharma, the cause is simultaneous with the fruit. When the b ija engenders a b ija which is similar to it, the cause is anterior to the fruit. But we attribute causal activity only to present things, not to future things (not yet va, born) and past things (already destroyed) which have no specic nature (svabha reality). Hence the name of b ija is reserved for that b ija which engenders the actual dharma, not for that which leads to the production of a b ija similar to itself. (Wei Tat, 127)

The stipulation that the cause has to be simultaneous with its eect apparently goes against our common sense which assumes that the  Tanaka acutely points out (275). cause precedes its eect, as Junsho
Furthermore, when coupled with such mutually contradictory concepts, the simultaneity of cause and eect is not limited to the generation of entities by seeds, nor is it explained merely psychologically with respect to the generation of seeds through the perfuming by entities, even though on a rst look it appears to be a psychological phenomenon. This suggests that there has to be a doctrinal explanation. (Tanaka, 275)

In other words, there has to be a doctrinal consideration in Xuan Zangs counterintuitive stipulation of the simultaneity between cause

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and eect. Indeed, in this regard, we nd Xuan Zang contending that if the cause precedes its eect, when the eect comes into existence its cause will have been gone. If this were the case, in what sense can we claim that the cause causes the eect since the cause and the causal activity belong to the past, and hence no longer exist? By the same token, if the eect succeeds its cause, when the cause is engaged in the causal activity its eect has not yet emerged. If this were the case, in what sense can we claim that the cause causes the eect since the eect belongs to the future, and hence does not yet exist? Such a position on causality is unique to Dharmap ala/Xuan Zangs Yog ac ara system which is not necessarily accepted by other Yog ac arins (Hukaura, vol.1: 35355). Here Xuan Zang clearly has the Sarv astiv ada position on causality in mind. The Sarv astiv adins advocate that things in the past, present and future all exist. By resorting to this doctrine, the Sarv astiv adins contend that the cause and the eect are simultaneous since an existent dharma can always produce an eect as its cause, hence rendering the problematic of continuity irrelevant. There are numerous problems which make it dicult to defend such a position, the most important of which is its abandonment of the orthodox Buddhist teaching of the non-substantiality of dharma. Consequently, this view on the existence of dharmas in all three stages of time is rejected by the Yog ac arins like Xuan Zang. However, Xuan Zang does embrace the Sarv astiv adins stance that the cause and the eect have to be simultaneous in order for causation to take place, although in his case, the simultaneity of cause and eect is possible only when the cause is a potential and the eect is an actual dharma. This means that, to Xuan Zang, causality can take place only in the situation wherein potentiality causes actuality, and the two have to be simultaneous. However, it is no longer causality as we normally understand it, since the conventional understanding of causality does not require the simultaneity of the cause and the eect but their succession, although this is not to say that any succession is necessarily causal. What, then, is the causality that Xuan Zang talks about here when he stipulates that cause and eect have to be simultaneous? If causality necessarily involves the succession of eect after cause, his insistence on the simultaneity of cause and eect actually transforms causality into grounding, with the dharma grounded in the b ija, the actual grounded in the potential. Simultaneity of the cause and the eect renders the former the ground for the latter. To quote Tanaka again,

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Since the generation of entities (dharma) by seeds (b ija) does not require time, it surely has to be viewed as indicating the root of possibilities. In other words, we should not interpret it as the cause that generates seed-carrying entities, but rather as the root [or ground] for the generation of entities. (269)

Since one is potential and the other actual, there is no conict between the two in order for both to exist at the same time and in the same place with the potential grounding the actual. After dealing with Xuan Zangs presentation of b ija, we are in a na is na. Let us see how a layavijn a layavijn a position to bring in a presented in the CWSL in the following.
  ANA ALAYAVIJN IN THE CWSL

na? According to the CWSL, this concept has three layavijn a What is a aspects: 1. It is that which stores up b ijas (Ch. neng cang). 2. It is that which is stored (Ch. suo cang). 3. It is that which is attached to (Ch. zhi cang). (104) na is that which stores up seeds which are layavijn a Put simply, a perfumed by the deled dharmas and it is the object of attachment tman. Here by manas resulting in the erroneous notion of a layavijn a na is granted a sweeping role in accomplishing the a objective of explaining everything from within the structure of consciousness without having to appeal to anything outside of that na makes the layavijn a structure. In other words, the formulation of a   Yogacara metaphysical idealist system, albeit in the qualied sense we talked about earlier, complete by rendering consciousness alone sucient to explain all of our experiences. Let us begin our inquiry na with its relationship layavijn a of Xuan Zangs presentation of a  with the bija.  na and B a ija Alayavijn layavijn a na is closely related to b As the bearer of seeds, a ija, but the exact nature of the relationship is dicult to determine. Here Xuan layavijn na is understood as that Zang encounters a thorny issue. If a a which stores up b ijas, we are faced with this question: even though b ijas are momentary, as we have discussed, does the postulation of na as their storehouse make it a permanent dwelling place layavijn a a itsu Yokoyama rightly observes: for b ijas? As Ko

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Now, if we only pay attention to the point that various dharmas as fruits are stored in layavijn a na becomes that which stores in itself the seeds this consciousness, this a na is the layavijna which are the fruits of various dharmas. To use a space metaphor, a layavijna na and b storing place where b ijas as goods are stored. However, a ija are not material things like the storage or stored goods, but rather something spiritual. Consequently, there arises the complex question in their relationship. (14849)

na is a permanent dwelling place for b layavijn a ijas, it would be If a against the Buddhist doctrine of impermanence and defeat the very na; that purpose is to account layavijn a purpose in the postulation of a for continuity without accepting any form of substantialization in line with the general Buddhist position against reication as da demonstrated in such core Buddhist concepts like prat ityasamutpa tman (no-self) (dependent origination), anitya (impermanence), ana  (emptiness). This is indeed a key conceptual diculty in  and sunyat a na. Xuan Zang is well aware layavijn a the Yog ac ara formulation of a na into some kind of permanent layavijn a of the trap in making a entity. In tackling this critical issue regarding the relationship na, we nd the CWSL claiming that layavijn a between b ija and a
The b ijas are neither identical with nor dierent from the root-consciousness na) and the fruits. This is because only such a relationship, between con (mulavijn a ` -vis b sciousness itself and its activities and between the cause vis-a ijas and the fruits ` -vis dharma, is reasonable. (108) vis-a

layavijn a na and between the The relationships between b ija and a ` -vis a b ` -vis an actual cause (hetu) vis-a ija and the fruit (phala) vis-a dharma are characterized as neither identical nor dierent. What is especially interesting to us here is the claim Xuan Zang makes that na. Moreover, the b layavijn a ijas depend on b ija is the activity of a  the eighth consciousness itself (svasam : vittibhaga), but they are only ga) because the perceiving aspect the perceived aspect (nimittabha ga) always takes them as its objects (ibid.). (darsanabha ga of the eighth consciousness, namely, the self-witSvasam : vittibha na that is perfumable, layavijn ness or self-corroboratory aspect of a a refers to its susceptibility to the inuence by other aspects (Wei Tat, 109). This means that b ijas depend on the self-corroboratory division na. Furthermore, b ga, the object layavijn a ijas are the nimittabha of a aspect, of the eighth consciousness since they are always taken by its perception aspect as its object. We have seen in our earlier discussion ga and that the perceiving and the perceived aspects (nimittabha na arise out of its self-corroboratory ga) of a layavijn a darsanabha division. When this is juxtaposed with Xuan Zangs claim that b ija is na, the natural conclusion is that layavijn a the activity of a

