SHORT HANDED

Fundamental #1: Short-handed play is fast (high average hands per hour). This might seem self-explanatory, but its impact is so large that it might not be considered fully at first glance. There are several factors that make online short-handed Texas Hold !m a very fast game. "nline poker is #ell kno#n to allo# players to average t#ice to three times more hands per hour than its live $%& counterpart. Shuffling is instantaneous, players can act before their turn, dealers never have to split pots or call the floor, and poker soft#are interfaces let players act more 'uickly than in a $%& cardroom. (nd these advantages of online poker are magnified at shorthanded games. &any hands end 'uickly through blind stealing or folds on the flop, so the instant shuffling has an increased impact. "f course, there are also fe#er players #ho must make decisions. (ll these effects multiply, leading to averages of )*+-,++- hands per hour in many cases. $ut #hat does this mean to you, the aspiring #inner. /ots and lots of money, most importantly. 0oker is a game of many small edges. The more good decisions a #inner makes (-!1 decisions), the more money they earn. Simple, eh. 2ell, short-handed games allo# a #inner to make more decisions per hour than in a )+-handed game for t#o main reasons. The most straightfor#ard (but common to all forms of online poker) is simply #hat #e discussed above. There are more hands played per hour. Ho#ever, a lesser considered reason is the looseness of the typical short-handed player. 3ue to the high price of the blinds, each player #ill take part in more hands. &ore hands played #ill result in more decisions to be made and each of these decisions is an opportunity for the good player. So, there s the prospect of making a lot of money fast. $ut be#are. The incredibly fast pace of shorthanded play is a double-edged s#ord. &any players complain of the very high variance of short-handed tables. "n one hand, luck actually plays a smaller role in theory due to the higher number of decision opportunities per hour. To explain this phenomenon, 4 ll consider a case #here a person is flipping a coin. 4f one person flips a coin only )+ times, there is a significant chance the percentages of heads #ill vary greatly. 4t #ouldn t be so shocking to see 5+ or 6+7 of all flips end in heads (or tails). Ho#ever, if that same person flipped a coin )++ times, the chances of heads coming up 6+7 of the time are extremely small. The math needed to demonstrate the actual probabilities in our t#o scenarios is 8ust an expansion of simple arithmetic, but too cumbersome for the purpose of this article. The point is that #hile luck s#ings to both good and bad players alike, the variance in general #ill be lo#er as more decisions are made. 4f #e ve proven that luck is a smaller factor, #hy #ould a high variance be a normal complaint. Simply put, the game often proceeds faster than players can ad8ust. 2hile conditions can change 'uickly in poker under any set of circumstances, the damage that can be done in shorthanded play is amplified. /et s say you are playing #hat is normally a #inning strategy for your game. 4f an opponent crafts a solid strategy capitali9ing on your #eaknesses, you may not reali9e you are being outplayed for 'uite a fe# hands. The longer it takes to counter, the more money you #ill lose. 4n other #ords, since your opponents have changed, the decisions you make #ill have negative expectations. The speed of play may mean that a lot of hands pass before you even reali9e #hat is happening. :urthermore, shorthanded play can often be very volatile and unpredictable, for reasons 4 #ill highlight in the next section and in future articles. 3ecisions #ill be closer to marginal in general than they #ould be in other games because even great short-handed players are forced to do a lot of educated guessing #ith very imperfect information. Fundamental #2: Short-handed play is usually loose and aggressive. (t the time 4 am #riting this article, there are six )+-handed ;<=;5 games of Hold !m at a popular online poker site. The average pot si9e is ;<, exactly. (t the same time, there are three *handed ;<=;5 games at the same site, #ith an average pot si9e of ;,6. 2hy such a small difference. The ans#er lies in an oft-used phrase, >0oker begins as a fight for the blinds.> 4n a )+-handed game, tight play is so critical that it often is the biggest difference bet#een #inners and losers in a lo#-limit game. "ne can afford to #ait for premium hands before entering a pot. 4n a *-handed game, keeping the same tight standards #ill be suicide to your bankroll. !ach player #ill pay one of the blinds ?+7 of the time, constantly putting in money #ithout any guarantee of even reasonable cards. Sklansky and &almuth point out the need for far looser standards pre-flop in #hat is pretty much the only available literature that focuses on short-handed play, Hold !m 0oker for (dvanced 0layers. (s they sho# #ith basic math, a good short-handed player #ill need to play at least ?+7 of their hands preflop in many. Short-handed players #ill enter a lot more pots and see a lot more flops than their ring-game counterparts. 4n addition, the nature of Texas Hold !m re#ards aggressive play, and this is never more true than in short-handed play. 2hy is being aggressive so critical. @onsider a common situation #here a player raises preflop in a short-handed game and the big blind calls, making it heads-up on the flop. :our small bets are already in the pot. :irst, a little mathematical background. ( player #ith a nonpocket pair #ill only improve to a pair about one-third of the time. This average is decreased if one s opponent has a similar holding, such as (A vs (B. 4f a player has connectors, such as CD, CT, CA, there is an additional chance of bet#een about 6-))7 that the flop #ill result in a straight or open-ended straight dra#. ( player #ith t#o suited cards #ill

