Consult Brazil CP

Brazil will say YES Generic ..................... 31

Contents
Consult Brazil CP ................................................ 1 1NC ................................................................. 2 1NC Impact Scenarios .................................... 4 Relations..................................................... 5 Latin American Democracy ........................ 6 2NC ................................................................. 7 2NC Overview ............................................ 8 *** Will Consult *** ................................ 11 Consult on Cuba ....................................... 12 Consult on Mexico ................................... 14 Consult on Venezuela .............................. 15 Consult on Latin America Generic ......... 17 *** Perms ***.......................................... 21 SHOULD definition ................................ 22 A2 Perm do both ...................................... 23 A2 Perm do the cp.................................... 24 A2 Perm do the plan then cp ................... 25 A2 Perm do the plan and consult on other issues ........................................................ 26 *** Solvency ***...................................... 28 Cooperation Generic ............................. 29

Brazil says YES Cuba .............................. 33 A2 Brazil doesnt solve ............................. 34 A2 Normal Means .................................... 35 A2 Status Quo .......................................... 36 *** Impact Scenarios *** ........................ 38 2NC Democracy ....................................... 39 2NC Relations........................................... 41 *** Theory *** ........................................ 44 A2 Consult CP Abusive ............................. 45 *** Net Benefit *** ................................. 48 Coop with Brazil on Cuba doesnt link to PTX ........................................................... 49 AFF ANSWERS .............................................. 51 Brazil says No Generic........................... 52 Brazil says No Venezuela ...................... 54 Brazil says No Cuba ............................... 55 Brazil says No Mexico ........................... 56 Destroys Relations ................................... 57 Relations Already High............................. 58 Consult CPs Bad ....................................... 59 SHOULD definition................................ 60

1NC
Text: The USFG will engage in prior binding consultation with the Federative Republic of Brazil over ________________ [insert plan text]. The United States will advocate ________________ [insert plan text] during the consultative process and will adopt the result of the consultation. Well clarify. Contention 1: It competes. The 1AC cant do binding consultation. That would be abusive.
A. Violates Resolved: Resolved implies a definite course of action. The CP tests the definite and immediate nature of the plan. If we win the CP is beneficial, we have disproved the necessity of the resolution and the affirmative should lose. Any permutation makes the plan conditional and severs the definite and immediate nature of the plan text. This is a voting issue. B. Makes the plan conditional: Consulting over the plan justifies the affirmative condition plan on anything or answering case turns and offense with the plan wont pass. This means the negative is always one step behind and will never win.

Contention 2: Solvency Binding consultation with Brazil key to US-Brazil relations Luigi R. Einuadi, March 2011, ambassador, distinguished fellow at the Center for Strategic Research,
Institute for National Strategic Studies, and the National Defense University. Member for the Advisory Council of the Brazil Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Brazil and the United States: The Need for Strategic Engagement, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/docupload/SF%20266%20Einaudi.pdf A prerequisite for improved mutual engagement will be changes in perspective on both sides. Mutually
beneficial engagement requires the United States to welcome Brazils emergence as a global power. Brazil is more than a tropical China35; it is culturally and politically close to the United States and Europe. Brazil, in turn, needs to realize that the United States accepts its rise. Brazil also needs to recognize that the United States still matters greatly to Brasilia and that more can be achieved working with Washington than against it. The United States

and Brazil have vast overlapping interests, but a formal strategic partnership is probably out of the question for both countries. In the United States, Brazil must compete for policy attention with China, India, Russia, Japan, Mexico, and several European countries. It poses no security threat to the United States. Moreover, despite Brazils importance in multilateral organizations, particularly the UN, Brazil can be of limited practical assistance at best to the United States in its two current wars. Brazils interests, in turn, may be fairly said to include the need to distinguish itself from the United States. Diplomatically, this means neither country can expect automatic agreement from the other. Interests differ and it may be politically necessary to highlight differences even when interests are similar. But both countries should make every effort to develop a habit of permanent consultation in an effort to coordinate policies, work pragmatically together where interests are common, and reduce surprises even while recognizing that specific interests and policies often may differ. A first operational step, therefore, is for both countries to hold regular policy-level consultations, increase exchanges of information, and coordinate carefully on multilateral matters. This is much easier said than done. The list of global issues on which Brazil is becoming a major player includes conflict resolution, all aspects of energy, including nuclear matters, all types of trade, the environment, space, and the development of international law, including law of the seas

and nonproliferation. To share information and ensure effective consultation on so many functional issues will require finding ways
to lessen the geographic stovepiping natural to bureaucracy. The U.S. Department of State, for example, has historically organized itself into geographical bureaus responsible for relations with countries in particular regions, leaving functional issues to offices organized globally. This organization hampers the exchange of information and consultation with countries such as Brazil, whose reach and policies go beyond their particular geographic region. One result is that multilateral affairs are still often an isolated afterthought in the U.S. Government. Are there things the United States and Brazil could do, whether bilaterally or in the World Trade Organization, that would offset some of the negative effects of the China trade on manufacturing in both their countries?36 Just posing the question reveals the complexity of the task.

[INSERT IMPACT CARDS]

1NC Impact Scenarios

Relations
Multilateral engagements are key to US-Brazil relations Meiman 9(Kellie, led the Brasil/Southern Cone and trade practices of McLarty Associates, The United States and Brazil Two perspectives
on dealing with partnership and rivalry, Center for American Progress, March 2009, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/03/pdf/brazil.pdf) TC

The U.S.-Brazil relationship has always been complexnot surprising for two continental powers located in the same hemisphere. It has often been characterized by positive bilateral engagement, counterbalanced by efforts to isolate the other in regional and multilateral forums. This approach is no longer workable, and is in neither countrys best interest. The combination of Brazils clear emergence on the world stage and the United States need to reassert itself as a multilateralist creates potential to forge a partnership born
of overlapping interests. This is a moment when both Brazil and the United States need to prove themselves. Brazil needs to show that it is prepared to make hard decisions tied to the role of global stakeholder, as it has done in Haiti by maintaining a critical peacekeeping presence in the troubled Caribbean nation. And the

United States must show that the era of U.S. unilateralism is over. Even though Brazil will not agree with the United States on every issue, it is in the United States interest to forge a cooperative, bilateral relationship. Brazil has much to contribute in regard to integrating emerging powers and technologies into
international frameworks, as well as an active interest in growing its global stakeholder role. Brazil should be encouraged to seize this mantle in a meaningful way.

Key to overall Latin American relations Lyons 12 (John, Correspondent at The Wall Street Journal in Brazil U.S. Seeks an Ally in Brazil, The Wall Street Journal, April 8,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304587704577332082752648096.html) TC The issues in play reflect Brazil's growing economic reach. Brazil's biggest trade partner these days is China, not the U.S., and U.S. officials want Brazil as an ally in nudging China to let its currency rise. Brazil's

bigger economic presence in regional neighbors such as Venezuela, Ecuador and Cuba could allow Brazil to act as a moderating force in a region that has become more anti-U.S. in recent years. The U.S. is likely to seek Brazil's support on regional issues ahead
of a summit of hemispheric leaders later this month in Colombia. Some analysts say Brazil will urge Mr. Obama to add star power to aU.N. environmental conference planned for Rio de Janeiro this year. Mr. Obama hasn't committed to attend.

Latin American Democracy

The plans unilateral action kills relations and Latin American democracy. CP solves. LeoGrande 12 (William M., Dean, School of Public Affairs American University, Latin America Policy in the Next Two Years:
The Obama Administration and the Next Congress, March 7, http://www.american.edu/spa/gov/upload/LeoGrande-Harvard-DRCLAS-3-15-11Final.pdf) TC By this unilateral

shift in policy, Washington split the Latin American consensus and belied its commitment to multilateralism. The result was to damage relations with Brazil, and to encourage the far right elsewhere in Latin America to think they might be able to overthrow democratically elected progressive governments with the acquiescence of the United States. In August 2009, the United States and Colombia announced a
Defense Cooperation Agreement providing the U.S. military with access to Colombian military bases. The agreement was announced

without prior consultation with other Latin American countries, and both Venezuela and Brazil had strong negative reactions. Once again, the unilateralism represented by this lack of consultation reminded Latin Americans of Washingtons interventionist past rather than heralding a multilateral partnership.

Democracy deters conflict and warnumerous studies Tomz and Weeks 11 (Michael and Jessica, Department of Political Science, Government, The Democratic Peace: An Experimental
Approach, January, https://www.princeton.edu/~pcglobal/conferences/methods/papers/tomz.pdf) TC Few findings from the political science literature have received as much attention as the democratic

peace, the discovery that democracies almost never fight against other democracies. To some, the absence of military conflict among democracies is so consistent that it approaches the status of an empirical law (Levy 1988). Numerous studies have documented a correlation between democracy and peace. Most have found that the democratic peace is dyadic, meaning that democracies are less likely to attack other democracies
but are no less likely to attack autocracies (Maoz and Russett 1993, Ray 1995, Oneal, Russett, and Berbaum 2003). Fewer studies have found evidence of a monadic democratic peace, in which democracies

are overall less likely than autocracies to use military force. We therefore focus on why democracies tend to refrain from using force against other democracies.

2NC

2NC Overview
The CP solves 100% of case but consults Brazil on key issues PRIOR to implementing the plan It competes. The 1AC cant do binding consultation. That would be abusive.
A. Violates Resolved: Resolved implies a definite course of action. The CP tests the definite and immediate nature of the plan. If we win the CP is beneficial, we have disproved the necessity of the resolution and the affirmative should lose. Any permutation makes the plan conditional and severs the definite and immediate nature of the plan text. This is a voting issue. B. Makes the plan conditional: Consulting over the plan justifies the affirmative condition plan on anything or answering case turns and offense with the plan wont pass. This means the negative is always one step behind and will never win.

Four Net Benefits: First is relations, increased cooperation on regional issues allows for USBrazil collaboration on key issues and increases communication. Second is democracy, consulting Brazil on the plan means that democratic reforms will be introduced to Latin America which deters conflicts that are on the brink now. Third: Brazil consultation solves deterrence, nuclear terrorism, arms and drug trafficking, and others Luigi R. Einuadi, March 2011, ambassador, distinguished fellow at the Center for Strategic Research,
Institute for National Strategic Studies, and the National Defense University. Member for the Advisory Council of the Brazil Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Brazil and the United States: The Need for Strategic Engagement, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/docuploaded/SF%20266%20Einaudi.pdf These words cannot be read simply as rhetoric rooted in the Third World trade unionism of the weak. Brazil is no longer weak. It is the only BRIC without a nuclear bomb not because it could not produce one, but because it has chosen not to, and its security doctrines are focused on protecting its borders and on deterrence , not on projecting global power. President Lulas grandstanding with Turkey in Iran damaged his countrys credibility, but as Brazils global reach matures, its multilateral skills and record of autonomy could prove 8 important assets in efforts against the risks of nuclear terrorism and nuclear proliferation . Like Canada and only a few other countries, Brazil has a tradition of good UN citizenship . This characteristic is an important asset for the United States to find in a friend nowadays. The author believes it was no accident that Srgio Vieira de Mello, the much admired UN peacemaker who lost his life in Iraq in 2003, was Brazilian. Brazils generally violence-free domestic history, the absence of conflicts with neighbors, and its longstanding commitment to UN principles and peacekeeping without the imposition of force are an important reservoir for conflict resolution.42 The United States and Brazil face similar problems in their immediate neighborhoods.

