UNITED STATES ARMY

ARMY EXTENSION COURSE S

SUBCOURSE 33
PRINCIPLES OF WAR
FORT GORDON, GEORGIA
1 Novem.ber 1959
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
"
This subcourse consists of three lessons and an examination. You
will find the three lessons in this lesson book; the examination will be
sent to you separately when you have completed all lessons. Check all
contents of this envelope as that you have all
the texts, materials, lessotts', and 'answer sheets req)lired to solve lessons
one through three.,
The answer sheets for individual lessons are grouped together in
the back of the lesson book. They,i;l:reiii:reyerse order to assist in their
removal. Be certain that the 'answer sheet corresponds
with the lesson you are completing. "',,,,,
You may submit any or all of the sson's'<;>lutions for grading at one
time. Mail the answer shee,t\n the addressed enyelope inclosed.
-, ,I i
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completed the

YOUR ASSISTANCE IS NEED:F:b
CASUBCOURSE 33, PRINCIPLES OF WAR
Your'ev!"luaiion ofthis slibcourse is i'n our effort
to give you the bestnonresident instructionpossible. ariswerthe
items on this questionnaire after you have completedall of the lessons.
Your comments and suggestions will assistin improving the quality of
this subcourse andthe ArmyExtension Course Programin general. It
is thatyou as study this subcourseandthensub-
y?,;r .. 'If
f01" US!! additio,ria1t>aper.
1. Are ,You satisfiedwith what you have as a result"ftakirigthis
subcourse? (Strike out one; ifanswer is "no", explain.)
(Yes) (No)
Z. Do youfeel that this subcourse has adequately coveredthe purpose
prescribedfor itinthe introduction? (Strike out one; ifanswer is
"no", listthatwhich':'las not covered.)
(Yes) (No)
3. Wasthere sufficient withthe subcourse to
enable youto answer the questions correctly? (Strike out one; if
answe r is "no"I cific ))
(Yes) (No)
., /
-:1 i\:J
1 November 1959
4.
5.
6.
Are there any questions trequirements t situations t or instructions
that are in error, confusing
t
ordifffcult to understand? If SOt list
the specific cases
List any suggestions you have for making this sul;>course more
informative; "".
j '- , ' "..'"
If yPu a reply comments you have m.ade above t list
j ....:.' : ' '. ,I ">.. , ' _ r ': '; .; - .:'" . l: ';: ' .
below the which you want. more information
t
and PRINT
your in the space' (lino reply is desired
t
you+ signature is optionaL)
. (,
. L. ' ; :
"
, .,
NAME
MAILlNG ADDRESS
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STATE'
, ,.
CA SUBCOURSE 33
PRINCIPLES OF WAR
INTRODUCTION
An understanding of the principles of war is essential to professional
understanding of military history. Military history is of interest to the
professional officer because of the lessons which can be learned from past
military successes or failures. Any reader of military history can grasp
the sequence of events which led to a particular victory or defeat, but the
professional must evaluate and analyze the events if he is .to profit from
past military experience. This evaluation and analysis must be conducted
within the framework of the principles of war, because these are the prin-
ciples which regularly operate in war, and any lesson taught in a particular
operation will reveal itself as an application, or lack of application, of the
principles.
The principles of war are not confined to the combat arms in the
presence of an enemy, but are applicable to all branches of all services in
operations, combat or otherwise, and at all echelons of command. Each
principle complements the other, and in some instances they even conflict.
One principle cannot be applied to the neglect of the others. Sometimes
the application of one or more principles may have to be p,artially sacrificed
because of the circumstances existing at the time. The considered balance
of these principles, to best meet any specific situation, is the aim of the
successful military leader.
This subcourse consists of three lessons and an examination, as
follows:
Lesson 1, Principles of War.
2, Fundamentals of Offense.
3, Fundamentals of Defense and Retrograde.
Examination
Eight (8) credit hours are given for the successful completion of this
subcourse. You are not limited as to the number of hours that you may
spend on anyone lesson or the examination. For statistical purposes you
are requested to enter in the space provided on the answer sheet the total
number of hours spent on each lesson.
1
Credit Hours - -
Text Assignment
LESSON 1 - PRINCIPLES OF WAR
- 3
- - - - - - - - - FM 100-5, para 69-78.
Attached Memo. , App. 1-4.
Materials Required - - - - - - - - - - None
Lesson Objective - - - - - - - -- - - To acquaint you with the principles
o!war and their. a.pplication;a)},d to
examine some contemporary writings
tha! critically analyze the principles
o! war.
Detach the ans'vversheet, enter your solutions as indicated, and
mail in the addressed envelope provided.
ATTACHED M:E:MORANDUM
" ( . . '.'::, ." -.:.' .
1. GENERAL. The arts, sciences, and professions have their basic
principles, axioms, and laws. The art and science of war are not excepted.
P.riP,c:iplesapplicabl<;> to wa.rfare hilyellvQlved thro\lgh the centuries .. Their
from both successes and 'failures in war. Some
date back to the writings of the pre -Christian era (Sun Tzu, 505 B. C. , had
13 Napol<;>Qn lists Clausewitz 71'rinciples, and
NelsonJ.!).. . ., .'.
:The war are officially enunci!l'ted in one form or
another by all majoll;w,ilitary services, American and foreign. The US
Navy, in its NWP 10, Naval Warfare, lists 12 principles of war applicable
to naval warfare. The US Air Force in its AFM 1-2,. USAF Basic Doctrine,
lists principles. The US Army lists nine prinHpte'sClf war .
..
Some allied military services have more, others less. The
FreMh:); ha.....e. y. tWQ p:dnl:ipIes - -unity ,freedom
of action -,V(b,ile ,re ol,'ce.Nqt
same terms; US terminology differs somewha.t among the
Services. The following list shows the titles of US 'War 'and
,th0.S.pf rsqme,.otb,er: powers,,,,,: ":'" r::
2
US Army uSNavy USAF .British
Soviet
a. Objective Objective Objective Selectionand Advance and
maintenance consolidation
ofaims
b. Offensive
.Offensive .Of:fens ive Offensive Offensive
action
c. Simplicity Simplicity Administr ation
d. Unity of 'dontrol 'Control Cooperation Combined
,corIim.arid
Cooperation arms
(listedas
"separate
principles)
e. Mass Concentration Concentration Concentration Concentration
" offorce
. Economyof Economy Economyof Economyof Economy of
force

I'lffort force
g. Mobility Flexibility Flexibility Maneuver and
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, !';
:irlitilitive
; ,.:;
h. s..irprise' s:ufprise
\'Surpri'se" Surpiis'I'l' SUi-prise arid
c',' " ", 1,
','.f,",I : '.I,:,. .; 'I
deteption
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i. Security Security Sebur'lty' Security A'de quate

j. Morijle Mairitenanc'El', "d'Morale
'of1rt<frltlei. v v'; '"
Cf <,' :'1.1
, .'1.' " '
k.
. )p. 'A'fin'ihilation
1. Rea,diness
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.. t.he /..fHW pfiIi.eii:\l'd'iof'WarJi!re')liiislCu!llJedin FMI00"51Ii
'!,9}e:;,(IL'Supp'i'em,i'!rl.,ia'J' dts 'P'1:'lncipI:e s6fwar'is" i
' . :':;;,';1':",
)1.\:: ";': i; r:.;, ',',':":'.:'" c' ,.; t,i',ijJ ",j
Z. SUPPLEMENTALDISCUSSION; 'TRe'prihciple
3
allbranches of all services in all operations, combator otherwi,se, and at
allechelons of command.
Innovations, whether inthe category ofmateriel, organi:;;ation,
ortechniques, have hada profoundeffect ontactics andtechniques. Each
new developm,mt (bow and arrow, gunpowder, poisongas, tanks, airplanes,
parachutes, divisions, corps, nuclear weapons, to name a few) has pro-
vokedtwo questions: How can,the maximumadvantage be gainedfromthe
ofthe developmeI).t? What is the best,defense against it? In
eachinstance, solution is found inthe applicationof common se,nse. The
results have brought changes inemphasis in applicationofthe principles
of wit)1out fundamental change in the principles themselves.
A principle ofwar is a basic military rule or guide which, if
applied increases,the probabilityofproducingfavorable re-
suits. The principles ofwar are aids in graspingthe essentials ofthe art.
In essence, the principles ofwar constitute a collectionof items of comiinon
sense andthey mljst be understoodip their entire,ty inthatlight-not as
dogmato be rigidly applied. AlLnine pripciples most often complement
eachother apdI\qrmally aremljtua,lly depeJJ.dent. However, in some situa-
tions they conflict. The copsideredbalance ofthese principles to best
meet each,specific situation is,the'aimofthe successful militaryleader.
These principles may be learned"in a, shorttime, but a whole lifetime cap
be spent inthe study oftheir application ipwar.
Me,re knowledge andunderstanding ofthe principles ofwarwill
certainlynot provideus withthe solution of a problemofwar. The humap
elem.ept-cqurage, morale, discipline, leadership-has a directbearing ort
theoutcome of aPy operationandis to successthatitdeserves our
copstant Bowever, andunderstanding of the principles
ofwar will lendorder andguidance to a mindtrainedtoanalyze facts,
form at a decision. In the#nc\l sound
judgmeptapd ,sepseareofvital imPortancetothe successfulappli-
cationof principlesotwal\.,' "
Preseptedbeloware keythoughts applicable to eachpripciple,
witbral:)J;iefhistorical ot,eachan;d,further discussion.
3., ,Pl3,j"ll:CTIVE. Every mustbe,directedtoa,
clearly<;IefiPed, decisive, ando\>taipable ' Thede"trt1ctionof,
the enemy's armed the ultim'lte ob-
jective ofwar. The objective'ofeachoperationmustcontrtbute,to this
ultimate objective., Each,inte,rmediate objective mustbe suchtha.t its
attainrnent will'most directly';"quickly, \1.nd economi'cally'contribute to the
, , ,: _ . .',' ,. ',. " "
4
purpose of the operation. It mustpermitthe application ofthe maximum
means available. Its selectionmust be basedupon considerationof means
available, the enemy, andthe areaof operations. Secondaryobjectives
ofany operationmust contribute to the attainment ofthe principal objective.
The missionofthe Army is "'1:0 defeatthe enemy'forces in
land combat and gain control ofthe landand its people." A better under.
standing ofthe means of effectivelyaccomplishing that partofthe dual
mission of gaining control ofthe landand its people is affordedbya con-
siderationofthe objectives of civil affairs operations, which are to
(1) assistmilitaryoperations by maintaining order, promot-
ing the securityofthe occupying force, preventing interference with mili-
taryoperations, reducing active and passive resistance, releasing combat
troops frorn civiladministration, andutilizin'g local resources inaidqf'
militaryobjectives.
(2) support and implementnational policies towardwhich
modernmilitary efforts are directed. Support ofnationalpolicy is an
inherent responsibility of every member ofthe ArmedForces.
(3) fulfill obligations arising fromtreaties, agreements, or
customary internationallawwhich impose an: obligahonuponthe occupation
forces to assume responsibilityfor the care and controlofcivilianperson-
nel in an civilaffairs control.Forexample, the Hague
Regulations provide thatthe the' legitimate power haVing in
fact passedinto the hands ofthe occupant, the latter shalltake all measures
in his powerto restore, and ensure, asfar as possible, publicorder and
safety, while reSpecting, unless absolutelyprevented, the laws inforce in
the country.
(4) provide for the transfer of responsibilityfromthemili-
tary commander to a designated civilagency of government. , Inpointof
time, this will occur lastandwill markthe termination of controlbythe'
military authorities.
This fourfold objective indicates thatcivil affairs fa the tornbat
commander'smeans ofaccomplishing th", a
manner as to,leavethe bases uponwhich gain
the or at United
States aims and security when' " '
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the Without an objective, and
5
adherence to it, the dther.principles !:Iecome meaningless. There is always
the danger that the goal will beobscu,red and the means become the end.
Once the, objective has been stated and understood, the whole problem be-
comes clearer, The IrLLlitary commander must consider each conternplate'd
action in the light of his assigned or selected objective. The nation, the
armed forces .and each element of the l;l.rmed forces down to the lowest
echelonthe man with the bayonet in his :\land--must all have their own ob-
jectives. But in the final analysis, eac:\l objective should contribute to the
national objective. The selection of the best objective may !:Ie the most
difficult par.t of making a decision.
Selection or assignment of the proper obje.ctive{s) is the first
and most vital step in the application of all the principles of war. This
principle gives us the what. The other principles are guides to the how to
attain. theobjective(s) selected.
4. . OFFENSIVE. The.. pr.inciple of the offensive embraces selzlng,
retaining, and exploiting the. initiative. In November 19.42, with Russia hard-
pres;sed. by.theGermans, the situation in North .A.frica unfavorable., and the
United States still not completely prepared. we took the offensive by landing
as part of an..A.llied Force' in North Africa.. On that occasion, the initiative
passed to the United States and its l\.llies, and was retained for the rest of
the war.
The offensive is attack--to secure or to maint.ain the initiative,
to preserve freeCliomof action, ;andtGdmpose one's will on theenern,y.
The grel;l.t advantage of offe!rlisive..action is the initiative, which permits the
selection of objectives an.d:ofthe.pla:.ce, time.', and means for accomplishing
the mission. Only by continuingo#enl;liveactioDq:,an. a cle&r -cut military
decision be gained. .A.chievement of high mor<\ole and an <\oggressive spirit
are facilitated by the offen.se" Our military doctrine is to, keep the enemy
off balance by offensive action.
The principle of the ,Ofenl;live il;l andtnuI;I,tbe applied even in.. de-
fenl;live operations --by an aggressive conduct of the defens.e including combat
patrols" rnaSl;ling of. firel;lG>AsU,itable targets., andcounterattackl;l, Such
actionl;l in.C'lude limited o!i>jecthre attakl;ltQ. ,de.stroythe enemy, spoiling
attackl;l,andattacks to gain mor'e favciH:able.terrain for the conduct of the"
defens,e. If $G>rced to either defensive. (!)r.rellro.grade action, every oppor.tunity
must be, sought to turn the situation to an offensive advantage in order. to
kill as many of the enerny as possible.
,".'..
Because of the immense destructive effort of nuclear weapons,
great imbalances of forces may be quickly eliminated or even reversed,
Thus, a commander must be prepared to shift more qUickly and more fre-
quently from the defense to the offense than has been true in the past.
Those quick changes from defensive to offensive and back again may tend
to obscure the dividing line between these two types of combat as we know
them today, but the offensive, the retention of the initiative and freedom of
action, will remain as a principle.
The role of Civil Affairs in the offensive is to control ,the civilian
population, prevent them from interfering with combat operations and dis-
ruptingsupply lines, and to marshal local resources to assist the command-
er in his mission.
5. SIMPLICITY. Simplicity is a quality or state. of being clear and
uncomplicated and is essential in plans if they are to be effectively executed.
A simple plan is easier to execute than a complicated plan and thus more
likely to be su'ccessful. Plans must work the first time in battle. Rarely
is there opportunity for rehearsal and the stakes are high. Simple plans
facilitate retention of flexibility, enhance control and coordination of fires
and movement, and decrease support problems. Simple plans permit con-
tinuation of execution in the face df interruption of control means.
Simplicity takes on added significance with the advent of nuclear
weapons. ' Simplicity helps to create order and the ato . c battlefield will
be a more disorderly place than the nonatomicone. Iso, ,the simple plan
is the lexibleplan ,and flexibility is paramount wh the entire balance of
forces may be altered'in an instant, ora comma a echelon be' wiped out
in a flash. Operations must go' 6n 'anopportlUli ie's mus.j:ibee'Jtploited in
spite of misslng echelons or1ackof <:!ommUriidatiotis;Simp1i;city in plans
and orde'rs offers the best chance of s\lcce'ssunder'tnese conditions.
Simplicity is also applied to organization, methods, and means
in order to pToduce orderliness on the battlefield.
THe' Civil 'Affairs organization is designed to deal with the pro-
blemr;rat!te1liding'the civilian population in the simplest manner. It is a
lexible'(orgariiz'ation.; which can be tailoxed to handle any form of Civil
Affair's ,operation, Its,opellat!ions are' develope.d on detailed, siiffiple .plans . '.
Its staff is flexible. As 'I.strue with all other, stlpportiIllg , ,,'.,
organizations, it is essential that all mili
i
ta;:ry:,plans be complete i ,'siimple, '.';
and contain appropriate guidance and direction to ensure continuity and
the accomplishment of the Civil Affairs tnission.,
7
6. UNITY OF COMMAND. The principle of unity of cOnUnand re-
quires that for every task there should be unity of effort under one respon-
sible commander. Unity of effort is the coordinated action of forces
toward a cOmmon goaL Unity of command should ensure unity of effo;rt
and thus apply the maximum power of available forces against the objective
at the decisive time and place. The unity of effort achieved by UN forces
in Korea is an example of the principle of unity of command.
A ,nuclear weapon will have effect not only in the zone of a
division, including the air space over it, but may well spread over into
the zones of the adjacent divisions. Therefore, the decision to employ such
a V/eapollmust rest in t,he hands of the commander who is in the position of
having overall knowledgl'l of the situation and control of all affected units.
The successful attack of fleeting targets with nuclear weapons means that
system, the communication system, the supply of weapons,
and the delivery means must come directly under a single commander.
There will not be time for conference, compromise, and vague "cooperation. "
Unity of effort must be ensured by unity of command. All commanders secure
',' ...... .. .... \
the effect of unity of command by conducting operations in the absence of
specific instructions as their knowledge indicates their higher command would
dire ct if able.
The military nature of Civil Affairs operations requires that
responsibility and authoriWfor the establishment and conduct of those activi-
ties be vested in the senior commander. The commander must a,ppreciate
that the establishment of good public relations, which underlies all civil
affairs, is a command responsibility. SUbo;rdinates may be charged with
or missions" but, the c0:tnn'l.aIlder himself must establish
the tone of civil affairs. It is a profound c,ommand responsibility at all levels
of command.,
7. MASS. The principle of mass demands the achievement of superi-
ority of P9vver at the decisive place andtime for the decisive purpose. The
principle of mass involves more than Just superior numbers. It includes use
of all, ava,ilable .facilities, superiority of firepower, supply, supporting
services, fighting skill, c;ourage, administration, and
leadersh,ip. For, the Allied to ,knock Germany
out of the war, the largest invasion force the world had ever known was con-
,the United Kingdom. H was a carefully balanced, team of Army,
;Force elements, thorOughly trained for its tasks, superbly,
equipped, ,and The focusing of theeort of this' :forc;euP9n the
beac;hes, of Nq;rrnand,Y'\lIldertaken even though eJC.Pec;ted t,9reduC;,e
potential result,S in j;he Med;te;rranean Theater" is, anillu,stratiQn6f the a,)ilpli-
cation of the principle of mass.
8
Mass in the form ofatomic fire may be substitutedin some
tasks for masses of infantry, tanks, andnonatomic fire. ' This does not
implythat atomic fire alone canalways be decisive. Its effects maylast
for onlyashort time or cover a limitedarea. Although firepower alone
has seldombeen decisive, within appropriate circumstances atomic'fire
may to provide a,major portionofthe mass required atthe
decisive time andplace.
CivilAffairs focuses upon the establishment of satisfactory re-
lationshipwiththe local communityto support the militaryoperationwith
all available facilities. To a large extentthis is dependent upon the ability
to dealharmoniouslyand sympatheticallywithpeople. This faculty is
desirableinthe conduct ofmilitaryaffairs; it is indispensable in the conduct
of civilaffairs. It entails, moreover, considerations not presentinthe
military sphere. Such administrationandleadershipatthe decisive time
andplace enhances the principle ofmass andpermits the combat commander
to,use his available manpower for fighting.
