S.

Florea

The Role of NGOs in Post-Conflict reconstruction: A Partnership with the United Nations
by

Simona FLOREA

Masters Thesis Presented to the Graduate School of Webster University at Geneva In partial fulfillment of the requirement for the degree of Master Master of Arts in International Relations

Copyright by Simona Florea ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

Geneva, Switzerland July 2005

The author hereby grants to Webster University permission to reproduce and distribute publicly paper and electronic copies of this thesis document in whole or in part for educational purposes.

S. Florea ABSTRACT

The increasing amount of internal conflicts has put a pressure on the international community to find more efficient ways of dealing with their devastating effects. In these regards, the UN has come to recognize the importance played by Non-Governmental Organizations and Civil Society Organizations as operational bodies.

The purpose of this research is to define the role of NGOs in post-conflict reconstruction. This definition encompasses the description of different post-conflict phases, the issues arising in these areas as well as the reasons behind them.

The study is based on the following statement of purpose: the role of NGOs in the field of international intervention has proven to be quintessential for successful reconstruction of war-torn societies.

The nature of internal conflicts and their effects, the international community as well as its aim and issues faced in reconstruction are addressed. Concepts related to reconstruction are defined and distinguished form one another.

The role of NGOs in post-conflict reconstruction and their relationship to UN funds and specialized agencies are discusses and analyzes. The strengths and weaknesses of NGOs are presented and analyzed.

The last part of the study addresses the conflict in the Province of Kosovo demonstrate the relationship between theories and practice. Kosovo is described and used as a case study showing that the main characteristics identified in the first part can be found and applied to

S. Florea present reconstruction efforts in post-conflict states. The reconstruction process and the obstacles met by the UN bodies and NGOs are addressed.

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TABLE of CONTENTS

Introduction

Methodology Research results and conclusion Research parameters

6 9 9

1. New type of wars faced by the international community 1.1. Conflicts of the 1990s 1.2. The international community 1.2.1. The United Nations 1.2.2. UN specialized agencies 1.2.3. The NGO community

12 12 15 15 18 19

2. Post-conflict reconstruction: where does it start? 2.1. The transitional phase 2.1.2. Gaps within the transitional phase 2.2. The reconstruction phase 2.2.1. Reconstituting legitimacy of the government 2.2.2. Re-establishing security 2.2.3. Rebuilding effectiveness 2.3. Issues in reconstruction 2.3.1. Elections: Issues and Importance 2.3.2. Implementation of the rule of law

22 25 28 30 31 32 32 33 35 36

3. NGOs in post-conflict reconstruction 3.1 History 3.2 The NGO-UN relationship 3.3 The strengths of NGOs 3.4 The weaknesses of NGOs 3.4.1 NGOs and governments

38 38 39 41 46 47

S. Florea 3.4.2 NGOs and resource distribution 3.4.3 NGOs and funding 48 49

4. Conclusion

52

5. Recommendations

54

ANNEX: Country study- Kosovo

57

1. Introduction

58

2. Background 2.1. The Kosovo conflict

58 60

3. Reconstruction developments in Kosovo 3.1. Reconstituting legitimacy of a governing body 3.1.2. Elections and Power Sharing 3.1.3. Development of the Civil Society 3.2. Re-establishing security 3.2.1. Reconstruction of homes and job generation 3.3. Rebuilding effectiveness 3.4. Issues in reconstruction 3.4.1 Gaps within the transitional phase in Kosovo

61 62 62 64 65 67 68 70 71

4. NGOs in Kosovo 4.1. Service provision 5. Conclusion Bibliography

73 75 77 79

S. Florea INTRODUCTION The aim of this study is to define the role of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) in post-conflict reconstruction. This definition encompasses the description of different postconflict phases, the issues arising in these areas as well as the reasons behind them.

The thesis is based on the following statement of purpose: the role of NGOs in the field of international intervention has proven to be quintessential for successful reconstruction of war-torn societies. The obstacles related to the work of NGOs in post-conflict reconstruction need to be dealt with. Additionally the relationship between NGOs and UN agencies needs to be strengthened. These tasks need to be accomplished in order for the international community to attain successful results in the field.

The study first introduces the new type of wars and conflicts and their effects on various societies. Secondly, the international community is briefly presented as well as its aim in reconstruction. In order to provide a clear understanding of the reconstruction phase and the issues faced by the international community, concepts related to reconstruction will be defined and distinguished form one another.

The second part of the study deals with the reconstruction phase and issues faced by the UN and NGOs in achieving their goals.

The third section discusses and analyzes the role of NGOs in post-conflict reconstruction and their relationship to UN funds and specialized agencies. Furthermore the strengths and weaknesses of NGOs are presented and analyzed.

The fourth section includes broad recommendations for the NGOs and UN agencies active in post-conflict reconstruction.

The last part of the study presents the conflict in the Province of Kosovo. Kosovo is described and used as a case study in order to provide a lucid picture as well as to show that the main characteristics identified in the first part can be found and applied to present reconstruction efforts in post-conflict states. Lastly, it discusses the reconstruction process and the obstacles met by the UN bodies and NGOs as well as their weak cooperation and the recognition of the need to strengthen their relationship. 6

S. Florea METHODOLOGY This study is benefited from research conducted during a three-month internship with the World Health Organization (WHO) at three different locations namely New York, Belgrade and Pristina (Kosovo). The major part of the study is however based on research carried out in Geneva.

The persons interviewed include United Nations staff members working in different specialized agencies, such as WHO, United Nations Development Program (UNDP), United Nations Development Group (UNDG) and staff members of different Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) based in Geneva. The NGOs include the World Vision, Quaker UN and World Young Womens Christian Association (YWCA). The selection of these persons was based on the advice of my supervisors. The interviews carried out in Geneva were established through networking. The selection of persons interviewed in Geneva was mainly based on the NGO oriented focus of research.

List of persons interviewed: Ardita Tahirukaj- Health promoting Schools Adviser, WHO Pristina Burbuque Dobranja- Public Information Officer, UNDP, Kosovo Claudia Seymour- UNICEF, UNDG/ECHA, New York and Liberia Conor Lyons- Coordinator of the UN Volunteer Programme, UNDP, Kosovo Daniel Perez- NGO SECTION/DESA, New York Deirdre Keogh- Programme Analyst, UNDP, Kosovo Gerry McWeeney- Healthy Environment Programme Manager, WHO Pristina Luigi Migliorini M.D.- Head of Office, WHO Belgrade Mark Bowden- Senior Coordinator of UNDG, New York Mark-Andre Dorel ECOSOC, (specialized on transitional countries in Africa), New York Michelle Federoff- Deputy of Head of Office, NGO SECTION/DESA, New York Mytaher Haskuka- National Programme Analyst, UNDP, Kosovo Dr. Melita Vujnovic- Liaison Officer, WHO Belgrade Dr. Richard Alderslade- Senior External Relations Officer on Health Policy, WHO New York Dr. Serap Sener- Head of Office, WHO Prisitina Sofia Carrondo- Deputy Resident Representative, UNDP Pristina Musimby R.A. Kanyoro- General Secretary, World YWCA Geneva 7

S. Florea David Atwood- Quaker UN Tom Getman- World Vision

The collection of data consists of interviews with the UN and NGO staff members, attendance at UN meetings and teleconferences, online and telephone discussions. The interviews were not structured with open-ended questions with the purpose of not constraining the interviewees. The interviews were not recorded as was advised and also due to the risk of diminishing the quality of information received. The notes were transcribed and analyzed.

The length of the interviews varied from forty-five minutes to an hour and fifteen minutes. The interviews were produced to fit the context and the knowledge of the interviewee based on their position and expertise.

In regards to the transition and reconstruction in Kosovo the following questions were asked: 1. What kind of transition is the one taking place in Kosovo? 2. When did Kosovo enter the transition phase? 3. What were the events that determined the beginning of the transition phase? 4. When did the initiation of reconstruction activities take place? 5. Which are the predominant types of activities (i.e. emergency/reconstruction or both) in the transition phase in Kosovo? 6. What are the main problems faced in the transition period in Kosovo? 7. What types of gaps can be identified in the field of transitional work in Kosovo? 8. Which are the major INGOs and local NGOs in the field of transition in Kosovo? 9. One of the frequently arising issues in the field of transitional work is the lack of cooperation and coordination amongst the actors involved. How is the present situation in Kosovo? 10. Lack of funding for the reconstruction activities is another main issue arising the transitional field. How is the funding situation in Kosovo? 11. From the lessons learned in the post-conflict transitional states Country Studies, the lack of a common vision of the end-state and shared goals were identified to be imperative for a successful transitional response. Might one say this is achieved? 12. Which are the main donors in the transitional field of work in Kosovo? 13. Which are the most funded activities? 14. Which are the less funded activities? 8

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Interview with World YWCA, Quaker UN 1. What would you say are the strengths of NGOs? 2. Their weaknesses have been criticized by many could you counter some of the main criticisms against NGOs? 3. What can easier be accomplished by NGOs in comparison to the UN? Could you give some examples? 4. What would you say is the role of NGOs in post-conflict reconstruction? 5. Are NGOs implicated in the organizations and supervision of elections in post-conflict states? If Yes- How? Why? 6. What complications do NGOs face when working with the UN? 7. What and how could it be improved?

While interviewing staff at the World Vision the following questions were added to the above ones. 1. What implications have you experienced when working with the UN? 2. What would you say are the most common problems faced by NGOs in post-conflict reconstruction? 3. Has the World Vision carried out any activities in Kosovo that you are familiar with?

In addition to the initial questions a series of why?, give some more examples, what is your personal experience? were added.

The secondary data was obtained through literature, unpublished literature, also called grey literature consisting of UN and NGO internal reports and documents, the UN intranet, publications received from the NGO Liaison Services (NGLS) the Internet and newspaper articles. Most of the used internal documents and reports were recommended and/or given by the supervisors, other UN staff members or by the interviewees.

The analysis of data was based on the interviews and secondary data obtained throughout the research. This was done by a comparison between the interviews and secondary data.

S. Florea Research results and conclusion In transitional post-conflict states the main issues faced by the international actors are those concerning coordination and cooperation and a lack of clarity in the definition of the transitional phase thereby resulting in lack of donor funding as well as a negative impact on reconstruction. The role played by NGOs has increased in term of importance during the past twenty years as have their presence, and their recognition as necessary operational partners in post-conflict reconstruction. The recent past and present situation in Kosovo is used as an example to strengthen the identified common characteristics of reconstruction and NGO- UN relation.

Research parameters The difficulties faced during my research concern the definition and clarification of terms such as: What are Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and how there are distinguished from NGOs. Also problematic has been identifying the difference between peace-building and reconstruction since both consist of by and large, the same activities.

The reconstruction phase has more of an economic element to it than peace building, which is a more social/political concept. That said, there is a lot of overlap between the terms. Linguistic precision is unfortunately not carefully observed among users, as the CSO/NGO definition debate shows.1

In my dialogue with a number of UN personnel, NGO staff and others involved in this area of work there was a common theme however their opinions differed greatly. It appears that due to the pressure NGOs face to prove themselves to the rest of the international community they seem to be more sensitive and more aware of these terms. Moreover and to my surprise, the more recent articles are more careful when using terms and concepts in comparison to the older ones. The more recent articles try to provide clear definitions instead of using the terms loosely.

Due to the fact that my research has been limited to the availability of only a relatively small number of interviewees, it runs the risk of generalizing the criticisms and counter-criticisms regarding the issues arising in the relationship between NGOs and the UN in post-conflict

Discussion, Professor King, Webster University Geneva

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S. Florea reconstruction. The subject is very broad. Increasing the number of interviews would have involved and amount of additional research and analysis that would have exceeded the amount required for an MA thesis in international relations. While the end result of the present thesis is rather broad, I believe that it is accurate.

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S. Florea 1. NEW TYPE OF WARS FACED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

In the late 1980s and early 1990s at the end of the Cold War the global order changed. The threat of war among states appeared to have diminished and the expectations of peace breaking out were steadily increasing over the globe. Instead of the expected peaceful transition from controlled economy to market economy and from communism to democracy, a new type of conflict arose in the developing countries and former colonized states.

1.1 The conflicts of the 1990s

The proliferating conflicts of the 1990s, multiplying in different regions of the world were not a new phenomenon. These conflicts had been protracted for long periods of time but had been kept at bay during the Cold War by the former super powers.

The nature of war in the 1990s had taken a new shape. Along with the end of one of the two super powers, the number of interstate wars was drastically reduced but only to be replaced by intrastate wars. These new type of wars were/are based on ethnicity, race, religion natural resources and power. By breaking all the formerly accepted rules of war, these conflicts target civilians, men, women, children and the elderly indiscriminately. These wars are stateless in nature, not controlled by any state government and organized by non-state groups with the objectives of self-determination. 2

These conflicts leave societies with destroyed infrastructure, paralyzed commerce, devastated agriculture, high unemployment and absent foreign investment. The traditional sources of authority in post-conflict societies are usually destroyed or greatly undermined in the absence of a legitimate governing body. The police and judicial systems are usually considered a part of the problem, with democratic practices and institutions often minimal or non-existent.
3

Under these described conditions, the conflicts are more likely to continue or worsen rather than end. Their importance is screened to the international community through their domino
2

KING, John: The New Warfare and the Need for an Interactive Military, in Humanitarian Action, Security and the Military, The Ninth Annual Humanitarian Conference of Webster University, Geneva, Refugee Survey Quarterly, UNHCR, Volume 23 Number 4, 2004, Oxford University Press, pp. 48-57 3 HIERONYMI Otto: Ethnic and Nationalistic Intolerance-The Threat for International Order, in Internal Conflicts: The Role of Humanitarian Action Proceedings of the 3rd Webster University Humanitarian Conference, International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, 1998, pp.143-148

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S. Florea effect and contagious nature of quickly spreading to the neighboring countries thus affecting whole regions.

