‘Glow YOURSELF, KNOW Youn EXE + ASUNDHED BATTLES, A HUNDHED vicToarzs", sou Tay(8), Physics fitness of the troops. ~- €@) ity of commanders at all levels to ‘the men under their comand. 2 ._ fhe Review vas to be carried out by Lieut General Srigedter PS Susur We ‘niet of te ‘Levter’> 70512/3/C0s5, dated Ae Decenbery 1965 — annemare 1}. 3 In order, however, to assess the above empects, it is Recessary, at first, to exanine the develomesta and events prior to the nostiilties as also the balasce, posture, and ‘streagth of the day st the outbreak of hostilities. with this foundation, it will thea be easy to follow the operations as vell as understand the reasze ai caises for the Various < actions and the turn in evestes LATOT? OF THE RSYIEW 4 The backgroud of developsests and tie poise of the say ure more in the stratecio ophere and, therefcre, the concern of arny Heaiquarters, end, perhaps, that of tie Commands. The ations itself exbrace both the stratesica as well as the entical aspect end hence require exezination dove to Corps Level and eves lover. Tt vould, trerefore, nave been coavectest 2d Logieal to trace the events fros iray “eaiquerters ond thea move dova to Comande for more details, a-d, fizally, Nith field foraations for the battle itself: 5 Review of the functioning of army Healcuarters, Ras not been dealt wit: o” the eivice of the Chief of the Amy Staff. Thus, perforce, the actions and developments at aray Hesiquerters have hai to be traced from docaneats available at Comsend Headquarters. Ir this process, a wacber of Loose ecds goneerning Army Heaiquarters could not be verified and have been Left unanevered. The relationsrip betvee: Defence Ministry and Headquarters and the directions gives by the foraer to the Letter could, thezefore, also sot be exatineds 6 | The major Lendaarks in the developneats o: the INDO-TIBET Border, broaily speaking, are as under:— (a) In October, 1959, the IiD0=TTE:7 Borde: Decame the responsibility of the Ary. iis vas es aremlt of Chinese aggressive action at U1GJJ in NEFA in August, 1959, end at KOGKALA in LADAK: in Ostoborya (>) The tntroduction 6f the "Forverd Policy* — t Novender/Deceuber,. 1961, (s)! Fhe surrounding of GitWaN Post in LabixH - ' “30 Joly, 1962, ond DHOLA Post in WEFA — 8 Septeaber, igsz, ie 1 neae HAR BSR \d) The rat: of IV and the announcenent of (0 iae stiatiee paneer t eee nee (e) The outbreak of hostilities on 20 October, 1962. (2) Cease Fire on 21 Noveuber, 1962. 7, It will be seen thet each of the above events marked | successive stages in the border developments and requires stratogioal reappratssl at each stage. ‘Thus, it vould be convenient to consider the developments within these stages and ot tho sppropriate Levels fron Command dowivards. It 3 | also obvious that the developments in NEFA vere clo corslLated to those in LADAKE, and, thus, any study of HEPA operations must be carried out in’conjuiction with dovelop- ments and operations in tho Western Theatr. Tho Roview, therefore, eabraces both Western snd astern Comands, bit, for stmpltcity, each has been studied soparately.. aotions oa one front that hed repercussions on the otier heVe, hovever, eon corelateds 8 The Layout of the Review is, therefore, broadly as unders- Paty (a) CHAPTER T_— WESTERN comyanp This Chapter deals vith the developments and operations as viewed fron Western Command. (b>) GHAPTSR 11 — BASTERT cota This deals with the developments in UEFA upto the outbreak of hostilities. (ec) GHAPTER TIT ="IV cones. Ths Chapter covers the deteils of operations in NGFA end includes, where applicable, the commend and control exercised at various levels froa amy Heatguartere dovaverdss (4) HAPTER IV — concumstoxs ‘This Chapter brings out the salient factors and actions that led to our reverses and the Lessons derived from them. PaRT IT ‘DETAILED Lessons In this are included the detailed lessons, and covers all the facets, as required in the Terms of Reference. These are largely in the tactical sphere and are meant for more general distribution, ‘Top _suoneralive one. In consequence, the Army was nade responsible z i i f ' a 8 ; i i under Bastern Comand, ooked after by ‘The developments ia NEFA vill be considered Later Only LADAKH will be dealt with in this Chapters The developments in LADAKH fall into three distinct phases and hence this Chapter is dividea into sections to correspond with the phases as under:- (a) Section 1 (b) Section 2 (e) Section 3 (@) Section 4 October, 1959, to Hovesber/ December, 1961, the time of introduction of the "Porvard Policy®. Toveubor/Decenber, 1961, to 20 Dotober, 1962, outbreak of hostilitios. 20 October, 1962, to 21 Novenber, 1962, the of Cease Fire. Conclusion. aR ATE1 The period October, 1959 ~ November/December, 1961 vas mainly devoted to the consolidation by the Army of the territory actually 4n pessestion of our forces in LADAKH, It vas also a period for appraical of the Chinese threat and for planning anf ‘building up of our forees in the LADAKH Sector. 2 ' dn intelligence appreciation was issued by Aray Headquarters in October, 1950, and this vas folloved up by Operational Instruction Wo 26 issu: 1960, It is significant vas Puction to be seued by Arey Headquarters and vad, therefore, currenty and could be considered the basis of our planning to moet the » Chinese aggression in 1962. How far short vere these arrangenents, 4m the light of tho subsequent build up of the Chinese and other of the border, will be 4a more 11 as events unfold themselves. It is thus important that ‘nd arrangements thea undertaken are ctudied in pEanning sone detail. 3 A systematic appraisal vas carried out, and, as vo ho en, an intelligence appreciation vas made,” Based on it and the dinttation imposed due to the terrain and other factors, tasks vere allotted, comensurate vith the forces that could be indueted into LABAK, 4 This process of planning and issue of orders vas findertaken at successive levels. It would take a great deal of time and space to examine the planning and orders at each of these levels. Tims these are being grouped together and the general situation existing in 1959-1960 in LADAKH is being dealt with in detail. - GITUATION IN LADAKH ~ 1959 - 1960 Ghinese threat, 7 5 The Chinese were in the process of building up their Strength and improving commintcations and as sueh it was not expected that they would be in a position to launch a major offensive during 1959-1960. It was estimated, however, that the Chinese could deploy over a regiment plus (equivalent of fa brigade plus of ours) with some tanks against LADAKH, The jmain sectors where operations could be expected were as undert- (a) DEMCHOK - CHUSHUL, with min) ‘attack on CHUSHUL with a reginent ) supported by tanks. (Arrow A) ) (b) Battalion group along GHANGCHEMO ) towards HOF SPRING and SHYOK. ) See (row 8) 3 Sketen F a (e) Battalion group on KARAKORAM route! ‘to LE. (Arrows G, C1 and C2). or (@d Battalion group through KAURIK D and B) SETS ) ? ) ) )Generally, therefore, tt could be said that the Chinese would wert aateetiony ‘their eres to part peaoencteee of” “company telion strength and would h e to launch a bigger offensive during this periods SHS Ee a Bonlovment ant taske = om forces A total bafld up of a brigede group vith two additional “4 and K Militia battalions wae planned by Army Headquarters. bi f Headquarters 114 Infantry Brigede vas established at L2H on 4a Fh Mey Ant) a 7 sas i o8 ipa aap Leas formed a ‘a series of forward posts/picquets. The reusinder of the Brigade Group, however, could not be ‘Andacted into LADAKH owing to shortage of air lift. s ‘The task in general given to the Brigede was to restrict & any FURTHER (capital letters used for emphasis) See ee into Indian territory along the INDO-TIBET Border in le ; Along vith this, the particular task given to the Brigade was to hold the general line MURGO ~ TSOGSTSALU = PHOBRANG CHUSHUL = DEMCHOK and defend LEH. (See Sketch A). The screen established by 7 and 14 J and K Militia Battalions by middle of 1960 generally followed this line. (Refer to relevant ortions of Army Headquarters Operation Instruction No 26 at Kinemre 2, Aray Neadquarters Intelligence Appreciation at Annexure 3, and Western Command Operation Instruction No 26 at dnnemre 4). © Army Eeadquarters also laid down that the status quo in the disputed areas should bo maintained and patrolling was to de cartied out to ensure that no further ingress vas made. (innemares 5 and 6). The Chinese Claim, as then known, was |) the 1054 line (Seo Sketch B)» It vill be seen that, except | perhaps for DENCHOX, there was no difference between the line || Setmatiy neta by us’and the Chinese Clain, The Chinese from |] PHOBRANG Northwards actually held positions well BAST of thetr claims. The exact positions were not known, but it could be taken tobe DEHRA Li, XONGKA LA, KHURWAK Fort, and. SPANQGUR, )) Gketoh A, Line ¥).” Thus thore vas a vide gap between the to || torces and a great deal of territory claimed by the Chinese | was not then occupied by either sides Unequal race 10 _Im the meantime, in 1960, the Chinose hed ‘grafually tonsolidated and strengthened their positions. & reappraisal was, therefore, made through a var gare run in Western Comaand In October, 1960. This brought ‘Sut that @ aintmun o davis! Fequired to mest the Chinese eee is toot, Recommendations emerging frou this war game were forwarded to ‘Aray Headquarters by Western Command, and, after sone corresponionce between the tvo Headquarters, a firm deaand of a division with additional aéninistrative troops was Subsitted by Western Command in Septouber, 1961. Wo decision on thie vas given ty Arny Headquarters. (Relevant extracts from Western Command Exeretse 'SHREL' Annenire 7, Western Comman’ letter Ho 2019/16/4/38(Ops), dated 29 Septenber, 1061, Annemire 8)- 11 Arwy Headquarters, by October, 1960, issued a % consolidated Intelligence Review on CHINA’and TISET, bringing ESI PEAK are ‘Top sgcRETmage Bs due to Asciaise, engpoehs to started in got a fresh impotus in 1960, vn Border Roads Organisation took aver rond constracti oe ‘buses, a however, = buses 7 > continued £0 bo airs ‘SITUATION IN LADAKH IW 1961 Qun deployment’ —Septenber/October, 1961 battalion (1/8 GR) as sgainst 2 brigade [ty inducted into LADAMH during 1961 too | ‘Sepleyment of 114 Infantry Brigade, by October, 1961, was (a) Headquarters 114 Infantry Brigade in - LEH (>) 145 and E Militia = KsRAKORIM Sector trom DaUuar B8¢ OLDI to SHOK, with a company in LEE and the Battalion () 8a - two companies in CHUSHIL. Southern LADAKH Sector from inclusive DUNGII to s ‘DEMCHOK. * “ the Line of our poste, in October, 1961, ‘eioopt that it hea ‘boon \ (a) 72 and K Militia generally the sane as for 1960, Gxtented to Dalit Bic G.DI, ih the OATS, end CHING ©. DUNGTI Sector, and JARA La, in DENCOK Sector, in the 5: ‘Enemr_situation 45. Wo fresh review was carried out, tut, from the Weekly Intelligense Sumarios ismed by Army Headquarters, 1% was EF clgtr that the Chinese bel further conooldated ‘their positions opened up nev tracks in the Hoxtas "There a: ; Htronger in Botobers i8ety than in October oF fi ee ee aes at on 16 It will be acer October, 1961. situation Mis turther boon weigaved In Favour of the chinese: We had previcas year.” ‘Top SEGRETwanaged'to complete the induction of one infantry “Pattalion, and thus there wore, at that tine, one brigade (114 Infantry Brigade) of one regular infantry battalion and tvo J and K Militia battalions in-LADAKH, This Brigade ~ had no supporting arms in the shape of artillery, mortars, br tie, The Toad had barely been comlcted ta Lx fron ‘BRINAGAR. The land rout ‘to all posts SAT of LEH ware, at best, aifficalt wile tracks over the high LADAKH Ranges 47. AYL posts were maintained by air ¢rops, except the Following, where airfields had been constractedt~ Gay Beer ois @) amet (e) FUSGHE near DORITT (a) Hors, 13 ‘These airfields also coincided with the larger garrisons where, ese ‘two companies, were deployed. The othe? tvant were gon: of platoon strength | or 19 Thus the deployment in 1961 was essentially one of staking elains and showing the flag rather then for fighting. 20 Oa the other hand, the Chinese had opened up vehicular youtes upto their Western=most posts (see oh B), and als: strengthened then. Their capacity for deployment of forces, eeeeedehes was greater tasn in 1940. Thus, mich greater caution was required for the security of our forces at this stage than at any time previously. instead, hovever, st this junsture, the ‘Forward Policy! was broaght into forces SuMaARE cs pi In this Section ve have seen that, after the Aray took Gver the border, tho normal systen of Army planning and issue er erders was undertaken at each successive level. General poliey and tasks were laid dow snd details were left to be worked out at the appropriate levolse of shortage of air lift, |. On the other hand, the ‘also limited to the means evailable, 22 The build up, however, Decou than‘*VORMAND POLICE” DECTSTON. Gavernment Dectaton ~ 1 Tho background to. the Government's decision on the “Forward Policy" ta not inom. Nor are the minutes of the meeting laying down the "Forward Poltcy” available. 2 A mecting, however, was held in the Prime Minister's office ‘on 2 oveabar, 1981, andves attended anongst others by the Defence Minister, the Foreign Secretary, the Chief of the Army Staff, and thé ‘Direetor, Intelligence Buren. Tt appears that the DES vas of the opinton that "the Chinese would not react to our establishing nov posts and that they vere WOT LIKELY T0 USE FORCE AGAINST ANY OF OUR POSTS EVEN I¥ THEY WERE IN A POSITION TC DO BO" (in capitals for | euphasis). (ieay Headquarters letter No 71939/05/MOl, dated 20 | December, 1962, para 7, annexure 10). This vas contrary to the military intelligence appreciation, brought out in the CONCLUSION of Aray Headquarters Ansual Intelligence Heview ~ CEINA-PTBS?, 1959 - 195) (Annexure 9)3 which ee ‘Anddeated that the Chinese vould resist by force any attonpt: to take back territory held by thes. What opinion was given by General Staff Branch at the meeting 1s, hovever, not known, Mevertheless, the meeting laid down three operative decisions for the izplenentation of the "Forvard Policy". These decisions are of Some significance and are, therefore, reproduced in full belowi- "(q) So far as LADAKH 1s concerned, wo are to patrol as far forvard as possible fron our present rositions towards the Intemational border. This will be done vith a ostablishing our posts which should prevent the Chinese from advancing further and also dominating froz any posts which they may have elready established in our territory. This mist be done without getting Anvolved in a clash with the Chincse, unless this Desomes necessary in self defence. (b) As regards UP ané cther Northern areas, there are not the same difficulties as in LADAG, We should, therefore, us far as practicable, go forvard and be in effective occupation of the whole frontier. where ‘there ave any gaps, they mst be covered either by patrolling or by posts. (c) In view of numerous operational and adainistrative Aifficulties, efforts should be ade to position major concentration of forces along our borders in places conventently situsted behind the forvard poste from where they could bo natatained logistically and from where they can restore a border situation at short notice.” ‘TOP SECRET‘was no question of there being major bases for thet matter any base vorth the name to withstand any ‘lone to restore a situation. Thus, if one sions hed to be implemented in its entirety, 4b could anly be done after induction of a sizeable forces Western Comand had already indicated that 2 minimum of a division vas required for the effective defence of LADAME. Amuy Headmuartors action 5 From @ November, 1961, to 5 December, 1961, Aray Headquarters took no totion on the overnncat's *Forvard Policy” decisions. What transpired in this period is not mown, but that there wes a major deviation from the Government's Aseisions 18 obvious from the directive sent out by Army Headquarters to Commands, This is reproduced in full below Gnnemre 11)%= : "1. The policy regarding patrolling and establishing posts with reference to INDO-TIBET Border has recently been reviewed by Government. The decisions taken by Government are reflected in the succeeding paragraphs. f Lape 2 We are to patrol as far forward as possible from our present positions towards the International Border as Fecognised by us. This will be done vith a view to establishing additional posts located to prevent the Chinese further and also to dominate any from advancing Chinese posts already established in our territory. 