The Lebanese Crisis of 1958: The Risks of Inflated SelfImportance*

By Fawaz A. Gerges [http://www.lcps-lebanon.org/pub/breview/br5/gergesbr5pt1.html#top]

Myths and legends o ten orm a community!s view o its own history. "istorical truth is the irst casualty not only o war but also o nation-building. #nly cohesive and united societies can a ord the lu$ury o historical sel -deception. %ragmented societies indulge in such anci ul invention at the their own peril& or& to survive& they need to 'now and comprehend the real and ull truth o their past and accommodate themselves to political realities. (he )ebanese& in particular& have resisted coming to terms with their own history. (hey have ailed to learn rom their tragic past and have continued to entertain illusions about their national identity and their importance in the world. The Conflicting Histories of Lebanon*t was rom this perspective that +amal ,alibi diagnosed the genesis o the bloody and prolonged war that erupted in 1-.5 and that almost destroyed the political and socio-economic abric o )ebanon. "e argued that the upheaval was basically a civil war ought between )ebanese actions lying di erent historical banners: the /hristian )ebanese particularist banner on one side& and the 0rab nationalist/*slamist banner on the other. (o him& both sides were misguided1 contrary to the claims o the particularists& the concept o a historical )ebanese nationality is not well ounded. 0s a country& asserted ,alibi& )ebanon is a modern creation1 it was established and organi2ed by the colonial powers. 0lthough )ebanon!s history is somewhat di erent rom that o its 0rab neighbors& ,alibi re3ected the idea o )ebanon as an entity separate and distinct rom 0rabism: the )ebanese case its com ortably into the general pattern o 0rab history.[1] (his does not mean that ,alibi subscribes to the 0rab nationalist *slamist interpretation o )ebanon!s history. 4hile he emphasi2ed the basic 0rabism o )ebanon& he warned against blindly adhering to the tenets o 0rab nationalist doctrine. (his highly ideali2ed vision& contended ,alibi& is problematic since it distorts the evolution o 0rab history by con using *slam and 0rabism. 5y re uting the di erent theories o )ebanon!s history and setting the record straight& he hoped to in3ect the )ebanese with a dose o realism and remind them o their humble origins. [6] * they ailed to come to terms with their historical origins and the di erences among them& ,alibi eared& the )ebanese would continue to act as tribes: Each tribe forever suspicious and distrustful of the others; each tribe always alert, extending feelers to the outside world in different directions, probing for possible sources of external support in preparation for yet another round of open conflict.[3] ,till& ,alibi did not deal directly or e$plicitly with the oreign policy prescriptions and implications o these two main poles o thought. (his omission needs to be recti ied& given the close lin'age between domestic and oreign politics in )ebanon. 7assi "itti has argued that& since independence& the controversial issues that plunged the country into the abyss o instability and violence belong to the realm o e$ternal rather than internal politics. %or e$ample& the crisis o 1-58& the protracted con lict with 9alestinian guerrillas a ter 1-:-& and the all-out war that erupted in 1-.5 can all be seen as products o irreconcilable di erences over )ebanon!s relationship with its environment& di erences arising rom contradictory perceptions o )ebanon!s place in 1

the region and beyond.[;] 4hat are some o the perceptions that have had such considerable impact on )ebanon!s relations with the outside world< (he Asile du Liban constituency& with its emphasis on the 9hoenician origin and special historical character o the )ebanese& perceived o )ebanon as a =shinning e$ample o liberal democracy and general social advancement in the 0rab world.[5] (he 0rab world was seen as a tribal domain& in erior to that o the civili2ed& >uropean-li'e& and materially success ul )ebanon. ,mall wonder that this particularist& )ebanonist school identi ied itsel culturally and politically with the 4est rather than with the *slamic world. *t called or a reorientation o )ebanon!s oreign policy and or a strategic alliance with the 4estern powers. 0n ideali2ed view o the 4est ostered e$aggerated e$pectations: it was assumed that the latter would ight to protect the =only 4estern model= in the 0rab region.[:](he )ebanonist adherents thus came to overvalue )ebanon!s place on the 4estern strategic chessboard and set goals beyond their capabilities. (he result was the adoption o con rontational policies that alienated and clashed with the ob3ectives o the 0rab nationalist and *slamist segment o )ebanese society. (he latter saw the political destiny and uture o )ebanon in a di erent light. (heir point o re erence was the 0rab/*slamic world rather than the 4est. (he interests o )ebanon were subordinated to those o its immediate environment. *n a sense&. this constituency served& consciously or unconsciously& as a conduit or and mirror to other ideologies& whether 7asserism& the 9alestinian nationalism o the 9)#& or the militant *slamism o the *slamic ?epublic o *ran.[.] 7ot surprisingly& )ebanon became a theater or inter-0rab rivalries and regional con licts. The Crisis of 1958:The Risks of Inflated Self-Im ortance (he purpose o this paper is to analy2e how the perceptions o the particularist and 0rab nationalist/*slamist schools a ected )ebanon!s e$ternal relations& and how they adversely in luenced the ormation o its oreign policy. *t will be argued that the in lated images held by the two constituencies distorted their world views and led to an over-estimation o their own and )ebanon!s importance in the international system. (he ailure to maintain a balance between goals and means produced rec'less policies based on miscalculation and improvisation. 0t no time was this truer than in the con lict o 1-58& when the clash between the di ering views o the two groups culminated in a bloody con rontation and outside intervention. 0s a case study& the crisis o 1-58 sheds much light on the oreign policy misperceptions o both constituencies. /ontrary to popular perceptions& 0merican military intervention in )ebanon did not re lect any strategic commitment by 4ashington to the )ebanonist agenda or to )ebanon!s uture. *n addition& 5eirut was not the main target o @.,. action1 rather& /airo and Moscow were. ,hoc'ed by the success o the Auly 1-58 *raBi evolution& although accepting it as a fait acco pli, 0merican o icials used )ebanon as a theater to pro3ect their military power and demonstrate their will to protect their vital regional interests& mainly the supply o oil. (hey wanted to signal to their adversaries their readiness to use orce& i necessary& to arrest the urther crumbling o the 0rab conservative order. 0s one @.,. policyma'er put it& =)ebanon was a test case in the eyes o the others.=[8]

(he >isenhower administration probably would not have sent troops to )ebanon i the *raBi revolution had not occurred. 9rior to the Auly revolution& and notwithstanding the repeated reBuests or @.,. intervention by president /amille /hamoun and his oreign minister& /harles Mali'& president >isenhower was reluctant to become entangled militarily in the Buagmire o )ebanese politics. 5ut in @.,. eyes& the dramatic events in *raB introduced a dangerous new element in that it threatened to destroy the whole 4estern security structure in the Middle >ast. >isenhower elt that the time had come to intervene in the region to =stop the trend toward chaos.=[-] *n this sense& the @.,. action should be viewed within a broader conte$t than merely that o the situation in )ebanon. )ebanon served as a convenient place or the @nited ,tates to send signals to its adversaries. %ar rom being seen as a proo o 4estern commitment to the security o )ebanon& 0merican intervention was part o the struggle between the 4est and revolutionary 0rab nationalism. the )ebanonist constituency ailed to reali2e that )ebanon was not high on 4ashington!s global priority list. (hey duped themselves into believing that their alliance with the 4estern powers was mutual and strategic. "ow else can one e$plain /hamoun!s anger and bitterness toward the @.,. government when it ultimately abandoned him in avor o his nemesis& Camal 0bd al-7asser<[1D] )i'ewise& the 0rab nationalist/*slamist adherents ell victim to the same misconceptions& and they su ered& li'e their )ebanonist compatriots& rom a similar geostrategic myopia. (he problem was that they digested uncritically the slogans o radical 0rab nationalism emanating rom /airo and Eamascus. (o them& )ebanon had to march with the 0rab caravan whatever the conseBuences and costs. (hey were obsessed with 7asser who became Fin the words o ,hay'h 7adim al-Aisr& a leading opponent o 9resident /hamounG& =to all 0rabs and Moslems& and ob3ect o worship ne$t to Cod.=[11] 0s a result& the lines between national and regional politics blurred. 7ot only did the 0rab /old 4ar play itsel out in )ebanon& but so too did the rivalry between the 0rab 7ationalist Movement and the 4est. (he crisis o 1-58 was a case in point& 7asser!s >gypt was asserting its leadership in the 0rab arena by attempting to punish and subdue regional enemies. *t was also battling the 4estern powers to orce them to recogni2e >gyptian hegemony in the area. *n a sense& 0rab nationalists were pawns sin the >gyptian game o regional and international politics. (hey had a blind aith in the authenticity and historical inevitability o 7asser!s brand o 0rabism and in their own important role in achieving it .(hey never Buestioned the real motives behind >gypt!s drive or 0rab unity or reali2ed that they were being used as tools to achieve 7asser!s ob3ectives. (he irony was that at the height o the 1-58 war 7asser was secretly negotiating with the 0mericans to stri'e a deal. #ne wonders whether the >gyptian leader too' the time to consult with his 3unior allies in 5eirut to get their approval or such a course o action. 0ccording to the e$isting evidence& the answer is no. *n local con licts where the interests o small actors tend to be sacri iced to those o bigger powers& it was no surprise to see that in )ebanon both the )ebanonist and 0rab nationalist constituencies endured the same treatment by their more power ul patrons.

The !enesis of the Lebanese CrisisInternal Ca"ses (he )ebanese con lict& which bro'e out in the spring o 1-58& had internal& regional& and international dimensions& all closely related to one another.[16] *t is only by surveying events in )ebanon up to the 1-58 crisis and e$amining these three dimensions that the )ebanese war can be understood. #n the domestic ront& a struggle or power between the opposition and 9resident /amille /hamoun was polari2ing )ebanese politics and society. /hamoun& a staunchly pro-4estern Maronite politician& was determined to assert his political will at all costs. 0s early as May 1-5.& the /ommander o the )ebanese army& Ceneral %ouad /hehab& privately told @&,. representatives that /hamoun!s =dictatorial= style was driving the opposition into a corner and splitting the political elite across sectarian and religious lines. /hehab contended that he had o ten warned /hamoun against tampering with the parliamentary elections scheduled or Aune 1-5.. 0ccording to the Ceneral& the balance o the system was such that it would not be possible to eliminate opposition.[1H] (his balance between /hristians and Muslims& maintained /hehab& would not allow /hamoun to become a =dictator=. "ence& in the Ceneral!s eyes& the solution lay in a compromise which would save ace or the government and =give the opposition a slice o the cheese.= "e implored his 0merican interlocutors not to view the internal power struggle in )ebanon in terms o >ast-4est rivalry. Most o the men opposed to /hamoun& concluded /hehab& were patriotic )ebanese: =* [,uleiman] %ran3ieh or [+amal] Aoumblat are /ommunists then * am a raid you must consider me one also&= he is reported to have said.[1;] *n a similar vein& the secretary general o the Moslem 7ational #rgani2ation& 0bd al4ahab ?i aIi& in ormed a @.,. o icial that /hamoun!s handling o local political issues and personalities was at the heart o the problem. "e accused /hamoun and Mali' o being egocentric& adding that they =sought to impose their personal convictions upon the people without su icient spadewor'.=[15] (his showed clearly that opposition to /hamoun was broadly based& and included some o the important members o the ruling establishment. (hey blamed the president personally& and argued that his authoritarian approach was responsible or alienating a large segment o the political elite. *n /hehab!s words& /hamoun was the problem.[1:] Civen the level o opposition to his administration& one would have e$pected /hamoun to try to placate his opponents and come to terms with them. 5ut the tenacious president and his combative oreign minister were not prepared to tolerate dissent. (hey were determined to win the battle o wills against the opposition by counting on the physical and political support o the 4estern powers. (heir overestimation o )ebanon!s strategic importance to the 4est and their overcon idence would prove their undoing. (his strategy was translated initially into a resounding victory o the pro-/hamoun orces in the 1-5. parliamentary elections& which urther polari2ed )ebanese political li e. (he opposition bitterly contested the magnitude and legality o the government !s triumph& and alleged that /hamoun wanted to amend the constitution so that he could be re-elected. (he president!s re usal to publicly deny these allegations convinced his opponents and supporters ali'e o his intention to see' a second term& and both the

/*0 and the @.,. embassy in 5eirut concluded that /hamoun had i$ed the elections in such a way as to ensure his re-election.[1.] (he opposition also accused 4ashington o inancing the pro-/hamoun candidates. (here was some truth in this charge. (he main /*0 contact with /hamoun& 4ilbur >veland& claimed that the /*0 provided !massive! unding to the pro-government deputies& and he portrayed the elections as a /*0-run operation.[18] 0ccording to >veland& the @nited ,tates did so in the 'nowledge that the new parliament would elect a new president in 1-58. 0lthough no speci ic @.,. documents relating to 4ashington!s in luence on the elections have been released yet& recently declassi ied sources hinted that the @nited ,tates =played an active role.= (hey also showed that %oreign Minister Mali' sought 0merican assistance to in luence the results o the elections.[1-] Regional Ca"ses *t would be misleading& however& to thin' o the )ebanese crisis as simply an internal struggle or power& or as a clash o temperaments and personalities. *nternal dissatis action with /hamoun was ueled mainly by the government!s pursuit o regional and international policies which were seen to be provocative and divisive. *n the second hal o the 1-5Ds the polari2ation o the 0rab world e$acerbated internal divisions within )ebanon. (wo currents were competing or in luence and dominance on the Middle >ast scene: while 7asser!s >gypt led the revolutionary pan-0rab nationalist movement& *raB& representing the pro-4estern 0rab states& spearheaded the conservative opposition to >gypt!s Buest or regional dominance. (he >gyptian-*raBi rivalry poisoned inter-0rab relations& and the lames o the 0rab /old 4ar engul ed the regional order. )ebanon was no e$ception. /hamoun!s pro-*raBi policy mani ested itsel in his lirting with the idea o 3oining the 5aghdad pact& which antagoni2ed >gypt and later ,yria. 7ot only did 7asser and /hamoun hold con licting views on the ma3or issues that divided the 0rab world& but they also had a serious clash o personalities.[6D] /hamoun!s stand on other regional issues added urther to the straining o relations between >gypt-,yria and )ebanon& and the deepening o )ebanese internal divisions. 4hen 5ritain and %rance invaded >gypt in 1-5:& /hamoun re used to sever diplomatic relations with the two >uropean powers. !(he rulers o )ebanon&= 7asser declared later& !stabbed us in the bac' during our time o stress.=[61] Euring the ,yrian crisis o 1-5.& /hamoun and Mali' received the @.,. envoy& )oy "enderson& without consulting ,yria. Mali' e$horted the >isenhower administration to topple the ,yrian regime. "e told "enderson that -pro-4estern )ebanon could not coe$ist with a neutralist or communist-oriented ,yria: =,ooner or later one or the other must disappear.=[66] *n return& the ,yrian oreign ministry denounced /hamoun or serving !imperialistic and Jionist designs.=[6H] (he )ebanese president was not deterred& however. "e perceived radical 0rab nationalism as a threat to the regional conservative order o which )ebanon was an integral part. /hamoun and Mali' were prepared to ta'e ris'y decisions to combat the rise o 7asser!s pan-0rabism. %or e$ample& when in %ebruary 1-58 >gypt and ,yria

united to orm the @nited 0rab ?epublic F@0?G& /hamoun initially re used to recogni2e the new entity.[6;] 7either the president nor his oreign minister seemed to ta'e much account o the domestic implications o pursuing an anti->gyptian policy. *nstead& they swam against the current o public opinion& thus undermining the bases o their political legitimacy.[65] (he opposition resented /hamoun!s lu'ewarm attitude toward the @0?. 0 ter the conclusion o the union& Eamascus became a virtual pilgrimage site or many )ebanese politicians and citi2ens wishing to pay homage to 7asser. (he spea'er o the )ebanese parliament& 0dil @sayran& declared that =)ebanon will march with the 0rab caravan& and anyone who thin's o wor'ing or interests other than those o the 0rabs will have no room in )ebanon.=[6:] *n their 2eal or 0rab unity under 7asser& Muslim demonstrators trampled the )ebanese lag in the streets o (yre.[6.] Civen the diametrically opposed views o the )ebanonist and 0rab nationalist/*slamist constituencies& the stage was set or a con rontation in which each side sought e$ternal support to consolidate its position. 4hile /hamoun and Mali' courted 4ashington& the opposition welcomed with open arms >gyptian and ,yrian political and material assistance. 5oth sides played a dangerous game: they mortgaged the uture o their country to oreign creditors. International Ca"ses /hamoun!s pursuit o a pronounced pro-4estern policy only compounded his di iculties internally and regionally. "e& Mali'& and 9rime Minister ,ami ,olh tied )ebanon!s ortunes to 0merican policy in the Middle >ast. (heir strategy could have been bene icial but or the steady deterioration o relations between the 4est and the orces o revolutionary 0rab nationalism since the mid-1-5Ds. (his development con ronted the /hamoun government with a problematic choice.[68] 5eirut had to choose between a close association with 4ashington& thus ris'ing domestic instability and regional isolation& and a low-'ey and neutral approach in order to appease pan0rab nationalist orces. /hamoun hoped to preempt the opposition by aligning )ebanese oreign policy with that o the @nited ,tates. /hamoun and Mali' Buic'ly sei2ed on the >isenhower Eoctrine to reBuest @.,. military assistance. *t was Mali'& rather than /hamoun& who was the driving orce behind )ebanon!s active alignment o its oreign policy with 4ashington.[6-] >ven be ore /ongress approved the doctrine in March 1-5.& Mali' in ormed >isenhower that )ebanon welcomed his initiative and was ready to combat communist subversion in the region. "e also asserted that >gypt and ,yria were gradually alling under ,oviet domination. =*t [is] essential&= added Mali'& =that political change ta'e place in ,yria and >gypt.=[HD] 4ith the e$ception o )ibya& )ebanon was the only 0rab country o icially to endorse the doctrine. (he other pro-4estern 0rab governments recogni2ed the inherent danger in such a move. /hamoun!s opponents believed that& by aligning )ebanon with the 4est against >gypt and ,yria& the president had violated not only 5eirut!s traditional neutrality but also the delicate balance among the various )ebanese actions. 0s two o the opposition leaders& +amal Aunblat and ,hay'h Aisr& put it& the

1-58& intifada was a direct response to oreign in luence and to )ebanon!s dependence on the 4est.[H1] More than any other issue& )ebanon!s international alignment and its estrangement rom the 0rab old brought the crisis to a head. (his re lected the )ebanonist and 0rab nationalist constituencies! contradictory perceptions and irreconcilable di erences over )ebanon!s relationship with its environment. The Sho#do#n (he scene was thus set or a con rontation between the regime and the opposition. (he balance o power was clearly not in /hamoun!s avor since Ceneral /hehab re used to commit the army on the president!s side. (he Ceneral was opposed to involving the army in an internal struggle lest it be torn apart by the contradictions o )ebanese politics. *n discussions with @.,. representatives. /hehab &could not hide his =sincere disgust= with /hamoun and his collaborators.[H6] (he neutrali2ation o the army was important in two respects. %irst& it e$posed basic divisions within the )ebanese government and the precarious position o /hamoun himsel . ,econd& it enabled the opposition& with material and political assistance rom the @0?& to e$pand and consolidate its presence in large areas o the country. /hamoun was orced to rely on local militias and on the police or resistance. (o him& this was not a viable option since he was not interested in a stalemate. /hamoun needed to de eat his opponents and their regional sponsors& and or this he reBuired the intervention o a superior 4estern orce. 0s tensions increased in the early months o 1-58& /hamoun and his government tried to emphasi2e the e$ternal nature o the crisis and to impress on 4ashington the need or decisive action. (hey portrayed the con lict as a struggle between pro-4estern )ebanon and radical 0rab nationalism& which was allied with communism.[HH] *n three separate statements in May& /hamoun& ,olh& and Mali' accused the @0? o inter ering in )ebanon!s internal a airs with the intention o overthrowing its democratically-elected government. 5eleaguered at home& /hamoun and Mali' began loo'ing or outside support. *n his meetings with @.,. o icials& Mali' lamented the incapacity o the 4est to deal with the communist threat. 5y emphasi2ing the e$ternal menace and by playing the /old 4ar card& /hamoun and Mali' wanted to internationali2e the dispute and involve the 0mericans on their side. *n contrast& the opposition was adamantly against the internationali2ation o the crisis since the con iguration o orces was in their avor. *n contrast to /hamoun& they asserted that the roots o the con lict were internal and had nothing to do with the ambitions o the @0?. 7evertheless& they relied heavily on the moral and physical support o the @0?.[H;] 0t the end o may 1-58 the )ebanese government lodged two complaints against the @0? be ore the 0rab )eague and the @7 ,ecurity /ouncil. (o /hamoun and Mali'& however& the )eague was not eBuipped to resolve the crisis. *nstead& they ocused their e orts on the ,ecurity /ouncil& which voted to send an observer team to )ebanon.[H5] 5y mid-May& 7asser bro'e his silence and denied any responsibility or events in )ebanon. "e accused /hamoun o trying to convert a purely internal a air into an e$ternal problem in order to =deceive the 5ig 9owers and induce them to

intervene.= *n the meantime& the !oice of the Arabs radio station& a mouthpiece o the >gyptian government& was attac'ing /hamoun and calling on the )ebanese people to topple him.[H:] The Initial $%S% Res onse ?ecently declassi ied 0merican documents show clearly that& initially& @.,. o icials disagreed in their assessment o the )ebanese crisis. (hree points o view can be discerned: the irst& shared by >isenhower and Eulles& argued that the problem in )ebanon was =/ommunistic in origin.= (o them& 0merica!s in luence and presence inn the Middle >ast were at a critical point since the @,,? was instigating instability throughout the region. >isenhower wrote later: =5ehind everything was our deepseated conviction that the communists were principally responsible or the trouble.=[H.] 0 second view established a connection between radical 0rab nationalism and communism& thus emphasi2ing the destabili2ing role o the @0?. (he =/ommunist incitement to revolt= was lin'ed closely with 7asser!s e orts to destabili2e the pro4estern regimes in the Middle >ast including )ebanon. >gyptian and ,yrian aid to the )ebanese opposition reported @.,. representatives in 5eirut& was prolonging and aggravating the situation. 0ccording to this view& 7asser!s latest o ensive was designed to in lict ma$imum damage on 4estern prestige in the area.[H8] *n contrast& a third view held by 0merican o icials argued that the crisis was political1 in nature. *n their eyes )ebanon was not threatened by e$ternal aggression& since the @0?& which had con ined its activities to propaganda& was not a member o the ,ocialist bloc. %or e$ample& the @., ambassador to 5eirut& ?obert Mc/lintoc' &saw largely domestic political causes at the heart o the con lict. (o him& Buestions o oreign policy were less important than Buestions o personality.[H-] "owever& this was a minority opinion within the @.,. administration. 5e ore the escalation o the crisis in early May& the @.,. government was orthcoming in its commitment to /hamoun!s policies and even with regard to his Buest or reelection.[;D] (his represented a low-ris' strategy or 4ashington since political discontent had not erupted yet into an allout rebellion against the /hamoun regime. 0s the situation urther deteriorated ollowing the assassination o a leading opposition 3ournalist& 7assib al-Matni& the >isenhower administration reconsidered its previous underta'ing to )ebanon. (he intensity o the riots which bro'e out in the country sobered @.,. o icials. (he latter recogni2ed the inherent danger getting entangled in internal )ebanese politics& which would have pitted them against the orces o radical 0rab nationalism. *t was within this conte$t that Mc/lintoc' advocated the adoption o a cautious @.,. approach to the )ebanese crisis& unless =we desire to use the )ebanon issue as a means or carrying out a conscious policy o enmity toward 7asser and the @0? with a view to splitting o ,yria and trying a !neo-,ue2! against 7asser.=[;1] 5ut >isenhower and Eulles were not prepared to ris' a con rontation with the @0? over )ebanon. 0merican o icials did not see )ebanon as intrinsically important in itsel . /hamoun and Mali'& to their dismay& later discovered this truth& and it shattered their

somewhat idealistic view o the 4est. 0ccordingly& on May 1H& in response to a tentative reBuest by 5eirut or possible @.,. intervention& Mc/lintoc' was instructed to in orm /hamoun that 4ashington considered the introduction o 0merican orces into )ebanon as a !grave= step which could have the most serious and ar-reaching conseBuences. 0t this stage& the 0mericans were uneasy about military intervention. (he sta'es were low and the potential political costs very high. (he @.,. administration impressed on /hamoun the need to rely on his own resources to resolve the con lict. 0merican o icials hoped that /hamoun could still deal with the evolving crisis by putting his house in order. [;6] (he consensus in 4ashington was that armed intervention could have regional repercussions which would be inimical to 4estern interests. %or e$ample& during a 7ational ,ecurity meeting& the director o the @.,. *n ormation 0gency& Ceorge 0llen& warned against the sending o 0merican troops because this would be regarded as an intervention on behal o the /hristian community. 0s he put it: =(he )ebanese had or so many years tended too much to place reliance on the protection o outside powers - the (ur's& the %rench& the 5ritish& and& lately& ourselves.= *nstead& 0llen concluded& the )ebanese should depend on themselves or protection.[;H] *n response to a lowering o tension towards the end o may& Eulles stated publicly that the administration did not consider )ebanon to be threatened by international communism under present conditions.[;;] 0lthough the @.,. airli ted police arms to 5eirut and moved elements o the ,i$th %leet to the eastern Mediterranean& 0merican o icials were reluctant to commit themselves to any decisive action. Meanwhile& Moscow!s initial response to the )ebanon crisis was limited and con ined to rhetoric. 0n o icial ,oviet statement protested the dangerous attempts by oreign powers to inter ere in )ebanon!s internal a airs. 4estern intervention& warned the statement& could result in =serious conseBuences= or the uture o peace in the Middle >ast.[;5] Moscow did not& however& underta'e an active diplomatic -o ensive in )ebanon as it had done during the ,yrian crisis the previous year.[;:] (his re lected the marginal position which )ebanon occupied in ,oviet policy& and indicated that ,oviet o icials did not see their vital interests to be involved there. 5y mid-Aune the security situation in )ebanon too' a turn or the worse. /hamoun instructed Mali' to re-inBuire whether the @.,. would be willing& i reBuested& to send troops to 5eirut. Mali' impressed on 0merican o icials the urgency o the situation and put them on notice that a reBuest or intervention might be imminent. "e emphasi2ed the e$ternal dimension o the crisis by accusing 7asserism and communism o unleashing their ury upon )ebanon. Mali' told Eulles that the con lict transcended the boundaries o )ebanon to encompass the Middle >ast as a whole. *t was a contest& he asserted& between /hamoun and the 4est on the one side& and 7asser and the >astern bloc on the other1 hence the real ight was between capitalism and communism. 4estern e orts to tac'le the crisis& concluded Mali'& should not be restricted to )ebanon1 they should be broad enough to resolve the underlying problems in the region.[;.] (he >isenhower administration held a serious o meetings at the highest levels to

discuss /hamoun latest overtures and de ine a course o action toward )ebanon. (he consensus in 4ashington was still against intervention. >isenhower doubted that intervention could be 3usti ied under the >isenhower Eoctrine& which was directed only against e$ternal aggression - an admission that the causes o the crisis were internal.. he elt that the @nited ,tates should be sub3ected to the same criticism that its >uropean allies had aced during their invasion o ,ue2. >isenhower lamented the lac' o strong leadership and the deep divisions within the )ebanese ruling elite: thus he =had little& i any& enthusiasm or our intervening at this time.=[;8] Eulles echoed >isenhower!s opinion by noting that to intervene at this point would be catastrophic to @.,. allies and interests in the Middle >ast. ,uch an action& he added& should ta'e into account the divisiveness o )ebanese politics and the general wea'ness o the pro-4estern governments in the region. "e was particularly worried about the unstable "ashemite monarchy in 5aghdad. Eulles suggested that 4ashington must pressure the )ebanese into solving their problems themselves and induce /hamoun to ma'e concessions. "e was blunt with Mali': /hamoun should be under no illusion that by inviting the @.,. to intervene he could win the battle against 7asser1 = on the contrary& he would lose it.= *n other words& the @nited ,tates was not prepared to ight 7asser and the orces o 0rabism to please 5eirut.[;-] *n act& @.,. o icials were secretly negotiating with 7asser to ind a solution to the )ebanese crisis. (his amounted to an implicit recognition by 4ashington o the >gyptian leader!s transnational status and power in the 0rab world. 0t the end o may& 7asser approached the >isenhower administration and o ered to use his in luence to help end the con lict. 0 series o meetings too' place in /airo between 7asser and the @.,. ambassador. 5ut when the ,tate Eepartment communicated to /hamoun the outline o the >gyptian leader!s proposal& /hamoun re3ected it out o hand. "e re used to accept any compromise that would signal the end o his political career. 4hat was pu22ling was that 0merican o icials did not even attempt to convince /hamoun o the merits o 7asser!s plan as a starting point or negotiations. (hey dismissed the proposal as a ploy to impose a solution =not desired by )ebanon.= (he irony was that two months later the >isenhower administration would use the terms o the >gyptian plan as the basis or a settlement o the )ebanese crisis.[5D] #n Aune 1-& Eulles reBuested Mc/lintoc' to urge /hamoun to do everything in his power to avoid a situation in which a reBuest or intervention might be reBuired. (he ambassador told /hamoun that sending 4estern troops to 5eirut would not solve the present crisis. *nstead& it would have the opposite e ect and arouse popular eelings which could destabili2e and possibly overthrow the moderate 0rab regimes1 it could even lead to =)ebanon!s ultimate territorial partition or truncation.= (his would result in the wea'ening o the 4estern position and an increase in the prestige and in luence o 7asser.[51] /hamoun was not convinced by these arguments. (o him& a political solution was unattainable because& he believed& the initiative was no longer in the hands o local leaders1 7asser now was the driving orce behind the rebellion. "e le t it to his oreign minister& however& to articulate the regime!s position. Meeting with Eulles on Aune HD& Mali' reiterated the view that the main cause o the con lict was not internal1 it had a larger dimension. * )ebanese independence were undermined& he noted& other