flop a four-flush or flush ),7 of the time(by the #ay, a player #ith suited connecters such as DTs #ill flop either a fourflush, open-ended straight, or completed hand about )57 of the time). 4n other #ords, your opponent #ill flop a good dra# or pair less than H(/: the time, but the same applies to you. (fter a bet, there #ould be five small bets at stake. :ive small bets is not enough to 8ustify a gut straight dra# or dra# at overcards #ithout extraordinary implied odds. So, if a player holds CD and the flop is ,d *h Bc for example, they #ill have a very difficult time calling even a single bet. 3ra#ing to#ards overcards in this case is not 8ustified by the pot odds (there is a 5E?) chance of improving, or about 6 to ) against making a pair on the turn). (lso note that if that CD is going against a set, t#o pair, or is dominated by a hand such as (C, (D, FC, FD, etc, then it does not even have 5 outs and may be dra#ing virtually dead. The CD is in a position of vulnerability. ( call is marginal at best. To capitali9e on this vulnerability, good short-handed players #ill often bluff at a ragged flop (or any flop for that matter) since they are receiving ?-to-) odds for their bluff and their opponent #ill not have connected #ith the flop approximately *+7 of the time. 4n response, a good player #ill often raise back, as a bluff or semibluff, or #ith as little as <rd pair. (fter all, folding too often makes the bluff profitable, so a good player must fight back to keep from being bullied. Go#, this process can often result in a conflict that looks more like a game of >chicken> than poker (i.e. t#o players bullying each other trying to force the other to fold). This po#er game creates some difficult decisions for the short-handed player, but the main premise is that most play is aggressive and loose. There is a #ider variety of hands played and a #ider set of strategies used than in a )+-handed game. $luffs, semibluffs, semibluff reraises, check-raise bluffs, and bluff raising can all be found at online *-handed tables because TH!H (I! ":T!G !::!@T41!. 4n turn, players #ith legitimate hands bet, raise, and reraise #ith far more abandon than in a full ring game, and their opponents #ill raise, reraise, or call #ith a far #ider range of hands. This means a lot of money is going into each pot, often before the turn, even though the action is usually heads-up. 4t s easy to correlate ho# the increased range of hands and aggressiveness results in more educating guessing and fe#er clear-cut decisions for a good player. Fundamental #3: To #in at short-handed poker, you must be observant. 4 might be a poker purist, but 4 believe good poker should include a high degree of bluffing, aggression, and guts. That s certainly ho# mass society vie#s the game. $ut the truth in full ring games, especially at lo# limits, is that bluffs are usually bad plays, tightness is often a huge factor separating #inners and losers, and guts have far less to do #ith ho# much is #on than Holly#ood #ould ever have us believe. Jtili9ing a good conservative strategy, staying patient, understanding pot odds, and some basic card reading skills are the main tools of #inners. "nline players (including a lot of professionals) sometimes play t#o or three )+-handed games at the same time because they can #in by simply using a straightfor#ard, tight strategy. The same decisions come up repeatedly, and straightfor#ard play takes the cash. These professionals #in even though they don t kno# the tendencies of each player because the advantage of kno#ing each players tendencies is reduced. 4 am not attempting to say that being observant is unimportant in full-ring games. $ut the fact remains that especially in lo# limit games, many professionals #in #ithout being observant because it is less important than other skills such as card selection (tightness). On the other hand... 4n short-handed games, a #inning player does one fundamental thing that sets him or her apart from the losing player. They ad8ust their o#n play to their opponents to capitali9e on their opponents mistakes. $eing observant and ad8usting one s playing style is the most important re'uirement for being a #inning short-handed player. :irst, #ith a higher rate of hands played, an observant player can pick up the tendencies and playing style of opponents much more 'uickly. "f course, there are many, many individual inclinations that can be exploited #ith a good counterstrategy (e.g. a player might fold too often to raises or check raises, they might not call enough in the blinds or they might call too much, or a player might fold too often on the end). There seem to be almost infinite possibilities. 4t might seem obvious, but almost every tendency can be countered. (nd in shorthanded play, strong card reading, psychology, and observation skills #ill result in opportunities for -!1 players 'uickly and often. (ll a #inning player has to kno# is ho# to read those tendencies 'uickly and counter them effectively. $ut of course, therein lies the rub. Ieading trends and understanding other players can be very difficult, and finding the best defense is harder yet. (nd in the real #orld, your opponents #ill not al#ays be predictable. They #ill vary their play or #ill ad8ust to your counterstrategies. Hour goal is to prepare ahead, and be ready to ad8ust 'uicker than your opponent. To be a #inning player, you #ill al#ays be one step ahead, outguessing, outthinking, and outplaying each opponent. The sub8ect of short-handed play is so complex and rich because it is in many #ays completely different than the full-ring counterpart. There may not be a lot of shorthanded literature available to offer a straightfor#ard strategy that #ins, but the relative ne#ness of the game is not the only reason. 4nstead, shorthanded poker is exceptional because each scenario is

