(http://www.scribd.com/doc/39674201/Moral-Notes) Plaintiff-appellee: Jesus P. Morfe (Judge of CFI) Defendants-appellants: Amelito R. Mutuc (Executive Secretary) et al.

Facts: The Law: Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act of 1960 (RA No. 3019) Every public officer within 30 days after its approval or after his assumption of office and within the month of January of every year thereafter, as well as upon termination of his position, shall prepare and file with the head of the office to which he belongs, a true detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities, including a statement of the amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year. Plaintiff Morfe, a judge of a CFI, contends that the periodical submission within the month of January of every other year thereafter of their sworn statement of assets and liabilities (SAL) is violative of due process as an oppressive exercise of police power and as an unlawful invasion of the constitutional right to privacy implicit on the ban against unreasonable search and seizure construed together with the prohibition against self-incrimination. Executive Secretary and DOJ Sec: Acceptance of public position = voluntary assumption of obligation Merely seeks to adopt a reasonable measure of insuring the interest of general welfare in honest and clean public service and is therefore a legitimate exercise of police power. CFI of Pangasinan held that the requirement exceeds the permissible limit of the police power and is thus offensive to the due process clause Issue/s: Whether the periodical submission of SAL for public officers is: 1. An oppressive exercise of police power; 2. Violative of due process and an unlawful invasion of the right to privacy implicit in the ban against unreasonable search and seizure construed together with the prohibition against self-incrimination; 3. An insult to the personal integrity and official dignity of public officials. Ruling: Decision reversed. Ratio: Presumption of validity Plaintiff asserted that the submission of SAL was a reasonable requirement for employment so a public officer can make of record his assets and liabilities upon assumption of office. Plaintiff did not present evidence to rebut the presumption of validity. If the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the person, the standard for the validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects the most rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measure is wider. (ErmitaMalate Hotel v. Mayor of Manila) Exercise of Police power and the defense provided by the Due Process Clause inherent and plenary power in the state which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society (Justice Malcolm) The power of sovereignty, the power to govern men and things within the limits of its domain (Justice Taney, going beyond curtailment of rights) Anyone with an alleged grievance regarding the extension of police power to regulatory action affecting persons in public or private life can invoke the protection of due process.

It has been held that due process may be relied upon by public official to protect the security of tenure which in a limited sense is analogous to property. Therefore he could also use due process to strike down what he considers as an infringement of his liberty. Under the Constitution, the challenged provision is allowable as long as due process is observed. The standard for due process is REASONABLENESS. Test: Official action must not outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression. It would be to dwell in the realm of abstractions and to ignore the harsh and compelling realities of public service with its ever-present temptation to heed the call of greed and avarice to condemn as arbitrary and oppressive a requirement as that imposed upon public officials and employees to file such sworn statement of assets and liabilities every two years after having done so upon assuming officeThere was therefore no unconstitutional exercise of police power. Right to privacy Right to be let alone It cannot be said that the challenged statutory provision calls for disclosure of information which infringes on the right of a person to privacy. It cannot be denied that the rational relationship such a requirement possesses with the objective of a valid statute goes very far in precluding assent to an objection of such character. This is not to say that a public officer, by virtue of position he holds, is bereft of constitutional protection; it is only to emphasize that in subjecting him to such a further compulsory revelation of his assets and liabilities, including the statement of the amounts of personal and family expenses, and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year, there is no unconstitutional intrusion into what otherwise would be a private sphere. Unreasonable Search and Seizure The constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure does not give freedom from testimonial compulsion. Right against self-incrimination We are not aware of any constitutional provision designed to protect a mans conduct from judicial inquiry, or aid him in fleeing from justice. Insult to personal integrity and official dignity Only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the action taken, mey be the basis for declaring a statute invalid. ___________________ Erlinda and Potenciano were married on July 11, 1942.They had six children. Potenciano is a lawyer who owns extensive properties valued at millions of pesos. He was a lso the Chairman of the Board and President of Baguio Country Club. After 30 years of living together, the spouses separated on the year 1972 They separated from bed and board for undisclosed reasons. Potenciano lived at Urdaneta Condominium Manila and when in Baguio, at Ilusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club. Erlinda lived in Antipolo city. On Dec. 30, 1997, Potenciano lived with Erlinda at Antipolo after his arrival from the US. Their children alleged that Erlinda gave Potenciano an overdose of Zoloft. She gave 200 mg instead of the 100 mg antidepressant drug prescribed by the latters doctor in New York. Because of the overdose, Potencianos health deteriorated.

On 1998, Erlinda filed with the RTC a petititon for the guardianship over the person and property of Potenciano due to the latters advanced aged, frail health, poor eyesight and impaired judgment. On May 1998, Potenciano did not return to Antipolo city after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio city. He lived in Cleveland Condo Makati. On March 1999, Erlinda filed with the CA a petition for habeas corpus to have the custody of lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio. She alleged that the respondents prevented her from visiting her husband and preventing the latter from going home to Antipolo. Court of Appeals denied the petition of Erlinda for writ of habeas corpus. However, the CA granted visitation rights. The petition of Erlinda K. Ilusorio is to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and its resolution dismissing the application for habeas corpus to have the custody of her husband, lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio and enforce consortium as the wife. On the other hand, the petition of Potenciano Ilusorio is to annul that portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals giving Erlinda K. Ilusorio visitation rights to her husband and to enjoin Erlinda and the Court of Appeals from enforcing the visitation rights.

Issue: Was the order granting visitorial rights proper?

After due hearing, the Court of Appeals concluded that there was no unlawful restraint on his liberty. The Court of Appeals also observed that lawyer Potenciano Ilusorio did not request the administrator of the Cleveland Condominium not to allow his wife and other children from seeing or visiting him. He made it clear that he did not object to seeing them. As to lawyer Potenciano Ilusorios mental state, the Court of Appeals observed that he was of sound and alert mind, having answered all the relevant questions to the satisfaction of the court. Being of sound mind, he is thus possessed with the capacity to make choices. In this case, the crucial choices revolve on his residence and the people he opts to see or live with. The choices he made may not appeal to some of his family members but these are choices which exclusively belong to Potenciano. He made it clear before the Court of Appeals that he was not prevented from leaving his house or seeing people. With that declaration, and absent any true restraint on his liberty, we have no reason to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals.

