Rule 37

Haj

Pernes

ALABAN vs. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 156021, September 23, 2005

Facts:

On 8 November 2000, respondent Francisco Provido (respondent)

filed a petition for the probate of the Last Will and Testament of
the late Soledad Provido Elevencionado (decedent).On 30 May 2001, the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 68, in P.D. Monfort North,
Dumangas, Iloilo, rendered its Decision, allowing the probate of the
will of the decedent and directing the issuance of letters
testamentary to respondent.
Thereafter, herein petitioners filed a motion for the reopening
of the probate proceedings.On 11 January 2002, the RTC issued an Order
denying petitioners motion for being unmeritorious. Petitioners
thereafter filed a petition with an application for preliminary
injunction with the CA, seeking the annulment of the RTCs
Decision dated 30 May 2001 and Order dated 11 January 2002. In
its Resolution promulgated on 28 February 2002, the CA dismissed the
petition. It found that there was no showing that petitioners failed
to avail of or resort to the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief from judgment, or other appropriate remedies
through no fault of their own. Petitioners sought reconsideration of
the Resolution, but the same was denied by the CA for lack of merit.
Issue: Whether or not the proper remedy is an annulment of judgment
or the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief for
judgement and other appropriate remedies

Ruling:

Section 37 of the Rules of Court allows an aggrieved party to

file a motion for new trial on the ground of fraud, accident,
mistake,
or
excusable
negligence.
The
same Rule permits the
filing of a motion for reconsideration on the grounds of excessive
award of damages, insufficiency of evidence to justify the decision or
final order, or that the decision or final order is contrary to law.
Meanwhile, a petition for relief from judgment under Section 3 of Rule
38 is resorted to when a judgment or final order is entered, or any
other proceeding is thereafter taken, against a party in any court
through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence.
A motion for new trial or reconsideration and a petition for
relief from judgment are remedies available only
to
parties
in
the proceedings where the assailed judgment is rendered. In fact,
it has been held that a person who was never a party to the case, or
even summoned to appear therein, cannot avail of a petition for relief

from judgment.However, petitioners in this case are mistaken in

asserting that they are not or have not become parties to the probate
proceedings. A proceeding for the probate of a will is one in rem,
such that with the corresponding publication of the petition the
courts jurisdiction extends to all persons interested in said will or
in the settlement of the estate of the decedent.As parties to the
probate proceedings, petitioners could have validly availed of the
remedies of motion for new trial or reconsideration and petition for
relief from judgment.In fact, petitioners filed a motion to reopen,
which is essentially a motion for new trial, with petitioners praying
for the reopening of the case and the setting of further proceedings.
However, the motion was denied for having been filed out of time, long
after
the Decision became
final
and
executory.
Conceding
that
petitioners became aware of the Decision after it had become final,
they could have still filed a petition for relief from judgment after
the denial of their motion to reopen. For failure to make use without
sufficient justification of the said remedies available to them,
petitioners could no longer resort to a petition for annulment of
judgment; otherwise, they would benefit from their own inaction or
negligence.
Rule 37
DE LOS SANTOS vs. ELIZALDE
February 2, 2007

Facts:

On December 15, 1986, petitioners filed a Complaint for Quieting

of Title, Damages and Attorneys Fees before the Kalibo, Aklan RTC,
involving four (4) adjoining lots designated located in Boracay
Island, Malay, Aklan. After due hearing of the case, the trial court
issued the April 29, 1996 Decision. Petitioners and respondent Fred
Elizalde filed their separate Notices of Appeal dated June 6, 1996 7 and
May 16, 1996,8 respectively. Subsequently, the CA issued the June 2,
1998 Notice to File Brief,9 requiring petitioners and respondent
Elizalde to file their briefs. On April 8, 1999, petitioners, through
their former counsel Atty. Napoleon M. Victoriano, filed an Ex-Parte
Motion to Withdraw Appeal. Said motion sought the withdrawal of the
appeal on the ground that petitioners and respondents delos Santos
entered into an amicable settlement on May 11, 1999. Thus, the CA
issued the assailed Decision dismissing CA-G.R. CV No. 54136 and SP
No. 48475 and considering them withdrawn. On the same day, petitioners
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of Decision with Prayer for
Reinstatement of Appeal, which was verified solely by petitioner
Vicente delos Santos. In their Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners
alleged that they did not have any knowledge of the promulgation of
the assailed Decision of the CA; that they never entered into any
amicable settlement with respondents delos Santos; and that they never
authorized their former counsel, Atty. Victoriano, to withdraw their
appeal.

