Of Paradise and Power

OF PARADISE
AND POWER
America and Europe
in the New World Order
ROBERT KAGAN
Vintage Book
A Division of Random House, Inc.
New York
FIRST VINTAGE BOOKS EDITION, JANUARY
-
Copyright 2003, 2004 by Robert Kgan

Al rights reserved under International and Pan-Aerican Copyright
Conventions. Published in the United States by Vintage Books,
a division of Random House, Inc., New York, and simultaneously
in Canada by Random House of Canada Limited, Toronto. Originally
published in hardcover in the United States by Afed A. Knopf,
a division of Random House, New York, in
-
.
Vintage and colophon are registered trademarks of Random House, Inc.
A shorter version of this essay originally appeared as an article entitled
"Power and Weakness" in Polic Review (June/July
--
).
Cataloging-in-Publication Data is on fe at the Library of Congress.
Vitage ISBN: 1-4000-3418-3
Author photograph Claudio Vazquez
www.vintagebooks.com
Printed in the United States of Aerica
'
-
'
For Leni and David
OF PARADISE
AND POWER
IT I S T I M E tc stcp prctcnding that Eurcpcans and
Amcricans sharc a ccmmcn vicw cfthc wcrld, cr cvcn
that thcy cccupy thc samc wcrld. On thc all-impcrtant
qucsticncfpcwcr-thccmcacycfpcwcr,thcmcralitycf
pocr, thc dcsirability cf pcwcr-Amcrican and Eurc-
pcan pcrspcctivcs arc divcrging. Eurcpc is turning away
ncm pcwcr, cr tc put it a littlc dincrcntly, it is mcving
bcycnd pcwcr intc a sclf-ccntaincd wcrld cflaws and
rulcsandtransnaticnalncgctiaticnandcccpcraticn.Itis
cntcring a pcst-histcrical paradisc cfpcacc and rclativc
prcspcrity,thc rcalizaticncfImmanuclKant's"pcrpctual
pcacc'' Mcanwhilc, thc Unitcd Statcs rcmains mircd in
histcry,cxcrcisingpcwcrinananarchicHcbbcsianwcrld
whcrc intcrnaticnal laws and rulcs arc unrcliablc, and
whcrc
ruc sccurityandthc dcfcnsc andprcmcticn cfa

libcral ordcr still dcpcnd cn thc pcsscssicn and usc cf
militarymight.Thatiswhycnmajcrstratcgicandintcr-
naticnal qucsticns tcday, Amcricans arc ncm Mars and
Eurcpcans arc ncm Vcnus. Thcy agrcc cn littlc and
undcrstand cnc ancthcrlcss and lcss.Andthis statc cf
anairs is nct transitcry-thc prcduct cfcnc Amcrican
OF PARADI SE AND POWER
c|cction or onc catastrophic cvcnt. Thc rcasons for thc
transat|antic dividc arc dccp, |ong in dcvc|opmcnt, and
|ikc|ytocndurc.Wcnitcomcstoscttingnationa|priori-
tics, dctcrmining thrcats, dcnning cha||cngcs, and fash-
ioningandimp|cmcntingforcignanddcfcnscpo|icics,thc
UnitcdStatcsandEuropchavcpartcdways.
Itiscasicrto scc thccontrastas anAmcrican|iving in
Europc.Europcansarcmorcconsciousofthcgrowingdif-
fcrcnccs, pcrhapsbccauscthcyfcarthcmmorc.Europcan
intc|lcctuals arcncar|yunanimousinthcconvictionthat
Acricans and Europcans no |ongcr sharc a common
"stratcgic cu|turc." Thc Europcan caricaturc at its most
cxtrcmc dcpicts an Acrica dominatcdbya "culturc of
dcath,'itswarlikctcmpcramcntthcnaturalproductofa
vio|cntsocictywhcrc cvcrymanhasagun and thc dcath
pcna|tyrcigns. utcvcnthoscwhodonotmakcthiscrudc
|ink agrcc thcrc arc profound dincrcnccs in thcwaythc
UnitcdStatcsandEurcpcccnductforcignpo|icy.
Thc Unitcd Statcs, thcy arguc, rcsorts to forcc morc
quick|y and, comparcdwithEuropc, is |css paticntwith
dip|omacy. Acricans gcncra||y scc thc wor|d dividcd
bctwccn good and cvi|, bctwccn fricnds and cncmics,
whi|cEuropcanssccamorccomp|cxpicturc.Whcncon-
frontingrca|orpotcntia|advcrsarics,Amcricansgcncra||y
favorpo|icicsofcocrcionrathcrthanpcrsuasion,cmpha-
sizing punitivc sanctions ovcr induccmcnts to bcttcr
bchavior,thcstickovcrthccarrot. Amcricanstcndtoscck
hna|ityinintcrnationa|anairs.Thcywantprob|cmsso|vcd,
thrcatsc|iminatcd.And,ofcoursc,Acricansincrcasing|y
tcnd toward uni|atcra|ism in intcrnationa| anairs. Thcy
arc |css inc|incdto actthroughintcrnationa| institutions
5
such as thc Unitcd Nations,|css |ikc|y to work ccopcra-
tivcIywithothcrnationstopursuccommongoa|s,mcrc
skcptica| about intcrnationa| |aw, and morc wi|ling to
opcratcoutsidcitsstricturcswhcnthcydccmitncccssary,
or cvcn mcrc|yuscm|. '
Europcansinsistthcyapproachprob|cmswithgrcatcr
nuancc and sophistication. Thcy try to inucncc cthcrs
through subt|cty and indircction. Thcy arc mcrc tclcr-
ant cf fai|urc, morc paticnt whcn so|uticns dcn't ccmc
quick|y. Thcygcncra|lyfavcrpcaccm|rcspcnscstc prcb-
|cms, prcfcrring ncgotiation, dip|cmacy, and pcrsuasicn
to cocrcion. Thcy arc quickcr tc appca| tc intcrnaticnal
|aw,intcrnaticna|ccnvcnticns,andintcrnaticnalcpinicn
tc adjudicatc disputcs. Thcytrytc usc ccmmcrcia and
cconcmicticstobindnaticnstcgethcr.Thcychcncmpha-
sizcprcccss cvcr rcsu|t,bclicvingthatu|timatc|yprcccss
canbccomcsubstancc.
ThisEurcpcanpcrtraitisadualcaricaturc,cfccursc,
with its sharc of cxaggcraticns and cvcrsimplihcaticns.
Onc cannct
gcncra|izc abcut Eurcpcans. ritcns may

havc amorc`7mcrican''vicwcfpcwcr than manyEurc-
pcans on thc Contincnt. Thcir mcmcry cf cmpirc, thc
"spccia| rc|aticnship" with thc Unitcd Statcs fcrgcd in
Wor|dWar II andatthcdawnofthcCo|dWar,andthcir
historica||y a|oof position with rcgard tc thc rcst cfEu-
ropc tcnd to sct thcm apart. Nor can cnc simply |ump
lOne representative F
r
ench observer describes "a U.S. mindset"
that "tends to emphasize miitary, technical and unilateral solutions to
international problems, possibly at the expense of co-operative and
political ones:' See Gilles Andreani, "The Disarray of U. S. Non
Proliferation Policy," Survival 41 (Winter 1999-2000) : 42-61.
OF PARADISE AND POWER
Frcnch and Gcrmans togcthcr: thc nrst proud and indc-
pcndcnt but also surprisingly insccurc, thc sccond min-
glingsclf-conhdcnccwithsclf-doubtsinccthccndcfthc
ScccndWcrldWar.Mcanwhilc,thcnaticnscfEastcrnand
Ccntral Eurcpc havc an cntircly dincrcnt histcry frcm
thcirWcstcrn Europcan ncighbors, a histcrically rcctcd
fcarcfRussianpowcrandconscqucntlyamorcAmcrican
vicwcfthcHcbbcsianrcalitics.And, cfccursc,thcrcarc
dincringpcrspcctivcswithinnationscnbcthsidcscfthc
Atlantic. Frcnch Caullists arc not thc samc as Frcnch
Socialists. In thc Unitcd Statcs, Dcmocrats cncn sccm
mcrc "Europcan" than Rcpublicans, Sccrctary cf Statc
ColinPcwcllmayappcarmorc"Europcan"thanSccrctary
cfDcfcnscDcnaldRumsfcld.ManyAmcricans,cspccially
amongthcintcllcctualclitc,arcasunccmfcrtablcwiththc
"hard" quality ofAmcrican forcign policy as any Eurc-
pcan, and somc Europcansvaluc powcr as much as any
Acrican.
Ncvcrthclcss, thc caricaturcs do capturc an csscntial
truth. Thc Unitcd Statcs and Europc arc mndamcntally
dincrcnttoday. Powcll and Rumsfcld havc morc inccm-
mcnthando PowcllandthcforcignministcrsofFrancc,
Ccrmany,orcvcnGrcatritain.Wcnitcomcstothcusc
of fcrcc, most mainstrcam Amcrican Dcmocrats havc
mcrc in common with Rcpublicans than thcy do with
mcstEuropcans.Duringthc:p}oscvcnAmcricanlibcrals
wcrc morc willing to rcsort to forcc and wcrc mcrc
Manichcan inthcirpcrccptionofthcworldthanmcstof
thcirEuropcancountcrparts.ThcClintonadministraticn
bcmbcd Iraq as wcll as Afghanistan and Sudan. Mcst
Eurcpcan gcvcrnmcnts, it is safc to say, wculd nct havc
7
donc so and wcrc, indccd, appallcd at Amcrican mili-
tarism. Whcthcr Europcans cvcn would havc bcmbcd
clgradc in 1999 had thc Unitcd Statcs not fcrccd thcir
hand i an intcrcsting qucsticn.
-
In Octcbcr 2002, a
majority of Scnatc Dcmccrats suppcrtcd thc rcscluticn
authorizingPrcsidcntushtogctowarwithIraq,whilc
thcir pclitical countcrparts in Francc, Gcrmany, Italy,
clgium, and cvcn thc Unitcd Kingdom lcckcd cn in
amazcmcntandscmchcrrcr.
Whatisthcscurccofthcscdincringstratcgicpcrspcc-
tivcs Thc qucsticn has rcccivcd tcc littlc attcnticn in
rcccntycars.Forcignpclicyintcllcctualsandpclicymakcrs
cnbcmsidcscfthcAtlantichavcdcnicdthccxstcncccf
gcnuincdincrcnccscrscughttcmakclightcfprcscntdis-
agrecmcnts,nctingthatthctransatlanticalliancchashad
mcmcntscftcnsicninthcpast.Thoscwhchavctakcnthc
prcscnt dincrcnccs mcrc scriously, cspccially in Eurcpc,
havc bccn mcrc intcrcstcd in assailingthcUnitcd Statcs
than in undcrstanding why thc Unitcd Statcs acts as it
dccs-cr,Iorthatmattcr,whyEuropcactsasitdccs. Itis
pasttimctcmovcbcycndthcdcnialandthcinsultsandtc
faccthcproblcmhcad-on.
Dcspitc what many Europcans and somc Amcri-
cansclicvc,thcscdincrcnccsinstratcgic culturc dc nct
2
The case of Bosnia in the early 1990S stands out as an instance
where some Europeans, chiefy British Prime Minister Tony Blair, were
at times more forcefl in advocating military action than frst the Bush
and then the Clinton administration. ( Blair was also an early advocate
of using air power and even ground troops in the Kosovo crisis. ) Ad
Europeans had forces on the ground in Bosnia when the United States
did not, although in a U peacekeeping role tat proved inefective
when challenged.
OF PARAD I S E AND POWER
spring naturally ncm thc naticnal charactcrs cfAcri-
cansandEurcpcans.WhatEurcpcansncwccnsidcrthcir
mcrc pcaccml stratcgic culturc is, histcrically spcaking,
quitc ncw. Itrcprcscnts an cvcluticn awayncmthcvcry
dincrcntstratcgicculturcthatdcminatcdEurcpcfcrhun-
drcdscfycars-atlcastuntdWcrldWar1. ThcEurcpcan
gcvcrnmcntsandpccplcs-whccnthusiastica1ylaunchcd
thcmsclvcs intc that ccntincntal war bclicvcd in Macht
politik. Thcywcrcfcrvcntnaticnalistswhchadbccnwm -
ingtcpromctcthcnaticnalidcathrcughfcrcccfarms,as
thc Ccrmans had undcr ismarck, crtc prcmctc egalite
andfaternite withthcswcrd,asNapclccnhadattcmptcd
carlicrinthcccntury, crtc sprcadthcblcssingscflibcral
civilizaticn thrcugh thc canncn's mcuth, as thc ritish
had thrcughcut thc scvcntccnth, cightccnth, and ninc-
tccnthccnturics.ThcEurcpcancrdcrthatcamcintcbcing
with thc unihcaticn cfCcrmanyin :8
7
: was,"likc all its
prcdcccsscrs,crcatcdbywar."Wilcthcrcctscfthcprcs-
cnt Eurcpcan wcrldvicw, likc thcrcctscfthc Eurcpcan
Unicn itsclf, can bc traccd back tc thc Enlightcnmcnt,
Eurcpc'sgrcat-pcwcrpclitics fcrthc pastthrcchundrcd
ycars did nct fcllcw thc visicnary dcsigns ofthc philo-
scphcsandthcPhysiccrats.
As fcr thc Unitcd Statcs, thcrcis ncthing timclcss
abcutthcprcscnthcavyrcliancccnfcrccasatcclcfintcr-
naticnalrclaticns,ncrabcutthctilttcwardunilatcralism
andawayncmadcvcticntcintcrnaticnallaw.Amcricans
arcchildrcn cfthc Enlightcnmcnt,tcc, and in thc carly
3 Michael Howard, The Invention of Peace (Ne Haven, 2001) ,
P
47
9
ycars cf thc rcpublic wcrc mcrc faithml apcstlcs cf
its crccd. At its birth Amcrica was thc grcat hcpc cf
Enlightcnmcnt Eurcpcans, whc dcspaircd cfthcir cwn
ccntincnt andvicwcd Acrica as thc cnc placc "whcrc
rcascnandhumanity"might"dcvclcpmcrcrapidlythan
anyhcrc clsc''Thc rhctcric,ifnctalways thc practicc,
cfcarlyAmcrican fcrcign poli was sumscd with thc
principlcs cfthc Enlightcnmcnt.Amcrican statcsmcn cf
thc latc cightccnthccntury,likcthcEurcpcaustatcsmcn
cftcday, cxtcllcd thcvirtucs cfccmmcrcc asthcsccth-
ingbalm cfintcrnaticnal strifc andappcalcdtc intcrna-
ticnal lawandintcrnaticnalcpinicncvcrbrutcfcrcc.Thc
ycungUnitcd Statcswicldcdpcwcr against wcakcr pcc-
p|cscnthcNcrthAcricanccntincnt,butwhcnitcamc
tc dcalingwiththcEurcpcangiants,itclaimcdtc abjurc
pcwcr and assailcd as atavisticthc pcwcr pclitics cfthc
cightccnth- andninctccnth-ccnturyEurcpcancmpircs.
Scmchistcrianshavc glcancdncm this thc mistakcn
vicwthatthcAmcricanfcundinggcncraticnwasutcpian,
that it gcnuincly ccnsidcrcd pcwcr pclitics "alicn and
rcpulsivc" and was simplyunablc to "ccmprchcnd thc
impcrtancccfthcpcwcrfactcrinfcrcignrclaticns."
ut
Gccrgc Washingtcn, Alcxandcr Hamiltcn, Jchn Adams,
andc
Y
cnThcmasJcncrscnwcrcnctutcpians. Thcywcrc
wcllvcrscdinthcrcaliticscfintcrnaticnalpcwcrpclitics.
Thcycculd playby Eurcpcanrulcswhcncircumstanccs
pcrmittcdandcncnwishcdthcyhadthcpcwcrtcplaythc
4 Robert R. Palmer, The Age of the Democratic Revolution: A Politi
cal History of Europe and America, 1760-1800 (Princeton, 1959) , 1:242.
5 Feli Gilbert, To the Farewell Address: Ideas of Early American
Foreign Polic (Princeton, 1961) , p. 17.
OF PARADI S E AND POW E R
gamc cfpcwcr pclitics mcrc cncctivcly. ut thcy wcrc
rcalistic cncugh tc kncw that thcywcrc wcak, andbcth
ccnscicuslyandunccnscicuslythcyuscdthcstratcgicscf
thcwcaktc trytcgctthcirwayinthcwcrld.Thcydcni-
gratcdpcwcrpoliticsandclaimcdanavcrsicntcwarand
militarypcwcr,allrcalmsinwhichthcywcrcfar infcricr
tc thc Eurcpcan grcat pcwcrs. Thcy cxtcllcd thc virtucs
and amclicratingcncctscfccmmcrc, whcrcAmcricans
ccmpctcdcnamcrccqualplanc.Thcyappcalcdtcintcr-
naticnallawasthcbcstmcanscfrcgulatingthcbchavicr
cf naticns, kncwing wcll thcy had fcw cthcr mcans cf
ccnstraning Crcatritain and Francc.Thcykcwncm
thcirrcadingcfVattclthatinintcrnaticnallaw,"strcngth
crwcakcss. . . ccuntsfcr ncthing.Adwarfisasmucha
man as a giant is, a small Rcpublic is nc lcss a scvcrcign
Statc than thc mcst pcwcrml Kngdcm." Latcr gcncra-
ticnscfAmcricans,pcsscsscdcfagrcatdcalmcrcpcwcr
andinucncc cnthcwcrldstagc,wculdnctalwaysbcas
cnamcrcdcfthisccnstrainingcgalitarianqualitycfintcr-
naticnallaw. Inthccightccnthandcarlyninctccnthccn-
turics, it was thc grcat Eurcpcan pcwcrs that did nct
alwayswanttcbcccnstraincd.
Twc ccnturics latcr, Acricans and Eurcpcans havc
tradcdplaccs-andpcrspcctivcs. This ispartlybccauscin
thcsctwchundrcdycars,andcspcciallyinrcccntdccadcs,
thc pcwcr cquaticn has shincd dramatically. Wcn thc
Unitcd Statcswaswcak,itpracticcdthcstratcgicscfindi-
rccticn, thc stratcgics cfwcakncss, ncwthat thc Unitcd
6
Quoted in Gerald Stourzh, Aleander Hamilton and the Idea of
Republican Government (Stanford, 1970), p. 134.
1 1
Statcs is powcrml, it bchavcs as powcrm nations do.
WcnthcEuropcangrcatpowcrswcrcstrong,thcybchcvcd
in strcngth and martial glory. Now thcy scc thc wcrld
throughthc cycs ofwcakcr powcrs. Thcsc vcry dincrcnt
points ofvicw havc naturally produccd dincring stratc-
gicJudgmcnts,dincringasscssmcntsofthrcats andcfthc
propcrmcansofaddrcssmgthcm,dincrcntcalculationsof
intcrcst,anddincringpcrspcctivcs onmcvalucandmcan-
ingofintcrnationallawandintcrnaticnalinstitutions.
utcvcnthcpowcrgapohcrsonlypartofthcclana-
tionIorthcbroadgulfthathascpcncdbcnccnthcUnitcd
Statcs and Europc. For along with thcsc natural consc-
qucnccsofthctransatlanticdisparityofpowcr,thcrchas
alscopcncdabroadidcological gap. Europcans,bccausc
ofthciruniquchistoricalcxpcricnccofthcpastccntury-
culminatinginthccrcationofthcEuropcanUnicn-havc
dcvclopcdasctofidcals andprinciplcsrcgardingthcuti|-
ity and morality ofpowcr dincrcnt nom thc idcals and
principlcsofAmcricans,whchavcnotsharcdthatcxpcr-
cncc.If thcstratcgicchasmbctwccnthcUnitcdStatcsand
Europc appcars grcatcr than cvcr today, and grows still
widcrataworrngpacc,itisbccauscthcscmatcrialand
idcologicaldincrcnccsrcinforcconcancthcr.Thcdivisivc
trcndthcytogcthcrproduccmaybcimpcssiblctcrcvcrsc.
THE POWER GAP
Scmc might ask, what is ncw It is truc that Eurcpc has
bccndccliningasaglcbalmilitarypcwcrfcralcngtimc.
Thc mcst damaging blcw tc bcth Eurcpcan pcwcr and
ccnhdcnccfcllalmcstaccnturyagc,inthcwcrldwarthat
brckc cut in :p:
4
. That hcrrcndcus ccnict dcvastatcd
thrcc cf thc hvc Eurcpcan pcwcrs-Ccrmany, Austria-
Hungary, andRussia-that had bccn kcy pillars cf thc
ccntincntal balancc cf pcwcr sincc :8
7
:. It damagcd
Eurcpcan cccncmics, fcrcing thcm intc dccadcs-lcng
dcpcndcncccnAmcricanbankcrs.utmcstcfall,thcwar
dcstrcycdthcwillandspiritcfCrcat ritain andFrancc,
at lcast until thc ritish rallicd undcrChurchillin :p)p,
whcn itwas tcc latc tcavcid ancthcrwcrld war. In thc
:pzos, ritain rcclcd ncm thc "scnsclcss" slaughtcr cfa
whclc gcncraticn cf ycung mcn at Passchcndaclc and
cthcrklling hclds, and thc ritishgcvcrnmcntbcgan at
war'scndthc rapiddcmcbilizaticn cfits army.A night-
cncdIrancchadstrugglcdtc maintainadcquatcmilitary
fcrcctc dctcrwhat it ccnsidcrcdthcincvitablcrcturn cf
Ccrmanpcwcrandrcvanchism.Inthccarly:pzos,Francc
was dcspcratc fcr an alliancc with Crcat ritain, but the
Anglc-Acrican guarantcc tc dcfcnd Francc stipulatcd
in thc Vcrsaillcs Trcaty vanishcd intc thin air whcn thc
U. S. Scnatc rcmscd tc ratiq it. Mcanwhilc, thc trauma-
tizcd ritish,scmchcwccnvincingthcmsclvcs againstall
rcascn that Francc, nct Ccrmany, was thc grcatcstthrcat
tc Eurcpcan pcacc, procccdcd tc insist, as latc as :}
)4
,
that Francc disarm itsclf tc thc lcvcl cf Gcrmany. Win-
13
stcnChurchill'swas alcnclyvciccwarningcfmc"awml
dangcr" cf "pcrpctually asking thc Frcnch tc wcakcn
thcmsclvcs.'
T!c intcrwar cra was Eurcpc's hrst attcmpt tc mcvc

bcycndpcwcr pclitics,tc makcavirtuccut cfwcakncss.
Instcad cfrclying cn pcwcr, asthcyhadin thc past,thc
EurcpcanvictcrsinWcrldWarIputthcirfaithin"ccllcc-
tivc sccurity" and in its instituticnal cmbcdimcnt, thc
Lcaguc cfNaticns. "Our purpcsc,' dcclarcd cnc cfthc
lcaguc'slcadingstatcsmcn,was"tc makcwarimpcssiblc,
tckillit,tcannihilatcit.Tc dcthiswchadtc crcatcasys-
tcm''
5utthc"systcm" did nct wcrk, inpartbccauscits

lcadingmcmbcrshadncithcrthcpcwcr ncrthcwill.Itis
ironicthatthcdrivingintcllcctualfcrccbchindthischcrt
tosclvc Eurcpc'ssccuritycrisisthrcughthc crcaticncfa
supranaticnal lcgal instituticn was anAmcrican,Wccd-
rcwWilscn.Wilscnspckcwiththcauthcritycfwhathad
in rcccnt dccadcsbcccmccnc cfthcwcrld's richcstand
mcstpcwcrmlccuntrics, andwhcsclatccntryintcWcrld
War I had signihcantly aidcd thc Allicd victcry. Unfcr-
tunatcly, Wilscn spckcfcrAmcricaatatimcwhcnit,tcc,
was runningaway ncm pcwcr, and, as it turncd cut, hc
did nct actually spcak fcr his ccuntry. Thc Amcrican
rcmsal tc participatc in thc instituticn Wilscn crcatcd
dcstrcycdwhatcvcrsmallchanccitmayhavc hadtc suc-
cccd.As Churchillwrylyrccallcd,"Wc,whchaddcfcrrcd
scmuchtc Wilscn's| cpinicnsandwishcsinallthisbusi-
7 Winston Churchill, The Gathering Storm ( Boston, 1948) , p. 94.
8
Edvard Benes quoted in E. H. Carr, The Twent Years' Crisis,
1919-1939 ( London, 1948) , p. 30.
ncss ofpcaccmakng, wcrc told without much ccrcmcny
that wc ought to bc bcttcr informcd about thc Amcri-
can Constitution." Thc Europcans wcrc lcn to thcm-
sclvcs, and whcn connontcd by thc rising powcr of a
rcarming, rcvisionist Gcrmany in thc :p)os, "collcctivc
sccurity"mcltcd away and was rcplaccdby thc policy of
appcascmcnt.
At its corc, thc appcascmcnt ofNazi Gcrmanywas a
stratcgy
bascdonwcakncss,whichdcrivcdlcssnomgcnu-
inc inability to contain Ccrman powcr than from thc
undcrstandablc fcar ofanothcr grcat Europcan war. ut
builtontopofthisfoundationwasanclaboratcstructurc
ofsophisticatcdargumcntsaboutthcnaturcofthcthrcat
poscdbyCcrmany and thc bcst mcans ofaddrcssing it.
ritishomcials,inparticular,consistcntlydownplaycdthc
thrcat, or insistcd that it was not yct scrious cnough to
rcquirc action. "Ifit could bc provcd that Gcrmanywas
rcarming,' thc ritish Conscrvativc lcadcr Stanlcy ald-
winsaidin:p)),thcnEuropcwouldhavctodosomcthing.
"ut that situation had not yct ariscn."' Proponcnts of
appcascmcntproduccdmanyrcasonswhythcapplication
ofpowcrwasunncccssaryorinappropriatc. Somcargucd
that Gcrmany and its Nazi govcrnmcnt had lcgitimatc
gricvanccsthathadtobctakcnintoaccountbythcWcst-
crnpowcrs.ThcVcrsaillcsTrcaty,asJohnMaynardKcyncs
cxplaincd, had bccn harsh and countcrproductivc, and
ritain and Francc had onlythcmsclvcs to blamc ifGcr-
9 Churchill, The Gathering Storm, p. 12.
1
0
Quoted in A. J. P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War
( New York, 1983) , pp. 73-74.
: 5
man pclitics had turncd angry and rcvanchist. Wcn
HitlcrccmplaincdabcutthcmistrcatmcntcfcthnicGcr-
mans in Czcchcslcvakia and clscwhcrc, thcWcstcrn dc-
mccracics wcrc prcparcd tc co
ccdc thc pcint. Ncr did

thccthcrEurcpcanpcwcrswanttcbclicvcthatanidcc-
lcgi
_
al rinmadc ccmprcmisc with Hitlcr andthcNazis
impcssiblc.In:p)6thcFrcnchprimcministcr,Lccnlum,
tcld a visiting Ccrman ministcr, "I am a Mxist and a
Jcw,'but"wccannctachicvcanythingifwctrcatidcclcgi-
calbarricrsasinsurmcuntablc."''Manyccnvinccdthcm-
sclvcsthatalthcughHitlersccmcdbad, thcaltcrnativcstc
himinGcrmanywcrcprcbablywcrsc. ritishandFrcnch
cmcialswcrkcdtc gainHitlcr'ssignaturcon agrccmcnts,
bclicvinghcalcnccculdccntrclwhatwcrcassumcdtcbc
thcmcrccxtrcmcfcrccsinCcrmansccicty.'
-
Thc purpcsc cf appcascmcnt was tc buy timc and
hcpcthatHitlcrcculdbcsatishcd.utthcstratcgyprcvcd
disastrcusfcrritainandFrancc.Evcrypassingycarallcwcd
Gcrmany tocxplcit its latcnt cccncmic and industrial
supcriority and tc rcarm,tc thc pcint whcrc thc dcmc-
cratic Eurcpcan pcwcrs wcrc incapablc cf dctcrring cr
dcfcating Hitlcr whcn hc hnally struck. In :p
4
o, Hitlcr's
ministcrcfprcpaganda,JcscphCccbbcls,lcckcdbackcn
11
Quoted in Henry Kissinger, Diplomac (New York, 1994), p. 307.
1
2
As one French ofcial stationed in Berlin put it, "If Hitler is sin
cere in proclaiming his desire for peace, we will be able to congratulate
ourselves on having reached agreementj if he has other designs or if he
has to give way one day to some fanatic we wi l at least have postponed
the outbreak of a war and that is indeed a gain:' Quoted in Athony
Adamthwaite, France and the Coming of the Second World War, 1936
1939 (London, 1977), P.30j Kssinger, Diplomac, p. 29 4.
thc prcvicus twc dccadcs cf Eurcpcan diplcmacy with
scmcamazcmcnt.
In:p
))
aFrcnchprcmicrcughttchavcsaid,andif
I hadbccn thc Frcnchprcmicr I wculdhavc said
it) . "Thc ncw Rcich Chanccllcr is thc man whc
wrctcMein Kmpf which saysthisandthat.This
man cannctbctclcratcdin curvicinity. Eithcrhc
disappcars cr wc marchl" ut thcydidn't dc it.
Thcylcnusalcncandlctusslipthrcughthcris|
zcnc,andwcwcrcablctcsailarcundalldangcrcus
r
cfs.And when we were done, and well armed, bet

ter than they then they started the war!13
Thc scphisticatcd argumcnts cf appcascmcnt might
ccnccivablyhavcbccn morcvalidhadthcybccn applicd
tcadincrcntmanandadincrcntccuntryundcrdincrcnt
circumstanccs-fcrinstancc,tcthc Gcrmanlcadcrcfthc
:pzos, Gustav Strcscmann. Thcyhad bccn misapplicdtc
Hitlcr and thc Gcrmanycfthc :p)os. ut thcn, in truth,
thc appcascmcnt stratcg had bccn a prcduct nct cf
analysisbutcfwcakcss.
IfWcrld War I scvcrcly wcakcncd Eurcpc, thc Scc-
cndWcrld War that rcsultcd ncm this failurc cfEurc-
pcan stratcgyand diplcmacyallbut dcstrcycdEurcpcan
naticns asglcbalpcwcrs.Thcirpcstwarinabilitytc prc-
jcctsumcicntfcrcccvcrscastcmaintaincclcnialcmpircs
inAsia,Anica,andthcMiddlcEastfcrccdthcmtcrctrcat
1
3
Q
uoted in Paul Johnson, Modern Times: The World fom the
Twentes to the Eighties (New York, 19 83), p. 341.
:
7
cnamassivcscalcancrmorcthanhvcccnturicscfimpc-
ri dcminancc-pcrhaps thc mcst signihcant rctrcnch-
mcnt cfglcbal inucncc in human histcry. Lcss than a
dccadcintcthcCcldWar,Eurcpcansccdcdbcthcclcnial
hc|dings and stratcgic rcspcnsibilitics in Asia and thc
MiddlcEasttcthcUnitcdStatcs,scmctimcswi|linglyand
scmctimcsundcrAmcricanprcssurc,asinthcSuczcrisis.
At thc cnd cfWcrldWarII, manyinucntialAcri-
cans had hcpcd that Eurcpc cculdbc rccstablishcd as a
"third fcrcc"inthcwcrld, strcngcncughtc hcld itscwn
against thc ScvictUnicn and allcwthcUnitcd Statcstc
pullback frcm Eurcpc. Frank|in Rccscvclt, DcanAchc-
scn,andcthcrAcricancbscrvcrsbclicvcdCrcatritain
wculd shculdcr thc burdcn cf dcfcnding much cf thc
world against thc Scvict Unicn. In thosc carly pcstwar
days,PrcsidcntHarryTrumancouldcvcnimagincawcrld
whcrcLondonandMcscowcompctcdfcrinucncc,with
thc Unitcd Statcs scrvingas"an impartial umpirc."' ut
thcnthcritishgcvcrnmcntmadcclcarthatitcculdnct
ccntinuc thc cccncmic and military suppcrt tc Crcccc
andTurkcyithadbccnprcvidingsinccthccndcfthcwar.
y:p
47
, ritishcmcialssawthatthcUnitcd Statcswculd
sccn bc "pluckng thc tcrch cf wcrld lcadcrship ncm
curchillinghands'''
Eurcpcwasncwdcpcndcntcnthc
Unitcd Statcsfcritscwnsccurityandfcrglcbalsccurity.
Francc andritain did nct cvcn lUc thc idcacf an indc-
pcndcnt Eurcpcanblcc, a"third fcrcc,' fcaring itwculd
prcvidcthccxcuscfcrAmcricanwithdrawalncmEurcpc.
14 John Lewis Gaddis, Te Long Peace (New York, 19 87) , p. 55.
1
5 Ibid.
OnccagainthcywculdbclcnalcncfacingCcrmany, and
ncw thc Scvict Unicn as wcll.As cncAmcrican cmcial
put it, "Thc cnc faint clcmcnt cfccnhdcncc which thc
Frcnch| clingtc is thc fact that Amcrican trccps, hcw-
cvcrstrcnginnumbcr, standbctwccn thcm andthc Rcd
Army``'
Frcmthc cnd cfWcrld War !! and for thc ncxthny
ycars,thcrcforc,Eurcpcfcllintcastatcofstratcgicdcpcn-
dcncccnthcUnitcd Statcs. Thc onccglobal rcach cfthc
Eurcpcan pcwcrs nc lcngcrcxtcndcdbcycndthcCcnti-
ncnt. Eurcpc`s sclc, ifvital, stratcgic mission during thc
Cold War was tc stand hrm and dcfcnd its own tcrri-
tcry against any Sovict offcnsivc until thc Amcricans
arrivcd.AdEurcpcanswcrchardprcsscdtodccvcnthat.
Eurcpcan unwillingncsstc spcndasmuchonthcirmili-
taryasAmcricanadministraticnsbclicvcdncccssarywasa
ccnstant scurcc cftransatlantic tcnsicn,frcmthc cstab-
lishmcnt cfNATO tc thc days cfKcnncdy, whcsc dcc-
trinc cf "cxiblc rcspcnsc" dcpcndcd cn a signihcant
incrcasc in Ercpcan ccnvcnticnal fcrccs,tc thc Rcagan
ycars,whcn
_
cricancongrcssmcnclamcrcdfcrEurcpc
tcdcmcrctc"sharcthcburdcn"cfthcccmmcndcfcnsc.
utthccircumstanccs cfthcCcldWarcrcatcdapcr-
haps unavcidablc tcnsicnbctwccnAcrican and Eurc-
pcanintcrcsts.Acricansgcncrallyprcfcrrcdancncctivc
Eurcpcan military capability-undcr NATO ccntrcl, cf
ccursc-that cculd stcp Scvict armics cn Eurcpcan scil
shcrtcfnuclcarwar and with thc bulk cfcasualtics suf-
fcrcdbyEurcpcans,nctAcricans. Nctsurprisingly,many
1
6
Quoted in ibid. , p. 65
: p
Europcans took a dincrcnt vicw of thc most dcsirablc
formofdctcrrcncc.Thcywcrccontcnttorclyonthcpro-
tcctiononcrcdbythcu.s. nuclcarumbrclla,hopingthat
Europc'ssafctycouldbcprcscrvcdbythcU. S. -Sovictbal-
ancc of tcrror and thc doctrinc of mutually assurcd
dcstruction. !nthccarlyycarsofthcColdWar,Europcan
cconomicswcrc toowcakto build up sumcicntmilitary
capacityforsclf-dcfcnscanyway.utcvcnwhcnEuropcan
cconomicsrccovcrcdlatcrinthcColdWar,thcEuropcans
wcrcnotcspcciallyintcrcstcdin closingthcmilitarygap.
ThcAmcrican nuclcar guarantcc dcprivcd Europcans of
thcinccntivctospcndthckindofmoncythatwouldhavc
bccnncccssarytorcstorcthcmtomilitarygrcat-powcrsta-
tus.Thispsychologyofdcpcndcnccwasalsoanunavoid-
ablcrcalityofthcColdWarandthcnuclcaragc.Aproud
Caullist Francc might tryto cscapcitby lcaving NATO
andbuildingitsownsmallnuclcarforcc. utthcforce de
fappe was littlcmorcthansymbolism,it rclicvcdncithcr
Francc nor Europc nom stratcgic dcpcndcncc on thc
UnitcdStatcs.
!fEuropc'srclativc wcakncss appcarcdlcss ofaprcb-
lcmintransatlanticrclationsduringthcColdWar, itwas
partlybccauscofthcuniqucgcopoliticalcircumstanccscf
that ccnict.Athough dwarfcd bythctwo supcrpcwcrs
on its hanks, a wcakcncd Eurcpc ncvcrthclcss scrvcd as
thc ccntral stratcgic thcatcr of thc worldwidc strugglc
bctwccncommunismanddcmocraticcapitalism,andthis,
alongwith lingcringhabits ofworld lcadcrship, allcwcd
Europcansto rctain intcrnational inucncc and intcrna-
tional rcspcctbcyondwhatthcir shccrmilitarycapabili-
ticsmighthavcanordcd.Amcrica'sColdWarstratcgywas
built around thc transatlantic alliancc. Maintaining thc
unityand cohcsionofthcWcst"wascsscntial.Naturally,
this clcvatcd thc importancc of Europcan opinion on
global mattcrs, giving both Europcans andAmcricans a
pcrhapscxaggcratcdcstimationofEuropcanpowcr.
Thc pcrccption pcrsistcd into thc :ppos. Thc alkan
conicts ofthat dccadc forccd thc Unitcd Statcs to con-
tinuc attcnding to Europc as a stratcgic priority. Thc
NATOallianccappcarcdto havc foundancw,post-Cold
War mission in bringing pcacc to that part ofthc Con-
tincntstillpronctoviolcntcthnicconict,which,though
onasmallcrscalc,appcarcdnot unlikcthc ccntury's car-
licrgrcatconicts.ThccnlargcmcntofthcNATO alliancc
to includcformcrmcmbcrs ofthcSovictbloc-thcccm-
plction of thc Cold War victory and thc crcation cf a
Europcwholc and ncc"-was anothcr grandprcjcct cf
thc Wcst that kcpt Europc in thc forcfront ofAcrican
politicalandstratcgicthinkng.
And thcn thcrc was thc carly promisc ofthc ncw"
Europc. y bonding togcthcr into a singlc political and
cconomic unit-th
historic accomplishmcnt ofMaas-

tricht in :ppz-many hopcd to rccapturc Europc's cld
grcatncss in a ncwpolitical form.Europc"wouldbcthc
ncxt supcrpowcr, not only cconomically and politically
butalsomilitarily.ItwouldhandlccriscsonthcEuropcan
contincnt,suchasthccthnicconictsinthcalkans, and
it would rccmcrgc as a global playcr of thc nrst rank.
Inthc:ppos, Europcanscouldstillconndcntlyasscrtthat
thc powcr ofa unincd Europcwould rcstorc, nnally, thc
global multipolarity" that had bccn dcstroycd by thc
ColdWar and its ancrmath. Ad mostAcricans,with
2 1
mixcdcmotions,agrccdthatsupcrpowcrEuropcwasthc
mturc. Harvard Univcrsity's Samucl P. Huntington prc-
dictcdthatthc coalcscingofthc Europcan Unionwould
bcthcsinglcmostimportantmovc"inaworldwidcrcac-
tion against Amcrican hcgcmony and would producc a
trulymultipolar"twcnty-hrstccntury.
Had Europc mlhllcd this promisc during thc 1990S,
thcworldwouldprobablybcadincrcntplacctoday. Thc
UnitcdStatcs and Europc might nowbc ncgotiatingthc
ncwtcrmsofarclationshipbascdonaroughcqualityof
powcr, instcad ofstruggling with thcir vast disparity. It
is possiblc that thc product ofthat mutual adjustmcnt
would havc bccn bcnchcial to bcth sidcs, with Eurcpc
taking on somc cf thc burdcns of glcbal sccurity and
thc Unitcd Statcs paying grcatcr dcfcrcncc to Eurcpcan
intcrcstsandaspiraticnsasitfcrmulatcditscwnfcrcign
policics.
utthc"ncw"Eurcpcdidnotmm this promisc. In
thccconomicand pcliticalrcms,thc Europcan Unicn
produccdmiraclcs. Dcspitcthchcpcsandfcarscfskcptics
onboth sidcs ofthcAtlantic, Eurcpcmadc goodcnthc
promisc ofunity. And thc unitcd Europc cmcrgcd as an
cconomicpowcrofthchrstrank,ablctohclditsownwith
thcUnitcdStatcsandthcAsiancccnomicsandtcncgcti-
atc mattcrs ofintcrnational tradc and hnancc on cqual
tcrms. Ifthc cnd ofthc ColdWar hadushcrcdin an cra
whcrc cconomic powcr mattcrcd morc than military
powcr,asmanyinbothEuropcandthcUnitcdStatcshad
17 Samuel P. Huntington, "The Lonely Superpower:' Foreig Afairs
78 (MarchlApril 1999): 35-49 .
cxpcctcditwould,thcnthcEuropcanUnionwouldindccd
havcbccn poiscdto shapcthcworld ordcrwithas much
inucncc as thc Unitcd Statcs. ut thc cnd ofthc Cold
War did not rcducc thc salicncc ofmilitarypowcr, and
Europcansdiscovcrcdthat cconomic powcrdidnotncc-
cssarily translatc into stratcgic and gcopolitical powcr.
ThcUnitcdStatcs,whichrcmaincdbothancconomicand
amilitarygiant,faroutstrippcdEuropcinthctotalpowcr
itcouldbringtobcaronthcintcrnationalsccnc.
!nfact,thc1990S witncsscdnotthcriscofaEuropcan
supcrpowcr but thc mrthcrdcclincofEuropcinto rcla-
tivcmilitarywcakncsscomparcdtothcUnitcdStatcs.Thc
alkan conict at thc bcginning ofthc dccadc rcvcalcd
Europcan military incapacity and political disarray, thc
Kosovo conflict at dccadc's cnd cxposcd a transatlantic
gapinmilitarytcchnologyandthcabilitytowagcmodcrn
warfarcthatwouldonlywidcninsubscqucntycars.Out-
sidcofEuropc,bythccloscofthc1990S, thcdisparitywas
cvcn morc starky apparcnt as it bccamc clcar that thc
ability and will ofEuropcan powcrs,individually or col-
lcctivcly, to proj c
t dccisivc forccinto rcgions ofconict

