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First-Past-The-Post
, 2014
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Prmbledhje
Sistemet zgjedhore dhe mnyra e ndarjes s mandateve, madhsia dhe numri i zonave zgjedhore, si dhe ndarja
e trupit votues e prcaktojn esencn e procesit zgjedhor, q n mas qensore e prcakton nivelin demokratik
t nj shteti.
N aspektin teorik, mnyra e ndarjes s mandateve mund ta krijoj sistemin e dy partive politike, njjt si q
mund t ndodh e kundrta, ku sistemi ekzistues i dy partive ose koalicioneve kryesore e definon modelin.
Duke u nisur nga supozimi q modelet zgjedhore i prshtaten nevojave t qytetarve, ky Dokument e analizon
sistemin e shumics relative (nj deputet i zgjedhur n nj zon zgjedhore), si alternativ e sistemit aktual
proporcional, duke i analizuar prfitimet e tij, si dhe efektet e mundshme negative dhe sfidat q i krijon.
Dokumenti fillimisht e prezanton problemin, duke u prqendruar n dy shtje kye. S pari, vshtrohet ndarja e
votave n zonat aktuale zgjedhore, ku mandatet e barabarta n Kuvend fitohen me sasi t dallueshme t votave.
S dyti, analizohet lidhshmria e votuesve me deputetet e zgjedhur. M tej vazhdohet me pasqyrn tabelare, ku
prshrkuhet gjendja aktuale n aspektin e votave t nevojshme pr fitimin e mandatit, si dhe prqindja e votave
t humbura. Pr ta matur nivelin e lidhshmris mes votuesve dhe deputetve, analiza i prdor t dhnat e
programit Deputeti Juaj me t clin matet aktiviteti i deputetve.
Duke u kombinuar me dimensionin teorik, pjesa e tret i prkushtohet mundsive q i jep Sistemi i shumics
relative si dhe veoriv kryesore pr rrethanat tona. N fund jepen prfundimet dhe rekomandimet pr
pjesmarrsit kryesor t sistemit politik, si dhe pr bashksin akademike dhe sektorin civil.
Executive Summary
Voting systems and the model of mandate allocation, along with the size and number of voting
districts, and the division of the constituency determine the very essence of the electoral process,
which in turn dictates the quality of democracy in any given country.
In the theoretical sense, the allocation model may create a two-party system, to the same extent
that two major parties or coalitions might de-facto shape the system through their real actions.
In its democratic history, the Republic of Macedonia has already applied the FPTP until 1998, before
replacing it with the combined system. The current proportional formula was promoted in 2002.
Assuming that electoral systems are tailored to the needs of the citizens, this paper looks at the FPTP
as an alternative to the current proportional model, analyzing its advantages, potential
disadvantages and challenges.
The paper begins with an overview of the problem, focusing on the allocation of the votes in the
current districts, where mandates are won with different polls of votes. In addition, it looks at the
link between the elected representatives and their constituency. The latter section is illustrated with
a graphical representation, reflecting the current quantity of votes requested for a mandate, and the
percentage of wasted votes. The relationship between MPs and their constituency is further
depicted through the Your MP project reports that scrutinize the MPs parliamentary activity..
In addition to the theoretical dimension, the last section looks into the possibilities of the FPTP and
its main features, applicable to our circumstances. Finally, the paper brings a set of conclusions and
recommendations for the political stakeholders, as well as the academic community and civil society.
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Bernard Grofman, Arend Lijphart (eds), Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences, New York, 2003, 171
ii
Bernard Grofman, Arend Lijphart (eds), Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences, New York, 2003, 21
iii
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Josep M. Colomer (ed), Handbook of Electoral System Choice, New York, 2004, 11
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Michael Gallagher, Paul Mitchell (eds), The Politics of Electoral Systems, Oxford, 2005, 170
vii
Michael Gallagher, Paul Mitchell (eds), The Politics of Electoral Systems, Oxford, 2005, 163
viii
Rein Taagepera, Predicting Party Sizes The Logic of Simple Electoral Systems, New York, 2007, 3
ix
Rein Taagepera, Predicting Party Sizes The Logic of Simple Electoral Systems, New York, 2007, 216
xi
Bernard Grofman, Arend Lijphart (eds), Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences, New York, 2003, 121
xii
Hans-Dieter Klingemann (ed), The Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, New York, 2009, 184-186
16