Unpublished manuscript work in progress

Habermas, Taylor and Religion in the Public Sphere

In their recent dispute on religion in the public sphere (Taylor/Habermas 2011), Habermas and Taylor agree on one fundamental point, namely that the formal institutions of the liberal democratic state must (ideally) be neutral with regard to different cultural or religious conceptions of the good. Their disagreement seems to concentrate on two questions: (1) does religion have a special problem with neutrality? (2) Is political fairness and inclusiveness depending on democratic processes of secular reasoning in the public sphere? According to my reconstruction, Habermas answer to both questions is yes, Taylors no. I discuss some of the strengths and weaknesses of both positions, and I argue lastly that (a) Habermas current position on the requirements of citizenship is ambivalent; (b) there are good reasons to be ambivalent; (c) a normatively stronger and more controversial interpretation of the relationship between morality, politics and secularism in Habermas is preferable to a weaker, but less controversial interpretation.

1 Secular or neutral?
Habermas interventions in the debate on religion and public reasoning hinge on a distinction between the formal and the informal public spheres, and the relation between the two (2005, 119-155; 2011). The formal public sphere is defined as the institutions of the state, such as parliaments, courts, and official administration (2005, 129). In this sphere, only strict impartiality is fair for everyone; the principle of the separation of church and state obliges politicians and officials within political institutions to formulate and justify laws, court rulings, decrees, and measures exclusively in a language that is equally accessible (ibid.) to all citizens. It would seem to be clear that equally accessible language must be independent of particular religious vocabularies, which leads Habermas to claim that official language must be secular. In their recent debate, however, Charles Taylor has argued against Habermas that he wrongly turns religion into a special problem: equally accessible language also excludes references to, say, Marx or Kant, and not only religious references (Taylor 2011, 50). The fact that Habermas remains fixated on the case of religion shows, according to Taylor, that he is biased by a well-known myth of the enlightenment according to which religious thought is rationally inferior to secular thought (Taylor 2011, 53). If this myth becomes a part of an official ideology of secularism, this will alienate religious citizens, especially non-Western ones, from political life. Why not admit with Taylor that, in principle, secularism is about neutrality, not about religion? One reason why Habermas maintains that religion is in fact a special case is its opaque core of discursively inaccessible truths: () religis verwurzelte existentielle berzeugungen entziehen sich durch ihren () Kern von infalliblen Offenbahrungswahrheiten der Art von vorbehaltsloser diskursiver Errterung, denen sich andere ethische Lebensorientierungen und Weltanschauungen, d.h. weltliche Konzeptionen des Guten aussetzen (2005, 135). Legitimate political will-formation, according to Habermas, depends on communication processes in which the regulative idea of a rational discourse is effective as a counterfactual, critical ideal. According to the most basic intuitions of ! "!

what a conversation looks like (2005, 89), this ideal demands inclusiveness (all affected parties can participate), equality (all have an equal change of contributing), sincerity (participants say what they mean) and absence of extradiscursive power (such as threats). But the spoken words of holy prophets, for example, are not understood by believers as claims to be tested in a critical discourse, but as truths to be interpreted and lived. Since their validity ultimately depends on a postulated past event the revelation religious certainties are not even possible to confirm or falsify via new evidence or arguments (2005, 267). By contrast, disagreements between Kantians and utilitarians, or between natural scientists, point to a future solution that can - in principle be reached discursively (where, in the last case, empirical evidence also counts as an argument). According to Habermas, this turns religious certainties into a special challenge for a democracy that wants to be deliberative. Taylor, on the other hand, refuses to see any principle difference between religious and secular language. Kantian philosophy, he argues, will appear just as nonsensical to some people as Christian dogmas appear to others (Taylor 2011, 64-65). Habermas, of course, does not dispute that official institutions should refer neither to Kant nor to the Bible, but he holds on to the view that Kantian insights are easier to formulate in a neutral language than Christian beliefs. And also that this says some principle about the difference between secular and religious ways of knowing. Taylor appears to me to have a point in questioning Habermas straightforward definition of secular reasons as reasons that can be expressed in a public, or generally shared language is problematic (2011, 61).1 First, many secular reasons will be just as difficult to make available to a wider public as many religious ones, such as complex scientific or philosophical reasons, or reasons that depend on subjective experience. Secondly, if we understand sharable in a strictly quantitative sense (how many people understand it), then some religious claims will, in some contexts, be more sharable than some secular ones. In the USA, for example, a political statement that refers to the will of God will probably be more sharable, and less controversial, than a reference to Darwins theory of evolution. Habermas meets this objection with a further argument: Taylors refusal to distinguish principally between religious and secular reasons is failed because of the fact that
By using any kind of religious reasons, you are implicitly appealing to membership in a corresponding religious community. Only if one is member and can speak in the first person from within a particular religious tradition does one share a specific kind of experience on which religious convictions and reasons depend. () The most important experience () arises from participation in cultic practices, in the actual performance of worshipping () (2011, 61).

