‘GDI 2006 Russell Suni Campbell UN Constabutary Foree Aff 84.5 CF S Iraq *CF is Constabulary Force Az 19 1AC 86-8 88a INHERENCY 89 10 Constabulary force def 90-91 A2: CF costly/siow u Const foree logistics 92: ‘A2: CF = paramilitary 1215 No UN CF now 2 Ad: EUIRRF tradeoff 16 Status Quo RRF inadequate 94 ‘AD Intervention Bad K 7 PDD 71 terminated 95 A2 Int'lawK 96 AQ: Threat conK SOLVENCY 7 A2: Armed CIV POL ofp 18-21 USK2CF 98 AQ: NGO coumter-plan 22-23, CF Solves Genocide co 2430 CF Solves security gap 31CF Stops terrorism: Genocide impacts 32CF CF solves Demilitarization Terrorism Impacts 33-35 CF leads to Rule of law Cyber Terror Impacts 36-37 Rule of law K 2 PK Poverty Impacts 3839 Rule o flaw k stop org orime Biodiversity Impacts 40 Rale of law k demo/develop—"g~ - - - Prolif Bad Impacts al Rule of law stops oppress Disease Impacts 42 (CF improves rapid reaction - ‘Laundering Impacts a3 Rapid Reaction gd—Rwanda 114-116 AIDS impacts 44 Rapid Reaction k UN cred 178 Organized Crime Impacts 45 RR under secretariat 119-124 Drug Trafficking Impacts 46 CF has support 125-7 Arms Trafficking Impacts a7 CF leads to refugee aid 128-130 Sex Trafficking Impacts 48-51 RR good 52 CF S preemptive war 3 Pre operational prep K 54.55 UN PKO’s good 56 UN stops Sex traffic in PKO 57-59 ‘Brahimi report good LEADERSHIP 60-61 CFK2US leadership 62-63 CF Inerease read SECURITY GAP HARMS 64.66 Mil can’t PK 67-71 CIV POL bad 2-75 Private PKO’s bad SPEC PLACES FOR CF 16-17 Haiti U 8-81 CF Solves Haiti 82 CFS India-Pakistan N war 83 CFS Israel-PalestineCONSTABULARY FORCES AFF | he CAMPBELL vg Oe ~ US. AND U.N. PKOs CONSTANTLY REINVENT THE WHEEL - SHORT- SIGHTEDNESS IN PLANNING IS DEMONSTRATED BY THE LACK OF A U.N. CONSTABULARY FORCE COLLONS, PERITO, & SPEAR 03. (JOSEPH J, SEN FELLOW IN POLITICAL MILITARY ‘STUDIES, ROBERT, SPECIAL ADVISOR RULE OF LAW PROGRAM, JOANNA, PHD @ i SOUTHAMPTON UNIV, OCT 14, WWW. SFCG.ORG/DOCUMENTS/CPRF/CPRFOCTOBER2003.PDF) << Mr Perito explained that while the U.S. has the world’s finest military, it is poorly prepared to provide a civilian partner to the military, that is, to provide civilian personel that can perform these security functions in post-conflict environments. No single U.S. government pariment has responsibility for post-conflict stability operations. In fact, no government department has post-conflict stability as its core mission. A recent report by the RAND Corporation points out that the State Department and the Department of Defense have treated ity operation as iit were the TWst one encountered and as iit were is" No Federa s a er prosecutors, judges or corrections officers to assist in restoring the rule of law in post-conflict societies. As.a result, the U.S. must rely almost exclusi ilitary, or on the provision of foreign forces, which may not be in smely slow to deploy’ WITHOUT A U.S. ENDORSEMENT, THERE WILL BE NO UN. CONSTABULARY FORCE ‘THE WORLD POLICY JOURNAL 98. (APR 1, THOMPSON & ROSENBLATD) 1 Canada, Denmark, and the N we taken these flues to heart in proposing . fiieans By which the United Nations can an deploy pesokepess Lo more sapily and Se Ee han at present. Allthe rhetoric in the Sa er oo Save, is not going to result in the creation of a rapid reaction force unless the big daddy on the international scene, the infematinal sen; the fates 0 ica, gets idea, Penirousness, neo-isolationism, and Best Toward the United Nations are holding it back, | PLAN: The United States federal goverument should encourage the creation of and provide all necessary support for the development of a United Nations: peacekeeping rapid-teaction constabulary force. |COYSTABULARY FORCES AFF IAC CAMPBELL +04 Cc RUSSELL A 3 i : 2/4 Adsutyge dS) effective Peace hangin TBE U.S. IS KEY TO AN EFFECTIVE U.N. CONSTABULARY FORCE - ONLY THE U.S. HAS THE EXPERTISE AND ABILITY TO GENERATE THE POLITICAL WILL TO SOLVE FLOURNOY & PAN 02. (CODIR POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT, COORD POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT, FALL, WASHINGTON QUARTERLY) ‘The United States and the intemavional commonity have substantial gaps. inthis capability to provide be | dustice and reconciliation assistance that may be necessary. Talcing a holistic approach to achieving justice and reconciliation in postconflict reconstruction operations can be a Herculean task. Nevertheless, failure to coordinate the delicate and complex relationship between justice and reconciliation cares great risks, as the absence of a viable justice system or adequate reconciliation mechanisms can undermine the security and ~ ~ lity essential to sustai ction efforts. Becay iff appropriate fashion, Although the United States will not always play a lead role, it should be prepared to tical a such as training, communi a CURRENT PKOS ARE TOO SLOW, CONSTABULARY FORCE IS KEY TO ACTING QUICKLY TO STOP CRISES FROM ESCALATING TO GENOCIDE, SMITH 2000 (COLONEL DAN, CHIEF OF RESEARCH FOR CENTER FOR DEFENCE INFORMATION; OF PEACEKEEPIN AND ROGUE STATES ~ THE TIMES THEY ARE VCHANGING, WEEKLEY DEFENSE MONITOR VOL. 4 ISSUE 25, JUNE 252000) = | ‘The first is H.R. 4453, introduced by Representatives James McGovern (D-MA), John Porter (RAL), and Constance Morella (R-MD) and subsequently cosponsored by fourteen other House members. It would establish a United Nations Rapid Deployment Police and Security Foree. The need for such a constabul force has been evident for some time. As.both the condi equ Meena BES aT Te peacekeeping missions have become more SaaS ee lex, the Iength of time between the UN.” Soe, See ero of @ mission and the first meaningful troop deployment has lengthened. Delays of four to six months are not uncommon. Such delays in failing states lead fo an increase in lawlessness, in the severity of humanitatian disasters, aad ist case 1 jouide, as in Rwanda in t