A Defence of Philosophic Doubt Being An Essay On The Foundations of Belief (Arthur James Balfour, 1879)

A DEFENCE
OF
PHILOSOPHIC DOUBT
A DEFENCE
OF
PHILOSOPHIC DOUBT
BEING AN ESSAY ON
THE FOUNDATIONS OF BELIEF
BY
ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR,
M.A.,
M.R
ÎFOKÎ^
\ \
MACMILLAN AND
1879,
The right of translation
is
CO.
reserred
'
'
70-3
'As, to the
for Religion
;
religious,
it
will
seem absurd
it
to set forth
any
justification
so, to the scientific,

last is certainly
will
seem absurd
to defend Science.
first
Yet to do the
as needful as to do the
Herbert Spencer
'A doctrine
is
first
;
received as
an
intuitive
truth,
standing beyond
rigid
is
all
;
need of demonstration
then
it
becomes the object of
demonstration
afterwards the demonstration ceases to be conclusive,
and
merely probable
and,
finally,
the effort
is
limited to demonstrating that there
reason on the other side.

stration is
In the later stages of
belief,
the
is no conclusive show of demon-
mere
bluster, or is useful only to trip

1^ i^
up an antagonist
Leslie Stephen
2 6y
\^
PREFACE
It
IS
NOT NECESSARY
its
to preface this
Essay by any
It
is
precise account of
sufficiently
scope and design.
may be
a piece
described
by saying
that
it
of destructive criticism, formed
by a
series of argu-
ments of a highly abstract character.
The
reader
who
the
is
not deterred by this description from reading

will
its
work
find,
think,
no
difficulty in
under-
standing
It
plan.
may be
in
*
convenient to mention that the
first
and sixth chapters and the Appendix have already

appeared
Mind'
in
and that the thirteenth chapter

*
was published
the
Fortnightly
Review.'
In
each case there have been some verbal alterations,

but nothing deserving the
substance.
name
of an alteration in
The
sixth chapter elicited a short reply

will
from Professor Caird, which
be found
in the
number
which
to
I
of
'Mind'
I
for this
month.
For reasons
it
there gave
have not thought

in
necessary
make any important changes
consequence of
his remarks.
VI
PREFACE.
I
must not omit
to
acknowledge the great and
unvarying kindness which
my
brother-in-law,
Mr.
Henry Sidgwick,
interest
in
has shown
in criticising the
various
portions of the Essay as they were written.
His
its
the
work, and his suggestions for

;
improvement, have both been invaluable

the
and
have
to
more reason
to
be grateful
for them,
owing
the fact that, in

differs
many
respects, his point of
view
widely from
my
own.
Whittinghame
January
1879.
*^* The original

Scepticism,'
title
of this
for
book was
'
A
me
Defence of Philosophic
that, considering
and
it
was even
a short time advertised under this

the
name.
It
was, however, pointed out to

contents, the
nature of
number of people who would read the book would probably bear an infinitely small proportion to the number of people who would read only its title, and that most of those who read
its
the
title
without reading the book would assume that by Scepticism

in matters
was meant scepticism

reasoning,
that,
of religion.
As
could deny the
accuracy neither of the premises nor of the conclusion of this piece of

I
substituted the present for the original

it
title,
in the
hope
though
is,
as
think, less accurate,
it
may
at all events prove
less misleading.
CONTENTS
PART
CHAPTER
I.
I.
PAGE
On the
Idea of a Philosophy
II.
Empirical Logic
15
III.
Induction
.
,
30
. . . .
IV. Historical Inference
45
PART
V. Introduction to
II.
Part
II
73
VI. Transcendentalism
VII.
85
.
Three Arguments from Popular Philosophy
138
VIII.
The
Authority
of
Consciousness
.
.
and
.
of
.
Original Beliefs
154'
IX. Psychological Idealism
X.
XI.
The Test
of Inconceivability
....
.
178
194
209
Mr. Spencer's Proof of Realism
Viii
CONTENTS.
PART
CHAPTER
III.
PAGE
.
XII. Science as a Logical System

XIII.
.242
. .
The Evolution of Belief
260
SUMMARY
277
PRACTICAL RESULTS
Note on the Discrepancy between Science and
Religion
.
296
^28
APPENDIX.
On the
Idea of a Philosophy of Ethics
.
.335
OF THB
''A
university'
A
DEFENCE OF PHILOSOPHIC DOUBT.
PART
I.
CHAPTER
Everything
that
I.
ON THE IDEA OF A PHILOSOPHY.

we know,
or think
we know, may
may be
and
what
be classed under one of four heads, which, without

departing very widely from ordinary usage,
named
thus
Science,
Metaphysics,
is
Ethics,
Philosophy.
By Science
particular
meant
here, not only
commonly goes by that name, but also history, and

knowledge of
*
matters of fact
so that
knowledge of phenomena and the

'
relations subsist-
ing between phenomena
would be a more
for
accurate,
though
logy and
this
is
less
convenient, expression
is
what
is
intended. In Metaphysics
all
included, not only
Theoreal or
doctrines of the Absolute, but also (and

all
not necessarily the same thing)

entities
supposed knowledge of
nomenal.
which are not phe-
A DEFENCE OF PHILOSOPHIC DOUBT,
[part
i.
What
in the
is
meant by Ethics
will
have shown at length
Appendix which
be found at the end of
the volume.
it
Here
it
is
only necessary to say that
includes, not only
what are commonly called moral

usually
systems, but also

so described.
some analogous systems not

all
Multitudes of propositions,
professing to
emour
body
knowledge belonging to one of these departare being continually put forward

for
ments,
acceptance.
(
And
as no one believes
all
of them, so
those
who
profess to act rationally
must hold that
there are grounds for rejecting the propositions they

disbelieve,
//
and
for
accepting those they believe.
The
and
systematic account of these grounds of belief

disbelief
makes up the fourth of the classes into which possible knowledge is divided, and is here
always called Philosophy.
If
It
be objected that
this
is
not the
common
difficult
meaning of the term, I reply that it would be to point out what the common meaning is.
been used, perhaps, most frequently
department of science.
absolute are also called
in
It
has
England, as
is
being equivalent to Psychology, which
properly a
after
But researches
philosophical,
is
is
the
and these
belong to ontology.
Ethics
sometimes called
sometimes called
moral philosophy, as science

natural
philosophy
while
Logic,
which
a very
common usage
would, as
I
regards as a branch of philosophy,
shall presently explain,
be included
in
it
CHAP.
I.]
also
by
my
definition.
So
that there cannot, on the
whole, be
much harm
in using the
term to represent
is
a definite subject of investigation for which there
no other word.
(
It follows directly
from
this definition, that
how-
ever restricted the range of possible knowledge

be, philosophy can never
may
For
be excluded from
it.
unless the restriction be purely arbitrary, there must
be reasons
that even
for
it
and
is
it is
the systematic account of
these reasons which

if it
here called philosophy.
So
is
should turn out that Metaphysics

'
'
an
illusion,
and only positive
knowledge
far
is
attain-
able, this discovery
would be so
from destroying
it
philosophy that
it is
)
only by philosophy that
could
be established.
If
mankind was in the condition of believing nothings and without a bias in any particular direction, was merely on the look-out for some legitimate creed, it would not, I conceive, be possible, a priori,
to
name any
of the positive characteristics which
the philosophy corresponding to that creed must necessarily possess.
But since
this is
by no means
the case, since everybody has a certain

scientific
beliefs,
number of
and most people have a certain number of ethical and metaphysical (theological)
ones,
it
may be
possible to describe
in a
some of the
at-
tributes
which should be found
philosophy pro-
fessing to support these provisional conclusions.
For example.
Since
B 2
no one supposes that
all

the propositions
[part
i.
we
believe are self-evident,
it
may
are
be assumed that the greater number of them are

legitimate inferences from propositions
self-evident.
which
And
from
this
it
follows that
philo-
sophy must consist of two main departments, one of which deals with these ultimate, or self-evident propositions, the other with
I
modes of
inference.
do not forget that some writers have held that

is
the truth of a system
to be inferred, not from

its
its
any
self-evident propositions lying at
root,
but from
the consistency and coherence of
parts,
though
self-
each of these taken by

evident.
itself is
it
by no means
Of such a system
one part
it
incorrect to say that
is
would apparently be ultimate and another

said, that the truth
derivative
ought rather to be
is
of the whole
an inference from the consistency of

is
the parts, while the .truth of the parts
an inference
this
from the truth of the whole.
But even on
theory the formula above stated holds good, for such

systems, so far from being self-contained (as
it
were)
and
a
sufficient
evidence for themselves, are
really, as
little
consideration will show, dependent for their
validity
on some such proposition as

is
this
'
all
that
is
coherent
true.*
Which
is
is
itself
again either
ulti-
mate or
derivative.
This double function

istic
an important character;
of a complete philosophy
it
let
me now
mention
another which, though

obvious,
is
would seem
It
sufficiently
continually ignored.
may be
stated
CHAP.
I.]

The
is
thus
' :
business of philosophy
is
to deal with
the grounds, not the causes of
belief.'
There
no
distinction
which has to be kept

this
more
steadily in
view than
between the causes

a
belief,
or antecedents which
produce
and the
enquiry
grounds or reasons which justify one.

into the first
is
The
psychological, the enquiry into the
second
is
philosophical,
and they belong therefore

to
(according to the classification just announced)

entirely distinct departments of knowledge.
No
may be
various
before
doubt, in constructing a philosophy, a pre-
vious psychological enquiry
may be
required.
It
necessary to
acquaint ourselves with the

arrive at
conviction,
modes by which we
select those
we can what we must

do,
tion
is
which are legitimate.
But
opera-
not do, and what
we
are very apt to

first
to suppose that
satisfactorily,
by performing the
all.
we
absolve ourselves from perIn the face of modern
forming the second at

discovery
progress
we made
have continually to recollect that no

in tracing the history of opinions,
no no
a
its
development of the theory of association of

application
ideas,
of the
doctrine
of evolution to mind,
for
however much they may prepare the ground

philosophy, add, or
structure.
can add, one fragment to
Thus,
it is
never a
final
it
answer to philosophy to
is
say of a particular
pirical, or,
belief,
innate, connate,
em-
a prioriy the result of inheritance, or the
'
[part
i.
product of the association of ideas.

satisfied
Psychology
is
by such
replies, but(ô
rational foundation for
make psychology the philosophy, is to make a deall
partment of science support that on which

is
science
by
definition
supposed to
?
rest.
It is strictly
*
im-
possible that
any solution of the question

'
How
came I to believe this the demand Why ought

*
should completely satisfy

I
to believe
it ?
'
though,
especially in the case of derivative beliefs,
it
may go
some way towards

to
it.
In the case of what profess
be ultimate
beliefs, discussions as to their origin
are either philosophically irrelevant, or else prove to
demonstration that they are not ultimate.
This
will
perhaps be clearer
if
we
take a concrete case.
Let
us suppose that the result of a particular psychological investigation is that a certain

*
judgment,
e.g.y
Everything has a
cause,'
is
a priori'
The
it is
'
psy-.
chologist
who makes
this discovery is apt to trespass

'
on the domain of philosophy, and add,

fore true.'
thereto
Now
if
'
everything has a cause

it
is
be
accepted as true, because

that very reason
at least
it is
is
^
;
priori,^ then for
not ultimate
it
two propositions
ist, all
is
'
must be accepted before
a priori'
judgments are
judgment.
true, and, 2nd, this
an 'a priori
dis-
Both of which are assertions both
putable and disputed.

discussion
ciple
it is
So
in
loose philosophical
very
common
to
advance some prinrequiring nor
as being self-evident,
neither
possessing any justification, and immediately after-
'
CHAP.
I.]

in its
wards to adduce
as that
'
support some such argument

to
all
it
is
common
in
men/
it
or that
it
has
all-
been implanted
wise Creator.'
our nature by a benevolent and

is
In such cases
clear either that

nt,
the principles in
question are not self-evide
or
that the arguments used to support

fluous.
It
is
them are superfallacies as
by the consideration of such

I
these that
ultimate,
have been induced to use the word

the expression
*
'
when
a priori
'
'
might ap-
pear the most natural.

dent of experience
is
;
A priori
means indepen-
but independent of experience

*
ambiguous.
It
may mean
either that experience
has not produced the judgment in question, or that

it
furnishes no grounds for believing

is
it.
The
first
meaning
no
quite beside the purpose
philosophy has
direct concern with the origin of beliefs, which,

stated,
is
as before
part of the
subject-matter of
psychology.
The second meaning, on

it
the other
hand, while
belief,
excludes experience as a ground of

far expresses
full
'
and so
the desired idea, does

'
not express the

viz. that
all.
differentia
of ultimate beliefs
we
require no grounds for believing them at

it
On
the contrary,
sometimes seems to suggest
itself directly
as a reason for accepting a
judgment
(as if the fact
that experience did not prove anyit),
thing was a ground for believing
and sometimes
mediately, as showing that the constitution of our
mind when
in
a healthy condition impels us to

it,
[part
i.
believe
or that
it
;
was implanted
fact that
in
us by the
Author of our being

or bad, show,
as reasons, that the
ultimate.
which reasons, whether good

they are given
called
by the very
judgment
a priori
is
not
While, then,
it
is
evidently not the business of

for
philosophy to account
ultimate
axioms
it
and
not
modes
its
of inference,
it is
also clear (though
may be
it
hardly necessary to
make
it
the remark) that
is
business to prove them.

is
To
prove any concluobliged to perform
sion
to
show
;
that
legitimately follows from a
true premiss
so that
if
we were
this operation for
our axioms and modes of inference

received as ultimate,
before they were to be
we
should be driven either to argue in a circle or to an

infinite regress.
if
Indeed, this will sufficiently appear
we
reflect that all
we mean by
is
ultimate
is
'
inde-
pendent of
proof.'
But
if
philosophy
neither to investigate the

belief,
causes nor to prove the grounds of
what,
I
it
may be
hend
it,
asked,
is
is it
to
do
Its business, as
appre-
to disengage the latter, to distinguish
them
from what simulates to be ultimate, and to exhibit
them
in systematic order.
is
What
meant here by disengaging the grounds

if
of belief in contradistinction to proving them, will
appear more clearly

deductive logic.
we
consider what
logic,
is
is
done by
Deductive
apart from the

is (ac-
practical rules with
which
it
encumbered,
CHAP.
I.]
cording to the terminology here employed) neither
an art nor a science, but a systematic account of an

ultimate
mode
of inference
all
by which
it
may be
:
dis-
tinguished from
other modes, whether legitimate

it
or illegitimate, whether ultimate or derivative

therefore
is
by
definition a
branch of philosophy.
Now when
deductive logic says that any three

*
propositions which can be reduced to the form,
All
is
B, all
is
*
.
all
is B,'
are legitimately
connected as premises and conclusion, whatever
may
be their content,
it is
by no means meant that such

It
pieces of reasoning derive their validity from the

fact
of their corresponding with the formula.
simply means, to distinguish and mark off a certain
mode
of
it
;
of inference
by giving a general description
each particular example of such inference

in itself the
being
witness of
its
own
validity.
This example explains the procedure of Philosophy with regard to inferences
the
*
axioms of
procedure
mathematics furnish an
in the
illustration of its
matter of ultimate principles.
Two
hundred
one
and
forty
pence and twenty
shillings,
being each
is
equal to a pound, are equal to one another,'

of an indefinite
sitions,
number of
similar self-evident propo*
which are described by saying that
things
which are equal to the same thing are equal to one

another
;
'
but which do not require to be deduced

in
is,
from such general description

certain.
order to
make them
possible.
Such a deduction
no doubt,
10

may,
if I
[part
i.
I
*
please, say,
'
things which are equal,
&c/
Two
hundred and forty pence and twenty
shillings
are things which are equal, &c.,' 'therefore they are
equal to each other.'
But such a syllogism would

all
be as frivolous as Mr. Mill supposes

to
is is
syllogisms
be
and
for this reason, viz. that the conclusion
quite as obvious
and certain as the premiss which

it.
introduced to prove
It
is
conceivable, of course, that the axioms at

;
the basis of knowledge are incapable of classification

that
no two of them have anything
in
common except
the fact that they are ultimate.
In such an event
the business of philosophy will be to enumerate,

instead of describing them.
But
this
can hardly be
philosophy
speaking,
the case with

of deduction
modes of
is
inference.
The
already,
comparatively
complete
and though the same cannot be said of

it is
any other mode of inference,

that the
differs in
difficult to believe
bond connecting premises and conclusion

every case, so as to exclude the possibility
of classification.
Something very
distantly approachif
ing this state of things would exist
each depart-
ment of knowledge had a mode of reasoning peculiar to itself, as some have supposed, e.g;, theology to
have.
To
their
classify inferences
is
to exhibit
is
what
is
called
common
is
form.
And
it
plain that
if
of two
inferences,
which by
false
classification
have the same
form, one
and the other
true, the classification
CHAP
I.]

is
ii
which connects them
philosophically worthless.
in
There would be no use

stance,
deductive
*
logic, for in'
some syllogisms worthy and others not.

if
in
Barbara
were
trust-
It follows
from
this
very obvious remark that

to be philosophical,
every kind of
logic, if
it is
must
be formal.
The whole
object of a philosophy of
valid
inference being to
distinguish
and ultimate
inferences from those which are invalid or derivative, this
can only be done either by exhibiting the

or forms of such inferences, or (on the
common form
violent hypothesis that they
have no common forms)

instance.
by enumerating every concrete

ciate
To
enun-
a form of inference which
shall include both
valid
and invalid examples, can

interest;
at best only
it
have a
is
psychological
misleading.
philosophically,
will
only
These remarks
to
be found of imtheories of
portance
when we come
consider
inference other than syllogistic ones.
The same remark

any
applies, mutatis mutandis^ to
classification of ultimate propositions.
There
is
no ground 'a priori'
(i.e.
following
from the idea of a philosophy) for supposing that

ultimate judgments
ticular.
are
if
all
general
latter,
or
all
par-
Of course,
they are the
there must
be some legitimate mode of reasoning from particulars

I
without the help of general propositions.

I
have now, shortly and incompletely, but
hope
at sufficient length for
my
purpose, sketched out the
12
[part
i.
form to which any reasonable system of belief must
be capable of being reduced.

in the
What
is
desire to
do
far
remainder of
this
essay
to
examine how
not
and
certainly every creed current
among manby educated

of
kind, nor even those which are accepted

civilised
men, but
the vast system

;
modern
This
is
physical science conforms to this standard.
only a fragment of the whole subject

if
but even
this,
pursued
in
detail,
would demand volumes
for its
inti-
complete treatment, not to speak of an author
mately acquainted with the methods and results of

every one of the sciences.
of the kind
is
I
need not say that nothing

I
aimed
they
;
at here.
propose to deal only

all
with the roots, so to speak, from which
sciences,
ulti-
however
but
far
may
;
spread their branches,

special to
mately spring
roots which are

to
all
no
science,
common
and even of
limited,
I I
this subject,
so
limited
and doubly
end
shall
not attempt a
it
complete treatment, though

ficient for the
trust
may be
suf-
in view.
Now,
there are several
ways
in
;
which the subject

all
so sketched out might be attacked

as abstract reason
is
of them, so far
concerned, equally legitimate.
We
it
might begin,
for
example, by taking science as
stands,
and tracing back each particular thread

till
of argument
we
arrived at the unproved and unit
provable belief on which
must ultimately depend.

to carry
it
Such a method would be complete, but
out would require a writer with a great deal of
CHAP.
I.]
13
knowledge and a reader with a great deal of

Again,
time.
we might
attempt to
all
find,
by a process of
mere
casual exploration,
the axioms which are
really self-evident,
and
all
the processes of inference

far
which are obviously sound, and then see how
dogmatic structure resting on them could be made

to
harmonise with the received body of the sciences.

is,
This method of procedure

could be
fore
however, too unsysteif it
matic to be likely to produce good results, even
made
to produce
any
results at all
thereless
incline to the
more convenient, though
ambitious plan, of starting with the clearest and most

plausible
scientific
statement of the most ordinary view of

philosophy, and seeing
how
far this will
carry us towards the goal

this fails us,
it
we
desire to reach.
When
will
then be time to examine what help
can be derived from other and less popular systems.
Now, the most ordinary view

sophy
it
I
of scientific philo-
take to be this
that science, in so far as
consists of a statement of the laws of
phenomena,
not
is
founded entirely on observation and experiment
that observation
and experiment,
in fact, furnish
only the occasions of scientific discovery, but also the

sole evidence of scientific truth,
evidence, however,
of science not only
which
is
considered by most
men
amply
large
sufficient,
but also as good as any which can

Considering, however, what a
be well imagined.
number
of persons there are

all
who suppose
themselves to derive
their
knowledge from these
\
14

it
[part
i.
sources,
is
somewhat remarkable
information
this feat is to
that
we
should
precise
have so
little
respecting the
method by which
first sight,
be accomplished. At
indeed, the problem
may
not seem a hard
one.
We
are
constantly drawing inferences from
experience by methods which do not appear to be
very abstruse
to
and
all
that
it
may seem
necessary
to
do
is
to extend the operation of these
methods
the utmost limits of knowledge
to
prove, in other
words, the most general propositions respecting the

course of Nature in exactly the same manner as
are accustomed to prove the
we
by
more
limited truths
which we guide our daily
life.
Whether
which
I
this
is
possible or not
in
is
the point
propose to examine
I
the next section.
And
in
doing so
cannot pursue a more convenient
course than to take as
my
text Mr. Mill's
'
Logic,'
in
which professes to solve

affirmative sense.
this initial
problem
an
CHAP.
II.]
EMPIRICAL LOGIC.
15
CHAPTER
II.
EMPIRICAL LOGIC.
There are two points of view from -which any system of logic may be criticised. We may consider, first, how far it gives a satisfactory account of those
methods of inference with which
and, secondly,
it
professes to deal
in the
how
far
it is
complete
sense of
first
dealing with
all
methods of
inference.
The
of
these conditions, of course, every logic which
is
worth
anything must
satisfy.
Mr. Mill challenges criticism

also.
under the second head

that he has told us
all
He
considers not only
about some modes of inference,

all
but that he has told us

course,
about
all
all,
that
if
is,
of
which are legitimate; so that
we
only
master his book,
we
shall
be acquainted with every
method by which mediate truths are or can be derived

from those which are immediate. This completeness of range
ever,
is
not attained, how-
by adding on new methods
to those
which have
already been reduced to system, but rather by bringing forward one single method, and announcing that
all
others are either modifications of this or are not

all.
concerned with inference at
It is in this last
way
i6

I
[part
i.
that Mr. Mill disposes of the syllogism.
have too
he quotes
great a regard for him, and attach too great weight

to the formidable
list
of authorities
whom
as witnesses to
its
truth
and importance,
to treat his
celebrated speculation on this subject in anything but
a serious
that
it
spirit.
At
the
same
time,
must confess
appears to
me
to originate in a misuse of lan-
guage, and to end in an important philosophic error.
This doctrine, discovered by Mr. Mill and applauded by Sir John Herschel and Professor Bain,
is,
on
its
negative side, this
There can be no inference

in
from the premises of a syllogism, because
the
is
major premiss there
is
already asserted what
afterwards asserted in the conclusion.
Now, when a
on
ing
it
logician puts
any mode of inference

does
is
its trial,
it,
he has to decide two questions concernI
and, so far as
can see, only two.

is
First,
involve a progress from what
known
to
what
not
known
is is
(the answer to this question decides

is
whether it
if is
or
not a
mode
?
of inference). Secondly,
there
a progress from the known to the unknown,

(the answer to this quesis legiti-
that progress justified
tion decides
whether the mode of inference

first
mate).
;
The
question
is,
so to speak, a question of
Fact the second question

in the case of the
is
one of Law. Now, taking

first,
Syllogism the second question
no one has everthought of denying that if,

there
is
in that form,
any inference
at
all,
it is
legitimate.
The
conclusion
may
not be inferred from the premises
CHAP.
II.]
EMPIRICAL LOGIC.
rate, if these are true, it is true.
17
but, at
any
So
is
that
the only question that remains to be decided
the
question of
fact.
Do
we, as a matter of
we employ do know or
affirmative
himself,
a syllogism, ever proceed from

think
we know
to
when what we what we do not know ?

fact,
This question can certainly only be answered

;
in the
and, indeed,
it
is
so answered by Mill
at least
by
implication.^
But, says Mr.
Mill,^ are
we warranted
in
'as-
serting a general proposition without having satisfied
ourselves of the truth of everything which

?
'
it
fairly includes
Supposing we give the expected

not
answer,
and agree that we are then Mr. Mill would go on to say

to allowing that
warranted,
this is equivalent
premiss unless
we ought not we are already

included
'
to assert
any major
acquainted with the

is
conclusion, because the conclusion
undoubtedly
something
'
fairly
in
the major premiss
and
it
is
absurd to say that a truth which
we must
be conif it
know
before
we can
it.
assert another truth can

this
I
cluded from
true that
To
reply, that
even
be
miss
that
we have no right to assert unless we previously believe

as, in
the major prethe conclusion,
is
not a matter with which logic has any concern.

point of
first
So long
fact,
we
do assert the major
premiss without
will the latter
believing the conclusion, so long
be an inference from the former, and
so long will the syllogism be the formal statement of

^
Logic, vol.
i.
p. 206.
"^
Ibid. vol.
i.
p. 207.
i8
[part
i.
that inference.
at
Granted that a major premiss arrived

if it is ar-
by any process which does not independently

is
prove the conclusion

rived
at, it is in
illegitimate,
still,
no way prevented by the illegitimacy

premises,
of
its
origin from being the basis of a real inference,

in
and of one which,

correct.
relation
to
its
is
So
far,
then,
it
appears to
me
this
that
on
his
own
data Mr. Mill uses misleading language about the

functions of the syllogism
;
but
if
was
all, I
should
not so long have troubled the reader about the matter.

If
the controversy turned

'
simply on whether
or the
we
should use the word
infer
'
word
interpret/
whether we should talk of 'drawing a conclusion
from
'
or of
drawing a conclusion according

left
to,'
formula, the matter might be

cians,
to professed logi-
with only this recommendation
that
if
they
it
decide in each case on the second alternative,
would be well
to revise the
common
definition of the
word
infer.'
The
amount
really important thing
which gives a certain

Mill's theory of
all
of plausibility to Mr.
is
;
the
syllogism
particulars
the doctrine that
inference
in
is
from
and
this is
mixed up
such a manner
I
with
the
general
argument which
a
sort
have been
idea
that
discussing above, that careless readers carry away,

I
am
convinced,
of
general
it
follows
from
taking the correct
mean Mr.
Mill's
view
by
which they
of the functions of the
CHAP.
II.]
EMPIRICAL LOGIC.
19
syllogism.
The
truth
is
that Mr. Mill's criticism

it
of the ordinary theory of the syllogism, where

is
not merely verbal, so far from proving this doc-
trine,
depends on
it
for its
whole
effect.
Supposing
we know any
general proposition with the same im-
mediate certainty that
we know any
of the particular
propositions which serve as a foundation for Induction,
then,
if it
is
it
formally possible to
I
make any
suppose, be
deductions from
at all (which will not,
denied), one of these things
must be true
either by
we
or
;*
the mere act of knowing the general proposition
know
else
'everything which
it
fairly includes,' so that'

is
the deduction, though possible,
superfluous
we
can proceed by the syllogistic process from
something we know to something we do not know,
and
which,
method.
may Now, the

it
be,
can
be arrived at by
no other
first
of these alternatives certainly

I
cannot be proved, and

exaggeration that
it is
think
may
affirm without
;
extravagantly absurd
we are,
in
therefore, reduced to the second alternative,

effect
which
amounts
to this
that,
on a certain supposition
respecting the nature of our ultimate premises, the
syllogism would not only be a
mode
of inference, but
would be a formal statement of the only mode of

inference which
it
would be
in
our power to use.
The
substantial part, in short, of Mills attack

this,
on the syllogism amounts to

case where
that
in
every
we deduce
a conclusion from a general

c 2
proposition, the ultimate grounds for our believing
20

is
[part
i.
that conclusion
a process of inference by which
both the general proposition and the conclusion can
be co-ordinately proved on the doctrine that

doctrine, as held
I
and
this
is
again
is
founded
all
inference
from particulars.
Before following out this important philosophic
by Mr.
Mill, to
some
of
its results,
have three general remarks to make on

it
it.
Firstly,
whether
be
true or untrue,
it
does not
it
lie
within
the province of Logic either to prove

it.
'
or to assume
:
As
Mr. Mill himself very properly remarks

with their number or nature
least, has, in
With the
a direct
original data or ultimate premises of our

;
.
knowledge
in
logic,
I
way at
the sense in which
conceive the science, nothing to do.
These questions
all,
are partly not a subject of science at

that of a very different science.'^
and partly
impossible
In the second place,

it is
whether the doctrine be true or untrue,

in
any general way to prove

a
it.
It is possible
no doubt
man to go over all his beliefs in turn, and find to his own satisfaction that whenever they are not immefor
diate,
they are ultimately inferred from particulars

is
but he can hardly show that this

racteristic
a necessary cha-
of
all
conclusions.
it
Something would be
done
in this direction if
could be proved that there
was no
method known by which inferences could be drawn from general propositions unfortunately, it seems at present easier to show this
satisfactory
of particular ones.
^
Logic, vol.
i.
p. 6.
CHAP.
II.]
EMPIRICAL LOGIC.
remark
is,
21
My third
that
if
the views on ethics
expressed in the Appendix are correct, the whole of
our morality must be deduced from general propositions which are not,
and which cannot

particulars. Mill's
be,
themin-
selves inferences
from
To
is
ethical
ferences, therefore,
Mr.
theory
altogether
inapplicable.
Let
us,
however, assume with Mr. Mill that
all
our knowledge springs ultimately from

experiences,
particular
and that there
is
therefore but
one
fundamental type of inference
namely,
inference
from particulars
rules has
far in
by
'
simple enumeration'
what
is
he to give us by which we
may judge how

inferring
any given case the operation of

?
legitimately performed
We should
expect before-
hand thatWn a work on
logic, consisting of
two large
view of
volumes, and founded on this
particular
inference, the systematic account of such rules
would
form a considerable
part.
This
is
not
is
so.
What
up
Mr. Mill has to say on the subject
scattered
and down
his book, chiefly in connection with certain
concrete examples, and must be collected for pur-
poses of criticism from these

singular
so that
we have
the
phenomenon
in
is
of a
work professing
to treat
mainly of inference,
inference
which the universal type of

!
treated of only incidentally
How
mode by
this
comes about most of

:
my
readers are
probably already aware
it
is
which, according to
known that the Mr. Mill, we arrive at

well
22

is
[part
i.
a law of nature
*
by discovering, through one of the

that
Four Methods,'
is
causally connected in a
then,
particular instance with B,
and
by
virtue of the
law of universal causation, extending

to other times
this discovery
and other places
the general pro-
position expressing the law of causation being thus
the major premiss of the syllogism by which the
discovery
is
established.
truths,
Omitting the case of mathematical

have, therefore,
*
we
hardly any cause to employ the

'
universal type
of reasoning, except for the pur-
pose of proving the law of universal causation.

since this
is
But
not only the most important but also
the most
perfect
example of
its
application,
we
cannot do better than follow Mr. Mill's (from some

points of view rather singular) course, and examine
it
chiefly in this connection.
The
on
its
first
important thing to note
is
that the
legitimacy of this sort of reasoning does not depend

form.
Without going the length of Mr.
Mill,
and asserting that inference from

can be formally cogent,
particulars never
we may safely say
that as yet
it
neither Mr. Mill nor any one else has

is
shown how
to
be made so. Now, to say that
the legitimacy of any piece of

its
reasoning does not depend on

as saying that,
if
form
is
the
is
same
you want to know

fact
if it
correct,
you must determine the

considerations.
If
(to
by means of extraneous
in
put the matter
a more
GHAP.
II.]
EMPIRICAL LOGIC.
23
concrete way) a particular
mode
of reasoning gives
similar
me
and
A
D
as an inference from B,
and a precisely
mode
gives
me C
as an inference from
true), then,
(both
being supposed to be
or, at
if I
find that
I
is
not true,
any
rate, is
not proved,
must
have some other reason

than that
it is
for believing
to
be true
inferred from
in exactly the
is
same
manner
let
as
was from B.
So much
plain.
Now
us apply these general remarks to the particular
case of the
Law The Law of
of Universal Causation.
Universal Causation
'
is
an inference
It
from particulars
has never
by simple enumeration.'
has
;
been found a certain number of times to be true

it it
(I
I
allow this for the sake of argument),

say,
has never,
been known to be
I
false.
This
is
the statement, and as far as

statement, of
rests.^
can judge the complete

it
the inductive argument on which
But
if
we
trust as a rule to this

shall,'
same inducdistin-
tive argument,
grossly.'
It is
*we
says Mill,
in general err
clear therefore that
we must
guish the correct argument by which the
Law
of
Causation
is
proved from the incorrect arguments

;
which
it
exactly resembles
and
this
it
is
equally
clear can only
be done by means of considerations to

itself.
be found outside of the argument

these considerations
?
What
are
They can be seen on page 102 of the second volume of the Logic,' and may be paraphrased somewhat in the following way
*
:
Vol.
ii.
p. 102.
24

Certain sequences
[part
i.
may be
observed to be con-
stant
and invariable within
limits which,
compared
hazardous
with the total range of time and space open to
human
to
observation, are restricted.
It is
assume that these sequences

in
will
obtain
much
beyond the sphere

to
which they have been observed
be
true,
because they
may be
the result not of

'
direct causation but of
an arrangement, or
this
collo-
cation
'
of causes
and
arrangement, and con-
sequently
its effects,
may
only exist within the limits

If,
where
it
has been observed.
however,
we
sup-
pose the sphere in which
we have observed
total
such a
in pro-
sequence to
portion as
to
it
be gradually extended, then,

approaches to the
range open
human
observation, in that proportion will the
observed sequence approach the certainty and universality of a law of nature, until ultimately the
two
become
indistinguishable.
This
is
the case with the
Law
of Causation.
the objection that has to be
is
Now
made
to this
method of proof
tion at issue.
that
it
assumes the whole ques-
The
distinction
between sequences
which are the
result of direct causation
and sequences
which depend on the collocation of causes, has no meaning unless we assume a universe governed by
causation
;
and the existence of such a universe
is
the very thing
we want
to demonstrate.
Grant
all
that Mr. Mill or Mr. Bain could desire
and a great
that at every
deal
more than could be proved
grant
CHAP.
II.]
EMPIRICAL LOGIC.
25
time and in every place throughout that very Hmited

portion of time and space open to
human observation
every event has had a cause, and every cause has
been always followed by the same event, we should

still
be no nearer proving that an inference founded

likely to
on these particulars was more

than an inference
be accurate
founded on any other particu-
between the two assumed a universe of the very kind we wished to

lars, so long as the only distinction
prove.
tinction
And
this
is
precisely
It is
what Mr.
in
;
Mill's dis-
does assume.
dangerous
an ordinary
but
way
(he says) to infer from particulars

safely
if
we may
do so
our induction
is
sufficiently wide.
And
we
why
Because
we
shall
then be sure that what
have observed
causation.
is
not due to chance or the accidental
collocation of causes, but to the direct operation of
This
is
doubtless a most excellent canon
of criticism, and one which
may
'
enable us to judge
of the worth of
ation.'
it
many
inferences
by simple enumerand that

the
There
is,
however, one such inference which

of,
is
can never enable us to judge

of Causation
itself.
Law
ment
basis
This expedient
in
for placing the empirical argu-
favour of the uniformity of nature on a sure

rather clumsy, but the truth
it is
is,
may seem
for
that,
it
though not good,
as
good
as
any other which
was possible
For
in
Mr.
Mill, with his
views about the
sources of knowledge, to suggest.
a general
way we may
lay
it
down
that
26
[part
i.
by informal inference we mean inference of which the truth cannot be discovered from the form, any attempt to prove a conclusion by means of such
since
inference, can only tive in
be made even apparently

:
effec-
one of three ways
Firstly,
we may
distin-
guish the legitimate from the illegitimate application

of the
itself
method by means of some

by
that method.
principle
which
is
arrived at
This
less
is
Mr.
Mill's
device,
and involves a more or

a
circle.
obvious argu-
ment
other
in
Or, secondly, our principle of dis-
tinction
may be given either a priori, or by some mode of inference. This plan, though common
is
enough,
of course
inconsistent
with
empirical
philosophy, at any rate as conceived by Mr. Mill.
Or, thirdly,
we may adopt no
all,
extraneous principle of
distinction at
but simply affirm that of two similar
cases of inferences
we
perceive one to be cogent

'
,
and the other

I
not.
am
it
not aware that any philosopher has forlast expedient.
mally adopted this

ever,
is
In reality, how-
hardly to be distinguished from those

particular experiences
*
theories according to which
are the occasions of our forming
intuitive
'
judg-
ments.
It is true that in
'
the one case the particular

reasons,'
experiences are called

*
and
in
the other
first
occasions,'
and that a system founded on the

But except
in the
would be
second
is
'
called 'empirical,'
and one founded on the
intuitional/
names there
For
no important difference between the two.
CHAP.
II.]
EMPIRICAL LOGIC.
27
why
are
we
to accept the conclusion supposed to

*
be
proved by the
reasons
?
'
Because of the cogency

at
all.
of the reasoning
Not
Precisely similar
reasoning from
leads to
*
equally true
premises
frequently
gross error.'
if
We
I
accept this example of

it,
reasoning,
we do
in
accept
in exactly
to, certain
it
the
same
way
as,
by the
;
theories
allude
judgments
are accepted
the one case

to
is
the reasoning
intuition,
which
is
known
be valid by a special
the judgment.
and
in the other
It
it is
would
not, therefore,
have been open
to
Mr.
Mill to take this view of the proof
by which the
proof
'
Law
of Causation
in form,
is
established.
'
It is in reality,
' ;
though not
anxious
is
an
intuitional
and so
he to be free from any
taint of
intuitivism,'
that of the chapter nominally devoted to proving the

law, he has thought
to disproving the
*
it
expedient to devote a quarter

'
intuitive
proofs of other people
and
if
the reader will refer to the early part of that
chapter he will see that Mr. Mill's dialectic would be

quite as effective against the particular intuitional
doctrine, which, as
I
have explained above,

it
lies
con-
cealed under an empirical disguise, as
is
against
those more usual and orthodox theories with which
we
are familiar.
In the foregoing attack on Mr.

inference, in so far, at least, as
it is
Mill's
view of
applied to the
I
proof of the law of universal causation,
have said
nothing which, as
imagine, has not, in one shape
28

itself to
[part
i.
or another, suggested
logic.
many
students of his
But
am
anxious to explain that the fact of

for criticism implies a recognition of
singling
him out
his merits
even more than of
his defects.
is
If his
empirical view of the universe

attack,
it
peculiarly easy to
is
is
not because his method of proof
less
satisfactory than that of other empirical philosophers,
but because he saw more clearly, or at any rate
allowed his readers to see more

that
clearly,
what
it
was
had
to
be proved, and the only method by which,

data,
If
on purely empirical
proof was possible.
failed completely),
in
it
even the semblance of

failed
he
(and
think he
was because he attempted what,

I
the present state of our knowledge, cannot,
believe, be accomplished.
It
is
impossible
if
to
deny that science
is
only
;
possible
that,
if
we assume
the law of universal causation
observation and experiment be the sole foun-
dation of knowledge, the law of universal causation
must be proved from

stated
particulars
that Mr. Mill has
(or, if you please, has avoided stating) the method of proof from particulars as ingeniously as
and that his statement (or want of statement) cannot in reality stand for a
;
can well be imagined
moment
against hostile criticism.

I
The most
I
impor-
tant of these points
have proved, as
think, in the
I
course of the preceding remarks, the rest of them
hope the reader

therefore,
will
admit without proof
and
now,
go on
to show, in a few words, that
even
CHAP.
II.]
EMPIRICAL LOGIC.
were
it
29
if
legitimate inference from particulars
possible,
is
and the law of causation were proved,
by no
means the adequate foundation for the superstructure of science which Mr. Mill, and those who accept Mr.
Mill's general line of thought,
appear to imagine.
30
[part
i.
CHAPTER
INDUCTION.
III.
Admitting then
that the course of nature
is
regular,
and that every event has an antecedent upon which follows, and a consequent which init invariably
variably follows
it,
the question
still
remains,
how
are the real members of these sequences to be dis-
covered
How
can
we
single out the causes which
produce any given
effect
and the
?
effects
which are
produced by any given cause

(and
it
Mr. Mill would say
will again,
think, prove a convenient course
to begin the discussion
by examining
'
his opinion)
that the discovery
must be made by the employment
of one of his well-known
Four Methods.'
it
To
see
how
far the assertion
is
correct,
will only
be neces-
sary to quote two of them
the
first
and the second.

in
They run
as follows
If
any instance
which the
phenomenon
cumstance
only
in the in
under investigation
it
occurs,
and an
cir-
instance in which
does not occur, have every
common
;
save one, that one occurring
former
the circumstance in which alone

is
the two instances differ
the
effect,
or the cause, or
an indispensable part of the cause of the pheno-
CHAP.
III.]
INDUCTION.
'
31
And If two or more instances of the menon/ phenomenon under investigation have only one circumstance in common, the circumstance in which
alone
all
the instances agree
is
the cause (or effect)
of the given phenomenon.'
For the
difference
its
first
of these methods
the
method of
Mr.
is
Mill claims that a single instance of

sufficient to
application
;
prove a general law of
nature
and
in
a certain sense no doubt the claim

It
if
it
may be
allowed.
would certainly prove a general

could be applied
;
law of nature
is
but then
it
unfortunately never can be applied^
The
state of
the universe
never the same at two successive

Simultaneously
instants in every particular but one.
with the change falling under the special notice of

the observer, or
(if it
be a case of experiment)
in-
troduced into the phenomena by the experimenter,

there occur countless changes which he neither
knows
all
of nor produces, and which,
for
anything that the
canon
tells
us to the contrary,
may
each or
of
them be the cause of the subsequent

parallel objection
effect.
method
that of
may be brought against the second agreement. As Mr. Mill himself

method can never by a
single
explains at length, this
application prove a case of causation, owing to the

fact that the
same
;
effect is often
if
produced by more
than one cause
so that, even
two instances of a
*
phenomenon' have only one circumstance

mon, there
is
in
com-
a probability, but only a probability.
32

is
[part
i.
that that circumstance
the cause (or effect) of that

it
phenomenon.
instances of a
But has
ever occurred that two
phenomenon have only one circum?
stance in
common
is
We
may
safely reply, never.

difference,
As
in
the case of the

vitiated
method of
the
reasoning
by the
fact that
the universe
in
never
differs in
two successive moments
only one
fails,
particular,
so the
method of agreement
two successive
not
only for the reason given by Mr. Mill, but because

the
universe,
at
moments, never
neither the one
select-
agrees in only one particular.
And
canon nor the other shows us any grounds for

ing from
among
the countless points of difference or

is
agreement that one which

of which
I
the cause or the effect
we
are in search.
this objection as against Mill,
it
have stated
but
it
must not be supposed that
has only weight
against Mr. Mill's statement of the law of induction.

It is
equally applicable to the ordinary version of
the means whereby
obtain knowledge by experiment and observation, of which view, indeed, Mr.

Mill merely attempts a systematic exposition.
If
we
we man swallow the contents of a phial, and immediately fall down dead, we conclude that his death is
see a
the consequence of what he has drunk
and we do
so undoubtedly on the grounds stated in the canon of the Method of Difference. All other circumstances seemed to remain the
same except these

and
his
twohis drinking the
liquid
death
we
CHAR
III.]
INDUCTION.
them
off as
33
therefore pair
cause and
effect.
The
must
smallest reflection, however, shows that there
have been an
indefinite
number
of events which,
like the drinking of the liquid,
immediately preceded
not so plain
in
is
the death of the

principle
man what is which may justify us

;
*the
assuming, that
effect,
though they are antecedents of the
they are
no part of
its
cause.
Now
there are two
ways
It
in
which
this difficulty
or ambiguity in the ordinary version of inductive
reasoning
may be
met.
may,
in the first place,
be asserted, that by previous observation or experi-
ment we may, and commonly

fidence to select
do, arrive at
some
conclusions which enable us with
more or less confrom among the phenomena which

it.
precede an event the one which produced

example,
For
and
we know
in small
that there are
many drugs which

;
taken even
doses produce instant death
this is a consideration
which materially influences us

I
in affirming, in the case

tion, that
have just used
for illustra-
the drinking of the contents of the phial,
and the sudden death of the man, were not mere

coincidences, but
tion.
were events connected by causait
But though
may be
admitted that
in fact
we do
thus habitually use our knowledge of the
general laws of nature to guide us in the interpretation of particular observations or experiments, this
is
no justification of inductive methods
in the abstract,
3ince these general laws of nature must,
on any
ern-
34
[part
i.
pirical theory, in the first instance
themselves have
been arrived at by induction.

that, unless
It is therefore plain
we
all
are
doomed
to
wander
in
an endless
logical circuit,
some inductions must be
valid which
derive, or at
events require, no support from any
extraneous authority.
We turn
what
in this
then to the second possible solution of
the difficulty, which might be stated perhaps some-
in error
Mr. Mill (it might be said) is way when he supposes that one properly con:
'
ducted experiment can prove a law of nature, even

if
the
method employed be the

In
all
"
Method of
If
Differ-
ence."
cases of induction
we
can do no more
than prove a certain law to be probable.

servations or experiments be
ful,
if
our ob-
numerous and successa very high one

;
the probability proved
may be
they are few and ambiguous,
slight
one
but in either case
may be a very what we prove is

it
probability
and probability alone.

If
still
This, however,
need cause us no uneasiness.

certainty
is
demonstrative
denied
us,
we may
life.'
by
this
method
require
obtain that practical certainty which

to guide us in the affairs of
is all
we
This,
imagine,
is
the
opinion
of Professor
'
Jevons, elaborated at
ciples
of Science.'
some length in The PrinThat work has no pretension

since,
if
I
to
be a complete philosophy of science,

it it
understand
rightly,
the uniformity of nature
is
assumed
in
without proof, as a necessary condi-
CHAP. HI.]
INDUCTION.
;
35
tion of inductive enquiry
but, this
assumption once
arrive at a
facts of
granted, the further steps
by which we
it
knowledge of the laws of nature from the

nature are given in detail, so that
is
directly con-
cerned with the subject-matter of
this chapter.
Now
Jevons
is
it
can hardly be doubted that Professor
correct in saying that
arrive at nothing better

in
is
by induction we can than probability and that

;
consequence a study of the theory of probability

a necessary and most important part of the phi-
losophy of science.
But
his
enthusiasm for
this
branch of the subject carries him perhaps rather

further than sober reason warrants.
Because, apart
little,
from the logic of chance

to suppose that, aided
we
can do
he seems
by the
logic of chance,
we
can do everything.
The
universe appears to him
like a gigantic ballot-box,
from which the
scientific
observer occupies himself in drawing and replacing

black and white balls
;
and because the resources
of the calculus would enable the drawer to deter-
number of draws, the chances of the next ball being black or white, even when the number of the balls in the box is infinite, he apmine, after any
pears to suppose that a similar procedure will enable

the experimenter to foretell the probability of a future
event from a study of the sequences and co-existences

of
phenomena
It
in the past.
may be
doubted, however,
how far
the universe
can be fairly assumed to resemble a ballot-box, even P 3
36
[part
i.
though the
infinite.
size of the hypothetical ballot-box

it
be
And
is
still
more open
to
question
whether a legitimate application of the theory of

probability will permit us to hold scientific beliefs
with anything like the certainty which

attach to them, even granting
all
men of science
the premises which
they are in the habit of claiming.
Let
us, in
order to
make
this perfectly clear, ex-
amine a hypothetical case of induction, which we
may make
as
favourable as
we
choose.
Let us
has been
(if
imagine that two phenomena,

frequent occurrence
;
and
B, are of very
that
whenever
observed
please) that
has invariably followed it, and whenever B has been observed

it.
you
has
invariably been found to precede
Let us further
suppose that the connection between the two has
been proved both by the 'method of difference'
and
'the method
of
agreement,'
with as
much
completeness as anything can be proved by these
means.
Then, granting the principle of the uniis
formity of nature, what probability
there that
when next
it ?
shall occur
will
be found to follow
It
is
evident that unless this probability be
very high, amounting indeed almost to practical certainty, then,
either the confidence with
which we
the laws of nature is greatly exaggerated (since no law can have better experimental evidence than that which connects and
commonly regard
B), or else
some considerations not supplied by the
CHAP.
III.]
INDUCTION.
37
principle of the uniformity of nature, or the logic of

induction,
It
have been omitted from the proof.

admitted at once
that, In
may be
a world which
we assume
sequence of
to
be governed by law, the invariable
B on
is
a proof that there
is
probably
some
causal link, direct or indirect, between them.

it is
In other words,
coincidence
is
very unlikely that this constant

precise
the
work of chance. What the
numerical value of this probability
may be
It
it is
not
easy to determine, but undoubtedly

large
;
would be very
and as we are
at liberty to imagine as
many
it
coincidences as
we
please,
we may
consider
it
as
practically infinite.
This being granted,
would
most
seem
next
this
to follow that, in a uniform world, the
confident expectation might be entertained that
when
A
is,
appeared,
as
I
It
would be succeeded by B, and

It,
understand
it
the opinion of Mr. Mill

is
and Mr. Jevons, as

ordinary
certainly
the opinion of
common
sense.
It is not,
however, a con-
clusion which can be legitimately
drawn from the
premises provided for us by inductive philosophy, as

the following considerations will show.
The
precedes
fact
that in our experience
invariably
gives a certain probability In favour of
being causally connected with B.

all
But
it
gives
no probability at
cause of B.
in
favour of
that
is
A
we
being the whole

are acquainted
Every cause
with
is
complex.
But there
no process whatever
it is.
by which we can show how complex
Mr. Mill
38

is
[parti.
says somewhere that induction

nation
;
a process of elimiis
but he gives no method, and there

all
no
method, for eliminating
the
phenomena which
it
do not co-operate with
when
produces B.
Of
course
it
is
easy to take two cases of
and
occurring,
and
to say that the circumstances in
which the two cases differed cannot be necessary

for the production of
B by A.
But
it is
this assertion
must be
carefully qualified before
accepted.
If
we
could conceive the second case of

first
occurring to
be precisely similar to the

particulars, then, since
case except in certain

it is
follows both times,
plain
of course that these particulars are not necessary for the production of B.
But no such inference can be
made
if
the
first
case of
A occurring has some circumhas not.