With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of choice, Potenciano Ilusorio may not be the subject of visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise, we will deprive him of his right to privacy. Needless to say, this will run against his fundamental constitutional right.
_____________________ Gaanan v. IAC, 145 SCRA 112 (1986) F: Complainant Atty. Pintor and Montebon offered to withdraw the complaint for direct assault they filed against Laconico after demanding P8,000 from him. This demand was heard by Atty. Gaanan through a telephone extension as requested by Laconico so as to personally hear the proposed conditions for the settlement. Atty. Pintor was subsequently arrested in an entrapment operation upon receipt of the money. Since Atty. Gaanan listened to the telephone conversation without complainant''s consent, complainant charged Gaanan and Laconico with violation of the Anti- Wiretapping Act (RA 4200).

ISSUE: W/N an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Sec. 1 of RA 4200 such that iuts use to overhear a private conversation would constitute an unlawful interception of communication between 2 parties using a telephone line.
Held: No. The law refers to a tap of a wire or cable or the use of a device or arrangement for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words. An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as tapping the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use.
_____ Valmonte vs. Belmonte

This case involves a request by petitioners from the General Manager of the Government Service Insurance System to furnish them a list of names of legislators who were able to secure loans upon the guaranty of then First Lady Imelda Marcos, as well as certified true copies of documents evidencing the loans. In granting the petition for mandamus, the Court said that the public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held by the alleged borrowers make the information sought clearly a matter of public interest and concern. However, the right to access such records does not accord them a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts, summaries and

the like in their desire to acquire information or matters of public concern. _____________
3. OPLE VS. TORRES, July 23, 1998 Puno, J. Facts: On December 12, 1996, then President FIDEL V. RAMOS issued Administrative Order No. 308 entitled ADOPTION OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM. The AO seeks to have all Filipino citizens and foreign residents to have a Population Reference Number (PRN) generated by the National Statistics Office (NSO) through the use of BIOMETRICS TECHNOLOGY . The AO was questioned by Senator Ople on the following grounds: 1. The establishment of the PRN without any law is an unconstitutional usurpation

of the legislative powers of the Congress of the Philippines; 2. The appropriation of public funds for the implementation of the said AO is

unconstitutional since Congress has the exclusive authority to appropriate funds for such expenditure; and 3. The AO violates the citizens right to privacy protected by the Bill of Rights of

the Constitution. Held: 1. The AO establishes a system of identification that is all-encompassing in scope,

affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizens and foreign residents and therefore, it is supposed to be a law passed by Congress that implements it, not by an Administrative Order issued by the President. Administrative Power, which is supposed to be exercised by the President, is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs. It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. Prescinding from the foregoing precepts, AO 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an Administrative Order. An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative

operation of the government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy. The subject of AO 308 therefore is beyond the power of the President to issue and it is a usurpation of legislative power. 2. The AO likewise violates the right to privacy since its main purpose is to provide

a common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies through the use of BIOMETRICS TECHNOLOGY. Biometry is the science of the application of statistical methods to biological facts; a mathematical analysis of a biological data. It is the confirmation of an individuals identity through a fingerprint, retinal scan, hand geometry or facial features. Through the PRN, the government offices has the chance of building a huge and formidable information base through the electronic linkage of the files of every citizen. The data, however, may be gathered for gainful and useful government purposes; but the existence of this vast reservoir of personal information constitutes a covert invitation to misuse, a temptation that may be too great for some of our authorities to resist. Further, the AO does not even tells us in clear and unequivocal terms how these informations gathered shall be handled. It does not provide who shall control and access the data and under what circumstances and for what purpose. These factors are essential to safeguard the privacy and guaranty the integrity of the information. The computer linkage gives other government agencies access to the information. YET, THERE ARE NO CONTROLS TO GUARD AGAINST LEAKAGE OF INFORMATIONS. WHEN THE ACCESS CODE OF THE CONTROL PROGRAMS OF THE PARTICULAR COMPUTER SYSTEM IS BROKEN, AN INTRUDER, WITHOUT FEAR OF SANCTION OR PENALTY, CAN MAKE USE OF THE DATA FOR WHATEVER PURPOSE, OR WORSE, MANIPULATE THE DATA STORED WITHIN THE SYSTEM. AO No. 308 is unconstitutional since it falls short of assuring that personal information gathered about our people will be used only for specified purposes thereby violating the citizens right to privacy. ____________

Case Digest on ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. Comelec Freedom of expression 323 SCRA 811
November 10, 2010

FACTS: Comelec came up with a resolution prohibiting the conduct of exit polls during elections for the reason that exit polls have the tendency to cause confusion. HELD: Conducting exit polls and reporting their results are valid exercises of freedom of speech and of the press. A limitation on them may be justified only by a danger of such substantive character that the state has a right to prevent. The concern of the Comelec cannot be justified since there is no showing that exit polls cause chaos in voting centers.

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Epicharis Garcia vs. The Faculty Admission CommitteeL-40779November 28, 1975Respondent: Fr. Lambino Facts :1. That in summer, 1975, Respondent admitted Petitioner for studies leading to an M.A.in Theology;2. That on May 30, 1975, when Petitioner wanted to enroll for the same course for thefirst sem ester, 19751976 respondent told her about the letter he had written her,inform ing her of the faculty's dec ision to bar her from re -adm ission in their schoolreason in the letter: Petitioners frequent questions and difficulties had the effect of slowing down the progress of the class.3. Fr. Pedro Sevilla, the school's Director, that the compromises she was offering wereu n a c c e p t a b l e , t h e i r d e c i s i o n w a s f i n a l , a n d t h a t i t w e r e b e t t e r f o r h e r t o s e e k f o r admission at the UST Graduate School4. Petitioner then subsequently made inquiries in said school, as to the possibilities for her pursuing her graduate studies for an for M.A. in Theology, and she was informedthat she could enroll at the UST Ecclesiastical Faculties, but that she would have to fulfiltheir requirements for Baccalaureate in Philosophy in order to have her degree later inTheology which would entail about four to five years more of studies whereas inthe Loyola School of Studies to which she is being unlawfully refused readmission, itwould entail only about two years more.5. She pra yed for a writ of m andam us for the purpose of allowing her to enroll in the current semester Issue: W hether or not the Fac ult y Adm issions Comm ittee had authorit y and discretion inallowing petitioner to continue studying or not? Held: Yes. Being a particular educational institution (seminary). Petition dismissed for lack of merit.Petitioner cannot com pel the m andam us to adm it her into further studies s ince the respondent had no clear duty to admit the petitioner. That respondent Fr. Lambino andLoyola School of Technology has the discretion whether to admit the petitioner or not.Factors that were c onsidered ar e ac adem ic standards, personality traits, character orie ntation and nature of Loyola School of Theology as a seminary _______________