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na is more than the collection of b layavijn a ijas and that b ija is a only one of its aspects, namely the perceived aspect. The other na are its perceiving aspect and its selflayavijn a aspects of a na is formulated as a layavijn a corroboratory aspect. This is how a form of consciousness itself, instead of simply a collection of seeds.18 layavijn a na is neither However, when Xuan Zang argues that a  identical with nor dierent from the bijas, as we have seen above, he is clearly in a dilemma which he is keenly aware of. The two are obviously not the same since the latter is only one aspect of the former. However, Xuan Zang cannot make them dierent either, na against layavijn since that would lead to the subtantialization of a a the orthodox Buddhist view that substance is itself the continuum of activities and that there is no substance separate from such a continuum. In order to nd his way out of the dilemma, Xuan Zang layavijn a na neither permanent nor impermanent (170). The makes a rationale is provided as a commentary to the fourth stanza in  It is in perpetual transformation like a Vasubandhus Trim : sika violent torrent.
Perpetual means that this consciousness has continuously evolved without interruption as a homogeneous series since before the beginning of time, because it is the tu), directions of reincarnation (gatis) basis that establishes realms of existence (dha and forms of birth (yoni), and because it does not lose b ijas it holds due to its rm nature. Transformation means that this consciousness arises and perishes instantaneously and mutates from one moment to the next. Due to the constant extinction of cause and generation of fruit, it is never a single entity. Hence it can be perfumed by other consciousnesses to produce b ijas. Perpetual states that it is uninterrupted; transformation suggests that it is impermanent. (170) As Schmithausen observes, this seems to be case in the Basic Section of the ca rabhumi layavijn a na and seeds in the In concerning the relation between a Yoga itial Passage identied by him: It admits of being understood not only in the sense na possesses or contains the Seeds, implying that it is, itself, something layavijn a that a layavijn a na merely comprises them, being hardly more, but also in the sense that a anything else but their sum or totality. In otherwords: There does not seem to exist, in the Initial Passage, any reliable clue for assuming that it did anything else but hypostatize the Seeds of mind lying hidden in corporeal matter to a new form of mind proper, this new form of mind hardly, or, at best, but dimly, acquiring as yet an na (30). Xuan essence of its own, not to speak of the character of a veritable vijn a na and layavijn a Zang seems to be trying to strike a balance between substantializing a making it simply the collection of b ijas. He appears to be cautious in making it an entity of some sort, aware of the risk involved.
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Xuan Zang is trying to achieve two objectives here. One is to make na causally connected with other consciousnesses, hence it layavijn a a is said to be perfumable. The other is to make it a continuous series of activities, but not a substance of some sort. The rst objective is na would be rendered layavijn a necessary because otherwise a unaected by activities of the other consciousnesses, resembling the tman. The second objective is needed because otherwise our a experience of the world would become chaotic if the foundation of na, is discontinuous and haphazard. The layavijn our cognition, a a na. layavijn a rst point addresses the self-corroboratory aspect of a Since it is causally connected with the other two aspects the perna as well as the other layavijn a ceiving and the perceived aspects of a na layavijn a seven consciousnesses, the self-corroboratory aspect of a would not be regarded as some sort of witnessing consciousness standing apart from and unaected by the cognitive process, like the ks Hindu Advaita Ved anta notion of sa : in, which is the empirical tman. The second point, on the other hand, makes manifestation of a layavijn a na abide by the rule of dependent origithe activities of a nation:
Since before the beginning of time this consciousness has been of the nature that the generation of fruit and the extinction of cause take place instantaneously. It is not impermanent due to the generation of fruit; it is not permanent due to the extinction of cause. To be neither impermanent nor permanent this is the principle of dependent da). Hence it is said that this consciousness is in perorigination (prat ityasamutpa petual transformation like a torrent. (Xuan Zang, 172)

It is not permanent, in the sense that it is itself an activity, not a substance; it is not impermanent, in the sense that the activity is a continuous and uninterrupted process. Xuan Zang here appeals to the central Buddhist doctrine of dependent origination to account for the law regulating the activities of consciousness. In this way, Xuan layavijn a na is not some permanent dwelling place Zang proves that a for b ijas or permanent ground for the dharmas but rather is itself a continuum of activities. As Katsumata (225) points out, in the above interpretation Xuan Zang follows Dharmap alas insertion of the word perpetual into . The original Sanskrit word in Vasubandhus Vasubandhus Trim : sika  which means as a text that can imply such a meaning is srotasa stream or torrent (ibid.). Since perpetual becomes so important in Dharmap ala/Xuan Zangs commentary, we can clearly see their departure from Vasubandhu wherein their creativity lies:

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In Dharmap alas exposition, the principle of dependent origination is articulated as layavijn a na that is neither impermanent nor permanent and the successive series of a is without interruption. Therefore, here, after the theories of causality held by Sarv astiv adins, Sammat yas, Sthavirav adins, Sautr antikas and others are tossed out, we can conclude that the correct doctrine of dependent origination in Mah ay ana Buddhism which stipulates the succession between cause and eect is rendered credible. (Katsumata, 227)