bcyond thc Contincnt wcrc ncgligiblc. Europcans could
providcpcacckccpingforccsinthcalkans-indccd,thcy
cvcntually did providc thc vast bulk of thosc forccs in
osnia, Kosovo, and Maccdonia-and cvcn in Afghani-
stan and pcrhaps somcday in !raq. ut thcy lackcd thc
whcrcwithal to introducc and sustain a hghting forcc in
potcntially hostilc tcrritory, cvcn in Europc. Undcr thc
bcst ofcircumstanccs, thc Europcan rolc was limitcdto
hllingoutpcacckccpingforccsancrthcUnitcdStatcshad,
largcly on its own, carricd out thc dccisivc phascs of a
23
military mission and stabilizcd thc situatin. As somc
Europcansputit,thcrcaldivisionoflaborconsistcdofthc
Unitcd Statcs makng thc dinncr" and thc Europcans
doingthcdishcs."
A grcatcr Amcrican propcnsity to usc military forcc
didnotalways mcana grcatcrwillingncssto riskcasual-
tics. Thc disparityin mditarycapabilityhad nothing tc
do with thcrclativccouragc cfAcrican and Europcan
soldicrs. Ifanyhing, Frcnch and ritish and cvcn Gcr-
man govcrnmcnts could scmctimcs bc lcss troublcd by
thc risks tc thcirtrcops thanwcrcAcrican prcsidcnts.
Duringthc alkan crisis in thc mid-:ppos and latcr in
Kosovo,ritishPrimcMinistcrTonylairwasmorcwill-
ingto put forccs onthc grcund against Scrbiathanwas
Prcsidcnt ill Clinton. ut in somc ways this disparity,
too,workcd against thc Europcans. ThcAcrican dcsirc
toavoidcasualticsandthcAcricanwillingncsstospcnd
hcavilyonncwmilitarytcchnologicsprovidcdthcUnitcd
Statcs with a formidablc military capability that gavc it
dcadly accuracy nom grcat distanccs with lowcr risk to
forccs. Europcan militarics, onthc othcr hand,wcrc lcss
tcchnologicallyadvanccdandmorcdcpcndcntontroops
hghting in closcr quartcrs. Thc chcct cf this tcchno-
logical gap, which opcncdwidc ovcr thc coursc ofthc
:ppos,whcnthcU. S. militarymadcrcmarkablcadvanccs
in prccision-guidcd munitions, joint-strikc opcrations,
and communications and intclligcncc gathcring, only
madc Amcricans cvcn morc willing to go to war than
Europcans, who lackcd thc abilityto launch dcvastating
attacks nom safcr distanccs and thcrcforc had to pay a
biggcrpriccforlaunchinganyattackatall.
Thcsc Europcan military inadcquacics comparcd to
thc powcr of thc Unitcd Statcs should havc comc as
no surprisc,sincc thcscwcrc charactcristics ofEuropcan
forccsduringthcColdWar.Thcstratcgicchallcngcofthc
Cold War and ofa containmcnt doctrinc that rcquircd,
in Ccorgc Kcnnan's famous words, adroit and vigilant
countcr-forccatascricsofconstantlyshininggcographi-
cal and politicalpoints"had compcllcdthc Unitcd Statcs
tobuildamilitaryforcccapablcofprojcctingpowcrinto
scvcral distant rcgions at oncc.
'
" Europc's stratcgic rolc
hadbccncntirclydincrcnt,todcfcnditsclfandwithstand
thconslaughtofSovictforccs, nottoprojcctpowcr. ' For
most Europcan powcrs, this rcquircd maintaining largc
landforccs rcadyto blockSovictinvasionroutcs in thcir
owntcrritory,notmobilcforccscapablcofbcingshippcd
to distant rcgions. Amcricans and Europcans who pro-
poscdancrthcColdWar thatEuropcshouldcxpand its
stratcgicrolcbcyondthcContincntwcrcaskingforarcvo-
lutionaryshinin Europcan stratcgyandcapability. !twas
unrcalisticto cxpcct Europcans to rcturn to thc intcrna-
tionalgrcat-powcrstatusthcyhadcnjoycdpriortoWorld
War!!,unlcss Europcanpcoplcsvcrcwillingtoshinsig-
nihcant rcsourccs nom social to militaryprograms and
to rcstructurc and modcrnizc thcir militarics to rcplacc
18
X
[
George F Kennan 1, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct;' Foreign
Afairs, July 1947, reprinted in James F Hoge Jr. and Fareed Zakaria,
eds. , The American Encounter: The United States and the Making of the
Modern World (New York, 1997) , p. 165.
19 The United Kingdom and France had the greatest capability to
project force overseas, but their capacity was much smaller than that of
the United States.
25
forccs dcsigncdforpassivc tcrritcrialdcfcnscwithfcrccs
capablcofbcingdclivcrcdandsustaincdfarncmhcmc.
Clcarly,Europcanvotcrswcrcnctwillingtcmakcsuch
a rcvoltionary shin in prioritics. Nct only wcrc thcy
unwillingtopaytoprojcctfcrccbcycndEurcpc,but,ahcr
thc ColdWar, thcywould notpayfcr sumcicnt fcrcc tc
conductcvcnminormilitaryactionsonthcircwnccntincnt
withoutAmcricanhclp.Nordiditsccmtomattcrwhcthcr
Europcan publics wcrc bcing askcd tc spcnd mcncy tc
strcngthcnNATOoranindcpcndcntEurcpcanfcrcignd
dcfcnsc policy. Thcir answcrwas thc samc. Rathcr than
vicwingthc collapscofthc SovictUnicnas anoppcrtu-
nitytocxpandEuropc'sstratcgicpurvicw,Europcanstcck
itasnopportunitytocashinonasizablcpcaccdivIdcnd.
ForEuropc,thcfallofthcSovictUniondidnotjustclimi-
natc a stratcgic advcrsary, in a scnsc, it climinatcd thc
nccdforgcopolitics.ManyEuropcanstcokthccndcfthc
ColdWarasaholidaynomstratcgy.Dcspitctalkofcstab-
lishingEuropcasa global supcrpowcr,thcrcforc,avcragc
Europcan defcnscbudgcts gradually fcll bclow 2 pcrccnt
of CDP, and throughout thc 1990S, Europcan mditary
capabiliticsstcadilyfcllbchindthoscofthcUnitcdStatcs.
ThccndofthcColdWarhadadincrcntcncctcnthc
othcrsidcofthcAtlantic.ForalthcughAmcricanslcckcd
forapcaccdividcnd,too,anddcfcnscbudgctsdcclincdcr
rcmaincd fat during most ofthc1990S, dcfcnsc spcnd-
ingstillrcmaincdabovc 3 pcrccntofCDPFastonthchccls
of thc Sovict cmpirc's dcmisc camc Iraq's invasIcn cf
KuwaitandthclargcstAmcricanmilitaryacticninaquar-
tcrccntury-thcUnitcdStatcsdcplcycdmcrcthanahalf
million soldicrs to thc Pcrsian Gulf rcgion. Thcrcancr
AmcricanadministrationscutthcColdWarforcc,butnot
asdramaticallyasmighthavcbccncxpcctcd.!nfact,suc-
ccssivc Amcrican administrations did not vicw thc cnd
ofthc Cold War as providing a stratcgic holiday. From
thc hrst ush administration through thc Clintonycars,
Amcrican stratcgy and force planning continucd to bc
bascdonthcprcmiscthatthcUnitcdStatcsmighthavcto
hghtandwintwowars in dihcrcntrcgions ofthcworld
almost simultancously. This two-war standard, though
oncn qucstioncd,wasncvcrabandoncd by military and
civilianlcadcrswhobclicvcdthcUnitcdStatcsdidhavcto
bcprcparcdtonghtwarsonthcKorcan Pcninsulaandin
thc Pcrsian Culf. Thc fact that thc Unitcd Statcs could
cvcnconsidcrmaintainingsuchacapabilitysctitfarapart
from its Europcan allics, who on thcir own lackcd thc
capacity to nght cvcn onc small war closc to homc, lct
alonctwolargcwarsthousandsofmilcsaway.5yhistori-
cal standards, Amcrica's post-Cold War military powcr,
particularlyitsabilitytoprojcctthatpowcrto allcorncrs
ofthcglobc, rcmaincdunpreccdcntcd.
Mcanwhilc, thc vcry fact ofthc Sovict cmpirc's col-
lapsc vastly incrcascd Amcrica's strcngth rclativc to thc
rcstofthcworld.ThcsizablcAmcrican militaryarscnal,
onccbarclysumcicnt to balancc Sovictpowcr,was now
dcploycdin a worldwithout a singlc formidablc advcr-
sary.Thisunipolarmomcnt"hadancntirclynaturaland
prcdictablcconscqucncc:!tmadcthcUnitcd Statcs morc
willingtouscforccabroad.WiththcchcckofSovictpowcr
rcmovcd, thc Unitcd Statcs was ncc to intcrvcnc practi-
callywhcrcvcrandwhcncvcrit chosc-a factrccctcdin
thc prolifcration of ovcrscas military intcrvcntions that
z
7
bcgan duringthchrstushadministrationwiththcinva-
sion ofPanamain:p8p,thcPcrsianGulfWarin:pp:,and
thc humanitarian intcrvcntion in Somalia in :ppz, and
contincdduringthcClintonycarswithintcrvcntionsin
Haiti,osnia,andKosovo.WiIcmanyAmcricanpoliti-
cianstalkcdofpullingbacknomthcworld,thcrcalitywas
an Amcrica intcrvcning abroad morc ncqucntly than it
hadthroughoutmostofthcColdWar.Thankstothcncw
tcchnologics,thcUnitcdStatcswasalsonccrtouscforcc
aroundthc world in morclimitcdways through air and
missilcstrikcs,whichitdidwithincrcasingncqucncy.Thc
cndofthc ColdWarthuscxpandcdanalrcadywidcgulf
bctwccnEuropcanandAmcricanpowcr.
PSYCHOLOGIES OF POWER
AND WEAKNESS
Howcouldthis grcat andgrowing disparityofpowcr fail
to crcatc agrowinggapinstratcgicpcrccptionsandstra-
tcgicculturc" Strongpowcrs naturalIyvicwthc world
dincrcntly thanwcakcrpowcrs. Thcy mcasurc risks and
thrcats dincrcntly, thcy dchnc sccurity dincrcntly, and
thcyhavcdincrcntlcvclsoftolcranccforinsccurity.Thosc
withgrcatmilitarypowcrarcmorclikclytoconsidcrforcc
a uscml tool of intcrnational rclations than thosc who
havc lcss militarypowcr. Thc strongcr may, in fact, rcly
on forcc morc than thcy should. Onc ritish critic of
Amcrica'spropcnsitytomilitaryactionrccallsthcoldsaw
Wcnyouhavcahammcr,allproblcmsstarttolooklikc
nails." This is truc. ut nations without grcat military
powcr facc thc oppositc dangcr: Whcn you don't havc a
hammcr,youdon'twantanythingtolooklikcanail.Thc
pcrspcctivcs and psychologics of powcr and wcakcss
cxplainmuch,thoughccrtainlynotall,ofwhatdividcsthc
UnitcdStatcsandEuropctoday.
Thcproblcmis notncw.DuringthcColdWar,Amcri-
canmilitaryprcdominanccandEuropc'srclativcwcakcss
produccd important and somctims scrious disagrcc-
mcntsovcrthcU. S. -Sovictarms raccandAmcricanintcr-
vcntionsinthcthirdworld.Caullism, Ostolitik, andthc
variousmovcmcntsforEuropcanindcpcndcnccandunity
wcrc manifcstations not only of a Europcan dcsirc fcr
honorand nccdomofaction.Thcy also rccctcdaEurc-
pcanconvictionthatAmcrica'sapproachtothc CcldWar
was too confrontational,tco militaristic,and too dangcr-
ous. Ancr thc vcry carly ycars of thc Cold War, whcn
Churchill and othcrs somctimcsworricdthatthcUnitcd
Statcswastoogcntlcin dcalingwith Stalin,itwasusually
thcAmcricanswhopuscdfcrtoughcrformsofccntain-
mcnt and thc Europcans who rcsistcd. Thc Europcans
bclicvcd thcykcw bcttcr how to dcal with thc Sovicts:
throughcngagcmcntandscduction,throughcommcrcial
and political tics, thrcugh paticncc and forbcarancc. It
wasalcgitimatcvicw,sharcdattimcsbymanyAmcricans,
cspcciallyduringandancrthcVictnamWar,whcnAmcri-
canlcadcrsbclicvcdthcy,too,wcrcworkingnomaposi-
tion ofwcakcss. ut Europcans' rcpcatcd disscnt from
thchardcrAmcrican approach to thc ColdWar rccctcd
Europc's mndamcntal and cnduringwcakncss rclativc to
thcUnitcdStatcs:Europcsimplyhadfcwcrmilitaryoptions
at its disposal, and itwas morc vulncrablc to a powcrml
z p
SovictUnion. ThcEuropcanapproachmayhavcrccctcd,
too, Europc's mcmory of contincntal war. Amcricans,
whcnthcywcrc notthcmsclvcs cngagcdinthc subtlctics
ofdctcntc,vicwcdthcEuropcan approachasancwform
ofappcascmcnt, a rcturn to thc fcarml mcntalityofthc
:p
)
os.Europcansvicwcditasapolicyofsophistication,as
a possiblc cscapc nom what thcyrcgardcd as Washing-
ton'scxccssivclyconnontationalapproachtothcColdWar.
Duringthc ColdWar, howcvcr, thcscwcrc morctac-
tical than philosophical disagrccmcnts. Thcy wcrc not
argumcntsaboutthcpurposcsofpowcr,sinccbcthsidcs
of thc Atlantic clcarly rclicd on thcir poolcd military
powcrtodctcranypossiblcSovictattack,nomattcrhow
rcmotcthcchanccsofsuchanattackmightsccm.Thccnd
ofthcColdWar,whichbothw dcncdthcpowcrgap and
rcmovcdthccommonSovictcncmy, notonlycxaccrbatcd
thc dincrcncc in stratcgic pcrspcctivcs but also changcd
thcnaturcofthcargumcnt.
For much of thc :ppos, nostalgic policymakcrs and
analystsonbothsidcsofthcAtlanticinsistcdthatAmcri-
cansandEuropcansmostlyagrccdonthcnaturcofthcsc
thrcats to pcacc and world ordcr, whcrc thcy disagrccd
wasonthcqucstionofhowtorcspond.Thissunny analy-
sisovcrlookcdthcgrowingdividc.Morcandmorcovcrthc
pastdccadc,thcUnitcdStatcsanditsEuropcanallicshavc
hadrathcrsubstantialdisagrccmcntsovcrwhatconstitutc
intolcrablcthrcatstointcrnationalsccurityandthcworld
ordcr,asthccascof!raqhasabundantlyshown.Andthcsc
disagrccmcntsrccct,abovcall,thcdisparityofpowcr.
Onc of thc biggcst transatlantic disagrccmcnts sincc
thc cnd of thc Cold War has bccn ovcr which "ncw"
thrcats mcrit thc most attcntion. Acrican administra-
tionshavcp|accdthcgrcatcstcmphasisonso-ca||cdroguc
statcs and what Prcsidcnt Gcorgc W. ush a ycar ago
callcd thc axis of cvil." Most Europcans havc takcn a
ca|mcr vicw of thc risks poscd by thcsc rcgimcs. As a
Frcnch omcial oncc to|d mc, Thc prob|cm is `fai|cd
statcs,not`rogucstatcs'"
Wyshou|dAmcricans andEuropcansvicwthcsamc
thrcats dincrcnt|y Europcans oncn arguc that Acri-
canshavcanunrcasonab|cdcmandforpcrfcct"sccurity,
thc product ofliving for ccnturics shic|dcd bchind two
occans. Europcansc|aimthcyknowwhatitis|ikctolivc
with dangcr, to cxst sidc by sidc with cvil, sincc thcy'vc
donc it for ccnturics-hcncc thcir grcatcr to|crancc for
such thrcats as maybcposcdby Saddam Husscin's Iraq,
thc ayatol|ahs' !ran, or North Korca. Amcricans, thcy
claim, makc far too much ofthc dangcrs thcsc rcgimcs
posc.
utthcrcis|csstothiscu|turalcxplanationthanmccts
thccyc.ThcUnitcdStatcsinitsformativcdccadcs|ivcdin
a statc of substantia| insccurity, surroundcd by hosti|c
Europcan cmpircs on thc North Amcrican contincnt, at
constantriskofbcingtornapartbyccntrimgalforccsthat
wcrc cncouragcdby thrcats nomwithout: Nationa|insc-
curity formcd thc corc ofCcorgcWashington's Farcwcl|
Addrcss. As for thc Europcans` supposcd tolcrancc for
insccurityandcvil,itcanbcovcrstatcd. Forthcbcttcrpart
of thrcc ccnturics, Europcan Catho|ics and Protcstants
20
For that matter, this is also the view commonly found in
Aerican textbooks.
31
morc oncn prcfcrrcd to kill than to tolcratc cach othcr,
nor havc thc past two ccnturics shown al that much
mutual tolcrancc bctwccn Frcnch and Gcrmans. Somc
Europcans argucthat prccisclybccausc Europc has suf-
fcrcdsomuch,ithasahighcrtolcranccforsuncringthan
Acrica and thcrcforc a highcr tolcrancc for thrcats.
Morclikclythcoppositcistruc.ThcmcmoryofthcFirst
Wor|d War madc thc ritish and Frcnch publics morc
fcarmlofNaziGcrmany, notmorctolcrant,andthisatti-
tudccontributcdsignihcantlytothcappcascmcntstratcgy
ofthc1930S.
Abcttcr cxplanationofEuropc's grcatcr tolcranccfor
thrcats today is its rclativc wcakncss. Thc dincring psy-
chologics of powcr and wcakncss arc casy cnough to
undcrstand.A man armcd onlywith a knifc maydccidc
thatabcarprowlingthcforcstisatolcrablcdangcr,inas-
much as thc altcrnativc-hunting thc bcar armcd only
withaknifc-isactuallyriskicrthanlyinglowandhoping
thcbcarncvcrattacks.Thcsamcmanarmcdwitharic,
howcvcr, will likcly makc a dicrcnt calculation ofwhat
constitutcs a tolcrablc risk. Why should hc risk bcing
maulcdtodcathifhcdocsn'thavctoThispcrfcctlynor-
malhumanpsychologyhas drivcn a wcdgc bctwccn thc
UnitcdStatcsandEuropc. ThcvastmajorityofEuropcans
always bclicvcd that thc thrcat poscd by Saddam Hus-
scinwas morc tolcrablcthan thc risk ofrcmovinghim.
utAmcricans,bcingstrongcr,dcvclopcdalowcrthrcsh-
old of tolcrancc for Saddam and his wcapons of mass
dcstruction, cspccially ancr Scptcmbcr 11. oth asscss-
mcnts madc scnsc, givcn thc dincring pcrspcctivcs ofa
powcrml Amcrica and a wcakcr Europc. Europcans luc
to say that Amcricans arc obscsscd with ming prob-
lcms, but it is gcncrally truc that thosc with a grcatcr
capacitytomproblcmsarcmorclikclytotrytomthcm
thanthoscwhohavcnosuchcapability.Acricanscould
imaginc succcssmlly invading Iraq and toppling Sad-
dam,andthcrcforcbythccndofzoozmorcthan
7
opcr-
ccntofAcricansfavorcd such action. Not surprisingly,
Europcans found thc prospcct both unimaginablc and
nightcning.
Thcincapacityto rcspondto thrcatslcadsnotonlyto
tolcrancc.Itcanalsolcadtodcnial.Itisnormaltotryto
put out of onc`s mind that which onc can do nothing
about. According to onc studcnt of Europcan opinion,
cvcn thcvcry focus on `thrcats" dincrcntiatcs Amcrican
policymakcrs from thcir Europcan counterparts.Amcri-
cans, writcs Stcvcn Evcrts, talk about forcign thrcats"
suchasthcprolifcrationofwcaponsofmassdcstruction,
tcrrorism, and `roguc statcs.` `` ut Europcans look at
challcngcs,"suchascthniccontlict,migration,organizcd
crimc,povcrtyandcnvironmcntaldcgradation."AsEvcrts
notcs,howcvcr, thckcydincrcncc is lcss a mattcr ofcul-
turc and philosophy than of capability. Europcans "arc
mostworricdaboutissucs. . . thathavcagrcatcrchanccof
bcing solvcd bypolitical cngagcmcnt and hugc sums of
moncy.`
'
In othcr words, Europcans focus on issucs
challcngcs"whcrc Europcan strcngths comc into play,
but not on thosc thrcats" whcrc Europcan wcakcss
2
1 Steven Everts, "Unilateral America, Lightweight Europe?: Man
aging Divergence in Transatlantic Foreign Policy;' workng paper,
Centre for European Reform, February 2001.
) )
makcssolutionsclusivc.!fEuropc'sstratcgicculturctcday
placcs lcss valuc on hard powcr and military strcngth
and morc valuc on such son-powcr tools as cccncmics
and tradc, isn't it partly bccausc Europc is mditardy
wcak and cconomically strong Acricans arc quickcr
to ackowlcdgc thc cxistcncc ofthrcats,cvcntopcrccivc
thcmwhcrcothcrsmaynotsccany,bccauscthcycanccn-
ccivcofdoingsomcthingtomcctthoscthrcats.
Thc dihcring thrcat pcrccptions in thc Unitcd Statcs
and Europc arc not just mattcrs of psychology, hcw-
cvcr. Thcyarc also groundcd inapractical rcalitythatis
anothcrproduct ofthcdisparityofpowcrandthcstruc-
turcofthcprcscntintcrnationalordcr.Forwhilc!raqand
othcrrogucstatcshavc poscd athrcatto Europc, objcc-
tivcIy thcy havc not poscd thc samc lcvcl of thrcat to
EuropcansasthcyhavctothcUnitcdStatcs. Thcrcis,hrst
of all, thc Amcrican sccurity guarantcc that Europcans
cnj oy and havc cnjoycd for sb dccadcs, cvcr sincc thc
Unitcd Statcs took upon itsclfthc burdcn ofmaintain-
ing ordcr in far-ung rcgions ofthc world-nom East
Asia to thc Middlc East-nom which Europcan powcr
hadlargclywithdrawn.EuropcanshavcgcncraUybclicvcd,
whcthcrornotthcyadmitittothcmsclvcs,thatwhcncvcr
!raq or somc othcr roguc nation cmcrgcd as a rcal and
prcscnt dangcr, as opposcdto mcrclyapotcntial dangcr,
thcn thc Unitcd Statcs would do somcthing about it. If
duringthc ColdWar Europcby ncccssitymadc a majcr
contributiontoitsowndcfcnsc,sinccthccndofthcCcld
War Europcanshavc cnjoycdanunparaUclcdmcasurccf
nccsccurity"bccauscmostofthclikclythrcatscmanatc
nomrcgionsoutsidcEuropc,whcrconlythcUnitcdStatcs
OF PAR ADISE AND POWER
canprojcctcncctivcforcc.!n avcrypractica|scnsc-that
is, whcn it comcs to actual stratcgic planning-!raq,
North Korca, !ran, oranyothcr roguc statcin thcworld
has not bcn primarily a Europcan problcm. Nor, ccr-
tainly,isChina. othEuropcansandAmcricansagrccthat
thcscarcprimarilyAmcricanprob|cms.
ThisiswhySaddamHusscinwasncvcrpcrccivcdtobc
thcthrcattoEuropcthathcwastothcUnitcdStatcs. Thc
logicalconscqucnccofthctransat|anticdisparityofpowcr
has bccn that thc task of containing Saddam Husscin
always bclongcd primarily to thc Unitcd Statcs, not to
Europc, and cvcryonc agrccd on this
including Sad-
dam, which was why he always considcrcd thc Unitcd
Statcs, not Europc,hisprincipaladvcrsary.!n thc Pcrsian
Culf,thcMidd|cEast,andmostothcrrcgionsofthcworld
,including Europc) , thc Unitcd Statcs plays thc ro|c of
ultimatccnforccr.Youarcsopowcrful,Èuropcansoncn
saytoAmcricans. Sowhydoyoufcclsothrcatcncd"ut
it is prccisclyAmcrica`s grcat powcr and its willingncss
to assumcthc rcsponsibilityforprotccting othcrnations
thatmakcitthcprimarytargct,andoncnthcon|ytargct.
MostEuropcanshavcbecnundcrstandablycontcntthatit
shouldrcmainso.
Apol|ofEuropcanandAmcricanopiniontakcninthc
summcr ofzooz nicclyrcvca|cdthis transatlantic gap in
pcrccptionsofthrcat.Athoughwidc|yrcportcdasshow-
ingAmcricanandEuropcanpublicsinroughagrccmcnt,
thc rcsu|ts indicatcd manymorc Amcricans than Euro-
22
Notwithstanding the sizable British contribution to military
operations in Iraq.
)
pcans wcrricd abcut thc thrcat pcscd nct cnly by !raq,

!ran,andNcrthKcrca,butalscbyChina,Russiathc!ndia-
Pakis
an ccnncntaticn, and cvcn thc ccnict bctwccn

!sracl and thc Arab statcs-cn almcst all thcsc issucs
signihcantly mcrc Amcricans than Eurcpcans cxprcsscd
ccnccrn. utwhyshculdAmcricans,prctcctcdbytwc
occans,' bc morc wcrricd about a ccnagraticn cn thc
Asian subcontincnt or in thc Middlc East or in Russia
thanthcEurcpcans,whclivcscmuchclcscrThcanswcr
is that Amcricans know that whcn intcrnational criscs
crupt,whcthcrinthcTaiwanStraitorinKashmir,thcyarc
likclytobcthchrsttobccomcinvolvcd. Europcanskow
this,tcc. PollsthatshowAcricansworryingmorc than
Europcansaboutallnaturcofglobalsccuritythrcatsand
Europcansworryingmorcaboutglobalwarmingdcmon-
stratcthatbcthsctsofpublicshavcarcmarkablyaccuratc
scnsccfthcirnaticns'vcrydincrcntglcbalrclcs.
Amcricansarcccwbcys,'Eurcpcanslcvc tc say.And
thcrc is truth in this. Thc Unitcd Statcs dccs act as an
intcrnaticnal shcrin, sclf-appcintcd pcrhaps but widcly
2
3 The poll, sponsored by the German Marshall Fund and the
Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, was taken between June 1 and
July 6, 2002. Asked to identif which "possible threats to vital interests"
were "extremely important:' 91 percent of Americans listed "interna
tional terrorism" as opposed to 65 percent of Europeans. On "Iraq
developing weapons of mass destruction:' the gap was 28 points, with
86 percent of Aericans identifing Iraq a an "extremely important"
threat compared to 58 percent of Europeans. On "Islamic fndamental
ism:' 61-49; on "military confict between Israel and Arab neighbors:'
67-43; on "tensions between India and Pakstan:' 54-32; on "develop
ment of China as a world power:' 56-19; on "political turmoil i
Russia:' 27-15.
OF PARADISE AN D POWER
wclcomcdncvcrthclcss,tryingtocnforccsomcpcaccand
j usticc in what Amcricans scc as a lawlcss world whcrc
outlaws nccd to bc dctcrrcd ordcstroycd, oncn through
thcmuzzlcofagun.Europc,bythisWildWcstanalogy,is
morc likc thc saloonkccpcr. Outlaws shoot shcrins, not
saloonkccpcrs. In fact, from thc saloonkccpcr's point of
vicw,thcshcrifftryingtoimposcordcrbyforcccansomc-
timcsbcmorcthrcatcningthanthcoutlaws,who,atlcast
forthctimcbcing,mayj ustwantadrink.
Wcn Europcans took to thc strccts by thc millions
ancr Scptcmbcr ::, most Amcricans bclicvcd it was out
of a scnsc ofsharcd dangcr and common intcrcst: Thc
Europcans kncwthcy could bc ncxt. ut Europcans by
and largc did not fccl that way. Europcans havc ncvcr
rcally bclicvcd thcy arc ncxt. Thcy could bc sccondary
targcts-bccauscthcyarc allicdwiththcUnitcdStatcs-
but thcy ar not thc primarytargct, bccausc thcy no
longcrplaythcimpcrialrolcinthcMiddlcEastthatmight
havccngcndcrcdthcsamcantagonismagainstthcmasis
aimcd at thc Unitcd Statcs. Wcn Europcans wcpt and
wavcd Amcrican ags ancr Scptcmbcr ::, it was out of
gcnuinchumansympathy. Itwasancxprcssionofsorrow
and ancction for Amcricans. For bcttcr or for worsc,
Europcan displays ofsolidarity wcrc a product mcrc cf
fcllowfcclingthanofcarcmlcalculations ofsclf-intcrcst.
Europcans'hcartfcltsympathy, unacccmpanicdbyascnsc
ofsharcd risk and common rcsponsibility, did not draw
Europcans and Amcricans togcthcr in stratcgic partncr-
ship.Onthc contrary, as soonasAmcricansbcganlook-
ingbcyondthcimmcdiatctaskofnndinganddcstroying
) 7
OsamabinLadcnandA Qacdatobroadcrstratcgicgoals
inthcwarontcrrorism,Èuropcansrccoilcd.
Diffcring pcrccptions ofthrcats andhowto addrcss
thcm arcin somcways onlythc surfacc manifcstation of
morc mndamcntal dincrcnccs in thc worldvicws of a
strong Unitcd Statcs and a rclativclywcakcrEuropc. !t is
not j ust that Europcans and Amcricans havc not sharcd
thcsamcvicwofwhattodoaboutaspccincproblcmsuch
as!raq.Thcydonotsharcthcsamcbroadvicwofhowthc
worldshouldbcgovcrncd,aboutthcro|cofintcrnational
institutions and intcrnational law, aboutthc propcrbal-
anccbctwccnthcuscofforccandthcuscofdiplomain
intcrnationalanairs.
Somc of this dincrcncc is rclatcd to thc powcr gap.
Europc'srclativcwcakcsshasundcrstandablyproduccd
apowcrmlEuropcanintcrcstin building aworldwhcrc
militarystrcngth and hard powcr mattcr lcss than cco-
nomicandsohpowcr,anintcrnationalordcrwhcrcintcr-
national lawand intcrnational instituIions mattcr mcrc
than thc powcr of individual nations, whcrc undatcraI
actionbypowcrml statcs isforbiddcn,whcrc al nations
rcgardlcss of thcir strcngth havc cqual rights and arc
cqually protcctcd by commonly agrccd-upon intcrna-
tionalrulcsof
bchavior.ccauscthcyarcrclativclywc,
Europcanshavc a dccp intcrcstindcvaluing and cvcntu-
allycradicatingthcbrutallawsofananarchicHobbcsian
worldwhcrcpowcristhcultimatcdctcrminantofnational
sccurityandsucccss.
This is no rcproach. !tis what wcakcr powcrs havc
wantcd nom timc immcmorial. !t was what Amcricans
wantcd inthccightccnth and carly ninctccnth ccnturics,
whcnthcbrutalityofaEuropcansystcmofpowcrpolitics
runbythcglobalgiantsofFrancc,ritain,andRussialcn
Acricans constantly vulncrablc to impcrial thrashing.
!twaswhatthcothcrsmall powcrs ofEuropcwantcdin
thoscycars,too,onlyto bcsnccrcdatbyourbonkngs
andothcrpowcrmlmonarchs,who spokc instcadofrai
son d'etat. Thc grcat proponcnt ofintcrnationallaw on
thc high scas in thc cightccnth ccnturywas thc Unitcd
Statcs,thcgrcatopponcntwasritain'snavy,thcmistrcss
ofthcscas."!nananarchicworld,smallpowcrsalwaysfcar
thcy will bc victims. Crcat powcrs, on thc othcr hand,
oncnfcarrulcsthatmayconstrainthcmmorcthanthcy
doanarchy.!nananarchicworld,thcyrclyonthcirpowcr
toprovidcsccurityandprospcrity.
This natural and historic disagrccmcnt bctwccn thc
strongcr andthcwcakcrmanifcsts itsclfintoday'strans-
atlanticdisputcovcrthcissucofunilatcralism.Europcans
gcncrallybclicvc thcir objcction to Amcrican unilatcral-
ismisproofofthcirgrcatcrcommitmcnttoprinciplcsof
worldordcr.Anditistruethatthcircommitmcnttothosc
idcals,althoughnotabsolutc,isgrcatcrthanthatofmost
Acricans.utEuropcansarclcsswillingtoacknowlcdgc
anothcr truth: thatthcirhostilityto unilatcralism is also
sclf-intcrcstcd.SinccEuropcanslackthccapacitytoundcr-
takcunilatcralmilitaryactions,cithcrindividuallyorcol-
lcctivclyasEuropc,'itisnaturalthatthcyshouldopposc
allowingothcrstodowhatthcycannotdothcmsclvcs.For
Europcans, thc appcal to multilatcralism and intcrna-
tional lawhasarcalpracticalpayoffandlittlccost.
Thc samc cannot bc said ofthc Unitcd Statcs. Polls
)
p
consistcntly show that Amcricans support multdatcral
action in principlc. Thcycvcn support acting uncr thc
rubricofthcUnitcdNations,which,ahcrall,Amcricans
crcatcd.utthcfactrcmainsthatthcUnitcdStatcscanact
unilatcrallyandhasdonc somanytimcswithrcasonablc
succcss.ThcfacilcasscrtionthatthcUnitcdStatcscannot
"go italonc''is morc a hopcmlplatitudcthan a dcscrip-
tion ofrcality.Amcricans ccrtainlyprcfcrto acttogcthcr
withothcrs, andAmcrican actionsstand abcttcrchancc
ofsucccssifthcUnitcdStatcshasallics.utifitwcrclitcr-
allytructhatthcUnitcdStatcscouldnotactunilatcrally,
wc wouldn't bc having a grandtransatlantic dcbatc ovcr
Amcricanunilatcralism.Thcproblcmtoday,ifitisaprob-
lcm, is that thc Unitcd Statcscan "go it alonc,' and it is
hardly surprisingthatthc Amcrican supcrpowcr should
wishtoprcscrvcitsabilitytodoso.Ccopoliticallogicdic-
tatcsthatAmcricanshavc alcsscompcllingintcrcstthan
Europeans in upholding multilatcralism as a univcrsal
principlcforgovcrningthcbchaviorofnations.Wcthcr
unilatcral acticn is a good or a bad thing, Amcricans
objcctivclyhavc morcto loscnomoutlawingitthanany
othcrpowcrintoday'sunipolarworld.!ndccd,forAmcri-
cansto sharcthc Europcanpcrspcctivc onthcvirtucsof
multilatcralis
'
thcywouldhavctobccvcnmorcdcvotcd
tothcidcalsandprinciplcsofanintcrnationallcgalordcr
than Europcans arc. For Europcans, idcals and intcrcsts
convcrgcinaworldgovcrncdaccordingtothcprinciplcof
multilatcralism. ForAmcricans,thcy do notconvcrgc as
much.
!t is also undcrstandablc that Europcans should fcar
Acrican unilatcralism and scck to constrain it as bcst
OF PARADISE A ND POWER
thcycanthroughsuchinstitutionsasthcUnitcdNations.
Thosc who cannot act unilatcrally thcmsclvcs naturally
want tohavcamcchanismforcontrcllingthoscwhocan.
FromthcEuropcanpcrspcctivc,thcUnitcdStatcsmaybc
a rclativcly bcnign hcgcmon, but insofar as its actions
dclaythc arrival ofaworld ordcrmorc conducivc to thc
safctyofwcakcrpowcrs, it is obj
cctivclydangcrous.This
is oncrcascnwhy inrcccntycars aprincipal objcctivc of
Europcan forcign policy has bccomc, as onc Europcan
obscrvcr puts it, thc "multilatcralising" of thc Unitcd
Statcs. ItiswhyEuropcans insist thatthcUnitcdStatcs
act only with thc approval ofthc UN Sccurity Councd.
ThcSccurityCouncilisapalcapprcximationofagcnuinc
multilatcralordcr,foritwasdcsigncdbythcUnitcdStatcs
togivcthchvc"grcatpowcrs"ofthcpostwarcraancxclu-
sivc authorityto dccidc whatwas andwas not lcgitimatc
intcrnationalaction.TodaythcSccurtyCouncilcontains
onlyonc"grcatpowcr,"thcUnitcdStatcs. utthcSccurity
Council is ncvcrthclcss thc onc placc whcrc a wcakcr
nationsuchasFrancchasatlcastthcthcorcticalpowcrto
controlAmcricanactions,qthcUnitcdStatcscanbcpcr-
suadcdtocomctothcSccurityCouncilandbcboundby
its dccisions. ForEuropcans,thcUNSccurityCouncilisa
substitutcforthcpowcrthcylack.
Indccd, dcspitc thc prcdictions of Huntington and
many rcalist thcorists, thc Europcans havc not sought
to chcck thc rising powcr of thc Amcrican colossus by
amassing a countcrvailing powcr of thcir own. Clcarly
2
4 Everts, "Unilateral Aerica, Lightweight Europe?"
4 1
thcydo notconsidcr cvcn a unilatcralist Unitcd Statcs a
sumcicntthrcat to makc thcm incrcascdcfcnscspcnding
to containit.Norarcthcywillingto riskthcirvasttradc
with thc UnitcdStatcsbyattcmpting towicldthcir cco-
nomic powcr against thc hcgcmon. Nor arc thcywdling
to allythcmsclvcswith China, which is willingto spcnd
moncyondcfcnsc,inordcrtocountcrbalanccthcUnitcd
Statcs.!nstcad,EuropcanshopctocontainAmcricanpowcr
withoutwiclding powcr thcmsclvcs. Inwhat may bc thc
ultimatc fcat ofsubtlcty and indircction, thcy want to
controlthcbchcmothbyappcalingtoitsconscicncc.
Itisasoundstratcgy,asfarasitgocs.ThcUnitcdStatcs
is a bchcmoth with a conscicncc. It is not Louis XV's
FranccorGcorgcIII's England.Amcricans donotarguc,
cvcnto thcmsclvcs,thatthciractionsmaybcj ustihcdby
raison d'etat. Thcydo notclaimthcrightofthcstrongcr
orinsistto thc rcstofthcworld, asthcAthcnians didat
Mclos,matthc strongrulcwhcr
thcycanandthcwcak
suncr what thcy must'' Amcricans havc ncvcr acccptcd
thc principlcs of Europc's old ordcr nor cmbraccd thc
Machiavcllian pcrspcctivc. Thc Unitcd Statcs is a libcral,
progrcssivc socicty through and through, and to thc
cxtcnt that Amcricans bclicvc in powcr, thcy bclicvc it
mustbca mcans ofadvancingthc principlcs ofa libcral
civilization and a libcral world ordcr. Acricans cvcn
sharc Europc's aspirations for a morc ordcrlyworld sys-
tcmbascdnotonpowcrbutonrulcs-ancrall,thcywcrc
striving for such a world whcn Europcans wcrc still
cxtolling thc laws ofMachtolitik. utwhilc thcsc com-
monidcalsandaspirationsshapcforcignpolicicsonboth
sidcs of thc Atlantic, thcy cannot complctcly ncgatc thc
vcry dincrcnt pcrspcctivcs nom which Europcans and
Amcricansvicwthcworldandthcrolc ofpowcrinintcr-
nationalanairs.
HYPERPU I SSANCE
Thcprcscnttransatlantictcnsionsdidnotbcginwiththc
inaugurationofCcorgcW. ushin}anuary2001, nordid
thcy bcgin ancr Scptcmbcr 11. Wilc thc ham-handcd
diplomacyofthcushadministrationinitscarlymonths
ccrtainlydrcwasharpcrlincundcrthcdincringEuropcan
andAmcricanpcrspcctivcs onthcissucsofintcrnational
govcrnancc, and whilc thc attacks ofScptcmbcr::shonc
thc brightcst possiblc light on thc transatlantic gulfin
stratcgicpcrccptions,thoscdivisionswcrcalrcadycvidcnt
during thc Clinton ycars and cvcn during thc hrst ush
administration. As carly as :ppz, mutual rccriminations
had bccn rifcovcrosnia. Thc hrstush administration
rcfuscd to act,bclicvingit had morc important stratcgic
obligations clscwhcrc. Europcans dcclarcd thcy would
act-itwas,thcyinsistcd,thc hour ofEuropc"-butthc
dcclaration provcd hollow whcn it bccamc clcar that
Europc could not act cvcn in osnia without thc Unitcd
Statcs. Whcn Francc and Ccrmany took thc hrst small
stcps to crcatc somcthinglikc an indcpcndcnt Europcan
dcfcnsc forcc, thc ush administration scowlcd. From
thcEuropcanpointofvicw,itwasthcworstofbothworlds.
ThcUnitcdStatcswaslosingintcrcstinprcscrvingEuro-
4 )
pcan sccurity, but at thc samc timc it was hostilc to
Europcan aspirations to takc on thc task thcmsclvcs. '
Europcans complaincd about Amcrican pcrhdy, andA-
cricanscomplaincdaboutEuropcanwcakcssandingra-
titudc.
Today many Europcans vicwthc Clinton ycars as a
timc of transatlantic harmony, but it was during thosc
ycarsthatEuropcansbcgancomplainingaboutAcrican
powcrandarroganccinthcpost-ColdWarworld.Itwas
duringthcClintonycarsthatthcn-Frcnchforcignminis-
tcr Hubcrt Vcdrinc coincd thc tcrm hyperpuissance to
dcscribcanAmcricanbchcmothtooworryinglypowcrml
tobc dcsignatcdmcrclyasupcrpowcr.Anditwasduring
thc1990S thatEuropcansbcgantovicwthcUnitcdStatcs
asa` `hcctoringhcgcmon''Suchcomplaintswcrcdircctcd
cspcciallyatSccrctaryofStatcMadclcincAlbright,whom
oncAmcricancriticdcscribcd,abithypcrbolically,asthc
hrstSccrctaryofStatcinAmcricanhistorywhoscdiplo-
matic spccialty. . . is lccturingothcrgovcrnmcnts,using
thrcatcning languagc and tastclcssly bragging of thc
powcrandvirtucofhcrcountry."
Evcn in thc i}}os thc issuc on which Amcrican and

