6. For a Depression-era economist making the point about fascisms, see for example, Robert A.

Brady, Business As A System of Power, New York: Columbia University Press, 1943, especially pp. 5-7, 16-17, 295.

7. On the failure of the New Deal but success of military spending in ending the Depression, see for example, Richard B. DuBoff, Accumulation and Power: An Economic History of the United States, Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1989, ch. 6. An excerpt (pp. 91, 98):
Despite the efforts of Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal, real G.N.P. [Gross National Product] did not regain its 1929 volume until 1939, when per capita income was still 7 percent below its 1929 level. Unemployment, reaching an estimated 25 percent of the labor force in 1933, averaged nearly 19 percent from 1931 through 1940 and never dipped below 10 percent until late 1941. The anemic nature of the recovery during the 1930s was a direct result of the inadequate increases in government support for the economy. . . . Only the Second World War ended the Great Depression. "Rearmament" commenced in June 1940 and over the next year, before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, military spending jumped more than six-fold, to 11 percent of the G.N.P. It rose to 42 percent of G.N.P. in 1943-44. Under this mighty stimulus, real national product increased 65 percent from 1940 through 1944, industrial production by 90 percent. . . . What had really happened between 1929 and 1933 is that the institutions of nineteenth-century free market growth broke down, beyond repair. . . . The tumultuous passage from the depression of the 1930s to the total economic mobilization of the 1940s was the watershed in twentieth century capitalism. After that, nothing in the macroe