layavijn a na to reinterpret dependent This is how Xuan Zang uses a origination without having to postulate any entity that continues da from one moment to the next. As a result, prat ityasamutpa na. layavijn a becomes the law that governs the activities of a  na and the seven consciousnesses a Alayavijn Since Xuan Zang has established the primacy of consciousness over the objective world, as long as he can demonstrate, rst, that the continuum of the conscious activity is the result of its following the causal law and, second, that our experience of externality is the result of the self-externalizing activity of consciousness, he would succeed in explaining continuity within the connement of the Mah ay ana Buddhist orthodoxy of non-substantiality of reality. What is at stake in achieving the rst goal is to sort out the relationship amongst the various forms of consciousness, namely the eight consciousnesses. That is, Xuan Zang has to explain that the manifestation of consciousness itself follows the causal law. In order to reach the second goal, he has to explain how the self-externalization of consciousness takes place. Let us begin our inquiry with an examination of the rst question, namely how the CWSL makes the case that the causal law governs the various dynamics of consciousness. (A) Causal relationship among consciousnesses. First, Xuan Zang argues what causality means in his system:
This right principle is profound and mysterious beyond words. Such words as cause (hetu) and fruit (phala) are mere metaphorical postulates. When the phenomenon that the present dharma produces its succeeding dharma is observed, the succeeding fruit is postulated so as to explain the present cause. When the phenomenon is observed that the generation of the present dharma is due to a preceding dharma, the past cause is postulated to account for the present fruit. Metaphorical postulates means that it is the present consciousness itself that appears as a future eect or a past cause. Thus the rationale of the causal principle is clear. It is far from the two extreme views of permanence and impermanence and is in accordance with the Middle Path. (174)

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What is interesting to us in this passage is that Xuan Zang regards the principle of causality as mysterious and cause and eect as merely metaphorical postulates. He is obviously well aware of the conventional understanding of causality as the succession between cause and eect. However he claims that the cause and the eect can only be understood metaphorically since they are not simultaneous, as we have discussed previously. The true nature of causality is, according to Xuan Zang, that the present consciousness itself appears as the semblance of a future and a past, of cause and fruit.19 In other words, there is only the activity of consciousness at each present moment, and past/future and cause/eect are nothing but the self-dierentiating activities of consciousness at each present moment. The natural question, then, seems to be: what is this self-dierentiating activity of consciousness? This relates to the dierent manifestations of consciousness in the Yog ac ara system. In this connection, we nd Xuan Zang saying:
Although consciousness can be transformed into innite forms, what is capable of such transformations is of three kinds only. The rst is the ripening consciousness ka; Ch: yishu), namely the eighth consciousness, since it holds b (Sk: vipa ijas which are of the nature of ripening in varied ways. The second is the deliberative consciousness, namely the seventh consciousness, since it is always engaged in deliberation and speculation. The third is the consciousness that discriminates spheres of objects, namely the rst six consciousnesses, since the spheres of objects are crude. The word and in the stanza indicates that the six consciousnesses form one group. The above three kinds are all called consciousness that is capable of transformation. (96)

Put simply, the manifestation of consciousness at each moment is simultaneously a threefold process: retribution process, self-cogitation process and cognitive process of objects other than the self. The three processes are intermingled with each other20 at each moment:
ga of a pravr na) is born of b The consciousness that perfumes (darsanabha ijas: : ttivijn a at the moment of its birth, it is a cause capable of increasing and creating b ijas. Hence three dharmas must be considered: the b ijas that engender the consciousness, the engendered consciousness that perfumes and creates b ijas, and the b ijas created or caused to grow by the perfuming inuence of the engendered consciousness. These This is somewhat reminiscent of the Kantian argument that causality is a form of human subjectivity since it is the way human consciousness organizes the world. 20 In another somewhat cryptic passage, Xuan Zang writes, The eight consciousnesses cannot be said to be denitely one in their nature . . . . Nor are they denitely dierent. . . . Thus, they are like illusory beings that have no denite nature. What was previously said with regard to the distinct characteristics of consciousnesses is the result of convention, not the ultimate truth. In the ultimate truth, there is neither the mind nor world (498).
19

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three revolve in a cycle reciprocally and simultaneously functioning as cause and eect, just as a candle-wick engenders the ame and the ame engenders the incandescence of the wick. (Wei Tat, 133)

na refers to the seven consciousnesses, namely, the ve Pravr : ttivijn a na and manas. They are born of b ijas, but they also senses, manovijn a perfume b ijas, resulting in either creating new b ijas or causing the existing ones to grow. These three processes, namely the birth of the seven consciousnesses by b ijas, the birth of new b ijas as the result of perfuming by the seven consciousnesses and the growth of existing b ijas as the result of perfuming by the seven consciousnesses, move in a cycle, reciprocally and simultaneously functioning as cause and eect.21 This is what the CWSL means when it states that the ma) of consciousness is of two kinds: the rst transformation (parin :a ma) , and the second is its is its transformation as cause (hetuparin :a  transformation as eect (phalaparin a ma ) (96). : However, if the three processes are going on simultaneously at each present moment, how can they account for the past and the future as Xuan Zang claims? A closer look at the threefold process will reveal to us that even though the three are in a simultaneous process, past and future are contained in each present moment. More specically, the perfuming of b ijas by the seven consciousnesses and the engendering of seven consciousnesses by b ijas are processes wherein the cause and the eect are simultaneous, whereas the engendering of new b ijas by their predecessors is a process wherein the cause and the eect are successive; as Xuan Zang explicitly points out, in the b ijas generation of similar b ijas, the cause and the eect are not simultaneous; in the mutual generation of b ijas and dharmas, the cause and the eect are simultaneous (254). Therefore, both the past and the future are contained within the present; recall Xuan
21 na is the perfumable and the seven conlayavijn a According to the CWSL, a sciousnesses are the perfumers. Xuan Zang stipulates that the perfumable has to be durable, meaning that it has to be an uninterrupted series; it has to be non-dened, hence able to be perfumed; it has to be perfumable; and it has to be in intimate and na has all kavijn a harmonious relation with the perfumer. Consequently, Only vipa kavijn na is perfumable, not its ve caittas (130). On the four characteristics. Vipa a other hand, the perfumer has to have the following characteristics: not eternal, capable of activity and able to create and nourish b ijas; endowed with eminent activity which rules out the eighth consciousness; capable of increase and decrease, which rules out the fruits of Buddha, in intimate and harmonious relation with the perfumed, which rules out physical bodies of other persons as well as preceding and nas, with their consubsequent moments (1302): Only the seven pravr : ttivijna comitant mental activities, are conspicuous and can increase and decrease. They have these four characteristics and are thus capable of perfuming (132).