distinct, and a #inning player, more than anything else, must ad8ust to each situation uni'uely. Jntil the next article, good luck. 4n the last article, 4 pointed out that short-handed poker is a game of small edges, but that the number of decisions made in an hour are higher. "ne of the interesting aspects of such a game is that behaviors that #ould not normally have much impact in a full game #ill have a pronounced detriment short-handed. 4n this article, #e #ill examine the prominent effect of ignoring an old common sense maxim in short-handed poker. &ost of us #ere taught the fairy tale >Dack and the $eanstalk> as a child. 4n this anecdote, Dack tries to reach a golden harp. To do so, he must apply all his energy to sneak past a sleeping giant. Dack does not #ant to #ake up the giant, because if he does, he d be in big trouble. The story teaches a subconscious, simple, and smart lesson. >3on t #ake a sleeping giant.> Scenario 1: The " o! imit Shar"" ( couple months ago, 4 had the pleasure to make my semi-annual trip to /as 1egas. 4 play poker online at home, so most of the trip #as spent engaging in the >forbidden> gambling fruitsE the -!1 table games. (fter three days of losing hundreds at the black8ack tables and sportsbooks around to#n, 4 made my first trip to the home of the prosE $ellagio s glorious poker room. 4 #as impressed, and the style fit right in #ith my desire to take it easy and have some fun. (fter a short #ait, 4 sat do#n at a lo#er limit table, ordered myself a drink, and #ent cra9y. 4t #as a raucous game. 4 dropped ;*++ and had a great time. (fter 8ust a fe# hours, 4 #as do#n to my final ;,++ of the day. (t that moment, 4 become a#are of a ne# player to my immediate right. He #as a <*-year old man, and 4 noticed him because 4 bet out of turn #hen he delayed. He #as taking the game very seriously. He paused #hen the action reached him preflop and checked his holecards the last possible moment. !ven then, he scanned t#o or three spots behind him before making his play. Suddenly, 4 remembered a fundamental truthE 0oker is not 8ust played for fun. 2hen 4 sa# this player next to me, the lightbulb in my head cleared the alcohol-induced fog in three seconds flat. ( challenge had been issued, even if the man did not intend it. &y desire to #in erupted. The results are unimportant, but 4 did #in back ;?++ before 4 called it a night. &ore importantly, the ne# player had modified my motivation and behavior. 4 have no doubt 4 could have gone broke and left the table fully satisfied, leaving the ne# player to clean up and profit, if only 4 had kept playing for fun. Sklansky and &almuth point out that it is important not to take too long to act in a lo#-limit game, because it can ruin the >fun> atmosphere of the game and let others kno# you are playing to #in. Scenario ) is a classic example. 4n shorthanded poker, there is an additional factor. "bservation is critical. Ho#ever, #e often only consider our ability to #atch others. This gentleman took extra time and effort, so he recogni9ed the importance of observation. 4n the process, he inadvertently made sure other players noticed him. 4n short-handed poker, it is financial suicide to call such attention to yourself. 4f others are scrutini9ing you closely, they #ill eventually figure out #ays to counter your play. Scenario 2: The "An#r$ o%er" /ike most of you, 4 #ork a full-time 8ob. "ne night a fe# #eeks ago, after a particularly tough day at #ork, 4 8umped online to play poker to blo# off some steam. 4 #as not playing my ( game, to say the least. &y game of choice #as *-handed Texas hold em. (s 4 en8oyed my leisure time, 4 read some football articles, flipping back and forth to the poker action. (bout an hour into the action, a critical hand occurred. 0reflopE 4 held B 5 in the big blind. @utoff raised, button cold called, and 4 thre# in an extra bet. :lopE * A C (fter 4 checked, the cutoff checked as #ell. Got surprisingly, the button tossed in a bet. "n a normal day, if this #ere a hand 4 #ould play, 4 #ould bet out or maybe check-raise. 2ith ? outs, my dra# is not sufficient for the pot odds, especially #ith one player left behind me (#ho could raise). Ho#ever, 4 called. 2ithout fail, small mistakes compound into bigger ones, and 4 found myself the victim of a raising battle as the cutoff check-raised. 4 #as left in a tough spot #ith a gro#ing pot and a ?-outer in my hands. 4 should have dropped my hand at some point on the flop, but #ith #aning attention, 4 did not. 4nstead, 4 called a total of ? small bets on the flop and ) big bet on the turn. (s any bad-beat enthusiast could predict, 4 caught the nuts on the river. TurnE , IiverE 6 So, 4 played badly yet #on a large pot. This story could end there.

4 could have continued to read about the #eekend s G:/ games, playing poker #ith half effort. 4nstead, the cutoff angrily typed into the chat box, using derogatory language. &ost players have seen the behavior a thousand times, but it is often dismissed as >part of the game> and simple rudeness. 4t is also unprofitable. 4 decided my opponent #as correct. 4 needed to pay more attention to the poker game, so 4 did. The cutoff steamed a#ay the rest of his money, and 4 played serious, mistake-free poker for the rest of my session. &ncrea%ed 'a#nitude in Short(Handed )o"er 4n short-handed poker, players #ill be making much more marginal decisions, and sometimes, due to a bad read or misunderstanding of short-handed concepts, a vicious bad beat #ill occur. Het, it is imperative for a profitable shorthanded player to never berate or correct their opponents. Gothing good can come of it. ( bad player might improve, get upset and leave, or ignore it. ( good player might feel offended and target the >angry loser.> 4 mentioned above that it is better not to have people paying too much attention in the first place. 0ainting a target on your back is #orse, and causing the >live ones> to leave is the greatest crime of all. 2hy push a#ay the bad players #hile challenging the good players. There are a million more examples that any number of players could give. This #ebsite includes several authors #ho have discussed similar stories. The convergent theme is thisE 4f you do something that dra#s negative attention to yourself, you are likely reducing your ability to #in. 4 am not saying that you should sit 'uietly and brood at your local game to avoid suspicion. 4n fact, you #ould probably dra# attention by appearing so serious. 4nstead, 8ust act normal, smile, and don t offend anybody. (ppear to have fun even if you aren t, or at least don t take out your frustration on other players. (nd that brings us back to our premise at the top of the article. >Gever #ake a sleeping giant.> The problem in shorthanded poker is that every other player is a potential >giant.> 2ith the proper motivation and the desire to concentrate, any player can observe, target, and beat you. Hence, one goal in short-handed poker is to not >#ake> any of your opponents. 4n a full game, you might be able to avoid somebody bent on revenge. 4n a short-handed game, it is impossible. (ccordingly, if your goal is to #in money, keep every possible edge for yourself. 3on t antagoni9e the opposition and be content making the right plays. 4f you get angry, yell at your computer monitor. 4t #on t hold a grudge. Jntil the next article, good luck

Short(handed Hold*Em: )re+lo, )la$ -)art &.