It
stances which the second has not, while the second
has some which the
first
may be
that
these exceptional circumstances, though different in
each case, were in each case necessary, and that without them
B would
in neither case
will
:
have followed.
if
This piece of reasoning
perhaps be clearer
(i)
put in a more symbolic form
A happens twice,
The
a,
first
and
is
each time followed by B.

it
time
c;
it
happens
is it
accompanied only by
happens
it
b,
the
second time
X, y, z.
c, X, y,
is
accompanied only by
a, b,
It is
impossible to infer from this that

in the
were not essential factors
production
of B.
{2)
A happens twice
and
is
each time followed
by
B.
The first time it happens
it is
accompanied only
'
CHAP.
III.]
INDUCTION.
39
by
a, b, c.
panied
The second time it happens it is accomonly by b, c. From this It may be inferred with
Is
certainty that a
not necessary to the production of
B.
Now
It
Is
evident that the canon of elimination
which could be deduced from these two examples,
though logically
practice.
perfect,
can never be applied in

'
It is like
If
Mr.
it
Mill's
method of
difference
admirable
only
could be used.
Unfortunately
we know only an Infinitesimal fraction of the phenomena which accompany any cause, and even to this fraction the above canon can never be made to fit.
It invariably
it
happens that the second time
occurs
will
be accompanied by some things which did not

It
co-exist with
before,
and
will not
be accompanied
It
by some things which did

in the first of the
Is
co-exist with
before.
It
therefore occurs under the circumstances mentioned
above formulas, and no Inference

its
possible respecting the share which any of

in the
ac-
companiments have
But
assert
it
production of B.
may be
said,
'
though
it Is
impossible to
positively
which of the phenomena accomone of these phenomena only
panying
B,
still
A
If
are not necessary for the production of
we
find
occurring once In conjunction with
out of the
surely assert
many
in the
times in which
all
A
it
occurs,
we may
that In
probability
was
on that occasion no factor
production of
B.'
It is
not necessary for

it
my
purpose to dispute
this
whether
could be successfully disputed or no.
40

it
[part
i.
For
of
leaves altogether unsolved the further problem
how we
are to dispose of these
are always to be found in

fixed stars, for example.
phenomena which company with A the
On
?
what
principle are
we
to say that these are not necessary to
in
order
that
B may be produced
?
What is to be our method

is
of elimination here
It
cannot evidently be experi-
ment, because in this respect every experiment

identical.
For the same reason

It
;
it
cannot be obser-
vation.
can be no deduction from the theory of

the ballot-box gives us no assistance
sense,
;
probability
and common
which
does
if it
which quietly ignores the
diffi-
culty, furnishes us
it
with no hint as to the principle on
so.
Now
be admitted, as
in
theory
think
it
must be admitted, that every phenomenon which has always accompanied A is as likely as not to be an
essential part of the cause of
it
appears to follow
that our expectation that
will in the future follow
A must depend in part on our expectation that each of the phenomena which have always accompanied A
will
do so again.
But these phenomena are
in
number
infinite.
We
know, or might know, thousands of
them
yet those
we know
are entirely lost in the
vast multitude of those which
we do not know, but which we have every reason to believe exist in the
infinity of space.
Because, therefore,
we
are unable
to eliminate the
accompaniments of
which are not

to
necessary for the production of B;
we have now
CHAP.
III.]
INDUCTION.
41
face the further difficulty of determining the proba-
biHty that these accompaniments of
will co-exist
with
it
in the future.
But
this
problem puts us back
precisely
into
the
trying to escape.
traverse exactly the
In order to solve
we were we have to same ground as we had when we

position from which
it,
were enquiring
of
into the
methods by which the causes
B were
to be discovered.
still
For a case of
persist-
ence (and of course

is in
more obviously of
recurrence)
reality a case of causation.
The
its
persistence of
the planet Mars, for example, through another year
depends upon causes of which
existence at this
?
moment
is
only one.
What
are these other causes
and what
is
the probability of their being in operation

?
for another year
These are the very questions we

trying to determine the
asked when
we were
method
con-
by which the antecedents of B might be discovered,

and
for
which we could find no answer.
The
tinued existence of the planet
Mars may, for anything we know to the contrary, depend upon the continued existence of the moon, a phenomenon
which, as far as our experience goes, has always coexisted with

it.
What
then
is
?
the probability of the
moon's continuing to exist

the
About
this precisely
same
series of questions
s^-mie
may be
of
asked, meeting
unsatisfactory
with precisely the

answers.
position.
series
So
that
we
find ourselves finally in this

if
Experiment and observation,
conducted
under favourable circumstances, can determine with
42
[part
i.
a probability approaching to certainty, that a phenomenon A is causally connected with a phenomenon

B.
But neither experiment nor observation can give

multitude of
is
us the smallest information as to whether any of the

infinite
phenomena which accompany
whenever B
for
produced, are or are not necessary
parts of the cause of
nor can they
tell
us
exactly the
same reason
anything
and
it,
about the
probability of a single one of these
accompaniments
of A, however well
we may be
it
acquainted with
;
continuing to accompany
in the future
still
less
can they assist us in computing the chances of the

recurrence or persistence of those essential parts of
the cause of
bers, but of
B which may
exist in indefinite
numIn
is
which we know absolutely nothing.

that the course of nature
other
words granting
uniform, no scientific methods,

principle alone, can give us
by the help of
this
any assurance that the

ourselves to have
laws of nature, which
we suppose
discovered, will continue to operate in the future.
What
It
is
additional principle,
then,
must be
esta?
blished in order that this assurance
may be
obtained
evident in a general
it
way
that the principle,
whatever
tion
;
may
is,
be,
that
it
must be a principle of eliminamust enable us to eliminate from
among the innumerable antecedents of a phenomenon those which we may be certain have nothing whatever to do with
self altogether
its
occurrence.
But
confess
my-
unable to formulate such a principle,
CHAP.
III.]
INDUCTION.
to
43
much
and
less
prove
it.
There
is,
no doubt, a
practical
instinct,
common
both to the unscientific
to the scientific observer,
which induces men
to
ignore as
much
as possible the share which either
very remote or very permanent phenomena
may
have
are
in the
production of the effects for which they

to
trying
account.
Nobody,
for
example,
seriously imagines that the existence of a star in the
Milky
before
Way
it
is
a necessary concomitant to a spark
can explode a barrel of gunpowder.

it
On
the other hand, this instinct, though

that
it
is
so strong
is
not easy gravely to discuss

it,
any theory
be trusted.
flagrantly inconsistent with
can hardly be accurately
defined,
and
certainly
cannot always
The most distant

this planet
effect
;
object that has ever been perceived

effect
is
has had some appreciable
on the
affairs
of
since
if
is
its
perception
in itself
such an
sun,
and
we
consider permanence,
the
which has accompanied every phenomenon ever

experienced,
an essential and not very remote
link in the chain of causes,
by which
all
the events
that occur
on the surface of the globe are protherefore,
duced.
It
is
evident,
that the
difliculty of
proving the uniformity of nature, and the law of universal causation,

is
not the
only obstacle
which
stands in the
way
of a satisfactory empirical philo-
sophy.
Even granting
it is
the truth of
these great
principles,
not easy to frame with their help an
44
[part
i.
inductive logic, which shall really enable us to argue

to
unobserved instances
and,
shall
show
it
in the
next chapter, could say the

least,
we prove such
complete
laws,
would, to
itself to
by no means be
sufficient
by
justify us in holding the

its
scientific
creed in
ordinary shape.
CHAP.
IV.]
HISTORICAL INFERENCE.
45
CHAPTER
The proper
IV.
classification of the sciences is a subject
which has of
late
engaged the attention of

is,
scientific
philosophers, and
therefore,
is
it
need not be
said,
one about which there

of which
some
difference of opinion.
Into the minutiae of this controversy, the importance

is,
perhaps, not very great,

;
do not pro-
pose to enter
but one broad division, not of the

it
sciences, indeed, but of science (for
runs across the

it
lines separating the particular sciences),
is
necesit
sary that
should recall to the reader, since
has
in
an important philosophic bearing on the subject
hand, and must be constantly kept in mind through-
out the following discussion.
Every
of
statement
concerning
phenomena
other words, every scientific proposition
in
is
of one
two kinds
It
expresses either a law or a fact

in
That anarchy ends

true or not
lution
is
despotism
;
is
a law (whether
of no
moment)
that the
French Revois
gave birth to the power of Napoleon
fact.
That
accidental variations, which are of use to the
individual in the struggle for existence, are likely to
become permanent
is
a law
that existing species are
46

is
[part
i.
produced by natural selection

at equal temperatures
fact.
That
all
forms of energy tend to resolve themselves into heat

is
a law
that the earth will
become an
be turned
inert mass, containing

is
no energy that can
into work,
fact.
Now,
in so far as science is
founded upon obser-
vation and experiment (and on the most extrava-
gantly a priori theory these must form an essential

part of
its
groundwork),
it is
plain that
I
all
the pro-
positions stating laws (which
will call, the abstract
part of science) must ultimately be, to a certain extent,
founded on the propositions

concrete part of science.
^tdXvcig facts
is
i.e.
on the
What
is,
perhaps
less plain,
but what
is
no
less certain,
that almost the whole

is
of our knowledge of concrete science
in like
manner
founded upon abstract science.

that are
still
As
regards facts
in
the future, this
is
sufficiently obvious.
Leaving supernatural prophecy out of account, our

sole
means of
foretelling
what
is
to
;
come depends
and
this
upon our knowledge of natural laws

is,
indeed
according to some people, the chief reason which

natural
makes
laws worth investigating.

it
little
reflection
shows that
is
equally true of facts that

facts
have already occurred, whether those
be what
are ordinarily called scientific, as, for example, the existence of the glacial epoch, or whether they are
what are
ordinarily called historical, as, for example,
the death of Julius Caesar.
Massing these together under the common name
CHAP.
IV.]
47
historical,'
is
we may
say generally that a law of
nature
an essential part of every inference what-
ever by which
we arrive
at facts
which are occurring
we are immediately informed by perception or memory from which it may be deduced that every principle which
or have occurred, other than those of which
;
is
required to
establish
a law must be
required
to establish a historical fact,
though
it
does not follow,

sufficient.
of course, that these principles will be
In
in
order to determine this latter point,

strictness to
we ought
list
have before us a complete
of these
to
principles, in order that
we might apply them

But
it
cases of historical inference.
will
be more
trusted,
convenient to assume that our knowledge of the laws

of nature, as taught us by science,
is
to
be
and that the only general principle required for arriving at this knowledge is the law of universal
causation.
in
On
this
assumption (which
is
sufficiently
accordance with current philosophy) the problem

:
before us would be as follows

(ist)
Given as premises
some knowledge of existing and recent facts obtained immediately by perception or memory; (2nd) a knowledge of the abstract laws of phenomena as set forth by science (3rd) the law of causa;
tion can we deduce from these the ordinary version
of history, and,
if
not,
what additional
so,
principles will
is
be required to enable us to do
evidence on which they rest
?
and what
the
The
first
of these kinds of premises
some know-
48
[part
i.
ledge of existing and recent facts

as might at
establish
first
is
not necessary,
is
appear, because
of
it
required to
these are
the laws
phenomena;
for
already assumed.
It is necessary,
rather,
because
without
it
nothing concrete could be inferred from
the abstract propositions contained under the second
and
third of the
above-mentioned heads.
The
exist-
ence and distribution of phenomena at any given

period cannot be arrived at
by a mere knowledge of
the laws of
some knowledge of the existence and distribution of phenomena at

phenomena
;
it
requires also
some other period

nomena, both
ultimately, therefore, our mediate
knowledge of the existence and distribution of phein the past
and the
future,
must depend
on some immediate knowledge of them, and we have no such immediate knowledge, except concerning the
present and perhaps the recent past.
Now, although a knowledge nomena that is, of causes and

effects
of the laws of phetheir corresponding

is
a necessary element in every inference

is
about concrete science, there

difference in the
a most important
ployed, according
way in which these laws are emas we are dealing with the futuffe^
For whereas every inference about
so every inference about the
or with the past.
the future necessarily involves at least one argument
from cause to
effect,
past necessarily involves at least one argument from

effect to cause, a distinction which, curiously
is all in
enough,
favour of that department of knowledge con-
CHAP.
IV.]
49
cerning which
least
we suppose
the future.
ourselves to
It
know
the
namely,
all
seems, indeed, clear

is
enough that the ordinary view
correct,
all
and that if
we knew
them
existing causes,
and
the laws binding
to their consequents,
calculation, then,
powers of
and if we had infinite assuming the law of uni-
versal causation to be true,

into operation,
and that no new cause came
we
could forecast the whole future

'
'
of the universe.
large, perhaps, to
The ifs here are somewhat too make this very substantial comfort,
once perceive,
it
but, as the reader will at
is
by no
does
means obvious
that even
on similar terms we could

it
give a complete account of the past, because
not appear to be inconsistent with our assumptions

to suppose that
more than one

effects
^
;
set of causes could

in other
is
have produced existing

This
reflection,
words, that
more than one version of

what
to
is
history
equally possible.
then, points
out very
clearly
the
first
question
we have more
particularly
examine
namely, whether a knowledge of natural

we
is
laws such as
of causation,
possess,
combined with the principle
sufficient to enable us to
overcome
and,
the apparent ambiguity

inference
introduced into historical

plurality of causes
in
;
by the possible
if
this question
be answered
the negative,
we
shall
then have to determine whether any valid principle

can be found to
reasoning.
fill
up
this
it
gap
in
our ordinary
is
The
enquiry,
*
may be
p. 6^).
observed,
of
See note on
50
[part
i.
some importance,
be determined
very
since no issue less than this has to
namely, whether a branch of science

grown
ill-considered history
of the greatest speculative interest, which has

in not
many years from an
of a few nations for a few centuries, to an account,

in outline at least, of the history of the race, of the
whole human
belongs
organic world, of the planet on which

to
we
dwell,
(I
and of the system
which
it
whether
say) this vast department of

its
knowledge
deserves to retain
position,
or should be con-
sidered as a mere collection of illustrations,

aginary, though possible, examples, of
by im-
laws work or
In order
how natural may work in the concrete. that we may attack the problem with
let
the best hope of success,

it
us begin by considering
as simplified
by
certain arbitrary limitations.
The
possibility of history, as
we have
seen, rests
on the
possibility of eliminating all sets of causes
but one of
existing effects
let
us then at
first
take into conit
sideration only one effect,

7nust
and
let
us suppose that
have been produced by one of two causes,
but might have been produced by either.

these conditions, what
Under
is
we have
to determine
the
ground which may
justify us in asserting,
as
we
our
so often do assert, that one of
them was the
actual
historical cause rather than the other.
To
fix
ideas, let us take

flints
a concrete case.
collection of
broken into shapes rudely resembling arrowis
heads
found during the course of some excava-
CHAP.
IV.]
51
<f/>
tion.
No human
being (who need be considered)
doubts under these circumstances that one of tliS

causes of this striking effect was the will and intelligence of
man, though
at the
same time
it is
not
to be denied that each
one of these arrow-heads, and

which
therefore
all
of them, might be the product of that

in
unknown
this
collection of mechanical causes
case, for
convenience,
we may
is
call
accident.
Why
do we unhesitatingly
?
reject accident in favour
of intelligence
bilities
is,
The answer
in
ready.
The
proba-
are infinitely
favour of the latter that
the chances against accident are
enormously,
if
indefinitely, greater
than the chances against
intel-
ligence.
itself to
This answer, which certainly commends
common
sense, suggests, however, a further
enquiry.
On what grounds
do we form this estimate

?
of the comparative probability of the two causes

It
is
plain that
The
particular value that
we ought to have some grounds. we assign to the chance of

by mere abstract
one or other of any two possible causes being the

actual cause cannot be determined
speculation, but
must be derived from some theory

not
difficult to
respecting the conditions under which these causes
were
likely to
have acted.
It is
see
that in the
example before us these conditions are

be,
.
supposed to
obtain
on the whole, similar

It
it
to those
which
now.
is
is,
assumed that an arrow-head

merely one of an indefinite
all
shape was, as
number
of other forms,
of which ^r produced^
52
[part
i.
in
equal or greater numbers, by mechanical causes,

it
and that
waSy as
it is,
a form which
is
man
it is
in
a state
of savagery finds useful, and
therefore likely to
quite true
origin are
that
this
manufacture
and on
But
this hypothesis
that the chances in favour of a
human
evident
enormous.
hypothesis
fact
;
it
is
no
less
is
it
itself
the statement of a historical
that
must, therefore, involve an inference

;
from
effects to causes
that these effects
may
again
;
be conceivably due to more than one set of causes

that
we must
in
again select one set of causes rather
than another on grounds of probability, and again be

obliged,
order to establish
that probability,
to
make a new inference from effects to causes. If, now, we imagine this process carried on indefinitely, we may suppose ourselves at last to arrive at the
deduction of the totality of causes from the totality
of effects.
Supposing, as seems likely enough, that
the totality of effects might conceivably have been
produced by more than one selection or arrangement

of causes, on what principle are
we now
?
to choose
between these conflicting

them, perhaps
select,
all
it
possibilities
Most of
except the
one we commonly
would,
can scarcely be doubted, seem in
the highest
degree extravagant
is
and
improbable.
But
their
extravagance
merely the result of the

;
manner
and as
in
which they strike on our imagination

I
for their improbability,
am
altogether at a
loss to see
how, from our principles, any estimate of
CHAP.
IV.]
53
their probability at all like
what we require can be
founded.
effects,
it
Since
we
are dealing with the totality of
cannot clearly be founded on ^ny further
inference from effect to cause,

tion
and no other founda-
seems to
me
possible, except
by the intervention
of
some new
I
scientific
axiom.
am
I
afraid that this speculation

;
may seem
the
mere extravagance of scepticism

tion
and the
illustra-
am
about to give may, perhaps, strengthen
the prejudice against
my
view, though
it
hope
it
may make
telligible.
the grounds of
more
clear
and
in-
Let us suppose, then, that our only source of

information respecting the past was derived from
written
documents
that,
with
the
exception
of
what each man remembered, he knew absolutely nothing of times gone by beyond what he read in
books or MSS. professing to have been written at
the various periods of which they spoke.
further suppose that from such materials a
less consistent
Let us
more or
and plausible history has been conlet
structed,
and then
us try and determine the sort
of grounds
we have
for estimating its probable truth.
The
effects
here
are
the
books and MSS.
the causes inferred from these effects are
various
writers having access to information about different

periods,
who have
taken care to place this informarecord.
tion accurately
upon
Since there are, how-
ever, other possible causes, for example, the inven-
54
[part
i.
tion
by one or more persons of a story, and the forgery of the documents required for its support, it becomes necessary to find a principle which may
enable us to choose between the rival hypotheses.
commonly said that the authenticity of any document may be shown by two kinds of evidence
It is
the external and the
internal
and since
internal
evidence would be defined as evidence drawn from

the document
itself, it
might seem natural to conit
clude that such evidence really exists, and that
might provide us with the principle of which

search.
we are
in
In strictness, however, this
is
not the case.
From
the character of any document alone no con-
clusion can be
drawn
in favour of its
its
it
genuineness,
forgery be
is
provided
admitted.
the
bare possibility of
Supposing, for example,
said that
the style and character of thought of
some book
show
it
to
have been the product of a certain age
and country
this implies
if
it
a knowledge of that age

to
and country which,
is
be admitted as
evi-
dence, must clearly be derived
from some other

;
source than the book
it
is
intended to vindicate
and
this is equally true of
any possible
for
characteristic
which can be adduced either
or against
any
the
theory respecting date of composition or authorship.

It
would appear, indeed,
at
first
sight,
as
if
contents of a book might be so unlike the sort of

things people invent, or so difficult to
consistent
if
make
self-
they were invented, that
its
genuineness
CHAP.
IV.]
55
could be concluded from the mere consideration of

these peculiarities.
But even
this inference involves
some hypothesis respecting the condition

world at
the supposed date of authorship.
of the
It
sup-
poses that the ability to invent and the desire to

invent existed at that
to
time
such
degrees as
;
make
invention of this sort highly improbable
but since this estimate cannot be founded on the
document
itself
without a petitio principii,
it
must
be founded either on some hitherto undiscovered

axiom, or on other documents, or on other non-
documentary phenomena.
bilities
is
I
The
first
of these possi-
reserve for discussion later on.
The
last
excluded by hypothesis.
the
second.
There remains,
there-
fore,
But the smallest consideration
will
show that all the remarks just applied to a single document apply equally well to any number of documents taken together. Once admit the
possibility of their forgery, the improbability of
such
an event can only be deduced from

themselves deductions from
all
facts
which are
of these
in this
It
or
some
all.
documents, and which consequently cannot

matter be used as a basis of inference at
may
from
this
be
stated, therefore, generally that if
we
I
start
the arbitrary hypothesis with which

illustration,
all
began
then,
first,
it
is
quite as probable that
history should be fictitious as that

true
if
;
some
of
it
should be
corollary,
and,
secondly^ as
it
necessary
two versions of
are
mutually ex-
56

It
[part
i.
elusive,
likely.
is
impossible to say which
is
the
more
a
The
when
general
principle
from which
this
Is
deduction seems to me, indeed, almost self-evident

clearly stated.
It
would run thus
If
more
It
than one cause can produce a given

impossible,
to say
effect,
Is
by the mere contemplation of the

it
effect,
by what cause
Is
was probably produced.'

effects,'
'
The same
of causes.'
true of
'
groups of
and
the
'
'
groups
It is also true
of the
totality of effects,'
if
'
and the
causes
'
totality of causes.'
'
Now,
effects,
all
totality
of effects
'
means
existing
the
totality
of
Is, if
not history, at
events the necessary
foundation of history.
Therefore, the chances against

Is
any particular version of history being true

as the
It
simply
number
will
of possible versions of
fitting transition to
I
It Is
to one.^
be a
the next stage
In this discussion If
here notice the interesting
effect
which the existence of one particular cause

all
has on the validity of
historical
inferences
mean the universal first cause, whether that be the unknown x of certain philosophers, or the personal
God
of the theologians.
It is of
the essence of this idea of a First
Cause
that everything which exists
in
other words, the
whole of the premises on which we found our knowledge of history Is produced by It directly
Strictly
speaking
as the number of possible versions of
it
mmiis
unity are to one.
GHAP.
IV.]
Moreover,
It
it
57
or indirectly.
is
clearly impossible
set of
to shew that, while phenomena directly.
could produce one
It
was only able
to produce
another set indirectly,
i.e.,
by means of some phe-
nomenal cause intervening.

that there
is
From
at
;
this
it
follows
no period of history
nor
which creation
I
might not have taken place

that,
if it
am
able to see
at
did take place,
it
would do so
one
period more probably than at another.
In other
there
words, whatever date in the past
we
select,
are always two causes which are equally likely to
have produced the phenomena then existing

one
is
the
phenomena which might have produced them according to known laws the other
the group of
;
is
the First Cause.
It
may be worth
noting that
these remarks are true not only of the metaphysical

substance, whether personal or not, which
origin
is
the
of
all
things,
but also of
to
any phenomena
-which
may be assumed
for
have produced the present
order of nature, but of whose laws
we
are ignorant.
that,
Supposing,
example,
it
was
shown
by
tracing back the course of events through time,
we
arrived at a point where the
recognised laws of
in
nature failed
us,^
and where we were
consequence
compelled to assume a new, and, of course, unknown

set of antecedents acting in
unknown ways
in
that
case
^
we should
not be justified in supposing that the

re-
This speculation was suggested by certain physical theories
specting the distribution of heat.
58

known causes failed unknown causes came
[part
i.
point where the

point where the
tion.
us was the
into opera-
The
probabiHties, in fact, are infinitely the
other way.
For
since these causes are
unknown,
we
clearly cannot say that their properties are such
as to
make
their appearance
time than at another.
more probable at one That they must appear at
some period or other is shown, according to our hypothesis, by the insufficiency of established laws but when followed up beyond a certain point
;
since, also
by hypothesis, we can predicate nothing

causes, except their existence
of these
their
it
unknown
to
and
have
power
produce the present order of nature,

likely to
would seem that they are quite as

any
other.
exercised that power at any one instant of time as

at
The
reader acquainted with
the elements
of
I
geometrical optics will see clearly the point which
am
attempting to establish,
if
he
will consider the

*
distinction
between a
real
'
and a
is
virtual
is
'
image.
spectator
whose
position
fixed
contemplating
(let
us suppose) what appears to him to be the flame
of a candle.
He
if
believes
it
to
be a candle because
the rays of light reach his eye precisely as they
would do
forming
they emanated from a candle placed

Nevertheless,
where he sees the image of the flame.

in this
very natural conclusion, he
may be
altogether in error.
Since the rays would reach his
eyes
in precisely
the
same manner, whether they came
CHAP.
IV.]
real
59
from a
flame or the virtual image of a flame
produced by some optical contrivance, and since the
manner
in
which the rays reach
his
eye
is
(we
may
have
suppose) the sole ground on which he can found any

inference at
all, it is
perfectly plain that he can
no reason
for believing the
one rather than the other
to be the true object of perception.
So
it is
with us
and our inferences about the

for space, the facts
past, if
we substitute time
immediately presented to us for the
rays striking directly on the retina, and the history

of the past, as given to us
by
science, for the
image
able
of the flame.
to point to
If
we
are fortunate
we may be
an imaginary condition of the world at

period,
some given
and
say,
'
Trace out the con-
sequence of these causes according to the known

laws of nature, and you will arrive at the state of
things you
now
*
see around you,' just as
some one
accounted
might
exists,
for.'
say,
On
the supposition that a candle flame

is
your actual perception
fully
But just as
in
the
second
case a virtual
effect as the
image would have precisely the same

real image, so in the first case other
combinations of
phenomena obeying known laws, or a metaphysical first cause, or phenomena obeying unknown laws which the failure of known laws compels us to believe in, might all of them result in the existing universe.
But whereas
in the
second case the rays from the
image would not generally be the only available
means of forming a judgment respecting the
real
6o

we have
usually
[part
i.
nature of their origin, and
some
other independent grounds for deciding in favour of
one hypothesis rather than another,

so far as at present appears,
!^
in the first case,

so.
it is
not
Existing
facts are
facts,
our sole (particular) evidence for historic

if
^'
j
and
our general principles can get nothing
definite out of them, science at all events has nothing
further to suggest.
All
the cases
we have
so far considered have

in
these characteristics in
common that
each
we
sets
have
to choose
between two or more causes, or

are
of causes, which
the possible historical
ante-
cedents of the world as
we
see
it
that in each the

lie
causes between which our choice

causes, that
Is,
are actual^
are (by hypothesis)

;
to
have existed
and that
In
known to exist or each we have as yet

at this point
discovered no reason for preferring any one possible

alternative to
any other.
But
an
in-
teresting question suggests
Itself.
Why
should
we
retain the limitation (originally adopted In order to
simplify the investigation) stated in the second of the
preceding propositions
On what
principle
?
do we
confine our attention to actual causes
Why should
absolutely
we
not admit causes about whose existence or non-
existence now, or in past times,
we know
nothing as possible
^
historical
antecedents,
and
:
if
as
its
This use of the word 'actual is clumsy and not very accurate but meaning in this connection is clearly defined, its employment
'
will,
hope, lead to no confusion.
CHAP.
IV.]
6i
we do
sion
so admit them, what effect will
the admishistorical
have on the validity of our ordinary

?
inference
The
last question, at all events,
does not
seem hard
ments
to answer.
If
we
are to admit, as ele-
in the historic
problem, an indefinite number of
such possible causes on the same footing as
we now
admit actual causes, then

initial
(if
we
are limited to our
assumptions)
all
inference with regard to the
past becomes
impossible.
We
may,
if
we
as
please,
amuse ourselves by showing how

be a
them, but
actual causes
may
see
sufficient explanation of the facts
we
we must
at the
same time admit
that the
chances are infinitely against that explanation being

the true one, and for this obvious reason
:
since
follows
every historical belief
must be founded
in the last
it
resort on an inference from
effect to cause,
that
if
there are an infinite

all
number
of causes, so far
as
we know,
them
equally possible, the chances against
any one of them

of
therefore
is
against any achcal one

infinite.
If,
being
show
the real cause are also

to exist at
all,
it
therefore, history
will
be neces-
sary to
possible
that the actual causes
are the only

is
ones, or, at all
events, that there
a very
great presumption in their favour.
We
have now considered
historic inference in the
light of four separate suppositions.
We have supposed
;
that our choice lay
ist,
between
different sets of phe-
nomenal causes whose laws are known 2nd, between a noumenal cause and phenomenal causes 3rd,
'
'
62
[part
i.
between phenominal causes whose laws are known,

and phenonienal causes which are known to have
existed, but
whose laws are not known
4th,
between
causes which are
known
for
to exist, or to
have existed,
and causes which,

the contrary,
anything
we at
present
know
to
may have
;
existed in indefinite numbers.
In
all
these cases there are two alternatives prein
sented to us
accepts
each of them science unhesitatingly

rejects
one and
the other, and
in,
at all
events, most instances

choice.
I
common
sense endorses the
Nevertheless, the preceding discussion has,
hope,
made
it
plain that this course derives
no
justification
from our supposed knowledge of the ab-
stract laws connecting

in
phenomena, even when taken

supplement these grounds
which
if
connection with the law of universal causation.
It is necessary, therefore, to
of belief by
it
some other
principle or principles,
now becomes our
business to find out, and,
pos.
sible, to justify.
We
turn
first,
as
is
natural, to the
reflection
'
Uniformity
it
of Nature.'
scarcely gives
since,
But a
little
shows that
us that of which
its
we
are in search,
it
according to one of
meanings,
it is
is
in-
sufficient, while,
according to another,
If
it
not only
insufficient,
it
but untrue.
be taken to mean, as
usually
is,
that the past, the present,

in
this,
are uniform
that
the
and the future same antecedent is

it
is,
always followed by the same consequent, then
of course, one of the very assumptions with which
CHAP.
IV.]
and which have
that the
left
63
we
started,
us with
If,
all
these
unsolved problems on our hands.

hand,
it
on the other
means
same consequents are always
preceded by the same antecedents,
we could, no doubt,
fatal
from
this, in
theory, construct a history of the past
precisely to the
same extent and with the same
limitations as from the converse proposition

in
we
can
theory
now
construct a history of the future.

is
But
then, unfortunately, this
opposed
to the practical
teachings of the very science in aid of which
we
appeal to
*
it,
and
is
in
'
apparent contradiction both to

experiment.'
^
observation' and to
third meaning, according to
which the Uni-
formity of Nature would imply that no supernatural

interference with the
Order of Nature,
i.e.,
with the
succession of natural causes and effects, was possible,

This may be a convenient place at which to touch on an objecwhich the reader accustomed to regard the universe from a mechanical point of view may be tempted to raise. He may say, ' I utterly deny the possible plurality of causes, on the existence of which depends so much of your argument. I hold that the world may be regarded as a system of particles obeying mechanical laws, that it is
1
tion
therefore quite as possible to reconstruct the past, as
it is
to construct
in theory,
the future, from the present
and that both operations may,
be carried out with absolute certainty.' Since, however, this theoretical possibility can never by any accident be realised in practice, it may, for my purposes, be neglected. I write for human beings with human powers of calculation. But besides this, it is by no means
proved,
I
believe, to the satisfaction of the
men
of science that the
world IS a purely mechanical system. I am, therefore, justified in assuming, with the majority of scientific philosophers, that while one kind of cause can only have one kind of effect, one kind of effect may have more than one kind of cause. The attentive reader will see that, even were this otherwise, still, so long as it is so for our powers of observation and calculation, the main argument of the chapter remains
entirely unaffected.
64
[part
i.
would give a solution of the second problem, but of

the second problem only.
a principle, nor can
know of no proof of such conceive any. Hume's arguI
ment against miracles, Another general

phrase that
Nature.'
is
need not
say,
is
inapplicable.
principle
is
'
suggested
by a
sometimes used
The
Simplicity of
possible to
in
Let us examine how
far
it is
extract from this the premiss of

search.
which we are
simple,'
When we
not,
I
speak of Nature being

its
'
it is
presume, meant that

is,
laws are easily under-
stood, that
are
'
simple
'
relatively to our faculties

first
if
it
of comprehension.
In the
place,
it
is
not the
case,
case
in the
second place,
were the
it
we
should derive no assistance from

difficulty, since
in
our present
every one of the alternatives

is
we have
been weighing
other
;
as easily
understood as every
it
and
in the third place,
would involve the
hypothesis of a pre-established
the 'cosmos' and the
'
harmony between
'
microcosmos
which men of
Nor, for
'
science at least would be slow to admit.

this
same
reason, can
it
mean
that the
is,
most
simple
'
or
'
natural' explanation
that
the explanation
which,
when understood, seems,
in
some vague way,
especially to
is
commend
itself to
the investigator
always the true one
more particularly as different

views as to what
if
investigators take very different

is
*
natural.'
It is clear,
indeed, that
we
are to get
it
any assistance out of the Simplicity of Nature,
CHAP.
IV.]
is
65
must be because the Simplicity of Nature

thing
'
somein
objective,'
something that can be stated

merely expresses
terms which have no reference to the

observer, something which
mind of the
the
manner
in
which natural phenomena occur.
That
Nature employs the fewest possible number of causes,

or rather kinds of cause, to produce her results (which
corresponds to the maxim,
'
that causes are not to be

')
multiplied without a reason
is
a proposition which
conforms to these conditions, and which seems to

assert a kind of simplicity.
Will
this serve
our turn
So
far
as
the fourth problem (which requires us
to decide
between known and unknown causes)

it
is
concerned,
that
If
apparently
will.
It practically tells
us
we know
do
of causes that might have produced
a given
did
result, that
these causes, or
It
some of them,
in accord-
actually
so.
therefore unquestionably
affords a solution of this
problem exactly
ance
witji the
ordinary scientific view.
If,
however,
we examine
Its
bearing on the
first
and
third problems, this does not appear to

fact.
be
altogether the
In these two cases
we
are re-
quired to choose between kinds of cause which are
by hypothesis known
of
*
to exist
so that the principle
Simplicity
'
leaves us very
much where we
were.
While, with regard to the second problem, since the

alternative there
lies
between natural and superit
natural causes, a principle which (In so far as F
says
66
A DEFENCE OF PHILOSOPHIC DOUBT.
[part
i.
anything) gives us Information only about the former,
cannot be of much assistance.

I
may add
that,
though philosophers never hesi-
tate to appeal to the Simplicity of

suits their convenience,
I
Nature when
it
am
not aware that any of
them have thought

its reality.
fit
to supply us with a proof of
Though
there seems, then, to be no obvious or
recognised principle which will exactly serve our

purpose, there must nevertheless be
some
unformulated notion
isting historical
perhaps
which
lies
at the root of ex-
judgments, and which on analysis
may
furnish us with the principle of
which we are
a sort
in search.
Now
take this notion to be that there
is
of continuity in the course of Nature through the past
which discourages (so to speak) violent changes and

the interference of
unknown
is,
causes.
But such a
statement as
far too
it
stands
it
need hardly be observed,

re-
vague
to
have any philosophic value, and
quires a
good deal of analysis before even we come
to the question of proof.

violent
"^
To
begin with, what
is
It cannot, of course,
mean va^x^y startling,

produced
as
it
would then
refer solely to the effect
on the imagination, and could hardly be made the

foundation of a canon by which to judge the course
of Nature.
It
must, therefore, have

to
it,
meaning attached
clear that
though
at
some objective the same time it is

it
no such meaning can be given to
which
CHAP.
IV.]
It
Is,
67
shall
have any absolute value.
mean, impos-
sible to say
what
is
or
is
not objectively a violent
some particular change as a standard of comparison. Now, what is this standard

change, except by taking
change
It
cannot evidently be a fixed or permaall
nent rate of change to which
others must conform,
because
if
so
it
must
either be
one of which we have
immediate knowledge, or one we have arrived at by

historical inference.
It
cannot be the second, as this
(since
we
are looking for a basis for historical inferin
ence) would involve a very obvious argument

circle.
It cannot, again,
be the
first,
because recogviolent
nised history supplies us with
many more
changes than those of which we have immediate experience, so that

it
is
impossible both that history
should be true and that historic changes should con-
form
to the standard.
A
it
meaning which promises better

first
results,
because
does not at
sight appear to suggest a fixed

:-=
standard, would be as follows
'
If there are
is
two
possible causes for any effect, that one
to
be chosen
which involves the

it
least violent change.'

is
But
this,
must be observed,
not a statement respecting

to guide the
Nature, but a
maxim intended
It
judgment
the
of the natural philosopher.

its
must, therefore, derive
authority from
some
fact in nature, exactly as
ordinary rules of induction derive their authority from

the law of universal causation.
fact
?
Now
what
is
thisî^
Our guesses
(according to this maxim) beF 2
68
[part
i.
come more
accurate as they approach a certain limit.
The
smaller the change required by the conclusion,

is
the more likely
the inference on which that conclu-
sion rests to be sound.

is
But the
limit here
implied
a condition of things under which there would be

all,
no change at
a supposition which
is
absolutely
else.
incompatible with history and everything

It
must
also
be remarked that
is
'
rate of change,'
or
amount of change/
it
itself
an expression to
which
precise
is
only
;
now and then

in fact,
possible to attach a
meaning
forth.
only in those cases in which
we
are dealing with quantities, mass, velocity, force,
and so
from
Science
is,
however, so
far at present
it
being purely quantitative (whatever
may
some day become),

from being
Since, then,
it
that those notions are far indeed
sufficient to
cover the necessary ground.

for-
does not seem easy even to
mulate the axiom or axioms which are required in

addition to the law of causation to justify our ordi-
nary historic judgments,
the
second step
in
the
philosophy of the subject, by which
we seek
to
prove
or classify them (according as they are derivative or

ultimate), cannot
be attempted.
The
truth of the
matter appears to be that history rests on a kind of

scientific instinct,
is
none the
less healthy
because
is
it
not very reasonable.
This, fortunately,
quite
vigorous enough to resist the attacks of any merely

philosophic scepticism, as any one anxious to try the
experiment
may discover
for himself
provided he
will
CHAP.
IV.]
69
ask the next
man
of science he meets, whether (say)
4000
B.C. is
not as Hkely as any other assignable date

of this Earth as a separate
is
for the
commencement
If the enquirer
planet.
fortunate
enough
to get
any answer
at all to so
absurd a question, he
will pro-
bably be told that no
known
causes are adequate to
the production of existing effects in so short a time.
To
which
it
may be
replied, that there
is
no
parti-
cular reason for supposing that
known
causes have
been the only ones

of science
in operation.
On
this the
man
may
to
If
I
not improbably rejoin that gratuitous
suppositions ought to be avoided
that
the deus ex
machmd
from
art.
is
be excluded as much from science as he were further asked the grounds of

his
this canon,
do not know exactly what would be

I
answer, though
know that whether he

diminished.
could find an
answer or
not, the strength of his convictions
would
not be in any
way
From
tive result.
certain
assumptions,
then,
which seem
very negaas well to
this con-
reasonable enough,
we have arrived
it
at a
Before concluding,
may be
point out certain
ways
in
which the nature of

It will
clusion reacts on the premises.
be recollected
that
we
started with the supposition that, in addition
to the law of causation,
we were
be seen
to accept the teach-
ing of science so far as particular abstract laws were

concerned.
But
it
will
at once that the evihistorical

i.e.,
dence of many of these laws
is itself
depends on the truth of the current version of
his-
70
[part
i.
tory.
Of how many
it is
this
may be
said
do not en-
quire, but
obviously true of those which in any
way depend on a series of observations carried through many years, such as parts of astronomy and
sociology
(if
this
is
to
be considered a science).
It is also true
of
all
laws which are direct deductions
from the historic
facts
which alone are supposed to
exemplify them, such as parts of geology.
What,
preced-
however,
is
of perhaps
more
interest
is
the bearing
which some of the points brought out
in the
ing discussion have on the empirical evidence of the
law of universal causation.
The
nature of the process of inference by which

is
I
this great principle
proved from experience has

,
been discussed, and,

a previous chapter
;
think,
shown
to
be
invalid, in
but one remark concerning the
premises of that inference
maybe made appropriately

at the
now.
It
was pointed out
commencement of
the chapter that, though our knowledge of the laws

of nature must be founded, in part at least, on our
knowledge of
theless all our
particular matters of fact, that never-
knowledge of particular matters of fact other than those of which we have immediate experience, rfiust
in
their turn
be founded upon our
Now, it is commonly admitted that a law of nature depends for its generality upon the law of universal causation, in
other words,
solely
is
knowledge of the laws of nature.
extended to unobserved instances

that law
;
by means of
from which
it
follows,
CHAP.
IV.]
is
71
that the law of universal causation
a necessary
premiss in every inference by which

historical facts.
we
arrive at
What
have been hitherto attempt-
ing to
show is,
that even assuming this premiss to be

in
true, there is
an inevitable ambiguity
to insist
the inference
what
now wish
on
is,
that whether those

is
views be true or
if
false, this at
any rate
certain, that
the law of universal causation be founded on expeall,
rience at
limited.
that experience
must be extremely
dilating
Empirical
philosophers,
on the
accumulated evidence
we have
it
for this law, are in
the habit of telling us that
is
the uncontradicted
;
result of observations extending through centuries
but they have omitted to notice, that unless

believe in the law,
we
first
we
can have no reason for be-
lieving in the observations.

will,
Turn
the matter as
we
the fact that
mankind have been observing or

It
doing anything else for centuries, cannot be to any

of us a matter of direct observation or intuition.
must, therefore, be an inference
;
and
if
it
an inference
can be
in-
from experience, the only experience

ferred from,
is
the immediate and limited experience

;
of each individual
this, therefore, either at
one
re-
move
or two,
is
the only possible empirical founda-
tion for the law of causation, or

principle.
any other general
This argument does not show, of course, that

empirical
philosophy
is
it
false
is
but
it
does show,
beyond question, that
not plausible.
What-
72

its
[part
i.
ever be
philosophic vakie, there
is
certainly some-
thing consolatory to
common
sense in the Idea that
our convictions rest on a broad basis of experience.
There
is
something practical
in the
very sound of a
phrase which implies a method of judging that most

satisfactorily distinguishes us
from the pre- Baconian

that this
philosophers.
*
But when
'
it
becomes evident
broad basis
Itself rests
on the exceedingly narrow
basis of individual experience,
stood that what

perceived,
in past
is
perceive,
when it is once underand remember having

all,
my sole ground for believing that people

empiricism
its
ages perceived anything at
certainly loses
much
of
Its
dignity,
though
philoit
sophic value remains, perhaps, very
much what
was
before,
CHAP,
v.]
INTRODUCTION TO PART
11.
73
PART
XL
CHAPTER
V.
IL
In the three preceding chapters
empirical reasoning concisely, but
I
have discussed
sufficiently,
hope
I
from three different points of view.

the
first
showed, in
place, that whereas, according to this philo-
sophy,
all
our knowledge
is
derived from particulars,
that there
was nevertheless no method, or at all events no method hitherto discovered, by whicli inference from particulars was possible and that
;
Mr. Mills theory on
this subject will in
no sense
it
bear minute examination.
From
this
reasoning
is
necessarily follows that pure empiricism
not at
present a tenable system
but there
is
a kind of
for
mixed or spurious empiricism, which, taking
granted (on no very explicit or intelligible grounds)

the principle of universal causation, assumes that by
the help of this alone
we
can argue from particular
matters of fact to the general laws of phenomena.
This
imagine to be a not
uncommon view among
men
of science, and to be that formally put forward
74

in his
*
[part
ii.
by Mr. Jevons
large one
Principles of Science.'
this theory is
The
philo-
assumption required by
evidently a
it,
so
large, indeed, as to
make
;
sophically speaking,
nearly worthless
I
but,
even
granting that assumption,

in the
large,
showed
in the
next place,
third chapter, that
no experience, however
and no experiments, however well contrived

any reasonable assurbe repeated
and
successful, could give us
ance that the co-existences or sequences which have
been observed among phenomena

in the future.
will
This
is
as
much
as to say that induc-
tive logic (even granting the uniformity of Nature)

is
worthless, since
it
can do no more than find a rule
according to which
all
known
instances of an event
have occurred, without giving us any right to extend

this rule to instances
It
which are not known.
appears, then, that neither the
mixed and
in
in-
complete empiricism considered

still
in the third chapter,
less the
pure empiricism considered
the second
for infer-
chapter, affords us
any
satisfactory
method
ring the laws of nature from particular observations
or experiments
full
but even this does not exhibit the

scientific logic, for
weakness and inadequacy of

I
showed that, granting \k\2X we possessed a knowledge of the laws of phenomena, and granting the truth of the law of universal causain the fourth chapter
tion
it
in other
words, granting the truth of that which

in the
was shown
not be proved
it
two preceding chapters could was impossible, even on these
CHAP, v.]
knowledge of
Its
II.
75
\
terms, to arrive at any
historical facts,
taking this expression In

alL-tfeat
widest sense as Including
has occurred outside our Individual sphere of
immediate experience.
I
have therefore stated three
distinct objections
that
may be
taken to the ordinary proof of current
scientific beliefs.
Empirical philosophy, so far as

;
can
see, gets
over none of them
though every one

philosophy of
I
of them must be got over by any system which has

pretensions
science.
to
being an
so.
adequate
It
This being
Is
not necessary,
sup-
pose, to dwell longer
on
this part of the subject,
even
if
by so doing other difficulties might be started
equally hard of solution. It will be convenient rather

to proceed at once to the next branch of the enquiry.
The
reader will recollect that in the
first
chapter
philosophy was divided into the philosophy.-o infer-
ence and the philosoplvy^f ultimate premises.

three preceding chapters
in the
still
The
may be
described as dealing
;
main with the
first
of these divisions
and we
be
require therefore to give a
more
is
particular con-
sideration to the second.
How
this subject to
approached
On
the whole, perhaps, most conif
veniently by taking the premises which,
not
at
ulti-
mate from a philosophic point of view, are

rate ultimate from a scientific point of
any
i.e.,
view
those on which science depends, but which do not
depend on science
and trying to find out the proof,
or kind of proof, of which they are susceptible.
76
[part
il.
Now these premises consist (so far as

in the first place, of certain in
can judge),
unknown
principles,
shown
the third and fourth chapters to be necessary
to the validity of science, but which, since they are
unknown, need no longer detain

place, of the
us.
In the second
;
Law
;
of Universal Causation
which, as
was shown
in the
second chapter, cannot be proved
by induction
and, in the third place, of individual
or particular experiences, which (as will be

the ninth chapter, though
it
shown
in
is
here assumed) must
be supposed
It is
to refer to a persistent universe.

last
the evidence of these
two premises
chiefly
or kinds of premiss which will us

;
now
occupy
but as the discussion of this matter will oblige

to
me
deal with a great
many
dissimilar
and
dis-
connected systems,
necessary.
I
a change of method will
be
shall
make
henceforth no attempt to
link each chapter to that

it
which precedes and follows

chain.
by an argumentative
will contain
On
and
it
the contrary,
each chapter
a discussion as complete as
subject,
will
seems necessary of one
only be
it
related to the other similar chapters inasmuch as
proceeds from the same basis and leads to the same

conclusion.
Before entering, however, into this more extended
examination of the various methods by which philosophers have attempted to establish the existence of a
persistent universe governed
by
causation,
shall per-
haps be asked whether
this is a
matter which really
CHAP,
v.]
all.
II.
77
requires proof at
Is not the belief
(it
may be
said) in the reality of such a universe
one of those
un-
truths which
lie
is
I
at the root of
all
knowledge, for
still
which proof
necessary
?
impossible, or,
if
possible,
reply that this
is
a question the true

but,
answer to which may be suggested,

person must,
from the
nature of things, cannot be demonstrated.

in
Each
mind
the last resort, decide for himself

is
whether or not any given proposition

of the kind
'ultimate.'
I
to his
have described
in the first section as

all
In this particular case
that can be
said
is that,
as a matter of fact, the law of causation

in its integrity
does not appear to be accepted

the greater part of the
by
human
race,
and that those
who do
ing
it
accept
it
seem
to feel the necessity of found:
upon some kind of proof

I
either
upon expe-
rience, which, as
have already shown, can furnish
no proof
principles
at all
or
it
upon some of the philosophical

will
which
be
my
business to examine
persistent universe,
in the sequel.
the
case
is
With regard to a somewhat different.

in
it,
Everybody
prac-
tically believes
even those who speculatively

all
question
it
but at the same time the verdict of

to
philosophy seems
its
be that the dogma asserting

be
existence
is
one which can be speculatively questherefore,

if it
tioned,
and must
true,
be capable
of
some
speculative
it
defence.
So
strations of
have been
offered, that
many demonit may well be

qualified to
assumed
that, in the
judgment of those
78

some demonstration
still
[part
ii.
decide,
ever,
is
required.
is
If,
how-
anyone
thinks that this
a matter which
those interested in the rational foundation of science
may be permitted to neglect, the following ations may perhaps induce him to alter his
If
is is
consideropinion.
an immediate knowledge of a persistent world

all, it
given us at
given us
fact
will
be admitted,
;
think, that
is
it
in perception
if its
existence
an
ultiit is
mate
a
which cannot and need not be proved, which we are assured by what
*
fact of
is
somewhat
absurdly called the
direct evidence of the senses.'
In other words,
we know
same
first
that there
sort of
is
a persistent
world much
in the
same
absolute assurance as
way and with the we know that we feel

immediately
?
hot or cold.
The
is,
question, therefore, which
has to be asked
What do we know
and with certainty by means of perception
The
answer suggested by the psychology of Berkeley
and
in effect amounted to this. The only know and can know immediately are things we our own sensations and ideas. Objects are merely
Hume
groups of sensations. groups of ideas

;
Imagined objects are merely

vanish
in truth
and as these pass and
away, so do the things, of which they are
the only real constituents, cease to have any but
a nominal existence.
were
affections of the mind,'
While they were real they and when they ceased
to be affections of the mind, they ceased to be anything.
CHAP,
v.]
II.
79
The soundness
of this psychology, which,
if
true,
would completely dispose of any immediate knowledge of a persistent world,

question.
It is
is,
however, open to
dif-
maintained by thinkers of a
ferent school^ that in perceiving objects
we cannot
properly be said to perceive either sensations or

related sensations, or even facts of sensation, but only
qualities of objects
;
qualities
which are constituted
not by sensations but by relations,

therefore thought but cannot be felt.
and whjgh^ re
If this
theory
of perception Be sound,
it
is
evident that the argu-
ment
of the psychological idealist cannot be mainI
tained in the shape in which

If the world, as
it is
have just stated
it.
immediately perceived, does not

it
consist of sensations,
need not evidently be tran-
sient merely because sensations are so.
We
there-
fore
tion
have again
to ask ourselves
whether
in percep-
we
gain an assurance, both immediate and reof the existence of persistent objects f
flective,
and
to this question,
their views,
I
though without subscribing
to all
^nswer, as the^j^sydiological jded^
answered. No.
^
Cf.
Mr. Green's edition of Hume, and an
article,
published after
the greater part of this essay was written, in the Contemporary Review,
March 1878. The reader may, perhaps, be

"^
inclined hastily to imagine that an
assurance cannot be both immediate ^ reflective. This combination is, however, not only possible, but it ought to be found in all ultimate premises, and is actually found in the axioms of mathematics.
proposition of which
we have immediate
is
reflective assurance, is
one
which, after reflection,
seen to be certain without proof.
8o

I
[part
ii.
must here guard against a possible misconception which may be suggested by the word im'
mediate.'
In one sense of the term
all
the know-
ledge, real or supposed,
which
is
obtained by per:
ception alone
may be
called
immediate
since
know-
ledge obtained through any conscious process of

inference
is
ipso facto mediate.
Nevertheless,
we
all
cannot
properly
be
said to
reflective,
have an
of the
assurance,
truth of
both immediate and

the
facts
we immediately
perceive.
facts
is
Our
real
;
or
supposed knowledge of the

not immediate.
immediate
our
reflective assurance of the truth of these facts is cer-
tainly
If,
for
example,
its
see an
object in space,
size is obtained
my
knowledge of
real
shape and
by no piece of conscious reasoning,

Nevertheless, the reflective
is
and cannot therefore be appropriately described as

mediate or derivative.
assurance that the thing seen
actually that shape
and
size,
and not
if it
merely shaded and coloured

were, can only be arrived at
so as to look as
a more or
less elaborate process of inference,
by and
must undoubtedly therefore be looked on as mediate.

In
harmony with
this explanation
:
our original questhat
tion
would therefore run thus
Conceding
legitimate
we
immediately perceive the existence of a persisting

universe,
is
the reflective assurance that such a uniis it

(if it
?
verse exists immediate, or

at
all)
be so
only in virtue of a process of inference
To
my
thinking, the bare consideration of the problem
CHAP,
v.]
is
II.
8i
so stated
sufficient to
show
It
that the latter alterna-
tive should
be accepted.
appears to
me
that the
immediate belief which the majority of mankind

certainly
have
in
the reality of such a universe
is
of
the
same kind
as that which they

;
had
in the
apparent
motion of the sun and stars

speculative
and
that,
on
reflection,
legiti-
doubt
is
not only possible and
mate, but
If
is
hardly to be avoided.
this statement,
I
anyone disagrees with
would
ask him
how he
deals with the admitted occurrence

?
of optical or other (so-called) illusions of the senses
In such cases the judgment revSpecting the persistence
of the object perceived

in
is
as immediate,
and
is
given
it
perception precisely in the perception

is
same way,
as
is
when
normal.
The
only difference
is
that on reflection
it is
seen to be incorrect.
And by
By showas
exists a
what method
ing
its
is its
incorrectness
shown
inconsistency with the order of nature
revealed to us by science.
But unless there
persisting universe, the order of nature, as revealed

to us
by
science,
is
a dream.
is
If therefore the existin percep-
ence of such a universe

tion,
given us merely
we can
assert that a particular object
is
transient
only by a mediate inference from an authority whose
immediate verdict
is
that
it is
persistent.
fact
True/
it
may be
replied,
'
but this
is
which presents no
difficulty.
We
are constantly correcting one obser-
vation by means of another, without concluding from

this,
that observation
is
a means of acquiring know-
'
82
[part
ii.
ledge unworthy of credit.

authorities of precisely the
This show s that
wo
same kind may

latent
qualify
without destroying each other, and without giving

rise
to
any
lies
suspicions
of
contradiction.
this
In
what
the
distinction
?
'
between
case
and the one stated above

this
:
The
distinction lies in
that In the second case the scientific obser-
vations correct and can correct each other only on
the presupposition which
It
is
the business of the
perceptions in the
first
case to establish.
We
can
extract a single truth out of a series of observations
only on the supposition that they

single object,
all
deal with a
and they can only deal with a single

through at
least the
object
if
that object persists
whole period over which the observations extend.

If perceptions can correct each other only
on similar
terms,
it
would seem tolerably plain that they cannot
correct each other
when
the question In dispute
is
whether the object perceived has, or has

attribute of persistence.
If there
'
not, the
be a persistent
world, the fact
that the
evidence of our senses

its
occasionally misleads us as to
true character
may
be of small Importance.
But
if
our whole ground
for believing In the existence of a persistent
world
fact
be derived from the evidence of the senses, the

a suspicion over
that they deceive us, though only occasionally, casts

all
the rest of their testimony.
Reverting to the remarks on the psychology of

perception
made
a few pages back, the reader
may
'
CHAP,
v.]
II.
83
perhaps say
If objects are constituted

felt,
by
relations
which are thought, not

tions
may
not one of the rela-
sistence
by which they are constituted be that very perwhose reality you tell us has to be inferred ?
in the
May
given
not the assurance that objects persist be thus

process of sense perception, though not,
strictly speaking,
derived from the evidence of the
senses
Now
ance
do not
at present
deny that such assur-
may be legitimately
attained
by reasoning on the
at
basis of the psychology
which
offers us this analysis
of the perceived object.
But without
safe,
I
present
going into
this question,
it is
suppose, to assert
that to think an object as persisting cannot

persist.
Whatever may be the
truths of which
make it we
to
are immediately assured in perception, that the object
perceived actually has any qualities

attribute to
it,
we choose
cannot be one.
into
To
suppose the con-
trary
to
is
to
fall
an error similar to that according
which the existence of

fact that existence
God was demonstrated

was part of His
is
from the
essence.
it
Grant that everything which

real, since if it
real is thought,
is
cannot be the fact that everything which

is
thought
were
so,
mistakes as to the true

;
nature of any object would be impossible

as subversive of science as
a doctrine
any form of idealism ever

course, not
devised.
These preliminary remarks have, of

G
2
been intended as even a proximate solution of any
84

Their object has
[part
ii.
philosophic problem.
been to
suggest doubt, not to establish scepticism.
They
have aimed
at
convincing anyone inclined to an

in his natural convictions, that the
is
easy acquiescence
reality of the subject-matter of science
not a thing
that should too readily be taken for granted.
Our
natural convictions
may be
right,
but they must be

;
shown to be right. Proof of some kind is necessary and where proof is necessary, scepticism is possible.
All that
I
here contend for
is
that a preliminary ex-
amination of what perception
tells
us
no assumption
'
being made as to the truth of any particular psychological theory,

*
and no use being made of the words

objective/ or
is noi(
'
subjective,'
external
fails
if
to
show
that scepticism
is
possible.
it
So
that
ever this
to
be established
must be by the help of
systems which, whatever be the nature of their conclusions,
cannot be accepted without criticism.
pass
now to the most
important, the most elaborate,

of these systems, which, in
it
and the most
difficult
harmony with the terminology

to call
*
employs,
venture
Transcendentalism.'
CHAP,
vi.j
TRANSCENDENTALISM.
85
CHAPTER
That
is
VI.
TRANSCENDENTALISM.
the pure empiricism
still
in
fashion
among
scientific
philosophers leads naturally to scepticism
a fact which has been familiar to certain schools of
thought ever since

stripped
of
its
Hume
presented
It
is
it
to the world
plausibilities.
hardly to be not himself
believed that so subtle a thinker did
perceive the ultimate consequences of his reasoning.
He
must have been perfectly aware that on
his
system a philosophy of science was

nevertheless, his
*
impossible
Essay on Miracles' and occasional
announcements, such as that with which he ends

his
ing,'
'
Enquiry concerning the
Human
Understand-
appear to have quite convinced natural philo
sophers that his scepticism merely undermined religion
result
which to most of them was a cause

If,
of very
moderate uneasiness.
still
however,
they
ignored, and
ignore, the wider reach of that

it
engine of destruction,
telling.
has not been for want of
Hume
himself makes no effort to conceal
it,
and the sneer with which he informs the students
86

is
[part
ii.
of science that theirs
the only kind of knowledge
worth pursuing,
with which he
is
scarcely less obvious than that
tells
the theologian that the most

'
solid foundations of religion are

revelation.'
is
faith
'
and
'
divine
But Hume's own
view of his position
not the only,
nor even the main, evidence for
the sceptical nature of the conclusions to which his

theories
necessarily lead.
On
that
scepticism,
as
is
we have been informed
with sufficient iteration,
founded the whole imposing structure of modern
German philosophy; and modern German philosophy, whatever be its value, is not a phenomenon
which easily escapes
it
notice.
is
If
it
gives
little
light
is
not because
it
hidden under a bushel.

its
In
all
probability, however,
it
very magnitude has pre-
vented
from materially influencing the course of

philosophy in this country
;
scientific
I
and
believe
may
almost say from permanently influencing
scientific
philosophy even in Germany.

forgiven
if,
man
may be
before seriously attempting to
master so huge a mass of metaphysics, composed of

several inconsistent systems, difficult of comprehension from their essential natures,
still
more
difficult
in-
from the extraordinary jargon under which the

genuity of
man
I
has concealed their import

if
he may
is,
be forgiven,
the time
say,
he pauses and considers whether
may
is
not be better spent in reading somelikely to understand.

It
thing he
ever,
more
howeven
unfortunate
that
this
pardonable, and
' ' ;
CHAP.
VI.]
TRANSCENDENTALISM.
87
laudable, caution should
have prevented so many

diffi-
people from trying to comprehend the exact

culty which
empiricism of
Kant and Kant's successors saw in the Hume, and the extremely ingenious
in
method which they adopted

for
order to avoid
it
it
when
these are understood,

is
becomes
at
once
plain that the difficulty
a real one, and that the

rate,
solution offered of
ation.
it,
at
any
deserves consider-
The
nor,
relation in
it
which Kant stands to

is
I,
Hume
said,
is
;
not a topic which

if it v/ere,
necessary for
it
me
to discuss
could
need hardly be
add
anything to what Professor Green and
Professor
Caird, not to mention previous commentators, have
already written on the subject.
What more
cendentalist
directly concerns
I
my
purpose
is
to
examine the answer which, as
suppose, a transscepticism of the
would make
to the
preceding chapters, on the only two points where

his defence of the
really
grounds of science and

ground.
I
my
attack
meet on common
'
mean
causation
and the
world.'
existence of a persistent and independent
Now
problem
the usual
is
way
*
in
which the transcendental

is
put
is,
How
knowledge possible
most
and, taking transcendentalism as an answer to

this,
it
Hume,
the usual way,
is
also the
natural,
because
was Hume's theory of the origin of knowledge

to scepticism.
which led necessarily
As, however.
S8

I
[part
ii.
in this essay
have put forward no theory of the

from
origin
of knowledge,
my
point of view the

'
question should
rather be stated,
How much
is
of
what pretends
such,
tract
to
?
'
be knowledge must we accept as
and why
My
business, therefore,
to ex-
from the answer which the transcendentalist

first
gives to the
enquiry, an answer which shall,
if
it
possible, satisfy the

is
second
and
for this
purpose
necessary to
in
change
the
make a slight, though only a usual mode of stating his doctrine.

first
slight,
The
I
reader will recollect, that in the
chapter
insisted
on the obvious truth that every tenable
system of knowledge must consist partly of premises
which require no proof, and partly of inferences

which are legitimately drawn from these.
What,
then, on the transcendental theory, are our premises,
and by what method do we derive from them the

required conclusion
If
?
we were simply
and
seize
to glance at transcendental
first
literature,
on the
apparent answers to
to think that
these questions,
we should be disposed
is
the philosophers of this school assume to start with
the truth of a large part of what

science,
commonly
to
called
the very thing which, according

it
my
view
of the subject,
prove.
'
is
the business of philosophy to
Respecting pure mathematical and pure

Kant,^
'
natural science,' says

exist,
it
as they certainly
do
are
may
with propriety be asked

^
how they
CritiqueJ
p. 13.
Tr.
CHAP, vl]
transcendentalism.
;
89
possible
for that they
must be possible
is
shown by
the fact of their really existing.'

'
The
question,
How
is
'
knowledge possible
to
is
not,'
says Professor Green,
be confused with the
question upon which metaphysicians are sometimes
supposed
to
waste their time,

is
Is
knowledge possible
....
Metaphysic
no superfluous labour.
is
It is
no more superfluous, indeed, than

process which without theory
any theory of a
^
we
already perform.'
Passages of
this sort
would almost lead one
to con-
clude that the business of transcendental speculation
was not
existence
to justify beliefs, but to account for their

;
to to
is
tell
us
it
:
how we do
a thing, not whether
we ought
philosophy
do
a view by which, apparently,
regarded as dealing with the laws of
thought much as physiology deals with the laws of

digestion.
If this
were
so,
transcendentalism might
be an important and useful department of science,

but
this
it
could have nothing to do with the subject of

It
essay.
would answer no doubt,

But,
in
it
would
solve
no
difficulty.
truth,
the
language
often used
by Kant and echoed above by Professor

not
incorrect,
is
is
Green,
if
certainly
misleading.
Transcendentalism
philosophical, in the sense in

to use the
which
have ventured
term
it
does
attempt to establish a creed, and, therefore, of necessity

it
indicates the nature of our premises
and the
Contemporary Review
T)tc. i^j J.
90

in
[part
ii.
manner
which the subordinate beHefs
may be
legitimately derived from them.
On
explicit
the
first
point
its
;
statements are not, indeed,
and categorical
but
this is
simply because,
for historical
reasons, the philosophic

it
problem has
not been presented to
exactly in the shape which
makes such statements necessary.

I
Nevertheless,
all
suppose that a transcendentalist would postulate

first
in
the
instance, or rather all that each

is
man who
is
studies his system
required to postulate,
of,
that he
knows, and
is
certain
sornethmg
he
is
conscious,
for example, or
may be
conscious, that he perceives

;
a coloured object, or a particular taste
in
other
words, he gets some knowledge, small or great, by

experie7ice.
This
very
it
moderate
concession,
then,
being
granted, as
must be granted, by the
sceptic, the
is. How can any knowledge worth speaking of be inferred from such premises ?
next question that arises
It
is
in
the
answer
to
this
in
that such
force
and
is
originality as there
really
may be
it
transcendentalism
to
be found; and
is
is
here that the
full
meaning of the question which
placed at the head

'
of that philosophy becomes manifest.
You
allow,'
'
we may suppose
a transcendentalist to say,
is
You
allow that experience
possible
you allow that
it may only be of the facts of immediate perception, can be obtained by that channel. I therefore ask you '' how that experience
some knowledge, though
CHAP.
VI.]
TRANSCENDENTALISM.
"
91
is
possible
in
what
it
essentially consists
I
and
whatever
fact or principle
can show to be involved

I
in that experience
if
that experience
whatever can prove must be of that you must,

is
be,
in
to
common
and
of
it
consistency, grant the reality.'

is
principle
so proved
is
said to be
transcendentally deduced,'
the validity of that deduction in the cases
causation
it
and
is
the
existence
of
a persistent
world, that
my
business
more
particularly to
examine.
The whole
value,
then, of the
transcendental
philosophy, so far as the questions raised in -this
essay are concerned, must depend on

to
its
being able
show
that the trustworthiness of these far-reaching
scientific postulates is
involved in those simple ex-
periences which everybody must allow to be valid.