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Zangs claim, it is the present consciousness itself that appears as a future eect or a past cause (174). Obviously, Xuan Zangs Yog ac ara theory incorporates both the Sarv astiv ada position on the  simultaneity of cause and eect and the Sautrantika view on the succession of b ijas. However, for Xuan Zang to explain the order in our experience by analyzing the relationship amongst consciousnesses without appealing to the existence of that which is experienced, he has to answer this question: is consciousness alone sucient in explaining our experience? In order to deal with this, the CWSL further elaborates the relationship amongst the eight consciousnesses into four conditioning categories: hetupratyaya (condition qua cause), samanantarapratyaya lambanapratyaya (condition qua per(condition qua antecedent), a ceived object), adhipatipratyaya (condition qua contributory factor). Let us briey examine them one by one. First is hetupratyaya, condition qua cause, dened by Xuan Zang as the condition under which the conditioned dharmas (sam : kr : tas) themselves produce their own eects (534). This refers to two kinds of causal conditions, namely the b ijas and the dharmas (ibid.):
The b ijas with respect to the two following cases are hetupratyaya: they can generate succeeding b ijas of the same kind and can produce dharmas of the same nature simultaneous with them. Dharmas refer to the seven transforming consciousnesses na) and their contents (ibid.) (pravr : ttivijn a

This hetupratyaya is basically a reformulation of our earlier discussion of the Yog ac ara causality theory. As we pointed out earlier, such a causal theory is unique to Dharmap ala/Xuan Zangs Yog ac ara system since it stipulates that cause and eect are simultaneous, except in the case of b ijas engendering b ijas wherein there is a succession between cause and eect. Since b ijas are only potential, not ` -vis cause actual, even though there is a succession between b ijas vis-a ` -vis eect, it is a succession of potentials, an undetected and b ijas vis-a succession. Nevertheless this still means that true succession can only be succession of b ijas, albeit an undetected occurrence. Dharmic moments, namely the seven consciousnesses as a group since there is no succession amongst them are mediated by their own b ijas: the successive transformations of similar dharmas are not hetupratyaya one for the other, because they are born from their own b ijas respectively (53436). For Xuan Zang, the conventional understanding of causation is a mediated kind of causation, mediated by b ijas. In other words, causation in Xuan Zangs theory looks like this:

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dharma perfumes b ija, b ija creates a succeeding b ija of a similar kind, new b ija engenders new dharma whose nature is similar to the dharma of the preceding moment. Our conventional understanding of causation does not heed the mediating role played by b ijas. Therefore, there is only succession, not direct causation, between dharmas mediated by b ijas. Hukaura Seibun (Vol. 1, 354) compares the generation of dharmas by b ijas to the generation of shadows by objects. Just like the causal relationship between objects and their shadows as well as their simultaneous existence, b ijas and dharmas coexist simultaneously despite the causal relationship between the two. The dharma of the preceding moment is, according to the CWSL, samanantarapratyaya, condition qua antecedent, of dharma of the succeeding moment. This is the second condition Xuan Zang lists, meaning that the eight consciousnesses and their concomitant mental activities form a group in the preceding moment and pass into the succeeding group of similar kinds without any mediation (536). Apparently the eight consciousnesses are not samanantarapratyaya between themselves, because several species of consciousness coexist (Wei Tat, 537). In other words, this condition concerns the succession between dharmas, not those that are simultaneous with one another, as in the case of hetupratyaya, condition qua cause. This means that the eight consciousnesses as a group at the present moment are the samanantarapratyaya of the eight consciousnesses of the succeeding moment. This is apparently the conventional understanding of causation, in that there is a successive relationship between the cause and the eect. Interestingly, however, impure dharmas can be samanantarapratyaya of pure dharmas (538); since the impure cannot be the cause of the pure, Xuan Zang needs something else to explain the succession of the pure after the impure, namely the pure dharma from tu. This line of thought is a clear indication that the the dharmadha theorization denitely has the possibility of enlightenment in mind. He has to maintain the view that the pure can succeed the impure, otherwise there would be no possibility for enlightenment, since we are all currently in the impure state. However, Xuan Zang also wants to maintain the homogeneity between successive dharmic moments, otherwise it would lead to disorder and chaos in our experience, hence the unintelligibility of the world as we experience it, regardless of whether it exists independently of consciousness or not. Consequently, he makes a distinction between succession and causality. Since there is only a relationship of succession between two dharmic

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moments, even when they are heterogeneous, the law of causality which guarantees the order of our cognition hence of the world as we experience it is not violated, as long as there is a causal relationship between successive b ijas whose relationship with their respective dharma is also causal. lambanapratyaya, condition qua perceived The third condition is a object, referring to the dharmas upon which the mind and its concomitant activities, which perceive those dharmas as such, depend (542). This condition apparently accounts for the objective grounding of our cognition and it holds the key to the success or failure of Xuan Zangs eort to explain the adequacy of cognition by appealing to the transformation of consciousness alone. He distinguishes two kinds of lambanapratyaya, close (Ch. qin) and remote (Ch. shu): a
If a dharma is not separated from the appropriating consciousness and it is cogitated ga and taken as its inner support, we can tell that it is the close by darsanabha lambanapratyaya. If a dharma, though separated from the appropriating cona ga cogitates sciousness, is the material capable of generating that which darsanabha lambanapratyaya. and takes as its inner support, we can tell that it is the remote a (54244)

lambanapratyaya is that which In Hukauras words, the close a mental dharmas depend on directly (Vol. 1, 375), and the remote lambanapratyaya, as the material that mental dharmas depend on a ga that darsanabha ga relies indirectly, is manifested as the nimittabha lambanapratyaya is an on (ibid., 376). In other words, the remote a lambanapratyaya within entity that is capable of producing the close a ga, the perceiving aspect, that consciousness upon which darsanabha ga, the perceived aspect. The remote nds its support as its nimittabha lambanapratyaya here refers to a dimension in our perceptual a experience of an object which is not personal. Xuan Zang, in dierlambanapratyaya, recognizes that there are entiating two kinds of a two dimensions of the perceived. The close one is the personal dimension of the perceived whereas the remote one is the non-personal dimension. The remote generates the close. Xuan Zang realizes that a viable idealist theory of cognition has to be able to account for the collectivity of our experience. However, since he is a metaphysical idealist, albeit in the qualied sense which we talked about earlier, his eort to explain the collectivity of our experience has to seek that collective dimension within the parameters of consciousness and dierentiate it from the personal dimension. There is no meaningful external world within his system to which he can appeal in explaining the collective dimension of our experience.