$y Dason 0ohl &ainstream poker literature often includes popular charts or groupings for hand rankings, created to measure the relative value of hands in a full ring game. Jnfortunately, these helpful tools cannot be used effectively in short-handed hold em, because they #ere not #ritten to assume a short-handed structure. The t#o main differences bet#een full and *-person games are kno#n to most advanced players, even if they are not fully understood. :irst, the relative value of big offsuited cards goes up, and the relative value of dra#ing hands go do#n. Second, the blind structure forces more action. $linds come too often, and a good player cannot 8ust #ait for a premium holding. 4n 0art 4 of this article, #e #ill focus on the first distinction. There are three main reasons that hand rankings change so drastically #hen the number of players drops. &m,lied Odd% are reduced. 3ra#ing hands are often overvalued by many novices of short-handed games. :or example, suitedness earns a considerable payoff by hitting a flush, but that only occurs about <7 of the time. ( hand like Fx suited #ill flop a four flush or flush about )=Bth of the time. 2ith a four flush on the flop, the player #ill only end #ith a flush )=<rd of the time. These improbable odds mean the suited hand needs to get in cheap and have multi#ay action to earn profit. Shorthanded poker fits neither re'uirement. 0reflop play in *-handed games very often involves a raise, meaning a player must pay t#o bets to even see the flop. "n the flop, the contest is often heads-up, and the four flush loses money on every additional bet to the pot. Hence, suitedness is #orth considerably less in a short-handed game. The same logic can be applied to all dra#ing hands. The probability of hitting a very strong hand (such as a set, straight, or flush) stays the same in both a shorthanded and a ring game, but the compensation in a short-handed pot is often inade'uate. /i# card% !in %mall ,ot%. 4t has been stated in many mainstream books that a hand like (Fo has value because it can #in unimproved in a headsup match. $ut this concept is not 8ust limited to hands like $ig Slick . There #ill be many hands that feature t#o dra#ing hands, and the big cards #ill take do#n the pot #hen both miss. E0am,le 1:

0layer )E ( * Ksmall blindL 0layer ,E D T Kbig blindL :lopE ? < F . K? small bets in the pot.L

0layer ) bets, 0layer , raises. 0layer ) calls. TurnE 5 . 0layer ) checks. 0layer , bets. 0layer ) calls. IiverE C . $oth check, and the (*o takes do#n the pot. Geither player makes a mistake in the scenario above. 2ith 6 bets in the pot already, 0layer ) #as correct to call on the flop #ith at least 5 kno#n outs and a backdoor flush dra#. 0layer , might have checked the turn, but it s not particularly pertinent to this scenario. (lso, a bluff might #ork on the end here, but it depends on the skills of both competitors. The bottom line is that the bigger card took do#n a pot unexpectedly, and 0layer ) is several bets richer. 4t is hard to overvalue the extra small pots earned by the high cardM it happens far too often in heads-up and shorthanded play to ignore. The other advantage of big cards is that they upgrade guess#ork into value bets and semibluffs. The follo#ing scenarios better illustrate the advantages allo#ed by high cards. E0am,le 2: 0layer ) has F A . Ksmall blindL 0layer , has 5 * . Kbig blindL :lopE D < B . K? small bets in the potL

4f you are 0layer ), you cannot be sure #hat you are up against. ( bet here is a percentage play, but it s still a guess, because you cannot be sure the Fing-high is currently #inning. 0layer , is forced to fold. E0am,le 3: 0layer ) has 5 * . Ksmall blindL 0layer , has F A . Kbig blindL :lopE D <d B . K? small bets in the potL

0layer ) bets. 4t s a complete bluff. 4f 0layer , plays back, 0layer ) is in trouble and #ill likely muck. 4f there is even a ,*7 chance of an immediate fold, 0layer , #ould be correct to raise. (GoteE This is true regardless of #hat 0layer , holds, but the next scenario #ill illustrate #hy holding big cards makes this raise even more profitable.) E0am,le 1: 0layer ) has 5 * . Ksmall blindL 0layer , has F A . Kbig blindL :lopE D * B . K? small bets in the potL

0layer ) bets. 4t s a value bet #ith <rd pair. 4f 0layer , plays back, they re making a mistake. $ut it s not much of a blunder, because 0layer , still has 5 immediate outs if a Fing or Gine hits, and there are several cards (Ten or any heart) that give 0layer , a strong dra# on the turn. 4t s easy to dismiss the choice of 0layer , because it is a -!1 play, but that s an error. 4n short-handed poker, you #ill misstep sometimes. Het, there is tremendous value in big cards because they minimi9e the impact of inaccuracies. E0am,le 234: 0layer ) has 5 * . Ksmall blindL 0layer , has F A . Kbig blindL