1D

pro-4estern governments would collapse: =)ebanon is holding the di'e and this is a battle not or )ebanon alone but [ or] the 4est. * )ebanon goes& the 4est will go down too.=[56] Mali' argued that neither 7asser nor his pro-)ebanese sympathi2ers were interested in a political compromise. 0t any rate& he added& /hamoun was not prepared to ma'e any concessions because he believed that 7asser should not be permitted to have a say in )ebanon!s domestic and oreign a airs: =/hamoun will ight this battle until he wins or collapses because this is a battle or reedom and or stability and peace in the Middle >ast. *t transcends )ebanese interests.=[5H] (he apocalyptic language and the absolute terms in which Mali' portrayed the con lict re lected a desire on his part to entice the 4est to intervene militarily in the crisis. 5ut on a higher level& it also e$pressed an in lated conviction o the signi icance o )ebanon on the 4estern strategic chessboard. Ket how realistic were Mali'!s claims< 0nd to what e$tent was the survival o the 4est really and ine$tricably lin'ed to the survival o )ebanon< Eulles& or one& was not impressed by Mali'!s presentation. Military intervention would be =disastrous&= he told his )ebanese counterpart. 5y now& 0merican o icials were beginning to see /hamoun as the ma3or obstacle to a peace ul settlement since he was =stubbornly unwilling to ta'e those last measures o personal sacri ice which might assure a political compromise averting his own de eat. =*t was in this conte$t that Eulles proposed to Mali' the need to thin' seriously about a successor to /hamoun.[5;] ,oon& however& bloody developments in *raB would prompt 0merican policy-ma'ers to Buestion their initial doubts about intervening in the Middle >ast& and cause them to pursue a contrary course o action. The Ira&i Re'ol"tion /onservative 0rab rulers were worried about the escalation o the )ebanese crisis and the increased strength o the pro-7asser orces there. 7o one was more an$ious than the *raBi prime minister& 7uri al-,aid& who was aware o the precarious position o the *raBi monarchy. (he struggle over the 5aghdad 9act had convinced him that everything in the 0rab order was interlin'ed. 9olitical survival in 0rab politics reBuired a constant balancing and counterbalancing act. "ence& in *raBi eyes& an >gyptian victory in )ebanon would urther contribute to the isolation o 5aghdad in 0rab circles. ,uch a shi t in the regional balance o power would threaten the survival o the conservative 0rab regimes. Civen the wea' oundations on which their rule was built& the "ashemites in *raB would be the irst to collapse. *nevitably& there ore& 7uri al-,aid too' the lead in trying to devise ways to support /hamoun. 0ccording to the @.,. 0mbassador to *raB& 4aldemar Callman& 7uri e$pressed his dismay with 4ashington ailure to adopt a positive approach toward /hamoun. "e implored the 4est to ta'e the initiative in actively supporting the beleaguered )ebanese president. %urthermore& 7uri in ormed /hamoun that *raB and Aordan were willing to conclude a de ensive military or political agreement with )ebanon. 5ritain also supported an *raBi-)ebanese de ense lin'.[55] *raBi o icials encouraged /hamoun to stand irm and re use to ma'e any concessions to the opposition. =(hey

11

assured him that )ebanon could rely on 4estern intervention as a last resort& *raB went urther and publicly attac'ed 7asser& accusing him o using communist methods o subversion rom within in order to control the 0rab world. (o demonstrate their determination to help /hamoun& members o the 5aghdad pact scheduled a meeting in *stanbul on Auly 1; to discuss& primarily& the )ebanese crisis.[5:] 5ut in the early hours o that day& a group o army o icers& led by 0bd al-+arim Lasim& moved on 5aghdad and overthrew the "ashemite royal amily. (wo decades o unpopular policies had antagoni2ed large segments in the army and society& and the old order was swi tly demolished.[5.] The (estern Res onse:Inter'ention in Lebanon and )ordan (he revolution in 5aghdad shoc'ed 4estern leaders and too' them completely by surprise. *t also delivered a devastating blow to the 5ritish position in the Middle >ast& since *raB was the last ma3or bastion o 5ritish in luence in the region. *n @.,. eyes& the de ection o 5aghdad rom the pro-4estern camp threatened to wea'en the region!s de enses and undermine the security o the conservative 0rab regimes. 5y its adherence to the 5aghdad 9act& *raB was the only 0rab state to align itsel openly with the west against ,oviet communism. 0s >isenhower put it& *raB =was the country that we were counting on heavily as a bulwar' o stability and progress in the region.=[58] *n other words& the @nited ,tates could not a ord to be passive. (he coup in *raB posed a direct threat to 4ashington!s interests and to its allies in the region. 9anic'ing leaders in )ebanon& Aordan& and ,audi 0rabia urged the @.,. to act orce ully to contain the revolutionary currents sweeping their societies. (o /hamoun& the *raBi revolution signaled a broad o ensive by 7asser& with ,oviet bac'ing& to unseat all pro-4estern 0rab governments. 0ccordingly& a ew hours a ter the coup& he summoned Mc/lintoc' and reBuested 4ashington!s prompt military intervention. "e said he would interpret the administration!s intentions by its deeds rather than by its rhetoric.[5-] )i'ewise& +ing "ussein met the @.,. representative in 0mman with a similar reBuest. +ing ,aud also contacted the >isenhower administration and as'ed or 4estern intervention in Aordan& )ebanon& and *raB. @nless the 4est acted decisively& ,aud warned& the @.,. and 5ritain would be inished as ma3or powers in the Middle >ast1 ,audi 0rabia also would be orced to acBuiesce in 7asser!s ambitions - a veiled threat that ,aud would realign his regional and oreign policies.[:D] #n Auly 1;& >isenhower held a series o meetings with his cabinet the 7,/& and congressional leaders to ormulate @.,. strategy. (o >isenhower& the *raBi revolution changed @.,. ob3ectives rom stabili2ing a precarious situation in )ebanon to preventing the possibility o =a complete elimination o 4estern in luence in the Middle >ast.= Eulles& echoing the sentiments o the pro-4estern 0rab leaders& stated that the real authority behind the new *raBi regime was 7asser& and that behind 7asser was the ,oviet @nion. (he ear o a domino e ect was high in the minds o 0merican o icials& and /*0 Eirector 0llen Eulles warned that the coup would set up a chain reaction which would endanger the survival o the conservative 0rab regimes.[:1] >isenhower seemed to have made up his mind about the necessity o ta'ing strong

16

action to avoid the collapse o the whole 4estern security structure. "e told the 7,/ that =we must act or get out o the Middle >ast entirely.= ,ecretary o ,tate Eulles concurred with the president. "e said that @.,. prestige and credibility were at sta'e not only in the Middle >ast but throughout the world.[:6] @.,. o icials believed that the @nited ,tates must provide a psychological boost to its riends in the area by asserting itsel militarily. (he consensus within the administration was that to do nothing would be disastrous to 4ashington!s interests and to its local allies. *n a 'ey meeting attended by the heads o the Eepartments o ,tate and Ee ense and the /*0& the conseBuences o @.,. inaction were summari2ed as ollows: F1G 7asser would dominate the whole 0rab arena1 F6G 4ashington would lose in luence throughout the area& and its military bases there would be in 3eopardy1 and FHG the reliability o @.,. commitments would be brought into Buestion around the world. [:H] (o 0merican leaders& the crisis and its implications were not con ined to the Middle >ast. (hey saw the con lict in broader& global terms through the prism o their rivalry with the ,oviet @nion.[:;] (o them radical 0rab nationalism was supported and had been penetrated by communism& and 7asser was no more than an instrument in the hands o the ,oviet @nion. Eulles went urther& comparing 7asser and his pan0rabism with "itler and his pan-Cermanism.[:5] (he connection was thus easily established between /airo!s involvement in the )ebanese and *raBi crises and the +remlin!s indirect aggression. (he hidden hand o Moscow was seen to be pulling the strings. Ket& there was no hard evidence to implicate Moscow. Euring their deliberations over the Buestion o whether 4ashington should intervene or not& however& 0merican policy ma'ers were not terribly concerned about )ebanon. 0s Eulles put it& )ebanon was =not very important in itsel =1[::] it was no more than a battleground where the @nited ,tates could assert its leadership against radical 0rab nationalism and communism. Mc/lintoc' was not even sure about this& however. 0 ter his meeting with /hamoun on Auly 1;& the ambassador advised his superiors against intervention1 such a decision could only be ta'en in light o broader political and strategic concerns a ecting the 0merican position in the whole region. =,o ar as )ebanon alone is concerned&= added the ambassador& =we cannot as o midday discern need or so portentous a step.=[:.] Ket having concluded that intervention in )ebanon was necessary to pro3ect 0merican military power and political will& 4ashington sent @.,. marines to 5eirut on Auly 151 meanwhile& 5ritish troops were dispatched to Aordan. Moscow and /airo were the two main targets o the @.,. action. 5y engaging militarily& the >isenhower administration hoped to orce the ,oviets to put a bra'e on 7asser!s drive. *n a meeting o the 7,/& Eulles said that the real problem in the Middle >ast was not 7asser but the +remlin!s unwillingness to limit his actions. (o Eulles& i ,oviet leaders could be persuaded that 7asser!s policies could lead to war& they would surely act to restrain him.[:8] 0t the heart o @.,. thin'ing lay a misperception that 7asser was Moscow!s man rather than his own. 0merican o icials erred both in accusing the >gyptian leader o engineering the coup in 5aghdad and in e$aggerating ,oviet in luence on him& and a ew months later events would prove them wrong. Lasim!s *raB asserted its independence rom 7asser and e ected the irst ma3or split in the 0rab revolutionary movement. /oncurrently& a heated and bitter propaganda campaign erupted between