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This is the primary reason for the postulation of the remote lambanapratyaya which can account for the collectivity of our a experience without going outside the realm of consciousness. Within the domain of consciousness, what belongs to the collective dimension and what to the private dimension? In this connection, we nd that
One can experience the body and land belonging to another person, because the content of the others eighth consciousness resulting from its transformation is the basis of the contents of ones own consciousness. On the other hand, ones own b ijas or indriyas22 are not experienced by others, since the evolving eighth consciousness of the other are not the same as ones own evolving eighth consciousness. This is because not all sentient beings b ijas are of the same number. Therefore it should be lambanapratyaya exists in said that we cannot ascertain whether or not the remote a the eighth consciousness in all cases of existents. (544)

Xuan Zang is making an unequivocal distinction between the personal dimension and the collective dimension of our experience. The rst point made in the above passage is that dierent people share common experiences of bodies and lands (which is the realm of existence in which they are born, namely the world) as the result of the common basis in the transformations of their eighth consciousnesses. The second point is that peoples sense organs are private. If this is juxlambanapratyaya, it betaposed with the idea of remote and close a comes clear that in the two aspects of our cognitive structure, namely the perceiving and the perceived aspects, the perceiving aspect is the sense organ and it is private, but the perceived aspect has both lambanapratyaya and a ` -vis the close a a personal dimension vis-a lambanapratyaya. ` -vis the remote a collective dimension vis-a However, there appears to be a conict in Xuan Zangs discussion of lambanapratyaya. the relationship between the remote and the close a In one passage (Xuan Zang, 544), Xuan Zang argues that consciouslambanapratyaya but it necessarily ness may or may not have a remote a lambanapratyaya, whereas in another passage (ibid.) he has a close a lambanapratyaya is the cause of the close contends that the remote a lambanapratyaya, which means that consciousness cannot have the a close one without the remote one. Xuan Zang appears to be struggling between an intentional analysis of consciousness and a causal explanation. Intentional analysis, as Edmund Husserl the father of phenomenology in the twentieth century denes it, is to see consciousness as essentially that which is of an object; on the other hand
22 I am taking Wei Tats interpretation of ones own b ijas as ones indriyas (545).

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causal explanation takes consciousness as that which is by an object which means that it is causally connected with things-events in the natural world. When Xuan Zang argues that consciousness may or lambanapratyaya, he is clearly aware of the may not have a remote a intentional structure of consciousness within which the remote lambanapratyaya, or real object in Husserls terminology, is not a a necessary component. However, when he contends that the lambanapratyaya is that which produces the close remote a lambanapratyaya he appears to resort to the causal analysis in a explaining the relationship between the remote and the close lambanapratyaya. The causal analysis contradicts the intentional a analysis in this particular case since in the former passage the remote object is a necessary condition for the close object whereas in the latter passage the remote object is not a necessary condition for the close object. Nevertheless Xuan Zang clearly privileges the intentional analysis over the causal explanation by virtue of the fact that he devotes much of his CWSL to the former while paying little attention to the latter. Such a position can be justied in that the causal explanation presupposes the intentional analysis since only the intentional analysis can locate the cause in the causal explanation. Put dierently, in order to locate the remote object as the cause of the correlating close object, there is no way other than an investigation into that very close object through the intentional analysis whereas the causal explanation, without the intentional analysis, falls into an innite regress. But we are still left with this question: what is the relationship between the remote object and the close object? We will pick this up when we deal with the self-externalization of consciousness later in the essay. The last condition that Xuan Zang talks about is adhipatipratyaya, condition qua contributory factor, dened as a real dharma (conditioned or unconditioned, as opposed to imaginary dharmas), possessing potent energy and capable of promoting (rst nine hetus) or counteracting (tenth hetu) the evolution of another dharma (Wei Tat, 547).23 Needless to say, the real dharmas here refer to the eight consciousnesses, and this means that the eight consciousnesses are adhipatipratyaya to one another (Xuan Zang, 570). This conditioning
23 The ten hetus refer to the following: 1. things, names and ideas which are the bases upon which the speech depends; 2. sensation; 3. the perfuming energy that can attract its own fruit indirectly; 4. direct cause, namely matured b ijas; 5. complementary cause; 6. adductive cause; 7. special cause: each dharma generating its own fruit; 8. a combination of conditions; 9. obstacles to the generation of fruits, 10. non-impeding conditions (Xuan Zang, 55256).

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factor addresses the subjective hence the private aspect of conditioning, which involves the support of sense organs as the perceiving aspect in the structure of our cognition. This is the simultaneous support of consciousness. Specically, the ve senses have four supports: ve sense organs as the object support, manona as the discriminating support, manas as the pure-impure vijn a layavijn a na as the root support (Xuan Zang, 26668). support and a  Manovijn ana, which normally functions with the ve senses in their discriminatory cognitive function of the external world, may be functioning alone while the activities of the ve senses have stopped, na. Manas layavijn a e.g., in a dream. It has as its support manas and a na as its   layavijn a na while also taking a layavijn has as its support a a  na has manas as its support. object (Xuan Zang, 280). Alayavijn a More interestingly, Xuan Zang claims that all three previous conditions are adhipatipratyaya (546). This means that all the causes and conditions are essentially activities of the eight consciousnesses. He needs this postulate to complete his idealist system, by bringing all the conditions back to dierent manifestations of consciousness itself. This is what Xuan Zang means when he states that it is the present consciousness that is manifested as the semblance of cause and eect, past and future. To sum up,
In the transformations of the eight consciousnesses as a group, there must be adhipatipratyaya amongst themselves, but not hetupratyaya or samanantarapratyaya. lambanapratyaya. (Xuan Zang, 570) There may or may not be a

Hetupratyaya has to do with the relationship between the eight consciousnesses and b ijas, an intra-moment relationship, whereas samanantarapratyaya deals with the relationship between the eight consciousnesses as a group at one moment and the succeeding moment,  an intra-moment relationship. Alambanapratyaya and adhipatipratyaya, in explaining our sense of externality, address the internal relationship amongst the eight consciousnesses at each moment, an intra-moment relationship; the former is the perceived/objective aspect and the latter the perceiving/subjective aspect as well as the perceived/ objective aspect, as expressed in the following remark: the same niga is both a lambanapratyaya and adhipatipratyaya of the mittabha ga whereas the darsanabha ga is only adhipatipratyaya of the darsanabha ga (Xuan Zang, 572). nimittabha Through this detailed analysis of the relationship amongst the consciousnesses, Xuan Zang has rmly established the realm of