U. S. v Perfecto March 4, 1922 G.R. No. 17493

J. Johnson Facts: The complainant charged the defendants with sedition in violating section 8 of Act No. 292 as amended by section 1 of Act No. 1692. The defendants averred that: (a) that the complaint was illegal and unconstitutional for the reason that it had been presented by a political entity without authority, and that the same had not been formulated in accordance with the essential requisites required by the law; (b) that the facts alleged in the complaint did not constitute a crime and that, even though they came under the provisions of Act No. 292 as reformed by Act No. 1592, said laws were null because they violated certain provisions of the organic law of the Philippine Island

(c) that as a result of the first two grounds of the demurrer, the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila was without jurisdiction of the person of the defendants nor over the facts alleged in the complaint. In the trial court, the judge ruled that he evidence was insufficient to show that one of the defendants, Mendoza, was guilty. He was absolved with costs. However, the other defendant, Perfecto, was guilty and made to pay 500 and of the costs. Perfecto appealed to the SC and gave several assignments of error. These were: (a) That the lower court committed an error in overruling the demurer; (b) That the lower court committed an error in not declaring the complaint illegal and unconstitutional, in that it was entitled "The People of the Philippine Islands" instead of in the name o the "United States of America;" (c) In not declaring illegal, unconstitutional, and null, Act Nos. 2667 and 2886 of the Philippine Legislature; (d) In not declaring that Act No. 292, as amended by Act No. 1692, is null, illegal, and unconstitutional; and (e) In not declaring that the trial court was without jurisdiction to try and decide the cause presented in the complaint. The question of fact presented by the appellant claimed that the evidence given during the trial didnt show that he was guilty of the crime charged in the complaint. Issue: Did the defendant act in violation of violating section 8 of Act No. 292 as amended bysection 1 of Act No. 1692? Held: No. Petition granted Ratio: Given the evidence, the Supreme Court held that the appellant intended to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing his office, nor that said publication tended to instigate others to cabal or to meet together for unlawful purposes, or to suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots, or to stir up the people against the lawful authorities, or to disturb the peace of the community, or the safety and good order of the government. To hold otherwise, upon the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause, in our opinion would be to abridge the freedom of the press in the Philippine Islands, which abridgment would be in direct contravention of the provisions of paragraph 13 of section 3 of the Jones Law. When the citizens of a state become convinced that the administration of the affairs of their government is not carried on in accordance with the law, or is not conducted for the best interestof all concerned, they have not only a right but it is their duty to present the cause of their grievances to the public, and the free press of the state usually affords the best avenue for that purpose. To that end, the organic laws of all modern free states have wisely provided that "no law shall be passed, abridging the freedom of the press" and that no person shall be punished except for an above of that freedom. The interest of civilized society and the maintenance of good government demand a full and free discussion of all affairs of public interest. Complete liberty to comment upon the administration of Government, as well as the conduct of public men, is necessary for free speech. the people are not obliged, under modern civilized

government, to speak of the conduct of their officials, of their servants, in whispers or with bated breath. US. V Bustos The freedom of the press consists in the right to publish the truth, with good motives and for justifiable ends, although said publication may be offensive to the Government, to the courts, or to individuals. Chief Justice Marshall of the Supreme Court of the United States, in discussing the freedom of the press, said: "The spirit of the constitution and the opinion of the people cannot be curbed by those who administer the Government. Among those principles which are held most sacred by the people of America, there is none more deeply rooted in the public mind than that of the liberty of the press." Webster- It is important to safeguard to the utmost the right to free speech and the free press. It is the ancient and constitutional right of our people to judge public matters and public men. It is such a self-evident right as the right to breathe the air and to walk on the surface of the earth. I will defend this high constitutional prerogative in time of war, in time of peace and all the time. Dead or alive I shall maintain it. It is the particular duty of the people of the state to zealously maintain the right to express freely, either verbally or by publication, their honest convictions regarding the acts of public officials and the governing class. If the people of a free state should give up the right of free speech; if they are daunted by fear and threats, and abdicate their convictions; if the governing body of the state could silence all the voices those that extol their acts; if nothing relating to the conduct of the governing class can be reach the people except that which will uphold the men in power, then we may well say "Good-bye" to our liberties forever. While under such circumstances free government may still be maintained, their life, their soul, and their essentials will be gone. If the publication of the conduct of public officials annoys them, let them examine their own act and determine the time of the illustrious Voltaire he expressed the opinion that "tolerance was never the cause of internal strife in the state, on the contrary, the pursuit of intolerance has covered the world with blood. The tyrants of our thought have caused the greater part of the misfortunes of the world."
______________ Gonzales vs. Comelec(Clear and Present Danger Rule)

Facts:

RA 4880 which took effect on June 17, 1967, prohibiting the too early nomination of candidates and limiting the period of election campaign or partisan political activity was challenged on constitutional grounds. More precisely, the basic liberties of free speech and free press, freedom of assembly and freedom of association are invoked to nullify the act. Petitioner Cabigao was, at the time of the filing the petition, an incumbent councilor in the 4th District of Manila and the Nacionalista Party official candidate for Vice-Mayor of Manila to which he was subsequently elected on November 11, 1967; petitioner Gonzales, on the other hand, is a private individual, a registered voter in the City of Manila and a political leader of his copetitioner. There was the further allegation that the nomination of a candidate and the fixing of period of election campaign are matters of political expediency and convenience which only political parties can regulate or curtail by and among themselves through self-restraint or mutual understanding or agreement and that the regulation and limitation of these political matters invoking the police power, in the absence of clear and

present danger to the state, would render the constitutional rights of petitioners meaningless and without effect. Senator Lorenzo M. Taada was asked to appear as amicus curiae, and elucidated that Act No. 4880 could indeed be looked upon as a limitation on the preferred rights of speech and press, of assembly and of association. He did justify its enactment however under the clear and present danger doctrine, there being the substantive evil of elections, whether for national or local officials, being debased and degraded by unrestricted campaigning, excess of partisanship and undue concentration in politics with the loss not only of efficiency in government but of lives as well. The Philippine Bar Association, the Civil Liberties Union, the U.P. Law Center and the U.P. Women Lawyers' Circle were requested to give their opinions. Respondents contend that the act was based on the police power of the state.