The wars started in the early 1990s in former Yugoslavia serve as perfect examples of the devastating effects internal conflicts have on societies and regions as a whole. These wars were based on self-determination of various groups of people depending on religion and/or ethnicity. The last conflict taking place, in this region was the ethnic conflict in the Serbian and Montenegrin Province of Kosovo in 1997. Kosovo is presently suffering from lack of political and economic institutions, expertise and knowledge, infrastructure and ongoing tensions. 4

In the Great Lake Sub-region; Burundi, Tanzania, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) the internal conflicts have been based on control of power and natural resources, and ethnicity. They have left the societies of this region in poverty, with millions of people dead and a massive number of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs).5

Furthermore, the conflict in Sierra Leone which started in 1991 and ended eleven years later left the country with a devastated infrastructure, a destroyed economy, and collapsed national institutions. During this conflict 50.000 people were killed while 500.000 were forced to migrate to neighboring countries displacing up to 700.000 other persons. 6

The war in East Timor, currently Timor Leste, started in 1974 due to the power vacuum produced by the absence of its former colonial power, Portugal. After its colonization by Indonesia, East Timor was given its independence and relapsed into conflict once again. The country was left with seventy percent of its infrastructure and public administration destroyed and with no people that knew how to run the country.7

The Republic of Congo is still at risk of relapse into conflict and has been the case ever since the conflict started in 1997. The international community had established a cease-fire

Cf. the Proceedings of the 8th Annual Webster University Conference on The Economic and Social Consequences of Humanitarian Crises. Refugee Survey Quarterly, Oxford University Press, 2003 5 UNDG,2002, Country Studies: The Great Lake Region 6 UNDG,2002, Country Studies: Sierrea Leone 7 UNDG,2002, Country Studies: East Timor Leste

14

S. Florea agreement in 1999 but the crisis resumed in 2000 and again in 2002. Currently the main cities are destroyed and 800.000 people are displaced.8

After the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in 1989 and the conflict prior to the occupation in 1978, Afghanistan was left with competing leaders dependent on opposing flows of politically motivated military assistance. The rest of the population survived on politically motivated humanitarian aid, which was cut off after the 9/11 attacks. The country suffers from destroyed agriculture, commerce, and a lack of national institutions, thereby not being able to improve its status on its own.9

The increasing frequency of internal conflicts raised concern within the UN regarding its ways of reacting to situations of massive violence, humanitarian emergencies, and breakdown of authorities and human rights abuses taking place within states rather then between states. The nature of the UNs rights, obligations and responsibility to intervene as well as its capacity to do so was raised. The UN had formerly been dealing with state sovereignty and was restrained by Article 2(7) of the UN Charter to intervene in matters within the domestic jurisdiction of states. These matters had therefore been dealt with by the UN on an ad hoc basis lacking developed plans and programs of intervention. 10

The devastating effect of these conflicts in their respective regions soon came to convince the UN Security Council that new methods of intervention were needed and that the UN had to get involved. Peace-keeping operations were the initially predominant mechanisms used to deal with these conflicts. They were originally developed during the post-war decolonization period and used as means of filling the power vacuums caused by the absence of the colonial powers. The peace-keeping operations were established for the purpose of enabling negotiation for permanent settlement of post-colonial conflicts.11

Thereafter, the regional organizations were expected to pick-up on the remaining matters arising form these conflicts, such as their effects on neighboring societies. However this soon proved to be unsuccessful due to a number of reasons; in some regions, if there were any organizations they were not accepted or were regarded to be partial and/or the existing and
8 9

UNDG,2002, Country Studies: Republic of Congo UNDG 2002,Country Studies: Afghanistan 10 Roberts, Adam, 1993, United Nations Divided World-The UNs Role in International Relations p. 87-91 11 Ibid

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S. Florea accepted organizations proved to lack the capacity, expertise and/or resources to raise large peace-keeping operations.12 This to some extent is still the case today.

Since the end of the Cold War both the demand and scope of the UN peace-keeping operations had increased expanding form negotiation matters to disarmament of various factions, the return of refugees, temporary administration, humanitarian relief assistance, and the organization and supervision of elections.13

The solution was concluded to be increased and improved systematic contact and a more cooperative course of action between the UN and its operational partners was called for.

1.2 The international community The actors involved in post-conflict reconstruction activities are generally referred to as the international community which consists of the many voices of governments, or as one voice through the UN, its funds, programs and specialized agencies. In addition, the financial institutions (IFIs), and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) make up a large part of the international community. All these actors are collaborating and interacting on a range of different levels. However, their success in reconstruction is highly dependant on the quality of their collaborations and interactions.

Since this paper is mainly concerned with the role of NGOs as operational UN partners, it is nonetheless important to briefly mention the UN bodies important to reconstruction of wartorn states will be briefly introduced.

1.2.1 The United Nations As the principal world body of peace and security, the role of the UN is to work with the affected states to identify the key transition and development needs of the country, and help the government coordinate necessary interventions as well as carry out the necessary coordination and implementation of needed projects and activities. The UN does this by interacting and cooperating with its operational partners.14

12 13

Ibid p. 87-91 Ibid p. 92 14 Interview, Richard Alderslade

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S. Florea The Security Council is the main Peace and Security organ of the UN consisting of five permanent member states and ten on a rotational two year mandate. The UN Charter gives the Security Council primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security and may intervene whenever peace is threatened. All member states are obliged to implement the Security Councils decisions. It has the power to impose economic sanctions or/and order an arms embargo as measures of enforcing its decisions. However it will firstly try to find ways of peaceful settlement of disputes or undertake mediation between the opposing parties. If violence breaks out, the Security Council aims at securing a ceasefire by sending peacekeeping missions into the affected region with the aim of maintaining peace or keeping apart opposing parties. If necessary, the Council may authorize the use of all necessary means to make sure its decisions are followed.15

In terms of post-conflict states, the Security Council is responsible of ending the violence by using its power to make decisions regarding the initiation of operations such as peace-keeping operations and the establishment of Interim Administration bodies helping the countries through their political and economical transitions. Special Representatives of the Secretary General (SRSG), Humanitarian Coordinator (HC), Resident Coordinator (RC), and the UN Country Team (UNCT), are all dependant on the Security Councils decisions.16

The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) within the UN Secretariat, under the UN Charter is committed to assist the Member States and the Secretary-General in their efforts to maintain international peace and security. In post-conflict settings the DPKO sets up its own offices carrying out activities and projects to integrate UN efforts, governmental and non-governmental bodies concerned with peace-keeping operations. DPKO also provides guidance and support on military, police, mine action, and logistical and administrative issues to UN political and peace-building missions, and leads states through a transition to stable government.17

The UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) aims at promoting higher standards of living, full employment and economic and social progress; identifying solutions to

15 16

www.un.org ibid 17 http://www.un.org/depts/dpko/dpko/index.asp

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S. Florea international economic, social and health problems; facilitating international cultural and educational problems; and encouraging universal respect for human rights and freedoms.18

ECOSOC is the main UN coordinating body of economic and social activities concerning the work of the UN funds, programs (specialized agencies) and its autonomously governed specialized agencies, such as the World Health Organization (WHO), the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Often specialized agencies include the UN development Programme (UNDP), UN Childrens Fund (UNICEF), UN Population Fund (UNPFA), UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), UN World Food Programme (WFP), and UN Environment Programme (UNEP).19

In addition the ECOSOC, under the Art. 71 of the UN Charter, is given the responsibility of granting consultative status to NGOs.20 ECOSOC does not have in-country teams but through its coordination of UN bodies, specialized agencies and most importantly NGOs, its functions guide the field based partners in their activities.21 The Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) was established to serve as a UN coordinating body responding to humanitarian emergencies, policy development and humanitarian advocacy. It aims at improving the effectiveness of UN humanitarian in-country operations through collaboration with other UN humanitarian agencies, funds and programmes and NGOs. The UN Development Program (UNDP) carries out development projects and a range of activities concerning democratic governance, poverty reduction, crisis prevention and recovery, and aiding countries to improve their populations living standards. The UNDP is involved in most developing countries and post-conflict states. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is mandated to lead and co-ordinate international action to protect refugees and resolve refugee problems worldwide. Its primary purpose is to safeguard the rights and well-being of refugees. It strives to ensure that everyone
18 19

NGLS, 2003, Intergovernmental negotiations and decision making at the United Nations- A guide p. 8 Ibid p.9 20 Ibid p.8 and 47 21 NGLS, 2003, Intergovernmental negotiations and decision making at the United Nations- A guide

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S. Florea can exercise the right to seek asylum and find safe refuge in another State, with the option to return home voluntarily, integrate locally or to resettle in a third country.22 UNIFEM is a UN fund focusing on developing womens empowerment and gender equality. It provides financial and technical assistance on reducing feminized poverty, ending violence against women, reversing the spread of HIV/AIDS among women and girls, and achieving gender equality in democratic governance in times of peace as well as war.23 The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) conducts international efforts to defeat hunger. FAO works with both developed and developing countries but however focuses on developing rural areas. Within FAO states are able to meet and negotiate agreements and debate policy. FAO is also a source of knowledge and information enabling developing states and states in transition to modernize and improve their agriculture, forestry and ensure good nutrition.24 1.2.2. UN specialized agencies Specialized agencies are autonomous Organizations working with the United Nations and each other through the coordinating machinery of the Economic and Social Council. The programmes, funds and other departments of the United Nations report only to the General Assembly.25

As set out in its Constitution, the World Health Organizations objectives are the attainment by all peoples for the highest possible level of health26, that is health as a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity27.

The World Bank is an international financial institution (IFI) and even though not a part of the UN it is affiliated as a special agency of the UN system. The World Bank aims at eradicating poverty and improve the living standards of people in the developing world thorough its programmes and activities. It is a development Bank which provides loans, policy advice, technical assistance and knowledge sharing services to low and middle income countries to

22 23

www.unhcr.ch www.unifem.org 24 www.un.org 25 NGLS, 2003, Intergovernmental negotiations and decision making at the United Nations- A guide p.9 26 http:// www.who.int/overview/en/print.html 27 www.who.org

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S. Florea reduce poverty. The Bank promotes growth to create jobs and to empower poor people to take advantage of these opportunities.28 The International Monetary Fund was established to promote international monetary cooperation, exchange stability, and orderly exchange arrangements. IMF carries out projects aiming at promoting economic growth and employment. It also provides temporary financial assistance to countries trying to help ease balance of payments adjustment.29 Nevertheless, the reconstruction tasks cannot be accomplished by the UN, its agencies, funds and programmes alone, or solely by the Governments. New operational partners such as NGOs and Civil Society actors are highly needed for improved performance and results. 1.2.3 The NGO community By definition both Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and NGOs appear to be regarded as being the same kind of organizations and as the definition below will show there is a very fine line distinguishing one form the other.

A brief definition of CSOs, which also will be used through out the paper, describes Civil Society Organization as the associational activity of citizens (outside their families, friend and workplaces) that is entered into voluntarily to advance their interests, ideas, ideals and ideologies. It doesnt include associational activity of people for profit-making purposes (the private sector) or for governing (the sate or public sector).30 The NGOs could be placed under the definition of CSOs as components of civil society, described as organizations formed to provide a benefit to the general public or the world at large either through the provision of specific services or through advocacy. Most are membership organizations, recruiting those who share the common interest; they are mostly considered philanthropic or public organizations because their programmes reach well beyond their members.31

28

www.wb.org Cf. also World Bank: Alcira Kreimer, etc: The World Banks Experience with Post-Conflict Reconstruction, Washington, D.C. 1998 and World Bank: Paul Collier, etc: Breaking the Conflict Trap Civil War and Development Policy, A copublication of the World Bank and Oxford University Pres, 2003 29 www.imf.org 30 United Nations,2001, The diversity of actors within the UN System 31 ibid

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S. Florea As will be discussed later on, there are numerous NGOs and CSOs present in post conflict reconstruction. NGOs vary both in size, targeted areas of work and foundations. However their aim is always the same- to alleviate suffering, improve living standards, represent and make heard the voices of the people. In order to better understand how NGOs vary form one another a few of them will be presented. Oxford Committee for Famine Relief (OXFAM) is a confederation of twelve organizations present in over one hundred countries aiming to find lasting solutions to poverty, suffering and injustice. Oxfam International seeks increased worldwide public understanding that economic and social justice, are crucial to sustainable development. We strive to be a global campaigning force promoting the awareness and motivation that comes with global citizenship whilst seeking to shift public opinion in order to make equity the same priority as economic growth.32 Oxfam works both in emergency and relief situations as well as long term development programmes found in reconstruction activities. The areas of concern are: education, debt and aid, health, gender equality, conflict and natural disasters, and democracy and human rights.33 Mdecins Sans Frontires (MSF) is a non-partisan international humanitarian aid organization, independent from governments, that provides emergency medical assistance in more than 80 countries. MSF works together with authorities such as the Ministry of Health to provide assistance in those countries lacking health structures. MSF works in rehabilitation of hospitals and dispensaries, vaccination programmes and water and sanitation projects and provides training of local personnel. All this is done with the objective of rebuilding health structures to acceptable levels.34 MSF also seeks to raise awareness of crisis situations by acting as witness. It also addresses any violations of human rights and violations committed or sustained by political actors by confronting the responsible actors themselves and by putting pressure on them through mobilization of the international community, and by issuing information publicly. In order to

32 33

www.oxfam.org ibid 34 msf.org

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S. Florea prevent compromise or manipulation of MSF's relief activities, MSF maintains neutrality and independence from individual governments.35 Quaker UN aims at abolishing war and promotes peaceful resolution of conflicts, human rights, economic justice and good governance. QUNO works within the areas of conflict prevention, relief and emergency aid, disarmament and peace-building, human right and refugee issues and economic development. QUNO has consultative status with ECOSOC and cooperates with a number of multilateral organisations, such as the World Trade Organisation, International Labour Organisation, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund.36 The Watchlist on Children and Armed Conflict is an NGO network that monitors and reports on violations against the security and rights of children and adolescents in specific situations of armed conflict. Watchlist uses this information to urge action by the UN Security Council, other UN agencies and appropriate governments. Watchlist also provides capacitystrengthening support to local NGO partners in areas of conflict. The Watchlist is housed at the Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children, a member of the network's Steering Committee.37 World Vision is a Christian relief and development organization focusing on children and communities by targeting critical needs such as clean water, reliable food supplies, basic health care, education, and income-generating microeconomic development. The aim of World Vision is to save lives and reduce suffering by tracking crises, pre-positioning emergency supplies for immediate response, and remaining after the crisis to rebuild and restore communities, by working with churches, governments, local organizations, and international agencies.38

35 36

ibid www.quno.org 37 www.womenscommission.org 38 www.worldvision.org

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S. Florea 2. POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION: WHERE DOES IT START?

The issues discussed in this paper concern post-conflict reconstruction in war-torn states. A post-conflict state is one that is neither at peace nor in conflict. There exists a prevailing risk of renewed violence which therefore calls for international intervention. Through its reconstruction efforts, the international communitys aim is to prevent a relapse into conflict and subsequently ensure sustainable peace. The international community seeks to bring wartorn societies back to normalcy and through reconstruction, aid them in establishing better living standards for their populations. In order to achieve its goals, the reconstruction activities carried out by the international community include the promoting of democracy through the establishment and/or improvement of national institutions, good governance, and of the judicial and economic systems.39

According to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict Final Report, strategies for preventions are divided into two clusters:40

a. Operational prevention is short- term in nature and includes peace-making activities and emergency and relief crisis. b. Structural prevention refers to prevention prior to conflict or prevention of reoccurrence of conflict. The latter includes the longer term activities such as peacekeeping and peace-building operations and reconstruction activities.