8. ECONOMY OF FORCE. The principle ofeconomyofforce con-
tends thatthe allocation of available combat power mustbe suchthat all
tasks together get results effectively. In orderto mass sufficient strength
in the United Kingdom for the Normandyinvasion, the Allies usedminimum
forces in Italyandthe Pacific. Trooplists for the Normandy invasion
were carefully drawnup andbalariced, while trooplists for the Pacific were
thoroughly examinedand reducedto the b:ire essentials. This same con-
siderationalso appliedto materiel.
Economy offorce does not exclusively imply "skirnping"inone
areainorderto provide maximumpower inanother, but is application does
permit, within its overailrne aIling, concentrationofforces in: strengths
required, sothat all forces areusedto the bestadvantage. This includes
such considerations as apportionment offorces andnational resources.
Nuclear weapons willoftenperrnittheernployment of llmaller
troopUnits thanpreviouslywaspos slble. Certainly,theywill g,ive the
commandermore flexibility inallotting his forces. In secondary,attacks,
as withmainattacks, thecommander may assignt'roops arl!d nuclear
weapons"invarious combinations to achieve the power.
Toeffect anecoIlOmy ofpersonnel, the duties of CivilAffairs
personnelare confined, whenever possible, to overexisting
or re-e,!!tablished A majorPllrpose of C;ivilAffair S
is tomobilize local resources in of civilianreq,uirements. S'erv
i
ices of CiViliandoctors'areobtatnedto care for the injuredrefugees.
9
Necessary supplies are moved from unaffected areas to points of need and
only where such supplles are inadequate are they augmented by United
State s stipplie s.
Civil Affairs operations contribute materially to the military
operation. 'l:'heresources 'of the area are mobilized in support of our forces
as well as fo'r the satisfaction of the commander's responsibility to meet
minimum essential civilian requirements. Assistance is provided the tech-
nical services in the local procurement of required supplies at a considerable
saving in time, shipping space, and, often, money. Civil Affairs elements
assist inthe procurement of port and rail facilities, communications, storage
facilities, necessary housing and utilities. They a.ssist in obtaining local
civilian labor for essential labor that would 'otherwise require the diversion
of combat troops. The extensive Civil Affairs organization functioning COn-
stantly at the grasSrocits level conStitutes an effective source of informa.tion
and intelligence whie:h is of vital importance in the pursuit of combat.
9. MANEUVER. The principle of maneuver states that one's military
resources must be positioned to favor the accomplishment of the mission.
Maneuver is the mdvement of combat power to provide the necessary mass
at the proper tim'll' arid place for a:ttaintnentof the objective. Maneuver en-
hances combat power since orily through maneuver can we so position Our
military resources that they can apply their full power, or mass, at the
decisive point and time. The encirclement of some 300,000 German troops
in the Ruhr by the tis Army during World War II is an outstandirig 'example
of the principle of manettver. Maneuverls most effective when not disclosed
to the enemy. The principle" of maneuver is not limited to the movement or
maneuver of troops alone. There is maneuver of fires and maneuver of
logistics, ma:nemver of the means for controlling' areas and populations, and
maneuver of political force. In applying this p:t'inciple; time, distance,a.nd
the means and power of maneuver must be
Toappl)T maneuver to establish the cbncentration of forces or
mass required at the decisive point and tim.e,mobility is essential. This
mobility may be achieved by improvement in ground means but will be limited
in flexibility uhle'ss' it exploits, increasingly,air mearisof transport. It
mearis that 'a!.r'suppl'y or even air lines of corrimuriication must be used to full
capacity routinely rather than considered as an" emergEmcy means ofs,upply.
Small, mobile, battlegroups of all arms, containing their own fire and logis-
tical support, triav be isolated for longpetiods 'Qf time deep' in the enemy
rear. Their coritinuEtdexistence may' welT 'depend upon their mobility. <'
il,
10
The application of even such force as is required to win a war
has a tremendous effect upon the civil population, and the affected civil
population, in turn, can have a tremendous effect upon the commander's
ability to continue the application of required force. A previously normal
populac,," can become an.uncontrolled mob, a multitude of scared, hurt,
and disrupted people who. seek only to flee from further injury with what-
ever possessions as are intact and obtain, by any means possible" that
which is necessary to remain alive. They clutter the roads and interfere
with., or preven,t, the movement of troops and supplies. Their injured ring
about the combat corrunander's medical facilities in numbers beyond their
capacity to treat. They take from his supplies, if for no other reason than
to stay alive. Their numbers screen enemy agents and saboteurs who
harass troops from the rear. They do all this and more; they all but s'top
the milit,l.ry operation in its tracks, unless proper action is ta)!::en to anti-
cipate and plan in advance such civil affairs controls as will effectively
prevent civilian interference with military operations and meet the emer-
gency requirements of a war -torn people.
10. ,SURPRISE. The principle of surprise connotes striking the
enemy when, where, and,i%). a manner for which he is unprepared. Secrecy
of plans, concealment of movements and strengths, feints and demon-
strations, and rapidity of movemel).t all con,tribute to surprise as do
resourcefulness and aring.
Combat e e p t i ~ n and psychological warfare contribute to
surprise. There may be. surprise in. time , place, direction, size of force,
tactics, weapons, or supply considerations. Surprise can be effected by
varying operating procedures, by making use of unfavor;l.ble terrain, by the
employment of new weapons, or by operations in unfavorable weather. Sur,-
prise can have the effect of increasing combat power.
An excellent example of initial surprise is Washington's crossing
the Delaware River on Christmas night, 1776, and his attac)!::against the
Hessian garrison in Trenton on the mOfIl;ing,of?6 pecember,
If we can .surprise the enemy with our atomic attacks, we may
incre.ase the effectiveness Of tl:wse attacks severalfol.d aI).d thus hasten the
destruction of his forces and his will to fight.
Civil Affairs can assist in surprise by keeping civilians off,
certain roadli!to allow rapidity of movement. In their operations against,
guerrilla action, Civil Affairs has the basic objective of separating
guerrilla forces from civilian support and preventing their getting infor-
mation.
11
11. SECURITY. The principle of security argues for the prevention
of surprise. Through security, we retain freedom of action. Through
proper application of security, the enemy is prevented from interfering
with our freedom of action. The prevention of surprise and the retention
of freedom of action are accomplished by. calculated and continuous readi-
ness including use of essential security forces, suitable formations and
dispositions, and continuous and aggressive efforts to secure and evaluate
information.
At the beginning of World War II, the first concern oX the United
States was its own security while preparing to launch its own offensive.
Thus,bases in Greenland, Iceland, Alaska, and Hawaii were secured.
With the present rate of improvements in rangeaild speed of the riiodern im-
plements of w;;l.r, such bases assume greater importance to a nation's se-
curity.
On the atomic battlefield, when the enemy has the power to des-
troy a force of almost any size once he has located it, forces must be
dispersed and concealed, and their vulnerability-' to" atomic. attack reduced.
The extent of dispersion must, however, be balanced with mpbility to avoid
defeat.
Security depends primarily 'on the s\lcceS"s of civil security
measures for the 'control of the civilian population inCluding the prompt
establishment of reliable local police forces, registration of civilians, con-
trol of circulation and communications, and the fostering of friendly re-
lations with the civilian population; military se'curity operations includlng
counterintelligence measure's 1!opreventdisclosure of information to the
enemy, espionage, ands'abotage;'and oper'a.tions to separate guerrillas from
civilian support.
In our brief analysis of the US Arriiy principres of war we have
examined some of the problems essentially civilian in nature which will
confront a combateomttllander on the battlefield, and 'ha"J'e Witne s sed that
'(""'.:'" ..
the to CivilAffairs'as to factors
dealingwithpersonnel;'inteUigenee, operations. mCf/logistics.
12
APPENDIX 1 TO .LESSON 1, CA SUBCOURSE 33
PRACTICAL EXERCISES ON PIUNCIPLES OF WAR
1. GENERAL SITUATION. In June 19 Aggressor launched an
invasion of SOUTH KOREA. US Forces piecemeal into the
struggle as units became available. The limited number of troops availa-
ble to defend the position required the assignment of large sectors to the
units in the forward positions.
To adequately garrison its sector the 10th Infantry Division
placed three battle groups onl ine with the 2d BG, 7th Inf as division reserve.
The 2d BG, 10th Inf had. been retained as Army reserve.
2. SPECIAL SITUATION.
a. On 29 Aug the 1st BG, 87th Inf occupied its sector without
enemy contact (see Figure 1). Only minor guerilla activity occurred in the
area. <:;0 E, 2d Med Tk Bn, 69th Armor attac,hed to 1st BG, 87th Inf rein-
forces fires of Mort Btry, 1st BG, 87th Inf.with one 105mm Aowitzer battery.
b. Col,. 1st BG, 87th Inf decided to defend the battle group sector
(16,000 yards) by utilizing platoon strong points. Most of these
strong points were not :t;l:),utuany supporting and several could be reached only
with difficulty. Onepl;l-tOQIJ, of tanks was attached to Co Band D. The battle
group reserve consisted of the tank company (-) and one platoon of.Co A. The
Recon Plat, 1st BG, 87th Inf was directed to maintain contact with 2d BG, 29th
Inf. The Mort Btry is in glilnersupport.
c. Weather andT'1Hain. The weather during the.plilriodis.warm
anq.<;lear. The WARRIOR uIJ.fOrdable except at thetwao'0"1U$.indi-
cated in Figure 1. At thes.e points. both vehicles and foot trooplil.frnay q;t'.oss
with some difficulty. The marshes can be crossed by foot troops with great
difficulty. Wheeled vehicles are restricted to the limited road net. Cross-
country movement of truck vehicles is limited due to the rugged terrain.
d. Both friendly and Aggressor forces possess atomic weapons;
however, atomic weapons have not been employed to date. Aggressor
possesses a numerical superiority with a limited armored capability. Friend-
ly forces have air superiority.
13
3. FIRST REQUIREMENT. In the occupation of this defensive
position, which principles of war did Col, 1st BG, 87th Inf emphasize and
which did he violate?
4. SITUATION CONTINUED. On the night of 30 Aug the enemy
attacked in formce across the WARRIOR River against the defensive po-
sitions of the 1st BG, 87th Inf. The main crossing was made in the vicinity
of the northern ford and the positions in that area were quiclq'y overrun with
heavy casualties to the defending force. Co A and B fought a delaying action
and by dawn they had organized a defense in conjunction with the battle
group reserve north of BIG MARSH. The enemy secondary attack in the
vicinity of southern ford forced the withdrawal of Co D to positions just south
of BIG MARSH. Minor probing attacks against GoC were and at
dawn Co C occupied its original defensive positions; however, several
enemy groups of 4-7 men each had been observed to its rear. Capt, Co C
requested permission to withdraw but was directed by Col, 1st 'BG, 87th
lnf to remain in present positions and hold at all cost. See Figure 2 for
dispositions.
5. SECOND REQUIREMENT. In this situation, which principles of
war did Col, 1st BG, 87th Inf emphasize and which did he nJ,ost seriously
violate?
6. SITUATION CONTINUED. Co C was ordered to withdraw to po-
sitions north of BIG MARSH on afternoon of 31 Aug. The withdrawal and
occupation of a reserve defensive position was completed by morning of
1 Sep. Each night from 2-6 Sep, the enemy attacked along the entire front
against 1st BG, 87th Inf while remaining in hiding during the day. These
night attacks were successfully repulsed. On.8 Sep. Capt, Co D was noti-
fied that a small enemy group of3 -4 men was operating in his rear area.
To handle this problem, Capt, Co D directed each of the three forward rifle
platoons t9.!lend two men to the Co CP for use in a combat patrol to be
organized under the comm<l,nd of the platoon sergeant from the reserve pla-
toon. Due to the delay in Qrganizi'llgthe patrol the small enemy group was
never d:etected and it was assumed that they had escal?ed.
T,HIRD REQUIREMENT. In this of
war did Capt, Co D emphasizeahd which did he violate 7'
8. SITUATION CONTINUED.
a. On 14 Sep, the 1st BG, 87th Inf successfully crossed the
WARRIOR River and was advancing against the retreating enemy. Just
prior to darkness, Col, 1st BG. 87th Inf forIned a taskforce by attaching
to Co C the following:
(1) Sufficient Infantry carriersto Inechanize the foot
eleInents.
(2) One tankplatoon.
(3) One platoon 4.2"Inortars.
(4) Sectionassault gun platoon.
b. This taskforce was giventhe Inissionofbreakingthrough
the Aggressor rear guardand seizingthe division objective. 5 miles to the
west.
c. The'taskforce attackedanhour after darkand successfully
sInashedthroughthe eneIny rear guardandoverranthe enemyforces re-
treating along the Inain road. By Inorning (15Sep) the taskforcewas on
the division objective.
9. FOURTHREQUIREMENT. Inthis situation, whichprinciples
ofwar did Col, 1st BG, 87th Inf emphasize andwhich didhe violate?
17
APPENDIX 2 TO LESSON 1, CA SUBCOURSE 33
The following article is reprintedfrom The MilitaryReview, 'May
1955. The views expressedin this article are the author's, Lt Col Fallwell,
andnotnecessarily thos,eofthe Department ofthe Armyor the US.Army
CivilAffairs School.
THE PRINCIPLES OF WARAND THE SOLUTION OF MILITARY PROBLEMS
A BASIC aimofthe CommandandGeneralStaff College is to develop,
inpotential commanders and staffofficers, the ability to solve military
problems. This the College attempts to do--anddoes quite successfully--
by presenting the basicfactorsef, andtheirinluence on, the problemand,
throughthe use of appropriate forms" a .sound, logical approachto the solu-
tionofproblems is reached,
Yet commanders and staffofficers--including some graduates ofthe
College--domake'wrongdecisions. There are many reasons for this--
mental,emotional, andphysical. The factors andtheir influence may be
incorrectlyestimated. The problemitselfmay not be fully recognized. The
logicmaybe faulty. The thought processes by which a problemis solved
may be misunderstood. At the riskof over-simplification, it canbe stated
thatthe basic'mentalreasons for poor decisions are three innumber: lack
ofunderstanding.of the problem, lackofknowledge ofthe factors andtheir
influence onthe preblen'!., and incomplete knowledge anduse ofthought pre-
cesses in solving the problem.
Adequate knowledge ofthe factors involvedin a military situation and
their influence onthe de.cisionrequire'syears.of experience andstudy. Al-
though our military colleges canhelpprovide knowledge, they cannever
completely r,eplace personalexperience. On'the other hand, our schools
cananddo provide instructionandPl:'.actice in soundmethods of recognizing
problems and arriving at decisions.
ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION
The'best'eocampleof sucha methodis the cemmander'sestimateof
the situationwhich receives greatemphasis atthe CommandandGeneral
StaffCol1ege'.>Theestimate--itspre,sentformisaproductofmany yearsI
studyandexperience-provides for,a natural,souridapproachtothesolu_
,tionofa tactil:calproblerni Following:astaternentoftaemission, the
18
significant conditions ofweather, terrain, andthe opposing forces are
listed. Next are listedthose courses ofactionwhichappear feasible and
. which, if successful, will accomplishthe mission. Thenthe commander
mentally "war-games"eachofhis courses ofactionagainst eachenemy
capabilityanddetermines the probable outcome, while further testingthe
feasibility ofhis courses ofactionand determining the factors whichare
most significant. Afterthe "war-gaming"the commander compares his
courses of action in the lightofthe significantfactors. Finally, he selects
the best course of actionandembodies it inhis decision.
Thus, inourestimate ofthe situation, we have followedwhat the
UnitedStates Naval War College termsthe "naturalmentalprocessfor
solutionof anyproblem." (See Figure 3).
An orderlyprocess? Yes. Sound? Yes. Simple? No.
The complexityofthe estimateprocess arisesfromthe numerous
chances of errorwhichpresentthemselves. Firstofall, the estimate
must containa number of subordinate estimates. At the outset, the mission
must be estimated. This, of course, is a relatively simple matter ifone
has beenorderedto seize andholda certainhill, butis ita simple matter
whena commander must decide whether to t t c ~ ordefend? If the com-
mander does not state his mission correctly, thenany decision he reaches
is likelyto be a badone.
Thestatements ofthe conditions ofweather, terrain, andopposing
forces constitute not onlyfactsbut--ina large measure--estimates.,as well.
Here, staffestimates areusually involved--personnel, intelligence, op-
erations, andlogisticalestimates. Perhaps the intelligence estimate offers
the greatest chance for error- -butour own capabilities canalsobe mis-
understood.
The selectionof courses ofactioninvolves another estimate- -or series
of estimates. If only one ortwo coursesarelisted, there is the possibility
that the bestwillnot be considered. If tOCil many courses ofactionare con-
sidered, thenthe estimatewillbe verylong andinvolved.
Finally, there is the estimation involved inanalyzing and comparing
the various courses ofactioninorderto selectthe best.
Accordingto the Naval War College'sSoundMilitaryDecision:
"Lo,gical thought separatesthe rationalfromthe irrational. ltsuse
avoiCils the,\wastefulness oftrial-and-errormethod. By its insistente m ~
ployment. dormantpowers ofreasoning are awakened, andthe dangell'that
,
19
SOLUTION OFA PROBLEM
The Natural Mental Process
Step 1. The establishmentofthe
proper basis for solution
ofthe problems, including
(a) a grasp ofthe salient
features ofthe situation,
(b) a recognitionofthe
incentive. and (c) anap-
preciationofthe effect
desired.
Step 2. The actual solutionofthe
problemthroughthe em-
ploymentofthe reasoning
power inthe consideration
ofvarious possible solu-
tions. andthe selectionof
the best solution.
Step 3. The conclusionofdecision
embodyingthe best solu-
tion.
Figure 3
The Commander's Estimate
(a) Determinationofthe mission.
(b) St;Ltement ofthe factors of
weathe.r, terrain, .and own and
opposing forces.
(c) Determinationofthose suitable
courses ofactionwhich, if suc-
cessful, will accomplishthe
mission.
(d) Analysis ofeach course of
actioninlight ofeachenemy
capability.
(e) Comparisonof courses of
action.
(f) Conclusionas to best course of
action.
(g) Decisionembodying the best
courseQfaction.
20
attends instinctive, spontaneous, impul'slve, Or emotional acceptance of
conclusions is lessened. The evil effects of an inclination to dodge the
issue or of a disinclination to face the facts are thus also avoided. "
Man is a rational ~ n i m l Man's rationality, however, is unfortu-
nately influenced strongly by tradition, habit, bias, and a lazy tendency
to accept plausible suggestions. Too often what little, reasoning man doe s
is concerned with justification ,of a decision already reached.
A notable characteristic of the human mind is a constant search for
reliable rules of action inspired by an intuitive belief in cause and effect.
If not provided with sound rules, man will devise his own'out of his own
experience and follow them, although they may be faulty. This drive for
valid guides has given us a mass of proverbs, adages, and aphorisms
dating from antiquity. '
, ,
THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR
We must reckon, then, with this psychological drive for valid guides;
and the best solution is to provide ourselves with valid rules. Since war-
fare is a science - -that is, since the phenomena of war follow the natural
law o,f cause and effect - -we should be able to state the general relationships
between'causes and effects in. war, althoughuot with the quantitative pre-
cision customary in the phySical sciences. In other sciencessUth state-
ments are known as principles --they are also natural laws because'they
express facts of nature.
The search for valid rules of conduct by the armies of the world has
led to the formulation of principles, rules, maxims, and doctrine in an
effort to capitalize on past experience. A vast number of causal relation-
ships and historical examples form thE!"science of war. However, the mere
compilation of knowledge is not enough. Too many commanders have failed
because they blindly applied methods which--however successful in the past--
were inadequate in a new situation. The resulting disillusionment led to two
schools of thought. One group averred that brilliantly successful generals
like Napoleon and Alexander were geniuses whose successes were due to
intuition rather than methods, and that warfare could never be reduced to a
science. Maurice de Saxe, Marshal General of the armies of France, once
stated that:
"War is a science so involved in darkness, and attended with so much
imperfection, that no certain rules of conduct can be given concerning it;
custom and prejudice, the natural consequence of ignorance, are its sole
foundation. "
21
Fuller in his Foundations of the .5c1<)nc<) of. War, quoted Dragomirov
as stating:
"First of all, science and theory are two different things, for
every art may and must be in possession of its. own theory, but it would
be preposterOUS to claim for it the name of a science .... Nobody will
venture today to assert that there could be a science of war. It would be
as absurb as a science of poetry, of painting, or of music."
