Remedial Law Doctrines

Wednesday, August 8, 2012

IT IS A WELL-SETTLED RULE THAT A PARTY WHO DELIBERATELY ADOPTS A CERTAIN THEORY UPON WHICH THE CASE WAS DECIDED BY THE LOWER COURT WILL NOT BE PERMITTED TO CHANGE [IT] ON APPEAL.
It is a well-settled rule that a party who deliberately adopts a certain theory upon which the case was decided by the lower court will not be permitted to change [it] on appeal.( Pasco v. Pison-Arceo Agricultural and Development Corporation, G.R. o. !"##$!, %arch &', &$$", ('# )*R+ #!(, #&,..etitioner is bound by the statements and stipulations he made while the case was being heard in the lower courts.( Roman Catholic Archbishop of Caceres v. Heirs of Manuel Abella, G.R. o. !(,#!$, o/ember &,, &$$#, (0" )*R+ !, '.- In Manila Electric Company v. Benamira,( #$! .hil. "&! (&$$#-.we said1 [I]t is a 2undamental rule o2 procedure that higher courts are precluded 2rom entertaining matters neither alleged in the pleadings nor raised during the proceedings below, but /entilated 2or the 2irst time only in a motion 2or reconsideration or on appeal. 3he indi/idual respondents are bound by their submissions that +4)I)I is their employer and they should not be permitted to change their theory. )uch a change o2 theory cannot be tolerated on appeal, not due to the strict application o2 procedural rules but as a matter o2 2airness. + change o2 theory on appeal is ob5ectionable because it is contrary to the rules o2 2air play, 5ustice and due process. (Id. at ",'.- (R D !" M R!A #$. C RA% & &'$P(R $ )(!M &*( (* A!., +.R. & . ,-,,./, D(C(M)(R -, 01,,, !( &ARD D( CA$*R , 2.34
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JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: RIGHT TO APPEAL

3he right to appeal is not a natural right or a part o2 due process, but merely a statutory pri/ilege and may be e<ercised only in the manner and in accordance with the pro/isions o2 the law. 3he party who see:s to a/ail o2 the same must comply with the re=uirements o2 the rules, 2ailing in which the right to appeal is lost. (Producers )an5 of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals , G.R. o. !&""&$, +pril !0, &$$&, ,'! )*R+ !'#, !>0.- (HEIRS OF AGAPATIO T. OLARTE AN ANGELA A. OLARTE ET AL. !S.

OFFICE OF THE PRESI ENT OF THE PHILIPPINES ET AL." G.R. NO. #$$%%&" '(NE #&" )*## , !ILLARAMA" 'R." '.+.
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RELEVANT DOCTRINAL PRONOUNCEMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT ON THE SECOND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
(i) Indeed, a second MR as a rule, is generally a prohibited pleading. ( Alcantara v. Ponce, #!( .hil. &&& (&$$#-? *ira6ona v. Philippine (D$ *echno-$ervices, 'nc ., G.R. o. !">0!&, @anuary &$, &$$>, #0" )*R+ "&#, "&', citing rtigas and Compan7 !imited Partnership v. #elasco , ,&( .hil. (',, ('> (!>>"-. 3he *ourt, howe/er, does not discount instances when it may authoriAe the suspension o2 the rules o2 procedure so as to allow the resolution o2 a second motion 2or reconsideration, in cases o2 e<traordinarily persuasi/e reasons (Alcantara v. Ponce, #!( .hil. &&& (&$$#-? *ira6ona v. Philippine (D$ *echno$ervices, 'nc., G.R. o. !">0!&, @anuary &$, &$$>, #0" )*R+ "&#, "&', citing rtigas and Compan7 !imited Partnership v. #elasco, ,&( .hil. (',, ('> (!>>"-. such as when the decision is a patent nullity. ( Ramos vs. &!RC, ,#' .hil. 0$# (!>>'-. 3ime and again, the *ourt has upheld the theory that the rules o2 procedure are designed to secure and not to o/erride substantial 5ustice.( Cando v. la6o, G.R. o. !"$0(!, %arch &&, &$$0, #!' )*R+ 0(!.3hese are mere tools to e<pedite the decision or resolution o2 cases, hence, their strict and rigid application which would result in technicalities that tend to 2rustrate rather than promote substantial 5ustice must be a/oided.( Pe8osa v. Dona, G.R. o. !#($!', +pril ,, &$$0, #&$ )*R+ &,&.(9&'#(R$'*: " *H( (A$* #$. 9&'#(R$'*: " *H( (A$* (MP! :(($; A$$ C'A*' &, +.R. & . ,-<=<>, $(P*(M)(R ,., 01,,, M(&D %A, 2.4.
(ii) SE !"D M!#I!" $!R RE !"SIDER%#I!" IS &R!'I(I#ED) )ection &, Rule #& o2 the Rules o2 *ourt e<plicitly pro/ides that [n]o motion 2or reconsideration o2 a 5udgment or 2inal resolution by the same party shall be entertained. %oreo/er, )ection ,, Rule !# o2 the Internal Rules o2 the )upreme *ourt (+.%. o. !$-(-&$-)*.- decrees vi61 )7*. ,. $econd motion for reconsideration. - 3he *ourt shall not entertain a second motion 2or reconsideration and any e<ception to this rule can only be granted in the higher interest o2 5ustice by the *ourt en banc upon a /ote o2 at least two-thirds o2 its actual membership. 3here is reconsideration Bin the highest interest o2 5usticeB when the assailed decision is not only legally erroneous but is li:ewise patently un5ust and potentially capable o2 causing unwarranted and irremediable in5ury or damage to the parties. + second motion 2or reconsideration can only be entertained be*ore the ruling sought to be reconsidered becomes *inal by operation o* law or by the ourt+s declaration.