In the Agenda for Peace 1992, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, former UN Secretary-General states that the first step to be taken is to identify at the earliest possible stage, the situations that could produce conflict and through active diplomacy, try to remove the sources of danger The legacy of oppressive regimes, of violent and often protracted internal conflicts is inefficient economies, neglected and often intentionally destroyed material and social, private and common capital. The need for resources for successful reconstruction is enormous. Moreover, the problems of reconstruction are multiplied by the fact that in most conflicts that have led to major humanitarian crises, the principal targets were civilians, and the main, explicit objective of the warring parties was to destroy existing communities and social structures, to create hatred and division that will make future peaceful interaction also impossible. This is one of the reasons why the quality, the speed and the extent of humanitarian assistance and protection is so important during and after the conflicts: in fact humanitarian action helps not only the actual or potential victims directly concerned but it also brings in a dimension of humanity in tragic and vicious situations and can contribute to future moral reconstruction. Otto Hieronymi and Chiara Jasson: Introduction, The Economic and Social Consequences of Humanitarian Crises, Refugee Survey Quarterly, 2003, op.cit.
Dress, Toby, P., 2005, Designing a peace-building infrastructure: Taking a system approach to the prevention of deadly conflict, NGLS p.13
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S. Florea before the initiation of violence.41 However important, preventive action prior to conflict is impeded by the difficulty of coming up with an exact forecast. Currently, a large number of states are vulnerable to conflict however only a few fall into complete collapse or end up in violent strife. In order to identify the states at risk of collapse, reliable tools of analysis for precise predictions are needed. Since the UN lacks a well-funded and centralized body focusing solely on collection of early warning information and analysis, it remains dependant on external actors. As a consequence the UNs resources are usually directed to areas considered most vulnerable or to states that might have the largest impact on regional and/or international stability at the expense of the ones considered less important but similarly vulnerable.42

With respect to preventing reoccurrence of conflict, the UN needs on-ground operational partners that work closely with the people and have the capacity to provide first-hand information. Additionally, many more areas can be covered if the collaboration between the UN and its operational partners is strengthened.43

If the momentum of conflict prevention is lost, the first step to be taken is initiating activities aimed at resolving the issues that started the violence. This is achieved through coordinating efforts of trying to reach an agreement by bringing together the hostile parties. These activities constitute part of the peace-making operations which are the first laying a foundation for future post-conflict activities. They are therefore very important attempts at successful future reconstruction.44

It is argued that the success or failure of post-conflict state-building endeavors depends to a considerable degree on the quality and nature of the peace agreement upon which the new order will be built.45

Due to the urgency of ending the violence, the international community risks winding up with hastened agreements which do not define if the aim at stopping the violence and its
Roberts, Adam, 1993, United Nations divided world: The UNs Role in International Relations p. 473 Samuels, Kristi, 2003, The future of UN state-building: Strategic and Operational Challenges and the Legacy of Iraq, International Peace Academy p.6 43 Dress, Toby, P., 2005, Designing a peace-building infrastructure: Taking a system approach to the prevention of deadly conflict, 44 Voices from Africa, 1998, Conflict, Peace and Reconstruction, issue no. 8, NGLS 45 Samuels, Kristi, 2003 The future of UN state-building: Strategic and Operational Challenges and the Legacy of Iraq p.7
42 41

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S. Florea reoccurrence or building national democratic institutions. Most often, conflicts are ended through different kinds of power-sharing establishments which have proved to impede future reconstruction and state-building. One such example is the 1999 Lom Agreement for Sierra Leone which granted amnesty to one group of rebels and provided them with ministerial posts. As time passed, the government was condemned as being illegitimate. Another example is the case of Afghanistan witnessed large numbers of warlords regaining power over great regions of the country.46 Peace-keeping operations are the second step to be taken in a post-conflict scene. Their aim is to alleviate human suffering and create enabling conditions to building institutions for selfsustaining peace as well as preventing the reoccurrence of violence which as experience has shown spills over into the region. Furthermore, peace-keeping operations aim to stabilize the conflict situation after a cease-fire and to create an environment where the opposing parties can shake hands and together seek to work and improve the situation of their country.47 Through peace-keeping operations, the peace however fragile it might be needs to be maintained. Moreover, implementations of agreements between the opposing parties need to be assisted. This step usually takes place after violence has been brought to a standstill which enables the initiation of the international emergency and relief phase.

The activities carried out in the emergency and relief phase are short-term in nature. These include emergency services such as providing food, clothing, clean water and sanitation equipment to distressed populations; providing shelter establishment for homeless victims, repairing salvageable structures, preventing, containing and treating life-threatening diseases; and the demining of certain areas. The focus of these activities is not on the managing of conflict but rather on saving lives.

As the nature of war has changed and the peace-keeping approaches have rapidly evolved, a new concept was borne. Peace-building has come to be an essential part of the UN interventions and is defined as: action to identify and support structures which will tend to strengthen and solidify peace in order to avoid a relapse into conflict.48

46

Samuels, Kristi, 2003, The future of UN state-building: Strategic and Operational Challenges and the Legacy of Iraq p.7 47 Roberts, Adam, 1993, United Nations divided world: The UNs Role in International Relations p. 480-486 48 Roberts, Adam, 1993, United Nations divided world: The UNs Role in International Relations p. 375

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Peace-building aims at laying the foundation for future reconstruction and development by focusing on reconciliation, respect for human rights, political inclusiveness, safe return of refugees and IDPs, reintegrating ex-combatants into society, and mobilizing resources for reconstruction and economic recovery.49 Although sharing some similarities with the reconstruction phase, peace-building should not be mistaken for humanitarian and development activities. The role of peace-building is to add to such activities that reduce the risk of relapsing into conflict and enabling reconstruction and reconciliation to take place. 50

If successful, the peace-making and the peace-keeping operations increase the opportunities for post-conflict peace-building and reconstruction. However, in the aftermath of peacemaking activities, peace-keeping, peace-building and reconstruction need to take place simultaneously and in a cooperative manner. In recent years, the international community has acknowledged the need for a smooth transition between peace-keeping operations and the peace-building and reconstruction activities. The belief that post-conflict intervention activities were linear in nature has impeded many activities carried out by the international community and brought to its attention the need for a transitional phase. This phase has come to be recognized as vital for the prevention of reoccurring crisis and successful reconstruction.

2.1 The transitional phase Post-conflict reconstruction projects and activities in war-torn societies are initiated after the emergency and relief phase. Nevertheless, in some operational areas the two take place simultaneously. In most cases the emergency and relief activities, if properly carried out, need to take into account and plan for future implementation of reconstruction. On the other hand, the reconstruction activities need to be pre-planned in order to pick up where emergency and relief activities have left off or are ready to transform. The transition between the emergency phase and reconstruction phase is therefore a very complex undertaking.

The transition phase in post-conflict states is defined as the process and actions that create the conditions for political, social and economic stability, and allow the process of securing

49 Aall Pamela, Miltenberger, Daniel, LT. Col., Weiss, Thomas, G., 2002, Guide to IGOs, NGOs and the Military in Peace and Relief Operations p. 122-3 50 Voices from Africa, 1998, Conflict, Peace and Reconstruction, issue no. 8, NGLS p 28-29

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S. Florea peace, justice and social equity to occur.51 The primary goal of the transitional phase is to improve country level national capacity and functioning in order to ensure that there is no relapse to violence during the transitional period.52

The concept of transition was formally related to natural disasters and has subsequently evolved changing to what today is known as the movement to consolidate peace and government establishment. The planning of transitional efforts and activities carried out by the humanitarian and developmental actors therefore need to be taking place jointly.53

Each transition situation is unique and most often triggered by a cease-fire agreement, peace negotiations or peace agreements, a Security Council resolution or by a peace process often led by active engagement of one or two UN Member States. There is no clear-cut definition of where the transitional phase starts and where it ends. The transition periods are neither linear nor unidirectional whereas their dynamics lack direct or uninterrupted process of progress from conflict to peace and from relief to reconstruction and recovery. It is rather a process where political, peacekeeping, humanitarian, and developmental facets are taking place simultaneously. Development, cooperation and coordination between the international actors are critical links for a successful transitional process.54

During transition, the humanitarian assistance operations are winding down while the assistance aimed at long-term sustainable development has not begun or is just about to begin. There is prevailing tension and a very real possibility that the matters could get worse before they improve. The state is unstable and at high risk of relapse into violence and conflict. The risk of relapse increases where the regional and global influences are at work or parties remain dissatisfied.55

A period of transition is therefore inherently unstable and the causes that lead to instability in the country concerned have most certainly not been resolved. Lack of an established peace agreement, ongoing violence in the country and a missing functioning government to work

UNDG/ECHA, 2003 (March 4), Briefing to ECHA ibid 53 Interview with Mark Bowden 54 UNDP, 2000 (27 Nov.), Role of UNDP in crisis and post-conflict situations 55 UNDG/ECHA, 2003, Towards an Implementation Plan: Draft synthesis of issues, lessons learned and preliminary recommendations
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51

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S. Florea with as a reliable partner, are all examples of the most common causes that might impede the achievement of stability.56

Given that each transition situation is unique, the issues arising need to be responded to in an appropriate way. As a start, the most common issues arising in a transition situation in postconflict states need to be identified. 57

One of the main problems is that of coordination and cooperation amongst the parties involved. On one level the humanitarian and the development actors need to cooperate to ensure sustained transition, finding a balance between the scaling down of the humanitarian aid and the scaling up of the development one.58

Another common problem appears to be the arrangements for the countries concerned, which are often withdrawn too early or prolonged beyond the time needed. An important aspect to be taken into account is the balance between aid and the rise of the government in the country concerned. It is therefore imperative not to prolong international aid when the government shows capacity of rising.59

On the other hand early withdraw of humanitarian agencies, funds and projects ensuring the completion of transition could and most often does result in a regression of transition such as relapse into violence and conflict.60

The issue of timing and sequencing in transition is usually ruled by availability of funds. Most often a shift from humanitarian aid to sustainable development should be initiated but is impeded generally due to lack of funding. The lack of funding in the relief-development transition phase occurs because of the fact that most donors do not allow themselves to invest in activities poorly clarified.61

Alderslade, Richard, Dr., 2003, The Transitional Working Group and Framework Team: Issues UNDG/ECHA, 2003, Towards an Implementation Plan: Draft synthesis of issues, lessons learned and preliminary recommendations 58 UNDG/ECHA, 2003, Towards an Implementation Plan: Draft synthesis of issues, lessons learned and preliminary recommendations, p3 59 UNDG/ECHA, 2003, Towards an Implementation Plan: Draft synthesis of issues, lessons learned and preliminary recommendations, p5 60 UNDP,2002,Country Study: Angola 61 Interview with Mark Bowden.
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S. Florea As a result major donors involved in the transitional field of work do not recognize the transition phase and therefore do not provide funds. Clarifying and identifying the transition phase and the actions needed in this phase could solve this problem as well as the political issues and integration of the planning process needs to be incorporated in the transitional work. Issues arising in this area of funding are common at the end of the emergency phase and at the initiation of development work. Donors tend to be more interested in funding the emergency phase, which is short term, more evident and the results are more visible compared to the ones in the transition phase. 62

2.1.2. Gaps within the transitional phase The transition period habitually consists of a number of gaps which can be identified to take place immediately after crises end and amplify as emergency assistance declines. These gaps impede the long-term development activities which need to be implemented.63

The gaps are created by an inability to transfer the momentum of crisis response to recovery, rehabilitation and development activities64 and have repeatedly emerged and hindered recovery efforts to date. Even with appropriately planned and coordinated efforts, there are a number of critical areas where gaps continuously arise in post-conflict transitional situations.65 During the gaps, people and communities begin to recover spontaneously, rebuilding, resettling, and often reproducing the conditions for relapse back into crisis.66

The following five gaps have been identified and described by the United Nations Development Group (UNDG) a part of the UNDP: 67

1. The institutional gaps; These are characterized by extremely slow efforts to move from relief activities to development activities, where the opportunities to undertake relief, recovery, and development efforts in a coherent and simultaneous manner have often not been noticed by the concerned organizations and agencies. Although the
Interview with Mark Bowden UNDP, 2002, Country Study: Congo 64 UNDG Bridging the Gap; A Report on the behalf of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Reference Group on Post-Conflict Reintegration 65 UNDP, 2000 (27 Nov.), Role of UNDP in crisis and post-conflict situations 66 UNDP,Transition Recovery Programme: Turning Crisis into Opportunities for Development 67 UNDG Bridging the Gap; A Report on the behalf of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Reference Group on Post-Conflict Reintegration
63 62

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S. Florea agencies and organizations are aware of their weaknesses (such as lack of common and region specific vision, conflicting principles and mandates, lack of coordination, institutional culture and unpredictable and inadequate funding), the disconnectedness between their administrative procedures and continuing efforts to secure the attention of donors make it difficult for them to change some of the failings of the system.

2. The political gaps: The bilateral donors determine their engagement in a country where there is less existent political uncertainty or avoid the countries where the outcome is uncertain and the limits of engagement are unclear. The programmes dealing with core post-conflict issues are the ones suffering most often from lack of funding due to delay or non-existing donor resources.

3. The authority vacuums; These are characterized by delayed post-conflict recovery assistance due to the resistance from the national authorities in the concerned country towards international representatives. An additional reason for delayed assistance might also be the limited capacity of most government and civil service structures in enforcing policies.

4. The synchrony gaps; These are characterized by a lack of synchrony between the international community and national authorities and happen most often in situations where the international community tries to implement programmes they feel are necessary while the national authorities do not agree. These programmes often deal with reconciliation, justice, and governance. The gap in such situations therefore also rises from the lack of commitment of the national authorities in the affected communities.