Notable among these is trafficking in illegal drugs and arms , which contributes to citizen insecurity, migration, and unaccustomed messiness along parts of their borders. These issues should all be included in a permanent consultation process, but Brazils approach of South America for South Americans does
not encourage effective cooperation with the United States on even such vital issues. Brazils assertion of regional power to the exclusion of the United States is similar to Chinas active measures to promote Asian organizations that exclude the United States.43 Initiatives such as UNASUR that exclude the United States, but which include actively anti-U.S. governments, invite uncertainty. The answer for Brazil is not to abandon UNASUR, let alone South American integration, but for both the United States and Brazil to ensure that they each develop and sustain bilateral ties with individual countries in accordance with the particular interests and needs of those countries. (Will anyone deny that Mexico is on some matters more important to the United States than Brazil?) Both

the United States and Brazil should actively support inter-American institutions like the OAS that bring both of them together with other countries of the hemisphere. Most Latin American and Caribbean countries want good relations with both the United States and Brazil, and multilateral activities are a key way to set and observe rules for everyone. Multilateral formats also are useful to offset the asymmetries of power, which have long hampered the United States in dealing with its neighbors, and which now are beginning to bedevil Brazil as it grows more rapidly than most countries around it.9

Fourth is politics the CP avoids it because forms of cooperation are popular in Congress and wont provoke hard-line disagreement

*** Will Consult ***

Consult on Cuba
Brazil would say yes theyve helped out Cuba economically in the past EFE 11/2/11 [EFE, a Spanish international news agency created in 1939 by Spain's former minister of
the press and propaganda Ramn Serrano Ser and Manuel Aznar Zubigaray, Brazil wants to help Cuba update its economic model, http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/politics/2011/11/02/brazil-wantsto-help-cuba-update-its-economic-model/, PS] Brazil wants to help Cuba "update" its economic model and increase its exports, the Brazilian ambassador said
Wednesday at the Havana International Trade Fair. Jose Eduardo Martins confirmed Wednesday that Brazil shares Cuba's "optimism" regarding its economic outlook as a result of the reform plan being pushed by the government of President Raul Castro. "I'm

sure that the Brazilian business community is not only coming here to sell, but also to help in the effort of 'updating' the Cuban economic model and in the effort of Cuba to increase its export capacity and reduce imports," Martins said. He spoke during the celebration of the Day of Brazil at the fair, which opened on Monday with the
participation of some 1,500 businessmen from 57 countries. The Cuban foreign trade and investment minister, Rodrigo Malmierca, emphasized Wednesday that Brazil

and Cuba are promoting projects in the areas of health care, education, computers and agriculture and livestock, among other sectors, and are intending to "promote" the areas of economic complementation. "During 2012 we're going to continue deepening and broadening our economic and trade relations toward new strategic objectives, placing emphasis on those that allow Cuba to increase its exports to Brazil and to other countries," Malmierca emphasized. He also
mentioned the ongoing construction and investment at the western Cuban port of Mariel as the "signature" project of bilateral economic cooperation. Brazil is set to invest as much as $500 million in expanding the facilities at Mariel with the aim of making it into the island's main trade port. In 2010, the 29 Brazilian firms that participated in the Havana Trade Fair closed 543 contracts valued at $69.1 million. Brazil

and Cuba have tightened political and trade relations in recent years, and Latin America's biggest economy has broad programs of cooperation and financing for infrastructure projects on the Communist-ruled island.

Brazil would help Cuba benefits them UPI 2/2/12 [United Press International, a major international news agency, whose newswires, photo,
news film and audio services provided news material to thousands of newspapers, magazines and radio and television stations for most of the twentieth century, Brazil eases Cuba into free market economy, http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2012/02/02/Brazil-eases-Cuba-into-free-marketeconomy/UPI-30261328184039/, PS] Brazil is easing Cuba into the free market economy with a generous package of aid in cash and kind and joint projects that give the Latin American country a pre-eminent position in Havana's heady mix of communism and experimental capitalism. Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff appeared to be in the right place at the right time when she flew into Havana in a spirit of revolutionary camaraderie and clinched deals that secured Brazil's status as the senior partner in a long-term, multifaceted relationship. Current bilateral trade exceeds $642 million a year. In talks with Fidel Castro, his brother President Raul Castro and senior Communist Party leaders, Rousseff readily
invoked her own revolutionary credentials as a former left-wing guerrilla fighter and chided the United States for continuing to operate its Guantanamo Bay prison. Her meeting with Fidel Castro was described in the media as an emotional encounter for the Brazilian president, who as a young militant was one of many Latin Americans who admired the Cuban leader after the 1959 communist takeover. Rousseff followed in the footsteps of populist former President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva. But reports said she appeared quickly to have established rapport with the Castro administration. The

"excellent" ties secure Brazil an advantageous position in Cub's hugely porous economy, hungry for basic consumer goods, investment and modernization. Economic upgrading in all sectors and a phased end to Cuba's international isolation offer lucrative opportunities for Brazil's state and private sectors. Brazil will invest $640 million in a $900 million modernization of the Mariel container port, west of
Havana, led by the Brazilian firm Odebrecht. Brazil is also giving Cuba $400 million in credits for food imports and investing $200 million in

modernizing Cuban agriculture. Rousseff

pledged Cuba a long-term commitment to help its economic

regeneration.

U.S. should consult Brazil on Cuba Commander Carlos Iglesias, United States Navy, 2012, United States Security Policy Implications of a
Post-Fidel Cuba, U.S. Army War College, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA560408
On the other hand, this international

dissention does hold some prospect for leveraging U.S. soft power. An indirect approach would be to coordinate U.S. proxy actions with partner countries interested in Cuba. This has the double benefit of leveraging U.S. soft power without compromising legislated restrictions or provoking hard-line Cuban-American ire. In this approach, burgeoning relations with Brazil and Mexico would be strong candidates. Devoid of the bullhorn diplomacy that have marginalized U.S.-Cuban policy efficacy for decades, the U.S. could better engage the island through hemispherical interlocutors. At a minimum, U.S. interests would be advanced through the proxy insights of what is occurring on the island in addition to the potential displacement of anti-American influences (e.g. Chvez).100

Consult on Mexico
Brazil would help Mexico want closer links UTC 12/19/12[United Technologies Corporation, an American multinational conglomerate
headquartered in the United Technologies Building in Hartford, Connecticut, Brazil wants closer links with Mexico; Rousseff plans to travel next March, http://en.mercopress.com/2012/12/19/brazil-wantscloser-links-with-mexico-rousseff-plans-to-travel-next-march, PS] Brazilian president Dilma Rousseff is planning to visit Mexico in early 2013 taking advantage of the good chemistry with the new leader Enrique Pea Nieto, and with the purpose of re-launching the deteriorated relations between the two main economies of Latinamerica. And the big excuse for the approach is
Petrobras, the Brazilian oil and gas giant with strong private participation and which has been a success in discovering and developing hydrocarbons offshore. This capacity could turn Brazil into one of the worlds leading oil producers and exporters in a few years time. Executives from Mexicos petroleum giant, Pemex are fascinated with the success of Petrobras as a model for their own country and wish to continue on the first collaboration steps planted by Pea Nieto and Rousseff when the then elected president visited Brazil last September.

Pea Nieto caused a very good impression in Brasilia, said diplomatic sources and President Rousseff is travelling to Mexico probably next March The trip should also help to make the ups and downs relation more fluid, particularly since the early 2012 spat when Brazil imposed import quotas on Mexican manufactured vehicles in an attempt to contain the bilateral trade deficit. Making the relation with Mexico more solid is very attractive for Brazil which has seen its economy stall with an annual growth of 1% in 2012, despite all the stimuli, and a deteriorating relation with Argentina, that has become the main market for Brazilian manufacturing. Brazil is trying to tone down its protectionism with Mexico and last September in private talks the Rousseff administration said it was willing to discuss an expansion of the auto quotas. But there are also practical reasons since the cap was unable to contain the trade deficit with Mexico, which in the first
ten months of this year has soared to 1.8bn dollars, particularly attracted by the high selling Mexican Ford Fusion of which President Rousseff has one. The Brazilian auto industry is complaining that in the first seven months of the year the full twelve months Mexican quota has been used up but cars keep coming in despite a 35% tariff. However despite Brazilian optimism things could not be that easy since the Mexican business community is distrustful of Brazil following what happened with the car agreement and also believe it is a country with a far too closed market. I believe it makes sense to have certain scepticism said trade consultant Luis de la Calle who was one of the negotiators of the free trade treaty with the US and Canada.

The good chemistry is positive because without it you cant advance but at the end of the day it all comes down to each countrys interests, and what is best both for Brazil and Mexico is a far more open trade relation. The president of Mexican businesspeople in Brazil, Eduardo Ragasol said
that the Pea Nieto/Rousseff relation is full of good signals, such as the approval in record time of the new Mexican woman ambassador in Brazil. But its too early to know when all this will materialize in concrete investments. Mexican corporations have been far more aggressive: millions of Brazilians use Claro cellular phones and watch television on the NET cable system from Mexican tycoon Carlos Slim; they have breakfast with Bimbo toasts and have soft drinks bottled by Femsa, all Mexican businesses. Brazilians on the other hand have been rather shy but could see a turning point in 2015 when Braskem begins to build a huge petro-chemical complex in Veracruz, with an investment of 3.5 billion dollars. But for point.

bilateral trade to keep advancing with a quality leap, some kind of agreement is needed according to analysts. Given the complexity of the relation cooperation between Petrobras and Pemex could be a starting

Consult on Venezuela
The US should consult with Brazil over Venezuela Luis Ferreira, 4-16, 2013, staff writer for thinkpolitic, Post-Chavez Venezuela,
http://thinkpolitic.com/post-chavez-venezuela/ This brings us to a second area impacted by Chavezs death the international arena. Two hours before
Chavezs death was announced, Maduro expelled two U.S. diplomats after accusing them of spying on Venezuelas military. This could be just a taste of a Maduro administration; a more aggressive

foreign policy, especially against the United States, would be a way to maintain the governments legitimacy. Similarly, support for Cuba, Bolivia, Ecuador, and other friendly regimes
would be crucial for the stability of a Maduro administration. Already, governments throughout Latin America (which have all benefited from Venezuelan support) have showed solidarity with the country. This could mean that Maduro would continue Venezuelas hostile foreign policy. For its part, the

United States should tread carefully but, most importantly, consult and work with Venezuelas neighbors especially Brazil, the continents main regional power, which will have a massive influence on the transition of power in Venezuela.