If
it
cannot prove
this,
it
may
still
be a valuable
;
contribution to a possible philosophy
it
may
still
show by
nature,
its
searching analysis
all
that
is
implied in
the existence of nature, as wê ordinarily understand
and of the sciences of nature as we are taught
to accept
them
but more than this
it
cannot do
exists,
it
cannot show either that such a nature
or that
our accounts of
it
are accurate
it
cannot, in other
words, supply us with a philosophy adequate to our

necessities.
Before going on to consider the general value

of this method, or the success of
particular instances,
it
its
application in
may be
well to give
some
92

its
[part
ii.
examples of
character
for
reasonings by which
its
precise
may be more
is
clearly understood.
Here,
instance,
one taken from Kant's proof of
the principle of substance
ceived by us except in
Change cannot be persubstances, and origin or

'
:
extinction in an absolute sense, that does not con-
cern merely a determination of the permanent, can-
not be a possible perception, for
it is
the very notion
of the permanent v/hich renders possible the representation (perception) of a transition from one state
into another,
and from non-being
into being,
which
consequently, can be empirically cognised only as

alternating determination of that which
is
permanent.
....
Substances
all
in the
world of phenomena are
the substratum of
determinations of time.
is
....
Accordingly, permanence
a necessary condition
under which alone phenomena, as things or objects,

are determinable in a possible experience.'
^
Now
the point of this demonstration
lies,
as the
reader will see, in showing, or attempting to show,

that experience of change
is
not possible unless
we
assume unchanging substance.

experience changes (as
Therefore,
certainly
if
we most
we can can), we
are forced also to admit the existence of that without
which change would have no meaning.
Here
Green's
is
another argument of the same kind

I
respecting causation, which

introduction
*
quote from Professor
to
Hume:
Tr.
'A
uniformity
Critique, pp. 140, 141.
CHAP.
VI.]
TRANSCENDENTALISM.
(i.e.,
93
which can be thus

blished
istence
is,
by a
single instance) estaIts
in the
proper sense, necessary.

its
ex-
is
not contingent on
It
being
felt
by any-
one or everyone.
does not come into being with

it.
the experiment that shows

real,
It is felt It
because
it is
not real because
it is felt.
may be
is
objected,
indeed, that the principle of the ''uniformity of nature,"
the principle that what

itself
is
fact
once
fact always,
gradually results from the observation of facts

feelings,
which are
and that thus the principle which

due
to such repetition.
enables us to dispense with the repetition of a sensible experience

is
itself
The
answer
is,
that feelings which are conceived as facts
are already conceived as constituents of a nature.
The same
presence of the thinking subject
to,
and
distinction of itself from, the feelings
which renders
them knowable
world which
is
facts, renders
them members of a
its
one throughout
changes.
In
other words, the presence of facts from which the

uniformity of nature as an abstract rule
inferred,
is
is
to
be
already the consciousness of that uni^
formity in concreto!
is,
In this extract the argument

i.e.,
that facts are unknowable,
are no facts for us,
except as members of a uniform nature.
We
;
may
is
be as
as
certain, therefore, of the uniformity of nature
we
are certain that
we
can
know
facts
which
another
way
of saying that
all.
we need have no doubt
about the matter at
Pp. 273, 274.
94
[part
ii.
to
These quotations are not long enough, perhaps, do full justice to the argument of which they con-^
one statement
sort
;
tain
but they are long enough to

the argument in either case
is.
show of what
And
this
:
the essential force or point of those arguments,

first
as against the sceptic, seems at
sight to
lie
in
is
the
to
sceptic, in
questioning any principle,
shown
tion
be making an illegitimate abstraction from

because
the relations which constitute an object, an abstrac-
which
is
illegitimate,
it
renders
the
object meaningless and unthinkable.
He
has to
choose, therefore, between altogether giving

reality of the object, or
up the
be
admitting a principle implied
by one of the
relations of
which that
all
reality can
shown
do the
second.
to consist.
first
;
He
is
cannot, in
cases at least,
to
he
bound,
therefore,
do the
Now,
this
before proceeding to examine the force of

it
reasoning, as
is
employed
in
proving parti-
cular points, one difficulty
must be discussed which
attaches to
it
generally.
When
argument,
a
it
man
must
is
convinced by a transcendental
I
be, as
have explained, because

is
he perceives that a certain relation or principle

necessary to constitute
his
admitted
truth of
experience.
This
is
to
him a
fact,
the
which he
is
obliged to recognise.
But another
is
fact,
which he
may
also find
it
it
hard to dispute,
that he himself,
and, as
would appear, the majority of mankind,
; '
CHAP, vl]
transcendentalism.
this
it
95
have habitually had

consciously thinking
experience without ever

this relation
;
under
it
and
this
second
fact is
one which
does not seem easy to

shall
interpret in a
manner which
harmonise with
the general theory.
The
transcendentalist wouldj
in question
if it
no doubt, say
not always
at
once that the relation

implicitly,
had always been thought
even
;
had
come
into clear consciousness
and having
enunciated this dictum he would trouble himself no further about a matter which belonged merely to the
*
history of the individual.'

in this
is
But
if an
implicit thought
means
else,
it
connection what
it
means everywhere
is
simply a thought which
logically
bound
up
in
some other thought, and which

very definition,
is
it is
for that reason
may always be
from
this
called into existence
by
it.
Now,
a mere
plain that so long as a

exist.
It is
thought
implicit
it
does not
possibility,
which may
indeed at any
an
actuality,
and which,
;
moment become when once an actuality, may

it is
be indestructible
bility,
but which, so long as
a possi-
can be said to have existence only by a figure
of speech.
If,
therefore, this
meaning of the word

ourselves
in
implicit
be
accepteci,
we
find
difficulty.
Either an object can exist and be a reality to an

intelligence
which does not think of

as
I
I
it
under
relait,
tions which,
now
see,
are involved in
i.e.,
without which
cannot
or
else
am
in error,
now think of it as an object when I suppose myself and
96
[part
ii.
other people to have ignored these relations in past

times.
If the first of these alternatives is true, the
I
whole transcendental system, as

vanishes in
understand
it
it,
smoke
if
the
second,
comes
into
apparent
conflict,
not only with science, and with the

opinions of
avowed
sophy
scientific
many
of
its
disciples,
but with the later form of the transcendental philoitself.

is
For by
in
that system the

;
development
its
till
of thought
stages
it
is
driven on by
own
the
proper nature from one stage to another

highest of them
rest
is
reached, where alone
it
can find
and
satisfaction.
But those who believe most
firmly in this theory
by no means intend
to assert as
is
a historical fact that every thinking being

lectually restless until
intel-
he has grasped the philosophy

they must rather be held to
of the Absolute.
What
mean
is,
that the inadequacy
and
self-contradiction
cate-
of a universe thought under
any of the lower

or he
gories can be demonstrated, and

to
when demonstrated
I
me
or any other thinking being,
may be
obliged to seek repose by including the contradictory
elements under some category which shall reconcile
them
as
in
a higher unity
fact,
but, they
must admit
not
that,
a matter of
to
this
demonstration has been

are
vouchsafed
few.
There
many,
for
example, who, whatever their perplexities, can find

intellectual satisfaction in
'
such a formula as this:
The
universe
itself,
is
the process whereby spirit exter-
nalises
or manifests itself in an external world,
CHAP.
VI.]
TRANSCENDENTALISM.
by a movement
of
at
97
that out of this externaUty,

positive
once
and negative,
sciousness of self'^
may rise to the The great body

it
highest con-
mankind
certainly prefer a contradiction

see,
which they do not

to be
to a reconciliation
;
which they do not underis
stand
and what
desire
not
shown how,
is
on transcendental grounds, such a position

able,
unten-
but how
is
its
existence, as a fact,
is
to
be con-
sistently accounted for.
The analogy of the ordinary

It is true,
logic
here misleading.
no doubt, that
we may intelligently
all
hold premises without perceiving
or any of the deductions which
may be
legiti-
mately drawn from them, and

premises in such a case,
clusion
;
that, in asserting the
we
implicitly assert the condifficulty,
but this presents no
because
it is
not the recognition of the conclusion which makes

sense of the premises.
the case
is
In transcendental reasoning
exactly the other way.
The
ground, and
the whole ground, on which
we
are forced by that
reasoning to recognise the reality of certain relations,

is,
that without those relations the object of

for
;
which we have experience would be as nothing

us
;
it
would have neither meaning nor

I
significance
and what
wish to
know
is,
how
it
happens that
there exists any object at
all
for so
many people
of
to
who
tuted.
are
wholly innocent of
it
any knowledge
said
in this
those relations by which

If
is
be
constiit
there
^
is
any value
objection,
Caird's Kant^ p. 427.
98

it
[part
ii.
would apparently follow from
movement or So long inference in this logic is an impossibility. so long as as the transcendentalist refuses to move he merely declines to abstract the relations by which
that
an object
is
already constituted,
;
he
stands, perhaps,
on firm ground
but directly he
tries to oblige
us
to think a thing
under new
relations,
his
method
If,
becomes either ineffective or self-destructive.

the one hand,
on
we can think
there
;
the object not under these
new
relations,
is
nothing in the method to
compel us to do so
for the
method
consists in
show-
ing that without this
new
it
relation the object

If,
would
not exist for us as thinking beings.
on the other
hand,
we
cannot think
except under these
new
re-
lations, then, either
we were not thinking it before or the relations are not new and in either case there is no inferential movement of thought from the known to the unknown. From these reflections it would appear that the
;
transcendentalist must either give

fact
up the seeming
on which
fact
his
system depends, or explain away a

is
seeming
fact
is,
which
inconsistent with
is
it.
The
is,
first
that a given relation

;
necessary to constitute
that a
a knowledge of an object
great
the second fact
many
intelligent beings,
and the transcendenlife
talist himself,
during the earlier part of his
among
the number, appear able to

tion.
know
it
out of this rela-
Now,
one solution
of this
difificulty
has been
CHAP.
VI.]
TRANSCENDENTALISM.
;
99
already disposed of
it
has been shown, or rather
stated (for the assertion requires no proof), that a
thought which
at
all, it is
is
merely implicit
is
really
no thought
a creation of language, which can constiit is
tute nothing because
nothing.
It
is
may however,
perhaps, be said that the thought
neither merely
implicit nor wholly explicit, but exists in a kind of
intermediate stage between nonentity and the fulness

of clear consciousness
;
a stage
'
in
which
it is
strong
enough, so to speak, to
not strong enough to be
constitute an object,' but

to the individual for
known
whom
it
performs this important function.

is
This
apparently one of the views taken by the
transcendentalist^; for
Kant
that
*
says, with the approval
of Professor Caird,
unity)
the
consciousness (of a
may be
but weak, so that
we become aware
unity
of
it
only in the result produced, and not in the act

it
;
of producing
but
that,
nevertheless, the
of consciousness must always

it
be present, though
has not clearness sufficient to
make
it
stand out'
In other words, the unity of consciousness which
is
necessary for the existence of any experience

lie
may
hidden, like a drop of

until
its
reagent,
some powerful chemical presence is made certain by the

this
analysis of
its results.
Such a theory as
its
requires us to hold that
thought may, so to speak, diminish the amount of

being
till
it
ceases
to
be known as thought,
p. 395.
See Caird's Kant,
100

;
[part
ii.
thought not to behave as such

first
and no doubt the
half of this statement
is
correct.
That a
seninis,
sation can be
weaker or stronger, can change
its
tensive quantity (to use the technical expression)
of course, plain.
It
can also be thought of under
more or fewer
it
relations.
And
in
both these ways
may The same may be According as we

rather than on
be said to have varying degrees of being.

said,
fix
mutatis mutandis, of thought.
our attention on the relation

related,
the things
so
we may,
suppose, say that our consciousness of the relation

increases or diminishes
;
but the utmost diminution

is
of which the consciousness

hilation,
capable without anniin its quality

;
makes no
alteration
and
if
the consciousness vanishes, the thought must vanish

too,
since,
except on some crude materialistic hypo-
thesis,
they are the same thing.
This quantitative
or intensive diminution of being, then, will not explain the apparent fact that so
feel the necessity of
many people do
not
thinking things under their sup-
posed necessary
relations.
The second manner
in
which any object of

its
thought can be imagined to vary
being depends
;
on the number of relations by which it is qualified and in this respect thought also, not less than sensation,
may be
said to increase or diminish.
Relations
is,
may
as,
be compared and classed

less
that
may
;
be
thought under relations not
than feelings
is
and
no doubt, a relation which
not so compared
CHAP.
VI.]
TRANSCENDENTALISM.,''
'
'
ici
and classed cannot be an object of thought, cannot be known as a relation, it may be supposed that here
we have
which
is
a definition of that intermediate

required to smooth over our
it
stage
difficulties.
Every man,
enlightened
may be
said,
really thinks objects

us,
under the relations which seem to
who have been

be necessary
;
by transcendentalism,
to
but he
is
not aware that he does
so,
because he has
not taken the trouble to consider them from the

points of view from which alone they can appear as
relations to him.
But
*
if this
be
trye,
*
what becomes
intelligi
'
of the identity of the

If relations
esse
'
and the
can exist otherwise than as they are

?
thought,
why
should not sensations do the same
Why should
not the
'
perpetual flux
'
of unrelated
objects the metaphysical spectre which the modern

transcendentalist labours so hard to lay,
say, should this not
why,
1
have a
real existence
We^
of
it
indeed, cannot in our reflective
moments think
it
except under relations which give

but once allow that an object
a kind of unity
may
exist,
but in such
a manner as to
beings,
make
is
it
nothing for us as thinking
and
this incapacity
may be
simply due to the
fact that
thought
powerless to grasp the reality of
things.
The
liarly
transcendentalist, then,
to
would seem pecuwhich
bound
admit what no philosopher, perhaps,

to deny, that thought
is
would be disposed
not
known
as thought cannot properly be said to
rp2-
A;r?5:5EKC,E
of philosophic doubt,
is
[parth.
exist at
all.
He
therefore reduced to one of
two
an
alternatives.
Either he must maintain that
it is
error of
memory and
observation to suppose that

all
every intelligence does not at
times think objects
under their necessary
relations, or else
is,
he must hold
is
that a necessary relation
not a relation that
actually required to constitute
an object for a think-
ing being, but
is
only one which, upon due reflection,

is
a thinking being
unable to
make
abstraction
is
of.
The
is
first
of these alternatives
somewhat too
which
it
violent a contradiction of that experience
the business of transcendentalism to justify, to be
seriously maintained
by transcendentalists.
fact that
Accordnecessary
ingly
we
find
them admitting the
relations are not always thought as qualifying the
object they are
supposed to constitute
in
other
words, accepting the second of the alternatives mentioned above, but at the
same time declining any
responsibility concerning a circumstance which, ac-
cording to them, has to do only w4th the history of

the individMal.
*
The
''
think,"
'
says
Kant
'
(I
am
quoting Proac-
fessor Caird's translation),
must be capable of
companying
thought
all
my
ideas, for otherwise
something
would be presented
;
to
is
my mind
the
which could not be

as to say that
it
and that
same thing
Again,
*
the idea would be either impossible, or, at least,
would be nothing
for me.'
All ideas have
a necessary reference to a possible empirical con-
CHAP.
VI.]
TRANSCENDENTALISM.
103
sciousness
....
.
but, again, all empirical conscious-
ness has a necessary reference to a transcendental

consciousness.
.
.
The mere
idea "
I," in
reference
it
to all other ideas (whose collective unity

possible),
is
makes
This
the transcendental consciousness.
idea
may be clear (empiric consciousness) or obscure. This we do not need to consider at present, nor even
it
whether
actually exists at
all
it
all
but the possibility

rests necessarily
of the logical form of
knowledge
on the reference of
faculty!
'
and
this
apperception as a
Professor
is
In other words,* says

this passage,
*
Caird,
commenting on
Kant
here examin-
ing what elements are involved in knowledge, and

therefore does not need to consider
how
far the clear
consciousness of them
is
developed
in the individual,
nor indeed whether

sensitive being
tJie
individual ever actually deveall.
lopes that consciousness at
The
individual (the
who becomes
the subject of
knowmerely
ledge)
may be
at different stages
on the way
to clear
self-consciousness.
He may be sensitive with

:
the dawning of consciousness
he
may
be conscious
;
of
objects,
but not distinctly self-conscious
or,
he
may be
to have
clearly conscious of the
identity of self in
relation to the objects.
Thus we can imagine him

has not distinctly
self; or
many perceptions, which he
combined with the idea of

suppose him
their
life)
we may even
period of
all,
(like children in the earliest
not to have risen to the idea of self at
to the separation of the ego from the act
whereby
104

is
[part
ii.
/the object
determined.
But we cannot imagine

for such ideas
ihim to have any ideas which are incapable of being
Icombined with the idea of

Joe ideas
self,
would
incapable of being thought, incapable of

intelligible contents of conscious"
forming part of the

ness
;
they would be for us a thinking being,
as
good as nothing."
critical
Though,
all
therefore,
we
can think
of an experience in which
the elements which the
philosopher distinguishes are not consciously
or separately present to the individual,
we
cannot
think of an experience which does not imply

all.'
^
them
in
From
these extracts
latest
it
would appear that both
Kant and Kant's

^thinking that
all
expositor are agreed
that
is
required to constitute a
perception
in
other words, an experience is not
that the object of that perception should actually
be
/thought in the relations which

sary to
we
are told are necesit
make
it
an
object,
but only that
should be
capable of being so thought.
But with such an adwhich thought

to
mission the whole transcendental argument appears

to
me
to vanish
away.
The
rules
was supposed
to impress
upon Nature, according
which Nature must be, because without them she would be nothing to us as thinking beings, these
rules
turn out, after
all,
to
be only of subjective
validity.
flective
They
are the casual necessities of our re:
moments unmeaning to us
necessities
which would have been
in
*
our childhood, of which the mass
Phil, of Kant^ p. 396.
CHAP.
VI.]
TRANSCENDENTALISM.
conscious,
105
of
mankind are never
and from which we

truth)
ourselves are absolved during a large portion of our

lives.
To
argue from these necessities to the

is
of things
merely to repeat the old fallacy abouD

if
innate ideas in another form, for
thought does not^

in
make experience (and

gible
it
appears that
it
any
intelli-
meaning of that expression

is
does not), then
there
no reason
for
supposing that experience need
conform to thought.
The
net result of this discussion appears, then,
to be that, according to transcendentalism, relations
are involved in experience in at least two ways, the

difference
between which, though

is
it
is
never recog-
nised
by that philosophy,
exceedingly important.
According
to the first way,
an explicit consciousness
is
of the relation in question
a necessary element in
it
every possible experience
without
the experience
would be
it,
'
'
nothing to us as thinking beings,' and by
therefore, the experience
may very
fairly
be said
>^
to
be
constituted.'
But the number of
relations,
necessary in this sense, cannot be large, even ac-
cording to the transcendentalists themselves
nor can
the necessity ever be established by argument, since
the mere fact that
somebody who knows the meanit,
ing of the words he uses disputes
proves that
it
does not
exist.
If
man
does not find that a

is
particular relation, about which there

is
a question,
involved in his experience, an argument founded

is
on the circumstance that no experience
possible

is
io6
[part
ii.
which
not in fact constituted by an explicit conis
sciousness of such a relation,
not likely to convince

that
him
that
is
proof
The mere consideration proof impossible. makes required

it
is
there.
The second way
in
which a transcendentalist
differs
re-
gards relations as involved in experience
from
;
that just discussed in several important particulars

for
whereas
in that the explicit consciousness of the
relation
all
was required
is
to constitute the object, in this
that
required
is
that the object
must be capable
It is plainly
of being thought under the relation.
incorrect to describe the relation in this last case as

*
constituting the object
'
it
cannot even be said
that the capability of being thought under the relation necessarily constitutes
it
;
for,
according to the
'
transcendentalist,
'
esse
is,
'
is
equivalent to
it
intelligi
'
that
is,
an object
as
is
apprehended by a
is
thinking being, and since a thinking being can, as

admitted, apprehend
it
without in
all
cases perceiv-
ing the capability, this cannot be required to render

the object
lations
is
real.
As far then as this second class

in
of re-
concerned, the transcendentalisms argument
seems involved
something
in
like fatal inconsistency.
Because he finds himself,

*
bringing an object into
clear consciousness,' unable to

relation,
make
this
abstraction of
incapacity into
;
a certain
he elevates
a universal and necessary characteristic of objects

while at the same time admitting that other
intelli-
gences and his own intelligence at other times have
CHAP.
VI.]
TRANSCENDENTALISM.
had objects presented
to
107
actually
them without
this
characteristic.
Enough has perhaps been

objection
(if It
said about this general

to the transcendental
be an objection)
method, and
it is
now time
to follow the philosophers
who employ it, in their special endeavours to show that when the nature of experience Is once brought
to the
rate,
'
clear consciousness
'
of the reader, he, at any
can be in no further doubt as to the necessity
of regarding objects in space as persistent and inde-
pendent, and
all
objects whatever as subject to the
law of universal causation.

Kant's refutation of Idealism was only introduced
into the second edition of the
*
Critique,'
and was the

edition of
main occasion of Schopenhauer's assertion that Kant
had changed
that
his
view between the
first
work and the second, respecting the external

I
world.
understand,
however, that
;
this
is
not
admitted by his later

'
critics
that they regard the

itself,
Refutation
'
as
satisfactory In
and as harIts
monising with the general course of

speculations
;
author's
tained
in
It
and that the proof of realism conIs the one on which they would be
disposed to
to criticise
I
*
rely.
As
such, therefore,
am
forced
It.
say forced,' because

I
It is
somewhat unwillingly
an
is
that
go
to
Kant
direct for the statement of
argument, partly because there
never any security
that his disciples will admit that his reasoning in
any
io8

is
[part
ii.
particular case
in
consonance with the rest of his

is
system
partly because his obscurity
so great that
his critics are as likely to
be attacked for not under-
standing his
arguments as for not having answered

suddenly converted
his expo-
them, a proceeding by which what was intended to
be a philosophic discussion
into a historical one.
sition are so great that
is
Yet the defects of

no care
will really avert this
danger
for
he has contrived to state a theory
of
great difficulty in itself,
and of which
all
his
own grasp
does not appear to have been at

sure
times perfectly
in
language which always seems to be strug-
gling to express a
quite clear,
meaning which
it
can never get
and which possesses
in
an astonishing
degree the peculiarity of being technical without

being precise.
As, however,
I
am
is
not acquainted with any neo-
Kantian statement of the transcendental argument
on
this subject,
;
it
to
Kant himself
formal
is
that
must
of
appeal
and, fortunately, the
refutation
Idealism which he has advanced
so short (apart
it
from the elucidatory notes) that

It
runs as follows
can quote
entire.
Theorem.
*
ness
The simple but empirically determined consciousof my own existence proves the existence of ex-
ternal objects in space'

1
The
translation here referred to
is
Mr. Meiklejohn's.
CHAP.
VI.]
TRANSCENDENTALISM.
109
Proof.
'
am
conscious of
my own
existence as deter-
mined
in time.
All determinations in regard to time
pre-suppose the existence of something permanent in

perception.
But
in
this
permanent something cannot
be something
something.
me, for the very reason that
my
ex-
istence in time
is itself
determined by this permanent
It
follows that the perception of this

is
permanent existence
possible only through a thing
without me, and not through the mere representation

of a thing without me.
Consequently, the deteris
mination of
my
existence in time
possible only
through the existence of real things external to me.
Now,
consciousness in time
is
necessarily connected
with the consciousness of the possibility of this determination in time.

ness in time
is
Hence
it
follows that conscious-
necessarily connected also with the
existence of things
without me, inasmuch as the

is
existence of these things
the condition of deter-
mination in time.
of
That
is
is
to say, the consciousness
my own
existence
at the
same time an imme-
diate consciousness of the existence of other things
without me.'
This proof,
i.e.,
it
will
be observed,
is
is
transcendental,
that an ex-
its
method of procedure
to
show
[that,
perience which
we
^
certainly
have
167.
namely, of
CritiqueJ
tr. p.
no A DEFENCE OF PHILOSOPHIC DOUBT,
[part
ii.
the series of our mental states as they occur in time]

is
impossible, unless the thing to be proved [which
is
stated (though, as
we
shall see, inadequately stated)
to be the existence of external objects in space]
be ad-
mittedFirst,
And
the demonstration consists of two steps.
it is
asserted that the experience of a succesis
sion of things in time

to
impossible except in relation

in
something permanent, or
is
other words, that the
perception of change
the
inconceivable, unless
we
at
same time perceive something which does not
change.
And
in
the second place,
Kant goes on
in this
*
to .say, that since that

is
which changes
self),
case
'
myself (my phenomenal each
since the
things
iwhich succeed
other in
time are
my own
is,
Imental states, the unchanging object to which they
are referred must be outside myself
that
must
be the external object whose existence was to be

proved.
one,
it
So
can
we immediately perceive the only be on condition that we immediately

that
if
perceive the other also.
Such
is
the formal answer which

;
Kant has given

only that he
to Idealism
but
it
is
not in this
way
has treated the question, since

*
in his
proof of the
'
principle of substance
'
[which precedes the
refu-
tation' in the
'Critique,'] he has brought forward

if
arguments which,
sound, would seem to render

'
any further
'
refutation
superfluous.
For, the
First
in all
;
Analogy of Experience'
asserts this,
is
'That
changes of phenomena substance
permanent
and
CHAP.
VI.]
TRANSCENDENTALISM.
is
m
it is)
the quantum thereof in nature
neither increased
nor diminished.'
And
if it is
is
as
by substance Kant means

I
something which,
not (as
think
exactlyis
equivalent to what
commonly
is
called matter,
is
at
;
any
rate the
this
genus of which matter

proposition
in
one species
clearly
absolutely
in
inconsistent
I
with Idealism
term.
If
the
is
sense
which
use the
matter
to be thought of as
permanent
and
indestructible,
we
are clearly under the necesis
sity of thinking that there
in nature
something be-
sides the fleeting succession of our conscious states.
The
I
proof of this Principle of Substance, which
give partly in Kant's words, partly in Professor
Caird's,
this
way
:
and partly
*
in
my
own, runs somewhat

exist in time.
in
is
All
phenomena
Change
But
only conceivable in an unchanging time.
this
time
tion,
is
not,
is
and cannot
be, itself
an object of percep-
but
rather a form given to the relations of
perception which supposes that they are otherwise

related.
They must be
all
otherwise related as deter-
minations of a permanent substance.

are in one time, so
As
in
all
times
changes must be
one per-
manent
object.
is
The
conception of the permanence

all
of the object
implied in
determinations of
its
changes.
Change involves
that one
mode
of exist-
ence follows another
mode
of existence in an object
recognised as the same.

changes, changes only in
^
Therefore a thing which

its
states or accidents, not
Critique, p. 136.
'
112
[part
ii.
in its substance.
An
is
experience of absolute anniimpossible, for

it
hilation or creation
would be an
experience of two events so absolutely separated
from each other that they could not even be referred The First Analogy,' therefore, is a to one time.'
*
deduction from the possibility of experience, and-^

requires no empirical proof.
When
a philosopher
was asked,
'
What
is
the weight of
smoke
?
'
he
answered, 'Subtract from the weight of the burnt
wood
will
the weight of the remaining ashes, and you
have the weight of the smoke.'

it
Thus, he prein fire the
sumed
of
it
to
be incontrovertible that even
matter (substance) does not perish, but only the form
undergoes a change.^
reader will at once perceive that .while there
that
is
The
is
*
much
common
to the
Refutation
'
and the
First Analogy,' there are
trines peculiar to each,
some arguments and doca fact which makes the satis;
factory discussion of the question rather difficult
because,
while
it
is
impossible to
it
arguments as
identical,
is
the two somewhat clumsy and

treat
would lead
to a
good deal of
repetition to consider
them altogether separately. The most convenient

first
course,
perhaps, will be
in
to consider the points
which are to be found
both, and then to proceed with the examination of

their mutual relationship
and with what
is
special to
each of them.
Cf.
Kant, Critique^
p.
136
Caird, p. 453.
CHAP.
VI.]
TRANSCENDENTALISM.
first
113
The
*
difficulty,
then,
which occurs to me,

feel, refers
is
and which, perhaps, others may

transcendental
necessity
'
to that
which
the very pith

in the
and marrow of the whole demonstration, both

'
Refutation
'
and
in the
*
First Analogy.'
Is
it
really
*
true that change
is
nothing to us as thinking beings

it
except
we
conceive
in relation to
?
a permanent and
unchanging substance
I
I
For
my part, however much

'
try to bring the matter into

feel
clear consciousness,'
myself bound by no such necessity.
For
though change
for
may perhaps be
calls
*
unthinkable, except
what Professor Green

and though
to
'
combining,' and,
therefore, to a certain extent a

ness,'
it
persisting conscious-
may have no meaning

is
'
out of
^
relation
that which
not-change,' this
not-
change by no means implies permanent substance.
On
the contrary, the smallest recognisable persis-
tence through time would
seem enough
;
to
I
make
cannot
its
change in time
intelligible
by contrast
fact
and
help thinking that the opposite opinion derives

chief
plausibility
from the
is
that
in
ordinary
;
language permanence
the antithesis to change
whence
tives
it
is
rashly
assumed
that they are correlain
which imply each other

It
the
system of
nature.
has to be noted also, that Kant, in his
proof of the analogy, makes a remark (quoted and
approved by Professor Caird) which almost seems

to
concede
this
is
very point, for he says,

:
Only the
permanent
subject to change
I
the mutable suffers
114

;
[part
ii.
no change, but rather alternation
that
is,
^
when
certain determinations cease, others begin.'
Now
word
is
there can be no objection, of course, from a philosophical point of view, to an author defining a
in
any sense he pleases
what
is
not permissible
to
make such a
definition
;
the basis of an argument
to matters of fact
yet the above passage suggests
the idea that Kant's proof of the permanence of
substance
is
not altogether free from this vice.
If
(by definition) change can only occur in the permanent, the fact that there is
change
is
is
no doubt a
But\
this
conclusive proof that there

the
'
permanent.'
in
question then arises,

?
is
there change
is
sense
How
do we know that there
anything
more than
alternation which (by definition) can take

?
place in the mutable
All transcendental arguments

*
convince by threats.
say,
'
Allow
my
conclusion,' they
or
will
prove to you that you must surrender

beliefs.'
one of your own cherished

the threat
is
But
in this
case
hardly calculated to frighten the most
timid philosopher.
There must be a permanent, say

;
the transcendentalistS; or there can be no change
but this surely
is
no very serious calamity,
if
we
are
I
allowed to keep alternation, which seems to me,

confess, a
very good substitute, and one with Avhich
the ordinary
To
those
man may very well content himself. who agree with the preceding account
of our intellectual necessities,

^
who can
either conceive
Critiqjie, p. 140.
CHAP.
VI.]
TRANSCENDENTALISM.
115
change without permanence, or are content to get

along with the help of
solutely fatal to the
in the
' '
alternation,'
it
will
seem ab-
whole Kantian argument, both

'
First
Analogy
and the
it
'
Refutation/
To
those
who do
not agree,
will
only be a difficulty in
so far as the existence of any
mind unconscious of
the
disI
transcendental necessities
transcendental theory,cussed.
is
inconsistent with
point
have already
But
let
us pass over
this,
and
grant, for the
sake of argument, that change

succession of our mental
states
in general,
in
or the
particular,
can
only be perceived in relation to a permanent something

;
then
ask (and this
is
the next most obvious
objection) why, in
order to obtain this permanent
something, should
the reader
supplies,
is
we go
'
to external matter
As
*
aware, the
pure
eg-o
of apperception
on the Kantian system, the unity
in refe-
rence to which alone the unorganised multiplicity of

perception becomes a possible experience
;
and
it
seems hard to understand why that which supplies

unity to multiplicity
to succession.
objection,
may
to
not also supply permanence

indeed, anticipated this
;
Kant
has,
it
and replied
but as
I
understand the
reply,
I
objection
much
better than
do the
latter,
'
will
content myself with giving the

phrase, in Kant's
'
without para-
own words
We
find,'
he says,
that
we
possess nothing permanent that can corre-
spond and be submitted to the conception of a

substance
as
intuition,
except matter.
I
In
ii6

/,
[part
ii.
the representation
the consciousness of myself,
is
not an intuition, but a merely intellectual representation
produced by the spontaneous activity of a

It follows,
thinking subject.
that this
Its
has not any
predicate of intuition, which, in
character of per-
manence, could serve as correlate to the determination of time In the internal sense. In the
as impenetrability
Is
^
same way
the correlate of matter as an
empirical intuition.'
Though
'
do not profess altogether

it
is,
to
understand
it,
this reasoning,
at all events, clear

Is
from
that
the permanent
'
whose existence
;
demonstrated
Is
must be an object of perception

the
a fact which
also evident from various passages In the proof of

*
First Analogy,' as, for instance, this
' :
Time
itself
cannot be an object of perception.

is
It
follows
that in objects of perception, that
in
phenomena,
^
there
must be found a substratum,' &c.

see indeed
It
is
i
difficult to
how
that which
Is
a quantity,
incapable of either increase or diminution, can be
other than an object of perception

events, be a concept
;
it
I
cannot, at
think,
all
and we may,
assume
from the whole tenor of Kant's argument, as well as from his categorical assertions, that the substance of which he speaks is a phenomenal Âtng: But If it
be perceived, and
to be found
?
if it
be a phenomenon, where
is It
In the perpetual flux of nature,

persist for a time, but
3
where
(to all
objects
'
do indeed
where
Critique, p. i68.
Critique, p. 137.
CHAP, vl]
transcendentalism.
is
T17
appearance) nothing
eternal,
who
?
has had expe-
By a dialectical process, probably familiar to the reader, we may with much plausibility reduce what we perceive in an
rience of this unchanging existence
object to a collection of related attributes, not one of
which
is
the object
itself,
but
all
of which are the

object.
'
changing attributes or accidents of the

if
But
of
this
process be legitimate, the

is
'
substratum
these accidents
at all events,
is
either never perceived at
all, or,
only
known
it is
as a relation.
In neither
case can
it
be the permanent of which Kant speaks,

first
since in the
case
not an object of immediate

it
perception
in the
all.
second
'
can hardly be regarded

replied),
as an object at
But
(it
may perhaps be
by a remarkable coincidence, science has established by a wide induction the very truth which Kant attempts to prove a priori.
us that matter
that
is
When men
it is
of science
tell
indestructible,
to
be presumed
they attach some meaning
to the phrase,
and
are referring neither to a metaphysical substance nor

to an evanescent appearance.
When Kant
uses the
same phrase,
the
may be supposed that he refers to same object.' For my own part, I confess to a
it
rooted distrust of
these
remarkable coincidences
between the
results
;
of scientific
experiment and
a priori speculation
nor does a closer examination

It
of this particular case tend to allay the feeling.

is
true,
no doubt, that science asserts matter to be

;
indestructible
but what
is
the exact meaning of the
ii8

and what
is its
[part
ii.
phrase,
evidence
Can we perceive
all
any thread of
identity running through
the various
changes which (what
we
describe as) one substance
may undergo ? To a certain extent science assures There are two, though, so far as I us that we can.
know, only two attributes of matter, namely,
tion to a
its rela-
moving
put
force
and
its
power of
attracting
and being attracted by

alter
*
;
other matter, which never

strictly, if
or, to
it
more
'
we
take a certain
area of observation
(say a closed vessel) out of

it
which matter cannot pass and into which

enter, then,
cannot
the
whatever changes occur within
this,
matter there, whether always the same or not, never

varies in respect of these
two
properties.
But
it
has to be observed, that though

velocity
we
can
fact
directly perceive both
and weight, the
that there are
unchanging relations between a given
portion of matter and a given force, or between two

portions of given matter, can only be established
by an elaborate process of inference involving a large number of assumptions. It might, therefore,

be plausibly contended that though they are perceived,
\ki\x permanence is
not, so that
they cannot
properly be said to form any permanent element in

perception.
Passing over this possible objection,
however, and, granting for the sake of argument,

that
we
directly perceive
the permanence of these

it
two properties of matter,
is
still
clear, that since
these are the only two properties of which
we
can
CHAP.
VI.]
TRANSCENDENTALISM.
119
say as much, either they must constitute matter, or

matter, in so far as
it
is
permanent, cannot be an
first
object
of perception.
The
these
alternation
is
in-
admissible,
relations
because
properties
are
merely
between certain portions of matter and The second would seem to be something else.
inconsistent with the Kantian proof.
The
reader will understand that
am
not here
contending that Kant's conclusion
is
inconsistent
is
with science, or that the scientific inference

either in
its
:
wrong,
is
method or
its
results.
My
point
rather
this
Though
its
Kant does
not, of course,
conclude to the necessary permanence of matter
merely from
theless
to
its
permanence
in
in perception,
never-
permanence
in
perception would seem
be involved
his proof.
so
Now
it
;
assert that
is
what we perceive, in
either not matter or
tain that
scientific
is
far as
is perceived,
not permanent
and
main-
an examination of that part of the ordinary

or empirical proof which
bears on the
question really confirms this view.

It
may
perhaps be thought (and some of Kant's
expressions countenance the view) that he means to
say no more than that
we
perceive the permanent

its
substance by means of certain of

this
accidents.
First,
But
is
seems
to raise
new
difficulties.
how
the phenomenal substance thus mediately known, to
be distinguished from the

if it
z^^//;;^^;/^/
substance which,
be known at
all, is
known
precisely in the
same
I20
[part
ii.
way
or
Why should we suppose to Why should we suppose space

?
it ?
be
it
in
time
to
be a
quantity
And
how,
finally,
can
we
is
say with any

at
meaning, that such a substance

all ?
phenomenal
To
put the matter

that
*
in
one sentence
in
when
/
Kant says
all
determination
regard to time
presupposes the existence of something permanent

in perception,' if his assertion is to
it
be taken
literally,
is
is
in contradiction with experience, for there in perception, unless
nothing permanent
we choose
and other
to describe the relations of matter to force
gravitating matter in that
hand, he means that
way if, on the other what we perceive indicates the

:
existence of something permanent, he has

to prove the
fact,
first
got
and has then got

reality
is
to
show
that the
is
permanent
identical
whose
thus
established
with the external

sense
;
world of science and

point out
^
common
be said
and
lastly, to
how we can
which
its
to
be
'
immediately conscious'
through,
of that
we
only
know
and
by means
of,
attributes.
Such, then, are the chief objections which, as

think, apply with equal force to the
'
First
Analogy'
and the
any
'
Refutation.'
Before going on to explain

either, let
difficulties,
which are special to
me
ex-
point out a curious consequence which

tracted from
together.
^
may be
the
two demonstrations
considered
Critiqtie^ p. 167.
CHAP.
VI.]
TRANSCENDENTALISM;
'
X2t
Kant's argument in the

it
Refutation
'
consisted,
will
be recollected)
in
showing that we could have
no experience of our own changing mental states

unless
we perceived some permanent object outside us

'
while in the
First Analogy,' his

all
argument involved
itself never
the assertion that

tions of
changes are but the determina-
some permanent substance, which

According to the
'
changes.
fore,
First Analogy,' therestates,
our changing mental
like
or,
all
other
changes, must be determinations,
as they are
;
usually called, accidents, of a permanent substance

while, according to the
*
Refutation,' this
permanent
substance must be an object of perception indepen-
dent of us and outside us

matter.
in
space
in
other words,
propositions
Between
to
them
these
two
would seem
furnish
a complete transcendental
as
proof that our conscious states must be thought
mere accidents
far
of a material substance
so that the
crude materialism of certain modern physiologists,
from being the rash conclusion of an unphilosophic

is
empiricism,
critical
demonstrable a priori by approved

!
methods
The
'
only further remark

'
have to make on the
First
Analogy
is
of the nature, perhaps, of a verbal

as
if it
criticism.
Kant speaks throughout of matter

nor diminished.
were a
definite quantity in nature, a quantity
which
could neither be increased

this
But
would seem
to be inconsistent with his theory

is
that a
vacuum
impossible, because
if
matter
is
122

is,
[part
ii.
wherever space
it
must, one should think, be not A
less impossible to conceive the first as a totality

it
than
'
is
to conceive the
'
second
'
and the words
in/
crease
ingless
and
in
is
diminution
must be altogether meanto
their
application
a quantity whose Kant's expression,

/
amount
held to
necessarily indefinite.
is
therefore,
a somewhat loose one, and he must be|

that matter exists,
mean simply
it
and that no/

I
portion of
can be created or destroyed.
may
vacuum he points out that matter may be a quantity in more than one way, but that neither in the First Analogy nor the Refutation does he explicitly tell us in which way
add, that in his discussion of a
*
'
'
it is
incapable of diminution.
It
would be
interest-
ing to
know
this, in
order that his results might be

results at which,
compared with the

methods,
by very
different
men
I
of science have arrived.

*
My
tion,'
concluding criticism refers to the
Refuta-
and
and
to
must ask the reader to turn back to it, compare the thing which Kant announces his
In the
is
intention of proving with the thing he professes to
have proved.
demonstrated
in
Theorem,' the thing to be
the
*
existence of external objects
space
is
in the
Proof,' the thing actually

'
demonme'
strated
the existence of
in
'
real things external to
that
is,
things which are not themselves something

so,
me, though of course their representations are
without
me
'
being evidently equivalent to
'
other
than
my
conscious states, as determined in time.'
CHAP.
VI.]
TRANSCENDENTALISM.
these two expressions really meant the
further refutation of Idealism
123
Now
thing,
if
same
any
would be
for a
perfectly superfluous.
No human
being that under-
stood the meaning of his
own words would

in
moment deny
his body.
in
that there
were objects
space,
and
therefore without
him
in the
sense of being outside

is
The
real question
this-
Does
?
being
space and outside the body imply that the exis
tended and external object
outside the mind, and
other than one of a series of conscious states

realist asserts that
it
The
it
does, the idealist asserts that
does not
and
to assume, as
is
that the one proposition
Kant appears to do, very much the same as

intention
is
the other
at
issue.
is,
in reality,
to
beg the whole question

merely
For unless Kant's
to demonstrate the existence of
extended objects,
which
it
it is
I
equally unnecessary and impossible to do,
must,
suppose, be to
show that
their existence
is
independent of their being perceived

it
neither
in
beginning with
to
nor perishing with
it;
and
order
do
this
he must prove, from his point of view,
two
things.
The
the
first
of these
is,
that the
is
con-
sciousness of one's
possible on
own
i.e.,
existence in time
that
only
supposition
something perindependent
manent
second
thing
exists outside,
is,
other than, one's self; the
that
this
permanent and
identical with
first
is in
any sense
extended matter.
I
The
evidence for the

;
of these positions
have
is
already considered
the evidence for the second
124

explicitly stated
it
;
[part
ii.
nowhere
but
cannot help suspect-
ing (though
omitted to
into
seems scarcely credible) that Kant provide any, though a temporary lapse
that
at
the
common though absurd assumption

in
'outside'
all
one
sense
is
equivalent
'
to,
or,
events, necessarily implies,

difficulty
outside
'
in the other.^
feel in
With the
which most philosophers

that
understanding
how
which
is
an
immediate
object of perception can be other than zn co7isciousness,
a difficulty which
is
certainly not lessened
by
the Kantian theory of space,
Kant himself makes

the transcen-
no attempt
to deal.
turn
now from
dental proof of an external world to the transcendental proof of the law of Causation.
In his proof of the law of Causation, contained

in the
'
Second Analogy of Experience,' Kant,

the one on which he
if
understand him rightly, adopts two lines of argu-
ment
stress
appears to lay most

itself
being consistent neither with

In
discussing
it
nor with
the
other.
am
unfortunately
deprived of the assistance of Professor Caird, who,

in the exercise of his
discretion as an expositor of
the
Critical
it.
Philosophy, has
will
chosen practically to
ignore
not venture to determine whether
^ I do not of course suppose that Professor Caird and the NeoKanlians are guilty of the confusion of thought which I here attribute
to Kant.
But (as I explained above) since they appear to be content with the argument in the form in which Kant left it since at all events they have not, so far as I know, thought fit to provide a corrected version of it, I am not only justified, but compelled, to
;
treat
it
as
if it
were an authentic exposition of their views.
CHAP.
VI.]
TRANSCENDENTALISM.
125
in so
doing he has or has not somewhat transgressed
even the very wide Hmits imposed on him by the

plan of his work
;
but lest the reader should imagine
that the absence of the

state
in
'
argument
ask
am
about to
from the commentary, implies

original,
^
its
non-existence
consult
the
will
him
it
to
the
attri-
Critique,'
and see whether

range of the
may
not be
buted to Kant with as much plausibility as any

the whole
follows
*
in
Critique.'
It
runs
as
give
it
partly in
italics
my own
words, partly in
:
Our apprehension of the manifold of phenomena is But sometimes we regard this always successive.' manifold of phenomena as constituting an object
Kant's, though the
'
are always mine
(say a house), sometimes as a series of events (as
when a
to
ship
is
seen to float
down a
river).
Subjec-
tively, in
apprehension, these two series would seem

;
be of the same'^kind
objectively, as every
one
knows, we widely distinguish them.
We
no more
if
suppose that the upper story of the house,

begin looking at
it
we
at the top,
is
a phenomenon pre-
ceding
in
is
time the ground

at the
floor,
than
we suppose
perceive the
the ship
same time
in
at
two
different places
on the
river.
Yet
consciousness
we
ground
perceive
floor
after the upper
perceive the ship lower

it
higher up.
is
requires solution
this
1
we down the river after we The problem then that How do we distinguish, as
story, exactly as
seq.
Page 142
126

experience
[part
ii.
in
we
certainly do distinguish, the first

?
series
from the second
And
them
Kant's answer
if
is
that
we
can only distinguish

first
we
regard the
order of the
series as arbitrary,
rule.
'
and that of the
second as subject to a
In the former example
my
perceptions in the apprehension of the house

at the roof
;
might begin
or vice versa
and end
at the foundation,
in
or
might apprehend the manifold
this empirical intuition
by going from
right to left
or from
left to right.
Accordingly, in the series of
these perceptions, there
was no determined order

In
which necessitated
in
my
beginning at a certain point
order empirically to connect the manifold.'

is
the second case the order
objective
it
in
no way
depends on the mode

sent
it
;
in
which we choose
if
to repre-
and
this
can only be
we suppose
that
it
occurs in conformity with a rule or law.
And
'
this
becomes
at
once apparent,
if
for
an instant we try
and imagine the contrary

this
to be the case.
Let us
suppose that nothing precedes an event upon which

event must follow in conformity with a
rule.
All sequence of perception would then exist only in
apprehension, that
tive,
is to say,
would
be merely subjec-
and
it
could not thereby be objectively deterto precede
mined what thing ought

to follow in perception.
and what ought
In such a case
we
should
have nothing but a play of representation, which would possess no application to any object. That is to say, it would not be possible through perception
CHAP.
VI.]
TRANSCENDENTALISM.
127
to
distinguish
one phenomenon from another, as

;
regards relation of time
because the succession
in
the act of apprehension would always be of the

sort,
same
and therefore there would be nothing

to
in the
phenomenon
And,
determine the succession, and to
render a certain
in this case,
I
sequence
objectively necessary.
cannot say that two states in a
phenomenon
follow one
upon the
other, but only Ihat
one apprehension follows upon another.
But
this
is
merely subjective, and does not determine an object,
and consequently cannot be held

of an object
to
be a cognition
not
even
in
the phenomenal world.
when we know in experience that something happens, we always suppose that someAccordingly,
thing precedes, whereupon
it
follows in conformity
I
with a
rule.
it
For otherwise
follows
;
could not say of the
object that
because the mere succession in

be not determined by
my
apprehension^ if
it
a rule in
relation to something preceding, does not authorise
succession in the object.

to a rule, according to
Only, therefore, in reference
which phenomena are deteris,
mined
in
their sequence, that

state,
as they happen,
by the preceding
under
can
make my
;
subjective
it is
synthesis of apprehension objective

this presupposition that
is
and
only
even the experience
of an event
possible.'
Starting then from the succession in apprehension,
or the
subjective succession
of phenomena,
Kant had
to distinguish
from it first, the objective
128

which constitutes a thing
;
[part
ii.
coexistence
in
space
house, a tree, and so forth

seqtcence
and
second, the objective
which constitutes a series of events.
As
pointed out in the section on the independent world,
he does
not, so far as
know, furnish any principle
of objective coexistence, but in the law of causation
he finds the principle of objective sequence.

put
it
Or, to
in
a transcendental form, he holds that the

is
experience of (objective) events
only possible
If
we presuppose
tainly
the law of causation, and as
we
cer-
have such an experience, &c.

as a proof of the law of universal
I
Now, regarded
causation, the
argument
have just stated

first place.
is
scarcely
worth
after
criticising.
In the
Professor Caird,
is
Schopenhauer, admits that the conclusion

If
is
it
'
inconsistent with one of the premises.

said to prove that sequence in the object
can be
accordfirst
;
ing to a
rule,'
It
is
only by showing in the

is
instance that sequence in the subject
arbitrary
so that the causation proved

versal.
is
at all events not uniit
But, in the second place,

Is
does not prove,
or attempt to prove, that there
actually an objec-
tive sequence according to a necessary rule, but only
that if there
is
an objective sequence,
it
must be
according to a necessary rule,

it
because otherwise
could not be distinguished from the subjective
sequence.
Now these are very different propositions
and the second or conditional one might be admitted

to its full extent, without admitting the truth of the
CHAP.
VI.]
TRANSCENDENTALISM.
is
129
first
or unconditional one, which
for
purposes of
required.
science the proposition for which proof
is
The second
of the
first,
proof which Kant gives of the prinis
ciple of causality
so hidden
away
in the recesses
that
some doubt might perhaps be thrown

to put
it
on whether he intended formally

a proof at
tion to
all.
forward as
The
first
fact that
it is
in direct contradic-
the
proof,
does not perhaps go

this point
;
far
towards helping us to a decision on

in any case the matter
I
but
is
not of
much
importance, as
am more
concerned with the meaning which the
post-Kantians extract from his writings, than with

that which he himself intended to put into them.
The
if
it
first
proof attempted to show that the expe-
rience of an objective sequence
was only possible

proof
was distinguished from a subjective sequence

to a rule.
by being according
The second
at-
tempts to show that no sequence can be experienced

except on the same terms.
It is plain, therefore, that
the second proof aims at demonstrating a causation
which
is
universal,
and which cannot,
therefore,
be
reconciled with the partial causation contemplated
by
the
it is
first.
It
only remains for us to examine whether

I
more
satisfactory.
^
:
give
it
entire in Professor
Caird's
'
words
The judgment
For time
1
of sequence
cannot be
made
without the presupposition of the judgment of causality.

is
a mere form of the relation of
Phil, of Kant^ pp. 454-5.
I30

and cannot be perceived by
itself.
[part
ii.
things,
Only when
we have connected
think of
events with each other can
we
them
as in time.
And
the connection must
be such, that the

in the
different elements of the manifold
of the events are determined in relation to each other,
same way as the
different
moments
in
time are
it
determined
in relation to each other.
But
is
evi-
dent that the

in relation to
moments
i.e.,
of time are so determined
each other that

that
we can
only put them
into
one order
we
can proceed from the but not vice
previous to the subsequent moment,

versa.
Now,
if
objects or events cannot be dated in

it
relation to time, but only in relation to each other,
follows that they cannot be represented as in time at

all,
unless they have an irreversible order
or, in
other
words, unless they are so related according to a

universal rule,
else
when one
thing
is
posited something
must necessarily be posited

implied
in consequence.
in time,
In
every representation of events as

supposition
is
;
this pre^
and the denial of causality

all
necessarily involves the denial of

time.'
It
succession in
appears to be asserted in this proof that
we
cannot conceive succession, unless

there
is
we suppose
fit
'
that
a necessary order in
phenomena
time.
to enable
into the
them, so to speak, to correspond with and

necessary order
in
the
moments of
Events
are determined in relation to each other in the

\i.e.,
I
same
suppose, some corresponding] way, as different
CHAP.
VI.]
TRANSCENDENTALISM.
131
moments
But
in
are determined in relation to each other.'

I
so far as
can attach any definite meaning
to these
words
at
all,
they seem to distinguish two
things which are really the same, and to confound
two things which are

events and the
*
really distinct.
'
The
'
order
'
of
moments if we assert that two events succeed each other, we are describing precisely the same relationship between them as when we assert that two moments succeed each other. When, on the other hand, we assert that one event is the cause of another, we assert not only this actual sucorder of
;
are not two kinds
of order, but one kind
and
cession, but also,
by
implication, a similar succession
whenever an event resembling the cause or first term But this in the relationship may happen to occur.
relationship
it
is
so far independent of time, that though

in
must occur
it
some time,
it
may
occur in any time,

relation be-
and
in
no way corresponds with the
tween actual successive events or successive moments which can never be repeated, because the related
terms can never recur.
followed by event
Event
and moment a are

b.
B and moment
if
This happens
;
once actually and,
you
please, necessarily
but
it
never happens again.

past as certainly as the
The
be
events vanish into the

in
moments
which they occur,

But
all this
and they can as
little
recalled.
has
nothing to do with causation.
What
the principle of
is,
causation, strictly speaking, asserts
not that
if
event
recurs
it
will
be followed by event B, for

K
2
132
[part
ii.
event
cannot possibly recur
but that
If
an event
will
similar to
recurs,
:
an event similar to
this
cer-
tainly follow
and how
second hypothetical as-
sertion
is
involved in the categorical assertion of a
simple historical succession between actual concrete
events and moments, altogether passes

standing.
my
under-
The
transcendental view appears to be, that beis
cause there
a necessary order between successive
moments, therefore there must be a necessary order

between successive events
sity
;
and
this desired neces-
can only be found in the principle of causation.

if
But
there
still
was no
causality at
all,
the order of events

little
is
would
be just as much or just as
necessary
as the order of
moments.
it
An
does.
it
event
what
is
it
is
because
it is
it
happens when
it
moment
what
because
occurs
when
does.
Neither the one
nor the other could occur at any other time, simply
because by so doing
it
would cease
is
to
be
itself
It is
all
true of course (and this
no doubt the cause of
the confusion) that
we
habitually talk of the
same
event as occurring at different times, while
we make
no such assertion respecting particular moments.

But
this is
simply because the whole essence of a

the time at which
that this
it'
moment
whereas
consists in
it is
occurs,
commonly the case

all
it is
is
the least
interesting of
the relations which constitute an

therefore most often
event,
and the one of which
convenient to
make
abstraction.
Nor
is
it
to the
CHAP.
VI.]
TRANSCENDENTALISM.
133
purpose to say that events cannot be dated
in rela;
tion to time, but only in relation to other events
because
in
every sense in which this can be asserted

it
of particular events,
particular
can likewise be asserted of

therefore, this fact necesI
moments.
If,
sitates causation in the
one case (which, however,

it
deny),
is
it
must necessitate
also in the other
which
absurd.
Other objections besides these might no doubt be

taken against particular points
in the
it is
transcendental
to
proof, but the best refutation of

its
be found
in
own
version of
is
its
general nature and object.
That object
succession
is
simply to show that a clear idea of
impossible, except to those
who
first
regard phenomena
to the principle
as necessarily connected according

;
of causation
which, again,
is
as
much
as to say that
by
far the larger part of
mankind
I
have no clear idea of succession say the larger part of mankind,

bered that
those
in that
at
it
all.
And when
must be rememall
majority are included not only
who do
not believe in the universality of cauall
sation,
but also almost
those
who do
since
will
make bold to say that the greater number however much they turn their minds to the
principle of cause
of these,
nature of
succession in time, do not find involved therein the
and
effect.
This necessity, then,

if it
is
under which the transcendentalists labour,

to
be of
'
objective
'
application,
all,
and
is
to
have any
philosophic value at
requires us to believe that
134

is,
[part
ii.
mankind has been, and

ideas,
suffering under a very

its
singular illusion respecting the clearness of
own
be so
on a point which
is
commonly thought
This by
to
simple as to defy further analysis.

sufficiently
itself is
hard to believe
and the
difficulty
does
not diminish
more
closely.
oblige us to
when we come to examine the matter For what does the supposed necessity hold ? That when we perceive two
first
is
events in succession, the
the cause of the
second
Not
at
all.
But that when we perceive

somewhere a
cause possibly (indeed, pro-
two events
in succession, there exists
cause for the second

bably) of which
a
are,
we
and
shall
remain for ever,
ignorant
So
that
what the transcendental doctrine
comes
to
is this,
that
we can
is
have, and do have, an
idea of succession which
not causal, but that

'
we
cannot have such idea, at least in

ness,'
clear conscious-
which does not involve the idea of some other

is
succession which
indeed causal, but one element

be, quite
I
of which
is,
or
may
unknown
to us
On
Kuno
the whole, then,
cannot agree with Herr

'^
Fischer that Kant's 'giant strength

in this
has been
very happily employed

doctrine of causation
attack
;
attempt to place the

sceptical
all
beyond the reach of

it
on the contrary,
seems
to
me
that
the
difficulties
all
inherent in the transcendental method, and
the confusion and obscurity which are so often
to be
met with
in
^
Kant's use of that method, are

i
Fischer's Kant, p.
rS.
CHAP.
VI.]
TRANSCENDENTALISM.
135
strikingly exhibited in his treatment of this central
and important
that
it
principle.
It
is
commonly
is
asserted
was Hume's theory

which suggested
to
(that our expectation or
belief in the uniformity of
Nature
the result of
habit)
Kant
the necessity of
finding
some more
it
solid basis
on which to rest our

If so,
it
systematic knowledge of phenomena.
is
unfortunate that
should be precisely at this point
that the ingenious
and important method of
proof,
which
it
is
his chief glory to
have invented, most

had
all
obviously and completely breaks down.

I
have only
to point out, in conclusion, that
the transcendental demonstration been as sound in

its
parts as
it
Herr Kuno Fischer and Professor Caird

to be, the thing
suppose
proved
is
not sufficient
by
itself to
serve as a basis for scientific induction.
All that
Kant can be
said,
on the most favourable

is
view of
his reasoning, to
have established
that,
own words, 'the phenomena in the past determine all the phenomena in succeeding time
to use his
'
;
or,
as Professor Caird phrases
it,
'the subsequent
state of the
world
is
the effect of the previous state/
But something more than a fixed relation between

the totality of
totality of
phenomena at one instant and the phenomena at the next instant, is required
'
before
we
can, in the scientific sense of the expression,
assert that these are
laws of nature.'
A law of nature
totality of
refers to a fixed relation, not
between the
phenomena, but between extremely small portions of

136

;
[part
ii.
that totality
and
it
asserts a fixed connection, not
between individual concrete phenomena, but between Now by no known process classes of phenomena.
of logic can
that
'
we
extract from the general proposition,

is
the subsequent state of the world
the effect
of the previous state,' any evidence that such laws as
these exist at
proposition
all;
and what
is
more, this general

true,
might be perfectly
all
and yet the and purposes,
course of nature might be, to
intents
absolutely irregular, even to an intelligence which,
very unlike our own, was able to grasp phenomena

in their totality at
rity
in
'
any given moment.
For regula'
is
an expression absolutely inapplicable to

is
series,
which there
for
no kind of repetition
and we have
no reason
science
supposing
from the
at
point of view of
we have every
which
it
reason for no^ supposing
that the world will ever return exactly to the

state in
If,
was
same some previous moment.

for
therefore,
we have grounds
believing that
the states of the universe at two successive instants

are connected only as wholes, and not necessarily
by
means
of
independent causal links between their
separate parts, then of such a universe
we
could say,
perhaps, that
its
course through time was determined^
but
it
we
could not say that
be possible for
was regular, nor would a mind, however gifted, to infer, by

it
any known process of reasoning,

past.
If
I
its
future from
its
may judg'e from a phrase
of Professor Caird's,
CHAP.
VI.]
TRANSCENDENTALISM.
for
137
he holds a different opinion,
he appears to think
that the existence of causal links
between individual
phenomena
follows necessarily from the fact of a
causal connection
at different times.
between the
'
totality of
phenomena
'
To
find,'
he
says,^
the special
threads of causality which connect the sequent states

of objects
is
of course a matter of careful observation

Bi^^ in asserting sequence
and experiment.
we have
already by implication asserted that the threads are

there.'
I
do not know whether the implication here

is
spoken of
neither
transcendental.
Its
nature
is
developed
unas'
by Kant nor by
it
himself,
'
and
my own
sisted efforts to find
in the
clear consciousness
of
sequence have, as perhaps was natural, met with no

success.
But
if it is
I
not transcendental, certainly
it is
not empirical.
showed
before, that, admitting the
existence of these causal threads, experience alone
could never show their precise nature
still
less,
if
we do
prove
not admit their existence, can experience alone

it.
It is not,
however, necessary to waste the
reader's time in establishing this point.
The
trans-
cendentalist would be ready to admit
it
without de-
monstration, since,
if
he allowed that experience was

sufficiency in other cases
a sufficient ground of belief in this case, he would

find
it
hard to deny
its
while,
on the empiricist's view of the question

sufficiently
have
dwelt in the earlier chapters of this
essay.
1
p. 459.
138
[part
ii.
CHAPTER
VIL
THREE ARGUMENTS FROM POPULAR PHILOSOPHY.