5. The sustainability gaps; These are characterized by the national governments inability to maintain the recovery momentum due to the obligations created by the external assistance. Another aspect of the sustainability gap is the difficulty in ensuring postconflict recovery due to the lack of formal government structures. 68

UNDG, Bridging the Gap; A Report on the behalf of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee Reference Group on Post-Conflict Reintegration

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2.2 The reconstruction phase Reconstruction of war-torn societies requires careful planning. During this phase the history and political culture of the state need to be taken into account. Required is also an understanding of the impact international activities could have on the states power structures. Once achieved, initiation and implementation methods can be determined thus paving way for more successful reconstruction.69

Post-conflict reconstruction has two overall objectives: (1) to facilitate the transition to sustainable peace after hostilities have ceased and (2) to support economic and social development. 70

The recreation of the governmental framework is established by strengthening government institutions, restoring law and order, and enabling the organizations of civil society to work effectively. Also of great importance are reconstruction, maintenance and improvement of physical and social infrastructure, key of which include transport, and communication. 71

Economic recovery depends on the success of this transition and on the rebuilding of the domestic economy and restoration of access to external resources. These objectives involve the creation of conditions for continuation of trade, savings, domestic and foreign investment; and promote macroeconomic stabilization, rehabilitation of financial institutions, and the restoration of appropriate legal and regulatory frameworks. 72

Of importance as well is the assistance provided to those populations affected by war through reintegration of displaced populations, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, restoration of employment opportunities and support for vulnerable groups such as femaleheaded households. Other activities that are part of primary reconstruction tasks are the support of land mine action programs, where relevant, including mine surveys and demining

69

Samuels, Kristi, 2003, The future of UN state-building: Strategic and Operational Challenges and the Legacy of Iraq 70 Alderslade, Richard, Dr., 2003, The Transitional Working Group and Framework Team: Issues, 71 Alderslade, Richard, Dr., 2003, The Transitional Working Group and Framework Team: Issues, 72 Alderslade, Richard, Dr., 2003, The Transitional Working Group and Framework Team: Issues,

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S. Florea of key infrastructure, as part of comprehensive development strategies for supporting a return to normal life of populations living in mine-polluted areas.73

Reconstruction however does not refer solely to the reconstruction of "physical infrastructure," nor does it necessarily signify a rebuilding of the social and economic framework that existed before the onset of conflict. If conflict is protracted, it will affect and transform a society and therefore a return to the situation prior the conflict may not be possible or desirable.74 In many instances, these conflicts start because of the old regimes and its ways of dealing with its citizens by not representing them and oppressing or forcing them to a minimal standard of living. The primary objectives of reconstruction are a return to normalcy and the creation of a new environment. This new environment created through the establishment of the minimum of services, creation of work and school, the establishment and maintenance of security, and the required creation of enabling conditions for a functioning peacetime society. 75

The rebuilding of governments includes tasks such as establishing an independent judiciary, respect and enforcement of property rights, institution building, and the law of contract. The law of contract is one of the main tasks of reconstruction and falls into the economic and social development dimension.76

Having come this far, it is important to introduce the three main areas of priority in reconstruction of war-torn states need to be clarified. These are: reconstituting legitimacy of the government, re-establishing security within the state and rebuilding effectiveness. 2.2.1. Reconstituting legitimacy of the government77 One of the main challenges facing the international community in reconstruction of war-torn states is the creation of a legitimate government that includes and represents its whole

73 World Bank, 1999, World Bank Group: Transitional Support Strategy for Kosovo, Europe and Central Asia Region, p 14 74 Cf. also Gilles Carbonnier Undoing War Economies: A Prerequisite for Peace? ; John Maresca: The Role of the Private Sector in Post-Conflict Reconstruction ; and Otto Hieronymi and Chiara Jasson: The Consequences of Protracted Crises in the The Economic and Social Consequences of Humanitarian Crises, Refugee Survey Quarterly, op.cit. 75 Dr. Otto Hieronymi, In-class discussion 76 Dr. Hieronymi, In-class discussion 77 Brinkerhoff, Derick, W.,2005 Feb., Rebuilding Governance in failed states and post-conflict societies, International Journal of Management, vol. 25, no. 1

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S. Florea population. A state without a legitimate governing body that is not accepted by its citizens and not including all parts of its population is doomed to the reoccurrence of violence and the relapse into conflict. Considering the effects of these reoccurrences, the legitimacy of a state needs to be reconstituted. The tasks involved include the expansion of participation and inclusiveness of its population, reducing inequities, creating accountability, combating corruption, holding regular elections, re-establishment of rule of law, promoting democracy and rebuilding democratic institutions, and developing the civil society sector. While undertaking these tasks, it is important to make results visible, providing people with hope and a desire for continuation of reconstruction and improvement of their society. 2.2.2. Re-establishing security78 Enabling a society a return to normalcy can only be attained through the establishment of security. Re-establishing security refers to the rebuilding or strengthening of systems in both the economic and political sphere. It is carried out through a combination of reconstruction activities, delivery of know-how, and the reformation or break up of the existing police forces, private militias and military forces.79

Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) are the main tasks undertaken in this area. DDR is closely linked with the reconstitution of legitimacy in terms of medium and long term objectives of reconstruction such as; rebuilding and/or strengthening of judicial institutions and police force, restart of economy and creation of employment opportunities. Most often these states lack adequate systems of providing the civilian population the security oversight that is needed for a return or establishment to normal pre-conflict economic and political activity. Reestablishment of security also refers to peace-keeping operations of which is linked to the humanitarian and emergency relief activities. 2.2.3. Rebuilding effectiveness80 Rebuilding the basic infrastructure destroyed by conflict and enabling the state to provide the population its basic needs such as health, education, water and electricity, restarting the economy, providing welfare, reducing poverty, and enabling socio-economic growth are the
78

Brinkerhoff, Derick, W.,2005 Feb., Rebuilding Governance in failed states and post-conflict societies, International Journal of Management, vol. 25, no. 1 79 ibid 80 ibid

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S. Florea main objectives of rebuilding state effectiveness. If not achieved, mass displacement of the population, epidemics and humanitarian crises are the results.

These objectives can be attained through good governance which in these terms, involves the provision of adequate and functioning municipal infrastructure such as restoration of schools, health care systems and institutions, social safety nets, and transport. However, since the governments in these states are weak or non-existent, the role of civil society and private sector is increased.81

In terms of economic governance and activities, these states are likely to favor the elites which translates into a deficiency of fiscal policy control thereby paving way for corruption. It is therefore important to facilitate macro-economic and fiscal policy-making, the implementation management of resources and the enabling of investment opportunities for the population as a whole.82

As being the most carried out in post-conflict reconstruction, these three areas are interrelated and overlap with one another. The reconstitution of legitimacy and rebuilding of effectiveness could not be successful if security would not be restored. On the other hand, if the government fails to provide its citizens their basic needs, especially in states suffering from ethnic divisions, it will not be fully recognized and supported by its people. Finally, if education and job opportunities would be established, people would be less likely to be involved in acts of violence and therefore security would be easier to attain.

2.3. Issues in reconstruction The following constitute the main areas of impediment to reconstruction efforts: 83 Inability of ensuring security as foundation for reconstruction, good governance and economic growth. Lack of effective coordination mechanisms among international actors Lack of transparency in donor goals, most often resulting in political gamesmanship and the reduction of coordination activities.

81 82

ibid ibid 83 ibid

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S. Florea Slow state capacity-building thereby hindering immediate and long-term delivery of services, which in turn delays socio-economic growth. Delayed delivery of services by the government might lead people to warlords and elites, creating a breeding ground for corruption and regression of other reconstruction efforts. Introduction of shared and country-led decision-making84 is a necessity but as discussed has proven to be problematic. Timing and sequencing of activities. Exclusive or premature concentration on democracy and election85 risks destabilization of situations and renewal of conflict. In terms of the economy, measures such as the liberalization of markets and privatization, timing and sequencing need to be balanced and not carried out as ideological imperatives. Lack of sufficient attention directed to the linkage between reconstruction of government legitimacy, effectiveness and security. This issue arises due to the division of post-conflict reconstruction activities which have initially been seen as linear. Major international actors focus on one of the areas while ignoring the others. The military has been taking care of security issues only, while the reconstruction of state effectiveness has been carried out by the development actors and their operational partners such as UNDP, USAID, DFID, and development oriented NGOs. Reconstruction of government legitimacy has in turn been undertaken by diplomatic actors such as the UN Security Council and the US State Department.86

Quick-fix approaches or one-size-fits-all solutions in form of agreements and legislative acts, activities carried out at a premature time or delayed institution building, and ignoring existing local capacity result in the dependency on external actors. Thus impedes the state from full and independent recovery as well as from opportunities for governments to establish their legitimacy.87

84 85

Ibid p.7 ibid p.7 86 Ibid p. 10 87 Ibid p 7

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S. Florea The quality and nature of the peace-agreements established at the end of violence is very important for flourishing reconstruction. If formulated carelessly, the agreements could worsen the conditions within the state.88

Another challenge faced by the international community when restoring or re-building the government in post-conflict societies lies in creating/rebuilding central level institutions or sub-national/ local institutions. When a society is torn by conflict due to inequalities and ethnic divisions, a de-centralized form of government would limit the central power by relocating resources and control to different levels of government. This subsequently would impede a winner- takes-all situation form occurring thus preventing relapse into conflict. Moreover, it would increase support for peace by integrating regions and/or minorities into larger political affairs and decision-making.89

On the other hand, a de-centralized form of government risks enhancing divisions amongst groups of people and the recreation of old systems. In some cases such as Afghanistan and Sierra Leon, the elites given local autonomy have been too powerful for the central government to control. In Afghanistan the formal government in Kabul is supported by the international community, however sub-national governance is conducted by warlords and local commanders. Their power is diminishing the role and influence of the formal government resulting in a regional division of governance.90

In Sierra Leon where the Local Governance Act of 2004, aiming at increasing the local representation, provided for locally elected councils and autonomous local decision-making. The act was however used by the elites to maintain and increase their power.91

2.3.1. Elections: Issues and Importance Elections play a central role in democratization effortsand this focus must remain strong; but elections must also be part of a long-term undertaking that will lead to a strengthening of national institutions and democratic processes. The real test of a democratization process is

Samuels, Kristi, 2003, The future of UN state-building: Strategic and Operational Challenges and the Legacy of Iraq p. 5 89 Brinkerhoff, Derick, W.,2005 Feb., Rebuilding Governance in failed states and post-conflict societies, International Journal of Management, vol. 25, no. 1 90 Ibid 91 Ibid p. 8

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S. Florea not the organization of first elections, but whether those first elections are followed by others in accordance with an agreed electoral timetable 92

The implementation of elections, which is an essential part of post-conflict reconstruction, brings about numerous issues both for the international actors and the situation within the state. The main issue faced by the international community is the timing of elections. If elections are held prematurely, in many instances, the reconstruction situation is worsened. Not only do premature elections often take the focus away form other vital reconstruction activities but previous leaders might reassume their power or use the election period for personal gains in many cases intensifying the ethnic hatred and division.93

In this respect it is argued that elections should not be rushed but rather be put on hold allowing the reformation and reconstruction of institutions to take place and establishing an environment to prepare for them. This involves strengthening of institutions, re-enforcing security, judicial systems, and the army. Without these steps completed the election process risks to fail its purpose.94

On the other hand, postponing elections might lead to difficulties for the international community. People in war-torn societies, especially if based on race, ethnicity or religion more often than not rely heavily on international aid, tending to have high expectations of overnight improvements concerning the legacy of their oppressive government. When these improvements are delayed the people might loose faith and no longer cooperate.95 Another issue resulting form postponement of elections is the locals perception that the international actors active in reconstruction activities, illegitimately hold the power.96

2.3.2. Implementation of the rule of law One of the cornerstones of good governance is the rule of law. It is an essential part in the efforts carried out by the international community to establish sustainable peace and successful reconstruction. Through the implementation of the rule of law, the power of
Voices from Africa, 1998, Conflict, Peace and Reconstruction, issue no. 8, NGLS p. 34 Samuels, Kristi, 2003, The future of UN state-building: Strategic and Operational Challenges and the Legacy of Iraq p.9 94 Ahmed, Salman, Jan/Feb 2005, No size fits all: Lessons in Making peace and Rebuilding States, Foreign Affairs, Vol.84, no.1 95 Paris, Roland, 2004, At Wars End: Building peace after civil conflict, Cambridge Press, Cambridge 96 Samuels, Kristi, 2003, The future of UN state-building: Strategic and Operational Challenges and the Legacy of Iraq
93 92

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S. Florea governments is restrained thereby impeding state leaders to use their authority for personal gains. It obliges the governments to conduct themselves in accordance with stipulated and publicly known rules.97

In post-conflict societies, the rule of law provides for the protection of the rights of all members of the society through rules that constrain the power of all parties involved in conflict, holding them responsible for their actions. It also provides the means for non-violent dispute resolution.98

The issues faced by the international community in this respect concerns the narrowly focused attention on only a few legal institutions. In order to establish a legitimate government based on good governance, the implementation of rule of law needs to be included in the reconstruction of all institutions.99

Poor coordination of planning, resource distribution and unity of labor among the actors carrying out the implementation of rule of law (i.e. DPKO, UNHCR, UNDP, their operational partners and states) is another issue. In addition the lack of local experts and indigenous involvement cooperating with the external experts while setting the rule of law agendas in the concerned states contributes to less satisfactory results.100

Aall, Pamela, Crocker, Chester, A., Hampson, Fen, Osler, , 2001, Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict, p 801-802 98 Ibid p. 801-802 99 Samuels, Kristi, 2003, The future of UN state-building: Strategic and Operational Challenges and the Legacy of Iraq p 10-11 100 ibid

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S. Florea 3. NGOS IN POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION

NGOs are by and large seen as privately owned and financed organizations working outside of their country. Most often than not NGOs form an organization based on tasks and activities they consider are not sufficiently addressed by the public and/or the governmental efforts, within the countries. NGOs and CSOs provide assistance in the international sphere and can be categorized into four directives: humanitarian emergency relief, sustainable economic and social development and reconstruction, spreading and monitoring of human rights, and mediation/ negotiation and conflict resolution.101

Due to the increasing awareness of the importance of cooperation and coordination in this field, NGOs and CSOs have come to recognize that all four directives overlap. NGOs providing emergency relief need to take into account the following phase and the impact their activities might have on the recipients ability to achieve future sustainable development.102

3.1 History I see a United Nations which recognizes that the NGO revolution- the new global people power- is the best thing that has happened to our organization in a long time. SecretaryGeneral Koffi Annan103

NGOs have been present for decades and are a new phenomenon in the humanitarian field. Already in World War II NGOs such as Quaker UN were involved in humanitarian relief and emergency work providing food and shelter to soldiers on the field.104

During the 70s and 80s the NGOs started to become increasingly respected by the Secretariat and the Member States for their emerging ability to shape the global development agenda and policy development. Furthermore during this period the NGOs and CSOs proved themselves to be increasingly important operational partners in response to humanitarian

101

Aall, Pamela, Crocker, Chester, A., Hampson, Fen, Osler, , 2001, Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict 102 Ibid p 638 103 NGLS, 2003, Intergovernmental negotiations and decision making at the United Nations- A guide p. 48 104 Interview Quaker UN

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S. Florea crisis, leading to increased visibility and participation at briefings, meetings and dialogues with the UN and governments.105

During the 90s an explosion of new NGOs and CSOs took place in the involvement of all UN activities, bringing together specialists from all key institutional constituencies such as governments, special agendas, mass membership organizations, parliamentarians, the media and others shaping the public opinion.106

3.2 The NGO-UN relationship Presently the UN is undergoing a reform process. Part of that process is deciding the role of NGOs and CSOs in the UN post-conflict reconstruction work as well as to which extent their involvement in the UN activities will take place. This matter has been present for a long time within the UN, particularly within the agencies involved in post-conflict states. 107

When carried out properly, the UN- NGO relationship enhances the quality of decisionmaking, increases ownership of the decisions, improves accountability and transparency of the process and enriches outcomes through a variety of views and experiences. But handled badly- it can confuse choices, hamper the inter-governmental search for a common ground, erode the privacy needed for sensitive discussions, over-crowd agendas and present distractions at important meetings.108

The NGO and CSO presence has increased radically over the past two decades and numerous organizations are currently linked with many parts of the UN, working closely with the UN humanitarian missions and development projects in the field of transitional post-conflict states. All of the UN funds, programs and specialized agencies now maintain formal arrangements for interaction with NGOs. 109

The ECOSOC is the main formal UN organ for consulting NGOs and undertakes the approval process of accrediting NGOs consultative status. When accredited the consultative status the NGOs are provided access to UN meetings. Depending on the form of accreditation NGOs
105 106

ibid UNDG/ECHA, Briefing to ECHA 107 United Nations, UN Reform Dossier: 1997-2002 108 United Nations, 2003 (May), UN System and Civil Society: An inventory and Analysis of Practices, p. 2 109 United Nations, 2003 (February), UN Secretary-General names Fernando Henrique Cardoso, former President of Brazil, to lead high-level review of Un-civil Society relations, p 2

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S. Florea may be granted access to UN facilities, documents, and formal sessions where they can interact with government officials, secretariat staff. They may also be provided the opportunity of bringing oral and written statements enabling them to influence the decisionmaking process and results of the meetings.110

NGOs need to meet certain requirements in order to be granted with consultative status. Their activities need to be relevant to the ECOSOC, they must have democratic decision-making mechanisms, must have been officially registered for at least two years, and their primary source of funding must come from national affiliates, individual members or other NGOs.111 There are two forms of accreditation112: Temporary/conference accreditation, which is given to NGOs for one or two certain conferences and ends when the conference is over. Consultative status/ongoing accreditation granting a regular presence at the UN. NGOs can apply for this type of status with the ECOSOC, the UN agencies, funds, programmes or autonomous specialized agencies. The consultative status is divided into three categories: 1. General consultative status is given to large NGOs active in most ECOSOC activities. They may attend all meetings, speak before delegates, circulate statements and place items on the agendas. Every four years, they must submit quadrennial reports on their contributions to the work and goals of the UN.113 2. Special consultative status is given to NGOs active in a few ECOSOC activities. The difference between the general and special consultative status is that the latter are not allowed to place items on agendas and their written statements are limited. 3. Roster consultative status is granted to NGOs that might at times provide their expertise in specific areas and they may also have consultative status with one of the UN specialized agencies. They may attend meetings but not enjoy any of the other privileges granted to the NGOs with general and special consultative status.