Europcanpolicicsbcganmostnotablytodivcrgcwas!raq.
EuropcanswcrcappallcdwhcnAlbrightandothcradmin-
istration ofhcials in :}}
7
bcgan suggcsting that thc cco-
2
5 Charles Grant, "European Defence Post-Kosovo?," workng
paper, Centre for European Reform, June 1999, p. 2.
26
The comment was by former State Department adviser Charles
Maechling Jr. , quoted in Thomas W. Lippman, Madeleine Albright and
the New American Diplomac ( Boulder, CO, 2000) , p. 165.
nomicsanctionsplaccdon!raq ancr thc CulfWar could
not bc lincdwhilc Saddam Husscin rcmaincd in powcr.
Thcybclicvcd, in classically Europcan fashion, that !raq
should bc oncrcd inccntivcs for bcttcr bchavior, not
thrcatcncd, in classically Amcrican fashion, with morc
cconomicormilitarycocrcion. Thcgrowingsplitbctwccn
thcUnitcdStatcsanditsallicsonthc!raqqucstion camc
intothcopcnatthccndof:pp
7
,whcnthcClintonadmin-
istration tricd to incrcasc thc prcssurc on aghdad to
coopcratc with UN arms inspcctors, and Francc j oincd
Russia and China in blocking thc Amcrican proposals
in thc UN SccurityCouncil.Wcn thc Clinton adminis-
tration nnally turncd to thc usc of military forcc and
bombcd Iraq in Dcccmbcr :pp8, it did so without a UN
SccurityCouncilauthorizationandwithonlyCrcatritain
byitssidc.Initswaningmonths, 1hcClinton administra-
tioncontinucdtobclicvcthat!raq,undcrSaddamHus-
scin, rcmains dangcrous, unrcconstructcd, dcnant, and
isolatcd." It would ncvcr bc ablc to bc rchabilitatcd or
rcintcgratcdintothccommunityofnations"withSaddam
inpowcr.
ThiswasnotthcvicwofFranccormostofthc
rcst of Europc. Thc rchabilitation and rcintcgration of
SaddamHusscin'sIraqwcrcprccisclywhatthcysought.
!t was during thc :ppos, too, that somc ofthc con-
tcntious issucs that would producc transatlantic storms
during thc sccond ush administration madc thcir nrst
appcarancc.Clintontookthcnrststcpstowardconstruct-
2
7 Address by Assistant Secretary of State Martin Indyk to the
Council on Foreign Relations, April 22, 1999, quoted in ibid. , p. 183.
4
inga ncwmissilcdcfcnscsystcm dcsigncdtc prctcctthc

Unitcd Statcs nom nuclcar-armcd rcguc statcs such as
Ncrth Korca. Such a systcm thrcatcncd tc undc t
Antiballisti
MissilcTrcaty and thc dcctrinc cfmutually

assurcd dcstructicn that Eurcpcans had lcng valucd as
ccntraltcmcircwnstratcgicsccurity.Italscthrcatcncdtc
prctcct Amcrican scil whilc lcaving Eurcpcans still vul-
ncrablc to nuclcar attack,which Eurcpcans undcrstand-
ablyccnsidcrcdundcsirablc.ThcClintcnadministraticn
ncgotiatcd thc Kyoto prctoccl tc addrcss glcbal climatc
changc but dclibcratcly did not submit it to thc Scn-
atc,whcrc it was ccrtain to bc dcfcatcd.And itwas thc
Clinton administration, proddcdbySccrctaryofDcfcnsc
William Cohcn and scnior military omcials at thc Pcn-
tagon, that hrst dcmandcd that Acrican troops bc
immuncnomprosccutionbythcncw!ntcrnationalCrimi-
nalCourtwhichhadbccomcthcquintcsscntialsymbcl
ofEuropcan aspirations to a world in which all naticns
wcrc cqualundcrthclaw. !ntakingthistackaway frcm
thc Europcan multilatcralist conscnsus, Prcsidcnt Clin-
tonwas to somccxtcnt bowingto prcssurcs ncm ahcs-
tilc Rcpublican-dominatcd Congrcss. ut thc Clintcn
administration itsclfbclicvcd thcsc trcaticswcrc awcd,
cvcnClintonwa
notasEurcpcan"ashcwculdlatcrbc
dcpictcd. In any casc, thc grcwing divcrgcncc bctwccn
AcricanandEuropcanpclicicsduringthcClintcnycars
rccctcd a dccpcr rcality. Thc Unitcd Statcs in thc pcst-
ColdWarcrawasbccomingmcrcuniIatcralinitsapprcach
to thc rcst cfthc world at a timc whcn Eurcpcans wcrc
cmbarking cnancwandvigcrcus cncrttc build amcrc
O F PARADISE AND P O WER
comprchcnsivc intcrnational lcgal systcm prcciscly to
rcstrainsuchunilatcralism.
ThcwarinKosovointhcspringof1999 gavcanintcr-
cstinghintofthcmturc.Althoughthcallicdmilitarycam-
paign against Scrbia`s Slobodan Miloscvicwas a succcss,
andrcprcscntcdthchrstoccasioninits hp-ycarhistory
thatNATO had cvcrundcrtakcnmilitaryaction,thccon-
ict also rcvcalcd subtlc hssurcs in thc post-Cold War
alliancc-hssurcs that survivcd Kosovo but might not
withstandthcgrcatcrprcssurcsofadincrcntkindofwar
undcrdincrcntintcrnationalcircumstanccs.
Thc conduct of thc war rccctcd thc scvcrc trans-
atlantic military imbalancc. Thc Unitcd Statcs cw thc
maj ority ofmissions, almostall ofthc prccision-guidcd
munitions droppcd in Scrbia and Kosovo wcrc madc in
Amcrica, and thc unmatchcd supcriority of Amcrican
tcchnical intclligcncc-gathcring capabilitics mcant that
99 pcrccnt ofthc proposcd targcts camc fromAcrican
intclligcnccsourccs.ThcAcricandominanccofthcwar
cnorttroublcdEuropcansintwoways. Onthconchand,
itwas arathcrshockingblowtoEuropcanhonor.Astwo
ritish analysts obscrvcd ancr thc war, cvcn thc Unitcd
Kingdom,whichpridcsitsclfonbcingascriousmilitary
powcr,couldcontributconly4 pcrccntofthcaircranand
4 pcr ccnt ofthc bombs droppcd."
To Europc's most
rcspcctcd stratcgic thinkcrs in Francc, Ccrmany, and
ritain,thcKosovo warhadonlyhighlightcdthcimpo-
tcncc of Europc`s armcd forccs." !t was cmbarrassing
2
8
Tim Garden and John Roper, "Pooling Forces:' Centre for
European Reform, December 1999.
4 7
that cvcn in a rcgion as closc as thc alkans, Europc's
ability to dcploy forcc" was but a mcagcr naction" of
Acri
a's.
-
Morc troubling still was that Europcan dcpcndcncc

onAmcricanmilitarypowcrgavcthcUnitcdStatcsdomi-
nantinucnccnotonlyovcrthcwaythcwarwasfought
butalsoovcrintcrnationaldiplomacybcforc,during,and
ancrthcwar.Europcanshadfavorcdapauscinthcbomb-
ing ancr a fcw days, for instancc, to givc Miloscvic a
chancc to cnd thc crisis. ut thc Unitcd Statcs and thc
Amcrican NATO commandcr, Ccncral Wcslcy K. Clark,
rcmscd. MostEuropcans,cspcciallythcFrcnch,wantcdto
cscalatc thc bombing campaign gradually, to rcducc thc
damagctoScrbiaandgivcMiloscvicinccntivctocndthc
conuictbcforcNATO dcstroycdcvcrythinghcvalucd.ut
Clark disagrccd.InU. S. militarythinking,'hc cxplains,
wcsccktobcasdccisivcaspossiblconccwcbcgintousc
forcc''
any Europcanswantcdto focus thc bombing

onScrbianforccscngagcdincthnicclcansing"inKosovo.
ut as Clark rccalls, MostAcricans bclicvcd that thc
bcst and mostrapidwaytochangcMiloscvic'svicwswas
tostrikcathim andhisrcgimcashardaspossiblc."'
Wcthcr thc Acricans orthc Europcans wcrc right
aboutthcwayhatwar oranywar shouldbcfought,for
Europc thc dcprcssing fact rcmaincd that bccausc thc
29 Christoph Bertram, Charles Grant, and Francois Heisbourg,
"European Defence: The Next Steps:' Centre for European Reform,
CER .Bulletin 14 ( October/November 2000) .
3
0
Wesley K. Clark, Waging Modern War (New York, 2001) , p. 449.
31 Americans also didn't want their pilots flying at low altitudes
where they were more likely to be shot down. Ibid.
OF PARADIS E AND POW E R
Kosovo war was fought with `1mcrican cquipmcnt," it
was fought largcly according to `1mcrican doctrinc."
ForallEuropc'sgrcatcconomicpowcrandforallitssuc-
ccssatachicvingpoliticalunion,Europc'smilitarywcak-
ncss had produccd diplomatic wcakncss and sharply
diminishcditspolitical inucncc comparcdtothatofthc
UnitcdStatcs,cvcninacrisisinEuropc.
Thc Amcricans wcrc unhappy, too. Gcncral Clark
and his collcagucs complaincd 1hat thc laborious cffort
to prcscrvc conscnsus within thc alliancc hampcrcd thc
hghtingofthcwaranddclaycditssucccssmlconclusion.
cforc thc war, Clark latcr insistcd,wc could not prc-
scnt an unambiguous and clcar warning to Miloscvic,'
partly bccausc many uropcan countrics would not
thrcatcn action without a mandatc nomthc UN Sccu-
rityCouncil-what Clark,intyicallyAmcricanfashion,
callcd Europc's lcgal issucs." For thc Acricans, thcsc
lcgal issucs" wcrc obstaclcs to propcrly planning and
prcparing" for thc war. Duringthc hghting, Clarkand
his Amcrican collcagucs wcrc cxaspcratcd by thc nccd
constantlytohndcompromiscbctwccnAcricanmilitary
doctrincandwhatClarkcaUcdthcEuropcanapproach."
!t wasalwaysthcAmcricanswhopushcdforthc cscala-
tiontoncw,morcscnsitivctargcts. . . andalways somcof
thc Alics who cxprcsscd doubts and rcscrvations." !n
3
2
Garden and Roper, "Pooling Forces."
33 Clark, Waging Modern War, pp. 420, 421. "The lack of legal
authority:' Clark recalls, "caused almost every NATO government ini
tially to reject Secretary Cohen's appeal to authorize a NATO threat"
prior to the outbreak of war in early 1999.
34 Ibid., p. 449.
4 p
Clark'svicw,Wcpaidapriccinopcrationalcffcctivcncss
byhavingto constrainthcnaturcofthc opcration to ht
withinthcpoliticalandlcgalconccrnsofNATO mcmbcr
nations."' Thc rcsult was a warthatncithcr Europcans
norAcricanslikcd. InamcctingofNATO dcfcnscmin-
istcrs afcw monthsancrthcwar, oncministcrrcmarkcd
thatthcbiggcstlcssonofthcallicdwarinKosovowasthat
wcncvcrwanttodothisagain."
Fortunatclyforthchcalthofthcallianccin:ppp,Clark
andhis supcriors in thc Clinton administrationbclicvcd
thcpriccforallicdunitywasworthpaying.utAcrican
willingncssto prcscrvctransatlanticcohcsioncvcnatthc
costofmilitarycncctivcncssowcdagrcatdcaltothcspc-
cial,ifnotuniquc,circumstanccs ofthcKosovoconict.
ForthcUnitcdStatcs,prcscrvingthccohcsionandviabil-
ity of thc alliancc was not just a mcans to an cnd in
Kosovo,itwasamongthcprimaryaimsofthcAerican
intcrvcntion,just as saving thc alliancc had becn a pri-
marymotivcforAmcrica'scarlicrintcrvcntioninosnia,
and just as prcscrving thc cohcsion ofthc alliance had
bccn a primary goal of Amcrican stratcgy during thc
CoIdWar.
Amcricanabstcntion nom thc alkanconictduring
thc hrst ush administrationand in Clinton's hrst tcrm
had sccmcd to thrcatcnNATO itsclf. Wcn Sccrctary of
Statc}amcsakcrrcfcrrcdtothcalkanwarasa strictly
Europcan conict" and dcclarcd that thc Unitcd Statcs
didnothavcadoginthathght,"suchscntimcnts,widcly
35 Ibid. , p. 426.
3
6
As Clark wryly reports, "No one laughed." Ibid. , p. 417.
O F PARADISE AND P O WER
sharcd among his collcagucs, including cspccially thcn-
Chairman ofthc Joint Chicfs ofStahColin Powcll, had
raiscdtroublingqucstionsaboutAmcrica'srolcinEuropc
in thc post-Cold War world. Was thc Unitcd Statcs still
committcd to Europcan sccurity and stability Could
NATO mcct what wcrc thcn considcrcd to bc thc ncw
challcngcs ofthc post-ColdWarcra, cthnic conict and
thc collapsc ofstatcs Orhad thcAmcrican-lcd alliancc
outlivcditsuscmlncsstothcpointwhcrcitcouldnotstop
aggrcssion and cthnic clcansing cvcn on thc Europcan
contincnt
Amcrican involvcmcnt in Kosovo or osnia was not
bascd on calculations cf a narrow Amcrican national
intcrcst,'atlcastasmostAmcricansundcrstoodthctcrm.
WilcAmcricanshadacompcllingmoralintcrcstinstop-
pinggcnocidcandcthnicclcansing,cspcciallyinEuropc,
Acrican rcalist thcorists insistcdthcUnitcd Statcs had
nonationalintcrcst"atstakcinthcalkans.WcnClin-
ton omcials and othcrsupportcrs ofAmcrican intcrvcn-
tiondcfcndcdAmcricanmilitaryactiononthcgroundsof
thc nationalintcrcst,it was as a mcans ofprcscrvingthc
alliancc and rcpairing thc fraycd bonds of thc trans-
atlanticrclationship.AsinthcColdWar,Amcricafought
inthcalkansultimatclytoprcscrvcthcWcst."Andthat
goal dctcrmincd Amcrican military stratcgy. As Ccncral
Clarkputsit,No singlc targct orsct oftargctswasmorc
importantthanNATO cohcsion."
Such an approach to hghtingthcwarmayhavcbccn
soundinKosovoandosnia.utitraiscdqucstionsabout
37 Ibid., p. 430.
5 1
thc mturc. Would Clark or any mturc Amcrican com-
mandcr makc thc samc calculation in dincrcnt circum-
stanccs Would hc bc willing to sacrihcc opcrational
cncctivcn
ss, rapid cscalation, `crican military doc-

trinc,' and thc usc ofdccisivc forcc in awarwhosc pri-
mary goal was not thc cohcsion and prcscrvation of
NATO andEuropcInfact,thcKosovowarshowcdhow
dimcult itvas going to bcfor thc Unitcd Statcs and its
Europcanallicstohghtanywartogcthcr.Watifthcyhad
to hght a war not primarily "humanitarian" in naturc
What if Amcricans bclicvcd thcir vital intcrcsts wcrc
dircctlythrcatcncdWhatifAcricanshadsuhcrcdhor-
rcndous attacks onthcirowntcrritoryand fcarcd morc
attacks wcrc comingWouldAcricans insuchcircum-
stanccshavc thc samctolcrancc for thc clumsyandcon-
straincdNATO dccision-makingandwar-hghtingproccss
Would thcy want to compromisc again with thc "Euro-
pcanapproach"towarfarc,orwouldthcyprcfcrto"goit
alonc" Thc answcr to thosc qucstions camc ahcr Scp-
tcmbcr11. WithalmostthrccthousanddcadinNcwYork
City, andOsamabinLadcn onthc loosc inAghanistan,
thc U. S. military and thc ush administrationhad littlc
intcrcst in workng through NATO.his mayhavc bccn
unfortunatcnomthcpcrspcctivcoftransatlanticrclations,
butitwashardlysurprising.
Thc fact is that by thc cnd ofthc 1990S thc dispar-
ityofpowcrwas subtly rcnding thc fabric ofthc trans-
atlantic rclationship. ThcAmcricanswcrcunhappyand
impaticnt about constraints imposcdby Europcan allics
whobroughtsolittlctoawarbutwhoscconccrnfor"lcgal
issucs" prcvcntcd thc war's chcctivc prosccution. Thc
Europcans wcrc unhappy about Amcrican dominancc
and thcir own dcpcndcncc. Thc lcsson for Amcricans,
includingthctop omcials inthcClintonadministration,
wasthatcvcnwiththcbcstintcntions,multilatcralaction
couldnotsuccccdwithoutasignihcantclcmcntofAmcri-
canunilatcralism, anAcricanwillingncsstouscitsovcr-
whclming powcr to dominatc both war and diplomacy
whcnwcakcrallicshcsitatcd. ThcClintonadministration
hadcomcintoofhcctalkingaboutasscrtivcmultilatcral-
ism",itcndcduptalkingaboutAmcricaasthcindispcns-
ablcnation."
Thc lcsson for many Europcans was that Europc
nccdcdtotakcstcpstorclcascitsclfatlcastpartiallynom
a dcpcndcncc on Amcrican powcr that, ancr thc Cold
War, sccmcd nolongcr ncccssary. This,in turn,rcquircd
that Europc crcatc somc indcpcndcntmilitarycapability.
At thc cnd of :}}3, that j udgmcnt promptcd no lcss a
nicndofthcUnitcdStatcsthanTonylairtorcachacross
thcChanncltoFranccwithanunprcccdcntcdoncrtoadd
ritain`swcighttohithcrtostallcdcnortstocrcatcacom-
mon EuropcanUniondcfcnsc capabilityindcpcndcnt of
NATO. Togcthcr, lair and }acqucs Chirac won Europc-
widc approval for buildinga forcc of6o, ooo troops that
couldbcdcploycdfarnomhomcandsustaincdforupto
aycar.
Oncc again, had this Anglo- Frcnch initiativc bornc
huit,thcUnitcdStatcsandEuropcmighttodaybcinthc
proccss of cstablishing a ncw rclationship bascd on a
grcatcr Europcan military capability and grcatcr indc-
pcndcncc from Amcrican powcr. ut this initiativc is
hcadcdthc way ofallothcr proposals to cnhancc Euro-
)
pcan military pcwcr and stratcgic sclf-rcliancc. In Dc-
ccmbcr 2001 thcclgian fcrcign ministcr suggcstcd that
thcEUmilitaryfcrccshculdsimply"dcclarcitsclfcpcra-
ticnalwithcutsuchadcclaraticnbcingbascdcnanytruc
capability''"Infact,thccncrttcbuildaEurcpcanfcrcc
has sc far bccn an cmbarrassmcnt tc Eurcpcans. Tcday,
thc EurcpcanUnicn is nc closcrtc hclding an indcpcn-
dcntfcrcc,cvcn asmaUcnc,thanitwasthrccycars agc.
And this Iatcst failurc raiscs thc gucsticn that sc many
Eurcpcans and sc many"transatlanticists"in thc Unitcd
Statcs havc bccn unwilling cvcn tc ask, much lcss tc
answcr.Why hasn't Eurcpc mlhllcd thc prcmisc cfthc
EurcpcanUnicninfcrcignanddcfcnscpclicy, crmctthc
prcmptingscfscmccfitsmcstimpcrtantlcadcrstcbuild
upcvcncncughmilitarypcwcrtctiltthcbalancc,justa
littlc,awayhcmAmcricandcminancc
THE POST MOD ERN PAR ADISE
Thc answcr lics scmcwhcrc in thc rcalm cfidcclcgy, in
Eurcpcanattitudcsnctjusttcwarddcfcnscspcndingbut
tcwardpcwcritsclf.Impcrtantasthcpcwcrgaphasbccn
inshapingthcrcspcctivc stratcgicculturcs cfthcUnitcd
Statcs and Eurcpc, ifthc disparity cfmilitary capabili-
tics wcrc thc cnlyprcblcm, thc scluticnwculd bcfairly
straightfcrward. With a highly cducatcd and prcductivc
pcpulaticncfalmcst400 miUicnpccplcanda$ptrihicn
cccncmy, Eurcpctcdayhasthcwcalthandtcchnclcgical
3
8
John Vinocur, "On Both War and Peace, the EU Stands Divided:'
International Herald Tribune, December 17, 2001.
capabilitytomakcitsclfmorcofaworldpowcrinmilitary
tcrms ifEuropcanswantcdtobccomcthatkindofworld
powcr.Thcycouldcasilyspcndtwiccasmuchasthcyarc
currcntlyspcndingondcfcnscifthcybclicvcditncccssary
todoso. AndclosingthcpowcrgapbctwccnthcUnitcd
Statcs and Europc would probably go somcwaytoward
closingthcgapinstratcgicpcrccptions.
Thcrc is a cynical vicw currcntinAmcrican stratcgic
circlcsthatthcEuropcanssimplycnj oythcnccridc"thcy
havc gottcn undcr thc Amcrican sccurity umbrclla ovcr
thcpastsixdccadcs.CivcnAmcrica`swillingncsstospcnd
somuchmoncyprotcctingthcm,Europcanswouldrathcr
spcnd thcirownmoncyonsocialwclfarcprograms,long
vacations,andshortcrworkwccks.utthcrcismorctothc
transatlantic gulfthan a gap inmilitarycapabilitics, and
whilc Europc may bc cnjoying a frcc ridc in tcrms of
global sccurity, thcrc is morc to Europc`s unwillingncss
tobuildupitsmilitarypowcrthancomfortwiththcprcs-
cntAmcrican guarantcc. Ancr all, thc Unitcd Statcs in
thcninctccnthccnturywas thc bcnchciaryofthc ritish
navy`sdominanccofthcAtlanticandthcCaribbcan.ut
that did not stop thc Unitcd Statcs from cngaging in its
own pcacctimc naval buildup in thc :88os and :8pos, a
buildup that cquippcditto launch andwin thcSpanish-
39 Europeans insist that there are certain structural realities in their
national budgets, built-in limitations to any signifcant increases in
defense spending. But if Europe were about to be invaded, would its
politicians insist that defense budgets could not be raised because this
would violate the terms of the EU's growth and stability pact? If
Germans truly felt threatened, would they insist nevertheless that their
social welfare programs be lef untouched?

Amcrican War, acquirc thc Philippincs, and bcccmc a
wcrldpcwcr.Latc-ninctccnth-ccnturyAcricansdidnct
takcccmfcrtncmthcirsccurity,thcywcrcambiticusfcr
mcrcpcwcr.
urcpcans tcday arc nct ambiticus fcr pcwcr, and
ccrtainlynotfcrmilitarypcwcr.Eurcpcanscvcrthcpast
half ccntury havc dcvclcpcd a gcnuincly dihcrcnt pcr-
spcctivc cnthcrclcofpcwcrinintcrnaticnal rclaticns,a
pcrspcctivcthatspringsdircctlyncmthciruniquchistcri-
calcxpcricnccsinccthccndcfWcrldWar II.Thcyhavc
rcjcctcdthcpcwcrpoliticsthatbrcughtthcm suchmiscry
cvcrthc pastccnturyand mcrc.This isa pcrspcctivc cn
pcwcrthatAmcricansdcnctandcannctsharc,inasmuch
asthcfcrmativchistcricalcxpcricnccscnthcirsidccfthc
Atlantichavcnctbccnthcsamc.
Ccnsidcr again thc qualitics that makc up thc Eurc-
pcanstratc
gicculturc.thccmphasiscnncgctiaticn,diplc-
macy, andccmmcrcialtics,cnintcrnaticnallawcvcrthc
usccffcrcc,cnscducticncvcrcccrcicn,cnmultilatcral-
ismcvcrunilatcralism.Itistructhatthcscarcncttradi-
ticnally Eurcpcan apprcachcs tc intcrnational rclaticns
whcnvicwcdncmalcnghistcricalpcrspcctivc.utthcy
arcaprcductcfmcrcrcccntEurcpcanhistcry.Thcmcd-
crn Eurcpcanstratcgic culturc rcprcscnts a ccnscicus
rcjccticncfthcEurcpcanpast,a rcjccticn cfthccvdscf
Eurcpcan Machtolitik. It is a rcccticn cf Eurcpcans'
ardcntandundcrstandablcdcsircncvcrtc rcturntcthat
past.WckncwsbcttcrthanEurcpcansthcdangcrsthat
arisc ncm unbridlcd pcwcr pclitics, ncm an cxccssivc
rcliancc cn military fcrcc, ncm pclicics prcduccd by
naticnal cgcism and ambiticn, cvcn hcm balancc cf
powcr and raison d'etat? As Ccrman Forcign Ministcr
Joschka Fischcrputit in a spccch outlininghisvision of
thc Europcan mturc,Thccorc ofthcconccptofEuropc
ancr 194
5
was and still is a rcj cction of thc Europcan
balancc-of-powcrprinciplcandthchcgcmonicambitions
ofindividualstatcsthathadcmcrgcdfollowingthcPcacc
ofWcstphaliain1648."40 ThcEuropcanUnionisitsclfthc
productofanawmlccnturyofEuropcanwarfarc.
Of coursc,it was thc hcgcmonic ambitions" ofonc
nationinparticu|arthatEuropcanintcgrationwasmcant
to contain. And it is thc intcgration and tamingofCcr-
manythatisthcgrcataccomp|ishmcntofEuropc-vicwcd
historica|ly,pcrhapsthcgrcatcstfcatofintcrnationa|po|i-
ticscvcrachicvcd.SomcEuropcansrccaU,asFischcrdocs,
thc ccntral rolc thc Unitcd Statcs p|aycd in solving thc
Ccrman problcm." Fcwcr likc to rccal| thatthc mi|itary
dcstructionofNazi Ccrmanywasthcprcrcquisitcforthc
Europcan pcacc that followcd. !nstcad, most Europcans
lUctobclicvcthatitwasthctransformationofthcEuro-
pcan mind andspiritthat madc possib|cthcncwordcr."
Thc Europcans, who invcntcd powcr politics, turncd
thcmsclvcsintoborn-againidcalistsbyanactofwU|,|cav-
ingbchindthcmwhatFischcrca||cdthco|dsystcmofbal-
anccwithitscontinucdnationaloricntation,constraintsof
coa|ition, traditional intcrcst-lcd politics and thcpcrma-
ncntdangcrofnationalistidcologicsandconfrontations''
FischcrstandsncaronccndofthcspcctrumofEuro-
pcan idcalism. ut this is not rcally a right-lcn issuc in
Europc. Fischcr's principal contcntion-that Europc has
40 Fischer speech at Humboldt University in Berlin, May 12, 2000.
5
7
mcvcdbcycndthc cld systcm cfpcwcrpclitics and dis-
ccvcrcdancwsytcmfcrprcscrvingpcaccinintcrnaticnal
rclaticns-
iswidclysharcdacrcssEurcpc.Asscnicrritish
diplcmat and EU cmcial Rcbcrt Cccpcr has argucd,
Eurcpctcdaylivcsina"pcstmcdcrnsystcm"thatdccsnct
rcst cnabancccfpcwcrbutcn"thcrcjccticncffcrcc"
andcn"sclf-cnfcrccdrulcscfbchavicr."Inthc"pcstmcd-
cmwcrld,'writcsCccpcr,"raion d'etat andthcamcraliq
cfMachiavcUi'sthccricscfstatccrah. . . havcbccnrcplaccd
byamcralccnscicusncss"inintcrnaticnalahairs.'
Amcrican rcalists might scch at this idcalism. Hans
McrgcnthauandCccrgcKcnnanassumcdthatcnlynaIvc
Acricanssuccumbcdtc such"Wilscnian"lcgalisticand
mcralisticfancics,nctthcscwar-tcstcd,histcricallymindcd
Eurcpcan Machiavcls. ut, rcally, why shculdn't Eurc-
pcans bc idcalistic abcut intcrnaticnal ahairs, at lcast
asthcyarcccnductcdinEurcpc's"pcstmcdcrnsystcm"
Withinthc
cnhncscfEurcpc,thcagc-cldlawscfintc
-
naticnal rclaticns havc bccn rcpcalcd. Eurcpcans havc
pursucdthcirncwcrdcr, nccdncmthclawsandcvcnthc
mcntalitycfpcwcr pclitics.Eurcpcans havc stcppcdcut
cfthcHcbbcsianwcrldcfanarchyintcthcKantianwcrld
cfpcrpctualpcacc.
In fact,thc UnitcdStatcssclvcdthc Kantianparadcx
fcrthcEurcpcans.Kanthadargucdthatthccnlyscluticn
tc thc immcral hcrrcrs cfthc Hcbbcsianwcrldwas thc
crcaticn cfa wcrld gcvcrnmcnt. ut hc alsc fcarcd that
thc"statccfunivcrsalpcacc"madcpcssiblcbywcrldgcv-
crnmcntwculdbcancvcngrcatcrthrcattc humanncc-
41 Robert Cooper, The Observer, April 7, 2002.
domthanthcHobbcsianintcrnationalordcr,inasmuchas
such a govcrnmcnt, with its monopoly ofpowcr, would
bccomc thc most horriblc dcspotism." How nations
couldachicvcpcrpctualpcaccwithoutdcstroyinghuman
frccdom was a problcm Kant could not solvc. ut for
Europc thc problcmwas solvcd bythc Unitcd Statcs. y
providing sccurity from outsidc, thc Unitcd Statcs rcn-
dcrcd it unncccssary for Europc`s supranational govcrn-
mcnt to providc it. Europcans did not nccd powcr to
achicvcpcacc,andthcydonot nccdpowcrtoprcscrvc it.
Europcanlifc duringthcmorcthanhvcdccadcssincc
thccndofWorldWarIIhasbccnshapcdnotbythcbrutal
lawsofpowcrpoliticsbutbythcunfoldingofagcopoliti-
calfantasy, amiraCe ofworld-historicalimportancc.Thc
Gcrman lion has lain down with thc Frcnch lamb. Thc
conictthatravagcdEuropccvcrsinccthcviolcntbirthof
Gcrmanyinthcninctccnth ccnturyhasbccnputto rcst.
Thcmcansbywhichthismiraclchasbccnachicvcdhavc
undcrstandablyacquircdsomcthingofasacrcdmystiquc
for Europcans, cspccially sincc thc cnd ofthc Cold War.
Diplomacy, ncgotiations, paticncc, thc forging of cco-
nomictics,political cngagcmcnt,thcuscofinduccmcnts
rathcrthansanctions,compromiscrathcrthanconnonta-
tion, thc takng ofsmall stcps and tcmpcring ambitions
forsucccss-thcscwcrcthctoolsofFranco-Ccrmanrap-
prochcmcnt and hcncc thc tools that madc Europcan
intcgration possiblc. Francc, in particular, took thc lcap
into thc unknown, oncring to pool nrst cconomic and
42 See Thomas L. Pangle and Peter J. Arensdorf, Justice Among
Nations: On the Moral Basis of Power and Peace (Lawrence, KS, 1999) ,
pp. 200-201.
p
thcn pclitical scvcrcigntywith its cld Ccrman cncmy as
thc bcst mcans cfprcvcnting mturc ccnicts. Ccrmany,
in turn,ccdcd its cwn grcatpcwcrwithin Eurcpc in thc
intcrcstcfrcintcgraticn.
ThcintcgraticncfEurcpcwasncttcbcbascdcnmili-
trydctcrrcncccrthcbalancccfpcwcr. Tc thc ccntrary,
thcmiraclccamcncmthcrcjccticncfmilitarypcwcrand
cfits utilityas aninstrumcntcfintcrnaticnalanairs-at
lcastwithinthcccnhncscfEurcpc. DuringthcCcldWar,
fcw Eurcpcans dcubtcd thc nccd fcr military pcwcr tc
dctcr thc Scvict Unicn. utthc cndcfthc CcldWar, by
rcmcving cvcn thc cxcrnal dangcr cfthc Scvict Unicn,
allcwcdEurcpc'sncwcrdcr,anditsncwidcalism,tcblcs-
scmmllyintc a grandplan fcrwcrld crdcr. Frccd ncm
thc rcquircmcnts cfanymilitary dctcrrcncc, intcrnal cr
cxtcrnal,Eurcpcansbccamcstillmcrcccnhdcntthatthcir
waycfsttlingintcrnaticnalprcblcmsncwhadunivcrsal
applicaticn.Thcirbclicfinthcimpcrtanccandrclcvancc
cfsccuritycrganizaticnslUcNATO diminishcdbycqual
mcasurc.
"Thcgcniuscfthcfcundingfathcrs,'EurcpcanCcm-
missicnPrcsidcntRcmancPrcdicxplaincd,"layintrans-
latingcxtrcmclyhighpcliticalambiticns. . . intc ascrics
cfmcrcspccinc,almcsttcchnicaldccisicns.Thisindircct
apprcach madc mrthcr acticn pcssiblc. Rapprcchcmcnt
tcck placc gradually. Frcm ccnncntaticn wc mcvcd tc
willingncss tc cccpcratc in thc cccncmic sphcrc and
thcn cn tc intcgraticn." This is what manyEurcpcans
43 Speech by Romano Prodi at the Institut d'Etudes Politiques i
Paris, May 29, 2001.
bclicvc thcy havc to offcr thc world: not powcr, but thc
transccndcncc ofpowcr. Thc "csscncc" ofthc Europcan
Union, writcs Evcrts, is "all about subj ccting intcr-statc
rclations to thc rulc oflaw,' and Europc's cxpcricncc of
succcssmlmultilatcralgovcrnancchas, inturn,produccd
anambitiontoconvcrtthcworld. Europc"hasarolcto
play in world `govcrnancc," says Prodi, a rolc bascd on
rcplicatingthcEuropcancxpcricnccona global scalc. !n
Europc"thcrulcoflawhasrcplaccdthccrudcintcrplayof
powcr. . . powcrpoliticshavclostthcirinucncc''Andby
"makingasucccssofintcgrationwc arcdcmonstratingto
thcworldthatitispossiblctocrcatcamcthodforpcacc''
Nodoubtthcrcarcritons,Ccrmans,Frcnch,andoth-
crs who would nown on such cxubcrant idcalism. ut
many Europcans, including many in positions ofpowcr,
routinclyapplyEuropc'scxpcricncctothcrcstofthcworld,
and somctimcs with thc cvangclic zcal of convcrts. Thc
gcncral Europcan critiquc ofthc Amcrican approach to
roguc rcgimcs is bascd on this spccial Europcan insight.
!raq,North Korca, !ran, Libya-thcsc statcs maybc dan-
gcrous and unplcasant, and cvcn, ifsimplisticAmcricans
insist,cvil. utCcrmanywascviloncc, too. Mightnotan
"indircctapproach"workagain,asitdidinEuropcMight
it not bcpossiblconccmorcto movc nom confrontation
torapprochcmcnt,bcginningwithcoopcrationinthccco-
nomicsphcrcandthcnmovingontopcaccmlintcgration
CouldnotthcformulathatworkcdinEuropcworkagain
with !ran Might ithavc cvcn workcdwith !raq A grcat
many Europcans havc insistcd that it might, and at lcss
44 Everts, "Unilateral Aerica, Lightweight Europe?," p. 10.
6 :
ccstandriskthanwar.AdEurcpcwculdapplyitslcsscn
tc Israclis and Palcstinians as wcll, fcr, ahcr all, as EU
CcmmissicncrChrisPattcnargucs,"Eurcpcanintcgraticn
shcwsthatccmprcmiscandrcccnciliaticnispcssiblcahcr
gcncraticns cfprcjudicc,warandsuncring''Thctrans-
missicncfthcEurcpcanmiraclctc thcrcstcfthcwcrld
has bcccmc Eurcpc's ncw mission civilisatrice. Just as
Acricanshavc waysbclicvcdthatthcyhaddisccvcrcd
thcsccrcttchumanhappincssandwishcdtccxpcrtittc
thc rcst cfthc wcrld, sc Eurcpcans havc a ncw missicn
bcrncfthcircwndisccvcrycfpcrpctualpcacc.
Thus wc arrivc at what maybc thc mcst impcrtant
rcascn fcr thc divcrgcncc in vicws bcnccn Eurcpc and
thcUnitcdStatcs. Amcrica's pcwcranditswillingncss tc
cxcrciscthatpcwcr-unilatcrallyifncccssary-ccnstitutc
athrcattcEurcpc'sncwscnsccfmissicn.Pcrhapsitisthc
grcatcstthrcat.Amcricanpclicymakcrshavcfcundithard
tc bclicvc, butlcading cmcials andpcliticians in Eurcpc
rcally havc wcrricd mcrc abcut hcw thc Unitcd Statcs
might handlc cr mishandlc thc prcblcm cf Iraq-by
undcrtaking unilatcral and cxtralcgal military acticn-
thanthcyhavccvcrwcrricdabcutIraqitsclfandSaddam
Husscin's wcapcns cfmass dcstructicn. And whilc it is
truc thatthcyhavc fcarcd such acticnmight dcstabilizc
thc Middlc East and lcad tc thc unncccssarylcss cflifc,
thcrchasalwaysbccnadccpcrccnccrn. SuchAcrican
45 Chris Patten, "From Europe with Support," Ydiot Ahronot,
October 28, 2002.
4
6
The common American argument that European policy toward
Iraq and Iran has been dictated by fnancial considerations is only
partly right. Are Europeans greedier than Americans? Do Aerican
O F P AR ADI S E AND P O W E R
acticn,cvcn ifsucccssml, is an assault cn thc csscncc cf
"pcstmcdcrn" Eurcpc. It is an assault cn Eurcpc's ncw
idcals, a dcnial cf thcir univcrsal validity, muchas thc
mcnarchicscfcightccnth- andninctccnth-ccnturyEurcpc
wcrcanassaultcnAmcricanrcpublicanidcals.Amcricans
cughttc bcthc hrsttc undcrstand that athrcattc cnc's
bclicfs can bc as nightcning as a thrcat tc cnc'sphysical
sccurity.
AsAmcricanshavcfcrtwcccnturics,Eurcpcansspcak
with grcat ccnhdcncc cfthc supcricrity cfthcir glcbal
undcrstanding,thcwisdcmthcyhavctccncrcthcrnaticns
abcutccnictrcsclution,andthcirwaycfaddrcssingintcr-
naticnal prcblcms. utjust as in thc hrst dccadc cfthc
Acrican rcpublic, thcrc is a hint cf insccurity in thc
Eurcpcan claimtc succcss,an cvidcnt nccd tchavcthcir
succcssamrmcdandthcirvicwsacccptcdbycthcrnaticns,
particularly by thc Unitcd Statcs. Ancr all, tc dcny thc
validitycfthcncwEurcpcanidcalismistcraiscprcfcund
dcubts abcut thc viability cf thc Eurcpcan prcjcct. If
intcrnaticnalprcblcmscannct,infact,bcscttlcdthcEurc-
pcan way, wculdn't that suggcst that Eurcpc itsclf may
cvcntuallyfallshcrtcfascluticn, withallthchcrrcrsthis
implics That is cnc rcascn Eurcpcanswcrc sc adamant
abcutprcscrvingthc univcrsal applicabilitycfthc Intcr-
naticnalCriminalCcurt.FcrthcUnitcdStatcstcdcmand
immunip,adcublcstandardfcrthcpcwcrml,istcundcr-
corporations not infuence American policy in Asia and Latin Aerica
as well as in the Middle East? The diference is that American strategic
judgments sometimes confict with and override fnancial interests.
For the reasons suggested in this essay, that confict is much less com
mon for Europeans.
mincthcvcryprinciplcEurcpcansarctryingtccstablish-
thatallnaticns,strcngandwcak,arccqualundcrthclaw
and all must abidc by thc law. If this principlc can bc
cutcd, cvcn bythc bcncvclcnt supcrpcwcr, thcn what
happcnstcthcEurcpcanUnicn,whichdcpcndsfcritsvcry
cxstcncc cn ccmmcn cbcdicncc tc thc laws cfEurcpc
If intcrnaticnal law dccs nct rcign suprcmc, is Eurcpc
dccmcdtcrcturntcitspast
Ad,cfccursc,itisprccisclythisfcarcfslidingback-
ward that still hangs cvcr Eurcpcans, cvcn as Eurcpc
mcvcs forward. Europcans, particularly thc Frcnch and
thc Ccrmans,arcnotcntirclysurcthatthcprcblcmcncc
kown as thc"Ccrmanprcblcm"rcallyhas bccn sclvcd.
Ncithcr Francc undcr Francis Mittcrrand ncr ritain
undcrMargarctThatchcrwas plcascd at thc prcspcct cf
CcrmanrcunincaticnancrthccndcfthcCcldWar,cach
hadtc bcccaxcd alcngandrcassurcdbythcAcricans,
]ustasritishandFrcnchlcadcrshadbccnccaxcdalcng
tc acccpt Ccrman rcintcgraticn fcur dccadcs bcfcrc. As
thcir varicus and cncn vcry dincrcnt prcpcsals fcr thc
mturc ccnstituticn cf Eurcpc suggcst, thc Frcnch arc
still nct ccnndcnt thcy can trust thc Ccrmans, and thc
Ccrmans ar still nct surc thcy can trust thcmsclvcs.
NcarlysixdccadcsancrthccndcfWcrldWarII,aFrcnch
cmcialcanstillrcmark."Pccplcsay,Ìt isatcrriblcthing
that Ccrmany is nct wcrking.' ut I say, ` Rcally Wcn
Ccrmanyiswcrkng,sixmcnthslatcritisusuallymarch-
ingdcwnthcChampsElysccs'"
uricdnctvcrydccply
47 See Gerard Baker, "Europe's Three Ways of Dealing with Iraq:'
Financial Times October 17, 2002, p. 17.
OF P ARA DI S E A ND P OW E R
bcncaththcsurfacccfsuchjckcslicsagcnuinc,lingcring
trcpidation abcut a Ccrmanythat is stilltcc big fcr thc
Eurcpcan ccntincnt. Last summcr, whcn Ccrman Chan-
ccllcrCcrhardSchrccdcrdchcdthcushadministraticn's
callfcrEurcpcansuppcrtinIraq,hisinsistcncccndcaling
withsuchmattcrsin"thcCcrmanway"waspcrhapscvcn
mcrcunscttlingtchisEurcpcan ncighbcrsthanitwastc
thc Unitcd Statcs. Ircnically, cvcn Ccrman pacinsm and
ncutralismcannightcnEurcpcanswhcnaCcrmanlcadcr
spcakscf"thcCcrmanway."
Suchfcars can attimcshindcrprcgrcsstcwarddccpcr
intcgraticn,butthcyalschavc drivcnthcEurcpcanprcj -
cct fcrward dcspitc innumcrablc cbstaclcs. Eurcpcan
intcgraticn isprcpcllcdfcrward in partbythc Ccrmans'
fcars abcut thcmsclvcs. ThcEurcpcanprcjcct must suc-
cccd, }cschka Fischcr warns, fcr hcw clsc can "thc risks
andtcmptaticnscbjcctivclyinhcrcntinCcrmany'sdimcn-
sicnsandccntralsituaticn"bccvcrccmc
Thcschistcric
Ccrman"tcmptaticns"playatthcbackcfmanya Eurc-
pcan mind. And cvcry timc Eurcpc ccntcmplatcs thc
usc cfmilitaryfcrcc,cris fcrccdtc dc scbythc Unitcd
Statcs,thcrcisncavcidingatlcastmcmcntaryccnsidcra-
ticn cf what chcct such a military acticn might havc
cn thc "Ccrman qucsticn" that sccms ncvcr cntircly tc
disappcar.
Pcrhaps it is nctjust ccincidcncc, thcrcfcrc, that thc
amazingprcgrcsstcward Eurcpcan intcgraticn in rcccnt
ycars has bccn acccmpanicd nct by thc cmcrgcncc cfa
Eurcpcansupcrpcwcrbutby a diminishingcfEurcpcan
4
8
Fischer speech at Humboldt University, May 12, 2000.
militarycapabiliticsrclativc tcthcUnitcd Statcs. Turning
Eucpcintcaglcbalsupcrpcwcrcapablccfbalancingthc
pcwcrcfthcUnitcdStatcsmayhavcbccncnccfthccrigi-
nal scllingpcints cfthc Eurcpcan Unicn-an indcpcn-
dcntEurccan fcrcign and dcfcnsc pclicywassuppcscd
tc bc cnc cfthc mcst impcrtant by-prcducts cfEurc-
pcan intcgraticn. ut, in truth, isn't thc ambiticn fcr
Europcan"pcwcr"scmcthingcfananachrcnismItisan
atavistic impulsc, inccnsistcnt with thc idcals cf pcst-
modcrn Eurcpc, whcsc vcry cxistcncc dcpcnds cn thc
rcj ccticn cfpowcr pclitics. Whatcvcr its architccts may
havcintcndcd,Eurcpcanintcgraticnhas prcvcdtcbcthc
cncmy cf Eurcpcan military pcwcr and, indccd, cf an
impcrtantEurcpcanglcbalrclc.
Thisphencmcncnhasmanifcstcditsclfnctcnlyinat
crdccliningEurcpcandcfcnscbudgcts,butincthcrways,
tcc, cvcn in thc rcalm cf"sch"powcr. Eurcpcanlcadcrs
talkcfEurcpc's csscntial rclc inthc wcrld. Prcdiycarns
"tc makc curvcicc hcard,tc makc curacticns ccunt."
AditistructhatEurcpcansspcndagrcatdcalcfmcncy
cn fcrcign aid-mcrc pcrcapita, thcylikc tc pcint cut,
thandccsthcUnitcdStatcs.Eurcpcanscngagcincvcrscas
militarymissions,sclcngasthcmissicnsarcmcstlylim-
itcdto pcacckccping. utwhilcthc EUpcricdically dips
itshngcrsintctrcublcdintcrnaticnalwatcrsinthcMiddlc
EastcrthcKcrcanPcninsula,thctruthisthatEUfcrcign
pclicyisprcbablythcmcstancmiccfallthcprcductscf
Eurcpcan intcgraticn. As onc sympathctic cbscrvcr has
nctcd,fcw Eurcpcanlcadcrs"arcgivingit muchtimc cr
49 Prodi speech at the Institut d'Etudes Politiques, May 29, 2001.
cncrgy."'
EU forcign policy initiativcs tcnd to bc shcrt-