1H

/airo and Moscow& thus shattering the myth o 7asser!s subservience to the ,oviet @nion. (he problem with @.,. policy was that it loo'ed at the Middle >ast through the lenses o the /old 4ar rather than in terms o its own internal dynamics. (his distorted 0merican perceptions o regional politics and complicated 4ashington!s relations with the 0rabs. *ronically& the ,oviet @nion was the main bene iciary o this policy. 0lthough @.,. o icials had discounted the possibility o ,oviet counter-action& they re used to sanction a military operation in *raB. 4hile the 5ritish advocated a ullscale armed campaign to clean up the whole area& >isenhower was unwilling to go along. "e was aware o the political and military implications inherent in such a move. @.,. o icials recogni2ed the utility o promoting a counter-revolution in 5aghdad& since =the situation in *raB was hopeless.=[:-] %urthermore& in deliberating whether or not to intervene in )ebanon& @.,. o icials could not neglect the possibility o a ,oviet reaction. (he balance o terror had served to in luence the superpowers against precipitate acts. (hey would sooner neglect their local allies than endanger the international balance o power. @.,. strategy was also designed to avoid a costly con rontation with radical 0rab nationalism. ?obert Murphy& who was sent to )ebanon as >isenhower!s personal representative& visited >gypt and *raB and assured 7asser and Lasim that 4ashington had no intention o attac'ing their countries. "e made it clear that the @.,. was 'een on maintaining good relations with the 0rab nationalist movement. Moreover& the administration reported its intervention in )ebanon to the @7 ,ecurity /ouncil and stated its willingness to cooperate with the @7 to acilitate the withdrawal o @.,. orces.[.D] 5y promptly dispatching a presidential envoy to the region& 4ashington signaled its interest in a political solution. *ndeed& during their deliberations& 0merican decisionma'ers displayed a realistic appreciation o the limits o orce. (hey believed that armed intervention was unli'ely to provide a Buic' and easy answer to the problems o )ebanon or the Middle >ast. *n their opinion& using 4estern troops to stem the tide o nationalism would simply not wor'. =4e have no illusion&= noted Eulles& =that this response will solve the problems o that area - in act it may ma'e them worse.= (his view served to limit @.,. ob3ectives to the restoration o political stability in )ebanon.[.1] 0ccordingly& while in )ebanon Murphy opened a channel o communication with all the warring )ebanese actions. *n his meeting with the opposition leaders& Murphy reassured them that @.,. intervention was not designed to prop up /hamoun or to impose a settlement.[.6] (his was a clear signal rom 4ashington that /hamoun was dispensable. Murphy!s discussions with )ebanese politicians led him to report to >isenhower that =much o the con lict concerned personalities. /ommunism was playing no direct or substantial part in the insurrection. (he outside in luences came mostly rom ,yria and >gypt.=[.H] (he importance o recogni2ing this was that 4ashington could now deal directly with the internal sources o con lict in )ebanon. *ts e orts would no longer be diverted by ocusing on an imaginary communist threat. 5y placing the crisis in its own conte$t&

1;

@.,. o icials would ind the contending parties amenable to a political compromise. "ence the main 'ey to a solution o the )ebanese pu22le lay in addressing and smoothing over the clashing views and claims o the government and the opposition. 5y coming to terms with this reality. 4ashington was able to acilitate a settlement in 5eirut. *g+ tian and So'iet Res onses 7asser heard about the *raBi coup and the subseBuent 0merican and 5ritish intervention in )ebanon and Aordan while visiting (ito in Kugoslavia. "e was concerned mainly that 4ashington would use the (ur'ish military machine to crush the new regime in 5aghdad and threaten Eamascus. *n contrast& )ebanon did not igure very highly in 7asser!s thin'ing. *n 7asser!s view& the @,,? was the only power capable o counter-balancing 4ashington. (he >gyptian leader decided to leave Kugoslavia and go to Moscow to consult with ,oviet leaders and ascertain whether he could rely on them in the event o con rontation with the 4est. 7asser urged +hrushchev to prevent any 4estern or (ur'ish move against *raB or ,yria by delivering an ultimatum to the 4est.[.;] "is reBuest was re used. =%ran'ly&= +hrushchev was reported to have told him& =we are not ready or a con rontation./ 4e are not ready or 4orld 4ar (hree.=. "e emphasi2ed that >gypt would have to move with the tide because Eulles was determined to get his way. "owever& the ,oviets had to do something to molli y their 0rab riends. 0s a gesture o solidarity& Moscow ordered general troop maneuvers on the 5ulgarian-(ur'ish border.[.5] +hrushchev also privately warned >isenhower against attac'ing *raB. ,uch an eventuality& he implied& would trigger a =world con lict.=[.:] 0lthough 7asser le t Moscow empty handed& +hrushchev!s symbolic act o ordering troop maneuvers enabled the >gyptian leader to use the ,oviet card in his propaganda campaign. 0s soon as he arrived in Eamascus& he announced to the crowds that the ,oviet @nion was = ully behind us.= ?hetoric aside& however& /airo!s and Moscow!s responses were very restrained and 7asser!s options were limited. 7asser!s meeting with +hrushchev came as a real awa'ening to him. "e could barely de end his interests& and ar less mount a credible resistance to the 4estern powers& without active ,oviet participation. *n the post-world 4ar ** era& one o the implicit rules governing @.,.-,oviet relations was the avoidance o a direct armed clash. *t was one thing to threaten the 5ritish& the %rench& and the *sraelis& as Moscow had done during the ,ue2 crisis& but Buite another to threaten a superpower. ,oviet leaders would not orce themselves into a corner lest 4ashington call their blu 1 superpower miscalculation could lead to global war. )ocal actors& who deluded themselves into believing otherwise did so at their peril. )i'e 7uri and /hamoun& 7asser did not seem to have learned this important lesson. (he ultimate mani estation o this misunderstanding was 7asser!s behavior during the >gyptian-*sraeli crisis o 1-:.& when his gamble on superpower support would prove disastrous. ,oviet strategy toward the )ebanese crisis was similar to that which was adopted during the ,ue2 and ,yrian con licts& its purpose being to orce the 4est to recogni2e the ,oviet presence and role in the region. *n other words& Moscow wanted to li t the

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4estern veto on its participation in Middle >astern diplomacy. (o do so reBuired an active approach which would& on the sur ace& champion the rights o 0rab states while& in essence& see'ing a compromise with 4ashington. *n a letter to >isenhower on Auly 1-& +hrushchev called or a summit con erence o the ive ma3or powers in the @7 security /ouncil& with the participation o the @7 secretary general& to see' a comprehensive solution to Middle >ast problems.[..] 0 great power summit would allow Moscow to become an integral part o any regional settlement. 4ashington would not tolerate this& however. *t was determined to e$clude Moscow rom Middle >astern diplomacy and& inevitably& >isenhower re3ected +hrushchev!s proposal. (he two leaders then engaged in a bitter and hostile e$change o letters.[.8] 0s a result o superpower bic'ering& the @7 ,ecurity /ouncil could not ind a ormula to end the crisis. +hrushchev and >isenhower inally reached a compromise to place the )ebanese dispute be ore the @7 Ceneral 0ssembly.[.-] 0gain& no agreement could be reached on any dra t resolution introduced by other members& and the result was a stalemate. (he stalemate was bro'en in 0ugust& however& when the 0rab states sponsored their own resolution which was unanimously adopted by the @7. (his showed that despite the intensity o the 0rab /old 4ar& inter-0rab euds could still be tac'led success ully within a regional ramewor'. (he ,oviet @nion emerged as a passive player throughout the )ebanese crisis. *t had neither the military capabilities nor the will to con ront the @nited ,tates. (he events in )ebanon proved beyond any doubt that 4ashington was the dominant actor in the Middle >ast. (he main challenges to the 4estern powers emanated rom the region itsel rather than rom any e$ternal sources. Moscow!s role was secondary. Meanwhile& Murphy!s mediation e orts among the )ebanese actions bore ruit. 4ith @.,. bac'ing& Ceneral /hehab emerged as the consensus candidate or the presidency. %rom the outset 4ashington was 'een on /hehab as the successor to /hamoun since he was =immune to the charge o being orced on )ebanon with 0merican bayonets.=[8D] 0t the end o Auly he was elected president& and in #ctober the ,tate Eepartment announced that 0merican troops would be completely withdrawn rom 5eirut by the end o the month.[81] (his withdrawal mar'ed the end o the )ebanese crisis. Concl"sion (his paper has tried to show how the in lated sel -images held by the )ebanonist and 0rab/*slamist constituencies distorted their view o oreign a airs and led them to over-estimate their own and )ebanon!s importance in the world. (hese images blinded them to the realities o power politics and to the inconseBuential role played by )ebanon in the international system. 7ewly declassi ied @.,. documents show that during the crisis o 1-58& ar rom being strategically indispensable to the 4est& )ebanon too' a bac' seat in @.,. strategy. (o 0merican o icials& the signi icance o )ebanon ebbed and lowed depending on their perception and calculation o broader @.,. regional and global interests. 5e ore the *raBi revolution& the >isenhower administration was not inclined to send troops to 5eirut. *n the a termath o the overthrow o the "ashemites in *raB& however& @.,. policyma'ers changed their

