People vs.

Mingoa [GR L-5371, 26 March 1953] En Banc, Reyes (J): 10 concur Facts: Found short in his accounts as officer-in-charge of the office of the municipal treasurer of Despujols, Romblon, and unable to produce the missing fund amounting to P3,938 upon demand by the provincial auditor, Aquino Mingoa was prosecuted for the crime of malversation of public funds in the Court of First Instance of Romblon. Mingoa explained to the examining officer that some days before he had, by mistake, put the money in a large envelope which he took with him to a show and that he forgot it on his seat and it was not there anymore when he returned. But he did not testify in court and presented no evidence in his favor. Having been found guilty as charged and sentenced to the corresponding penalty, he appealed to the Court of Appeals. But that court certified the case to the Supreme Court on the ground that it involved a constitutional question. Issue: Whether Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that "the failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use" violates the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved cannot be sustained. Held: The validity of statutes establishing presumptions in criminal cases is now a settled matter, Cooley, in his work on constitutional limitations (8th ed., Vol. I, pp. 639-641), says that "there is no constitutional objection to the passage of a law providing that the presumption of innocence may be overcome by a contrary presumption founded upon the experience of human conduct, and enacting what evidence shall be sufficient to overcome such presumption of innocence." In line with this view, it is generally held in the United States that the legislature may enact that when certain facts have been proved they shall, be prima facie evidence of the existence of the guilt of the accused and shift the burden of proof provided there be a rational connection between the facts proved and the ultimate fact presumed so that the inference of the one from proof of the others is not unreasonable and arbitrary because of lack of connection between the two in common experience. The same view has been adopted here as may be seen from the decisions of the Supreme court in US vs. Tria (17 Phil 303); US vs. Luling (34 Phil 725); and People vs. Merilo (GR L-3489, 28 June 1951). The statute in the present case creates a presumption of guilt once certain facts are proved. It makes the failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming, upon proper demand, any public funds or property with which he is chargeable prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal use. The ultimate act presumed is that the officer has malversed the funds or property entrusted to his custody, and the presumption is made to arise from proof that he has received them and yet he has failed to have them forthcoming upon proper demand. Clearly, the fact presumed is but a natural inference from the fact proved, so that it cannot be said that there is no rational connection between the two. Furthermore, the statute establishes only a prima facie presumption, thus giving the accused an opportunity to present evidence to rebut it. The presumption is reasonable and will stand the test of validity laid down in the above citations. Herein, Mingoa's explanation is inherently unbelievable and cannot overcome the presumption of guilt arising from his inability to produce the fund which was found missing. If the money was really lost without Mingoa's fault, the most natural thing for him to do would be to so inform his superiors and apply for release from liability. But this he did not do. Instead, he tried to borrow to cover the shortage. And on the flimsy excuse that he preferred to do his own sleuthing, he even did not report the loss to

the police. Considering further, as the prosecution points out in its brief, Mingoa had at first tried to avoid meeting the auditor who wanted to examine his accounts, and that for sometime before the alleged loss many teachers and other employees of the town had not been paid their salaries, there is good ground to believe that Mingoa had really malversed the fund in question and that his story about its loss was pure invention. Tatad Vs. Sandiganbayan 159 SCRA 70 G.R. Nos. L-72335-39 March 21, 1988 Facts: The complainant, Antonio de los Reyes, originally filed what he termed "a report" with the Legal Panel of the Presidential Security Command (PSC) on October 1974, containing charges of alleged violations of Rep. Act No. 3019 against then Secretary of Public Information Francisco S. Tatad. The "report" was made to "sleep" in the office of the PSC until the end of 1979 when it became widely known that Secretary (then Minister) Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos and had resigned from the Cabinet. On December 12, 1979, the 1974 complaint was resurrected in the form of a formal complaint filed with the Tanodbayan. The Tanodbayan acted on the complaint on April 1, 1980 which was around two months after petitioner Tatad's resignation was accepted by Pres. Marcos by referring the complaint to the CIS, Presidential Security Command, for investigation and report. On June 16, 1980, the CIS report was submitted to the Tanodbayan, recommending the filing of charges for graft and corrupt practices against former Minister Tatad and Antonio L. Cantero. By October 25, 1982, all affidavits and counter-affidavits were in the case was already for disposition by the Tanodbayan. However, it was only on June 5, 1985 that a resolution was approved by the Tanodbayan. Five criminal informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan on June 12, 1985, all against petitioner Tatad alone. (1) Section 3, paragraph (e) of RA. 3019 for giving D' Group, a private corporation controlled by his brother-in-law, unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official functions; (2) Violation of Section 3, paragraph (b) for receiving a check of P125,000.00 from Roberto Vallar, President/General Manager of Amity Trading Corporation as consideration for the release of a check of P588,000.00 to said corporation for printing services rendered for the Constitutional Convention Referendum in 1973; (3) Violation of Section 7 on three (3) counts for his failure to file his Statement of Assets and Liabilities for the calendar years 1973, 1976 and 1978. A motion to quash the information was made alleging that the prosecution deprived accused of due process of law and of the right to a speedy disposition of the cases filed against him. It was denied hence the appeal. Issue: Whether or not petitioner was deprived of his rights as an accused. Held: YES. Due process (Procedural) and right to speedy disposition of trial were violated. Firstly, the complaint came to life, as it were, only after petitioner Tatad had a falling out with President Marcos. Secondly, departing from established procedures prescribed by law for preliminary investigation, which require the submission of affidavits and counter-affidavits by the complainant and the respondent and their witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the Presidential Security Command for finding investigation and report. The law (P.D. No. 911) prescribes a ten-day period for the prosecutor to

resolve a case under preliminary investigation by him from its termination. While we agree with the respondent court that this period fixed by law is merely "directory," yet, on the other hand, it can not be disregarded or ignored completely, with absolute impunity. A delay of close to three (3) years can not be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar.