Brian Bridson Nietzsche: Moral Immoralist Nietzsches books must be understood not in isolation from one another but

as a corpus of works, which build upon one another in order to express Nietzsches philosophy in its most complete form. My purpose for writing this paper is to illustrate that Nietzsche argues that everything is moral. However, Nietzsches conception of morality is markedly distinct from traditional accounts of morality; it is in fact directly opposed to these systems. First, I shall examine Nietzsches concept of history in order to illustrate his moral position. Secondly, I will provide the evidence necessary to explain how Nietzsche distinguishes himself from traditional moralists. I will, with the conclusion of this paper, explain that Nietzsche, the self proclaimed immoralist, is in fact a very strict moralist. Before I start with an explanation of Nietzsches concept of history, I must posit that to discuss any major concept of Nietzsches necessitates discussing his other major concepts as well. Therefore, in this section of the paper, not only will I be discussing history and morality, I shall also discuss God, infinite, truth and critique. These concepts cannot be understood in isolation from one another, to do so would be bad faith. Section 46 of Thus Spake Zarathustra offers an incredibly rich account of Nietzsches concept of history. In this section Zarathustra is walking along a road with a dwarf and comes to a gate in the middle of the road. Zarathustra tells the dwarf that the gate has two faces, where the roads, antithetical to one another, meet. Zarathustra says, This long lane backwards: it continueth for an eternity. And that long lane forward that is another eternityThe name of the gateway is inscribed above: This moment.1 In this same section, Zarathustra also says that while this gateway exists now, it also existed before. We learn a great deal about Nietzsches concept of history from this section: history is not the past only; history is a process. History is the eternal now! This concept is difficult to understand, and a reckless reader may take Nietzsche to mean that the world is causally determined. But Nietzsche is not a determinist; his philosophy is founded upon the conviction that all people have choice and are responsible for every decision they make. Nietzsche writes that everything that has already existed lies upon this eternal lane backwards. The past is not the past as it is colloquially conceived; it is not something that was and is no more. All things that have existed lie upon this path, the path that we walk on presently. The past in its entirety exists in this very moment. This moment has also already existed, Nietzsche explains, and it infinitely recreates itself. Each time the gate recreates itself, so to speak, everything that happened in that moment, everything finite, becomes one with the infinite. Thus with each moment the gate moves further along the infinite road, and can be understood as a process of infinitely infinitizing the finite. One may read fragments of Nietzsches work, like Must not this gateway also have already existed?2 and conclude that Nietzsche argues for a deterministic picture of the universe; that this moment has already existed. It is in fact here where the moral dimension of Nietzsches concept of history becomes
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Nietzsche. Thus Spake Zarathustra. Sec. 46, part 2. Nietzsche. Thus Spake Zarathustra. Sec. 46, part 2.

Brian Bridson apparent. Aphorism 337 of The Gay Science describes the process of a person being a finite expression of the infinite, as being a process whereby this person is engaged in active creation; that of becoming. The person contemplates the infinite, develops an understanding of it, and becomes the active, finite expression of it. 3 The process is therefore necessitated by choice. As such, because we have choice, it cannot be the case that the universe is deterministic: the two concepts are not reconcilable. Regarding this choice, in 344 of The Gay Science Nietzsche writes, I will not deceive, not even myself; and with that we stand on moral ground. Therefore, as individuals with the ability to choose, we must be truthful in our interpretations of the infinite as we finitize it. Nietzsche tells us that we are responsible for who we are, with every choice we make. But if we have read Nietzsche carefully, we learn that not only are we responsible for ourselves in the expression of the infinite, but we are simultaneously responsible for all future events as well. Thus, we are infinitely responsible for ourselves, as well as for everyone and everything else. This sense of responsibility, not only for oneself but for everyone and everything, is the reasoning behind Nietzsches referring to our responsibility as a burden. Nietzsches concept of history then is a synthesis of the finite and the infinite, and a process of interpretation focussed on truth and the moral responsibility of the individual to refrain from deceiving everyone and everything, themselves included. This process of interpretation is one of critique, whereby we never accept as truth that which we already know, but question everything, including these past truths. Only when we regard truth in this way, as a process, are we able to embrace it. Only in this way are we able to partake in the great experiment: to determine to what extent the truth is able to endure incorporation.4 One might argue that this conception of history is problematic because of its subjective nature. Their intellectual critique is concerned with reconciling the subjective interpretation of history with an objective notion of historical truth. Nietzsche would argue that their concept of objective truth finds its roots in logic, which has as its most basic principle that one two different things may be equal. But the idea that one object may equal another object is preposterous. No object may equal another object.5 To clarify this point, consider two pennies. Only a terribly confused person would say that they are the same coin, for each was made using different materials, at different times, and each occupies a different material position. Thus the two cannot be said to equal one another, and it is clearly the case that they do not. What can be said, however, is that they are similar to one another. With this understanding, one can abandon any notion of truth founded upon equality, and Nietzsches conception of history remains unblemished. Nietzsche knew that this notion of history would leave all persons on a similar plain, and that this would prohibit any person from possessing a claim to truth and be able to tame others with it. As such, it denies the possibility of forming any doctrine of belief, as well as letting any person believe their process of seeking