1:

minds& and )ebanon acBuired a temporary special status in the >ast-4est struggle. [86] 4hile /hamoun and his adversaries enticed e$ternal actors to intervene on their behal & they lost sight o the act that the e$ternal actors were using them as pro$ies to ight their own wars. *nstead& )ebanon was turned into a theater o the /old 4ar. %or e$ample& /hamoun and Mali' reBuested 4estern intervention to counterbalance what they perceived to be an >gyptian-,yrian attempt to unseat them. (hey hoped to use the 4est to strengthen their own ran's and de eat their opponents. (hey had no appreciation& however& o the limits o )ebanon!s power and in luence in relation to >gypt!s and ,yria!s. *n @.,. eyes& /airo& not 5eirut& was the nerve center o the 0rab world. "ere lies the e$planation behind 4ashington!s unresponsiveness to /hamoun!s repeated initial reBuests to intervene militarily on his behal and put an end to the insurrection against his regime. *n the inal analysis& 0merican o icials sacri iced /hamoun at the altar o their wider regional interests. 0 ter dispatching the marines to 5eirut& 4ashington saw /hamoun as a liability& and so ignored him and dealt directly with /hehab and the opposition. >veland drew an illuminating picture o 4ashington!s contempt or the )ebanese president& and Mc/lintoc' and Murphy were less than cordial to /hamoun. "e was bluntly told not to count on @.,. support since 4ashington would not do his wor' or him. ,mall wonder that /hamoun elt bitter toward the administration or the way it had treated him. "e believed that& in the end& 4ashington had deserted him to appease 7asser& when all the while he had seen himsel as ighting on behal o the 4est against the 'ind o radical 0rab nationalism propounded by the >gyptian leader.[8H] )i'e the monarchists in *raB& /hamoun had e$pected the 4est to sustain and maintain his regime in power. (his miscalculation casts light on the nature o the relationship between small and large states. *n their dealings with the @nited ,tates& )ebanese and *raBi leaders behaved as i they were strategically indispensable to 4estern security. (hey also had a blind aith in the capability and reach o their superpower ally. 5ut they ailed to remember a crucial principle in world politics: big powers have no permanent riends& only perpetual interests. (he importance o local actors depends on how the ma3or powers perceive the con iguration o power on the regional and international scenes at a given historical moment. Eulles! response to /hamoun!s predicament was indicative o this thin'ing. %ar rom sympathi2ing with /hamoun!s plight& Eulles pinned the blame or the debacle on the )ebanese president. "e declared that /hamoun!s di iculties could be e$plained by the act that he went too ar in embracing the >isenhower Eoctrine. (he problem with /hamoun& he noted& was that he had adopted an e$treme pro-4estern policy=1 so e$treme that at one time Eulles had even suggested modi ications in /hamoun!s approach.[8;] Eulles was correct in one respect: encouraging client states to ally themselves too closely and openly with the 4est tended to undermine the legitimacy and security o these states. 5ut the secretary o state was distorting the historical record by eschewing any responsibility or /hamoun!s problems. 4ashington actively encouraged )ebanon to 3oin the >isenhower Eoctrine& and the @.,. embassy in 5eirut

1.

played a critical role in helping to unseat all the )ebanon deputies who had voted against accepting it.[85] *n its crusade against ,oviet communism and in its pursuit o vital economic interests& 4ashington had enlisted the support o whichever state was willing to sign up& regardless o the costs involved in such a transaction. (he )ebanese opposition& conversely& tied the uture o )ebanon to that o >gypt. *n this sense& 'nowingly or un'nowingly& they re lected and carried out 7asser!s policies. (he act remained that neither 4ashington nor /airo was prepared to 3eopardi2e its relationship with the other or the sa'e o their allies in 5eirut. Eespite the deterioration o @.,.->gyptian relations since the mid-1-5Ds& both sides recogni2ed the importance o preserving mutual relations and avoiding a ma3or con rontation. 5e ore the )ebanese crisis was over& @.,. o icials recogni2ed the utility o trying to oppose radical 0rab nationalism. >isenhower proposed coming to terms with 7asser. 0s he argued& since =we are about to get thrown out o the area& we might as well believe in 0rab nationalism.=[8:] *n the a termath o the *raBi revolution and @.,. intervention in )ebanon& the >isenhower administration embar'ed on a ma3or reappraisal o its strategy in the area. (o the @nited ,tates& the virtual collapse o conservative resistance to radical 0rab nationalism made the latter appear to be the driving orce in the region1 it was the =wave o the uture&= @.,. o icials believed that collaboration with 7asser!s brand o pan-0rabism was an !essential element in the prevention o the e$tension o ,oviet in luence in the area.= (hey began to recogni2e 7asser as the undisputed leader o the 0rab world and to deal with him as such. >gypt became the ocus o 4ashington!s relationship with the 0rab states.[8.] *n a similar vein& 7asser came to appreciate more deeply @.,. power and in luence in the region. (he rise o communist in luence in the 0rab >ast& coupled with the clash between communism and nationalism& and the subseBuent ,oviet->gyptian Buarrel& motivated 7asser to revive the 0merican connection. *n a gesture o goodwill& the @0? rela$ed its criticisms o @.,. policy and actively sought @.,. cooperation in a number o ields. ?elations between 4ashington and /airo showed a mar'ed improvement& and 7asser himsel soon viewed the relationship as normal.[88] (he @.,.-@0? rapprochement came as a slap in the ace or both the )ebanonist and 0rab nationalist constituencies in )ebanon. (he )ebanese crisis might not have escalated so dangerously had /hamoun!s regime and its opponents not over-estimated their strategic importance. * both sides had 'ept a proper perspective o their place in the world& they would have been orced to come to terms with each other. *nstead& they relied on oreign intervention to tilt the balance o power in their avor. (he result was to e$acerbate domestic problems and to turn )ebanon into a battle-ground or oreign rivalries. (his proved to be another e$ample o the lin'age between internal wars and e$ternal interventions which have helped to shape the course o )ebanon!s troubled history.[8-] *t can be argued urther that a similar in lated sel -image was at wor' during the prolonged civil war which erupted in 1-.5. (he inability o the )ebanese system made them vulnerable to outside in luence and e$ploitation. #nly by ceasing to entertain illusions about their national identity and their e$aggerated importance in the

18

world can the )ebanese rid themselves o the deadly ghosts o their tragic past. )ebanon!s signi icance does not lie in its strategic or economic position& but in the solidarity and cohesiveness o its people and the willingness o the )ebanese to coe$ist in peace and harmony. (he greatest challenge con ronting the )ebanese is to construct one nation-state out o their myriad tribal& sectarian& and religious loyalties. #nly then will the )ebanese assume their proper place within the community o nations.
M* wish to ac'nowledge the critical eedbac' o several scholars on an earlier version o this paper. *n particular& * would li'e to than' the late Mr. 0lbert "ourani and Er. 0vi ,hlaim o ,t. 0ntony!s /ollege& #$ ord @niversity& and 9ro essors 9hilip +houri o M*( and Jachary )oc'man o "arvard @niversity. M%awa2 0. Cerges& who completed his doctorate in 9olitics and *nternational ?elations at #$ ord @niversity& is a Nisiting ,cholar at the /enter or Middle >astern ,tudies at "arvard @niversity. (his year he is completing a boo' on the relationship between the great powers and the 0rab world. Endnotes 1. 6. H. ;. 5. :. .. 8. +amel ,alibi& A "ouse of #any #ansions$ %he "istory of Lebanon &econsidered F)ondon: *.5. (auris& 1-88G& pp.1:& H1& .D-.1& 1H-& 15D-51&61:-1.& 66:& 6HD. 'bid., pp. 1.-18& 61-& 6H1. 'bid., pp. 61.-18. 7assi "itti& =(he %oreign 9olicy o )ebanon: )essons and 9rospects or the %orgotten Eimensions&= (apers on Lebanon, 7o. - F#$ ord: /enter or )ebanese ,tudies& 0pril 1-8-G& p.H. ,alibi& A "ouse of #any #ansions, p. 1:5. "itti& =(he %oreign 9olicy o )ebanon&= pp. 1H-1;. 'bid., pp.1;-15. Minutes o /abinet Meeting& 18 Auly 1-58& p.;1 and Aoint /hie s o ,ta and 7ational 9olicy& 1-5:1-58& A/, "istory& /hapter *O& sub3ect: =(he )ebanon /risis and 0 ter&= p.;:-. (his paper relies heavily on recently declassi ied @.,. documents obtained& by the /enter or )ebanese ,tudies& #$ ord1 rom the Ewight >isenhower library& 0bilene& +ansas1 Marine and 7aval /orps "istorical /enters1 /entral *ntelligence 0gency1 and 7ational 0rchives and ?ecords 0dministration& 4ashington& E./.& and ,uitland& ME Ewight E. >isenhower& %he )hite "ouse *ears$ )aging (eace, +,-./+,.+. F7ew Kor': Eoubleday& 1-:DG& p.6.D. /amille /hamoun& 0rise au #oyen/1rient F9aris: >ditions Callimard& 1-:HG& pp. ;6;-H1. 0n *nterview with ?aymond "are& #ral "istory (ranscripts& 68 0ugust 1-.6& pp.:8--. ,ee the speech by the deputy rom (ripoli ,hay'h Aisr: the ?oots o the )ebanese ?evolution& 5eirut to Eepartment o ,tate& 7o. ;DD:& 1; #ctober 1-58& p.1D. %ahim Lubain& 0risis in Lebanon F4ashington& E./.: (he Middle >ast *nstitute& 1-:1G& p.HD. 5eirut to 4ashington& E0 *ntelligence ?eport& prepared by ?obert /. 4or's& ,ub3ect: #pinions o /ommanding Ceneral /hehab& 7o. ?-18--5.& H1 May 1-5.& pp.1-H. 'bid., pp. 6-H. Mc/lintoc' to Eepartment o ,tate& 5eirut& 6. March 1-58& %oreign ,ervice Eispatch& no. 5;.. 5eirut to 4ashington& E0 *ntelligence ?eport& p. 6. A/, and 7ational 9olicy& 1-5:-58& p.;61. /urrent *ntelligence 4ee'ly ,ummary& /*0& # ice o /urrent *ntelligence& 1& 15& 6- May 1-5.& p.1D o 6D1 Eepartment o ,tate& 5ureau o 9ublic 0 airs& # ice o the "istorian& "istorical ,tudies& ,ub3ect: (he @nited ,tates and )ebanon& 1-58& 7o. :& p.61 and @.,. >mbassy& 5eirut& 65 Aune 1-58 [no identi ication]. F(he )ebanese constitution limits the presidency to one si$year termG. 4ilbur /rane >veland& &opes of 2and$ A erica3s 4ailure in the #iddle East F)ondon: 4.4. 7orton& 1-8DG& pp. 6;8-58& 6::. (he # icer in /harge o )ebanon-,yria 0 airs to the Eirector o the # ice o 7ear >astern 0 airs& 1. Aanuary 1-58& in 4oreign &elations of the 5nited 2tates, +,-6/+,.7$ Lebanon and 8ordan. Nol. O* F4ashington: @nited ,tates Covernment printing # ice& 1--6G& p.;. Fhence orth& this series will be re erred to as %?@,& 1-58-:D& Nol. O*.] (he )ebanese %oreign

-. 1D. 11. 16. 1H. 1;. 15. 1:. 1..