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consciousness as both necessary and sucient in explaining our experiences, personal as well as collective. The formulation of na as the ground of our experience not only incorporates layavijn a a the three kinds of continuity previously listed but also expands that scheme. As we have seen, Xuan Zang has actually accepted the Sarv astiv adins position on the simultaneity of cause and eect, except that the Sarv astiv adins fall into the trap of substantialism in its extreme form by maintaining that dharmas in the past, present and future all exist simultaneously. Xuan Zang, on the other hand, interprets the simultaneity between cause and eect as the cause na, is itself layavijn a grounding the eect, although the ground, a always in the process of transformation, too. Moreover, since b ijas are potential, not actual, their causal succession takes place undetected. Due to the homogeneity between the successive b ijas, their succession can be misidentied as some entity persisting through the change. Mediated by b ijas, there is a congruity between successive dharmic moments, but not direct causality, as we have seen earlier. This is shared by the Sautr antikas. These three scenarios of continuity encapsulate the rst two kinds of conditioning discussed in the CWSL, namely hetupratyaya, condition qua cause, and samanantara-pratyaya, condition qua antelambanapratyaya, condition cedent. The latter two kinds, namely a qua object, and adhipatipratyaya, condition qua agent, examine the causal conditioning from both the objective and the subjective sides; they enable Xuan Zang to explain our experience of externality and subject/object duality without appealing to the actual existence of any external objects independent of consciousness. (B) The self-externalization of consciousness. Now that Xuan Zang has established that the relationship between dierent kinds of consciousness is governed by the causal law, the next step is to explain ` -vis the mental activities can give rise to how an internal process vis-a the sense of externality, so as to complete his case that the actual existence of an external world is irrelevant.24 Two issues are at stake
As Xuan Zang explains, there are two theories regarding the manifestation of consciousness: (1) that of Dharmap ala and Sthiramati, which maintains that consciousness manifests itself in two functional divisions, the perceiving and the perceived, out of the self-witness division; and (2) that of Nanda and Bandhusri, which contends that inner consciousness manifests itself in what seems to be an external sphere of objects (Wei Tat, 11). It is clear that Xuan Zang incorporates both views into his scheme in the CWSL. It is even conceivable that Xuan Zangs account of the collectivity of our experience might have been inuenced by the latter view but since all of their works are now lost there is no way to verify such a hypothesis.
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in this eort. First, he needs to make the case that externality is the result of the self-externalizing activities of consciousness. Second, he has to explain how an essentially private self-externalizating activity of an individual can account for the collectivity of our experience of the external world.25 On the rst issue, we nd the following remark in the CWSL:
At the moment the perceived is apprehended, it is not grasped as external; only later na, in its discriminatory function, creates the illusion of the external. manovijna Therefore, the domain of the perceived is the result of the transformation of ga of consciousness itself. In this sense, the perceived exists. However, nimittabha na as externally real objects, it does not exist. when it is grasped by manovijna Moreover, in the domain of objects, the objects are not objects even though they appear so; they are not external even though they appear so. They are like dream objects which should not be grasped as real and external objects. (520)

According to Xuan Zang, the sense of externality does not arise at the moment when immediate perception takes place. In other words, at the moment of immediate perception, there is no dierentiation between the internal and the external. There is perception only. The sense of externality only arises as a result of the discriminatory na, the sixth consciousness, which transforms a function of manovijn a na, namely nimittabha ga. percept into the image aspect of manovijn a
There can be two approaches to the question of how consciousness alone can account for the collective dimension of our experience. We can either regard na as a universal consciousness and the individual consciousness as the layavijn a a layavijna na as essentially individualistic but result of its individuation, or regard a having a universal dimension. Larrabee (4) summarizes the two possibilities well: laya is one, but materializes at many points as individual consciousness First, the a which are empirically but erroneously viewed as individual ego-centered persons. laya is many, that is, each individual person has an a laya as one of the Second, the a eight consciousnesses which make up that individual. As we can see, the latter interpretation emphasizes the psychological descriptive aspect of the Yog ac ara doctrine, while the former highlights the metaphysical or ontological aspect. layavijn a na is Larrabee rightly points out that Xuan Zang takes the view that a individualistic, which militates against any monistic tendencies of the doctrine of consciousness-only, which at times seems to posit some single ultimate reality (ibid., layavijn a na as the 6). Larrabee chooses the other alternative which interprets a ground for the individual ego-centers and, consequently, as a common ground for the consistency of world-experience undergone by the majority of individual human subjects, specically the continuous yet (for Buddhists) illusory belief engendered by the manas-consciousness that a substantial world with substantially enduring egosubjects exists. (ibid.) na betrays a clear Advaitin inuence on layavijn a Such a monistic interpretation of a layavijna na is the part of Larrabee. Xuan Zangs individualistic interpretation of a more in accord with the general Buddhist tenet. The universalistic interpretation is premised on an understanding of the mind which is too much to assume in a philosophical deliberation. Hence, I will only deal with Xuan Zangs interpretation and its rationale.
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Xuan Zang uses a dream as an example to illustrate his point that consciousness itself is capable of creating the sense of externality. In a dream state, even though the ve senses have stopped their functions, na still create the sense of the continued activities of manovijn a na that externality (266). This is a clear indication that it is manovijn a creates the sense of externality, and that the sense of externality does not have to be premised upon the actual existence of external objects independent of consciousness. na externalizes which makes us However, what is it that manovijn a experience the externality of the world? This has to do with the objectication of consciousness. We have seen earlier in this essay that two conditions are responsible for the objective dimension in our cognitive structure, according to Xuan Zangs Yog ac ara lambanapratyaya, condition qua object, and scheme, namely the a adhipatipratyaya, condition qua agent. According to Xuan Zang, the lambana of manovijn a na includes a layavijn na, manas and the ve a a na are also themselves senses (570), and these objects of manovijn a consciousnesses, namely adhipatipratyaya. What is relevant to our na. In this regard, we nd Xuan Zang layavijn a purpose here is a na itself is born through the power of layavijn a stating that [w]hen a causes and conditions, it is manifested internally as b ijas and a body with sense-organs and externally as the world (136). Here Xuan na manifests itself into two realms, layavijn a Zang points out that a internal and external. The internal refers to the b ijas and the body with sense organs, and the external to the world. When this is na that dierentiates the juxtaposed with the claim that it is manovijn a external from the internal, it is clear to us that the dual manifestation layavijn a na is the result of externalizing activities of manovijn a na. of a What is even more interesting, however, is that, according to the na which layavijn a CWSL, there are common or universal b ijas in a na) provide the objective basis for externality. The word place (stha in the stanza refers to the fact that the ripening consciousness na) manifests as objects in the external world through the kavijn a (vipa ripening of its universal b ijas (144). This means that there are two kinds of seeds, private and universal. Private seeds give rise to ones own body with its sense faculties, namely the seven consciousnesses, whereas universal seeds generate non-private dharmas, that which appear to be the external major elements and derived matter. As  Tanaka rightly points out, the universal b Junsho ija

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is postulated as the foundation for the possibility of collective experience. Collective experience means that which is manifested as an existing entity in the consciousnesses of the majority [of sentient beings] and is therefore commonly experienced, (Tanaka, 277)