On January 31, 2000, the CA issued the assailed Resolution,

wherein it was ruled that: The "Motion for Reconsideration With Prayer
for the Reinstatement of Appeal" filed on June 17, 1999 by the said

new counsel for plaintiffs-appellants, to which an Opposition has been

filed by the first set of intervenors-appellees, is DENIED admission
for being late by nine (9) days. The records show that plaintiffsappellants counsel of record, Atty. Napoleon M. Victoriano received
copy of the Courts Decision dated May 11, 1998, on May 24, 1999.
Thus, appellants had only until June 8, 1999 to file their Motion for
Reconsideration.

Issue: Whether or not

the filing of petitioners motion for
reconsideration
should be counted from the time when petitioners
themselves obtained a copy of the assailed Decision of the CA on June
2, 1999, or from the time that their former counsel, Atty. Victoriano,
received a copy of said Decision on May 24, 1999

Ruling:
Section 1 of Rule 37, in conjunction with Section 3 of Rule 41 of
the Rules of Court, provides for the period within which a Motion for
Reconsideration may be filed.(Refer to Rule 37 Sec. 1 and Rule 41 Sec.
3)
The fifteen (15)-day period should run from May 24, 1999, when
Atty. Victoriano received a copy of the assailed Decision of the CA,
and not from June 2, 1999, when petitioners claimed to have been
informed of the CA decision.
In the present case, the assailed CA Decision was rendered on May
11, 1999, and the notice of it was received by Atty. Victoriano on May
24, 1999. Petitioners current counsel, Atty. Verano, filed his
appearance only on June 17, 1999, with the sole conformity of Vicente
delos Santos. Thus, The CA correctly served a copy of the Decision on
Atty.
Victoriano,
which
is
considered
notice
to
petitioners
themselves. Therefore, May 24, 1999 is the correct reckoning point for
the reglementary period of filing a Motion for Reconsideration to the
assailed Decision which ended on June 8, 1999. Hence, petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration filed on June 17, 1999 was belatedly filed
and correctly rejected by the CA.

Rule 38
Haj Pernes

PURCON vs. MRM PHILIPPINES, INC. - HAJ

G.R. No. 182718, September 26, 2008

Facts:

Petitioner was hired by respondent MRM Philippines, Inc as a

seaman on January 28, 2002. On June 2002, petitioner felt an
excruciating pain in his left testicle. After being examined, he was
diagnosed with hernia. Subsequently, petitioner was repatriated due to

his ailment. Upon his return to the Philippines, petitioner was again
examined by the company physician and the latter declared that he was
fit to resume work. When petitioner reported to MRM Philippines, Inc.
hoping to be re-hired for another contract, he was told that there was
no vacancy for him.
Petitioner a complaint filed by petitioner for
reimbursement of medical expenses, sickness allowance and permanent
disability benefits with prayer for compensatory, moral and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees before the Labor Arbiter.However, the
Labor Arbiter
dismissed the complaint for utter lack of merit. On
appeal, the NLRC affirmed the decision of the labor arbiter.

Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari under Rule

65 of the Revised Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals
(CA). However,
the
CA
dismissed
the
case
due
to
formal
infirmities. Petitioner's
motion
for
reconsideration
was
also
denied. Subsequently, the CA resolution became final and executory
.Petitioner filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the
resolutions of the CA, which dismissed his petition for certiorari. In
Our Resolution dated July 16, 2007, We denied the petition. Thus,
petitioner filed the instant petition for relief from judgment.

Issue: Can petitioner avail of a petition for relief from judgment

under Rule 38 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure from Our resolution
denying his petition for review?
Ruling:

is

We answer in the negative. A petition for relief from judgment

not
an
available
remedy
in
the
Supreme
Court.