Cell-settled is the rule that issues or grounds not raised below cannot be resol/ed on re/iew by the )upreme *ourt, 2or to allow the parties to raise new issues is antithetical to the sporting idea o2 2air play, 5ustice and due process. Issues not raised during the trial cannot be raised 2or the 2irst time on appeal and more especially on

motion 2or reconsideration. ;itigation must end at some point? once the case is 2inally ad5udged, the parties must learn to accept /ictory or de2eat. Cuenco v. *alisa7 *ourist $ports Comple?, 'ncorporated, G.R. o. !0(!#(, @uly ,$, &$$>, #>( )*R+ ,>", ,>>-($$.- (2 () M. A!'#'AD #$. PR C*(R @ +AM)!( PH'!$. '&C. A&D PR MM-+(M '&C., +.R. & . ,/1=1/, 29&( /, 01,,, D(! CA$*'!! , 2.34 .34
(iii) %s a rule, a second motion *or reconsideration is a prohibited pleading pursuant to Section ,, Rule -, o* the Rules o* i.il &rocedure which pro.ides that) o second motion 2or reconsideration o2 a 5udgment or 2inal resolution by the same party shall be entertained. 3hus, a decision becomes 2inal and e<ecutory a2ter !# days 2rom receipt o2 the denial o2 the 2irst motion 2or reconsideration. Dowe/er, when a motion 2or lea/e to 2ile and admit a second motion 2or reconsideration is granted by the *ourt, the *ourt there2ore allows the 2iling o2 the second motion 2or reconsideration. In such a case, the second motion 2or reconsideration is no longer a prohibited pleading. (!(A+9( " C'*'($ " *H( PH'!'PP'&($ (!CP4 (* A!, #$. C M(!(C (* A!., +.R. & . +.R. & . ,-/<=,, "()R9AR: ,=, 01,,, )(R$AM'&, 2.34 (i.) /e deny 0udge Dilag1s Motion *or Lea.e to %dmit %ttached Second Motion *or Reconsideration and note without action the appended Second Motion *or Reconsideration . Rule #&, )ection & o2 the Rules o2 *ourt, on motions 2or reconsideration 2iled be2ore the *ourt o2 +ppeals, reads1 )ec. &. $econd Motion for Reconsideration . E o second motion 2or reconsideration o2 a 5udgment or 2inal resolution by the same party shall be entertained. 3a:en in con5unction with Rule #", )ection & o2 the Rules o2 *ourt, the a2ore=uoted pro/ision is also applicable to original cases 2iled be2ore the )upreme *ourt, which includes disciplinary proceedings against 5udges, such as the one at bar. + second motion 2or reconsideration is, there2ore, a prohibited pleading. 3he rule against entertaining a second motion *or reconsideration is rooted in the basic tenet o* immutability o* 2udgments. +t some point a decision becomes 2inal and e<ecutory and, conse=uently, all litigations must come to an end.

Indeed, there ha/e been instances when we ga/e merit to second motions 2or reconsideration, but only when there are e<traordinary persuasi/e reasons and only a2ter an e<press lea/e shall ha/e been obtained.( *ira6ona v. Philippine (D$ *echno-$ervice, 'nc. , G.R. o. !">0!&, @anuary &$, &$$>, #0" )*R+ "&#, "&'.- ( IF+ 67RGI 7)+ )G+R7H 6). @GFG7 R7 +3I FI;+G J *I *7.*II +. .+)*G+, +.%. I. R3@-$"-&$!(, +GGG)3 !", &$!!, P(R C9R'AM-

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JUSTICE MARTIN VILLARAMA, JR.: MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION PRO FORMA

