(10) Unson vs.

Navarro, 101 SCRA 183, November 17, 1980 Petitioner, Miguel Unson, and private respondent, Edita Araneta, were married on April 19, 1971 1 and out of that marriage the child in question, Teresa, was born on December 1, 1971. On July 13, 1974 they executed an agreement for the separation of their properties and to live separately, as they have in fact been living separately since June 1972. During early part of 1978, Unson found out that Araneta has been living with her brother in law Agustin F. Reyes and later had two kids. Araneta and Reyes had also embraced a protestant sect. Petitioner contends that Maria Teresa was born and reared under the Roman Catholic faith and should not be exposed to an environment alien to the Catholic way of life which is the upbringing and training her father is committed to. Editha admitted that her present circumstances at first impression might seem socially if not morally unacceptable; but she has reared and brought up Maria Teresa in an atmosphere of Christian love, affection and honest. Respondent is seeking the custody of their child. Issue: WON the child custody should be given to the mother? Held: No. The Court finds that it is in the best interest of the child Teresa to be freed from the obviously unwholesome, not to say immoral influence, that the situation in which private respondent has placed herself, as admitted by her, might create in the moral and social outlook of Teresa who is now in her formative and most impressionable stage in her life. The fact, that petitioner might have been tolerant about her stay with her mother in the past when she was still too young to distinguish between right and wrong and have her own correct impressions or notions about the unusual and peculiar relationship of her mother with her own uncle-in-law, the husband of her sister's mother, is hardly of any consequence now that she has reached a perilous stage in her life.

No respectable father, properly concerned with the moral well-being of his child, specially a girl, can be expected to have a different attitude than petitioner's in this case. B. Transfer of PA, FC 210 cf. FC 223-224, FC 234, 217 Art. 210. Parental authority and responsibility may not be renounced or transferred except in the cases authorized by law. Art. 223. The parents or, in their absence or incapacity, the individual, entity or institution exercising parental authority, may petition the proper court of the place where the child resides, for an order providing for disciplinary measures over the child. The child shall be entitled to the assistance of counsel, either of his choice or appointed by the court, and a summary hearing shall be conducted wherein the petitioner and the child shall be heard. However, if in the same proceeding the court finds the petitioner at fault, irrespective of the merits of the petition, or when the circumstances so warrant, the court may also order the deprivation or suspension of parental authority or adopt such other measures as it may deem just and proper. (318a) Art. 224. The measures referred to in the preceding article may include the commitment of the child for not more than thirty days in entities or institutions engaged in child care or in children's homes duly accredited by the proper government agency. The parent exercising parental authority shall not interfere with the care of the child whenever committed but shall provide for his support. Upon proper petition or at its own instance, the court may terminate the commitment of the child whenever just and proper. Art. 234. Emancipation takes place by the attainment of majority. Unless otherwise provided, majority commences at the age of twenty-one years. Emancipation also takes place:

(1) By the marriage of the minor; or (2) By the recording in the Civil Register of an agreement in a public instrument executed by the parent exercising parental authority and the minor at least eighteen years of age. Such emancipation shall be irrevocable. Art. 217. In case of foundlings, abandoned neglected or abused children and other children similarly situated, parental authority shall be entrusted in summary judicial proceedings to heads of children's homes, orphanages and similar institutions duly accredited by the proper government agency. (11) Eslao vs CA, 266 SCRA 317 On June 22, 1984, petitioner Maria Paz Cordero-Ouye and Reynaldo Eslao were married. After their marriage, the couple stayed with respondent Teresita Eslao, mother of the husband. Out of their marriage, two children were begotten, namely, Leslie Eslao and Angelica Eslao. Leslie was entrusted to the care and custody of petitioners mother while Angelica stayed with her parents at respondents house. Reynaldo Eslao died. Petitioner intended to bring Angelica with her to Pampanga but the respondent prevailed upon her to entrust the custody of Angelica to her, respondent reasoning out that her son just died and to assuage her grief therefor, she needed the company of the child to at least compensate for the loss of her late son. Subsequently, petitioner married Dr. James Manabu-Ouye, a JapaneseAmerican and the petitioner migrated in the US. Petitioner returned to the Philippines to be reunited with her children and bring them to the United States. The petitioner then informed the respondent about her desire to take custody of Angelica and explained that her present husband, Dr. Ouye, expressed his willingness to adopt Leslie and Angelica and to provide for their support and education;

