India-Pakistan Conflict

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By 2005 the gradual easing out of tensions between India and Pakistan had enabled a series of confidence building measures (CBMs). Since then the slow but steady negotiations have aimed at addressing the contentious issues such as Siachen, Sir Creek, Baglihar, Tulbul

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navigation project, drug trafficking, terrorism, organised crime, prisoners, roadblocks to trade and transit routes. While significant achievements have been made on certain issues, there are some issues over which no agreements had been reached. The agreement on conventional CBMs is merely in finalisation of the proposals put forward in the Agra Summit in 1999. It has taken six years to agree to implement the said proposals which acts as a dampener for speeding up the pace of the CBMs. Moreover, genuine security concerns need to be retained while chalking out these measures which are precisely the reason for the stalling in this area. Indian Defence Minister Mr Pranab Mukherjee's observations that Pakistan has built bunkers and reinforced defence structures in Tanghdar, Batalik, Kargil and Nowshera sectors since the November 2003 ceasefire along the Line of Control (LoC) could hamper the movement. There is a need to institutionalise nuclear CBMs and establish nuclear risk reduction centers on the lines of the ones established between the US and the former
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Soviet Union.

The internal conflict between Hindus and Muslims has received some of its stimulus since 1947 from the international conflict between India and Pakistan. One of the great tragedies of the freedom struggle was the relentless polarization of opinion between the Congress, which came to represent mostly Hindus, and the All-India Muslim League (Muslim League--see Glossary), which eventually stood behind a demand for a separate homeland for a Muslim majority. This division, encouraged under British rule by provisions for separate electorates for Muslims, led to the partition of Pakistan from India and the outbreak of hostilities over Kashmir. Warfare between India and Pakistan occurred in 1947, 1965, and 1971; the last conflict led to the independence of Bangladesh (formerly East Pakistan) and a major strategic victory by India. The perception of Pakistan as an enemy nation has overshadowed all other Indian foreign policy considerations because neither country has relinquished claims over Kashmir, and a series of border irritations continue to bedevil attempts at rapprochement. In the late 1980s, tensions over large-scale military maneuvers almost led to war, and regular fighting over glacial wastelands in Kashmir continues to keep the pressure high. An added dimension emerged in 1987 when Pakistan publicly admitted that it possessed nuclear weapons capability, matching Indian nuclear capabilities demonstrated in 1974. In the mid-1990s, both nations continue to devote a large percentage of their military budgets to developing or to purchasing advanced weaponry, which is mostly aimed at each other--a serious drain of resources needed for economic growth. Pakistan does not possess the relative strength necessary for adoption of an offensive posture against India. On the other hand, remaining on the strategic and tactical defensive would be disastrous due to lack of strategic depth. The same lack of depth precludes a protracted struggle. "Cold Start" is the Indian military doctrine meant to allow rapid deployment Special Forces units "to strike Pakistan within hours of any terrorist attack on Indian soil. It assumes that militants from Pakistan, and not home grown Indian radicals,
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are responsible for any actions". Such a rapid response would not allow time for diplomacy. "Cold Start" was developed with the help of external strategists, borrowing heavily from Israeli tactics, notably from the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. The assumptions of the new Indian Doctrine are: (1) act offensively against Pakistan for any perceived acts of strategic destabilisation of India, proxy war and terrorism (2) move away from India's defensive mindset of the past 50 years (3) prepare to undertake offensive military operations at the outset (4) undertake offensive operations short of the nuclear threshold (5) the vast majority of Indian public will support any war putting Pakistan into place and forces it "to desist from proxy war and terrorism against India." India's doctrine of "Cold Start" involves swift penetration of Pakistan with the aim of isolating, destroying or capturing vital points (such as nuclear stores and other installations). India can deploy four Strike Corps against Pakistan, one each against the Southern part of Azad Kashmir, Central Punjab, Southern Punjab and one against Sindh. They have the necessary balance