3he )upreme *ourt has held that mere reiteration o2 issues already passed upon by the court does not automatically ma:e a motion 2or reconsideration pro forma. Chat is essential is compliance with the re=uisites o2 the Rules. Indeed, in the cases where a motion 2or reconsideration was held to be pro ,orma, the motion was so held because (!- it was a second motion 2or reconsideration, or (&- it did not comply with the rule that the motion must speci2y the 2indings and conclusions alleged to be contrary to law or not supported by the e/idence, or (,- it 2ailed to substantiate the alleged errors, or ((- it merely alleged that the decision in =uestion was contrary to law, or (#- the ad/erse party was not gi/en notice thereo2. -FERNAN O !. GON.ALES !S. COMELEC" G.R. NO. #%)/&0" MARCH /" )*##" !ILLARAMA" 'R." '.+.
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SUMMARY JUDGMENT:
Summary judgments are proper when, upon motion of the plaintiff or the defendant, the court finds that the answer filed by the defendant does not tender a genuine issue as to any material fact and that one party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. (RULES O !OUR", Rule #$. % deeper understanding of summary judgments is found in Viajar v. Estenzo& ('() *hil. $+' (',(,-.
Relief by summary judgment is intended to e.pedite or promptly dispose of cases where the facts appear undisputed and certain from the pleadings, depositions, admissions and affida/its. 0ut if there be a doubt as to such facts and there be an issue or issues of fact joined by the parties, neither one of them can pray for a summary judgment. 1here the facts pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for a summary judgment cannot ta2e the place of a trial. %n e.amination of the Rules will readily show that a summary judgment is by no means a hasty one. 3t assumes a scrutiny of facts in a summary hearing after the filing of a motion for summary judgment by one party supported by affida/its, depositions, admissions, or other documents, with notice upon the ad/erse party who may file an opposition to the motion supported also by affida/its, depositions, or other documents . . .. 3n spite of its e.pediting character, relief by summary judgment can only be allowed after compliance with the minimum re4uirement of /igilance by the court in a summary hearing considering that this remedy is in derogation of a party5s right to a plenary trial of his case. %t any rate, a party who mo/es for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine issue of fact, or that the issue posed in the complaint is so patently unsubstantial as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial, and any doubt as to the e.istence of such an issue is resol/ed against the mo/ant. (3d. at $(67$(#. !itations omitted.-

8% summary judgment is permitted only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 9the: mo/ing party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.;( Eland Philippines, Inc. v. Garcia, <.R. =o. '(#6),, ebruary '(, 6>'>, +'# S!R% ++, )'7)6.- "he test of the propriety of rendering summary judgments is the e.istence of a genuine issue of fact, (Estrada v. Consolacion, '+# *hil. $?>, $?, (',(+-.8as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contri/ed or false claim.; (Eland Philippines, Inc. v. Garcia, supra at )). 89%: factual issue raised by a party is considered as sham when by its nature it is e/ident that it cannot be proven or it is such that the party tendering the same has neither any sincere intention nor adequate evidence to prove it . "his usually happens in denials made by defendants merely for the sa2e of ha/ing an issue and thereby gaining delay, ta2ing

ad/antage of the fact that their answers are not under oath anyway.; (!oncurring Opinion of @ustice 0arredo in Estrada v. Consolacion, supra at $$?. Emphasis supplied.3n determining the genuineness of the issues, and hence the propriety of rendering a summary judgment, the court is obliged to carefully study and appraise, not the tenor or contents of the pleadings, but the facts alleged under oath by the parties andAor their witnesses in the affida/its that they submitted with the motion and the corresponding opposition. "hus, it is held that, e/en if the pleadings on their face appear to raise issues, a summary judgment is proper so long as 8the affida/its, depositions, and admissions presented by the moving party show that such issues are not genuine.;( Eland Philippines, Inc. v. Garcia, surpa at )6. Emphasis supplied- (ANICETO CAL !A" I! ET AL. V#. $EP !LIC O% T&E P&IL#., G.$. NO. '()*+,, - NE .., .)'', /EL CA#TILLO, -.0
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hristian 3. 4illasis +tty. *hristian KLitK 6illasis is a pro2essor and 8+R Re/iewer on Remedial ;aw o2 se/eral law )chools and Re/iew *enters. +side 2rom being a litigation (ci/il and criminal- lawyer, .ro2. 6illasis has a di/ersi2ied general law practice. De handles all aspects o2 corporate, commercial business and ban:ing transactions, protection and en2orcement o2 intellectual property rights, collection, admiralty and maritime practice, labor-management relations, election, administrati/e and local go/ernment cases, 2amily cases, real estate transactions, land titles, deeds and con/eyances, 2oreclosure o2 mortgages, ta<ation, regulatory compliance, etc. 6iew my complete pro2ile