In the opposing camp are men like Clausewitz and most modern mili-
tary leaders who believe that there are which can be discovered..
Jomini believed:
"The fundamental principles upon which rest all good combinations
of war have always existed, and to them all others should be referred for
the purpose of, arriving at their respective merits. These principles are
unchangeable; they are independent of the arms employed, of times, and of
places. "
Napoleon' advised:
"PerUIl<) ,again and again the campaigns of Alexandl)r, Hannibal,
Caesar, Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, Eugene, and ]frederick. Model your-
selupon theeI'll- This is the only means of becoming a great captain, and of
acquiring the.,secret of the art of war. Your own genius will be enlightened
by this study, and you will learn to reject all maxims foreign to the princi-
ples of the'se great commanders. "
From the work of this latter group has developed thl) principles of
war which are recognized by the various nations. 'l!'rop-i ihcient China have
corne thE; 13 principles of Sun Tsu. From Napoleon.' s *-itings have been
derived PS maxims. The German Von US three, seven, or
mOre principles, depending on how one word. The French
Gen,eral Foc)) listed four principles at the turn of the century, ending his
list with a significant "et cetera;" The British Gen,eralFuller deduced 6
principles in a work of 1909; later he expanded this number, first to 8, then
to ll,and finally settled on 9. From these writers and others, the national
principles shown in Figure 4 were
'1'hedifferences in the number of principles accepted by the various
nations are based, not so much on doCtrinalahd organizational differences,
as they are on the desired degree of emphasis to be given certain concepts.
CURRENT PRINCIPLES OF WAR
United States
Objective
Simplicity
Unity of
Command
Offensive
Maneuver
Mass
Economy
of Force
Surprise
Security
British
e l e t ~ o n and
Maintenance
of the Aim
Co-operation
Offensive Action
Flexibility
Concentration
of Force
Economy of
Effort
Surprise
Security
Maintenance
of Morale
Administration
French
Liberty of
Action
Concentration
of Effort
Surprise
Soviet
Advance and
Consolidation
Combined Arms
Offensive
Maneuver and
Initiative
Concentration
Economy of
Force
Surprise and
Deception
Adequate Reserves
Morale
Annihilation
Figure 4
23
No one will say that British plans and orders are likely to be complicated
because they have ignored the principle of simplicity. Similarly, tactics
of the French are not defective because they profess to find only 3 princi-
ples rather than the 9 United States or 10 British principles. All of the
concepts embodied in the principles are taught in all armies, but with
differences in interpretation and emphasis.
The United States official list of principles is a product of the twentieth
century. Our Field Service Regulations of 1904 are reported to have con-
tained the following statement - -but not a list of principles:
"While the fundamental principles of war are neither very numerous
nor complex, their application may be difficult and must not be limited
by set rules. Departure from prescribed methods is at times necessary.
A thorough knowledge of the principles of war and their application enables
the leader to decide when such departure should be made and to determine
what methods should bring success. "
Training Regulations 10-5 of 1921 contains what is apparently the
first official list of principles, but the publication gave the names only with-
out explanation and the list .was rescinded in 1928. The Field S.ervice
lations of 1923 treated the principles without naming them. Its successor,
Field Manual 100-5, Field Service Regulations, Operations, continued this
approach until our present edition of 1954 which both names and discusses
the principles.
Although our Army was apparently late in its official acceptance of
the principles, they were taught much earlier, as evidenced by General
Pershing's statement:
"But the principles of warfare as I learned them at West Point re"-
main unchanged. They were verified by my experience in our Indian wars,
and also during the campaign against the Spaniards in Cuba. I applied them
in the Philippines and observed their application in Manchuria during the
Russo-Japanese War. "
In the British Army.a very similar procedure took place . General
Fuller has related how, in 1911, he read in the British. Field Service
Regulations that "the fundamental princi}?les of war are neither vllry
numerous nor in themselves very abstruse.. "; but that he searched for
them in vain. Spurred by t4e need for valid principles, he fieUy evolved
nine principles; in. 1923, he realized the satisfaction of seeing most of them
printed in a service man\l.al. T4e origillal British principles remained sub-
stantially unchanged until after World War II when two ..A.dministration
24
and Maintenance ofMorale, were added, due, one may guess, to the in-
fluenceof FieldMarshalMontgomery.
Within the UnitedStates Army, the principles ofwar have been
regardedas basic truths, applicable to alls'ituations, intelligent appli-
cation ofwhichwill aid success. Although apparent conflicts between'
principles are recognized-,-mass and securityfor example- teachthat
a principle should be violatedor disregardedonly after mature considera-
tion of all factors involved. The principles have never been statedas laws
of cause and effect. They represent, infact, certaindurable, proved
concepts which, in the opinion ofthe times, deserye emphasis over all
other concepts. Interpretation ofthe concepts has varied, of course, and
will doubtles'sly vary inthe future.
CRITICISM OF THE PRINCIPLES
CaptainFrankL. Johnson, UnitedStates Navy, wrote, "The mere
mention ofthe term 'principles ofwar' brings out the semantic beastin
certainindividuals."
As'soonas the principles were published, an argumentbeganwhich
has cohtinued'unti! the presentday. For every artiCle ih a service journal
which expoundedthe officialline,'th:ere appearedanother artiCle attacking
one or more ofthe principles. Most'early objections were based-on the
grou.nds thatthe principlesweCl'e a me Ie' Hstofnouns ornoun substantives
which couldbe interpretedin many ways. Some wantedto expandtheHst.
Others- -appealing to the dictionaries- -wishedto discardallwhichwere
not basicto e'Very situation. As anexample,'Br'igad,erGeneral Charles
M. the CommahdandGerieril:l Staff School--
could find only five basic principles--offensive, simplicity,'objective, su-
periority, and security. The others he thought valid as doctrine but not as
principles,
Later criticsccnotably the NavalWar College and Colonel S. '
Johnston, former'instructor and'libtariahat'Fort Leavenworth-cattatke'dthe
principles on firmer ground. While not denying their value as c'dh'c:ej:>l:s,
they Claimedthe principles were not statedproperly--thatis, that relation-
ship between: caus'e<andeIfectWas not'shbwn;that doctririeandmetllodwas
beingcOhfusec!withpriNciple; and1:hatth,elabel"principle"haclniisled sorrie
commande rs tobelieve'that thesecortceptll"iwE!1'e'basic' rule s to be appliedto
everysituation. Thus.1twas said, fau'L1:yrtile
i
s ofabti6nil'have beenderi'ved
fromcdncepts'c!leisigned to replace, s'ucha.ultY'i'uhi s.
Cbl6hel'J6hnstort cite s thefol16Wingfrdni WotldWar I on the cdnNis'fbn
of'principfe''attd,metilod:'
I..
25
"General Harbord says that to induce acceptance of the American
original idea of unity of control of supply, our General Headquarters had
likened it to unity of command. Foch then seized upon this opening to
press for the project--not so bad for the French, but certainly undesira-
ble for us - -Of complete unity of interallied supply. 'It was' a: bit awkward,
Harbord tells us, 'foi' General Pershlngtourge the principles and the
limitations at the same time. '--It was awkward, no doubt of that. It was
awkward because our Ceneral Headquarters had mistaken a method for a
principle. "
In a search for true principles, these later writers'were led to
expand on the old adage, "It depends on the situation," and to produce such
statements of causal relationships as appear in the Naval War College's
Fundam'ental Principle of War:
"The attainment of a military objective (the creation or maintenance
of a favorable military situation) depends on effective operations involving
the salient feature s of
(1) effective action with relation to correct physical obJectives;
(2) projection of action from advantageous relative positions;
(3) proper apportionment of fighting strength; and
(4) ensurance of adequate freedom of action:
each fulfilling the requirement of
(a) suitability, as determined by the factoi' of the appropriate
effect desired;
(b) feasibility, byreas6t\. of relative fighting strength as
determimidby tile factors of the means available and opposed, irifhiertl::ed by
the fador of the' characteristics of 'the' 'theater of opera.tion:and
:i"
(c) ac,cep1iibility,asd:etermined by the factoi' of'l;1\.'e canse;'
quence s as to costs, -whi<thfactor'sarein: turndependeJilt on eachdther. "
Statements of this type have a definite value in that they constantly
reefer onieto theconti'Olling c6nditionsof:the,curr'erit'situaHon. Whether or
not,theyJwill eve:r satisfy man's is
questionable. One feels that man may make an equivalent error by applying
26
yesterday's conditions in lieu of tomorrow's. Still, causal principles
are in accord with "the Natural Mental Process" described earlier.
Their further use should be studied by our service schools.
Their first application could be to the solution of two problems inci-
dent to the commander's estimate of the situation--the determination of a
suitable mission, and the formulation. of courses of action to be considered
at length. In this connection, the following propositions apply.
1. The determination of a suitable objective depends upon the
a. , suitability of the objective in light of the future mission
of the command;
b. feasibility of the objective as determined by the means
available and opposed, the time available, and the condition of the theater;
and
c. acceptability of the costs involved.
Z. The selection of a suitable course of action for accomplish-
ment of an objective depends upon the
a. suitability of the course of action with regard to the ob-
jective and the future mission of the command;
b. feasibility of the course of action, as, determined by the
means available and opposed, the time available, and the conditions of the
theater; and
c. acceptability of the costs involved.
There is nothing new here, of Our first proposition merely
states that an objectiVll must further the mission.ofthe command, must
be capable of. achieveIIlent in the time available, and must be acceptable as
to costs. This last.statement i$ correct and the language is familiar to
all; so, why change it? One must admit there is no great necessity. The
advantage of the proposition, however, is that it points out the relationships
of the factors; involved and thereby contributes to a frame of mind--a method
of thinking--which is a distinct asset to the service officer.
Intheremaining'pages, the author proposes to examine our principles
of war and determine their application to the solution of military ..
Z7
OBjECTivE
"Theultirp.ate objectiv,! of ail military operations is the'
oftlle enemy's armedforces and his 'will to fight: Selection of
attainment contributes most decisiv<i!ly and
quickly to the of'the ultimate objective ... must be
based ... corp.pl,ete kn;0"fledge of th,e and the,!-ter of operations .. --"
Field Man1.la,l 100 '75, :E'ield Ser,:,ice Operations.
,Th,! has two ciistinct m:ee,ning
s
.. In the larger sense,
it is 'the "effect desired, " or thec'reation of a niilitiny situation.
Thi,s,we objective is
commOnt.p all military. operations .. Applied.to oft:ensive it
maye'the' seizure. pf ce'rtain terrain or the destruc.tion pf an enemy force;
indeellFi:.re.oRe;ra:tions, the objective rrlaybe)o deny an area or facility'
o;rit'maY be sim:p1yto,n::,ahitain the integrity of a certain '. '
fOrce; Th.eRfoper ofp1an
n
illg i,s the, ultimate
ITIis sian. Based upon this, one determines fiivorable i;rJ.ilitary situations
, ! ..I ' ' .. ,. , .. ,I ; .. ' .. !.; ',' : , .. ,' .. .' .... " :! .. '" ,I" i' .. "".. ,.. <' .. ,',!, ; ': .. .' -,./ i' ' '
which favor. accomplishment of theult1mat
e
m1ssion. These situa:tions then'
, , " " " , , , ,j... .. .. ,d ,,) JJ,-:.',' . 1 '1. i' ,',' ,
become inte,rmediate millsions .
. In the second sense, in tactics, the creation of a favora?le military
sih1ation can often best be expressed in t",rms of physical objectives for an
attaqing force., This is the second, and, m:ore usual, meaning of th,! term.
, '." .. ', -,' . '. ;', , .', .", ., ,.' ' ... ,' i, ,. ,." ,- " .. ;'-"
.. .. ," . ',-. '-"'" !
v.;ai: wh
i
cI1js the Abjective.
Insolving
i
zhilitif'y#obiems, t6estabti,sh thebbjecti:Ve
orn).ission.. An 'ihip):oper 'must --
if not to' ,aiiul'e:ltl at 111s 'tBii 'must 'b'ring into
play all of his knowledge and reasbffihg 'p34bf'.'Tl1iS"heavy:'l'esponsibilitY'
grows with the degree of ,but it is not inconsiderable even
when a objective has ]j'eehc.ss'ig'riilciJb'ytpe higher commander. Nearly
be or implied, and intermediate
De di'sim; " .. ' " , ." , I
\,9,: . h' i'" ," , ' i ' , ',r
.... laHi'
obj e 2Hyerillislbe
.snoul'd 'futu':re' ope :rati'orts'; ,
the thteat"d h%}59Shio.n.' (
or riskdestr1.lcti<;>Il therein; it sb,ould .a conyergence of effbJ:it; ancf"')
be easily identifiecl,
We have no analogous criteria in our field manuals regarding the
selection of an objective in the sense of the mission, but certain guides can
be determined. Earlier, we stated'that a suitable objective or mission of
the command will be capable of achievement in the time available. and will
be acceptable as to' costs. Other desirable characteristics could be deduced,
but these are the basic 6nes which must be Present in all .cases.
We are striving to produce leaders who use their reasoning powers
rather than rely on set rules of action. The danger in this principle - -and
the others as well-is that the may convert.it into an invariable rule
of action or slogan, such as "seek out and destroy the enemy's main force."
Views such as this were at least partially responsible for the bloody and
indecisive fighting during most of World War 1. Dr. Bernard Brodie cites
the more recent example of the ,United States Third Fleet at Leyte Gulf.
Following the U{"ted States landings c;m Leyte. the Japanese initiated a naval
counterattack involving two task forces , . comprised mainly' of battleships
and cruisersuwhich we,re to encircle the island from the east and converge
on the ianding areas. A small decoy force of carriers approached from the
north ana west. The United States naval commander decided to steam north
and attack the carriers because of the then current concept that "the enemy's
main force is where his carriers are. "
Dr. Brodie then said:
"But the question asked wa,s. 'Where are enemy"s carriers? That
is where his main force. must 'be. " I subJ;Ilit that this was true for the pre-
ceding 2 years of the war. but at the time of Leyte dul itwas no longer
true, an,d I also that the intelligence was available to the fleet which
should have indicated that it ""alii no longer true . :. . In that battle the
enemy's n;tain fqrce,comprised in factllilil battleships. That would have been
clear, for, th", existence of the slogan. "
TBE OlfF'ENStVE
, . . , ,
'. '. L L .. ' .. \; ,
"Through offensive action, a commander preseryes hisf;ree,d9I,"};of "',
action and imposes his will on the enemy. The selection by the commander
of the:right timeiiUld place for offens.ive action deC;ilil ive, factqr in the
,of th", operlltion. A defensive attitude J;Ilay
by many liIituations; but. '" .shollld be as, il: teJ:nPC1,-
rary expedient. . . "- Fi!'l'l<iSe;r"icej'tegulations, '
Opel'atiol;ls. ' , , " "" '
Our doctrine ofthe offensive is'as basic as any concept in the
UnitedStatesArmy; for only through offensive action canwe ultimately
destroythe enemy"s armedforce's'. Only through the offensive can we
retain'the initiative. Therefor'e, we aretaught that evenwhen forced
to assume the defensive we shouldcondU!ct anaggressive or offensive
defense.
The'basicnature ofthis principle, however, has misledmany
commanders who elevateditto the"'rule ofwar"by insisting on the
attack atalltimes. Marshal Foch, whose early writings onthis princi-
ple had much influence in World War I, hadthe following to say in his
postwar Memoirs:
If the doctrine ofthe offensive ...tendedto impose an invariable
rule leading too oftento tactics thatwere blindandbrutalandfor that
very rea"son dangerous. It alsoproduceda strategythat was bare and
uniform, easily sterile, unproductive of results, 'and costly.',I
This degenerationofa soundconcept into a fau:lty rule of actionis
a veryhuman'failing. Man seeks invariable ru.lesofactionand isim-
menselycomfortedwhen he thinks'he'has discOveredone. No bitterer
condemnationof a commander of this type has beenwritten,than,the
following words by General Fuller ittspeakirig ofa high British,comman.-
der during World War I:
"His (Haig's) theory offighting was as simple as General U. S.
Grant's, andhe never once budgedfromit', whilstGrant did: Fromhistory
he (Ha.igrhadlea.rnedthat ba.ttles passed,throughthefo11owin.g phases:
ihe maneuver for position,the, first clash ,ofbattle,thewearin'g*outfight
ofvarying duration; andtheeventualdeC'isiveMchv','vJhichwould give
victory.
It hadbee'i'l, so and, cOnsequently,'itl'a,ustbe soina11,circumstances
and irrespective of changes inarmaments. As the,decisive,blowinfOil'me'r
wars hadbeen deliveredby cavalry, cavalry remainedthe decisive arm;
con'&eq:uently, ,theyfig<Ul'ed'iilallhis battlie:s:,: irrespective of mud, fire, and
wire;,:Asthis blow'hatVtQ blh;a'ecededby thewe,aring-outfight, which
hithertohadbeen carrie'd'but'by infantryandartillery,thi,s lJn1JlJst'continuej.,
for ofthe new arms Haig couldgraspnothing, because of themhistory could
tell"'hinhothin'g'. His c:r'eed'Was;that,'firtn,hold:be kept O.i!irst principles,
andtHat it plan, when once it 'had,been,accepted','ilInustbe:adher,edto:and
pur su'ed"wi1!l't 'determination.I" Ithat"lwhate:vett1:le;strategy"",
final' Victorycould'ooifieonlywhetl:,' <!ifter the fi11st dash/,ofbat1l1eii" the,
:'30
wearing-out fight, of whatsoever character it might be, had exhausted
and re.ducedthe. enemy'spow<;lr.of resistance andhis willto fight.' 130
ithappenedthat on 28 June 1917,heis reportedto have said, 'that if
the fighting was kept upatits presentintensity for 6 months, Germany
wouldbe atthe. endofher available manpower'."
The solutionto the problem, of course, is notto discard our valid
principles and concepts butto state them so thatthe relationship of
cause and effect is evident, andto educate our lead<;l:rs to relyontheir
powers of reason rathe:r than "invariable" rules of action.
The ultimate value ofthe offensive is that it is the onlyreliable
way to breakthe enemy's will to fight--with the possible exceptionof
strictlylimited conflic.ts. Tile eve,ryday results of successfuloffensive
actionare initiative'andIligh morale. Ge'neral Pattonthought soIlighly
of these that he once fo:rbadedisseminationbelow generaloffiGer.grade
of an orderto'asaumethe defensive.
In solving, militaryproblems,.the actiontaken must be consistent
withthe ultimate destructionthro,ug).loff,ensive actionofthe enemY's
will to.. fight. 1 the correctpresent.d.ecisionis toassume the defensive,
he plan adopted;mustprovideor suitable,'Qfel}siveac;tion suchas :raids,
andlimited.obJective attacks al}d.CQunter,attaCks.
MASS
"Mass.or the c;ol'l!centrationof,supel:"iolr.fo.rc;e,s, <;m the ground,
at sea, and inthe air, attlled.eoei.$iv'e,place,AnQ" time.,and.tllei.r employ-
tnent ina decisive direction,creates.tlle tovictory. -.-,"
Field Manual100-5, FieldServic.e Regulationsi Qp.er,ations.
The concept oftnass is certainly basic. Mass or concentrationof
forcesis 'recognizedas a principle ofwar by mostwo]:"1d powers- the
notable-exceptionof France. .,':<
{, ."
The ideaoftnasshas'givenbirthtemanyfamiliars10.g;l,n,s;,
tations- -allofwhichar.e,notwiseJ '.',God is,on, the l3icle,of",theqigg,e!l:\!l,bat-
tals." "Gitrthar iuste s,twiththElmQstest;"'.