Issue: Held:

Whether or Not RA 4880 unconstitutional.

Yes. As held in Cabansag v. Fernandez there are two tests that may supply an acceptable criterion for permissible restriction on freedom of speech. These are the clear and present danger rule and the 'dangerous tendency' rule. The first, means that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high before the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the 'substantive evil' sought to be prevented. It has the advantage of establishing according to the above decision a definite rule in constitutional law. It provides the criterion as to what words may be publicly established. The "dangerous tendency rule" is such that If the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable. It is not necessary that some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body seeks to prevent. The challenged statute could have been more narrowly drawn and the practices prohibited more precisely delineated to satisfy the constitutional requirements as to a valid limitation under the clear and present danger doctrine. As the author Taada clearly explained, such provisions were deemed by the legislative body to be part and parcel of the necessary and appropriate response not merely to a clear and present danger but to the actual existence of a grave and substantive evil of excessive partisanship, dishonesty and corruption as well as violence that of late has invariably marred election campaigns and partisan political activities in this country. The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a right on the

part of its citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for redress of grievances. As in the case of freedom of expression, this right is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent. The prohibition of any speeches, announcements or commentaries, or the holding of interviews for or against the election of any party orcandidate for public office and the prohibition of the publication or distribution of campaign literature or materials, against the solicitation of votes whether directly or indirectly, or the undertaking of any campaign literature or propaganda for or against any candidate or party is repugnant to a constitutional command.

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Cabansag vs Fernandez Facts: This is a contempt proceeding.A p o l o n i o C a b a n s a g a n d h i s l a w y e r s Roberto V. Merrera were found guiltyand sentenced the first to pay a fine of P20 and the last two P50 each with thew a r n i n g t h a t a r e p e t i t i o n o f t h e o f offense will next time be heavily dealtw i t h . A p o l o n i o C a b a n s a g f i l e d o n January 13, 1947 in the Court of FirstI n s t a n c e o f P a n g a s i n a n a c o m p l a i n t s e e k i n g t h e e j e c t m e n t o f G e m i n i a n a Fernandez, et al. from a parcel of land.t h e c o u r t , p r e s i d e d o v e r b y J u d g e Villamor upon petition of both parties,o r d e r e d t h e s t e n o g r a p h e r s w h o t o o k d o w n t h e n o t e s d u r i n g t h e p r e v i o u s hearings to transcribe them within 15days upon payment of their fees, andt h e h e a r i n g w a s p o s t p o n e d u n t i l t h e t r a n s c r i p t o f s a i d n o t e s h a d b e e n submitted. Notwithstanding the failureof the stenographers to transcribe theirn o t e s , t h e h e a r i n g w a s s e t . , J u d g e Pasicolan presiding, issued an ordersuggesting to the parties to arran g e with the sten ographers wh o took downthe notes to transcribe their respectiven o t e s a n d t h a t t h e c a s e w o u l d b e s e t for h earing after th e submission of thetranscript. From December 9, 1952 toAugust 12, 1954, n o further step wastaken either by th e cou rt or any of thec o n t e n d i n g p a r t i e s i n t h e c a s e . . , President Magsaysay assumed of fice,h e i s s u e d E x e c u t i v e O r d e r N o . I c r e a t i n g t h e P r e s i d e n t i al Complaintsa n d A c t i o n C o m m i s s i o n ( P C A C ) , Apolonio Caba n s a g , a p p a r e n t l y i r k e d a n d d i s a p p o i n t e d b y t h e d e l a y i n t h e disposition of his case, wrote the PCAC,a l e t t e r c o p y w h i c h h e f u r n i s h e d t h e Secretary of Justice and th e Executive Judge of the Court of First In stance of Pangasinan. Atty. Manuel Fernandez ,counsel for defendants, filed a motionb e f o r e J u d g e M o r f e p r a y i n g t h a t A p o l o n i o C a b a n s a g b e d e c l a r e d i n c o n t e m p t o f c o u r t f o r a n a l l e g e d scu rrilous remark h e made in his lettert o t h e P C A C t o t h e e f f e c t t h a t h e , Cabansag, has long been deprived of his land "thru the careful maneuvers of a tactical lawyer", to which counsel forCabansag replied with a counter-chargepraying that Atty. Fernandez be in turnd e c l a r e d i n c o n t e m p t b e c a u s e o f certain contemptuous remarks made byh i m i n h i s p l e a d i n g . J u d g e M o r f e d i s m i s s e d b o t h c h a r g e s b u t