to focus their attack in a combination of two or even three corps but time and space dictate they cannot move more than one strike corps on any axis and they have to cater for Pakistan's counter-offensive. With all 3 Armoured Divisions and 4 RAPID Divisions, with 2 out of 5 Independent Armoured Brigades concentrated in Rajasthan, the resource allocation makes the offensive targets either along the Jaisalmer-Rahimyar Khan axis or along the Barmer-Mirpurkhas axis. In 2005 the "South-Western Command" was created at Jaipur. Their likely main thrust remains the deep South Barmer-Mirpurkhas axis with secondary effort in the Jaisalmer-Rahimyarkhan area. Since no ground offensive is possible in the Thar Desert without heavy air cover, India's air deployment in 2002 suggested that the focus of their strike corps could well be in the south (Western and Southern Commands). Pakistan's assumptions about "Cold Start" are: (1) offensive operations commencing without giving Pakistan time for diplomacy and (2) offensive operations will not cross the nuclear threshold or prompt Pakistan into crossing it. India implies that, should Pakistan opt for crossing the threshold,
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the onus would lie squarely on Pakistan. The ability to hold limited portions of Pakistan with military might and use this for political leverage against Pakistan will be unacceptable, triggering a ground war as well as a possible nuclear exchange. From the 1965 war through the Indian Army's Brass Tacks excercise in 1987, Pakistan's emphasis was on static defence at the border. Three heavy infantry holding formations - IV, XXX, and XXXI Corps - are tasked with countering Indian thrusts in their immediate areas. Penetration of Indian territory would be undertaken only on an opportunity basis. This concept of operations was inadequate, given the lack of strategic depth in Pakistan. Eventually it was realized that a "stand and fight" doctrine would probably result in deep penetration by Indian forces, without Pakistani forces being able to manoeuver effectively. The Indian Army could gain the initiative, destroying Pakistani formations piecemeal as they reacted to Indian thrusts. Pakistan's "Riposte" is simple in concept: the two Strike Corps would conduct a limited advance along narrow fronts to occupy Indian territory near the border, probably to a depth of about 50 km. I Corps (Mangla) and II Corps (Multan) are armor heavy "strike" corps. Independent Armoured and Mechanized Brigades are intended for quick counter attack and exploitation and would add weight to advances by the Strike Corps. Pakistan believes that international pressure would result in a ceasefire after a maximum of three weeks of conflict, which should be enough time to gain some territory to be used in subsequent bargaining. The "Riposte" is practiced at all levels. Major excercises involve the crossing of water obstacles and minefields at night with emphasis on subsequent break-out and rapid advance. Complete mechanization of the Strike Corps and other formations to achieve desired mobility was slowed by the effects of US sanctions. But by 2008 US Army surplus equipment is now being rapidly delivered, and local manufacture and rebuilding of US supplied AFV/APC has received considerable impetus, thus improving the mechanization process. Initially there was acceptance of Indian penetration of Pakistani territory, which is seen as inevitable, given the
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comparitive lack of mobility within the Infantry Divisions. But India's doctrine of "Cold Start" resulted in some modification to the Riposte, since acceptance of penetration could be fatal to counter-penetration plans. In the event of an Indian advance reaching or crossing the line of the main Lahore-Karachi highway, there could be consideration of employment of tactical nuclear missiles. The Indian army/airforce excercise Vajra Shakti (Thunder Power) conducted in Punjab from 1-10 May 2005), emphasized maintaining mobility while operating under nuclear attack. But Pakistan's nuclear battlefield preparedness is patchy, and it is doubtful that even the Strike Corps could fight under nuclear attack. Others have suggested that "instead of seeking a better bargaining position vis a vis India, through capture of sensitive territory a riposte Pakistan should adopt a destructionoriented strategy, fighting on our own territory, permitting penetrations by the enemy. This would allow Pakistan to destroy the forces that make these penetrations by using the reserves. Such a strategy would erode Indias numerical superiority and its ability to threaten Pakistan with a long war."
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Cold-starting Pakistan By Ikram Sehgal The News Thursday, January 22, 2009 Indias possible war deployment Ikram Sehgal Info-Thread on the Pakistan Army

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