The US should consult Brazil on Venezuela Harkin 04 {Peter Harkin; foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, No.1 Jan-February 2004}
Brazil's involvement in Venezuela, on the perspectives, and avoid other hand, is likely to be a more important feature of U.S.-Brazil relations. For the past conflict is critical. year, Brazil has chaired the "friends of Venezuela, "a six-country group that includes the United States and has urged the Venezuelan government and insurgents to resolve their political differences by holding a constitutionally authorized recall vote on President Chavez's term. At the same time, however, Lula has pursued direct negotiations with the Chavez administration, to foster bilateral economic ties and closer integration among South American states Brazil has managed this precarious double act so far, but should the situation in Venezuela deteriorate Brasilia might have
difficulty pursuing both tracks at once without alienating Washington.

Brazil will help Venezuela common economic incentives Zibechi 10/2/12 [Ral Zibechi, a researcher in social movements, journalist and writer. He is a
columnist and international analyst for La Jornada., Brazil is covering Venezuela's back , http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/oct/02/brazil-has-venezuela-back, PS]
After Lula's arrival in government, the quality of Brazil's relationship with Venezuela leapt. In 2003, the trade between the two countries amounted to $800m. By 2011, this figure had gone up to $5bn. The

two countries tightened institutional links through consultancy on public policies and training courses for leaders provided by the prestigious Brazilian research centre
Ipea (Institute of Applied Economic Research) and Embrapa (the Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation), which opened offices in Caracas. In 2005, Lula and Chvez signed the Brazil-Venezuela strategic alliance and in 2007, they started holding quarterly presidential meetings an unheard-of regularity to accelerate the integration of infrastructure, which continued until 2010 In May 2011, Ipea, which is dependent on Brazil's ministry of strategic affairs, published two important studies that highlight the progress made on integration, involving areas such as the road, river and air transport systems. A

"common economic area" is being created, stretching from the north of Brazil to the south of Venezuela. Brazil contributes to the industrial development of Venezuela to help it reduce its dependency on oil exports and the import of 70% of all food consumed. Venezuela has started to supply industrial consumables to north Brazil, creating complementary industrial chains in the border area, in sectors such as the metal mechanics industry and agro-industry. Brazilians emphasise "the quantity and quality" of the region's resources. Venezuela has the largest oil reserves in the world,
having displaced Saudi Arabia, the third-largest bauxite reserves, the fourth-largest gold reserves, the sixth-largest natural gas reserves and the 10th-largest iron reserves. The Brazilian state of Roraima, on the border with Venezuela, holds the world's biggest reserves of gold, niobium and tin, in addition to important deposits of thorium, cobalt, molybdenum, diamonds and titanium. However, the main goals of Lula and

Chvez were geopolitical. Samuel Pinheiro Guimares, the most influential diplomat in the Brazilian chancellery, explained that Brazil's strategy sought to prevent the "removal" of Chvez through a coup, to block the reincorporation of Venezuela into the North American economy, to extend Mercosur with the inclusion of Bolivia and Ecuador and to hinder the US project to consolidate the Pacific Alliance, which includes Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. This

high level of contact and co-operation shows that the analysts who believe these two nations represent opposites in their approach to the politics of the left are wrong. The friendly relations forged by Chvez and Lula have continued under Rousseff. They present a challenge to those seeking to undermine Venezuela by promoting a so-called "Brazilian" way: in fact the two models are closer than we are led to believe.

Consult on Latin America Generic

Brazil wants consultation before US action in Latin America Hakim 10 (Peter, president emeritus and senior fellow of the Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington-based think tank on Western
Hemisphere affairs, US-Brazil Relations: Expect More Conflict, Inter-American Dialogue, October 21, http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=2490)

In the past year or so, the US and Brazil have squabbled over several hemispheric issuesas Brazil has taken on a more assertive role in Latin America. Brazil surprised and irritated the US and neighboring Colombia when it
joined nearly every other South American nation in opposing a newly announced military arrangement allowing US expanded access to Colombian military bases. By subsequently mending fences with Colombia and announcing its own, albeit more modest, military accord with

Brazil demonstrated a welcome flexibility and accommodation. It also made clear, however, that US military initiatives in South America henceforth require prior consultation and agreement from Brazilwhich is hardly an unreasonable demand. Indeed, this should be routine by now for Washington.
Washington,

The US should consult with Brazil over Latin America Luigi R. Einaudi, March 2011, ambassador, distinguished fellow at the Center for Strategic Research,
Institute for National Strategic Studies, and the National Defense University. Member for the Advisory Council of the Brazil Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Brazil and the United States: The Need for Strategic Engagement, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/docuploaded/SF%20266%20Einaudi.pdf The United States has a basic national security interest in Brazils continuing democratic and market oriented success, which improves its will and capacity to help address pressing global problems. We
are in a rapidly changing period of international relations, in which a high premium is put on skilled and effective diplomacy in order to provide a measure of management to situations that could spin out of control. We are still haunted by nuclear weapons. In these circumstances, Brazil

plays an important role. It is in the U.S. interest to find as many ways as possible not only to cooperate with Brazil, but also to engage with Brasilia as a regional and global partner in the maintenance of peace and prosperity. A prerequisite for improved mutual engagement will be changes in
perspective on both sides. Mutually beneficial engagement requires the Uniteda States to welcome Brazils emergence as a global power. Brazil is more than a tropical China35; it is culturally and politically close to the United States and Europe. Brazil, in turn, needs to realize that the United States accepts its rise. Brazil also needs to recognize that the United States still matters greatly to Brasilia and that more can be achieved working with Washington than against it.

The United States and Brazil have vast overlapping interests, but a formal strategic partnership is probably out of the question for both countries. In the United States, Brazil
must compete for policy attention with China, India, Russia, Japan, Mexico, and several European countries. It poses no security threat to the United States. Moreover, despite Brazils importance in multilateral organizations, particularly the UN, Brazil can be of limited practical assistance at best to the United States in its two current wars. Brazils interests, in turn, may be fairly said to include the need to distinguish itself from the United States. Diplomatically, this means neither country can expect automatic agreement from the other. Interests differ and it may be politically necessary to highlight differences even when interests are similar. But

both countries should make every effort to develop a habit of permanent consultation in an effort to coordinate policies, work pragmatically together where interests are common, and reduce surprises even while recognizing that specific interests and policies often may differ. A first operational step, therefore, is for both countries to hold regular policy-level consultations, increase exchanges of information, and coordinate carefully on multilateral matters. This is much easier said than done. The list of global issues on which Brazil is becoming a major player includes conflict resolution, all aspects of energy, including nuclear matters, all types of trade, the environment, space, and the development of international law, including law of the seas and nonproliferation. To share information and ensure effective consultation on so many
functional issues will require finding ways to lessen the geographic stovepiping natural to bureaucracy. The U.S. Department of State, for

example, has historically organized itself into geographical bureaus responsible for relations with countries in particular regions, leaving functional issues to offices organized globally. This organization hampers the exchange of information and consultation with countries such as Brazil, whose reach and policies go beyond their particular geographic region. One result is that multilateral affairs are still often an isolated afterthought in the U.S. Government. Are there things the United States and Brazil could do, whether bilaterally or in the World Trade Organization, that would offset some of the negative effects of the China trade on manufacturing in both their countries?36 Just posing the question reveals the complexity of the task.

Past commitments have not been pursued, we need to cooperate with Brazil NOW Crandall 9 (Britta H., adjunct professor of political science at the Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies, Hemispheric
giants: The unusual story of United States policy toward Brazil into the 21st century, Udini, 2009, http://udini.proquest.com/view/hemispheric-giants-the-unusual-pqid:1896841681/) TC INTRODUCTION On March 31, 2007, President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva met with President George Bush at Camp David. Reserved for strategically critical meetings and sensitive negotiations, the venue for the two presidents' discussions reflected the importance of the principal issue at hand - reduction of the U.S. foreign oil dependence through the use of biofuels. To build upon the recent agreement between the two countries to cooperate on the production and development of ethanol, President Bush vowed to deepen Washington's dialogue with Brazil. This commitment to closer ties with Brazil revealed several developments of the South American giant's economic and geopolitical importance. In addition to being the global leader in the production of sugar-based ethanol, in 2009 Brazil was a leading global exporter of beef, orange juice, and coffee; its 2007 discovery of a massive deepwater oil field off its southern coast increased its energy independence and export potential; it was an international creditor; and its economy was the eighth largest in the world. In fact, the Goldman Sachs investment bank grouped Brazil together with Russia, India, and China (the so- called "BRIC" countries) to describe those emerging economies with such enormous economic potential that their economic strength would eclipse most developed countries by the year 2050. Brazil's

relative weight and importance relative to the West has only grown since the turn of the 21st century and is poised to continue to do so, given energy changes at the global level and a renewed global urgency to find energy alternatives to oil. Moreover, both Brazil and the United States are electoral democracies and are committed to non- 1 proliferation, market-led economies, and the social welfare of their citizens. All told, the casual observer could be forgiven for concluding
that Brazil is one of the United States' closest and most important strategic and economic partners. Yet the Camp David meeting belied a very different reality.