3 4

This is a genius example of Nietzsches concept of the Dionysian. The Gay Science. Aphorism 110. 5 The Gay Science. Aphorism 111.

Brian Bridson truth is completed. Truth is a historical and hence infinite process, and no one will ever possess a complete notion of truth. This is how Nietzsche would respond to such a question regarding his concept of history. Thus, not only have I thus far shown how Nietzsche argues that history is a moral process, but I have also shown how this concept of history is intrinsically linked with the concepts of truth, critique and infinite. I will now explain how these concepts, including that of God, are themselves subjects of moral concern. Nietzsches concept of God must be understood as divorced from all colloquial, anthropomorphic or traditional ideas. In Aphorism 108 of The Gay Science, Nietzsche makes an incredible claim: God is dead. But just what he means by God is not easily understood and must, like his concept of history, be carefully examined. Aphorisms 124-125 of The Gay Science provide the explanation we need in order to understand what Nietzsche means by God. In 124 Nietzsche describes the infinite using very specific language: the infinite is free, non-constrainable and like the ocean. The opposite of the infinite, the finite, is referred to as being like the land: familiar, domesticated. With this contrast in mind we are able to understand Aphorism 125 properly. The madman with his piercing eyes jumps into a crowd of men and cries out, Whither is God...We have killed him you and I...But how did we do this? How could we drink up the sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the entire horizon? What were we doing when we unchained this earth from its sun? We understand that God is not an anthropomorphic deity, God is the infinite. The evidence of this lies in the descriptors of this concept: the sea, the horizon, the sun. As such, God must be understood just as history is: by employment of critique, the honest, infinite pursuit of truth. But, as such, our understanding of God is incomplete. If we truly understand Nietzsches conception of God then we must understand God to be history. If you will recall in Section 46 of Thus Spake Zarathustra, Nietzsche describes the infinite as a road that extends backwards and forwards and finds expression at the gateway of This moment. Thus in this passage we must understand history as being infinite, and that it infinitely expresses itself finitely. We understand that the infinite and the finite are inseparable; that each gains its expression through the other. Thus, because God is the infinite, and because we understand the necessary relation between finite and infinite, we can properly understand God to be history. If we understand God in this light, as history, we realize that Nietzsches God differs from traditional concepts of God, such as in the Judeo-Christian or Islamic relation. God is not static; God is not complete. God is a process, whereby even God becomes itself. Even our relation to God is understood differently with Nietzsche; we are expressions of God and are engaged in the process of Gods becoming what it is.6 But God is not a being like a rock, a human being, or a creator in heaven; God is a process. Therefore, because God is this process of finite expressions, of which we are a part, we understand we eternally incorporate the infinite into the finite and simultaneously re-create the infinite by eternally
Nietzsche is without a doubt indebted to Spinoza for the development of this idea. Please see: Spinoza. The Ethics. Part I: Concerning God.
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Brian Bridson incorporating the finite into it. But never is our ontological reality of choosing nullified: we are not expressions in the mind of God (as in Spinoza), nor are we creatures created by a god in heaven that causes miracles and other supernatural events to happen, which infringe upon our ability to choose. Nietzsche also differs in that he does not give his God a supernatural origin, or an empirically transcendental being. Thus, Nietzsches concept of God is very different than competing concepts of God, and in such a way that does not place this God beyond empirically verifiable (or refutable) limits, thereby maintaining a live spirit of critique, and not his principles of morality. The careful reader will have noticed something very exciting at this point. I have just illustrated that God is history because God is infinite, and that the infinite is inseparable from the finite. I ask you, the reader, what we, as people are. We have already admitted that we are finite expressions of the infinite involved in the process of becoming. But, following from the line of reasoning above, to be finite means to be simultaneously infinite: to exist is to be a synthesis of the finite and infinite; each necessitates the other. Thus each of us, because we exist, is God. So long as one is mindful of what this means and does not confuse this concept of God with another, then this understanding is made in good faith, which is to say, truthfully and morally. Thus far I have illustrated that history, God, and even us as individuals, when understood properly, are the same thing. I must not be misunderstood when I write that they are the same thing. I am not trying to equate history, God, and the individual, as I have already shown that this cannot be done. What I am saying is that traditionally, and hence, colloquially, we have made these concepts distinct from one another, which is an error. Truthfully there is only one concept, and our inability to understand it as one is evidence of what degree these concepts have been bastardized. I have also illustrated that in order to understand ourselves (hence history and also God), one must understand oneself as a process of becoming; to understand oneself according to critique, which is the infinite pursuit of truth, and thus realize that this understanding of, and becoming oneself, is a moral process. It is in fact with this understanding of the self that we can understand Nietzsches bermensch.7 The conscious bermensch is the person who realizes they are a synthesis of the infinite and the finite as I have described. The conscious bermensch is the only truly moral being, who employs all their creative energies in overcoming themselves, which as we see in Zarathustras Prologue,8 is nothing other than becoming oneself, or embracing oneself completely. (I have included conscious as a qualification, because while everyone shares in the process of overcoming and becoming himself, not everyone is aware of this.9 From herein, all