In other words, according to Habermas, philosophical arguments rely neither on cultic practices nor on a worshipping community, and this makes them more sharable than religious ones. But again, not all religious arguments rely on these things either; the arguments made by Buddha, Jesus or Muhammad, for example, rather sought to redefine or break radically with established communities and their institutionalized practices of worship. So did the Christian motives invoked by Sren Kierkeggard. Furthermore, as also Taylor observes, the mere reference to God in a discourse does !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
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not bind the speaker to a particular religious community: she could be Christian, Jew, Muslim or something else (Taylor/Habermas 2011, 62-63). These problems, however, are of a rather terminological nature, and they can hardly be seen as pressing problems in our political culture; as Habermas observes, religious citizens mostly shift naturally between different contexts of justification (Habermas 2011, 68). Even during the so-called cartoon crisis, I would add, European Muslims almost exclusively used secular arguments (in Habermas sense of fallible, understandable arguments) to criticize or discuss the publication of provocative caricatures of their prophet (see also Asad 2009). Taylors model, I believe, has more fundamental problems. If we ask why secularism, or state neutrality, is to be preferred at all, he draws attention to the Enlightenment ideals of freedom, equality and brotherhood as common goods in our culture (Taylor 2009). These goods wouldnt be possible in a theocracy. But Taylor doesnt give any normative justification of secularism since he believes that no context-transcendent justification is possible. But this is unsatisfying for political theory; when confronted with critique, such as the influential post-structuralist critique according to which secularism is a suppressive Western ideology that violates Muslim sensibilities (e.g. Asad 2009), we should be able to say something more than: this is how we do it here (Taylor 2009). Why is liberal democracy a legitimate model, and not simply god for us? As touched upon above, the main Habermasian justification of liberal democracy, and of political secularism as its condition of possibility, is that (a) social arrangements that result from deliberative processes among all affected parties are more legitimate than arrangements resulting from tradition, coincidence, fear, suppression, strategy and so on. Furthermore (b) fair processes of communication presuppose certain civil and social rights, just as a fair implementation of these rights presuppose democratic processes (which makes democracy and human rights gleichursprnglich). In recent writings, Habermas admits that this procedural strategy of justification might be influenced by a dogmatic intuition about the autonomy and dignity of the human person (Habermas 1998; 2010); the search for the better argument is not the only reason why we grant people rights, or why we take their interests and needs into consideration; it is also because there are humans, that is, with Kant, ends in themselves. But this more philosophical or quasi-anthropological justification of secularism in terms of the normative presuppositions of liberal democracy is more controversial than the mere reference to the neutrality of the state. The hard question therefore arises: should normal citizens agree with this justification? Would it not be a paternalistic violation of peoples freedom of conscience to demand that? In the next section on deliberation in the unofficial public sphere(s) I will argue that Habermas is ambivalent in this matter.

2 Religion and justification

Over the years, and for good reasons, both Taylor and Habermas have changed their political-philosophical theories in ways, which could be seen as responses to each others criticisms. Habermas has increasingly recognized ethical and religious lifeforms as important bearers of meaning, identity and solidarity, and thick questions of the good as relevant in political discourse (Habermas 1998). He has also admitted than questions of the good and the right are often impossible to separate practically in political deliberation. And, in recent writings, he seems to be open to an intuition that was always present in Taylor: that even procedural theories of justice presuppose a modern conception of the autonomous, linguistic human being ! =!

however thin we formulate it (Taylor 1986, 45). Taylor, on the other hand, seems to have downplayed the communitarian tendencies in his initial approach, and now speaks more of overlapping consensus in John Rawls sense, than of healthy national patriotism (Taylor 2009). Nevertheless, Habermas and Taylor still disagree fundamentally over the notion of consensus in liberal democracies. According to Taylors defence of overlapping consensus, all we can hope for is an agreement on core political principles for different reasons, e.g. Christian, Islamic or Kantian reasons. This means that, in a pluralistic society, we must accept that other people support the basic political principles from reasons we may find bad. Habermas, on the other hand, holds that this is insufficient when it comes to core principles of justice: here, citizens must reach a political background consensus in a stronger sense: a consensus on the same principles for the same reasons. Without coming (discursively) to a mutual understanding of the fairness of our core political principles, citizens of a pluralist society could not go to the courts and appeal to specific rights or make arguments by reference to constitutional clauses in the expectation of getting a fair decision (Taylor/Habermas 2011, 65). Habermas also makes it clear this consensus is only possible in a secular language (Taylor/Habermas 2011, 65). This strong focus on consensus has led some critics to claim that Habermas prefers homogeneity and assimilation to the diverse landscape of cultural formations. Veit Bader, for example, claims that Habermas () fails to appreciate the depths of national diversity (Bader 2009, 133). Taylor is not so strong in his formulations, but his critique goes in the same direction, namely that Habermas distrusts the variety of equality legitimate reasons to support liberal democracy. With regard to the implicit assumption of these criticism that consensus leads to homogenization, Habermas does not agree:
() the transitory unity that is generated in the porous and refracted intersubjectivity of a linguistically mediated consensus not only supports but furthers and accelerates the pluralisation of forms of life and the individualization of lifestyles. More discourse means more contradiction and difference. The more abstract the agreements become, the more diverse the disagreements with which we can non-violently live (1992, 140)

Habermas seems justified in claiming that a peaceful unfolding of disagreement and contestation, and its pluralizing effects, is only possible on the background of some sort of dialogue. Furthermore, Baders strong critique ignores that Habermas takes reasonable disagreement (or non-consensus) to be a self-evident fact in ethical, existential and religious matters. However, it also seems reasonable to ask with Taylor if not the idea of strong consensus is futile, or maybe counterproductive, in a society whose citizens identify with completely different and deeply rooted traditions and life-forms? As I understand Habermas, he is ambivalent on this matter. In the debate with Taylor he insists that citizens agree on abstract principles of justice independent of deeper religious or ethical doctrines. However, in his more well known work, Zwischen Naturalismus und Religion (2005) he claims that religious citizens cannot be expected to justify political principals with secular reasons: religiously monolingual citizens should be allowed to use the only language they know (2005, 134). In both works we also meet a third interesting formulation, namely that the public use of reason demands a reflexive consciousness that makes the egalitarian premises of the morality of human rights compatible with its own articles of faith (2011, 27). But the interpretation of this demand is far from obvious: does it mean that human rights should be justified from within religious traditions, that with, ! >!

with religious reasons? In that case, the consensus with other citizens will be overlapping, and not based on the same reasons. Or does it mean that religious citizens must harmonize the independent secular consensus with their own religious reasons? Habermas motive for adopting the weaker, overlapping line of argumentation, and for refraining from the strong demand that ordinary citizens reach a consensus through reason alone (2011, 65), is sympathetic: it expresses a wish to include all citizens, religious or non-religious, in democratic life - without paternalistic demands to their inner motives. He therefore agrees with the criticisms made by Nikolas Wolterstorf and Paul Weitman of the standard liberal approach to religion in the public sphere (e.g. Rawls and Robert Audi). This approach demands that public reasoning should refer to proper political reasons only (Rawls), and not to comprehensive religious or secular doctrines. According to the critics, this has two unacceptable consequences: (1) the positive influence of religious movements on democratic processes, such as the American civil rights movements is denied; think only of the famous speech of Martin Luther King or the humanitarian work of religious organizations (Habermas 2005, 129-130). It is a clear motive in the later Habermas to make the epistemic potentials of religious vocabularies available as a common ethical-existential resource in a derailed (entgleisende) modernity. (2) The liberal approach implies a notion of citizenship, which is unacceptable for religious citizens who cannot or are not willing to make the required separation between contributions expressed in religious terms and those expressed in secular language (Habermas 2011, 25). For some religious citizens, in other words, it would by psychologically impossible to find secular reasons in political deliberation; they very demand would violate their sense of personal integrity. The weaker Habermas therefore concludes that a liberal state cannot expect from religious citizens to justify their political motives independently of religious motives (2005, 133): Der Verfassungskonsens, den sich die Brger gegenseitig understellen mssen, erstreckt sich auf das Prinzip der Trennung von Stat und Kirche. Diesen Grundsatz von der institutionellen Ebene auf die Stellungnahmen von Organisationen und Brgern in der politischen ffentlichkeit auszudehnen, ist aber () eine skularistische berverallgemeinerung (2005, 134) The question is, however, if the stronger Habermas is guilty of such a secularistic berverallgemeinerung himself? In his discussion with Taylor he speaks of the informal public sphere (politische ffentlichkeit) and claims that in this sphere, citizens must come to a background consensus on constitutional essentials (Verfassungskonsens). And he continues: How can we settle this background consensus in the first place if not within a space of neutral reasons (). The reasons must be secular () (2011, 65) What are the motives behind this stronger line of argumentation? The explicit reason in the discussion with Taylor is that citizens could not expect formal state neutrality without a mutual justification of constitutional essentials. If we had no idea if and why our fellow citizens supported basic principles of justice, our trust in the political system would decrease. And, since religious reasons are principally impossible to agree upon via argument, the discursive justification must be secular. Even though I see some possible objections here, I sympathize with the demanding character of this ideal, and its provocative insistence on learning processes: discursive processes of justification naturally force us to transcend the narrow self-security of ! ?!

particular worldviews and take a larger perspective (2011, 66). But is it not unfair, or even narrow, that the reasons in this discourse should be secular? We should remember here that Habermas demands from secular (or non-religious) citizens that they engage in a cooperative work of translation of the semantic potentials assumed to be inherent in religious traditions (2005; 2011). Also atheists and agnostics should make an effort to find meanings and potentials in religious utterances from which they are at first alienated. By being translated into fallible arguments, religious motives and meanings find a form through which they can be taken up also in official political will-formation. In other words, the narrow form of secularism, which regards religion as nonsense, is also incompatible with fair processes of justification and consensus building. According to Habermas, the duty to translate (or interpret) puts equal burdens on the shoulders of religious and non-religious citizens. The force of Habermas weaker position is its greater inclusiveness: private religious citizens can support constitutional essentials for religious reasons as long as they accept an institutional translation proviso (2005; 2011). The force of the stronger position is its insistence that citizens communicate and reach a mutual understanding concerning constitutional essentials and core political principles. In order to be neutral, this understanding cannot rely directly or solely on religious reasons. In addition, I would argue, the stronger position is not strictly procedural. It says that, not only must we sometimes agree on the same principles for the same reasons, we must also agree on certain principles for certain reasons. And it spells out some of these principles and reasons. For example, when Taylor suggests that our being created in Gods image is a morally good reason to support human rights - just as good as any utilitarian or Kantian reason (2011, 54) - we should object: also if God didnt exist, it would be wrong to deny specific groups in our society the same legal status as others. Why would it be wrong? The answer to this question points in the direction of Habermas later writings in which the procedural focus is supported by reflections on the normative substance of the equal dignity of every human being that human rights only spell out (2010, 467). The weakness of the stronger position is that more people will disagree with it and find it Western or secularistic. But that might be a price worth paying for being honest about ones normative intuitions.

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References
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