In spite of Brazil's economic heft and growing political importance in the global arena, it has not been prioritized in U.S. foreign policy decisions since the 1970s; before this time, Brazil was oftentimes treated as a strategic
partner and ally. Incongruent with Brazil's economic and strategic importance, the twenty-first century has seen scant operational discussions in Washington on cooperation with Brazil. The Camp David meeting was an anomaly to this pattern of ambivalence. This

is where a paradox in the U.S.-Brazil relationship emerges: Brazil is anything but an insignificant country by both global economic and political standards, yet it has apparently been treated as such by the United States since the mid 1970s. Many policymakers and the public alike seemingly have very little concept of U.S. policy toward Brazil. One high level State Department official even referred to Brazil as the "black hole" of U.S. foreign diplomacy given its size and significance in relation to the low degree of engagement and attention that emanate from the U.S. government.1 While the official statements between the two countries have been uniquely friendly, recalling a long history of bilateral bonds, this verbal commitment has not been backed by congruent examples of concrete policy cooperation or engagement at high levels since the late 1970s. 1 Anthony Harrington,
Ambassador to Brazil 1999-2001, Interview by Author, 12 June 2008. The Ambassador attributed this description of Washington's Brazil policy to another unnamed official. 2Hence, explanations

of U.S. policy toward Brazil based on the neglect assumption have in common the urgent appeal for the U.S. government to pay closer attention to Brazil. The sense of urgency belies Brazil's peaceful and friendly relationship with the United States, focusing instead on the perceived fleeting window of opportunity for engagement, and the hitherto missed opportunities in security, energy, and economic cooperation. William Perry expressed dismay at how "such a large and
influential country in the hemisphere [had] escaped a sustained interest from the legislative branch," calling Brazil "too important to ignore."9 The literature

overwhelmingly implores the United States to change its errant ways and wake up to the reality of Brazil's size, economic importance, and potential as a strategic ally. In claiming that the United States has ignored Brazil, implicit in the neglect assumption is the belief that any existent mid-level engagement is insufficient and
lacks gravitas or value. The widely-held acceptance of U.S. neglect of Brazil since the 1970s contrasted by the special relationship prior to this time raises interesting and obvious questions. Why did the United States apparently abandon its alliance with Brazil? If indeed the United States has neglected Brazil since the 1970s, what caused this shift? What were the factors that prompted attention between 1882 and the mid 1970s, and are those factors currently present? Finally, have new

factors emerged such as those centering around energy

development and agricultural trade which could prompt increased bilateral engagement? 9 William Perry,
"Brazil: Too Important to Ignore," CSIS Americas Program, Policy Papers on the Americas, VTL3 (15 July 1996). 6

When it comes to economic matters, the time is right to consult Brazil Blank 13 (Rebecca, Deputy Secretary of Commerce, Remarks on Strengthening U.S.-Brazil Relations at Columbia University Event in Rio
de Janeiro, Brazil, March 20, http://www.commerce.gov/news/deputy-secretary-speeches/2013/03/20/remarks-strengthening-us-brazilrelations-columbia-univers) So the

question is: Where do we go from here? What are the next steps in our journey together? We the next natural stage in the U.S.-Brazil relationship. From a foundation of robust exchange in goods, services, and investmentsall of which will continue to growwe are now moving into sharing knowledge, ideas and innovation. Leaders in both of our nations are beginning to understand the need for this type of outreach from our knowledge communities. There have never been more opportunities for the United States and Brazil to work together to encourage economic development and foster innovationoften at the same time.
are now embarking on

The US and Brazil cannot ignore incentives to consult Sotero 12 (Paulo, Director of the Brazil Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Why United States and Brazil
Will Pursue a More Productive Bilateral Relationship, Huffington Post, November 9, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/paulo-sotero/whyunited-states-and-bra_b_2102004.html)

The growing presence of Brazilian global companies in the United Stated, complementing traditionally strong American investments in Brazil, has created a two-way street where common interests are more visible and pressure both governments to recognize the benefits of working together or risk paying a political price for not doing so. Brazil's emergence as an substantive international actor and its rise as the world's sixth largest economy, have introduced new factors in Brazilian-American relationship that authorities and bureaucrats in Washington and Brasilia cannot afford to ignore. Once the host of numerous multinational companies from the United States and Europe, Brazil is now also home to dozens of Brazilian controlled multinational enterprises that have dramatically expanded their operations worldwide and, in particularly, in the United States. Some occupy substantial positions as investors in key markets, such as the meat, beer, regional aviation and special steel industries. The growing presence of Brazilian companies in the United States offers new perspective to matters such as the negotiation of a tax treaty that
the two countries have talked about for four decades.

*** Perms ***

SHOULD definition
Should is more than desirabilityits an obligation Summers 94 (Justice, Supreme Court of Oklahoma, Kelsey v. Dollarsaver Food Warehouse of Durant, The Oklahoma State Courts
Network, November 8, http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn14)

Certain contexts mandate a construction of the term "should" as more than merely indicating preference or desirability . Brown, supra at 1080-81 (jury instructions stating that jurors "should" reduce the amount of damages in proportion to the amount of contributory negligence of the plaintiff was held to imply an obligation
and to be more than advisory); Carrigan v. California Horse Racing Board, 60 Wash. App. 79, 802 P.2d 813 (1990) (one of the Rules of Appellate Procedure requiring that a party "should devote a section of the brief to the request for the fee or expenses" was interpreted to mean that a

party is

under an obligation to include the requested segment); State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958) ("should" would
mean the same as "shall" or "must" when used in an instruction to the jury which tells the triers they "should disregard false testimony").

Should demands immediacy Summers 94 (Justice, Supreme Court of Oklahoma, Kelsey v. Dollarsaver Food Warehouse of Durant, The Oklahoma State Courts
Network, November 8, http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn14) The legal question to be resolved by the court is whether the word "should"13 in the May 18 order connotes futurity or may be deemed a ruling in praesenti.14 The answer to this query is not to be divined from rules of grammar;15 it must be governed by the age-old practice culture of legal professionals and its immemorial language usage. To determine if the omission (from the critical May 18 entry) of the turgid phrase, "and the same hereby is", (1) makes it an in futuro ruling - i.e., an expression of what the judge will or would do at a later stage - or (2) constitutes an in in praesenti resolution of a disputed law issue, the trial judge's intent must be garnered from the four corners of the entire record.16 In

praesenti means literally "at the present time." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 792 (6th Ed. 1990). In legal parlance the phrase denotes that which in law is presently or immediately effective, as opposed to something that will or would become effective in the future [in futurol]. See Van Wyck v. Knevals, 106 U.S. 360, 365, 1
S.Ct. 336, 337, 27 L.Ed. 201 (1882).

A2 Perm do both
The permutation is abusive and a voting issue: First is Intrinsicness the affirmative does something thats neither in the plan or CP text 1. That moots the CP because they can just say that we can do both CPs are uniquely key to testing the affirmative 2. It destroys neg strategy perms that arent based on anything destroy predictability makes it impossible to predict every single scenario they could permute nullifies strat by allowing the aff to add new policy options 3. Destroys education we cant learn about the plan and have to focus on redundant theory debates 4. Ground No CP ground means that they can runs tons of affs that can easily be solved by another actor 5. Puts the aff in a double bind: either they lose because their perm is REALLY abusive or they lose because now we can make Intrinsicness arguments to all their harms and they have no advantage Second is timeframe the plan has to happen immediately the aff must stick by the time frame in the 1NC to avoid getting out of all neg args by altering uniqueness destroys neg ground

A2 Perm do the cp
The permutation is abusive and a voting issue First is severance the perm severs the certainty and desirability of the plan text 1. Destroys education they get to cut out part of their aff which means we only learn about part of their plan which skews our education in the round. 2. Fairness skews neg strategy - if we cant base our round strat on our 1NC links and the aff can just permute out of all of them the neg would never be able to win a round 3. Ground when the aff changes, none of the 1NC off case strategies will work independent reason to reject the team on potential abuse Second is timeframe the plan has to happen immediately the aff must stick by the time frame in the 1NC to avoid getting out of all neg args by altering uniqueness destroys neg ground Third is that it makes the affirmative not topical the perm proves that the aff is Unresolved behind their plan and not topical. This is an independent voting issue for jurisdiction

A2 Perm do the plan then cp

1. DOESNT SOLVE/ LINKS TO THE NET BEN: Fiat is immediate but the consultation must happen before in order to solve for US-Brazil relations 2. MOVING TARGET: By shifting the timeframe of the plan and CP they can shift their advocacy to avoid Das like politics and this KILLS NEG GROUND AND STRATEGY. The 1AC is the focus of the debate. If they can shift their advocacy that kills predictability and supports argumentative irresponsibility. 3. SEVERANCE Allowing rollbacks or amendments of the plan is skews the Negs strategy. The 1NC is the foundation for the Negatives strategy in the round and illegitimate perms create a time and strategy skew. The perm could result in the status quo, which is core NEG ground. 4. KILLS COMPETITION timeframe perms kill competitiveness of every counterplan even those that are mutually exclusive with the plan Counterplans are key ground for the Neg to test the aff from multiple angles and limit the topic.

A2 Perm do the plan and consult on other issues

1. INTRINSIC PERMS KILL NEG GROUND The permutation nullifies all of the 1NC by adding new policies. The 1NC is the foundation of Neg strat and intrinsicness makes the aff a moving target, killing neg ground and skewing time and strategy 2. KILLS EDUCATION The CP is key to test the Aff on whether or not the plan should be a simple unilateral policy versus one that should be consulted about or a multilateral action. The CP is key to this kind of policy education and critical thinking for the Aff to defend their form of policy making. 3. PERM IS NOT JUSTIFIED BY THE CP By not consulting NATO that becomes disadvantage ground. The affirmative chose to not include this action. The CP is not artificially competitive 4. Links to the Net-Benefit

*** Solvency ***

Cooperation Generic
Cooperation has benefits Now key Julia E. Sweig, Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies and Director for Latin America Studies, Samuel W. Bodman, James D. Wolfensohn, 2011, Global Brazil and U.S.-Brazil
Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Brazil_TFR_66.pdf
Cooperation between the United States and Brazil holds too much promise for miscommunication or inevitable disagreements to stand in the way of potential gains. A

strengthened U.S.-Brazil relationship could be the basis for economic growth in Brazil, the United States, and globally, as well as for lasting peace and democratic stability in the region, nuclear nonproliferation, international progress on combating climate change, development of a global renewable energy market, global food security, and more legitimate and effective international institutions. Presidents Obama and Rousseff have laid the groundwork for progress on many of these fronts. The moment to build on this positive foundation is now.

Brazil and the U.S. ought to cooperate to increase relations Julia E. Sweig, Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies and Director for Latin America Studies, Samuel W. Bodman, James D. Wolfensohn, 2011, Global Brazil and U.S.-Brazil
Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Brazil_TFR_66.pdf The Task Force recommends that U.S. policymakers recognize Brazils standing as a global actor, treat its emergence as an opportunity for the United States, and work with Brazil to develop complementary policies. Given Brazils rise over the past two decades, the United States must now alter its view of the region and
pursue a broader and more mature relationship with the new Brazil. It is time that the foreign policy of the United States reflects the new regional reality and adjusts to advance U.S. interests, given what has changed and the changes likely to come. Brazil

and the United States are now entering a period that has great potential to solidify a mature friendship, one that entails ever deepening trust in order to secure mutual benefits. This kind of relationship requires the two countries to move beyond their historic oscillation between misinterpretation, public praise, and rebuke, and instead approach both cooperation and inevitable disagreement with mutual respect and tolerance. The Task Force recommends open and regular communication between Obama and Rousseff and between senior officials of both countries. As Brazil continues to rise and the United States adapts to a multipolar order, frequent dialogue will help anticipate and diffuse tensions that will surface as each country reacts and adjusts to a new and evolving Overview 5 geopolitical dynamic. High-level contact will signal to each countrys bureaucracyhistorically distrustful of one anotherthat the relationship is a priority and that the success of each is in the others interest.