orderedC a b a n s a g t o s h o w c a u s e i n w r i t i n g within 10 days why he s h o u l d n o t b e held liable for contempt for sending theabove letter to the PCAC which tendedto degrade the court in the eyes of t h e P r e s i d e n t a n d t h e p e o p l e .Cabansag filed his answer stating that h e d i d n o t h a v e t h e i d e a t o b e s m i r c h the dignity or belittle the respect duet h e c o u r t n o r w a s h e a c t u a t e d w i t h malice when he addressed the letter tot h e P C A C . o r d e r r e q u i r i n g a l s o s a i d a t t o r n e y s t o s h o w c a u s e w h y t h e y s h o u l d n o t l i k e w i s e b e h e l d f o r contempt for having committed actsw h i c h t e n d t o i m p e d e , o b s t r u c t o r d e g r a d e t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f justice Issue: whether or not the C a b a n s a g s h o u l d b e h e l d i n c o n t e m p t f o r h i s remarks.Ruling: the decision appealed from is reversed, without pronouncement as toc o s t s . t h e c r i t i c i s m r e f e r s , n o t t o t h e court, but to opposing cou ns el whoset a c t i c a l m a n e u v e r s " h a s a l l e g e d l y c a u s e d t h e u n d u e d e l a y o f the case. The grievance or complaint, if any, isaddressed to the stenographers fort h e i r a p p a r e n t i n d i f f e r e n c e i n t r a n s c r i b i n g t h e i r n o t e s . T h e o n l y disturbing effect of t h e l e t t e r w h i c h perhaps has been the motivating factorof th e lodging of the contempt chargeb y t h e t r i a l j u d g e i s t h e f a c t t h a t thel e t t e r w a s s e n t t o t h e O f f i c e o f t h e President asking for help because of t h e p r e c a r i o u s p r e d i c a m e n t o f Cabansag. To be so the d a n g e r m u s t cause a serious imminent threat to thea d m i n i s t r a t i o n o f j u s t i c e . N o r c a n w e i n f e r t h a t s u c h a c t h a s " a d a n g e r o u s t e n d e n c y " t o b e l i t t l e t h e c o u r t o r undermine the administration of justicef o r t h e w r i t e r m e r e l y e x e r c i s e d h i s c o n s t i t u t i o n a l r i g h t t o p e t i t i o n t h e government for redress of a legitimate grievance ____________

ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp v. COMELEC

ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp v. COMELEC January 28, 2000 FACTS: COMELEC issued a Resolution approving the issuance of a restraining order to stop ABS CBN or any other groups, its agents or representatives from conducting exit surveys. The Resolution was issued by the Comelec allegedly upon "information from a reliable source that ABS-CBN (Lopez Group) has prepared a project, with PR groups, to conduct radio-TV coverage of the elections and to make an exit survey of the vote during the elections for national officials particularly for President and Vice President, results of which shall be broadcasted immediately. The electoral body believed that such project might conflict with the official Comelec count, as well as the unofficial quick count of the National Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel). It also noted that it had not authorized or deputized ABS-CBN to undertake the exit survey.

Two days before the elections on May 11, 1998, the Court issued the Temporary Restraining Order prayed for by petitioner ABS-CBN. The Comelec was directed to cease and desist, until further orders, from implementing the assailed Resolution or the restraining order issued pursuant thereto, if any. In fact, the exit polls were actually conducted and reported by media without any difficulty or problem. ISSUE: W/N the Comelec, in the exercise of its powers, can absolutely ban exit polls

ABS-CBN:

The holding of exit polls and the nationwide reporting of their results are valid exercises of

the freedoms of speech and of the press COMELEC: 1)The issuance thereof was "pursuant to its constitutional and statutory powers to promote a clean, honest, orderly and credible May 11, 1998 elections"; and "to protect, preserve and maintain the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot." 2)It contends that "the conduct of exit surveys might unduly confuse and influence the voters," and that the surveys were designed "to condition the minds of people and cause confusion as to who are the winners and the losers in the election," which in turn may result in "violence and anarchy." 3)"exit surveys indirectly violate the constitutional principle to preserve the sanctity of the ballots," as the "voters are lured to reveal the contents of ballots," in violation of Section 2, Article V of the Constitution and relevant provisions of the Omnibus Election Code. It submits that the constitutionally protected freedoms invoked by petitioner "are not immune to regulation by the State in the legitimate exercise of its police power," such as in the present case. 4) "[p]ress freedom may be curtailed if the exercise thereof creates a clear and present danger to the community or it has a dangerous tendency." It then contends that "an exit poll has the tendency to sow confusion considering the randomness of selecting interviewees, which further make[s] the exit poll highly unreliable. The probability that the results of such exit poll may not be in harmony with the official count made by the Comelec x x x is ever present. In other words, the exit poll has a clear and present danger of destroying the credibility and integrity of the electoral process." SUPREME COURT: The COMELEC Resolution on exit polls ban is nullified and set aside.

1) Clear and present danger of destroying the integrity of electoral processes Speculative and Untenable. First, by the very nature of a survey, the interviewees or participants are selected at random, so that the results will as much as possible be representative or reflective of the general sentiment or view of the community or group polled. Second, the survey result is not meant to replace or be at par with the official Comelec count. It consists merely of the opinion of the polling group as to who the

electorate in general has probably voted for, based on the limited data gathered from polled individuals. Finally, not at stake here are the credibility and the integrity of the elections, which are exercises that are separate and independent from the exit polls. The holding and the reporting of the results of exit polls cannot undermine those of the elections, since the former is only part of the latter. If at all, the outcome of one can only be indicative of the other.

2) Overbroad The Comelec's concern with the possible noncommunicative effect of exit polls -- disorder and confusion in the voting centers -- does not justify a total ban on them. Undoubtedly, the assailed Comelec Resolution is too broad, since its application is without qualification as to whether the polling is disruptive or not.[44] Concededly, the Omnibus Election Code prohibits disruptive behavior around the voting centers.[45] There is no showing, however, that exit polls or the means to interview voters cause chaos in voting centers. Neither has any evidence been presented proving that the presence of exit poll reporters near an election precinct tends to create disorder or confuse the voters. Moreover, the prohibition incidentally prevents the collection of exit poll data and their use for any purpose. The valuable information and ideas that could be derived from them, based on the voters' answers to the survey questions will forever remain unknown and unexplored. Unless the ban is restrained, candidates, researchers, social scientists and the electorate in general would be deprived of studies on the impact of current events and of election-day and other factors on voters' choices. 3) Violation of Ban Secrecy The contention of public respondent that exit polls indirectly transgress the sanctity and the secrecy of the ballot is off-tangent to the real issue. Petitioner does not seek access to the ballots cast by the voters. The ballot system of voting is not at issue here. The reason behind the principle of ballot secrecy is to avoid vote buying through voter identification. Thus, voters are prohibited from exhibiting the contents of their official ballots to other persons, from making copies thereof, or from putting distinguishing marks thereon so as to be identified. Also proscribed is finding out the contents of the ballots cast by particular voters or disclosing those of disabled or illiterate voters who have been assisted. Clearly, what is forbidden is the association of voters with their respective votes, for the purpose of assuring that the votes have been cast in accordance with the instructions of a third party. This result cannot, however, be achieved merely through the voters' verbal and confidential disclosure to a pollster of whom they have voted for. In exit polls, the contents of the official ballot are not actually exposed. Furthermore, the revelation of whom an elector has voted for is not compulsory, but voluntary. Voters may also choose not to reveal their identities. Indeed, narrowly tailored countermeasures may be prescribed by the Comelec, so as to minimize or suppress incidental problems in the conduct of exit polls, without transgressing the fundamental rights of our people.##