First, although Section 1 of Rule 38 states that when a judgment or

final order is entered through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable
negligence, a party in any court may file a petition for relief from
judgment, this rule must be interpreted in harmony with Rule 56, which
enumerates the original cases cognizable by the Supreme Court. A
petition for relief from judgment is not included in the list of Rule
56 cases originally cognizable by this Court.
Second, while Rule 38 uses the phrase "any court," it refers only to
Municipal/Metropolitan
and
Regional
Trial
Courts.
Third, the procedure in the CA and the Supreme Court are governed by
separate provisions of the Rules of Court. Neither the Rules of Court
nor the Revised Internal Rules of the CA allows the remedy of petition
for relief in the CA.There is no provision in the Rules of Court
making the petition for relief applicable in the CA or this Court. The
procedure in the CA from Rules 44 to 55, with the exception of Rule 45
which pertains to the Supreme Court, identifies the remedies available
before said Court such as annulment of judgments or final orders or
resolutions (Rule 47), motion for reconsideration (Rule 52), and new
trial (Rule 53).
Nowhere is a petition for relief under Rule 38
mentioned.If a petition for relief from judgment is not among the
remedies available in the CA, with more reason that this remedy cannot
be availed of in the Supreme Court.
A petition for relief raises

questions of facts on fraud, accident, mistake, or

negligence, which are beyond the concerns of this Court.

excusable

Rule 38
CAYETANO vs. CEGUERRA
13 SCRA 73
Facts:
On November 15, 1960, plaintiff Catalina Cayetano instituted a
civil case for Foreclosure of Real Estate Mortgage, against
defendants-spouses Osmundo Ceguerra and Felina Serrano. Summons and
copy of the complaint for foreclosure were served on the defendants
within the reglementary period. On January 11, 1961, the court a
quo rendered judgment for the plaintiff. It appears that this decision
never became known to appellants-spouses, the same having been
returned to the Court, as unclaimed.vi law library
Subsequently, defendants were served with a copy of a Writ of
Execution, addressed to the Sheriff of Quezon City, commanding the
latter to seize the goods and chattels of the defendants-appellants in
order to satisfy the judgment. The matter was referred to counsel who
presented a Petition for Relief. Plaintiff-appellee interposed an
opposition to the petition for relief. Resolving the petition and the
opposition, the Court handed down an Order declaring that that the
first registry notice for the decision of this Court was received by
the defendant on January 13, 1961, and according to the provisions of
the rules, five (5) days after the receipt of such first notice, he is
presumed to have received the same when the petition for relief and
that when it was filed, more than 60 days has elapsed. The said
petition for relief was filed beyond the reglementary period thus, it
must be denied. A motion to reconsider the above Order was filed,the
main ground being that the petition for relief was presented on time.
The argument in support of the contention is that defendants having
actually known of the adverse decision rendered, only on April 21,
1961, the presentation of the petition on June 17, 1961, was only 57
days from the former date. To bolster the argument, See. 3, Rule 38 of
the Rules was cited, wherein it was provided, among others, that
petitions of this nature should be filed within sixty days after the
petitioner learns of the judgment, order or other proceedings to be
set aside. This motion for reconsideration was likewise denied, for
failure to comply with the rules regarding the three (3) day notice
and for lack of merits.
Issue: Was the petition
provided for by the rules?

for

relief

presented

within

the

period

Ruling:
We consider the petition for relief to have been filed on time.
This is so, because a petition for relief may likewise be taken from
the order of execution, inasmuch as Sec. 2, Rule 38, Revised Rules,
does not only refer to judgments, but also to orders, or any other
proceedings (PHHC v. Tiongco & Escasa, L-18891, Nov. 28, 1964). From
the time they had actual knowledge of the order of execution, on April
21, 1961, until the filing of the petition for relief, on June 17,
1961, only 57 days had elapsed. It is conceded that defendants
received a first registry notice on January 13, 1961, but they did not
claim the letter, thereby giving rise to the presumption that five (5)
days after receipt of the first notice, the defendants were deemed to