In this chapter
I
propose to examine the philosophic
value of three arguments

respectively, the
*
which
may be
called,
Argument from general
consent,'
the
y
Argument from success in practice,' and the Argument from common sense."' These arguments are not, perhaps, as a general
'
''
rule,
put forward as
final
and conclusive grounds of

to philo-
belief
by writers having much pretension

;
sophic insight
but they
fill
so important a place
are, as
among
fact,
the reasons
by which men
a matter of
convinced, they constitute such a large part of
actual popular philosophy, that they require
some
notice in this essay.

It
is
not necessary to remind the reader of a
truth which has been already stated, that in discuss-
ing them no attempt can legitimately be
made
to
demonstrate their insufficiency to furnish a basis of

philosophic certitude.
Neither this attribute, nor
its
converse can, from the nature of things, be demonstrated of

sible to
any argument whatever.

is
It
is
as impos-
prove that a belief
not to be accepted as
CHAP.
VII.]
POPULAR PHILOSOPHIC ARGUMENTS.
139
one of the ultimate data of knowledge, as to prove This is a point the that it is to be so accepted.
decision of which
must
in
all
cases
be
left
to
each man's individual judgment; and the duty of

the philosopher can go no further than to
make
it
the decision as easy as possible, and to see that

is
really given
first
on the main question

at
least,
at issue, and, in
If the
the
instance
on that alone.
verdict be given in the affirmative,
and the
belief in
question
it
is
pronounced true and also ultimate, then

in the
will
be necessary,
second place, to enquire

;
i.e., what conclusions how much ground it covers we may draw from it, and what proportion these conclusions bear to the total number of beliefs we
desire to establish.
In conformity with this plan,

first
let
us discuss in the
place that particular argument from authority

I
which
have called the 'Argument from general

It will
consent'
that
be admitted,
suppose, at once,
any one who regards the general consent of

as a final
mankind
that
ground of
belief
must
hold,
ist,
some
of his particular beliefs
either are, or
may be deduced
from, propositions assented to

;
by
the generality of mankind

sitions assented to
true.
and, 2nd, that propo-
by the generality of mankind are

of these positions.
it,
Now
I
with regard to the
first
would ask any one who holds
whether he
is
immediately convinced of the fact that mankind

[part
140
ii.
assent generally to any given proposition, or whether

.he arrives at that conviction
'ing
?
If,
by a process of reasonat all events,
as
is
more than probable, he adopts the

by so doing he admits,
which are not which
latter alternative,
that he believes S07ne propositions
proved by general consent

These,
all
those, namely,
are required to establish the fact that this general
consent
of the
exists.
it
is
to be presumed, are
same general character as those which are required to establish any other historical fact, and
consist in the first place of evidence, oral
and docu-
mentary, and in the second place, of those general

principles which, as the reader
is
already aware, are
required before any general induction can be based
on these or any other
particulars.
fact
Before, therefore,
(if fact it
any use can be made of the

*
be) that
by the generality of mankind are true,' we must both believe a large number of statements because they are assented to, not by
propositions assented to
the generality, but by a very small fraction of mankind,
and and
also accept a large
number of the very

it is
'
propositions
proof,
*
for
which we most desire to obtain

thought that the
in
favour of which
argument from general consent may legitimately
be invoked.
So much
'
for what, in
'
formal logic,
is
called the
minor premiss
of the argument under discussion.

to the
*
Let us now turn
major premiss,' which, as
has already been stated, would run in this
way
CHAP.
VII.]

generally
141
What mankind have

true.
Is
assented
to,
is
this
an ultimate proposition
one
which we
accept as neither susceptible of proof, nor as requir-
ing proof
If
any reader
is in
doubt as to the true
reply which should be given to this enquiry, the
answer which he
feels
disposed to
make
him
to the
following question may, perhaps, help

sion.
to a deci-
Does he regard the argument from general consent as an example, and a specially perfect example, of the ordinary argument from testimony ?
If
he does, and
think he probably
is
will,
then the
proposition
we
are discussing
told,
not ultimate.
We
are
commonly
and when properly understood
the assertion
greater
is
perfectly correct, that
we
accept the
testi-
number of our beliefs on the faith of

But by
this
is
mony.
not meant, or ought not to
be meant, that the

tion
is,
real
it is
ground of accepting an
asserted.
asser-
is
the fact that
The
real
ground
or should be, the belief that our informant or in-
formants probably
willing to
know
the truth and are probably
communicate
all
it.
And
this belief itself
is
one which
would allow required evidence, and

on
reflec-
could not therefore be considered ultimate.
Now
tion,
imagine that most people

this
is
will,
admit that
true, not
only
when we
are
dealing with the opinion of this or that individual,

or
body of
individuals, but also
when we
are dealing
with
the united
testimony of mankind.
In other
142

i
[part
ii.
words, they will admit,

general consent
'
st,
that the
'
argument from
is
merely an instance of the ordi-
nary arguments from testimony, and, 2nd, that the ordinary arguments from testimony depend on something beyond the
fact
that certain opinions have

also to be assured, that
truthful
been
stated,
and require us
stating
the persons
them were
and well
informed.
This amounts, of course, to an admission that

the proposition
one.
we
are discussing
is
not an ultimate
Strictly speaking, therefore,
we might consider
it
the discussion at an end.

subject,
it
But before leaving the

enquiring whether
is
may be worth
i.e.,
nearly ultimate
whether, without tracing the

further back,
thread of inference
find
much
we can readily
to rest
it.
some
satisfactory
axiom on which
Have we then any

as a whole, or
(I will
reason to believe that mankind,
any section of them, are well informed
not dispute their truthfulness) respecting the

?
larger postulates of science
With regard
in their
to
man-
kind as a whole,
can only imagine two reasons

opinion
being given for putting confidence
on such a
subject.
The
first is,
that a belief gene-
rally held for
ages must in
all
probability be in har-
mony
must
*
with the experience of those

succeed,' that
is,
'
who
'
;
hold
it
is,
in practice
the other
that the universality of an opinion

it
is
a proof that
results from the

'
'
normal working of the human

is
mind
in other words,
established
by common
CHAP, vil]
popular philosophic ARGUMENTS.

meaning of
arguments,
that
143
sense, according to one
ambiguous
form
expression.
As
these
however,
part of the
will
main subject-matter of
this chapter,
and
I
be separately discussed
in their
It
proper place,
may for
fore,
the present ignore them.
remains, there-
only to consider whether a special reason exists

the opinion of
for reposing confidence in

ticular
some
par;
section
of
mankind on these
is
subjects
in
other words, whether there
any body of men who

all
hold a position towards philosophy at

ing to that
correspondto
which experts are supposed
hold
towards science, or Churches and

theology.
Popes towards
The
only persons,
suppose,
who have any

agreed
in their
claim to an authority of this kind in philosophy, are
philosophers
conclusions,
and
if
they had
all
and had forborne
to
make
public the
various lines of speculation by which they arrived

at them,
cisely
it
might have been

estimate the value
difficult,
perhaps, pre-
to
of their pretensions.
fulfilled
As, however, they have not

these conditions,
the second of
we
are compelled to judge each
man by
not
his arguments,
and are so altogether carried

;
out of the region of authority

fulfilled
and as they have

if
the first,
we
should,
to
all.
reduced to beleft
^
lieving only
what they agreed
recommend, be
without a philosophic creed at
As
is
remarked
with great force and point by Sir James Stephen,

^
Nineteenth Century^ April, 1877,
p. 290.
144
[part
ii.
the bare names of Spinoza, Leibnitz, Kant, Hegel,
Descartes, Pascal, Bossuet, Voltaire, Cornte, Hobbes,
Locke, Berkeley,
to
Hume, Paley, Mill, are quite enough show how much the deepest thought, the most
the most pious feeling, the shrewdest
brilliant talents,
practical sagacity,
the most earnest and scrupulous

.
conscientiousness
have contributed to a
Sir
practical
is
agreement on
here talking,
this subject.'
I
James Stephen
ought to mention, of the founda;
tions of theology
but the remark, with one slight
omission,
is
at least as appropriate to the foundation

I
of science, with which alone
am
here concerned.
To sum
of
all
up.
The minor
premiss of the arguis
ment from general consent (and the same

without assuming many,
postulates,
to prove.
if
true
arguments from authority) cannot be proved

not
all,
of those scientific
which
it is
the business of that argument

premiss, on the other hand,
The major
of the argument cannot, any
more than the major premiss of any other argument from authority, be
regarded as an ultimate belief; and (the case of
experts being excluded)
if
we ask what proof can be

*
given of
it,
we
are reduced either to the

*
argument
from success
in practice,' or to the
argument from
common
I
sense.'
turn,
therefore, to the
first
of these
about
'
which a very few words

*
will suffice.
The Argument from
success in practice
is
no-
thing more than an appeal from the scepticism of theory
CHAP. VH.]

which
*
145
to
the
faith
it
is
born of experience.
'
You
assert,'
says,
that no logical proof of ordinary

that
opinions can be given, and
neither
common
;
sense nor universal consent can supply a basis of

philosophical certitude.
Grant that
this is so
it
by
no means necessarily follows that men ought

subtlety of speculation, beliefs which
to give
up on a point of theory, or through some over-
work admir-
ably in practice.
doubts, after
all
However
nor
ingenious
may
be your
experience proves that they have no

;
substantial foundation
is it
any use
to say that
the uniformity of nature, or any other great principle, is
not proved to be true,

all
when every hour

it is
of
our lives shows that at
events
true
enough
for all practical purposes.'
That men ought not

grounds the
belief in
'
to give
up on speculative
the uniformity of nature, or

I
any other great

see
if his
principle,'
hold, as the reader will
patience lasts
till
the end of the volume,
with as
much
persistence as any man.
But
must
is
altogether take exception to

central point of the
the statement which
the
argument just stated, namely, that
the fact that these principles
work
in practice
is
any
ground
true.
for believing
is
them
to
be even approximately
illegiti-
This
in reality
an example of the
mate extension of a perfectly legitimate argument.

Given certain laws of nature
given that there
is
fixed plan according to which phenomena occur, and
which we
are
capable of discovering,
it
is
un-
146
[part
ii.
doiibtedly true that the fact that a certain theory

*
works
in practice,'
i.e.y
agrees, so far as our experiis

;
ence goes, with the real order of things,

for putting confidence in
it
a ground
for the future
how much
Inductive
confidence
it
is
the
business
of
the
Logician to
tell us.
But the
earlier chapters of this

if
essay have been v/ritten in vain

quires to be told that experience
the
reader re-
is
altogether in-
capable of establishing the truth

truth
even the probable

It
of these
it
initial
assumptions.
cannot prove
the
wisdom of a
provisional belief in them, simply

all.
because
can prove nothing about them at
Its
oracles are not so
much ambiguous
;
in their import,
as altogether
dumb
and
certainly give
no reason-
able encouragement to the compromise (which, however,

I
myself
believe
in)
between
theoretical
scepticism and practical faith.

It is
obvious indeed that to found such a comis
promise on the teaching of experience

ing which,
if
a proceed-
the reasoning of the preceding chapters

logical
be sound, involves a
perience
attacks
;
contradiction.
Ex-
is
one of the chief

admit,
therefore,
idols
which scepticism
to
the accuracy of the
sceptical argument, but to
add that experience deit
monstrates that in practice

to say in the
isy
may be
neglected,
is
same breath
it
that the sceptical
reasonmg
proves
and that
it
is not,
sound.
If scepticism
anything,
proves that experience proves nothing.
Similar considerations
show
that no process of
'
CHAP.
VII.]

can produce or add to philosophic
147
verification
certi-
tude.
Against the practical use and necessity of

I
verification
have not a word to
say.
It
must
always remain one of the most important instruments

for determining the laws of nature, granting that
by
any known method the determination of the laws of

nature
is
possible.
is
But
it
is
a mistake to suppose
distinction
that there
any philosophic
between
founding a belief on experience and founding a belief
on experience plus
I
verification.
Into this mistake,
cannot help thinking that Mr. G. H. Lewes has

'
fallen in his
Problems of Life and Mind.'

that
He seems
to
imagine
the
*
because knowledge of what he
calls
super-sensible,'
which
is
not derived from

'
experience, differs from knowledge of the
sensible
and
the
'
extra-sensible,'
in
is
which
is
derived
from
experience,
therefore
it
being incapable of verification, that

less
worthy
of belief
i,e.y
Whether
theology
substantial
I
a knowledge of
the super-sensible,
really rests
and metaphysics,
not argue here
on a
less
basis than science, as

;
Mr. Lewes contends,

all
will
but at
events the difference does
not depend on the fact that the theories of the one

CAN, and of the other cannot, be verified, since verification
is
not in reality a separate or distinct kind of
proof
It is
merely the name given to an observation
or experiment which, instead of suggesting a

theory, supports one already framed.
in
It
new
does not
any
essential
particular
L
2
differ
from other em-
148

grounds of
belief.
[part
ii.
pirical
it
Philosophically speaking,
fall
must stand with them or
with them, nor can

for a
it
afford
any independent evidence

it is
system of
which
I
itself an integral part.
now come
which
to the
'
Argument from common

it
sense,'
differs
from the two arguments that have

in
just
been discussed
least,
the fact that
constitutes,
nominally at
an essential part of an actual philo-
sophic system, and has been explicitly advanced as

furnishing a sufficiently solid basis for
belief,
not
merely by the vulgar, but by thinkers of influence
and
reputation.
Unfortunately, however, though
these thinkers have added, by the sanction of their

authority, to the dignity
'
and importance of the term

been accompanied by
in its definition.
common
sense,' this has not
any increased accuracy or clearness

been
in
In their use of the expression they have not always
agreement with themselves, with each other,

:
or with the unphilosophic majority

is
though, as
it
only with the opinions of the latter that

is
we
are
here concerned, this
not a subject which at this
moment need
detain us.
in
Now
common
when,
ordinary discussion, a belief

it
is
defended on the ground that

sense,
is
in
accordance with
what
is
frequently intended to be
I
conveyed by the argument

thing of this sort
:
imagine to be some-
'
The
belief in question
be exactly defensible on rational grounds,

that
may not we admit
we cannot
satisfactorily
support
it
by reasoning
CHAP.
VII.]

all
149
nevertheless practically
and
all
men
micst assent to
is
it,
men
do assent to
it,
and there
I
nothing
more
plaint
to
be said about the matter.'

to
have no com-
whatever
make
is.
against any one

it
who
takes
up
this position,
provided
It
is
be understood exactly
not an argument in
what the position

favour of a belief
:
is
it
a confession that no such
argument can be found, and an assertion that we
must do without one.

either of
It
is
not a
;
philosophy,
it is
common
all
sense or anything else

philosophy.
is
rather
it
a negation of
that, directly
And
made
therefore
is is
any attempt
to raise
what
a mere dogmatic assertion to the dignity of a philosophical reason,

it
is
found necessary to buttress
it
up by various supplementary
principles, which, as
they are not always clearly distinguished from the

original
ground on which assent was demanded, are

This necessity of adding supI
apt to introduce the strangest confusion into every

part of the subject.
port to
common
it,
sense pure and simple, as
have
just described
shows
itself
in
various ways in
ordinary quasi- philosophical
discussion.
man why he
and he
is
believes the dictates of
Ask any common sense,

'
very likely to say that he does so because

else
everybody
does so (which
is
the
argument
from general consent '), or that he does so because
he and mankind
is
if,
in
general find them
the
'
argument from success
in practice.'
is
on some other occasion, he
answer which Though asked why he puts
I50

it
[part
ii.
confidence in these two latter arguments,
must be
admitted that he
is
very likely to say that he does
so because they are
recommended
to
him by
'
his
common
sense.'
is
But there
another argument sometimes used
to eke out the bare assertion that proof
must be
fore-
gone, which
is
so important that
it
may be doubted
title
whether
it
does not better deserve the

;
of the
it
argument from common sense

really
is
more
especially as
an argument (though not a very good one),
which the other

in this
:
way Human intelligence, like any other may machine, work rightly or wrongly. It may do
'
is
not.
It
may be
stated
somewhat
its
proper and normal work, or
it
may do something
In the former
;
altogether different and abnormal.
case
error.
we
shall obtain
from
it
truth
in the
latter,
In order, therefore, to get at the truth,
we
have only to observe what an intelligence working

normally turns out,
in
other words what
common
that.*
sense naturally believes, and to put our faith in
But then the question

ligence
*
arises
'
What
it
is
an
intel-
working normally
such a
It is
not enough to say that

in
is
an intelligence
working
way
as to perceive the truth, for,
when asked what was

reply that
it
the truth,
we
could merely
was that which an
intelligence
working
when asked what an intelligence working normally was, that it was an intelligence which perceived the truth a pair of
normally perceived to be true, and
CHAP.
VII.]
151
statements which, taken by themselves, would not
bring us
sophy.
much nearer to the discovery of a philoNor is it of any use to say that a normal
is
intelligence
one which obeys natural laws

science
is
; not
intel-
only because,
if
to
be believed, every
that,
ligence, sane or insane, does
but because
we
should then be
ing that
in the singular position of maintain-
we know what
in
it
are natural laws by
means of
yet
is
an intelligence
because
it
whose judgment we had confidence

law.
was governed by natural

of what
Nor
is
possible to say that the question of

(indirectly)
what
normal
can be
and therefore
is
:
true,
decided by majorities however large
to
do so would
consent,'
is
be to revert to the
'
argument from general

of.
which has been already disposed

to
If
anything
be made of
it
this principle,
it
can only be by supple-
menting
design.
in
We
some form or other by the idea of must either presuppose a Creator who
constructs our Intelligences in such a
manner
is
that
true,
on the whole what they

or else
incline to believe
we must adopt
the
modern
is
substitute for
Creator, and suppose that there
some process by
to multiply
which right-thinking intelligences tend
and wrong-thinking ones

these suppositions,
there
is
it
to die out.
On
either of
fact
all
:
is
undoubtedly the
that
a considerable probability that what

is
men
but
practically agree in believing
worthy of
belief
then, not to speak of the difficulty already dwelt
on
of showing, without
2.
petitio principii,
what
It is
that
152

men agree
in believing,
[part
ii.
all
the question
still
remains,
what reason have we

suppositions
I
for thinking that either of these
is
true
Nobody
has as yet, so far as
know, maintained that the theory of natural selecis
tion
self-evident
and though the same cannot

of
absolutely
be
said
Theism, yet the

it
common
if
opinion seems to be that

possible,
is
desirable to have,
some kind
of proof for
the
in
existence of
a God.
In any case, as
mankind
to
it
general are not
more disposed
of
to believe the
fundamental principle
believe the fundais
Theology than they are
mental principles of Science,

further evidence to
absurd without
support of the
adduce the
first in
second.
Design, therefore, whether Theistic or atheistic,
whether depending
the
blind
on an
intelligent
Creator
or
operation
of natural
selection,
is
I
requires
?
I
proof.
And what
kind of proof
possible
have never heard of any, nor can
imagine any,
which does not depend on those very principles for which proof is required and in support of which the hypothesis of a normal intelligence con;
trived
fore,
by design was adduced. The circle, therein which the argument turns is evident. We
are required to believe in certain propositions be-
cause they are believed in by a normal intelligence
we are required to believe in the existence and testimony of a normal intelligence because intelligence is
the product of design or of something equivalent to
CHAP.
VII.]
-NATt?R27 PHILOSOPHIC ARGUMENTS. 155
design
and we are required
to believe in design
because of certain facts which can only be established

if
the propositions
we
originally set out to
prove are
true
judge,
Of the two meanings then, which, so far as I can may be attributed to the argument from common sense as it is ordinarily used, the first is not so much an answer to scepticism as an admission
'
'
that no answer
is
forthcoming
while the second
ceases to be effective as soon as the various propositions

relief,
which compose
it is
it
are
brought
it is
into
clear
plausible only so long as
confused.
154
[part
ii.
CHAPTER
VIII.
THE AUTHORITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND OF

ORIGINAL BELIEFS.
The
I
reader may, perhaps, be surprised that hitherto
while discussing the argument from
common
sense,
have not had occasion to do more than allude to

is
the philosophic version of that argument, large as the space which

speculation.
diately
it
occupies in the
field
of English
This omission, which

has
will
be Imme-
remedied,
;
been
dictated
by several
the
the
in
reasons
among which is the circumstance that philosophy of common sense is, according to
statement of
reality not
its
most eminent modern exponent,
founded upon
:
upon consciousness
common sense at all, but common sense being merely a

mind which receives
needless to say,
name given
be such,
that this
'
to the attitude of
the verdicts of consciousness, or what are thought to

in unhesitating faith. ^
is
It is
an attitude of mind to which many

*
This refers to Sir William Hamilton's opinions as expressed in In the Lectures,' see Chap, xxxviii., he gives (after his fashion), a different account of the matter. But whatever version of his opinion be taken, it must, I believe, if clearly expressed, be substantially identical either with the theory criticised at
the
'
Dissertation on Reid.'
the beginning of this chapter
i.e.^
the theory of the' Dissertation,' or

attribute to
that dealt with at the end, which
Mr.
Mill.
CHAP.
VIII.]
AUTHORITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS,
&c.
155
philosophers lay claim whose philosophy has nothing

to
do with common sense
and the reader therefore
may
will
naturally expect that the ensuing controversy
mainly turn, not on whether

but on what
trust.
it
we ought
to trust
is
consciousness,
the
consciousness
which we ought to
though
perhaps
This statement, however,
fairly
enough
describes
the
character of Mr. Mill's polemic against Hamilton,
does not precisely indicate the point of view from
which the question

'
is
approached
in the sequel.
*
Demonstration,' says Sir William Hamilton,

last
if
proof be possible, behoves to repose at

sitions which, carrying their
on propo-
own evidence,
necessitate
their
is
own
admission.'^
Nothing can be
in the
is
truer.
This
the fundamental doctrine on which this essay rests,
and which has been repeated

to weariness.
course of
it
even
But surely
it
a strange assertion
with which to introduce a discussion on the grounds
we have
carry their
evidence,
for
believing those
evidence.'
'
propositions
'
which
own
if
If
they carry their
own
they
necessitate their
own
admission,'
what can be the use of introducing a dens ex
machind
in the
shape of consciousness
in
order to
recommend them ? There are, indeed,

which
their
lie
The
if
reason
is
is
not far to seek.

possible, beliefs
knowledge
and
at the root of all

* '
knowledge, which 'carry
own evidence
'
necessitate their
own
ad-
mission
but there are others which no doubt every

^
Dissertation on Reid,
p. 742.
156
4

_____
[part
ii.
_____
to
is
v^
one would wish

classes agree in
for neither of
have proved, but
for
which unfor-
tunately no proof
readily forthcoming.
These two
while
nothing but the
single fact, that

;
them can any reason be given
they differ
in
the
somewhat important
sense (as
it.
peculiarity that
whereas the self-evident^do not require proof, the beliefs
of
common
class)
cannot obtain
we might call the second The device, which, in this

was
by
sorts of belief
difficulty,
occurred to Sir William Hamilton,
partially to
amalgamate the two

of
inventing an authority which he called by the time-
honoured name
testify to
consciousness,
which
should
both of them,^ not indeed, as he admits, in
precisely the
same way, or
to precisely the
same
degree,
still
sufficiently in the
second case, as well as
in the first, to require
our assent.
To my
common
weight of
is
thinking, this idea of a faculty within the
mind, whether called conscience, consciousness, or

sense,
its
inducing the mind by the
mere
authority to accept certain propositions,

fictions
It is
one of the most singular

in
which has ever

a
fiction,
appeared, even
over, which
that, in all
is
metaphysics.
morefact,
it
particularly unfortunate
from the
cases
where
it
is
not superfluous,
is
misleading.
In the case of propositions which have

It
other evidence.
is
clearly superfluous
in
the case
of propositions having no other evidence but which

are certain
in
themselves,
'
it
is
also
superfluous
P. 744.
CHAP.
VIII.]
&c.
157
while in the case of propositions which have neither

external evidence nor internal certainty,
ing,
it is
mislead-
since
it
can, as
shall presently
show, only
simulate
original
I
the appearance
of
an independent and
ground of
belief.
may be
told,
indeed, that the
consciousness
which Sir William Hamilton and many other philosophers set up as the
final
arbiter of truth
is
is
no
separate faculty within the mind, but
co-extensive
with the mind
itself.
If this
were
so, their
theory
it
might be much more tenable psychologically, but
would be much
it
less tenable philosophically,
than
was
before.
They would be
guiltless of
;
founding
but they
their philosophy
on an imaginary faculty
would,
single
it
on the other hand, be deprived of any
and supreme authority on which

all.
to found
at
It
may be
a*s
readily admitted that, with-
out doing violence to established usage, consciousness
might be used
a general
name
for
;
mental pheno-
mena, or our apprehension of them

case
it
but
it
in
that
ought not to be regarded, any more than

from the several particulars
'
other general names, as denoting anything separate
and
distinct
describes.
Though, doubtless, the

every such phenomenon
'
in relation to
is
which
all
mental phenomena are apprehended

is
a unity, yet
distinct
from every other,

for
and consciousness,
if it
be used as a general term

is
describing these phenomena,
a unity only
in
the
sense of being one
name which belongs
to a great

things,
158
[part
ii.
many
and
in this
sense
it
is
evident that
it
cannot be regarded as a single authority.
This
be,
is
equally true
if
consciousness
is
taken to
as
it
might perhaps be maintained that Sir

in this
William Hamilton
connection intends
it
to be,
a general name for our acts of intuitive judgment. This use of the word certainly excludes the notion
of consciousness being set up as a kind of separate
faculty,
but then
it
also excludes the idea of con-
sciousness testifying to anything.

criterion for the truth of intuitive
Either there
is
no
judgments,
;
in
which
/
case consciousness cannot be that criterion

is
or there
/
criterion,
in
which case
it
must be something
more than a general name by which those judgments

are described.
In the
first case,^
much
of Sir William
Hamilton's language must be regarded as metaphorical,

it
and some of
it
as erroneous
in the
second case,
to
would seem that

I
he
stands
committed
doctrine (which,
to
believe,
he
really held), according
which consciousness
is
regarded as a kind of
judge whose veracity and whose competence are

equally above suspicion.
Now,
it is
evident that a theory of this

is
sort,
by
which consciousness
popular morality
do, just as
raised to a position in philoin
sophy similar to that which conscience occupies

this telling us
what we ought
to
that
tells
us what
we ought
to believe
cannot be proclaimed without immediately provok*
Cf. Lectures, p.
5.
CHAP.
VIII.]
:
&c.
159
ing three questions

exist
?
First,
Does such an authority
Second,
Why
it tell
ought
we
it
to
?
beHeve
I
it ?
Third,
first
What
does
us to believe
waive the
of these questions, though
raises points of
much might be said, and I pass on to the second. Why ought we to believe Sir William Hamilton is in no way embarrassed it ?
great interest about which
for
an answer, indeed,
five,
in the
Dissertation
is
'
he gives
list
:
no less than
1.
of which the following
>/Uj
,J^
i
Consciousness ought to be presumed to be
true
till it is
proved to be
false.
V\/
^
2.
Some
The
of the data of consciousness cannot
b,^
/\
doubted, because the doubt would annihilate

3.
itself.^
data of consciousness have the negative

i.e.,
proof of consistency,
so far as at present appears
they have never been proved inconsistent with each

other.^
4.
If
they are untrue, then
we must have been
deliberately deceived
5.
by a perfidious Creator.^
To
doubt consciousness involves a contra-
diction.^
With regard
a creed
is
to the first of these proofs,
it is
only
necessary to say that some more solid foundation for

required than that the rules of debate,
according to Sir William Hamilton's interpretation

of them, throw the burden of proof on the objector.
The second
'
proof
is
not strictly speaking a proof

'
Pp. 743, 745. ^ Pp. 743, 745-
P. 744.
'
'
P. 745-
P- 754.
i6o
A DEFENCE OF PHILOSOPHIC DOUBT.is
[part
ii.
that the authority of consciousness

it is
to
be trusted
rather, in so far as
it
is
sound, an assertion that

is
in
some
cases that authority

its
not required
that
it
certain of
utterances are intrinsically certain.

first, is
The
third proof, like the
of too negative
at
a character to
make
it
worth while discussing

it
any length
at the best,
only removes a hypo-
thetical objection.
The fourth
proof has been,
imagine, sufficiently
dealt with in the remarks
made above in the
course of
the discussion on the ordinary view of the argument
from
will
common
fifth
sense.^
in Mill's
'
Some additional
Examination,'
observations
be found
p. 164.
The
argument has the peculiarity of not

unsound, but of being so on
only being
intrinsically
the evidence of Sir William Hamilton himself, given
a few pages previously.
On
p.
754 he asserts that
to doubt the truth of consciousness

to
when
'
it
testifies
its
what he elsewhere
is
calls
a fact
*
beyond
own
ideal existence,'
last
tantamount to
belief
is
believing that the
ground of
all
not to be believed, which

p.
is self -contradictory!
While, on
*
744, he assures
in this
us truly enough that

. .
.
doubt does not
case
refute
itself.
// is not suicidal by self-contra-
diction!
If self-contradiction is suicidal, the vitality
of Sir William Hamilton's

ticular
opinions
on
this
par-
point can hardly be such as to
make any
lengthened discussion of them necessary.^

*
See ante,
p. 151.
Vide
Mill's
Examination of Hmnilton,
p. 158.
CHAP.
VIII.]
proofs,
it
&c.
i6i
These
will
be recollected, are proofs
at the second
remove of judgments which, though

'
they were originally pronounced to

evidence
are
*
carry their
own
and
to
necessitate their
own
admission,'
many
first
of them, in reality, open to doubt.
We
called
are
called
upon
to believe these truths

:
on the
authority of consciousness
and we are now
upon
to believe
the authority of consciousness on
the strength of the five somewhat inadequate reasons.
But now the question
arises,
By what means
are
we
to discover the
?
judgments to which conscious-
ness certifies
question.
Instead, however, of answering this
Sir
William
Hamilton
answers
quite
another one, namely.
What
are the marks by which

?
we may
discover those judgments which are original

it
Whence,
and that
would appear, that he considers that
all
deliverances of consciousness are original judgments,

all
original
judgments are deliverances of
consciousness.
Before examining what grounds he
may have
much
for such
an opinion,
'
must say one word

round which
on the meaning of the word
original,'
confusion has arisen in connection with this
subject in the writings of

'
judgment,
The word original,' may be legitimately used

distinct,
It
more than one author. when applied to a belief or

in
two senses,
either
which are perfectly

always
though they are not

that
is
distinguished.
first
may mean
which stands
in
order of logic, that which
premiss, but not a conclusion, or that which stands
i62

in
[part
ii.
first
order of time, that which (to put

in the chain of
it
more
not a
strictly),
phenomena governed by
a
cause, but
all
is
psychological laws,
product.
rest
may be
When
it is
said that
proof must finally
on
original propositions
is
which are not themselves
proved, the term

it
used
in its first
is
meaning
when
intelli-
is
said that 'necessity
a criterion which will
enable us to distinguish an original datum of
gence from a result of generalisation and custom,'^

it is
used in
its
second meaning.
it
Mr.
in the
Mill, as will
appear
directly, habitually uses
second sense,
and seemed
In
I
to think that
Hamilton did the same.
this, I think,
he was mistaken.
Hamilton used
it,
believe, in both senses (though without distinguish-
ing between them), and, on the whole,
more
to
fre-
quently in the
first
sense than in the second.
On what
original
grounds
then
(to
return
our
argument) does Sir William Hamilton identify our
judgments (according to either

'original')
definition of
the
word
?
with the deliverances of consciousI
ness
He gives
no reason himself; and as
know
nothing but what can be gathered from his writings

respecting the nature of that internal authority, not
even the
any.
fact of its existence, this omission,

it
am
unable to supply
But
is
evident, destroys the
value of the whole argument from
common
sense.
Grant that consciousness
is
shown
to be trustworthy
by the
five
^
arguments, and that original judgments

Cf.
Hamilton's Lectures, pp. 268, 270.

''
CHAP.
VIII.J
&c.
163
may be
by
unless
recognised by the four marks^ enumerated
Sir William Hamilton,
how
are
we advanced,
judgments are
we know
Perhaps
I
that
the
original
identical with those
which are
shall
certified
by consciousemployed
ness
be told that their identity
follows from the definition of the terms
that original judgments
and deliverances of con-
same thing, because the two expressions mean the same thing or to put it techsciousness must be the
;
nically, that their ^<?-notation
cannot be different since

If this really
their con-x\.oX2X\ovi
it
is
identical.
be
so,
is
plain that Sir William

'
Hamilton used one or

'
other of the terms

in
consciousness
and
original
I
an altogether
different sense
If
from that which
have supposed.
'
we
are to identify in meaning

'
deliverance of consciousness
with what
is
properly
an original judgment, then consciousness cannot be
an authoritative faculty
are to identify
'
if,
on the other hand, we

'
original
judgment
then
'
with judgment
delivered
by
authority,
original
judgment
must
logic,
signify
something different from either ^^^5^/ in
ox first in causation.
On
the
first
is
of these
suppositions,
its
consciousness
dethroned from
by which dignity, and

for certain
serves merely to furnish a general
name
of our convictions (those namely which are original),

I
wish to
know what
is
meant by such an assertion

of,
as this
that
consciousness assures us
^
or gives
Dissertation, P 754
i64
[part
ii.
testimony
thing
own existence, and beyond its own existence?^

to, its
it
also to
If this
someis
not
language gratuitously metaphorical,

that consciousness
is
clearly implies
an authority which can give

;
us two kinds of information
information,
namely,
about
itself,
which Hamilton says we cannot doubt,

else,
and information about something

us
which he
tells
we can
doubt.
What, again,
is
meant by
telling
us that 'the credibility of consciousness
must be
determined by the same maxims as the credibility of
any other witness'^ if consciousness be a mere And, finally, what plausibility unity ? fictitious
remains
in the
reasons by which Hamilton tries to

is
persuade us that consciousness
veracious
If
consciousness be an authority implanted in us for
our guidance, there
may be some
reason (on the
Theistic hypothesis of the universe) for supposing

that
it
it is
inconsistent with the Divine veracity that
should be otherwise than trustworthy.

for
But what
shadow of reason can there be
making the Deity
specially responsible for certain beliefs solely because
they do not happen to be produced by
known
?
psychological laws, or because no other reason for
accepting them happens to be forthcoming
And
why are
such laws to be presumed true

false, like
till
they are
proved to be
able witness
the utterances of a respect-
who
has never been detected in an

if
untruth
*
These reasons are bad
the
P. 749.
common
Cf. Dissertation, p. 745.
CHAP,
viii.]
is
&c.
165
sense philosophy
founded upon the existence of

;
a single subjective authority

founded, they cease,
I
but
if
it
is
not so
think,
even to be specious.
The
ton's
difficulties
on the opposite view of Hamilless serious.
meaning are perhaps not

to
He
never scruples
talk
of
fundamental
bases
of
beliefs,^
primary
beliefs,^
original
knowledge,^
original (as
&c.,
opposed
to derivation) convictions,"^ &c.,
when an argument founded

*
solely
upon the
authority of consciousness would

talk of
is
require
him
to
it
the deliveran.ee of consciousness.'
And
all
hardly conceivable that he should so far ignore

these
the proper use of language as to employ
terms, every one of which naturally implies originality in
one of
its
two legitimate meanings, as merely
signifying that which emanates from consciousness
regarded as a subjective authority.

I
believe,
then,
that
in
his exposition
is
of the
;
common
I
sense philosophy there
an ambiguity but
is
further hold that this ambiguity
essential to the
I
plausibility of that celebrated
system, otherwise
should not have so long detained the reader over

the matter.
ton
one.
Tlê problem that Sir William Hamilto
desired
solve
was a
perfectly
legitimate
He
found certain
beliefs,
those
respecting
the existence of our actual conscious state, which no

sceptic
had questioned.
*
He
found others whose

' '
P. 743P. 743.
P. 742.
P. 754.
'
i66
A DEFENCE OF PHILOSOPHIC DOtfBT.

it
[part
ii.
truth
was scarcely
which
less desirable to raise
beyond
at
?
suspicion,
scepticism
had
made,
to
least
It
theoretically doubtful.
What was
as
it
be done
seemed as impossible to find anything like a reason

for these
convictions
was
to give
them up
because no reason was forthcoming.
The Kantian
device for getting over the difficulty never seems to
have been understood by him

the beliefs were innate was
merely to say that

but the scheme
out of fashion since

left
Locke
which
nothing therefore was
have just been considering.
Ask a common
all
sense philosopher of the Hamlltonian school what
he believes, and he
tells
you that he believes
the original convictions of
mankind
tells
ask him
that
It
why
beIt
he believes them, and he
you
Is
cause they are deliverances of consciousness.

is
because
some of the
not, considered
original
convictions
of
mankind are
sciousness
by themselves, beyond
authority of con;
the reach of scepticism, that the

is
invoked
in their behalf
it is
because
no mere
faculty
reflection
on the nature of that imaginary

are
Its
can
it
make known what

is
deliver-
ances, that
necessary to take for granted that
they are Identical with the original convictions of
mankind.
Some
of the confusion and ambiguity
incident to Hamilton's exposition of the theory are
therefore really necessary to
its plausibility.
If
you
improve his statement, you destroy

always supposing that his system
is
his
I
system
as
have repre-
CHAP.
VIII.]
&c.
167
sented
it.
On
this point,
however,
admit
it,
may-
have been mistaken.

is
Mr.
be,
Mill's version of
which
;
very
to
different,
this,
may
after
all,
the correct one

say,
and
which,
strange to
he not only
attributed to
Reid, to Hamilton, and to the philo-
sophic world at large, but also fully accepted himself,

I
now
address myself.
To many the
graph
will
last
sentence of the preceding para-
seem a paradox.
That Mr.
Mill,
who
has criticised the Hamiltonian theories at length,
and who
Sense
in the chapter
devoted to the
declared
that
Common
he
Philosophy,'
differed
has
and
he
Hamilton
on the most important question

that
about which
philosophers were divided,
should really hold the philosophic opinions which
he attributes to
prise.
It
is,
his opponent,
may
easily excite sur-
nevertheless, true.
He
agreed with
to
what he considered the philosophy of Hamilton

be
;
and where he
differed
from him was not on a
point of philosophy, but on a question
whose
interest,
which
admit to be great,
is
almost purely psycho-
logical.
His theory was
this.
The
premises^ of
all
knowledge consist of immediate and
intuitive beliefs.
Some
those
of these immediate and intuitive beliefs are
we have
1
concerning our
own
actual subjective
Examination of Hamilton,
p. 151.
i68
A. DE:fe:NCE:
^
OF PHILOSOPHIC DOUBT,
[part
II.
states
but there are, or

credit,^
may
be, others not less

*
worthy of
which are described as

in
^
facts
which have been

ning,'
*
consciousness from the begin*
the original elements of mind,'
our original
exist,
beliefs.'^
That these judgments,

to think
if
they
are
to
be trusted he did not doubt himself, and he

that
seemed
to him,
no other philosopher could
have doubted.
The
real difficulty arises, according
when
the question comes to be discussed as

original beliefs are
:
to
what these
and
it
was on
this
point that
he thought the philosophic world was
divided into two great parties, according as they
pursued one or other of two methods, which he
names respectively the psychological and the

spective.
intro-
The former of these consists in rejecting from among the list of apparently original beliefs all
those to which the operation
of the law
of the
association of ideas or (I presume)

logical law,
any other psychowould give an appearance of immediatethe

latter,
ness
or
necessity:
in
accepting these
attributes as conclusive proof that the convictions to
which they belonged were part of the original furniture of the mind.
If the
philosophic
world really were divided
mainly on
this point, the small progress that philo-
sophy has made would cease

in reality, the
*
to
be surprising.
For,
question
'^
is
one
chiefly of psychological
P.
1.
51.
P. 172.
P. 178.
P. 157.
P. 173.
CHAP.
VIII.]
little
&c.
i6g
interest,
and has
direct bearing
on philosophy
properly understood.
fact, I
As a
matter of mere historic
should be unwilling to admit that the marks

original
by which
judgments are to be discerned

battle-
have been universally considered the chief
ground of philosophy, though
this
is
not the occasion

I
on which to discuss the question.
am
rather con-
cerned with discovering whether Mr. Mill's view of

the foundation of knowledge, taken even in connection with the psychological
solid philosophical results.
method, can furnish any
But before doing

effectively,
it is
so,
or rather in order to do so
necessary to determine in what sense
he uses the word consciousness.

the ultimate beliefs which
As we have
seen,
may
or rather must be
accepted with confidence are, according to him, of
two kinds
the beliefs
we have
respecting our
own
actual mental states,
and the
beliefs, if any,
which
are part of the original furniture of the mind.

frequently asserts that
belief
He
we
hold both these kinds of
on the authority of consciousness.
Are we
I
then to attribute to him the theory which

attributed to Sir William
have
I
Hamilton
the
theory,
mean, that consciousness
is
an internal witness which
must be distinguished
statements to which
it
like other witnesses

certifies ?
I
from the
think not.
He
used the language
in this
respect of the
common
sense philosophy, language sanctioned by general

philosophic tradition
;
but as the
fiction
suggested
I70

it
[part
ii.
by
will
is
not in any
way
necessary to his system,
it
be more convenient to assume that he did not

it.
believe In
The
as
I
reason
why an
authoritative con-
sciousness
is
a necessary part of the
common
sense
philosophy
is,
have explained above, because
the aim of that philosophy was to obtain proof for

certain
judgments about which scepticism

all
is
possible.
if
Mr. Mill was of opinion that

such
exist,
original beliefs,
stand on the same level of certainty as

:
our beliefs respecting our actual states of mind
and
about these he was of opinion that scepticism was

impossible.
that
Now
it
is
evidently superfluous to say

conscious-
we
believe that
ness
tells
us that
we feel cold because we feel cold. Even If

it
these two
of,
statements asserted different things instead
as
they really do, the same thing,
is
obvious that
what
in point of
form appears here as the premiss
can add nothing to the certainty of what in point of
form appears here as the conclusion

anything which
feelings
it is
and thus
In
to
adduce the testimony of consciousness

is
favour of
as
certain
as
our Immediate
must always be superfluous.

Mr.
Moreover,
not, according to
is
Mill, consciousness
whose
authority
thus indisputable, whatever occasional

to the contrary, but only con^
*
phrases
may imply
'
sciousness
in its pristine purity,'

:
before
Its
original
its
revelations have been overlaid
'
consciousness in
developed, and therefore corrupted condition, being
P. 171.
CHAP.
VIII.]
&c.
171
capable apparently of any amount of deception.

that
if
So
the
we
are to credit
him with the
'
independent
all
authority' theory of consciousness, besides
other difficulties in the
way
of that theory which
have been, or might

to
be, enumerated,
he would have
overcome the presumption which Sir William

-^
Hamilton says
must
lie
against any witness deIf,
tected in error \falsus in uno.falsus in 07nnibics.

in addition to all these objections,
it is
recollected that
the theistic or teleological assumption, which really

lies at
the root of the
common
sense philosophy, was

it
wholly foreign to Mr. Mill's modes of thought,

will
be admitted,
think, that
am
not illegitimately
if I
improving the substance of his teaching
venture
always to describe as 'original beliefs' or 'judgments,'
what he occasionally
*
calls
'
the
or
*
'
revelations
of consciousness,' or the
genuine
original de-
liverances of consciousness.'
The
let
'
nature of his theory being thus determined,

its
us next turn to the question of
value.
first
Could we try the experiment of the
confirst
sciousness in any infant,' says Mr. Mill,^ 'its

reception of the impression
we
call external,
what-
ever was present in that
first
consciousness would be
(^.e.y
the genuine testimony of consciousness"

as
I
would,
'
should say, be an original judgment),

entitled to credit,
and
would be as much would be as

^
indeed there
it,
little
possibility of discrediting
2
as our
.
Dissertation on Reid, p. 746.
p^ j^^^
172
A DEFENCE OF PHlLOSOPMtC DOUBT:
[partis
sensations themselves.
But we have no means of

direct
now
ascertaining
by
evidence whether
we
were conscious of outward
and
external
objects
when we
first
opened our eyes
to the light.
is
That
in
a belief or knowledge of such objects

consciousness
muscles,
is
our
now whenever we
for
use our eyes or

it
no reason
concluding that
was
any
there from
the beginning, until

it
we have
settled the
If
question whether
was brought
in since.
mode can be
pointed out in which within the comit
pass of possibility
the hypothesis
might have been brought
in,
must be examined and disproved

consciousness.
before
tion
is
we
are entitled to conclude that the convicof
an original deliverance
The proof that any

or Principles of
of the alleged Universal Beliefs,
Common
Sense, are affirmations of

:
consciousness, supposes two things

exist,
that the beliefs
and that there are no means by which they

this
could have been acquired.'
From
very remarkable extract, which con-
tains explicitly or implicitly the
whole psychological
theory of ultimate beliefs

explain,
it
have just endeavoured to
is
clear, as
before stated, that a belief
may
be either of the highest conceivable certainty,

all,
or of no certainty at
according as
it
has or has
:
not been in consciousness from the beginning
i.e,,
according to whether pyschological laws have not

or have been concerned in
its
production.
this
The
grounds,
however,
on
which
very singular
CHAP.
VIII.]
is
&c.
173
doctrine
based are not so
plain.
Why
are our
earliest beliefs elevated to this exceptional dignity?
Why are we
to regard infants as (at least potentially)

in
occupying the place

Councils and
faith
?
matters of reason which

in
Popes have claimed

if
matters of
this
And
infants are to
into
be credited with
unerring
insight
the
mysteries which have

to
if
puzzled philosophers, are

to the lower animals
?
we
deny the same

are,
gift
?
And
we
;
why
are
we
These are some of the means the only

and so
duced.
cal
first
questions which the
pyschological theory suggests

ones.
Beliefs
but they are by no
which have been the

association of ideas,
product of pyschological laws

forth
are,
it
appears, on a
much lower
level
of certainty than those which have not been so pro-
But why has the action of those pyschologi-
laws so
much more
pernicious an effect upon their

?
products than the operation of any other laws
Mr.
Mill and the thinkers of his school would be the last
persons to deny that the most original of
all beliefs,
those which have been in consciousness since conciousness was, are

are
still
produced by some laws.

fortunate
in
Why
their
these laws
so
much more
operation than those which, by a conventional classification,
are regarded as specially mental, that
we
may
regard their results as
having attained
I
'
the cer-
tainty which
we
call perfect.'^
neither Mr. Mill nor the great
tell, and body of philosophers
cannot
P. 152.
174
[part
ii.
which according to him shares his opinion on point, appear willing or able to do so.
this
Now
ation of
let
us turn for a
moment from
the consider-
how we know
in the
first
that beliefs which are original
are specially certain, to the question of

to
how we come
know
instance that they are original.
In their
mode
of dealing with this problem lay, in
Mr.
Mill's opinion, the special glory of the school to

It consisted,
which he belonged.
ing to pyschology
'
he thought,
in adapt-
the
known and approved methods

more particularly
in
of physical science,'^ and
bringing
*
to light the original elements of consciousness
as
residual
phenomena, by a previous study of the

Against
pyschological method/
I
modes
of generation of the mental facts which are

^
not original.'
this
when confined
say.
I
to pyschology,
have not a word

it
to
all
am
perfectly ready to admit that
has
the merits which
may
is,
appertain to the
'
;
'
known and
but what
I
approved methods of physical science

wish to point out
pyschology,
the
first
it
that though
it
may
give us a
In of
can never give us a philosophy.
place, the
known and approved methods

it is
physical science unfortunately take for granted

of the judgments which
most
is
the pressing business of

it
philosophy to establish, and which therefore,

evident, cannot be proved
by
that
method without
if
arguing
in
circle.
In the second place, even
these scientific assumptions were established by

'
some
P. 173.
""
Ibid.
CHAP.
VIII.]
still
&c.
175
Other means,
no
belief
shown by
us,
this
method
to
be original can be ultimate for

the fact
is
is
simply because
one that has to be shown.
Grant that
it
original,
and then, may

but as
be,
'
there would be as
as our sensations
little
possibility of discrediting
'
;
It
themselves
we can never know

much
that
It
was
fact
original without a previous argument, the fact,

It
If
be,
does not help us
nearer to the founda-
tions of a creed.
To
But
Mr.
Mill's hypothetical
baby
no doubt
its
first
impressions
to us
ground of belief
of the
may supply a solid who have to arrive at a

science,' this
knowledge of what these are by the laborious use

'
approved methods of physical

Is,
circumstance
value,
philosophically speaking, of small

little
and can afford us but
consolation.
There seem,
original beliefs.
for
therefore, to be three fatal objec-
tions to a philosophy founded
upon the authority

is
of,
In the
first
place, there
no ground
supposing that original beliefs are particularly

serve as the foundation of a creed
is
;
fitted to
in the
second place, .there
no ground for supposing that
acquired beliefs are particularly unsulted for such a
purpose
and, in the third place,
it
Is
Impossible to
determine what beliefs are original and what are

acquired without assuming the truth of
positions
many
pro-
whose only evidence can on
this
theory be
that they are original.

I
shall,
perhaps, be told that though Mr. Mill
attaches
In
theory this absolute certitude to our
176

beliefs,
[part
ii.
original
yet that
in
practice
he supposed
himself to require as a foundation for his inferred

beliefs
no immediate knowledge but that which the

its
is
mind has of
deny that
it
own
states.
admit the
It
fact,
but
any defence.
relieves him,
no
doubt, from the charge of practically committing the

logical error pointed out in
my
third objection, but
at the cost of falling into

still.
one of greater magnitude
He
cannot be accused of founding his creed
on judgments proved by the psychological method

to
be
original,
and therefore
method,
in
true,
simply because
opinion,
the psychological
his
showed
that no judgments are original.
His philosophy of
ultimate beliefs, therefore,

if
was not only unsound, but

useless.
sound
it
would have been
My
complaint
against him, however, does not end there.
That
the philosophy which
he speculatively maintained
should be incapable of solving the problems which
most press
for solution is bad,
but
it
is
worse that
the philosophy to which he adhered in practice should
ignore the very existence of these problems.
And
here
think Sir William Hamilton
is
greatly his
superior.
The Common Sense
Philosophy, whatever
all
be
its
shortcomings, and they are many, was at
events constructed with a view to our actual necessities.
It
recognised,
fact
in
a more or less confused
manner, the
truth
that
most of the judgments whose

sort of proof for
we
habitually
;
assume are not beyond the reach
of scepticism
that
some
them
is
CHAP.
VIII.]
&c.
177
therefore required, and that none of the usual proofs
from experience are sound.

consciousness whose veracity
The
is
hypothesis of a
in
some way
in-
volved
in that of the Deity, in their favour, is
and which
shall give its
testimony
not one perhaps very
well calculated to stand hostile criticism, but at

rate, if true,
it
any
would go some way towards solving
the difficulty.
To
the psychological school, on the
other hand,
there
it
hardly seems to have occurred that
was a
difficulty to
be solved.
Their psycho^
logy so overshadows their philosophy that
they have once discovered to their

a thing
when satisfaction how
came
to be believed, they
seem comparatively
If only
indifferent as to the
far,
more important questions of how

to
and why,
it
'
ought
be believed.
they
can apply the
approved methods of physical science'
to the discovery of the genesis of mental
phenomena,
difficulties
they take a very optimistic view of the
which attach
to the proof of the principles

*
on which
*
the legitimate application of the
approved methods
must
cussed
finally
depend.
One example
of their easy
acceptance of insufficient proof
when
I have already diswas dealing with the law of Universal
Causation.
difficulties
A still
more remarkable case of ignoring

in the criticism
remains to be treated of
which follows on the psychological theory of the

external world.
178
[part
ii.
CHAPTER
Berkeleian Idealism
haps, most quickly
IX.
~
PSYCHOLOGICAL IDEALISM.
is
of
all
speculative theories
concerning the external world the one which, per-
and
philosophic enquirer.
commends itself to the The greater number of persons

easily
who dabble
so
in
such subjects have been idealists at

lives if they
one period of their

;
have not remained

call
and many more, who would not
themselves
idealists,
are nevertheless of opinion that though the

is
existence of matter
is
a thing to be believed
it is
in, it
not a thing which
possible to prove.
The
causes of this popularity are, no doubt, in part, the
extreme simplicity of the reasoning on which the

theory
rests, in
part
its
extreme
plausibility, in part,
is
perhaps, the nature of the result which
commonly
thought to be speculatively interesting without being

practically inconvenient.
For
it
has to be observed,
that the true idealist that his system,

contradicts
is
not necessarily of opinion
properly understood, in any

sense.
;
way
common
It destroys,
no doubt, a
is
belief in substance
but then substance
a meta:
physical
phantom conjured up by a vain philosophy
CHAP.
(-
IX.]
life it
179
the Matter of ordinary
supposes
I
itself to
leave
untouched.
That the things
see with
my
eyes
I
and touch with
my
hands do
exist, really exist,
make
not the least question.
The
only thing whose
existence
we deny
is
that which philosophers call
Matter, or corporeal substance.

this there is
And
it.' ^
'
in
doing of
no damage done
says
to the rest of
I
mankind,
with
who,
daresay, will never miss
affirm,
confidence,'
(i.e.,
Mr.
Mill,
'that
this
conception
the idealistic one) of matter includes the whole

to
it
by the common world, apart from philosophical and sometimes from theological,
meaning attached
theories.''^
But though
idealist philosophers
have said
Plain
this,
the world has never believed them.
men have
question
continued to think that something more
is in
than a metaphysical invention, about which they

neither
know nor
care anything
and that
in losing
substance they would lose something essential to

their idea of the
scheme
of the universe.
I
This
is
an opinion which
also share
and
it
is
to Idealism considered
this point of
from
this point of view,

I
and
view alone, that
wish to direct the
reader's attention in this chapter.

fore, at least,
There
are, there-
two important controversies connected

I
with this theory which
shall not discuss,
shall
not discuss either the real nature of the object of

^
Berkeley, Principles of Human Knowledge^ Part

2
i.
35.
Examination of Hamilton^
p. 227,
i8o

is
[part
ii.
perception, which
what
especially occupied Berke-
ley, nor the psychological account of the origin of
our
belief
in
matter,
I
which
is
what
especially
interested Mr. Mill.
am
prepared, for the sake of
argument, to assume, with the former, that
we know
and senneither a
and can know

sations,^
directly only our
own
ideas
and with the
latter that
any
belief in the
is
existence of an external reality which sensation nor a possibility of sensation,

of the laws of the association of ideas.
is
the product
is
There
also
a third subject which

dealing with
shall
absolve myself from
mean
the constructive side of Beris
keley's philosophy.
As
well known, he replaced
the material world by the Divine

in this the
Mind
this
it,
and found
permanent substance which ordinary men

But though
theory
yet
it
sought
for in matter.
is
as
good as many which have succeeded

not
fulfil
does
the conditions which limit the discussions

:
in this essay
it
has had no appreciable influence on

speculation.
I
the current of
modern English
on one
side,
shall,
therefore, put this
and
shall confine
my
criticisms to the Idealistic
Theory, on what
may be
called
its
negative or destructive side.

thesis
it is
I
The
one, and
if
wish to maintain
:
is
a very simple
this
Received science cannot be true

:
the idealistic account of the universe be accurate

is
nor
the
;
discrepancy between
is
the
two merely
and can be
verbal
it
fundamental and
essential,
'
Berkeley usually describes them both as
ideas.'
CHAP.
IX.]
artifices of
i8i
bridged over by no mere
terminology.
I I
That there
no proof.
is
a verbal discrepancy requires,
imagine,
Natural science (of which alone

the
am here
of
speaking) assumes
Independent
existence
matter
this
In all its utterances.