An exit poll is a species of electoral survey conducted by qualified individuals or groups of individuals for the purpose of determining the probable result of an election by confidentially asking randomly selected voters whom they have voted for, immediately after they have officially cast their ballots. The results of the survey are announced to the public, usually through the mass media, to give an advance overview of how, in the opinion of the polling individuals or organizations, the electorate voted. In our electoral history, exit polls had not been resorted to until the recent May 11, 1998 elections.

_____________ Adiong vs. Comelec

Facts:

COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 2347 which provides that decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas, prohibiting posting in "mobile" places, public or private. Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate in the May 11, 1992 elections now assails the Resolution. In addition, the petitioner believes that with the ban on radio, television and print political advertisements, he, being a neophyte in the field of politics stands to suffer grave and irreparable injury with this prohibition.

Issue: Held:

Whether or Not the COMELECs prohibition unconstitutional.

The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech. The preferred freedom of expression calls all the more for the utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage. The so-called balancing of interests individual freedom on one hand and substantial public interests on the other is made even more difficult in election campaign cases because the Constitution also gives specific authority to the Commission on Elections to supervise the conduct of free, honest, and orderly elections. When faced with border line situations where freedom to speak by a candidate or party and freedom to know on the part of the electorate are invoked against actions intended for maintaining clean and free elections, the police, local officials and COMELEC, should lean in favor of freedom. The regulation of election campaign activity may not pass the test of validity if it is too general in its terms or not limited in time and scope in its application, if it restricts one's expression of belief in a candidate or one's opinion of his or her qualifications, if it cuts off the flow of media reporting, and if the regulatory measure bears no clear and reasonable nexus with the constitutionally sanctioned objective. The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and othermoving vehicles does not endanger any substantial government interest. There is no clear public interest threatened by such activity so as to justify the curtailment of the cherished citizen's right of freespeech and expression. Under the clear and present danger rule not only must the danger be patently clear and pressingly present but the evil sought to be avoided must

be so substantive as to justify a clampover one's mouth or a writing instrument to be stilled. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to express his preference and, by displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree with him. A sticker may be furnished by a candidate but once the car owner agrees to have it placed on his private vehicle, the expression becomes a statement by the owner, primarily his own and not of anybody else. The restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be posted is so broad that it encompasses even the citizen's private property, which in this case is a privately-owned vehicle. In consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule prescribed by the Constitution would be violated. Section 1, Article III of the Bill of Rights provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law. The prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether public or private except in the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship.

____
Imbong vs. Comelec FACTS: This is a petition for declaratory judgment. These are 2 separate but related petitions of running candidates for delegates to the Constitutional Convention assailing the validity of RA 6132.Gonzales: Sec, 2, 4, 5 and Par 1 Sec 8, and validity of entire law Imbong: Par 1 Sec 8 ISSUE: Whether the Congress has a right to call for Constitutional Convention and whether the parameters set by such a call is constitutional. HOLDING: The Congress has the authority to call for a Constitutional Convention as a Constituent Assembly. Furthermore, specific provisions assailed by the petitioners are deemed as constitutional. RATIO: - Sec 4 RA 6132: it is simply an application of Sec 2 Art 12 of Constitution -Constitutionality of enactment of RA 6132: Congress acting as Constituent Assembly, has full authority to propose amendments, or call for convention for the purpose by votes and these votes were attained by Resolution 2 and 4 - Sec 2 RA 6132: it is a mere implementation of Resolution 4 and is enough that the basis employed for such apportions is reasonable. Macias case relied by Gonzales is not reasonable for that case granted more representatives to provinces with less population and vice versa. In this case, Batanes is equal to the number of delegates I other provinces with more population.

- Sec 5: State has right to create office and parameters to qualify/disqualify members thereof. Furthermore, this disqualification is only temporary. This is a safety mechanism to prevent political figures from controlling elections and to allow them to devote more time to the Constituional Convention. - Par 1 Sec 8: this is to avoid debasement of electoral process and also to assure candidates equal opportunity since candidates must now depend on their individual merits, and not the support of political parties. This provision does not create discrimination towards any particular party/group, it applies to all organizations.
___________________ American Bible Society vs. City of Manila

Facts: Plaintiff-appellant is a foreign, non-stock, nonprofit, religious, missionary corporation duly registered and doing business in the Philippines through its Philippine agency established in Manila in November, 1898. The defendant appellee is a municipal corporation with powers that are to be exercised in conformity with the provisionsof Republic Act No. 409, known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila. During the course of its ministry, plaintiff sold bibles and otherreligious materials at a very minimal profit. On May 29 1953, the acting City Treasurer of the City of Manila informed plaintiff that it was conducting the business of general merchandise since November, 1945, without providing itself with the necessary Mayor's permit and municipal license, in violation ofOrdinance No. 3000, as amended, and Ordinances Nos. 2529, 3028 and 3364, and required plaintiff to secure, within three days, the corresponding permit and license fees, together with compromise covering the period from the 4th quarter of 1945 to the 2nd quarter of 1953, in the total sum of P5,821.45 (Annex A).