110 111

NGLS, 2003, Intergovernmental negotiations and decision making at the United Nations- A guide p. 52 Ibid p. 54 112 Ibid 113 Ibid p. 53

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S. Florea NGOs focusing on a specific subject may apply for some form of consultative status with one of the UN funds, programs and autonomous specialized agencies. When joined with the funds and programs, NGOs are able to take part in their meetings and may address the Executive Boards but can not participate in the decision-making.114

These relationships vary considerably, from the World Health Organization and the United Nations Food and Agriculture organization, which cooperate closely with and consider NGOs integral to their work on a variety of fronts, to the International Monetary Fund, which has no formal system of relation with NGOs. The UNDP has recently activated a UNDP civil society committee, while the World Bank NGO Committee is now undergoing a review. The WHO cooperates and consults with many NGOs at different levels and agrees to NGO participation in their meetings.115

The Department of Public Information (DPI) has formal links with NGOs through which NGOs attain access to the UN Meeting Rooms, documents, and buildings. The DPI provides access to official UN documents and conducts a large information programme that includes a monthly calendar of events, and a monthly mailing of UN information materials and a weekly news letter.116

3.3 The strengths of NGOs NGOs exist primarily, if not solely, to provide relief from suffering and, in todays world, to try to bring about sustainable development, addressing the failures of governments and society as a whole. 117 The main strengths of NGOs are knowledge, expertise, networking capabilities, spirit, creativity, commitment, and the many years of operation in post-conflict settings. These strengths have been acquired by NGOs due to their close proximity with the grassroots and most often their long presence in the same area.118

Ibid p. 54 United Nations, 2003 (May), UN System and Civil Society: An inventory and Analysis of Practices 116 NGLS, 2003, Intergovernmental negotiations and decision making at the United Nations- A guide p. 56 117 The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, October 2001,Comfortable with chaos: working with UNHCR and the NGOs; reflections from the 1999 Kosovo refugee crisis 118 Interview with Mrs. Kanyoro
115

114

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S. Florea In addition and as a positive side effect, by working closely with the locals, NGOs provide training and new ways of thinking. The locals involved in NGO activities are thought how to manage on their own and become independent from external support.119

Moreover, International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) have worked to increase the capacity of local NGOs and to show the importance of cooperation. Local NGOs through right guidance and training can contribute significantly to improve the effectiveness of democratic governance by increasing levels of civic participation. They can easier target youth, women, and the disabled due to their knowledge of indigenous culture and languages.120 An example of this is the Catholic Relief Services who have carried out projects dealing with the management and capacity building of local NGOs hiring Macedonian staff to provide training and technical assistance to various centres in the Serbian part Kosovo.121

Neutrality is an additional strength of NGOs. In post-conflicts states most often the root cause of violence is oppression and discrimination based on religion, language and/or ethnicity. Due to the lack of representation of all citizens, NGOs such as Medicins Sans Frontier, CARE and the Red Cross are needed on the ground without taking sides.122

NGOs provide societies individual nurturing and encouragement as well as independence through a bottom-up approach. By working with individuals at the grass-root level is one of the NGOs main strengths.123 For these reasons NGOs tend often to be trusted by the people and are familiar with their values, traditions and culture. This enables them to easier understand the needs of the people and therefore easier target specific needs as well as the root causes of problems.124 YWCA serves as a perfect example of this. The organization, as many others such as World Vision and the Red Cross, use locals as the majority of staff for their in-country offices. 125 NGOs do not suffer from the same bureaucratic illness as many other international organizations. When on the field, NGOs are given the authority from the home-based head
119 120

Interview with Mrs. Kanyoro Interview with Mrs. Kanyoro

121
122

http://www.interaction.org/kosovo/index.html

The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, October 2001 Comfortable with chaos: working with UNHCR and the NGOs; reflections from the 1999 Kosovo refugee crisis htm 123 Ibid 124 Interview Tom Getman 125 Interview with Mrs. Kanyoro

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S. Florea quarters to make decisions enabling them to act more timely. Consequently, they can focus on specific issues and solve them.126 NGOs have throughout time always been in favor of cooperation with other international partners witch gives them the advantage of reaching out to a greater number of people and informing them of the actual happenings on the field and headquarters. 127 The Christian Reformed World Relief Committee in Kosovo (CRWRC) started its activities in Kosovo 1999 through the Alliance for the Rehabilitation of Kosovo (ARK), a partnership of six specialized agencies including Bethany International Services, Dorcas Aid International, International Aid, Partners for Christian Development, Reformed Church World Service.128 At the end of its funding period, the alliance was taken over by a new NGO called Ruth. Ruth was run by Kosovoars previously employed by the former ARK members. Its area of focus includes health care, food security and agriculture, income generation, education, women's issues, and community and institutional development and participation.129 Their networking capabilities have been developed over time due to the need of other cooperating partners helping them to help others in need. Most of the key NGOs are used to working with the UN. Multi-national and multi-lingual organizations such as MSF, World Vision and OXFAM are truly world-wide, with well established contacts, both between each other and into governments and civil structures.130 Many NGOs do not have the protection and security the UN provides for its staff. Thanks to their burning desire to help NGO personnel risk their lives working in dangerous areas. In

126 127

Interview with Mrs. Kanyoro Interview with Mrs. Kanyoro

128 129

http://www.interaction.org/kosovo/index.html http://www.interaction.org/kosovo/index.html
the

130

Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, October 2001 Comfortable with chaos: working with UNHCR and NGOs; reflections from the 1999 Kosovo refugee crisis

118

Laurence, Tim, Commodore, Humanitarian Assistance and Peacekeeping: An Uneasy Alliance?, Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, Whitehall Papers Series, No. 48.

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S. Florea instances where the situations might seem hopeless they try to provide the highly needed help to the people.131 NGOs have the capabilities to effectively mobilize public opinion through their close relationship with the media. Whatever the rights and wrongs of individual NGOs, they together with the media, have become searchlights, illuminating and drawing attention to particular causes and conflicts, and influencing both the participants and the outside world community. Between them they are often the catalyst for a military deployment in the first place.132 As NGOs mainly survive on funds from their members and those interested in their area of work they frequently struggle with their finances, especially if the NGOs are small in size. Due to their limited budget NGOs rely significantly on volunteers. The large numbers of volunteers involved in NGO activities is a significant strength of these organizations showing the dedication and pure interest of their staff. This is the backbone of concrete results where time has no meaning but only the results.133

In comparison to the UN, NGOs have the freedom of voicing their opinions and making decisions without further implications. Every decision the UN makes goes through governments. Governments act in their interest and therefore impede many decisions from being made at the appropriate time or at all. The Kyoto Protocol and the US long-lasting refusal to ratify it is one example. IN comparison, NGOs act in the interest of the people and do not suffer from the same bureaucratic illness.134

The UN has to respect state sovereignty. The Secretary General cannot be partial but the persistent voices of the NGOs have contributed to many changes. And yes, NGOs do make a difference through their demonstrations and constant pressure for change. The UN and governments are like the big and strong elephants of Africa that fear nothing. However a single bee flying into their ear constantly buzzing and irritating them can stir them up making them act in ways they otherwise would not. The NGOs have a very similar effect on the governments and UNs behavior and agendas.135
119

Interview with Mrs. Kanyoro

133 134

Interview Tom Getman Interview Mrs. Kanyoro 135 Interview Mrs. Kanyoro

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The involvement of NGOs has contributed to the conferences ability to reach consensus in difficult policy areas. These actions led to a preparatory process by the UNCED (UN Conference on Environment and Development Collection- Agenda 21), which was teaching the activists how policy was made at both national and international levels. The outcome showed the importance of NGOs as essential stakeholders for sustainable development.136 The most common and successful reconstruction activities undertaken by NGOs in war-torn societies are: training of local NGO staff in countries, conducting demining operations; provision of public services such as water, sanitation, shelter repair and construction; encouragement of agricultural rehabilitation to achieve food security; managing health clinics;137 demobilizations of soldiers; resettlement of refugees and IDPs (Internally Displaced Persons), and other activities designed to promote reconciliation.138 At the beginning of the conflict in Kosovo, the OXFAM team placed in Northern Macedonia, Southern Albania and Kosovo comprised of experts in water and sanitation. These experts had previous experience in such situations and knew what was required. WFP placed in the same setting moved and distributed enormous quantities of food.139 NGOs and Civil Society actors have successfully dealt with priority areas of UN concern and have also been active in directing international attention to issues such as poverty reduction and human rights as well as convincing governments to give more serious attention to other matters of concern. In this way, NGOs and Civil Society actors have increased public understanding, sharpened policy-making and encouraged more concentrated international efforts to deal with global issues. The NGOs and Civil Society actors have demonstrated with time to have a collective power not only in influencing agendas to shift policy makers and shape public opinion but also in setting them.140

136

United Nations, 2003 (May), UN System and Civil Society: An inventory and Analysis of Practices p. 6 and (www.ciesin.org/datasets/unced/unced.html) 137 Interview with Mark Bowden 138 Ibid 139 The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, October 2001,Comfortable with chaos: working with UNHCR and the NGOs; reflections from the 1999 Kosovo refugee crisis 140 United Nations, 2003 (May), UN System and Civil Society: An inventory and Analysis of Practices

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S. Florea 3.4. The weaknesses of NGOs I see a United Nations keenly aware that if the global agenda is to be properly addressed, a partnership with civil society is not an option; it is a necessity.141 Secretary-General, Koffi Annan

As there are numerous positive aspects of the NGO involvement in the field of post-conflict states in reconstruction there are also negative aspects. The issues and criticism, concerning the NGO involvement in the UN activities are multi-faceted arising from both the UN and governments. It is easy to take sides but the present world has changed and the most powerful actors playing in the international arena- the governments by themselves or as one body- the UN have come to the realization that todays issues cannot be solved without collaboration among all actors.

However what is required from the governments, the UN and donors is the recognition that as they have weaknesses so do the NGOs. As they have been criticized over and over so have NGOs. The same way the UN agencies are a blend of professional and amateurs, effective and non-effective, efficient and inefficient, so are the NGOs. Most importantly however it is that the strengths of NGOs are being recognized. New ways of improving each others operational methods can only take place by interaction, and the identification of problems, weaknesses and strengths.

The main issue in post-conflict reconstruction has been identified as coordination and cooperation amongst the parties involved. This issue concerns NGOs as much as any other actor active in this field. 142 With regards to the NGO activities, the need for coordination with UN bodies to ensure sustained transition must be achieved.143 This process needs to take place within a single and integrated strategy that shifts the analytical perspective from symptoms of the crisis to its underlying causes144. The parties involved in post-conflict reconstruction activities need to share a common vision of an end state and to have shared goals. This fact

141 142

NGLS, 2003, Intergovernmental negotiations and decision making at the United Nations- A guide p. 48 UNDG/ECHA, 2003, Towards an Implementation Plan: Draft synthesis of issues, lessons learned and preliminary recommendations, p2 143 Ibid p3 144 Ibid

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S. Florea has through time and lessons learned proven to be imperative for successful post-conflict response however it has not yet been achieved.145 Nevertheless, this is not the sole issue related to or faced by NGOs in reconstruction activities. Taken to extreme they can be self-indulgent, too focused on their particular human issue and, living within a rights-based culture, they can be resentful of control, morally arrogant and blind to the dark side of individual human nature; often their heart rules their head.146 3.4.1. NGOs and governments The fact that most governments in post-conflicts states if existent, are unstable and weak results in a strengthened donor-NGO relationship. Most often this matter contributes to a tense government-NGO relationship where governments feel threatened by NGOs and as a result become hostile towards them by impeding the desire for cooperation between the two.147 The NGO donors most often show reluctance in working with government counterparts148 due to the fact that the majority of governments if existent do not show their own commitment in reconstruction efforts, i.e. Angola spending most of the money it received on the military.149 Another reason for this cause is the lack of transparency leading to uncertainty of how and where the funds are going to be used. This criticism, even if very often directed towards NGOs, is highly applicable to the work of the UN.150

In addition, the demand of government accountability raised by NGOs is another question elevating concerns among the governments. NGOs demand higher government accountability while governments consider they are the legitimate representatives of society given that they were elected. Governments also feel that the demands of the NGOs and Civil Society actors are unrealistic and unreasonable and if attempted to by the UN, the results would imply fundamental changes reaching beyond the UN Charter.151

145 146

ibid The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, October 2001, Comfortable with chaos: working with UNHCR and the NGOs; reflections from the 1999 Kosovo refugee crisis 147 Interview with Mark Bowden 148 Interview with Luigi Migliorini 149 ibid 150 Discussion with Richard Alderslade WHO 151 Interview Mrs Kanyoro

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S. Florea Moreover, the growing numbers and diversity of NGOs raises concerns within Member States and governments. The increasing number of NGOs has been regarded with fear and anger by many. One forgotten aspect highly relevant to the criticism towards NGOs is the fact that NGOs do not speak with one voice. Governments seem to believe that a few is enough but each and every one of them deal with different areas. In comparison to the governments that have their officials included in one body and the UN which is seen as one body consisting of numerous departments, the NGOs are not one body with one voice. Each is a body of its own.152

NGOs are meant to speak for the people and bring to the surface issues that are ignored or forgotten. They voice critique against governments questioning their accountability and putting a pressure on them to act in the interest of the people respecting human rights and the environment. They have been crying out for the injustice of child labor, trafficking of persons and equality of women amongst many other things. They hold to account the consciousness of the governments and the UN and therefore the criticism of NGOs is quite large.153

3.4.2. NGOs and resource distribution Action in any sphere of international assistance has repercussions in the recipients society going beyond those that were foreseen and intended by the NGO.154 Evidence of this statement can be found in various activities conducted by NGOs.