. ":;:
,31
manpower and their callous acceptance ofhuge losses. Althoughnumerical
super1qrity is often.desirable. the.re are other factors whichmay be equally,
or more, important inobtaining mass- -armor, artillery, air, the state of
training, andmo.rale, to mentionbut a few. In'solving militaryproblems,
we must the principle ,of mass at all times. In the formulation of
courses of action, mass.01' the maineffortis usually statedin: general
terms only. In the analysis of opposing courses ofaction, the degree and
nature ofmass, both that necessaryand that available, can be visualized,
Finally" details are developed inthe complete planto ensurethe desired
mass atallforeseeable stages ofthe operation.
Mass is not achievedfor its own sake..For a modernexample, let
US returnto Dr. Brodie's comments on the Battle of Leyte Gulf. The
Americannaval commander tellsuS that after discov,ering the three Japa-
nese taskforces moving toward,Leyte, he formulatedthree courses of
action, to remain,where he was; to attackthe carriersto the northwith.
allhis.force;or,to,divide his force, keepingpartinothe.areaandsending
partto attackthe carriers. He,decidedagainst splittinghis force because
this would conflictwith the "principle of concentrationofforce." Dr. Brodie
has,thefollowing'to $ayconcer:nirtgthis'reasoning:
"The purpose ofthe principle of concentrationofforce is to suggest
that one should so allocate one's forces,that one can hope to be superior
to the enemy somewhere, preferablyin,the most importantplace, or at
leastminimize,one's inferiority in thedecislve place. I submitthatthe
commander ofthe ThirdFleethadforces so overwhelmingly superiorto
those ofthe enemythat he couldhave dividedhis forces betweenSan Ber-
nardino Straitandthe northandhave'remainedoverwhelmingly superior
locallyto each enemyforce. An when you are overwhelmingly superior--
howmuchmor.e superior do you,wantto get?"
ECONOMY OF FORGE
"Theprincipie of economyoforce rs'a cor'ollarytothe principle
ofmass. In to,concentrate supei'ior 'combat strelllgth inone place,
econ.omy ofoil1ce'lnustbe exercisedin otherpla'ces."--FieldManual 100
FieldServiceRegulations, Operations.
Here the 'dependence:ofthis principle ofwar is recognized. Properly
:speaking, it.;.s a methodo,achievingmass.
The termeconomyoforce has wide acceptance ah'J.bng armie's ofthe
worldbut is not always interpretedthe sameway. Ofie' ' iri1u:ential writer.
32
has to the status of "the lawofwar." To the British
a!\d C.ap.adianArmies, e.conomyofforce implies,. "abalanced employment
offorces and a Judicious, expenditure ofall resourceswiththe objective of
effective concentrationatthe dedsive time'andplace." Here
economy.is interpretedinthe,nmeteenth century sense of "utilizing allre-
sources "ratherthan in,the twentieth century sense of "to economize; to
save.II
The inexactness inthe use of single nouns ornoun sub-
stantives to signify concepts or principles is well illustrated.
Inthe 1;>roadsense, economy offorce pertains to the proper apportion.
ment offorces and resources between main.and secondary efforts and re-
serves. W,eightingthe.main effort is naturally stressedinourArmy schools.
At might 1;>e wellto showthat secondary efforts mustalso be
weighte.d at leastto the extentnecessaryto enablethemto accomplishtheir
mis.sions. Secondary efforts arenot only are required.
"Everyattil-ck,musthave a mainand.secondary effort."
In solving militaryproblems then', we must,cleadystate.the mlmmum
objectives to be attainedbythe secondaryeffort andtoallotthe minimum
forces required.
,Any re.sourcesare.u'sed,to strengthen, inpriority,.,the
mainap.ds.econdar.yjef!or,ts:., ,T,lle.question is, where can we affowd.to econo-
mize, and.towhat.degree/?
UNITY,OF COMMAND
"Unityof commandobtainsthil-tunityofeffort.whichis essential.to
the decisive applicationofthe full combat power ofthe available forces."--
FieldManual100-5, Field,Ber.vic.eReg,Ul-a:tioI1>S.,..Operations.
,He.re'iof cou:rse" .UJliity.ofeffort- -or'cooperationin''the British' Army
andUnit.:dState,s:.A,iil,Fo,rce.,.is the,de:sired'end,or principle, andunity,of .,
cOmmand is ,to,t.b!at,eJ;1(l. 'Ce,rtainly., unity of.cotll1'mariCll i!lnot
fundamental to all situations. To bear,out,this statementvv,e,neel!hcite only
two examples: the normal relationshipbetween a regimental commander and
his a:rtilleryi ,al'ld.thJe relatironship between a'1'iny commander
andthe supportingtactical air force... qJ;lemay.bei.llempted,to ;r,eply that,urrity
of command inthese situations is exercisedby the division commander and
the,ithea!ier"cQmma,J;ldElr, "res.p!i'ctively. If.,$O'I..olllie\also:m1<lS,tadmit thatthe
princ,t:l?llih illdl;lYalid .In !lome,Cil-ses c!-J;1d,ij,t, s-ome, ,li"chelionsi'," ' 'f
33
Onthe other hand, unity of effort, or cooperation, is highly desira-
ble andshouldbe fundamental inevery situation. History affords us many
instance s of opportunitie s lostbe cause unity of effortwas not achieved.
Two examples which readily come to mindareStuart's cavalryat Gettys-
burg andthe lack--un.tilI918--ofaneffective high commandamong the
Allies in World WarI. World War II will doubtlesslyfurnish other exam-
pIes. ,One potentiallybad situationwas that describedbyGeneral H. H.
Arnold regarding conflicting zones and interests between theaters of
operations inthe Pacific andthe FarEast.
Unity of effort depends on a number offactors.
Firstof all, various units and services mustbe working towarda
commongoal if complete cooperationis to be achieved. There mustbe no
discordantjealousyor rivalry. Commontraining and equipment--expecial-
lysignal communications means- -are alsovitalto full cooperation.
Cooperationbetweenallies--whichhas become more andmore impor-
tant-;-introduces Iiltill other factors suchas national aims", divergent customs,
andlanguage difficulties. In dealing witJ;1 allies one cannot do betterthan
remember that "allies are attimes difficultto dealwith; whenthis occurs
it is well to remindonselfthat one is also an
The degree ofunity of effortachievedby a planofactionis a test
ofthe validity ofthe plan. Therefore, unity oI.effort can be usedas anaid
in solvingmilitaryproblems. The state,ment of the mission, the selection
ofphysicalobjectives, andthe selectionofpossible courses of actionall
effectthe cooperationto be achieved. In general, it canbe statedthatthe
maximum cooperation shol,lld.,be developedinthe of a plan, but
thatthe degree ofinherenturlitY,of effortis not the dominant factor inde-
ciding on one of several courses ofaction. Onthe otherhand, the ability
of the corp.mand,to achieve the unity ofeffort requiredin a particular cours.e
of actionisadominant factor inthe rete,ntion or rejection. ofthat course of
action. In this last statement, we can see a close relationshipto the appli-
cation,of surprise,andsimplicity. InJhis sense, the testforrequiredumty
of effortis a feasibiUtytest.
For example" wemay consider anatt<l,ck,aC;J;ossopenterrain. As to
time ofattack, two general courses ofactio'uare . c;1a)' and
A nightattackis a complexoperationrequiring careful coordinationand
teamworkamong allelemjlnts. Inotherwords,succells.in a nish.t attack
degre,e onthe <lbility of to achieve the
requiredunity of effort. The <lbility ofthe commandtoaccomplishthe .
reql,lired cooper<ltionwould determine whether the night attackwouldbe
'34
seriously considered.
In solving militaryproblems then, we can askthe following
questions.
1. Does the formulation ofthe missionallowforfull development
of cooperation?
2. Is the command capable of achieving the degree of cooperation
requiredby the proposed courses of action?
If the answer to either questionis negative, thenthere has been an
error.
MANEUVER
"Maneuver in itselfcanproduce no decisive results, but if properly
empl'oyeditmakes decisiveresults throughtheapplicationofthe
principles ofthe offensive, mass, economyofloree, andsurprise."--Field
Manual100-5, F'ielcfService Regulations, Operations.
, '. i
This quotation shows thatmaneuver--likeunity of commandandecono'-
my of force--is properlya. methodofachievingcombat superiority. It is,
however, an importarit coricept which deserves emphasis. Manetlver is, of
cour se; notto beso ught fbr itso\Vns ake. Like r prifllriples;
exc"!pt the.objective andp'cissibly security, maneuvet may'not!)e appHcable.
to every occasion. .'
;i
Maneuver is mdvernenttoplace'tf'oopsandfire atamO'lle',advantageous
positionwith respecttdtheenemy. The'comparableBl'itishprineiple, flexi-
bility, is somewhat more inclusive than the UriitE,'d States'term, l:'naneuver.
What is meant il'i notonly maneuver oftactica1units';,'b'ut such'consi'derations
as'm.obility ofmind'ih'culcateddining trairiing, and'rho'li>Hlty or &upply;
.\ ;J.e :.;
Altholighit ishatd'to imagineN\'at'anyohe"vould turn'this"princt4ple;
into anendto be sought, the UnitedStates Naval War to
warn:, "AvoidanceofmovemeJ:lt isfrequentlythe correctdecision,
becap.se ifit is scarcely'JlIl
i
iiltlfi
i
abYeeven if
it entails'nd material'lo'ss'.",. '.: k':,., I. , ", :, ,
.','
1liispcrincipleha:sconsfd'e':fa'bTe"ippHcationointhes'bate'thent afpos sible
cour'Jes olactionand'in'de"iiloptne'nt8:fthe plan'of lietion;Thefollowing
i -j '. '; , : ,'j .' .', fl,i :l' ',' .')
35
questions are useful in selecting mis,sions, objectives, and courses of
action.
1. Is the, of <J,c1;ievin,g th
tl
,rtlq;.lirecl degree of
maneuver? 1 not, the objective or course of action is infeasible.
2, Is the command's capacity of maneuver used to best ad-
vantage?
3. What is the degree of maneuver for the"ccp:nmand relative
to that for the enemy initially and throughout the action?
SURPRISE
"Surprise, must be sought throughout the, and
by every, echelon of, command. SUJ;prire which
deny information to the enemy ,0rd,e,Felye him. ' ',i l;ry V;a:ria,tion in the ,means
and methods employed in combat; by rapidity and power of execution; and by
the utiiization of ttlr,),'ain which appea;rs ,'" - _ Field
.l'ield Service, Regul,ation,s,,,pper"Hon,s.,
Hk.emany qf ou17 1.;1 itself, In
reality it is but a means or method for achieving com1:;lat, s\lperiority'.
".. -<, .. ..;
The#rst ;sep.tenc,\"qql;le re,prese,n,tlltiYIl ofthe more dog-
matic statements which still appear in 'ourpeld, by the phrase
"must be sought" we mean "must be attempted", or 1,;Uust' be gairied, I, then
the iltateme!':tis npttalwnliter1\llyan,<'l is usually
deili:ra,l:ll,\,,- _"ny -,manY - -aNd esped,ally
deceptive measures - -require an expendjture ofeffo;rt, the effect of whiSh, on
the main effort, weighed carefully. of may
be ,Vie ,e?:emy, tar-
gets will be attack.ed, or when we disclose our own 'order of ,battle through the
preJ1;,s. ,'-I I r:!, ;1
. ,. J' "f: I"
In the e,stimiL,te of, We oUf selye s, 9,1,\1;', general
questions. Are the courses ,of ,ac,tlon stated in a manner to allow development
Of,lll,ul;P.i" e ,?,W,ha,t,d
e
8:r,e,e,,, pi IilHir.P,fi ,iii t,? e,ach cours e
ofaptlo;lh? I.W,hat flei;1jee is, .':Ih,at
will, :Qe, tlj1", OF pf.
surprise., of course, will be developed after the
/ .
'i'
qi
36
SIMPLICITY
"Plans should be as simple and direct as the attainment ofthe objec-
tive will permit. Simplicity of plans mustbe emphasized, forinopera-
tions eventhe most simple plan is usually difficultto execute."- -Field
ManuallOO-5, FieldService Regulations, Operations.
Simplicity in a plan or order has been interpretedin two very dif-
ference ways: simplicity of statementof the planor order and simplicity
ofthe operation inVOlved.
As anexample ofthe first interpretationin which simplicity is
synonymous with clarity, we mayreferto General Eisenhower's directive:
"You will enter the Continent of Europe, and, in conjunctionwith
the other UnitedNations, undertake operations aimedat the heartof Ger-
many and the destrt.lction of-her Armed Forces."
This direCtivehas'been dtedas a model of simplicity. 'Certainlyit
is a classic of its kind:bhe'f,e6ncise; 'andclear; but, one is entitledto
wonder how simple it reallyis. fewwilldoubtthatthe concept involved,
the conquest of WesternEurope, -entailed'some ofthe most complicated
operations of alt"times. '
The secondinterpretation, simplicity of operation, is the more usual,
but is vastly more difficult to attain. -
Our 1923 FieldService Regulations state: "The taskassignedto any,
unit mllstnot involve a compHcatedmanet.lver. Simple anddire'et plans and
methods are_alone practicablein'war ,,-
':.,1'
In_his High'Coinmandin War, FieldMarshal Mdtitgb\1lety stated:
.. ..' ," .. -, .... - ,,' '.. t.. _ .... ,.. .... .. ',,' .. .\ ,:.\"," i:' : \ >
"The first requirement of a simple plan is thateach component p'art-
of a force should have its owntaskto carryout, andits operations should
not be dependent on the;su(;cess 6'1' other'f'Orihati6n.s 61' units,'I
The years of ,manuals'tellus
plq,nsan,d simple man:euversare best..'This,must be good "
andis nottobe discardedlightly. But the applicationofthep1:'ihciple"6f
f
' '
simplicitylarioteasy. " " . ,e;,':
This is so primarilybecause we do not seek simplicity initself.
Instead, we seekwhat we believe to be aneffective means to a desiredend.
37
If t)le rnaX<sorn,e,t}rneS t)lem;
ofte'?", the cornple.l<;itYi }.1;s,eJfanq ,att,eq>pt to Teq.).lCe it
by trainiIlg ,a,Ildt!;lro)1g!;l bette,li anf'. ,T4us, our ,con-
cept,ofsimplic;ity ,iIlClude s tljeIlotipn, c9mplex,ity. ,Witllthis
ill m,ind, .we ma,y"wan4 o)1r prinsiple by jl,Ming:
. . .
"C;,om,plexities 'I>i;.ould 1;>13 intrp4uced into only
after careful consideration of the additional results to be obtained, the
tll", forc,::!3 t",oyercp;me t!;le; tim,e,ayailable;, the
cost"jl.nd"tlle ris,kilWolve,d. " '" " '
13y
c
9
rn
ple",ity,we me;al1 a:s ;naIle)1ver I l':Il0verp,eIlt, or-
gani",...tion"" 'f4ich anej. ,which
may requi'\' e c;o:qt,J;0l:, ':' C;e;r1;f:i,n, ,9per,')-ti
ons
such as the raid, the night attack, and chemical warfarec;:aIJ. be xery, com-
plex and difficult. Newer concepts such as amphibious, ahborne, ahd
atomic,:: "':,ifi,
'. . '. ." J) , , . '.' "" . , ..,,( ,'( ,
'1J:J.,tJ;,e esFmate; 9f, the, ,ap,p!y :b
y
elimi
nating tpOl>e of action,.w!;los,e c,::omplexities, ca!1I10t be overcome, and
",' ",',- -'1'- '," . ,_, ' ..j'; _,C'Li)' ,,_ .... ' -.C-, '.".',!.. '\" ')L,I, ,':', ::" ... .' '
by removing obviously unnecessary complexities in other courses of action,
, y: /\.::,j i/;,
In our expanded principle of simplicity, we have a practical state-
men,t, is
cOffipati1;>le: Jro';U ,:
Se,;t;Xtg
e
!i!Fil-tr,?, Wat Blalls ,mus,t
not . ,tJr,e
O!+t 4"Y,,1.Qpment slfCh .
as ;'!') ,',,,, ". ", :. '. ..';
J,''J.':l, ; e'il " !. ;" iiJ.!.l ",;' ,"}:b,r',;' ", I ::'. 'Lei". :.;Y!' ",j.: 'i ' ':; ",' ,,'-" o!:\': .. '.'
The evident change in: interpretation of sirn.plicity in the last 15 years
,Wi'JHw "'L9Br, ,;i
!:'.' j,
".i:.',:\ .., ':,-1,: _,;.j'
1...
;';0;'1' 1:',"(0.: , '1 :!::C,i ;:.)')f"r'i, l'il: "'l')' 0, .:-,,',> >}}J" \i ".:"trb i)!j'7. "
;,:. 'it.e ,
S", J," ",6't,;til.1?',t.,!3eIi\\, 13 'i
any re .. IH0 TS.. ,li.,e,
1
4,.'f
': j j , (":: "":"(\i ' ':;q "'y ();I,),(:d 'H -1!f ':<)
a'\'mie s
except the French.' . , ,
,
,.\
r; f,,' ,n'r
:1;} '3.fl !)ri,b J:o CD ';'
The quotation'above points out only one aspect of security. Not only
mustthe commander protectagainst surprise, hemustalso guardagainst
known enemy capabilities. In the offense, securitymeasures are takento
retainthe initiative despite enemy counter strokes. Active securitymeas-
ures include'secondary,attacks andthe employment of reconnaissance forces
and reserves. Passive security measures are designedtolimitenemy
knowledge of our activities andto minimize, damage fromenemyattack.
The commander mustnot take counsel ofhis fears, however, lesthe
develop a defensive attitude. "Boldactionis essentialto success in war."
Inthe estimate ofthe situatiori, the problemof securityarises where
our own courses of actionare analyzedwith respectto enemy capabilities.
Then the generalnature andtiming of eachthreat is visualized. Detailed
planning comes later.
One ofthe more interestingproblems concerns risk, the obverse of
security. The solution, of course, depends onhow muchone can affordto
lose. Earlier, we statedthat the suitability of any objective or course of
actiondepends, among other uponthe degree of riskinvolved.
SUMMARY
In this article it has been suggestedthat the principles ofwar were
developed throughman's instinctive searchtor vatfdrules or guides. The
nine principles ofthe UnitedStates Armyandthose of other nations repre-
sentthose provedconcepts orpoints of doctrine which, inthe opiriion of
the times, deserye more emphasis than allother equallyvalidconcepts or
doctrines. A study ofthe principles has made it obvious thattheir state-
ment and eventheir number has,undergone steady change and refinement.
The same desire to minimize errorin militarydbcfs'icins whichpro-'
duced OUF principles ofwar, has also producedour estimate ofthe situa-
tionwhich is a standardsequencefor reaching tactical decisions. The
estimate directs one's attention tothe influences ofthe factors ofthe situa-
tionorthe effect. Iil'b'tner sciences,these
relationships or aretermed'principles,. butnot'sointhemilitarywhere
"principle"means "doctrine'." Aithoughthe war of\i!or'd's has not yet .
terminated, the following points have emergedinthe opinion ofthe author!i)
1. Our principles ofwifate validconcepts and doctrines.
2.. Like all doctrine, principles of are subjectto change.
3. There is a requirementfor fundamentals statedinthe scienti-
fic formof,cause and effect.
39
DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNITED STATES PRINCIPLES OF WAR
TR 10-5
(19Zl)
Principles
of War
Objective
Offensive
Mass
Economy of
Force
FSR*
(19Z3)
General
Principles
of Combat
Objective
Offensive
Concentra-
tion of
Superior
Forces
Economy of
Force
FM 100-5, FM 100-5* FM 100-5
Tentative * (1939) (1944) (1949)
General Principles
for Doctrines Principles
Conduct of War of Combat of War
Objective Objective Objective
Offensive (Mobility) Offensive Offensive
Concentration of Concentra- Mass
Superior Forces tion of
(Economy) Superior
Forces
Economy of
Force
Surprise
Simplicity
Security
Movement
Cooperation
Surprise
Simplicity
Security
Quality**
Fire
Superiority
Surprise
Simplicity
Security
Unity of Effort
Surprise
Simplicity
Security
Unity of
Command

Surprise
Simplicity
Security
Maneuver
Unity of
Command
NOTES: *Where the principles are not formally titled. the keyword
or major concept of each nembered paragraph has been
chosen. Lesser included concepts are placed in parentheses.