Plaintiff now questions the imposition of such fees. Issue: Whether or not the said ordinances are constitutional and valid (contention: it restrains the free exercise and enjoyment of thereligious profession and worship of appellant). Held: Section 1, subsection (7) of Article III of the Constitution, provides that: (7) No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religion test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights. The provision aforequoted is a constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, which carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. It may be true that in the case at bar the price asked for the biblesand other religious pamphlets was in some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of the same but this cannot mean that appellant was engaged in the business or occupation of selling said "merchandise" for profit. For this reason. The Court believe that theprovisions of City of

Manila Ordinance No. 2529, as amended, cannot be applied to appellant, for in doing so it would impair its free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship as well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs. With respect to Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, the Court do not find that it imposes any charge upon the enjoyment of a right granted by the Constitution, nor tax the exercise of religious practices. It seems clear, therefore, that Ordinance No. 3000 cannot be considered unconstitutional, however inapplicable to said business, trade or occupation of the plaintiff. As to Ordinance No. 2529 of the City of Manila, as amended, is also not applicable, so defendant is powerless to license or tax the business of plaintiff Society. _________

Osmena v. Comelec (March 31, 1998)

Facts: -Emilio Osmena and other petitioners are candidates in the National Elections. -R.A. No. 6646, the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, prohibits mass media from selling or giving free of charge print space or air time for campaign or other political purposes, except to the Commission on Elections. -They contend that events after the ruling in National Press Club v. Commission on Elections have called into question the validity of the very premises of that decision.

-NPC v. COMELEC upheld the validity of R.A. No. 6646 against claims that it abridged freedom of speech and of the press. In urging a reexamination of that ruling, petitioners claim that experience in the last five years since the decision in that case has shown the undesirable effects of the law because the ban on political advertising has not only failed to level the playing field, but actually worked to the grave disadvantage of the poor candidate[s] by depriving them of a medium which they can afford to pay for while their more affluent rivals can always resort to other means of reaching voters like airplanes, boats, rallies, parades, and handbills. -However, no empirical data were presented by the petitioners to back up their claim. They instead they make arguments from which it is clear that their disagreement is with the opinion of the Court on the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6646 and that what they seek is a reargument on the same issue already decided in that case. Issue: WON upholding the validity of RA 6646 actually worked in favor of richer candidates Held: Petition DISMISSED Ratio: It is incorrect to claim that the purpose of RA 6646 is equality of the candidates when what its provisions really speak of is equality in opportunity. The main purpose of the RA is regulatory. Any restriction on speech is only incidental, and it is no more than is necessary to achieve its purpose of promoting equality of opportunity in the use of mass media for political advertising. The restriction on speech, as pointed out in NPC, is limited both as to time and as to scope. Assuming that rich candidates can spend for parades, rallies, motorcades, airplanes and the like in order to campaign while poor

candidates can only afford political ads, the gap between the two will not necessarily be reduced by allowing unlimited mass media advertising because rich candidates can spend for other propaganda in addition to mass media advertising. Moreover, it is not true that 11(b) has abolished the playing field. What it has done, as already stated, is merely to regulate its use through COMELEC-sponsored advertising in place of advertisements paid for by candidates or donated by their supporters.
______________ Salonga vs. Cruz-PanoG.R. No. L-59524 Feb. 18, 1985Gutierrez, Jr., J.:FACTS:Jovito Salonga was charged with the violation of the Revised Anti-Subversion Act after he wasimplicated, along with other 39 accused, by Victor Lovely in the series of bombings in Metro Manila. Hewas tagged by Lovely in his testimony as the leader of subversive organizations for two reasons (1)because his house was used as a and (2) because of his remarks during the party of RaulDaza in Los Angeles. He allegedly opined about the likelihood of a violent struggle in the Philippines if reforms are not instituted immediately by then President Marcos. ISSUE:Whether or not alleged remarks are protected by the freedom of speech.

HELDYes. The petition is dismissed.RATIOThe opinion is nothing but a legitimate exercise of freedom of thought andexpression. Protection is especially mandated for political discussions. Political discussion is essential tothe ascertainment of political truth. It cannot be the basis of criminal indictments. The constitutionalguaranty may only be proscribed when such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminentlawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action. In the case at bar, there is no threat againstthe government.In PD 885, political discussion will only constitute prima facie evidence of membership in asubversive organization if such discussion amounts to conferring with officers or other members of suchassociation or organization in furtherance of any plan or enterprise thereof. In the case, there is noproof that such discussion was in furtherance of any plan to overthrow the government through illegalmeans. Lovely also declared that his bombing mission was not against the government, but directedagainst a particular family. Such a statement negates any politically motivated or subversive assignment.OBITER DICTUM:To withhold the right to preliminary investigation, it would be to transgress constitutional dueprocess. However, it is not enough that the preliminary investigation is conducted to satisfy the dueprocess clause. There must be sufficient evidence to sustain a prima facie case or that probable causeexists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused

Pita vs. Court of Appeals Facts: On December 1 and 3, 1983, pursuing an Anti-Smut Campaign initiated by the Mayor of the City of Manila, Ramon D. Bagatsing, elements of the Special Anti-Narcotics Group, Auxilliary Services Bureau, Western Police District, INP of the Metropolitan Police Force of Manila, seized and confiscated from dealers, distributors, newsstand owners and peddlers along Manila sidewalks, magazines, publications and other reading materials believed to be obscene,

pornographic and indecent and later burned the seized materials in public at the University belt along C.M. Recto Avenue, Manila, in the presence of Mayor Bagatsing and several officers and members of various student organizations. Among the publications seized, and later burned, was "Pinoy Playboy" magazines published and co-edited by plaintiff Leo Pita. Plaintiff filed a case for injunction with prayer for issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction against Mayor Bagatsing and Narcisco Cabrera, as superintendent of Western Police District of the City of Manila, seeking to enjoin said defendants and their agents from confiscating plaintiffs magazines or from preventing the sale or circulation thereof claiming that the magazine is a decent, artistic and educational magazine which is not per se obscene, and that the publication is protected by the Constitutional guarantees of freedom of speech and of the press. Plaintiff also filed an Urgent Motion for issuance of a temporary restraining order against indiscriminate seizure, confiscation and burning of plaintiff's "Pinoy Playboy" Magazines, pending hearing on the petition for preliminary injunction. The Court granted the temporary restraining order. The case was set for trial upon the lapse of the TRO. RTC ruled that the seizure was valid. This was affirmed by the CA.