The bermensch can be translated as superman or overman. It reads -man and not -person only because Nietzsche wished to stress the strength of the overman, and strength is generally seen as being masculine. This term applies to both men and women, and thus, Nietzsche must not be understood as sexist. 8 Thus Spake Zarathustra. Section 1. 9 Nietzsche himself might, if he could, ask me to take this one step further and change my qualifier to willfully conscious. It is true that it is one thing be unaware and another to be aware of our condition, just as it is one thing to be aware of our condition and quite another to embrace it.

Brian Bridson references to the bermensch shall be understood as being wilfully conscious bermensch, unless otherwise indicated.) Thus, the bermensch, in recognizing themselves as a process of overcoming and becoming, engage in critique. In critique they regard themselves as a synthesis of the finite and infinite, they pursue truth and question everything, including their own previously developed notions of truth. They accept this burden of truth, that they must deceive not even themselves, and understand that this means they are simultaneously responsible for everyone and everything. This concept of the bermensch is necessary in order to properly understand how Nietzsche specifically distances himself from other moral approaches. The bermensch, in his process of overcoming and becoming, displays what Nietzsche refers to as the will to power. This concept has been misunderstood by many of Nietzsches superficial readers, who take the concept of will to power to refer a desire to outdo or to come to dominate other people. But this simply is not the case; the will to power refers only to our ability to maintain control over ourselves and to be engaged in this process of becoming. The will to power is the will to life.10 It is to become what we are, to choose, and to accept and respect our moral responsibility for everyone and everything. We realize that if we are to actualize this will to power, our dignity and ability to choose must be respected. Thus, we are not responsible only for the creation of history, but also for ensuring the dignity of everyone and everything is respected. Nietzsche himself, in Aphorism 227 of The Gay Science, wrote that when a person seeks to dominate others around them that they are lacking the will to power, because they have no control over themselves. Therefore, the will to power is diametrically opposed to this critique; its purpose is to control oneself and respect the dignity of others. Thus, our being God (in this Nietzschean manner), we must realize that we are engaged in the infinite creative process of becoming, which requires we be infinitely engaged in a process of critique, and that this places everything on moral ground. As such, I have satisfied my objective for writing this paper, for I have shown that according to Nietzsche, everything is moral. But I must now divorce this Nietzschean concept of morality from traditional moral positions and account for why Nietzsche refers to himself as an immoralist. Nietzsche refers to all moral approaches that he challenges as comprising the formula of dcadence.11 These are moral systems that instruct people to retreat from themselves; that teach their followers that the will to power is wrong. On page 64 of The Twilight of the Idols he writes, there is in our eyes no more radical opposition than that of the theologians, who continue to infect the innocence of becoming with punishment and guilt by means of the moral world-order. In The Anti-Christ he writes: One should not dress up Christianity: it has waged a war to the death against this higher type of manChristianity has taken the side of everything weak, base, ill-constituted, it has made an ideal out of opposition to the preservative instincts of strong lifeThe most deplorable example: the depraving of Pascal, who believed his
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The Gay Science. Aphorism 349 Twilight of the Idols. p. 98