:lopE D :lopE D

* T . K? small bets in the potL "I * A . K? small bets in the potL

0layer ) bets, again believing it s a value bet #ith <rd pair. Ho#ever, 0layer , is the favorite on both flops. 4n both scenarios, 0layer , #ill #in approximately B+7 of the time. "bviously, 0layer ) is in trouble. F A is plainly a superior hand to 5 * heads-up. $ut reality sho#s that many losing short-handed players leak money heavily by overplaying small cards. 5 * is a group * hand in Sklansky s Hold !m hand rankings. F A is a group 5 hand. $ut the examples above clearly demonstrate the original hypothesisE Hand rankings for full ring games do not #ork for short-handed strategy because they #ere not intended as short-handed strategy. Hand domination i% a much %maller +actor. Hand domination occurs #hen one starting hand causes apparent outs to be counterfeited in another starting hand, resulting in a very po#erful advantage for the superior holding. !xamples include ((( vs. (F), ((F vs. (C), (( * vs. F ? ), or even (FC vs. CA). 4n a ring game, a hand such as FA has a fairly significant chance of being dominated, even if the flop includes a Fing. 2ith nine opponents (and a Fing on the flop), there is a )+7 chance an opponent holds a FT, FD, FC, or (F. (gainst any of these combinations, FA is dra#ing very slim or virtually dead. &ore importantly, there are no Fx hands that a normal player #ould hold in a full ring game, so the FA #ill not earn good pots #ith top pair. "verall, it is a clear loser. 4n a short-handed game, FA becomes profitable in many cases. 0layers #ill often not give you credit for top pair, so top pair #ith any kicker goes up in value. 4n addition, many players #ill play Fx suited or #ill play Fing #ith a small kicker fast from the blinds #hen a Fing hits. &oreover, the chances that an opponent holds FT, FD, FC, or (F is greatly reduced (less than *7), further mitigated by examining if the opponent raised or reraised preflop. The Role o+ Dece,tion !verything up to this point has indicated that hands like 5* are highly overrated in short-handed poker. Ho#ever, there are t#o good reasons to demonstrate strength #ith small cards. :irst, stealing pots is a necessity in many short-handed contests, and #aiting around for big cards means missing a lot of excellent stealing opportunities. 4f you kno# an opponent folds too often, it is profitable to challenge them #ith a #ider range of hands. 4f you raise #ith 5* , your opponent #ill typically fail to comprehend that your real motivation for raising #as to steal the pot. "n the other hand, if you raised and eventually sho#ed do#n a hand like D,, your opponent #ould likely begin calling or reraising more often, neutrali9ing your advantage by correcting their play. Second, it is important to not be too predictable. 4f you only raise #ith big cards, your opponents #ill begin bluffing at you #hen rags hit the flop. "r, they #ill simply fold marginal hands since they kno# you #ould not raise #ithout a strong holding. So, mixing up your play is critical. Iaising #ith small suited connectors becomes a semibluff. Hou #ouldn t mind if your opponent folded, but you #ould be 8ust fine #inning the pot #ith a surprising straight or t#o pair, #hich can rake in a larger pot because the flop appears harmless. 4n addition, mixing your play #ill slo# do#n the opposition in the long run and force them to pay off your big cards more often, since they must give you credit for a #ider range of potential starting hands. 4n the next article, #e can examine the effect of the blind structure more thoroughly, no# that #e can gauge the relative strengths of different starting hand combinations. 4f you have any 'uestions, or comments, please feel free to email me at 8asonNpokerpages.com. Jntil next article, good luckO

Short(handed Hold*Em: )re+lo, )la$ -)art &&.

$y Dason 0ohl 4n the last article, #e examined the relative value of starting hands in full and shorthanded games. To summari9e, in shorthanded games implied odds are reduced, big cards take do#n pots unimproved, and hand domination is infre'uent. 0art 44 of this topic revolves around the blind structure. $linds orbit 'uickly in a shorthanded game. (t its most extreme is heads-up hold em, #here both players post a blind. 4n this article, #e #ill examine heads-up preflop play so that #e can revie# fundamental concepts before moving to larger shorthanded games. Head%(5, )la$ Heads-up play is analy9ed by Sklansky and &almuth in Hold'Em Poker for Advanced Players. 4f you do not o#n this book (and study it religiously), then you are placing yourself at a great disadvantage. The first concept offered by Sklansky and &almuth concerns the preflop play re'uired by the blind structure.

4n a ;)+=,+ game, the small blind has anted ;* and the big blind has anted ;)+. 4f the small blind raises, he is betting ;)* to #in ;)*. So, he must steal the blinds only *+7 of the time to earn immediate profit (assuming no raising and all things are e'ual postflop). 4f the big blind folds too often, the small blind #ould earn a significant profit by raising )++7 of the time preflop. 4n fact, since the small blind #ould also #in some hands after the flop, the fold percentage re'uired for profit is far less. 4n other #ords, blind stealing works incredibly well! &t 6et% 7or%e8 :urthermore, the small blind has a positional advantage after the flop. 0osition #ill allo# the small blind to bluff more successfully, earn extra bets #ith big hands, or save bets in many situations. Got only do heads-up games feature a large volume of hands, but plays such as bluffs and semibluffs hold more conse'uence. @onsider the follo#ing examples. E0am,le 1. 4t is a normal ;,=? heads-up game, #ith one exception. Hou must pay your opponent ;,+,+++ if you play a hand preflop. @learly, to keep your losses at a minimum, you #ould never play a hand. E0am,le 2. 4t is the same normal ;,=? heads-up game, except you must only pay ;) if you play a hand preflop. &any holdings such as (( are still clearly profitable, but you #ould think t#ice before playing most hands, since there is a hefty fee to overcome each time you compete. 3efending the big blind is similar to example , above. The exact amount lost by not having position differs #ith the competition, but the disadvantage al#ays exists. :or each hand that goes to the flop, the player #ith position #ill benefit because they #ill have an enhanced ability to profitably bluff, earn an extra bet on good hands, or save a bet #ith bad ones. Ho# can a big blind out of position minimi9e its losses or even earn a profit against such obstacles. De+endin# the /i# /lind Sklansky and &almuth suggest defending #ith ?+7 of all hands, and reraising #ith the top 'uarter of those, based on the idea that this calling=raising strategy neutrali9es the preflop advantage of raising )++7 of the time from the small blind. 4 propose that this advice is too passive. :urthermore, the percentage of hands played should be fluid, based on the competition s play a+ter the flop as #ell as preflop. $efore going any further, let s repeat the authors definition of playable hands, counting up to ?+7. >(ny pair, any ace, any other t#o cards that are both nine or higher, any other straight flush combination #ith no gaps or 8ust one gap (except for ?,s and <,s), and any king little suited. (Hou might add in a fe# more hands such as DBs, AB, or A6.)> &any beginning players might #onder ho# to figure out that these holdings represent ?+7 of all possible hands. 4t is possible to double-check the authors #ork by revie#ing the number of combinations of each holding. Since there are )<,5 possible ,-card combinations, a hand like ((, #hich can be made six different #ays, represents (5=)<,5) of all possible starting hands. 4n percentages, this e'uates to P+.?*7 of all hands, or about ,,+E). T#o cards of unkno#n suits can be combined sixteen different #ays, #hile a suited hand is only formed #ith four possibilities (e.g. ( F , ( F , ( F , ( F ). "ne resource for an aspiring player #ho is truly interested in learning the fundamental probabilities is Hold'em's Odds Book by &ike 0etriv. Rerai%in# )re+lo, There are three main reasons for adopting a more aggressive reraising strategy to effectively combat the stealer. Ieraising punishes the stealer, sets up profitable postflop play, and establishes variation. ). )uni%h the o,,o%ition. 4 m not the first person to suggest reraising to slo# do#n your opponent on future action. 4n fact, Sklansky and &almuth make it apparent that it is critical for your opponent to #orry that a raise #ill cost more than it appears. (s they say, >He needs to kno# that he s in 8eapordy of a reraise. Thus you fre'uently reraise for the sake of future hands, not the hand that you are holding.> $ut is reraising )+7 of your hands enough. )+7 represents the cream of the cropE ((-AA (5 possible combinations each), (F-(T()5 combinations each), FC()5), FDs(?), FTs(?), CDs(?), DTs(?). These hands are so dominating that many of them #ould be <-bet in a full ring game. 1ersus a steal raise, the selection is too thin. &ore importantly, reraising )+7 of the time #ill likely not even affect a blind stealing opponent #ho is raising )++7 of the time preflop. "ut of )+ hands, the stealer #ill immediately #in the blinds 5 times, play on the flop against an out of position caller < times, and face a reraise only once. 4n this situation, even against a reraise, it