More dialogue needed Julia E. Sweig, Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies and Director for Latin America Studies, Samuel W. Bodman, James D. Wolfensohn, 2011, Global Brazil and U.S.-Brazil
Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Brazil_TFR_66.pdf If the United States and Brazil are invested in a serious and deepening relationship, their conversation must continue. As in U.S. relations with such powers as India, China, Russia, or Germany, frank and high

level dialogue with Brazil will allow both countries to identify, acknowledge, and manage issues of potential disagreement, which should not destabilize the relationship in its entirety.

Cuba/Venezuela is a good starting point for better US-Brazil relations Malamud and Garcia-Calvo 10 (Carlos and Carola, Professor of History of the Americas at the Universidad Nacional de
Educacin a Distancia and Director of the Latin American Department at the Instituto Universitario Ortega y Gasset , and Research Assistant, Elcano Royal Institute Research Assistant at the Elcano Royal Institute, The US in Brazils Foreign Policy (ARI), Real Instituto Elcano, March 3, http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/wps/portal/rielcano_eng/Content?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/elcano/elcano_in/zonas_in/usatransatlantic+dialogue/ari31-2010) TC In any case, a

bilateral relationship is a two-way street, and although Brazil has criticised some US decisions and positions in the region, and said repeatedly that Obama has done virtually nothing to create a new relationship with Latin America, the Brazilian government has not taken any firm steps either to strengthen its ties with Washington. Therefore, it is worth asking if its position on Cuba is the best way to do that, or if its constant concessions to Chvez are. The last one came from Dilma Rousseuf, Minister of the Presidency and candidate of the Workers Party in
the next presidential election, when she refrained from criticising nationalisations in Venezuela or Chvezs treatment of the Venezuelan news media. It would seem that Brazil

is willing to demand and receive things from the US without giving anything

in return.

Brazil will say YES Generic

Brazil wants consultation before US action in Latin America Hakim 10 (Peter, president emeritus and senior fellow of the Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington-based think tank on Western
Hemisphere affairs, US-Brazil Relations: Expect More Conflict, Inter-American Dialogue, October 21, http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=2490)

In the past year or so, the US and Brazil have squabbled over several hemispheric issuesas Brazil has taken on a more assertive role in Latin America. Brazil surprised and irritated the US and neighboring Colombia when it
joined nearly every other South American nation in opposing a newly announced military arrangement allowing US expanded access to Colombian military bases. By subsequently mending fences with Colombia and announcing its own, albeit more modest, military accord with

Brazil demonstrated a welcome flexibility and accommodation. It also made clear, however, that US military initiatives in South America henceforth require prior consultation and agreement from Brazilwhich is hardly an unreasonable demand. Indeed, this should be routine by now for Washington.
Washington,

When it comes to economic matters, the time is right to consult Brazil Blank 13 (Rebecca, Deputy Secretary of Commerce, Remarks on Strengthening U.S.-Brazil Relations at Columbia University Event in Rio
de Janeiro, Brazil, March 20, http://www.commerce.gov/news/deputy-secretary-speeches/2013/03/20/remarks-strengthening-us-brazilrelations-columbia-univers) So the

question is: Where do we go from here? What are the next steps in our journey together? We are now embarking on the next natural stage in the U.S.-Brazil relationship. From a foundation of robust exchange in goods, services, and investmentsall of which will continue to growwe are now moving into sharing knowledge, ideas and innovation. Leaders in both of our nations are beginning to understand the need for this type of outreach from our knowledge communities. There have never been more opportunities for the United States and Brazil to work together to encourage economic development and foster innovationoften at the same time.

Brazil wants to be consulted on regional matters Lyons 12 (John, Correspondent at The Wall Street Journal in Brazil U.S. Seeks an Ally in Brazil, The Wall Street Journal, April 8,
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304587704577332082752648096.html) TC

More than any single agreement, Ms. Rousseff may be seeking something that was a scarce commodity for the volatile nation in past decades: respect. The country's leaders have sought to be treated as a partner with the U.S. to be consulted on important regional issues since U.S. president Dwight Eisenhower visited Brazil in 1960. Brazil has sought a permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council essentially since the council came into existence. Such
demands used to draw mostly laughs. But that has begun to change with Brazil's economic growth. Mr. Obama is speeding up Brazilian travelvisa applications, in part because Brazilians are starting to outspend Europeans in key U.S. tourist destinations such as New York and Florida.

The US and Brazil cannot ignore incentives to consult Sotero 12 (Paulo, Director of the Brazil Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Why United States and Brazil
Will Pursue a More Productive Bilateral Relationship, Huffington Post, November 9, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/paulo-sotero/whyunited-states-and-bra_b_2102004.html)

The growing presence of Brazilian global companies in the United Stated, complementing traditionally strong American investments in Brazil, has created a two-way street where common interests are more visible and pressure both governments to recognize the benefits of working together or risk paying a political price for not doing so. Brazil's emergence as an substantive international actor and its rise as the world's sixth largest economy, have introduced new factors in Brazilian-American relationship that authorities and bureaucrats in Washington and Brasilia cannot afford to ignore. Once the host of numerous multinational companies from the United States and Europe, Brazil is now also home to dozens of Brazilian controlled multinational enterprises that have dramatically expanded

their operations worldwide and, in particularly, in the United States. Some occupy substantial positions as investors in key markets, such as the meat, beer, regional aviation and special steel industries. The growing presence of Brazilian companies in the United States offers new perspective to matters such as the negotiation of a tax treaty that
the two countries have talked about for four decades.

Brazil supports the US in Latin America Harkin 04 {Peter Harkin; foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, No.1 Jan-February 2004}
BRAZIL has never aggressively challenged U.S. goals in Latin America. It has not questioned the U.S. vision for hemispheric free trade arrangements enhanced security cooperation the collective defense of democracy; in fact, it has formally committed to working with Washington in each of these areas. Yet, more than any other Latin American nation, it has repeatedly demurred at Washington's ideas on how specific proposals and
initiatives should work in practice. Brazil is the only country in the region that has sufficient weight and independence to credibly challenge the United States.

Brazil says YES Cuba

US-Brazil cooperation is the way to spur US-Cuban relationsthe US cant act alone Sweig 12 (Julia E., Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies and Director for Latin America Studies, Council on
Foreign Relations, The Frozen U.S.-Cuba Relationship, Council on Foreign Relations, February 28, http://www.cfr.org/cuba/frozen-us-cubarelationship/p27510) TC The second point is what's

happening in Cuba. It's not realistic to expect the United States to undertake a series of unilateral moves toward normalization; it needs a willing partner. I believe we have one in Havana but
have failed to read the signals. Raul Castro has now been in office since the beginning of 2008. Raul holds the reins on both foreign policy and domestic policy, and, domestically, the politics of implementing a fairly wide range of economic and political and social reforms are his priority. In a deal that was coordinated with the help of the Cuban Catholic Church and Spain, he released all of the political prisoners in Cuba. He also is taking a number of steps that imply a major rewriting of the social contract in Cuba to shrink the size of the state and give Cuban individuals more freedom--economically, especially, but also in terms of speech--than we've seen in the last fifty years. He has privatized the residential real estate and car market[s], expanded much-needed agrarian reform, lifted caps on salaries, and greatly expanded space for small businesses. He also is moving to deal with corruption and to prepare the groundwork for a great deal more foreign investment. He's moving in the direction of the kind of reforms that every administration over the last fifty years has called upon Cuba to make, albeit under the rubric of a one-party system. There's

a broad range of cooperation--neighborhood security in the Gulf of Mexico, as Cuba has just started drilling for the two countries that is still not happening, and that gives me the impression that the United States has been unwilling to take "yes" for an answer and respond positively to steps taken by Cuba. Brazil is a regional power and a global power; it plays in a number of spaces well beyond Latin America. In the last couple of years it undertook some major investments, and those investments will grow in Cuba--in infrastructure, in agriculture, in perhaps energy as well, and others. Brazil is clearly stepping into a space where the United States should be, and the United States has made a decision to watch as that happens.
oil, counternarcotics, and natural disasters--between

Brazil wants to improve U.S. Cuba relations in order to remove the embargo Partlow 09 {Joshua Partlow; Washington post foreign service writer; Brazils president to Seek a Change in US
Approach; http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/03/13/AR2009031303032.html ; March 14, 2009}

Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim said in an interview that Brazil wants to find ways to improve relations between the United States and Cuba and to change the perception that Washington cares about Latin America only as a terrain for the war on drugs. Lula has also urged the United States to
reach a free-trade agreement with Colombia. "We would hope that the United States and the Obama administration would not look to Latin America and South America under the prism of drug trafficking. Drug trafficking is one problem, it's a serious problem, but the relation is much broader and otherwise it will be contaminated from the beginning," Amorim said. "If there is a message we would like to give, that would be one." Thomas A. Shannon Jr., the assistant secretary of state for Western Hemisphere affairs, said in an interview this week that current major initiatives with Brazil -- such as cooperation on developing biofuels, combating racial discrimination and fighting AIDS and malaria in Africa -- already operate well beyond the realm of drugs. "There's not a security or counter-drugs component to it," said Shannon, who described Brazil as being "on the verge of greatness" and as "the kind of partner we want."

Washington's policy toward Cuba is also of particular importance in the region, where the U.S. embargo is widely seen as an anachronistic failure. The Obama administration has eased travel restrictions to Cuba, and some observers expect the president to announce larger changes in U.S. policy toward the Caribbean nation around the time of the Summit of the Americas next month in Trinidad and Tobago. "I think we would certainly encourage dialogue, encourage the end of isolation," Amorim said, adding that ending restrictions on travel and sending money back to Cuba would
not be enough. "I think something bigger has to be done," he said.