He further dierentiates four subcategories of entities in terms of their private and universal seeds. They are the common in the common, the non-common in the common, the non-common in the non-common, and the common in the non-common (278). Accordingly, the common in the common refers to entities like mountains and rivers, the non-common in the common private properties like houses and land, the non-common in the non-common ones own body, and the common in the non-common other peoples bodies (ibid.). Moreover,
Even though the consciousnesses of sentient beings are manifested dierently, what are manifested are similar, with no dierence in terms of locality. This is just like many lamps are lit together such that the lights appear to become one single light. (Xuan Zang, 144)

In this passage, Xuan Zang seems to backpedal from the earlier position that there are private as well as universal b ijas by saying that the common world is the result of the manifestation of private consciousnesses. The idea of the universal b ijas does not even appear to be necessary. The message Xuan Zang is trying to convey here, if we look at the two passages together, is that the commonness of the world as we experience it is not a real one but an apparent one. Such a common world is constituted by the manifestation of essentially individual and private conscious processes, whose apparent commonness is attributed to the working of the universal b ijas. In other words, the universal b ijas do not account for a real common world, but only an apparent one. This is tantamount to claiming that the universal b ijas themselves do not share the same degree of reality as the private b ijas in Xuan Zangs Yog ac ara system. lambanapratyaya discussed If we bring in the close and the remote a earlier, it becomes obvious that the remote object of consciousness refers to the dharmas generated by the universal b ija and the close object by the private b ija. Since the remote/universal object is only apparent, not real, its universality is then premised upon its seeming na. In externality resulting from the externalizing activity of manovijn a other words, the universality of b ija is directly linked to the na. This means that the universal externalizing activity of manovijn a

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na in that b ija correlates with the externalizing activities of manovijn a na. there is a universal structure in what is externalized by manovijn a The sense of the remoteness of an object is the result of such an na. Or to be more exact, the sense of the externalization of manovijn a remote object is constituted by the externalizing activity of manona which has a universal structure. As to whether such a remote vijn a object actually exists or not, it is not a question that can be explained within Xuan Zangs qualied idealist system. Neither is he interested in such a question. This explains Xuan Zangs claim that while the close object is a necessary condition for consciousness the remote object is not. Therefore, the issue concerning the relationship between the remote and the close objects is resolved by attributing the origin na while shelving the of their senses to the operation of manovijn a metaphysical question of whether a remote object actually exists or not. Consequently, for Xuan Zang, there are three dierent senses of the world: (1) the apparent common receptacle world which is the result of the operations of all eight consciousnesses of an individual that belong to the community of individuals in the everyday waking state; (2) the private world which results from the operations of na of an individual in dreams; and na, manas, and a layavijn a manovijn a (3) the world of the enlightened. He uses the second to explain the rst while leaving the third out of the explanatory scheme regarding the externality and commonness of the objects of our everyday experience. What distinguishes the rst from the second is the cooperation of the ve senses. At this juncture, let us focus our attention on the rst sense of the world since this is where the issue concerning the experience of a common world is at stake. Xuan Zang enumerates three kinds of non-private dharmas, namely, the receptacle world, another persons mind, and another persons body. The receptacle world is what appears to be a common world, the sense of which is constituted by a community of individual consciousness. As for another persons mind, Xuan Zang treats it no dierently from any external physical object, as is evident in the following remark,
Ones consciousness can comprehend another mind as a seemingly external object like a mirror where what looks like to be an external object appears. However, such a comprehension is not direct. What can be comprehended directly is the transformation of the mind itself, not another mind. (522)

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In other words, another persons mind is the unfolding of ones own mental activities; it can be understood within the discriminatory cognitive structure of the grasper and the grasped in ones own conscious process. With regard to another persons body, Xuan Zang contends that on the one hand sense faculties and their supporting physical body are the result of maturing of private b ijas (148); on the other hand,
kavijn na Because of the power of the ripening of the universal b ijas, this vipa a transforms itself in such a way that it resembles other persons sense organs in the locus of their bodies. Otherwise, one would not be able to enjoy the sense organs of other persons. (ibid.)

Put simply, even though ones sense faculties or body are developed out of ones own particular series of seeds, the operations of the ve sense faculties give rise to the sense of collectivity of the human body. To sum up, in Xuan Zangs Yog ac ara system, the private and the . collective, the individual and the universal, are identical entities, with na dierent senses attributed to them by the operation of manovijn a and the cooperation of the ve sense faculties. Thereby, Xuan Zang has made his case that the apparent commonness or collectivity of the world is the result of the externalization of a community of individuals each of which is constituted by eight consciousnesses.  na and the self a Alayavijn Finally, we are faced with the question we set out to answer: has Xuan Zang achieved his objective in explaining continuity within the na? In layavijn a Buddhist orthodoxy through his presentation of a order to answer this question, we rst have to know what kinds of continuity the Yog ac ara Buddhists like Xuan Zang are concerned about. This can be detected in the list of logical arguments26 Xuan na in the CWSL; layavijn Zang gives in support of the existence of a a na layavijn a he states that a
As Lusthaus observes, Eventually Buddhist epistemology would accept only na) as valid means for perception (pratyaks : a) and inferential reasoning (anuma n acquiring knowledge (prama : a), and these changes were only beginning in India while Hsu an-tsang was there. They were not yet institutionalized. Prior to that shift the two acceptable means were scriptural testimony (sruti) and reasoning (yukti, na). It was Vasubandhus disciple, Dign anuma aga, after all, who rmly established n perception and inference as the two valid prama : as, and undermined the status of scripture (1989, 321). Since the scriptural support Xuan Zang cites does not have a direct bearing on the philosophical argument, I will not get into it here.
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kacitta that holds b is vipa ijas; is the uninterrupted retributive mind; is the mind in the course of transmigration; is that which appropriates the body; is the support for life and heat; is the mind at conception and death; marupa  ; exists by reason of na is the substance of consciousness-food on which the other three foods (food in mouthfuls, food by contact and through aspiration) depend; patti; (9) is the mind in nirodhasama (10) is the foundation for pure and impure dharmas. (20244) Obviously Xuan Zang is preoccupied with the continuity of subjectivity, within one lifetime and between lives. In the nal analysis, his theoretical eort to explain the continuity of subjectivity is aimed at accounting for the self as a continuum; this is evidenced by the three na given in the CWSL, one of which asserts that layavijn a meanings of a tman is the result of attachment to the eighth consciousness (104), as a we have seen previously. His explanation of an external object as a continuum is the extension of the continuity of subjectivity, since for him the continuity of subjectivity and the continuity of objectivity are two aspects of the same cognitive process. The former holds primacy over the latter, while the actual existence of external objects independent of consciousness is rendered irrelevant. Let us now take a closer look at how Xuan Zang explains our sense of self as a continuum within the Yog ac ara theoretical edice he has presented. Since tman as the result of attachment and misidentication of he regards a na as an identity, our eort will focus on layavijn the continuum of a a examining how such a misidentication takes place. tman has two kinds: that According to the CWSL, attachment to a which is innate and that which results from mental discrimination (20). The innate kind is always present in the individual and it operates spontaneously without depending on external false teachings or mental discriminations (ibid.). It is itself divided into two kinds:
The rst is constant and continuous, and it pertains to the seventh consciousness which arises together with the eighth consciousness and grasps the mental image of the latter as the real self. The second is sometimes interrupted and it pertains to the sixth consciousness and the ve aggregates that are the result of their transformations; the mental image that arises with them individually or as a group is grasped as the real self. (ibid.)