becomes pretty easy for the small blind to fold if the flop doesn t hit him hard, since he kno#s he is competing against a premium hand. ,. Set u, Flo, ,la$. 4f you re going to be in the hand to the end, you might as #ell get the money in early. 4 m not sure #here 4 read or heard the above advice, but it makes a lot of sense. 2ith a po#erful hand, you #ant to put pressure your opponent and make him pay for the right to outdra# you. Hou #ant to earn the most money possible, and fundamentally, you #ant to get your money in #hile you are ahead. (This is an oversimplification, but it #orks for shorthanded play due to a concept called clustering .) &ason &almuth #rote about shorthanded play in 0oker !ssays, a good book for advanced players to hone specific theories. >@oncept Go. <E $e prepared to go to the river.> $asically, if your hand is strong and unle%% the board develops in a very scary manner, you #ill often #ant to sho#do#n. Since you #ill be going to the river #ith many hands, you should get the money in early, #hich makes a sho#do#n strategy more likely to be correct and profitable in the long run. ( second factor is initiative. 4 mentioned above that most preflop stealers #ill not be affected by reraises, especially those raising )++7 of the time preflop. 4n my experience, most opponents simply fold if the flop didn t hit their hand since they expect to be against a monster hand. !ven those #ho do not habitually steal raise #ill still respect an opponent #ho reraised preflop. 4n other #ords, if you are the big blind and raise #ith a hand like DTs, you should virtually al#ays bet on the flop, even if the flop misses entirely. 0utting the pressure back on your opponent is critical. "pponents may simply concede on the flop, expecting to be against a very po#erful hand and not #ishing to pay a turn and river bet to see a sho#do#n. <. E%ta9li%h :ariation. The third reason to increase aggression preflop and reraise #ith a #ider selection of hands addresses the predictability of the play. )+7 narro#s the possible hands considerably, and it creates an undeniable problem if the flop arrives #ith < rags. Jnder Sklansky and &almuth s advice, you #ould be reraising #ith big cards < out of ? timesM this is simply too predictable against even average competition. So, #hat is appropriate for a reraise preflop from the big blind. 2hat if #e added BB-55(5 combinations each), FDo(),), FTo(),), CDo(),), CT()5), (As-(,s(? combinations each), TAs(?), and ABs(?). The total is an additional ))+ hands, #hich progresses the amount of reraising hands to )B.,*7 of total hands. Gotice that most of these hands can be taken to a sho#do#n, yet they create enough variation to make any flop potentially dangerous for your adversary. 7atchin# the o,,o%ition (n aggressive counterstrategy is only part of the e'uation. Hou #ill still be calling #ith other hands. Hou #ill still need to vary your play to keep your opponent off your scent. 4 recommend slo#playing (( or FF sometimes, reraising #ith lesser holdings on occasion, and follo#ing up #ith occasionally unpredictable flop play. Feep them guessing. &ean#hile, #atch your opposition. 0reflop, you #ill ad8ust your standards in the same direction as your opponent. 4f the small blind stops raising half the time, you should not call as often, since you #ill too often be playing bad cards #ith bad position, a costly combination. Ieraising is still valuable but should be reduced as #ell. Hou #ant to slo# do#n against an opponent #ho raises only #ith legitimate hands. 4n addition, you must consider the postflop play of your opponent. 4f the opponent plays very #ell #ith positionE earning extra bets, staying aggressive, and follo#ing a solid bluffing strategy, then he #ill earn a significant advantage each hand played on the flop. 2ith your higher postflop burden, you must ad8ust by folding more preflop. (gainst an expert, you #ill fold 'uite often (and therefore call less than Sklansky and &almuth s recommended strategy). The important thing to note is that you will be losing money by folding the big blind more often. IepeatE H"J 24// $! 1"/JGT(I4/H /"S4GQOOOO $ut you #ill lose less money folding than playing marginal hands that cost extra bets after the flop. Sometimes (often) you cannot #in in the big blind of a heads-up matchupM your best choice is simply to minimi9e losses. 3on t #orryM you ll make your profits #hen you are in position and have the advantage. Slo! *em Do!n :inally, a good preflop game #ill complement the overall strategy. Qetting the money in early #ith the best hand #ill help to mitigate your positional disadvantage to some degree. $ut the best reason to stay aggressive may be intimidation. 4f you can scare your opponent into slo#ing do#n, you #ill begin to #in the blinds for free, and you #ill not be forced to play at a disadvantage so often. 4n other #ords, you want your opponent to stop raising your blinds. So snarl (metaphorically) and attack backO Jntil next time, good luckO

4f you have any 'uestions, or comments, please feel free to email me at 8asonNpokerpages.com. 4 received a lot of great emails in the last month, and 4 hope to hear from more of you in the future.