** By "Quality" is meant "greater mobility, higher morale, and
better leadership." FSR, 19Z3, paragraph 381.
Figure 5
40
I
'ApP:E::NDrX 3 TO'LESSON 1,CA SUBCOURSE 33
The following article is reprinted fr'om The MilitaryReview, February
1956. The views expressed'inthiliartide are the Major James
A. Huston, and not necessarily those of the Department of the Army or the
U. S. Army Civil Affairs School.
RE-EXAMINE THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR
It has become'commonplaceto 'introduce any discussion of the prittciples
of war by saying that weapons and tactics change, but the principles of war
do not <tb.ange. Thep'rinciples of war are' eternal anddmmutab'le. They
seem to have achieved the status ofa dogmatic creed, to. be, challenged only
at the risk of raising accusations Of .p,eresy. As such ,they have been reduced
to a catechism to be' accepted on faith by all young officea-s.. By so doing
we tend to stereotype the application of the principles of war and thus repress
the"ability to apply bold imagination t? the interpretat,ionoftb.ese .. p.rinciples.
',";
It is undeni.able that the principles of war--largely the principles of
CbM.s'ewitz - -have a great deal of trutb..,iri the,m. Som(%o ,them seem' 01wio1llis:
truisms, but others are open to serious question. Not only has airborne and
aton1i.c warfare' madeslome of those\:lI:oxioepts' obsolete!,:, b,-,t ,many exceptions:
are to be found to them throughout the history of warfare. Again,in the
or,dinary.classrobmp:r,esentation of of wail'.,." e"li/il.mples
shalled to illustrate how battles have been won with the correct application
of the stii;ted principles, and lost through the failure to applyt'hem.Ldilx-
ceptions are carefully ignored. And the exceptions are not the"kind that
pr0vetheJ rule', but ',il'dmetimes dis'proV\e it., Unfortunately bffiCel1s, indoc,. "',
trlinate'cl.and imbued with such unexceptionable principles' a';;e"likely to fail
to search for the exceptions which in a partiGular situation may be decisive.
',,/ . \' !.fJj". '
While it would be agreed that military operations must have an
the nature of that objective must be consid'ered carefuilily,j;l'l!"explantion of
this first principle elf war, we are told that: The ultimate objective df all
mi:lita'l'y, ope "atidns iUs tilier.de's,tiuotion J:>fthtj enenw'\s " alllld..jM$"
will tc"fight.. ,,,:f,"'''' ,:",; 'in y.
:;1; <,",
41
OBJECTIVE
The im.plicatioll is thatthe prim.ary objective is the enem.y arm.ed
forces" Yet atthe end of World War II we sawJapan surrenderwhile a
Japanese force of 2 m.illion men and 9,000 airCraft rem.ained inbeing to
defend the hom.e island's:
Am.ericandoctrine has tendedto conform. withwhat Liddell Hart calls
the "Napoleoni"falliicyll that wars aretobe won only by destroying the
enem.y's arm.y, 'not byoccupying his c;apital or other m.ajor cities. Our'
is thee;>em.y's arm.y; we arenot interestedin realestate. Never-
thelessthe em.otional and econom.ic attachm.ents ofa nation for a particular
city cab. be. so great that its loss to the enem.y m.eans the loss ofthe'war.
This has beentr.ue 'of Paris- -whenever Paris has fallen France has fallen.
Vi'her:NapoleonleftParis lightly guardedin 1814 inorderto pursue the
enem.y thealliesmade straightfor Paris, andaweek
after they enteredthe capitalNapoleon abdicated. 'Throughout World War
I it generallywas assum.edthatthe Germ.an capture ofParis wouldm.ean
the loss ofthe war for the Allies. In World War II the French suedfor an
armistice 2 daysafter,tn.e fallMtheir capita!:.;
It is true thatvictory may be won by destroyingthe enem.y's arm.edforces.
But italsoisnonetheless truethat som.etim.es victory m.ay be won without
forces.. ManyAm.ericans have come to equate victory with
destructiori,andthey 'hold t<?the destructive principle ofuncoriditiorial sur-
rneder:. A,gaih, wearetoldthat "inwar there.is no substitute foi- vrctory,"
,appare,ntly cOmPlete destructionofthe enem.y. Perhaps itis enough
for a soldier strictlyto m.ilitary considerations; to hold'
vict()ry as his Whenhe to the placetourge highnational
however, he m.lfst lookbeyondvictoryt6the morebasicobjectives
whichbroughthis nationinto war. 'Theultimate6bje'divEi'ofwar is not sim.ply
victory, but the wellbeing ofthe llation. The objective for the nation is not
the destructionofthe enefuy: bU:fthe pr6tectionofits own security andthe
restorationofjustice,freedom, andpeace. Failuretqlookbeyond the im.-
ofthe enetriy'toth'e polittcarconsequences is the reason
Americans found thenlosing the peace.
Was victory 'more cornpietethan:'iti'WbrldWar 1I? Did it bring security
andpeace?
Bec!lus,ethe"'flElm.Y,forces rerna.inedintact, manyAinericans haVe)ex-
pres.sedthe o;efnion'tha;twe lostthecoMHet in Korea.' Ifvictorymeatitthe
'otalft-iortl,i. Korea the destructionofthe Cllines'e
,armies; thent):uly'hwas 1l;ot ':eutwhatobjectivedidth:e,trhited
States have in korea fit ;.ras to stop the comri\.uni'8I:aggressiotd,gairist
42
South Korea. That objective was achieved. Holding ourselves to the original
objective, clearlythe UnitedStates andher UnitedNations allies won a vic-
tory in Korea. In war a stalemate is a victory for the defensive.
"The ultimate objective of all opel' il.tions"mightbetterbe
statedas being the destructionof the enemy's capability orhis willtofight.
SIMPLICITY
Simplicity,,is a principle which may offer some va.lue most of the time,
but even it is pot to be acceptedunquestioningly for all occasions. If every-
one hadinsistedon following the rule of simplicity, there probably would
have been110 ail'borne operations during World War II. Itmay be arguedthat
airborne attacks made no decisive contributions to Americanbattle victories.
But ifthey did contribute somet)ling to the successes in Sicily, Normandy,
Holland, or Corregidor, itwas not because they offeredthe simplestof the
possible courses of action. 'On the contrary t)ley'were highly complexunder-
takings.
Again, the simpleplanm<!'ybe too o1:)vious to the Itwas,"impos-
sible"for the Japanese to move allthe way down the Malay Peninsulato
Singapore- -so of course that is the v.. FY r.oute they used.
It is saidthatthe final of a plan is its execution. ' And so itis for
that particularplan, but its SIlCCeS!! does,not ]"ul,e Putallthe alternative
plans beenevert, more succe8$ful. Toofrequently we.tlmd
tojustifyour militarydoctrine witht4e unassailable statement, "Well, we
won the war, we,?" when it is CJ.uite conceivable members,and
in(iustrialrllsoUrCe!! those ofthe Allies, the.Germansmight
have bllen fully as succjlssfulwithtpei
r
doctrinlls of airpower,for luSt'ance,
as were tPe Britispq,n<,i withtheirs. .,.
,'
UNI1:+OF COMMAND
:." ..."-" " .. ',0_"" '.:; ,'i-'
.... '. .. ,:'i .' "'" '. " .. ,:- -'.. , _; .': .. ",: " " , :," .', i .. ..: ',:,-, .. " .', ' .
111 football, simple ,systems freql.iently.pave been successful.
':'-C'_';, -,.:L- ", ::.; " ,'" , .. .", ' ",',
Butwitpthe right personnel, highly c"oJiXl,;plllx have at
be,Iil11spectaculilrly succes,sful. So mjiy}tbjl toowith offenljive .
systems in battle. '
Untty of would be,one.of those truis!T':s to
.everyonewereitrtqtviolatedWithS,1f<;:), frequenc;y.," mspiteof
pverseils s s uMble
un>lecl PClltt).1'llap,d pr;,tAA theUp1tedStq,te s. 91n<;"1'{' 91'1<1 W,..r 11
the Air fromthe Principle of uPft{
c.'.... '. .... .. .. " '., .. , , .. - .... _".' "'.', ', .. '.,'. .. ,
43
whenever it means assigning combat elements to the control of an officer
of another service. 'There stillisno unified commarid over aircraft and
parat'roops inairborne operations. Apparently, the Air Force has COme
to accept the idea of unity of commandfor air defense, withArmy antiair-
craft units under anAir Force commander, but air officers show great
reluctance to see tactical air units put under commandof the ground forces
commander whomwhey are supposedto be helping with close support
missions.
Evento this principlethere may be justifiable exceptions in cases where
there is no officer presenthaving knowledge ofthe capabilities and limi
tations,of elements of other thanhis ownwhich are to cooperate
in some particular situation. In spiteofits usualweaknesse s, cooperation
may be more effectivesometimes thanunified command. Each commander
of cooperatingforces mayfeel a certain sense of responsibility ofwhichhe
wouldbe relievedwere the sole re'sponsibility placed on a single pair of
shoulders.
THE OFFENSIVE'
Perhaps the mostdeeply imbuedof allprinciples ofwar', atleastas far
as American officers are concerned, is the principle ofthe offensive. It is
saidthat a decision canbe \!\l0n only through attack.. The only excuse for
as\'],lmitlg the defensive: .' ..istogaintime pending the development of more
favorable conditions for undertaking the offensive, or to economize forces
on one front for the purpose of concentrating superiorforces for a decisive
actionelsewhere.
To imply that defersive actions never have been decisive, but at best
have 011.lyset the stage for decisive countetoffen'sives, ignoresthe record of
history."Ofthe Fifte;en Decisive Battles ofthe Wotld On which Sir Edward
""rote, atleastLOwere defensive victories intheir strategic ortacti-
caias.pects, or inboth. While itis tr],le that therewere localattacks.onthe
part othe victors, in varying degrees, at Marathon, atthe defeat of the
atSyrac],lse, the cl.efeat of Hasdrubal atthe Metaurus, the defeat
" '. F".' .':....... >".' .... : ;' :,'.' t. ':. ,', t, "::', ,'><
of Varus anq bytn.e Cermans, tIfe checking ofAftilaandthe Huns.
byRom.ansand a+Ch:a.lonS,inPeferthe Great's victory over Charles
XIIgfSwedenat Fultowa, arid,rtSaratoga; eachofthose engagements.repre-
enemY' After the defe.atofthe '
the Syracusanslladno'thoughtoflauriching an inva!siOri 6fAthens
to make.the victory decisive.
his court:", from Pultowa. Charles Martelgaineda decisive
victory, whenhis defen,8e, stoppedthe at Tou'rs; the defeat ofthe Spanish
Armadawas essentiafiy a deCisive victory for.' the-defense';,and so too was tne
44
successful defense of the FrenchRevolutionaryArmy againstthe Prussians
atValmy. Gettysburg alsowas a decisive defensive victory (of course it
is true that ittook offensive action to bring the Civil War to a successful
terminationfor the North).
"SPIRIT"
The "offensive spirit"virgually ruinedthe FrenchArmy in World War
1. One of the advantages ofthe offensive is saidto be the higher morale
which it inspires in the t:t:oop.s. After the succession of costly, useless
Frenchassaults againstthe German defenses in1915-17, however, the of-
fensiveinspired mutiny inthe troops rather than spirit. Indeed, a command
in whichthe offensive ideahas been oversoldmay actually be inviting low
morale onthe part of its soldiers when forced to go intoa "temporary"de-
fensive situation. The lowering ofmorale may corne, not simply because
the unit no longer is aqvancing andthe doughboy may stay in the same place
for a few days, but because menhave been convincedthatvictory and
,success can come only with the offensive; therefore, the assumption ofthe
defensive must meanthat some catastrophe is impending or atleastthat
victory and success have beenpostponed. This feeling was evident among
menofthe ThirdArmywhen they hadto revertto the defensive in Lorraine
in September1944.,
Moreover anenemyknown to believe that ot11y attack'can winputs
selfat a disadvantage against a wily andmor.e broadmindedfoe who willthen
layhis own plans accordingly.
MASS
The principle of)nass reqJ1irElsfurthel,", coI>sideration. Again'itis
essentialto leave the.door.open for.mMy eX:ceptions. Unquestionii;lg ac-
ceptance ofthis principle,may]:le. worse thanhaving noprinciple at
Evenin discussing.old, traditioJ:1,always ofwarfare is.necessary
on this point'.
,Itmaybe fatal, for instance, to b:}f!":t:tor forces,before a
superior enemy. Washingtonwas anxious ,toaV'oi\:lthe CoIlcentration of all
the smallAmericanforces in Charleston,Sovth. whent:heB:dtish
threatenedthatkey city in1780 lest the
loss,ofallhis fo.rces. The concen,tratiop. not strong to
ac:hieve .the intendeqpurpose maygef.atl!-1,"., ; , ,", '
'I, : "\'. '-".
In othersitua,tionsitis J:1,ecessa,ry.,to;t;V'otd concentrations oftroops in
- .. :." '.- ',"-',-', ',}x',' .U."':;,-' ", ;... ", .. ,- '_ ,"-';":.\,y
place.s where SJ1pplY'lUld trlUlii!POJrtl!'tiSm be .. ,In
45
1758 General James Abercrombie delayed his attack against Canada by
way of Lake George and Lake Champlain until 20,000 colonial troops
could be added to his force at Fort Edward. Further delays wereneces-
sary to get up the supplies, horses, wagons, and boats necessary to
transport the supplies for supporting this bigger force'. He thus lost the
advantage of the earlier spring which would have permitted him to be mov-
ing northward while the French remained bound in Montreal. In this case
he might have had greater success had he been more determined to move
quickly, and less concerned about massing his forces'.
The winters when Washington's miserable army suffered most for
want of prOVisions and clothing were those when it was concentrated at
Valley Forge and then at Morristown. The situation was quite different
in the winter of 1778-79 when the infantry was divided between camps at
Danbury, Connecticut, and West Point, New York, and the cavalry was
spread out all the way from Durham, Connecticut, to Winchester, Virginia,
and Middlebrook, New Jersey, with the size of each garrison determined at
least in part by the availability of supplies.
It frequently may be the case too that scarcity of supply and trans-
portation facilities will make' advisable a division of forces for offensive
operations. In Ainherst'smasterliJ.l campaign against Montreal in 1760,
British forces moved by three widely separated routes - -down the Saint
Lawrence from Lake Ontario, northward by way of Lake Champlain, and
up the Saint Lawrence from Quebec. Such a division of forces permitted
the advance on Montreal to begin without waiting for a concentration of all
the forces, it made use ef Widely separated supply and transportatien faci-
lities without overtaxing any of them, and it cut off any French retreat to
the west. '
In'modern warfare' the principle of ma'ss becomes more questionable.
The hnportance of mass in parachute drops M.d been stressed in plans for
during World War II. However, high winds and other
factors caused plans to go awry bver Sicily for the82d Airborne Division
and paratJ!06pers weresc'atteredas' much as 60 miles apart, all the way
from 'Noto to Licata. About one-'eighth of the parachute force landed in
front of the 1st DivTsion, as'pianned. Nevertheless most of the assigned
missions wobre accomplished;' and'rnuch unplanned for assistance was 'given
in ir6nt' of the 45th British and Canadian unit's a.s well,'
Allied oice'rs were1:littei'1y disappointed with the operafion. 'Ge'rinanswere
tremendoUsly impressed(byit. ' Ids possible that the scatte'reddrop was'
more e1eetive in disrupting the' enemy than would have be'en a 'drop massed
according'to plan.
Again in Normandy parachute units were scattered over 40 miles
up and down the Cotentin Peninsula, but they were effective. German
plans for moving against concentrations of paratroopers
were of little use when few concentrations could be found. Commanders
preparing to rush out in one direction were distracted by firing of scat-
tered paratroopers in another direction. In some situations it is con-
ceivable that an airborne division deliberately scattered all over an
enemy's communication system might accomplish far more than a massed
division dropped directly into a battle position.
When we. come to a consideration of atom bombs, the principle of
mass begins to sound completely out of place. On one hand it seems to
make .little sense to speak of concentrating atom bombs. If an enemy had
20 hydrogen bombs at his disposal for an attack against the United States,
would his most effective use of them be to drqp them all in the area New
York--New Jersey-.-Philadelphia? Or, might it not be much more effect-
ive to scatter them all across the country, o.ne each at such places as
Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Detroit, Binning-
ham, Chattanooga, Cincinnati, Indianapolis, Chicago, Sault Sainte Marie,
Saint Lquis, Kansas City, 11/1i!'lneapolis, Denver, Seattle, San Francis co,
Los Angeles, and San Diego? On the O,ther ,hand the prospect of faciJ:.lg
atomic artillery and guided missiles and bombs. makes it mOre imperative
than ever that military forces and military facilities b('> widely dispersed.
ECONOMY OF FORCE
Economy 0' force "is a corollary to the principle of mass." This is
a principle which needs a new emphasis. It is a necessa,ryprinciple, we
are told, in order to permit the concentration of forces at another pl;a..ce.
The principle of economy of force is one which should be extended t'lthe
conduct of war itself. It should be extended to include. Saint 'f!
principle thiLt only So much forc'il rnust be applied as is ;requiredto attain
the oPjectiv('> .. Such e:x;trayaganc\,s as the dropping of.,5,0 many
bombs on the Cologn('> ar('>a ill D('>cemb('>r 1944 as was to do the
job of knocking out th\, transportation system (according tq th('> United
States Strat('>gic Bombing S\lrvey) seem inexcusable., is. difficult to find
justification for the destr.uction of St. Lo on,thenight of 6 -7 Jun('> 1944.
Presumably as a part of their effo;rt to isolate th('> .!i,q,rmandy battlefield,
American airmen, bombed St, .L.o heayily at 20PO, 6 Jun,e, then more devas-
tatingly shortl;)" after 2400. But thatw;a.s. l'1.0tenO\:lgh, . Th('>y returp.edat,
0300 and agai!'l at 0.500 to bomb this al;rea,dy, q('>stroyed to,wn,yvhich
had, no war ind1.lstries, was no keytr;a.n:spo;rtation center, and from.
most of the German troops had withdrawn.
47
Many people seemto operate on the principle that anything which
hurts the enemy or bringsdestructionupon llim is to be encouraged.
Again, victory is equatedwith total destruction of the enemy. Any'des-
tructionbeyondthatwhich contributes directlyto the objective is unwise,
for itonly makesweirsethe postwar problems which will have to be met;
it is inexpedient for ittends toarouse resentment onthe partof allies
and defiance onthe partof enemies; andit is immoralbecause it claims
the lives and theway ofliving of people beyond evenwhat might be justi-
fied in terms of militarynecessity, or certainlybeyondwhat should be the
basic objective of restoring justice andpeace.
SURPRISE
Surpriseis another of those principles which seems to be almost a
universaltruism, but even here exceptions mustbe admitted. There are
times when it may be an advantage to advertise one's strength, andeven
one's intentions. When Henry Bouquet marched into the Ohio country in
1764toput Pontiacls uprising, he was able toaccomplishhis mission
withouta battle, simplybymarchi.ng a sizable force of1,500 menboldly
throughtheh
7
ar
t
ofthe territo1'y, andthendraWing his troops up in
full displaybefore treaty negotiations. , The Alliedpractice later inWorld
War nofdroppingwarningleaflets on cities be!ore bombing servedto
demonstrate completeAllied supe:riority. "Warning leafletsdropped on
St. where there were no flak batteries, andwhenthe GermanAir Force
was neai'lYimpot,mt, mi.ght have the livEis OfFrench civilians with
very risk
SECURITY
Certainlyfew'wOllld for security so that one's
o""cnfe";ces willnot be subjecttbsurprise. Here the problemis nottopoint
out' but to impro''';'ethe applicationofthe principle.