livcdandarcrarclybackcdbysustaincdagrccmcntonthc
partofthcvarious Europcan powcrs. Thatis onc rcason
thcy arc so casilyrcbuncd. InthcMiddlc East,whcrc so
muchEuropcanmoncygocstomndPalcstinianandothcr
Arabprojccts,itisstilltothcUnitcdStatcsthatArabsand
Israclisalikclookforsupport,assistancc,andasafc rcsc-
lutionofthcirconflict,nottcEurcpc.AllofEurcpc'sgrcat
cccncmic pcwcr sccms nct tc translatc intc diplcmatic
inucncc,inthcMiddlcEastcranyhcrcclscwhcrccriscs
havcamilitaryccmpcncnt.'
It is obvious, morccvcr, that issucs outsidc ofEurcpc
don'tattractncarlyasmuchintcrcstamcngEurcpcansas
purclyEuropcan issucs dc. This has surpriscd and nus-
tratcdAmcricansonallsidcscfthcpcliticalandstratcgic
dcbatc. Rccall thc prcfcund disappcintmcnt cf Acri-
canlibcralswhcnEuropcansfailcdtc mcuntan cncctivc
prctcst against ush's withdrawal ncm thc AM Trcaq.
NordidmcstEuropcans,cithcramongthcclitcscramcng
thccommonvotcrs,givcthcslightcstthcughttoIraqbcfcrc
thcushadministrationthrcatcncdtcinvadcit.
ThisEuropcantcndcncytolockinwardisundcrstand-
able,howcvcr,givcnthccncrmcusanddimcultagcndaof
intcgration. Thc cnlargcmcnt cfthcEuropcan Unicn tc
mcrcthantwo dozcnmcmbcrstatcs,thcrcvisicn ofthc
commoncconomicandagriculturalpolicics,thcqucstion
ofnationalsovcrcigntyvcrsussupranationalgovcrnancc,
50 Charles Grant, "A European View of ESDP:' workng paper,
Centre for European Policy Studies, April 2001.
51 As Grant observes, "A EU that was less impotent militarily
would have more diplomatic clout." Grant, "European Defence," p. 2.
thc sc-callcd dcmccracy dchcit, thcjcstling cfthc largc
Eurcpcanpcwcrs,thcdissatisfacticncfthc smallcrpcw-
crs,thc cstablishmcntcfa ncwEurcpcan ccnstituticn-
all cf thcsc prcscnt scricus and unavcidablc challcngcs.
Thcdimculticscfmcvingfcrwardmightsccminsupcra-
blcwcrc it nct fcr thc prcgrcss thc prcjcct cfEurcpcan
intcgraticnhasalrcadydcmcnstratcd.
Acrican pclicics that havc bccn unwclccmc in
substancc-cn a missdc dcfcnsc systcm and thc AM
Trcaty,bcUigcrcncctcwardIraq,suppcrtfcrIsracIhavc
bccnal thcmcrcunwclccmcbccauscfcrEurcpcthcyarc
adistracticnhcmthcqucsticnsthatrcallyccnccrnthcm,
namcly, qucsticns abcut Eurcpc. Eurcpcans chcn pcint
tcAcrican insularityand parcchialism,butEurcpcans
thcmsclvcshavcturncdintcnsclyintrcspcctivc.A Dcmi-
niquc Mcisi has pcintcd cut, last ycar's Frcnch prcsi-
dcntial campaign saw"nc rcfcrcncc . . . tc thc cvcnts cf
Scptcmbcr llr and thcir far-rcaching ccnscqucnccs`' Nc
cncaskcd,"WatshculdbcthcrclccfFranccandEurcpc
in thc ncwccnhguraticn cffcrccs crcatcdahcrScptcm-
bcriiHcwshculdFranccrcappraiscitsmilitarybudgct
and dcctrinc tc takc acccunt cf thc nccd tc maintain
scmc kind c! parity bctwccn Eurcpc and thc Unitcd
Statcs, cr at lcast bctwccn Francc and thc UK" Thc
Middlc East ccnict bccamc an issuc in thc campaign
bccausccfFrancc'slargcArabandMuslimpcpulaticn,as
thchighvctcfcr}can-MaricLcPcndcmcnstratcd.utLc
Pcnisnctafcrcignpclicyhawk.AdasMcisinctcd,"Fcr
mcst Frcnch vctcrs . . . sccurity has littlc tc dc with
abstract and distant gccpclitics. Rathcr, it is
a qucsticn
cfwhichpcliticiancanbcstprctcctthcmncmthccrimc
and violcncc plaguing thc strccts and suburbs of thcir
citics."'
CanEuropcchangccourscandassumcalargcrrolcon
thcworldstagcThcrchasbccnnoshortagcofEuropcan
lcadcrsurgingittodoso. NoristhcwcakncssofEUfor-
cign policytodayncccssarilyproofthatit mustbcwcak
tomorrow, givcn thc EU`s rccord of ovcrcoming wcak-
ncsscsinothcr arcas.Andyctthcpoliticalwilltodcmand
morcpowcrforEuropcappcarstobclackng,forthcvcry
goodrcasonthatEuropc docs not scc amissionforitsclf
thatrcquircspowcr.!tsmission, ifithasamissionbcyond
thc conhncs ofEuropc, is to opposc powcr. !t is rcvcal-
ingthatthcargumcntmost oncn advanccdbyEuropcans
for augmcntingthcirmilitary strcngth is notthatit will
allow Europcto cxpand its stratcgic purvicw or cvcn its
globalinucncc.!t is mcrclyto rcin inandmultilatcral-
izc"thcUnitcdStatcs.`1mcrica,``writcsthcpro-Amcrican
ritishscholarTimothyCartonAsh,hastoomuchpowcr
foranyonc`sgood,includingitsown."'ThcrcforcEuropc
mustamass powcr, but for no othcrrcasonthanto savc
thcworldandthcUnitcdStatcsfromthcdangcrsinhcrcnt
inthcprcscntlopsidcdsituation.
Whcthcr that particular mission is a worthy onc or
not, it sccms unlikcly to rouscEuropcan passions. Only
FranccandCrcatritainsofarhavcrcspondcdcvcnmar-
ginally to this challcngc. ut Francc`s proposcd dcfcnsc
budgctincrcascwillprovc,likc thcforce de fappe, morc
symbolicthanrcal.FormcrFrcnchforcignministcrHubcrt
52 Dominique Moisi, Financial Times, March 11, 2002.
53 Timothy Garton Ash, New York Times, April 9, 2002.
Vcdrinc, whc cncc ccmplaincd abcut Amcrican hyper
puissnc, hasstcppcdtalkingabcutccuntcrbalancingthc
UnitcdStatcs.Instcad,hcshrugsanddcclarcsthcrc"isnc
rcascnfcrthcEurcpcanstcmatchaccuntrythatcanhght
fcurwars t cncc." It was cnc thing fcr Eurcpc in thc
:ppostctrytc incrcascitsannualccllcctivc cxpcnditurcs
cn dcfcnsc hcm $:o billicn tc $:8o billicn whcn thc
UnitcdStatcswasspcnding$z8obillicn.utncwthatthc
Unitcd Statcs is hcading tcward spcnding as much as
$
(oo billicn pcr ycar, cr pcrhaps cvcn mcrc in ccming
ycars, Eurcpc has nct thc slightcst intcnticn cfkccping
up. Thus Francc might incrcasc its dcfcnscbudgct by 6
pcrccnt, prcddcd by thc Caullism cf Prcsidcnt Jacqucs
Chirac.ThcUnitcdKingdcmmightmakcancvcngrcatcr
ccmmitmcnt tc strcngthcningandmcdcrnizingitsmili-
tary,guidcdbyTcnylairinanattcmpttc rcvivc,ifcna
much smallcr scalc, an cldcr ritish traditicn cflibcral
impcrialism.utwhatis"Eurcpc"withcutCcrmanyAnd
Ccrmandcfcnscbudgcts,tcdayrunningatabcutthcsamc
pcrccntagccfgrcssdcmcsticprcductasLuxcmbcurg's,arc
dcstincd tc drcp cvcn mrthcr in ccming ycars as thc
Ccrman cccncmystrugglcsundcr thcwcightcfastiing
labcr and scci wclfarc sytcm. Eurcpcan analysts may
lamcntthcCcntincnt's"stratcgicirrclcvancc''NATOSccrc-
taryCcncralCccrgcRcbcrtscnmaycallEurcpca"military
pygmy"inancblcchcrttcshamcEurcpcansintcspcnding
mcrc,andmcrcwisclythanthcydcncw.utwhchcncstly
bclicvcs Eurcpcans will mndamcntally changc thcirway
cfdcingbusincssThcyhavcmanyrcascnsncttc.
54
Q
uoted in David Ignatius, "France's Constructive Critic:' Wah
ington Post, February 22, 2002.
THE WORLD AMERICA MADE
IfAmcricansarcunhappyaboutthisstatcof anairs,thcy
should rccall that today's Europc-both thc intcgratcd
Europc andthcwcakEuropc-isvcrymuchthcprcduct
ofAmcrican forcign policystrctchingbackovcrthcbct-
ter part of ninc dccadcs. Thc Unitcd Statcs abandoncd
EuropcancrWorldWarI, standingasidcasthcContincnt
slippcdintoawarcvcnmorchorriblcthanthcnrst.Evcn
asWorldWarIIwascnding,thc initialAmcricanimpulsc
wastowalkawayagain. FrankinDclanoRooscvclt'sorigi-
nalwartimcvisionhadbccntomakcEuropcstratcgically
irrclcvant. Inthc latc 1930S and cvcn duringthcwar,thc
commonconvictionofAmcricanswasthat"thcEuropcan
systcmwasbasicallyrottcn, thatwarwascndcmiconthat
contincnt, and thc Europcans had only thcmsclvcs to
blamcfor thcirplight."Europc appcarcdtobc nothing
morc than thc ovcrhcatcd incubator ofworldwars that
costAmcricadcarly.
DuringWorldWarII, Amcricanslikc Rooscvclt,look-
ing backward rathcr than forward, bclicvcd no grcatcr
scrvicccouldbcpcrformcdthantotakcEuropcoutcfthc
globalstratcgicpicturconccandforall.Rooscvcltactually
55 As the historian John Lamberton Harper has put it, FDR wanted
"to bring about a radical reduction in the weight of Europe" and
thereby make possible "the retirement of Europe from world politics."
Harper, American Visions of Europe: Franklin D. Roosevelt, George F
Kennan, and Dean G. Acheson ( Cambridge, UK, 1996) , pp. 79, 3.
5
6
William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, Te Challenge to Iso
lation, 1937-1940 (New York, 1952), p. 14.
7 1
prcfcrrcd dcing busincss with Stalin's Russia. "Acr
Ccrmanyisdisarmcd,'FDRpcintcdlyaskcd,"whatisthc
rcascn fcr Francc having a big militarycstablishmcnt"
Charlcs dcCaullc fcund such qucsticns"disquictingfcr
Eurcpc andfcrFrancc,'aswcllhcmighthavc.Acricans
cfRccscvclt'scrahcldancldAmcricanvicwcfEurcpcas
ccrrupt and dccadcnt,ncwminglcdwith a ccrtain ccn-
tcmpt fcr Eurcpcan wcakncss and dcpcndcncc. If mc
Eurcpcanpcwcrswcrcbcingstrippcdcfthcirglcbalrcach
bymilitaryandcccncmicwcakncssfcllcwingthcdcstruc-
ticn cf Wcrld War II, many Amcricans wcrc cnly tcc
happy tc hurry thc prcccss alcng. As FDR had put it,
"Whcnwc'vcwcnthcwar,Iwillwcrkwithallmymight
andmaintcscctcitthatthcUnitcdStatcsisnctwhccdcd
intc thc pcsiticn cfacccpting any plan that will mrthcr
Francc's impcrialistic ambiticns, crthatwill aid crabct
thcritishEmpircinitsimpcrialambiticns."
WhcnthcCcldWardawncd,AcricanssuchasDcan
Achcscn hcpcd tc crcatc in Eurcpc a pcwcrml partncr
againstthcScvictUnicn,andmcstAmcricanswhccamc
cfagcduring thcCcldWarhavcalwaysthcughtcfEurcpc
almcst cxclusi
Y
clyinAchcscniantcrms-as thc csscntial
bulwarkcfnccdcminthcstrugglcagainstScvictqanny.
ut a suspicicus hcstility tcward Eurcpc always playcd
arcundthccdgcs cfAmcricanfcrcignpclicy, cvcnduring
thcCcldWar.WcnPrcsidcntDwightEiscnhcwcrundcr-
mincdandhumiliatcdritainandFranccatSuczin:p6,
itwas cnlythcmcstblatantcfmanyAmcricanchcrtstc
57 Quoted in Selig Adler, Te Isolationist Impule: Its Twentieth
Centur Reaction (New York, 1957) , p. 142; Kssinger, Diplomac, p. 396.
cutEurcpcdcwntc sizcandrcduccitsalrcadywcakcncd
glcbalinucncc.
Ncvcrthclcss, fcr thc mcst part thc cmcrging thrcat
cfthc Scvict Unicn ccmpcllcd Amcricans tc rccalculatc
thcir rclaticnship with Eurcpcan sccurity, and thcrcfcrc
with thc Eurcpcans.Andultimatclythc mcrc impcrtant
Acrican ccntributicn tc Eurcpc's currcnt wcrld-apart
status stcmmcdnctfrcm anti-Eurcpcanbutncmcsscn-
tiallyprc-Eurcpcan impulscs. A ccmmitmcnttc Eurcpc,
ncthcstilitytc it,lcdthcUnitcd Statcsinthcimmcdiatc
pcstwarycarstckccptrccpscnthcCcntincntandtccrc-
atcNATO.ThcprcscncccfAmcrican fcrccsasasccurity
guarantcc in Eurcpc was, as it was intcndcd tc bc, thc
critical ingrcdicnt fcrbcginningthcprcccsscfEurcpcan
intcgraticn sc that a cchcsivc "Wcst" wculd bc strcng
cncughmatcriallyandspirituallytcwithstandthcdaunt-
ingchallcngccfwhatprcmiscdtcbcadimcultCcldWar
ccnncntaticnwiththcScvictUnicn.
Eurcpc's cvcluticn intc its prcscntstatc cccurrcdun-
dcrthc mantlccfthc U. S. sccurityguarantccand cculd
nct havc cccurrcd withcut it. Nct cnly did thc Unitcd
Statcs fcr almcst halfa ccntury supply a shicld against
such cxtcrnal thrcats as thc Scvict Unicn and intcrnal
thrcatspcscdbycthnicccnictinplaccslikcthcalkans.
Mcrc impcrtant, thc Unitcd Statcs was thc kcy tc thc
scluticn cf thc "Ccrman prcblcm" and pcrhaps still is.
Ccrmany's Fischcr, in his Humbcldt Univcrsity spccch,
nctcdtwc"histcric dccisicns"thatmadcthcncwEurcpc
pcssiblc. "thc USA's dccisicn tc stay in Eurcpc" and
"Francc'sandCcrmany's ccmmitmcnttcthcprinciplccf
73
intcgraticn,bcginningwithcccncmiclinks''ut,cfccursc,
thc lattcr cculd ncvcr havc cccurrcdwithcutthc fcrmcr.
Francc's willingncss tc riskthcrcintcgraticncfCcrmany
intc Eurcpcand Francc was, tc say thc lcast, highly
dubicusdcpcndcdcnthcprcmisccfccntinucdAmcri-
can invclvcmcnt in Eurcpc as a guarantcc against any
rcsurgcncccfCcrmanmilitarism.NcrwcrcpcstwarCcr-
mansunawarcthatthcircwn mturcinEurcpcdcpcndcd
cnthccalmingprcscncccfthcAmcricanmilitary.
Thc currcnt situaticn abcunds in ircnics. Eurcpc's
rcjccticn cfpcwcr pclitics and its dcvaluing cfmilitary
fcrcc as a tccl cfintcrnaticnal rclaticns havc dcpcndcd
cn thc prcscncc cfAmcrican military fcrccs cn Eurc-
pcanscil.Eurcpc'sncwKantiancrdcrcculdcurishcnly
undcrthc umbrcllacfAmcricanpcwcrcxcrciscdacccrd-
ing tc thc rulcs cfthc cld Hcbbcsian crdcr. Amcrican
pcwcrmadcitpcssiblcfcrEurcpcanstcbclicvcthatpcwcr
wasnclcngcrimpcrtant.Andncw,inthchnalircny, thc
fact that u.s. military pcwcr has sclvcd thc Eurcpcan
prcblcm, cspcciallythc "Ccrman prcblcm,' allcwsEurc-
pcans tcd
y, and Ccrmans in particular, tc bclicvc that

Amcrican militarypcwcr,andthc"stratcgic culturc"that
hascrcatcdandsustaincdit,iscutmcdcdanddangcrcus.
McstEurcpcansdc nctscccrdcnctwish tc sccthc
grcat paradcx. that thcir passagc intc pcst-histcry has
dcpcndcdcnthcUnitcdStatcsnctmakngthcsamcpas-
sagc.ccauscEurcpchasncithcrthcwillncrthcabilitytc
guard itscwn paradisc andkccp it ncmbcing cvcrrun,
spirituallyaswcllasphysically,byawcrldthathasycttc
acccpt thc rulc cf"mcral ccnscicusncss," it has bcccmc
dcpcndcnt on Amcrica's willingncss to usc its military
mighttodctcrordcfcatthoscaroundthcworldwhcstill
bclicvcinpowcrpolitics.
SomcEuropcansdoundcrstandthcccnundrum.rit-
ons
'
notsurprisingly, undcrstand it bcst. Rcbcrt Cocpcr
writcsofthcnccdtoaddrcssthchardtruththatalthough
"withinthcpcstmcdcrnworld i. c. , thcEurcpcoftcday|,
thcrc arc nc sccurity thrcats in thc traditional scnsc,"
ncvcrthclcss,throughcutthcrcstofthcwcrld-whatCcc-
pcr calls thc "modcrn and prc-modcrn zoncs"-thrcats
abcund.Ifthcpcstmodcrnworlddccsnctprotcctitsclf,it
canbcdcstroycd.uthowdocsEuropcprotcctitsclfwith-
out discarding thcvcryidcals andprinciplcsthat undcr-
girditspacincsystcm
"Thc challcngc to thc postmodcrn world,' Cccpcr
argucs, "is to gct uscd to thc idca ofdoublc standards."
Amongthcmsclvcs,Europcansmay"cpcratconthcbasis
cflaws andopcncoopcrativcsccurity."utwhcndcaling
withthcworldcutsidcEuropc,"wc nccdtorcvcrttc thc
roughcr mcthods of an carlicr cra-fcrcc, prccmptivc
attack,dcccption,whatcvcrisncccssary."ThisisCoopcr's
principlc for safcguardingsocicty. `1mongoursclvcs,wc
kccp thc law,butwhcnwc arc opcratingin thcjunglc,wc
must also usc thc laws of thcjunglc." Coopcrdirccts his
argumcnt at Europc, and hc couplcs it with a call for
Europcanstoccascncglcctingthcirdcfcnscs,"bothphysi-
calandpsychological.""
CoopcrhasalsoscrvcdasacloscadviscrtoTonylair,
and it is clcar that lair, pcrhaps a good dcal morc than
58 Cooper, The Observer, April 7, 2002.
75
his Labcur Party fcllcwcrs, has cndcrscd thc idca cfan
intcrnaticnal dcublc standard fcrpcwcr.Hchas tricd tc
lcad ritain intc thc rulc-bascd Kantian wcrld cf thc
EurcpcanUnicn.utashissclidaritywithPrcsidcntush
cn thc qucsticn cfIraq has shcwn, lair has alsc tricd
tclcadEurcpcbackcutintcthcHcbbcsianwcrld,whcrc
military pcwcr rcmains a kcy fcaturc cf intcrnaticnal
rclaticns.
utIair'sattcmpttcbringEurcpcalcngwithhimhas
bccnlargclyunsucccssml.Schrccdcrhastakcnhisnaticn
"thcCcrmanway,'andFrancc,cvcnundcrthcmcrcccn-
scrvativc Caullism cf Jacqucs Chirac, has bccn a mcst
rcsistantpartncrcfthcUnitcdStatcs,mcrcintcntcnccn-
strainingcricanpcwcrthaninsupplcmcntingitwith
Frcnchpcwcr.
Onc suspccts that what Cccpcr has rcally dcscribcd,
thcrcfcrc,isnctEurcpc'smturcbutAcrica'sprcscnt.Fcr
it is thc Unitcd Statcs that has had thc dimcult task cf
navigating bcnccn thcsc twc wcrlds, trying tc abidcby,
dcfcnd, and mrthcrthc laws cf advanccd civilizcd sccicty
whilc simultanccusly cmplcyng mUitary fcrcc agamst
thcscwhcrcmsctcabidcbysuchrulcs.ThcUnitcdStatcsis
alrcady cpcrating acccrding tc Cccpcr's dcublc standard,
fcr thc vcry rcascns hc suggcsts. Acrican lcadcrs, tcc,
bclicvcthatglcbalsccurityand alibcralcrdcr-aswcllas
Europc's "pcstmcdcrn" paradisc-cannct lcng survivc
unlcssthc UnitcdStatcsdccsusc itspcwcrinthcdangcr-
cusHcbbcsianwcrldthatstillcurishcscutsidcEurcpc.
WhatthismcansisthatalthcughthcUnitcdStatcshas
playcdthccriticalrclcinbringingEurcpcintcthisKant-
ianparadisc,andstillplaysakcyrclcinmakingthatpara-
O F PA R A D I S E A ND P O W E R
disc pcssiblc, it cannct cntcr thc paradisc itsclf. It mans
thcwallsbut cannct walkthrcugh thc gatc. Thc Unitcd
Statcs,withallitsvastpcwcr,rcmainsstuckinhistcry,lch
tcdcalwiththcSaddamsandthcayatcllahs,thcKimJcng
Ils andthc Jiang Zcmins, lcavingmcst cfthcbcnchts tc
cthcrs.
I S I T S T I L L
"
T H E W E S T
"
?
If this cvclving intcrnaticnal arrangcmcnt ccntinucs tc
prcducc a grcatcrAmcrican tcndcncy tcward unilatcral-
ism in intcrnaticnal anairs,this shculd nct surprisc any
cbj cctivc cbscrvcr. In rcturn fcr manning thc walls cf
Eurcpc's pcstmcdcrn crdcr, thc Unitcd Statcs naturally
sccksaccrtainnccdcmcfacticntcdcalwiththcstratcgic
dangcrs that it alcnc has thc mcans and scmctimcs thc
will tc addrcss. This is thc grcat prcblcm fcr rclaticns
bctwccnthcUnitcdStatcsandEurcpc,cfccursc.Fcrjust
atthc mcmcnt whcn Eurcpcans, nccd cfCcldWarfcars
and ccnstraints,havcbcgun scttling intc thcirpcstmcd-
crnparadiscandprcsclytizingfcrthcirdcctrincscfintcr-
naticnal law and intcrnaticnal instituticns, Amcricans
havcbcgunturninginthccthcrdirccticn,awayncmthc
ccmmcnsclidaritywithEurcpcthathadbccnthcccntral
thcmc cfthc Ccld War and back tcward a mcrc tradi-
ticnal Amcrican pclicy cf indcpcndcncc, tcward that
uniquclyAmcricanfcrmcfunivcrsalisticnaticnalism.
ThccndcfthcCcldWarhadancvcnmcrcprcfcund
cncctcnthctransatlanticrclaticnshipthanisccmmcnly
7 7
undcrstccd,fcrthcccmmcnScvictcncmyandthcccnsc-
qucntnccdtcactinccnccrtfcrthcccmmcndcfcnscwcrc
nct all that disappcarcd ahcr 198 9. Sc, tcc, did a grand
stratcgypursucdcnbcthsidcscfthcAtlantictcprcscrvc
andstrcngthcnthccchcsicnandunitycfwhatwascallcd
"thc Wcst." It was nct just that thc Unitcd Statcs and
EurcpchadhadtcwcrktcgcthcrtcmcctthcScvictchal-
lcngc.Mcrcthanthat,thcccntinucdunityandsucccsscf
thcIibcralWcstcrncrdcrwasfcrmanyycarsthcvcrydch-
niticncfvictcryinthcCcldWar.
Partly fcr this rcascn, Amcrican stratcgy during thc
Ccld War chcn ccnsistcd cfprcviding mcrc tc nicnds
and allics than was cxpcctcd ncm thcm in rcturn. Tc a
rcmarkablc
dcgrcc,Amcricangcvcrnmcntsmcasurcdthc
succcsscfthcirfcrcignpclicynctbyhcwwcllthcUnitcd
Statcswasdcingbyanynarrcwrcckcningcfthcnaticnal
intcrcst,butrathcrbyhcwwcllAmcrica'sallicswcrc far-
ingagainstthcmanyintcrnalandcxtcrnalchallcngcsthcy
faccd.ThusitwasAmcricancccncmicstratcgytc raiscup
ncmthc ruin
cfWcrldWar IIpcwcrmlcccncmic ccm-