have receive the letter. This Court, however, cannot justly attribute
upon defendants actual knowledge of the decision, because there is no
showing that the registry notice itself contained any indication that
the registered letter was a copy of the decision, or that the registry
notice referred to the case being ventilated. We cannot exact a strict
accounting of the rules from ordinary mortals, like the defendants. w
library
CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, the Order denying the
petition for relief and that denying the motion for reconsideration,
are set aside and another entered remanding the case to the court
below, for hearing on the merits. No costs.
Rules 40 & 41
Rule 40 & 41
Haj Pernes
HEIRS OF DORONIO vs. HEIRS OF DORONIO
[2008]
Facts:
Spouses Simeon Doronio and Cornelia Gante, now both deceased,
were the registered owners of a parcel of land located at Barangay
Cabalitaan, Asingan, Pangasinan. Marcelino Doronio and Fortunato
Doronio, now both deceased, were the children of the spouses and the
parties in this case are their heirs. Petitioners are the heirs
of Marcelino Doronio,
while
respondents
are
the
heirs
of Fortunato Doronio.
Eager to obtain the entire property, the heirs of Marcelino
Doronio and Veronica Pico filed before the RTC in Urdaneta, Pangasinan
a petition "For the Registration of a Private Deed of Donation"
docketed as Petition Case No. U-920. No respondents were named in the
said petition although notices of hearing were posted on the bulletin
boards
of
Barangay
Cabalitaan,
Municipalities
of
Asingan
and
Lingayen.During the hearings, no one interposed an objection to the
petition. After the RTC ordered a general default, the petition was
eventually granted on September 22, 1993. This led to the registration
of the deed of donation, cancellation of OCT No. 352 and issuance of a
new Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 44481 in the names of
Marcelino Doronio and Veronica Pico. Thus, the entire property was
titled in the names of petitioners predecessors.On April 28, 1994,
the heirs of Fortunato Doronio filed a pleading before the RTC in the
form of a petition in the same Petition Case No. U-920. The petition
was for the reconsideration of the decision of the RTC that ordered
the registration of the subject deed of donation. It was prayed in the
petition that an order be issued declaring null and void the
registration of the private deed of donation and that TCT No. 44481 be
cancelled. However, the petition was dismissed on the ground that the
decision in Petition Case No. U-920 had already become final as it was
not appealed.Determined to remain in their possessed property,
respondent heirs of Fortunato Doronio (as plaintiffs) filed an action
for
reconveyance
and
damages
with
prayer
for
preliminary
injunction against
petitioner
heirs
of
Marcelino
Doronio
(as
defendants) before the RTC, Branch 45, Anonas, Urdaneta City,
Pangasinan. After due proceedings, the RTC ruled in favor of
petitioner heirs of Marcelino Doronio. Disagreeing with the judgment

of the RTC, respondents appealed to the CA. the CA reversed the RTC
decision.
Issue: Can respondents be ndbou nd by the decision in Petition Case
No. U-920 even if they were not made parties in the said case?
Ruling:
Petitioners cannot use the finality of the RTC decision in
Petition Case No. U-920 as a shield against the verification of the
validity of the deed of donation. According to petitioners, the said
final decision is one for quieting of title. In other words, it is a
case for declaratory relief under Rule 64 (now Rule 63) of the Rules
of Court.Suits to quiet title are not technically suits in rem, nor
are they, strictly speaking, in personam, but being against the person
in respect of the res, these proceedings are characterized as quasi in
rem. The judgment in such proceedings is conclusive only between the
parties. Thus, respondents are not bound by the decision in Petition
Case No. U-920 as they were not made parties in the said case.The
rules on quieting of title expressly provide that any declaration in
a suit to quiet title shall not prejudice persons who are not parties
to the action.That respondents filed a subsequent pleading in the same
Petition Case No. U-920 after the decision there had become final did
not change the fact that said decision became final without their
being impleaded in the case. Said subsequent pleading was dismissed on
the ground of finality of the decision. Thus, the RTC totally failed
to give respondents their day in court. As a result, they cannot be
bound by its orders. Generally accepted is the principle that no man
shall be affected by any proceeding to which he is a stranger, and
strangers to a case are not bound by judgment rendered by the court.
Rules 40 & 41
SPOUSES MORALES vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 126196, January 28, 1998)