In some cases payment in form of tariffs or taxes has to be made by the NGOs to the military groups within the countries in exchange for the permission of delivering humanitarian assistance. These direct payments are criticized to contribute to the support of armies and subsidize the conflict.155 As in many other instances these criticisms do not only apply to the work of NGOs but also to the UN agencies. Secondly, the UN needs the consent of governments to enter their territory.156 In urgent cases, NGO aid in the form of water, food, medicine, clothing, etc is much needed and readily available while the UN aid may take some time to arrive or not arrive at all when needed.
Ibid Ibid 154 Aall, Pamela, Crocker, Chester, A., Hampson, Fen, Osler, , 2001, Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict, p638 155 Aall, Pamela, Crocker, Chester, A., Hampson, Fen, Osler, , 2001, Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict , Chap. 37 156 Discussion Richard Alderslade WHO
153 152

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Furthermore, the resources brought into the countries by NGOs are sometimes stolen and are at other times in the wrong hands. Whether the resources are used by the civilians or by armies due to the lack of cooperation between NGOs and governments, the governing bodies and army commanders are relieved from the burden of supporting the population and soldiers. This then results in the freeing of internal resources for the war efforts.157 This criticism does not only apply to NGOs but could happen to any UN convoy.

Moreover, by affecting the resource distribution, NGOs can aggravate the tensions in the countries. This can be done by the employment of some but not others based on their qualifications of what the NGOs might need. Development work targeted towards a certain group even if a disadvantaged minority group subject to discrimination, can worsen intergroup tensions. For example, some ethnic groups might be better skilled in agriculture than others and without NGOs being aware, their employing of that particular group increases tensions.158

Furthermore, NGOs can also have a negative impact on the development of the situations in war-torn states through the media. By using pictures of war atrocities in order to raise funds for their activities, they dehumanize one group of people in the minds of the public thereby making the peace process more difficult. Nevertheless, these reports dealing with crimes against humanity have also had positive effects. They have at numerous times pushed the international community to act faster then they would have and therefore saved many lives.159

3.4.3. NGOs and funding The fact that many NGOs work within a specific area of expertise and are usually small in size allowing them to work faster without the obstacles of bureaucracy, attracts many donors. However, the negative side lies in the high risk of dispersion, which NGOs often suffer from.

On the other hand, it is very difficult to put the government in charge with greater local ownership of strategies in the post-conflict phases and at the same time find ways of holding
157

Aall, Pamela, Crocker, Chester, A., Hampson, Fen, Osler, , 2001, Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict, p. 641 158 Ibid 159 Aall, Pamela, Crocker, Chester, A., Hampson, Fen, Osler, , 2001, Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of Managing International Conflict, 641

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S. Florea it accountable. One such example is Bosnia which ten years after the Dayton Peace Agreement is still governed by the High Representative, essentially an imperial proconsul.160

Holding the government accountable is one of the main responsibilities of NGOs but if weak they are not able to fulfill this function. The funding therefore generally goes through an international organization such as a UN agency, department or programme, which has credibility and is further sub-contracted to an NGO.161

The UN in-country operating agencies are concerned with both local and international NGOs (INGOs). The local NGOs can mainly be used in medium and long-term projects, while they have little experience and need coaching. Moreover, local NGOs are highly dependent and fund-orientated therefore tending to distance their focus from their area of expertise to those areas that are mostly funded (also described as waving on existing trends).162

This phenomenon can also be applied to the INGOs. The difference here is that INGOs have experience in the field and are dynamic in their work. Another negative aspect of INGOs is the fact that some tend to lean more towards a business and therefore enter the private sector. With these regards, there are two phenomena of distortion that can be described:163

1. NGOs often wave on existing trends. The UN agencies complain about facing difficulties in finding the right NGOs for the projects lying outside of the trends.164 This concern is true in some but not all cases. Nevertheless this fact does not have to be seen as a weakness but merely as a vulnerability, since many NGOs face difficulties receiving funds for their projects. On the other hand some NGOs are government initiated aiming at receiving international financial support from such institutions as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, called GONGOs.165

160 161

Discussion with Richard Alderslade Interview with Sofia Carrondo 162 Interview with Sofia Carrondo 163 Interview with Sofia Carrondo 164 ibid 165 Interview Mrs. Kanyoro

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S. Florea 2. NGOs who take on projects under a specific name while working on other activities not included in the project.166 It is true that some do not fulfill their purpose but look only for personal profit. These NGOs are usually established by one or two individuals using NGO-language when formulating its documents and are called My Own NGO (MONGOs). Their performance is poor and it does not follow up. The reason behind lies mostly in the fact that they do not have staff holding them accountable for their work. Thus very small NGOs are questionable.167

Nevertheless, there are also those NGOs that even if making profit, do their job. They do so by training people, especially the youth by showing them how to set up businesses.168

Time has been regarded as a negative aspect of NGOs when carrying out their projects. They have been criticized for not completing their work.169 This criticism is a generalization which should be questioned. Businesses are known to criticize NGOs. However NGOs most often than not do not have the resources Shell for example would have. If the NGOs are donor or project focused and/or contracted then of course they cannot stay longer than was planned. This is however not their error but the contractors.170

166 167

Interview with Sofia Carrondo Interview Mrs. Kanyoro 168 Ibid 169 Interview David Atwood 170 Interview Mrs. Kanyoro

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S. Florea 4. CONCLUSION

The change in the nature of war and the increasing amount of conflicts has put a pressure on the international community to find more efficient and if possible less time consuming methods of resolving these issues.

The current conflicts are based on ethnicity, religion and linguistic differences. Belligerents no longer target only combatants but whole groups of peoples and leave societies and regions with destroyed infrastructure, no legitimate governments and extremely poor living standards.

The tools previously used by the international community are no longer adequate. As a result the present tools used in post-conflict settings have developed from peace-making operations and negotiations to peace-keeping and peace-building operations. These operations were thought to take place one after the other but it has recently been recognized that in order to achieve the set goals these operations need to take place simultaneously.

The emergency/relief, transitional and reconstruction phase consists of a combination of postconflict operations and are not linear in nature. In order to avoid inefficiency, loss of funds and time, these phases need to be recognized as interrelated. The actors involved are forced to find new ways of strengthening their relationships and only by joint efforts based on cooperation can the expected results materialize.

The international community aims not only at bringing war-torn societies back to their normal state prior to the conflict but also to establishing a society with functioning democratic institutions based on the rule of law and respect for human rights.

The reconstruction phase has been acknowledged to start somewhere in the transition from the relief and emergency period. The transition phase is most often triggered by a cease-fire agreement, peace negotiations or by a peace process led by the international community. In this period the humanitarian assistance operations are winding down while the reconstruction efforts have begun or are about to take place. Societies in transition periods are neither at peace nor in conflict. Thus the state is weekend and at high risk of relapse into conflict and violence. For this reason the arrangements in the state made by the international actors need to be sequenced in order to provide a ground for the local government to continue on its own. 53

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The main identified issues faced by the actors working in this area deal with the coordination and cooperation of agencies, organizations and their activities and projects as well as that of the donors. Agencies do not always work in the exact same direction at the same time therefore a need for a common shared vision of the end-state has proven to be vital for a successful post-conflict response. The transitional phase and reconstruction activities need further clarification in order to be recognized by the donors.

Through the experiences gained and lessons learned, the UN has come to recognize the importance played by NGOs and CSOs in reconstruction of war-ton societies. The NGO community has through time increased in numbers and is presently active in most areas of international fieldwork. Their presence as well as the respect it has received by the UN Secretariat and the Member States started to increase two decades ago. They have through this period of time demonstrated their abilities to influence agendas and shape public opinion as well as to be essential stakeholders for sustainable development.

As a result, reform processes within the UN concerning the involvement and methods of cooperation with the NGO community are taking place. The importance of NGOs within the UN system is not necessarily reflected by the UNs desire to cooperate with them but rather the changing world and the demand that comes along with it. The UN is increasingly recognizing the important role NGOs play as operational partners especially in the field. Their strengths of being close to people, having their trust and receiving first-hand information about what is needed on the field is of importance if not essential for the UN bodies involved in reconstruction. Moreover their expertise, creativity, spirit and ability of making individual decisions, if necessary, are aspects that the UN bodies due to their heavily bureaucratic system lack.

So what is the role of NGOs in post-conflict reconstruction? They represent, as described through their strengths and clearly declared in the UN Secretary- General Koffi Annans statements, the new global people power. Their role is to represent the people and in the best way, to protect them from oppression, discrimination, and try to help them help themselves to improve their lives.

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5. RECOMMENDATIONS With regards to the improvement of the work taking place in the transition and reconstruction phase, the first step should be taken by NGOs in an effort to organize themselves. NGOs should establish a system similar to the one of the UN where the organizations would be categorized and establishing different departments depending on their area of expertise and regional focus. Each department should then develop an INGO and local NGO section. This system would in aid the improvement of cooperation and coordination among the NGOs as well as improve their efficiency, accountability and transparency.

A department should be established to work with the ECOSOC and DPI focusing on the improvement of cooperation between NGOs and the UN. The UN agencies and NGO partners should then initiate common approaches under this coordinating body which should be undertaken by the UN and in comparison to previous attempts, the efforts should continue and results should not be expected to materialize over night.

This could be achieved primarily through a strengthened relationship between the UN and NGOs both at the headquarters and in the field. Secondly, the INGOs in partnership with local NGOs should be given the responsibility to bring awareness to the locals due to the trust they are given by local communities, their creativity, spirit and capability of making fast decisions.

Nevertheless the UN should try to find ways of not imposing its bureaucratic system on the NGOs in the field. If this happens, the NGOs would be as time inefficient as the UN can be at times, which would take away one of the main strengths of the NGOs.

Using local initiatives and community participation, inter-agency collaboration enables one to successfully implement projects at any stage of the transition period in a society. For successful achievements of projects and activities the local structure and needs, the power in the communities and individuals should be taken into account. Moreover better rationalizing of the use of the resources through bottom first approach should be established.

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ANNEX: COUNTRY STUDY- KOSOVO

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S. Florea 1. INTRODUCTION

The Balkan region has suffered for more than a decade of disintegration due to its conflicts in former Yugoslavia. As a result a number of areas formerly part of Yugoslavia have established own autonomy such as Croatia, Bosnia- Herzegovina, Macedonia, and Slovenia. What is left of former Yugoslavia is now called Serbia and Montenegro including the Province of Kosovo.

Since the end of 1990s Kosovo is trying to gain own independence and undergoes a time of ethno-religious tension between the Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs. Currently the territory of Kosovo is a de facto UN protectorate and the present international community is carrying out a number of peace-keeping and peace-building operations, and reconstruction activities.

Through my stay in Kosovo I have had the opportunity to learn about the political, economical and social issues and also gained first hand knowledge on the obstacles faced by the UN agencies and NGO community in their efforts of reconstruction. My visit in the Province of Kosovo and Belgrade has been one of the main reasons for choosing this area as a country study.

2. BACKGROUND

Basically Serbia is presently experiencing two transitions: one post-conflict after the internal conflicts in the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, and the second after the Dayton Peace Agreements of 1995. The latter is a more conventional transition towards liberal democracy and free markets, with an ultimate aim of EU membership and will not be discussed in this project.

In early 1990s, the socio-economic situation in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) began to deteriorate. It was traditionally based on industry, mining and agricultural activities. The difficult transition from being a Communist state in 1991 and moving towards democracy was followed by a disintegration of the FRY culminating in a war in Bosnia and

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S. Florea Herzegovina. The climax of the situation was reached at the end of the1990, with the 1999 Kosovo crisis and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) intervention.171

After the democratic changes in Serbia in October 2000, authorities of the Montenegrin and Serbian republics started to renegotiate their relationship and resulted in transforming the former centralized federation into a loose union of the republics- now called Serbia and Montenegro. The union of Serbia and Montenegro has a combined population of 10.6 million, where Serbia is the larger republic with around 95 percent of population.172

The current Serbian government, democratically elected and internationally recognized, was established on the 25th January 2001. It inherited a country weakened by war- a bankrupt state, devastated economy, limited civil confidence and a suspicious international community. Despite the governments program of economic reforms, the unemployment rate almost doubled bringing significant decrease in official incomes and growth of the grey or informal economy.173

A new Constitutional Charter and associated Implementation Law were ratified in January 2003. Under the new Charter, the two republics have a joint Presidency, Parliament, and a Council of Ministers however the economic, fiscal, monetary and customs policies operate separately.174 The new Constitutional Charter stipulates that after a three-year period a referendum will be called to determine whether the two republics will remain together. Neither of the documents addressed the status of Kosovo, which until 1999 was a province of Serbia. In 1999, following the NATO intervention and signing of a peace accord, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1244i, placing Kosovo under the interim administration of the UN Mission in Kosovoii.175

Kosovo is a small province with a population of 2 million, before the recent conflict. It is placed in the southern part of Serbia bordering with Albania and Former Yugoslav Republic Of Macedonia (FYROM). Until 1990 Kosovo was an autonomous region in the Socialist
171

Vujnovic, Melita, Dr., 2003 (September), Country strategic health needs report and priorities for WHO collaboration 2004-2010: Serbia and Montenegro 172 World Bank, 1999, World Bank Group: Transitional Support Strategy for Kosovo 173 Vujnovic, Melita, Dr., 2003 (September), Country strategic health needs report and priorities for WHO collaboration 2004-2010: Serbia and Montenegro 174 Ibid 175 World Bank, 1999, World Bank Group: Transitional Support Strategy for Kosovo

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S. Florea Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY), with predominantly ethnic Albanian population. Under SFRYs 1974 constitution, Kosovo had its own judiciary, police, and education and health policies, however following the constitutional changes in the 1990s its autonomy was significantly restricted. Serbia took over the control over the Kosovar police and economic policies and ethnic Serbs replaced ethnic Albanians in many public sector jobs, resulting in an establishment of Kosovo Albanian parallel network of services and institutions.176 The outcome resulted in an armed revolt of the KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army) towards the Serbian government, which started in 1997-1998.177

2.1. The Kosovo conflict The conflict in Kosovo started in 1997-1998 with the armed revolt of the KLA who pledged to protect the Albanian people and win independence for Kosovo. The acts of the KLA were results of long-term frustration towards the oppressive Serbian government and were triggered by the Serbian assault of the non-violent student demonstration in August 1997 in Pristina. The Serbian security forces responded to the revolt in a brutal and violent way, attacking Kosovo Albanian villages, looting the houses, driving out the Kosovo Albanians, and as time passed and the situation worsened killing and executing the Kosovo Albanians. Within months from its conception the KLA had grown in numbers and was in control of some territory in Kosovo forcing the Serbian security forces to withdraw. However the KLA was technologically inferior to the Serbian forces, disorganized and weak. Their acts came to serve as an excuse for the Serbian authorities to continue with their expulsion and assassination of Kosovo Albanians.178

The Serbian leader, Slobodan Milosevic, used the already protracted disturbances and instabilities between the Serbs and Kosovo Albanians as tools securing his personal political position. For him, the dispute was not only about Kosovo but also about the growth of his own personal power and authority over Yugoslavia. Up until January 1999 the conflict was reported by the Serbian authorities to the international community as being under control but was however internationalized after media reported human rights violations in form of executions of forty-five Kosovo Albanians in the small town of Racak. This incident came to bring the international community to the realization that serious involvement in searching for

176 177

ibid Mertus, Julie, A., 1999, Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started War 178 Power, Samantha, 2002, A problem from hell- America and the Age of Genocide, Basic Books, NY p. 445

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S. Florea a diplomatic solution was not enough and enforcement of diplomacy by military threat was imperative if diplomacy was to succeed.179 Since the 1999 crisis, a provisional government has been elected in the UN Administrative Province of Kosovo however the area is still under the UN Resolution 1244.180

Presently Kosovo is undergoing a transition from relief to reconstruction and development. The emergency phase in Kosovo appears to have ended in the late 2001-early 2002, when the transition towards sustainable development and livelihood to the Kosovars started. The conflict was stopped by the NATO intervention 1999 and is presently being held under their supervision, thus Kosovo is neither at peace but nor in conflict.