Short Handed )o"er: De+endin# the /lind%

$y Dason 0ohl 4 received an email early in Danuary regarding heads-up strategy. Tom asked, >Ho# much is being in position #orth. "r to put it another #ay, ho# often should you be defending your blinds.> 4n the last article, 4 examined reraises from the big blind. 4n this article, 4 #ill focus on ho# often you should be calling from the big blind. $efore 4 begin, let s repeat Sklansky and &almuth s recommendations in Hold'Em Poker for Advanced Players. They suggest calling at least ?+7 of the time, reraising #ith the top 'uarter of these holdings. They include >(ny pair, any ace, any other t#o cards that are both nine or higher, any other straight flush combination #ith no gaps or 8ust one gap, and any king little suited. (Hou might add in a fe# more hands such as DBs, AB, or A6.)> (s 4 noted in the last article, 4 firmly trust the guidances in Hold'Em Poker for Advanced Players along #ith T eory of Poker. 4 believe Sklansky and &almuth are brilliant teachers and excellent poker authors #ho take their material very seriously. Ho#ever, 4 believe they use unsound logic to determine the number of playable hands in a short-handed game, and 4 don t feel our differences in opinion are insignificant. Sklansky and &almuth have an irrefutible reputation that is #ell deserved. Therefore, 4 am not 'uestioning their character, skill, brilliance, or credibility. 4t is only my intention to prove that in this one exceptional case, Sklansky and &almuth s advice is fla#ed. ;ould S"lan%"$ and 'almuth 9e !ron#< The analysis used by Sklansky and &almuth to find ?+7 does not 'uite make sense, and it can help indicate #hy current theory on short-handed play sometimes fails to designate the best strategy. Sklansky and &almuth point out that in a ;)+=,+ game, #ith the preflop raiser risking ;)* to #in ;)*, the raiser must steal the blinds only *+7 of the time to make an immediate profit (assuming no reraises). "n one hand, they point out correctly that >Kthe small blindL is entitled to a profit because he has position on you and because you have a larger blind than he does.> "n the other hand, they follo# up by suggesting, >The idea is to keep his profit to a minimum. This means that #hen the player on the button raises a lot you must call (or reraise) a lot.> Herein lies the fallacy. Sklansky and &almuth are saying that you should call because your opponent #ill make money if you don t call. &akes sense, right. 4f your opponent makes money (maximi9es his profit), you must be losing too much, right. /et s recall an example from last #eek. E0am,le 1: ;)+=,+ heads-up game. $linds ;*=)+. Hou have (h(c. Hour opponent flips over 6c,s and raises preflop. There are < small bets (;)* total) in the pot. $ut there s a catch. 4t #ill cost you ;,+,+++ to play your hand due to some vicious house rules. Should you call. "f course not. 4t doe% not matter that your opponent makes ;* stealing your blind. !ven though the opponent #ould lose money if you played your pair of (ces (and thus maximi9es profit #hen you fold), it is still correct for you to fold because the only relevant point is that you lose much, much less (minimi9ing your losses) by folding. @onclusionE 3on t #orry about the odds of the preflop raiser. Hour only concern is #hether a call or raise has positive expectation. 2e ll use some more examples to crystalli9e this argument. E0am,le 2: ;<=5 heads-up game. $linds ;)=;<. To steal, the small blind raises ;* to #in ;?. Jsing simple arithmetic, #e calculate that the preflop raiser needs to steal the blinds **7 of the time to make an immediate profit, a considerable increase over the *+7 needed in the ;)+=,+ game. 4f your goal #as only to counter your opponent s strategy, you could call less since you #ould only need to defend ?*7 of the time. Should you therefore play differently. Go. (s a big blind, you re facing the exact same situation in both games. 4n the ;)+=,+ game, there is ;<+ in the pot, and you must call ;)+. 3:1 ratio. 4n the ;<=5 game, there is ;A in the pot, and you must call ;<. 3:1 ratio. (lso note that the small blind is still raising )++7 of the time, so his potential holdings have not changed in fre'uency. E0am,le 3: ;)+=,+ <-handed game.