A2 Brazil doesnt solve

Brazil on the rise now 3 reasons Meiman and Rothkopf 3/11/09 [Kellie Meiman and David Rothkopf, Staff writers for Real Clear
Politics, The United States and Brazil: Two perspectives on dealing with partnership and rivalry, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/03/pdf/brazil.pdf, PS]
The choice of using the G-20 as the mechanism to coordinate the international response to the crisis rather than the G-8 was a signal of the growing centrality that

leading emerging powers such as Brazil must play in effecting any meaningful international response to the global markets meltdown. In addition, Brazil also hosted in late 2008 a summit of Latin American heads of state that did not include the United States, a clear message concerning Brazils sense of regional leadership as well as the growing desire among nations throughout the hemisphere to shake off what has been seen as the paternalistic embrace of the United States. These international meetings are but a few indicators among many that have come during the past eight years that the Obama administration is inheriting a relationship with Brazil that will almost certainly be dramatically different from nearly a decade ago. As they assess the situation, U.S. policymakers will see that Brazils rise is due to several key factors. First and foremost is Brazils economic growth, which is the result of both sound economic management and stabilization of the currency, and of Brazils emerging role as a leading commodity provider to many of the other fastest growing nations in the world, notably those
in Asia. As one observer put it, referring to Brazils agricultural exports, the country has built a massive industry exporting rain to China. The reference is to the fact that Brazils climate possesses many attributes that are in scarce supply in Asias two BRICs China and India which has propelled Brazil to the top position in the export of many critical food products. The

countrys great mineral resources augmented by recent very promising and substantial petroleum and natural gas finds have amplified the agricultural boom. So, too, has the countrys pioneering efforts in the area of biofuels, the growth of its financial sectorthe regions largest by farand a host of other factors. But beyond economic factors, the administration of Brazilian President Luiz Ignacio Lula da Silva thanks to the deft leadership and communications skills of the president himself and the tireless and enterprising efforts of his foreign minister Celso Amorimhas made itself a critical player in a host of international issues from leading the developing world position at critical intervals in the global trade round to playing a role as an effective mediator in critical regional disputes. As a consequence of these changes, for the first time there is serious talk among policymakers worldwide about Brazil assuming a permanent place at the head table of the international community. Initially, this
may come through continuing its role in the G-20, and having that group assume greater responsibilities, some of which were once the exclusive province of the G-8. But as the size of the G-20 is unwieldy and a number of its members clearly not of the same economic or political status as the largest developed and developing countries, there have been serious proposalssuch as that of World Bank President Robert Zoellickto shape a new alternative to the G-8, perhaps a G-12 or G-14, which could become the principal coordinating group on global economic matters.

A2 Normal Means
CP normal means for energy policyStrategic Energy Dialogue Meyer 13 (Peter J., Analyst in Latin American Affairs, Brazil-US Relations, Congressional Research Center, February 27,
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33456.pdf)

Energy has been another important area of U.S.-Brazilian cooperation in recent years. Brazil is widely regarded as a world leader in energy policy for successfully reducing its reliance on foreign oil through the development of
alternative energy resources and increased domestic production. In addition to being the worlds second-largest producer of ethanol (after the United States), Brazil currently generates 85% of its electricity through hydropower. Brazil also has recently discovered large offshore oil deposits that have the potential to turn the country into a major oil and gas producer and an important source of energy for the United States.106 To

facilitate greater cooperation in the development of safe, secure, and affordable energy, President Obama and President Rousseff launched a Strategic Energy Dialogue in March 2011.

A2 Status Quo
Current cooperative relations dont solve Julia E. Sweig, Nelson and David Rockefeller Senior Fellow for Latin America Studies and Director for Latin America Studies, Samuel W. Bodman, James D. Wolfensohn, 2011, Global Brazil and U.S.-Brazil
Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/Brazil_TFR_66.pdf The richest and deepest connections between Brazil and the United States tend not to involve direct bilateral relations between the governments, but rather third-country or subnational collaboration and private-sector partnerships. Some of the most promising collaborations between Brazil and the United States take place outside both countries borders on counternarcotics, health and development goals, promotion of decent work, and biofuels cooperation. The Task Force finds that there is ample room for the federal governments of the United States and Brazil to capitalize on the relationships being built in third countries and by the countries governors, private sectors, trade unions, and civil society organizations. The growth of these secondary and tertiary interactions presents an opportunity to build confidence and demonstrate commonality to the two societies, at the same time laying the groundwork for more structured bilateral relations that benefit from the confidence and partnerships already in place.

*** Impact Scenarios ***

2NC Democracy
DPT true empirics and studies prove Placek 2/18/12 [Kevin Placek, Research Intern at the Japan Chair, Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS), The Democratic Peace Theory, http://www.e-ir.info/2012/02/18/thedemocratic-peace-theory/, PS] Proponents of the normative/cultural perspective, by contrast, argue that shared democratic and liberal values best explain the peace that exists between democratic states. According to this view, democratic political culture encourages peaceful means of conflict resolution which are extended beyond the domestic political process to other democratic states because leaders in both countries hold a reasonable expectation that their counterparts will also be able to work out their differences peacefully. Political ideology, therefore, determines how democracies distinguish allies from adversaries: democracies that represent and act in their citizens interests are treated with respect and consideration, whereas nondemocracies that use violence and oppression against their own people are regarded with mistrust and suspicion. The importance of perception means that even if a particular state has enlightened citizens and liberal-democratic institutions, unless other democratic states regard it as a genuine liberal democracy then the democratic peace proposition will not hold. This argument can, therefore, explain a number of contentious cases: Americans did not consider England democratic in 1812 because England was a monarchy (War of 1812) and liberals in the Union did not consider the Confederacy a liberal democracy because of their use of slavery (American Civil War).
Although some scholars regard the institutional and normative explanations as mutually exclusive, a much more intuitive and persuasive defence of the democratic peace theory emerges from combining these two viewpoints. Thus, the

particular democratic practices that make war with other liberal democracies unlikely free and fair elections, the rule of law, free press, a competitive party system are driven by both converging expectations about what conventional behaviour is likely to be (institutions) and standards for what behaviour ought to be (norms). These two explanations are complimentary and mutually reinforcing: cultural norms influences the creation and evolution of
political institutions, and institutions help generate a more peaceful moral culture over time. A great deal of criticism of the democratic peace theory is focused on methodology. It is argued that the subjectivity of the specifics definitions adopted in such highly empirical studies is likely to significantly affect the results, making it difficult to validate the theory with certainty. But this is largely undermined by a

large number of studies that show democracies are highly unlikely to fight each other irrespective of the definition of democracy, the type of cases considered, or the dispute/war threshold. Furthermore, there has already been a significant increase in the number of democratic-democratic dyads from less than 2% of all political dyads in the 19th century, to 13% from 1900-1945, and 11% over the 1946-89 period without any major conflict.

Energy cooperation key to solve democracy and promote U.S. policies in LAC Langevin 12 (Mark S. Langevin, Ph.D. Associate Adjunct Professor of Government and Politics at the
University of Maryland-University College, a Contributing Faculty at Walden Universitys Graduate School of Public Policy and Administration) (Energy and Brazil-United States Relations A Discussion Paper, Brazil works, Sep 19, 2012, https://docs.google.com/file/d/0B7MqlY1WLL8eZnJUNGxxZlpSQi1KcGRlYUlOeHRRZw/edit?usp=dr ive_web) We are approaching a seminal moment when Brazil and the United States share many key objectives in the hemisphere Brazil can and should be a crucial player with the United States in sustaining economic reform and democracy, in promoting free trade and open markets, and in combating narcotics, terrorism, and trans regional crime If we want to sustain democracy, it wont happen if democracy fails in Brazil. None of these fundamental U.S. policies will work in the end without Brazil. Brazil is the
fulcrum (Council on Foreign Relations 2001). Interestingly, the 2001 CFR task force did not mention the importance of energy as either a

bilateral or regional policy priority. In sharp contrast, in 2011 the CFR composed another independent task force that issued the report, Global Brazil and U.S.-Brazil Relations, and asserted that

energy is and will remain a critical component of Brazils economic and political agenda, driven by rising per capita energy consumption, development of substantial domestic energy resources, and the need to expand existing energy infrastructure. Brazils investment in this industry is a primary example of its domestic and international agendas reinforcing each other. The United States and Brazil have common interests in improving energy efficiency, reducing carbon intensity, promoting the development of biofuels, expanding the use of natural gas, and managing offshore oil exploration and development(Council on Foreign Relations 2011:31). This most recent CFR report acknowledges Brazils noteworthy rise as a global power in the last decade and analyzes the multiplying importance of energy at the global, bilateral, and national levels of policymaking for both countries. In many respects, this CFR taskforce recognized and the Obama administration is carefully measuring Brazils newly gained geopolitical weight earned from the discovery of the massive, offshore pre-salt hydrocarbon reserves in 2006. There are other energy issues of mutual interest, but it is
petroleum that now drives foreign policy discussions and offers the greatest challenges and opportunities for bilateral partnership.

2NC Relations
A cooperative, bilateral relationship would benefit the US Meiman and Rothkopf 3/11/09 [Kellie Meiman and David Rothkopf, Staff writers for Real Clear
Politics, The United States and Brazil: Two perspectives on dealing with partnership and rivalry, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/03/pdf/brazil.pdf, PS] The combination of Brazils clear emergence on the world stage and the United States need to reassert itself as a multilateralist creates potential to forge a partnership born of overlapping interests. This is a moment when both Brazil and the United States need to prove themselves. Brazil needs to show that it is prepared to make hard decisions tied to the role of global stakeholder, as it has done in Haiti by maintaining a critical peacekeeping presence in the troubled Caribbean nation. And the United States must show that the era of U.S. unilateralism is over. Today, Brazil is more outward looking from a diplomatic and business perspective than at any point in its history, and would make a beneficial partner for the United States as we confront the next four years. To bear fruit, however, the relationship must be built on a positive, well-coordinated agenda,
not as a reaction to difficult regional and global circumstances. Active maintenance of this initiative must come from the highest levels of both governments, without sacrificing the autonomy of each countrys foreign policy. Even though Brazil will not agree with the United States on

it is in the United States interest to forge a cooperative, bilateral relationship . Brazil has much to contribute in regard to integrating emerging powers and technologies into international frameworks, as well as an active interest in growing its global stakeholder role. Brazil should be encouraged to seize this mantle in a meaningful way.
every issue,

An international commercial policy is uniquely key to collaboration Meiman and Rothkopf 3/11/09 [Kellie Meiman and David Rothkopf, Staff writers for Real Clear
Politics, The United States and Brazil: Two perspectives on dealing with partnership and rivalry, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/03/pdf/brazil.pdf, PS] Whereas competitiveness-focused policy was once viewed as serving primarily U.S. interests, Brazilian companies and industries are now in a secure position internationally, having conquered markets globally. We need to cultivate an environment where Brazil and the United States can collaborate on international commercial policy in a pragmatic fashion, as in the U.S. relationship with Europe. This will not eliminate economic disputes; we still have many fights with our European friends. A pragmatic approach on trade and investment policy, however, will allow us to pursue our shared interests in a way that has the potential to be exceptionally effective,
assuming both sides see this dialogue as mutually reinforcing our individual interests.