Brian Bridson reason had been depraved by original sin while it had only been depraved by his Christianity!12 The higher man Nietzsche refers to is the bermensch. Christianity, and certainly any system which preaches the will to power is an evil, a disease, a hindrance, is a system Nietzsche takes issue with. In denying and suppressing the will to power, they sicken and poison the individual, teaching them to hate rather than love and embrace themselves. An individual, who adheres to such a code, whether as the erector of its laws or as its sheepish follower, is an abortion of a person, one who actively kills oneself. Dcadence is the case whenever any person either erects a system of beliefs for themselves (independent of whether or not they have disciples), or a person accepts such a system of beliefs. They are equally dcadents, because each individual is, wilfully or not, engaged in a process of deception, which, to employ Nietzschean language, saturates infinity with a nauseous odour. They are deceived, again, wilfully or not, and thus all their decisions are life-defeating, they substitute their will to power with a will to submission. Furthermore, they consider truth to be something attained and something final. They begin to rest and grow lazy, they forget (or ignore, or perhaps they never realized) that life is a creative process of overcoming oneself so one can become oneself. They are responsible for the destruction of life while they believe they are living it. It is not difficult to compare Nietzsches morality with that of dcadence, the two systems are completely opposed to one another. Nietzsches concept of morality conceives of each person as possessing the ability to choose, and as such, they are forced to become what they already are. They do this by realizing they are beings whose nature is a synthesis of the finite and the infinite, who are involved in a creative process of becoming, which requires an infinite critique, whose purpose it is to take nothing, not even previously held notions of truth, as true. This is the bermensch. The dcadent is not aware, or chooses to ignore the fact, that they are all able to become the bermensch, and that all they need to be doing is embracing their actual natures. They are everything that the bermensch is not. They are lacking the process of critique, and thus the conception of truth as being an infinite process, not something that can be codified, and certainly not something that should apply equally to all. They fail to accept their nature that is both infinite and finite, and instead create accounts of fictitious gods that give their lives meaning and purpose, instead of creating values and meanings from within. Theirs is a process of eternal self-defeat. What is worse is that in choosing for them they necessarily choose for all of us, because whether they acknowledge it or not, they are simultaneously finite and infinite beings and a choice for one is still a choice for all. And they will always stand in opposition to Nietzsches notion of morality until they abandon these base practices and embrace that which is their actual natures; till they each become the bermensch. When Nietzsche refers to himself as an immoralist, we cannot understand him to mean that he does not believe in morality, for as we have been discussing, Nietzsche considers everything to be a matter of moral concern; that all experience

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The Anti-Christ. Aphorism 5.

Brian Bridson is moral experience. But then what does he mean? In referring to himself as an immoralist Nietzsche only means insofar as traditional morality is concerned; he would never wish to place himself in any sort of close proximity to such vile, disgusting, weak dispositions. His is a new morality. It is different because of his idea of truth as being moral, but as truth being an infinite process, thus it is without an end and cannot become a doctrine. It is on this note that Nietzsche must have felt a sense of pride when he distinguished himself as an immoralist: his was not something that could ever go unchanged and grow stagnant; his will never resemble the trash of the moralists, even in the slightest. Thus, I have illustrated that Nietzsche argues that everything is moral. I have also shown that Nietzsches account of morality is genuinely foreign to that of traditional morality, and that Nietzsche is an immoralist only insofar as he is opposed to any concept of finalized, indoctrinated truth. As such, one may understand morality to encompass everything according to the Nietzschean conception, and understand Nietzsche as a moral immoralist.

Brian Bridson Bibliography

Nietzsche. The Birth of Tragedy / The Case of Wagner. Vintage Books: New York, 1967. Translated by Walter Kaufman. Nietzsche. The Gay Science. Vintage Books: New York, 1974. Translated by Walter Kaufman. Nietzsche. Twilight of the Idols / The Anti-Christ. Penguin Books: New York, 1990. Translated by R.J. Hollingdale. Nietzsche. On the Genealogy of Morality. Hackett Publishing: Indianapolis, 1998. Translated by Maudemarie Clark and Alan J. Swensen. Spinoza. The Ethics. In: Works of Spinoza, Volume II. Dover Publications: New York, 1951. Translated by R. H. M. Elwes.