$linds ;*=)+. (gain, #e assume no reraising. "ur assumptions are helpful to keep the playing field even in our comparisons of headsup and <-handed games. The button is raising )++7 of the time, attempting to steal the blinds (;,+ to #in ;)*). Small blind folds. There is ;<* in the pot, and you must call ;)+. 3.2:1 ratio. Sklansky and &almuth suggest that since the small blind is also defending, the big blind needs to call 6+7 as often as it #ould in a heads-up game. This advice is #here 4 differ the most. (s big blind in a <-handed game, you have better odds to call then you #ould in a heads-up game, and #ith the small blind s cards in the muck, the proper play should clearly include more calling, not less. Iemember, the button is still raising )++7 of the time, and even if you assume the small blind is more likely to fold small cards, the distribution of cards that the button is raising does not change much. ;allin# +rom the /i# /lind So, ho# often should you be defending your blinds. To figure that out, #e only need to consider #hich hands are profitable to call. ( reraise #ill affect ho# much profit #ill be #on, not #hether the hand should be played. 4n other #ords, both raising and calling #ill have -!1, but one play makes more profit than the alternative. (fter a certain point, raising becomes less profitable than calling. (t another point, calling #ill incur a loss, and the hand should be folded. /ast article, 4 argued for reraising #ith approximately the top )67 of all hands, although that number depends on certain factors. Go#, #e #ill examine ho# many hands should be called, again assuming that your big blind is raised )++7 of the time. 2e #ill examine three circumstancesE heads-up, <-handed, and heads-up #hen the big blind has position. Head%(u, -Small 9lind ha% ,o%ition.. The irony of Sklansky and &almuth s analysis is that even though the reasoning behind the recommendation is imperfect, playing ?+7 of hands in the big blind is close to correct against an opponent of e'ual skill. The exact number is impossible to discern, because it depends on the skill of both you and your opponent. 4f you are a complete novice, but your opponent is a novice also, the disadvantage of being out of position is lessened. 4f you are an expert, but your opponent is also an expert, the disadvantage of being out of position is magnified. &y recommendation is to tend to#ards a tighter strategy for several reasons. :irst, the ?+7- strategy includes many marginal hands such as DBs, A6, 5?s, and F<s. 2hile these hands appear to have sufficient pot odds, they also have t#o fundamental problems. They #ill not hit any of the flop approximately ?+-*+7 of the time and #ill give up on the flop. (lso, #hen they hit the flop #ith a pair, it #ill often be a very exposed position, susceptible to a #ell-timed bluff or semibluff. Since so much of today s opposition relies heavily on bluffs and semibluffs, hands that are exposed to these moves #ill pay a significant penalty after the flop. :inally, these marginal hands are more likely to hit and still finish behind, either because the opponent has flopped a higher pair, or because the opponent dra#s out on the turn or river. The vulnerability of these hands can be reduced to some degree #ith strong play, especially in position #here free card plays are available. "ut of position, they #ill lead to some of the toughest decisions to be made in short-handed games, and these tough decisions #ill cause even experts to make mistakes. The other reason to lean to#ards a tighter strategy involves the overall aggression you #ill #ant to incorporate into your post-flop style. Hou should be reraising preflop )6-7 of the time. @oupled #ith postflop aggression, consistently revealing strong cards #ill likely lead to successful bluffs and semibluffs, as #ell as having the general effect of slo#ing do#n your competition (#hich is rarely a bad thing). 2hile it seems that an opponent could th#art your strategy by simply giving up on the flop #ithout a big hand, the reality is that you #ill either get action #ith your big hands or #in #ith your bluffs=semibluffs more than your fair share, depending on ho# your opposition ad8usts. 3(handed 2e should assume the small blind has folded to be able to compare fairly. 4n Hold'Em for Advanced Players, Sklansky and &almuth state, >you need to reali9e that the little blind should be a#are that the big blind may also call. @onse'uently he should only play his better hands. Thus the little blind should play about half as often as the big blind, and their combined playing fe'uency should be only a little more than it #as for the big blind #hen the game #as heads-up. 4n other #ords the big blind should play approximately 6+ percent as often as before, and the little blind should play approximately ?+ percent as often as the big blind played in the previous case.> 2e #ill discuss the small blind s 'uandary another time, but the key for no# is that this advice is incorrect for the big blind. (s a big blind, you do not care #hat >should> happen. Gor should it concern you that the small blind did not have a playable hand. The only important items are (a) the skill of the button player, (b) the likely raising hands from the button, and (c) the pot odds you are receiving. 4n both (a) and (b), there is no difference from the heads-up example. Ho#ever, the pot odds have increased. 4t is straightfor#ard that you should play more hands out of your big blind since the pot si9e has increased for your call. 4 #ould recommend calling #ith ?+-?*7 of hands in this situation. Iemember, your real concern is not ho# much your opponent is #inning or losing. 4t is only ho# much you are #inning or losing. The t#o matters are not necessarily e'uivalent.

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Head%(u, -/i# 9lind ha% ,o%ition.. This position is uni'ue and should only occur #hen everyone has folded to the small blind in a <-handed or larger game. 4f the small blind raises )++7 of the time, ho# much should you call. 4n this scenario, #e continue to assume an average player raising )++7 of the time, as #ell as the same <E) pot odds. Ho#ever, no# the big blind #ill have position post-flop. "bviously, position makes a tremendous difference, #ith the advantage yielding dividends immediately on the flop since you #ill be able to gain information about your opponent. 4f your position #ill earn an edge, and you have <E) pot odds, it should seem obvious that you can defend very liberally against an opponent #ho raises )++7 of the time. 0ersonally, 4 #ould play about t#o-thirds of all hands (sometimes more since 4 tend to make good use of position), as you should find a significant profit in several #ays, such as earning extra bets #hen you hit your hand, picking up pots #hen your opponent misses, buying free cards, and many more. Hou #ouldn t mind #inning R a small bet (and saving your big blind) #hen your opponent folds, but if he is raising )++7 of the time, you #ill turn a tidy profit by taking advantage of position. Some hands 4 #ould call includeE CSs, DSs, T6s, T5s, A5s, B*s, 6?s, DBo, TBo, T6o, FBo-F?o, CBo-C*o, B6o, 65o, and 5*o. "f course, this assumes my opponent is raising )++7 of the time preflop. 4n reality, 4 don t see players make that mistake from the small blind above the ;<=5 limit (and even then it is fairly rare). earnin# to Thin" +or =our%el+ 4n conclusion, this has been a very difficult article for me to #rite. 2hen 4 began, 4 re-examined correct big blind play and compared it to Sklansky and &almuth s recommendations. 4 found some similarities, but ultimately concluded that the advice 4 read in Hold'Em for Advanced Players #as based in part on faulty premises. The concept of playing to reduce the opponent s profit can go too far. $ut even the best strategists and theoreticians can be #rong sometimes, and so each idea should be examined on its merits, even #hen it is the advice of authors #ho are >correct> AA.A7 of the time. (fter all, #hether you #in or lose does not depend on #hat you ve read as much as it depends on #hat you learned and ho# much it helps you think.

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