Consultation on issues such as trade will solve relations Burnett 13 (Alistair, editor of Radio 4's The World Tonight, Brazil and the US Not on Same Page, YaleGLobal, April 12,
http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/brazil-and-us-%E2%80%93-not-same-page) TC RIO DE JANEIRO: Relations

between the two giant democracies of the Americas, Brazil and the US, should be easy. After

all, the two countries have much in common. Both are complex societies, with territory stretching across their respective continents and a history of European colonists taking land from indigenous Americans. Granting differences between British and Portuguese colonial traditions, both were built by immigrants, most who came willingly and others like slaves, indentured servants or prisoners who didnt. Both are well-established democratic federal republics. Yet,

when it comes to foreign policy and trade relations there are constant tensions. These could be addressed soon, with reports that President Dilma Rousseff will make a formal state visit to the
United States, the first of a Brazilian leader in two decades. US diplomats and analysts take the view that Brazil is often unhelpful, by which they seem to mean it doesnt always support US policy. For their part, the Brazilians

say the US doesnt want to accept that

the world has changed and Washington cant accept that it must deal with emerging economies on an equal footing.

*** Theory ***

A2 Consult CP Abusive
1. Key to test the word resolved & should which imply definite action, and tests United States Federal Government since the counterplan is multilateral. This proves they are both predictable and key to neg ground. American Heritage Dictionary 04 http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=should 2. Key to education A) We are topic-specific our 1NC link cards prove African aid is intimately tied to ____________. B) Its critical to geopolitical and foreign policy relations which is key to debate because thats the purpose of debate. C) Key to U.S. foreign policy debate
John Ikenberry 04, professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton, 10-23-2004 http://www.utexas.edu/lbj/news/fall2004/Ikenberry_article.pdf.

At the heart of the debate between conservative and liberal visions of unipolar order are judgements about the costs and benefits of binding US power to wider global groupings. The Bush
administration has calculated that the costs of lost policy autonomy, and national sovereignty, is greater than the gains from co-operation. The liberal calculation is that the lost autonomy associated with making binding commitments is worth less than the rewards generated by the institutional bargain. The Bush calculation has been that although other states will withhold co-operation, in a unipolar world this means little. The liberal calculation is that an international order with rules and institutions that are embraced by other states opens up the possibilities for a thousand acts of diffuse reciprocity each week.

3. Not a moving target We will always defend that Brazil says yes and the counterplan solves all of the case. 4. Impact turning the net benefit checks abuse Affirmatives always have the option of impact turning the terminal impact such as LAC relations bad, etc. 5. Probabilistic solvency deficit checks abuse The counterplan guarantees delay and potential veto.

6. We arent conditional fiat We will always defend that we consult Brazil over the affirmative plan, which gives the affirmative stable ground to straight turn the counterplan. 7. Key to competitive equity Consultation is key to check new affs and is a neg right to have a strategy to defeat new affs. 8. Best policy option We have an obligation to assess the quality of the counterplan versus the plan as policy-makers. The counterplan is a reason to reject the affirmative through opportunity cost 9. Generic equalizer Consult gives equal chance for underdogs to beat powerhouses which is key for people to join debate. 10. Key to solve 2AC add-ons Without them, the aff would always be able to kill any counterplan by reading a new add-ons. 11. Stealing aff ground is inevitable Kritiks, floating PICs, agent counterplans, and many others skew resolutional focus.

*** Net Benefit ***

Coop with Brazil on Cuba doesnt link to PTX Commander Carlos Iglesias, United States Navy, 2012, United States Security Policy Implications of a
Post-Fidel Cuba, U.S. Army War College, http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA560408
On the other hand, this international

dissention does hold some prospect for leveraging U.S. soft power. An indirect approach would be to coordinate U.S. proxy actions with partner countries interested in Cuba. This has the double benefit of leveraging U.S. soft power without compromising legislated restrictions or provoking hard-line Cuban-American ire. In this approach, burgeoning relations with Brazil and Mexico would be strong candidates. Devoid of the bullhorn diplomacy that have marginalized U.S.-Cuban policy efficacy for decades, the U.S. could better engage the island through hemispherical interlocutors. At a minimum, U.S. interests would be advanced through the proxy insights of what is occurring on the island in addition to the potential displacement of anti-American influences (e.g. Chvez).100

AFF ANSWERS

Brazil says No Generic

No US-Brazil cooperation in Latin Americaspecifically Cuba and Venezuela Hakim 12 (Peter, president emeritus and senior fellow of the Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington-based think tank on Western
Hemisphere affairs, Brazil and the US Security Agenda, Inter-American Dialogue, February 6, http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=2855) TC Similarly, the

US and Brazil are on polar opposite sides of nearly every issue dealing with Cuba . Brazil has also supported the development of new multilat-eral institutions in Latin America that ex-clude US participation, and could potentially further curb US influence in the region. In neither case, however, is US security a particular concern. Nor are the differing US and Brazilian approaches to Hugo Chavezs Venezuela. Many in Washington view Chavez as serious security problem and would welcome Brazil treating him more like a threat. But
Brazils good relations with the Venezuelan leader sometimes benefit the US by allow-ing Brazil to help, at least on occasion, to moderate his virulent anti-Americanism. Some disagreements, however, have raised important US security concerns. Brazil delivered its most forceful challenge to the US security agenda in Latin America in 2010, when it denounced a new US-Colombia security pact. Washington and Bogota had both considered the pact to be little more than a natural continuation of past bilateral anti-drug, anti-guerrilla cooperation. Moreover, the US viewed the Colombia agreementwhich formalized US access to several Colombian basesas a replacement for its continued use of Manta Air Base in Ecuador, which President Correa abrogated when the US lease on Manta ran out. Brazils disapproval mobilized opposition to the US-Colombia pact from nearly every South American country. The impasse was resolved when the Colombian Supreme Court declared the treaty unconstitutional because it had never been presented for legislative consideration. Since then, President Juan Manuel Santos has simply deferred any further action on the accord.

Brazil nervous of U.S. cooperation Robert and Maxwell 1 (Steven and Kenneth R., a British historian who specializes in Iberia and Latin America, longtime member
of the Council on Foreign Relations, for fifteen years he headed its Latin America Studies Program, A Letter to the President and a Memorandum on U.S. Policy Toward Brazil, Nova York: Council on Foreign Relations, February 12) TC

It takes two in order to build a sustained and positive relationship. Is Brazil ready? Given past history, we anticipate that Brazil will be skeptical about a new U.S. initiative. The perception in Brazil is that the United States has in the past been inconsistent in its approaches and has not always delivered on promises of greater engagement and consultation. There have been moments of close historical rapprochement between the United States and Brazil to be sure, as well as moments of estrangement. This history will influence the way Brazilians react to U.S. initiatives, and it is important to bear this in mind. The Baro do Rio Branco, the founder of Brazilian diplomacy, promoted the idea of a
special relationship with the United States. Thomas Jefferson also anticipated a special role for Brazil and the United States within an "American system" predating the Monroe Doctrine. This positive tradition brought major benefits for the United States. During the Spanish American War in 1898, the Brazilian Admiralty turned over a number of European ship-building contracts to the United States in order to increase American naval strength; from 1917 to 1918 during World War I the Brazilian Navy patrolled the Atlantic; from 1944 to 1945 more than 25,000 combat troops of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force (FEB) joined Allied efforts in Italy, taking enormous casualties at the battlefields of Monte Castello; also during World War II, Brazil provided the United States with key bases in the northeast for Atlantic operations; and in 1965 Brazilian troops were dispatched to the Dominican Republic. Most officers of the Brazilian General Staff until the mid-1980s were veterans of the FEB and proud of their association with the U.S. Army during World War II. Under the auspices of Nelson Rockefeller, during the 1940s Brazilian-American cultural relations reached a high point of interaction, cross-fertilization, and mutual discovery.

Brazil is skeptical of the United States Einaudi 11 (Luigi R., Acting Secretary General of the Organization of American States 2004, Brazil and the United States: The Need for
Strategic Engagement, INSS, March 2011, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/docuploaded/SF%20266%20Einaudi.pdf) TC

As much as both countries need it, however, improved cooperation may require them to make changes for which they are not yet ready.44 Depending somewhat on their politics, many Brazilians will be dubious about cooperation with the United States as long as it continues to massively subsidize and protect key

agricultural products, maintains an embargo on Cuba, is thought by important political groups to have ambitions on the Amazon or troops in South America, or fails to endorse Brazils UN Security Council ambitions. Similarly, some in the United States will question working closely with a Brazil that they see
as enjoying the luxuries of the irresponsible until it accepts greater responsibility on nuclear nonproliferation (including more UN monitoring of its facilities), distances itself from Iran, is more present on democracy and human rights issues (in the Middle East, Cuba, Iran, and Venezuela), is more active on these issues at the UN and OAS, and generally treats the United States better in its diplomacy than it has often done recently.

Brazil says No Venezuela

Brazil wont help Venezuela conflicting governments Zibechi 10/2/12 [Ral Zibechi, a researcher in social movements, journalist and writer. He is a
columnist and international analyst for La Jornada., Brazil is covering Venezuela's back , http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/oct/02/brazil-has-venezuela-back, PS]
For most analysts, the political regimes of Venezuela and Brazil are very different. Some governments, such as Barack Obama's, suggest the

two regimes are opposites, even conflicting. But the solid alliance between the two countries, overlooked by the media, does not mesh with these simplistic analyses. The Venezulean government of Hugo Chvez is accused of being populist and authoritarian, because the state plays a central role in the economy and society, and the regime of showing a dangerous tendency towards single-party politics that makes it very similar to that of Cuba. The Brazilian governments of Luiz Incio Lula da Silva (2003-10) and Dilma Rousseff, on the other hand, support private companies and have a good relationship with the opposition, to the extent that half a dozen parties, ranging from communist to centre-right, make up the government led by the Workers party. The leading players in Brazilian media, such as Rede Globo, do not mention the existence of censorship in the country. One of the main differences between the two countries is the relationship between the state and civil society. In Brazil, social movements such as Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Terra (Landless Workers' Movement), arose against the state. In Venezuela, they were created to a great extent by the state after Chvez got to power. The conservative media consider Venezuela to be a potential danger for the security of the US and a threat to democracy and its neighbours. We should remember that the George W Bush administration assigned Brazil the role
of "moderating" Venezuela's alleged radical impulses. What these analyses fail to explain is why two regimes that are meant to be opposites and incompatible with one another have established the most solid strategic alliance in the region, as solid or more so as that of Brazil and Argentina.