Facts:
The lots in question were originally part of one whole parcel
devoted to agriculture owned by one Enrique Bautista. Sometime in
1972, Bautista caused the subdivision of the land. His subdivision
survey plan was duly approved by the Land Registration Commission.In
1979, Bautista sold two (2) lots to plaintiff Gregorio Morales. He
also sold four (4) lots to plaintiff Maria Teresa Morales. Teresa in
turn, sold three (3) of her purchased lots to three different persons
who are likewise plaintiffs in the case.Plaintiffs assert that the
defendant surreptitiously took possession of their lots and prepared
them for planting, thereby altering its residential outline and
appearance.Defendant
countered
with
the
allegation
that
reclassification of the land was not approved by the proper
authorities and that he was duly constituted as tenant thereof by the
previous owner, Enrique Bautista.
The municipal court received evidence on the issue of right of
possession and the land's proper classification.Finding the land to be
agricultural and the fact that tenancy was in issue, the said court
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.Plaintiffs appealed. The
(Regional Trial Court) Judge who heard the case found that the
(municipal) court had jurisdiction because the land was duly
reclassified from agricultural to residential and that tenancy was not

involved. He then proceeded to decide the issues on the merits

resulting in a judgment favoring plaintiffs' recovery of possession of
the lots in litigation.Defendant-petitioner (on appeal by way
of certiorari to the Court of Appeals) alleges that the (Regional
Trial
Court)
Judge
gravely
erred
its
discretion
and
lacked
jurisdiction to decide the case.
Issue: Was the RTC correct in resolving the ejectment suit on its
merits?

Ruling:
We cannot sustain the Court of Appeals. Under Sec. 8 Rule 40
(refer to the codal provision),
a Regional Trial Court, in the
exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, should remand a case in the
event it reverses a decision of the MTC which ruled on a question of
law, provided that there was no trial on the merits. The significance
of this second requirement cannot be overemphasized, for it reveals
the rationale for remanding the case. A remand is a due process
requirement, because it affords the parties an opportunity to present
evidence on the merits of the case. Where the parties have presented
their respective evidence before the MTC, a remand becomes a useless
superfluity, an undue imposition on the time and the dockets of
courts.In the case at bar, it is clear that the MTC afforded due
process to the parties; it received relevant evidence sufficient to
decide the ejectment case on its merits.The Court, therefore, finds no
compelling reason to remand the case to the MTC, as the underlying
purpose and objective for such remand is already fait accompli. As
previously noted, the MTC observed due process; it received necessary
evidence to decide the ejectment case under the Rules on Summary
Procedure; and it discussed the issue of forcible entry. On appeal,
the decision of the RTC was based on the facts adduced by the parties
before the MTC. Consequently, remanding the case to the MTC serves no
useful purpose, for the parties have already presented their evidence.

Rule 38

GREATER METROPOLITAN MANILA vs. JANCOM ENVIRONMENTAL

June 30, 2006
Facts:

Presidential Memorandum Order No. 202 was issued by then

President Fidel V. Ramos creating an Executive Committee to oversee
and develop waste-to-energy projects for the waste disposal sites in
San Mateo, Rizal and Carmona, Cavite. Respondent Jancom International
Development Projects Pty. Limited of Australia (Jancom International)
was one of the bidders for the San Mateo Waste Disposal Site.
Thereafter,
the
above-said
Executive
Committee
approved
the
recommendation of the Pre-qualification, Bids and Awards Committee to
declare JANCOM as the sole complying bidder for the San Mateo Waste
Disposal Site. A Contract for the BOT Implementation of the Solid
Waste Management Project for the San Mateo, Rizal Waste Disposal