Following what has corne to be traditionalAmericanintelligence doc-
trine, the explanatory statementofthis principle says: Adequate security
against surprise requires a correct estimate of enemy capabilities .....
Time and againwe are toldin our intelligence schools, "Weare in-
terestedindetermining the enemy's capabilities; we are not mindreaders,
andwe do not want to go off on a tangent oftrying to figure out his intentions."
Yes, capabilities are important, but is that enoughto give us security? Of
whatuse is intelligence if we cannotestimate the enemy's intention? The
failures ofAmericanintelligence inrecentyears have been spectacular. We
48
might knpw very well ,that the Japanese ,ll.recapableof Jaunching an attack
anywhere ill the Pacific, but what good does that do if we cannot find out
that they .intending to attack Pearl Harbor? All kinds of intelligence
reports are marsha,lled to show us thi;Lt it ,had been correctly estimated
," .. ,', ... ' , '. 'C.': ,.' , .
that th!l, Germ;l.nswere c;l.pable of lal,tnching a,n through the Ar-
dennes inPecember but what good did they do Us when we .:.vere
unable tp finq out the German intentions?, On the other hand the Germans
knew that the Allies were ca,pable of ,invading the European cost anywhere
from the Bay of Biscay to the North Sea, but they could not defend equally
everywhere, so what good did it ,clO tJ;lem? Everyone knew that, the North
Koreans were capable of attacking South Korea in 1950, but we had not
learned their intentions and we we,re surpJ:ised. Everyone knew, too, that
the Chinese were capable of attacking across the Yalu River in November
1950, but we did not learn their intentions and were sur,prised again.
.. . '" . .
'-"
CONc<LU,SION
" . '.
The war, course, ,still sound, b,ut it is doubtful
whethf!rthey shquld bepresenteq,as, l,ttlexceptionable principles, unalterable
maxims, i1-:><;ipms; 'n1.0difications, 'or impJ:ove-
ments n1.ay be f,OUllel fOr ,e:-rery one,c:>them, ,;l.pcl, they should be admitted and
discussedfrankly., To teach yound o;ficers that there are universal rules
.' ".',. . :. ,'0;" r,_., ,j ;. . >J" '. " . . ' ' . . .
ma.y beaciisservice to, that which is for
mee,ting newsitu;l.tions. An of,icer, shol,tld be marked
down J?l,trely on the ground that A departs from the, nOrmal application of a
principle of war. If he' can that his solution will
contribute more toward the basic objective although it deviates from the tra-
ditional principle of war, then his paper should be marked upward, not down-
ward. The undeJ:lying principle that illuminates the principles of war should
be boll'limag\t:la.ti\ln. N9 idea, ;s99'lld be, ,top faIltastic 0;1' to be
rejected 'ff,J;ich the
development ofboldima.ginat,ions4puld be modified. That lI}cludes presen-
,.') -'.',,:".' '. i .. '. . ',:. "," " ' .1; ,',...... " .. ,
tations of the principles of war.' '
,; ,
"
, J;
,r.. :
'(Ii,'"
APPENDIX 4 TO LESSON I, CA S'UBCOURSE 33
The following is a reproduction ofa presentationInade by Dr. Bernard
Brodie of The Rand Corporationto COInInandandGeneral Staff College on
7 March1957. The views expressedinthis presentationare Dr. Brodie's
andnot necessarilythose ofthe DepartInent ofthe ArIny or the U. S. ArIny
CivilAffairs School.
Dr. Brodie: "GentleInen, when I was invitedhere lastyear, for the
first tiIne, to speakonthis saIne subject,. 1 felt constrainedto write to
General Davidson, who had extendedthe invitation, to tellhiInthat he Inust
have Inade a Inistake. Itwas not that I was unduly Inodest, Or that I didn't
want to COIne, but rather that I was aware ofthe ideas which are generally
standardat institutions like this one concerning the principles ofwar, and I
knewthatthose views I had given expressionto inprinthadnot beenin
harInonywiththat standardeonception. I deducedfroIn General Davidson's
replythat ifthe adIninistrationofthe College hadInade a Inistake, they weren't
going to adInit it. That explains lastyear. Nowthis year, well, General
McGarr is an oldfriend- -we' s'ervedat the National War College together--
and old soldiers areknown to be sentiInental.
"Iunderstandthat you have alreadyhad some lectures onthe princi-
ples ofwar, andthatyou,are familiar'withwhat'is IneantWhen one princi-
pIe or another is Inentionedbyname; tt'hatincidentally deInonstrates one
ofthe ways in whichthe conceptionofprinciples is Inostuseful. It gives
us a sortof short-hand, wherein a Inere phrase can convey a very considera-
ble body ofthought andmutuaLunderstanding, which is of course charac-
teristic of'specializedvocabul:aries in all sciences. The function of a jargon
is, to be sure, frequen1l1y abusedby scholars who have forgotten how to
write or think inEnglish;,
" I shouldlike to s.ay a few things about how the general ideaof "princi-
ples,ofwar"evolved. LetIne fir'st atte'Inpt to make confusion less confounded
bypointing outthatthe woord "principles"Inayhave one oftwo Ineanings. In
its ,broader sense itInay rrieansiInply a weltunderstoodand commonly
acceptedphilosophy concerningthe gove'rnaneeofstrategy. I thinkthat was
what was intendedby the older writersClln strategy, who often referredto
the principles ofwar without atteInpting to,name or evento define them; ln
itsnarrower and Inore recent sense, however, the words "principles ofwar"
are intendedto meana body.ofaxioIns,or maoohns,usuallynumbered,'the
number orarely exceeding tenor eleven, each'ox\.egenerally'express'edin'a
single sentence"lOr evem. inanincoInplete,s'entence; I am'ree'l;":Jring,to,such
,phrases as, "theprinciple oLc;oncentration," Oll'the ','principle.of ,the offensive,"
50
and so on. I intend,to talkabout the prinCiples ofwar under both concepts;
that is, first as a generalbody ofknowledge and secondly as a particular
list of maxims, but mostlyunder the latter, because I thinkthat ia what
was inte,ndedinthe invitation extendedme.
"Military science or strategyis boththe oldest andatthe same time
the leastdeveloped ofthe human sciences. Upon a little r'eflection, it is
not at all remarkable that it should be so. The fact that it is so ancient
means that its pursuit muchantedates the modern scientific age, in which
we feel uncomfo1rtable without an elaborate body of analyticallaws for
every,major department ofhumanknowledge. ,Thefa'ct ,that the di,rectionof
warwaa for many centuries, the calling exclusively of'princ,es and ofthe
aristocracy certainlyhelpedto keep itnonintellectual. Andby the time the
modern scientific age arrived, there was already enoughthatwas esoteric
about the practice ofwar to encourage scholars, withveryfew exceptions,
toleave itto the professionalsoldier . The soldiers themselves,onthe
other hand, tendedto do rathe:r little writingthemselves. For good and
obviousreasona, generalship is,noLa scholarly callingI 'Infact, there is
something ablOut it which is basically'inoompatibelwitha s,cholarly tem.,
perament. The soldier has always,pridedhimself onbeing a man ofaction"
ratherthan oftheory. He values suchqualities as the abilityto lead l'nen
to gras,pinstinttivelythequaUties and intentions,ofhis opponent,; tore-
solve onaplan ofaction, prefe,rahle s,imple;,"and'to stickto itthroughfair
weathe,r andfoul. 'These are,rare qualities,andnohle ones, but they are
not scholarly in,,char a:cter.
"Historkally, the mbst,intellectual and scholady,of our,generals and
ad:rn:irals have notbeenthe most success,ful. Th,ere,hav,e" (i)f ,course, been
exceptions,,, One notable excej,Jtion'ia the elde,r Von Moltke, the,manwho
ledthe PrussianArmythrough the brilliantly successfuLwats,of,Ge'rman
unification., He was Prussian Chief ofStafffor over 30 years (they didn't
thenbelie'leiXl rotationwhentheyhad a good man),and.yet'lo.e'wasamanof
,quite,e'xceptiorially;scholarlyattainme,nts" As,a ,matteil' off;a,ct,! as a young
manhee,ail1ned, schoolby Gib,)l!on,tom the''English
into the',iGe rman. ,ililut, hi.s ,,!col'ltetnporary,,our ownGener,al.Hall.e ck, who'wasi
knO,wn inthe ',' onii\'lt:e:r11.ilitional
law, and,who,'for atime"was"ge,ne,:L'al,.!i>n''clo.ief,during o.ttr Civil'Wat, was far,
fromheingconspkuo1!lisly,S'Ucce,s,s:uJ;.;al!,a"g,enetral.
'"1
"AdmiralAlhedThaY61r,,MaJajj.n".",per,haps thelmost scholarly, $Jndin-,
" ce.r,gi,' als oacknowl.edged!him'seildn:;.
his',autobi(J),g:raphy to,he lratheri'tms.uiteodt",rnpermental1y.for themil4tarcy
his'last command 'at sea, llIsi.iconmm.a,1'licliing',
officer ofthe cruiser "Chicago,"he got a badfitness reportfromhis superior.
Much inkhas been,spilled'overtheques,tionwhether'or nothe deservedto
get a badfiftressreport, butthe question i'sreallytotally irrelevantto
Mahan' !I, stature a:satheorist'of naval. str'ategy;
"I think it is fair to state that among the historic writers on strategy
there has been only one mind ofthe veryfirst rank--that of Karl von
Clausewitz. 'Therehave beena: few'other'S ofhigh but still secondary status,
like Jornihi,DU'!picq, Mahan andDbuhet, ahd'they are scatteredOver a
centuryoftim:e; even so, thehumber remains rather small.' One som:etimes
wonderedhow the boayofideas'or rutes that we now call "prineiples"was
in fact transmittedthr()ughthe'ages." There is nb'doubt'that certainbasic
doctrines were somehowkept alive fromancient days, or, if not kept alive,
then sOlnehow rediscoveredorithed,asisofComm:ort sense and discermnent.
1,\"
"If, or'exarnple', oneread!s Xeriophon's accourtt of,the, GreekExpedition
into Pe rs la', Elxpedition of the q 0,000 as'it issomethne s called.'one finds
inthe rathc!;r'frequerttspeeJ::hes(ofthe G1'eekgeneralstotheir,mereenary
troops views expressedthat are very similar'to"som:e ofthose we now called
principles of war. So far as we know, there were no lists of principles of
those days. ,'irrgerter':tl;t'h'e 1'Ule's of'corre'ct act!onseem:to havebeehac-
qui redbothbY"irtdividiJ'al e'xp,,'rienceandbytheoridadvice of ene's elders"
andthat'is'not'jjo unti:sua1.or'rernarkable"if'one,'cons,ider,",thatthatis the
waywis'dom'about'stt<ietly,pe'l'Sonalcortdl!lctis't\i:o',ansmitted;evetil. today. While
we know thatthere is a greatartd!corit:inua'i!lyidevelct>pi,ngibedyof,knowledge',
concerninghuman conduct, including the whole field of psychoanalysis, the
bestpradititlners bf'itheartbflivil'lgaridof'deaBhgwithothers are'rtdtalways
the ones whid<b.ow tnos't about it'on 'art intelle'ctual'MveL We recognizethe
exis'tEmce'of talent, orlaekbf'it, 1n'th'e pursuit o'fthat'art, as well as' inthe'
pur suit 'of the artS rndj'e'ldselY'pe rtaining toour,subj e ct of this mQrning.
"'f's'hould likertdW to'T',,'1iI!l"tn 'tio 'Cla.l!lsewitz}ustfora,m:dm.ent, imClTde1'
to cohside,r"the'orIgin''Of 'IDI.Ei"'si:l-Oldh!d '''pfiJidpleis'' Gf' war,"'" tlte"oi'iginal'ell1ci-
datfdn'6' Whith"!:i3 ,,' It fs t,f.tleithat:,ri1lfost'''()f''what
we pili'S'En"tlyllIll: "ffi'rin:dpl'e's"Mr\\l;l;t", "areto,'be found ir"eVea)ief! and dev,e1oped
in thil/t','gi'erkt',b6ok'df,)M$j,,,,nt'ithllfj"v:b'tW,'iK:r;i;ege;''''Glr ',,'OllH..W;ar1',;! Yehinthat
booR: he speclfical'lydenied'1iFlat"fheiie,:we':t<e'alny,su6Th t\hi>n.g'S urulesorprinci-
pIes, a denialfor which his 'J'otftl:n-if,'iilidok'l$1'l'l'''s
i
ever'ely:t'otask.
What Clausewitzmeantwas thatthe ideas abQut the conduct of.war that he was
trying.tddeve'Edp ahtl'elucidate'cCluil!<!l'ln'Ot %e' l'e'ducel:i'to
i
a,ew$irnpLe'and
te:t'se:J.y:Je<:Jtp,r;et;I sedrU!I!e$.' An ,if' Qtte;l',Ei,:ul;s'GIIl-Ws,ewdlt"I',,, din ltJn,e'if4ll:,tefll;1Nid'hat", ,
rathet,iehan:irt'ORe o,the,'Ile"erely,editedecl,dJti,ons,:thlLtfl1asbeen,l:'l'la,de..
avai1'l:tble',' bne''S'ee$'why that; 1$;'$0'.: s''as i:hucililocoric\ll rrte c;lw:i&h ,a];l
the ql1il.lii'c'at16n's'atitle:itcepti'on'te>"the' i,fuasi (j "ide'a' lie has'lilOCptr e!l sed, ,; ,as.. with
52
the original ideaitself. He apparently consideredone no more valid
thanthe other. and inthis he reveals his greatwisdom. His latter-day
editors. who thinkthey do a great service by deleting allthe qualifica-
tions andexceptions, have failed to understandthe measure ofhis
greatness.
''In Clausewitz, one finds innumerable wise andvalidthoughts. but
no single rule. except perhaps the recurrentinsistence thatthe pursuit
of war ought to be politicallypurposeful- -thatthe political objective should
guide the military conduct ofthe war. That happens tobe the one great
ideathathas almostbeenforgotten inthe lasthundredyears.
"What of Jomini, who reproachedClausewitz for denying the exis-
tence ofprinciples? Well. one finds Jomini arguing thatthere are indeed
principles of strategy. yet overa verylong life which covereda great
many publications. he newer settleddown to elucidatingjustwhat they were.
Certainly one does not find inhis writings anytable ofnumbereditems. such
as we are so familiar withtoday.
"Coming closerto our own time, we found that the manwho was later
to become the supreme Allied commander of World War I alsowrote,
earlier inhis career. a number of books on strategy, one ofwhichwas
actually called. "The Principles of War." Butevenin Foch'l;l pook ofthat
title. one stillfinds no listing of spe cific rule s.
"Iamnot myselfa sufficient scholar inthe history ofthe principles
ofwar to know exactlywhenthese listings were developed. Youhave had
in this College a Colonel Fallwell, who inan excellent article he published
in the May1955 issue oiy-our MilitaryReview on this very subject quotes
a revealing remarkbyGeneral Fuller. General Fullerrelates how, in1911,
he readin a BritishArmedServiceFieldRe.gulation that "The
principles ofwar areneither veryn\lme.rous, nor inthemselves veryab-
struse" thathe had searchedortheminvain. SPll:rredqn bythe need
for validprinciples. General Fullerfinally evolvednine.,priI).<:iples, and in
1923 he hadthe satisfactionof seeing most ofthemp,riI).ted inthe Service
Manual. Whether ornot this is actuallythe 1don't know. But we
cantake it as beingat least.roughly so.
"ColOnelFallwelltells us also inhis verynneartic1ethatwhile.
referencel;l to lIthe fundamental principlel;lofwall,"o<:o.Uer earlier, the firl;lt
actua11is.ting of suchprinciples inU. S. training'n:'I.anuals isfound inthe
TrainingRegulations10-5of1921, Which simply:gave the names oftheprinci-
pIes without explanation. ApPllirentlythis 9fknowledge was sc;>me:thing
53
everyone possessed. 'This list wasrescind:ed ,in 192,3. The ,Field Service
Regulations of 192,8, on the other hand, treated the principles without naming
them. It was not until the 1949 edition of Field Manual 100 -5 that we have
an American officiaTA:rmy publica:tionthat both names and discusses the
principles of war. Note that is witHin 'our present decade.
"Perhaps one reason for the'long delay in the c<l>dificationof the
principles of war'i's that the modern age is characteristically the age' of the
encapsulation of learning,' so that one may take it quickly, painles-sly, and
the:refore withoutinterfering with more important pursUits. This is the
era of the survey
,
course ih theCdlleges, of the Reader's Dige'ston the
newsstands, and of the one-page briefing sheets in government offices.
Mind you, I 'do not object to these things. They are unquestionably neces-
sary fbi' abusy man,and,therefore presumably for' good government. I
am notoneofthos'e who believe that a little knowledge is necessarily a
dangerous thing. A little knowledge may be,valstly better than no knowledge
at all, especially since I have not observed that complete ignorance on a
subject necessarily makes inenmere humble or' cautious in their opinions
on that subject'. I have 'also' seen caseswl:>.er,eoonCliensations of a report
conta'inedmore wit and wisdom than 'the ful1,r,eport,., In,fillct, I have written
such condensations of my own 'writings. Howllver, I have ,always felt that
where a single page actually succe'eded inben'veyiilg what ha,sbeencllmtained
in twO hundred, then someone had permitted himself to ,be' awfully lax with
time and words. Certainly; when I come tocritici,z:e the principles of war,
as I shaliido p'ro!lsently, I will charge them withatteimpting. ,to pr.esent in far
too co.ndensed a form the knowledge that has been acquired through much
time and hard experience.
""j '>; .', ;,)
'fLetus firsts'at'th'e' favdrable'tIl.i:ngstha.t de'se:rve to be said. If we
taRe the tisual listil'\!gof' thk'S0 J<i:all!ed: principlll{l !,of wa:r, in the form of
severtfdeleveh :i\.\irtJ,be:red itllirhs" ar.f esentialllY'I",o\l'lomon-
serts'e' piopdsftioris'; TheY'M.\(ea:lJl thE!' virtues,iof,commonsense. pr,opos.itions ,
whith othili' tJHings, 'that it .isllsefiiltorema,inaware,oftliem.
BeCil.us'e' they' a're \:!stlallY statediin 'brief and terse for1t1, theJ1 Jprt>vi<d\3' 'also
a ral:1I.e'!r ulibllt'il' 'll.elj;lingone the
foreftoht 'mind,' TIluch 'Ulile"the aigri"Think'" that we have, ,all seen on
the wallsof'mahy emces _-tJ:l.<ll1igh'perh8!Ps.IIi,Co1D.ldlhaye'Ill!J:<l>s'eID',a. futile
e,.;ainple. ,If we take')'i'or,.exarnple'i the idea om' tM,,'(\p;rip.cipleof cOnic,entr,ation, "
we,fthathilt the fue '9ft:&ose'th\L"ee\Voll'ds ('can help to remind ,the
gerie.ral.'tihat in war there'lai'e 1iRely't6Ybe onone's'r.e.
,s6urt'e's';'and <;>he'I1'1iist.b'e'stro:ngc.silllme
w
whe're" EitiaBle'$" one I t'O,'resi's'j!' l'Els s, delJ"lands ,;" It wiLL, ,1g., i
6\1'r
fi
g'efiIHal to) mind sotne of! his, ,own,
experience, as well as the vicario,us experience which one can gainfrom
the study ofhistory.
"Because the principles of war are really,commonsense propositions,
most ofthem apply equally to other pursuits inlife, including some which
at first glance seemto be prettyfar removedfromwar. For instance, if
a manwishes to win a maid, andespeciaUy if he is nottoo well endowed
withlooks or money , it is necessaryfor him to clarify inhis mindexactly
what he wants with this girl--thatis, the principle ofthe objective--and
then to practice rigorously the principles ofconcentrationofforce, ofthe
offensive, of economy offorces, and certainly of<;leception. Nor is it
necessarily damning to the principles ofwar thatthey are also applicable
to other pursuits. But it does being to suggest--andthis is the mainfea-
ture of my argument--thatthes'e principles are perhaps tooabstrac,t and
too generalto be very r:qeaningfulinthemselves, too devoid of content to
have any very specific application.