pctitcrs in Eurcpc andAsia, cvcn tcthcpcint whcrc,by
thclastdccadcscfthcCcldWar,thcUnitcdStatcssccmcd
tc many tc bc in a statc cfrclativc dcclincccmparcdtc
its incrcasinglyprcspcrcus allics. It wasAmcrican mili-
tary stratcgy tc risk nuclcar attack upcn its cthcrwisc
unthrcatcncd hcmcland in crdcr tc dctcr bcth nuclcar
and ccnvcnticnal attacks cn Eurcpcan andAsian allics.
Wcncncccnsidcrsthcabscncccfsimilarlyrcliablcguar-
antccs amcng thc varicus Eurcpcanpcwcrs in thc past,
bctwccn, say, Crcatritain and Francc in thc 192 0S and
ip)os, thc willingncss of thc Unitcd Statcs, standing in
rclativc safctybchindtwo occans,to linkitsvcrysurvival
tothatofothcrnationswasrathcrcxtraordinary.
Amcrica's stratcgic and cconomic"gcncrosity,' if cnc
can call itthat,was, ofcoursc, closcly rclatcd to Acri-
canintcrcsts.AsAchcsonputit,"FcrthcUnitcdStatcstc
takc stcpsto strcngthcncountricsthrcatcncdwith Scvict
aggrcssicn or Communist subvcrsicn . . . was tc prctcct
thc sccurity ofthc UnitcdStatcs-itwas tc prctcct ncc-
dcm itsclf."' ut this idcntincaticn cf thc intcrcsts cf
othcrs with its own intcrcsts was a striking quality cf
Amcrican forcignanddcfcnscpclicyahcrWcrldWar II.
Ahcr Munich, ahcr Pcarl Harbcr, and ahcr thc cnsct cf
thc ColdWar,Amcricansincrcasinglycmbraccdthcccn-
viction that thcir own wcll-bcing dcpcndcd mndamcn-
tallyonthcwcll-bcingofothcrs,thatAcricanprcspcrity
couldnct occur inthc abscncc cfglcbalprcspcrity, that
Amcrican naticnal sccurity was impcssiblc withcut a
broadmcasurc ofintcrnaticnal sccurity. This was a dcc-
trincofsclf-intcrcst,butitwasthcmcstcnlightcncdkind
ofsclf-intcrcst-tothcpointwhcrcitwasattimcsalmcst
indistinguishablcfrcmidcalism.
Amost,butncvcrcntircly. Idcalismwasncvcrthcsclc
sourccofAmcricangcncrosityoritspropcnsitytoscckto
workinconccrtwithitsallics.AmcricanColdWarmulti-
latcralism was morc instrumcntal than idcalistic in its
motivcs. Ancrall,"goingitalcnc"ahcr:p
4
mcantgcingit
alonc against thc Sovict Union. Coing it alonc mcant
shcaring apart thc Wcst. Nor was it rcally ccnccivablc,
59
Q
uoted in Kssinger, Diplomacy, p. 452.
7
p
withScvicttrccpsmasscdinthchcartcfEurcpc, fcrany
Acrican fcrcign pclicytc succccd ifit was nct "multi-
latcral"initsinclusicncfWcstcrnEurcpcanintcrcsts.On
thc cthcr hand, gcnuinc idcalistic multilatcralism had
bccnintcrrcdfcrmcstAmcricansalcngwithWilscnand
thc Lcaguc cfNaticns Ccvcnant. DcanAchcscn,amcng
thclcadingarchitccts cfthcpcstwar intcrnaticnalcrdcr,
ccnsidcrcdthcUNChartcr"impracticablc"andthcUnitcd
Naticns itsclfancxamplc cfamisguidcdWilscnian"faith
in thc pcrfcctibility cf man and thc advcnt cf univcrsal
pcaccandlaw."Hcandmcstcthcrsprcscntatthccrca-
ticn cfthc pcstwar crdcrwcrc idcalists, but thcywcrc
practicalidcalists.Thcybclicvcditwascsscntialtcprcscnt
a ccmmcn Wcstcrnncnttc thc Ccmmunistblcc,andif
that mcant swallcwing whatAchcscn disparagcd as thc
"hclywrit"cfthcUNChartcr,thcywcrcprcparcdtcplay
alcng.FcrAchcscn,suppcrtfcrthcUNwasncthingmcrc
than"an aid tc diplcmacy."'This is impcrtant,bccausc
manyaspcctscfAmcricanbchavicrduringthcCcldWar
that bcth Eurcpcans and many Acricans in rctrcspcct
hndscadmirablc,andwhcscpassingthcysclamcnt,rcp-
rcscntcdccnccssicnsmadcinthccausccfWcstcrnuniq.
That unity was nct always casy tc maintain. Amcri-
can hcstility tc dc Caullc's dctcrmincd indcpcndcncc,
Amcricansuspicicnabcutritishimpcrialism,argumcnts
cvcr Ccrmany's Ostolitik stratcgic dcbatcs cvcr arms
agrccmcntsandarmsbuildups,cspcciallyduringthcRca-
ganycars,allthrcatcncdtccpcncracksinthcalliancc.ut
60
Qu
oted in James Chace, Acheson: The Secretary of State Wo
Created the American World (New York, 1998), p. 107.
6
1
Ibid., p. 108.
thc cracks wcrc always hcalcd, bccausc cvcrycnc agrccd
that whilc disagrccmcnts wcrc incvitablc, nssurcs wcrc
dangcrcus. If"thc Wcst" was dividcd, it wculd fall. Thc
dangcrwasnctcnlystratcgic,itwasidcclcgical,cvcnpsy-
chclcgical."ThcWcst"hadtcmcanscmcthing,cthcrwisc
whatwcrcwcdcfcndingAnd,cfccursc,duringthcCcld
War, "thcWcst" did mcan scmcthing. Itwas thc libcral,
dcmccraticchcicccfalargcscgmcntcfhumanity,stand-
ingincppcsiticntc thcaltcrnativcchciccthatcxistcdcn
thccmcrsidccfthccrlinWall.
This pcwcrml stratcgic, idcclcgical, an
psychclcgi-
calnccdtcdcmcnstratcthatthcrcwasindccdacchcsivc,
unincd Wcst wcnt dcwn with thc crlin Wall and thc
statucs cfLcnin in Mcsccw. Thc lcsswas partlymaskcd
during thc 1990S. Manysaw thc strugglcs in csnia and
Kcscvc as a ncw tcst cf thc Wcst. Thc cnlargcmcnt cf
NATO tc includc fcrmcr Warsaw Pact naticns was an
ingathcring cfpccplcs whc had bccn fcrcibly cxcludcd
frcmthcWcstandwantcdtcbcpartcfitagain.Thcysaw
NATO asnctcnlycrcvcnprimarily asccuritycrganiza-
ticn but simply as thc cnc and cnly instituticn that
cmbcdicd thc transatlantic Wcst. Ccrtainly, thc Unitcd
Naticnswasnct"thcWcst."
ut thc vcry succcss cfthc transatlantic prcjcct, thc
scluticn cfthc Eurcpcan sccurity dilcmma, thc scluticn
cf thc Gcrman prcblcm, thc ccmplcticn cf a Eurcpc
"whclc and frcc,'thc scttlcmcnt cfthc alkan ccnicts,
thccrcaticncfafairlystablczcnccfpcaccanddcmccracy
cn thc Eurcpcan ccntincnt-all thcsc grcat and cncc
unimaginablc acccmplishmcnts hadthcincvitablccncct
cfdiminishing thcsignincancccf"thcWcst." Itwasnct
3 :
thatthcWcsthadccascdtocxist.NorwasitthatthcWcst
had ccascd to facc cncmics, for surcly militant Muslim
mndamcntalismisanimplacablccncmyofthcWcst.ut
thc ccntral point of Francis Fukuyama's famous cssay,
"ThcEndofHistory,'wasirrcmtablc.Thcccnturics-long
strugglc among opposing conccptions ofhow mankind
mightgovcrnitsclfhadbccndchnitivclyscttlcdinfavcrcf
thcWcstcrnlibcralidcal.Muslimmndamcntalismmight
havcitsfollcwinginthcpartscfthcwcrldwhcrcMuslims
prcdominatc.Norcanwcdcubtanylongcritscapacitytc
inicthorrihcdamagconthcWcst.utasFukuyamaand
othcrs havc pointcd cut, Muslim mndamcntalism dccs
notprcscnta scriouschallcngctothcunivcrsalprinciplcs
ofWcstcrn libcralism. Thc cxstcncc ofMuslim mnda-
mcntalismmayforccAmcricansandEuropcanstodcfcnd
thcmsclvcsagainstdcvastatingattack,andcvcntccoopcr-
atcinprovidingacommondcfcnsc.utitdocsnotforcc
"thcWcst"toprovcitsclfunihcd and cohcrcnt,as Sovict
communismoncchad.
With lcss nccdto prcscrvc anddcmonstratcthc cxis-
tcnccofacohcsivc"Wcst,'itwas incvitablcthatthcgcn-
crosity that had charactcrizcd Amcrican forcign policy
for hnyycarswould diminish ancr thc ColdWarcndcd.
This may bc somcthing to lamcnt, but it is not somc-
thingtobcsurpriscdat.ThccxistcnccofthcSovictUnion
andthc intcrnational communist thrcat had disciplincd
Amcricansandmadcthcmsccthatthcircnlightcncdsclf-
intcrcst lay in a rclativcly gcncrous forcign policy, cspc-
ciallytowardEuropc. AncrthccndofthcColdWar,that
disciplincwasnolongcrprcscnt.ThccndofthcColdWar
subtlyshincdthccldcquationbctwccnidcalismandintcr-
cst.Indccd,thcscwhcdccrythcdcclinccfAmcricangcn-
crcsityinthcpcst-CcldWarcramustatlcastrcckcnwith
thc lcgiccfthatdcclinc.SinccAcricanscbjcctivclyhad
lcssintcrcstinafcrcignpclicycharactcrizcdbygcncrcsity,
fcrthc UnitcdStatcstchavcmaintaincdthc samcdcgrcc
cfgcncrcsityinitsfcrcignpclicyasithadduringthcCcld
War, thcsamcccmmitmcnttc intcrnaticnalinstituticns,
thcsamcccnccrnfcranddcfcrcncctcallics,thcAmcrican
pccplcwculdhavchadtcbcccmccvcnmcrcidcalistic.
In fact,Amcricans arc nc mcrc crlcss idcalisticthan
thcy wcrc nny ycars agc. It is cbj cctivc rcality that has
changcd,nctthcAmcricancharactcr. Itwasthcchangcd
intcrnaticnalcircumstanccsancrthcCcldWarthatcpcncd
thcwaytcpcliticalfcrccsinCcngrcss,chicythcughnct
cxclusivclyRcpublican,whichaimcdtcrcwritccldmulti-
latcral agrccmcnts and dcfcat ncw cncs, tc cxtricatc thc
UnitcdStatcsncmtrcatycbligaticnsncwccnsidcrcdcncr-
cus cr cxccssivcly intrusivc intc Amcrican scvcrcignty.
What was ncw was nct thc cxistcncc cf such fcrccs and
attitudcs, fcr thcy had always bccn prcscnt inAmcrican
pclitics. ThcyhaddominatcdAmcricanpcliticsthrcugh-
cutthc1920S and1930S, a pcricd ushcrcdinbyaRcpub-
lican prcsidcnt prcmising a "rcturn tc ncrmalcy" ancr
thc ambiticus idcalism cfthc Wilscn ycars. ut during
thc Ccld War, and cspccially during thc ycars dcmi-
natcdbyRcpublicanprcsidcntsncmNixcntcRcagan,thc
grand anti-ccmmunist stratcgy had cvcrwhclmcd such
narrcwnaticnalistscntimcntsandtrumpcdccnccrnsfcr
scvcrcignty.
NcrwasAmcrica`spcst-CcldWarturntcwarda mcrc
naticnalistapprcachtc fcrcignpclicy simplythcprcduct
cfa rising Rcpublican Right. Rcalist intcrnaticnal rcla-
ticns thccrists andpclicymakcrs,thc dcminant intclIcc-
tual fcrcc in thcAmcrican fcrcign pclicycstabhshmcnt,
alsc pushcd thc UnitcdStatcsbackin thc dirccticn cfa
mcrc narrcw naticnalism. Thcy dccricd what Michacl
Mandclbaum famcusly callcd thc "intcrnaticnal sccial
wcrk"allcgcdlyundcrtakcnbythcClintcnadministraticn
incsniaandHaiti. Thcyinsistcd thatthcUnitcdStatcs
rcturn tc a mcrc intcnt fccus cnthc "naticnal intcrcst,'
ncwmcrc narrcwly dchncdthan ithadbccn duringthc
Ccld War. Amcrican rcalists ncm rcnt Sccwcrch tc
CclinPcwclltc}amcsakcrtcLawrcnccEaglcburgcrdid
nctbclicvcthcUnitcdStatcsshculdtakccnthcburdcncf
sclving the alkan crisis cr cthcr "humanitarian" criscs
arcundthcwcrld.Thc CcldWar was cvcr, thcyargucd,
anditwasthcrcfcrcpcssiblcfcrAmcricanfcrcignpclicy
tc"rcturntcncrmal."
Pcst-CcldWar"ncrmalcy,'hcwcvcr,mcantfcwcrccn-
ccssicnstcintcrnaticnalpubliccpinicn,lcssdcfcrcncctc
allics,morcnccdcm tc act as thc Unitcd Statcs sawht.
Thcscrcalistsgavc intchcctuallcgitimacytcthcfcrccsin
Ccngrcsswho ccuplcdtalkcfthc"naticnalintcrcst"with
callsfcrrcducticnsincvcrscasinvclvcmcntscfalkind.If
thc"naticnalintcrcst"wastcbcnarrcwlyccnccivcd,many
Rcpublicansaskcd,why,cxactly,wasitstidinthc"naticnal
intcrcst" fcr thc Unitcd Statcs tc pay its ccmparativcly
cxcrbitantUN ducsA cascthat had bccncasicrtc makc
whcn thc prcscrvaticn cfWcstcrn unity against ccmmu-
nism was thc gcal cfAmcrican fcrcign pclicywas ncw
hardcrtcmakcinthc abscncccfsucha far-rcachingand
cnlightcncddchniticncfmcAmcrican"naticnalintcrcst''
Evcn thc Clintonadministration,morcidcalisticand,
pcrhaps ironically, morcwcddcdtothcColdWar forcign
policy of gcncrosity than thc rcalists and Rcpublicans,
ncvcrthclcss could not cscapc thc ncw post-Cold War
rcality. Itwas Clinton, ancr all, who ran for prcsidcnt in
1992 on aplatform dcclaringthat thcAcricancconomy
mattcrcdandforcignpolicydidnot.Clintonstcppcdinto
trytorcpair"thcWcst"onlyancrtryingdcspcratclynotto
takc on that rcsponsibility. Whcn thc administration of
CcorgcW.ush camcto omcc in}anuary2 001, bringing
with it thc rcalist-nationalism of 1990S Rcpublicanism,
"thcWcst"asamnctioningconccptinAmcricanforcign
policy had bccomc dormant. Wcn thc tcrrorists struck
thcUnitcdStatcs cightmonthslatcr,thcColdWar cqua-
tionwascomplctclyinvcrtcd.Now,withthcthrcatbrought
dircctly to Amcrican soil, ovcrlcaping that ofAmcrica's
allics,thcparamountissucwasAmcrica'suniqucsuncring
andvulncrability,not"thcWcst."
Thc dccliningsignincancc of"thcWcst"as an organ-
izingprinciplcofforcignpolicywasnotjustanAcrican
phcnomcnon, howcvcr. Post-Cold War Europc agrccd
that thc issuc was no longcr"thc Wcst." For Europcans,
thc issuc bccamc "Europc." Proving that thcrc was a
unitcd Europc took prcccdcncc ovcr proving that thcrc
was a unitcd Wcst. A Europcan "nationalism" mirrorcd
thc Amcrican nationalism, and although this was not
Europc'sintcnt,thcprcscntgapbctwccnthcUnitcdStatcs
andEuropctodaymaybctraccdinparttoEuropc'sdcci-
sion to cstablish itsclf as a singlc cntity apart nom thc
UnitcdStatcs.
This cffort imprcsscd on Acrican minds that thc
transatlanticgcalwasnclcngcraunihcdWcst,thcEurc-
pcans thcmsclvcs nc lcngcr thcught in such tcrms. In-
stcad, Eurcpcans spckc cf"Eurcpc" as ancthcr pcIc in
a ncw multipclar wcrld-a ccuntcrbalancc tc Amcrica.
Eurcpc would cstablish its cwn scparatc fcrcign pclicy
anddcfcnsc"idcntity"cutsidccfNATO.Thcinstituticns
Eurcpcans rcvcrcd wcrc thc Eurcpcan Unicn and thc
Unitcd Naticns. ut fcr Amcricans, as fcr Ccntral and
Eastcrn Eurcpcans, thc UN was nct"thcWcst,'and thc
EurcpcanUnicnwasnct"thcWcst."OnlyNATOwas"thc
Wcst,'andncwEurcpcanswcrcbuildinganaltcrnativctc
NATO.EvcrythingthcEurcpcanswcrcdcingmadc scnsc
frcmaEurcpcanpcrspcctivc,andthcprcjcctcfEurcpcan
intcgraticn
wascbjcctivclycfbcnchttcthcUnitcdStatcs,
atlcastinscfarasitstrcngthcncdthcpcacc.Ncrwasitthc
intcnticn cfmcst Eurcpcans tc raisc a challcngc tc thc
UnitcdStatcs,muchlcsstcthcidcacf"thcWcst'uthcw
surprisingwasitthatAmcricansnclcngcrplaccdashigh
apricritycnthcunitycfthcWcstandthccchcsicncfthc
alliancc as thcycncchad Eurcpcans hadundcrtakcn an
all-ccnsumingprcjcctinwhichthcUnitcdStatcsbydch-
niticncculdhavcncpart.ThcUnitcdStatcs,mcanwhilc,
hasprcjcctscfitscwn.
AD J USTING TO H E G E M ONY
AmcricadidnotchangccnScptcmbcr11. Itcnlybccamc
mcrc itsclf. Ncr should thcrc bc anymystcry abcut thc
courscAmcricaison,andhasbccncn,nctcnlycvcrthc
pastycar orovcrthc past dccadc,butfcrthc bcttcr part
ofthc past six dccadcs, and, onc might cvcn say, for thc
bcttcr part ofthc past four ccnturics. It is an objcctivc
fact that Amcricans havc bccn cxpanding thcir powcr
and inucncc in cvcr-widcning arcs sincc cvcn bcforc
thcy foundcd thcir own indcpcndcnt nation. Thc hcgc-
monythatAmcricacstablishcdwithinthcWcstcrnHcmi-
sphcrc in thc ninctccnth ccnturyhas bccn a pcrmancnt
fcaturc of intcrnational politics cvcr sincc. Thc cxpan-
sionofAmcrica'sstrategicrcachintoEuropcandEastAsia
that camc with thc Sccond World War has ncvcr bccn
rctractcd. Indccd,itissomcwhatrcmarkablctorccctthat
morc than nnyycars ancrthccndofthatwar-apcriod
thathas sccn }apancsc and Ccrmancncmics complctcly
transformcd into valucd nicnds and allics-and morc
thanadccadcancrthcColdWar-whichcndcdinanothcr
stunning transformation ofa dcfcatcd foc-thc Unitcd
Statcsncvcrthclcssrcmains,andclcarlyintcndstorcmain,
thcdominantstratcgicforccinbothEastAsiaandEuropc.
Thccndofthc ColdWar was takcn byAmcricans asan
opportunitynotto rctract buttocxpand thcir rcach,to
cxpand thc alliancc thcylcad castward toward Russia,to
strcngthcn thcir rclations among thc incrcasingly dcmo-
craticpowcrsofEastAsia,tostakcoutintcrcstsinpartsof
thc world, likc CcntralAsia, that mostAmcricans ncvcr
kncwcxistcdbcforc.
Thc myth of Amcrica`s "isolationist" tradition is
rcmarkablyrcsilicnt.utitisamyth. Expansionoftcrri-
tory and inucncc has bccn thc incscapablc rcality of
Amcrican history, and it has not bccn an unconscious
cxpansion. Thcambitiontoplay agrandrolconthcworld
stagc is dccply rootcd in thc Amcrican charactcr. Sincc
indcpcndcnccandcvcnbcfcrc,Amcricanswhcdisagrccd
cnmanythings always sharcda ccmmcn bclicfin thcir
naticn'sgrcatdcstiny. Evcnasawcakccllccticncflccscly
unitcd cclonics strctchcd cut acrcss thc Atlantic Ccast,
thrcatcncd cn al sidcs by Eurcpcan cmpircs and an
untamcdwildcrncss,thcUnitcdStatcshadappcarcdtcits
lcadcrsa"Hcrculcsinthccradlc,'"thccmbryc cfagrcat
cmpirc." Tc thc gcncraticn cf thc carly rcpublic, tc
Washingtcn, Hamiltcn, Franklin, and Jchcrscn, ncthing
wasmcrcccrtainthanthatthcNcrthAcricanccntincnt
wculd bc subducd, Amcrican wcalth and pcpulaticn
wculdgrcw,andthcycungrcpublicwculdscmcdayccmc
tc dcminatcthcWcstcrn Hcmisphcrc andtakcits placc
amcng thc
_
orld's grcat pcwcrs. Jchcrscn fcrcsaw thc
cstablishmcnt cf a vast "cmpirc cf libcrty." Hamiltcn
bclicvcdAmcricawculd,"crclcng,assumcanattitudcccr-
rcspcndcntwiitsgrcatdcstinicsmajcstic,cmcicnt,and
cpcrativccfgrcatthings.Ancblccarccrhcsbcfcrcit''
FcrthcsccarlygcncraticnscfAmcricans,thcprcmisc
cfnaticnalgcatncsswasnct mcrclya ccmfcrting hcpc
but an intcgralpart cfthcnaticnal idcntity, incxtricably
cntwincd with thc naticnal idcclcgy. Thc Unitcd Statcs
must bcccmc a grcat pcwcr, and pcrhaps thc grcatcst
pcwcr,thcyandmanysubscqucntgcncraticns cfAcri-
cans bclicvcd, bccausc thc principlcs and idcals upcn
which it was fcundcd wcrc unqucsticnably supcricr-
supcricr nct cnlytc thcsc cfthc ccrruptmcnarchics cf
cightccnth- and ninctccnth-ccntury Eurcpc, but tc thc
idcasthathadshapcdnaticnsandgcvcrnmcntsthrcugh-
6
2 Q
uoted in Stourzh, Aleander Hamilton, p. 195.
OF PARAD I SE AND POWER
outhumanhistory.Thcproofofthctransccndcntimpor-
tancc ofthcAmcrican cxpcrimcnt would bc found not
onlyinthccontinualpcrfcctionofAmcricaninstitutions
athomcbutalsointhcsprcadofAmcricaninucnccin
thc world.Amcricanshavc always bccnintcrnaticnalists,
thcrcforc, but thcir intcrnationalism has always bccn a
by-productofthcirnationalism. WcnAmcricansscught
lcgitimacy for thcir actions abroad, thcy sought it not
nomsupranationalinstitutionsbutfromthcirownprin-
ciplcs. ThatiswhyitwasalwayssocasyforsomanyAmcri-
cans to bclicvc, as so many still bclicvc today, that by
advancingthcirownintcrcststhcyadvanccthcintcrcstsof
humanity. As cnjaminFrankinput it,Amcrica's"causc
isthccauscofallmanknd."
This cnduringAmcricanvicwofthcir nation'scxccp-
tionalplaccinhistory,thcirconvictionthatthcirintcrcsts
and thc world's intcrcsts arc onc, may bc wclcomcd,
ridiculcd,orlamcntcd.utitshouldnotbcdoubtcd.And
justasthcrcislittlc rcason to cxpcctEuropcto changc its
mndamcntal coursc, thcrc is littlc causc to bclicvc thc
UnitcdStatcswillchangcitsowncoursc,orbcgintocon-
ductitsclfinthcworldinafundamcntallydincrcntman-
ncr.Abscnt somc unforcsccn catastrophc-nota sctback
in Iraqor"anothcrVictnam,'butamilitaryorcconomic
calamity grcat cnough to dcstroy thc vcry sourccs of
Amcricanpowcr-itisrcasonablctoassumcthatwchavc
onlyjustcntcrcdalongcraofAcricanhcgcmony.Dcmo-
graphic trcnds show thc Amcrican population growing
6
3 Quoted in Edward Handler, America and Europe in the Political
Tought of John Adams (Cambridge, MA, 1964) , p. 102.
fastcrandgcttingycungcrwhilcthcEurcpcanpcpulaticn
dcclincs and stcadily agcs. Acccrding tc Te Economist,
ifprcscnt trcnds ccntinuc,thc Amcrican cccncmy, ncw
rcughlytc samc sizc as thc Eurcpcan cccncmy, cculd
grcwtcbe mcrcthantwiccthcsizccfEurcpc'sby205 0.
TcdaythcmcdianagccfAmcricansis35. 5; inEurcpcit is
37.7. y 205 0, thcAmcrican mcdian agcwUlbc36. 2. In
Eurcpc, ifprcscnt trcnds pcrsist, it will bc 52.7. That
mcans, amcng cthcr things, that thc hnancial burdcn
cfcaring for cldcrlydcpcndcntswillgrcwmuch highcr
in Eurcpc than in thc Unitcd Statcs. And that mcans
Eurcpcanswillhavccvcnlcssmcncytcspcndcndcfcnsc
in thc ccmingycars anddccadcsthanthcydc tcday. As
The Econom
'
ist cbscrvcs,"Thclcng-tcrmlcgiccfdcmcg-
raphy sccms likcly tc cntrcnch Amcrica's pcwcr and tc
widcncxistingtransatlanticrins,'prcvidingastark"ccn-
trastbctwccnycuthml,cxubcrant,multi-cclcurcdAmcrica
andagcing,dccrcpit,inward-lcckingEurcpc."
IfAcrica`s rclativc pcwcrwill nct diminish,ncithcr
arc Amcricans likcly tc changc thcir vicws cfhcw that
pcwcr is tc bc uscd. In fact, dcspitc all thc scismic gcc-
pclitical shins that havc cccurrcd sincc :p|:, Amcricans
havc bccn fairly ccnsistcnt in thcir thinking abcut thc
naturccfwcrldanairs andabcutAcrica'srclcinshap-
ingthcwcrldtc suititsintcrcstsandidcals.Thcfcunding
dccumcnt cfthc Ccld War, Kcnnan's "Lcng Tclcgram,'
starkly sct cut thc dcminant pcrspcctivc cf Acrica's
pcstwar stratcgicculturc. Thc Scvict Unicn was"impcr-
vicus tc thc lcgic cfrcascn," Kcnnanwrctc,but wculd
6
4 "Half a Bilion Americans?," The Economist, August 22, 2002.
OF PARADIS E AND P O W E R
bc "highly scnsitivc to thc logic offorcc."' A gocd lib-
cral Dcmocrat likc Clark Clinord agrccd that thc "lan-
guagcofmilitarypowcr"wasthc cnlylanguagcthatthc
Sovictsundcrstood,andthatthcSovictcmpirchadtcbc
considcrcd a "distinct cntity with which conict is not
prcdcstincdbutwith whichwc cannot pursuc ccmmcn
goals." Fcw Amcricans would put things that starkly
today, but many Acricans would agrcc with thc scnti-
mcnts.Lastycarlargcmaj oriticsofDcmocratsandRcpub-
licansinbothhouscsctCongrcssagrccdthatthc"languagc
of military powcr" might bc all that Saddam Husscin
undcrstood.
ItisnotthatAcricansncvcrirtcdwiththckindof
intcrnationalist idcalism that now pcrmcatcs Europc. In
thc nrst halfofthctwcnticth ccntury, Amcricans fought
Wilson`s "war to cnd all wars," which was followcd a
dccadclatcrbyanAcricansccrctaryofstatcputtinghis
signaturctoatrcatyoutlawingwar. Inthc:})os,Franklin
Rooscvclt puthis faith innonaggrcssionpacts andaskcd
mcrclythatHitlcrpromiscnottoattackalistofcountrics
Rooscvclt prcscntcd to him. Evcn ancr thcYalta confcr-
cnccof:}|,adyingFDRcouldproclaim"thccndcfthc
systcm of unilatcral action, thc cxclusivc allianccs, thc
sphcrcsofinucncc,thcbalanccsofpowcr,àndtoprcm-
isc in thcir stcad "a univcrsal organization in which all
pcacc-lovingNationswillnnallyhavcachancctcj cin. . .
a pcrmancnt structurc of pcacc." ut Rooscvclt no
6
5 Quoted in Chace, Acheson, p. 150.
66
Quoted in ibid. , p. 157.
6
7 Quoted in Kissinger, Diploma
c, p. 416.
p :
lcngcrhadfl ccnhdcnccinsuchapcssibility.AcrMu-
nichandPcarlHarbcr,andthcn,ahcracctingmcmcnt
cfrcncwcdidcalism,thcplungcintothc CcldWar, Kcn-
nan's"lcgic
ffcrcc"bccamcthccpcratingassumpticncf
Amcricans1ratcgy. Achcscnspckc cfbuildingup"situa-
ticns cfstrcngth" arcundthc glcbc. Thc"lcsscn cfMu-
nich"camctc dcminatcAmcricanstratcgicthcught,and
althcughitwassupplantcdfcrabricftimcbythc"lcsscn
cfVictnam,' tcday it rcmains thc dcminant paradigm.
Wilc a smallscgmcnt cfthcAcricanclitcstill ycarns
fcr"glcbalgcvcrnancc"andcschcwsmilitaryfcrcc,Acri-
cansncmMadclcincAbrighttc DcnaldRumsfcld,frcm
rcntScowcrcntcAthcnyLakc,stillrcmcmbcrMunich,
ngurativclyifnctlitcrally.Andfcrycungcrgcncraticnscf
Acricanswho do nctrcmcmbcr Munich crPcarl Har-
bcr, thcrc is ncw Scptcmbcr ::. Onc cfthc things that
mcstclcarlydividcsEurcpcansandAmcricanstcdayisa
philcscphical,cvcnmctaphysicaldisagrccmcntcvcrwhcrc
cxactly mankind stands cn thc ccntinuum bctwccn thc
laws cfthcj unglc andthclaws cfrcascn.Amcricans dc
nctbclicvcwcarcasclcsctcthcrcalizaticncfthcKantian
drcmasdcEurcpcans.
Scwhcrcdcwc gcncmhcrcAgain,itisnct hardtc
scc whcrc Acrica is gcing. Thc Scptcmbcr 11 attacks
shihcdandaccclcratcdbutdidnctmndamcntallyaltcra
ccursc thc Unitcd Statcs was alrcady cn. Thcy ccrtainly
didnctaltcrbutcnlyrcmfcrccdAmcricanattitudcstcward
pcwcr. Rccall that cvcn bcfcrc Scptcmbcr 11, Achcscn's
succcsscrs wcrc stid, if scmcwhat distractcdly, buUding
"situaticns cf strcngth" arcund thc wcrld. cfcrc Scp-
tcmbcr::,andindccd,cvcnbcfcrcthcclccticncfCccrgc
OF PAR AD I S E AND POW E R
W. ush,AcricanstratcgicthinkcrsandPcntagcnplan-
ncrs wcrclccking ahcad tc thc ncxtstratcgic challcngcs
that sccmcd likcly tc arisc. Onc cfthcsc challcngcs was
Iraq. DuringthcClintcnycars,Ccngrcsshad passcdbya
ncarly unanimcus vctc a bill authcrizing military and
hnancialsuppcrtfcrIraqicppcsiticnfcrccs,andthcscc-
cndushadministraticnwasccnsidcringplanstcdcsta-
bilizc Iraq bcfcrc thc tcrrcrists struck on Scptcmbcr ::.
ThcClintcnadministraticnalsclaidthcfcundaticns fcr
a ncw ballistic missilc dcfcnsc systcm tc dcfcnd against
rcguc statcs such as Iraq, Iran, andNcrth Kcrca. HadA
Ccrcbccn clcctcd,andhadthcrcbccn nctcrrcristattacks
cn Scptcmbcr ::, thcsc programs-aimcd squarcly at
ush's"axiscfcvil"-wculdstillbcundcrway.
AcricansbcfcrcScptcmbcri: wcrcaugmcnting,nct
diminishing, thcir military pcwcr. In thc zooo clccticn
campaign, ush and Ccrc bcth prcmiscd tc incrcasc
dcfcnscspcnding,rcspcndingncttcanyparticularthrcat
but cnly tc thc gcncral pcrccpticn that thc Acrican
dcfcnsc budgct-thcn running at Hcsc tc $
)
oo billicn
pcr ycar-was inadcquatc tc mcct thc naticn's stratcgic
rcquircmcnts.AcricanmUitaryandcivilianlcadcrsinsidc
and cutsidc thc Pcntagcn wcrc scizcd with thc nccd tc
mcdcrnizc Acrican fcrccs, tc takc advantagc cfwhat
was and is rcgardcd as a "rcvcluticn in military anairs"
that cculd changc thc vcrynaturc cfthc way wars arc
fcught. chind this cnthusiasm was a gcnuinc ccnccrn
thatifthcUnitcdStatcsdidnctmakcthcncccssaryinvcst-
mcntsintcchnclcgicaltransfcrmaticn,itsfcrccs,itssccu-
rity,andthcwcrld'ssccuritywculdbcatriskinthcmturc.
cfcrc Scptcmbcr ::,thcAmcrican stratcgic ccmmu-
p
)
nity had bcgun tc fccus its attcnticn cn China. Fcw
bclicvcd that awarwith China was prcbablc inthc ncar
mturc-unlcss as a rcsult cfscmc crisis cvcrTaiwan-
but many bclicvcd that scmc ccnncntaticn with China
wculdbccctc incrcasinglylikclywithinthc ccmingtwc
dccadcs, as China's military capacity and gccpclitical
ambiticnsgrcw.ThisccnccrnabcutChinawascnccfthc
drivingfcrccsbchindthcdcmandfcrtcchnolcgicalmcd-
crnizaticncfthcAmcricanmilitary,itwas,quictly,cnccf
thc mctivcs bchind thcpush fcr a ncw missilc dcfcnsc
program, and in abroadscnscithad alrcadybcccmcan
crganizingprinciplc ofAmcricanstratcgicplanning.Thc
vicwcfChinaasthcncxtbigstratcgicchallcngctcckhcld
in thc Clintcn Pcntagcn, andwas givcncmcial sancticn
byPrcsidcntushwhcnhcdcclarcdpcintcdlybcfcrcand
ancr his clccticn that China was nct a stratcgic partncr
butastratcgiccompctitcrcfthcUnitcdStatcs.
Wcn thcBush administraticn rclcascd itsncwNa-
ticnal Sccurity Stratcgy in Scptcmbcr cf last ycar, thc
ambiticusncss cfAmcricanstratcgylchmanyEurcpcans,
and cvcn scmc Amcricans, brcathlcss. Thc ncw stratcgy
wassccnasarcspcnsctcScptcmbcr::,andpcrhapsinthc
mindscfthcscwhcwrctcit,itwas.utthcstrUingthing
abcutthatdccumcntisthatasidcncmafcwrcfcrcnccstc
thcidcacf"prc-cmpticn,'whichitsclfwashardlyancvcl
ccnccpt,thcushadministraticn's"ncw"stratcgywaslit-
tlc mcrcthan a rcstatcmcnt cfAcrican pclicics, many
gcingback a halfccntury. Thc ush stratcgysaid ncth-
ing abcutthc prcmcticn cfdcmccracyabrcadthat had
nctbccnsaidwithatlcastcqualfcrvcrbyHarryTruman,
}chn F Kcnncdy, cr Rcnald Rcagan. Thc dcclaraticn cf
Amcrica'sintcntto rcmainthcworld'sprc-cmincntmili-
tarypowcr, and to rcmain strong cnough to discouragc
anyothcrpowcrnomchallcngingAcricanprc-cmincncc,
was mcrcly thc public cxprcssion ofwhat had bccn an
unspokcnprcmiscofAmcricanstratcgicplanning-ifnot
ofactualdcfcnscspcndingandmilitarycapability-sincc
thccndofthcColdWar.
ThcpolicicsofthcClinton and ushadministraticns,
wcll cr ill dcsigncd, ncvcrthclcss rcstcd cn a ccmmcn
anddistinctlyAmcricanassumpticn-that is,thcUnitcd
Statcs as thc "indispcnsablc naticn." Amcricans scck tc
dcfcndandadvanccalibcralintcrnaticnalcrdcr.utthc
cnly stablc and succcssml intcrnaticnal crdcr Amcri-
cans can imaginc is onc that has thc Unitcd Statcs at its
ccntcr. Ncr can Amcricans ccnccivc cfan intcrnaticnal
ordcr that is not dcfcndcd bypowcr, and spccihcallyby
Amcricanpowcr.Ifthisisarrcgancc,atlcastitisnctancw
arrcgancc. Hcnry Kissingcr cncc askcd thc aging Harry
Trumanwhathcwantcdtobcrcmcmbcrcd fcr. Truman
answcrcd."Wcccmplctclydcfcatcdcurcncmicsandmadc
thcm surrcndcr. Ad thcn wc hclpcd thcm tc rcccvcr,
to bcccmc dcmccratic, and to rcjcin thc ccmmuniq cf
naticns. OnlyAmcricacouldhavcdoncthat."
Evcn thc
mcsthardhcadcdAmcricanrcalistshavcgrcwnscntimcn-
tal contcmplating what Rcinhold Nicbuhr oncc callcd
Amcrica's"rcsponsibility"for"solving. . . thcworldprcb-
lcm." Ccorgc Kcnnan, sctting forth his doctrinc cf
containmcnt-whichhcforcsawwouldbcatcrriblydim-
cultstratcgyforadcmocracytosustain-ncvcrthclcsssaw
68 Q
uoted in Kissinger, Diploma
c
, p. 425.
p
thcchallcngcas"atcst cfthc cvcrallwcrth cfthcUnitcd