Site4 (the contract) was entered into by the Republic of the

Philippines and JANCOM.Owing to the clamor of the residents of Rizal,
the Estrada administration ordered the closure of the San Mateo
landfill. Petitioner GMMSWMC thereupon adopted a Resolution not to
pursue the contract with JANCOM. Hence, respondents filed a petition
for certiorari8 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City to
declare the GMMSWMC Resolution and the acts of the MMDA calling for
bids for and authorizing the forging of a new contract for the Metro
Manila waste management as illegal, unconstitutional and void and to
enjoin petitioners from implementing the Resolution and making another
award in lieu thereof. The Pasig City RTC found in favor of
respondents Jancom, which decision of the lower court was affirmed by
the CA. On appeal, this Court affirmed the November 13, 2001 CA
Decision
and
declared
the
contract
valid
and
perfected,
albeitineffective
and
unimplementable
pending
approval
by
the
President.
Issue: Whether or not the order of execution was valid
Ruling:
As provided in Rule 39, Sec. 1 (refer to the codal provision), if
the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution
may forthwith be applied for in the court of origin, on motion of the
judgment obligee, submitting therewith certified true copies of the
judgment or judgments or final order or orders sought to be enforced
and of the entry thereof, with notice to the adverse party. The
appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of
justice so requires, direct the court of origin to issue the writ of
execution. Once a judgment becomes final, it is basic that the
prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to a writ of
execution the issuance of which is the trial courts ministerial duty,
compellable by mandamus.
However, there are instances, when an error may be committed in
the course of execution proceedings prejudicial to the rights of a
party as where:1) the writ of execution varies the judgment; 2) it
appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued, or
that it is defective in substance, or is issued against the wrong
party, or that the judgment debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied,
or the writ was issued without authority.That a writ of execution must
conform to the judgment which is to be executed, substantially to
every essential particular thereof. Where the execution is not in
harmony with the judgment which gives it life and exceeds it, it has
no validity.51 In issuing the alias writ of execution, the trial court
in effect ordered the enforcement of the contract despite this Courts
unequivocal pronouncement that albeit valid and perfected,the contract
shall
become
effective
only
upon
approval
by
the
President.Indubitably, the alias writ of execution varied the tenor of
this Courts judgment, went against essential portions and exceeded
the terms thereof. The execution directed by the trial court being out
of harmony with the judgment. The execution directed by the trial
court being out of harmony with the judgment, legal implications
cannot save it from being found to be fatally defective.

Rule 39

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. vs. LANTIN - HAJ

G.R. No. L-59311, January 31, 1985

Facts:
Rufus B. Rodriguez, as President of the World Association of Law
Students (WALS), sent two cablegrams overseas through RCPI, one
addressed to a Mohammed Elsir Taha in Khartoum, Sudan Socialist Union,
and the other to a Diane Merger in Athens, Georgia, United States. The
cablegrams were, in turn, relayed to GLOBE for transmission to their
foreign destinations.However,both cablegrams went undelivered.
Rodriguez filed a complaint for compensatory damages, moral
damages, and exemplary damages before the CFI of Rizal against RCPI
and
GLOBE.The
CFI
rendered
a
decision
in
favor
of
petitioner.Thereafter, Rodriguez filed a "Motion for Execution Before
Expiration of Time to Appeal" relying on Rule 39, Section 2 of the
Revised Rules of Court alleging that the appeal is clearly dilatory
and that the lapse of time would make the ultimate judgment illusory
and ineffective. An opposition to the motion was filed by RCPI and by
GLOBE.A motion for reconsideration of the above order, however, even
before the issuance of this order denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration, the respondent Sheriffinsisted on levying on the
funds and assets of petitioners RCPI and GLOBE, prompting them to file
an "Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Execution. This urgent motion was
likewise denied so RCPI and GLOBE filed with the Court of Appeals a
petition for certiorari, mandamus, and prohibition with a prayer for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.Thereafter, the Court
of Appeals issued a restraining order enjoining the lower court from
further proceeding with the civil case and from enforcing the writ of
execution until further orders. The petitioners filed with the
respondent Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration,however,
their motion for reconsideration was denied by the said court.Hence, a
petition for appeal by certiorari was filed before the Supreme Court.
Issue: May damages be executed pending appeal? If so, What are they?
Ruling:
Yes. Considering the nature of the wrongful acts found by the
trial court and the amount of damages adjudicated as recoverable, both
of which are stated in detail in the decisions and various orders of
the trial court and the appellate court, we are constrained to sustain
the respondent courts insofar as the award for actual or compensatory
damages are concerned but to postpone the execution of the awards for
moral and exemplary damages until such time as the merits of the cases
now on regular appeal before the Court of Appeals are finally
determined. The execution of any award for moral and exemplary damages
is dependent on the outcome of the main case. Unlike actual damages
for which the petitioners may clearly be held liable if they breach a
specific contract and the amounts of which are fixed and certain,
liabilities with respect to moral and exemplary damages as wen as the
exact amounts remain uncertain and indefinite pending resolution by
the Intermediate Appellate Court and eventually the Supreme Court. The
existence of the factual bases of these types of damages and their
causal relation to the petitioners' act will have to be determined in
the light of the assignments of errors on appeal. It is possible that
the petitioners, after all, while liable for actual damages may not be
liable for moral and exemplary damages. Or as in some cases elevated
to the Supreme Court, the awards may be reduced.