3 This "Forvard Policy" shall be carried out without Eetting involved in a clash with the Chinese unless it Becones necessary in self-defence. UP_and other Worthera borders 4 As regards UP and other Northern areas, there are fot the sane difficalties as in LADAKH. We should, therefore, as far as practicable, go forvard and be in effective occupation of the vhole frontier. Gaps should de covered either by patrolling or by posts Reappraisal of tasks 5 _I realise that the application of this new policy in LADAKH and on our other borders vill entail considerable movements of troops with attendant Logistical problems. I vould like you to make a fresh ‘appraisal of your task in view of the new directive frox Government, espectally with regard to the additional logistical effort involved. Your recommendations in this respect are required by we by 30 Deceubor, 1061+ Meanwhile, vherever possible, action should be taken as indicated aboves ‘TOP SECRETTt will ‘be seen that Aray Hoadquarters directive 41d not reflect the te for the "Forward Policy" laid dom in s the Government's Operative Decision. ‘There vas also NO * of Army Beadquarters NOE imowing that such bases did question yo WO? exist at that time. Thus on the face of it, there ‘sppeared = to be a situation watch 1s hard to reconcile. fhe Goveranent /” who politically must have been keen to recover territory, » advocated a cautious policys whilst Army Headquarters dictated © @ policy thet was clearly militarily unsound. < 7 This, to some extent, perhaps explains Army Headquarters delay in sending out their directive, Once, hovever, the Atrective was issued, Army Headquarters pressed on with its iupleuentation, irrespective of the difficulties brought cut by lover formations. ' AMALXSIS OF THE *FORWARD POLICY® 8 The policy virtually intended the establishing of to dominate the Chinese positions in eccupied areas of bacttom Thus, in effect, it could mean our eventual domination of the axsal CHIN Righvay. In fact, Aray Hoadquarters aid reflect this _ ina letter in which it was stated "In pursuance of recent orders froa Government, it was proposed to establish certain posts in AKSAI CHIN in other parts of LADAKE in our territory now/by the Chine (aray Eoadquarters letter No 57888/T8/H0/ dated 7 December, 1961, Annemre 12). echt 9 This Review 1s HOT concerned with the probability of sonflict, with or without the "Forward Policy", but with its introduction the chances of a conflict certainly increased. It is obvious that politically the "Forvard Policy" vas desirable and presumably the eviction of the Chinese from LADAKH mst always be the eventual aim. For this, there can be no argument, ‘but what is pertinent is whether we were militarily in a position at that time to implement this policy. 10 That this tuplementation vould bring sbout a major change in the military situation vas obvious,and 1t cannot be viewed now “as being vise after the event". Yet, no operational or intelligence appreciation vas given out by Army Headquarters hor fresh operation orders or instruction issued to Commands. This, together with the fact that the Third Operative Decision of the Government vas not conveyed to Commanis, literally meant that they had to take Army Headquarters directive at its face Yalues thas troops, only to man the additional poste, were asked for by Western Commands (Western Coumand letter No 2005/10/C/ G8(ops), dated 29 Decenber, 1961, Annemre 13) Had the whole of the Goverauent directive been conveyed to the Commands, it is almost certain that Western Command would have brought out their inability to implement the "Forward Policy" till an infantry division as asked for by then had been indueted into LADAKH, There 1s, therefore, no doubt that the implementation of the *Forvard Policy", in the mannor it vas done, was carried out deliberately by Arny Headquartersy without the necessary Backing, as laid dow by the ents ‘TOP SECRET© pEvELopueurs AFTER INFRODUGTION OF THE "FORWARD POLICY" it ms been br out that, with the "Forvard ireonttenee ‘overall instructions were issued fran ‘Aray 2 Inioed, no overall plan far the probe forvard was given out at any stage. Instead, however, a series of orders, both written ani verbal, the lattér, sone direct to orps, were given out, from time to tine, by Army Headquarters. © 12 The probe Rastwards fron our bases can be conveniently Aivaded Sinko groups we Under!= (Sksteh 6) P (a) Based on DAULAT BEG OLDI F ‘slong CHIP CHAP River. (Sketch ¢ = P1) t (b) Based on SULTAN CHUSEKU along UNCHARTERED River tovards S000, (Sketoh ¢ - P2) Along GAIWAN River tovards (oats (Sketen ¢ - Pa) (@ Based on PHOBRANG ecross THRATSANGLA tovards | MZEWORE. (Skateh ¢ - P4) t (e) Based on CHUSHUL to (i) Area CHARTSE (a) Youn (Sketch ¢ - PS) (aaa) RAzaNGLA (2) Based on KOYUL te | = CHANGLA (Sketch C = Pé) (e) Based on DEMCHOK to ~ GQ) sar tA 2 (9 cmsorma 3} ee 13 | A short account of each of these probes from the time of ‘their initiation is given in the ensuing paragraphs. 14 Brobe based on DAULAT BEG OLDI (Sketch G) (a) Reconnaissance with a view to establishing a post Was ordered vide Army ener letter No 15458/1/H/9S/MO3 of 9 Wovenber, 1961, (Annexure 14, paragraphs 1, 2 ani 5). \ CO ase ees Stab seat gee = ; Salat aces ST (e) The first Chinese reuction vas on 22 April» 1962, ‘when one of the observation posts vas threatened and had to withdray, Later, the Chinese established three posts in that area. . ‘Top _SEORET1 CRON SB (a) Roconnstssance with a view to establishing a post at the head of UNGHARTERED River was ordered vide Army Headquarters letter Ho 15456/1/5/28/M03 of 10 April, 1962. (innemre 15, paragraph 3). (b) Patrol sent during April, 1962, reached the vicintt; of Chinese post at SU%D0, Arny Headquarters, vide” ‘their signal No 162452/M03, dated 23 April, ordered a post to be established by the patrol in the area Teacheds” ‘SADA River probe (Sketch ¢) (a) Reconnaissance vith a view to establishing posts vas ordered vide Army Headquarters letter Wo 15458/1/E/ 26/03 of 9 Wovenber, 1961. (Annemire 14). ~y (©) Recommetssance along the River approach was attempted x in winter, but was not successfule (c) General Staff Branch Army Headquarters omered a Fecoanaissance via HOP SPRING, ‘vide their Letter Wo 15458/1/B/T8/M03 of 10 April, 1962. (Annexure 1B, peragraph 4)+ (€) Western Command, vige their No 2005/10/R/¢8(0PS) dated 16 May, 88 Chaneite 18, paragreph 3) iaformed General Staff Branch Aruy Headquarters that, in view of the possible Chinese resections, NO post Should be established near SAMZUNGLIWG (@ALWAN River). (e) Aray Headquarters overruled Western Comand Fecomendation vide their No 15458/1/H/T8/M03 of 28 May, 1962, (Annemre 17). {f) This post was then established on 5 July, 1962, and subsequently brought upto approximately a platoon Strength. It vas surrounied by sone 70 Chinese on 10 uly, 1962, and gradually they increased their ‘strength to a’ battalion. {g) Mostorn Conmand, vide their signal Ho 02067 of 14 July, 1962, (Annemure 16) fecoumended that land route to GhiwaN Post should not be used, as that ment Yesult in an armed clash, and ested for sir 2 raintensnei (a) Army Headquarters directed, vide their signal Ho 160341/0PS ROOK of 14 July, 1962 (Annemire 19), that maintenance will be carried out by land routes (3) Land colums were sent between 15 - 18 July, 1952, Dut vere intercepted ant prevented by the Chinese from reaching the poste Baged_cn FHOBEANO (Gxatch ©) (a) In June, 1962, the Chief of the Arny Staff, whilst on tour in XV Corps, approved of the establishment oe sacuerSere 13 ~ ef the folteiring postst= ay amen oe Gi) THRAPSANGLA (Subsequently moved further EAST, ‘THRATSANGIA was not found suitable). (>) Both these posts vere established by the end of June, Based _on GHVSIUL (Seth ©) (a) aray Fnetgmartees directed that a post be established at (etter No 15458/1/H/T8/A/M03 of 7 Becember, 1961 = Annemre 20). Subsequently, on 14 tour ef fv forges ecdeced c section post to ber our a 3 post to be established at REZEIOLA, This post was established on 16 February, 1962. R (>) Various other posts were established around CHUSHUL « some unter orders of General Staff Branch Aray Headquarters - others to fill the vacuum, in |: parauance of the "Forvard Folicy". Thus by June/July CHUSHUL had around it the following main postst= (4) SIRIJAP (WORTH of Lake PANGONG). i (11) YULA 1 and 26 i 9 Baged_on KOYUL (Sketch ¢) f CHANGLA was ordered to be established by Aray Headquarters i t | vide their letter No 15458/1/8/28/1/H03 of 7 Decenber, 1961 = Annemire 20. This post of some 12 nen was established in December, 1961. | 20 Based on DEMCHOK (Sketch ¢) f ‘A number of minor posts wore established around DENCHOK, jj t pushing forward the line of actual control. i ‘Line held_by the end_of July, 19592 (Sketch 2 5 21 By the end of July, 1962, ve had, in the NORTH, moved forward fairly deep, and, in the central sector around CHUSUL, gone upto the vicinity of tho Chinese postse In the SOUTH, we i fad established posts et REZENGLA, CHANGLA, and aroand DEMCHOK upto the International Borde! ti 22 These nev posts, some thirty-six in number, obviously H farther dispersed our meagre resources and depleted our strength |! {! i in the vitel bases. Thus, whereas ve neoded added strength at onr bases to back up the new posts, we now had wealnesse Chinese reactions: 23 This probe forvard aleo activated the Chinese. With their moh greater resources and easier commnications, they set up stronger posts adjacent to ours, and, in many cases, virtually jarrounded cur postse 2% ‘The two sides wore now within strilcing distance of each other. This race for establishing posts by both sides also ‘Top SECRER(@) (e) - «bend route party prevented +1 “the ‘Chinese trou prousoding Yo ‘the Gala Post. - may B > One of our patrols in the Dauber BEG OLDE Sector fired upon oy ‘the Chinese using sorters, Ld, gud rifles. Sty 22 ~ General stat Branch aray Hood quarters gave the discretion to all jst commanders to fire on the nese, if their peats were threatened, 25 __ thus, by the end of July, 1962, tension had reached a pitch Te would, therefore, be appropriate to take stock of the military |; Where a small incident could spark off widesoread ectriat situation then previiling, SITUATION - AUGUST - SEPTEWBER 1962 26 114 Infantry Brigude had been wugmented by one additional infantry battalion and the Brigade’s deployment in August 1962 was as undert- (sketeh D) (a) (), (e) (@) © © ‘Troops Tocations Headquarters 414 Infantry Brigede = Lad 8 JAT Less one company - Aves PHOBRANG — HOT SPRING, Qne company : 5 dar - Area DIUEAT BEG OLDT, 4/8 GR with under Command one platoon 0 - area CHUSHTL. TS and K Militia = - area KOYUL - DENCHOK 44 Juni K Militia - area SHYOK - DAULAT BEG OLDIE TOPSECRED SNARE RN aE Ar eee eS& 7 The above deployment gives an impression of concentrations a or even Wore at tho main focal centres. In reality Gio position was different, With the prove forverd’ the teeet Eposts that had come into existence were in the region of 60, ‘A.few of these were perhaps upto platoon strength, inder Errore perforce section and bolow, "Bren with these very neck frosts they bad absorbed more than half the garrison strength in LADAKH, Thus, the bases wore no more than administrative centres with few troops. CHUSHUL with a battalion had the largest single tion, yet it had no pore than a WESTRN COMMAND REAPPRATSAL General basis 29 our weakness on the ground and the developments in July i0¢2 wore a cause of considerable consern to Nesters Comat, ‘They, therefore, submitted to General Staff Branch Army Head— | Bop" igoan" (western Gonnard ‘Letter Ho 2019/17 AGS OBS) nea fo (wostern 3 c | kskast 1908"- annexure £1). 28 Tho reappraisal te an important document, as 1t sets forth ryglistically the situation thon obtatning, “and gave recomenda- tions, both Short and long term, to ucct it. The reaporaisal is re ed in full in Annexure £1 and the more important aspects are discussed’ in the ensuing paragraphs. Somarative strengths b Dees ese Ges at cel ers arms deployed against LADAKH, Further, tho Chinese had developed [roads to all the important areas they held and thus could ee ‘large forces at any given place. As against this, E EB We vere thinly spreadcout, with fo sipportiag arma‘ warts the"hane\| Tna"ritn poor communlostions between the yartous aesteres shane in ‘cose of hostilities, we soUld be detested is aeteiie 81 ‘The comparative strengths, sector-nise, are given below:- (a) DAULAT BEG OLD Sector A regimental group against our thinly spread-out three companies over a frontage of some 60 miles, (b) CHANG CHENMO (HOT SPRING) Sector including GALWAN Area Ferg. gain the Chinese had « reeimontal group agetnst ‘three Companies deployed over a frontage of 60 miles. (ce) CHUSHUL Sector dn estimated regimental group, which could be further easily reinforced. Against this we had one battalion, @ Valley Sec K = A major threat was not visualised, but the Chines deploy 4 battalion group. P_SFCRhe fearpreteal vont on fo stress. the. grert « Heaton Srouent about by 3 ey of ebbe Une Plage tad gaked for a decision at the i? st level for future action, “he relevant paragraph 49 omizous and is reproduced delowi— win view of the foregoing, it is imperative trat political ‘aistetion As sored fn wilitery esther. If toe to are ea : co-elated, there is a dunger of crvating a situation » ‘here we Bay lose both in tho material and mora? sense ( ¥ auch more tt wo already have, Thus, there is no short. Srrects Frspeme pall eect rede oh i wraly our poorer ‘he illegal @laim over our territory.” re The und tere te pel eases troop requirements to mect the (a) Long tera ‘A four brigade division, with adequate supporting aru and administrative cover. (b) Short term F411 such tine as the long term arrangenents were Sompieted, the rollowing additional troops to be immediately inducted inte LADAKHi~ (3) Four infantry battalions. (34) one mountain reginent (441) two comantes ino 84 The reappraisal finally went on tc recomwnd the courses of action to be taken till such time as the strength was adequately made up, These, in min, wero as under:~ (a) As the prevatling mildtary yftuation in LApAtH was Siravourable, st vas vital that we Gid wot provoke the Chinsee into an armod elash, (b) Until such time as our strencth tn LADAKH wes butit Ups goupatibie vith the Chinese, the "forward Policy" should be held in abeyance, (©) A satisfactory rolitieal solution for the surrounded Gabi! Post shoiid be sought. (amexure 21, paragraphs 24, 2B snd 51). Ary Houdouarters reactions 35 Tt 4g not known whether this important document or the Soutents of it were conveyed to the Government. There was, however, a mecting on P August 1962 at which the Chief of the uray Start, the General Offie-r Comsaniing in Chief, Western Command, and the Chief of the General staff discus! Setsone’ peiateseieeds ‘No minites of the mosting were issued, TOP SECRETor of 5 Septesber 1962 from General staff Branch jondquarters to Western Command brings out the stand by Arey Headquarters, ‘he Totter gives ‘the impression that General stat? Branch Headquarters dia uot consider it likely that the Chinese ‘resort to aby large seale nostilities in LADAKH, Tbey jetracked: the main Issues, ani argusd on the correstioss Wyorward Policy and ironbeally enough eonteniod that swbaoquant events had justified the policy adopted, ste requiresent for extra trocps vas not touched Spon ahd the lopg term requireumt vas brushed aeide, quoting that Western Command theuselvas could not accept extra troops im LADAKH, “The reason for Yostern Comand not being able to ‘accept extra forces was availability of airlift and this was a | Cob Yefore extre troops could + be inducted, General Staff Branch Army Headquarters, however, © considered tuat, oxiug to shortage of foreign exchange, it was Unlikely that Goverment would consider inereasing the air fiset. {ex nt ‘Ho 15458/1/H/18/M08, cated & September, B | : of, out by the remark o7 the Dep: (ofrictating Chict of the Go: L.P. SEE, DSO in September 1962 that "experience in LADAKH had shown that 4 few rounds fired at the Chinese would eause them to yun away", (Report of Lioutenant-Gensrai L.P, SEN, DSO - Appendix A, paragrapa 6), $2, Whatever, the ressons, Gonoral Start Branchiray Headquarters took 1ittle action on Western Command's recommendations, eitacr ‘to strengthen LADAXH or, alternatively, to lessen the teasion there, On 20 Eoptomber, 1362) Aray Howiquarters ordered that mo further surrousl! }osts by the Chinese or occupying of ing zones be tolerated. Hes arters sil ETERS BosPer"Ss. donterber tees - Giteene ayes eet SUBSEQUENT EVEFTE = * Govornncnt Govision for eviction of Chinese trom NZEL 40 In the moaptime, tension was building up in NEFA as vel. DHVLA Post had been surrounded on 6 Septenber, i962 and a muuber of firing izetdente bad teken plece, mb 41. The Defence Mintster held s mecting on 22 Sent ‘and the border situation was reviewed. Chier of the Staff considered that any action by us in DsOLA area may well Fesult in the Chinese retaliating in LADAKZ, especially slong ‘the UNCHARTERED River and the GALWAN River.’ The Foreign Secretary kovever, was of the opinton that the Chinese would not reset very sttongly against us in LADAKH, He considered that operation)| for eviction of the Chinese from NEFA should de carried out, even ‘at the axpence of losing some territory in LADAKH. i er 5962 ELE ee (SOP SECRET“8 42 Potence. nalts eed ce tee Texoest of the Chief of ‘the Aray Staff, issued the instructions: te |) Whe deetatom throughout Ie been, as disenssed at ee Previous mestings, thet, the Arey 3 pee : ‘the Chinese out, i Pantie Divieion 18 HPA, 43° It 4n noteworthy that of territory im LADAKH, but ‘the HEPA Operations to General < tha WEVA Operations will be dealt | but 4¢ Ss obvious thet operations in the two theatres wore elosely eo-related. It was, therefore, incumbent on Arny’ Headquarters to not ‘ensure the preparations in WZFA but algo in LADAKH to meet the Chinese threat. ‘then only rei gngure that the strength, 45 It vas essential for General stuff Branch Aray Headquarters at thig stage to carry out a uajor appraisal of the border. situation and on the preparation and tining for the operations, They should not hive allowed themselves to be hustled into 111— prepared operations that could only lew to disaster, 4@ As far as Western Command 1s concerned the only action taken by General Stuff Branch army Headquarters was to warn thea of the iupending operations tn Mara and the possibility of Hinited reactions in LADG. (Arey Headquarters stgaal Yo 360398/oPS ROOM of 22 Beptesber 1662 - Annexure 25), Tho operative paragraphs of the signal for Western Comnand are given below: "for 0oC-in-€ Western Command axl COC X¥ Corps (4) the above action (the evicting of Chinese from NEFA) 1s Ukely to hive repercussions in LADAKH to tho oxtant that Cuinesa sy uttack some of our Zorvard posts (.) alt posts till tharefore be alerted and their defences Strengthened as far as possible (.) if attacked posts siti ent it out ant turliet maximum casualties on the Chinese () any udjustuents which nay be considered hecessary to strengthen cur presont positions may be carried outs 47. The polnt of significance in the struil vas the strengthen ing of our positions and posts end the posts to right it out, ale sounds peculiar in view of the fact that Western fad boon saving, with little, success, since, 10960) for extry | troops and the necessary airlift and loribtical backing. strengthening, therefore, could amount to vory little, Purther, the ordere to "fight it Out® to these far-flung, tactically ‘unsound and uncoordinated suaii posts brings out vividly how TOP SECRETwarealistic these orders. were, It is orders such as those ‘Meat were Aesued; tine and again, that brings doubt to onets ‘Staff Branch’ arny Headquarters were in j OF the situation, It appears that ‘Father than actions events. _ mind ‘whether General yhe introduction of the ‘Anpleaont 1t effectively. Feactions than on sepettoa staff work and coprctnation, proper military functioning, e308 sbamdoned by General star?’ Brasen planned actions, This the result that our the initiative of of the Fiela1. The Review ef Western Commend ves undertaken as the Ceeanet Pobioy" wee primarily introduced to baile the Chinese claims in LADAKH, Hed the developments steming Siay'tansqoarters end corel vied to Masay ¢'Ts postithe’” ers 3 post Seted metters till we wore Be , 3 i 3 i 4 i Of his not sttanking, but réther on the feet that ve have made our position wiessailable". 3 tlie it ta wathinkatle thet the General stat? $14 not stviee the Goverment on our wodiciess ahd inability fo implement the “worvard Poliay*.. General KIL in hia Feort (dupendi= paras 65-69) has brought out that, on a mmber of occasions in 1961-62, the Goverment vere advised » of oar dettodenaiee in omctpnett, ampove support, vaich would cerioucly prejudice ot position in the event of a Chinese attack on us, ‘the fect, hovever, rowalng hat orders vere given by the Generel Stott ta Doosaber 1961 Zor the iupheagatasion of the SForvard Policy" witaot the Bipamutsite of Major Baste for restoring’ military ‘sid dom by Governsent. Indeed Generel. Kal sho PMO, tine and agsin, ordered in furtherence of the Morvard Potioy" the estahlisment of individea! Posts, overruling protests male by Western Comand, jeneral Staff to have Pointed Out the unsoundness of the "¥orvard Polioy® without ‘$he meena to inpleaent it. Phis was brought out very forcibly by GOC-in-c Western Comand in his Letter of 17 August (annemre 21). apparently, hovovor, tho General Staff of HO stage eudaitved to the Government ah appraisal on the consequences of the "Forvard Policy" or the basie Feqirement of troops snd resources required before it should have’ bean inplenented, 5 por WOperel TATE in his report goes on %o state that ine amber of neetings held by the Defence Minister and attended by GOsS, himesl£ as COS, DIB and ropreontatives of Defence, External affairs, and Hine Mintatries, the gonercl view wes ‘that the Chinese’woula not provoke a shov-down. (appendix: Para 70). This is strenge, because military action eaergea ‘TOR SecRstfor defence or 3. Ero both political, and eilftary epprectationss, It vas from 1960 awards that greatly increased her force in TIES. h strength far greater than thet required Gualling of Tibotton uprisings This vas brought out in Ostober 1960 in the Military intelligence Review 1959=60 $ To base military actions and place in jeopardy the coat tconce tales indisctes either arcontarch ct Chee belief or a militarily immeture mind, The General steff, | Hirthor and pornoctel tis Folie? into the dnnye ith tse @sastrous. t that even field formations vere infected vith a sense of goeneys This ctenied from the fact compl ) that after 1960 and detailed staf? vor $0 eosential secs for "Higher Direc! War" was never serioudly undertacens StarF DUTIES coconut tage, Bere, Se, 90 many intonetbles, os in ver, 4t ts essential thet all facets of a problem are thoroughly gxemined before a course of action is determined. The higher the level the greater the necessity for a tho: ‘exaninations This process of higher levels must be carried out in wri! sa the wide range of exasinstion cannot obviously be cover nontally or verbally. Thus, in modern times, staff has increased as the complexitiés of war increased, end a systen of staf? duties have evolved waich encures a thorough appraisal end systematic planning before a course of action is alopted, S ihe detailed staff work that was carried out before the WORUNDY Operations is common knowledges Our staff at army Headqiarters io patterned on the Wer Office in the UNITED Hitebar_ Gur Gongral Star¥ with 18a dperstions, Intelligence, sod gtake Dutton Directorates is designed for eich detalied wo 9 ‘Infact, till 196 one can see systematic pl: Deing carried out of all levele, Intelligence aid operation ations wore made and plans evolved, in which the tasks d down were compatible with the resources available, The ans were then tried out through war gamos and 4¢ was hoped ‘the flave discovered would be put right. This as has ‘been seen was not donee In 1961-62, major developments took Place that required fresh sppraisal at each stages These were as unders- (8) Tho Chinese build up in TIBET by end of 1960 had sabstentially inereased and was brought out a, the Military Intelligence Review 1959-606 tis required a fresh reappraisal of our forces and tasts. (b) The introduction of the "forvera Policy® end of 1961. Before its introduction it was essential ‘TOP secrerst that none of this planning tock place a4 NO operation orders or instructions vere teaued ty the Genera) Starf. “It vas therefore NOP possible for Comiant o> lower formations to tome ary couprebeusive Order without © airective fron the Generel ‘Sveff,, Alt that could be dons H. uostere Comend to pest the situation, ‘vhea the bostil itt broke out, was done. Troops and eguipaett vere dep. from formbtions facing PAKIStaN to reinforce LADACAe Mt sngTale epee in staft Duties on the cart of the Chief _ of the General Staff, his Deputy, the DO, Dt, and other ~) Staff Directors is itexcusable. ‘Pron this stexed the unpreparedness and the unbalance of our forces. These pointaents in General Staff are key a:scintacnte and gtficers vere hant-picked by General Kill to 111 thene There vas therefore no question of any clact of personilitiess Generel Staff appointments are stepping stones to hich commend gud correspondingly carry heavy responsibility, When, noveyer, these appointuents sre locked upon as adjuncts to a siccessful’ gareer and the responsibility is not teken serioudly, the Fesalts, as is only too clear, are disastrous, Thin’ should Rever be allowed to be repeated and the staff as of old must be mate to bear the consequences for their lapses end mistekess Gosparatively the mistakes end lapses of the staff eitting in DELET without the etress and strain of battle are nore hetnous thea the errors made by commanders in the field of COURSE OF OPERATIONS 12), ine ymallitary poise of our forces in LADAKH has slresdy beon too clearly brought out and nceds no further elaboretion, Por $Bey Game to be oo placed has sloo been exauined in detail.‘The Chinese enployed pertieps a winimm of a division plus cinta Lab oy by mnoateting ae Fetes Fade foto tre cs vcigta oper guiate,e tment plus + DAULAT BEG OLDI end (4) One Foginent Pius’ <. for SPRIIG Sectors (o) ‘Division toss. - CHUSHUL Sector, ropizent : (0) Regiment mimus = HIDUS Valley sector 4 ds against thi: 10 November, we hed epproximately a division vorti: of Sabentey ‘but only a small proportion of superting suse “But where our main dissiventage lay was the ‘except for the new inductions, vhich reinforced CHUSHTL ‘and BUNGIE: defences, the rensinder of our tsogpe vere Gispersed in ey ee in outposts along entire LaDaKE Borders Bi Sector was isolated from the other and, _- within the Sector, there wore NO reserves to influence the battle, Except in. the later stages in CRUSHUL end DUNGIT, there vas MH such thing a6 a olose coordinated defence, 15. rms the battle in the main was individual posts ‘fighting it out' end, once overrun, the survivors trickled ‘back to a focal point’in each Sector, Biforts were nade to organise defences at these focal points, but, by then, there was neither the strongth nor tho tine to carfy it out} and ‘the only recourse vas a vithdravel to the reary 16 Tt vas a Juntor leaters and Jovons battle ani there is no doubt that they acquitted thoascl ves vell. They fought under grave handicaps end in face of defeat; yet there vas no sign of undue penie and never a rout. The main reason for this ves that troops fought under comenders they imew and trusted, There was no interference or short-circuiting 4a the chain of commend and commanders on the spot were Elven freedom of action. Tho good name of our Army was NOT Gompletely marred in LADAKH and the grave errors comitted by ‘the General staff to an oxtent mitigated; thanks to the fighting ability of our tr: We mist, however, ensure ‘that never again should our troops be placed in such jeopardy, L2ssons Pefence of Labaki 47 In LADAKH militarily wo will olways remain st a Gisadvantage compared to the Chinese, Our roads even vnon developed will not have the capacity to sustein major operations, ‘The road to LADAKH is snov-bound in the vinter ahd eroseas ‘soveral. mountain ranges varying in heights from 8000 = 13500 feet and is over 700 miles in Lengths 28 gum TH RADA tec? our anoouvrsbiity is restricted to GHUSHUG and THDUS Valley Sectors. Accessibility to DAULAT EEG OLDI and HOT SPRING Sectors in the KsRsXORM Mountains will always be difficult, ‘TOP SECREThave no doubt difficult ‘the Ribetian platemm. Once e asily accessible from their “for usioeuvre 1s much greater then air Gen help, but it 1s clear thet areh as an edelti add ‘fern cr Pepsort tnd will be more clearly brought out from NEPA Coie: & shful thinking thet fight in to other theatres, Thus for success ‘We should look to other theatres-where we are militarily at Pe neeieaa cer es fecal points that ‘Elve: socess to LEE, ee mr £2 Gold war positions meant for yolicing should NOT be the basis of our é than cctual ‘contiiets ‘Plane should be made to withdrew these outposts to major defences at focal Pointe, es indiested in the previous paragraph, ie ti ei 3 8 BR i cl athe iter alt co a threatened Sector or clear the enemy who may have infiltrated to the rear. Training and equipment 24 our basis training proved adequate sé stood the test of battle. But our officers ad mon vere unfasiliar vith Chinese tactics, thelr vespons, equipment, and capabilities, io Airective on werfare egeinst the Chineso haa beon issued by Generel. Steff Army Headquerters, Confidence in troops can only come vhen thoy have full Knoviedge of the capebiliti sd Linitetions of the aneays ‘The unknown bogota feare 25 There wore comparatively fow troops cuployed and hence shortages in equipment vere made up by Western Command through miliing other units in the Commande Our equipment, hwavor, neegs to be mitabiy mndified for 26 Equipment, clothing, and rations will be dealt vith wider general Léssons fron both theatres. bogiatic support a1, , the nethinery for the sltotuent, of Logistic. support, perticularly air, needs thorough overnaiing. Targets wore given, by Hokignartora, but these vere nover mek. there ‘vas either age of aircraft or sapply dropping equipnen' Garaciutes). ‘Iaduction of troops and stoozing wae always Dehind schedules It is essential that accurate forecast is i Rudo of tho Logistical support that vill bo, avattatile, go that formations can olan realistically and meet their comituents alequstely, Inflated figures for planning only mean hardship to the troops Later, TOP SECRET ,4989) ‘the Chinese overran our post Gh) tnd thusy for the firet tes, militarily a ‘the MDOATEEET Border. Tho vuole Border, the control of the hed been gradual ned. Lapa, EFA rere crees 2 ty the MSPA iuinistration assisted by Assut i ore, G comblonce of mthority ad control Tara, y however, it was still a as tar: sed book; und, ths the ate regiireneat was for induction of some forces to act as 2 firm base for ‘A spect dl. operation instruction was issued by amy arters ont Septeaber, 1989) vo astern Cousond, rie E $ "as one to establish our rights of possession on our side of the MaiA0H Line and to prevent infiltrations Tt leo sllotted to Easter Commend 16 Infantry Brigade for this parpoce, togcthor vith the gmuad of "che ascat Litles operations) pictocne in WEPAe Eastern on 7 Seztenber 1959, geve ra caus demise bet gece eis fo By date feabor 1955 at . The tuportant porate vere eho bane as in isey Headquarters Svecial Instractioa of 1 September 1959. A Amecting vas eld in SHILLONG on 45 Septeaber 1959, ‘aere the Cater of the Amy Staff prosiéed and, enongst others, General Officer Comiending-in-Ghiet, Bastern Command, and tho Inspeotor General of ASSiv Aiflos ware present. ‘The minutes gave out the gonerel policy to be Toliowed, which ‘aS aa under: (a) (o) () lio new posta vere to bo established on the UGLAHON Lise, ‘neither vere tha existing posta Smpected to stay onl fight, in tae event of a Chinese abtaity The extcting posts on the border should be of Plstooa strength, so thet they could ngtricate honesl vos tactigelly, if necessary Tt vas flee sereed that the Leake of thooo poste were o acb as = (1) gyabole of authority; (Li) 9: sts to % Laformatic C4) BaP Bataass Reet tical wormetion of ‘These forward posts should, in the event of an padds Seo oflagin, ee Soee eee He! Es ae HEAR Dar See Bataan na ‘TOR SSCHET aaLLcy folloved forces vis-a-vis the Chinese eed ete eee en Headquarters letter Ho e70te/A/aS/NOT dated Novenber 1950.