"To show you how abstractit cal'l. become, I must tellyouwhat
happene'd to the so-calledprinciple of "economy offor<;,es" ,sometijnes put
inthe plural and sometimes in the singular, "economy offorce,." W,hoever
it was who first propoundedthat principle in preciselythat language.ob-
viously had inmindthe 18th and19th century of word "econo-
my" which was very differentfrom thecopotemporary connotation. Today
the word "economy" simply means economizin,g o,r, skimping, altho,ugh in
former times it'Was much,more likelyto,'su,ggest,shrewdhus,bandry or
shrewdu'sage.
"Thus, inits original meaning the term "economyof forces," as ex-
plained even in so recent a pookas SirFr,ederickMaurice's "Principles of
War,"had the fOrce oianinjunction to use all one's r'esou:r,<;''i',s,th,at is" not
toletany gowasted. Therehave Peen many which one
sidelostbecause its commander, for one reaSOn to utilize
allthe resources availaMe to him. General JOe, Hooke,r IPs,t the,pattIe of
ChanceUorsville, in spite of a Lee,
mostlybecause he committedless than halt,h.is 'the battle., The
injunctionto use one's forces to the,fuUi's",lil;Par:tic1,11a:J;Iy<important one in
viewofthe'apparently'conflictingrrequi,remento,that, jl;l enterilJ,g,battle, a
oommander.shoul<;l seEhto itthll:t he"has,cel1,tll.iJa,iI'e,ser:,es which arenot com-
mittedtoo soon;., At shouldPe,usecl,
,Yet'Y.ou"a1'lql the principleS of
war,ClliscussedPYJpersons:wib'lll tP,O\lghtthaU;he'''i,JilJ,inciple,ofthe econojnY,Rf
f01'ce:s" meantshnplythat''One,a'hPulcl do:a:mHitaJt'Yjobwiththe lea,st fQ,r:cea
necessaryforthat'j'ob,. "Whehth:e,words<tlaq:)"rllm,ainthe same while tj:l.Il;'
5S
meaning is twisted to almost the exact opposite of what was originally
intended, one begins to wonder just how useful was that phrase.
"lncidentally, 1 am told by one of my friends, a physicist, that
there has been a comparable twisting of the meaning of one of the words
in the familiar phrase: "the exception that proves the rule." My friend
was often troubled by that phrase because, being a scientist, he couldnot
see how an exception could ever confirm a rule. He looked into it and
found that the word "prove" as originally used has the less common con-
notation of "testing;" in other words, the phrase was originally meant to
mean "the exception that ~ the rule," which, of course, makes a great
deal more sense.
"I suggested a few minutes ago that one fault of the usual list of
principles is that it represents too much condensation of wisdom, ,or perhaps
tends to conceal the absence of wisdom. I take my example from a list
of ten principles of war adopted within the last decade by the Canadian Chief
of Staff Committee for use in the guidance of the Canadian armed forces.
Number seven on that list is our old friend "economy of forces," only this
time it is given the somewhat different name: "economy of effort." I want
to say first of all that the connotation is ,in this instance correct, or at least
in line with traditional use 0' But how do they explain its meaning?
"In reading the statement verbatim, I am going to emphasize certain
WOrds which are not italicized in the original text. "Economy of effort"
implies a balanced employment of forces and a jUdicious expenditure of all
resources with,the object of achieving an effective concentration at the
decisive time and place. "
"I submit, gentlemen, that the problem is precisely to know what a
balanced force should properly be in the present day. With all the new
weapons and techniques that are crowding upon us, the same thing is ture
for all the other words I emph3isd:zed. ,What should their specific meaning
be in this terribly baffling age of ours - -baffling in rn3iny respects, but baffling
above all in respect to the profession to which yOll are committed?
"This brings me nOw to what I consider the chief dange}' of the princi-
ples of war as usually stated, which is that they tend often to be regarded not
3iS axiOms or 'as common sense propositions, but as r l i i ~ u s dogrn3is . That
is what one might expect of a list. of rules or dicta which are offered as a.
substitutefork<nowledge gained the hard way--that is, by experience imple_
mented by reading'and re'lection.
56
"Let me now give you an example of where adherence to the principles
of war resulted in what I think is generally acknowledged to have been a
grave blunder. Out of many examples available. I shall use one from World
War II, and, with deep regret. one that is American-made.
"The memoirs of the commander of the Third Fleet at Leyte Gulf.
Admiral William F. Halsey. tell how he arrived at his main decision in the
battle of October, 1944, which in terms of the number of tonnage of ships
engaged was not only the greatest naval battle of that war but of all time.
We cannot say it was the most decisive battle of the war. because by that
time the Japanese were pretty well licked, and some of them knew it. Never-
thele s s, it was the climatic experience of the Pacific war.
"When the three separated enemy forces had been located, and when
it was clear that the southern-most of the Japanese .forces would be taken
care of by Admiral Kincaid quite adequately. Admiral Halsey drew up .for
himself three alternatives with respect to the other two forces, the one
coming through San Bernardino Strait and. the other far away to the north.
Fi 31st, he could keep his entire force concentrate.d off the mouth of San
Bernardino Strait; second, he could divide his .force.s keeping one portion
off San Bernardino Strait and sending the remaining force north to counter
Admiral Ozawa's fleet; and third, he could.send his'entire force northward
against Ozawa. I am not necessarily giving them in the same order in which
he presents them in his memoirs, but those are the three alternatives he
considered. He tells us that he rejected the first of these alternatives, that
is, staying off San Bernardino Strait (I'll shortly tell you why), and then he
rejected the se.cond one because it conflicted with the principle o.f "concen-
tration of force." And so he chose his third alternative, that of throwing
the whole force against the northernmost enemy force, which meant throwing
ninety ships against sixteen, t40s.e.s:ixteen being individually much inferior
to their counterparts among our ninety !
"We now ;know that Ozawa's mission was itO lure the Third Fle.et
northwallnil, bilt that he himself thought that his forces were not strong enough
to serve that decoy mission. Logically, he was right. But, nevertheless,he
did succeed.
"The' Americancomm8J!l:der finally broke with the principle of
tration of force . After he :had 'sent his fo;rce threehundre d mites, .northward,
and when hissixnewbaA!tles4ips were. within forty,.ive"miles from their
targ'et, he was finally induced to turn them arouhd, 8elild t4em south again.
.After stopping to refuel his destroyers, he r,ushed 'on, ap,ead, with the,faste;r
"Iowa" and "New Jersey." The force that he was sending ahead at this time
was now much inferior to that which he hoped to catch.
57
"The principle of concentrationofforce is intendedto suggestthat
one should,so allocate ones forces that one canhope to be superiorto
the enemy somewhere, preferable ata decisive place--or atleastto mini-
mize ones inferiorityinthe decisive place, ifone has to be inferior. But
the Commander ofthe ThirdFleethadforces so overwhelmingly superior
to those ofthe enemythathe couldhave divided his forces betweenSan
BernardinoStraitandthe northand stillhave remainedoverwhelmingly
superiorlocallyto eachenemyforce. When one is overwhelmingly superior,
how much more superior does one want to get?
"Perhaps, inthe end, itwas a goodthing ithappenedthatway. If
those battleships hadwon a glorious naval victoryoffSan BernardinoStrait,
as I thinktheywouldhave done hadthey stayedthere, who knows how much
longer we wouldhave continuedto buildthe type afterward.
"I shouldliketo saya few words now about another kind ofaxiomor
maximwhichdiffers fromthe principle with a capital "P"inthatitis to
have the virtues of commonsense about it. This I shall callthe "slogan."
The sloganmay originate in experience or infancy, it may enthrall a par-
ticular service orthe whole professionof arms; but itin case tends to
become dogma, andtherefore to provide atthe momentof its ascendancy
the key to the basic decisions.
"Again, to give a naval example, throughout the whole latterhalfof
the nineteenth century, during a periodof greatexperimentation innaval
architecture, a very cOmmon axiominnaval manuals was "The ramis the
mostformidable ofallthe weapons ofthe ship." How didthataxiomorigi-
nate? Well, you remember the famous "Virginia"or "Merrimac" of our
own Civil War. Onthe first daythat she came outat Hampton Roads, she
rammedand sanka groundedFederalfrigate. I believe itwas the "Congress."
Throughoutthe remainder ofthe Civil War, numerous other attempts were
,made at ramming; none ofthem succeeded. Throughoutthe restofthe
nineteenth century almost all ofthe naval engagements that occurredwere
characterizedby attempts oframming. There was only one success in
battle, atthe battle of Lissain1866, whenthe destroyed shipwas again sta-
tionary inthe water. Incidentally, there was oQ.e success inpeacetime ina
Br.itishtactical maneuver inthe Mediterrainianwhere Admiral Tryonlosthis
flagship andhis life as wellas the lives ofabout 500 other men. The incident
is describedinthe movie called"KindHearts and Coronets."
"Some warships during thaterawere actuallybuiltas rams without
armament, anda1l1:lattlElships carrieda huge projectionatthe prow, below
the waterline, which.was intendedtobe a ram, aP.d whichalways effected
adverselythe handling qualities ofthe ship.
58
I
"Or take the slogan derived fromduPicq, the very brilliant officer
who met an untimely death in the first' few months of the Franco -Prussian ,
war. A much-quoted. statement frotn his writings was: "He will win who
has the resolution to advance." Du Picqderivedthis idea from a very
careful study of the battles of antiquity in which he discovered that the main
reason for the enormous disparities in casualties, between victor and van-
quished was that the latter hadturned and led. Soldiers can't fight facing
backwards, and since those who led were not more;. leet of foot than their
opponents, they not only lost the battle but also lost tretne;.ndously in human
life. Thus, du Picq concluded that the;. one thing an army must absolutely
do in battle is face forward, thus, the slogan: "He will \\lin who has the;.
reservation of advance;.." This slogan which was repeated again and again
in the;. years following his the;. fixed idea 6f an e;.xtremist
school in France prior to World War 1. It was used as an exhortation for
extre;.me;. adherence to the so -called principle;. of the;. offensive, and you find
it so used in Fodi's pre -war writings. 1 one wants to find examples of the;.
ruin of nations following from too-rigid adhere;.nce to principles with a capital
"P" , one Could tarry the principle of the offensive, especially
with the unhappy story of France in World War 1.
"But, to give you an instance of slogan from more recent
times, let me return to my example of Leyte Gulf. The reason Admiral
Halsey gave for rejecting the idea of staying off the San Bernardino Strait
was th<ti there was a slogan in the leet:, j''the enemy's main forces are
where his carrIers are. ',' Now, I submit that was true for
the preceding two, ye s of the war; but at the, time of Leyte Gulf, ,it was no
longer true. I submit also available t'o the leet which
indicated that it was rio longer true. We kn6wthe characteristics of the re-
maining enemy carriers at this time, and we knew they too puny
to be force. We could not, Of course, knowthattl'1eywere not
everi airplanes;but we should have known thatthemo?tplanes they
could fly far too smail be be decisive in any sense of the wor'd. We also
, :,'" , ,' .. '0..' :.".. c'':,,, .. ':" .. '. '''', :" .. ,'.. .. ,,: ", , / :.:. i .. ',," :, ':_
had sufficient expedence toknow that the Japanese forces at that
time like, what they in the first year
ofthe war. at Leyte Gulf the, s. Alain force in fact lay
where 'that wasjust too hard tdbelieve in view ofthe
dominance of the slogan. '
" ,,_ .... ,'., ..... ',' ,:.-, ,"",' "," .... ,_J.- '-":-":_", _',: ':,,' " .:'., .. :.. ..," "
"Incidentally, you have all heard an6therdogan that We might consiCler
fora , "Any gecision is better than nor-e." is supposed
to be ail: awful thing. I agree'thctt it is' an saythat any de-
cisi9hfs ,'[iette'rthan: none --wefl,if in afitl:ipafhe-
logical indecisiVeness for 24"irrours' have'been in the tight 'place
on the following day. "
59
"The slogan is objectionabl", o,r the same reason that an undue de-
ference to the principles of war is objectionable. It acts as a substitute
for thinking, and anY substitute for thinking is to be a bad ,substi-
what 1UY scien,tifi,c fri",nds call a p.igh-c,?nfidence
probability. The,.slogan fJ-. rig,idity ofthought, which. after all
is its purpos",.SuchrigiditY:n'lay also prevent tp.e realization of what
would otherwise be absurdly obvious. '
"Th",se ad1Uonitions, apply to all wa),ks and professions .of life and
not simply to the The medical profession to?llas it"]
slogans, a(il dO other prof",ssions, and they usually have the same stultifying
effect. But the wilitary, I think, have a special problem, because a
tary seryi<;:,ri\l a tightlyknit institution, ruled through hierarfhyof rank, '
the members of which generally share (more true in the past than in the
present, but nevertheless still true) a common kind of education, a common
association. ,Abo'leall, there is to test
their il;!",as about war between one war and the next. The slogan may indeed
repre a brilliant bcitif so, it is brilliantand insight-
fu1 only at its first utterance; when it becomes common currenc'y, it is al-
ready likely to be counte,l'feit.
'''I sh0;Uld sUbrnit1 tberefore, that on,:,. <;lithe first for a sound
strategy'is freedom from'the dominance '0 slogans. Let us rather I>tudy ,
history, the experience from which the slogan was derived. But, of course,
wh,en ,apout the virtues of his,t?ry, le,t)ls remember
also that we are now entering a world of markedly new and therefore unpre-
cedented ,al1Cl t!),at pa"]te:xperie?cr )'Iill oft':'n be a misleading guide
for the future. But I do believe that the past studied liberally and with free-
dom of spiritf"unis!J.es tp,,,,perspE1ctive,by which the future can be viewed
in a more just light. 'Anyway, witho'ut such perspective, we have nothing.
After all, what People fron,ci'lilians is a Prr speeti'Ie based
on your own experience and that of Y01.ir predecessors. Without this per-
spectiiYe,;t:':'J;1aye thecliches parade under name of
old and presumably unchanging principles. These cliches areals,?
by many to give us the conclusive answers in tomorrow's problem. Would
it we'!e .so. l;f it were so,thing"j wO\lld b,e 1'0 much easier. T,hank, you very
much. fI" A" . ", ,'. ',', '.'
",:( '1) Ii
;.":'!
60
EXERCISES
I. GENERAL SITUATION. The 80th Inf Div has recently been
activated at FORT GORDON, GEORGIA, where it is currently undergoing
training. Higher headquarters has directed that the staff officers of the
division receive refresher instruction on subjects appropriate to their
echelons of operations.
II. 'SPECIALSITUA.TION. You are Commanding General, 80th
Inf Div: The General and Special Staffs will shortly commence refresher
instruction on the fundamentals of combat. You have decided to address
this class with some introductorY,remarks relative to the principles' of
war, and youhave prepareda concise sentence which described the
ing of each of the nirte principles.
DIRECTIONS. The following questions are rnultiple choice type.
Each question has only one correct answer. Indicate your choice by placing
an "X" th;rough the appropriate letter on the answer sheet.
1. The principle of the objective is best described as
a. utilizing the available means and, effo:tt to' achieve a decisive,
obtainable goat. ' , , '
b. the sustained powe needed for a and eXploitation.
c. the impetus of the attack in increasedpressure on the enemy.
, " , ...
d. the early seizute of high gr,ound and critical
2. The,principle of the offensive 'is best
. a. ,h<l:ving the primary purpose of of
enemy personnel. ' "" ,., , ,
, .'.. '. >. ' , : -,' : ' : [ , ,
b. 'being especially suited to Arrno:r urifts<l:sAtmor has battle
field mobility and offensive shock action.
c. keeping the enemy off balance by planning and executing
operations which impose one's will on the enemy.
d. the closing with and final destruction of the enemy utilizing
fire and maneuver.
61
3. The principle of simplicity is best described as requiring
a. singleness of authority to produce maximum effort.
b. utilization of superiority to the point of decision.
c. a commander to keep the fewest number of separate units
in the attack.
d. uncomplicated plans and orders to permit common under-
standing.
4; The principle of unity of command is best described as
a. the establishment of a single authority to direct the inte-
gration of all elements of combat power to achieve maximurn effort.
,b. the proml!lil.gation of direct, simple plans and clear, concise
orders tom:inimize the confusion of combat and increase the chance of
success.
c. leadership, 'disCipline, andmo!'ale, as well as sound organi-
zation'tl!l' attain rnaximurn teil.rnwork.
d. directing all efforts toward carrying out a feasible mission
with minimurn loss of life.
5. The principle of mass is best described as
a. the combining ,,,,f <l:ombat arms into forces. in the proper
proportion to fight the tactical, situation.
b. the concentration 'of rneans at the decisive place and time
for a decisive purpose.
c. specifically li
rn
itingthe superiority to the point of deciJsion.,
d. placing the 'tnajlllQrity ioavailable units in the main attack.
! <; ') ,r
L,'"
62
6. The pdncip1e of the economy of force is best described as
a. the use o.f minimum power in a given area or areas in
order that major forces may be available elsewhere.
b. making the maximum use of firepower in lieu of military
forces.
c. the use of the minimum force necessary to accomplish a
given, n),ission.
d. a philosophy stipulating that the faster the units move and
accomplish their"m.issi.ons I the smaller will be their 10s.ses and the more
effective their gains.
7. The principle of maneuver i.s bestdescJ;ib",das
a .. ,creation of confusion in the enemy's ranks ,by: a-chieving
the maximum practicable military superiority at, the de,d-sh'e time, and '.'
place.
b,.. transpo;rting our ,troo,psbyall meq.llS and the
proper utilization of combat deception meaSlWl'e'S to ac,compU,sh-,
ment of the mission.
r
c. always providing for the timely moveme.nt.of security.fOl::c,es
for the front, flanks, and when necessary, the rear.
;1': i',;
d. the movement of combat power to a more advantageous
position with r:espec.t to the enemy, thereby providingthei neeeissally mass
at proper time and place for attainmentof,theobject., .; i'e ,,:
a. principle of taking the enemy unawares by striking him
when, where ,'and' i"" a rmannerr:fo'r w:hdich,h'e.,isi \1np':U.epared.:.,
br."app1h;a,tion of feint
or demonstration, to assist in throwing the enemy off balance and subject
him to our real combat power.
c. varying of our methods and techniques of combat to cause
confusion and low morale in the ranks of the enemy.
63
d. employment of all deceptive measures tom<l:ke the enemy
unaware of our true intentions in anytype operation.
9. The principle of security is best described as
a. embracing all measures takento guard againsthostile
interference w-ith operations.
b. the continuous effortto obtainand evaluate information.
c. protection of supplies or supply establishments against
enemy attack, fire, theft, and sabotage.
d. the responsibility for exercising staff supervisionover
the safeguarding of all classifiedmatters.
III. SPECIALSITUATION CONTINUED. You are stillthe Commanding
. General, 8dtHlrlf Div. 'th<l:tfhe G3 prepare a. s'e,ries of
practical exercises with 'aildac'c'ortipari'ying sketches, for the
Battle Group commanders and staffofficers to analyze, that will emphasize
the necessityfor understanding the principles of war. In addition, a short
true-false testwill follow the discussionofthe exercises. You are now
discussing the solutions to the problems in relation of war.