Statcsasanaticnamcngnaticns''Hccvcnsuggcstcdthat
Amcricansshculdcxprcssthcir"gratitudctcaPrcvidcncc
which, by prcviding thcm| with this implacablc chal-
lcngc,hsmadcthcircntirc sccurityas anationdcpcnd-
cntcnthcirpullingthcmsclvcstcgcthcrandacccptingthc
rcspcnsibiticscfmcralandpcliticallcadcrshipthathis-
tcryplainlyintcndcdthcmtcbcar."
Amcricansarcidcalists. Inscmcmattcrs,thcymaybc
mcrcidcalisticthanEurcpcans.utthcyhavcnccxpcri-
cncc cf prcmcting idcals succcssmlly withcut pcwcr.
Ccrtainly,thcyhavcnccxpcricncccfsucccssmlsuprana-
ticnalgcvcrnancc,littlctcmakcthcmplaccallthcirfaith
inintcrnaticnallawand intcrnaticnal instituticns,much
asthcymightwishtc,andcvcnlcsstclctthcmtravcl,with
thc Eurcpcans, bcycnd pcwcr. Acricans, as gccd chil-
drcncfthcEnlightcnmcnt,stid bclicvcinthcpcrfcctibil-
ity cf man, and thcy rctain hcpc fcr thc pcrfcctibility
cfthcwcrld.utthcyrcmainrcalistsinthclimitcdscnsc
thatthcysti
j
bclicvcinthcncccssitycfpcwcrinawcrld
that rcmains far frcm pcrfccticn. Such law as thcrc
maybc tc rcgulatc intcrnaticnal bchavicr, thcy bclicvc,
cxistsbccauscapcwcrlUcthcUnitcdStatcsdcfcndsitby
fcrcc cfarms. In cthcrwcrds, just as Eurcpcans Haim,
Amcricans can still somctimcs scc thcmsclvcs in hcrcic
tcrms-as Cary Cccpcr at high nccn. ThcywiU dcfcnd
thctcwnspccplc,whcthcrthctcwnspccplcwantthcmtc
crnct.
Tcday,asarcsultcfthcScptcmbcr11 tcrrcristattacks,
6
9 X [ George F Kennan 1 , "The Sources of Soviet Conduct:' p. 169.
O F PARADI SE AND P O WER
thcUnitcdStatcsiscmbarkcdonyctanothcrcxpansionof
its stratcgic purvicw. }ustasthc }apancsc attack on Pcarl
Harbor,whichshouldnotrcallyhavccomcassuchasur-
prisc,lcdtoancnduringAmcricanrolcinEastAsiaandin
Europc,soScptcmbcr::,whichmturc historianswill nc
doubt dcpict asthcincvitablc conscqucncc cfAmcrican
involvcmcnt in thc Muslim wcrld, will likcly prcducc a
lasting Amcrican military prcscncc in thc Pcrsian Culf
and CcntralAsia,andpcrhapsalcng-tcrmcccupaticncf
oncofthcArabwcrld'slargcstcountrics.Amcricansmay
bcsurpriscdtonndthcmsclvcsinsuchapcsition,justas
Amcricanscfthc:p)oswculdhavcbccnstunncdtc hnd
thcmsclvcs an occupying pcwcr in bcth Ccrmany and
}apan lcssthana dccadclatcr. utvicwcd ncm thc pcr-
spcctivcofthcgrandswccpcfAmcricanhistcry,ahistcry
markcdbythcnation'sstcadycxpansicnandasccmingly
incluctablc risc from pcrilcus wcakcss tc thc prcscnt
globalhcgcmony,thislatcstcxpansionofAmcrica'sstratc-
gicrolcmaybclcssthanshocking.
Watdocsallthismcanforthctransatlanticrclation-
ship Can Europc possibly follow whcrc Amcrica lcads
Andifitcannot,docsthatmattcr
Onc answcr to thcsc qucstions is that thc crisis ovcr
Iraq has cast thc transatlantic problcm in thc harshcst
possiblclight.Wcnthatcrisissubsidcs,asintimcitwill,
thc qucstions ofpowcr that mostdividcAmcricans and
Europcansmaysubsidcabitaswcll,thccommonpolitical
culturc and thc cconomic tics that bind Amcricans and
Eurcpcans will thcn ccmc to thc fcrc-until thc ncxt
intcrnational stratcgic crisis. ut pcrhaps thc ncxt crisis
will nctbringcuttransatlanticdisagrccmcnts asscvcrcly
p
7
as thc crisis ovcr Iraq and thc grcatcr Middlc East
a rcgion whcrc both Amcrican and Europcan intcrcsts
arc grcat but whcrc Amcrican and Europcan dincrcnccs
havcprovcdcspcciallyacutc.Thcncxtintcrnationalcrisis
could comcinEastAsia. Civcn its distancc nomEuropc
andthcsmallcrEuropcanintcrcstthcrc,andthcfactthat
EuropcanscouldbringcvcnlcsspcwcrtobcarinEastAsia
than thcy can in thc Middlc East, thcrcbymakingthcm
cvcnlcssrclcvanttoAmcricanstratcgicplanning,itispcs-
siblcthatanAsiancrisiswculdnctlcadtcancthcrtrans-
atlantic dividc ofthc magnitudc ofthatwhichwc havc
bccncxpcricncing.
Inshort,althoughitisdimculttofcrcsccaclcsingof
thcgapb
nccnAmcrican andEurcpcanpcrccpticns cf
thcwor1d,thatgapmaybcmcrcmanagcablcthanitcur-
rcntlyappcars. Thcrc nccd bc nc "clash cfcivilizaticns"
within what uscd to bc callcd "thc Wcst." Thc task, fcr
both EuropcansandAmcricans, istorcadjusttothcncw
rcality ofAcricanhcgcmony. And pcrhaps, as thc psy-
chiatrists Iikc to claim, thc nrst stcp in managing this
problcm is to undcrstand it and to ackowlcdgc that it
cxists.
CcrtainlyAmcricans,whcn thcy think aboutEuropc,
shouldnotloscsightofthcmainpoint.ThcncwEurcpc
is indccd a blcsscd miraclc and a rcason for cnormous
cclcbration-onbothsidcsofthcAtlantic.ForEuropcans,
it is thc rcalization ofa long and improbablc drcam. a
contincnt ncc nom nationalist strifc and blood fcuds,
nommilitarycompctition andarms raccs.War bctwccn
thcmajcrEurcpcanpcwcrsisalmcstunimaginablc.Acr
ccnturics cfmiscry, nct onlyfcr Eurcpcansbut alsc fcr
thoscpullcdinto thcirconicts-asAmcricanswcrctwicc
inthc pastccntury-thc ncwEuropc rcallyhas cmcrgcd
asaparadisc. Itissomcthingtobcchcrishcdandguardcd,
notlcastbyAcricans,whohavcshcdbloodonEuropc's
soilandwouldshcdmorcshouldthcncwEuropccvcrfail.
This docsnotmcan,howcvcr,thatthc UnitcdStatcscan
orshouldrclyonEuropcinthcmturcasithasinthcpast.
Amcricans should not lct nostalgia for what may havc
bccnthc unusualcircumstanccs ofthc ColdWarmislcad
thcmaboutthcnaturcofthcirstratcgicrclationshipwith
thcEuropcanpowcrsinthcpost-ColdWarcra.
CanthcUnitcdStatcsprcparcfor andrcspondtothc
stratcgicchallcngcsaroundthcworldwithoutmuchhclp
from Europc Thc simplc answcr is that it alrcady docs.
Thc Unitcd Statcs has maintaincd stratcgic stability in
AsiawithnohclpfromEuropc.Inthcvariouscriscsinthc
MiddlcEastandPcrsianCulfovcrthcpastdccadc,includ-
ingthcprcscntonc,Europcanhclp,cvcnwhcncnthusias-
tically oncrcd, has bccn tokcn. Watcvcr Europc can or
cannotoffcrintcrmsofmoralandpoliticalsupport,ithas
hadlittlc to offcr thc Unitcd Statcs in stratcgic military
tcrms sincc thc cnd ofthc ColdWar-cxccpt, ofcoursc,
thatmostvaluablcofstratcgicasscts,aEuropcatpcacc.
TodaythcUnitcdStatcsspcndsalittlcmorcthan 3 pcr-
ccntofits CDP on dcfcnsc.WcrcAmcricans to incrcasc
thatto4 pcrccnt-mcaningadcfcnscbudgctincxccssof
$oo billion pcr ycar-it would still rcprcscnt a smallcr
pcrccntagc ofnational wcalth than Amcricans spcnt on
dcfcnsc throughout most ofthc past halfccntury. Evcn
Paul Kcnncdy, who invcntcd thc tcrm "impcrial ovcr-
strctch" in thc latc :p8os ,whcn thc Unitcd Statcs was
p p
spcndingaround7 pcrccntofitsGDPondcfcnsc) ,bclicvcs
thcUnitcdStatcscansustainitscurrcntmilitaryspcnding
lcvclsanditscurrcntglobaldominanccfarintothcmturc.
ThcUnitcdStatcscanmanagc,thcrcforc,atlcastinmatc-
rial tcr
_
s. Nor can onc arguc that thcAmcrican pcoplc
>
arc unwilling to shouldcr this global burdcn, sincc thcy
havcdoncsoforadccadcalrcady, andahcrScptcmbcr11
thcysccmwm ingto continucdoingsoforalongtimcto
comc. Acricans apparcntly fccl no rcscntmcnt at not
bcingablctocntcrEuropc's"postmodcrn"world.Thcrcis
nocvidcnccthatmostAmcricansdcsircto.Partlybccausc
thcyarcsopowcrml,thcytakcpridcinthcirnation'smili-
tarypowcrandthcirnation'sspccialrolcinthcworld.
Thcd
ngcrsofthcprcscnttransatlanticprcdicamcnt,
thcn,licneithcrinAmcricanwillnorcapability,butinthc
inhcrcntmoraltcnsionofthccurrcntintcrnationalsitua-
tion. Asissooncnthccascinhumananairs,thcrcalqucs-
tionisoncofintangiblcs-offcars,passions,andbclicfs.
Thc problcm is that thc Unitcd Statcs must somctimcs
playby thc rulcs ofa Hobbcsian world, cvcnthough in
doingsoitviolatcsEuropc'spostmodcrnnorms.Itmust
rcmsc
to abidcbyccrtainintcrnational convcntionsthat
may constrain its ability to hght cncctivcly in Robcrt
Coopcr's junglc. It must support arms control, but not
always foritscf. Itmustlivcbyadoublcstandard.Adit
mustsomctimcsactunilatcrally, notoutofapassionfor
unilatcralismbutonlybccausc,givcnawcakEuropcthat
has movcdbcyondpowcr,thcUnitcdStatcshasnochoicc
but toactunilatcrally.
Fcw Europcansadmit,as Coopcrdocsimplicitly, that
suchAmcricanbchaviormayrcdoundtothcgrcatcrbcnc-
ht of thc civilizcd world, that Acrican powcr, cvcn
cmploycdundcradoublcstandard,maybcthcbcstmcans
of advancing human progrcss-and pcrhaps thc only
mcans. As Nicbuhr wrotc a half ccntury ago, Amcrica's
"inordinatcpowcr,"forallits"pcrils,`providcs"somcrcal
advantagcs for thc world community." Instcad, many
EuropcanstodayhavccomctoconsidcrthcUnitcdStatcs
itsclftobcthcoutlaw, aroguccolossus.Thcdangcr-ifit
is a dangcr-is that thc Unitcd Statcs and Europc could
bccomc positivcly cstrangcd. Europcans could bccomc
morcandmorcshrillinthcirattacksonthcUnitcdStatcs.
ThcUnitcdStatcscouldbccomclcssinclincdtolistcn,or
pcrhapscvcn to carc. Thcday could comc,ifit has not
alrcady, whcnAmcricans might no morc hccd thc pro-
nounccmcnts of thc EU than thcy do thc pronouncc-
mcntsofASEANorthcAndcanPact.
To thosc ofuswhocamc ofagc inthc ColdWar, thc
stratcgic dccoupling of Europc and thc Unitcd Statcs
sccms nightcning.DcCaullc,whcn connontcdbyFDR's
vision ofa world whcrc Europc was irrclcvant, rccoilcd
and suggcstcd that this vision "riskcd cndangcring thc
Wcstcrnworld."IfWcstcrnEuropcwastobcconsidcrcda
"sccondarymattcr"bythc Unitcd Statcs,would not FDR
only"wcakcn thcvcrycauschc mcant to scrvc-that of
civilization"WcstcrnEuropc,dcCaullcmaintaincd,was
"csscntialto thcWcst. Nothing can rcplacc thvaluc,thc
powcr, thc shining cxamplc of thc ancicnt pcoplcs."
Typically, hcinsistcdthiswas"trucofFranccabovcall."'
70 Reinhold Niebuhr, Te Irony of American History (New York,
1962), p. 134
71 Quoted in Harper, American Visions of Europe, pp. 114-15.
1 0 1
utlcaving asidc Frcnch amour propre, didnctdcGauhc
havcapcintIfAmcricanswcrctcdccidcthatEurcpcwas
no mcrc than an irritating irrclcvancy, wculdAmcrican
sccictygraduallybcccmc unmccrcd ncmwhatwc ncw
call"thc
y
cst"Itisnctarisktcbctakcnlightly,cncithcr
sidcoft
_
cAtlantic.
So what is to bc dcnc Thc cbvicus answcr is that
Europc shouldfcllowthc ccurscthat Cocpcr,Ash, Rcb-
crtscn, and cthcrs rcccmmcnd andbuildupits military
capabilitics, cvcn ifcnly marginally. Thcrc is nct much
grcund for hcpc that this wm happcn. ut, thcn, whc
knows Maybc ccnccrn abcut Amcrica's cvcrwccning
pcwcrrcallywillcrcatcscmccncrgyin Eurcpc. Pcrhaps
thcatavisticimpulscsthatstillswirlinthchcartscfGcr-
mans, ritons, and Frcnchmcn-thc mcmory cfpcwcr,
intcrnationalinucncc, and naticnal ambiticn-can still
bc playcd upcn. Scmc ritcns still rcmcmbcr cmpirc,
scmc Frcnchmcnstillycarnfcr la gloire; scmc Gcrmans
still want thcir placc in thc sun. Thcsc urgcs arc ncw
mcstly channclcd intc thc grand Eurcpcan prcjcct, but
thcycculdhndmcrctraditicnalcrcssicn.Whcthcrthis
istcbchcpcdfcrorfcarcdisancthcrqucsticn.Itwculd
bcbcttcr still ifEurcpcans cculd mcvc bcycnd fcar and
angcratthcrcguccclcssusandrcmcmbcr,again,thcvital
ncccssityofhavingastrcng,cvcnprcdominantAmcrica-
forthcworldandcspcciallyfcrEurcpc.Itwculdsccmtc
bcanacccptablcpricctopayfcrparadisc.
Amcricans canhclp. Itistructhatthcushadminis-
trationcamcintoomccwithscmcthing ofa chipcn its
shouldcr. Thc rcalist-naticnalist impulscs it inhcritcd
nomthcRcpublicanCongrcssofthc:pposmadcitappcar
OF PARADIS E A ND POW E R
almostcagcrtoscornthcopinionsofmuchofthcrcstof
thcworld.Thcpicturcitpaintcdinitscarlymonthswasof
abchcmoththrashingaboutagainstconstraintsthatonly
it could scc. It was hostilc to thc ncw Europc-as to a
lcsscr cxtcnt was thc Clinton administration-sccing it
not so much as an ally but as an albatross. Evcn ancr
Scptcmbcri:,whcnthcEuropcansohcrcdthcirvcrylim-
itcd military capabilitics in thc hght inAfghanistan, thc
Unitcd Statcs rcsistcd,fcaringthatEuropcancoopcration
wasarusctoticAmcricadown.Thcushadministration
vicwcdNATO'shistoric dccision to aidthcUnitcdStatcs
undcrArticlc5 lcss as a boon than as a boobytrap.An
opportunityto drawEuropc into common battlc out in
thc Hobbcsian world, cvcn in a minor rolc,was thcrcby
unncccssarilysquandcrcd.
ut Amcricans arc powcrml cnough that thcy nccd
notfcarEuropcans,cvcnwhcnbcaringgins.Rathcrthan
vicwing thc Unitcd Statcs as a Cullivcr ticd down by
Lilliputian thrcads,Amcrican lcadcrs should rcalizc that
thcyarchardlyconstraincdatall,thatEuropcisnotrcally
capablc ofconstraining thc Unitcd Statcs. Ifthc Unitcd
Statcs could movc past thc anxicty cngcndcrcd by this
inaccuratc scnsc of constraint, it could bcgin to show
morc undcrstanding for thc scnsibilitics ofothcrs, a lit-
tlc morc of thc gcncrosity ot spirit that charactcrizcd
AmcricanforcignpolicyduringthcColdWar.Itcouldpay
its rcspcctsto mu|tilatcralism and thcrulcoflaw, and try
to build somc intcrnational political capital for thosc
momcntswhcn mu|tilatcralism isimpossiblcandunilat-
cralactionunavoidablc.Itcould,in short,takcmorccarc
toshowwhatthcfoundcrscallcdadcccntrcspcctforthc
1 03
opinion ofmankind'' This was always thc wiscst pclicy.
Ad thcrc is ccrtainlybcncht in it for thc Unitcd Statcs.
Winningthc matcrialand moral support ofnicnds and
allics,cspcciallyinEuropc,isunqucstionablyprcfcrablcto
actinga
|
oncinthcfaccofEuropcananxctyandhostdity.
Thcc arc small stcps, and thcy wilI not addrcss thc
dccp problcms that bcsct thc transatlantic rclaticnship
today.ut,ahcrall,itismorcthanaclichcthatthcUnitcd
StatcsandEuropcsharcasctofcommonWcstcrnbclicfs.
Thciraspirationsforhumanityarcmuchthcsamc,cvcnif
thcirvastdisparityofpowcrhasnowputthcminvcrydif-
fcrcnt placcs. Pcrhaps it is not too navcly optimistic to
bclicvcthatalittlccommonundcrstandingcouldstihgoa
longway.
A F T E R W O R D
T O T H E V I N T A G E E D I T I O N :
American Power and the
Crisis of Legitimacy
"
WHAT KIND OF WORL D ordcr do wc want" That
qucstion, poscd by Gcrmany's forcign ministcr, Joschka
Fischcr, on thc cvc ofthc Acrican invasion ofIraq in
March zoo
)
, hasbccn onthc minds ofmanyEuropcans
thcscdays.'Thatbyitsclfshowsthcdincrcnccsthatscpa-
ratcEuropcans andAmcricanstoday, for it is safc to say
thc grcat majority ofAmcricans havc not pondcrcd thc
qucstionof"worldordcr"sinccthcwar.
Thcywillhavc to. Thc grcat transatlantic dcbatc ovcr
thc Iraq war was rootcd in profound disagrccmcnt ovcr
"world ordcr'`Ycs,AmcricansandEuropcansdincrcdon
thc spccihc qucstion of what to do about Iraq. Thcy
dcbatcd whcthcr Saddam Husscinposcda scriousthrcat
andwhcthcrwarwasthcrightanswcr.Asolidmaj orityof
Amcricans answcrcd ycs to both qucstions, cvcn largcr
majoriticsofEuropcansanswcrcdno.utthcscdisagrcc-
mcnts rccctcdmorc than simplctacticaland analytical
asscssmcnts ofthc situation in Iraq.As Francc`s forcign
ministcr, Dominiquc dcVillcpin,put it,thc strugglcwas
1
Joschka Fischer interview in Der Spiegel. March 24. 2003.
AF TER WOR D
notsomuchaboutIraqasitwasaconictbctwccn"no
visions ofthc world." Thc dincrcnccs in Iraq wcrc not
only about policy. Thcywcrcalso about hrstprinciplcs.
Opinionpollstakcnbcforc,during,andahcrthcwarhavc
showntwo pcoplcsliving on scparatc stratcgic and idco-
logicalplancts.Morcthan8opcrccntofAmcricansbclicvc
war may achicvc justicc, lcss than half of Europcans
bclicvcthatawar-anywar-cancvcrbcj ust.Amcricans
and Europcans disagrcc about thc rolc ofintcrnational
law and intcrnational institutions, and about thc ncbu-
lous and abstract yct powcrmlqucstionofintcrnational
lcgitimacy. Thcsc diffcrcnt worldvicws prcdatc thc Iraq
warandthcprcsidcncyofCcorgcW. ush,althoughboth
thcwarandthcushadministration`sconductofintcrna-
tional anairs havc dccpcncd and pcrhaps hardcncd this
transatlantic rihintoan cnduringfcaturcofthc intcrna-
tional landscapc. AmcricaisdincrcntfromEuropc,`Ccr-
hard Schrocdcr dcclarcd mattcr-of-factly months bcforc
thcwar. Whoanylongcrcandcnyit
2
Dominique de Villepin, address to the UN Security Council,
March 19, 2003.
3 See Transatlantic Trends 2003, a survey commissioned by the
German Marshall Fund of the United States and the Compagnia di
San Paolo. Poling was conducted June 10-25, 2003, in eight countries: the
United States, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands,
Poland, and Portugal. (Results can be viewed at w .transatlantictrends.
org. )
4 Gerhard Schroeder interview in The New York Times, Septem
ber 4, 2002.
5 As the British political scientist Christopher Croker has observed,
"Nothing is more naIve than the claim that the rifs are likely to end if
Bush fails to be reelected in 2004 or if the Schroeder government loses
power:' Christopher Croker, Empires in Confict: Te Growing Rif
1 0 7
Wcnthisbookwashrstpublishcdatthcbcginningof
2003, bcforcthcIraqwar,thctransatlanticgulfwasplainly
visiblc. Lcss clcar thcn, howcvcr, was how signihcant it
would
urnouttobcforthcworld. Onccouldimaginca
transatanticpartingofthcwayson globalstratcgicmat-
tcrsthatwas,ifnotquitcamicablc,atlcastmanagcablc,a
stratcgic division oflaborinwhich Europcconccntratcd
onEuropcandthcUnitcdStatcsoncvcrythingclsc.Cold
War stratcgicpartncrship mightbcrcplaccdbya ccrtain
mutualindincrcncc,butthatnccdnotauguranongoing
crisis within thc Wcst. Could not Amcricans and Euro-
pcans simply say to onc anothcr, in thc words of ob
Dylan,"Yougoyourway,andI'llgominc"
Todayadarkcrpossibilitylooms.Agrcatphilosophical
schismhasopcncdwithinthcWcst,andinstcadofmutual
indincrcncc, mutual antagonism thrcatcns to dcbilitatc
both sidcs ofthc transatlantic community. Coming at a
timcinhistorywhcnncwdangcrsand criscsarcprolifcr-
ating rapidly, this schism could havc scrious consc-
qucnccs
For Europc and thc Unitcd Statcs to dccouplc

stratcgicallyhasbccnbadcnough.utwhatifthcschism
ovcr"worldordcr"infcctsthcrcstofwhatwchavcknown
asthclibcralWcstWillthcWcststillbcthcWcst
Afcwycarsagosuchqucstionswcrcunthinkablc.Ahcr
thcColdWar, FrancisFukuyamaassumcd,alongwiththc
rcst ofus, that at thc cnd ofhistory thc world's libcral
dcmocracics would livc in rclativc harmony. Conicts
wouldbcbctwccnthcWcstand"thcrcst,'notwithinthc
Beteen Europe and the United States, Whitehal Paper 58 ( London,
2003) : 3
AF TERWORD
Wcst itsclf. Thc world's dcmocracics, sharing common
libcral, dcmocratic principlcs, would "havc no grounds
on which to contcst cach othcr's lcgitimacy."
That rca-
sonablc assumption has bccn thrown into doubt. For
it is prcciscly thc qucstion oflcgitimacythat is at issuc
todaybctwccnAmcricansandEuropcansnotthclcgiti-
macy ofcach othcr's political institutions, pcrhaps, but
ofthcir dincring visions ofworld ordcr." Morc to thc
point,itisthclcgitimacyofAmcricanpowcrandAcri-
can global lcadcrship that has comc to bc doubtcd by
a maj ority of Europcans. Amcrica, for thc hrst timc
sincc World War II, is suffcring a crisis ofintcrnational
lcgitimacy.
Amcricanswillhndthatthcycannotignorcthisprob-
lcm.Thcstrugglctodchncandobtainintcrnational lcgiti-
macyin this ncw cra mayprovc to bc among thc criti-
cal contcsts ofour timc, in somc ways as signihcant in
dctcrmining thc mturc ofthc intcrnational systcm and
Amcrica's placc in it as any purcly matcrial mcasurc of
powcrandinucncc.
THE THREE PILLARS OF
COLD WAR LEGI TI MACY
Whcrc cxactly has this strugglc ovcr lcgitimacy comc
fromThroughoutthcColdWarthclcgitimacyofAmcri-
6 Francis Fukuyama, The End of Histor and the Last Man (New
York, 1992) , p. 263.
7 Actually, Europeans and Americans do at times question each
other's political and economic institutions.
1 0 9
can powcr and global lcadcrship was largcly takcn for
grantcd,and notjustbyAmcricans.Thcvastmaj orityof
Europcans,thoughthcysomctimcschafcdundcrAmcri-
can ominancc and ohcn qucstioncd Amcrican actions
in Victnam, Latin Amcrica, and clscwhcrc, ncvcrthclcss
acccptcd Amcrican lcadcrship as both ncccssary and
dcsirablc.
Contrarytomuchmythologizingonbothsidcsofthc
Atlantic thcsc days, thc foundations ofAmcrica's Cold
War lcgitimacyhad littlc ifanything to do with thc fact
thatthcUnitcdStatcscrcatcdthcUnitcdNationsorfaith-
fullyabidcdbythcprcccptsofintcrnationallawaslaidout
in thc UN Chartcr. Thc UN Sccurity Councilwas para-
lyzcdforthchrstfourdccadcsofitscxistcnccbythcCold
War confrontation. Thc Unitcd Statcs did not considcr
itsclfboundtoscckthcapprovalofthcSccurityCouncil
bcforcmakingorthrcatcningwar,andEuropcansncithcr
cxpcctcdnordcmandcdthatitshould.NordidEuropcan
natio
s thcmsclvcs scck such authorization whcn thcy

wcnttowarinthcMiddlc East orinSouthcastAsiaorin
thcSouthAtlantic.WhcnthcUnitcdStatcsdidcitcintcr-
nationallawtojustiits ColdWar policics, it appcalcd
tothccatch-allprinciplcofcollcctivcsclf-dcfcnsc-bascd
on thc somctimcs dubious proposition that any action
takcnbythcUnitcdStatcs,nommilitaryintcrcntionsto
clandcstinc ovcrthrows ofrcgimcs throughout thc third
world,wasbydchnitionanactofcollcctivcdcfcnscofthc
"frccworld"againstaninhcrcntlyaggrcssivcintcrnational
communism.
Itwas not a structurc ofrulcs, laws,and institutions
butthccircumstanccsofthcColdWarandAmcrica'sspc-
AF TERWORD
cial rolc in that conflict that providcd thc Unitcd Statcs
with lcgitimacy, at lcast within thc Wcst." In Europc,
Amcrican lcgitimacyrcstcd onthrccpillars,allbascd on
thccxstcnccofaSovictcommunistcmpirc.
Thcsturdicstpillarwasthccommonstratcgicthrcatof
thc Sovict Union-thc rcality madc vivid daily by hun-
drcdsofthousands ofSovicttroopsparkcdinthcccntcr
of Europc. Couplcd with this common thrcat was thc
commonundcrstandingthat onlythc Unitcd Statcs pos-
scsscd thc powcr to dctcr it. For most Europcans, and
for most ofAmcrica`s Asian allics, too,Amcrica`s widcly
agrccd-uponrolcasprincipaldcfcndcragainstthcSovict
thrcat gavc it a vcry broad mantlc of lcgitimacy. Evcn
whcn Europcans bclicvcd thc Unitcd Statcs was act-
ing foolishly or immorally, as in Victnam, most ncvcr-
thclcss continucd to acccpt Amcrican powcr and global
lcadcrship-partly bccausc thcy had to. Much of thc
lcgitimacythcUnitcdStatcscnjoycdwithinthcWcstdur-
ingthcColdWardcrivcdfromthcsclf-intcrcstofitsallics.
Complcmcnting thc common stratcgic thrcat was a
common idcological thrcat. During thc Cold War thc
UnitcdStatcspridcditsclfonbcingthc"lcadcrofthcncc
world"againstthctotalitarianworld,andmostEuropcans
agrccd.ThcColdWar`sManichcanstrugglcprovidcdthc
world`smostpowcrmldcmocracysubstantialauthorityin
thc dcmocratic camp. In rctrospcct it is clcarthat com-
monlysharcdlibcraldcmocraticprinciplcsmcantagood
8 Outside of Europe and Japan, in places such as Latin America, the
Middle East, and Afica, and of course Russia and China, America was
generally accorded less legitimacy.
1 1 1
dcal morc in a world thrcatcncd bytotalitarianism than
thcywouldinaworldmadcsafcrfordcmocracy.
Finally, thc Cold War's "bipolar" intcrnational sys-
tcmprovidcdwhatmightbccallcdastructurallcgitimacy.
Thc roughlycqualbalanccbctwccn thc two supcrpowcrs
mcant thatAmcrica's powcr, though vast, was ncvcrthc-
lcss chcckcd. Itwas notthatEuropcanswclcomcd Sovict
military powcr on thc contincnt. ut many implicitly
undcrstoodthatthccxstcnccofSovictconvcntionaland
nuclcar powcr actcd as a rcstraint onthcAcricans. Dc
Caullc's Francc,Willy randt's Ccrmany, andothcrs rcl-
ishcdthc smallmcasurcofindcpcndcnccnomAcrican
dominanccthatthcsupcrpowcrbalanccgavcthcm.
Atthccndofthc ColdWar thcscpiUarsofAcrican
legitimacy fcll to thc ground alongwith thc crlinWah
and thc statucs of Lcnin. Thcrc has bccn littlc in thc
postCold War cra to rcplacc thcm. Radic, militant
Islam, whatcvcr dangcrs it may rcprcscnt whcn mani-
fcstcd as tcrrorism, hasnotand cannot rcplacc ccmmu-
nis
asanideological thrcattcWcstcrnlibcrdcmccra.
Today,thcphrasc"lcadcrofthcnccworld"scundsvagucly
absurdcvcntoAcricancars.
Nor has thc massivc thrcatcfthcSovictUnionbccn
rcplaccdasasourcc ofAcricanlcgitimacybythcmcrc
dimsc and opaquc thrcats of thc post-Cold War cra.
Ethnic conict in thc alkans in thc 1990S compcllcd
Europcans to givc thcir blcssing to Acrican military
intcrvcntion,andmakingEuropc"wholcandncc"was a
transatlanticprojcctinwhichAmcricawasstillacccrdcda
lcadcrship rolc, cspcciallyby thc nations cfCcntral and
EastcrnEuropc.utthccomplctionofthatprojcctputan
AF TERWORD
cnd to Europcan stratcgic dcpcndcncc on thc Unitcd
Statcs, at lcast in thc vicw of many Wcstcrn Europcans.
ThcpcoplcsofEuropcncvcr mllysharcdAmcricancon-
ccrns about wcapons ofmass dcstruction in Iraq, Iran,
andNorth Korca,notduringthc Clintonadministration
nor ahcrward. Nor do most Europcans today sharc
Amcricans` post-Scptcmbcr :: alarm ovcr thc possiblc
ncxusbctwccnsuchwcaponsandintcrnationaltcrrorism.
Rightly or wrongly, in thcir hcarts, Europcans do not
bclicvc thoscwcaponswillbcaimcdat thcm.Andtothc
cxtcntthatEuropcans doworry, most no longcrlookto
thc Unitcd Statcs to protcct thcm. Europcans living in
thcirgcopoliticalparadiscdonotfcarthcjunglcsbcyond,
thcrcforc thcyno longcr wclcomc thosc who guard thc
gatcs. Instcad,thcyask.Wowillguardthcguards
Amcrica`s lcgitimacy during thc Cold War rcstcd
hcavilyonEuropcansclf-intcrcst.TodayEuropcans'rcla-
tivcstratcgicindcpcndcncchascauscdmanytotakcback
thc blankct lcgitimacy thcy oncc accordcd Acrica.
Indccd,thc disappcarancc ofthc Sovictthrcat,thc inau-
guration ofthc prcscnt"unipolar"intcrnational systcm,
and thc conscqucnt loss of structural lcgitimacy havc
turncd many Europcans` fcars and suspicions wcstward
acrossthcAtlantic.FarfromvicwingthcUnitcdStatcsasa
protcctorand thcrcforcalcgitimatc"lcadcr,"manyEuro-
9 The exception, of course, is in Eastern and Central Europe, where
most nations still feel strategically dependent on the United States. But
if and as these powers feel less threatened over the coming years, and as
they become more entangled in the European Union's web of eco
nomic and political relationships, they may follow the path of the
Western European peoples.
: :
)
pcanstodayworry aboutan unconstraincdAmcricathat
has grown bcyond thcircontrol.
THE UNI POLAR PREDICAMENT
Watmightbccallcdthc"unipolarprcdicamcnt,'thcrc-
forc,isnotthcproductofanyspccihcAmcricanpolicyor
cfaparticularAcricanadministration. Withthccndof
thcColdWar,Amcrica'sunprcccdcntcdglobalpowcritsclf
has unavoidablybccomc thc ncw issuc, onc with which

EuropcansandAmcricanshavconlyinbcguntograpplc.
"Wat do wc do,' }oscma Fischcr askcd ahcr thc
Iraqwarbcgan,"whcn. . . our mostimportantpartncris
making dccisions that wc considcr cxrcmcly dangcr-
OUS?"lO WatindccdThcqucstionisarclativclyncwonc,
bccausc thc loss of Europcan control ovcr Amcrican
actionsisarclativclyncwphcnomcnon. DuringthcCold
War,cvcnadominantUnitcdStatcswascompcUcdtolis-
tcn
othcEuropcans,ifonlybccauscAmcricanColdWar
policyaimcdabovc aJ clscatprotcctingandstrcngthcn-
ingEuropc. Today,Europchaslostmuchofthcinucncc
itoncccnjoycd.Itistoowcaktobcancsscntialally, and
it is tco sccurc to bc a potcntialvictim.Wcrcas during
thc ColdWar thcUnitcdStatcs uscdto calculatcho
y
its
actions wculd affcct Europc's sccurity, today it docs not
havctoworryncarlyasmuch.
That's why Europcans arc worricd-about uncon-
straincdAmcricanpowcrandabouthowthcycanrcgain
10 Fischer interview in Ver Spiege March 24, 2003.
AF TERWORD
somc control ovcr how thc Unitcd Statcs cxcrciscs that
powcr. For onc thing, Europcans too long havc bccn
accustomcd to shaping thc world, cithcr through thcir
ownpowcrorthroughthcirinucnccovcrthcAmcricans,
to sit backhappilynow and lct Amcrica do thc driving
alonc.Adwhat arc Europcans to do ifthcybclicvc thc
Unitcd Statcs is drivingdangcrously Europcans fclt this
lossofccntrol acutclyduringthc alkan conicts ofthc
1990S, whcn in thc carly part ofthc dccadc thcywaitcd
hclplcssly for a hcsitant Clinton administration to act.
Thcn,whcnthcUnitcdStatcs didact,inthc1999 Kosovo
war, thcy had to watch as that dimcult conict in thcir
ownbackyardwas dircctcdalmostcntirclybyanAmcri-
cangcncral.WcthcrthcAmcricanprcsidcntwasCcorgc
ush, ill Clinton, or CcorgcW. ush, thc ncwintcrna-
tionalstructurchasputEuropcansinthcuncnviablcposi-
tion ofhaving totrustthcsolcsupcrpowcrtojudgc and
actwiscly.Thatisn`tancasythingtodo,forasEuropcans
wcllkow,allnationsmakcbadjudgmcntssomctimcs.
Thc unipolar prcdicamcnt raiscs cvcn morc mnda-
mcntal issucs, howcvcr. Abovc all, it raiscs thc issuc of
political and moral lcgitimacy. To thc modcrn libcral
mind,thcrcissomcthinginhcrcntlyillcgitimatcaboutthc
idca of a singlc, dominant world powcr unconstraincd
cxccptbyitsownscnscofrcstraint.Nomattcrhowdiplo-
maticallyadcptanAmcricanprcsidcntmightbc,thcspirit
oflibcral dcmocracyrccoils from thc idcaofhcgcmonic
dominancc, domcstic as wcll as intcrnational,no mattcr
howbcnignly it maybc cxcrciscd.As Kcnncth N. Waltz
putitina1997 cssay,"Unbalanccdpowcr,whocvcrwiclds
: :
it,isapotcntialdangcrtoothcrs."''Naturc,mostassumc,
abhorsamonopolyofpowcrasmuchasitdocsavacuum
ofpowcr.'
-
And is itnottruc, as LordActon wrctc, that
absolutcpowcrcorruptsabsolutcly
To
thcWcstcrnlibcral mind, chccks and balanccs arc

prcrcquisitcs for justicc and nccdcm in dcmcstic lifc.
As the ritish scholar-statcsman Rcbcrt Cccpcr argucs,
"Ourdomcsticsystcmsarcdcsigncdtcplaccrcstraintcn
powcr . . . . Wcvalucpluralismandthcrulccf lawdcmcsti-
callyanditisdimcultfordcmccraticsocictics-including
_
cUSA-
tc cscapcncmthcidcathatthcyarcdcsirablc
intcrnationallyaswcll.' 'WculdthcUnitcdStatcsuscits
powcrto scrvcitsownnarrowintcrcsts,atthccxpcnsccf
othcrsThat is what worrics cvcn nicnds and admircrs
ofthc Unitcd Statcs thcsc days."Thc dimcultywith thc
Acrican monopoly offorcc in thcworld communip,'
Coopcrargucs,"is that it is AmcrIcan and will bc cxcr-
ciscd,ncccssarily,inthcintcrcstsofthcUnitcdStatcs. This
willno! bcsccnasIcgitimatc."'
1
1
Kenneth N. Waltz, "Evaluating Theories;' American Political
Science Review 91 (December 1997) : 915.
1
2
In fact, according to realist and neo-realist theory, a unipolar
world of the kind we now live in is impossible, or at least is inherently
unstable and short-lived, because the emergence of a sole superpower
must quickly lead the world's other powers to band together in opposi
tion and restore international balance. For a summary and reftation
of this theory, see William C. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar
World;' International Securit 24 (Summer 1999) : 5-41.
13 Robert Cooper, The Breaking of Nations, (New York, 2004) ,
PP 163-64.
14 Cooper, The Breaking of Natons, p. 167.
AF TERWORD
Wcll bcforc thc ush administration provcd so mal-
adroit at rcassuring cvcn Amcrica`s closcst allics, othcr
post-Cold War administrations had faccd mounting
anxictyaboutAmcrica`sgrowingdominancc.Inthc1990S,
whilc ill Clinton and MadclcincAlbrightwcrc proudly
dubbing thc Unitcd Statcs thc "indispcnsablc nation,`
Frcnch forcign ministcrs, alongwith thcir Russian and
Chincsc countcrparts, wcrc dcclaring thc Amcrican-lcd
unipolarworldtobcunjust and dangcrous.
n thc Clin-
ton ycars, Samucl P. Huntingtonwaswarningabout thc
"arrogancc"and"unilatcral ism"ofAmcricanpolicics, and
Europcan complaints about thc "arrogancc" and"bully-
ing" of thc Clinton administration bcforc, during, and
ancr thc Kosovo warin 1999 cvinccd a growing conccrn
about thc inhcrcnt problcms of thc ncw structurc, and
cspcciallythcaccclcratinglossofEuropcancontrol.'
FormanyEuropcansthcnightmarcbccamcrcalahcr
Scptcmbcr 11, 2 001. For ancr thc attack on thc Unitcd
Statcs,thc ush administration andAmcricans gcncrally
bccamc quitc frankaboutwicldingAcrican powcrpri-
marily if not cxclusivcly in dcfcnsc of thcir own ncwly
cndangcrcd vital intcrcsts. Thc initial Europcan support
forthcAmcricaninvasioninAfghanistan,andthchistoric
invocationofArticlcVbythcNATOallics,providingfora
collcctivc dcfcnscofthc UnitcdStatcs,wcrcaimcdinpart
at cnsuring thc UnitcdStatcs did not go onon its own
and at giving Europc somc control ovcr thc Amcrican
15 As Huntington noted, "political and intellectual leaders in most
countries strongly resist the prospect of a unipolar world and favor
the emergence of true multi polarity:' See Samuel P. Huntington,
"The Lonely Superpower," Foreign Afairs 78 (MarchI April 1999 ) : 34.
1 1 7
rcsponsctothctcrroristattacks.Thatwasoncrcasonwhy
Amcrica's apparcnt indihcrcncc to thcsc ohcrs of assis-
tancc was so troubling tc Europcans. Thcn whcn thc
UnitcdStatcsbcganlookingbcyondAghanistan,toward
Iraqa
dan"axisofcvil,"Europcansrcalizcdthcyhadlcst
control. Thc Cold War bargain undcrlying transatlan-
tic cocpcration had bccomc invcrtcd.Wcrcas oncc thc
UnitcdStatcsriskcditscwnsafctyindcfcnscofathrcat-
cncdEuropc'svitalintcrcsts,todaya thrcatcncdAmcrica
looks out for itsclfin apparcnt and scmctimcs gcnuinc
disrcgard for what manyEuropcans pcrccivc to bc their
moral,political,andsccurityintcrcsts.
For Europcans thc problcm ofAmcrican hcgcmony
has bccn cspccially vcxing bccausc thcrc is so littlc thcy
can do about it. Sincc thc 1990S hopcs for an cmcrging
multipolarworldhavcfadcd.Todayalmostcvcrycnccon-
ccdcsthcncarimpossibilityofmatchingAmcricanpowcr
fordccadcsto comc,andcvcnthcnthcmostlikclycandi-
datcsto
compctcwithAmcricanpowcr,ChinaandRussia,
do not offcr an attractivc prospcct for most Europcans.
Europc's own military capabilitics continuc to dcclinc
rclativctothcUnitcdStatcs,andFrcnchambitionstocrc-
atc a Europcan countcrwcight to thc Unitcd Statcs arc
constantlyovcrwhclmcdbythcmorcpowcrml,postmod-
crn Europcan avcrsionto militarypowcr, topowcrpoli-
tics,andto thcvcryidcaofthcbalanccofpowcr. '
Thcy
16 Indeed, there is something contradictory in Europeans seeking a
return to a global balance of power, in order to restore peace and j ustice
to the international system, when they have rejected the balance of
power as the greatest threat to peace and justice on the continent of
Europe.
A F T E RWOR D
havcbccnchcckcd,too,byfcarsofalicnatingthcpowcrml
Unitcd Statcs, minglcdwith widcsprcad Europcansuspi-
cionsofFrancc's"son"hcgcmonismandlingcringfcarsof
rcncwcdGcrmanpowcr.
In thc cnd, howcvcr, Europcans havc not sought to
countcrAmcricanhcgcmonyinthcusual,powcr-oricntcd
fashion bccausc thcy do not hnd Amcrican hcgcmony
thrcatcning in thc traditional powcr-oricntcd way. Kcn-
ncth N. Waltz was wrong in this rcspcct. Not all global
hcgcmons arc cqually frightcning. Thc dangcr poscd by
thc Unitcd Statcs, as Europcans wcll kow, is not to
EuropcansccurityorcvcntoEuropcanindcpcndcnccand
autonomy. 'ThcAcrican"thrcat"isofancntirclydiffer-
cnt naturc.Wat Europcans fcar is not that thc Unitcd
Statcswantsto control thcmbutthatthcyhavc lost con-
trol ofthcUnitcd Statcs and, thcrcforc,bycxtcnsion, of
thcdircctionofworldaffairs.
Ifthc Unitcd Statcs is suffcring a crisis oflcgitimacy
today, thc Europcan dcsirc to rcgain somc mcasurc of
controlovcrAmcricanbchaviorisalargcpartofthcrca-
son. '" Thc vast maj ority of Europcans objcctcd to thc
AmcricaninvasionofIraqnotonlybccauscthcyopposcd
thcwar. ItwasAmcrica'swillingncss andabilityto go to
17 For all the talk about Aerican "empire," Europeans know that
the United States does not have imperial ambitions to control the con
tinent of Europe as would-be hegemons have tried in the past, fom
Louis XIV to Napoleon to Hitler.
18 Again, the fact that Russia, China, and many nations of Latin
America, Afica, and the Middle East opposed the use of Aerican
power as illegitimate is not a new phenomenon. What is new and dra
matic is the defection of America's European allies to that camp.
1 1 9
warwithoutthcapprovalofthcSccurityCouncil,whichis
alsotosay,withoutthcapprovalofallEuropc,thatposcd
thcgrcatcrchallcngcbothtothcEuropcanvicwofworld
ordcrandtoEuropc'sabilitytocxcrcisccvcnamodicum
ofinucnccinthc ncwunipolar systcm.`7worldordcr
cannotmnctionwhcnthcnationalintcrcstofthc stron-
gcst powcr is thc dchnitivc critcrion for thc uscofthat
country's powcr,' }oscma Fischcr complaincd. Thcrc
must bc rulcs to govcrn thc bchavior ofall nations, hc
insistcd, and thcsc rulcs "must apply to thc big, thc
mcdium-sizcd, and thc small nations."' As Prcsidcnt
}acqucs Chirac put it, world criscs cannot bc addrcsscd
"byoncnationactingalonconthcbasisofitsownintcr-
cstsandjudgmcnts. . . . Anycrisissituation,rcgardlcss of
its naturc, in anypartofthc world, is ofconccrn to thc
wholc intcrnational community." In thcsc calls for thc
involvcmcntofthc"intcrnationalcommunity"thcrcisan
unmistakablc insistcncc that Europc, in particular, bc
givcn handonthctillcr.
This is not to arguc that thc Europcan dcmand that
thc Unitcd Statcs scck intcrnational lcgitimization for
its actions is cynical. ccausc ofthcir own history, and
bccausc Europcans nowopcratc within an intcrnational
organization,thcEuropcanUnion,thatrcquircsmultilat-
cralagrecmcntonallmattcrs,thcEuropcancommitmcnt
to alcgitimacydcrivcdnommultilatcralncgotiationand
intcrnationallcgalinstitutionsissinccrc,cvcnzcalous.ut
idcalsandsclf-intcrcstncqucntlycoincidc,andEuropcan
19 Fischer interiew in Der Spiege March 24, 2003.
20
Jacques Chirac, televised interview, July 14, 200
3
.
AF TER WOR D
assaultsonthclcgitimacyofAmcricanactionsandAcri-
can powcrmaybcan cffcctivc ifunconvcntional way of
constraining and controlling thc Acrican supcrpowcr.
Lcgitimacy,wriIcsCoopcr,"isasmuchasourccofpowcr
asforcc,'andmanyEuropcansundoubtcdlyhopcthatthis
istruc.
Ccrtainly "lcgitimacy" is an assct Europcans bclicvc
thcyhavc inabundancc.Itisthcircomparativc advantagc
inthcncwgcopoliticaljostlingwiththcUnitcd Statcs,thc
grcat cqualizcr in an othcrwisclopsidcdrclationship.Thc
Europcan Union, most ofits mcmbcrs bclicvc, cnjoys a
naturallcgitimacy, simplybyvirtuc ofthc fact that it is a
collcctivc body. Thcrc is both strcngth and lcgitimacy in
numbcrs, andina modcrn libcralworldthislcgitimacyis
somcthing that can bc wicldcd as a substitutc for othcr
tycs ofpowcr.It can also bcbartcrcdfor inucncc. Thc
UnitcdStatcsnccdsEuropc,argucs}avicrSolana,bccausc
Europcis"apartncrwiththclcgitimacythatcomcsthrough
thc collcctivc action ofa union oftwcnty-hvc sovcrcign
statcs."' In rcturn for a grcatcr say in world anairs and
grcatcrcontrolofAmcrica'scxcrciscofpowcr,Europccan
givcthcUnitcdStatcsthclcgitimacyitnowlacks.Formany
Europcans, in fact, this is thc ncw grand bargain for thc
unipolarcra.JoschkaFischcrprcdictsthatAcricanswill
discovcr in Iraq that "thc qucstion oflcgitimization gocs
bcyondthccapabiliticsofthcU. S."utthisismorcthan
aprcdiction. ItisalsoaEuropcanbidforinucncc.
ThatdocsnotmcanthatFischcriswrong,howcvcr.Hc
21
Javier Solana, "The Future of Transatlantic Relations: Reinven
tion or Reform?" Progressive Governance, July 10, 2003.
>
2
Fischer interview, Die Zeit, May 8, 2003.
1 2 1
isprobablyright.Thccxpcrimcntofattcmptingtoinvadc
andthc
rcconstructIraqwithoutthcbroadbcncdiction
ofEuropchasnotbccnaparticularlyhappyonc,cvcn if
thcUnitcdStatcscvcntuallysuccccdsinIraq.ThcUnitcd
Statcs cannot ignorc thc qucstion of lcgitimacy, nor is
intcrnationallcgitimacysomcthingthcUnitcdStatcscan
providc itsclf. So if thc Unitcd Statcs nccds lcgitimacy,
whcrcshouldit lookto hndit
THE MYTH OF
" I N TER NATI ONAL ORDER "
Sinccthc Unitcd Statcs hrst bcgan opcnlycontcmplating
thc invasion ofIraq, thc Europcan answcr has bccn thc
UNSccurityCouncil."ItisnomthcUnitcdNationsalonc
thatthc1cgalandmoralauthoritycancomc,'Dominiquc
dcVillcpininsistcdbcfcrc,during,andahcrthcwar.Ad
thcrcisnodoubtthatthcFrcnchforcignministcrspcaks
for th
vast majority of Europcans, including ritons,