- dnnemire 26), above directions are tent, they formed of the peniey ee bet y till’ the introduction of the "Porvand Poli 7 4 paper on the defenes of NEFA by tho General Officer 1o00,, rectanended the Sbefenee bina’ bassien Sesetoe ae fira’ baseay Headquarters Intelligence Appreci stion Chinese Ste mye, tery keer Headquarters 118 down tho SALIENT POINTS PROM OPERATION INSTRUCTION Wo 28 (AANEXURE 27) ‘Chinese threat Xt was considered that the Chinese in 1960 would not 0 in a position to Lamch a major offensive, They vere ngeged in consolidating their hold over TIBET and opening ‘up commntcationss 2. In case of hostilities, however, the throat that could be posed in the Eastern Theatre was a5 under: (a) SIKEEY ~ BHUTAN = One division ) wera (4) Western ara = Upto two regiments, (41) Rastern NEFA = One regiment on forces jo XXMIII Corps haa been formed with Headquarters at Simuzole to Look etter the feliowings= (2) SIKKIM ~ BEURAT (>) mera (ce) assum - Bast PaxtstaN Border (4) Nagata Nes ed 1 Uy wnalZ00P® Pleced under KOTIT Corps with their tasks vere 4 Infentry Division - IFA ‘TOR creaye i t i t a gee a ‘The overall task was to defend our territory sgainst BChinese egeressiony 3 This to be earried out having border sts to contrgleeuoinae inte Mar ven ey, rong bases in depth along the fence Line” from to RAST as widers~ # TOWING — BOMDILA "CRO ~ DOPORTIO = MONG - ROING [7G = LONTTPUR = HATWTANG, 44 In addition, security of a nuaber of vulnerable points as to be aimirely fesse vere ia meiny focal peants, Hasodd stay ia depth of tho border oubgosts ani were’ as wndor TowaNa BaeNG XEN DIMEKLG ‘SUBINSRI Frontier Division, } ‘KMEMG Frontier Division, TOTNG 3 sxaso rrontior Division, a : ? - GOLLTaNG 3 LOEIT Frontier Divisions 15 Tt will be con that a three-tier aysten of defence was visualised in NEFA, 16 The forvard most tier consisted of border outposts asting as syubols of suthority and controlling routes of entry, These ‘border outposts vere not meant to fight, but to delay and fall back to fim bases in the rear, 47 In the middle tier were the vulnerable points on vhich the border outposts vere dependent and to vhich they vould felt back, vhen attacked, ‘Theso vulnerable points wore sufficientay in depth so as to increase the logistic problens of the Chinesey 18 The last tier vas the "Defeace Line", vhere the main Dattle would be fought and from where offénsive action would ‘be 1sunched, depending upon the situation. The "Defence ine" was sited so thet the Chinese vould be at a logistical (sadvantage and thas would be caught off balance, ‘TOP SECRETGemporesy * he outereak Gf Rngttlities in October 1962, if vas still in ‘measure, but, ‘SEEY HEADQUARTERS INTELLIGENCE. REVIEW 1959-60 (ATEEXTRE 5) ca Chinese antime in 1960 had further Sensotidsted theit strengta and posed u greater Brees agetnst Three Chinese divisions vere deployed on the periphery of HEFA. oy 2 a Zvo Givision cpoosition could be expected in Western Sub Sector of IEFA oF the EiMENG Frontier Division, (eo) Central Sub Sector GEA LA = Tas) Except between LHALA end GHLING, the rensinder of this region betveen EATNC Frontler Division and | TaMULA in LO=IT Frontier Division wes rel sti; ) threat from RIMa upto 2 regimentel group i sack time as road to RIVA vas completed. the roaf ves completed, this would also ‘Decome « vilnerable sub-sector of NEFA, 23 in the sors course, this increased threst would require | Feapereiaal of plans by the’ operational start at tj Eetituarters and then action tekes to mect che nev situation, -! ae moagiiered necessary, It is so pertisent to bring out goon after the Intelligence Review vas put: the Chief of Shs General Staft, bis depaty, ond his three @irectors she more necessary for Were chamed. It’ ves, therefare, allHo 8 of 15 July ration 5 on amy Headquarters Operation Instruction (a) @) Both Instructions tock cognisence of the Int ence Reviey, but only in so fr as to draw attention orgenisation and locations of tho Chinose forces in TIBET. ‘The actael threat brought out was the sae as given in drmy He: ‘ters Operation Instruction Ho 28, that is, upto two reginents against Western ‘NEPA end one egeinst Eastern, The plonning at sll levels, therefore, continued to be against a threat of & division, as against three divisions that the Chinese could e: bring sgainst Ifa. This vas time and egein gonfirmed by various menbers of tho General Steff from the Chief of the General staff downward during their tours in NEPA during 1961-62, Zn fect they ridiculed as slamict any suggestion of a groater force being brought ajainet NEPAe The Director of Military Operations as late as August 1962 openly declared of Hoalquacters 4 Infantry Division that the Chinese woulé not React end ware in no position to fights Thus Paychologically and otherwise preparations for meoting @najor threat were never really undertaken, ‘TOP SECRETence of NEFA was undoubtedly . ented, there would have being ht off palence. As on paper then on the ground. The Wetec a ey Belgreatin’ aged well shead of the off balance rather ae SITUATION IN MEPA IN 1969 "30, la have geen the deyeloruent.s tn NEFA, t0 1960 ond the regressive build dsny theres ant 3 Wao replaced by 4 Eacunty Division is noWeDen peste Tae and UII Corps formed to lock after NEFA, ASSAM, and NAGAL AND, in Yobruaty 1901, an hes elroaty been brought one, $7 ‘Infentry Brigade from 4 Infantry Division vas moved out to NAGL AND, is, in 1961, though we hed elaborate defence plans, in astusl ty We were very thin on the ground. How thin we were will s8en from the actual deploymento. Quiposts 31, Fitty Assm Rifles platoons vere made availchle for outposts, Hot all the posts were on the M@fAHON Lines Taber of platoons wore deployed in depth to Look etter the line of comunieations, to act as staging posts, and aleo to maintain the forvard posts, Their deployment vas as foLlowst~ (Seatch B):= 5 os | eer (a) KaMENG Frontier Division - Fourteen poste, (>) SUBANSRI Frontier Division = Seven posts. (ec) STANG Frontier Division = Bight posts, (@) Loum Frontier Division = Eight poste, $2 The strength of the posts varied fron one to two platoons. Thus, in effect, the border outpost Lins ves eeteolrabeke Deploment on *Vulnerable Points" ond "Defence Line® 55 (a) 4 Infantry Division with two infentry brigaies was eployed as under (Sketch D):— (4) Diviston Headquarters - TEZPUR (44) One infantry brigade - KAMENG Frontier (7 Infantry Brigade) Division, ‘TOP SecaEros) ee eect () Brigade Less one Gi) one vattation : Be: 2 8 f * Eafantey Brigade hi GL). One battetion (434) One battalion (iy) One battalion 34 Tt wii be seen that the Vulnerable Points in most eases company streneth, vhieh, considering the troops had upto available mnsatisfastory, 35 The situation regarding the Yas, hovewer, aifferent, In Town a ) vas “Defence Line' ‘Mura vas fough? there, 36 Tims» 99 in LADAKH, so in NEPA, ve vere hardly in a Position to adopt the "Forward Policy" with all its aggressive Burper€ end increased requirenents in troops and resources. at quarters, once again, proves that ‘the fas Tenltyand it was based more on ae tea. Higher pirestion of Par ‘Doe secrer The doteitea of 7 Infantcy Brigaie vas ©) Stine e) the Geploynent of 5 Infantry’ Brigede vas as followst- jor bases oa the "Defence Lino ¢ wes a brigade less a lion, thie vas tic Lersest base on the “Defence Line", bat, Sonsidering the threst of two divisions thet had been bailt’up ‘the Chinese in this Soctor, this strength could not be concl, adequate. There vas only battalion at BMDILA, the other bese 8 the "Defence Line" in Western HEPA In Eastern WSPA, TESU end EACULTATG) tho, bio basce between theny Dany, a otrength hardly stoquete for Booties “Ze ig cf intevoct So note that Wit sore a eee bat in the operations the main battle in Bastern ad one battalion less a groving threat in that = Reuainter of WEFAe = TOWANG area. = BOTA, = SOME Lap. = atea Zino ~ peportgo in SuBSishi Frontier Division. The Battalion Less, tro iver (in Siasa Frontier Division). Battalion less two companies was at LONG and two janies deployed WORTH of it at TOITNG and GELING. - In Lost Frontier Divisions Battslion Headquarters and two ‘companies at one coapany at HAYULIANG, and another company &t WHLONG,,ah ‘presonectvel notions of Jack Gf reactions by Chinese: than on sound military jadgaent, eed. TADATH may havo for its implenentetion, ‘but an appreciation ‘have shown the resultant reaction in BEF, ‘vee would 13, thetefore, all the moro nocossary in 1961 to ith caution ani avoldel any provocative action. “forverd Policy* vasa 2 ‘The "Forvard Poli: in Eastern Command was br: into fore yeas oe tat sry Seat ata of APS, : es or af, Eestera and Western Comen ‘fhe operstive peregraphs for Eastern Comand vere paregr: 4 md 5. 166 paragraphs are reproduced below: (a) Racegeanh 4 "ke regards UP ond other Northern areas, there are not the sme difficulties es in LADAKH Wo should, therefore, as fer as practicable, go forward ahd de in effective occupation of the whole frontier. Gays should bo covered eithor by patrolling or by postee* (>) Rerenrenh 5 I realise that tho application of this new policy in LADAKH and oa our other borders will entall considerable moveacnts of troops, vith attendant logistical problens. T vould Like you to make a fresh appraisal of your tasit, 4n View of the new directive fron Goverment, especially vitt regard to the aid tional ‘Logistical effort davolved. Your recomendations in this respect are required by me by 50 Deceaber, 1951. Meanuitle, vhcrever possible, astion should be taken ao indicated aboves™ 3 The tutroduction uni anulyais of the "Yorward Policy® has already been dealt vith under Chapter I, Section 2. Et ould however, [be usoful to briefly recapitulate the Goverment's decisions on the introduction of this Poligye Three operative decisions were taken (Chapter 1, Section 2 para 3), The first two weve reflected in Chief of the Staff's let:er to the General Officers Comandi: Chief, Eastern ani Western Comaands (innemire 11). Hhlzd' operative Decision, wich laid dom the prerequisites for the implouontation of the "Forward Policy" was omitted frou the letter, This, 1t vili be recollected, stressed the forming of major concentrations of forces’ along out TOR shonerdock the forward posts:and to restore any ‘dtaction af short notices ; Sir 8 28 us will be seen. from. Section 4 of this Chapters to 26, that the strong baces on the "Defence envisaged in army Headquarters Operation Instruction ‘25 had not materislised by the end of October 19614 ‘Thus this omission of the pre-requisite by Army He to Western Gommand, This Review having no - Arey Hoedquarvers docstents eid staff Le, not to assess the reasons or causes for this omission, ust bo Caien tote of ag all furtcer dovelomment Be taken a 2 ents Pe affected by lack of then ese et é H i E pa : 4 : th Generel, 5. The immediate rogiirenents asked for by astern Comend oa the introduction of the "Forweré Policy", ag has been seen in Western Commend, mast be viewed Keeping in wind the followings (a) The Government's decision:of the prerequisite of having major bases to sapoort the "Forward Policy" veo else not iowa to Kastern Command. (>) Gonoral staff dia not Lec any appreciation of the likely Chinese reactions and the method by which 1¢ wes to be combateds Rommpraissl 6 | Bastern Cousand, vide their letter to 120901/22/P/as(0) of 29 December 1961 to Army Headquarters (annemure 31) made fhelt roppprateal of taako and roqirencats as asied for by the Chief of the army Staff for implementing the "Forward Policy", The msin rans. in the reappraisal es far a3 UEFA Was concerned are given Delows— (a) Evteblishment of poste weli forward slong the RS¥a border would require aiditional logistic support including alr sanport and nelicopters for evacuating casualties, (antemre Sty paras 1 to 4). () Approvinately, one nore battalion of Assit Rifles world ‘be required for manning the forward poste, (e) Engineers were required for the construction ef winter accommodations (@) Zo Loo efter approximately 550 wiles of the HEPA Border, # Infantry Division was far too ‘TOR SECRET' 4“ {Pf ateetehod. Rastorn therefore, required ~ & minima of four brigates tor 4 Inf Divisions This mest an aiditional brigade to the permanent. compleaent of the three infant ades in 4 infantey Divielon order of battle, #2,5ee Sines hovevery 4 infantry Division only hea tvo brigadss, a5 the third brigade had earlier Pon ‘gent to Mabli Ds chusy in effect, tvo more | Xt will be recollected thet, efter Exereice Lal, ILA held in april 1960, Besteru Command ascosonent for EFA, with the threat then obtaining, waa for a division of four brigadess Ghapter Iz, Section 1, Paras 19 — 20). 