Issue: Whether or Not the seizure violative of the freedom of expression of the petitioner. Held: Freedom of the press is not without restraint as the state has the right to protect society from pornographic literature that is offensive to public morals, as indeed we have laws punishing the author, publishers and sellers of obscene publications. However, It is easier said than done to say, that if the pictures here in question were used not exactly for art's sake but rather for commercial purposes, the pictures are not entitled to any constitutional protection. Using the Kottinger rule: the test of obscenity is "whether the tendency of the matter charged as obscene, is to deprave or corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral influences and into whose hands a publication or other article charged as being obscene may fall." Another is whether it shocks the ordinary and common sense of men as an indecency. Ultimately "whether a picture is obscene or indecent must depend upon the circumstances of the case and that the question is to be decided by the "judgment of the aggregate sense of the community reached by it." The government authorities in the instant case have not shown the required proof to justify a ban and to warrant confiscation of the literature First of all, they were not possessed of a lawful court order: (1) finding the said materials to be pornography, and (2) authorizing them to carry out a search and seizure, by way of a search warrant. The court provides that the authorities must apply for the issuance of a search warrant from a judge, if in their opinion an obscenity seizure is in order and that;

1. The authorities must convince the court that the materials sought to be seized are obscene and pose a clear and present danger of an evil substantive enough to warrant State interference and action; 2. The judge must determine whether or not the same are indeed obscene. The question is to be resolved on a case-to-case basis and on the judges sound discretion; __________
137 SCRA 628 Facts: This petition was filed to compel the respondents to allow the reopening of Radio Station DYRE which had been summarily closed on grounds of national security. The petitioner contended that it was denied due process when it was closed on the mere allegation that the radio station was used to incite people to sedition. It alleged that no hearing was held and no proof was

submitted to establish a factual basis for the closure. The petitioner was not informed beforehand why administrative action which closed the radio station was taken against it. No action was taken by the respondents to entertain a motion seeking the reconsideration of the closure action. The petitioner also raised the issue of freedom of speech. It appears from the records that the respondents' general charge of "inciting people to commit acts of sedition" arose from the petitioner's shift towards what it stated was the coverage of public events and the airing of programs geared towards public affairs. ISSUE: Was the closure, without hearing, violative of the freedom of the press? RULING: Yes. All forms of communication are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of expression clause. Necessarily, however, the freedom of television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to newspaper and print media. Yet the freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative democracy. Broadcast stations deserve the special protection given to all forms of media by the due process and freedom of expression clauses of the Constitution The cardinal primary requirements in administrative proceedings laid down by this Court in AngTibay v. Court of Industrial Relations (69 Phil. 635) should be followed before a broadcast station may be closed or its operations curtailed. _________ G.R. Nos. 79690-707 October 7, 1988 ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR vs. RAUL M. GONZALEZ, FACTS: The following are the subjects of this Resolution filed by the Petitioner : a Motion, dated 9 February 1988, to Cite in Contempt filed by petitioner Enrique A. Zaldivar against public respondent Special Prosecutor (formerly Tanodbayan) Raul M. Gonzalez, in connection with G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and G.R. No. 80578. and a Resolution of this Court dated 2 May 1988 requiring respondent Hon. Raul Gonzalez to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt and/or subjected to administrative sanctions for making certain public statements. The Motion cited as bases the acts of respondent Gonzalez in: (1) having caused the filing of the information against petitioner in Criminal Case No. 12570 before the Sandiganbayan; and (2) issuing certain allegedly contemptuous statements to the media in relation to the proceedings in G.R. No. 80578. In respect of the latter, petitioner annexed to his Motion a photocopy of a news article which appeared in the 30 November 1987 issue of the "Philippine Daily Globe." ISSUE: Are lawyers entitled to the same degree of latitude of freedom of speech towards the Court? RULING: No. The Court begins by referring to the authority to discipline officers of the court and members of the Bar. The authority to discipline lawyers stems from the Court's constitutional mandate to regulate admission to the practice of law, which includes as well authority to regulate the practice itself of law. Moreover, the Supreme Court has inherent power to punish for contempt, to control in the furtherance of justice the conduct of ministerial officers of the Court including lawyers and all other persons connected in any manner with a case before the Court. Only slightly (if at all) less important is the public interest in the capacity of the Court effectively to prevent and control professional misconduct on the part of lawyers who are, first and foremost, indispensable participants in the task of rendering justice to every man. Some courts have held, persuasively it appears to us, and that a lawyer's right of free expression may have to be more limited than that of a layman. While the Court may allow criticism it has In Re: Almacen held: Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action. The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers even those gifted with superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their tempers. _______________ TELEBAP vs. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 132922, April 21, 1998 (289 SCRA 337) Facts: TELEBAP and GMA Network together filed a petition to challenge the validity of Comelec Time due to the fact that said provisions: (1) have taken properties without due process of law and without just compensation; (2) it denied the radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws;

and (3) that it is in excess of the power given to the Comelec to regulate the operation of media communication or information during election period. Held: Petitioners' argument is without merit, All broadcasting, whether by radio or by television stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies to assign. 9 A franchise is thus a privilege subject, among other things, to amended by Congress in accordance with the constitutional provision that "any such franchise or right granted . . . shall be subject to amendment, alteration or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires." Indeed, provisions for COMELEC Time have been made by amendment of the franchises of radio and television broadcast stations and, until the present case was brought, such provisions had not been thought of as taking property without just compensation. Art. XII, 11 of the Constitution authorizes the amendment of franchises for "the common good." What better measure can be conceived for the common good than one for free air time for the benefit not only of candidates but even more of the public, particularly the voters, so that they will be fully informed of the issues in an election? "[I]t is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount." 11 Nor indeed can there be any constitutional objection to the requirement that broadcast stations give free air time. Even in the United States, there are responsible scholars who believe that government controls on broadcast media can constitutionally be instituted to ensure diversity of views and attention to public affairs to further the system of free expression. For this purpose, broadcast stations may be required to give free air time to candidates in an election. In truth, radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit broadcast signals and images. They are merely given the temporary privilege of using them. Since a franchise is a mere privilege, the exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the performance by the grantee of some form of public service.