Respondent resisted the idea by way of explaining that the child was entrusted to her when she was ten days old and accused the petitioner of having abandoned Angelica. The lower court rendered its decision ordering respondent to cause the immediate transfer of the custody of the Angelica to her natural mother. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower courts decision. ISSUE:Whether or not custody of the daughter should be given to the mother. RATIO: Yes. The trial courts disquisition, in consonance with the provision that the childs welfare is always the paramount consideration in all questions concerning his care and custody is enough to convince the Court to decide in favor of private respondent. When private respondent entrusted the custody of her minor child to the petitioner, what she gave to the latter was merely temporary custody and it did not constitute abandonment or renunciation of parental authority. For the right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a childrens home or an orphan institution which do not appear in the case at bar. Of considerable importance also, is the rule long accepted by the courts that the right of parents to the custody of their minor children is one of the natural rights incident to parenthood, a right supported by law and sound public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not created by the state or decisions of the courts, but derives from the nature of the parental relationship. C. Who exercises PA, FC 211-213 cf. FC 49, 102(6), 43(2), 63(2), 176. 49, 102 (6), 129 (9) Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the persons of their common children. In case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the contrary.

Children shall always observe respect and reverence towards their parents and are obliged to obey them as long as the children are under parental authority. (311a) chan robles virtual law library Art. 212. In case of absence or death of either parent, the parent present shall continue exercising parental authority. The remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the parental authority over the children, unless the court appoints another person to be the guardian of the person or property of the children. (n) Art. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit. Art. 49. During the pendency of the action and in the absence of adequate provisions in a written agreement between the spouses, the Court shall provide for the support of the spouses and the custody and support of their common children. The Court shall give paramount consideration to the moral and material welfare of said children and their choice of the parent with whom they wish to remain as provided to in Title IX. It shall also provide for appropriate visitation rights of the other parent. Art. 102 (6)Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority of the common children choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. In case there in no such majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration the best interests of said children. Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall produce the following effects: (2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of

the community property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or in default of children, the innocent spouse; Art. 63. The decree of legal separation shall have the following effects: (2) The absolute community or the conjugal partnership shall be dissolved and liquidated but the offending spouse shall have no right to any share of the net profits earned by the absolute community or the conjugal partnership, which shall be forfeited in accordance with the provisions of Article 43(2) Art. 129. Those given the authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor. The parents, judicial guardians or the persons exercising substitute parental authority over said minor shall be subsidiarily liable. The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding paragraph shall not apply if it is proved that they exercised the proper diligence required under the particular circumstances. All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. (12) Tonog vs. CA, 376 SCRA 642 Dinah gave birth to Gardin Faith Belarde Tonog, her illegitimate child with Edgar V. Daguimol. The two cohabited for a time and lived with Edgar's parents and sister. A year after Dinah left for US where she found work as a registered nurse. Gardin was left in the care of her father and grandparents. Edgar later filed a petition for guardianship over Gardin and the trial court granted the petition and appointed Edgar as the legal guardian.

Dinah filed a petition for relief from judgement and the court set aside the original judgement and allowed Dinah to file her opposition to Edgar's petition. Edgar filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied and the court issued a resolution granting Dinah's motion for custody over Gardin. Edgar filed a petition for certiorari before the CA who modified their previous decision and granted Edgar custody over Gardin. Dinah contends that she is entitled to the custody of the minor, Gardin Faith, as a matter of law. As the mother of Gardin Faith, the law confers parental authority upon her as the mother of the illegitimate minor. Issue: Who is entitled to the temporary custody of the child pending the guardianship proceeding? Held: custody should remain with her father. In custody disputes, it is axiomatic that the paramount criterion is the welfare and well-being of the child. The general rule child should stay with their mother. However, even a mother may be deprived of the custody of her child who is below seven years of age for compelling reasons. Instances of unsuitability are neglect, abandonment, unemployment and immorality, habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, and affliction with a communicable illness. If older than seven years of age, a child is allowed to state his preference, but the court is not bound by that choice. The court may exercise its discretion by disregarding the childs preference should the parent chosen be found to be unfit, in which instance, custody may be given to the other parent, or even to a third person. In the case at bar, we are being asked to rule on the temporary custody of the minor, Gardin Faith, since it appears that the proceedings for guardianship before the trial court have not been terminated, and no pronouncement has been made as to who should have final custody of the minor.

Bearing in mind that the welfare of the said minor as the controlling factor; we find that the appellate court did not err in allowing her father to retain in the meantime parental custody over her. The child should not be wrenched from her familiar surroundings, and thrust into a strange environment away from the people and places to which she had apparently formed an attachment. Gardin Faith, has now exceeded the statutory bar of seven years, a fortiori, her preference and opinion must first be sought in the choice of which parent should have the custody over her person.