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Xuan Zang dierentiates two senses of self here: one is constant and the other is sometimes interrupted. Such a dierentiation is made with an eye on our dierent senses of the self in the waking state, the dream state,27 and the deep meditative state, which, it may be recalled, is the primary concern in the initial postulation of na. If our sense of self is limited to the waking and even the layavijn a a dream state, wherein the content of consciousness is recollectable, it would run the risk of being lost during the deep meditative state. This is the reason behind the dierentiation made between these two senses of self. In the rst case, the sense of self that is constant pertains to the seventh consciousness, manas, which adheres to na are conna as the self, since both manas and a layavijn layavijn a a a stant and never interrupted until enlightenment is reached. In the second case, the sense of self that can be interrupted pertains to the sixth consciousness which operates with the ve senses as in the waking state or without them as in the dream state. The second sense of self is interrupted during certain deep meditative states. In the case of the rst sense of self, we have learned that na has three aspects: the perceiving (darsanabha ga), the layavijn a a ga) and the self-corroboratory (svaperceived (nimittabha ga) divisions, which are manifested as the external world sam : vittibha on the one hand and the internal b ijas and sense organs possessed by the body on the other. Which aspect is the. one to which manas attaches and which is misidentied as the self? In this connection, Xuan Zang says that
na, not its other bha gas, ga of the a layavijn a Manas appropriates only the darsanabha ga has, since before the beginning of time, been a continuous and because darsanabha ga homogeneous series, as if it were a constant and an identical entity. Since this bha is the constant support of various dharmas, manas attaches to it as the inner self. (282)

ga, of the eighth conSo it is the perceiving aspect, darsanabha sciousness that manas takes as its object and misidenties as the self, ga is a homogeneous continuum even though it but darsanabha appears as eternal and one. This is how continuity is misconstrued as identity. The self in the second sense of the word is due to the activities of na, with or without the cooperation the sixth consciousness, manovijn a of the ve senses. However,
27 The Buddhists do not seem to be interested in the so-called dreamless state, as the Hindu philosophers do.

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na, like the visual consciousness etc., must have its own support manimanovijna festing its own name. Such a support does not arise from samanantarapratyaya (condition qua immediate antecedent), but from adhipatipratyaya (condition qua agent) instead. (Xuan Zang, 328)

na is As Wei Tat rightly points out, such a support of manovijn a manas, the seventh consciousness (329). Put simply, the sixth consciousness should have its own sense-organ, just as the eye is the sense-organ for visual consciousness. Here manas is viewed as na. However, as we have previously the sense-organ for manovijn a lambanas of manovijn a na seen, manas is also said to be one of the a (ibid., 570). This means that manas is both the support qua sensena. This is in line organ and the support qua object of manovijn a with Xuan Zangs general position, which treats subject and object as two aspects of the same experiential process. Since one of the na is its externalizing activities, if all these functions of manovijn a are juxtaposed side by side, the overall picture we get of the generation of the self involves the following processes: the perna is an ever-evolving ga, of a layavijn a ceiving aspect, darsanabha continuum, to which manas attaches and misidenties as an identity; this identity is then externalized by the activities of manona as a tman standing outside the cognitive structure of subject vijn a and object. There is another sense of self that Xuan Zang talks about, in contradistinction to the above two innate senses of self: it is caused by mental discrimination and derived from the force of external factors including false teachings and discriminations. This sense of na. This attachment to a tman is self pertains exclusively to manovijn a also of two kinds:
The rst, preached by certain heterodox schools, refers to the aggregates that arise na. Through discrimination and intellection, out of the mental images in manovijn a na attaches to those aggregates as a real self. manovijna The second refers to the characteristics of the self, preached by certain heterodox na. Through discrimination schools, that arise out of the mental images in manovijn a na attaches to those characteristics as a real self. (22) and intellection, manovijn a

In the rst case the self is conceived as the object of self-belief. This is the view held by the V ats putr yas. Xuan Zang refutes it by stating tman, that is the object of self-belief. that it is the ve skandhas, not a Since the ve skandhas are themselves impermanent, the permanence tman is hence rejected. In the second case the self is the product of of a tman-concepts of a false teaching which refers to the Vedic various a

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tman. Since these typical Buddhist refutations of other teaching of a views of self in defense of their own position are common knowledge to students of Buddhism, I will not go into them in detail here. It is worthwhile to take note of Xuan Zangs own violation of suspending the judgment on the existential status of any extra-contman does not exist, since its scious entities when he declares that a existential status is suspended within his philosophy. All he can tman altogether on actually do is to reject the existential question of a the ground that it can neither be armed nor denied within the structure of consciousness. To conclude, in this essay I have tried to present the concept of na as well as the rationale behind the Yog layavijn a ac arins eort in a formulating the concept as Xuan Zang presents it in the CWSL. Xuan Zang is very conscious of the limitations imposed by Buddhist orthodoxy on his theoretical endeavor. In my opinion, he is largely successful in explaining subjectivity as a continuum as well as the continuity of experience by analyzing consciousness alone without appealing to anything outside and by ably rendering the existential status of external objects irrelevant in his system. His eort underscores a vigorous attempt to fortify the Buddhist doctrine against any form of reication and substantialization. In explaining the self as a subliminal continuum he eectively endorses the view that our sense of self is closely related to some subliminal mental activities of which we are largely unaware in our daily life; this view is echoed by modern na layavijn a psychoanalysts like Freud, Jung, and others. However, a cannot be hastily compared to the unconscious developed in modern psychoanalysis without major qualications. But such a topic requires a separate eort.28
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Cf. Jiang (2004).

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Department of Religion Rutgers, The State Univerisity of New Jersey New Brunswick, NJ 08901-8525 USA E-mail: tjiang999@hotmail.com