Is
theory which denies
independent existence
undoubtedly therefore
;
In />rimd /acze contrdidiction
with Natural science and

Is,
the question
we have
to determine
whether under
or
Is
this superficial contradiction there
is
not a real
and substantial harmony.

confounding with
liable to
Now we
must beware of
it is
this question
another with which
be mixed up
namely, whether
Idealism
is
or
If
is
not consistent with our ordinary experience.
we admit the legitimacy of the Ideal psychology if we admit that objects as perceived may be resolved
into ideas or sensations, there
last
is
no doubt that
this
question must be answered In the affirmative.

is,
That
we may suppose
Idealism to be true without
being obliged to suppose that

hear, or feel
we should
either see,
under any circumstances what we should

if
not see, hear, or feel
independent matter existed.
Supposing, therefore, that Science consisted in

nothing more than a series of propositions asserting
what, under given conditions, our experience would
be, there
it
might be no fundamental discord between

If,
and Idealism.
'
for
example, as Berkeley de-
clares,^
the question whether the earth

In reality to
^
moves or
to wit,
no,
amounts
no more than
this
Principles of Human Knowledge^
58.
i82

to
[part
ii.
"
whether we have reason
conclude from what has

if
been observed by astronomers, that

in
we were
placed
such and such a position and distance both from
the earth and sun
we
should perceive the former to
move/'
'
&c.,
no doubt astronomy and the theory But
under discussion might easily be harmonised.

in truth Science
much more than this. It tells us not only what we should perceive if we were rightly circumstanced to perceive it, but also how it comes about that we should perceive that particular
does
thing and no other, and what
it is
that
would hapus that
pen or has happened whether we or anybody else

were there
which was
to perceive
it
or not.
It tells
perceiving organisms were

itself
evolved from a world
neither perceiving nor perceived,
and
that processes take place within that world which,

like the
elements of which
it
is
composed, are too

in
subtle to be
cases, to
apprehended by sense, or even,

in imagination.
some
it
be represented
In short,
asserts the existence of a vast machinery,
composed
figured,
of that
inert, senseless,
extended,
solid,
moveable substance existing without the mind,' which

Berkeley declares
^
to be a contradiction in terms,
infinite
and which causes, among an

effects,
number
of other
our perception of
itself.
If this
be not
in direct irreconcilable contradiction
with a theory which
asserts
the
existence of no
causes besides spirits and no effects besides ideas,

*
Principles of Human
K7tow ledge,
67.
CHAP.
IX.]
183
then such a thing as contradiction does not exist in

the world.
is still
But
if
(which
hardly think) any reader
unconvinced on
this point, let
him
try to state
the doctrine of Evolution in ideal language
withThe
mind
*
out of course postulating the Deity,
whom
Berkeley
would have introduced

attempt
will,
I
to save the situation.
think, leave
is
no doubt on
his
that Mr. Spencer
right
when he
'
declares that
if
Idealism be true. Evolution
(for
Evolution
we may
remarks
in the
read Science)
'
is
a dream.*
Perhaps
I
It
will
be objected that
In these
have only dealt with Psychological Idealism

In
form
which Berkeley
It
left it
and that
have not
I
done
justice to
even
all
in this
shape, since
have
omitted to consider
the constructive part which,

little
though
Its
It
has received
attention subsequently,
I
originator considered essential to his scheme.
am
quite prepared to admit that there
Is
some
force
In these criticisms,
and
also that Berkeley's version
of the system
Is
the less likely to be In
harmony
his
'
with Science, from the fact that he seems to have
regarded
the
*
scientific
hypothesis
'
of
own
to
day
the
corpuscular philosophy
and
the me-
chanical
principles
which
have
been
Mr.
applied
accounting for phenomena,'

approval.^
is
with
to
a very lukewarm
Mill,
Let us turn then

all
above
things
the
philosopher
of
who men of
science,
and observe whether

1
his statement of the

^
Principles of Hjiman
Knowledge
50.
84

is
[part
il-
case
more agreeable
to ordinary science
than that
of his theological predecessor.
At
first
sight there
seems a promise of reconciliation
in his
language, for
verbally at least, he recognises the existence of a
permanent something which may serve as a substitute
for
matten
The
external
world which
is
dealt with
by natural science
consisted, according to
to
Berkeley, in ideas.
sists
According
Mr. Mill
it
con-
of sensations and permanent possibilities of sen-
sation.^
An
;
object
when
it
is
perceived
may be may
resolved into sensations phis permanent possibilities

of sensation
an object when
it is
not perceived
be resolved into permanent

alone.
possibilities of sensation
What
sensations
mean
is
tolerably plain, whether
the partial resolution of a perceived object into
them
perif
be legitimate or not
sensation
?
But what are
possibilities of
And
in
what sense can they be
manent
Mr. Mill habitually speaks of them as

in the
they could exist

entities exist.
same sense
in
which positive
But
is
this surely is
till
an entire delusion.
actuality.
A
It
possibiHty
nothing
it
becomes an
will be something, or
future time, but, until
may be something at some then, it is nothing. You may

it
verbally indeed give a kind of present being to a

future sensation
exists now.
by saying that the

is
possibility of
it
But there
this phrase.
*
no
reality in
nature corre-
sponding to
sensation must either be

p. 248.
Examination of Hamilton^
CHAP.
IX.
;
185
or not be
is not.
and
if it is
only a possibility,
it
certainly
universe therefore which consists of such
possibilities is
a universe which for the present does

all
;
not exist at
it
is
a verbal
fiction,
and cannot
form the subject-matter of any science deserving the
name.
Mr. O'Hanlon, whose criticism on

nately,
nation,'
I
Mill, unfortu*
only
know from
the note in Mill's
Examitaken,
per-
from which the following extract

these
is
states
the difficulty in
terms
'
:
Your
manent
are not
possibilities of sensation are, so

felt,
long as they
nothing actual.
them,
'
Yet you speak of change

evident, though this
taking place in
and that independently of

it
our consciousness
^
;
and
is
Mr. O'Hanlon does not add, that unless change

in
something outside
consciousness
be possible,
science, as
we know
meet
this
'
it,
cannot
?
exist.
How
refers
does
'
Mr.
Mill
objection
to
He
is
his
young antagonist generally

subject in the
text
;
what
said on the
I
from which, as far as
able to judge, the following quotation
am may be most
conveniently selected as containing the essence of
what Mr.
his answer.
Mill
'
would have us understand to be
If
body altogether
is
is
only conceived
as a
power of exciting
sensations, the action of
one
body upon another
simply the modification by one

;
such power of the sensations excited by another

to use a different expression, the joint action of
^
or,
two
Examination of Hamilton,
p. 251, note.
i86

It is
[part
ix.
powers of exciting sensations.
easy for anyone

will
competent to such enquiries who

attempt,
to
make
the
understand how one group
of possi-
bilities of sensation can be conceived as destroying
or modifying another such group.'

is
Undoubtedly
it
easy to understand
is
this, if
first
by
possibility of sen-
sation
meant
But
(as
the
to
sentence in the above

sen-
extract
sation.
idealist,
would seem
if
show) power of exciting

this,
Mr. Mill meant

realist.
he was not an
but a
He
must have held that
besides sensations there were permanent powers of
producing sensations
manent
possibilities of sensation
if
inaccurately described as perwhich are to be

all,
' '
distinguished,
they are to be distinguished at

differences from the
by very subtle
substances
of
certain metaphysicians.
As, however, there can be

idealist,
no doubt that Mr. Mill considered himself an
we must suppose
and that
the
'
that
he adopted
this realistic
theory
;
only under the pressure of an immediate objection

in his
ordinary
'
moments he conceived
possibility
it
that
permanence of a
might
satisfy the
requirements of Science since
was a permanence,
it
and the requirements of Idealism since

the permanence of a possibility.
was only
little
Let us look a
more
If
into this matter.
we
say that a barrel of gunpowder constitutes
the permanent possibility of an explosion, what do
we mean ? We mean that in we find a large number of the
a barrel of gunpowder
conditions of an explo-

CHAP.
IX.
187
slon in a permanent form,
and that the other con-
ditions necessary to that effect
may
at
any moment
be supplied.
It
is
perfectly accurate to talk of a
permanent
sensation
possibility of sensation in the

is,
same sense
as equivalent, that
to a set of
permanent causes of
by which, when they are properly supplesensation will

actually be produced.
belief in
mented by causes which are not permanent, but only

occasional, a
But though
Scieruce
may be consistent with a

possibilities, the
is
a world composed of such

of Idealism certainly
not.
teaching
Again, the permanence attributed to the possibilities
of sensation might be a permanence
not of the
If
conditions
by which sensations are produced but
of the laws which regulate their production.
we
conceive a being whose states of mind at successive
moments should occur
strictly in
accordance with law,
but with law acting only between his states of mind,
we
*
might, perhaps, say (though the expression would
not be a happy one) that a given law constitutes a
permanent
possibility'
of his having a particular

exist-
sensation.
But a theory, which should admit the
ence of nothing permanent except

it
in this sense, though would be entirely consistent with Idealism, would
unfortunately be altogether at variance with Science.

'
For any
statement,' says Mr. Mill,^
which can
in
be made concerning material phenomena

the Realistic theory, there
^
terms of
is
an equivalent meaning
p. 246.
Examinatio7i of Hamiltoji,

i88
[part u.
in
terms of sensation and possibilities of sensation.'

this
is.
Let us see how
Here
I
is
a proposition which
:
may The
'
prove convenient for purposes of illustration

candle at which
am
looking produces in
me
certain sensations of light, colour,

in
and shape.'
Stated
terms of the Psychological Theory

:
would run
duce
this proposition
'
The group
of sensation and of perma-
nent possibilities of sensation

in
known
as a candle pro-
me
certain sensations of light, &c.'

is
Now
is,
the
like
candle,
which
here asserted to be a cause,
other perceived objects, constituted (on the Psychological hypothesis)
by two elements
effect
viz.
sensations
of these
not.
and
possibilities of sensation.
Are both
?
necessary
to
produce the
zs
Certainly
One
of them
the
effect.
The
sensations which
the candle produces are part of the candle.
What
produces the sensations must, therefore, be the other

part of the cause
tion.
namely, the
and
to be in
possibilities of sensa-
But the
possibilities of sensation are, ipso facto,
not in
my consciousness,
(to avoid side issues)
we
may suppose them not

So that, though
the cause of
idealistic in its terms,
anybody
else's either.
starting from a proposition professedly
we
are forced to conclude that

colour, &c.,
is
!
my sensation of
something
out
of,
and independent of consciousness
This
that
^
may be
true, but, again,
must point out

it is
it is
not Idealism.
I
On
the contrary,
a kind
Of course
am
spch an expression as
not responsible for the psychology which renders sensation of shape ' permissible.
'
CHAP.
IX.
}^
Realism
(as
189
of Transfigured
say), of
Mr. Spencer would
a particularly absurd type.
For we might
imagine a being so endowed that he could perceive

at
one moment every quality of the candle, which

in that case,
;
would
it
is
evident, consist entirely of

all
sensations
the possibilities of sensation being
conall
verted into actualities.
He
might also perceive
the physiological changes which are the necessary
antecedents of these sensations, and which would
thereby in the same

selves.
way become
clearly
sensations themto say of
Now
it
would
be erroneous
such a being that the immediate causes of the sensations
which constitute
his perception of the candle
were permanent
hypothesis
actualities)
;
possibilities of sensation (since
by
the
possibilities are all

it
converted into
and
would
clearly
be absurd to say that

;
these sensations were self caused
and
it
would be
any
I
altogether impossible to say that they were not caused

at
all.
What
fourth reply could be given on
theory which was both idealistic and scientific
am
unable to imagine.
result
:
So
that
we come
to this final
that
if
we
take a plain scientific proposition
asserting the action of external bodies, or
what are
in
commonly thought
the
first place,
to be- such,
it
on mind, we can,
only express
in
terms of possibilities
of sensation
tion
;
by
attributing to these a realistic significa-
and
in the
second place
if,
as
we have
a perfect
right to do,
all
we
conceive such possibilities of sensation

actualities,
converted into
we cannot
express the
all.
proposition in terms of the psychological theory at
190

*
[part
ii.
But,' the
*
reader may, perhaps, be Indined to
say,
these difficulties are just what might have been
expected.
proposition
tion
The
are
various renderings of the original

all
absurd,
because that proposi-
was an absurd one

I if
to start with.'
;
Extremely
but not at
all
absurd
absurd,
admit,
if
Idealism be true
so.
Science be
And
that
is
just the point.

it
Science cannot get on for an hour unless

to
be allowed
employ propositions of
this kind,
which assert the

Idealism, in the,
action of
some x upon the mind.

x, or in
hands of a true follower of Berkeley, would either
deny the existence of the

the Divine Spirit
;
would
identify
it
with
and
both cases would
make
received Science impossible.
Natural Realism again
would
identify the
x
all
both with the immediate object
of perception and with independent and extended

matter, and, like
present, at
other realistic systems, would
any
rate,
an appearance of harmony with
Scientific doctrine.
But when we ask the Psychodeal with
logical school
how they
the x,
we
can
extract from their teaching nothing but confusion.
They
give us to understand that they are idealists,
that in their opinion the world consists of nothing
besides sensations and possibilities of sensation
and
we
readily accept this as the true idealistic identifica-
tion of the real with the felt.

this identification is consistent
But on asking how

with a science which
nominally at least postulates a world independent of

mind,
we
find that they are forced to convert their
CHAP.
IX.]
191
possibilities into objects
which exist without being
perceived, which can act as causes, which can suffer
change, and which are therefore as Httle ideal as the
most vehement
'But how,'
it
realist
need
desire.
*
may be asked,
if
there
is this
radical
discrepancy between Idealism and Science, happens

it
that so
many
philosophers have accepted the

cast speculative doubts
for the
first,
and yet have never

second
?
upon the
fact
How
a
do you account
that
neither Berkeley nor Mill (to
go no
further) ever
detected
difficulty which,
?
'
if it
exists
at
all,
is
I
sufficiently obvious
One
reason of this oversight
take to be that Idealists have occupied themselves
more with showing

consistent Science.
that their particular system

it
was
consistent with ordinary experience than that
was
of
with the more
remote
conclusions
The
sort of objection
which they chiefly
anticipated, and with reason, was that of the persons
who thought
that
a disbelief in matter ought to
take the form of running up against posts or tumbling

into the water;
and so much of
this objection de-
pends on a gross misconception, that the grain of truth which lies hid in it is easily overlooked.
I
have already pointed out two further reasons

in
which,
the case
of
Berkeley, go far
towards
accounting for his insensibility to a difficulty with
which he several times formally professes to
deal.
The
first
is,
that his scientific beliefs were certainly

Is,
lukewarm, and probably heterodox; the second
192
[part
ii.
that his theology supplied the basis of a possible,
though not of any
actual, science of
phenomena, by
In Mr. Mill's
providing a permanent thinking substance in place

of the matter which he destroyed.
case neither of these reasons hold good.

tific
His scienwhile
it
faith
was fervent and orthodox
is
generally understood that his theological creed, what-
ever
may have been
its
precise nature, did not at
all
events include a belief in an Infinite
Mind who should
be the immediate cause of
all
our sensations.
Mr.
Mill,
however, had sources of error peculiar
to himself.
As
stated in the last chapter, one of
the disturbing elements in his philosophy, which no
doubt largely affected his views on

subject,
this
particular
in the
was the overpowering

truth.
'
interest
he took
genesis of a belief to the exclusion of a thorough
examination into
its
Thus
the main part of
the space devoted (in his

ton') to the Psychological
Examination of Hamiltheory of the external
world
is
occupied, not with discussing the general
philosophic ground and bearings of Idealism, but

in
showing how a
belief in matter originally
into existence.
But, besides this
came more general cause

fallen into, since
of error, there was another special to this question
which Mr. Mill should not have

is
it-
one of a kind he was particularly fond of preaching
against
mean
the error of supposing that because
there exists in language a name, that therefore there
must
exist in
Nature something corresponding to the
CHAP.
IX.]
Because
it
193
name.
is
allowable to speak of a
'
per-
manent
possibility,'
he permitted himself too easily
to think that a world consisting of possibilities of
sensation and these alone, could in any real sense be
permanent,
or, as I
should prefer to say, persistent.

has been sufficiently shown,
It,
I
That
this is not so
hope, in the preceding pages.
therefore, only
remains for those
who
accept Idealism as the one
possible theory of the material world consistent with
Psychological analysis, to choose between the results

of Internal
and those of External observation on
the one hand, or on the other boldly to adopt a creed
which
is
avowedly inconsistent with

I
itself.
In the next two chapters

as
it
shall
examine, so far
is
necessary for
my
purpose, the philosophy of
a thinker,
who though
I
in
a popular discourse he
is
frequently associated w^th Mr. Mill on the points
with which
am
concerned, resembles him but
little
in his teaching.
194
[part
ii.
UNIVERSITY
CHAPTER
X.
THE TEST OF INCONCEIVABILITY.

Mr. Spencer's theory of the grounds
that of Sir William Hamilton,
with,
is
of belief, like
intimately
bound up
view to
and seems
of,
chiefly constructed with a
the proof
the reality of the external world.

I
For
the moment, however,
shall deal with
It
separately,
reserving
till
the next section any reflections which

to in
may. be suggested by the use he has put it supporting the doctrine of what he calls, not
propriately,
'
inap-
Transfigured Realism.'
Sir William Hamilton, as

his initial assumptions
ness.
we have
his
seen, accepts
on
tîe
authority of Conscious-
Mr.
Mill
again
expresses
readiness to
to
accept any belief which can be

*
shown
'
have been
until
in
Consciousness from the beginning
though
that (in his opinion

occurs,
is
apparently) improbable event
content to base his creed on the immediate

its
knowledge the mind has of

practice, therefore,
is
own
states
and
In
truly
an empiricist.
It
But Mr.
Spencer, though anxious that
should be understood
that he defends his doctrine In the interests of the
experience hypothesis,^ can hardly be described as

*
Principles of Psychology^ vol.
ii.
p. 407, note.
CHAP. X.]

in
195
an empiricist
the word
;
any but an
esoteric signification of
since even
for facts
given
in
experience
he requires a warrant, which must be more certain

than they are, because
certainty
is
it is
the test by which their
recognised.
All propositions are to be accepted asûnque

tionable
whose negative
is
is
inconceivable.^
;
Such, in
one sentence,
Mr. Spencers doctrine

is
but the
sentence, though apparently simple,
capable of
to
more than one

able, 'to
interpretation,
and points
*
more
than one possible system of philosophy.
Inconceiv-
begin with,
is
commonly, though
in
in
my opinion
very improperly, used

It
two quite
distinct senses.
may mean
either that
which cannot be believed,

Mr. Spencer^
it
or that which cannot be imagined.
protests against the idea that he uses
in the first
rightly,
or improper sense
and,
it
if I
understand him
he habitually uses
in the
second and correct one.

I
But as the point

which
*
is
somewhat important,
is
must be
permitted to give one or two of the quotations on

this
opinion
based.
is
An
inconceivable proposition
one of which
the terms cannot by any effort be brought into consciousness

asserts
in
that
relation
^
which the proposition

is
between them.'
*
It
one of which
the
subject and predicate cannot be united in the

intuition.'
^
same
And
as an example,
ii.
'
the two sides (of

'^
Principles of Psychology^ vol. 3 p^ 408.
p. 392.
-^
Ibid. p. 407.
Ibid.
196

in
[part
ii.
a triangle) cannot be represented
consciousness as
third
becoming equal
side,
in
their joint length to the
without the representation of a triangle being
destroyed.'
These quotations, which might

it
easily
be multiplied, would seem to make
perfectly clear
that when Mr. Spencer says a thing cannot be conceived,
he means that
in the
it
cannot be imagined or
'
re'
presented
is
mind
indeed the world

in
imagine
one which he actually uses

the other hand,
^ it
'
this connection.^
On
must be admitted that he

inconceivable
I
'
never
hesitates to use
and unthink'
able' as
synonymes so
;
that, if
interpret
him
rightly,
'unthinkable'
and 'unimaginable' must with him

is
be also synonymes, which

the best philosophical
in
not in accordance with
usage.
Again,
he quotes,
order to answer, the hackneyed instance of the
inconceivability of the antipodes
as
if
he thought
in
that the antipodes
had once been inconceivable

But
it
his sense of the word.
is
certain,
appre-
hend, that the antipodes were never unimaginable,
though they were, or are said
to
have been,
incre-
The difficulty can scarcely have been to dible. represent men standing head downwards, though it might have been to believe that, when so standing,
they would not
*
fall
off.^
Mr. Spencer's use of the
Fortnightly Review,
p. 544.
* *
Principles of Psychology, vol. ii. p. 409. Mr. Mill is not fortunate in his language on this point
am
inclined to think he held the right view.
though I See Exam, of Hamilton,

;
pp. 81, 86.
CHAP.
X.]

'
igf
word inconceivable
'
is
not then, in spite of

;
all
his
explanations, perfectly
less
unambiguous
but neverthe-
we may
refers
is
say with certainty that the word with
him
to
some mental
incapacity which
belief,
(he
asserts)
not an incapacity of
and with a
high degree of probability, that

imagination or representation.
it is
an incapacity of
After
doctrine
this
explanation,
let
us
return
it
to
will
the
under discussion, which
states,
be
recollected, that all

is
judgments the negative of which
inconceivable are to be accepted as true.
Now,
its
according to this theory, Is the inconceivability of
negative the ground on which any proposition ought

to
be accepted, or
is
it
simply an attribute which
in fact
belongs to self-evident propositions and to

?
no others
It will
Is
it
a reason, or
is
it
merely a mark
be observed that the whole nature of Mr.
Spencer's philosophy must entirely depend on which

of these alternatives he selects second, then
it
If
he
selects the
all
would only remain
to
examine
the
ultimate propositions on which his creed rests, and

to observe
whether
is
it
is
true that the negative of
each one of them

result of this
inconceivable.
But even
I
if
the
examination were to show (as
appre-
hend
it
would show) that the negative of some of

facility,
them might be conceived with the utmost

this
would
in
no way tend
to invalidate the
his creed rests
;
grounds
it
on which the remainder of
would
simply show that those grounds had been wrongly
198

If,
[part
ii.
described.
alternative,
on the other hand, he selects the

negative
first
and means
to assert that the inconceivais
bility of their
is
the ultimate reason which

it
to
be given
for all his beliefs, then, if

is
can be
beliefs
shown
that this
in
reality
far
no reason, the
he
is
themselves must,
so
as
concerned,
be
ob-
regarded as requiring proof, but not as

tained
it.
having
There
Spencer,
are,
think,
in
some phrases used by Mr.

the
earlier
especially
version
of his
to
argument, which might lead one for a
moment
suppose that he held to the second of these alternatives.
Nevertheless,
shall
assume that the

Postulate
or
first
it
represents his real opinion, because otherwise
is
evident that his Universal

criterion of truth could
ultimate
never be brought forward as
an argument at
opposite
is
all.
If the inconceivability of the

is
merely an attribute which
thought to
attach itself to those ultimate beliefs which neither
have nor require proof, the discovery of

in certain cases will aifect
its
absence
no belief except the one

It can, there-
which asserted
fore,
its
universal presence.
never supply an ultimate ground of conviction,

sinks
into
and
fact
of
secondary philosophic
interest!
We
the
first
must credit Mr. Spencer then with holding

alternative, which, as
the following quota-
tions
may
serve to
indicate,
undoubtedly
fits
'
in
naturally and easily with his habitual language.
To
'
CHAP.
X.]

^
199
assert,'
he
says,
'
the inconceivableness of the neis
gative (of a cognition),
at the
same time
to assert
the psychological necessity

it,
we
are under of thinking
and to give our

'
logical justification for holding it!

it
Again, ^
the
How
do we know that
to
is
?
impossible for
same thing
be and not to be
impossibility
?
What
same
is
our
criterion
of this
Can
this
Sir William
Hamilton assign any other than

ceivability
?
it
incon-
Here,
will
be observed, we have a general
statement of the theory, with a particular example

of
its
application
and from a consideration of these

to quote,
it
and of other passages, too long
would
seem
that Mr. Spencer
regards our incapacity to
perform a certain mental act as the ultimate ground
on which
all
propositions,
to
even those asserting truths

finally to
commonly thought
accepted.
be necessary, are
be
This mental
thinking,
is
act,
have already given reasons
for
;
one of imagination or representation

I
but not to enter into unnecessary controversy,

describe
it
will
in
Mr. Spencer's own words as consistIf
ing in
'
tearing^ asunder states of consciousness.'
this operation
cannot be performed
persist
in
if
the states of
spite of our
consciousness
efforts
cohering,
then,
in
to
disunite
them,
according to
Mr.
Spencer,
^
we have
'"'
not only the highest warrant which

are
Page 407, the
italics
my
own.
p. 344.
Page
425.
Fortnightly Review,
200
[part
ii.
it is
possible to attain for supposing that the attri-
butes represented by these states of consciousness

coexist
in
nature,
but
warrant which, constructed as

to imagine/
If this
we have we
also
are,
the
it
highest
possible
is
be
so,
our prospects of discovering a
satisfactory philosophy
seem
small.
In what possible
it
way can
a psychological fact
'
whether
first
consists in
attempting to
tear asunder states of consciousness,'
or in anything else
afford a satisfactory warrant for
some other
a warrant
fact,
unless
we
of
take for granted

for
a very large number

is
propositions
?
which
should
very much needed

pre-established
Why
world
?
we assume
the
'
this
'
harmony between
'
subjective
and the
objective
Grant
either
some
theological postulate,
or
some law of
it
inherited aptitudes,
and the harmony may cease to

is
be surprising
but these are hypotheses which
needless to say cannot themselves afford a warrant

until
is
they
first
obtain
it.
Nor
*
is
this
all.
Not only
for holding
the mental incapacity to

'
tear asunder states of

'
consciousness
no
'
logical justification
a
in
belief, but,
on Mr. Spencer's own
principles, a belief
'
the incapacity would appear to require a
logical
justification' itself
We
is
^
are supposed by his theory
to believe that
to
'
it
impossible for the same thing
be and not to
be,'
on the ground that we cannot
conceive the opposite. But

1
how do we know
2
that
we
Psychology,
p. 425.
j^j^j
CHAP. X.]

?
201
cannot conceive the opposite

requires a warrant, or
is it
Is this a
?
beHef which
is^
not
If
it
then the
warrant must be that

conceive the opposite
we cannot
;
conceive that
we can
all
its
and as
this belief
and
successors will also require similar warrants,
we
are
committed
hand,
I
to
an
infinite
regress.
If,
on the other
it is
not a belief which requires a warrant, then
desire to
know why the

to be
belief that
'
it is
'
impossible
?
for the
I
same thing
and not
it
to
be
requires one
I
am
I
quite as certain that
is
impossible, as
;
that
cannot conceive
it
*
to
be possible
and
'
if I
am am
not expected to give a
I
for the
I
second of these
beliefs,
see no reason
for the
first.
why
should
be expected to give one
On
Mr. Spencer's own
principle,
indeed,
the
mental fact that
we cannot
conceive the opposite of
a given proposition, in the only case in which, according to him,

is
it
can serve as a
final
ground of
certainty,
not one of which
we
can have any immediate
knowledge.
Only,
is
it
appears,
when
the proposition
whose opposite
must be
true.
inconceivable happens also to be
undecomposable,^ can
we
say with assurance that
it
So that before applying his postulate that things which to the proof of some axiom (say are equal to the same thing are equal to one an'
other
this
'
'^)
we have
to convince ourselves, first, that
is
a proposition not capable of further decom;
position
and, secondly, that

Psychology,
p.
we
are unable to con^
410.
Ibid. p. 411.
202

its
[part
ii.
ceive
opposite.
Surely the scepticism which
is
set at rest
by such arguments as these must be of a

;
very pecuHar complexion
for
it
must doubt that
things which are equal to the

to
same thing are equal

very easy to deter-
one another, and be certain of logical and psy-
chological facts, not to
my mind
mine, and respecting which, by Mr. Spencer's

account,
own
men have
frequently been in error.

it
These
capacity
'
objections,
will
be observed, keep their

in-
weight whatever the nature of the psychological
may be which Mr. Spencer

'
describes as an
inability to conceive the opposite
of a proposition.
Though
that,
there
is,
as
before hinted,
some
obscurity
hanging over
this point,
there can be
is,
little
doubt
at all events,
the incapacity
as has been
hitherto assumed, one of imagination or representation.
What seems more

else
doubtful
it
is
whether Mr.
Spencer does not suppose
to
be
this
it
and
at the
same time something

fully
from which
ought carelanguage
to
be distinguished.
Much
of his
suggests the idea that, in his opinion, necessities of
imagination are not merely accompaniments

causes
of,
of,
or
necessities of belief, but
are actually the

attri-
same
thing,
and that the representation of the

is
butes in one image
actually identical with the act
of believing that two attributes are united in one

object.
He
says, for instance,^
'
An
abortive effort
to conceive the negation of a proposition,

*
shows that
Psychology,
p. 425.
Italics are
my
own.
Cf. also p. 402.
CHAP,
xj

is
203
the cognition expressed
one of which the predicate

is,
invariably exists along with the subject [that
suppose, shows that

united]
;
we
cannot conceive them
dis-
and the
discovery that the predicate invariits object is
ably exists along with

this cognition is one
the discovery that

to accept!
we are compelled
incredibility
And
in-
again, in the very act of distinguishing
between
conceivability
and
he seems to suggest
the idea that they differ in degree and not in kind.^

If the
strange psychological
is
doctrine
thus
adumany
brated
justified
really
Mr.
Spencer's,
he
is
no doubt
on his own principles
in asserting that
is
proposition of which the opposite
inconceivable
must be believed, because inconceivable with him
must mean not only that which

also,
is
unimaginable, but
is
and
in
at the
same
time, that
which
absolutely
and
the extremest degree incredible.
In truth,
however, his philosophy gains nothing by a confusion
which
logy.
(if it
be
his) is a serious blot
on
his psycho-
The
it
statement that
we
are absolutely incap-
able of believing the opposite of a proposition
may
it,
;
carry with
the assurance that
we must
believe
for in reality the

I
two expressions are equivalent

to see
I
but
altogether
fail
how
it
can show us that
we
ought to believe
it
it.
doubt myself, indeed, whether
is
possible to try to believe the opposite of an

in
axiom
the sense in which
it is
possible to try to
it
imagine the state of things opposite to that which

1
Page 408.
204

I
[part
ii.'
asserts.
doubt,
for
example, whether
we can
seriously try to believe
that a thing can both be
and not
be,
though some sort of attempt to imagine

filled
a space at the same time
and not
filled
by an
this
object might possibly be made.
But however
may
be,
it
is
certain that the incapacity to believe

it
one thing, though

necessity/
^
may
constitute a
'
'
psychological
'
cannot give a
contradictory
for
believing
its
and that
if it
be once
admitted that such a logical justification must be

obtained for what are
evident propositions,
commonly thought
to be selfI
we should
require, as
pointed
out before, not one, but an infinite series of justifications,
before anything could be considered as proved
at
all.
In short, whether inconceivable

(if
means un-
imaginable, unrepresentable
there
is
such a word),
unthinkable, or in the highest degree unbelievable,

its
relation
to the
theory of ultimate premises of
knowledge remains the same.
Under no circumis
stances can the recognition of the mental fact that
the opposite of a certain proposition
inconceivable
by me, be
ing
it.
to
me
a satisfactory reason for believ-
Mr. Spencer seems to be under the singular

delusion
*
that
any one declining to recognise the
Universal Postulate can consistently do this only so
long as he maintains the attitude of pure and simple

negation.
The moment he
^
asserts
anything
the
Page
407.
CHAP, x.]
205
moment he even gives a reason for his denial, he may be stopped by demanding his warrant. Against therefore " may be because," and every every entered a demurrer, until he has said why this
''
''
proposition
is
to
be accepted rather than the count-
ter-proposition.
So
that he cannot even take a step
towards justifying his scepticism respecting the Universal Postulate without, in the very act, confessing
his acceptance of it'
^
The may
it is
confusion
underlying
these remarks
;
has
if
I
already been pointed out by implication
and
venture to give an opinion on such a question,

the fundamental confusion which has vitiated
all
this portion of
Mr. Spencer s speculation.
He seems
it
to suppose that the choice lies
between founding a
order to demonstrate
creed on the Universal Postulate, and founding
upon nothing
puts
at all
and
in
the absurdity of the second alternative, he actually
himself to the trouble

calls
'
of refuting a
'
theory
'
which he
nothing
Pure Empiricism
which
tacitly
assumes that there

is
may be
a Philosophy in which
is
asserted but what
proved.'^
Whether
I
this singular
system has any objective existence

:
do not know
but
if it
has,
Mr. Spencer
may be
its
allowed
;
the credit of having effectually exposed

I
absurdity
protest against the notion that

this type,
we must choose
nor can
Page
391.
I
between a philosophy of
and one ultimately

;
based on the Universal Postulate

1
the
Page
427,
''^

2o6
[part
ii.
least
imagine the dialectical process by which Mr.

*
Spencer would compel the
Metaphysicians
'
(who
come
in for so
many hard
sayings at his hands) to
regard them as the only possible alternatives.

In one of the earlier chapters of his
Analysis,' Mr.
*
General
Spencer has found
it
convenient to
give us an amended version of one of Berkeley's

dialogues.^ It will not,
ful
if,
hope, be thought disrespectI
also in the dialogue form,
give
my
idea of
'
the method in which Mr. Spencer and a

physician
'
Meta-
would discuss the necessity and
validity
this
of the Universal Postulate.
We
must suppose
imaginary individual to have so far forgotten himself

as
to
make some
positive
statement
say
that
thing must either be or not be.
Instantly^ Mr.
Spencer demands
his
warrant for the assertion, upon
which our Metaphysician would probably say

Metaphysician.
tion,
have no warrant for the asserIt
and
wish for none.

is
expresses a belief for
which no proof
is
forthcoming, and for which none
required.
Mr.
position
Spencer.
is
Still
you must say why
this pro-
to
be accepted rather than the counter-
proposition.^
Metaphysician.
Perhaps,
Certainly.
2
if
that
is
your opinion,
version
you
will
be good enough to give
me your own
of this reason.
Mr.
1
Spencer.
337.
believe that a thing

s
Page
Page 427.
ibid.
CHAP. X.]

is
207
must
either be or not be, because this
a proposp((^'^
tion of
which
cannot conceive the negation.
Metaphysician.
that
tion
Then
in
your opinion the
fact
you cannot conceive the negation of a proposiis
in all cases
^
a sufficient logical justification for
believing
it ?
Mr.
Spencer.
Well, not
^
exactly.
'
It is sufficient
only in the case of those propositions

further decomposable.'
which are not
Metaphysician.
that
all
Then
understand you to hold
propositions which are not further decom-
posable,
true
;
and whose negations are inconceivable, are

'
and that a thing must

Spencer.
either
be or not be
'
is
such a proposition.
That my opinion. Metaphysician. Without disputing your major premiss which, however, by no means commends am curious to know how you to my mind
Mr.
is
itself
arrive at the conclusion that the proposition
we
are
discussing (i) cannot be further decomposed, and
has
{2)
a negation which
Spencer.
is
inconceivable
first
.'*
Mr.
Î
arrive at the
conclusion^
by
I
a careful consideration of the proposition

arrive at the second
itself;
Metaphysician.
feel
by a process of introspection.* Speaking for myself, I do not

respecting the
more
certainty
accuracy with
I
which these operations have been performed, than

1
Page
407.
Page 410.
Pages 394-399.
Fortnightly Review, pp. 542-545.
2o8
[part
ii.
did respecting the truth of the original assertion for
which you
indeed,
I
informed
feel
me
warrant was
required
do not
nearly so much.
Doubtless,
however, as you are so particular on the subject of

warrants, you have
some warrant
for
your opinions
precisely
on these points
it is ?
could you inform
me
what
shall
it
not continue
is
the
imaginary dialogue,
because
hard to think of any reply which Mr.

to this last
Spencer could make

not have about
It
demand which would

If the
a slight air of absurdity.
reader desires to bring the conversation to a proper

close,
he
will
have no
I
difficulty in filling in the

It
blank
clear
for himself
have said enough to make

Postulate does not, in
why
it is
that Mr. Spencer's elaborate discussion on
the Universal
my
opinion,
:
constitute a valuable addition to Philosophic theory
and
it
only remains to examine

is
how far
If
his particular
system of Realism, which

the Universal Postulate,
dited.
is
professedly founded on
that be discre-
tenable
This
shall
do
in the
next chapter.
CHAP.
XI.]
MR. SPENCER'S PRODF OF REALISM.
209
CHAPTER
I
XI.
MR. SPENCER'S PROOF OF REALISM.
HAVE been
In
some doubt whether, having regard

I
to the general plan of this essay,
ought or ought
not to Introduce Into
It
any
criticism
on Mr. Spencer's
gained some
Proof of Realism.
My
wish has been to consider
merely those opinions which

acceptance
these
In
have
among English
thinkers,
and
;
to criticise
their
most perfect shape
but
though,
is
doubtless, Mr. Spencer's statement of his views
the best attainable,
am
not aware that the portion
of his speculations which he himself would describe

as metaphysical
ditions,
in
fulfils
the
first
of the
above confol-
having obtained
any philosophic
metaphysics
lowing.
But though Mr. Spencer's

not perhaps
'
have
commanded much
is
assent, his general
theory of the universe, which logically depends on

his metaphysics,
accepted in
its
main outline by
so
many
thinkers in this country, and occupies so

field
Important a space In the

that a sort of reflected
of general speculation,
Is
importance
shed over his
defence of the foundations on which the Imposing

superstructure
finally
rests. It
may, therefore, be
2IO
[part
ii.
convenient to state some of the reasons which exist

for thinking that the defence
is
hardly as effective as
it.
Mr. Spencer seems to consider Mr. Spencer sees

clearly,
more
clearly perhaps
than other philosophers with

allied, that
whom
if
he
is
nearly
is
the question of the external world
fundamental one for Science, or,

at all events for Evolution.
'
not for Science,

idealist
is
Should the
be
right,'
^
he says,
'
the doctrine of Evolution
dream.'
cer
As, previous to this utterance, Mr. Spen(I

if
had written
think) five
volumes of
'
Philo-
sophy,' which,
the doctrine
of Evolution be a
it
dream, can be
clear that
little
better than waste paper,
is
he
is
bound under heavy

is
penalties to prove
that the Idealist
wrong.
Accordingly, he gives a
defence of Realism which certainly does not err on

the side of meagreness.
It consists of
some
nine-
teen chapters, occupying nearly two hundred pages,

divided,^ as the reader acquainted with Mr. Spencer's
favourite
expect,
method of arrangement
into a
will
be prepared to
into
an Introduction, an Analytical Arguproximate Analysis and an

a Synthetical Argument
ment (subdivided
ultimate Analysis), and
and enriched with even a larger number than usual

of those apologues with which Mr. Spencer so often
finds
it
convenient to prepare the minds of his
readers for the comprehension of his

speculations.
*
more abstruse
Psychology^ vol.
ii.
p. 311.
"^
Ibid. 367.
CHAP. XL]
21
It is
evidently impossible within the limits of
this essay to criticise so elaborate

its details.
a discussion
in all
The most
convenient plan will perhaps
be to say a few words on the substance of those

chapters which seem to
in their existing order.
call
for remark, taking
them
But before doing
this, it will
be well to determine certain preliminary points, which

will greatly facilitate the
progress of the argument.

idealists
In the
first
place,
Mr. Spencer and the
are agreed in asserting that

ceive the permanent reality
'
we do not
if
directly perexists.
'
such a thing
What we
are conscious
of,'
says Mr. Spencer,^

to
as
properties of matter, even

tance,
down
weight and
resis-
are but
subjective
affections
produced by
objective agencies which are

able.'
unknown and unknow-
In the second place, the idealist denies that there

is
any proof that
this
permanent
reality exists, while

is
Mr. Spencer asserts that there

that he
is
such proof, and
in
possession of
it.
And
in the third place,
understand Mr. Spencer
to maintain that the
unknown and unknowable, un-
perceived and unperceivable reality, varies in some

fixed relation with the
tive affection
known and perceived
subjec
which
it
produces.
to a certain
The thing to be proved being thus extent made clear, let us proceed to the
In doing so
^
proof.
shall take the liberty of omitting

Psychology, vol.
ii.
p.
493.
P 2
212

to
[part
ii.
any detailed reference
the
first
four
chapters
which Mr. Spencer describes as an Introduction.
My justification
for
doing this
is
that, as the object

^
of these chapters
is
I
merely to foreshadow
shall
the suc-
ceeding arguments,
to his case
overlook nothing essential

course.
by taking such a
While
my motive
for doing
it is
In the first place to
save space, and in
the second place to avoid having to enter, not merely

into
Mr. Spencer's views, but into
his
views of other
people's views.
consist in
Three out of these four chapters

Mr. Spencer
In the habit of hold-
an attack on that miscellaneous body of

is
thinkers
whom
to
'
ing
up
of
general contempt under the collective

' ;
name
Metaphysicians
Is,
and though
my
private
conviction
that could they reply they
would make
still,
very short work of some of his objections,
as
am
anxious to keep as clear as possible of historical
discussion,
and as
am
in
no way concerned
to the
in
to de-
fend the philosophers in question, the better course

will
be to proceed at once
argument, without indulging

mishing.
main body of the any preliminary skir-
Chapter V.
Is
merely explanatory of the general
arrangement of the discussion.

Chap. VI. contains
'
The Argument from

^
:
Priority,'
thus summarised by Mr. Spencer
'
In the history
of the race, as well as in the history of every mind,
Realism
1
is
the primary conception

ii.
only after
i^j^ p ^74.
it
has
Psychology, vol.
p. 367.
CHAP.
XI.]
213
been reached and long held without question does

it
become
possible even to frame the Idealistic con-
ception, while resting
upon the
Realistic
one
and
then, as ever after, the Idealistic conception, depend-
ing on the Realistic one, must vanish the instant the

Realistic
first
one
is
taken away.'
With regard
*
to the
of these positions, Mr. Spencer observes/ that

its
his calling in question
converse
will excite sur-
prise in the metaphysical reader,'

into astonishment
if
which
will
'
rise
he distinctly denies
is
it.'
If the
metaphysical reader
it will, I
either surprised or astonished,
apprehend, be more probably at Mr. Spen'
cer's
thinking that the assertion that

is
some form of
it
Realism
kind
'
the primary and natural belief of man-
is
relevant,
than at his thinking
true.
never heard of anybody
who supposed
illustrations,
that
the
Boys, Hottentots, and Farm-labourers, from
whom
Mr. Spencer draws his

Idealists
were either
or inferred the existence of the indepen-
dent world from the consciousness of their

sensations.
own
Nor
is
it
easy to
see
holding Mr. Spencer's views can think
how anybody it of much
importance what they thought, since their Crude
Realism
is
nearly as far
it
removed from Transfigured

*
Realism as
Spencer,^
'
is
from Idealism.
But,'
says
Mr.
Realism must be posited, before a step
can be taken towards propounding Idealism.'

in
And
the
^
succeeding paragraph he implies that the

Psychology, vol.
ii.
p. 369.
Ibid. p. 374.

[part
214
ii.
proof of Idealism logically requires us to assume the

existence of external
this
(?
Independent) objects.
if
For
statement however, which,
true,
would un-
doubtedly confute the idealist as distinguished from

the sceptic,
I
cannot find a shadow of proof, unless

I
the following extract (for the length of which

apologise)
*
must
is
to
be regarded as such.
Tell (a labourer or farmer) that the sound he
hears from the bell of the village church exists In

himself;
and that
in
the absence of
all
creatures
having ears there would be no sound.
When
his
look of blank amazement has waned, try and
make
him understand
this truth
which
is
so clear to you.
bell are
Explain that the vibrations of the

nicated to the air
as
;
commuthem
that the air communicates

;
waves or pulses
that these pulses successively
strike the
membrane
of his ear, causing
It
to vibrate
and that what
exists In the air as mechanical
movetheir
ments becomeîn him the sensation of sound, which

varies in pitch as these
rapidity of succession.
movements vary
him about
air,
in
And now
bell,
ask yourself,
?
What
are these things you are telling
When
?
you speak
If
to
him of the
of the
so
of the me-
chanical motions, do you
mean
many
of his Ideas
you
do,
you
fall
into the astounding absurdity of
supposing that he already has the conception you

are trying to give him.
vibrations, then,
By
the
bell,
the
air,
the
you mean just what he means
so
many
objective existences
and actions; and by
CHAP. XL]
215
no
possibility can
you present
to
him
this hypothesis,
that
what he knows as sound

realities.
exists in him,
In
and not
with
outside him, without postulating,
common
him, these objective
By
no possibility can
sensations,
you show him

these things
If
that he
knows only his own

to be
without supposing
him
already consciotcs 0/ all

his sensations!
and changes causing

sentence of
It,
we may judge from

last
this extract,
and especially
I
from the
italics,
which
have put
in
Mr. Spencer imagines that an Idealist

prove that
that,
sets to
work
ries,
to
we know
only our
own
sensations,
by showing
according to modern physical theo-
our sensations are produced in us by the motions

:
of objects In space
by showing,
its
for example, that
sound
Is
subjective, because
objective cause
is
vibrations,
which are something altogether

If
different
Idealist
from the sensations they produce.

really
any
argued
in this
way,
his
procedure would cercalls

^
'
tainly exhibit
what Mr. Spencer

But
a scarcely
Imaginable blindness to the contradiction between
premises and conclusion.'
never heard of such
an individual, and
representative.
if
he
^
exists,
he certainly
is
not
It Is
true that
many
Idealists
for
example, Mr.
J. S.
Mill
-have
held, in
my
opinion
erroneously, that Idealism was consistent with the
usual physical theories respecting the causes of sensation,
but they never founded their Idealism on
Psychology
vol.
ii.
p. 374.
Cf. section of this
Essay.
2i6
[part
ii.
those theories, and whatever be their errors, are certainly not guilty of
' *
unimaginable blindness.'
Priority
'
The Argument from

it
may
therefore
be dismissed, because, of the two main positions of
which
is
consists,
one
is
not relevant, and the other

first
not true.
It is
not relevant to say, that the
and natural
belief of
mankind
is realistic
it is
not
true to say, that the proof of Idealism logically in-
volves Realism.
Chap. VI I. ^ contains
plicity,'
'
The Argument from Sim:
which
is
shortly this
Since
the proof of
Realism contains
of Idealism,
it
I
is
much fewer steps than the proof therefore much less likely to be
erroneous.
of reasoning
shall reserve
my remarks
on
this piece
till
we
reach Chapters XIII. and XIV.,

;
where
it
is
more elaborately repeated

that
if,
and
shall
only say here

think,^ the
as
Mr. Spencer seems

to
to
proofs
whose lengths have

all
all
be com-
pared include not only

of one view, but also
that can be said in favour
that can be said against the
other
the nineteen chapters we are now considering

The Argument from Dismay be stated thus ^ The one pro'
:
must furnish a powerful objection against the truth

of Realism.
Chap. VI 11.^ contains

tinctness.'
It
'
position of Realism
Is
presented
In vivid terms,
and
each of the
1
many
propositions of Idealism or Scepii.
Psychology, vol.
Ibid. p. 379.
p. 375.
2 4
j^j^j
p ^yj^
Ibid. p. 380.
CHAP.
XI.]

represented in faint terms
ergo,
217
ticism
is
is
'
Realism
to
be preferred.
Without wasting the reader's
time by disputing the major premiss of this argument,

viz.
that
the propositions
whose terms are
vividly represented are to be preferred to propositions
whose terms are

is
faintly represented
absurd
it
as this
when crudely
stated,
and
ill
as
fits
in
with our author's doctrine, that propositions are to
be accepted
in proportion to the
I
strength with which
their terms cohere}
shall content
myself with attack*
ing the minor premiss.
What,
which
is
then,
is
'
the one proposition of Realism

?
represented in vivid terms
In glancing
Realism,
through
Mr. Spencer's
defence
of
we
come
across a large
highly abstract
number of propositions of a character, and all of them equally
necessary to his system.
He
has opinions on the
nature of the connection between subject and object
proof of the existence of the object explanation of the nature of the object none of which can be
omitted without depriving
essential
his
doctrine
of
some
'^
element.
Are
these the propositions, or

in vivid
any of them, which are represented
terms
The
is
reader shall judge from one specimen.
Here
sets
an extract describing the Real, as

:
us by Mr. Spencer's Realism
it
is
put before
These several
of experiences unite to form a conception of some-^
thing beyond consciousness which

^
is
absolutely inde-
Psychology, vol.
ii.
p. 450.
2i8

;
[part
ii.
pendent of consciousness
which possesses power,

it
if
not Hke that of consciousness, yet equivalent to
and which remains

appearances.
fixed in the
midst of changing
indepen-
And
this conception, uniting

is
dence, permanence, and force,
the conception
we
have of
called
matter.'
this
If
the reader thinks the
ideas
up by
sentence are particularly vivid,

^
he must, as Mr. Spencer remarks

sion,
on another occa-
have *a mental structure of a very peculiar

because
kind.'
The
and
real
truth
is
that,
all
idealists
sceptics, in the exposition
and defence of
their
opinions, have indulged
in a great deal of abstract
Psychology, Mr. Spencer concludes that such speculations are
more required by their opinions than they

their opponents.
are
tity
it
by the opinions of
The quansupport of
in
I
of such speculation which he has himself found

in
necessary to give to the world
Realism should
have made him cautious
his
assertions on this point,
which
are, in fact, as
shall
presently show, founded on a misconception respect-
ing the sceptical position.
The
chapters from IX. to XI. inclusive, which

cri-
contain Mr. Spencer's account of our ultimate

terion of belief,
have been
sufficiently dealt with in
the last chapter.
Chapter XII. contains an account of the proper
mode
of comparing conclusions in those cases where

^
Psychology^
vol.
ii.
p. 327.
CHAP. XL]
219
both sides
make
(as
appeal to the Universal Postulate,

all
on which
Mr. Spencer thinks)
belief
and
is,
all
reasoning are ultimately founded.

the
*
His view
that
conclusion
'
which involves the postulate the

the one to be accepted
;
fewest times
I
is
and though
shall for
obvious reasons ignore that part of his reitself,
marks which assume the truth of the postulate

it
will
be well to say something respecting an arguin its
ment which
main outlines Mr. Spencer used

essentially as follows
before in Chapter VII.
This argument
piece of reasoning
is
is,
Every
more
other things being equal, to be

in inverse
trusted, roughly speaking,

its
proportion to
it is
length.
In other words, the longer

is
the
likelihood
there of error having crept in at
some
point in
its
course.
in
How far this
argument,
is
if
sound,
can be used
will
favour of Realism
a question which
present
I
be discussed immediately.
At
am
conIt
cerned with the argument considered in
itself
may be admitted
in
it is
at
once that the allegation contained
true.
It is
undoubtedly the
is
fact that of
any
two computations the shorter

correct
probably the more
other things being the same.
But then, under

?
what circumstances are other things the same
To
whom
does
it
occur to
know no
So
far as
I
other difference
between two
between
lines of
?
reasoning but the difference
their lengths
can see, to only
two
classes of people
to those
difference merely because they
who know no other know nothing about
220
[part
ii.
the matter,
history
who
are absolutely Ignorant both of the

;
and of the character of the things compared
and
to those
who know something about

lines of
the subject,
but can draw no conclusions from their knowledge,

in
whose eyes both
reasoning appear equally
solid,
and the authorities

This
on both sides equally

is
worthy of deference.
not very different
from saying that the only people be convinced solely by the

plicity,'
'
who
are likely to
argument from sim-
are those
who
are either too ignorant or too
stupid to
make
use of any other.
These are
not,
imagine, the only persons

to persuade to
;
whom
Mr. Spencer desires

it is
but
it is
clear that
only in relation
them
that the comparative lengths of

^
*
two argu-
ments can be regarded as

as a
a rigorous test of the
relative validities of their conflicting conclusion,' or

*
method of ascertaining the comparative values

cognitions.'
^
of
is,
all
To
all
other people
to
all,
that
who have some

lines
opinion respecting the intrinsic

of reasoning compared
worth of the
the
relative length of those lines can at
most be only
one of the grounds on which their ultimate verdict

arises, what is to be done when the longest argument appears to be in
is
;
based
and then the question
itself
the soundest
To
judge by the confidence

In his
'
which Mr. Spencer appears to place

relative validity,' his opinion
test of
that,
would seem
2
to
be
Psycholos^yy vol.
ii.
p. 434.
Ibid.
CHAP
XI.]
22r
even
in that case, the conclusion arrived at

Is
by the
shortest route
to be accepted
a somewhat extrare-
vagant doctrine, according to which a long division

sum, done by a charity school-boy, would be
garded as giving
more trustworthy
to
results
than
the calculations establishing the lunar theory.

better
The
other
opinion
seems
be
that,
though,
things
being equal, the fewer steps an argument

is
consists of the less likelihood
there of one
of
them being
false
yet that, since this risk
may be
It
indefinitely diminished
by repeated examinations.
in those cases
may be
practically neglected
where
the balance of reason appears, on other grounds, to

Incline distinctly to
one side or the other.

Is
And
this
opinion,
take
it,
not only the most reasonable

Is
one
In itself,
but
is
that which
sanctioned by the
ordinary practice of mankind.
Chapter
general
'
XI 1 1,
contains
the application of the

'
test of relative validity
established In the
preceding
chapter
to
the
particular
controversy
between Realism and Scepticism.

have found reason
pretty
As, however,
the
'
we
'
for thinking that

I
test
is
nearly
worthless,
might consider myself
absolved from any obligation to consider

valid,
It
how
far, if
would
tell
;
in
favour of Mr. Spencer's parpass

this
ticular
opinions
and should therefore

it
chapter over, were
not that
It
affords a convenient
occasion for clearing up
some of the misconceptions
respecting the essential nature of the arguments to

222
[part
ii.
be compared, by which our author has been greatly

misled.
I
will begin, as
he does, with the
realistic
:
'
argu-
ment.
Here^
is
his
own
version of
it
Let him
(the reader) contemplate
an object this book, for

let
mstance.
Resolutely refraining from theorising,

finds.
him say what he

of
He finds
that he
is
conscious
the book as existing apart
from
himself.
Does
there enter into his consciousness any notion about

sensation
?
Not
at all
so
is
Does he perceive
is
that the thing he
conscious of
an image of the
as he refuses
feels
book?
Not
So long
to translate the fact into
any hypothesis, he
objective
simply conscious of the book, and not of an impression of the book

subjective thing.
of an
lastly,
and not of a
He
feels that this recognition of

is
the book as an external reality

act
will,
a single indivisible
And,
he
feels that,
do what he
he cannot reverse
this act
he cannot conceive
that where he sees
and feels
the book there is nothing.
Hence, while he continues looking at the book, his

belief in
it
as
an external
It
reality
possesses the
highest validity possible.

of the
has the direct guarantee

;
Universal Postulate
and
it
assumes the
Universal Postulate only once'
This very singular passage
is
immediately
fol-
lowed by three pages of argument, intended to show

^
Psychology,
vol.
ii.
p.
437
(italics
my
own).
CHAP. XI.]
223
that
we
can and do have a knowledge of the not-self
without having at the same time a knowledge of the

self.
How
I
this is
to
be reconciled with the
state-
ment
have
italicised
above, which asserts that in

it
looking at a book
we
;
are conscious of
as existing
it
apart from ourselves
how,
in
other words,
can be
possible to think of a thing as existing apart from
another thing, without at the same time thinking of

that other thing,
I
do not pretend
slip
:
to say.
I
Possibly
the expression
objections of
I
is
in
any
case,
pass on to
more importance.
first place,
if it
contend, then, in the

stated,
that the realistic

all
argument above
Spencer thinks
second
even
is
proved
that Mr.
it
proves,
not sufficient to establish

I
the ordinary belief in an external world.

in
tlie
contend,
place,
that the
rests
psychological facts
are,
on which the argument
when properly
understood, not inconsistent with either Idealism or

Scepticism.
if
And
is,
contend, in the third place, that

as Mr. Spencer thinks
it
is,
the argument
subit
versive of any theory of Idealism or Scepticism,
is
not less subversive of Mr. Spencer's
own
theory of
Transfigured Realism.
What
argument
terms.
'
is
?
the thing supposed to be proved by this
Mr. Spencer states
it
in
the clearest
While
(the reader) continues looking at the

it
book, his belief in

reality possesses
is
'
as an external
= independent)
imme-
the highest validity possible.' This

is
the conclusion which
so certain and so
224

is
[part
if-
diate that scepticism
impotent to shake
it.
But
it,
surely
it
is
evident that scepticism might admit

for the admission.
'
and not be much the worse
If
the only belief which, having

possible,'
the highest validity

sceptic,
is
must be respected by the
the
belief in the objective existence of the second
volume
single
of Mr. Spencer's Psychology (or

object),
some other
and that only so long as the reader happens

it,
to
be looking at
is
it is
plain that the field of legiti-
mate doubt
not materially limited.
So
very
modest a contribution to the Cosmos postulated by Science, Is scarcely sufficient by itself to assure us
that Evolution
this objection,
may
not, after
all,
be 'a dream.'
On
however, which deals rather with the

its
nature of the external world than with

ence,
I
independ-
do not dwell.
second objection to Mr. Spencer's
is,
My
realistic
argument
that he assumes in
It
that the idealistic
conclusion can be reached only by either ignoring or doctoring (so to speak) the facts given in percep.*
'
tion
a misconception which
think has
external.
Its
root in
the ambiguous use of the
word
self,
In this
connection external
may mean
of)
external to
(=
inde-
pendent
ternal to
is
of) the
perceiving
or
it
may mean
exIt
(= outside
the perceiving organism.

first
using the term in the
of these senses, not in
the second, that the sceptic and idealist doubt and deny respectively the existence of an external world
;
but
if
we
are rigidly
to interpret
Mr.
Spencer's
CHAP.
XI.]
225
language, he seems to regard these two very different

positions as equivalent.
man
looking at a book, he says,
'
cannot con-
ceive that
where he
sees
it
and
feels the book there is
nothing!
Idealism,
Nor
that
is
necessary, in the interests

it.
of
he should conceive
feels the
Of
course
;
where he sees and
book there
idealist
is
something
there
this
that,
is
the book.
The
does not deny
on the one hand, nor does he assert on the other
when he does
not see and feel the book,
it is
not
there,,
in the sense of having vanished
from
that
I
portion of space.
No
idealist seriously maintains,
should imagine, that the universe consists of

space,
infinite
empty except
to
this,
for those things
which happen
if
each
moment
be perceived.
is
But
they do not
maintain
what
the use of asserting, as against
them, that
we
cannot conceive that where

is
we
see
and
feel
a book there
third
is,
nothing
to
My
objection
that
Mr. Spencers
of
refuting
realistic
'
argument
the
mode
meta-
physicians,' for
which
in this chapter
and elsewhere
Like the
he shows a marked
himself as
*
partiality, is as effective against
it
is
'
against his opponents.

school, he constantly
common
call
sense
assumes that
the unbiassed deliverance
of consciousness (as he
would
I
it),
the unsifted opinion of the vulgar (as

it),
should rather describe
carries
with
it
some
really
peculiar weight in the controversy.