No US-Brazil cooperation in Venezuela Hakim 12 (Peter, president emeritus and senior fellow of the Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington-based think tank on Western
Hemisphere affairs, Brazil and the US Security Agenda, Inter-American Dialogue, February 6, http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=2855) TC Similarly, the

US and Brazil are on polar opposite sides of nearly every issue dealing with Cuba . Brazil has also supported the development of new multilat-eral institutions in Latin America that ex-clude US participation, and could potentially further curb US influence in the region. In neither case, however, is US security a particular concern. Nor are the differing US and Brazilian approaches to Hugo Chavezs Venezuela. Many in Washington view Chavez as serious security problem and would welcome Brazil treating him more like a threat. But
Brazils good relations with the Venezuelan leader sometimes benefit the US by allow-ing Brazil to help, at least on occasion, to moderate his virulent anti-Americanism. Some disagreements, however, have raised important US security concerns. Brazil delivered its most forceful challenge to the US security agenda in Latin America in 2010, when it denounced a new US-Colombia security pact. Washington and Bogota had both considered the pact to be little more than a natural continuation of past bilateral anti-drug, anti-guerrilla cooperation. Moreover, the US viewed the Colombia agreementwhich formalized US access to several Colombian basesas a replacement for its continued use of Manta Air Base in Ecuador, which President Correa abrogated when the US lease on Manta ran out. Brazils disapproval mobilized opposition to the US-Colombia pact from nearly every South American country. The impasse was resolved when the Colombian Supreme Court declared the treaty unconstitutional because it had never been presented for legislative consideration. Since then, President Juan Manuel Santos has simply deferred any further action on the accord.

Brazil says No Cuba

No US-Brazil cooperation in Cuba Hakim 12 (Peter, president emeritus and senior fellow of the Inter-American Dialogue, a Washington-based think tank on Western
Hemisphere affairs, Brazil and the US Security Agenda, Inter-American Dialogue, February 6, http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=2855) TC Similarly, the

US and Brazil are on polar opposite sides of nearly every issue dealing with Cuba . Brazil has also supported the development of new multilat-eral institutions in Latin America that ex-clude US participation, and could potentially further curb US influence in the region. In neither case, however, is US security a particular concern. Nor are the differing US and Brazilian approaches to Hugo Chavezs Venezuela. Many in Washington view Chavez as serious security problem and would welcome Brazil treating him more like a threat. But
Brazils good relations with the Venezuelan leader sometimes benefit the US by allow-ing Brazil to help, at least on occasion, to moderate his virulent anti-Americanism. Some disagreements, however, have raised important US security concerns. Brazil delivered its most forceful challenge to the US security agenda in Latin America in 2010, when it denounced a new US-Colombia security pact. Washington and Bogota had both considered the pact to be little more than a natural continuation of past bilateral anti-drug, anti-guerrilla cooperation. Moreover, the US viewed the Colombia agreementwhich formalized US access to several Colombian basesas a replacement for its continued use of Manta Air Base in Ecuador, which President Correa abrogated when the US lease on Manta ran out. Brazils disapproval mobilized opposition to the US-Colombia pact from nearly every South American country. The impasse was resolved when the Colombian Supreme Court declared the treaty unconstitutional because it had never been presented for legislative consideration. Since then, President Juan Manuel Santos has simply deferred any further action on the accord.

Brazil says No Mexico

Brazil wouldnt help Mexico competing economies Leff 6/19/12 [Alex Leff, the Americas editor for GlobalPost, moving back to the US after being its Costa
Rica correspondent since the website's inception. Alex was also Costa Rica stringer for Reuters. Previously the Tico Times online editor, Alex also contributed to such publications as Miami Herald, Voice of San Diego and Americas Quarterly as well as appeared as commentator on BBC radio and CBC television, Mexico vs Brazil: Whos winning?, http://www.globalpost.com/dispatches/globalpostblogs/chatter/mexico-vs-brazil-brics-emerging-economies-g20, PS] Off the field, though, the countries are jockeying to outdo one another as Latin Americas economic powerhouse, and it isnt always so friendly. By name, Brazil has a clear early lead. It branded the B in BRICS that nifty acronym for the worlds largest emerging economies, also including Russia, India, China and South Africa. At the turn of the noughts, when the term was coined, Mexico's growth paled in comparison. But the club could one day make way for M (BRICMS?), for Mexico, host of world leaders attending this weeks Group
of 20 meeting. On Wednesday, not to be outdone, Brazil takes the stage hosting world leaders at the Rio+20 sustainable development conference. Mexico

could become a "developed nation" within 15 years, predicts Carlos Slim, the world's richest man a Mexican. Last year Mexicos economy grew faster than Brazils and this year it looks set to do it again. Last week, the United Nations Latin America commission put 2012 economic growth for Mexico at 4 percent, and Brazil at just 2.7 percent. This year tensions mounted between the two countries over Mexicos rising auto exports to Brazil. In March, the former bowed to latter, choosing to reduce its car sales to Brazil. Reuters aptly pointed out: The dispute has undermined relations between Latin America's top two economies and laid bare the differences between free-trade disciple Mexico and Brazil, which is increasingly resorting to protectionist measures. Meanwhile, Mexicos auto production and exports of cars and trucks have hit record highs, Bloomberg reports. But its not just cars. The New York Times says, Mexican factories are exporting record quantities of televisions, cars, computers and appliances, replacing some Chinese imports in the United States.

Destroys Relations
The plan will lead to an increased division wrecks relations Meiman and Rothkopf 3/11/09 [Kellie Meiman and David Rothkopf, Staff writers for Real Clear
Politics, The United States and Brazil: Two perspectives on dealing with partnership and rivalry, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/03/pdf/brazil.pdf, PS] It should be quickly added, of course, that each of these institutional rebuilding processes contains not just the seeds
for cooperation, but also

the potential for fomenting greater division between the United States and

Brazil. As a developed and a developing country, it is only natural that the natural countries self-interests are at odds on certain key issues. Similarly, as economic competitorswith regard to the production of agricultural products for example divisions are natural. The United States helped establish the status quo and is served by it. Brazil must change that status quo in order to grow and evolve. The United States wants to limit the nuclear club, while Brazil has among the most advanced peaceful nuclear programs in Latin America, even
though it has chafed at international inspections of its facilities in the past, and its president has scoffed at what he perceives as the unfairness of the international nuclear regime. Security Council permanent members want to protect their prerogatives, outsiders want to share them.

The United States has a special role within organizations such as the World Bank or the InterAmerican Development Bank, Brazil wants a greater role commensurate with its changing stature. Consequently, each of these issues is likely to create new tensions or exacerbate old ones in the relationship. The answer in the long run and the answer for diplomats seeking to minimize tension is the same; deals will be cut and trade-offs will be made.
The question for Brazil will beis the United States acting in good faith to help us advance our interests wherever it is not in direct conflict with theirs?

Brazil wouldnt support the US Meiman and Rothkopf 3/11/09 [Kellie Meiman and David Rothkopf, Staff writers for Real Clear
Politics, The United States and Brazil: Two perspectives on dealing with partnership and rivalry, http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/03/pdf/brazil.pdf, PS] Any real or perceived interference in the region by the United States would greatly upset Brazil. If the United States decided that heavy-handed political pressure or intervention were required in regard, for example, to Venezuela, Bolivia, or Ecuador, this could put Brazil in an uncomfortable position where it has to choose between the United States and its neighbors . Since Brazil has spent years arguing for it would likely choose its neighbors oreven more likelychoose to interject itself as a third party with a third point of view. If economic pressures forced President Chavez to play the old populist card of
South American unity, going after the regional bogeyman the United States, then perhaps through a series of ever-increasing provocationsincluding expanding his on-going flirtations with the Syrians, the Iranians, the Russiansthis

could get out of hand and be seen as a test for the Obama administration that it could not shy away from. This hypothetical situation could become a reality sooner than later. The recent referendum eliminating term limits for elected officials in Venezuela is a development that
could eventually trigger some form of U.S. interventiondirect or indirectin the country. Though Venezuela is a key supplier of oil to the United States, putting the latter in a delicate position with regard to carrying out a more interventionist foreign policy, further consolidation of power in the hands of Hugo Chavez could eventually lead the United States to adopt different tactics.

Relations Already High

US-Brazil relations are positive nowcooperation on an array of issues Meyer 13 (Peter J., Analyst in Latin American Affairs, Brazil-US Relations, Congressional Research Center, February 27,
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33456.pdf) As its economy has grown to be the seventh largest in the world, Brazil has utilized its newfound economic power to consolidate its influence in South America and play a larger role in international affairs. The

Obama Administrations National Security Strategy recognizes Brazil as an emerging center of influence, and welcomes the countrys leadership on bilateral, hemispheric, and global issues. U.S.-Brazil relations generally have been positive in recent
years, though Brazil has prioritized strengthening relations with neighboring countries and expanding ties with nontraditional partners in the developing South. While some foreign policy disagreements have emerged, the

United States and Brazil continue to engage on issues such as security, energy, trade, human rights, and the environment.

Consult CPs Bad

Consult CPs are a VOTER: 1. There is an infinite amount of organizations, countries, etc. that the USFG could consultthis kills predictability which is key to fair, educational debates and in-round clash. 2. Aff research burden: its IMPOSSIBLE for the Affirmative to research all of the possible agents that could be consulted and defend their plan against these. This kills education. 3. Moots Aff offensedoes the plan but adds consultation before the affs implementation, they steal affirmative ground and offense, this kills all aff ability to attack the counterplan.

SHOULD definition
Resolved does not require immediacy OPTED 9 (Old Plain Text English Dictionary, a public domain English word list dictionary, Definitions from The Online Plain Text English
Dictionary: Resolve One Look Dictionary Search, 2009, http://www.onelook.com/?other=web1913&w=Resolve)

Resolve (v. i.) To form a purpose; to make a decision; especially, to determine after reflection ; as, to resolve on a
better course of life.

Should expresses probability AHD 92 (American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, 1992 (4ed); Pg. 1612)
Should2. Used to express probability or expectation:
They should arrive at noon.

Should means desirable --- this does not have to be a mandate AC 99 (Atlas Collaboration, Use of Shall, Should, May Can, http://rd13doc.cern.ch/Atlas/DaqSoft/sde/inspect/shall.html)
shall 'shall' describes something that is mandatory. If a requirement uses 'shall', then that requirement _will_ be satisfied without fail. Noncompliance is not allowed. Failure to comply with one single 'shall' is sufficient reason to reject the entire product. Indeed, it must be rejected under these circumstances. Examples: # "Requirements shall make use of the word 'shall' only where compliance is mandatory." This is a good example. # "C++ code shall have comments every 5th line." This is a bad example. Using 'shall' here is too strong. should 'should'

is weaker. It describes something that might not be satisfied in the final product, but that is desirable enough that any noncompliance shall be explicitly justified. Any use of 'should' should be examined carefully, as it
probably means that something is not being stated clearly. If a 'should' can be replaced by a 'shall', or can be discarded entirely, so much the better. Examples: # "C++ code should be ANSI compliant." A good example. It may not be possible to be ANSI compliant on all platforms, but we should try. # "Code should be tested thoroughly." Bad example. This 'should' shall be replaced with 'shall' if this requirement is to be stated anywhere (to say nothing of defining what 'thoroughly' means).