Rule 39
PERLA COMPANIA DE SEGUROS, INC. vs. RAMOLETE
G.R. No. L-60887, November 13, 1991

Facts:
The Cimarron PUJ, owned and registered in the name of Nelia
Enriquez, and driven by Cosme Casas, collided with a private jeep
owned by the late Calixto Palmes (husband of private respondent
Primitiva Palmes) who was then driving the private jeep.As a result,
Calixto Palmes died and physical injuries was caused on the part of
Adeudatus Borbon.
Private respondents Primitiva Palmes and Honorato Borbon, Sr.
(father of minor Adeudatus Borbon) filed a complaint against Cosme
Casas and Nelia Enriquez (assisted by her husband Leonardo Enriquez)
before the then Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch 3, claiming
actual, moral, nominal and exemplary damages. The Court of First
Instance rendered a Decision in favor of private respondent Primitiva
Palmes, ordering common carrier Nelia Enriquez to pay her P10,000.00
as moral damages, P12,000.00 as compensatory damages for the death of
Calixto Palmes, P3,000.00 as exemplary damages, P5,000.00 as actual
damages, and P1,000.00 as attorney's fees. The judgment of the trial
court became final and executory and a writ of execution was
thereafter issued. The writ of execution was, however, returned
unsatisfied. Thus, on 31 July 1979, private respondent Palmes filed a
motion for garnishment praying that an order of garnishment be issued
against the insurance policy issued by petitioner in favor of the
judgment debtor.On 6 August 1979, respondent Judge issued an
Order directing the Provincial Sheriff or his deputy to garnish the
third-party liability insurance policy. Petitioner then appeared
before the trial court and moved for reconsideration of the said
Order. More than two (2) years later, the present Petition
for Certiorari and Prohibition was filed with this Court alleging
grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Judge Ramolete in
ordering garnishment of the third-party liability insurance contract
issued by petitioner Perla in favor of the judgment debtor, Nelia
Enriquez. Petition should have been dismissed forthwith for having
been filed way out of time but, for reasons which do not appear on the
record, was nonetheless entertained.
Issue: Is the garnishment proper?
Ruling:
We find no grave abuse of discretion or act in excess of or
without jurisdiction on the part of respondent Judge Ramolete in
ordering the garnishment of the judgment debtor's third-party
liability insurance.
Garnishment has been defined as a species of attachment for
reaching any property or credits pertaining or payable to a judgment
debtor.In legal contemplation, it is a forced novation by the
substitution of creditors: the judgment debtor, who is the original
creditor of the garnishee is, through service of the writ of
garnishment, substituted by the judgment creditor who thereby becomes

creditor of the garnishee. Garnishment has also been described as a

warning to a person having in his possession property or credits of
the judgment debtor, not to pay the money or deliver the property to
the latter, but rather to appear and answer the plaintiff's suit.In
order that the trial court may validly acquire jurisdiction to bind
the person of the garnishee, it is not necessary that summons be
served upon him. The garnishee need not be impleaded as a party to the
case. All that is necessary for the trial court lawfully to bind the
person of the garnishee or any person who has in his possession
credits belonging to the judgment debtor is service upon him of the
writ of garnishment.The Rules of Court themselves do not require that
the garnishee be served with summons or impleaded in the case in order
to make him liable.

Rule 42
LARANO vs. CALENDACION
G.R. No. 158231, June 19, 2007

Facts:
Petitioner
owns
a
parcel
of riceland situated
in Barangay Daniw, Municipality of Victoria, Laguna. Petitioner and
respondents executed a Contract to Sell whereby the latter agreed to
buy
a
50,000-square
meter
portion
of
petitioner's riceland for P5Million, with P500,000.00 as down payment
and the balance payable in nine installments of P500,000.00 each,
until September 2001.Pending full payment of the purchase price,
possession of the riceland was transferred to respondents under the
condition that they shall account for and deliver the harvest from
said riceland to petitioner. Respondents, however, failed to pay the
installments and to account for and deliver the harvest from
said riceland.
Thereafter, petitioner sent respondents a demand letter to vacate
the riceland
but as her demand went unheeded, she filed a
Complaint against
respondents
for
unlawful detainer before
the
Municipal Trial Court (MTC), Victoria, Laguna. The MTC of Laguna
rendered a Decision in favor of petitioner. Respondents filed an
appeal with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 26, Sta. Cruz,
Laguna.
The
RTC
affirmed
the
decision
of
MTC,
with
slight
modification. Undaunted, respondents filed a Petition for Review with
the CA.For failure to file her comment despite receipt of CA
Resolution
which required her to file a comment, petitioner was
deemed to have waived her right to file comment to the petition in CA
Resolution dated August 28, 2002.The CA rendered a Decision setting
aside the Decision of the RTC and dismissing the complaint for
unlawful detainer. Dissatisfied,
petitioner
filed
the
present
petition with the Supreme Court. Respondent contends that the
Court
of Appeals committed grave error in giving due course to the private
respondents' petition for review notwithstanding the fact that said
petition contains no verification to the effect that the allegations
therein were read and understood by the private respondents and that