*
But, unlike the
common
sense
'
school, the opinions
which he
226
[part
ii.
holds respecting the external world require us to do

as
much
violence to our ordinary beliefs as any form

'
of what he calls
Anti- Realism.'
Throughout the
whole of the Negative Justification of Realism we are allowed to suppose that the errors of metaphysicians are
beliefs
it
aberrations
artificial
from true and natural

habits of analysis
;
produced by
till
and
we come to the Positive Justification of Realism that we discover how different are the
is
not
beliefs
which are true from those which are natural

being
truly
these last
ultimately described
constituting
life,'
*
contempt-
uously
*
if
as
'
a crude realism,'
the
realism of
common
the realism of the
child
and the
rustic'
A
when
striking
example of the
facility
with which
Mr. Spencer adopts the reasoning of Crude Realism

it
happens
to suit his convenience, occurs in
the chapter
we
are considering.
His object
for the
moment
I
is
to contrast in a certain particular (which
have elsewhere shown to be immaterial) the argu-
ments used by metaphysicians and the argument by

which Realism
this
is
established.
selects, as
For the purpose of

a specimen of meta-
comparison he
physical reasoning, the

realist; as
argument of the hypothetical

realistic
a specimen of
I
reasoning,
the
argument
the
quoted above.
*
It
'
would be easy
which
2
in the
interest of the
first
1
metaphysician
to take exception to
of these selections,
ii.
Mr.
jbj^j^ p^
Spencer
^^^^
Psychology, vol.
p. 497.
CHAP. XL]
227
justifies
on the strange ground that Hypothetical

is
*
Realism
of
all
the
comparatively unassuming parent

;
other Anti-Realistic doctrines

particularly to insist
but what
wish
more
on now
is
the impropriety
of his attempting to refute an argument, with whose

conclusion he substantially agrees,
by means of one
His
from whose conclusions he absolutely dissents.

opinion
we know
is
that ^
'
what we are conscious of
as properties of matter, even
down
to
weight and
resistance, are but subjective affections
produced
in
us by objective agencies which are
unknown and unby no means the

indi-
knowable.'
This,
take
:
it
is
also the opinion of
the Hypothetical Realist
but
it is
opinion either of the ordinary

vidual
man, or of the
whom
Mr. Spencer represents as arriving
at a
realistic
conclusion by the simple process of looking

single object
at
some
say the
'
second volume of the
'Psychology'
with
saw)
^
an unbiassed mind.
feels that the
This percontent of
as
sonage
his
(as
we
sole
consciousness
is
the
book considered
reality.'
an
external
(= independent)
is
And
the corre-
sponding belief
has
*
one,
we
are further informed, which
the highest
is,
validity possible.'
Now
*
the ex-
ternal reality
and
unknowable' 'a
told,^
according to Mr. Spencer,
mode
all
of being,'
'
unknown as we are
elsewhere
represented to us by
an indefinable
consciousness.'
Putting
these statements to^

"
Psychology, p. 441.
Ibid. p. 437.
Ibid. p. 493. Ibid. p. 452.
228
A DEFENCE OF PHILOSOPHIC DOUBT, we
[part.
ii.
gether,
arrive at the conclusion that the individual

Is
looking at Mr. Spencer's book
unconscious of any
of the properties of matter, and has, as the sole content of his consciousness, an Indefinable conscious-
ness standing for an
unknown and unknowable mode

!
of being beyond consciousness
This
result
;
Is
not a very
It Is
satisfactory
or Instructive
but
one of a kind which can scarcely be
avoided by any thinker
who
is
tries to
use our ordinary

sceptic,
and natural
beliefs as
weapons against the
at the very time
when he
all
attempting to establish
a theory against which

beliefs rebel.
our ordinary and natural

the effort to upset the
To my mind
results of critical analysis
(whatever these
is
may
be)
by an appeal to uncritical opinion

in the case of the sceptical
as reasonable
view of the external

Copernican
world as
it
would be
in the case of the
theory of the Solar System, and not nearly so reasonable as of Will.

it
would be
in the case of the

this
if it
Freedom
all It
But however
may
is
be,
whether the
method be good or bad,

be applied
impartially.
It
applied
must
reject
It will
not do
to
Idealism because
is
in opposition to natural con-
victions of mankind, unless
you are prepared
to say
that you think the natural convictions of
mankind
pre-
are sound
and you cannot think that the natural
convictions of
mankind are sound unless you are

in themselves,
pared to endorse opinions which are not only unfitted to sustain criticism
but which
CHAP.
XI.]

If
229
would render Physical Science an absurdity.

instinctive
our
judgments are
sufficient to
prove that an
independent object
exists,
they
are sufficient to
prove that
particular
it
is
coloured,
extended,
and with a
texture.
If
weight, configuration,
and
physical science
and introspective analysis are

that colour
are, as
to
be
believed
when they show
and the prosays,
perties of matter
Mr. Spencer
'sub-
jective affections,' they

instinctive
deprive the appeal to our

all
judgments of
the weight
it
might
otherwise possess.^
* An objection substantially the same as that given in the text has been urged by Mr. H. Sidgwick in the Academy^ and Mr. Spencer has replied to it in an article afterwards re-published in the third volume of his Essays.^ His reply, which he does not, I think, seem to be quite pleased with himself, need not detain us long. It turns essentially on a distinction between the Primordial Judgment, as he calls it,^ of Crude Realism, which informs us that an object exists, and the ^M^r Judgments of Crude Realism which (as he cannot deny) tell us that it is coloured, and so forth. The first we are to believe in, whatever arguments may be brought against it, but not the second. Now on what is this distinction founded He does not formally tell us, but he gives us to understand, by his examples, that it is founded on the fact, that the judgments of the second class are, while the 'Primordial' judgment of the first class is not, capable of an 'interpretation which equally
.''
well corresponds with direct intuition, while

culties.' ^
I
it
avoids
all
the
diffi-
myself with stating one of the objections to which this doctrine seems open which, if it remains unanswered, will, however, be sufficient. Mr. Spencer admits that, according to the immediate deliverance .of Crude Realism, the external reality has the properties of matter ; but we know that according to him the properties of matter, even down to weight and resistance, are but subjective affections.' * Crude Realism is, therefore, wrong but though wrong, it arrives at its
will content
:
'
Psychology,
Ibid. p. 284.
vol.
ii.
p.
282-286.
"^
Ibid. p. 286.
Ibid. p. 493.
i30

I
[part
il.
have now said
not
indeed
all
that might be
said,
but all
that need
be said
in
answer to the
negative justification
of Realism.
With Chapter
XIV. begins
case.
the Positive Justification, which extends
through four chapters, and completes Mr. Spencer's
This part of his argument need
not,
however,
opinion by a single step. Mr. Spencer shows that it is wrong by a process of ' interpretation,' which is nothing else than an explanation of the usual physical theories of the origin of sensation,^ and which is
to
and complicated argument. How is this be reconciled with that theory according to which results are trustworthy according as they are arrived at by the shortest trains of
therefore an extremely long
reasoning
truth
is,
What becomes
of
'
the test of relative validity

^
'
?
'
The
and
think
that Mr. Spencer's distinction between the

is
Primordial
I
the other Judgments of Crude Realism
perfectly arbitrary, as
he
will
himself see,
if
he
tries to
show reason
for restoring the follow-
ing doctored quotation from the
of his * General have added, or substituted, are put in italics. The reader looking at a book finds that he is conscious of the book as a coloured extended object apart from himself. Does there enter into his consciousness any notion about sensation ? No Does he perceive that the thing he is conscious of is an image of the book 1 Not at all So long as he refuses to translate facts into any hypothesis, he feels simply conscious of coloured and extended object^ and not of an impression of a coloured and extended object. .... He feels that this recognition of the book as an external coloured and extended reality is a single indivisible act And, lastly, he feels that do what he will, he cannot reverse this act. .... Hence, while he continues looking at the book, his belief in it
XHIth Chapter
I
Analysis
'
to its original form.
The words
'
and extended reality possesses the highest possible has the direct guarantee of the Universal Postulate and it assumes the Universal Postulate only once.' This argument is not, as I have shown, a particularly good one but it is quite as good when devoted to proving that colour and extension (which are both, on Mr. Spencer's theory, subjective affections) are objective realities, as it is when used, as Mr. Spencer uses it, to prove that an object with (I presume) no knowable qualities, has an independent existence.
as a coloured
It
validity.
See Essays,
vol.
iii.
p. 286.
CHAP, xi.j

It consists in
251
detain us long.
the main of a psycho-
logical theory of the
manner
;
in
which we obtain our
ideas of Subject and Object
and a single quotation

sufficient to
from the summary^

general character.
vation
*
will
be
show
its
Simply by a process of obserour states of consciousness
we
find,
that
segregate
into
two independent aggregates, each
held together by
it.
some
principle of continuity within
The
principle of continuity forming into a
whole
the faint states of
consciousness,
moulding
is
is
and
dis-
modifying them by some unknown energy,

tinguished as the
Ego
while the Non-ego
the
principle of continuity holding together
the indefind
pendent aggregate of vivid

that while our
states.
And we
states of consciousness cohere into
these antithetical aggregates, the experiences gained
by mutual exploration of the

cohesion, that to the
limbs, establish such
principle of continuity mani-
fested in the non-ego there inevitably clings a nascent
consciousness of force, akin to the force evolved by

the principle of continuity in the ego!
There are
difficulties in
this conclusion, as, for
instance, the absence of
any reason which should
make
us identify ourselves with one of these prin'
ciples of
continuity
is
'
rather than with the others
and there
also
much
p. 487.
material for criticism in the

is
process by which the conclusion

1
arrived
at.'^
But,
Psychology, vol.
Cf. Articles
ii.
by Professor Green, Contefuporary Reviewy Dec.
1877,
March
1878.
^32

whole of
this
[part
ii.
in truth, the
Psychology, be
it
good or
that the
if
be
it
bad,
is
irrelevant,
and irrelevant on Mr. Spencer's

that he tells us
'
own
*
principles.
It is true
'
absolute validity
it
of Realism
will
be shown
we
find
to
be a necessary product of thought proceed-
ing according to laws that are universal,'
by which
he means,
in
suppose, that our warrant for believing

the fact that a belief in
it is
Realism
is
universally
produced by the natural operation of psychological

laws.
But
this,
which
is
merely an instance of the
persistent error
which makes Philosophy dependent

not, as
I
on Psychology, does
sent Mr. Spencer's
real
fact
understand
it,
repre-
more
deliberate opinion.
'
The
'
warrant on which he believes the

that
is
mysterious
'we have a consciousness of something

is
which
to
out of consciousness,'
it
:
that he
is
obliged
think
and the three succeeding chapters

are deit,
therefore
of psychological analysis which
voted
not to showing but showing how

to
that he ought to think

it
comes about that he
is
obliged to think
it
discuss a question
With regard
last chapter,
It
is
which even
from
his
own
is
point of view can have no philosophic

to the
interest whatever.
itself, it
'warrant'
at
the
same as that which was discussed

it
some length
in the
and no more need

'
be said about
of the negation
here.
in
the
inconceivability
W
A
'
a scarcely altered form.

point that
2
There
is
only one more

ii.
feel
in/
Psychology^ vol.
p. 445.
ibid. p. 452.
CHAP.
XI.]
233
clined to touch
on before we reach the

It is
final
stage of
the discussion.
a favourite practice with Mr.
Spencer, whenever he happens to disbelieve a proposition, to
inform those
who
do believe
It
it
that
it
'
can-
not be realised in thought.'

to
'
would be interesting
in
know how
'
far
he can
*
realise
thought the
mysterious
is
it
fact
of
a consciousness of something
?
'
which
people
it,
yet out of consciousness
To
:
ordinary
might be open
to say
that they believed

it
though they could not
realise
but no such
reply
seems possible
to
Mr. Spencer.
He
is
of
opinion that
we
cannot really believe a proposition
which we cannot think, and that we cannot think

a proposition unless the subject and predicate are
realised in thought.^
Now
mode
which
of being sepain
rate
from myself produces changes

is
my
I
conscious
states,'
one proposition
'
in
understand
it
him
to believe.
This mode of being, since he can believe the

subject
is
unknown and unknowable, cannot be

thought,'
is
realised
in
another.
If
its
first
proposition
without
being realised in
thought, his general theory of knowledge, and most

of the positive positions contained in the First Principles^
it
must be abandoned.
says he does believe
it is
If
he cannot believe
except on those terms, then either he

it,
when he
thought.
1
or he
is
wrong wrong when

is
he supposes that
incapable of being realised in

to
He
would seem
vol.
ii.
be
in the
2
unfortunate
^jj^ jj
Psychologyy
p. 445.
j^j^j
234
[part
ii.
position of having devised a theory of
knowledge
in
the main for the purpose of establishing a realistic
system, and of having devised a realistic system
which
is
incompatible with his theory of knowledge.

is
That he
not unaware of the difficulties which
surround a theory according to which
we know
the
Unknowable,
successfully,
ciples}
admit
for
he struggles, not very

in his
to get over
them
First Prin-
by the help of such metaphorical expressions

consciousness
'
as
'
nascent
and
is
'
raw material of
holding these
thought.'
My
complaint
it
that,
opinions, he considers
to
a sufficient answer to
its
make
terms
to-
any
belief of
'
which he disapproves that

*
cannot be
realised in thought,' or
'
;
be joined
gether in consciousness
though neither Theology

I
nor Metaphysics contain, so far as

proposition of which these things can
know, any
truly
more
us
be
said than the propositions respecting the external
world,
*
which
Mr.
Spencer assures
have the
highest validity possible.'
We
last,
now come,
more
is.
in
chapter the nineteenth and
to a
precise account of
what
is
this external
world really
As
the reader
in the
;
already aware,
that
it
Mr. Spencer holds,
first
place,
in
is
unknown and
to
unknowable
and,
the
second
place, notwithstanding
some statements which seem

it
assume that
it
does not vary at alP that

relation
varies in
1
some determinate
Cf. especially, ch. iv.
to the
ii.
known
Cf. ch.
483.
CHAP.
XI.]
235
and knowable.
diately
The
itself
question,
therefore,
to
immehave
suggests
Mill^
how
we come
calls this
what Mr.
somewhere
prodigious
amount of knowledge respecting the Unknowable ? Grant what Mr. Spencer asks and admit that a
belief in the reality of an
independent Universe
for
is
it
valid
is
what grounds
?
have we
supposing that
precisely the kind of universe he postulates
and
no other
vary at
Why
should
?
it
vary
in
a determinate
it
relation to
phenomena
Why,
will
I
indeed, should
all ?
Perhaps Mr. Spencer

(though on what grounds
be inclined to say
that, as
do not know)
the cause of varying effects, the object must itself

vary.
But from the preceding chapter^

Conception
of
is
on the
Developed
the the
*
Object,
we have
learned that the object

tinuity,'
principle of con-
binding together the 'aggregate of our vivid
states of consciousness.'
is,
I
principle of continuity
should have thought, the unvarying element

If
it
in
the midst of incessant variations.
varies
itself,
must
'
it
not require another principle of conit,'
tinuity
to
form
as Mr. Spencer says,^

if
'
into a
whole
'
Furthermore,
?
the object varies,
does
re-
the subject vary

lation
Mr. Spencer represents the

illustration of
between the two by a diagram, which he

it.
seems to think affords a complete

It
consists of a cube (standing for the Object), a

*
Cf.
e.
g. p. 487.
Psychology, vol.
ii.
487.
236

and a
[part
ii.
cylinder (standing for the Subject),
reflection
of the cube on the surface of the cylinder (repre-
senting our 'vivid state of consciousness').

case the cube
cylinder
varies, the reflection
In this
varies, but the
does not vary.

in this
Are we
to
?
regard the
If so,
it
parallel as
particular
accurate
would be interesting to know on what grounds Mr.

Spencer asserts change
*
in
one of the unknown
Principles
of
Continuity,'
and denies
it
in
the
other.
Again, there seems some difliculty in understanding
how
that which
is
neither in
Space nor
Time can be
effects
a cause varying with the Phenomenal

in
which are
it,
Space and Time.

it,
Time
(it is
as
we
know
in
and Space as we know
are
stated
the First Principles^)
conceptions produced in
Since, there-
us
by some mode of the Unknowable.
fore,
is
we
are not to imagine that the

it
Unknowable
in
Time,
does not seem easy to understand

it
how
we
can imagine
as capable of
change
change
in rela-
having no meaning whatever for

tion to
us,
except
Time.
This criticism suggests the further reflection that

Mr. Spencer's Unknowable
is,
after
all,
not identical
with the subject-matter of physical science.

us take, for illustration,
position
;
Let
seven
a
some simple
scientific pro-
e.g.,
particles of matter vibrating
hundred
billions of times
*
a second produce
165.
in us
Page
CHAP.
XI.]

it
237
sensation of violet,' and consider

tion.
in this
connecas
The
it.
particles
it
of matter thus described
causes must,
or out of
in
it,
is
plain,
it is
be either
in
consciousness
And
also plain that they are not
except in the shape of symbolical concepts

calls
;
belonging to what Mr. Spencer

gregate of our conscious states
'
the
faint ag-
in
which condition
they cannot either be permanent or produce changes

in
the vivid aggregate of the kind required.
As
causes of sensation, they must therefore exist out of

consciousness
either be
;
whence
of
it is
evident that they must
modes
the unknowable, or else that
something besides the unknowable must exist be-
yond consciousness.
first
If
Mr. Spencer accepts the

I
of these alternatives,
desire to
know why he
chooses to describe that which exists beyond consciousness as the unknowable, seeing that most of
the knowledge which

to it;
if
we
possess professes to refer

I
he accepts the second,
desire to
know
what proof he can supply of the existence of such a knowable beyond consciousness at all.
To put the same What Science requires
difficulty
in
another form.
is
to
have proved
the exis-
tence of matter, which shall be independent of perception and sensation, shall produce perception and
sensation,
solidity,
and
shall
at the
same time possess mass,

forth.
extension,
and so
?
Is this
matter
Mr. Spencer's unknowable

In the
first
We
must answer. No.

it
place because, according to Science,
238

;
[part
ii.
is
decidedly knowable
in the
second place, because

is
Mr.
*
Spencer
tells
us^ that the matter which

'
extended and resistent
is
related to the
it,
unknow?
able as effect to cause.
Is
then, the
;
knowable
Again,
to
we must
*
answer.
'
No
because,
'
according
Mr. Spencer, the
objective agencies
'
which pro-
duce our
*
subjective affections
are in themselves
unknown and unknowable.'

Mr. Spencer's elaborate argument
is,
therefore,
I
altogether beside the mark.
In proving
or,
should
rather say, in attempting to prove, the existence of
the unknowable, he has aimed at the
wrong
object.
The
true state of the case

is
is
that the external world
required by Science
very much more like that

^
contemplated in the Crude Realism
(as
he con'
temptuously
it is
calls it)
of the child or the rustic

*
than
like that
propounded by the Transfigural Rea-
lism affected
fore, that the
by himself
Even
admitting,
there-
arguments establishing the
latter are
as unanswerable as he supposes
them
to
be, our
philosophic position would not be
much improved.
world
hardly save us
If the scientific creed respecting the external
be rejected, the unknowable from scepticism

cepted, the
;
will
while,
if
the scientific creed be acis
unknowable
foredoomed to the same

according
itself.'
existence of otium
to Jacobi,
If
^
cum
dignitate, which,
*
is
enjoyed by Kant's
thing in
rightly understand the line of thought taken

'^
First Principles^ pp. i66, 167.
Psychology^ vol.
ii.
p. 452.
CHAP.
XI.]
239
up
in
the First Principles^ Mr. Spencer would reply-
to this
by saying that matter as known by Science, may be regarded

it
to us,
and as
dealt with
as
permanent
and independent because

knowable cause which
effects of the
is
is
the effect of the un-
permanent and independent.
But, according to Mr. Spencer's doctrines, the only
unknowable of which we have imme'
diate
knowledge consist of
subjective affections,'
which are neither permanent nor independent. These

are not the subject-matter of physical science.
When
a Physicist asserts that vibrating molecules produce

the sensation of violet light, he
means
that certain
material particles which are not, which never have

been,
and which never will
be in
(human) conscious-
ness,
and which would vibrate precisely as they are
doing
now
if
(human) consciousness was destroyed,
produce certain conscious phenomena.
What Mr.
is
Spencer must think that they ought to mean by the

assertion
is,
that a
mode
of the unknowable which

I
symbolised (and, so far as

symbolised) by the
of our conscious
can
see, quite arbitrarily

'
member of the state known as

'
faint
aggregate
the concept of a
of
vibrating particle,
'
is
the
producing cause
'
member
of the vivid aggregate
known as
the sensa-
tion of violet light.
No verbal contrivance
can bridge
over the discrepancy between two statements, one

of which says that the cause of a
phenomenon
is
it
a
is
vibrating material particle, and the other that

^
First Principles^"^^1^^,
240
[part
ii.
an entity possessing none of the attributes of matter, and which, since it is neither in space nor time, must be incapable of vibration.
These are propositions

and not merely the
which assert
different things,
same thing
even
if
in different
language, so that Mr. Spencer,
he had proved the truth of the second, would

required by current scientific doctrines.
final
have done nothing towards establishing a realism

such as
*
is
The
remark
to
be made/ says Mr. Spencer,^
is
that Anti- Realistic beliefs
have never been held

Nor,
venture to
at all
Berkeley was not an Idealist

Kantist'
I
Nor was Kant a

add,
is
will
Mr. Spencer a Transfigured-Realist.
With-
out doubt the natural beliefs which in his ordinary
moments hold a not

rustic,*
less
undisputed sway over the

*
philosopher than they do over the

will
child
or the
be as victorious against Mr. Spencer's
doctrines as they are against those of
any of the
metaphysicians
selves in the
*
whom
he accuses of losing them-
mazes of verbal propositions.'^

is
On
the whole, indeed, he
less
fortunate than they.
For
it is
his singular
ill
fortune to have failed with
entire completeness in all the objects
which a man
may propose
to himself in constructing a theory of
the external world.
Some may wish

some
to justify the
justify
common
sense of
mankind, some to
the
teachings of Science,
to prove the being of
a God, some to give free rein to speculation without any secondary object.
*
It
was reserved
for
Psycholo^y^ voU
ii.
p. 300.
Ibid.
CHAP. XL]

to elaborate
241
Mr. Spencer
of science
satisfy the
a theory which can pre-
tend to justify the assumption neither of the
man
nor of the theologian, and which will
requirements neither of the ordinary
man
nor of the philosopher.
Looking back over the nineteen chapters we have been considering, and over the earlier half of
the First Principles,
it
is
impossible not to regret

'
that the ambition to produce a
System of
Phi-
losophy
'
should have forced our author into paths
where
his
remarkable powers of mind show to com-
paratively small advantage.
Could he have been

'
content with giving to the world
Suggestions
to-
wards a theory of the Universe on the basis of the

ordinary scientific postulates,' his astonishing faculty
for collecting
from every department of knowledge

tell in
the facts which seem to
his favour
would have
sensi-
had
free scope, while his
somewhat blunted
bility in
the matter of difficulties and contradictions
might have been of actual advantage. In trespassing

on metaphysical ground, the virtues which he possesses as a thinker
his extraordinary
range of
in-
formation and his ingenuity in framing original and

suggestive hypotheses
less,
become
comparatively use-
while the robust faith in his method and results

is
by which he
be
ifi
animated, necessary as
admit
it
to
order that he
may be
is
sustained through his
protracted labours
from a speculative point of
view an almost unmixed evil

R
242
[part
hi.
PART III. CHAPTER XII.

SCIENCE AS A LOGICAL SYSTEM.
The
we
reader will recollect that the only quality of obfirst
jects for the existence of which in the
instance
required proof was their persistence.
In point
of fact no philosopher has set himself to prove this
without at the same time attempting to prove
much
more, and as a necessary
result,
the foregoing exami-
nation of realistic systems has contained allusions,
more or
It is
less frequent, to other
and equally
*
essential
attributes of
what
is
called
the external world.'
now time
to desert the philosophers,

'
and to
it is
say a few words about this

dealt with
external world,' as
by Science
far
not
is
for the
purpose of deter-
mining how
Science
justified in
assuming
its
reality, for this
question has been already discussed,
but
in
order to obtain
some
idea of the general
character of the existing scientific system regarded

as a logical whole.
Granting, then, the reality of an external world,

let
us ask, in the
first
place,
what
is
its
?
real nature
according to modern scientific teaching
CHAP.
XII.]

it
243
Speaking generally,
consists,
we
are told, of
atoms possessing mass, chemical

qualities
;
affinity,
and other
called
and of a universally diffused medium,
ether, which,
by means of
certain very singular pro-
perties, transmits
through space certain vibrations by

affected.
in
which these atoms are
Associated together by various laws
various
groups, these atoms constitute the solid, liquid, and
gaseous bodies scattered through space

the infinite
from among
to each
number
of which there
is
man
assigned one of especial importance to himself;
mean
his
own
organism.
The very
interesting class
of objects to which these belong, do not differ from

the rest of the material universe in the nature of
their ultimate composition.
In
many
other most im-
portant respects no doubt they do

peculiarity about
differ,
But the
them with which

is
at this
moment
we
are specially concerned
the
fact,
that they are
the immediate channels of communication between

the world
I
have just described, and the thinking

their
beings
who by
its
means are made acquainted

and
in-
directly with the appearance of that world,

directly with
true nature
and
constitution.
Before going further in the consideration of the

general system of Science,
the reader
it
may be as well
to
remind
is
how
unlike the world just described
to
the world which
we
actually perceive, or can repreI
sent by an effort of the imagination.
do not of
course
mean
to say that the
world of perception and
244
[part
hi.
the world of science are numerically distinct.

Is
This
evidently not so.
When
astronomers talk of the

;
when chemists talk of elementary substances, they mean things we can touch and handle. But when they go on to
tell
moon, they mean the moon we see
us about the Intimate structure of these bodies
they are soon compelled to use words which have

only a symbolic meaning, and to refer to objects
which
(It
may
be) can be thoicght, but which cer-
tainly cannot In their real nature
be either perceived
or Imagined.
That knowledge or what passes

soon gets
In this
for
knowledge
way beyond
the data of perception

Is
and the powers of Imagination,

to the surface
a fact which comes
more prominently
I
In
Theology perhaps
Is
than In Science.
there
Is
am
not aware that this
because
these
between two great departments of knowledge. It

essential philosophic difference
any
arises rather
from the
fact that, for controversial pur-
poses.
It
has been found convenient to dwell on the

Is
circumstance that our idea of the Deity
to a certain
extent necessarily anthropomorphic, while the no less

certain,
If
somewhat
less obvious, truth that

is
our idea
of the external world
also anthropomorphic, does
not supply any ready argumentative weapon.
There
other.
are,
however, further reasons
why
this side
of the case has not received so
much
attention as the
One
of
them
is,
think,
that
any person
speculating on this subject
is
apt to slide
away from
CHAP.
XII.]
245
it
into the allied but altogether distinct questions
concerning Realism and Idealism.
These are prob-
lems, however, the solution of which has no direct
bearing upon the subject
we
are
now
discussing.
Whether Realism or Idealism either of them or both of them
be
true,
whether
are consistent with
Science, this broad fact remains, that the world as
represented to us by Science can no more be perceived or imagined than the Deity as represented to
us by Theology, and that in the
second,
first
case, as in the
we must
content ourselves with symbolical
images, of which the thing

is
we can most
certainly say
that they are not only inadequate but incorrect.
This
on
is
not an assertion which in reality requires

to support
it.
much argument
Its truth is
apparent
simple inspection,
and
it
applies equally to the
two main constituents of the external world

Matter as well as to Force,
to
in
it it
To
Science
begin with the

is
latter.
all
Force according to
its
the cause of
is
motion, and
amount
any case
measured by the amount of motion

in
produces or can produce

is
a given time.
Now,
see
evident that
we come most
to
closely into contact
(so to speak) with Force, either
when we
one
body foreign
ourselves
exercising
force
upon
another, as for example, a locomotive engine pulling
a coal waggon, or when
we feel
pressure between our
bodies and some foreign substance
that,
for
ex-
ample, produced by a tight boot
(this
pressure not
246
[part hi.
being the result of energy supplied by our bodies), or
when we
exercise effort so as to produce pressure

for
between our bodies and some foreign substance,

example, by raising a weight
result of
;
which pressure
If
is
the
energy supplied by our bodies.
we
can-
not perceive force in one at least of these cases,

cannot,
I
apprehend, perceive
it
it
at all
and
if
we we
cannot perceive
at
all, it
it
will
probably be admitted
that our ideas respecting
must be purely anthropo-
morphic, and only symbolical of the reality.
Without wearying the reader by examining these

three cases in detail,
it
may be assumed,
that, as a
imagine,
fact,
without further discussion our idea of force

is
matter of
derived in the last resort entirely

:
from the second and third
so that
either felt pressure or exercised
we had never muscular effort, we

if
should be altogether unable to frame
mental
image which should
in
any way correspond with the
subject-matter of dynamics.
Does the idea

?
it
so de-
rived correspond with the reality
The common
only symbolises
it
opinion seems to be that, though
the force which acts between inanimate bodies,

resembles the force which
living organisms.
is
exerted by, or acts on,
But this, I apprehend, is incorrect. There can be no resemblance between the mental images, whether of pressure or of effort, and that
external and independent force which they are
em-
ployed to represent.
Why
should the feeling (said
to be) of pressure be like the pressure
which pro-
CHAP.
XII.]

It is
247
duces
It ?
not force,
it is
:
one of the
it
effects of
force acting
on our organism
does not even vary

it,
directly with the force
which produces
but de-
pends on the part of the body affected and on other

circumstances.
effort,
Neither
it is
is
the feeHng of muscular
Force
rather one of the mental accomis
paniments of muscular action when that action
set
going by the Will.
do not even see how

:
it
can be
accurately called a cause of Force

into this
but without going
question, which
is
not material to
it
my
argu-
ment,
it
seems certain that whether

it
be cause or be
dis-
merely accompaniment,
tinct
must
at all events
from that which

then
it
causes or accompanies.
in
If
we
try
and represent to ourselves

is
imagination the reality which

assertion,
'
expressed by this
the inkstand presses on the table with a

is
force of
if
two pounds,' our idea of what

such an idea at
false for
all,
taking place,
we form
will in all probability
be entirely
first place,
two separate reasons.
In the
we
shall introduce notions of pressure
and
muscular
effort,
which have no imaginable meaning
for us, except as affections of a living organism, into
the relation which exists between portions of inani-
mate matter
force,
or,
and secondly, we
shall deal with feelif
ings of pressure and muscular effort as

at all events,
they were
resembled
force, instead of
being only
now and
then related to force, as causes,
as effects, or as accompaniments.
If
now from Force we
turn to Matter,
we
find
248

similar limits fixed to our
[part
hi.
somewhat
nation.
powers of imagiformwhile
It is true that
we
find
no
difificulty in
;
ing an idea of matter as matter appears to us

in the case of force, since
it
never appears to
us,
we
cannot even do this much.
But
if,
instead of framing
an idea of matter as we perceive

an idea of
it
it^
we
try to
it
frame
is,
as Science assures us that
really
we soon become
an impossibility.
kinds or degrees.
conscious that
we
are attempting
Of this
In
impossibility there are

cases, for
two
some
example,
we
may be
because
convinced that Matter has certain
qualities,
we observe
effects
which require an hypo-
thesis of this kind in order to account for them.
But
as to
what these
qualities
may
be, apart
from their
we not only cannot imagine, but we do not even know how to try and imagine. We have nothing to go upon. Our senses and our reason alike fail us and it would be more accurate perhaps to say that we
effects,
;
have no ideas corresponding to them at
all
than to
say that our ideas of them are anthropomorphic.
What,
for
example,
is
chemical affinity
What
is
the real nature of the change which takes place in a
copper wire when an

it ?
electric current passes

'^,
along
What
is
magnetism
Science has at present

:
no certain answer to give to these questions

the
true
but
there are other questions respecting matter to which
answers are known with a considerable

scientific probability,
degree of
though at the same
time they carry us not the less into regions where
CHAP.
XII.]

is
249
the imagination
unable to follow them.

to
For exdoubt on
ample,
we
are required
believe (no
excellent grounds) that the

light
is
sensation of coloured
produced by material particles vibrating with
a certain rapidity, and that the varieties of colour are

the result of differences in the rapidity and combinations of these vibrations
It is
when they reach
the eye.
a necessary consequence of this doctrine, that
the vibi'ating particles must themselves be regarded

as having no colour
effect
:
their colour being
merely the
produced on our particular organism by their
rapid periodic motion acting through space by

of the diffused ether.
sufficient to
means
is
But the smallest
trial
convince us that to represent in imagiis
nation uncoloured vibrating atoms
a task
alto-
gether beyond our powers.

or
'
The
other senses, touch
the muscular sense,' through which
we
acquire a
knowledge of material
objects, are altogether incapa-
ble of supplying the elements necessary for such a
purpose, at least they are so with
me and
;
it is
of
course impossible to bring in the sense of sight to

their assistance without at the
same time representing
as coloured the things
we
are attempting to imagine.
There
heat.
is
no similar
les's
difficulty in the parallel case of
Heat, no
than
light, exists in
the material
world as a mode of motion.
Yet
it is
easy to sepa-
rate in idea the vibrating particles
from the sensation
of warmth, and to consider one as the cause of the

other.
We
are not compelled, as in the case
of
2SO

by the laws of imagination,
with the cause before
all.
[part hi.
light,
to
confonnd the
effect
we
can picture to our-
selves the cause of
This particular weakness or defect

of representation affects,
it
in
our power
will
be observed, our
ideas of the whole material universe.
There
is
not
a single particle of Matter which

ceive or picture to ourselves as
as a similar assertion can, as
I
we
can either per:
it
really exists
and
have shown, be made
about Force
and as
it
can be
made with
still
more
obvious truth about the more occult kinds or properties
of external objects (ether, magnetism, and so

I
forth),
think
may
I
consider the thesis which in
this
long digression
set out to prove, as sufficiently
established.
Let us now return to the proper subject of the

present chapter, namely. Science considered in
its
most general aspect as a Logical System.

real nature of the external
I
We
have
the
seen what, according to scientific teaching,
is
world
(as for
convenience
it
here
it
call
it)
and we have seen that as
really
It is
is,
can neither be perceived nor imagined.

this,
easy to conclude from
what indeed
is
patent to
everybody, that
its real
we arrive
at our actual
knowledge of
minute
nature, not immediately, but
by a process of
inference.
particles
;
That material objects

that colour
;
consist of
is
the effect of the vibration of
these particles
as through
that these vibrations are transmitted

elastic
an
and imponderable medium
CHAP.
XII.]

world
is
251
that, in short, the
what
it is,
are truths which,
far
from being
intuitive,
must be considered as the

latest triumphs, of
most refined deductions, as the

scientific investigation.
What, then, are these deductions founded on
Men
point,
of science,
who
should be authorities on this
inform us that they are founded on facts

;
obtained by direct observation
and that the
facts
obtained by direct observation consist of what
we
of
can
perceive
of
the
qualities
and
behaviour
objects
whose
persistence, for the sake of argument,

to assume.
is
we are agreed
of
it
In othet words, our settled
view of the universe

hmnediately
is its
;
inferred from
what we know
it
and what we know of
imme-
diately
appearance.
Now
ing
is,
the singular thing about this sort of reason-
that unless the premises be true, there
seems
no particular ground
while
if
for accepting the conclusion

it is
the conclusion be accepted,
evident that
the premises cannot be entirely true.
Unless apbelieve
trust to
pearances are to be trusted,

in
Science
If
?
Science
is
why should we true, how can we
appearances
From the scientific point of view it may possibly be

replied, that our
immediate knowledge of the external
world
is in
part to be trusted
but only
in part.
We
;
know by direct
observation
and know truly^-of the

moving bodies
scientific inference, that
existence of extended, resisting, and
and we know, by a process of
252

forth,
[part iil
the qualities of colour and so
which these
extended, resisting,
possess,
and moving bodies appear to
are really the subjective effects of the inter-
action
between them and our organism.
So
that
may be said to provide us with by which we may distinguish between

Science
a criterion
that which
to be,
both seems to be and

but
is Hot.
is,
and that which seems
Now
pearance,
itself,
that
we do
in practice so
use Science to
enable us to distinguish between

is
reality
and ap-
undoubtedly the
fact.
But taken by
this
circumstance affords no real solution of
the difficulty, because the very thing

particularly to
we want more
know is, how we can thus legitimately erect Science into a judge of its own cause. The precise question which has to be answered,
and the
Insufficiency
it,
of
this,
the
first
and most
to
natural answer to
will
become obvious
anyone
who
line
reflects
on the following
series of propositions,
which extend and define the argument, whose outI
have just Indicated

Scientific
1st.
knowledge which
Is
not
imme-
diate
Is
derived by Inference from the Immediate
knowledge furnished by observations of the external

world.
(This
apprehend
Is
the view ordinarily
taken by
men
of science.)
2nd. Observations of the external world assure
us
(If
they assure us of anything) that bodies exist

resisting,
which are coloured, extended,
and so
forth.
CHAP.
XII.]
253
3rd.
The
assurance
are
we
obtain by pure observais
tion that bodies
coloured,
of precisely the
same kind as is the assurance we obtain from the same source, that they are extended and resisting.
(That
this Is so
cannot of course be proved, but

reflection.)
will
be evident to everybody on
4th.
While
pure
observation
shows
this,
in-
ferences professing to be derived In the main from
pure observation show us that bodies are not coloured,

but that the appearance of colour
is
produced by
motions or other changes
In the
uncoloured particles
composing the object perceived and the organism of

the percipient.
true,
(This must be admitted
if
Science
Is
and
If It Is
derived from observation.)

this
it
5th.
From
follows that
in
some of the imis
mediate knowledge given

worthy.
6th.
observation
untrust-
According
to
(4)
there
is
nothing
In
the
observations themselves to suggest any principle of

distinction
are,
between those which, according

not, trustworthy.
to Science
and those which are

7."
Neither
Is it
possible that such a principle of

it is
distinction should
be furnished by Science, since
only
if
the principle of distinction

Is
be sound that
Science
logically justified.
It is
not admissible to
make Science depend on the principle (whatever it may be), at the same time that we make the principle
depend upon Science.
Stated in this form, the exact nature of the
diffi-
254

I
[part hi.
culty
is
wish to point out becomes evident

that forces itself readily
it
and
if it
not one
is
on the
attention,
this
because
does not attach to the received
theory of the causal origin of our knowledge of the

material
world (which
is
the one
that
habitually
regulates our thoughts), but only to the theory of the
from empirical data, which is not a subject with which we are usually much concerned. Let me explain. When we are occupied with the consideration of how we come to possess the knowledge we have of the external world, if we are in a scientific rather than in a metaphysical humour, we immediately and naturally look at the
logical deduction
of
scientific doctrine
question from the poipt of view of the physiology of

perception
;
and the physiology of perception,

this
in its
most general form, teaches us

diate
that the immeis
antecedent to an act of perception
some
;
definite
change
if
in the
organism of the percipient

it
and that
to
will
this
change occurs, no matter how
is
originated, the particular perception corresponding

it
occur likewise.
Now
the
same kind of
change may
causes.
If
at different times
have
different sets of
on any given occasion one of the proxithe thing perceived, then percepIf,
mate causes of the physiological change producing

the perception
tion
is
is
said to be normal.
is
on the other hand, the
thing perceived
not one of the proximate causes
of the physiological change, then

deceived by
we
are said to be
an
illusion
of the
senses.
Supposing, for
CHAP. XII.]

I
255
example, that
see the
moon when
is
she
is
actually in
the field of view, and her rays are striking on

retina,
then the object seen

it,
one of the
my causes of my
to
if
seeing
and the immediate knowledge conveyed

of perception
I
me
(to
in that act
is
so far accurate.
But
take the opposite case),

that
see a ghost, then, on the
supposition
there
are
no such
things,
am
suffering under an optical delusion, since,
whatever
may be
results
the causes of the physiological change which

in
that
act of perception,
it
cannot at
all
events be the object perceived, which by hypothesis
has no existence.
This
is
the physiological theory of perception

its
looked at from
at
causal or physical side.

it
Looked
from
its
cognitive or mental side,

is,
suggests the
idea that there

verse>
on the one hand, a Material Uni;
and on the other a Mind

its
and that the Mind
obtains
information respecting the Material Uniit
verse by looking at
five senses,
through the medium of the

altogether excludes a
of what
it
a medium which
much
not
great deal, and distorts

pass.
I
allows to
am
In
here pretending to
criticise this
theory.
common
I
with most theories which give

it
an account of the origin of knowledge,

defect,
has a logical
in the
which
It
shall
attempt to explain
next
diffi-
chapter.
has
also,
no doubt, philosophical
culties peculiar to itself
But what
am
concerned
to
show here
is,
that so far from presenting
any
diffi-
culties in
the
way
of a belief according to which a
56

is
[part
hi.
distinction
is,
made between what appears and what

;
it
actually suggests such a belief

it is
and that therehabitually think
fore
in
not surprising that since
we
I
terms (so to speak) of this theory,

troubled by the discrepancy
we should be
to
little
have shown
exist
its
between the empirical premises of Science and

has been already pointed out that this dis-
received conclusions.
It
crepancy cannot be smoothed away by any principle supplied
by Science
But
itself,
it
except at the cost of
arguing
that the
in
circle.
may perhaps be thought
whole
scientific
doctrine of matter, and of
the methods by which the properties of matter be-
come known
to us,
may be
legitimately put forward

verification,
as a hypothesis,
and may be capable of
like other hypotheses,
by an appeal
objection
I
to experience
and that
in this
way the
have been urging
may be
Let
successfully evaded.
me
consider the subject for a
moment from
I
this point of view.
The
reasoning to which
object
asserts that the laws governing material
phenomena
that the
are inferred from the immediate knowledge of matter
given
in
perception, and at the
same time
laws so inferred show this knowledge to be in certain

particulars incorrect.
The
reasoning which
it
is
proposed to substitute for

least of the laws
this asserts that
some
in
at
governing material phenomena, and

those which
are included
more
especially
the
physiological theory of perception, are not inferred
from the knowledge given
in perception,
but are
CHAP.
XII.]
SCIENCE -AS A LOGICAL SYSTEM.
257
adopted as a hypothesis to account

such and such perceptions
exist,
for the fact, that
function which
they perform so successfully that they

cepted as to
truths.
all
may be
ac-
intents
and purposes demonstrated
This mode of establishing the laws of matter

identical in
its
is
general scope with that adopted by
certain philosophers to prove the reality of the external world

its"
;
although the difficulty which suggests

different in the
I
adoption
is
two
case^.
The
ideas,
phi-
losophers of
whom
speak were of opinion that
we
and
could perceive nothing beyond our
own
they sought to avoid an idealistic conclusion by
supposing that an objective cause was required to

account for the fact that our ideas
scientific
exist.
The
I
argument, on the other hand, with which

is
am
It
at present concerned,
not put forward in order
to avoid a psychological difficulty^ but a logical one.

is
not required because

this
introspective
analysis
shows
thing or that thing respecting the true
nature of perception, but because the conclusions of

Science,
if
made
to
depend
solely
on the immediate
not, as a
knowledge given
of
fact,
in perception,
do
matter
harmonise with their premises.

in
Now,
evadedj
order to estimate properly the value of
the argument
by which
this difficulty is
sought to he
we must
ignore the information given im-
mediately by perception respecting the nature of the

external causes
by which perception
s
is
produced.
258

is
[part
hi.
This
evident, because the difficulty itself arose

rest scientific
from our attempting to

this information.
doctrine
on
We
solely
are
expected, then, to found a theory re-
specting the true nature
of these external causes

i.e.,
on
the fact that their effects,
our percep-
tions, are of
such and such a character.
Now
this
undertaking
impossible
matter,
it
;
we may,
and
if
think, boldly assert to

is
be
there
any doubt about the

this single consider-
may be
set at rest
by
ation, that if
effect to
two causes capable of producing the

no possible way of deciding
(to
be accounted for (namely, our perceptions),

is
be suggested, there
between them.
Supposing, for example

it
revive
an old speculation),
was maintained that
it is
not
the
matter possessed of certain properties which
is
required cause, but the Deity acting directly on our
What reply could be made to such a supposition ? The immediate answer that rises to our lips is, that we know that matter exists, and that we have no such knowledge about the Deity. But how do we know that matter exists ? Because we perminds.
ceive
it ?
This source of knowledge

:
is
excluded by
hypothesis
nor can
imagine any other, of an
empirical kind, except the one

discussing.
It
we
are at the
must further be
recollected
moment that we
have no reason to suppose that the
limits of imagin-
ation represent on this subject the limits of possibility.
Nor
is it
practicable, as
pointed out in the
chapter on Historical
Inference,
by the mere con-
CHAP.
XII.]

It is
259
templation of an effect (and

in
to this that
we
all
are
the
present case restricted) to discover

it
the
causes by which
might conceivably have been
produced, or to determine which of these possible

causes,
If,
known or unknown, actually produced it. then, we cannot argue from the mere fact that
exist, neither is
it
perceptions exist to the fact that material objects
corresponding to them
possible to
argue from the
fact that these perceptions are of
such and such a kind, to the fact that the objects

perceived have such and such qualities.
Before concluding this section,
let
me
point out
in this In
what
last
it
is
that
have
7tot
attempted to do
it,
argumentative portion of
have not
any
way been concerned

real
with theories respecting the
constitution
of matter based on metaphysical
speculation, nor has any part of the reasoning de-
pended on the truth of a

ception.
I
particular doctrine of perthat. If as

It
have simply assumed

Is
we
:
are
told Science
founded upon experience,
must be
either
founded on experience of one of two kinds
upon
that experience
which
may be
described as
the Immediate knowledge of objects given In perception, or else

else
upon the experience which
is
nothing
than our knowledge of the fact that
we have
of these
such and such perceptions.

assumptions,
I
On
;
the
first
pointed out that the conclusions of

its
Science contradicted
premises
on the second,
at
showed
that Science could
draw no conclusions
all.
s 2
26o
[part in.
CHAPTER
Ever
XIIL
THE EVOLUTION OF BELIEF}

since there has been speculation
fact
on the subject
of varieties of opinion, this

obvious, that a man's beHefs
results of antecedents
must have been
are very
much
the
and surroundings with which
they have no proper logical connection.

sons of Christians are
That the
much more often Christians, and the sons of Mahommedans much more often Mahommedans, that a man more commonly holds
the opinions of those with
whom
he
lives,
and more
commonly
\j
trusts the policy of the party with
whom
cases
he
acts,
than on the theory of probability could

In all
happen supposing that conviction was
the result of an impartial comparison of evidence,
must always have been

observer.
It
plain to the
it
most
careless
other words,
must always have been

belief
known
that there
were causes of
which were
not reasons.
The
progress of knowledge has not led us to
increase, but rather to diminish, our estimate of the
The substance of this chapter appeared originally in the FortReview of 1877, p. 698. I have attempted to cure the obscurity which some of my friends professed to find in it, at the cost of
^
nightly
little
amplification,
and
fear a certain
amount of repetition.
CHAt>. XIII.]
THE EVOLUTION OF
BELIEF.
261
part which reasons as opposed to other causes have
played
in the
formation of creeds
for
it
has shown
us that these reasons are themselves the result of

non-rational antecedents, so that even
when a man
is
attempts to form opinions only according to evidence,
what he shall regard as
evidence
settled for
him by causes over which he has no more

ticular flora
is
control
than he has over the natural forces by which a par-
produced at any particular place and

evidence for this truth
It is justified
time.
The
scientific
is
various
and overwhelming.
regard to races
toric
a posteriori with
observation, with
regard to individuals by
common
by every improvement in our hismethod and every addition to our historic

Physiology shows
the
it
knowledge.
monstrating
a priori by de-
dependence of
thought
on the
organism, and of the organism on inheritance and
environment, while
finally evolution
binds up these
detached lines of proof into an imposing and organic

whole.
But though,
doubts the
plate
it
in
the face of such evidence, nobody

I
fact,
few people,
should think, contemsuffering
habitually without
now and then

(if
I
under a sort of sceptical uneasiness

express myself),
their
in
may
so
when they
consider
its
bearing on
own
opinions.
The
multitude of beliefs which,
obedience to a mechanic and inevitable law, sway

time the minds and actions of men, and are
for a
262
[part
hi.
then for ever swept away to the forgotten past,

giving place to others, as firmly trusted
in,
as false,
and as transitory as themselves, form a spectacle

which
is
is
not only
somewhat melancholy
in itself,
but
which
to the
apt to suggest uncomfortable reflections as
permanent character of the convictions we

to.
If,
ourselves happen to be attached
indeed, the
law obeyed
by
this
intellectual
dissolving
view
applied only to savages, or to the people with

opinions
plate
its
whose
we
disagreed,
we might perhaps contemis
action with a merely speculative interest.
Unfortunately, however, this
not
so.
We
are
all
involved in
its
operations, from the
most ignorant
barbarian to the most advanced thinker.

istence of
The
ex-
Comtism
it
is
explained by
it
not less than
that of fetichism,
accounts for theories of Evolution
not less than for Hindoo cosmogonies, and the

of science
is
man
as certainly under
its
is
Indian whose superstitions he

of analysis and classification.
control as was the making the subject
But
if
these
things
be
so,
wherein
?
lies
is
our
true
defence against universal scepticism

that
It
we hear on all sides of the progress ledge, that we imagine science to be as

fabric of
of
it
knowwere a
resting
which each generation lays a

laid
tier,
upon that which was
by
Its
predecessors, and
serving for a foundation for that which will be laid
by
its
successors.
But
after
all,
this
metaphor only
It is
represents an opinion
like other opinions.
the
CHAP.
XIII.]
THE EVOLUTION OF
BELIEF.
263
belief of an optimistic age,
which may seem
to future
generations no more than a transitory fashion.

last
The
suffi-
ground of
faith
is
seems cut away from beneath our

left
it
feet, if
no belief
which can be trusted
ciently for us to use
as a criterion of immutable
truth
and
if
our creed be the mere product of
irrational law,
where
is
such a belief to be found

this must,
I
train of
thought not unlike
should
imagine, have been sometimes started in the mind of
the reader
opinion.
I
when he
propose
I
reflects
on the evolution of
in this
chapter to put in a clear
form what
in
conceive to be the really solid element

if
such sceptical,
somewhat, vague, speculations.

stated thus
:
The
case
it
may be
Since
all
beliefs
are caused,
follows that those fundamental beliefs

at the root of all
I
must be caused which lie beliefs, and which are, as

chapter, the rational
other
first
explained in the
ground on which we hold them.
Now
these fundamental beliefs, being the ultimate

all
premises of
knowledge, are themselves, of course,
incapable of proof
So
that while they resemble
other beliefs in being caused, they differ from them

in this, that the causes
by which they are produced

In ordinary
are of necessity, and from the very nature of the

case,
always non-rational.
life,
when
we
perceive a non-rational cause for any opinion, as
for instance party feeling, or self-interest, or special
education,
it
makes us examine such reasons

it
as there
may be
for
with more jealous minuteness.
In
264

it is
[part
hi.
contrast to this,
curious and interesting to note
that the only beliefs of which, according to received

scientific theories,
we may say
with certainty that
they can have no reason, but micst have non-rational

causes, are those
on which the certitude of
all
other
beliefs finally rests.
The
upholders, however, of the
current theory of Evolution are so far from finding
any
difficulty here, that
they even refer triumphantly
to this theory of non-rational causation, as supplying
a basis of philosophical certitude to these funda-
mental
is
beliefs.
They hold
is
that though
all
opinion
the product of natural forces, the general tendency
of those forces
gradually to
make
opinion approxi-
mate
are
to truth
that in particular the opinions which

*
commonly regarded as
intuition
'
self-evident
'
and known
'
by
are really the result of reiterated and
uncontradicted
generations
;
experience
this
acting
on
successive
and that
theory of their origin
supplies a philosophic justification for believing

to
them
be
true.
This
fest
line of reasoning,
in
however, involves a maniIt
argument
circle.
cannot be that this

is
interaction
between organism and environment
reason for believing any proposition to be true which

is
required to prove that interaction.
Or
(to
put
it
more generally) no argument in favour of a system of beliefs can be drawn from the fact that, according to
that system,
its
fundamental beliefs would be
true.
From
Evolution, then, no argument can be
drawn
CHAP.
XIII.]
THE EVOLUTION OF
scientific
BELIEF.
It
265
in
favour of any
axiom.
remains to be
less
seen
whether that theory has any

belief.
negative
bearing on the philosophy of
Now
the
theory asserts this
All
phenomena
whatever are evolved by regular laws and groups

of laws from the
in time.
phenomena next preceding them

other phenomena, beliefs
;
Among
among
any-
other beliefs, fundamental beliefs.
All beliefs what-
ever being caused, the question
arises. Is there
thing in the nature of the laws according to which
they are caused which should
make them
true
To
which an evolutionist would probably reply that

there
is,
and would mention those causes
to
which
is
allusion has already
been made, whose tendency

belief
gradually
to
make
make
If
is
correspond
with
fact.
Then (we may

a nature as to
further ask) are these causes of such

all beliefs true
?
This question must undoubtedly be answered

the
negative.
'
in
any. result of 'observation and
experiment
certain, this
one
is
so
that
many
in
erroneous beliefs have existed, and do exist in the
world
so that whatever causes there
may be
operation by which true beliefs are promoted, they
must be
dency.
either
limited
in
their
operation,
or be
counteracted by other causes of an opposite ten-
Have
wê
then any reason to suppose that
fundamental beliefs are specially subject to these

truth-producing influences, or specially exempt from
causes of error
?
This question,
apprehend, must
266

in the negative.
if
[part
hi.
be answered
it
At
first sight,
indeed,
would seem as
those beliefs were specially pro-
tected from error which are the results of legitimate
reasoning.
But legitimate reasoning

if it
is
only a pro-
tection against error
proceeds from true pre-
mises,
and
it
is
clear that this particular protection

all
the
premises of
they,
'
reasoning never can possess.

?
Have
then,
any other
I
Except the
'
ten-
dency above mentioned,
must confess myself un;
able to see that they have

evolutionists)
is
so that our position (as

beliefs
all
this
From certain ultimate

all
we
infer that
an order of things exists by which
beliefs,
and therefore
ultimate beliefs, are probelief,
duced, but according to which any particular
and therefore any particular ultimate

doubtful.
belief,
must be
is
Now destructive. No
this
is
a position w^hich
beliefs,
self-
system of
giving an account
of the origin of fundamental beliefs, can be consistent

unless those fundamental beliefs are as certain
when
regarded as the result of antecedent causes, as they

are
when regarded
I
as the ground of our belief in the

It
existence and operation of those causes.
does
not follow (as

that
if,
pointed out by implication above)
according to the account of their origin given

beliefs are true,
by the system, those fundamental

that therefore they are
true
for the truth of the

beliefs,
system
is
an inference from these
and cannot
is,
therefore prove them.
What
does follow
that the
system has one of the negative conditions of truth,
CHAP.
XIII.]
THE EVOLUTION OF
BELIEF.
is
267
and
is
(so far at least as this

itself.
it
matter
concerned)
consistent with
To
there
this criticism
may
perhaps be replied, that

in
is
no contradiction involved
seems
considering a
proposition from two points of view
from
one of
which
It
it
certain,
and from the other doubtful.

in
happens every day
dealing with statements
which are established by pieces of evidence of very

different degrees of cogency.
For example, the
fact
that the three angles of a triangle are invariably equal

to
two right angles would be doubtful
if
we had no
better
means of demonstrating
pair of compasses.
it
it
than the employ-
ment of a
it
Geometrical proof, on
the other hand, makes
absolutely certain.
Will
can
be maintained that such an inconsistency,

so,
if it
?
be called
suggests any sceptical conclusion

not.
Assuredly
But there
is
no parallelism be-
tween the two
cases.
Ultimate premises are not
shown to be merely probable by one set of proofs, and shown to be certain by another. They are not shown to be certain at all. They are assumed to be
so
:
and the
first
stage of the difficulty arises from
the fact that while they are assumed without evi-
dence to be
their origin
certain, the
evidence
we
possess as to
shows that they are not

all,
certain.
If this
were
however, the
difficulty
a slight one.
We
should merely have to
would be modify our
original position,
and concede
to the sceptic that the
assurance
we
possessed respecting the validity of
268
[part
hi.
our ultimate premises was not quite so strong as
we
had supposed.
difficulty arises,
It is at the
next stage that the real
when we
consider the fact that our
whole ground
doubtful
tainty.
is
for thinking these ultimate

in the last resort
premises
their cer-
founded
is
upon
This
fatal
a manifest flaw or defect, which

the validity of any system from
must be
which
it
to
cannot be removed.
The difficulty only arises, it may be obsei^ved, when we are considering our own beliefs. If I am considering the beliefs of some other person
mediaeval divine
there
I
say of some
I
is
no reason why
should
regard them as anything but the results of his time
and circumstances.
a country,
teachers,
fell
observe that he lived
in
such
under the influence of such and such

across such
came
and such
incidents,
and
then
infer,
with
much
self-contentment, that his

I
beliefs could not
have been other than they were.
may even pay them

that
the compliment of pointing out

in
I
they form a necessary stage
the general
evolution of humanity.
sider
But when
as
come
to con-
my own
beliefs
a stage
in
the general
evolution of humanity, then there emerges the contradiction
mentioned above.
of
If
they represent such
a stage,
all
them may
be,
and many of them must

in
be, false.
Why
not the particular belief

it
Evo?
lution
Because
is
scientifically
demonstrated
This only removes the

back.
It
difficulty
a stage further
must be
demonstrated ultimately from
CHAP.
XIII.]
THE EVOLUTION OF
is
BELIEF.
269
something which
undemonstrated
doubtful
not demonstrated
are
and these
rendered
behefs
necessarily
by the
if this
reflection that they
form part of the
stage in the evolution of humanity.