18. 1-.

1-

6D.

61. 66. 6H. 6;. 65. 6:. 6.. 68. 6-. HD. H1.

H6. HH. H;.

H5. H:. H..

H8. H-. ;D. ;1. ;6. ;H.

Minister!s call on the 9resident& : %ebruary 1-5.& p.H. 7adim Eimech'ie& =(he @nited ,tates *ntervened Militarily by ,ending the Marines to )ebanon in 1-58: 4hy did this "appen&= paper given at the @niversity o (e$as /on erence on )ebanon in the 1-5Ds& 1D-1H ,eptember 1--6& pp.1D-1H& 1-. 0gnes C. +orbani& 52 intervention in Lebanon, +,-6 and +,,9$ (residential :ecision a;ing F7ew Kor': 9raeger& 1--1G& p.H;. Lubain& 0risis in Lebanon, pp.H:-.. (resident <a al Abdel/=asser3s 2peeches and (ress 'nterviews F/airo: Ministry o *n ormation& 1-58G& p.1-.. 5eirut to ,ecretary o ,tate& 68 0ugust 1-5.. Luoted in Eavid 4. )esch& =9relude to 0merican intervention in )ebanon: (he 1-5. 0merican-,yrian /risis&= a paper given at the @niversity o (e$as /on erence on )ebanon in the 1-5D!s& 1D-1H ,eptember 1--6&p.18. Luoted in /urrent *ntelligence 4ee'ly ,ummary& /*0& 1- ,eptember 1-5.& p.1. @, 0mbassador to Eepartment o ,tate& 1; %ebruary 1-58& p.6 o :. M. ,. 0gwani& the Lebanese 0risis, 1-58: A :ocu entary 2tudy F)ondon: 0sia 9ublishing "ouse& 1-:5G& pp.H-;. )eila M. (. Meo& Lebanon, ' probable =ation$ A 2tudy in political :evelop ent F5loomington: *ndiana @niversity 9ress& 1-:5G& p. 1D;. Luoted in the Egyptian <a>ette& 5 March 1-58. +amal ,alibi& =?ecollections o the 1-;Ds and 1-5Ds&= a paper given at the @niversity o (e$as /on erence on )ebanon in the 1-5Ds& 1D-1H ,eptember 1--6& p.6:. Eepartment o ,tate& # ice o the "istorian& p.11 and A/, and 7ational 9olicy& 1-5:-58& p.;6D. Eimech'ie& =(he @nited ,tates *ntervened Militarily&= p.18 >veland& &opes of 2and, p.6;5. (he )ebanese %oreign Minister!s call on the 9resident& : %ebruary 1-5.& pp.6-H1 A/, and 7ational 9olicy& 1-5:-58& p.;6D1 and ?ichards to ,ecretary o ,tate& 5eirut& 1: March 1-5.. 5eirut to Eepartment o ,tate& =(he ?oots o the )ebanese ?evolution&= 1; #ctober 1-58& pp.6& 1D1 Eepartment o ,tate& # ice o the "istorian& p.61 and A/, and 7ational 9olicy& 1-5:-58& p.;6D. +amal Aumblat& 4i #a?ra al/2iyasa al/Lubnaniya [*n the /ourse o )ebanese 9olitics] F5eirut: Ear al-(aliIa& n.dG& p.5.. 5. A. #deh& Lebanon$ :yna ics of 0onflict, a #odern (olitical "istory F)ondon Jed 5oo's& 1-85G& p.1DD. Eepartment o ,tate& # ice o "istorian& 1-58& p.61 and Mc/lintoc' to ,ecretary o ,tate& 5eirut& 7o. H1-1& 65 March 1-58& pp.1-6. Mc/lintoc' to ,ecretary o ,tate& 5eirut& 7os. ;115& ;6.6& 51D8& 66& 6. May and 65 Aune 1-581 and 5eirut to Eepartment o ,tate& the ?oots o the )ebanese ?evolution& 1; #ctober 1-58& p.;. 0gwani& %he Lebanese 0risis, pp.58& 85. /hamoun& 0rise au #oyen 1rient, p.11. 5eirut to the Eepartment o ,tate& - Aanuary 1-58& in %?@,& 1-58-:D& Nol. O*& pp. 1-6. Eepartment o ,tate& # ice o "istorian p.6. /harles 4. (hayer& :iplo at F7ew Kor': "arper and 5rothers& 1-5-G& pp. 6;-65. >veland& &opes of 2and, pp. 65:& 6.:. =ew *or; %i es, 1. Auly 1-58. Mc/lintoc' to ,ecretary o ,tate& 5eirut& 7o. ;;H8& ; Aune 1-581 and A/, and 7ational 9olicy& 1-5:-58& pp. ;H5-H-. (he =ew *or; %i es, 11& 1H& 6H May and . Aune 1-58. 7asser!s 2peeches and (ress 'nterviews F1-58G& pp. 1-:--8. 0llen Eulles& the Eirector o the /*0& shared >isenhower!s and Eulles! views that the ,oviets were in the )ebanese picture. Eiary& 1; Auly 1-581 Memorandum or ?ecord& 15 May 1-58& p.61 Memorandum o conversation with the 9resident& Eepartment o ,tate& sub3ect: )ebanon& 15 Aune 1-58& p.;1 and >isenhower to 9aul "o man& 6H Aune 1-58& p.6. >isenhower& )aging (eace, p.6::. ,tephen A. Cenco& =(he >isenhower Eoctrine: Eeterrence in the Middle >ast& 1-5.-1-58&= in 0le$ander ). Ceorge and ?ichard ,mo'e& :eterrence in A erican 4oreign (olicy$ %heory and (ractice F7ew Kor' and )ondon: /olumbia @niversity 9ress& 1-.;G& pp. H1.& HH-. 5eirut to ,ecretary o ,tate& 7o. H:;.& ; may 1-581 and A/, and 7ational 9olicy& 1-5:-58& p.;61. 0lan Eoty& #iddle East 0risis$ 5.2. :ecision #a;ing in +,-6, +,@7, and +,@3 F5er'eley: @niversity o /ali ornia 9ress& 1-8;G& pp.65-6.& H6-H;. 5eirut to Eepartment o ,tate& 6 Aune 1-58& in %?@,& 1-58-:D& Nol. O*& p. 88. Marine /orps "istorical /enter& 4ashington& /hapter *N& ,ub3ect: *ntervention in the *nternal 0 airs o a %oreign /ountry to 0ssure a %riendly Covernment& [n.d.]& p.6. ,ecretary o ,tate to 5eirut& 7o. H:6-& 18 March 1-581 and Mc/lintoc' to Eulles& 7o. H.D-& . May 1-58. 5eirut to Eepartment o ,tate& 6 Aune 1-58& in %?@,& 1-58-:D& Nol. O*.p.88. Eepartment o ,tate to the >mbassy in )ebanon& 1H May 1-58& in ibid& p.;-. >ditorial 7ote& 6- May 1-58& in ibid., p.8D.

6D

;;. ;5. ;:. ;.. ;8. ;-. 5D.

51. 56. 5H. 5;. 55.

5:. 5.. 58. 5-. :D.

:1.

:6. :H. :;. :5.

::.