they are true and correct of their own or personal knowledge or based
on authentic records, as required by the rules, hence, the CA should
have dismissed outright the petition for review.
Issue:

Ruling:

As to the contention of petitioner that the CA should not have

taken cognizance of the petition for review because it was not
verified, as required by the Rules, this Court has held in a number of
instances that such a deficiency can be excused or dispensed with in
meritorious cases, the defect being neither jurisdictional nor always
fatal.[19] The requirement regarding verification of a pleading is
formal.] Such requirement is simply a condition affecting the form of
pleading, the non-compliance with which does not necessarily render
the pleading fatally defective.[21] Verification is simply intended to
secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading are true and
correct and not the product of the imagination or a matter of
speculation, and that the pleading is filed in good faith.[22] The
court may order the correction of the pleading if verification is
lacking or act on the pleading although it is not verified, if the
attending circumstances are such that strict compliance with the Rules
may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may thereby be
served. Besides, petitioner did not raise the issue of lack of
verification before the CA. She did not file a comment to the
petition and it is too late in the day to assail such defect, as she
is deemed to have waived any objection to the formal flaws of the
petition. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to
the attention of the lower court cannot be raised for the first time
on appeal.
Rule 44
Haj Pernes

QUEZON CITY vs. ABS-CBN

G.R. No. 166408, October 6, 2008)

Facts:

Petitioner City Government of Quezon City is a local government

unit duly organized and existing by virtue of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
537,
otherwise
known
as the
Revised
Charter
of
Quezon
City. Petitioner City Treasurer
of Quezon
City is
primarily
responsible for the imposition and collection of taxes within the
territorial jurisdiction of Quezon City.
ABS-CBN was granted the franchise to install and operate radio
and television broadcasting stations in the Philippines under R.A. No.
7966. ABS-CBN had been paying local franchise tax imposed by Quezon
City. However, in view of the provision in R.A. No. 9766 that it
shall pay a franchise tax x x x in lieu of all taxes, the

corporation developed the opinion that it is not liable to pay the

local franchise tax imposed by Quezon City. ABS-CBN filed a written
claim for refund for local franchise tax paid to Quezon City for 1996
and for the first quarter of 1997. For failure to obtain any response
from the Quezon City Treasurer, ABS-CBN filed a complaint before
the RTC in Quezon City seeking the declaration of nullity of the
imposition of local franchise tax by the City Government of Quezon
City for being unconstitutional. The RTC rendered judgment declaring
as invalid the imposition on and collection from ABS-CBN of local
franchise tax and ordered the refund of all payments made. The City
of Quezon and its Treasurer filed a motion for reconsideration which
was subsequently denied by the RTC. Thus, appeal was made to the
CA. The
CA
dismissed
the
petition
of Quezon
City and
its
Treasurer. According to the appellate court, the issues raised were
purely legal questions cognizable only by the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners-appellants raised factual and
legal issues before the Honorable Court of Appeals
Ruling:
Obviously, these are purely legal questions, cognizable by
the Supreme Court, to the exclusion of all other courts. There is a
question of law when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law
is pertaining to a certain state of facts.
Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court provides that an appeal
taken to the CA under Rule 41 raising only questions of law is
erroneous and shall be dismissed, issues of pure law not being within
its
jurisdiction. Consequently,
the
dismissal
by
the
CA
of
petitioners appeal was in order.
However, to serve the demands of substantial justice and equity,
the Court opts to relax procedural rules and rule upon on the merits
of the case