*
But
is
all,'
the advocates of Evolution

'
may be
inclined to reply,
you have proved nothing

to grant.
is
more than we are quite prepared

present rigorously certain
We
not at
it
concede, without difficulty, that our theory

;
and even that
can
never become so. must always attach

further,
You have shown

to our original data
;
that doubt
we
will
go
into
and admit that error may always creep

But
this
our most careful deductions.
only shows---
what nobody ever disputedthat we must content

ourselves in science, as in everything else, with some-
thing short of rigorous demonstration.
Unless you
can show us that our system has some other defect,

not necessarily incident to the work of
fallible
man,
your arguments
will
be wasted on people
I
;
who
is
in the
main agree with

it
you.'
reply that
can show that

this
:
has some other defect
and the defect

be
If
we suppose Evolution
tionist
to
become what evety evolu-
must wish
is
it
to
though
he may admit
demonstra-
that
it
not
namely, a
certain
;
solid piece of
tion resting
ment
its
it
on axiomatic premises, from that mobecomes self-contradictory. It is impossible

it
as soon as
is
because,
by the very
fact of
becoming
certain,
we
obtain demonstrative proof
that the premises of the system, and therefore the

itself, is is
2 70
[part hi.
system
uncertain.
system of which
it is
this
can be said
not merely doubtful,
incoherent.
The
abstract
is
precise nature of this objection will perhaps

if,
be more clear
instead of being put in this
its
most
it
and general form, a concrete example of
taken.
We
may
suppose, then, a conversation between

in
an Evolutionist and an Enquirer,

the former has explained
in
which,
the usual
when ways how

reached
human
beliefs, after
passing through infinite grada-
tions of diminishing error,
have
at length
the highest development they are
now
capable of in
the opinion he himself professes, the Enquirer continues the dialogue
by asking
that this development of
limits,
Enq.
beliefs
Do you suppose
now reached
?
has
its
or do you antici-
pate as great a change in the future as has occurred

in the past
EvL However views may be over

still
great
the superiority
of
my
are
those of
my
remote ancestors,
or indeed over those of
my
contemporaries
tradition, there
who
is
under the influence of
every
reason to suppose that the causes which have pro-
duced
this superiority are still in operation,
and that
we may
mankind
Enq,
look forward to a time

will
when
the opinion of
bear the same relation to ours as ours
bear to those of primitive man.
glorious
hope
One, nevertheless,
which would seem to imply that many of our pre-
CHAP.
XIII.]
THE EVOLUTION OF
BELIEF.
271
sent views are either entirely wrong, or will require
profound modification.
EvL
Doubtless. Enq. would be

It
interesting to
know which
is
of
our opinions, or which class of them,
likely to
be
improved
example,
in this
is
way
off the face of the earth.
For
that
?
the opinion you have just expressed,
that beliefs are developed according to law
is
opinion likely to be destroyed by development

Evl.
tive
To
answer your question
in the affirmaIf (as
would appear
to involve a contradiction.
is
we assume) development
sible that
truthwards,
it
is
imposin
development should produce a disbelief
development
Enq,
belief in
tible,
understand you to hold then that a

true,
it
development is
in this
and therefore indestrucfrom many of our
and that
differs
other beliefs, of which

the same.
It
we
cannot, unfortunately, say
would be important
order
grounds of
see
this distinction, in
it
know the that we might

to
how
far
was capable of general

is
application.
j5'z//. Evolution
a theory arrived at by reDoubtless,

all
ceived scientific methods.
results of
true,
which the same may be said are equally

will
and
a
be equally permanent.
Enq,
You
talk
of
scientific
methods
but
I
method must proceed on a
principle or principles.
How
do you get
at these
EvL
The
principles
you speak of
are,
sup-
272
[part
hi.
pose, the assumptions which every one
must
start
from,
ledge.
who
expects to
make any
progress in know-
Enq.
are
These
therefore,
assumptions, as
scientific
understand you,
possible
what render a
method
at
They
cannot,
be
arrived
by a
scientific
method, nor can they belong to that class of beliefs

which, as you just pointed out, the progress of evolution will leave uninjured.
EvL
is,
Still
you must assume something.

the difficulty here, as
it
Enq,
that
But
you
seems to me,
if
start
from your idea of evolution, these

other beliefs not arrived at by
assumptions, like
*
all
received scientific methods,' are, or
may
be,
mere
like
transient phases in the
development of opinion,
the doctrines involved in ancestor worship or theism.
Nevertheless,
it
is
only by starting from these asto

if
sumptions that
tion at
all.
you ever get
your theory of evoluEvolution

is
In other words,
certain,
these assumptions must be certain,

as premises,
ducts.
when regarded
and uncertain when regarded as prois
This
not easy to believe.
i?z;/. Still)
thing.
you know, you must assume somea pity you cannot so
^//^.-Nevertheless,
order your assumptions
it
is
as
to
make your system
more what
his
self-consistent.
At
present you seem some-
to resemble
an astronomer who should base

real
whole theory of the
motion of the heavenly
CHAP, xiil]
the evolution OF
BELIEF.
273
bodies on the supposition that his

rest
;
own
planet was at
but should unfortunately discover that one of
the necessary conclusions from his theory was that

his planet, in
tion.
common with all the others, was Of such a one we should probably say,
were correct
if
in
moif
that
his deductions
his
premises must have
been wrong, while
his premises
were correct his
deductions must have been wrong.

;
So
far
have only considered

it
this difficulty as
it
applies to Evolution, because
seemed
It is
to
me
that
the issue to which
wished to
call attention
could
be thus most conveniently
raised.
a mistake,
however, to suppose that the

attaches to Evolution alone.
difficulty necessarily
Every theory
all beliefs
is
ob-
noxious to
it
according to which
are sup-
posed to be caused, while fundamental

caused
in
beliefs are
such a manner as to
to
:
make them
uncertain.
Now
it is
be noted that
this description is rather
wide one
and must undoubtedly be held to include
the world of Science as ordinarily conceived.
For
If
It is
plain that current scientific
methods can
is
lead to no other result than that belief
a product.
that.
experience can prove anything,

is
it
can prove
There
here none of that doubt which has been
thrown on the existence or non-existence of free will by the real or supposed discrepancy between the
deliverances of Introspective consciousness and the
verdict of ordinary historical
case,
experience.
In this
inter-
whether we consult
statistics,
whether we
^74
A DEFENCE OF PHILOSOPHIC DOUBT, we judge
[part
hi.
rogate consciousness, whether
of the matter
on grounds furnished by physiology, or ethnology, whatever scientific or history, or natural selection
doctrine or scientific
method be brought
Is
to bear
on
the question, but one result

beliefs,
obtained
beliefs, all
are the result of the operation of natural
causes,
certain,
and of these
I
alone.
And
since
it
is
no
less
apprehend, that these causes are of a kind

it
to throw doubts on the beliefs they produce,
follows
according to our canon, that ordinary scientific me-
thods land us in contradiction.
It
must, however,
be observed that there

convenience of
is
a justification, beyond mere
exposition, for
making Evolution
it is
especially the subject of th: criticism, because
Evolution alone which necessarily claims to regulate

the whole world of phenomena.
The
special sci-
ences
well
physics, chemistry, and so forth might very

on,
go
even
if
their
it
methods were not
uniit
versally applied, though

is
must be admitted that

But
nothing.
it,
not easy to find a principle of limitation.

is
if
Evolution
not universal,
are to be
left
it is
If certain
if
it
phenomena
outside
cannot
without contradiction and confusion explain, potentially at least,
how
the whole world as

it
it it
is
follows
necessarily from the world as
was,
certainly
its
appears to
me
its
that
it
ought to modify either
methods or
pretensions.
THE EVOLUTION OF
BELIEF.
275
NOTE.
In the preceding chapter the argument has turned
on the manner
their validity.
in
in part
which the nature of the causes of belief
in general (and therefore of ultimate beliefs)
may
to be
affect
At
first
sight there
may seem
contradiction between this portion of the argument
the general principles laid

it
down
in the first chapter.
some and For
was there pointed out that no enquiry
into the origin of
ultimate beliefs can be of any philosophic value, and the
reader
may
be tempted to interpret
this
canon into an
is
assertion that the origin of ultimate beliefs
a matter of
for
absolute philosophic
indifference
offers,
an
is
interpretation
which
my own
language
perhaps,
some excuse. Thus

It
ii>
interpreted, however, the doctrine
incorrect.
true
that the origin of ultimate beliefs never can supply
any
ground
for believing them,
simply because the fact of their
having any particular origin can only be shown by inference founded ultimately on these beliefs themselves.
it
But
is
quite possible that the converse of this proposition
may
be
true,
and that inference from ultimate
beliefs as to
their origin
may
this
furnish logical grounds for doubting or
disbelieving them.
The preceding chapter

science,
example of
drawn from actual
contains an and an imagi-
nary instance
still
may
perhaps serve to put the matter in a
more
forcible light.
We
might imagine
our ultimate
it
to be a
conclusion demonstrable from

those beliefs
beliefs,
that
were implanted
in us
by a being who had the
power, and- invariably had the wish, to deceive and mislead

us.
Now
say that under such circumstances
we should
be compelled either to think that our creed was essentially

T 2
276
[part
iii.
incoherent, or that
we had committed some blunder

dilemma which, though
in
in our
inference
and
this is the
I
a less
obvious shape,
maintain
we
are brought face to face with

applied, as
it
by the doctrine of Evolution when

applied, to our ultimate beliefs.
must be
SUMMARY.
"
277
SUMMARY.
I
HAVE now brought
to a close the long series of dis-
cussions on the speculative foundations of Science^
which began with the second chapter of

It
this
Essay.
may now be convenient
if I
endeavour, even at the
some repetition, to show by means of a concise summary the main outline of the argument of which
cost of
these discussions are the essential parts.
However
effect of
will
disjointed
and fragmentary the general

be, the attentive reader
is
what precedes may
not have failed to observe that a kind of unity
introduced into the whole by the
common
first
relation
which
In that
all
is
the other parts bear to the

laid
chapter.
down
with sufficient generality the
conditions which any system of thought must satisfy
before
it
can be regarded as reasonable
,*
while the
succeeding chapters contain an examination of

far these conditions are satisfied
If there
how
by orthodox Science.
appears but
is
little
unity in this part of the
Essay, the fact
only a reflection of the disunion
existing between the different systems of Philosophy

criticised,
which, though they
all
admit that Science
78

on a
solid
rests
and
rational foundation,
else.
seem
unfor-
tunately able to agree in nothing

If there
tific
was a
single recognised system of scienall its
philosophy, complete in
is,
parts
containing,
was
critic,
that
an account of the premises and modes of
inference
by which every
scientific
proposition
ultimately established
at least as the
the task of the
so far
arrangement of his work was conThis, however,
cerned, would be comparatively easy.

is
not
so.
Existing philosophies are not only various,
but they are incomplete.
They
not only treat the
same portions of the problem differently, but they none of them treat of it in all its parts. Their
attempts are fragmentary as well as inconsistent.
At what
point, then,
is
the critic to begin

first,
What
system should be examined

that system should be
and what parts of

be provisionally
is
assumed
to
sound while the

tested
?
solidity of the
remainder
being
in this
The
course that
have adopted
Essay, whether the most convenient or not, has been

to start with the ordinary Logic of Science, taking for
granted that the view which that Logic takes of the

premises of Science
the assumption as
it
is
correct,
and only modifying
was gradually found untenable.

that they consist
in
Now
the view of the premises of physical science

is,
taken by the usual Inductive logic

of observations of
what takes place

is
the external
world.
On
these
founded everything
we know
concerning the nature of the laws which obtain In
SUMMARY.
that world, including the fact that
it is
279;
governed by
is
law at
all
so that, as no general principle

I
given
(except on the transcendental theory which

later), in
first
examined
a single observation, the problem

is,
we have
this
to consider
ticulars alone.
how inference is The result of the discussion on

possible
possible from par-
point was to
show that, so
is
far as at present appears,

;
no
such inference
its
and
for
a reason which, in
in
most general expression, was given

I
the
first
chapter.^
if it is
there observed that
any kind of Logic,
to
be philosophical, must be formal.
The whole
object of a philosophy of inference being to distin-
guish valid and ultimate inferences from those which

are invalid or derivative,
either
this
can only be done,

infer-
by exhibiting the common forms of such
ences, or (on the violent hypothesis that they
have
no common forms), by enumerating every concrete

instance.
To
enunciate a form of inference which
shall include
both valid and invalid examples, can at
best have only a psychological interest*
Now,
in-
duction from particulars

includes both valid
is
a form of inference which
and
invalid examples, so that, in
accordance with the
maxim above
If
enunciated,
is
it
is
philosophically worthless.
no attempt
made
to
distinguish between the cases
where
it is
legitimate
and those where

placed in
its
it is
not,
then no confidence can be

If
conclusions.
such an attempt
is
made,
Chap.
i.
p. II.
28o

must be by the help of some general
principle,-
it
and in that case the inference ceases to be from

particulars.
Something, then, must be added to the knowledge
we
derive from observation to enable us to
arrive at a law of
Nature
and, further, this additional
premiss must be a general proposition.

to be
?
The
reader, recollecting that
What is we wish
it
to
keep as close as possible to the ordinary philosophy

of Science, and also to
as few as possible (seeing that
make our initial assumptions we have afterwards to

approve the
In the third chapter,
it
examine
their validity), will doubtless
choice of the law of causation.

therefore,
we
enquire
how
far
is
possible to arrive
it
at a
knowledge of the
special laws of Nature,

effects
being
conceded that similar

causes,
always follow similar

particular sequences
and that a knowledge of
and coexistences between phenomena can be derived

from observation.
The result of this enquiry was to show that, if we take some phenomenon or group of phenomena for investigation, inductive logic is
competent under favourable circumstances to prove,
with a high degree of probability, that certain of the
phenomena preceding it in time mere, and certain of them were noi, causally connected with it. But that, on the other hand, inductive logic could not show
either of these things respecting that indefinite mul-
phenomena which in experience have always been present, both when the phenomenon
titude
of
SUMMARY.
'
2^1
under investigation has occurred and also when

has not.
Since there
is
it
no apparent method by which
the effects of these persistent causes can be ehminated,
we
are for ever debarred from a theoretical

:
knowledge of any absolute law of Nature from a knowledge, I mean, of ^// the phenomena required
to produce a given result
:
and since there
is
no
assignable ground for assuming that these persistent

objects which have always accompanied,
and may
of
possibly have co-operated with, the
known cause
any
effect, will
continue to accompany them whenever
they recur, our ground for supposing that these
known
causes will in the future be followed by their accus-
tomed
consequents,
seems
in
great
measure
removed.
The
principles
on which
is
this
somewhat
:
unsatis-
factory conclusion
based are these two

anything
First,
every phenomenon which invariably precedes another
phenomenon may,
trary,
for
we know
to the con-
be part of
its
cause.
Second, the present or

furnishes no grounds
in
past existence of a
for
phenomenon
existence
anticipating
its
the future.
Of
course, in order that these principles
may be
legiti-
mately applied,
ignorance of
all
we
require to assume an absolute
the laws of Nature.
On
the con-
trary assumption, that
some of these laws are known,
we may have every
reason for thinking that certain
antecedents are not causes, and for expecting a con-
2S2

But
tinuance of things which have hitherto existed.
since we are examining the methods by which laws of
Nature
start
in
general are arrived
at,
we must
evidently
at yet,
by supposing that they are not arrived

principles
and on that supposition the two

stated
above
seem
to
me hard
I
to refute.
In Chapter IV.
took for granted that which in
Chapter
III.
showed could not be proved, namely,

of our knowledge of the laws
the trustworthiness
connecting phenomena, and enquired how, from laws,
we
could argue to facts
and more
especially to facts
that have already occurred.

I
pointed out that our knowledge of past events

entirely founded
;
was
upon reasoning from
effect to
cause
and that there was a prima facie

all
difficulty
attaching to
reasoning of this kind, arising from
the circumstance that

possibly
therefore,
more than one cause might

effect.
produce a given
The
problem,
which required consideration was, how to
distinguish from
possible, the
this
among
the causes which are merely
one which was actual or probable.

I
For
is
problem
could find no solution.

is
The
ordinary
to
procedure which
followed by
men
of science
estimate the comparative probabilities of the rival
hypotheses, on the basis of
some theory respecting

it is
the condition of things at the time of which they are

treating.
Now
own
this theory, if
not a mere figment
of their
torical
imagination, must, like any other his-
proposition,
be
itself
in
the
first
instance
SUMMARY.
founded upon an inference from
this process of resting
effect to cause
effect to cause.
283
But
successive inferences from
on
historical
hypotheses which can
only be justified by other inferences from effect to

cause,
is
must evidently have a

is
limit.
When
that limit
reached, what
to
be our next ground of belief?

Philosophy
is silent,
On
this point Scientific
and we
are driven to the conclusion, that
if
two or more
explanations of the universe are barely possible, they
must, for anything

equally probable
;
we
can say to the contrary, be

is
which
as
much
in
as to say, that
one version of history need not be

another, merely because
natural
it
less likely
than
seems
comparison un-
and extravagant. These remarks, of course, only hold good as bepossible.

If
tween causes which are
a cause could
not produce the effects which are our sole premises

for inferring the existence at
all,
and character of any cause

it
cadit qucsslio.
at
Supposing, therefore,
could
be shown that
any given time only one
set of facts
could result in the world as
we now see
?
it,
we should
It
know
ance.
the history of that time with a perfect assur-
Can
this
ever be shown
I
It
if
cannot.
restrict
cannot be shown,
attention to those
imagine, even
we
our
phenomena with whose laws we are
acquainted.
less
But, besides these, there
may be
that
count-
powers with the laws of whose operations we are
entirely unacquainted,
and by which
If
all
we
see
may have been
produced.
we once admit
the
284
A DEFENCE OV PHILOSOPHIC DOUBT.

do not know by
can have no
possibility of their existence (and 1
what authority we are to deny it), ence is thrown into confusion.

ground
for
all historical infer-
We
supposing these hypothetical powers to
begin acting at one time rather than at another,
whether they be powers which should be described

as
metaphysical,
theological, or
merely unknown.
In order, therefore, that a
man may have any rational

Cosmos
as revealed in
confidence in the history of the
the teachings of Science, he must be something
more
past
than an Agnostic.
He
must have very
solid
grounds
for believing, not only that
through the
infinite
only one series of phenomena can be assigned capable
of having produced the actual
universe,
but
that nothing besides
phenomena capable
all
of acting
on phenomena have ever existed at

solid
and these
all,
grounds of belief or disbelief must no^ be drawn

;
from history
but,
if
derived from experience at
must be derived from his own immediate observations.
Here terminated the first part of our enquiry. Its general result is to show (i) that from the particular knowledge obtained by observing the phenomena of a world assumed throughout this part of the Essay to be persistent, no scientific conclusions could be drawn and (2) that even if we suppose these phenomena to be part of a world governed by causation, we were not much advanced, and that therefore, (3) some further principles or modes of
:
SUMMARY.
-285
inference have need to be discovered before Science

is
placed on a rational foundation.

is
Of
these
'
further
principles/ since their nature

.no
altogether unknown,
more
notice has been taken.
The
second part of the Essay
was
principally
occupied in discussing various philosophic proofs of
two known assumptions on which Science proceeds

^namely, the persistence of the material universe
and
the law of universal causation.

iirst
With regard
to the
of them, though not,
think, with regard to the
second, two theories have been maintained, either of
which,
'of it
if true,
would render any philosophic defence

According
is
unnecessary.
to one, the persistence

;
of the material universe
self-evident
at the
according to
its
the other,
it
is
untrue
though
I
same time
untruth has no
iirst
scientific significance
whatever.
The
for
;
of these statements
gave some reasons

second part
doubting
in the Introduction to the
the
second
discussed at length in Chapter IX.
It will
not be necessary to recapitulate the arguI
ments by which
attempted to show that the main
systems of speculation which

precarious authority
now
hold a divided and

thinkers cannot
among English
pretend to furnish satisfactory evidence of the trustworthiness of these two scientific assumptions.
will
It
be
sufficient to
remind the reader

I
that,
in the
chapters from VI. to XI. inclusive,

less
fully
dealt
more or
with
(i)
The Kantian
or
neo- Kantian
2^6
A DEFENCE OF PHILOSt)PHIC DOUBT.

certain Trans-
argument which founds knowledge on

cendental necessities of
(2)
belief.
[Ch. VI.]
The system which
sets
up an
internal or
subjective authority
final arbiter
called Consciousness
as
the
(3)
The
[Ch. V 1 1 L] of Truth. system which finds the highest source of
certainty in our original judgments.

(4)
[Ch. VIII.]
in
The argument which
seeks either
the
opinions of mankind in general, or of
some
selected
portion of them, for an ultimate ground of belief.
[Ch. VII.]
(5)
The argument which

it
*
infers the truth of
an
opinion from the fact that
succeeds in practice.'
[Ch. VII.]
(6)
The argument which

'
infers
the truth of an
opinion from the fact that
common
sense
'
(in
the
popular acceptation of that term) supports
it.
[Ch.
VII.]
(7)
The philosophy which
declares every prois
position to be true of which the opposite

ceivable.
incon-
In addition to these discussions on various pro-
posed foundations for a creed,

second part two chapters
:
introduced into the

to refuting
one devoted
Mr. Spencer's proof of Realism [Ch. XI.], the other

to
showing that unless Realism be

false
I
true,
Science must
be
[Ch. IX.].
have purposely made these discussions personal,
in the sense of fastening
them on some
particular
SUMMARY.
individual
'
Vgy
în
all cases,
the most distinguished recent
exponent of
his special
views
because
in
I
this
method
raise a
seems the one most certainly calculated to

clear
and
definite issue.
While
regard to the sub-
ject-matter of the criticisms,

steer
have attempted to
of,
between the opposite danger
on the one
hand, dealing with minute or verbal errors, and on

the other, of wandering off into comments upon the
whole system of an author, instead of confining myself to those parts
which are alone relevant
to the
questions at issue.
Assuming
fairly
theii that
the arguments attacked are
representative of English Philosophy at the
present time
ing, as
as
is
is,
think,
the case
and
assumsay
Lam
bound
to do, that the answers here

effective,
given to tbose arguments are

that Science
we may
a system of belief which, for anything

is
we
can allege to the contrary,
wholly without
arrived at are
rests are un-
proof.
The
;
inferences
by which
it is
erroneous
proved.
the premises on which
it
It
only remains to show that, considered as

belief,
it is
a general system of
task
is
incoherent
and
this
undertaken
in the
two chapters which together

Chapter XII.)
is
form the Third Part.
The
devoted
first
of these (namely.
is
in the
main
to
showing that there
a dis-
crepancy between the
be
its
(particular)
its
which Science asserts to premises and the facts which it

facts
puts forward as
ultimate conclusions. But besides
288

it is
this principal contention,
shown
incidentally that
the universe, as
is
it
it
is
represented to us by Science,
wholly unimaginable, and that our conception of

is,
what
in
Theology would be termed, purely

It
anthropomorphic.
must be noted that the uninot the metaphysical Thing-
verse here spoken of

in-itself,
is
Unknowable Reality which we are supposed by some philosophers to arrive at, if we

nor
is it
the
drive our speculative analysis sufficiently deep.
On
the contrary,
all,
it is
the subject-matter of
all,
or almost
the propositions which are put forward
by Natural
Science, and which together constitute a large part
of what
is
commonly, though not very happily, de-
scribed as Positive Knowledge.
^The chief argument of Chapter XII.

ever, only indirectly
its
is,
how-
connected with this subject,

to contrast the world as
it
principal
end being
appears with the world as Science assures us that

is,
it
and
to
show
that the scientific reasoning
which
makes our knowledge of the second depend

upon our knowledge of the
first, is
logically
inadmissible.
The
flagrant
fact that the
two are
in
contradiction
is
and undeniable as any one may see who

objects.
considers that while perception gives us immediate
knowledge of the existence of coloured

Science
tells
us that this appearance
is
really
due
either to the
vibration of uncoloured particles, or

It is also,
I
to reflection from uncoloured surfaces.
imagine, evident that no integral part of a system
SUMMARY.
289
can contradict the premises of that system without

introducing
:
confusion
finally,
it
and incoherence
into
the whole
and
must be admitted that

system does rest upon
its
it
since our actual
scientific
the data given in perception, and since

sions are in contradiction with these data,
conclu-
must be
regarded as incoherent and confused.
Some
from
outline
I
speculative arguments
fail
of their effect
their too great subtilty.
The argument whose

is
have just
briefly indicated
likely to fail
from a precisely opposite reason.

it is
When once
stated
it is
so obvious, and so readily understood, that

is
hard to believe that there
not
some recognised
difficulty
I
and equally obvious reply by which the

raises
it
may be
disposed
of.
is
If so,
however,
:
do not
on
I
know where such

pointed out
in
a reply
to be found
I
while,
the other hand, cause
may
think be
shown
I
(as
the chapter under review)
why
the
difficulty itself
may
easily escape notice.
there
explained that in our reflections upon the origin of
our knowledge of the external world
we
habitually
:
take for granted the scientific theory of perception
according to which the perceived object acts upon
our organism, which in

ceiving mind what
ject.
is
its
turn produces in the per-
called a perception of the ob-
If this theory
intelligible
be true
and
did not dispute

it is
it
as
it is
enough that the object as
per-
ceived should not exactly correspond with the object

it is,
but that
(to
speak metaphorically) the mesu
290
sage sent by the latter should be altered and modified in the course of transmission.
IS
But the
difficulty
that this theory itself rests entirely
on observations
its exist-
of the external world, and therefore, though
ence quite accounts
for,
yet
it
by no means
justifies
our habitual indifference to the contradiction which

lies
between the immediate
results of these obser-
vations
and the remote conclusions which Science

In order to
this objection
draws from them.

ble
obviate a possi-
way by which
is
it
might be met,
showed, at the end of the chapter, that no advantage

that
gained for the

rests,
is
scientific
system by supposing
not on the facts given in perception, but
(which
quite another thing)

:
on the
fact that
such
and such perceptions occur

of the various things
not on the existence
perceived
crystals, metals,
planets, and so forth, but on the fact that we have
perceptions as of crystals, metals,
and
planets.
It
was
shortly pointed out that to regard the world of
Science as a hypothetical means of accounting for

the occurrence of these perceptions
and
it
is
this
which we should have to do,

our belief
in
it
if
we mean
to justify
merely by an inference founded on
the fact that these perceptions exist
would
be
simply to place
it
on a
level with
an indefinite
num-
ber of other hypotheses,
known and unknown, which

the
might be supposed
to
fulfil
same
function.
The
Thirteenth chapter, like the twelfth, dealt

in
with an inherent flaw or defect
the scientific system,
SUMMARY.
but one of a
ter.
291
much more
is
subtle
and
difficult
charac-
This flaw
due ultimately
to the fact that
may be considered from two separate It may be looked upon as a mempoints of view. ber of a logical series, or it may be looked upon as a member of a causal series. If we consider it from
every belief
the
first
of these points of view,
it
appears as a con-
clusion, as a premiss, or as
both a conclusion and a
premiss.
If
we
consider
It
from the second point of

as a cause, or as both
view,
it
appears as an
effect,
an
effect
and a
every
cause.
belief,
Now
without exception, has accord-
ing to Science got a cause.
But every belief has by

beliefs
no means got a reason, and there are some

ultimate ones on which
it
which cannot possibly have reasons, namely, those

all
others depend
these,
is
evident, must be products, but cannot be con-
clusions.
Confining our attention, then, to ultimate beliefs

considered merely as products,
that, as products,
it
becomes evident
they are in no
Infinite
way
to be distin-
guished from the

rise
multitude of beliefs which
Into
favour,
become the fashion, fall out of and are forgotten by all but the historians
notice,
of
opinion.
Like them, they are the
effects
of
material
antecedents,
the necessary results
of
primeval arrangement of atoms.
But
these,
the
reader must note, are causes which unquestionably
produce much
error,
and which
u
2
It
might be plausibly
292
maintained have produced more error than truth.
There
is
consequently a distinct probability

its
though,
results
of course, one uncertain in

lief,
amount
belief,
that any bewhich
and therefore any ultimate

will
from their operation
be erroneous.
But
if
now, from looking at the question excluside,
sively from the causal
we
turn round and look

well,
at
it
from the cognitive or logical side as

difficulty.
we
become conscious of a
consists
For
in so far as
Science conforms to the ideal of a rational system,

it
of conclusions certainly
inferred
from
certain premises.
But one of the conclusions thus

is
certainly
inferred
all
(as
we have
just seen), that

;
the premises of
science are doubtful
so that the
more
certain
we choose
to consider our inferences,
the more
we
diminish the only ultimate assurance
we have
If
it
for believing
them
at
all.
be replied that
this
consequence
may be
avoided by considering the

reasonable
probable,
'
scientific
it
system
as
all
men do
actually consider
to be merely
were suddenly
answer that we cannot consider any sysif it
tem
to
to
be even probable which,

certain,
become
would be
self-contradictory,
is
and
therefore impossible.
Such a supposition
absurd.
fact,
No
conclusion less than the recognition of the

is
some fundamental error or omission in the account given by Science, and more especially by the doctrine of Evolution, of the genesis of our
that there
ultimate beliefs, will satisfy the argument
though
SUMMARY.
293
how
this
error or omission
is
to
be corrected or
our
ordinary
I
supplied
theories
without
entirely
altering
about the history of the universe,
am
unable to say.
This discussion
in
the thirteenth chapter concludes
the speculative enquiry into the nature and validity of the evidence which can be produced in favour of
the current scientific creed.
results arrived at
It
fails
At every
point,
the
have been unfavourable
to Science.
in its premises, in its inferences,
and
in its
conclusions.
The
;
first,
so far as they are known,

;
are unproved
the second are inconclusive
the third
are incoherent.
Nor am
scientific
suffer.
acquainted with any

liable,
kind of defect to which systems of belief are
under which the
system of belief
may
not
properly be said to
If the reader, in the interests of speculation (the
practical question
chapter), feels
will
be discussed
in
the
next
inclined to complain of the purely
destructive nature of the criticisms contained in the
preceding pages,
in
reply that speculation seems sadly

criticism just at the present
faith
is
want of destructive Whenever any time.

universally, there
is
held strongly and
a constant and overpowering
tendency to convert Philosophy, which should be

its
judge, into
its
servant.
;
It
it
was so formerly, when

is
Theology ruled supreme

has usurped
its
so
now
that Science
place
and
assert with
some
con-
fidence that the bias given to thought in the days of
'
394
the Schoolmen through the overmastering influence of the

first
of these creeds was not a whit more perspeculation than
nicious to the cause of impartial
the bias which
it
receives at this
moment through
the influence of the second.

It is
curious to remark
in
how
the
similar are the con-
sequences of this bias
two
cases.
Philo-
sophy, or what passed for such, not only supported
Theology
but
in the
it
;
Middle Ages-ît became almost

it
identical with
it
not only supports Science now,

scientific
has almost become a

talk,
department.
To
hear some people
one would
really
suppose
that Philosophy consisted either of the
more general
in-
aspects of scientific truth or of the results obtained
by applying the
vestigation
'
'
approved methods of physical

which
!
to mind, or even,
is still
more exad-
traordinary, to the nervous system
It
may be
mitted that nothing can well be more interesting than

the treatment of the
writers as
first
of these subjects
;
by such
it
M. Comte and Mr. Spencer
though
can
hardly be necessary again to insist on the fact that no
mere generalisations within the sphere of Science,

though they may furnish materials
should term a
for a
*
Positive
I
Philosophy, can ever be expected to give us what

*
scientific one,
'
any more than a work
which, to start with, assumed the truth of the Three

Creeds,
could constitute
a rational exposition of
Christian evidences.
While, with regard to empirical

it is
psychology and empirical physiology,
only neces-
SUMMARY.
sary to remind the reader of what was
sufficient length in the first chapter,
295
shown
at
namely, that no
progress
research,
made along
these very respectable lines of

it
however much
may
increase our
know-
ledge of mind and of body, can ever produce, or even
perhaps suggest, a solid and satisfactory theory of

the grounds of belief.
Whatever be the
errors
I
and shortcomings of the

I
preceding discussions,
have,
trust, in
the course
(I
of them avoided this particular confusion
mean
between aspects of Science or parts of Science and

Philosophy) which
others.
is
the fertile cause of so
many
The
path of
my
argument has been a

on the other
narrow one, deviating neither into Science on the
one hand nor

it
into Metaphysics
and
if
seems
to run through a to lead to

it,
somewhat uninteresting
goal, yet
it,
region,
and
no desirable
I
or
something
like
must,
is
believe,
be traversed before
If speculations
intellectual repose
finally reached.
which do nothing but destroy seem to

they are,
unsatisfactory
be, as indeed
even from a speculative

not likely to be obtained
point of view, the reader must recollect that definite
and
rational certainty
is
unless
we
first
pass through a stage of definite and
rational doubt.
296
%%i
\,V
^^y
LI
THE
'
\^
NIVEHSlTYj
PRACTICAL RESULTS.
The
this
reader
who
Its
has followed the long argument of

termination at the close of the pre-
Essay
to
ceding chapter,
if
may perhaps be
disposed to ask, what,
any,
is
intended to be the practical result of a

its
piece of criticism so purely destructive in

If
it
character.
is
intended to be a mere dialectical puzzle,
a mere exercise in ingenious objections, or even a

contribution of a
somewhat
it
eccentric kind towards
English Philosophy,
cannot be regarded as of much

If,
general interest outside the sphere of speculation.
on the other hand,

belief,
it
is
intended to influence actual

it
what
effect
can
have, except the produc?
tion of a universal or nearly universal scepticism
an object which can scarcely be thought worth the

trouble both writer and reader must undergo in order
to attain
it.
Before answering these objections,

out that the word
planation
is
*
must point
either the
it
scepticism
It
'
taken without ex-
ambiguous.
may mean
its
intellectual recognition of the
want of evidence, or
may mean
this together
with
critic
consequent unbelief.
Now
if
my
supposed
uses the word in the
PRACTICAL RESULTS.
second of these senses,
ask whether
this question
It
297
might be
well, before askis

if,
ing whether such scientific scepticism

it
desirable, to
is
possible
because
in
as
believe,
must be answered
the negative
if
scepticism of the far-reaching character required
by
the reasoning of this Essay can be produced by no

rigour of demonstration
we
may make
It
ourselves
easy as to any
ill
effect
which, did
exist.
It
might be
expected to produce.
The
only persons
who might
conceivably be embarrassed by the speculative conclusions

I
have so
far
attempted to establish are those
whose devotion
that
to truth takes the form of asserting
we
are in duty
bound
rest.
if it
to
make
this
the strength of
our beliefs vary exactly with the strength of the evi-
dence on which they
But
maxim, though
In the face
occasionally uttered as
were a moral law, would
no doubt be found capable of modification

of an Imperious necessity.
If,
then, scepticism in the second sense be Impos-
sible, Is
scepticism In the
first
sense
scepticism which
of any
it
merely recognises the absence of philosophical proof

or other logical defect In a system of belief
but a speculative Interest
At
first
sight
would
belief,
seem
It
not.
Scepticism which does not destroy
Is
natural to suppose, does nothing.

is
This,
how-
ever,
by no means
necessarily the case.

all
If in the
estimation of
mankind
creeds stood on a philoso-
phic equality, no doubt an attack which affected them

all
equally would probably have
little
or no prac-
298
A DEFENCE OF PHILOSOPHIC DOUBT. The only result

it
tical result.
could reasonably proI
duce would be general unbelief, and as

a possible frame of mind.
have just
remarked, general unbelief can hardly be regarded as
But
if in
the estimation of
mankind there
is
the greatest difference in the rela-
tive credibility of prevalent
systems of
belief, if
now
one system now another

standard of certainty,
attack, especially
if it
is
raised to the dignity of a

is
it
plain
that a sceptical
deals with the system which

in favour,
happens at the moment to be

siderable consequences
may have conleast,
consequences, at
quite
as considerable as any which considerations addressed
merely to the reason are ever likely to produce.
To judge,
then, of the true bearing of
arguments
like those contained
in the preceding chapters,
we
must look not merely
at the
arguments themselves,
but also at the general habits of thought which prevail

at the time of their publication.
We
must consider
not only the nature of the agent, but the nature of

the material on which
it is
to act.
What,
then,
is
the position actually taken up
by
various sections of educated
men (we may

?
leave
others out of account), towards the beliefs
by which
we
find
ourselves
surrounded
Which do they
questions,
it
accept,
which do they hesitate about, which do they

reject
?
altogether
These are not

it
is
needless to say, to which

or possible to give
full
is
here either necessary
answers.
But
in
a sentence
or two
can
map
out in outline the creed secretly
PRACTICAL RESULTS.
or avowedly professed
299
by the two
largest
and
most important
concerned.
classes about
whom we
need be
In the opinion of both of these, beliefs tend to

assimilate
first
themselves to one of two types.

is
The
type
that presented
by established
it
science.
The
beliefs
which conform to
would be described
as consistent
and
positive, as arrived at
by recognised
scepticism.
in
methods, and as ultimately resting on primary axioms
whose
certainty
is
beyond the reach of
An
example of the second type may be found
any
of the superstitions, religious or scientific, which are
now by
floating
universal consent regarded as the products

Beliefs of this kind
of fanciful ignorance.
form a
mass of
error,
it is
;
unorganised, unproved, and

the business of true science
inconsistent,
which
gradually to destroy
a duty which
we
are given to
understand
it is
rapidly
and
effectually accomplishing.
Our more advanced thinkers, opinion that they have now reached
from which
the whole
in the indefinite future
those who are of

the point of view
will
it
be given to
human
of
race to look back on the errors

it,
which formerly misled

distribution
beliefs
deal very shortly with the

types.
between these two
Everything which has to do with phenomena, everything which they conceive to belong either to recognised science or to scientific conjecture, they put in
the
first class
it is
either certain, or belongs to the

certain.
type of that which
is
Everything
else they
300

:
put in the second

untrue, or
it
it
is
either a superstition
is
and
resembles superstitions and
beyond
indi-
the reach of proof.

I
do not of course mean by these remarks
them of classing Ethics among superstitions. This would be unjust. There is no body of men more careful to let it be understood that the
rectly to accuse
course of their speculations

elevated morality.
is scientific
is
guided by the most
But they hold that Ethics either
or might be
made
so,
and they therefore

it
regard themselves as justified in putting

first
in
the
category with the rest of our certain know-
ledge.^
The second
existing beliefs
class of
I
men whose
attitude towards
is
wish to describe
much more
people
numerous
constitute
(in
England
at least) than the first class,
but much less definite

it
in its opinions.
The
all
'
who
are by no
means clear that

is
'
knowledge
excepting that which
scientific
and deals with
phenomena is either essentially incapable of proof, or else is mere superstition. On the contrary, they are
inclined to admit the existence of a sort of middle
ground, a territory where
we may provisionally place

in respect
the beliefs which, in respect of their subject-matter,
approach to the type of superstitions, while

consigned Religion.
at the
of their probable truth they resemble science.

this region is
*
To
this
dis-
But even of
for
See Appendix,
end of the volume,
a more detailed
cussion of the subject.
PRACTICAL RESULTS.
ambiguous position
its
301
tenure
is
insecure.
Should
has
criticism succeed in doing to the satisfaction of the
people whose opinions
am
describing what
it
long
done
to
the
it
satisfaction
of our advanced
thinkers, should
succeed, namely, in demonstrating

religious
an essential
Inconsistency between
and
scientific belief
then,
if
understand rightly their

rele-
canons of judgment. Religion would at once be
gated to the class at present occupied by delusions
and detected
.
superstitions.
I
It is
not to be doubted,
think, that
most of the
persons
who
speculate at
all
upon the larger problems

days everybody dabbles
now
in
debate
and
in these
more or less in such speculations belong to one of But the point the two classes I have just described.
I
especially desire to insist
on
Is
that though In the

all
first class
are to be found almost
those
who
dls-
"belleve in Religion, while the

all
second includes almost

yet, that
those
who
believe In
It
may be
infinite),
the practical differences
however great between them (and
their practical differences are in
some cases almost
they nevertheless agree in thinking that no
more
certain warrant for a creed can be found than
the fact that
Science supports
It;
no more
fatal
objection to one, than the fact that Science contradicts

it.
The
tific
result of this
is
not only that

In
we
are ex-
pected to interest ourselves
the effect which scien-
discoveries have had, or
may be
expected to
302
have, on the historic evolution of religious thought,
but that
tion
it
seems to be assumed that the
logical rela-
which subsists between the doctrines of actual
science
and of actual day
religion
;
is
a fact of transcendent
theological importance
versies of the
so that the serious contro-
are, in fact, little

'
of what
is
called the
conflict
more than phases between Science and

discovery which
Religion.'
There
is
no
scientific
has not therefore an importance altogether disproportionate to

is
its
purely scientific bearing, because there
none which may not suggest or confirm a theory

with something long held
to
inconsistent
be an
essential part of Religion,
and which may not thus

prompted
become the centre of a

far
bitter controversy,
more by
theological or anti-theological zeal than
by a dispassionate love of scientific knowledge. I might insist on the evil done by such a state of
things both to Religion and to Science, but at this
moment
springs.
wish rather to enter
my
protest against
the principle from which the evil itself ultimately
Has Science any
claim to be thus set up as
the standard of belief?
Is there
any ground whatscientific teach;
ever for regarding conformity with
ing as an essential condition of truth
and non-
conformity with
error
?
it
is,
as an
it
unanswerable proof of
If there
cannot be drawn from the

itself.
nature of the scientific system

in the
We have seen
of
its
preceding pages
how a close examination
philosophical structure reveals the existence of almost
PRACTICAL RESULTS.
every possible philosophical defect.
that whether Science
303
We
have seen
be regarded from the point of

inferences, or the general rela-
view of its premises,

tion of its parts,
it is
its
found defective; and
that the ordinary proofs
we have seen which philosophers and men

fit
of science have thought
to give of
its
doctrines
are not only mutually inconsistent, but are such as
would convince nobody who did not

ever,
start (as,
how-
we
all
do
start),
with an implicit and indestruc-
tible confidence in the truth of that
which had to
thê;
is,
be proved.
fidence.
I
am
it.
far
from complaining of
complaint rather
con-
share
My
that of
two creeds which, from a philosophical point of view, stand, so far as I can judge, upon a perfect equality,
one should be set up as a standard to which the
other must necessarily conform.
am not insensible that to some of my readers may now appear to have reached an extremity of
I
paradox
far
beyond the
limits of sober reason.
Even
the existence of thirteen chapters of argument which,
whether good or bad, are undoubtedly

fail
serious,
may
to convince
them that
am
altogether In earnest.
It
must-be admitted that such hardness of belief on
their part has
some
excuse.
Its
Science in recent times.

worlds, the
The vast extension of new conquests In old
new worlds
Its
It
has discovered to conquer,
the fruitfulness of
hypotheses, the palpable witness
which
material results
bear to the excellence of
Its
methods,
may
well lead
men
to think that the
means
304
by which these triumphs have been attained are above To the reach even of the most audacious criticism.
"be told in the face of facts
Hke these that Science
stands on no higher a level of certainty than what
some people seem
to look
in
on as a dying superstition,
may
easily
excite
certain
minds a momentary
doubt as to the seriousness of the objector.

a doubt
if
Such
But
far,
is
not likely to be more than transient.
any reader, who has accompanied

it,
me
so
seriously entertains
can only invite him, since
he regards
the
fallacies
my
conclusions as absurd, to point out

vitiate the
which
reasoning on which
those conclusions are finally based.

I
have sometimes thought that the

might be conveniently
parallel be-
tween Science and Theology, regarded as systems of

belief,
illustrated
by framing
all familiar.
a refutation of the former on the model of certain

attacks
on the
latter with
which we are
We
might begin by showing how crude and connotions of primitive
tradictory are the
man, and
even of the cultivated man
In his unreflective
mo-
ments, respecting the object-matter of scientific beliefs.
We
it is
might point out the rude anthropomoranthropomortill
phism which underlies them, and show how impossible
to get altogether rid of this
phism, without refining away the object-matter

it
becomes an
unintelligible abstraction.
scientific apologists.
then turn to the
We might We should
show how the
authorities of one age differed from
PRACTICAL RESULTS.
305
those of another In their treatment of the subject,
and how the authorities of the same age
differed
among themselves
tems one
errors In detail
then
after taking
up
their sys-
after another,
and showing
their Individual
we
should comment at length on
the strange obstinacy they evinced in adhering to

their conclusions,
not.
whether they could prove them or

according to
It is at this point, perhaps, that
usage we might pay a passing tribute to morality.
With
all
the proper circumlocutions,
we should
sug-
gest that so singular an agreement respecting
some
of the most
difficult points
requiring proof, together
with so strange a divergence and so obvious a want

of cogency In the nature of the proofs offered, could
not be accounted for on any hypothesis consistent
with
the
Intellectual
honesty of
the
apologists.
Without attributing motives
to Individuals,
we should
and
hint politely, but not obscurely, that prejudice
education In some, the fear of differing from the

majority, or the fear of losing a lucrative place In
others,
had been allowed

;
to
warp the impartial course

scientific
of investigation
philosophers, in
ful
and we should lament that
many
respects so amiable
and use-
a body of men, should allow themselves so often to
violate principles
tiously
which they openly and even ostentaAfter this moral display,
avowed.
we should
turn from the philosophers
who
are occupied with
the rationale of the subject to the main body of

of science
men
who
are actually engaged in teaching and
3o6

Fully acknowledging their
research.
we
should yet be compelled to ask
many merits, how it comes
about that they are so ignorant of the controversies
which rage round the very foundations of their subject,
and how they can reconcile

self-respect,
it
with their intellectual
when they
are asked
some
vital
question
(say respecting the proof of the law of Universal
Causation, or the existence of the external world),

either to profess total ignorance of the subject, or to
offer in reply
It is
some shreds
is
of
worn out metaphysics
true,
they might say that a profound study of

not consistent either widi teaching
;
these subjects
or with otherwise advancing the cause of Science
but of course to this excuse

obvious rejoinder
cause of Science,
that,
it
we
should
make
the
before trying to advance the

to discover
would be as well
whether such a thing as true Science really existed. This done, we should have to analyse the actual
body of
ance
;
scientific
truth presented
its
for
our accept-
to
show how, while

its
conclusions are inin
consistent,
premises are either lost
a meta-
physical haze, or else are unfounded
and gratuitous
for
assumptions
after
which
it
would only remain

to
us to compose an eloquent peroration on the debt
which mankind owe to Science, and

masters
the great
that the
who have
it
created
it,
and
to
mourn
progress of criticism should have

to count
left
us no choice but
among
the beautiful but baseless dreams
PRACTICAL RESULTS.
307
which have so often deluded the human race with

the
phantom of
certain knowledge.
Of
parallel
course a parody
of
ought rather to say a
this sort
reflect
could serve no purpose but to

their ordinary
make people
on the boldness of
But
this alone
assumption respecting the comparative certainty of

Science and Religion.
small gain
;
would be no
since in the present state of opinion a
suspicion as to the truth of that assumption seems
the last thing that naturally suggests itself
Why
should this be so
That men of Science should

Is
exaggerate the claims of Science

donable, but
natural and par-
why
the ordinary public,
whose know-
ledge of Science
Is
confined to what they can extract
from fashionable lectures and popular handbooks,

should do
so.
It
is
not quite easy to understand.

Is
Perhaps
shall
be told that there
a very simple
explanation of this strange unanimity of opinion
namely, the fact that the opinion

reply that, even
If
Is
true.
To
this
I
we
dismiss
all
the reasons
is
have
given for thinking that the opinion

objector will
(of
not true, the
hardly assert that the general public

I
whom
alone
have been speaking) have ever

the sort of reasons
to
made themselves acquainted with

still
by which alone the opinion can be known

less that
be
true,
they have taken the trouble to weigh

While,
if it
those reasons with care.
be further sug-
gested that they are guided by an unerring instinct

in
such matters,
answer that
X
2
their instinct cannot
3o8

for history sufficiently
always be unerring,
that
it
shows
has not always been the same.

in
Another reason may be given, which

accounts for the
fact,
part
re-
though
after all
it
only
It
moves the
difficulty
a stage further back.

is
may
re-
be alleged that the popular opinion

flection of the
merely a
popular literature, and that the truth

I
of the assumption
rally believed
it is
am
calling in question
is
gene-
by the many who

and up
exists
read, simply because

write.
constantly asserted
is
by the few who
This
is
no doubt
accurate,
to a certain point
an
explanation.
There
now
a kind of literature,
already large and of growing importance, produced
by experts
for the benefit of those

' ;
who
desire to be
'generally informed
which, unlike most ephemeral
literature, leads public opinion rather
than follows
it
it.
Of
course the greater part of
this,
whether
consists
of handbooks or of review articles, has no bearing
whatever on the relation which ought to exist between

Religion and Science, or with the positive evidence
that
may
exist for either.
But just as popular accounts

an educated but busy public
as possible, about as
little
of chemistry, physiology, or history appear in answer

to the natural desire of
for as
much knowledge
many
:
things as possible, with as
trouble as possible
so there are easily found eminent authors anxious

to
purvey
for that apparently
increasing
class of
persons
who
aspire to be advanced thinkers,

their
but
for
who
like to
have
advanced thinking done
PRACTICAL RESULTS.
them.
ductions
309
Now
is
the very starting point of these prothe principle that Science

is
the one
thing certain, that everything which cannot be proved
by
scientific
means
is
incapable of proof, and that

inconsistent
everything which
is
with
is
Science
is
thereby disproved.
And
'
since
this
a doctrine
in
which
the
'
is
constantly reiterated, since
it is
one which
struggle for existence
has the great advantage
of being not only easily stated, but easily under-
stood
we need
not be surprised that a not very

it,
critical
public should readily believe

to
it
without taking
any great pains

evidence.
examine
into the nature of its
How
comes about that the distinguished

themselves never be troubled
solidity
is,
authors
who
so serenely take for granted this prin-
ciple of criticism should
by any suspicion as
to understand.
It
to
its
admit, harder
I
would have required,

less philosophical
should
have supposed, much
knowledge
and philosophical acumen than that possessed, for example, by Mr. Leslie Stephen or Professor
Huxley, to suggest to their minds doubts as to the
rational character of the
dogmatic system
;
in
which
they so confidently put their trust
and, once sug-
gested and unanswered, the smallest doubt should be

sufficient to
prevent them raising that system into a

all
standard by which the value of

belief
other systems of
might properly be estimated.
Without, however, making any special attack on

individuals, the nature of
my
indictment against the
3IO
general body of anti-religious controversialists
may
be easily
stated.
The
force of their attack
depends
in the last resort
think they find,
upon the discrepancy they find, or between Religion and Science. It

in,
must
require, therefore, a belief
at all events, the
comparative certitude of Science.

this belief finally
On what
to
frail
does
depend
Are we
suppose that
foundation
they rest
its
whole weight on the
supplied by the contradictory fragments of Philosophy
we have been discussing through all these chapters ? Or are we to suppose that their belief is a mere
assumption, with no other recommendation than that
it is
agreeable to the spirit of the age

it
Or
are
we
to suppose that
is
established
by some
esoteric
proof,
known only
to the few,
and not yet published

?
for the benefit of the
world at large
The
first
of these alternatives implies in the thinkers of

I
whom
when
speak the existence of an easy credulity
in singular
contrast with the acute scepticism they display
dealing with beliefs they do not happen to share.
The second writers who

Reason, and
is,
think, hardly
worthy of a
class of
appeal so often
and so earnestly
to
who
particularly pride themselves
on
proportioning the strength of their convictions to the

strength of the evidence on which they rest.
But
if
the third alternative represents the real state of the

case,
we have,
think, a right to ask that the conceal-
ment which the opponents of Religion are

with so remarkable an unanimity should
practising
to
come
an
PRACTICAL RESULTS.
311
end, and that since the philosophy of Science exists,
it
should forthwith be produced for our enlightenment.

