Quijano vs. Development Bank of the Phil.

FACTS: Appellants' applied for an urban real estate loan which was approved by appellee bank on April 80, 1953.they e ecuted the !ort"a"e contract on March !" #$%&, and that the release of the a!ount of the said loan of #19,500.00 was to be !ade in instal!ents sub$ect to certain conditions. %hat theloanobtained fro! &'# is to be received in several releases and to be paid later in instal!ents, under the ter!s and conditions specified in the loan a"ree!ent. %hat the first release of #(,)00 was !ade on April )9, 195(, and the other releases were !ade subse*uent thereafter, then the balance of the loan were all availed of and received by hi! later than +une, 1953.,odri"ue- paid the instal!ents as they fell due. .hen a balance of about #1(,000.00 re!ained unpaid, *ui$anooffered to pay for the said outstandin" balance with his back pay certificate pursuant to ,epublic Act. /o. 890, %he A!endatory Act of +une )0, 1953. %he 'ank refused to accept the said tender of pay!ent in certificate on the "round that the loan was not incurred before on +une )0, 1953. 'SS(): .hether or not the obli"ation of the petitioners was subsistin" at the ti!e of the approval of ,epublic Act /o. 890, the A!endatory Act of +ulie )0, 1953 to ,epublic Act 30(. .hether or not there is a roo! for interpretation or construction. *)+D: %hus even before the a!end!ent of the 'ack #ay 1aw, when said law li!ited the applicability of back pay certificates to 2obli"ations subsistin" at the ti!e of the approval of this Act,2 this 3ourt has ruled that obli"ations contracted after its enact!ent on +une 18, 19(8 cannot co!e within its purview. .45,567,5, the $ud"!ent of the trial court is affir!ed. /o costs. Stat. Con.: 3lear and una!bi"uous provisions of law offer no roo! for interpretation or construction. %he 8upre!e 3ourt has steadfastly adhered to the doctrine that its first and funda!ental duty is the application of the law accordin" to its e press ter!s, interpretation bein" called for only when such literal application is i!possible. /o process of interpretation or construction need be resorted to where a provision of law pere!ptorily calls for application. .here a re*uire!ent or condition is !ade in e plicit and una!bi"uous ter!s, no discretion is left to the $udiciary