8 tn early 196 Hosdquer tors eppointed a Border Desence Stuly’ Group 10d Wy Le Gen LD aan Gs sent General, Sequirenent for bordel Gefezcer fhe sonar oe sha Stay seoup was mbuitted to dray Heaimuerters and Winiotry of Defence in Mey 1961~ Ao Ser ae NEVA and the Chinogo threat was conoeraed, uaber of recomendations vere mado, including eich things a& Hai aininiateathony Intelligence, Colment set Spr eve meant of roade Logistical backingy end'eir supports Ab far es troop requirement ‘2p “This recommendation, as vill be seen, vas made before the introduction of the "Forvard Policy", ‘the action taken on these rocomendations can only be knovn trom Aray Heatquartera but suffice it to say thet NO frech induction of troops took places Qin July 1961, General Steff revioved their Emergency Expansion Plan, thé previous one having beon dram upein 495% A letter vas sent out to Commands asiing for thelr recommendations, in view of the changes that had taken place between 1957 and 1961. The aim of the Expansion Plan was to Provide shead in pease for such unite and formations as wore considered essential in-an encrgency, in order to sustain national wer effort, (dnnemire $8, Paras 1 and 4 to Z)« 40 Rastern Command gave their recomendations vide their Letter Wo 15548/G(SD), dated 14 October, 1961 (Amemre 54, Peres 1, 2, and 3). ‘tho Buergeacy Expataion Plea tor astern’ Command vas divided into two parts as unders— (a) Part 1 Formations and units to be raised/reorgani sed for completing upto seale the existing f1eld force. This included tho raising of an infantry divicion for euploymont in SIKKIM, a corps headquarters to con! new division’ and 20 Tafantry Division, which vas then located in RANC"T/RIMGRAH Areas ‘TOP SSCKET@) Petit Forgattons/uitto eqitred tenedt ately oe oa the out kof Mostiiitics to uest the Chinese threat, inelt their ‘@ divigion for SIEKIN) were requir: ‘aa follower” “ (4) "am aiditionel infentry division tee Sete Corps s (i) | “dn dnfantry division for UTTAR Sector (including | <9 Tnfentey Brigade Group). (414) dn infantry division for BHUTAN.) Only in caso we were Gv) “an infantry division for WEPaL. ) requized to wide aid 0 these countries, 11 | ‘Thus a total of five infantry divisions were reqire: one to bo ratood inaediately, and the others in tine to noo ea euorgengys cat of the Latter, one vas for NEFA. 12 arny Headquarters" action/éecision on Eastern Command's recomendations is not avaislanle with Heulguarters Eastern Gommand, “Tt it, hovover, amply cloar that roa 1960) tine end egeiny Bastern Gomand vent on pressing for extra trsops., Bat til the outbrede of hostilitien, NEFA contiaued to have 4 Infantry Division less a brigale. It is, therefore, all. nore hard to understand the General staff's decision to increase gar comituonte by the "Forverd Polsoy* rather than redace thea becarse of the pacity of troops, BORDER SITUATION IN NEFA PRIOR TO "FORHARD POLTCY™ tere dgployed on sane thietymsis onteestes Ries eee tease re on smo ‘outposte, before. tho’ worvart Folloy* wen introiuced, A huaber of tess poste were La Gepth, acting as staging posts, snd otherwise supporting the forward posts. {4 Tho general situation of the forward posts in NEPA ves as undert- (Sueteh F) (a) EaiBNO Pzontier Division (14 posts) (4) The ass Rifles posts were deployed to'Look after the more issertent ° routes into the Sector, These were ~ (aa) KRINZMUNE axis slong the NYMIANGCHD Rivers (bb) the BOMLA = TowalNG axis. (co) TOLUNGILA axis along GOSHU CHU. ‘TOR SScHET‘thé Vicinity of the border on the better known tretke betveen TIES? ond INDId, These posts vere located as Zollows:— 4 ati Fronti (4) 4 forverd posts in SuBARSRt Frontier (14) "6 forvard posts in STANG Prontier Divisions (Ai) 2 forvard posts in LOH Frontier Division, Thus, in these three frontier divisions Large scoas of the border were not policed. This vas natural, particularly, ia the WES? ahd NORTH WSS? region of the Lol? Frontier Division, whare, becemes of aifticult terrain, our forverd posts could be located in the mid-forvard sreas sone tventy to thirty miles short of the border, PROBE FORWARD ‘Preliminery planning 15 Bastexn Command (a) Bastern Command on 10 Januay 1962 issued Anstructions to XATIT Corps for the planing and implementation of the "Worvard Policy® in NEFA (annexure 36). The wan yoints from ‘the instructions are given below: (4) In the Bemno ana suBANSRI Frontier Divisions, the existing sosoondl posts to be converted into all-veather posts. Purther, if any change ia location of existing posts was found necessary, in view of the "Porvard Policy", this ves fey saplenented. “(hnnemré 58, Para G4) In the STANG and LOETT Frontier Divisions, there were fever posts and most of these were sone distance fron the borders Recomaendations vere, therefore, required for pushing forvard of old posts and pening up of new ones. (airomre 38, De cet“gid SLURP ene LOGY Pronticr Uivistous differed. 2 Eno the: ‘ibiwes stated that the changes i ‘Slopeetases bys Pereeet Paltey~ eeee vt : casey regtired. tines (e)> The estabhisbine of these posts say be a side b _ dame; as fer am tho ‘ceases that led to the Zovertes in TEA ave concersed, but, in the SESEGRS Procter pivteiony taie/200 fo toe opening of the DHA Post and 1:, therefore, most pertinent. “15 SEE ames. (a) EEEIT corps, on 24 Febrascy 1962, recommended the atns of nine pests (danemre 37) in sédition to the cwenty-four waich vere, in the Zenatinc, ordered by Amy Zeadcasrters oa ‘28 Jamuaay 1962, (dnnemre 52). “,ese stne posts inaladed s post at the TRI JUNCTION of TIEST- ‘SEUTAM aad the XaM5G Froctier Division of 1SDIde (This wes the old TRI JUNCTIOB, cs shown im maps in use before 1962 aq dic oot follow the £ ‘vatercheé princizle). 3 (b) Orders were iscued by XXXII Corps for “te Getakl Grcat of the’ teesty-tous sostsy ax EM, TALE ae ae Sone, Tact eis, natal Hg Led Sa" sespest 2 Dina. a. noted from paragranh 15Ce)(1) iaptenentixz of posts im the LE35 Front Division vas to be carried oat vitsout reference ‘to Bastar Command. XXIII Corps, ‘herefore, 4a May 1952, ca thetr own ve, ordered the estailizment of the TR: J0uc7ok Post (Bama) (a) deny Eesiqaartars, as already brought out, followed up the "Forvard Policy® directive oy is: amtracticas on the establistmect 2 forward posts . ie som:$8 _ The establishment of these posts contiazod from March to July/angast 196%, The saga of their move forvand, the 8 Shay endared, and the prosmure put ca subordinate formations by Aray Soslcuarters for the early estwlisiment ‘of these posts is beyond the of this Review It i however, pertinent to note that logistic support, ospeat: porterage and airlift, could not keep up vith tho haste and hurry required for the establishment of the posts, 12. The manner in vhich these posts wore ostahlished requires: detailed scrutiny and it is vor! efor the future that a. proper procedure is worked out for the estabiistuont of far—fung posts sone 10 - 14 days! march from their bases, That nary posts went without proper shelter, equinment, or even food for considerdle periods is comzon knoviedge in NEFA, 20__ ihe pet remit is vividly brought out ty TY Gorge Comuander in his signal of 16 betober 1962 (Amemre ‘thie Signal, after going into the details of aircraft requirmentMentone imnodiste ordors’ate issued the r ‘situation of these posts wiich is aire precarious nm: era tater nntenis ate on and dese: of ASSAM es personnels ® =<" x ‘ tis t to bring ont here thet IV Corps Commander TE te Per eteens qqvointeont ag Giiet of the General Stall ‘been mainly instrusentel for the haste and urgency in establishment of these Be een would not ate the conditions the ASSIM Rifles personnel ‘these "Forvard Posts", ‘In fact, there, were cases ‘Of poste vithout supplies end food for &week Sr mores Tho! ‘condition of the men Living in these isolated blesk outposts 6 OFe: ean well 2t nat Gl altitudes over 12,000 fect, without shelter, food, oF fuel; Amagineds ae at peogtonsy it ia essential that iover 2a: ‘progres es: ¢ Pnaee Pace left to egncute orders without interference ‘and undue preasure from Amy Headquarters, who neithor : | know the local. conditions nor details of execution and the 4 attendant difficulties, Where there are so may unknown } Sleneats, including countay, i¢ is amprcielly \ essenticl that the fc js on the spot are consulted | “Garin the planning stage rather than arbitrary ordera Givon; which are difficult or impossible to execute, i ‘Baskeround 22 As the DIOLA Post wes the foous of the start of Sinem ‘ Indioy hostilities in NEFA, it 1s tant that the back- ground to the establishment of the DHOLA Post is given in ‘some detail, 23 {411 the introduction of the "Forward Policy® in December Taety the polley Sn MFA in regard to aotivition ia the woinity of the McMAHON Line vas as undert- ‘yo patrolling exodpt, defengive petsol tt is to be permitted within two to three niles of the MCIAINN Line. In case a post has been i established within tvo miles of the McfAHON { Line, in eecordence with paragraph 2 above, then defensive patrolling is permissible in the: vicinity of this poste" Para 2 of the Letter § Taid down that, under certain conditions, post could be established WOT more then 2 miles { Bs the crow flies from the MoMAHON Linos (Headquarters Eastern Comsnd letter Ho 120901/20/a/GS(0) of, Tune 1960 - dnnomre 40). 24 The Chinege in Juno 106% hod, it appeared, pateohied Across the MeMAHON Line some S~ 4'miles WoT of KAINZIMANE Shi had shovn interest 1a the areas Thus, in Merch 1962 j {ity the epproaching of the patrolling setson, Sastern Céaaand, | Ga the subject from XXIII Corpa,, aad tray ‘Healquarters £ \ Pemiscion to pal ‘erea of the McXaHON Tne WSS? of’ KEINZOUNE. ia oN TOP SECRETfey the border on the map ‘pat was a arbitrary one run: ‘The watershed line and the old line Datsile of DHOLA Post 2p Ja lugust 1962) XHTIT Comps brougit to the notice Sf Eastern Command the discrepancy between the arbitrary Line dram on the map snd the lim as it chould be according to the watershed principle. (4nnemre 42). This letter 1: important, as it gave the details of the two boundary line: ‘The uain points are given belowi- (For location of variou: features sce Scotch fi). (@) ‘The boundary line printed on the maps had considershle inaccuracies, if the watershed principle and usage were to be applied. (b) Azcording to locel inhabitants (graziers) and the political representatives vho accompanied ‘the ASSAM Rifles to the DHOLA Post, the accepted/ Recognised boundery wes the one based on the eihed peinoinle, (the Letter did not specify as to who accepted/recognised this boundary line). Tt was, however, common knowledge that the MetaHon = | — Line was based on the watershed principles The % TRI-JUNCTION, according to the watershed principle, < should be tt"7622 and not as chown in the map 3 wa 79) ‘ (ce) There were three important approaches on the watershed boundary that lead into our area , ‘between KAINZWUNE and the recommended TRI- JWICTION MM 7522, The approaches vere as under z= (4) THAGLA mx 8717 Gi) Kano TI mr 9321 (Git) Mamanana wot ye22 TOP seceeTThe letter Went onto give recomendations for establishing the: and al: eked for a survey to be Sarried ou saa? us Fecomendations, Was int out patrolii between Watershed ‘tar somctren, his, in ettect, meant that the nome oF eftee Post vas actually Line os then marked on ‘the eh Gaaneseenreset Gt S13 vas Just Fhe eet Mi OSIS ust NORTH of the Fines “usten fhe se tan sho seify Gia Letter vas act Steasy 24 1 was never really expressly besughe tll 12 Septeaber 195a 7 aeeia ComTaNA conveyed the contents of this letter amy Headquarters on 3} dagusts So0g¢ " On 8 tender 1962, as is well knot SPER 1202 ae 10 w safe too stzone Za tae Te fone, 0 Yar Seite sypenfed i i oe~ ecm | theaselves to be puched into a military adventure, without the requisite forces, DHA Post was esteblished NORTH of the Metanou Line ay shorn, on mays prior to, Gotobsr/Novenber 1962 @dition, It is believed the old edition was given to the Chinese by our Externel Affairs Ministry to indieste the MoMAHON Line. It 1s also leamt that wo tricd to ‘was not fully Kiown to lover formations, sbe forvard in other areas in NEFA aid not ‘operations, and, therefore, tended to Fecede in the background, The heréship snd privations suffered by the men, howver, had en important bearing om norale ond leadership, .FO troops placed in tho clromstances as they vere could be expected to o . orders, Let slone fight, Tt is unplanned actions like \y these Carried ost in haste and mrry that changed G4eciplined men into o rabble, and an Aimy into = mob‘broadly in | as undere- (Ske! ta) Eeudgurtere 4 Infantry t (b) Hostquerters 5 Infantry i Brigede be (4) > One Battalion @v ana x) One 8B - p (aa) i ee ; G14) one Battalion - 6 KUMAQH) Gv) 2 RasPUT - Relieved WALONG area, awaiting at CHARDUAR’ for move to peace areas (c) Headquarters 7 Infantry Brigase = Moved to TowsNG in Marchydpril 1961+ One Battal sc = Moving te NEMZuNG CHT oO erm Sector. dotusliy only advance elements had reached LUMPU, vhile the remainder of the Battalion was strung out between SHAKTT, LUMbA, and POWANG. (44) one Battation = srea TOWANG, Git) 1/9-GORKHA RIFLES = the ontgoing battalion of the Brigade was st, MISS@IARTe The DIRANG DZONG. 8. 3 : s 8 A ag ere ty‘The Animel Transport of this Battery, hovever, had earlier oer Sasare nee mae Bainteda’ thon in TOWANG with the available air os tilt ve "3 ies - Postristed to reals ¥ m where jeeps could =e guns, * @) /~oeven ASSAM 7 deployed operational: Bitten piitoous sf comand 4 Inf: - Division along the border outposts, 2 (the slow progress of induction of troops into TOWANG from 1960 to 196% was due to the followings I {e). & vory Limited roel capacity. A 1-ton rosd hed oon tonpleted to TOWNE tz fact, “ihe reste GE,E29,F0MHs however, could not taco sustained | (b) A shortage of taton tracks and Jeeps. Those i ‘that were available vere also abt in good | epee ) Limited str support and short: of 1 eaprlag Seance gat shortage of supply, DESCRIPTION OF THE KAMENG FRONTIER DIVISION Zast GF TOWANG (SKETCH K) enters TIBED BAS? of KTIZANANE, Gore one 300-400 feet delow the shoulders of the gore rom SHAKTZ the tresk crosses tho NAVAMTANG CHU over & narrow bridge difficult for animal Traneport, and thea, efter sass 5-6 miles along the river, veers off WEst to LUPUs fe eygMiSE OF FATRITANC CHU cod NORTH of LOWPU 4 the axon ~~ : the scene erations, janorenic photograph oppo: Sad Scotch H)- Phis area is dominsted by tus were Pewee which runs roughly NORTH and SOUTH, and, in the upser Togtons, ‘TOP SECRET‘The LEFT feature is ‘the BIGHE as HATUNGLA - the Latter, ‘this ridge lies Hace which runs cA CHU River ie the controversial, THIGLA Ridges ~ DHOLA can be ‘approached frou two directions fron wndatte - (a) From SOUFH Vin KARPOLA TI - a long and diffiowt : : “" Poute some 3 days" va . march Fron LOU, = ‘Thia route vas the one that was subsequently used ead was in fuli warts view of the enemy. 6 Pa et sone ae Mees eae ch tine tn ages a but, in terms of tine, these are {Be "Eo get a tras picture; therefore, it 1s [Receseary to bring out the marching tine betweed the various \places. These ore as usders— i A Si i t G TOWANG via LUMLA to - Three st 1 2 ‘SUkit aaa (>) SHAKTT to LUPU = One day's march. { (e) Lowu to DEA = A good tvo days! march for troops and three days for portera,” at ‘at. tine, however, LINPU vas’ estinated, to be only one day's serch from DEG, ‘This in itsel? shows th Lack of Imowl edge ‘then obtaining of that part of the couatsy even at brigade and Givision levels The trek veo marry end steep, esvect ally bevoat LOMPU end aifetoxlt even for porters, RELIEF OF DHOLA (OPERATION LECHORN) Y | 00.9 September 1962 Eastern Command ordered HOTU Corps to take firm action to link up with DHU.A. In fact, Eastern Command ordered the inmediste move of 9 PUNJAS and the remainder Of the Brigade to follow wituin 43 hours, (danerure 44).tory ordby hed little practical basias Raough uncovering TOWANG, but to order the ale into difticult and Little known ‘without planning end considerstion of logistic beens hava to understend, Tho General Officer natng-tn-Ghiet, astern Commande clarifiostion 42 of the Aimy Statt rang him up ordering hin to ‘Brigade for the relicf of DHL. XOTIT Corps on JOseptbiatie’ pointed out to Bestern fomsont the usdestrabiiity of unesvering TOFANG, and that cision could only be, taken after propel reconnel ssance tnd appreciation by the Divisional and Brigade Comenders [BEE soe ‘Tn the meantime, preliminary action was taken by t i OXI Corps and 2 RAJPUF were placed under command of 7 Infentry Brigade md ordered to move to TOWANCG. 