Eepartment o ,tate to 5eirut& 1H May 1-58. :epart ent of 2tate Aulletin, - Aune 1-58& p.-;5. 0urrent :igest of the 2oviet (ress, 65 Aune 1-58& p.66. /urrent *ntelligence 4ee'ly ,ummary& /*0& 1- Aune 1-58& p.H o :. Memorandum o a /onversation& 4ashington& 15 Aune 1-581 Memorandum o a /onversation& Eepartment o ,tate& 18 Aune 1-58& in %?@,& 1-58-:D& Nol. O*& pp.8H& 1H1& 15H. Memorandum o a /onversation with the 9resident& 4hite "ouse& 4ashington& 15 Aune 1-58& in %?@,& 1-58-:D& Nol. O*& p.1H:. 'bid. Memorandum o a /onversation& Eepartment o ,tate& 4ashington 18 Aune 1-58& in ibid., pp.15H-5;. *n his memoirs& >isenhower blamed /hamoun!s mistrust o 7asser or the ailure to respond to the >gyptian proposal. >isenhower& )aging (eace, p. 6:8. (he >mbassy in >gypt to the Eepartment o ,tate& 6D May and . Aune 1-581 the Eepartment o ,tate to the >mbassy in >gypt& 6. May& 5 and - Aune 1-58& in %?@,& 1-58-:D& Nol. O*& pp.:8-.D& .:-..& -1--H& 1DHD;. 4illiam ?ountree to >mbassy& 5eirut& 4ashington& 7o. ;.1D& 1D Aune 1-58. 7asser!s 2peeches and (ress 'nterviews F1-58G& p.H--. /hamoun was also reassured that 4ashington had ull con idence in him personally as the symbol o )ebanon!s determination to de end its independence. ,ecretary o ,tate to 0mbassador Mc/lintoc'& 5eirut& 7o. 11D..& 1- Aune 1-58& pp.1-;. (he >mbassy in )ebanon to the Eepartment o ,tate& 6D Aune 1-581 Memorandum o a /onversation& 4ashington& HD Aune 1-58& in 'bid, p.18:. Memorandum o conversation& 4ashington&HD Aune 1-58&in 'bid& p18:. *bid.& pp. 18.-88. the >mbassy in )ebanon to the Eepartment o ,tate& 1- Aune 1-58& in ibid., p.158. (o /hamoun& the *raBi proposal was no more than an empty o er since *raB had traditionally avoided using its army against other 0rabs. *n his view& the conclusion o a treaty between *raB and )ebanon at this time would have been more o a political liability than o any military value. Mc/lintoc' to ,ecretary o ,tate& 5eirut& 7o. ;:;6& p.1-6. 4.A. Callman& 'raB under <eneral =uri$ #y &ecollections of =uri al/2aid, +,-C/+,-6 F5altimore: (he Aohns "op'ins 9ress& 1-:;G& pp. 1:;-:5. >veland& &opes of 2and, p. 686. )ord 5irdwood& =uri as/2aid$ A 2tudy in Arab Leadership F)ondon: /assell& 1-5-G& pp. 65:-5-. /urrent *ntelligence 4ee'ly ?eview& /*0& ,ub3ect: )ebanese ,ituation Fpart *G 1D Auly 1-58& p.1 o ;. 0gwani& %he Lebanese 0risis, pp.188--6. "anna 5atatu& %he 1ld 2ocial 0lasses and the &evolutionary #ove ents of 'raB F9rinceton& 7ew Aersey: 9rinceton @niversity 9ress& 1-.8G& pp. ..:& 8D5. >isenhower& )aging peace, p. 6:-. A/,& sub3ect: Military 9lanning (al's with Middle >astern /ountries& 7ote by the ,ecretaries& 7o. 188./H;.& March 1-5.& p.6:5D. Mc/lintoc' to ,ecretary o ,tate& 7o. H58& 1; Auly 1-581 5rie ing 7otes by 0llen Eulles in a Meeting at the 4hite "ouse with /ongressional )eaders& 1; Auly 1-58& p.H. (he irony was that a ew days later ,audi 0rabia would re use to permit 4estern over lights to transport uel to Aordan. 5rie ing 7otes by 0llen Eulles& 1; Auly 1-58& pp.5-:1 ,ynopsis o ?eports ?elating to the Mid->ast /risis& 1;-- Auly 1-58& pp.1-61 and Minutes o /abinet Meeting& 18 Auly 1-58& p.5. (hayer& :iplo at, p.96. 5rie ing 7otes by 0llen Eulles& 1; Auly 1-58& p. 81 (elephone /all rom 0mbassador )odge to Eulles& 1; Auly 1-581 Eulles ?emar's at /abinet Meeting& 18 Auly 1-58& p.61 and H.Hrd Meeting o the 7,/& 65 Auly 1-58& p.H. >isenhower& )aging (eace, p.6:-. /harles E. /remeans& %he Arabs and the )orld$ =asser3s Arab =ationalist (olicy F7ew Kor': 9raeger& published or the /ouncil on %oreign ?elations& 1-:HG& pp. 1:;-:5. Memorandum o a /on erence with the 9resident& 1; Auly 1-58& in %?@,& 1-58-:D& Nol. O*& pp.616-1;. (imetable o >vents o 4ee' o Auly& 1;-1-& 1; Auly 1-58. >isenhower& )aging (eace, p.6.D. /on erence with the 9resident& 1; Auly 1-58& in %?@,& 1-58-:D& Nol. O*& pp.616-1;. Memorandum or the ?ecord& ,ub3ect: Meeting ?egarding *raB& 1; Auly 1-58. >ri'a C. 0lin& %he +,-6 5nited 2tates intervention in Lebanon F(he 0merican @niversity: 9h.E. thesis& 1--DG& p.H-H. (his *nterpretation in luenced 0merica!s perceptions o the 0rab nationalist movement until 1-5-& when /airo and Moscow had a alling out. /on erence with the 9resident& 6D Auly 1-58& in %?@,& 1-58-:D& Nol.O*& pp.616-1;. Memorandum o /onversation& sub3ect: )ebanon and the Middle >ast& 1 Auly 1-58& p.H. Memorandum o a /onversation between the ,ecretary o ,tate and the 5ritish >mbassy F)ord "oodG& 4ashington& 1; Auly 1-581 and con erence with the 9resident& 1; Auly& in %?@,& 1-58:D& Nol.O*& pp.616-1H& 6H8.

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(he >mbassy in )ebanon to the Eepartment o ,tate& 1; Auly 1-58& in %rus& 1-58-:D& vol.O*&p.61:. H.Hrd Meeting o the 7,/& 65 Auly 1-58& p.11. 4illiam Luandt& =)ebanon 1-58 and Aordan 1-.D&= in 5. 5lechman and ,. +aplan Feds.G& 4orce )ithout )ar$ %he 52 Ar ed 4orces as a (olitical 'nstru ent F4ashington: 5roo'ings *nstitution& 1-.-G& p.6HD. :-. (he /hairman o the A/,& 7. (wining& was one o the ew voices within the administration to propose that the @nited ,tates& in con3unction with 5ritain& *srael& (ur'ey& and Aordan& should attac' >gypt and ,yria and de eat the *raBi ree # icers. (here was hardly any support or (wining!s proposal& however& Memorandum o a (elephone /onversation between 9resident >isenhower and 9rime Minister Macmillan& 1; Auly 1-58& in %?@,& 1-58-:D& Nol. O*& p.6H6. Memorandum or the ?ecord& Eulles and >isenhower& 1; Auly 1-581 /on erence with the 9resident& 15 Auly 1-581 Minutes o /abinet Meeting& 18 Auly 1-58& p.51 (elephone call rom Eulles to >isenhower& 1- Auly 1-58& p.;:-1 and Eepartment o ,tate& # ice o the "istorian& p.;. .D. Moscow to ,ecretary o ,tate& 15 Auly 1-581 #ral "istory (ranscripts& *nterview with Ceneral Coodpaster& 6 0ugust 1-:.& p.-D1 Eulles to all Eiplomatic 9osts& 15 Auly& p.61 and /on erence with the 9resident& 1; Auly 1-58. .1. /on erence with the 9resident& 1; Auly 1-581 Minutes o /abinet Meeting& 18 Auly 1-58& p.;1 Eulles!s ?emar' at /abinet& 18 Auly 1-58& p.H1 and Eepartment o ,tate& # ice o the "istorian& p.5. .6. 5eirut to ,ecretary o ,tate& 7o. 8H5& HD Auly 1-58& pp.1-6. .H. Eepartment o ,tate& # ice o "istorian& p.5 :epart ent of 2tate Aulletin, 6. #ctober 1-58& pp.:5D-51. .;. 7asser!s ,peeches and 9ress *nterviews F1-58G& p.616. 0bdel-)ati al-5aghdadi& #udha;;irat FMemoirsG& Nol. ** F/airo: 0l-Ma'tab al-Misri al-hadit& 1-..G& pp.56-H. Mohamed "ei'al& =asser$ %he 0airo :ocu ents F)ondon: 7ew >nglish )ibrary& 1-.6G& pp.166-6;. .5. =ews and !iews fro the 2oviet 5nion, 1- Auly 1-58& pp. 6-H. v. Micunovic& #oscow diary F)ondon: /hatto and 4indus& 1-8DG& pp. ;D--1D. Mohamed "ei'al& #adha hadatha fi 2uriyya F4hat "appened in ,yriaG F/airo: Ear al-Lawmiyya& n.d.G& pp.-6-H. .:. Moscow to ,ecretary o ,tate& 6H Auly 1-58& 7o.61: F,ection one o twoG& p.6. ... Moscow to ,ecretary o ,tate& 7o. 1H5& 1: Auly 1-58 and 7o. 1.D Ftwo sectionsG& 1- Auly 1-58. "elen Een'os& Al/2iyasa al/2ufyatiyya fi al/sharB al/awsat, +,--/+,@- [,oviet %oreign 9olicy in the Middle >ast& 1-55-1-.5] F5eirut: Ear al'alima al-0rabiyya& 1-8HG& pp.:.-8. .8. /on erence with the 9resident& 6D Auly 1-58& p..1 >isenhower to +hrushchev& the 4hite "ouse& 66 Auly 1-58& p.H1 and Moscow to ,ecretary o ,tate& 7o.61: Ftwo sectionsG& 6H Auly 1-581 and 7o. 6:; Fthree sectionsG& 68 Auly 1-58. .-. :epart ent of 2tate Aulletin, 1 ,eptember 1-58& p.H;6. 8D. /*7/,9> /#MM> to /7#& 7#.585; Ftwo partsG& 65 Auly 1-58& ,ee ?ichard Murphy!s in ormative account o his mission to )ebanon& :iplo at a ong )arriors F7ew Kor': Eoubleday& 1-:;G& pp. H-8-;18. 81. :epart ent of 2tate Aulletin, 66 #ctober 1-58& pp.:5D-51. 86. 0s Eulles put it: =@p to the time o the *raB coup we had not elt that there would be a need or our action. *t was the coup in 5aghdad& with the disclosure o a similar plot in Aordan& which modi ied the situation and led us to believe that it was imperative to preserve the morale o the smaller nations around the perimeter o the ,oviet-/hinese bloc into 0 rica& and we should without hesitation respond to /hamoun!s reBuest.= Luoted in +orbani& @, 'ntervention in Lebanon, p.;D. 8H. /hamoun& 0rise au #oyen 1rient& pp. 11& ;6;-H1. >veland& ?opes o ,and& pp.6.8& 6-:---. (he >mbassy in )ebanon to the Eepartment o ,tate& in %?@,& 1-58-:D& Nol.O*& p.6:D 8;. H.Hrd Meeting o the 7,/& 65 Auly 1-58& p. 1D1 and H81 Meeting o the 7,/& 6 #ctober 1-58& p.5. 85. >veland& &opes of 2and, pp.6;8-5D. 8:. Eiscussion at the Meeting o the 7,/0& 65 Auly 1-58& pp. .& 1D1 and /on erence with the president& 6H Auly 1-58& p.6. 8.. Ceneral /onsideration 0 ecting @.,. 9olicy toward the 7ear >ast F0nne$ 0G& pp.;D-;H. 88. Malcolm 'err& %he Arab )orld )ar$ <a al Abd al/=asir and his &ivals, +,-6/+,@7. F)ondon: #$ ord @niversity 9ress& 1-.1G& p.1-. 5aghdadi& #udha;;irat, Nol. **.& p.1DD. #peration /oordinating 5oard& ?eport on the 7ear >ast& H %ebruary 1-:D [period covered rom ; 7ovember 1-58 through H %ebruary 1-:D]& p.:. Marwan ?. 5uheiry& =>$ternal *nterventions and *nternal 4ars in )ebanon: 1..D-1-86.= in )awrence *. /onrad FedG& %he 4or ation and (erception of the #odern Arab )orld$ 2tudies by #arwan Auheiry F9rinceton& 7.A.: (he Earwin 9ress 1-8-G& pp.16--H8.

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