There are numerous issues faced by the actors involved in the post-conflict Kosovo in further development. The main issue is the lack of a final resolution on the political status of Kosovo. Due to the existing tension between the two ethnic groups in the area, the international community involved in this field is not prepared to make any major decisions involving the political status of Kosovo. A decision made by the international authorities might result in offending either the Serbian population or the Kosovoar population, aggravating the situation. Therefore the main decisions are being put on hold and the international actors are waiting for the matter to be decided.181 Currently, first talks on the future status of Kosovo are taking place, however the ethnic parties have not found a common ground on which an agreement could be reached. 182

3. RECONSTRUCTION DEVELOPMENTS IN KOSOVO The main aim in every post-conflict reconstruction setting, including the Province of Kosovo is to: restart and/or further develop public administrations to serve as solid grounds for future functioning democratic institutions, to rebuild infrastructure, and develop functioning, open and transparent market economies. All these objectives make part of the three main areas of priority in post-conflict reconstruction mentioned above. These are reconstituting legitimacy of the government, re-establishing security within the state and rebuilding effectiveness.

179

Schnabel, Albrecht, 2000, Kosovo and the challenges of Humanitarian Intervention, UN University Press, NY p.35 180 Interview with Luigi Migliorini 181 Interview with Conor Lyons 182 Financial Times October 15 2003

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S. Florea

3.1. Reconstituting legitimacy of a governing body One of the main challenges facing the international community in reconstruction of war-torn states is the creation of a legitimate government that includes and represents its whole population.

Regardless of the final resolution of Kosovos political status the efforts to develop local democratic institutions and processes have had to continue. In January 2000, through the formation of a Joint Structure of Interim Administration (JIAS) composed by 20 departments lead by one local and one international co-head serving on a Council of Ministers whose mission was to establish and implement socio-economic policies for Kosovo, the first steps towards more democratic systems of governance were taken. A Constitutional Framework for Interim Self-Government has been sanctioned in May 2001 aiming to establish Provisional Institutions of self-Government (PISG).183

3.1.2. Elections and Power Sharing The interim municipal councils set up in 1999, immediately after the conflict were replaced in 2000 by assemblies selected through democratically held municipal elections. Under the UNMIK these municipalities have the authorization over economic development, budget approval, health, education and a number of other social services. Only three out of thirty municipalities were not successful. These municipalities were consisting of a Serb majority that boycotted the election process.184

The issues faced in the development of such municipalities arose in those with equal representation of the two different ethnic parties or a large mix of the different existing minorities in Kosovo. The progress within these municipalities was delayed due to discussions between the ethnic groups related to the procedural nature rather than development related issues facing the communities. Other issues have concerned the lack of experience and know-how and narrow party interests.185

183 184

UNDP, 2002, Human Development Report ibid 185 ibid

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S. Florea In addition, many municipalities recruit candidates for what are defined as civil servant positions based on political considerations186. This is opposing the principles set up by the international standards where municipal servants are not to be appointed on a party association but on professional criteria.187

The first democratic elections for members of a new Kosovo Legislative Assembly were held in November 2001 and selection of a President were supposed to take place a month later but were delayed due to minor reoccurrences of violence throughout the Province. In early 2002 the new President was elected as well as the appointment of a new Government. Since then, gradual transfer of power from the international administration to the Kosovoars has been taking place. Presently the international government acts as advisor to the local government, however some competencies and responsibilities are still reserved for the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) appointed to oversee UNMIK activities. The total transfer of power to the central government will however take place only once the international mission in Kosovo is completed and the status of Kosovo has been resolved.188 The Resource Centre in Prizren (NRC Prizren) serves as a perfect example of NGO engagement in this area. The NRC Prizren is a local Kosovoar NGO. In 2002 the NRC Prizren along with eight other NGOs implemented a project called the "Monitoring the work of the elected officials to ensure transparency and their accountability to the electorate". The main objective of this project was to enhance democracy. This task was carried out through a number of activities namely monitoring Municipal Assembly meetings as well as the work of the municipal departments and directorates; providing information to elected officials on issues of concern for the local community; organising public debates with elected officials; and verifying that the meetings were advertised and sufficiently attended by citizens.189 Additionally, the NRC Prizren provides support to other NGOs, citizens and community groups. It aims to expand their operational and organisational capacities, through promotion of greater participation of the public and training of managerial capacity. It serves as a

186 187

ibid ibid 188 UNDP, 2002, Human Development Report p. 34-35 189 http://www.netdd.org/pz/en/activities/monitoring.htm

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S. Florea meeting point where networking and sharing of experiences between NGOs is enabled. It also empowers links between NGOs and local government, donors and the business community.190 In regards to tensions between the different ethnic groups a large number of NGOs have carried out projects focusing on reconciliation targeting youth, children and parents. The Catholic Relief Services (CRS) carried out a Parent-School Partnership program bringing communities together to identify and find solutions to their needs. This program focused on children, education and schools.191 The NRC Prizren is involved in several other projects i.e. Painting for Peace and Tolerance, a six-month multiethnic project involving Kosovo Albanian, Kosovo Serb, Ashkali and Roma children. The project aims at promoting reconciliation amongst younger generations. The project also resulted in the identification of new local NGOs as implementing partners.192 3.1.3. Development of the Civil Society Strengthening the civil society sector is one of the most important component of a democratic system and therefore very important in reconstruction. In post- conflict states the governments are usually weak or non-existent. In these situations the role of civil society is greatly increased.193

During the period of 1989-1998 Kosovo had around seventy active NGOs out of which five were INGOs. They were initially formed focusing on human rights issues but slowly came to expand to other areas. Since the1999 crisis the number of NGOs has increased presently reaching above a thousand and is still growing.194

The World Vision for example is presently carrying out projects mainly dealing with the promotion of peace by establishing relations with local communities and their leaders. They have been present in Kosovo since 2000 and founded the Council for Peace and Tolerance (CPT) consisting of nineteen voluntary members representing the Orthodox, Catholic and Muslim religions. Their aim is to collectively promote and build values of trust, security and

190 191

http://www.netdd.org/pz/en/background/background.htm http://www.interaction.org/kosovo/index.html 192 http://www.netdd.org/fk-kp/en/index.htm 193 ibid 194 UNDP, 2002, Human Development Report

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S. Florea enhanced quality of life for all citizens195 by organizing civic education seminars and multiethnic childrens outreaches, establishing links of communication between the different groups. The CTP has through its work established relations with UNMIK and a number of other organizations such as NATO, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), and local and international organizations.196 The local NGO named NRC Prizren, mentioned above, was established in association with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) but became independent in 2000. It is in charge of a project named Strengthening Civil Society. The main objectives of this project are to strengthen Civil Society in Gjakov/akovica municipality by generating and supporting local NGOs and coordinating their leadership. The activities involved in this project deal with provision of information and training support for local NGOs, and strengthening the cooperation of NGOs with local authorities.197 Concern Worldwide in Kosovo completed its reconstruction of schools program in mid 2001 and has since laid greater emphasis on human rights and minority issues. Parallel to these activities it has conducted capacity building activities with local NGOs.198 3.2. Re-establishing security As mentioned earlier, re-establishing security refers to the rebuilding or strengthening of systems in both the economic and political sphere. It is carried out through a combination of reconstruction activities and DDR.199

In Kosovo the judicial system prior to the 1999 conflict was not based on the principles of the rule of law and lacked a constitutional basis capable of holding offenders responsible for their actions. Some of the ethnic groups in Kosovo were not protected by a fair judicial system. The reconstruction of a legal system in Kosovo needed not only to be re-established but also reformed in order to protect human rights.

195

A World Vision Journal of Human Development, First Quarter 2005, Preventing Violent Conflict- can humanity move beyond band-aid solutions? p. 21 196 A World Vision Journal of Human Development, First Quarter 2005, Preventing Violent Conflict- can humanity move beyond band-aid solutions? 197 http://www.netdd.org/gj-dj/en/activities/strengthening.htm 198 http://www.interaction.org/kosovo/index.html 199 Brinkerhoff, Derick, W.,2005 Feb., Rebuilding Governance in failed states and post-conflict societies, International Journal of Management, vol. 25, no. 1

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S. Florea The development and functioning of Kosovos judicial system is currently under the authority and responsibility of the SRSG. The same structures existent prior to the 1999 conflict was restored including a Supreme Court, District, Municipal, and Minor Offence Courts as well as implementation of disciplinary- corrective institutions.200

The international community has faced difficulties in terms of establishment of parallel Kosovoar Serb judicial systems as a result of their resistant to take the necessary oaths before the representatives of the international administration. However the international community is in support of full and equal integration of judges and other judicial personnel.201

The appointment of international judges and prosecutors has taken place aiming at the training and strengthening the professionalism of the locals, to further the efficiency and independence of the system and support the implementation of the rule of law.202

The civilian oversight of security in the Province of Kosovo is undertaken by the NATO troops called Kosovo Force (KFOR). After the 1999 crisis the KLA was demobilized and transformed into the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) given the responsibility of civilian emergencies.203 The overall civilian protection is however the responsibility of the international civilian police force called the CIVPOL. Due to the initial issues faced by CIVPOL, such as language barriers and little knowledge about the laws in Kosovo, a local police force called the Kosovo Police Force (KPS) was set up.

The KPS was and still is under training by the CIVPOL in all kinds of areas, starting from directing traffic to crime related issues. In regards to the KPC, many locals gave the impression of not being very found of them, saying that even though they have changed name it is still the same persons with the same opinions that are at work. I guess the agreement signed between the SRSG, NATO and KLA transforming them into KPC was the international communitys way of initiating a sense of security among the different ethnic groups as well as integrating a large number of ex-combatants into society.204

200 201

UNDP, 2002, Human Development Report p.38 ibid 202 Ibid p. 39 203 ibid 204 UNDP, 2002, Human Development Reportp. 40

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S. Florea Due to such issues as lack of proper representation and security of minorities, NGOs like the International Catholic Migration Mission in Kosovo (ICMC) initiate programs dealing with areas of focus they believe to be overseen or not sufficiently attended. The ICMC has been active in the Province since 1999 aiming to assist the most vulnerable returnees, provide advocacy, protection monitoring, and re-integration assistance. Through their teams of caseworkers and advocacy advocates the ICMC has worked together with the UNHCR in the monitoring of minority security and protection issues.

3.2.1. Reconstruction of homes and job generation Reconstruction of homes and generation of job opportunities are very important parts of reconstruction and cornerstone of re-establishing security and DDR. In order to accomplish successful reintegration of ex-combatants, refugees, minorities and IDPs, homes and work places need to be made available.205

Kosovo suffers of high unemployment rates among its youth and/or females. Due to the slow privatization impeded primarily by a resolution of Kosovos final status but also the outdated production system, under investment and lack of foreign investment.

In regards to homes, some of the large international and regional organizations namely the UNMIK, World Bank, European Union in partnership with donor governments (i.e. US, Japan and Norway) and NGOs have been responsible for this task. United Methodist Committee On Relief in Kosovo (UMCOR) has been active in the Province since 1999. It has assisted Kosovoar refugees in the neighbouring countries through emergency relief. UMCOR has since made a transition to longer-term development and peace-building objectives presently managing areas of shelter, food security and agriculture, and social and community development.206 Stabilization Through Income Generation is one of UMCORs projects initiated in 2001 focusing on provision of credit, training, and information resources to micro and small entrepreneurs. The project aims to identify gaps in the economy and target them with small credits and grants. One of the primary objectives of this initiative is to work with UMCOR's

205

206

UNDP, 2002, Human Development Report http://www.interaction.org/kosovo/index.html

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S. Florea ongoing conflict resolution and peace-building projects to create cross-ethnic economic linkages to all communities in Kosovo.207

Kosovo Enterprise Program (KEP) is a project carried out by the IMCM in Kosovo. It focuses primarily on women, providing induction training and micro-loans to low income and small business entrepreneurs aiding them to start up their businesses.208

3.3. Rebuilding effectiveness In order to rebuild effectiveness of the government, rebuilding the institutional and physical infrastructure providing for the basic needs of the people is necessary. Restart of national economy, health, education and transportation are all parts of this area.

The common ambition of the people of Kosovo, UNMIK and the international community, goes beyond the return of Kosovo where it was in the beginning of 1989 or even 1998. Our ambition is to put Kosovo on the track of sustainable economic and social development which offers the people of Kosovo a future in Europe as citizens of Europe.209

The economy in Kosovo is more or less sustained by the international community but progress is visible in many areas. For instance the banking system was non-existent in the initial postconflict stages. Since then the international community has managed to rebuild and activate seven licensed banks, an inter-banking system of payments and a twenty-four hours banking service with automatic teller machines.210

Health and education has undergone tremendous changes. For example Kosovo, even prior to the conflict lacked any kind of mental health care system. Prior and during my stay in Kosovo the WHO in partnership with donor governments, international organizations, local and international NGOs had already laid the ground for such system. MSF has been active in the Province of Kosovo for more than a decade. Presently MSF is conducting its projects in Mitrovica, Skenderaj/Srbica and Vushtrri/Vushtrr municipalities.