It is
but justice, however, to the philosophic and
literary advocates of
extreme
scientific pretensions,
I
to
remark that the blame which

in part
have been laying
on them should
I
be shared by theologians.
do not mean, of course, that many theologians of
repute could be found prepared to assert that Religion
must either be proved wholly by
scientific
methods, and be shown to harmonise completely

with scientific conclusions, or else be summarily
rejected
;
but
do assert that the extreme anxiety
exhibited by certain of them to establish the perfect
congruity of Science and Religion
the existence of
end of whose
or to
a whole class of
labours appears
apologists,'
the
to
be
to
explain,
explain
away, every appearance of contradiction between

the
two
are
^
facts
which
naturally
suggest
the
conclusion that the assumption

thinkers
is
made by
the Free-
a legitimate one.
Let
me
not be misunderstood.
Truth
is
one.
Therefore any attempt to reconcile inconsistent or
not easy to find a single word to describe the opponents of is altogether free from objection. Most of the terms which suggest themselves have either acquired a somewhat offensive connotation, or are inexact. One or both of these defects attaches to the words ^ Infidel,' Atheist/ ' Agnostic,' and ' Sceptic' I have
^
It is
Religion which
'
pitched upon
because, if it suggests comparisons not altogether flattering to the modern assailants of theology, on the other
'
'
Freethinker
hand, this
is
word
credits
made up for by the fact that the strict meaning of the them with a virtue to which they have no exclusive title.
312

is
apparently inconsistent beliefs
in itself legitimate/
and
the
in so far as apologetics
I
aim
at this
and
at nothing
more,
have not a word

in
to say against
is
them
but
manner
which the controversy
carried on,
even from the theological
side, occasionally
suggests
the idea, not only that a consistent creed embracing
both
at
scientific
and
religious doctrines
some time or other, but that it now, and by no process more elaborate than
lopping off from Religion everything which
exactly agreeable with Science.
may be made ought to be made

that of
is
not
Yet the apologists should be the

is
first
to recognise
the fact that this Procrustean method of reconciliation
not one which ought ever to be applied to their

Its
theological convictions.
very ground and
justiis
fication is the idea that enforced consistency
the
shortest road to truth.
But
if
this
?
be
so,
what are
we
to think of religious mysteries
Religious mysteries
belief
suppose to be objects of
which so nearly elude the utmost stretch of

in
our imagination, that they can be only vaguely
and imperfectly described
words
or of such a
nature that any definite attempt to express their

attributes in formulae results in a contradiction in
terms.
tion,
Brought face
to face with such a contradic-
man may pursue one
of three courses
is,
he
may
reject both
contradictories that
;
refuse to
believe in the thing described
he
may
accept one
of the contradictories, and thus escape inconsistency
PRACTICAL RESULTS.
at the cost
(it
3(3
may
be) of completeness
or he may-
accept both contradictories, thinking thereby to obtain,
under however unsatisfactory a form, the

is
fullest
measure of truth which he

This
last
at present able to grasp.
course
is
the one which in
some
cases
all
(even merely natural) theologians have pursued.

is
It
therefore a matter of surprise that so
many
of
them
itself
thinking,
as they must, that religious truth
cannot always be so expressed as to be consistent with
should argue as
if it
ought necessarily to be
expressed so as to be consistent with Science.
Perhaps the reader
may be
its
inclined to object to
if
the foregoing considerations, that

to support Religion in
they are adapted
existing shape, they are
not less well adapted to support any Religion how-
ever absurd,
or
any superstition however
gross.
Arguments against one form of
belief are rebutted,
by rendering argument against any form of belief Immunity from one kind of criticism is impossible.
obtained only by the costly process of dethroning
de facto authority in the realm of opinion,
all
and
intro-
ducing into
confusion.
it,
thereby, every species of license and
Before considering the precise extent to which

these forebodings as to the consequences of philosophic scepticism are really well founded,
I
must point
I
out that for the consequences themselves
am
in
no
way
responsible.
They
are the results of an inves-
tigation of a purely speculative character conducted
314

all
with
the impartiality in
I
my
power
and though
admit that
should probably never have troubled

I
myself to put them into shape, had

that
not hoped
results,
they might have some practical

if it
the
thought of those results
has prompted the comin
mencement of the undertaking has

its
no way modified
should
course.
Even, therefore,
if
my conclusions
I
tend to foster forms of belief with which neither the

Freethinkers nor
full
I
happen
to agree,
shall
expect
absolution from
a body of writers
who have
constituted themselves the especial champions of the
doctrine that no enquiry should be discouraged out
of mere apprehension of
its
consequences.
itself.
I
To
return to the objection

first
It
must be
noted, In the
practically
in strict
place, that
when
suggest that
we need
not or cannot regulate our beliefs

cri-
accordance with the results of rational
ticism,
I
I
am
It
driven to
make
the suggestion not be-
cause
have used reason more
less freely,
is
but because
have used
freely than
usual upon subjects

rule,
respecting which
people,
as
accept
their
opinion without
much
preliminary examination.
But
this unfettered use of

.irrational
Reason need only produce an
and therefore unsatisfactory and provisional
attitude of
mind when we are dealing with Science

i.e.
as a whole,
as a single system of belief;
and
it
by
no means excludes or tends
to exclude the use of

for the purparts,
Reason within that
(or
any other) system
pose of harmonising or co-ordinating
its
nor
PRACTICAL RESULTS.
even from using
for the
it
315
to
modify
details of the
system
purpose of producing as much consistency
as possible between the different creeds which
we
happen
to hold.
Any
person, therefore, taking

liberty,
my
nay
view of these questions, would be at
would be bound,
the
to regulate his beliefs within the
sphere of Science according to rational principles, to
same extent and
in
precisely the
;
same way as
the ordinary
man
of science does
the only differ-
ence between them being that the sceptical philo-
sopher does so
in the full consciousness,
and the man
of science in utter unconsciousness, that the system
he
is
dealing with
is,
as a whole, incapable of
if
any
rational defence.
Of course,
Religion
is
thought
to stand in this respect on a level with
Science (a
point which
it
has not been
my
business to discuss),
the
same remarks, miUatis mutandis, may properly

it.
be applied to
It
appears then that the practical conclusions

sceptical philosophy
draw from a
tendency to
have
little
or no
alter the internal structure of
any actual
or possible creed.
But
it
may
still
be objected that
they give free scope to the simultaneous existence

of any
number
of creeds, no matter
how
foolish or
how
that
contradictory these
may happen
it
to be.
Now
in considering this question,

I
must be recollected
to present
I
have not presented or attempted

in
any arguments
favour of Theology.
attempted
to
have
the
shown indeed,
or
show,
that
3i6

its
fundamental assumption of most of

altogether baseless.
assailants is
But
after such
demonstration
the positive motives which produce theological belief
remain
precisely
what they were

is
they
are
not
strengthened because Science

losophically unsound, they
if
proved to be phi-
would not be weakened

extent, therefore,
a complete philosophy of Science were to be
produced which
this
to-morrow.
attack
The
to
on Science might theoretically

is
produce a chaos of conflicting creeds

determine.
It will
easy to
preserve from destruction those
creeds and those
only which, while they have a
claim on our beliefs like that possessed by Science
and Theology,
to be, in
are, as
Theology
is
by some supposed
If there
contradiction with Science.
be
any system of belief answering to

its
this description,
adherents are welcome to any assistance they can

I
derive from the arguments of this Essay.
can
not
only say, for
my
part, that if
it
exists,
know
where
it
is
to
be found.
There
to
is
one more question suggested by what
has been said in the course of the preceding remarks,
which the reader

wish to
may
may desire an answer. He know what constitute the claims on

*
our belief which
assert to be possessed alike

I
by
Science and Theology, and which
put forward as
the sole practical foundation on which our convictions

ultimately rest.
In dealing with this subject
it
can,
suppose, be
PRACTICAL RESULTS.
317
hardly necessary to repeat what the whole tenor of

this
Essay goes
to prove, namely, that these Claims

consist, so far as Science at least
to Belief
is
do not
concerned, in reasons.
Whatever they may
be,
they are not rational grounds of conviction, raised
by
It
their
very nature above the reach of

to describe
criticism.
would be more proper
them as a
kind of inward inclination or impulse, falling far

short of
should perhaps rather say, altogether
differing In kind
from
philosophic
certitude, leav-
ing the reason therefore unsatisfied, but amounting

nevertheless to a practical
the
effects
cause of
belief,
from
of which we do not even desire to be
released.
not,
The
object of this unreasoning belief

It
is
however, as
ought to be
if
our creeds were
truly rational, the ultimate premises from
which
:
all
Is
the other elements of the creed are inferred

rather the cree
1
it
as a whole, or even certain arbitrarily

it.
selected parts of
In the case of Science, indeed,

Its
this can hardly be otherwise, since

(as
premises are
;
we have
seen) not yet properly determined
while
in so far as
they are determined, they are explicitly
known
to but
few persons
and of those few there
is
probably not one
who
it
did not believe in Science bein relation to its premises,

it,
fore he thought of
and
such
who would
not continue to believe in
if
all
thoughts were obliterated from
his mind.
The
reader may, perhaps, think that
we ought
not to rest content with anything so unsatisfactory
3i8

*
as this
is
Impulse.'
If so,
am
;
quite of his mind.
It
assuredly unsatisfactory
and assuredly we ought

I
not to rest content with
it.
know
of no means,
however, by which the

died,
evil
can at present be rem.ediscovery of such
and
is
am
sure that the
means tomed
not likely to be hastened by the claims to
rationality
which the assailants of Religion are accusput forth in favour of their
to
own more
this
*'
limited creed.
But perhaps
pulse
"
it
will
be
said,
is
'
Grant that
im-
of which you speak
the whole motive on

their
account of which mankind accept

beliefs, still
stock of
you have not put Science and Religion

since
it
on an
pulse"
equality,
is
is
obvious that the
*'
im-
much more
it
universal in the case of the

If the
former than
is
in the case of the latter.'
comparative universality here claimed for the Scientific
impulse
was measured by the
comparative
number of persons who accepted respectively the general body of Scientific and Religious doctrines, I
apprehend that the objection
I
have just stated

fact.
would have no standing ground on
There
it.
is,
however, a better interpretation to be put on
We
may
in
conceive the
objection
to
mean
that
that
while
nobody does or can possibly

some
scientific doctrines
exist without believing

fire
food
nourishes
those
or
among
gion,
we can find plenty of persons who have either never heard of Reliwho have persuaded themselves that
as
burns or
PRACTICAL RESULTS.
Religion
is
319
false
who
The
it
street arabs or
advanced thinkers
do not accept even the smallest and most

fact In this case is
perverted fragment of religious truth.
undoubted
but to bring
forward as an objection to
error.
my
view implies a
the
double
It implies, in the first place, that

I
impulse of which
speak
is
a logical ground for
accepting Religion or Science, as the case
may be
and
it
implies, in the second place, that this

is
supposed
ground
of the kind which
have already sufficiently

of
*
dealt with,^ under the
name
The Argument from

critic,
General Consent.'
supposes that
I
My
imaginary
in
short,
regard an ultimate impulse to believe

it
;
a creed as a reason for believing

also that this ultimate
*
and he supposes
Neither
impulse
'
is
a better reason, the
more people there are who feel

of these opinions
Is
its
influence.
accurate
on the contrary, they

I
imply a
total
misconception as to the theory

to explain.
am
re-
endeavouring
This theory
may be
garded as having two sides

other positive.
is
one
rate,
;
negative and the
The
is,
negative side, the truth of which
capable of demonstration, amounts to an asserat
tion that Religion
any
no worse
off
than
Science in the matter of proof that neither from the

fact (If fact
It
be) that Religion only imperfectly har-
monises with experience,

while
nor from the fact that
men
of science agree substantially with each
other in their methods and in their results, theolo^
Cf. ch. vii.
320
glans differ profoundly from each other In both, nor
from any other known difference between the two

systems can any legitimate conclusion be drawn as
to their comparative certitude.
The
positive side,
to
on the other hand, which cannot properly be held

supply any rational ground of assent, and
Is
In
no
way
this
capable of actual
I
demonstration amounts to
that
If
and an
Indefinite
number
of other per-
sons,
we contemplate
Religion and
Science as
unproved systems of
feel
belief standing side

;
by
side,
Is,
a practical need for both
and
If
this
need
in the case of
those few and fragmentary
scientific
truths
by which we regulate our animal
actions, of
an especially imperious and indestructible character
on
be
the other hand, the need for religious truth,

It
rooted as
nature.
Is
Is
in
the loftiest region of our moral

not, If
one from which we would
we
could,
freed.
But as no legitimate argument can be

this
founded on the mere existence of

pulse,
need or Im-
so no legitimate argument can be founded
on any differences which psychological analysis may

detect between different cases of
its
manifestation.
We are
useless
in this
matter unfortunately altogether outof
side the sphere

to
Reason.
It
must always be
Impulse
discuss
is
whether a particular
towards a creed
of the
either of the right strength or

It
;
right quality to justify a belief In
be-
cause a belief can, in strictness, be justified by no

impulse, whatever be
Its
strength or whatever
Its
PRACTICAL RESULTS.
quality.
321
On
with
the
other hand,
let
no
man who
*
agrees
the reasoning of this Essay say,

in
cannot believe
any creed which

I
know
to
be
without evidence, merely because

tive
feel
a subjec-
need
for
it,'
unless he
is
prepared to limit his

metaphysical)
beliefs to those
detached
I
scientific (or
propositions which are,
apprehend, the only ones

it
he must
in practice
accept whether he likes
or not,
or unless he can find
Science which
is
some motive for believing in not an impulse and at the same

Let him,
if
time
is
not a reason.
he
will,
accept
Science and reject Religion, but
an explanation of his
him not give as behaviour an argument which

let
would be as
were engaged
appropriate
in
or inappropriate
if
he
showing why he accepted Religion
and
rejected Science.
The
doctrine that no rational justification exists

different attitude
for adopting a
towards the two
systems of
belief,
depends,
it
should be noted, not
only on the fact that
we
are without any rational
ground
fact that
for believing in Science,
but also on the
we
are without any rational ground for de-
termining the logical relation which ought to subsist
between Science and Religion.

habitually
The
is
Freethinkers
assume
that this relation
one of dependif
ence on the part of Religion, and that
there exist
any reason
for believing
it
at
all,
these reasons are
to be found scattered
trines of Science
;
up and down among the doc-
confusing apparently the historic
322
reasoning by which particular religious truths are

established, with the deeper sentiments
by which
Those,
Religion
these
itself is
produced, and in the light of which
historic
reasonings are conducted.

this
however,
of
it,
who make
assumption
I
offer
no proof
nor do they, so
far as
know, even indicate

it
the kind of proof of which they conceive

susceptible.
to
be
They
accept
it,
as they accept so
many
other assumptions, not only without having any evi-
dence for
of),
it
whatever (which
should not complain
but without being apparently conscious that any

is
evidence whatever
required.
In the absence then of reason to the contrary,

I
am
content to regard the
two great creeds by

lives
which we attempt to regulate our
as
rest-
ing in the main upon separate bases.

therefore, as neither of
So
long,
them can
lay claim to phi-
losophic
probability,
discrepancies
which exist or
may
hereafter arise between
them cannot be conBut

if
sidered as bearing
more heavily against the one

a really
to
than they do against the other.

valid philosophy, which
would support Science
the exclusion of Religion, or Religion to the exclusion of Science,
were discovered, the case would and

it
be somewhat
different,
would undoubtedly be
is
difficult for that
creed which
not philosophically
established to exist beside the other while in contradiction to

ble.
it
difficult, I say,
not absolutely impossi-
In the meanwhile, unfortunately, this does not
PRACTICAL RESULTS.
seem
likely to
323
become a
practical question.
is
What
has to be determined
now
the course which ought
to be pursued with regard to discrepancies
between
systems, neither of which can be regarded as philosophically established, but neither of which can
we
consent to surrender
it
and on
this subject, of course,
is
only possible to
perhaps
make suggestions which may commend themselves to the practical inthough they cannot compel his
In
stincts of the reader,
intellectual assent.
my
judgment, then,
if
these
discrepancies are such that, they can be smoothed
away by concessions on
but
if,
either side
which do not
touch essentials, the concessions should be
made
which
is
not at present the case, consistency
can only be purchased by practically destroying one

or other of the conflicting creeds,
I
should elect
I
In
favour of inconsistency
not
because
should be
content with knowledge, which being self-contradictory must needs be in
because a logical
destruction of
all
some particulars false, but harmony obtained by the arbitrary

discordant elements
may be bought
and necessary
at far too great a

truth.
It Is
sacrifice of essential
not probable that to these opinions (whose

is,
correctness
from the nature of the

I
case, altogether
Incapable of demonstration)
of
shall obtain the assent

;
many
I
scientific
philosophers
still
less is
it
likely
that
shall
convert any of those more declared

to
2
assailants
of Theology
Y
whom
have alluded
324

But
If
several times in this chapter.
the arguments
of this Essay prove Insufficient (as they doubtless

will) to
Induce these writers to agree with the Theo-
logical opinions to
effect
which
In
adhere, perhaps they
may
ex-
some
alteration
the
mode
Is
In
which a perpresent
fectly
legitimate
disagreement
I
at
pressed and defended.

reason
do
not, of course, see
any
why
the Freethinkers should not continue to
derive what advantage they may, from the use of

these convenient phrases, by a judicious employ-
ment of which
It
is
possible to Imply that they are
in possession of the last secrets revealed
by Time,
while their adversaries are

toils
still
struggling in the
of ancestral
prejudice.
instance,
There need be no
to
their
*
objection taken, for
advertising
their opinions as the Indications of

results
progress,* the
of
culture,' or the offspring
of
'
advanced
thought.*
true,
The
direct facts so stated are in a sense

not, perhaps,
it
and the implications intended are

think,
very damaging to their opponents.

well,
I
if
would be the sanction of Reason were less

Invoked
In
But
often
and
less loudly
favour of opinions
with which, so far as at present appears. Reason has
very
the
little
to do.
It
would be well
If
an appeal to
call it
religious
will
need, instinct,
impulse
you
were no
in
if
what
longer openly asserted to be an
argument
favour of Theology so
practically concedes the
whole
case,
weak that it by writers who
would be puzzled
they were required to produce
PRACTICAL RESULTS.
anything better in favour of Science.
325
And
It
would
be well
If
an examination
Into the truth of Religion
were
less
persistently inculcated as a moral duty,
Incumbent
on
all
believers,
by philosophers,
Is
to
whom
at
all,
it
never seems
to occur that Religion

if
not
the only creed to which a rule of that kind,
valid
would necessarily apply.
It
is
not necessary,
in
think, that
should add
anything more
explanation of
I
my attitude towards
in
those positive beliefs which
hold
harmony
with,
though not as conclusions from,the negative

contained in the body of this Essay.
I
criticisms
am
painfully
aware of how few there
are,
even among those few
whom the dry and

does not repel,
abstruse character of the argument

are likely to be the least in symI
who
pathy with the point of view

defend.
It will
have been trying to
hardly find favour either with the
ordinary believer or with the ordinary unbeliever.
As
regards the former, indeed,
console myself
by thinking
regards the
that the only practical
end
desire
has been in their case already attained.

latter,
I
But as
am
if
afraid that
have said
nothing which they will even consider relevant to

their
own
difficulties
they have any
respecting
of
the choice of a creed.
They
either ignore or are

in
without that religious impulse,
the absence
which
it
is
useless to clear away,
by any merely
326

It
dialectical process, the obstructions that, did
exist,
is
would hinder
its
free development.
Their case
not one that can be reached by argument, and argu-
ment is all I have to offer. Even could I command the most fervid and persuasive eloquence, could I rouse with power the slumbering feelings which find
in
Religion their only lasting satisfaction
could
compel every reader to long earnestly and with

passion for
some
living share in that Faith

life
which
has been the spiritual
of millions ignorant alike

is
of Science and Philosophy, this
not the occasion
on which
to
do
so.
should shrink from dragging
into a controversy
pitched throughout In another

full
key, thoughts
whose
and intimate nature
it
is
given to few adequately to express, and which, were

I
one of those few, would seem strangely misplaced

dry and scholastic argument
is
at the conclusion of this
In
any
case,
however, such a task

I
beyond
my
powers, and therefore

I
cannot hope that

it
my
reasoning, even could

able, will
suppose
to
be unanswereffect
produce any but a negative

the
on those
truth
in
who approach
that indifferent
question of religious
mood which they would perhaps

as
intellectual
themselves
describe
impartiality.
There may, however, be some of another temper,
who would
all
regard Religion as the most precious of
inheritances
if
only
it
were true
who
surrender
slowly and unwillingly, to what they conceive to be
unanswerable argument, convictions with which yet
PRACTICAL RESULTS.
they can scarcely bear to part
;
327
who,
for the
sake of
Truth, are prepared to give up what they had been
wont
hope
to think of as their guide in this

In another,
life,
their
and
to take refuge in
strange substitutes for
some of the ReHgion provided by the

It is
ingenuity of these latter times.

that to
to
not impossible
some
of these, hesitating between arguments

find
which they can
no reply and a creed which
they feel to be necessary, the line of thought suggested by this chapter
may be
of service.
Should
such prove to be the case, this Essay will have an

interest
and a
I
utility
beyond that of pure Speculasatisfied.
tion
and
shall
be more than
328
NOTE ON THE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN

RELIGION AND SCIENCE.
In the preceding chapter there was a good deal of
ence to the discrepancy which exists, or
exist,
is
refer-
supposed to
the
between Religion and Science.
To determine
amount of such discrepancy, or even to decide whether it has any reality or not, was in no way necessary to my main argument but it may be convenient to inactual
;
dicate in a note the general view which I should be dis-
posed to take of a question which, though

has been greatly exaggerated,
is
its
importance
not without interest.
The
discord between Science and Religion has referif
ence chiefly,
not entirely, to the interference by the
supernatural with the natural, which Religion requires us

to believe in
;
and the amount of
this discord
scientific
if
may
be
measured by the importance of the

determined at
sistent with
all
doctrines
which such a belief would require us to give up,

hazards to
we were
I
make
the two systems conshall

is
each other.
In discussing this subject,
assume, for the sake of argument, that this interference

not,
as has been often suggested, produced immediately
by
the operation of
some unknown though natural law

opinion
is
but that the
common
correct which attributes
it
to the direct action of a Supernatural Power.

tion therefore
beliefs
The quesscientific
we have
to ask,
if
is
this
What
do we contradict
we
assert that a Supernatural
Power has on various occasions

tion of natural laws
?
'
interfered with the

it
opera-
We
contradict,'
will
be replied,

*the belief in the uniformity of Nature/
329
Is the belief
which
is
?
thus contradicted particularly important then to

'
Science
*
So important/ many people would answer,

at the foundation of all our scientific reasoning,
that
it lies
as well as
all
of our practical judgments/ This
understand
to be the opinion of the
two most recent assailants of

know, have touched on the sub*
Theology who, so
ject
far as I
namely, the
author of
Supernatural Religion
'
and
Mr. Leslie Stephen.
The former
of these, whose treatment

is
of the whole question suggests a suspicion that he
hardly
equal to dealing with the profounder problems which he
has undertaken to solve, Stephen, however,

is
need not further allude

to the laws of
to.
*
Mr.
If
it
may
be quoted with advantage.

*
not contrary,' he says,

shall
Nature that the
dead
be raised, or one loaf feed a thousand men, the

If such a phe-
occurrence of the fact does not prove that an Almighty
Being has suspended the laws of Nature.
nomenon
is
contrary to the laws of Nature, then a proof
that the events had occurred would establish the inference. But, on the other hand,
lieve that the evidence
it
must always be simpler

mistaken
;
to beis
is
/<?r such
a belief
obviously consistent with a belief in the uniformity of NaturCy
which
soning.
is the sole
gtiarantee {whatever
its origiii)
of our reathus im-
Really to evade Hume's reasoning
is
possible,' &c.^
From
italics, it
the sentence in this extract which I have put in
would appear that Mr. Stephen
holds,
and thinks
that
Hume
implicitly held, the doctrine that a belief in

is
occasional Divine interference

lief in
inconsistent with that beis

*
the uniformity of Nature which

I
the sole guarantee

this
of our reasoning.'
doubt whether
incorrect.
was Hume's
opinion
*
in
any case
it is
'English Thought
in the
Eighteenth Century,'
p. 341.
330

The scientific
belief which, with least impropriety, may-
be termed the
'
sole guarantee
'
of our reasoning,
is
;
is
that
belief in the uniformity of
Nature which
equivalent to
a belief in the law of universal causation
which again
is
equivalent to a belief that similar antecedents are always
followed
by
similar consequents.
But
this belief, as the

is
least reflection will
convince the reader,
in
no way
in-
consistent with a belief in supernatural interference.
belief in the uniformity of Nature,

efl"ects
which
is
equi-
valent to a belief that natural
are uniformly pre-
ceded by natural causes, no doubt

supernatural interference
it is
;
is
inconsistent with
but of what pieces of reasoning
our sole guarantee, except those directed to show that

interfer-
in
any given case the hypothesis of supernatural

I
ence must be rejected,

It
is
am
not able to say.
clear, then, that the
most important discrepancy

alleged to exist between
which has been, or could
be,
Science and Religion has no real existence.

great general
principle
The only
philosophers
on which
scientific
have as yet been able to

touched.
rest their scientific creed is
un-
Let us therefore now turn our attention to the
more
sider
special
and derivative doctrines of Science, and conthey are affected by a belief in supernatural
how
far
interference.
In this enquiry
distinction
it
will
be convenient to keep
in
mind a
concrete
drawn
in the fourth chapter of this essay, be-
tween what were there called the abstract and the

parts of Science.
By
the abstract parts of Science were
meant the general laws by which phenomena are connected by the concrete parts were meant (what may be
;
sufficiently described as) particular matters of fact.
Does, then. Theology require us to modify in any our beliefs concerning the abstract part of Science
way
t

apprehend that
as true
it
331
does not.
Such
if
beliefs are in
themselves
and as
fully
proved
if
supernatural interference be
possible as they are
such interference be impossible.
law does not do more than state that under certain
circumstances (positive and negative) certain

will occur.
phenomena
If
on some occasions these kcumstances,_W%!i/"

interference,
owing to supernatural
that the
do not
If
occur, the
fact''iv>^^'^?^*>^
phenomena do not
will
follow proves nothing as to

law.
the truth or falsehood
of the
we
less
believe that
oxygen and hydrogen

to produce water,
combine under given conditions

none the
because
we
believe so
we
happen
also to believe that
some Supernatural Power may

insist
interpose, or has
on certain occasions interposed, to prevent

on
this point,
I
that result.
is
need not further

itself,
which
obvious enough in
and on which
believe I
am
in
agreement with Mr. Mill and others who are not commonly
suspected of a theological bias.
There remains then the concrete part of Science

matters of fact which compose history in
or
its
the
widest sense,
which belong!^ to that fraction of the future which
Science can pretend to foresee.
Now
with regard to the
former of these the question

tion
is
complicated by a considera-
which does not
affect us
when we
are dealing with
other portions of the scientific system
by the consideration,
namely, that
it
is
a matter of controversy what, in certain

scientific version of history
very pertinent particulars, the

really
is.
For the Theologians usually maintain that the

I call Historical,
kind of scientific inference which

belief in the intervention
compels a
on certain occasions of supernatural
causes
a great part of what are
commonly
called Chris-
tian evidences being indeed nothing
more than a
detailed
attempt to prove this
thesis, just as
most of the direct
attacks on Christianity are attempts to prove the precise
332

Now,
if
opposite.
the Theologians
are
right
in
their
opinions on this point, there can be no discrepancy whatever
between ReHgion and Science as regards matters of

because
it is
fact,
Science
itself
which compels us to accept the
account of miracles in which Religion teaches us to believe.

Before, therefore, discussing the nature
and magnitude of
the discrepancy which

it
is
supposed to exist between them,

fully into all the disputes
would seem necessary to enter
respecting the authenticity of documents, the credibility of

witnesses, the interpretation of texts, the
growth of myths,
the natural history of religions, the abstract question as to
the possibility of inferring supernatural facts from natural

data, and, in short, all the topics
which supply theological
and anti-theological
discussion.
writers
is
with so
much
material for
Such a task
on
of course impossible.
But
it
may
be worth while to note the conclusions that would

if
have to be faced
all
these disputed questions the
Theologians are wrong and the Anti-theologians are right

if
known
natural causes are able in

for the historical
if,
all cases,
without strain-
ing, to account
facts
which both sides
allow to have occurred, and
either for this, or for
some
more abstract
reason, only natural causes can rationally be

in operation.
admitted to have been
On
such a hypothesis
theological beliefs would, without doubt, modify opinions
framed out of purely

fication
scientific materials,
though the modiin their re*
may
easily be exaggerated.
Regarded
lation to us as
men, the
facts
which Theology asserts to

can
have happened are unquestionably of transcendent importance.
Regarded
in
their relation to Science, this
hardly be maintained.
As
phenqmena^ the few events

in Palestine
which are said to have occurred
and elsewhere
Be-
of a supernatural character are scarcely worth noting.
ing supernatural, they furnish no grounds either for be-
'

lieving in
333
any new law of Nature or
for disbelieving
;
which we had before supposed to be established

succeeded each other since the earth came into being.
the supernatural creation of the world, then, nothing
any and
'
being few, they are lost in the mass of facts which have
Is
'
the
reader
may
be tempted to exclaim.
is
have always under-
stood
that this
a subject on which
men
of science pro*
fessed to be altogether out of their sphere.
What, then,
.?
do you say about a
belief in Providence,
and
in the possible
interference of Supernatural
Power
in
answer to prayer
These, again, are not convictions which require us to
modify our adherence to known laws.
They may
cast,
indeed, an additional shade of doubt over our expectation
of the events which are to occur in the future, as well as
over the explanation of the events which have occurred in

"
the past
and
if
our actual
scientific inferences
were
(as I
have shown
in the fourth chapter that
they are not) of a
satisfactory character
on these
I
points, this
might prove a
only
matter of some, though not,

ance.
think, of very great importis
As
it is,
however, the Supernatural Power
one of an indefinite number of known and unknown natural

powers, which
we never have
seen,
and perhaps can never

if
hope to
see,
reduced to law, and which even
we
leave
to
miraculous interference out of account would
suflfice
make demonstrative prophecy

impossibility.
It
or retrospection an absolute
would appear then that the discrepancy between

if
Religion and Science which vanishes altogether

^
we take
If the literal interpretation of the Mosaic account of the creation be accepted as an essential part of religion, no doubt the discrepancy between Religion and Science will be greater than that stated I have, however, assumed (in accordance with what I in the text.
is
to
understand to be the opinion of theological experts) that this

the case.
is
not
334

favourable to the
in
its
the hypothesis most
Theologians
is
comparatively insignificant
hypothesis
if
amount even on the

Freethinkers
:
most
favourable
to
the
and
many
Science,
know a great deal about and may be supposed to know something about
writers
who
certainly
Theology, are of an altogether different opinion, this may,

I
apprehend, be attributed to the fact that they approach
the question with their minds completely saturated with a
theory of the logical
relation
which Ought
to
subsist
between Religion and Science, according to which the

grounds,
if
any, for believing the
first,
are to be found,
It is not
if
anywhere, among the doctrines

to see that as
it is
of the second.
hard
on any presupposition of
this sort
is
(combined
with the assumption that Science
philosophically
established), the smallest
want of harmony between the two
systems may, or rather must, lead to the most important

consequences
rationally
mere discovery that they are not connected would remove all ground for accept:
since the
ing the dependent creed
while the least appearance of
contradiction would supply a positive ground for rejecting

it.
As, however,
have
in
the preceding chapter
suffi-
ciently expressed
my
dissent
from
this
view,
it
is
it.
not
I I
necessary that
should here any further allude to
merely desired to point out the principal reason which

believe exists for the great exaggeration which
is
occa-
sionally to be observed in the estimate of the importance
of the contradiction between current Religion and current

Science put forward by thinkers of reputation.
APP.]
THE PHILOSOPHY OF
ETHICS.
335
APPENDIX.
ON THE IDEA OF A PHILOSOPHY OF
In
in this
ETHICS.
apply the
Appendix
first
propose to extend and
remarks on the Idea of a Philosophy

the
in general contained
chapter of the Essay, to the Philosophy of

But, in order to do so,
it is
Ethics in particular.
necessary,
in the first place, to correct
an error which,
in these
days
when Science and

tensive,
is
the
Knowable
Ethics
is
are supposed to be co-ex:
natural though not the less mischievous
the
That
error I
mean by which
degraded to a mere section

first sight,
or department of Science.
At
and from some
points of view, the opinion seems plausible enough.
mankind have passed through

example)
that
I
is
many
ethical phases (for

:
a fact in history, and history belongs to science

is
hold certain moral laws to be binding

;
a fact of
is
my
mental being
and, like
all
other such facts,
dealt with
by Psychology,
also
a branch of science.
all
Physiology,
Ethnology, and other sciences

the individual and in the race
fore, that
have something to say

not unnatural, there-
concerning the origin and development of moral ideas in

;
it
is
some men
of science, impressed by these facts,
have claimed, or seemed to claim, Ethics for their own. To hold such a view would be a most unfortunate error
not to hold clearly and definitely
its
contrary
may
lead to
much
confusion
for though, as will appear, scientific laws
form necessary steps in the deduction of subordinate ethi-
336
[app,
cal laws,
and though the two provinces of knowledge cannot

still
with advantage be separated in practice,
the truth
remains that
scientific
judgments and
ethical
judgments
deal with essentially different subject-matters.
Every
scientific proposition asserts
either the nature
of the relation of space or time
between phenomena which

;
have existed, do
simplifications
exist, or will exist
or defines the relations

if
of space or time which would exist
certain changes
and
were made
in the
phenomena
it
(as in ideal
geometry), or in the law governing the phenomena (as in

ideal physics).
Roughly speaking,
may
be said to state
facts or events, real or hypothetical.
An
ethical proposition,
it
on the other hand, though,

ought to speak the
I
like
every other proposition,
states a relation, does not state a

*
relation of space or time.
truth,' for
instance, does not imply that

shall
have spoken, do speak, or
speak the truth
it
asserts
no bond of causation be-
tween subject and predicate, nor any co-existence nor any

sequence.
It
does not announce an event

it
and
if
some
people would say that

fact either of the
*
stated a fact,
'
it is
not certainly a
'
external
or of the
internal
world.
One
cause, perhaps, of the constant confusion

is
between
Ethics and Science
the tendency there appears to be to
regard the psychology of the individual holding the moral
law as the subject-matter of Ethics, rather than the moral law

itself
;
to investigate the position which the belief in such

'
a proposition as
ought to speak the truth holds

'
in the
its
;
history of the race
and of the
individual,
its
its
its
causes and
accompaniments, rather than

substitute, in short,
truth or
evidence
to
Psychology or Anthropology
for Ethics.
The danger
of such confusion will partly be

in
shown by the
few remarks which,

thought begun
order to carry out the train of
in the first chapter, I
have to make on the
APP
THE PHILOSOPHY OF
:
ETHICS.
is,
337
Idea of a Philosophy of Ethics
that
on the form which

to
any
satisfactory system
of Ethics must assume^ or be able
assume, whatever be
its contents.
all
The obvious
itself,
is
truth that
knowledge
is
either certain in
or
is
derived by legitimate methods from that which
so,
has been already, perhaps, more
than sufficiently
insisted
ral, is
on
and
this,
which
is
true of knowledge in gene-
of course also true of ethical knowledge in particular.

consideration will enable us to go on, and state this
is
little
further fact, which
peculiar to Ethics.
The general probe either scientific
positions which really lie at the root
of any ethical system
must themselves
or metaphysical.
be ethical,
and can never

if
all,
In other words,
a proposition announc-
ing obligation require proof at
one term of that proof

obligation,
must always be a proposition announcing

itself requires
which
no proof
I
This truth must not be confounded
with that which
have just dwelt upon, namely, that
Science and Ethics have essentially different subject-matters.
This might be
its first
so,
and yet Ethics might be indebted

will
for all
principles to Science.
A concrete case
and
perhaps
make
clearer this
is
axiom
of ethical philosophy.
man
(let
us say)
not satisfied
a reason,
that he ought to speak the truth.

is
He demands
told that truth-telling conduces to the welfare of
society.
He
is
accepts this ground, and apparently, there-
fore, rests his ethics
on what
is
a purely scientific assertion.

fact.
But
this
not in reality the
There
is
a suppressed
premiss required to justify his conclusion, which would run
somewhat
is is
in this
way,
'
ought to do that which conduces
to the welfare of society.'

ethical.
And
is
this proposition, of course,

it
This example
not merely an illustration,

artifice
a typical case.
There
is
no
by which an
ethical
statement can be evolved from a
scientific or
metaphysical
338

any combination of such
it
;
[app.
proposition, or
and whenever the
reverse appears to be the fact,
will
always be found that
the assertion, which seems to be the basis of the ethical

superstructure,
is
in reality
is
merely the 'minor' of a
syllo-
gism, of which the major
the desired ethical principle.

it
If this principle be as true as

vious,
it
seems to
me
to be ob-
at
once alters our attitude towards a vast mass of

'
controversy which has encumbered the progress of moral

philosophy.
concerned
it
So far as the proof of a basis of morals is makes irrelevant all discussion on the origin of
on the nature of moral sentiments
;
moral
ideas, or
and
it
relegates to their proper sphere in Psychology or Anthro-
pology
all
discussion on
such subjects as association of
ideas, inherited instincts,
and
evolution, in so
far,
at least,
as these are supposed to

it is
refer to tiltimate
moral laws.
For
an obvious corollary from our
principle, that the origin
of an ultimate ethical belief never can supply a reason for

believing
it
;
since the origin of this belief, as of

is
mental phenomenon,
a matter to be dealt with
any other by Science

;
and
my
it
thesis
is,
that (negatively speaking) scientific truth

;
alone cannot serve as a foundation for a moral system

(to
or
put
positively), if
in
we have
it,
a moral system at
all,
there
must be contained
required.
explicitly or implicitly, at least
one ethical proposition, of which no proof can be given or

In one sense, therefore,
Ethics
all
is
'
a priori'
It is not,
and never can
be,
founded on experience.
Whether we be
Utilitarians, or Egoists, or Intuitionists,
by whatever name
series of experi-
we
call ourselves,
the rational basis of our system must be
something other than an experience or a

ences
;
for such
always belong to Science.

is
Limited indeed
the
have invariably kept
this
number of English Moralists who in view. However foreign it may
App.]
THE PHILOSOPHY OF
ETHICS.
339
be to their various systems, an enquiry into origin or into

the universality of moral ideas always appears to slip in
not in
its
proper place, as an interesting
psychological
adjunct,
but
as having an important bearing
on
the
authority of their particular principle.

result,
And
the necessary
of course, of these efforts to support ultimate princithat they cease to be ultimate, and
ples
is,
become not only

if
subordinate, but subordinate to judgments which,

citly stated,
expli-
would very
likely
appear
far
less
obvious
than they.
There
is
a whole school of Moralists, for example,
who
by
as a
find or invent a special faculty, intellectual or sensitive,
which moral truth

serious
beliefs
is
arrived at
if
who would
regard
it
blow to morality
the process
by which
ethical
were produced was found to be
common
called
'
to
many
other regions of thought.
Oddly enough, these
are the
very people whose systems are often
a priori'
Now
if
by
this
term be meant that the ordinary maxims of

appropriate enough
it is
morality are (according to these systems) independent of

experience,
it is
;
but
if it
be meant
that they are self-evident,

it
a singular misnomer.
For
is
clear that on their systems rigidly interpreted those
maxims
relation
derive their evidence, not from their
own
internal
authority, but from the fact that they bear a certain special
to our mental constitution
;
so that the ethical

is
proposition which really
something
validity of
of this sort
We
'
lies
at the root of their ethics
ought to obey
all
laws the
which
is
recognised by a special innate faculty,
whether called Conscience or otherwise.'
Now,
do not
deny that from a philosophical point of view such propositions as these are possible foundations of morals
I desire to point out
is
;
but what
that such a phrase (to take a con-
crete case) as
'
ought to speak the truth because conz 2
340

commands
it,'
[app.
science
ings,
may have two widely

to
different
meanand
is
and may belong
two
different
systems of Ethics,
first
'
not
commonly
distinguished.
'
According to the
most accurate meaning,

inference,
ought to speak the truth

be,
'
an
of which the major premiss must
ought to
do what conscience commands,' and being an inference, cannot obviously be an d priori law. According to the second
and inaccurate meaning,

reality received
ought to speak the truth

merits,
'
is
in
on
its
own
in,
and conscience
is
very
unnecessarily brought
or to account for or for
its
either to
add dignity to the law,
general acceptance
some other
is
extra-ethical reason.
among mankind, The first of these

it
views
open to no criticism from the point of view of

;
ethical philosophy
assailable.
so far as form
is
concerned
is
un-
But
greatly suspect that most people
who
nominally found their morality on conscience really hold

the second theory
;
and
if
in that case, as I think, their state-
ment
is
misleading,
far I
not erroneous.
So
it
have only given a negative description of the

I
nature of an ethical proposition.
have
said, indeed, that

is
announces obligation, but
this
statement
tautological
for if
we knew
in
no
difficulty in
what obligation consisted there would be stating the meaning of ethical. Beyond
this I
have only said that an ethical judgment deals with

possible to say
an essentially different subject-matter from either Science

or Metaphysics.
it
Is
it
more than
this
Is
possible to give
shall
any description of
ethical propositions
}
which
add to our knowledge of

it
their character
On
general grounds
is
plain that this can only be done,
supposing that what are commonly called ethical propositions
form part of a larger class of judgments which resemble
them
in
being neither
in
scientific
nor metaphysical, but

I
differ
from them
some other
respect.
myself hold
this to
APR]
THE PHILOSOPHY OF
case.
I
ETHICS.
341
be the
hold not only that the judgments com-
monly
called ethical (but which, in spite of the clumsiness
attendant on changing the meaning of a word in the middle

of a discussion,
I
shall
henceforward
call
moral) have the

in
two negative
characteristics
above mentioned
;
common
ethical
with a larger class of judgments
but that the distinction
between the two classes should be ignored by

philosophy, since
it
depends not on
form
'
but on
'
matter.'
I
All judgments belonging to either of these classes

henceforth
call ethical.
shall
Those commonly
;
called ethical I
shall describe as
moral
the rest are either non-moral or

then,
is is
immoral.
Every possible judgment,

;
either ethical either
or non-ethical
and every
explain
ethical
judgment
moral
view
or non-moral or immoral.
defined, let
The terminology
and
at the
thus being
me
it,
same time
my
on the subject.
If a
man
contemplates any action as one which he
chooses to perform, he must do so either because he

regards the action as one which he chooses for
itself,
or
because he expects to obtain by

chooses for
itself.
it
And
similarly, if
some object which he he contemplates any

must do so
either
itself,
object as one he chooses to obtain, he
because he regards that object as chosen for
or
because
it
may be
a means to one that

is
is.
In other words,
deliberate action
always directed mediately or immeis
diately to something which
chosen for
itself
alone
I
which
loosely
something
may
either be itself an action, or
what
term an object.
'end,'
I
Including both, then, under the term

thus:
define an ethical proposition

is
An
is
ethical
to
proposition
one which prescribes an action zvith reference

will
an
end.
Nobody
deny that
this definition
true of all
it
moral propositions (most people, indeed,

is
will think that
too obvious to need stating)
but they will probably say.
342

truly, that
it is
[app.
and say
sitions
is
also true of a great
many
propo-
which are not usually called moral.

distinction
Now my object
class
to
show that the
between what are usually
called moral propositions
and that larger
which
have defined above, has no philosophic import, has nothing

that
is
to
do with the grounds of obligation.

let
And
for this
purpose,
me
analyse more carefully this larger class
(which
is,
I call
ethical)
from a philosophic point of view, that
with reference to the rational foundation and connection

its parts.
of
(i)
Every proposition prescribing an action with
refer-
ence to an end, belongs either explicitly or implicitly to a
system of such propositions.

sition of
(2)
The fundamental propo-
every such system states an end, which the person
who
itself
receives that system regards as final

alone.
(3)
as chosen for
of that
{4)
The subordinate
or theological
propositions
system are deduced from the fundamental proposition by
means of
scientific
minor premises.
When
two such systems

which
'
conflict, their rival
claim can only
be decided by a judgment or proposition not contained in

either of them,
shall assert
which of these respective

[Ethics, then,
fundamental
rests
ends
shall
have precedence.
on two sorts of judgments, neither of which can be
deduced from the other, and of neither of which can any

proof be given or required.
The
first
sort declares
an end
ends
is
to be final, the second declares which of

to be preferred,
sort,
if
is
two
final
they are incompatible.
This second
of course,
not essential to an ethical system, but
can only be required when an individual regards more than
one end as
possibly
lie
final.]
(5)
No
other sort of proposition can

[This
is
at
the
root of an ethical system.
merely a restatement of the law dwelt on at the beginning

of this discussion.]

'
APP.]
THE PHILOSOPHY OF
in so
ETHICS.
343
Now
far as this
is
a complete philosophical diait
gram of every
tive
ethical system,
must show the
sort of
authority on which every ethical proposition
every impera-
must
rest.
Yet since
it is
plain that this diagram takes
no account of the differences there
and immoral ethical systems, how

affect the authority of the
(it
may be between moral may be asked) can we

This question takes us
account for the wide-spread delusion, that these differences
former
far afield into the regions of
Psychology and Anthropology,
but the answer to
it
may
perhaps be suggested as follows.
The main
reason for this error appears to be, false analogy,
unchecked by any clear apprehension of the nature of the

rational or philosophical peculiarities of an ethical system.
And
in
order to illustrate
I
this,
and
at the
same time
to
place the theory

possible,
it
am
'
defending under as strong a light as
may
be as well to examine the exact bearing
which
'
Universality
and the approval of
Conscience
(two of the chief characteristics of moral as opposed to non-
moral or immoral systems) have on obligation.
My
and
in
position, of course,
is
that they have no bearing
order to show this
offer the following analysis to

first.
the reader
taking
Universality
A
It
law
to be Universal in one of four senses.
may be said may mean (first)

bound by
I
it.
that
all
intelligences regard themselves as
This meaning we need not further consider, not only

because
it is
a scientific assertion, and therefore, as
have
shown, incapable of becoming the foundation of an ethical

system, but also because
entirely discredited.
It
is
it
is
a scientific assertion
now
quite out of fashion to maintain

in
that Morality
is
the
same
every race and every country,
and therefore
is
till,
in the revolutions of thought,
some one
further
found to re-assert
it.
this doctrine,
we need not
discuss
344
[app.
The second possible meaning is, that by a universal moral law we mean one by which all intelligences ought This also we may dismiss to regard themselves as bound.
because
it
amounts
all
to saying that there
is
a moral law
which obliges
laws.
Is
intelligences to be
bound by other moral

sejtse
then that moral law Universal in the

If
it is,
we
are
discussing?
of moral laws, each
we are committed to an infinite series commanding us to be bound by the

it
preceding one.
If
is
not, then there
can be a moral
law which
(in this sense) is
not universal.
In the third place, by a universal moral law
one which we think
all
men ought
to obey.
we may mean That we do

not think
it
think this of most moral laws, and that
we do
of the other ethical laws, namely, the non-moral and the
immoral ones,
as
is
tolerably certain.
It
remains to enquire
;
whether the difference bears on obligation

it
and
this enquiry,
seems to me,
may
be settled by a very simple con-
sideration.
telligences.
All intelligences means
Me
it
and
all
other in-
The
first
of these constituent parts would be
bound by a law held by

this sense) or not.
Me
it
whether
were universal
not be
(in
The second would
bound by a
law held by
not.
this,
Me
whether
were universal
in this sense or
In other words, to be bound by a moral law (and
by the way, brings out very
clearly the difference

is
between being ethically

not to regard
bound
and legally bound)

it
exactly the same thing as to regard

it is
as binding on
else
;
you
it
as binding on
it
someone
and
;
it is
not for someone else to regard

therefore,
as binding on
you
it
has
and
it
can have, no connection with Universality
in this third sense.

It
is, of course, open to anyone to assert that he recogno imperative which is not universal (in this sense).
nises
This
may
very well be the
fact,
and
have no wish to deny
APP.]
THE PHILOSOPHY OF
I
ETHICS.
345
it.
What
deny
is,
that the connection between the

it
two
is
other than empirical and accidental, or that

place in the philosophy of obligation.
has any-
The
to the
fourth and last meaning which I am able to attach word Universal, when used of a law, is that it
signifies
that
all
people of 'well-constituted minds' do,
as a matter of fact, regard themselves as
bound by a law
'
so qualified.
Now,
if
'
well-constituted
is
defined with
reference to morality,
and means 'holding the one true

all
moral system,' a proposition that

laws are universal,
is
true or right moral

verbal.
if it
frivolous
and merely
If
it
be
defined with reference to something else
means, for
instance, sane, or well-educated, or Christian, or scientific,
or anything non-moral, then the
same arguments may be

first
used to show that universality in this sense cannot be a
ground of obligation, as
sense.
used when speaking of the
For a proposition asserting that any considerable body of men, distinguished from the rest of mankind by some non-moral attribute, hold the same moral code, is
very likely to be questionable, and being a scientific assertion,
is
quite certain to be irrelevant.

then, for
So much,
science, I
Universality.
As
regards
Con-
have shown before, that to assume a special

is
faculty which
to
announce ultimate moral laws can

it do so the more by such sanctions
add nothing
if
to their validity, nor will

its
we suppose
remorse or
authority supported
as
this
self-approval.
Conscience regarded in
way
is
not ethically to be distinguished from any

as,
external
authority,
for
it
instance,
is
the Deity,
or the
laws of the land.
Now,
plain that
no external
authority can give validity to ultimate moral laws, for the
question immediately arises,

authority
?
why
should
Only two reasons can be
given.
we obey that The first is,
346

it is
[app.
that
right in itself to obey; the second

it
is,
that (through
a proper use of sanctions)

obey.
will
is
be for our happiness to

a moral law, which ob-
Now, the
first
of these
its
viously does
not derive
validity
from
is
the
external
authority, because the external authority
an authority
be said of the
only by means of
it.
And
moral.'
the same
may
second reason, substituting the words 'ethical but non-
moral
'
for the
word
'
In neither case, then,
is
the
external authority the ultimate ground of obligation.
The
tives
inevitable ambiguity which arises from the

'
sudden
extension of the meaning of the word
ethical
'
to imperait,
which are immoral or non-moral, makes

I
perhaps,
desirable that
should very concisely re-state, from another

I
point of view, the main position

establish.
have been attempting to
All imperatives,
all
:
propositions prescribing
if
actions,
have
this in
common
That
they are to have any
cogency, or are to be anything but

actions they prescribe
must be
to the individual
they are regarded as binding, either

diately desirable.
directly, to
itself
empty sound, the by whom mediately or immedirectly
They must conduce,
or infor
something which he regards as of worth
alone.
The number
of things which are thus in

is,
themselves desirable or of worth to somebody or other

of course, very great.
Pleasure or happiness in the abstract,
other people's pleasure or happiness,

its
money
(irrespective of
power of giving
pleasure), power, the
love
of God,
revenge, are
some
is
of the
commonest of them, and every

sake,
one of these
regarded by some person or other as an end

its
to be attained for
own
it
and not as a means to
something
else.
Now,
is
evident that to every one of
the ultimate propositions prescribing these ends, and for
which, as the ends are ends-in-themselves, no further reason
APP.]
THE PHILOSOPHY OF
ETHICS.
347
can be given, there will belong

propositions, the reasons for
a system of dependent
which are that the actions
they prescribe conduce to the ultimate end or end-in-itself.

If,
for instance,
revenge against a particular individual

a proposition which prescribes
is for
me
an
end-in-itself,
shooting him from behind a hedge

ordinate
or
may
be one of the subto
dependent
propositions
belonging
indefinite
that
particular system.
But whereas the
number of
form,
it
such systems
is
is
thus characterised by a
common
divided
by ordinary usage
is
into three classes, the moral,
the non-moral, and the immoral, about the ^^motation of
which
there
a tolerable
agreement.
It
would be
universally admitted, for instance, that a system founded on
the happiness of others was a moral system, while one
founded on revenge
this is not
was immoral
and,
though there
would be more dispute as to the members of the non-moral

class,
a question on which
of
need detain the
reader.
The denotation then

fixed,
is
these
.''
names being
or to limit the
1
presumably
what
is
the connotation
enquiry, what
the connotation of a moral system
The
they
apparent answers are as numerous as the number of schools

of Moralists.
But however numerous they
may
be,
can
all
be divided into two classes.

the denotation
end-in-itself
;
The first class merely

words, announce the
re-state
in other
ultimate
of the system,
all.
and
so,
properly
speaking, give no answer at
A Utilitarian, for example,

greatest happiness
may
simply assert
that
the
of the
If
for
greatest
number
is
for
him the ultimate end of
action.
he stops there he evidently shows no philosophic reason

distinguishing the system he adopts from
the countless
others which exist, or have existed.
If
he attempts to give
any further
characteristic of his system, he then belongs to
the second class,
who do indeed
explain the connotation of
348

*
[app.
the word
moral according to their usage of

'
it,
but whose
explanations have, and can have, nothing to do with the
grounds of action or the theory of obligation.
The
sanction
of conscience^ the emotion of approval, the expectation of

reward, the feeling of good desert, glow of conscious merit
these are
all
most undoubtedly marks or

:
characteristics of
moral actions
how they came
to be so,
whether by educait
tion, association
of ideas, innate tendency, or howsoever
has happened, matters nothing whatever, except to the

psychologist
;
that they are so

is
is
certain, but the signifi-
cance of the fact
habitually misunderstood.
}
simply the causes of good action

to
Are they Then they have nothing
do with Ethics, which
is
concerned not with the causes
but with the grounds or reasons for action, and would
remain wholly unchanged
if
not a single
man
ever had
t
done or could do
right.
the fact that they are obtained
Are they the ends of action by a certain course a

}
Is
valid
reason for pursuing that course
In that case they stand

precisely the
to a person holding that opinion in

relation as
same
savage.
money does to the miser, or revenge to the They are the groundwork of an ethical system, and to state them is simply to denote what ethical system it is which is being alluded to. Are they, finally, not ends of action, but merely marks by which certain actions may be known to belong to a particular system ? In that case,
and
for that
very reason, they can have nothing to do with

Therefore,
I
the grounds or theory of obligation.

justified in asserting that
'
am
though under the general name

distinctions regarded
ethical
'
are included not only moral, but also non-moral
and immoral systems, the
from the
outside between these subdivisions are not essential, and
has no philosophic import

proved.
which
was the thing to be
App.]
THE PHILOSOPHY OF ETHICS

I
349
Before concluding these remarks,

three corollaries that
would point out
may
be drawn from them, which are

first
not without rinterest.

structive
It is true,
The
corollary
is
that
no
in-
analogy exists between Ethics and Esthetics.
no doubt, that philosophers have talked about

the Beautiful, as
if
the
Good and
they were co-ordinate

ordinary language
subjects of investigation,
and that
'
in
we
say both that a picture

action
'
'
ought to be admired, and that an

Nevertheless, reflecting
it
ought
'
to be performed.
on actual or possible
that they must be
aesthetic systems,
would seem clear

to Psy-
included
either (i)
under
to
one of four heads.

(2)
They must belong

chology, or
(3)
Ethics, or
to Metaphysics, or, lastly (4) to Metaphysics
with an ethical or psychological element superadded.

in
And
none of these cases can Esthetics be said to rank as a
parallel subject of enquiry with Ethics.
The
belongs
first
of these possibilities, namely, that Esthetics

is
to,
or
included in Ethics,
mention chiefly
art-critics
for
the sake of completeness.
Even those
whose
our
denunciations of bad taste approach most nearly to the

level of
moral reprobation, hardly maintain that

in the
it
is
duty to admire the Venus of Milo
our duty to love our neighbour.

the conclusion to be drawn
is,
If
same sense as it is any do hold this view,
not that their Esthetic
code stands on a
different,
but similar platform to their

is
Ethical code, but that their Ethical code
larger than that

their Esthetics.
of ordinary people, by the whole
amount of
According to the second of these

that Êsthetics belongs to Psychology
;
possibilities,
namely,
Esthetics
is
merely
certain
the investigation
of the nature
and causes of peculiar

in
emotions chiefly secondary

more
to
produced
us
by
external causes, objects, or representations, and has no
do with
Ethics, either
by way of resemblance or
350

any other part of the science
to
[app.
contrast, than
which
it
belongs.
The
third possibility, namely, that Esthetics belongs
to Metaphysics, includes all such theories of the Beautiful
as deal exclusively with

*
'
objective standards,'
*
ideas,' or
archetypes,'
the evolution of the Idea,' or
the Perception
of the agreement of the Subject and Object,' and the like.
Taken by themselves,
physics
;
theories of this kind belong to
Meta-
but
if
there be added
any consideration of the

must belong
either to the
relation such ontological entities or processes bear to the

individual, these considerations
first
or the second of the above-mentioned possible treattherefore,
ments of Esthetics, and must,

or psychological.
be either ethical
This
is
the fourth possibility.

it
From
this concise
analysis then,
would seem
But
clear
that no analogy exists between Ethics rightly understood
and any system right or wrong of

be
so,
Êsthetics.
if
that
how comes
the existence of any analogy even to

}
have been supposed
exist an analogy between
The reply to this is, that there does some theories of Esthetics and
Ethics wrongly understood.
Some
moralists, for example,

in us
have dwelt largely on the emotion excited

actions.
by virtuous
of
these
is
And
if
the
scientific
examination
emotions really constitute the essence of Ethics, there

unquestionably an analogy between theories of the
Good
and some theories of the Beautiful.
Again,
if
ethical en-
quiries are thought to resolve themselves into researches
concerning the existence and nature of some objective

standard of right,
it is
inevitable that they should suggest,
and
it
is
probable they would resemble, those other metaobjective
physical enquiries concerning the
standard
I
I
of
beauty.
Now
it
must not be supposed that

;
pronounce
contend for
either of these investigations irrational
all
APP.]
THE PHILOSOPHY OF
;
ETHICS.
351
is
that they are not ethical

I
or,
rather (to avoid a dispute

is
about words), what
contend
for
that they have nothing,
and can have nothing,
directly to
do with Obligation.
the functions
The second
is
corollary concerns
It
is
of the
it
Moral Philosopher.
clear
from what precedes, that
not the business of the moral philosopher to account for
the origin of moral ideas, or to analyse and explain that
growth of sentiment which

which belong to Psychology.
prove the propositions which
of morals
;
collects
around
the
time-
honoured maxims of current morality.

Neither
lie
These
is
are' topics
he expected to
at the root of
any system
Nor, for the
for these are incapable of proof.
same
flict,
reason, can he justify the

final
judgments which declare
which of two
or
ends
of one
is is
to be preferred in case of conto be preferred to
how much
Nor,
how much
of
the other.
in reality,
has he any but a subordinate
part to play in expounding or deducing the derivative rules

of morality
;
and
form
for this reason.
The deduction
sarily in this
:
of any derivative rule

*
is
always necesto be
the happiness of
us say,
: *
mankind ought
promoted
piness of
it
'
(this,
let
is
the ultimate
unprovable
the hap-
foundation of the system)
monogamy promotes
: '
mankind
is
'
(this is the scientific [in
another system
therefore
might have been theological] minor premiss)

the required derivative rule.
monogamy
This
is
a system which ought to be supported;'
Now
the only
diffi-
culty in deducing this conclusion from the
first
principle of
the system
lies in
the difficulty of demonstrating the minor

it lies
premiss
in other words,
in the difficulty of a certain
sociological investigation,
which the speculative moralist as
such cannot be expected to undertake.
The important
tant duties, arise
duties of the moralist, for he has impor-
from the confused state
in
which the
352

mankind
[app.
greater part of
first
are with regard to their ethical
principles.
The two
do
I
is
questions each
man
has to ask
himself are
action
I
it
?
What
hold to be the ultimate ends of
and
If there
estimate them in case of conflict

will
more than one such end, how do These two questions, ?

fact,
be observed, are questions of

is
not of law
and the
duty of the moralist

fact,
to help his readers to discover the
not to force his
own view down

is
their throat
by
its
attempting a proof of that which

very nature, incapable of proof
of substituting
essentially,
all,
and by
Above
he must beware
some rude
simplification for (what
may
perhaps be) the complexity of nature, by deducing

Utilitarians do) all subordinate rules
principle,
(as the
from one fundamental

only approximately
when, it
may be,
this principle
contains actual existing ethical facts.
Since these two questions can be answered, not by

ratiocination, but only
by simple
inspection, the art of the
moralist will consist in placing before the enquirer various
problems
in
Ethics free from the misleading particulars

in
which surround them
practice.
In other words, his
method
It
will
be
casuistical,
and not dogmatic.

that, after
may
perhaps seem strange
commenting
at
some length on the prevailing confusion between Ethics and Psychology, I should now have to announce that the
business of the Ethical Philosopher (at least, so far as
principles are concerned)
is
first
as purely
psychological
I
as,
according to the two preceding paragraphs,

to be
;
make
it
out
and
it
may
seem, therefore, as
if
the difference
between
my
view and that of the Philosophers

criticise
is
is
whom
have attempted to
important.
is
by no means
essential or
This, however,
not the case.
My
complaint
against these philosophers
that they appear to suppose
that a psychological law can serve as a rational basis for
APP.]
THE PHILOSOPHY OF
;
ETHICS.
353
an ethical system
so that their chief aim often seems to
have been the estabhshment of their own particular views
on the origin and nature of our moral sentiments.
I,
on
the other hand, altogether deny the possibility of such a

basis,
and maintain that
all
that a moralist can

is,
do with
they are
regard to ethical first principles
not to prove them or

if
deduce them, but to render them explicit

implicit, clear if
they are obscure.
To do
this effectually
he must, of course, treat of ideas and motions, and his
work
will, therefore, in
some sense be undoubtedly psychostatement complete,

I
logical.
To make
by
this
should add,
is
that (as appears
my
next paragraph) there
no absur-
dity in supposing that a moralist
may
new
in the course of his

first
speculations hit on
some
entirely
principle which
he has riot held even obscurely before, but which commends

itself to his
mind
in
as soon as
it is
presented to him.
this
The
third corollary I
draw
is
that there are only

profess.
two senses
which we can rationally talk of a moral

According
system being superior to the one we

to the first sense, superior
means
superior in form,
more
in
nearly in accordance with the ideal of an ethical system

just
sketched out.
the
it
According to the second

attaches
to
sense,
which
system,
superiority
the
matter of the
is
can only mean that the system
one of which
if presented
we
are ignorant, but which
we should adopt
is
to us.
The
it
superiority indicated
a hypothetical supe-
riority.
Now
our own,
must be observed that the sense
in
which we.
which we
speak of other hypothetical systems as being superior to

is
by no means
identical with that in
speak of our
own
as being superior to that of other people.

history,
Looking back over
we
perceive a
change and
development of the moral ideas of the race
in the direction
A A
354

now
prevail
;
[app.
of the systems which
and
if,
this
change we
continue
false
rightly term an improvement.

past,
But
arguing from the

will
we suppose
that
this
improvement
through the indefinite future, we are misled by a

analogy.
The change may very

will
well continue, the
im-
provement certainly
not.
And
the reason
is
clear.
What we mean,
the past,
is
or ought to mean,
an approach to
by an improvement in our own standard, and since
any change
future
at all corresponding in magnitude to this in the must involve a departure from that standard, it must
necessarily be a change for the worse.
In other words,
when we
speak of another system as
we speak of a possible system which we should accept if we knew it. When we speak of our own system being superior to that of some other person, we assert the superiority unconditionbeing superior (in matter) to our own,
ally,
it
and quite irrespectively of the possible acceptance of by that other person, supposing him to be acquainted
it.
with
If then
it
we
believe that development will proceed
in the future as
has done in the past,
we must suppose
that a time will
would be as
man.
This
come when the moral ideas of the world much out of our reach, supposing them prealso true of scientific ideas
sented to us, as ours would be out of reach of primitive

is
:
but there
is
this difTerence
scientific
between them, that whereas the change
in
ideas
may be an improvement,
viz.,
that in
moral
ideas
must be a degradation.
The grounds
is,
of this dis-
tinction of course are obvious,
that the standard of
excellence in the case of scientific ideas

be, conformity to
or
is
supposed to
an infinitely complex external world
a conformity which
ideas.
may
increase with every
change
in the
The standard
of excellence, on the other hand, in
moral ideas must necessarily be conformity to our actual
APP.]
THE PHILOSOPHY OF
and
this
ETHICS.
355
ideal,
conformity must diminish with every change
in the ideas.
This point would not perhaps have been worth dwelling

on,
if
it
was not that the discussion brings into strong

so
far
relief the nature,
as
form
is
concerned, of the
criterion of right,
and
also has
some bearing on current

I
theories of optimistic evolution, with which
confess
it
does not seem possible easily to reconcile
it.
LONDON
SPOTTISWOODE
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CO.,
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A Defence of Philosophic Doubt Being An Essay On The Foundations of Belief (Arthur James Balfour, 1879)

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A DEFENCE

THE FOUNDATIONS OF BELIEF

ARTHUR JAMES BALFOUR,

so, to the scientific,

becomes the object of

afterwards the demonstration ceases to be conclusive,

limited to demonstrating that there

reason on the other side.

In the later stages of

is no conclusive show of demon-

bluster, or is useful only to trip

scope and design.

of destructive criticism, formed

ments of a highly abstract character.

not deterred by this description from reading

convenient to mention that the

and sixth chapters and the Appendix have already

and that the thirteenth chapter

each case there have been some verbal alterations,

sixth chapter elicited a short reply

from Professor Caird, which

have not thought

make any important changes

must not omit

acknowledge the great and

unvarying kindness which

portions of the Essay as they were written.

work, and his suggestions for

improvement, have both been invaluable

the fact that, in

respects, his point of

*^* The original

a short time advertised under this

was, however, pointed out to

without reading the book would assume that by Scepticism

was meant scepticism

could deny the

accuracy neither of the premises nor of the conclusion of this piece of

substituted the present for the original

think, less accurate,

at all events prove

IV. Historical Inference

Three Arguments from Popular Philosophy

IX. Psychological Idealism

Mr. Spencer's Proof of Realism

XII. Science as a Logical System

The Evolution of Belief

DEFENCE OF PHILOSOPHIC DOUBT.

ON THE IDEA OF A PHILOSOPHY.

be classed under one of four heads, which, without

here, not only

commonly goes by that name, but also history, and

knowledge of phenomena and the

ing between phenomena

included, not only

doctrines of the Absolute, but also (and

not necessarily the same thing)

which are not phe-

A DEFENCE OF PHILOSOPHIC DOUBT,

have shown at length

be found at the end of

only necessary to say that

includes, not only

^ The original