Spaniards,Polcs,andItaliansandmanyothcrsinthcmis-
namcd `ncw Europc'' Indccd, so powcrml is this con-
viction throughout all of Europc that cvcn Amcrica's
staunchest ally, Tony lair, thc lcadcr ofAmcrica's lcast
"Europcan" transatlantic partncr, Crcat ritain, ncvcr-
thclcss considcrcd UN authorization for thc invasion of
Iraqabsolutclycsscntialtosatishisownpublic. Prcsi-
'3 De Villepin address to the UN Security Council, March 19, 2003.
24 So much so that he sacrifced a great deal of his personal and
international political capital in the ftile attempt to gain a second
resolution explicitly authorizing war.
AF TERWORD
dcnt ush`s dccision to turn to thc Unitcd Nations was
vcrymuch drivcnby lair`spolitical nccds in thc Unitcd
Kingdom and also by lair`s nccd for influcncc on thc
Europcan contincnt. Thc Unitcd Nations is thc placc
whcrc intcrnational rulcs and lcgitimacy arc foundcd,`
dc Villcpin dcclarcd at thc Sccurity Council in March,
bccauscitspcaksinthcnamcofpcoplcs."
Nor is this conviction to bc found only in Europc.
Acricans havc a ccrtain rcvcrcncc for thcUNSccurity
Council,too,aspollsconsistcntlyshow.Acricansupport
issignihcantlymorcmcasurcdandagooddcalmorccon-
ditional than that ofthc Europcans, of coursc. A solid
maj orityofAmcricansfavorcdbypassingthcUNSccurity
CounciltoinvadcIraq.
utthcrciscnoughsupportfor
thc Unitcd Nations that CcorgcW. ush dccidcd itwas
wisc, at lcast for thc sakc of appcaranccs, to scck thc
SccurityCouncil`sapproval for thc Iraqwar,andthcnto
rcturn to thc Sccurity Council again and again sincc thc
war in pursuit of intcrnational support-and intcrna-
tional lcgitimacy.
utarcthcUN SccurityCouncil,andthcstructurcof
intcrnationallawitsitsatop,rcallythcholygrailofintcr-
national lcgitimacy, as Europcans arc today insisting
Intcrnationallifcwouldbcsimplcrifthcywcrc.utthcy
arcnot.EvcrsinccthcUNwasfoundcdalmostsixdccadcs
ago,thcSccurityCouncilhasncvcrmnctioncdasitsmorc
idcalisticauthorsintcndcd.Norinallthattimchasitbccn
rccognizcd and acccptcd as thc solc sourcc ofintcrn a-
2
5 De Villepin address to the UN Security Council, March 19, 2003.
2
6
See Transatlantic Trends 2003.
: z )
tional lcgitimacy-not cvcn by Europcans. Indccd, thc
EurcpcandcmandthatthcUnitcd Statcs scckUNauthor-
izationofthcIraqwar,andprcsumablyforallmturcwars,
hasbccnanovcl,cvcnrcvolutionary,proposal.
For most of thc UN's cxistcncc, during thc four
dccadcsofthcColdWar, thcSccurityCouncilwaspara-
lyzcd by thc implacablc hostility bctwccn its twc stron-
gcst, vcto-wiclding mcmbcrs. Only ahcr thc fall ofthc
SovictUnionandthccndofthcColdWarwasitcvcnpos-
siblctoimaginc thc Sccurity Council mnctioningasthc
solc locus for intcrnational authority and lcgitima.
Many thcn hopcd that thc U, which was csscntially
"aprc-ColdWarinstitution,'mightthcrcforc"bccomca
workab|cpost-ColdWarinstitution."
ut thc rccord ofthc post-ColdWar ycars has bccn

spotty. Thc hrst Prcsidcnt ush sought and gaincd thc
SccurityCouncil'sapprovalinthchrstPcrsianGulfwarin
:pp:,butcnlyahcrdcploying5 00, 000 trcopsandmang
clcarthatthcUnitcdStatcswouldactwithoutauthoriza-
tionifithadto.
ThcClintonadministrationscnttroops
toHaitiin:pp|withoutthcSccuripCouncil'sauthoriza-
tion,whichcamcahcrthcfact.In:pp8thcClintcnadmin-
istrationbombcdIraqinOpcrationDcscrtFoxwithcuta
rcsolution and, indccd, ovcr strong objcctions rcgistcrcd
inthcSccurityCouncilbyFranccandRussia.Thcrcwcrc
occasions whcn thc Sccurity Council mnctioncd, but
most obscrvcrs agrccthat its authoritywcakcncd rathcr
'7 Cooper, Te Breaking of Nations, p. ,
.
8 Had the Soviet Union blocked a resolution authorizing the frst
Gulf war, no one, including the Soviets, believed Bush would have
brought his half
'
illion troops back home.
AF TERWORD
thanstrcngthcncdovcrthccourscofthc hrstdccadcancr
thcColdWar.
ThcmostintcrcstingcascwasKosovo.ForinKosovoit
was thc Europcans who, along with thc Unitcd Statcs,
wcnt to warwithout obtainingthclcgitimizing sanction
ofthc UN Sccurity Council.
-
Ncvcrthclcss, most Euro-
pcans at thc timc and cvcr sincc havc insistcd that thc
Kosovo warwaslcgitimatc. ThcybclicvcdEuropcinpar-
ticular had a moral rcsponsibility to prcvcnt anothcr
gcnocidc onthcEuropcan contincnt. Norwas it an acci-
dcntthatamongthcstrongcstproponcntsofwarin1999
was a Ccrman, Joschka Fishcr, thc hcad ofthc intcnscly
moralistic Crccn Party. For Fischcr, as for Ccrhard
Schrocdcr and Tony lair, thc dirc humanitarian cmcr-
gcncyandthc brutal bchavior ofthc Scrbsovcrrodcthc
lcgal rcquircmcnt for UN authorization. Thc Europcan
rcsponsctoKosovo,RobcrtCoopcrwritcs,wasdrivcnby
"thc collcctivc mcmoryofthc holocaustandthc strcams
ofdisplaccdpcoplccrcatcdbycxtrcmcnationalisminthc
SccondWorldWar," andthis"commonhistoricalcxpcri-
cncc"providcd"justihcationforarmcdintcrvcntion."Thc
factthatthispotcntialgcnocidcwas occurringin Europc
gavc Europcans not only spccial rcsponsibility, but also
spccialliccnsctogotowartostopit.Historyandmorality
trumpcd traditional principlcs of intcrnational law. "It
wouldbcavcrydiffcrcntthing,"Coopcrnotcd,inabook
writtcn ancr thc Iraq war, for Europc "to intcrvcnc in
anothcr contincntwith anothcr history." Thc"Europcan
'9 Wen NATO went to war against Serbia in 1999, the allies tried
but failed to obtain authorization because Russia, Serbia's historic pro
tector, opposed the war.
1 25
ordcrisbascdonaspccihcEuropcanhistoryandthcval-
ucsthatownomit."
ThcAmcricans, ofcoursc,wcrcpcrfcctlycontcnttcgo
towarin1999 withoutUNauthcrization,indccd,manyin
thc Clinton administration hopcd it wculd sct a uscml
prcccdcnt. As thc ritish political scicntist Christcphcr
Crokcrnctcs," `Multilatcralifpcssiblc,unilatcralifncccs-
sary'was thccatcchismcfthc Clintcnadministraticn."'
Throughcut thc war itsclf, thc Amcrican ccmmandcr,
Ccncral Wcslcy Clark, likc mcst cf his Amcrican ccl-
lcagucs, crcsscd a ccrtain impaticnt disdain fcr thc
Eurcpcans'"lcgalissucs''AsdcVillcpinrightlyrccalls,thc
Amcricans,alcngwithTcnylair'sritain,sawKcscvc"as
thc hrst nstancc cf a custcmary right tc mtcrvcnc cn
humantariangrcundswithcutaUmandatc.Wc,hcw-
cvcr,sawitasancxccpticn,justihcdbywidcsuppcrtand
thcthrcat.ofanimmincnthumanitariandisastcr."
-
ut cxccptions can bc dcadly, cspccially with scmc-
thing as nagilc and oncn viclatcd as intcrnaticnal law
conccrning thc usc offorcc. Thc fact rcmaincd that thc
Koscvo war was illcgal, and nct only bccausc it lackcd
Sccurity Council authorization. Scrbia was a scvcrcign
statcthathadnot committcd aggrcssion against ancthcr
statc,butwassimplyslaughtcringitsowncthnicAbanian
populaticn. Thc intcrvcnticn, thcrcfcrc, violatcd a car-
dinal principlc, pcrhaps the cardinal principlc, cf thc
UN Chartcr. thc inviclablc sovcrcign cquality cf all
30 Cooper, Te Breaking of Nations, p. 61.
31 Croker, Empires in Confict 3.
32 De Villepin, "Law, Force and Justice," speech delivered at the
International Institute for Strategic Studies, March 27, 2003.
AF TERWOR D
nationsThathasbccnthcbcdrockprinciplcofintcrna-
ticnal law for ccnturics. Thc scvcntccnth-ccntury lcgal
thcoristHugoCrotiushaddcclarcdthcprinciplcofnon-
intcrvcntion thcsincquanon ofany systcm cfintcrna-
tional law.Thcso-callcdWcstphaliansystcmcrcctcdancr
thc dcvastating rcligious wars of thc mid-scvcntccnth
ccnturycnshrincdnationalsovcrcigntyandthcprinciplc
ofnonintcrfcrcncc as thc prcrcquisitcs for intcrnational
pcacc. Ovcr thc ncxt thrcc ccnturics, tc bc surc, thc
Wcstphaliansystcmwasabitofafraud.Itishardtonamc
a singlcycarinthclastthrccccnturicswhcnsomcnation
was not intcrfcring in anothcr nation's intcrnal anairs.
Still,thcprinciplcandthcoryundcrlyingitwcrclogicalif
not practicablc. For if national sovcrcignty is not hcld
sacrcd, and cach nation's own scnsc of j usticc and
mcralitymaylcad it to intcrvcnc in anothcrcountry, on
what 1oundation could any lcgal ordcr bc cstablishcd
Wouldcvcrynationbcitsownjudgcofrightandwrong
At thc timc of thc Kosovo conict, Hcnry Kissingcr
warncdthat"thc abruptabandonmcntofthc conccptof
nationalsovcrcignty"riskcdaworld unmoorcd nomany
notionofordcr,lcgal or othcrwisc."Onccthc doctrincof
univcrsalintcrvcntionsprcadsandccmpctingtruthscon-
33 Some might point to the Convention on Genocide as providing
some legal justifcation for the war,.but the Convention stipulated that
nations must "call upon the competent organs of the United Nations"
to take such action "under the Charter of the United Nations as they
consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of
genocide." Nations were not supposed to undertake such actions on
their own or even in large groups. NATO was not conceived as a substi
tute for the legal authority of the UN.
1 2 7
tcst, wc risk cntcringa world in which, in C. K. Chcstcr-
ton;s phrasc,`virtucrunsamok`"34
ut many Europcans a
thc timc rcjcctcd this com-

plaint. Robcrt Coopcr, writingin rcsponsc to Kssingcr,
hasargucdthatpostmodcrnEuropcis"no longcr a zonc
ofcompctingtruths.' Thc cnd ofthc ColdWar has prc-
duccd
"
a ccmmon sct of valucs i n Europc,' and thcsc
common v
@
cs havc madc "postmodcrn intcrvcntion
sustainablcboth morallyandpractically in the European
contet"35 In 1999, just fcur ycars bcforc thc Iraq war,
Europcansdidnotbclicvcintcrnationallcgitimacyrcsidcd
cxclusivcly at thc UN Sccurity Council, or in thc U
Chartcr,
or cvcn in thc traditional principlcs of intcr-

nationaHaw,butincommonmoralvalucs.
Somc lcgal scholarshavc argucdthat thc Kosovo war
was pcrhaps lcgal according to an cvolving standard of
intcrnational law that trcats immincnt human catastro-
phc as an cxccption to thc rulc ofnonintcrvcntion. ut
this is thc triumph of morality cvcr law. Taking such
actioninKosovo,withoutSccurityCouncilapproval,lcn
thcdctcrminationofintcrnationalj usticcinthchandsof
arclatIvclysmallnumbcr ofpowcrmlWcstcrnnations.Is
tha
|
rulcs-bascdsystcm
Itmaybcworthnotingthatinrcachingitsmoralcon-
clusionin1999. Europcdidnotspcak"inthcnamcofpco-
plcs."MostofthcnationsofLatinAcrica,Aica,andthc
34 Henry Kssinger, "The End of NATO as We Know It? Te
Washington Post, August 15, 1999, B7.
35 Cooper, Te Breaking of Nations, pp. 60-61. Emphasis added.
"Postmodern intervention" outside the European context, it has
become clear, is another matter.
AF TERWORD
Arab worldvigorously objcctcd to thc abrogation ofthc
UN Chartcr in Kosovo, no doubt fcaring, corrcctly, that
Wcstcrn libcral principlcs ofmoral rcsponsibility could
somcdaybccmploycdtojustiqintcrvcntionagainstthcm.
Thc nations ofthcNorth andWcstthusdividcd sharply
fromthc nations ofthc South andEast, and, as Michacl
Clcnnon has notcd,onthc mostmndamcntal ofissucs.
namcly, whcnarmcdintcrvcntionisappropriatc."Ifany-
thing, thc Kosovo war dcmonstratcd that although thc
UN's rulcs purport to rcprcscnt a singlc global vicw-
indccd,univcrsallaw-onwhcn andwhcthcrforcccanbc
justihcd,thcUN'smcmbcrs ,nottomcntionthcirpopu-
lations)arcclcarlynotinagrccmcnt''
Clcnnon, an intcrnational lcgal scholar, has argucd

thatthcprinciplcofnonintcrvcntioncmbodicdinthcUN
Chartcrhasbccnviolatcdsomanytimcs ovcrthcpastsix
dccadcs thatitcannolongcr qualiqasintcrnationallaw,
in lcgal parlancc it has fallcn into a statc ofdcsuctudc."
Whcthcr onc acccpts this vicw or not,it isccrtainlytruc
thatwhcnthcUnitcdStatcsandsomcofitsallicswcntto
waragainstSaddamHusscininMarch2003, thcprinciplc
that thc UN Sccurity Council alonc could authorizc thc
usc of forcc had not bccn cstablishcd, not cvcn by thc
Europcans thcmsclvcs. Sccrctary of Statc Colin Powcll
could wcll arguc, as hc did in Octobcr 2002, that thc
UnitcdStatcsandits supportcrsposscsscdthc"authority
to intcrvcnc in Iraq . . . just as wc did in Kosovo." As
Clcnnonnotcs,thcUNChartcrdocsnotpcrmithumani-
36 Michael J. Glennon, "Wy the Security Council Failed:' Foreign
Afairs, Vol. 82, Iss. 3, May/June 2003.
1 2 9
tarian intcrvcnticn any mcrc than it dccs prcvcntivc
war."In 2003 FranccandGcrmanyand cthcrEurcpcan
naticnswcrcdcmandingthatthcUnitcdStatcsadhcrctc
an intcrnaticnallcgalstandardthatthcythcmsclvcs had
igncrcd, fcr scund mcral and humanitarian rcascns, a
mcrcfcurycarscarlicr.
. thc Iraq crisis apprcachcd in 2002 and carly2003,
ma
yEurcpcans simplyshincdthcirvicwcfbcth intcr-

naticnallawand intcrnaticnal lcgitimacy. Lcgal schclars
might havc bccnwcrking tcward cstablishingncwprin-
ciplcs to j ustip humanitarian intcrvcnticn. ut Eurc-
pcan lcadcrs, kncwing wcll that such principlcs cculd bc
strctchcd tc ht many circumstanccs, wantcd tc clcsc all
thc locphclcs. Europcan lcadcrs scuttlcd away ncm thc
moralisticprinciplcs thcyhaduscdtc j ustipwarin Kc-
scvcandbcgandcmandingamuchmcrcrigidadhcrcncc
tcthcUNChartcr.JcschkaFischcr'svolte face wasthcmcst
striking, fcr whcn ccnncntcdbythcAcrican invasicn
cfIraq, Fischcrcatcgcricallyrcjcctcdthcidcathatarmcd
intcrvcticn and thc viclaticn cfa naticn's scvcrcignty
cculdever bcjustihcd,cvcn"incascscfgrcsshumanrights
viclaIicns."Ifintcrvcnticninancthcrnaticn'sanairswas
t
_
cccc"thcncwprinciplc,'Fischcrncwwarncd,cchc-
ingthcvcryargumcntsmadcbyKissingcrin1999, "thcrc
arcnumcrcuscandidatcs . . . . Wcnwill thisprinciplc| bc
applicd ywhcmwillit bc lcgitimizcd"
Gccd qucs-
ticnsall.utthcywcrcgccdqucsticnsin1999, tcc.
37 Michael J. Glennon, "Wy the Security Council Failed:' Foreig
Afairs, Vol. 82, Iss. 3, May/June 2003.
38 Fischer interview, Die Zeit, May 8, 2003.
AF TERWORD
ThcdoublcstandardEuropcansapplicdinthccascsof
Kosovo and Iraq rcvcals morc than a simplc dcsirc to
uphold thc principlcs ofintcrnational law and cnshrinc
thcprimacyofthc Sccurity Council. Javicr Solanatoday
insiststhatEuropc'sdcmandfora"rulcs-bascdapproach"
tointcrnationalanairs"isnotaploytoconstrainthcU. S. ,'
butsurclyitisatlcastpartlythat.
Thc controvcrsy ovcr thc Amcrican invasion ofIraq
necds to bc vicwcd in light of this rcccnt history. UN
Sccrctary Ccncral Koh Annan has dcnounccdAmcrica's
"lawlcssuscofforcc."
utfourycars ago,inthccascof
Kosovo, Annan himsclf articulatcd a noblc principlc of
humanitarianintcrvcntionthatplaccdhumanitariancon-
ccrnsabovclong-standing, intcrnational lcgaltraditions. '
Jacqucs Chirac has accuscd thc Unitcd Statcs of having
"undcrmincdthcmultilatcralsystcm,'insisting"noonccan
acccptthcanarchyofasocictywithoutrulcs."
-
utChirac
waswillingto bcndthoscrulcsinthcnamcofdcfcnding
KosovoAIbaniansnomslaughtcr.Europcanswillprotcst
thatKosovoandIraqwcrcdiffcrcnt.Indccdthcywcrc.ut
any"rulcs-bascd"intcrnationalordcrmustapplythcsamc
sctsofrulcstodincrcntsituations.Othcrwiscwcrcturnto
aworldwhcrcnationsindividuallyoringroupsdccidcfor
thcmsclvcs whcn war is and is not justihcd, guidcd by
thcirownmoralityandscnscofj usticcandordcr.
39 Solana, "The Future of Transatlantic Relations: Reinvention or
Reform?"
40 Dana Milbank, "At UN, Bush Is Criticized Over Iraq;' The Wash
ington Post, September 24, 2003, AI.
41 See Kof A. Annan, "Two Concepts of Sovereignty;' The Econo
mist, September 18, 1999.
42 Milbank, "At UN, Bush Is Criticized Over Iraq."
13 1
Infactthatisthcwcrldwclivc in, andthc cnlywcrld
wc havccvcrlivcdin.Itisawcrldwhcrcthcscwithpcwcr,
bclicvingthcyhavc rightcnthcirsidc,impcscthcirscnsc
cfjusticc cn cthcrs. Thissimplc rcality cfintcrnaticnal
cxstcncciscncndcscribcdsimplisticallyas"mightmakcs
right' ut arc all claims tc justicc and mcrality cqually
vidThcmcdcrnlibcral,whcthcrrcsidinginEurcpccr
inthcUnitcdStatcs,dccsnctandcannctbclicvcthat,fcr
libcralism has at its ccrc a ccnvicticn abcut justicc and
mcrality, dchncd as thc prctccticn cfthc rights cfthc
individual,withcutwhichlibcralismitsclfismcaninglcss.
During Wcrld War II, thc allicd dcmccracics' claim tc
mcraIity and justicc was strcngcr than that cf Hitlcr's
Ccrmanyand Impcrial Japan. Duringthc CcldWar, thc
libcralWcst's claim tc mcrality andjusticc was strcngcr
than that cf thc Scvict blcc. During thc Kcscvc war,
NATO's claim tc mcralityandjustIcc was strcngcrthan
thatcfSlcbcdanMilcscvicandcrisYcltsin'sRussia.Thc
pcint is this. A wcrld withcut a univcrsal standard cf
intcrn
_
ticnallawnccd nctbc awcrldwithcutmcrality
andjusticc.Indccd,inthcrcalwcrld,thctcc-rigidappli-
caticn cfthc principlcs cfintcrnaticnallawcan impcdc
th
pursuitcfmcralityandjusticc,asthcEurcpcansrcc-
ognizcdinthccasccfKcscvc.
ThcscdaysmcstEurcpcansarguc, asdc scmcAmcri-
cans,thatbyinvadingIraqwithcutthcSccurityCcuncil's
apprcval, thc Unitcd Statcs has "tcrn thc fabric cf thc
intcrnaticnalordcr."utifthcrccvcrwasanintcrnaticnal
ordcrcfthckndthcydcscribc,thcnEurcpcundcrmincd
itin1999, tcc.Infact,thcfabriccfthishcpcd-fcrintcrna-
ticnalcrdcrhasycttcbcknit.
AF TERWORD
Thc point hcrc is not to catch Europcans contradict-
ing thcmsclvcs. If thcrc has bccn a ccrtain convcnicnt
cxbility in Europcans' dchnition of what constitutcs
"lcgitimacy"inrcccntycars,itisbccausc"lcgitimacy"isa
gcnuinclyclusivc andmobilcconccpt.Discovcringwhcrc
lcgitimacylics at anygivcn momcnt inhistoryis an art,
not a scicncc rcduciblc to thc rcading of intcrnational
lcgaldocumcnts. For modcrnlibcralism,ofthc kind that
animatcs Acricans and Europcans alikc, Kosovo, Iraq,
andinnumcrablcothcrintcrnationalcriscsofrcccntycars
havc shown that thc scarch for lcgitima constantly
stumblcs across a mndamcntal dilcmmathatis cndcmic
tobothlibcralismandlibcralintcrnationalism.
Thcproblcmisthatthcmodcrnlibcralvisionofprog-
rcssinintcrnational anairshasalwaysbccnbifocal. On
thc onc hand, libcralism has sincc thc Enlightcnmcnt
cntcrtaincd a vision ofa world pcacc bascd on an cvcr-
strcngthcning intcrnational lcgal systcm. Thc succcss of
suchasystcm,howcvcr,dcpcndsonrccognizingthcinvio-
lablc sovcrcign cquality of all nations, whcthcr big or
small, dcmocratic or tyrannical, humanc or barbarous.
For as Crotius,Hans Morgcnthau,and manyothcrshavc
askcd,what intcrnational law couldsurvivc ifstatcs may
violatc onc anothcr`ssovcrcigntyinthcintcrcstofpropa-
gating dcmocracy or human rights or any othcr moral
good
43 The following discussion of liberalism and international law
owes much to the work of Thomas L. Pangle and Peter J. Arensdorf in
their book, Justice Among Nations: On the Moral Basis of Power and
Peace ( Lawrence, Kansas, 1999. )
133
Onthc othcr hand,modcrnlibcralism has alsc chcr-
ishcd thc rights and libcrtics cfthc individual, and has
dchncdhumanprcgrcssasprcvidinggrcatcrandgrcatcr
protccticn to thcsc rights and libcrtics acrcss thc glcbc.
utinthcabscnccofasuddcnglcbaldcmccraticandlib-
cral transfcrmaticn, that gcal can cnly bc achicvcd by
ccmpclling qrannical cr barbarcus rcgimcs tc bchavc
mrcdcmocraticallyandhumancly,andscmctimcs,as in
Kcscvc,byfcrcc.Libcralshavcalscbclicvcd,atlcastsincc
KantandMcntcsquicu,thattyrannicalrcgimcstcndtcbc
mcrc aggrcssivc and warlUc and thcrcfcrc that glcbal
pcaccultimatclydcpcndsnctcnlawbutcnthcsprcadcf
pcliticalandccmmcrciallibcralism. 4 Evcnmcdcrnlibcr-
alscfa mcrcpragmaticbcnthavcccnsidcrcdintcrfcrcncc
just and prcpcr undcr ccrtain circumstanccs. Thus Ed-
mundurkcwrotcahcrthchorrorsofthcFrcnchRcvo-
lution,`1 morc mischicvous idca cannot cxist than that
any dcgrcc ofwickcdncss, viclcncc and opprcssion may
prcvail in aCountry,thatthcmostabominablc,murdcr-
ous and cxtcrminatoryRcbcllionsmayragc in it, orthc
most atrocious and bloody tyranny may dominccr, and
thatnoncighboringpowcrcantakccognizanccofcithcr,
: 2
orancrd succor to thc miscrablc suncrcrs'' Englishmcn
oughttobcthclasttoinsistuponaprinciplcofnonintcr-
fcrcncc, urkc argucd, for England owcd "its Laws and
Libcrtics. . . tothccontraryprinciplc."'
4 Both Kant and Montesquieu believed peace would be based pri
marily on the rise of commercialism in liberal nations, which would
make them unwilling to fght one another.
45 Letter to Lord Grenville of August 18, 1792, in Harvey C. Mans-
AF TERWORD
KohAnnan,lookngbackon Kosovo,thcgcnocidc in
Rwanda,andothcrcriscs,namcdthcmodcrnlibcral'scri-
sis oflcgitimacywcll."Onthconchand,'hcaskcd,"isit
lcgitimatcforarcgionalorganizationtouscforccwithout
aUNmandatc Onthcothcr,isitpcrmissiblctolctgross
and systcmatic violations ofhuman rights, with gravc
humanitarianconscqucnccs,continucunchcckcd"Anan
callcdthc intcrnationalcommunity's inability"to rccon-
cilcthcsctwocompcllingintcrcsts"a"tragcdy."utthcUN
Sccrctary-Ccncral himsclf discovcrcd no answcr to this
dilcmma,othcrthantoplcadwiththc"intcrnationalcom-
munity"tohnd"conscnsus."
Civcn thc tcnsion bctwccn thcsc two libcral visions,

howcvcr, what constitutcs intcrnational lcgitimacy must
always bc a mattcr ofdisputc within thc libcral, dcmo-
craticworld.Kant`svisionof"pcrpctualpcacc"solvcdthc
problcm, in thcory, by prcsuming that all thc nations
in his imagincd intcrnational systcm would bc ncc,lib-
cral rcpublics. ut thc UN Chartcr, in practicc, ignorcd
Kant`sprcscriptionandcnshrincdthc"sovcrcigncquality
ofallits mcmbcrs,"rcgardlcss ofthcnaturcofthcirgov-
crnmcnts. Thc prcscnt intcrnational lcgal structurc,
thcrcforc, docs not and arguably cannot conformto lib-
cralism's goal ofamcliorating thc human condition and
sccuring thc rights ofall. As Robcrt Coopcr notcs, thc
feld Jr. , Selected Letters of Edmund Burke ( Chicago, 1984); Pangle and
Ahrensdorf, Justice Among Nations, pp. 184-85.
46 See Annan, "Two Concepts of Sovereignty."
47 See Fukuyama, The End of Histor and the Last Man, pp. 281-82.
:
)
Unitcd Naticns was mcant"tc dcfcndthc status qucand

ncttccrcatcancwcrdcr."
A mcdcrn libcrals must wrcstlc with this ddcmma.

Fcr Eurcpcans it is a particularly dimcultprcblcm. Fcr
EurcpcitsclfisthcKantianmiraclc,ithasmcvcdbcycnd
thcWcstphalian crdcrintc a pcstmcdcrn, supranaticnal
crdr. Ircnically, whilc many Eurcpcans ncw caim tc
dchncintcrnaticnallcgitimacyas strict cbcdicncc tc thc
UN Chartcr and thc Sccurity Ccuncil, thc Eurcpcan
Unicn transccnds thc UN's cxclusivc fccus cn naticnal
scvcrcignty.Itisallaboutintcrfcrcncc.Asaccnfcdcraticn
of ncc statcs, thc EU is mcrc thc mlhllmcnt cf Kant's
libcral visicn than cf Crctius's. Thc "ncw pcstmcdcrn
Europcanordcr,'Ccopcrargucs,"isbascdcncntirclydif-
fcrcntidcas"than thosconwhichthc UnitcdNaticnswas
bascd. Tony lairargucdatthctimcofthcKcscvowar
thatEuropcmusthght"fcra ncwintcrnaticnalismwhcrc
thcbrutalrcprcssioncfcthnicgrcupswillnctbctclcratcd
and| fcraworldwhcrcthcscrcspcnsiblcforcrimcswill
havcncwhcrctchidc."
Ifthisisthc"ncwintcrnaticnal-
is
g
,'thcnthc"cldintcrnaticnalism"cfthcUNChartcris
48 Copper, The Breaking of Nations, p. 58.
49 Ibid.
50 Tony Blair speech to the Chicago Chambers of Commerce,
September 1998; Cooper, The Breaking of Nations, pp. 59-0. Nor have
Europeans limited themselves in such intrusions on national sover
eignty to their own continent. The International Criminal Court,
which European governments championed, authorizes action against
leaders and ofcials of other nations, even where those nations have
not ratifed the treaty.
AF TER WOR D
dcad.Eurcpcansmayhavctcchccscwhichvcrsicncflib-
cral intcrnaticnalism thcy rcally intcnd tc pursuc. ut
whcthcrthcychccsc crnct,thcymustat lcastrcccgnizc
thatthctwcpathsdivcrgc.
Ifthc Unitcd Statcs sccks lcgitimacy, which cfthcsc
libcralvisicnsshculditaspirctcfcllcwThcUnitcdStatcs
isandalways hasbccnlcssdividcdcnthisqucsticnthan
Eurcpcans arc tcday. y naturc, traditicn, and idcclcgy
thcUnitcdStatcshasalwaystcndcdtcwardthcprcmcticn
cflibcral principlcs in disrcgardofWcstphalian nicctics.
Likcurkc'sEngland,thcUnitcdStatcsowcsitscxistcncc,
its Laws and Libcrtics,' to thc principlc ofintcrfcrcncc.
NcrdccsthcUnitcdStatcsdcpcndonasystcmofintcrna-
ticnal laws as dccs thcEuropcanUnicn,which is itsclfa
structurc cf intcrnational laws. So it is nct surprising,
dcspitcthcAmcricanrclcininvcntingthcUnitcdNaticns
and draning thc UN Chartcr, that thc Unitcd Statcs has
ncvcrmllyacccptcd thc UN's lcgitimacy, and lcast cfall
thc UN Chartcr's dcctrinc cf thc inviclablc scvcrcign
cqualitycfallnaticns.ThcUnitcdStatcshasalwaysbccn
acutclyjcalcuscfitscwnscvcrcignty,butthrcughcutthc
CcldWar, andindccdthrcughcutitshistcry, thcUnitcd
Statcshasbccnagccddcallcss ccnccrncd abcutthcscv-
crcign inviclability cf cthcr naticns. It has rcscrvcd tc
itsclfthc right tc intcrvcnc anywhcrc and cvcrywhcrc-
ncm Latin Amcrica and thc Caribbcan tc Ncrth Anica
andthc Middlc East,frcmthc Scuth Pacihctc EastAsia
and,hnally, inthctwcnticthccntury,cvcninEurcpc.And
althcugh thc Unitcd Statcs is as capablc cf sclf-scrving
hypccrisyascthcrnaticns,ithasgcncrallyjustihcdintcr-
vcnticninthcnamccfdcfcndingcrsprcadingthc causc
:
) 7
oflibcralism.DuringthcColdWar, andmuchtothcdis-
mayofrcalistthinkcrs andstatcsmcn nom Morgcnthau
andKcnnantoKissingcr,Amcricanswcrcncvcrwihingtc
acccpt thclcgitimacyofthc Scvict Unicn and ccnstanty
soughtwaystoundcrmincitnomwithin and nomwith-
out,cvcnatthcriskofglobalinstability.A"cvilcmpirc"
canhavcnolcgitimacyandnoinviclablcrightsasascvcr-
.(' .
cig!naticn.
ThcUnitcdStatcsinthisscnscisandalwayshasbccna
rcvolutionary powcr, a somctimcs unwitting but ncvcr-
thclcss pcrsistcnt disturbcr of thc status quo whcrcvcr
its inucncc has grown. From thc founding gcncration
onward, Amcricans havc lookcd at forcign tyrannics as
transicnt,dcstincdtotopplcbcforcthcforccs ofrcpubli-
canism unlcashcd by Acrica's cwn rcvolution. Evcn
allicddictatorshipshavcbccnrcgardcdasinhcrcntlyillc-
gitimatc,
'
hostilctyrannicshavcalways bccn considcrcd
fairgamc.AndifmostAmcricanshavcbccncblivicustc
thcirownnaticn'srcvoluticnaryimpactonthcwcrld,thc
rcst
fthcworldhasnotbccn.JchnQuincyAdams,writ-
ingn
mLondonin:8:
7
,cbscrvcd,"ThcunivcrsalfccIing
Europcinwitncssingthc giganticgrcwthcfcurpcpu-
lationandpowcristhatwcshall,ifunitcd,bcccmcavcry
dangcrous mcmbcr ofthc sccicq cfnaticns." In thc
carly ninctccnth ccntury it was Eurcpcan ccnscrvativcs
S1 The list of "fiendly" dictators ultimately toppled with the con
nivance of the United States is long. Consider the fates of Ferdinand
Marcos, Aastasio Somoza, Manuel Noriega, and the mitary junta of
South Korea, to name a few.
s Letter to Wiliam Plumer, January 17, 1817, in Worthington
Chauncey Ford, ed., Writings of John Quinc Adams, Vol. V, (New
York, 1968) , p. 143; Lockey, Pan-Americanism, p. 159.
AF TERWORD
likcMcttcrnichwhofcarcdthatthcAmcricanRcvoluticn,
and thc Frcnch uphcaval it hclpcd spark, would ripplc
outward and fatallycngulfthcirinstitutionsandsccict
Today it is thc forccs of conscrvatism in thc Muslim
world-thcmilitantmndamcntalists-whofcarandscck
to rcpcl Amcrica's corrosivc inucncc. And Eurgcans,
consumcdwithcarryingoutradicalchangcsonthcircwn
contincnt, scck stability and prcdictability in thc wcrld
bcyond. To thcsc Europcans, thc Unitcd Statcs has cncc
again bccomc a dangcrous mcmbcr of thc sccicty cf
nations.
FAREWELL, WESTPHALIA
That dangcr, for Europcans, is cncapsulatcd in thc so-
callcd ush doctrinc, with its dcclaration of confrcn-
tation with a global "axs ofcvil."ManyEuropcans and
somc Acricans profcss thcmsclvcs shockcd that thc
Unitcd Statcs would announcc its intcntion,to scck
"rcgimc changc" in dcspotic govcrnmcnts, and if ncc-
cssary at thc cxpcnsc of intcrnational law and thc UN
Chartcr. ut in thc light ofAcrican history, cspccially
that ofthc prcvious halfccntury, could anything bclcss
shocking Thc ush doctrinc, such as it is, has sprung
naturallyoutofthclibcral,rcvolutionaryAmcricantradi-
tion. DocsanyoncimagincthatHarryTrumanandDcan
Achcson,}ohnF KcnncdyandRonaldRcagan,crforthat
mattcrThcodorcRooscvclt,WoodrowWilscn,andFrank-
linRooscvclt,orcvcnillClintcn,wouldhavccbjcctcdtc
thcidcathathostilcthirdworldtyrants scckngwcapcns
) p
cf mass dcstructicn shculd bc rcmcvcd by fcrcc, with
crwithcutSccurityCcuncilauthcrizaticn'ThcUnitcd
Statcshasmanytimcstcpplcdtyrannicalrcgimcswimlcss
prcvccaticn, and lcss cbvicus justihcaticn. Ifthc libcral
visioncfsccuringthcrightscfallpccplcsmayrunafcul
cfintcrnaticnallcgaltraditicns and cfthc U Sccurity
Ccuncil,itshculdccmcasncsurpriscthatalibcralnaticn,
suchasthcUnitcdStatcs,mightbccvcnmcrcinclincdtc
sct asidc lcgal and instituticnal ccnstraints whcn it is a
mattcr cfdcfcndingitscwn citizcns and scil againstdic-
tatcrswithdcadlyarscnals.
Tcday thc prcblcm cf lcgitimacy has bccn madc a
gccd dcal mcrc ccmplcx by thc fact that thc cmcrgcncc
cfa unipclarcraccincidcdwithtwc cthcrcvclvinghis-
tcricalphcncmcna,thcincrcasingprclifcraticn cfwcap-
cns cf mass dcstructicn and thc risc cf intcrnaticnal
tcrrcrism-bcthcfwhichthcscdayssccmmcrcthrcatcn-
ingtcAmcricansthanthcydctcEurcpcans.Ithasbccn
thc ush administraticn's rcspcnsctcthcscphcncmcna,
includingthcsc-callcddcctrinccfprc-cmpticn,thathas
causcdthcgrcatcstuprcarcnbcthsidcscfthcAtlantic.'
53 Bill Clinton, in fact, argued in July 2003 that seeking "regime
change" in Iraq was the correct policy if Saddam Hussein did not dis
arm. Bill Clinton interview on CNN, July 22, 2003.
54 The term "pre-emption" is not an accurate description of the
Bush administration's doctrine. It implies takng action against a
nation or group that is about to strike. What the Bush administration
did in Iraq was "prevention:' which implies taking action even before
the decision to strike has been taken by a potentially hostie power, and
perhaps well before. This is the harder case fom a traditional interna
tional legal point of view. For the purposes of this essay, I wil use the
term "preventive" war.
AF TERWORD
ManyEuropcans,andmanyothcrsaroundthcworld,
insistthcAmcricanwillingncsstotakcprcvcntivcactionis
thc primc cxamlc of thc supcrpowcr's disrcgard fcr
intcrnational la
andintcrnational ordcr,thccpitcmccf
Amcrica's ncw illcgitimacy. "Until now,' UN Sccrctary-
CcncralKohAnnanasscrts,"ithasbccn undcrstoodthat
whcn Statcs go bcyond immcdiatc sclf-dcfcnsc| , and
dccidctouscforcctodcalwithbroadcrthrcatstointcrna-
tionalpcaccandsccurity,thcynccdthcuniquclcgitimacy
providcdbythcUnitcdNations."Thcvcry"logic"ofprc-
vcntivc war,thcrcforc,poscs"amndamcntalchallcngcto
thcprinciplcsonwhich,howcvcrimpcrfcctly,worldpcacc
andstabilityhavcrcstcdforthclasthny-cightycars."Sct
asidcforthcmomcntAnnan'srcnditionofthchistoryof
thcColdWar,withitscrroncousasscrtionthatAmcricans
and Europcans acccptcd thc "uniquc lcgitimacy" ofthc
Unitcd Nations throughout thosc dccadcs, or cvcn in
1999. Thcmorcintcrcstingqustioniswhcthcrncwintcr-
national circumstanccs havc forccd not j ust thc Unitcd
Statcs but also Europcans,andcvcn KohAnan himsclf,
to rccxaminctraditionalintcrnationallcgalprinciplcsand
dchnitionsof"lcgitimacy."
Thc idca of prcvcntivc war is notncw, ofcoursc. As
RobcrtCoopcrnotcs,thcushadministration'snotionof
prcvcntivc waris not mndamcntally dincrcnt from"thc
longstandingritishdoctrincthatnosinglcpowcrshould
bcallowcdtodominatcthccontincntofEuropc,'aprinci-
plcthatjustihcdthclaunchingofthcWar ofthcSpanish
55 Milbank, "At U. N. , Bush is Criticized Over Iraq:'
Succcssicn in thc latc scvcntccnth ccntury. Ncr is prc-