1/9 GORKEA ating move to peace station) were to be in reserve. G 40 From then on ti11 4 October, when IV Corps under [Lt Gen Be Kuh vas fo: At wes'e tug-of-war between |Bastern Command and Corps ~ the foraer pressing for ‘2 quick zove of 7 Infentry Brigade to DHGA crea end Latter resisting ay hasty step being takens 41 Bastern Comsend, in turn, vere being prodded by Amy Heaiqarters. This was done more by personel phone cells to the Generel O2ficer Comuanding-in-Chief, Eestezn Commend, ‘and by celling him up for conferences at my Headquarters ‘and Defence Ministry. Unfortunctely, there appears to be no telephone log regarding tele conversations and Eastern Comend are not rare of any minutes being kept of meetings, Let clone temued. Thus iayortant, decisions at Defence Winistry end Amy fesdquerters lcvol on Eastern Gomend operations cen only be sumrlsed fron actions taken ‘ty Bastern Command and the General Officer Commanding-in— Ghief's version of these decisions. It is strange also that Amy Feaiquerters daring this period Gia not issue a single cleur-cut operation instruction, HO aporeciation of the Possible Chinese reasiicns aupecrs to have been made, other hond, a fecling vas injected that there would be no major recotions 42 _Siuilarly, et Comend level, no coordinated instructions wore issueds ond Gomands in sost’ cates, it peared, transni ted Yo Corps vast vas ordered by Ary Heaiquerters, Thus the operations, of necessity, lack a set pattern or contimity. In order (2 trace the operations wits sone cohesion, they have been declt with under three heads us undert (2) Malox devlomente: Under this the policy decisions by amy ‘and Reedquerters, Eastern Comend, and Corps WiLL be élsensced. () Gidnese build up ‘The Chinese build up and our intelligence system will be exenined. ‘lob SEORET(e), Qtner cevsloments Under. this detailed developments will be traced. a DEVELOPMENTS. ERLE corns morectation 3 their atiol 12 ber 1968 Chuwenire 4€}s Tho atin pointe that excrged “from the sppreciation are.given belov:~ i Chinese could build division 1 see bel Reet re EER Weetons Gein piestttcent that the Chinese build up visualised wes the same thet given in ia Headquarters Operation fustruction No 26 threat dum atcengtk thet could be mustered tmediately aoe # f Hi a f i a B (b) Our own logistic support had to be based on sir tnd, “beomse of uncertainty of air support tn Ocking should be comple! fore gperattons ‘commenced, On the other hand, ee communications be! stone endent exclusively ty Land they would be tt a Gisaiventage compared to us when snov and winter conditions set its faa ims in winter the Chinese may well have/to reduce ‘their comitment, if not vithirar altogether, fe) 1s would ret arctic clot! and tent - Tnajer protien of indactions® taco (a) XEUIT Cope, therefore, seoomsented that a toroe ‘of two battalions, based on TIMP and Duud, should sit around the se on cur side of the version of the McMAHON Line, The other two immediately available battalions to cover TOWANG, This action would not provoke the Chinese but would contain then and prevent any further ingress, and, at the seme tine, TOWANG vould be covered, fe) Fu Corps asked for clear-cut orders fron Soman Mowe_of 62 Infantry Brizade 14 In tho meantime, 62 Infantry Brigade vas made availeble dy Amy Noaiquartere to nove to Miva ex RoGI, CAnemise 47) ‘Toe SECRETo) () @ Government would not cocept any ‘of tho Chinese into our territory. If they Come in, they must be throm out by force, ‘The army Commander felt that there was some Goubt in the minds of officers regarding the alignment of the McMsHON Line WES? of KHINZMMANE. He Glerified that the Government had dlways maintained that Sie, tne a anet on the Watershed pringinle end, therefore, it ren along the THM Ridge,” Ths DEA vas well inside the MclAHON Line, ‘Tho Amy Commender then stabed thet ho had pointed out ub DELIT that ve mst earect Peestions by the Chinese slong NEP, Border, where our garrisons vere relatively week compared to the Chinese. Covermicnt hie accepted this, but, at the sano time, dizested that, shiuld iny of our, posts be Lost, every effort vitl be mats to retake wit ot 68 fatantey Brigade to US, move ant ‘hese places vould be reinforced ao untert=” G4) TUTTHG to be nate up to a battalion strength. ‘TAKSTIG to be veinforced by a companyse Qos Battalion of 2 Infantry Brigade hey te,be moved te ALONG, (Presmably to @ the establishment of post at THAGLA, the Sees ‘in the meeting at DELEZ sugsested h a poet nest Co the Chinasen, ne onsidered that this nly. be done aftdr the winters (e) The Goverment had not agreed to the use of close ET i air Logistic port for XXXIIL Corps as as possit be found fran ‘within DOL Corps allotment. Army Heatquarters, However, had neers to try and assist with | Soe [17 It will be seen that there are sexe important ani far- Fesohing paints arising out of the DELHI ani TEZPUR conterenoes. Shose ao’ given bel (a) oo Cee im his report (Ap; brought out that the Defence ster Earns stated that in view of the TOP ture oF the contgronse Ho nimtes vould e Tbhs pra ‘appears, vas ZolLoved ‘tne conferences that vere hela by the Betence Minister in connection with these ‘This Se a surprising decision ond al bo regponst bal any mjor decision. Thus, $eiocull cad aid Lesa be’ decl Stone ‘beter taken without careful ani considered thought on the consequences of those decisions, (b) The Goverments stipulation that any Chinese orbering om Servitcey would be ovioted by Soros, gpl that ou territory went upto, the TEA meant that lefence Minister's f meeting at DELEI- had alr iscided on the : Chinese eviction fran the KAMENG Frontier Division. A decision that vas later given out in writing on 22 September 1962 by the Goverment. (ce) The Arny Commander's clarification of the McMAHOW Tite Ent Eke doubts that’ scisteg tn ene mints of sone officers need exaninins. It is clear in the wining stage and after tho establiciment of the Batch Pct thee EExtit Corrs oii foseeeions mies it were vorking under the impression that the, McMAFON Line as such wes as given in the map then Spidiable to then, MULTI Corps letter af 24 Februsry 1962 (Annexure 37) recomending the catatlisunent of posts speciticatiy mennisseg the establishment of b post st the old version of the ERE JUICTION (Sketch #). Later, in thes letter Of 15 August 1962 (Annexure 42); after the DHOLA Post was established, XQIII Corps brought ‘TOR SECRET= gat the doubt and ssked for clarification as also the fact if posts could be establiched on ‘the THAOLA Ridge, Ho clarificetion of the lignnent nor decision for establishing posts ‘was given till this conference. Had thia been : dona eerlier perhepe vo might have forestalied (0) The Fo: Seoretery's suggestion of establishing pe $0). Sede oat tuaaea aiabe cseseetio: cos Chinese, viewed against the happenings in LADAKH, seems Ancredibley } 1B Tho sbove brings out that military decisions must only : to be teken by ‘those who are in the Imouledge of the ; ailitery situation oid can appreciate the tactical implications. -Auuy Commander's Conference - 14 Sentember 1962 {9 The sray Comander followed up the 13 September Conference sy another on 14 September. This dealt with the executive action to be teken on the points brought out on 15 Septenber. These vere as undert- (a) 62 Ines Brigede less 2 battalion for sLONG to be initially located at a suitable roai/reil heed with an airfield such as TE2PUR or JOHIAT. (b) Reinforcing of the places given in 13 September Conference to bo carried ont with opeods (e) REKTT Corps asked to formlate a new plen for the eviction of the Chinese fron our territory. he plan vould be seen by Chief of the Amy Statte ‘Remi of other develoonents in NERA 20 The moving of troops and the other developments in NEFA, as alresdy brought out, will be discussed in detail ‘. Sut, in order to maintain the contiouity of the story, the developments that tock rlace between 8 Septenber ~ £2’ Septenber are briefly described in the subsequent paragraphs, 24 9 PUNJAB hed made contact with the DHOLA Post and move of 9 PUNTAB to the DHOLA Area was in progress. Noanvhilo, iray Headquarters wes prodding Bastera Comand for the move of the whole Brigade to DLs, ond Zastern Comend, in turn, Yes pressing XXXIII Corps. ‘TOP SECRETthe Kwa CHU, area, the Chinese ‘the NANKA CHTy Ta dge was far greater on the THAGLA Riage had ‘The details of the meeting ezein aro not known to this adqerters (Operstions Review) except wast is given in joutline in the Bes s tine tence of Events" issued to us by dry eiquarters, : This mee! onse again, reiterated the Government's decision to ‘evi’ tuo Ghinesey’ who hed intruded into HEPA, ‘The Chief of the Army Staff gave out the possible Reactions of the Chinese as underi— {a) The Chinese could send more reinforcements to the DHOLA sree, (©) ‘They could retaliate eleewnore, tt (c) They could retaliate in LaDamH. |26 The Chief of the Amy Staff considered that the (Chinese vould most likely react in LADAKH and capture our post in the GALAN Valley and others, and so achieve their aim of reaching the 1960 cleim Ling, |gy, The Foreign Secretary, hovever, considered that the (Ghinese vould not react in any strength but, perheps, vould ‘eapture one or two posts. _ \ (88 The Chief of the amy Staff then asked for written instructions of the Goverment to evict the Chinese in DHOLA area, The folloving Government directions were ‘then givent— oo “the decision throughout has been as discussed at evious meetings that the ray should prepare and Risow the Ghinese out 9s soon ke posibler’ the’ Ghiet of the Amy Staff was accordingly directed to texe action for the eviction of the Chinese in Kaghd Frontier Division of NEPA as soon as he in ready.’ 39 2, Amy Eosdmuarters, ta Assued these directions Phas, Septganor 1962 to’votn Wester end Basten Comune. Points arising out of the meeting $._, Zt,18 epparent from the records of tho meoting thet there vas a generel fecling prevailing thet there vould be no major reastions by the Chinese. Way this should be 60 TOP secRet22 Beyteaber 1962, after ell the String incidents ‘the: Sarrounng of posts in Labakn thee 200, is ene Tt will also be remenbered < Whether the eivice given by Chief of the Amy Start thay mecting ves besed on tay oporattonal suit intelis gence lation is not knew. Tt 2 Fy obvious from ysources the Chinese vere then fave that they coula ject strongly end similtensously ‘theatres, in both Tt was for the General Steff to have §s Whilst these developments vere taking place and oppp Mere being moved to LUMPU, IOXIIT Corps, 4 Infantry Avision, and 7 Infentsy Brigade Comnders wore carrying gt reconneissances and formilating a plan for the eviction £ the Chinese, 4 Gn 30 Septeuber 1962, XOTIT Corps forvarded their en to Headquarters Eastern Commend, (annexure 49). 4 umber of stipulations were made, before the plan could be wecuteds The plan and the stiptlations are discussed in he ening paragraphs. 5 The Plan (a) Tho plan envisaged a Limited task of securing a foothold across the WiMEA CHU River and clearing fhe, iinet fron those arouse, 7 Tarentzy Seigale would require three infantry battalions, a battery plus of guns, and a company of MMG for the task. (>) It vill toscen thet this plan only dealt with ‘the action against the Chinese in the THARLA 4rea and did not cover the defence aspect in the jainder of the KAMENG Frontier Divisione This 8 understandable, as the Amy Commander in the gonference on 14 September only required plane for the eviction of the Chinese fron the Haina eR (e) The execution of the plan was dependent uj the ete ARTS a a ~ ‘troops could concentrate by 10 October 1962, ‘TOP SECRET< the etipelatione Lala dows vere brought out in the ‘govering Letter. The mein ones ere as undort- a) Earliest the oporetion comtd atart yas_10 Qetober % ‘1962, and the ist by 15 October 1962. ‘Latter date was fixed on the besis that, ceed $ 1. Rha date, there would not be cufricient tine f volt reaped oder ba ping oer ig a 5 © (b) The operation to only comence once a minimum holding of 530 tons of stores ves in position ‘in DHODA areas (e) Fire cupport of a niniaun of ons battery plus “a troupe, wae, Foestredy” the. gine hod 12 be ste jy 08 there vas no other means of taking {a)) ‘The attack coula only be carried out from the Western flaak and hence oceupetion of any areas (2GANGES) on tho Western flank across the WEL GHU chowlé only be done st the comencenent of Operations, in order HOT to disclose the decision Of attack.’ Whon dealing vith the developments fh Geteity ve wilt soo that the occupation of ‘TSMGE wis carried out pronaturaly, 37 The plan and the stipulations were not subsequently adhered to, bat they Lave been brouht ‘have wMisartakt bearise on the develonaents that follovedy Tomation of ney coms 38 On 4 October 1962, XXKIIT Corps ceased to be responsible for NEFA end was replaced by IV Coxpa vith Li Gen SM Kull ag Compe Gommander TY Gorpe as aoe yet relsedy yet tt vas Soudred to simitatcoudly fom, fuiotion, and Soncuct operations tn NEPAL : 39 _Aruy Hoaiquarters had placed tho wicle of the Basten Comend Northern Border under IV Corps. (uray Noaiquarters signal Wo 161S20/M04(5) dated € October, 1962 ~ Annsmre 60) This ves however, reduced by Reptern Cimuund to HEPA only Signals of 4 and 5 October 1962, (Annemre 81 40 The change over of Corps brought to an end the unequal tug-of-var between Bastern Command and XXII Corps. The phase of and pro“éing of DIT Gorps by Tastern Cownend ten the operations finally ended, instead « new phase had sts ted where the new Corps Lesped into an operation without first concldering the implication S41 It will, therefore, be of interest, to exanine the Chinese build up as knovn'ti21 then in order to see if | XUUIT Corps wero justified in their caution. ‘TOP_SECRET | | | | |@) Fig Efsiestion om the cutnese basis wp ont (>). Fhe yorktog of the eae system and ‘that the thtest on th iG We have sect ‘the Ste TRS seoter, end ‘Fegiment + ‘TSETHANG © ee Sea Te @ One battalion ~ Ts0%a DzcNG (21) One battalion = SHAO (opposite BUMIA) Git) one battalion - smectite. Third roginent with HQ st ©) Bones tenis aeplayed es umer:~ (2) one battalion = tmomese nzoua (24) one battalion = sweacronma (opposite Loraru (424) one battalion = CHOSRAM (opposite Tarasa asea) 44. Roads trom respective roginontal bases to forward arses hal ‘also been completede e Tt will be seen, therefore, that, from 1960 to the Sf Goptenber’ 1968, ‘thors wore’ne shanges 18 Ee 1» 25 known to us. { Se one \@) 0 Baptenbor 1962 (annexure 52) Fubeldtory Intelligence Burean reported tho @ (aa) (ay) (wv) (wt) (wis) ‘11 tents were seen in Chinese tersttory ‘ond LAMBU. (ais could indicate a company plus), 411 civil population in TsOHA DZONG and Border areas was evacuated to the rear during first week of September 1962, (Zhis could be for security reasons and also for making use of civil. gecommodstion, It, however, indicated ‘that the Chinese were getting ready for a show dom). About 40 big tents seen in @rea SONA ~ Deane,” cfs ‘cout gen resent a battalion). ° Telephone 2ine installed upto ORTH of TEAGLA Rage in the first week of September asa, 1° “Tet ‘Li nore tents pitched at LE and KHINZAMANE Gnother compary). Four huts opposite and WEST of KHINZAMANR. Telephone line 1e14 to LAGU, he reason for the activity at LAMBU is Rot quite clear. It is situated jetmeen Be the two respective routes SOKA DZOH- XEDIZAWANE and SONA DZONG - EUMLA, Ie Perhaps be as a deception plan to take sxcy te ‘the MAGIA Area,@ (e) @) ee aces, ates eins Paved sagertad ts (1) rock S1M0 towards BUMLA upto DOMCHANGLA showed movenient of large bodies. (42) 40 wheeled guns arrived TSORA DZONG during ‘the preceding week (Approximetely three Chinese artillery regiments equivalent of one divisional artillery). (414) 8 tents near SHAO (possibly one company). (4v) 50 Chinese goldiers (two platoons) area THAGLA. (*) Two comantes reported between NANKA CHU ani BEatuA Rage’ (ihe offect of this emt Gist of the topert of 2 Septonbor 1962 ge genut with together detailed developments UE september. 