207 208

http://www.interaction.org/kosovo/index.html http://www.interaction.org/kosovo/index.html 209 UNDP, 2002, Human Development Reportp. 73 210 UNDP, 2002, Human Development Report and interview with Conor Lyons

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S. Florea These activities include mobile clinics, mental health, equipment and support, reconstruction and rehabilitation of medical structures, well cleaning and water sanitation for schools.211

It has also been involved in different project concerning the IDPs in Serbia and Montenegro and their return to the province of Kosovo. In 2003 the MSF was carrying out a project aiming at the improvement of IDPs situation. This was done through the provision of psychosocial support and small-scale rehabilitation.212

In regards to the activities conducted in Mitrovica, the MSF has been working in both parts of the divided municipality. Even though concerned about the withdrawal of several international organizations due to attacks on humanitarian staff, the MSF decided to remain active in the area. The organization runs mobile clinics and mental health activities in North Mitrovica while supporting the municipalitys hospital.213

An important component of Kosovos efforts to develop a strong economy involves its infrastructure, including energy, transportation and telecommunication systems.214

The International Rescue Committee (IRC) as well as Mercy Corps International have been active in Kosovo since early 1990s. The IRC have been engaged in assisting community and local institutions in rebuilding the Kosovoar infrastructure. The Mercy Corps International has been following an Integrated Rural Development Strategy based on civil society, agricultural and economic development, and transitional social services initiatives.215

Besides the, and imperative for successful reconstruction of the health, education and economy sectors, the telecommunication, transportation and energy infrastructure needs to be strengthened and improved. Activities in these areas are carried out and even progress is visible, however much more needs to be done.

211

http://www.msf.org/msfinternational/invoke.cfm?component=article&objectid=751B7B22-B3D6-11D4B1FA0060084A6370&method=full_html 212 http://www.msf.org/msfinternational/invoke.cfm?component=article&objectid=7AB00326-F177-4FC28CA0E0DDC2A17B5E&method=full_html 213 http://www.msf.org/msfinternational/invoke.cfm?component=article&objectid=751B7B22-B3D6-11D4B1FA0060084A6370&method=full_html 214 UNDP, 2002, Human Development Reportp. 79 215 http://www.interaction.org/kosovo/index.html

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S. Florea 3.4. Issues in reconstruction As experienced in post- conflict reconstruction of states, Kosovo is not an exception in regards to lack of cooperation and coordination amongst the actors involved in the field. Due to lack of an existing functioning body or mechanism, cooperation appears to be stronger when established at personal levels as opposing to institutional levels.216

Why is coordination and cooperation important? Coordination and cooperation is a necessity for successful post-conflict reconstruction. It maximises the utilisation of resources and helps all players involved to better achieve their goals217.

Many of the issues in the Kosovo post-conflict reconstruction arise from the lack of coordination and cooperation. In order to make the two possible; information sharing and transparency of the various organizations agenda are needed. In regards to the NGOs in Kosovo, many have been hesitant to share information because they see each other and sometimes also the UN agencies as competitors for the available donor funds.

Another issue related to coordination in Kosovo is that the NGOs do not have a place within the structure of the UNMIKs international coordination efforts. These efforts are organized under UNMIKs four pillars; humanitarian, economic, institution building and governance, and civil administration action. Due to the large numbers and great diversity of cultures and agendas within the NGO community, coordination proves to be a difficult task. This could be solved through unified NGO efforts aiming to organize and coordinate themselves.218

Presently the development phase in Kosovo is suffering of funding fatigue. This issue as many others is linked to the lack of cooperation and coordination amongst the actors involved in the field. There has been enormous funding in the emergency phase, which has not been used in an optimal way.219 Many of the activities in the immediate post-conflict period in Kosovo were dealing with institution building and should have been taking place in the present transition period rather than during the emergency phase. Thus presently there is a

216 217

Interview with Sofia Carrondo ibid 218 http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?ID=1039 219 Interview with Sofia Carrondo

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S. Florea lack of funding for the activities, which currently are imperative while in the past where not applicable and therefore unsuccessful.220

3.4.1. Gaps within the transitional phase in Kosovo As mentioned the gaps in the transition from emergency and relief to reconstruction start after crisis end and widens as emergency assistance declines. Going back to the fact that the funds were misplaced already from the first phase after the crisis ended, and as the emergency phase is over, the gaps have widened, resulting in lack of funding for present needed projects.221 All the previously-mentioned gaps can be found and identified as follows:222

1. The institutional gaps: The UNMIK has the transitional authority to run Kosovo through the establishment of own institutions differing from the ones set up in the rest of Serbia leading to confusion and difficulties in decision-making and acting at an appropriate time, results in the slowing down of efforts to move from relief to reconstruction and development. Perfect examples of institutional gaps are the municipal operation UNMIK established including the issuing of own passports and the Kosovoar vehicle registration, both only recognized in Kosovo resulting in movement restriction.

2. The political gaps: The final resolution of the political status of Kosovo, which is the main problem faced by all actors involved in the situation due to conflicting interests, defines this type of gap. The political status of Kosovo cannot be decided by the international community due to various reasons as above mentioned.

3. The authority vacuums: Although the UNMIK has been given the authority from the UN, the local authority in Kosovo is vague and weak and therefore limited in its capacities to affect the established policies. In spite of the international presence the law and order in the present Kosovo is weak.

220 221

Interview with Sofia Carrondo Interview with Sofia Carrondo 222 Interview with Sofia Carrondo and Conor Lyons

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S. Florea 4. The synchrony gaps: This type of gap is linked to the political gap and is also identified by the disagreement and dissatisfaction by both ethnic parties in regards to the final political status of the Serbian province of Kosovo.

5. The sustainability gaps: Unsustainable economy is the basis of this gap. Presently the international community is sustaining Kosovos economy. Without their presence Kosovo would at this point in time collapse.223

223

Interview with Conor Lyons

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S. Florea 4. NGOs IN KOSOVO

Since the ending of the crisis, the number of NGOs in Kosovo has increased from 65 local NGOs and 5 INGOs to nearly 2500 local NGOs and 500 INGOs.224 They are spread throughout Kosovos territory focusing on human rights and humanitarian aid, psychologicalsocial aid, education, economic aid, citizen education, and political lobbying, targeting both youth, women, the disabled, ethnic groups and business community.225

The Humanitarian Community Information Center (HCIC) was set up aiming at provision of information and coordination of tasks and activities of international organizations, INGOs and NGO working in the field. 226Due to the speed of increasing NGOs and INGOs in Kosovo, the goal was not achieved. Lack of coordination amongst the actors involved led to further complications in the planning of both the emergency and the reconstruction phase.227

The UN agencies and INGOs active in the field have worked to increase the capacity of Kosovar NGOs. Their importance as operational bodies is recognized by the UN agencies. Additional work is however needed to show Kosovar officials the importance in cooperating with NGOs.228

The UNMIK is positively disposed to local NGOs but there are no established procedures for provisions of grants.229In these regards, the NGOs in Kosovo have experienced issues of inclusion into the UN. They express that the information exchanged in the field has often been one-sided. While they have been able to provide the UN agencies with essential information from the locals, the UN agencies have not pursued the expected strengthening of cooperation.230

224 225

Interview with Conor Lyons UNDP, 2002, Human Development Report 226 www.reliefweb.int/hcic 227 Interview with Gerry McWeeny 228 ibid 229 2000 NGO Sustainability Index USAID

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S. Florea The UN agencies faced various difficulties in their work with the local NGOs and INGOs due to a gap between the levels of organization of a smaller number experienced NGOs, active in the area before the war, and a large number of NGOs that have formed since.231

Firstly local NGOs have little experience and need coaching and can therefore be used in medium and long-term projects. Secondly, while the INGOs have dedication, experience in the field and are dynamic in their work they can be prone to wave too much on existing trends. This fact might result in difficulties in finding INGOs appropriate for the projects lying outside of the trends. Thirdly, some NGOs tend to lean more towards a business and therefore enter the private sector.232

Two phenomena of distortion to be identified in these regards: 1. NGOs who are highly donor funding dependent resulting in turning their focus away from their areas of specialty towards the mostly funded activities.

2. NGOs who take on projects under a specific name while working on other activities not included in the project.233

While the experienced and established NGOs have developed clear missions and strategic plans, and permanent, high quality staff, the majority of newly established NGOs are more likely to design their initiatives in response to donor priorities. Moreover, they are likely to be forced to hire staff on a temporary basis to fulfil the needs of particular projects because of their small budgets and donor dependency.234

Having said this, major donors prefer to fund projects proposed by international organizations. Although the thinking behind the donors rather working with NGOs might be politically correct since the strengthening of the civil society in Kosovo is highly needed,
231

2000 NGO Sustainability Index USAID Interview with Sofia Carrondo

232

232 232

Interview with Sofia Carrondo Barnes, Catherine, 2004, GPPAC Discussion Paper: UN-CSO Interaction in Conflict-Affected Communities, http://www.gppac.org/documents/GPPAC/Research/UN-CS_interaction/Regional_experiencespaperCB_29Sept04.doc

234

2000 NGO Sustainability Index USAID

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S. Florea NGOs are less capable of resisting the mainstreaming trends. Therefore the funding is generally going through an international organization such as an UN agency, department or programme, which has the UN credibility and is further sub-contracted to an NGO.235 Moreover, the level of technical advancement within the NGO sector has improved dramatically since the end of the war. The more established NGOs have concrete technical bases, while those in smaller cities and in rural areas do not have access to even the most basic equipment.236 Attempts have been made by several international organizations to establish an infrastructure supporting the NGO sector development. The main issues have dealt with lack of access to space for meetings, office equipment and libraries. Nevertheless, the local NGOs have been successful in establishing information sharing structures and promotion of cooperation within the sector but also with the government and private sector. Strong coalitions have been established especially among NGOs active in the women rights field and those involved in election monitoring.237 4.1. Service provision Over the past decade the Kosovoar civil society has had to provide health services, education, protection of human rights and other public services due to the lack of government support. The post-conflict influx of international organizations has however disempowered the role of local NGOs in the Province. This has been raising concern about the future provision of such services once the international community leaves the area.238

However, even if the local NGOs cannot fully meet the community needs in terms of production of goods and services they serve as an important source of information regarding community needs to the international organizations.239

Due to lack of contact between the local NGOs and their government prior to the war the NGO sector has acquired the habit of opposing the government rather than lobbying it for the implementation of certain policies. Having said that, they have little experience in advocacy
235 236

Interview with Sofia Carrondo 2000 NGO Sustainability Index USAID 237 2000 NGO Sustainability Index USAID 238 2000 NGO Sustainability Index USAID 239 2000 NGO Sustainability Index USAID

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S. Florea and need to develop capacity to fully participate in decision making especially as the government structures evolve.240 Nevertheless, the INGOs and local NGOs contribute significantly to improve the effectiveness of democratic governance by increasing levels of civic participation.241

The UNMIK and OSCE as well as INGOs have contributed to their training by maintaining good communication with the local NGOs as well as by consulting with them on different policy issues. Local NGOs were also actively involved in reviewing and commenting on UNMIKs NGO regulation and the content and nature of reporting for public benefits.242

240 241

2000 NGO Sustainability Index USAID Interview Gerry McWeeny 242 2000 NGO Sustainability Index USAID

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S. Florea 5. Conclusion

Numerous conflicts and internal strives have been taking place in the Balkans over the past decade, forcing the region to undergo significant changes and along with them so has the international community. Most recently the Former Republic of Yugoslavia is known as Serbia and Montenegro with the Province of Kosovo under the administration of UNMIK.

After the 1999 crisis Kosovo has been taken significant steps towards sustainable democracy and livelihood for the local people. This has been accomplished by and large through successful reconstruction efforts. These include development of local democratic institutions based on the rule of law and respect for human rights as well as bringing greater awareness of the importance of a strengthened civil society to the locals and government officials. Secondly, reconstruction of judicial systems and effective police force, generation of job opportunities and homes have been initiated. Through these efforts security is being reestablished to serve as a basis of reintegration of refugees, IDPs and ex-combatants. Lastly, state effectiveness is being improved through the reconstruction of infrastructure, health and education systems and institutions serving as basis for meeting the peoples needs and restart of economy.

Even if largely successful, the reconstruction phase has not progressed without impediments. The main issues faced in by the international community are firstly, the lack of final resolution of Kosovos status. The UNMIK is still the main governing body and full power to the democratically elected government will be transferred only when the status is finalized. Secondly lack of coordination between the international actors and a weak relationship between the UN and NGOs.

The implementation of a coordinating body of reconstruction activities has been established, however not been highly successful. Other issues linked to the poor coordination of activities are remaining tensions between the ethnic parties, lack of foreign investment, and funding fatigue. Lack of funding is the result of narrowly planned activities.

Since the ending of the crisis, the amount of NGOs in Kosovo has increased from 65 local NGOs and 5 INGOs to nearly 2500 local NGOs and 500 INGOs. Frustration has been experienced both by the UN and NGOs when attempting to cooperate. Improvements need to 77

S. Florea be made in order to accomplish the goals set for Kosovo and the local institutions and government officials need to be made aware of the significant contribution NGOs can deliver.

The importance of NGOs as operational partners is nevertheless increasingly recognized by the rest of the international community. They are spread throughout Kosovos territory focusing on human rights, and humanitarian aid, psychological-social aid, education, economic aid, citizen education, and political lobbying, targeting both youth, women, the disabled, ethnic groups and business community.

In these regards, the NGO work carried out in Kosovo is of essential importance to the reconstruction of post- conflict environments. They are active in all areas of reconstruction. Moreover their close proximity to the grassroots is of major importance. The major international organizations even if large in size and budget would have not been able to cover the areas dealt with by the NGOs, especially not at the grassroots level.

Even though mistakes have been made the reconstruction in Kosovo is progressing and regardless of its final status the efforts to establish sustainable peace and development will continue. This period therefore identifies further learning and maturing of the actors playing in the international arena of war-torn states. The current issues arising in reconstruction are yet to be solved but nonetheless improving. The mistakes made in the past seem to serve today as a base for future improvement.

Under the UN Security Council Resolution 1244, Kosovo remains a province of Serbia, but is to have substantial autonomy and meaningful self-administration while the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the FRY continue to be recognized. It also provides that UNMIK is to be replaced over time with democratic selfgoverning local institutions. ii The United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was established by the UN resolution 1244 as a transitional administration. The powers vested in UNMIK- and its head, the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG)- include all legislative and executive authority including the administration of the judiciary. UNMIK has four pillars or areas of accountability: (i) humanitarian issues; (ii) civil administration; (iii) democracy building and elections; and (iv) reconstruction recovery and economic development.

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Websites of interest: http://www.interaction.org/kosovo/index.html www.ciesin.org/datasets/unced/unced.html www.un.org/esa/coordination/ngo www.reliefweb.int/hcic

Interviewed persons: NGO SECTION/DESA Michelle Federoff Daniel Perez OCHA Mark Bowden (Senior Coordinator of UNDG) QUAKER UN David Atwood- Director Representative Disarmament and Peace UNDP KOSOVO Sofia Carrondo- Deputy Resident Representative Conor Lyons- Coordinator of the UN Volunteer Programme WHO PRISTINA Dr. Serap Sener- Head of Office Ardita Tahirukaj- Health promoting Schools Adviser Gerry McWeeney- Healthy Environment Programme Manager WHO BELGRADE Luigi Migliorini M.D.- Head of Office, WHO Belgrade Dr. Melita Vujnovic- Liaison Officer, WHO Belgrade WHO NEW YORK Richard Alderslade- Senior External Relations Officer, Health Policy WORLD VISION Tom Getman WORLD YWCA Mrs Musimbi Kanyoro- General Secretary

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