vcnticn a ncvcl ccnccpt in thc mcdcrn cra. Jchn F
Kcnncdythrcatcncdprcvcntivc acticninthcCubanMis-
silcCrisis.Inthcmid-p8os,fcllcwingthcbcmbingcfmc
Marinc barracks in cirut, Sccrctary cfStatc Cccrgc P.
Shultzpubliclycallcdfcr a dcctrinccfprcvcntivc acticn
againstintcrnaticnaltcrrcrism-and,cncmightadd,with
ncpubliccutcryncmEurcpc.
Evcnbcfcrcthcushadministraticnpubliclycnunci-
atcd a pclicycfprcvcntivcwar in zooz, mcrccvcr, thcrc
hadbccnagrcwingbcdycfcpinicninthcUnitcdStatcs,
andcvcninEurcpc,thatprcvcntivcacticnmightattimcs
bcncccssarytcmcctncwintcrnaticnalthrcats,rcgardlcss
cfthcfactthatsuchacticnviclatcdtraditicnalncticnscf
intcrnaticnal law and thc principlcs cfthc Wcstphalian
systcm. In thc Unitcd Statcs, it was thc rcncwncd lib-
cral |ustwarthccrist,MichaclWalzcr,whc argucdinpp8
that traditicnal lcgal argumcnts against prcvcntivc war
lcccd"dincrcntwhcnthcdangcrispcscdbywcapcnscf
mass dcstructicn, which arc dcvclcpcd in sccrct, and
which might bc uscd suddcnly, withcut warning, with
catastrcphic rcsults." Nct cnly might prcvcntivc acticn
bc"lcgitimatc"undcrsuchcircumstanccs,Walzcr argucd,
with1raq spccihcally in mind. ut sc wculd "unilatcral
acticn" withcut a Sccurity Ccuncil authcrizaticn. Thc
"rcmsal cfa U.N. majcritytc act fcrccmlly'was nct"a
gccdrcascnfcrrulingcutthcusccffcrccbyanymcmbcr
statc that can usc it cncctivcly.' IfAmcricans wcrc nct
56 Cooper, Te Breaking of Nations, p. 64.
AF TERWORD
not rcady somctimcs to "act unilatcrally," Walzcr con-
cludcd, thcn"wcarcnotrcadyforrcallifcinintcrnational
socicty."'
From thc oppositc cnd of thc idcological spcctrum,
HcnryKissingcr,thcgrcatproponcntofthcprinciplcsof
nationalsovcrcignty, nonintcrfcrcnce,andthcsanctityof
thc Wcstphalian systcm, ncvcrthclcss argucd that such
principlcs now had to bc sct asidc in ordcr to connont
changcd intcrnational circumstanccs."Thc intcrnational
rcgimcn following thc Trcaty of Wcstphalia," Kissingcr
argucdbcforcthcinvasionofIraq,"wasbascdonthccon-
ccpt ofan impcrmcablc nation-statc anda limitcd mili-
tarytcchnologywhichgcncrallypcrmittcdanationtorun
thc risk of awaiting an unambiguous challcngc." In thc
post-Cod War cra, howcvcr, "thc tcrrorist thrcat tran-
sccndsthcnation-statc,'andthcprolifcrationofwcapons
of mass dcstruction had madc thc risk of waiting too
grcat. '
WcnHcnryKissingcrmakcssuchapronouncc-
mcnt,thcWcstphaliansystcmisnomorc. Infact,thctwin
dangcrs ofwcaponsprolifcration andtcrrorismarcforc-
ingmanytorccvaluatcboththclcgalityandthclcgitimacy
ofthc usc ofprcvcntivc forcc. }avicr Solana insists that
"thc hght against intcrnational tcrrorism . . . has to takc
placcwithinthcrulcsofintcrnationallaw,'butisthatpos-
siblcwithoutsignihcantchangcsinthcrulcsthcmsclvcs'
57 Michael Walzer, "The Hard
Q
uestions: Lone Ranger:' Te New
Republic, April 27, 1998.
58 Henry Kissinger, "Iraq Poses Most Consequential Foreign- Policy
Decision for Bush:' Los Angeles Times, August
,2002.
59 Glenn Kessler, "Bush: Israel Must Defend Itself:' The Washington
Post, October 7, 2003, A19
:
4 )
Rcbcrt Cccpcr, whc happcns tc bc cnc cfSclana's tcp
adviscrs, ackncwlcdgcs that in a wcrld cf prclifcrating
wcapcnscfmassdcstructicn,"fcllcwingwch-cstablishcd
lcgalncrmsandrclyingcnsclf-dcfcnscwl nctsclvcthc
prcblcm''
AndcvcnKchAnnanhassuggcstcdthatUN
mcmbcrs shculdbcgin ccnsidcring"critcria fcr an carly
authcrizaticn cf cccrcivc mcasurcs tc addrcss ccrtain
typcs of thrcats-fcr instancc, tcrrcrist grcups armcd
withwcapcnscfmassdcstructicn'' 'IfthcUnitcdStatcs
fcars fcr its safcty and wants tc takc prcvcntivc acticn,
Annan is suggcsting, it cculd scckU Sccurity Ccuncil
authcriqfcraprcvcntivcstrikc.
Anan's prcpcsal, whatcvcr its practicality, rcvcals
acorctruabcutintcrnaticnalattitudcstcwardprcvcn-
ticn. Thcrcalissucmaynctbcprcvcnticnitsclfbutwhc
is do
ing thc prcvcnting, and whc gcts tc dccidc whcn

andwhcrcprcvcntivcwarcccurs.Inthisasinmanycthcr
cascs, what Eurcpcans cbjcct tc is nct sc much Acri-
canacticns,butwhatthcyccnsidcrthc"unilatcralism"cf
Acrican acticns. Thc disputc cvcr prcvcntivc war is
rcallylittlcmcrcthanarccapitulaticncfthcccntraluni-
pclar
prcdicamcnt. Hcw wUl thc sclc supcrpcwcr bc

ccntrcllcd
60
Cooper, The Breaking of Nations, p. 64.
6
1
Kof Annan speech to the UN General Assembly, September 22,
2003
AF TERWORD
WHAT IS " M U L TI LATERALISM " ?
Mcst Eurcpcans wculd arguc that if thc Unitcd Statcs
scckstcgainintcrnaticnallcgitimacyfcranyusccffcrcc,
it must avcid acting "unilatcrally" and must cmbracc a
fcrcignpclicycf"multilatcralism."And mcstAmcricans
wculd gladly agrcc-sc lcng as thcy did nct lcck tcc
clcscly at what Eurcpcans mcan by thc tcrm. Fcrwhcn
Amcricansspcakcf"multilatcralism,"thcymcanapclicy
that activcly sclicits and gains thc suppcrt cfallics. Fcr
mcst Amcricans, cvcn thcsc whc prcclaim thcmsclvcs
"multilatcralists,'aUNSccurityCcuncil authcrizaticnis
always dcsirablcbutncvcrcsscntial-"multilatcralifpcs-
siblc, unilatcral ifncccssary'` It is a mcanstcthccndcf
gainingallicdsuppcrt. It is nct,fcr thcvast majcritycf
Amcricans, ancndinitsclf.
ut whcn Eurcpcans spcakcf"multilatcralism"thcsc
days,thctcrmhasamuchmcrcfcrmalandlcgalisticcast.
Tc Eurcpcans it mcansgaininglcgitimatc sancticn frcm
dulyccnstitutcdintcrnaticnalbcdicsbcfcrc undcrtaking
any acticn and indccd as an csscntial prcrcquisitc fcr
acticn. ArcccntpcllshcwcdamajcritycfAmcricanswill-
ingtc bypassthcUN SccurityCcuncilifAmcrica's"vital
intcrcsts"wcrcthrcatcncd.utinthcsamcpcllamajcrity
cfEurcpcansinsistcdthatthcywculd abidcbyadccisicn
cfthc Sccurity Ccuncilcvcn ifit mcant sacrincingthcir
naticn'svitalintcrcsts.
AtlcastthatiswhatEurcpcanssaytcday, ahcrthcIraq
6. See Transatlantic Trends 2003.
:
4
war. In :ppp, whcn thc issucwas Kcscvc, Eurcpcans fclt

dincrcntly. Oncc again, it turns cut that cvcn fcr Eurc-
pcans, with thcir lcgalistic, principlcd undcrstandng cf
thc tcrm,thc attcmpt tc dchncintcrnaticnal lcgitima
simplyas"mu|tilatcralism"fcundcrscnthcsamcshihing
sandsasallothcrsimplcdchniticns.Fcrwhatis"multilat-
cralism" Ifit dccs nctmcan strict cbcdicncc tc thcU
SccurityCcuncil,andin:pppitdidnct, thcn"muItilatcr-
alism"bcccmcsaslippcryccnccpt.
Wat, cxactly, madcAmcrican acticn in Iraq"unilat-
cral" Thc Unitcd Statcs, ahcr all, did nct act alcnc in
invadingIraqinMarch2003 buthadanumbcrcfintcrna-
tioal partncrs, including such prcmincnt mcmbcrs cf
thcEurcpcanUnicnas Grcatritain,Spain,andPcland.
Thc Amcrican acticn was "multilatcral" in scmc scnsc,
thcrcfcrc, cvcn withcut a UN authcrizaticn,just as thc
Kosovowarwas"multilatcral"dcspitcthclackcfSccurity
Councilapprcval.NcrwculdEurcpcanshavcdcncunccd
Amcrican acticnin Iraqas"unilatcral"hadFrancc, Gcr-
many, andCrcatritainallagrccdtcsuppcrtthcwarbut
RussiaandChinahadcppcscdit-justasEurcpcansdid
notcondcmnthcircwnwarinKcscvcas"unilatcral"just
bccausc Russia and much ofthc dcvcloping wcrld wcrc
opposcd. Dc Villcpin ackowlcdgcs that "scmc pcwcrs
in thc South" opposcd thc war in Kcscvc. Thc war was
ncvcrthclcssj ustincd,dcVi|lcpinargucs,bythc"widcsup-
port" it cnjoycd in Europc.
As Cccpcr suggcsts, Eurc-

pcans considcrcdthat thcir ncarunanimcus suppcrt fcr
63 De Villepin, "Law, Force, and Justice," speech to the International
Institute for Security Studies, March 27, 2003.
AF TERWORD
thcwar,bascdas itwas on commonEuropcanhistoryand
common Europcan valucs, providcd lcgitimacycnough.
ut should intcrnational lcgitimacybc dchncdas what-
cvcrEuropcanscanagrccon
InthccascofthcAmcricaninvasionofIraq,thcEuro-
pcanscrcctcdahigh intcrnationalstandardoflcgitimacy.
"Thc authority of our action,' Dominiquc dc Villcpin
dcclarcdinhisfamousspccchtothcUNSccurityCouncil
in Fcbruary2003, had to bc bascd "on thc unityofthc
intcrnational community''
ut what docs that mcan

WasdcVillcpinarguingthatnoactioncouldcvcrbctakcn
without thc unanimous conscnt of thc cntirc intcrna-
tionalcommunity Oris"unity"anothcrwordthatnccds
tobcdchncdlooscly Thc UnitcdStatcshadthcsupport
ofdozcnsofnationsforitswarinIraq,butaccordingtodc
VillcpinandmanyothcrEuropcans,notcnough. Isthcrc
thcn accrtain,magicnumbcrofsupportingnationsthat
bcstowslcgitimacy Orisitthcqualityofonc'sallicsthat
mattcrsmorc thanthc quantitywhcn dchning"multilat-
cralism" Is Francc worth morc than Spain"Lcgitimacy
dcpcnds on crcating a widc intcrnational conscnsus,'
JavicrSolanainsists.uthowwidciswidcAndwhowill
dccidc whcn it is widc cnough Thc answcrs to such
qucstionsarcincvitablysubj cctivc,andfartoo subj cctivc
toscrvcasthc undcrpinningofany"rulcs-bascd"intcrna-
tionalordcr.
64 De Villepin statement to the UN Security Council, February 14,
2003,
65 Solana, "The Future of Transatlantic Relations: Reinvention or
Reform?" Progressive Governance, July 10, 2003,
:
( 7
Itisdimculttc avcidthcccnclusicnthatwhcnEurc-
pcans,andAmcricans,claimthatAmcricanacticninIraq
was"unilatcral,'thcydc nctrcallymcanthatthcUnitcd
Statcslackcdwidc intcrnaticnal suppcrt.Thcymcthc
Unitcd Statcs lackcd widc Eurcpcan suppcrt. Thc prcb-
lcm wasnctthatRussiaandChinawcrccppcscd-whcn
did any Amcrican cr Eurcpcan cvcr wcrry abcut that
NcrwasitthatthcvastmajcritycfnaticnsinAnica,Latin
Amcrica,andthcMiddlcEastwcrccppcscd.Fcrmuchcf
thc past ccntury, thc majcritycfthc wcrld's pcpulaticn
has cppcscd many Amcrican pclicics, and many Eurc-
pcanpclicics,tcc,withcutcausingacrisiscflcgitimacyin
thc Wcst.Nc,whatthccriticsmcanbyAmcrica's"unilat-
cralism"inthcIraqwarwasthatthcUnitcdStatcsdidnct
havcthcmllsuppcrtcfallitstraditicnalEurcpcanallics,
including,mcstspcctacularly, Francc andGcrmany. Thc
ushadministraticnwas"unilatcralist"nctbccauscitlcst
thcsuppcrtcfMcsccw,cijing,ScPaclc,KualaLumpur,
and dczcns cfcthcrcapitals,butbccausc itlcstthc sup-
pcrtcfParisandcrlin.
In thc cnd, mcrccvcr, what critics rcally mcan by
Acrican unilatcralism" is nct that thc Unitcd Statcs
actcdalcnc,butthatitwculdnctandcculdnctbcccn-
straincd,cvcnbyits clcscstnicnds.Frcmthcpcrspcctivc
cfcrlin and Paris, thc Unitcd Statcs was "unilatcralist"
bccauscncEurcpcanpcwcrhadanyrcalinucncccvcrit.
As }cschka Fischcr mcst candidlyput it, "Thc qucsticn
ncw is. What will bcccmc cf thc Eurcpcans givcn thc
dcminant rclc cfthc Unitcd StatcsWillthcybc ablc tc
dctcrmincthcircwnfatccrwiUthcymcrclybcfcrccdtc
carry cut what has bccn dccidcd clscwhcrc" Ycs, thc
AF TERWORD
ritishandSpaniardssupportcdthcUnitcdStatcsinIraq,
Fischcr acknowlcdgcs, but "thc dccisivc qucstion" was
whcthcr thcsc countrics "can havc or cvcr did havc any
inucncc at all."
Thus,cvcn ifthcrc wcrc onc hundrcd

nations onAcrica's sidc, and cvcn ifthrcc-quartcrs of
Europcan nations supportcd Amcrican action, it is thc
lcssofinucnccovcrthcUnitcdStatcsthatmakcsAmcri-
canpolicy"unilatcral."
ThatiswhymanyEuropcanshavcfoundsoobj cction-
ablcthcushadministration'srcfcrcnccsto"coalitionsof
thcwilling" as thc forcign policy tool of choicc for thc
Unitcd Statcs in thc mturc, rathcr than institutionalizcd
allianccssuchasNATO.Thcidcathatthcmissiondctcr-
mincsthccoalition"frccsthcUnitcdStatcsfromallobli-
gations and from Europcan intlucncc, cvcn if somc
Europcans arc part ofthc coalition. It is also why many
EuropcansfoundsotroublingAmcricantalkofold"and
"ncw" Europc, it was vicwcd as anAmcrican stratcgy of
dividc-and-conqucr, a way of mrthcr minimizing thc
inucncc ofaunitcdEuropc,ifsuchathingwcrc cvcrto
comcintocxistcncc.
AsJavicrSolanaputsit,Mostofuswouldprcfcrtobc
callcdanàlly'ora`partncr'rathcrthana`tool'inabox."If
thcUnitcdStatcswillonccagainconsidcritsclfboundto
itsEuropcanallics,Solanasuggcsts,thcEuropcanswillin
turnprovidcitthcsupportandlcgitimacyitnccds."Trcat
your nicnds likc allics and thcy will bchavc likc allics,"
Javicr Solana has argucd sincc thc Iraqwar."Thcyallow
66 Fischer interview, Die Zeit, May 8, 2003.
4 p
fcr and lcgitimizc lcadcrship."
Ad althcugh Sclana
againinsiststhatEurcpcansindcmandingthistrcatmcnt
arc nct sccking a "dc factc Eurcpcanvctc cnAmcrican
initiativcs,'cfccurscthcyarc.Nccnccanblamcthcmfcr
wanting such avctc. Still, whcn all is said and dcnc,thc
crisis cflcgitimacytcdayis nct cnlyabcut principlcs cf
law,cr cvcn abcut thc suprcmc authcrity cf thc UN
Sccurity Ccuncil. It is alsc vcry much thc prcduct cfa
transatlanticstrugglcfcrinucncc.ItisEurcpc'srcspcnsc
tcthcunipclarprcdicamcnt.
T H E LEG I T I M A C Y 0 F LI B ERA LI S M
Itwou|dbctcmptingfcrAmcricans,thcrcforc,tc dismiss
thcwhclcissuccflcgitimacyasaruscandanaud.During
thczoooprcsidcntia|campaign,CccrgcW. ush'stcpfcr-
cign pc|icyadviscr, CcndclcczzaRcc,dcridcdthcbclicf,
whch shc attributcdtcthcClintcnadministraticn,"that
thcsuppcrtcfmanystatcs-crcvcnbcttcr,cfinstituticns
likc
mc Unitcd Naticns-is csscntial tc thc lcgitimatc

cxcrcisc cf pcwcr." ut as it turns cut, cvcn thc ush
administraticnfcltccmpcllcdtcscckEurcpcanapprcval
fcr its acticn, and at thc placc whcrc Eurcpcans insistcd
apprcval bc grantcd, thc UN Sccurity Ccuncil. Pcrhaps
thc ush administraticn did nct nccd Francc and Gcr-
many, but it bclicvcd it nccdcd thc suppcrt at lcast cf
67 Javier Solana, "The Future of Transatlantic Relations: Reinven
tion or Reform?" Progessive Governance, July 10, 2003.
AF T E RWORD
Grcatritain.WyNctbccauscritishtrccpswcrccsscn-
tialtcthcsucccsscfthcinvasicncfIraq.Itwasthcpatina
cf intcrnaticnal lcgitimacy lair's suppcrt prcvidcd-a
lcgitimacythatthcAmcricanpccplcwantcdandnccdcd,
as ush cmcials wcll undcrstccd. Ncr can thcrc bc any
qucsticn thatthc ush administraticn has suncrcd ncm
its failurc tc gain thc mll apprcval cf Eurcpc, and thus
a brcadcr intcrnaticnal lcgitimacy, fcr thc invasicn cf
Iraq-andsuncrcdathcmcaswcllasabrcad.
ThcrcarcscundrcascnswhythcUnitcdStatcsnccds
Eurcpcan apprcval, rcascns unrclatcd tc intcrnaticnal
law, thcstrcngthcfthcSccurity Ccuncil, andthc as-yct-
ncncxistcnt "fabric cf thc intcrnaticnal crdcr." Eurcpc
mattcrsbccauscEurcpcandthcUnitcdStatcsrcmainthc
hcartcfthclibcral,dcmccraticwcrld.Thclibcral,dcmc-
craticcsscncccfthcUnitcdStatcsmakcsitdimcultifnct
impcssiblc fcr Amcricans tc igncrc thc fcars, ccnccrns,
intcrcsts, and dcmands cfitsfcllcw libcral dcmccracics.
AmcricanfcrcignpclicywillbcdrawnbyAmcricanlibcr-
alismtc scckgrcatcrharmcnywithEurcpc, if Eurcpcans
arcwillingandablctcmakcsuchharmcnypcssiblc.
Thc altcrnativc ccurscwillbcdimcult fcrthcUnitcd
Statcs tc sustain, fcr it is qucsticnablc whcthcr thc
Unitcd Statcs can cpcratc cncctivcly cvcr timc withcut
thcmcralsuppcrtandapprcvalcfthc dcmccraticwcrld.
This is nct fcr thc rcascns usually citcd. Wilc mcst
Amcricanadvccatcscf"multilatcralism"havcfccuscdcn
thc nccd fcr thc matcrial cccpcraticn cf allics, it is
Amcrica'snccdfcrintcrnaticnallcgitimacy,dchncdasthc
apprcval cfthc libcral, dcmccratic wcrld-rcprcscntcd,
abcvc all, by Eurcpc-that will in thc cnd prcvc mcrc
15 1
dccisivc in shaping Amcrica's ccursc.
Wcthcr thc
Unitcd Statcs can "gc it alcnc" in a matcrial scnsc is an
cpcn qucsticn. Militarily, it can and dccs gc virtually
alcnc, cvcnwhcnthcEurcpcansarcmllycnbcard,asin
KcscvcandinthchrstPcrsianGulfwar.Econcmically,it
cangc alcncinthcrcconstructicncfplaccs lUc Iraqifit
absclutcly has to-hvc dccadcs agc, ancr al, it rcccn-
structcd Europc and }apan with its own mnds. ut
whcthcrthcAmcricanpcoplcwill ccntinuallybcwilling
andablctosupportbothmilitaryactionsandthcburdcns
ofpostaroccupationsinthcfaccofconstantchargcscf
illcgitimacybyitscloscstdcmocraticallics-thatismcrc
dcbtml.
Amcricans havc always carcd what thc rcst cf thc
wcrld thinks ofthcm, cr at lcast what thc libcral wcrld
thinks.Thcirrcputaticnfcrinsularityandindincrcnccis
undcscrvcd.Amcricanswcrctcldtccarcbythcfcunding
gcncraticn-inthcirDcclaraticncfIndcpcndcncc,Amcri-
cansdcclarcdthcimpcrtancccfhavinga"dcccntrcspcct
fcr thc cpinicn cfmanknd,' bywhichthcymcant Eu-
rcpc.Evcrsincc,Acricanshavcbccnfcrccdtccarcwhat
thclibcralwcrldthinksbythciruniqucnaticnalidcclcgy.
Fcrunlikcthcnaticnalisms cfEurcpc,Acricannaticn-
alismis nctrcctcdinblccd and scil, it is a univcrsalist
6
8
It is not yet the case that the world's other major liberal democ
racies, including India and Japan, weigh as heavily in American calcula
tions as does Europe. Whether t is because they are relative
newcomers to "the West" or because of cultural and racial prejudices in
the transatlantic community is hard to say. But the views of New Delhi
do not carry as much weight, or excite as much passion, as the views of
Paris.
AF T E R WOR D
idcology that binds Amcricans togcthcr. Amcricans for
much ofthc past thrcc ccnturics havc considcrcd thcm-
sclvcs thc vanguard of a worldwidc libcral rcvolution.
Thcirforcignpolicynomthcbcginninghasnotbccnonly
about dcfcnding and promoting thcir matcrial national
intcrcsts. "Wc hght not j ust for oursclvcs but for all
mankind,"cnj amin Franklin dcclarcd atAmcrica`sWar
ofIndcpcndcncc,andwhcthcrornotthathasalwaysbccn
truc, most Amcricans havc always wantcd to bc|icvc it
wastruc.Thcrccanbcnoclcardividinglincbctwccnthc
domcsticandthcforcign,thcrcforc,andno clcardistinc-
tion bctwccn what thc dcmocratic world thinks about
Amcrica and what Acricans think about thcmsclvcs.
EvcryprofoundforcignpolicydcbatcinAmcrica'shistcry,
nom thc timc whcn }cncrson squarcd on against Ham-
ilton, has ultimatcly bccn a dcbatc abcut thc naticn's
idcntity and has poscd fcr Amcricans thc primal gucs-
tion."Whoarcwc"ccauscAcricansdccarc,thcstcady
dcnial of intcrnational lcgitimacy by fcllow dcmccra-
cicswillovcrtimcbccomcdcbilitatingandpcrhapscvcn
paralyzing.
Amcricans thcrcforc cannot ignorc thc unipolar prc-
dicamcnt.Pcrhapsthcsingularfailurcofthcushadmin-
istration may havc bccn that it has bccn too slow tc
rccognizcthis.ushandhisadviscrscamctocmccguidcd
bythcnarrowrcalismthatdominatcdinRcpublicanfor-
cign policy circlcs during thc Clinton ycars. Thc Clin-
ton administration,CondolcczzaRiccwrctcin afamous
cssayin}anuary2000, hadfailcdtcfocusonthc"national
intcrcst"andinstcadhadaddrcsscditsclfto"` humanitar-
ianintcrcstsòrthcintcrcstsof`thcintcrnationalcommu-
:
)
nity.' ` Thc ush administration,by contrast, would takc
a ncsh look at all trcatics, obligations, and allianccs
and rccvaluatc thcm in tcrms of Acrica's "national
intcrcst."
Thc notion that thc Unitcd Statcs could takc such a

narrowvicwofits"nationalintcrcst"hasalwaysbccnmis-
taken. Acricans had "humanitarian intcrcsts" bcforc
thc tcrm was invcntcd. ut bcsidcs bcing an analytical
crror, thc cnunciation of this "rcalist" approach by thc
sclc supcrpowcr in a unipolar cra was a scrious fcrcign
policycrrcr.Thcglobalhcgcmoncannctproclaimtc thc
worldthatitwillbcguidcdonlybyitscwn dchniticn of
its ``naticnal intcrcst." For this is prcciscly what cvcn
Acrica's clcscstfricnds fcar, that thc Unitcd Statcs wm
wicld its unprcccdcntcdvastpcwcr cnlyfcritsclf. Inhcr
cssay Ricc dcridcd "thc bclicfthat thc Unitcd Statcs is
cxcrcisingpcwcrlegitimatclycnlywhcnitisdcingsccn
bchalfofsomccnccrscmcthingclsc."utfcrthcrcstof
thcwcrld,what cthcrscurcc cflcgitimacan thcrcbc
Wc thc Unitcd Statcs acts in its cwn intcrcsts, Ricc
claimd, as wculdmanyAcricans, it ncccssarily scrvcs
thcintcrcstsofcvcrycnc."Tcbcsurc,'Riccargucd,"thcrc
is ncthingwrcngwithdcingscmcthingthatbcnchts all
humanity, butthatis,ina scnsc,ascccnd-crdcrcffcct."
ut could cvcn Acrica's clcscst nicnds cvcr bc pcr-

suadcdthat anAcricaalways pursuingits sclf-intcrcst
can bc rclicd upon to scrvc thcir intcrcsts, too, as somc
kindof"sccond-ordcrcncct"
(
69 Condoleezza Rce, "Promoting the National Interest:' Foreig
Afairs, 79 ( January/February 2000) : 47.
70 Ibid.
AF TERWORD
oth thc unipolar prcdicamcnt and thc Amcrican
charactcr rcquirc a much morc cxpansivc dchnition of
Amcricanintcrcsts.ThcUnitcdStatcs canncithcrappcar
tobcactingonlyinitssclf-intcrcst,norcanitinfactactas
ifits ownnational intcrcstwcrcall that mattcrcd. In thc
wordsofthcon-quotcdJcwishsagcHillcl,"IfIamnotfor
mysclf,whowillbcformcIfIamnotforothcrs,whatam
I"ThcUnitcdStatcs must,indccd,actinwaysthatbcnc-
htallhumanity,asithasfrcqucntlytricdtodointhcpast,
anditmustccrtainlysccktobcnchtthatpartofhumanity
that sharcs Amcrica's libcral principlcs. Evcn attimcs cf
dirccmcrgcncy,andpcrhapscspcciallyatthosctimcs,thc
world's solc supcrpowcr nccds tc dcmonstratc that it
wiclds its grcat powcr on bchalfofits principlcs and all
whosharcthcm.
ThcmanncrinwhichthcUnitcdStatcsconductsitsclf
in Iraq today is cspccially important in this rcgard. At
stakc is not only thc mturc ofIraq and thc Middlc East
morcgcncrally,butalsoofAmcrica'srcputation,itsrclia-
bility, and its lcgitimacy as a world lcadcr. Thc Unitcd
Statcs will bcj udgcd, and should bcj udgcd,bythc carc
andcommitmcntittakcstosccurcadcmocraticpcaccin
Iraq. Itwillbcj udgcdbywhcthcrit indccd advanccsthc
causc oflibcralism, in Iraq and clscwhcrc, orwhcthcr it
mcrclydcfcndsitsownintcrcsts.
No onc has madc this argumcnt morc powcrmlly,
and morc prcscicntly, than that quintcsscntial rcalist,
HcnryKissingcr.InthcsamccssaywhcrcKissingcrmadc
thc casc for moving bcyond thc Wcstphalian systcm, hc
also insistcd that by lcading this ncw, "rcvolutionary"
approach thc Unitcd Statcs incurrcd"aspccial rcsponsi-
:
bility."ccauscofitspowcr,and"prccisc|ybccauscofthc
prcccdcnt-sctting naturc of this war," Kssingcr argucd
bcforcthcinvasion,"its outcomcwilldctcrmincthcway
Amcricanactionswillbcvicwcdintcrnationally''Thctask
inIraq, Kissingcrargucd,wasnotj usttowinthcwarbut
to" convcy| tothcrcstofthcworldthatourhrstprccmp-
tivcwarhasbccnimposcdbyncccssityand thatwc scck
thcworld'sintcrcsts,nctcxclusivclycurcwn."Amcrica's
"spccialrcspcnsibility, asthcmcstpcwcrmlnaticninthc
world,istcworktcwardanintcrnaticnalsystcmthatrcsts
cn mcrc than mditary pcwcr-indccd, that strivcs tc
translatcpowcrintc cccpcraticn.Anycthcrattitudcwl
graduallyisclatcandcxhaustus''
ThcUnitcdStatcs,inshcrt,mustpursuclcgitimacyin
thcmanncrtrucsttoitsnaturc,byprcmctingthcprinci-
plcs oflibcral dcmocracy, nctcnlyas amcanstc grcatcr
sccurity,butasancndinitsclf. Succcssinsuchcndcavcrs
willprovidc thcUnitcdStatcsamcasurc cflcgitimacyin
thc libcral, dcmocratic world, and cvcn in Eurcpc. Fcr
Europcans cannot forcvcr ignorc thcir cwn visicn cfa
morchumancworld,cvcnifthcyarcthcscdaysmcrcprc-
occupicdwiththcirvisionofastrcngthcncdintcrnaticnal
lcgalcrdcr.
NorcanthcUnitcdStatcs,inpromotinglibcralism,fad
to takcthcintcrcstsandthcfcarsofitslibcraldcmccratic
allicsinEuropcintcacccunt.ThcUnitcdStatcsshculdtry
tomlhllitspartofancwtransatlanticbargainbygranting
Europcans somc inucncc ovcrthc cxcrcisc ofAmcrican
powcr-if, that is,thc Europcans in turn wid wicld that
inucncc wiscly. ThcNATO alliancc-an alliancc cfand
forlibcraldcmccracics-cculdbcthclocuscfsuchabar-
AF TERWORD
gain,ifthcrcis tobconc. NATO iswhcrcthcUnitcdStatcs
hasalrcadyccdcd inucncctoEuropcans,whovotconan
cqual footing with thc supcrpowcr in all thc alliancc`s
dclibcrations. Indccd,NATO hasfordccadcsbccnthconc
organization capablc ofrcconcilingAmcricanhcgcmony
withEuropcanautonomyandinucncc.AndNATO cvcn
todayrctainsascntimcntalattractionforAmcricans,morc
potcntthanthcattractionthcyfcclforthcUnitcdNations.
utcanthcUnitcdStatcsccdcsomcpowcrtoEuropc
without puttingAcrican sccurity, and indccd Europc`s
and thc cntirc libcral dcmocraticworld`s sccurity, at risk
inthcproccssHcrclicsthcrub.Forcvcnwiththcbcstof
intcntions,thcUnitcdStatcscannotcnlistthccoopcration
ofEuropcans ifthcrc is no common asscssmcnt ofthc
naturcofglobalthrcatstoday, andofthcmcansthatmust
bccmploycdto mcctthcm. utit isprccisclythis gap in
pcrccption that has drivcn thc Unitcd Statcs and Europc
apartinthcpost-ColdWarworld.
Ifit is truc, as Robcrt Coopcr suggcsts, that intcrna-
tional lcgitimacystcms from sharcdvalucs and a sharcd
history, docssuchcommonalitystillcxistwithinthcWcst
now that thc Cold War has cndcd For whilc thc libcral
transatlantic community still sharcs much in common,
thcphilosophicalschismonthcmndamcntalqucstionsof
worldordcrmaynowbcovcrwhclmingthosccommonal-
itics. It is hard to imagincthc crisis oflcgitimacybcing
rcsolvcd so long as this schism pcrsists. For cvcn ifthc
Unitcd Statcswcrc to mlnll its part ofthc bargain, and
grantthc Europcans thcinucnccthcycravc,wouldthc
Europcans, with thcir vcry dincrcnt pcrccption of thc
world,mlnllthcirsWcrcEuropcansandAmcricanscvcr
:
7
tcagrcccnthcnaturccfthcccmmcnthrcat,thccccpcra-
ticn thcymanagcdduringthc CcldWar wculd nct bc
hardtcrcsumc.utsclcngasEurcpcansandAcricans
dcnctsharcaccmmcnvicwcfthcthrcatpcscdbytcrrcr-
ismandwcapcnscfmassdcstructicn,thcywillnctjcinin
a ccmmcn stratcgy tc mcct thcsc thrcats. Ncr will
Eurcpcans acccrd thc Unitcd Statcs lcgitimacy whcn it
sccks tc addrcss thcsc thrcats by itsclf, and by what it
rcgardsasscmctimcsthccnlymcanspcssiblc,byfcrcc.
And what, thcn, is thc Unitcd Statcs tc dc ShcuId
Amcricans,inthcintcrcstcftransatlanticharmcny,trytc
altcrthcir pcrccpticns cfglcbalthrcatstc match that cf
thcirEurcpcannicndsTc dcscwculdbcirrcspcnsiblc.
NctcnlyAmcricansccuritybutthcsccuritycfthclibcral
dcmccraticwcrld dcpcnds tcday, as it has dcpcndcd fcr
thc past half ccntury, cn Acrican pcwcr. Kch Annan
mayccnvincchimsclfthatthcrclativcpcaccandstability
thcwcrldhaskncwnsinccWcrldWarIIwasthcprcduct
cfthcUNSccurityCcuncilandthcUNChartcr. utcvcn
Eurcpcans,in mcmcnts cfclarity, kncwthatis nct truc.
"ThcU. S. isthccnlytrulyglcbalplaycr,'JcschkaFischcr
has dcclarcd,"and I mustwarnagainstundcrcstimating
its impcrtancc fcr pcacc andstabilityin thc wcrld. Ad
bcwarc,tcc,cfundcrcstimatingwhatthc U. S. mcansfcr
curcwnsccurity."
'
ut thc Unitcd Statcs has playcd that rclc nct by
adcpting Eurcpc's pcstmcdcrnwcrldvicw,butbysccing
thcwcrldthrcughitscwncycs.WcrcAmcricans ncwtc
adcptthcwcrldvicwcfpcstmcdcrnEurcpc,ncithcrthc
7
1
Joschka Fischer interview, Stern, October 2, 2002.
AF T E R WOR D
Unitcd Statcs ncr pcstmcdcrn Eurcpc itsclf wculd lcng
rcmainsccurc.Tcday,mcstEurcpcansbclicvcthcUnitcd
Statcscxaggcratcsthcdangcrsinthcwcrld.AcrScptcm-
bcr11, 2001, mcstAmcricansfcarthcyhavcn'ttakcnthcsc
dangcrsscricuslycncugh.
Hcrcin lics thc tragcdy. Tc addrcss tcday's glcbal
thrcats Amcricans will nccd thc lcgitimacy that Eurcpc
canprcvidc.utEurcpcansmaywcllfailtcprcvidcit.In
thcir cncrt tc ccnstrain thc supcrpcwcr, thcywill lcsc
sightcfthc mcunting dangcrs in thcwcr|d,dangcrsfar
grcatcr than thcsc pcscd by thc Unitcd Statcs. In thcir
ncrvcusncss abcutunipc|arity, thcymayfcrgctthc dan-
gcrscfamultipclarityinwhichncnlibcralandncndcmc-
cratic pcwcrs ccmc tc cutwcigh Eurcpc in thc glcbal
ccmpctiticn. Inthcirpassicnfcrintcrnaticnallcgalcrdcr,
thcymaylcscsightcfthccthcrlibcralprinciplcsthathavc
madc pcstmcdcrn Eurcpc what it is tcday. Eurcpcans
thus may succccd in dcbilitating thc Unitcd Statcs, but
sinccthcyhavcncintcnticncfsupplcmcntingAmcrican
pcwcrwiththcircwn,thcnctrcsultwillbcadiminuticn
cfthctctal amcuntcfpcwcrthatthclibcraldcmccratic
wcrldcanbringtc bcarinitsdcfcnsc-andindcfcnsccf
libcralismitsclf.
Right ncwmanyEurcpcans arcbcttingthatthc risks
ncm thc "axis cfcvil,' ncm tcrrcrism and tyrants, will
ncvcr bc as grcat as thc risk cfan Amcrican Lcviathan
unbcund. Pcrhaps it is in thc naturc cf a pcstmcdcrn
Eurcpc tc makc such a j udgmcnt. ut ncw maybc thc
timcfcrthcwiscsthcadsinEurcpc,includingthcscliving
inthcbirthplacccfPasca|,tcbcginaskingwhatwillrcsult
ifthatwagcrprcvcswrcng.

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OF PARADISE

Copyright 2003, 2004 by Robert Kgan

ruc sccurityandthc dcfcnsc andprcmcticn cfa

gcncra|izc abcut Eurcpcans. ritcns may

T!c intcrwar cra was Eurcpc's hrst attcmpt tc mcvc

5utthc"systcm" did nct wcrk, inpartbccauscits

ccdc thc pcint. Ncr did

cfs.And when we were done, and well armed, bet

historic accomplishmcnt ofMaas-

t dccisivc forccinto rcgions ofconict

pcans wcrricd abcut thc thrcat pcscd nct cnly by !raq,

an ccnncntaticn, and cvcn thc ccnict bctwccn

Evcn in thc i}}os thc issuc on which Amcrican and

inga ncwmissilcdcfcnscsystcm dcsigncdtc prctcctthc

MissilcTrcaty and thc dcctrinc cfmutually

Morc troubling still was that Europcan dcpcndcncc

any Europcanswantcdto focus thc bombing

ss, rapid cscalation, `crican military doc-

EU forcign policy initiativcs tcnd to bc shcrt-

y, and Ccrmans in particular, tc bclicvc that

cfWcrldWar IIpcwcrmlcccncmic ccm-

thcchallcngcas"atcst cfthc cvcrallwcrth cfthcUnitcd

For Europc and thc Unitcd Statcs to dccouplc

s thcmsclvcs scck such authorization whcn thcy

has unavoidablybccomc thc ncw issuc, onc with which

thcWcstcrnlibcral mind, chccks and balanccs arc

vast majority of Europcans, including ritons,

ut thc rccord ofthc post-ColdWar ycars has bccn

thc timc rcjcctcd this com-

or cvcn in thc traditional principlcs of intcr-

Clcnnon, an intcrnational lcgal scholar, has argucd

yEurcpcans simplyshincdthcirvicwcfbcth intcr-

Civcn thc tcnsion bctwccn thcsc two libcral visions,

Unitcd Naticns was mcant"tc dcfcndthc status qucand

A mcdcrn libcrals must wrcstlc with this ddcmma.

Succcssicn in thc latc scvcntccnth ccntury. Ncr is prc-

ing thc prcvcnting, and whc gcts tc dccidc whcn

prcdicamcnt. Hcw wUl thc sclc supcrpcwcr bc

war. In :ppp, whcn thc issucwas Kcscvc, Eurcpcans fclt

As Cccpcr suggcsts, Eurc-

ut what docs that mcan

Thus,cvcn ifthcrc wcrc onc hundrcd

mc Unitcd Naticns-is csscntial tc thc lcgitimatc

Thc notion that thc Unitcd Statcs could takc such a

ut could cvcn Acrica's clcscst nicnds cvcr bc pcr-

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