1962 Br eitstten to the two companies ln HOREE cf the 1UMEA CU) ahother company i= the WIE 22 Semtenbor 1962 b Subsidiary Intelligence Bureau roported Soviuts aia touts teat sksd. ivo/three conpantes ' : The total build from the reports would amount q $2 epprorimtely Four Pettalicns. Most of these | indicate new locations and hence could aiicr be 2resh troops or troops moved out of ‘permanent ications With the increased movement eeing on between TSETHANG and forward areas, it be safely assumei that upto one more regiment thad been inducted in by 19/20 September 1962. POP Sahersed Sorgergingclotanse of a ae aera 19720 ‘teptanber (4) (na battalion plus < (24) one battalion plus, which could also be moved to THAGLA within e day, in area = LE (©) Comentration opposite BUMLA built upto a reginent. (@)" Hoyenent of 40 guns into TS0BA DZONG also gave an Andication of a divisional concentration in SORA DZONE and forward of it. be: red out could eith £5) GSEs ame eases Med ens cond either, neem miking ctl (2) Keeping estimtes to a minimum, Helcorenerated, tn Sacha Dao sod forward Et ey 20 Goptenbor., Searing in mind that Tota Daaid 4s only some '20 - 26 miles from the border, gui os ‘the Toads ‘co, upto ivo niles short of the’ ler, it would tepiy that the Chinese were in a position to consentrate a division on the border within three days, if required. (e) The concentretion opposite BIMLA showed that we Gould expect, operations Rea? of KEINZAMAIE ax well, thet is, towards TOWANG. a A curious point is that the gulsidiary Intelligence Bureau ytly started giving their reports of Chinese build w,te 4 infantry Division fron 10 September, soon after, the DHOLA Pi was surrounded, Thess lowever, peterel cut z 28/20 wevtenber,” us, intelligendoy apert thon reports by bra trosbe tn coutahty tn the cfaotel porica between 20 September and 19 aber ‘wes not available to the comuanders. 50 Tt has already been.brought out that these reports Feached the Dizestor of ftelligence Bureau direst and heme resumably wore imcedtately available to the Government and ral Staff Branch at Army Headquarters. SL army Headquerters Weekly I telligence Summaries, it sppenrsy quoted ‘yerbatin, fron aie Tntelligence Buresm Reports no assessuent seens to have been male or given out ‘on lower formations. These weekly intelligence ieee ie aoe cases, produced intelligence one to two weeks old and i another week or so for the summaries to reach lower rey » the intelligene was of little value to the féeid comanders We have already seen that General Staff contimed to.preas for the capture of the THAGLA Ridge right upto Bis October, the date of the first clash with the Chinese. therefore, obvious that either they were ignorant of has aa Teported or failed to take due cognisance of the ate ‘TOP SECRETe g (1) our acquisition of intelligenve Blow to be of any use or operationss (11) the inteliigense is built around te suit the astia that hes happened. Then again intelligense other than that a2quired in the field was not available efter 20 Septenber till the end of the operations. Bureau reports can only result inc reat: field oamaniere a lack of confidence in the Intelligente Bureau organieatian; (@) Tho reporting’ of Mntelligence itself wos * The gowtees did not appear to have been ‘to pick out the Important eu the essentials. 55 Gollutien unl Brelustion {) Bven frou these vague reports attempt could have been made to evaluate the build uw by the Director of Military Intelligence. It is agreed that boosuse of the vague nature of the reports the evaluation my ust Rave been sccurete, but that there was & _ major build up could nav ‘brought outs. as it was, bits and pieces of tae build up given in the Weekly Intellizense Suumarics had Little value. (>) Ho attemmt was made to Link up the now build up with the old doplayncnt. hue ftold formations, tad 1ittle guidance whether these were iresh troops or old ones moving tc new locations. OP SEORETERY i Hs i : i i suipeian Hiller il iti Eeedd E = gf I i fa, § E L i il i i that much faster means ‘ont processed and Field formations, 4f 2¢ 0 Ca i 2 it Q 8 gz 4a § i 57 Having examined the intelligence system in sone detafl, there ig no doubt that « major overhauling of the systen fs » The intelligence is obviously collected, Téeeguedy tninaginatively put across en ineffiedintly joeninated. Ga the other ‘the General staff Branch on isolated cases. Th j@ nein impression under which the General Steff ani cther senior comendcrs acted ani staked all on was that there would be NO Chinese reactions. DBEAILED DEVELCPMEDTS, General $8, The major developments that have been brought cut in fits period of © Septenber = 4 Gotober 1862 ar (2) & ptember, 1962 - Surrounding of the ¢ DHOLA Post. | Geptenber, 1962 ~ Ordering of nove of nin T'iptantry Brigade to Area by Bastern Command, (0) Big 14 Septenbor, ~ Conferences ot Defame 11963 Ministry, Amy Headquarters ant TUR, “1 T >) op opoRRT |é the eviction of = ‘the Chinese. = ma (o) 90 beptesae 1901 > ep pestle otation ‘ - - enly snd not before $ rt 10 October, 1962. (2) 4 October, 1962 = Change over of Corps. “tne detailed dey 8 will now be considered to s6e-how they Pitted into the major decisions or whether the developments opcurred irrespective of then % ono be drmers GOC XXXIII Corps reported back from leave. He inforned Goc~in-C Eastern Command in @ signal No 02156 of 10 September(Annemre 45) the various actions he hed taken or contemplated taking. These in the main are as under i= 2 On 8 9 PUNTAB ordered t¢ co alee rsa” : (b) Divisional Commender ordered to carry cut Feconnaissanes and submit proposal for meeting the threat, (e) Because of the importance of TOWANG, he did not consider it aivissble to uncover TOWMIG. (@) Consequently, he hed ordered the move of 2 RAJPUT ‘ex CHARDUAR to TOWAIG. (e) In addition, he was considering moving 4 GRENADIERS on arrival NEFA to TOWING. (2) His immediate requirenent was for six helicopters. 61 On 10 September, Bactern Command followed up their signsl of 9 Septeaber(Annemure 44) by asking XXXII Corps to confirm maintenenee possible for the task and after consulting Bastern Mr Command to intimate edditional air lift required. (annemret 62 On 11 Septenber, General Staff in thoir signal (dnnemre 56) allotted 7 Intentry Brigate two helicopters, but did not agree fo close air support. dir transport suport’ and tactical Feconngiccanee could, however, be used. They further asked if Bastera Comand required additional assistance. This obvioucly implied aselstance conceraing air only. Lt Gen Buf KAM. showevery Gn hic report (annexure 3, Para S(c)) has mentioned that it is, not within hic knovledge’ whether any such additional ascistance either in troops or in logistic support was ever sought by Eastern Command from Army Hesdquarters, and that he(bt Gen Kat) | wes subsequently honpered in his oserations because of the Leck of both. Fron the above, it 1s apparent that Army Headquarters Signal only applies to aly edditdonal air support. © (@), 22 Septenbar,. 1962; .-» Firm orders for “PRR ‘Top seouEr@) ‘The strongths to be maintained were os undert~ @) Towne = 2000 personnel ‘200 animals @1) aru = 3700 personnel “. 200 Snimals LOLA = 900 personnel. eh 50 Eninels Tnftiel stocking was to be os unders= (4) 15 days supplies and maintename stores. (44) 20 days reserve supplics. (421) 90 days worth of ordnance stores Ancluling tentage ani st . (his does not Sefer to the int issue but maintenance for replacenent). @v) Three first line scales of ammunition. 2 SECREE& Qoe maze company to TAKEO, Tht $2 giattien Wo em entered prerionaly I t § SEes have been given te hig overall errungemnta required posditle Ching resstions, 69 iter 9 conference vith the Mr reprematative of Restor Mx Comend, GC IIT Corps oat, on 19 Sptorbor 1902, bie propomsls bad on erdigiili ty of clroreft and other logistical remurees, (insemre 62). the mein points ‘in the proposal vero (a) Pinforeonnt of MATA not possible aus to Lek of porters.Ht a ei: e ii iy oa 4 a ai! il 23;pense a now rougat "too hands of that do wr iy eoalet. ond Arey the tection ‘this oF olde cone to, = play intl Ha i Hite aH ay Lee evi oe i hala i Hi Hi 3 i!ole ii ah sh Aa ‘vith one company in TSANDHAR areas {v) 9 PURIAB was deployed between Bridge 1 to 4 ant (c) Menainter of Brigade vas duo to complete ‘concentration in area LIMPU. a the end, 4% was pointed out higher companion overall tasi: ‘on. the @ The mounting friction between GOC in ¢ Hastera Comand and 60¢ XXKIII Gorpas () The eocupstion of TEMNGIE was ordered again ond fagein by Aray Headquarters. (o) Tho trritetion and frustration felt by lover 8 brings out ome a) comamiors if higher formations ordered minor fastioal moves.30. alresty geese. | Ea gi aa a2 1 2 HH a & Beptenber and rations in one post hed Octobers ‘vas that there hed boom no afr drop siin! fat i (99 “2a tints Section, uc kuwe seen bow the developments ‘eousl quidkly ‘ent wolectiensIy turds 2 ‘fn TAMAKE we may bo veak, ‘tn REA i enennept Ha a len i | th f is dEgaRe le iat i i He tad al ay it i : f £ i : Hl e t f i r 5 . 5 il Hi i tf |<-eenen ane ae RNR 7 LT ARE SRA is fda, dy ubtaly bas Hh He i i Hie i ee A i‘ lt : se TMU RD diel i it GLa tigi ail Fee i FL a 1 ee Ww iy a a He Babee ai athPalins ak pi ; db Aue eH a ig hy a te il i: ah BEL iMG r i hi ey iH i welt iu we i Hy B al i i i iii aah alt thy rt iif (ee ue fila He at a it ik it “ll ga nc HT aBE tagi sell dads > oH gee a 2 iy ETT ae . $e gaat Int 1H Bae ahi! Oh iF if e de aa apd i i eae ae ne i Pal i we aos i | He Haat 2 poenite Be Mondquarters ae 8 38 wa pei : i : : ei fs seat Sosa The dovolopssnte tn TFTA nccelerated with the Anconing of IV Corps ani, »» it Aa necessary thet() @ Biond K Recinens (3) Battalion less three companies = DOOR (38) Two companies: - TKI (442) One company - EKG ‘SUAS (4) Battalion Jess two coxpenion = Ture (43) One company - eum (411) one company - ROE sumac (4) Bettarion Hecdguarters Jess tuo coxpanies ~ apaTG00 (i) B00 compantes ~ aroM ‘B/QQOBTIA RIFLES (ox: 64 Tntentoy Brigada) Concentrating in AIONO ox JORUAT. SUL (om 66 Infante Brigade) Concentrating 2 IAIDNO ex JORAT.ie a ; Ee _—Lopeein all ! j i i I (2) 99 Paett Asbatance ip a4 dastty thi, i 4 Byagng 248 i i ee at sundae ii i Hi: it tah tn Ha a Heli iy aia ci aa He if 33 “iat ‘al ie Heweknae af Seater ho pave ontera fer the compation of 3) 3 i aa dip! i ‘ Wg has B eee a es) ae HI 5 3 Annemre 75), Ho also ‘hed been appointed, Somnandor on 4 October aber, 1962 = ‘Camanter dmediately, (4 Infantry Division ith consequent holding up of all other traffic, ‘and TOWNG and wet 4 Divisional Agrals, vhich, at tins, tock over ight hours soit, ae neamtiine, te Asay FP 2 fais om ore Sr neha ome i) Comanter. ‘oxtared the Brigato Som fron toe ay os sary ce hak srt ‘the Brigade, abe samp tea ‘ee sore 0 get from feu tke aH sah Hu jap i iHa pelts { il ale bali Ta i Se Gee He ieee a ds Pau .2 ai Le ee i a al atl i 123] aah fia! ti He fiat to ian fh (eal 3 pail : i ii sted i it ayia | sents 1 wie sett : Hi a 2 7 a iiBh Hae te fee‘stops to “outwit Operations ‘on 10 Oetobir, Gar objectives, s La fe i. a 4aA Hid a3 I te alll & ualHe, ‘ond ate Be cated uo Wy :ateting Mestquarters ee ‘of increased logistic ‘that ho vould renain with ‘Mao Feoults of the hasty nove vere alrenty being i t Hi Al aie a i) ®i ue if ae if — } th on HH a an ied At i eal Hl a ne atainda id ie Gy i’ La i able a. te pat ele Di i | if 4. pss i hii ue Hae GE Pe da BIB ain ult a5 ial it ste ine fa 3 2 zics i Aj we az. 3 GE west oYbal Ae Ht hi ‘i i a ih Hi tl ill Radi eased nel tiat oot t na iil ee‘¢ GREIBDIERS, arrived on 14 Gotober, ‘G4 despatch factlities vere ‘There veo Httle actual development in the DEOTA Area, Oxo nore tet The actual position of the more importent stens of 5p eseanation, and equlpaent on $0 Oetaber 1962 it E R oil .! 5 deys 8 dee 32-15 days (414) Fotatoos and() 3° mor ayoroxteatety sao Lom sean, = Sete section). (vi) ~- Hamdigrenades One per man in f rantry F battalions. (0) Exaiceent @ Blankets Average of two ans (aa) byes Sufficient for Ss approximately Sas. “ wine 5 be dnl nar Sree te ereing toe tesaeess, be Dotctias deployment on 19 Cotober 1962 a rane (a) Brigaée Keadqurters ‘DaOLA (be) 4 GuEMDIERS 1ess one conor nettge 4 To age seman Aree(©) 9 PURI 2020 one company See company ye (COSMHA RIFIRS les one @ ‘apd ene platecn: oper Moving to TSARGIE xe, company np piatoen, (eo) 9 mare. a te Hi ay. Basse # ih aif a He fl mi oll stton could ve attack of the dfecussiens Curiously, u thege discussions the posuibility Comantor usd discussions ‘Phe thene On 14 and 15 October, the, Corps ‘was how end vhen and vith whet nore preparat with the Divisional Comanier. 2. 10 of tho MAMKA CHU was neverBey 3 = tila tl ed Be Hdl vd sageeat ht maa pd allie EUG |, Aide ql leapt Wad mah le, Winn ays a ae i we aa hb Uae! tala ila lies He ie aut Ha 2 i : is 34 3 ii 288 aa aft ea i i Sa (6) Give preference to *étscratton” over *prost (2) Cor lintter from Taune. eea pull Me vile an i race i ae Hie: Hees is : sis ‘rom tho discussions held in TRIPUR and the signals, See idl it Hl ni i a f i bidb | q iid {3 hin meA aa ee ie gia at HL EL ve de ie aaa ik] fit i HI Hk aie eid al HE Ie oie UMS ht Mi 2 as rae .protested ‘omanier was * for bolding on te ich vas later ted thst “veighty conoizerations tho Yivtetonat ie fF bat In fact, there ‘the tel somal ‘Tats of ‘those orders to Corpa ty ed is, ted, (c) ne company to be based on Bridge 5. cia tot maatine, Te“tl aa ll, i Oneo the Sntontion of capturing THAGIA was given up, ‘he holding of TSNGIS by itceif hed Little meaning. eae Sin Es Up wna tae ho decision of holding TSMGL? automatically comittel the Drigele in tactically unsount & @) aa 4‘the River Wu@KA CHU vere contimed to satay Beigeiey Bg : g 5 e i 2 5 : ‘Eastern Commend is not known. But in view of ‘continued to issue important orders from ‘all the more necessary that he should have on in Eastera Command and preferebly at TS2PUR. ie £ & soning ond logistical support inet ‘ound WO favour vith the authorities. fore, hed to go. Instead IV Corps vas ‘expre! ee of Oxpediting operations in the DHOLA Area, It was a meena to bring in a new comander ‘the ea that he could evict the Chinese in « jon of a new corps could never ‘@ sound military move. Dash: Bivmice of the Chinese SHOT REACTING" to even a military of-fosce By uss! ethaps the Defence Ministry and the DIB had convinced the Generel Staff iray Headquarters regarding ‘the lack of reactions or, it may be that they reached the conclusion together. In any case, it is apparent that Generel Steff Branch army Heaiquarters percolated this ‘thinking down to alli Levels of command and brought about a sense of false complacency. A most dangerous and wn— ullitery attitude for en Amy end one which was to dog throughout the ill-fated operations, \ 99 Military planting and posture vere throm overboard. 22 con Eitty Wnbsonful of tho military situction end umminde ful of the Sepontial requirements of the troops, rushed, ‘7 Infantry Brigelo into DEOLA area. Once comitted in the Bren; ho Refused to Fedenloy the toons, although he had the time, the authority, and the discretion to do 50 100 ‘The Anvolveaent in SINGYANG vas again a matter of Keeping to 4 proniced date, It could mver be called @ ealeulsted military move oid was certainly not backed up by any military ctrongth. When the bluff was called, our Meakates and poor lealership become apparent 401 Finstty, the continmed occupation of TSANGLE and the Keeping of 7 infantry Brigade in unsound tactical positions against i military advice was entirely the responsibility Of the Corps Comanicr. In this he was probably abetted by the Officiating chief of the General Staff and the Director of Military Operations.