DIRECTIONS. The following questions are multiple choice type. Each
question has one or more correct answers. Indicate your choice(s) by placing
an "X" throughthe appropriate letter{s) onthe,answer,sheet:.:,"
10. In the Fhst Il1'inciples'dfwif did Colonel,
1st B.G, 87th Inf emphasize? ",
a. None
b. Simplicity
c. Security
j ::l i'
d. Economy offorce
11. In;tHeFirstRe'\iut:reftl.lllnl,',WhichplJiMiple's';df
Ci
wir. dtic! 001ohlel,
1st BG, 87th Infviolate? ,;' "ii,f"i" ;\
a. Mass
., b. Surprise
c. Economy of force
d. None
12. In the Second Requirement, which war clid
Colonel, lst BG, 87th Inf emphasize?
a. None
b. Maneuver
c. Mass
d. Simplicity
13.. ,In the Secgnp. ,"r1;li9h pripcipl,es of wal: did
ColoItel, lstBG, 87th ,Int I;Ilost serrlpullly.violate?
a. Mass
c. Security
d. Ec.onomy "of. o.rce,
II} the of war ,dip
Captain, Co D emphasize? ',"I
a. Mass
b. Economy of force
I' '
c. Se cur'ity
,.\ ;
d. Offensive
15.;, In the oJf:wa;r dill ,
Captain, Co D, violate? ;\
j, a. Unity of command
b. Surprise
c. Maneuver
d. Simplicity
16. In the Fourth Requirement, which principles of war did
Colonel, 1st BG, 87th Inf emphasize?
a. Surprise
b. Security
c. Offensive
d. Maneuver
17. In the Fourth Requirement, which principles of war did
Colonel, 1st BG, 87th Inf violate?
a. Surprise
b. Offensive
c. Security
d. Maneuver
DIRECTIONS. The following statements are either TRUE or FALSE:.
Indicate your selection of the correct answer by an "X" in the
corresponding space on the answer sheet.
18. The principle of security is protection from surprise and hostile
interference in order to gain and maintain the power of free action.
, i:- ' . ',',
19. The principle of mass means the cbncentrationbf superior
power at the decisive time and place.
20. The principle of economy of force means adherence to simple
plans, concise orders, and formations that facilitate control.
21. The principle of the objective means striking the enemy when,
where, or in a manner for which he is unprepared.
66
22. The principle of simplicity means the employmep,t, minimum
essential means at points other than that of decision.
23. Maneuver is the movement of forces to favor accomplishment
of the mission by the positioning of combat elements to plasethe ellemy
at a relative
24. The principle of surprise means. th",dire.ction of. all ,efforit
towards a decisive and obtainable goal.
25. Unity oicommand means the assignment of a single r.esponsi-
ble commander to each effort.
26. The of the offensive means the seizl:lre, r.etention,
and exploitation of the initiative.
27. Major Huston tak",s exception to the statement that the primary
objective in 'vra,rj,s"th",destrl:lcti9tt. 9rthe,
28. Major Huston's discussion oithe principle of simplicity gives
the impression that if an operation is complex it
principle of simplicity. .
29. Dr. Brodie put emphasis on mobility and the need to exploit
air lines of communication and supports the idea that will be
more important in the future than in the past.
30. Major Huston that surprise is another of those princi-
W th"'re,for
e

is incoml?,Jl-tiJ?le 100 ,r!J.' l'." "
.,,/. :) ,\'\
31. Dr. Brodie's article contains the most comprehensive dis-
,qf "
32. tt Col Fa:llweilis' the""
PfirSiRles ofvr,f,t ""J" ,"',1'''' "i
\", , , ;;,i
Credit Hours
LESSON 2 - FUNDAMENTALS OF THE OFFENSE
- - 2
Text Assignment - - FM 100-5, Paras 69-78, 174-178,
200-270, 346-350.
:i"'} I
Materials Required - - - - - - - - - - None
Lesson Objective - - - - - - - - - - - - To provide you with the necessary
offensive fundamentals applicable to
division level.
Detach the answer sheet, enter your solutions as indicated, and
mail in the addressed provided.
EXERCISES
1. GENERAL The 80th Inf Div has recently been acti-
vated at FORT GORDON, GEORGIA, where it is currently undergoing
training. Higher headquarters has directedthat thel;ltaff officers ,of the
division receive, refresher ins,tiruction, on ,subjects appropriate to,their
echelons of operations.
H. SPECIAL 'SITUATION. You are G3, 80th Ini Div. Another sub-
ject for the division's staff officer refresher course is the, "funGla,rnentalsof
the offense." You will present this subject at the second meeting of the
class,' and you,ar,e now studying available reference'sJ,o"ensur'e your under-
standing of the subject.
DIRECTIONS. The following questions are multiple choice type. Each
question has onear mOre l;oue,qt, a1iliswflrs.,,!.lJiu(li,Cllite, yourchQice(s) by placing
an "X" th:rough thl'lapPrQpriat,e lEltter,(!'!) 9ntl,eanswerl;lheet.,
1. What is the relationship between offensive fundamentals and the
principles of .war? d'
,<\.., ,Afl,y soupd ,opeJ.'ation w,i,ll efl,sure Jull,l'<Bpli<;ation
of the nine ,principles of. war.
bi Offensive o.perationl;l be.strepreSeJ'lt the ',ap,p1h;a,t.i,onQf the
principles of war.
c. Tl,1e principles of war were designed primarily for
offensive operations.
d. There is no relationship because the principles of war are
theoretical and offensive fundamentals are applicatory.
2. The purpose of o n ~ i v operations is
a. to exert pressure along a wide front.
b. to pass around the ene.my's main battle position and seize
an objective in his rear area.
c. to attack because it is the only way to defeat an enemy
force.
d. the destruction. of the enemy's armed forces, the imposition
of the commander's will on the enemy. or the seizure of territory for
future operations.
3. How does a turning movement differfl'om a.nenvelopment?
a.. While a battle group may occasionally make a turning
movement for a division, turning movements are usually 'executed at a
higher echelon.
b. An envelopment applies to small units and turning movement
applies to lal'geunits.
c. The distinction in the forMs 0f maneuver exists, primar.ily
in the intent of the commander since in most operations a.combililation.of
forms is employed.
d. The turning movement is'aniridependent or semi.independent
operation with the maneuvering force \!suallygbing qUite deep and not
expecting support from the fixing forces.
4. How does the direction of attack differ from the axis of a.dvance?
a. The axis of advance is similar tb: a:directidri of attack but
is more restrictive. '\., ....
b. Bypas'singis' not pe:l'tnitted, and;the( 81>ecified direction must
be followed.
69
c. Axis of advance may be used to indicate to subordinate
units a general direction of advance.
d. When necessary for unity of effort, a direction of attack
is assigned to a subordinate unit which requires that unit to direct its
effort in the specified direction.
5. If a division' is executing a single envelopment, what form(s)
of offensive may its battle groups be executing?
a. Single envelopment.

b. Sirigle and double envelopments.
c. Single and double envelopments, penetrations, turning
movements, and night attacks;
d. Single double envelopments and penetrations.
6. How may the main attack be weighted?
a. Fire support.
b. Assignment of best approach.
c. Assignment of a maneuver"zone.
d. Location of reserves.
7. The two main elementsofa plan of attack are
a .. plan of nian:euveTand ire support.
b. 'plan of fire support and counterattack.
c. adequate forces and sufficient time.
';
d. surprise and an assailable enemy flank.
. j."':J',.; '! '.' i, .;
8. In the attack of an enemy position, which of the following tasks
should be
a. Fight
70
b. Find
c. Finish
d. Fix
9. Which of the following most closely describes a difference
between the main and secondary attacks under all conditions?
a. More manpower is allocated to the main attack than the
secondaryattack(s).
b. The unit(s) making the main attack have more inherent
firepower than the unit(s) making the secondary attack(s).
c. The objective of the main attack has more tactical impor-
tance than the objective(s) of the secondary attack(s).
d. The bulk of the available logistical support is allocated to
the main attack.
10. When is the use of one axis of advance favored?
a. The enemy situation is vague.
b. Ease of control is important.
c. The terrain is restrictive.
d. There is a need to concentrate fires.
11. Which of the following control measures usually is most
restrictive to a division commander who has an attack mission?
a. Final objective
b. Zone of action
c. Phase lines designated by Corps
d. A direction of attack assigned to a battle g).".oup by division
71
12. The degree of success attained by night attacks is largely
dependent on
a. training of troops.
b. hasty reconnaissance.
c. complex plan of operation.
d. effective control measures.
13. Which of the following is the most extensive effect that nuclear
weapons have had on the forms of maneuver?
a. The availability of atomic weapons may make the penetration
a more acceptable form of maneuver.
b. Nuclear weapons have made a turning movement less
desirable.
c. They have made a double envelopment easier to coordinate .
. d. They have created much confusion in the minds of com-
manders as regards distinguishing the forms of maneuver.
14. When phase lines are utilized in the attack, a unit, upon reaching
a phase line, will
a. halt and report its location to the next higher headquarters.
b. halt and wait for orders to continue.
c. report its location to the next higher headquarters and con-
tinue on its mission.
d. halt, reorganize, and prepar.e to COJ;ltinue on order.
15. Exerting pressure along a wide front while another form of
action is occurring in a different area best descr.ibed
a. penetration.
b. frontal attack.
72
c. envelopment.
d. turning movement.
16. Which factors must be considered in determining the strength
and composition of the reserve?
a. Mission
b. Enemy situation
c. Terrain
d. Troops available
17. What major effect does increased air-mobility-have on a com-
mander's selection of a form of maneuver?
a. Increased air -mobility limits a commander's choice of
variations and combinations of offensive maneuver.
',:,," ,
b. Air -mobility might permit the early seizure of the decisive
objective or points vital to the turning movement enroute to the objective
on the ground.
c. Air s not change the conditions which favor the
adoption of a specific form of maneuver.
d. Air-mobifit)'enablesacomrna.nd'er' to usea'vertical envelop-
ment in any situation.
18. Which of the following are pertinent to the ideal location of the
reserVe d1'an 'attacking divisitlri 1 ".. .. , .
a. One which permits the employment of the reserve in the area
of the main attack in tlie':H:i6Hest period 'of time.
b. DiMancl!;' is the iihportarit consideration
in determining the availibil'i'ty'of'th<if 'i'es'e':i've: ' .
\ '. '
c. If the reserve is physicaHy close to the l'xiain attack force,
a dangerous concentration of force may result.
,1' Ii '1
13
d. Dispersal of the reserve in several locations must be
based on its ability to cOncentrate rapidly for emplOyment and to disperse
rapidly for security.
DIRECTIONS. The following statemertts are either 'TRUE or FALSE.
Indicate your choice by placing art "X" in: the apprOpriate space on the
answer sheet.
19. Frontal attacks are usually confined to secondary attacks with
the primary object of maintaining pressure and thus preventing enemy
disengagement.
20. If a division is executing a single envelopment, its battle groups
may be executing single and double envelopments, penetrations, and night
attacks.
21. Nuclear weapons and superior land and air -mobility will permit
a numerically inferior force to launch a successful offensive against a larger
force by means of rapid and vigorous exploitation after atomic preparation.
22. The manner in which the attacking force maybe transported
(e. g., air versus vehicle) is the principal difference between an envelopment
and a turning movement.
23. Exploitation follows a successful penetration, envelopment. or
link-up with airborne forces dropped in the enemy rear.
24. The frontal attack seeks to secure the decisive objective and
normally contains the greatest practicable concentration of combat power.
25. Sketchy intelligence of enemy strengths and dispositions beyond
the line of contact favors a strong initial reserve for a division with heavy
atomic support that is making an attack against a strongly prepared enemy
defense.
26. Guerrillas and partisans are used to further the confusion in the
enemy's ranks and to hamper his retreat or efforts to reorganize.
27. The principle of maneuver is applied to alter the relative combat
power of military forces.
74
,'i 1"1,,, .,' 'F',"'..
,CBj;t is,
persistent chemical agents .
,the,e!?-e i e pe
and hiscapa,pility pt
30. Pursuit is a type of offensive military operation which is a
phase'
'L.V'
:",'.';
(\:
'J
,
j".<:'-. ",

. ;q,y,':'q
c t,'.' t,ni;
X1T:t,i>'-\\!)
n "toJ l.c-;ilinr gnoTJB S ;)'lO"J'S'}j:.' "(1
;curi..ISgs ll6 gnjj:.liJ:fT 2.1 tLlf) ; oq,'F'


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75
LESSON 3 -FUNDAMENTALS OF THE DEFENSE AND RETROGRADE
Credit Hours - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2
Text Assignment
Materials Required
- - - - - - - -
- -FM 100 -5, Paras 271-329
- - None
Lesson Objective - - - - - - - - - - - - To provide you with the necessary
defensive-and retrograde funda-
mentals applicable at division level.
Detach the answer sheet, enter your solutions as indicated, and
mail in the addressed envelope provided.
EXERCISES
1. GENERAL SITUATION. The 80th Inf Div has recently been acti-
vated at FORT GORDON, GEORGIA, where it is currently undergoing
training. Higher headquarters has directed that the staff officers of the
division receive refresher instruction on subjects appropriate to their
echelons of operations.
II. SPECIAL SITUATION. You are G3, 80th Inf Div. Another subject
for the division's staff officer refresher course is the "fundamentals of the
defense and retrograde." You will present thissubjeet at the third meeting
of the class, and you are now studying available references to ensure your
understanding of the subject.
DIRECTIONS. The following questions are multiple choice type. Each
question has one or more correct answers. Indicate your choice(s) by placing
an "X" through the appropriate letter(s) on the answer sheet.
1. In general, which of thefc;>llowing is the most difficult to control
and conduct?
a. Double envelopment
b. Mobile defense
c. Position .defense
76
d. Retrograde operation
2. In a position defense the reserve is employed primarily to
a. block an enemy penetration.
b. cover the withdrawal of friendly troops in the event of an
enemy penetration.
c. counterattack the enemy penetration.
d. secure the flanks.
3. The mobile defense is conducted
a. to the rear of the area to be defended.
b. in and around the areato be defended.
c. immediately forward <i>fthe area to be defended.
d. well forward of the area to be defended.
4. In mobile defense the key to success is
a. the attack by the striking force.
b. detailed fire support planning.
c. the establishment of mutually supporting. wellloca,ted,
strong points.
d. the action of the strong points syste<m incanalizilJ<g the
enemy.
5. . In' mbbl:1ef defense the striking force' is located a <considerable
distance in rear of the strolJ<g point system in order to
a. afford maximum security for the striking. force.
b. occupy good blockilJ<g positions.
c. provide adequate maneuver room foil' the <attatile{oy the
striking force.
77
d. provide protection from long;-range artillery fire.
6. Mobile defense is organized with a
a. main line of resistance and a striking force.
b. strong point system and a striking force.
c. mobile covering force and a combat outpost.
d. series of delaying pc;>sitions.
7. &elief in place in the defensive is executed either from rear
to front or front to rear as directed by the higher commander who considers
these factors.
a. Size of unit(s) making the relief.
b. Strength and combat efficiency of unit(s) on line of contact.
c. Atomic capability of enemy.
d. Need for varying pattern of relief.
8. The most desirable employment of the striking force is to
a. attack and destroy the enell).y force at a time and place of
defender's choosing.' " , .
b. attack within the strong point system.
c. attack in rear of the strong point system.
d. reinforce strong points being threatened.
9. In actions, delay on alternate positions has the ad-
vantage over delay on successive positions in that it '
a. requires lesstroops ..
b. is less fatiguing to the troops.
c. permits
78
d. does not require a reserve.
10. In delaying actions the reerve is normally committed to
a. deceive the enemy.
b. block a threatened penetration.
c. delay the enemy without becoming decisively engaged.
d. slow, stop, repel, or canalize the enemy.
11. from, action should be timed to take place
a. preferably during daylight hours and exceptionally at
night.
b. preferable during the hours of darkness and exceptionally
during daylight hour s.
c. only during daylight hours.
d. only during hours of darkness.
12. A delaying action is
a. made on a volll:llfary basis with as mllc1l. secrecy as possible.
b. an operation in which a unit time ap.d inflicts
maximum punishment on the enemy without becoming decisively involved in
combat.
"
. c. usually conducted following a successful completion of other
types of retrograde operations. .
d. an operation in. wh.icha ,withdraws without enemy
pressure and refuses combat under the existing situation. .
13. Which of the following constitute the' between
position and mobile defense.?
, a., The battle area with,
alm of stoppmg the enemy forwa:t:'l! olit, defenl!e enV1Slons
decisive combat occurring within the battle are'll..

79
b. Forces in a mobile defense are highly mobile, whereas
those in a position defense are seldom if ever mobile.
c. The position defense is a relatively compact defense with
mutually supporting defensive positions, while the mobile defense is a
fluid defense with forces to block, impede, and canalize the enemy.
d. A position defense is designed to hold one or more pieces
of critical terrain, wh"lreall a mobile defense is not so designed.

14. Security elements provided by the division or its subordinate
units may include
a. general outpost.
b. combat outpost.
c. reconnaissance and security forces.
d. local security.
15. To what extent are control measures used in defensive
operations and in offensive operations?
a. As much as possible in defensive operations and as little
as possible in offensive operations.
b. As much as possible in defensive operations and as much
as possible in offensive operations.
c. As little as possible in defensive operations and as much
as possible in offensive operations.
d. Used to the minimum required in both types of operations
but are reliable commun.ications and control.
16. The primary mission of observation posts in mobile defense
is to
a. deceive enemy.
b. hold at all costs.
80
c. observe and report activities.
d. harass and delayenemy by smallarmsfire.
17. The missionofthe generaloutpost is to
a. warnof enemyapproach.
b. deny the enemygroundobservationofthe mainbattle
position.
c. delay, deceive, anddisorganize the enemy.
d. coverthe withdrawalofthe force.
18. Counterattackplans mayinclude
a. assemblyareas.
b. zones ofaction.
c. time ofattack
d. a terrainobjective.
19. The strongpoint variationofmobile defense is usuallyem-
ployedwhen
a. the enemy's mobility is muchgreaterthanthedefen,d.er's.
b. itis essentialto hold certaincriticalterrainfeatures.
c. terrainpermits employment ofthe layer variation.
d. commander has a actionwithinthe
defensive area.
1.' ',. ,
DIRECTIONS. Thefollowing statements are either TRUE or FALSE.
Indicate your choice byplacing an "X"in the appropriate space OIl the
answer sheet.
20. Boundaries shouldnot divide responJi!ib,ility for an;Lvenue of
approachuIlless the avenue is toolargeto be coveredbya single unit.
8,1

21. Retrograde operations do include both offensive and defensive

philosophies.
22. The mobile defense is anoperationdesignedto insure retention
of anarea, placing primaryreliance upon offensive maneuver, while
positiondefense places primaryreliance on holding selectedlocalities.
23. In the mobile defense the observationposts establishedby
strongpoints inthe forwarddefensive areaperformsthe missions ofa
.combat outpost .
24. If the situationandterrainpermit, the counterattackis designed
to hitthe flank ofthe penetrationand avoidfriendly defensive positions.
25. The special requirements for intelligence necessaryto defend
against guerrillas and infiltrations includes sources of supply.
26. The generaltrace ofthe forwardedge ofthe battle areaandthe
various securitylines arenormallydesignatedbylimitingpoints placed
on flank boundaries ofthe units responsible for organization.
27. In the mobile defense the strongpoints ofthe forward defensive
areamayperformthe missions ofthe general outpostfor the remainder
ofthe division.
28. Regardless ofwhichunit preparesthe positions alongprescribed
switchpositions, the division commander usually orders occupationofthese
positions and designates the forces to effectoccupation.
29. Switchpositions shouldbe preparedfor defense indepthwhenever
possible.
30. Securityelements forward ofthe battle area shouldbe provided
with mobility superior tothat ofthe enemy.
31. The night withdrawal is characterizedby secrecy, deception, and
the requirement ofr close control.
32. A daylightwithdrawalenvisionsthe necessityfor fighting tothe
rearandthe covering ofthe withdrawal offorwardelements by other forces.
33. If the designofa defense applies "mutual support"to the maxi-
mum, security suffers the most.
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34. The striking force commander may be called upon by the higher
commander to provide small mobile security and reconnaissance forces
to operate in forward defensive area.
35. Normally, the covering forcei:s provided by division and co-
ordinated by corps.
36. A disengagement is a maneuver in which a force not in contact
avoids engagement by moving away from the enemy.
37. Retrograde operations are characterized by decentralized )
planning and centralized execution. ...
83
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