‘rho Sperations in TEPA ‘sectors as fallowsi= <> (a) KAMEIE Sooke (4 Zarantey Division) ean be considered under tvo 3 This will 4nclude SOMDILA, DIRANG DZ0NG and other operations carried out EAST cf DEANS DESH. (b) Remainder of IEPA (2 Infantry Division) (4) MALOND Sector The 27 xt1ons here centred round WALONGlami, therefore, require no sub-diy (4s) Remainder of WSFA less WALONG Sector Not much of consequence took place in this Sector. It is, hovever, being dealt with to bring out tho general advance of the Chinese ani vill be considered along with the general operations in NEFA. 2 In order, however, to get a connected picture, a resume of operations in fA as a'whole 4s cirst being given.’ This will bring out the general course of tne operations, our own build up, ani the poseible Chinese build up and ncves as reconstructed frat yarious actions. Operations in each sector will then be examined Uner separate sections, The layout of this Chapter will, there fore, be as unter!— (a) Section 2 = General Operations NEFA (2) Section 2 = WALONG Battle (e) Section 5 = Operations in the KAMENG Frontier Division, (@ Section 4 Conelusion.° © Snfentey Brigate OT Tatantey Beige me wp dus to Diviston, braflablo at effioero, ‘the Division ing this ‘the HeMMEOH by betomm, there was eat ‘the second pistes Wisin. io jered along with tons ean be Tart ‘Tho HIME CHU Disaster ant vithdravel Fell of SHIA. Collapse at SO:DTIA. te conetderst m Operet ) (2) eet iH tid :lia 8 lit nll ie ite ul Hig [adh aul igi liae ig a i i ae i i ai nal He ible heal al ai! tie anal aiid Commander, to ‘of the aitnation, 02 19 October, ‘tho. We potuted out over the ‘ith the over-stretched defence layout of ‘eneay had the ospacity to drive a volge ‘The brigade Comanter, ‘that, the Brigaie, the and strike at TSAMCDHAR, serloustces 9 stronglyPertichlar, the TEARGIE troops. He, oi, tn 28 Gn nigut 19/20 October, the Chinese lit a large bonfire in the SINGING Ares, appureatly to cot as @ laninark for helping the ‘troopa to gather in tha’ area, before going in for the attack, Tho Commanding O2ficor 2 RiJPUF, located / in aca Bridge ¢ ad the log Bridge, was azxprehenstve that i ‘2b attack my de forthooning. He asked for mre ammunition were’ that might by e party of 15 other E i E 1A Me 1900 ~ 1200 Chinegs force moving toverde TSAWOIE (en 19 October ant the foros thst collected in SINGJANG Guring night 19/20 Ostober crossed the River 1ine between, 18 The resainder formed up just before davn Wis? of the ‘azpur Posttien in the FUP Molish, Tue F Hour for the attack waa fret Uekt, welch ae epptoriaately Os00 towre, Ter | Ywouty simtes Gefore H Hour, there vas heary shelling on he RIPE end GOK poottibam the preliainary : ip before the attack. "At H Hour, unter cover of an | Derragey, the Chinese attacked the RJPUTS fron the WEST | Flnutefd, efter severe bei-tohant fighting, rolled up the ; ion by 0735 hewree" i i, es ean ‘ut al i maa ih Fr ‘vbich tine ition MAMEA CHU from Bridge 1 ey ik be in post CRPMDTERS on Bridge 1. ‘The Divisions? Comsanter ordered 9 PUNIAB to withdrew to HATURGIA from Bridge 2, folloved by GRPNADIERS to vithdraw Wi befcre 1700 houro, ‘the Divisional Conaanier hoped 9 PUVA vou! at FATUNGIA, The track along thepe “i it ie iu 4 Hi Be me a i ie an allt Ute foreed the Sesue earlier, as did the Brigaie Commer on ‘the night before the attack. (WITHDRAWAL 70 TOWANG ‘The ‘that the io Ostover 7 orige ‘The withiravel to TSAI 17 Infantry Brigete, for all intents ani purposes, consisted of troops of Divisional Hesdquerters and fie that the Brigede had left benind in LIMPU ‘and ether places moving back as best as they could. Tt has little military or historical interest outline ef the vithdravel has already been given in Section 1. Divisional Commander ani oteff vith ¢ Artillery consed to exist after 20 October. mainly rear deta! Commander eorched back end reached TOWING late on 22 26 $962, ‘Events Ti TOWNS tor Brigedior KAIIAN SINGH, Commander ¢ Artillery Brigeto, vith bie oun hesiquerters, it will be October to ZIMITHANG for consultation ‘TAL night 22/28 October, thero vas little ene activity, commani of the TIAN Sector, ‘walked back to TOWAMD reaching thore by about 1780 hours 22 October 1962, ‘with the Divisional Comanter ani later in the vithdraval ‘in the TOWING Soctor. AIYAN STIG! haf gone on 19 reneuberei, vos 12 a ‘The state of confusion in comand and control can be from the fact that the hapless TOWNG garrison hed commanders at one tine, The Arsy Comsanier, on Po eucet ‘hres‘The Aray lor Goneral Staff then left the jeered down to the belipsd to catch ‘end the Divisional Gomender. Ocmanter vith his Briged He then asked the three joint St on to Brigadicr HALZAN SING? (Gomanter jeldcopter bask to TEZPOR, only to find that it had Left earlier at 1500 hours. Tesdquarters and 3 ape F atte 5) ledear ‘appear to have clarified. comantere t0 pass 4 artillery Brigne) ‘the Last he Brigeie ‘There also appears The Aray malities between the tv. Gcmander has stated that the Divisional Cossamier considered»ataal ft hh aa Lh bela 4 it ae 4 Ht i dt Sia He aie a a Mice get uke Ba ead toibe Wi ge fa iit e Hine gigas 334 G02 3 an tht apiglatey pil iH pls Nida wig pF tetas ba aay aaah Wee ip lid wae Bigg: E]eda ea ei tk ig ta Hee Ha ie wt Ep, a ik tue! Hy Hel 2533 i hi al a we s at Aue eiGrouping for these sectors vas attached az an Apreniix. Tt Gove thZee battalions to the three trigates (Annecsre 152). » 29 bas been brought ot, the plan ves Ditered after ComaMer 4 Infantry Diviston'n aprroctetion fon & Hovesber ani IV Corpe Operation Instruction, inrued on 9 Uovenber. WO further Operation Instruction var israel t7 & Infantry Division, but, epparentiy, om verbal orders, the task of & infantry Brigade was shifted from Si%G to DIME 47 Tale eleo was Later changed by the Division, ant, uster Commander, tvo battalions of tae “vere dispersed in company ani platoon grouse te block ‘SOUT of te 5 ¢ i é i E cae Firte comer - AUR One Fifie comasy leew tae platecss Rit mee Cam platens, - ma Dae piatecs : maar 4 AY NE ACER EETi thy . aus i cape pede aH theta i qsf 8 Bock adladii aii PUG ag cies tay 2 = ‘under comand, @ @) (@) ”Whine ue eH settle 10) ‘we Te with, therefore, be soon that the general layout vas as followt~ if covering Take” Area. vere to novo jeitions on vithfreval o Both these battalions vere mutually and in tactically strong pooitions. pl ditrieas Guo cunt ion end stprites vith f the Srignce could ition could be turned St vas Else ‘The position vas tactically « strong one anf hed opti. ‘the capture, Provided ‘the unite end paintonance could be ensure} 38 of tAah eA a A ET POBSE ATE BPE, é . La Hi! mdb. LU i lau! iy i i cattn! FHL is ied od yialiil, : iii mere Hi ieaui He a | ae al ia: | lu pal iid i fae! He Git g | tells ry ii i: ‘ui i Hn fini 5 ale 4 3 ag ¢ ze s 2 gy. 2s see i #3 g a ay ie il ee EEq eter BO S ily er ti BE? uae " ae Had Seagtgay 24 ie le, ee in aes sldlieeta WWE: Bieta sme ahets Chaimiadet HEUMSg(st baa sieball baie EU aaes i gam GS Ge (cal Sea pusht Hania senda HUES ire) gee | reli Ue Mie al if sueeahT od gl sheet hai Rin aalls iil BA a ts,61 After his talks with COS, Aray Commander, ant BOS IV Corps, Sctcsior aut fommaster'& Iasty Srigne took place seserng Comanter ier ie too ‘the withdrawal of 62 Infantry Brigete, (Annemire 107, Serial 6). In the neantine, the Corps Comanier crrived, ax! the Bivistonal Gomander spoke to the forner over the toleptons at about 1945 q tise the Divisional Comanter requested permission for 62 Infantry Brigate to vithdrev from S8IA, an the atiustion ‘there vas deteriorating fast, — Tt is significant that ho did 10 aoution to the Corps Commander the Brigade Comanter's reaction tho holding of SEIA and ‘hat the lather vas prepared tonold it for a vook of more, depending upon the maixtenan situation, In fact, he painted the reverse picture ant imlicd ‘hat the Brigade Comanter vas anzlous to uithdrav. Tho Gomanler at firet agreed, but subsoquently changed his orders, 5 > ba sont a sigaal at 2155 houra on 17 ovesber to vithiray nly when position becane untenable, (Annemire 158), Mis first igual peraitted the Divisional Comanter to withérey to BODTIA Yas canoellel as it vas being tranmitted, but the order vas over the tolashono by the BOS to 46 Infantzy Brigade for relaying we 48 Infantry Brigade vere Inter infersol (Appendix G, Para 80;\ Appeniix D, Para 139). i i ERE‘beak te could be first lay base portion LT being vitetrevs ve felt, ts a ae Haak cMbadi Hae jeden wine the wetton of woe Pewee ve Siete vite we rice F oveber tat riertat off we:il tf, | og dae FY : vf i; ae itt Us my tae jae fl ial ial Hees ed WE aillel ty Ce ae eatin a ih * it a li AG GEUBE GE atfize 2 z s 3 Beccg fa zk ib jaya, } 7 gs i if 4 i rt feed Aas fs. at OS Peat et edie stn tlt tate nelle: Wea] te Hl He i ny pala sFetlgtes) gal ial aia sguchgderyeea et afi] ; Vpalmat! landline yA Se ne ae Mniet ib i ral iu i: jae. ibis : lent ue Haunt | tte |e a ; ti iid a net atbisdazi l3fse (o) @ (@)Hid be With this background and the suidien order for Para 2). @) night 17/18 Hovesber 2 SIME LT te vithiray on (e) ‘from all directions SIG? The Brigade ‘the orders for 1 ) abd vould be vith thea soon, ‘The secontein-commani informed so Belgas Valor tht. the Ghinene ha sireaty 1W WITHDRAWAL #111 19/19 Fovesbery that the orders vere clear that ia any ease, the Brigade Oomanter vas then his vay to SEIA abd vere firing Major at about 0490 hours on the morning of the 18th Hovesber. ie: E & (3). Tao Litt of aisintegration com bo ganged from ‘the foot 79 ‘Tho Brigade paid the price for the folly of holding on to SEIA, amt, when once 4t was there, for being moved out of 48 to go to the rescue of a Divisional Headquarters, which ‘had already vantohed.ea {in wats, 49 iefentry Brigele starved to develop BODTIA deconsee vith unite go unters- (Amnemsre 123,.Para 13). t 83 On tovesber, the Divistonel Comanter enteral ¢@ Infantry Brigade to send & platoon on \SRINOIA Track. : {Gatch 1), . Tie platoon was reinforeed under the orders Giiciber uml, finaly, tho resainier of tho comrany vas Be a rass aaa Cina on woe Sg ef 5 GUAFDS to reinforce the compary already sent up mi f ibe Mette en “a ees a ee Sechaba fie eo foree seat Sorel ; 1 ea RN te Tile siti eee gre | t E ‘the reports of 49 Infantry Brigade, The Divisional ‘The Division vas now getting properly perturbed and cometent ‘uals “pinasing <£ dele” yoliey. ‘They ordered the (e) 68 Infentry/to sent out the vhole off Brigade 5 GULIDS, the task vas to rocapture POSHINGIA, Orders for this were given by Division at 1080 hhoure on 16 Hovesber and the battalion moved font between 1400 ~ 1600 hours, Tt could IT Yo moved earlier as companies fron BOWDIIA ‘TOR SHORT Lee nnn ranean cmantans san}ii se ai le Hialea"timenare 102)* ‘but they managed to yards fron 5 GIANDS ‘Too GUARDS by 1645 hours come 08 o estimated the onsuy etrengts en cof ein Seeman, arte maton ‘The exeay then regrouped and after some 15 ninstes Dorval started eocireling mevenotte ant intiitration, inte cone deat ea mdi) ‘Tho eneny vas engaged all tho ti ich | Unter He i au ie alk i is as ieR PEA stalion was 107 lost. Paras 131 al 1665 ‘Gok Annemire 123, Faran 15 end ete "ead Divisional ‘there, Signi! Tegisent hare ‘hehe beltttiing me ‘the oxeny ‘elon, The o ia, Ci the by at vgs Perea 7 and 6 Appentiz Dy 3 Hist aly oie lai ‘ ee i aa aye ae a Paras 19 ~ 35) Rskee 8, oer oommel, prevailed ani mother Cppenits iszemare hike tb Sorbo nas och ia the a 28 defence layout. Souo of ‘0a the morning of 17 Hovenber, (visional Headquarters of 18 Hovenber end . ingly, tbe ‘chat ‘Soe of TRANG D2ONG the to | ‘gor from 62 Infaxtry 2) 8, 6, and T)e organi for the Divisional Keaiquarters was Living min ace ttn io ai anabsence of any var-like atuosphere ve felt thet the viole ue FLIGH regarding the withdruval ond suthority jiisiotal Commenter to withires, if yoeitions ved 2% 0300 houre 18 Movecber the orders fron Corps Comanter ore to 101 ith this he drove off Amemze 151, Paras 14 and Report of Brig'AS CHDA), 4, Wfustion ELST of DIRANO D20MG, and the former *% rs S rafenty Brigade to etthorer is that he (the Divisional Comanter) var ening off to hover to return to Divisional Headquarters. should Paras 3 ondLdeatlig dies ee see a aU efits Tat alana it Gael a A a a af i z { af aid i ; at Gene AGfor ‘hed Fovesber. f ie pay Hl i lll i il i i H z eg ey Ae tel h ut ila He au a iy ea 7 a a i Hit mea ne ae i Bu a I a ie age a ; Lau mee: a au Ms Bi aHif He nw nee Ritieay ehh i | H dig i Hef : Hi 3 i ‘all hill SR i pe 4 ‘e Pe % a: ate F - a 4 g fin] a ee 15 i be i Ht te +e Au (GH Senia tee as p qh 3 L i i i fe Hint Ah ii agua El A ‘canght sdrealt House to ‘Companies hed been overran, He vas told Comand ond oatrol of the ition, failing which to reorganise on mn EAST of Pago T Ives overran ani also the af hoe force. y» personnel of 1 SIMI LI vere 20 fap poottto a ponttlon. st that tino vere ina mst nbs lanced state; ‘200n lest and, by” 1800 kre, the Brigade Healquarters nesr Ci ing UP ‘thosil, i lls | a if 3 quae i piney I doqiel i = pide 4 i i fee a, 3 the 2 aap ishilt Psse quit 5. i i Sgsty "s oa oiSas- a Gu ‘Th 32g i age pe i ee alll neil Adil Ling | 1620 houre ond stating that there vas 10 one does HT seen to be correct. D, Para 148 (0). ion of Lt Col BHUPIIDER SINGH ven tal 1. Be ‘ue Brigute Comander ani Brigade Yajor vere vith ‘Ts vas being repaired. Roads Organisation. I SING! aparently came over from hie Command Fost ‘the wireless set next door. near the Brigade Tactical Headquarters to the Brigate order from 1585 hours omarde. Captain MATHUR of the Border BHUPDDER= 5 Ya cdl samdill ines ndettllls dele Boe i 8, 4.5 sietaatcac 885 det y3senees a egse 8 yd alle BARGE ED adult } ciel ital fa tayataie gdarasdeeae f gnay | ij geal Wales Gi Wy tlaalel bPal Mute wats Uns seideily jal! nh lech fie bl ee a nn et ee et aqeeg | 82% igs saga gate spite BUPA ade ey itll, Bib tittle ala HE Hs al i ite, fall : 2 wey ie ity a ele ‘ath Hf tah : i i Hou Ea ite vidi at its Nie abafanciid of i" PEs age alldTLS ee = x et 3 a Bos ge a aq “hil il j ites rt hb vi etl aan Wik iat ithih iy thin Hy EE folie emul WP Lath Hea Uaioe need hth ee sali eet Me i i MeL ih aria aga Hy aldistdics obbaalivtecile of we dhrl dik HieYe mat ly the eal phere. ‘of the Comant ion of logistic qovis: ‘be the concern |mp? content with thet the Divicton committed the | ‘to withdrew within a natter of hours ou night 17/18 Tovesber the battalion holéing K.JIA Pass. This vas tao, turaing point 4m the Fall of SIA, The vithiravel of this battalion led to the {nt Sint and SELA end eventual dicintogration of 62 Infantry Brigaie, to DIU. Efforts of a fev offivers, particularly those of Capt RWRAWAT, conld MOT, hovever, replace disintegration 1e nbove Divisional rections cas be grouped wnler 1 BOR Mo 4", ant vas fairiy ani oquarely due to ‘note and omissions of Heolquarters 4 Infantry Division ‘the 459 Tue Division dtesolvel eni the lost of its brigaies ws "tsi | next te be broven up by Corps or core securately, by 8 "comprised cf the trey Comamler, the Corps Gommemder, end the Directer of Militery Operations. of the tactical layout, out of touch with the situation in BOOT, they plenned and ordorei the moving cut of a aizeable foree fron the alvesdy bere BOMDITA defences. WOT that they Were WOT warned, end "Irrenpactive of uhat bipred to BODIIA" seer to open the Road BODIIA'~ DIRANG D201, 460 the ordering cut of the force vas directly renponefble for the fell of BOTA, There were four ccmpante: in ‘the BOYDTIA defences. “Intesd, on the Plank vnera the Chinese Aitacked, there vas one platoon, vere there should have boon @ battalion, Tite thea was "FORDUIESTAL GRR to $" end Sb Gealed the fate of BUDIUA, The planers emt orderers must {ake the Blane for this. ‘TOr_seoRESin Halll dil acy 3 ay be